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Gender Inequality and Terrorism: The Impacts of Female Empowerment on Domestic and Transnational Terrorism

Jennifer Dumas
University of New Orleans, jdumas@uno.edu

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Gender Inequality and Terrorism: The Impacts of Female Empowerment on Domestic and
Transnational Terrorism

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
University of New Orleans
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in
Political Science

by

Jennifer Dumas

B.A. University of Louisiana at Monroe, 2008
M.A. University of New Orleans, 2010

May, 2021

Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to the “me” who thought I would never make it. You are stronger than you think.

Acknowledgements

I would like to extend my deep gratitude to my dissertation committee chair, Dr. Michael Huelshoff, and committee members Dr. Edward Chervenak and Dr. Robert Worth – thank you all for the ways in which you shaped and elevated this work through your insightful comments, suggestions, guidance, and constructive criticism. Thanks especially to Dr. Huelshoff for seeing me through this entire journey from first-year grad student to graduation, enduring my procrastinating ways and self-doubt, and encouraging me to stay the course. I would also like to thank several current and former members of the UNO Political Science department for their mentorship and service on my various graduate committees, particularly Dr. Christine Day, Dr. Elizabeth Stein, and Dr. Richard Frank – each of you contributed enormously along the way to this dissertation and throughout my graduate school career, and I deeply appreciate it. Many thanks as well to Ernest Mackey, whom I owe considerably for never steering me wrong and bearing witness to far too many of my existential crises throughout grad school to recount. I would also like to thank all of my fellow grad students, past and present, who helped me along the way, whether through offering advice, sharing a drink, or lending a shoulder to cry on – especially the late and greatly missed Charles “Chuck” Holman.

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Abstract

In the post-9/11 years, terrorism has emerged as an urgent issue with important national security and foreign policy ramifications. Within political science, terrorism research has likewise developed as a burgeoning subfield with the potential for significant contributions to policymaking worldwide. However, the literature has until recently generally neglected gender inequality as a structural antecedent to terrorism, despite studies which support a relationship between gender parity and conflict mitigation in other areas as well as increasing calls for the integration of gender measures into counterterrorism agendas and initiatives among scholars and policymakers. To address this gap in the literature, I introduce a theory linking gender inequality to terrorism characterized by the implications of substantial gender gaps in rights as well as participation in social, economic, and political arenas, which I refer to as “pull,” “push,” and “prevent” factors. I test the theory using both panel analyses and a case study examining the formation of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Results of the empirical analyses indicate that while facets of female empowerment, including higher education, paid employment, and social rights, have robust effects on both terrorist group formation as well as numbers of attacks, gender equality is not a panacea for terrorism. In addition, effects on groups and attacks are not homogenous across types of gender inequities, indicating the need for further research on the relationship between socioeconomic and political gender gaps and terrorism. Case study findings largely reflect results from the models, and a comparison of regions in Nigeria further reveals that temporal and spatial patterns of gender inequality generally align to the outbreak of terrorist violence. I conclude by offering several areas of future research generated by arguments and findings presented here and discussing ways in which interventions at the global, state, and local levels may close gender gaps which have salience for mitigating terrorism.

Keywords: Gender equality; gender parity; female empowerment; terrorism

Chapter 1: Introduction

...if a scholar or policymaker had to select one variable...to assist them in predicting which states would be the least peaceful or of the most concern to the international community or have the worst relations with their neighbors, they would do best by choosing the measure of the *physical security of women* (Hudson et al. 2009, 41, italics added).

In the post-9/11 years, terrorism has emerged as an urgent issue with important national security and foreign policy ramifications. Within political science, terrorism research has likewise developed as a burgeoning subfield with the potential for significant contributions to policymaking worldwide. Today, violent extremist groups such as Islamic State and the Taliban present significant domestic and foreign terrorist threats, and many states struggle with the physical and economic impacts of terrorism, with some states in the post-9/11 era experiencing over 1,000 attacks in a given year and over 30 active organizations (see Figures 1 and 2¹ below for spike plots of yearly counts of terrorist incidents and groups). As states work in the era of globalization to contain threats to security, terrorism continues to represent an insidious challenge to both strong and weak states. As the number of terrorist organizations, the variety of their methods, and their ability to inflict costs in both blood and treasure have increased in recent years, policymakers must determine the best course of action to take in terms of counterintelligence and counterterrorism programs to mitigate risk of attack.

While domestic terrorism is far more common, transnational terrorism, particularly against the United States, remains a major source of both media coverage and scholarly research.

¹ The Global Terrorism Database (GTD), from which I source the data used to create Figures 1-4, does not include terrorism data for the year 1993 due to data losses (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START] 2019).

When attempting to solve the puzzle of why terrorism occurs, some scholars argue that transnational terrorism may occur as a spillover of domestic conflicts, thus emphasizing the salience of theoretically linking transnational terrorism to the domestic conditions of attackers and origin states (Addison and Murshed 2002; Neumayer and Plümper 2011). As terrorist groups do not form in a vacuum, counterterrorism initiatives should address risks stemming from the broader environment in which organizations emerge.

Figure 1: Yearly Count of Terrorist Incidents (Spike plot)





Figure 2: Yearly Count of Terrorist Groups (Spike plot)



In addition, one may also consider that organizational dynamics of terrorism have changed in the last few decades - while leftist groups generally propagated the waves of terrorism experienced in the 1960s and 1970s, today's terrorist groups seem much more right-leaning in ideology, a trend that began in the 1990s (Enders, Hoover, and Sandler 2014). Many of the leftist groups incorporated women in their organizations and advocated to some extent for women's rights in a revisionist society, as in Nicaragua's FSLN, El Salvador's FMLN, or

Germany's Red Army Faction. However, today's most prominent terrorist organizations, such as Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and various Al-Qaeda factions, generally emerge in gender unequal environments and exclude women in their hierarchies; where women are included, they are often subject to exploitation or subjugation. In addition, these organizations often explicitly or implicitly reject the notion of gender equality through their rhetoric or specific anti-female actions, such as kidnapping women for domestic labor or to offer as forced brides for fighters.

These dynamics are juxtaposed against global trends over recent decades in which international norms have shifted progressively in favor of gender equality initiatives addressing female empowerment (Coleman 2004). In countries exhibiting gender parity, both men and women matriculate freely in society, contribute equally to the economy, and serve in politics. As the literature notes, this gender parity inculcates egalitarian norms, creates greater economic growth, promotes diversity of opinions and ideas, and stimulates competition, all of which have the potential to manifest in more peaceful societies. Thus, a society that marginalizes women today finds itself increasingly lagging in social, economic, and political development, rendering it vulnerable to political violence.

Noting this, one popular counterterrorism initiative in the modern era involves promoting women's empowerment to counteract such violence (Caiazza 2001). Despite the various ways scholars have connected gender equality to conflict reduction as well as the general notion propagated by policymakers that terrorism can be abated by addressing issues of women's rights, few studies have empirically approached the question of how gender equality relates to terrorism or sought to address potentially differing impacts of various types of gender gaps. Given the changes in types of terrorist organizations operating over the past few decades, the spread of global norms regarding gender equality, and the linkages many have made between gender,

development, and security in the post-9/11 years, I believe it is worth examining empirically why and how gender inequality is related to terrorism, and I propose to do so with this dissertation.

This work will focus on relationships between gender inequality and terrorism output. In particular, I address the following research questions: 1) whether or not any relationship exists between gender inequality and domestic as well as transnational terrorism; 2) if socioeconomic and political gender gaps affect the formation of terrorist groups in the same way that they drive terrorist attacks; and 3) given that gender inequality leads to terrorism, do all types of female disempowerment exhibit similar impacts? If not, which gender parity factors are most salient?

In Chapter 2, I examine the pertinent literature, including a survey of the terrorism and gender and conflict literatures, as well as introduce my theory, arguments, and hypotheses. Within the terrorism literature, I explore conceptual difficulties (Richards 2018; Taylor 2002); ties to theories on protest groups and social movements (Huff and Kruszewska 2016; Comas, Shrivastava, and Martin 2015; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Goodwin 2006); and divides in the literature over structural causes of terrorist activity related to socioeconomic and political factors (Krueger and Malečková 2003; Pape 2005; Blomberg and Hess 2008; Freytag et al. 2009).

I then turn to a discussion of the literature on gender and conflict, in particular the theories developed within the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) literature which relate gender inequality to civil, transnational, and subnational violence, including arguments linked to improvement of governance or the economy (Bussmann 2007; Caprioli et al. 2007); biological constructs (Van Vugt 2009; Taylor et al. 2000); social constructs (Caprioli 2000); strict gender roles in “hypermasculine” or honor-based societies (Aslam 2014; Ahram 2015, 58); social and power structures conditioned on female subordination, as in patrilineal or misogynistic societies (Bowen, Hudson and Nielson 2015; Díaz and Valji 2019); and broad implications of structural

violence and treatment of “others” within patriarchal societies (Caprioli 2005; Bjarnegård and Melander 2017).

Findings from the WPS literature indicate that women’s rights and gender equality appear to have mitigating impacts on the outbreak and intensity of civil and interstate conflict (Caprioli 2000, 2005; Regan and Paskeviciute 2003; Busmann 2007; Melander 2005; Forsberg and Olsson 2020; Schaftenaar 2017). However, the WPS and terrorism literatures have until recently tended to focus on individual motivations for female terrorists or the deleterious effects of terrorism on women, rather than on gender inequality as a structural explanation for terrorism (Bloom 2005; O’Rourke 2009; Berrebi and Ostwald 2015, 2016; Cahalan, Gitter and Fletcher 2020; Rotondi and Rocca 2019). Nevertheless, works which do address the impact of female empowerment generally find mitigating impacts on terrorism, as with other types of conflict (Robison 2010; Salman 2015; Harris and Milton 2016; Saiya, Zaihra, and Fidler 2017; Fisher and Lee 2019; Hudson and Hodgson 2020).

Following this survey of the literature, I introduce a theory linking gender inequality to terrorism characterized by the implications of substantial gender gaps in rights as well as empowerment in social, economic, and political arenas, which I refer to as “pull,” “push,” and “prevent” factors. “Pull” factors refer to the ways in which oppression against women limits female autonomy and promotes anti-female norms which diffuse throughout society, legitimating marginalization and violence among individuals and groups seeking power. “Push” factors reflect the downstream effects of women’s absence from the economy in patriarchal societies which create material incentives for political violence. Finally, “prevent” factors reference the extent to which women’s exclusion from public life erodes barriers to conflict by precluding efficacy in political and security matters. I further discuss specific dimensions of female

empowerment which I argue best reflect the arguments underlying my theory, and offer testable hypotheses corresponding to my theory and arguments.


To test my hypotheses, I conduct empirical analyses in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 that address causes of domestic and transnational terrorism through the lens of gender inequality and the effects of the “pull,” “push,” and “prevent” factors described above. Chapter 3 tests the hypotheses introduced in Chapter 2 using negative binomial regression and data on socioeconomic and political gender gaps as well as domestic and transnational terrorism, including numbers of attacks and groups. I gather data on terrorism from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (START 2021) which includes data on nearly 200,000 domestic and transnational attacks for over 200 states from 1970-2018. Data on women’s empowerment are derived from the World Bank’s (2021) World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset, which includes data for over 200 states from 1960-2020, as well as the WomanStats Project Database (2021), which offers data on nearly 400 female-centric measures for 176 states. I include several control variables suggested by the terrorism literature, including regime type, state capacity, history of conflict, national wealth, ethnic fractionalization, and state size. I then subject the models to a number of robustness checks to assess the strength of my findings.

Results indicate that while facets of female empowerment, including higher education, paid employment, and social rights, have robust effects on both terrorist group formation as well as numbers of attacks as predicted by some of my arguments, gender equality is not a panacea for terrorism. For example, certain aspects of my theory are not borne out by the findings, and effects on groups and attacks are not homogenous across types of gender inequities, indicating the need for further research on the relationship between economic, political, and social gender gaps and terrorism.

In Chapter 4, I conduct a case study examining the impact of patriarchy in Nigeria on the emergence of the Boko Haram terrorist organization. I focus in particular on differences in gender equality between the country's North and South regions, relying on terrorism and gender equality data from a variety of sources such as GTD, WDI, state and local authorities, international and local media sources, and academic researchers. This case study serves as a means of clarifying the causal pathways between "pull," "push," and "prevent" factors and terrorism output, allowing for a closer look at the ways in which the variables of interest in my models relate to terrorism in a specific case over time. I also highlight the ways in which the case study findings diverge from the findings of my models in Chapter 3 and provide evidence of possible salience for the relationship between gender inequality and terrorism regarding other potential variables of interest generated from the case study. I also offer avenues of future research and describe initiatives which seek to close the gender gap in Nigeria as well as the potential for these to succeed. This case study aids in linking the status of women to the growth of terror organizations and the number of attacks for which a state may be at risk as argued in my theory, and is particularly timely as Boko Haram has become one of the most prolific and deadly terrorist organizations worldwide and organized non-state violence continues to wreak havoc on the overall stability of one of Africa's most populous and wealthy states (see Figures 3 and 4 below for spike plots of yearly counts of Boko Haram attacks and terrorist incidents in Nigeria).

Finally, Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation by summarizing findings, examining potential concerns with the empirical analyses (such as measurement error and data availability), and offering several areas of future research generated by arguments and findings presented here. I also discuss ways in which interventions at the global, state, and local levels may close gender gaps which have salience for mitigating terrorism as suggested by this dissertation's findings and


Figure 3: Yearly Count of Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria (Spike plot)



the literature, and the likelihood of success of these initiatives in the context of the findings of the statistical analyses and case study. For instance, several states have attempted to boost female political representation by instituting gender quotas in national legislatures and subnational political institutions. Beaman et al. (2009) notes that gender quotas imposed in India for village councils resulted in more women elected to office by changing attitudes toward female politicians. Huber (2019, 2300) also argues that the quota represents a “signal sent by the

government to its population, the international community, and terrorist organizations that it supports gender equality.” However, contradictory results among the findings for the models and the case study regarding the impact of female political leadership on terrorism suggest that further research is needed on efficacious ways to close gender gaps which spur terrorist violence.

Figure 4: Yearly Count of Terrorist Attacks in Nigeria (Spike plot)



This dissertation is poised to contribute to both the policymaking and academic communities. Few studies exist which fully examine whether theory, empirical findings, and policy are harmonized when considering the existence and potential ramifications of a

relationship between gender equality and terrorism. This attempt to evaluate the substantive effects of gender parity on conflict risk mitigation could therefore shed light on why terrorism occurs and what short or long-term methods states could use to fight it. All signs indicate that terrorism, rather than withering away in the post-9/11 years, has continued and become even more relevant as a foreign policy and national security issue, particularly as technology advances and social media increasingly enable terrorist groups to operate and recruit worldwide. As we attempt to determine what factors may stave off terrorism, we should know which methods are most useful in which areas. There is no one-size-fits-all approach to counterterrorism, but states should develop cohesive strategies incorporating substantive initiatives backed by empirical evidence, to which this study attempts to contribute.

In the following chapters, I address the extant literature on terrorism and gender and conflict and introduce my theory and arguments (Chapter 2); conduct statistical analyses testing my hypotheses and report findings (Chapter 3); present a case study tracing the influence of patriarchy in Nigeria on the formation of the terrorist group Boko Haram and noting areas of convergence and disagreement with the statistical findings (Chapter 4); and conclude the dissertation with a summary of arguments and findings, areas of future research, and potential means of closing gender gaps which could substantively reduce risk of terrorism (Chapter 5).

Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theory

As former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (n.p.) noted in 2005 before a session of the Commission on the Status of Women:

Sixty years have passed since the founders of the United Nations inscribed, on the first page of our Charter, the equal rights of men and women. Since then, study after study has taught us that there is no tool for development more effective than the empowerment of women... And I would also venture that no policy is more important in preventing conflict, or in achieving reconciliation after a conflict has ended.

Though such statements claim parity between males and females may have potential for mitigating conflict across the world, I find that the literature has until recently generally neglected gender inequality as a possible structural explanation for certain types of political violence, including terrorism. The potential relevance of gender equality for terrorism is bolstered by findings that indicate a positive relationship between gender inequality and civil as well as international conflict (Caprioli 2000, 2005; Melander 2005; Bussmann 2007). Despite these findings, the literature has tended to focus on individual-level studies on women's motivations for joining terrorist organizations as well as the deleterious effects of terrorism on women (Caiazza 2001; Bloom 2005; Ness 2005; Von Knop 2007; O'Rourke 2009; Berrebi and Ostwald 2016; Robertson, López-Acevedo, and Morales 2020; Cahalan, Gitter and Fletcher 2020; Berrebi and Ostwald 2015; Rotondi and Rocca 2019). The structural implications of gender equality for domestic and transnational terrorism have received less attention in the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) and terrorism literatures, despite increasing calls among policymakers for foreign aid and counterterrorism initiatives incorporating gender issues as a potential combatant against terrorism (Caiazza 2001). The relationship between gender

inequality and terrorism thus represents an under-studied and timely topic warranting additional theoretical and empirical treatment.

Below, I examine the literature on terrorism, including the divide in the literature on the primary structural causes of terrorist activity. I also survey the literature on gender equality and conflict and conclude with an explanation of my theory, presentation of hypotheses derived from my arguments, and description of gender factors of interest this work will further explore.

Terrorism and Political Violence

Scholars have struggled for years to reach a consensus on a definition of terrorism; disagreements among terrorism researchers over what constitutes terrorism often hinge on a variety of issues, including the relative importance of the perpetrator or the cause, which activities merit the term, and the extent to which terrorism overlaps with other types of conflicts (Richards 2018). For instance, terrorism often occurs in concert with civil wars. As Findley and Young (2011) note in their work on geospatial and temporal use of terrorism in civil conflict, terrorism occurs in 73% of the civil wars in their dataset, and thus complications arise in distinguishing between guerilla warfare tactics in civil war that are politically-motivated, often imitate domestic terrorism, and are characterized by civilian casualties, and terrorism independent of civil conflict.

While scholars often disagree on the definition of terrorism, most agree on certain characteristics of terrorist attacks that they argue differentiate them from other acts of civil or international conflict (Taylor 2002). For instance, most terrorist groups attempt to court the media, choosing symbolic targets as a means of generating fear and gaining the greatest amount of attention. Symbolic targeting often involves civilians, though terrorists mean to convey their message to a broader audience than those directly targeted. Another common characteristic of terrorist attacks is the political nature of the terrorists' cause – this differentiates terrorism from

criminal acts. Neumayer and Plümper (2011, 4) state that, “terror groups ultimately strive for gaining political influence, power and control in their home country or wider region.” Terrorists also generally operate in cells in a somewhat decentralized fashion rather than as a traditional, hierarchical armed force and commit attacks at irregular intervals – this type of organizational and sporadic attack strategy arises due to the preponderance of power the ultimate targets of the terrorists have related to the terrorists themselves, such as the state (Taylor 2002).

Protest and Social Movements

Huff and Kruszewska’s (2016) work on public opinion and protest groups’ tactics, in which survey participants were less likely to approve of hypothetical negotiations between the government and protest groups when such groups used bombing as a tactic rather than less violent approaches such as demonstrations and occupations, evokes another characteristic of terrorist groups which, as with terrorism in civil war, expands the theoretical and empirical understanding of the phenomenon – relationship to social movements. As Comas, Shrivastava, and Martin (2015) argue, terrorist groups are rarely static organizations – they often vacillate between more or less distinct states, in particular formal organizations, networks, and social movements; they may inhabit more than one of these forms simultaneously; and each of these states can exist as a scale (e.g., embedded to disarticulated social movement). For example, the authors note that ETA, the Basque separatist group operating primarily in Spain, has roots as a social movement defending the oppressed minority Basque community against the Spanish national government, but now appears as more of a network due to years of indiscriminate violence perpetrated by ETA and the emergence of a more viable non-violent political movement that currently represents the Basque region in the Spanish legislature.

If terrorist organizations can have roots in social movements as well as networks and formal organizations or shift between these states once formed, one may argue that factors

leading to the rise of such movements and organizations are important to the understanding of the emergence of terrorist groups. Comas, Shrivastava, and Martin (2015) address this when they argue that terrorist groups can form due to socioeconomic conditions that foster grievances (i.e., poverty, discrimination, etc.), leading group leaders to take advantage of opportunities to recruit. The emergence of ETA as a response to systematic discrimination against the minority Basque community in Spain is an example of this type of formation as social movement, particularly as ethnic Basques mobilized through the mechanism of collective identity.²

Collective identity, as Polletta and Jasper (2001) note, may explain not only the broader bonds, such as religion or ethnicity, that inspire many to act collectively against an adversary, but also the types of tactics that appeal to certain actors – for instance, they argue the extremist tactics of certain groups, such as terrorist organizations, may appeal as a type of mobilizing identity itself for those who join the group and perpetrate its acts. The authors note that mobilization to action based on collective identity can have implications for the outcomes of movements – a change in identity can occur not just as a result of a movement’s actions but can be a goal itself for the movement. An example would be a group that wishes to transform itself from the minority to the majority power in a state, which may in some cases be achieved through use of violence, including terrorism.

The “why” rather than the “how” of the development of political movements, particularly in terms of the relationship between social structure, including gender, ethnicity, class, etc., and politics, drew less attention among scholars as grievance-driven theories, such as relative

² Arising as a response to the shortcomings of resource mobilization and political process theories, collective identity, as defined by Polletta and Jasper (2001, 285) is “an individual's cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution...perception of a shared status or relation...distinct from personal identities, though it may form part of a personal identity... [it] may have first been constructed by outsiders...expressed in cultural materials...but not all cultural materials express collective identities.”

deprivation theory,³ declined (Walder 2009; Beckwith 2001). Relative deprivation theory increasingly encountered difficulties in operationalization and empirically supported predictions as quantitative methodology grew in popularity in the social sciences. In response, in the 1970s opportunity-driven theories, such as resource mobilization theory, rose to prominence, emphasizing the opportunities that enable mobilization more than grievances, which some theorists argue form underlying (and thus more or less constant) motivation for action (Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1977).

In this vein, political process theorists argue that opportunity determines political orientation by allowing some groups to survive and others not (i.e., in some societies, underground or violent groups may have an advantage over other types of organizations) (Walder 2009). Regarding types of political violence, according to Goodwin (2006), movement leaders choose terrorism as a strategy by judging the use of violent action on population support for either the group or the state; the author says such support is determined by social structure differences between the group and the population. Studies of political violence, ethnic mobilization, and terrorism thus continue to focus on the “why” as well as the “how” in terms of the development of politically oriented organizations, to which both grievance and opportunity-focused theories can contribute (Goodwin 2006; Walder 2009).

Terrorism Studies

In terms of the "why" of terrorism studies, Moghadam (2006a) argues that one can explore terrorism from individual, organizational, and environmental levels of analyses, while studies combining these three levels of analysis provide the greatest explanatory power regarding

³ Relative deprivation theory, championed by theorists such as Davies (1962) and Gurr (1970) argues that, rather than absolute hardship, political tension and violence can occur due to comparative frustration on the part of individuals. As individuals experience a decline in circumstances or a disconnect between expectations and status, relative deprivation theorists argue they will develop psychologically-driven anger and frustration that leave them vulnerable to extremism and violence.

terrorism. These levels are largely analogous to Ross' (1993) psychological, rational choice, and structural levels of analysis regarding terrorism studies.

Some scholars (Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze 2011; Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev 2011; Neumayer and Plümper 2011) attribute similar causes to international and domestic terrorism or spillover effects between domestic and transnational terrorism, while others argue that the causes for the two are divergent (Abadie 2006; Burgoon 2006; Boulden 2009). The former case is important for the theoretical argument made in this paper and appears bolstered by Dugan, LaFree, and Fogg's (2006) finding that terrorist groups often progress from domestic to international terrorism. In terms of the latter, Abadie (2006) argues that terrorists seeking increased media coverage are likely to commit transnational attacks against wealthy states, while Addison and Murshed (2005) note that some terrorists may target foreign states due to support for unpopular domestic regimes. As with domestic and transnational terrorism, some (Pape 2003; Wade and Reiter 2007) argue for different causes for non-suicide and suicide terrorism, while others (Crenshaw 1981; Moghadam 2006b) maintain that the two types of terrorism emerge from similar conditions. Pape (2005) and Piazza (2008) also observe that suicide terrorism generally evolves from non-suicide terrorism.

In terms of the structural or environmental level of analysis, one major debate regarding potential causes of terrorism concerns the relative merit of socioeconomic as opposed to political or regime characteristics in accounting for domestic or transnational terrorist attacks, arguments which often invoke elements of relative deprivation as well as resource mobilization and political process theories. Such research has great significance for foreign policy, since policymakers in the past have argued that both political and socioeconomic issues seemingly associated with the above theories, such as lack of civil liberties and poverty, drive terrorism and have sought to

structure foreign aid and development assistance accordingly (Ehrlich and Liu 2002). Among scholars, some argue that an important relationship exists between socioeconomic factors and terrorism, while others assert instead that regime characteristics such as political repression drive terrorism (Tyson 2001; Wolfensohn 2002; Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana 2004; Atran 2004; Dingley and Mollica 2007; Pape 2003; Wade and Reiter 2007).

Of those who point to a relationship between political characteristics and terrorism, Krueger and Malečková's (2003) study is one of the most well-known in the literature. Their findings on militants indicate that education and income positively relate to support for terrorism. In addition, they find that civil liberties have a dampening effect on terrorism, a finding supported by Krueger and Laitin (2008), who note that origin countries for transnational terrorism typically offer few civil liberties, illiteracy appears to have no effect on terrorism, and economic development makes states more attractive targets for terrorism. In addition, Abadie's (2006) study on domestic and international terrorism finds a non-monotonic relationship between political rights and the risk of terrorism in which anocracies are the most vulnerable types of states, while income and Human Development Index (HDI) scores are unrelated to the risk of terrorism. Piazza (2006) also finds that socioeconomic variables including malnutrition, inequality, and poverty appear unrelated to international terrorism as opposed to regime characteristics such as political repression and social cleavages, which increase the risk of terrorism. Similarly, Findley and Young (2011) argue that states that are unable to commit credibly to refrain from using their power against citizens are more likely to experience terrorism; they find that states that are able to commit through independent judiciaries have a decreased risk of domestic and transnational terrorism. In addition, Choi (2010) finds that strong

rule of law and citizens' perceptions of the legitimacy of the state decrease the risk of domestic and international terrorism.

Finally, Pape (2005, 19) states that, "Poverty remains a poor indicator of suicide terrorism." He argues instead, along with Atran (2003) and Piazza (2008), that factors such as civil liberties, regime type, and occupation significantly affect the risk of suicide terrorism. Furthermore, Piazza (2008) finds that literacy and economic development relate positively to suicide terrorism, which is supported by Wade and Reiter's (2007) findings regarding the relationship between energy consumption and suicide terrorism.

In contrast to these researchers, others argue that socioeconomic conditions primarily drive terrorism. For instance, Graham (2002, 28) states that, "The challenge from international terrorism is, among other things, a wake-up call to concern ourselves with the fate of poor people in poor countries," and that accordingly, policymakers have used foreign aid as a tool against terrorism. For example, Sprinzak (2000) provides evidence that members of terrorist organizations often hail from poor families. Some (Burgoon 2006; Freytag et al. 2009) find that terrorism is alleviated by increases in social welfare spending, while others (Lai 2007; Blomberg and Hess 2008) argue that poor economic conditions, such as inequality and poverty, increase the likelihood of transnational terrorism. Ehrlich and Liu (2002) note that originating states for transnational terrorism are often also developing states, and that these states are particularly poor in comparison to developed states in terms of education, health, and gender inequality. Freytag et al. (2009) further find that intermediate economic development makes originating states especially vulnerable to transnational terrorism.

Bueno de Mesquita (2005) argues that terrorist organizations likely use a screening procedure for their applicants in order to retain the highest-quality recruits, which may account

for Krueger and Malečková's (2003) finding that terrorists seem socioeconomically advantaged relative to their surrounding population. However, Bueno de Mesquita argues that economic downturns will likely cause the pool of applicants for such organizations to be comprised mainly of the economically disadvantaged, so that socioeconomic conditions still theoretically drive people to terrorism, though organizations may not select them. Finally, both Krueger and Malečková (2003, 137) and Bueno de Mesquita (2005) note that a "Robin Hood effect" may apply to some terrorists, in which relatively socioeconomically advantaged persons join terrorist organizations to protest against the dire social conditions of their fellow citizens, which might also account for the surprisingly prosperous backgrounds of some terrorists. Similarly, regarding suicide terrorism, Azam (2005, 178) argues that educated suicide terrorists may engage in their acts as "an extreme form of saving" to advance the welfare of future generations. Atran (2003) and Harrison (2003) further argue that dissatisfaction with a person's current educational or employment status can drive that person to commit suicide attacks.

Gender and Conflict

Despite a number of works studying structural or environmental causes of terrorism, gender inequality as a structural antecedent is not as commonly explored in the terrorism literature. The relative absence of such studies is surprising, given the strong evidence that gender inequality is influential in both civil and transnational conflict, though several theories regarding the nature of these relationships abound. Some have argued gender parity is related to political violence through improvement of governance or the economy (Bussmann 2007; Caprioli et al. 2007); biological constructs (i.e., females are less conflict-prone than men due to inherited differences - Van Vugt 2009; Taylor et al. 2000; Campbell 1999; Eagly and Wood 1999); social constructs (i.e., females are conditioned to be less conflict-prone or to remain outside of public life - Caprioli 2000); the emphasis on imposing or fulfilling strict gender roles,

such as those exhibited in “hypermasculine” or honor-based societies (Aslam 2014; Ahram 2015, 58); social and power structures conditioned on female subordination, as found in patrilineal or misogynistic societies (Bowen, Hudson and Nielson 2015; McDermott 2018; Díaz and Valji 2019); and broad implications of structural violence and treatment of “others” (Caprioli 2005; Bjarnegård and Melander 2017). The body of work exploring the idea that women, women’s rights or empowerment, and gender equality are related to conflict is known as the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda (Díaz and Valji 2019).

As noted, authors suggest various pathways from gender to conflict or peace. In terms of an indirect relationship, Bussmann (2007) argues that the relationship between gender inequality and civil conflict is influenced by the impact of gender inequality on state capacity, finding, for instance, that female political participation indirectly reduces civil conflict through promotion of good governance and development. Bussmann (2007, 1) asserts that inclusion of women in education and employment increases competition, thus “as a result of the competitive environment corruption and rent-seeking is inhibited improving the quality of governance.” Caprioli et al. (2007, 13) further note that as the research consistently shows strong links between women’s empowerment and economic development, as well as economic development and political instability and conflict, “Thus, in this case, the inclusion of women as equal members of society should reduce conflict indirectly as state wealth increases.” Forsberg and Olsson (2020) also note that gender capacity, in which investment in women and their engagement in society is indicative of capacity and network-building, leads to peace by allowing women an influence on society and peace processes and improving governance and democracy.

Some write from a biological or evolutionary psychology perspective, arguing that women, due either to genetic differences or their unique reproductive roles, are inherently more

nurturing and therefore more peaceful than men (Van Vugt 2009; Taylor et al. 2000; Campbell 1999; Eagly and Wood 1999). However, explanations hinging primarily on biologically-related sex differences have fallen out of favor with many feminist and WPS scholars in recent years; currently, WPS research focuses more often on conflict outcomes related to social constructs of gender, the dynamics of gender hierarchies, and implications of gender parity. For instance, Caprioli (2000, 55) references the idea stemming from the social constructivist literature that men and women are “tied to roles that require males to be aggressive and females passive;” the notion of the social construction of gender highlights the gender norms that have traditionally been linked to the sexes, which typically associate men with “masculine” traits such as strength, virility, stoicism, intelligence, and aggressiveness, while women are associated with the “feminine” traits of being weak, caring, unintelligent, emotional, and dovish (Tickner 1992; Schramm and Stark 2020).

The consequences of these socially constructed or stereotypical gender traits manifest not just at the household or community levels, but also at the national and international levels as women are relegated to private as opposed to public roles, resulting in an absence of mediating and peacemaking voices in foreign policy and national security decision-making, leading to internal and external conflict (Beaman et al. 2009; Robison 2010; Hudson and Hodgson 2020). In some cases, as Schramm and Stark (2020) note, women under pressure to perform while in leadership positions or running for office may adopt masculine traits as a means of consolidating power or gaining support, which could also result in conflict.

Another way in which gender stereotypes can manifest in conflict, according to some authors, is through the construction of “hypermasculine” norms of behavior and societies based on preserving and defending honor, typically through enforcing strict codes of conduct on

women (Ahram 2015, 58; Bjarnegård, Brounéus, and Melander 2017; Bjarnegård and Melander 2017; Aslam 2014; Ahram 2019; Tschantret 2020; Díaz and Valji 2019). Bjarnegård, Brounéus, and Melander's (2017) survey data indicate that the use of violence is related to a concept of honor encompassing both patriarchal values and norms of masculinity. Tschantret (2020) further finds that honor cultures are tied to more severe acts of terrorism in the United States.

Similarly, Aslam (2014), examining Islamism within Pakistan, and Ahram (2015, 58), exploring the relationship between the governments of Iraq and Syria and the development of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), reference notions of "hypermasculinity" and honor in conflict. Aslam (2014) argues that fulfilling certain aspects of masculinity are required in predominantly Muslim Pakistan to achieve true manhood, but these conditions are increasingly difficult to achieve given Pakistan's economic woes, endangering men's honor and rendering certain religiously-themed types of conflict, such as jihad, acceptable in turn. Ahram (2015; 2019) finds that the Hussein and Assad governments in Iraq and Syria, respectively, engaged in systematic sexual violence, including honor killings, designed to emasculate their political rivals and render them powerless; such violations of the honor of households, communities, and ethnic and religious groups were then mirrored in the sexual and gender-based violent practices of ISIS, which arose after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and began gaining significant territory in the region in 2014 and 2015. According to Ahram (2015, 70), "the modes of hyper-masculine statehood that have emerged in the Arab world provided a blueprint for instrumentalising sexual violence as a tool of state-building. The repertoires of sexual violence are effective precisely because they capitalise on entrenched gender norms that emphasise shame as a mechanism of social control."

Díaz and Valji (2019) refer to a related aspect of hypermasculinity and honor ideology in their analysis of the relationship between misogyny and extremism. They link misogynistic ideologies on the part of perpetrators to a litany of violent acts, including domestic violence, mass murders, threats and violence committed by “incels,”⁴ and Western and Islamist terrorism, specifically noting the misogyny inherent in the sexual violence committed by Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab; “misogynist acts are not merely part of their repertoire of violence or accessories to their political project, but rather central to it, and...control over women’s bodies is just as important to these groups as controlling territory or defeating their enemies” (Díaz and Valji 2019, 46-47).

Similarly, some argue that the particular nature of certain gendered structures creates strict gender hierarchies and norms, distorted social interactions, and incentives for violence (McDermott 2020; Hudson, Bowen, and Nielsen 2020; Hudson and Den Boer 2004; Cameron, Meng and Zhange 2017; Bowen, Hudson and Nielson 2015; Hudson and Matfess 2017; McDermott 2018; McDermott and Cowden 2014). For example, Hudson, Bowen, and Nielsen (2020, 2) describe the “Patrilineal/Fraternal Syndrome,” as a “socially constructed system of male security alliances, united through agnatic kinship networks that have safeguarded their physical and social reproduction over millennia.” The authors argue that subjugation of women through patrilineal systems represents, “the first political order,” with broadly negative implications for stability and peace, including terrorism (Hudson, Bowen, and Nielsen 2020, 12).

In several works, authors explore how patrilineal societies, even in wealthy states, create marriage market distortions through son preferences and unbalanced sex ratios (Hudson and Den

⁴ According to Díaz and Valji (2019, 42), “Incels, short for ‘involuntary celibates,’ are virulently misogynistic men who blame women and feminism for all kinds of personal and social ills,” and have been linked to several violent acts in recent years, including the 2018 Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School shooting in Parkland, Florida.

Boer 2004; Cameron, Meng and Zhange 2017); discriminatory family laws regulating issues such as marriage age, child custody, and divorce which favor men (Bowen, Hudson and Nielson 2015); and brideprice⁵ (Hudson and Matfess 2017) and polygyny (Hudson and Matfess 2017; McDermott and Cowden 2014) dynamics, which result in unique male incentives to attain wives within systems which accord the status of manhood, social privileges, and security to men based on marriage and family size. McDermott (2020) notes that research indicates these common aspects of patrilineal societies lead to instability and violence.

In particular, Hudson and Matfess (2017) and McDermott (2020) link brideprice inflation to the formation and recruiting tactics of Boko Haram in Nigeria and increased violence related to cattle raiding in South Sudan, while Hudson and Hodgson (2020) find that brideprice is linked to a goading effect for terrorism, in which disempowered men unable to fulfill gender roles become vulnerable to exploitative terrorist recruiting techniques based on these grievances. Such marriage market distortions, particularly polygyny, also produce severely negative outcomes for women, resulting in lower marriage ages, higher maternal mortality ratios and domestic violence rates, and exploitation of female labor, among others (McDermott and Cowden 2014; McDermott 2018).

Finally, authors point to the idea that gender inequality is indicative of a social structure that generates norms of discrimination and violence (Tickner 1992; Caprioli 2005; Bjarnegård and Melander 2017; Wood and Ramirez 2017; McDermott 2020; Forsberg and Olsson 2020; Hudson and Hodgson 2020). Some, such as Tickner (1992) focus broadly on the normalization of the use of oppression, coercion, and violence to achieve goals as a result of discrimination

⁵ Brideprice refers to the practice of prospective grooms providing money or material items to a bride's family in order to secure a marriage; such marriages underlie the kinship-security nexus inherent in patrilineal societies (McDermott 2020; Hudson and Matfess 2017).

against women at both micro and macro levels in society. According to McDermott (2020, 1), “there is no more universal normative prescription in conflict than the political, social, economic and sexual subordination of women to men;” she argues that patriarchal cultures create hierarchies through which men dominate women for several different types of gains, and those norms are socialized in households and communities. Similarly, Wood and Ramirez (2017) argue that attitudes form the microfoundations of the relationship between gender inequality and conflict; those who are supportive of gender equality are less likely to advocate for the use of violence to achieve goals, with the effect particularly true of males. Additionally, Caprioli (2005) argues in reference to civil conflict that gender inequality acts as an antecedent to structural inequality, which manifests in cultural and structural violence; gender inequality encourages subordination of women and norms of inequality and violence in society which, through nationalism, lead to gendered social roles and ethnically-charged out-group dynamics that incite violence. Ahram (2015, 60), refers to the destructive elements of a particular type of patriarchal structure in a study exploring the gendered nature of the rise of ISIS:

The histories of Syria and Iraq are emblematic of what is known as ‘neopatriarchy’, in which the boundaries between family, society and state are blurred. The state operates as a macrocosm of the family, and neopatriarchy deploys modern techniques of governance to reinforce traditional modes of male domination. Men are the heads of households and expect complete submission, while women are treated as subordinate sources of sexual and reproductive resources, and as family managers. Honour and shame dynamics reinforce this domination.

Hudson and Hodgson (2020) also find evidence of a boot camp effect for terrorism, in which sexual discrimination in the home dehumanizes women and teaches men to use violence.

Forsberg and Olsson (2020) similarly hypothesize that one pathway between gender inequality and subnational conflict hinges on how patriarchal structures which disempower women normalize and legitimate “othering” and violence in disputes, in particular through grievances and treatment of outgroups, and demonstrate correlations with other types of inequality and discrimination. Conover (1988) notes that the internalization of women’s unequal status in gender unequal societies may manifest as empathy toward others who are marginalized; conversely, Díaz and Valji (2019) argue that misogyny leads to hostile attitudes and violence towards “others” in society. According to Melander (2005, 698), “in societies characterized by more equal gender roles, the norms of respect and inviolability that characterize an individual’s closest relations are also expected to carry over to more distant relations, thereby strengthening societal norms that reject abuse and violence.” Further, Bjarnegård and Melander’s (2017) survey data indicate that for both men and women, those holding more egalitarian views on gender equality are predisposed to more tolerant views of foreigners and minorities.

In terms of the substantive effects of women’s empowerment and gender equality on various measurements of conflict, according to Hudson, Bowen, and Nielson (2020, n.p.), “A society’s choice to subjugate women has significant negative consequences: worse governance, worse conflict, worse stability, worse economic performance, worse food security, worse health, worse demographic problems, worse environmental protection, and worse social progress.” Similarly, Hudson et al. (2009) find a positive relationship between women’s physical security and state peace. The authors state, “if a scholar or policymaker had to select one variable...to assist them in predicting which states would be the least peaceful or of the most concern to the international community or have the worst relations with their neighbors, they would do best by choosing the measure of the physical security of women” (Hudson et al. 2009, 41). Caprioli

(2000) further finds that declining fertility rates and increasing female political participation and leadership promote transnational peace, results that are supported by Caprioli and Boyer (2001) and Regan and Paskeviciute (2003).

Caprioli (2005) also finds a relationship between gender inequality and civil conflict; as in her previous work on interstate conflict, she discovers that higher fertility rates, as well as lower rates of female economic participation, increase the risk of civil conflict onset. Further, Melander (2005) finds that increasing numbers of female legislators and a declining gender education gap lessen the intensity of civil conflict. In terms of a direct relationship, Bussmann (2007) finds that socioeconomic variables have more of an impact than political variables; she finds that improvements in female education, literacy, and health directly increase the probability of peace. Regarding the indirect relationship between gender inequality and conflict, Bussmann notes that female suffrage decreases the risk of civil conflict through good governance. In addition, when controlling for GDP per capita, Bussmann notes that rising levels of female labor participation increase the likelihood of peace.

Also looking at subnational conflict, Forsberg and Olsson (2020), find a strongly significant mitigating impact on conflict for women's education, while the results indicate weaker links to conflict for female literacy and male youth bulges. Schaftenaar (2017) further finds that gender equality promotes nonviolence in terms of anti-government opposition. Several works also explore the relationship between gender ideology and the nature of ethno-political organizations in the Middle East, finding that organizations which embrace gender inclusivity are less likely to become violent, regardless of religious ideology (Asal et al. 2013; Asal, Schulzke, and Pate 2017), and that militant and nationalist organizations are less likely to exhibit

gender ideologies, while leftist and social services-oriented organizations are more likely (Asal, Avdan, and Shuaibi 2020).

Gender and Terrorism

Though oppression against women is often examined in studies concerning women's motivations for joining terrorist organizations, and several studies also address the impact of terrorism on women's empowerment and security, finding, for instance, that terrorism creates deleterious effects on women's labor participation and fertility rates, fewer studies have examined gender inequality as a structural cause of terrorism (Caiazza 2001; Von Knop 2007; Berrebi and Ostwald 2016; Robertson, López-Acevedo, and Morales 2020; Cahalan, Gitter and Fletcher 2020; Berrebi and Ostwald 2015; Rotondi and Rocca 2019).

Recently, however, scholars have extended their focus for the WPS agenda to the relationship between gender equality and terrorism, often discovering a dampening effect on terrorism as males and females achieve parity in society. Robison (2010) finds that women's labor participation reduces terrorism, arguing the effect may be produced through both biological and social constructs of women's peaceful influence on society as well as modernization. Salman (2015) examines aspects of female political, economic, and education empowerment and finds that nearly all are negatively related to both domestic and transnational terrorism (female political empowerment appears to be insignificant for transnational terrorism). Harris and Milton (2016) similarly find that women's rights are negatively associated with domestic terrorism, though not with transnational terrorism. Hudson and Hodgson (2020) find that an array of gender inequality factors, including violence against women, treatment under the law, and brideprice, increase both non-state and state terrorism.

Saiya, Zaihra, and Fidler (2017) conduct a study on women's rights and anti-U.S. terrorism, discovering a negative relationship between women's political, social, and economic

rights and attacks against the United States. Tschantret (2020) also finds that in the U.S. South, where honor culture is prevalent, terrorist attacks are more severe. Looking specifically at terrorism in Turkey, Fisher and Lee's (2019) results show that while regional differences matter in terms of the relationship between gender equality and terrorism, life expectancy ratios favoring females and declining fertility rates are consistent negative predictors of terrorism nationally, but higher adolescent fertility rates generally have the opposite effect, as does the female/male survival ratio; female political representation and education variables generally have null or inconsistent effects in their models.

Regarding ways in which gender gaps favoring females or moves toward gender parity may create enhanced risks of terrorism, Younas and Sandler (2017) report that societies characterized by a greater proportion of females than males are more likely to experience domestic terrorism, particularly developing states featuring weak bureaucracies; the authors argue this relationship occurs due to a lack of males in law and administrative agencies as well as agriculture and other labor-intensive industries, leading to both a failure of societal order and economic growth. Interestingly, Krieger and Meierrieks (2015) indirectly cite women's rights as they link market-capitalist states and economic transition to anti-American terrorism; they argue that market-capitalist states are less likely to initiate terrorist attacks against the U.S., but the often-destabilizing transition to a market economy can spark resentment against the U.S. through the imposition of Western values, including gender equality norms, on traditionalists.

Gender Inequality and Terrorism

The research on domestic and transnational terrorism as well as gender inequality and conflict indicates that gender inequality may, in addition to driving civil and international conflict, have a substantive effect on terrorism as well. Gender discrimination is one of the most visceral and widespread forms of discrimination across the world, and gender inequality can

inhibit development throughout an individual's lifetime and across many socioeconomic and political facets of society. When gender discrimination occurs, approximately half of the state's population is directly affected, and long-term impacts of such discrimination are likely to affect the population detrimentally as a whole. Research regarding the effects of gender inequality on terrorism thus has the potential to advance theory regarding causes of terrorism, provide policy suggestions for eliminating or significantly inhibiting such factors, and significantly mitigate both gender inequality and terrorism, addressing pressing human rights and security issues.

This work seeks to address the following questions: What are the relationships between gender equality and terrorist violence? Does gender inequality drive terrorism, whether domestic or transnational, and if so, why and how? Which gender gaps are most salient in producing terrorism? Below, I develop a theory linking the impacts of socioeconomic and political gender inequality, described as "pull," "push," and "prevent" factors, to terrorism. I posit that these factors are likely to have similar effects on the development of terrorist organizations and the proliferation of attacks, a theory which has received scarce attention in the literature thus far.

"Pull"

Marked gender inequality, beyond its immediate impact on women and girls, creates a broad atmosphere of victimization and oppression, likely acting as a precursor or indicator of other types of discrimination. Gender inequality may seem to be *prima facie* evidence of a simple power dichotomy between the outgroup (females) and ingroup (males). But if, per Elshaint (1986, 6), "In the beginning man made oppression," and if gender inequality is considered, in Hudson, Bowen, and Nielsen's (2020, 12) characterization, "the first political order," then differences between men and women form the foundation of a pyramid of inequality, the base of multiple additional layers of oppressions and discriminations. Hierarchies are also complex and evolving. While men may enjoy more rights and privileges than women in

patriarchal societies, patriarchy does not render men equal among themselves; having engaged in structural violence against women, men are also likely to marginalize and use violence against others who threaten their influence or to secure additional resources and power. Women therefore are not alone in experiencing the effects of gender inequality – in order to retain their statuses, men in patriarchal systems must work to maintain and assert their “masculinity” and places in the hierarchy, leading to larger power struggles in the community and society.

Where women are denied social autonomy, the ability to access the public sphere as equals, and the means to achieve upward mobility, norms of marginalization and coercion take root throughout society. Individuals and groups, having absorbed these norms in homes and communities, are likely to embrace exclusion and violence as acceptable means of realizing and sustaining power. Normal channels for most aspects of political change are unlikely to have the desired impact for protesters and political opponents on various issues. Thus, inequality and violence are normalized throughout society, and groups that seek political power and the ability to configure society and government in ways they prefer will tend to choose violent, rather than non-violent, means of achieving their goals. Political violence manifests as terrorism against a dysfunctional status quo anchored by underlying, festering disparities between men and women. Gender inequality can thus be considered as a staging condition for political violence, one of several known conditions (such as regime type or state capacity) that contribute to a state's likelihood of experiencing terrorism. I derive the following hypothesis from this argument:

Hypothesis 1: Increasing women's social autonomy will reduce the numbers of terrorist incidents and terrorist organizations.

“Push”

While the structural violence inherent in gender inequality creates norms of discrimination and aggressive power-seeking, the economic implications of patriarchal systems

provide additional “push” factors driving terrorism. Scholars increasingly support the idea that investment in both genders enhances a state’s socioeconomic productivity, as women and men contribute differentially to the marketplace, the home, and communities (World Bank 2012; Kabeer and Natali 2013). Economic underdevelopment, including increasing inequality, unemployment, and poverty, resulting from women’s absence from the economy in gender unequal societies, however, strains resources, which increases the intensity and violence of competition over such resources. This not only produces economic hardship but also resentment as men encounter difficulties fulfilling traditional male breadwinner roles prevalent in patriarchal social structures as well as marriage market distortions such as brideprice which are common in patrilineal societies. These economic pressures may increase material motivations for joining terrorist organizations, particularly those which offer alternative sources of income or compensation for fighters. Thus, it is important to assess the impact of women’s economic empowerment on risk of terrorism. Hypothesis 2 addresses this “push” argument linking economic gender inequality to terrorism:

Hypothesis 2: Increasing women’s economic empowerment will reduce the numbers of terrorist incidents and terrorist organizations.

“Prevent”

Aside from the “pull” factor of anti-female norms and the “push” factor of economic dynamics, an additional “prevent” factor may influence the relationship between gender equality and terrorism – the extent to which women are actively involved in security and political matters. The literature demonstrates the change in focus and priority women can bring to legislatures and executive branches in which they participate (Yoon 2011; Koch and Fulton 2011). While some argue that women’s reduced public presence may lead to terrorism by limiting the more peaceful influence of women due to biological or social constructs, I argue that women’s inability to

influence political arenas has an impact on terrorism by limiting competition and innovation. Women's exclusion from public life precludes their involvement in traditional councils and political leadership roles where resources that can spark conflict (such as land allocations), important political matters (including national legislation or community initiatives), conflict negotiations, and peacebuilding initiatives are debated and decided. The widespread stifling of competing ideas and political contributions created by women's absence in these arenas reduces state capacity and social services while increasing stagnation, corruption, instability, and the risk of recurring tensions, which creates grievances motivating organized political violence. Therefore, I develop the following hypothesis to test the argument that female political leadership can mitigate the risk of terrorism:

Hypothesis 3: Increasing women's political leadership roles will reduce the numbers of terrorist incidents and terrorist organizations.

The previous arguments and hypotheses refer to manifestations of gender inequality in socioeconomic and political arenas. I argue that it is also important to examine the thresholds societies set for women's entrance into public life; the extent to which women are granted equal rights with men to participate in these arenas is indicative of the intrinsic value of women in society as well as the degree of their legal protections and freedoms. Therefore, my final hypothesis examines the concomitant effects of the above arguments regarding economic, political, and social rights for women.

Hypothesis 4: Increases in comprehensive measures of women's social, economic, and political rights will result in declines in both terrorism incidents and organizations.

Where marked gender inequality exists, it represents a few major issues related to political violence, including an unwillingness to acknowledge the empirically validated positive

effects on society of both genders matriculating freely and equally in the public sphere; this is particularly the case as international norms have shifted progressively in favor of gender equality initiatives (Coleman 2004). In countries exhibiting gender parity, both men and women serve in politics, adding to diversity, and in the workplace, taking the burden off men to provide for the home - this leads to greater economic growth opportunity, investment in communities, diversification of skills, expression of ideas, stabilization of communities and households, and spreading egalitarian norms, all of which have the potential to manifest in more peaceful societies. Thus, a society that marginalizes women today finds itself increasingly lagging in social, economic, and political development, rendering it vulnerable to political violence. Gender discrimination, therefore, normalizes exclusion and the acquisition of power through violence, foments underdevelopment, and erodes barriers to conflict, paving the way for the proliferation of terrorist groups and attacks.

Gender Indicators of Interest

One way in which this study hopes to contribute to the literature is by determining which aspects of women's empowerment and gender gaps in socioeconomic and political areas are theoretically and substantively salient in terms of affecting terrorism, similar to Hudson and Hodgson (2020) and Forsberg and Olsson (2020). In terms of those public spheres which best reflect the fundamental aspects of my "pull" argument, education, healthcare, and marriage and family dynamics indicate the extent to which women are valued as autonomous and equal members of society and matriculate without discrimination. Education allows one to gain communication and critical analysis skills, make informed decisions, and prepare for a career; female education may indeed represent a foundational shift in gender equality dynamics due to the independence and upward mobility afforded through education, potentially significantly threatening the gender hierarchy in a patriarchal society. Similarly, a lack of healthcare access

can create health burdens which limit a person's social and economic mobility as well as the ability to care and provide for one's self and family; fertility rates may represent how valued women's lives are in society in addition to women's decision-making capacity in healthcare and family planning, opportunities for women outside the home, and the extent of men's control over women's bodies.

Regarding my "push" argument, marriage market distortions and economic underdevelopment linked to female economic disempowerment may provide material incentives to join terrorist organizations. The prevalence of brideprice indicates the extent to which men must achieve financial success to marry and become full members of a patrilineal society. In terms of women's empowerment and economic participation, labor participation allows one to network with others, contributes to household and national economies, and increases autonomy. I also explore indicators measuring unemployment, income level, and supervisory roles which may further reflect individual economic contributions, the extent to which women are economically vulnerable in the home and society, and prospects for overall development.

To explore my "prevent" argument regarding the ways in which political gender equality can avert conflict through improvements in governance and efficiency, I propose to examine female representation in political office. Political leadership through appointed or elected office allows for a more influential presence in politics at all levels, signifies a position of visceral power and respect, and allows one to compete for and, perhaps most importantly, allocate state resources; this type of political empowerment provides additional representation for citizens in electoral bodies, gives voters a voice on public policy issues, and ensures some measure of transparency and efficacy in politics.

Finally, multidimensional aspects of political, social, and economic rights and freedoms which include female agency, legal protections, and measures exploring the degree of women's parity with men in terms of ability to matriculate in society will serve as a means of exploring the impact of female rights on terrorism. These encompass rights related to freedom of movement; property and inheritance; discrimination in employment and political contestation; and marriage and family dynamics, including domestic violence, which represents an important indicator of the intrinsic value of women in society as well as the extent of their protections under the law. Unequal treatment under the law signifies a gender bias both in codified law and practice which can hinder upward mobility, restrict movement and behavior, and prohibit certain political, social, and economic activities, increasing risk of terrorism as predicted in the "pull," "push," and "prevent" theory. An analysis of the most significant factors driving shifts in gender gaps, which this work seeks to do, is thus critical to furthering our understanding of the relationship between gender equality and terrorism.

I am examining with this work the nexus between the treatment of women and the use of terrorism by groups seeking to exploit and perpetuate environments of structural violence for the purpose of gaining political power. Does gender inequality create social acceptance of violence to achieve goals, suppress economic development, and thwart innovation in security and politics, providing an incubating environment for armed groups to engage in violence? Which gender gaps are most salient in driving the risk of groups forming and attacks occurring? In effect, where women are empowered, do states experience less terrorism, and under what circumstances does this occur? In the following chapter, I conduct an empirical analysis of the "pull," "push," and "prevent" theory and four associated hypotheses using panel data on domestic and

transnational terrorism as well as female rights and empowerment in socioeconomic and political arenas, along with a variety of control variables suggested by the literature described here.

Chapter 3: Examining the Empirical Effects of Female Socioeconomic and Political Empowerment on Terrorism

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I detailed the literature on terrorism; women, peace, and security (WPS); and the burgeoning study of gender and terrorism. I then introduced a theory regarding the ways in which gender inequality may create permissive structural conditions, induce specific material incentives, and erode barriers to political violence manifested as terrorism. These causal pathways are identified as “pull,” “push,” and “prevent” factors, and in the previous chapter I developed specific hypotheses which seek to test these arguments. Here, I conduct an empirical study examining the nexus between the treatment of women and the dynamics of terrorism, finding that while not all elements of female empowerment appear to relate to terrorism, certain aspects of gender inequality substantively affect both terrorist incidents and groups, supporting previous literature on the relationship between gender and conflict and suggesting new ways in which counterterrorism strategies may incorporate gendered initiatives.

Method

In this chapter, I explore the relationship between women’s empowerment in socioeconomic and political arenas and terrorism, including both attacks and organizations. I use data on terrorism from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START] 2021) which includes publicly available data on domestic and transnational attacks for over 200 states from 1970-2018,⁶ including nearly 200,000 events. Data for women’s empowerment are derived from the World Bank’s (2021) World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset, which includes data for over 200

⁶ GTD does not include terrorism data for the year 1993 due to data losses (START 2019).

states from 1960-2020, as well as the WomanStats Project Database (2021), which offers data on nearly 400 female-centric measures for 176 states. I describe my dependent, explanatory, and control variables and their data sources in more detail below.

Dependent Variables

Utilizing terrorism data from GTD, I construct two dependent variables to operationalize risk of terrorism. The first is a count of terrorist attacks committed per country-year, including both domestic and interstate attacks.⁷ The second dependent variable consists of a count of terrorist organizations that have committed attacks per country-year.⁸

Explanatory Variables

I employ several explanatory variables to examine women's empowerment. As with similar studies (Caprioli 2005; Regan and Paskeviciute 2003; Salman 2015), I use the female value for political and socioeconomic indicators to operationalize gender equality in society. Regarding Hypothesis 1, which examines the impact of social autonomy for women on terrorism, I adopt measures which reflect education access and reproductive burdens. For education measures, I use school enrollment rates for primary, secondary, and tertiary levels of education,⁹ completion rates for primary and secondary education,¹⁰ and literacy rates.¹¹ To measure reproductive burdens, I use fertility rates for female adults and adolescents.¹² Data from

⁷ Though the GTD dataset records incidents in which terrorism, according to the following criteria, may or may not have occurred, I only include incidents in this analysis which adhere to all three terrorism criteria as noted in the GTD data: 1) "The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal;" 2) "There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims;" 3) "The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities" (START 2019, 11).

⁸ Data for terrorist groups was also coded to adhere to the three terrorism criteria as described above.

⁹ For primary and secondary enrollment rates, these are measured in net percentages. For tertiary enrollment rates, these are measured in gross percentages due to unavailability of net rates.

¹⁰ For primary and secondary completion rates, these are measured as percentages of adults 25 and older who have completed primary and secondary educations.

¹¹ Literacy rates are measured using percentages of females aged 15 and older. I also examine youth illiteracy rates, which are measured as percentages of women aged 15-24 in the youth illiterate population.

¹² Fertility rates are measured as the number of children born per woman during lifespan. Adolescent fertility rates are measured as the number of births per 1,000 females ages 15-19.

WDI (World Bank 2021) are used for these variables. For Hypothesis 2, which explores the relationship between economic empowerment and terrorism, I focus on factors operationalizing female economic participation and marriage market distortions. For economic measures, I examine labor participation¹³ and unemployment rates for adults and youths¹⁴ as well as types of jobs and income levels. Specifically, the latter variables examine the number of women with wage and salaried jobs¹⁵ as well as the number of women employed as managers.¹⁶ These data are provided by WDI (World Bank 2021). For marriage market distortions, I examine the effect of brideprice dynamics. This variable is constructed using data from the WomanStats Project (WomanStats Project Database 2021). The original measure, which is coded for year 2016 only, is interpolated and extrapolated for additional years in my dataset, as I do not expect such socially entrenched dynamics as brideprice to dramatically shift between years; however, a more precise, time-variant measure of this variable is preferable in future works to avoid potential measurement error.¹⁷

For Hypothesis 3, which argues for a relationship between political leadership and terrorism, I use the percentages of women in national parliaments and ministerial positions. These data are sourced from WDI (World Bank 2021). Finally, for Hypothesis 4, in which I explore the relationship between comprehensive measures of female rights and terrorism, I

¹³ Labor participation is defined as the modeled International Labor Organization (ILO) estimate of the percentage of the female population active in the labor force, aged 15 and older.

¹⁴ Both adult and youth unemployment measures are modeled ILO estimates of percentages of unemployed females among the female workforce. For youths, the measure is estimated for those aged 15-24.

¹⁵ Wage and salaried workers is defined as the percentage of women with paid jobs among female workers.

¹⁶ Female managers is measured as the percentage of females in senior and middle management positions.

¹⁷ The original WomanStats variable is categorical in nature, with up to ten categories reflecting various widely practiced means of exchanging money, gifts, and property between grooms, brides, families, and guardians. I take this variable and create a dummy variable reflecting whether or not it is common practice for grooms or grooms' families to provide money or goods to brides' guardians to secure a marriage (originally coded as "8" and "9" in the WomanStats codebook). This reflects the nature of brideprice dynamics in terms of financial pressures placed on men to afford marriages (WomanStats Project 2021).

employ factors which operationalize female agency¹⁸ as well as legal rights,¹⁹ data for which are derived from WDI (World Bank 2021). Further, multifaceted aspects of political,²⁰ economic,²¹ and social²² rights are explored using data from the CIRI Human Rights Project dataset, with data for years 1981-2011 (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). A measure from CIRI which combines these three types of rights for women is also utilized (labeled full rights). All explanatory variables are lagged by one year to address potential endogeneity.

Control Variables

I employ several control variables with precedent in the terrorism and WPS literatures to account for alternative causes of terrorism incidents. Given the potential impact of regime type on terrorism, I employ a variable signifying a state's democratic status. The Polity2 variable from the Polity V dataset is used to operationalize regime type,²³ with data for states from 1946-2018 (Marshall and Gurr 2020). Studies have indicated different effects of democracy on risk of terrorism – some (Krueger and Laitin 2008; Pape 2005; Neumayer and Plümer 2011) argue that

¹⁸ This variable is an index comprised of WDI data representing the sum of several dummy variables indicating (1) if females have equal ability with males to: obtain a passport, be head of household, choose where to live, obtain a job, obtain a divorce, open a bank account, travel outside the home, travel outside the country, remarry, and work in the same industry.

¹⁹ This variable is an index representing the sum of several dummy variables from WDI indicating (1) if females have equal ability to: inherit as surviving spouses, hold property, inherit as children, have say over assets in marriage, access credit, disobey husbands, receive equal pay for equal work, work in dangerous jobs, and work at night, along with whether or not legislation exists against employment discrimination, sexual harassment in the workplace, and domestic violence.

²⁰ CIRI's measure of political rights ranges from 0 (in which rights are denied) to 3 (rights are widely extended and executed), and refer to the following: voting, joining parties, running for and holding political office, and petitioning the government (Cingranelli and Richards 2014).

²¹ CIRI's measure of economic rights ranges from 0 (in which rights are denied) to 3 (rights are widely extended and executed), and refer to the following: equal pay, freedom to become employed without male permission, employment without discrimination (including sexual harassment), ability to work at night and in dangerous jobs, and ability to join police and security forces (Cingranelli and Richards 2014).

²² CIRI's measure of social rights ranges from 0 (in which rights are denied) to 3 (rights are widely extended and executed), and refer to the following: equal inheritance, marriage and divorce, travel, citizenship conferral to spouses and children, passport attainment, property rights, rights to a home, freedom of movement and matriculation, and ability to refuse female genital mutilation/circumcision (FGM/FGC) and sterilization (Cingranelli and Richards 2014).

²³ The Polity V index assigns scores of -10-0 for autocracy, 1-6 for partial democracy, and 7-10 for full democracy (Marshall and Gurr 2020). I transform the variable to a score ranging from 1-21 to aid in interpretation.

increases in civil liberties and political rights decrease the risk of terrorism, while others (Stanton 2013; Fortna 2015) find that democracies are more likely to be targeted by terrorist organizations in civil conflict. Other research indicates that fully democratic and autocratic states have fewer terrorist incidents and fatalities than anocracies (Magen 2018). Regime type may also relate to the extent of female empowerment in a state, further emphasizing its importance as a control variable. To account for the potential for prior conflict to affect terrorism dynamics, I also control for civil, ethnic, and interstate violence using data from the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV), 1946-2018 dataset (Marshall 2019). To control for the possible impact of a relationship between ethnic fractionalization and terrorism as some (Elbadawi 1999; Collier and Hoeffler 2004) observe for civil conflict, I also include data from the Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization Dataset (HIEF) (Drazanova 2019); as the HIEF dataset provides data for years 1945-2013, I extrapolate ethnic fractionalization data through 2018.

To account for the potential impact of state capacity on both terrorism and gender measures, I employ the variable Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) from the National Material Capabilities (v5.0) dataset (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972, 2021) which provides a measure of state capacity or national capability including military expenditures, military personnel, total population, urban population, energy consumption, and iron and steel production for states from 1816-2012. Previous research indicates that more populous and economically developed states may be at higher risk for terrorism, including states with higher energy consumption rates (Neumayer and Plümper 2011; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Krueger and Laitin 2008; Piazza 2008; Wade and Reiter 2007). I also control for the impact of state size on risk for terrorism, using land area data from WDI (World Bank 2021), as larger states may present bigger challenges to policing and security efforts to deter terrorism (Saiya, Zaihra, and

Fidler 2017). Finally, as with regime type, many argue that economic development is a significant predictor of domestic and transnational terrorism, though there is disagreement over the nature of the relationship (Lai 2007; Blomberg and Hess 2008; de la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca 2012). Therefore, I use GDP per capita²⁴ data from WDI (World Bank 2021) as a control variable. I also use region and year dummies in all models to control for the potential of contagion effects and autocorrelation, respectively.²⁵ Time-variant control measures are all lagged by one year to account for potential endogeneity. Data for state capacity, land area, and GDP per capita are log-transformed due to strongly skewed distributions.

Empirical Method

As with other studies on terrorism (Neumayer and Plümper 2011; Krieger and Meierrieks 2015; Salman 2015; Harris and Milton 2016; Saiya, Zaihra, and Fidler 2017), to account for overdispersed terrorism data, I use negative binomial regression with robust standard errors clustered by country to test my hypotheses. My unit of analysis is the country-year. I also conduct several robustness checks for the models which I detail further after presentation and discussion of my main findings.

Results

Table 1 presents major findings of interest from negative binominal regressions testing each of my four hypotheses for both incidents and groups. Full model results, including all explanatory variables, control variables, and other information, are included in the Appendix (see Tables 2-5). Summary statistics for all variables are available in Table 6 in the Appendix as well.

²⁴ Measured as constant 2010 US dollars.

²⁵ The control region is Americas/Caribbean in all models.

Table 1: Findings of Interest

	Incidents	Groups
H1: Social autonomy		
<i>Primary enrollment</i> $T-1$.021 (.007)**	.005 (.005)
<i>Secondary enrollment</i> $T-1$	-.003 (.010)	-.012 (.006)*
<i>Tertiary enrollment</i> $T-1$	-.019 (.006)**	-.012 (.003)**
<i>Completed primary</i> $T-1$	-.023 (.010)*	-.005 (.006)
<i>Completed secondary</i> $T-1$	-.021 (.008)*	-.006 (.005)
H2: Economic empowerment		
<i>Unemployment</i> $T-1$.028 (.012)*	.005 (.009)
<i>Youth unemployment</i> $T-1$.018 (.007)**	.005 (.006)
<i>Waged/salaried workers</i> $T-1$	-.018 (.006)**	-.016 (.005)**
<i>Managers</i> $T-1$	-.050 (.021)*	-.018 (.019)
H3: Political leadership		
<i>Legislators</i> $T-1$	-.016 (.012)	-.002 (.008)
<i>Government ministers</i> $T-1$	-.008 (.0124)	.001 (.010)
H4: Comprehensive women's rights		
<i>Agency</i> $T-1$	-.149 (.050)**	-.085 (.034)*
<i>Divorce</i> $T-1$	-.716 (.207)***	-.602 (.129)***
<i>Remarry</i> $T-1$	-.577 (.216)**	-.393 (.129)**
<i>Legal rights</i> $T-1$	-.115 (.044)**	-.058 (.033)
<i>Legislation domestic violence</i> $T-1$	-.596 (.203)**	-.407 (.146)**
<i>CIRI full rights</i> $T-1$	-.107 (.071)	-.102 (.042)*
<i>Social rights</i> $T-1$	-.319 (.125)*	-.229 (.074)**

Negative binomial regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations clustered by country. Female-only values for variables. Full models reported in Appendix. Shaded measures indicate significance across robustness checks models. * $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .001$**

Hypothesis 1 Findings

Findings for the models indicate mixed support for Hypothesis 1 regarding the effect of social autonomy on terrorism. In terms of incidents, the hypothesis is supported when looking at higher education and completed education: Tertiary enrollment, completion of primary education,²⁶ and completion of secondary education each reduce terrorism incidents, at statistical significance levels of .01, .05, and .05, respectively. However, other education variables present more complicated relationships: While secondary enrollment appears unrelated to terrorism incidents, primary education appears to have a significant (.01 level) and positive relationship with terrorism, contrary to my hypothesis. In addition, neither adult literacy nor youth illiteracy appears to relate to terrorist incidents. Finally, in terms of the effect of reproductive burdens on risk of terrorism, Hypothesis 1 is not supported: Neither adolescent nor adult fertility rates affect terrorist incidents. In terms of terrorist groups, tertiary enrollment continues to reduce terrorist group formation with statistical significance at the .01 level. However, findings diverge in some cases regarding the groups models; while secondary enrollment did not appear to relate to terrorist incidents, the variable does support Hypothesis 1 in terms of deterring terrorist groups, with statistical significance at the .05 level. In addition, neither primary enrollment, completion of primary education, and completion of secondary enrollment appear to relate to the development of terrorist groups. Hypothesis 1 is further unsupported for groups in terms of literacy rates and fertility rates.

²⁶ Several models including the variables for completion of primary education and secondary education fail to produce Wald chi² and associated p-values. However, in analyzing these models, it appears that inclusion of year dummies appears to drive this result; running the models without year dummies produces similar results, with both variables maintaining statistical significance in the predicted directions.

Hypothesis 2 Findings

As with Hypothesis 1, findings indicate mixed support for Hypothesis 2 regarding the impact of female economic empowerment on terrorist incidents and groups. In terms of female unemployment, the hypothesis is supported: More unemployment among adults and youths relates positively to terrorist incidents at the .05 and .01 levels of significance, respectively. Further, as the number of women with wage and salaried jobs increases, the number of terrorist incidents decreases, with statistical significance at the .01 level; in addition, increases in female managers decrease terrorism incidents at the .05 significance level. However, Hypothesis 2 is not supported in terms of the impact of female labor force participation and brideprice dynamics on terrorist incidents. When examining group models, the only economic variable that presents as statistically significant is the number of wage and salary workers (.01 level), indicating that states with more women with stable incomes are less likely to have terrorist groups. However, Hypothesis 2 is not supported in terms of impact on terrorist groups when looking at other economically-oriented variables.

Hypothesis 3 Findings

Regarding Hypothesis 3, which argues that female political leadership should reduce both terrorist attacks and groups, this hypothesis is not supported by the findings; neither female legislators nor female government ministers appear to relate to the development of terrorist incidents or terrorist groups, as the coefficients for these variables do not achieve statistical significance in any models.

Hypothesis 4 Findings

For Hypothesis 4, which explores the impact on terrorism of multidimensional female rights encompassing economic, political, and social facets, the models again exhibit mixed support for this hypothesis. In terms of terrorist incidents, agency, which includes a range of

abilities and freedoms, relates negatively with statistical significance at the .01 level; as women gain parity with men in terms of freedom of movement and social, political, and economic inclusion, states' risks of terrorist incidents decline. Regarding legal rights, findings for this variable also support Hypothesis 4; as women gain more legal rights, terrorist incidents decrease, with a statistical significance level of .01. In addition, more social rights for women relates negatively to terrorist incidents at the .05 significance level. However, other measures relating to rights for women do not appear to support Hypothesis 4 in terms of reducing terrorist incidents, including political, economic, and full rights. Regarding terrorist groups, comprehensive rights measures also reduce the number of groups forming, including agency (.05 level of statistical significance) and social rights (.01 level). In addition, the measure for full rights reduces terrorist group formation at the .05 level of significance. However, other measures of comprehensive rights for women do not support Hypothesis 4 regarding terrorist groups, including legal rights, political rights, and economic rights.

Impacts on Terrorist Incidents

The substantive impacts of my explanatory variables on terrorism vary. For terrorist incidents, economic and education variables appear to have the strongest relative effects compared to variables linked to rights. The impact of a one-unit increase in female adult unemployment as determined by incidence rate ratios (IRRs) is an increase in the rate of terrorist incidents by a factor of approximately 1.03, followed by youth unemployment (increase by 1.02) and primary enrollment (increase by 1.02). One-unit increases in tertiary enrollment, completion of primary education, completion of secondary education, and wage and salary workers all decrease the rate of terrorist incidents by a factor of .98, with a slightly smaller impact for female managers (.95). Among rights variables, the strongest impact is observed for legal rights; a one-unit increase in legal rights for women leads to a decline in the rate of incidents by a factor of

.89, closely followed by agency with a decrease by a factor of .86. The variable for social rights produces smaller relative effects which also reduce terrorism incidents (.73).

Plots of predictive margins for key variables of interest can be found in Figures 5-11. Figure 5 demonstrates an increase in predicted events from approximately 45 to nearly 200 as unemployment ranges from its minimum to maximum values with control variables at observed values, with a similar effect for youth unemployment (an increase in events from approximately 42 to just over 150). With tertiary enrollment increasing to its maximum, terrorist events are expected to decline from approximately 60 events to nearly zero (Figure 6). Figure 7 demonstrates that as the variable for wage and salary workers increases to its maximum, events are reduced from over 145 to less than 25.

Figure 5: Female Unemployment and Predicted Number of Events




Figure 6: Female Tertiary Enrollment and Predicted Number of Events





Figure 7: Female Wage/Salary Workers and Predicted Number of Events




Impacts on Terrorist Groups

Regarding substantive effects on terrorist group formation, impacts for the explanatory variables are similar to that for terrorist incidents, with education and economic variables producing the greatest relative effects compared to rights-oriented variables, though impacts are smaller overall. One-unit increases in secondary and tertiary enrollment result in a decrease in the rate of terrorist groups by a factor of .99, closely followed by wage and salary (decline of .98). For agency, a one-unit increase reduces terrorist groups by a factor of .92, while the same for full rights results in a decline in the rate of groups by a factor of .90. Smaller relative impacts, as with incidents, are observed for social rights (decrease by .80).


These results, as outlined in plots of predictive margins in Figure 8, indicate that as tertiary enrollment increases to its maximum value with control variables held at observed values, the predicted number of groups declines from over 2 to nearly zero. As wage and salary

Figure 8: Female Tertiary Enrollment and Predicted Number of Groups



workers ranges from its minimum to maximum values, groups are predicted to decrease from approximately 4 to 1 (Figure 9).

Figure 9: Female Wage/Salary Workers and Predicted Number of Groups



Control Variable Findings

Among control variables for the models, findings for several are in line with expectations and are strongly statistically significant with robustness across models. In particular, coefficients for the variable reflecting state capacity are positive and highly statistically significant (.01 level and higher) for all incidents and groups models, indicating that states with larger populations, military expenditures, and energy consumption rates are most likely to attract terrorism. This finding comports with prior research on state capacity and terrorism (Neumayer and Plümper 2011; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Krueger and Laitin 2008; Piazza 2008; Wade and Reiter 2007). As anticipated, prior conflict also relates positively with terrorist incidents and groups in nearly

all models, with statistical significance at the .01 level or higher for these models; thus, more conflict-prone states in terms of international, civil, and ethnic violence are more likely to experience terrorism (Stanton 2013; Findley and Young 2012). In addition, coefficients for polity are positively related with terrorist incidents and groups in nearly every model, with statistical significance at the .01 level and higher for most models, indicating that democracies are more at risk for both terrorist incidents and groups; this reflects some findings in the literature on conflict and regime type as well (Stanton 2013; Fortna 2015). GDP per capita is also negative and statistically significant for several models, indicating that wealthier states are less likely to experience terrorism in terms of incidents or groups; again, this finding supports that of others in the literature (Sprinzak 2000; Ehrlich and Liu 2002; Burgoon 2006; Freytag et al. 2011; Lai 2007; Blomberg and Hess 2008) regarding the effects of poverty and social welfare spending on terrorist violence.

Other control variables exhibit less consistent effects in the models. In terms of a potential contagion effect, it appears that some regions, including Europe/Central Asia and Middle East/North Africa (MENA), are more likely to experience terrorism on average compared to the control region (Americas/Caribbean), while for the East Asia/South Asia/Pacific and sub-Saharan Africa regions, terrorism risk was decreased for most models (particularly sub-Saharan Africa). For ethnic fractionalization, while the variable was positive and statistically significant for some models, the variable's inconsistency in terms of statistical significance indicates a limited relationship with terrorism; however, the positive sign of the coefficients indicates that higher ethnic fractionalization scores lead to a potentially greater risk of terrorism. Finally, regarding state size, the land area variable failed to achieve statistical significance for any models related to terrorist incidents. Findings for group models indicate a statistically

significant and negative relationship for land area in only a few models, indicating a weak relationship overall with terrorism; while it seems counterintuitive that greater land size would deter terrorist groups, it may be that larger states present logistical difficulties in terms of travel and communication which undermine the formation of many groups.

Robustness Checks

To test the strength and consistency of these findings, I conduct several robustness checks for the models. First, it is possible that only certain components of indices such as the agency, legal rights, and CIRI rights variables consistently drive these variables' relationships with terrorism. Though the individual components comprising the CIRI indices are not available for direct testing, I conduct robustness checks on the agency and legal rights indices by testing their component variables in further models. These results can be found in the Appendix in Tables 7 and 8. In terms of the individual components of the agency index, a few continue to support Hypothesis 4 for reducing terrorist incidents, including the freedom to choose where to live (.05 significance level) and the freedom to bank (.05 level). Variables measuring the ability to divorce and remarry decrease terrorist incidents with statistical significance at the .001 and .01 levels, respectively. As these variables, along with the ability to choose where to live, arguably represent social freedoms, this may indicate further support for Hypothesis 1 as well.


However, findings for a couple of agency measures contradict Hypothesis 4, including the freedom to travel outside the home and outside the country, both of which relate positively to terrorist incidents at the .05 and .01 significance levels, respectively. These findings are surprising, but may help clarify the causal mechanism behind Hypothesis 4 (and perhaps Hypothesis 1 as well, as these variables also relate to social autonomy); given that of the individual agency measures, many of those related most clearly to family dynamics, including freedom to divorce, remarry, and choose where to live, appear to affect terrorism incidents, this

may indicate that autonomy for females at the household level and within families is most important in terms of reducing terrorism within societies, while other measures reflecting freedom of movement require further study to determine the nature of the relationships these may have with terrorism. In addition, neither of the travel measures which positively relate to terrorist incidents appear to affect the development of terrorist groups. However, agency measures which do reduce the risk of groups forming include the right to divorce (.001 significance level) and the right to remarry (.01 level). Other components of the agency index, including the ability to obtain a passport, act as head of household, obtain a job, and work in the same industry as men, do not relate to either terrorist incidents or groups.

Among the different measures which constitute the legal rights index, legislation against domestic violence is negatively related to terrorist incidents at the .01 significance level. As with measures for ability to divorce and remarry, this finding may provide supplementary support for Hypothesis 1 in terms of social autonomy and norms regarding treatment of women. A few other legal rights components also reduce the number of terrorist incidents, including the right to own property (.05 level of significance), the right to own assets (.05 level), and the right to access credit (.01 level). Both legislation against domestic violence and legislation against workplace sexual harassment negatively impact the formation of terrorist groups with significance at the .01 and .05 levels, respectively. Other measures of legal rights, including the rights to inherit, inherit as children, disobey husbands, receive equal pay for equal work, work without sex-based discrimination, work at night, and work in dangerous fields, do not relate to either terrorist incidents or groups. This indicates that for terrorist incidents, economically-oriented legal rights are most salient in terms of reducing risk, while for terrorist groups, variables reflecting regulation of workplace and household dynamics have the greatest relevance.


As the variables representing right to divorce and remarry in the agency index and legislation against domestic violence in the legal rights index appear to have the most significant impacts on both terrorist incidents and groups, I continue to report results for these variables in the following robustness checks. In terms of substantive effects, IRRs reveal that the right to remarry, legislation against domestic violence, and the right to divorce produce smaller relative effects compared to education, economics, and social rights variables which reduce terrorism incidents (.56, .55, and .49, respectively). Predictive margins for the models reveal that states which extend the right to divorce to women experience half as many attacks as states which do not, with the former predicted to experience approximately 35 terrorist events compared to just over 70 events for the latter, with similar impacts for states with legislation against domestic violence and those which allow women to remarry (Figure 10). In terms of terrorist groups, smaller relative impacts, as with incidents, are again observed for the right to remarry (.68 IRR),

Figure 10: Right to Divorce and Predicted Number of Events



legislation against domestic violence (.67), and right to divorce (.55). For states which offer the right to divorce to women, the predicted number of groups is just over 1, while states which do not offer these rights are likely to have at least two terrorist groups, with similar results for the right to remarry and legislation against domestic violence (Figure 11).

Figure 11: Right to Divorce and Predicted Number of Groups



As another robustness check, I restrict the data to attacks considered domestic in nature by GTD (START 2019; 2021). While I argue that states which suffer from gender inequality are likely to produce terror both inside and outside the state, terrorism data compiled by GTD present a potential complication in the assessment of that relationship. As terrorism incidents compiled by GTD are recorded by the states in which attacks occurred geographically, data may include attacks perpetrated on a state by a foreign group without uniform coding of such attacks as transnational or information on the national origins of the group; thus, analyses using these

data may provide a limited test of the impact of state-centric gender equality measures on risk of terrorism. Other commonly used terrorism datasets, including International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) (Mickolus 2007), also fail to systematically identify attacks as domestic or transnational or include state-level identifications of perpetrator groups; some, such as ITERATE, only pertain to transnational attacks.

GTD lists over half of the nearly 200,000 events in the dataset as missing or unable to code as domestic or transnational in nature - of those that are coded, 8.5% are coded as transnational and just over 45% as domestic, which supports the literature on the ratio of domestic to transnational attacks (Neumayer and Plümper 2011). For incidents which were classified as unknown in nature, I assign missing data for attacks for these states rather than zero attacks as a means of creating the most accurate estimate of domestic attacks. Findings for both incidents and groups can be found in the Appendix in Table 9 and in general continue to provide partial support for several of my hypotheses as many measures maintain robustness.

For Hypothesis 1, findings for domestic incidents reflect that of the main incidents models in large part. In terms of education measures, higher education and completed education continue to offer support for Hypothesis 1, as tertiary enrollment, completed primary education, and completed secondary education all reduce terrorist incidents at the .001, .05, and .01 significance levels, respectively. As with the main incidents models, primary enrollment contradicts Hypothesis 1, as the coefficient is positive and significant at the .01 level. Regarding domestic terrorist groups, both secondary and tertiary enrollment negatively relate to the development of groups at the .05 level, reflecting findings from the main groups models. In addition, several education variables achieve statistical significance in the predicted negative direction for the groups models, including completion of primary education, completion of

secondary education, and adult literacy rates, at the .05, .01, and .05 levels, respectively. The remaining variables for these models, adolescent illiteracy rates and fertility rates for adults and youths, do not appear to relate to domestic incidents or groups, as with previous results.

Regarding Hypothesis 2, several measures also demonstrate consistency between the main and domestic incidents models. Both adult and youth unemployment increase domestic terrorist incidents at the .05 and .01 significance levels, respectively, while increases in female wage and salary workers reduce domestic terrorist incidents at the .001 level. However, female managers fails to achieve statistical significance for domestic attacks, diverging from the findings of the main incidents models. Regarding domestic terrorist groups, wage and salary workers, as with the main groups models, also relates negatively to the development of groups at the .01 level. However, contrary to predictions, the brideprice coefficient presents as negative and statistically significant (.05 level) for domestic terrorist groups, indicating that where it is more common for grooms or grooms' families to provide money or other assets to brides' guardians to secure a marriage, terrorist groups are less likely to form.

In terms of Hypothesis 3, results for domestic incidents and groups replicate that of the main models: Neither female legislators nor female government ministers appear to relate to domestic terrorism. However, regarding Hypothesis 4, several variables continue to provide at least partial support for this hypothesis when looking at domestic incidents and groups. Variables measuring female agency (.01 level of significance), the right to divorce (.05 level), legal rights (.001 level), and domestic violence legislation (.01 level) all negatively relate to domestic terror incidents. However, the coefficients for social rights and the right to remarry fail to achieve statistical significance for domestic incidents, diverging from earlier findings. Regarding terrorist groups, all of the rights variables which related negatively to groups in the main models continue

to do so for domestic terrorist groups: Agency (.05 level of significance), right to divorce (.001), right to remarry (.01 level), full rights (.05 level), social rights (.01 level), and domestic violence legislation (.01 level). In addition, the coefficient for legal rights achieves statistical significance in the model at the .05 level, indicating that more legal rights for women decreases the number of domestic terror groups.

For the domestic models overall, Hypotheses 2 and 4 lose some support as the female managers, social rights, and right to remarry variables fail to maintain robustness for domestic incidents. However, for domestic groups, several variables achieve statistical significance which failed to do so for the main groups models, including completion of primary education, completion of secondary education, adult literacy, and legal rights, providing additional support for Hypotheses 1 and 4. Finally, the results for brideprice dynamics in the group models contradict predictions for Hypothesis 2, as the coefficient is negative, though as I discuss below, there are several potential explanations for this finding. In general, the results for the domestic models tend to reflect the findings of the main models and indicate robustness for several variables. I also argue that the results for this robustness check lend further support to the main models, as there is reason to believe that full coding of the GTD dataset would reveal a strong ratio of domestic to transnational attacks in line with findings from the literature on terrorism.

Given studies in the terrorism literature suggesting the potential for nonlinear impacts of national wealth (Freytag et al. 2011) and regime type (Abadie 2006; Magen 2018), I test the models using the quadratic terms of both of these control variables. Results of these robustness checks are located in Table 10 in the Appendix. For incidents models, all variables of interest remain robust to the inclusion of the quadratic terms for both polity and GDP per capita. For groups models, all variables of interest but one maintain robustness; the coefficient for secondary

enrollment, which was negative and significant at the .05 level for the main groups models, remains negative but fails to achieve statistical significance with the inclusion of the quadratic terms (however, the coefficient's p-value registers at .055, rendering it just shy of statistical significance). These findings indicate that nearly all variables of interest remain robust to the inclusion of the quadratic terms for polity and GDP per capita for both terrorist incidents and groups. For the polity variables in these models, the findings support the notion of a nonlinear relationship between regime type and both terrorism incidents and groups: In most models, the quadratic terms' coefficients present as statistically significant with an inverted U-shape, indicating a higher risk of terrorism for anocracies, or those with mid-range levels of autocracy and democracy, as also reported by Abadie (2006) and Magen (2018).

Results are less consistent regarding a nonlinear effect for GDP per capita. Coefficients for GDP per capita in both the youth illiteracy and brideprice incidents models present as negative and statistically significant, but the failure of both terms to achieve statistical significance does not indicate a nonlinear relationship. In all other incidents models, the coefficients for GDP per capita fail to register as statistically significant. For groups models, findings for some models (completion of primary education, completion of secondary education, labor participation, unemployment, youth unemployment, wage and salary workers, female legislators, and female ministers) indicate a nonlinear relationship between wealth and terrorism which is statistically significant and U-shaped, suggesting that terrorist groups are less likely to form in middle-income states, but results are not replicated in other models. Other findings for groups models (youth illiteracy, economic rights, political rights, and social rights) do not support a nonlinear relationship, as the coefficients for GDP per capita remain negative and statistically significant while the quadratic terms' coefficients are insignificant. For all other

groups models, the GDP per capita coefficients do not present as statistically significant. Findings for these robustness checks therefore support the argument that regime type has a nonlinear impact on terrorism, but do not provide strong support of the same for national wealth.

I conduct another robustness check related to variables controlling for national capability or state capacity. As the national capability variable in my main models is an index comprised of several measures, including total population, urban population, military expenditures, military personnel, iron and steel production, and energy consumption, it may be useful to control for some of the components in this index which may have the greatest salience for the relationship with terrorism as separate measures. I therefore run additional models controlling for total population and military expenditures, as these are the most common alternatives to the national capability index in the literature (Harris and Milton 2016; Saiya, Zaihra, and Fidler 2017). Since larger populations may allow for more terrorist activity due to a bigger pool for recruits and decreased state policing ability, I control for the impact of total population using data from WDI (World Bank 2021; Neumayer and Plümper 2011; Fearon and Laitin 2003). To account for government repression and military capacity, which may increase attacks or provide ability to prevent attacks, respectively, I also utilize military expenditures data from WDI (World Bank 2021; Neumayer and Plümper 2011). These variables are both log-transformed due to strongly skewed distributions. Results can be found in Table 11 in the Appendix.

All explanatory variables remained robust for these models regarding terrorist incidents, with the addition of the female youth illiteracy coefficient presenting as positive and significant at the .01 level, providing support for Hypothesis 1. Several variables of interest remained robust for the groups models as well, including wage and salary workers, agency, social rights, the right to divorce, the right to remarry, and legislation against domestic violence. In addition, some

variables present as statistically significant in the groups models that did not in the main groups model, including youth illiteracy (positive at the .05 significance level) and legal rights (negative at the .05 level), providing support for Hypotheses 1 and 4, respectively. However, Hypotheses 1 and 4 also lose some support for the groups models, as the coefficients for secondary enrollment, tertiary enrollment, and full rights fail to achieve statistical significance. Regarding the effects of the control variables, both population and military expenditures present as positive and statistically significant for all groups models and all but two incidents models, indicating that, as is found in the literature, bigger populations and higher levels of military spending are associated with higher levels of conflict (Neumayer and Plümper 2011).

These findings indicate that population and military expenditures are strong drivers of the significance of the broader national capabilities measure; however, I believe the index to be a better operationalization of overall state capacity and development impacting both gender equality and risk of terrorism. In addition, with the exception of a few variables which present as newly significant in this robustness check (youth illiteracy and legal rights) and a few that lose significance (secondary and tertiary enrollment along with full rights in the groups models), the findings for terrorist incidents and groups closely reflect the findings of the main models, providing confidence in the national capability index measure.

Another robustness check concerns the potential impact of waves of terrorism. Some argue that terrorism has declined in the post-Cold War years, indicating the need to control for this time period in studies on terrorism (Harris and Milton 2016); however, as the model years are generally constrained to the post-Cold War era, it is not possible to control for this effect here. In addition, there may be reason to believe terrorism has instead increased in recent years, particularly in the Middle East/North Africa region, since the beginning of the Global War on

Terror in the post-9/11 era. I therefore construct a dummy variable indicating “1” for the year 2002 and beyond and “0” otherwise and test the models using this control variable while excluding year dummies. Results are provided in Table 12 in the Appendix.

Results for the incidents models are generally robust to the inclusion of the 9/11 era dummy; primary enrollment, tertiary enrollment, completion of primary school, completion of secondary school, youth unemployment, wage and salary workers, agency, social rights, right to divorce, and right to remarry remain statistically significant with the same signs as exhibited in the main incidents models. However, coefficients for adult unemployment, female managers, legal rights, and legislation against domestic violence fail to achieve statistical significance, diverging from the findings of the main models and reducing support for Hypotheses 2 and 4. For the groups models, all of the variables remain robust to the inclusion of the 9/11 era dummy variable. Regarding the effects of the 9/11 dummy, the variable presents as negative but inconsistently statistically significant for the incidents models, with greater consistency for the groups models; this indicates that in the post-9/11 era, as in the post-Cold War era, fewer groups are likely to form and to a lesser extent, fewer incidents are likely to occur.

Finally, though I argue that the use of year dummies acts as a better control for autocorrelation in the models, I test a control variable for prior terrorist incidents and groups, as is common in the literature (Harris and Milton 2016; Robison 2010; Salman 2015). In the incidents models, the one-year lagged value of incidents is included, while the one-year lagged count of terrorist groups is included in the groups models; year dummies are excluded in these models. Findings for these models are presented in Table 13 in the Appendix.

Regarding incidents, several variables remain robust to the inclusion of the lagged incidents control variable; these include tertiary enrollment, completion of primary school,

completion of secondary school, youth unemployment, wage and salary workers, managers, social rights, the right to divorce, the right to remarry, and legislation against domestic violence. In addition, the coefficients for secondary enrollment, full rights, and political rights achieve statistical significance at the .001, .05, and .05 levels, respectively, with the predicted negative signs, providing further support for Hypotheses 1 and 4. However, the coefficients for primary enrollment, adult unemployment, agency, and legal rights fail to achieve statistical significance in this model, reducing support for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4. The groups models present stronger findings in terms of robustness to the inclusion of the lagged group count; all variables which present as statistically significant in the main groups models retain significance in these models with the predicted signs. In addition, the coefficients for adult fertility rates, legal rights, and political rights all newly achieve statistical significance with the predicted signs at the .05 level, providing support for Hypotheses 1 and 4. Regarding the lagged counts of incidents and groups, these variables remain positive and statistically significant at the .01 level or higher in all groups and most incidents models, indicating that, as predicted, prior terrorism experience has a strong effect on the risk of future terrorism.

Discussion and Conclusion

Overall, findings indicate at least partial support for my “pull” and “push” arguments and Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4, with several measures associated with these hypotheses retaining statistical significance across a number of robustness checks. For Hypothesis 1, variables that mitigate terrorism through reducing terrorist incidents or groups include female secondary and tertiary enrollment as well as completion of primary and secondary education. Higher numbers of females working in wage and salary jobs are robustly associated with both fewer incidents and groups while unemployment among females drives increases in terrorist incidents, lending support to Hypothesis 2, which explores the relationship between economic empowerment and

terrorism. Finally, Hypothesis 4 receives support from several models which indicate that higher rates of female agency, legal rights, full rights, and social rights reduce terrorist incidents and groups, including the right to remarry and legislation against domestic violence. As with wage and salary work, the right to divorce is robustly associated with reductions in both attacks and groups; as noted previously, this may provide additional support for Hypothesis 1 as well. Incidence rate ratios attained from the models reveal relatively larger substantive impacts from economic and education variables compared to rights-oriented measures.

These findings indicate that female social autonomy in terms of education (particularly higher education and completion of education at the primary and secondary levels); economic empowerment through stable, paid employment; and agency and social rights which ensure equality in familial issues are important in deterring incidents. Further, these results also indicate that higher education, economic empowerment (primarily through wage and salary work), and several aspects of social rights also matter for deterring groups. Thus, findings indicate partial support for the “pull” theory, which argues that social autonomy for women reflects embedded values of equality, non-discrimination, and peaceful competition in society. Education provides communication and critical analysis skills along with the tools to make informed decisions and prepare for a career, and the ability for females to gain an education, particularly at higher levels of schooling, indicates the extent to which women are valued as autonomous and equal members of society and given the freedom to matriculate without discrimination. Female education significantly undermines the gender hierarchy in a patriarchal society due to the independence and upward mobility afforded through schooling, representing a foundational shift in gender equality dynamics.

Further, results here provide partial support for the “push” theory, indicating that female economic empowerment undermines financial incentives for terrorism. Employment, particularly in jobs offering wages and salaries, provides networking opportunities and gives women the ability to contribute to household and national economies, further increasing autonomy, eroding traditional breadwinner gender roles, and boosting overall socioeconomic development. The collective benefits of paid female labor thus reduce material motivations to engage in violence which may otherwise be driven by opportunistic terrorist groups capitalizing on widespread underdevelopment, poverty, and desires to fulfill strict gender roles in patriarchal societies.

Finally, underpinning the “pull,” “push,” and “prevent” theories, Hypothesis 4, which argues that comprehensive measures of female rights will reduce terrorism, receives partial support as well from the findings of the models. While many aspects of Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 are reflective of manifestations of female rights, measures examined in Hypothesis 4 relate to equal rights for men and women under the law which set thresholds of parity in participation for a range of economic, political, and social behaviors. As the results regarding female agency, legal rights, social rights, the right to divorce, the right to remarry, and domestic violence legislation indicate, provision of equal rights for females is indicative of the intrinsic value of women in society as well as the extent of their legal protections and freedoms. The mitigating effects of the extension of these rights on terrorism are robust, particularly regarding the right to divorce, revealing that more rights and abilities for women, particularly social rights closely aligned with family and household dynamics, reduce risk of terrorist violence.

The results reported here are also important as the differences between terrorist incidents and groups in terms of their relationships with gender equality have rarely been explored in the literature. I test the theory that gender-related causes for both incidents and groups are similar,

but results here demonstrate varying impacts of some gender inequality variables, indicating that future research in the WPS literature should explore theories concerning the impact of women's empowerment on the growth of groups and the proliferation of attacks which proffer divergent causes for the two. While my results indicate some overlap in terms of gender-related impacts on incidents and groups, particularly regarding education, paid employment, and social rights, the full results point to potentially differing effects of achieving gender parity in other areas:

Addressing economic issues such as youth unemployment among females may deter incidents rather than groups, while focusing on rights for women may discourage the development of groups more so than attacks. Altogether, the results indicate that while several aspects of female empowerment have significant potential to reduce terrorist attacks and groups, gender equality is not a panacea for terrorism.

While several models provide support for my hypotheses and the corresponding “pull” and “push” theories, other findings fail to support my arguments. For instance, rather than mitigating terrorism, female primary enrollment is instead linked to greater risk of terrorism, contrary to the predictions of my “pull” argument and Hypothesis 1. However, this finding does have precedent in the literature. While some works (Melander 2005; Bussmann 2007; Salman 2015) report a pacifying effect from increasing female education for conflict and terrorism, Brockhoff, Krieger, and Meierrieks (2015) find that primary education instead increases the risk of domestic terrorism. Afzal (2012) uses survey data from Pakistan in a study on support for terrorism against the United States, finding that educated women are more likely to support terrorism targeting the US relative to educated males, and that these attitudes can be traced to the high school and college years. Similarly, Malečková and Stanišić (2014) find that education among women does not appear to decrease support for terrorism as has been assumed in the past.

While I argue that the gender gap in education represents a gender bias in social norms which begets violence, findings here in conjunction with similar findings in the literature regarding the relationship between female education and terrorism require further study to determine the ways in which education may increase rather than allay the risk of terrorism.

Other findings also contradict my arguments and hypotheses. For example, regarding the “pull” theory, models including variables for fertility rates and literacy rates generally fail to support Hypothesis 1. Though I argue that reproductive burdens are an important aspect of inequality which may limit social autonomy and relate to the intrinsic value of women within households and communities, and other studies (Caprioli 2000; Caprioli 2005; Regan and Paskeviciute 2003; Fisher and Lee 2019) find a relationship between adolescent and adult fertility rates and conflict, my results regarding fertility rates do not replicate these findings in most models. It is possible that in some societies, rather than creating a reproductive burden which limits upward mobility, having more children gives women prestige and more control within the household. In addition, larger families may provide bigger support systems which allow women to work if they desire while sharing childcare responsibilities.

It is surprising that literacy rates appear generally unrelated to terrorism, given that female education, particularly higher education, consistently decreases terrorist incidents and groups in findings presented here; however, the literature also appears divided on the impact of literacy rates on conflict, with some (Krueger and Laitin 2008; Forsberg and Olsson 2020) finding weak or nonexistent links to conflict for literacy, others (Piazza 2008) finding positive relationships between literacy and terrorism, and some (Busmann 2007) reporting negative relationships between female literacy and civil conflict. Thus, as with primary enrollment,

additional research is needed to determine the potentially divergent causal pathways between literacy rates, fertility rates, and terrorism.

In addition, my “push” argument, explored in Hypothesis 2, also generally fails to gain support when measured in terms of female labor participation, brideprice, and female managers. Though the “push” theory argues that more women in the workforce increases economic empowerment and improves socioeconomic development which should reduce financial incentives for joining terrorist groups, the variable for labor participation fails to achieve statistical significance in any model, despite other results which indicate that unemployment and wage and salary work significantly relate to terrorism as well as findings in the literature which support a relationship between labor participation and conflict mitigation (Bussmann 2007; Robison 2010; Salman 2015). In conjunction with my findings on wage and salary workers, I take these results for labor force participation as an indication that the types of jobs women hold matters; it is possible that when women hold jobs in which they are guaranteed a salary or wage regardless of amount of production achieved, this injects stability into individual and community economies which boosts economic development and reduces incentives to engage in terrorism, while labor force participation may reflect an amalgamation of jobs which masks this dynamic.

Similarly, while having more female managers does appear to reduce incidents, the variable does not achieve significance in several robustness checks and does not appear to relate to the development of terrorist groups, findings which also indicate that stable wages may matter more than supervisory status in deterring terrorism. Finally, the brideprice variable achieves statistical significance in only one model and contradicts predictions as the sign is negative; however, this finding may reflect a potential measurement error issue. As noted previously, the data for brideprice are limited to one year and are categorical in nature, restricting the variation

of this variable. In terms of potential explanations for this finding beyond measurement error, it is possible that in places where brideprice dynamics are common, groups are less likely to form due to financial constraints and strong kinship ties which drive group formation rather than political ideologies; it may also be that men are more concerned, particularly in areas where brideprice traditions are strong, with finding legitimate means of earning money in order to secure a marriage than joining militant organizations. Thus, findings here indicate that brideprice deserves further analysis in future works when comprehensive data collection efforts allow.

Regarding my “prevent” theory, which I explore in Hypothesis 3, model results fail to support this argument. Female political leadership, measured here through both legislators and government ministers, does not appear to have an impact on terrorist incidents or groups; the variables do not achieve statistical significance in any models. This is a surprising finding, as others demonstrate substantive links between female political participation, leadership roles, and conflict mitigation. For instance, Caprioli (2000), Caprioli and Boyer (2001), and Regan and Paskeviciute (2003) find that increasing female legislative representation promotes international peace. Further, Melander (2005) finds that growing numbers of female parliament members lessen the intensity of civil conflict. Regarding the indirect relationship between political gender equality and conflict, Bussmann (2007) notes that female suffrage decreases the risk of civil conflict through improving both governance and economic development.

In addition, Salman (2015) finds that female membership in parliament is negatively related to domestic terrorism (though insignificant for transnational terrorism). Saiya, Zaihra, and Fidler (2017) also find a negative relationship between women’s political rights and attacks against the United States. However, Salman’s (2015) findings regarding the impact of political leadership on domestic as opposed to transnational terrorism along with null findings here

indicate that future works should further examine this variable to determine the ways in which political leadership may relate to civil or interstate conflict but not aspects of terrorism. Though I argue that political inclusion and traditional leadership roles for women are vital to prevent conflict, in some cases, as Schramm and Stark (2020) note, women under pressure to perform while in leadership or running for office may adopt masculine traits and combative stances as a means of consolidating power or gaining support, which could mitigate the impact of female political participation as otherwise predicted in much of the WPS literature. Such dynamics may arise in particular for women seeking executive leadership or national defense-oriented positions, as gender norms traditionally linked to the sexes typically associate men with “masculine” traits such as strength, virility, stoicism, intelligence, and aggressiveness often considered essential to such roles, while women are associated with the “feminine” traits of being weak, caring, unintelligent, emotional, and dovish (Tickner 1992; Schramm and Stark 2020).

Finally, for Hypothesis 4, which sought to evaluate the effect of multidimensional aspects of women’s rights on terrorism, neither economic nor political rights appear to relate significantly to terrorism despite findings in the literature which link these to a reduction in terrorism (Harris and Milton 2016; Saiya, Zaihra, and Fidler 2017). While these findings also appear to contradict Hypotheses 2 and 3 regarding economic and political empowerment, respectively, the lack of findings for political rights is in line with other results for Hypothesis 3 as described above, and other economic variables lend support for Hypothesis 2, signifying that female economic participation may act as a greater deterrent to terrorism than extension of economic rights. Taken together with my findings on the impact of agency, legal rights, and social rights for women on terrorism, this may suggest that of the three types of rights included in the CIRI full rights index, social rights are the strongest drivers in reducing terrorism. Finally,

Hypothesis 4 is contradicted by findings for the travel-related components of the agency index; as indicated previously, these findings require further study to determine the ways in which freedom of movement as opposed to other agency-related measures, including household and family dynamics, may affect terrorist incidents and groups.

As noted, several control variables display strongly robust effects in the models on terrorist incidents and groups. Among these, state capacity, prior conflict, polity (and its quadratic term), and GDP per capita exhibit significant relationships with terrorism which have precedent in the literature. As anticipated, relative impacts on terrorism incidents and groups are greater for several control variables, including polity, prior conflict, and state capacity, in comparison to my variables of interest, with incidence rate ratios for these controls exceeding the rate changes effected by my explanatory variables in the models. While control variables for regions do not produce robust effects in the models, for the Europe/Central Asia and MENA regions, these variables tend to produce relatively strong substantive effects as demonstrated by IRRs, while effects are subdued for the sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia/South Asia/Pacific regions. In addition, though ethnic fractionalization does not appear to relate consistently to terrorism, relatively large IRRs reveal a substantive relationship with terrorism in those cases where ethnic fractionalization demonstrates a statistically significant effect.

These findings indicate strong impacts on terrorism for these variables which dovetail with previous research but do not fully eclipse the relative impacts of variables related to gender equality, several of which also present as robust and highly statistically significant and have the potential to cut rates of terrorist incidents and groups by half in some cases. These findings indicate that my variables of interest matter in the margins at a minimum; while other variables such as national capability and prior conflict may produce greater relative impacts on terrorism,

gender inequality can also contribute to the number of attacks that occur and groups that form for a given state. Thus, improving aspects of female empowerment can reinforce state stability and security as well as save lives.

As a means of clarifying the causal pathways between my “pull,” “push,” and “prevent” theories and terrorism output, in the next chapter I conduct a case study examining the impact of patriarchy in Nigeria on the emergence of the terror organization Boko Haram, with particular focus on differences in gender equality between the country’s North and South regions. This case study allows for a closer look at the ways in which the variables of interest in my models relate to terrorism in a specific case over time, relying on data from sources such as GTD, WDI, state and local authorities, international and local media sources, and academic researchers. I highlight the ways in which the case study findings diverge from the findings of my models in this chapter and provide evidence of possible salience for the relationship between gender inequality and terrorism regarding other potential variables of interest as described above. This case study acts as an “on the ground” look linking the status of women to the growth of terror organizations and the number of attacks for which a state may be at risk as argued in my “pull, “push,” and “prevent” theories, and is particularly timely as Boko Haram has become one of the most prolific and deadly terrorist organizations worldwide and organized non-state violence continues to wreak havoc on the overall stability of one of Africa’s most populous and wealthiest states.

Chapter 4: A Case Study Exploring the Impact of Nigerian Patriarchy on the Emergence of Boko Haram

Introduction

Building upon the findings of the previous chapter, this work seeks to determine the extent to which gender inequality creates favorable conditions for terrorist violence through a case study exploring the ways in which patriarchy in Nigeria has contributed to the rise of the terrorist organization Boko Haram. It also suggests ways that such violence may be mitigated by gender parity initiatives. As I will discuss in this case study, patriarchal societies such as Nigeria: generate norms of subjugation, dehumanization, and coercion which precipitate violent action on the part of groups seeking political change or control; experience economic underdevelopment and distortions which favor recruitment to terrorist organizations; and overlook creative solutions to tensions and conflicts by reducing women's contributions in politics. These reflect the theory of "pull," "push," and "prevent" factors introduced in Chapter 2 which influence the emergence and prevalence of terrorism in patriarchal environments.

Where gender inequality prevails in Nigeria, terrorism has grown in the state, producing one of the most destructive terrorist organizations worldwide. Described as a "Manichaeist fundamentalist ideology constructed around Salafism," Boko Haram is an Islamist terrorist organization operating primarily in Nigeria (Akinola 2015, 3). Founded around 2002 and beginning militant operations in approximately 2008, most of its attacks are domestic in nature. However, other states in the region have also been targeted, including Niger, Cameroon, Chad, and Burkina Faso (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START] 2021). Boko Haram gained worldwide attention in 2014 when its members raided a girls' school and kidnapped over 200 predominantly Christian girls, many of whom have yet to be recovered (United States Department of State 2019b). Boko Haram has committed over 2,000

terrorist attacks²⁷ to date, killed thousands, and displaced millions in the region (START 2021; United States Department of State 2019b). Drawing recruits and supporters from Nigeria, surrounding states, diasporas, and other regions around the world, the group has shown an ability to act as a potent transnational organization.

As this study will demonstrate, Boko Haram's emergence is intricately tied to the patriarchal culture of its host state. Below, I explain my case selection criteria, briefly restate my theory, examine the case of Nigeria and Boko Haram, and conclude with overall findings, future research ideas, alternative explanations and counterarguments, and a brief discussion of gender parity initiatives in Nigeria with potential for reducing conflict in the region.

Selection of Case

Following a process of narrowing relevant cases of terrorist organizations for study, I produced a list of potential cases, using attack and organization data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (START 2021). This process used the following criteria: 1) The organization must be currently active,²⁸ 2) The organization must have 5 years²⁹ or more of activity, 3.) The organization must appear on the U.S. State Department Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list,³⁰ 4) The organization must have committed both domestic and interstate attacks,³¹ 5) The organization must have committed more than 25 attacks total in its active time period,³² and 6) The organization must have committed attacks against 3 or more states.³³ These criteria provided

²⁷ According to GTD data, Boko Haram is responsible for 2,340 unambiguous terror attacks; including ambiguous events increases the attack total to 2,665 (START 2021).

²⁸ This criterion restricts the list of cases to those which are relevant in the current time period due to ongoing activity (within the last three years) and thus a focus of current or future counterterrorism initiatives.

²⁹ This criterion restricts the list of cases to those which are sustained organizations which represent an ongoing risk to states.

³⁰ This criterion restricts cases to those which the United States has designated as a threat to U.S. national security, indicating a likelihood of foreign counterterrorism initiatives to address the threat.

³¹ This criterion restricts cases to those organizations which aspire to represent a threat to multiple states.

³² This criterion restricts cases to those which represent a substantive threat to states.

³³ This criterion restricts cases to those in which the organization represents a deliberate, significant regional or global threat, which will increase the likelihood of state-sponsored counterterrorism initiatives.

a list of several potential cases (full list provided in Table 14 in the Appendix). From this list, I have selected a case for this case study for the purposes of evaluating the causal mechanisms underlying my theory, providing a more granular examination of my variables, and exploring the ways in which the findings of the previous chapter's statistical analyses are supported or not in a particular case, including anomalous findings from the models (such as the lack of influence of female political leadership on terrorism). Through this case study, I will demonstrate the presence of substantial gender inequality in Nigeria followed by the emergence of Boko Haram. I compare regional gender differences in Nigeria between the North and South which have significantly shaped the rise and character of the organization. In addition, the case of Boko Haram offers both a sufficient time frame to observe changes in trends and numerous attacks against multiple states, providing substantial data to analyze patterns of activity.

Gender Inequality and Terrorism

To briefly restate my theories and hypotheses, I argue that terrorist groups such as Boko Haram are likely to form in gender-unequal societies due to several factors, which I refer to as “pull,” “push,” and “prevent” factors. Regarding the “pull” factor, patriarchal societies are characterized by strict gender roles for men and women that reinforce norms of subjugation, dehumanization, and coercion in the pursuit of political power. Where women are disempowered, norms of discrimination and violence performed for political gain take root throughout society, resulting not in normal political competition, but in asymmetric campaigns of terrorism designed to take political power and resources by force while targeting the most vulnerable in society. Thus, my first hypothesis derived from this “pull” argument is as follows:

Hypothesis 1: Increasing women's social autonomy will reduce the numbers of terrorist incidents and terrorist organizations.

In order to examine this hypothesis in this case, I continue to focus on factors from Chapter 3 which operationalize the social rights, status, and autonomy of women, in particular regarding abilities to receive education and avoid reproductive burdens, both of which are often determinant in one's upward mobility and independence in society. For education measures, I examine school enrollment and completion rates for females as well as literacy rates. To measure reproductive burdens, I use fertility rates for female adults and adolescents.

Such environments, because women are neglected in the labor force, typically lead to extensive economic inequality and underdevelopment. Depressed economic conditions resulting from women's absence from the workforce increase financial motivations for joining terrorist organizations which provide alternative sources of income that help men fulfill traditional breadwinner roles and circumvent the economic pressures of marriage market distortions such as brideprice. The various ill effects of economic underdevelopment resulting from gender inequality therefore represent a "push" factor incentivizing terrorist violence. My second hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 2: Increasing women's economic empowerment will reduce the numbers of terrorist incidents and terrorist organizations.

To test this hypothesis, I continue to focus on factors operationalizing female economic empowerment and marriage market distortions. For economic measures, I examine labor participation and unemployment rates for females as well as types of jobs and income levels. For marriage market distortions, I examine the effect of brideprice dynamics.

Finally, women's political leadership produces a "prevent" factor which inhibits conflict. Women's exclusion from public life precludes their involvement in politics and security matters, where both resources that can aggravate tensions and negotiation or peacebuilding initiatives are

debated and decided; the absence of women reduces the available pool of ideas and contributions for such endeavors, leading to stagnation and corruption which also increase the likelihood of organized violence. Prohibitions on women in political roles limits diversity of opinion and hinders creative solutions to disputes, increasing the likelihood that tensions will boil over into violent conflicts. My third hypothesis derived from this “prevent” argument is:

Hypothesis 3: Increasing women’s political leadership roles will reduce the numbers of terrorist incidents and terrorist organizations.

To test this hypothesis, I operationalize women’s political leadership through female legislators and female government ministers as in the previous chapter.

The prior arguments and hypotheses refer to manifestations of gender inequality in terms of female participation in socioeconomic and political arenas. It is also important to examine the thresholds societies set for entrance into public life for women; the extent to which women are granted equal rights to participate in these arenas is indicative of the intrinsic value of women in society as well as the extent of their legal protections and freedoms. Therefore, my final hypothesis examines the concomitant effects of the above arguments regarding economic, political, and social rights for women:

Hypothesis 4: Increases in comprehensive measures of women’s social, economic, and political rights will result in declines in both terrorism incidents and organizations.

To examine this hypothesis, as in Chapter 3, I focus on combinations of factors substantiating female agency and legal rights, which involve several aspects of political, economic, and social rights. Regarding agency, these include equal abilities with men to obtain divorces or inherit, to travel freely, to bank, and to work in the same industry, among others. For legal rights, I examine women’s equal ability to inherit, to own property and assets, to access

credit, and receive equal pay, as well as the impact of legislation against sexual harassment and domestic violence. I also examine economic, political, and social rights, including employment discrimination, voting rights, and bodily autonomy, among others.

One way in which this study hopes to contribute to the literature is by determining, in conjunction with the findings of the previous chapter, which aspects of women's empowerment and gender gaps in socioeconomic and political areas are theoretically and substantively relevant in terms of affecting terrorism. We should explore not just how gender equality is tied to terrorism, but also the most important political and socioeconomic gender factors in that relationship, and which means are most likely to improve those factors. To do so, I examine here the impact of gender inequality on the formation and function of one of the deadliest and most prolific terrorist organizations operating today – Boko Haram.

In the following work I conduct a case study exploring the environment in which Boko Haram developed and operates and the ways in which patriarchy in Nigeria have led to terrorist violence in the country, with special focus on the relationship between Boko Haram's rise and differences between Northern and Southern Nigeria in terms of women's rights. I follow with a review of findings, including socioeconomic and political factors which appear to be most salient, as well as alternative explanations and counterarguments. I close with a discussion of future research ideas and efforts at the international, national, state, and local levels to address gender inequality in Nigeria which may have subsequent counterterrorism effects.

Nigeria

Nigeria's history is fraught with conflict, and women's development in Nigeria is intricately tied to this history. Nigeria³⁴ was formed as a unified state in 1914 when Great Britain

³⁴ See Figure 12 in the Appendix for a map of Nigeria.

combined Northern and Southern protectorates in the region established in the decades prior into a single territory (Ade Ajayi et al., n.d.-b). Nigeria has since become the most populous state with the largest economy in Africa, financed primarily through oil. However, national statistics regarding Nigeria's wealth belie serious disparities between the state's Northern and Southern regions (generally aligned with the former colonial protectorates) and among its six geopolitical zones,³⁵ and Nigeria has struggled for decades with its legacy of colonialism, including recurring ethnic and religious-based violence, widespread inequality and poverty, and a patchwork of contradictory, discriminatory, and loosely-enforced laws throughout the state.

Nigeria's colonial rulers instituted a system of local governance with British oversight, an export-based economy which relied on cash crops, and social and political structures which fragmented Nigerians (Ade Ajayi et al., n.d.-b). Western cultural, educational, and religious institutions were introduced primarily in Southern regions, as the British generally allowed Muslim leaders with long-established power bases in the North to rule indirectly (though with increasingly circumscribed authority) in those areas; this bifurcation created tensions and differing trajectories of socioeconomic development between the North and the South with long-ranging consequences for Nigeria as a whole (International Crisis Group 2010). Post-WWII, the Nigerian independence movement began in earnest, and once again, the Southern region, now divided into Eastern and Western provinces, realized autonomy from Great Britain more quickly than the underdeveloped North (Ade Ajayi et al., n.d.-b).

Ethnic and religious tensions permeated the road to formal independence in 1960 (Ade Ajayi et al., n.d.-a). These destabilizing divisions erupted again post-independence, with coups, military regimes, secessionist threats, and regional inter-fighting characterizing much of the next

³⁵ See Figure 13 in the Appendix for a map outlining Nigeria's six geopolitical zones.

few decades for Nigeria, despite the establishment of civilian rule in 1979. Conflict continued to shape Nigeran politics at the turn of the millennium, including the introduction of Sharia law in Northern parts of the country, the founding of Boko Haram in the Northeast, and the eruption of militancy in the Delta region over oil profits (Ade Ajayi et al., n.d.-a). Nigerian democracy remained fragile, as the 2007 and 2011 presidential elections attracted claims of electoral fraud and protests, respectively. Additionally, Goodluck Jonathan's presidency (elected in 2011), sparked controversy by violating a long-standing tradition in which the presidency traded between a Northerner and a Southerner as a means of reducing tension between the predominantly Muslim North and Christian South (Ade Ajayi et al., n.d.-a; Kaplan 2012). These religious lines are generally reflected in ethnic groupings in the country, with the Hausa, Fulani, and Kanuri ethnic groups, who are largely Muslim, concentrated in the North, and the Igbo, who are mostly Christian, and the Yoruba, who are divided among Christians and Muslims, located in the South, among other smaller ethnic groups (UN Women 2018).

Though heading the strongest economy in Africa, Jonathan's presidency would be hampered by the explosive growth and violence of Boko Haram, along with issues of corruption, poverty, and inequality, spurred by an unstable economy dependent on market fluctuations in oil prices. These issues ultimately defeated Jonathan at the polls in the 2015 presidential election in favor of Muhammadu Buhari, a former 1980s-era military leader; this constituted the first peaceful turnover of civilian power in the country (Ade Ajayi et al., n.d.-a). Though re-elected in 2019, Buhari continues to struggle with worsening violence in Nigeria, attracting ridicule by claiming multiple times since his first election that the state has made substantial progress against Boko Haram and that the group has been "defeated" or "beaten" (Ade Ajayi et al., n.d.-a; Giles 2019; Mumbere 2018, n.p.). While Boko Haram's activities are curtailed from their peak in

2015, the group remains active, particularly in the Northeast and Lake Chad regions, and evidence indicates an increase in insurgent activity since 2019 (Giles 2019; Miller 2020).

Patriarchy in Nigeria

It is in this troubled history that Nigerian women have struggled to enjoy political and socioeconomic agency while suffering disproportionately from the effects of poverty and violence. Nigeria is widely described as a patriarchal society, though authors differ on whether women's roles were more circumscribed before or after colonization; some argue that women in Nigeria exercised more freedom and autonomy in pre-colonial times, while others dispute this bifurcated characterization of women's development (Makama 2013; Ake 1996; Bako and Syed 2018; Umukoro 2014; Mofoluwawo 2014; Chegwe 2014; Para-Mallam 2010; House-Midamba and Ekechi 1995). In any case, authors argue that modern Nigeria, particularly in the North, is predisposed against gender equality in numerous ways, through limiting female decision-making, education, economic and political participation, and freedom of movement, among others. Hindered by deeply ingrained stereotypes regarding gender roles, strict and entrenched religious and cultural traditions, weak legal protections, inconsistent progress on women's rights, and regional suspicion of alleged "Western" norms and international conventions, women and girls in Nigeria have struggled for years to make substantive gains against their male counterparts in both the private and public spheres (Makama 2013; Bako and Syed 2018; Mofoluwawo 2014; Chegwe 2014; Para-Mallam 2010).

The extent to which Nigerian society is characterized by patriarchy is also reflected in the state's ranking in the World Economic Forum's (2019) Global Gender Gap Report 2020, where Nigeria currently ranks 128 out of 153 states on the Global Gender Gap Index, scoring low on factors such as politics (#146), health status (#135), and education (#145), despite marked improvements in economic gaps (#38); among sub-Saharan African states, Nigeria ranks near the

bottom in the Global Gender Gap Index, at 27 out of 34 states. Similarly, in the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Index, which examines linkages between women's empowerment and peace, Nigeria ranks 145 out of 167 states, placing it in the bottom quintile (Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security and Peace Research Institute Oslo [GIWPS/PRI] 2019).

The Nigerian woman's unequal status is created through patriarchal constructions of gender roles, informed and enforced in part by cultural tradition and religion, generating a dynamic in which women are less valued than men; this creates a general social preference for boys and dominance of men (Bako and Syed 2018). Such interpretations of gender label women as weak based on claims of biological difference or cultural stereotypes; argue against notions of women as heads of household or decision-makers; exercise violent control of women's bodies and sexuality through practices such as female genital mutilation/circumcision (FGM/FGC) or widowhood rites which subject widows to humiliation and physical abuse upon the death of their spouses, including forced remarriage; and in some areas, confine women to the home or mandate physical separation of the genders in public, further limiting their agency (Federal Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development [FMWASD] 2006; Bako and Syed 2018; Makama 2013; Mofoluwawo 2014; Para-Mallam 2010; Adebayo 2020a). This means that men make most decisions for Nigerian women regarding their access to healthcare, education, jobs, and political participation (Chegwe 2014). As may be expected, violence against women in Nigeria is widespread, underreported, and under-investigated (Chegwe 2014).

As Alabi et al. (2014, 393) state, "Being born and growing up as a girl in a developing society like Nigeria is almost like a curse due to contempt and ignominy [sic] treatment received from the family, the school and the society at large." Early on, girls face significant obstacles to parity: "...most girls wake up earlier and go to bed later than boys; they have less time for

homework and recreation, and are more likely to be pulled out of school in the event of financial hardship and/or for marriage” (Para-Mallam 2010, 470). The comprehensive nature of Nigeria’s patriarchy is supported by Mofoluwawo (2014, 170), who argues, “In Nigeria, women are underrepresented not only in the political sphere but also in decision making within the private sector, at the village level and in the civil society. At the local level, men usually dominate positions of power, including religious and traditional leaders, local politicians and village elders.” Further, as women advance in society, they are typically double burdened by domestic duties in the private sphere as well as the demands of formal labor or political positions in the public sphere (Makama 2013). Even in areas where women’s work is essential, their influence is limited by prevailing patriarchal norms; for example, women constitute a clear majority of the labor force in agriculture and food production Nigeria, making enormous contributions to the economy and mitigation of hunger in their communities, but are shut out of decision and policy-making on the subject (Ogunlela and Mukhtar 2009).

The status of women in Nigeria today must be understood through the context in which patriarchal attitudes at the micro and macro levels are reinforced through religion and tradition and codified through the convoluted tripartite system of English, customary, and Islamic laws developed when Nigeria instituted a federalist system with significant space for regional legal differences. As Chegwe (2014) argues, the notion of liberal feminism in Nigeria as a panacea for gender inequality tends to ignore the crux of the problem for many Nigerian women, which is a lack of consistent legal protection in the private sphere, where tradition and religion may become the prisms through which treatment of women is constituted. The static and strict nature of many religious norms, whether part of Christianity, Islam, or other religions, renders progress toward gender parity a delicate process – according to Para-Mallam (2010), such norms tend to militate

inherently against fundamental change. The Nigerian legal system is complicated by the juxtaposition of its federalist, secular nature and international legal obligations against both a common law system and a myriad of regionally imposed customary and Islamic laws based on tradition and religious edict (Makama 2013; Bako and Syed 2018). Several acts at the federal level aim to protect women, but Islamic and customary law exemptions allow individual states' laws to trump those protections for women in many places (Bako and Syed 2018). Additionally, national policy contains important gaps in terms of women's rights, leading to significant regional and state variation in gender equality.

Legal Protections for Women

In terms of federal law, Chapter 2 of the 1999 Constitution guarantees women legal equality and protection against discrimination, specifically sex-based discrimination (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999; Bako and Syed 2018). According to Chegwe (2014), while the Nigerian Constitution's liberal approach to gender equality may seem laudable, such an approach modeled on the assumption of equal outcomes based on the formal declaration of equal treatment under the law fails to account for instances in which women might be better served under sex or gender-specific laws which allow for certain protections for females, as in South Africa. The Constitution is also contradictory in its approach to gender equality – for instance, while Chapter 2 proclaims equality among all Nigerian citizens, Chapter 3 only allows men to confer Nigerian citizenship on their wives; Nigerian women may not extend Nigerian citizenship to their husbands through marriage (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999; Chegwe 2014).

However, in 2006 Nigeria also instituted the National Gender Policy (NGP), which promised further action on women's rights as a result of the failure of Nigeria's Constitution to ensure full gender equality, including the right to education for girls and women, expanded female political representation, and the mainstreaming of gender issues in all areas, dependent on

a holistic approach to implementation that would necessitate active participation by government officials, business leaders, and religious figures, among others (Para-Mallam 2010; FMWASD 2006). The NGP points out the practical shortcomings of the 1999 Constitution regarding realizing true parity for women in the context of the divided nature of Nigeria’s legal system: “Section 43 permits both male and female Nigerians to own and acquire movable and immovable property. In spite of this, a large proportion of women in Nigeria are barred from owning land by customary laws of inheritance” (FMWASD 2006, n.p.). The NGP specifically notes the requirement of “confronting patriarchy” in meeting its goals and sets a range of objectives and targets for achievement (FMWASD 2006, n.p.). For example, by 2015, the NGP called for 35% political representation for females in Nigeria’s elected and appointed offices and sought to lower maternal mortality rates in the country by the same percentage, though the country has not yet achieved these benchmarks (FMWASD 2006).

While the NGP calls for addressing stereotypical attitudes and practices toward women and girls at all levels in society as a means of achieving gender equality, other national, regional, customary, and religious laws and codes in Nigeria present significant obstacles to such a goal. For example, while the Constitution specifically calls for policies prohibiting gender-based discrimination in pay, corresponding national legislation is lacking, and no national laws banning workplace sexual harassment exist, though the Senate recently passed a bill criminalizing sexual harassment at universities (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999; Adejugbe and Adejugbe 2018; Bro and McCaslin 2019; Adebayo 2020b). Nigeria’s Constitution empowers the National Industrial Court (NIC) to hear cases on employment-related sexual harassment, but the NIC, lacking relevant federal law, has instead looked to international conventions to which Nigeria is party, such as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women

(CEDAW), as well as the Nigerian Constitution to assess these cases (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2011; Adejugbe and Adejugbe 2018). The Nigerian Labour Act of 2004 does not explicitly address workplace sex discrimination and may not extend to informal labor, where nearly 80% of Nigerian women work, substantiating Chegwe's (2014) fears of the inadequacies of a liberal feminist approach to legal protection from discrimination in terms of advocacy for gender-blind laws and policies (Makama 2013; FMWASD 2006; Adejugbe and Adejugbe 2018).

Women face restrictions on working in the mining industry as well as overnight (Bro and McCaslin 2019; Federal Republic of Nigeria 1971). Women also encounter discrimination working within the police and military forces; females face barriers to employment with the Nigeria Police Force based on age, marital status, and pregnancy. Until a court ruling prohibited the practice, Nigerian policewomen were forced to seek approval to marry, which was given only after successful investigations of the prospective grooms (Adejugbe and Adejugbe 2018). Nigerian women may also face limitations in advancement through the ranks of the Nigerian military given recent rumors of rules barring them from combat courses (Ogundipe 2017).

Regarding violence against women, recent attempts to pass laws which would address both definitions of and punishments for sexual assault and rape, such as the Sexual Offences Act, passed by the National Assembly in 2015, have attracted controversy; the Sexual Offences Act caused outrage over the convoluted language of the law, which seemed to suggest that the age of consent would be lowered to 11 years of age (Ezeamalu 2015a, 2015b). The House of Representatives introduced a follow-up bill in 2019 which sought to address the issue by affirming the legal age of consent as 18 years of age (Ntoka 2019). While the Violence Against Persons (Prohibition) Act (VAPP), passed in 2015, does criminalize acts including spousal rape and battery, harmful widowhood practices, FGM/FGC, and stalking, the VAPP is only applicable

to the Federal Capital Territory, including the national capital of Abuja (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2015). Only 15 states have moved to adopt the VAPP thus far (Durojaiye 2020). Additionally, some regard the VAPP as insufficient, as rape and sexual assault victims remain burdened by fees for investigations and court cases, and states lack adequate testing mechanisms and shelter and rehabilitation facilities (Yahaya 2019).

The lack of national legal support for women in terms of violence has had negative repercussions in both filings and outcomes of criminal cases for rape and assault. Makama (2013) argues that crimes against women often receive less media and police attention, and the fear of ostracism keeps women from reporting many crimes. Even when women do report these cases, they must overcome poor police training and a patriarchal legal system which favors male defendants in order to obtain convictions. Such a situation becomes “a man’s trial but a woman’s tribulation” (Makama 2013, 126). Higher courts can be hostile and confusing places for women seeking redress in Nigeria as well: In several cases regarding inheritance of property for daughters and wives, “...the Supreme Court led the way in subjugating women by steadily upholding patently discriminatory customary laws against women” (Chegwe 2014, 69). However, Chegwe (2014) also notes more sympathetic Court of Appeal rulings regarding female inheritance of property in recent years.

Religious and Customary Law

In 2016, the national parliament struck down a proposed law, the “Gender and Equal Opportunities Bill,” which would have extended women’s property inheritance and political rights, among others, due to objections from Muslim and Christian lawmakers (Bako and Syed 2018; BBC News 2016). Such a deferential approach to religious and traditional views is enshrined in Nigeria through numerous customary and religious laws in various regions or states which can complement or, in many cases, contradict national law on women’s rights. While just

over 45% of the Nigerian population is Christian and concentrated generally in the South, approximately 53% of the population is Muslim and located mainly in the North (Central Intelligence Agency 2020; Kaplan 2012). One can see the impact of the religious divide in Nigeria not simply through the lens of geography, but also through differences in state law. Islamic, or Sharia law, is a significant source of law in Northern Nigeria, and customary law also incorporates aspects of Christianity or other traditions in other regions. For many women in Nigeria, the influence of religious beliefs on regional law has worked to the detriment of gender equality in these areas: “Because religion is associated with the sacred as well as divine origins, dominant groups often use it to forestall resistance and legitimate their authority” (Para-Mallam 2010, 463). As Para-Mallam (2010) argues, for example, patriarchal attitudes within Christianity tend to relegate women in predominantly Christian regions to the private sphere and use the doctrine of female submission to perpetuate lack of female agency; for example, FGM/FGC is thought to be more widespread in Nigeria’s Christian South (UNICEF n.d.; Kaplan 2012).

Similarly, Makama (2013, 127) states “Sharia as religious law gives central place to paternalistic interpretation to women’s appropriate roles and socio-political arrangement of the society.” Post-democratization, some Northern states in Nigeria have adopted partial Sharia law for civil and criminal cases, and others full Sharia law (Bourbeau, Umar, and Bauman 2019). Though Sharia law was introduced in the North in part as a means of gaining popular support for political office by its proponents, its faster, more accessible, and less costly court proceedings, harsh penalties for crimes, strict social rules, and comprehensive legal codes covering marriage, inheritance, and property disputes have appeal for many where it exists (Makama 2013; FMWASD 2006; Bourbeau, Umar, and Bauman 2019; Imam 2004).

There are conflicting reports regarding how women fare under Sharia in the case of marriage or family disputes. Sada, Adamu, and Ahmad (2006) note that women under Sharia law in Northern Nigeria enjoy the right to inherit and to own and use wealth with autonomy. The NGP (FMWASD 2006, n.p.) states "...Islamic laws tend to be more accommodating of women's concerns in cases pertaining to family/marital break -up." Women are also more likely to turn to Sharia courts, rather than conventional courts, for domestic matters and report relatively high levels of satisfaction with the courts in some states with Sharia law (Bourbeau, Umar, and Bauman 2019). Sharia courts in Nigeria, according to Imam (2004), have improved on affirming female rights in inheritance, marital disputes, and child custody cases for decades.

Some, however, argue that Sharia law creates a hostile environment for women, including a segregated system in which women and men are kept physically separate, females are denied rights under the law, and discriminatory treatment of women goes unpunished (Imam 2004; Makama 2013; Bako and Syed 2018; Chegwe 2014). Chegwe (2014) argues that Sharia limits the ability of women to divorce; men acquire divorces more easily under Sharia, while women often must return their dowries or brideprices in order to obtain divorces and face difficulties gaining custody of children (Sada, Adamu, and Ahmad 2006). Imam (2004, 6) notes that Sharia laws tend to exhibit embedded bias against women in criminal proceedings: "The diya (monetary compensation in cases of hurt, if the victim or his/her family are willing to accept this instead of the stated punishment) to be paid for Muslim men is higher than that of Muslim women (or non-Muslims), although qisas (retaliatory punishment) can be applied regardless of gender." The courts value male testimony more than female, and in cases of rape, female victims must either provide two direct witnesses to the alleged crime or secure a confession from the alleged rapist to achieve a conviction, while males who are accused of rape may avoid conviction

by simply swearing before the court that they did not commit the crime (Bourbeau, Umar, and Bauman 2019; Imam 2004). Further, women who are unable to prove a rape occurred may be charged with zina, or crimes of “illicit sexual intercourse” (Imam 2004, 6).

Under the auspices of Sharia, officials implement dress codes for women, exclude females from certain modes of transportation or equal freedom of movement, and prohibit sex education (Imam 2004). Local officials known as hisbah also monitor citizens’ adherence to Sharia laws, taking on a range of enforcement roles depending on the state. Critics have argued that hisbah groups focus excessively on policing the conduct and appearances of women, at times physically punishing women thought to be in breach of the law. Women are also disproportionately underrepresented as staff members and judges in Nigerian Sharia courts, though they have participated in hisbah (Bourbeau, Umar, and Bauman 2019). Sharia also generally discourages female leadership in politics, though women can hold lower-level political offices (Sada, Adamu, and Ahmad 2006).

In addition to religious authorities, customary and family laws, traditions, and ethnic cleavages also work to shape the regional legal landscape and limit women’s agency throughout Nigeria. In recognition of this, the NGP (FMWASD 2006, n.p.) set a goal to “Eliminate all harmful cultural, religious and social gender- biased practices, which reproduce gender inequalities by 2020.” Regarding family dynamics, several legal systems and traditions seek to regulate women’s access to and rights regarding marriage and divorce, leading to major regional differences across the country and creating significant difficulties for women in the cases of widowhood rites and inheritance (FMWASD 2006). For instance, brideprice traditions are strong in Nigeria, (a ranking of “8” on the Brideprice/Dowry scale in the WomanStats Database), generating expectations that grooms and their families will provide money or assets to brides’

guardians to secure a marriage; these arrangements arguably commodify marriages and limit female autonomy (WomanStats Project 2021). Further, according to Makama (2013, 126), “under some traditional customary law systems, especially in south east Nigeria, [a woman] is one of the chattels to be ‘inherited’ after the death of her husband.”

Numerous contentious issues arise in the case of inheritance for widows or divorcees, who typically experience pushback from families or the courts as they attempt to assert their rights. In the Southeastern states of Enugu and Ebonyi, property of a deceased male traditionally reverts to his family rather than a wife or daughter when he passes, though a 2001 law passed in Enugu state directly related to widows’ rights may mitigate this to some extent (Bako and Syed 2018; FMWASD 2019). As noted previously, the Nigerian Supreme Court has upheld some customary laws preventing women and daughters from inheriting in the case of no male heirs or disagreement with the deceased’s family (Chegwe 2014).

Ethnic and family ties can also affect the status of women; as the NGP (FMWASD 2006, n.p.) notes, “The most pervasive and severe violations of women’s rights are frequently those associated with the unwritten traditional norms and practices of Nigeria’s numerous and diverse ethnic groups.” Mofoluwawo (2014, 173) and Chegwe (2014) point to the existence of a “son of the soil” dynamic in Nigeria which denies women rights as a consequence of marrying into a different ethnic group or clan. While kinship ties are less significant to the Kanuri, the Hausa and Fulani in the North maintain patrilineal systems frequently involving marriages among relatives (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica 2010; The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica 2017; The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica 2019). Bako and Syed (2018) also reference anti-woman elements of the customary laws of the Igbo in the South (FMWASD 2006). Thus, religious, ethnic, and cultural dimensions underlying many of the marked differences between

federal and state laws as well as among states indicate that states are better-positioned relative to the federal government in terms of meaningfully affecting the status of Nigerian women, as the NGP (FMWASD 2006) acknowledges.

Economic participation

Economic participation is one of the areas in which the factors described above, from embedded patriarchal norms to contradictory legal systems, discriminatory religious and cultural rites to harmful ethnic and family practices, militate simultaneously and dispiritingly against Nigerian women, with downstream effects for the Nigerian economy as a whole: According to one report, Nigeria's economy could improve by nearly one-quarter by 2025 if economic participation were gender equal (Bro and McCaslin 2019). Women face barriers related to entry into the formal economy, leading to widespread unpaid and underpaid work (some estimates find that as many as half of Nigerian women engage in unpaid labor), unemployment, and vulnerable employment (British Council Nigeria 2012). A 2010 survey indicated that more women were engaged in unpaid informal labor than men (NBS 2010). Women are also often disproportionately unemployed, underemployed, or engaged in unpaid work at home due to pregnancy and child-rearing responsibilities (FMWASD 2019; British Council Nigeria 2012).

While the World Bank (2021) estimates that women made up just under 45% of the country's total labor force in 2019, the ratio of women to men in labor force participation rate has hovered near 82% since 1990, reaching a peak of 86% in 2005 before declining starting in 2011. Female labor force participation rates similarly reveal a reduction in the number of women working from approximately 55% in 1990 to just over 47% in 2018, while the global average stands at 50% (World Bank 2021). According to British Council Nigeria (2012, iii), "Nearly six million young women and men enter the labour market each year but only 10% are able to secure a job in the formal sector, and just one third of these are women." Similarly, women are

underrepresented with major employers such as the Federal Civil Service (FMWASD 2006). Women, whether single or married, fare worse than men in terms of employment, but single men are more than twice as likely to be employed than single women; the gap worsens between women, as single women are over 5 times less likely to be employed compared to married women, while single men are nearly 2.5 times less likely to be employed relative to married men (International Labor Organization 2020). Women's unemployment rates have outstripped males' since 2014, climbing over 9% in 2017; in 2019, female unemployment rates stood at 8.9% versus males at 7.4%, generally aligning with the average among all states for female unemployment (9.14) (World Bank 2021). For female youths, unemployment rates have doubled from approximately 8% to 17% since 1991, with dramatic increases from 2015-2016 (10-16%). The global average for female youth unemployment is slightly higher, at 18% (World Bank 2021).

Where they are formally employed, Nigerian women also face significant income disparities relative to men: "When the incomes of men and women with the same education levels are compared, women at every educational level earn less than their male counterparts and men with less education in some cases earn more than more educated female peers," though the pay gap declines for women at the highest levels of education (British Council Nigeria 2012, 15). In the sectors of agriculture, mining/quarrying, and public administration/social services, the gender pay gap is substantial – women earn approximately 40%, 45%, and 77% of male earnings in these fields, respectively. In the trade/business services sector, women receive a dismal 6% of men's average earnings per month (International Labor Organization 2020). While the number of female wage and salary workers in Nigeria has increased slightly from approximately 11% to 13% of female workers since 1991 (peaking just below 14% in 2011), these figures remain well below the average for female wage and salary workers among all states (approximately 54%).

The share of women employed as managers in Nigeria, approximately 29%, falls slightly below the mean for all states, at approximately 31% (World Bank 2021).

According to the NGP (FMWASD 2006, n.p.), “Women represent 87% of those employed in the service sector, which involves predominantly informal and unregulated forms of employment.” More women in Nigeria are turning to microenterprises to make a living, in which they own or work for a microbusiness; as many of these microbusinesses are also listed in the informal sector, this may create distortions in the labor market which belie the extent to which Nigerian women are engaged in labor, such as the high number of women thought to be unemployed or inactive in the economy (British Council Nigeria 2012; NBS 2010; World Bank 2021; FMWASD 2019). A 2010 survey showed that Nigerian women were more likely than men to both own and work for microenterprises, though many of these are considered “necessity-driven,” and therefore may not provide sufficient protection against poverty, income disparities, and underemployment (FMWASD 2019, 7; NBS 2010). Finally, compounding their economic woes, women have half the access to credit or loans that men enjoy (Makama 2013; Bako and Syed 2018; Ogunlela and Mukhtar 2009; British Council Nigeria 2012).

Education

Nigerian women are hindered in economic progress due not only to the double burdens in domestic duties as well as gender gaps in employment and pay they face, but also in lack of formal education and literacy. Though some data suggest that Nigerian women with lower levels of education are more likely to be employed than those who are more educated, women with higher levels of education tend to receive higher wages and exhibit narrower gender pay gaps (British Council Nigeria 2012). The high number of illiterate women in Nigeria suggests that many will struggle in the search for stable, formal employment and good wages. Just over 50% of Nigerian adult women were considered literate in 2018, while just over 70% of adult males

were literate; this reflects a general improvement for both since 1990 but remains well below the mean female literacy rate of approximately 76% for all states. Nearly 70% of female youths (aged 15-24) and 80% of male youths were considered literate in 2018, revealing an overall trend of increasing rates for females and stagnating rates for males since 1991, though female rates trail the global average for literacy among female youths significantly, at approximately 86%. Similarly, though illiteracy rates among female youths in Nigeria have declined slightly over the past few decades, 2018 figures still exceed the average for female youth illiteracy rates among all states, at 62% vs. 50% (World Bank 2021). Makama (2013) attributes gender gaps in literacy to domestic burdens and gender stereotypes which privilege male education over female.

More progress has been made on parity in school enrollment, particularly at the primary level; this is likely due at least in part to the 2003 Child Rights Act, which mandates free primary education for all (FMWASD 2019). For both male and female students, gross primary enrollment has fluctuated frequently over the years, but the gender parity index (GPI) has narrowed to .94 in 2016 from approximately .60 in 1970, reaching near parity in 2014 (World Bank 2021). In 2016, the last year of available data from the World Bank, males had a primary school enrollment (gross rate) of approximately 87% compared to approximately 82% for females; however, at no time has female enrollment exceeded that of males according to the available data. Female primary enrollment rates remain below the global average of 93%. Secondary education enrollment data is similarly volatile for both males and females, with lower enrollment rates overall; current (2016) secondary enrollment (gross)³⁶ rates rival that of the lowest primary enrollments recorded by the World Bank (2021) in the 1970s. Female secondary enrollment rates have risen from a low of nearly 3% in 1970 to a high of 53% in 2013; the 2016

³⁶ Net rates for secondary and tertiary enrollment rates are not available for Nigeria from the World Bank (2021). Therefore, I report gross enrollment rates here for these levels of education, as well as the primary level.

rate dipped to just below 40%, which leaves female secondary enrollment rates in Nigeria significantly trailing the average among all states (65%). In a similar pattern, male rates have grown from 6% in 1970 to nearly 60% in 2013, dropping to just over 44% in 2016. The gender gap is higher for secondary enrollment than for primary, with a GPI of .90 in 2016 for the former versus .94 for the latter; the GPI for secondary enrollment peaked at .91 in 2012, with a low of .35 in 1984 (World Bank 2021).

Tertiary enrollment rates demonstrate both the lowest enrollment rates across all education levels as well as the highest gender gap. In 1985, the female gross tertiary enrollment rate stood at just under 2%, while male enrollment reached 5%; in 2011, the last year of World Bank data, corresponding enrollment rates were approximately 8% and 12%, respectively; the global average female tertiary enrollment rate is much higher, at 27% (World Bank 2021). The GPI for tertiary enrollment has ranged from a low of .35 in 1985 to a high of .78 in 1999, with the 2011 rate dropping to just under .7. As with primary enrollment, female rates do not exceed that of males in either secondary or tertiary enrollment. Recent data indicate sustained or widening gender gaps in formal education, with gaps of 17%, 13%, and 31% in primary, secondary, and tertiary education, respectively, and less than 10% of women attending universities (World Economic Forum 2019). Females also face persistent threats of sexual harassment and violence in schools, further reducing enrollment rates (Para-Mallam 2010). In terms of women completing education levels, 2006 figures from the World Bank (2021) indicate that Nigerian females completed primary education at rates of approximately 52% compared to secondary education at 43%; these figures also lag behind global averages for these figures, at 75% and 57%, respectively.

Low enrollment rates and large gender gaps in higher education underlie some of the difficulties women face when navigating the economy in Nigeria. Though British Council Nigeria (2012, 21) argues that “women in the micro-enterprise sector tend to be better educated, and that more of them report vocational and graduate education compared to men,” Makama (2013) notes that far fewer women work in professions that require advanced education and training, such as medicine. The educational disparities between men and women also speak to the significant differences in income they report. The effect is likely cyclical in nature - women in poverty due to lack of education and employment can ill-afford to educate their children, perpetuating the poverty trap.

Healthcare

Lack of education can also make women especially vulnerable to negative healthcare outcomes and limit their decision-making capacity. Only 50.8% of adult Nigerian women reported making their own healthcare choices related to sexual practices and family planning in 2013, according to the World Bank (2021) data. Nigeria also has a high fertility rate, with 5.3 births per woman in 2018, dropping from 6.3 births in 1960, as well as a high birth rate, ranking 21 in the world with over 34 births per 1000 people (World Bank 2021; Central Intelligence Agency 2020). Adolescent fertility rates are similarly high, at approximately 105 births per 1,000 female youths in 2018, though this reflects a decline from 172 births in 1977. However, Nigerian adult and adolescent fertility rates remain well above the global averages for these figures, at 4.09 and 78, respectively (World Bank 2021).

Furthermore, Nigerian women often undergo FGM/FGC due to religious or cultural practices (Makama 2013). Though estimates of the number of females who have experienced FGM/FGC vary, evidence indicates that approximately 20-50% or more of women undergo genital cutting as part of traditional, ethnic, or religious rites (FMWASD 2006; (WomanStats

Project Database 2021). According to the NGP (FMWASD 2006, n.p.), “These practices have a devastating impact on the health and well-being of Nigerian women and girls and further undermine their progress and development,” limiting bodily autonomy, reducing sexual function and pleasure, and risking severe health outcomes, including death (Connor et al. 2016).

Violence Against Women

FGM/FGC is not the only type of violence that Nigerian women currently face. As previously noted, many women do not report gender-based violence and sexual assault due to Nigeria’s patriarchal culture, and domestic violence laws are lacking. Girls also face sexual violence in early marriage and as they attend school. “Nigeria is home to the largest number of child brides in Africa, with 23 million girls and women who were married in childhood” (UNICEF 2015, 5). The Constitution stipulates in reference to citizenship rights in Chapter 3 that 18 years of age constitutes adulthood, with a caveat that married women are automatically considered adults, paving the way for underage girls to be married (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). Lacking a universally adopted minimum marriage age law, over one-third of girls in Nigeria are married or have been married by age 19, and “nearly 22 per cent of married Nigerian women were betrothed by age 15, a figure that rises to 46 per cent by age 18” (Chegwe 2014, 71). As women are often treated as property in marriage and find themselves limited in their abilities to gain an education or enter the workforce due to domestic responsibilities such as childbearing, they also become vulnerable to domestic abuse.

As described previously, domestic violence laws in Nigeria are severely lacking in both scope and application due to patriarchal attitudes which imbue the laws, creating legal systems which often fail to punish or even sanction wife-beating as a normal part of marriage. The patriarchal attitudes which influence both society and law to see domestic violence as a normal part of intimate relationships also prevent many women and girls from reporting acts of domestic

abuse and sexual violence to officials for fear of rejection in their communities or maltreatment in courts (FMWASD 2019). As may be expected, many Nigerian women suffer from domestic or sexual violence: “Generally, nearly 3 in 10 Nigerian women have experienced physical violence by age 15 through either forced and early marriages or the physical, mental or sexual assault on a woman” according to National Demographic Health Survey data (FMWASD 2019, 23). Over 15% of women report sexual violence within relationships, and 2% of women report sexual violence from non-partners. Nearly half of girls in early marriages reported abuse. Those who are wealthy and educated are also more likely to have been abused. It is unclear why educated and wealthy women experience more abuse; it may be that these women are targeted because their education and wealth afford them a greater level of self-sufficiency than poorer, less educated women, though it may also be that wealthier, educated women are more aware of the harmful concept of domestic violence than less educated women, who may see this as expected behavior within a marriage or partnership due to embedded social norms.

Wives may also face abuse if they should become widowed (Chegwe 2014). Widowhood rites are widely practiced, particularly in the South among the Yoruba and Igbo, and can include severely abusive and dehumanizing aspects, such as seclusion and confinement, forced mourning, claims of being “unclean,” shaving of hair, public nudity, and loss of homes or jobs (Adebayo 2020a, n.p.; Akinbi 2015). At times, widows are forced to perform certain acts to disprove accusations of murdering the deceased, such as lying with the corpse or drinking water used to clean the corpse, and are threatened with ostracization and expulsion from their communities (Adebayo 2020a; Akinbi 2015). Widows may also be forced to remarry a member of their late husband’s family and often face obstacles to inheritance due to competing claims from their husband’s relatives (Adebayo 2020a; Akinbi 2015; Bako and Syed 2018; Makama

2013; Chegwe 2014). However, women with formal education, jobs, or wealth may be less likely to undergo the harshest types of widowhood rites (Akinbi 2015). Akinbi (2015, 68) argues many of these rituals stem not from culture or religion, but that “the death of a male member of the family offers an opportunity to the other male of the extended family to increase their holding of the scarce and inelastic commodity ‘land’.” Men whose wives die do not face the prospect of such degrading rites or inheritance conflicts (Akinbi 2015; Adebayo 2020a).

Political leadership

One way in which Nigerian women’s rates of violence, lack of access to healthcare, and inabilities to gain education or jobs could be addressed and mitigated is through political empowerment of women throughout the state. However, while some progress has been made in gaining national political positions for women in recent years, the progress is inconsistent and trends downward along with the rise of Boko Haram. Though many women in Nigeria vote, far fewer run for or achieve political office, and the numerous obstacles to their political empowerment include gender stereotypes, financial inequities, and threats of violence. For example, in 2015 the Independent National Electoral Commission created a Gender Policy to track electoral violence against women, and “the women’s situation room was established to track and document incidences of violence against women candidates, voters and in some cases, electoral officers,” indicating a significant violence problem for females attempting to participate in the political arena (FMWASD 2019, 35).

According to Nigeria’s Constitution, all adult Nigerian citizens regardless of sex or gender are eligible to participate in politics, vote, and join political parties (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999; Makama 2013). Though the NGP (FMWASD 2006) calls for policies to ensure greater female inclusion in Nigerian politics, including a 35% female quota in elected and appointed political bodies by 2015, Nigeria remains far from achieving that goal, particularly in

terms of elected positions for women (Para-Mallam 2010). Currently, Nigeria has one of the lowest rates of female parliamentarians in the world, ranking last among all sub-Saharan African states with just 7.2% seats in the House of Representatives held by women (IPU Parline 2020). After the 2019 National Assembly elections, where females comprised less than 15% of those running for office, women held less than 10% of the seats in either the Federal Senate (6.4%) or House of Representatives (3.5%), resulting in a rate of female representation in the national legislature at just over 3% compared to the global average of 17% (United States Department of State 2019a; FMWASD 2019; World Bank 2021). In 2015 elections, women achieved similar numbers for the Senate, and slightly higher numbers for the House, at 5.6% (FMWASD 2019).

In elections for the National Assembly dating back to 1999, women have only gained as many as 7% of seats in the House, and 8.3% in the Senate, both occurring in 2007 elections. Since that time, women's representation in the House has dropped increasingly, while the Senate has remained steady (FMWASD 2019). These declines come after gains for women in both the 1999 and 2003 House and Senate elections, which saw their percentages jump from 2.8% to 8.3% in the Senate after the 2003 elections; such trends indicate volatility in women's electoral politics which tends to align with the rise of Boko Haram in the mid and late-2000s and spikes in Boko Haram violence in 2014/2015 and 2018/2019 (FMWASD 2019; Bako and Syed 2018; Mofoluwawo 2014; START 2021). Women have been shut out of high-level elected positions, including the Presidency and state governorships, though the percentage of female deputy governors rose from approximately 5% to 16% from 2003 to 2007 (Makama 2013; Mofoluwawo 2014). The percentage of women elected in state Houses of Assembly remained lower than women in the National Assembly across elections from 1999 to 2011, despite a higher number of available seats in the state houses (Mofoluwawo 2014).

In terms of appointed positions, women in Nigeria fare better; over 30% of appointed positions were held by women in 2011, and 35% in 2015 (FMWASD 2019). These positions included the Chief Justice of the Federation, Supreme Court justices, judges and the President of the Court of Appeal, National Industrial Court judges, ambassadors, permanent secretaries, and members of the Federal Cabinet (FMWASD 2019). Currently, women head the Federal Ministries or Ministries of State for Finance, Budget and National Planning; Environment; Transportation; Women's Affairs; Federal Capital Territory; Industry, Trade, and Investment; and Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management, and Social Development (BBC News Pidgin 2019). The Special Adviser to the President on Social Investments is also female (The Statehouse, Abuja 2020). In 2019, females held approximately 10% of minister positions in the Nigerian government, declining from a high of 28% in 2012; the global average is 18% (World Bank 2021). As the current Federal Cabinet contains 44 positions, this means that just over 15% are now held by women.

Despite gains in appointed positions and voter share, where women represent over half of registered voters, as well as overall political participation in 2018 elections, Nigerian women have faced obstacles in transforming these trends into greater political power and influence (Mofoluwawo 2014; FMWASD 2019). The nature of Nigerian party politics represents one such formidable obstacle; vote-buying, godfatherism, and gendered party activities and strategies are significant aspects of electoral politics (Makama 2013; Mofoluwawo 2014; Para-Mallam 2010; FMWASD 2019). Vote-buying is widespread in Nigerian politics, and women's lower incomes and higher poverty rates hinder their abilities to compete (Mofoluwawo 2014). Similarly, as Makama (2013, 132) argues, "Godfatherism involves a patron-client or servant-master relationship which cannot be free of violence, especially in the area of controversies where a

candidate fails to comply with earlier agreed negotiations and contracts. Politics of godfatherism hardly favours women.”

Political parties also tend to hold meetings at night, creating prohibitive difficulties for women in terms of achieving leadership positions, candidacies, or opportunities at influencing party platforms, as women are typically expected to be at home during those times (Mofoluwawo 2014). As an example of the gender stereotyping inherent in these party dynamics, women have been accused of promiscuity or prostitution when they attempt to attend political meetings (Para-Mallam 2010). Parties routinely further disadvantage female candidates by replacing them with males deemed more electable, and according to Para-Mallam (2010, 469), “culture and religion act to sanction women’s entry into formal politics as well as confine them to women’s wings of political parties and in many instances to ‘soft’ portfolios.” More broadly, women who marry outside of their ethnic groups or communities are often viewed as “foreigners” and subject to the “son of the soil” bias which precludes substantive political participation (Mofoluwawo 2014, 173). Politics in Nigeria is also seen as a brutal arena reserved for those who are “hardened” and underhanded; gender stereotypes casting women as either “weak” or pure therefore discourage their involvement (Makama 2013, 132; Mofoluwawo 2014, 173).

The foregoing section demonstrates that women throughout Nigeria experience significant barriers to socioeconomic and political equality; however, as the following section demonstrates, many of the most prominent gender gaps persist in Northern Nigeria. Boko Haram, hailing from the Northeast, represents an organized violent group whose germination is inextricable from an environment characterized by striking inequality between men and women. Below, I analyze the differences between Northern and Southern Nigeria in terms of the status of

women and follow with a discussion of the linkages between gender inequality in Northern Nigeria and the rise of Boko Haram in that region.

North vs. South

Manifold inequities persist in the North, particularly the Northeast as economic growth has been outpaced by economic inequality: "...the North-East has the highest level of poverty, scores lowest on the gender development measure (GDM), has almost the lowest score on the gender empowerment measure (GEM), and records the highest increase in Gini inequality (along with the South-West)" (British Council Nigeria 2012, 13). Recent figures indicate that the Northeast's average Gini scores lag just behind the South-South region (home to the nation's oil wealth), though the Northeast's scores do not include Borno state; inclusion of Borno would likely increase the Northeast region's overall inequality, as the region's joblessness levels grew rapidly from 2004-2013 amid increasing insecurity in Borno, with the region leading the nation in unemployment (World Bank 2016).

Northern poverty rates exceed those of the South, with nearly every Northern state exhibiting poverty rates over 40%; while only one Southern state (Ebonyi) has a rate over 60%, six states in the Northern regions have poverty rates exceeding 40% and three Northern states have rates over 80%³⁷ (NBS 2020). The Northeast's poverty rate rose over the last decade, compared to stagnating and declining poverty rates in the Northwest and Northcentral regions, respectively, though the Northwest also contains nearly half the chronically poor in Nigeria (World Bank 2016). In addition, the North trails other regions in infrastructure, with less than 30% of the Northeast and Northwest populations having electricity and less than 10% having adequate sanitation (World Bank 2016).

³⁷ Borno state in the Northeast, due to the insecurity in the region, is not included in this report on poverty and inequality in Nigeria (NBS 2020).

Likely contributing to and exacerbating these economic issues, women in the North are less likely to be formally employed than Southern women, and less likely to own microbusinesses (FMWASD 2019). Borno records the fewest women employed in the country, at less than 30%, followed by Yobe at 34%, while Katsina reports the fewest women with bank accounts, at less than 4% (GIWPS/PRIO 2019). Among Nigerian women reporting multiple types of deprivation, Hausa and Fulani women reported the most multidimensional deprivations at 54.6% and 19.2% respectively, at much higher rates than their population shares; Igbo and Yoruba women reported multidimensional deprivations at rates of 0.7% and 0.3% respectively. Hausa women experienced deprivations in healthcare autonomy, early marriage, sanitation access, and adequate housing, while Fulani women experienced deprivations in adequate medical care at childbirth, education, employment, water access, and nutrition (UN Women 2018).

Substantial educational gender gaps between the North and South exist as well. Average literacy rates for females in the South outstrip that of females in the North, at 76.31 and 44.30, respectively, and the gap between the least literate region for females in the South (Southwest) and the most literate region for females in the North (Northcentral) still favors the South by nearly 25 points (World Bank 2016). The difference between male and female literacy rates is wider in every Northern region compared to Southern regions, with regional gender gaps in the North averaging over two times that of regional gaps in the South. Literacy rates across Nigeria are lowest for both men and women in the Northeast region, and the gap between male and female rates is widest in the Northwest region (World Bank 2016).

As the World Bank (2016) notes, the low literacy rates for women and men in the Northeast and the wide gender gap in literacy for the Northwest, both the worst in Nigeria, create a substantial lack of human capital in those regions compared to the South. Northern states are

also less likely to have female teachers in schools, or girls that enter or complete school due to threats of violence as well as marriage and childbirth (Makama 2013; FMWASD 2019); according to British Council Nigeria (2012, 30), “only 4% of women in the North complete secondary school.” Over 99% of poor Fulani females report six years or less of education, greatly outstripping wealthier Igbo women (UN Women 2018).

Female enrollment in primary school for Northern regions lags behind the South, with females comprising an average of approximately 45% of primary school students in the North, compared to rates of approximately 49% for the South; in the Northwest, only 42% of primary school students are female (NBS 2019). Gender gaps between the North and South are even greater for secondary school enrollment rates; while approximately 50% or more of junior secondary students in the Southern regions are female, girls represent less than 47% of junior secondary students in the Northern regions and less than 40% of students in the Northwest (NBS 2019). Similarly, for senior secondary school enrollment, the Northeast and Northwest regions have the lowest percentages of female students, at approximately 40 and 36%, respectively (NBS 2019). Sokoto in the Northwest reports a dismal rate of less than 4% of females with secondary education, ranking last among all Nigerian states (GIWPS/PRIO 2019). Data on women in the labor force reveal that Northern women are far more likely to be uneducated than women in the South. The World Bank’s (2016) analysis of 2013 labor force education levels for both males and females across the six geopolitical zones indicates significant differences between Northern and Southern females. Nearly 60% of female workers in the Northeast had no formal education, followed by approximately 53% and 46% of women in the Northwest and Northcentral zones, respectively. Figures for uneducated female laborers in the South were much lower at approximately 13% for both the Southeast and South-South regions and 16% for the Southwest.

Northern women also face significantly disproportionate health burdens. Women in the North often lack autonomy in healthcare decision-making and access to healthcare due to certain Sharia provisions which limit women's ability to independently contract and pay for health services, with significant impacts on health and reproductive care, including higher fertility rates in the Northern regions (Sada, Adamu, and Ahmad 2006). According to 2016/2017 data, the average total fertility rate in the North was nearly 6.3 compared to 4.5 among Southern women, leading to elevated dependency ratios among Northern states as well (World Bank 2016; NBS 2019). Additionally, adolescent fertility rates in the North, particularly the Northeast and Northwest, far outstrip rates in the South, as the only regions to report over 100 births per 1,000 adolescent females (aged 15-19) on average in 2016. Zamfara and Katsina states in the Northwest each recorded over 200 adolescent births in 2016, and the Northwest state of Jigawa reported an astounding total fertility rate of 8.5 (NBS 2019).

Lower average marriage ages among Northern women could signify a contributing factor to lower literacy and school enrollment rates as well as high fertility rates; girls are married on average between the ages of 12 and 15 in the North, while Southern girls' average marriage ages range between 16 and 21 (Chegwe 2014). The younger ages for married girls in Northern Nigeria may result from the fact that most Northern states have not adopted the 2003 Child Rights Act, which raises the minimum marriage age to 18 (Chegwe 2014; Adebowale 2019). Nearly 80% of Northern Hausa/Fulani girls were married before age 18; Fulani girls were nearly five times more likely to marry early compared to Yoruba girls. While wealthier, urban women in these ethnic groups were less likely to be in child marriages, even among the wealthiest Hausa nearly 50% of women experienced child marriage; those who were poor and lived in rural areas were most likely to be married early (UN Women 2018).

Women also experience gender bias as they attempt to navigate the political environment in Nigeria, with female representation particularly lacking in Northern states. After the 2011 elections, only 4 seats were held by Northwestern women in national and state-level elected bodies, followed by the 9 seats Northeastern women held (British Council Nigeria 2012). Northcentral and South-South women fared better in 2011, holding 18 and 17 seats, respectively (British Council Nigeria 2012). Women in the Southeast and Southwest regions, however, gained more than six times as many seats as Northwestern women, with 29 and 24 seats, respectively. Similarly, in the 2019 general elections, “Observers attributed fewer leadership opportunities for women in major parties and government, particularly in the North, to religious and cultural barriers” (United States Department of State 2019a, 27). The gulf between the North and South may be attributed at least in part to the fact that Northern women gained the right to vote in 1979, nearly twenty years after women in the South (British Council Nigeria 2012).

Regarding legal rights and protections, women in both the North and South suffer under the gender-biased legal codes that govern those territories, which sanction, discount, or reinforce sexual and gender-based violence in some cases and entrench discrimination in application of the law by instituting varying punishments according to the gender of the victim (FMWASD 2006; Makama 2013; Bako and Syed 2018). Southern states generally operate under the Nigerian Criminal Code (NCC), which does not recognize spousal rape or rape committed against males and offers less criminal severity and jail time in assault cases if the victim is female (Makama 2013; Bako and Syed 2018). As noted previously, Bako and Syed (2018) argue that bias against females also permeates the customary laws of the Igbo in the South, and women from some Southeastern states such as Enugu and Ebonyi have been barred from inheriting property.

As noted previously, Northern states have adopted the Sharia-influenced Penal Code, which also fails to criminalize spousal rape, discounts female testimony in court, and further sanctions domestic violence under the law by allowing husbands to beat their wives so long as such action does not result in serious injury or death (FMWASD 2006; Makama 2013). Five of the six Nigerian states to pass specific anti-domestic violence legislation lie in the South, while the only Northern state to pass an anti-domestic violence law, Jigawa, allows husbands to take “correctional actions” against wives similar to the Penal Code (Onyemelukwe 2018, 195). Of the 15 states that have moved to adopt the VAPP, only 3 are in the North, with Bauchi most recently passing the law in 2020 (Durojaiye 2020). States in the South have also been more likely to pass state-level laws related to gender equality, widow’s rights, FGM/FGC, and domestic violence, though a handful of Northern states have passed laws on girls’ education, early marriage, and child’s rights (FMWASD 2019).

These legal code differences are reflected in regional attitudes. Women in the North have less ability to contribute to decision-making independently or within their marriages; in Sokoto, only 1.3% of married women report having the ability to make or contribute to decisions (GIWPS/PRIO 2019). In terms of bodily autonomy and violence, females were much more likely to be circumcised in Southern states, with approximately 50% of girls on average undergoing FGM/FGC compared to Northern states, where an average of approximately 6% of girls are circumcised (British Council Nigeria 2012; UNICEF n.d.; Bako and Syed 2018). Wealthier, urban women are more likely to report undergoing FGM/FGC; Yoruba/Igbo women are also more likely to experience FGM/FGC than Hausa/Fulani, with nearly 70% of Igbo women undergoing FGM/FGC. However, Hausa women are most at risk from health complications due to FGM/FGC, as the vast majority of these cuttings are performed by traditional practitioners

(UN Women 2018). Southern women are also more likely to be subjected to harmful widowhood rites (Makama 2013; Adebayo 2020a; Akinbi 2015; Bako and Syed 2018).

In addition, surveys on domestic violence indicate disturbing numbers of women in Nigeria experience physical violence, and large numbers of women believe actions such as wife-beating are justified. For instance, among married Southern women, approximately 23% on average report experiencing physical violence compared to 11% of Northern women (British Council Nigeria 2012). Unmarried Southern women are also more likely to experience violence than Northern women (35% and 26%, respectively), and in higher numbers than married women in both regions. Among all women aged 15-24, Southern women were twice as likely to indicate having experienced physical abuse compared to Northern women (approximately 32% vs. 15%).

Regional differences also emerge in terms of attitudes toward domestic violence. Among those who are or have been married, nearly 80% of Northern women on average felt domestic violence was justified, compared to an astounding 92% among married Southern women. However, unmarried women in the North were more than twice as likely to indicate that wife-beating was justified compared to unmarried Southern women (13% vs. 5%), and among all 15–24-year-olds in the North, they were three times as likely to indicate acceptance of domestic violence compared to Southern women (18% vs. 6%).

It is difficult to determine why unmarried women in both the North and South are more likely to experience physical abuse than married women, particularly as such abuse often occurs in the context of partner or familial violence, or why married women in both the North and South were much more likely to accept wife-beating as justifiable than women who were unmarried (British Council Nigeria 2012). In any case, these surveys indicate that while more women in the South report experiencing physical violence, more women in the North appear to believe

domestic violence is justified, though British Council Nigeria (2012) argues that cases of violence may be going unreported in the North. Yoruba and Igbo women in the South were more likely to report experiencing this violence than Hausa/Fulani women in the North; however, Hausa/Fulani women were least likely to see help for such violence (UN Women 2018). Additionally, though the WPS index finds that Southern states report higher rates of domestic violence, Northeastern states comprised three out of the ten states recording the highest rates of violence, with Benue in the Northcentral region reporting the highest rates (GIWPS/PRIO 2019).

Having described the ways in which gender gaps in socioeconomic and political arenas are heightened in Northern Nigeria compared to the South, I now turn to an explanation of the emergence of Boko Haram in Northeastern Nigeria which explores the founding of the group, including major leadership transitions; temporal and spatial trends in insurgent activity; divisions of the organization; and implications of recent attacks. I follow with a review of findings and a discussion of additional gender factors of interest suggested by the case.

Boko Haram

Nigeria has experienced several prior insurgencies and conflicts, from Fodio during the early 1800s to Maitatsine in the 1980s as well as long-standing secessionist violence in the Southeast, while the post-democratic era saw a proliferation of various types of threats, including militancy and conflict in the oil-rich Niger Delta and herder-farmer clashes in the Middle Belt (Iyekekpolo 2016; Akinola 2015; Ibara 2011; International Crisis Group n.d.; Pavlik 2018). At the turn of the millennium, a group named Boko Haram formed in Northeast Nigeria, influenced

by the spread of Salafism³⁸ and Wahhabism³⁹ throughout Africa (Akinola 2015). Salafism gained ground in Northern Nigeria in the 1960s, with Saudi-educated preacher and politician Ja'far Adam becoming a major proponent of Sharia law in the region; Adam went on to mentor Boko Haram's founder, Mohammed Yusuf, though the two eventually clashed over Yusuf's embrace of violence and anti-Western rhetoric (Thurston 2017). Since then, Jama'at ahlis Sunnah lid Da'wat wal Jihad, or "People Committed to the Prophet's Teachings for Propagation and Jihad," has emerged as a major threat to the Lake Chad region in West Africa in recent years (United States Department of State 2019b, 253; International Crisis Group 2019).

A veteran of other Islamist groups, youth leader and preacher Mohammed Yusuf took the reins of leadership of Boko Haram in the Northeast state of Borno in 2002, and the group's profile soon grew in the region (Akinola 2015; Iyekekpolo 2016). Boko Haram gained traction in local politics; politicians looked to the members to provide assistance in the form of coercion ahead of elections and in turn supplied them with weapons and promises of greater Sharia law and government influence (Akinola 2015). Capitalizing on the extreme poverty of the North, Yusuf "was said to receive funds from external Salafi contacts, including Osama bin Laden, that he used to fund a micro-credit scheme for his followers and give welfare, food and shelter to refugees and unemployed youth" (International Crisis Group 2014, i). The group grew more dangerous over time, eventually risking an uprising against Nigerian security forces in 2009

³⁸ Salafism is a type of Sunni Islam which focuses on the early adherents of Islam, emphasizes piety, purity, and exclusivity, and adopts a literalist approach to the Koran and other religious texts. Salafists are diverse and broad-based, with three general categorizations: 1) quietist Salafists, who avoid political activism; 2) political Salafists, who, as the name connotes, are attentive to and active in politics; and 3) Jihadi-Salafists, who encourage or engage in jihad against what they designate as apostate governments in Muslim areas (Wagemakers 2016).

³⁹ Wahhabism is a type of Salafism which grew in what is now Saudi Arabia starting in the 18th century. Wahhabism as practiced in Saudi Arabia also focuses on a conservative, literalist approach to Islam, including banning prayers at shrines and the intermingling of men and women. Saudi Arabia's oil wealth and desire to influence regional politics helped spread Wahhabism throughout the region and globally starting in the mid-20th century, particularly through migrant workers returning home from the Gulf (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica 2020; Wagemakers 2016).

which resulted in hundreds of Boko Haram deaths and Yusuf's execution (Akinola 2015; International Crisis Group 2014). After this point and under new leader Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram began to incorporate more suicide attacks and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in its campaign along with numerous attacks against civilians, significantly increasing its lethality (Akinola 2015; International Crisis Group 2014). In fact, Boko Haram, according to Markovic (2019), has surpassed all other terrorist groups in the use of female suicide bombers, having utilized over 500 female bombers thus far (Searcey 2020). By 2015, over half of the group's suicide attacks were committed by women, with most of these attacks targeting civilians and "soft targets," such as markets, mosques, and bus depots," (Markovic 2019; Fullmer, Mizrahi, and Tomsich 2019; Warner and Matfess 2017; Bloom and Matfess 2016, 111).

In recent years, particularly in the wake of shocking attacks such as the kidnapping of over 200 schoolgirls from Chibok in Northern Nigeria in 2014, the Nigerian government has treated Boko Haram as its top threat and sought help from neighboring states, regional forces, and multilateral counterterrorism campaigns to address the threat Boko Haram poses (Akinola 2015; United States Department of State 2019b). The group proved extremely deadly in 2014 and 2015 – Boko Haram is credited with nearly 1000 attacks across the two years, and 20 attacks with 100 or more fatalities each; the group's deadliest attack to date, ascribed to but not claimed by Boko Haram, in May 2014, resulted in over 300 fatalities in Borno (START 2021). However, the Nigerian government and its partners more effectively challenged the group in 2015, driving Boko Haram out of some of its territory in the Northeast, including the group's capital of Gwoza in Borno; unfortunately, Boko Haram responded by increasing its use of suicide attacks against civilians, often carried out by children (Matfess 2019; ACLED 2020).

“Boko Haram’s retreat exacerbated longstanding personality clashes and doctrinal differences within the organization” (International Crisis Group 2019, 1). As early as 2012, splinter groups such as Ansaru⁴⁰ began forming, with more foreign-educated and trained fighters and closer ties to Al-Qaeda (United States Department of State 2019b; International Crisis Group 2014). In 2015, Boko Haram pledged loyalty to Islamic State, becoming Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP);⁴¹ however, shortly afterward the group split, with Shekau and his supporters retaining the original Boko Haram name (or JAS) and Mamman Nur and Abu Musab al-Barnawi leading the ISWAP portion (International Crisis Group 2019). JAS maintains a sphere of influence within central and southern Borno, southeastern Yobe, and along the border with Cameroon, while ISWAP primarily operates in northern Borno, parts of Yobe, along the border with Niger, and in the Lake Chad region; frequent spillover of attacks occurs⁴² (International Crisis Group 2019; Matfess 2019).

Ansaru, which split from Boko Haram due to JAS’ targeting of Muslims, has expressed greater interest in targeting Westerners; the group has committed multiple kidnappings-for-ransom of Western civilians, and several victims have died in rescue attempts. JAS attempted to forge closer ties with Ansaru in late 2012/ 2013, with military operations targeting regional militant supply chains providing motivation for cooperation between the groups (International Crisis Group 2014). According to Matfess (2019), Ansaru has been comparatively insignificant in the region since 2016, with some fighters rejoining Boko Haram; however, other reports indicate increased Ansaru activity in 2020, particularly in the Northwest (Kajjo 2020; Agence France-Presse 2020).

⁴⁰ Also known as Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan.

⁴¹ Also known as ISIS-WA.

⁴² See Figure 14 in the Appendix for a map displaying attacks by the two factions from 2016-2019.

Boko Haram⁴³ committed nearly 200 attacks in 2018, the last year of available comprehensive attack data collection in the Global Terrorism Database, including an attack in November that year in Borno at a military base claimed by ISWAP which killed 188 people (START 2021). Taking advantage of seized materiel and fading morale among security forces, Boko Haram has stepped up attacks in the Northeast over recent years with progressively sophisticated weaponry, including drones (Searcey 2019). In 2019, Boko Haram increased both the number of attacks it committed and its lethality; according to Miller (2020), Boko Haram committed nearly 350 attacks in 2019, an increase from 2018 of 43%, while the number killed in attacks, including perpetrators, rose 47% from 2018 to just under 2,000, the largest increase in lethality by far among groups including the Taliban, Islamic State,⁴⁴ Houthi extremists, and Al Shabaab. This also surpasses violence carried out by Fulani extremists in 2019, which exceeded that of Boko Haram the previous year. Violence perpetrated by Boko Haram and Fulani extremists placed Nigeria in the top five countries to experience terrorist attacks in 2019, though total attacks and deaths remained below 2018 figures, largely due to a decline in Fulani activity. Boko Haram also mounted additional attacks outside Nigeria on the neighboring states of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon in 2019 and 2020 (Miller 2020).

Additionally, over two million Nigerian citizens have been internally displaced as a result of the Boko Haram conflict (United States Department of State 2019b). Reports from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED 2020) note that the group is directly responsible for over 16,000 civilian deaths so far, while total battle deaths exceed 40,000. Attack data from

⁴³ The Global Terrorism Database (START 2021) does not systematically distinguish Boko Haram as separate groups in its dataset, though it provides group sub-names when available evidence determines the specific group responsible for a given attack; therefore, in this work, “Boko Haram” refers to both JAS and ISWAP, except where noted. Ansaru is listed as a separate group in GTD, though it is only credited with six attacks from 2011-2013.

⁴⁴ Referred to in Miller (2020) as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

both ACLED and the Council on Foreign Relations' Nigeria Security Tracker (NST) reveal that civilian deaths comprise almost half of the deaths attributed to the Boko Haram conflict, with a minority of these deaths attributed to the Nigerian military (Campbell and Harwood 2018). The group's attacks against some neighboring states target civilians at an even higher frequency than the group's attacks in Nigeria; according to ACLED, one-third of Boko Haram's attacks in Nigeria target civilians, whereas attacks in Cameroon and Niger target civilians approximately 40% of the time (ACLED 2019). The group has also recently increased the number of abductions of civilians it conducts, particularly in neighboring states (ACLED 2019). The group "largely self-finances through criminal activities such as looting, extortion, kidnapping-for-ransom, and bank robberies" (United States Department of State (2019b, 254).

Most recently, on December 13, 2020, JAS reportedly abducted hundreds of male students from a secondary school in the Northwest state of Katsina while President Buhari was visiting the state. Boko Haram and ISWAP have routinely conducted such kidnappings and attacks on schools, and shortly afterward took credit for the abductions, claiming the attack as a means to reject "Western education" and restore the group's version of Islam to the region (Kwai 2020; Paquette 2020, n.p.). While the government continues to deny Boko Haram's involvement, with Buhari referring to the attackers as "bandits," according to reports, Boko Haram has capitalized on security lapses in the Northwest by partnering with armed bandits in the region, likely facilitating the large-scale attack (Kwai 2020, n.p.; Petesch 2020). Several days after the abductions, Boko Haram once again took responsibility for the attack, and over 300 students were returned to authorities, though government officials continue to dispute Boko Haram's involvement (Maclean and Alfa 2020; Petesch 2020). However, if Boko Haram's claim to the

kidnappings stands, such an attack represents a significant expansion of operations into the Northwest region for the group (Paquette 2020; Maclean and Alfa 2020).

Findings

This examination of the status of women in Nigeria and the rise of Boko Haram reveals several findings which support my theory and hypotheses and dovetail with the findings of my previous chapter. Nigeria's patriarchal culture seems closely linked to the outbreak of violence and terrorism in the state. In particular, the divergences in gender norms and female empowerment between the North and South align with the emergence of Boko Haram and its splinter groups in the Northern region. Women in the North, particularly the Northeast and Northwest, are disproportionately disenfranchised, economically marginalized, and politically excluded. The North exhibits endemic anti-female attitudes and norms embedded within customs and laws, extreme poverty and inequality, and a conspicuous absence of leading female voices and influences in political matters. A review of this case study indicates a number of socioeconomic and political factors which have particular salience for the relationship between gender inequality and terrorism, many of which support findings from the previous chapter. Gender gaps in education, healthcare, property ownership, labor participation and income, political leadership, and legal and social rights are quite strong between the North and South and may be especially significant in explaining the rise of Boko Haram.

Hypothesis 1

Regarding Hypothesis 1, several "pull" factors representing anti-female norms which manifest as disproportionately negative outcomes for women place Nigeria, and the North in particular, at risk for terrorism, corresponding to the outbreak of terrorist violence committed by Boko Haram in that region. Persistent gender gaps span all education levels which marginalize women throughout the state; females are less likely to attend primary, secondary, and tertiary

schools, with the largest gender gaps presenting for the highest levels of education. Rates for primary, secondary, and tertiary enrollment among females in Nigeria, as well as rates for completion of primary and secondary education, all lie below global averages. These findings are largely reflective of results from models testing Hypothesis 1 in Chapter 3, as Nigeria, and the North in particular, exhibit large gender gaps in higher education and completed education rates, indicating the extent to which female education is devalued in Nigeria as well as the limitations women will face in the workplace and in achieving autonomy, widening the power gap between men and women which embodies structural violence and placing the state at risk for terrorism.

In addition, though the relationship between primary education and terrorism deserves further study as discussed in the previous chapter, females are less likely to attend and complete primary school in Nigeria than males (though the gender gap is lowest for primary compared to higher levels of education). While literacy rates did not appear to relate to terrorism in the models, Nigerian females, both adults and youths, also exhibit lower literacy rates than males, with Southern females' literacy rates outpacing those for Northern women and national literacy rates for adult and youth females falling below global averages.

In addition, females in Nigeria are subject to heavy health and reproductive burdens. Though fertility rates failed to drive terrorism in the statistical models, Nigeria exhibits very high fertility rates which exceed averages for adult and youth fertility rates worldwide, and one of the widest gender gaps between the North and South concerns healthcare and reproductive burdens placed on women. Strikingly high fertility rates for girls and women in the North unveil social structures which fail to adequately care for females and actively contribute to their harm. Such disparities indicate the extent to which women in Nigeria are diminished in society, valued primarily for their reproductive abilities, and relegated to the private sphere.

I argue that the inequities women in the North face regarding education, health, safety, and autonomy support my “pull” theory, predisposing the North to extremist violence due to the influence of patriarchal norms and structures. Strict gender roles which devalue girls’ education, restrict movement and decision-making abilities, endanger health, prioritize marriage and childbearing, and permit physical and sexual violence against women render females as second-class citizens unworthy of equal protection and rights. Such dehumanization of women is normalized at household and community levels and codified and reinforced in regional laws. This dynamic creates social conditions that precipitate violent action on the part of organizations such as Boko Haram. Thus, anti-female norms in the North which deliberately exclude and marginalize women create favorable conditions for extremist violence to occur, representing a “pull” factor for Boko Haram’s acts of terrorism.

Hypothesis 2

Regarding Hypothesis 2, I argue that depressed economic conditions in Nigeria, particularly in the North, stem from women’s exclusion and embody “push” factors which incentivize membership in extremist organizations such as Boko Haram. Nigerian females are less likely than males to be formally employed and more likely to work in unpaid labor or in vulnerable jobs while receiving lower incomes than males at all levels of education. Female labor force participation has fallen below the global average, with corresponding increases in unemployment rates, especially among youths. Numbers of female wage and salary workers as well as managers also fail to meet global averages, with a particularly high gap for the former.

As noted previously, women’s economic participation has downstream effects for the economy: One report estimates that, “Nigeria’s gross domestic product (GDP) could grow by 23 percent—or \$229 billion—by 2025 if women participated in the economy to the same extent as men” (Bro and McCaslin 2019, n.p.). Regional impacts of women’s absence from the workforce

are strong, and a disproportionate lack of female participation in the economy is likely linked to the North's poor economic conditions, including higher levels of poverty and inequality as well as human capital and infrastructure deficiencies. Northern women in the labor force are less likely to be formally educated compared to their Southern counterparts, limiting earning potential. Compared to women in the South, women in the North are less likely to be formally employed and less likely to own microbusinesses, with Borno recording the lowest level of female employment among all Nigerian states according to the WPS index (FMWASD 2019; FAO n.d.; British Council Nigeria 2012; Slavchevska et al. 2016; GIWPS/PRIO 2019). Katsina in the Northwest similarly ranks last among all states for female financial inclusion in the WPS index (GIWPS/PRIO 2019). Each of these activities promotes wealth creation, thus limiting not only women's autonomy, but also overall economic growth.

Such significant economic losses due to female unemployment and underemployment can be linked not only to overall economic underdevelopment, but also to specific material incentives to engage in extremism. The North's poor economic conditions increase the desire to join extremist groups which offer money and other material goods as recruiting tools; for instance, one defector from Borno claimed Boko Haram failed to provide him a motorcycle initially offered as a part of his recruitment, which he had planned to use to help support his family of eight, including two wives (Kindzeka 2020). Inability to provide for families and households in patriarchal societies may threaten traditional notions of masculinity, which increase motivations to join organizations such as Boko Haram if they offer alternative sources of income. As Zenn and Pearson (2014, 51) note, "Boko Haram's ideology casts men in hyper-masculine combat roles, their duty to violently oppose the west...This combative ideological masculinity appears to have specific resonance with a section of disenfranchised Nigerian men."

These findings regarding female economic empowerment again generally reflect findings for Hypothesis 2 in the previous chapter, with higher levels of female unemployment for both adults and youths and gender gaps in paid employment leading to a greater risk for terrorism. While female labor participation did not appear to affect terrorism in statistical models, gender gaps in formal labor participation in Nigeria suggest this factor may have significance for the emergence of Boko Haram, and warrants further analysis in future works.

While brideprice also did not relate significantly to terrorism in statistical models, brideprice dynamics are strong in Nigeria, with a ranking of “8” in the WomanStats Project Database (2021) designating a tradition of brides’ guardians receiving money or goods from prospective grooms to secure marriages. Northern Nigerian men, due to high unemployment rates, high economic inequality, and high poverty rates, may find themselves disproportionately unable to pay brideprices, particularly in cases of brideprice inflation. In a patriarchal and patrilineal society such as Nigeria’s, which accords the status of manhood, social privileges, and security to men based on marriage and family size, unmarried men are likely to feel alienated and disenfranchised; this incentivizes these men to join organizations, such as Boko Haram, which capitalize on such fears by offering money for dowries and brideprices and arranging weddings for recruits (International Crisis Group 2016; Searcey 2016; Matfess 2016). However, brideprice dynamics may have less relevance for the Boko Haram case since the Kanuri, which predominantly make up the organization, are less invested than other Northern ethnic groups in kinship ties which often underlie the patrilineal motivations for brideprice (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica 2010). Thus, women’s equal economic participation in Nigeria may preclude specific motivations for terrorism related to fulfillment of traditional gender roles and

financial hardship, though findings indicate that the relationship between brideprice dynamics and terrorism deserves further study.

Hypothesis 3

Regarding Hypothesis 3, though political leadership for women, including female legislators and government ministers, did not drive terrorism in the prior chapter's statistical analysis, women's lack of political empowerment in Nigeria may relate to terrorism in the state, particularly in the North, as it indicates an enduring lack of female voices in the public sphere which suppresses competition and collaboration, further inhibiting good governance and successful peace initiatives. Evidence indicates that women across Nigeria are underrepresented in politics; they are less likely than males to run for or achieve political office and are often shut out of party politics due to gender stereotypes. Regarding electoral politics, Nigeria falls far behind both globally and among sub-Saharan African states in terms of the number of women in the national legislature. While females have achieved greater representation through appointed political positions in recent years, the gender gap still favors males.

Women in the North gained the right to vote nearly two decades after women in the South; their relative lack of political empowerment continues today, as Northern women are less likely than Southern women to gain seats in local, state, and national elections (British Council Nigeria 2012; NBS 2019; United States Department of State 2019a). Women in the North have also faced greater obstacles achieving prominent positions in traditional leadership councils, political parties, and the military (United States Department of State 2019a; Mofoluwawo 2014; Makama 2013; FMWASD 2019; Ogundipe 2017). According to Ogundipe (2017, n.p.), potential recent changes to Nigerian combat training programs which would disproportionately disadvantage women, though denied by the military, appeared to be prompted by rumors of "northern elements...opposed to the programme because it was particularly popular amongst

southern females who are predominantly Christian.” Thus, women’s absence from leadership in politics and security in the North is likely due at least in part to aspects of Sharia law which discourage female leadership in politics (Sada, Adamu, and Ahmad 2006).

As noted, women’s political representation appears to have declined after the rise of Boko Haram in the mid and late-2000s and spikes of violence in 2014/2015 and 2018/2019 (FMWASD 2019; Bako and Syed 2018; Mofoluwawo 2014; START 2021). It is possible that this decline is due to the argument that a “strong” or “masculine” political leader is needed to combat a violent extremist organization such as Boko Haram, especially considering the common belief that Nigerian politics is fit only for “tough” participants, further reinforcing the effect of the “prevent” factor by excluding women from important security and peace processes at just the moment when their contributions are likely needed most to achieve successful outcomes. (Makama 2013; Mofoluwawo 2014). However, the lack of statistical findings regarding female political leadership in this work indicates that the relationship between women’s political empowerment and terrorism merits additional research.

Hypothesis 4

Finally, for Hypothesis 4, many aspects of political, social, and economic rights which appear to drive terrorism in the models presented in the previous chapter also relate to the emergence of terrorism in Nigeria. Lack of female agency and legal and social rights, as indicated by statistical analysis, also increase risk of terrorism in the case of Nigeria and Boko Haram, with Northern females often exhibiting greater restrictions on freedom of movement, ability to marry and divorce, bodily autonomy, and legal protections, including legislation against domestic violence. Though the models fail to support a relationship between economic and political rights for females and terrorism, women in Nigeria also face significant gender gaps

in these areas which disadvantage them in terms of equal pay, sexual harassment and workplace discrimination, and running for political office, as described above.

Overall, Hypothesis 4 is supported when examining the myriad of ways in which gender bias permeates national, regional, state, and local legal codes to restrict female autonomy in political, social, and economic arenas in Nigeria. The Nigerian Constitution, National Criminal Code (NCC), Penal Code, and federal laws such as the Nigerian Labour Act of 2004 often contradict one another and are frequently challenged by religious, ethnic, and culturally infused laws and codes at the state level. States regularly fail to adopt federal acts, such as the VAPP and Child Rights Act, which aim to support women's rights, and endemic issues such as sexual harassment remain unaddressed by national legislation. These legal conundrums limit women's freedom of movement, introduce gender bias into court proceedings, normalize domestic violence and mistreatment of women, restrict women's abilities to marry and divorce, favor males in property and inheritance disputes, fail to ensure equity in the workplace, prevent women from realizing political aspirations, and prohibit females from accessing the benefits of full citizenship throughout Nigeria.

Regionally, Northern women have less protection under the law, as most Northern states under Sharia have been reluctant to embrace national legislation offering special protection for girls and women by raising minimum marriage ages, criminalizing domestic violence, and outlawing gender discrimination; these states have often failed to reaffirm gender equality in state-level laws on widow's rights, FGM/FGC, and domestic violence (though the former two appear to be more common in Southern states). Sharia law, while allowing women access to courts for various criminal and civil matters and providing for women's retention of personal wealth, disproportionately burdens women in court cases related to sexual assault and rape,

limits women's freedom in terms of dress and movement, and can handicap women in divorce and child custody cases (Chegwe 2014; Adebowale 2019; Durojaiye 2020; FMWASD 2006; Makama 2013; Onyemelukwe 2018; Imam 2004; Bourbeau, Umar, and Bauman 2019; Sada, Adamu, and Ahmad 2006). Northern women are also more likely to believe domestic violence, which is enshrined in the North's Penal Code, is justifiable and are less likely to seek help, indicating the extent to which attitudes on women's worth are not only codified in local and regional law, but diffused throughout society (FMWASD 2006; Makama 2013; British Council Nigeria 2012; UN Women 2018).

Furthering supporting my theory, Northern states comprise the bottom 17 rankings of the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) subnational index of all 36 Nigerian states, given their scores on a range of female-oriented indices such as employment, education, political representation, domestic violence, and decision-making ability (GIWPS/PRIO 2019). Nigeria records the largest subnational gap in scores among all states in the index, representing the deep divide in the status of women between the North and South. Only the Northcentral states of Kwara and Kogi, which border the Southwest and South-South regions, rank in the top ten in subnational scores. The WPS index also incorporates into these scores the level of organized violence in these states to understand the important links between the status of women and peace; the report states, "higher levels of gender inequality in education, financial inclusion, and employment, as well as higher levels of intimate partner violence and adolescent fertility, are significantly correlated with greater risks of violent conflict" (GIWPS/PRIO 2019, 47).

The low WPS ranking of the Northeastern states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe, placing 35, 36, and 37, respectively, thus indicates a relationship between the disproportionately unequal status of women there along multiple dimensions and the outbreak of violence, manifested in

Boko Haram and ISWAP's presence; Fulani militias, herder-farmer clashes, organized crime elements, and jihadist groups such as Ansaru are also active in several Northwest and Northcentral states which also rank low on the WPS scale (Pavlik 2018; GIWPS/PRIO 2019; International Crisis Group 2020). According to the World Bank (2016, 103), "The number of conflicts in Nigeria rose significantly between 2000 and 2015 and peaked in 2014, with an estimated 503 conflicts. The North East showed the highest average, at 102 conflicts per year, followed by 47 in the North West and 81 in the North Central." In particular, the WPS subnational index indicates Borno well outranks every other state in Nigeria in terms of organized violence, with over 300 battle deaths from 2010-2017, with Adamawa and Yobe reporting the second and third-most battle deaths.

Thus, factors inherent to the "push," "pull," and "prevent" theory create favorable social conditions, provide material incentives, and break down barriers to terrorist activity by withholding essential rights from women and preventing their equal participation in society. Though gender inequality affects women across Nigeria and thus places the entire state at risk for terrorism according to my theory, an analysis of regional data further delineates the areas of the state where terrorism is most likely to occur. As the North exhibits relatively greater levels of socioeconomic and political gender inequality than the South, I contend that the North is therefore more susceptible to extremist activity and organization, demonstrated most clearly by Boko Haram's presence in that region. I argue that evidence indicates the rise of Boko Haram is consequent of the disproportionate lack of female empowerment in Nigeria, especially the Northeast region where the group formed, and the norms of exclusion, hierarchy, and use of violence to achieve power which permeate this setting; that the patriarchal culture of Nigeria provides material incentives to join extremist organizations such as Boko Haram through

suppressing economic growth; that women's exclusion from political leadership prevents substantive contributions to governance and peace initiatives which could avert such violence; and that the concomitant effects of the above arguments regarding lack of multidimensional rights for women further heighten the risk of terrorism in Nigeria. Finally, I argue that such dynamics existed prior to Boko Haram's establishment, limiting the potential for endogenous effects in the relationship between gender inequality and terrorism.

Similar arguments can be made for other violent groups which developed in particularly gender unequal areas in Nigeria, such as ISWAP and Ansaru, as well as herder-farmer conflicts across the Northcentral region and gang activities in the Northwest (including the possible expansion of Boko Haram into that region) which may also constitute terrorism, indicating additional support for the link between the status of women and the outbreak of terrorist violence in Nigeria. (GIWPS/PRIO 2019; International Crisis Group 2020).

While patriarchy persists throughout Nigeria, and violence regularly erupts in the Middle Belt and Southern parts of the state where women enjoy relatively better circumstances than their Northern counterparts, the most acute and long-standing violence in the state in recent decades has undoubtedly occurred in the North and is tied to Boko Haram, providing supportive evidence that, as argued in my theory and demonstrated in the previous chapter's findings, gender inequality can drive the development of terrorist incidents and groups.

Additional Gender Factors of Interest

Thus, several socioeconomic and political factors appear to form the foundation of the relationship between gender inequality in Nigeria and the outbreak of terrorism in the state, which are further supported at the regional level and which generally dovetail with both my arguments and findings from the previous chapter. However, case study findings also indicate a

number of other gender factors potentially significant in the relationship between gender inequality and terrorism in Nigeria which were not tested in the previous chapter.

Regarding additional factors which could further operationalize restrictions on social autonomy for women, gender bias in attitudes toward women, though often difficult to capture, is an important factor highlighted in the case of Nigeria. Indeed, one area in which Nigeria does exhibit gender parity is in gender bias – according to the Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI) (United Nations Development Programme 2020, 8), which examines the extent to which men and women agree with statements embedded with gendered social norms and stereotypes, such as, “Men make better political leaders than women do,” and “Men should have more right to a job than women” over 99% of Nigerians surveyed expressed one gender bias, and nearly 95% expressed two or more. Strong bias was observed in political, economic, and physical integrity (examining domestic violence and reproductive rights) dimensions, while less than half those surveyed exhibited an educational bias. Perhaps more surprising, over 99% of both men and women reported one bias, and just over 91% of women and nearly 98% of men reported two or more biases. The high number of Nigerian females expressing gender bias which undermines women’s empowerment may reflect the ways in which norms of oppression and inequality have diffused throughout society as gender inequality is normalized and practiced in the home and in public arenas.

In terms of education factors which are indicative of female autonomy, while data are scarce for pre-primary enrollment compared to higher education levels, existing data for Nigeria demonstrate similar rates for males and females between 2001 and 2010, with female rates actually exceeding that of males in 2008; while pre-primary enrollment rates hovered near 25% for both females and males in 2001, in 2010 males and females had rates of just over 40%

(World Bank 2021) Despite the gains in school enrollment for both boys and girls, Nigeria is thought to have approximately 10 million children out of school – the gender gap among these children appears to favor boys (British Council Nigeria 2012; FMWASD 2019). In addition, women lag in computer access and literacy in Nigeria, further hindering their job opportunities in an increasingly digital world (FMWASD 2019). As varying impacts are observed regarding the relationship between women’s education and terrorist violence, an examination of the effect of gender gaps in pre-primary education, children out of school, and computer access may aid in refining the causal mechanisms linking social autonomy and terrorism.

Regarding reproductive burdens and healthcare, Nigeria’s high fertility rates and birth rates are likely in part a function of lack of access to contraceptives and family planning care. Less than 50% of this need is met in Nigeria, though more educated women are more likely to use contraceptives than less educated women; the rate of contraceptive use more than doubles for women who have received primary education compared to those without education, though even among those women at the highest level of education, only one third report using contraceptives. Wealthier women are also more likely to use contraceptives (FMWASD 2019).

The combination of patriarchal attitudes which limit women’s autonomy in healthcare decision-making as well as access to adequate healthcare (particularly in maternal care, where less than 50% of births are overseen by qualified medical personnel) results in Nigeria currently ranking fourth in the world in maternal mortality ratio, with over 900 women dying per 100,000 live births, though this is down significantly from 1200 deaths per 100,000 births in 2000 (FMWASD 2006; Central Intelligence Agency 2020; World Bank 2021). Nigeria also reports a high infant mortality rate, ranking number 12 in the world; however, the rate has dropped from

195 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1964 to just over 75 in 2018 (Central Intelligence Agency 2020; World Bank 2021).

Northern women are much less likely to receive prenatal care and undergo deliveries assisted by medical professionals than Southern women, leading to higher rates of severe postnatal conditions such as vesicovaginal fistula (VVF) (Sada, Adamu, and Ahmad 2006). The average maternal mortality ratio for women in the North is nearly 10 times that of women in the South, with Borno in the Northeast having over 2300 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2016, more than four times the national average (Makama 2013; British Council Nigeria 2012; NBS 2019). Women in the North, unsurprisingly, have children in worse health than women in the South due to lack of vaccinations, malnutrition, and stunting; this also leads to higher under-5 mortality rates in the North (World Bank 2016). This indicates that in future works, additional factors related to reproductive burdens and lack of adequate access to healthcare, including contraceptive use, prenatal care rates, maternal mortality rates, and child health outcomes, should be analyzed, as they may present as significant drivers of terrorism.

Regarding additional economic factors of interest highlighted by the case of Nigeria and Boko Haram, land ownership and polygyny rates appear relevant to the emergence of terrorism as well. Nigerian women are consistently shut out of land ownership due to patriarchal norms which argue against ideas of female autonomy (particularly for unmarried women), a patrilineal tradition of land transfer to male heirs supported by customary and religious practices, and lack of enforcement of the equal property provisions of the Nigerian Constitution and the 1978 Land Use Act, which created a nationalized, usufructuary system permitting equal access to land use and occupancy for Nigerians (Bako and Syed 2018; FMWASD 2019; FAO n.d.). According to British Council Nigeria (2012, iv), “Though many women are involved in subsistence agriculture

and off farm activities, men are five times more likely than women to own land,” with an even greater gender gap presenting in sole ownership of plots (Slavchevska et al. 2016).

Regional disparities exist as well; women in the Northeast and Northwest own as little as 4% of land compared to over 50% for men, while gaps in ownership between women and men in the Southern regions are far smaller, with Southeast women owning just over 10% of land and men owning approximately 38% (British Council Nigeria 2012). Women in the Northeast and Northwest own less than half the land of women in the South-South and Southeast regions; this disparity between North and South may be due at least in part to a Sharia law provision in which women are not entitled to full inheritance of property (FAO n.d.; British Council Nigeria 2012; Slavchevska et al. 2016; FMWASD 2019). Similarly, men are three times more likely to manage land than women, and over four times more likely to manage land without a partner (Slavchevska et al. 2016). Local male leaders’ roles are outsized in agriculture and land use in Nigeria; according to one survey, local leaders determined ownership for over 90% of single-sex owned plots (Slavchevska et al. 2016).

Regarding other economic factors, given works which link brideprice to terrorism (Hudson and Matfess 2017; McDermott 2020; Hudson and Hodgson 2020) and the prevalence of brideprice in Nigeria, it may be important to investigate the impact of a related marriage market distortion on the emergence of terrorism: Rates of polygyny (Hudson and Matfess 2017; McDermott and Cowden 2015). Contravening Nigerian civil law, polygyny, or marriage in which a husband takes multiple wives, is sanctioned under the North’s Sharia-influenced Penal Code and practiced most widely among Muslims and the Kanuri, Hausa, and Fulani peoples in the North; the Yoruba in the South also practice polygyny, though the popularity of polygyny among the Yoruba has declined in recent years (Imam 2004; Chegwe 2014). Over one-third of

Nigerian women report being in polygynous marriages (Behrman 2019). Wealthier men who can afford brideprices may thwart other, poorer men in the marriage market by marrying multiple wives, creating distortions in the marriage market which inflate brideprices and increase financial incentives for joining terrorist organizations. Regarding other costs of polygyny in the region, the Emir of Kano argues that, “Those of us in the north have all seen the economic consequences of men who are not capable of maintaining one wife, marrying four... They end up producing 20 children, not educating them, leaving them on the streets, and they end up as thugs and terrorists” (BBC News 2017, n.p.).

While female political leadership at the national level did not significantly affect terrorism in the statistical analysis, gender gaps at other levels of political representation may prove more salient to the outbreak of violence in a state or region. For example, though Nigerian women have had greater success in attaining appointed positions in politics compared to winning elections, female spheres of influence remain subject to male appropriation: “Even in areas where women are traditionally allowed to preside, they are being excluded, with men appointed as Commissioners for Women Affairs in some states. On 28 August 2015, the Governor of Adamawa State appointed a man as the Commissioner for Women Affairs” (Mayah et al. 2017, 20). At the local level, women are under-represented in Northern politics in Nigeria. From 1999-2015, women in the Northeast gained only 1.4% of chairperson positions in local governments, while Northwestern and Northcentral women gained just 2.4% and 4.3%, respectively (NBS 2019). Women in the Southern regions tended to have more representation, with women gaining

just under 3% of chairperson positions in the Southwest, 4.7% of positions in the South-South, and nearly half in the Southeast⁴⁵ (NBS 2019).

Traditional leadership councils are also significant sources of local power in Nigeria. Particularly in Northern Nigeria, where Boko Haram operates, Nigerian officials are pursuing increased female presence in historically male-dominant traditional leadership structures, which issue decisions on important matters like local customs, land ownership, and intercommunity disputes (FMWASD 2019). Given the standing of traditional leadership councils in Nigeria in terms of resolving disputes and allocating resources such as land, women's absence from these councils in the North is especially troubling for both the ability of women to influence outcomes which intrinsically affect them as well as the overall efficacy of these councils in terms of preventing conflict, including terrorism.

Finally, regarding comprehensive rights for women, the case of Nigeria demonstrates that ratification of international laws and conventions regarding human rights and rights for women does not necessarily translate to significant shifts in domestic laws. In terms of international law, in 1985 Nigeria ratified the United Nations-sponsored Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which holds national governments to certain actions regarding the mitigation of gender inequality in public and private spheres; pledged additional actions on issues such as women's representation in politics after adopting the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, a follow-up to CEDAW; endorsed the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol) in 2005; and ratified the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish

⁴⁵ Data for the time period are missing for two out of six Northeast states, three out of six South-South states, one out of five Southeast states, and two out of six Southwest states, limiting the accuracy and generalizability of these data and analyses (NBS 2019).

Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Palermo Protocol), in 2001, one of the first four states globally to do so (Bako and Syed 2018; FMWASD 2019; United States Department of State 2020).

However, as is described in this case study, numerous domestic laws impinge on the domestication of these international conventions, perhaps rendering international conventions on women's rights a limited factor as it relates to reductions in terrorism. For instance, though Nigeria passed the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act (TIPLEAA) and formed the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons and Other Related Matters (NAPTIP) as a consequence of ratifying the Palermo Protocol, only Edo, a major hub for sex trafficking, has criminalized human trafficking at the state level (Olateru-Olagbegi and Ikpeme 2006; United States Department of State 2020). Thus, several gender factors of interest which were not addressed in the prior chapter's statistical analyses may have relevance for the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria, and these factors may prove salient in additional studies examining the relationship between gender equality and terrorism.

Alternative Explanations and Counterarguments

For Boko Haram, as with my statistical analyses, several factors present as potentially significant alternative explanations or counterarguments to my theory on gender inequality and terrorism, including history of conflict, regime type, national capabilities (including urbanization and militarization), and enduring economic deprivations, especially in the North (Akinola 2015; Iyekekpole 2016). For prior conflict, which positively relates to terrorism in the models, Nigeria's score demonstrates variation; after peaking at 9 conflicts in 1966, Nigeria's conflict levels have varied considerably, with conflicts leveling off at 4 starting in 2014 (well above the mean of .72), reflecting an overall increase in conflict since the early 2000s which corresponds to the general findings regarding the impact of prior conflict on risk of terrorism. Though research

indicates that fully democratic and autocratic states have fewer terrorist incidents and fatalities than anocracies, Nigeria, which is designated as an institutionalized democracy by the Polity Project, had the second-highest rate of terrorism fatalities among all states in 2019, contrary to the findings in the models regarding a nonlinear impact of regime type on terrorism (though Nigeria remains on the lower end of that categorization, with a Polity score of 7 in a range of 6-10) (Marshall and Gurr 2020; Magen 2018; Miller 2020).

As the models indicate that higher levels of state capacity or national capability, including measures of urban population, total population, energy consumption, iron and steel production, military expenditures, and military personnel, relate positively with terrorism, the same is generally observed in the case of Nigeria and Boko Haram. Nigeria is the most populous nation in Africa, with a steady population increase from approximately 45 million people in 1960 to over 200 million as of 2019 (World Bank 2021). The urban population has risen correspondingly, from approximately 7 million in 1960 to over 100 million in 2019; this indicates that just over half the population in Nigeria now resides in urban areas (World Bank 2021). Increasing urbanization and unemployment in the region are further driving up recruitment for Boko Haram, evidenced by the numbers of rural migrants and citizens from the Lake Chad area affiliated with the group (Akinola 2015).

In the case of military expenditures, figures from both the World Bank (2021) and Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972, 2021) indicate a less straightforward relationship – though military expenditures increased post-2000 according to Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972, 2021), World Bank (2021) figures indicate that Nigerian military expenditures declined starting in the 1980s and have remained below 2% of GDP since then. Similar discrepancies are observed regarding military personnel; while World Bank (2021) data reveal that Nigeria's armed forces personnel

have increased from approximately 100,000 in 2000 to 223,000 in 2018, Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey's (1972, 2021) data indicate a decline in military personnel beginning in the late 1970s, with forces remaining below 100,000 since the early 1990s. According to Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972, 2021), iron and steel production values for Nigeria also contain significant variation, with production peaking above 250,000 tons in the early 1980s before a sharp decline to nearly zero production two decades later; however, figures indicate a stabilization in production in the following years at approximately 100,000 tons. Energy consumption, however, has increased steadily in Nigeria according to Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972, 2021). In addition, data for the CINC variable indicate a sharp rise in overall national capability for Nigeria since 2000, which supports the findings of the statistical models regarding impact of state capacity on terrorism (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972, 2021).

Regarding national wealth, Nigeria is one of the wealthiest nations in Africa, which, according to the findings of the models, should decrease its risk of terrorism; however, findings for Nigeria defy this prediction. According to World Bank (2021) data on GDP per capita, Nigeria's wealth has increased steadily since 2000, with small declines starting in 2014; as noted, terrorism in Nigeria has increased steadily since 2010, corresponding with the emergence of Boko Haram as a potent terrorist organization.

Despite Nigeria's overall wealth, potential motives for terrorist violence in Northern Nigeria include socioeconomic deprivation, characterized by poverty, economic inequality, urbanization, and unemployment. Nigeria, though rich in natural resources, is affected by widespread poverty and inequality, and the socioeconomic situation in the state has deteriorated in recent years, particularly in the North (Akinola 2015). Invoking elements of relative deprivation arguments, some refer to discrepancies between the North and South in Nigeria in

describing Boko Haram's emergence, as low human development rankings in the North in terms of literacy, youth employment, and life expectancy are thought to have driven the group's recruitment (Akinola 2015). As noted, the Northeast and Northwest in particular also suffer from major infrastructure and human capital gaps compared to the South (World Bank 2016).

Boko Haram has thrived in areas of Nigeria which are poor, as have other Nigerian insurgent groups which address socioeconomic grievances and development gaps between the North and South as part of their rhetoric (Akinola 2015; Iyekekpola 2016). Often, Boko Haram, as with Maitatsine before it, uses regional poverty as a rallying cry, and recruits heavily among young disenfranchised males, as well as almajirai, underprivileged students studying the Quran (Akinola 2015; Iyekekpola 2016). Extremist groups have also capitalized on a lack of state resources in the region, particularly during times of economic contraction, to provide services to citizens, increasing anti-government resentment and fueling recruitment for groups such as Boko Haram (Akinola 2015). These findings may indicate that state-level measures of wealth are inadequate in terms of capturing sub-national economic dynamics related to inequality and underdevelopment which could increase risk of terrorism.

Ethnic fractionalization, as with the statistical models, does not appear to relate strongly to terrorism in the case of Nigeria and Boko Haram. Though ethnic fractionalization scores did not consistently present as statistically significant in the previous chapter's models, the signs of the coefficients indicate that higher ethnic fractionalization scores create greater risk of terrorism; however, for Nigeria, ethnic fractionalization scores, though high overall, have declined consistently since the 1970s, which contradict the predictions of the models. In addition, the Boko Haram conflict appears to have few significant ethnic dimensions; both the group's members and victims are predominantly Kanuri, and fighters also hail from other regional ethnic

groups (Campbell and Harwood 2018). Thus, while ethnic violence is common in Nigeria, ethnic conflict appears to play little role in the fomentation of Boko Haram's violence. Finally, though the sub-Saharan Africa region on average appears less at risk for terrorism according to the statistical models, Nigeria again defies this finding, producing multiple terrorist groups and more terrorism fatalities than nearly every other state in the world in 2019 (Miller 2020).

Thus, a review of the case of Nigeria and Boko Haram indicates some relevance for control variable findings from the models, particularly regarding national capability measures. However, the case study also points to additional control variables which may drive a state's risk of terrorism. For instance, Boko Haram's anti-Western rhetoric and name could be ascribed at least in part to the divisive legacy of British colonialism in Nigeria which pitted the North against the South in terms of resources and culture and fomented religious conflicts between Muslims and Christians; an anti-Western element also characterized the Maitatsine uprisings of the 1980s (Iyekekpolo 2016). In Hausa, Boko Haram's name can be translated as "Western education is bad or forbidden" (Akinola 2015, 22). Boko Haram also regularly espouses anti-Western rhetoric designed to link Western influence in the region with impiety, corruption, and underdevelopment (Iyekekpolo 2016; International Crisis Group 2010). Additionally, substantive changes in gender parity risk provoking a backlash related to anti-Western sentiment— according to Para-Mallam (2010), Nigerian survey participants and activists reported worries about what gender equality would mean for household and community dynamics, particularly in terms of role reversals for men and women. For some, gender equality represents an "external norm," or an element of a Western value system (Bako and Syed 2018, 438).

In addition, other aspects of state capacity, including corruption and inability to provide services to citizens, may also increase terrorism. Persistent security and services voids in the

North provide compelling motivations for violence. For example, the Nigerian military's recent decision to withdraw forces into supercamps in the North provides Boko Haram and other extremist groups the opportunity to move more freely throughout much of the region (Searcey 2019; Alfa and Maclean 2020). State capacity deficiencies and political corruption in the Northeast, according to Iyekekpola (2016), helped drive recruits to the group; as politicians sought gain for themselves in Borno and Yusuf took advantage of such situations to increase the group's influence in local politics, Boko Haram thrived. Akinola (2015) also argues that addressing the needs of Nigerian citizens may help build trust in the state again, which could effectively thwart Boko Haram; according Akinola (2015, 21), "the battle against Boko Haram is a battle for the hearts and minds of Nigerians, many of whom have unfortunately lost hope in the country's ability to live up to its socioeconomic cum political and cultural potentials as Africa's most populous country and largest economy." Similarly, International Crisis Group (2014, ii) notes that, "Able to move fairly freely, these groups are unlikely ever to be completely suppressed, unless the government wins local hearts and minds by implementing fundamental political reforms to address bad governance, corruption and underdevelopment."

It is possible that state repression or retaliation by the Nigerian government against the group also affects risk of terrorism. Regarding state repression, Akinola (2015) points to the role of a long-standing pattern of state violence in creating distrust and lack of cooperation with authorities among citizens. In addition, while the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor has recently recommended war crimes and crimes and humanity investigations against Boko Haram, the Prosecutor also noted that Nigerian Security Forces are likely responsible for similar crimes during the Boko Haram conflict and should also be investigated (BBC News 2020). Other sources also indicate numerous extrajudicial killings, excessive use of force, sexual and gender-

based violence, human trafficking, and other crimes against civilians, including vulnerable populations such as the elderly, women, and children, perpetrated by Nigerian security forces and government-affiliated militias such as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), formed to help combat Boko Haram, which may also foment terrorism in the state (United States Department of State 2019a, 2020; Amnesty International 2020; International Crisis Group 2014).

In terms of the effects of government retaliation, under Shekau's leadership after Yusuf's execution and a crackdown by security forces, the group increased its use of suicide attacks and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) along with attacks against civilians, significantly increasing its lethality (Akinola 2015; International Crisis Group 2014). However, according to ACLED (2019, n.p.), "The prevalence of violence against civilians, as compared to clashes with state security forces, suggests that Boko Haram is in greater control of where and when it engages in violent activities in 2019 than in 2016." ACLED (2019) notes that this surge in civilian casualties followed more engagements with the Nigerian military in late 2018 but does not appear to indicate diminishment of Boko Haram's overall capacity for violence. While one theory argues that increasing attacks against civilians suggests weakness on the part of militant groups, particularly in terms of their abilities to attack military targets, Boko Haram's recent successes in overrunning military outposts and reports of security forces retreating ahead of Boko Haram arrivals in some areas suggest that the group, despite a loss in territory since 2015, remains potent (ACLED 2019; Searcey 2019).

Some also argue that religious factors play a strong role in the development of both gender inequality and Boko Haram. It is worth noting that both Christianity and Islam, the major religions present in Nigeria, endorse various aspects of gender inequality in their doctrines as described above; however, the gender unequal nature of Islam is reflected more clearly in the

North's Penal Code and state laws, including Sharia. Para-Mallam (2010) notes that religion can play a vital role in maintaining the status quo, including a gendered hierarchy of power; in this sense, religious doctrine is used to preserve gender inequality by designating strict gender roles which simultaneously undermine women's equality and authority and evade scrutiny due to divine characterization. Religious doctrine, therefore, may reflect, entrench, and attempt to codify existing patriarchal gender structures in society, rather than newly create such structures. Thus, Boko Haram's commitment to institute strict Sharia law may result at least in part from the extent to which Sharia can be used to legitimate anti-female laws and codes of conduct.

Regarding religious exclusivity and conflict, as Para-Mallam (2010) notes, religion can foment conflict due to strictly kept traditions, resistance to change, and exploitation by elites. Previous insurgencies in Northern Nigeria have incorporated exclusivist and fundamentalist Islamist aspects, including Fodio during the early 1800s and Maitatsine in the 1980s (Akinola 2015; Iyekekpola 2016). For Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf spoke of the group's desire to reform Islam within Nigeria, rid the state of Westernized leaders and influences, and establish strict Sharia law (Iyekekpola 2016). Boko Haram is a Jihadi-Salafist organization with a stated desire to form a caliphate and institute Sharia in the territory it controls as a rejection of the secular Nigerian state as well as other religious groups it considers apostate or corrupt by association, including Sufis, who are more moderate, mystical Muslims (Akinola 2015; Thurston 2017). "A thread of rejectionist thinking runs through northern Nigerian history, according to which collaboration with secular authorities is illegitimate.....many in the far north express political and social dissatisfaction through greater adherence to Islam and increasingly look to the religious canon for solutions to multiple problems in their lives" (International Crisis Group 2010, ii).

However, while Boko Haram often frames its conflict in the context of religion and anti-Western intent, in an extremely telling sign of the importance of gender inequality to Boko Haram's identity, the group, in its 2009 announcement of jihad, listed "the rights and privileges of women" first among a slew of concepts argued as inherent to Western civilization, and therefore forbidden (International Crisis Group 2010, 37). Furthermore, the group's frequent targeting of Muslims alongside Christians argues against an exclusively religious explanation for the conflict (Campbell and McCaslin 2019; Campbell and Harwood 2018; Akinola 2015). Finally, research indicates that ethno-political organizations which embrace gender inclusivity are less likely to become violent, regardless of religious ideology (Asal et al. 2013; Asal, Schulzke, and Pate 2017).

Iykekepolo (2016, 2223) argues for the inadequacy of religious and economic factors in terms of explaining the emergence of Boko Haram in the North, citing the presence of religiously-oriented conflicts as well as economic deprivation throughout Nigeria, and instead favors an explanation that rests on political opportunity, indirectly influenced by socioeconomic and religious dimensions: "The economic situation created frustration, which was framed by sect leaders in a religious light, but this needed to find political opportunity to express itself as insurgency and this opportunity was created by the political actors, just as in previous insurgencies in northern Nigeria." Oriola (2017, 102-103) similarly offers a number of causes to explain Boko Haram's rise, including "motivation of its members to fight against social injustice, ideology of its founder, revenge for the 2009 security crackdown, financial benefits, the failure of the Nigerian state, currents of global religious terrorism, and resistance against perceived Western cultural domination and wars in Muslim countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq."

Thus, this case study suggests several additional control variables which may prove important when included in future works analyzing terrorism, including history of colonization, social services provisions, government repression, and religious conflict. Regarding additional counterarguments generated by this case study, other states or regions in Nigeria may at times or in certain circumstances present as similarly or more gender unequal than Borno, the birthplace of Boko Haram, or the North. The Southern and Middle Belt regions also experience ongoing violence in the form of herder-farmer clashes, separatist conflict, and Niger Delta militancy (Ibaba 2011; International Crisis Group n.d.; Pavlik 2018). While not discounting the presence of both gender inequality and violence in other parts of the state, I contend that the balance of female disempowerment in Nigeria remains tilted firmly toward the North, which, as predicted by my arguments and hypotheses, also exhibits the highest rates of violence. Thus, I argue that evidence presented here demonstrates that the emergence of Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria represents the nexus of gender inequality and terrorism which underlies my theory.

Discussion

This work argues that persistent and disproportionate gender gaps in Nigeria produce “pull,” “push,” and “prevent” factors which motivate and incentivize terrorist violence such as that practiced by Boko Haram. Results largely reflect that of the previous chapter’s statistical analysis, with gender gaps in higher education, paid employment, and multidimensional rights linked to terrorism in Nigeria. As a further test of my hypotheses, I compare regions in Nigeria in terms of both gender parity and risk of violence, finding that regional patterns of gender inequality generally align to the outbreak of terrorist violence. Northern Nigeria exhibits “pull” factors for terrorism through Northern women’s disproportionately unequal status compared not only to men, but also to Southern women in terms of education and reproductive burdens. Economic underdevelopment in the North resulting from women’s underperformance in the

workforce also increases material motivations for joining terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram which offer compensation for fighters, creating compelling “push” factors for terrorism.

Though female political empowerment did not drive terrorism in the models in Chapter 3, women are generally denied leadership roles in Nigerian party politics and in the practice of godfatherism in electoral politics, and Northern women exhibit the lowest rates of political leadership and electoral gains (Mofoluwawo 2014; Makama 2013). These prohibitions on women in political and traditional leadership roles, as I argue in the “prevent” theory, limit diversity of opinion and hinder creative solutions to disputes, increasing the likelihood that tensions will boil over into violent conflicts and that conflicts which erupt will endure longer than otherwise, which may help explain the emergence of Boko Haram, associated splinter groups, and other sources of terrorism in the North. Finally, as argued in Hypothesis 4 and reflected in the findings in Chapter 3, multidimensional discrimination against female rights in Nigeria, especially in terms of legal rights, creates attendant effects of patriarchy which serve to foment a greater risk of terrorism. Where women fail to advance in social, political, and economic rights which sanction their entry into public life, as is particularly true of women in Northern Nigeria, violence is most acute, and terrorist groups are most prolific.

Having examined the violent nature of Boko Haram’s terrorist actions, I argue future research should also explore the likelihood that Boko Haram’s particularly anti-female violent tactics stem from the starkly patriarchal culture of its broader environment. Boko Haram, arising from a gender unequal environment, frequently uses sexual and gender-based violence against women as a means of recruiting and retaining group members, utilizes women in ultimately fatal attack roles (e.g., suicide bombers), targets children as both child soldiers and attack victims, harasses and kills the elderly, and directs attacks against civilians and soft, high-casualty targets.

It is also one of the most violent active terrorist organizations worldwide, having committed over 300 attacks and nearly 2000 fatalities from 2018-2019, lagging only the Taliban, Houthi extremists, and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Miller 2020).

It is possible that the norms of coercion inherent in gender unequal environments lower barriers to indiscriminate violence for these groups as a means of achieving goals and gaining political power; as oppression and violence against “others” is normalized in the broader environment, attacks against soft targets may increase. Having absorbed the norms of gender inequality and the implications of structural violence in their environments of origin, terrorist groups may adopt similar norms of violence against women and other vulnerable actors in society in their rhetoric, territories, and attacks, and link the frequent and broad use of violence to the likelihood of accomplishment of their goals. Kidnapping women and girls for sexual slavery or providing wives to fighters, as Boko Haram does, could extend the gender unequal environment in which the group operates by recreating a gendered hierarchy which the group can exploit both internally (producing cohesion among male members and sourcing females to commit suicide attacks, provide domestic servitude, and bear children to propagate the group) and impose externally upon the group's territory through deleterious effects on the status of women (further reducing women’s socioeconomic and political presence in society relative to men). A study exploring this issue could answer the question of why terrorist organizations perform sexualized and gender-based violence as opposed to other types of violence, and particularly to the depth and consistency of groups such as Boko Haram.

Conclusion

An examination of arguments at work in this case study thus reveals findings which both dovetail with and diverge from statistical findings presented in Chapter 3. In addition, the case study highlights several factors which should be explored further to determine their impacts on

the relationship between gender inequality and terrorism as well as gendered terrorist tactics. I also detail below international, national, state, and local initiatives which seek to close the gender gap in Nigeria, as well as the potential for these to succeed.

Though I discuss these in more detail in the following chapter, Nigeria has undertaken a number of initiatives addressing several gender equality issues which seek to improve the status of women in the state, with varying degrees of success. The Nigerian government has established the Federal Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development (FMWASD), currently headed by a woman, with a broad portfolio of issues focusing on women's affairs and gender equality as well as other vulnerable demographic groups; state-level Ministries of Women Affairs and Gender exist in all states, and gender focal units are also now located in all Federal Ministry, Department and Agencies (MDA's) (FMWASD 2018; FMWASD 2019). Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) is also now emphasizing gender in its data collection practices and reports (FMWASD 2019).

Various policies and programs exist which seek to improve access to education and literacy for girls and women in Nigeria. The 1999 Universal Basic Education policy addressed enrollment in primary and secondary school for every child, while the 2004 Universal Basic Education Act extended access to pre-primary education (British Council Nigeria 2012). Nigeria has also established the Agency for Mass Literacy, and developments such as Smart Women Nigeria, 1000 Girls in Training, and the ICT Girls club represent attempts to reduce the gender information technology gap (FMWASD 2019).

Regarding healthcare and reproductive rights, despite programs and policies such as the National Primary Healthcare Development Agency, Midwives Services Scheme, Community Health Influencers, Promoters and Services (CHIPS), and the revised National Health Policy

(2017), all designed to increase access to primary and maternal healthcare for Nigerian women (particularly in rural areas) as well as collect healthcare data, Nigerian healthcare funding lags more than two times behind the 15% the state had pledged to spend in 2001, representing less than 4% of GDP; other obstacles to these programs include a need for states' cooperation, lack of skilled medical personnel and necessary equipment, and inadequate data collection (FMWASD 2006; FMWASD 2019; World Bank 2021).

Regarding female participation in the economy, Nigeria has introduced several programs in recent years to assist women in economic development, though many of these programs exhibit a dearth of female influence in program development (FMWASD 2019). The Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Fund (MSMEDF) seeks to assist women with micro-business opportunities, and a number of credit and loan programs have proliferated to increase women's access to financing, including the Business Development Fund for Women (BUDFOW), the Women Fund for Economic Empowerment (WOFEE), the Central Bank's Financial Inclusion Policy, the Government Enterprise and Empowerment Programme (GEEP), and the TraderMoni program, which specifically targets micro-business owners; BUDFOW and WOFEE are exclusively female-oriented programs (FMWASD 2019).

In terms of access to land and property ownership, FMWASD (2019) notes a number of government-sponsored programs in progress meant to spur female success in agriculture and food production through added access to jobs, credit, education, and training, including gender-specific attributes of the Agriculture Promotion Policy, the Anchor Borrowers Programme' (ABP), Livelihood Improvement Family Enterprise (LIFE), Youth and Women in Agriculture Business Investment Programme, and the Women's Economic Empowerment through Climate Resilient Agriculture (WEE CRA) program. State-level programs, such as those established in

Kaduna, Jigawa, Borno, and Akwa Ibom, have provided women with new equipment and skills to gain agriculture-based employment (FAO n.d.). In addition to the agriculture-oriented programs as well as direct cash transfers to economically vulnerable women, the 2018 World Bank-sponsored “Nigeria for Women Project,” seeks to assist women with networking and economic entry, particularly rural women (FMWASD 2019).

Regarding political empowerment, though the NGP (FMWASD 2006) calls for a 35% quota for women in appointed and elected political positions, Nigeria remains far from achieving that goal, particularly in terms of elected positions (Para-Mallam 2010). Programs which seek to help women succeed in electoral politics include the Nigerian Women’s Trust Fund, regional women’s political empowerment offices, “100 Women Lobby Group,” and “Committees of Women in Parliament” (FMWASD 2019, 20 & 22). Women have also increased their share of party nominations for federal House and Senate seats, and parties have begun waiving fees for female candidates in general elections (FMWASD 2019).

The HeforShe program, launched in 2017 as a FMWASD/UN Women project, seeks to engage male leaders in the gender equality effort, and has succeeded in attracting the support of federal and state politicians in both the North and South, as well as traditional, religious, and business leaders, facilitating women's representation in traditional councils in certain areas (FMWASD 2019). Women have made some progress in entry into the Nigerian security forces, though their numbers remain generally low, particularly in leadership roles. The Nigerian military now has an Army Women Corps, and the police and Defence Academy have created female-specific training and recruitment programs (FMWASD 2019). A National Action Plan was also created in 2017 to address the unique roles women can play in conflict negotiation and prevention in Nigeria.

While the Nigerian government and civil society groups, along with partners such as Norway, the European Union, and the United Nations, have created programs to monitor domestic violence rates, shelter domestic violence victims, provide legal assistance, and publicize information on and ensure compliance with existing child marriage and FGM/FGC laws, many programs the state has launched to combat the various sources of violence against women in Nigeria, including domestic violence, child marriage, trafficking, and insurgent violence, have met with limited success (FMWASD 2019).

The degree to which patriarchy is reflected in national and regional laws and the variation in those laws introduced by Nigeria's federalist system particularly stymies gender equality initiatives (FMWASD 2019). The tripartite legal system gives states considerable power to reject federal laws and closely integrate ethnic, religious, and customary traditions into regional and state law, allowing Northern states to implement Sharia law and Southern states to continue traditional practices which civil law otherwise prohibits. Individual states may also institute more permissive or stricter laws concerning gender equality and women's empowerment, such as anti-trafficking statutes in Edo or anti-domestic violence legislation in Jigawa. As with land reform, Nigerian women face obstacles including long-standing customs and traditions, influential religious and community leaders, and a complex legal landscape in terms of achieving substantive progress on culturally sensitive issues such as minimum marriage ages and eradication of FGM/FGC; many of the government's ongoing initiatives and future goals in areas such as domestic violence, child marriage, and FGM/FGC rely on legal efforts that have limited national scope (such as the VAPP or Child Rights Act), or focus on monitoring and tracking efforts (FMWASD 2019). Nigeria's report on the status of the state 25 years after signing onto the Beijing Platform speaks to the enduring nature of patriarchal norms, attitudes, and structures

in Nigeria, noting that even the phrase “gender equality” continues to generate hostility in some areas (FMWASD 2019).

A final significant obstacle to gender equality efforts in Nigeria ironically stems from the ongoing violence in the state, particularly in the Northeast where insurgent activity by Boko Haram and ISWAP endangers millions of citizens and prevents effective governance (FMWASD 2019). “Insecurity in the North East, and the gender distortions that come with it such as high numbers of internally displaced persons, high incidence of gender violence, erosion of livelihoods and feminized poverty, etc., have undermined national progress towards realizing gender equality commitments” (FMWASD 2019, 56). Nigerian authorities have sought to work with regional and global partners to facilitate security and humanitarian assistance to those suffering from gender-based violence in Northern states as a result of insurgent activities, such as transit centers providing social services to women previously held by Boko Haram. Thus, efforts to stem violence throughout the state, particularly in the North, could enable implementation of gender equality initiatives which should have a long-term effect on peace and counterterrorism

While certain aspects of life in Northeastern Nigeria aim to return to normal in the wake of Boko Haram’s recent loss of territory there, including local sports and markets, the region is hardly free from the risk of ongoing Boko Haram terrorism and insurgency (Egbejule 2019). The group has remained active and lethal even as it has lost territory and proved able to withstand fragmentation in its organization. Boko Haram has stepped up attacks in the Northeast in recent years using increasingly sophisticated weaponry, overwhelmed Nigerian security forces at times, produced significant civilian casualties, and extended its reach into the Northwest. The group has also expanded its attacks into neighboring states in the Lake Chad region. The Boko Haram conflict, combined with ongoing bandit violence and herder-farmer clashes in the Northwest and

Northcentral regions, represents a severe security crisis for Nigeria which threatens to create widespread destabilization for the state, amplifying the erroneousness of President Buhari's declaration in 2015 that Boko Haram had been "technically defeated" (Egbejule 2019, n.p.).

As might be expected, "The insurgency context in North Eastern Nigeria has not only exacerbated existing gender disparities but led to the emergence of new ones" (FMWASD 2019, 7). Boko Haram's targeting of girls' education, along with kidnapping and impregnation of women and girls, is likely to perpetuate and aggravate already below-average girls' attendance and completion rates in the North, widening the education and literacy gap between girls and boys and the human capital gap between the North and South. Communities may shun women who experience such violence or who joined, married into, or were abducted by Boko Haram, contributing to alienation and lack of opportunities for women to reintegrate into society (United States Department of State 2020; Oduah 2016; Nwaubani 2018; Bloom and Matfess 2016; Searcey 2020). Boko Haram's rampant use of female suicide bombers has also increased overall suspicion of women, such that some have been killed by mobs because they are believed to be potential suicide attackers (Markovic 2019). Such dynamics exacerbate the pre-existing deprivation of women in education, jobs, and political roles. According to Oriola (2017, 112), "The combination of physical, sexual, and psychological abuse of the women and girls in the hands of Boko Haram and their material deprivation in conventional society therefore reinforces their second-class status."

Other contemporary examples of deadly terrorist and insurgent groups emerging in gender unequal environments include the Taliban in Afghanistan, Islamic State, Houthi extremists in Yemen, and Al Shabaab in Somalia, with the Taliban and Islamic State responsible for similarly heinous, widespread anti-female attacks and numerous attacks against soft targets

and civilians. These along with Boko Haram are among the most lethal and active terrorist groups currently operating worldwide. Thus, efforts must be undertaken to understand the links between gender and conflict and combat the rise of such groups and their tactics. This work seeks to contribute to these efforts through the foregoing case study on Boko Haram which I argue is illustrative of my theory on the “push,” “pull,” and “prevent” factors underlying the relationship between gender inequality and terrorism and which acts as “on the ground” case useful in examining the impacts of variables of interest as well as control variables included in models presented in Chapter 3. Findings here often support those models’ findings, indicating that gender gaps in higher education, paid employment, and rights and freedoms are linked to the outbreak of terrorism, including the emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria, and should be further studied and incorporated in counterterrorism initiatives.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

I have argued in this work that the WPS and terrorism literatures have until recently generally neglected gender inequality as a structural antecedent to terrorism, despite extant literature which supports a relationship between gender parity and conflict mitigation as well as increasing calls for the integration of gender measures into counterterrorism agendas and initiatives among scholars and policymakers. I have sought to address this gap in the literature with this dissertation, which proposes and tests a theory which argues that the implications of socioeconomic and political gender gaps drive the development of terrorist groups and the proliferation of terrorist attacks.

I refer to the factors which underlie this theory as “pull,” “push,” and “prevent” factors. “Pull” factors reflect the legitimization of marginalization and violence among individuals and groups seeking power resulting from oppression against women, which limits female autonomy and promotes the diffusion of anti-female norms throughout society. The downstream effects in terms of economic underdevelopment and marriage market distortions due to women’s disempowerment in the economy in patriarchal societies create material incentives for political violence which form the basis of my theory’s “push” factors. Finally, “prevent” factors reference the extent to which women’s exclusion from public life erodes barriers to conflict by limiting transparency, competition, and efficiency in political and security matters. I further outline specific dimensions of female empowerment, including both rights and forms of participation in social, political, and economic arenas, which I argue best reflect the arguments underlying my theory, and develop four testable hypotheses corresponding to my theory and arguments.

In Chapters 3 and 4, I present empirical findings which indicate at least partial support for hypotheses corresponding to “pull” and “push” factors, demonstrating impacts on terrorist

incidents and groups for factors such as higher education, completion of education, unemployment, paid work, agency, legal rights, and social rights for women. According to my findings, when women receive higher education, complete schooling, engage in wage and salary work, and achieve equal rights, particularly in social and legal areas related to marriage and family dynamics, the risk of terrorism declines, while increases in female unemployment lead to higher rates of terrorism. Results of robustness checks indicate that both paid work and the right to divorce are robustly associated with reductions in attacks as well as groups. Incidence rate ratios attained from the statistical models reveal relatively larger substantive impacts on terrorism for economic and education variables compared to rights-oriented measures.

Other findings fail to support my theory and arguments. For example, contrary to the predictions of my “prevent” argument, I do not find a relationship between female political leadership and terrorism. In addition, female primary school enrollment appears to relate positively to terrorist incidents, contradicting my “pull” argument; however, as noted, this finding has precedent in the literature. Other “pull” theory measures, including literacy and fertility rates, do not appear to drive terrorism. In addition, regarding “push” factors, though unemployment and paid labor relate to terrorism, labor participation rates for women do not, and while supervisory roles for women appear to reduce incidents, the measure does not demonstrate robustness. Finally, the brideprice measure generally fails to achieve statistical significance and contradicts predictions as the sign of the coefficient is negative; however, as discussed in Chapter 3, this finding may reflect potential measurement error. I also find that neither economic nor political rights for women appear to relate significantly to terrorism.

Overall, findings from statistical models indicate a relationship between certain “pull” and “push” factors which increase risk of terrorism, particularly those which impinge on female

autonomy, economic empowerment, and legal and social rights. Results from my case study on the emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria, presented in Chapter 4, largely reflect findings from the statistical models, indicating that gender gaps in higher education, paid employment, and multidimensional rights are linked to the development of Boko Haram. Findings from a comparison of regions in Nigeria in terms of both gender parity and risk of violence reveal that regional patterns of gender inequality generally align to the outbreak of terrorist violence, with Northern Nigeria disproportionately exhibiting “pull,” “push,” and “prevent” factors for terrorism in terms of education inequities, reproductive burdens, economic marginalization, political disempowerment, and multilayered discriminations against female rights.

My findings also indicate substantive impacts on terrorism for several control variables, such as regime type and state capacity, which dovetail with previous research. While strong, these impacts do not fully eclipse the relative impacts of my variables of interest, several of which present as robust and highly statistically significant and have the potential in some cases to cut rates of terrorist incidents and groups by half. These findings indicate that while factors such as national capability and history of conflict may produce greater relative impacts on terrorism, gender equality can reduce the number of attacks that occur and groups that form for a given state, reinforcing state stability and security as well as saving lives. For a state such as Nigeria, which exhibits gender inequality and observed nearly 2,000 fatalities attributed to Boko Haram’s terrorist violence in 2019 (ranking second in the world), the implications of this study may have particular salience for future security and counterterrorism agendas (Miller 2020).

Though I have attempted to gather representative data from reliable sources for gender equality measures, terrorism attacks and groups, and control variables, I acknowledge that data availability hinders aspects of this study, and my models and findings may be subject to issues

such as measurement error. For certain states in certain time periods, particularly during times of conflict or in authoritarian regimes, data collection efforts for an array of variables may be hindered, possibly introducing bias into the data. For any state, data collection efforts for certain variables with potentially sensitive implications, such as adolescent fertility rates or female political participation, which primarily rely on state-provided data may be suspect. For variables such as brideprice, data are imprecise and lacking in time scope; findings regarding these measures are to be regarded with caution, and further analysis is required when additional data with time variation are available. Regarding the case study, while I have collected data from a variety of sources, including widely-used datasets such as the Global Terrorism Database (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START], University of Maryland 2021) and World Development Indicators (World Bank 2021), state and local authorities, international and local media sources, and academic researchers, as a means of generating reliable measures for variables and confidence in findings, use of secondary sources has the potential to introduce bias into the case through measurement error or misinterpretation.

As noted in Chapter 3, the GTD terrorism data used here, while improving over many alternatives, introduces a level of uncertainty regarding testing my hypotheses given the coding of states and perpetrator groups in the attack data; as noted previously, I have attempted to mitigate this issue by conducting robustness checks which limit the data to domestic attacks and groups, and I expect that in a full coding of GTD data, the ratio of domestic-to-transnational attacks would continue to heavily favor domestic attacks, which I argue lends support to the veracity of the findings in the main incidents and groups models.

Despite these potential issues with the data and models, I argue that the findings presented here regarding the effect of gender inequality on terrorism act as valuable

contributions to the academic and policymaking communities. This work seeks to add to the WPS literature through investigating the relationship between both rights and manifestations of female empowerment and terrorism as a means of testing my theory regarding “pull,” “push,” and “prevent” factors; findings indicate at least partial support for several associated hypotheses, contributing to the broader WPS collection of theories on gender and conflict.

I also attempt to add to both the WPS and terrorism literatures by testing my theory on terrorist incidents as well as groups, which few works exploring the relationship between gender and terrorism have done. My findings indicate an overlap in gender-related causes of terrorist incidents and groups, particularly regarding education, wage and salary work, and social rights, but not homogeneity; thus, in some cases female empowerment measures more substantively relate to incidents as opposed to groups (such as youth unemployment) while others appear to affect group formation more so than incidents (such as rights). This finding deserves further attention given implications for WPS theories as well as terrorism studies. Though I have tested the theory here that gender-related measures drive the development of both incidents and groups in similar ways, it is possible that environmental and organizational dynamics related to terrorism further shape these relationships, which future works may explore in greater detail.

My findings may also have implications for the policymaking community and future counterterrorism initiatives. As some policymakers have in the past argued that gender inequality is a strong determinant of conflict and terrorism, this study has attempted to demonstrate empirically which types of female empowerment have the most salient and robust relationships with terrorism, finding that while not all aspects of gender inequality appear to relate to terrorism, some appear to substantively affect both attack rates and proliferation of groups. This study also points out potential problem areas among gender issues, like primary school

enrollment, which deserve more careful assessment, treatment, and further research. Thus, while I argue that gender equality is a universal human right deserving of policymaking attention and initiatives, the results of this study demonstrate that not all women's rights and empowerment measures appear to mitigate terrorism; certain facets of gender inequality relate more strongly and consistently to terrorism than others, and the policymaking community may receive greater benefits in terms of counterterrorism efficacy by focusing on and directing resources to these areas when considering such projects.

As noted, findings from this work suggest several future research avenues. Beyond those already described, future works could explore more granular effects of gender inequality on terrorism. While GTD (START 2019) provides precise location data for attacks when possible, including longitude and latitude, such exact geo-coded data for gender-related measures is often unavailable; however, the ability to demonstrate a link between gender dynamics in specific communities with localized attack data would constitute a robust test of the theory that gender inequality drives terrorism. Moreover, future works could measure the impact of changes in female empowerment measures as well as levels on terrorism; it is possible that major shifts in gender parity create analogously large changes in incentives and disincentives for terrorism. Also possible is a long-term effect of gender equality: While I employ one-year lags for my variables of interest in models here, additional data enabling longer lag times for these variables may reveal stronger links between female empowerment and terrorism as the benefits from gender equality consolidate and accrue over time.

Further, as Harris and Milton (2016) observe in their work, additional research is needed to explore the possibility of a nonlinear relationship between gender equality and terrorism. For instance, I argue here that economic underdevelopment resulting from women's absence from

the workforce increases material motivations for joining terrorist organizations, such that increasing women's economic participation decreases the risk of terrorism; however, particularly for poor societies, women's entry into the workforce may displace men from jobs, especially where women are paid less than men for the same work, resulting in a potential backlash against women's empowerment and increasing material incentives to engage in terrorism for men; such a dynamic may also create a nonlinear relationship between gender inequality and terrorism, in which increases in women's economic participation create an initial spike in terrorist activity, followed by a long-term mitigating effect. Moves toward gender equality, particularly those perceived as promulgated by foreign ideologies or resources, could have a negative impact, if only temporarily, in terms of increasing resentment in the general population and providing recruits for terrorist organizations. While in the long-term gender equality may have a pacifying effect on terrorism, in the short-term such changes in society could instead provoke a violent reaction, temporarily enhancing the risk from terrorist organizations. As with the relationship between female labor force participation and terrorism, it is important to further investigate the possibility of nonlinear effects on terrorism for other variables representing the various facets of gender inequality.

These considerations, along with the findings presented here, also have ramifications for domestic and foreign aid projects related to gender parity. Results demonstrating a robust dampening effect on terrorism for higher education, paid work, and social rights could signify that aid and development assistance in these sectors may be effective tools for combating terrorism, as these projects reduce discrimination and improve development. However, particularly for foreign aid, as noted above, such projects may also carry the potential for local backlash, both in terms of perception of foreign interference in traditional community and social

dynamics as well as the possibility of the public misconstruing such aid as support for an unpopular domestic government.

This work also suggests several gender measures which, due to constraints of space and data availability, were not included in models here but are deserving of further review in future works. For instance, case study findings indicate that traditional community leadership and region or district-level political leadership opportunities for females, in addition to or instead of national political leadership, may help mitigate terrorism. Furthermore, while CIRI data used in this work provide a measure of the provision and implementation of political participation rights for women, more comprehensive data indicating the extent to which women engage in politics in terms of voting, petitioning, and protesting, among other acts, may help determine if differences arise regarding effects on terrorism when examining gender gaps in participation in politics as opposed to leadership roles (Cingranelli and Richards 2014).

Regarding null findings here for political and economic rights for women, it is possible that such rights are offered to females in name only, undermining women's abilities to exercise their stated rights and matriculate in society, or that contradictions in the law, such as that observed in Nigeria, render effective implementation of female-centric laws quite difficult where such laws exist. Though I attempt to address this issue by utilizing variables from the CIRI rights dataset which measure both the extension and the execution of female economic, political, and social rights, data which more fully explore the degree to which stated rights for women are realized throughout society may shed additional light on the ways in which both state and non-state barriers to equal rights and legal freedoms for women precipitate violence.

Data which attempt to investigate attitudes towards the value of women or rates of domestic violence are also important (though difficult) to collect, as they may help further test

the “pull” theory which argues that gender inequality in social autonomy is reflective of structural violence and anti-female norms. Studies exploring the impact of the number of women in informal and unpaid labor on terrorism may provide an interesting corollary for the robust relationship found here between female wage and salary workers and terrorist incidents as well as groups, potentially further supporting the “push” theory; this is supported by the large numbers of women in Nigeria engaged in informal, unpaid, and vulnerable labor (National Bureau of Statistics [NBS] 2010; Federal Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development [FMWASD] 2019; British Council Nigeria 2012).

Information on female landowners is also useful in determining the extent to which women are economically vulnerable, particularly in states with large agriculture sectors or insecure land and property rights regimes; again, the findings of the case study support the potential relevance of such a variable for terrorism risk, as Nigerian women, particularly in the North, exhibit disproportionately poor access to land in terms of ownership or management (British Council Nigeria 2012; Slavchevska et al. 2016) Though data are scarce currently, comprehensive data collection efforts on female genital mutilation or circumcision (FGM/FGC) and polygyny rates would also aid in testing my arguments, as FGM/FGC rates could indicate violations of female bodily autonomy and disproportionate health burdens, while polygyny rates may reflect additional marriage market distortions beyond brideprice which could increase financial incentives to join terrorist organizations. Further, case study results indicate that in future works, additional factors related to reproductive burdens and lack of adequate access to healthcare, such as prenatal care and maternal mortality rates, should be analyzed, as they may present as significant drivers of terrorism.

Finally, as I noted in the previous chapter, my research on Boko Haram indicates that the group's extreme use of violence, including sexual and gender-based violence, attacks against children and the elderly, and frequent use of suicide terrorism, may also stem from the implications of my theory regarding the impact of gender unequal environments on terrorist violence. Some qualitative studies have traced the ways in which extremist or insurgent groups adopt particularly anti-female tactics and strategies, including gender-based violence. Díaz and Valji (2019, 46) argue, in reference to Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, the Taliban, and Islamic State, that "the violation of women's rights also plays a role in the tactics of these organizations, not just their ideology," noting the extensive violence perpetrated by these groups against women, such as restrictions of movement, curtailment of rights, kidnappings, forced marriages, trafficking of women and girls, sexual slavery, and use of females as suicide bombers. Boko Haram's use of indiscriminate violence against vulnerable actors may demonstrate the imprint of gender unequal environments on not only the formation of terrorist groups, but also strategies and tactics. Studies which address this issue would contribute not only to the WPS literature, but also to theories on organizational dynamics of terrorist groups, including targeting choices, by expanding upon notions of acceptable types of violence among groups.

As discussed in the case study, future works should also address the attendant issue of which methods are most effective for closing gender gaps in the identified areas of interest as a means of counterterrorism. For instance, expanding on the proposals of some politicians and lawmakers, gendered foreign aid could act as a potentially effective counterterrorism strategy in terms of a non-violent means of creating gender parity (as opposed to more controversial measures, such as house demolitions and drone strikes); such aid could, ostensibly, be more cost-effective regarding long-term success. State and local interventions, such as gender quotas in

political institutions, adoption of international agreements related to improving women's rights, and engagement with traditional and religious leaders on gender issues, may also prove effective at closing gender gaps and reducing terrorism. Nigeria has undertaken several gender parity initiatives in recent years to enhance the status of women; mixed outcomes resulting from these agendas and projects, as detail below, may have implications for other states similarly characterized by patriarchy which seek to reduce risk of terrorism by addressing inequality.

Regarding specific interventions, adoption of international agreements related to improving women's rights, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) or the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, may reflect government endorsement of gender equality. In terms of international agreements, Nigeria has ratified CEDAW, adopted the Beijing Platform, endorsed the Maputo Protocol, and ratified the Palermo Protocol (Bako and Syed 2018; FMWASD 2019; United States Department of State 2020). However, the case study demonstrates that the extent to which the domestic landscape of laws and traditions, including state, religious, and customary laws, impinges on the domestication of international conventions such as CEDAW also matters, as this may serve to undermine the government's international commitments. Reconciling federal and state laws and ensuring federal law trumps state law in cases of difference, harmonizing the Criminal and Penal codes, reducing any mandatory jurisdiction of religious or customary law, expanding federal acts guaranteeing protections for women to all states, and ensuring full implementation of and compliance with international agreements all appear integral to guaranteeing equal rights for Nigerian women and thus reducing risk of terrorism.

In terms of political empowerment, quotas which seek to improve women's representation, particularly in legislative bodies, remain one potential pathway to gender

equality. Beaman et al. (2009) notes that gender quotas imposed in India for village councils resulted in more women elected to office by changing attitudes toward female politicians. Huber (2019, 2300) argues that the quota represents a “signal sent by the government...that it supports gender equality. Therefore, the presence of women alone in government may not be sufficient...but that additional societal and governmental commitments to gender equality is necessary.” However, as with international conventions, the case of Nigeria points to the shortcomings of gender quotas in terms of insufficient compliance. Nigeria remains far from achieving the NGP’s goal of a 35% quota in appointed and elected political positions for women, particularly in terms of elected positions (FMWASD 2006; Para-Mallam 2010).

Nigeria and its civil society and global partners are engaging in a number of initiatives to bolster female political participation and leadership, with some gains reported from these efforts regarding female electoral participation (FMWASD 2019). However, significant difficulties persist for females seeking political leadership roles in Nigeria. While parties have begun waiving fees for female candidates in general elections, women still encounter the obstacles of vote-buying and godfatherism in which they are poorly positioned to compete compared to men, as well as other political party actions which systematically disadvantage them, such as late meeting times (FMWASD 2019). In addition, as Para-Mallam’s (2010, 469) reference to “soft portfolios” for Nigerian female officeholders and party members denotes, while more women running for and winning or being appointed to office signifies progress, the status of the office and opportunities for wielding substantial power and influence in political affairs for women are key as well. For instance, given the importance of agriculture to Nigeria’s economy and the numerous ways in which women contribute to farming and food security in the country, the appointment of a female Agriculture Minister would represent major symbolic and substantive

advancement for women (Ogunlela and Mukhtar 2009). Given Nigeria's federalist structure, the election of female governors would also provide significant opportunities to influence state political agendas, legal environments, and social practices.

Regarding sources of violence against women, the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in persons (NAPTIP) was created to investigate potential human trafficking cases and provide support to victims, with operations in every state in Nigeria; however, NAPTIP has met with mixed success in its mission, carrying out hundreds of investigations and making arrests in dozens of cases of human trafficking, but achieving only 27 convictions from April 2019 to March 2020, nearly half the previous year's convictions (FMWASD 2019; United States Department of State 2020). NAPTIP has faced obstacles ranging from lack of resources to help victims of human trafficking, inadequate presence in rural areas, interagency coordination problems, and judicial corruption in meeting its goals, and while NAPTIP has improved in terms of convicting government officials for human trafficking crimes and creating a registry of sex offenders and traffickers in 2019, it has failed to investigate recent claims of human trafficking in camps for the internally displaced (United States Department of State 2020). In addition, women and children who are likely trafficking victims of Boko Haram have been held by the Nigerian government on suspicion of criminal acts in contradiction to Nigerian law concerning treatment of crimes committed by victims of human traffickers (United States Department of State 2020). This treatment may be related to a broader social phenomenon in Nigeria in which girls and women who are married to Boko Haram fighters are treated with suspicion by their communities after they return (Oduah 2016; Nwaubani 2018; Bloom and Matfess 2016).

In terms of literacy and education, while gender gaps persist in higher education, completion of education, and literacy, progress has been made on parity in school enrollment,

particularly at the primary level; this is likely due at least in part to the 2003 Child Rights Act, which mandates free primary education for all (FMWASD 2019). Education legislation and programs which are female-specific or feature gender components include: 1986 Blueprint on Women's Education; 1991 National Commission for Mass Literacy and Non-Formal Education; 1994 Family Support Basic Education Programme; 2001 National Policy on Women; and the 2004 Girls' Education Project. Indicative of the dire effects of ongoing insurgency in the North on female education, such as the 2014 abduction of hundreds of Chibok schoolgirls by Boko Haram, the Nigerian government has worked with partners such as UNICEF in recent years to establish or rebuild girls' schools and vocational programs in the North, including the Girls' Education Programme, G4G Initiative, and the Safe School Initiative (FMWASD 2019).

It is important to know how direct the link may be between education and formal or informal employment, income improvements, and overall economic progress for women, as this will speak to the potential effectiveness of gendered education initiatives and programs. Despite several such programs in Nigeria, Para-Mallam (2010) argues that lack of female input on education policy has perpetuated a gender-biased system, indicating that substantial women's participation in education programs is likely necessary to achieve true progress. British Council Nigeria's (2012, 15) findings on the disconnect between women's education levels and employment as well as income compared to men demonstrate that these programs may not be enough to truly affect the status of women: "Quite clearly, it is not straightforward in Nigeria to improve income by means of educational qualifications; structural barriers will need to shift before education can make a difference for women." For example, the finding that women working in informal labor are also likely to be more educated demonstrates that women from all educational backgrounds are looking to the informal sector for jobs and income, despite its issues

with lack of regulation and instability, indicating, as British Council Nigeria (2012) notes, the inadequacy of higher education in facilitating women's employment and higher incomes. Similarly, Para-Mallam (2010, 474) notes, "access to education, crucial as it may be for enhancing the social status and improving the material conditions of Nigerian women, is not sufficient to produce gender equality unless fundamental steps are taken to address prevalent cultural and religious gender bias."

For instance, while programs have aided Nigerian women in agriculture, such as the nearly 2500 women who have received assistance through the Youth and Women in Agriculture program, the FMWASD (2019, 25) appears to concede the difficulties in confronting gender gaps in land access by advocating a "phased approach" to reforms regarding female land ownership, agricultural usage, and decision-making centered on negotiations for female land use, ostensibly with local male leaders. These leaders' roles are outsized in agriculture and land use in Nigeria; thus, in those cases where reforms might occur, women will likely still face obstacles to advancement related to patriarchal norms even if the legal or economic landscapes are changed (Ogunlela and Mukhtar 2009; Sada, Adamu, and Ahmad 2006). In a state such as Nigeria, where agriculture is a major part of the economy (nearly 22% of GDP in 2019), disputes over land are common, and patrilineal traditions are deeply entrenched, many would see land holdings as too valuable to risk ownership transfer to women and too upsetting to long-standing customs (World Bank 2021; Slavchevska et al. 2016; Bako and Syed 2018; Ogunlela and Mukhtar 2009).

In terms of economic initiatives for women beyond agriculture and land reform, the National Centre for Women's Development has created vocational programs to facilitate employment for women in areas such as catering and tourism (FMWASD 2019). While not female-specific, ongoing reforms to the Nigerian tax system meant to increase overall

compliance may help mitigate disproportionate tax burdens on women and ensure access to tax relief. Women also have a voice in federal policy, as a female currently heads the Ministry of Finance, Budget and National Planning, though few women sit on the National Economic Council (Ministry of Budget and National Planning 2020; FMWASD 2019). However, women face difficulties in accessing or fully realizing the benefits of many of the government's economic assistance programs – women with home-based businesses are often deemed ineligible, and high interest rates and lack of awareness keep others away (FMWASD 2019).

More broadly, Nigeria has committed to several programs, domestically and in conjunction with international partners, to help bridge the gender gap, though numerous hurdles remain. FMWASD (2019) argues that female-oriented NGOs, activists, and civil society organizations have been crucial in expanding women's rights and opportunities in Nigeria, due in particular to their work with traditional leaders. In terms of international commitments, Nigeria has partnered with regional and international organizations such as the African Union, African Development Bank, United Nations (and affiliated organizations such as the UNDP and UNICEF), and World Bank, to increase information and best-practices sharing, monitoring of agreements, and program funding to achieve goals set both domestically through national initiatives as well as globally through agreements such as CEDAW, the Beijing Platform, and the Maputo Protocol. In addition, Nigeria has developed gender-oriented Memoranda of Understanding with several bilateral state partners (FMWASD 2019).

One area in which Nigeria has sought to increase capacity is through comprehensive data collection efforts and studies on gender issues, the status of women, and implementation of gender equality initiatives. In conjunction with international partners, the National Center for Women Development (NCWD), housed within FMWASD, also established the National Gender

Data Bank (NGDB) in 2006 to collect gender-specific data across sectors (FMWASD 2019). These data compilation efforts, though hindered by uneven information reporting across sectors, may influence national and local budgeting processes, which could have important impacts on the status of women across Nigeria. Recent national budgets have recorded increases in funding to support initiatives such as direct cash transfers for women, as well as more money for programs to address maternal health and women in agriculture (FMWASD 2019).

However, “limited involvement by the private sector, insufficient government budgetary allocations and short - term donor support have consistently limited the capacity of state and national gender machineries to meet up with their annual targets” (FMWASD 2019, 56). Inconsistencies and shortfalls in budgets for gender-oriented programs create uncertainties and hinder abilities to undertake major reforms. For instance, to address the gender gap in education, Para-Mallam (2010) advocates reforming the education system to feature gender mainstreaming, through addressing gendered language (including in religious texts and folktales); training education professionals, traditional leaders, and religious authorities on gender bias; and tackling sexual assault and violence in schools. Such reforms will likely require substantial local and federal resources.

Speaking to the difficulties in realizing gender parity which are likely to affect all patriarchal societies, initiatives which could reduce political, social, and economic gaps between men and women, such as undertaking land and property rights reforms or shifting anti-female attitudes, will require not only economic support, but grassroots cooperation in communities across Nigeria, and are likely to encounter resistance from traditional and religious leaders as well as legal and budgetary challenges. As the NGP (FMWASD 2006, n.p.) notes, “A major task is how best to confront patriarchy, exacerbated in the culture of male supremacy. The patriarchal

cultural norm remains obscured and protected within traditional institutional structures held in abeyance, and almost in sacredness.” Where gender equality laws and programs do exist, barriers to their efficacy “include a failure to domesticate the laws in some states, insufficient funding and gender capacity deficits within key government institutions particularly state and local government levels respectively” (FMWASD 2019, 57). Further, the implications of marked differences in the law indicate that states are currently better-positioned relative to the federal government in terms of meaningfully affecting the status of Nigerian women, as the NGP (FMWASD 2006) acknowledges. Thus, for Nigeria as well as other states seeking reforms which will achieve gender parity, while numerous structural and logistical obstacles may confront such reforms, states and their partners have a wide range of options for implementing agendas, projects, and laws designed to improve the status of females.

In conclusion, as scholars and policymakers attempt to determine which methods of counterterrorism may prevent a terrorist group’s formation or future attacks, it is useful to develop comprehensive strategies involving substantive initiatives supported by empirical evidence, to which this dissertation contributes. My findings indicate that states should invest in women’s empowerment, particularly in terms of higher education, paid employment, and social rights and autonomy (especially regarding the family and household) to mitigate risk of terrorism for both incidents and groups. Additional research can further indicate the best ways in which policymakers could utilize gender equality initiatives as part of a long-term, multifaceted counterterrorism strategy incorporating other measures which this study indicates relate strongly to terrorism, including state capacity, prior conflict, regime type, and national wealth. This dissertation contributes to both the terrorism and WPS literatures by theorizing and demonstrating a link between gender inequality and risk for terrorism and suggesting additional

ideas for domestic and transnational terrorism studies, further expanding the ways in which academic works can inform policymaking and influence peace and conflict dynamics.

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Appendix

Table 2					
Incidents of Terrorism					
<i>H1: Social autonomy</i>					
<i>Primary enrollment (net)</i> _{T-1}	.021 (.007)**				
<i>Secondary enrollment (net)</i> _{T-1}		-.003 (.010)			
<i>Tertiary enrollment (gross)</i> _{T-1}			-.019 (.006)**		
<i>Completed primary</i> _{T-1}				-.023 (.010)*	
<i>Completed secondary</i> _{T-1}					-.021 (.008)*
Polity _{T-1}	.059 (.019)**	.066 (.027)*	.039 (.017)*	.089 (.027)***	.085 (.023)***
Prior conflict _{T-1}	.535 (.082)***	.503 (.149)***	.407 (.084)***	.580 (.136)***	.538 (.106)***
Ethnic fractionalization _{T-1}	1.080 (.528)*	1.086 (.719)	1.256 (.493)*	.177 (.774)	.591 (.609)
CINC (logged) _{T-1}	.691 (.102)***	.836 (.131)***	.910 (.113)***	.879 (.177)***	.676 (.155)***
Land area (logged) _{T-1}	-.036 (.087)	-.080 (.107)	-.153 (.088)	.016 (.125)	.106 (.105)
GDP per capita (logged) _{T-1}	-.429 (.126)***	-.248 (.147)	-.122 (.118)	-.549 (.180)**	-.302 (.163)
Region:					
Europe/Central Asia	.505 (.407)	.688 (.460)	-.423 (.378)	1.636 (.435)***	1.450 (.396)***
Sub-Saharan Africa	-.666 (.344)	.053 (.491)	-1.965 (.375)***	-.368 (.462)	-.442 (.355)
MENA	.401 (.550)	1.246 (.743)	-.741 (.491)	2.233 (.569)***	1.894 (.484)***
South/East Asia & Pacific	-.072 (.434)	.819 (.549)	-.856 (.500)	.554 (.653)	.678 (.443)
Time dummies	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included
Log pseudolikelihood	-4334.7431	-3123.4362	-6821.1021	-1157.7591	-1442.5865
N	2068	1458	2933	507	634
Clusters	138	126	140	116	128
Wald chi ²	851.88	814.87	1189.13	-	-
p>chi ²	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	-	-
Negative binomial regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations clustered by country. All IVs are presented as female-only values. Region control is Americas/Caribbean. *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001					

Table 2a
Incidents of Terrorism
H1: Social autonomy

<i>Literacy rate</i> T_{-1}	-.004 (.008)			
<i>Youth illiteracy rate</i> T_{-1}		.019 (.013)		
<i>Fertility rate</i> T_{-1}			-.116 (.102)	
<i>Adolescent fertility rate</i> T_{-1}				-.003 (.003)
Polity T_{-1}	.154 (.018)***	.156 (.018)***	.056 (.015)***	.057 (.015)***
Prior conflict T_{-1}	.541 (.072)***	.539 (.077)***	.488 (.047)***	.481 (.048)***
Ethnic fractionalization T_{-1}	-.069 (.500)	-.127 (.513)	.882 (.421)*	.902 (.442)*
CINC (logged) T_{-1}	.809 (.115)***	.819 (.128)***	.781 (.082)***	.782 (.082)***
Land area (logged) T_{-1}	.044 (.092)	.017 (.096)	-.084 (.069)	-.080 (.071)
GDP per capita (logged) T_{-1}	-.516 (.150)***	-.487 (.138)***	-.411 (.110)***	-.376 (.103)***
Region:				
Europe/Central Asia	.945 (.416)*	.810 (.419)	-.566 (.366)	-.591 (.365)
SSA	-.422 (.454)	-.378 (.430)	-1.683 (.277)***	-1.803 (.281)***
MENA	1.737 (.501)***	1.586 (.483)***	-.342 (.384)	-.504 (.392)
Asia & Pacific	.480 (.484)	.418 (.481)	-1.341 (.349)***	-1.350 (.369)***
Time dummies	Included	Included	Included	Included
Log pseudolikelihood	-1228.2773	-1219.258	-11722.64	-11725.35
N	505	499	5165	5165
Clusters	126	125	147	147
Wald chi ²	4779.04	4039.87	1405.80	1435.83
p>chi ²	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
Negative binomial regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations clustered by country. All IVs are presented as female-only values. Region control is Americas/Caribbean.*p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001				

Table 2b
Terrorist Groups
HI: Social autonomy

<i>Primary enrollment (net)_{T-1}</i>	.005 (.005)				
<i>Secondary enrollment (net)_{T-1}</i>		-.012 (.006)*			
<i>Tertiary enrollment (gross)_{T-1}</i>			-.012 (.003)**		
<i>Completed primary_{T-1}</i>				-.005 (.006)	
<i>Completed secondary_{T-1}</i>					-.006 (.005)
Polity _{T-1}	.052 (.013)***	.089 (.020)***	.062 (.012)***	.068 (.017)***	.074 (.014)***
Prior conflict _{T-1}	.193 (.073)**	.077 (.080)	.170 (.054)**	.208 (.055)***	.201 (.052)***
Ethnic fractionalization _{T-1}	.469 (.371)	.968 (.511)	.769 (.353)*	.247 (.519)	.386 (.387)
CINC (logged) _{T-1}	.470 (.071)***	.577 (.083)***	.589 (.064)***	.690 (.103)***	.549 (.079)***
Land area (logged) _{T-1}	-.006 (.063)	-.058 (.071)	-.010 (.063)	-.100 (.071)	-.032 (.055)
GDP per capita (logged) _{T-1}	-.255 (.071)***	-.186 (.097)	-.122 (.064)	-.496 (.126)***	-.293 (.101)**
Region:					
Europe/Central Asia	.346 (.253)	.635 (.302)*	-.083 (.226)	.675 (.282)*	.613 (.254)*
SSA	-.447 (.257)	-.387 (.353)	-.912 (.260)***	-.311 (.390)	-.120 (.299)
MENA	-.010 (.362)	1.166 (.532)*	-.046 (.309)	1.531 (.337)***	1.341 (.283)***
Asia & Pacific	-.301 (.226)	.218 (.266)	-.613 (.238)**	-.369 (.324)	-.078 (.228)
Time dummies	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included
Log pseudolikelihood	-2803.8211	-2018.1042	-4306.6586	-711.11818	-886.52979
N	2068	1458	2933	507	634
Clusters	138	126	140	116	128
Wald chi ²	966.98	871.44	1394.50	-	-
p>chi ²	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	-	-

Negative binomial regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations clustered by country. All IVs are presented as female-only values. Region control is Americas/Caribbean. *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001

Table 2c
Terrorist Groups
H1: Social autonomy

<i>Literacy rate</i> _{T-1}	-.007 (.005)			
<i>Youth illiteracy rate</i> _{T-1}		.009 (.008)		
<i>Fertility rate</i> _{T-1}			.090 (.067)	
<i>Adolescent fertility rate</i> _{T-1}				.002 (.002)
Polity _{T-1}	.089 (.013)***	.088 (.013)***	.065 (.010)***	.062 (.010)***
Prior conflict _{T-1}	.198 (.044)***	.193 (.045)***	.186 (.036)***	.192 (.036)***
Ethnic fractionalization _{T-1}	-.043 (.358)	-.035 (.376)	.495 (.302)	.483 (.298)
CINC (logged) _{T-1}	.470 (.082)***	.487 (.088)***	.549 (.052)***	.545 (.053)***
Land area (logged) _{T-1}	-.040 (.069)	-.058 (.071)	-.104 (.046)*	-.105 (.048)*
GDP per capita (logged) _{T-1}	-.266 (.122)*	-.303 (.109)**	-.218 (.067)***	-.229 (.057)***
Region:				
Europe/Central Asia	.465 (.282)	.383 (.285)	-.055 (.202)	-.031 (.209)
SSA	-.261 (.281)	-.157 (.297)	-.984 (.169)***	-.894 (.169)***
MENA	.845 (.337)*	.831 (.350)*	-.003 (.230)	.116 (.236)
Asia & Pacific	.114 (.279)	.115 (.298)	-.720 (.165)***	-.675 (.174)***
Time dummies	Included	Included	Included	Included
Log pseudolikelihood	-731.57637	-726.53506	-7389.0046	-7391.4967
N	505	499	5165	5165
Clusters	126	125	147	147
Wald chi ²	5426.24	7072.44	1248.50	1304.88
p>chi ²	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
Negative binomial regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations clustered by country. All IVs are presented as female-only values. Region control is Americas/Caribbean. *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001				

Table 3
Incidents of Terrorism
H2: Economic empowerment

<i>Labor force participation rate</i> $T-1$	-.004 (.005)					
<i>Unemployment</i> $T-1$.028 (.012)*				
<i>Youth unemployment</i> $T-1$.018 (.007)**			
<i>Waged/salaried workers</i> $T-1$				-.018 (.006)**		
<i>Managers</i> $T-1$					-.050 (.021)*	
<i>Brideprice</i> $T-1$.022 (.411)
Polity $T-1$.085 (.015)***	.076 (.016)***	.077 (.016)***	.088 (.016)***	-.018 (.132)	.058 (.014)***
Prior conflict $T-1$.562 (.053)***	.563 (.054)***	.561 (.055)***	.559 (.052)***	.574 (.297)	.477 (.050)***
Ethnic fractionalization $T-1$.934 (.458)*	.958 (.450)*	1.041 (.442)*	1.026 (.416)*	1.473 (1.190)	.823 (.413)*
CINC (logged) $T-1$.738 (.084)***	.791 (.088)***	.809 (.092)***	.716 (.086)***	.901 (.279)***	.792 (.085)***
Land area (logged) $T-1$	-.081 (.068)	-.117 (.071)	-.132 (.074)	-.061 (.069)	-.184 (.290)	-.087 (.073)
GDP per capita (logged) $T-1$	-.468 (.10)***	-.465 (.099)***	-.477 (.098)***	-.209 (.132)	.159 (.373)	-.348 (.095)***
Region: Europe/Central Asia	.453 (.282)	.389 (.276)	.386 (.266)	.618 (.245)*	.393 (.643)	-.501 (.366)
SSA	-.689 (.309)*	-.623 (.289)*	-.582 (.280)*	-.961 (.295)***	-.201 (1.005)	-1.871 (.434)***
MENA	1.307 (.402)***	1.210 (.417)**	1.155 (.431)**	1.853 (.394)***	-.231 (1.433)	-.437 (.527)
Asia & Pacific	.298 (.410)	.465 (.419)	.482 (.416)	.245 (.384)	1.417 (.888)	-1.290 (.316)***
Time dummies	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included
Log pseudolikelihood	-7092.9694	-6718.9283	-6712.6885	-6705.7449	-974.35151	-11728.314
N	3075	2961	2961	2961	496	5165
Clusters	147	147	147	147	66	147
Wald chi ²	1080.08	1064.04	1016.16	1186.21	314.02	1408.61
p>chi ²	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
Negative binomial regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations clustered by country. All IVs are presented as female-only values. Region control is Americas/Caribbean. *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001						

Table 3a
Terrorist Groups
H2: Economic empowerment

<i>Labor force participation rate</i> $T-1$	-.003 (.005)					
<i>Unemployment</i> $T-1$.005 (.009)				
<i>Youth unemployment</i> $T-1$.005 (.006)			
<i>Waged/salaried workers</i> $T-1$				-.016 (.005)**		
<i>Managers</i> $T-1$					-.018 (.019)	
<i>Brideprice</i> $T-1$						-.353 (.223)
Polity $T-1$.069 (.011)***	.067 (.011)***	.067 (.011)***	.072 (.011)***	.037 (.068)	.056 (.010)***
Prior conflict $T-1$.214 (.033)***	.225 (.032)***	.224 (.032)***	.228 (.031)***	.240 (.093)**	.190 (.036)***
Ethnic fractionalization $T-1$.721 (.335)*	.759 (.331)*	.786 (.323)*	.706 (.312)*	-.065 (.887)	.495 (.287)
CINC (logged) $T-1$.520 (.057)***	.528 (.058)***	.535 (.060)***	.507 (.058)***	.755 (.164)***	.530 (.053)***
Land area (logged) $T-1$	-.086 (.044)	-.088 (.045)*	-.094 (.047)*	-.084 (.045)	-.171 (.139)	-.084 (.045)
GDP per capita (logged) $T-1$	-.309 (.062)***	-.308 (.062)***	-.312 (.062)***	-.090 (.093)	-.032 (.186)	-.267 (.052)***
Region:						
Europe/Central Asia	.125 (.193)	.143 (.190)	.134 (.184)	.231 (.191)	.381 (.425)	-.071 (.198)
SSA	-.342 (.232)	-.365 (.199)	-.357 (.202)	-.624 (.195)***	.246 (.598)	-.546 (.230)*
MENA	.763 (.309)*	.818 (.271)**	.785 (.284)**	1.092 (.294)***	.921 (.696)	.274 (.262)
Asia & Pacific	-.099 (.188)	-.055 (.193)	-.051 (.192)	-.158 (.164)	.910 (.511)	-.662 (.171)***
Time dummies	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included
Log pseudolikelihood	-4377.3789	-	-4165.6334	-4125.6451	-622.00953	-7385.923
N	3075	2961	2961	2961	496	5165
Clusters	147	147	147	147	66	147
Wald chi ²	712.59	708.75	708.54	776.07	275.74	1237.66
p>chi ²	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
Negative binomial regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations clustered by country. All IVs are presented as female-only values. Region control is Americas/Caribbean. *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001						

Table 4
Incidents of Terrorism
H3: Political leadership

<i>Legislators</i> $T-1$	-.016 (.012)	
<i>Government ministers</i> $T-1$		-.008 (.0124)
Polity $T-1$.088 (.020)***	.123 (.026)***
Prior conflict $T-1$.638 (.069)***	.708 (.095)***
Ethnic fractionalization $T-1$	1.164 (.550)*	.678 (.637)
CINC (logged) $T-1$.715 (.102)***	.714 (.129)***
Land area (logged) $T-1$	-.001 (.079)	.039 (.095)
GDP per capita (logged) $T-1$	-.413 (.119)***	-.423 (.160)**
Region: Europe/Central Asia	1.292 (.315)***	1.323 (.401)***
SSA	.049 (.368)	.353 (.487)
MENA	2.245 (.428)***	3.355 (.494)***
Asia & Pacific	1.219 (.476)**	1.557 (.608)**
Time dummies	Included	Included
Log pseudolikelihood	-4298.0869	-1182.7799
N	2130	566
Clusters	146	146
Wald χ^2	727.79	276.64
$p > \chi^2$	0.000***	0.000***
Negative binomial regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations clustered by country. All IVs are presented as female-only values. Region control is Americas/Caribbean.* $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$; *** $p \leq .001$		

<p align="center">Table 4a Terrorist Groups H3: Political leadership</p>		
<i>Legislators</i> _{T-1}	-.002 (.008)	
<i>Government ministers</i> _{T-1}		.001 (.010)
Polity _{T-1}	.072 (.013)***	.082 (.017)***
Prior conflict _{T-1}	.284 (.042)***	.275 (.065)***
Ethnic fractionalization _{T-1}	.866 (.416)*	.447 (.533)
CINC (logged) _{T-1}	.518 (.070)***	.483 (.089)***
Land area (logged) _{T-1}	-.046 (.053)	.023 (.066)
GDP per capita (logged) _{T-1}	-.326 (.080)***	-.369 (.109)***
Region:		
Europe/Central Asia	.721 (.243)**	.909 (.273)***
SSA	-.066 (.267)	.155 (.386)
MENA	1.456 (.296)***	2.002 (.330)***
Asia & Pacific	.347 (.245)	.659 (.314)*
Time dummies	Included	Included
Log pseudolikelihood	-2723.1447	-739.81621
N	2130	566
Clusters	146	146
Wald chi ²	420.89	269.26
p>chi ²	0.000***	0.000***
<p>Negative binomial regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations clustered by country. All IVs are presented as female-only values. Region control is Americas/Caribbean. *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001</p>		

Table 5
Incidents of Terrorism
H4: Comprehensive women's rights

<i>Agency</i> _{T-1}	-.149 (.050)**					
<i>Legal rights</i> _{T-1}		-.115 (.044)**				
<i>CIRI full rights</i> _{T-1}			-.107 (.071)			
<i>Economic rights</i> _{T-1}				-.114 (.142)		
<i>Political rights</i> _{T-1}					-.039 (.155)	
<i>Social rights</i> _{T-1}						-.319 (.125)*
Polity _{T-1}	.068 (.014)***	.063 (.015)***	.068 (.021)***	.072 (.019)***	.072 (.019)***	.068 (.021)***
Prior conflict _{T-1}	.486 (.049)***	.489 (.049)***	.469 (.064)***	.485 (.052)***	.490 (.051)***	.463 (.063)***
Ethnic fractionalization _{T-1}	.797 (.434)	.718 (.414)	1.053 (.415)*	1.076 (.439)*	1.123 (.435)**	1.070 (.407)**
CINC (logged) _{T-1}	.785 (.080)***	.795 (.084)***	.719 (.095)***	.762 (.091)***	.776 (.090)***	.726 (.095)***
Land area (logged) _{T-1}	-.097 (.070)	-.105 (.071)	-.062 (.077)	-.056 (.074)	-.064 (.073)	-.072 (.076)
GDP per capita (logged) _{T-1}	-.362 (.093)***	-.284 (.096)**	-.341 (.087)***	-.406 (.101)***	-.431 (.097)***	-.311 (.089)***
Region: Europe/Central Asia	-.356 (.335)	-.496 (.344)	-.449 (.386)	-.218 (.369)	-.250 (.362)	-.411 (.386)
SSA	-1.968 (.280)***	-1.905 (.273)***	-1.913 (.343)***	-1.59 (.325)***	-1.577 (.327)***	-1.896 (.344)***
MENA	-.797 (.450)	-.823 (.427)	-.661 (.471)	.069 (.497)	.070 (.494)	-.773 (.490)
Asia & Pacific	-1.273 (.325)***	-1.349 (.351)***	-1.320 (.340)***	-.762 (.410)	-.801 (.406)*	-1.307 (.339)***
Time dummies	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included
Log pseudolikelihood	-11524.313	-11534.588	-6980.0069	-8926.3976	-9051.8859	-7068.0466
N	5019	5019	2828	3767	3803	2859
Clusters	145	145	145	146	146	145
Wald chi ²	1270.31	1378.02	833.50	1263.95	1246.32	865.93
p>chi ²	0.000***	0.000**	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
Negative binomial regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations clustered by country. All IVs are presented as female-only values. Region control is Americas/Caribbean.*p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001						

Table 5a
Terrorist Groups
H4: Comprehensive women's rights

<i>Agency</i> _{T-1}	-.085 (.034)*					
<i>Legal rights</i> _{T-1}		-.058 (.033)				
<i>CIRI full rights</i> _{T-1}			-.102 (.042)*			
<i>Economic rights</i> _{T-1}				-.088 (.068)		
<i>Political rights</i> _{T-1}					-.092 (.095)	
<i>Social rights</i> _{T-1}						-.229 (.074)**
Polity _{T-1}	.066 (.009)***	.064 (.009)***	.073 (.011)***	.076 (.010)***	.077 (.010)***	.071 (.011)***
Prior conflict _{T-1}	.192 (.037)***	.197 (.036)***	.176 (.040)***	.177 (.039)***	.182 (.038)***	.178 (.039)***
Ethnic fractionalization _{T-1}	.498 (.303)	.497 (.287)	.377 (.290)	.619 (.297)*	.606 (.303)*	.419 (.286)
CINC (logged) _{T-1}	.543 (.053)***	.545 (.055)***	.496 (.055)***	.518 (.053)***	.519 (.052)***	.497 (.055)***
Land area (logged) _{T-1}	-.113 (.048)*	-.113 (.048)*	-.102 (.050)*	-.091 (.046)*	-.091 (.046)*	-.103 (.048)*
GDP per capita (logged) _{T-1}	-.250 (.055)***	-.224 (.054)***	-.232 (.054)***	-.301 (.055)***	-.310 (.054)***	-.225 (.052)***
Region:						
Europe/Central Asia	-.105 (.193)	-.150 (.190)	-.173 (.188)	-.007 (.190)	-.032 (.185)	-.141 (.189)
SSA	-.937 (.172)***	-.897 (.165)***	-.772 (.171)***	-.657 (.175)***	-.625 (.178)***	-.766 (.170)***
MENA	-.269 (.291)	-.179 (.272)	-.111 (.301)	.385 (.273)	.342 (.277)	-.156 (.282)
Asia & Pacific	-.794 (.164)***	-.828 (.164)***	-.633 (.157)***	-.432 (.168)**	-.455 (.167)**	-.622 (.159)***
Time dummies	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included
Log pseudolikelihood	-7243.4445	-7255.1117	-4264.442	-5484.3876	-5551.6648	-4316.0615
N	5019	5019	2828	3767	3803	2859
Clusters	145	145	145	146	146	145
Wald chi ²	1247.08	1317.71	828.12	1002.61	1000.19	866.43
p>chi ²	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
Negative binomial regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations clustered by country. All IVs are presented as female-only values. Region control is Americas/Caribbean.*p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001						

Table 6
Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Terrorist incidents	9,579	17.03602	101.7728	0	3380
Terrorist groups	9,622	1.431719	3.481441	0	59
Primary enrollment (net)	3,096	80.50037	20.34735	4.90081	99.98995
Secondary enrollment (net)	2,523	66.4969	27.99268	.0517	100
Tertiary enrollment (gross)	4,575	27.65745	28.57399	0	146.838
Completed primary	872	75.58904	25.85958	.58823	100
Completed secondary	1,091	57.05144	29.77418	.2	100
Literacy rate	909	76.26247	25.1069	3.39059	99.99761
Youth illiteracy rate	896	50.24365	13.44473	0	98.49733
Fertility rate	10,786	4.090475	2.028071	.977	8.864
Adolescent fertility rate	10,797	77.5887	54.92289	.283	232.4838
Labor participation rate	5,518	50.71714	16.59519	5.687	90.77
Unemployment rate	5,340	9.144736	7.510415	.118	47.649
Youth unemployment rate	5,340	18.31661	14.38443	.159	70.607
Wage/salaried workers	5,340	54.0823	32.36358	.77	99.973
Managers	991	30.74812	8.624453	4.22	60.91
Brideprice	10,616	.4426338	.4967216	0	1
Legislators	4,306	17.18077	11.42067	0	63.75
Ministers	1,672	18.27843	12.7034	0	66.66666
Agency	9,300	7.378387	2.369362	1	10
Legal rights	9,300	6.396667	2.677683	1	12
CIRI full rights	3,609	4.289831	1.797297	0	9
CIRI economic rights	4,877	1.32766	.6969403	0	3
CIRI political rights	4,927	1.787092	.6469358	0	3
CIRI social rights	3,653	1.244457	.8496988	0	3
Polity	8,651	12.00809	7.36261	1	21
Prior conflict	9,896	.7238278	1.786543	0	18
Ethnic fractionalization	8,347	.4383671	.2684302	0	.89
CINC (logged)	8,621	-7.170416	2.365242	-15.22628	-1.522725
Land area (logged)	10,966	11.26268	2.748088	.6931472	16.61218
GDP per capita (logged)	9,005	8.260707	1.498933	4.883389	12.18618

Table 7		
Agency Index		
	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Groups</i>
H4: Comprehensive women's rights		
<i>Passport</i> _{T-1}	-.168 (.179)	-.098 (.136)
<i>House head</i> _{T-1}	-.184 (.189)	-.098 (.136)
<i>Choose live</i> _{T-1}	-.424 (.176)*	-.170 (.120)
<i>Job</i> _{T-1}	-.308 (.203)	-.114 (.115)
<i>Divorce</i> _{T-1}	-.716 (.207)***	-.602 (.129)***
<i>Banking</i> _{T-1}	-.744 (.312)*	-.273 (.185)
<i>Travel out home</i> _{T-1}	.807 (.376)*	.442 (.282)
<i>Travel out country</i> _{T-1}	1.023 (.388)**	.521 (.293)
<i>Remarry</i> _{T-1}	-.577 (.216)**	-.393 (.129)**
<i>Same industry</i> _{T-1}	-.047 (.175)	-.015 (.111)

Negative binomial regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations clustered by country. All IVs are presented as female-only values. *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001

Table 8		
Legal Rights Index		
	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Groups</i>
H4: Comprehensive women's rights		
<i>Inherit</i> _{T-1}	-.313 (.230)	-.274 (.175)
<i>Property</i> _{T-1}	-.481 (.196)*	-.212 (.130)
<i>Child inherit</i> _{T-1}	-.305 (.220)	-.249 (.173)
<i>Assets</i> _{T-1}	-.457 (.220)*	-.144 (.144)
<i>Credit access</i> _{T-1}	-.845 (.327)**	-.282 (.178)
<i>Obey</i> _{T-1}	-.496 (.312)	-.058 (.188)
<i>Equal pay</i> _{T-1}	-.013 (.223)	.090 (.160)
<i>Employ discrimination</i> _{T-1}	-.253 (.194)	-.172 (.117)
<i>Legislation sexual harassment</i> _{T-1}	-.387 (.200)	-.257 (.130)*
<i>Legislation domestic violence</i> _{T-1}	-.596 (.203)**	-.407 (.146)**
<i>Danger work</i> _{T-1}	.191 (.193)	.111 (.128)
<i>Night hours</i> _{T-1}	.354 (.217)	.145 (.130)

Negative binomial regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations clustered by country. All IVs are presented as female-only values. *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001

Table 9
Domestic Terrorism

	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Groups</i>
H1: Social autonomy		
<i>Primary enrollment (net)</i> $T-1$.025 (.010)**	.004 (.008)
<i>Secondary enrollment (net)</i> $T-1$	-.021 (.013)	-.022 (.009)*
<i>Tertiary enrollment (gross)</i> $T-1$	-.029 (.007)***	-.015 (.006)*
<i>Completed primary</i> $T-1$	-.031 (.012)*	-.016 (.008)*
<i>Completed secondary</i> $T-1$	-.028 (.010)**	-.017 (.008)*
<i>Literacy rate</i> $T-1$	-.006 (.010)	-.012 (.005)*
<i>Youth illiteracy rate</i> $T-1$.011 (.014)	.008 (.009)
<i>Fertility rate</i> $T-1$	-.181 (.127)	.081 (.095)
<i>Adolescent fertility rate</i> $T-1$	-.005 (.003)	.003 (.003)
H2: Economic empowerment		
<i>Labor force participation rate</i> $T-1$	-.010 (.007)	-.007 (.008)
<i>Unemployment</i> $T-1$.038 (.018)*	.011 (.014)
<i>Youth unemployment</i> $T-1$.027 (.010)**	.013 (.010)
<i>Waged/salaried workers</i> $T-1$	-.029 (.009)***	-.025 (.010)**
<i>Managers</i> $T-1$	-.074 (.042)	-.013 (.038)
<i>Brideprice</i> $T-1$	-.358 (.444)	-.579 (.282)*
H3: Political leadership		
<i>Legislators</i> $T-1$	-.003 (.014)	.004 (.013)
<i>Government ministers</i> $T-1$	-.006 (.016)	-.007 (.016)
H4: Comprehensive women's rights		
<i>Agency</i> $T-1$	-.157 (.061)**	-.100 (.049)*
<i>Legal rights</i> $T-1$	-.206 (.055)***	-.107 (.045)*
<i>CIRI full rights</i> $T-1$	-.118 (.088)	-.144 (.060)*
<i>Economic rights</i> $T-1$	-.102 (.179)	-.136 (.095)
<i>Political rights</i> $T-1$.094 (.195)	-.116 (.142)
<i>Social rights</i> $T-1$	-.276 (.151)	-.305 (.114)**
<i>Divorce</i> $T-1$	-.603 (.280)*	-.633 (.189)***
<i>Remarry</i> $T-1$	-.432 (.255)	-.520 (.185)**
<i>Legislation domestic violence</i> $T-1$	-.670 (.248)**	-.550 (.180)**
Negative binomial regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations clustered by country. All IVs are presented as female-only values. * $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$; *** $p \leq .001$		

**Table 10 (table cont.)
Polity and GDP Quadratic Terms**

	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Groups</i>
<i>H1: Social autonomy</i>		
<i>Primary enrollment (net) T-1</i>	.020 (.008)*	.006 (.006)
Polity _{T-1}	.462 (.112)***	.255 (.071)***
Polity ²	-.017 (.005)***	-.009 (.003)**
GDP per capita (logged) _{T-1}	.088 (.963)	-.500 (.628)
GDP per capita ²	-.018 (.056)	.020 (.037)
<i>Secondary enrollment (net) T-1</i>	-.012 (.009)	-.012 (.006)
Polity _{T-1}	.564 (.151)***	.395 (.085)***
Polity ²	-.021 (.006)***	-.013 (.003)***
GDP per capita (logged) _{T-1}	1.325 (1.243)	-.571 (.857)
GDP per capita ²	-.077 (.073)	.030 (.048)
<i>Tertiary enrollment (gross) T-1</i>	-.017 (.006)**	-.012 (.004)**
Polity _{T-1}	.409 (.078)***	.272 (.056)***
Polity ²	-.016 (.003)***	-.009 (.002)***
GDP per capita (logged) _{T-1}	1.070 (.973)	-.648 (.573)
GDP per capita ²	-.056 (.059)	.038 (.034)
<i>Completed primary T-1</i>	-.026 (.010)*	-.003 (.005)
Polity _{T-1}	.248 (.142)	.165 (.082)*
Polity ²	-.007 (.006)	-.004 (.004)
GDP per capita (logged) _{T-1}	.401 (1.379)	-2.119 (.807)**
GDP per capita ²	-.048 (.076)	.094 (.043)*
<i>Completed secondary T-1</i>	-.021 (.008)**	-.006 (.005)
Polity _{T-1}	.334 (.136)*	.211 (.077)**
Polity ²	-.011 (.006)	-.006 (.003)
GDP per capita (logged) _{T-1}	-.124 (1.145)	-1.511 (.600)*
GDP per capita ²	-.002 (.065)	.072 (.033)*
<i>Literacy rate T-1</i>	-.003 (.008)	-.005 (.005)
Polity _{T-1}	.501 (.106)***	.231 (.077)**
Polity ²	-.015 (.005)**	-.006 (.003)
GDP per capita (logged) _{T-1}	-1.866 (1.039)	-1.156 (.669)
GDP per capita ²	.096 (.064)	.058 (.042)
<i>Youth illiteracy rate T-1</i>	.019 (.012)	.009 (.008)
Polity _{T-1}	.504 (.103)***	.226 (.077)**
Polity ²	-.015 (.005)***	-.006 (.003)
GDP per capita (logged) _{T-1}	-2.096 (1.012)*	-1.437 (.691)*
GDP per capita ²	.112 (.065)	.074 (.045)
<i>Fertility rate T-1</i>	.000 (.107)	.107 (.067)
Polity _{T-1}	.375 (.071)***	.268 (.045)***
Polity ²	-.014 (.003)***	-.009 (.002)***
GDP per capita (logged) _{T-1}	1.156 (.831)	-.180 (.399)
GDP per capita ²	-.081 (.047)	.004 (.023)
<i>Adolescent fertility rate T-1</i>	-.001 (.003)	.002 (.002)
Polity _{T-1}	.373 (.069)***	.263 (.045)***
Polity ²	-.014 (.003)***	-.009 (.002)***
GDP per capita (logged) _{T-1}	1.127 (.777)	-.345 (.363)

GDP per capita ²	-0.080 (.045)	.013 (.021)
H2: Economic empowerment		
Labor force participation rate <i>t-1</i>	-.003 (.006)	-.007 (.005)
Polity _{T-1}	.323 (.080)***	.202 (.050)***
Polity ²	-.010 (.004)**	-.006 (.002)**
GDP per capita (logged) _{T-1}	-.233 (.954)	-1.448 (.486)**
GDP per capita ²	-.006 (.057)	.072 (.029)*
Unemployment <i>t-1</i>	.026 (.013)*	.012 (.009)
Polity _{T-1}	.314 (.082)***	.188 (.054)***
Polity ²	-.010 (.004)**	-.005 (.002)*
GDP per capita (logged) _{T-1}	-.580 (.936)	-1.429 (.525)**
GDP per capita ²	.015 (.055)	.070 (.031)*
Youth unemployment <i>t-1</i>	.019 (.008)*	.010 (.006)
Polity _{T-1}	.321 (.080)***	.191 (.053)***
Polity ²	-.011 (.004)**	-.005 (.002)*
GDP per capita (logged) _{T-1}	-.799 (.951)	-1.587 (.561)**
GDP per capita ²	.028 (.056)	.079 (.033)*
Waged/salaried workers <i>t-1</i>	-.019 (.006)**	-.015 (.005)**
Polity _{T-1}	.314 (.081)***	.193 (.052)***
Polity ²	-.010 (.004)**	-.005 (.002)*
GDP per capita (logged) _{T-1}	.425 (.835)	-.863 (.428)*
GDP per capita ²	-.029 (.048)	.049 (.024)*
Managers <i>t-1</i>	-.052 (.022)*	-.015 (.021)
Polity _{T-1}	.245 (.550)	.062 (.230)
Polity ²	-.006 (.018)	.000 (.009)
GDP per capita (logged) _{T-1}	-2.608 (2.227)	-1.706 (1.266)
GDP per capita ²	.148 (.132)	.088 (.071)
Brideprice <i>t-1</i>	-.155 (.390)	-.351 (.215)
Polity _{T-1}	.374 (.069)***	.257 (.043)***
Polity ²	-.014 (.003)***	-.009 (.002)***
GDP per capita (logged) _{T-1}	1.193 (.733)	-.424 (.376)
GDP per capita ²	-.084 (.043)*	.015 (.022)
H3: Political leadership		
Legislators <i>t-1</i>	-.015 (.012)	-.005 (.009)
Polity _{T-1}	.337 (.099)***	.215 (.072)**
Polity ²	-.011 (.004)*	-.006 (.003)*
GDP per capita (logged) _{T-1}	-.440 (.944)	-1.730 (.529)***
GDP per capita ²	.010 (.055)	.087 (.030)**
Government ministers <i>t-1</i>	-.008 (.014)	-.005 (.011)
Polity _{T-1}	.205 (.154)	.227 (.091)*
Polity ²	-.003 (.006)	-.006 (.004)
GDP per capita (logged) _{T-1}	-.324 (1.198)	-2.035 (.839)*
GDP per capita ²	-.003 (.070)	.102 (.047)*
H4: Comprehensive women's rights		
Agency <i>t-1</i>	-.124 (.048)**	-.081 (.033)*
Polity _{T-1}	.375 (.070)***	.263 (.044)***
Polity ²	-.014 (.003)***	-.009 (.002)***
GDP per capita (logged) _{T-1}	.994 (.751)	-.516 (.362)
GDP per capita ²	-.073 (.044)	.022 (.021)

<i>Legal rights</i> $T-1$	<i>-.094 (.042)*</i>	<i>-.048 (.031)</i>
Polity $T-1$.369 (.069)***	.258 (.044)***
Polity ²	-.013 (.003)***	-.008 (.002)***
GDP per capita (logged) $T-1$	1.201 (.747)	-.422 (.354)
GDP per capita ²	-.081 (.044)	.017 (.021)
<i>CIRI full rights</i> $T-1$	<i>-.098 (.067)</i>	<i>-.104 (.041)*</i>
Polity $T-1$.337 (.078)***	.239 (.045)***
Polity ²	-.012 (.004)***	-.007 (.002)***
GDP per capita (logged) $T-1$.673 (.762)	-.762 (.396)
GDP per capita ²	-.053 (.045)	.037 (.024)
<i>Economic rights</i> $T-1$	<i>-.073 (.131)</i>	<i>-.099 (.067)</i>
Polity $T-1$.390 (.076)***	.257 (.045)***
Polity ²	-.014 (.003)***	-.008 (.002)***
GDP per capita (logged) $T-1$.600 (.823)	-.888 (.374)*
GDP per capita ²	-.052 (.048)	.041 (.022)
<i>Political rights</i> $T-1$	<i>-.087 (.142)</i>	<i>-.119 (.094)</i>
Polity $T-1$.395 (.076)***	.263 (.045)***
Polity ²	-.014 (.003)***	-.008 (.002)***
GDP per capita (logged) $T-1$.638 (.831)	-.803 (.380)*
GDP per capita ²	-.055 (.049)	.035 (.022)
<i>Social rights</i> $T-1$	<i>-.251 (.125)*</i>	<i>-.226 (.073)**</i>
Polity $T-1$.323 (.077)***	.227 (.043)***
Polity ²	-.011 (.004)**	-.007 (.002)***
GDP per capita (logged) $T-1$.618 (.751)	-.855 (.396)*
GDP per capita ²	-.049 (.045)	.042 (.024)
<i>Divorce</i> $T-1$	<i>-.675 (.205)***</i>	<i>-.550 (.130)***</i>
Polity $T-1$.372 (.067)***	.243 (.041)***
Polity ²	-.014 (.003)***	-.008 (.002)***
GDP per capita (logged) $T-1$	1.068 (.713)	-.479 (.332)
GDP per capita ²	-.075 (.042)	.020 (.020)
<i>Remarry</i> $T-1$	<i>-.474 (.211)*</i>	<i>-.370 (.128)**</i>
Polity $T-1$.357 (.069)***	.254 (.043)***
Polity ²	-.013 (.003)***	-.008 (.002)***
GDP per capita (logged) $T-1$	1.114 (.709)	-.482 (.365)
GDP per capita ²	-.078 (.041)	.020 (.021)
<i>Legislation domestic violence</i> $T-1$	<i>-.441 (.204)*</i>	<i>-.357 (.137)**</i>
Polity $T-1$.365 (.068)***	.254 (.043)***
Polity ²	-.014 (.003)***	-.008 (.002)***
GDP per capita (logged) $T-1$	1.108 (.756)	-.403 (.360)
GDP per capita ²	-.077 (.044)	.016 (.021)

Negative binomial regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations clustered by country. All IVs are presented as female-only values. *p \leq .05; **p \leq .01; ***p \leq .001

**Table 11 (table cont.)
CINC Alternatives**

	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Groups</i>
<i>H1: Social autonomy</i>		
<i>Primary enrollment (net) T-1</i>	.024 (.008)**	.008 (.005)
Population (logged) T-1	.945 (.107)***	.633 (.074)***
Military expenditures (logged) T-1	.861 (.184)***	.552 (.135)***
<i>Secondary enrollment (net) T-1</i>	-.000 (.009)	-.007 (.006)
Population (logged) T-1	1.017 (.126)***	.675 (.075)***
Military expenditures (logged) T-1	.942 (.286)***	.617 (.166)***
<i>Tertiary enrollment (gross) T-1</i>	-.013 (.006)*	-.006 (.004)
Population (logged) T-1	1.090 (.121)***	.698 (.062)***
Military expenditures (logged) T-1	.651 (.187)***	.415 (.107)***
<i>Completed primary T-1</i>	-.022 (.009)*	-.004 (.006)
Population (logged) T-1	.832 (.173)***	.699 (.113)***
Military expenditures (logged) T-1	.866 (.271)***	.611 (.139)***
<i>Completed secondary T-1</i>	-.022 (.008)**	-.005 (.006)
Population (logged) T-1	.818 (.146)***	.625 (.087)***
Military expenditures (logged) T-1	.603 (.271)*	.569 (.128)***
<i>Literacy rate T-1</i>	.004 (.008)	-.003 (.004)
Population (logged) T-1	.974 (.176)***	.585 (.099)***
Military expenditures (logged) T-1	.791 (.224)***	.477 (.108)***
<i>Youth illiteracy rate T-1</i>	.030 (.010)**	.015 (.007)*
Population (logged) T-1	.934 (.174)***	.586 (.010)***
Military expenditures (logged) T-1	.756 (.241)**	.494 (.112)***
<i>Fertility rate T-1</i>	-.134 (.102)	.022 (.064)
Population (logged) T-1	.921 (.084)***	.640 (.060)***
Military expenditures (logged) T-1	.386 (.082)***	.319 (.084)***
<i>Adolescent fertility rate T-1</i>	-.003 (.003)	.001 (.002)
Population (logged) T-1	.931 (.086)***	.639 (.059)***
Military expenditures (logged) T-1	.395 (.085)***	.319 (.086)***
<i>H2: Economic empowerment</i>		
<i>Labor force participation rate T-1</i>	-.001 (.006)	.001 (.005)
Population (logged) T-1	.870 (.091)***	.584 (.067)***
Military expenditures (logged) T-1	.290 (.119)*	.335 (.104)***
<i>Unemployment T-1</i>	.027 (.012)*	.004 (.010)
Population (logged) T-1	.925 (.092)***	.588 (.066)***
Military expenditures (logged) T-1	.291 (.111)**	.343 (.103)***
<i>Youth unemployment T-1</i>	.016 (.007)*	.003 (.006)
Population (logged) T-1	.941 (.093)***	.592 (.066)***
Military expenditures (logged) T-1	.282 (.110)**	.340 (.100)***
<i>Waged/salaried workers T-1</i>	-.017 (.007)*	-.012 (.006)*
Population (logged) T-1	.840 (.093)***	.557 (.068)***
Military expenditures (logged) T-1	.307 (.104)**	.354 (.099)***
<i>Managers T-1</i>	-.051 (.016)**	-.017 (.016)
Population (logged) T-1	.920 (.216)***	.724 (.130)***
Military expenditures (logged) T-1	.435 (.469)	.857 (.353)*
<i>Brideprice T-1</i>	.448 (.403)	-.203 (.201)
Population (logged) T-1	.942 (.086)***	.634 (.059)***
Military expenditures (logged) T-1	.418 (.086)***	.313 (.084)***
<i>H3: Political leadership</i>		
<i>Legislators T-1</i>	-.015 (.010)	-.003 (.007)
Population (logged) T-1	.850 (.108)***	.585 (.074)***

Military expenditures (logged) _{T-1}	.460 (.188)*	.506 (.124)***
Government ministers <i>T-1</i>	-.001 (.010)	.000 (.009)
Population (logged) _{T-1}	.863 (.124)***	.555 (.086)***
Military expenditures (logged) _{T-1}	.452 (.231)	.470 (.135)***
H4: Comprehensive women's rights		
Agency <i>T-1</i>	-.166 (.049)***	-.078 (.031)*
Population (logged) _{T-1}	.927 (.086)***	.636 (.060)***
Military expenditures (logged) _{T-1}	.399 (.078)***	.325 (.083)***
Legal rights <i>T-1</i>	-.127 (.042)**	-.061 (.029)*
Population (logged) _{T-1}	.938 (.089)***	.639 (.062)***
Military expenditures (logged) _{T-1}	.387 (.081)***	.324 (.085)***
CIRI full rights <i>T-1</i>	-.090 (.069)	-.058 (.038)
Population (logged) _{T-1}	.806 (.090)***	.600 (.054)***
Military expenditures (logged) _{T-1}	.482 (.119)***	.352 (.095)***
Economic rights <i>T-1</i>	-.088 (.139)	-.036 (.063)
Population (logged) _{T-1}	.861 (.086)***	.610 (.052)***
Military expenditures (logged) _{T-1}	.419 (.102)***	.357 (.101)***
Political rights <i>T-1</i>	-.086 (.152)	-.047 (.091)
Population (logged) _{T-1}	.868 (.085)***	.610 (.051)***
Military expenditures (logged) _{T-1}	.414 (.096)***	.348 (.103)***
Social rights <i>T-1</i>	-.257 (.123)*	-.147 (.066)*
Population (logged) _{T-1}	.806 (.091)***	.597 (.055)***
Military expenditures (logged) _{T-1}	.445 (.105)***	.336 (.092)***
Divorce <i>T-1</i>	-.667 (.218)**	-.502 (.120)***
Population (logged) _{T-1}	.902 (.087)***	.613 (.058)***
Military expenditures (logged) _{T-1}	.433 (.087)***	.348 (.087)***
Remarry <i>T-1</i>	-.587 (.206)**	-.320 (.120)**
Population (logged) _{T-1}	.890 (.085)***	.618 (.061)***
Military expenditures (logged) _{T-1}	.401 (.079)***	.326 (.085)***
Legislation domestic violence <i>T-1</i>	-.610 (.198)**	-.366 (.144)*
Population (logged) _{T-1}	.953 (.089)***	.644 (.061)***
Military expenditures (logged) _{T-1}	.409 (.085)***	.329 (.085)***
Negative binomial regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations clustered by country. All IVs are presented as female-only values. *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001		

**Table 12 (table cont.)
9/11 dummy**

	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Groups</i>
H1: Social autonomy		
<i>Primary enrollment (net) T-1</i>	.020 (.007)**	.006 (.005)
Post-9/11 dummy	-.532 (.194)**	-.556 (.115)***
<i>Secondary enrollment (net) T-1</i>	-.007 (.009)	-.013 (.005)*
Post-9/11 dummy	-.843 (.238)***	-.577 (.102)***
<i>Tertiary enrollment (gross) T-1</i>	-.012 (.006)*	-.009 (.003)**
Post-9/11 dummy	.079 (.203)	-.227 (.111)*
<i>Completed primary T-1</i>	-.025 (.009)**	-.004 (.005)
Post-9/11 dummy	-.585 (.450)	-.437 (.192)*
<i>Completed secondary T-1</i>	-.019 (.008)*	-.005 (.005)
Post-9/11 dummy	-.238 (.350)	-.326 (.184)
<i>Literacy rate T-1</i>	-.003 (.007)	-.006 (.004)
Post-9/11 dummy	-.886 (.288)**	-.431 (.122)***
<i>Youth illiteracy rate T-1</i>	.016 (.012)	.010 (.008)
Post-9/11 dummy	-.814 (.273)**	-.428 (.119)***
<i>Fertility rate T-1</i>	-.130 (.112)	.044 (.057)
Post-9/11 dummy	-.259 (.196)	-.371 (.089)***
<i>Adolescent fertility rate T-1</i>	-.002 (.003)	.002 (.002)
Post-9/11 dummy	-.182 (.203)	-.372 (.098)***
H2: Economic empowerment		
<i>Labor force participation rate T-1</i>	-.002 (.006)	-.003 (.005)
Post-9/11 dummy	-.540 (.140)***	-.526 (.072)***
<i>Unemployment T-1</i>	.019 (.011)	.002 (.008)
Post-9/11 dummy	-.480 (.144)***	-.510 (.076)***
<i>Youth unemployment T-1</i>	.015 (.007)*	.003 (.006)
Post-9/11 dummy	-.499 (.144)***	-.512 (.075)***
<i>Waged/salaried workers T-1</i>	-.017 (.006)**	-.016 (.005)**
Post-9/11 dummy	-.565 (.147)***	-.528 (.076)***
<i>Managers T-1</i>	-.042 (.022)	-.016 (.017)
Post-9/11 dummy	-.046 (.253)	-.223 (.175)
<i>Brideprice T-1</i>	.232 (.432)	-.285 (.211)
Post-9/11 dummy	-.177 (.177)	-.391 (.092)***
H3: Political leadership		
<i>Legislators T-1</i>	-.006 (.012)	.003 (.008)
Post-9/11 dummy	.004 (.200)	-.212 (.081)**
<i>Government ministers T-1</i>	-.014 (.013)	.001 (.011)
Post-9/11 dummy	Omitted (collinearity)	Omitted (collinearity)
H4: Comprehensive women's rights		
<i>Agency T-1</i>	-.110 (.052)*	-.067 (.031)*
Post-9/11 dummy	-.068 (.193)	-.368 (.088)***
<i>Legal rights T-1</i>	-.058 (.047)	-.037 (.029)

Post-9/11 dummy	-.026 (.194)	-.342 (.107)***
<i>CIRI full rights</i> <i>T-1</i>	-.120 (.074)	-.105 (.040)**
Post-9/11 dummy	-.659 (.173)***	-.544 (.089)***
<i>Economic rights</i> <i>T-1</i>	-.151 (.159)	-.098 (.066)
Post-9/11 dummy	-.610 (.171)***	-.554 (.081)***
<i>Political rights</i> <i>T-1</i>	-.082 (.156)	-.106 (.089)
Post-9/11 dummy	-.552 (.183)**	-.517 (.081)***
<i>Social rights</i> <i>T-1</i>	-.323 (.125)**	-.225 (.072)**
Post-9/11 dummy	-.709 (.170)***	-.579 (.087)***
<i>Divorce</i> <i>T-1</i>	-.563 (.257)*	-.554 (.126)***
Post-9/11 dummy	-.160 (.198)	-.395 (.091)***
<i>Remarry</i> <i>T-1</i>	-.567 (.212)**	-.382 (.122)**
Post-9/11 dummy	-.139 (.187)	-.383 (.089)***
<i>Legislation domestic violence</i> <i>T-1</i>	-.328 (.192)	-.302 (.132)*
Post-9/11 dummy	-.019 (.194)	-.294 (.092)***

Negative binomial regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations clustered by country. All IVs are presented as female-only values. *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001

**Table 13 (table cont.)
Lagged Dependent Variable**

	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Groups</i>
H1: Social autonomy		
<i>Primary enrollment (net) T-1</i>	.008 (.006)	.003 (.003)
Lagged DV	.026 (.008)***	.250 (.028)***
<i>Secondary enrollment (net) T-1</i>	-.019 (.006)***	-.010 (.003)**
Lagged DV	.027 (.009)**	.238 (.031)***
<i>Tertiary enrollment (gross) T-1</i>	-.010 (.003)**	-.006 (.002)**
Lagged DV	.025 (.005)***	.176 (.038)***
<i>Completed primary T-1</i>	-.017 (.007)*	-.001 (.004)
Lagged DV	.017 (.009)	.191 (.061)**
<i>Completed secondary T-1</i>	-.014 (.006)*	-.005 (.003)
Lagged DV	.020 (.012)	.200 (.044)***
<i>Literacy rate T-1</i>	-.004 (.006)	-.001 (.003)
Lagged DV	.012 (.007)	.155 (.038)***
<i>Youth illiteracy rate T-1</i>	.014 (.010)	.007 (.006)
Lagged DV	.012 (.007)	.153 (.037)***
<i>Fertility rate T-1</i>	.067 (.069)	.077 (.038)*
Lagged DV	.023 (.004)***	.200 (.030)***
<i>Adolescent fertility rate T-1</i>	.002 (.002)	.002 (.001)
Lagged DV	.023 (.004)***	.200 (.030)***
H2: Economic empowerment		
<i>Labor force participation rate T-1</i>	-.004 (.005)	.001 (.003)
Lagged DV	.021 (.006)***	.216 (.023)***
<i>Unemployment T-1</i>	.019 (.010)	.001 (.006)
Lagged DV	.021 (.006)***	.219 (.024)***
<i>Youth unemployment T-1</i>	.013 (.005)*	.002 (.003)
Lagged DV	.021 (.006)***	.219 (.023)***
<i>Waged/salaried workers T-1</i>	-.013 (.005)**	-.008 (.003)**
Lagged DV	.021 (.006)***	.212 (.023)***
<i>Managers T-1</i>	-.038 (.019)*	-.012 (.014)
Lagged DV	.022 (.015)	.228 (.042)***
<i>Brideprice T-1</i>	-.248 (.234)	-.123 (.153)
Lagged DV	.023 (.004)***	.201 (.031)***
H3: Political leadership		
<i>Legislators T-1</i>	-.004 (.008)	-.003 (.00)
Lagged DV	.020 (.007)**	.227 (.027)***
<i>Government ministers T-1</i>	-.009 (.011)	-.002 (.008)
Lagged DV	.015 (.009)	.247 (.047)***
H4: Comprehensive women's rights		
<i>Agency T-1</i>	-.058 (.035)	-.056 (.024)*
Lagged DV	.023 (.004)***	.196 (.030)***
<i>Legal rights T-1</i>	-.043 (.028)	-.035 (.016)*
Lagged DV	.023 (.004)***	.197 (.030)***
<i>CIRI full rights T-1</i>	-.119 (.050)*	-.069 (.025)**
Lagged DV	.022 (.005)***	.202 (.022)***

<i>Economic rights</i> <i>T-1</i>	<i>-.089 (.094)</i>	<i>-.040 (.044)</i>
Lagged DV	.022 (.004)***	.215 (.022)***
<i>Political rights</i> <i>T-1</i>	<i>-.223 (.102)*</i>	<i>-.115 (.049)*</i>
Lagged DV	.021 (.004)***	.214 (.021)***
<i>Social rights</i> <i>T-1</i>	<i>-.264 (.096)**</i>	<i>-.153 (.049)**</i>
Lagged DV	.022 (.005)***	.202 (.022)***
<i>Divorce</i> <i>T-1</i>	<i>-.607 (.157)***</i>	<i>-.346 (.099)***</i>
Lagged DV	.022 (.004)***	.193 (.030)***
<i>Remarry</i> <i>T-1</i>	<i>-.315 (.133)*</i>	<i>-.282 (.095)**</i>
Lagged DV	.023 (.004)***	.194 (.030)***
<i>Legislation domestic violence</i> <i>T-1</i>	<i>-.324 (.155)*</i>	<i>-.269 (.087)**</i>
Lagged DV	.023 (.004)***	.196 (.030)***
Negative binomial regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations clustered by country. All IVs are presented as female-only values. *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001		

Table 14 (table cont.)
List of potential terrorist organizations produced by criteria⁴⁶

Organization Name	Years Active⁴⁷	Total Attacks	States Targeted⁴⁸
Al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB) ⁴⁹	2013-2018	70	Algeria (1), Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger
Al-Nusrah Front (ANF)	2012-2017	245	Iraq (1), Lebanon, Syria
Al-Qa'ida (AQ) ⁵⁰	1992-2011	79	Afghanistan, France (1), Indonesia, International (1), Iraq, Kenya, Pakistan, Somalia (1), Spain, Tanzania (1), Tunisia (1), Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, West Bank/Gaza Strip (1), Yemen
Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	2004-2018	632	France (1), Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (1), United Kingdom (1), United States (1), Yemen
Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)	2007-2018	218	Algeria, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast (1), Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria (1), Tunisia
Al-Shabaab (AS)	2007-2018	2336	Democratic Republic of the Congo (1), Djibouti (1), Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania (1), Uganda
Boko Haram (BH)	2009-2018	2355	Burkina Faso (1 attack), Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Niger, Nigeria

⁴⁶ GTD-provided attack totals as of December 2020; GTD data is only available from 1970-2018 for non-commercial license holders (START 2021). Attack totals exclude ambiguous events in which there may be doubt of terrorism.

⁴⁷ Years of activity here defined by time span in which group has committed attacks listed in GTD.

⁴⁸ Includes all states listed in GTD as the targets of attacks by group. It is noted in the chart if only one attack against a state occurred.

⁴⁹ This organization is named as Al-Mua'qi'oon Biddam Brigade (Those who Sign with Blood) and Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) in GTD – this entry represents the combination of their data.

⁵⁰ Though both AQ and ISIS have truncated timelines according to GTD data which would otherwise preclude their listings here, as the parent organizations of currently active splinter organizations, I have included their attack data in the table along with their splinter organizations.

Hamas	1989-2018	385	Egypt, Israel, Lebanon (1), West Bank/Gaza Strip
Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI), Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B) ⁵¹	1999-2017	25	Bangladesh, India, Pakistan
Hizballah (Hezbollah)	1983-2018	262	Argentina, Bahrain, Bulgaria (1), Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt (1), France, Greece, Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Niger (1), Saudi Arabia, Spain, Syria, Thailand (1), Tunisia, Turkey, West Bank/Gaza Strip (1)
ISIL-Iraq and the Levant	2013-2018	5034	Australia (1); Bahrain; Belgium; Egypt; France; Georgia (1); Germany (1); Indonesia (1); Iran; Iraq; Jordan; Kyrgyzstan (1); Lebanon; Libya; Malaysia (1); Philippines; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Somalia (1); Syria; Tajikistan; Tunisia; Turkey; United Kingdom; West Bank/Gaza Strip; Yemen (1)
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) ⁵²	2003-2013	728	Iraq, Jordan, Syria, United Kingdom (1)
Islamic State's Khorasan Province (ISIS-K)	2014-2018	463	Afghanistan, India, Pakistan
ISIS Sinai Province (ISIS-SP) ⁵³	2012-2018	395	Egypt; Israel; West Bank/Gaza Strip
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	1987-2018	1672	Austria, Belgium, Denmark (1), Finland (1), France, Germany, Greece, Iran (1), Iraq, Italy (1), Netherlands, Norway (1), Switzerland, Syria, Turkey
Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT)	1996-2018	227	Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia (1)

⁵¹ While these groups are named separately in the US FTO list, GTD combines their attack data.

⁵² As the GTD divides ISIS into the separate groups of al-Qaeda in Iraq and Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) while they are combined and named as the FTO ISIS by the US State Department, ISIS here represents the combination of both of these groups' data in GTD.

⁵³ This organization is named as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (Ansar Jerusalem) and ISIS-SP in GTD – this entry represents the combination of their data.


Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ)	1996-2018	178	Afghanistan, India, Pakistan
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and PFLP-General Command	1970-2017	157	Algeria (1), Austria (1), France, Greece, Iran (1), Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Netherlands, Singapore (1), South Yemen (1), Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States (1), West Bank/Gaza Strip, West Germany (FRG)
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) ⁵⁴	1975-2018	2580	Brazil (1), Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Venezuela
Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) ⁵⁵	1979-2017	276	Austria (1), Belgium (1), France (1), Germany, Netherlands, Turkey, West Germany (FRG) (1)
Shining Path (SL)	1978-2018	4145	Argentina (1), Bolivia, Brazil (1), Colombia, Ecuador (1), Mexico (1), Peru
Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) ⁵⁶	2007-2018	1218	Afghanistan, Pakistan, United States (1)

⁵⁴ This entry represents the combination of attack data for both FARC and FARC dissident groups. While there is disagreement about the extent to which FARC dissident groups operate cohesively, I argue that evidence indicates these groups are attempting to continue attacks in the nature of the original FARC organization in the aftermath of the 2017 FARC demobilization process, and I therefore include their data here (Pappier and Johnson 2020).

⁵⁵ This organization is named as Dev Sol and Devrimici Halk Kurtulus Cephesi (DHKP/C) in GTD – this entry represents the combination of their data.


⁵⁶ The TTP is the Pakistan affiliate of the Taliban; the Taliban otherwise does not appear on the US FTO list and is therefore not included here (Finnegan 2019).

Figure 12: Map of Nigeria



(UN Geospatial 2014)


Figure 13: Map of Nigerian Geopolitical Zones



(UN Geospatial 2014; zone drawings and names added by author)

Figure 14: Map of JAS and ISWAP Attacks

Map of Violent Activities Associated with Boko Haram by Faction (1 January 2016 - 2 February 2019)



(Matfess 2019)

Vita

Jennifer Dumas was born in West Monroe, Louisiana. She is a proud alumnus of the University of Louisiana at Monroe and University of New Orleans.