


**Culture, Conflict, and Northern English Fortification in the British Civil Wars, Circa
1638–1652**

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24 September 2020,

This thesis is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



This thesis is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. I further state that no substantial part of my thesis has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It does not exceed the prescribed word limit for the relevant Degree Committee.

Tristan Griffin thesis abstract: 'Culture, conflict, and Northern English fortification in the British Civil Wars, circa, 1638-1652.'

The dissertation is a study of the fortress garrisons of Northern England during the Wars of the Three Kingdoms. It combines cultural and administrative methodologies to explore the subject, linking it to as many different areas of Civil War historiography as possible to demonstrate the centrality of fortification to the conflict. It consists, broadly, as three separate components of unequal length divided into eight chapters. The first section introduces the subject, thoroughly exploring the historiography and outlining the method before moving on to the technical and physical aspects of fortification.

The main body of the thesis applies both administrative and cultural historical approaches to explore the legal framework that royalist, parliamentary, and covenanter garrisons operated under, their relationship with civic authorities such as civic corporations, and the relationship between governorships and the concept of lordship. This section is particularly important since it addresses the question of royalist military government. The dissertation will suggest that an alternative methodology, examining the interactions of military governments with civic authorities, can be used to partially reconstruct royalist administration even in the absence of garrison records – which were mostly destroyed during the conflict.

The final part of the thesis explores fortification through the concept of trauma, arguing that garrisons acted as *foci* of violence and suffering, inflicted with varying degrees of discrimination on soldiers and civilians alike. The details of this suffering, inflicted through both physical violence and starvation, are explored before their wider 'cultural' significance is analysed. 'Cultural' impacts of traumatic fortification included the telling of ghost stories, the publication of articles of surrender and other details of prominent sieges, and the afterlife of fortresses long after the civil wars had ended.

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List of Abbreviations

Source Abbreviations

- *Cal. S.P. Dom.*: Calendar of State Papers Domestic Series
- *ODNB*: Oxford Dictionary of National Biography

Other Abbreviations

- *C.o.S.*: Council of State
- *C.o.B.K.*: Committee of Both Kingdoms
- *C.o.B.H.*: Committee of Both Houses
- *BBIH*: Bibliography of British and Irish History

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Chapter One: Introduction, Historiographical Position, Methodology and Boundaries of the Study

England was at that date full of Plantagenet castles, still in good repair as dwelling houses, though their battlements now peered over the mossy roofs of outhouses and the wavering tops of trees, whose age told how many generations had gone by since the inhabitants last expected the approach of the besiegers. These veteran strongholds which had seen our Kings go forth to Normandy, and the palaces of red brick whose mullioned windows recalled the peace of Elizabeth and her successor, were alike put into a state of defence.¹

The popular memory of the British Civil Wars has two types of geographical *foci*. Firstly, there are famous battlefields, such as Edgehill, Marston Moor or Naseby. Every year these sites serve as spaces for popular historical interaction, through the auspices of organisations such as the Sealed Knot.² But however large the annual commemorations, such battlefields are uncommon. Field battles on such a scale were highly unusual, which is probably why those few that did occur were so vividly remembered. Much more common than the sites of great field battles are the fortified castles and towns that were garrisoned throughout the Civil Wars.³ Across the British Isles, the local histories of the conflict are centred around garrisons, with sieges naturally attracting the most enthusiastic attention. Surviving fortresses, principally but not exclusively castles, are centres of historical recreation, the main means by which most Britons interact with their civil war history.

¹ George Macaulay Trevelyan, *England under the Stuarts*, 1st edn (London: Methuen & co., 1904), p. 202.

² See Sealed Knot Events, [<http://www.thesealedknot.org.uk/events/new>]. Just in 2019 there were 25 different events, including ‘A 17th Century Day Out At Shaw House, Newbury, Berkshire’, Sat. 09 Mar. 2019 to Sat. 09 Mar. 2019; ‘Castle Bromwich Hall Gardens’, Sun. 21 Apr. 2019 to Mon. 22 Apr. 2019; ‘The Siege Of Basing House’, Sat 20 Apr 2019 to Mon 22 Apr 2019; ‘Pontefract Castle’, Sat. 01 Jun. 2019 to Sun. 02 Jun. 2019; ‘Siege Of Bolsover Castle’, Sat. 08 Jun. 2019 to Sun. 09 Jun. 2019; ‘Thirlestane Castle Civil War Re-enactment Weekend’, Sat. 10 Aug. 2019 to Sun. 11 Aug. 2019; ‘The Siege Of Crowland Abbey’, Sat. 14 Sep. 2019 to Sun. 15 Sep. 2019. See also Newark National Civil War Centre, ‘Fortress Newark’, [<http://www.nationalcivilwarcentre.com/visitus/pastevents/fortressnewark.php>], accessed 05/2020.

³ ‘Nearly a quarter of all the casualties in the War [English Civil War] happened during major sieges- 31% of the Parliamentarian, 2% of Royalist, a total of 21000. To these can be added a proportion of the 47% of all skirmishes, many of which involved the taking of castles, towns, and great houses. Of the 650 or so discrete actions of the War, nearly a third were sieges.’ See Mike Osborne, *Sieges and Fortifications of the Civil Wars in Britain* (Leigh-on-Sea: Partizan Press, 2004), p. 6.

1.1 Purpose of the Study

This study will argue that fortresses were critical spaces during the British Civil Wars, uniting conceptual, lordly, military, administrative, and polemical elements within a single structure, or, as in the case of fortified cities, within a series of interconnected structures. These elements, while distinct, cannot be studied in isolation from one another without undermining the entire analysis. Every combatant in the civil wars engaged in the practices of fortification and garrisoning.⁴ They were at the centre of zones of control demarcated and enforced using garrisons scattered across the country, from which the soldiery could dominate the surrounding countryside. This control was densest around the garrison's base of operations and would become more sporadic further away. The seats of these garrisons were naturally significant strategic targets, necessitating their protection using fortification. Indeed, most garrisons were positioned at locations that were already defensible, such as fortified towns or dwellings such as castles.⁵

Furthermore, fortresses possessed a significance beyond their purely military utility. Their most important use was as centres of administration, which in the context of a civil war, where the ordinary machinery of administration had broken down, was crucial. Garrisons operating out of fortified bases were responsible for several administrative duties. These included but were not limited to, the collection of contribution money and other revenues, the arrest or suppression of dissenters, the provision of courts-martial and, perhaps most significantly, ensuring the compliance of antebellum civic administrative entities, such as city corporations, with the policies of whatever party dominated them.⁶ The separation of the Royalists from the traditional institutions of governance in London made them particularly dependent upon their military-administrative organs.⁷ Royalist governors, acting under commissions from either the King or his designated regional commanders, were vital figures within the Royalist administrative

⁴ Ronald Hutton and Wylie Reeves, 'Sieges and Fortifications', in eds. John Kenyon and Jane Ohlmeyer, *The Civil Wars: A military history of England, Scotland, and Ireland 1638–1660* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 195–233.

⁵ Hutton and Reeves, 'Sieges and Fortifications', pp. 195–200.

⁶ For examples of the relations between military and civic governments during this period the main source this study will use are the records of civic corporations, see Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1; Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2; M Y Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660* (Northallerton: North Yorkshire County Record Office, 1991); Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3; Common Council Order Books, Tyne and Wear Archives, MD.NC/2/1.

⁷ Ronald Hutton, *The Royalist War Effort 1642–1646* (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 85–90; Ian Roy, 'The Royalist Council of War, 1642–6', *Historical Research* 92 (2007), 150–168.

structure.⁸ They only became more prominent as the conflict continued and the Royalist cause began to fail; eventually, the governor was merely the primary but the only effective, administrative office remaining in the disintegrating Royalist hierarchy.⁹

1.2 Historiographical Position

Crudely summarised, the historiography of the British Civil Wars began with Edward Hyde, Lord Clarendon, who like Churchill had the advantage of writing a history of his career, before proceeding to Samuel Gardiner in the late nineteenth century.¹⁰ Gardiner wrote in the style of Leopold von Ranke, with scrupulous impartiality. The next significant historian of the Civil Wars was quite different. George Macaulay Trevelyan, writing between 1899 and 1954, saw the culmination of what has become known as the Whig approach. Trevelyan wrote widely about Early Modern Britain, but his civil war work, *England under the Stuarts*, dated to the early part of his career in 1904.¹¹ While Gardiner had treated the Civil Wars with balance, Trevelyan was openly partisan in favour of the Parliament.¹² While eminently readable, thanks

⁸ Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty's forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41; Copy of the appointment William, Earl of Newcastle, General of the King's Forces in the North of Col. Henry Stradling as Colonel and [deputy] commander in chief under Col. Gray of the brigade to be raised in Northumberland and Durham, 7 July 1643, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, DPH/1/89/1; Commission, George, Lord Digby, Baron of Sherborne, Lieutenant General of the Forces, Northside of the Trent, to Sir John Mallory, to be Governor of the town and Castle of Skipton, 18 October 1645, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Morley Vyner MSS, T/32/43.

⁹ For the commissions giving Sir John Mallory sweeping authority over his command area post Marston Moor see Royal Warrant to Sir John Mallory, to collect rents and arrears due to the king from Henry, late Earl of Cumberland, and to use them for the maintenance of the garrison. Given under Royal signet, at Oxford, 30 March 1645, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/44; Commission, George, Lord Digby, Baron of Sherborne, Lieutenant General of the Forces, Northside of the Trent, to Sir John Mallory, to be Governor of the town and Castle of Skipton, 18 October 1645, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Morley Vyner MSS, T/32/43. For various receipts and demands from the governor of Pontefract to local officials during the Second Civil War, when there was no proper regional Royalist command, see John Morris, receipts for the garrison of Pontefract, Kew, national Archives, ASSI 47/20/11.

¹⁰ Edward Hyde, *The history the rebellion and civil wars in England*, 3 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1702–1704); Samuel Rawson Gardiner, *History of England from the accession of James I to the outbreak of the civil war, 1603–42*, 10 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1883–1884); Samuel Rawson Gardiner, *History of the great civil war, 1642–9*, 3 vols. (London: Longmans, Green, & co., 1886–1891); Samuel Rawson Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate*, rev. edn by C.H. Firth, 4 vols. (London: Longmans, Green, & co., 1903).

¹¹ Trevelyan, *England under the Stuarts*, 1st edn.

¹² David Smith, *Review of England under the Stuarts*, (review no. 364), [https://reviews.history.ac.uk/review/364], accessed 10/2019.

to its elegant narrative, Trevelyan's significance for this historiographical review lies in those features of his scholarship which later historians rejected. His storytelling style and dependence on printed secondary sources, mainly Gardiner and Clarendon, now seem antiquated. However, Trevelyan was also the last seminal historian of the British Civil Wars who gave primary attention to the military dimensions of the conflict. His successors, attempting to escape from the idea of history as a sequence of great battles, fell into the trap of largely neglecting the study of the Civil Wars as a war.

Trevelyan's dominance ended with the rise of Marxism in British academia, aside from figures such as Dame Veronica Wedgwood.¹³ Economic determinist histories of the Civil Wars predated this rise, with the 'Storm over the Gentry' or 'Gentry Controversy' being fought out on the pages of the *Economic History Review*. It began in 1941 with Tawney's 'The Rise of the Gentry, 1558–1640', which argued that the rising fortunes of the gentry, and the reluctance of the titled nobility to accommodate them, led to the civil war.¹⁴ Hugh Trevor-Roper responded to the Tawney hypothesis, developed further in 1948 by Lawrence Stone, by arguing that far from rising, the economic fortunes of the gentry were declining and that this was the true cause of the war.¹⁵ This entire debate was ultimately ended by the lack of empirical differences in the economic fortunes of Royalists and Parliamentarians, which suggested that Trevelyan's statement that the war was of ideas, rather than classes or regions, was correct after all.¹⁶ While

¹³ Dame Veronica Wedgwood published from the mid nineteen-thirties until the mid-sixties, with her most productive period being the nineteen-fifties, when she published extensively in *History Today*. For an extensive, but not exhaustive bibliography showing her breadth of interests see, Cicely Veronica Wedgwood, 'European reaction to the death of Charles I', *American Scholar* 34 (1965), 431–446; Cicely Veronica Wedgwood, *A coffin for King Charles: the trial and execution of Charles I* (New York: Random House, 1964); Cicely Veronica Wedgwood, 'The earl of Strafford and the arts', *History Today* 11 (1961), 659–664; Cicely Veronica Wedgwood, *Thomas Wentworth, first earl of Strafford, 1593–1641: a revaluation* (London: Cape, 1961); Cicely Veronica Wedgwood, 'The Covenanters in the first Civil War', *Scottish Historical Review* 39 (1960), 1–15; Cicely Veronica Wedgwood, 'All my birds have flown: January 4th 1642', *History Today* 8 (1958), 313–320; Cicely Veronica Wedgwood, 'The Elector Palatine and the Civil War', *History Today* 4 (1954), 3–10; Cicely Veronica Wedgwood, 'Anglo-Scottish relations, 1603–40', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 32 (1950), 31–48; Cicely Veronica Wedgwood, 'Prince Rupert's campaign of 1644. A Civil War tercentenary', *Geographical Magazine* 17 (1944), 134–142; Cicely Veronica Wedgwood, 'George Goring: soldier and rake', *Sussex County Magazine* 9 (1935), 164–169.

¹⁴ Richard Tawney, 'The Rise of the Gentry, 1558–1640', *Economic History Review* 11 (1941), 1–38.

¹⁵ Lawrence Stone, 'The Anatomy of the Elizabethan Aristocracy', *Economic History Review* 18 (1948), 1–53; Hugh Trevor-Roper, 'The Elizabethan Aristocracy: An Anatomy Anatomized', *Economic History Review* 3 (1951), 279–298.

¹⁶ George Macaulay Trevelyan, *England under the Stuarts*, 3rd edn (London: Methuen & Co., 1908), p. 228.

none of these historians were Marxists, the entire controversy demonstrates the rapid movement of seventeenth-century British history towards socio-economic analysis in the 1940s and 1950s.

The most famous exponent of Marxist economic determinism in Civil War history was Christopher Hill. Hill's lifelong commitment to Marxism, from his earliest essay on the Civil Wars in 1940, meant that he accepted the materialist teleology that the period marked the English transition from the feudal to the bourgeois stages of development.¹⁷ Furthermore, what had been known since the nineteenth century as the English Civil War gained a new name as it evolved into the English Revolution, to fit with the new mood.¹⁸ The entire conflict was reduced to the irreconcilable class antagonisms essential to the Marxist model of history.¹⁹ Hill went further in his struggle for a post-Whiggish history, as he sought seventeenth-century antecedents for his positions.²⁰ Radical sects such as the Diggers, Levellers, Ranters and Fifth Monarchists became highly popular subjects of study as English, not British, precursors to the modern working-class or proletarian revolution.²¹ The problems with this view, such as these groups' intense religiosity and equally intense contemporary unpopularity were generally ignored.²²

Marxism had several major positives. The largest of these was the popularisation of history from below. The 'common folk' were now a subject of serious scholarly analysis, not just the

¹⁷ Christopher Hill, *The English Revolution 1640* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1940).

¹⁸ A view previously put forward by Trotsky, who claimed that 'In the seventeenth century England carried out two revolutions. The first, which brought forth great social upheavals and wars, brought amongst other things the execution of King Charles I, while the second ended happily with the accession of a new dynasty...The reason for this difference in estimates was explained by the French historian, Augustin Thierry. In the first English revolution, in the "Great Rebellion," the active force was the people; while in the second it was almost "silent"', Leon Trotsky, *Dictatorship vs. Democracy, Terrorism and Communism* (New York: Workers Party of America, 1922), pp. 48–49. See also Christopher Hill, *The English Revolution 1640*; Christopher Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas in the English Revolution* (London: Penguin, 1991); Austin Woolrych, *Britain in Revolution, 1625–1660* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

¹⁹ George Orwell, 'The English Civil War', *New statesman and nation* 496 (1940), 193.

²⁰ Although it was actually Trevelyan who first stated that 'Winstanley founded English Communism' in an extremely lengthy footnote in Trevelyan, *England under the Stuarts*, pp. 223–224.

²¹ Christopher Hill, *The world turned upside-down: radical ideas during the English Revolution* (London and New York: Temple Smith, 1972); Christopher Hill, 'From Lollards to Levellers', in *Rebels and their causes: essays in honour of A.L. Morton*, ed. Maurice Cornforth, 3 vols. (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1978), vol. II, 49–67; Christopher Hill, 'From Marprelate to the Levellers' in *The collected essays of Christopher Hill* (Brighton and Amherst, MA, 1985), vol. I, 75–95.

²² John Morrill, 'Revisionism's Wounded Legacies', *Huntington Library Quarterly* 78 (2005), 577–594, at p. 585.

actions of a few ‘great men’ in the style of the histories of Thomas Carlyle.²³ Furthermore, social histories of the Civil Wars meant that the historiography was expanded beyond the purely political and administrative enquiry previously favoured. However, the Marxist school’s limitations were profound. It ironically deepened the pro-Parliamentarian distortions of Whig historians like Trevelyan, to the point that Royalism was barely examined at all. Whiggish teleology was taken to extremes and traditional conditional qualifications, such as the political failings of Charles I, were dismissed. Marxism erected mountains of ‘extraneous theoretic superstructure’ and then sought the evidence to fit it, a natural consequence of Marx’s contempt for the ‘crude English empiricism’ of scholars who engaged in evidence-driven analysis.²⁴

These failings and Marxism’s scholarly dominance meant that the collapse of ‘vulgar Marxism’ and ‘crass Whiggery’, to quote John Morrill, was both protracted and dramatic, the revisionist revolution in Civil War history lasting from the 1970s until 1991.²⁵ Revisionism did not, in nearly every historiographical use of the term, signify an organised school, but a series of attacks on prevailing historical doctrines, whether in analysis or method. Indeed, the most important innovation was methodological, breaching the wall between local and national Civil War histories.²⁶ Conrad Russell and John Morrill pioneered this approach which, while ordinary practice now, was unusual at the time.²⁷ Hill generally limited his sources to central archives and printed material, since he could not read Secretary hand, which complicated his aim of writing history from below immensely.²⁸ This study follows this principle, being primarily based on local archive sources with central state records forming a secondary component. This is primarily a matter of practicality rather than any grand attack on previous models of historical practice. It is simply that the local archives are where the primary sources for these fortresses are held.

Revisionists wished to rebut the economic determinist teleologies of the civil wars, which had come to dominate the field. Instead, they argued in favour of the contingency of the Civil Wars

²³ Thomas Carlyle (ed.), *Oliver Cromwell’s Letters and Speeches, with Elucidations* (London: Hutchinson, 1904); Blair Worden, ‘Thomas Carlyle and Oliver Cromwell’ in a lecture to the British Academy (29/10/1999), [<https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/sites/default/files/10-worden.pdf>], accessed 11/2019.

²⁴ Blair Worden, ‘In a White Coat’, *New Statesman and Nation* (August 4 1972), 167–168; Robert Conquest, *Reflections on a Ravaged Century* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), p. 36.

²⁵ Morrill, ‘Revisionism’s Wounded Legacies’, p. 579.

²⁶ Morrill, ‘Revisionism’s Wounded Legacies’, p. 580.

²⁷ Morrill, ‘Revisionism’s Wounded Legacies’, pp. 580–581.

²⁸ Morrill, ‘Revisionism’s Wounded Legacies’, p. 584.

and antebellum stability in the Stuart government.²⁹ Since revisionism had no organised structure it fragmented quickly once the revisionist moment had passed and Marxism and Whiggery had both mostly collapsed. The central point of disagreement lay in attempting to provide alternative explanations for the conflict's cause. For while the economic determinism of Marxism had proven erroneous, scholars now risked proving that 'the Civil Wars had no causes and should not have taken place'.³⁰ John Morrill argued radical religion was the primary motivation for conflict, and that it was 'England's wars of religion'.³¹ Conrad Russell paid more attention to government institutions, arguing that the British kingdoms were not just poorly governed by Charles I, but ungovernable by any monarch owing to problems inherited from the sixteenth century.³² These arguments were less famous and influential than the revisionist moment itself, not changing the field as dramatically. Various alternative causes of the outbreak now generally coexist—the intrusion of John Adamson's account of the Civil Wars as a baronial revolt aside—with students being taught to synthesise all of them in their studies.³³ Following the fall of the Soviet Union and the corresponding collapse of Marxism in western academia, the field settled down to a peace of exhaustion. But this did not lead to the end of history, for in the 1990s the field diversified rapidly. Print became popular not merely as a source but as a subject of analysis in its own right.³⁴ Royalism emerged from the ghetto in which it had been placed by Marxist and Whig progressive teleologies to be studied by historians such as Ronald Hutton, David Smith, Jason McElligott and Andrew Hopper.³⁵

²⁹See Conrad Russell, *Unrevolutionary England, 1603–1642* (London: Bloomsbury, 1990).

³⁰ Morrill, 'Revisionism's Wounded Legacies', p. 586.

³¹ John Morrill, 'Introduction : England's wars of religion', in *The nature of the English revolution*, ed. John Morrill (London: Longman, 1993), pp. 33–44; John Morrill, 'The Puritan Revolution', in eds. John Coffey and Paul Lim, *The Cambridge companion to Puritanism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 67–88; John Morrill, 'Renaming England's Wars of Religion', in eds. Glenn Burgess and Charles Prior, *England's Wars of Religion* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 307–326.

³² Conrad Russell, 'The British problem and the English Civil War', *History* 72 (1986), 395–415; Conrad Russell, 'The British background to the Irish Rebellion of 1641', *Historical Research* 61 (1988), 166–182; Conrad Russell, *The Fall of the British Monarchies, 1637–1642* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

³³ John Adamson, 'The baronial context of the English Civil War', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th ser., 40 vols. (1990), vol. 40, 93–120; John Adamson, *The Noble Revolt. The overthrow of Charles I* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2007).

³⁴ Jason Peacey, *Politicians and Pamphleteers: Propaganda during the English Civil Wars and Interregnum* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004); Jason McElligott, *Royalism, Print and Censorship in Revolutionary England* (Woodridge: Boydell, 2007).

³⁵ Hutton, *The Royalist War Effort 1642–1646*; David Smith, *Constitutional Royalism and the search for settlement, c.1640–1649* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Barry Robertson, *Royalists at War in Scotland and Ireland 1638–50* (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2014); McElligott, *Royalism, Print and Censorship in Revolutionary England*; Andrew Hopper, 'The Self-Fashioning of Gentry Turncoats during the English Civil Wars', *Journal of British Studies* 49 (2010), 236–257.

The purpose of the prior review of three centuries of historiography is to demonstrate their distance from this study. The revisionist moment might have been the most significant event in Civil War historiography, but its importance here is limited. It would be appropriate, if crude, to describe this study's position as post-post-revisionist. Far more important for this study is the significant absence of debates over military history in the previous few pages. It is a peculiarity of civil war historiography that it is essentially bifurcated, between academic and popular history. Academic interest is international, if almost entirely Anglophone, while popular attention is limited to the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic.³⁶ Popular understandings of the Civil Wars are overwhelmingly militaristic. The role of the local castle and parish church as the central popular space for history probably made this inevitable. Battles, sieges, and massacres—all of which apparently involved Cromwell—form the popular impression of the wars.

The cleavage between the military historiography and the rest of the discipline originated in the collapse of Whiggery in the 1950s and the mutual rejection of Trevelyan by both Marxists and revisionists. In addition to his narrative style, limited primary source base and pro-Parliamentarian sympathies, Trevelyan used battles to frame his work. They were described in exacting detail, providing the rhythm for his narrative of Puritan Parliamentary progress. Marxist scholars were as uninterested in battles as they were in 'great men' and regarded both as insignificant compared to the long-term economic changes and irreconcilable class antagonisms that drove historical change.³⁷ Furthermore, even as the historians of the revisionist moment laboured to demolish many Marxist assumptions, they were also interested in repudiating Whiggery, including the idea of history as a series of battles.³⁸ The famous

³⁶ For prominent examples of civil war scholarship published at American Universities, see William Cortez Abbott (ed.), *Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell with an Introduction, Notes and a Sketch of His Life*, 4 vols. (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1937–1947); Glenn Burgess, *Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996); Mark Stoyke, *Soldiers and Strangers: an Ethnic History of the English Civil War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); Kevin Sharpe, *Image wars: promoting kings and commonwealths in England, 1603–1660* (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2010). In addition the most important short-title catalogue of the period was published in the United States, see Carolyn Nelson and Matthew Seccombe, *British Newspapers and Periodicals 1641–1700: A Short-Title Catalogue of Serials Printed in England, Scotland, Ireland and British America* (New York: The Modern Language Association of America, 1987).

³⁷ Trotsky, *Dictatorship vs. Democracy, Terrorism and Communism*; Hill, *The English Revolution 1640*; Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas in the English Revolution*.

³⁸ Morrill, 'Revisionism's Wounded Legacies', p. 579.

struggle between Marxism and the revisionists similarly revolved around non-military questions. Historians were interested in why people became Royalists or Parliamentarians, but not really in the battles and sieges they took part in afterwards.³⁹

This alienation of mainstream academia from martial questions and analysis corresponded with the independent development of a Civil War military historiography in its modern form. This history had for several decades one name of great significance. That was Brigadier Peter Young (1915–1988), who published continually from 1938 until eight years after his death.⁴⁰ In that period he published twenty-two works, beginning with articles for the *Journal for Army Historical Research* before moving onto larger books after retiring from the army in 1959.⁴¹

³⁹ See Hugh Aveling, *Northern Catholics: The Catholic Recusants of the North Riding of Yorkshire 1558–1790* (London: Geoffery Chapman, 1966), pp. 303–305; J. T. Cliffe, *The Yorkshire Gentry: From the Reformation to the Civil War* (London: The Athlone Press, 1969), pp. 344–365; John Morrill, ‘The Religious Context of the English Civil War’, *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 34 (1984), 155–178; Ian Gentles, ‘Why Men Fought in the British Civil Wars, 1639–1652’, *The History Teacher* 26 (1993), 407–418; Mark Stoyle, ‘English “Nationalism”, Celtic Particularism, and the English Civil War’, *The Historical Journal* 43 (2000), 1113–1128; Robert Matthews, ‘“To a man for the King”: The Allegiance of Welsh Catholics during the First Civil War, 1642–46’, *Proceedings of the Harvard Celtic Colloquium* 20 (2000/2001), 86–97.; Rachel Weil, ‘Thinking about Allegiance in the English Civil War’, *History Workshop Journal* 96 (2006), 183–191; Nicholas McDowell, *Poetry and Allegiance in the English Civil Wars: Marvell and the Cause of Wit* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Nicole Greenspan, ‘Charles II, exile and the problem of allegiance’, *The Historical Journal* 54 (2011), 73–103; J. Eales, ‘The clergy and allegiance at the outbreak of the English Civil Wars: the case of John Marston of Canterbury’, *Archaeologia Cantiana* 132 (2012), 83–109; Fiona McCall, *Baal’s Priests: The Loyalist Clergy and the English Revolution* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), p. 4.

⁴⁰ He was credited in Peter Young and John Eric, *Hastings to Culloden: battles of Britain* (Stroud: Sutton, 1996), despite its publication several years after his death.

⁴¹ Peter Young, *Naseby 1645: the campaign and the battle* (Peterborough: Century Press, 1985); Peter Young, *An Illustrated history of the Great Civil War* (Bourne End: Spurne Books, 1979); Peter Young and Wilfrid Emberton, *Sieges of the great civil war* (London: Bell & Hyman, 1978); Peter Young and Wilfrid Emberton, *The Cavalier army: its organisation and everyday life* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1974); Peter Young and Richard Holmes, *The English Civil War: a military history of the three civil wars, 1642–51* (London: Wordsworth, 1974); Peter Young and Margaret Toynbee, *Strangers in Oxford: A Sidelight on the First Civil War, 1642–6* (Bognor Regis: Phillimore, 1973); Peter Young, *The English Civil War* (London: Osprey, 1973); Peter Young and Margaret Toynbee, *Cropredy Bridge, 1644: the campaign and the battle* (Warwick: Kineton, 1970); Peter Young, *Marston Moor, 1644: the campaign and the battle* (Warwick: Kineton, 1970); Peter Young and J. P. Lawford, *History of the British Army* (Worthing: Littlehampton, 1970); Peter Young, *Edgehill, 1642: the campaign and the battle* (Warwick: Kineton, 1968); Peter Young, *Oliver Cromwell* (London: Severn House, 1968); Peter Young, *The British army, 1642–1970* (London: William Krimber, 1967); Peter Young, ‘The order of battle of the Parliamentary and Royalist armies at the first battle of Newbury, 20 Sept. 1643’, *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 42 (1964), 132–136; Peter Young, *Oliver Cromwell and his times* (London: B. T. Batsford, 1962); Peter Young and Alfred Higgins Burne, *The Great Civil War: a military history of the first Civil War, 1642–1646* (Whitney: Windrush Press, 1959); Peter Young, ‘The praying captain—a Cavalier’s memoirs’, *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 35 (1957), 3–15, 53–70; Peter Young, ‘The Royalist artillery at Edgehill, 23rd October, 1642’, *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 35 (1957), 145–151; Peter Young, ‘The battle of Hopton Heath, 19th March 1643’,

He then founded the War Studies Department at RMA Sandhurst, the professional institute of military history in the United Kingdom.⁴² He also was famously one of the founding figures of the Sealed Knot, the largest historical recreation society in the world outside the United States.⁴³ Because of this latter point, in terms of his impact on the popular perception of the British Civil Wars, Brigadier Young was extremely influential. The Sealed Knot and the ‘amateur’ historians, who generally make up with knowledge for what they lack in formal academic qualifications, he inspired still form the main body of military historiography. Many of these successors would make major achievements in the technical field, which will be explored in greater detail in the historiography sections of subsequent chapters.

Young’s work was not without flaws. He published relatively little compared to many of his contemporaries, and what he wrote is almost completely explanatory. This was deliberate, as Young’s interest was in writing accounts of battles and campaigns. His professional background as a soldier, rather than as a historian, naturally drew him to this viewpoint. Young’s exclusively martial focus placed him outside mainstream academia during the great revisionist revolution during his later career. But his work, for its sheer thoroughness, was vital in establishing the modern basis of Civil War military history. Without him, this study would not have been possible.

The tradition of the retired soldier-scholar has continued to the present, with historians such as Gruber von Arni, the authority on military healthcare in wartime Oxford.⁴⁴ The suitability of military history as a subject for professional historians, as opposed to retired army officers, has become more acceptable since the turn of the 1990s. While not a prolific author, Peter

Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 33 (1955), 35–39; Peter Young, ‘The Royalist army at Edgehill: a seventeenth century plan’, *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 33 (1955), 56–60; Peter Young, ‘The Royalist army at the battle of Roundway Down, 13th July, 1643’, *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 31 (1953), 127–131; Peter Young, ‘The life and death of Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Lucas’, *Essex Review* 57 (1948), 113–131, 201; Peter Young, ‘Standards and colours, 1644–5’, *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 25 (1947), pp. 39–39; Peter Young, ‘King Charles I’s army of 1643–5’, *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 18 (1939), 27–37; Peter Young, ‘King Charles I’s army of 1642’, *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 17 (1938), 102–109.

⁴² Alison Michelli, *Commando to Captain-Generall: the life of Brigadier Peter Young* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2007).

⁴³ Michelli, *Commando to Captain-Generall: the life of Brigadier Peter Young*.

⁴⁴ Eric Gruber von Arni, *Justice to the maimed soldier: nursing, medical care and welfare for sick and wounded soldiers and their families during the English Civil Wars and Interregnum, 1642–1660* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001).

Newman's 1981 doctoral thesis and subsequent work on the Royalist army still stands largely unrevised around three decades after its publication, a testament to both its strength and to the relative lack of interest in military history within academia.⁴⁵ Barbara Donagan was, particularly in the 1990s, extremely productive, publishing a series of histories, primarily of destruction and atrocity.⁴⁶ Peter Gaunt has also occasionally strayed into the field, with his most recent work, *The English Civil War: A military history* being published in 2014.⁴⁷ Annual research conferences at the Newark National Civil War Centre have helped to bring the academic and military branches of the discipline together with significant returns.⁴⁸ Like its counterparts in political, cultural and social enquiry, Civil War military history is also diversifying. For example, Nadine Akkerman's 2018 book *Invisible Agents* tackled the prominence of female spies in the Civil Wars, expanding the remit of military history from the battlefield to the important field of military intelligence.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Peter Newman, 'The Royalist Army in Northern England 1642–4', Ph.D. thesis, University of York, 1978; Peter Newman, *Royalist officers in England and Wales, 1642–1660: a biographical dictionary: Garland reference library of social science*, 72 (New York: Garland, 1981); Peter Newman 'The King's servants: conscience, principle and sacrifice in armed Royalism', in eds. John Morrill, Paul Slack and Daniel Woolf, *Public duty and private conscience in seventeenth-century England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 225–41; Peter Newman, *Old service : Royalist regimental colonels and the civil war, 1642–1646* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993).

⁴⁶ Barbara Donagan, 'Codes and conduct in the English Civil War', *Past and Present* 118 (1988), 65–95; Barbara Donagan, 'Prisoners in the English Civil War', *History Today* 41 (1991), 28–35; Barbara Donagan, 'Atrocity, war crime, and treason in the English civil war', *American Historical Review* 99 (1994), 1137–1166; Barbara Donagan, 'Halcyon days and the literature of war: England's military education before 1642', *Past and Present* 147 (1995), 65–100; Barbara Donagan, 'The casualties of war: treatment of the dead and wounded in the English Civil War', in eds. Ian Gentles, John Morrill and Blair Worden, *Soldiers, writers and statesmen of the English Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 113–132; Barbara Donagan, 'The army, the state and the soldier in the English civil war', in *The Putney debates of 1647: the Army, the Levellers and the English State*, ed. Michael Endle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 79–102; Barbara Donagan 'The Web of Honour : Soldiers, Christians, and Gentlemen in the English Civil War', *Historical Journal* 44 (2001), 65–89; Barbara Donagan, 'Myth, memory and martyrdom : Colchester 1648', *Essex Archaeology & History*, 3rd ser., 34 (2004), 172–180; Barbara Donagan, *War in England, 1642–1649* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Barbara Donagan 'War, Property and the Bonds of Society: England's "Unnatural" Civil Wars', in eds. Erica Charters, Eve Rosenshaft and Hannah Smith, *Civilians and War in Europe 1618–1815* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2012), 52–67.

⁴⁷ Peter Gaunt, *The English Civil War: A Military History* (London: Tauris & Co., 2014).

⁴⁸ See Newark National Civil War Centre, 'Mortality, Care and Military Welfare during the British Civil Wars', August 7–8, 2015, [<http://www.nationalcivilwarcentre.com/visitus/events/mortalitycareandmilitarywelfareduringthebritishcivilwars.php>], accessed 04/2020.

⁴⁹ Nadine Akkerman, *Invisible agents: women and espionage in seventeenth-century Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

As far as this dissertation is concerned, the wars were a consequence of the collapse of the Personal Rule owing to Charles I's failed foreign policy and alienation of key elites in Ireland, over Strafford's government, in Scotland, over the prayer book and the redirection of noble lands taken in the Reformation back to the Church, and in England, over an intense disagreement about the nature of the English Reformation, the methods used to raise revenues and the actions of various royal favourites.⁵⁰ The outbreak of actual conflict was contingent on a large range of personal decisions by many different people with a broad spectrum of motives, varying from personal animosity to the Caroline regime, to religious and legal concerns, to pure opportunism. Radicalisation followed rebellion, culminating in two decades of war.⁵¹ This dissertation accepts this argument, based on several significant works of the past forty years, and does not seek to address that point significantly. In popular historical terms, this study follows Brigadier Young in regarding those wars themselves as the rightful primary subject of any enquiry into the period. To paraphrase Marx, the subsequent political and religious arguments of the 1640s and 1650s are the superstructure above the base of interminable and omnipresent violence.

Existing studies of fortification can be broadly divided into two camps. There are local history and archaeology, neither of which is wholly satisfactory. It is not that these works are poorly written and argued, nor that they are inadequately supported by primary sources. Indeed, many studies are superlatively equipped in both; it is simply that the very nature of these works has profound limitations. Local history is just that, local. It is centred upon a specific locality, and while it may go into tremendous detail about its specific case study, it cannot compare the experience of different localities, nor try to establish more widespread normative practices of fortification. The historian's problem with archaeological studies of civil war fortification is largely a consequence of the differing priorities of separate, if closely related, academic

⁵⁰ For the alienation of the Scottish nobility vis-à-vis the revocation of royal and Church land alienated since 1540, see Keith Brown, 'Aristocratic Finances and the Origins of the Scottish Revolution', *The English Historical Review* 104 (1989), 46–87; Roger Mason, 'The aristocracy, episcopacy and the revolution of 1638', in *Covenant, Charter and Party: Traditions of Revolt and Protest in Modern Scottish History*, ed. Terry Brotherstone (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1989), 7–24; Peter Donald, *An Uncounselled King: Charles I and the Scottish Troubles, 1637–1641* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 18–21. For the alienation of the Irish nobility by the actions of Strafford, see Richard Cust, *Charles I and the Aristocracy, 1625–1642* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 114–118; Ronald G. Asch, 'Wentworth, Thomas, first earl of Strafford (1593–1641)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, [<https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/29056>], accessed 03/2020; Jane Ohlmeyer, 'The Aristocracy in Seventeenth-Century Ireland: Wider Contexts and Comparisons', *History Compass* 12 (2014), 33–41.

⁵¹ Morrill, 'Revisionism's Wounded Legacies', p. 579.

disciplines. The priorities of archaeology are the technical details of fortification; the positioning and purpose of various structures, the process of their construction and destruction and so on. Archaeological studies are not interested in the significance of fortified garrisons to contemporary perceptions and experiences of the war, or their critical role in the military administration in the localities.

1.3 Source Base

While an examination of Parliamentary and Covenanter forms of fortress administration is a worthy aim in itself and forms part of this study, an enquiry into the Royalists' fortresses is particularly valuable. This is due to the oft-cited limitations in evidence which make any traditional administrative history of the Royalists impossible to undertake at a serious level. The Parliamentarians controlled the central organs of the English state, the Parliament itself and its record apparatus, and left a wealth of documentary evidence of their activities. The *Calendar of State Papers Domestic Series* is the most prominent of these sources and has formed the evidential basis of a great many histories of the civil wars.⁵² This is unsurprising, as the *CSPD* contains a vast body of pertinent information.

The Royalists, separated from the three kingdoms' administrative centres, except for the straitened Dublin, did not have the institutional systems of records at the Parliamentarians' or Covenanters' disposal. Their administration was, by necessity, a thing of improvisation. This was compounded by the destruction of their records as the war turned against them.⁵³ This made a great deal of sense, given the military and political realities of the times. From the military perspective, these documents were confidential information, whose capture by the enemy jeopardised Royalist operations elsewhere. Politically, they contained potential evidence against Royalist officials and sympathisers, who were at a very real risk of sequestration or

⁵² William Douglas Hamilton (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I, July preserved in the State Paper Department of Her Majesty's Public Record Office*, vols. 1–23 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1891). References for the *Calendar of State Papers Domestic* use page numbers referring to this calendar, and document references and folio numbers referring to the specific manuscript contained in the National Archives. Example of the first reference on is as follows: *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 20: Oct. 1644–July 1645, p. 2: SP 21/19 f.61: 'The Committee of both kingdoms to Col. Fleetwood'. Example of the subsequent references are as follows: *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 20, 1644–1645: p. 2: SP 21/19 f.61. The page number refers to the source's position in the catalogue, the folio number its position in the original manuscript.

⁵³ Hutton, *The Royalist War Effort 1642–1646*, p. 86.

prosecution for ‘malignancy’, providing a motive for the destruction of Royalist records.⁵⁴ The most notorious example was the mass burning of records at Oxford immediately before that city’s fall in 1646, but this was only the most famous occurrence of the phenomenon.⁵⁵ As far as the author is aware, few records of the regional Royalist committees survive, the destruction being widespread across the country and not merely limited to the royalist capital.⁵⁶

An in-depth study of fortification helps to bridge this gap through two main categories of sources: governors’ records, and the records of city corporations. Governors’ records, or accounts written by governors, were more likely to have survived than the records of Royalist committees. Gubernatorial documents have survived in private collections, such as the Musgrave and Mallory papers now contained within the county archive offices of Cumbria and West Yorkshire respectively.⁵⁷ Other collections of papers have already been transcribed and published, such as the Parliamentarian Sir John Hotham’s papers.⁵⁸ Governors such as Sir Hugh Cholmley of Scarborough also published memoirs and accounts of their wartime activities after the end of the civil wars.⁵⁹ While not providing a holistic source base for the activities of military administration, these records are of great use for historians. They provide information about the governor’s petitions, their military activities, and part of their interaction with both their superiors and the civic authorities over whom they frequently rode roughshod. The second source base for the activities of Royalist military governments lies in the records of these civic corporations.⁶⁰ Unlike committee records, the records of corporations were preserved after

⁵⁴ John William Clay (ed.), *Yorkshire Composition Papers or the Proceedings of the Committee for compounding with Delinquents during the Commonwealth*, vols. 1–3, in *Yorkshire Archaeological Society Record Series*, vols. XV, XVIII, XX (York: Yorkshire Archaeological Society, 1893); Richard Wiford (ed.), *Records of the Committees for compounding, etc. with delinquent Royalists in Durham and Northumberland during the civil war, etc., 1643–1660* (Durham: Surtees Society, 1905); P. G. Holiday, ‘Land Sales and Repurchases in Yorkshire after the Civil Wars, 1650–1670’, *Northern History* 5 (1970), 67–92.

⁵⁵ Hutton, *The Royalist War Effort 1642–1646*, pp. 86–87.

⁵⁶ Hutton, *The Royalist War Effort 1642–1646*, pp. 86–87.

⁵⁷ For Musgrave papers see, Carlisle Archive Centre, DMUS/5/5/1–3; For Mallory Papers see, West Yorkshire Archive Service, Morley, Vyner MSS.

⁵⁸ Parliamentarian governor of Hull until his disgrace and execution. See Andrew Hopper (ed.), *The Papers of the Hothams, Governors of Hull during the Civil War*, Camden Fifth Series no. 39 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for the Royal Historical Society, 2011).

⁵⁹ Hugh Cholmley, *The memoirs of Sir Hugh Cholmley, Knt and Bart: Addressed to his two sons in which He gives some account of his family, and the distress they underwent in the Civil Wars; and how far he himself was engaged in them* (Whitby: Nathaniel Cholmley, 1787); C. H. Firth, ‘Sir Hugh Cholmley’s narrative of the Great Siege of Scarborough’, *English Historical Review* 42 (1917), 568–587.

⁶⁰ For this dissertation, the corporate records of York, Chester, Hull, Newcastle and Carlisle; Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1; Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2; Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–*

Royalist defeats, both to ensure the continuity of administration and as a matter of civic pride. The most important use of civic records in this study will be the accounts of the corporations' interactions with the governors and committees placed over them. This allows for the exploration of the military administrations' activities and relationship to the antebellum authorities, albeit only from the perspective of the corporation. Despite this limitation in perspective, this methodology does provide a crucial view of Royalist committees' activities and affords a significant advance on the current state of historical knowledge on the subject.

Any history of the role of castles in the Civil Wars that did not explore their significance as lordly seats would be not only incomplete but anachronistic. The contemporary understanding of castles as spaces for the performance of lordship was demonstrated by the vast sums of money that aristocratic families continued to pour into their medieval dwellings; or in the construction of new seats with curtain walls and fortified features well into the seventeenth century.⁶¹ Furthermore, the role of the castle governor in military administration was conceptualised by contemporaries using the formulas of lordship.⁶² If the historian does not understand the base, surely their analysis of the superstructure is on a weaker footing. Therefore, this study will devote a portion of its space to contemporary concepts of lordship, and how they related to castles.

The fortress was also a prominent feature of contemporary polemic and 'intelligence'. The taking of various fortresses was a regular item of the reports in the newsbooks: John Birkenhead's *Mercurius Aulicus* and Marchamont Nedham's *Mercurius Britannicus* both frequently used garrisons as propaganda.⁶³ The heroic continued resistance of a garrison to a siege was interpreted as providential proof of the righteousness of their side's cause, and a sign of the inevitability of their victory. The taking of an enemy garrison was likewise understood

1660; Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3; Common Council Order Books, Tyne and Wear Archives, MD.NC/2/1; Common Council Order Books 1639–1645, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, CA/2/1.

⁶¹ Spence, *Skipton Castle and Its Builders* (Skipton: Skipton Castle, 2002), pp. 92–93. See also Charles Coulson, 'The state of research: Cultural realities and reappraisals in English castle-study', *Journal of Medieval History*, 22 (1996), 171–208, at p. 179.

⁶² David Papillon, *A Practicall Abstract of the Arts, of Fortification and Assailing. Containing Foure different Method's of Fortifications, with approved rules, to set out in the feild, all manner of superficies, Intrenchment and approaches, by the demy circle, or with Lines and Stakes. Written for the benefit of such as delight in the Practise of the So Noble Arts* (London: R. Austin, 1645), p. 92.

⁶³ *Mercurius Aulicus*, 41st week (6 October–12 October 1644), p. 1198 (*Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 275.241); *Mercurius Britannicus*, no. 38 (27 May–3 June 1645), p. 295 (*Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 286.038).

as a sign of divine favour. Furthermore, the resistance of an enemy garrison was presented as the consequence of misguided or insane fanaticism, resulting in pointless and immoral bloodshed. For example, Newcastle was described by one Covenanter observer as worthy of the destruction inflicted upon Magdeburg in the Thirty Years' War, the city only being spared thanks to the greater moral worthiness of the Presbyterian Covenanters as opposed to the Catholic Imperialists.⁶⁴

1.4 Methodology

The structure of this dissertation is not wholly systematic. This is a necessary limitation imposed by the source base and inevitable given some chapters' use different forms of analysis. The study's chapters are divided by topic but are also arranged into a rough chronology. This is to provide this thesis with a sense of narrative, necessary to its overall argument about the significance of fortification throughout the civil wars. The evolution of the argument should reflect the contemporary evolution of Northern England's fortified spaces from domestic spaces to martial bastions, centres of military government and finally siege, misery and ultimate destruction.

Furthermore, there are three chapter subsections in this study that form small microhistories on the Ginzburg model.⁶⁵ These are 4.1, which focuses on a single petition; 6.2, which examines a single case study in the York Royalist coup of 1643; and 8.3, which explores the appearance of a ghost at the siege of Carlisle in 1644–1645. In each case, there are different reasons to adopt the microhistorical model. In 4.1 there is the simple fact that the said petition forms the available evidence for the first Covenanter occupation of Newcastle.⁶⁶ All other civic sources from the period were destroyed, probably during the storm of the city in October 1644. If there is only a single available source, it is reasonable to adopt a microhistorical approach to get the greatest possible analytic returns. In 6.2 and 8.3 the choice of a microhistorical, in-depth

⁶⁴ William Lithgow, *A TRUE EXPERIMENTALL AND EXACT RELATION UPON That famous and renovvned Siege OF NEW CASTLE, The diverse conflicts and occurances fell out there during the time of ten weeks and odde dayes: And of that mightie and marveilous storming thereof, with Power, Policie, and prudent plots of Warre. Together with a succinct commentarie upon the Battell of Bowdon Hill, and that victorious battell of York or Marston Moore, never to bee forgotten* (Edinbrugh: Robert Bryson, 1645), p. 24.

⁶⁵ See Sigurður Gylfi Magnússon, and István M. Szijártó, *What Is Microhistory?: Theory and Practice* (Abingdon-on-Thames: Taylor & Francis, 2013), pp. 1–13, 39–61.

⁶⁶ Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1.

analysis of a single event is simply a result of deep personal interest. The *coup* in York and the ghost of Carlisle form two extremely fascinating case studies, largely unique in civil war historiography, worthy of detailed and thorough explanation in and of themselves.

In basic terms, this study will use the traditional methods of empirical history and will not rely on the theoretical models of the social turn.⁶⁷ However, this does not mean that it operates within a purely Rankean framework. The limitations of evidence mean that cultural and literary methods, in the form of semiotic analysis and the methods of literary criticism, have been employed to bridge the gaps a conventional administrative history would leave. The cultural turn of the late 1990s introduced the methods of cultural analysis into history and in Civil War history this was reflected in a growing concern for image and contemporary perception, a view whose most notable proponent has been Kevin Sharpe.⁶⁸ This study utilises cultural analysis as a valuable source of information to cover ground where a conventional historical approach is inadequate owing to a lack of primary source material.

This study uses the term ‘British Civil Wars’ to refer to the series of conflicts that occurred across the Stuart dynastic union between 1638 and 1661, with the main period of active warfare ending in 1653. It will not use a model of the conflict divided into three largely separate wars, nor will it use the terminology of the ‘English Revolution’.⁶⁹ The reason for the former is the simple fact that the conflict ranged across the British Isles and that events in all three kingdoms

⁶⁷ For the finest articulation of those traditional models, see Geoffrey Elton, *The Practice of History* (London: Fontana Books, 1967). It should be noted that while this dissertation’s method is inspired by Elton’s approach, it does not strictly adhere to them—as the term ‘culture’ in the title suggests.

⁶⁸ For the most cited original inspiration for the cultural turn, see Clifford Geertz, ‘Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture’, in *The Interpretation of Cultures*, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 29–39. For the most prominent explanations of the cultural turn in history, see Peter Burke, *Varieties of Cultural History* (Ithaca, New York: Polity, 1997); Peter Burke, *What is Cultural History?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004). The cultural turn was not without criticism. See Peter Mandler, ‘The Problem with Cultural History’, *Cultural and Social History* 1 (2004), 94–117. Mandler’s main criticisms were methodological, in terms of a shallow use of, but overdependence on, theory. This dissertation hopes to avoid this by using cultural methods to inform a more traditional administrative and military history, as opposed to diving into what Mandler memorably summarised as ‘pseudo-philosophy’. See also Kevin Sharpe, *Image wars: promoting kings and commonwealths in England, 1603–1660* (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2010); Kevin Sharpe, *Reading authority and representing rule in early modern England* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013).

⁶⁹ Trotsky, *Dictatorship vs. Democracy, Terrorism and Communism*; Hill, *The English Revolution 1640*; Hill, *The world turned upside-down: radical ideas during the English Revolution*; Hill, ‘From Lollards to Levellers’, pp. 49–67; Hill, ‘From Marprelate to the Levellers’, in *The collected essays of Christopher Hill*, vol. I, 75–95. Morrill and Worden (eds.), *Soldiers, writers and statesmen of the English revolution*; Braddick (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the English Revolution*.

were closely entangled. In the case of Northern England, it is clear that the movement of armies was influenced by events that did not stop at the Irish Sea or the river Tweed. For example, Royalist anxieties that the Covenanter army in Ulster might use the Isle of Man as a base for an attack on North-West England resulted in the Earl of Derby abandoning Lancashire to secure the island, leaving the Lancastrian Royalists leaderless and hastening their defeat.⁷⁰ Over the past twenty years, the unfitness of this tripartite model has been widely acknowledged, and accepted, by historians; but this is especially the case in Northern England, where the progress of the war simply does not make sense in the absence of the wider British dimension, given the Covenanter invasion.⁷¹ Furthermore, since this study's subject is primarily military rather than purely administrative or ideological, and where it does examine these subjects it finds tradition and continuity more prominent than dramatic change, the use of the 'revolution' model is inappropriate.

However, the term currently favoured by most academic opinions, the 'Wars of the Three Kingdoms', while a significant improvement on the tripartite model, does bring its problems. Most recently this has been acknowledged by Julian Goodare of the University of Edinburgh, who has pointed out that:

If not used with care, 'three kingdoms' analysis tends to divide the participants into "the Scots", "the English", and "the Irish". Yet some Scots had more in common with some English (for instance) than they did with other Scots. And the agendas that they pursued were rarely simply national.⁷²

The term 'Three Kingdoms' implies that the conflict was primarily an inter-state war between the three components of the British dynastic agglomerate. And while the Civil Wars certainly

⁷⁰ Ernest Broxap, *The Great Civil War in Lancashire: 1642–1651* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1910), p. 86; John Seacome, *The History of the House of Stanley, From the Conquest, to the Death of the Right Honorable Edward, Late Earl of Derby, in 1776: Containing a Genealogical & Historical Account of That Illustrious House. to Which Is Added, a Complete History of the Isle of Man* (Preston: E. Sargent, 1793), p. 82.

⁷¹ The 'three kingdoms' approach is more typically associated with recent scholarship, particularly after Russell, 'The British problem and the English Civil War'; Russell, 'The British background to the Irish Rebellion of 1641'; and Russell, *The Fall of the British Monarchies, 1637–1642*. But earlier examples of the tripartite model include C. V. Wedgwood, *The Great Rebellion: The King's peace, 1637–1641*, 2 vols., (London: Collins, 1955), vol. I.; C. V. Wedgwood, *The King's War, 1641–1647* (London: Collins Fontana, 1973).

⁷² Julian Goodare, 'The Rise of the Covenanters, 1637–1644', in *The Oxford Handbook of the English Revolution*, ed. Michael Braddick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 43–59, at p. 57.

included examples of this, most notably in the later conflicts between Parliamentary England and the Covenanted Scottish state, a singular focus on this part of the war is misleading. All three Stuart kingdoms suffered from extensive warfare within their borders, which made up a majority of conflict throughout this period. Neither were the divisions between kingdom, nation, ideology, and faction as uniform as this model suggests. Royalists were ubiquitous in all parts of the British Isles, Scots were found throughout the English Royalist and Parliamentary forces, and there were Royalist, Covenanter and Parliamentary strongholds in Ireland. It is also clear that contemporaries recognised that the British dimension was essential in securing their position not just within the dynastic union, but against local political enemies as well. The Scottish Covenanters, with their desire to effect a union of kirks to spread Presbyterianism across the British Isles, were the most obvious examples; but a recognition of the common political, economic and social circumstances and position of the three kingdoms was by no means extraordinary.⁷³ Finally, it should be noted that ‘British’ is used in the archipelagic sense, rather than referring to Great Britain specifically. There is no reason why ‘British and Irish’ should not be used instead, but this study will use the singular ‘British’ for simple reasons of brevity.

1.5 Boundaries of This Study

The author has chosen to define the North as England between the Trent and the Scottish Border. This was the command area held by William Cavendish, Lord Newcastle, in his capacity as Lord-General for the King’s armies in the North between December 1642 and July 1644.⁷⁴ This only functioned for two years, while the Royalist armies controlled much of Northern England, although the title would be granted to later Royalist commanders in the region. It does, however, provide a solid example of what early modern Britons considered ‘the north’.

⁷³ Goodare, ‘The Rise of the Covenanters, 1637–1644’, p. 57.

⁷⁴ Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty’s forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41; Copy of the appointment William, Earl of Newcastle, General of the King’s Forces in the North of Col. Henry Stradling as Colonel and [deputy] commander in chief under Col. Gray of the brigade to be raised in Northumberland and Durham, 7 July 1643, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, DPH/1/89/1; Lynn Hulse, ‘Cavendish, William, first duke of Newcastle upon Tyne (bap. 1593, d. 1676)’, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, [https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-4946?rskey=ZiDjQm&result=22], accessed 10/2017.

This study will use an expanded timeframe from 1638 to 1652. This is to cover the entire period of civil conflict in Northern England, rather than the rather arbitrary segregation of the conflict into discrete first, second and third civil wars. The most obvious problem with the tripartite division of the ‘English’ Civil Wars in the Northern English context is establishing when they began. If one were to start one’s study in 1642 with the outbreak of the ‘first English Civil War’, one would miss four years of the militarisation of Northern England’s strategic towns. The Bishops’ Wars resulted in garrisons, both royal and Covenanter, occupying strategic towns such as Newcastle and Carlisle.⁷⁵

An endpoint in 1645 or 1649 is equally problematic. For many fortified towns across Northern England, the militarisation of their homes and communities never ceased. Garrisons persisted at strategic cities like Carlisle and Hull throughout this entire period, even if they changed between Royalist, Covenanter and Parliamentary hands. A broad period allows the study to compare the different armies’ experience of fortification, and to gauge their varied impact on the local population. Differences between the combatants certainly existed. The Royalist garrisons which were slowly, and painfully, reduced in 1645 were largely held by locals. Some of the new Parliamentary garrisons that replaced them would be held by fellow northerners, but other fortresses were occupied by southern or Scottish soldiers.⁷⁶

This expanded timeframe also allows for the exploration of the process of slighting, the deliberate destruction of fortified structures to render them untenable as garrisons. This policy aimed at rendering the country easier to pacify with a field army. With Britain’s large number of castles culled, rebellions against the republican regime would lack any defensive positions to make up for their lack of numbers and experience compared to the New Model Army. In line with this policy, many of the North’s fortresses were destroyed during the Interregnum, with only key strategic strongholds, such as Hull, Carlisle, and Scarborough, surviving. As coastal fortresses, these locations were vital to national defence, in a period in which the new

⁷⁵ Mark Fissel, *The Bishops’ Wars: Charles I’s campaigns against Scotland, 1638–1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 59–61; Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1.

⁷⁶ This was particularly problematic at Carlisle, where local border animosities and the presence of Scottish Royalists within the garrison mitigated against capitulation to the Covenanters: see J. Wilson (ed.), *Victoria County History of England, A History of the County of Cumberland*, 2 vols. (London: Haymarket, 1905), vol. II, pp. 286–293. Although Lord Leven instead encouraged the garrison to surrender to him, and not the local English Parliamentarians, as the latter had neither courage nor power to protect [sic] him after surrender’, see Isaac Tullie, *Siege of Carlisle* (Whitehaven: Michael Moon, 1988), p. 47.

government was concerned about attempts at a foreign-backed Royalist restoration. The inland fortresses in private hands, however, were to be destroyed. Both slighting and the presence of various alien garrisons were important parts of the history of Civil War fortification in the North and therefore form the natural conclusion to this study.

Chapter Two: Fortification as a Technical Process and Cultural Symbol

2.1 Introduction and Historiography

While this dissertation is primarily concerned with fortification as an administrative and cultural phenomenon, it would be remiss not to explore the physical and technical details of the militarisation of castles and towns. While apparently divorced, in its discussion of bastions, earthworks, geometry and other assorted martial esoterica, from administrative and cultural analysis, it is a necessary prelude. Without a firm grounding in how mid-seventeenth-century fortresses were built and functioned, little of the rest of this dissertation would make sense.

The technical details of fortification have not attracted much attention from professional historians, with much of the work being done by heritage organisations, enthusiastic non-professionals and archaeologists. Hutton, in *Debates in Stuart History*, commented that ‘research here has been the most individual and unsystematic’ resulting in histories that neglected to explain differences between different types of artillery and their effects upon fortifications.¹ Even the venerable Peter Young concentrated on the stories of campaigns and battles as strategic and tactical narratives, not as technical challenges.² The only real example was James Burke, publishing principally on Irish sieges from 1990 to 2001.³ There are a few happy exceptions to this rule. The first is a chapter by Hutton and Wylie Reeves in a 1998 edited military history of the British Isles.⁴ While only a very brief summary, it does provide enough of a grounding to make it a valuable tool of instruction for laymen in the subject. Barbara Donagan has also written on the theoretical underpinnings of Civil War military practice in her 1995 article ‘Halcyon Days and the Literature of War: England’s Military Education before 1642’ in *Past & Present*.⁵ This article, as well as the military textbooks it analyses, forms an important point of reference for this chapter.

¹ Ronald Hutton, *Debates in Stuart History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 43.

² Hutton, *Debates in Stuart History*, p. 43.

³ James Burke, ‘The New Model Army and the problems of siege warfare, 1648–1651’, *Irish Historical Studies* 27 (1990), 1–29; James Burke, ‘Siege warfare in seventeenth century Ireland’, in *Conquest and resistance: war in seventeenth-century Ireland, History of Warfare*, ed. Pádraig Lenihan, 131 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2001), vol. III, pp. 257–291.

⁴ Hutton and Reeves, ‘Sieges and Fortifications’, pp. 195–233.

⁵ Donagan, ‘Halcyon Days and the Literature of War: England’s Military Education before 1642’.

The emergence of the modern heritage industry in Britain in the previous century meant that historical fortifications were generally taken under state management, either directly or by preservation trusts operating under state licence. The Ministry of Works was responsible for this work in the mid-century, later succeeded by organisations such as English Heritage, Historic Scotland and Cadw. These organisations produced detailed investigations of many of their sites as part of their heritage work.⁶ Unfortunately, the quality of these investigations varies over time and space, with some sites being particularly well attested, while others have barely been examined at all. Some problems, such as the exact location of Lathom House, the palatial fortress-residence of the Stanleys, have entirely eluded resolution because of limited funding or a simple lack of material evidence.⁷ In particular, the publicly available guidebooks to these fortifications are notably sparse on serious historical information, since they are aimed at a non-academic audience.⁸ This is not necessarily a problem, since it broadens the site's appeal to the public, but it is a stark demonstration of the distinction between the popular-military and academic-political branches of Civil War historiography.

While Young was not quite as interested in the technicalities of fortification as in how those fortifications were used, the historical tradition that he inspired was. Osborne's *Sieges and Fortifications of the Civil Wars in Britain* (2004), David Cooke, *Yorkshire Sieges of the Civil Wars* (2011) and certain sections of Stephen Bull, *The Furie of the Ordnance: Artillery in the English Civil Wars* (2008) are all works of great depth.⁹ Osborne's work has an extensive

⁶ HMSO, *Kenilworth Castle: An Illustrated Guide with a Short History of the Castle from Earliest Times* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1958); M. R. McCarthy, H. R. T. Summerson, R. G. Annis, D. R. Perriam and B. Young, 'Carlisle Castle, A survey and documentary history' in *English Heritage Archaeological Report* no 18 (1990); Trevor Pearson, 'Scarborough Castle, North Yorkshire', in *English Heritage, Survey Report, Archaeological Investigation Report Series AI/11/1999*; Al Oswald, 'Archaeological investigation and analytical field survey on Cawood Castle Garth, Cawood, North Yorkshire', *English Heritage, Survey Report, Archaeological Investigation Report Series AI/16/2005*; J. Kenyon, *Raglan Castle* (Cardiff: Cadw, 2003); J. Clark, *Helmsley Castle* (London: English Heritage, 2004); G. Coppack, *Helmsley Castle* (London: English Heritage, 1990); B. Davison, *Old Wardour Castle* (London: English Heritage, 1999); I. Roberts, *Pontefract Castle* (Wakefield: West Yorkshire Archaeology Service, 1990); J. Weaver, *Middleham Castle* (London: English Heritage, 1998).

⁷ Jennifer Lewis, 'Lathom House: The Northern Court', *Journal of the British Archaeological Association* 152 (1999), 150–171.

⁸ See, Grace McCombie, *Tynemouth Priory and Castle* (London: English Heritage, 2008); Henry Summerson, *Carlisle Castle* (London: English Heritage, 2008). Particularly problematic in this way is Weaver, *Middleham Castle*, which is an extremely short book of highly limited utility for serious academic work.

⁹ Osborne, *Sieges and Fortifications of the Civil Wars in Britain*; David Cooke, *Yorkshire sieges of the civil wars* (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2011); Stephen Bull, *The Furie of the Ordnance: Artillery in the English Civil Wars* (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2008).

introduction to the terminology of fortification, explaining the distinctions between a sconce and a bastion, and how exactly to employ a murderer.¹⁰ Cooke's work was, naturally, very useful as a secondary source for this thesis for its encyclopaedic summary of Yorkshire's fortifications. Smaller historical publications such as the *English Civil War Series* of the Stuart Press and the ever-popular *Osprey Military History Series* also provide a wealth of technical information.¹¹ In the case of the Osprey publications, a prominent fixture in the history section of most major British bookshop chains, this includes professional diagrams and illustrations.

Finally, archaeologists have studied the subject as part of independent academic research projects and not just as part of state or heritage surveys. Jennifer Lewis' article on Lathom House has already been cited but is only one of several such articles and books with subjects ranging from entire cities to small, solitary artillery forts and in both national and local archaeological journals.¹² Lia Rakoczy of the University of York archaeology department produced her 2007 doctoral dissertation about slighting in the Civil Wars.¹³ Rakoczy made the seemingly obvious, but significant observation, that 'slighting' lacked a proper definition. She argued that slighting should be considered 'the non-siege, intentional damage during times of war of high-status buildings, their surrounding landscape or works, and/or their contents and features'.¹⁴ This is important since the term 'slighting' is commonly applied to any form of destruction inflicted on a castle during the Civil Wars, irrespective of its origin. A good example

¹⁰ A sconce is a self-contained earthen fort, while a bastion is a protruding extension of a wider defence system. A 'murderer', also spelt 'murther', is a small cannon used to fire grapeshot into assaulting infantry formations. See Osborne, *Sieges and Fortifications of the Civil Wars in Britain*, pp. 12–13.

¹¹ David Flinham, *The English Civil War Defences of London* (Bristol: Stuart Press, 2014); Peter Harrington, *English Civil War Fortifications 1642–1651* (London: Osprey, 2003).

¹² Lewis, 'Lathom House: The Northern Court'; P. Courtney and Y. Courtney, 'A siege examined: the Civil War archaeology of Leicester', *Post Medieval Archaeology* 26 (1992), 47–90; C. Drage, 'An excavation of the Royalist town ditch at Victoria Street, Newark, Nottinghamshire, 1986', *Transactions of the Thoroton Society of Nottinghamshire* 91 (1987), 127–132; G. Foard, 'The Civil War defences of Northampton', *Northamptonshire Past and Present* 9 (1994), 4–44; G. Foard, 'The Civil War siege of Grafton Regis' in *Grafton Regis: The History of a Northamptonshire Village*, eds. C. Fitzroy and K. Harry (Cardiff: Merton Priory Press, 2000); A Howes and M Foreman, *Town and Gun: The 17th Century Defences of Hull* (Kingston upon Hull: Kingston Press, 1999); J. R. Kenyon, 'Early artillery fortifications in England and Wales: A preliminary survey and reappraisal', *Archaeological Journal* 138 (1981), 205–240; B. O'Neil, 'A Civil War battery at Cornbury, Oxon', *Oxoniensia* 10 (1945), 73–78; R. Sheppard, 'Excavation of a medieval building and a Civil War refortification at Bolsover Castle, Derbyshire', *Derbyshire Archaeological Journal* 123 (2003), 111–145; R. Stockwell, 'Sites review: Cawood Castle', *Interim Bulletin York Archaeological Trust* 10 (1985), 13–17; S. Holmes, 'The walls of Newcastle-upon-Tyne', *Archaeologia Aeliana* 18 (1896), 1–25.

¹³ Lila Rakoczy, 'Archaeology of Destruction, A reinterpretation of Castle Slightings in the English Civil War', Ph.D. Thesis, University of York (2007).

¹⁴ Rakoczy, *Archaeology of Destruction*, p. i.

of this is Scarborough Castle, where information provided by English Heritage states that the half-ruined keep was slighted, despite this wholly contradicting the account by the governor, Sir Hugh Cholmley, who stated that the keep was brought down by Parliamentary bombardment during the siege.¹⁵ Rakoczy's exhaustive bibliography, which includes the vast majority of archaeological publications on the subject for the past century and a half, was particularly useful for this dissertation and should be given due credit.¹⁶

2.2 Military Manuals and the Science of Fortification

While few Britons had professional training in military engineering compared to the continental Europeans, this did not mean they were completely uninformed about military matters. The centrality of the European Wars of religion, above all the Dutch struggle against Spain and the Thirty Years' War, to the emergent British public's sense of their place in the world meant a significant interest, principally among the gentry, in military affairs.¹⁷ This provided a market for military manuals, textbooks of good military practice, several of which were published in English in the *antebellum* years.¹⁸ Furthermore, while the martial role of the gentle and noble ranks was less formal than in previous centuries, the rudiments of military knowledge remained an important part of a gentleman's education.¹⁹

The principal military theorists who published in England before the wars were John Cruso, Henry Hexham, and Robert Ward.²⁰ All three derived their methods from the Dutch school of fortress design, rather than the French or Italian models favoured in Britain in the previous century.²¹ Firstly, this was because of the high prestige that the United Provinces enjoyed in

¹⁵ C. H. Firth (ed.), 'Sir Hugh Cholmley's Narrative of the Siege of Scarborough, 1644–5', *The English Historical Review* 32 (1917), 568–597, at p. 583.

¹⁶ Rakoczy, *Archaeology of Destruction*, pp. 431–455.

¹⁷ Donagan, 'Halcyon Days and the Literature of War', pp. 72–78.

¹⁸ Donagan, 'Halcyon Days and the Literature of War', pp. 67–72; Henry Hexham, *The First Part of the Principles of the Art Military practiced in the warres of the United Netherlands, under the command of His Highness the Prince of Orange our Captaine Generall* (Delf: s.n., 1642); Robert Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre: Composed of the most refined discipline, and choice experiments that these late Netherlandish, and Swedish warres have produced: With divers new inventions, both of fortifications and strategems* (London: John Dawson, 1639).

¹⁹ Donagan, 'Halcyon Days and the Literature of War', pp. 93–97.

²⁰ Ole Peter Grell, 'Cruso, John (c. 1595–1655)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn, Sept 2004, <https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-6852>, accessed 03/2019; Hexham, *The First Part of the Principles of the Art Military practiced in the warres of the United Provinces...*; Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre...*

²¹ Osborne, *Sieges and Fortifications of the Civil Wars in Britain*, p. 14.

British political life because of the competence of its military in the war against Spain. Although dethroned by the Palatinate and then Sweden as the torchbearer for militant international Protestantism, the Netherlands remained a model state and society for Protestants across the British Isles. The familial connections between the Stuarts and the House of Orange-Nassau, beginning with the marriage of Charles I's daughter Mary to Prince-Stadtholder William II in 1641, demonstrated the high esteem in which the Netherlands were held, as well as King Charles' desire to firm up his Protestant credentials and secure foreign allies in the face of rebellion across his dominions.

Furthermore, the Dutch school of fortification was, as Osborne has pointed out, well suited to the requirements of the combatants of the British Civil Wars. It stressed the use of low earthworks to absorb cannon fire and argued in favour of using flooding and other waterworks to control access to the defences.²² While the latter was naturally better suited to the waterlogged Dutch fields, the former could be constructed with nothing more than measuring string, a few wooden posts, and a large number of unskilled labourers.²³ This meant that defences could be constructed cheaply, at least compared with the vast stone star forts of continental Europe, and relatively quickly. While primitive, they would also serve well against the small calibre siege weapons that dominated British Civil War battlefields.²⁴ The earth would simply absorb the small cannonballs instead of collapsing and would still provide an obstacle for the attacker, particularly if it was reinforced with wooden stakes and small pits designed to impede infantry and cavalry movement respectively.²⁵ By necessity, the defences of the wars were primarily improvised and needed to be made ready very quickly; in many cases in localities that had been peaceful for generations.

John Cruso was born in 1595 in Norwich to parents who had fled Flanders because of their Protestantism.²⁶ The family had become prominent in the Anglo-Dutch community, and Cruso would serve as an elder from the 1620s to at least the late 1640s.²⁷ Despite serving as a captain in a Dutch/Walloon company of the Norwich trained bands, Cruso had no military experience

²² Osborne, *Sieges and Fortifications of the Civil Wars in Britain*, p. 14.

²³ Osborne, *Sieges and Fortifications of the Civil Wars in Britain*, p. 14.

²⁴ Hutton, *Debates in Stuart History*, pp. 43–44; Bull, *The Furie of the Ordnance: Artillery in the English Civil Wars*, pp. 38–53; Osborne, *Sieges and Fortifications of the Civil Wars in Britain*, pp. 6–9.

²⁵ Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre*, pp. 63, 60–61.

²⁶ Grell, 'Cruso, John', *ODNB*.

²⁷ Grell, 'Cruso, John', *ODNB*.

as such and never served in any position close to high command.²⁸ His value, to both historians and his contemporaries, lay in his translations of continental, principally Dutch, military theorists.²⁹ This was a natural development of Cruso's familial connections, amateur military interests, and fluent Dutch.³⁰

Unlike Cruso, Henry Hexham had served in the Netherlands under the Prince of Orange, his 'Captaine-Generall', to whom he dedicated his *Principles of the Art Military*.³¹ This work consisted of three parts: the first detailed the responsibilities of commanding officers, the second the responsibility of field officers, and the third the use of artillery.³² However, Hexham acknowledged an important omission to his study, writing 'But yet (me thinkes) these three parts, are *defectiue* and *incompleate*, unlesase a fourth be added thereunto, which is the excellent art of *Fortification*.'³³ This was written in a dedication to Sir Henry Vane in Hexham's 1638 English translation of the Dutch mathematician Samuel Marlois's study on fortification, first published in 1615 and later revised by the Huguenot immigrant to the Netherlands and fellow mathematician, Albert Girard.³⁴

In 1642 the most modern anglophone military manual was Robert Ward's *The Animadversions of War*, which incorporated 'choice experiments that these late Netherlandish, and Swedish warres have produced' and which promised 'divers new inventions, both of fortifications and strategems', which was published in London in 1639.³⁵ Unlike Cruso and Hexham's works, this was not a translation, but a genuinely new guide to the arts of war. The impetus was the outbreak of the Prayer Book Rebellion the previous year. He wrote, in his dedication addressed

²⁸ Grell, 'Cruso, John', *ODNB*.

²⁹ John Cruso, *Militarie Instructions for the Cavall'rie or Rules and Directyions for the service of Horse, collected out of divers forrain authours ancient and modern & rectified and supplied according to the present practise of the Low-Country Warres*, ed. Holly Ollivander (United States: Velluminous Press, 2014).

³⁰ Grell, 'Cruso, John', *ODNB*.

³¹ Hexham, *The First Part of the Principles of the Art Military practiced in the warres of the United Netherlands, under the command of His Highness the Prince of Orange our Captaine Generall*.

³² Henry Hexham, *The art of fortification, or architecture militaire as vvell offensiue as defensiue, compiled & set forth, by Samuell Marolois revievved, augmented and corrected by Albert Girard mathematician: & translated out of French into English by Henry Hexam* (Amsterdam: M. Iohn Iohnson, 1638), p. i.

³³ Hexham, *The art of fortification*, p. i.

³⁴ A. F. Pollard & M. R. Glozier, 'Hexham, Henry (c. 1601–1650)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn, Sept 2004 [<https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-13160?rskey=tLp2fl&result=5>], accessed 02/2020.

³⁵ Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre*.

to King Charles at the beginning of the book, that ‘this grim Monster (War) hath violently broken down the Pale of prosperity in our Neighbouring Kingdomes’.³⁶ Ward argued that ‘neither Peace nor Warre can bud nor flourish, but under the well-managed Sword’ and, with as much modesty as his prose could muster, declared that he hoped ‘that my fellow Subjects who have not beene verst in these affaires, might gaine some profit, whereby they might be inabled to doe your Majestie the better service upon all sudden occasions, when your Highnesse shall call them thereto.’³⁷ It is not recorded what Ward’s reaction was to the outbreak of civil war across England in 1642, where manuals like his would prove vital not just to the Royalists, but also to the Parliamentarians, in turning civilians into soldiers, and domestic spaces into fortresses.

Hexham’s translation and Ward’s *Animadversions* both stress the mathematical basis of the construction of fortresses. Ward even began with ‘The Abridgement of Geometrie, so farre as belongs to the Art of Fortification’.³⁸ Ward included diagrams of what angle ramparts of earth should be placed in order best to reduce the impact of incoming cannonballs, or potentially even to deflect them altogether.³⁹ On an equally practical level, knowledge of the proper use of compasses and other such tools would be necessary for Ward’s prospective reader to draw their plans for defences based on his designs.⁴⁰ Furthermore, this concern for mathematical perfection was in line with the prevailing intellectual trends of the age.⁴¹ While the ‘scientific revolution’ model is controversial, given both the demonstrable vitality of medieval intellectual life and the potential for its degradation into crudely progressive teleology, the early modern period saw the systematisation of worldly knowledge on a scale not previously employed.⁴² In his efforts to establish the seriousness, utility, and professionalism of both himself and his discipline, it was natural that Ward would appeal to this intellectual impulse.

The concept of a ‘perfect’ fort, its quality stemming not just from practical experience, but the pitiless idealism of mathematics, was evidently of great importance to Ward, but he did not neglect the influence of geographical variation in the construction of defences. For example, on

³⁶ Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre*, p. 2.

³⁷ Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre*, pp. 2–3.

³⁸ Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre*, pp. 35–37.

³⁹ Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre*, pp. 35–37, 63, 69.

⁴⁰ Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre*, p. 35.

⁴¹ See Mikuláš Teich, *The Scientific Revolution Revisited* (Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2015), pp. 55–74, 83–100; S. Shapin, *The Scientific Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

⁴² Barbara Donagan, ‘Halcyon Days and the Literature of War’, p. 81.

page 44 he provided a diagram of a perfectly hexagonal star fort, and then gave five subsequent examples of how the same principles could be applied to ‘irregular’ fortresses, typically involving the incorporation of river bends, joins, or islands into the defences.⁴³ These diagrams also included guidelines to their size, given in a scale in paces, to assist the reader in their construction.⁴⁴ He gave further advice concerning the number of men to be placed in a fortification, where cannon were to be situated, how to best position soldiers and guns to repel an attack through a breach in the walls; and lengthy descriptions of famous sieges, not only from antiquity but also from the then-ongoing Eighty Years’ War in the Low Countries, to provide context for his various plans.⁴⁵ The First Siege of Breda, in 1624–1625, received an entire chapter, a natural consequence of its length, technical sophistication, and prominence in the imagination of a Protestant British public in perpetual anxiety about Catholic Habsburg expansion.⁴⁶

⁴³ Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre*, pp. 44–54.

⁴⁴ Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre*, p. 41.

⁴⁵ For the the duties of soldiers within a fort see Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre*, pp. 79–83, 155–156; For the use of artillery within a fort see Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre*, pp. 107–142; for examples of famous sieges both ancient and contemporary see Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre*, pp. 55–59, 322, 325, 342, 348, 345, 346, 354–355, 357, 360–361.

⁴⁶ Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre*, pp. 95–105; Anon, *The newes which now arrive from diuers parts, translated out of Dutch copies, with some aduertisements sent hither, vnto such as correspond with friends on the other side. In seuerall letters from honourable and worshipfull personages, residing at Skink Sconce, in the leager of his excellencie at Breda, in the campe of Count Mansfield, and from other places...* (London: Nathaniel Butter & William Sheffard, 1622), pp. 18–19; Thomas Archer and Ambrogio Spinola, *A certaine and perfect relation of the encounter and bloody slaughter which is newly happened betweene the Marquesse Spinolas forces, and the forces within the towne of Breda, occasioned by the enemies surpsiral of a wood who at length tooke it in, by which meanes he is approached very neere to the towne, although with the losse of a great number of his men, and fiue of his chiefeest commanders. : With the copie of a letter sent by the Marquis Spinola to the Archdusses of Austria, the which was intercepted by the Prince of Oranges horsmen, to this effect, openly shewing his priuate intent for what causes he must of necessitie leaue the siege of Breda, and would haue done before now, had it not beene that hee must haue indangered to haue left his ordnance behind him. : Likewise a confirmatiue rehearsall of relieuing the towne of Breda after a new inuention, with the Prince of Oranges designes, both to annoy the enemy, and drowne their trenches* (London: Thomas Archer and B. Aslop, 1625); Anon, *A remonstracion of the French subiects professing the reformed religion vnto the French King* (London: Iohn Dawson, 1622), pp. 17–18; Anon, *A continuation of all the principall occurrences which hath happened to the Leaguers lying before Breda shewing into what great extremitie and necessity the armie of the Marquesse Spinola is likely to fall into for want of prouision and pay: for which causes he hath already lost aboue 12000 men. With a relation of the forces that are now a leauying vnder, and for the command of Count Mansfield, and the Duke of Brunswicke, by Collonell Smith, and Captaine Daniel de la Riue, with expectation to receiue the forces now dismist by the Kings of Denmarke and Sweden, intending to aduenture their fortunes once more together...* (London: Thomas Archer, 1625); Anon, *A iournall or, historicall relation of all the principall matters which haue passed in the present siege of Breda from day to day With a description both of the manner of Spinolaes siege, and the workes of defence in the towne...* (London: Mercurius Britannicus, 1625); Anon, *A short description of the marching forth of the enemy out of Breda, and what thereupon followed* (London: M. Parsons, 1637).

While Ward's *Animadversions* was as holistic a guide to fortification as could be found in England in 1642, it did not survive very long without coming under criticism borne of the experience of civil war. In 1645 David Papillon of London published *A Practicall Abstract Of the Arts, of Fortification and Assailing. Containing Foure different Methods of Fortifications, with approued rules, to set out in the field, all maner of superficies, Intrenchments and approaches, but the demi Circle, or with lines and Stakes*. It was dedicated to Sir Thomas Fairfax and was written with the aim 'To rectifie the deformities of our Fortifications.'⁴⁷ The experience of the past few years had not convinced Papillon that the flush of publications of the 1630s had managed to rectify the country's deficiencies in fortification. He wrote that:

the deformitie of our Works is so great, and the errours in the seting out of them so grosse, that they serve only as an object of derision to Forrainers that see them: And these errours proceed from a selfe-conceitednesse inherent in some men of these days, that presume to have skill in those things, in which they have no skill at all; for the most mechanick Artificers and Shop-keepers will be meddling with the Election, and control Enginiers. And some Divines, in stead to feed their flocks, do take upon them to be Sub-Committees of the fortifications of a Garrison. And these duorders are permitted by the over-frugalitie to themselves, and to a whole Countie, as some have found by lamentable experience. Now to avoid these errours for the time to come, I have in this Abstrct [*sic*] set down (without reservation) the preportions and dimensions they are to observe, and from whence they are to draw the Lines of their Flanks, and of their Line of defence to be convenient for the Cannon and Musket-shot, without which odiervations no Fortification can be good, or servcable.⁴⁸

Papillon's main line of complaint was that defences continued to be designed and raised by those with not only no experience of fortification, but no practical knowledge whatsoever. The complaints that shopkeepers and divines were now ordering around military engineers was similar to other such comments from the period by military professionals trying to deal with far less technically adept colleagues and superiors.⁴⁹ Papillon's solution was much the same as Ward, giving plans and directions for a variety of field fortifications, and entreating the reader

⁴⁷ Papillon, *A Practicall Abstract of the Arts, of Fortification and Assailing. Containing Foure different Method's of Fortifications, with approved rules, to set out in the feild, all manner of superficies, Intrenchment and approaches, by the demy circle, or with Lines and Stakes. Written for the benefit of such as delight in the Practise of the So Noble Arts*, p. A3.

⁴⁸ Papillon, *A Practicall Abstract of the Arts, of Fortification and Assailing...*, p. A3.

⁴⁹ John Barrat, 'A Rabble of Gentility?' the Northern Horse, 1644–45', in *A new way of fighting: professionalism in the English Civil War: proceedings of the second Helion & Company 'Century of the Soldier' conference*, ed. Serena Jones (Solihul: Helion & Company Limited, 2017), 51–71, at pp. 51, 64.

to follow them as closely as possible. However, there were some notable differences. Papillon made it very clear that he regarded those military manuals that had been in common use over the recent past as an important cause of this technical deficiency in fortification.⁵⁰ In the opening to his *Practical Abstract*, he complained that:

the Theoricall writings of Mr Ward, Mr. Cruso, Mr. Norwood, and of the Author of the *Enchyridion*, have rather encreased the ignorance of meane capacines, then their knowledge in the practice of these Arts. For I have conversed with some, that had all their rules upon their fingers ends, that could not set up a Superficie in the field to any purpose, and that is the reason why I write more plainly then they.⁵¹

While Ward's account had been exactly complete, it had been too complex, too long, and ultimately too professional to be used to its full extent by officers who were not trained military engineers or soldiers of long experience. Most notably, Ward had neglected to explain clearly how to turn a plan of a fort into an actual earthwork. By contrast, Papillon included guidelines of how to mark out a planned fort using wooden stakes and rope, explaining with each direction the purpose of this part of the fort.⁵² Unlike Ward, he did not assume some technical knowledge, or at least vague acquaintance with the contemporary genre of the military manual, on the part of the reader. The practical experience of setting large armies chiefly staffed by military novices against each other in a wide-ranging and destructive war had informed Papillon that this was unsuitable given the professionalism, or lack thereof, of contemporary British armies.⁵³

2.3 Medieval Castles, Lordly Residences and Early Modern Warfare⁵⁴

Papillon was only slightly exaggerating when he complained of the contempt in which foreigners held English defences, for the British Isles were generally lacking in modern fortifications along the line of the star forts of the Low Countries and Northern Italy.⁵⁵ There were several reasons for this, principally the relative poverty of the pre-union Tudor and Stuart monarchies compared to the French kings or the sprawling dynastic agglomerate of the Habsburgs, and the internal peace and pacific foreign policy of Great Britain following 1603.⁵⁶

⁵⁰ Papillon, *A Practicall Abstract of the Arts, of Fortification and Assailing*..., pp. A3–A4.

⁵¹ Papillon, *A Practicall Abstract of the Arts, of Fortification and Assailing*..., pp. A3–A4.

⁵² Papillon, *A Practicall Abstract of the Arts, of Fortification and Assailing*..., pp. 61–88.

⁵³ Jones (ed.), *A new way of fighting: professionalism in the English Civil War*, pp. xi–xiii.

⁵⁴ It should be noted that substantial parts of this subsection, 2.3, are drawn from the author's MPhil thesis, 'The Royalist Garrison Castles of Yorkshire 1642–49', submitted to the University of Cambridge in 06/2015.

⁵⁵ Hutton and Reeves, 'Sieges and Fortifications', pp. 202–203.

⁵⁶ Hutton and Reeves, 'Sieges and Fortifications', pp. 202–203.

There was simply no real need for such extensive defensive works, aside from a few coastal forts designed to protect the Stuart dominions from external invasion.

The exception to this rule was Ireland, where defensive structures were much more up to date.⁵⁷ The continued danger of internal conflict, and the possibility of foreign intervention from France or Spain in support of any insurrection, meant more government attention and funding for security concerns. Limerick received extensive development, with improvements to the castle, multiple bastions surrounding the walls, and a 'star-shaped redoubt outside the city walls'.⁵⁸ Cork and Galway received new defences in the early seventeenth century, while artillery bastions and defensive earthworks were added to the venerable Norman castle of Carrickfergus in Ulster.⁵⁹ But, even in relatively militarised Ireland, these modern developments were dramatically outnumbered by fortified structures built to less sophisticated specifications, either due to age, lack of funding, or some combination of both.⁶⁰

Therefore, most fortified strongholds in the British Isles which were garrisoned during the conflict were medieval castles and towerhouses, or privately owned structures with defence works. Contemporaries recognised their inadequacy. Ward wrote in 1642 that 'we should take notice of such Fortifications, as in informer ages have been used for the safeguard of Towns here in England, so take an occasions to discourse of the imperfections of our walled Townes here in England, that we may not bee deceived in putting our confidence in the strength of them.'⁶¹ But the speed with which even the most antiquated castle, some in a state of semi-ruin, was occupied by a garrison during the spread of civil war across England in 1642 demonstrated the important place these structures occupied in popular memory. They had been the principal spaces for civil conflict for centuries, and the populace's default reaction was to use them again. Despite their unsuitability in resisting bombardment by modern siege weapons, this was perfectly sensible.⁶² Britain's poverty of modern fortresses was matched by its limited provision of heavy siege artillery in the form of high calibre cannons and explosive projectile firing mortars.⁶³ At the siege of Lathom House, the single mortar used by the besiegers was the

⁵⁷ Hutton and Reeves, 'Sieges and Fortifications', pp. 202–203.

⁵⁸ Hutton and Reeves, 'Sieges and Fortifications', p. 202.

⁵⁹ Hutton and Reeves, 'Sieges and Fortifications', pp. 202–203.

⁶⁰ Hutton and Reeves, 'Sieges and Fortifications', pp. 202–203.

⁶¹ Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre...*, p. 55.

⁶² Osborne, *Sieges and Fortifications of the Civil Wars in Britain*, pp. 18–1, 20; Bull, *The Furie of the Ordnance: Artillery in the English Civil Wars*, pp. 81–99.

⁶³ Bull, *The Furie of the Ordnance: Artillery in the English Civil Wars*, pp. 38–53.

only weapon capable of causing significant damage to the fortress, with the smaller calibre cannons only causing superficial damage, despite one memorable occasion in which a cannonball passed through Lady Derby's private chamber.⁶⁴

Most artillery pieces used in the British Civil Wars were small field pieces, designed to be used against soldiers in battles in open country. Firing small iron cannonballs only a few pounds in weight, they could do hideous damage to human beings in close formations, knocking off limbs and heads, pulverising bones, but their impact on even antiquated fortifications was extremely limited.⁶⁵ Far from being completely obsolete as the traditional popular narrative, or the more academic but equally misleading 'military revolution' model, suggests, medieval castles remained viable defensive structures in mid-seventeenth-century Britain.⁶⁶

It is appropriate, at this point in the study, to define the term 'castle'. This is apparently simple, owing to their ubiquity across the British landscape, but is problematised by the distinction made in both popular and academic history between a 'castle' and a mere fortified 'manor house'. This dichotomy, between martial and domestic architecture, will not be used in this study, since it is anachronistic and misleading, implying as it does a dramatic distinction that, in most case studies, simply does not exist. This view has been a feature of medievalist histories of castles for over two decades. In 1996 Charles Coulson argued that it was erroneous to consider the form of medieval castles as being solely directed towards martial functions. He pointed out that 'emblems of nobility (as arrow-slits, towers, ditches, battlements) were crucial' as demonstrations of the identity of lordly power, and so served a valuable semiotic function beyond their uses in wartime.⁶⁷ Coulson's main purpose in his 1996 article was the rejection of any sharp divide between 'shams', 'follies' and 'seriously fortified castles' which he argued was a dichotomy that informed 'the popular recreation of castle-visiting'.⁶⁸ These developments are of considerable value, given the prominence of lordly residences as sites of garrisons during the British Civil Wars.⁶⁹ While most of these structures were relatively small,

⁶⁴ Stanley, *A Journal of the siege of Lathom House*, pp. 41, 48

⁶⁵ Bull, *The Furie of the Ordnance: Artillery in the English Civil Wars*, pp. 38–53; Hutton and Reeves, 'Sieges and Fortifications', pp. 202–203; Osborne, *Sieges and Fortifications of the Civil Wars in Britain*, pp. 18–19.

⁶⁶ Coulson, 'The state of research: Cultural realities and reappraisals in English castle-study', p. 179.

⁶⁷ Coulson, 'The state of research: Cultural realities and reappraisals in English castle-study', p. 179.

⁶⁸ Coulson, 'The state of research: Cultural realities and reappraisals in English castle-study', p. 177.

⁶⁹ See also Andy King, 'Fortresses and fashion statements: gentry castles in fourteenth-century Northumberland', *Journal of Medieval History* 30 (2007), 372–397; Charles Coulson, *Castles In Medieval Society, Fortresses in England, France, and Ireland in the Central Middle Ages* (Oxford:

some were massively well-defended structures. For example, Lathom House in Lancashire had a curtain wall two feet thick that was studded with nine large towers.⁷⁰ In the same county is Clitheroe Castle, the smallest Norman keep in England, a much smaller building with comparatively limited defensive works. Given this, it is difficult to argue mere size, or a greater level of fortification is an adequate basis for a serious distinction between ‘houses’ and ‘castles’.

While the seventeenth century’s conceptions of gentle and lordly identity were less martial than in previous centuries, military capability remained central to their self-conception.⁷¹ This was reflected in the persistence of the use of medieval castles as residences, and the addition of elements of fortified architecture, typically walls and crenulations, to newly constructed buildings. For example, Skipton Castle in Yorkshire had been extensively redeveloped in the fifty years preceding the Civil Wars to serve as the lordly seat of the Clifford Earls of Cumberland. It retained its curtain wall, twelve feet thick and twenty-two foot tall, marked with five or six massive drum towers providing commanding positions over the small market town it dominated.⁷² But it had also had a new wing added to the keep in the late sixteenth century in the latest styles, with large mullioned glass windows to let in the light.⁷³ The great drum towers were used as residential spaces for the Earl and his family even after the outbreak of war when their roofs were used to mount great cannons to control the pass through the Pennines.⁷⁴ The ultimate combination of the domestic and the military was the castle’s gatehouse. The fourth and fifth Earls had redeveloped the gatehouse to fit a dining room and Neoplatonic grotto, used for entertaining the gentry who benefitted from Clifford patronage, and who, in turn, extended the Earl’s influence at the local level.⁷⁵ But this should not be considered an example of the domestic triumphing over the martial, as the building work also involved the modification

Oxford University Press, 2003); Leonie Hicks, ‘Magnificent entrances and undignified exits: chronicling the symbolism of castle space in Normandy’, *Journal of Medieval History* 35 (2009), 52–69; Abigail Wheatley, *The Idea of the Castle in Medieval England* (York: York Medieval Press, 2004).

⁷⁰ Young and Emberton, *Sieges of the Great Civil War 1642–1646*, p. 59.

⁷¹ Donagan, ‘The Web of Honour: Soldiers, Christians, and Gentlemen in the English Civil War’, pp. 365–369; Andrew Hopper, ‘The Self-Fashioning of Gentry Turncoats during the English Civil War’, pp. 236–239.

⁷² Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, p. 1.

⁷³ Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, p. 4.

⁷⁴ The name ‘Pennines’ for the range of hills that runs the length of Northern England is not contemporary, but dates from the nineteenth century, being derived from the Apennines of Italy. However, given the ubiquity of this name, and the lack of any useful contemporary nomenclature, this dissertation will use it from this point onward without comment.

⁷⁵ Spence, *Skipton Castle and Its Builders*, pp. 97, 100; Roy Strong, *The Renaissance Garden in England* (London: Thomas and Hudson, 1979) p. 138; See also Per Palme, *Triumph of Peace* (London: Almquist & Wiksell, 1957).

of the main gate itself. Gun loops were added in the door, allowing musketeers to fire through it down the town's high street.⁷⁶ In the seventeenth century, military and domestic architecture both remained living presences in the lordly residences of the British Isles.

Furthermore, in seventeenth-century sources, a hard distinction between a castle and a house was rarely articulated. For example, the newsbook *Mercurius Aulicus*, referred to 'Basing castle' eight times and 'Basing house' four times between 31 March 1644 and 30 March 1645.⁷⁷ While the Parliamentary *Mercurius Britanicus* referred to Lathom House as a castle and even spoke of 'Hettlebury Castle, a House belonging to the Bishop of Worcester'.⁷⁸ A distinction was sometimes made owing to age, as structures constructed before the turn of the sixteenth century were much more likely to be identified as castles. The same newsbook also articulated a distinction based upon size and prestige. In January 1645 *Britanicus* declared that it was 'high time for them not only to fortifie *old* Castles, but (if it were possible) to make *new*'.⁷⁹ The Parliamentary newsbook also wrote that, while rubbishing a rival Royalist publication, 'He says, *the Passage upon the Rive Ex is not quite blot up, because they have put a garrison in Poudrum-Castle. We used to call it Poulsdrum-House, but now they have it, the Mole-Hill is become a Mountain, the House a Castle*'.⁸⁰ It is apparent that, at least on this occasion, 'castle' was considered a grander term than a mere 'house'. But given the coexistence of very impressive houses such as Lathom, and such unimpressive castles as Clitheroe, as well as the inherent subjectivity of a definition based upon 'grandness', this is also unsatisfactory as a basis for a definition. Given the lack of a solid contemporary basis for a castle/house dichotomy and the synthesis between military and domestic architecture common to both types, this study will examine both fortified houses and castles together without any such distinctions.

⁷⁶ Author was shown this by the guides of Skipton Castle.

⁷⁷ *Mercurius Aulicus* (31 March 1644–31 April 1645), pp. 915–1526 (*Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 275.210A–275.310). In this and all subsequent references to *Aulicus* the page number refers to the reference's position in Peter Thomas (ed.), *The English Revolution III: Newsbooks I Oxford Royalist*, 4 vols. (London: Cornmarket Press, 1971). References to other serial newsbooks are given in the same format, but with pagination referring to the original source.

⁷⁸ *Mercurius Britanicus*, no. 38 (27 May–3 June 1644), p. 295 (*Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 286.038); *Mercurius Britanicus*, no. 93 (11–18 August 1645), p. 838 (*Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 286.093).

⁷⁹ *Mercurius Britanicus*, no. 64 (30 December–6 January 1644/1645), p. 507 (*Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 286.064).

⁸⁰ *Mercurius Britanicus*, no. 115 (19–26 January 1646), p. 1013 (*Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 286.115).

2.4 City and Town Walls

Compared to castles and other lordly residences, towns and cities posed a much greater challenge from a military engineer's perspective. Unlike castles which could be effectively garrisoned by a small number of men, even the best urban defences were considerably less dense. Most of the traditional major urban centres of Northern England retained their walls. York, Chester, Newcastle, Hull and Carlisle all had extensive fortifications constructed during the previous centuries.⁸¹ This was not unusual, and the observation that 'not every city had a wall, and not every walled community was a city. But the correlation was remarkably high and certainly applied to the North.'⁸² However, these fortifications were not uniform in quality. Carlisle's defences were the most formidable, the small city being sandwiched between two fortresses, Carlisle Castle at the north end and an artillery 'citadell' built by Henry VIII at the south.⁸³ Chester, located at a bend in the River Dee, was able to use natural defences to cover most of its perimeter, resulting in the 1644–1646 siege being one of the lengthiest in Northern England.⁸⁴ By contrast York's medieval defences were breached in several places, and the Royalists did not even try to hold Scarborough's walls—instead immediately withdrawing within the castle itself.⁸⁵

City walls were not only defences against attack, but also served other purposes; indeed the non-military function of city walls has been the subject of considerable historical interest, with scholars such as Christopher Friedrichs and Daniel Jütte being of particular interest to this thesis.⁸⁶ Firstly, walls allowed for the regulation of access to the city—and therefore of civic trade—through the city gates.⁸⁷ Given the merchant oligarchy that formed most early modern British civic governments, this was of primary concern to the city authorities.⁸⁸ The alacrity

⁸¹ McCarthy, Summerson, Annis, Perriam and Young, 'Carlisle Castle, A survey and documentary history'; Rosie Serdiville and John Sadley, *The Great Siege of Newcastle 1644* (Stroud: The History Press, 2011), pp. 25–29; Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 6, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, pp. 482, 483, 496–7, 499, 506.

⁸² Christopher Friedrichs, *The Early Modern City* (London: Longman, 1995), p. 21.

⁸³ McCarthy, Summerson, Annis, Perriam and Young, 'Carlisle Castle, A survey and documentary history', pp. 171–175.

⁸⁴ S. W. Ward, *Excavations at Chester, the Civil War Siegeworks, 1642–6* (Chester: Chester Archaeological Society, 1987), pp. 5–6

⁸⁵ Binns, *A Place of Great Importance...*, pp. 131–182

⁸⁶ Daniel Jütte, 'Entering a city', *Urban History* 41 (2014), 204–227; Friedrichs, *The Early Modern City*.

⁸⁷ Jütte, 'Entering a city', pp. 208–210.

⁸⁸ P. M. Tillott (ed.), *A History of the County of York: the City of York* (London: Victoria County History, 1961), pp. 135–140, 173–186; C. P. Lewis and A. T. Thacker (eds.), *A History of the County*

with which civic corporations established watches upon the outbreak of civil war—explored in chapter six of this dissertation—demonstrates their desire to retain control over gates, rather than simply surrender them to military control.⁸⁹

Indeed, Jütte argues that ‘entering a city’, was subject to early modern interest; the New Jerusalem of Revelation was bounded by walls and twelve gates, and walls remained an essential component of the idealised city.⁹⁰ The mentality of the city as a righteous space, girded by walls against surrounding perdition was naturally subject to a political reinterpretation; the sacralisation of the siege of Hull by post-war Parliamentary civic commemorations and Isaac Tullie’s description of a religiously untainted Royalist Carlisle beset by hordes of besieging schismatics demonstrates that was a commonly held view in early modern Britain. Jütte argues that walls were the ‘face of the city’, the urban space’s self-presentation to the outside world.⁹¹ This interpretation is borne out by the evidence from the seventeenth-century North. Before a Royal visit in *antebellum* Hull, the walls were put in good order by the council—not wanting to embarrass the city in front of Charles I; this proved successful, and the King declared himself satisfied.⁹²

But, while symbols of civic pride, urban defences were also a considerable civic expense.⁹³ The York Corporation allowed their walls to deteriorate after the Civil Wars until their dilapidated state was criticised by the Duke of Abermarle.⁹⁴ Furthermore, walls no longer provided all of an urban area with protection. The growth of British cities in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries meant that most of Northern England’s cities expanded beyond their walls.⁹⁵ The suburbs would often surround the traditional defensive perimeter, and typically housed workshops or lower-class housing—which made these low-income areas prime targets for destruction as expendable by the defenders during sieges.⁹⁶ Unusually for a military

of Chester, the City of Chester: General History and Topography, 5 vols. (London: Victoria County History, 2003), vol. V, pp. 97–102.

⁸⁹ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 75–77; Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 59.

⁹⁰ Jütte, ‘Entering a city’, pp. 214–215.

⁹¹ Jütte, ‘Entering a city’, pp. 211–212; Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, p. 683, Tullie, *Siege of Carlisle*, pp. 1–5.

⁹² Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, p. 503.

⁹³ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 95–96.

⁹⁴ Giles MS., York Civic Archive, D. 10 (i).

⁹⁵ Stephen Porter, *Destruction in the English Civil Wars* (Stroud: Sutton, 1994), p. 23.

⁹⁶ Hutton and Reeves, ‘Sieges and Fortifications’, p. 204.

technicality, this phenomenon has been extensively studied by historians, typically as part of the study of destruction in the Civil Wars.⁹⁷ In Northern England, this was most notable, and controversial, in the case of Chester.⁹⁸ While the city was bounded on two sides by rivers, to the North there was an extensive belt of suburbs beyond the walls.⁹⁹ Immediately before the beginning of the great siege of the city these were all burnt on the orders of the governor, Lord Byron.¹⁰⁰ Suburbs beyond the defences provided both cover and shelter to the besiegers. Their destruction gave the garrison's guns an open field of fire and meant that the enemy would be forced to improvise shelter, an unpleasant prospect in a Northern English winter. Naturally, those forced out of their homes were less sympathetic to this logic, as were their fellow citizens who were forced to take the refugees in.¹⁰¹

Aside from the destruction of suburbs and the costs, there were other public nuisances associated with fortification, as the litany of complaints to civic and military authorities made clear. At Carlisle, the destruction of part of a mill's dam during the siege, to strengthen the defences through flooding, was unfixed and still causing problems eight years later in 1653.¹⁰² Deliberate flooding severely affected the quality of life at other fortresses. At Chester it caused water to leak into cellars, 'causing great annoyance'.¹⁰³ The stench associated with stagnant moat water, or the use of dung heaps and middens to provide earth reinforcements for walls, was also subject to public concern, a natural consequence of the contemporary acceptance of the miasma theory of disease and the fear of epidemic illnesses common to early modern cities.¹⁰⁴ These miseries would contribute to the troubled relationship between civic and military urban governments which will be explored in chapters five and six of this dissertation.

⁹⁷ Hutton and Reeves, 'Sieges and Fortifications', p. 204.

⁹⁸ Porter, *Destruction in the English Civil Wars*, p. 58; Great Letter Book 1599–1650, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, M/L/2, p. 293.

⁹⁹ John Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–1660: County Government and Society during the English Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974).

¹⁰⁰ Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 58; Porter, *Destruction in the English Civil Wars*, p. 58;

¹⁰¹ Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 58; Great Letter Book 1599–1650, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, M/L/2, p. 293.

¹⁰² Petition to the Corporation of Carlisle, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, CA/2/195.

¹⁰³ Chester Record Office, ZAB/2, Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–84, p. 68.

¹⁰⁴ See chapter one 'Rats, Witches, Miasma, and Early Modern Theories of Contagion' in Lucina Cole, *Imperfect Creatures: Vermin, Literature, and the Sciences of Life, 1600–1740* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2016), pp. 24–48; Lindsay Pannell, 'Viperous Breathings: The Miasma Theory in Early Modern England', MA Thesis, West Texas A & M University, 2016, pp. 1–7, 19–25, 62–8; Arjesh Kannadan, 'History of the Miasma Theory of Disease', *ESSAI* 1 (2018), 41–43.

Despite the expansion of suburbs beyond the traditional boundaries of the walls, the oldest and most important parts of these cities remained protected within the old defences. However, as was the case with castles, these defences required considerable modification before they could be used. The first step was to repair the walls, which had often been allowed to decline in the long years of peace.¹⁰⁵ Reinforcement of city walls with piles of earth was necessary if they were to resist the power of cannon fire.¹⁰⁶ These modifications would require continual reinforcement to keep them useful, particularly after combat. In 1645 and 1646 the Hull Corporation paid significant attention to the reinforcements, which had degraded from both combat and the weather.¹⁰⁷

In addition to direct reinforcement, city walls were surrounded by trench lines and sconces, designed to keep the enemy away from the walls and to provide enfilading fire from the sconces against any attacking infantry.¹⁰⁸ Construction of these defences was expensive and typically the burden was borne by the citizens. This included the actual construction work itself, as hundreds of unskilled labourers were required to move the thousands of tonnes of earth needed to surround a city with earthworks.¹⁰⁹ Skilled craftsmen and military professionals, typically using textbooks such as Cruso and Ward as their plans, would direct the work, which should not be understood as a spontaneous, amateur effort.¹¹⁰ Whether or not the unskilled workers, both men and women, were paid varied. Even London, by far the wealthiest city in the British Isles, simply provided the workers with food during their labour, rather than pay.¹¹¹

However, skilled craftsmen needed to be compensated for their talents, and raw materials needed to be paid for. In Northern England, these costs were normally borne by the city corporation. In September 1644 the Chester Corporation repaid an alderman for ‘repaying the Mudwalls of this Cittie’.¹¹² Indeed, responsibility for these works was then transferred, at the

¹⁰⁵ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 65–67.

¹⁰⁶ Hutton and Reeves, ‘Sieges and Fortifications’, pp. 203–204.

¹⁰⁷ Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, pp. 666, 711, 761.

¹⁰⁸ Sir Henry Slingsby, *Original Memoirs written during the Great Civil War; being the life of Sir Henry Slingsby and the memoirs of Captain Hodgson* (Edinburgh: James Ballantyne, 1806), pp. 109–110.

¹⁰⁹ Flinham, *The English Civil War Defences of London*, p. 15.

¹¹⁰ Flinham, *The English Civil War Defences of London*, p. 15.

¹¹¹ Edward Razzell and P. E. Razzell (eds.), *The English Civil War – A contemporary Account*, 5 vols. (London: Caliban Books, 1996), vol. III, p. 50.

¹¹² Chester Record Office, ZAB/2, Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–84, p. 68.

governor's request, to the city treasurer.¹¹³ On several occasions, the corporation imposed financial levies on the city to gather funds for the defences.¹¹⁴ Despite a more coherent fiscal and administrative structure, this was also the case at Hull.¹¹⁵ In this respect, there was no significant variation between Royalist and Parliamentary practice in Northern England.

The defences constructed at the outbreak of the wars, while less impressive than the star forts of contemporary continental Europe, could still be highly effective. Lord Newcastle's attempts to attack Hull accomplished little besides the exhaustion of his field army, forced to try and dig their own earthworks to give his troops cover in attacking Hull's defences, the Royalists' trenches flooded.¹¹⁶ Other improvised urban defences, such as chains strung across streets to impede cavalry movement, proved effective during the Royalists' attempted seizure of Manchester in 1642.¹¹⁷ The impact of city walls on the towns and cities of Northern England was paradoxical. They could protect a city from attack but also gave the defenders the ability to actively resist a besieger—inviting either a debilitating siege or a devastating storm. They were symbols of civic pride and an unwelcome expenditure for civic corporations trying to cope with contributions to the warring combatants and the conflict's disruption of trade.¹¹⁸ At fortresses of strategic significance, such as Carlisle or Hull, the city corporation was not given a choice in maintaining civic defences—they were simply ordered to assist in keeping their civic defences in a war-ready state.¹¹⁹ This demonstrated both the continued strategic significance of the port's defences, but also the continued attachment of the corporation to their walls as a symbol of civic pride.

Similar to castles as lordly residences, city walls combined civic/domestic and military functions, with reinforcement required for the latter in order to make urban defences fit for

¹¹³ Chester Record Office, ZAB/2, Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–84, p. 68.

¹¹⁴ Chester Record Office, ZAB/2, Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–84, pp. 56, 62, 71.

¹¹⁵ Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, pp. 562, 581, 586, 599, 612, 615, 666.

¹¹⁶ Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, pp. 599–600.

¹¹⁷ Broxap, *The Great Civil War in Lancashire: 1642–1651*, p. 44; Anon, *Newes from Manchester being a true relation of the battell fought before Manchester. Wherein the Lord Strange lost 150. men besides 100 taken prisoners, with the losse only of 12 men of the town side, whereof six of them were taken prisoners. Sent in a letter to a private friend* (London: Richard Best, 1642), p. A4.

¹¹⁸ Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, p. 146: MIC 833 & 2150/318.

¹¹⁹ Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, pp. 612, 613–616, 665, 666–667, 711, 740, 744, 745–646, 792.

seventeenth-century combat.¹²⁰ These new defences were similarly constructed by local labour according to contemporary anglophone military manuals.¹²¹ The new defences imposed significant costs on civic corporations, as well as resulting in the lowered quality of life of citizens through labour, the destruction of suburbs or degradation of the environment.¹²² But the most significant tension—and the main distinction between most isolated castle garrisons and their urban equivalents—was between civic and military responsibility for urban defence. This will be explored in greater detail in chapter six of this dissertation; what is of relevance here is that civic corporations were heavily involved in the maintenance and reinforcement of their civic defences, both in peace and war.

¹²⁰ Hutton and Reeves, 'Sieges and Fortifications', pp. 203–204; Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, pp. 666, 711, 761.

¹²¹ Hexham, *The art of fortification*....

¹²² Porter, *Destruction in the English Civil Wars*, p. 23; Chester Record Office, ZAB/2, Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–84, p. 68.

Chapter Three: The North and the Bishops' Wars

3.1 Introduction and Historiography

The Bishops' Wars were a pair of conflicts between Charles I and the Scottish Covenanters, separated by a short truce, over questions of Church reform in Scotland and control over the Scottish government.¹ They included both a civil war within Scotland between the Covenanters and their enemies, concentrated in the Gaelic and Catholic West Highlands and the Episcopalian strongholds of the North-East.² The King attempted to raise forces from his other kingdoms to suppress the Covenanters, namely the royal army itself in Northern England and a scheme by the Earl of Antrim to transport a MacDonnell army from Ulster to fight the Covenanter Campbells in Western Scotland.³ The wars included several pitched battles, most notably between the Covenanters and the royal army at Newburn, near Newcastle on 28 August 1640.⁴ This cost the King the North-East, destroyed his remaining political capital and forced him to submit to summoning the Long Parliament.⁵

In terms of monographs, the Bishops' Wars generally serve as the prelude to the history of the Covenanters. This is due to the model of the 'Scottish Revolution' favoured by the dominant scholars on the subject, namely Donald Stevenson and, more recently, Laura Stewart.⁶ This is essentially the same as the 'English Revolution' model, focusing on administrative and political changes in what Stewart calls 'Covenanted Scotland'.⁷ Stewart will be explored in more detail in the next chapter; what is pertinent here is that it focuses only on how the Covenanters funded the Bishops' Wars, and naturally does not address Northern England.⁸ Indeed the most

¹ James Wylie, *The Story of the Covenant and the Services of the Covenanters to the reformation in Christendom and the liberties of Great Britain*, 2nd edn., in *Covenanter History Series* (Edinburgh, Blue Banner, 1998), pp. 12–15.

² Julian Goodare, 'The Rise of the Covenanters, 1637–1644', p. 51.

³ Ohlmeyer, 'MacDonnell, Randal, marquess of Antrim (1609–1683)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn, Sept 2004 [<https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-1006645?rskey=B68ex4&result=1>], accessed 04/2019.

⁴ Goodare, 'The Rise of the Covenanters, 1637–1644'.

⁵ Ronald Ireland, *The Bloody Covenant* (Stroud: History Press, 2010), p. 106; David Stevenson, 'The Covenanters: The National Covenant and Scotland', *Saltire Pamphlets* 11 (1988), 48–49.

⁶ Fissel, *The Bishops' Wars, Charles I's campaigns against Scotland, 1638–1640*, pp. 53–61; David Stevenson (ed.), *The Scottish revolution 1637–1644: the triumph of the Covenanters* (Edinburgh: John Donald, 2003).

⁷ Laura Stewart, *Rethinking the Scottish Revolution, Covenanted Scotland, 1637–1651* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

⁸ Stewart, *Rethinking the Scottish Revolution, Covenanted Scotland, 1637–1651*, pp. 177–192.

significant work focusing on the conflict is still Mark Fissel's *The Bishops' Wars, Charles I's campaigns against Scotland, 1638–1640*, published in 1994.⁹ While brief in terms of its analysis of the various battles, largely due to the relative absence of these forms of military engagement, Fissel's analysis of royal and Covenanter fiscal-military administration during the wars is both extensive and well-sourced.

Articles are somewhat more fruitful, but even here the Bishops' Wars attract less academic interest than the much more widespread and violent conflict that broke out in 1641–1642.¹⁰ Of interest is Scott's 1997 article about the problem of Yorkshire's loyalties during the Bishops' Wars. Scott disagreed with Fissel's interpretation of the cause of the King's defeat and argued that the problem of mobilising a royal army from a staunchly localist militia proved decisive.¹¹ The main relevance of Scott's article to this thesis lies in its explanation of the depth of militarisation in Yorkshire between 1638 and 1640. He pointed out that 'The desire to protect the county from further hardship and to redress its grievances, principally over billeting' was an important motivator for gentle and noble petitioners towards the end of the conflict.¹²

General histories of the Civil Wars in England typically begin in 1642, with the Bishops' Wars being relegated to the introduction to the study. There are admirable exceptions to this rule; such as Dame Veronica Wedgwood's *The Great Rebellion*, the first volume of which, rather inappropriately named *The King's Peace*, covers the years 1637–1641.¹³ This is a natural consequence of the tripartite division of the Civil Wars into their 'national' English, Scottish, and Irish histories. It is also, in the case of Northern England, completely unfit for purpose and one of the main reasons why this study has abandoned the 'English' model in favour of a 'British' history.

If one's study is of England and Wales in general, then it may be possible to place the Bishops' Wars in the background. They did not, after all, ravage the entire country as subsequent

⁹ Fissel's *The Bishops' Wars, Charles I's campaigns against Scotland, 1638–1640*.

¹⁰ Joseph Black, 'Pikes and Protestations: Scottish texts in England, 1639–40', *Publishing History*, vol. 42 (1997); David Scott, 'Hannibal at our Gates: Loyalists and Fifth-columnists during the Bishops' Wars the Case of Yorkshire', *Historical Research* 70 (1997), 269–293.

¹¹ Scott, 'Hannibal at our Gates: Loyalists and Fifth-columnists during the Bishops' Wars the Case of Yorkshire', p. 271.

¹² Scott, 'Hannibal at our Gates: Loyalists and Fifth-columnists during the Bishops' Wars the Case of Yorkshire', p. 274.

¹³ Wedgwood, *The Great Rebellion: The King's peace, 1637–1641*, vol. I.

conflicts did. But if the subject is just Northern England, this is no longer the case. The two Bishops' Wars placed the North into a state of militarisation that it would not escape for over a decade.¹⁴ While far less destructive than the First Civil War, there was still a great deal of violence and several cities were placed under Covenanter occupation, a topic explored in the next chapter. Furthermore, the transformation of many northern towns and castles into fortresses occurred during the Bishops' Wars. For the Northerners the wars began in 1638, not 1642; and therefore, it is the appropriate beginning of this study's chronology. This is not a unique approach, with at least two published articles on Northern England in the conflict, but it is unusual.¹⁵

The northern experience of the Bishops' Wars also serves as an excellent case study to address the idea of a 'noble revolt' articulated by John Adamson in his 'The Baronial Context of the English Civil War' submission to the Royal Historical Society and 2007 book on the subject.¹⁶ In summary, the Adamson hypothesis is that the outbreak of civil conflict in 1642 represented a noble revolt against a monarchy that had attacked their privileges. It has been challenged by other scholars and remains controversial.¹⁷ While this chapter will not argue that a 'baronial revolt' is an appropriate term to describe the outbreak of civil war in 1642, since it does not give enough space for the other causes of the war, it will not reject it completely. The term is useful in explaining the lordly mechanisms of raising troops that dominated the Northern English experience of the Bishops' Wars.¹⁸ It is more appropriate to speak of a 'baronial mobilisation', in which interlinked systems of noble and state power raised soldiers through systems inherited from the medieval period.

¹⁴ 'Though it was generally said and thought, that if the wars should continue, and Armies should lye in Yorkshire but one year, there could not possibly be any provision or food left; yet have Armies been here almost six yeers already, in Yorkshire, sometimes six Generals and their Armies at once, often above 20000d.' See John Shawe, *The three Kingdomes Case: OR, Their sad Calamities, together with Their CAUSES and CVRE. Laid down in a SERMON PREACHED AT A Publique Fast at Kingston upon Hull. With some very remarkable Passages of Providence worthy of generall Observation* (London: T.B., 1646), pp. 6–7.

¹⁵ R.T. Spence, 'Henry, Lord Clifford and the First Bishops' War, 1639', *Northern History* 31 (1995), 138–156; Scott, 'Hannibal at our Gates: Loyalists and Fifth-columnists during the Bishops' Wars the Case of Yorkshire'.

¹⁶ Adamson, 'The baronial context of the English Civil War', pp. 93–120; Adamson, *The Noble Revolt. The overthrow of Charles I.*

¹⁷ Morrill, 'Revisionism's Wounded Legacies', p. 586.

¹⁸ Mark Fissel, *The Bishops' Wars, Charles I's campaigns against Scotland, 1638–1640*, pp. 152–162.

3.2 The House of Clifford and the Fortress of Carlisle

Responsibility for the 1638 mobilisation of the North was placed in the hands of Henry, Lord Clifford, son and heir to the aged fourth Earl of Cumberland.¹⁹ By the seventeenth century, the family possessed extensive estates across the West Riding of Yorkshire, Cumberland and Westmorland.²⁰ In 1638 Henry Clifford, referred to in subsequent chapters as the Earl of Cumberland, served as the *de facto* Lord-Lieutenant of Cumberland, Westmorland and Northumberland, a leasee and governor of Carlisle Castle, and *de facto* hereditary sheriff of Westmorland.²¹ He was active in the preparation for war of the fortresses of Carlisle, Newcastle and Skipton, and played a vital role in the 1642 mobilisation of not only Yorkshire but also Westmorland and Cumberland. His agent in Cumbria, Sir Philip Musgrave, left an extensive collection of correspondence to posterity, detailing how he organised the garrisons and gentry of the two counties on Clifford's behalf.²²

When the Prayer Book Rebellion erupted in 1638, Clifford was uniquely placed to direct the war effort. His local powerbase, familiarity with the court and personal loyalty to Charles I made him the ideal appointee.²³ In 1639 the King appointed Clifford the governor of Newcastle.²⁴ Clifford's staff also included many of his future subordinates during the Civil Wars, most notably John Mallory, who would later serve as governor of Skipton Castle itself after Clifford's death.²⁵ Indeed all but one of Clifford's principal officers would serve under him again in the First English Civil War.²⁶

¹⁹ Richard Spence, 'Clifford, Henry, fifth earl of Cumberland (1592–1643)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn, Sept 2004, <https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-5649#odnb-9780198614128-e-5649>, accessed 10/2017.

²⁰ Spence, *Skipton Castle and its Builders*, pp. 95–117.

²¹ Spence, 'Clifford, Henry, fifth earl of Cumberland', *ODNB; Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 3, Mar 1628–June 1629, p. 374: SP 16/120 f.57: 'Deputy Lieutenants of Cumberland to Henry Lord Clifford'.

²² Musgrave Papers bundle 2, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, DMUS/5/5/1/1–31; Musgrave Papers bundle 2, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, DMUS/5/5/2/1–34; Musgrave Paper bundle 3, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, DMUS/5/5/4/1–28.

²³ Fissel's *The Bishops' Wars, Charles I's campaigns against Scotland, 1638–1640*, p. 78.

²⁴ Spence, 'Henry, Lord Clifford and the First Bishops' War, 1639', p. 139.

²⁵ Spence, 'Henry, Lord Clifford and the First Bishops' War, 1639', p. 142; Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty's forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41.

²⁶ Spence, 'Henry, Lord Clifford and the First Bishops' War, 1639', p. 142.

3.3 Noble Mobilisation in the Northern Counties of England in the First Bishops' War

While not a professional soldier, Clifford was an energetic and experienced administrator and set about readying the two fortresses for war. Following the Union of the Crowns, the royal fortresses of Northern England had become dilapidated.²⁷ In the case of Carlisle, the castle had last seen a garrison in 1621, while its walls had not seen any significant renovations since the reign of Henry VIII.²⁸ The corporation was well aware of their city's weakened defences and petitioned the King repeatedly throughout the beginning of 1639.²⁹ A letter from the Mayor, John Aglionby, to Charles I on 29 January 1639 would 'beseech the King to take into his consideration the weakness and poverty of that poor city, wanting ammunition, and the ports and walls thereof much ruined'.³⁰ The King responded, and on the 19th of the following month, a letter was sent by secretary Windebank to the royal military adviser Sir Jacob Astley.³¹ In it, the secretary told Astley that the King had been informed of the corporation's request and that they should be sent what guns and powder they required from the great arsenal at Hull.³² Windebank also stated that 'all such inhabitants of those parts to be furnished with arms out of that magazine as shall desire them'.³³

Clifford, using his own money and with lead from his mines in the Yorkshire Dales, had the castle re-roofed and made fit for habitation; the drawbridges and portcullis were repaired, and the stables renovated to house a troop of cavalry.³⁴ The timber for these enterprises was provided by Clifford from his estates as a gift to the royal war effort, and according to the Cliffords' private accounts amounted to £200 in value.³⁵ The Cliffords were willing to meet this expense because possession of the Carlisle governorship was an important part of the

²⁷ McCarthy, Summerson, Annis, Perriam and Young, 'Carlisle Castle, A survey and documentary history', pp. 194–195

²⁸ Spence, 'Henry, Lord Clifford and the First Bishops' War, 1639', p. 139; McCarthy, Summerson, Annis, Perriam and Young, 'Carlisle Castle, A survey and documentary history', pp. 171–175.

²⁹ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 13, Sept 1638–Mar 1639, p. 376: SP 16/410 f.137; *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 13, Sept 1638–Mar 1639, p. 458: SP 16/412 f.236; *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 13: Sept 1638–Mar 1639, p. 459: SP 16/412 f.237.

³⁰ *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 13, 1638–1639, p. 376: SP 16/410 f.137.

³¹ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 13: Sept 1638–Mar 1639, p. 481: SP 16/413 f.64.

³² *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 13, 1638–1639, p. 481: SP 16/413 f.64.

³³ *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 13, 1638–1639, p. 481: SP 16/413 f.64.

³⁴ Spence, 'Henry, Lord Clifford and the First Bishops' War, 1639', pp. 139–140.

³⁵ Spence, 'Henry, Lord Clifford and the First Bishops' War, 1639', p. 148; Bolton MSS, Book 270, title 'Reparations'. V

network of offices that cemented their control over Cumberland and was essential in maintaining their dominance over the county's lesser gentlemen.³⁶ As previously stated, Carlisle was leased by Henry Clifford and his father from the Crown.³⁷ This lease had come with the title of governor of the castle, but in July 1639 the 21st Earl of Arundel, Lord Marshall, attempted to place his son Sir William Howard into command at Carlisle, threatening Clifford power in the region.³⁸ The attempt by the Earl Marshal to place one of his own family into the position was regarded by Henry Clifford as an unacceptable attempt to replace Clifford influence over Carlisle. Indeed, his concern was well-founded, as his failure to secure the election of his nominee for MP of Carlisle in the Short Parliament of 1640 demonstrated.³⁹ The level of seriousness with which Lord Clifford took this attack on his family's influence, was borne out by his decision to take the matter straight to the King. The meeting, as recounted by Sir Henry de Vic to Windebank, went as follows:

It is also said that Lord Clifford, who has yet 39 years [interest] in the castle of Carlisle, having acquainted his Majesty with the right he has in that place, his Majesty answered that he knew not of it, [whereupon] Lord Clifford said openly, that the Earl Marshal, if he pleased, might command in the town, but shall not in the castle.⁴⁰

Up unto this point Henry Clifford had been passionately devoted to the King and his cause. In a letter of 28 July 1638, he had written a letter to Charles declaring that the same blood ran in his veins as in his devotedly loyal ancestors.⁴¹ But the affront of the Earl Marshall's action, and the King's unthinking support for it, was so severe that it moved Clifford to confront the King himself.⁴² While overlapping legal and customary rights could be used to mobilise a greater

³⁶ Many of these gentlemen would later become royalist officers during the civil wars thanks to their links with the Cliffords, see Spence, 'Henry, Lord Clifford and the First Bishops' War, 1639', p. 147; Fissel, *Bishops' Wars*, pp. 88–89.

³⁷ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of James I*, vol. 1, 1605–1610, p. 204: SP 14/13 f.56: 'Warrant for a grant to Sir Hen. Leigh, of the keepership of Carlisle Castle, for life', p. 260: SP 14/60 f.22: 'Grant, in reversion to Francis Earl of Cumberland, and Henry Lord Clifford, of the office of Keeper of Carlisle Castle, for life'.

³⁸ Spence, 'Henry, Lord Clifford and the First Bishops' War, 1639', p. 154; *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 14: April–Sept 1639, p. 409: SP 16/426 f.59.

³⁹ Spence, 'Henry, Lord Clifford and the First Bishops' War, 1639', p. 156; Papers of Sir John Bankes, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS Bankes. 65/53; R. T. Spence, 'The Backward North Modernized? The Cliffords, Earls of Cumberland and the Socage Manor of Carlisle, 1611–1643', *Northern History* 20 (1984), 64–87, at pp. 84–87.

⁴⁰ *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 14: April–Sept 1639, p. 409: SP 16/426 f.59.

⁴¹ Spence, 'Henry, Lord Clifford and the First Bishops' War, 1639', p. 138.

⁴² Spence, 'Henry, Lord Clifford and the First Bishops' War, 1639', p. 154.

proportion of a locality's resources, it also raised the possibility of a clash between those two rights, and a consequent lack of unity at a critical juncture.

A similar process, of reinforcement and militarisation, occurred at Newcastle, where Clifford took over from Sir Jacob Astley.⁴³ Clifford organised the creation of a magazine in the city and armed the local gentry for war with weapons from this stockpile, as well as from the far larger amount stored at Hull. Stockpiles of grain were put in place in case of a future siege, and to support the expected field army, and cannons were placed upon the walls to secure the city's defences.⁴⁴ Unlike at Carlisle, there was never any effort to take away Clifford's Newcastle governorship, but his control over the city was never complete. He did not have as extensive a familial connection to the eastern city and, as the base for the royal army, the power of the King's other generals was considerably greater.

3.4 The Second Bishops' War and the Mechanics of Stuart Local Defence

The First Bishops' War had not ended in a lasting settlement between the Covenanters and the Crown, and conflict broke out once again in 1640. With the resumption of the wars, Northern England was once again placed into a state of mobilisation and militarisation. In the case of the county of Cumberland, documentary evidence has survived detailing the processes of mobilisation that Charles I ordered.⁴⁵ This document is the Carlisle Corporation's copy of the order. The document is composed of two parts, both located on the same page. In the first section were the King's general orders for mobilisation, while in the second section were the deputy lieutenants' more specific orders detailing which troops are to report to which fortresses for service. The order began:

Charles R: Trusty and welbeloued we great y[o]w well being in our owne reall P[er]son this far aduanced towards the froutyiers of this Kingdome to repell these rebells of our Kingdome of scotland, who haue now inuaded us and our subiects.⁴⁶

⁴³ Spence, 'Henry, Lord Clifford and the First Bishops' War, 1639', p. 141.

⁴⁴ Spence, 'Henry, Lord Clifford and the First Bishops' War, 1639', pp. 139–141.

⁴⁵ King's Letter: Mobilising [the trained bands] against the Scots Covenanters, 1640, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, PR 122/324.

⁴⁶ King's Letter: Mobilising [the trained bands] against the Scots Covenanters, 1640, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, PR 122/324.

The King's orders opened with both an invocation of Cumberland's traditional marcher function and an assurance that he was coming to deal with the problem personally.⁴⁷ Given the long history of violence in the borders, the King's description of an invasion of 'us and our subiects' from the North was calculated to enthuse his supporters in Cumberland.⁴⁸ Charles I's personalised model of monarchy was supported by his emphasis on the presence of 'our owne reall P[er]son' in the North.⁴⁹ It was important, for ensuring gentry support, that the King could be seen. Royal orders from London were a lot easier to undermine or ignore than the King in person, resistance to whom was blatantly treasonous. This was a favoured technique of Charles I that he employed throughout his reign, albeit with mixed results. While it sometimes produced compliance and submission, on other occasions it resulted in extremely damaging defiance, for example in the cases of the House of Commons and Hull in 1642.⁵⁰

The royal orders specified that it was not an invasion by 'the Scots', but by 'these rebells of our Kingdome of Scotland' that the officials of Cumberland were ordered to prepare for.⁵¹ The traditional narrative of a hostile kingdom to the North was complicated by the twin political

⁴⁷ King's Letter: Mobilising [the trained bands] against the Scots Covenanters, 1640, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, PR 122/324.

⁴⁸ Keith Durham, *Border Reiver 1513–1603* (London: Osprey, 2014); R. T. Spence, 'The Pacification of the Cumberland Borders, 1593–1628', *Northern History* 13 (1977), 59–160; *Calendar of State Papers Domestic, James I*, vol. 1, 1603–1610, p. 202: MC4323503201: 'Joint commission to five persons of England and five of Scotland, to remove all occasions of strangeness and marks of division between the countries, and to manage the government of the Border counties'.

⁴⁹ King's Letter: Mobilising [the trained bands] against the Scots Covenanters, 1640, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, PR 122/324. For the personalism inherent in Caroline and late Royalist military command, see Hughes, 'The King, the Parliament, and the Localities during the English Civil War', pp. 251–260.

⁵⁰ Charles I, King of Great Britain, France & Ireland, *His Maiesties letter to the Lord Keeper of the Great Seale of England. Concerning Sir Edward Herbert Knight, and the five members of the House of Commons, read in both Houses Mar. 9 1641* (London: John Wright & John Franke, 1642); Peter Bland, *AN ARGVMENT IN IVSTIFICATION OF The five Members ACCUSED By HIS MAIESTY. VVherein is proved, that the raising of this present Army by Authority of Parliament, is not Treason. By which it likewise appeareth, that never any King of England received losse or damage by any Parliament, from the first that ever was called, to this present Parliament* (London: John Field, 1643); Charles I, King of Great Britain, France & Ireland, *His Maiesties letter to the maior of Kingston upon Hull, 25. of Aprill. 1642* (London, s.n., 1642); Charles I, King of Great Britain, France & Ireland, *HIS MAJESTIES MESSAGE Sent from Beverley to both Houses of Parliament, 24. April. Concerning Sir Iohn Hothams refusall to permit His Majestie to enter into His Town of HULL. Together with a Petition presented unto His Majestie in the name of the Gentry, and Commons of the County of YORK. With His Majesties Letter to the Major, Aldermen, and Burgesses of the Town and Port of Kingston upon HULL. 25. April. 1642* (York: Robert Barker, 1642).

⁵¹ King's Letter: Mobilising [the trained bands] against the Scots Covenanters, 1640, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, PR 122/324.

necessities of both reinforcing Charles I's continued possession of both England and Scotland, and of denying legitimacy to the 'rebells'.

The first stage of the mobilisation process was 'to drawe together into a body all the trained bands both horse and foote wthin that Countye'.⁵² This was not useful for garrisoning, which would require a large number of smaller formations but would create a small field army capable of standing up against a serious Covenanter attack from either Dumfriesshire or the occupied regions of Northumberland. Garrisoning was to be left to the 'what other forces y^e: possibly can [raise]' who would ensure the 'secureinge and defence of ^{all} the passes wthin the...Countye'.⁵³ These levies, non-professional even by the standards of early-modern English militia, were only to be used in fixed defences, where the impact of their lack of training would be minimised. The order also established the chain of command these garrisons were to operate under, stating that 'Y^e are to obserue upon all occacons such orders and direcons: as y^w shall receiue from us: or ye cheife Commanders of our Army'.⁵⁴ The King made it clear that his authority could overrule that of his subordinates, a feature of Charles I's style of leadership that continued into the Royalist military hierarchy of the First English Civil War.⁵⁵

Also typical of later Royalist practice was the desire to maintain the appearance of consent by local elites. The version of Charles' orders recorded by the Carlisle Corporation included the specification that 'Orders agreed upon by the Consente of the deputye Leinetents of y^e County of Cumb[er]l[an]d'.⁵⁶ There was no legal requirement for the King's military subordinates to give their consent, but by including it in the record, irrespective of actual events, the tradition of unanimity in government and the image of local fidelity to the Crown were both maintained. The final part of the order confirmed that it was 'to be observed not onely by the trayned Bands, but by all those that are able to beare Armes for the defence of the same upon all Allarums or

⁵² King's Letter: Mobilising [the trained bands] against the Scots Covenanters, 1640, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, PR 122/324; see also Jonathan Worton, 'Ludlow's Trained Band: A study of militiamen in early Stuart England', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 91 (2013), 4–23; Braddick, *State Formation in Early Modern England*, p. 194.

⁵³ King's Letter: Mobilising [the trained bands] against the Scots Covenanters, 1640, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, PR 122/324.

⁵⁴ King's Letter: Mobilising [the trained bands] against the Scots Covenanters, 1640, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, PR 122/324.

⁵⁵ For a good summary of personalism in the Royalist military system, see Ann Hughes, 'The King, the Parliament, and the Localities during the English Civil War', *Journal of British Studies* 24 (1985), 236–262, at pp. 242–244.

⁵⁶ King's Letter: Mobilising [the trained bands] against the Scots Covenanters, 1640, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, PR 122/324.

invasion of y^e enemy.’⁵⁷ This made it clear that the forces raised to secure the garrison-fortresses of Cumberland in 1640 consisted of more than just the traditional militia, but that all of these forces were placed under the same command structure and ordinances of war.

3.5 Baronial Legacies in the Assembly of the Militia of Cumbria in the Second Bishops’ War

The complete mobilisation of the county’s men of fighting age, as opposed to solely the trained bands or smaller regiments, was an important distinction between the British Civil Wars and the previous conflicts in which the Stuart monarchy had engaged. Those prior wars had all been foreign expeditions, principally against France, using a small number of troops.⁵⁸ Furthermore, war within Charles I’s domains meant that the consequences of failure were much more severe for the King than, for example, failing to relieve the French Protestants at La Rochelle. La Rochelle may have lost Charles I Buckingham, the Second Bishops’ War cost him effective control over the government of Scotland.

The fact that fighting was taking place within the British Isles themselves also meant that large numbers of men could be placed in a state of readiness without reducing the agricultural workforce to an unacceptable level. ‘All those that are able to beare Armes’ would not have been put into action until the ‘invasion of ye enemy’ actually occurred.⁵⁹ This meant that, for the vast majority of the time, they continued at their work, instead of being non-productively engaged in soldering. As the Civil Wars escalated this would decline, the necessities of omnipresent formal garrisons and large field armies demanding great deals of manpower. But troops remained reluctant to serve outside their counties, and the model of the local emergency militia would remain the central feature of British domestic defence into the nineteenth century, before its resurrection during the World Wars.

The place of Rendesvous for the trayned bands both of horse and foote are appointed att Carlile: whither upon all occaccons they are commanded w[i]th all possible speede to repaire: each man being to bringe w[i]thin puision of victualls for fiue dayes.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ King’s Letter: Mobilising [the trained bands] against the Scots Covenanters, 1640, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, PR 122/324.

⁵⁸ Fissel’s *The Bishops’ Wars, Charles I’s campaigns against Scotland, 1638–1640*, p. 282.

⁵⁹ King’s Letter: Mobilising [the trained bands] against the Scots Covenanters, 1640, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, PR 122/324.

⁶⁰ King’s Letter: Mobilising [the trained bands] against the Scots Covenanters, 1640, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, PR 122/324.

The city, castle and citadel of Carlisle was the most important fortress in the county, and the natural gathering place for the trained bands. As outlined in the King's letter, both cavalry and infantry were to be gathered together into a single force. This would form a small field army capable of meeting any force the Covenanters' moved into the county. As was the case in the First Bishops' War, Carlisle was the central defensive feature in Cumberland. It was the only relatively modern fortress in the county, as well as the only city and most important market. Its strategic position, straddling not only the passes from Scotland into England but also Northumbria into Cumbria, was of absolute importance. It was also the seat of county administration, and where the deputy lieutenants met to agree upon the mobilisation orders. It was natural, given the urgent need to bring together a body of men capable of resisting a potentially imminent Covenanter incursion, that they were concentrated at Carlisle:

The place of Roundesuous for the inhabitants of the Country able to beare Armes, in tyme of Allarmes w[i]ch shalbe giuen noitce of by burneing of beacons or publique notice taken of Invasion of the enemye is appointed to be att the seu[e]rall houses of the seuerall lords of the man[ou]r: and landlords.⁶¹

In 1640, as in 1638 and 1642, the North of England moved to a state of war through a process of lordly mobilisation. At the highest levels, this meant great noble magnates such as the Cliffords, Cavendishes, and Stanleys, whose domineering position over whole counties' official and social hierarchy was vital in ensuring the effective mobilisation of both. This would become particularly important in 1642, given the collapse of normal administration, but was still highly significant during the Bishops' Wars. This analysis is borne out by the order for the levies to assemble at their houses of their landlords. Firstly, this was simply a practical measure, as a short, readily comprehensible order that would bring the levies together quickly. Almost all of the order's intended recipients would have known where their landlord lived, given that they had to pay rent to them, and aside from ordering them to assemble at their local church, it would have been the most prominent structure in their daily lives. However, this eminently practical concern was not the only mechanism that was at work in this order. If it was, why was the order to assemble at the landlords' houses rather than the parish churches? In seventeenth-century England, the social and official hierarchies closely corresponded with one another. Mobilising the populace for war, however necessary, posed serious dangers for gentlemen determined to preserve the social hierarchy. Their social inferiors needed to be armed and trained to fight,

⁶¹ King's Letter: Mobilising [the trained bands] against the Scots Covenanters, 1640, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, PR 122/324.

which could establish a rather problematic precedent and encourage rebellion. The solution was to ensure that the gentry was firmly embedded in the command structure, even at this early period of mobilisation.

In the case of Cumberland, there was also quite literally a baronial mobilisation in 1640, with the ancient baronies of the county forming the main martial-administrative units. The only named baronies were, ‘the Barrony of Burgh att Roccliffe: those of the Barrony of Graystoke att Graystuck Castle, those of the Barrony of Gilsland att Noward Castle’.⁶² These three baronies were the largest in northern Cumberland and surrounded the city of Carlisle itself.⁶³ The three named castles’ geographic distribution is worthy of comment, as it reveals a great deal about the strategic thinking behind the orders. Burgh-on-Sands is located immediately to the west of Carlisle, along the southern bank of Solway Firth. However, the men of the barony were not ordered to assemble at their *caput*, the titular burgh by the Solway sands, but at the castle of Rockcliffe.⁶⁴ No longer extant, Rockcliffe castle was also located along the shore, but to the North, rather than the west, of the city of Carlisle. This meant that, if the alarm had been sounded, the consequent body of men would have been placed between Carlisle and the likely attacking force from Dumfriesshire. This was obviously of greater use in an emergency than assembling the troops at Brugh, away from any possible Covenanter line of attack.

The barony of Gilsland was the largest of the three named baronies and was east of Carlisle. The barony court was located in Brampton, but, given that Brampton castle was a single earthen motte that had long fallen out of use as anything other than a beacon, it was natural that the barony’s soldiers were to assemble at Naworth Castle.⁶⁵ The former Barons, the Dacres of the North, had gone extinct in 1569 and the castle was now owned by William Howard (1563–1640), the third son of the fourth Duke of Norfolk and one of James I & VI commissioners of the borders.⁶⁶ Naworth castle is located at the head of the valley of the South Tyne river. This

⁶² King’s Letter: Mobilising [the trained bands] against the Scots Covenanters, 1640, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, PR 122/324.

⁶³ Anon, ‘A Guide to Superior Lordship in Cumbria’, Manorial Records: University of Lancaster, [<http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/fass/projects/manorialrecords/cumbria/map.htm>], accessed 02/2018.

⁶⁴ King’s Letter: Mobilising [the trained bands] against the Scots Covenanters, 1640, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, PR 122/324; Anon, ‘A Guide to Superior Lordship in Cumbria’.

⁶⁵ Anon, ‘A Guide to Superior Lordship in Cumbria’.

⁶⁶ Richard Ovenden and Stuart Handley, ‘Howard, Lord William (1563–1640)’, in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn, Sept 2004,

valley is the only practicable route from Cumberland into Northumberland, lying as it does between the North Pennines and the Cheviot Hills. A garrison here prevented any advance into Cumbria from the east coast or any attack on Newcastle from the west.

Finally, the barony, and castle, of Graystoke is located to the south of Carlisle, just west of Penrith.⁶⁷ Located in the Eden river valley, this was the only practical route south for a large body of soldiers. To the east are the Pennines, while the west is blocked by the Cumbrian mountains. To move an invading army from northern Cumberland to Lancaster or Yorkshire, it would be necessary to pass Graystoke before marching south *via* Penrith and Kendal. This made it the perfect location to intercept any force which either bypassed or overwhelmed the northern fortresses before it was able to move further into England. The named castles' positions remained just as strategically important as they had always been, and the choice of these particular castles as rallying points was selected primarily for this reason. The King's letter further clarified that:

Each man to bring wth him vii: dayes prouision: and euery Man his Knapsack w[i]th him and in the meane tyme to provide themselues w[i]th Armes for the defence of them selues wifes children and Counteye.⁶⁸

The phrase 'for the defence of them selues wifes children and Counteye' was designed as an emotional appeal, aimed at encouraging the congregant, or reader in the marketplace, to fulfil the order to the best of their ability. Like the men of the trained bands, the other levies were ordered to bring victuals for themselves, in this case, sufficient for a week. Unlike the trained bands, the levies were emergency troops, designed to be brought together in a crisis and consequently lacking the same commissarial structure needed to support them. It is therefore unsurprising that they were required to bring slightly more victuals, seven days' worth, as opposed to the five days' worth required by the trained bands. The levies were also required, after the receipt of the order but before the alarum-call, to provide themselves with weapons.

<https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-13947?rskey=Gq8V46&result=14>, accessed 11/2017.

⁶⁷ Anon, 'Graystoke', Cumbrian County History Trust, [<https://www.cumbriacountyhistory.org.uk/township/greystoke>], accessed 02/2018.

⁶⁸ King's Letter: Mobilising [the trained bands] against the Scots Covenanters, 1640, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, PR 122/324.

The order does not specify what weapons these would be but was likely to be limited to pikes and other weapons which could be manufactured easily by village carpenters and blacksmiths. Black-powder weapons were unlikely. This is significant for any history of Cumbrian castles in the Bishops' Wars, as it means that the levies could not have been used to their full potential in the defence of those castles. The purpose of pikes in contemporary warfare was to keep cavalry away from the musketeers and cannons during a field battle. In siege defence, they could, at a pinch, be used to prevent an assault through a breach in the walls, but even at this task their extreme length made them far from the ideal weapon. There are one of two possibilities. Either the levies were to be armed more appropriately when they arrived at their assembly points, or they would be used in field operations, but any conclusion is speculative owing to a lack of surviving evidence.

3.6 Conclusions and Impacts

There were three major impacts of the Bishops' Wars on Northern England in terms of fortification. The principal fortresses guarding the north-south passes between Scotland into England, namely Carlisle and Newcastle were militarised to resist Covenanter attack and to support the royal army's operations. Both cities were extensively renovated, and their fortifications repaired as part of the war preparations. This was carried out using a combination of royal, lordly and civic power to mobilise resources for the fortification effort. Lord Clifford had a deep familial and personal connection with the government of the city of Carlisle, which he used to gather resources from his Yorkshire estates to reinforce the city. He would do the same thing in reverse at the outbreak of civil conflict in Yorkshire in the summer of 1642.

The role played by the Cliffords and other noble magnates were not the only occasion in which the mechanisms of a traditional, baronial mobilisation were used by the royal war effort. The summons of the male population of Cumberland to arms was organised around several castles controlling the main routes to Carlisle, to which the inhabitants of a particular barony were summoned. Firstly, this ensured that there would be blocking forces in place to prevent any surprise advance upon the city from any direction. While this system would never be tested, as the Covenanter army advanced along the east coast rather than try the longer route through Dumfriesshire and the Cumbrian mountains, it demonstrated that the castle still formed the focus of contemporary conceptions of local defence. This 'baronial mobilisation' embraced not only lordly magnates such as Lord Clifford but also the structures, both physical and administrative, of the ancient baronial system of Cumberland.

Chapter Four: Fortress Cities and Covenanter Government in Northern England

4.1 Introduction, Historiography and Methodology

Ultimately neither Carlisle nor Newcastle had their defences tested during the Bishops' Wars. Newcastle surrendered without a fight after the Covenanter victory at the Battle of Newburn.¹ The city was then subjected to a Covenanter occupation which lasted until their withdrawal a year later.² One of the main distinctions between the Southern and Northern English theatres of the First Civil War was the presence of Covenanter armies in the latter. Following the signing of the Solemn League and Covenant between the Scottish and English Parliaments, the Covenanter army crossed the Tweed to begin its campaign against Newcastle's army.³ Moving with his army to defend his titular city, Newcastle was forced to retreat to Yorkshire following the collapse of the Royalist position after the defeat of Lord Belasyse at the battle of Selby on 11 April 1644.⁴ The consequence of this retreat was the renewed Covenanter occupation of Northumberland and Newcastle-upon-Tyne.⁵

¹ Fissel, *The Bishops' Wars*, pp. 54–60; Boyd Zacharie, *The Battel of Nevvbyrne: Where the Scots Armie obtained a notable victorie against the English Papists, Prelasts and Arminians, the 28 day of August 1640, the Second Edition* (Glasgow: George Anderson, 1643), p. 22.

² Scottish Army, *Our Demands of the English Lords manifested being at Rippon Octob. 8. 1640. With Answers to the Complaints and Greivances Given in by the Bishop of Durham, Northumberland, and some of Nevvcastle: said to be committed by our Army* (London: Margery Mar-Prelat, 1640), pp. a2–a3; for further information on the presses, used to distribute Covenanter propaganda in London see David Como, *Radical Parliamentarians and the English Civil War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 50–88; David Como, 'Secret Printing, the Crisis of 1640, and the Origins of Civil War Radicalism', *Past & Present* 196 (2007), 37–82, at p. 52–53; Anon, *His Maiesties passing through the Scots armie: As also, His entertainment by Generall Lesly. Together with the manner of the Scots marching out of New-Castle; Related by the best Intelligence* (Edinburgh: s.n., 1641), pp. 1–5.

³ Anon, *The Scots army advanced into England Certified in a Letter, Dated from Addarston, the 24 of Ianuary: From his Excellncies the Lord Generall Lesley's Qaurters. With the Summoning of the Country of Northumberland: Expressed in a Letter by the Commissioners and Committees of both Kingdoms, to Sir Thomas Glemham Governor of Newcastle, And to the Colonells, Officers and Gentlemen of the forenamed County: With Sir Tho: Glemhams Answer thereunto. Together, With a Declaration of the Committees, for Billeting of Souldiers in those Parts. As also, the Articles and Ordinances for the governing their Army* (London: Robert Bostock, 1644), pp. 3–5.

⁴ Ferdinando Fairfax, *A letter sent from the right honorable the Lord Fairfax, to the committee of both kingdoms: concerning the great victory, lately obtained (by Gods blessing) at Selby in York-shire* (London: Edward Husband, 1644); Anon, *A victorious conquest neer Selby in Yorkeshire* (London: Andrew Cole, 1644); Joseph Caryl, *The saints thankfull acclamation at Christs resumption of his great power and the initials of his kingdome. Delivered in a sermon at Westminster, before the Honourable House of Commons, upon the day of their solemne Thanksgiving unto God, for the great victory given our armie, under the command of the noble Lord Fairfax, at Selby in Yorke-shire and to other the Parliaments forces in Pembroke-shire, April 23^d, 1644* (London: Giles Calvert, 1644), pp. 1, 35–36.

⁵ A. Humble, *A letter from Newcastle to the Right Honourable, the Lord High Chancellour of Scotland and the rest of the Scottish Commissioners at London. Containing a Relation of the taking of the Town*

While the interaction between the Covenanters and the English Parliamentarians within the framework of the Solemn League and Covenant has been the subject of significant historical enquiry, the occupation of Northern England has been neglected. This chapter deals principally with the towns of Carlisle and Newcastle and argues that these two fortified spaces were central to a Covenanter government over Northern England that lasted for over two years, between late 1644 and early 1647. This occupation government is not a significant feature of the historiography of the Covenanters. In Stewart's *Reflections on the Scottish Revolution*, Newcastle is mentioned only twice, on both occasions in the contexts of the Bishops' Wars.⁶

Therefore, the term 'Covenanter government' requires some clarification, for it has not been widely used concerning the occupation of Northern England after Marston Moor. What Laura Stewart referred to as the 'Covenanted State' ruled the northernmost counties of England for two years, imposing military authorities over local corporations, dictating local affairs and raising revenues from local sources.⁷ What better term can be used to describe these processes of administration than 'government'? It is also better to describe this government as 'Covenanter', or 'Scottish Covenanter' rather than simply as 'Scottish'. This is for the same reason that it is problematic to use the simple term 'English' to refer to the forces of the English Parliament. As outlined in the introduction to this thesis, the British Civil Wars were not just a series of civil wars between the three components of the Stuart dynastic agglomerate, but also saw intense conflict within those kingdoms themselves.⁸ However, it is important not to take this line of thought beyond the evidence. Despite their British ambitions, including the establishment of common mechanisms of parliamentary government, and the spreading of Presbyterian Church government and doctrine to England, Wales and Ireland, the Covenanters

of Nevvcastle by Storm (London: Robert Bostock and Samuel Gellibrand, 1644), pp. 1–5; Anon, *A declaration wherein is full satisfaction given concerning Sir Edward Deering: with a true relation of the Scots preceedings of about the surrendering of Newcastle* (London: Andrew Coe, 1644), pp. 3–5; Anon, *A Full relation of the Scots besieging Newcastle and their taking the glasse houses, and other forts...* (London: Bernard Alsey, 1644), pp. 3–6; Anon, *The True intelligence sent to this kingdome, concerning the taking in of the town of New-castle: with, Copies of the letters, and other Passages, that occurred betwixt our Army and those in the Town...* (Edinburgh: Evan Tyler, 1644).

⁶ Stewart, *Rethinking the Scottish Revolution: Covenanted Scotland, 1637–1651*, pp. 186, 299.

⁷ Stewart, *Rethinking the Scottish Revolution: Covenanted Scotland, 1637–1651*.

⁸ Goodare, 'The Rise of the Covenanters, 1637–1644', p. 57.

did not aim at the permanent addition of Northern England to Scotland, despite English worries to that effect.⁹

It is for this reason that this chapter will use the term ‘Covenanter government’, rather than Stewart’s ‘Covenanted government’. While possessing all the effective features of a government, the Covenanter occupation was not to be the direct means by which England’s Church and society were to be reformed in line with its Scottish counterpart. There was no wholesale reformation of Church and state, indeed the similarities in practice between the Covenanter and Royalist military governments are striking. Subsequent chapters will argue that while the Royalist government was *improvised*, it was not *innovative*. Much the same can be said of the Covenanter government in Northern England. Instead, it existed both to meet the security needs of the Covenanters and Parliamentarians in suppressing a stronghold of Royalism, and to provide additional strength to the Covenanters’ negotiating position in London. The occupation of the Northern counties, and the subsidies that the Covenanter army required, would also improve the financial situation of the Committee of Estates, who were now supporting military forces in Northern England, Ulster, and the Scottish Highlands.¹⁰

⁹ ‘We have it in charge from both Houses to demand of your Lordships and the rest of this Committee that, in pursuance of the large treaty of both kingdoms, the works about Carlisle be slighted and the place dismantled, and that the Scottish garrison put in there without the consent of the Parliament of England be forthwith removed...We have it in charge to demand of this Committee that the several garrisons in Warkworth Castle, Tynemouth Castle, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Hartlepool, Stockton Castle, and Thirlwall Castle, being placed there without the consent of the English Parliament or their committees, may be speedily removed.’ See *Calendar of State Papers Domestic, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 21, July 1645–Dec 1647, p. 114: SP 16/510 f.159: ‘Copies of the Five Papers intended to have been given in to the Scots’ Committee, which should have treated with the Commissioners from the Parliament of England, only on reference ...’; Chad van Dixhoorn, ‘Scottish influence on the Westminster Assembly: a study of the synod’s summoning ordinance and the Solemn League and Covenant’, *Scottish Church History* 37 (2007), 55–88.

¹⁰ Phillip Sidney, *An armie for Ireland, conducted by the Lord Lithe., son to the right honourable, the Earle of Licester, Lord Deputy of Ireland. Being a vote of both houses in Parliament for the sending of speedy ayd into Ireland, consisting both of the Scottish and English army, speaking of the great feare that the city of Dublin hath been in, and in what danger to be taken sundry times, but now most valiantly defended by the Scottish volunteers, and the English army. With an excellent copy of a letter sent from the Lord Moore to Sir William Barker in England, speaking of all the greivances and miseries of the Protestants whatsoever, as also of all the bloody designes that the rebels intended to take the castle* (London: John Greensmith, 1642); Robert Munro, *A trve relation of the proceedings of the Scottish armie now in Ireland by three letters the first sent from General Major Monroe to Generall Leslie his excellence; the second writ by the Major and aldermen of London-Derry to Generall Major Monroe; the third sent by the Earle of Antrvm to Generall Major Monroe; which letters were sent by Generall Major Monroe to Generall Leslie his excellence* (London: John Bartlet, 1642); William Thompson, *Montrosse totally routed at Tividale in Scotland on Saturday last, by Lieutenant Generall Lesly, where were taken and kill'd two thousand foot, eight hundred horse, and nine knights; and all the Kings papers and writings sent to Montrosse are taken. Sent to a member of the Honorable House of Commons, and appointed to be forthwith printed* (London: Edward Husband, 1645); Cuthbert Sydenham, *Declaration*

It is also worthy of note that this chapter and the entire dissertation will consistently use the term ‘Covenanter’ or ‘Scottish Covenanter’ as opposed to the typical ‘Scottish’. The convention of referring to the Covenanters, particularly when in England or Ireland, as ‘the Scots’ is a common feature of the historiography all the way back to Trevelyan and before—the term being used to describe the Covenanter invasion in contemporary polemic.¹¹ By contrast even when on campaigns in Scotland and Ireland, the Parliamentarians are typically termed the ‘English Parliamentarians’ far more consistently than simply ‘the English’.¹² The Scottish origins of the Covenanter regime and army were not ignored by contemporary critics; for example, a petition from Newcastle that used a number of Scottish stereotypes in its attack on the Covenanter army.¹³ In this way, nationality formed an important part of Northern English hostility to the Covenanters, a natural legacy of the region’s history as a border region. The term’s use in historiography is a natural extension of the tripartite division into separate ‘national’ histories which this thesis, for reasons outlined in the introduction, has rejected.

Because of this rejection, this dissertation will not follow this pattern, instead choosing to distinguish between the Scots and the Covenanter regime. The first important reason for this distinction is the observation that the ‘Covenanter’ and ‘Scots’ are not synonymous, as the civil war in Scotland—particularly the campaigns of Montrose—clearly demonstrated.¹⁴ The Covenanters may have captured many of the institutions of the Scottish state, but so had the

of the Committee of Estates of the Parliament of Scotland, in vindication of their proceedings from the aspersions of a scandalous pamphlet, published by that excommunicate traytor, James Grahame (London: John Macock & Francis Tyton, 1650).

¹¹ See, Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1.

¹² Although this may be because Cromwell fought English as well as Irish Royalists in Ireland, in addition to the Confederates, as well as a tendency in historiography to biographise the ‘Cromwellian’ conquest. See John Cunningham, ‘Oliver Cromwell and the “Cromwellian” settlement of Ireland’, *The Historical Journal* 53 (2010), 919–937, at pp. 919–920.

¹³ Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1, pp. 1–2, 6–7.

¹⁴ Ronald Williams, *Montrose* (Isle of Colonsay: House of Lochar, 2001), pp. 272–275; Anon, *A true relation of the happy success of His Maiesties forces in Scotland under the conduct of Lord Iames Marquisse of Montrose His Excellencie, agains the rebels there. Also, causes of a solemne fast and humiliation kept by the rebells in that kingdom. According to a copy printed formerly at Edinburgh* (Oxford: L. Lichfield, 1645); Anon, *A True relation of the happy successe of His Majesties forces in Scotland under the conduct of the Lord Iames, Marqvisse of Montrose His Excellencie, against the rebels there also, causes of a solemne fast and humiliation kept by the rebells in that Kingdom : according to a copy printed formerly at Edinbvrgh* (London: s.n., 1645); Anon, *The true relation of the late & happie victorie, obtained by the Marques of Montrose his Excellencie, His Majesties Lieuetenant, and Generall Governour of the kingdom of Scotland against General Lieuetenant Baylie, and others of the rebels, at Kilsyth, 15 August, 1645* (Aberdeen: J. Brown, 1645).

Parliamentarians for England; in both cases, there was enough rejection to this state capture to sustain significant parties of Royalist opposition capable of waging civil war. Therefore, analytic consistency suggests using similarly denationalised terminology for both parties; this would also bring the terminology of Scottish armies abroad more closely in line with historiography's approach to English Parliamentarian and Irish Confederate armies in Ireland in the period. Scots also fought with the Royalist armies in England, such as 'Major of the House' William Farmer at Lathom House and several officers of the Royalist garrison of Carlisle.¹⁵ Carlisle in particular had a large number of Scottish officers and lords in the Royalist garrison, whose intense hostility to the Covenanters stemmed from their defeat and subsequent dispossession during the Bishops' Wars.¹⁶ Anglo-Scottish ethnic conflict in the 'British Middle Shires' was not part of these Royalists' reasons for refusing to surrender to Leven; rather it was a distinctively Scottish hostility to the Covenanter regime based on Episcopalian religion or familial rivalry with the Campbells.¹⁷

Furthermore, while ethnic stereotyping formed part of Northern Royalist hostility to the Covenanters, other examples of specifically English Royal and Royalist mobilisation rejected or moderated this approach. The Royal Mobilisation orders of 1640—analysed in the previous chapter—defined the Covenanters as 'rebels of our Kingdom of Scotland', explicitly denying them the sovereignty of the realm and implicitly denying their right to represent the Scottish

¹⁵ Colin Pilkington, *To play the man: The story of Lady Derby and the Siege of Lathom House, 1643–1645* (Preston: Carnegie Publishing, 1991), p. 35; Tullie, *Siege of Carlisle*, p. 9.

¹⁶ Amongst the Royalist garrison of Carlisle included 'The Lord Aboyne, Lord Maxwell, Lord Harris, S. James Lesley, S^r William Hayes, M^r Barklay, Cap^t Gordon, Nesbut, wth a few more Scots Lievtenants, Ensigns, quartermaisters, etc. sans nombre'. See Tullie, *Siege of Carlisle*, p. 9.

¹⁷ James Gordon, 2nd Viscount Aboyne had fought the Covenanters during the Second Bishops War, serving as King's Lieutenant in Northern Scotland. In 1643 he was involved in negotiations with the Earl of Antrim to bring an Irish Royalist army from Ulster to Western Scotland. Trapped in Carlisle, he escaped the besieged city in April 1645 to join Montrose. See David Stevenson, 'Gordon, James, second Viscount Aboyne (d. 1649)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn, Sept 2004, [https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-11050], accessed 03/2021. Lord Robert Maxwell was the 1st Count of Nithsdale and lord of Caerlaverock in Dumfriesshire. Maxwell had garrisoned his castles against the Covenanters at Charles I's urging until Caerlaverock fell on 26 September 1640 after a two-month siege. In 1643 he was accused of treason and his estates were confiscated and he was then excommunicated by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland after leading an attack on Dumfries from Carlisle on 26 April 1644. See J. R. M. Sizer, 'Maxwell, Robert, first earl of Nithsdale (b. after 1586, d. 1646)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn, Sept 2004, [https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-67520], accessed 03/2021.

nation, even as he appealed to traditional Cumbrian hostility to invasions from the North.¹⁸ The use of ‘national’ terms also implies that the British Civil Wars were primarily a conflict of ethnic fragmentation—like, for example, the Yugoslav Wars—which was not the case. Emphasis on faction, rather than nation, acknowledges the internal political fragmentation of the Stuart realms in the conflict; it also brings the conflict together into a single war, with archipelagic strategic considerations driving military decision making.¹⁹

Finally, Covenanter ideology, while decisively shaped by the Scottish Reformation, was British in its scope of ambition, aiming as it did at enforcing Presbyterian church government across the entire British Isles; Argyll, the dominant figure within Scottish politics for most of the Covenanter period, made these ambitions clear when he declared that ‘let nothing make us again two, who are so many ways one—all of one language, in one island, all under one king, one in religion, yea one in covenant; so that in effect we differ in nothing but in name (as brethren do) which I wish also removed, that we might be one if the two kingdoms think fit.’²⁰ A key benefit in analysing the occupation of Northern England as ‘Covenanter’ rather than ‘Scottish’ is in seeing how the authorities in both Edinburgh and London negotiated the impact of the Solemn League and Covenant on the local level. The Covenanters’ actions in England aimed to secure both their ‘Scottish’ and ‘British’ interests, which they saw as basically the same. Dominance over the fortresses of Newcastle and Carlisle secured Scotland from invasion, but it also allowed Edinburgh to project power into England, helping to sustain its ambitions for the Presbyterian Party at Westminster, ambitions ultimately thwarted by the New Model Army’s emergence as an independent political force.²¹ An emphasis on a ‘Scottish’ occupation distorts this picture, perpetuating a limited and arguably Anglocentric image of the conflict which this thesis regards as inappropriate.

¹⁸ King’s Letter: Mobilising [the trained bands] against the Scots Covenanters, 1640, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, PR 122/324.

¹⁹ For example, the Earl of Derby was sent to the Isle of Man to counter a perceived threat to Northern England from the Covenanter army in Ulster, see Broxap, *The Great Civil War in Lancashire: 1642–1651*, p. 86

²⁰ John Rushworth, *Historical Collections of Private Passages of State*, 8 vols. (London: D. Browne, 1621–1622), vol. VI, pp. 298–322

²¹ Braddick, *God’s Fury, England’s Fire*, pp. 473–504

4.2 The First Covenanter Occupation, the Alienation of Civil Society and the Emergence of Northumbrian Royalism

The Covenanter army under Lord Leslie crossed the Tweed on 20 August 1640.²² It then moved south, unopposed by the royal army, before scattering the English forces after a brief battle at Newburn on the Tyne on 28 August.²³ Two days later his forces occupied Newcastle, which they would hold for over a year. Following this disaster, on 21 October the King agreed to the Treaty of Ripon, which ended active hostilities.²⁴ But this did not lead to an immediate Covenanter withdrawal from Northumberland. The Covenanter army would still be in Newcastle when the King arrived on 13 August 1641, on his way to Edinburgh to finally settle affairs with the Covenanters.²⁵ It would withdraw to Leith before disbanding at the end of the same month.²⁶ Although it lasted an entire year, the details of how the first period of the Covenanter occupation of Newcastle functioned are extremely vague, owing to a lack of source material. No corporate records survive from before 1645. This is because all prior records disappeared during the 1644 siege, which ended in the Covenanters taking the city once again. Neither has the author found detailed Covenanter records of the first occupation. Both traditional administrative historical approaches, and the new methodology for Royalist administrative history advocated by this study, unfortunately, fail in the case of Newcastle.

There is however a single invaluable source that does provide some details of this highly significant period of Newcastle's Civil War history. This is a single petition addressed 'To the Leaders of ye Scottish Army' currently located in the Tyne and Wear Archives.²⁷ The document's provenance is somewhat problematic. While written during the first Covenanter occupation, it is undated and could have been produced in either 1640 or 1641. The petitioner's identity is also highly unclear. They did not leave their full name, merely describing themselves as 'Bilton Frind in NewCastle Streete.' It is impossible to confirm whether 'Bilton' does indeed refer to an author, owing to the aforesaid disappearance of Newcastle's corporate records. However, it would be incorrect to say that there is absolutely nothing that can be said about the petition's writer. The document was expertly written, with clear and even lineation, regular

²² Fissel, *The Bishops' Wars*, pp. 52–53.

²³ Fissel, *The Bishops' Wars*, pp. 54–60; Zacharie, *The Battel of Nevvbrne*, p. 22.

²⁴ Emberton, *The Civil War Day by Day*, p. 4.

²⁵ Anon, *His Maiesties passing through the Scots armie*, pp. 1–5.

²⁶ Anon, *His Maiesties passing through the Scots armie*, pp. 6–7; Emberton, *The Civil War Day by Day*, p. 6.

²⁷ Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1. A full semi-diplomatic transcription of this source is available in Appendix 1 of this dissertation.

spelling and letterforms, and almost no otiose strokes or blotches. This meant that it was written by a professional scribe, suggesting that whoever had it produced had wealth and prominence to employ such a scrivener. This, combined with the extreme level of attachment to Newcastle displayed in the petition, suggests a member of the city oligarchy. As an openly polemical document, it is inappropriate to take the petition as a statement of clear fact. It is, however, useful, particularly in comparison with *Our Demands of the English Lords manifested being at Rippon* – a pamphlet published in London by the Covenanters which included their viewpoint on the occupation of Newcastle, in exploring the mentalities of occupied and occupier.²⁸ The inflammatory rhetoric and mutually contradictory narratives of these two sources demonstrated how the experience of occupation was constructed for rival polemical purposes, and how both citizens and occupiers conceptualised themselves as virtuous and persecuted by the other.

While mentioning a few specific grievances, the petition did not follow normal practices. It was highly disrespectful instead of adopting a tone of deference. In addition to its specific complaints, it also contained sweeping statements of the illegitimacy of the Covenanters' war efforts, the perfidy of their army, and the irreligious nature of their leadership. It began by declaring that its purpose was 'to informe that yee are men who protest protest protest but neuer pforme'.²⁹ The use of mockery made it clear that the petitioner did not regard the Covenanter army's leadership as being worthy of any respect at all. An ironic comparison between the Covenanters' declarations, and their actions, was used to demonstrate the hypocrisy which the petitioner attributed to them, 'For wee well remmember how the last yeare *the* mayne drift & Scope of all yowr Antimarthiall Bookes, Protestatons and declaratcons were onely to mayntaine the lawfullnes of Defensiue Armes.'³⁰ The Covenanter authorities were careful in publishing declarations to justify their actions to the literate public across Britain³¹ Efforts at countering this propaganda included the publication of a ballad declaring that Newcastle's capture was because the Covenanter were '*Machiavillians, and faythles truce breakers*'.³² The Covenanters'

²⁸ Scottish Army, *Our Demands of the English Lords manifested being at Rippon*, pp. 3–6.

²⁹ Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1, p. 1.

³⁰ Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1, pp. 1–2.

³¹ Scottish Army, *Our Demands of the English Lords manifested being at Rippon*; Como, *Radical Parliamentarians and the English Civil War*, pp. 50–88; Como, 'Secret Printing, the Crisis of 1640, and the Origins of Civil War Radicalism', at p. 52–53; David Stevenson, 'A Revolutionary Regime and the Press: The Scottish Covenanters and their Printers, 1638–51', *The Library*, 6th Ser. VII, 4 (1985), 315–337.

³² Martin Parker, *Newes from New-castle with An Advertisement, To all English men that (for the safety of themselves, their King and Country) they would abandon the fond opinion, (which too many doe conceave) of the Scots good meaning to England, which our fore-fathers have ever experienced to the*

subsequent embrace of the ‘Bugbeare’ of invasion, according to the petitioner, had brought down the very ‘Curse and direfull Anathema’ which they had promised would attend any English invasion of Scotland upon their heads.³³

The militarisation of Newcastle was described in graphic terms. The ‘English were such Simple plaine dealing men as to lye downe, Sleepe on’ before the ‘drums and Bagpipes the Clashing of yor Armes...in or Streets did at length waken us from o[u]r dull Latheagie’.³⁴ The narrative the petitioner established was of an unwelcome and sudden transformation from peace to war, imposed on a reluctant populace. This was not wholly accurate, and the petition acknowledged that the city had already served as the base of operations for the royal army assembled to fight the Covenanters.³⁵ But it claimed that ‘Thus haue yow by degrees made yowr selues Masters of a Towne thee neuer Conquered, thee were admitted by us as freindes but contrary to the law of Armes by way of requitall thee haue used us as slaues and in a disgracefull way disarmed us as if wee were Conquered people.’³⁶

The insistence that Newcastle willingly let the Covenanter army in and that they were not allowed under the rules of war fully to occupy the city formed the bedrock of the petitioner’s arguments. Customary martial law dictated that if a city was taken by storm the occupier was free to dispose of it as they wished.³⁷ The petitioner argued that, since neither siege nor storm had occurred, the Covenanters had no right to dispose of the city as they saw fit.³⁸ According to the petition, the sheriff of Tynedale had gone to meet the leaders of the Covenanter host

contrary; they having bin oftentimes found to bee circumventing Machiavillians, and faythles truce breakers. This dity was written upon some occasion of newes from the North; containing the Scots surprizing of New-Castle, where they left three thousand men in Garison, with a briefe touch of some of our brave Cavaleirs who manfully fought in that conflict (London: E.G., 1640).

³³ Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1, pp. 1–2.

³⁴ Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1, pp. 1–2.

³⁵ See Fissel, *The Bishops’ Wars*, pp. 4, 16–18, 22, 26, 93, 154, 198, 208.

³⁶ Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1, pp. 14–16.

³⁷ Randall Lesaffer, ‘Siege warfare and the early modern laws of war’, in eds. E. J. Broers, B. C. M. Jacobs, & R. C. H. Lesaffer, *Ius Brabanticum, ius commune, ius gentium: Opstellen aangeboden aan prof. mr. J. P. A. Coopmans ter gelegenheid van zijn tachtigste verjaardag* (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006), p. 96; originally quoting Francisco de Vitoria, *Relectio de iure belli*, eds. and trans. Anthony Pagaden and Heremy Jawrance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 319–321; Pierino Belli, and Herbert Nutting (trans.), *De re militari et bello tractatus*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Classics of International Law, 1936), vol. II, p. 131; Balthasar de Ayla, and Jgn Pate (trans.), *De Jure et Officiis Bellicis et Disciplina Militari libri III*, 2 vols., (Washington: Classics of International Law, 1912), vol. II, pp. 37–39; Albericus Gentilis, and John Rolfe (trans.), *De Irue Belli libri tres*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Classics of International Law, 1933), vol. II, p. 216.

³⁸ Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1, pp. 14–16.

outside Newcastle after ‘ye Skrimish’, and the only demands had been for ‘prouision for their money’ but he did ‘treate onely for what ye Towne could spare’.³⁹ The Covenanters had, therefore ‘perjured’ themselves by taking possession of the city and seizing its financial resources. The petitioner stated that ‘This Lord did protest as in the presence of God and his holy Angells that none but the Commissary w[i]th ye Generalls life-guard should be lodged in the Towne but now whole Regmnte are there quartered and instead of guing to the Kings Maty’, and also declared that ‘If wee had suspected such basenes in yow wisdomes would haue taught us too Cutt yor throates first and then dyed. Dyed freemen.’⁴⁰ This sentiment, that fighting would have been a better option, is important in explaining the city’s later Royalism, which meant that it was the only major city in Northern England to be stormed rather than surrender on terms.⁴¹ The Covenanters argued for ‘the necessity of our stay at New-Castle, with our Army, till we sent supplications to his Majesty’.⁴² The image of a reluctant occupation of the city, only undertaken under ‘neccesity’ was central in the fashioning of the occupation as a defensive act, rather than an aggressive act against England. By contrast, the petition identified the townsfolk as the victims of a coercive and exploitative military regime and stated that:

I am sure yowr ransacking of our houses teaking oppen *our* dores locks, Chests Canbinettes and what not drawing our Cattle treading downe a[I]l Corne fieldes pulling it upp by the Rootes snatching the bread from *our* mouthes doe all Cry out ag[ains]t yowr yowr damned pjury, but thee tell us the borrow onely, yet w[i]thout leave making Scottish promises to pay but when!⁴³

Any large army was forced to procure supplies from its surroundings, resulting in the seizure of crops and livestock for food, and the destruction of trees for firewood. The formulaic statements of ‘snatching bread from o[u]r mouthes’ made it clear that the petitioner perceived that the Covenanter troops were engaged in outright theft.⁴⁴ Covenanter sources naturally

³⁹ Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1, pp. 10–11.

⁴⁰ Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1, pp. 10–11; Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1, pp. 14–16.

⁴¹ Humble, *A letter from Newcastle to the Right Honourable, the Lord High Chancellour of Scotland and the rest of the Scotch Commissioners at London. Containing a Relation of the taking of the Town of Nevvcastle by Storm*, pp. 1–5; Anon, *A declaration wherein is full satisfaction given concerning Sir Edward Deering: with a true relation of the Scots preceedings of about the surrendering of Newcastle*, pp. 3–5; Anon, *A Full relation of the Scots besieging Newcastle and their taking the glasse houses, and other forts...* pp. 3–6; Anon, *The True intelligence sent to this kingdome, concerning the taking in of the town of New-castle...*

⁴² Scottish Army, *Our Demands of the English Lords manifested being at Rippon*, p. 3.

⁴³ Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1, pp. 6–7.

⁴⁴ Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1, pp. 6–7.

denied this, claiming that ‘They denyed us; that their Bakers and Brewers should provide us any bread and drinke... We finding they had resolution to starve us’.⁴⁵ Therefore ‘it behoved us to take it’ even though ‘When we had Corne, we could not get it ground, they saying their Millers were fled’.⁴⁶ Neither of these competing narratives is provable, but both demonstrate the mentality of the occupier and the occupied during food shortages. Both argued that the other was hoarding supplies for themselves: the Covenanter argument relied upon the supposed unreasonableness of the townsfolk in denying them supplies, while the petitioner’s argument focused on the fact that it was ‘o[u]r dores locks’ and ‘our Cattle’ that were being violated.⁴⁷ The subject of ‘ransacking’ was returned to frequently throughout the petition and was the most common complaint against the Covenanters.⁴⁸

Their response was a simple denial of responsibility. Firstly ‘If any stragling Souldiers committed any pillageing, we doe not allow it, but knowing it shall punish it’, secondly ‘All Robberyes committed cannot be imputed to our Army’, and thirdly ‘Many English put on blew Bonnets [the basic uniform of the Covenanter army] called themselves Scots, robbed houses, and by the way some of them being now in prison for the same.’⁴⁹ The mentality of an army that conceptualised itself as morally superior and fighting for the good of all Britons, not just English or Scots, could not allow itself to be presented as exploitative. Indeed the pamphlet declared that ‘*if they have Calumniated our Army, they may have Lex talionis.*’⁵⁰ *Lex talionis*, the principle of retaliatory punishment in the manner of the original offence, explains the use of rubbital throughout *Our demands of the English Lords*.⁵¹ Every common denunciation was reversed, and targeted at the occupied to demonstrate that they were responsible for the offence.

Later in the document, the petitioner stated that ‘yee search...private houses under pretence of looking after the kings Armes byt tis indeede to steel what private Armes.’⁵² Confiscating

⁴⁵ Scottish Army, *Our Demands of the English Lords manifested being at Rippon*, p. 4.

⁴⁶ Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1, pp. 6–7.

⁴⁷ Scottish Army, *Our Demands of the English Lords manifested being at Rippon*, p. 4; Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1, pp. 6–7.

⁴⁸ Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1, pp. 6, 9–10, 14.

⁴⁹ Scottish Army, *Our Demands of the English Lords manifested being at Rippon*, p. 4.

⁵⁰ Scottish Army, *Our Demands of the English Lords manifested being at Rippon*, p. 3. Italicisation present in original source.

⁵¹ Jonathan Law and Elizabeth A. Martin, ‘Lex Talionis’, in *A Dictionary of Law*, 7th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), [https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199551248.001.0001/acref-9780199551248-e-4506?rsk=8zrTun&result=1], accessed 16/02/2020.

⁵² Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1, pp. 12–14.

private weaponry served to eliminate the capacity for popular resistance to measures such as free quarter, as well as adding to the Covenanters' stockpiles. The petitioner admitted that officially this was a search for 'the kings armes', and that 'wee well obserue how yowr Tyranny still growes uppon us the Kings Magaysine was broke upp w[i]th disgrace his Matyes powder Shott Armes and prouision seised on'.⁵³ The process of confiscation began with a 'p[ro]clamacon' read through the town that all royal arms were to be delivered to the Covenanter army, and that if any royal arms were found in private hands afterwards then that private individual would pay with the confiscation of their goods.⁵⁴ According to the petition, this search was also to provide the opportunity to 'steel...what goodes what l[e]seures what plate what moneyes men had; but yee least hole could escape yowr narrow eye the very Privy must be smelt.'⁵⁵

Our Demands did not directly address this criticism but insisted that 'The cheife men of Newcastle were gone, and [illegible] the their money and goods, nothing being left'.⁵⁶ The pamphlet further alleged that 'the Bishops, Deans, Prebends, Parsons, they rifled their own houses themselves, left their doors open, and fled from them: so that if there were justice in the Land, they may be accused before the Chief Iustice, for the pillageing their own houses, and assusing others.'⁵⁷ Aside from the claim that the damages were inflicted by the owners of the houses, the Covenanters identified the perpetrators as specific religious and political opponents, namely Church officials whose offices they wished to abolish and nameless 'cheife men' who had abandoned their city.⁵⁸

Aside from their offences against the townsfolk, the petition also argued that the Covenanters' has usurped royal authority over both city and fortress. It claimed that 'his Customes w[i]th highest impudency entred uppon and his Seruantes Imprisoned'.⁵⁹ The collection of customs duties was a vital source of royal revenue, typically collected by local officials.⁶⁰ The

⁵³ Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1, pp. 11–12.

⁵⁴ Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1, pp. 12–14.

⁵⁵ Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1, pp. 12–14.

⁵⁶ Scottish Army, *Our Demands of the English Lords manifested being at Rippon*, pp. 4–5.

⁵⁷ Scottish Army, *Our Demands of the English Lords manifested being at Rippon*, pp. 4–5.

⁵⁸ Scottish Army, *Our Demands of the English Lords manifested being at Rippon*, pp. 4–5.

⁵⁹ Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1, pp. 11–12.

⁶⁰ 'Customs duties produced 30–40 per cent of total revenues throughout the period', see Braddick, *State Formation in Early Modern England*, pp. 40, 68, 252; Michael Braddick, *The Nerves of State: Taxation and the Financing of the English State, 1558–1714* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), pp. 49–55.

Covenanters organised their war effort through the institutions of the Scottish state, but this was of no relevance at a city in Northern England.⁶¹ As shall be explored later in this chapter, the second occupation was ratified by the Committee of Both Kingdoms, and through that body, the English Parliament; but this was not the case during the Bishops' Wars. Customs officials were not popular but were the royal officers with which the townspeople were most familiar, making their removal particularly shocking.

In addition to taking possession of the city's existing fortifications, the petitioner claimed that 'ye fortifie as if yee did intend to nestle at NewCastle all winter' and that instead of the city trained bands 'thee guard o[u]r gates place yow Garrisons Crate'.⁶² Furthermore, the city was placed under, 'yow Gounor', who 'imposie Contribucon money both in Towne and Countrey contrary to all law and equity yowr word and oath'.⁶³ The governor was not mentioned by *Our Demands*, which also claimed 'we meant nothing but borrowing from Protestants, and to repay it: but from Papists and Prelats prize', and that 'The offer of New-Castle was voluntary, and a contract for borrowed money'.⁶⁴ What the petition fashioned as an alienating, persistent military occupation, *Our Demands* argued was a beneficial contract between the Covenanter army and the civic corporation.

However, it was at this point in the petition that the victim mentality shifted to an articulation of clearly proto-Royalist sentiments. It declared that 'Is this the liberty yow helped us to to make us greater slaves...If wee neede must be slaves better be Royall Slaves to a King never to a Sub[je]c[t]'.⁶⁵ This sentence demonstrated the importance of the first experience of Covenanter occupation in transforming Newcastle into a Royalist stronghold for the forthcoming First English Civil War. Just a decade earlier a petition against the Mayor and aldermen, signed by 700 citizens, had been presented to Charles I.⁶⁶ He had brushed it off, instead choosing to enjoy that same Mayor's hospitality, and the Council of the North did the same.⁶⁷ The collection of Ship Money was as unpopular in Newcastle as it was throughout the

⁶¹ Fissel, *The Bishops' Wars*, pp. 62–78, 90–137.

⁶² Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1, pp. 10–11.

⁶³ Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1, pp. 10–11.

⁶⁴ Scottish Army, *Our Demands of the English Lords manifested being at Rippon*, pp. 3, 4.

⁶⁵ Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1, pp. 16–17.

⁶⁶ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 6: April 1633–April 1644, p. 94: SP 16/240 ff.122–123.

⁶⁷ Roger Howell, *Newcastle upon Tyne and the Puritan Revolution: a study of the Civil War in North England* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 57.

rest of England and Wales.⁶⁸ But then Newcastle had been occupied for almost a year, while Charles I's opponents maintained 'the fond opinion, (which too many doe conceive) of the Scots good meaning to England'.⁶⁹ This unwelcome experience of occupation undoubtedly played a part in the 1642 transformation of Newcastle into a Royalist stronghold. In 1642 Lord Newcastle, under royal commission, set about securing the North-East for the Royalist cause. In this endeavour his titular city's oligarchy eagerly complied, making the Earl an honorary burgess and voting him a donation of £700.⁷⁰ Indeed, the petition went as far as to begin articulating the image of Charles I as the martyr-king, suffering for the sake of his people.⁷¹ It stated that:

Yee that use headers have pittie on yow king too Good a King to be thus used whose heart cannot but bleed...this admurable patience in bearing such affrote w[i]ch a priuate spirit would not put upp ever from his equall Declares to all the world that he loues yowr nation equally if not more than o[u]rs And yet wee are ready to fight for him yow against him.⁷²

The image of the King suffering for the sake of his people's sins would become a recurring theme of Royalist propaganda until its ultimate culmination at the regicide.⁷³ The petition further demanded that the Covenanters 'Aske noe more of a king then he can wth honor grant unreasonable it is that rebellion should haue its charges borne and loyalty be undone'.⁷⁴ The petition explicitly endorsed the position that there were concessions, such as renouncing episcopacy and control over the militia, that the King simply could not make.⁷⁵ The petitioner also made clear that they regarded the Covenanters as setting a bad example, and that, 'This is

⁶⁸ Howell, *Newcastle in the Puritan Revolution...*, pp. 61–62; M. H. Dodds, 'Ship Money', *Newcastle Citizen* 1 (1930), 68–70; See *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 13, 1638–1639, pp. 4–5: SP 16/398 f.35: 'Thomas Smith to [Sir John Pennington]', p. 80: SP 16/400 f.216: 'Sir William Belasys, Sheriff of co. Durham, to Nicholas'.

⁶⁹ Parker, *Newes from New-castle with An Advertisement*.

⁷⁰ Howell, *Newcastle in the Puritan Revolution...*, pp. 144–146.

⁷¹ Charles I, King of Great Britain, France & Ireland, *Basiliká the works of King Charles the martyr : with a collection of declarations, treaties, and other papers concerning the differences betwixt His said Majesty and his two houses of Parliament : with the history of his life : as also of his tryal and martyrdom* (London: Printed for Ric. Chiswell, 1687); John Arnway, *The tablet, or, Moderation of Charles the I. martyr. With an alarum to the subiects of England* (The Hague: Arnway, 1649).

⁷² Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1, pp. 18–19.

⁷³ Charles I, *Basiliká the works of King Charles the martyr...*; Arnway, *The tablet, or, Moderation of Charles the I. martyr...*; Andrew Lacey, *The Cult of King Charles the Martyr* (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2003), pp. 18–49.

⁷⁴ Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1, pp. 19–20.

⁷⁵ See chapter six, 'Issues and Sticking-Points', of Smith, *Constitutional Royalism and the Search for Settlement, c. 1640–1649*, pp. 143–218.

the ready way to encourage others to be what yow are Rebels.’⁷⁶ These remarkably prescient statements do throw the dating of the source into some doubt, foreshadowing as they do the 1641 rebellion in Ireland and the outbreak of the civil war in England and Wales in the following year. However, there is no other evidence for a later date of composition in the petition – and so the question remains unanswerable.

Furthermore, even if composed after the end of the first occupation of Newcastle, the petition still demonstrated the essential mentalities of an occupied population. Fear of an alien military presence, resentment at the loss of civic autonomy and the confiscation of money and property, and ultimately a desire for revenge through the support of an opposing political movement, in this case, the emergent Royalist party.⁷⁷ Within Newcastle, the experience of life as a Covenanter fortress meant that its later Royalism was not merely reactive but actively revanchist. By contrast, the Covenanter narrative stressed their moderation, military necessity, and the unreasonableness and perjury of the occupied population in refusing to supply vital supplies and then lying about the nature of the occupation.⁷⁸ Neither narrative can be proven with extant sources, but the case study demonstrates how dramatically different the mentalities of occupation were between the occupier and the occupied.

4.3 The Solemn League and Covenant and the Siege of Royalist Newcastle

During the Bishops’ Wars, the centre of the second Covenanter occupation was Newcastle-upon-Tyne. The city occupied a highly significant strategic position in the military geography of the British Civil Wars. Not only was it along the main route from Scotland into England, but it was also London’s traditional source of coal.⁷⁹ Royalist control of the city resulted in an embargo on the importation of fuel to the capital between 1642 and 1644. In the era of the Little

⁷⁶ Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1, pp. 19–20.

⁷⁷ Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1, pp. 1–2, 6–7, 10–11, 14–16.

⁷⁸ Scottish Army, *Our Demands of the English Lords manifested being at Rippon*, pp. 3–5.

⁷⁹ The Lord Mayor of London was forced to take steps to try and secure an appropriate supply of fuel to the capital. Sir Thomas Atkins declared that ‘And finding it a very hard and difficult matter to supply the same in these trouble[s]ome times, by reason that Newcastle from whence this City was formerly stored, is blocked up’ and that as a consequence ‘Hath thought fit hereby to publish and declare, that such persons shall have free leave and liberty, at their pleasure to vend and put to saile within this City and Liber[ties] thereof, whatsoever fewell they shall bring hither, for the use and purpose aforesaid, and shall be accounted men well affected to this City: And their doings and actions herein, shall bee taken as a very acceptable service to this City, and not to bee forgotten.’ See Thomas Atkins, *By the Major. A proclamation for the bringing into the Port of London, any manner of fevvell* [Fuel] (London: Richard Coates, 1644).

Ice Age, when global temperatures were low, this lack of fuel caused serious difficulties in the capital. The capture of Newcastle, and the restoration of coal shipments, was a vital concern for the parliamentary leadership, who were well aware that popular dissatisfaction with the heating situation was a key cause of pro-peace and anti-Parliamentarian unrest in London. A report from the English Parliament's commissioners with Lord Leven's army, Sir William Armyne, Richard Barwis, and Robert Fenwick, received by Sir Henry Vane on 27 October 1644, makes this concern for the fuel situation very clear:

And we earnestly desire the House will consider of how great concernment the settling of Newcastle is to all their affairs in these northern parts, and of what advantage the coal trade and customs are for the maintenance of their armies, if rightly managed, and whenever the Scots shall draw into the field, how the town may be preserved in peace, which is yet wholly malignant and cannot be suddenly reduced to the condition which is to be wished.⁸⁰

For London, the primary concern with Newcastle was that it be taken and that the supply of coal was resumed. Through the English commissioners, Leven made his view on Newcastle's resources clear. The payment of the Covenanter army in England would be the subject of continual bickering between the Covenanter and Parliamentary leaderships until the final settlement, and consequent Covenanter withdrawal, in 1647.⁸¹ The capture of Newcastle intact would open up the financial resources of the coal trade and its attendant customs to Leven and his army. With the Covenanters' military resources stretched across Northern England, Ulster and the Scottish Highlands and English subsidies unreliable this source of supply was potentially critical.⁸² While the Covenanter armies were highly unusual in their willingness to fight far from home in the cause of Christ's Crown and Covenant, a continual supply of money was still necessary. The Parliamentary commissioners with the Covenanter army knew that London was concerned about the situation in the North-East and took care to reassure their superiors. They declared, 'Pardon our earnestness in this because the delaying of the business may prove prejudicial to you, the north is far from you, and things cannot every day be

⁸⁰ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 20: Oct 1644–July 1645: p. 74: SP 16/503 f.53: 'Sir William Armyne, Ric. Barwis, and Robert Fenwick, the Commissioners from the Parliament residing with the Scottish army, to [Sir Henry Vane, senr.]'.

⁸¹ Laura Stewart, 'English funding of the Scottish armies in England and Ireland, 1640–1648', *Historical Journal* 52 (2009), 573–593.

⁸² Kevin Forkan, 'The Ulster Scots and the Engagement, 1647–8', *Irish Historical Studies* 35 (2007), 455–476; Stewart, *Rethinking the Scottish Revolution: Covenanted Scotland, 1637–1651*, pp. 172–213; Williams, *Montrose*, pp. 126–261.

presented unto you as in the south.’⁸³ Problems of communication aside, the commissioners also provided context about the subsidiary sieges then taking place around Newcastle. They wrote:

The Governor of Tynemouth Castle hath been willing to listen to propositions for its surrender, and Lord General Leven, according to his usual manner, was not backward to make trial what might be done in a fair way before coming to extremities, and went toward the castle himself; and after it was summoned, they entered into terms for the rendering it up, which was performed late this evening, and the Lord General hath soldiers in it so that our ships may come freely in at their pleasure.⁸⁴

Tynemouth Castle controlled the Tyne estuary, and unless it was taken it would be impossible to ship coal from Newcastle to London. The heavy barges would have had to sail right under the guns of the Royalist garrison to reach the open sea.⁸⁵ Indeed the strategic significance of the site was such that, during the First and Second World Wars, gun emplacements were put into the site to cover the entrance to the river, and the important shipyards located there.⁸⁶ The coal barges would be easy targets for Royalist gunners, preventing either the supply of fuel to London or the collection of revenues from Newcastle’s docks by Leven’s officers. Therefore, the capture of both Royalist strongholds was essential to both the Parliamentarians and Covenanters.

But neither Newcastle nor Tynemouth would not be captured immediately upon the Royalist withdrawal to Yorkshire. The Covenanter field army pursued Lord Newcastle back to York but returned to the North-East following the Battle of Marston Moor. Newcastle and Tynemouth were reinvaded on 15 August 1644.⁸⁷ However, this movement was not wholly uncontroversial, since the Committee of Both Kingdoms was still deeply concerned about Yorkshire, despite the destruction of Lord Newcastle’s field army the previous month. In a letter to the Committee of Estates and Leven, the Committee of Both Kingdoms acknowledged that ‘We understand by Lord Warristone of your marching northward, and your resolutions to lie down before Newcastle, which we conceive may prove of great advantage to this kingdom.’⁸⁸ But they also

⁸³ *Cal. S.P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 20: 1644–1645: p. 74: SP 16/503 f.53.

⁸⁴ *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 20, Oct 1644–July 1645: p. 74: SP 16/503 f.53.

⁸⁵ McCombie, *Tynemouth Priory and Castle*, p. 34.

¹⁹ McCombie, *Tynemouth Priory and Castle*, pp. 16–19

⁸⁷ Serdiville and Sadler, *The Great Siege of Newcastle 1644*, pp. 67–69.

⁸⁸ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 19: Jan–Sept 1644: p. 432: SP 21/18 f.287.

cautioned Leven that ‘We are informed there is a considerable strength of horse and foot of the enemy’s in Westmoreland and Cumberland’.⁸⁹

The Committee of Both Kingdoms asked that intelligence on Royalist movements be constantly shared between the Covenanter army and Lords Fairfax and Manchester, the main Parliamentary commanders north of the Trent.⁹⁰ They also asked that, if the Royalists did re-invade Yorkshire, that Covenanter forces be broken off from the siege of Newcastle to help stop them.⁹¹ While a simple, and sensible, enough request the complex command structure on display in this source is worthy of comment. At no point did the Committee of Both Kingdoms order Leven to do anything. Their requests to him were prefaced with statements such as ‘we desire your Lordships’ and ‘we conceive it will be of advantage’.⁹² By contrast, this source stated that ‘We have given order to Manchester’; the difference in language is striking.⁹³ Furthermore, the letter was not addressed solely to Leven but was also sent to the Committee of Estates of Scotland.⁹⁴ This demonstrates that, despite being composed of both English and Scottish commissioners, the Committee of Both Kingdoms did not enjoy the uncomplicated right of command over the Covenanter army in Northern England that it held over the Parliamentary soldiers in the same theatre. This multifaceted command structure, with several differing poles of authority, was the distinguishing feature of Covenanter military governance in Northern England. This was natural enough, given the complex legality of the Solemn League and Covenant, but it problematises the study of the Covenanter occupation of the North’s castles and fortresses.

The Royalists managed to hold the city until mid-October of that year when a Covenanter assault forced them to withdraw to the Castle itself. On 18 October 1644, two days after the

⁸⁹ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 19: Jan–Sept 1644: p. 432: SP 21/18 f.287.

⁹⁰ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 19: Jan–Sept 1644: p. 432: SP 21/18 f.287.

⁹¹ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 19: Jan–Sept 1644: p. 432: SP 21/18 f.287.

⁹² *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 19: Jan–Sept 1644: p. 432: SP 21/18 f.287.

⁹³ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 19: Jan–Sept 1644: p. 432: SP 21/18 f.287.

⁹⁴ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 19: Jan–Sept 1644: p. 432: SP 21/18 f.287.

withdrawal, the Royalist governor Sir John Marley surrendered on condition of mercy.⁹⁵ The terms were generous, allowing the Royalists to march out with arms, horses and baggage with safe passage to any Royalist garrison within sixty miles.⁹⁶ The same privilege was extended to any citizens of the city who desired to go with the Royalist troops. But ‘the town, castle, and forts of Newcastle, with their stores’ were ‘demanded by Excellence the Earl of Leven, Lord General of the Scots’ army, to be kept for the use of his Majesty and the Parliament of England.’⁹⁷ There are two important historical points from this source. Firstly, with this surrender, Leven secured the occupation of the entire fortress complex of Newcastle. This comprised not only the city and castle within the walls, but the outer earthworks and forts constructed by the Royalists over the past two years to secure their hold on the Tyne. The Royalists had transformed the dilapidated fortifications of Newcastle into a significant stronghold. Sir John Marley had ordered that the castle keep be roofed over with planks sufficient to support artillery. He was also reported as having dealt with a gargantuan dunghill that had previously built up, resting on the western wall of the castle. Such was the weight of this dunghill that part of the castle wall had collapsed. Marley broke it up and used the spoil to reinforce the town walls instead.⁹⁸

Secondly, Leven demanded the surrender under his authority as ‘Lord General of the Scots’ army’ but stated that the fortress was to be put to the use of ‘his Majesty and the Parliament of England.’ This sentence serves as a microcosm of the Covenanter occupation’s complexity. King Charles is referred to simply as ‘his Majesty’ without either an English or Scottish qualification. Given the British dimension of the monarchy, this was understandable, but the statement that the town was to be used by the English Parliament is more problematic. It was to be occupied and run by the Scots army, for the English Parliament. The complexity of this situation was not lost on contemporary policymakers and the enquiry, and the response of the Committee of Both Houses to the Committee of Estates concerning the Covenanter occupation of Newcastle and Carlisle is worth quoting at length. While relatively brief, it is the clearest statement about the legal framework under which the Covenanter military government was to

⁹⁵ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 20: 1644–1645: p. 51: SP 16/503 f.46: ‘Conditions whereupon the surrender of the town, castle, and forts of Newcastle, with their stores, are demanded by his Excellence the Earl of Leven, Lord General of the Scots’ army, to be kept for the use of his Majesty and the Parliament of England’.

⁹⁶ *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 20, 1644–1645: p. 51: SP 16/503 f.46.

⁹⁷ *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 20, 1644–1645: p. 51: SP 16/503 f.46.

⁹⁸ Eneas Mackenzie, *Historical Account of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne Including the Borough of Gateshead* (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1827) pp. 89–10

operate. The English enquiry, dated 25 October 1644 at Newcastle, referred to ‘the city of Carlisle and town of Newcastle’, rather than to the counties of Cumberland and Northumberland.⁹⁹ This demonstrates the absolute strategic importance of these two fortresses, and their centrality to the entire war in the northernmost counties of England. Royalist domination in the North had been based upon the quick acquisition of these two strongholds. As a consequence, it was only natural that the Lords and Commons gave the commissioners ‘special charge’ to see that they were settled to both Houses’ satisfaction.¹⁰⁰ Indeed, this document specified that the ‘persons and garrisons’ to be put into Carlisle and Newcastle should be ‘appointed by the two Houses’.¹⁰¹ This was not merely a claim to a supervisory role over the Covenanter occupation, but a claim to the right to appoint governors of two cities which were, after all, in England.¹⁰²

4.4 The Second Covenanter Occupation of Newcastle and the Legality of Covenanter Government in England

The response to this enquiry came only a day later, on 26 October, from ‘the Committee of Estates of Scotland attending their army’.¹⁰³ It was clear from the Committee of Estates’ reply to the English enquiry that the Covenanters had different ideas about the future disposition of Carlisle and Newcastle from the Parliamentarians. While they acknowledged the request that the two cities be ‘delivered over to the persons and garrisons appointed by the two Houses of Parliament’, they did not agree to this demand.¹⁰⁴ Instead, they replied that they would take the English Parliament’s ‘advice concerning the governor or garrison of Newcastle’.¹⁰⁵ While they would ‘endeavour to answer the expectations of both Houses with all brotherly love and respect’, the Estates refused to confirm that these expectations would always be delivered

⁹⁹ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 20: Oct 1644–July 1645: p. 70: SP 16/503 f.50: ‘The Committee of both Houses attending the Scotch army to the Committee of Estates of Scotland’.

¹⁰⁰ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 20: Oct 1644–July 1645: p. 70: SP 16/503 f.50: ‘The Committee of both Houses attending the Scotch army to the Committee of Estates of Scotland’.

¹⁰¹ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 20: Oct 1644–July 1645: p. 70: SP 16/503 f.50: ‘The Committee of both Houses attending the Scotch army to the Committee of Estates of Scotland’.

¹⁰² *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 20: Oct 1644–July 1645: p. 70: SP 16/503 f.50: ‘The Committee of both Houses attending the Scotch army to the Committee of Estates of Scotland’.

¹⁰³ *Cal. S.P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 20: 1644–1645: p. 51: SP 16/503 f.51.

¹⁰⁴ *Cal. S.P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 20: 1644–1645: p. 51: SP 16/503 f.51.

¹⁰⁵ *Cal. S.P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 20: 1644–1645: p. 51: SP 16/503 f.51.

upon.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, while professing their desire for concord between the two Parliaments in the matter of appointments, the Estates did not clearly state that the right of appointment to the two governorships lay with the two Houses and their Committee.¹⁰⁷

The occupation of Newcastle by Covenanter armies was, naturally, followed by a purge of the ‘delinquents’ present in the city. Whatever known Royalists who had not taken advantage of Leven’s generous terms of surrender to leave the city were now subject to persecution. The new Newcastle Corporation held an extremely lengthy meeting on 20 March 1645, in which virtually the entire former Royalist government of the city was purged.¹⁰⁸ The language used in this document was not merely denunciatory, but extraordinarily virulent in its condemnation of Marley, Newcastle, and the entire Royalist civic government. The list of Royalists purged was as follows:

Sr Iohn Marley Knight, Maior of the Towne and County of Newcastle upon Tyne S^r George Baker Knight Recorder of the said Towne of Newcastle upon Tyne Sr Nicholas Cole Knight & [illegible] Thomas Liddle esq^e Sr Francis Browns Knight Raphe Cole and Raphe Corke Aldermen of the Said Towne of Newcastle upon Tyne, James Cole Sheriffe of the said Towne of Newcastle upon Tyne and Henry Marley Clarke of the Chamber.¹⁰⁹

The elimination of the previous leadership was near-total, with the executive, legal and archival officers all being removed, as well as the aldermen who had supported their government. They were condemned for acting ‘Countrary to their several Oathes...the lawes of the Realme of England and the Charter liberties and privildges’ in assisting the Earl of Newcastle.¹¹⁰ This form of purge was the norm throughout Northern England, as Royalist civic governments were replaced by men better inclined towards the Parliament. Records survive of similar purges at Chester and York, and, in terms of who was being removed from office, Newcastle did not differ from the general pattern.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁶ *Cal. S.P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 20: 1644–1645: p. 51: SP 16/503 f.51.

¹⁰⁷ *Cal. S.P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 20: 1644–1645: p. 51: SP 16/503 f.51.

¹⁰⁸ Common Council Order Books, Tyne and Wear Archives, MD.NC/2/1, p. 25.

¹⁰⁹ Common Council Order Books, Tyne and Wear Archives, MD.NC/2/1, p. 25.

¹¹⁰ Common Council Order Books, Tyne and Wear Archives, MD.NC/2/1, p. 26.

¹¹¹ Cheshire Archives and Local Studies: Z AB/2 Assembly Books, vol. 2 1624–84, ff. 76–78; Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 104–108.

However, Newcastle possessed one freeman who was of not just local, but national stature. This was naturally the titular peer of the city, William Cavendish, Lord Newcastle. The King's former Lord-General in the North was singled out for special condemnation by the corporation. The document first stressed that he was in 'September 1642 Admitted to be a Free Burgess of this Corporaton', and that he had sworn the same oaths as any other burgess.¹¹² Despite this, he had 'possessed himself of this Towne by force and Armed And endauored to bringe in an Arbitrary Gouverment into this Towne to the Ouerthrowe and destracton of ancient [illegible] and laudable Gouverment of the same'.¹¹³ The corporation's contention that the Earl of Newcastle had secured control of the city by force was untrue, although he used his garrison to bolster his position there subsequently. Lord Newcastle was commissioned as governor of the city whose name he bore by Charles I at some point in June 1642, the exact date is uncertain.¹¹⁴ After being received by the city oligarchy, and recognised as the legal governor, he did send orders to County Durham for the trained bands of that county to move into Newcastle.¹¹⁵ But the corporation went further, claiming that Newcastle:

Did imprison divers of his Ma[jes]ti[es] good Subiects, and plunder and take away their estates Contrary to the knowne lawes of this Kingdome and the libertie of of a Subiect for no other cause but that they would not assist aid and Contribute their estates to the makeinge and leauyinge of an uniust and wicked Warr w[i]th him thesaid Earle and his complices against the Kinge and parliament.¹¹⁶

While extreme, evidence from the rest of Northern England suggests that these accusations were at least partially true. At Kendal, Royalist forces had arrested suspected Parliamentary sympathisers, and at York significant coercion, to be explored in chapter six was used to force the civic government into compliance.¹¹⁷ Newcastle himself ordered the governor of Skipton,

¹¹² Common Council Order Books, Tyne and Wear Archives, MD.NC/2/1, p. 26.

¹¹³ Common Council Order Books, Tyne and Wear Archives, MD.NC/2/1, p. 26.

¹¹⁴ Howell, *Newcastle upon Tyne and the Puritan Revolution...*, p. 144; Footnote 5 is as follows, 'The King's commission to the Earl appears to have been dated 20 June 1642, Brand, *History of Newcastle*, 2: 460, says 29 June, but the earliest date is more probable because it was mentioned in the House of Commons on 30 June that the Earl had sent out his warrants to Durham. *CJ* 2: 648'; See Margaret Cavendish, *The Life of William Cavendish, Duke of Newcastle*, ed. C. H. Firth (London: J. C. Nimmo, 1886), p. 19, n. 1. The date is perhaps even earlier. A warrant of the Earl of Newcastle dated 14 June 1642 mentions that he has been appointed Lord Lieutenant of Durham and Northumberland and governor of Newcastle see Warrant of Lord Newcastle, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS Tanner 63, f. 68.

¹¹⁵ Howell, *Newcastle upon Tyne and the Puritan Revolution...*, p. 144.

¹¹⁶ Common Council Order Books, Tyne and Wear Archives, MD.NC/2/1, p. 26.

¹¹⁷ Appleby, Sir Philip Musgrave to the Mayor of Kendal advising him to conduct a search for dissidents in the town, 21 November 1642, Cumbrian Archive Service, Kendal Archive, DMUS/5/5/4/18; Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 81–84.

Sir John Mallory, to arrest and imprison ‘all who shall be found disaffected his Majesty’s good government whatsoever’.¹¹⁸ Seizing the property of political enemies was commonly employed by Royalists, Parliamentarians, and Covenanters alike. Furthermore, if ‘his Mati good Subjects’ had not ‘assist aid and Contribute their estates’, or, in plainer language, paid the contribution moneys Newcastle demanded, it is certain that he would have prosecuted them for their defiance. As a consequence of these offences, the English Parliament had ‘promulgated the said Earle of Newcastle to be a Traytor For all and evrey the aforesaid notorious and Wicked Acts’.¹¹⁹ In compliance with these instructions, as well as to ‘expiate and appease the great wrath of God’, the corporation stripped Newcastle of his freedom of the city, his franchise and put his name out of the free roll, forbidding its re-entry.¹²⁰

Indeed, the Estates’ continued concern about ‘delinquents’, was made clear by the Scottish parliamentary register for 7 January 1645.¹²¹ The main legislative business of the day was an ‘Act anente the delinquentes at Neucastle’, which came in response to a letter of 4 February sent by the English Parliament to their Caledonian allies.¹²² The register stated that ‘the Committee of Both Kingdoms at Newcastle’ had agreed that what skilled miners who were available should continue to work at the coals, ‘without whom the work could not have been so well ordered’.¹²³ This meant that ‘some persons are employed who are contained in the order of the house of commons of 19 November’.¹²⁴ The continued employment of proscribed delinquents was justified as occurring ‘not out of any intention to protect them from the justice of the law but of mere necessity for upholding the coalworks, which necessity still remains.’¹²⁵ Once again two similar themes emerge, namely the supervisory, but not commanding, role played by the Committee of Both Kingdoms and their aim to ensure a regular supply of coal to London.

¹¹⁸ Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty’s forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41.

¹¹⁹ Common Council Order Books, Tyne and Wear Archives, MD.NC/2/1, p. 26.

¹²⁰ Common Council Order Books, Tyne and Wear Archives, MD.NC/2/1, p. 27.

¹²¹ *The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707*, K.M. Brown et al eds. (St Andrews, 2007–2017), 1645/1/77, [<https://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1645/1/77>], accessed 11/2018.

¹²² RPS, 1645/1/77, [<http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1645/1/77>], accessed 11/2017.

¹²³ RPS, 1645/1/77, [<http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1645/1/77>], accessed 11/2017.

¹²⁴ RPS, 1645/1/77, [<http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1645/1/77>], accessed 11/2017.

¹²⁵ RPS, 1645/1/77, [<http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1645/1/77>], accessed 11/2017.

The concern about the supply of coals not just to London, but also to the Covenanter army in the field was to prove a continual point of discussion, if not dissent, between the governor and the corporation. On 24 October 1646, the corporation moved that ten or twelve tons of coal be provided 'For the iuse of His Ma[jes]tie the Generall and the Gouvernor'.¹²⁶ But this seemingly large supply of coal was quickly used up, for by 10 November the corporation had received a letter from the governor directing them to supply more for the King, then in Newcastle as a prisoner of the Covenanters, Lord Leven, and the governor himself.¹²⁷ The corporation would be required to provide coals to the King on at least two further occasions but did at least receive payment to the some of 3^{1/2d} per 'Bowle' for their trouble.¹²⁸

4.5 The Covenanter Occupation of Carlisle, Cumberland and Westmorland

Compared to Newcastle, Carlisle received less attention and resources from the Covenanter government. It was less of a trading centre than its Northumbrian counterpart and was not needed to maintain General Munro's lines of communication to Ulster. The governor, Colonel William Douglas, was forced to appeal to the Committee of Estates for additional support, writing that they were in 'some straits'.¹²⁹ This appeal was followed by a more detailed request by Douglas to the committee. He asked that the:

former commission granted to him for levying 100 horses to attend the garrison at Carlisle might be enlarged for a squadron of horse, and that the estates would grant their approbation to the three troops already levied by him, and a new warrant for the fourth to complete the squadron, and to cause the supplicant be answered of the £500 sterling advanced by him in levying the said troops lifted by him for attending the said garrison at Carlisle.¹³⁰

Douglas's immediate concern was for additional cavalry. This suggested that he intended to use his garrison to dominate not just Carlisle itself, but the surrounding counties of Cumberland and Westmorland as well. Cavalry would not have been that useful in a strictly defensive role but would be vital in projecting power through the rugged Cumbrian countryside. While more limited than its counterpart in Northumberland, the Covenanter occupation in the west was

¹²⁶ Common Council Order Books, Tyne and Wear Archives, MD.NC/2/1, p. 30.

¹²⁷ Common Council Order Books, Tyne and Wear Archives, MD.NC/2/1, p. 73.

¹²⁸ Common Council Order Books, Tyne and Wear Archives, MD.NC/2/1, p. 81.

¹²⁹ *The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707*, K.M. Brown et al eds. (St Andrews, 2007–2017), 1645/7/24/44, [<http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1645/7/24/44>], accessed 11/2017.

¹³⁰ *The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707*, K.M. Brown et al eds. (St Andrews, 2007–2019), 1645/11/200, [<http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1645/11/200>], accessed 11/2017.

effectively administering large areas of countryside in addition to its fortified base of operations. This was made clear by an order of 17 July 1646 from Lieutenant-Colonel Strachan, who gave his rank as ‘Comander In Cheiff of the Scottis Forces In Westmorland and Comerland’.¹³¹

The first problem for the historian is that two lieutenant-colonels of the Covenanter army bore the surname Strachan. One was Alexander Strachan of Glenkindie, who was most probably a member of a small Aberdeenshire clan headed by the Strachan baronets of Nova Scotia from 1625 to 1828. He is listed by the records of the Scottish Parliament as suffering losses to Montrose and is referred to several times in lists of appointments to committees intended to control the fight against the Highland Royalists.¹³² Given that there is no record of Alexander Strachan serving in England, it is more probable that the Kendal colonel was Archibald Strachan, who served as both a Parliamentarian and Covenanter officer, was a noted supporter of Oliver Cromwell, extreme member of the Kirk party, and who ultimately died in grief following his excommunication, for his support of Cromwell, in 1651.¹³³ While more likely than Alexander, given that Archibald served extensively in England, and was in Covenanter service from May 1645 until February 1647, there is the problem of rank.¹³⁴ While Archibald Strachan was a lieutenant-colonel by 1648, when he was given that position in Gilbert Kerr’s regiment of horse by the Committee of Estates, it is not clear whether he held it before, or was still just a major, as he had been since the battle of Lansdown in Somerset on 5 July 1643.¹³⁵

Whoever exactly gave these orders, the point was that they were ‘For all offieris and Sogers [sic] serveng King and Parliament and for all Postm[aste]rs and Constables etc.’¹³⁶ They informed the recipient that a Mr Dudley of Penrith, who had ‘caried himself in ane fair way

¹³¹ Letter from Penrith, Lieutenant-Colonel Strachan, commander in chief of the Scottish forces in Westmoreland and Cumberland, to all officers and soldiers serving King and Parliament, and to all Postmasters and Constables, 17 July 1646, Cumbrian Archive Service, Kendal Archive, WDRY/5/192.

¹³² *The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707*, K.M. Brown et al eds. (St Andrews, 2007–2019), 1645/11/214, [<https://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1645/11/214>], accessed 05/2019.

¹³³ Edward Furgol, ‘Strachan, Archibald (d. 1652)’, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn, Sept 2004, [<https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-26617;jsessionid=7FE472D7EDDEA64652EEAEFB16A259BB>], accessed 01/2018.

¹³⁴ Furgol, ‘Alexander Strachan’, *ODNB*.

¹³⁵ Furgol, ‘Alexander Strachan’, *ODNB*.

¹³⁶ Letter from Penrith, Lieutenant-Colonel Strachan, commander in chief of the Scottish forces in Westmoreland and Cumberland, to all officers and soldiers serving King and Parliament, and to all Postmasters and Constables, 17 July 1646, Cumbrian Archive Service, Kendal Archive, WDRY/5/192.

during our aobd heir' was on his way to London for 'ane severall Bussines'. It further specified that 'non trouble him but suffer him to go and returne home againe w^tout trubell or molestatione' and that he be given 'good sufficient post horses and one guyd he paying for them according to the reatts of the Comittie this yeare'.¹³⁷ Strachan expected his authority to carry weight not just in Cumberland and Westmorland, but to be sufficient to take Dudley from Penrith to London and then back again. He addressed the recipient in the name of King and Parliament, the classic Parliamentary formulation, but did not address just 'offieris and Sogers' of the Parliamentary army but also civilian officers such as postmasters and constables. This suggests that at this stage in the Solemn League and Covenant, before the decline of the Presbyterian party in the English Parliament and the consequent breakdown in the alliance between London and Edinburgh, that the Covenanter army felt comfortable in issuing directives to the civilian authorities of the English state.

4.6 Sir James Lumsden and the Ratification of the Covenanter Governorship of Newcastle

However, this period, which seemed to promise that the Covenanters would succeed in their goals, had already begun to come to a close. On 6 March 1645, the Scottish Parliament met to place 'the kingdom in a posture of defence'.¹³⁸ The purpose of this legislation was to mobilise the men and resources required to meet the threat of James Graham, the Marquess of Montrose, and his highland army. This business took up most of the day, but also Sir James Lumsden was ratified as governor of Newcastle. Lumsden was a professional soldier who had fought under Gustavus Adolphus in the Thirty Years War.¹³⁹ He had come back to Britain from Germany either shortly before, or at, the outbreak of the First Bishops' War.¹⁴⁰ During the 1644 Covenanter invasion of Northern England, he served with the rank of major-general.¹⁴¹ At the siege of Newcastle, he was present, along with the Earl of Manchester, under Lord Leven. Lumsden and Manchester were responsible for commanding the digging of mines under the

¹³⁷ Letter from Penrith, Lieutenant-Colonel Strachan, commander in chief of the Scottish forces in Westmoreland and Cumberland, to all officers and soldiers serving King and Parliament, and to all Postmasters and Constables, 17 July 1646, Cumbrian Archive Service, Kendal Archive, WDRY/5/192.

¹³⁸ *The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707*, K.M. Brown et al eds. (St Andrews, 2007–2017), 1645/1/171, [<http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1645/1/171>], accessed 11/2017.

¹³⁹ A. Grosjean, 'Lumsden, Sir James, of Innergellie (fl. 1629–1651)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn, Sept 2004, <https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-17185>], accessed 11/2017.

¹⁴⁰ Grosjean, 'Lumsden, Sir James, of Innergellie', *ODNB*.

¹⁴¹ Grosjean, 'Lumsden, Sir James, of Innergellie', *ODNB*.

Royalist defences, and seem to have served as Leven's main subordinates during the siege.¹⁴² When the main Covenanter army pursued the Royalists to York, Lumsden was left with six regiments of foot and several troops of cavalry to continue to straiten Newcastle.¹⁴³ However, he did appear to have been present, albeit briefly, at the siege of York, since he is mentioned as such in a dispatch from Sir Henry Vane the younger to the Committee of Both Kingdoms on 11 June 1644.¹⁴⁴ Given his familiarity with Newcastle, he was a natural choice to serve as its governor following the garrison's surrender. He was appointed at some point between the surrender of Newcastle on 18 October 1644 and the meeting of the Committee of Estates on 7 March 1645. Indeed, the Scottish Parliament had received Sir James' commission about a week before. The parliamentary register's entry for 1 March 1645 runs as follows:

Act of approbatione of certane articles concludit be the committie of dispatches

The estates of parliament, efter heiring of the report from the committie of dispatches anent the articles eftirspecified, ratifies and approves the samene articles, viz:

1. That the commissione granted be the committie with the armie in Ingland and lord generall to Sir James Lumsdene for the gouvernement of the toune and gariesone of Newcastle wpoun Tayne be ratified and approvine be the parliament.¹⁴⁵

Lumsden's commission was awarded in the field but was then sent back to Edinburgh in dispatches, where it was read by the responsible committee. As was typical for governorships in the British Civil Wars, Lumsden was given authority over both 'town' and 'garrison', a combination of civic and military authority. Within the week of the Committee of Dispatches receiving Lumsden's commission, the Estates declared that they 'heirby ratifies approves the commissione granted by the committie with the army in Ingland and the lord generall'.¹⁴⁶ It is clear that, while multiple committees were involved in confirming the appointment, the new governor's military superior was not left out of the process.

¹⁴² Grosjean, 'Lumsden, Sir James, of Innergellie', *ODNB*.

¹⁴³ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 20: Oct 1644–July 1645: p. 51: SP 16/503 f.51: 'Answer of the Committee of Estates of Scotland attending their army to a paper presented to them by the Commissioners of the Parliament of England'.

¹⁴⁴ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 20, Jan 1644–Sept 1644: p. 223: SP 21/16 f.31: 'Sir Henry Vane, junr., to the Committee of both kingdoms'.

¹⁴⁵ *The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707*, K.M. Brown et al eds. (St Andrews, 2007–2017), 1645/1/154, [<http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1645/1/154>], accessed 11/2017.

¹⁴⁶ *RPS*, 1645/1/154, [<http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1645/1/154>], accessed 11/2017.

The ‘lord generall’ in question was Alexander Leslie, 1st Earl of Leven, the commander of the Covenanters’ expedition into England.¹⁴⁷ What is not clear is exactly who had greater control over the appointment, the ‘committie’ or the ‘lord generall’.¹⁴⁸ Neither is it quite clear to which committee it is referring; either a Scottish parliamentary committee accompanying the army or members of the Committee of Both Kingdoms directing the Scottish army in England. The request of the English commissioners on 25 October 1644 suggested that it was an Anglo-Scottish committee; but, as previously stated, despite the cordial reception of the request by the Scottish Estates, there was no codified agreement on the matter.¹⁴⁹ That said, the Earl of Leven held his commission as lord-general of the Covenanter army from the Committee of Estates, even if he still had to coordinate his actions in England with the Committee of Both Kingdoms.¹⁵⁰ As lord-general, Leven was Lumsden’s military superior and would have probably had to have given his consent for Sir James’ appointment as governor.

While the exact nature of Lumsden’s original appointment is hard to determine, owing to a lack of clarity in the surviving sources, what was very clear was that it required ratification from authorities superior to Lord Leven, or the committee travelling with the Covenanter army. As previously stated, the commission was first sent to Edinburgh to be ratified by the Scottish Parliament.¹⁵¹ The fact that it was sent to Edinburgh first suggests that declarations of ‘all brotherly love and respect’ aside, the Estates intended to be in a dominant position *vis-à-vis* their army’s occupation of Newcastle and Carlisle.¹⁵² According to this ratification, dated 6 March 1645, Sir James Lumsden was ‘governour of the toune of Newecastle and gariesoune foirsaid with all fies, liberties and priviledges belonging to that chairge’.¹⁵³

There were no specific details of what exact powers Lumsden now possessed, just that he held all those appropriate to his new position. The probable cause of this vagueness was the fact that this document is not the commission itself—which was presumably read before the house—but just its ratification. The use of the terms ‘fees, liberties and privileges’ was also different from

¹⁴⁷ David Stevenson, ‘Leslie, Alexander, first earl of Leven (c. 1580–1661)’, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn, Sept 2004, [https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-16482?rskey=BBDI3n&result=2], accessed 02/2018.

¹⁴⁸ *RPS*, 1645/1/154, [http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1645/1/154], accessed 11/2017.

¹⁴⁹ *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 20: Oct 1644–July 1645: p. 70: SP 16/503 f.50.

¹⁵⁰ Stevenson, ‘Leslie, Alexander, first earl of Leven’, *ODNB*.

¹⁵¹ *RPS*, 1645/1/171, [http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1645/1/171], accessed 11/2017.

¹⁵² *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 20, Oct 1644–July 1645: p. 70: SP 16/503 f.50.

¹⁵³ *RPS*, 1645/1/171, [http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1645/1/171], accessed 11/2017.

the language used in the Royalist commissions, which framed their powers in terms of the hierarchy of command, and the military responsibilities of the governor.¹⁵⁴ By contrast, the Covenanter document framed the governorship in the language of civic, rather than military, governance. Terms such as ‘liberty’ and ‘privilege’ were not only the rallying cry of the Parliamentarians but were used by other corporate bodies throughout early-modern England, such as the civic corporations.¹⁵⁵ The decision to frame Lumsden’s commission in these terms is worthy of comment. Firstly, it demonstrated that the Covenanters aimed to secure their control over the civic government of Newcastle. The existing liberties and privileges of the city were now held by the governor, Sir James Lumsden, on behalf of his Majesty and the English Parliament of course.¹⁵⁶ Secondly, the continued concern for the financial resources of Newcastle was shown by the statement that the governor was also entitled to the ‘fees...belonging to that charge’.¹⁵⁷ This was a reference to the customs fees the great port city would collect, suggesting that Lumsden now had the legal backing to utilise these revenues for the use of the Covenanter army.

Lumsden did not use these powers immediately, and it should be presumed that the corporation continued to run the civic customs for much of the occupation.¹⁵⁸ This changed on 10 December 1646, when the common council received unwelcome news from an alderman who had been sent to go to Lord Leven and the governor: ‘Their desire was to have 2000£ sent them And for their Securitie they should have the Customs House and Excise’.¹⁵⁹ This was extremely unusual, even with Lumsden’s commission, and represented a significant assertion of the authority of the Covenanter military government over the Newcastle Corporation. The situation was made even more complex by the fact that these were revenues of the English state, being collected

¹⁵⁴ For Royalist governor commissions see Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty’s forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41; Copy of the appointment William, Earl of Newcastle, General of the King’s Forces in the North of Col. Henry Stradling as Colonel and [deputy] commander in chief under Col. Gray of the brigade to be raised in Northumberland and Durham, 7 July 1643, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, DPH/1/89/1.

¹⁵⁵ Roger Howell, ‘The Structure of Urban Politics in the English Civil War’, *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies* 11 (1979), 111–127, at pp. 113, 118–119.

¹⁵⁶ RPS, 1645/1/171, [<http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1645/1/171>], accessed 11/2017.

¹⁵⁷ RPS, 1645/1/171, [<http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1645/1/171>], accessed 11/2017.

¹⁵⁸ Common Council Order Books, Tyne and Wear Archives, MD.NC/2/1, p. 90.

¹⁵⁹ Common Council Order Books, Tyne and Wear Archives, MD.NC/2/1, p. 90.

for the use of forces of the Scottish state. In the absence of the central figure of the British dynastic union, the King, or even any recorded directions from the Committee of Both Kingdoms, this action lacked any real legal basis. Leven and Lumsden were aware of this, explaining that ‘they would not have desired the same but upon great necessitie.’¹⁶⁰ The triumph of the force of arms over law should not come as a great surprise, considering the nature of civil war. By its very nature, involving as it does armed conflict over control of the state, the vast majority of civil war is effectively extralegal. Propaganda screeds aside, a willingness to use force instead of law to secure sources of supply was a common feature of all combatants in the British Civil Wars.

The costs of these charges were severe. On 20 December of the same year, the common council ordered that the clerk draw up ‘A Perticuler of the Charges and disbursements’ to which the town had been subject from both the garrison and the captive King’s court. The results of this review demonstrated a severe lack of funds on the part of the corporation, for three days later another meeting of the common council was held, in which the Mayor moved that five hundred pounds be borrowed ‘for foure or five Monthes to paie the last quarter And the weekly Disbursements.’¹⁶¹ Borrowing money to cover regular costs is typically a sign of severe financial stress, and suggested that towards the end of the Covenanter occupation the Newcastle Corporation was approaching its financial resource base’s limits. If the sum could not be repaid, the ‘Aldermenes bond should be putt in [illegible] for The same the 500£ interest’.¹⁶² The legal basis of all of these demands for monetary supply was Sir James Lumsden’s commission, but that cannot be considered unproblematic. Naturally, this was not the opinion of the Committee of Estates, who declared on 6 March 1645 that:

as the commission granted in his favour relating thereto in itself more fully purports in all and sundry heads, articles, clauses and conditions of the aforesaid commission and according to the tenor thereof in all points; and declare the present general ratification thereof to be as sufficient, valid and effectual as if the aforesaid commission was word for word inserted in this present ratification thereof, for the which the estates hereby dispense.¹⁶³

¹⁶⁰ Common Council Order Books, Tyne and Wear Archives, MD.NC/2/1, p. 90.

¹⁶¹ Common Council Order Books, Tyne and Wear Archives, MD.NC/2/1, p. 97.

¹⁶² Common Council Order Books, Tyne and Wear Archives, MD.NC/2/1, p. 97.

¹⁶³ *RPS*, 1645/1/171, [<http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1645/1/171>], accessed 11/2017.

This rather complex passage needs unpacking. Rather than quote the commission at length, the register instead merely stated that the Estates should consent and declare it valid. This does mean that the precise details of the commission elude this record. However, it was mentioned that the commission consisted of ‘sundry heads, articles, causes and conditions’, indicating that it was a document of considerable length and complexity. This stood in contrast to the relative brevity of the Royalist commissions, which were typically not longer than a single page. A probable cause was the complexity of the legal situation of the occupation of Northern England by the Scottish Covenanter army, at the request of the English Parliament, in the name of the British king, whose armies the Covenanters and Parliamentarians had just defeated. Seemingly in the interests of brevity, the Estates merely confirmed their support for the general details and insisted that it was ‘sufficient, valid and effectual’. However, Lumsden’s original commission had been composed, it was retrospectively validated by the sole authority of the Scottish Estates, with no seeming role for the English Parliament. However, the legislation did also make clear that ‘the foirsaid commissione, with this ratificatione thair of, shall onlie endure till he receave commissione from the committy of both kingdomes.’¹⁶⁴ While the Estates did consider their singular authority sufficient in the short term, their alliance with the Parliamentarians meant that, in the long term, the consent of the two Houses was required.

This took place the following month, at a meeting of the Committee of Both Kingdoms on 11 April 1645. The last item of business in the daybook for orders was a simple statement that ‘At the Committee of both Houses. 10. That the commission to be granted to Sir James Lumsden be drawn up and presented to this Committee.’¹⁶⁵ There are two points of significance in this source. Firstly, it must be made clear that this was the record of the Committee of Both Kingdoms the reference to the two Houses appears between items nine and ten on the agenda of a meeting of the former. This suggested that the Committee of Both Kingdoms resolved that it was the responsibility of the Committee of Both Houses to draw up Sir James Lumsden’s new commission before it was presented to the Committee of Both Kingdoms for final ratification by the commissioners of both the English and Scottish Parliaments. The Committee of Estates, the Committee of Both Houses and the Committee of Both Kingdoms each had a part in drawing up Lumsden’s various commissions. Consequently, all three had, to lesser or

¹⁶⁴ *RPS*, 1645/1/171, [<http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1645/1/171>], accessed 11/2017.

¹⁶⁵ *RPS*, 1645/1/171, [<http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1645/1/171>], accessed 11/2017.

greater degrees, claims on his loyalty and obedience. This was borne out by a subsequent letter from the Committee of Both Kingdoms, dated 26 August 1645:

The Committee of both kingdoms to Sir James Lumsden. We have received intelligence that a great part of the garrison of Newcastle are gone into Scotland, leaving that town, which is of so great consequence, in great hazard during their absence. Both an enemy may thus be encouraged to make an attempt upon it, and the disaffected within to comply with them. We recommend it to your care that some effectual course be taken to supply the defect, and to secure that town in safety. Sent by the post.¹⁶⁶

Following the spectacular victories of Montrose and his highland army, much of Scotland had fallen into the Royalists' hands.¹⁶⁷ This was a grievous blow to the authority and prestige of the Covenanters and required the withdrawal of most of their armies back to Scotland. This also applied to the garrison at Newcastle, to the concern of the Committee of Both Kingdoms. The intense concern for the settlement of Newcastle was made very clear in the letter, as the Committee described the city 'of so great consequence' and 'in great hazard'.¹⁶⁸ Royalist forces in Northern England continued to launch raids from their strongholds in support of one another, and the possibility of a deep raid to retake Newcastle could not be discounted. After all, the coal supply from the North was already at risk from Royalist privateers operating out of Scarborough.¹⁶⁹ A cavalry raid could not have seemed out of the question to the worried Committee in London.

Neither could Newcastle, the womb of the great popish army and titular city of its commander, be considered well-affected to the Parliamentary cause. As previously stated, the Committee

¹⁶⁶ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 21: July 1645–Dec 1647: p. 86: SP 21/21 f.149: 'The Committee of both kingdoms to Sir James Lumsden'.

¹⁶⁷ Williams, *Montrose*, pp. 272–275; Anon, *A true relation of the happy success of His Maesties forces in Scotland under the conduct of Lord Iames Marquisse of Montrose ...*; Anon, *A True relation of the happy successe of His Majesties forces in Scotland under the conduct of the Lord Iames, Marqvisse of Montrose His Excellencie, against the rebels there ...*; Anon, *The true relation of the late & happie victorie, obtained by the Marques of Montrose his Excellencie, His Majesties Lieuetenant, and Generall Governour of the kingdom of Scotland against General Lieuetenant Baylie, and others of the rebels, at Kilsyth, 15 August, 1645*.

¹⁶⁸ *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 21, 1645–1647: p. 86: SP 21/21 f.149.

¹⁶⁹ Binns, *A Place of Great Importance*, pp. 110–103; Jack Binns, 'Captain Brown Bushell: North Sea Adventurer and Pirate', *Northern History* 27 (1991), 90–105; *Mercurius Aulicus*, 26th week (25 June 1643–1 July 1643), p. 341 (Nelson and Seccombe STC, 275.126).

Newcastle was also 'Northerne Algiers, or nest of Sea and land Pirates', see Thomas Coleman, *Huls pillar of providence erected: or The providentiall columnne, setting out heavens care for deliverance of that people, with extraordinary power and providence from the bloud-sucking Cavaliers, who had for six weeks closely besieged them* (London: Ralph Rounthwait, 1644) p. 4.

of Both Kingdoms was deeply concerned about the ‘malignant’ population of the city.¹⁷⁰ The slackening of the Covenanter grip could be the trigger for an internal uprising, possibly executed with external assistance from one of the remaining Royalist fortress garrisons. The realism of the paranoia of the Committee of Both Kingdoms is unclear, aside from the fact that the city did not rebel and remained in Lumsden’s hands until the withdrawal of all Covenanter troops from Northern England in 1647.¹⁷¹

Finally, this source also reiterated the ambiguity in the legal relationship between Lumsden and the committees in London. This letter did not presume to command the governor, but merely to ‘recommend it to your care that some effectual course be taken to supply the defect, and to secure that town in safety.’¹⁷² Even the Committee of Both Kingdoms, which contained Scottish commissioners representing the estates, evidently did not feel capable of issuing direct orders to Lumsden. The contrast with the Estates is striking, for the Scottish Parliament felt no such compunctions about issuing orders to an officer in their army.¹⁷³

4.7 The City Corporation, the Economics of Occupation and the Covenanter Withdrawal.

Even with the number of troops in the city falling, the Covenanter army still dominated Newcastle, not just militarily, but also economically. This was made clear by a complaint which was made by the common council to the governor on 3 June 1645, which stated that:

It is Ordered that Mr Maior and, *some of* the Aldermen be pleased to speake wth Mr Gouvernor. and to make him acquainted wth the great wronge an[torn] Iniurie they dayly recaud by the Scotts *slougiers* buying And [illegible] of Sheepes Skinnis and Lambe Skinns, And by Pedlers and petty Chapinen who buy great quantitis of gloues and parseo[torn] and sell them againe in the Marketts Contrary to the Laws of this Kingdome and the prudilly of this Towne-) and to desire the Gouvernors Faver and assistance for the tynelly redresse of the same. And presenacon of the same for [torn] Tyme to come.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁰ *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 20: Oct 1644–July 1645: p. 70: SP 16/503 f.50.

¹⁷¹ *The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707*, K.M. Brown et al eds (St Andrews, 2007–2017), 1646/11/85, [http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1646/11/85], accessed 11/2017.

¹⁷² *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 21: July 1645–Dec 1647: p. 86: SP 21/21 f.149.

¹⁷³ Indeed Lumsden, in addition to his position as governor was appointed as a commissioner ‘for clearing the accounts with England’, see *The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707*, K.M. Brown et al eds. (St Andrews, 2007–2017), 1645/11/238, [http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1645/11/238], accessed 11/2017.

¹⁷⁴ Common Council Order Books, Tyne and Wear Archives, MD.NC/2/1, p. 3.

In Britain the early modern civic oligarchy was typically commercial, being primarily composed of craftsmen and tradesmen.¹⁷⁵ Therefore, a part of civic independence particularly valued by any oligarchy was the right to license the city's industries and commerce. In the chaotic conditions of civil war and military occupation, the corporation's control over the business of Newcastle had collapsed. According to the above complaint, there were two particular culprits. The first was the Covenanter soldiers themselves, who were buying great quantities of sheepskins.¹⁷⁶ In the hills of County Durham and Northumberland, the wool trade was the main form of economic activity.¹⁷⁷ As by far the largest port and trading centre in the region, its only real rivals being Edinburgh, York and Hull, all of which lay at a considerable distance, Newcastle could expect to reap considerable rewards from this trade. According to the common council, this essential source of income and resources was now closed owing to the Covenanter army purchasing these goods instead.¹⁷⁸ Worse for the common council, their control of even the internal civic economy appeared to have partially collapsed, with traders buying and reselling goods 'again in the Marketts Contrary to the Laws of this Kingdome'.¹⁷⁹ The use of the term 'Pedlar' and the adjective 'petty' suggested that these traders were not licensed, as did the corporation's insistence that it was to 'the prejudice of this Towne'.¹⁸⁰ If the officers of the city were no longer capable of regulating commerce, it demonstrated a significant collapse in the corporation's ability to administer Newcastle. The fact that they were appealing to the governor for redress, not just of the buying of sheepskins by his troops, but for assistance in controlling trade is extraordinary.

Compared to the jealous guarding of civic autonomy demonstrated throughout the rest of Northern England, particularly under Royalist military governments, it was even more remarkable.¹⁸¹ The probable cause of the seemingly abject position of the civic corporation was the repeated blows it had been subjected to over the previous years. Newcastle had been taken

¹⁷⁵ Tillott (ed.), *A History of the County of York: the City of York...*, pp. 135–140, 173–186; Lewis & Thacker (eds.), *A History of the County of Chester, the City of Chester: General History and Topography*, vol. V, pp. 97–102.

¹⁷⁶ Common Council Order Books, Tyne and Wear Archives, MD.NC/2/1, p. 3.

¹⁷⁷ Peter Bowden, *The Wool Trade in Tudor and Stuart England* (London: F. Cass, 1971), pp. 66, 108–109, 166, 189–190.

¹⁷⁸ Common Council Order Books, Tyne and Wear Archives, MD.NC/2/1, p. 3.

¹⁷⁹ Common Council Order Books, Tyne and Wear Archives, MD.NC/2/1, p. 3.

¹⁸⁰ Common Council Order Books, Tyne and Wear Archives, MD.NC/2/1, p. 3.

¹⁸¹ For Lord Byron's account of his struggles with the corporation of Chester see, Lord Byron's *Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210; for the Royalists' armed intervention against the corporation of York see, *Minutes of full council (pre-1835)*, House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 81–84; both examples will be explored later in this dissertation.

relatively non-violently in the Second Bishops' War, then occupied, used by the Royalists as a base of operations before being besieged, stormed, and finally occupied for a second time.¹⁸² It does not strike the author as suppositional to suggest that these events would have exhausted corporate resources and prevented the proper functioning of civic institutions. Indeed, it would be considerably more remarkable if the corporation had not suffered this collapse after such disruptive experiences.

Following the inter-parliamentary negotiations that took up much of 1646, the Scottish Parliament issued a lengthy set of 'Instructions from the parliament to the commissioners sent to Newcastle and to the generall, generall officers and governor of Newcastle'.¹⁸³ Dated 26 December 1646, this document was a list of instructions for the removal of the Covenanter garrison in Newcastle, and its return to Scotland. Firstly, this letter was not phrased as a 'request' or a 'recommendation' but as 'instructions'.¹⁸⁴ They were irresistible orders, issued from a superior to a subordinate, and demanding, rather than asking for, execution. This may be a consequence of the time at which this document was composed, towards the end of the Covenanter occupation. But it is notable that, despite seeking consensus with their Parliamentary allies, the Scottish Estates felt capable of issuing orders to Lumsden while neither the Committees of Both Kingdoms and Both Houses did so.¹⁸⁵

As the Covenanter occupiers began to withdraw, the estates ordered Lumsden to take the appropriate steps to ensure, following 'the treaty now passed between our commissioners at London and the houses of parliament', that the fortifications of 'Berwick and Carlisle' were dismantled.¹⁸⁶ This was in keeping with the Covenanters' objective of keeping Scotland and

¹⁸² Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives, DX1148/1; Sadler & Serdiville, *The Great Siege of Newcastle 1644*, pp. 57–58; Anon, *A declaration wherein is full satisfaction given concerning Sir Edward Deering: with a true relation of the Scots preceedings of about the surrendering of Newcastle* (London: Andrew Coe, 1644) Anon, *A Full relation of the Scots besiedging Newcastle and their taking the glasse houses, and other forts...* (London: Bernard Alsey, 1644).

¹⁸³ Charles Hamilton, 'Anglo-Scottish Militia Negotiations, March–April 1646', *The Scottish Historical Review* 42 (1963), 86–88; *RPS*, 1646/11/85, [<http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1646/11/85>], accessed 11/2017.

¹⁸⁴ *RPS*, 1646/11/85, [<http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1646/11/85>], accessed 11/2017.

¹⁸⁵ For the radical differences in how the C.o.B.K and the Committee of Estates addressed the Covenanter garrison of Newcastle compare, *RPS*, 1646/11/85, [<http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1646/11/85>], accessed 11/2017; *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 20: Oct 1644–July 1645: p. 70: SP 16/503 f.50.

¹⁸⁶ *The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707*, K.M. Brown et al eds. (St Andrews, 2007–2017), 1646/11/95, [<http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1646/11/95>], accessed 11/2017.

England ‘conjoined in a firm peace and union to all posterity’.¹⁸⁷ Since these fortifications could have no purpose in defending Britain from external invasion, there would be no point in maintaining them. It would only increase divisions between the two kingdoms, contrary to both the aims of the Covenanters and the process of demilitarisation and the pacification of the borders began by King James.¹⁸⁸

Naturally, it would also mean that if the Covenanters had to send their army back over the Tweed for the third time, these two fortresses would not be an obstacle to their passage south. This looked increasingly likely, given the receding possibility of the Covenanters securing their goal of spreading their model of Church government throughout all the Stuart dominions.¹⁸⁹ The collapse in their military prestige after the victories of Montrose and his Irish-Scottish Royalist army had fatally damaged their influence in the English Parliament.¹⁹⁰ Within that body, their allies, the Presbyterian party, was increasingly losing control, and the English parliamentary army was beginning to assert itself as a political force opposed as much to presbytery as to prelacy.¹⁹¹ Indeed, the collapse of relations between the Covenanters and Parliamentarians, the engagement, and the outbreak of the Second Civil War meant that these plans were never fully put into effect. While the fortifications of Berwick are now extremely degraded, the driving of a railway through the castle in the nineteenth century not helping the preservation of the site at all, those of Carlisle are the most intact civic defences in Northern England.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁷ Parliaments of Scotland and England, *A solemn league and covenant, for reformation; and defence of religion, the honour and happiness of the King, and the peace & safetie of the three kingdoms. Of Scotland, England, & Ireland* (Aberdeen: Edward Raban, 1643), p. 12.

¹⁸⁸ Cal. S. P. Dom., James I, vol. 1, 1603–1610, p. 202: MC4323503201: ‘Joint commission to five persons of England and five of Scotland, to remove all occasions of strangeness and marks of division between the countries, and to manage the government of the Border counties’.

¹⁸⁹ Van Dixhoorn, ‘Scottish influence on the Westminster Assembly: a study of the synod’s summoning ordinance and the Solemn League and Covenant’.

¹⁹⁰ Wedgwood, ‘The Covenanters in the first Civil War’, at pp. 1, 9–10, 12–15.

¹⁹¹ Lawrence Kaplan, ‘Presbyterians and Independents in 1643’, *The English Historical Review* 84 (1969), 244–256; Lawrence Kaplan, ‘English Civil War Politics and the Religious Settlement’, *Church History* 41 (1972), 307–325; Clement Walker, *Relations and observations, historicall and politick, upon the Parliament, begun anno Dom. 1640. Divided into II. bookes: 1. The mystery of the two junto's, Presbyterian and Independent. 2. The history of independency, &c. Together with an appendix, touching the proceedings of the Independent faction in Scotland* (London: s.n., 1648), pp. 1–20.

¹⁹² See, McCarthy, Summerson, Annis, Perriam and Young, ‘Carlisle Castle, A survey and documentary history’, pp. 1–4, 12–67, 195–200.

The relief with which the Newcastle corporation greeted the Covenanter withdrawal was made clear by their decision to vote, on 15 February 1647, ‘100£...to lend the Gouvernor’.¹⁹³ This governor was not Lumsden, but Major-General Phillip Skippon, appointed by the English Parliament, on the recommendation of Sir Thomas Fairfax, in December of the previous year.¹⁹⁴ Skippon had also escorted £200,000 in thirty-six carts, intended finally to pay the arrears of the Covenanter army, and took custody of the King.¹⁹⁵ While the city still had a military governor, it was no longer burdened with the problem of sustaining the Covenanter armies. While the city would not experience true demilitarisation until long afterwards, it was at least spared direct fighting in the Second and Third Civil Wars. After nearly ten years of conflict, Newcastle could begin a slow return to relative normalcy.

On 29 January 1647, the corporation was able to record that ‘to giue the Towne 500£ Sd securitie unto duiers of the Aldermen for the repayment of 400£ w[i]ch was by them taken upon att intrest for the use of the Maior & Burgesses’.¹⁹⁶ It is unclear whether this was the five-hundred-pound sum borrowed the previous year since there was no record of an additional loan of four-hundred pounds, but either way, it indicated the beginning of a return to fiscal solvency by the corporation. At the same meeting, the Mayor also received retrospective approval for ‘A Butt of Sacke And two hogsheads of Chargerett wine to the Earl of Pembroke And the rest of the Comis[sioners]’.¹⁹⁷ Indeed the corporation decided to take the mayor’s policy of bribing political superiors one step further. They ‘desired that Mr Maior would be pleased to Consider of a present to be presented unto Maior Generall Skippon the Gouvernor of this Garrison.’¹⁹⁸ Despite the beginning of a return to normality, the corporation continued the policy of subordination to military authority that it had displayed under the Covenanters.

4.8 Conclusions

The second Covenanter occupation of Northern England did not result in any significant lasting change in the region’s society or administration. Its impact largely lay in deepening the

¹⁹³ Common Council Order Books, Tyne and Wear Archives, MD.NC/2/1, p. 99.

¹⁹⁴ Ian Gentles, ‘Skippon, Philip, appointed Lord Skippon under the protectorate (d. 1660)’, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn, Sept 2004, [https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-25693], accessed 05/2019.

¹⁹⁵ Gentles, ‘Phillip Skippon’, *ODNB*.

¹⁹⁶ Common Council Order Books, Tyne and Wear Archives, MD.NC/2/1, p. 102.

¹⁹⁷ Common Council Order Books, Tyne and Wear Archives, MD.NC/2/1, p. 102.

¹⁹⁸ Common Council Order Books, Tyne and Wear Archives, MD.NC/2/1, p. 102.

alienation of the region from the Covenanting cause that had already begun with the first occupation. The main consequence of this was a reduction in the expected support for the invasions of the region by the Engagers, the faction in Scottish politics who had allied with Charles I in the Second Civil War, in 1648, and Charles II in 1651.¹⁹⁹ But it is still worthy of historical attention. It, along with Ulster, was the only part of the British Isles outside Scotland to come under long-term administration by the Covenanted state. While their impact on popular culture and memory was much less in Northern England than in Northern Ireland, in both cases it revolved around fortresses. But while Carrickfergus and Belfast were fortresses to be maintained, bolstered, and turned into positions of strength, Carlisle and Newcastle were only ever intended for temporary Covenanter control. If the Covenanters had succeeded in their war goals both cities would have seen their fortifications dismantled. Their intentions in this regard were ultimately to be fulfilled by the Parliamentarians, as part of their policy of slighting, intended to prevent fortifications sheltering rebels from the New Model Army's wrath.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁹ Royle, *Civil War: The Wars of the Three Kingdoms, 1638–1660*, pp. 412–426; Charles Hamilton, 'Church and State and the Engagement in Scotland, 1648', *Journal of Church and State* 11 (1969), 465–472; Stewart, *Rethinking the Scottish Revolution: Covenanted Scotland, 1637–1651*, pp. 256–302.

²⁰⁰ Anon, *The Presentment and Articles Proposed by the Grand Jury of the County of York: And the Declaration of the Nobility, Grand Jury and Gentry of the said County: At the Assises assembled in August* (York: Robert Barker, 1642), p. 5.

Chapter Five: Governorships

5.1 Introduction, Historiography and Method

Fortification was not merely a physical process. It also required coherent administration, not only to construct defences but also to ensure that they would be manned and used effectively. In the British Civil Wars the key office in any fortified position, castles, towns and cities alike, was the governorship. Governors were appointed by every combatant during the Civil Wars and were charged with the direction and administration of the garrison. Moreover, the evidence suggests that gubernatorial authority was not limited to the soldiers under their command, but also extended over the locality in which they were based. Governors gave orders to local officers ranging from parish constables to the ancient corporations of cities such as York. The office of governor was not a wartime creation. Major royal fortresses, of which the most prominent in Northern England was Carlisle, were administered by governors appointed by the Crown.¹ But during the Civil Wars, governors massively proliferated in both number and sphere of competence as the garrison system of fortified strongholds holding down a locality proliferated.²

The historiography of office-holding in Early Modern England is extensive, exciting attention throughout the past century despite the twists and turns of historical debate across that period. Elton wrote extensively on the subject to support his theory of a ‘revolution in Tudor government’.³ More recently Braddick has engaged with it as part of his wider study over the past quarter-century of what he terms ‘state formation’ in early modern England.⁴ Braddick’s

¹ After 1605 the ‘superior custody of the castle and its socage were, however, conferred on the Earl of Cumberland and his son...in 1611 castle and manor were finally demised to them for a term of sixty years, at an annual rent of £50’, see McCarthy, Summerson and Annis, *Carlisle Castle: A survey and documentary history*, pp. 194–195. For original source, see Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre: DLONS, box 3, ‘Lowther family, Earls of Lonsdale’.

² Trevelyan, *England under the Stuarts*, 1st edn, p. 202.

³ Geoffrey Elton, *The Tudor Revolution in Government: Administrative Changes in the Reign of Henry VIII* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953); Geoffrey Elton, *England under the Tudors* (London: Methuen, 1955); Geoffrey Elton, *The Tudor Constitution*, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

⁴ Michael Braddick, *Parliamentary Taxation in seventeenth-century England: Local Administration and Response* (London: Royal Historical Society, 1994); Michael Braddick, ‘The early modern English state and the question of differentiation from 1550 to 1700’, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 38 (1996), 92–111; Michael Braddick, *State formation in early modern England, ca. 1550–1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Michael Braddick & John Walter, *Negotiating power in early modern society : order, hierarchy and subordination in Britain and Ireland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Michael Braddick, ‘The Rise of the Fiscal State’, in *A companion*

‘bottom-up’ model of state development places great attention on the role played by local officeholders in extending the influence of the state to provincial England. The significance of this model for the history of Royalism will be explored in the subsequent chapter. Of immediate relevance is Braddick’s point that from the most basic officer of the state, the constable, to the greater offices of sheriff and Lord-Lieutenant, officeholders existed within a complex social framework, which could both limit the office, for fear of offending peers or neighbours, or expand it through the use of contacts, patronage and nepotism.⁵

Also of relevance is Mark Goldie’s 2001 article ‘The Unacknowledged Republic: Officeholding in Early Modern England’ in *The Politics of the Excluded, c. 1500–1850* edited by Tim Harris.⁶ In his chapter, Goldie provided a thorough explanation and analysis of the structure and function of English county government in the seventeenth century. Like Braddick, Goldie argues that officeholding was relatively common, estimating that by 1700 around one in twenty adult males were ‘governing’ in any given year thanks to the profusion of offices such as the parish constable.⁷ Familiarity with not just officialdom, but officeholding, was therefore common across much of the population irrespective of social rank. However magisterial Goldie’s analysis of officeholding, it is very hard to fit governorships into his *Unacknowledged Republic*. Aside from a few royal fortresses, the office simply did not exist in peacetime and assumed powers and responsibilities that would have been quite unthinkable. The office was not ‘republican’ nor strictly monarchical, but responsible principally to its military superiors. This combination of civil and military power is conceptually problematic, and there are other noticeable problems. For example, it is not at all apparent that the *cursus honorum* pattern of officeholding, with particular inferior offices needing to be held before more senior ranks were reached, applies to Civil War governorships, an office whose occupants may have had only cursory military experience, if any.⁸

Indeed, compared with the attention placed by historians on officeholders in general, the specific office of governor is generally unexplored in this context. Braddick for example never

to *Stuart Britain: Blackwell Companions to British History*, ed. Barry Coward (Oxford : Blackwell Publishers, 2003), pp. 69–87.

⁵ Braddick, ‘The early modern English state and the question of differentiation from 1550 to 1700’, p. 98.

⁶ Mark Goldie, ‘The Unacknowledged Republic: Officeholding in Early Modern England’, in *The Politics of the Excluded, c. 1500–1850*, ed. Tim Harris (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 153–194.

⁷ Goldie, ‘The Unacknowledged Republic: Officeholding in Early Modern England’, p. 161.

⁸ Goldie, ‘The Unacknowledged Republic: Officeholding in Early Modern England’, pp. 164–165.

mentions it once in *State Formation in Early Modern England*. Instead, it is found within the localist studies of individual garrisons or biographies of singular individuals, such as Sir Hugh Cholmley, governor of Scarborough for both the Parliamentarians and Royalists.⁹ This is not to criticise these often excellent studies but the limitations of the biographical medium mean that larger questions of how governorship was legally constituted and operated go unanswered in favour of personalised accounts.

The first stage in any historical analysis of governorship must be to examine the commission. The commission was the source of the office's authority and delimited its powers and responsibilities. Given the centrality of the governor to the Civil Wars in the North, particularly to the Royalists, these are documents of great historical significance. The second part of this chapter will be devoted to a comparative study of two Royalist commissions, produced by Lord Newcastle for Sir John Mallory, governor of Skipton, and Sir Henry Stradling, governor of Carlisle.¹⁰ The two commissions are very similar in structure, indeed, significant parts of the two documents are nearly identical. However, there are several important differences, owing to the contrasting circumstances of the two garrisons. In addition to Newcastle's commissions, Sir John Mallory's second commission as governor, produced in October 1645 by Lord Digby, will also be analysed.¹¹ This is to demonstrate the disintegration of Royalist military administration in Northern England following the disaster of Marston Moor the previous year. Finally, the nature of Royalist governorship will be contrasted with Parliamentary experiences.

⁹ Braddick, *State formation in early modern England, ca. 1550–1700*, p. 441.

¹⁰ Copy of appointment of Col. Henry Stradling as Governor of Carlisle, 29 October 1643, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, DPH/1/89/2; Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty's forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41.

¹¹ Commission, George, Lord Digby, Baron of Sherborne, Lieutenant General of the Forces, Northside of the Trent, to Sir John Mallory, to be Governor of the town and Castle of Skipton, 18 October 1645, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Morley Vyner MSS, T/32/43.

5.2 Lordly Power as a Model for Governorship¹²

In *State Formation in early modern England, c. 1550–1700*, Michael Braddick argued that England's social and political hierarchies mirrored one another.¹³ Lesser gentlemen were justices of the peace or magistrates, while greater gentlemen, knights or the sons of titled nobility were the most common source of members of parliament. While this is an obvious assertion, Braddick's point was that the effective exercise of political power in seventeenth-century England was often dependent on a symbiotic network of social power, and *vice-versa*.¹⁴ The effectively hereditary shrievalty that the Cliffords held in Westmorland was an example of this.¹⁵

For this office to be truly effective, an informal and private network of relationships was required. This normally took the form of patron-client relations between superior and inferior societal ranks, in this case between the titled nobility and subordinate gentry families.¹⁶ The Cliffords' power base across Northern England was highly dependent on these relations, which they cultivated assiduously. For example, between 8 and 20 August 1609, the fourth Earl of Cumberland hosted 140 guests at his grand seat of Skipton Castle.¹⁷ They included not only social equals such as the fifth Earl of Rutland but also Sir William Ingleby of Ripley, Sir Thomas Metcalfe of Nappa, Sir John Savile of Howley and Sir Stephen Tempest of Broughton.¹⁸ These were all prominent local gentry families, between them covering a large swathe of the Yorkshire Dales. Several of these families, the Tempests in particular, would contribute members to Earl Henry's officers during the later Civil Wars.¹⁹

The importance of these relations was understood by contemporary military theorists, who

¹² It should be noted that substantial parts of this subsection, 5.2, are drawn from the author's MPhil thesis, 'The Royalist Garrison Castles of Yorkshire 1642–49', submitted to the University of Cambridge in 06/2015.

¹³ See Braddick, *State Formation in Early Modern England*, pp. 28–30, 33–37.

¹⁴ Braddick, *State Formation in Early Modern England*, pp. 1–2; more generally see 'Part II: The patriarchal State' in Braddick, *State Formation...*, pp. 101–175.

¹⁵ Spence, 'Clifford, Henry, fifth earl of Cumberland', *ODNB*.

¹⁶ See Adamson, 'Politics and the Nobility in Civil-War England', pp. 231–232; Russel, *Unrevolutionary England 1603–1642*, p. xii.

¹⁷ Chatsworth House, Bolton Abbey MSS, Bk. 73; Bks 226, 228, 230. Yorkshire Archaeological Society, DD/121/36A (2); T. D. Whitaker, *The History and Antiquities of the Deanery of Craven in the County of York*, 3rd edn (Leeds: London: Joseph Dodgson / Cassell Petter and Galpin, 1878), p. 394.

¹⁸ Spence, *Skipton Castle and Its Builders*, pp. 92–93.

¹⁹ Three Tempests served in the Skipton Castle garrison Colonel John Tempest (who originally served as Captain under a commission from the Earl of Cumberland) and Captains Robert and Stephen, see Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, pp. 16, 119.

argued that a basis in a locality's elites was necessary for a governorship to function properly. David Papillon's *A Practicall Abstract of the Arts, of Fortification and Assailing* argued that a governor must be 'allied to men of repute' in his area of responsibility.²⁰ The importance Papillon assigned to this quality is shown by the fact that it was near the top of his list of desirable qualities for a governor, topped only by gentle birth and loyalty to the cause.²¹ The contrast with Ward's *Animadversions* is striking, for the 1639 work did not mention alliances with local powerbrokers in its discussion of governorship at all.²² This was a consequence of the experience of three years of civil war, making clear the problems faced by governors in controlling localities where they had no power base among the local elite.

Private residences such as Skipton Castle operated for some time as Royalist garrisons with no formal commissions from the military hierarchy. Sir John Mallory was only commissioned as governor of Skipton after the fifth Earl of Cumberland's death, a necessity given that the new owner of the fortress, Lady Anne Clifford, was married to a Parliamentary grandee.²³ Outside Northern England, John Paulet, the 5th Marquess of Winchester and the owner of Basing House in Hampshire responded to Waller's demand for surrender 'that bazing was his owne house, which the Law told him hee might keepe against any man: That it was now more particularly commanded by His Majesty (who had put a Garrison into it) beyond which command he knew no obligation.'²⁴ The combination of Royalism and the lordly conception of defending a seat against private enemies proved a powerful motivation for the garrison of Basing, who refused to surrender until put to the storm.²⁵

²⁰ Papillon, *A Practicall Abstract of the Arts, of Fortification and Assailing*..., p. 92.

²¹ Papillon, *A Practicall Abstract of the Arts, of Fortification and Assailing*..., p. 92.

²² Robert Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre: Composed of the most refined discipline, and choice experiments that these late Netherlandish, and Swedish warres have produced: With divers new inventions, both of fortifications and strategems*.

²³ Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty's forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41; Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, p. 90.

²⁴ *Mercurius Aulicus*, 46th week (12 November 1643–19 November 1643), p. 655 (*Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 275.146); Ronald Hutton, 'Paulet, John, fifth marquess of Winchester (1598?–1675)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn, Sept 2004 [<https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-21621>], accessed 17 April 2020], accessed 03/2020.

²⁵ Anon, *A great victory obtained by Colonel Norton and his horse, and Colonell Jones and his foote, against Colonel Rayden, from Basing house, neere Walneborough Mill, within halfe a mile of Odium; where were taken prisoners Ssrjeant [sic] Major Langely, a mercer in Pater-noster-row, that went to*

However, ownership of a castle was not enough to ensure possession, as Sir Thomas Middleton of Ruthin in North Wales, along the border with Cheshire, discovered. Ruthin was an ‘old castle...lately made unservicable’ before being occupied by Royalist forces from the neighbouring garrison of Holt.²⁶ The sixty royalist musketeers in Ruthin were quickly surrounded by seven times their number under the command of the castle’s owner.²⁷ ‘Sir Thomas Middleton summoning the Castle as his owne house (for so it is)’.²⁸ When the Royalists refused ‘Sir Thomas grew extreme angry, vowing he would storme them that night’, resulting in the loss of around sixty Parliamentary troops.²⁹ *Aulicus* declared that this was ‘a lasting vexation to Sir Thomas Middleton, to come with so great a strength and yet be shamefully beaten and abused by so few, before his own doore.’³⁰ In this case, personal connections served not to encourage resistance, but to humiliate a Parliamentary target. Similarly, at Berkley House in Gloucestershire at the outbreak of the war a garrison was placed in the castle ‘without

Basing, also his escape. Captain Rawlet that was a scrivener at Holbern bridge. Lieutenant Rawlet at Holborne Cunduit. Lieutenant Ivorie a citizen of London. Ensigne Lucas a silke dier in the Old baly. Ensigne Corum, a papist of Winchester. Robinson a chyrurgeon to the Marques of Winchester, a papist. Taken besides, 3 gentlemen of armes 3 serjeants, 3 drummers, 5 drums, 75 common men, 100 armes, some horse, 4 were slain. 10 of onr [sic] men which were prisoners in Basing house escaped. Certified by gentlemen that were engaged in the service. Published according to order (London: Andrew Coe, 1644); Anon, A description of the seige of Basing castle; kept by the Lord Marquisse of Winchester, for the service of His Maiesty: against, the forces of the rebels, under command of Colonell Norton, Anno Dom. 1644 (Oxford: Leonard Lichfield, 1645); Anon, A looking-glasse for the Popish garrisons: held forth in the life and death of Basing-House. VVherein is described her former vanity, present condition, and a friendly admonition to the other malignant dens. VVith divers articles of high-treason drawne up against Sir Robert Peake, governour of the said garrison (London: W. W., 1645); William Beech, re sulphure for Basing: or, God will fearfully annoy and make quick riddance of his implacable enemies, surely, sorely, suddenly. Shewed in a sermon at the siege of Basing on the last Lords day, Sept. 21. 1645. Together, with a word of advice, full of love and affection to the Club-men of Hampshire (London: John Wright, 1645); pp. 2–3, 28; Anon, Englands remembrancer: in two parts. Or, A catalogue of all or most of the severall victories, and strong holds obtained (through Gods blessing) by the Parliaments forces since the armies rising from before Oxford in June last, 1645. to the generall thanksgiving, Octob. 2. 1645. As also since that time to this present thanksgiving of the Parliament, city of London, and parts adjacent. March 12. 1645. All within the time of 8 moneths. Published of purpose to draw forth Englands thankfulness, unto the Lord of Hoasts at all times, but more especially upon her dayes of thanksgiving (London: Thomas Underhill, 1645), p. 5.

²⁶ *Mercurius Aulicus*, 47th week (17 November 1644–23 November 1644), p. 1261 (*Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 275.247A).

²⁷ *Mercurius Aulicus*, 47th week (17 November 1644–23 November 1644), pp. 1261–1262 (*Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 275.247A).

²⁸ *Mercurius Aulicus*, 47th week (17 November 1644–23 November 1644), p. 1262 (*Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 275.247A).

²⁹ *Mercurius Aulicus*, 47th week (17 November 1644–23 November 1644), p. 1262 (*Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 275.247A).

³⁰ *Mercurius Aulicus*, 47th week (17 November 1644–23 November 1644), p. 1262 (*Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 275.247A).

the leve, and against the liking of the Lord thereof', who refused to leave despite an order from the House of Lords to that effect.³¹

Other lordly owners, such as the Earl of Derby, left their wives in control of their seats while they were away on campaign.³² Lady Harley, the wife of Sir Robert Harley, controlled the Royalist garrison of her castle of Brampton until her death in November 1643, leaving her doctor in command of the garrison.³³ While these *she-generalissima*, to quote Queen Henrietta Maria, did not exercise direct control over military affairs, that task being left to hired professional soldiers, they did serve as the final arbiter for the direction of the garrison.³⁴ Lady Derby's principal military subordinate was 'major of the house', not governor or colonel, Captain William Farmer, a Scottish professional soldier who had fought in the Thirty Years War.³⁵ The use of this title, clearly below that of a governor and lacking any confirmatory commission from the Royalist military hierarchy, suggests that Lady Derby retained her ultimate control over her husband's seat throughout the first siege of Lathom.³⁶

The only source from within the walls of Lathom during the siege, an unknown diarist writing several years afterwards, never directly stated that the countess gave any explicit commands to her soldiers, beyond ordering them to continue resistance. Given her lack of training and employment of Major-Captain Farmer, it is probable that she authorised his orders for counterattacks and raids against the besiegers. But Lady Derby retained the decision of when to surrender, the most important gubernatorial power. The diary of the siege stated she was responsible for rejecting several Parliamentary offers for terms, several of them quite generous.³⁷ Instead, she held out until relieved by Prince Rupert during his march North.³⁸ This tied down considerable numbers of soldiers, draining the Lancastrian Parliamentarians of men and money and contributing to their destruction at Rupert's hands at Bolton later that year.³⁹

³¹ *Mercurius Aulicus*, 31st week (30 July 1643–5 August 1643), p. 410 (*Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 275.131).

³² See Pilkington, *To play the man: The story of Lady Derby and the Siege of Lathom House, 1643–1645*.

³³ *Mercurius Aulicus*, 45th week (5 November 1643–11 November 1643), p. 640 (*Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 275.145).

³⁴ Pilkington, *To play the man...*, pp. 33–35.

³⁵ Pilkington, *To play the man...*, p. 35.

³⁶ Pilkington, *To play the man...*, p. 35.

³⁷ Pilkington, *To play the man...*, pp. 60–63, 72–73, 75–76, 89–90.

³⁸ Pilkington, *To play the man...*, pp. 95–107.

³⁹ Pilkington, *To play the man...*, pp. 54–59, 79–81, 95–97.

In most of her responses to various Parliamentary surrender demands, Lady Derby expressed deference towards her husband. In the various surrender negotiations with the besiegers, she often invoked his ultimate authority. Her reply to the Parliamentary propositions of 7–10 March 1644 was as follows, ‘she wold receve no more messages without an expresse of her Lords pleasure, whoe shee now heard was returned from the Isle of Man, and to whom shee referr’d for the transacc’ on of the whole business’.⁴⁰ She repeated this sentiment on 23 May 1644 when she replied to the surrender summons with the statement, ‘That unless they wold treat wth her Lord, they shold never have her, nor any of her friends alive’.⁴¹

However, these expressions of deference in language were not necessarily matched in her actions. On 20 March, Fairfax sent Lady Derby a letter he had received from her husband. In this letter the Earl expressed his wish for ‘an honorable and free passage [to Chester or the Isle of Man] for his Lady and children, if shee so pleased, being loath to expose them to the uncertaine hazard of a long seidge’.⁴² While Derby did not order his wife to settle for Parliamentary terms, as the qualifier ‘if shee so pleased’ made clear, he was expressing his wish that his family not expose themselves to the danger of a siege. In response to this letter, Lady Derby declared that ‘till she was assured it was his Lo^{pps} pleasure, she wold neither yield the house, nor herself desert it, but waite for the event according to the good will of God.’⁴³ Aside from her ultimate control over the garrison’s affairs, the primary daily activities of Lady Derby were the traditionally feminine spheres of religion and family:

Her Ladiship commanded in cheeffe, whose first care was the service of God, which in sermons and solemne prayers shee duely saw p’formed: 4 tymes a day was shee com’only p’sent in publike prayers, attended with 2 litle ladyes her children, the Lady Mary and the Lady Catherine, for piety and sweetnes truly the childen of soe princely a mother: and if daringness in tyme of danger may adde anything to theire age and virtues, let them have this testimonye, that though truely apprehensive of the enemyes malice, they were nev’ startled wth any appe’ance of danger.⁴⁴

This ensured regular contact allowed Lady Derby to condescend to solidarity without undermining her superior social position, the basis of her authority. Her two daughters, ladies

⁴⁰ Stanley, *A Journal of the siege of Lathom House*, pp. 27–28.

⁴¹ Stanley, *A Journal of the siege of Lathom House*, pp. 58–59.

⁴² Stanley, *A Journal of the siege of Lathom House*, p. 32.

⁴³ Stanley, *A Journal of the siege of Lathom House*, p. 33.

⁴⁴ Stanley, *A Journal of the siege of Lathom House*, p. 65.

Mary and Catherine, performed the same aristocratic feminine roles as their mother, and this bolstered her own image as ‘soe princely a mother’, an image of traditional womanly virtue capable of motivating men to fight and die in her name.⁴⁵

But the two children were also, unlike their mother, of Stanley blood. This was an important consideration given Lady Derby’s French birth and consequent status as ‘A WOMAN AND A STRANGER’.⁴⁶ The absence of the Earl and the destruction of the family’s traditional sphere of patronage across Lancashire and Cheshire during the previous two years of civil conflict had devastated the Stanleys’ position. When previously Lathom had been ‘THE ONELY COURT OF THE NORTHERNE PARTS OF THIS KINGDOM’, it was now besieged by Parliamentary soldiers who, in several cases, had previously been amongst the Stanleys’ servants or client families.⁴⁷ The public presentation of the bloodline would have reassured the diehard supporters of the house present in the garrison that, despite the present crisis, the Stanley line would endure. The performance of traditional feminine virtues, combined with her evident scorn for the besiegers, worked well in maintaining the garrison’s morale. Despite the ferocious bombardment, they never broke and launched regular sallies against the enemy. On one occasion the countess was able, following a fiery denunciation of the final Parliamentary surrender demand, to drive her soldiers to an ecstasy of loyalty as ‘they broke into shouts and acclamations of joy, closing all wth this generall voyce, “Wee’ll dye for his Ma[jes]tie and your Honour-God save the King!”’⁴⁸

Without any formal commission from any superior military authority, but in the context of several hundred years of accepted lordly and gentle practice, noblewomen such as Lady Derby had a significant impact on the course of the war. However, once Rupert arrived at the house he took steps to bring it under the control of the formal Royalist military hierarchy, as part of his broader aims of establishing a strong Royalist powerbase in the formerly predominantly Parliamentary North-West of England.⁴⁹ Lady Derby was to join her husband on the Isle of Man to ensure continued Royalist government over the island while one of the garrison’s

⁴⁵ Stanley, *A Journal of the siege of Lathom House*, p. 65.

⁴⁶ Stanley, *A Journal of the siege of Lathom House*, pp. 22–23.

⁴⁷ Stanley, *A Journal of the siege of Lathom House*, p. 14.

⁴⁸ Stanley, *A Journal of the siege of Lathom House*, p. 47. For a general study of the relationship between conceptions of honour and Royalism, see Jerrilyn Greene Marston, ‘Gentry Honor and Royalism in Early Stuart England’, *Journal of British Studies* 13 (1973), 21–43.

⁴⁹ Pilkington, *To play the man: The story of Lady Derby and the Siege of Lathom House, 1643–1645*, pp. 109–110.

captains, Edward Rawstorne of New Hall near Preston, was made an official governor of the house.⁵⁰ He would ultimately command the garrison of the anticlimactic second siege and was responsible for formally surrendering it to the Parliamentarians, greatly against his will but under threat of mutiny, on 2 December 1644.⁵¹

The lordly conception of governorship and elite power was particularly notable in castle garrisons, owing to architecture. As a space for lordly mentalities, the castle retained significance well into the seventeenth century, with those castles still used as lordly seats being extensively renovated. At Skipton Castle between 1619 and 1621, the fourth and fifth Earls of Cumberland paid building costs of £140 *per annum*, a larger sum than can be accounted for by repairs.⁵² These works coincided with the death of the fifth Earl's sons, which meant that the castle would fall out of the control of the Cliffords upon his death under the terms of King James VI and I's settlement of the Clifford inheritance dispute.⁵³ The importance that the castle had for the Earl's power base and image was shown by the continued spending of large sums on the renovation: £126 between 1625 and 1626 and the vast amount of £265 in 1630.⁵⁴

The neighbouring parish church was also incorporated into the castle's symbolic framework with the erection in 1631 of a memorial to the fifth Earl's sons overlooking the main altar.⁵⁵ Indeed, his body was brought back from York to Holy Trinity following his death in 1643, demonstrating the importance the church held to Clifford dynastic symbolism.⁵⁶ This was not unusual after noble or gentle deaths. At the first siege of Pontefract Sir Gervis Cuttler, a Royalist officer, died following a short illness on 26 June 1645.⁵⁷ It was claimed that 'the enemy [will not] suffer him either to be buried in the Church or Conveyed to his own habitation to take place wth his Auncetors.'⁵⁸ Instead, he was buried the day after his death in a coffin 'all

⁵⁰ Pilkington, *To play the man...*, pp. 35, 107.

⁵¹ Pilkington, *To play the man...*, p. 122.

⁵² Spence, *Skipton Castle and Its Builders*, p. 97.

⁵³ Spence, *Skipton Castle and Its Builders*, p. 97; Copy of a Digest of the great Books of Records kept at Skipton Castle taken from a quarto Volume, York Minster Library and Archives, Hailstone Papers, Box 7, p. 56.

⁵⁴ Spence, *Skipton Castle and Its Builders*, p. 97.

⁵⁵ Copy of a Digest of the great Books of Records kept at Skipton Castle taken from a quarto Volume, York Minster Library and Archives, Hailstone Papers, Box 7, p. 56.

⁵⁶ Copy of a Digest of the great Books of Records kept at Skipton Castle taken from a quarto Volume, York Minster Library and Archives, Hailstone Papers, Box 7, p. 57.

⁵⁷ Walker (ed.), *The First and Second Sieges of Pontefract Castle Nathan Drake's Diary*, p. 49.

⁵⁸ Walker (ed.), *The First and Second Sieges of Pontefract Castle Nathan Drake's Diary*, p. 49.

wrapped up in lead' in the castle chapel.⁵⁹ Given the value of lead within a besieged garrison, where it was needed for ammunition, this was a clear statement of the value Cuttler's contemporaries placed upon gentle burials.⁶⁰

Parish churches associated with the local noble family could also be targets for desecration. This was probably the case with All Saints' Church in Ripley, Yorkshire. Opposite Ripley Castle, the seat of the Royalist Ingilby family, at several places around the church there are clusters of musket ball marks. According to local tradition, this was the result of a massacre of Royalist prisoners carried out by Cromwell the day after Marston Moor, as a consequence of the disrespect shown to Cromwell by Lady Jane Ingilby, also known as 'Trooper Jane'.⁶¹ Unfortunately, the absence of any surviving parish records for the years of civil war makes this impossible to determine. It was less fantastic, and more in character for Cromwell, to assume that the musket shots were an act of public iconoclasm. This was a relatively common form of iconoclasm during the Civil Wars and served as a public insult to the Ingilbys, most of whom were buried in the church.⁶²

At Skipton, the garrison was originally not so much Royalist, as it was Clifford. The Earl raised the force out of his pocket and put his household accounts at its disposal.⁶³ His secretary, Robert Robertham, simply added a section entitled 'what hath been expended from the day aforesaid [23 March 1643] & in the same yeere for souldyers pay and other military occasions' to his regular account book.⁶⁴ This account book was not destroyed, as most Royalist castle accounts were. Its rarity makes Robertham's account book an invaluable source for examining the

⁵⁹ Walker (ed.), *The First and Second Sieges of Pontefract Castle Nathan Drake's Diary*, p. 49.

⁶⁰ 'Parcels of lead' were valuable enough to be listed among the financial assets of Skipton Castle, see An Inventory taken at Skipton Castle of such goodes wich [sic] is my lady Pembrookes, May the 7th 1645, The Devonshire Collection, Archives and Library, Chatsworth House, Londesborough Papers G/8; The parcels left in the house for the use of the Countesse [sic] of Pembroke, The Devonshire Collection, Archives and Library, Chatsworth House, Londesborough Papers, G/9.

⁶¹ The author was told this by a guide at Ripley Castle.

⁶² See also David Cressy, 'Different Kinds of Speaking: Symbolic Violence and Secular Iconoclasm in Early Modern England', in eds. Muriel C. McClendon, Joseph P. Ward, and Michael MacDonald, *Protestant Identities: Religion, Society, and Self Fashioning in Post-Reformation England* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 19–42; John Walter, 'Popular Iconoclasm and the Politics of the Parish in Eastern England, 1640–1642', *The Historical Journal* 47 (2004), 261–290.

⁶³ Disbursements to and for Henry earl of Cumberland by Richard (?) Robotham, viz. What hath been expended from the day aforesaid and in the same year for soldier's pay and other military occasions. Also servants' wages etc., The Devonshire Collection, Archives and Library, Chatsworth House, Bolton Abbey MSS, Clifford Household Accounts, Ministers' Accounts, Rentals etc. no. 181.

⁶⁴ Chatsworth House, Bolton Abbey MSS, Clifford Household Accounts, Ministers' Accounts, Rentals etc. No. 181, p. 181.

regular expenditures of a small castle garrison, albeit one relatively well supplied from the Cliffords' coffers. There are two forms of regular expenditure, namely soldiers' pay and the purchase of ammunition, typically from York.⁶⁵ This meant that the costs of the garrison were being met by the Cliffords' household accounts. Even more unusual costs, such as money 'To a spye sent to Leeds' 2s 5d and 'To a spye sent to Kilweeke' 1s' were covered by domestic funds.⁶⁶

The unique synthesis of lordly and military power held by Mallory extended to the collection of crown rents owed by the fifth Earl after his death, and their use in support of the garrison. This was done under a royal warrant of 30 March 1645.⁶⁷ All 'Rents and Arreares' owed between the receipt of the warrant of the feast of St Michael were to be used 'for the maintenance of our Garrison of Skipton'.⁶⁸ In collecting these rents, Mallory was scrupulous to maintain an air of legality through receipts. The sums were extensive, with £447, 13 shillings and sixpence being collected from several villages near Skipton Castle on 30 May 1645.⁶⁹ Mallory stated that the rents were owed to the Crown by 'Henry late Earle of Cumberland' and that his use of them was 'by his Maiestyes especiall command under his signe manuall.'⁷⁰

The care with which Mallory detailed the legality of these collections suggested that he was

⁶⁵ Disbursements to and for Henry earl of Cumberland by Richard (?) Robotham, viz. What hath been expended from the day aforesaid and in the same year for soldier's pay and other military occasions. Also servants' wages etc., The Devonshire Collection, Archives and Library, Chatsworth House, Bolton Abbey MSS, Clifford Household Accounts, Ministers' Accounts, Rentals etc. no. 181, pp. 183–199; For purchases of ammunition and weaponry from York see Disbursements to and for Henry earl of Cumberland by Richard (?) Robotham..., The Devonshire Collection, Archives and Library, Chatsworth House, Bolton Abbey MSS, Clifford Household Accounts, Ministers' Accounts, Rentals etc. no. 181, pp. 188–189, 191–192.

⁶⁶ Disbursements to and for Henry earl of Cumberland by Richard (?) Robotham, viz. What hath been expended from the day aforesaid and in the same year for soldier's pay and other military occasions. Also servants' wages etc., The Devonshire Collection, Archives and Library, Chatsworth House, Bolton Abbey MSS, Clifford Household Accounts, Ministers' Accounts, Rentals etc. no. 181, p. 187.

⁶⁷ Royal Warrant to Sir John Mallory, to collect rents and arrears due to the king from Henry, late Earl of Cumberland, and to use them for the maintenance of the garrison. Given under Royal signet, at Oxford, 30 March 1645, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/44.

⁶⁸ Royal Warrant to Sir John Mallory, to collect rents and arrears due to the king from Henry, late Earl of Cumberland, and to use them for the maintenance of the garrison. Given under Royal signet, at Oxford, 30 March 1645, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/44.

⁶⁹ Receipt by John Malory for £447 13s. 6d. received from the lands of the Priory of Bolton, Linton, Threshfield, Rylstone, Flasby and Hetton for the use of the garrison of Skipton, The Devonshire Collection, Archives and Library, Chatsworth House, Box labelled: Clifford Yorks etc., 7. no. 24.

⁷⁰ Receipt by John Malory for £447 13s. 6d. received from the lands of the Priory of Bolton..., The Devonshire Collection, Archives and Library, Chatsworth House, Box labelled: Clifford Yorks etc., 7. no. 24.

aware of how controversial it was for a castle governor to collect and use the rents owed by a lord to the Crown. He stressed in a receipt of 5 November 1645 that he was only acting under royal instruction and that the payments were owed for St Michael's day, 29 September, and that he was only still collecting them owing to late payments.⁷¹ This did not satisfy some of those from whom he collected money, as a later petition signed by 41 tenants to the Committee for Public Revenue made clear.⁷² According to the petition the tenants 'paid their rents due for the yeares 1643: 44: 45 unto such officers as that Garrison sent to collect them', for fear of 'greater Mischiefe'.⁷³ While it was natural to accuse Royalist officials of coercion in a petition to the Parliamentary authorities for relief, the fact that they chose to attack this particular means by which Mallory raised revenues suggests that it was deeply unusual.

5.3 Royalist Governorships, a Comparative⁷⁴

Sir John Mallory's biography is well known. While his family did not have a hereditary knighthood, they were prominent gentlemen in the West Riding. The Mallory family had held their seat at Studley Royal since 1444; and were sufficiently important that Mallory's uncle had been a gentlemen usher in the household of Francis Clifford, fourth Earl of Cumberland.⁷⁵ His mother had even been present at the christening of Catherine Clifford, daughter of the fifth Earl.⁷⁶ The prominence of the Mallorys in the political life of the West Riding was demonstrated by the elections to the 1640 Parliament, where both John Mallory and his father

⁷¹ Receipt by John Mallory of £83 10s. 5d. crown rents received by the command of the king for the use of the garrison of Skipton, The Devonshire Collection, Archives and Library, Chatsworth House, Box Labelled, Bolton MSS, sundry documents 1, 1204–1670, no. 67.

⁷² Petition of the tenants of Richard earl of Cork to the Committee for Public Revenue, describing how they paid rents during the war to the garrison of Skipton Castle but had now been instructed by the committee's order of 8 Feb. 1650 to pay rents a second time: asking for relief'. [With the signatures of tenants of Linton, Hetton, Rylstone, Threshfield and Flasby], The Devonshire Collection, Archives and Library, Chatsworth House, Box Labelled, Bolton MSS, sundry documents 1, 1204–1670, no. 73.

⁷³ Petition of the tenants of Richard earl of Cork to the Committee for Public Revenue..., The Devonshire Collection, Archives and Library, Chatsworth House, Box Labelled, Bolton MSS, sundry documents 1, 1204–1670, no. 73.

⁷⁴ It should be noted that substantial parts of this subsection, 5.3, are drawn from the author's MPhil thesis, 'The Royalist Garrison Castles of Yorkshire 1642–49', submitted to the University of Cambridge in 06/2015.

⁷⁵ Anon, 'The Mallory Family', *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 13 (1905), 216–219, at p. 217; see also [Anon], 'The Mallory Family (Continued)', *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 13 (1906), 324–329; [Anon], 'The Mallory Family (Continued)', *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 13 (1906), 441–445.

⁷⁶ Clifford Household Accounts 1594, The Devonshire Collection, Archives and Library, Chatsworth House, Bolton MSS, Book 13A, p. 81.

served as MPs for Ripon.⁷⁷ Mallory earned his spurs at some point before the Second Bishops' War, where he served as a cavalry ensign under Cumberland.⁷⁸ Newman, in *The Old Service*, stated that his knighthood was earned in 1641, but he is addressed as 'Sir John' before this date.⁷⁹ In the First Civil War, Mallory was appointed a commissioner of array and colonel of a regiment of 800 foot.⁸⁰ Many of these troops would be raised from the Dales estates of his family's ally Cumberland and Mallory himself arrived at Skipton with his regiment in January 1643.

The relationship between Cumberland and Mallory was not that of a superior and inferior military officer but was that of a lord and his subordinate gentleman. No soldier by training, Cumberland quickly came to rely on Mallory as his main military subordinate at Skipton. Mallory was not appointed governor, Cumberland being present as an owner, but took practical charge of the defensive works.⁸¹ He did, at this stage, still frequently return to his estate at Studley Royal to attend to his own business.⁸² During these periods Cumberland took over command once again, inspecting the defences while accompanied by an escort.⁸³ Who exactly had command in Skipton castle at this point was decidedly ambiguous. Spence argues that Mallory was Cumberland's choice, rather than Newcastle's: and, given the longstanding links between the two men's families and their record of amicable cooperation throughout early 1643, the author is inclined to agree with Spence.⁸⁴ In this period Mallory did appear to have

⁷⁷ Anon, *The Tourist's Guide; being a concise history and description of Ripon, Studley Royal, Fountains Abbey, Markenfield Hall, Brimham Rocks, Hackfall, Winton, Masham, Tanfield, Norton Conyers, Newby Hall, Boroughbridge, Aldborough, Ripley, Harrogate, Knaresbough, Plumpton, and Almas Cliff* (Ripon: John Lewis Linney, 1838), p. 77; Willis Browne, *Notitia Parliamentaria, Part II: A Series or Lists of the Representatives in the several Parliaments held from the Reformation 1541, to the Restoration 1660. From the Commons Journals, Archbishop Wake's State of Church, Rastal's Entries at the End of his Statutes, &c. With a Series of the Members in the several respective Parliaments in that Period* (London: Willis Browne, 1750), p. 238.

⁷⁸ Commission, Sir Thomas Howard, Earl of Arundel etc., and General of the Forces in the expedition for the defence of the Realm, to Sir John Mallory; to repair to Selby-upon-Ouse and receive from the captain, Lord Clifford, his ensign's command of a troop of 100 horse, 2 April 1639, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/53; Royal Commission to Sir John Mallory, Colonel of a Regiment of Foot, West Riding, to summon together his forces to a rendezvous at Ripon on 3 Sept. and there to await further orders for "the royal purpose is to repell rebels and march to the frontier", 25 August 1640, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/52

⁷⁹ Peter Newman, *The Old Service, Royalist regimental colonels and the Civil War, 1642–46* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), p. 226.

⁸⁰ Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, p. 16.

⁸¹ Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, p. 23.

⁸² Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, p. 23.

⁸³ Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, p. 23.

⁸⁴ See Clifford Household Accounts 1594, The Devonshire Collection, Archives and Library, Chatsworth House, Bolton MSS, Book 13A, p. 81.

subordinated his military activities to Newcastle's overall directives, but what is not clear is whether those orders were relayed to the Earl, or sent directly to Sir John.

Even after Cumberland left for York on 27 May 1643, after the death of his daughter Catherine, Mallory was not appointed governor.⁸⁵ This would only occur when Cumberland died of a fever on 11 December that same year.⁸⁶ The death of Cumberland posed a serious problem for the Royalists. He had no surviving male issue, and therefore his estate was to be split. In the case of Skipton, this meant that the castle was inherited by Lady Anne Clifford, the late Earl's cousin, who was unfortunately married to the Parliamentary grandee, William Herbert fourth Earl of Pembroke.⁸⁷ Under the terms of their marriage, the Earl of Pembroke became a life-tenant of his wife's castle at Skipton.⁸⁸ Furthermore, since Mallory was only a colonel, whose authority to command at Skipton came from Cumberland, he now had no legal standing at Skipton. This is why, a mere four days after Cumberland's death, Newcastle appointed Mallory as a royal governor for Skipton castle.⁸⁹

By contrast, Sir Henry Stradling's life was less well documented: his period at Carlisle, in particular, is poorly represented in the secondary literature. He was the son of the first Stradling baronet, the Glamorgan MP Sir John Stradling.⁹⁰ Unlike Mallory, Stradling had a military career before the Civil Wars, serving as a naval officer in the Mediterranean as early as 1628.⁹¹ As a naval commander, Stradling was highly accomplished, commanding warships throughout the later 1630s, with his most prestigious appointments being during the Spanish war scare of 1637.⁹²

⁸⁵ Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, p. 45.

⁸⁶ Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, p. 45.

⁸⁷ Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, p. 53.

⁸⁸ Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, p. 53.

⁸⁹ Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty's forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41.

⁹⁰ Michael Baumber, 'Stradling, Sir Henry (d. 1649?)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn, Sept 2004 [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-26627?rskey=gTbKZo&result=2>, accessed 30 Jan 2018], accessed 03/2018.

⁹¹ Michael Baumber, 'Stradling, Sir Henry (d. 1649?)', *ONDB*.

⁹² Michael Baumber, 'Stradling, Sir Henry (d. 1649?)', *ONDB*.

Stradling briefly served in the army during the First Bishops' War, while in the Second Bishops' War he was back at sea.⁹³ He was also active in the Irish Rebellion, attempting a relief of Limerick by river before he was 'called away from that employment by His Majesties Command'.⁹⁴ With the outbreak of civil war in England in 1642, Stradling demonstrated his commitment to the Royalist cause.⁹⁵ Sailing to Newcastle, under the King's orders, as part of a squadron of four warships he was forced to leave his warship at the Tyne when the crew mutinied at the approach of a larger Parliamentary squadron.⁹⁶ This brought Stradling into the proximity of the Earl of Newcastle and his army, suggesting that Stradling found service with Newcastle around this period. However Stradling met Newcastle, the Earl had a high enough opinion of his capabilities to commission him as colonel and deputy commander of a brigade of foot raised in Northumberland and Durham.⁹⁷ Stradling only served in this position for a few months, however, for in October of that year Newcastle promoted him to the position of

⁹³ Anon, *A list of his Majesties Navie Royall, and merchants ships their names, captaines and lieutenants, their men and burthens in every one, now setting forth for the guard of the narrow seas, and for Ireland this yeare, 1642. With an order, for the speedy rigging of the navie for the defence of the kingdome. Algernon Percy, Earle of Northumberland, Lord Percy, Lucy, Poynings, &c. Knight of the most noble order of the garter, and one of his Majesties most Honourable Privy Counsell, Lord high Admirall of England, and Lord Generall of his Majesties Navy Royall* (London: John Rothwell, 1642); Anon, *The true list of His Majesties Navie Royall, and merchants ships, their names, captaines and lieutenants, their men, and burthens in every one, now setting forth for the guard of the narrow seas, and for Ireland, this yeare, 1642. Algernon Piercie, Earle of Northumberland, Lord Piercie, Lucie, Poynings, Fitz Paine, Bryan and Lattimer, Knight of the most noble order of the garter, and one of his Majesties most Honhurable [sic] Privie Councill, Lord high Admirall of England, and Lord Generall of his Majesties Navie Royall* (London: John Thomas, 1642); House of Commons, *A declaration of the Commons assembled in Parliament concerning the rise and progresse of the grand rebellion in Ireland. Together vvith a multitude of examinations of persons of quality, whereby it may easily appear to all the world, who were, and still are the promoters of that cruell and unheard of rebellion. With some letters and papers of great consequence of the Earl of Antrims, which were intercepted. Also some letters of Mart, which were granted by the Lord Mohun, Sir Ralph Hopton, &c. And likewise another from the rebells in Ireland, who term themselves, the supreme council for the Catholique-cause...* (London: Edward Husband, 1643), pp. 30–31.

⁹⁴ Tristram Whetcombe, *A true relation of all the proceedings in Ireland, from the end of April last, to this present: sent from Tristram Whetcombe, mayor of Kinsale, to his brother Benjamine Whetcombe, merchant in London. With a certificate under the hand and seal of Sir William Saint-Leger, lord president of Munster. As also the copy of an oath which was found in a trunck in Kilbrittaine Castle neer Kinsale, after the rebels were fled from thence, the first of June, 1642* (London: Joseph Hunscomb, 1642), p. 8; House of Commons, *A declaration of the Commons assembled in Parliament concerning the rise and progresse of the grand rebellion in Ireland...*, pp. 30–31.

⁹⁵ Michael Baumber, 'Stradling, Sir Henry (d. 1649?)', *ONDB*.

⁹⁶ Michael Baumber, 'Stradling, Sir Henry (d. 1649?)', *ONDB*.

⁹⁷ Copy of the appointment William, Earl of Newcastle, General of the King's Forces in the North of Col. Henry Stradling as Colonel and [deputy] commander in chief under Col. Gray of the brigade to be raised in Northumberland and Durham, 7 July 1643, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, DPH/1/89/1.

governor of Carlisle.⁹⁸ Unlike Mallory, Stradling was Newcastle's man: with no familial connections to Carlisle or any of the aristocratic grandees of Cumberland. The commissions will be quoted in comparison throughout the following chapter section, with Stradling's commission always preceding Mallory's. They began as follows:

William Marques of Newcastle Governor of Towne and County of [New]Castle and Generall of all his Ma[jes]tes forces rayised in ye Northern parts of [Ki]ngdome for defence of y^e same As also of ye several Countyes of Nottingham...Rutland Derby Stafford, Leicester Warwick Northampton Huntingdon [?]rodge Norfolk Suffolk Essex and Hertford./⁹⁹

William Marquis of Newcastle Governor of the Towne and County of Newcastle and Generall of all his Maiesties Forces rayised in the Northern parts of this Kingdome for defence of the same As also of severall Countyes of Nottingham, Lincolne Rutland Derby, Stafford Leicester, Warwick, Northampton, Huntington, Cambridge Norfolk Suffolk Essex & Herford.¹⁰⁰

In both commissions, Newcastle introduced himself, and defined his authority, in the same way. In comparison, a few spellings are the only differences between the two documents. Newcastle's governorship over his namesake city came first, as it was the first military office invested in him during the Civil Wars.¹⁰¹ But it was his generalship that took up the bulk of the

⁹⁸ Copy of appointment of Col. Henry Stradling as Governor of Carlisle, 29 October 1643, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, DPH/1/89/2.

⁹⁹ Copy of appointment of Col. Henry Stradling as Governor of Carlisle, 29 October 1643, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, DPH/1/89/2.

¹⁰⁰ Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty's forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41.

¹⁰¹ Anon, *Trve nevves from Yorke consisting of severall matters of note, and high concernment since the 13 of Iune: concerning these severall heads, viz.: concerning 1. Sir Iohn Meldrun, 2. L. Marq. Hamilton, 3. Earle of Newcastle, 4. Earle of Warwick, 5. Lord Willoughbit, 6. Duke of Richmond, 7. L. Marq. Hertford, 8. Earle of Bristoll, 9. Lord Paget: whereunto is added newes from Ireland, viz.: concerning 1. E. of Antrime, 2. E. of Castlehaven, 3. Lord Conway, 4. Lord Digby : with a catalogue of the names of the lords that subscribed to levie hose to assist His Majestie in defence of of [sic] his royall person, the two Houses of Parliament, and the Protestant religion* (London: M. T., 1642), pp. 2–3; William Cavendish, Duke of Newcastle, *A declaration made by the Earl of Nevv-Castle, Governour of the town and county of New-Castle: and generall of all His Majesties forces raised in the northern parts of this kingdom, for the defence of the same. For his resolution of marching into Yorkshire. As also, a just vindication of himself from that unjust aspersion laid upon him, for entertaining some popish recusants in his forces* (York: s.n., 1642), p. 3; House of Commons, *A declaration of the Commons assembled in Parliament concerning the rise and progresse of the grand rebellion in Ireland. Together vvith a multitude of examinations of persons of quality, whereby it may easily appear to all the world, who were, and still are the promoters of that cruell and unheard of rebellion. With some letters and papers of great*

introduction. Newcastle's sweeping authority was made clear by the injunction that 'all his Maiesties Forces' in the North were subordinated to him as general.¹⁰² Newcastle positioned himself as the intermediary between the King, and the colonels and governors in the field. He also claimed power over a wide sweep of counties ranging from the south bank of the Humber to the Thames estuary.¹⁰³ These additional counties are added as a postscript to the main title, 'As also in', and were connected to Newcastle's occasional incursions south of the Humber during the great Royalist offensives of 1643.¹⁰⁴

Newcastle made his authority's origin very clear, stating in Stradling's commission that it was 'By the power and Authority given unto mee by o[u]r soueraigne Lord King Charles – Under the Great Seale of England as Generall of the said Army etc.'¹⁰⁵ Identical phrasing was used for Sir John's commission.¹⁰⁶ Firstly, and most importantly, the general was appointed 'under the great Seale of England'.¹⁰⁷ The removal of the Great Seal of the realm from London by

consequence of the Earl of Antrim, which were intercepted. Also some letters of Mart, which were granted by the Lord Mohun, Sir Ralph Hopton, &c. And likewise another from the rebels in Ireland, who term themselves, the supreme council for the Catholique-cause (London: Edward Husband, 1642), pp. 18–19.

¹⁰² Copy of appointment of Col. Henry Stradling as Governor of Carlisle, 29 October 1643, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, DPH/1/89/2.

¹⁰³ Copy of appointment of Col. Henry Stradling as Governor of Carlisle, 29 October 1643, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, DPH/1/89/2.

¹⁰⁴ Anon, *A Briefe relation of the most remarkeable feats and passages of what His Most Gracious Majesties commanders hath done in England against the rebells and of his severall glorious victories over them sithence [sic] Ianuary 1641. till December 1643. and from the first of May 1644. till the fifth of this present Iuly / collected out of severall papers printed at Oxford, 1644. and divers letters printed from His Majesties campe to Chester, Bristoll, &c...* (Waterford: Thomas Boyeke, 1644), pp. B3–B4; Anon, *A CATALOGUE of remarkable mercies conferred upon the seven Associated Counties, viz. Cambridge, Essex, Hartford, Huntingdon, Norfolk, Suffolk, and Lincoln. Printed by the command of the Right Honourable EDWARD, Earl of Manchester, the Major Generall thereof, and the Committee now residing in CAMBRIDGE: And appointed to be published in the severall Parish-Churches of the aforesaid Counties, upon the fourteenth of April, that Almighty God may by solemne Thanksgiving, have the glorie due unto his Name* (Cambridge: s. n., 1644), p. 3.

¹⁰⁵ Copy of appointment of Col. Henry Stradling as Governor of Carlisle, 29 October 1643, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, DPH/1/89/2.

¹⁰⁶ Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty's forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41.

¹⁰⁷ Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty's forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41; Parliament

Lord Keeper Littleton in May 1642 had been a major boon to the Royalists.¹⁰⁸ Parliament had been thrown into chaos at a critical juncture by the removal. Without the affixation of the great seal, the symbol of legal sovereignty, Parliament's writs and decrees were incomplete.¹⁰⁹ Indeed the strongest demonstration of the importance of Littleton's action was the furious reaction of Parliament, which issued a warrant for the Lord Keeper's arrest 'as had been the case of the foulest felon or murder'.¹¹⁰

Newcastle's possession of a 'Commissions...issued under the great Seale of England' was particularly obnoxious to the Parliamentarians since it was the 'meanes whereof many thousands of professed papists (whose very principles of religion do ingage them to rebellion and shedding the blood of all Protestants; and therefore ought not by the lawes to be entrusted with armes in their own houses, nor to come within the verge of his Majesties Court) are gathered into great bodies'.¹¹¹ Parliament would, in November 1643, be reduced to producing another great seal, which the King promptly denounced as a counterfeit.¹¹² Possession of the great seal gave the King's party a significant advantage in the struggle for legality waged in 1642–1643. It meant that Charles I's orders could take a form that was both known, and immensely respected. By highlighting the ensealed nature of his generalship, Newcastle made the legality of his office, and that of his appointments, very clear. He also reminded the reader of who appointed him, 'our soveraigne Lord King Charles'.¹¹³ The King's right to command his armed forces had been one of the key issues that had split Crown and Parliament the year before.¹¹⁴ It must be noted that, in Mallory's commission, it was not clear under what title each of his powers was given. His commission was addressed:

of England and Wales, *A declaration of Both Houses of Parliament shewing the necessity of a present subscription of Money and Plate for further supply of the Army* (London: s.n., 1642).

¹⁰⁸ D. E. Kennedy, *The English Revolution* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2000), p. 14.

¹⁰⁹ Kennedy, *The English Revolution*, p. 15.

¹¹⁰ Kennedy, *The English Revolution*, p. 15.

¹¹¹ Parliament of England and Wales, *A declaration of Both Houses of Parliament shewing the necessity of a present subscription of Money and Plate for further supply of the Army*.

¹¹² Kennedy, *The English Revolution*, p. 15.

¹¹³ Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty's forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41; Copy of appointment of Col. Henry Stradling as Governor of Carlisle, 29 October 1643, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, DPH/1/89/2.

¹¹⁴ Gardiner (ed.), '50. The Militia Ordinance', in *The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution...*, 245–246; Charles I, *His Majesties message to both Houses of Parliament upon his removall to the city of York* (London: Robert Barker, 1642); John Pym, *A DECLARATION Presented to*

To Colonell Sir John Malory Knight Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander in Chief of the forces in Garrison there and of [illegible] severall Divisions of Staincliff & Ewecosse.¹¹⁵

In addition to this mass of titles, Mallory had also served as a commissioner of array.¹¹⁶ Mallory's colonelcy and commission of array predated his coming to Skipton, and it was under these titles that he had the authority to raise and command troops for the King's service.¹¹⁷ But in later letters from his superior officers, including King Charles I himself, Mallory was mostly addressed as 'governor'. The King addressed Mallory as the 'Governor of Our Garrison of Skipton' in a letter of 16 December 1644, placing him under the command of Prince Rupert, who now held the rank of 'Captain General of the forces'.¹¹⁸ His superiors' preference for the title of 'governor' in addressing Mallory suggested that the title took precedence over his other ranks. Furthermore, as will be explored later in this chapter, the title of governor and commander in chief superseded a mere colonelcy in the chain of command.

However, before moving on, it must be noted that Mallory's colonelcy was not static and changed across 1643. The Skipton garrison's neat hierarchy of various discrete military units all answering to a single colonel disintegrated over the course of the year.¹¹⁹ The year had begun with three separate military forces at the castle.¹²⁰ Mallory's regiment of both foot and horse, the old foot company of Earl Henry, now of the command of a Captain, later Major, Hughes,

the Honourable House of COMMONS. With A Speech delivered at conference with the LORDS, January 25. 1641. By occasion of the Petitions from the City of London, and the Counties of Middlesex, Essex, and Hartford (London: Richard Lownes, 1642), pp. 36–37.

¹¹⁵ Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty's forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41.

¹¹⁶ Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, p. 23.

¹¹⁷ Royal Warrant given at the Court at York, commissioning Sir John Mallory to raise a Regiment of 800 Trained Band soldiers in the West Riding; 200 from the Wapentake of Claro, 600 from the Wapentake of Staincliffe and Ewecross, 7 May 1642, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/48.

¹¹⁸ Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty's forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41.

¹¹⁹ Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, pp. 16, 56–57.

¹²⁰ Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, p. 16.

who served as Sir John's second in command, and a troop of cavalry under a Scot, Lieutenant-Colonel Leviston.¹²¹ The year, which had seen the Royalists conquer most of Yorkshire, and come close to winning the war in England completely, had taken a severe toll on the garrison. The Royalists at Skipton had launched a pair of assaults on Thornton Hall, the base of operations of the then-Colonel Lambert.¹²² Then Lambert launched several counterattacks into Craven, capturing horses and Cumberland's Ribblesdale possessions in Giggleswick and Settle on 19 December 1643.¹²³ All of these losses led to the continual bleeding away of Mallory's men to serve in the ranks of Newcastle's field army.¹²⁴ By the beginning of 1644, Mallory's regiment consisted of just 236 men and was in an abysmal state of organisation.¹²⁵ There were a mere five companies, some with as few as 32 men, and all a precarious mix of horse and foot, rather than in discrete companies.¹²⁶

The first part of each commission was the announcement of the recipient's new title of governor and the explanation of which soldiers were under the new officials' command. While the language used in both was similar, it was at this point that the first major distinctions between the two commissions emerged. The distinction between the two is what type of fortification Sir Henry and Sir John were being appointed to govern. The commissions stated that:

I do hereby Constitute and Appoint- yow Gouvernor of ye Castle, Citty, and Cittadell of Carlile in the County of Cumberland¹²⁷

I do hereby Constitute and Appoint yow Governor of Skipton:Castle¹²⁸

¹²¹ Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, pp. 16–29.

¹²² Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, pp. 37–48.

¹²³ Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, p. 47.

¹²⁴ Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, pp. 56–57.

¹²⁵ Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, pp. 56–57; Morley, Vyner MSS, Mallory Papers.

¹²⁶ Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, pp. 56–57.

¹²⁷ Royal warrant to the Governor of Skipton Castle to receive orders from the royal nephew, Prince Rupert, who has been appointed Captain General of the forces under the Royal Prince Charles; to send Prince Rupert a plan of the garrison, a list of officers, artillery, ammunition and arms, and intelligence such as is submitted to the Secretary of State, 16 December 1644, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/54.

¹²⁸ Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty's forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41.

Skipton was defined as merely a castle, while Carlisle was ‘Castle, Citty, and Cittadell’. In the 1640s the town of Skipton was concentrated around three streets.¹²⁹ Carlisle was, by contrast, a sizable walled city.¹³⁰ There was no titular distinction between a governor of a city and that of a castle and in no case were separate governors appointed for castles and cities in the same locality. For example, the governor of Carlisle had authority over both town and castle, as did the governors of York, Newcastle, Chester, etc.¹³¹ This is unsurprising, given that one of the key functions of a governor was to provide a single commander for a strategically important locality.

More significant was the identification of Carlisle as a ‘Cittadell’. The term had emerged in the sixteenth century, being imported into English from the French *citadelle*, or the Italian *citadella*.¹³² It meant a fortress within a city, or a fortified section of the city, into which the garrison could withdraw if the rest of the city fell.¹³³ Carlisle Castle was suited for this role, although it was never used as such during the Civil Wars. However, the same can be said of many other castles across Northern England. Indeed, the castle of Scarborough would be used as such during the two lengthy sieges of the castle, the garrison not being large enough to hold the town.¹³⁴

The reason behind this curiosity was that there was a part of the defences of Carlisle literally called ‘the citadel’, that was separate from the castle. The citadel was a triangular artillery fort just to the east of the south gate of the city, called the ‘English-Gate’.¹³⁵ It had been built in 1541–1542 by Henry VIII as part of his intensive construction of modern fortresses at strategic locations throughout England.¹³⁶ Before the castle and city was ‘without any manner of force or strength to withstand any power unless it be defended with great power and strength of men and that great provision be made for ordnance, powder, guns, artillery and other things requisite

¹²⁹ Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, pp. 7–9.

¹³⁰ McCarthy, Summerson, Annis, Perriam, and Young, ‘Carlisle Castle, A survey and documentary history’, p. 2.

¹³¹ Copy of appointment of Col. Henry Stradling as Governor of Carlisle, 29 October 1643, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, DPH/1/89/2. Newcastle’s two commissions for Stradling and Mallory also refer to him as governor of the town, with no separate governor listed for the castle.

¹³² *OED*, *Citadel*, <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/citadel>, accessed 29/01/2017.

¹³³ McCarthy, Summerson, Annis, Perriam, and Young, ‘Carlisle Castle, A survey and documentary history’, pp. 2, 12–67.

¹³⁴ Binns, *A Place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640–1660* (Preston: Carnegie Publishing, 1996), pp. 131–182.

¹³⁵ McCarthy, Summerson, Annis, *Carlisle Castle: A survey and documentary history*, p. 171.

¹³⁶ McCarthy, Summerson, Annis, *Carlisle Castle: A survey and documentary history*, p. 171.

for the sure fortifying of the same'.¹³⁷ The castle was, according to governor Sir Thomas Wentworth, 'in sore ruin and decay', while the city walls had become so ruined that their repair into a tenable state would take 'very great charges'.¹³⁸

The Duke of Norfolk argued for a defensive system orchestrated around 'a small citadel...so that if the town were won none could remain there'.¹³⁹ The modern artillery fortress was considered so important to the defensive works that it was described using the same terminology as the castle. A note on the 1541 plans for the new defensive work described the limits of the planned defences as... 'qui inter Arcem et Arcem includunt totum oppidum', or 'which enclose the entirety of the town between the one fort and the other'.¹⁴⁰ Both the newly modernised castle and the new artillery fort were to be coequal components of the stronghold of Carlisle.

As an office, the unique aspect of the governorship was its position at the conjunction of both civil and military administration. While the title 'governor' indicated supremacy over local civic administration, as will be analysed later in this chapter, it was combined with an exalted position over all of the military forces in the locality. In both commissions, Newcastle invested the recipient with the position of 'commander-in-chief', which stated that:

Commander in Cheife of all the Forces already in Garrison or hereafter to bee putt into the Castle, Citty or – Cittidall for defence of the same¹⁴¹

¹³⁷ McCarthy, Summerson, Annis, *Carlisle Castle: A survey and documentary history*, p. 171; *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Henry VIII*, vol. 12: Part I: 1537, p. 448: SP 1/118 f. 239: 'Henry Earl of Cumberland to the Council'.

¹³⁸ McCarthy, Summerson, Annis, *Carlisle Castle: A survey and documentary history*, p. 17; *Cal. S. P. Dom., Henry VIII*, vol. 12, part II, 1537–1538, p. 51: SP 1/121 f.177: 'The Border', p. 238: SP 1/124 f.186: 'Sir Thomas Wentworth to Cromwell', SP 1/138 f.74: p. 463: '[Sir] Thomas Wentworth, Captain of Carlisle, to Cromwell', p. 463: Cotton Caligula B/III f.157: 'The Council of the North to Cromwell': 'The Bp. of Llandaff and council of the north, to the Ld. Privy Seal; about the gaol delivery at Carlisle;....'.

¹³⁹ McCarthy, Summerson, Annis, *Carlisle Castle: A survey and documentary history*, p. 171; *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Henry VIII*, vol. 14: Part I: April 1539, p. 356: SP 1/150 f.106: 'Norfolk to Cromwell'.

¹⁴⁰ McCarthy, Summerson, Annis, *Carlisle Castle: A survey and documentary history*, p. 171. Latin translation given by Dr Vedran Sulovsky, Gonville and Keys College, Cambridge.

¹⁴¹ Royal warrant to the Governor of Skipton Castle to receive orders from the royal nephew, Prince Rupert, who has been appointed Captain General of the forces under the Royal Prince Charles; to send Prince Rupert a plan of the garrison, a list of officers, artillery, ammunition and arms, and intelligence such as is submitted to the Secretary of State, 16 December 1644, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/54.

and Commander in Cheife of all the Forces allready in Garrison at Skipton or hereafter to come thither or to bee raysed and listed for his *Maiesties* service within the Divisions of Staincliffe and Ewcrosse in the West ridding of the County of yorke called Craven¹⁴²

It is important to note that ‘Commander in Chiefe’ did not carry the connotations of supreme command over the entire armed forces that it does today. It simply meant the highest military official within either a defined area of command or a definite military unit. For example, earlier in 1643 Stradling had been appointed as:

Colonell and Commander in Cheife next and immediately under Colonell Gray of the Foote Bragade now raised and to bee raised w[i]^hin the Counties of Northumberland and Bishop[x]irk of durham and now remaineing there for the secure of those Counties, and of all such forces as shallbee dawne out of the Garrisons of Newcastle and Tynmouthcastle when they shall ioyne in a body in the feild.¹⁴³

In both commissions, the new governor was given command over the forces of his new garrison. This control was not only given over the soldiers already in the garrison but also, to prevent disputes of command, of any new forces brought into the fortress. This would not always work, as Stradling found out when Sir Thomas Glemham, former governor of York, effectively took command over Carlisle following his arrival in late 1644.¹⁴⁴ In the case of Mallory however, this command area did not only extend to Skipton castle itself, but also to ‘Divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecrosse’.¹⁴⁵ Combined, this covered almost the entire Yorkshire Dales and gave Mallory a large territory to administer and levy money from.¹⁴⁶ The geographical limitations of Mallory’s authority were given in terms of pre-existing units of administration.

¹⁴² Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty’s forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41.

¹⁴³ Copy of the appointment William, Earl of Newcastle, General of the King’s Forces in the North of Col. Henry Stradling as Colonel and [deputy] commander in chief under Col. Gray of the brigade to be raised in Northumberland and Durham, 7 July 1643, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, DPH/1/89/1.

¹⁴⁴ Tullie, *Siege of Carlisle...*, pp. 8–9.

¹⁴⁵ Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty’s forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41.

¹⁴⁶ Great Britain Historical GIS : University of Portsmouth, History of Staincliffe and Ewecross, in Craven and West Riding: Map and description, A Vision of Britain through Time, [URL: <http://www.visionofbritain.org.uk/place/24989>], accessed 01/2020.

The subordination of antebellum institutions and officials to military officers was a common feature of the Civil Wars, particularly for the improvised Royalist administration. As will be explored later in this dissertation, this included exercising dominance over pre-existing civic corporations.¹⁴⁷ Newcastle's instructions to Stradling and Mallory about the use of their troops were a mixture of explicit orders and open ended suggestions. He gave broad outlines about what the purpose of their command was but left the operational details, including the responsibility for launching offensive actions, to their independent initiative. Newcastle's directions were that:

and the said Forces to Gouverne, Order and dispose for his Mai[es]tes Seruive [illegible] in yor good discretion yow shall thinke best, and to oppose all forreigne and Domestique invasion¹⁴⁸

And do hereby give unto you full power and Authority to call and drawe togeather into one entire body all or as many of the Forces raysed and listed or to bee raysed and listed as aforesaid from time to time upon all occasions as shall bee by you thought fitt, for the suppressing all insurrections invasions and rebellions that shall happen or arise there against the Peace of our soveraigne Lord the Kinge.¹⁴⁹

As commander-in-chief, each governor was responsible for the deployment of the forces under his command to meet the enemy. However, Newcastle defined Mallory and Stradling's roles as commander-in-chief subtly differently. Sir Henry Stradling's orders were brief and to the point and focused on his need to 'oppose all forreigne and Domestique invasion'.¹⁵⁰ This referred to the threat posed not only by the domestic forces of the English Parliament but also by the Scottish Covenanters. While the Covenanters would not intervene in England until the following year, Newcastle was already concerned about the threat they posed. During the

¹⁴⁷ See Chapter 6.2 of this dissertation and Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 81–82.

¹⁴⁸ Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty's forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41.

¹⁴⁹ Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty's forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41.

¹⁵⁰ Copy of the appointment William, Earl of Newcastle, General of the King's Forces in the North of Col. Henry Stradling as Colonel and [deputy] commander in chief under Col. Gray of the brigade to be raised in Northumberland and Durham, 7 July 1643, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, DPH/1/89/1.

Bishops' Wars, his powerbase of Northumberland had been completely overrun, making him acutely aware of the potential for another Covenanter incursion.¹⁵¹ Controlling the western route into England, Carlisle was, along with Berwick, the traditional bulwark against any movement from Scotland into England. Unlike Stradling, Mallory was permitted to 'drawe together into one entire body all or as many of the Forces raysed and listed or to bee raysed and listed'.¹⁵² This provided the legal basis for Mallory deploying his forces as a small field army, rather than keeping them as garrisons. Furthermore, Mallory was given explicit, and sweeping, authority in suppressing parliamentary sympathisers and partisans in his area of command. He was directed:

And with the said Forces to fight against, kill, slay and destroy all rebells & Traytors, and to disarme, disenable & imprison all that shallbee found disaffected to his Maiesties Person and Government according to your good discretion¹⁵³

The open-ended nature of Mallory's powers against subversives was unusual by the standards of Newcastle's commissions, but should not be taken to mean that other Royalist officials without this explicit authorisation did not engage in purges of dissidents. On 21 November 1642 Sir Philip Musgrave, then at Appleby leading the local trained bands, ordered the mayor of Kendal to search for 'some ill affected person amongst us, intend opposition to all authoret[torn]'.¹⁵⁴ It was probably Skipton's delicate strategic position that drove Newcastle to give Mallory this explicit, and extensive, authority. Skipton lay in the far South of Mallory's command area, right next to the predominantly Parliamentary textile towns of the West Riding.¹⁵⁵ Combined with the importance of Skipton as the guardian of the main pass through

¹⁵¹ Fissel, *The Bishops' Wars*, pp. 54–60; Zacharie, *The Battel of Nevvbyrne*, p. 22.

¹⁵² Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty's forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41.

¹⁵³ Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty's forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41.

¹⁵⁴ Appleby, Sir Philip Musgrave to the Mayor of Kendal advising him to conduct a search for dissidents in the town, 21 November 1642, Cumbrian Archive Service, Kendal Archive, DMUS/5/5/4/18.

¹⁵⁵ See Anon, *Another miraculous victorie obtained by the Lord Fairfax, against the Earl of Newcastle, at Barnham-Moore, where 1500. men were slain, with the number of officers, colours, commanders, and common souldiers that were taken prisoners, with ordnance, arms and ammunition: as it was informed to some members of the House on Monday the 12. of June. 1643.* (London: Robert Wood, 1643), pp. 3–5; Anon, *An exact and perfect relation of the proceedings of Sr Hugh Cholmly in Yorkshire,*

the Pennines, the danger of this crucial garrison's subversion was obvious. It is important to note that Mallory's commission did not give him *carte blanche* to purge his command area completely. Only 'rebells & Traytors', presumably actively in arms, were to be fought against and physically destroyed. Meanwhile, the 'disaffected' were to be disarmed and rendered unable to rebel in the future. Exactly what legal system the disaffected were to be prosecuted under was unclear. As will be outlined shortly, Royalist officers did possess judicial authority over the troops under their command.¹⁵⁶ But in the case of the civilian population under Mallory's control, Newcastle left Mallory's powers ambiguous.

Obedience from subordinate officers is implicit in any military office, but Newcastle took care to define the responsibilities owed to the governor and commander-in-chief. He wrote, first for Mallory and then for Stradling, the following:

Hereby Chargeing & requiring all in ser[v]ice officers and solduirs of the said Garrison to bee dutifull and obedient to Commandes as Gouvernor and Commander in Chief as aforesaid according to the Dicipline of Warr.¹⁵⁷

Hereby Charging and requiring all officers and soldiers rayased or to bee rayased as aforesaid to bee obedient to your Commands in all things tending to the advancement of

and of the taking of Captaine Canfield by the Parliaments forces, who commanded a Lancashire troop of papists. Also a true relation of a great battle fought at Tadcaster the last week, where Captaine Hotham slew and took three or foure hundred cavaliers. Likewise true information from Leeds, Mackefield, and Skipton. Also the proceedings of Sir John Seaton in Manch[e]ster. Likewise a true relation of a great battle fought neere Darby, between Mr. Hastings of Leicestershire, and Sir John Gell. Whereunto is annexed a copy of instructions sent by His Majesties great counsell, to the Lieutenants, Deputy-Lieutenants, and all other officers of every respective county of England; for the due execution of justice, the looking to the corruption of sheriffes, the enquiry after enclosures, the convicting of papists, &c. And many more particulars worthy the knowledge of the Kingdome. (London: J. Harris, 1642), pp. 1–2; Anon, *Joyfull nevves from Plimouth, being an exact relation of a great victory obtained against the Cornish cavaliers, by the Parliaments forces in those parts, also a wonderfull token of Gods mercy to the Parliaments forces, for during the fight, the Lord sent fire from heaven, so that the cavaliers powder in their bandaliers, flasks, and muskets tooke fire, by which meanes they hurt, and slew each other, to the wonder and amazement of the Parliaments forces. Published at the request of some persons of eminencie, which were partakers of this wonderfull mercy, and mighty deliverance. Whereunto is annexed an abstract of severall letters, sent from severall parts of the Kingdome, to good hands in the city, containing many worthy particulars* (London: Leonard Smith, 1643), pp. 2–3.

¹⁵⁶ The Royalist articles of war made this very clear, with crimes judged by either 'the council of war' (the local rather than the royal) or 'as the Lord Generall or Court-Marshall shall think fit'. See Anon, *Military orders and articles established by His Majestie, for the better ordering and government of His Maiesties army* (York: Robert Barker, 1642).

¹⁵⁷ Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty's forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41.

his *Maiesties* service And you likewise to observe and follow such orders and directions as yow now have or hereafter shall recave from mee or any other [of] your superior officers of this Army for his *Majesties* service according to the discipline of Warr.¹⁵⁸

These responsibilities were executed under the ‘discipline of Warr’, which prescribed severe punishments for malefactors. In the 1642 Royalist articles of war, article nine stated that ‘No man shall presume to quarrell with his superiour Officer, upon pain of chasering, and Arbetrary punishment, nor in such quarrell to lift up his hand to strike any such, upon pain of death.’¹⁵⁹ Later articles prohibited drawing a weapon against an officer, desertion, unlawful assembly, resisting an officer in the execution of their duty, sedition, and not reporting seditious texts or speech.¹⁶⁰ The prescribed punishment for all of these offences was death.¹⁶¹

Martial law was not enacted by the civilian legal system, but by the officers of the army itself, with different procedures such as army commissioners replacing the jury.¹⁶² The governor’s possession of judicial authority over their troops was a normal feature of seventeenth-century European warfare. This was made clear by contemporary military manuals. In Ward’s 1639 work, *The Animadversions of Warre*, he stated that the governor was ‘the chiefe judge in place of judicature’.¹⁶³ In Ward’s view, the court-martial should consist of the governor, who possessed an additional vote in coming to any verdict, and his ‘chuef officers’.¹⁶⁴ Once convicted, the ‘Malefactor is according to his demerit punished according as most voyces shall agree upon’.¹⁶⁵ Mallory and Stradling’s judicial authority over their troops was phrased in very similar terms by Newcastle, but the Earl invested Stradling with an additional power that he did not explicitly extend to Mallory. In Stradling’s commission, he stated that:

¹⁵⁸ Copy of the appointment William, Earl of Newcastle, General of the King’s Forces in the North of Col. Henry Stradling as Colonel and [deputy] commander in chief under Col. Gray of the brigade to be raised in Northumberland and Durham, 7 July 1643, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, DPH/1/89/1.

¹⁵⁹ Anon, *Military orders and articles established by His Majestie, for the better ordering and government of His Maiesties army...*, p. 2.

¹⁶⁰ Anon, *Military orders and articles established by His Majestie, for the better ordering and government of His Maiesties army...*, pp. 2–3.

¹⁶¹ Anon, *Military orders and articles established by His Majestie, for the better ordering and government of His Maiesties army...*, pp. 2–3.

¹⁶² See, John Collins, *Martial Law and English Laws, c. 1500–c. 1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 169–206. While an excellent summary of the evolving use of martial law by the parliamentary authorities, Collins does not examine Royalist uses of martial law at all.

¹⁶³ Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre...*, p. 155.

¹⁶⁴ Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre...*, p. 155.

¹⁶⁵ Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre...*, p. 155.

Lastly I do Authorise yow to call a Counsell of Warr as often as yow shall thinke fit, for the punishment of offenders in the said Garrison and yow to bee- President thereof in the absence of the Lord Widdrington President of the Councell of Warre and to cause the- Sentence or sentences of those Councells to bee duly executed.¹⁶⁶

The term ‘council of war’ is a problematic one, for it was used to refer to a pair of similar, but distinguishable phenomena. Like Parliaments before the Civil Wars, many councils of war were events rather than institutions.¹⁶⁷ As events, they consisted of meetings of the officers of a force, whether a field army or a garrison, in which they would discuss future actions.¹⁶⁸ During the third siege of Pontefract Castle during the Second Civil War a council of war was summoned by the governor, Colonel Morris, to determine whether they would accept Parliamentary surrender demands.¹⁶⁹ Furthermore, also at Pontefract, there were records of the gentlemen of the garrison meeting to determine their next course of action.¹⁷⁰ In function, if not in name, these meetings were councils of war.

The second type of the council of war was not an event, but a series of institutions with a primarily judicial function. The aforesaid use of the governor and his chief officers in place of judicature was a council of war of this type. According to the Royalist articles, each army would have ‘a grand Councell of Warre’, composed of thirteen members, as its supreme judicial body.¹⁷¹ This body would have the authority to condemn malefactors to death.¹⁷² Smaller regimental councils could recommend the death penalty but had to receive authorisation from the army councils to execute the sentence.¹⁷³ In giving Stradling the authority to call a council,

¹⁶⁶ Copy of the appointment William, Earl of Newcastle, General of the King’s Forces in the North of Col. Henry Stradling as Colonel and [deputy] commander in chief under Col. Gray of the brigade to be raised in Northumberland and Durham, 7 July 1643, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, DPH/1/89/1.

¹⁶⁷ Anon, *Declaration of the Northerne Army with instructions concluded at a Councell of Warre, concerning the northerne forces. Also a Letter concerning the countries resolutions in relation to the Scots. Decemb. 30. 1647...* (York & London: Thomas Broad and Robert Ibbitson, 1649). It should however be noted that councils of war could become regular, if temporary institutions, see Parliamentary Army, Council of War at Ripon, Knaresborough, York and Pontefract, 1647–1648, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Wakefield Branch, C469/1 & 2.

¹⁶⁸ Parliamentary Army, Council of War at Ripon, Knaresborough, York and Pontefract, 1647–1648, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Wakefield Branch, C469/1 & 2, pp. 1, 3, 5–7, 10, 12, 14, 16, 24–25.

¹⁶⁹ George Fox, *The Three Sieges of Pontefract Castle: printed from the manuscript compiled by George Fox* (Burton Salmon: Old Hall, 1987), p. 114.

¹⁷⁰ Walker (ed.), *The first and second sieges of Pontefract Castle: Nathan Drake’s diary*, p. 16.

¹⁷¹ Barbara Donagan, *War in England 1642–1649* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 176.

¹⁷² Donagan, *War in England 1642–1649*, p. 179.

¹⁷³ Donagan, *War in England 1642–1649*, p. 179.

and to execute the sentences of that court in absence of superior authorities such as Lord Widdrington, Newcastle was investing the governor with a significant expansion of his legal powers.¹⁷⁴ Unlike Skipton, Carlisle was a considerable distance from Newcastle's base of operations—which was at this point located in York. This encouraged the creation of an independent judicial authority for Stradling's command, rather than having to wait for replies from York, or even the Oxford council of war.

The King's 'Councell of Warre' was the institution headed by Charles I, which undertook the direction of the Royalist war effort at the highest levels.¹⁷⁵ It is important to note that this council of war had a similar function, as an advisory and judicial body, as the army or regimental councils.¹⁷⁶ Its main distinguishing feature was that it was headed by the King himself, who in addition to commanding his army was naturally the supreme commander of the entire Royalist war effort. Unlike the Royalist Parliament, that always sat at Oxford, the council moved with the King. When he was a resident at Oxford, it met in Christ Church; when he was campaigning, it met wherever he was present.¹⁷⁷ Based upon the surviving evidence, principally the letters of Sir Edward Walker, the King's secretary-at-war, the King was present at all but two known meetings of the council.¹⁷⁸

The royal Council of War had two primary concerns. First was the royal army itself, and its problems of quartering and supply.¹⁷⁹ The supply of uniforms, arms and victuals; the raising of revenues and the imposition of contributions, both on the immediate locality of the army as well as further afield; billeting and the provision of quarter were all among the royal Council of War's most important responsibilities.¹⁸⁰ These responsibilities were limited by geography, being centred around the royal army's base of operations at Oxford.¹⁸¹ In his 2007 article, Roy argues this did not even extend to Wales, much of the Midlands and the West; all areas without

¹⁷⁴ Copy of the appointment William, Earl of Newcastle, General of the King's Forces in the North of Col. Henry Stradling as Colonel and [deputy] commander in chief under Col. Gray of the brigade to be raised in Northumberland and Durham, 7 July 1643, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, DPH/1/89/1.

¹⁷⁵ Ian Roy, 'The Royalist Council of War, 1642–6', *Historical Research* 35:92 (2007), 150–168.

¹⁷⁶ Ian Roy, 'The Royalist Council of War', p. 151.

¹⁷⁷ Ian Roy, 'The Royalist Council of War', p. 152.

¹⁷⁸ Ian Roy, 'The Royalist Council of War', p. 152.

¹⁷⁹ Hutton, *The Royalist War Effort 1642–1646*, p. 50.

¹⁸⁰ Ian Roy, 'The Royalist Council of War', pp. 153–154.

¹⁸¹ Ian Roy, 'The Royalist Council of War', p. 155.

a regional commander on the level of Newcastle.¹⁸² The second was to advise the King on the strategic decisions that would affect not just his army, but those of his various regional commanders-in-chief as well.¹⁸³ Unlike the improvised councils of war, the royal council was composed of both soldiers and civilians, principally senior courtiers or a few select members of the Privy Council.¹⁸⁴ There was not to be any fixed formula stipulating under what circumstances the council was to be summoned, aside from at the pleasure of the King.¹⁸⁵ According to both commissions, Stradling and Mallory held their positions at Newcastle's pleasure:

And this Commission to remaine in force during My Pleasure only and no longer. Given under my hund and Seale the Nine & [illegible]fith day Of October A[nn]o Dmi 1643 . W. Newcastle.¹⁸⁶

To Excerise and Enioy the Authorityes aforesaid during my Pleasure and noe longer. Given under my hand & Seale the Fithteenth day of December *Anno Domini 1643*. W. Newcastle¹⁸⁷

He could dismiss his subordinates whenever he wanted, and such a dismissal would not have been resistible. Newcastle did not, of course, do this. A courtier and politician by profession, Newcastle was perfectly aware of the importance of a governor with a strong basis in local political life.¹⁸⁸ Neither did either governor give Newcastle cause to replace them. Therefore, they were both still in office when Newcastle went into exile from Scarborough in July 1644 following the Royalist defeat at Marston Moor.¹⁸⁹ In doing this he had effectively resigned his

¹⁸² Ian Roy, 'The Royalist Council of War', p. 155.

¹⁸³ Ian Roy, 'The Royalist Council of War', p. 153.

¹⁸⁴ Anon, *A catalogue of the moneys, men, and horse, already subscribed unto by severall counties of this kingdome and undertaken for His Majestyes service August the fifth 1642* (London: John Thomas, 1642).

¹⁸⁵ Ian Roy, 'The Royalist Council of War', p. 152.

¹⁸⁶ Copy of the appointment William, Earl of Newcastle, General of the King's Forces in the North of Col. Henry Stradling as Colonel and [deputy] commander in chief under Col. Gray of the brigade to be raised in Northumberland and Durham, 7 July 1643, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, DPH/1/89/1.

¹⁸⁷ Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty's forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41.

¹⁸⁸ Hulse, 'Cavendish, William, first duke of Newcastle upon Tyne (bap. 1593, d. 1676)', *ODNB*; Papillon, *A Practicall Abstract of the Arts, of Fortification and Assailing...*, p. 92.

¹⁸⁹ See 'But the Earle of Newcastle, the brave Marquesse of Newcastle, which made the fineplayes, he danced so quaintly, played his part a while in the North, was soundly beaten, shew'd a paire of heels,

generalship. In practical terms, the office of Royalist general-in-chief of the North was *de facto* defunct from this point onward. As will be outlined later in this chapter, the King would henceforth communicate directly with his subordinate governors in the field: or, to be more accurate, he would attempt to communicate with his isolated and frequently besieged Northern governors.¹⁹⁰

5.4 Governors and Local Officers

In addition to their authority over their troops, governors habitually commanded civil officers. The relationship between military and urban civic government will be explored in more detail in the next chapter. What is relevant here is that Royalist governors used the constabulary as a means of raising money for the Royalist cause. In the seventeenth century, nearly all taxation raised in England was collected by the village constable, including the Subsidy, the Fifteenth and Tenth, County Rates, Ship Money and the Purveyance.¹⁹¹ However, this was normally under the direction of superior civil county officers, such as high constables and sheriffs, not a military officer such as the governor.¹⁹² The outbreak of civil war changed this, with the Royalists in particular exercising control through the offices of governors and the Commissioners of Array.¹⁹³

Both the Parliamentary and Royalist armies grouped various county commands into ‘associations’, the most famous of which were the Parliamentary Eastern and Northern associations.¹⁹⁴ Parliamentary ordinances made clear the rules under which associations

and exit Newcastle’ in Anon, *The Oxford character of the London diurnall examined and answered* (London: M. P., 1645), pp. 5–6.

¹⁹⁰ Royal Warrant to Sir John Mallory, to collect rents and arrears due to the king from Henry, late Earl of Cumberland, and to use them for the maintenance of the garrison. Given under Royal signet, at Oxford, 30 March 1645, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/44.

¹⁹¹ Braddick, *State Formation in Early Modern England*, p. 33.

¹⁹² Braddick, *State Formation in Early Modern England*, p. 30.

¹⁹³ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 21: July 1645–December 1647, p. 265.

¹⁹⁴ Clive Holmes, *The Eastern Association in the English Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). See also Parliament of England and Wales, *The declaration of the Lords and Commons now assembled in Parliament, For the suppressing of divers Papists, and other malignant persons, in the Counties of Yorke, Northumberland, Westmerland, Cumberland, Lancashire, Cheshire, the County Palatine of Duresme, and the Town of Newcastle; who have taken the oath of Association against the King and Parliament* (London: E. T., 1642); Parliament of England and Wales, *An Ordinance of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament, Wherein the County of Lincolne is added in the association of the six Counties of Norfolke, Suffolke, Essex, Cambridge, Hartford, Huntingdon, for the mutuall defence each of other against the Popish Army in the North under the command of the Marquesse of Newcastle. Also, giving power to the Earle of Manchesterto nominate Governours over*

operated. Their orders be enacted by ‘the Lord Lieutenants, Committees of Parliament and other Officers and Commanders within the said Counties’.¹⁹⁵ While this ordinance did not explicitly mention local offices such as parish constables or sheriffs of hundreds and wapentakes, terms such as ‘other Officers’ and ‘all other well-affected Persons’ left little doubt that they were placed under the association’s authority as well.¹⁹⁶

While Parliamentary sources described the Northern Royalist army as ‘Papists and other malignants, and ill-affected persons...entered into association’, Newcastle’s warrants instead stressed his rank as ‘Generall of all his Ma[jes]tes forces rayzed in ye Northern parts of [Ki]ngdome lord generall’.¹⁹⁷ No document similar to the parliamentary ordinances clarifying the relationship between association and local officers has survived for Newcastle’s command, but a comparison with the Royalist association agreement for the South West (Somerset, Dorset, Cornwall and Devon) suggests that all local officers were expected to obey instructions by military superiors. The agreement included a protestation of loyalty to the King, and exhaustively clarified:

That there be copies of this Protestation delivered out by the Sheriffe at the Sessions of

the parts of Holland and Marchland; and if any person harbout a souldier that is impressed to serve under him, he shall be fined, if he refuse to pay his fine, his goods shall be sequestered, and he imprisoned till the fine be satisfied. With the names of the Committees appointed for the collection of money to pay the Forces raised for the preservation of those seven Counties (London: John Wright, 1643); Parliament of England and Wales, *An Ordinance of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament, For the maintenance and pay of the GARRISONS of Newport Pagnel, Bedford, Lyn Regis, and other Garrisons in the Eastern Association* (London: Edward Husband, 1645); Parliament of England and Wales, *Two Ordinances of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament. The one, That the several persons of the Committees for the Northerne Association shall subscribe to the Articles herein mentioned before they execute any thing as one of the said Committees. The other, For the enabling of the Commissioners of the Great Seakem and other Committes in their several Counties, to tender an Oath to all such persons, of what degree or quality soever, tat shall come into the protection of the Parliament. Together with the said Oath to be taken* (London: John Wright, 1645).

¹⁹⁵ Parliament of England and Wales, *An Ordinance of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament. Concerning the Association of the Counties of Warwick, Coventry, Salop, Chester and the parts adjacent. Together with an Order for raising monies for the Advancement of the present service of the said Counties* (London: G. M., 1643), p. 6.

¹⁹⁶ Parliament of England and Wales, *An Ordinance of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament. Concerning the Association of the Counties of Warwick, Coventry, Salop, Chester and the parts adjacent...*, pp. 3, 6.

¹⁹⁷ Parliament of England and Wales, *The declaration of the Lords and Commons now assembled in Parliament, For the suppressing of divers Papists, and other malignant persons, in the Counties of Yorke, Northumberland, Westmerland, Cumberland, Lancashire, Cheshire, the County Palatine of Duresme, and the Town of Newcastle; who have taken the oath of Association against the King and Parliament...*p. A2; Copy of appointment of Col. Henry Stradling as Governor of Carlisle, 29 October 1643, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, DPH/1/89/2.

the Peace of each County, to the Constables of each Hundred respectively, and the Hundred Constables do immediately deliver out severall copies to all the Petty-Constables, which are by the Minister of every Parish Church and Chappell, to be published the next Sunday following after the receipt; and such persons as shall take the same, are to subscribe their names thereunto, before the said Minister, Constable, or Churchwardens, or two of them; and the Ministers & Constables are to give the list, or certificate of their names that take it, and of them that refuse, to the Constables of the Hundred, who are to deliver the same to the Commissioners at the next generall meeting, after the taking, or refusall thereof.¹⁹⁸

Constables were expected to continue their revenue-raising activities in the service of the military authorities, including governors of fortified garrisons. In a series of folders held by the West Yorkshire Archive Service are assessments collected by the local constabulary between 1640 to 1649.¹⁹⁹ Most assessments were paid in cash, either in weekly instalments of a few shillings or monthly contributions of just over a pound.²⁰⁰ There is no difference in format between the peacetime assessments carried out under the auspices of Sir Arthur Ingram the elder and those undertaken during the war under Sir Arthur Ingram the younger who was, unlike his father, a Royalist.²⁰¹ This was remarkable considering the confusion of Royalist and Parliamentary garrisons across the region between 1643 and 1644. Even those receipts for supplying funds to ‘the Scottish army’ were undertaken in the same way, indicating a continuity of local officials.²⁰² One constable was particularly open about this, detailing ‘the charges of Billeting of souldiers both of the parliaments partie & of the Kings partie which wee weare charges with...ower & aboue our monthly Assessments.’²⁰³

After the collapse of the Royalist army at Marston Moor, a majority of the assessments were undertaken under the local Parliamentary committee, but as late as February 1645 Arthur Ingram was still collecting Royalist assessments, suggesting that the local Royalist garrisons

¹⁹⁸ Anon, *The Association agreement and protestation of the covntries of Somerset, Dorset, Cornwall, & Devon* (Oxford: Leonard Lichfield, 1644), pp. 9–10.

¹⁹⁹ Civil War Assessments, Pewter etc., B I–IV, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, WYL100/PO/2/15.

²⁰⁰ Civil War Assessments, Pewter etc., B I, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, WYL100/PO/2/15.

²⁰¹ Edward Besly, *English Civil War Coin Hoards* (London: British Museum, 1987), p.14.

²⁰² Civil War Assessments, Pewter etc., B II, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, WYL100/PO/2/15.

²⁰³ Civil War Assessments, Pewter etc., B III, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, WYL100/PO/2/15; it should be noted that the Leeds Reference Library No. is no longer used by the WYAS for sorting purposes, but it remains the only individual reference the otherwise loosely sorted Morley Civil War Assessments possess.

retained at least some of their power even at this late date.²⁰⁴ Even once the region was denuded of garrisons, fortification still resulted in costs being levied upon the textile towns. An assessment between 1647 and 1648 included ‘an asses for Pontefract and Scarbrough’ coming to a total of six shillings and ninepence for one household’s contribution to supporting the two sieges.²⁰⁵

The Royalist collection of funds became even more irregularly brutal after the fall of York and the collapse of the central body of Royalist administration in the North. On 1 September 1645, the governor of Sandal Castle issued orders for the constable of the village of Southowiam.²⁰⁶ He demanded ‘in money or p[ro]visions tow monthes Assessment after the rate of 10000£ amonth for the whole County’ and qualified that the constable should ‘faile not att your prills’.²⁰⁷ It was clear from the governor’s language that when the Royalist garrisons were reduced to isolated strongholds, their methods of raising money become truly exploitative; demanding vast sums of money and promising violent retribution if they were not delivered.

In 1648, when Royalist insurgents took Pontefract, they relied on similar methods of coercion to ensure the compliance of the local constabulary.²⁰⁸ In one such directive the governor, John Morris, ordered that a constable report to the castle ‘to doe such service as shall be appointed’, a sufficiently open-ended order that it could imply almost anything.²⁰⁹ Dozens of these receipts, unsorted, are held by the National Archives.²¹⁰ Their demands were an interesting contrast to those contained in the Morley archive. Six demanded that foodstuffs, typically various types of grains but also beef, butter and cheese, be brought to the castle.²¹¹ Four demanded that the constables collect wood, presumably for fuel in the winter of 1648/9, along with a single demand for coal.²¹² The problems of transporting these goods were settled by a pair of orders for horses, oxen and their attendant wains and wagons. There was even a single warrant for

²⁰⁴ Civil War Assessments, Pewter etc., B III, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, WYL100/PO/2/15.

²⁰⁵ Civil War Assessments, Pewter etc., B III, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, WYL100/PO/2/15.

²⁰⁶ Letter from the Governor of Sandal Castle to the inhabitants of Southowsam, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Halifax Branch, SW: 4/TSM/1645 Sep 1.

²⁰⁷ Letter from the Governor of Sandal Castle to the inhabitants of Southowsam, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Halifax Branch, SW: 4/TSM/1645 Sep 1.

²⁰⁸ John Morris, receipts for the garrison of Pontefract, Kew, national Archives, ASSI 47/20/11.

²⁰⁹ John Morris, receipts for the garrison of Pontefract, Kew, national Archives, ASSI 47/20/11.

²¹⁰ John Morris, receipts for the garrison of Pontefract, Kew, national Archives, ASSI 47/20/11.

²¹¹ John Morris, receipts for the garrison of Pontefract, Kew, national Archives, ASSI 47/20/11.

²¹² John Morris, receipts for the garrison of Pontefract, Kew, national Archives, ASSI 47/20/11.

plaster, indicating that the castle required some renovations after the previous siege. There were also five orders that constables escort ‘draughts’, presumably conscripts, to the castle for the garrison.²¹³

Only obliquely, through threats, did any of Morris’ warrants want money. The contrast with the Morley receipts is due to the very different conditions in which they were issued. Morris was the governor of an isolated insurrectionist stronghold, in need of emergency renovation and resupply before the inevitable siege, not a component of a wider fiscal-military system that had to support a field army in addition to various garrisons.²¹⁴ Given these circumstances, a focus on the essentials, men, transport, food and fuel, was rational. However, he was still dependent on the local constabulary to gather these resources and it is incredible that he would have been able to sustain resistance through the bitter second siege of Pontefract without their compliance.

In addition to their responsibility for the regular raising of revenue, Royalist governors were also responsible for preventing their troops from looting the surrounding area for their enrichment. In Halifax on 14 August 1643, during the brief period of Royalist ascendancy over the region, the governor, Francis Mackworth, gave orders to try to limit the extent of looting.²¹⁵ Relaying orders from Newcastle, Mackworth prohibited ‘plunderinge & pillaginge’ under pain of death.²¹⁶ This included ‘goods, Cattell or Chattells of any person or persons whatsoever’. However, Mackworth’s apparent leniency was immediately undermined by his qualification that looting could not take place ‘without an especiall order in premises either from mee or my superiors.’²¹⁷

He did not exclude the idea of the wholesale confiscation of private property but instead wished to direct it against local Parliamentarian sympathisers.²¹⁸ Morris acted similarly, ordering the

²¹³ John Morris, receipts for the garrison of Pontefract, Kew, national Archives, ASSI 47/20/11.

²¹⁴ Thomas Paulden, *Pontefract Castle: An account how it was taken: and how General Rainsborough was surprised in his quarters at Doncaster, anno 1648. In a letter to a friend / By Captain Tho. Paulden. Written upon the occasion of Prince Eugene’s surprising Monsieur Villeroy at Cremona* (London: Edward Jones, 1702), pp. 2–6; Boothroyd, *The History of the Ancient Borough of Pontefract*, p. 260.

²¹⁵ Sir Francis Mackworth, and the Situation at Halifax in August 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Halifax Branch, M/54: 761/3.

²¹⁶ Sir Francis Mackworth, and the Situation at Halifax in August 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Halifax Branch, M/54: 761/3.

²¹⁷ Sir Francis Mackworth, and the Situation at Halifax in August 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Halifax Branch, M/54: 761/3.

²¹⁸ Sir Francis Mackworth, and the Situation at Halifax in August 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Halifax Branch, M/54: 761/3.

seizure of ‘ye. goods, or otherwise to bring such persons before mee as shall denye ye paying of any Cessment, or which is to be Employed in his Ma[jes]ties Service’.²¹⁹ This was normal, sequestration being a popular combination of punishment and fundraising employed by all sides, but it should be noted that these confiscations were not to be directed by a Royalist committee, but by the governor personally, with only his military superiors capable of overruling him.²²⁰

This did not mean that the Parliamentary army did not exert coercive authority over civil officers. Outside the North for example, in a letter of 20 February 1645 to Edward Mountagu, then serving as governor of Henley-upon-Thames, a Parliamentary colonel reported that he had ‘imprisoned the High Constable of the next hundred for peremptorily refusing to execute any warrant for workmen to be sent in to work at the fortifications.’²²¹ Two years earlier, Sir John Hotham had chastised ‘the constable and churchwardens of Bainton parish’ for their parish minister’s introduction of ‘divers innovations and superstitious ceremonies’, ordering them to ‘keep their tithes in their own hands till they have order from the Parliament how to dispose of them.’²²² But the Royalists, particularly after Marston Moor, were particularly dependent on the direct relationship between governors and their local officers, as the regional system of administration had completely collapsed.

5.5 Digby and the Collapse of the Royalist Central Government in Northern England

Despite the northern generalships’ lack of any real command and control after the battle of Marston Moor, Sir John Digby was appointed to Newcastle’s old position on 13 October 1645.²²³ The appointment came following the King’s dismissal of Rupert from his command position as captain-general on 14 September, at the urging of Digby.²²⁴ With Rupert riding to

²¹⁹ John Morris, receipts for the garrison of Pontefract, Kew, National Archives, ASSI 47/20/11.

²²⁰ Sir Francis Mackworth, and the Situation at Halifax in August 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Halifax Branch, M/54: 761/3.

²²¹ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 20: October 1644–July 1645, p. 314: SP 16/506 f.109: ‘[Lieut.-Col.] Mark Gryme to Col. [Edward] Mountague [Governor of Henley-on-Thames]’.

²²² *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 18, 1641–1643, p. 462: SP 16/497 f.157: ‘Sir John Hotham to the constable and churchwardens of Bainton parish [co. York]’.

²²³ Ronald Hutton, ‘Digby, George, second earl of Bristol (c.1612–1677)’, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn, Sept 2004 [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-7627>], accessed 01/2018.

²²⁴ Hutton, ‘Digby, George, second earl of Bristol (c.1612–1677)’, *ODNB*; Anon, *A great victory obtained by Generall Poyntz and Col: Copley, against the Kings forces under the command of the Lord Digby, and Sir Marmaduke Langdale, at Sherborn in Yorkshire, the 15. of October, 1645. Together with a perfect list of the commanders and souldiers, slain and taken prisoners* (1645).

Newark to present himself to Charles, Digby had reason to make himself absent and requested the northern command. Given the King's remaining cavalry, he hoped to break through to Scotland.²²⁵ The effort was a failure, Digby's little army losing the battle of Sherburn in Yorkshire two days after his appointment before its ultimate collapse on the shores of Solway Firth on 21 October 1645.²²⁶ While Digby's presence in Yorkshire was extremely short-lived, he did visit the garrison at Skipton.²²⁷ It appeared that the Royalist high command was concerned that Newcastle's self-imposed exile endangered the legality of his commissions.²²⁸ Consequently, when Digby managed to visit Skipton on 18 October 1645 he produced a new commission for Mallory. It was written in the form of a letter, even though, in the commission, Digby stated that he sealed it at 'the Castle of Skipton'.²²⁹ This began:

George Lord, Digbye Baron of Sherborne, his *Maiesties* Lieutenant *Generall* on the north side Trent; To my very worthy freind Sir John Mallory Knight Greeting: whereas his *Maiestie* hath ben pleased to appoint me his Lieutenant *Generall* on the northside Trent²³⁰

The first major distinction between Newcastle and Digby's commissions were the titles that they bore as the King's deputy in the North. Newcastle was always referred to as 'General' or 'Lord-General'. In contrast, Digby was given the title of 'lieutenant general'. The rank had a long precedent in the Royalist armies. In the 'Military Orders and Articles' of 1642, it was used in the form of the King's 'lieutenant general of the army', a title which it gave to Robert, Earl of Lindsey.²³¹ In addition to placing the document between 1 August and 23 October 1642, this suggested that 'lieutenant general' was a title given to the effective chief of staff of the King's army.²³² However, in later documents, it is not clear whether Lindsey's successor, Patrick

²²⁵ Anon, *The routing of the Lord Digby, and Sir Marmad. Langdale at Carlisle-Sands; by Sir John Brown. Certified by Letters from Sir John Brown, to General Lesley, and other Letters to the Scots Commissioners* (London: Jane Coe, 1645), pp. 1–2.

²²⁶ Hutton, 'Digby, George, second earl of Bristol (c.1612–1677)', *ODNB*; Anon, *The routing of the Lord Digby, and Sir Marmad. Langdale at Carlisle-Sands; by Sir John Brown....*

²²⁷ Commission, George, Lord Digby, Baron of Sherborne, Lieutenant General of the Forces, Northside of the Trent, to Sir John Mallory, to be Governor of the town and Castle of Skipton, 18 October 1645, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Morley Vyner MSS, T/32/43.

²²⁸ Hulse, 'Cavendish, William, first duke of Newcastle upon Tyne (bap. 1593, d. 1676)', *ODNB*.

²²⁹ Commission, George, Lord Digby, Baron of Sherborne, Lieutenant General of the Forces, Northside of the Trent, to Sir John Mallory, to be Governor of the town and Castle of Skipton, 18 October 1645, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Morley Vyner MSS, T/32/43.

²³⁰ Commission, George, Lord Digby, Baron of Sherborne, Lieutenant General of the Forces, Northside of the Trent, to Sir John Mallory, to be Governor of the town and Castle of Skipton, 18 October 1645, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Morley Vyner MSS, T/32/43.

²³¹ Anon, *Military orders and articles established by His Majestie...*, p. 2.

²³² Andrew Thrush, 'Bertie, Robert, first earl of Lindsey (c.1582–1642)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn, Sept 2004

Ruthven, was referred to by the same title.²³³ Later versions of the articles, printed in early 1643, still cited the then-deceased Lindsey as Lieutenant General, while the 1644 edition simply referred to 'Our Lord Lieutenant Generall of Our Armies' without naming the office-holder.²³⁴

Digby justified his authority using similar language to Newcastle. It was under 'his Maiesties Commisison' that he appointed Mallory 'Governor of the Towne & Castle of Skipton & Chiefe Commander under me of all the Places & forces thereunto belonging.'²³⁵ There was however a significant distinction between the two. Newcastle's commission had been 'Under the Great Seale of England'.²³⁶ Digby by contrast either did not have this essential legality on his commission or chose not to publicise it in the commissions he produced following his appointment. A possible explanation has already been touched upon in this chapter, namely the production, by the Parliament of its own great seal in mid-1643.²³⁷ In November of that year, the King had issued a proclamation denouncing the 'Counterfeit Great Seale'.²³⁸ Newcastle had produced his commission for Mallory in the following month. Drumming in the Royalist possession of the original great seal would have been even more valuable as a propaganda device at this particular date, resonating with the King's proclamation and thus helping to buttress Mallory's authority. By contrast, Digby produced his commission nearly two years later, long after both the production of its new seal and the King's denunciation of it. The new seal was simply no longer news and had lost much of its propagandistic impact.

[<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-2277>], accessed 01/2018.

²³³ Stuart Reid, 'Ruthven, Patrick, earl of Forth and earl of Brentford (*d.* 1651)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn, Sept 2008 [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-24373>], accessed 01/2018.

²³⁴ Anon, *Military orders and articles established by His Majestie, for the better ordering and government of His Maiesties army. Also Two Proclamations, one against Plundering and Robbing. The other against selling or buying of Armes and Horse* (Oxford: Leonard Lichfield, 1643), p. 2; Anon, *Military orders and articles established by His Majesty, for the better ordering and government of His Maiesties army. Also Two Proclamations, one against Plundering and Robbing. The other against selling or buying of Armes and Horse* (Oxford: Leonard Lichfield, 1644), p. 2.

²³⁵ Commission, George, Lord Digby, Baron of Sherborne, Lieutenant General of the Forces, Northside of the Trent, to Sir John Mallory, to be Governor of the town and Castle of Skipton, 18 October 1645, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Morley Vyner MSS, T/32/43.

²³⁶ Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty's forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41.

²³⁷ Kennedy, *The English Revolution*, p. 15.

²³⁸ Kennedy, *The English Revolution*, p. 15.

Unlike Newcastle's, the Digby commission did not give clear geographical boundaries to Mallory's command area. This was due to the deteriorating position of the Yorkshire Royalists rendering his previous command area effectively moot. The incursions of Lambert into Ribblesdale were just the beginning of Mallory's loss of control over most of his territory.²³⁹ Spence argued that, after Marston Moor, 'the area where Mallory held sway had shrunk, its bounds now Littondale and Grassington to the north, Gargrave to the west, Bolton Abbey and Barden to the east and as before Silsden and Carlestone to the south.'²⁴⁰ Instead of effective government over two large preexisting territorial administrative units, all that Mallory had was predominance, but not absolute control, over a small area near Skipton Castle itself. Digby's vague geographical outline of 'the Places...thereunto belonging' was a tacit acknowledgement of the change in Mallory's circumstances.²⁴¹ While the wording of the commission left scope for Mallory to stretch his power over all of Staincliffe and Ewecrosse once again, as places 'thereunto belonging' to the garrison, this was strictly implicit and was increasingly unlikely as the military situation continued to deteriorate.²⁴²

The legal framework that Digby's commission gave to Mallory's authority was extremely vague. Digby did not outline any new powers and responsibilities to Mallory, instead retrospectively 'authorising & requiring you to doe, execute & performe, by vertue hereof from time to tyme, all such powers, Iurisdictions and other Acts or things whatsoever as unto the Governour of the sayd Places doe belong'.²⁴³ Digby did not name what exactly those various powers were. As with the commission's geographical limitations, or lack thereof, the commission authorised any 'things whatsoever'.²⁴⁴ Mallory was presumably to use his own judgement as to what was 'powers, Iurisdictions and other Acts or things whatsoever as unto

²³⁹ Spence, *Skipton Castle and the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, pp. 66–67.

²⁴⁰ Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, p. 66.

²⁴¹ Commission, George, Lord Digby, Baron of Sherborne, Lieutenant General of the Forces, Northside of the Trent, to Sir John Mallory, to be Governor of the town and Castle of Skipton, 18 October 1645, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Morley Vyner MSS, T/32/43.

²⁴² Commission, George, Lord Digby, Baron of Sherborne, Lieutenant General of the Forces, Northside of the Trent, to Sir John Mallory, to be Governor of the town and Castle of Skipton, 18 October 1645, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Morley Vyner MSS, T/32/43.

²⁴³ Commission, George, Lord Digby, Baron of Sherborne, Lieutenant General of the Forces, Northside of the Trent, to Sir John Mallory, to be Governor of the town and Castle of Skipton, 18 October 1645, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Morley Vyner MSS, T/32/43.

²⁴⁴ Commission, George, Lord Digby, Baron of Sherborne, Lieutenant General of the Forces, Northside of the Trent, to Sir John Mallory, to be Governor of the town and Castle of Skipton, 18 October 1645, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Morley Vyner MSS, T/32/43.

the Governour of the sayd Places doe belong', as no direction by Digby has survived.²⁴⁵ This does not mean that such guidelines were not communicated verbally in their meeting on 18 October, but if they were the records were either destroyed or never made in the first place. It is clear that, by October 1645, the Royalist military hierarchy in the North had completely collapsed. Newcastle had ordered Mallory to obey 'mee or any other [of] your superior officers of this Army'.²⁴⁶ By contrast, the new order was:

to obey such orders & Commands as you shall receive either from his Ma[ies]t[i]e himselfe the Prince of Wales, or his Lieuten[an]t Gen[er]all. Given under my hand & seale at the Castle of Skipton the eighteenth day of october. 1645

George Digby²⁴⁷

Digby did not even explicitly name himself in the list of Mallory's superiors, which hardly spoke to his confidence in either the length or the effectiveness of his lieutenant-generalship. Digby ordered Mallory to obey not just himself, but also his successor after his probable defeat or flight.²⁴⁸ Furthermore, Digby explicitly, unlike Newcastle, authorised Mallory to respond to multiple channels of command, not only from his superior officers but also directly from the King or from the Prince of Wales. In October 1645 the Royalist military position in both the North and the South was in dire straits.²⁴⁹ Both of the Royalists' main field armies had been defeated, and while Oxford would not fall until June of the following year, the King's communications to the North were sporadic at best.²⁵⁰ In these circumstances, opening up multiple lines of command was logical; providing a greater probability of someone being in a position to command Mallory. It was also in character for Digby, a courtier through and through,

²⁴⁵ Commission, George, Lord Digby, Baron of Sherborne, Lieutenant General of the Forces, Northside of the Trent, to Sir John Mallory, to be Governor of the town and Castle of Skipton, 18 October 1645, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Morley Vyner MSS, T/32/43.

²⁴⁶ Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty's forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41.

²⁴⁷ Commission, George, Lord Digby, Baron of Sherborne, Lieutenant General of the Forces, Northside of the Trent, to Sir John Mallory, to be Governor of the town and Castle of Skipton, 18 October 1645, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Morley Vyner MSS, T/32/43.

²⁴⁸ Commission, George, Lord Digby, Baron of Sherborne, Lieutenant General of the Forces, Northside of the Trent, to Sir John Mallory, to be Governor of the town and Castle of Skipton, 18 October 1645, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Morley Vyner MSS, T/32/43.

²⁴⁹ Royle, *Civil War: The Wars of the Three Kingdoms 1638–1660*, pp. 353–367; Braddick, *God's Fury England's Fire...*, pp. 389–412.

²⁵⁰ Binns, *Yorkshire in the 17th Century*, pp. 47–59.

to think in terms of direct communication with the court rather than the military hierarchy and the council of war.²⁵¹

Digby's generalship was never more than ephemeral and had essentially no impact on the relationship between the Royalist fortresses of the North and a higher authority that had effectively collapsed the year before. His military failure at Sherburn prevented him from establishing the Royalist preponderance in field armies that would have been necessary to rectify this situation. But while militarily and politically insignificant, his involvement in the region is historically important, if only in demonstrating the impossibility, after Marston Moor, of turning the mess of isolated garrisons back into a coherent system of military administration capable of controlling the region and extracting the men, money and victuals the dying Royalist cause so desperately needed.

5.6 Parliamentary Governorship, Distinctions and Continuities

The most significant Parliamentary stronghold in Northern England, and therefore the most appropriate comparison with the major Royalist fortresses, was the city and castle of Kingston-upon-Hull. Hull poses both opportunity and difficulty for historical enquiry, but its source base is generally good compared to contemporary Royalist garrisons. An invaluable resource is the collected papers of the Hothams related to Hull, edited by Andrew Hopper and published in 2011 for the Royal Historical Society.²⁵² Full transcriptions of sources of this type are rare, a majority of historians' efforts in this regard going to sources dealing with political and religious debate, or to figures of national importance such as Cromwell.²⁵³

The most important Parliamentary stronghold in Northern England, militarily, economically and in terms of propaganda, Hull contained a major arsenal, was one of Britain's most important ports for trade with the United Provinces, the Empire and Scandinavia, and finally was the site

²⁵¹ Hutton, 'Digby, George, second earl of Bristol (c.1612–1677)', *ODNB*.

²⁵² Hopper (ed.), *The Papers of the Hothams, Governors of Hull during the Civil War*.

²⁵³ For example, Oliver Cromwell has had three major editions of his collected writings since the nineteenth century, see S. C. Lomas (ed.), *The letters and speeches with elucidations by Thomas Carlyle / Oliver Cromwell ; edited in three volumes, with notes, supplement and enlarged index by S. C. Lomas ; with an introduction by C. H. Firth*, 3 vols. (London: Methuen & Co., 1904); Abbott (ed.), *Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell with an Introduction, Notes and a Sketch of His Life*, vols. 1–4. The most recent critical edition, including all known letters, writings and speeches of Oliver Cromwell, is the work of a team of scholars led by Professor John Morrill over the past decade, funded by the principally Leverhulme Trust. It is in four volumes and is due to be published online and in hard copy by Oxford University Press in 2021.

of the famous confrontation between King Charles and the governor, Sir John Hotham. Sir John was appointed early in 1642 before the Civil War had broken out across England.²⁵⁴ His appointment was part of the struggle for control of provincial loyalty between the King and the Parliament which spread across England and Wales in the first half of 1642. Mutually contradictory orders and proclamations were issued to both civic and military officers across the country, as both King and Parliament attempted to create an army to bring the other into obedience.²⁵⁵ This culminated in the rival proclamation of the Militia Ordinance and the Commissions of Array in March but was already underway at this embryonic stage of civil conflict.²⁵⁶ The Lords and Commons took early and effective steps to secure Hull for the emerging Parliamentary cause in a letter of 11 January 1642, a mere seven days after the King's attempted arrest of the five members and a single day after the royal family left London for Hampton Court. The letter stated that:

Sir John Hotham or such person of the trained bands of the parts next adjoining to that town, for the defence of that place and magazine there, according to the resolution of both Houses. Henry Elsynge, clerk of the House of Commons.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁴ Peter Edwards, *Dealing in Death: The Arms Trade and the British Civil Wars, 1632–52* (Stroud: Sutton, 2000), pp. 201, 224; Binns, *Yorkshire in the 17th Century*, pp. 47–59.

²⁵⁵ For a good general history of the war of letters that preceded fighting in England, see Braddick, *God's Fury England's Fire...*, pp. 182–208. For a good contemporary summary of two weeks of Royalist and Parliamentary proclamations and counter-proclamations, see Anon, *A Collection of speciall passages and certaine informations of all the most memorable accidents, and remarkable truths, from London, Westminster, and divers other parts of this Kingdome, from Munday Octob. 17. till Tuesday Novemb. 1. 1642. With a summary collection of all the declarations, orders, messages, remonstrances, petitions, letters, and other passages that have been published by order of both Houses of Parliament. And what other relations of newes have been any other ways published within that time from all other parts. Collected for the satisfaciton of all those that desire to be truely informed* (London: Francis Coles, 1642). See also Parliament of England and Wales, *A declaration of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament for the disarming of all popish recusants and that it shall be lawfull for any of His Majesties subjects to seize upon the persons of all such as shall execute the illegall commission of array : together with a declaration of the Lords and Commons in Parliament that all persons whatsoever which shall assist His Majesty in this war with horse, armes, or money, shall be traytors to His Majesty, the Parliament, and kingdom.* (London: Edward Hisband and I. Franke, 1642); Edward Nicholas, *Strange newes from Yorke, Hull, Beverley, and Manchester. Or, a continuation of the proceedings passages, and matters of consequence that hath passed this last weeke in his Maiesties army before Hull, with some occurrences from Yorke during the Kings absence* (London: John Thomas, 1642).

²⁵⁶ Anon, *The Case of the commission of array stated* (London: s.n., 1642); Anon, *A Discourse or dialogue between the two now potent enemies: The Lord Generall Militia, and his illegal opposite Commissioner of Array...* (London: Thomas Belis, 1642); Samuel Rawson Gardiner (ed.), '50. The Militia Ordinance', in *The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution 1625–1660*, 3rd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1906), 245–246.

²⁵⁷ HHC: Hotham MS, U DDHO/1/71: Resolution of both Houses of Parliament concerning Sir John Hotham, Westminster, 11 January 1642.

The Parliamentarians' aim in securing its man as governor of Hull was simple. They were attempting to seize control of England's armed forces because they no longer trusted Charles I with control of an army, which would be required to defeat the Confederate rebellion in Ireland, for fear that it could be used against them.²⁵⁸ This appointment marked an important development within parliamentary history, as the body attempted to assert authority over what was legally a royal prerogative. This would be codified in Parliament's subsequent attempts at forcing the King to submit to a Militia Bill, which ultimately resulted in the aforementioned Militia Ordinance.²⁵⁹ The possibility that Hull could serve as a Parliamentarian base of operations in a largely Royalist-dominated county was not yet apparent, but the potential of its royal magazine certainly was, as the letter mentioned quite explicitly.²⁶⁰ This would prove prescient in the following months, as the King moved to Yorkshire to begin building an army, culminating in his attempt to take control of Hull on 23 April.²⁶¹

²⁵⁸ Braddick, *God's Fury England's Fire*, p. 182; Royle, *Civil War: The Wars of the Three Kingdoms 1638–1660*, p. 164.

²⁵⁹ Gardiner (ed.), '50. The Militia Ordinance', pp. 245–246; Charles I, *His Majesties message to both Houses of Parliament upon his removall to the city of York* (London: Robert Barker, 1642); John Pym, *A DECLARATION Presented to the Honourable House of COMMONS. With A Speech delivered at conference with the LORDS, January 25. 1641. By occasion of the Petitions from the City of London, and the Counties of Middlesex, Essex, and Hartford* (London: Richard Lownes, 1642), pp. 36–37.

²⁶⁰ Hopper (ed.), *The Papers of the Hothams*, p. 49, HHC: Hotham MS, U DDHO/1/71: Resolution of both Houses of Parliament concerning Sir John Hotham, Westminster, 11 January 1642.

²⁶¹ Anon, *An Answerable REMONSTRANCE OF HIS MAJESTIES [sic] ingdomes of England, Scotland, Ireland, and the principality of Wales To the Parliament...* (London: J. Horton, 1642), p. 3; Anon, *An admiration by way of answer to the petition of the rebells in Ireland. To all true hearted Protestants, why the rebells in Ireland should petition to his Majesty to transport themselves into England to ayd and assist him, and by strength to carry on his designes untill they arrive at a prosperous end, and that they joyning with the papists here in England, which are a great and considerable number, doe not doubt but to curbe the insolencies of the Protestants. Whereunto is adjoynd the exact copy of the petition to the Kings Majesty by the rebells in Ireland, subscribed by 11. lords, and others of quality; examined by the originall by a person of honour there, being intercepted, was sen [sic] over to two Members of the House of Commons Dated the 17. of August, 1642* (London: Thomas Homer, 1642), pp. 1–6; A. J. B., *VVhat kinde of Parliament vvill please the King; and hovv vvell he is affected to this present Parliament. Gathered out of his owne papers...* (London: s.n., 1642), p. 3; A. F., *Strange newes from Yorke, Hull, Beverley, and Manchester. Or, a continuation of the proceedings passages, and matters of consequence that hath passed this last weeke in his Maiesties army before Hull, with some occurrences from Yorke during the Kings absence as also of my Lord Stranges comming in a warlike manner against the town of Manchester and slew three of the inhabitants thereof. Beeing all that passed here from the 16 of Iuly to the 23. Sent in a letter from a worthy knight now resident in Yorke, to a gentleman in Kings Street in Westminster, Iuly 25. 1642. Also the humble petition of Sir Francis Wortley Knight and Baronet to the Kings most Excellent Majestie. With his Maiesties answer thereunto...* (London: John Thomas, 1642), pp. 1–6; Coleman, *Huls pillar of providence erected: or The providentiall columnne, setting out heavens care for deliverance of that people, with extraordinary power and providence from the bloud-sucking Cavaliers, who had for six weeks closely besieged them*, pp. 4–5.

An additional letter on the day of Sir John's appointment, sent by the clerk of the House of Lords, further authorised him to take 'some of trained bands of Yorkshire, nearest to Hull in that county' under his command.²⁶² These soldiers 'shall with all speed be put into the said town of Hull, for the securing of the King's magazine there, and the said town'.²⁶³ This was a dramatic expansion of the authority of not just the Lords and Commons, but the position of governor. The trained bands of the East Riding were properly under the authority of the Lord-Lieutenant of Yorkshire, who was responsible for the defence of all three ridings and the city of York itself.²⁶⁴ In 1642 however, the office was in crisis and was utterly incapable of exercising its command over the county's militia.

From 1628 to 1641 it had been held by Thomas Wentworth, first Earl of Strafford, an appointment that came along with the office of lord president of the North and privy councillor.²⁶⁵ Strafford's fall and execution in 1641 resulted in the office briefly passing to Viscount Savile before being granted to Robert Devereux, third Earl of Essex.²⁶⁶ Both men, particularly Essex, had been prominent enemies of Strafford. While initially hesitant, owing to the Lord-Lieutenancy's importance during the Bishops' Wars, the appointment of Essex was part of an effort by the King to reconcile with his parliamentary enemies, an effort which ultimately failed within a year.²⁶⁷ There is no evidence that Essex ever seriously used his authority as Lord-Lieutenant, occupied as he was with his positions as Lord-General of the armies south of the Trent and Lord Chamberlain, not to mention his concurrent lieutenantancies of Staffordshire, Montgomeryshire, Herefordshire and Shropshire.²⁶⁸ By the crisis of 1642 relations between King and Essex had entirely collapsed and the latter was fully occupied with

²⁶² Hopper (ed.), *The Papers of the Hothams*, p. 49, *HHC*: Hotham MS, U DDHO/1/72–73: Order of the House of Lords to Sir John Hotham, Westminster, 11 January 1642.

²⁶³ Hopper (ed.), *The Papers of the Hothams*, p. 49, *HHC*: Hotham MS, U DDHO/1/72–73: Order of the House of Lords to Sir John Hotham, Westminster, 11 January 1642.

²⁶⁴ Braddick, *State Formation in Early Modern England*, pp. 28–29.

²⁶⁵ Asch, 'Thomas Wentworth, 1st Earl of Strafford (1593–1641)'; J.C. Sainty, 'Lieutenants of Counties, 1585–1642', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, Special Supplement no. 8* (London, Athlone Press, 1970), p. 37.

²⁶⁶ J.C. Sainty, 'Lieutenants of Counties, 1585–1642', p. 37; West Yorkshire Archive Service, Bradford: Tong/10/1, *Warrant appointing Robert Earl of Essex to be Lieutenant of the County of York*.

²⁶⁷ John Morrill, 'Devereux, Robert, third earl of Essex', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn, Sept 2004 [<https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-7566?rskey=JCiX8D&result=14>], accessed 03/2020.

²⁶⁸ Morrill, 'Devereux, Robert, third earl of Essex', *ODNB*; W. M. Ormrod, (ed.), *The Lord Lieutenants and High Sheriffs of Yorkshire, 1066–2000* (Barnsley: Wharncliffe Books, 2000), p. 7.

the organisation of the nascent Parliamentary government in London.²⁶⁹ With the King present in the county, and actively summoning, however ineffectively, the trained bands to his person, the office of Lord-Lieutenant was entirely ineffectual.

By granting the power to command the militia to Hotham the two Houses were applying a pragmatic solution to the military challenge they faced in the war of letters that dominated the first half of 1642. They gained control of Hull and its arsenal, a garrison that ultimately proved vital to the Parliamentary cause in Yorkshire. But this gave Hotham a wholly independent power base preceding the establishment of any countywide body of Parliamentary coordination.²⁷⁰ Again, this was an inevitable consequence of the timing of Hotham's appointment, long before the fighting began, but it would prevent the Yorkshire Parliamentarians from achieving victory without external intervention, in addition to giving Hotham the necessary power to contemplate a defection of his garrison to the Royalists.

While neither of the letters of 11 January explicitly referred to Sir John Hotham with the title governor, it was clear that the office was the *de facto* sum of the powers given to him. Even in the absence of formal sanction as governor, Parliamentary sources quickly began to use the title. John Hampden, who naturally corresponded extensively with Hotham, addressed him as 'Governor of Hull' in his correspondence beginning 7 June 1644.²⁷¹ While stubbornly refusing to coordinate effectively with the Fairfaxes, at least until Lord Ferdinando was appointed 'General of the Northern Forces', Hotham's office did not allow him to ignore his superiors completely.²⁷² In addition to his regular correspondence with Westminster, on 12 November

²⁶⁹ Morrill, 'Devereux, Robert, third earl of Essex', *ODNB*.

²⁷⁰ Hopper (ed.), *The Papers of the Hothams*, pp. 20–21.

²⁷¹ *HHC*: Hotham MS, U DDHO/1/4: John Hampden to Sir John Hotham, [Westminster], 7 June 1642.

²⁷² Hopper identified Aulicus as first describing the Hotham/Fairfax split on 17 January 1643 and reporting it subsequently. See *Mercurius Aulicus*, 3rd week (15 January 1643–21 January 1643), p. 28 (*Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 275.103A). Lord Fairfax complained about this publicly, stating that 'I have sent to Sir John Hotham, Sir Edward Rhodes, Sir Hugh Cholmley, and Captaine Hotham, but they all aleadge great neccessities of their own, and helpes me with none; so that I am put upon such streights, as seldom happen, to retaine an Army together, and with it serve upon a more potent Enemy', see Ferdinando Fairfax, *A second letter from the right honourable the Lord Fairfax, of his late prosperous proceedings against the Earle of New-castle, and his popish army in Yorke-shire. Presented to the Parliament, and read in both houses, on Wensday the 4. of January. 1642. With an order of the Lords and Commons, that if any of the trained-bands within the city of London, Westminster, or the county of Middlesex; shall neglect to repaire to their colours as often as they shall be required, they shall suffer two days imprisonment [sic] or else pay five shillings for the offence. Die Mercurii 4. Ian. 1642. Ordered by the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament, that this letter and order shall be forthwith printed and published. J. Brown Cler. Parliamentorum* (London: Iohn Wright, 1642), pp. 4–5.

1642, he sent a lengthy report to 'the Committee of Safety' then sitting at Northallerton in the North Riding, informing them of his situation, intelligence of Newcastle's preparations for an invasion of Yorkshire, and his son's intentions to oppose it.²⁷³ Ultimately his son's small force was easily swept aside by Newcastle's army, who then marched to York, placing a large Royalist army between the three Parliamentary forces in Yorkshire, further weakening any possibility of inter-Parliamentarian cooperation.²⁷⁴

Sir John's fall came about because of two factors: his deteriorating relationship with Parliament and his dealings with Newcastle. Despite being the darling of the Parliamentary cause in spring 1642, Sir John Hotham grew dissatisfied owing to a combination of the increasing radicalism of Parliamentarianism and the disrespect that he felt critics and enemies within the Parliament held towards him.²⁷⁵ A lack of funds for his troops caused him to complain to the Parliament. In a reply of 20 January 1643 Pym replied that he was 'heartily sorry you are in such straits...but truly we have had so little money come in of late that the whole army was even ready to disband'.²⁷⁶ Pym reassured Sir John that money was being sent and that 'the House commanded a letter to be written to you acknowledging the great service you have done and the estimation they have of your merit and desire to give content'.²⁷⁷ A commander whose continued devotion was considered secure did not require such extensive massaging of ego, suggesting that Sir John Hotham's superiors were aware of his increasing dissatisfaction.

The problem faced by the Parliamentarians was that they were incapable of reconciling Sir John's conception of the cause with the measures they felt necessary to win.²⁷⁸ His subordination to Lord Ferdinando Fairfax, appointed General of the Northern Forces of the Parliament in the early summer of 1643 particularly rankled, given his rivalry with the Fairfaxes

²⁷³ Sir Christopher Wray, John Hotham, and Thomas Hatcher to the Committee of Safety, Northallerton, 12 November 1642, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS Nalson II, no. 95.

²⁷⁴ Binns, *Yorkshire in the 17th Century*, p. 73; J. Rushworth, *The Tyrall of Thomas Earl of Strafford* (London: John Wright & Richard Chiswell, 1680), pp. v, 78.

²⁷⁵ Binns, *Yorkshire in the 17th Century*, pp. 75, 77; Braddick, *God's Fury England's Fire*, pp. 298–291; Royle, *Civil War: The Wars of the Three Kingdoms 1638–1660*, pp. 263–264; Hopper (ed.), *The Papers of the Hothams...*, pp. 17–21.

²⁷⁶ John Pym to Sir John Hotham, [Westminster], 20 February 1643, Hull History Centre, Hotham MS, U DDUO/1/10.

²⁷⁷ John Pym to Sir John Hotham, [Westminster], 20 February 1643, Hull History Centre, Hotham MS, U DDUO/1/10,

²⁷⁸ Hopper (ed.), *The Papers of the Hothams...*, pp. 20–21.

over the previous months and intense sense of self-importance.²⁷⁹ This expansion of Lord Fairfax's position was not total, for Hull would only be fully incorporated into the Northern Association in July 1645.²⁸⁰ For all its active involvement in the Civil Wars, Hull was an independent command with ineffective connections to local Parliamentary forces.²⁸¹

Its strategic importance, relative isolation following Newcastle's invasion, and the circumstances in which it had become a garrison, at the very start of the conflict, meant that it remained an independent garrison subject only to the direction of the central Parliamentary authorities. Sir John Hotham's intense devotion to a social hierarchy that he felt was increasingly under threat by the continuation of the war ultimately drove him into opposition to the prosecution of the conflict.²⁸² References in his son's letters to the exchange of propositions between King and Parliament show that he hoped for a reconciliation between the two.²⁸³ This put Sir John in a majority position, since both the war and even the idea of outright military victory were unpopular, but left him at great risk from more enthusiastic Parliamentarians.

The exchange of letters with Newcastle was not directly made by Sir John, but by his son, commonly referred to by contemporaries and historians alike as Captain John Hotham for reasons of clarity. Captain Hotham carried out an exchange of letters with Newcastle from as early as 18 December 1642 until his fall in June 1643.²⁸⁴ The very first letter to Newcastle was

²⁷⁹ Hopper (ed.), *The Papers of the Hothams...*, pp. 17–22; See also Rushworth, *Historical Collections of Private Passages of State*, vol. V, p. 64; His Majesty's Stationery Office, *Journal of the House of Commons*, 269 vols. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1802), vol. II, pp. 920, 923; Fairfax correspondence, 1625–1688, British Library, Add. MS. 18,979, ff. 127r, 35.

²⁸⁰ Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, pp. 669–771.

²⁸¹ Hopper (ed.), *The Papers of the Hothams...*, pp. 17–21; *Mercurius Aulicus*, 3rd week (15 January 1643–21 January 1643), p. 28 (*Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 275.103A).

²⁸² Andrew Hopper, 'Fitted for Desperation': Honour and Treachery in Parliament's Yorkshire Command, 1642–1643', *History* 86 (2002), 138–154, at pp. 140–143.

²⁸³ John Hotham to William Cavendish, earl of Newcastle, Hull, 22 March 1643, Hull History Centre, Hotham MS, U DDHO/1/25; John Hotham to William Cavendish, earl of Newcastle, Beverly, 3 April 1643, Hull History Centre, Hotham MS, U DDHO/1/12; John Hotham to William Cavendish, early of Newcastle, Lincoln, 14 April 1643, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, Bodl. MS Nalson XI, no. 220.

²⁸⁴ David Scott, 'Hotham, John (1610–1645)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn, Sept 2004 [<https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-13853>], accessed 03/2020; John Hotham, *Certain letters sent from Sir Iohn Hotham, young Hotham, the major of Hull, and others. Intercepted, and brought to Court to his Majesty, April 16* (Oxford: Henry Hall, 1643).

innocent enough, merely enquiring about the exchange of prisoners, presumably captured during Newcastle's victorious march south to York.²⁸⁵ However, the subject rapidly turned to the Hothams' dissatisfaction with the course of the war, Sir John's desire for the King to understand his ultimate loyalty to the Crown, despite the confrontation at Hull, and ultimately the possibility of defection.²⁸⁶ If Sir John had defected, it would have given the King access to Yorkshire's principal port and meant that the remaining Parliamentary forces in the county would have had no stronghold to retreat to from Newcastle's much stronger field army. Captain Hotham had a meeting in February 1643 with the Queen and Newcastle, where he allegedly demanded the titles of viscount for his father, baron for himself and £20,000 to betray Hull.²⁸⁷ The younger Hotham took his time in making good on any deal, instead enjoying his generalship of the Lincolnshire Parliamentarians, subverting his command and possibly securing a further treaty with the Queen, then at Newark.²⁸⁸

Colonels Hutchinson and Cromwell became suspicious of this behaviour and sought a warrant from the Committee of Safety for the younger Hotham's arrest.²⁸⁹ The final break came when Captain Hotham was arrested when he brought his troops to join up with Lord Fairfax and Cromwell, who were at that point confronting Newcastle, who was marching his army south from Yorkshire.²⁹⁰ While he managed to escape, Sir John broke completely with the Parliamentarians. Denouncing Cromwell as 'the great Anabaptist', a particularly virulent accusation implying bloodthirsty, blasphemous anarchism, Hotham suggested in a message to

²⁸⁵ John Hotham to William Cavendish, earl of Newcastle, Cawood, 18 December 1642, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS Nalson II, no. 114.

²⁸⁶ See Hopper (ed.), *The Papers of the Hothams...*, pp. 73–83.

²⁸⁷ Scott, 'Hotham, John', *ODNB*.

²⁸⁸ Hopper (ed.), *The Papers of the Hothams...*, pp. 20–21; Anon, *A relation of a fight in the county of Lincoln, between the Kings forces, and the rebels of that county Which happened upon the eleventh day of Aprill, anno Domini, 1643. Neere Ancaster. And was presented to Her Majesty at Yorke, Aprill 13. Together with the subscription of those gentlemen whose names follow at the end of the relation* (York: Stephen Bulkley, 1643), pp. 4–7; William Bridge, *A true relation of a great victory obtained by the Parliament forces in Lincolnshire, under the command of the Lord Willoughby, Colonel Hobart, Colonel Cromwell, Lieutenant Generall Hotham. Declared in severall letters, one from Colonel Cromwell, to Colonel Hobart, dated from Shasten. And another from Master Bridge a minister, to a friend in London. Together with Colonel Hobart his answer to a letter sent him from some gentlemen, who were imprisoned in Crowland* (London: Nebjamine Allen, 1643), pp. 1–5.

²⁸⁹ Hopper (ed.), *The Papers of the Hothams...*, pp. 20–21; Lucy Hutchinson, *Memoirs of the Life of Colonel Hutchinson*, ed. N. H. Keeble (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1995), p. 108.

²⁹⁰ Sir John Hotham to John Hotham, Hull, 25 June 1643, British Library, Add. MS 44, 848, fo. 287v; Anon, *HVLLS Managing of the Kingdoms Cause: OR, A brief Historicall RELATION OF THE Severall Plots and Attempts against KINGSTON upon HULL, from the beginning of these unhappy differences to thi day; and the means whereby through Gods blessing it ha^h been preserved, and the Kingdom in it* (London: Richard Best, 1644), pp. 10–11.

his son that he was planning to defect.²⁹¹ This was immediately followed by his attempted flight and consequent capture. Captain Hotham had just arrived back in Hull but was then arrested, while abed, by the authority of the mayor on 28 July.²⁹² The mayor and the citizens took control of the defences, and Sir John put his escape plan into effect. He got as far as Beverly, before being knocked off his horse and returned to Hull.²⁹³

He had around a week to get his affairs in order. On 3 July 1643 the committee of Hull noted that Sir John wanted ‘out of his money £200, that his horses may be kept by his men in his own stable with his own provision of beans and oats’.²⁹⁴ He also tried to wrap up some of his finances, writing that he had accepted £400 from a Mr John Barnard ‘for the payment of the garrison...for which I did give him my bills exchanged’.²⁹⁵ This suggested that there had been a conflation of Hotham’s private and garrison accounts, confirming that this combination of public and private spheres was not a purely Royalist phenomenon but also extended to Parliamentary garrisons. Given the strong devotion of the Hothams to the social hierarchy, with Captain Hotham being reported as denouncing Cromwell’s men as a ‘company of Brownists, Anabaptists, [and] factious, inferior persons’, it was natural that this strongly lordly conception of governorship, addressed earlier in this chapter, was their model.²⁹⁶ Whether or not the Hothams had a grand plan to defect and deliver Hull to King Charles, or were just attempting compromise, is irrelevant for this study. Ultimately both were imprisoned in the Tower of London, tried and finally executed for treason.²⁹⁷

The dangers that placing significant martial resources, ample defences and both military and civic defences in the hands of one man posed in terms of defection were clearly understood by contemporaries. While the dismissal and arrest of a suspect were prudent internal security measures, the publicity with which the Hothams met their deaths was designed to demonstrate

²⁹¹ Scott, ‘Hotham, John’, *ODNB*; Sir John Hotham to John Hotham, Hull, 25 June 1643, British Library, Add. MS 44, 848, fo. 287v.

²⁹² Royle, *God’s Fury, England’s Fire*, p. 298.

²⁹³ Royle, *God’s Fury, England’s Fire*, p. 299; Sir Hugh Cholmley, *TVVO LETTERS THE ONE Being Intercepted by the Parliaments Forces, which was sent from Sir Hugh Cholmley to captain Gotherick, employed in the Parliaments service; Advising him to quit Wrestle-Castle, or else to secure captain Carter, and to make himself master of it, and keep it for His Majesties service...* (London: Edward Husband, 1643).

²⁹⁴ Note of the Committee of Hull, 3 July 1643, Hull History Centre, C BRS/7/66.

²⁹⁵ Sir John Hotham to the Mayor and Committee of Hull, Hull, 4 July 1643, Hull History Centre, C BRL/310.

²⁹⁶ Scott, ‘Hotham, John’, *ODNB*.

²⁹⁷ Basil N. Reckitt, *Charles the First and Hull* (London: A. Brown and Sons, 1952), pp. 76–86.

the penalties that could be expected for turncoats. The Parliamentarians would not always remain consistent in this policy, allowing Sir Hugh Cholmley to go into exile after the great siege of Scarborough Castle the following year, despite angry calls in the Parliamentary press for the death of 'Judas Cholmley'.²⁹⁸ In this case pragmatism, by encouraging Cholmley to surrender, trumped the need to make an example out of him. Defections and plots would continue to affect the Parliamentary effort in Northern England, particularly in the Second Civil War, where the governor of Scarborough defected while Pontefract castle was seized by Royalist plotters who had managed to manoeuvre themselves into the governor's confidence.²⁹⁹ This was generally more of a Parliamentary problem particularly as the war went on, owing to both the expansion of the number of garrisons and the increasing radicalism of the cause, ultimately concluding in the regicide.

Following the purge of the Hothams, a new governor needed to be appointed for Hull. This was decided by the House of Commons a month after Sir John's flight. On 19 August the house sent a letter to the corporation ordering them to 'deliver up the military government of the said town

²⁹⁸ Hopper, *Turncoats and Renegadoes: Changing Sides in the English Civil Wars*, p. 147, quoting from *Scotish Dove*, no. 93 (25 July–15 August 1645; *Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 594.093); Anon, *Die Lunæ*, 3^o April. 1643 (London: Edward Husband, 1643); Parliament of England and Wales, *A declaration of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament; straightly charging and forbidding all in-keepers, victuallers, alehouse-keepers, or other persons whatsoever, to harbour or entertain any marriners, seamen, water-men, &c. prest into any of His Majesties or merchants ships employed in this service after the beat of the drum, and proclamation made to give them notice, to repair on boord the severall ships to which they belong. Ordered by the Lords and Commoms in Parliament, that this declaration be forthwith printed and published. Hen: Elsyng, Cler. Parl. D. Com. Also a letter from Sir Iohn Hotham. Ordered by Commons in Parliament, that this letter be forthwith printed and published. Hen: Elsyng, Cler. Parl. D. Com* (London: Edward Husband, 1643); Sir John Hotham, *A true and exact relation of all the proceedings of Sir Hugh Cholmleys revolt, deserting the Parliament, and going to the Queen, with the regaining of Scarborough Castle, by the courage and industry of Capt. Bushel. Sent in two letters, the one from Sir Iohn Hotham to M. Speaker, the other, from a worthy Captain to a member of the honourable House of Commons. Die Martis 4 Aprilis 1643. It is ordered by the Commons in Parliament, that these two letters concerning Sir Hugh Cholmley's Revolt, and the re-taking of Scarborough Castle, shall be forthwith printed and published. H. Elsyng, Cler. Parl. D. Com.* (London: Richard Best, 1643).

²⁹⁹ And even, at Pontefract, into the governor's bed. See, Binns, *A Place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640–1660*, p. 199; Thomas Paulden, *Pontefract Castle: An account how it was taken: and how General Rainsborough was surprised in his quarters at Doncaster, anno 1648. In a letter to a friend / By Captain Tho. Paulden. Written upon the occasion of Prince Eugene's surprising Monsieur Villeroy at Cremona* (London: Edward Jones, 1702), pp. 2–6; Boothroyd, *The History of the Ancient Borough of Pontefract, containing an interesting account of its castle and the three different sieges it sustained, during the civil war, with notes and pedigrees of some of the most distinguished Royalists and Parliamentarians, chiefly [sic] drawn from Manuscripts never before published*, p. 260; Collections for a History of Pontefract, 12 sets of notes, York Minster Library and Archives, Add MS 279.

and forces therein into the hands of the right honourable Ferdinando Lord Fairfax.³⁰⁰ The legal authority backing this appointment was an ‘ordinance of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament, dated 22 July 1643’.³⁰¹ Until this appointment the ‘mayor and aldermen of Kingston-upon-Hull with others who since the apprehension of Sir John Hotham their late governor and his son Captain John Hotham, the 29 June last have faithfully negotiated the affairs of the town and diligently applied themselves for the well government thereof’.³⁰²

This suggests that the period in which the Hull Corporation had enjoyed civic self-government once again did not result in any weakening of the Parliamentary position in the city, nor any significant change in local military policy. This will be explored further in the next chapter, which focuses on civic corporations, but should be mentioned at this point for clarification. However, it should also be noted that the appointment of the Fairfaxes to power in Hull was not solely the responsibility of the London authorities, but also the result of the actions of both the city corporation and the Fairfaxes themselves. The fall of the Hothams was serendipitous since the crushing defeat of the Parliamentary army by Newcastle at the Battle of Adwalton Moor occurred contemporaneously, necessitating the Fairfaxes retreat to Hull.³⁰³

While simpler than their Royalist equivalent, dependent upon clear parliamentary orders in the place of the mixture of lordly appointments and heterogeneous commissions used to codify northern Royalist gubernatorial offices, parliamentary governors’ power was also dependent upon local factors. The existence of a relatively organised civic committee in Hull, which will be explored in greater detail in the next chapter, provided an alternative source of military power and defence policy, with fatal consequences for Sir John Hotham. This began to change as the civil conflict in Yorkshire began to recede after the destruction of the remaining Royalist garrisons in 1645. Despite the resurgence of fighting in 1648–1649, the Parliamentary victors

³⁰⁰ Order of the House of Commons for the Corporation of Hull to deliver the military government of Hull to Lord Fairfax, 19 August 1643, Hull History Centre, Hotham MS, U DDHO/1/77.

³⁰¹ Order of the House of Commons for the Corporation of Hull to deliver the military government of Hull to Lord Fairfax, 19 August 1643, Hull History Centre, Hotham MS, U DDHO/1/77.

³⁰² Order of the House of Commons for the Corporation of Hull to deliver the military government of Hull to Lord Fairfax, 19 August 1643, Hull History Centre, Hotham MS, U DDHO/1/77.

³⁰³ Anon, *HVLLS Managing of the Kingdoms Cause: OR, A brief Historicall RELATION OF THE Severall Plots and Attempts against KINGSTON upon HULL...*, pp. 12–13; Coleman, *Huls pillar of providence erected: or The providentiall columnne, setting out heavens care for deliverance of that people, with extraordinary power and providence from the bloud-sucking Cavaliers...*, p. 9; Binns, *Yorkshire in the 17th Century*, p. 77; Anon, *An Expresse relation of the passages and proceedings of His Majesties armie vnder the command of His Excellence the Earle of Newcastle: against the rebels, under the command of the Lord Fairfax and his adherents* (Oxford: s.n., 1643).

were able to consolidate their hold on the county. This meant that the freedom of action of the Hull Corporation was significantly reduced. Even after the end of the Civil Wars, Hull continued to sustain a garrison and be overseen by a military governor. Its strategic importance, as one of the most important ports on the east coast and a potential point for importing weapons or soldiers raised by the court in exile, meant that it was not subject to the destruction of its fortifications.

The dominant figure in Hull throughout this period was Robert Overton, the radical enthusiast for the regicide who had served under the Fairfaxes during the siege and who was later appointed deputy governor under Lord Ferdinando.³⁰⁴ Ultimately succeeding Lord Fairfax, his religious and political radicalism alienated the civic authorities in Hull, who complained about him to the central authorities.³⁰⁵ Their efforts to get rid of him ultimately resulted in his dismissal in 1655.³⁰⁶

The governor was not the sole influence over the military government in Hull in the period after the Civil Wars. The Council of State's purges of 'delinquents' and 'malignants' and other security threats would continue into the mid-1650s, with the central government issuing

³⁰⁴ Barbara Taft, 'Overton, Robert (1608/9–1678/9)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn, Sept 2004 [<https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-20975?rskey=YTUiFl&result=2>], accessed 03/2020.

³⁰⁵ Taft, 'Overton, Robert', *ODNB*.

³⁰⁶ For further information on Hull's subsequent years under the republican regime, see Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 6, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, f. 486; Rushworth, *Historical Collections of Private Passages of State*, vol. VII, pp. 1020–1021; *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 22: Jan 1648–Jan 1649, p. 88: SP 21/24 f.89: 'The Committee of both Houses to Peregrine Pelham, Esq.', pp. 101–103: SP 21/9 f.117: 'Proceedings at the Committee of both Houses at Derby House, Present, in the morning: Earls of Pembroke, Manchester, and Mulgrave, Edw. Lord Howard, Sir Wm. Armyne, Sir J. Danvers,', pp. 137–138: SP 21/24 f.147: 'The Committee of both Houses to the Mayor and Aldermen of Hull': 'Committee of both Houses to the Deputy Governor of Hull': 'Committee of both Houses to the Lord General [Fairfax]', p. 198: SP 21/24 f.239: 'The Committee of both Houses to Col. [Robert] Overton, [Deputy] Governor of Hull', p. 226: SP 21/24 f.287: 'The Committee of both Houses to the Lord General [Fairfax]'; *Cal. S.P. Dom., Commonwealth, vol. 1, 1649–50*: p. 159: SP 25/62 f.359: 'May 28 1649. Council of State. Day's Proceedings', p. 160: SP 25/123 f.27: 'May 28 1649, Council of State. Day's Proceedings', p. 312: SP 25/94 ff.437–439: 'Council of State to Col. Overton, governor of Hull. Thanks for your care of the place; we doubt not its preservation': 'Council of State to the Mayor and Aldermen of Hull. The town of Hull is of consequence to the commonwealth, and we would omit nothing that conduces to its safety; the enemies have'; Thomas Birch (ed.), *Thurloe's State Papers*, 7 vols. (London: Fletcher Gyles, 1742), vol. III, pp. 46–47; Hist. MSS. Com. *Portland, I*, p. 468, 471, 478.

repeated directives to that effect.³⁰⁷ Compared to the period of civil conflict, in which the corporation had managed to overthrow one governor and influence the selection of another, albeit with parliamentary approval for both, the decline in civic autonomy over security matters is readily apparent. Even the dismissal of Overton was a temporary victory, as he returned to the city amidst the crisis at the end of the British republic in 1659–1660.³⁰⁸ His efforts to make a stand in the city for a ‘Good Old Cause against ... a King and Single Person’ fell on deaf ears, despite some support from his garrison, and he was finally replaced as governor of the city by General Monck in March 1660.³⁰⁹ The alienation caused by the seemingly neverending militarisation of the city, the interference in civic religious matters, and the repeated purges is demonstrated by the strongly Royalist character of the representatives elected by Hull to the Convention Parliament of April 1660.³¹⁰

5.7 Conclusions

Governorship in Northern England during the Civil Wars was heterogeneous in not only allegiance but also in legal basis, the extent of power, relation with local elites, relation with

³⁰⁷ O. Ogle and W. H. Bliss (eds.), *Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers*, 5 vols. (Burlington: Tanner Ritchie, 2010), vol. II, pp. 8, 336, 344. The Prince of Wales attempted to subvert the Parliamentary allegiance of Hull, see *Cal. S.P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 22, 1648–9: p. 216: SP 16/516 f.115: ‘Charles Prince of Wales to the Mayor and Corporation of Kingston-upon-Hull’. Council of State required oaths of allegiance from the garrison and corporation of Hull, see *Cal. S.P. Dom., Commonwealth*, vol. 1, 1649–50: p. 312: SP 25/94 ff.437–439. Council of State ordered Overton to send ‘in secure custody’ a ‘pretended ally’ of his from Hull to London, see *Cal. S.P. Dom., Commonwealth*, vol. 12, 1650, pp. 126–128: SP 25/64 f.269: ‘April 27 1650, Council of State. Day’s Proceedings’. C.o.S. gave order ‘To write Col. Overton, taking notice of his going out of town with his officers on the Lord’s Day, whereby the town is supposed to be in some danger.’ See *Cal. S.P. Dom., Commonwealth*, vol. 2, 1650, pp. 205–207: SP 25/64 f.453: ‘June 17 1650, Council of State. Day’s Proceedings’. C.o.S. ordered additional ammunition to the Hull garrison *Cal. S.P. Dom., Commonwealth*, vol. 2, 1650, p. 284: SP 25/123 f.216: ‘Council of State to the Commander of the Ann and Joyce’. C.o.S. considered changing the garrison of Hull, see *Cal. S.P. Dom., Commonwealth*, vol. 3, 1651, pp. 10–12: SP 25/16 f.27: ‘Jan. 13 1651, Council of State. Day’s Proceedings’. During the Third Civil War, C.o.S. was worried that the Scottish army would take Hull, see *Cal. S.P. Dom., Commonwealth*, vol. 3, 1651, pp. 405–407: SP 25/96 ff.495–499: ‘Council of State to Lieut.-Col. Salmon’: ‘Council of State to the Militia Commissioners for co. York’. C.o.S. gave order for delinquents to be secured in Hull, demonstrating its continued significance for internal security purposes during the republic, see *Cal. S.P. Dom., Commonwealth*, vol. 7, 1654, p. 246: SP 25/75 f.423: ‘July 8 1654. Pres. Lawrence to Sir Wm. Constable, high sheriff of co. York’. The court in exile continued to focus on Hull as a letter to Secretary Nicholas in Cologne stated: ‘These several years, when there were hopes of his Majesty’s restoration, I encouraged my townsmen of Hull to declare for him, and since Cromwell has advanced himself so high, I find them very pliable’ see, *Cal. S.P. Dom., Commonwealth*, vol. 8, 1655, pp. 338–339: SP 18/100 f.288: ‘Luke Whittington to Sec. Nicolas, Cologne’.

³⁰⁸ *C.J.* vii, pp. 688, 738; Charles Firth and Godfrey Davies, *The Regimental History of Cromwell’s Army*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940), vol. II, pp. 557–558.

³⁰⁹ Taft, ‘Overton, Robert’, *ODNB*.

³¹⁰ Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 6, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, p. 303.

lordly power and territorial scope. This was particularly prominent in the case of Royalist governors owing to both the improvised nature of Royalist administration and the progressive collapse of centralised authority over Northern England's Royalist garrisons following the defeat at Marston Moor.³¹¹ Parliamentary governorship was slightly more coherent, being confirmed by the parliamentary authorities in London, but as the previous chapter explored, even here there was significant legal confusion with the appointment of governors in the Covenanter-occupied counties. In both cases, governorships emerged as a pragmatic response to state collapse—the devolution of power to the locality being a consequence of the intense stress the fractured English systems of administration were placed under by the conflict.³¹²

Royalist administration remains underdeveloped in comparison with the rest of the field, and is even small when compared with the historiography of Royalist ideology; this underdevelopment is a consequence of the limited source base for Royalist history—which this thesis has frequently acknowledged.³¹³ The distinctions between different court factions and various strands of Royalist thought have been a feature of historical debate for decades, with Burgess and Smith both writing on the subject.³¹⁴ The same has not been true for Royalist military-administrative systems, with the notable exceptions of Hutton's *The Royalist War Effort* and Roy's 2007 article on the King's council of war.³¹⁵ Furthermore, the historiography of Civil War governorship remains parochial, concerned with narrative studies of the locality as opposed to analytic studies of the office.³¹⁶ The office of governor has excited less historiographical attention than, for example, Parliamentary committees and associations or the New Model.³¹⁷

³¹¹ Hulse, 'Cavendish, William, first duke of Newcastle upon Tyne (bap. 1593, d. 1676)', *ODNB*; Hutton, 'Digby, George, second earl of Bristol (c.1612–1677)', *ODNB*.

³¹² *HHC*: Hotham MS, U DDHO/1/71: Resolution of both Houses of Parliament concerning Sir John Hotham, Westminster, 11 January 1642.

³¹³ Hutton, *The Royalist War Effort 1642–1646*, p. 86.

³¹⁴ Burgess, *Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution*; Smith, *Constitutional Royalism and the Search for Settlement, c. 1640–1649*.

³¹⁵ Hutton, *The Royalist War Effort 1642–1646*; Ian Roy, 'The Royalist Council of War'.

³¹⁶ Many of these studies, such as Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645* and Binns, *Sir Hugh Cholmley of Whitby 1600–1657: Ancestry, Life and Legacy* are excellently researched but are either studies of a particular locality or are biographical, as opposed to being institutional histories. Their analyses of the gubernatorial office are incidental rather than instrumental as a consequence.

³¹⁷ Holmes, *The Eastern Association in the English Civil War*. For a non-exhaustive sample of New Model scholarship in the past half-century see Mark Kishlansky, *The rise of the New Model Army* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1983); Ian Gentles, *The new model army in England, Ireland, and Scotland, 1645–1653* (Cambridge Mass.: Blackwell, 1992); Malcolm Wanklyn, *Reconstructing the New Model Army* (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2015).

This thesis argues that this tendency undervalues the importance of governors to the progress of the Civil War, despite the office not proving a significant lasting innovation in British administrative history. By placing the governor as the centre of the analysis, a system of fragmented, loosely coordinated military government is revealed. This system allowed the Northern Royalists in particular to bypass the normal systems of County administration—which had ceased to function or were ‘in rebellion’—securing both the material and financial resources that Newcastle’s field army required and control over large areas of the region.³¹⁸ This was despite this system’s clearly improvised nature and limited central organs of control, those being restricted to direct orders from Newcastle or the King’s command itself.³¹⁹ The Royalist gubernatorial system’s weakness only became apparent after Marston Moor, where the loss of the field army and the absence of effective coordination by the King’s regional proxy resulted in the system’s fragmentation.³²⁰ But despite this the garrisons of the besieged garrisons continued to attempt to support one another, occupying considerable numbers of Parliamentary and Covenanter troops—allowing the Royalists to continue fighting in Scotland and the South-West of England and Wales for another year.³²¹

Several important continuities defined the office, whether it was Royalist, Parliamentary or, as discussed in the previous chapter, Covenanter. First was the conflation of military and civil

³¹⁸ Civil War Assessments, Pewter etc., B I, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, WYL100/PO/2/15; John Morris, receipts for the garrison of Pontefract, Kew, National Archives, ASSI 47/20/11.

³¹⁹ Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty’s forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41; Royal warrant to the Governor of Skipton Castle to receive orders from the royal nephew, Prince Rupert, who has been appointed Captain General of the forces under the Royal Prince Charles; to send Prince Rupert a plan of the garrison, a list of officers, artillery, ammunition and arms, and intelligence such as is submitted to the Secretary of State, 16 December 1644, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/54; Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 94.

³²⁰ Hutton, ‘Digby, George, second earl of Bristol (c.1612–1677)’, *ODNB*; Anon, *The routing of the Lord Digby, and Sir Marmad. Langdale at Carlisle-Sands; by Sir John Brown...*; Commission, George, Lord Digby, Baron of Sherborne, Lieutenant General of the Forces, Northside of the Trent, to Sir John Mallory, to be Governor of the town and Castle of Skipton, 18 October 1645, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Morley Vyner MSS, T/32/43.

³²¹ The Royalist garrison of Skipton Castle launched raids to relieve the sieges of Helmsley Castle in November 1644 and Greenhalgh Castle in May 1645. See Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, pp. 70–72, 78–79; Richard Holmes (ed.), *The Sieges of Pontefract Castle* (Pontefract: Thomas William Tew, 1887).

authority. While their exact power and influence may have varied, all garrison governors asserted a right to the civil governorship implied by their title; this point will be developed further in the subsequent chapter of this dissertation.³²² This included the control of civic officers such as constables, but could also include the usurpation of the prerogatives of lordly power, albeit only with explicit royal authorisation.³²³ They also possessed a poorly defined judicial authority, not merely enforcing military discipline amongst their subordinates but also presiding over the purging of ‘malignants’ or ‘delinquents’ from local civic society.³²⁴ These functions were held in common by most governors, despite significant variations in how their office was legally constituted; Stradling, Mallory—both during his period both a Clifford and Royal governor—and Sir John Hotham all took, or attempted to take, similar measures to control their command areas despite their offices’ different legal bases.³²⁵

The lordly dimension of governorship is particularly important—as was acknowledged by contemporaries such as Papillon—as both offices fulfilled a similar function in providing autonomous military and administrative leadership to a defined locality.³²⁶ There were

³²² Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1; Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–1660...*, p. 130; Lord Byron’s *Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210; Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, pp. 119–120; MIC 2150/301–2.

³²³ Letter from Penrith, Lieutenant-Colonel Strachan, commander in chief of the Scottish forces in Westmoreland and Cumberland, to all officers and soldiers serving King and Parliament, and to all Postmasters and Constables, 17 July 1646, Cumbrian Archive Service, Kendal Archive, WDRY/5/192; Royal Warrant to Sir John Mallory, to collect rents and arrears due to the king from Henry, late Earl of Cumberland, and to use them for the maintenance of the garrison. Given under Royal signet, at Oxford, 30 March 1645, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/44.

³²⁴ Appleby, Sir Philip Musgrave to the Mayor of Kendal advising him to conduct a search for dissidents in the town, 21 November 1642, Cumbrian Archive Service, Kendal Archive, DMUS/5/5/4/18; Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty’s forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41.

³²⁵ Compare, Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty’s forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there..., The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41; Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty’s forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41.

³²⁶ Papillon, *A Practicall Abstract of the Arts, of Fortification and Assailing...*, p. 92.

important distinctions, governorships being generally non-hereditary and lacking lordships' social privileges, but the similarities in function were striking—even if garrison governors wielded significantly more power over their locality than contemporary lords. Furthermore, both offices benefited from a strong basis in local elites, whether they were gentry families or, as shall be explored in the subsequent chapter, civic oligarchies. Historical studies of lordship in early-modern Britain generally focus on contemporary honour codes, the changing role of a traditionally military aristocracy and manorial economic developments. While this dissertation does not endorse the 'Baronial Revolt' theory of the Civil Wars—for the reasons outlined in chapter three—it should be noted that traditional lordly patterns of war-making remained central to many Northerners' approach to the now-alien experience of civil conflict.³²⁷ Trevelyan's quotation about 'These veteran strongholds...were alike put into a state of defence' which opened this thesis could also be usefully applied to the office of governor, which employed traditional lordly systems of power to provide both local control and supplies for larger field armies.³²⁸ While Trevelyan argued that the garrisoning system was the 'death' of the Royalists, frittering away their strength in a series of regional strongholds instead of concentrating in larger field armies, it is difficult to see how the Royalists could have raised revenues, men, and victuals or prevented further insurrection within their area of control without the garrison system, or the governors who directed it.³²⁹

Finally, it should be noted that, in terms of 'history from below', garrison governors were the military officials who exerted the most influence of a majority of Northern England's population during the period of active conflict, particularly in Royalist-dominated regions. It was under gubernatorial direction that parish constables collected the contribution money that kept Royalist armies in the field.³³⁰ It was under gubernatorial direction that open opposition to the King's cause was suppressed, even if the no equivalent of the elaborate Parliamentary proscription of 'malignants' ever developed.³³¹ Following Marston Moor, and the departure of

³²⁷ Adamson, 'The baronial context of the English Civil War', pp. 93–120; Adamson, *The Noble Revolt. The overthrow of Charles I.*

³²⁸ Trevelyan, *England under the Stuarts*, 1st edn, p. 202.

³²⁹ Trevelyan, *England under the Stuarts*, 1st edn, pp. 202–203.

³³⁰ Letter from Penrith, Lieutenant-Colonel Strachan, commander in chief of the Scottish forces in Westmoreland and Cumberland, to all officers and soldiers serving King and Parliament, and to all Postmasters and Constables, 17 July 1646, Cumbrian Archive Service, Kendal Archive, WDRY/5/192.

³³¹ Appleby, Sir Philip Musgrave to the Mayor of Kendal advising him to conduct a search for dissidents in the town, 21 November 1642, Cumbrian Archive Service, Kendal Archive, DMUS/5/5/4/18; Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty's forces

Newcastle for exile, it was in effect the only Royalist office remaining in Northern England; a pattern repeated by the insurrectionary governorships of Pontefract and Scarborough in the Second Civil War.³³² This alone makes governorships a key subject of historical attention, particularly given the poverty of Royalist historiography in general.

raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41.

³³² Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, pp. 119–120: MIC 2150/301–2; John Morris, receipts for the garrison of Pontefract, Kew, National Archives, ASSI 47/20/11; Boothroyd, *The History of the Ancient Borough of Pontefract, containing an interesting account of its castle and the three different sieges it sustained, during the civil war, with notes and pedigrees of some of the most distinguished Royalists and Parliamentarians, chiefly [sic] drawn from Manuscripts never before published*, p. 260.

Chapter Six: Civic Corporations and Military Governments

6.1 Introduction, Historiography and Method

Control of major towns and cities was vital for both Royalists and Parliamentarians in Northern England, as in the rest of the country. They provided invaluable sources of money and supplies and could serve as the perfect base of operations for major field armies. This demanded their fortification, a process that was not limited to their encirclement with entrenchments, but also the establishment of a military government to secure their position over the city. In the previous chapter, the gubernatorial office was the primary subject of analysis. In this chapter, the interaction of military and civic government in the fortified cities of Northern England will be explored, concerning four case studies: York, Chester, Scarborough and Hull.¹

The historiography of Northern England's cities in the Civil Wars follows the same general pattern. A single historian, often a local, will assume a magisterial position based upon an absolute familiarity with the source material born of decades of work. In the case of Scarborough, this is Jack Binns, who has published regularly about the town for the past 30 years.² In his various works, Binns' tells a compelling narrative of Scarborough's progressive alienation and impoverishment as a consequence of repeated occupations, sieges and extractive military governments. John Morrill's work on Cheshire occupies a similar position, with an excellent analysis of the Civil War government of Chester, which this thesis does not seek to challenge, but to expand upon.³ The period of Royalist government of the city, in particular, is of interest and will be explored in greater detail in the third section of this chapter. Other localist studies of the wartime experiences of Liverpool, Bolton, York and Newcastle are also extant, with Malcolm Gratton's work on the garrison in Liverpool, in particular, being well-sourced, well-argued and extensive.⁴

¹ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1; Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2; Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*; Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3.

² Binns, *A Place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640–1660*; Jack Binns, *Sir Hugh Cholmley of Whitby 1600–1657: Ancestry, Life and Legacy* (Pickering: Blackthorn Press, 2008); Jack Binns, *Yorkshire in the 17th century* (Pickering: Blackthorn Press, 2007); Jack Binns, *Yorkshire in the Civil Wars: Origins, Impact and Outcome* (Pickering: Blackthorn Press, 2012).

³ Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–1660: County Government and Society during the English Revolution*.

⁴ Malcolm Gratton, 'Liverpool under parliament: the anatomy of a civil war garrison, May 1643 to June 1644', *Transactions of the Historical Society of Lancashire and Cheshire* 156 (2007) 51–74; David Casserly, *Massacre, The Storming of Bolton* (Stroud: Amberley Publishing, 2010); Howell, *Newcastle upon Tyne and the Puritan Revolution....*

However, there are some limitations in these studies, primarily in their parochial focus on one particular city. Regional or factional patterns of military government are absent, which is particularly problematic in the case of the Royalists. As the Royalist cause collapsed, its supporters took steps to ensure that potentially incriminating documentation would not fall into enemy hands. The most famous example of this was the destruction, *en masse*, of documents that immediately preceded the fall of Oxford in June 1646.⁵ Combined with the improvised nature of Royalist administration, compared to the control of the central organs of the English state the Parliamentarians possessed, this has left a dearth of primary sources concerning Royalist military government. Indeed in 1982, Ronald Hutton argued that this meant that a proper administrative history of Royalism would ‘never be written’.⁶

This chapter suggests that an alternative methodology, centred around the records of civic corporations, may provide a partial solution to this problem. The method adopted by this chapter is an indirect ‘history from below’, analysing military government through its interactions with civic corporations, whose carefully maintained records have usually survived. The combination of this source base with the method of analysing the state pioneered by Braddick in *State Formation in Early Modern England*, looking at how government was constituted at the local level, as opposed to charting the development of central state organs such as Parliament or the Privy Council, has produced a heterogeneous image of Royalist military government.⁷ Civic corporations exerted varying degrees of influence *vis-à-vis* their military occupiers, depending on the strength of the garrison, but were generally subjected to increasing levels of coercion, forced financial contributions and political interference.

This could be called ‘institutional trauma’, meaning ‘collective trauma effecting a particular institution’, in this case, civic corporations whose traditional privileges were overturned by military governors. The concept of trauma will be examined in more detail in the subsequent chapter but is worthy of introduction here when considering civic authorities’ reactions to the assertion of military supremacy. While rarely using the term ‘trauma’ contemporaries certainly articulated it. The term ‘misery’ was commonly used to describe the state of a kingdom in a civil war, in a particularly terrible state of collective bodies such as a county or

⁵ Hutton, *The Royalist War Effort 1642–1646*, p. 86.

⁶ Hutton, *The Royalist War Effort 1642–1646*, p. 86.

⁷ Braddick, *State Formation in Early Modern England c.1550–1700*, pp. 11–46.

town.⁸ Like personal trauma, ‘institutional trauma’ was performed to excite sympathy and to try and achieve fiscal relief. Petitions for corporations for relief owing to the impoverishment of their towns’ owing to the Civil Wars bear a great resemblance in general tone to soldiers’ petitions, indicating a common contemporary language of trauma at work in both cases.⁹ While far from a holistic hermeneutic, the concept is useful in understanding the progressive alienation of civic and military authority in Civil War Britain.

6.2 The City of York and the Royalist *Coup* of 1643

In Northern England, the most dramatic example of this phenomenon was the Royalist seizure of power with armed force in January 1643. This followed a dispute between the council and Newcastle about the election of that year’s new Lord Mayor. Sir Edmund Cowper, sometimes spelt ‘Cooper’, had been elected the year before, in January of 1642. He had a history in York’s civic life dating back to 1620, when, before his knighthood, he had served as one of the city’s sheriffs.¹⁰ The Lord Mayor of York served for a single year before another was selected in an election on 15 January.¹¹ According to the charter the new Lord Mayor should not have served in the office before, and therefore Cowper was ineligible for a second term. This was not to the pleasure of Newcastle, who eventually suspended the election by use of force. The following account of this episode comes from House Book 36 of the corporate records of the city of York.¹²

⁸ Vincent Philip, *The lamentations of Germany. Wherein, as in a glasse, we may behold her miserable condition, and reade the woefull effects of sinne. Composed by an eye-witnesse thereof: and illustrated by pictures, the more to affect the reader* (London: E. G., 1638). ‘The above-mentioned answer to the Parliament’s petition.—We expected such propositions from you as might speedily remove and prevent the misery and desolation of this kingdom’, see *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 18: 1641–1643, p. 410: SP 16/492 f.268: ‘The above-mentioned answer to the Parliament’s petition’.

⁹ Ismini Pells, ‘Soliciting sympathy: the search for psychological trauma in seventeenth-century English Civil War maimed soldiers’ petitions’, in eds. E. Peters and C. Richards, *Early Modern Trauma* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, forthcoming). Dr Pells provided an advance copy of this chapter for the author of this dissertation, who is duly grateful.

¹⁰ Francis Drake, *Eboracum: or the History and Antiquities of the City of York from its Original to the Present Times. Together with the History of the Cathedral Church, and the Lives of the Archbishops of that SEE, From the first Introduction of CHRISTIANITY into the Northern Parts of this ISLAND, to the present State and Condition of that MAGNIFICENT FABRICK. Collected from Authentick Manuscripts, Publick Records, Ancient Chronicles, and Modern Historians. And illustrated with COPPER PLATES. In Two BOOKS* (London: William Bowyer, 1736), p. 365.

¹¹ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 81.

¹² Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1.

By the late sixteen-thirties, York's civic government had recently undergone several major reforms, including a new royal charter, but remained dominated by a largely self-perpetuating mercantile oligarchy.¹³ The 1632 charter removed the power of the guilds to nominate the common council and gave that power to the Lord Mayor, the aldermen, and a select group of councillors called 'the twenty-four' or 'the privy council' – who handled most regular council business.¹⁴ The Lord Mayor, aldermen and the twenty-four filled their vacancies from the common council, meaning that despite the guilds' exclusion from the civic government the social makeup of the body remained largely unchanged.¹⁵ For example, 18 of 29 aldermen elected between 1603 and 1644 were merchants, as were 18 of 19 elected between 1645 and 1662 and 60 of 101 Lord Mayor between 1603 and 1701.¹⁶ Attendance was irregular, demonstrated by the regular letters sent to aldermen demanding attendance, and the civic affairs dominated by the Lord Mayor and the aldermen.¹⁷

The meeting of the corporation on 16 January 1643 was 'assembled all in the Councell Chamber' on Ouse bridge.¹⁸ The list of attendees was headed by the Lord Mayor and was followed by four aldermen and eleven others.¹⁹ They were then informed that Newcastle had sent the council a letter. This letter itself has not survived, however, the house book contained a transcription.²⁰ The decision to preserve a copy of this and subsequent letters in the corporate records suggests the great importance of the entire exchange between the corporation and Newcastle to the former.²¹ By placing these records in the minutes, the corporation ensured that its ultimate submission to Newcastle's authority was clearly understood, by posterity, as occurring under extreme pressure and not without considerable complaint. While the Royalist members would still lose their jobs after the fall of York, this demonstrates that the destruction of records, to

¹³ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 35, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 106, 107, E/60B.

¹⁴ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 35, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 178–179; Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 38, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. E/60A and B.

¹⁵ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 38, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. E/60A and B.

¹⁶ Tillott, *Victoria History of the County of York: The City of York*, pp. 173–186; lists based on York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, Minutes of full council (pre-1835) *passim*; Francis Drake, *Eboracum* (York: William Boyer, 1736), pp. 365–167; Robert Skaife, *Civic Officials of York and Parliamentary Representatives*, 3 vols., York Civic Archive, SKA MS.

¹⁷ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 32, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 340, 341, 377, 247, 35, 197, 221, 36, 49, 141, 157.

¹⁸ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 81.

¹⁹ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 81.

²⁰ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 81.

²¹ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 82.

hide involvement with the Royalists, was not the only means by which provincial records were manipulated by contemporaries to try and provide cover for controversial wartime actions.²²

The first letter was as follows:

Gentlemen

I have [crossed out, illegible] a request to yow and that in his Ma[jes]ties name
that yo^u will make choyce of this prsent Lord Maior to Continue
in that place for the yeare followinge wherein you haue such
a Testimonie of his Fidellitie & worth that yow Cannott
Conceive I desire to putt a pr[edj]udice uppon yow & besides
it is of so greate an importance to his Ma[jes]ties p^rsent
service that yow must not deny it as you tender his
service to w[i]ch I Am Confident yow all beare such a
regard as yo^w will desire his Ma[jes]ties thanks And
oblige me to remaine as I am att this p[es]ent instant

Pomferett this
10th of of Ianu[ary] 1642

Yor very affectionate Freind
Will[ia]m Newcastle²³

At first, Newcastle tried to work through the existing mechanisms of civic administration. The letter did not command but represented its demands as a ‘request’. Neither, at any point, did Newcastle use his title of Lord General. While granting Newcastle control over the King’s forces between the Trent and the Tweed, the administrative powers of the office were poorly defined. Newcastle had command over the Royalist governors, who often, as outlined in the previous chapter, possessed effective control over local administration. However, in this case, there was no clear chain of command. Newcastle appeared to have bypassed the city governor, Sir Thomas Glemham, and communicated directly with the common council. This was a common feature of Royalist military administration and may be a consequence of the personalised understanding of government that the Royalists, naturally enough, gravitated towards.²⁴

²² Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 106, 107–108; Clay (ed.), *Yorkshire Composition Papers or the Proceedings of the Committee for compounding with Delinquents during the Commonwealth*, 3 vols., in *Yorkshire Archeological Society Record Series Volume XV*, vol. I, pp. 195–200.

²³ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 81.

²⁴ For examples of the King ignoring the chain of command and sending orders directly to subordinates of Newcastle and Digby, see Royal warrant to the Governor of Skipton Castle to receive orders from the royal nephew, Prince Rupert, who has been appointed Captain General of the forces under the Royal Prince Charles; to send Prince Rupert a plan of the garrison, a list of officers, artillery, ammunition and arms, and intelligence such as is submitted to the Secretary of State, 16 December 1644, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/54; Royal Warrant to Sir John Mallory, to collect rents and arrears due to the king from Henry, late Earl of Cumberland,

At this point, however, the limitations of the method become apparent. The fact that this is the only letter the common council appears to have received on the matter does not mean that Newcastle did not, at the same time, send orders to Sir Thomas Glemham. Events occurring four days after this meeting would demonstrate the existence of a private line of communication between the governor and the Lord General. These letters, if they existed, did not survive the fall of York. Neither did any documents about this incident survive from the Royalist capital at Oxford. While ‘walking back’ through borough records does provide an insight into the methods, practices and priorities of Royalist military governments, it cannot provide the evidential base for a holistic account of Royalist administration.

Newcastle did not at this stage reveal that he was under orders from the King to secure Cowper’s reelection. Instead, he stressed that the reappointment was ‘of so greate an importance to his Ma[jes]ties pr[es]ent service’ and that he was sure that the council ‘desire his Ma[jes]ties thanks’.²⁵ In a subsequent letter from Newcastle to Cowper, read before the common council four days later, the Lord General made it very clear that he was relaying the King’s orders.²⁶ Instead of blandly informing the council of the King’s wishes, Newcastle attempted to get the council to comply of its own free will. Contemporary accounts demonstrate that Newcastle was habitually polite, and his efforts to avoid publicly undermining the council’s autonomy may simply be an example of his customary courtesy.²⁷ This also demonstrated the importance of

and to use them for the maintenance of the garrison. Given under Royal signet, at Oxford, 30 March 1645, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/44. See also, Hughes, ‘The King, the Parliament, and the Localities during the English Civil War’, pp. 251–260.

²⁵ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 81.

²⁶ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 81.

²⁷ Newcastle’s courtesy was more notable to both contemporaries and historians than his military skills. For example, after capturing Lady Anne Fairfax following the Battle of Adwalton Moor, Newcastle provided her with his own coach and a cavalry escort to rejoin Sir Thomas at Hull. See Jacqueline Eales, ‘Fairfax [née Vere], Anne, Lady Fairfax (1617/18–1665)’, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn, Sept 2004 [<https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-66848>], accessed 07/2020. See also Timothy Raylor, “‘Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue’: William Cavendish, Ben Jonson, and the Decorative Scheme of Bolsover Castle”, *Renaissance Quarterly* 52 (1999), 402–439, at 406–409; Young, *Marston Moor, 1644: the campaign and the battle*, pp. 100–110. Clarendon did not have a high opinion of Newcastle, describing him ‘as fit to be a general as to be a bishop’, although he also acknowledged him as a ‘very fine gentleman’, see R. Dunn McCray (ed.), *Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers preserved in the Bodlian Library*, 2 vols. (Burlington: Tanner Ritchie, 2010), vol. II, p. 63; Hugh Chisholm (ed.), ‘Newcastle, Dukes of s.v. William Cavendish’, *Encyclopædia Britannica 11 ed.*, 29 vols. (1911, Cambridge University Press), vol. XIX, 470–471.

building local consensus to Royalist concerns.²⁸ The cost of failing to build an adequate elite consensus for royal policy in the 1630s had been disobedience, discontent and, ultimately, rebellion.²⁹ For the past year and a half, Newcastle and his predecessor, the fifth Earl of Cumberland, had enjoyed a productive relationship with the corporation.³⁰ Disputes between civic and urban authority had taken place, but money had been raised and a base of operations for Newcastle's field army secured.³¹ If this relationship could be sustained, even strengthened under the continued tenure of a Lord Mayor with the royal trust, it would be of great benefit to Newcastle's martial operations.

Unfortunately for Newcastle, the council concluded that they could not abide by his request in 'the saftie of theire oaths and Charter'.³² While they would, of course, be perfectly happy to 'Acommodate my Lord Genall in this or anie other request' that was not contrary to the charter, altering the terms of the mayoral election was too far.³³ The history of York's charter in this period is complex, and some context is in order. A new charter had been implemented in 1632, annexing several towns to the Ainsty of the city, which had formerly been in the liberty of St Peter.³⁴ The Ainsty of York was the part of Yorkshire that was directly subject to the civic authorities, and which was not part of any of the three ridings. The expansion of the Ainsty was unpopular in the annexed townships, several of which claimed that they had been charged ship

²⁸ Although Ann Hughes suggested that royalists were generally more contemptuous of local opinion, see Hughes, 'The King, the Parliament, and the Localities during the English Civil War', pp. 240–244, 251–260.

²⁹ Brown, 'Aristocratic Finances and the Origins of the Scottish Revolution'; Mason, 'The aristocracy, episcopacy and the revolution of 1638'; Donald, *An Uncounselled King: Charles I and the Scottish Troubles, 1637–1641*, pp. 18–21; Cust, *Charles I and the Aristocracy, 1625–1642*, pp. 114–118; Asch, 'Wentworth, Thomas, first earl of Strafford (1593–1641)', *ODNB*; Ohlmeyer, 'The Aristocracy in Seventeenth-Century Ireland: Wider Contexts and Comparisons'.

³⁰ For the establishment of a city watch under Cumberland's direction see, Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 75–77; For supply of money and food to Newcastle's army see, Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 84, 86.

³¹ Other disputes between corporation and military government include; Corporation asks that soldiers should be forbidden to fell trees and insisted that the city only provide pay for its own trained bands see, Y/COU/1/1, Minutes of full council (pre-1835): 'House Book 36', ff. 78–79; Corporation quarrels with Royalist committee and refuses to provide more ammunition from the city magazine without payment or to support a new loan see, Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 84, 86; Corporation petitions the army against taxation or billeting of troops within the city see, Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 87.

³² Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 81.

³³ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 82.

³⁴ 'The seventeenth century: Civic government', in Tillott, *Victoria History of the County of York: The City of York*, pp. 173–186, accessed by *British History Online* [<http://www.british-history.ac.uk/vch/yorks/city-of-york/pp173-186>], accessed 11/2017.

money by both the county and corporation authorities.³⁵ In 1636 the charter was cancelled by the King-in-Council, to the corporation's distress, which enquired whether it could retain at least some of the annexed towns and villages.³⁶ The Lord Mayor and aldermen finally resolved to abandon the 1636 charter in 1640, but as late as 1645 it was reported that the charter's surrender had been 'engrossed but not executed.'³⁷ Of course, this convoluted history, and the nebulous state of the charter's legality in the early 1640s, was not acknowledged in the council's response to Lord Newcastle. Instead, the charter was presented in absolute terms, the subject of the council's inviolable oaths and the origin of their authority. The perilous state of the charter, and the attacks to which it had been subjected over the past decade, spurred on the council's defence of it.³⁸ Civic authority had, within recent memory, been challenged, abused, and ultimately suspended. Under these circumstances, any corporation would develop an even stronger impulse to defend the basis of their government, despite the danger posed to their

³⁵ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 9, 1635–1636, p. 12: SP 16/306 ff. 103–105: 'Petition of Inhabitants of Clifton, Roecliff, Osbaldwick, TENGhall, Gate-Fulford, Water-Fulford, Heslington, and Heworth, to the Council': 'Order of Thomas Viscount Wentworth, for rating the above-mentioned towns with the North Riding, notwithstanding they be annexed to the city of York for ...', p. 198: SP 16/312 f.155: 'Petition of the Lord Mayor and Commonalty of York to the Council', p. 213: SP 16/313 f.79: 'Lord Chief Justice Bramston and Attorney-General Bankes to the Council', p. 261: SP 16/314 f.243: 'Petition of the Inhabitants of Clifton, Roecliffe, Osbaldwick, TENGhall, Gate Fulford, Water Fulford, Heslington, and Heworth to the Council', pp. 294–295: SP 16/316 f.19: 'Petition of Richard Colville and others, owners of the manors of Gedney, co. Lincoln, on behalf of themselves and 300 copyholders. of inheritance of the said manors, to the Council'.

³⁶ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 9, 1635–1636, p. 539: SP 16/325 f.179: 'Order of the King in Council, upon consideration of a petition of the dean and chapter of the metropolitical and cathedral church of St. Peter in the city of York, complaining that by a charter ...'; *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 16, 1640, pp. 503–504: SP 16/460 f.166: 'Collection of precedents extending from 1637 to 1640', p. 557: SP 16/403 f.114: 'Petition of the Mayor and Commonalty of the city of York to the King'; Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 35, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 313, 314, 316, 327, 337.

³⁷ *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles*, vol. 9, 1635–1636, p. 539: SP 16/325 f.179; *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles*, vol. 16, 1640, pp. 503–504: SP 16/460 f.166, p. 557: SP 16/403 f.114; Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 35, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 313, 314, 316, 327, 337; Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 26, 41, 159; *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 15, 1639–40, pp. 467–468: SP 16/403 f.87: 'Petition of the Dean and Chapter of the cathedral church of St. Peter at York to the King', p. 475: SP 16/403 f.92: 'Petition of the Mayor and Commonalty of the city of York to the King', 'His Majesty is pleased to confirm to petitioners their ancient charters, lands, and privileges'; *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 16, 1640, pp. 556–557: SP 16/403 f.87: 'Petition of the Dean and Chapter of the cathedral church of St. Peter at York to the King'; *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 17, 1640–1641, pp. 372–373: SP 16/475 ff.188–192.

³⁸ *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 9, 1635–1636, p. 12: SP 16/306 ff. 103–105, p. 198: SP 16/312 f.155, p. 213: SP 16/313 f.79, p. 261: SP 16/314 f.243, pp. 294–295: SP 16/316 f.19.

³⁸ *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles*, vol. 9, 1635–1636, p. 539: SP 16/325 f.179; *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles*, vol. 16, 1640, pp. 503–504: SP 16/460 f.166, p. 557: SP 16/403 f.114; Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 35, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 313, 314, 316, 327, 337.

relationship with the Royalist military authorities.

Newcastle stressed the royal origins of the city's self-government and reminded the council that it was 'in his Ma[jes]ties name that *you* will make choyce' of the new Lord Mayor.³⁹ Despite the electoral selection of the Lord Mayor, he was still a servant of the King and a royal appointee; responsibility for that appointment being delegated to the common council by the royal charter.⁴⁰ This position was, of course, wholly fitting with the Royalist conception of government. While by no means a homogenous party, Royalists all professed obedience to the King as the apex of legal authority, in whose name the business of government was carried out.⁴¹ This conception of power was not, for many Royalists, contrary to rule through law. Indeed, the law was held to be the proper mechanism through which royal power was enacted.⁴² Aside from Sir Robert Filmer, who in his *Patriarcha* argued that kings were unbound by law completely, this was the position of most antebellum theorists of monarchical government.⁴³ Sir Francis Kynaston, writing in 1629, stressed that 'the King alone makes Lawes' and that legal authority 'soley proceeds from the King... & is rather fortified than created by the Subjects consent'.⁴⁴ This argument was aimed at the assertion, later made more forcefully by Parliamentary theorists and intelligencers, that it was Parliament that made the laws. Instead, Kynaston asserted that even if the monarch made the laws in his persona of 'King-in-Parliament' that those laws still only had force by royal consent. Nor, for many Royalists, did this claim to royal legal supremacy imply unlimited royal competency in the law. Judge David Jenkins, in his *The Cordiall of Judge Jenkins* of 1647, held the following:

We hold only what the Law holds, the Kings Perogative and the Subjects liberty are determined, and bounded, and admeasured by the written Law what they are; wee doe not hold the King to have any more power, neither doth this Majestie claime any other power but what the Law gives him...⁴⁵

³⁹ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 81.

⁴⁰ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 35, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 106, 107, E/60B; Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 38, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. E/60A and B.

⁴¹ For a good summary of the heterogeneity of the Royalist party, see Smith, *Constitutional Royalism...*, pp. 3–15. For the acceptance of the King as the apex of legal authority, even among moderate or 'constitutional' Royalists, see Smith, *Constitutional Royalism...*, pp. 219–255.

⁴² Burgess, *Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution*, pp. 29–35.

⁴³ Burgess, *Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution*, p. 37.

⁴⁴ Francis Kynaston, *A True Representation of Forepast Parliaments*, British Library, Lansdowne MS 213, fols. 153–154.

⁴⁵ Burgess, *Absolute monarchy and the Stuart Constitution*, p. 23, originally quoted in David Jenkins, *The Cordiall of Judge Jenkins, For the Good People of London* (London: s.n., 1647), p. 20.

The King was bound by law but not subject to it. Both King and law were irresistible, and obedience to both was demanded from all of the King's subjects.⁴⁶ While a king would be judged by God for failing to abide by the laws, it was never permissible for his subjects to resist him. This was not universally accepted, given that there was an ongoing civil war on the subject. However, Burgess argues that this formula on the practical expression of kingship would have been known and understood by most Englishmen in the 1640s.⁴⁷ The decades following the Union of the Crowns saw a debate on the legitimacy of resistance.⁴⁸ Andrew Willet, in his 1607 *Harmonie upon the First Booke of Samuel*, stated that 'Tyrants and wicked governours may be removed by the whole state'. He further argued that:

Unlesse the Prince by oath be tied to certain conditions, and so his authoritie be not absolute but conditionall, so long as he observe and keep the auncient rites and priviledges of the country: which seemeth to be the question at this day, betweene the Archduke and the States of the united Provinces.⁴⁹

However, Burgess argued that even qualified resistance theories such as that of Willet were uncommon in antebellum England. More developed theories of resistance only become frequent during the Civil Wars themselves, when they became an important part of

⁴⁶ Burgess, *Absolute monarchy and the Stuart Constitution*, pp. 18–28.

⁴⁷ Burgess, *Absolute monarchy and the Stuart Constitution*, pp. 91–123.

⁴⁸ 'Resistance theory', principally derived from the work of Calvinist theologians, has been a significant subject in both contemporary and modern scholarship. For contemporary sources, see John Ponet, *A shorte treatise of politike pouuer and of the true obedience which subiectes owe to kynges and other ciuile governours, with an exhortacion to all true naturall Englishe men, compyled by. D. I.P. B. R. VV* (Strasbourg: Printed by the heirs of W. Köpfel, 1556). See also 'The conclusion of these two parts with a farther declaration of the same, that it is both Lawful and necessarie some tymes to disobeye and also to resiste Vngodly magistrats and wherin', in Christopher Goodman, *How superior powers ought to be obeyd of their subiects and wherin they may lawfully by Gods Worde be disobeyed and resisted. Wherin also is declared the cause of all this present miserie in England, and the onely way to remedy the same* (Geneva: Iohn Crispin, 1558), p. 85. See also John Knox, *The first blast of the trumpet against the monstrous regiment of women* (Geneva: J. Poullain and A. Rebul, 1558); George Buchanan, *De iure regni apud Scotos* (Edinburgh: Ioannis Rossei, 1581). While Buchanan dedicated his work to the young James VI, he also defined both 'kings' and 'tyrants' and argued that traditional exhortations to obey legal authority only applied to the latter. For a non-exhaustive list of significant modern scholarship, see Robert Kingdon, 'Calvinism and resistance theory, 1550–1580', in *The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450–1700*, eds. J. Burns and Mark Goldie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 193–218; Jonathan Scott, 'The Law of War, Grotious, Sidney, Locke and the Political Theory of Rebellion', *History of Political Thought* 13 (1992), 565–585; David Van Drunen, 'The Use of Natural Law in Early Calvinist Resistance Theory', *Journal of Law and Religion* 21 (2005/2006), 143–167.

⁴⁹ Burgess, *Absolute monarchy and the Stuart Constitution*, originally quoted in Andrew Willet, *An Harmonie upon the First Booke of Samuel* (Cambridge: s.n., 1607), pp. 294–295.

Parliamentarian rhetoric; particularly towards the later 1640s.⁵⁰ At the beginning of the decade, the irresistibility of the King was both common and widely accepted. This will become significant later in this chapter, as Newcastle revealed that he was acting under royal orders and that his instructions were consequently irresistible.

By stressing that the charter was the channel of the King's authority, and not independent from it, Newcastle was not claiming personal extralegal authority over the corporation. Indeed, at no point in his exchange with the council did Newcastle refer to his authority, but always cited the pleasure of the King. Where the kingly power lay was naturally highly confused across the country, with both Parliamentarians and Royalists alike claiming to hold the King's authority lawfully; while their opponents were naturally unlawful usurpers. However, Yorkshire was uniquely confused in this respect, since the office of Lord-Lieutenant of the county had been empty since 1642.⁵¹ During his period as the predominant Royalist of Yorkshire, the Earl of Cumberland did issue declarations using the title 'Lord Lieutenant Generall of His Maiesties Forces in Yorke-Shire'.⁵² But the origins of this style are unclear, and even the separation of 'Lord Lieutenant' from 'General of His Maiesties Forces' is far from certain. Certainly after the arrival of Newcastle in Yorkshire in the winter of 1642, and his appointment as Lord-General, the lieutenancy had ceased to have even a nominal existence. Newcastle did, however, possess a commission from the King that some, such as Stanley Carpenter have defined as viceregal.⁵³ He cites Newcastle's ability to create knights as evidence that the office of Lord-General had, in addition to its commanding military function, the role of representing the monarch in Northern England.⁵⁴ It should, however, be clarified that the author has not found any further evidence of this statement, which Carpenter does not provide any references for, and so the suggestion that Newcastle possessed such power remains suppositional.

⁵⁰ For further reading on the development of political language during the British Civil Wars, see Glenn Burgess, 'The Impact on Political Thought: rhetorics for Troubled Times', in *The Impact of the English Civil War*, ed. John Morrill (London: Collins & Brown, 1991), 73–78.

⁵¹ See pp. 205–206 of this dissertation for the history of Lord-Lieutenancy of Yorkshire during the civil wars.

⁵² Henry Clifford, *The declaration of the right honourable Henry, Earle of Cumberland, Lord Lievtenant Generall of His Maiesties forces in Yorke-Shire: and of the nobility, gentry, and others His Majesties subjects now assembled at Yorke for His Majesties service and the defence of this city and county* (York: Stephen Buckley, 1642), p. 1.

⁵³ Stanley Carpenter, *Military Leadership in the British Civil Wars, 1642–1651, The Genius of the Age*, p. 63.

⁵⁴ Stanley Carpenter, *Military Leadership in the British Civil Wars, 1642–1651, The Genius of the Age*, p. 63.

Whatever the exact nature of Newcastle's legal competence, he made it clear that he considered it proper for him to act as a channel for royal orders. It was his responsibility to convey the King's desires, even if he did not yet call them orders outright, and the duty of the council to obey. In *Absolute monarchy and the Stuart Constitution* Burgess stresses the importance of the King's discretionary power in bridging gaps where the common law did not provide guidance.⁵⁵ Where there was confusion about the exact competence of the law, it was the responsibility of the King to provide direction. Given the nebulous legality of the corporation's charter such a move by the King may have been unusual, but certainly understandable in the interests of establishing a well-affected civic government.⁵⁶ Newcastle's legal position may have been vague, but so was the authority he was attempting to overawe. The common council's reply was delivered to Newcastle by an august deputation consisting of four city officials, including two aldermen.⁵⁷ These two aldermen, Henry Thompson and William Scott, both were attendees at the common council meeting of 16 January 1643.⁵⁸

While the council was decided upon defying Newcastle's requests, they attempted to avoid a breach with the Royalists. Their response to Newcastle stressed their desire to accommodate the Lord General, who was addressed respectfully as 'your excellency'.⁵⁹ Anxious to justify their refusal, the council took care to explain their election's laws. This served to demonstrate the impossibility, as they perceived it, of legally complying with Newcastle's instructions. Cowper had been Lord Mayor before, in 1630, but given that the Mayor had to 'have not beene twice Maior nor Maior by the space of five yeares last past' he was ineligible.⁶⁰ The council took care to stress that their oaths to uphold the charter the primary reason they could not satisfy Newcastle's desires.⁶¹ While the 'charter' was mentioned twice, and the 'freedoomes' of the

⁵⁵ Burgess, *Absolute monarchy and the Stuart Constitution*, p. 209.

⁵⁶ *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles*, vol. 9, 1635–1636, p. 539: SP 16/325 f.179; *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles*, vol. 16, 1640, pp. 503–504: SP 16/460 f.166, p. 557: SP 16/403 f.114; Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 35, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 313, 314, 316, 327, 337; Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 26, 41, 159; *Cal. S.P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 15, 1639–40, p. 475: SP 16/403 f.92: 'Petition of the Mayor and Commonalty of the city of York to the King', 'His Majesty is pleased to confirm to petitioners their ancient charters, lands, and privileges', pp. 467–468: SP 16/403 f.87; *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles*, vol. 16, 1640, pp. 503–504: SP 16/460 f.166, p. 557; *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 17, 1640–1641, pp. 372–373: SP 16/475 ff.188–192.

⁵⁷ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 81.

⁵⁸ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 81.

⁵⁹ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 81.

⁶⁰ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 81.

⁶¹ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 81.

city once, the ‘oathes’ sworn by the councilmen were mentioned three times in rapid succession.⁶² The common council regarded the sanctity of their oaths as the argument most likely to persuade Newcastle without outright rejecting his authority.

The next meeting of the common council took place four days later, on 20 January 1643. Aldermen Scott and Thompson were both recorded as attendees, confirming that the civic deputation to Newcastle had returned from Pontefract.⁶³ This assembly was considerably larger than its predecessor. In attendance was Cowper, the recorder, seven aldermen, and thirteen others. The only order of business was the election, and the meeting began with Scott and Thompson reporting on their audience with Newcastle. This took place ‘on Fryday last at night...att Pomfreite’.⁶⁴ 20 January 1643 was a Tuesday, and this meant that this audience had to have taken place on 16 January. Pontefract was over twenty miles from York, further still if the deputation went via the Great North Road. While this was a distance that could be accomplished in a day, it was not insubstantial. Scott and Thompson must have gone straight from the meeting of the common council to Pontefract to be received by Newcastle late that evening. The speed with which the deputation reached Pontefract, and the increased attendance at the meeting of the twentieth, demonstrates that the council was extremely concerned.⁶⁵ Civic independence was under threat, as were the tattered remnants of the corporation’s charter.

Bringing the letter personally to Newcastle, ‘vpon delivryie whereof he asked them if they would choose the same Lord Maior againe’ without first reading the common council’s message.⁶⁶ The pair responded that ‘they Could not by therie Charter’.⁶⁷ The two aldermen stressed that they ‘could not’, not ‘would not’. They were careful not to shape their refusal of Newcastle as defiance of his authority; but only that the request was incompatible with the very laws that gave them their authority to elect the Lord Mayor in the first place.⁶⁸ Newcastle informed the aldermen that the requirements of his army meant that he could not return to York, but told them that:

⁶² Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 81.

⁶³ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 81.

⁶⁴ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 81.

⁶⁵ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 81.

⁶⁶ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 81.

⁶⁷ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 81.

⁶⁸ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 35, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff., 106, 107, E/60B.

afterwards readinge the let[te]r and Coppies of the Oathes thereuntosed and againe addressinge him selfe vnto them he saide it was a buisnes of Consequence and he would Consider of itt and they should have an Answer thereof.⁶⁹

Following this, the pair took their leave for the night. Newcastle gave them his reply the following day, at noon. He had around twelve hours to decide on his reply. The selection of the Lord Mayor was a matter of great importance for Newcastle, as well the council. He was, as he would reveal during his reply, under royal instruction to ensure the election of Cowper.⁷⁰ This account of the interview suggested that Newcastle did not only read the council's letter that evening but also 'Coppies of the Oathes thereuntosed'.⁷¹ But, despite the York delegation taking care to present Newcastle with the legal backing for their refusal, his reply was curt:

Gentlemen I have Rec[ei]v[e]d yor let[e]r and have so plainly delived his Ma[jes]ties pleasure and my intention to my Lord Maior to whose ewlation I refeir yow that I shall not neede to trouble you with a repitition of itt and so froth
Yor very affectionate Frend Will[ia]m Newcastle⁷²

While Newcastle maintained the forms of politeness, this letter was strikingly different from its predecessor. The confidence that Newcastle claimed he had in the council's desire for the King's favour was gone, replaced by terse, cool courtesy. Aside from confirming that Newcastle had received the letter the council sent on 16 January 1643, he barely said anything at all. There are only two points of significance in the letter. The first was that it is 'his Ma[jes]ties pleasure' that Cowper continued in his office.⁷³ Newcastle did not quite go as far as to use the formulaic 'will and pleasure', or to state that he had a royal warrant. But the choice of the phrase suggested that he had received royal orders to ensure Cowper's reelection. It is at this point that the question of timing becomes important. This letter was received by the common council only four days after they had sent their reply to Newcastle at Pontefract.⁷⁴ It is incredible that any letter could go from Newcastle at Pontefract to the King in the south, and back again, within this short space of time. Therefore, Newcastle must have received the order to secure the Mayor's reelection before any of this exchange with the corporation began. The absence of any such order in Newcastle's first letter to the council makes it clear that he chose

⁶⁹ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 81.

⁷⁰ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 81.

⁷¹ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 81.

⁷² Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 81.

⁷³ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 81.

⁷⁴ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 81–82.

to conceal it, in the hope of a mostly voluntary submission. A man sensitive to the dignity of others, as well as himself, it was wholly in character for Newcastle to provide an opportunity for the council to save face.⁷⁵

The second important point to be taken from this letter is that Newcastle had ‘delivered...my intention to my Lord Mayor’.⁷⁶ This confirmed that the record contained within the house book did not represent the totality of the correspondence that took place between Newcastle and York. In the same period, he was communicating privately with Cowper. The existence of this correspondence helps to explain the peculiar timing of this entire affair, for the election of the Lord Mayor had already been delayed. According to the charter, it should have taken place on 15 January.⁷⁷ But it was only the day after, the sixteenth, that the common council had assembled to receive Newcastle’s ‘request’.⁷⁸ The delay remained unexplained in the House Books, meaning that it must have been arranged outside the normal channels of the council, possibly by the Lord Mayor himself under prior instruction from Newcastle. These letters have not survived and so while the existence of this communication is definite, its contents must remain largely suppositional. The exception to this was a letter from Newcastle that Sir Edmund Cowper showed the council after the Lord General’s terse reply to their refusal had been read out.

Newcastle began by informing Cowper that it was ‘his Ma[jes]ties pleasure’ that he continued in the office of Lord Mayor.⁷⁹ Newcastle was now stating that the King was expressly ordering that Cowper retain his office. Indeed, Newcastle specified that Cowper must keep his ‘place & Command’.⁸⁰ Charles I’s primary concern, and therefore that of Newcastle, was to keep the civic government functioning under a known and trusted Royalist Lord Mayor. The irresistibility of royal commands was demonstrated by Newcastle’s reminder that ‘since it is his Ma[jes]ties pleasure itt will become all to submitt to itt’.⁸¹ Newcastle’s solution to the

⁷⁵ Eales, ‘Fairfax [née Vere], Anne, Lady Fairfax (1617/18–1665)’, *ODNB*; Raylor, “‘Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue’: William Cavendish, Ben Jonson, and the Decorative Scheme of Bolsover Castle”, pp. 406–409; Young, *Marston Moor, 1644: the campaign and the battle*, pp. 100–110; McCray (ed.), *Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers preserved in the Bodlian Library*, vol. II, p. 63; Chisholm (ed.), ‘Newcastle, Dukes of s.v. William Cavendish’, *Encyclopædia Britannica 11th ed.*, vol. XIX, 470–471.

⁷⁶ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 82.

⁷⁷ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 81.

⁷⁸ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 81–82.

⁷⁹ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 82.

⁸⁰ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 82.

⁸¹ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 82.

problem of satisfying both the King and the charter was, ‘By the afforsaide of that charter I shall desire yow that yow forbear to p[ro]ceed to anie Election at all but Continue still in yor place’, extending Cowper’s term without him technically being reelected.⁸²

How this was to be implemented Newcastle left up to ‘yor best discretion’.⁸³ This open-ended phrasing was used by Newcastle on other occasions, such as when he ordered Sir John Mallory to punish all ‘rebells & Traytors’ and to ‘disarme, disinable & imprison all that shallbee found disaffected to his Maiesties Person and Government according to your good discretion’.⁸⁴ The limitations of communications over Newcastle’s vast command necessitated giving wide autonomy to his subordinates and suggested that Cowper had some influence over how he implemented his instructions. Indeed, Newcastle specified that ‘that yo^w Signifie his Ma[jes]t^{ies} pleasure herein to the Aldermen & Common Counsell’.⁸⁵ However, the arrival of the governor, with his own orders from Newcastle, demonstrates that the latter was, if not micromanaging, at least ultimately controlling the events from a distance:

after the readinge of which letters S[i]r Thomas Glemham Gov[er]nor of this Cittie and Capt[ain] Throgmorton came into this Counsele & beinge acquainted with the former letters S[i]r Thomas Glemham told them that he had Command from his Excellencie that there should be noe Election and that if they offered to p[ro]reede to Election he must hinder itt.⁸⁶

It is unclear from the surviving evidence whether Glemham was brought into Newcastle’s plans to suspend the election directly, or whether he was asked to assist by Cowper. Glemham was ‘acquainted’ with Newcastle’s letters to the council and the Lord Mayor, but the record did not make clear whether he was acquainted with their contents at the meeting, or beforehand. The governor’s statement that he ‘had Command from his Excellencie’ suggested that Newcastle had sent been directly communicating with Glemham, but the exact course of events is beyond the scope of historical reconstruction.⁸⁷ As governor of York, Glemham was commander of all

⁸² Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 82.

⁸³ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 82.

⁸⁴ Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty’s forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection, 15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41.

⁸⁵ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 82.

⁸⁶ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 82.

⁸⁷ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 81.

the Royalist forces within the city while Newcastle was absent.⁸⁸ His soldiers would be vital to the *coup* Newcastle had directed Cowper to undertake. Whether he arrived with men or summoned them when the council delayed in agreeing to abandon the election is not clear. But whenever the soldiers arrived, the results were certainly impressive:

there were souldiers at the Common Hall both horse and foote and it was further [illegible] to this Courte by Ellen Garbutt wife of James Garbutt keeper of the Common Hall the place of Election that she beinge there to lay Cushions S[i]R Thomas Glemham came hither with the other Captaine who att his Comeinge tooke the keys from her and put souldiers into the Hall aboute two Hundred Armed men w[i]th musketts and pykes.⁸⁹

Glemham's men's presence reminded the council that, in a civil war, effective power lay with those in arms. These soldiers could have been from regiments listed by the gentle and noblemen of the north under their commissions of array or colonelcies, or they could have been raised by the city for self-defence out of the council's own pockets.⁹⁰ Whatever their regiment, they were obeying Glemham, giving him a monopoly on force within the city.⁹¹ Furthermore, his confiscation of the Common Hall's keys meant Glemham controlled the access to the council's seat and now determined whether the council could sit at all. But even in the face of military coercion, there was a final effort by the corporation to preserve the normal mayoral succession:

And the said Alder Thompson att his beinge with my Lord Genall afforesaide then offered to his Excellencie that Alder Hertforth who was then to be chosen was a mann very well affected to his Ma[jes]tie ~~and th~~ and Faithfull to the Citiie for which S[i]R Marmaduke Langdalle and Mr Francis Tyndall of Brotherton beinge pr[e]sent offered to ingage to [illegible] wherein his Excellencie was satisfied but told them it was his Ma[jes]ties pleasure that this pr[e]sent Lord Maio^r should stand for the yeare followinge and therefore it must be soe.⁹²

While Newcastle responded positively to Thompson's offer, his insistence that it was the King's pleasure that Cowper retained his office ended any effort at compromise and resulted in the election's cancellation. Eventually, the only election that took place was the selection of

⁸⁸ Andrew Hopper, 'Glemham, Sir Thomas (1595–1649)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn, Sept 2004 [<https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-10813>], accessed 02/2020

⁸⁹ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 82.

⁹⁰ For York City Watch see, Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, pp. 75–77.

⁹¹ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 82.

⁹² Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 82.

chamberlains for the next year.⁹³ The chamberlains were the civic officials with responsibility for the collection and distribution of the city revenues.⁹⁴ York had a varying number of chamberlains throughout the late medieval and early modern period, with the normal number being four to six such officials.⁹⁵ However, on this occasion, no less than eight were selected by the common council.⁹⁶ Given the increased burdens on the city owing to the presence of Royalist troops and the disruption to trade and revenues caused by the conflict, it was natural that the corporation wished to ensure that it was capable of meeting its financial commitments.⁹⁷

It is important not to overstress the revolutionary implications of the Royalist *coup* on York. Most of the city oligarchy appeared to have remained intact, and open to continued collaboration with the Royalist authorities, albeit with less enthusiasm than previously. A comparison between the aldermen present at the 20 January 1643 the next election meeting, on 20 January 1644, is almost identical, with only a single name changing between the two dates.⁹⁸ A further sign of the resumption of the normal procedure is the location that the common council was meeting in. The council is described as ‘Assembled in the Councell Chamber vpon Ouse bridg[e]’.⁹⁹ They had returned to their normal place of assembly, and there is no suggestion that troops were still present at this meeting. Neither was there any change in how the city was run. The Lord Mayor was present at the meeting, as was the city recorder. The meeting would end with the election of a new set of chamberlains for the next year. Aside from the suspension of the council for a year, and the continued presence of Cowper in his office, the civic government appears to have remained largely intact.

This is significant, as it tells the historian a great deal about how Royalist conceptions of

⁹³ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 82.

⁹⁴ Tillott, *Victoria History of the County of York: The City of York*, p. 183.

⁹⁵ Tillott, *Victoria History of the County of York: The City of York*, p. 181.

⁹⁶ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 82.

⁹⁷ The York Corporation records contain several examples of financial contributions to the Royalist army; For civic payments for the watch and the repair of the walls and city arms see, Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 95–96; For another assessment on the corporation in May 1644 see, Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 88–90; For the corporation agreeing to borrow money or sell city plate to pay for provisions for 200 soldiers in York Castle see, Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 95–96; For Sir Henry Slingsby, Royalist army officer, stating that York was ‘being wearied with payments’ see, Henry Slingsby, *Original Memoirs written during the Great Civil War; being the life of Sir Henry Slingsby and the memoirs of Captain Hodgson* (Edinburgh: James Ballantyne, 1806), pp. 106–107.

⁹⁸ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 82–94.

⁹⁹ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 94.

government impacted administration at the most local levels. While the Royalist administration was *improvised*, it was not *innovative*. Aside from outlandish thinkers such as Hobbes, whose views were developed consequentially to the Civil Wars, the Royalists were conservative. The Royalist party had developed over the two years before the outbreak of civil war in England from a heterogeneous selection of the population. By no means all had been supporters of all of the royal policies of the 1630s; but the King's critics in Parliament were identified as a dangerous clique who were attacking the basis of the ancient constitution they claimed to defend.¹⁰⁰ Combined with the example of the failure of royal policies in the 1630s due to a lack of elite consensus, this worldview provided powerful mitigation against radical changes in administration.¹⁰¹ Given that preventing radical changes to the governance of the Church and state was one of the Royalists' key *raisons d'être* it could hardly be otherwise.

The primary business for which the meeting of 20 January 1644 had been summoned was, naturally, the matter of the lord mayor. A letter from the 'Marques of Newcastle' was read before the council, with its demand that 'Therefor knowing the the pr[e]sent Lord Maior to be a man of experience and Integriti as well to the City as to his Ma[jes]ties service. I have thought reight by his ma[jes]t[ie]s express commands to will and desire you to constitue and elect him Lord Maior for the yeare to come'.¹⁰² While Newcastle maintained his typical courtesy this time he did not pretend that he was not relaying royal orders. Indeed, he used his strongest language yet, informing the council of 'his ma^{ts} express commands to will and desire you'.¹⁰³ He reiterated the Royalist position that royal power was irresistible and that there was no option but to 'yeald obedience to his ma[jes]t[ie]s'.¹⁰⁴ Interestingly, the council no longer referred to Newcastle by his office of Lord-General, as previously, but called him by his new noble style of marquess.¹⁰⁵ Unlike the year before, this second intervention by Newcastle did not result in an exchange of letters lasting several days. Instead, the council was, after hearing Newcastle's orders, informed of the following exchange between the city recorder and Lord Newcastle a week before the meeting:

¹⁰⁰ Smith, *Constitutional Royalism*..., pp. 62–106.

¹⁰¹ Brown, 'Aristocratic Finances and the Origins of the Scottish Revolution'; Mason, 'The aristocracy, episcopacy and the revolution of 1638'; Donald, *An Uncounselled King: Charles I and the Scottish Troubles, 1637–1641*, pp. 18–21; Cust, *Charles I and the Aristocracy, 1625–1642*, pp. 114–118; Asch, 'Wentworth, Thomas, first earl of Strafford (1593–1641)', ODNB; Ohlmeyer, 'The Aristocracy in Seventeenth-Century Ireland: Wider Contexts and Comparisons'.

¹⁰² Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 94.

¹⁰³ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 94.

¹⁰⁴ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 94.

¹⁰⁵ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 81, 94.

And m Recorder further maid knowne unto them that he being with my Lord Maior and Alder at his Excellency on wednesday last his Excellency told them that he must be a suter to them that they would elect my Lord Maior to be Maior againe this yeare Following where unto m[r] Recorder Answered y[a]t as they had certified his Excellency the last yeare they could nether by there Charter nor oath make choice of him againe to whome his Excellency replied that then they must suffer him to continue as they did before where upon th[ose] *pr[e]*sents and the Common Councell thought it was in vain for them to goe to the Comon hall to make an new election.¹⁰⁶

Given that the majority of the aldermen at this meeting had been present a year before when Glemham ordered his soldiers into the council chamber, it is unsurprising that, this time, the council submitted to Newcastle's instructions quickly. They did not submit without protest, reminding Newcastle that they could not choose Cowper again by 'Charter nor oath'. The words used to describe this second submission were much harsher than that of the previous year. The council has to 'suffer him [Cowper] to continue'.¹⁰⁷ The council 'thought it was in vain...to make an new election'.¹⁰⁸ The entire language of the record shifted into stressing the impositions made upon the corporation by the Royalist authorities. While the aldermen were willing to work with the still-dominant Royalists, clearly the *coup* had seriously damaged relations between the Royalist military government and the common council.

A final interesting point about this account of the second prorogued election was the prominence of the recorder in the common council's discussions. A recorder was the city's principal legal officer, appointed by the mayor and aldermen, responsible for the keeping of the records of the civic courts. This recorder was new, having changed in the year 1643–1644. The office was now filled by Sir Thomas Widdrington, a Member of Parliament for Berwick and Sir Thomas Fairfax's brother-in-law.¹⁰⁹ He had a prior history with the corporation, standing for election as a nominee of Strafford in the autumn of 1640.¹¹⁰ He failed in this endeavour, ultimately becoming an extremely active member of the Long Parliament.¹¹¹ He was not prominent in debates, but owing to his legal background as a bencher and ancient at Gray's Inn,

¹⁰⁶ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 94.

¹⁰⁷ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 94.

¹⁰⁸ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 94.

¹⁰⁹ David Scott, 'Widdrington, Sir Thomas (c.1600–1664)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn, Jan 2008 [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/29358>]. accessed 11/2017.

¹¹⁰ Scott, 'Widdrington, Sir Thomas (c.1600–1664)', *ODNB*.

¹¹¹ Scott, 'Widdrington, Sir Thomas (c.1600–1664)', *ODNB*.

he was often selected to draft bills and ordinances.¹¹² Ironically one of the first items of parliamentary business he helped to prepare was the bill of attainder against his former patron, Strafford.¹¹³ Widdrington was present at York when Charles I arrived in March of 1642 and urged the King to ‘condescend unto...parliament’.¹¹⁴ He was granted a leave of absence from the house on 22 July 1642 and did not return to London for two years, spending the time at York.¹¹⁵

Widdrington, who had previously been such a critic of the King, and who was linked by marriage to the most prominent of Yorkshire Parliamentarian families, now possessed the highest legal office of the city. He would only give up the office in 1661, having maintained it throughout the Interregnum.¹¹⁶ While Widdrington was far from being among the most radical Parliamentarians, his presence in a senior office in what had been a strongly Royalist city shows the level of discontent with which the Royalist government was now held by the aldermen of the city. While Newcastle had fulfilled his orders from the King, the price for keeping Cowper in the mansion house had been undermining the Royalists support base in the city oligarchy.

It is hard to judge the impact of the *coup* on the Royalist war effort. While it may have resulted in more combative relations between the council and the military authorities, most of Newcastle’s requests for supply were fulfilled, even if it was after protest and short exchanges of letters. In the six months after this meeting, but before the battle of Marston Moor, the city would pay for a watch and their watchtowers, repair of the walls and weapons, housing wounded Royalist soldiers in the Merchants Tailors Hall, paying surgeons to treat them, and burying the dead.¹¹⁷ The corporation appeared to have been decisively subordinated to the military government and did not put up any significant resistance until the complete collapse of the city’s military position following Marston Moor. But compared to the lengthy sieges undergone by the corporations of Carlisle, Chester and Scarborough, York was exposed to direct attack for a relatively short, if intense, period.¹¹⁸ The corporation’s reaction to a

¹¹² Scott, ‘Widdrington, Sir Thomas (c.1600–1664)’, *ODNB*.

¹¹³ Scott, ‘Widdrington, Sir Thomas (c.1600–1664)’, *ODNB*.

¹¹⁴ Scott, ‘Widdrington, Sir Thomas (c.1600–1664)’, *ODNB*.

¹¹⁵ Scott, ‘Widdrington, Sir Thomas (c.1600–1664)’, *ODNB*.

¹¹⁶ Scott, ‘Widdrington, Sir Thomas (c.1600–1664)’, *ODNB*.

¹¹⁷ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 95–96.

¹¹⁸ For the problems of supplying food and ammunition to the defenders during the siege see, Slingsby, *Original Memoirs written during the Great Civil War*, pp. 108–110; Cavendish, *Life of Newcastle*, pp. 55–56. For Newcastle’s rejection of Parliamentarian/Covenanter terms of surrender before Marston Moor see, Slingsby, *Original Memoirs written during the Great Civil War*, pp. 108–111; *Calendar of*

protracted siege is speculative and therefore a direct judgement on the success of the *coup* for the Royalist military government is not possible. However, it is clear that in response to royal instruction and with the justification of military necessity, the Royalists were prepared to sweep aside *antebellum* conceptions of civic independence to secure their most vital fortified places.

6.3 Chester and the Failure of Royalist Military Government in Cheshire and Lancashire

However, it is important to note that relations between civic and military governments across the Royalist north were not solely defined by the dramatic assertion of the latter over the former. An illuminating example is the city of Chester, where the minute books of the common council suggest a corporation that was actively involved in preparing for the defence of their city, and which lacked an effective military governor until 1643 or 1644.¹¹⁹ Chester's military situation changed as the civil war in England progressed, but had several general characteristics that endured throughout the conflict.

At the outbreak of war, the Royalists of Lancashire and Cheshire had suffered from similar problems to their counterparts across the Pennines. Lord Strange, soon to be the Earl of Derby, had decided to take Manchester, a developing Parliamentary fortress, by force after failing to secure its loyalty through his commission of array.¹²⁰ Manchester was caught unprepared. It was not an ancient medieval city, curtailed by civic walls, but a prosperous market town open to the surrounding countryside. The town did employ a professional engineer, an enigmatic and avaricious figure of German origin known as Rosworm, who was employed to defend the city for six months for the sum of £30, using 'mudwalles at the townes ends' and the stringing of chains across streets to prevent cavalry from moving freely throughout the town.¹²¹ Lord Strange concentrated his small army at Warrington before marching on Manchester on 24

State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I, vol. 19, p. 246: SP 21/16 f.57. For Glemham's rejection of Parliamentary/Covenanter terms of surrender after Marston Moor see, Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, f. 102. For the final surrender a week later see, Slingsby, *Original Memoirs written during the Great Civil War*, p. 116; Drake, *Eboracum*, p. 170; Wedgwood, *The King's War*, p. 348.

¹¹⁹ Cheshire Archives and Local Studies: Z AB/2 Assembly Books, vol. 2, 1624–84.

¹²⁰ Anon, *Strange newes from Yorke, Hull, Beverley, and Manchester. Or, a continuation of the proceedings passages, and matters of consequence that hath passed this last weeke in his Maiesties army before Hull, with some occurrences from Yorke during the Kings absence as also of my Lord Stranges comming in a warlike manner against the town of Manchester and slew three of the inhabitants thereof. Beeing all that passed here from the 16 of Iuly to the 23. Sent in a letter from a worthy knight now resident in Yorke, to a gentleman in Kings Street in Westminster, Iuly 25. 1642*, p. 6.

¹²¹ Broxap, *The Great Civil War in Lancashire: 1642–1651*, p. 44; Anon, *Newes from Manchester being a true relation of the battell fought before Manchester...*, p. A4.

September 1642.¹²² His demands for submission were rejected.¹²³ Strange launched a brief six-day siege but despite an army numbering between two and three thousand, outnumbering his opponents by three to one, he failed to take the town.¹²⁴ The poor weather also damaged the morale of besiegers, who were trapped out in the field in the wind and the rain without proper shelter over their heads.¹²⁵

Neither did the Royalists enjoy a support base in most of Cheshire, outside Chester. In his 1974 work *Cheshire 1630–1660: County government and society during the English Revolution*, John Morrill argued that the majority of the populace of the county supported Brereton, the local Parliamentary commander.¹²⁶ He cites Lord Bryon as saying at the battle of Nantwich ‘In this ill-affected country I could never get intelligence save by troops of horse’, while another Royalist blamed the ‘industrie of seditious preachers’ as the cause of Royalist unpopularity in Cheshire.¹²⁷

It was under these circumstances, of Royalist defeat, a developing Parliamentary military hegemony, and of the collapse of Stanley power over the twin counties palatine of Lancashire and Cheshire that the Chester corporation mobilised for war. The dire military situation, which persisted for the vast majority of the First Civil War, meant that Chester had to depend upon its own material and administrative resources for its defence. Unlike at York, there was no field army present. Unlike at Carlisle, there was no pre-existent history as a garrison town. While the city had strong links to the Stanley family, it was cut off from the centre of Stanley power at Lathom House by Parliamentary Southern Lancashire. It was this isolation from other centres

¹²² Anon, *Newes from Manchester being a true relation of the...*, pp. A2–A3.

¹²³ James Stanley, 7th Earl of Derby [attributed], *The Lord Strange his demands to the Inhabitants of the Town of Manchester, concerning a pacification, and laying down of Armes: with The valiant Answer and Resolution of the Commanders and Souldiers, in denying and withstanding the said Demands...* (London: Thomas Cook, 1642), pp. 1–4.

¹²⁴ Broxap, *The Great Civil War in Lancashire : 1642–1651*, p. 44; Anon, *The Latest remarkable truths, (not before printed) from Chester, Worcester, Devon, Somerset, Yorke and Lanchaster counties, as also from Scotland* (London: Thomas Underhill, 1642), p. 8; Anon, *A True and faithfull relation of the besieging of the towne of Manchester in Lancashire upon Saturday the 24. of September* (London: s.n., 1642); Anon, *Newes from Manchester being a true relation of the battell...*, pp. A3–A4; William Birch, *A True relation of the proceedings at Hereford by the Lord St. Johns and his regiment there, of the Kings comming thither and his intertainment, and the late proceedings at Manchester* (London: R. Walbanke, 1642), p. 6.

¹²⁵ Broxap, *The Great Civil War in Lancashire*, p. 50.

¹²⁶ Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–1660: County Government and Society during the English Revolution*, p. 78.

¹²⁷ Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–1660: County Government and Society during the English Revolution*, p. 78; quoting R. N. Dore, *The Civil Wars in Cheshire*, pp. 18–19.

of Royalist power that resulted in the Chester Corporation assuming a level of control of its military affairs that was unique in the Royalist north.

On 1 September 1642, the corporation placed Chester on a war footing. After some regular administrative business, the council ordered that an ‘Assessment of 150 marks granted for repayre of ye gates and fertyfying ye City: also Assesers appoynted & Constables ordered to C[ol]lect it & desteyn on those that refuse to pay: & if any fate arise to be a citty cause’.¹²⁸ The inference, made clear from the context, is that the city was not, despite its walls, yet in the state which could be called ‘fortified’. The assessment the council levied to support this endeavour was substantial, but not massive by the standards of a prosperous city like Chester. A mark represented a sum of 160 pence, meaning that this assessment came to £100 in total. The relative poverty of this assessment, compared with later sums raised to fortify Chester, suggests that the initial work was quite modest in ambition.¹²⁹ A comparison with later assessments for digging extensive earthworks outside the city indicates that these works, which ultimately encompassed the city’s vulnerable areas, did not begin construction at this point in the conflict.¹³⁰ However extensive this early fortification work was, what is clear is that it was ordered by the Common Council, and not directly by any Royalist military official. The main body of text, below the summary quoted above, contained the following order:

And alsoe att the Same Assembl[e]d Mr Maior (takinge concideraction the present and imminent dangers that are upon the [illegible] and how necessary it is that speciall care should be taken for the defence of this Citty moued that the sume of one hundred Markes might be Assessed leauied and Collected upon the seuerall Inhabitanes within the same for the reparaion of the Gates and fortifications [of the] said Citty of Chester.¹³¹

It was ‘M^r Maior’ who moved that the sum be levied owing to the ‘present and imminent dangers’ which threatened the city.¹³² In the absence of any military governor, the responsibility for

¹²⁸ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 56.

¹²⁹ For example, in September 1644 the corporation was required to raise £600 in two weeks see, Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 68; *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 20, 1644–5, pp. 67–68: SP 21/17 f.81, p. 95: SP 21/17 f.109; Morris, *Siege of Chester*, pp. 65–66; Dore, *Civil Wars in Cheshire*, p. 43; Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–60...*, pp. 135–136.

¹³⁰ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 61. Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–60*, p. 135.

¹³¹ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 56.

¹³² Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 56.

defence fell to the mayor, who was at this time an ironmonger called Thomas Cowper.¹³³ Cowper's motion was according to the record approved unanimously, which probably reflected the convention of presenting corporate unity rather than a unique enthusiasm for the militarisation of the city.¹³⁴ Following a list of the aldermen who would be responsible for collecting the levy, the following order was given:

And the said Aldermen hereby delyied to appoint [illegible] to looke to the workemen And likewise it is ordered thatt itt sholl and may be lawfull for the Constables of the se[ve]rall wards within this Citty or any of them to distraine any the goods of the person or persons distraynable as shall refuse to pay accordinge to the Assessment of the said Cessre. And yf any suite ther upon arrise the same to be mayntained as a Citty cause and this order to be there sufficent warrant in that behalfe.¹³⁵

The first task was hiring the workmen to build the new defences. City constables were given wide powers to punish those who refused to pay.¹³⁶ If the cess was not met, the malcontent would suffer confiscations of goods to cover the payment the council required from them.¹³⁷ Confiscation of dissenters' property was a common reaction to defiance from nearly every party involved in the Civil Wars.¹³⁸ However, these seizures were intended to cover payments owed by the inhabitants of Chester that they had refused to pay, and were not intended as punishment for displays of Parliamentary sympathy.¹³⁹ The corporation was aware that there would be those who would refuse, and who would react poorly to the consequent seizure of their property. Therefore they took pains to define the order as a 'sufficient warrant' for the confiscations, and that if anyone attempted to bring any official to court over the matter to maintain the case at the city's expense.¹⁴⁰

On 29 September 1642 William Stanley, the 6th Earl of Derby, died in his house in Chester.¹⁴¹ He had passed over most of his responsibilities to his son, James Stanley, over a decade before

¹³³ No relation to Sir Edmund at York. Lewis and Thacker (eds.), *A History of the County of Chester, the City of Chester: General History and Topography*, vol. V, pp. 305–321.

¹³⁴ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 56.

¹³⁵ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 57.

¹³⁶ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 57.

¹³⁷ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 57.

¹³⁸ Christopher O'Riordan, 'Popular Exploitation of Enemy Estates in the English Revolution', *History* 78 (1993), 183–200; P. G. Holiday, *Royalist Composition Fines and Land Sales in Yorkshire 1645–1665*, Ph.D. thesis, Manchester University, 1996.

¹³⁹ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 56.

¹⁴⁰ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 56.

¹⁴¹ Leo Daugherty, 'Stanley, William, sixth earl of Derby (bap. 1561, d. 1642)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn, Sept 2004

and had since lived in a relatively small house in Chester on a fixed stipend from the family fortune.¹⁴² Therefore his death did not markedly damage the Royalist war effort in Cheshire and Lancashire, but it did provide the Common Council with an opportunity to renew both its bonds with the Stanleys and its fidelity to the Royalist cause. On 11 October, at the first meeting of the Common Council after the 6th Earl's death, the corporation resolved as follows:

And likewise att the same Assembly the Right Honroble Iames Earle of Derby, Chamberlaine of the Countie Palatine of Chester, was elected and Chosen Alderman of this Citty in the Roome and place of William Earle of derbie his late deceased father late Alderman of the said Citty.¹⁴³

The election of James Stanley in the place of his father was, technically, like any other election to replace a dead alderman. The language used to record this election was no different from any other in the Chester common council record books.¹⁴⁴ But the explicit replacement of the father with the son suggests that Derby's position as alderman of the city was *de facto* hereditary. Given his dominance of the other civic offices of Lancashire and Cheshire, this was hardly surprising. Both James Stanley and his father had been appointed as joint Lord-Lieutenants of Lancashire and Cheshire by a grant of 27 September 1626, in addition to being made chamberlain of the county palatine of Chester.¹⁴⁵ The close connections between the city and Stanley brought about by these links determined the Common Council's Royalism throughout the First Civil War, as well as the highly extensive purge launched by the victorious Parliamentarians after the city's surrender.¹⁴⁶

On Friday 11 November another meeting of the corporation took place.¹⁴⁷ Ordered at this meeting was the establishment of a city watch, with the responsibility of guarding the city gates both day and night.¹⁴⁸ The orders specified the numbers of watchmen, the gates they were to

[<https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-72296>], accessed 11/2019.

¹⁴² Daugherty, 'Stanley, William, sixth earl of Derby', *ODNB*.

¹⁴³ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 58.

¹⁴⁴ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 58.

¹⁴⁵ Barry Coward, 'Stanley, James, seventh earl of Derby (1607–1651)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn, Sept 2004 [<https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-26274>], accessed 11/2020.

¹⁴⁶ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, ff. 76–78.

¹⁴⁷ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 59.

¹⁴⁸ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 59.

guard, and their weapons.¹⁴⁹ For reasons of brevity, a shortened version of the order was as follows:

At which Assembly Mr Maior (takinge into Consideracon the present dangers and how necessary it was that Constant watch should bee kept for the preservacon of this City)...Att the Newgate to the tower persons, whereof two muskateeres and two halberdeers.¹⁵⁰

Armed with muskets and halberds, these soldiers would have been able to provide an early alarm and stop anyone taking the city gate before being reinforced. The mix of weapons at each gate was not uniform. The larger gates had an additional pair of musketeers allocated, presumably because their larger size provided more firing points for handguns.¹⁵¹ The order also specified how the watch was to be organised, establishing ‘a Courte of Guard kept at the high Cross Consisting of twelpe persons. who there shall remayne night and day to bee ready uppon all occasions to giue directions for the better order of the said watch’.¹⁵² The watch was to be made of new recruits, a fact made clear by the order’s specifications for their training as professional soldiers.¹⁵³ While a plan of deployment is essential to any functioning military unit, without professional training in arms the new watchmen would have been a lot less useful, incapable of doing more than fleeing to raise the alarm in the event of a surprise attack. The solution to this was simple. It was ordered that ‘8 of ye Trayned bands to instruct thos[e] that wach day or night in ye use of their Armes’.¹⁵⁴

The explicit purpose of these trained bandsmen was to instruct the new recruits ‘how to handle there Armes, which wilbe a meanes to keepe them [illegible] Idlenes and to teach them there postures Soe as they may bee able to use Armes in tyme of danger’.¹⁵⁵ Neither was the common council ignorant of the possibility of the arms’ theft or misuse. The weapons were not permanently issued to the watchmen, but the ‘32 muskettters that wa[t]ch da[i]ly to giue them at night to thos[e] that [illegible] them in ye watch [illegible] to take their muskets out of ye Prattice’.¹⁵⁶ The historical consensus is that, outside those professional soldiers who had served

¹⁴⁹ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 59.

¹⁵⁰ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 59.

¹⁵¹ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 59.

¹⁵² Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 59.

¹⁵³ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 59.

¹⁵⁴ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 59.

¹⁵⁵ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 59.

¹⁵⁶ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 59.

on the continent, the vast majority of soldiers in the Civil Wars were, at least at first, amateurs.¹⁵⁷ The author generally agrees with this assessment, at least where most of England and the Scottish lowlands are concerned, but the record of the Chester watch should serve as a small qualification.¹⁵⁸ Amateur does not necessarily mean incompetent, and civic corporations could adapt remarkably well to the new circumstances imposed by war.¹⁵⁹ Neither did they neglect the city's industries' military potential. The resolution included the following passage:

And likewise at the same Assembly It was ordered that the Cittizens and all others that doe inhabit within this Cittie shalbe moued to contribute to the charge in makeing prouision of Armes and all maner of Ammunition, as also in makeing of outeworkes and planting of ordnance for the defence of the Citty.¹⁶⁰

While the repair of the gates had been contracted out to workmen, the scale of the fortification of the entire city required a considerably larger workforce.¹⁶¹ The metalworkers of the city were employed to make arms, probably simple weapons such as pikes, or lead shot, given that Chester is not known to have been a major centre of armament production before the war.¹⁶² The final stroke in the war preparations was the establishment of a civic defence association, recorded in the minutes as follows:

And lastly at the same Assembly it was ordered that there should bee, upon Monday next, a generall muster of all the soldiers aswell those of the trayne band, as of the volanteers of this Citty. At which assembly it was agreed that wee shall all ioyn together in a mutuall Assosiacon for the defence of this Citty against all Forces whatsoever that shall come in any hostile manner for to inuade this Citty or to disturbe the peace thereof.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁷ See all of Serena Jones (ed.), *A new way of fighting: Professionalism in the English Civil War: Proceedings of the 2016 Helion and Company 'Century of the Soldier Conference'* (Solihul: Helion & Company, 2016); but particularly Serena Jones, 'A "Professional Officer"? Colonel George Lisle, 1642–48', in *A new way of fighting...*, 71–87.

¹⁵⁸ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 59.

¹⁵⁹ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 59.

¹⁶⁰ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, p. 68.

¹⁶¹ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, pp. 57, 68.

¹⁶² Although Chester was of great significance for arms imports, mostly from Ireland, see Edwards, *Dealing in Death: The Arms Trade and the British Civil Wars, 1632–52*, pp. 47–48, 66–79, 88, 98–99, 120, 125, 224–225, 233. For a broader history of arms imports, see Edwards, *Dealing in Death: The Arms Trade and the British Civil Wars, 1632–52*, pp. 173–211.

¹⁶³ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, ff. 59–60.

A distinction was made between ‘all of the soldiers’, ‘those of the trayne bands’ and ‘the volanteers of this Citty’.¹⁶⁴ While the distinction between the trained bands and city volunteers was quite clear, the use of the term ‘all of the soldiers’ was not. The most probable meaning of the term is that it refers to those Royalist soldiers raised under commissions of array or independent colonelcies in Chester and the rest of the county, and which had found themselves part of the city garrison.¹⁶⁵ The failure of the Cheshire Royalists had effectively handed over control of the county, forcing them back within several garrisons of which Chester was the most significant.¹⁶⁶ The second is that these three disparate forces were united into a single association ‘for the defence of this Citty against all Forces whatsoever’.¹⁶⁷ While the records of the Chester association have not survived, the fact that its creation was agreed to, and ordered by, the civic corporation is of note.¹⁶⁸ It demonstrates that the corporation was not only controlling its watch but that at this stage in the war the entire garrison was under a considerable degree of civic control. Naturally, this civic control was not limitless, and the order did not make clear exactly how the chain of command for the association worked, and whether the corporation could give direct orders to the military officers.¹⁶⁹

The probable commander was Sir Francis Gamull, a Chester MP and the city’s Commissioner of Array.¹⁷⁰ The evidence for this is his appearance later in the minute books as ‘Colonel Gamull’, who along with the mayor had to be consulted on military matters.¹⁷¹ But while the association could defend the city, its stated purpose was not to assist the straitened Royalist forces in the rest of the county. This failing has been noted by scholars, such as John Morrill, as a defining feature of the Chester corporation.¹⁷² Because, rather than in spite of, its greater

¹⁶⁴ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, ff. 59–60.

¹⁶⁵ There were certainly non-citizen Royalist troops in Chester, since there was a proclamation aimed at preventing them from plundering, see, Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–1660: County Government and Society during the English Revolution*, p. 134; Proclamation against plundering by Royalist soldiers, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, ML/2/290; for further civic complaints against Royalist soldiers, see Civil War Letters and Documents, British Library, Harleian MS 2135, ff. 40–3, 54–8.

¹⁶⁶ For the collapse of the Royalist cause in Cheshire, which Morrill argues was largely the result of Royalist infighting see Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–1660...*, pp. 128–133.

¹⁶⁷ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, ff. 59–60.

¹⁶⁸ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, ff. 59–60.

¹⁶⁹ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, ff. 59–60.

¹⁷⁰ Francis Gamull was elected burgess of Chester in 1641 see, Thomas Walkley, *A catalogue of the names of the knights for the counties, citizens, burgesses for the boroughes, and barons for the ports for the House of Commons, for this Parliament* (London: Thomas Walkley, 1641), p. A3; Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–1660...*, p. 44.

¹⁷¹ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 64.

¹⁷² Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–1660...*, p. 130.

independence, the corporation naturally prioritised its defence over the wider Royalist cause in the county. This policy was to have dire consequences, as it allowed Brereton, the Parliamentary commander, to ultimately assemble a force capable of maintaining, and winning, a close siege of the city.¹⁷³

Of course, the Chester corporation was not unique in the establishment of a city watch; indeed the York corporation had given a similar order two months before on 6 September 1642.¹⁷⁴ York's orders did not go into as much detail as Chester's and did not give a gate-by-gate breakdown of the deployment of the watchmen, let alone details of training procedures.¹⁷⁵ But the order was broadly similar, right down to the mix of ranged and melee weapons to be used.¹⁷⁶ In both cases, it was the mayor who was responsible for the watch. This was to be expected at Chester, given the absence of effective gubernatorial authority until the following year. But it demonstrated a level of military independence on the part of the city of York that is at odds with their later record of serving almost solely as a source of revenues for the Royalist garrison. The evidence suggests that the corporation had attempted to give the responsibility over to the garrison but had been rebuffed. Following the order establishing the watch, the minute books stated that:

And that seeing my Lord of Cumberland is desreous that the Alloction of the Watch may be made by my Lord Maior and Aler & also the places where they are to watch bee appointed by them & at there charges.¹⁷⁷

The Earl of Cumberland was consulted by the York corporation before the meeting, at which he had made clear that, while a watch of the city was a necessity, it should be raised, paid for and commanded by the city.¹⁷⁸ The fact that the corporations of both York and Chester, two cities with very different relationships between civil and military authority, established watches demonstrates that it was a normative civic institution in wartime. Furthermore, by placing the responsibility for the watch of the city on the corporation, Cumberland removed it from his

¹⁷³ Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–1660: County Government and Society during the English Revolution*, pp. 130–131; Osbourne, *Sieges and Fortifications of the Civil Wars in Britain*, pp. 48–49; Lord Byron's *Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, ff. 55–56; Porter, *Destruction in the English Civil Wars*, pp. 23, 45, 50–51, 61.

¹⁷⁴ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 75–77.

¹⁷⁵ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 75–77.

¹⁷⁶ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 59; Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 75–77.

¹⁷⁷ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 75–77.

¹⁷⁸ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 75–77.

overstretched, and rapidly failing, military command in Yorkshire.¹⁷⁹ Given the absence of a governor at Chester, this was naturally also the case on the other side of the Pennines. The Chester minute book specified the cost as ‘An assesment of 66[£] 13^s 4^d to be made for maintenance of y^e wach & officers for a monoth’.¹⁸⁰ The fact that the assessment was only made monthly suggests that the common council expected, or hoped, that the conflict would not last very long and that significant long-term expenditures could be avoided. Presumably, the assessment was renewed or continued to be levied, but there is no record of how the watch specifically was funded after the expiry of this first assessment. But there is evidence of further general assessments in the minute books. On 20 March 1643, a meeting of the council resolved that:

Also this assembly taking into Consideracon the great danger Citty is subiect unto in these perilous tymes And the necessitie of [illegible] such Cittizens as are become souldiers for the defence of this Garrison payd; It was thierupon ordered by generall consent att this Assembly the Assessm[en]ts hieretofore made for the said souldiers weekly payments should bee continued.¹⁸¹

Unfortunately for the Chester corporation, their strategic situation had deteriorated. In Cheshire itself, the balance of forces remained roughly equal, with both the Royalists and the Parliamentarians having around 2,000 to 2,500 soldiers in the county.¹⁸² But to the north, in Lancashire, the Royalist cause had collapsed. On 9 February 1643, the Parliamentary forces based in Manchester and Bolton attacked and captured Preston.¹⁸³ The Royalists put up a fight, but attacked from two separate directions by superior numbers, resistance effectively collapsed in just over two hours.¹⁸⁴ The town controlled the main route through Lancashire and allowed the Parliamentarians to link their twin strongholds together. This also meant that the Royalists of southern Lancashire and Cheshire were now cut off from the rest of the Royalist north.

¹⁷⁹ Binns, *Yorkshire in the 17th Century*, pp. 72–73.

¹⁸⁰ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 59.

¹⁸¹ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 62.

¹⁸² Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–1660: County Government and Society during the English Revolution*, p. 75.

¹⁸³ Broxap, *The Great Civil War in Lancashire*, p. 62; Anon, *A perfect relation of the taking of the towne of Preston in Lancashire, by the Parliaments forces under the command of Colonell Sir John Seaton on Thursday the ninth day of February, 1642. As it was certified by some gentlemen of repute in the same county to a member of the House of Commons, with the names of those that were slain. Together, with very good nevvs from Cheshire* (London: Edward Husbands, 1643).

¹⁸⁴ Broxap, *The Great Civil War in Lancashire*, p. 62.

The rest of Spring 1643 would see both the high point of Derby's campaign and its ultimate collapse. On 13 March Derby marched out of Wigan with an army of 600 foot and 400 horse, intending to attack Lancaster.¹⁸⁵ Pillaging the town but failing to take the castle, he was forced to retreat.¹⁸⁶ In April there was a series of engagements around Warrington that saw the Royalists emerge victorious, resulting in Derby marching his army to Whalley in Ribblesdale.¹⁸⁷ There the Royalists suffered a catastrophic defeat, allowing the Parliamentarians to take the offensive.¹⁸⁸ Derby eventually left Northern England completely and arrived on the Isle of Man on 15 June, where he intended to forestall a possible Covenanter invasion from Scotland or Ulster.¹⁸⁹

If Chester had been isolated before, its position was now much worse.¹⁹⁰ The cost of supporting the garrison on Chester's resources had evidently begun to seriously damage the city's economy, for on 20 October 1643 they ordered that 'And likewise at the same Assembly it was ordered that a peticon shall be presented to his Ma[jes]^{tie} for reliefe towards the maintenance of this Garrison'.¹⁹¹ This was the first time that the corporation had appealed to an external source of funding to maintain their forces, and marked the beginning of a reduction of the common council's independence. This funding was necessary since the deteriorating military situation had forced the significant expansion of the garrison. The minute books stated:

And lastly the propositions made for raysing of three Troopes of horse of the necessarie defence of this Cittie was approued by the general consent of this Assembly And thiereupon it was by them ordered that two men should goe thorow the Cittie aswell to a strangers as free Cittizens to know what they would bee pleased freely to contribute

¹⁸⁵ Broxap, *The Great Civil War in Lancashire*, p. 74; John Angier, *Lancashires valley of Achor, is Englands doore of hope: set wide open, in a brief history, of the wise, good, and powerfull hand of divine providence, ordering and managing the militia of Lancashire; not onely to the preservation, but exaltation of a poor, and praying people, in two hundreds; against, and above a considerable armie, of popish, and ill-affected persons in foure hundreds: Wherein the strift [sic] of piety and providence, with impiety and humane strength, in the weaknesse of means, unto graduall, and compleate victory, is laid out; to advance gods praise, and advantage Englands faith. By a well-wisher to the peace of the land, and piety of the church* (London: Luke Fawne, 1643), p. 16.

¹⁸⁶ Broxap, *The Great Civil War in Lancashire*, pp. 71–72.

¹⁸⁷ Broxap, *The Great Civil War in Lancashire*, p. 81; Anon, *A True relation of a great and wonderful victory obtained by Captian Ashton and the Parliaments forces against the Earl of Derby at Whalley in Lancashire as it was certified in a letter from a gentleman there to a member of the House of Commons : for which great mercie they have apointed a day of thanksgiving* (London: Edward Husband, 1643).

¹⁸⁸ Broxap, *The Great Civil War in Lancashire*, pp. 82–83.

¹⁸⁹ Broxap, *The Great Civil War in Lancashire*, p. 85.

¹⁹⁰ Pilkington, *To play the man: The story of Lady Derby and the Siege of Lathom House, 1643–1645*, pp. 5–11.

¹⁹¹ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 64.

towards the advancement of the said Troops And for nominating of such as shall bee implied in the said service it was refered to mr Maior and Colonell Gamul.¹⁹²

Cavalry would allow the garrison to dominate the surrounding countryside more effectively, and to provide a warning in the event of an attack on the city. Cavalry was costly and three troops would have represented a significant expenditure. It was for this reason that the corporation made two innovations in revenue, the first being the appeal to the King.¹⁹³ The second was the extension of civic assessment to temporary residents in the city, as well as citizens and permanent inhabitants.¹⁹⁴ The corporation would return to this source of revenue again and again as the military situation worsened.¹⁹⁵ These migrants and refugees, particularly those with significant assets, represented a source of revenue that was both nearby, and capable of being enforced with civic-military resources. At this stage, the corporation did not employ coercive measures to secure this revenue, instead of asking the ‘strangers...freely to contribute’ as much as they felt able towards the war effort.¹⁹⁶ The question of control came up once again, with the statement that the choice of recruits was ‘refered to mr Maior and Colonell Gamul’.¹⁹⁷ The equal ranking of both civic and military authority reinforces the unusual prominence of the former in the affairs of the latter which is a defining feature of the fortress of Chester.

However, the period of near-unlimited corporate competence in military affairs was to end with 1643. The Royalist Council of War at Oxford was not insensible to the lack of command in the North-West in absence of the Earl of Derby, and on 7 November 1643 John Byron, 1st Baron Byron since 24 October that year, was appointed to take charge of the situation.¹⁹⁸ He arrived in the vicinity of the city on 11 October with an army of 1,300 men.¹⁹⁹ While the exact beginning of the Chester governorship is unclear, from the winter of 1643 onwards a succession of Royalist military officials were appointed to run the garrison before Byron took complete

¹⁹² Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 64.

¹⁹³ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 64.

¹⁹⁴ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 64.

¹⁹⁵ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, ff. 64, 68, 70–71.

¹⁹⁶ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 64.

¹⁹⁷ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 64.

¹⁹⁸ Eliot Warburton (ed.), *Memoirs of Prince Rupert, and the cavaliers: Including their private correspondence, now first published from the original manuscripts* (London: Richard Bently, 1849), p. 329; William Dobson, ‘Byron, John, first Baron Byron (1598/9–1652)’, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn, Sept 2004 [<https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-1007546?rskey=RGGUzA&result=8>], accessed 01/2019.

¹⁹⁹ Dobson, ‘Byron, John, first Baron Byron’, *ODNB*.

charge later in 1645 after Marston Moor.²⁰⁰ As stated in the previous chapter, there were, in comparison to the other Royalist fortresses of the North, many governors with a short average tenure.²⁰¹ None of them were local and all of them were both unpopular and possessed a combative relationship with the civic authorities.²⁰²

Byron claimed, in a typically self-justificatory account written after the wars, that he received ‘a Commission from his Highnes Prince Rupert’ not out of ambition, but that he ‘was persuaded by my friends...though otherwise unwilling...to avoyde such disputes for the future, as had formerly happened during Col. Leggs command there, both to his Ma[jes]ties disservice.’²⁰³ Ann Hughes commented that ‘The hierarchical chains of command between individuals implicit in Royalism are revealed in the virulent complaints against subordinates and rivals, particularly civilian or corporate bodies’, Byron was a particularly fine example of this phenomenon.²⁰⁴ Byron was to prove a continual, if interrupted by campaigning and visits to Oxford, presence in Chester until the city’s capitulation on 2 February 1646. He began well, providing an active executive that the Cheshire Royalists had previously lacked. He defeated the Parliamentarians at Middlewich on 26 December 1643, clearing most of Cheshire of field forces, but his army was bled by a lengthy and failed siege of the stronghold of Nantwich before being heavily defeated by Thomas Fairfax on 25 January 1644.²⁰⁵ Forced to fall back into Cheshire, Byron was only relieved by Prince Rupert’s march north, allowing him once again to exercise his authority across the surrounding area. Byron’s brief dance with success was a consequence of his appointment as field commander not just in Cheshire, but in what remained of Royalist Lancashire and in stalwart North Wales.²⁰⁶ This, combined with the first of the regiments from Ireland brought to England as a consequence of the negotiations between Ormonde and the Confederates, gave Byron a relatively large army he could use offensively. But his defeat at Nantwich reversed all these gains, throwing the Cheshire Royalists back into

²⁰⁰ Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–1660...*, pp. 126, 131–138; Dobson, ‘Byron, John, first Baron Byron’, *ODNB*.

²⁰¹ Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–1660...*, p. 126.

²⁰² Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–1660...*, pp. 126, 131–138; see also, Lord Byron’s *Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210.

²⁰³ Lord Byron’s *Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 54.

²⁰⁴ Hughes, ‘The King, the Parliament, and the Localities during the English Civil War’, pp. 259–260.

²⁰⁵ Dobson, ‘Byron, John, first Baron Byron’, *ODNB*.

²⁰⁶ Dobson, ‘Byron, John, first Baron Byron’, *ODNB*.

their typical state of isolation within Chester, and reinforcing the Chester Corporation's position *vis-à-vis* their martial superior Byron.²⁰⁷

Furthermore, Byron's campaigning meant he was absent from Chester for long periods. This prevented him from providing a continual counterbalance to the civic authorities and allowed them to periodically reassert themselves in his absence. According to Byron, this reassertion came at the cost of the city's defences.²⁰⁸ In his account of his time in Chester, he wrote that he had gone to North Wales at some point in the late summer or early autumn of 1645 (his account is unclear on the exact date) to re-energise the region's commitment to the Royalist war effort.²⁰⁹ According to Byron, he had ensured that the mayor was left with instructions for the preparation of the city's defences. He wrote that:

I tooke my Iourney into Wales. for the morning before I went out of Chester, I desired Mr. Walley, the Maior of the Citty (whose house was in the foregate suburbs) to goe along with mee and view and view those works where I conceived the most danger to bee of a surprisall and particularly a place neere the riuer (where afterwards the enemy entred) and gaue order it should bee palisaded, and that the ditch should bee made both wider and deeper, and that a guard house should bee built there for the better security of the place. I likewise left order for the pulling downe of S^t. Iohns steeple, which (in case the enemies should possesse the suburbs) would bee verie preiudiciall to the Cittie, as ouerlooking it all, and from whence (in the ensuing siege) wee receiued our greatest annoyance. All these things the Maior promised to see done, but performed none of them.²¹⁰

The most obvious caution that must be raised in the analysis of this source is that it came from Byron. The essence of his narrative is that he was correct in everything that he did and that everything that went wrong for the Royalists in general, and him in particular, was the fault, in no particular order, of court intrigues, other Royalists' incompetence, the Chester Corporation

²⁰⁷ Charles I, King of Great Britain, France & Ireland [attributed], *THE KINGS LETTER Intercepted coming from OXFORD. WITH A Ioyful and true Relation of th[...] Great victory obtained by Sir THOMAS FAIREAX, Sir William Brereton, and Sir VVilliam Fairfax, against the Irish, at the raising of the siege at Nantwich...* (London: Andrew Coe, 1644), pp. 3–6; Anon, *Magnalia Dei. A RELATION Of some of the many Remarkable Passages in CHESHIRE Before the Siege of NAMPTVVICH, during the Continuance of it: And at the happy raising of it by the victorious Gentlemen Sr Tho. Fairfax and Sir William Brereton...* (London: Robert Bostock, 1644), pp. 1–14.

²⁰⁸ Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, ff. 55–56.

²⁰⁹ Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 55.

²¹⁰ Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, pp. 56–57.

and citizenry, and the Welsh.²¹¹ It is therefore important not to take his account unproblematically, and this incident went unrecorded in the corporation records. However, the disconnect between the two sources is significant. This lack of corroboration and the mutual blame both the corporation and Byron hurled at one another make the acrimonious and dysfunctional nature of the civic-military governmental relationship in Royalist Chester apparent.²¹²

Byron's narrative also made clear that he tried, or wished to be seen to have tried after the fact, to assert direct control over the civic authorities through both his officers and the mayor and his officials.²¹³ This was particularly true during the increasingly close siege of the city in 1645–1646.²¹⁴ He wrote that 'I likewise gaue order to ye Maior, presently to prouide all such materials as were requisite for a Towne besiegd, as spades, Matocks, shouells, lincks, lanthornes, pitcht ropes, with diuers other necessaryes (whereof I gaue him a list in writing) and that hee should haue them in a readiness att the penthouse, a place where hee kept our aine guard.'²¹⁵ While this would seem, from the historical perspective, to maintain the practice of giving the Chester corporation a significant share in the defence of the city, in practice, it would have meant its reduction to a purely commissary role. The Mayor was responsible for the supply of resources, not just money and victuals, to the garrison, but not that garrison's directives; neither did the mayor have the authority to control where those resources were either stored or employed, that being decided by Byron.²¹⁶ Byron made it clear that he 'gave order' to the mayor, rather than discussing it with him, which made his conception of the superior-subordinate status of their relationship very clear.²¹⁷

²¹¹ For Lord Byron blaming court intrigue see, Lord Byron's *Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, ff. 54, 63; for Lord Byron blaming other Royalists' incompetence see, Rawlinson MSS.: B210, ff. 56, 61, 63; for Lord Byron blaming the Chester corporation and citizenry see, Rawlinson MSS.: B210, ff. 55–56, 58–59, 63–64; for Lord Byron blaming the Welsh see, Rawlinson MSS.: B210, f. 55.

²¹² Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–1660: County Government and Society during the English Revolution*, p. 130.

²¹³ Lord Byron's *Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, ff. 56, 68, 61, 73.

²¹⁴ Lewis and Thacker (eds.), *A History of the County of Chester, the City of Chester: General History and Topography*, vol. V, pp. 115–125.

²¹⁵ Lord Byron's *Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 56.

²¹⁶ Lord Byron's *Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, ff. 55–57.

²¹⁷ Lord Byron's *Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, ff. 55–56.

This superior-inferior mentality extended to Byron's assessment of the civic militia, which he described as being of limited professionalism. He wrote that 'though all the Cittie were in armes, yet knewe they not how to dispose of them or in what place to use them with best advantage, but ranged up and downe the streets in promiscuous bodyes, and would faine have done something, butt knew not how to goe about it.'²¹⁸ They had attempted a sally against the attackers early in the siege but had retreated in a panic upon the death of one of their sergeants.²¹⁹ Despite the problem of a Byronic source, this assessment seems entirely probable, considering the poor military competence displayed by the Chester Corporation throughout the Civil Wars, and the more charitable view that armed townsmen with limited military experience should not be regarded too harshly for breaking upon the death of one of their leaders.²²⁰ Byron's response to this problem was to increase his control over the garrison and enmesh the civic militia within his forces. He claimed that he 'call'd all the officers together, and appointed them their seuerall posts, and what guards should bee kept, and withal, what officers, Gentlemen and Reformadoes (of which there was then good store in Towne) should upon all occasions bee assistant att such and such places.'²²¹ Byron's systematisation of urban defence extended to non-combatant services as well, as he 'call[e]d alsoe all the Artificers, fire men and granadoe men together, and gaue to each their seuerall charge, and where they should keepe their stations.'²²² Byron was either ensuring the proper supply of gunpowder and various derivatives, such as grenades, or organising firefighters in case the parliamentary attack, that included not just cannons but grenades fired from mortars and fire arrows.²²³ He certainly did this later in the siege with the provision of raw hides and the requirement that every household should have a tub of water for putting out fires.²²⁴ This was a sensible precaution, with

²¹⁸ Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 56.

²¹⁹ Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 56.

²²⁰ Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–1660: County Government and Society during the English Revolution*, pp. 128–133.

²²¹ Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 56.

²²² Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 56.

²²³ For methods of destruction in sieges see Porter, *Destruction in the English Civil Wars*, pp. 41–63. For Chester specifically, which included motars, burning torches, fire-arrows and 'wildfire' see Porter, *Destruction in the English Civil Wars*, pp. 45, 50–51, 61. However Bereton claimed to wish to limit the destruction within the city see R. N. Dore (ed.), *Letter Books of Sir William Bereton*, 2 vols. (Chester, Record Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, CXXIII, CXXVIII, 1984, 1991), vol. II, p. 409.

²²⁴ Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 63.

organised fire-fighting teams being practised at several notable defences of the Civil Wars, such as Newark and Hull, but what is pertinent in this chapter is that, once again, Byron presented this organisation as having stemmed from his initiative, been sustained by his authority and finally subject to his direction.²²⁵

While Byron declared that the burghers' reaction to these measures was positive, even in his self-exculpatory account he admitted that this relationship rapidly soured, particularly as he took measures to control the supply of foodstuffs within the town.²²⁶ There was apparently 'Noe publick Magazin of Victuall', and, since the year was drawing to a close with 'Seventeene ~~hundred~~ mouths att the least to feede, whoe would not bee regulated in their dyett, because they had their provisions in their own custody', efforts at imposing rationing were both critical and difficult.²²⁷ In response, Byron had summoned his officers, the Mayor and the commissioners of array, before making proposals for the steps required to eke out the city's supplies.²²⁸ According to Byron, the Mayor rejected his suggestion of a central stockpile of victuals because, since a large number of townsmen formed the garrison 'whoe would not suffer it [their foodstuffs] to bee in any custodye butt their owne', there was a danger of mutiny if the plan proceeded.²²⁹ This case demonstrates the complex relationship between civil and military authorities in Royalist Chester. Byron's assertion of supremacy did not entail the wholesale exclusion of the Mayor from military affairs, but his incorporation within a hierarchy of officers as Byron's subordinate.

This was a necessity considering that 'the greatest part of the garrison consisting of Citizens'.²³⁰ The practice even extended to the mayor signing, next to Byron, the various defiant responses

²²⁵ For the fire brigades of Hull see, Porter, *Destruction in the English Civil Wars*; originally quoting Firth (ed.), *Stuarts Tracts*, p. 388; John Tickell, 'History of the Town and County of Kingston upon Hull' (1798), British Library, Lansdowne MS 890, p. 482; Alec Clifton-Taylor, *The Pattern of English Building* (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), pp. 212–213.

²²⁶ Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, ff. 58–59.

²²⁷ Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 58.

²²⁸ Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, ff. 58–59.

²²⁹ Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 59.

²³⁰ Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 60.

to the Parliamentary surrender demands.²³¹ But this should not be confused with an equal partnership. Byron stated that ‘I caused the Maier of the Cittye to subscribe with mee in this, as likewise in other answers which I returned upon several occasions, both, the more to ingage him, and to the end our good agreement, and consent, in the defence of the Cittie...might the better appeare.’²³² By taking direct responsibility, Byron maintained the appearance of unanimity within the city walls.²³³ This became more and more important as the siege continued, and ‘both the Citizens and soldiers, began to bee verie doubtfull of releefe.’²³⁴ As hunger grew acute, and the mood of populace and soldiery alike turned mutinous, the mayor distanced himself from Byron. The latter wrote:

The Maier of the Cittye, whoe till that tyme appeared verie cordiall and zealous in the service and could easily have checked such disorders, was then rather...an abetter of them, and whereas hee should have punish, pittied them, pretending that by his oath hee was tyed to doe nothing without the advice and consent of his Counsell of fortye, whoe were most of them suspect to bee Parlamentarians and fomented the mutinye as much as they could, purposely to enforce mee to a Treatie.²³⁵

While Byron’s main purpose in writing this was to establish the mayor and corporation’s responsibility for Chester’s capitulation, the collapse of relations between the civic and military authorities was a natural consequence of the city’s increasingly dire condition. Brereton reported to London that ‘our last Granadoes...did great execution, and were [...]]rrible and the City might have been thereby defaced and destroyed’.²³⁶ The mayor apparently complained that ‘I [Byron] was lead away with ill Councell, and that I valued a puntillio of honor, more then all

²³¹ For the occasions when Byron claimed that he and the mayor jointly signed the garrison’s responses to Parliamentary surrender demands see Lord Byron’s *Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, ff. 60, 63. For occasions when Byron claimed the mayor alone signed surrender demands see Bodleian Library: Rawlinson MSS.: B210, ff. 64–65.

²³² Lord Byron’s *Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 60.

²³³ Lord Byron’s *Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 60.

²³⁴ Lord Byron’s *Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 62.

²³⁵ Lord Byron’s *Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 64.

²³⁶ William Brereton, *Sir William Breretons letter sent to the Honoble William Lenthal Esq; Speaker of the Honorable House of Commons. Concerning all the passages and treaties of the siege and taking of the city of Chester. And by Mr. Speaker appointed to be printed and published. With a most exact declaration of Chesters enlargement after three yeers bondage, set forth by Nathanael Lancaster, chaplein to the Cheshire forces* (London: Edward Husband, 1646), pp. 3–4.

their lives, and the safety of their Cittye'.²³⁷ Byron was equally scathing, alleging that 'the Maior himselfe (as I have since beene informed) gave him [Brereton] frequent intelligence of: beeing desirous to curry favour with the party likely to prevayle.'²³⁸ He also alleged that 'in Chester above all other places, where the freemen of the Cittye, are bound by a solemne oath to obey the Mayors orders, and upon the ringing of a certaine bell, to bee assistant to him upon all occasions.'²³⁹ While Byron probably exaggerated the Mayor's duplicity and the citizens' absolute obedience to his will, the rest of his description of the crisis between the two authorities seems highly plausible.

Byron's other suggestion, that most of the civic oligarchy was Parliamentary in sympathy, is doubtful considering the extent of the purge of Royalists that occurred after Chester's surrender.²⁴⁰ This ultimately included seven justices of the peace and ten 'Sherriffs Peers and Common Councell men of the same Cittie'.²⁴¹ While this list included only a quarter of the forty-strong common council, leaving open the possibility of a Parliamentary majority, albeit a dormant one, it demonstrates that the body had a strong, and active, Royalist component of its membership. But it is important not to take this line of reasoning too far, for the relationship between the city and the governor continued to deteriorate, Royalist council or no.

The corporation's complaints about their situation were not just passed directly to the governor but were also sent further up the Royalist chain of command, albeit through civil and not military channels. In April 1644, the corporation wrote to their MPs at the Royalist Parliament at Oxford complaining about the gentry refugees failing to contribute to civic defence.²⁴² They wrote that 'The nobility & gentry & clergie...utterly refuse to contribute their weekly

²³⁷ Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 64.

²³⁸ Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 64.

²³⁹ Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 64.

²⁴⁰ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, ff. 76–78.

²⁴¹ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 76.

²⁴² Civil War Letters and Documents, British Library, Harleian MS 2135, ff. 9–10; cited in Morrill, *Cheshire...*, p. 130.

contributions towards the maintenance of the garrison though the same was assented unto & ordered by the Lo: Byron'.²⁴³ The citizens of the city made a similar complaint.²⁴⁴

Whether the corporation received a reply from their MPs with advice about how to remedy the situation is unknown, but by 3 September 1644, the common council had evidently run out of patience.²⁴⁵ The approach of autumn imposed new material demands upon the garrison and therefore new financial demands upon the town. This time the requirement was 'for makeing Prouision of Match Coales and Candles and other necessities for the use of this Garrison'.²⁴⁶ To supply these essentials, the 'sum of fithiere pounds a weeke is to be Assessed leuyed and Collected upon the free Cittizens and [illegible] Inhabitants of this Cittie', the language being in line with previous assessments imposed upon the city.²⁴⁷ But the order contained an additional levy, specifying that 'the residence (being the sume of fiue pounds a weeke) to bee likewise Assessed leuyed and Collected upon such nobilitie Gentry & Cleargie as are fled into this Citty for Protection inregard of this p^r[e]sent Rebellion'.²⁴⁸

There was no endpoint of assessment given but it was renewed on 5 January 1645 and 8 April 1645.²⁴⁹ While not strictly an example of the relationship between civic and military authorities, this levy was a notable example of the dysfunction between the various Royalists, civic and military, city and country, in Chester that has been noted by John Morrill. This would ultimately doom the Royalist cause in Cheshire, preventing them from bringing all of their forces to bear upon Bereton's increasingly dominant Parliamentarians.²⁵⁰ This dysfunction became particularly noticeable during the siege when the corporation had difficulty in getting enough councillors to attend common council meetings.²⁵¹ The corporation was forced to resort to a fine, declaring on 1 December 1645 that:

²⁴³ Civil War Letters and Documents, British Library, Harleian MS 2135, ff. 9–10; cited in Morrill, *Cheshire...*, p. 130.

²⁴⁴ Civil War Letters and Documents, British Library, Harleian MS 2135, ff. 40–3; cited in Morrill, *Cheshire...*, p. 130.

²⁴⁵ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 68.

²⁴⁶ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 68.

²⁴⁷ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 68.

²⁴⁸ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 68.

²⁴⁹ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, ff. 70–71.

²⁵⁰ Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–1660: County Government and Society during the English Revolution*, pp. 128–133.

²⁵¹ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 74.

And lastly upon Consideracon had of the great neglect of appearance att this Assembly; It was by the generall consent of the said Assembly ordered, That all those that are absent from the same, or any other Assembly hereafter to bee called, Not hauing such sufficient cause or excuse in that behalfe, as the Maior, for the tyme being shall approue of) shalbee and hiereby are fined in three shillings foure pence a peece for [illegible] tume offending therein; And the same to be leuyed by distresse (or otherwise) by such as, the said Maior shall in that behalfe appointe And the same to be conuerted to the use of this Garrison.²⁵²

By then the city had been closely besieged for two months and, despite the garrison's resistance until 20 January the following year, the relationship between civic and military authorities had collapsed. This was to be the last meeting of the common council until the surrender of the city.²⁵³ But while the organisation was by this point defunct, the city oligarchy was to prove a decisive influence in favour of surrender. The mayor by then was Charles Whalley, the favoured Royalist candidate, Colonel Sir Francis Gamull, having failed to secure election.²⁵⁴ While he supported Lord Byron's rejection of a surrender demand of 12 January a few days later, under threat of violence from the citizens, Lord Byron was forced to begin negotiations with Brereton. Byron wrote that he was reminded of the example of his brother, Sir Robert Byron, the governor of Liverpool who was delivered to the besiegers by his men.²⁵⁵

According to Byron, a final meeting between officers and the common council took place where he offered to try to secure a surrender on honourable conditions before the burghers demanded that surrender negotiations begin immediately.²⁵⁶ Byron went into considerable detail about the mechanics of the last days of Royalist Chester, claiming that he attempted to drag out the

²⁵² Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 74.

²⁵³ For the last meeting of the corporation before the capitulation see Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 74. For the surrender of Chester see Brereton, *Sir William Brereton's letter sent to the Honoble William Lenthall Esq; Speaker of the Honorable House of Commons. Concerning all the passages and treaties of the siege and taking of the city of Chester. And by Mr. Speaker appointed to be printed and published. With a most exact declaration of Chesters enlargement after three yeers bondage, set forth by Nathanael Lancaster, chaplein to the Cheshire forces*, pp. 3–4.

²⁵⁴ Lewis and Thacker (eds.), *A History of the County of Chester, the City of Chester: General History and Topography*, vol. V, pp. 115–125; Peter Clark and Paul Slack (eds.), *Crisis and Order in English Towns 1500–1700* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), pp. 211–212; Annette Kennett, *Loyal Chester: A Brief History of Chester in the Civil War* (Chester: Chester City Record Office, 1984), p. 20.

²⁵⁵ Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 64; Gratton, 'Liverpool under parliament: the anatomy of a civil war garrison, May 1643 to June 1644', p. 70.

²⁵⁶ Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 65.

negotiations to provide time for a relief force to arrive amidst ‘the madness of the people’.²⁵⁷ Public protests, largely induced by hunger, will be covered in the next chapter of this dissertation, what is of immediate significance is the question of whether this collapse represented a reassertion of civic authority over the military government or a popular compulsion of both in the direction of surrender. Byron’s description of Chester during the negotiations, as ‘full of mutinye’, and his assertion that the citizen-soldiers of the city no longer obeyed his orders and did not bother to maintain the city watch, suggests that the military government had completely lost control.²⁵⁸ While it is important not to take Byron at face value, it does seem highly probable, given similar events at other contemporary besieged cities such as Carlisle, that the military hierarchy had collapsed.²⁵⁹

While the official communication to Brereton informing him of the garrison’s desire to surrender did acknowledge that the power to make a treaty rested in Byron’s hands, it claimed that he was doing so at the entreaty of the ‘Maier, Noblemen, Gentlemen, Aldermen and Citizens of Chester’, and Byron insisted that he was ‘forced to begin a Treatie’ instead of waiting for a relief attempt to be launched.²⁶⁰ Naturally, Byron did not communicate his condition to Bereton in their negotiations, which were published on parliamentary order later that year.²⁶¹ The negotiations were much more protracted than Byron suggested in his narrative, and, although the initial approach was made by the mayor and an officer of the garrison, quickly Byron began a direct correspondence with Brereton.²⁶² However, the two quickly began to argue over terms, accusing each other of extravagant demands, until it looked as if negotiations were about to collapse.²⁶³ Only further letters from the Mayor, asking Bereton to nominate commissioners, prevented the resumption of the siege.²⁶⁴ After the commissioners had met, Byron attempted a final delay, signing with the Mayor a letter stating that ‘wee finde to so absolutely impossible to make a final conclusion in the time limited...that we are forced to

²⁵⁷ Lord Byron’s *Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 65.

²⁵⁸ Lord Byron’s *Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 65.

²⁵⁹ Compare with the emergence of public protest in favor of surrender at Carlisle in Isaac Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle* (Whitehaven: Michael Moon’s Bookshop, 1988), p. 47.

²⁶⁰ Lord Byron’s *Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 65.

²⁶¹ Brereton, *Sir William Breretons letter sent to the Honoble William Lenthal Esq...*, p. 8.

²⁶² Brereton, *Sir William Breretons letter sent to the Honoble William Lenthal Esq...*, p. 8.

²⁶³ Brereton, *Sir William Breretons letter sent to the Honoble William Lenthal Esq...*, pp. 10–11.

²⁶⁴ Brereton, *Sir William Breretons letter sent to the Honoble William Lenthal Esq...*, p. 9.

require a further day'.²⁶⁵ Brereton refused, saying 'I shall not therefore admit any further delay' as 'I finde nothing more then delays in your desires, there being no new matter proposed yesterday, but what you have had sufficient time to consider.'²⁶⁶ The following day the articles were formally agreed upon, and Chester surrendered.²⁶⁷

The Royalist commissioners appointed to negotiate with Brereton were not purely drawn from the civic oligarchy but also included representatives of the soldiers, the clergy and those gentry from the surrounding countryside driven into the city.²⁶⁸ Indeed only four of the twelve commissioners would represent 'the cittye', and while this was the largest single group within the commission, it was still an overall minority.²⁶⁹ Military interests remained strongly represented in the negotiations, and the civic oligarchy appeared to have fared no better than the governor in controlling the 'mutinous' soldiery, who, according to Byron, refused to take their stations.²⁷⁰ The terms eventually concluded were typical.²⁷¹ The Royalists would be allowed to march out for another of the King's garrisons but had to leave much of their arsenal for the new occupiers.²⁷² Chester would be occupied and the civic oligarchy subsequently purged, although that was not mentioned in the articles.²⁷³

The only real exception to the normative forms of surrender was the qualification that 'such Irish as were born of Irish parents, and have taken part with the Rebels in Ireland, and now in the City, shalbe prisoners.'²⁷⁴ Byron complained about this, stating that he had endeavoured to get his Irish soldiers treated on the same basis as his English and Welsh forces, and the terms of the anti-confederate ordinance were ultimately enforced less brutally at Chester than in other

²⁶⁵ Brereton, *Sir William Brereton's letter sent to the Honorable William Lenthall Esq...*, p. 13.

²⁶⁶ Bereton, *Sir William Brereton's letter sent to the Honorable William Lenthall Esq...*, p. 13.

²⁶⁷ Bereton, *Sir William Brereton's letter sent to the Honorable William Lenthall Esq...*, p. 13.

²⁶⁸ Lord Byron's *Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 65.

²⁶⁹ Lord Byron's *Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 65.

²⁷⁰ Lord Byron's *Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 64.

²⁷¹ See chapter 8.2 of this dissertation.

²⁷² William Bereton, *Sir William Brereton's Letter concerning the surrender of the City of Chester*; John Byron, *The Lord Byrons FIRST ARTICLES Presented to Sir William Brereton BEFORE The Surrender of the City OF CHESTER: Wherein the great Ambition of that party doth appear, And as by the last Articles whereunto he subscribed is to be seen at large* (London: John Field, 1645).

²⁷³ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, ff. 76–78.

²⁷⁴ Sir William Brereton's *Letter concerning the surrender of the City of Chester*, 223526, p. 7.

parts of England.²⁷⁵ Byron consoled himself by regarding the terms the citizens had obtained for themselves ‘as ill as I could wish, their folly and knaverie deserving noe better.’²⁷⁶ Byron’s assessment was not entirely fair, for the author does not share his conclusion about mayoral duplicity. Given that Charles Whalley and many of his colleagues were purged from office and barred from ever taking part in public life again it is improbable that they were a Parliamentary fifth column within the city walls.²⁷⁷ But they had undoubtedly had a combative and often dysfunctional relationship with the Royalist army that contributed significantly to the failures of the Cheshire Royalists.

Whereas the York Corporation was placed under the military government’s authority, most dramatically in the case of Sir Thomas Glemham’s coup, at Chester the opposite took place. The corporation exerted a domineering influence over the affairs of the garrison from the beginning of the war almost until its end. This was not entirely for the ill. At the beginning of the war, the corporation had succeeded in fortifying the city with repaired gates and surrounding earthworks, had created a united local association for the defence of the city, and established a watch to prevent Chester from falling to a surprise attack.²⁷⁸ They had used their authority to support this with funds levied upon the city, and would later find new innovative sources of revenue in the form of assessments on gentle and noble refugees.²⁷⁹

But despite these successes, the author must agree with the assessment of Morrill that the corporation failed to make effective use of its military resources.²⁸⁰ They solely focused on the defence of the city and combined with their effective dominance of local military resources this meant that their considerable strength was not employed to support the Royalists in the rest of Cheshire.²⁸¹ The defeat of the Lancastrian Royalists deepened this strategic isolation, causing

²⁷⁵ Lord Byron’s *Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 64; Parliament of England, ‘An Ordinance Commanding that no Officer or Soldier either by Sea or Land, shall give any Quarter to any Irishman, or to any papist born in Ireland, which shall be taken in Arms against the Parliament in England’, in *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642–1660* (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1911), pp. 554–555; Stoye, *Soldiers and Strangers: An Ethnic History of the English Civil War*, pp. 53–72.

²⁷⁶ Lord Byron’s *Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 65.

²⁷⁷ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, ff. 76–78.

²⁷⁸ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, ff. 56–57, 59–60.

²⁷⁹ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, ff. 68, 70–71.

²⁸⁰ Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–1660: County Government and Society during the English Revolution*, p. 138.

²⁸¹ Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–1660...*, pp. 136–138.

the corporation and its garrison to grow even more defensively orientated.²⁸² Neither was the corporation capable of constructive relationships with the military authorities eventually placed over it.²⁸³ Used to running their own military operations, the relationship the corporation had with gubernatorial authority was never better than combative.²⁸⁴ This, ultimately, hindered the effective employment of the city's resources even more than the overbearing presence of a governor like Glemham. This conclusion was shared by Lord Byron: 'I found by sad experience what it was to be in a garrison of Burgers whose experience is tied more to their mayor than their Governor'.²⁸⁵

6.4 Scarborough and the Insurrectionist Garrison of 1648–1649

The Scarborough Corporation's interactions with its garrison are extremely easy for historians to work with thanks to M. Y. Ashcroft of the North Yorkshire County Record office, who in 1991 published a full calendar, with transcriptions, of Scarborough's borough records from 1641–1660; a uniquely high-quality transcription of corporate records from this period.²⁸⁶ The interaction between the Scarborough corporation and the Parliamentarian/Royalist garrison of Sir Hugh Cholmley has been thoroughly explored already by Jack Binns.²⁸⁷ This interaction initially began well but gradually became more combative as the garrison became isolated and Cholmley's financial demands became more severe.²⁸⁸ The alienation of the city corporation, which was 'all pleased to assist Cholmley in his proceedings for the protection of the towne' on 16 October 1642, was made clear by its petition to the Committee of Both Kingdoms for financial assistance on 19 August 1645, shortly after Cholmley surrendered.²⁸⁹ The impositions Cholmley placed upon the town included multiple assessments, billeting of soldiery and,

²⁸² Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–1660...*, pp. 136–138; Broxap, *The Great Civil War in Lancashire*, pp. 63–85; Pilkington, *To play the man: The story of Lady Derby and the Siege of Lathom House, 1643–1645*, pp. 5–11.

²⁸³ Lewis and Thacker (eds.), *A History of the County of Chester, the City of Chester: General History and Topography*, vol. V, pp. 115–125.

²⁸⁴ Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210; Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–1660...*, pp. 136–138.

²⁸⁵ Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 64.

²⁸⁶ Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*. References to Ashcroft's calendar are given with the document reference number for the original manuscript following the calendar page number. For example, see Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, pp. 41–42: MIC 2052/104.

²⁸⁷ Binns, *A place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640–1660*; Jack Binns, *Sir Hugh Cholmley of Whitby 1600–1657: Ancestry, Life and Legacy*.

²⁸⁸ Binns, *A place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640–1660*, pp. 109, 113–114, 118–120, 122–126, 129–130.

²⁸⁹ Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, p. 17: MIC 833 & 2150/243, 42: MIC 1320/1001.

ultimately, bringing a devastating siege into the heart of the community through his refusal to surrender the castle.²⁹⁰ The last entry of the common council in this first Royalist government of Scarborough was that:

It was agreed uppon...by the baliffs[s] burg[esses] and commons then assembled that their should be either 100 men billitted in the towne for the towne use or £10 paid them in money, besid[es] these souldyers...beinge townesmen that are nowe listed under the severall captaines and this to continew as the towne shalbe able, and as the said 100 souldyers or soe manye of them shalbe readye in their owne person to receive their billitted money or take his billitt in such houses as any of them shalbe assigned and alsoe £8 6s 8d for the payement of the townsmen.²⁹¹

Demands for money and billets would reoccur throughout Scarborough's experience as a garrison and form the core of the corporation's complaints against subsequent Parliamentary and Royalist military governments. Following Cholmley's surrender the Parliamentary Matthew Boynton, second son of Scarborough's staunchly Parliamentary new MP, was placed in command.²⁹² He controlled the garrison for the next three years but suffered from difficulties in paying his troops, for which he repeatedly asked for redress from his superiors.²⁹³ Receiving none, Boynton declared for Charles I in the summer of 1648 and immediately resumed the full militarisation of the town with a series of 'demands' upon the common council.²⁹⁴ The lack of sympathy with which the corporation received these demands is shown by the lack of any declaration of thanks in the corporation's records, as they had given to Cholmley, and their use of the coercive term 'demands' in the place of 'request'.²⁹⁵ Despite their evident reluctance, the corporation agreed to raise £20 per week to support a new company of soldiers to be raised from the citizenry.²⁹⁶ A month later, the Governor 'doth demaund of this common house to borrow the summe of £70 of them for the repayment whereof he doth

²⁹⁰ Binns, *A place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640–1660*, pp. 131–175. For Cholmley's assessments on Scarborough see Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, p. 17: MIC 833 & 2150/243, 42: MIC 1320/1001. For the billeting of soldiers in Scarborough, see Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, pp. 41–42: MIC 2052/104.

²⁹¹ Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, pp. 41–42: MIC 2052/104.

²⁹² Binns, *A place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640–1660*, p. 193.

²⁹³ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 22: Jan 1648–Jan 1645: p. 69: SP 21/24 f.59, p. 211: SP 21/24 f.277.

²⁹⁴ Alienation from the victorious Parliamentarians was a vital cause of renewed Royalist sentiment during the Second Civil War, see Robert Ashton, 'From Cavalier to Roundhead Tyranny, 1642–9', in *Reactions to the English Civil War 1642–1649*, ed. John Morrill (London: MacMillan, 1982), 185–207.

²⁹⁵ Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, pp. 41–42: MIC 2052/104.

²⁹⁶ Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, pp. 117–118: MIC 833 & 2150/299.

promise to give his owne ingagement'.²⁹⁷ This forced loan was negotiated down from £80 by the council:

If the governor stand upon £80 positively what answer shall be given[.] Whereas the honourable Coll Mathew Boynton Governor of this towne & castle hath demaunded the summe of £80 to be borrowed of this common house, we the baliffes & burgesses whose names are underwritten...in common councell assembled doe with mutuall assent & consent humbly offer unto the governor that in regard of the present great charges upon the town the scarcity & dearness of all manner of provisions & the want of all manner of trading wee are not able to lend the same.²⁹⁸

This collective defiance of the governor, supported by the entirety of the common council, stood in stark contrast to its generally deferential behaviour towards Cholmley, where resistance was generally limited to abstention from voting, rather than outright rejection.²⁹⁹ On the other hand, Binns points out that only twenty-five of the forty-four members of the common council actually attended this meeting and that they ultimately submitted, if only after vociferous complaint.³⁰⁰ The submission of the corporation was influenced by the skirmishes then taking place around the town between Boynton and a regiment of Parliamentary cavalry under Bethell, who would become governor after Boynton's surrender.³⁰¹ As the Parliamentarians lacked the infantry and artillery needed successfully to assault the town, Boynton retained the preponderance of force within Scarborough and thus the capacity to overawe the reduced common council.³⁰²

On 15 August Boynton demanded the supply of 'wood, nailes and iron work' for the 'baracadoeing the towne' and the supply of 'coales & candles for the guards' at civic expense.³⁰³ But as the Parliamentary forces around the town increased in size, the corporation grew bolder in defying Boynton.³⁰⁴ On 4 September the council ordered that the constables

²⁹⁷ Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, p. 118: MIC 833 & 2150/300.

²⁹⁸ Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, p. 119: MIC 833 & 2150/300.

²⁹⁹ See Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, p. 17: MIC 833 & 2150/243, p. 19: MIC 833 & 2150/245, p. 20: MIC 833 & 2150/906, p. 21: MIC 833 & 2150/247, p. 21: MIC 833 & 2150/250, p. 23: MIC 833 & 2150/251, p. 23: MIC 1320/912, p. 32: MIC 1320/937, p. 26: MIC 2052/89, p. 36: MIC 833 & 2150/253–255.

³⁰⁰ Binns, *A place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640–1660*, p. 202.

³⁰¹ Binns, *A place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640–1660*, p. 203.

³⁰² Binns, *A place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640–1660*, p. 203.

³⁰³ Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, p. 119: MIC 2150/301.

³⁰⁴ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 22: Jan 1648–Jan 1649: p. 236; SP 21/24 f.303; Binns, *A place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640–1660*, pp. 203–204.

collect only half of the weekly assessment, and when Boynton demanded the payment of the full sum they refused on the grounds of poverty.³⁰⁵ This consistent declaration of an inability to pay culminated in a petition to the governor on 12 September 1648. Despite the deferential appeal to ‘the hon[oura]ble Mathew Boynton Governo[u]r of the town and Castle of Scarborough’, the ‘humble representation’ was clear in its rejection of the garrison’s financial demands.³⁰⁶ In it, the corporation wrote of ‘the heavy charges already undergone by this towne’ and their inability to pay any more assessments.³⁰⁷ They listed the charges they had borne for the past six weeks as the:

Quartering of soldhers, paying assessments, furnishing provisions of victuals and bedding for the castle, loane moneys, deales, timber, workemens wages, for making works, coals and candles for the guards (as 38 pecks of coals on a night, eating upp our meadowes, taking and wasting our hay, the takeing away our kine and horses, daily common coats (now charged upon the persons of housholders) the decay of all tradeing, and soe consequently are wee deprived of all our subsistence.³⁰⁸

They added that despite a petition the week before ‘there hath not beene any course taken for our releife therein’ and that ‘wee humbly desire to signifye unto your honour that wee for ourselves in particular and for the towne in generall are not able to pay any more assessments.’³⁰⁹ Exactly how Boynton responded to this complete break with the common council is unclear, since the next entry was an order for the town bailiff to try and stop the Parliamentary forces, who had broken through the town walls and forced the governor back within the castle, from damaging the new pews in the town church.³¹⁰ Boynton would hold out for a few more weeks, but his interaction with the civic government was at an end.³¹¹

³⁰⁵ Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, pp. 119–120: MIC 2150/301–2.

³⁰⁶ Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, p. 120: MIC 2150/302.

³⁰⁷ Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, p. 120: MIC 2150/302.

³⁰⁸ Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, p. 120: MIC 2150/302.

³⁰⁹ Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, p. 120: MIC 2150/302.

³¹⁰ Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, p. 120: MIC 2150/302.

³¹¹ For contemporary newsbooks coverage of the second siege of Scarborough, see Anon, *Die 16. Octob. 1648. A messenger sent to the city of London with a packet of letters from the Isle of Wight, to be communicated to all His Maiesties loyall and true-hearted subjects in his Kingdom of England and dominion of Wales. Concerning his Maiesties answer to the proposition of Ireland, also, severall new proposolls by his Majesty to the commissionets, [sic] with their mutuall compliance for peace, being joyfull tydings for all his Majesties loyall subjects in his realms and dominions. Whereunto is annexed, the last and trnest [sic] intelligence from Scotland, Pomefract Scarborough, and other parts of the Kingdom. Examined by the originall papers, and published by authority for generall satisfaction* (London: R. M., 1648), p. 6; Anon, *A full and exact relation of the horrid murder committed upon the body of col. Rainsborough, the person that did it, and the cause thereof. Also the killing of Capt. Layton, and divers others: and a fight neere Pontefract; with the relieving of Scarborough, and a Pinnace taken there. Likewise the list of the names of some members of both Houses of Parliament, and chiefe officers*

Despite this, a mere ten days after their petition to the governor the corporation agreed to pay £140 to support the Parliamentary army.³¹² A week later the corporation had argued this down to £40 to be paid in two months.³¹³ This suggested that at least part of the corporation's unwillingness to supply Boynton was not just his extortionate demands, but also the fact that he was clearly in a weaker, and weakening, military position. Now that the town once again was subject to a strong Parliamentary occupation, there was no choice but to submit, begrudgingly, to their demands. Throughout the next year, the corporation would complain to the new governor about the great stress the continued occupation placed upon its finances.³¹⁴ This culminated in another petition to the governor on 25 March 1649 after 48 citizens of the

of the army, against whom there is a designe to take away their lives. Certified by letters to both houses of Parliament. Viz. His Excellency the Lord Generall. The Lord Say and Seal. The Lord Wharton. Lieut. Gen. Cromwell. Mr. Challenor. Mr. Pury. Mr. Corbet. Major-Generall Skippon. Serjeant Wild. Colonell Hammond. Colonell Rich. Colonell Pride. Colonell Hewson, &c (London: R. A., 1648), p. 5; Anon, *A great and bloody fight at Scarborough-castle in Yorkeshire, between the Kings forces under the command of Col. Bointon, and the Parliaments forces under the command of Col. Bethel: with the number that were killed and taken, and the totall routing of the foot, near the cliffs, and breaking their necks down the great rock, and casting them into the sea. Also the declaration of Col. Charles Fairfax, and Major Gen. Poyntz, Marshall Gen. for the King, and their joyning with Col. Boynton against the Parliament. Likewise, another fight near Skipton castle in Yorkshire, between the English and the scots, and the Scots resolution and design touching the city, of York. Together, with the Parliaments message and propositions, to their brethren of Scotland, concerning the Kings Majesty* (London: G. W., 1648), pp. 1–2; Oliver Cromwell & Henry Elsynge, *Propositions sent in a letter from Lieu. Gen. Cromvvell and his officers, to the Lords and Commons of the committee of Derby-house. And by them presented to the House of Commons: and by them read, and reffered to a committee. Die Sabbati Novemb. 19. 1648. Ordered by the Commons in Parliament assembled, that this letter from Lieutenant Generall Cromwell, be referred to the committee of the army, to make provisions of the particulars therein desired and mentioned* (London: Robbert Ibbitson, 1648), pp. 1–2; Hugh Bethel, *Col: Bethels letter to His Excellence the Lord Fairfax, concerning the surrender of Scarbrough Castle, on Tuesday, Decemb. 19. 1648. Together, with a true copy of the articles for the rendition thereof, and the result of the Councell of War concerning the same* (London: J. Playford, 1648). For the Committee of Both Houses' records of the second siege of Scarborough, see *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 22: Jan 1648–Jan 1649: p. 254: SP 21/10 f.103: 'Proceedings at the Committee of both Houses at Derby House. Present: Earl of Manchester, Lords Say and Howard, Sir J. Danvers, Sir G. Gerard, Sir J. Trevor, Sir H. Vane, junr., Sir Wm, Masham, Mr. Solicitor St. John, and Messrs. Pierrepont and Fiennes', p. 255: SP 21/24 f.339: 'The Committee of both Houses to the Committee at York, the Commander at the siege of Scarborough, and Sir Arthur Haselrigg', p. 274: SP 21/25 f.19: 'The Committee of both Houses to the Lord General [Fairfax]'. Colonel Boynton was ultimately declared a traitor, see *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Commonwealth*, vol. 1, 1649–1650, p. 41: SP 18/1 f.40: 'Order in Parliament that Col. Mat. Boynton, late governor of Scarborough, Sir Jno. Morley, and Col. Leveson, late governor of Dudley Castle, be proscribed and banished as enemies and traitors'.

³¹² Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, p. 120: MIC 1320/1196.

³¹³ Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, p. 121: MIC 2150/303.

³¹⁴ Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, p. 120: MIC 1320/1196, p. 121: MIC 2150/303, p. 145: MIC 1320/1225, p. 146: MIC 2052/171, p. 146: MIC 833 & 2150/318.

town were, according to the corporation, owed money for quartering Parliamentary soldiers.³¹⁵ This petition was as follows:

Petition of bailiffs & burgesses "to the honourable the committee", nd Humbly sheweth that the insupportable burthens & losses which have beene upon this poore towne within these few late yeares have beene soe many and greivous (and that without any reparation) as can scarce be parrelleled in this nation...to give further testimony of their willingnes according to their power to serve the parliament did lend moneys & allow quarters to the soldjers in the companyes of Colonell Bethell & Capt John Lawson in garrison att Scardbrough Castle.³¹⁶

Despite the corporation's appeal to a higher authority and their dire fiscal straits, Bethell appealed to the common council for a loan to support the soldiers.³¹⁷ The corporation refused because 'the towne is nott att present in a capacity to lend money' and that they expected repayment of the arrears for quartering to be paid before they gave another loan.³¹⁸ Despite the replacement, yet again, of the command of the Parliamentary garrison, the financial tensions between the town and the garrison continued. Even quartering continued despite the impoverishment of the town and the end of any active Royalist military threat; forty-eight townspeople required 'Moneys oweing by severall soldjers in Capt John Lawsons company to severall inhabitants of Scarbrough for quarter since the 25th of March 1649'.³¹⁹

The entire affair, from the slow alienation of the common council from Cholmley to Boynton's insurrectionist governorship and the continued tension between the town and the garrison under Bethell that followed, demonstrated the problems faced by a small, but strategically vital, town. The end of active combat was of little benefit to Scarborough, aside from reopening the trade routes. The experience of fortification placed an economic and political burden upon the town that it was incapable of sustaining. The ultimate consequence was an acrimonious relationship with subsequent Parliamentary and Royalist garrisons. Those garrisons, in turn, owing to the town's economic problems and antipathy to them, lacked an adequate support base for much of the 1640s, resulting in them becoming increasingly predatory in their fiscal policies and, in the case of Boynton, even contributing towards a defection from the parliamentary cause.

³¹⁵ Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, p. 145: MIC 1320/1225.

³¹⁶ Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, p. 146: MIC 2052/171.

³¹⁷ Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, p. 146: MIC 833 & 2150/318.

³¹⁸ Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, p. 146: MIC 833 & 2150/318.

³¹⁹ Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, p. 145: MIC 1320/1225.

6.5 Parliamentary Military Government in Wartime Hull

As briefly addressed in the previous chapter, the Hull Corporation was an active participant in the British Civil Wars, and notable for its strong Parliamentarianism, even to the point of purging Sir John Hotham to prevent any possible defection to the Royalists. This was not always the case as, ironically, Hotham initially experienced some difficulty in securing the town for the emergent Parliamentary cause in January 1642.³²⁰ According to Hotham, in a letter to William Lenthall, Speaker of the Commons, Hull's opposition to his commission was such that 'while we were at the gates the papists were freely admitted, but scarce any of ours, to but their fellows necessary victuals.'³²¹ The arrival of Glemham, whose later career in York and Carlisle has already been explored in this dissertation, with his regiment while 'these good Commonwealthsmen said nothing of the liberty of the subject that was infringed' posed a further difficulty for Sir John.³²² The corporation admitted in their records their reluctance to admit Hotham, despite parliamentary orders.³²³ It was written that 'mr. Robt Cartwright, being ordered by ye Parliam[en]t: to appeare before them, for that S^r. John Hothams Regim[en]t: of Soldiers, had not ready admittance into the Towne; according to the Parliam[e]nts. order'.³²⁴

William Legge, who had been responsible for the renovation of the city defences for the King in the period between the two Bishops' Wars, confirmed Hotham's story in his letter to Secretary Nicholas.³²⁵ Legge stated that 'His admission was quite denied, and a letter to the Parliament dispatched under the hands of the chief burgesses to excuse themselves from receiving any garrison, they of the town being able to secure the place for his Majesty's service.'³²⁶ This confident report of Legge would prove presumptuous, as Newcastle admitted in a letter to the King on 15 January, stating that 'I am here at Hull according to your commands,

³²⁰ Hopper (ed.), *The Papers of the Hothams, Governors of Hull during the Civil War*, pp. 50–51; John Hotham to William Lenthall, Hull, 4 February 1642, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS Tanner LXVI, fo. 256

³²¹ Hopper (ed.), *The Papers of the Hothams*, pp. 50–51; John Hotham to William Lenthall, Hull, 4 February 1642, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS Tanner LXVI, fo. 256

³²² Hopper (ed.), *The Papers of the Hothams*, pp. 50–51; John Hotham to William Lenthall, Hull, 4 February 1642, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS Tanner LXVI, fo. 256; Hopper, 'Glemham, Sir Thomas (1595–1649)', *ODNB*.

³²³ Hopper (ed.), *The Papers of the Hothams*, pp. 50–51; Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, p. 554.

³²⁴ Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, p. 554.

³²⁵ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 18, 1641–1643, pp. 253–254: SP 16/488 f.90: 'Captain William Legge to [Sec. Nicholas]'.

³²⁶ *Cal. S.P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 18, 1641–1643, pp. 253–254: SP 16/488 f.90: 'Captain William Legge to [Sec. Nicholas]'.

but the town will by no means admit me, so I am very flat and out of countenance here, but will stay until I know your further pleasure.’³²⁷

The refusal to admit Newcastle, along with the fervour of the city’s later Parliamentaryism, makes it is improbable that the corporation’s disaffection to Hotham’s arrival signified the incipient Royalism of the city. It is far more likely that the corporation’s openness to Glemham, and initial hostility to Hotham, was a desire to avoid the outbreak of fighting. Neutralist sentiments, refusing to choose either the King or the Parliament, both of which were commonly regarded as vital institutions of government, were common throughout England as the conflict gathered pace in early 1642, and Yorkshire was no exception.³²⁸ Beyond a mere refusal to make a choice, the city took more active measures to prepare the civic administration for trouble. On 13 January 1642, a Committee of Defence was created by the corporation.³²⁹ It consisted of a selection of burgesses who:

shall for & on the behalf of the rest of the Burgesses, attend Mr: Maior & The aldermen, at such tymes as they shall haue occasion to send for them; to advise & conferre w[i]th them touching the defence of the Towne, (during these tymes of danger; And that whatsoever shall be done, ordered or consented unto by the same p[er]sons underwritten, together w[i]th the consent and approbacon of the said Maior & Aldermen, or the most p[ar]te of them, shalbe taken & reputed as the acte * agreem[en]^t: of all the whole Burgesses in gen[er]all, And for want of appearance of the whole number of the said

³²⁷ *Cal. S.P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 18, 1641–1643, pp. 253–254: SP 16/488 f.90: ‘Captain William Legge to [Sec. Nicholas]’.

³²⁸ The most famous example of this was the Treaty of Rothwell between Royalists and Parliamentarians, which aimed to prevent fighting in Yorkshire. It never came into effect owing to Captain Hotham’s attack on the Archbishop of York’s property of Cawood Castle. For the text of the treaty, see Anon, *A TREATIE OF PEACE, Concluded The 29. of September, 1642. being Michaelmas day, That all Forces assembled together in any part of Yorkshire, Countie, or Citie of Yorke, shall be disbanded, and all those under Captaine Hotham now in Doncaster, and all other forces in any other parts of the Countrey, under any other Commanders belonging to the Garrison of Hull, shall retire to Hull with all speed possibly, and that Captaine Hotham shall begin to march from Doncaster towards Hull, upon Saturday next, the first of October, 1642...* (London: I. Benson, 1642), pp. A2–A3; see also A. Woolrych, ‘Yorkshire’s Treaty of Neutrality’, *History Today* 6 (1956), 696–704. For Captain Hotham’s rebuttal of the treaty, see John Hotham, *THE DECLARATION Of Captain HOTHAM Sent to the Parliament, wherein hee sheweth the Reasons of his marching into the County of York, with some troops of Horse and Foot, as also why he consented not to the treaty of Peace agreed upon by some of the Gentlemen of that County* (London: Richard Best, 1642); and also Slingsby, *Original Memoirs written during the Great Civil War*, pp. 77–83; *A Perfect Dirunall...* (17–24 October 1642), p. 24 (Nelson and Seccombe STC, 513.16B). For general history of the Treaty of Rothwell, see Binns, *Yorkshire in the 17th Century*, p. 67. For a broader historiography of neutralism, see Brian Manning, ‘Neutrals and Neutralism in the English Civil War’, D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1957; A. Fletcher, *A County Community in Peace and War: Sussex, 1600–1660* (London: Longman, 1975), pp. 284–289; John Morrill, *The Revolt of the Provinces* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1976), pp. 36–42.

³²⁹ Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, p. 551.

p[er]sons; It is agreed and concluded that any tenn or more of them consenting, may effect the busines as the whole.³³⁰

This directive streamlined the civic administration and reduced the power of the legislature over the executive. By allowing the Committee of Defence to represent all the burgesses in military matters the corporation could close ranks against internal dissent in opposition to mayoral policy. The further clarification that it was not even necessary to have the presence or even the agreement of the entire defence council, but only ten of them, further narrowed the decision-making class within the city.³³¹ Given the activity of the corporation later that year, first in purging the Hothams and later during the great siege of Hull, the defence council was hugely important in establishing the basis for independent policy-making by the city's rulers.

Hotham ultimately successfully established himself as governor using his parliamentary warrant and his moving of '700 of the trained bands of the county of York into the town of Hull'.³³² This was clearly more than the Parliament had expected since Hotham took care to explain 'The reason that I drew in so many'.³³³ A superior military force, as much as a parliamentary warrant, had given him possession of the city, but it would have hardly helped him ingratiate himself with the civic oligarchy. As the war in England had not yet broken out Hotham was very concerned about the legality of his actions, asking that he hoped 'the wisdom <will> *of* the House will not stand upon the nice formalities of law and lawyers seeing that *salus populi is suprema lex*', meaning 'the safety of the people is the highest law'.³³⁴

Within the papers of the Hothams relating to Hull, little of Sir John's correspondence with the Defence Committee and the Mayor of Hull is dated, with the first such letter being 3 July 1643, shortly before the governor's ignominious disposition.³³⁵ However, within the corporation's own records there is significant evidence of disputes between Hotham and the corporation.³³⁶ Payment for resources given to the garrison was a notable cause of complaint. On 7 January

³³⁰ Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, p. 551.

³³¹ Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, p. 551.

³³² Hopper (ed.), *The Papers of the Hothams*, pp. 50–51; John Hotham to William Lenthall, Hull, 4 February 1642, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS Tanner LXVI, fo. 256.

³³³ Hopper (ed.), *The Papers of the Hothams*, pp. 50–51; John Hotham to William Lenthall, Hull, 4 February 1642, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS Tanner LXVI, fo. 256.

³³⁴ Hopper (ed.), *The Papers of the Hothams*, pp. 50–51; John Hotham to William Lenthall, Hull, 4 February 1642, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS Tanner LXVI, fo. 256.

³³⁵ Note of the Committee of Hull, 3 July 1643, Hull History Centre, C BRS/7/66.

³³⁶ Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, pp. 581–582, 583–584, 582, 587.

1643 the corporation resolved that ‘M Robinson late Chamblaine is appointed to demand of Sr. Iohn Hotham [illegible] for the grasse winter eatage of the Garrison ye last yeare xiiii:li as hath bene [illegible] in respect he & his officers had the benefitt thereof the last yeare.’³³⁷ The corporation had been supplying fodder for the garrison’s cavalry at their own expense and had not received any assurances of repayment, by either the garrison or the parliamentary authorities. The fact that they chose to phrase their message as a ‘demand’ suggests that despite the relatively small sum of money, only nine pounds, the corporation had chosen to make a major issue of the payments, implying that relations between governor and corporation at this point, nearly a year after Hotham’s arrival, were not in a good state.

There was also a dispute over city security. A watch, along similar lines to the earlier examples cited in this chapter, had been established.³³⁸ Its creation ‘hath bene of dyvers times moved to M^r Maior in private by Sondry Burgesses That in respect of the p^rsent dangers....of these times’ that a body be ‘settled for the Townesmens watching of the Towne, Castle & Blockhouses’.³³⁹ The townsmen were summoned to the council house to give their assent.³⁴⁰ But despite the assembly of aldermen, burgesses and townsmen being recorded in detail in the record, the governor received little attention. ‘The consent’ of Hotham ‘now also p^rsent’ is contained within brackets in the margin of the original manuscript.³⁴¹ The obscurity of Hotham in the establishment of the watch suggests that his role was peripheral. This was potentially extremely dangerous, given that the watch was not just responsible for the city gates, but also the ‘Castle & Blockhouses’, vital for garrison security.³⁴² This probably motivated a later directive of Hotham, recorded in the corporation record of May 1643 as:

It is ordered (upon the morow) of Sir John Hotham, that the late [illegible] of watching by the Inhabitants, within the Towne, Castle & Blockhouses in the night time, shall cease for present; & untill mr Maior & The aldermen shall [illegible] to gyve further order therein.³⁴³

³³⁷ Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, p. 581.

³³⁸ Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, pp. 583–584.

³³⁹ Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, pp. 583–584.

³⁴⁰ Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, pp. 583–584.

³⁴¹ Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, p. 587.

³⁴² Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, pp. 583–584.

³⁴³ Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, p. 587.

Hotham's logic is difficult to determine. While not explicitly stated in the civic record, these watchmen would have had to be replaced by soldiers, since their function was far too important for the town's security to be wholly neglected. The only explanation that makes sense is that he no longer trusted the corporation and wished to place his men in control of the town's security. Given his later fate, this was a prudent, if ultimately ineffective, measure. It is important to note that while the watch's dismissal 'is ordered....of Sir John Hotham' that this was 'untill m^r Maier & The aldermen shall [illegible] to gyve further order therein.'³⁴⁴ Within its records, the corporation reserved the right to give orders contrary to the Governor's at a later date. A possible reason for tension between Governor and corporation was the latter's concern that, if the King and the Parliament made peace, they would be excluded from any official pardon or act of oblivion that accompanied a settlement. The prominence of their town in Hotham's reluctant defiance of the King made this a reasonable concern. They used their Parliamentary representation to bring this worry to the highest level. It was agreed that:

that a l[ett]re be written to Mr Pelham now Burgesse of Parl[iament]. for this Towne, to request him, that in case the treaty of Peace betwixt the King & Parl[iamen]t: shall take effect: it may be remembred to gett it passed by Act of Parl[iament]. in expressed wordes, that this Towne, or any the Inhabitante thereof, shall not hereafter be questioned for aine thing by them done for be fore the makeing of such Act: in assisting the Parliam[en]t. or otherwise touching the late tumults, hath and bene here, or in the Kingdome:/³⁴⁵

Self-preservation against royal vengeance was a powerful motivation as the war intensified in 1643. This fear was also a probable reason for the corporation's slowness in expelling Royalist members. In the summer of 1642 James Watkinson, a city alderman and justice of the peace, had left 'this Towne, and his habitation here, and departed his office place & dutie & went to york & hath there remained ever since, under the Command of the Earl of Newcastle's Army'.³⁴⁶ Despite this display of obvious Royalist militancy, the corporation did not take action against Watkinson until 6 July 1644, after the immediate danger of Royalist conquest had ceased with the battle of Marston Moor four days before.³⁴⁷ This was either a coincidence of

³⁴⁴ Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, p. 587.

³⁴⁵ Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, p. 582.

³⁴⁶ Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, pp. 626–627.

³⁴⁷ Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, pp. 626–627.

timing or deliberate burning of the corporation's bridges with the Royalists, now that it was clear that the Parliamentary cause was in the ascendency in Yorkshire.

After two whole years, in which Watkinson 'hath contributed his assistance there against the Parliam[en]^t' it was decided 'for w^{ch} & other causes he hath beene & is adjudged a delinquent to the Parliam[en]^t: by the Comittte for Sequestracons w[i]thin this Towne & County'.³⁴⁸ According to Watkinson's later composition for his sequestered property, he 'was the keeper of or an Assistant in the Maggazine at York...for the space of one yeere and more...and during that tyme constantly and from tyme to tyme issued out of the said Maggazine...diuers Armes, Ordinance, Musketts, Carbines, Pistolls, powder, Shott, and other Amunicon.'³⁴⁹ He had secured a 'passe and pteccion' from 'Generall Leven, my Lord ffairefax, and the Earle of Manchester' from 15 July 1644 after the fall of York.³⁵⁰ Despite this protection for his 'person and goods' he had to compound 'upon a particuler delivered in under his hand and upon another returned from the Com^{tee} of Hull, by which he doth Submitt to such ffine &c. and by which, and his confession before us it doth appeare'.³⁵¹ The total value of 'Messuages, Lands and Tenements' sequestered by the Hull Corporation was £82 12s 4d, for which Watkinson had to pay a fine of £165 6s 8d.³⁵²

Interestingly, Watkinson attempted to blame Hotham for his service to the Royalists in York.³⁵³ In a petition to the Committee, he claimed that he had been sent to York by Hotham 'untill hee gave yo^r pet[it]ione^r leave, the Cause whereof (as hee conceaves) was, his Mat^y understood y[a]^t the no^{ble} Houses of Parliam[en]^t had given Order for y^e removing of y^e Magazine (where of yo^r pet[it]ione^r had y^e Charge from Hull to London.'³⁵⁴ According to Watkinson Sir John had put Captain John Hotham up in his house in Hull and deferred a decision on the matter, forcing him to remain in York, serving the King at the magazine there.³⁵⁵ While utterly self-justificatory,

³⁴⁸ Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, pp. 626–627.

³⁴⁹ Clay (ed.), *Yorkshire Composition Papers or the Proceedings of the Committee for compounding with Delinquents during the Commonwealth*, 3 vols., in *Yorkshire Archeological Society Record Series Volume XV*, vol. I, p. 109.

³⁵⁰ Clay (ed.), *Yorkshire Composition Papers...*, vol. 1, p. 109.

³⁵¹ Clay (ed.), *Yorkshire Composition Papers...*, vol. 1, p. 109.

³⁵² Clay (ed.), *Yorkshire Composition Papers...*, vol. 1, p. 111.

³⁵³ Clay (ed.), *Yorkshire Composition Papers...*, vol. 1, pp. 111–112.

³⁵⁴ Clay (ed.), *Yorkshire Composition Papers...*, vol. 1, pp. 111–112.

³⁵⁵ Clay (ed.), *Yorkshire Composition Papers...*, vol. 1, p. 112.

this account reveals the depth of distaste in which Hotham was held after his fall, if blaming him was a viable option for clearing one's own reputation.

The purge of the Hothams, and the corporation's role in both it and the ascension of his successor Ferdinando Fairfax was addressed in the previous chapter. This extraordinary assertion of power over the governor was complex, as it did not represent a dramatic expansion of the corporation's authority over the governorship.³⁵⁶ The civic authorities of Hull had the conception of their proper role in wartime conditions and, like the Chester Corporation, were prepared to use what power they had to give that conception force, even against the wishes of the governor. However, it is important not to overstate their degree of civic independence. They undertook their most dramatic actions under the direction of the parliamentary authorities, and with the authorisation of the Committee of Safety as their legal backing.³⁵⁷ It was not the assertion of local independence against an alien military authority, but the civil and military centre eliminating a rogue subordinate and using the civic corporation as their instrument. The troubled relations between civic and military authorities in Hull reinforces this argument.

6.6 Conclusions

As with governors and village constables, the antebellum offices of urban administration were brought under the direction of martial authority as part of the process of fortification. City corporations provided an essential support mechanism for their resident garrisons. Without the raising of civic funds, billeting in private and city property and the supply of food and fuel to the soldiery it was impossible for a garrison, and therefore a fortification, to function properly. Furthermore, corporations were involved in fortification more directly, providing resources and labour for the maintenance and restoration of the city's defences.³⁵⁸ The establishment of a city watch at civic expense and fire-fighting precautions were also normal.³⁵⁹ These various procedures did not necessarily entail a firm sympathy with the military government, as they

³⁵⁶ See Hopper (ed.), *The Papers of the Hothams, Governors of Hull during the Civil War*, pp. 21–32.

³⁵⁷ Order of the House of Commons for the Corporation of Hull to deliver the military government of Hull to Lord Fairfax, 19 August 1643, Hull History Centre, Hotham MS, U DDHO/1/77.

³⁵⁸ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, f. 56.

³⁵⁹ Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, ff. 59–60; Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 75–77; Lord Byron's *Memoir of the Siege of Chester*, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210, f. 63; Porter, *Destruction in the English Civil Wars*; originally quoting Firth (ed.), *Stuarts Tracts*, p. 388; Tickell, 'History of the Town and County of Kingston upon Hull' (1798), British Library, Lansdowne MS 890, p. 482; Clifton-Taylor, *The Pattern of English Building*, pp. 212–213.

were undertaken by enthusiastic and sullen civic corporations alike, but represented the basic precautions of a city exposed to intense conflict for the first time in many decades.

Military administration in fortified towns and cities generally represented an intrusion into the autonomy and privileges of an established civic oligarchy, an intrusion that was ultimately bitterly resented as the demands of the garrisons grew. The ability of the civic authorities to resist this intrusion was dependent on the strength of the garrison. A strong garrison with plentiful, well-supplied and loyal soldiers could rely on its preponderance of force to ensure compliance with even bitterly unpopular decrees. At York this extended to direct interference in the process of the mayoral election using armed soldiers.³⁶⁰ By contrast at Chester, where the garrison was isolated, materially weak, and had many soldiers who answered to the mayor rather than the governor, the Royalist military authorities failed to bring the corporation under their firm control.³⁶¹ During Matthew Boynton's insurgent rule over Scarborough, his authority collapses with his military power.³⁶² By contrast at Parliamentary Hull, civic and central authority ultimately combined to eliminate a rogue subordinate.³⁶³ But this was not indicative of a major distinction between Royalist and Parliamentary corporations, the Scarborough corporation having failed to prevent Cholmley and Boynton's defections, for example, rather it demonstrated the unusual importance of Hull, and its close links via sea to London, within the Parliamentary north.

³⁶⁰ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 81–82.

³⁶¹ Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–1660: County Government and Society during the English Revolution*, p. 78–81; Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, ff. 58–64; Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210.

³⁶² Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, pp. 118–121.

³⁶³ Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, pp. 583–587.

Chapter Seven: Sieges, Destruction and Trauma

7.1 Introduction and Historiography

While violent death was a common and continual presence at sieges, it was not the only way in which men and women perished in seventeenth-century warfare. Starvation, or the diseases associated with malnourishment such as scurvy, was common in lengthy sieges.¹ Furthermore, there was the phenomenon of massacre which, while not common in Northern England, did occur in a few verifiable cases following the fall of fortresses.² The purpose of this chapter is to explore the impact of these forms of killing, and how contemporaries variously condemned, justified, and ultimately coped with death and atrocity.

While these two forms of suffering were widespread across the British Isles throughout this period, especially in Ireland, the mechanics of siege warfare meant that it was relatively worse at encircled fortresses for defender and besieger alike. The miserable conditions for the besieged are obvious enough. The lack of food which was the eventual cause of the collapse of resistance in most prolonged sieges would result in famine conditions within the walls.³ If the fortified space was a town or city this meant that there was a large civilian population who had to be fed, shortening food stocks, and thus the length the garrison could resist, opening the possibility of food riots once the last victuals ran out.⁴ Continual bombardments were enervating and raised the possibility of sudden, brutal death for the besieged at any moment.⁵

¹ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, pp. 13–14, 34–35; Firth, ‘Sir Hugh Cholmley’s narrative of the Great Siege of Scarborough’, pp. 585–587.

² Anon, *An exact relation of the bloody and barbarous massacre at Bolton in the moors in Lancashire, May 28 by Prince Rupert being penned by an eye-witnesse, admirably preserved by the gracious and mighty hand of God in that day of trouble*. (London: R. W., 1644); *The Moderate Intelligencer*, no. 183 (14 September 1648–21 September 1648, *Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 419.183); *Mercurius Anti-Mercurius*, no. 1 (12 September 1648–19 September 1648, *Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 269.1); *Packets of Letters*, no. 27 (18 September 1648, *Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 480.27).

³ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, pp. 13–14, 34–35; Firth, ‘Sir Hugh Cholmley’s narrative of the Great Siege of Scarborough’, pp. 585–587.

⁴ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 47.

⁵ ‘though the Captaine recovered this sickness, yet after hee esscaiped death verie narrowlie, having his hand on another gentleman’s shoulder, when a bullet 64⁸ weight passeth betweene there bodyes, killeth the other’, Firth, ‘Sir Hugh Cholmley’s narrative of the Great Siege of Scarborough’, p. 583. See also Bull, *The Furie of the Ordnance: Artillery in the English Civil Wars*, pp. 100–136; Walker (ed.), *The first and second sieges of Pontefract Castle: Nathan Drake’s diary*, p. 35; Binns, *A Place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640–1660*, pp. 263–270.

But neither was the attacker safe. Counterfire from the garrison meant that they too were often subjected to bombardment, and often besieging armies also suffered from a lack of foodstuffs. The destruction of suburbs surrounding defended towns meant that besiegers were forced to exist in improvised shelters, as was the case at the Covenanter sieges of Carlisle and Newcastle.⁶ In the former case, this was during the Cumbrian winter, with all of the adverse weather conditions that entailed. It should also be noted that, for both attackers and defenders, a siege was among the most protracted period of continuous action that contemporary warfare could provide. A battle, while hazardous and intense, was generally resolved within a day. By contrast, several Northern English sieges lasted months.⁷ If a siege was forced to a storm, such as at Scarborough and Bolton, the attacker was forced into the most personally dangerous form of warfare, namely attacking defended positions designed to give every advantage to the defender.⁸ The repeated assaults the Parliamentarians under Sir John Meldrum launched on the gatehouse of Scarborough Castle during the first siege were bloodily repulsed, despite the reduction of the gate to a pile of rubble.⁹ Meldrum would be killed leading his men in one of these attacks, shot through the spine and dying after several days, ultimately leaving his broken men to starve the Royalists into submission.¹⁰

Violence and death have naturally been the subject of considerable historical interest. In popular memory, it often takes precedence over other experiences of the conflict, with massacres such as Drogheda remaining politically relevant until the present day. Academic historians have increasingly been treating violence as an independent subject, and not merely a subsection of a more general history. Donagan went through a period in the early 1990s working on massacres and has since returned to the topic with a project on the Dublin depositions of Protestant

⁶ Porter, *Destruction in the English Civil Wars*, p. 23; Sadler & Serdiville, *The Great Siege of Newcastle 1644*, pp. 57–58, 95; S. Reid, *All the King's Armies – a Military History of the English Civil War* (Staplehurst: The History Press, 1998), p. 95; Lithgow, *A TRUE EXPERIMENTALL AND EXACT RELATION UPON That famous and renovvned Siege OF NEW CASTLE, The diverse conflicts and occurranes fell out there during the time of ten weeks and odde dayes: And of that mightie and marveilous storming thereof, with Power, Policie, and prudent plots of Warre. Together with a succinct commentarie upon the Battell of Bowdon Hill, and that victorious battell of York or Marston Moore, never to bee forgotten*, pp. 10–11.

⁷ See Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*; Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, pp. 81–100; Stanley, *A Journal of the siege of Lathom House*....

⁸ Firth, 'Sir Hugh Cholmley's narrative of the Great Siege of Scarborough', pp. 584–586; Casserley, *Massacre: the Storming of Bolton*, pp. 116–118.

⁹ Binns, *Sir Hugh Cholmley of Whitby 1600–1657*, pp. 120–121.

¹⁰ Binns, *Sir Hugh Cholmley of Whitby 1600–1657*, p. 122.

refugees following the 1641 rebellion.¹¹ But the subject of slaughter had been popular among historians for some time previously, albeit on not so large and organised a scale. In 2008 Stoye wrote an article in *English Historical Review* on the murder of female camp followers by Parliamentary forces following the battle of Naseby, which was justified on the grounds that the, predominantly Welsh, women were Irish Catholic rebels.¹² The sack of Bolton by Rupert's army, which features in this chapter, and the aforementioned massacre at Drogheda have also been the subject of independent historical interest.¹³

But it is Inga Jones' 2012 edited book chapters on 'Massacres during the Wars of the Three Kingdoms' and 'Religion, Ethnicity and Massacre during the Irish Rebellion, 1641–1642' that are the gold standard for present scholarship on the subject, particularly the former.¹⁴ While only giving a brief overview, this chapter provides an excellent introduction to the distribution, motivation and dynamics of massacres across the British Isles during the period of civil war. Jones gave most of the 'credit' for massacres to religious differences or hostility to the Irish, particularly in the conspiracy theory-addled England of the 1640s.¹⁵ She also, alone amongst recent academic historians, gives due credit to the unique clan dynamic involved in massacres in the Scottish Highlands, where killings in cold blood of ancient rivals and unrestrained warfare against civilian populations, such as in the Royalist-MacDonald conquest of Argyle in 1645, were relatively common.¹⁶

¹¹ See 1641 Depositions Online Project, College of the Holy and Undivided Trinity of Queen Elizabeth near Dublin, [<http://1641.tcd.ie/>], accessed 01/2020. According to the *Bibliography of British and Irish History*, 26 of 35 publications on the 1641 depositions were published in the past ten years, demonstrating the popularity of the subject at the time of writing, see *Bibliography of British and Irish History*, [http://cups.brepolis.net/bbih/search.cfm?action=search_advanced], accessed 01/2020. Actually cite all of these.

¹² Mark Stoye, 'The Road to Farndon Field: Explaining the Massacre of the Royalist Women at Naseby', *English Historical Review* 123 (2008), 895–923.

¹³ David Casserley, *Massacre: the Storming of Bolton* (Stroud: Amberley, 2011); John Morrill, 'The Drogheda massacre in Cromwellian context', in *Age of atrocity: violence and political conflict in early modern Ireland*, ed. David Edwards (Dublin: Four Courts, 2007), 242–265; Micheál Ó Siochrú, 'Propaganda, rumour and myth: Oliver Cromwell and the massacre at Drogheda', in *Age of atrocity: violence and political conflict in early modern Ireland*, ed. David Edwards (Dublin: Four Courts, 2007), 266–282.

¹⁴ Inga Jones, 'Massacres during the Wars of the Three Kingdoms', in eds. Philip Dwyer & Lyndall Ryan, *Studies on War and Genocide*, 30 vols., *Theatres of Violence: Massacre, Mass Killing and Atrocity throughout History* (New York: Berghahn, 2012), vol. XXX, pp. 63–78.

¹⁵ Jones, 'Massacres during the Wars of the Three Kingdoms', pp. 74–75.

¹⁶ Jones, 'Massacres during the Wars of the Three Kingdoms', p. 68; Williams, *Montrose*, p. 202.

The historiography of mental and physical disability has also contributed to the closely connected history of trauma in this period.¹⁷ For example, soldiers' petitions for relief detailed the extent of their mental anguish as well as of their physical injuries.¹⁸ This historiography, articulated by historians such as Ismini Pells, Erin Peters and Mark Stoye, also took care to define what they meant by 'trauma', largely choosing a definition rooted in psychiatry and psychology.¹⁹ This was a natural consequence in their analysis focusing on the individual self-fashioning of trauma that occurred as a consequence of either physical injury or direct experience of battle.²⁰ This dissertation will employ this definition of trauma but also uses what can be described as 'institutional trauma', as described in the introduction to chapter six.

This chapter's analysis is primarily organised by the forms of suffering which took place, whether it was inflicted by hunger or the sword. Both were devastating in sieges and were inflicted with varying levels of discrimination, often little, on both soldier and civilian within the walls. But it should be noted that, unlike massacres, famine has no place as a separate subject of analysis in the historiography of the British Civil Wars. The *BBIH*'s only entries on the subject are general histories, normally of Ireland, stretching from as far as 900 to 1900.²¹ This is noteworthy considering the importance of hunger as a weapon of war and the relatively abundant historiography of massacres.

¹⁷ Pells, 'Soliciting sympathy: the search for psychological trauma in seventeenth-century English Civil War maimed soldiers' petitions'; Erin Peters, 'Trauma Narratives of the English Civil War', *Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies* 16 (2016), 78–94; Mark Stoye, "'Memories of the Maimed": The Testimony of Charles I's Former Soldiers, 1660–1730', *History* 88 (2003), 204–226, at p. 205; Geoffrey Hudson, 'Disabled Veterans and the State in Early Modern England', in *Disabled Veterans in History*, ed. David Gerber (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 117–144, at pp. 118–19.

¹⁸ Pells, 'Soliciting Sympathy: The Search for Psychological Trauma in Seventeenth-Century English Civil War Maimed Soldiers' Petitions'.

¹⁹ Debra Hyatt-Burkhart and Lisa Lopez Levers, 'Historical Contexts of Trauma,' in *Trauma Counselling: Theories and Interventions*, ed. Lisa Lopez Levers (New York: Springer, 2012), 23–27, at pp. 23–24; Roger Buck, 'The Impact of War on Military Veterans', in *Trauma Counselling...*, 434–449, p. 434; Nigel Hunt, *Memory, War and Trauma* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

²⁰ Pells, 'Soliciting Sympathy: The Search for Psychological Trauma in Seventeenth-Century English Civil War Maimed Soldiers' Petitions'.

²¹ *Bibliography of British and Irish History*, accessed 10/01/2020, http://cpps.brepolis.net/bbih/search.cfm?action=search_advanced_result&search_order=year_desc&ALLFIELDS=famine&PERIOD=%28%20%28%28165D%7C166D%7C1640%7C1660%29%20WITHIN%20t%29%20OR%20%28%2817C%7C164D%29%20WITHIN%20to%29%20%29&PERIOD_CLOSE_MATCHES=0&PERIOD_FROM=1640&PERIOD_FROM_CLOSE_MATCH=%2D10000&PERIOD_PARTIAL=17C%7C164D&PERIOD_TO=1660&PERIOD_TOTAL=165D%7C166D%7C1640%7C1660&PERIOD_TO_CLOSE_MATCH=2100&startrow=41&search_selection=.

The exception to the organisation of this chapter by method of killing is the fourth subsection, which will explore responses to suffering in the form of ghosts. This subsection is based on the reported appearance of a ghost at the siege of Carlisle in the winter of 1644/45, at a time when the straitened garrison was beginning to suffer from the early stages of famine. The role of the supernatural in the Civil Wars, largely ghosts and witches, is a considerably wider subject than this chapter can hope to cover.²² This case study has been included in this thesis for two reasons. Firstly, it demonstrates one of the methods by which contemporaries comprehended their traumatic experiences and gave them meaning. Ghosts are never without purpose or motive, and their appearance can serve to dignify and cope with death.²³ Secondly, it had a polemical purpose. The ghost of Carlisle was formerly a Covenanter but upon return from death allegedly spouted Royalist slogans. The propaganda value of this sighting for the besieged and famished garrison, implying that God was truly on their side, is clear.

7.2 Famine, Sieges and Surrender

Ultimately the most common reason that a fortress surrendered was due to the defenders running out of food and water. No matter how great the courage of the besieged, it was not possible to sustain resistance if they were too weak to walk.²⁴ Furthermore, if there were many non-combatants within the defences famine conditions would occur more quickly, and potentially resulted in large numbers of civilian casualties. Following the collapse of the northern Royalist field army at Marston Moor, the various Royalist garrisons of England from the Trent to the Borders were isolated.²⁵ While the Parliamentary and Covenanter armies would take time to reduce them each in turn, ultimately most of them were put to siege before

²² Keith Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic*, 4th edn (London: Penguin Books, 1991), pp. 701–734; Gillian Bennett, ‘Ghost and Witch in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’, in *New Perspectives on Witchcraft, Magic and Demonology: Witchcraft in the British Isles and New England*, ed. Brian Levack, 5 vols. (London: Routledge, 2001), vol. III, pp. 3–14; Jo Bath, ‘“In the divell’s likeness”: Interpretation and confusion in popular ghost belief’, in *Early modern ghosts: proceedings of the “Early Modern Ghosts” conference held at St. John’s College, Durham University*, ed. John Newton (Durham: Centre for Seventeenth-Century Studies, 2003), pp. 70–78; Jo Bath, ‘“Sensible Proof of Spirits” : Ghost Belief during the Later Seventeenth Century’, *Folk-Lore* 117 (2006), 1–14.

²³ Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic*, 4th edn, pp.711–718.

²⁴ Firth, ‘Sir Hugh Cholmley’s narrative of the Great Siege of Scarborough’, p. 587.

²⁵ Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, pp. 66–67; Binns, *Yorkshire in the 17th Century*, pp. 83–85; Charles I, King of Great Britain, France and Ireland [attributed], *The Kings cabinet opened: or, certain packets of secret letters & papers, written with the Kings own hand, and taken in his cabinet at Nasby-Field, June 14. 1645 By victorious Sr. Thomas Fairfax; wherein many mysteries of state, tending to the justification of that cause, for which Sir Thomas Fairfax joyned battell that memorable day are clearly laid open; together, with some annotations thereupon* (London: Robert Bostock, 1645), p. 13.

they surrendered.²⁶ This chapter section will explore the two most dramatic cases of siege-famine that occurred in Northern England during the British Civil Wars, namely the siege of Carlisle, and the Great Siege of Scarborough. A comparison between the two is valuable, for while they were both Royalist fortresses held to the bitterest extremity between 1644–1645, there were otherwise some considerable differences. At Scarborough, the Royalists withdrew quickly into the castle and did not contest the town.²⁷ By contrast at Carlisle, the entire city was held by the Royalists until the final surrender, and the Royalists actively raided the surrounding countryside for victuals until a few weeks before their surrender.²⁸

The main source for the siege of Carlisle is the account written by Isaac Tullie, a young resident of the city during the fighting.²⁹ Throughout Tullie's narrative, food was one of his central preoccupations. He wrote that 'Some 6 weeks past without much action, except for catching now and then of a few Cowes, some Foles accompanied wth carousing, and some skirmishing w[i]th the Scotch hors[e] w[i]thout order.'³⁰ Throughout his narrative Tullie recounted multiple battles over cattle, often resulting in casualties. In a siege situation, such 'meat on the hoof' was an extremely valuable resource. Before withdrawing inside the fortress, the Royalists had scoured the surrounding countryside of 'Corn from all the adjacent fields, besides meat, salt, coles and cowes'.³¹ Interestingly, there was a punitive as well as pragmatic motive behind this process. Tullie stated that the confiscations were 'cheifly from about Wigton, y^e nest of the Roundheads'.³² Even without the added motive of punishing dissent, and weakening potential allies for the invading Covenanters, confiscated cows represented a ready source of essential victuals for the garrison. Indeed, so many cattle were seized that 'an Oxe might have been bought in their towne for 18d at this time', a bargain considering that a pound of beef normally cost around two and a half pence in this period.³³ But the defenders' cattle had to be grazed outside the city and were therefore at risk of attack from the besiegers' cavalry troops. Royalist troopers were assigned to protect the livestock, resulting in repeated small skirmishes. Indeed, these battles are the most common single feature of Tullie's narrative, being mentioned 13 times

²⁶ Binns, *Yorkshire in the Civil Wars*, pp. 83–87.

²⁷ Binns, *A Place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640–1660*, pp. 131–182; Firth, 'Sir Hugh Cholmley's narrative of the Great Siege of Scarborough', p. 581.

²⁸ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle: Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640–1660*, p. 7.

²⁹ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*.

³⁰ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 12.

³¹ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 7.

³² Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 7.

³³ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 7; Gregory Clark, 'The Price History of English Agriculture, 1209–1914', *Research in Economic History* 22 (2004), 41–123, at 63.

in all.³⁴ While one would expect the cost of meat to skyrocket during a siege, and therefore beef to be out of reach of all but the wealthier citizens, this was reportedly not the case at Carlisle, owing to the governor's imposition of rationing in Christmas 1644.³⁵ Tullie wrote that:

Now was all the corn taken from the Citizens, and carried to the Magazeene, a portion thence distributed weekly to every family according to their Number, and their Cattell w[he]ⁿ they were to be killed, taken to the Castle thence from time to time distributed, no more to y^e owner, but y^e head, heart, and liver; then to any other.³⁶

The governor's concern for private property was secondary to keeping the city adequately provided with foodstuffs. In mid-January, the garrison also assumed control over the city's alcohol supply, which both conserved valuable victuals and helped to cut down on drunkenness amongst the townsfolk and soldiers alike.³⁷ Tullie recorded that:

About this time, Dr. Basire, in his sermon, seasonably reprovng the Garrison's excessive drinking, called drisling, prevailed so, that the Governours forthwith appointed a few brewers in every street, to furnish each family sparingly and p'portionably.³⁸

Control over both food and drink was centralised under the control of the governor and his officials, before being distributed to the townspeople as they required it.³⁹ While owing to the normal paucity of garrison records, it is unknown how exactly these requirements were calculated, the implementation of rationing marked the end of normal market relations in Carlisle. The last time that Tullie mentioned a skirmish over cattle was dated 29 May, and once the supply of beef ran out, the Royalists were forced to resort to less wholesome sources of meat.⁴⁰ Tullie stated that they reduced to a 'small quantity of hors flesh without Bread or Salt', and that 'Hempseed, dogs, and rats were eaten'.⁴¹ Dogs and rats may be stringy and not particularly good eating, particularly in the case of the latter, but at least they actually had edible meat on their bones. It is difficult to see how much nutritional value hempseed could have provided, and the entire episode demonstrated the desperate condition of the defenders. Indeed,

³⁴ See Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, pp. 7, 12–14, 18, 25–34, 42.

³⁵ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 13.

³⁶ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 13.

³⁷ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 15.

³⁸ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 15.

³⁹ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 15.

⁴⁰ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 43.

⁴¹ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 43.

by this stage in the siege, the state of famine in the city became acute for both garrison and townspeople alike. Tullie's entry for 6 June recounted that:

Now were Gentlemen and others so shrunk that they could not chuse but laugh one at another to see their close hang as upon men on gibbets; for one might have put their head and fists between the doublet and the shirts of many of them.⁴²

Black humour as a coping method for dealing with trauma was a common feature of warfare, and indeed of the history of suffering in general.⁴³ However, this humour belied the desperate state of the Royalist soldiery. The fact that both 'Gentlemen and others' were so emaciated that they resembled corpses demonstrates that rank was no guarantee of sufficient nutrition at this point in the siege.⁴⁴ While this demonstrates that the ration system was still succeeding in producing an equitable distribution of the remaining victuals, given that the gentlemen of the garrison were starving to death alongside their men, it also meant that the fighting quality of the Royalist soldiers would have begun to drop. While it could be that the gentlemen in question were simply losing excess body fat, it could also demonstrate the loss of muscular tissue owing to low nutrition.⁴⁵ Even long before this condition becomes life-threatening, typically due to the heart muscle weakening, this would result in a precipitous decline in the sufferer's physical fitness.⁴⁶

Despite and because of these conditions, it was necessary to continue the raids on the surrounding countryside to acquire more foodstuffs. At the beginning of June, six troopers were sent to gather sacks of grain from a mill, to bring back into the town.⁴⁷ While they did possess some draft horses in addition to their mounts, it is difficult to see how such a small party of men

⁴² Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 44.

⁴³ Cameron Nickels, *Civil War Humor* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2010), pp. 83–114; Rosmary Gallagher, "All this happened, more or less": Making Sense of the War Experience Through Humor in "Slaughterhouse-Five" and "The Sirens of Titan", *Studies in American Humor* 3.6, *Special Issue: Kurt Vonnegut and Humor* (2012), 73–78.

⁴⁴ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 44.

⁴⁵ Ancel Keys, Josef Brožek, Austin Henschel, Olaf Mickelsen, Henry Taylor, Ernst Simonson, Angie Sturgeon Skinner, Samuel M. Wells, J. C. Drummond, Russell M. Wilder, Charles Glen King, and Robert R. Williams, 'Nature of the Physiological Problems', in *The Biology of Human Starvation*, 2 vols. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1950), vol. I, pp. 575–586, accessed February 11, 2020. doi:10.5749/j.ctv9b2tqv.31.

⁴⁶ Ancel Keys et al, 'Circulation and Cardiac Function', in *The Biology of Human Starvation*, vol. I, 607–634; Ancel Keys et al, 'The Capacity for Work', in *The Biology of Human Starvation*, vol. I, 714–748.

⁴⁷ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 46.

could carry enough grain back to Carlisle to sustain the garrison for very long. Neither was the expedition without violence, for they were blocked on their return by Covenanter horsemen. Incredibly the charge of six Royalists managed to scatter their opponents, and they made it back into Carlisle.⁴⁸ Tullie, with his typical ‘spin’ on events, declared that ‘What could [nt] these worthies have atchieved, if they had not co in a pinfold and pined with hunger?’⁴⁹ While undoubtedly valorous, the troopers’ actions only bought the garrison a few more weeks. By the end of June, Carlisle was essentially out of foodstuffs, and as a consequence, civic order began to collapse. Tullie recorded that on 28 June:

The towns men humbly petitioned S[i]^r Tho[ma]^s Glenham y[a]^t their horse flesh might not be taken from them as formerly; and informed him y[a]^t they were not able to endure y^e famine any longer; to w[i]^{ch} he gave no answer, nor redresse, in 4 dayes space; at which time, a few women of y^e scolds and scum of the citty, mett at y^e cross, braling against S^r Henry Stradling there p[’]sent; who first threatned to fire upon them; and when they replyed they [would] take it as a favour, he left them wth tears in his eyes, but could not mend their commons.⁵⁰

Two days after this second protest, Carlisle surrendered. The first protest had maintained the normal forms of civic-military relations, with the townsmen ‘humbly’ petitioning the commander-in-chief of the garrison, Sir Thomas Glemham.⁵¹ However, the contents of the petition, which regrettably, but typically, has not survived, were far from normal. The fact that the Royalists were collecting the horsemeat from the entire town, presumably as part of their rationing efforts, shows the level of control the garrison had over the town’s foodstuffs during the siege.⁵² Furthermore, the fact that the citizens, after six months of rationing, were no longer willing to see their last remaining stocks of food confiscated by the garrison for distribution demonstrates that this control had fallen apart.⁵³ Given everything else Tullie said about the near-complete absence of foodstuffs at this stage in the siege, the collapse of the rationing system was clearly due to the garrison no longer having any real stocks of food left to ration.

Glemham did not offer any succour to the citizens of Carlisle, as there was none to be had. This precipitated the second protest, which did not maintain the normal forms of civic-military

⁴⁸ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 46.

⁴⁹ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 46.

⁵⁰ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 47.

⁵¹ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 47.

⁵² Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 47.

⁵³ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 47.

relations at all. By contrast with the ‘humble petition’, which suggests a degree of formality consistent with the actions of the civic oligarchy, the townswomen’s protest was drawn from ‘ye scolds and scum of the citty’, indicating that they were of relatively low social status.⁵⁴ Furthermore, Tullie characterised, and condemned, their protest as ‘braling’ against the governor.⁵⁵ It is not clear from Tullie’s narrative which he found more offensive, the fact that the protesters were women, the fact that they were poor, or the way their protest against Tullie’s beloved cavaliers was carried out. The complete breakdown in the civic-military relationship was borne out by Stradling’s threat to order his men to fire upon the small crowd.⁵⁶ Killings of protesters in this way were not a usual feature of the Civil Wars, particularly in the case of a small number of unarmed women. Stradling’s reaction to the womens’ declaration that quick death would be preferable to the continued suffering they were currently enduring suggests that he never seriously intended to open fire.⁵⁷ As much as the protest, the governor’s emotional collapse demonstrated that the strain and privation of the siege had become intolerable.

While Tullie did not mention diseases such as scurvy in his narrative, it was probably frequent amongst the garrison and the townsfolk alike. A diet of horse, dog and rat meat was ultimately not sustainable, and it is highly doubtful that hempseed would have provided sufficient greenery to make up for the complete lack of fruit and vegetables. This was certainly the case at the contemporaneous Great Siege of Scarborough in Yorkshire. Sir Hugh Cholmley and his garrison had retreated within the castle on 18 February 1645, leaving Scarborough town to be taken by the Parliamentarians.⁵⁸ They had then put up five months of fierce resistance, in which the castle was subject to intensive bombardment and repeated assaults.⁵⁹ Outnumbered three to one, the Royalists managed to hold off the enemy despite considerable losses and the destruction of most of the castle due to cannon fire.⁶⁰ However, by summer the garrison had run critically low on food and water, and as a consequence, they suffered ‘the scurvie which grew to be as contagious as the plague’.⁶¹ In his account of the siege, Cholmley stated that:

⁵⁴ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 47.

⁵⁵ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 47.

⁵⁶ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 47.

⁵⁷ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 47.

⁵⁸ Firth, ‘Sir Hugh Cholmley’s narrative of the Great Siege of Scarborough’, p. 581.

⁵⁹ Firth, ‘Sir Hugh Cholmley’s narrative of the Great Siege of Scarborough’, pp. 582–583.

⁶⁰ Firth, ‘Sir Hugh Cholmley’s narrative of the Great Siege of Scarborough’, pp. 568–587.

⁶¹ Firth, ‘Sir Hugh Cholmley’s narrative of the Great Siege of Scarborough’, p. 587.

At length the miseries of the Castle began exceedinglie to multiply; halfe of the soldiers were either slaine or dead of the scurvy, of which disease neare the other halfe laid soe miserable handled they were scarce able to stirr hand or foot.⁶²

While caution must be taken when relying upon this account, as Cholmley's status as a former Parliamentarian meant that he had good reason to demonstrate the depth of his new-found loyalty to the King, this part of his account is borne out by other sources.⁶³ Parliamentarian newsbooks reported that, at the surrender of the castle, many of Cholmley's men were too weak to walk and had to be carried on stretchers down into the town.⁶⁴ Furthermore, while Cholmley's men had been given leave to go to Royalist Newark, only a hundred and sixty men and women went south from Scarborough with Sir Hugh.⁶⁵ Other sources state that 100 men, too ill to be moved owing to scurvy, were left in Scarborough itself.⁶⁶ While many would have defected, or simply gone home, the evidence for as many as 50% casualties, and possibly even fatalities, is strong. Scurvy ravaged the garrison, and it is probable that if the Parliamentarians had had the stomach for another direct assault it would have managed to carry the fortress given that 'there was but 25 of the common soldiars able to doe dutie'.⁶⁷ Even the disposal of the mounting piles of dead bodies had become difficult, since 'there dyed ten in a night, and manie layed two days unburied for want of helpe to carrie them to the grave'.⁶⁸ Scurvy caused a

⁶² Firth, 'Sir Hugh Cholmley's narrative of the Great Siege of Scarborough', p. 586.

⁶³ For a historical perspective on Cholmley's efforts at self-justification, see Hopper, 'Fitted for Desperation': Honour and Treachery in Parliament's Yorkshire Command, 1642–1643', pp. 147–149; Hopper, 'The Self-Fashioning of Gentry Turncoats during the English Civil War', pp. 251–252. For original sources relating to the dire situation within the castle, see James Hopkinson, *The coppie of a letter from major Generall Poines his quarters of the taking of Scarborough. With the coppie of the 12 articles agreed and concluded upon the 22. of July, 1645. between the Honourable Sir Matthew Boynton, Knight and Baronet, one of the militarie committee, for the Northerne Association. And Sir Hugh Cholmley Knight and Baronet, governour of that castle there, concerning the delivering of the same. As also a list of what was taken in Scarborough. Printed, and published according to order* (London: B. Alsop & J. Coe, 1645); Anon, *An exact relation of the surrender of Scarborough Castle, By Sir Hugh Cholmley, governour of the same; to Coll. Sir Matthew Boynton, Colonell Lassels, and Coll. Needham, commanders in chief of the Parliaments forces in Scarborough. Together with a copy of the articles agreed upon at the said surrender. Also, that Rabs Castle, Sir Henry Vanes houses in the Bishoprick of Durham, with all the armes and ammunition therein, is yielded up to the Parliaments forces* (London: John Field, 1645), pp. 3–4; Anon, *God appearing for the Parliament, in Sundry late Victories Bestowed upon their Forces, VVich Command and call for great Praise and Thanksgiving, both from Parliament and People* (London: Edward Husband, 1644), pp. 3–5.

⁶⁴ Binns, *A place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640–1660*, p. 162; Hopkinson, *The coppie of a letter from major Generall Poines his quarters of the taking of Scarborough....*

⁶⁵ *The Weekly Account...*, no. 20 (23 July 1645–29 July 1645, *Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 671.230).

⁶⁶ *Mercurius Britannicus*, no. 91 (21 July 1645–28 July 1645, *Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 286.091).

⁶⁷ Firth, 'Sir Hugh Cholmley's narrative of the Great Siege of Scarborough', p. 586.

⁶⁸ Firth, 'Sir Hugh Cholmley's narrative of the Great Siege of Scarborough', p. 586.

vicious cycle of famine, as the garrison became too weak to carry out the actions necessary to keep themselves alive. Cholmley recounted that:

there was corne sufficient, but not to make the mills goe, in soe much that most in the Garrison had not eaten a bitt of bread for divers dayes before the render, and the Governour had often in person turned the mills to get himselfe bread.⁶⁹

While it is doubtful that the governor had to grind mills himself, the idea that the surrender was due to the final collapse of the garrison's food production system is very probable. But it was not only bread that was wanting, for the garrison had essentially run out of water. The castle had two wells, a deep one by the keep and a shallow one serving the chapel near the sea cliff.⁷⁰ The first had already failed by early 1645, and the second was so shallow that it only filled up with winter rains and was useless in summer.⁷¹ There were springs at the base of the sea cliff that the castle was built upon, but this involved climbing down the cliff, and then back up again holding containers full of water.⁷² Amazingly, this was to prove the garrisons' main source of water for the final part of the siege, even if it was collected 'with much paines, difficulty and perrill'.⁷³ But by July even this supply had been cut off, as the Parliamentary naval blockade grew tighter, and enemy ships moved into a position to fire directly at the base of the sea cliff.⁷⁴ Cholmley wrote that:

There was a well in the Castle but the water if affoorded us nott considerable, and the shipps had now debarred access to that under the cliff, soe that manie horses had beene with out water for seaven days together, which occasioned contagion amongst them alsoe.⁷⁵

It was now impossible to effect further resistance to the parliamentary forces. While the garrison was, according to Cholmley, also running low on gunpowder, the amount of space he spent in describing the problems imposed by want of food and water makes it clear that he considered lack of those essentials for life the main cause of the garrison's collapse.⁷⁶ With the promise of lenient terms, despite Cholmley's status as a turncoat, the garrison finally surrendered on 22

⁶⁹ Firth, 'Sir Hugh Cholmley's narrative of the Great Siege of Scarborough', p. 586.

⁷⁰ Pearson, 'Scarborough Castle, North Yorkshire', pp. 6, 11, 22, 53.

⁷¹ Binns, *A place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640–1660*, p. 159.

⁷² Binns, *A place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640–1660*, p. 159.

⁷³ Binns, *A place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640–1660*, p. 159.

⁷⁴ Firth, 'Sir Hugh Cholmley's narrative of the Great Siege of Scarborough', p. 586.

⁷⁵ Firth, 'Sir Hugh Cholmley's narrative of the Great Siege of Scarborough', p. 586.

⁷⁶ Firth, 'Sir Hugh Cholmley's narrative of the Great Siege of Scarborough', pp. 586–587.

July 1645. While at most garrisons the signing of the articles of surrender was immediately followed by the defender's vacating their garrison, at Scarborough the pitiful state of the Royalists meant that Cholmley was given three days to evacuate all of the castle's residents.⁷⁷ This was made more difficult, since 'the entrance in the Castle was soe barracadoed as they were forced to make a passage through the maine wall into the ditch, where the besieged passed out, the Governor bringing up the rear.'⁷⁸ Over the space of the three days, Chomley moved all of the survivors out of the devastated ruin they had held for five months into Scarborough town. A majority were no longer capable of unassisted movement. He wrote that:

At the rendor of the Castle there was a hundred and fowerscore sicke personns, of which most of them not able to move, but were carryed out in blancketts, and many of them dyed before they gott into the Towne...Those which had abilitie to march out of the Castle with out helpe, though manie of them infirme in health, were about threescore, most Gentlemen and officers.⁷⁹

Sixty walked out of the garrison, and a hundred and eighty were carried out, some dying on the way.⁸⁰ This was just over half of the four hundred soldiers, plus civilians, whom Cholmley had led into the castle five months before.⁸¹ While many had died in the Parliamentary bombardment, or on repelling the assaults Meldrum had launched against the castle gatehouse, it was the famine that had finished the Royalists. Cholmley did not record the proportion of fatalities attributable to famine, but if it is just casualties are considered then those incapable of moving on their own outnumbered their able colleagues by two to one.

A hunger blockade was not as dramatic a method of forcing a garrison to submit as a direct storm, but it imposed considerably less risk upon the attacker. It also was a military tactic that, particularly in the case of fortresses with significant civilian populations, required the exposure of non-combatants to the same privations and suffering as the soldiers in arms. While civilians outside fortresses may have gone hungry, particularly if a field army had passed through their locality, the acute famine of this type was not common in Northern England during the Civil Wars. Fortresses might have been constructed as a means of protection, but under these circumstances, civilians were exposed to considerably greater suffering inside the defences than

⁷⁷ Binns, *A Place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars*, p. 162.

⁷⁸ Firth, 'Sir Hugh Cholmley's narrative of the Great Siege of Scarborough', p. 587.

⁷⁹ Firth, 'Sir Hugh Cholmley's narrative of the Great Siege of Scarborough', p. 587.

⁸⁰ Firth, 'Sir Hugh Cholmley's narrative of the Great Siege of Scarborough', p. 587; Binns, *A Place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars*, p. 162.

⁸¹ Binns, *A Place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars*, p. 162.

outside them. Moreover, famine was not the only means by which such universal pain was inflicted in besieged fortresses. For if the lines broke, and the fortress was taken, there was the possibility of a massacre.

7.3 The Storming of Fortresses and the Dynamics of the Massacre.

As the most historically prominent form of atrocity, the analysis of massacres suffers significant methodological difficulties. The main problem, given the formulaic nature of many contemporary reports of atrocities, is in determining whether the reported massacre had happened at all. The atrocities committed by the opposing side were naturally an important tool for the propagandist, and polemics produced by all of the combatants of the Civil Wars are filled with stories of the mass killing of civilians or prisoners, torture, and other forms of cruelty outside even the quite loose military ethics of the seventeenth century.⁸² Particularly important for the development of the atrocity story in the antebellum British Isles was the example of the concurrent Thirty Years war in Central Europe.⁸³ The length and viciousness of the Imperial conflict provided ready scope for the emergent medium of popular print in the Stuart dominions.⁸⁴ The accounts written for British Protestants of the behaviour of the Imperial-Catholic forces, in particular, contain many of the same formulas of the atrocity which would then be recycled in the British Isles' own devastating civil conflict.⁸⁵ Barbara Donagan has

⁸² For contemporary military ethics see Hugo Grotius, *The Rights of War and Peace, including the Law of Nature and of Nations*, translated from the Original Latin of Grotius, with Notes and Illustrations from Political and Legal Writers, by A.C. Campbell, A.M. with an Introduction by David J. Hill (New York: M. Walter Dunne, 1901), pp. 323–345, 359–372; Steven Forde, 'Hugo Grotius on Ethics and War', *American Political Science Association* 92 (1998), 639–648.

⁸³ See Peter H. Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy: A new history of the Thirty Years War* (London: Allen Lane, 2009) for the best current anglophone general history of the conflict.

⁸⁴ For example, accounts of the siege of Breda were very popular see Anon, *The newes which now arrive from diuers parts...*, pp. 18–19; Archer and Spinola, *A certaine and perfect relation of the encounter and bloody slaughter which is newly happened betweene the Marquesse Spinolas forces...*; Anon, *A remonstracion of the French subiects professing the reformed religion vnto the French King...*, pp. 17–18; Anon, *A continuation of all the principall occurrences which hath happened to the Leaguers lying before Breda...*; Anon, *A iournall or, historicall relation of all the principall matters which haue passed in the present siege of Breda...*; Anon, *A short description of the marching forth of the enemie out of Breda...*; For full refernces see pp. 48–49 of this dissertation.

⁸⁵ For contemporary English-language atrocity narratives from Germany 1610–1650 see Anon, *THE LAMENTABLE DESTRVCTION of Mulheim, a Protestant Towne in Germany. Done by the Inhabitants of Cologne the 30. of September last 1615. at three of the Clock in the Morning. Printed according to the Dutch Originall* (London: G. Eld & Richard Marchant, 1615); M. Parker, *A briefe dissection of Germanes affliction with warre, pestilence, and famine; and other deducable miseries, lachrimable to speak of; more lamentable to partake of. Sent as a (friendly) monitor to England, warning her to beware of, (generally) ingratitude, and security; as also (particularly) other greevous sinnes, the weight whereof Germany hath a long time felt, and at this present doth (and England may feare to) feelee. Written from approv'd intelligence* (London: T. Coates, 1638); Philip, *The lamentations of Germany. Wherein, as in*

pointed out that atrocities such as the spitting of babies on soldiers' pikes are reported with remarkable frequency in both wars, and as such are probably largely a polemical invention.⁸⁶

Accusations of torture, illegal under English common law except for in investigating treason, were also hurled by all parties' newsbooks against each other with little in the way of first-hand accounts to back them up.⁸⁷ On 2 November 1642 a pamphlet was produced in London entitled *A True and Perfect Relation of A victorious Battell Obtained against the Earl of Cumberland And his Cavaliers, By the Lo: Fairfax and Capt: Hotham*. According to this publication eight of the men of the Hull garrison had been taken back to Pontefract by their Royalist captors, whereupon, despite pleas for quarter and clemency, two of them were 'put to degrees to miserable torture, till they were dead', the rest were then promptly shot.⁸⁸ The anonymous author's motive was made very clear by the subsequent declaration that 'Captain Hothams Souldiers are resolved to burn his house, and to use all the cruelty that may be to him, and to give no quarter to the Cavalliers in that Castle.'⁸⁹ This pamphlet was not the only London publication to condemn the behaviour of the Earl of Cumberland's army in the autumn of 1642.⁹⁰ The Earl was sufficiently troubled by the blackening of his, and his army's, reputation

a glasse, we may behold her miserable condition, and reade the woefull effects of sinne. Composed by an eye-witnesse thereof: and illustrated by pictures, the more to affect the reader. For contemporary English-language general accounts of the Thirty Years War see N. C., *The history of the present warres of Germany A sixth part. Gathered out of the best intelligences, and reduced into times, places, and actions. Briefly brought down from October last past, to our Lady day 1634* (London: Thomas Harper, 1634); Anon [given in original source as 'Gentleman well deserving that hath suffered much in those warres'], *The invasions of Germanie with all the civill, and bloody warres therein, since the first beginning of them in anno 1618 and continued to this present yeare 1638: wherein are described the severall battles, encounters, conflicts, and assaults, of cities, townes, and castles ... with a new and exact map of Germany ...: together with the progresse of every army, marked with severall markes or lines, with the pictures of the chiefe commanders on both sides / faithfully collected out of good and credible originalls by a Gentleman well deserving that hath suffered much in those warres* (London, I. Norton, 1638). See also Serena Jones (ed.), *'Britain Turned Germany': The Thirty Years' War and its impact on the British Isles 1638–1660* (Solihul: Helion & Company Limited, 2018).

⁸⁶ Barbara Donagan, 'Codes and Conduct in the English Civil War', *Past and Present* 118 (1988), 65–95, at pp. 73–74.

⁸⁷ See Elizabeth Hanson, 'Torture and Truth in Renaissance England', *Representations* 34 (1991), 53–84.

⁸⁸ Anon, *A True and Perfect Relation of A victorious Battell Obtained against the Earl of Cumberland And his Cavaliers, By the Lo: Fairfax and Capt: Hotham. Also. The manner of the Lo: Fairfax his besieging of the City of York; with divers other remarkable Passages concerning the same. And. The Taking of Eight of Sir John Hothams Souldiers prisoners by the Cavaliers, and the tormenting deaths they put them unto. With. The Resolution of Captain Hothams Souldiers thereupon* (London: William Ley, 1642).

⁸⁹ Anon, *A True and Perfect Relation of A victorious Battell Obtained against the Earl of Cumberland...*

⁹⁰ *A Perfect Dirunall...*, no. 19 (17–24 October 1642), p. 33 (Nelson and Seccombe STC, 511.20B).

that he published a rebuttal to the charges.⁹¹ This was reprinted in London on 8 December 1642, to ensure that the audience that received the original atrocity pamphlet also got access to his vindication. There was no other reference to the torture and summary execution of Parliamentary prisoners in any other source from this time and place and it was probably fictitious. This was not a solely Parliamentary approach to atrocity, as the Royalist press were just as prone to the retelling of stories of torture. In his narrative of the siege of Carlisle, Isaac Tullie stated that:

March 17: The Gallant and faithfull Coronet Philipson returned from soliciting y^e King for y^e Cittyes relief. In his return, he was taken prisoner at Wetherby, and carried to York. Wherte Fairfax found the Kings letter about him, and by councell of Warr sentenced him to be racked the next morning; but he leaped the walls y[a]^t night.⁹²

While in Tullie's account cornet Philipson was lucky enough to escape torture, there is a similar evidential problem with the case of the two Parliamentary prisoners of Pontefract three years earlier. There were no other accounts of this incident, and it is impossible to prove its actuality one way or the other. This does not mean that the torture and summary execution of prisoners did not happen, for it would be incredible, given the subsequent historical experience of other conflicts involving large numbers of relatively unprofessional, ideologically opposed soldiers, if that were the case. What it does mean is that second-hand accounts of such atrocities, predominantly given in newsbooks, should not be accepted unproblematically by historians.

However, while obviously formulaic atrocity stories should be treated with suspicion, it is very important to note that there were circumstances in seventeenth-century warfare in which massacre was accepted by contemporary military ethics.⁹³ In the *Animadversions of War* several massacres were included in a chapter on historical strategies, which were meant to serve as examples for the reader.⁹⁴ On page 339, no less a mass-murderer than Tamerlane was even cited by Ward as an exemplar of how to treat a captured garrison.⁹⁵ If the garrison had surrendered, Ward recounted, Tamerlane treated them with mercy. If they resisted to the point

⁹¹ Henry Clifford, *The Declaration of the Right Honourable Henry: Earle of Cumberland; Together with divers Gentlemen of the County of York, who desire it may be put in print, and published in all the Parish-Churches of this County* (London: John Thomas, 1642).

⁹² Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 23.

⁹³ Grotius, *The Rights of War and Peace*..., pp. 323–345, 359–372; Steven Forde, 'Hugo Grotius on Ethics and War', pp. 639–648.

⁹⁴ Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre*..., pp. 333, 339.

⁹⁵ Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre*..., p. 339.

that the Timurid forces had to resort to storming the fortress, all within would be massacred.⁹⁶ Other examples from this chapter make it clear that, far from regarding such behaviour as an atrocity, Ward regarded it as perfectly acceptable. He also recounted the English invasion of France of 1544, in particular the service of Lord Poynings.⁹⁷ Ward stated that Poynings had warned the garrison of a French castle that ‘if he caused him to shoot (according to the Law of Armes) they should all be put to the Sword’.⁹⁸ The purpose of this threat was to encourage garrisons to surrender promptly, meaning that the attacker was not put to the expense, in blood, treasure and time, of a lengthy siege or, even worse, a risky direct assault. To further encourage surrender, those who did would be allowed to retain not only their lives but to march out with martial dignity and honour intact.⁹⁹

In addition to a deliberate policy of massacring those who failed to surrender promptly, the dynamics of siege warfare encouraged such outbursts of uncontrolled and indiscriminate violence. The risk of death to the besieger in an attack was significant. In *Going to the Wars*, Carlton calculated that a third of all military actions were sieges, and where a quarter of all deaths occurred.¹⁰⁰ For the attacker, as for the defender, a siege was a lengthy period of intense stress and danger quite unlike other forms of seventeenth-century battle. While many more people would die in a day of field battle than most days of a siege, storms and assaults excepted, a confrontation between two field armies was at least nearly always over within a day. By contrast, sieges could go on for months, in which the besieging soldiers were in almost continual action and, consequently, were under continual risk of violent death. Carlton argued that these conditions meant that ‘More often such pathetic sights [of the defeated defenders] stimulated aggression rather than compassion on the part of the victors’ because ‘the winners felt that they

⁹⁶ Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre...*, p. 339.

⁹⁷ Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre...*, p. 345.

⁹⁸ Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre...*, p. 345.

⁹⁹ See Anon, *Col. Bethells Letter to his Excellence the Lord Fairfax, Concerning the Surrender of Scarborough Castle, on Tuesday, December 19, 1648. Together with a true copy of the Articles for the Rendition thereof, and the Result of the Councell of War concerning the same* (London: J. Playford, 1648); York Minster, Hailstone Papers, Box 7: ‘Non-contemporary copy of the Articles agreed upon Between Coll. Richard Thornton, Commander in chiefe of the forces before Skipton Castle on the one party, and Sir John Mallory Knight, Col, and Governor of Skipton Castle on the other party, about The Surrender and Delivery of the said Castle, with the Cannon, Ammunition, Goods and Provisions belonging thereto, in manner after specified, to the said Coll, for the use of King and Parliament, the 21st day of December, 1645’, p. 2.

¹⁰⁰ Charles Carlton, *Going to the Wars: The Experience of the British Civil Wars 1638–1651* (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 155.

had already suffered enough from the vanquished.¹⁰¹ Both Carlton and Coster argued that the combination of the euphoria of victory and the prior sufferings of a long siege meant that the victorious besiegers would commit ‘acts of extreme irrationality and violence’.¹⁰² This theory provides a robust explanation for the outbreaks of violence against helpless prisoners that sometimes accompanied the fall of seventeenth-century fortresses.

Despite these psychological factors, along with the sanction of contemporary military ethics, there were few massacres of surrendering garrisons in Northern England during the British Civil Wars. Indeed, outside Ireland and the Scottish Highlands, such massacres were not a common feature of the conflict.¹⁰³ The exception to this general rule was the massacre of surrendered Royalist troops at the Second Siege of Scarborough in 1648.¹⁰⁴ The former Parliamentarian, now Royalist, governor of Scarborough Castle, Colonel Matthew Boynton, had received reinforcements by sea in late August 1648.¹⁰⁵ Parliamentarian newsbooks recorded that these reinforcements consisted largely of Catholics from the Spanish Netherlands and that they had treated the inhabitants of Scarborough town very poorly.¹⁰⁶ While a few of the reinforcements may have been sailors from the continent the majority of them were a mixed assortment of Royalist veterans from all over the British Isles.¹⁰⁷ There were three hundred of them, and as such, they now outnumbered the original two hundred former Parliamentarians

¹⁰¹ Carlton, *Going to the Wars: The Experience of the British Civil Wars 1638–1651*, p. 170.

¹⁰² Coster, ‘Massacre and Codes of Conduct in the English Civil War’, p. 91.

¹⁰³ Jones, ‘Massacres during the Wars of the Three Kingdoms’, pp. 74–75.

¹⁰⁴ *The Moderate Intelligencer*, no. 183 (14 September 1648–21 September 1648, *Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 419.183).

¹⁰⁵ *Mercurius Anti-Mercurius*, no. 1 (12 September 1648–19 September 1648, *Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 269.1).

¹⁰⁶ *Packets of Letters*, no. 27 (18 September 1648), p. 6 (*Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 480.27).

¹⁰⁷ Binns, *A Place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640–1660*, p. 206, quoting Committee for the Militia of the County of York, *By the committee of the militia for the countie of York wee being assigned and authorized by authority of Parliament for the raising of forces within this countie for suppressing of invasions and insurrections within the same* (York?: s.n., 1648); *Mercurius Anti-Mercurius*, no. 1 (12 September 1648–19 September 1648, *Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 269.1); *The Kingdome’s Weekly Intelligencer*, no. 277 (12 September 1648–19 September 1648, *Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 214.277); *Packets of Letters*, no. 27 (18 September 1648, *Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 480.27); R. Smith, *Bloudy newes from the north, declaring The particulars of three several Fights, neer Carlisle, Berwick, and Scarbrough between the English Scots, and French, undere the command of Lien. Gen. Crumwell, Col. Gen. Lambert, Generall Monro, Col. Sir Tho: Tildsley}{Colonell Boynton, Major Sanderson, and Major Ashton. WITH The number killed and taken on each side, the routing of the French neer Scarbrough, the great blow given to the Scots neer Carlisle, Monro’s retreating into Scotland with the remainder of his Horse and Foot, and the dispersing of Col. Tildsley’s forces neer Berwick. Likewise, the marching of the English Army toward Scotland, and Lieu. Gen. Cromwels Summons to the said Kingdom* (London: G. Lawrenson, 1648), p. 6.

who had followed Boynton into the King's service.¹⁰⁸ Three weeks after the arrival of reinforcements, on 15 September 1648, Colonels Bethell and Lascelles' Parliamentary soldiers stormed Scarborough town.¹⁰⁹ The Royalists put up resistance but were swiftly defeated in a series of street fights before they retreated into the safety of the castle.¹¹⁰ However, they were not able to retreat with their forces intact, and a great many were captured.

What followed was the massacre of a large number of Royalist prisoners by Parliamentary forces.¹¹¹ While the main primary sources for this massacre are polemical newsbooks, which this chapter has previously cautioned on relying upon for evidence of atrocities, there are extenuating circumstances in this particular case. It is the agreement of both Parliamentary and Royalist newsbooks on the reality of this massacre that suggests that these reports were true. While both opposing parties naturally attempted to place their own particular 'spin' on the events, there was no effort at denial by Parliamentary sources. They did, however, attempt to justify the massacre by reporting that the Parliamentary soldiers thought that the surrendered Royalists were Catholic rebels from Ireland.¹¹² Since 1644 such unfortunates if found in England in arms for the King could, by ordinance of the Parliament, be killed out of hand, even after they surrendered.¹¹³ The *Moderate Intelligencer*, a Parliamentary newsbook whose main

¹⁰⁸ Binns, *A Place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640–1660*, p. 206.

¹⁰⁹ Ashcroft (ed.), *Scarborough Records 1641–1660*, p. 120: MIC 2150/302; Anon, *Die 16. Octob. 1648. A messenger sent to the city of London with a packet of letters from the Isle of Wight, to be communicated to all His Maiesties loyall and true-hearted subjects in his Kingdom of England and dominion of Wales...*, p. 6; Anon, *A great and bloody fight at Scarborough-castle in Yorkeshire, between the Kings forces under the command of Col. Bointon, and the Parliaments forces under the command of Col. Bethel: with the number that were killed and taken, and the totall routing of the foot, near the cliffs, and breaking their necks down the great rock, and casting them into the sea. Also the declaration of Col. Charles Fairfax, and Major Gen. Poyntz, Marshall Gen. for the King, and their joyning with Col. Boynton against the Parliament....*, pp. 1–2; *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles I*, vol. 22: Jan 1648–Jan 1649: p. 254: SP 21/10 f.103, p. 255: SP 21/24 f.339, p. 274: SP 21/25 f.19. Colonel Boynton was ultimately declared a traitor, see *Cal. S.P. Dom., Commonwealth*, vol. 1, 1649–1650, p. 41: SP 18/1 f.40.

¹¹⁰ Binns, *A Place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640–1660*, p. 206.

¹¹¹ Committee for the Militia of the County of York, *By the committee of the militia for the countie of York wee being assigned and authorized by authority of Parliament for the raising of forces within this countie for suppressing of invasions and insurrections within the same*; *Mercurius Anti-Mercurius*, no. 1 (12 September 1648–19 September 1648, *Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 269.1); *The Kingdome's Weekly Intelligencer*, no. 277 (12 September 1648–19 September 1648, *Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 214.277); *Packets of Letters*, no. 27 (18 September 1648, *Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 480.27); Smith, *Bloudy newes from the north...*, p. 6.

¹¹² *Mercurius Anti-Mercurius*, no. 1 (12 September 1648–19 September 1648, *Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 269.1); *Packets of Letters*, no. 27 (18 September 1648, *Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 480.27).

¹¹³ C H Firth and R S Rait (eds.), *Ordinances and Acts of the Interregnum* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1911), pp. 554–555, in *Medieval and Early Modern Sources Online* [<http://sources.tannerritchie.com/browser.php?bookid=85>], accessed 06/2015.

value to both contemporaries and historians alike lies in its generally accurate reporting, explained that ‘prisoners, some Walloons, whom the soldiers took for Irishmen, [were] put to the sword, countrymen not knowing the difference of languages’.¹¹⁴ Other Parliamentary sources, such as the historians Rushworth and Whitelocke, incorporated these reports into their histories of the wars as truth without efforts at denial.¹¹⁵ The fact that the Parliamentary press provided complex justifications for the massacre suggests that they were aware that this slaughter would be regarded as an atrocity that required justification. It also demonstrates that to the intended audience these newsbooks were aimed at, Irish members of Royalist garrisons were not subject to the same protection as their comrades from the rest of the British Isles.¹¹⁶

It is not clear what the reaction of these unfortunate Royalists’ commander, Boynton, was to the massacre. *Mercurius Melancholicus* and *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, the main Royalist newsbooks of this period, declared that the governor was outraged by the killings and determined to avenge them.¹¹⁷ *Pragmaticus* reported that Boynton had said that ‘*rather than yeeld, he will bury his bones under the walls of the Castle, and that he doubts not to maintain it against all opposers*’.¹¹⁸ *Melancholicus* had a similar response to the event, stating that ‘Now the thing that hath so enraged the Governor, and questionlesse the soldiers with him, is the inhumane cruelty which the Pagan saints under Bethell and Lasselles executed upon those of the King’s party’.¹¹⁹ But this interpretation was hardly credible, considering several important points. Firstly, it was unclear how exactly either of these newsbooks were able to gain such an intimate knowledge of the reactions of Boynton and his garrison to the massacre. Boynton was

¹¹⁴ *The Moderate Intelligencer*, no. 183 (14 September 1648–21 September 1648, *Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 419.183).

¹¹⁵ Binns, *A place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640–1660*, p. 208; Rushworth, *Historical Collections of Private Passages of State*, vol. VI, p. 1265; Bulstrode Whitelocke, *Memorials of the English affairs from the beginning of the reign of Charles the First to the happy restoration of King Charles the Second*, 4 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1853), vol. II, p. 409.

¹¹⁶ Parliament of England, ‘An Ordinance Commanding that no Officer or Soldier either by Sea or Land, shall give any Quarter to any Irishman, or to any papist born in Ireland, which shall be taken in Arms against the Parliament in England’, in *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642–1660*; Jones, ‘Massacres during the Wars of the Three Kingdoms’, pp. 74–75; Stoye, ‘The Road to Farndon Field : Explaining the Massacre of the Royalist Women at Naseby’, pp. 895–923; Stoye, *Soldiers and Strangers: An Ethnic History of the English Civil War*, pp. 53–72.

¹¹⁷ *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, no. 26 (19 September–26 September 1648, *Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 369.226); *Mercurius Melancholicus*, no. 58 (25 September–2 October 1648, *Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 344.58).

¹¹⁸ *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, no. 26 (19 September–26 September 1648, *Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 369.226).

¹¹⁹ *Mercurius Melancholicus*, no. 58 (25 September–2 October 1648, *Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 344.58).

trapped within the walls of Pontefract Castle by Parliamentary soldiers, and so was not giving many interviews to friendly journalists.¹²⁰ While the apparatus of Parliamentary censorship meant that neither *Melancholicus* nor *Pragmaticus* had any details as to where they were published, it was probably not in immediate proximity to Scarborough.¹²¹ Secondly, the reported Royalist response was formulaic and was very similar to the reported torture of Parliamentary prisoners at Pontefract Castle six years before.¹²² Naturally, a propagandist would declare that his side's reaction to a massacre was defiance, rather than despair and demoralization. The final point against *Melancholicus* and *Pragmaticus*' argument was the surrender of the Scarborough Castle garrison on 17 December 1648.¹²³ Boynton lacked the resources to successfully hold the castle through winter, and Bethell offered generous terms that allowed the Royalists to march out of Scarborough with honour intact; despite their status as Parliamentary defectors.¹²⁴

Rather than fanatical resistance, the combination of massacre and generous terms produced a prompt surrender rather than the lengthy siege and costly assault endured at the Great Siege of

¹²⁰ Binns, *A place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640–1660*, pp. 205–206; George Goring, *A letter from the Earl of Norwich, the Lord Capel. and Sir Charles Lucas, to the Lord Generall Fairfax; and his answer thereunto. Also, a sally forth upon the Lord Fairfax his forces in Fryday last, and propositions for making addresses to the Prince. With a great fight in the couty of Hereford, between Sir Henry Lingen, and Major Harley. Another fight in the North between Lieu. Gen. Cromwel and the Scots, and Major Gen. Lamberts speech at the heat of his army* (London: B. A., 1648), p. 3; J. Walton, *The bloody battel at Preston in Lancashire between His Majesties forces commanded by Duke Hamilton, and Sir Marmaduke Landale, and the Parliaments forces commanded by Lieutenant Generall Cromwel, and Major Generall Lambert. With the particulars of the fight, the totall routing of the Scots generals Army, and their killing of 700. upon the place, and the place, and taking of 1100 horse, 47. colours, 20. pieces of ordnance all their armes and ammunition. Likewise, the resolution of the Scottish Army, touching Lieutenant Generall Cromwel, and both houses of Parliament, and the present proceedings concerning the Kings Majesty. Together with a message from His Highnesse the Prince of Wales, to the Lord Gen. Fairfax. And his Excellencies answer thereunto* (London: s.n., 1648), p. 3.

¹²¹ For further reading on the Parliamentary censorship apparatus, see McElligott, *Royalism, Print and Censorship in Revolutionary England*.

¹²² Anon, *A True and Perfect Relation of A victorious Battell Obtained against the Earl of Cumberland And his Cavaliers, By the Lo: Fairfax and Capt: Hotham. Also. The manner of the Lo: Fairfax his besieging of the City of York; with divers other remarkable Passages concerning the same. And. The Taking of Eight of Sir John Hothams Souldiers prisoners by the Cavaliers, and the tormenting deaths they put them unto. With. The Resolution of Captain Hothams Souldiers thereupon*.

¹²³ Binns, *A place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640–1660*, pp. 211–212.

¹²⁴ See Binns, *A place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640–1660*, p. 210; Anon, *Col. Bethells Letter to his Excellence the Lord Fairfax, Concerning the Surrender of Scarborough Castle, on Tuesday, December 19, 1648. Together with a true copy of the Articles for the Rendition thereof, and the Result of the Councell of War concerning the same*.

Scarborough three years before.¹²⁵ This incident was the only significant massacre of disarmed enemy personnel in Northern England during the Civil Wars, but it was not the only occasion when large scale killing accompanied the fall of a garrison.¹²⁶ The other most notable incident was the fall of Bolton on 28 May 1644.¹²⁷ The Parliamentary forces in the town consisted of the small army, under Colonel Rigby, formerly besieging Lathom House, who had been forced to withdraw into protected positions at the approach of Rupert. Unfortunately for Rigby, Bolton was wholly unprepared for action. The city had not had a garrison present for nearly a year, and its defences were out of repair.¹²⁸ There was no real siege at Bolton, instead, the Royalist forces arrived and promptly stormed the underdefended town.¹²⁹ The first Royalist attack was repulsed, but the second broke through the defences and took the town amidst fierce street fighting.

The accounts of the Bolton Massacre were vague and mutually contradictory.¹³⁰ Estimates of the dead ranged from 2,000 out of 3,000 Parliamentary soldiers present, to around 1,200 to 1,500 between both Royalists and Parliamentarians.¹³¹ What was clear is that the town was

¹²⁵ Firth, 'Sir Hugh Cholmley's narrative of the Great Siege of Scarborough', pp. 568–587; Anon, *An exact relation of the surrender of Scarborough Castle, By Sir Hugh Cholmley, governour of the same; to Coll. Sir Matthew Boynton, Colonell Lassels, and Coll. Needham, commanders in chief of the Parliaments forces in Scarborough. Together with a copy of the articles agreed upon at the said surrender. Also, that Rabs Castle, Sir Henry Vanes houses in the Bishopricks of Durham, with all the armes and ammunition therein, is yielded up to the Parliaments forces.*

¹²⁶ Anon, *An exact relation of the bloody and barbarous massacre at Bolton in the moors in Lancashire, May 28 by Prince Rupert being penned by an eye-witnesse, admirably preserved by the gracious and mighty hand of God in that day of trouble* (London: R. W., 1644); Sir John Meldrum warned of the Royalists 'wasting and spoiling' Lancashire, see *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 19, 1644, p. 180: SP 16/501 f.228, 'Sir John Meldrum to Basil Earl of Denbigh'; he also described the county as 'much threatened with the ravages of that fierce thunderbolt', see *Cal. S.P. Dom, Charles I*, vol. 19, 1644, p. 188: SP 16/501 f.229, 'Sir John Meldrum to Basil Earl of Denbigh'; while the C.o.B.K. were informed that 'they made a great slaughter of the defenders as the vulgar reports tell us', see *Cal. S.P. Dom, Charles I*, vol. 19, 1644, p. 206: SP 21/16 f.17f.228, 'June 5 1644. The Earls of Leven and Manchester and Lord Fairfax to the Committee of both kingdoms'.

¹²⁷ *Mercurius Aulicus*, 24th week (9 June 1644–15 June 1644), pp. 1020, 1031 (*Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 275.224A).

¹²⁸ Broxap, *The Great Civil War in Lancashire*, p. 121.

¹²⁹ Anon, *An exact relation of the bloody and barbarous massacre at Bolton in the moors in Lancashire, May 28 by Prince Rupert being penned by an eye-witnesse, admirably preserved by the gracious and mighty hand of God in that day of trouble*, p. 2; *Cal. S.P. Dom, Charles I*, vol. 19, 1644, p. 206: SP 21/16 f.17f.228, 'June 5 1644. The Earls of Leven and Manchester and Lord Fairfax to the Committee of both kingdoms'.

¹³⁰ Anon, *An exact relation of the bloody and barbarous massacre at Bolton in the moors in Lancashire, May 28...*; Anon, *A Briefe relation of the most remarkeable feats and passages of what His Most Gracious Majesties commanders hath done in England against the rebells and of his severall glorious victories over them sithence [sic] Ianuary 1641. till December 1643. and from the first of May 1644. till the fifth of this present Iuly / collected out of severall papers printed at Oxford, 1644. and divers letters printed from His Majesties campe to Chester, Bristoll, &c.* (Waterford: Thomas Bourke, 1644).

¹³¹ Broxap, *The Great Civil War in Lancashire*, p. 122.

attacked, stormed and then sacked by Prince Rupert's army with a ferocity that was uncommon in the Lancastrian wartime experience. The main incident which appeared to enrage the Royalist army followed the repulse of their first attack. The defenders decided to take a captured Royalist officer and to hang him from the city walls 'as an Irish papist'.¹³² The exact identity of this officer is unknown, and it is unclear whether or not he was Irish, or indeed a Roman Catholic. David Casserley suggests that he may have been a local Lancastrian recusant serving in the regiment of Colonel Tyldesley, the most prominent of the county's Catholic Royalists.¹³³ The triumphal, and very public, killing of a prisoner reportedly enraged Prince Rupert who ordered that no quarter was to be given to 'any person then in Armes' within the town.¹³⁴

Personal and feudal relationships also played a part in the violence of the Royalist assault. The Earl of Derby and his men were accompanying Rupert, and James Stanley's animosity towards the defenders was significant.¹³⁵ Not only had the Parliamentary garrison been until a few days before engaged in shooting at his wife and children, but many members of the garrison had been his clients before the war.¹³⁶ Derby's martial reputation had also suffered from his defeats in Lancashire the year before, and his wife's greater military successes had made him the object of public mockery in the Parliamentary newsbooks.¹³⁷ This combination of familial rage, perceived treachery against the House of Stanley, and the desire to rebuild his military reputation drove Derby to take the lead in the Royalist assaults against Bolton. He requested that his forces would lead the attack, two of his regiments under Colonel Tyldesley taking the brunt of the infantry assault.¹³⁸ Popular legend has Derby as the first Royalist to enter the town

¹³² Casserley, *Massacre: the Storming of Bolton*, p. 117; Prince Rupert's 'Diary' of the Civil War, Wiltshire County Record Office, 413/44Ai, f. 34. It should be clarified that, in the words of Malcolm Wanklyn this is 'an unhelpful title in that it is not a diary and it was written for, not by, the prince.' See Malcolm Wanklyn, *Decisive Battles of the English Civil War* (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2006), p. 10. The source was probably compiled by Rupert's secretary, as it was later discovered in their his family archive.

¹³³ A Captain Gilbert Ashton, of Tudlesley's Regiment was recorded as having been killed at Bolton. See Casserley, *Massacre: the Storming of Bolton*, p. 117; Prince Rupert's 'Diary' of the Civil War, Wiltshire County Record Office, 413/44Ai, f. 34; Anon, *The royal martyrs, or, A list of the lords, knights, officers, and gentlemen, that were slain (by the rebels) in the late wars, in defence of their king and country* (London: H. L., 1663), p. 9.

¹³⁴ Casserley, *Massacre: the Storming of Bolton*, p. 117; Prince Rupert's 'Diary' of the Civil War, Wiltshire County Record Office, 413/44Ai, f. 34.

¹³⁵ 'The Earle of Derby desireing to be one of the first to avengers of that barbarousness and cruelty expressed to his Lady', see Stanley, *A Journal of the siege of Lathom House...*, p. 62.

¹³⁶ Stanley, *A Journal of the siege of Lathom House...*, p. 63.

¹³⁷ *Mercurius Britannicus*, no. 27 (11 March 1644–18 March 1644), p. 207 (*Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 286.027A).

¹³⁸ Broxap, *The Great Civil War in Lancashire*, p. 121.

once the defences were breached, but this is probably hyperbole largely derived from wartime propaganda.¹³⁹ But Derby was certainly involved in the fighting within the town, where one of the most famous, and controversial incidents in the massacre occurred.

What all accounts, Royalist and Parliamentary, agree upon is that Derby encountered the Parliamentary Captain Bootle. Bootle ‘formerley one of his owne servants’ had joined the Parliamentarians and had been an officer under Rigby during the siege of Lathom House.¹⁴⁰ Here the reports differed on partisan lines. According to the Parliamentary accounts, Bootle had surrendered and was killed by Derby in cold blood.¹⁴¹ In one telling the captain was even brought before the Earl, a soldier holding him tightly by each arm before the enraged Stanley ‘drew upon him and run him through with his Sword.’¹⁴² Royalist accounts vary on whether or not the Earl killed his treacherous servant. In one account Derby did kill Bootle, but during the battle, and not after the latter had been given quarter.¹⁴³ In other accounts, Derby was reported to have told Bootle ‘I will not kill thee, but I cannot save thee from the others.’¹⁴⁴ The truth of the matter is probably beyond the reach of historians. When Derby was executed in Bolton in

¹³⁹ Casserley, *Massacre: the Storming of Bolton*, p. 211.

¹⁴⁰ Stanley, *A Journal of the siege of Lathom House...*, p. 63.

¹⁴¹ Anon, *An exact relation of the bloody and barbarous massacre at Bolton in the moors in Lancashire, May 28 by Prince Rupert being penned by an eye-vvitness, admirably preserved by the gracious and mighty hand of God in that day of trouble*, p. 4.

¹⁴² Robinson [attributed], ‘A Discourse of the Warre in Lancashire’, p. 51.

¹⁴³ Casserley, *Massacre: the Storming of Bolton*, p. 118; Stanley, *A Journal of the siege of Lathom House...*, pp. 62–63.

¹⁴⁴ Casserley, *Massacre: the Storming of Bolton*, p. 118; John Brown, *The History of Great and Little Bolton* (Manchester: John Leigh, 1825), p. 411.

1651 it was primarily on the charge of treason against the Parliament, rather than the murder of Bootle.¹⁴⁵ However, the charge was part of the trial and was denied by the Earl.¹⁴⁶

Religious differences were a significant factor, as was the case at so many massacres throughout the British Isles during this period. Bolton was known as the ‘Geneva of the North’ and was one of the strongest centres of the hotter forms of Protestantism in Lancashire.¹⁴⁷ By contrast, a large number of the attacking Royalists, namely Colonel Tyldesley’s regiments, were raised from the recusants of the county.¹⁴⁸ Confessional enmity was the main reason behind the killing of the Royalist prisoner that precipitated Rupert’s second attack and was borne out by the harsh treatment visited upon the town. While Parliamentary reports of ‘four worthy divines’ being killed by the Royalists are manifestly untrue, given that three of them signed the *Harmonious*

¹⁴⁵ James Stanley, *The tryall and plea of James Earle of Derby, prisoner of war, before a court martiall at Chester, Octob. 1. 1651 The articles were severall particulars of treason, by his invading England, raising forces, &c. The answer is a confession of the fact. The plea is a plea of quarter, which he conceives to be a good bar to a tryall for life, by court martiall or councill of war, though not against a meer civill judicature. His plea was over-ruled by the court upon this account, that the court martiall was directed by Parliament. So that the court proceeded to sentence, only gave him a fortnights time from the first of October. From this sentence he appealeth to his Excellency the Lord Generall* (London: s.n., 1651), p. 8. See also, James Stanley *The Earle of Darby’s speech on the scaffold, immediately before his execution at Bolton in Lancashire, on Wednesday, October 15. 1651. Exactly taken in shorthand, as it was spoken; and now published for the satisfaction of those that desire to be truly informed* (London: Nathaniel Brooks, 1651) James Stanley, *The true speech delivered on the scaffold by James Earl of Derby, in the market-place at Boulton in Lancashire, on vvednesday last, being the 15. of this instant October, 1651. With the manner of his deportment and carrage on the scaffold: his speech concerning the King of Scots. And his prayer immediately before his head was severed from his body. As also his declaration and desires to the people. Likewise, the manner how the King of Scots took shipping at Graves-end, on the fourth of this instant October, with Captain Hind, disguised in sea-mens apparel, and safely arrived at the Hague in Holland. Published by Authority* (London: Robert Eles, 1651).

¹⁴⁶ The account reads, ‘Peter Cropper of Bickerstaffe in the County of Lancaster Gentleman, maketh Oath, That about the latter end of the Month of May, in the year 1644. at the time when Prince Rupert took the Town of Bolton in Lancashire, by assault; he this Depone[...],t, being there present, saw the now Earle of Derby neer unto the Cross in Bolton; and it being ru|mored then, that the said Earle had slaine one Bootle, that had bin once his Porter, he looked and saw the said Bootle wounded, but not dead; and soon after, one Col. Clifton, since deceased, standing by, with his sword ran the said Bootle through once or twice, saying, If thou have not enough, thou shalt have more, or words to that effect; upon which the said Bootle fell down dead; and he further saith, that this killing of the said Bootle, was above an hour before the said Town was taken, or any generall Quarter given; for that the Princes Souldiers did pursue those in the Town above an houre after the said Bootles death, before they ceased, and gave Quarter.’ Stanley and Anon, *The tryall and plea of James Earle of Derby, prisoner of war, before a court martiall at Chester, Octob. 1. 1655.....*

¹⁴⁷ George Ormerod (ed.), *Tracts relating to military proceedings in Lancashire during the great civil war, commencing with the removal, by Parliament, of James, lord Strange, afterwards earl of Derby, from his lieutenancy of Lancashire, and terminating with his execution at Bolton* (London: Chetham Society, 1844), p. 128; William Farrer and J. Brownbill (eds.), *A History of the County of Lancaster*, 5 vols. (London: Victoria County History, 2003), vol. V, pp. 243–245.

¹⁴⁸ Casserley, *Massacre: the Storming of Bolton*, p. 117.

Consent in 1649, there are also reports of Royalist mocking the survivors with cries of ‘where is your Roundhead God now?’¹⁴⁹ Once the Royalists broke into the city, the killing of fleeing Parliamentarians was joined by the killing, theft and rape of the local inhabitants. While the primary target of the killing was the Parliamentary soldiery, the Royalists quickly lost control of their men, who began rampaging through the town. Looting was, as previously stated, entirely permissible under contemporary military ethics and was a prominent feature of the sack. The targets of looting were very varied, ranging from bales of cloth to fine rapiers and other expensive items.¹⁵⁰ Other details of the sack, such as accounts of very elaborate tortures of the residents of the town, bear the hallmarks of atrocity stories; but the accusation of ‘barbarous usage of some other maids, and wives of the town in private places, in fields and woods’ rings true given similar historical experiences of sacked cities both before and since.¹⁵¹

The total number of dead is hard to judge. The estimate that 800 of the town’s 1,588 recorded residents perished in either the battle or the sack seems improbably high.¹⁵² Equally the records of the parish churches only show ‘78 old Bolton slayne of the 28 May 1644’, which is far too low, and does not take into account the killing of fleeing soldiers in the countryside surrounding Bolton.¹⁵³ After the defeat of the northern Royalists at Marston Moor, the Bolton massacre became a prominent feature of Parliamentary propaganda. This did not happen immediately,

¹⁴⁹ Casserley, *Massacre: the Storming of Bolton*, p. 122; Anon, *An exact relation of the bloody and barbarous massacre at Bolton in the moors in Lancashire, May 28 by Prince Rupert being penned by an eye-witnesse, admirably preserved by the gracious and mighty hand of God in that day of trouble*, p. 3; Richard Heyrick, *The harmonious consent of the ministers of the province within the county palatine of Lancaster, with their reverend brethren the ministers of the province of London, in their late testimonie to the trueth of Jesus Christ, and to our Solemn League and Covenant: as also against the errours, heresies, and blasphemies of these times, and the toleration of them* (London: J. Macock, 1648), pp. 26, 30.

¹⁵⁰ James Scholes and William Pimblett, *A History of Bolton with Memorials of the Old Parish Church* (Bolton: The Daily Chronicle, 1892), p. 268; Edward Robinson [attributed], ‘A Discourse of the Warre in Lancashire’, in *Remains Historical & Literary connected with the Palatine Counties of Lancaster and Chester*, ed. William Beaumont, Old Series, 114 vols. (Manchester: Chetham Society, 1864), vol. LXII, p. 52. William Beaumont identified Robinson, a Parliamentary major, as the author but this is disputed by J. Gratton on the basis of the author’s lack of attention to military details the soldier Robinson would have been familiar with. Instead he suggests, Thomas Robinson (no relation), a schoolteacher of Kirkham School in Lancashire, who also refers to a family marriage within the document. See J. Malcolm Gratton, ‘A discourse of the war in Lancashire: Its authorship resolved’, *Transactions of the Historic society of Lancashire and Cheshire* 154 (2005), 137–147.

¹⁵¹ Anon, *An exact relation of the bloody and barbarous massacre at Bolton in the moors in Lancashire, May 28 by Prince Rupert being penned by an eye-witnesse, admirably preserved by the gracious and mighty hand of God in that day of trouble*, p. 4.

¹⁵² Martyn Bennet, *The English Civil War, A Historical Companion* (Cheltenham: The History Press, 2004), p. 47.

¹⁵³ Casserley, *Massacre: the Storming of Bolton*, p. 123.

for example, *Britannicus* did not comment upon the killings until well after the battle of Marston Moor.¹⁵⁴ Subsequent Parliamentary accounts drew on a contemporary tradition of civic atrocity writing amongst British Protestants, with Bolton serving as a Lancastrian Magdeburg in anti-Catholic narratives.¹⁵⁵

7.4 Ghosts and the Meanings of Trauma.

At sieges, for besiegers and besieged alike, death was unpleasant, obvious and everywhere. This provided an ideal environment for ghosts, as contemporaries grappled with the horror of their situation. The following section will explore one such ghost, which was reported at the siege of Carlisle in February 1645 and which was recorded by Isaac Tullie in his narrative.¹⁵⁶ However, before the analysis of this incident can begin, it is necessary to provide some contextual information. What does this dissertation, and what did contemporaries, mean by a ghost?¹⁵⁷ The ghost was a difficult concept for seventeenth-century Britons, owing to the Protestant Reformation and the consequent removal of purgatory from the post-mortem British landscape. The medieval conception of the ghost as an unquiet spirit wandering the world was quite simple to square with the theology of the Roman Catholic Church.¹⁵⁸ The existence of Purgatory meant that there was a large metaphysical space for such unfortunate individuals; they had been sent from purgatory, by God, to roam the world of the living while they atoned for their sins committed in life.¹⁵⁹ The idea of the ghost as a restless spirit, in need of appeasement to lie at rest, had no official place after the Reformation.¹⁶⁰ But this raised a further

¹⁵⁴ Casserley, *Massacre: the Storming of Bolton*, p. 123.

¹⁵⁵ Anon, *THE LAMENTABLE DESTRUCTION of Mulheim, a Protestant Towne in Germany. Done by the Inhabitants of Cologne the 30. of September last 1615. at three of the Clock in the Morning. Printed according to the Dutch Originall*; Anon, *An exact relation of the bloody and barbarous massacre at Bolton in the moors in Lancashire, May 28 by Prince Rupert being penned by an eye-witness, admirably preserved by the gracious and mighty hand of God in that day of trouble.*

¹⁵⁶ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 21.

¹⁵⁷ 'An apparition of a dead person which is believed to appear or become manifest to the living', in *OED*, 'ghost'.

¹⁵⁸ Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic*, 4th edn, pp. 701–702.

¹⁵⁹ Frederick Valletta, *Witchcraft, magic and superstition in England: 1640–70* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), p. 80.

¹⁶⁰ It should be clarified that the post-Reformation English Church did retain certain Biblical examples of similar phenomena, such as the appearance of Moses and Elijah to Christ at the Transfiguration. 'There he was transfigured before them. His face shone like the sun, and his clothes became as white as the light. 3 Just then there appeared before them Moses and Elijah, talking with Jesus.' *King James Bible*, Matthew 17:3. It also be clarified that this was a unique case and was not cited by seventeenth-century advocates of ghosts on a regular basis.

difficulty for theologians, since ghost sightings continued, and it was necessary to explain what they were if not the unquiet dead.¹⁶¹

The official position, which emerged in the sixteenth century and which was still orthodoxy at the beginning of the seventeenth, was that ghosts were simply a satanic delusion.¹⁶² This position was set out by James VI & I in his *Daemonologie* of 1597.¹⁶³ He stated that ‘When they appeare vpon that occasion, they are called Wraithes in our language. Amongst the Gentiles the Deuill vsed that much, to make them beleue that it was some good spirite that appeared to them then, ether to forewarne them of the death of their friend; or else to discouer vnto them, the will of the defunct, or what was the way of his slaughter’.¹⁶⁴

The problem for historians is that this simple distinction, between Catholic belief and Protestant unbelief in ghosts as the returned dead, was far from watertight. In their 2006 essay, Jo Bath and John Newton argued that the absorption of ghosts by demons was a phenomenon of ‘the learned within the Reformed Churches’, but this distinction was hardly clear.¹⁶⁵ In the 1590s William Twisse, who later become a noted Puritan divine, experienced a religious awakening as a boy after being confronted with the spectre of a damned schoolmate.¹⁶⁶ For this young man, the witnessing of a ghost and conversion to the hotter forms of Protestantism were inextricably linked. Even among the most official Protestant divines of the Caroline period, the confidence in a demonic explanation for ghosts began to collapse. At Oxford University there were debates about ‘whether spirits really and substantially appeare, i.e. the ghosts of the deceased’.¹⁶⁷ Until the Civil Wars, none of these debates had yet reached the level of officially stated Church policy. But it suggested that the clear demonic explanation favoured at the end of the previous century

¹⁶¹ Valletta, *Witchcraft, magic and superstition in England: 1640–70*, p. 80.

¹⁶² Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic*, 4th edn, pp. 703–704.

¹⁶³ Valletta, *Witchcraft, magic and superstition in England: 1640–70*, p. 66; James VI & I, *Daemonologie, in forme of ane Dialogue, diuvided into three books* (Edinburgh: Robert Waldegrave, 1597) in *The Bodley Head Quartos: King James the First Daemonologie, Newes from Scotland...*, ed. G. B. Harrison (London: The Bodley Head, 1924), pp. 19–23, 55, 60–61.

¹⁶⁴ James VI & I, *Daemonologie...*, pp. 60–61.

¹⁶⁵ Bath and Newton, ‘Sensible Proof of Spirits: Ghost Belief during the Later Seventeenth Century’, p. 3.

¹⁶⁶ Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic*, 4th edn, p. 707; originally quoting John Aubrey, *Miscellanies on Various Subjects Fourth Edition* (London: John Russel Smith, 1857).

¹⁶⁷ Bath and Newton, ‘Sensible Proof of Spirits...’, p. 3; quoting Thomas Crosfield, *The Diary of Thomas Crosfield*, ed. E. S. Boas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935), p. 17.

was beginning to break down, a process that would be greatly accelerated by the outbreak of civil conflict.¹⁶⁸

The Civil Wars were famously a period rife with prodigies, monsters, visions and witches.¹⁶⁹ These occurrences were directly connected with the violence by contemporaries. The Royalist newsbook *Aulicus* claimed that reports of witches in Parliamentary Essex and Suffolk was ‘an usuall Attendant on former Rebellions’.¹⁷⁰ This was also a period in which apparitions of the dead were common, a natural consequence of the violence of the times. The most famous Civil War ghosts were, of course, the phantoms that were reported fighting in the skies above Edgehill following the battle.¹⁷¹ These ghosts, also described as prodigies sent by God rather than the returned souls of the dead, were only silenced when the bodies still littering the battlefield unburied received a Christian interment.¹⁷² The new sects that proliferated during the conflict may have been even more prone to ghost sightings than the recusants. Many active Parliamentarians’ reports of ghosts were collected into the *Certainty of the World of Spirits* by Richard Baxter in 1691, who used them to argue that atheism was irrationally ignoring all of the evidence of the persistence of the soul after death.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁸ Amanda McKeever, ‘The Ghost in Early Modern Protestant Culture: Shifting perceptions of the afterlife, 1450 – 1700’, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Sussex (2010), pp. 4–5; Bath and Newton, ‘Sensible Proof of Spirits...’, pp. 3–4.

¹⁶⁹ Harriet Lyon, ‘Monstrosity and truth in Restoration England’, M.Phil. thesis, University of Cambridge, 2014; Stuart Clark, *Thinking with Demons: The Idea of Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 557–559; McKeever, ‘The Ghost in Early Modern Protestant Culture...’, pp. 4–5; Malcolm Gaskill, ‘Witchcraft, emotion and imagination in the English Civil War’, in *Witchcraft and the Act of 1604*, eds. John Newton and Jo Bath, (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 161–178.

¹⁷⁰ *Mercurius Aulicus* (10 August 1645–17 August 1645), pp. 1697–1698 (*Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 275.318). *Aulicus*’ issue no. are given according to its frontispiece’s ‘1st week, 2nd week etc.’ Format, with the numbers repeating every year. However *Aulicus* lacks issue weeks after 12 January 1645. As a consequence the relevant references are given without issue number, but still with dates and page numbers.

¹⁷¹ Anon, *The New Yeares Wonder. Being a most certaine and true Relation of the disturbed inhabitants of Kenton, And other neighbouring villages neere unto Edgehill, where the great battaile betweixt the kings army, and the Parliaments forces was fought. In which place is heard & seene fearfull and strange apparitions of spirits as sounds of drums, trumpets, with the discharging of Canons Miskies, Carbines pettronels, to terroure and amazement, of all the fearfull hearers and behoulders* (London: Robert Elliot, 1643).

¹⁷² Valletta, *Witchcraft, magic and superstition in England*, p. 82.

¹⁷³ Richard Baxter, *The certainty of the worlds of spirits and, consequently, of the immortality of souls of the malice and misery of the devils and the damned : and of the blessedness of the justified, fully evinced by the unquestionable histories of apparitions, operations, witchcrafts, voices &c. / written, as an addition to many other treatises for the conviction of Sadduces and infidel* (London: T. Parkhurst & J. Salisbury, 1691).

However, it is important not to overstate this shift as the demonic model continued to be endorsed until the later seventeenth century, even if it was far less commonly articulated than before the Civil Wars. In 1658 in London Thomas Bromhall published ‘A Treatise of Spectres’, an exhaustive work cataloguing those ‘Apparitions, Oracles, Prophecies, and Predictions, with Dreams, Visions, And Revaltions. and the Cunning Delusions of the *DEVIL*, to strengthen the *Idolatry* of the GENTILES, and the Worshipping of Saints departed; with the Doctrine of Purgatory.’¹⁷⁴ But Bath and Newton argue that Bromhall’s position was considerably more nuanced than may seem from his frontispiece. They point out that ‘stories from Catholic sources sat side by side with tales from Luther and Melancthon without comment or qualification.’¹⁷⁵

The complex and dynamic pattern of reactions to ghosts in this period means that it is hard to determine under exactly what model of interpretation contemporaries operated during the British Civil Wars. From the souls of the unquiet dead in purgatory to devilish delusions and prodigies sent by God, there was no uniform system of interpretation prevailing during the period with which this study is concerned. This places the main onus of interpretation upon the historian and requires a thorough analysis of the apparition’s context to determine its possible meanings. The rest of this section will be devoted to an in-depth description and analysis of the entire affair of the Carlisle ghost, as reported by Tullie in his account of the siege.¹⁷⁶

There are two different ways in which the Carlisle ghost will be analysed, from the perspectives of Isaac Tullie and the more speculative perspective of the soldiers in the field. The former was quite clearly an exercise in polemical writing, as Tullie used the ghost story to reinforce his overtly Royalist narrative of the siege.¹⁷⁷ Through the medium of the ghost, Tullie both asserted the virtuous nature of Royalism and argued that God was clearly on the side of the King’s party.¹⁷⁸ The second form of analysis is more difficult, owing to the absence of sources other than Tullie’s narrative. It is concerned with what the ghost meant to contemporaries other than Tullie, principally the soldiers whom he claimed had seen the spectre.

¹⁷⁴ Thomas Bromhall, *A treatise of specters, or, An history of apparitions, oracles, prophecies, and predictions* (London: John Streater, 1658), p. A1.

¹⁷⁵ Bath and Newton, *Witchcraft and the Act of 1604*, p. 4.

¹⁷⁶ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 21.

¹⁷⁷ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 14.

¹⁷⁸ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 21.

The first point of analysis must be Tullie himself. As stated in chapter five Tullie was a boy during the siege and wrote his narrative at the age of eighteen.¹⁷⁹ He was a fierce Royalist, generally referring to the Parliamentarian and Covenanter forces with pejorative terms such as ‘rebels’, ‘roundheads’ and ‘the enemy’.¹⁸⁰ Tullie’s narrative, and his ghost story, must be placed within the context of both his fervent Royalism and the traumatic siege his city was undergoing. This was a fairly common response to trauma. For example, Ismini Pells argues ‘petitions could also reflect what has been termed “philosophies of trauma,” the need to attach meaning to difficult past experiences and convince oneself and others that it was not all in vain.’¹⁸¹ All of the evidence suggests that Tullie was an orthodox Anglican, whose Royalism and religion were closely linked. He opened his narrative with the statement that ‘Cumberland, a place not seduced with lechers, generally free from the seeds of Schisme, and therefore untainted with the p[re]sent. rebellion.’¹⁸² His use of pejorative terms like ‘schism’ demonstrated an extremely negative view of Puritanism, a point reinforced by words such as ‘lecherers’ and ‘untainted’.¹⁸³

In his narrative, Tullie reported that a ghost was repeatedly witnessed between 16 and 28 February 1645, outside the besiegers’ works.¹⁸⁴ The ghost was of a Captain Forester, a probable Covenanter officer, who had been converted to Royalism after his death and who was now demanding the same from his former comrades.¹⁸⁵ Tullie made it clear in context that Forester was either a Parliamentarian or Covenanter officer, but did not explicitly state which.¹⁸⁶ Lists of Parliamentarian officers show two officers with the surname ‘Forester/Forrester’, but both fought in the ranks of William Waller’s Southern Association and were highly unlikely to be serving in the much smaller Cumbrian Parliamentarian force.¹⁸⁷

¹⁷⁹ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 21.

¹⁸⁰ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, pp. 1, 7, 12, 19, 21–22, 26, 28, 32, 34–37.

¹⁸¹ Pells, ‘Soliciting Sympathy: The Search for Psychological Trauma in Seventeenth-Century English Civil War Maimed Soldiers’ Petitions’.

¹⁸² Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 1.

¹⁸³ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 1.

¹⁸⁴ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 21.

¹⁸⁵ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 21.

¹⁸⁶ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 11.

¹⁸⁷ Anon, ‘Surnames beginning ‘F’’, in *The Cromwell Association Online Directory of Parliamentarian Army Officers*, ed. Stephen K Roberts (2017), British History Online, [<http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/cromwell-army-officers/surnames-f>], accessed 06 2018.

In the Covenanter army, a Forrester was serving with the Clydesdale Foot, but only as a minister, not an officer.¹⁸⁸ In any case, the Clydesdale Foot was not part of the forces besieging Carlisle, being quartered in County Durham for the winter of 1644 before marching to the siege of Hereford in 1645.¹⁸⁹ The allegiance of George, first Lord Forrester of Clan Forrester in the Lothian, is unclear but his son in law James Ballie, after 1654 the second Lord Forrester, was a Royalist fined under the Protectorate.¹⁹⁰ The family also had several smaller cadet branches scattered throughout the Lothian, from which Captain Forrester may have originated.¹⁹¹ The first mention of Forester came as Tullie recounted his defeat of the Royalists' attempt at a spoiling attack against the newly-arrived Leven.

This action took place at some point in the autumn of 1644 and demonstrates that Forester was an active subordinate of Leven during the early part of the siege.¹⁹² He not only defeated the Royalist soldiers but completely routed them. Tullie's use of terms like 'flight' and the qualification that Forester 'had the chse [chase] of them for 2 miles' indicated that he collapsed the Royalist unit and pursued it to near destruction.¹⁹³ This demonstrated that Forester was actively engaged against the Royalist forces from the very beginning of the siege and was, in fact, responsible for the most prominent Covenanter-Parliamentarian victory since the siege began.¹⁹⁴ This fame helps to explain why, after his death, the besiegers claimed to have seen his apparition.

Forester's death occurred shortly before Christmas 1644, in a small, routine skirmish over cows with Royalist forces.¹⁹⁵ Battles over cows, set to graze beyond the walls, were a relatively common occurrence at sieges. At Pontefract, on 26 May 1645, a boy cutting grass to feed the animals within the walls was shot in the face.¹⁹⁶ Likewise on 10 June 'the enemy shott a boy of ours [who] was houlding of a Cow at gras'.¹⁹⁷ Tullie did not state the results of these

¹⁸⁸ Edward Fingol, *Regimental History of the Covenanting Armies 1639–1651* (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2003), p. 122.

¹⁸⁹ Fingol, *Regimental History of the Covenanting Armies 1639–1651*, p. 122.

¹⁹⁰ George Way & Romily Squire, *Collins Scottish Clan & Family Encyclopedia* (London: Harper Collins, 1994), pp. 389–390.

¹⁹¹ Way & Squire, *Collins Scottish Clan & Family Encyclopedia*, pp. 389–390.

¹⁹² Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 11.

¹⁹³ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 11.

¹⁹⁴ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 11.

¹⁹⁵ Tullie cites battles over cows as part of the 'daily skirmishes' but only explicitly referred to them at Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, pp. 12, 14–15, 18.

¹⁹⁶ Walker (ed.), *The first and second sieges of Pontefract Castle: Nathan Drake's diary*, p. 35.

¹⁹⁷ Walker (ed.), *The first and second sieges of Pontefract Castle: Nathan Drake's diary*, p. 41.

engagements, a lack of detail which, when compared to his normal exacting accounts, suggests short, indecisive actions with few casualties on either side.¹⁹⁸

Forester, here referred to as Forest, was one of the unlucky few. 'Forest was the only man who held the Cavalliers in play, but at length was slain either by Wood or Brathet.'¹⁹⁹ While Tullie did not state the victor of these skirmishes, this sentence suggests that Forester performed well, the Royalists only getting an advantage over their opponents upon his death. Indeed, Forester's reputation was such that even his enemies were saddened by his demise. Tullie recounted that 'His losse was as much lamented wthin the walls as wthout, being the only Enemie of Remarked valour.'²⁰⁰ Tullie's statement of the respect, if not sympathy, in which Forester was held by the garrison was an essential component of how his ghost functioned. From the perspective of a Royalist, it made a lot more sense that it was the enemy of valour, an exemplar of traditional military virtues, who had gone over to their cause after his death.²⁰¹ It would also have caused the most distress to the besiegers that their most active and courageous officer, their only real hero of the siege so far, had been resurrected as a Royalist. Tullie reported that Forester appeared repeatedly, always in front of the same part of the siege line, and always made the same demand for obedience:

About this time there was a common report that Capt Forester appeared often at the round head's worke at Botcherby; fiercely demanding of y[e]^m if they were not yet converted to the King...Major Barwis, being asked by Philipson at a parley of the truth hereof, protested he could bring 500 souldiers eye witnesses of it.²⁰²

Botcherby is now a suburb to the east of Carlisle, just south of the river Eden, and in 1645 was part of the Covenanter-Parliamentarian siege works. Tullie referred to it as 'the round head's worke', and a later scandal concerning the vacation of the local Parliamentarians by Covenanter soldiers from Botcherby confirms that the witnesses were not Scottish soldiers.²⁰³ Further supporting this conclusion was the report given to the Royalists of the incident by Richard

¹⁹⁸ None are longer than a paragraph in description see Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, pp. 12, 14–15, 18.

¹⁹⁹ Of all of the descriptions of cow-skirmishes the only one longer than a single paragraph is Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, pp. 14–15.

²⁰⁰ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 12.

²⁰¹ For the best current explanation of military virtue in the British civil wars see Donagan, 'The Web of Honour: Soldiers, Christians, and Gentlemen in the English Civil War', pp. 368–380.

²⁰² Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 21.

²⁰³ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 21; *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 20, 1644–145, p. 552: SP 16/507 ff.159–161.

Barwis, the Cumbria Parliamentary leader whose relations with the Covenanters were even then in the process of collapse.²⁰⁴ This made more sense than if the ghost had appeared before Covenanter troops, who would have probably ascribed it solely to diabolical activity. By contrast, there was little enthusiasm for the hotter forms of Protestantism, either of the Presbyterian or Puritan forms, in the two Cumbrian counties.²⁰⁵ While those few anti-Laudian Protestants present in the county were represented amongst the ranks of the local Parliamentarians, most of their members shared the traditional Anglicanism of their Royalist neighbours, even if they were not outright recusants.²⁰⁶

Of further relevance was Barwis' troubled relationship with the Covenanters, which would ultimately boil over into outright scandal.²⁰⁷ While he was one of the English Parliament's commissioners appointed to implement the terms of the Solemn League and Covenant in 1643, and had assisted and encouraged Leven in his invasion of Cumbria, the relationship ultimately fell apart.²⁰⁸ The first disagreement arose over the command at the siege of Carlisle. As the only Parliamentary MP from the region, and the man who had invited Leven to invade the county in the first place, Barwis naturally assumed that he had some direction over the employment of the much larger Covenanter forces in addition to his soldiers.²⁰⁹ The Covenanters were also angered by Barwis' willingness to accept former Royalists into the ranks of the new Cumbrian Parliamentary party.²¹⁰ Barwis' critics would point to his favouring of such 'malignants' as

²⁰⁴ David Scott, 'Barwis, Richard (1602–1649)' in *Oxford Dictionary Nation Biography* 2004; online edn, Sept 2004 [<https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-74210>], accessed 11/2018; David Scott, 'The Barwis Affair', in *English Historical Review* vol:463 (2000), pp. 843–863.

²⁰⁵ According to Thomas Denton, a lawyer writing for the Cumbrian neutral gentleman Sir John Lowther after the civil wars 'the Common Prayer was read in the church of Sebergham in all ye late times of trouble, and we never had a phanatick in the parish, neither then nor since', see Thomas Denton for Sir John Lowther, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, MS D/Lons/L12/4/2/2., f. 85.

²⁰⁶ For the Ecclesiastical History of Carlisle from James I to the Restoration, see Wilson, *Victoria County History of England, A History of the County of Cumberland*, vol. II, pp. 89–99; The ecclesiastical establishment of the city suffered from frequent changes in the episcopate and, after 1642, an absentee and pluralist bishop in James Ussher, also Archbishop of Armagh and Primate of All Ireland see Carlisle Episcopal Register, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, Usher, MS, f. 313.

²⁰⁷ Scott, 'Richard Barwis', *ODNB*; Scott, 'The Barwis Affair'.

²⁰⁸ Scott, 'Richard Barwis', *ODNB*.

²⁰⁹ David Scott, 'The Barwis Affair', p. 845; On 1 June 1645, Barwis wrote letters to Leslie demanding that local Parliamentarian's kept their Botcherby garrison, see *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of Charles I*, vol. 20, 1644–1645, p. 552: SP 16/507 ff.159–161; which was rejected by Leslie's subordinate Lord Kirkcubright who restored that 'I value not who shall pry into my actions', see, *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, Charles I*, vol. 20, 1644–1645, p. 428: SP 16/507 f.37., p. 423: SP 16/507 f.44., p. 552: SP 16/507 ff.159–161.

²¹⁰ Scott, 'Richard Barwis', *ODNB*.

evidence of his secret affection for the Royalist cause, and raised questions about his constancy.²¹¹

So while the relationship between Barwis and the Covenanters would only completely collapse in the summer of 1645, nearly six months after the ghost sighting, these examples demonstrate that it had been in trouble for some time before the final rupture. This troubled relationship, and Barwis' conciliatory attitude towards former Royalists, made him the natural Parliamentary observer from Tullie's perspective. Barwis was known to locals and trusted by them, even if London and Edinburgh harboured quite different opinions of his reliability. He had been a JP in 1626, an MP for Carlisle in 1628, and had become the sheriff of Cumberland in 1634.²¹² He had even served as the city's mayor after helping to secure a royal charter for Carlisle in 1635.²¹³ To the inhabitants of the city, Barwis' testimony would have been particularly valuable. Having cited a trustworthy source, Tullie backed up the account with Barwis' declaration to the Royalist Captain Philipson that the former could produce 500 soldiers who had witnessed the phantom.²¹⁴

If one took Barwis and Tullie at face value, hundreds of soldiers had witnessed the late captain's revenant.²¹⁵ These soldiers had experienced the worst of Cumbrian weather. According to Barwis they had 'bided the cold winter' in their trench works.²¹⁶ Forester had died just before Christmas 1644, and his ghost began appearing in late February 1645.²¹⁷ This was significant if the story recounted by Tullie originated with the besiegers, rather than the besieged. Even if the Botcherby Parliamentarians were not starving, they were still forced to live with inadequate shelter in harsh weather. This must be borne in mind in any analysis, as it is not always mentioned in the primary sources. As shall be explored later in this chapter, Tullie did not always shy away from the traumatic implications of siegecraft, but here he did not mention it.

The social function of ghost stories is a point of modest controversy amongst historians. Thomas argued that the purpose of ghosts was to ensure that the living adhered to the wishes

²¹¹ Scott, 'Richard Barwis', *ODNB*.

²¹² Scott, 'Richard Barwis', *ODNB*.

²¹³ Scott, 'Richard Barwis', *ODNB*.

²¹⁴ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 21.

²¹⁵ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 21.

²¹⁶ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of Charles I*, vol. 20, 1644–1645, p. 552: SP 16/507 ff.159–161.

²¹⁷ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, pp. 18, 21.

of the dead.²¹⁸ By contrast, in her 2010 doctoral dissertation, MacKeever argued that Thomas's conclusion was 'very wide of the mark' and that the persistence of ghosts in the Protestant world was less due to 'memoria' than to a variety of factors that she summarised as 'the reinforcement of the doctrine of Providence, and a counterattack on the heresy of mortalism [the idea that the soul did not persist after death]' on the elite level and that 'the ghost story was a sub-genre in a whole scheme of literature which focused on Divine Providence and vengeance' in popular literature.²¹⁹ In the case of Captain Forester's ghost, the demand for justice was a demand for submission to the authority of the King. Furthermore, Tullie couched Forester's demands in explicitly religious language, with the invitation to defect to the Royalist cause being described as his former comrades being 'converted to the King'.²²⁰

While not seeking to challenge MacKeever's general conclusions about the sociological function of early-modern ghost stories, this dissertation qualifies it with the observation that the mentality of a besieged fortress, and military mentalities more generally, occupy a different conceptual space to the crime-cantered analysis of MacKeever and other critics of Thomas.²²¹ The intensity and length of traumatic experience, as well as the number of people affected, is greater in war than in robbery or murder; and in an 'unnatural' civil war there were additional spiritual anxieties that could descend into apocalyptic millenarianism.²²²

²¹⁸ Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic*, 4th edn, p. 719.

²¹⁹ Armanda Jane MacKeever, 'The Ghost in Early Modern Protestant Culture...', pp. 11–13.

²²⁰ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 21.

²²¹ MacKeever is particularly influenced by Malcolm Gaskill, *Crime and Mentalities in Early Modern England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 231.

²²² Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas in the English Revolution*; Thomas Moore, *An address for submissive, peaceable, and loving living together under the present government to the people of the commonwealth of England, however by some called royalists, Presbyterians, independents, or fifth-monarchy-men* (London: James Cottrel, 1656); Anon, *The Downfall of the Fifth Monarchy. Or, The personal reign of Christ on earth, confuted. Discovering the desperate and dangerous principles and designs of these frenzy-conceited men of the Fifth Monarchy; who pretending to do the work of their generations, seek to involve these nations again in bloud and misery, had not the Lord prevented them in their designe; with a brief manifestation of the true generation work which every good Christian ought to do* (London: John Andrews, 1657); Anon, *A Breife description or character of the religion and manners of the phanatiques in generall* (London: s.n., 1660); Champlin Burrage, 'The Fifth Monarchy Insurrections', *The English Historical Review* 25 (1910), 722–747; Leo Solt, 'The Fifth Monarchy Men: Politics and the Millennium', *Church History* 30 (1961), 314–324; Alfred Cohen, 'The Fifth Monarchy Mind: Mary Carey and the Origins of Totalitarianism', *Social Research* 31 (1964), 195–213; J. F. McGregor, Bernard Capp, Nigel Smith and B. J. Gibbons, 'Fear, Myth and Furore: Reappraising the "Ranters"', *Past & Present* 140 (1993), 155–194; Andrew Bradstock, *Radical Religion in Cromwell's England: A Concise History from the English Civil War to the End of the Commonwealth* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010); S. A. Burrell, 'The Apocalyptic Vision of the Early Covenanters', *The Scottish Historical Review* 43 (1964), 1–24; Thomas Fairfax, *The speeches of the Lord Generall Fairfax, and the officers of the armie to the Diggers at St. Georges Hill in Surry, and the Diggers severall answers and replies*

This dissertation will not argue against MacKeever or Gaskill, but will qualify that there is an additional ghostly purpose to vengeance or justice. That is giving meaning to seemingly random and omnipresent suffering. A comparison with the Edgehill ghosts demonstrates this. *The New yeares wonder* described the battlefield as a ‘peece of earth paistred with English goare and turned vnto a Golgotha of bones is now become the plot of feare and horrornr [sic]’.²²³ This apocalyptic language, comparing the battlefield to the Hill of Golgotha, the location of the deicide, demonstrated this conception of war as deeply, even nightmarishly, traumatic. However, *The New yeares wonder*, published in London, proclaimed that the only remedy to this was that ‘the Lord in His mercy inlighten his Maiestys heart, that those eveill councelares which are about him may be put ever far from him and that wee may have peace. Amen.’²²⁴ Instead, the staunchly Royalist Tullie took the opposite tack, with the dead calling on unconditional submission to the King as the only means to end the war.²²⁵

The mere appearance of Forester’s apparition was not the totality of the event. Tullie also recounted that ‘when they [the Parliamentarian soldiers] replied "no," hee was wont to call on Cap. Philipson to fall upon them with horse and foot. Instantly to their Imaginations, horse and foot fired upon them’.²²⁶ As previously stated, captains Philipson and Forester had previously fought one another shortly after the arrival of the Covenanter army.²²⁷ The fact that Forester was calling upon him to attack the besiegers’ positions was a clear demonstration of the depth of his posthumous defection.²²⁸ Forester’s revenant was not just willing to harangue his former comrades, but also to serve with his former enemy in seeming to fire upon them. Indeed, the association between Forester and Philipson in Tullie’s account was particularly close. Philipson

thereunto (London: R. W., 1649); Gerrard Winstanley, *A VINDICATION OF THOSE, Whose endeavors is only to make the Earth a common treasury, called DIGGERS* (London: Giles Calvert, 1650); Gilbert Roulston, *The ranters bible or, Seven several religions by them held and maintained. With the full particulars of their strange sects and societies; their new places of meetings, both in city and countrey; the manner of their life and conversation; their blasphemous opinion of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, and their burning of his blessed word, and sacred Scriptures* (London: J.C., 1650); Anon, *The Ranters creed being a true copie of the examinations of a blasphemous sort of people, commonly called ranters, whose names are herein particularised, together with the name of their pretended God almighty, and their false prophet* (London: James Moxon, 1651).

²²³ Anon, *The New Yeares Wonder...*, p. 5.

²²⁴ Anon, *The New Yeares Wonder...*, p. 8.

²²⁵ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 21.

²²⁶ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 21.

²²⁷ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 11.

²²⁸ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 21.

also appeared after the incident, when he was informed of the appearance of Forester's shade by Richard Barwis at a truce.²²⁹

Philipson, like Forester, was not a prominent figure in the history of the British Civil Wars. He served as an officer of the garrison with his brother, the same cornet Philipson who had, according to Tullie, escaped torture at the hands of the Fairfaxes.²³⁰ The captain appeared frequently throughout Tullie's narrative and was typically engaged in leading cavalry raids by the garrison against the besiegers' positions; later he served as one of the Royalist commissioners in the surrender negotiations.²³¹ His stature amongst the defenders made him a natural partner for Forester in Tullie's narrative, serving first as a valorous opponent, then a spectral comrade in arms, before finally demanding proof of the entire affair from Barwis.²³²

It should be noted that Tullie stated that this gunfire was not real, but was a product of the soldiers' 'imagination'.²³³ This could mean that Tullie operated under the traditional Protestant conception of ghosts as devilish illusions. The devil's power was conceived as strictly preternatural, which is to say, limited by natural law even if it was beyond human agency.²³⁴ An illusion of the air was within the devil's capabilities, for 'the Deuill coulde by his woorkemanshippe upon the aire' to 'forme what kinde of impressions he pleases in the air', but the miraculous appearance of actual gunfire was not.²³⁵ This argument has merit, but in the wider context of Tullie's account is unsatisfactory. Given his fervent Royalism, it is unlikely that Tullie would wish to ascribe Forrester's post-mortem defection to the King's cause to a

²²⁹ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 21.

²³⁰ For list of Royalist officers of the garrison during the siege, including Captain Philipson, see Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, pp. 8–10. For the alleged torture of Cornet Philipson see Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 23.

²³¹ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, pp. 14, 19–20, 21, 22–23, 26, 27–28, 30–31, 34, 36–37; 'House of Lords Journal Volume 7: 5 July 1645', in *Journal of the House of Lords*, 249 vols. (London, 1767–1830), vol. VII, 478–482, accessed at British History Online [<http://www.british-history.ac.uk/lords-jrnl/vol7/pp478-482>] accessed 11/2018.

²³² Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, pp. 11, 21.

²³³ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 21.

²³⁴ James VI & I, *Daemonologie*..., pp. 39–40; Early-moderns commonly identified demonic illusions with the air, 'at the fall of Lucifer, some Spirites fell in the aire, some in the fire, some in the water, some in the lande: In which Elements they still remaine. Whereupon they build, that such as fell in the fire, or in the aire, are truer then they who fell in the water or in the land, which is al but meare trattles & forged be the author of al deceit. For they fel not be weight, as a solide substance, to stick in any one parte', 'Which all are but impressions in the aire, easelie gathered by the spirite, drawing so neare to that substance himselfe'; James VI & I, *Daemonologie*..., pp. 20, 22.

²³⁵ James VI & I, *Daemonologie*..., pp. 22–23, 38–42.

diabolical trick of the light.²³⁶ Even if he privately considered this as the probable explanation, he did not draw attention to it in his account of the incident. However imaginary the gunfire was, to the men on the earthwork it was real enough that ‘they answered them w[i]th shott from the worke, w[i]^{ch} being heard at Stanwix, some horse were sent to assist them, two of which were drowned in crossing the ford at Rickerby.’²³⁷ Captain Forester did not appear after this incident in February, and Tullie did not mention him again in the subsequent parts of his narrative.

Ultimately, certain details of Forrester’s damascene afterlife remain obscure owing to a lack of the necessary evidence. Tullie’s account is the only source for this reported sighting, which does not feature in any other contemporary source such as newsbooks. Like other supernatural reports from the period, the historical view of Forrester’s ghost is that it was informed by the acute anxieties of society during rapid, and violent, social, political and religious change.²³⁸ However, it is clear that Tullie’s account of the incident owed a great deal to the particular ‘siege mentality’ that had emerged within the city of Carlisle amidst cold, omnipresent violence, and an increasingly severe food shortage. Under these stressful conditions, where desperate rumours of worldly deliverance reached the point of suggesting that Charles I himself was marching to Carlisle’s relief, it is unsurprising that at least one explicitly otherworldly rumour emerged.²³⁹

7.5 Conclusions

A fortified space is, by definition, a space for the execution of warfare. This meant that, during the Civil Wars, they became *foci* for conflict. The fortified spaces of Northern England, when properly garrisoned, supplied and organised could withstand the limited capabilities of most besiegers for significant periods. This involved the exposure of both attackers and defenders to uncomfortable and unpleasant living conditions, a progressive reduction of food intake to dangerous levels, an increase of disease and the omnipresent, continual, and dramatically increased risk of a sudden, violent and often exceedingly painful death owing to military

²³⁶ For Tullie’s typically Royalist use of pejorative terms such as ‘roundhead’ and ‘rebel’, see Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, pp. 1, 7, 12, 19, 21–22, 26, 28, 32, 34–37.

²³⁷ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 21.

²³⁸ Clark, *Thinking with Demons...*, pp. 557–559.

²³⁹ For the King’s supposed relief of Carlisle see Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, pp. 40–44.

action—an collection of miseries this dissertation has addressed as ‘trauma’.²⁴⁰ Furthermore, famine owing to a blockade was, and is, inherently indiscriminate as a weapon.²⁴¹ While contemporary accounts, such as Tullie’s, describe in great detail the sufferings of the starving besieged, they never implied that the besiegers’ deliberate denial of sources of supply to the garrison was an illegitimate military action.²⁴²

By contrast, direct massacres occupied a more complex legal and ethical position. If a garrison forced the attacker to the storm through protracted resistance, then it could legally be sacked, a process that normally entailed significant civilian losses in both life and property.²⁴³ But this did not mean that massacres, even in these circumstances, were an accepted and uncontroversial part of warfare. The popularity of atrocity stories as propaganda demonstrated the hostility most early modern Britons had to massacres, particularly if they were likely to become victims of such killings.²⁴⁴ These two forms of suffering, particularly prominent at fortresses, provided ample fodder for the supernatural, particularly in the form of ghosts.²⁴⁵ The use of the supernatural in framing the suffering of both besiegers and besieged at Carlisle demonstrated

²⁴⁰ Porter, *Destruction in the English Civil Wars*, p. 23; Sadler & Serdiville, *The Great Siege of Newcastle 1644*, pp. 57–58; p. 95; Reid, *All the King’s Armies – a Military History of the English Civil War*, p. 95; Lithgow, *A TRUE EXPERIMENTALL AND EXACT RELATION UPON That famous and renovvned Siege OF NEW CASTLE, The diverse conflicts and occurances fell out there during the time of ten weeks and odde dayes: And of that mightie and marveilous storming thereof, with Power, Policie, and prudent plots of Warre. Together with a succinct commentarie upon the Battell of Bowdon Hill, and that victorious battell of York or Marston Moore, never to bee forgotten*, pp. 10–11; Ancel Keys et al, ‘Circulation and Cardiac Function’, in *The Biology of Human Starvation*, vol. I, 607–634; Ancel Keys et al, ‘The Capacity for Work, in *The Biology of Human Starvation*, vol. I, 714–748.

²⁴¹ Firth, ‘Sir Hugh Cholmley’s narrative of the Great Siege of Scarborough’, pp. 586–587.

²⁴² Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 47.

²⁴³ Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre...*, pp. 339, 345.

²⁴⁴ Donagan, ‘Codes and Conduct in the English Civil War’, at pp. 73–74; Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 23; Anon, *A True and Perfect Relation of A victorious Battell Obtained against the Earl of Cumberland...*; Jones, ‘Massacres during the Wars of the Three Kingdoms’, pp. 74–75; *The Moderate Intelligencer*, no. 183 (14 September 1648–21 September 1648, *Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 419.183); *Mercurius Anti-Mercurius*, no. 1 (12 September 1648–19 September 1648, *Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 269.1).

²⁴⁵ Bath, ‘“In the divell’s likenesse”: Interpretation and confusion in popular ghost belief’; Bath, ‘“Sensible Proof of Spirits”: Ghost Belief during the Later Seventeenth Century’; Anon, *The New Yeares Wonder. Being a most certaine and true Relation of the disturbed inhabitants of Kenton, And other neighbouring villages neere unto Edgehill, where the great battaile betweixt the kings army, and the Parliaments forces was fought. In which place is heard & seene fearfull and strange apparitions of spirits as sounds of drums, trumpets, with the discharging of Canons Miskies, Carbines pettronels, to terroure and amazement, of all the fearfull hearers and behoulders*; Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 21.

both the intensity of seventeenth-century siege warfare and the severity of its impact upon a population not used to such prolonged periods of intense violence and hunger.

Chapter Eight: Slighting, Memory and Conclusion

8.1 Introduction and the Historiography of Slighting

The ultimate fate of the majority of Northern England's fortresses was destruction. At Skipton Castle, the towers were reduced to half of their height and never rebuilt to the same thickness, to prevent them from ever supporting heavy artillery again.¹ Pontefract Castle was completely destroyed as a consequence of the Civil Wars. Already badly damaged from repeated sieges it was largely torn down by parliamentary ordinance. Cromwell had described it as 'one of the strongest inland garrisons in the Kingdom' but now it was to be destroyed to prevent it from being used again as the base for another Royalist rebellion.² The Grand Juries of Yorkshire, by August 1645 under Parliamentary control, petitioned the Parliament requesting support for Pontefract Castle's destruction. The petition began with a condemnation of the castle garrison's activities during the conflict before requesting that:

That those walls which have harbored so much Tyranny and Oppression, may not stand, but be levelled with the ground, that this Nest and Cage of all Villany may be destroyed, that those unclean Birds which have now left it, may never roost themselves again there.³

However, the reconstruction of other fortifications continued throughout the 1650s and 1660s, but only in the case of sites of strategic significance, such as Hull, Carlisle and Scarborough did the victorious Parliamentarians maintain the garrisons.⁴ Scarborough's position as a coastal stronghold needed to support the Commonwealth's navy in its wars with the Netherlands and Spain ensured that it retained its fortress character throughout the period, with repairs continuing until the last two years of the republican regime.⁵ Berwick received attention from

¹ The author was told this by the guides of Skipton Castle.

² Fox, *The Three Sieges of Pontefract Castle: printed from the manuscript compiled by George Fox*, p. 128.

³ Anon, *The Presentment and Articles Proposed by the Grand Jury of the County of York: And the Declaration of the Nobility, Grand Jury and Gentry of the said County: At the Assises assembled in August*, p. 5.

⁴ D. H. Evans, 'The Fortifications of Hull between 1321 and 1864', *Archaeological Journal* 175 (2018), 87–156, at pp. 131–134.

⁵ *Cal. S. P. Dom., Commonwealth*, vol. 11, 1657–1658, p. 345: SP 18/180 f.91: 'List of 30 requisitions for ordnance stores, allowances, &c, for Scarborough, of which 7 are crossed as needless. 5 March 1657–8', pp. 347–349: SP 18/180 f.94: 'Council. Day's Proceedings'; *Cal. S. P. Dom., Commonwealth*, vol. 12, 1658–1659, p. 200: SP 18/183 f.244: 'Request of Capt. John Northend to the Protector Richard', p. 211: SP 18/184 f.31: 'Order in Council—on report of Lords Fleetwood,

both the Protectorate and the Restoration governments; the governor petitioned Cromwell in 1655 that ‘there is a breach in the walls...Begs allowance for what he has spent or shall spend for needful repairs’, while in 1666 the governor repaired the defences in preparation for the Second Anglo-Dutch War.⁶

The Restoration monarchy continued to invest in Hull’s fortifications, ordering the drawbridges to be repaired in 1662 and selling part of the damaged defences to partially repair a blockhouse in 1661.⁷ This effort was not entirely unproblematic, in 1681 the misappropriation of materials from this reconstruction was investigated by the Ordnance Office.⁸ Other fortresses also received state attention. After the Restoration Sir Philip Musgrave—the Earl of Cumberland’s loyal lieutenant—was appointed governor of Carlisle.⁹ In 1662 Musgrave was granted 200*l.* for repairs to the castle and, in 1664, 3,367*l.*, 6*s.* to pay the garrison’s yearly expenses, demonstrating the continued military value of the fortress to Charles II’s government.¹⁰

Civic pride also led to city governments investing in their defences’ restoration; the corporation of Hull lent money to the governor to fix one of the city’s gates in the mid-1660s.¹¹ At York—as outlined in chapter two of this dissertation—the corporation reacted to criticism by the Duke of Albermarle in 1665 by extensively repairing the walls and demolishing private homes that had been constructed too close to the walls, which would have been a liability in the event of a

Whalley, and Goffe, that 10 rounds of shot for divers species of guns, 30 hand grenade shells, 100 muskets, 50 pikes, and 3 drake ladles are...’.

⁶ *Calendar of State Papers Domestic, Commonwealth*, vol. 8, 1655, p. 371: SP 18/101 f.24: ‘Petition of Lieut.-Col. John Mayer, Governor of Berwick, to the Protector’; *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles II*, vol. 5, 1665–1666, p. 488: SP 29/161 f.22: ‘Mark Scott to Williamson’.

⁷ Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 6, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, p. 464; *Cal. S.P. Dom., Charles II*, vol. 3, 1663–1664, 184: SP 44/15 f.73: ‘Warrant authorizing Lord Belasyse, governor of Hull, to use the materials, by sale or otherwise, of the North Blockhouse at Hull, which is very ruinous, to put the necessary part of the...’; Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 7, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 177, 1664–1679, pp. 452, 456.

⁸ James Sheahan, *History of the Town and Port of Kingston-Upon-Hull* (Beverly: John Green, 1866), pp. 338–344.

⁹ *Calendar of State Papers Domestic, of the reign of Charles II*, vol. 1, 1660–1661, p. 431: ‘Grant to Sir Phil. Musgrave of the office of Governor of the town and castle of Carlisle; fee, 16*s.* a day.’

¹⁰ *Calendar of State Papers Domestic, of the reign of Charles II*, vol. 2, 1661–1662, p. 496: SP 44/7 f.25: ‘Warrant to pay to Sir Philip Musgrave 200*l.*, for repairs of Carlisle Castle.’; *Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles II*, vol. 4, 1664–1665, p. 127: ‘Warrant to pay to Sir Philip Musgrave 3,367*l.* 6*s.* a year, for the garrison of Carlisle Castle, to begin from 26th June last.’

¹¹ K. M. Stanewell, *Calendar of the Ancient Deeds, Letters, Miscellaneous Old Documents, &c. in the Archives of the Corporation* (Kingston upon Hull: 1951), p. 352: M. 324. However, Evans suggests that reconstruction remained cursory, see Evans, ‘The Fortifications of Hull between 1321 and 1864’, p. 134.

renewed siege of the city.¹² But it should be stressed that reconstruction was not general, private strongholds such as Helmsley and Lathom remained in ruins and even at partially-repaired Scarborough the keep continued to be uninhabitable.

The historiography of slighting is an area in which Ronald Hutton's 2004 observation that academic historians were generally ignorant of military technicalities is particularly appropriate, for the field is completely dominated by archaeologists and interested amateurs.¹³ Furthermore, when archaeologists wrote about slighting, they generally focused their analysis on the medieval period.¹⁴ The past tense is used here because this situation is happily changing, with new scholars contributing valuable work on this subject from the archaeological perspective. Rakoczy's aforementioned 2007 doctoral thesis is an excellent example of this positive trend.¹⁵ On the subject of Pontefract, Rakoczy pointed out that the destruction was not merely motivated purely by political or military concerns, but also the possibility of financial and material benefit for those involved in the slighting process.¹⁶ The petition for destruction cited the great poverty of the town owing to the devastation of three sieges and requested that the material of the castle be used in the reconstruction of the town church, destroyed in the fighting.¹⁷ Rakoczy's concern for the wider social implications of slighting is atypical. The majority of publications on the subject are purely technical and largely exist as part of wider surveys of the site in question.¹⁸

However, the most prolific recent scholar on this subject is Rachel Askew, who has published three articles between 2016 and 2017 discussing the Civil War archaeology of Sandal and

¹² Giles MS., York Civic Archive, D. 10 (i).

¹³ Hutton, *Debates in Stuart History*, pp. 42–43.

¹⁴ David Cornell, 'A Kingdom Cleared of Castles: the Role of the Castle in the Campaigns of Robert Bruce', *The Scottish Historical Review* 87 (2008), 233–257; Richard Nevell, 'The Archaeology of Castle Slighting in the Middle Ages', Ph.D. thesis, University of Exeter, 2017; Richard Nevell, 'The archaeology of slighting: a methodological framework for interpreting castle destruction in the Middle Ages', *Archaeological Journal* 41 (2019), 99–139.

¹⁵ Rakoczy, 'Archaeology of Destruction, A reinterpretation of Castle Slightings in the English Civil War'.

¹⁶ Rakoczy, 'Archaeology of Destruction, A reinterpretation of Castle Slightings in the English Civil War', p. 262.

¹⁷ Rakoczy, 'Archaeology of Destruction, A reinterpretation of Castle Slightings in the English Civil War', p. 224; Anon, *The Presentment and Articles Proposed by the Grand Jury of the County of York: And the Declaration of the Nobility, Grand Jury and Gentry of the said County: At the Assises assembled in August*, pp. 3–4.

¹⁸ McCarthy, Summerson, Annis, Perriam and Young, 'Carlisle Castle, A survey and documentary history', pp. 210–214; Pearson, 'Scarborough Castle, North Yorkshire', p. 12.

Sheffield castles in Yorkshire, and Eccleshall Castle in the Midlands.¹⁹ Askew's work is extremely welcome and addresses many of the problems with the historiography of Civil War castles. She is well aware of the false dichotomy between martial and domestic architecture in the study of lordly castles.²⁰ Her solution is wedded in the analysis of material culture rather than documentary evidence, but given the lack of manuscript primary sources at Sandal when compared with fortresses such as Skipton this is not necessarily a problem.²¹

Askew's articles on Sheffield and Eccleshall are worthy of particular notice since they both address the possibility of the castle owner benefiting from the destruction, and integrate slighting into the historiography of iconoclasm. While relatively intact and occupied by both Royalists and Parliamentarians, Sheffield Castle was not subject to any significant siege before it was largely dismantled.²² The castle was owned by the Earls of Arundel, who ran it as absentee landlords.²³ Askew notes that the Parliament only ordered the castles' destruction when the neutralist 21st Earl died in October 1646, resulting in the accession of his Royalist son, who had fought for the King at Edgehill.²⁴ Its destruction was ordered with several other Yorkshire castles on 16 October 1648 by the York committee, with the first demolition work beginning in January of the following year.²⁵

The main body of Askew's article is a systematic breakdown of the accounts of the castle's destruction to demonstrate who were the principal material beneficiaries. Of particular interest is that Arundel himself was particularly involved in the destruction of his castle, using a large amount of the material to help refurbish a nearby manor.²⁶ This demonstrates that while the destruction of lordly castle seats did significantly reduce the northern aristocracy's military power, they could potentially benefit from it if they were not completely alienated from the Parliamentary establishment. Despite his Royalist past, the 22nd Earl of Arundel's agents

¹⁹ Rachel Askew, 'Political iconoclasm: the destruction of Eccleshall Castle during the English Civil Wars', *Post-Medieval Archeology* 50 (2016), 279–288; Rachel Askew, 'Biography and Memory: Sandal Castle and the English Civil War', *European Journal of Archaeology* 19 (2016), 48–67; Rachel Askew, 'Sheffield Castle and The Aftermath of the English Civil War', *Northern History* 54 (2017), 189–210.

²⁰ Askew, 'Biography and Memory: Sandal Castle and the English Civil War', p. 58.

²¹ Askew, 'Biography and Memory: Sandal Castle and the English Civil War', p. 61.

²² Askew, 'Sheffield Castle and The Aftermath of the English Civil War', p. 191.

²³ Askew, 'Sheffield Castle and The Aftermath of the English Civil War', p. 190; Leeds University Library, Brotherton Collection, Wilson MSS, 295/42, fol. 155; 295/68, Book 5, fols. 46–52v. T.

²⁴ Askew, 'Sheffield Castle and The Aftermath of the English Civil War', p. 191.

²⁵ Rushworth, *Historical Collections of Private Passages of State*, vol. VI, p. 513.

²⁶ Askew, 'Sheffield Castle and The Aftermath of the English Civil War', p. 198.

managed the destruction of the castle, kept the accounts and ensured that he was able to make full use of the financial and material resources so generated.²⁷

Askew's Eccleshall article, while slightly outside the geographical limitations of this dissertation, is even more interesting from a historical perspective. Eccleshall Castle was the seat of the bishops of Lichfield and Coventry and therefore represented a tempting target to opponents of episcopacy.²⁸ Askew's idea of 'political iconoclasm', arguing that, while officially prohibited by Parliament, the destruction of royal and noble monuments did occur during the Civil Wars, is potentially extremely rewarding for historians.²⁹ The historiography of iconoclasm, explored later in this chapter concerning the destruction of much of Carlisle cathedral by Covenanter troops, is largely focused on the motivations behind the destruction of purely religious imagery. A new paradigm of iconoclasm, using the term in its more modern meaning of the destruction of even secular symbols or ideas could be applied to the seventeenth century with significant returns in terms of analysis. A possible reversal of the hermeneutic, 'political iconography', could also be useful in exploring the shift from royal to republican symbolism under the Commonwealth and Protectorate, for example. While the archaeological and historical disciplines will naturally remain distinct, there is a possibility of convergence over these salient points – which would be of great benefit to the scholarship of the British Civil Wars.

8.2 Articles of Surrender and the Preservation of Martial Dignity

The process of surrendering was fairly uniform and consisted of drawing up a mutually acceptable series of articles detailing how the surrender was to be carried out, when it would take place and what would happen to the garrison's men and material. Further articles ensured that the property and lives of the inhabitants were protected, the main distinction between an organised surrender and a sack. Articles of surrender have survived from Skipton, Scarborough, Carlisle, Chester, Newcastle, York and Newark; these allow for several conclusions to be drawn up regarding normal procedure and content.³⁰

²⁷ Askew, 'Sheffield Castle and The Aftermath of the English Civil War', p. 203; Accounts of the Destruction of Pontefract Castle, Leeds University Library, Brotherton Collection, Wilson MSS, 295/57.

²⁸ Askew, 'Political iconoclasm: the destruction of Eccleshall Castle during the English Civil Wars', p. 280.

²⁹ Askew, 'Political iconoclasm: the destruction of Eccleshall Castle during the English Civil Wars', p. 283.

³⁰ Isaac Tullie, *Siege of Carlisle*, pp. xiv–xviii; Non-contemporary copy of the Articles agreed upon Between Coll. Richard Thornton, Commander in chiefe of the forces before Skipton Castle on the

The first stage was for both parties, besiegers and besieged, to appoint commissioners to negotiate terms.³¹ These were usually trusted military subordinates of the senior commanders, captains and colonels; although in the case of Newark the Parliamentarian/Covenanter commissioners were appointed directly by the Committee of Both Kingdoms.³² If an agreement could be reached, a date would be set in which the garrison would abandon their fortress. Often the articles were then published as propaganda.³³ In the case of Newark and Chester, Edward Husband was responsible for the printing of the articles in the form of a pamphlet, while Skipton's articles were published anonymously.³⁴ Indeed it is useful to consider surrender articles as a separate genre of polemic in their own right.

Husband was a prolific printer operating from 1640 to 1660.³⁵ A search on *EEBO* shows 540 publications attributed to him, albeit including several repeat issues, between these two dates, principally acts and ordinances of Parliament.³⁶ During the First Civil War, he printed only sporadically, with four publications in 1642, one in 1643 and two in 1644.³⁷ In 1645 he was brought into regular parliamentary service, publishing sixty-four pamphlets and styling himself 'Printer to the Honorable House of Commons'.³⁸ He would then publish large volumes of material until the Restoration when changed political circumstances forced his retirement. He

one party, and Sir John Mallory Knight, Col, and Governor of Skipton Castle on the other party, about The Surrender and Delivery of the said Castle, with the Cannon, Ammunition, Goods and Provisions belonging thereto, in manner after specified, to the said Coll, for the use of King and Parliament, the 21st day of December, 1645, York Minster Library and Archives, Hailstone Papers, Box 7.4; Anon, *Col. Bethells Letter to his Excellence the Lord Fairfax, Concerning the Surrender of Scarborough Castle, on Tuesday, December 19, 1648. Together with a true copy of the Articles for the Rendition thereof, and the Result of the Councill of War concerning the same*; Anon, *Articles concerning the Surrender of Newark To the Commissioners of both Kingdoms: And sent from Colonel General Poyntz to the Honopurable William Lenthal Esq; Speaker of the Honorable House of Commons, by Lieutenant Colonel Carleton, his Adjutant General* (London, Edward Husband, 1646).

³¹ Anon, *Articles concerning the Surrender of Newark To the Commissioners of both Kingdoms*..., p. 3.

³² Anon, *Articles concerning the Surrender of Newark To the Commissioners of both Kingdoms*..., p. 7.

³³ Anon, *Articles concerning the Surrender of Newark To the Commissioners of both Kingdoms*....

³⁴ Anon, *Articles concerning the Surrender of Newark To the Commissioners of both Kingdoms*, p. 1.

³⁵ *Early English Books Online*, author search for 'Edward Husband'.

³⁶ *Early English Books Online*, author search for 'Edward Husband'.

³⁷ *Early English Books Online*, author search for 'Edward Husband', date search 1642–1642; *Early English Books Online*, author search for 'Edward Husband', date search 1643–1643; *Early English Books Online*, author search for 'Edward Husband', date search 1644–1644.

³⁸ *Early English Books Online*, author search for 'Edward Husband', date search 1645–1645.

was printing articles of surrender at the direction Henry Elsyng, clerk of the commons from 1639–1648.³⁹

This was not arranged by Elsyng under his authority but on direction from his superiors. The Commons had ordered the publication of Newark's surrender articles, which were read in the chamber on 9 May 1646 after they had been sent to Speaker William Lenthall by Lieutenant Colonel Carleton, Adjutant General to Colonel General Poyntz, the senior Parliamentary commander at Newark.⁴⁰ The purpose behind this explanation of the document's journey from battlefield to publication is to demonstrate that articles of surrender were not just military necessities and rituals conducted on the battlefield. This document moved from the military into the political sphere when it was sent to the Commons, who ordered that it be sent into the public sphere to publicise the defeat of one of the largest remaining Royalist fortress garrisons in England.

But before they were printed for propaganda purposes, surrender articles were practical guides for a vital military ritual that allowed for a garrison to surrender whilst maintaining most of its military dignity. Dignity was essential to the formal process of surrendering a garrison. With few exceptions, such as Scarborough, where the garrison was abused by the citizenry as they left, the humiliation of the defeated was not part of surrender proceedings.⁴¹ This was natural given that a formalised surrender aimed to discourage continued resistance. Public humiliation might have inspired little else but a fight to the death. Furthermore, 'gratuitous shaming, and humiliation' was dishonourable, and reflected poorly on the responsible soldiers.⁴² While the garrison would be required to leave, they were allowed to leave with martial honour intact, to signify that they had not been conquered but had surrendered on honourable conditions. This took the form of the garrison marching out displaying as much of the symbolic panoply of war as they could carry. The phrase, 'All their arms, flying colours, drums beating, matches lighted at both ends, bullets in their mouths' is repeated, almost word for word, in the articles of

³⁹ J. C. Sainty, 'Elsyng [Elsyng], Henry (bap. 1606, d. 1656)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn, Sept 2004 [<https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-8765?rskey=KuPJIG&result=1>], accessed 11/2019.

⁴⁰ *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I*, vol. 21, July 1645–Dec 1647, p. 434: SP 16/514/1 f.23.

⁴¹ Binns, *A Place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars*, p. 162.

⁴² Donagan, 'The Web of Honour: Soldiers, Christians, and Gentlemen in the English Civil War', p. 372.

surrender of both Carlisle and Skipton.⁴³ The importance that contemporaries attributed to these displays was demonstrated by the fact that it was normally one of the first listed articles. At Skipton, it was the fourth article out of fifteen, at Carlisle the first out of eighteen.⁴⁴

The issues of honour, dignity and self-fashioning are the subject of extensive scholarship, but this historiography typically addresses only personal honour, not the honour of institutions such as regiments or garrisons.⁴⁵ In her 2001 *Historical Journal* article, 'The Web of Honour: Soldiers, Christians, and Gentlemen in the English Civil War', Donagan argues that rather than being 'an expression of machismo or romantic chivalry, military honour in Early Modern England was professional, moral, utilitarian'.⁴⁶ Donagan's argument in favour of professionalism as a defining feature of military honour, and the connected idea of a corporate soldierly identity, is useful in explaining the importance that was attached to a garrison's marching out with military honours.⁴⁷

Donagan stressed the dual pragmatic/symbolic nature of the ritual, with the personal arms borne by the soldiery protecting the retreating garrison from any act of treachery.⁴⁸ The obvious symbolic value was as a piece of military theatre, a ritual of public display designed to demonstrate to the defeated, the victor and spectators alike that the garrison had retained their professional pride. This was essential if officers were to retain control over their men as they marched to a new garrison, a situation that provided the perfect opportunity for desertion. Through the ritualistic reassertion of the unbroken honour and integrity of the garrison as a military unit, soldiers whose resolve may have been weakened by defeat could be kept close to the colours. Connected with this was the mutual agreement, not recorded in surrender articles but well-attested from other sources, that the besiegers would not incite the garrison to desert during this process.⁴⁹

⁴³ Tullie, *Siege of Carlisle*, pp. xiv–xviii; Non-contemporary copy of the Articles agreed upon Between Coll. Richard Thornton, Commander in chiefe of the forces before Skipton Castle on the one party, and Sir John Mallory Knight, Col, and Governor of Skipton Castle on the other party, about The Surrender and Delivery of the said Castle, with the Cannon, Ammunition, Goods and Provisions belonging thereto, in manner after specified, to the said Coll, for the use of King and Parliament, the 21st day of December, 1645, York Minster Library and Archives, Hailstone Papers, Box 7.4.

⁴⁴ Spence, *Skipton Castle in the Great Civil War 1642–1645*, p. 106–107; Tullie, *Siege of Carlisle*, p. xv.

⁴⁵ Hopper, 'The self-fashioning of Gentry turncoats during the English Civil War'.

⁴⁶ Donagan, 'The Web of Honour: Soldiers, Christians, and Gentlemen in the English Civil War', p. 365.

⁴⁷ Donagan, 'The Web of Honour', p. 370.

⁴⁸ Donagan, 'The Web of Honour: Soldiers, Christians, and Gentlemen in the English Civil War', p. 385.

⁴⁹ Donagan, 'The Web of Honour', p. 385.

These honours were not explicitly awarded to the garrison of Newark, although they were allowed to leave with their 'Horses, Arms, and their proper Goods' for the officers and 'Money, Clothes and Swords' for the common soldiers.⁵⁰ This harsher language compared to the surrenders of the last year was owed to the increasing radicalisation of the Parliamentary party. In most previous articles the relevant fortresses were surrendered to 'King and Parliament', while at Newark the fortress was given over 'for the use of the Parliament of England'.⁵¹ The two surrenders at Scarborough and the 1649 surrender at Pontefract developed this trend further. While the turncoat governor Bethell was allowed to march from Scarborough 'with his Horse and Armes, both offensive and defensive', his men were not guaranteed the right to march with full military honours.⁵² The 'functional radicalisation' of the Parliamentary cause, to quote Morrill, evidently also applied to the language they employed in dealing with their enemies.

At Pontefract the situation was considerably more complicated, owing to the governor, Colonel Morris, being exempted from pardon due to once again taking up arms against the Parliament after having compounded and sworn the negative oath after the First Civil War.⁵³ Since he had already won the confidence of the former governor before betraying him, he was also probably considered a turncoat, the penalty for which was typically execution.⁵⁴ While the besiegers did not name those officers of the garrison who were exempted from pardon, Morris accurately guessed that he was amongst them.⁵⁵ The garrison ultimately negotiated six days before the

⁵⁰ Anon, *Articles concerning the Surrender of Newark To the Commissioners of both Kingdoms*, p. 4.

⁵¹ York, 1; Tullie, *Siege of Carlisle*, p. xv; Anon, *Articles concerning the Surrender of Newark To the Commissioners of both Kingdoms*, p. 4.

⁵² Anon, *Col. Bethells Letter to his Excellence the Lord Fairfax, Concerning the Surrender of Scarborough Castle, on Tuesday, December 19, 1648. Together with a true copy of the Articles for the Rendition thereof, and the Result of the Councill of War concerning the same*, p. 7.

⁵³ Boothroyd, *The History of the Ancient Borough of Pontefract, containing an interesting account of its castle and the three different sieges it sustained, during the civil war, with notes and pedigrees of some of the most distinguished Royalists and Parliamentarians, chiefly [sic] drawn from Manuscripts never before published*, p. 292.

⁵⁴ Allegedly Morris had gained the confidence of the governor to the point of sharing his bed, see Boothroyd, *The History of the Ancient Borough of Pontefract, containing an interesting account of its castle and the three different sieges it sustained, during the civil war, with notes and pedigrees of some of the most distinguished Royalists and Parliamentarians, chiefly [sic] drawn from Manuscripts never before published*, p. 260. See also Geoffrey Parker, *Empire, War and Faith in Early Modern Europe* (London: Allen Lane, 2002), p. 169; Hopper, *Turncoats and Renegadoes: Changing Sides in the English Civil Wars*, p. 179.

⁵⁵ Boothroyd, *The History of the Ancient Borough of Pontefract, containing an interesting account of its castle and the three different sieges it sustained, during the civil war, with notes and pedigrees of some of the most distinguished Royalists and Parliamentarians, chiefly [sic] drawn from Manuscripts never before published*, pp. 296–297.

truce took effect with General Lambert, the Parliamentary commander, to give Morris time to escape.⁵⁶ He was ultimately unsuccessful and was hanged on 23 August 1649.⁵⁷

In return for safely exiting a fortress, the relevant garrison was obliged to leave it fit for occupation by the besiegers. The first article in the surrenders of Newark, Skipton, Carlisle and York was a demand—phrased in various ways—that the fortress was handed over intact. This also included stockpiles of ammunition and pieces of cannon, which the garrison was typically not permitted to carry away with them. The Chester and Carlisle articles contained additional clauses designed to spare the town from the iconoclastic destruction of churches. The third Carlisle article specified ‘That no church be defaced’ while the tenth article of Chester stated ‘That no church within the City, Evidences or Writings belonging to the same shall be defaced.’⁵⁸ The destruction of religious buildings and images in this period is a well-studied subject among historians, literary scholars and archaeologists alike, particularly after the revisionist moment in Civil War historiography in the 1970s and 1980s saw religious reasons for civil war come to the fore of historiography.⁵⁹ Fears of the recatholicization of the English Church, and a desire for a ‘complete’ reformation with the destruction of all ‘superstitious images’, all contributed to a widespread culture of iconoclasm amongst the Parliamentary and Covenanter armies.

⁵⁶ Boothroyd, *The History of the Ancient Borough of Pontefract, containing an interesting account of its castle and the three different sieges it sustained, during the civil war, with notes and pedigrees of some of the most distinguished Royalists and Parliamentarians, chiefly [sic] drawn from Manuscripts never before published*, pp. 296–297.

⁵⁷ Robert Ahston, ‘Morris, John (c. 1615–1649)’, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn, Sept 2004 [<https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-19307?rskey=sWIGre&result=1>], accessed 01/2020.

⁵⁸ Tullie, *Siege of Carlisle*, p. xv; Anon, *Sir William Bereton’s Letter concerning the surrender of the city of Chester for the Parliament: Together with the articles agreed betwixt both parties, and the commissioners names* (London: Edward Husband, 1645), p. 7.

⁵⁹ John Philips, *The Reformation of Images: Destruction of Art in England, 1535–1660* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); John Hoffman, ‘The Arminian And The Iconoclast: The Dispute Between John Cosin And Peter Smart’, *Historical Magazine of the Protestant Episcopal Church* 48 (1979), 279–301; S. K. Baskerville, ‘Puritans, Revisionists, and the English Revolution’, *Huntington Library Quarterly* 61 (1998), 151–171; Morrill, ‘The Religious Context of the English Civil War’, 155–178; Peter Goldman, ‘Living Words: Iconoclasm and beyond in John Bunyan’s “Grace Abounding”’, in *New Literary History: The Book as Character, Composition, Criticism, and Creation* 33 (2002), 461–489; Julie Spraggon, *Puritan Iconoclasm during the English Civil War*, 42 vols. (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2003), vol. VI; Walter, ‘Popular Iconoclasm and the Politics of the Parish in Eastern England, 1640–1642’, pp. 261–290.

As explained in the previous chapter, the besiegers at Carlisle had also spent the winter in miserable conditions. They were also largely Covenanter soldiers, confronted with a city whose dominant religious characteristics were either Anglicanism or apathy.⁶⁰ The same conditions which underpinned most of the period's massacres were present, but that possibility had been removed by the formal surrender. In the absence of any opportunity for a sack, personal suffering and militant Protestantism combined to provide the perfect motivation for the destruction of a significant proportion of the Carlisle Cathedral complex: 'In a moment of fanatical purity the cloisters, part of the deanery, the chapter house and prebendal buildings were pulled down, and the materials were sacrilegiously used to build a main guard and repair the fortifications of the city. The west portion of the cathedral was also demolished, leaving only three bays of the venerable Norman structure, standing'.⁶¹

Carlisle was, however, the exception, and the breaking of the terms of surrender was very rare in Northern England during the Civil Wars. There was no controversy similar to the execution by Thomas Fairfax of Royalist prisoners after the fall of Colchester in August 1648, which Royalist polemicists claimed was a breach of the articles of surrender.⁶² Where massacres and murders happened in the north, as explored in the previous chapter, it was in either the absence of formal articles, such as during a sack or before they were composed. Surrender articles were generally effective as a means of peacefully ending Northern England's sieges, while their

⁶⁰ Tullie, *Siege of Carlisle*, p. 1; Leopold George Wickham Legg (ed.), *A relation of a short survey of 26 counties observed in a seven weeks journey begun on Aug. 11, 1634* (London: F. E. Robinson & co., 1904), p. 37.

⁶¹ Wilson (ed.), *Victoria County History of England, A History of the County of Cumberland*, vol. II, pp. 91–92; Hugh Todd, 'Account of the City and Diocese of Carlisle', in Chancellor Ferguson, *Cumberland and Westmoreland Antiquarian and Archæological Society*, tract series, no. 6 (Kendal: Cumberland and Westmoreland Antiquarian and Archæological Society, 1892), pp. 23–26.

⁶² Thomas Fairfax, *A letter from his Excellency the Lord Fairfax Generall of the Parliaments forces: concerning the surrender of Colchester, the grounds and reasons of putting to death Sir Charles Lucas and Sir George Lysle; with the articles and explanation of the same. Together with a list of all the prisoners taken, their numbers and qualities therein exprest. Read in the House of Peeres upon the 31 of Aug. 1648. And commanded to be printed and published* (London: Jon Wright, 1648); Anon, *An elegie on the death of Sir Charls Lucas and Sir George Lisle* (London: s.n., 1648); Anon, *The cruel tragedy or inhumane butchery, of Hamor and Shechem, with other their adherents. Acted by Simeon and Levi, in Shechem, a city in Succoth a county or Lordship in Canaan. Lately revived and reacted heere in England, by Fairfax and Ireton, upon the persons of Sir Charles Lucas and Sir George Lisle, in Colchester, the 28. Aug. 1648. Presented to publicke view in meditations, discoursing the former, discovering the latter, and comparing the circumstances of both, and dedicated to the honoured memory of the two last named worthies* (London: 1648); Donagan, 'The Web of Honour: Soldiers, Christians, and Gentlemen in the English Civil War', pp. 382–383.

publication was effectively used by the Parliamentarians as a propaganda device aimed at publicising the totality of their victory over northern Royalism.

8.3 Afterlives of Fortification

Particularly in the case of fortified cities, civic defences remained the most prominent symbol of the conflict for the inhabitants. In the case of towns that had undergone intense sieges, the memory of the conflict remained long after the end of active hostilities. At Hull a year after the end of the siege, the Common Council gave orders for the commemoration of the relief of the city. It ordered that:

It is ordered that Satterday next being the *xith* day of October instant shall be solemnly kept & observed, throughout this Towne of a day of public[cl]y: thankesgiveing to Almighty God: for his mercifull deliverance of this Towne from the power of the Enemy: by rising the siege upon the *xith* day of october: Annio 1643./ w[i]ch was then laid against the Towne by the Earle of Newcastle & his Army. And publ[ic]y: notice to be hereafter ypon the Constables w[i]thin their severall wards, wth as also. to warne all buisnesses to [illegible] keep their markt for sale of victualls to morrow: for that sattaday they will not be suffered to keep any Markett.⁶³

There was a strong partisan motivation in these commemorations. Notably, the council waited until after the defeat of the Royalists at Marston Moor and the fragmentation of the Royalist army into isolated garrisons. It appeared politically safe for the corporation to begin openly celebrating this particularly prominent Royalist defeat. Hull's service was unusual in the region, as most of Northern England's most important fortresses, being Royalist, were ultimately forced to surrender. These cities, such as Newcastle, York, Carlisle, and Chester were not motivated to celebrate their unsuccessful resistance against the Parliamentarians and so did not establish similar commemorations.

However, this does not mean that the sieges were forgotten, for they remained a key focus for popular understandings of the war-torn past. Indeed, it was not just in the immediate aftermath of the conflict that sieges of fortresses formed a central feature of local memory, for it continued into the eighteenth century and down to the present day. In 1750 Francis Drake, a resident of Pontefract and a cleric, wrote:

Midst the wild flames, that civil discord spread,

⁶³ Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, p. 683.

When by base arts the royal martyr bled,
 Still loyal Pomfret spurned the tyrants' hate,
 Last in these northern climes that scorned to pay,
 A servile homage to his lawless sway,
 And in glorious ease survive the monarch's fate.⁶⁴

A century after Pontefract Castle had been destroyed by parliamentary order, it had now become a celebrated symbol of local identity and loyalty to the Crown. Other symbols of the garrison perpetuated themselves long after the end of the conflict. The town's motto remains '*post mortem patris pro filio*', 'after the death of the father, for the son', the slogan displayed on the first obsidional coins minted by the garrison in the name of Charles II following the regicide.⁶⁵ Changing political circumstances dictated how the inhabitants of Pontefract portrayed their town's Civil War experience to the world. Under the English Republic, the castle was 'the nest of unclean birds', the author of the town's ills – which was transformed by the Restoration into the symbol of the town's affection to the Royalist cause.

Even the terminology used to refer to the most significant sieges demonstrates the significance attached by posterity to them. The term 'Great Siege' is commonly applied to York, Scarborough, and Newcastle.⁶⁶ There is no scientific definition of what separates a 'Great Siege' from a mere 'Siege', for example, the highly destructive sieges of Newark and Basing House are normally given the latter cognomen, despite the intensity of the conflict there. 'Great Siege' is primarily a legacy of long-standing use in local, oral and folk histories primarily informed by these most dramatic memories of past, namely those of violent conflict. In the introduction to this dissertation, the dramatic distinction between popular and academic understandings of the Civil Wars was explored primarily using the divergent political/religious and military historiographies. But it is in popular memory that the distinction is particularly vivid, as fortress remnants such as Skipton Castle, which has an annual event celebrating the Civil Wars, and Newark, which hosts regular re-enactments in addition to the National Civil War Centre, reflect the way in which a majority of the public interact with the civil conflicts of mid-seventeenth-

⁶⁴ Fox, *The Three Sieges of Pontefract Castle: printed from the manuscript compiled by George Fox*, p. 159.

⁶⁵ Pontefract Civic Society Website, [<https://www.pontefractcivicsociety.org.uk/about-us/town-history/>], accessed 11/2019. Nelson, 'The obsidional money of the Great Rebellion 1642–1649', p. 325; Besly, *Coins and Medals of the English Civil War*, p. 9.

⁶⁶ Wenham, *The Great and Close Siege of York: 1644*; Sadler & Serdiville, *The Great Siege of Newcastle 1644*; Firth, 'Sir Hugh Cholmley's narrative of the Great Siege of Scarborough'.

century Britain.⁶⁷ The large numbers of guidebooks, albeit generally of low quality, produced by organisations such as English Heritage are a clear demonstration of this.⁶⁸

8.4 Final Conclusion

The purpose of this dissertation has been to demonstrate how fortification was a three-fold phenomenon—physical, administrative and cultural—the analysis of which is essential to understanding the progress of the British Civil Wars in Northern England. Its structure, an agglomeration of case studies exploring several different aspects of the fortress in the period, reflects the shape of the historiography of fortresses in the British Civil Wars. There is no analogue to the organised debates around cause and allegiance that dominated scholarship for much of the later twentieth century.⁶⁹ Academia has only recently begun to seriously address the period from the military-historical perspective and is yet to focus on the study of fortresses as a discrete subject. This dissertation aimed to link the subject of fortification to as many of the different debates and fields of Civil War History as possible, to demonstrate the role played by the fortress in each.

Fortification's physical basis is inadequately understood by most academic historians of the period, despite Hutton's 2004 suggestions, but it is a field of growing significance in archaeology.⁷⁰ The developments of medievalist castle studies, exploring the castle as more than a purely military phenomenon, are finally being applied to Early Modern castles and fortified houses.⁷¹ This is welcome, but the process is still in a relatively early stage. Further interdisciplinary work directly involving archaeologists and historians is necessary to develop as full a picture as evidence permits of the material patterns of fortification; this dissertation contributes towards such change by foregrounding how Early Modern British fortification relied on a combination of theoretical textbooks, derived from the experiences of contemporary

⁶⁷ See 'Pikes and Plunder Annual Civil War Festival, May 5–6, 2015, [<http://www.nationalcivilwarcentre.com/events/pikesandplunderannualcivilwarfestival.php>], accessed 09/2020.

⁶⁸ Weaver, *Middleham Castle*; McCombie, *Tynemouth Priory and Castle*; Summerson, *Carlisle Castle*.

⁶⁹ Russell, *Unrevolutionary England, 1603–1642*; Morrill, 'Introduction: England's wars of religion', pp. 33–44; Adamson, 'The baronial context of the English Civil War'; Adamson, *The Noble Revolt. The overthrow of Charles I*; Smith, *Constitutional Royalism and the search for settlement, c.1640–1649*.

⁷⁰ Hutton, *Debates in Stuart History*, pp. 42–43.

⁷¹ Rakoczy, *Archaeology of Destruction, A reinterpretation of Castle Slightings in the English Civil War*; Askew, 'Political iconoclasm: the destruction of Eccleshall Castle during the English Civil Wars'; Askew, 'Biography and Memory: Sandal Castle and the English Civil War'; Askew, 'Sheffield Castle and The Aftermath of the English Civil War'.

continental wars, and the ‘ancestral memory’ of the centrality of castles to previous conflicts.⁷² The former was applied mainly to the construction of the earthworks needed to protect antiquated structures and was typically undertaken by manual labourers raised from the locality, paid or unpaid, under the direction of military professionals.⁷³

The main weight of this dissertation, in terms of its impact upon the field, is in chapter six and seven—the chapters where it deals with fortress administration. Administrative history is—alongside political and religious studies—the primary form of enquiry into the British Civil Wars. The sheer scale of publications on these three subjects is well known, as are the different schools of thought and the primary source bases, principally central archival material such as the *Calendar of State Papers Domestic*.⁷⁴ While the past fifty years have seen an explosion in the use of regional archives, to the great benefit of the field, this has had limited effect on the history of fortification, which remains unintegrated into administrative history. This is erroneous, because fortification entailed the creation of the fortress as an institution, as well as a physical structure. Without supplies, soldiers or the competent command of both a fortress was little more than useless expenditure; this fact is generally understood by military historians but—given the ubiquity of garrisoning across a country whose normal administrative system had largely collapsed—it is also absolutely necessary to return the study of garrisoning to a serious position within Civil War studies.

The most important figure in any fortress, city or castle, was typically the governor. Constituted through commissions from superior authorities, such as regional generals or committees, or the Royalist, Parliamentary or Covenanter central authorities themselves.⁷⁵ Governors possessed

⁷² Donagan, ‘Halcyon Days and the Literature of War’; Hexham, *The First Part of the Principles of the Art Military practiced in the warres of the United Netherlands, under the command of His Highness the Prince of Orange our Captaine Generall*; Hexham, *The art of fortification, or architecture militaire as vvell offensiue as defensiue, compiled & set forth, by Samuell Marolois reuiewed, augmented and corrected by Albert Girard mathematician: & translated out of French into English by Henry Hexam*; Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre*; Papillon, *A Practicall Abstract of the Arts, of Fortification and Assailing. Containing Foure different Method’s of Fortifications, with approved rules, to set out in the feild, all manner of superficies, Intrenchment and approches, by the demy circle, or with Lines and Stakes. Written for the benefit of such as delight in the Practise of the So Noble Arts*.

⁷³ Flintham, *The English Civil War Defences of London*, p. 15.

⁷⁴ Hamilton (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I, July preserved in the State Paper Department of Her Majesty’s Public Record Office*, vols. 1–23.

⁷⁵ Commission, William, Marquess of Newcastle, General of His Majesty’s forces raised in Northern parts of the kingdom for the defence thereof, to Sir John Mallory. Colonel, Governor of Skipton Castle and Commander-in-Chief of the forces there, and in the divisions of Staincliffe and Ewecross, to be Governor of Skipton Castle with authority to call together forces for the suppression of insurrection,

wide-ranging formal powers over both civic and military subordinates, as well as the impressive influence afforded by a preponderance of military force.⁷⁶ This preponderance of military force shaped the often combative relationship between military and civic governments in the fortified cities of Northern England, which resulted in a variety of outcomes ranging from the complete submission of the corporation to military authority, as at York, to rendering the military government dysfunctional and ineffectual, as was the case in Chester.⁷⁷ These relationships have been studied before—by Morrill, Hopper, Binns and others—but on a local, rather than regional or national, basis.⁷⁸ This was not an error, but only by bringing together multiple case-studies could the heterogeneity of the civil-military relationships of Civil War Northern England be demonstrated for historical analysis.⁷⁹ That analysis demonstrated the diversity of circumstances and outcomes across the region's cities, dependent on military developments, political and military calculations but also the personality of the governor and their ability to interact profitably with urban oligarchies.⁸⁰

Furthermore, this thesis has demonstrated the centrality of governors to Royalist administration in particular. The Royalists' reaction to the crisis of state authority was to develop *ad-hoc*

15 December 1643, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/41; Copy of the appointment William, Earl of Newcastle, General of the King's Forces in the North of Col. Henry Stradling as Colonel and [deputy] commander in chief under Col. Gray of the brigade to be raised in Northumberland and Durham, 7 July 1643, Cumbrian Archive Service, Carlisle Archive Centre, DPH/1/89/1.

⁷⁶ Royal Warrant to Sir John Mallory, to collect rents and arrears due to the king from Henry, late Earl of Cumberland, and to use them for the maintenance of the garrison. Given under Royal signet, at Oxford, 30 March 1645, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, Vyner MSS, T/32/44; John Morris, receipts for the garrison of Pontefract, Kew, National Archives, ASSI 47/20/11; Civil War Assessments, Pewter etc., B III, The West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds Branch, WYL100/PO/2/15.

⁷⁷ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1; Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–1660: County Government and Society during the English Revolution*, p. 138; Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2; Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210.

⁷⁸ Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–1660: County Government and Society during the English Revolution*; Andrew Hopper, "'The Great Blow' and the Politics of Popular Royalism in Civil War Norwich', *English Historical Review* 560 (2018), 32–64; Binns, *A Place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640–1660*; Howell, 'The Structure of Urban Politics in the English Civil War'.

⁷⁹ Compare, Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 81–82; Assembly Books vol. 2 1624–1684, Cheshire Archives and Local Studies, Z AB/2, ff. 58–64; Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210; Hull Corporation Records Bench Book 5, Hull History Centre, Microfilm Roll 175, C BRB/3, pp. 583–587.

⁸⁰ Minutes of full council (pre-1835), House Book 36, York Civic Archive, Y/COU/1/1, ff. 81–84; Lord Byron's Memoir of the Siege of Chester, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson B. 210.

system of devolved local military governments loosely coordinate by regional commanders answering to the King; extant studies of wartime administration, focused as they are institutional developments, generally fail to take this system into account.⁸¹ With the notable exception of Hutton, Royalist administration is simply written off as impossible to study.⁸² However—despite the lack of evidence for a traditional administrative historical enquiry—it is possible to reconstruct the fragmented Royalist system through the ‘bottom-up’ pioneered by Braddick; examining Royalist power on the local level and seeing which bodies exercise that power, namely the governors of towns and castles.⁸³ This system was not atypical; indeed a comparison with the broader historiography of civil war or state weakness shows remarkable similarities, from the medieval dependence on lordly magnates to project power to the periphery of a weak state, to the *Reichsverteidigungskommissars*—the regional defence coordinators prominent in the last months of Nazi Germany, when central authority began to disintegrate.⁸⁴

Finally, there is the role played by the fortress as a symbol, and a space for the performance of lordship, military dignity or suffering. This dissertation has chosen to define this aspect of the fortress as ‘cultural’, since it was central to contemporary experiences of fortification, but does not adequately fit into the apparently discrete categories of ‘physical’ or ‘administrative’. The restoration of medieval systems of garrisoning also demonstrated the persistence of the model of the castle as a lordly residence.⁸⁵ This was acknowledged by the authors of military manuals such as Papillon, who wrote after the experience of several years of civil war.⁸⁶ The lordly underpinnings of the gubernatorial office should not be ignored, given the as-yet unresolved controversy of Adamson’s ‘baronial revolt’ and the ongoing historiography of office-holding

⁸¹ See Stewart, *Rethinking the Scottish Revolution: Covenanted Scotland, 1637–1651*; David Smith, ‘Parliaments and Constitutions’, in *The Oxford Handbook of the English Revolution*, ed. Michael Braddick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 243–257; Stephen Roberts, ‘State and Society in the English Revolution’, in *The Oxford Handbook of the English Revolution*, ed. Michael Braddick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 294–309; Mark Knights, ‘The Long-Term Consequences of the English Revolution: State Formation, Political Culture, and Ideology’, in *The Oxford Handbook of the English Revolution*, ed. Michael Braddick, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 518–531.

⁸² Hutton, *The Royalist War Effort 1642–1646*, p. 86.

⁸³ Braddick, *State formation in early modern England, ca. 1550–1700*.

⁸⁴ Jane Caplan, *Nazi Germany: Short Oxford History of German* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 98.

⁸⁵ Adamson, ‘Politics and the Nobility in Civil-War England’, pp. 231–232; Russel, *Unrevolutionary England 1603–1642*, p. xii; Chatsworth House, Bolton Abbey MSS, Bk. 73; Bks 226, 228, 230. Yorkshire Archaeological Society, DD/121/36A (2); Whitaker, *The History and Antiquities of the Deanery of Craven in the County of York*, 3rd edn, p. 394; Spence, *Skipton Castle and Its Builders*, pp. 92–93.

⁸⁶ Papillon, *A Practicall Abstract of the Arts, of Fortification and Assailing...*, p. 92.

and lordly mentalities; this dissertation does not intend to significantly develop the latter two subjects—beyond the commentary the governorship should be included, despite its relative brevity as a common office—but suggests a revision and clarification of the former controversy, albeit only in regions of Northern England near the Anglo-Scottish borders with a long history of government dependence on local magnates for security.⁸⁷

As centres of traumatic suffering, fortresses also became symbols of both heroic resistance and futile misery. If a fortress could not be taken quickly, either by storm or due to the garrison surrendering, a siege would ensure. This was among the most miserable forms of early-modern warfare for besieger, defender and civilian alike. It meant continual exposure to the danger of violent death, indiscriminate use of famine against soldier and civilian alike and ultimately established many of the prerequisites for massacres.⁸⁸ Suffering and trauma was fashioned by contemporaries in different ways, depending on motive. Royalist newsbooks such as *Mercurius Aulicus* heroized resistance, turning besieged garrisons into powerful propaganda images.⁸⁹

In cases of massacre, such as at Bolton or Scarborough, the forms of the atrocity story would be employed.⁹⁰ In one strange case, a minister accompanying the Covenanter army at Newcastle declared that a massacre should have ensued, as a punishment of the town's sins.⁹¹ Ultimately no such massacre occurred. This 'reverse atrocity story' type was uncommon but demonstrates

⁸⁷ Cynthia Neville, 'Keeping the Peace on the Northern Marches in the Latter Middle Ages', *The English Historical Review* 109 (1994), 1-25; Cynthia Neville, 'Scottish Influences on the Medieval Laws of the Anglo-Scottish Marches', *The Scottish Historical Review* 81 (2002), 161-185.

⁸⁸ Ward, *The Animadversions of Warre...*, p. 339; Carlton, *Going to the Wars: The Experience of the British Civil Wars 1638-1651*, pp. 155, 170; Coster, 'Massacre and Codes of Conduct in the English Civil War', p. 91.

⁸⁹ *Mercurius Aulicus* (2-12 January 1645), p. 1331 (*Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 275.302); *Mercurius Aulicus*, 41st week (6 October 1644-12 October 1644), p. 1198 (*Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 275.241).

⁹⁰ Casserley, *Massacre: the Storming of Bolton*, p. 122; Anon, *An exact relation of the bloody and barbarous massacre at Bolton in the moors in Lancashire*; Binns, *A Place of Great Importance: Scarborough in the Civil Wars 1640-1660*, p. 206, quoting Committee for the Militia of the County of York, *By the committee of the militia for the countie of York wee being assigned and authorized by authority of Parliament for the raising of forces within this countie for suppressing of invasions and insurrections within the same*; *Mercurius Anti-Mercurius*, no. 1 (12 September 1648-19 September 1648, *Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 269.1); *The Kingdome's Weekly Intelligencer*, no. 277 (12 September 1648-19 September 1648, *Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 214.277); *Packets of Letters*, no. 27 (18 September 1648, *Nelson and Seccombe STC*, 480.27); Smith, *Bloudy newes from the north...*, p. 6.

⁹¹ Lithgow, *A TRUE EXPERIMENTALL AND EXACT RELATION UPON That famous and renovvned Siege OF NEW CASTLE, The diverse conflicts and occurranes fell out there during the time of ten weeks and odde dayes: And of that mightie and marveilous storming thereof, with Power, Policie, and prudent plots of Warre. Together with a succinct commentarie upon the Battell of Bowdon Hill, and that victorious battell of York or Marston Moore, never to bee forgotten*, pp. 24-26.

the variety of propaganda on the subject. Finally, besieged fortresses became spaces for both ritualistic surrender and the telling of ghost stories; the former aimed at encouraging capitulation by maintaining the security of both the defenders' lives and honour.⁹² The latter shaped the experience of traumatic suffering to give it meaning, placing death into a spiritual context that supported a particular political position.⁹³

This dissertation began with a quotation from Trevelyan, with the further commentary that as far as fortification is concerned, Civil War historiography has changed considerably less over the past century than is generally appreciated.⁹⁴ However, the fortress can be placed in a position of prominence without major historiographical revision of existing arguments; instead—as a framing concept—it brings together multiple fields and subjects of analysis, demonstrating the interconnectedness of cultural, administrative and military approaches and bringing the academic history of the period closer to its popular counterpart—which remains centred on, 'These veteran strongholds...alike put into a state of defence.'⁹⁵

⁹² Donagan, 'The Web of Honour: Soldiers, Christians, and Gentlemen in the English Civil War', p. 372.

⁹³ Tullie, *A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle*, p. 21.

⁹⁴ Trevelyan, *England under the Stuarts*, 1st edn, p. 202.

⁹⁵ Trevelyan, *England under the Stuarts*, 1st edn, p. 202.

Appendix

Transcription: Petition to the Leaders of the Scottish Army, Tyne and Wear Archives.

Reference No: DX1148/1

Transcription Conventions

- *xxx* indicates expanded contractions which are either conventional abbreviations (such as *w^{ch}* or *ma^{tie}*), or where the contraction is marked in the manuscript by a tilde.
- [xxx] indicates letters supplied by the editor when the original manuscript lacked any tilde marking contraction, or when the contraction was not a conventional abbreviation.
- \xxx/ indicates text located within the margins or between the lines. Lination within the marginal text has been preserved as far as is possible, any discrepancies in location have been noted.
- The letters i/j and u/v have been regularized as appropriate for ease of reading.
- {...} indicates text which has been made illegible due to blot, folding or excessive biting. The number of periods within the parentheses indicates the approximate number of letters within the illegible word.
- ‘es’ and ‘&’ bevigraphs have both been expanded and the added letters italicised.
- Fossil thorns have been converted into ‘th’ without italicisation.
- ///xxx/// indicates that the surrounded text is within italic script.
- **xxx** indicates that letters written in an engrossing hand.
- These various different conventions are used simultaneously-for example \///xxx/// would indicate italic text located in the margin.
- The ‘r-loop’ has been lowered and all of supplied letters (including the ‘r’) italicised, in order to distinguish it from a suspended ‘r’.
- ‘Yo’ was expanded to ‘yowr’ and not to ‘your’, based upon the generally consistent use of ‘yow’ instead of ‘you’ by the scribe. However, ‘o’ has been expanded to ‘our’ based upon the scribe’s spelling.
- The hyphen ‘=’ has been replaced by its equivalent modern convention ‘-’ in the transcription.
- Where a blank line has been inserted into the text there is a change in paragraph in the original manuscript.
- ---pagebreak--- indicates a change in page, with page numbers indicated as ‘p. 1.’, ‘p. 2.’ Etc.
- Original lineation has been preserved.

Details of Document

Fourteen unpaginated and unnumbered paper folios with script on both sides bound together. Text is written throughout in a regular late secretary hand with good lineation and consistent

letterforms; the source is clearly professionally scrivened and lacks significant ink blots, otiose strokes or other mistakes.

Transcription

---frontispeice---

To the leaders of the Scottish Army./

---p.1.---

To the Leaders of the Scottish Army./

Theise are to informe that
 yee are men who protest
 protest protest but never p[er]forme for wee well rem-
 member how the last yeare the mayne drift *and*
 Scope of all yowr Antim-
 arthiall Bookes, Protestatons
 and declaracons were onely
 to mayntaine the lawfullnes
 of Defensive Armes. Invasione
 was then such a Bugbeare
 word that yow did-

---p.2.---

Wish a heavy Curse and
 direfull Anathema to fall on
 that nation that did first
 invadie each others but thee
 were not then growne p[er]fect Rebels And the En-
 glish were such Simple
 plaine dealing men as
 to lye downe, Sleepe on
 and beleive *that* yow were
 Christians till the noyse
 of yowr drums and Bagpipes
 the Clashing of the Armes
 and dommineering in *our*
 Streetes did at length
 waken us from *our* dull
 Letheagie to bee and

---p.3.---

greive at yowr falsehood
 and perjury and therefore
 I feare yow have puld

downe a Thunderbolt
from heaven uppon yowr owne
heads./

The last somer tis true
wee had an Army Royall
uppon *our* border and it
was onely to compell yow
to be what yow should
have beene *with* out Com-
pulsion loyall *Subjects*, yet
wee made peace *with*
yow then when wee might
have ever triumphed
were yowr weakeness to shew

---p.4.---

it was not yowr blood but
obedience to yowr native
Prince and love to us
wee sought after but yee
perfidiously made a see-
ming peace *with* us when
warre was in yowr hearte
yow made peace then onely
to enable yow for warre
now./

But to let yowr busines
of the last yeare passe
with the yeare it selfe
This yeare to usher in
yowr invasine Arme and
to attract yowr well mienning
followers, yet sett forth

---p.5.---

or protestatons when yow
call *thee* God of heaven *and*
and earth to wittnesse
that thee will not take
from any the worth of
a Shooe Latchett *with* out
money or good securitye
for it and that yow onely
intent and purpose was to
peticon to his *Majesty* for
redresse of yowr greaviances

and as and then quietly
and peaceably to returnne
to *yowr* owne Countrey./

And what if his *Majesty*
will not grant *yowr* desires
then belike *yowr* intent is

---p.6.---

is to compell him by force
to give him Phisicke uppon
a Scottish daggers poynt
to cast theise his Kingdomes
of England and Ireland by
yowr barbarous Invasions
well whether this may or
that way I am sure
yowr ransacking of our
houses teaking oppen *our*
dores locks, Chests Canbi-
nettes and what not
drawing our Cattle treading
downe a[l]l Corne fieldes
pulling it upp by the
Rootes snatching the
bread from *our* mouthes
doe all Cry out ag[ains]t

yowr

---p.7.---

yowr damned pjury, but
thee tell us the borrow
onely, yet w[i]thout leave
making Scottish promises
to pay but when! When
Landerson and Dykes are
B[isho]pps Lashley and *thee*
D[e]vill Anticovennitors, then
and not till then./

But I know *yow* object
wee are served
why did wee oppose *yow*
in *yowr* passage over Tyne
thee expected fri[e]ndes but
thee found us foes Alas
what nation can be

soe Scottish as *without*

resistance

---p.8.---

resistance to admitt an
 Army of another nation
 into her bowells I will
 aske *yow* one question and
 let *yowr* owne Consciencs
 make *thee* Answer whether
 or noe if our Army
 had come into Scotland
 to speake *with* Lashley *yow*
 would have invited
 them to dynner and
 made them welcome
 But *yowr* wickednes doth
 not stay there, aske the
 Sheriffe of Tindale *and*
 lett him speake uppon
 his honor. and he will

confesse

---p.9.---

confesse thee are yet more
 guilty for when he accom-
 panied Comissary Gibson
 and I[or]*d* Walter Riddall at
 Newcastle gates *the* next day
 after the Skirmish he did
 in the name of the Army
 desire onely provision for
 their money *with* calling
 the great god to wittnesse
 that there should be ho-
 nest dealing thee doe
 now comannd both at *and*
 our money he did treate
 onely for what the Towe
 could spare byt *yow* take
 from us what wee
 cannit spare placing *yowr*

Countrys

---p.10.---

Countrie uppon *our* Towne
 lofts yow make *our* Mills
 the Batties least a morsull
 of bread should fall into
 a poore mans mouth.
 This Lord did protest
 as in the presence of
 God and his holy Angells
 that none but the Commissary
with the Generalls life-
 guard should be lodged
 in the Towne but now
 whole Regim[en]tes are
 there quartered and in-
 stead of givng to the Kings
 Majesty and instead of p[ro]viding

for

---p.11.---

for yowr Army thee take
 possession of the Towne
 thee fortifie as if thee did
 intend to nestle at NewCastle
 all winter, thee guard *our*
 gates place yowr Garrisons
 Crate yowr Govnor imposie
 Contribucon money both in
 Towne and Countrey con-
 trary to all law and equity
 yowr word and oath./

And wee well observe
 how yowr Tyranny still
 growes uppon us the Kings
 Magaysine was broke upp
with disgrace his Ma[jes]ties powder
 Shott Armes and
 provision seised on, then

his

---p.12.---

his Customes *with* highest
 impudency entred uppon
 and his Servantes Imprisoned/
 Now what mercy can a

sub[*jec*]*t* hope for when
 yow are this Cruell to yowr
 Prince, First like kings
 thee make p[ro]clamacon through
 the towne that all *thee*
 kings Armes should
 w[*i*]*thout* delay be delivered
 upp into yowr handes *and*
 that *with* whomsoweuer
 they were afterwarde founde
 they should incurre the
 penalty of Confiscacon
 of Goodes next thee search

private

---p.13.---

private houses under
 pretence of looking after
 the kings Armes byt tis
 indeede to steel what
 private Armes what
 goodes what l[e]seures what
 plate what moneyes
 men had; but *thee* least
 hole could escape yor
 narrow eye the very
 Privy must be smelt
 into *dulcis odor lucri* And
 then for private Armes
 yow cry God f[o]rbide
 that wee should medle
with them *wich* poore
 men have brought *with*
 their money or (a sanctified

resoluton

---p.14.---

Resolucon this if as well
 practised but it was
 not long ere uppon a
 second or third search
 thee tooke them away
 too, yowr not suffering
 any goodes to be taken
 out of *thee* towne doe
 manifestly discern yowr

foule intentons though
 yow seeke non see much
 to Cloake them under
 a holy vaile soe wee
 expect ere long to
 haive our hauses by yow
 villanously plundered And
 in the reare shoppps yow
 will picke a quarrell

w[i]th

---p.15.---

wish us to Cutt *our* throates./
 Thus have yow by
 degrees made *yowr* selves
 Masters of a Towne thee
 never Conquered, thee were
 admitted by us as freindes
 but contrary to the law
 of Armes by way of
 requitall thee have used
 us as slaves and in a
 disgracefull way disarmed
 us as if wee were
 Conquered people./

If wee had suspected
 such basenes in yow
 wisdom would have
 taught us too Cutt *yowr*
 throates first and then

dyed.

---p.16.---

dyed freemen Is this the
 liberty yow helped us to
 to make us greater slaves
 when yow made to gett
yowr owne liberty what
 Justice is it to snatch
 from others In mayn-
 tayning *yowr* own Church
 discipline doe yow Robb
 us of ours If wee neede
 must be slaves better
 be Royall Slaves to a

king never to a Sub[*jec*]*t*.
 Yow have seene in
 this Mapp the pyresse
 of our Misery *yowr* pujry
 A Turke would have
 kept his word till upon

it

---p.17.---

it that a Christan should
 not keepe his Oath but
 our Comfort is there is
 a God of trueth will
 one day revenge *yowr* false-
 hood though to punish
 our sinnes and to fatten
yow for distrucc[ti]on he
 sufferes *you* to goe on *and*
 prosper heere

Mistake me not I doe
 not brand all *with* this
 infamous note of pujry.
 I know among *yowr* gentry
 and nobility some to that
 I could say all truely
 noble who groane that
 their honor is thus

stayned

---p.18.---

stayned and their blood
 tainted under pretence
 of Religion. Amongst the
 Ministry some there
 are that weepe that
 one thing is dayly *pr[e]*ached
 another practised./
 Among the Comonally many
 there are that high poore
 moan that they are thus
 driven like beastes to
 Slaughter./

Thee that use headers
 have pittie on *yowr* king

too Good a King to be
 thus used whose heart
 cannot but bleed to
 finde more m[er]cy among

us

---p.19.---

us English then yow his
 native sub[jec]tes this admirable
 patience in bearing such
 affrote w[i]ch a private
 spiritt would not put upp
 ever from his equall
 Declares to all the world
 that he loves yowr nation equally
 if not more than
 ours And yet wee are
 ready to fight for him
 yow against him, thee
 possesse most of the p[re]ferrm[en]t[es]
 about his sacred person *our*
 p[re]ferrment is onely to
 be loyall; For shame re-
 pent cast downe yorselves
 and Armes at his *Matjesties*
 feete returne home

least

---p.20.---

least otheres haue the honor
 of loving yowr native prince
 better then yowr selves
 Aske noe more of a king
 then he can *with*
 honor grant unreasonable
 it is that rebellion should
 have its charges borne and
 loyalty be undone
 This is the ready way
 to encourage others to
 be what yow are Rebels.
 How the world will
 laugh that soe many
 brave Cavaleres should
 be soe bewitched to
 follow a packe, *prefeeres*

a Pedler before a Prince

thinke

---p.21.---

thinke of this and disband
 be not soe Cruell to *yowr*
neighbors yowr selves yowr
 wives and Children as
 to tarry here then of
 necessity both nations
 must bleed for the English
 cannot wth honor nor
with safetie suffer yow to
 dwell heere thee that
 Minister for Christ *yowr*
 Masters sake be not
 su[c]h pulpitt incendiaries to
 bring us into hatred w[i]th
yowr people by preaching
 to yow Comonally that
 wee of newCastle
 are Popish Idolaters that

in

---p.22.---

in all parte of *our* service
 Booke (to use Mr Andrew
 Cookes Phrase) are but
 Babilonish bratte to be
 dashed ag[ains]t the stones
 whom God and *yowr* selves
 know wee detest
 Popery Supershition and
 Idolatry as much if
 not more than yow selves./

Sweete Jesus that
 shedd thy blood
 for us suffer us
 not to shedd one
 anothers Convert
 this people from

their

---p.23.---

their Error
and Rebellion of their
wayes./

One that loves
yowr Nation
though he hate
yowr pujry

Bilton

Frind in NewCastle
Streete./

---backpeice---

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[Anon], *A Collection of speciall passages and certaine informations of all the most memorable accidents, and remarkable truths, from London, Westminster, and divers other parts of this Kingdome, from Munday Octob. 17. till Tuesday Novemb. 1. 1642. With a summary collection of all the declarations, orders, messages, remonstrances, petitions, letters, and other passages that have been published by order of both Houses of Parliament. And what other relations of newes have been any other ways published within that time from all other parts. Collected for the satisfacion of all those that desire to be truely informed*, London: Francis Coles, 1642. Source located at E.242[2], Thomason Tracts. ESTC System No. 006095039: ESTC Citation No. R2829.

[Anon], *A Discourse or dialogue between the two now potent enemies: The Lord Generall Militia, and his illegal opposite Commissioner of Array...*, London: Thomas Belis, 1642. Source located at E.240[28], Thomason Tracts. ESTC System No. 006096511: ESTC Citation No. R2966.

[Anon], *A list of his Majesties Navie Royall, and merchants ships their names, captaines and lieutenants, their men and burthens in every one, now setting forth for the guard of the narrow seas, and for Ireland this yeare, 1642. With an order, for the speedy rigging of the navie for the defence of the kingdome. Algernon Percy, Earle of Northumberland, Lord Percy, Lucy, Poynings, &c. Knight of the most noble order of the garter, and one of his Majesties most Honourable Privy Counsell, Lord high Admirall of England, and Lord Generall of his*

Majesties Navy Royall, London: John Rothwell, 1642. Source located at 669.f.3[50], Thomason Tracts. ESTC System No. 006116556: ESTC Citation No. R209785.

[Anon], *A TREATIE OF PEACE, Concluded The 29. of September, 1642. being Michaelmas day, That all Forces assembled together in any part of Yorkshire, Countie, or Citie of Yorke, shall be disbanded, and all those under Captaine Hotham now in Doncaster, and all other forces in any other parts of the Countrey, under any other Commanders belonging to the Garrison of Hull, shall retire to Hull with all speed possibly, and that Captaine Hotham shall begin to march from Doncaster towards Hull, upon Saturday next, the first of October, 1642...*, London: I. Benson, 1642. Source located at Wing/1296:25, University Microfilms International. ESTC System No. 006120157: ESTC Citation No. R213425.

[Anon], *A True and faithfull relation of the besieging of the towne of Manchester in Lancashire upon Saturday the 24. of September*, London: [s.n.], 1642. ESTC System No. 006088991: ESTC Citation No. R22592.

[Anon], *A True and Perfect Relation of A victorious Battell Obtained against the Earl of Cumberland And his Cavaliers, By the Lo: Fairfax and Capt: Hotham. Also. The manner of the Lo: Fairfax his besieging of the City of York; with divers other remarkable Passages concerning the same. And. The Taking of Eight of Sir John Hothams Souldiers prisoners by the Cavaliers, and the tormenting deaths they put them unto. With. The Resolution of Captain Hothams Souldiers thereupon*, London: William Ley, 1642. Source located at E126 (5), Thomason Tracts reel 22. ESTC System No. 006086297: ESTC Citation No. R20068.

[Anon], *An admiration by way of answer to the petition of the rebells in Ireland. To all true hearted Protestants, why the rebells in Ireland should petition to his Majesty to transport themselves into England to ayd and assist him, and by strength to carry on his designs untill they arrive at a prosperous end, and that they joyning with the papists here in England, which are a great and considerable number, doe not doubt but to curbe the insolencies of the Protestants. Whereunto is adjoyned the exact copy of the petition to the Kings Majesty by the rebells in Ireland, subscribed by 11. lords, and others of quality; examined by the originall by a person of honour there, being intercepted, was sen [sic] over to two Members of the House of Commons Dated the 17. of August, 1642*, London: Thomas Homer, 1642. Source located at E.115[5], Thomason Tracts. ESTC System No. 006084551: ESTC Citation No. R18440.

[Anon], *An Answerable REMONSTRANCE OF HIS MAJESTIES [sic] ingdomes of England, Scotland, Ireland, and the principality of Wales To the Parliament...*, London: J. Horton, 1642. Source located at Wing/2456:31, University Microfilms International. ESTC System No. 006138161: ESTC Citation No. R38502.

[Anon], *An exact and perfect relation of the proceedings of Sr Hugh Cholmly in Yorkshire, and of the taking of Captaine Canfield by the Parliaments forces, who commanded a Lancashire troop of papists. Also a true relation of a great battle fought at Tadcaster the last week, where Captaine Hotham slew and took three or foure hundred cavaliers. Likewise true information from Leeds, Mackefield, and Skipton. Also the proceedings of Sir John Seaton in Manch[e]ster. Likewise a true relation of a great battle fought neere Darby, between Mr. Hastings of Leicestershire, and Sir John Gell. Whereunto is annexed a copy of instructions sent by His Majesties great counsell, to the Lieutenants, Deputy-Lieutenants, and all other officers of every respective county of England; for the due execution of justice, the looking to the corruption of sheriffes, the enquiry after enclosures, the convicting of papists, &c. And many more particulars worthy the knowledge of the Kingdome.*, London: J. Harris, 1642. Source located at Wing/E3606, University Microfilms International. ESTC System No. 006100414: ESTC Citation No. R3972.

[Anon], *Bloudy nevves from the Lord Byron, in Wales; declaring the proceedings of the royall party, against the Parliaments forces, and the rising of the Welch-men with long hookes, and the bloudy execution done thereby. Also, a great fight neer the Isle of Anglesea, between the forces commanded by the Lord Byron, and Col. Horton, with the particulars thereof, and the number killed and taken. And a dangerous fight at Scarbrough Castle in Yorkes, between a party of the Princes forces, and Col. Bethels. Likewise, the resolution of the Levellers of England. And the remonstrance and declaration of Lieut. Gen. Cromwell, concerning the enemies of religion, King, and kingdome. Commanded to be printed and published. O. Crumwell*, London: G. H., 1648. Source located at 74:E.463[15], Thomason Tracts. ESTC System No. 006111954: ESTC Citation No. R205099.

[Anon], *Exceeding True and Happy News from Pomfret Castle: Being a perfect description of a great Battaille, fought by Mr. Hotham, sonne to Sir Iohn Hotham, with 200 Horse and 500 Foote, against the Lord Savill and Sir Francis Nevill, With 1500 of Horse and Foot, before*

the walls of Pomfret Castle, London: Thomas Rider, 1642. Source located at E121 (33), Thomason Tracts reel 21. ESTC System No. 006089033: ESTC Citation No. R22630.

[Anon], *His Majesties Declaration to All His Loving Subjects: Of the 12 of August 1642*, York: Robert Barker, 1642. Source located at Wing/ 1352:11, University Microfilms International. ESTC System No. 006093225: ESTC Citation No. R26591.

[Anon], *Military orders and articles established by His Majestie, for the better ordering and government of His Maiesties army*, York: Robert Barker, 1642. ESTC System No. 006130456: ESTC Citation No. R223884.

[Anon], *Most joyfull Newes By Sea and Land, Being the true Relation of a glorious victory obtained by the Lord Fairfax and Captain Hotham sonne to Sir Iohn Hotham at Cawood Castle in Yorkshire, against the Earle of Cumberland and his Northern Cavaliers: Wherin the Earle was forced to fly to York and is since pursed by the Lord Fairfax and Captain Hotham and is by them beset, with the great loss of men on the Earles side, with small loss on the adverse part: Also, the taking of two ships at Fulmouth in Cornwall by the ships sent down by the Earle of Warwick, to secure those those parts, which came from Holland, wherein was many Commanders Ordnance, Powder, Ammunition for War, and many letters of weighty and serious consequence: Together with the proceedings of his Majesties forces at Oxford since his departure from Banbury*, London: John Hunt, 1642. Source located at E126 (11), Thomason Tracts reel 22. ESTC System No. 006086083: ESTC Citation No. R19867.

[Anon], *Newes from Manchester being a true relation of the battell fought before Manchester. Wherein the Lord Strange lost 150. men besides 100 taken prisoners, with the losse only of 12 men of the town side, whereof six of them were taken prisoners. Sent in a letter to a private friend*, London: Richard Best, 1642. Source located at 21:E.121[5], Thomason Tracts. ESTC System No. 006086837: ESTC Citation No. R20573.

[Anon], *Strange newes from Yorke, Hull, Beverley, and Manchester. Or, a continuation of the proceedings passages, and matters of consequence that hath passed this last weeke in his Maiesties army before Hull, with some occurrences from Yorke during the Kings absence as also of my Lord Stranges comming in a warlike manner against the town of Manchester and slew three of the inhabitants thereof. Beeing all that passed here from the 16 of Iuly to the 23.*

Sent in a letter from a worthy knight now resident in Yorke, to a gentleman in Kings Street in Westminster, Iuly 25. 1642, London: John Thomas, 1642. Located at E.108[5], Thomason Tracts. ESTC System No. 006102358: ESTC Citation No. R5791.

[Anon], *The Case of the commission of array stated*, London: [s.n.], 1642. Source located at Wing/C1043 Thomason Collection vol. I, pt. I, p. 183 and Wing/248:E.123[18], University Microfilms International. ESTC System No. 006087581: ESTC Citation No. R2127.

[Anon], *The Latest remarkable truths, (not before printed) from Chester, Worcester, Devon, Somerset, Yorke and Lanchaster counties, as also from Scotland*, London: Thomas Underhill, 1642. Source located at E.240[23], Thomason Tracts. ESTC System No. 006104731: ESTC Citation No. R7997.

[Anon], *The Presentment and Articles Proposed by the Grand Jury of the County of York: And the Declaration of the Nobility, Grand Jury and Gentry of the said County: At the Assises assembled in August*, York: Robert Barker, 1642. Source located at E.116[37], Thomason Tracts. ESTC System No. 006106078: ESTC Citation No. R9236.

[Anon], *The true list of His Majesties Navie Royall, and merchants ships, their names, captaines and lieutenants, their men, and burthens in every one, now setting forth for the guard of the narrow seas, and for Ireland, this yeare, 1642*. Algernon Piercie, Earle of Northumberland, Lord Piercie, Lucie, Poynings, Fitz Paine, Bryan and Lattimer, Knight of the most noble order of the garter, and one of his Majesties most Honhurable [sic] Privie Councell, Lord high Admirall of England, and Lord Generall of his Majesties Navie Royall, London: John Thomas, 1642. Source located at 669.f.3[52], Thomason Tracts. ESTC System No. 006116566: ESTC Citation No. R209795.

[Anon], *Trve nevves from Yorke consisting of severall matters of note, and high concernment since the 13 of Iune: concerning these severall heads, viz.: concerning 1. Sir Iohn Meldrun, 2. L. Marq. Hamilton, 3. Earle of Newcastle, 4. Earle of Warwick, 5. Lord Willoughbit, 6. Duke of Richmond, 7. L. Marq. Hertford, 8. Earle of Bristoll, 9. Lord Paget: whereunto is added newes from Ireland, viz.: concerning 1. E. of Antrime, 2. E. of Castlehaven, 3. Lord Conway, 4. Lord Digby: with a catalogue of the names of the lords that subscribed to levie hose to assist His Majestie in defence of of [sic] his royall person, the two Houses of Parliament, and*

the Protestant religion, London: M. T., 1642. Source located at E.153[15], Thomason Tracts. ESTC System No. 006088147: ESTC Citation No. R21800.

[Anon], *A perfect relation of the taking of the towne of Preston in Lancashire, by the Parliaments forces under the command of Colonell Sir John Seaton on Thursday the ninth day of February, 1642. As it was certified by some gentlemen of repute in the same county to a member of the House of Commons, with the names of those that were slain. Together, with very good nevvs from Cheshire*, London: Edward Husbands, 1643. Source located at E.89[22], Thomason Tracts. ESTC System No. 006083203: ESTC Citation No. R1720.

[Anon], *A relation of a fight in the county of Lincoln, between the Kings forces, and the rebells of that county Which happened upon the eleventh day of Aprill, anno Domini, 1643. Neere Ancaster. And was presented to Her Majesty at Yorke, Aprill 13. Together with the subscription of those gentlemen whose names follow at the end of the relation*, York: Stephen Bulkley, 1643. Source located at wing R786A, reel 2368, University Microfilms International. ESTC System No. 006146722: ESTC Citation No. R230154.

[Anon], *A True relation of a great and wonderful victory otained by Captian Ashton and the Parliaments forces against the Earl of Derby at Whalley in Lancashire as it was certified in a letter from a gentleman there to a member of the House of Commons : for which great mercie they have apointed a day of thanksgiving*, London: Edward Husband, 1643. Source located at E.100{32}, Thomason Tracts. ESTC System No. 006076976: ESTC Citation No. R11443.

[Anon], *An Expresse relation of the passages and proceedings of His Majesties armie vnder the command of His Excellence the Earle of Newcastle: against the rebels, under the command of the Lord Fairfax and his adherents*, Oxford: [s.n.], 1643. Source located at Wing/1009:22, University Microfilms International. ESTC System No. 006098471: ESTC Citation No. R31482.

[Anon], *Another miraculous victorie obtained by the Lord Fairfax, against the Earl of Newcastle, at Barnham-Moore, where 1500. men were slain, with the number of officers, colours, commanders, and common souldiers that were taken prisoners, with ordnance, arms and ammunition: as it was informed to some members of the House on Monday the 12. of June.*

1643., London: Robert Wood, 1643. Source located at E.106[3], Thomason Tracts. ESTC System No. 006085011: ESTC Citation No. R18867.

[Anon], *Die Lunæ, 30 April. 1643*, London: Edward Husband, 1643. Source located at Wing/2237:02, University Microfilms International. ESTC System No. 006145329: ESTC Citation No. R42480.

[Anon], *Joyfull nevves from Plimouth, being an exact relation of a great victory obtained against the Cornish cavaliers, by the Parliaments forces in those parts, also a wonderfull token of Gods mercy to the Parliaments forces, for during the fight, the Lord sent fire from heaven, so that the cavaliers powder in their bandaliers, flasks, and muskets tooke fire, by which meanes they hurt, and slew each other, to the wonder and amazement of the Parliaments forces. Published at the request of some persons of eminencie, which were partakers of this wonderfull mercy, and mighty deliverance. Whereunto is annexed an abstract of severall letters, sent from severall parts of the Kingdome, to good hands in the city, containing many worthy particulars*, London: Leonard Smith, 1643. Source located at Wing /249:E.129[30], University Microfilms International and E3752, Thomason Collection. ESTC System No. 006085705: ESTC Citation No. R1951.

[Anon], *Military orders and articles established by His Majestie, for the better ordering and government of His Maiesties army. Also Two Proclamations, one against Plundering and Robbing. The other against selling or buying of Armes and Horse*, Oxford: Leonard Lichfield, 1643. Source located at E.246, Thomason Tracts. ESTC System No. 006130456: ESTC Citation No. R223884.

[Anon], *The New Yeares Wonder. Being a most certaine and true Relation of the disturbed inhabitants of Kenton, And other neighbouring villages neere unto Edgehill, where the great battaile betweixt the kings army, and the Parliaments forces was fought. In which place is heard & seene fearfull and strange apparitions of spirits as sounds of drums, trumpets, with the discharging of Canons Miskies, Carbines pettronels, to terrour and amazement, of all the fearfull hearers and behoulders*, London: Robert Ellit, 1643. Source located at E 86 (23), Thomason Tracts. ESTC System No. 006077720: ESTC Citation No. R12123.

[Anon], *A Briefe relation of the most remarkeable feats and passages of what His Most Gracious Majesties commanders hath done in England against the rebells and of his severall glorious victories over them sithence [sic] Ianuary 1641. till December 1643. and from the first of May 1644. till the fifth of this present Iuly / collected out of severall papers printed at Oxford, 1644. and divers letters printed from His Majesties campe to Chester, Bristoll, &c....*, Waterford: Thomas Boyeke, 1644. Source located at Wing/1647:06, University Microfilms International. ESTC System No. 006139561: ESTC Citation No. R39938.

[Anon], *A CATALOGUE of remarkable mercies conferred upon the seven Associated Counties, viz. Cambridge, Essex, Hartford, Huntingdon, Norfolk, Suffolk, and Lincoln. Printed by the command of the Right Honourable EDWARD, Earl of Manchester, the Major Generall thereof, and the Committee now residing in CAMBRIDGE: And appointed to be published in the severall Parish-Churches of the aforementioned Counties, upon the fourteenth of April, that Almighty God may by solemne Thanksgiving, have the glorie due unto his Name*, Cambridge: [s.n.], 1644. Source located at Wing/1809:01, University Microfilms International. ESTC System No. 006130615: ESTC Citation No. R224048.

[Anon], *A declaration wherein is full satisfaction given concerning Sir Edward Deering: with a true relation of the Scots preceedings of about the surrendering of Newcastle*, London: Andrew Coe, 1644. Source located at Wing/234:E33[4], University Microfilms International and D802, Thomason Collection. ESTC System No. 006081636: ESTC Citation No. R15755.

[Anon], *A Full relation of the Scots besieging Newcastle and their taking the glasse houses, and other forts...*, London: Bernard Alsey, 1644. Source located at Wing/234:E.33[25], University Microfilms International and F2369, Thomason Collection. ESTC System No. 006078045: ESTC Citation No. R12428.

[Anon], *A great victory obtained by Colonel Norton and his horse, and Colonell Jones and his foote, against Colonel Rayden, from Basing house, neere Walneborough Mill, within halfe a mile of Odium; where were taken prisoners Ssrjeant [sic] Major Langely, a mercer in Pater-noster-row, that went to Basing, also his escape. Captain Rawlet that was a scrivener at Holbern bridge. Lieutenant Rawlet at Holborne Cunduit. Lieutenant Ivorie a citizen of London. Ensigne Lucas a silke dier in the Old baly. Ensigne Corum, a papist of Winchester. Robinson a chyrurgeon to the Marques of Winchester, a papist. Taken besides, 3 gentlemen of*

armes 3 serjeants, 3 drummers, 5 drums, 75 common men, 100 armes, some horse, 4 were slain. 10 of onr [sic] men which were prisoners in Basing house escaped. Certified by gentlemen that were engaged in the service. Published according to order , London: Andrew Coe, 1644. ESTC System No. 006077027: ESTC Citation No. R1149.

[Anon], *A victorious conquest neer Selby in Yorkeshire certified by a letter from the Lord Fairfax his quarters, and compared with the Lord Fairfax his letter and others read in Parliament. At which time were taken prisoners, 2 colonels. 3 lievtendant colonels. 4 serjeant majors. 20 captains. ... besides other officers. 4 brasse pieces of ordnance. 8 pieces of ordnance in a ship. 7 barrels of powder. ... 1600 common soldiers. all their bag and baggage. divers ships in the river. Besides dives other purchase. and a cleer victory. An order whereby the Parliament have appointed Tuesday for a Thanksgiving, Master Carroll and Master Perne are appointed to preach before the Parliament,* London: Andrew Cole, 1644. Source located Wing/2101:07, University Microfilms International. ESTC System No. 006127391: ESTC Citation No. R220749.

[Anon], *An exact relation of the bloody and barbarous massacre at Bolton in the moors in Lancashire, May 28 by Prince Rupert being penned by an eye-vvitness, admirably preserved by the gracious and mighty hand of God in that day of trouble,* London: R. W. , 1644. Source located at E.7[1], Thomason Tracts. ESTC System No. 006081695: ESTC Citation No. R1581.

[Anon], *God appearing for the Parliament, in Sundry late Victories Bestowed upon their Forces, VVich Command and call for great Praise and Thanksgiving, both from Parliament and People,* London: Edward Husband, 1644. Source located at 45:E.271[22], Thomason Tracts. ESTC System No. 006118940: ESTC Citation No. R212192.

[Anon], *HVLLS Managing of the Kingdoms Cause: OR, A brief Historicall RELATION OF THE Severall Plots and Attempts against KINGSTON upon HULL, from the beginning of these unhappy diffrences to thi day; and the means whereby through Gods blessing it ha h been preserved, and the Kingdom in it,* London: Richard Best, 1644. Source located Wing/237:E.51[11], University Microfilms International and H3362, Thomason Collection. ESTC System No. 006089774: ESTC Citation No. R23332.

[Anon], *Magnalia Dei. A RELATION Of some of the many Remarkable Passages in CHESHIRE Before the Siege of NAMPTVVICH, during the Continuance of it: And at the happy raising of it by the victorious Gentlemen Sr Tho. Fairfax and Sir William Brereton...*, London: Robert Bostock, 1644. Source located at Wing/234:E.31[13], University Microfilms International and M255, Thomason Collection. ESTC System No. 006077522: ESTC Citation No. R11944.

[Anon], *Military orders and articles established by His Majesty, for the better ordering and government of His Maiesties army. Also Two Proclamations, one against Plundering and Robbing. The other against selling or buying of Armes and Horse*, Oxford: Leonard Lichfield, 1644. Source located at Wing/2650:07, University Microfilms International. ESTC System No. 006162830: ESTC Citation No. R176361.

[Anon], *The Association agreement and protestation of the covntries of Somerset, Dorset, Cornwall, & Devon*, Oxford: Leonard Lichfield, 1644. Source located at Wing/524:08, University Microfilms International. ESTC System No. 006081094: ESTC Citation No. R15252.

[Anon], *The Scots army advanced into England Certified in a Letter, Dated from Addarston, the 24 of Ianuary: From his Excellncies the Lord Generall Lesley's Qaurters. With the Summoning of the Country of Northumberland: Expressed in a Letter by the Commissioners and Committees of both Kingdoms, to Sir Thomas Glemham Governor of Newcastle, And to the Colonells, Officers and Gentlemen of the forenamed County: With Sir Tho: Glemhams Answer thereunto. Together, With a Declaration of the Committees, for Billeting of Souldiers in those Parts. As also, the Articles and Ordinances for the governing their Army*, London: Robert Bostock, 1644. Source located at Wing/233:E30[16], University Microfilms International and S2022, Thomason Collection. ESTC System No. 006071675: ESTC Citation No. P1232.

[Anon], *The True intelligence sent to this kingdome, concerning the taking in of the town of Newcastle: with, Copies of the letters, and other Passages, that occurred betwixt our Army and those in the Town...*, Edinburgh: Evan Tyler, 1644. Source located Wing/2258:13, University Microfilms International and T2712, Thomason Collection. ESTC System No. 006140924: ESTC Citation No. R43791.

[Anon], *A description of the seige of Basing castle; kept by the Lord Marquisse of Winchester, for the service of His Maiesty: against, the forces of the rebells, under command of Colonell Norton, Anno Dom. 1644*, Oxford: Leonard Lichfield, 1645. Source located Wing/237:E.50[13], University Microfilms International and G1771, Thomason Collection. ESTC System No. 006105090: ESTC Citation No. R8325.

[Anon], *A great victory obtained by Generall Poyntz and Col: Copley, against the Kings forces under the command of the Lord Digby, and Sir Marmaduke Langdale, at Sherborn in Yorkshire, the 15. of October, 1645. Together with a perfect list of the commanders and souldiers, slain and taken prisoners*, 1645. Source located at E.305[14], Thomason Tracts. ESTC System No. 006107233: ESTC Citation No. R200325.

[Anon], *A looking-glasse for the Popish garrisons: held forth in the life and death of Basing-House. VVherein is described her former vanity, present condition, and a friendly admonition to the other malignant dens. VVith divers articles of high-treason drawne up against Sir Robert Peake, governour of the said garrison*, London: W. W., 1645. Source located at 50:E.307[2], Thomason Tracts. ESTC System No. 006107243: ESTC Citation No. R200336.

[Anon], *A true relation of the happy success of His Maiesties forces in Scotland under the conduct of Lord Iames Marquisse of Montrose His Excellencie, against the rebels there. Also, causes of a solemne fast and humiliation kept by the rebells in that kingdom. According to a copy printed formerly at Edinburgh*, Oxford : L. Lichfield, 1645. Source located at E.269[2], Thomason Collection. ESTC System No. 006119132: ESTC Citation No. R212385.

[Anon], *A True relation of the happy successe of His Majesties forces in Scotland under the conduct of the Lord Iames, Marqvisse of Montrose His Excellencie, against the rebels there also, causes of a solemne fast and humiliation kept by the rebells in that Kingdom : according to a copy printed formerly at Edinbvrgh*, London: [s.n.], 1645. Source located at Wing / T2964, University Microfilms International. ESTC System No. 006119132: ESTC Citation No. R212385.

[Anon], *An exact relation of the surrender of Scarborough Castle, By Sir Hugh Cholmley, governour of the same; to Coll. Sir Matthew Boynton, Colonell Lassels, and Coll. Needham, commanders in chief of the Parliaments forces in Scarborough. Together with a copy of the*

articles agreed upon at the said surrender. Also, that Rabs Castle, Sir Henry Vanes houses in the Bishoprick of Durham, with all the armes and ammunition therein, is yielded up to the Parliaments forces, London: John Field, 1645. Source located at E.294[15], Thomason Tracts. ESTC System No. 006107093: ESTC Citation No. R200184.

[Anon], *Englands remembrancer: in two parts. Or, A catalogue of all or most of the severall victories, and strong holds obtained (through Gods blessing) by the Parliaments forces since the armies rising from before Oxford in June last, 1645. to the generall thanksgiving, Octob. 2. 1645. As also since that time to this present thanksgiving of the Parliament, city of London, and parts adjacent. March 12. 1645. All within the time of 8 moneths. Published of purpose to draw forth Englands thankfulnesse, unto the Lord of Hoasts at all times, but more especially upon her dayes of thanksgiving*, London: Thomas Underhill, 1645. Source located at Wing/2532:09, University Microfilms International. ESTC System No. 006107568: ESTC Citation No. R200663.

[Anon], *Sir William Beretons Letter concerning the surrender of the city of Chester for the Parliament: Together with the articles agreed betwixt both parties, and the commissioners names*, London: Edward Husband, 1645. Source located at E.320[20], Thomason Tracts. ESTC System No. 006107477: ESTC Citation No. R200572.

[Anon], *The Oxford character of the London diurnall examined and answered*, London: M. P., 1645. Source located at E.274[32], Thomason Tracts. ESTC System No. 006116653: ESTC Citation No. R209884.

[Anon], *The routing of the Lord Digby, and Sir Marmad. Langdale at Carlisle-Sands; by Sir John Brown. Certified by Letters from Sir John Brown, to General Lesley, and other Letters to the Scots Commissioners*, London: Jane Coe, 1645. Source located at E.308[7], Thomason Tracts. ESTC System No. 006107273: ESTC Citation No. R200366.

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