

**CONTEMPORARY LAND RUSH,  
AND DYNAMICS OF AGRARIAN  
CHANGE IN SENEGAL  
(2006-2017)**

Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD

2019

**RAMA SALLA DIENG**

Department of Development Studies  
SOAS, University of London

### **Declaration for SOAS PhD thesis**

I have read and understood Regulation 21 of the General and Admissions Regulations for students of the SOAS, University of London concerning plagiarism. I undertake that all the material presented for examination is my own work and has not been written for me, in whole or in part, by any other person. I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from the published or unpublished work of another person has been duly acknowledged in the work which I present for examination.

Signed:

Date:

## Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the peoples of Northern Senegal who welcomed me in their homes, and companies involved in this research who opened their doors, from Saint-Louis to Louga. Thanks for your warm welcome, and willingness to take part in this research. Without you, this work would not have been possible.

To my supervisor, Carlos Oya, thanks for your intellectual guidance and critical reflections. Your pragmatic approach, wide scholarship in almost all the interconnected themes of this thesis saved me a considerable amount of time and efforts. We do not always agree on everything Carlos, but through this “*rite de passage*”, I was able to define, fine-tune and defend my own scholarly views while becoming a more independent thinker. *Jërëjëf*.

I am also grateful to my other supervisors, Matteo Rizzo and Leandro Vergara-Camus for always opening new possibilities to digress and think more critically. I cannot forget to thank my fourth invisible supervisors I met at the rich SOAS library: alive or late, all of you feminists and political economists, who “blazed the trail”, I am grateful for your scholarship which gave me tools and possibility to articulate my own contribution.

I would also like to thank my two examiners Professors Maureen Mackintosh and Deborah Johnston for their very useful remarks and fruitful engagement with the first draft of this work. I was able to address my revisions in a new city, and a new professional environment thanks to the collegial support of my colleagues at CAS Edinburgh! Thank you.

The dream of pursuing this doctoral thesis at SOAS would have become a reality if it was not for the generous funding from the Mo Ibrahim foundation: thank you for assuring me that my dreams are valid! I am appreciative of Angelica Baschiera and the SOAS Centre of African Studies’ support: thanks for your unwavering support: you are a gem!

My warmest thoughts go to you, my soulmate, and to you my daughter: you two are my bedrock! You have been an inexhaustible source and resource of warmth, hope, perseverance, and faith. Your presence, and your unconditional love, kept me going through this long and lonely journey from me to myself. To my family: my dear sisters and brother: I love you. And to you my father: I am so thankful you are still with us to witness this moment!

To you Anta, thank you for all that you are, for all that you represent and for always enlightening my path. Thanks to you for coming with me to *Walo and Kajoor*, for looking after “*yaay bu ndaw*”, for the many conversations post-interview, and above and beyond, for being *present*. Thanks to you Bamba for your assistance, and for your friendship; I am ever so grateful. To all my friends, far and close, in Senegal, in France, in the UK and beyond, and to all my intellectual mates and doctoral comrades, thank you.

I would not have thought of pursuing doctoral studies if it was not for the inspiration of two people: my mother (thank you for being my role-model: *Gacce Ngallaama Guèye Ndioro, amuma sa fay*). And Professor Adebayo Olukoshi, whose wide scholarship I have learned considerably from during my years at IDEP, as well as his firm belief that indeed African scholars have an urgent task ahead: finding home-grown solutions to Africa’s challenges.

I hope this piece of work will be useful, in one way or another, to you, my dear Senegal.

To Anta (1985-2019),  
Who came with me,  
and cared for me,  
and for us  
as a guardian angel.

I dedicate this work to you,  
With all my love.

## Abstract

This thesis critically examines the political economy of the post-2006 land rush in the regions of Saint-Louis and Louga, in the Delta and the Valley of River Senegal. Through a comparative case-study approach, and a feminist lens, it investigates the following questions: i) How and why did the land rush take place in Northern Senegal's horticultural sector? ii) What are the roles of the different stakeholders at different levels? iii) What are the differentiated outcomes of interactions between "emerging" and "old" classes of capital and labour in this context? Drawing on my own original data – collected over 2 years through my multi-methodological approach including 7 months of immersive fieldwork in villages in Northern Senegal and visits to UK branches of the three selected companies - I investigate the global-local dynamics of agrarian change in northern Senegal. I do so with a *longue durée* approach to understand what yesteryear processes have sedimented to engender the contemporary land rush, and with what consequences.

I argue that workers are not being exploited in a vacuum, and challenge constructions of a genderless, undifferentiated "local community" that falls prey to an "undifferentiated capital". Rather, I unpack the multidimensional outcomes that have occurred in the decade following the land rush by focusing on social differentiation from below (workers or classes of labour), from above (classes of capital), and on the wider Anthropocene beyond markets. This leads me to conclude that the *post-2006 land rush in the Senegalese agricultural sector has exacerbated the pre-existing dynamics of agrarian change*. The main contribution of this thesis is that it is one of the first pieces of research to provide empirical evidence on what happens "beyond the hype" of land deals in Francophone West Africa with empirical evidence from private investors, political and traditional leaders, and different relevant social groups.

## Table of Contents

<b>ABBREVIATIONS.....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>13</b>
1.1. GENESIS.....	13
1.2. WHAT IS A ‘LAND GRAB’? ANATOMY OF A CONCEPT.....	16
1.3. WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT “LAND GRABS” IN SENEGAL?.....	20
1.4. KNOWLEDGE GAP.....	23
1.5. RESEARCH QUESTION AND MAIN CONTRIBUTION.....	24
1.6. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS.....	25
<b>CHAPTER 2: ANATOMY OF THE LAND RUSH DEBATE.....</b>	<b>27</b>
INTRODUCTION.....	27
2.1. UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICS OF EVIDENCE.....	27
2.2. SURVEYING THE LITERATURE ON IMPACTS AND OUTCOMES.....	33
2.3 LAND DEALS DO NOT HAPPEN IN THE VACUUM: GLOBAL AND LOCAL DIMENSIONS.....	37
2.4. SITUATING THE LG/LSLAs IN THE AGRARIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY DEBATE.....	45
2.6. A FEMINIST CRITICAL AGRARIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY.....	57
CONCLUSION.....	62
<b>CHAPTER 3: CAPITAL(IST) ACCUMULATION, LAND TENURE AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY: WHAT DOES HISTORY HAVE TO DO WITH IT?.....</b>	<b>64</b>
INTRODUCTION.....	64
3.1. <i>THE LONGUE DURÉE</i> OF FOREIGN CAPITAL PENETRATION IN THE DELTA AND RIVER VALLEY REGIONS AND ITS OUTCOMES.....	65
3.2. TENURIAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE SENEGAMBIA.....	82
3.3. FEED OURSELVES FIRST, THEN EXPORT? AGRICULTURAL POLICY, EXPORT HORTICULTURE AND AGRICULTURAL COMMERCIALISATION.....	91
CONCLUSION.....	103
<b>CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY, AND DATA.....</b>	<b>105</b>
INTRODUCTION.....	105
4.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS.....	105
4.2. DESIGNING THE RESEARCH.....	106
4.3. RESEARCH METHODS.....	115
4.4. FIELDWORK.....	120
4.5. COLLECTING AND ANALYSING DATA.....	126
4.6. ETHICS.....	129
CONCLUSION: RESEARCHING “OTHERS” AND FINDING YOURSELF.....	131

**CHAPTER 5: 5 STEPS TO “GRAB” LAND SUCCESSFULLY, AND GET AWAY WITH IT!..... 134**

INTRODUCTION.....	134
STEP 1: UNDERSTANDING THE NATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY.....	134
STEP 2: AIM TO ATTRACT FDI BY ALL MEANS POSSIBLE: ALL THAT YOU NEED IS LAND, WATER, PEOPLE AND SUN!.....	142
STEP 3: MAP AND MASTER THE AREA OF INTERVENTION, THEN CAREFULLY SELECT YOUR CHAMPIONS! ....	150
STEP 4: GET AN OFFICIAL CONTRACT FIRST, THEN AN UNOFFICIAL SYMBOLIC CONTRACT TO SEAL THE DEAL!	163
STEP 5: GET YOUR OWN MIDDLE(WO)MEN (IT HELPS, A LOT!) .....	177
CONCLUSION.....	180

**CHAPTER 6: WHEN CAPITAL NEEDS LAND AND LABOUR: “CSR PATERNALISM” AND POLITICAL REACTIONS TO LAND DEALS ..... 182**

INTRODUCTION.....	182
6.1. POWER BATTLES WITHIN THE STATE .....	183
6.2. VARIETIES OF CAPITALISTS AND UNICITY OF LABOUR EXPLOITATION GOALS .....	188
6.3. PRIVATE PATERNALISM AND WORKING CONDITIONS: BETWEEN CARE AND COERCION.....	199
6.4. SOCIALISING CAPITALISM AND BANKING ON SHARED DEVELOPMENT, WIN-WORLD AND RESILIENT NARRATIVES.....	211
6.5. PRIVATE INVESTORS’ ACCUMULATION STRATEGIES: STRADDLING ACROSS BUSINESS MODELS, SECTORS AND ACTIVITIES.....	219
6.6. REACTIONS TO THE LAND DEALS: WHO RESISTS? WHY AND HOW? .....	225
CONCLUSION.....	234

**CHAPTER 7: UNPACKING OUTCOMES..... 236**

INTRODUCTION.....	236
<b>UNPACKING OUTCOMES (1): SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION FROM BELOW (CLASSES OF LABOUR) AND EXPLOITATION WITHOUT DISPOSSESSION .....</b>	<b>238</b>
7.1. “FIELDS OR PACKING HOUSE”? DIVISION OF LABOUR WITHIN THE THREE COMPANIES.....	238
7.2. ENGENDERING THE “CLASSES OF LABOUR”: WAGE WORKERS OUT OF THE INVISIBLE (ORAL HISTORIES) .....	258
7.3. DISCUSSING CLASS, GENDER, AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION.....	266
<b>UNPACKING OUTCOMES (2): SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION FROM ABOVE (CLASSES OF CAPITAL) .....</b>	<b>277</b>
7.4. QUERYING “EMERGING” CLASSES OF CAPITAL.....	277
7.5. “EMERGING” AND “OLD” CLASSES OF CAPITAL: A SELECTION OF ORAL HISTORIES.....	279
7.6. PROFILING EMERGING CAPITALISTS.....	288
<b>UNPACKING OUTCOMES (3): MORE THAN MARKETS: LAND IS LIFE .....</b>	<b>293</b>
7.7. LOCAL LABOUR MARKET TIGHTENING.....	294
7.8. COMPETITION FOR THE LOCAL MARKETS FOR PRODUCTS.....	295
7.9. MORE THAN MARKETS: BEING, BELONGING AND BECOMING .....	298
CONCLUSION: ALL VERY POOR, POWERLESS OR VICTIMS? .....	306

<b>CHAPTER 8: HOW TO NOT CONCLUDE?</b> .....	<b>309</b>
<b>8.1. IN A NUTSHELL: KEY ARGUMENTS AND FINDINGS</b> .....	<b>309</b>
<b>8.2. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS</b> .....	<b>314</b>
<b>8.3. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH</b> .....	<b>319</b>
<b>8.4. TOWARDS A CONCLUSION?</b> .....	<b>320</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b> .....	<b>321</b>
<b>ANNEX</b> .....	<b>359</b>
<b>ANNEX 1: QUALITATIVE DATA (LIST OF SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS, GROUP INTERVIEWS AND FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS (FGD) – SUMMARISED IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE</b> .....	<b>359</b>
<b>ANNEX 2: MAP OF THE FIRST COMPANY SITES OF RESEARCH (SURVEY SOLUTIONS)</b> .....	<b>367</b>
<b>ANNEX 3: MAP OF THE FIRST COMPANY NEIGHBOURING VILLAGES (SOURCE: SEIA IMPACT ASSESSMENT)</b> .....	<b>367</b>
<b>ANNEX 4: MAP OF THE FIRST COMPANY LOCATION</b> .....	<b>368</b>
<b>ANNEX 5: MAP OF THE SECOND COMPANY SITES OF RESEARCH (SURVEY SOLUTIONS)</b> .....	<b>368</b>
<b>ANNEX 6:MAP OF THE SECOND COMPANY NEIGHBOURING VILLAGES (SOURCE: SEIA IMPACT ASSESSMENT)</b> .....	<b>369</b>
<b>ANNEX 7: MAP OF LAND OCCUPATION AROUND THE SECOND COMPANY (SOURCE: SEIA IMPACT ASSESSMENT)</b> .....	<b>370</b>
<b>ANNEX 8: MAP OF THE THIRD COMPANY SAINT-LOUIS RESEARCH SITES (SURVEY SOLUTIONS)</b> .....	<b>371</b>
<b>ANNEX 9: MAIN SOCIO-ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN THE AREAS OF STUDY</b> .....	<b>372</b>
<b>ANNEX 10: INTERVIEW REQUEST LETTER (FRENCH)</b> .....	<b>373</b>
<b>ANNEX 11 : SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE (FRENCH)</b> .....	<b>373</b>
<b>ANNEX 13: IN THEIR OWN WORDS: PERCEPTIONS OF AGRARIAN CHANGE</b> .....	<b>374</b>



## List of Tables

<b>TABLE 1: MAIN POLICY INSTRUMENTS BETWEEN 1960 AND 2018</b> .....	94
<b>TABLE 2: MAIN FFV PRODUCTION FIGURES IN SENEGAL IN 1996, 2006 &amp; 2016 (IN TONNES).</b> .....	102
<b>TABLE 3: TOTAL NUMBER OF WORKERS</b> .....	119
<b>TABLE 4: MAIN VILLAGES VISITED (SEE MAPS IN ANNEX):</b> .....	120
<b>TABLE 5: QUALITATIVE RESEARCH ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN (EXHAUSTIVE LIST IN ANNEX)</b> .....	128
<b>TABLE 6: MAIN LAND DEALS IN SENEGAL SURVEYED BY THE LAND MATRIX</b> .....	146
<b>TABLE 7: AN OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN HORTICULTURAL COMPANIES IN THE DELTA OF THE RIVER</b> .....	148
<b>TABLE 8: THE FIRST COMPANY’S CALENDAR OF PRODUCTION</b> .....	158
<b>TABLE 9: DESCRIPTION OF THE PRODUCTION BY THE FIRST COMPANY</b> .....	160
<b>TABLE 10: DISTANCE BETWEEN THE SECOND COMPANY AND MAIN NEIGHBOURING VILLAGES, INFRASTRUCTURES AND VENUES</b> .....	160
<b>TABLE 11: MAIN VEGETABLES PRODUCED BY THE SECOND COMPANY AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS</b> .....	161
<b>TABLE 12: MAIN DATA OF THE THE THIRD COMPANY POTATO FARM PRODUCTION</b> .....	162
<b>TABLE 13: SUMMARY OF THE MAIN AGREEMENTS OF THE THE FIRST COMPANY LAND DEAL</b> .....	165
<b>TABLE 14: SUMMARY OF THE MAIN AGREEMENTS OF THE THE SECOND COMPANY LAND DEAL</b> .....	167
<b>TABLE 15: SUMMARY OF THE MAIN AGREEMENTS AND BACKGROUND OF THE THE THIRD COMPANY DEAL</b> .....	169
<b>TABLE 16: MAIN AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE THIRD COMPANY AND OTHER PARTIES</b> .....	175
<b>TABLE 17: THE FIRST COMPANY EXPORTS AND DOMESTIC MARKET SALES BETWEEN 2014 AND 2017 (CFA FRANCS)</b> .....	223
<b>TABLE 18: SUMMARY OF THE FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD COMPANY DEALS AND MAIN REACTIONS (SOURCE: CONTRACTS &amp; SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS)</b> .....	227
<b>TABLE 19: LABOUR SEGMENTATION IN ALL THREE FARMS (ACCORDING TO TYPE OF CONTRACT)</b> .....	240
<b>TABLE 20: THE SECOND COMPANY TOTAL DAY WORKFORCE REPRESENTED BY VILLAGE/TEAM DURING SUMMER 2017</b> .....	242
<b>TABLE 21: WORKERS’ ACCORDING TO GENDER, MARITAL STATUS AND NUMBER OF CHILDREN. N=166</b> .....	243
<b>TABLE 22: WORKERS’ OTHER SOCIO-ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND SCHOOL ENROLEMENT N=170</b> .....	246
<b>TABLE 23: WORKERS’ OTHER SOCIO-ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES ACCORDING TO GENDER AND MARITAL STATUS; AND WORKERS’ LABOUR HIRING. N=166</b> .....	247
<b>TABLE 24: GLOSSARY OF MOST COMMON JOBS</b> .....	250
<b>TABLE 25: GENDER AND MIGRATION N=164</b> .....	251
<b>TABLE 26: WORKERS’ MIGRATION AND SCHOOL ENROLEMENT HISTORY N=164</b> .....	252
<b>TABLE 27: WORKERS’ GENDER AND REASONS FOR MIGRATING N=75</b> .....	252
<b>TABLE 28: WORKERS’ TYPE OF LAND HOLDINGS (FAMILY OR PERSONAL) N=164</b> .....	254
<b>TABLE 29: WORKERS’ OWNERSHIP OF THEIR CURRENT ACCOMMODATION ACCORDING TO MARITAL STATUS AND GENDER ACROSS THE 3 COMPANIES. N=166</b> .....	255
<b>TABLE 30: RURAL ACCUMULATORS’ MARITAL STATUS N=15</b> .....	278
<b>TABLE 31: RURAL ACCUMULATORS’ LABOUR HIRING (OF NON-FAMILY-MEMBERS) N=11</b> .....	279
<b>TABLE 32: MIGRATION AND HOUSE PROPERTY. N=164</b> .....	302
<b>TABLE 33: DO YOU PREFER YOUR LIFE BEFORE OR AFTER THE COMPANY’S ARRIVAL? BY GENDER AND COMPANY</b> .....	375

## Table of Figures

<b>FIGURE 1: THE 2010 UNCTAD, FAO, IFAD AND THE WORLD BANK’S PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT THAT RESPECTS RIGHTS, LIVELIHOODS AND RESOURCES (PRAI).</b> .....	113
<b>FIGURE 2: MAIN DECENTRALISED AUTHORITIES IN SENEGAL</b> .....	142
<b>FIGURE 3: EVOLUTION OF THE THIRD COMPANY</b> .....	162
<b>FIGURE 4: THE SECOND COMPANY MAIN VALUES</b> .....	192
<b>FIGURE 5: THE SECOND COMPANYS’ ORGANOGRAM IN FRENCH (PROVIDED BY THE COMPANY)</b> .....	194
<b>FIGURE 6: ORGANOGRAM OF THE FIRST COMPANY</b> .....	195
<b>FIGURE 7: UNDERSTANDING THE PYRAMIDAL NATURE OF LABOUR CONTROL AT THE FIRST COMPANY AND THE SECOND COMPANY</b> .....	196
<b>FIGURE 8: : WORKERS’ EDUCATION LEVELS BY COMPANY (N = 170)</b> .....	245

## List of Pictures

<b>PHOTO 1: THE SENEGAL RIVER (FACING MAURITANIA). DECEMBER 2017. (PHOTOGRAPH BY RESEARCHER)</b> .....	132
<b>PHOTO 2: NEAR THE LAKE . SUMMER 2017. (PHOTOGRAPH BY FROM THE SECOND COMPANY)</b> .....	132
<b>PHOTO 3: SAINT-LOUIS (NDAR). JUNE 2017. (PHOTOGRAPH BY RESEARCHER)</b> .....	133
<b>PHOTO 4: INTERVIEW (DW26) SAINT-LOUIS NOVEMBER 2017.</b> .....	133
<b>PHOTO 5: MEN UNDER THE PALAVER TREE WAITING FOR LUNCH. N.NOVEMBER 2017. (PHOTOGRAPH BY RESEARCHER)</b> .....	154
<b>PHOTO 6: A WOMAN IN THE FIELDS. MAY 2017. (PHOTOGRAPH</b> .....	155
<b>PHOTO 7: A DONKEY CHARRETTE IN N. NOVEMBER 2017</b> .....	155
<b>PHOTO 8: CHILDREN PLAYING IN LOUGA. DECEMBER 2017. (PHOTOGRAPH BY RESEARCHER)</b> .....	156
<b>PHOTO 9: THE SECOND COMPANY'S ETHICS IN THE WORKPLACE. SENEGAL . MAY 2017. (PHOTOGRAPH BY RESEARCHER)</b> .....	192
<b>PHOTO 10: CAPTURE OF ONE OF THE SLIDES OF A THE SECOND COMPANY HEALTH AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT FOUND ON THE INTERNET (ACCESSED JUNE 2017)</b> .....	193
<b>PHOTO 11: THE SECOND COMPANY FIELD WORKERS GOING HOME AFTER A DAY OF WORK. OCTOBER 2017. (PHOTOGRAPH BY RESEARCHER)</b> .....	203
<b>PHOTO 12: THE THIRD COMPANY TRACTORS, ALSO USED FOR TRANSPORTING STAFF. NOVEMBER 2017. (PHOTOGRAPH BY RESEARCHER)</b> .....	203
<b>PHOTO 13: THE FIRST COMPANY INFIRMARY. JUNE 2017. (PHOTOGRAPH BY RESEARCHER)</b> .....	204
<b>PHOTO 14: THE THIRD COMPANY WORKERS UNION MEETING NOVEMBER 2017. (PHOTOGRAPH BY RESEARCHER)</b> .....	208
<b>PHOTO 15: THE FIRST COMPANY GREENHOUSES. SAINT-LOUIS. JULY 2017. (PHOTOGRAPH BY RESEARCHER)</b> .....	218
<b>PHOTO 16: IRRIGATION INFRASTRUCTURES. SAINT-LOUIS. DECEMBER 2017. (PHOTOGRAPH BY RESEARCHER)</b> .....	218
<b>PHOTO 17: THE THIRD COMPANY POTATO BAGS READY FOR COMMERCIALISATION. NOVEMBER 2017. (PHOTOGRAPH BY RESEARCHER)</b> .....	218
<b>PHOTO 18: CATTLE WALK NEAR THE SECOND COMPANY. APRIL 2017. (PHOTOGRAPH BY RESEARCHER)</b> .....	230
<b>PHOTO 19: THE SECOND COMPANY APRIL 2017 (SCOPING STUDY). (PHOTOGRAPH BY RESEARCHER)</b> .....	256
<b>PHOTO 20: THE SECOND COMPANY FIELD WORKERS DURING A BREAK. OCTOBER 2017. (PHOTOGRAPH BY RESEARCHER)</b> .....	256
<b>PHOTO 21: A DAY AS A THE THIRD COMPANY WAGE WORKER (1): IN THE POTATO LINES. NOVEMBER 2017. (PHOTOGRAPH BY RESEARCHER)</b> .....	256
<b>PHOTO 22: A DAY AS A THE THIRD COMPANY WAGE WORKER (2): BREAKFAST TIME. NOVEMBER 2017. (PHOTOGRAPH BY RESEARCHER)</b> .....	257
<b>PHOTO 23: ZAYNAB'S MOM &amp; HER FRIENDS WORKING ON THE LEATHER BEFORE EVENING NEAR THE FIRST COMPANY. MAY 2017. (PHOTOGRAPH BY RESEARCHER)</b> .....	263
<b>PHOTO 24: BOURY USED TO MANAGED ONE OF THESE TEAMS IN THE FIRST COMPANY'S FIELDS. APRIL 2017 (SCOPING STUDY). (PHOTOGRAPH BY RESEARCHER)</b> .....	264
<b>PHOTO 25: BREAKFAST TIME AT THE SECOND COMPANY: WORKERS GATHER AROUND CODOU AND OTHER SELLERS' STALLS IN FRONT OF THE PACKING HOUSE. MAY 2017. (PHOTOGRAPH BY RESEARCHER)</b> .....	264
<b>PHOTO 26: IFRA'S BUSES IN FRONT OF THE FIRST COMPANY. JUNE 2017. (PHOTOGRAPH BY RESEARCHER)</b> .....	280
<b>PHOTO 27: IFRA'S BUSINESSES: A GROCERY SHOP WHICH ALSO OFFERS MONEY SENDING SERVICES, AND HIS RESTAURANTS. JUNE 2017. (PHOTOGRAPH BY RESEARCHER)</b> .....	281
<b>PHOTO 28: ANIMALS FROM ALAN'S FARM (SOURCE, FACEBOOK PAGE OF THE FARM) ACCESSED DECEMBER 2017</b> .....	282
<b>PHOTO 29: FATY'S RESTAURANT. NOVEMBER 2017. (PHOTOGRAPH BY RESEARCHER)</b> .....	285
<b>PHOTO 30: MAYRAM &amp; HER DAUGHTER IN THEIR RESTAURANT WITH HABY'S CONDIMENTS, NEAR THE THIRD COMPANY. NOVEMBER 2017. (PHOTOGRAPH BY RESEARCHER)</b> .....	286
<b>PHOTO 31: INTERVIEW WITH MAYRAM. NOVEMBER 2017. (PHOTOGRAPH BY RESEARCHER)</b> .....	286
<b>PHOTO 32: MAYÉCOR'S PLOT: NOVEMBER 2017. (PHOTOGRAPH BY RESEARCHER)</b> .....	287
<b>PHOTO 33: A VIEW OF THE THIRD COMPANY FROM MAYÉCOR'S PLOT. NOVEMBER 2017. (PHOTOGRAPH BY RESEARCHER)</b> .....	288

## Abbreviations

ABD: Accumulation by Dispossession  
AOF: *Afrique Occidentale Française*  
APIX: Investment Promotion and Major Projects Agency  
CAADP: Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme  
CF: Contract-Farming  
CSR: Corporate Social Responsibility  
DGID: Direction in Charge of the National Domain and Fiscal Affairs  
DPES: Economic and Social Policy Document  
DPV: Direction for the Protection of Vegetables  
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment  
FFV: Fresh Fruits and Vegetables  
GDP: Gross Domestic Product  
GOANA: Grand Agricultural Offensive for Food Security  
I-PRSP: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy  
LDN: National Domain Law  
LG: Land grab or Land Grabbing  
LOASP: Agriculture, Forestry, and Livestock Act (LOASP)  
LSLA: Large-Scale Land Acquisition  
MCC: Millennium Challenge Corporation  
MDGs: Millennium development Goals  
MEF: Ministry of Economy and Finance  
NSES: National Strategy for Economic and Social Development  
NIE: New Institutional Economics  
NNCDE: New Neo-Classical Development Economics  
NPA: New Agricultural Policy  
ONDC: Old Neoclassical Development Economics  
OSFV: Out-of-Season Fruits & Vegetables  
PA: Primitive Accumulation  
PAMLT: Medium and long terms Adjustment Programme (PAMLT)  
PCR: President of Rural Community  
PDIDAS: Sustainable and Inclusive Agribusiness Development Project  
PDMAS: Programme for the Development of Agricultural  
PNASA: National Program of Support to Food Security  
PNIA: National Agricultural Investment Programme  
POAS: Land Allocation and Use Plans  
PODES: Orientation Plan for Economic and Social Development  
PREF: Economic and Financial Adjustment Plan  
PRSP: Poverty Reduction Strategy  
PSE: Emerging Senegal Plan  
REVA: Return to Agriculture Plan  
SNDS: National Statistics Development Strategy  
SNSAR: National Strategy for Food Security and Resilience  
SCA: Accelerated Growth Strategy  
SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa



# CHAPTER 1: Introduction

## 1.1. Genesis.

**August 1997**

**Pikine**, densely populated city in the suburbs of Dakar.

A bulldozer had just knocked down houses. The woman watched helpless. She just finished building her house, and was looking forward to moving in. Everything was now in shambles. Not just her house, her dreams too. She lamented to my mother that she just finished building it, and that she was looking forward to moving in. In her despair, my mother who just acquired the plot of land next to her's, from the local *Lebu* chiefs, felt lucky. That she had not started building on it yet. She had not lost as much, she thought.

**August 2002**

**Dakar**

She returned home from her appointment with the trader. He too lost land. Not one plot like her, but more than 20, and a few houses. He had become the spokesman of the movement. To reclaim the lands the state had taken a few years ago to build a new highway. I found it funny, that a capitalist would be the spokesman of such a movement. "Only in Senegal, I thought". My mom was pensive. I asked her what she was thinking about. "Nothing" She said. Then, after a few minutes: "Five years ago, when I watched that woman crying over her demolished house, I felt lucky. Little did I know then that I would be on the third list". Each list had approximately 20 names. On the first, were those who were to be compensated first, on the third, the last ones.

**February 2008**

Several citizens' demonstrations took place in Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso and Douala in Cameroon.

### **March 2008**

It was the turn of Senegalese and Ivoirian citizens to take to the streets. Pikine and Guédiawaye never disappointed me: I always thought they were *the pulmons* of Senegal. In Senegal, the price of the most consumed yet largely imported food crops and grains had rapidly increased, putting pressure on the livelihoods of the poorest in particular. My mom told me the events were called “food riots” or “riots against the expensive cost of life”. I followed all that from afar: I was too busy hunting for summer jobs, as a student in France.

### **Sometimes in 2014**

I was in London, studying for an MSc. The lecturer asked me: “What does *mbindaanu*” mean? I looked at him. Not surprised that he would ask me that question: he researched Senegal before I knew I wanted to do “research”. But that he would know the deep sense of that particular term. I smiled. I was loving SOAS, and discussing everyday concepts of *deep Senegal* with someone who had lived and done research there.

I was happy that day, I got a good grade, for an essay, on land grabs. Yes. Me! While still un-learning to write essays with a “Frenghish style”.

### **April 2016**

I am in London, preparing for my MPhil upgrade. All students had to present a summary of their PhD project. As I was preparing, my mother called me on Whatsapp. I told her I was nervous. She did not believe me. I told her the topic of my research: “land deals”. She laughed: “I see you are always an activist. Are you researching that topic because of my land?”

“Your land? What do you mean?”

I had somehow forgotten deep inside. Completely. About that land. My PhD was about large-scale land investments and the rise of export horticulture, in the Senegalese countryside. I thought I “re-discovered” that interest when I was working at a research institute, based in Dakar. I organised and attended conferences on it. I also read papers on it, including from my supervisor. I thought that was it. My mom’s story inhabited me, it was part and parcel of my PhD research.

## June 2016

I first met them in London. We are discussing. They asked me why I was interested in coming to the village to conduct research. “I don’t know. I majored in Labour during my *Licence* in France. And I am passionate about “the land rush” too.” They did not seem convinced. And over the two following years. None of my respondents from the villages I lived with seemed convinced. That I did not have an ulterior, hidden, motive. Neither were the investors, who kept asking me if my parents were from the Delta of the river, and if that was the reason for my interest in “Large-scale land-based investments” (LSLAs henceforth). Or the families who welcomed me, and my baby, and later, my sister, and my uncle. “How strange: So, all of you (grown-up as you are) travelled just to come ask us questions about “land grabs”, et *voilà*? And with a baby? (silly woman! These intellectuals!) I smiled.

## August 2018

I was struggling. With the writing up. I “Whatsapped” my mom, to find motivation, or inspiration. I asked her what land meant to her. She responded:

*“Land means first of all security. It is a space to which I identify my ancestors, my parents and myself, a space that allows me to live in symbiosis with my family and my friends. But that land is the fruit of my savings, of so many years, lost to the State “for public utility” ... Well, I won the battle. I have recovered my land. It is part of your heritage, material and immaterial.”*

Yes, my mother, (as you do know now) lost her land to the State over 20 years ago and was only able to recover it recently, in 2017. But, now you also know, that I cannot claim with certainty that this is how the “land thing”, “*l’affaire foncière*”, began. I just know that for me, *the personal is political*.

This phenomenon has been interchangeably called “land rush”, “land grab”, “land deals” and “LSLAs” in the relevant literature, just as I did. It gained considerable scrutiny after a general interest in farmland acquisitions in both local and international media<sup>1</sup> after the 2007/8 commodity prices boom. The 2008 GRAIN Report *Seized!* documented over one hundred cases of “land grab” and said they were driven by food security and financial

---

<sup>1</sup> Prompting what Oya (2013) dubbed the “literature rush” (a sudden expansion in the volume of publications and media reports on the topic).

returns as more private equity and hedge funds sought to acquire land which they considered THE new strategic asset, after oil. Following the 2008 food crisis, an inflation of continental development initiatives targeting land and agriculture has been observed in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA henceforth)<sup>2</sup>. The World Bank's 2011 *Rising Global Interest in Farmland (RGIF)* further documents the scale of the rush, estimating land deals to have involved 4 million hectares by 2008. Moreover, approximately 56 million hectares of large-scale farmland deals were announced before the end of 2009, of which two-thirds were in SSA (Deininger et al, 2011).

In this study, I use the term land rush, “land grabs” or land deals to refer not only to the renewed interest in land, but also the spectacular increase of investments in export horticulture that seeks to transform land into capital through Global Value Chains (GVCs henceforth). Section 1 defines and discusses these concepts considering agrarian studies and political economy literatures. **Section 2** explains the genesis of this research, explaining why I focus on Senegal and outlining my main research questions. **Section 3** identifies the main research gaps in critical agrarian studies and how this thesis aims to address them. **Section 4** presents the structure of the rest of this thesis.

## **1.2. What is a ‘land grab’? Anatomy of a concept.**

A survey of the existing literature highlights a lack of consensus on key concepts and terms (Cotula 2009; De Shutter 2011; Deininger et al. 2011; Edelman et al. 2013, Hall et al. 2013, Kaag and Zoomers 2013; Oya 2013a). Since 2008, several research publications, non-governmental organisations (NGO) documents and media reports have sought to make sense of “land grabs”, focussing on their speculative dimensions and ideas of social justice. The term “land grab”, has been defined by the International Land Coalition (ILC henceforth) as a land acquisition or a concession that does one or more of the followings:

*(i) violate human rights, particularly the equal rights of women; (ii) not based on free, prior and informed consent of the affected land-users; (iii) not based on a*

---

<sup>2</sup> These include the Land Policy Initiative in Africa, the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and the Agenda 2063: *The Africa We Want* implemented under the leadership of the African Union (AU)



*thorough assessment, or are in disregard of social, economic and environmental impacts, including the ways in which they are gendered; (iv) not based on transparent contracts that specify clear and binding commitments about activities, employment and benefits sharing, and; (v) not based on effective democratic planning, independent oversight and meaningful participation (ILC 2011).*

“Land grab” also includes different types of appropriation such as “green grabbing” or “water grabbing”. “Green grabbing” – a term coined by John Vidal in 2008 – is defined as the “appropriation” or “acquisition” of land and resources for environmental ends; an emerging yet growing practice based on the assumption that land needs protecting (Fairhead et al. 2012: 238). Such grabs are intended as a form of “economy of repair”: despite the motives of nature conservation and sustainability, this practice remains contentious. The term “water grabbing” refers to situations in which powerful actors are able to seize control of water resources for their own gain, and at the expense of previous users or the ecosystems on which those users’ livelihoods were based. It involves the capturing of the decision-making power regarding water, including the power to decide how and for what purposes water resources are used, now and in the future (Franco and Kay 2012: 2). While the first phenomenon appears to be new, the second is not. The difference is that contemporary commodification of water resources is now subject to international law and other new government mechanisms.

To add a level of complexity, “land grab” is now coupled with, or replaced by, terms that describe some of the things land grab *does* such as “control grabbing”: the grabbing of land rights (access, use and transfer) and “production grabbing”, appropriating what is produced on land through contract-farming for instance. However, the means mobilised by investors to gain, maintain access to, and benefit from such resources often involve legal and illegitimate practices (Borras et al. 2012: 405; Franco, 2014:3). Deals may sometimes be *unfair*, yet legal.

An LSLA is often conflated with a “land grab” *a priori* (LG henceforth) due, in part, to the force of the “land grab narrative”. LSLAs are defined as acquisitions including “*purchase of ownership rights, but also the acquisition of user rights, for instance through leases or concessions, whether short or long-term*” (Cotula 2009:17). The term “acquisition” may be misleading as most such transfers in Africa are in the form of long-

term leases, due to legal and customary tenure systems, with rare cases of outright purchase (Cotula, 2013; Schoneveld 2011:13). What is understood as an LSLA is varied and depends on local context as well as researchers' methodological choices. Some researchers have used scale/size, for example, an IIED report from 2009 focused on deals above 1000ha (Cotula et al. 2009: 17). Another study on Ethiopia defines LSLAs as those including more than 2000ha while transactions involving less than 500ha qualify as "small scale" (Rahmato 2011:12). For capitalist agriculture, what matters most is business scale (annual turnover or total investment) rather than farm size.

Land Matrix', the leading international repository on LSLA established in 2009, chooses to use the term "land deal". It defines it as:

*an intended, concluded or failed attempt to acquire land through purchase, lease or concession that meet the following criteria: i) entail a transfer of rights to use, control or ownership of land through sale, lease or concession; ii) have been initiated since the year 2000; iii) cover an area of 200 hectares or more; and v) imply the potential conversion of land from smallholder production, local community use or important ecosystem service provision to commercial use.*<sup>3</sup>

With SSA's complex land tenure systems, focusing on size alone may not be the right approach; the "fetishization of hectares" is not productive and may be misleading" (Edelman 2013: 497). For example, planned activities and investments are also relevant, although it is hard to obtain indicators of scale (Cotula et al. 2014: 910). Land deals may not be large-scale but can still be relevant if the capital involved is substantial by comparative standards, or if they are a conglomerate of smaller acquisitions involving various actors (Borras 2013: 404; Kaag and Zoomers 2014: 3). For Bernstein (2010: 93), size alone is no longer a relevant measure of scale since in modern capitalism, farm capitalisation is more relevant a criterion. He defines it as "the amounts of capital required to establish different types of farming (entry costs) and to reproduce them".

The term "investment" is more "positive" and implies future benefits, greater revenues or incomes and value appreciation. In the agriculture, such investments may generate expectations of higher technology use or transfer, greater levels of capital and

---

<sup>3</sup><http://www.landmatrix.org/en/about/#what-is-a-land-deal>

employment creation, increased infrastructure and greater knowledge, all contributing to improved levels of rural and national economic development. Uses of the term “agricultural investment” reveal another problematic facet of the “land grab” literature, the binary between foreign versus domestic investment. Whilst there is a consensus that all types of investment matter for socio-economic development, especially in developing countries, what divides scholars is whether foreign direct investment (FDI) is preferable to other sources of investment (Farole and Winkler 2014: 9).

The growing interest in horticultural export and agro-processing appears to be justified with the pessimism about the replicability of East-Asian types of manufacturing in SSA (Mkandawire 2001), states that would paradoxically display a certain level of “Embedded autonomy” (Evans 1995). Horticultural exports are now being defined as alternatives to manufacturing: “industries without smokestacks”, alongside with other tradable services such as tourism, transport and IT (Newfarmer et al 2018). Whether countries should opt for policies that favour domestic investments, by targeting “self-reliance” is debated. In Senegal, for example, evidence suggests the pro-poor nature of FDI in the fresh fruits and vegetable (FFVs) sector (Maertens et al. 2009). For instance, Ndikumana and Blankson’s find, that the source of investment does indeed matter, and that SSA should improve their financial intermediation environment as well as internal savings mobilisation in order to encourage domestic investment rather than dependency on FDI (2015). Rodrik, on the contrary, is of the opinion that: “one dollar of FDI is worth no more (and no less) than a dollar of any other kind of investment” (Rodrik 2003, cited in Moran, 2005: 281).

There is competition in SSA, to attract FDI through developing more “enabling business environments” with numerous investment codes, investment promotion and *Émergence* strategies (Jaffrelot 2008). This could be explained by domestic capital accumulation levels not yet being at the desired levels to spur enough economic growth, especially in sectors that are not yet developed, which makes FDI a less risky source of private capital more resilient to exogenous shocks. Notwithstanding, the main rationale for states to seek FDI is the promise of spill-overs: both horizontal (*diffusion of knowledge from multinational affiliates to domestic firms in the same industry*) and/or vertical (in another industry) spill-overs, technology, knowledge and other benefits that local actors gain from *linking* into global markets (Farole and Winkler 2014: 9-10).

Comparisons of Ghana, Vietnam, and Mozambique’s agribusiness sectors find that FDI in Vietnam procures more locally, on average, than FDI in the other countries and that the agricultural production segment of the value chain offers more spill-over effects as domestic farmers are fundamental to international firms’ activities in the sector (Farole and Wrinkler 2014: 203-204). The relative benefits of foreign versus domestic investments depend mainly on the social, political and economic contexts in which they take place.

### **1.3. What do we know about “land grabs” in Senegal?**

Senegal reaffirmed its commitment to improve food security and agricultural productivity with a focus on food self-sufficiency post-2008. Interestingly, horticultural growth in Senegal has been particularly rapid in the last ten years, partly coinciding with the “land rush”, with symptoms sometimes similar to a “land grab”.

The literature on Senegal reveals that research undertaken on the “land rush” is quite recent. The emerging interest in “land grab” issues can be related to political and economic developments in Senegal and is explored below as contextual stylised facts.

First, large-scale development models have been encouraged as a means for developing countries to boost their agricultural sector and improve food security and rural infrastructure since independence<sup>4</sup> (Faye et al. 2011; Oya et al. 2013; SCA 2007; SNDES 2010). The agricultural sector is thus expected to generate export revenues after the major groundnut production crisis led to a steady decline in the export contribution of groundnut products. Almost coinciding with the beginning of the ‘land rush’, President Wade’s liberal government responded to the 2008 food price crisis by launching special initiatives in the agriculture (discussed in chapter 5). The opportunist behaviour of national and foreign investors in response to the incentives around such programmes and initiatives by the state has been examined by recent scholars (E.g. Dieng 2017; Faye 2011; Kaag et al. 2011; Oya et al. 2013). Agricultural performance has improved in the last decade years, boosting national growth rates from 2.5% in 2006 to 6.8% in 2017 after two decades of limited structural transformation (World Bank 2018). Yet, access to land and negative

---

<sup>4</sup> Though the history of Senegalese agriculture does not start in 1960 as we will see in chapter 3.

labour productivity remain a challenge (Ibid). However, the scope and extent of linkages between local transactions and national development policies needs to be better documented.

Second, is the rise of export horticulture. By cultivating a discourse of “national development” centred around the current growth and development strategy Emerging Senegal Plan (PSE), the government has initiated and encouraged policies to generate resources through increasing the production of rice, onion, groundnut and off-season fresh fruits and vegetables (FFVs henceforth) for export while at the same time responding to the national demand. The National Strategy for Food Security and Resilience (SNSAR 2015-2035) encapsulates this strategy with the aim of exporting a volume of 157,500 tonnes to Europe in 2017.

Third, there is a suggestion that many deals were reportedly operated by - and in many instances for - Government officials, politicians and religious leaders<sup>5</sup> especially in pre-elections periods, such as 2009 (Kaag et al. 2011). The ruling classes’ (religious and political) exploit their power to facilitate or take part in land accumulation, illustrating a case of “politicised accumulation” (Berry 1993: 67; Boone 1992).

Fourth, the processes of such deals have also attracted attention. Transparency is one of the key dimensions of the ILC definition of “land grab”. Problems related to the gaining (or not) of informed consent from “local populations” has been widely denounced, as has the level of secrecy around land deals (Faye et al. 2011). Hence the need to research early outcomes.

Fifth, successive land legislation changes combined with the existence of unclear concepts in current law has facilitated the land rush. The 1964 national Land Domain Law (LDN) is still in force. Despite its abolition of customary rights for farmers and imposition of formalisation through titling, this law has never been reformed. Central to understanding how the State makes use of an unclear LDN is the presence of deliberately unclear terms and concepts. One such concept is that of “lack of productive use” of land, not clearly defined by the State that uses it to dispossess populations of their land rights

---

<sup>5</sup> Or *Marabouts*

without offering them much compensation in many cases (Niang 2004). This notion of “productive use” has allowed the state to seize any land for “public utility” or “public interest”.

Sixth, is the “unfinished business” of decentralisation, which also affects current “land grab” dynamics. The 1996 and 2013 laws, which constitute respectively the Act Two and the Act Three of decentralisation, transfers authority over rural lands accounting for 95% of the national domain from the central State to rural communities. Neither the state nor the rural communities in charge have the economic means, the political will and human resources to enforce the law.

Seventh, the restructuring of European markets towards the end of the 1990s, was to drastically transform horticulture increasing the power of retailers and vertically oriented agribusiness firms that had to comply with a plethora of global rules, practices and standards (Baglioni 2015; Maertens and Swinnen 2009). The development of Global Value chains (GVCs) appear to be double-edged for developing countries<sup>6</sup> (Baldwin 2011). The governance of GVCs defined as “the process of defining the functional division of labour along a chain” determined a range of entry barriers (Gibbon and Ponte 2005: 200), has also changed considerably. With entry barriers tightening participation in GVCs, the FFVs sector is increasingly buyer-driven, forcing export companies to either be more competitive by controlling all the production through estates, produce for the domestic market with the possibility of using contract farming, or to disappear (Baglioni 2015; Gibbon and Ponte 2005: 200; Maertens and Swinnen 2009,). As a result, the Delta and the Valley of the River, have experienced on the one hand, the rise and fall of contract farming and the renaissance of estate farming.

Eighth, as the result of 1970s agricultural crises, international economic and financial shocks, and climate change, Northern Senegal has heavily invested in large-scale irrigation infrastructure projects (Lavigne-Delville 1991), and have also experienced multidimensional (seasonal, clandestine, permanent, etc.) domestic, regional and

---

<sup>6</sup> On the one hand, it represents an opportunity for such countries such as SSA’s to industrialise earlier thanks to cheaper labour and other advantages which allow them to be more competitive, in addition to meeting required standards to access European markets. On the other hand, however, they might still struggle with the high costs induced by their “enrolment” in international markets if they choose an import-substitution path to industrialisation (Baldwin 2011).

international migration (Adams 1977; Ba 1992; Manchuelle 1997; Top 2014) and subsequently, of capital flows. As a result, a comprehensive analysis of local and global connections and disruptions of food, labour and capital, through rural exodus, migration and global food and value chains.

Tacking stock of the above, my thesis examines the processes leading to land deals in Saint Louis and Louga, Senegal, and the outcomes of these land deals in the context of increasingly politicised capital accumulation, blooming horticultural rural labour markets and changing dynamics of migration which has an impact on food security and agrarian in the region.

## **1.4. Knowledge gap**

The land rush literature has moved from a “making sense” phase (Borras et al. 2013) and is now exploring themes that have been hitherto missing, such as the importance of an historical analytical framework, the implications of the land rush for agrarian change and capitalist development, the plurality of legal regimes (including the focus on trade and investment law to the detriment of human-rights law at the international level), the differentiated outcomes and reactions to land deals, and methodological challenges to current knowledge-building efforts (Anseeuw et al. 2013; Colin 2013; Edelman et al. 2013: 5-11; Edelman, M. 2013; Ho and Hofman 2012; Oya 2013a; Oya 2013b; Scoones et al. 2013 ).

The definition of land grabbing and use of data has not been very rigorous, affecting the quality and veracity of findings (Edelman 2013; Oya 2013b; Pearce 2013; Scoones et al. 2013). Therefore, the selection and use of secondary data, in a study such as this one, must be done carefully and data sourced credibly before joining “domain of the factual” (Denzin 2013; Mukherjee and Wuyts 2007: 241-253; Oxfam 2011.). A feminist political economy analysis of the land rush in relation to the development of capitalism in Africa in the “longue-durée” is still missing (Oya 2013a 2013b).

This brief literature review suggests that there are still important knowledge gaps on the outcomes of land deals, both intermediate and long-term. The polarisation of the “land grab” debate makes it difficult to apprehend their global and local implications for processes of ongoing agrarian change.

## **1.5. Research question and Main contribution**

I focus on the Delta and the Valley of River Senegal because it is the leading commercial horticultural export-earning production zone besides the Niayes, Casamance and Dakar regions (Matsumoto-Izadifa 2008b, PADEN 2015: 5). Different from the Niayes of Dakar, which is a peri-urban area, the three case studies in this thesis take place in rural or semi-rural areas of the regions of Saint-Louis and Louga. Using evidence from these regions, my overarching research question is:

*How and why did the ‘land grabbing’ take place in the Delta and the Valley of Senegal River’s agriculture after 2006 and with what outcomes?*

Drawing on my own original data – collected over 2 years through my multi-methodological approach including 7 months of immersive fieldwork in villages in Northern Senegal and in the UK, I focus on a contrastive case study approach of the outcomes of land deals with three big players in Senegal’s (export) horticulture: The First, Second and Third Companies (anonymised). With a critical political economy approach, I ask: Who does what? Owns what? Gets what? Does what with it? And what has gender, age, ethnicity, marital status, nationality, and class got to do with it?

This thesis demonstrates how political economy and social reproduction theory (SRT) can uncover the complex and differentiated nature of land deal outcomes. My analytical framework moves beyond the frequent polarisation of the “land grab” debate by trying to capture the intricate web of intertwined outcomes, which emerges relating to: i) dynamics of class formation from above (classes of capital) and from below (classes of labour); ii) the interplay of gender, class and ethnicity which I hope adds nuance to our understanding of the actors, while transcending dichotomous narratives of class-less winners and losers; iii) and the multidimensional nature of land-based relations and capitalisation of life, which affects “ways of being”, “ways of knowing”, and “ways of relating”, i.e. social norms, social relations and identity (indigeneity and belonging).

The main contribution of this work is that it is one of the first academic studies to focus on in-depth analysis of socio-economic outcomes of ‘land grabs’ in Francophone West Africa with primary data collected not only from “the affected” populations who are the



usual interlocutors, but also the “usual suspects”: corporate powers and political decision-makers. This hopefully contributes to the emerging literature offering more nuanced and critical perspectives in the “land grab” debate.

## 1.6. Structure of the thesis

The first four chapters set the scene of this research: Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical concepts and themes underpinning this research and surveys the literature, situating the key knowledge gaps to present the main contributions of this thesis to the current body of knowledge on the land rush. Chapter 3 offers a historical overview of tenurial and labour relations, focusing on *Waalo and Kajoor*, the Kingdoms which historically occupied most of the Delta and the Valley of River Senegal Region. It also documents the rise of the horticultural (FFVs) sector despite the absence of a coherent package of policy measures to boost it, and the stylised facts about the main case studies. Chapter 4 focuses on the methodological choices and questions through a feminist agrarian political economy lens providing an extended reflexive account of fieldwork.

The remaining chapters present empirical evidence and findings and are based on a combination of quantitative and qualitative research. Chapter 5 examines processes of the land rush by focusing on i) the *modus operandi* of most investors, ii) the contents of the agreements, their governance mechanisms, and negotiation, iii) and the nature and roles of actors in the negotiation. Chapter 6 analyses the variegated layers of power involved at each level of the national and local political economy, and how they intersect with labour regimes and managerial ethos to mobilise, discipline and control the labour force socially and spatially. By investigating encounters between local populations, including workers and private agribusiness capital, I analyse in Chapter 7, the dynamics of agrarian change and social differentiation which occur as outcomes of land deals and argues that these “classes of labour” are not being exploited in a vacuum. In doing so, I challenge constructions of a genderless and undifferentiated “local community” that falls prey to “undifferentiated capital”. Chapter 7 also offers an analysis of non-market outcomes of land deals in the horticulture in the Delta of the River, and argues for the need to go beyond the “coloniality of markets” and *bring the social back in* to analyse how land deals affect “ways of being and becoming”, and “ways of relating” (belonging) i.e. social

norms, social relations and identity. Chapter 9 summarises the thesis, discussing its main findings, policy implications and recommendations, and possible avenues for future research.

# CHAPTER 2: ANATOMY OF THE LAND RUSH DEBATE

## Introduction

In this chapter, I unpack the main conceptual and methodological debates discussed in the “land grab” literature. More specifically, I engage with arguments on agrarian change and relate these arguments to the dynamics and effects of land deals. I articulate my own critical position within both feminist and critical political economy literature.

## 2.1. Understanding the politics of evidence

### 2.1.1. What do we know about the land rush?

The land rush is not the result of a “crises narrative”, as some NGO reports have presented it (GRAIN 2008; Oakland Institute 2011; OXFAM International et al. 2011.), or the by-product of only one or two drivers such as the food or energy crises (White et al. 2012; Zoomers 2010). In SSA, the current land rush re-actualises old challenges in the form of new multidimensional investments (Alden-Wily 2012; Cotula 2013; Edelman et al. 2013; Nyong’o 2013; White et al. 2012; Woodhouse 2012). It has antecedents such as the concentration of land by domestic and foreign capital, massive privatisation of state and common lands, etc. involving high financialisation, the presence of non-Western competitors, relative autonomy of contemporary states and ability to organise and differentiate it considerably from the first “two waves” of land rush (Moyo et al. 2012: 182).

Arguments built on the triple crises narrative (food, energy and environment) and unprecedented economic growth in transition countries (GRAIN 2008; Matondi et al. 2011: 9-10), or on imperialist or neo-colonialist narratives (Liberti 2013), show just the tip of the iceberg, since several intersecting processes: speculation, financialisation, urbanisation and industrialisation have *together* increased interest and investment in land

as a “new strategic asset” (Allan 2013; Anseeuw et al. 2012; Evers et al. 2013; Fairhead et al. 2012; Vidal 2008;). The reasons for these so-called “new enclosures” are many including economic, and ecological. A holistic consideration of all the geographic, political, ecological, cultural and socio-economic aspects, dubbed the “geo-logics” of land deals, is recommended (Carmody 2013: 120-133). The land rush is a complex and multidimensional issue brought about by many intersecting dynamics leaving even recent academics to ask whether these “grabs” were an “opportunity” or a “menace” (Alhassan et al. 2018). Put differently, it is a “development strategy” (Lavers 2012) happening with the complicity of the state, which becomes a “land grabber using the law as facilitator” (Alden-Wily 2012; Wolford et al., 2013), to facilitate accumulation by local and foreign businessmen (Hilhorst et al. 2011), or a “hyped and humane-made issue with hyped solutions” (Evers et al. 2013; Kaag and Zoomers 2014). The current land rush cannot be explained by a single story.

The land rush has been followed by a parallel “literature rush” from the media, NGOs, think- tanks and academics globally. This prolific body of knowledge has been produced in two main phases. 2007-2012 corresponds to the “making sense” period characterized by the emergence of global online databases surveying the phenomenon, quick fieldwork studies from NGOs and activists to draw global conclusions on the rush and emerging yet timid scholarly publications (Edelman 2013: 1517-1531). During this phase, much attention was paid to the main drivers of the land rush, their processes, their location and the identity of the actors. More specifically, questions of what is the land rush? A “land grab”? What are the drivers? (Cotula 2011, 2013a, 2013b; Cotula et al. 2009; 2013; Deininger 2011; De Schutter 2011; White et al. 2012); Who is grabbing the land? Their nationality? (Brautigam 2012; Buckley, L 2013; Cotula 2011, 2013; Cotula et al. 2009; Faye et al. 2011; Hilhorst et al. 2011; Peters 2012); Where are the deals happening? Which countries? In rural or urban areas? Is it a new phenomenon? How are deals taking place? Who is facilitating it? Who is resisting it? How much is being grabbed? How do we count? (Alden Willy 2012; Cotula 2013; Deininger 2011; GRAIN 2008; Moyo and Patnaik 2011). The questions covered in this first phase are easier to investigate and this has been done in a short timeframe, not always with due respect to the principles of rigorous research.

The second wave of knowledge production emerged in 2013, after the Cornell Global Land Deals Initiative Conference. It challenged the limitations of the first wave whilst at the same time recommending the use of more rigorous research methods. It has first tried to investigate the impacts of land deals and their trans-local effects, the role of the state, conservation and underground realities (green and water grabbing and mining), reactions to land deals, governance challenges related to territoriality and authority, non-agricultural drivers of the rush such as urbanisation, industrialisation, infrastructure development, etc. (Allan et al. 2013; Edelman, Wolford et al. 2013; Fairhead et al. 2012; Franco et al. 2012; Hall et al. 2015; Kaag and Zoomers 2014; Li 2011; Margulis et al. 2013: 5; Mehta et al. 2012; Woodhouse 2012). Secondly, it has challenged some of the assumptions formulated during the “making sense” phase, such as the scale of deals, the identity of the main investors, claims of negative impacts and displacements, generational, gender, livelihood and class implications; food and biofuel production, etc. (Alhassan et al. 2018 ; Behrman et al. 2012; Bräutigam et al. 2013; Cowaloosur 2014; Hall et al. 2015 ; Hofmann et al. 2012, Tsikata et al. 2010 ; Woertz 2013).

### **2.1.2. How do we know what we know?**

The land rush literature is characterised by polarised debates, advocating for or against land deals, and is a battlefield of ideological claims structured along theoretical and disciplinary lines. This political charge is reflected in the naming of deals as “grabs” or “appropriation”, acknowledged by many authors who use the terms “deals” or “rush” instead (Anseeuw et al. 2012; Cotula 2012, 2013; Edelman 2013; Scoones et al. 2013, Holmén 2015; IDEP-UNISA 2013; Mpofu 2017; Oya 2013a, 2013b; Stein 2015). For example, Hubert Ouédraogo of the Economic Commission for Africa spoke on this topic, in 2013, at an international roundtable event in Addis Ababa. When reflecting on evidence-based land policy, Ouédraogo opted to use the term “LSLA”, arguing that “those in charge of post-colonial African states rejected accusations of involvement in land grabbing considering those deals as foreign investment in Africa’s land resources instead” (IDEP-UNISA 2013).

The term “land grab” has been critiqued by some since land is often acquired at the invitation of, and with the support of, interested states – often using the law to facilitate

and regulate deals (Alden-Wily 2012; Cheru and Modi 2013; Evers et al. 2013; Lanz et al. 2018; Stein 2015; Wolford et al. 2013). Since land deals are a relatively new phenomenon, it is still too early to characterise their outcomes as positive or negative. The research that does exist is of low quality; it is neither published in peer-reviewed journals or based on in-depth primary research, with evidence collected through rapid and short appraisals (Hofman and Ho 2012; Oya 2013). According to Oya (2013b), most existing publications report negative outcomes (60%) with a tiny fraction reporting positive outcomes (3%). Such arguments are undermined by those who, after recognising the political charge of the concepts of “grab” and “appropriation”, still use them to remind us of the stakes involved and grabbing potential (La Via Campesina 2012).

“Local communities”, “peasants”, “investors” or “small farmers” are often presented as a homogenous group, discounting individual interests and experiences and other significant factors such as gender, class, age and ethnicity. For instance, several studies have emphasised the differences within and between classes of farmers highlighting the fact that they are not a homogenous group (Bernstein, 2010; Bryceson et al., 2000; Moyo and Yeros, 2005; Oya 2002, 2004; Wolf, 2001a). In her study of Mbarali, Tanzania, Greco has critiqued simplistic generalisations about “local communities” and the risks about homogenising them, suggesting to consider rather the shifting class alliances at play within processes of accumulation from above through the state and private capital, and from below due to increasing social differentiation (2015: 225-244). Instead, they emphasize the shifting class alliances at play in processes of rural social differentiation and class formation from above (the state or private capital) and from below (classes of labour). Another study finds, for instance, Liberian NGO activists, with the participation of elders, to be mostly responsible for constructing the idea of a “homogenous African community” that ignores gender and generational differences (Gilfoy, 2015:185-205). This is despite most young people he interviewed having favourable views on the Sime Darby project which could provide them with new opportunities. As for NGOs, they were inclined to adapt their advocacy discourses to serve targeted policy and political objectives (ibid.). The categorisation of grabbers as foreign corporate businesspersons is facilitated by and reproduced in the biases of existing database, some NGO or academic advocacy publications, which are replete with North versus South categorisations as well as “pro-nationalistic” or “David against Goliath narratives”, which do not pay sufficient attention

to dynamics “from above” through the role of governments and local businesspersons (Borras and Franco, 2013:1742).

For authors who first highlighted the existence of such misleading binaries, condemnation of land deals by activists, rural peasant movements and NGOs is mainly based on dichotomies that qualify the land transactions as undesirable or dangerous *a priori* because they constitute a threat to ‘Merrie Africa’, perpetuating the opposition between large ‘predatory’ investors and smallholders, foreigners and locals (De Schutter 2011). These binaries do not account for the heterogeneity of outcomes and actors involved and their sometimes diverging, converging, and overlapping interests. Binaries are unhelpful when trying to understand reality, since “actors are not operating in isolation but from mixed and blurred categories which are difficult to disentangle” (Kaag and Zoomers 2014: 201).

In this section I have reviewed the current “land grab” literature, arguing that it is crucial to overcome the challenge of defining what “land grabs” *are* by responding to what they *do* and *for whom*? The methodological biases and empirical uncertainties discussed in this section mask important ideological and theoretical differences between participants in these debates. Indeed, the failure to provide more robust evidence on outcomes is *not* evidence of lack of outcomes, but a reflection of how theoretical preferences may blinker our empirical analysis of real phenomena in motion.

### **2.1.3. Why don’t we know more?**

This section argues that how we know about “land grabs” shapes what we know about them. Research is eminently political, and this affects its outcomes. Land is at the crossroad of the social, political and economic due to its “social embeddedness” (Polanyi 2001). It constitutes a battlefield of methods and discourses: “Evidence is something that is concrete and indisputable, whereas politics refers to activities concerned with the acquisition or exercise of authority” (Morse, 2006: 395). Research on land grabs is further complicated by the multiplicity of sources, speculation, and reports that the “land grab” might be a declining phenomenon (Kaag and Zoomers 2014), along with a rush to find “killer facts” at the expense of high-quality methodology. This is discussed by Oya

(2013a: 505), who claims that a demand for sensational stories has led to “quick and dirty research”.

Advocacy’s own rationale and agendas are equally political. When considering the reliability of research, it is important to examine what the stakes are – especially regarding “messy hectares”, scale, actors, the “naming” of deals and silences regarding impacts and outcomes. This confirms that the political nature of research affects its methods and outcomes. Therefore, it is crucial to examine the rising convergence of evidence-building and the underlying politics of pushing agendas, resistance, contestation or success.

Analysing the epistemology of existing datasets and sources of data on land is one critical step if our knowledge-building efforts are to be sustained. It is crucial that we interrogate the context and circumstances in which research is produced, including its goals, claims, target readership, geographical area targeted, implicit assumptions of the researcher, and even the silencing of other data. Such efforts are in line with Edelman (2013: 494), who questions the over- or under-reporting of land deals by some media outlets, how information is obtained and leaked, and why the focus has been on some investors and not on others (see also Cotula 2013: 39). In Senegal for instance, I analysed data obtained from the global database on land deals, Land Matrix<sup>7</sup> in 2013, along with a desk review of media articles and grey literature. I found the focus to be overwhelmingly on international investors, even in cases of collaboration between international and national partners (Dieng 2017). Subsequent use of the database in 2018 showed further improvement as crowdsourcing was now complemented by snowball sourcing in which the initial source serves as a starting point for further investigation, and reviewing of grey literature (Land Matrix website 2018; Nolte 2016: 4). This revision process might be the result of the critical debate emerging on the politics of evidence, such as in the 2012 Cornell academic conference. This as an example of academic community engagement/

---

<sup>7</sup> <https://landmatrix.org/>



## **2.2. Surveying the literature on impacts and outcomes**

The impacts and outcomes of any development intervention are difficult to assess. Socio-economic impact is my main interest in this thesis. The International Institute for Impact Evaluation's (3ie) defines "impact" as, "how an intervention alters the state of the world. Impact evaluations typically focus on the effect of the intervention on the outcome for the beneficiary population..." (2012:5). However, by considering outcomes as variables (medium-term effects of variables of interest), and impact as the change arising from those variables (3ie 2012), 3ie's definitions of outcome and impact can create "confusion including within the impact evaluation community itself" (Belcher and Palenberg 2018). The Organisation for Economic Development, Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) defines "impact" as the "positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended" (OECD DAC, 2012:24)<sup>8</sup>. Outcome is "the likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs" (OECD DAC, 2010: 28). Impact and outcomes are effects of an intervention. Where there is a sequential logic of causality between outcomes and outputs, impact is the result of a purposeful intervention, and may generate "unintended outcomes", results that fall outside of the initial intention of the intervention (Jabeen 2018: 264). Impact is measurable yet requires the selection of a specific set of indicators as well as the factoring in of unintended outcomes. This makes credible and rigorous impact assessment rare due to the "myopia bias" in favour of projects that bring about quick results and lead to a focus on short-term effects (Ravallion 2009: 32). Land deals are no exception. Their longer-term impacts are hard to assess, due to two methodological and epistemological challenges: finding ways to associate research questions with adequate methods and counterbalancing the effects of ideology in research questions and methods (Oya 2013: 1535-6).

### **2.2.1. Time delay in implementation might shape outcomes**

Many land deals have only recently been implemented, meaning that their long-term impacts are yet to be known. Despite this, Cotula argues that researchers must not be complacent as such deals still exacerbate land pressures and create opportunities and costs

---

<sup>8</sup> <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/2754804.pdf>

(Cotula, 2013: 46) as a study of Ethiopia, Ghana and Tanzania reveals (Cotula et al. 2014: 219). Data from the Land Matrix shows that in Senegal, in 2015, 26 deals were inventoried on the database, of which 14 were at a production stage, and 5 abandoned. One thing we can infer from this evidence is the significant uncertainty of land deals. The way the database provides information is biased, filters are automatically set to show oral and contractual transnational agreements, and one needs to ‘tick other boxes’ to have information on failed, intended and domestic deals. Uninformed users may be led to focus on concluded deals only, and not to question cases where contracts or negotiations have been cancelled and failures at implementation stage. Most databases are a work in progress. Thus, the data can lead users to focus in certain directions and may reinforce tendencies to take perceptions of outcomes as actual impact.

### **2.2.2. Land deals have multidimensional outcomes**

Researching the effects of agricultural investment – or indeed of any kind of development – demands caution, since the outcomes can be time-bound and context-specific; shaped by the specific history of a place and its current political economy (Bebbington and Bebbington 2018). This is illustrated by the case of Senhuile Senethanol, a Senegalese-Italian Company which began its activities in Fanaye, Ronkh and Ngnith, in Senegal. This was after being granted 20000ha for the cultivation of sweet potato for biofuel production. The project was first stopped in 2013, due to an uprising by the local population who claimed negative outcomes. Three people were killed and Senhuile Senhethanol was relocated to Ndiael by the President. President Wade declassified protected reserves and granted the company 20000 ha, while the Senegalese citizens occupying 6650ha of the land were forced to relocate. President Wade’s successor, Macky Sall, immediately cancelled the project following his election. He later authorised it again, leading to new social mobilisations against the deal. The project was eventually stopped in 2014, but as of February 2016 its website remains active. The fact that the project changed its production from biofuels to food (peanuts, sunflower and food supplies for livestock) illustrates how project outcomes are shaped by external factors, such as the location of the land, including in its later stages - in this case leading to cases of displacement and claims of lost employment opportunities.

This supports the argument of Borrás and Franco: that changes in land use affect outcomes depending on the pattern of the change, i.e. food to food, food to biofuels, non-

food to food, or non-food to biofuels (2012). Changes in land use are critical from a livelihood and agrarian change perspective. For other researchers, focusing solely on land use change is insufficient compared with studying the entire process of crop selection (White and Dasgupta 2010: 600-605). It would be more productive to question the conditions under which crops are grown and processed, the type of ownership, labour regimes (as discussed below), segment of the food regime, type of commodity chains and the mechanisms in place to facilitate inclusive benefit-sharing (Ibid.).

Outcomes may also be differentiated between and within categories of actors over time and space, with a sorting of winners benefiting from positive outcomes such as the local distribution of revenue flows, business opportunities or personal benefits (Sassen 2010). To access opportunities considered as rents, actors' resort to everyday politics to influence outcomes. Hence, we can observe different reactions 'from below' to land deals, acquiescence, resistance and adverse incorporation (Borras and Franco 2013; Edelman et al 2013; Martiniello 2015). According to Hall et al., these community (re)actions depend on several factors such as pre-existing tenure systems, local land interests, the intensity of existing land-use conflicts, the transparency and smoothness of land acquisitions, the promises that are made, the landholding practices and business models of investors, the extent of new livelihood opportunities created and how broadly these are shared, and state and investor attitudes and responses to community concerns (Hall et al. 2015:19-21). Therefore, it is crucial to analyse both structure and the agency of subjects, as well as how this affects processes of agrarian change.

In land deals, process outcomes have been framed as relating to dynamics of "inclusion" and "exclusion" leading to the finalisation or implementation of deals, terms of the deals, type of business model, selection of sites, choice of final *produce* (crops in the case of agricultural land deals), legal arrangements, benefit-sharing, etc. These are connected to the terms of the deal and how they change pre-existing relationships, for example regarding contracts, agreements and the ways in which the terms of agreement are enforced. This is the focus of seven studies focusing on Senegal, which report a lack of transparency and the state's tendency to accept without discernment any business model proposed by investors to attract FDI (Cicodev 2011; Copagen 2012; Copagen et al. 2013; Kaag et al. 2011; IPAR 2012). Other studies focus on the social, economic, political, environmental, and even cultural outcomes. Such impact assessments correspond with

Shaffer's mechanism-based approach, which emphasises livelihoods, social relations and agrarian change (Shaffer 2015). Such studies examine the outcomes on people's lives and livelihoods, and other issues related to access to employment and markets (Cotula 2013; Kaag and Zoomers 2014; McCarthy 2010), displacement or dispossession (Cotula et al., 2014; Hall et al., 2015), compensation (Cotula et al., 2009; Hall et al., 2015), human rights violations (Hall et al. 2015; Martiniello 2015; Shiva and Chomsky 2014), changes in inter and intra-class and gender relations (Behrman et al. 2012; Doss et al. 2014; Faye 2012; Koopman and Tsikata 2009; Tsikata et al. 2014), patterns of agrarian change, (re)actions from below (Borras and Franco 2013; Hall et al. 2015; Martiniello, 2015), and responses from above to regulate deals (Kaag and Zoomers 2014; Kugelman et al. 2013; Margulis et al. 2013; Schutter 2011), as well as the ways in which land transfers impacts on belonging and identity (Kuba and Lentz 2006, Borras and Franco 2013).

Recent research on Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique and Congo focuses on three aspects: i) loss of resources; ii) implications for livelihood activities and employment opportunities; iii) the distribution of social benefits (Hall et al. 2015). Despite a promising approach that centres more on employment and livelihood outcomes, most case studies tend to report negative outcomes (or perceptions of outcomes) because they contrast real effects with unrealistic expectations of permanent employment. Some researchers seem to ignore the realities of rural labour markets and the intrinsic seasonality of agricultural wage labour including self-employment which is discussed in chapter 7. An emerging literature shows how more rigorous evidence on employment dynamics and understanding of the seasonal nature of these jobs requires analysis in terms of job quality, numbers, security and sustainability over time (Cotula et al. 2014; Oya and Pontara 2015).

In this thesis, I unpack the differentiated agrarian change outcomes of land deals (since impact takes longer to materialise), as well as the perceptions of those living near to, or participating in, rural labour markets. Analysing perceptions has proven to be a powerful method especially in poverty studies (Pradhan and Ravallion 2000; Sen 1985). Despite this, I recognise that this needs to be complemented by other research methods to achieve a more holistic analysis and balance between real effects and subjective measurement.

## **2.3 Land deals do not happen in the vacuum: Global and local dimensions**

There is a need to understand land deals in the broader context of agrarian change and class dynamics in capitalist development. Agrarian political economy examines agrarian change through considering some key processes and analytical categories, namely peasant differentiation, class struggle, transitions to capitalism and production, productivity and rural labour markets in rural areas. As the *Journal of Agrarian Change*<sup>9</sup> makes clear in its mission statement, agrarian political economy is concerned with “the social relations and dynamics of production and reproduction, property and power in agrarian formations and their processes of change, both historical and contemporary (Bernstein 2010: 1).

### **2.3.1. The centrality of labour regimes**

The land grab literature has paid attention to the importance of labour regimes in shaping different outcomes for different classes of labour. Labour regimes are defined by Bernstein as “the interrelations of (segmented) labour markets and recruitment, conditions of employment and labour processes, and forms of enterprise authority and control” (2007: 5-7). It is within the interaction of classes of labour and variegated classes of capital that most outcomes reveal their multidimensional nature. Burawoy’s definition of factory regime, is fruitful, in considering not only the wider social relations of production, based on the combination of capital and labour, but also the relations in production both at the international and national level and reproduction (Burawoy 1985, Mezzaddri and Srivastava, 2015:5). Such an approach allows us to understand how the international food regime defined as “a rule governed structure of production and consumption of food on a world scale” (Friedmann, 1993, 30-1) shapes the vertically integrated firm’s labour regime at the national and international level. The labour regime, dictated by the imperatives of the food regime through global commodity chains, shapes local valuation and segmentation of the labour force. Business/farming models shape labour regimes and thereby constitute an expression of the encounters between capital and labour. Consequently, class struggles emerge as a response, a counter-movement

---

<sup>9</sup> <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/page/journal/14710366/homepage/productinformation.html>

embodying local labour control regimes (LLCRs) which determines the forms of mobilisation and exploitation of labour (Pattenden, 2018: 1043; Baglioni 2018). This illustrates the relevance of business/farming models for this research being: i) estates or plantation farming; ii) outgrowing including contract-farming (CF)<sup>10</sup>.

Estates or plantation farming is largely defined by the following characteristics: a focus on growing one main cash crop, their capital investment requirement, their larger than average size, their reliance on hired resident or migrant labour, and their central management (Smalley 2013: 17). A definition oriented to African contexts considers it, “a type of land ownership and use involving generally foreign investors producing tropical crops, mainly or wholly for export, with hired labour (Baglioni and Gibbon 2015: 1559). As for contract-farming, it has been defined as a “form of vertical integration between agricultural producers and buyers (exporters, agro-processing companies or retailers at the end of the value chain” (Oya 2012: 2). The term “out-grower” is sometimes used interchangeably with the CF as it’s a form of production using hired external labour. It has been defined by Hall et al. (2011: 204) as, “involving the development of processing facilities (usually with a core commercially operated estate), through which small producers are incorporated into commercial value chains”.

An important study surveying the evolution of plantation farming in 19 African countries suggests that the spread of plantation farming practiced in West Africa was unequal. The “golden age” of estates farming between 1920 and 1960 resulted in a substantial increase in crop production and area cultivated. The quantities of crops produced<sup>11</sup> in the post-1960 period dominated by small scale farming was reduced (Baglioni et al. 2015). Two striking and particularly relevant developments for this study are the rise of higher-value crops<sup>12</sup>, including fresh vegetables post-1980, and the increase of domestic capitalists owning estates (Baglioni et al. 2015). However crucial these developments are, they do not explain the difficulty of establishing estates in the contemporary period. For Dancer et al. (2015), this difficulty is to be linked with the historical association of plantations farming with processes of land expropriation, followed by displacement and loss of

---

<sup>10</sup> The colonist model also exists: the first one involving the introduction of commercial producers who take over a block or area, as has been seen in Southern Africa (Hall 2011: 204)

<sup>11</sup> Mainly cocoa, coffee, spices, copra, cotton and tobacco.

<sup>12</sup> Other higher-value crops comprise of cut flowers, citrus and grapes.

commons for previous users, such as in Kenya's post-independence period. This can also be understood in relation to waves of land rush that have witnessed the state's siding with (foreign) capital in the name of "agricultural modernisation" or "food security", as is the case in Senegal. Estate agriculture has been characterised by low wages and poor working conditions (with the domination of casual employment), increased feminisation of the labour force, and higher levels of mechanisation which have had various effects on workers (Dancer et al. 2015: 14).

Several African case studies comparing different types of labour regimes illustrate the effects of these models. A case study on Ghana's largest fruit-processing company, Blue Skies, analysed employment patterns in the out-grower value chain system and found that while men occupied permanent position in the factories, as well as high-earning jobs in the value chain as out-growers, while women were employed as casual workers in these two spaces (Torvikey et al. 2016: 77-97). Another study comparing a Dutch-Ghanaian owned nucleus farm Integrated Tamale Fruit Company IFTC with two plantations, the Norway Solar Harvest Limited and the US-Ghana government partnership Prairie Rice, also found different outcomes (Tsikata and Yaro 2014: 46-64). Whilst land was previously managed through local chiefs or under family systems, after the deals, previous users were forced to either borrow land, engage in sharecropping, or clear new land. Most farmers interviewed agreed to become wage workers through "incomplete proletarianization" with jobs being casual (over 80% for Prairie and Solar Harvest and over 40% for IFTC - 58% of the jobs being permanent). This type of employment was considered an opportunity for some, while others regretted that it did not allow them to work on their own farm. Unsurprisingly, resistance came mainly from those who suffered the adverse impacts of land deals (rich urban migrant farmers from Tamale where IFTC operated and their women labourers). Access to employment contributed to the creation of new patterns of socio-economic differentiation.

Case studies beyond SSA, also tend to provide evidence against "the win-win narratives" of contract-farming. Vicol (2017: 157-166) rejects narratives promoting CF as an inclusive alternative to "land grabbing" as was proposed by De Schutter (2011: 256) and (Braun et al. 2009; FAO 2013; Paglietti and Sabri 2013) based on a case study on potato production in Maharashtra where it resulted in the introduction of new modes of

production and accumulation in an already very socially-differentiated context. CF adversely incorporated farmers in “new relationships of capital, debt and power that often do not result in the pro-poor rural development outcomes imagined by some”, but a “complex mosaic of winners and losers amongst rural households” (Vicol 2017: 165).

Much attention has been paid to other processes of rural class formation, including the so-called disappearance of peasants, de-agrarianisation (Bryceson et al. 2000; Moyo and Yeros 2005) and the implication of this for capitalist development (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2010a, 2010b, 2009). Other studies suggest dynamics of semi-proletarianisation (Hall et al. 2015) and strategies of labour mobilisation and surplus value extraction by different classes of capital. Whether in the Senegalese Groundnut Basin (Oya 2002, 2004, 2007) or in the Niayes area (Baglioni 2015), in the Ivorian cocoa sector and the pineapples market in Ghana (Amanor 2012), in the Mozambican tobacco sector (Perez-Nino 2016) or in the “super-exploitation” of Zimbabwean agrarian wage labourers (Chambati 2017), social classes are most likely to go through gradual and uneven transformations rather than just suddenly disappear. The unevenness and historical contingency of these processes of agrarian change are also determined by agency and negotiation by all actors - including peasants who are never totally constrained. Transactions, exchanges and social interactions are open-ended and multidimensional rather than single-stranded and definitive (Berry 1993: 13).

### **2.3.2. Querying Capital’ and Capitalists**

The above discussion of labour regimes serves as a relevant entry point to the question of capital. This is so because labour regimes are one of the three dimensions of capital, the other two being the logic of accumulation and ethos of management, also discussed in this section (Lee 2017: xii). Indeed, much of the literature on land grabs focuses on scale when documenting land deals and investors. As demonstrated above, beyond the sole focus on hectares, it is also sensible to look at the capital involved as deals can be small or medium (by size) but involve significant capital (Borras, Franco et al. 2012: 851, Edelman 2013: 497; Mehta et al. 2012: 195,). Capital is central to examining processes of differentiation - both in a sociological sense (social class) – and in a material sense (social relations of production) (Bernstein 1977:67). How wealth becomes capital is key



even within classes of petty commodity producers, as they are not all “family<sup>13</sup> farmers<sup>14</sup>” or even “peasant” despite the frequent conflation of the two in many contributions to the land grab literature (Bernstein 2010). Questions regarding to be asked concerning capital and capitalists are: What are the origins of capital and the accumulation background of the capitalists? What are their main drivers and motivations? What are the implications for broader questions of capitalist transition?

Evidence on the origin of the capital is inconsistent because different studies choose to focus on one or two sources of investment rather than looking at “capital” in all its manifestations. Some studies focus on foreign corporate investors (Evers et al. 2013), some on foreign investors from the Global North, Europe and the US, and others emphasise the role of Gulf countries and China in sending investors to acquire farmland. This has led to biases and exaggerations, notably in relation to the case of Chinese investors (Bräutigam 2015; Bräutigam and Zhang 2013; Buckley 2013; Hofman and Ho 2012). Other studies have stressed the role of acquisitions originating from the ‘South’; other middle-income developing countries in South-East Africa and countries such as India and Brazil (Woertz 2013: 104-119 in Allan et al 2013; Cotula 2013: 63). The narrative of ‘foreign grabbers’ has certainly contributed to the interest of mass media in the topic.

What most first-wave studies of LSLA had failed to appreciate was the significance of domestic investors (Cotula 2013; Greco 2015; Hilhorst et al 2013). Baglioni and Gibbon (2013) stress the important role played by domestic or “African” capital, especially from South Africa, which has actively participated in the land rush. Domestic capital, they explain, remains cumulatively important as illustrated by at least 95% of all transactions in the Benin, Niger and Burkina Faso coming from local businesspersons and state agents or politicians. In Senegal, they found the big players in the export horticulture and groundnut sector to have had a major implication in such deals (ibid: 1562). Cotula (2013: 52) argues land deals are not an externally-driven process but often result from internal historical processes of social differentiation and capitalist accumulation. This is, according to Cotula, the principal reason why deals are so opaque and fail to openly seek

---

<sup>13</sup> “Family is an internal social organisation based on family labour, whereby the family serves as the unit of production, consumption, reproduction, socialisation, welfare, and risk-spreading”(Bryceson et al 2000:2).

<sup>14</sup> “A farm pursues an agricultural livelihood which combines subsistence production with commodity production” (Ibid.).

for prior informed consent. Research on the land rush in Burkina Faso and Mali post-2007 has shown how urban inward investors increasingly acquire farmland using their personal contacts, networks and resources with only a few investors benefiting from state support (Hilhorst and Nelen 2013: 146-159). It is useful to try and reconceive of “investment chains”, to capture the multiplicity of actors and relations linked to a project, their locations, contribution, role, and the flow (upstream and downstream) and share of the financial gains. This allows for better outcomes and that pressure points (Cotula and Blackmore 2014: 1).

The rising interest in farmland and the associated arrival of foreign or domestic capitalists revives an old debate about the obstacles to African transition to capitalism (Amin 1969; Austin 2005; Baglioni 2015; Berry 1993; Boone 1992; Hill 1963; Iliffe 1983; Kennedy 1988; Sender and Smith 1986). Is the land rush an illustration that such obstacles are being removed? This is what Bernstein and Byres call the ‘production’ problematic in the agrarian question (Byres 1996: 26). Using Kautsky’s conceptualization of “the continued existence in the countryside, in a substantive sense, of obstacles to an unleashing of accumulation in both the countryside itself and more generally – in particular, the accumulation associated with capitalist industrialization” (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2010a). In the land grab literature, the focus is on labour outcomes (on-farm and off-farm employment creation), i.e. whether producers are dispossessed, and workers obtain jobs in relation to the usual binaries i.e. local verses foreign, or subsistence verses market-oriented production. The capitalist, or investor, is not really problematized beyond the nationality of their passport. More important is understanding why capitalists acquire land and whether they need a lot of labour and how they use labour. These are empirical questions that the land grab literature has not yet addressed in full, or with sufficient substance. More specifically, a key question is whether land rush reflects a “return” of the agrarian question of capital, in the sense of a renewed interest in the development of capitalist agriculture as an aspect of broader capitalist development. This question is connected to the links between labour regimes (for instance CF when that is the form that land deals take) and capitalist development in agriculture (Oya 2012). It is therefore crucial to look at outcomes to understand how different fragmented classes of labour (Bernstein 2007) and different classes of capital fare in the land rush. How they fare in cases where both land and labour are needed and in cases where only land or labour is required (Li 2011). “Was the land rush an instance of acceleration of agrarian capitalist

development or not?” (Oya 2013b).

In the land rush literature, it has been argued for instance that “production grabbing” by capital may take place without “land grabbing”, as in the case of CF or out-grower models. In other words, this can occur without investors necessarily acquiring land, but with them controlling the various segments of the value-chain, through externalising production using different types of labour regimes (as defined below), vertical integration and direct investments (Anseeuw and Ducastel 2013: 2; Ducastel and Anseeuw 2011: 2; Matondi et al. 2011: 35). Another phenomenon has been defined as “control grabbing”, which seeks to respond to state and donors’ shifting production strategies as well as accumulation imperatives by foreign and domestic accumulators (Huggings 2014). As opposed to “production grabbing”, “control grabbing” cannot happen without land because control and authority over land are the very cause of struggle (Margulis et al. 2013: 11-12). A recent concept “labour grabbing” has been proposed in the land grab debate in relation to processes through which state agencies impose cash crop production after the formalisation of land rights (Stein et al. 2015). Hall has proposed that the current use of “land grabbing” can distract its users from its real effects which are, “not the mere capture of land but the capture of labour, water, and most of all, the adverse incorporation – rather than exclusion – of smallholder agriculture into new value chains, patterns of accumulation, and the wider transformations in agrarian structure and agro-food systems that these precipitate” (Hall 2011: 207-208). Adverse incorporation, in this sense, allows us to go beyond the rhetoric of “inclusion/exclusion” and to critically analyse the *terms of incorporation* (Du Toit 2004: 30; Hall 2011; McCarthy 2010; Vicol 2017). This might result in the marginalisation of workers who bear the risks included in this type of labour as a result of firms seeking to reduce their transaction costs while they are more integrated in global food chains. This might also dictate the type of political responses to deals (Borras et al. 2013; Hall et al. 2015,).

In all these different scenarios of labour mobilisation and land use, much depends on the variegated logics of accumulation by newly arrived capitalists, as well as ethos of management. The affected actors are not mere bystanders watching these transformations without struggling, they are rather groups with agency that articulate different forms of active and passive resistance to commodification, dispossession and proletarianisation (Moyo et al. 2012). The land rush may lead to overt or hidden conflicts between: i) The

state and local communities, ii) local communities and new land holders, iii) different groups within local communities, iv) between local leaders and community members, v) between communities. Resistance and attempts to ‘grab back’ the land can take many forms such as court cases, demonstrations, illegal night grazing, thefts, abductions, death threats, etc. (Borras and Franco 2013: 19-21; Reid Ross 2014).

People presented as ‘victims of land grabs’ do not always react with the level of resistance or violence expected of them. More often they take the forms of *everyday resistance* which are the main *Weapons of the weak*, rather than overt *weaponization of life*: “passive non-compliance, subtle sabotage, evasion, and deception”<sup>15</sup>(Scott 1985: 295). Consequently, polar narratives of expulsion and resistance should not be taken for granted (Borras and Franco 2013: 1724). Borras, examining political reactions from below, suggests they are diverse and identifies: struggles against dispossession through questioning the state’s role or demanding its arbitration, struggles against exploitation or adverse incorporation and focus on the terms of the dispossession, as well as struggles against land concentration, and for redistribution and recognition in which the relationship to land might be more visceral (Borras and Franco 2013). In short, understanding the dynamics of these new forms of agrarian accumulation and whether they point to a resolution of the agrarian question cannot be done without considering the politics of resistance and struggles that also shape what capitalists can do.

---

<sup>15</sup> These include: ‘foot-dragging, evasion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander and sabotage.’

## **2.4. Situating the LG/LSLAs in the agrarian political economy debate**

The contemporary land grab might be a “hype” (Kaag and Zoomers 2014), but it constitutes an opportunity to further our understanding of the processes of agrarian change. Understanding agrarian change is complicated by ideological, conceptual, disciplinary and methodological schisms. Therefore, overcoming dichotomies and moving beyond the polar positions requires first and foremost understanding underlying disciplinary divergences: “particularly the conceptual differences between analyses of African agriculture by economists and other quantitatively oriented social scientists, on one hand, and by historians and anthropologists on the other” (Berry 1993: 4). It also involves grasping theoretical divergences. This section provides an overview of the main theoretical debates and how they structure dichotomies in the land grab debate.

### **2.4.1. Varieties of political economy traditions**

Derek Hall proposes that the “land grab” literature is dominated by critical agrarian political economy approaches whereas for Oya, neoclassical and neo-populist claims are dominant (Edelman et al. 2015: 11). This section discusses the two main strands of agrarian political economy: on the one hand, a pro-smallholder neo-populist tradition, which greatly influences the thinking of those who denounce land grabs, and on the other hand, the classical Marxist agrarian political economy which brings in the concepts of petty commodity producers, agrarian differentiation, agrarian transitions and the problematic of accumulation.

Neoclassical theories gained momentum in the post-war period, when development economics emerged and focused on why “economically backward areas” were so and the stages required to develop *à la Rostow*<sup>16</sup>. From the *old* neoclassical (henceforth ONDC) an economic theory of growth, produced in the “first world”, it has evolved to become a multidimensional and non-linear approach effectively applied in both developed and developing economies in search for solutions for the poor (Byres, 2003 and 2006). ONDC’s main preoccupation is maximising the use of scarce resources through effective

---

<sup>16</sup> Rostow, W.W. (1960) *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

allocation of goods and the condition for reaching equilibrium. In this model based on individualism, getting prices right is promoted as the way to allow economic agents to make rational choices and maximize their utility/profit.

With the end of the Golden Age of accelerated growth in Europe, new neoclassical development economics NCDE emerged (Byres, 2003 and 2006). The assumptions of NCDE and those of New Institutional Economics (NIE) on the agrarian questions are: i) the peasantry is “amorphous”, representation of rational small farmers in perfect competition; ii) mutuality exist between producers and non-producers and among producers themselves; iii) the different agents/classes have equal economy power but asymmetrical access to information which is resolved by existing agrarian institutions; iv) the causes and reproduction of backwardness is contingent and therefore ignored; v) a very ambiguous position regarding state intervention (Byres 2003: 243-250, 2006).

For “Orthodox Marxists” understanding the development of capitalism is necessity to transcend it and progress towards a “superior” mode of production and social organisation: communism (Marx 1881). Whereas for agrarian neo-populists, the desirable agrarian change must respect the values and interests of small producers; they do not believe that “peasant elimination is a necessity” as defended by pro-capitalist or socialist agricultural modernisation theorists including Marxists (Bernstein 2010).

As for neoclassical neo-populism<sup>17</sup> is a term coined by Byres (2004) to describe the convergence between neo-classical economics and neo-populism reflected in Chayanov’s “Theory of Peasant economy” (Byres 2004). Such an approach entails the application of the main assumptions of neoclassical economics (especially utility maximisation), to explain how small farmers hold the key to poverty reduction since they are more efficient and able to attain higher productivity because of their greater ability to supervise labour, (farm size-productivity inverse relationship thesis). For Johnston and Leroux (2007), such assumptions on labour supervision fail to consider the inner complex workings of household decision making as well as the differences in efficiency between unpaid family labour and paid labour. Neoclassical neopopulism was exemplified in the work by Griffin et al (2004) and Lipton (1977), for whom the bias in favour of large producers and the

---

<sup>17</sup> The first use of the term 'neo-populism' in 1923 is attributed to L. N. Litoshenko, to describe the approach of Chayanov's school', and was later taken by Soviet Marxists (Harrison, 1975).

allocation of resources to urban areas, to the detriment of rural ones (urban bias), had to be reversed to make agricultural markets perform efficiently (Byres, 2004). In the 1990s, the inverse relationship thesis was used to justify the establishment of new contracts between small producers and large agribusiness (Lipton 1993; Binswanger and Deininger 1993). This was implemented despite flaws, such as the lack of intensive-machinery, which leads to diseconomies of scale in smallholder production as opposed to “upstream remittances” realised by large scale farming thanks to being well-positioned in the supply chain (Baglioni and Gibbon 2013).

For Lipton, higher transaction costs in the new institutions of farm-product exchange, namely supermarkets, grades and standards, and wholesaling which work against small holders could be overcome with adequate internalisation (information and methods allowing them to adopt and adapt to new (super)market’s requirements) - and intermediation - (by entering into contracts with certified intermediaries that allow them integrate vertically) (Lipton 2006). According to Byres (2004), neoclassical neo-populism is static and fails to address contemporary processes of capitalist development in developing countries.

Neo-classical neo-populism as a variant of agrarian populism is linked to the notion of “technical populism” (Bernstein 2010) and as I have argued focuses on the economic superiority of smallholder farming and their positive properties in relation to agricultural development and poverty reduction. A smallholder farming path is not only favoured on economic grounds. Political arguments, as manifested in *political populism*, assume an undifferentiated peasantry and are mainly concerned with defending “family farmers”, the “people of the land” against threats to their reproduction. In the wake of a *new imperialism*, political populism defends the people from merchants, banks, capitalist landed property, agrarian capital and agribusiness through projects of state-led “national development” in all their capitalist, nationalist and socialist variants’ (Bernstein, 2010:86). In addition, the homogeneity of the peasantry remains an “urban illusion” that produces a rural fantasy (Wolf, 2001a:255). Political populism indeed remains a powerful force in dominant pro-peasant discourses on “land grab” as the defence of smallholders and peasants is advocated not on economic grounds but in the name of social justice.

Structural adjustment policies built on the state-market<sup>18</sup> dichotomy contributed to the starving of funds to agriculture and the persistent withdrawal of the state from supporting agrarian transformations (Chang 1999, Adelman 2001, Oya, 2007: 276, Oya, 2010:12). Even softer versions of neo-classical economics, i.e. NNDEC, which relaxed the state vs market binary in favour of a more balanced analysis of the role of the state in correcting pervasive market failures (Dorward 1999) fail to address some fundamental problems in its approach to agrarian change. Byres' (2003) heterodox view built on a classical political economy analysis proposes a different set of analytical categories, namely: i) socially differentiated peasants have antagonistic relations of production, determining polar class relations and their compulsion to take part or not in market exchanges; ii) in lieu of the mutuality dear to the NNDC partisans, the quest for the appropriation of surplus value is a more central issue than a risk for "agrarian institutions" and suggests using class analysis to study 'interlinked markets'; iii) agrarian institutions (e.g. sharecropping or contract farming), asymmetrical economic power exist and this is reflected through the bargaining power of different parties to negotiate or to enforce terms of contracts; iv) the roots of underdevelopment are empirically documented and a transition to capitalist agriculture under specific circumstances can be a solution to prevent the reproduction of poverty, v) a pragmatic view of state intervention, which neither glorifies nor demonises the state, rather assesses interventions in terms of the configuration of interests they represent and stresses the centrality of state's agency in shaping the process of agrarian change (Byres, 2003: 243-250, Byres, 2006).

This heterodox approach focuses on four central questions concerning social relations of production and reproduction (Bernstein 2010). The first question: "who owns what?" analyses agrarian property relations and the ways in which the means of production and reproduction are distributed. The second question, "who does what?" is concerned with the social divisions of labour (using class analysis). The third question, "who gets what?" analyses the distribution of income (monetary and non-monetary). The fourth "what do they do with it?" focuses on patterns of accumulation, reproduction and consumption (Bernstein 2010, 22). Two more questions have been added in the context of the land grab debate (White et al., 2012:621). The first "what do they do to each other?" seeks to capture

---

<sup>18</sup> This binary and the demonization of the state added the 'rent seeking' hypothesis to the urban bias thesis thereby reinforcing the view that governments should leave the agricultural sector to the forces of the market to reverse such biases (Berg Report WB 1981 and Bates 1981, 1983).



the political and relational aspects (including gender and sexuality) of the four initial questions by analysing how different social classes, groups in society and the state, interact with each other. The second additional question “how do changes in politics get shaped by dynamic ecologies and vice versa?” concerns the political-ecological context of land deals.

#### **2.4.2. Contested paths for rural transitions to capitalist development**

For heterodox Marxists such as Byres and Marx, paths of agrarian transition are important and cannot be theorised in a teleological and Eurocentric way (Wood 1999:27-33). They contest Marx’ famous statement on the classicism of the English path (Marx, 1976:876):

*The history of this expropriation assumes different aspects in different countries and runs through its various phases in different orders of succession, and at different historical epochs. Only in England, which we therefore take as our example, has it the classic form.*

However, in his correspondence with Vera Zasulich who asked him about the agrarian question in Russia, Marx responded through successive drafts that “to save the Russian Commune, there must be a Russian Revolution” since the historical inevitability is restricted to Western Europe, referring to the French Edition of *Capital*<sup>19</sup> (Marx 1881 - Second draft- in Shanin 2018:14-15). This constitute an important admission to the possibility of different (paths a similar idea to Chayanov’s *Theory of Peasant cooperatives* in 1919) as this would explain how revolution could happen in predominantly agrarian-based and non-fully capitalist societies like Russia. Building up on Lenin’s work, Byres distinguishes three ideal types of transition paths in the English, Prussian (capitalism from above) and American, only adding Taiwanese, Japanese and South Korean paths later (1996). The three later paths were deemed more significant for contemporary developing countries. “Capitalism from above” happened in the Prussian

---

<sup>19</sup> “Only in England has it been accomplished in a radical manner [...]. But all the other countries of Western Europe are following the same course”. (*Capital*, French edition, p. 315.)

path with landlords becoming capitalist farmers, rather than capitalism occurring through rural social differentiation. This unique, though reactionary path led to a slow transition with landlords maintain semi-feudalism at the expense of increasingly poor peasants. As for the USA path considered more relevant for land-rich African countries, it happened through a clear process of rural differentiation with classes of labour being exploited by classes of capital (petty commodity producers turned capitalist farmers) through increasing wage labour (Byres 1996).

For Byres, examining how “accumulation, production and politics contribute to or constrain agrarian transition” is necessary to understanding the path of capitalist development of any given social formation (Akram Lodhi et al, 2010: 257). Bernstein has argued that agrarian transition is no longer a necessary condition for capitalist development in this 21<sup>st</sup> century era of globalisation giving priority to the problematics of accumulation and rural production (2006, 2009). Samir Amin (2019: 54), on the contrary, contests that there is no contemporary agrarian question:

*The contention that capitalism has indeed solved the agrarian question in its developed centres has always been accepted by large sections of the left (...). What was always overlooked was that capitalism, while it solved the question in its centres, did it through generating a gigantic agrarian question in the peripheries, which it can only solve through the genocide of half of humankind.*

Similarly, Oya disagrees with Bernstein and rather urges us to pay attention to the slow emergence of varieties of emerging capital (foreign, domestic, small, middle or large-scale) in the African countryside (2013b, 1548-9). He asks: “... Is the kind of slowly emerging capitalist farming accelerating as part of the current ‘land rush’ or not? (Oya, 2013b: 1552).

But in order to examine the implications of the current land rush to contemporary questions of labour - the crisis in the social reproduction of labour - (Oya 2013b) or the social crisis of capitalism as such” (Fraser in Bhattacharya, 2017: 22) and of capital (processes facilitating or impeding the emergence of agrarian capital and rural capitalism) in this thesis, it is necessary to revisit and problematise key Marxist political economy concepts. That is the aim of the following sections.

### 2.4.3. ‘So-called primitive accumulation’

Capital accumulation involves the reinvestment of the profits accruing from accumulation to augment and concentrate capital. This seems to be the rationale for most “investments” in or “acquisitions” of land. Some of these aspects have been examined in the context of the development of capitalism in Africa (Berry 1993; Hill 1963; Iliffe 1983; Sender and Smith 1986). However, contemporary debates on land grab seem to have neglected these “old” concerns (Oya 2013b; 2007a). It is therefore imperative to reflect on the wide use of Marxist concepts such as “primitive accumulation” (PA henceforth) and “accumulation by dispossession” (ABD henceforth) to assimilate “land grabs” to a new form of imperialism (Harvey 2003), “sub-imperialism” (Hall, 2013; Moyo et al., 2012), and to understand whether current land grabs are the “remorseless expansion of capital(ism)” (Alden Wily 2012; Amanor 2012). Despite their Marxist roots, the use of these concepts in LSLA debates has tended to converge on the kinds of positions defended by neo-populists (hence Hall’s assertion that these debates were dominated by critical agrarian political economy). Peters (2013a) reminds us that land deals have implications for broader societal transformations, since land deals are socially embedded.

The land grab literature is informed by the Marxian conceptualisation of “dispossession” that arises in processes of so-called ‘primitive accumulation’, emphasising the political coercive origin of capitalism. Referring to four centuries of laws, institutions and policies of enclosures, Marx (1976: 874-875) contends that:

*... The process (of so-called primitive accumulation), which creates the capital-relation can be nothing other than the process which divorces the worker from the ownership of the conditions of his own labour.*

From this dispossession, emerges a worker dependent on the market for wages, “the exchange value” of labour which enables workers to meet the cost of social reproduction. Capital continues to accumulate at a faster pace trying to acquire a bigger consumer base for its commodities and appropriate more surplus labour at minimum costs, the very basis of capitalist survival. This distinctive “contradiction of capitalism” (Wood 2002) leads to the creation of “classes of capital” exploiting “classes of labour”. The first exploiting the labour of the latter creates more dependency to the market:

...But the relation of every capitalist to *his own* workers is the relation *as such of capital and labour*, the essential relation (...) Capital itself then regards *demand by the worker* — i.e. the payment of the wages on which this demand rests — not as a gain but as a loss. I.e. *the immanent relation between capital and labour* asserts itself. *Here again it is the competition among capitals*, their indifference to and independence of one another, which brings it about that the individual capital relates to the workers of the entire remaining capital *not as to workers*: hence is driven beyond the right proportion. (Marx 1973: 419-420)  
(Original emphasis)

This concept of PA will be subsequently revisited in Rosa Luxemburg's *Accumulation of Capital* (1913) and Lenin's *Imperialism, the Highest stage of Capitalism* (1917). Luxemburg's *Accumulation of Capital* (1913: 348-349) is of particular interest. She criticises Marx's idea that:

*The existence and development of capitalism requires an environment of non-capitalist forms of production... Capitalism needs non-capitalist social strata as a market for its surplus value, as a source of supply for its means of production and as a reservoir of labour power for its wage system....*

Following Luxemburg, Kalecki (1971) also defended the view that capitalism necessarily required an exogenous stimulus to sustain its expanded reproduction.

#### **2.4.4. Accumulation by dispossession**

Building on Luxemburg's critique of Marxian PA, David Harvey (2003) coined the concept of "accumulation by dispossession" to define the exponential continuation of accumulation efforts in the contemporary age of neo-liberal crises. ABD is a metaphor for solutions to capitalist crises through temporal deferment and geographical expansion to new arenas of accumulation in developing countries, and areas of social life that previously resisted the logic of capital. In Harvey's (2007: 159) own words, ABD:

*... include the commodification and privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations [...]; conversion of various forms of property rights [...] into exclusive private property rights [...]; suppression of rights to the commons; commodification of labour power and the suppression of alternative*

*(indigenous) forms of production and consumption; colonial, neo-colonial, and imperial processes of appropriation of assets [...]; monetization of exchange and taxation, particularly of land; the slave [...] and usury, the national debt and, most devastating of all, the use of the credit system as a radical means of accumulation by dispossession.*

This theory has been central to the land grab debate. This contradiction is said to create workers' dispossession through further proletarianisation and/or dependence on the market for self-reproduction (Wood 2009). Therefore, from an opportunity, markets become a compulsion (Brenner 1976; Wood 2002). The land grab literature has made use of the concepts of PA and ABD, drawing an equivalence with the processes ongoing in the land rush. Harvey (2003: 84) states that, "the shape and form any new imperialism will take is therefore up for grabs". Harvey does not differentiate between "dispossessions compounded by privatisation, financialisation and manipulation of crises and land and/or water grabs" (Fairhead, Leach and Scoones 2012: 243). Harvey's analysis has been criticised for discarding the centre-periphery contradiction of historical capitalism, his flawed understanding of resistance to neoliberalism (which emphasises dispersion and variety rather than collective potential), and a lack of unity rather than solidarity (Moyo et al. 2012). Despite acknowledging that land-grab driven dispossession happens, a few researchers, including Hall (2013: 1588), do not agree with the idea that takes for granted land-grabbing as a crisis-driven ABD.

Harvey (2003: 83) refers to "spatio-temporal fixes" as a metaphor for solutions to capitalist crises, through temporal deferment and geographical expansion to new arenas for accumulation. Either through selling-off and redistributing state assets to privileged private commercial interests in the developed world or the forceful territorial acquisition and control through financialisation, privatisation, commodification, management and manipulation of crises in developing countries.

Hall (2013) argues that concepts of PA and ABD *cannot* be used to describe *all* that is now known as land grab. In cases of capitalist to capitalist purchases and leases there is no room for extra-economic accumulation. For instance, cases such as conservation do not bring anything into capitalism, while they may shape dynamics of exclusion, they are not ABD. Praising Harvey's use of the concept of ABD yet judging it to be more abstract than its uses by "land grab" researchers, Levien (2011) has offered an interesting critique

and “reconstruction” to cover cases in which a number of actors, mainly state agents, recourse to extra-economic means of capitalist accumulation such as legal and political coercion to proceed to mass expropriations and redistributions. He defines ABD rather as:

*...the use of extra-economic coercion to expropriate means of production, subsistence or common social wealth for capital accumulation’ asking the central question of why in a given situation, capital would need to dispossess land rather than purchase it through the ordinary operation of real estate markets (ibid: 457).*

This use of the concept of ABD “re-politicises” the land grab debate by acknowledging the dynamics of accumulation “from above”, capital acquiring land and transforming it into capital. Land in a dynamic capitalist enterprise translates into “capital” in a way that petty commodity production cannot achieve. Consequently, it is crucial to reflect on the boundaries of what is “agriculture”? For instance, Sender and Cramer (2018) make the argument that some forms of agricultural production are more sophisticated (and require a form of dynamic capitalism) than many industrial manufacturing sectors. Here it is the *intention* of the acquisition that matters more than the means of acquisition. In the case of the export horticulture firms selected in this research, greenhouse irrigated land with thousands of workers (high intensity), packing houses and cold chain is not simply “land”. It is indeed capital. An interesting counter-perspective is that of Nichols, who suggests “disaggregating primitive accumulation” to grasp the spirit of Marx’s interchangeable use of “expropriation, theft, dispossession”. For Nichols (2015: 24), this can be fruitful when “dispossession” is used strategically to explain the process that leads to peasants divorcing from their means of production. The use of “soil” or “land” as an allegory of “nature” should not blind us to its literal understanding as a commodity that unites land and labour productively (ibid: 25-27).

There are limits to the extent in which ABD is achieved through coercive means as per the common assumption in the literature (Bin 2018). Harvey’s argument seems to stress *one* of the definitions of dispossession highlighted by Marx, “dispossession by displacement” or enclosure, and not the spirit of his definition as suggested by Nichols. Displacement does not always take place after recourse to non-economic means of coercion. The lines between economic and extra-economic dispossession are blurred and therefore the two should be understood as a continuum rather than as a binary (Hall 2013:

1593-1596). For Daniel Bin (2018), most debates on current dispossessions, which link it to primitive accumulation, do so without sufficient theoretical backing when associating it with contemporary capitalist accumulation. He therefore suggests two concepts: 1) Expanding capitalising dispossession, which, besides proletarianisation is the transformation of direct producers into wage-dependent producers — involves capitalisation, i.e., the transformation of the means of subsistence into capital: 2) Expanding commodifying dispossession which combines the processes of proletarianisation and capitalisation, which leads to a reduction in the cost of variable capital and of constant capital, respectively (ibid).

## **2.5. “Exploitation without dispossession?”: The diversity of forms of agricultural wage labour and their invisibility**

Empirically-grounded evidence and historical comparative research can help document the current land grab. Agrarian transition debates are of relevance in Africa with the centrality of *labour* over *land* in accordance with Berry’s (1993: 101). The study of wage employment in Africa has been limited by several methodological and ideological biases, leading some scholars to suggest labour markets may be non-existent (Cramer et al. 2014; Oya 2010, 2015;). Nonetheless, several studies have stressed the ubiquitous presence of labour hiring, even in smallholder dominated production systems, and segmentation of labour arrangements in rural Africa (Adams 1991; Cramer, Oya, Johnston, and Sender 2014; Cramer, Oya and Sender 2008; Fall 2011; Oya 2010, 2013a; Oya and Pontara 2015; Rizzo 2011; Sender et al. 2006,). This is with regards to the many roles of agriculture in African development including its poverty-reduction potential considered higher than growth in any other economic sectors (Diao et al. 2010: 1-9). Rural Non-Farm Economy (RNFE), constituted by all economic activities other than primary agricultural commodity production and self-employment, represented 35% of rural incomes in Africa and 50% in both Asia and Latin America in 2007 (Haggblade et al. 2007; Reardon et al. 2007). RNFE still elicits little interest in academic research, perhaps because to its mostly casual and precarious nature (Oya and Pontara 2015).

I use Oya and Pontara’s (2015: 3) definition of rural wage employment as “any form of work for another person or entity in exchange for any kind of compensation, whether in kind (including land for example) or in cash”. This comprehensive definition allowed me

to investigate patterns of multiple occupancy in the survey questionnaire. While semi-structured interviews conducted for this thesis quickly confirmed the longstanding practice of labour hiring in these contexts, and sometimes “unconscious” waged activities, which respondents only reported after further probing, but which fitted this definition. To further understand dynamics of social reproduction, I also asked questions about other unpaid work, and indeed most respondents did not consider it as “work”.

Previous studies confirm that rural wage work is neither new, nor was it simply a result of land deals, as the literature on accumulation by dispossession would suggest, i.e. that displaced people were “forced” to seek wage employment (Fall: 2011; Hill 1970; Mackintosh 1989; Oya 2015: 41). Land deals occurred where both agricultural wage employment and labour migration for agricultural jobs was common. Fall (2011) has surveyed some types of wage employment in his history of the evolution of labour in Senegal in the 20th century. Oya (2002, 2004, 2015), writing on forms of agricultural production in the groundnut basin and in the Niayes, has detailed a diverse set of labour arrangements generated by small, middle and large, agrarian capital. These are the *nawetaan*<sup>20</sup> (non-family *surga* migrant workers, mostly active during the rainy season), the *mbindaan* (or seasonal wage labour resident, who works for 6-8 months in the farms of middle producers or well-off farmers and is paid in cash, food and accommodation), the *saad* (or *sass*, casual daily wage work paid for a specific task or piece-rates), the disappearing *firdous* who were recruited in groups for piece work at groundnut harvest time), and collective labour *sant* (or *santaane*, often including a disproportionate share of poorer villagers) (Oya 2015: 48-53)<sup>21</sup>.

Berry’s (1993) theory of “exploitation without dispossession” is particularly useful in highlighting the centrality of rural labour mobilisation. Based on her comparative research on agricultural commercialisation and cocoa farming in Ghana, Kenya and Zambia, Berry observes that different classes of labour were mobilised by farmers in the year/decade X. This was achieved through networks and markets with varying degrees of

---

<sup>20</sup> See David, P. 1980: *Les Navétanes: Histoire des Migrants saisonniers de l’arachide en Sénégal* des origines à nos jours, NEA Dakar

<sup>21</sup> Some of these labour arrangements are also found in the selected research sites for this study in Louga and the Delta of the River, and especially *surga* (family or migrant), various forms of casual labour (*saad* or *sass*), as well as some forms of collective labour (*bay bokk*).



labour control, which was never total though it impacted the dynamics of social and rural differentiation. Her line of explanation “centers labour in the land grab debate” (Li 2011) in line with accounts of growing pressures on land, whether commercial or not, which increases social differentiation due to both land and labour being needed for further accumulation (Alden Wily 2012; Anseeuw et al. 2012; Peters 2004, 2013b). This theorising of exploitation without dispossession echoes that of “control grabbing” (Borras et al 2012: 402-406): “State and private actors taking control over land use and rural labour, rather than directly ‘grabbing’ land” (Huggings 2014:367). Berry’s findings about reasons for contesting labour and land in Anglophone Africa is interesting, but would this be relevant in the context of Francophone Senegal? Similarly, Bernstein offers another dimension of the Marxian concept of dispossession in “peasant dispossession by differentiation” which is driven by the market imperatives of capitalism to exploit labour, improve productivity, and cut the costs of production and defined as the “tendency of petty commodity producers to divide into classes of capital and labour” (Bernstein 2010:125).

Recently, new concepts have emerged such as “production grabbing” or “labour grabbing” - discussed in this thesis as per Hall’s (2011: 2008) recommendation to not only look at, “how these deals come to be, their implications for displacement and impacts on livelihoods but also asking what land grabbing produces: what new social relations, land politics, labour markets and modes of accumulation are being produced?” Recent literature on the land rush has begun to document the agrarian change outcomes of encounters between capital and labour, especially labour regimes (Baglioni 2018; Pattenden 2018) and social reproduction outcomes (Cousins et al. 2018) after a long period of “making sense” of the nature and dynamics of land acquisitions (Edelman et al. 2013).

## **2.6. A feminist critical agrarian political economy**

Labour relations are socially structured by the combination of land and capital for production. As for the division of labour, Bernstein (2010: 20) states that not only does it require a technical specialisation of workers and social organisation, it is also based on the distribution of productive activities within and between different units of production or households. Reproduction is mostly organised around the labour provided by women

and children, and those who own or hold the land, mostly males. Feminist research has contributed to agrarian studies by questioning largely accepted concepts such as “the household, “the economy”, “the market” and “the family” (O’Laughlin 1995, Kabeer 1997, Johnston et al 2007). Such research draws attention to labour and its valuation within “the market” and across families, and their relations with the control of land in agrarian societies as illustrated by the Jackson-Agarwal debate in the *Journal of Agrarian change* in 2003-2004, and other publications (Hall et al. 2015; Lanz et al. 2019; Rajjar et al. 2019).

### **2.6.1. Production and reproduction**

Marx and Harvey (1957: 713) focus on how capitalist accumulation and production adapt the numbers of workers to their expansion through the creation of “a relative surplus population” or “industrial reserve army”. Feminist scholarship has used Luxemburg’s emphasis on the centrality of non-capitalist milieus to examine and critique the ways in which capitalist accumulation subjugates female labour and reproduction, to preserve the condition of the production and reproduction of labour power:

*...primitive accumulation...was not simply an accumulation and concentration of exploitable workers and capital. It was also an accumulation of differences and divisions within the working class, whereby hierarchies built upon gender, as well as ‘race’ and age, became constitutive of class rule and the formation of the modern proletariat (Federici 2004: 63-64).*

The domestic, referred to as the sphere of reproduction, is no less important than “the productive” sphere which supposedly creates surplus value (Mies 2013: 209-238). There are “non-capitalist modes of production that capitalism require even in its most developed form if it is to continue growing or accumulating” (Luxemburg 1913). Several other political economists have attempted to analyse the linkages between production and reproduction (Meillassoux 1981) but have failed to analyse the roots of women’s subjugation and the nature of domestic work, which prevents women taking then part in the “labour force” (Johnston 1997: 219; Katz 1983; Mackintosh 1977; O’Laughlin 1977). This thesis seeks to banish the supposed boundary between private and public, or domestic and professional, because it is precisely this that allows the interrelated system of patriarchy/capitalism to maintain oppression in the familial superstructure and the

exploitation of women as workers. I agree with Mies (1986: 38) that “the never-ending process of capital accumulation cannot be achieved unless patriarchal man-woman relations are maintained or newly created”.

### **2.6.2. The centrality of social reproduction**

Feminist research has significantly enriched agrarian political economy perspectives in at least three ways: i) explicating the internal dynamic within and across families and households as well as the intersection between the political, economic and domestic; ii) recognising the centrality of unpaid care work taken for granted in most research on livelihoods; iii) constructively critiquing the methodological limitations of most mainstream neoclassical studies, which fail to capture the complexity and nuances of social formations (Razavi 2009: 200).

Feminist scholars studying agrarian change have made significant contributions to documenting the nature of the “unpaid care economy” and seeking its recognition against the “commodity economy” (Folbre 2006; Randriamaro 2013; Razavi 2007,), and “cheap labour”. Mbilinyi (1986: 107-108) defines cheap labour as “labour which is remunerated below the level of reproduction of labour power”. Due to low salaries, most casual workers have a second job. Feminist scholars also investigate women’s participation in rural labour markets (Mbilinyi 1986, Whitehead and Kabeer 2001, Baglioni 2017), changing livelihoods (Tsikata 2009, 2016; Razavi 2009), the mutual constitution of production and reproduction (Carney and Whatts 1990, Bryceson 1995, O’Laughlin 1995, Tsikata 2016, Razavi 2009, Mbilinyi 2016), and “social reproduction” (Katz 2001, Razavi 2007, Chung 2017, Bhattacharya 2017, Gimenez 2018). Recent feminist research on land deals has analysed some gendered outcomes of land deals by assessing: employment and new income benefits, landholdings and previous livelihoods activities, access to the commons and reproductive activities, and enjoyment of ancillary benefits (Dancer and Tsikata 2015; Mbilinyi 2016).

Feminist research has also paid attention to the gendered nature of labour regimes. They have examined labour mobilisation as the work of women is often preferred because of their supposed “nimble fingers” (Elson and Pearson 1981: 87-107) and docility

(Barrientos & Pallangyo; Mbilinyi 1986; Elson and Pearson 1981: 93; Whitehead 1979). Dolan (2001: 47) has shown that export French bean companies have contributed to this “naturalisation” of labour division by regarding women as “better bean pickers”: “Their hands are smaller and they have more patience for the work than the men”. Narratives of female “docility”, while true in some instances, are not always reflective of reality. In fact, as sometimes play an active role in resistance and strikes, a situation described, for example, by Mackintosh at BUD (1989: 176-178). As it turns out, women’s labour is often paid below the cost of social reproduction, and they are concentrated at the bottom of the jobs supply chain (Baglioni 2018; Cramer et al. 2014; Deere 2005; Dolan 2004a, 2004b, 2005; Mackintosh 1989; Maertens and Swinnen 2012; Van den Broeck and Kilic 2018).

Feminist research has further explored these issues by questioning the gendered relations of power, concepts of “family” and “household”, as well as labour division within and across families and their relations with the control of assets including land in agrarian societies (Engels 1884; Johnston et al. 2007; Kabeer 1994; O’Laughlin 2007). For instance, this was at the centre of the 2003 “Jackson – Agarwal debate”<sup>22</sup>.

Social reproduction takes place in markets, households and states and is defined as “activities and attitudes, behaviours and emotions, responsibilities and relationships directly involved in the maintenance of life on a daily basis” (Laslett and Brenner 1989: 382–3). Chung (2017: 104) defines social reproduction as “an assemblage of diverse labour processes — both paid and unpaid, material and symbolic, individual and communal — which are necessary for the sustenance and resilience of human life”. She highlights the specificity of agrarian households that lies in “their labour processes (i.e. the transformation of their labour power into labour) occur on, with and through the land” (ibid). Some feminists, such as Randriamaro (2013<sup>23</sup>), acknowledge a “hidden crisis” of care while others have instead highlighted a crisis of social reproduction itself. According to the latter, this is an acute “*expression of the social reproductive contradictions of financialised capitalism*”<sup>24</sup>, “a social crisis of capitalism as such” (Fraser in Bhattacharya 2017: 22) Cousins et al. (2018: 1060-1082) reveal a similar situation in their study of

---

<sup>22</sup> This debate arose when the second claimed that: “The gender gap in the ownership and control of property is the single most critical contributor to the gender gap in economic well-being, social status, and empowerment” (Agarwal 1994a: 1455).

<sup>23</sup> <http://www.eldis.org/document/A67528>

<sup>24</sup> Original emphasis.

South Africa when they claim social reproduction can include the reproduction of kinship systems, specific forms of marriage and community membership, as well as of social relations of assets ownership. This leads them to conclude that, though shaped by dynamics of capitalist accumulation, a substantial amount of social reproduction activities take place outside of (direct) market relations (ibid). However, the ways in which these processes of capitalisation of life and capital accumulation impact various actors is not always as dramatic as portrayed by land activists: it is sometimes not even “dramatic”, but “mundane” (Li 2014: 3).

I situate this study in this perspective and consider that it is urgent to pay special attention to the ways in which capitalism and patriarchies are mutually constituted. To do so, I argue that it is the conjugated power of capitalism-patriarchies that shape dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, and adverse incorporation in rural labour markets, in the distribution of rents (such as jobs, contracts, etc.), and the differentiated outcomes of the land deals.

### **2.6.3. Beyond markets: Bringing the social back in**

Much of the scholarship on LSLAs and agrarian change in Africa concentrates on socio-economic outcomes, capitalist pathways and transition. Other political economists have also recognised the need for a holistic approach paying equal attention to socio-cultural and economic aspects of agrarian change. This is the case of Akram-Lodhi (2018<sup>25</sup>) who suggests, in his definition of critical agrarian studies, the centrality of a multidimensional class analysis by “identifying and exploring the cultural, ecological, social, political and economic factors and forces that facilitate or impede class formation”. Similarly, Berry (1993: 12-14) says that in both neoclassical and Marxist political economy, culture like power “is treated as exogenous or subordinate to economic systems and processes”. She proposes that culture, power, and material resources are of equal significance as they act “in mutually constitutive ways to shape the course of economic and social change” (ibid). Archie Mafeje (2003) proposes that there is more than one way to understand the relationship between agrarian change and social development, and that “mono-economics” should not lead in the analysis of the agrarian question (and land tenure) in

---

<sup>25</sup> <http://roape.net/2018/03/28/what-is-critical-agrarian-studies/>

Africa. Finally, the Senegalese philosopher, Souleymane Bachir Diagne (1991: 2) argues that “one cannot be economically right if they are socio-culturally wrong”. Put simply, culture matters.

I am interested in understanding what land means to the different people I interviewed because of its social embeddedness. Why do some people/individuals still espouse Polanyi’s definition of land as a “fictitious commodity”<sup>26</sup>(Polanyi, 2001: 72). They do so despite the marketisation of land illustrated by the existence of (vernacular) land markets (Chimowhu and Woodhouse 2005). Such questions intersect with what Bernstein (2007: 2) termed the moral economy, “the social embeddedness of all economic institutions and practices and their moral or normative meanings to the social agents who inhabit those institutions and pursue those practices”. Indeed, increasing numbers of political economists, critical geographers and historians are now seeking knowledge beyond (frontier) markets and employment outcomes. Some of them are returning to questions of capital, capitalisation, marketisation and financialisation (Beckert 2014; Gimenez 2018; Lee 2017; Li 2014; Mies 2014; Ouma 2015; Oya 2015; Piketty 2015; Ralph 2015). The intention is to overcome real or imagined boundaries to consider *glocal* dynamics of accumulation of labour, and capitals and consider moral and *social orders* not only of markets (Beckert 2009), but of life.

## Conclusion

Surveying the current “land grab” shows us there have been significant progress in capturing their multidimensional nature. Further contributions can document land deals impact on the restructuring of power dynamics, social reproduction, identities, relationship to nature, and spiritualities. There is a need to go beyond the “coloniality of markets” which seeks to explain every phenomenon through the logic of capital, in which colonialism produced differences based on gender, race and different classes of capital, resulting in regimes of domination and exploitation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015; Tafira and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2017). This tendency to limit the multidimensional question of land to its economic outcomes is reductionist, and we should now aim to consider the Anthropocene at large.

---

<sup>26</sup> i.e. not produced for sale on the market (along with labour and money) which is still the “very fabric of society”



# CHAPTER 3: CAPITAL(IST) ACCUMULATION, LAND TENURE AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY: WHAT DOES HISTORY HAVE TO DO WITH IT?

## Introduction

To understand the contemporary land rush, it is necessary to appreciate historical processes of connection and disruption, continuity and change. This chapter provides an overview of the historical context that has shaped the farming models examined in this research on the land rush in estates<sup>27</sup> farming (as discussed in chapter 3), and one instance of contract farming.

This research involves the regions of Senegal now known as Saint-Louis and Louga. They cover the historical kingdoms of Waalo and Kajoor. Waalo was situated around the Senegale River, which straddles: i) the Lower Valley including the delta which extends from Podor to the mouth of the River with a mainly Wolof population; ii) the Middle Valley situated between Bakel and Podor, which has a mainly Halpulaareen population; iii) the Upper Valley located upstream of Bakel, extending over 50 km along River Senegal to the Malian border and the left bank of Faleme which is inhabited by a population of mainly Soninke. As for the failed deal in Louga, it is located in the area historically known as Kajoor (Diouf 1990:18).

In this chapter, I argue that, to understand the current land rush in the Delta of the Senegal River Valley, it is necessary to scrutinise its historical socioeconomic and political dynamics. By adopting this *longue durée* approach (Braudel 1958) as well as the comparative approach, this chapter shows that indeed the history of Senegal does not start with colonisation, albeit 19<sup>th</sup> century French conquest and reign made it easier for the

---

<sup>27</sup> I use invariably with plantation farming.



metropole to have a more direct and easier access to land and labour. This was to have a lasting impact on the land law and agricultural policy, and ultimately the land rush in this country. Therefore, this chapter focuses on i) retracing the roots of foreign capital in the Senegal River Valley region marked by the paramount relevance of labour, which shapes and is shaped by capitalist development, and in turn influences migration dynamics and impacts the Valley's *anthropocene*; ii) retracing the *longue durée* of tenurial transformations in the West Africa, including SeneGambia; iii) analysing this development in particular through the expansion of agricultural commercialisation and export horticulture in the Valley Region.

### **3.1. *The longue durée* of foreign capital penetration in the Delta and River Valley Regions and its outcomes**

This section offers a background to understand how various historical dynamics might have sedimented to make the Delta of the Valley the theatre of the current land rush. The sources used in this chapter are books and/or academic articles based on both internal and external sources<sup>28</sup>. There are few erroneous interpretations in the existing historiography according to Becker et al. (1975: 270). The major criticism of internal sources used for the study of Kajoor (such as Diouf 1990) is that they have often failed to establish a link between the political situation of the kingdom of Kajoor and European slave trade (Saint-Martin 1991). On the other hand, external sources tend to focus on internal crises and relations between the Damel (king of Kajoor) and Europeans, and undermine the scale of slave trade on Senegambian coast and its impact (Becker et al. 1975: 271). This is not tenable according to archive documents<sup>29</sup>. With this in mind, I have tried to engage critically with both types of sources not to fall into the trap of romanticising Waalo and Kajoor.

---

<sup>28</sup> Internal sources provide sociological, linguistic and ethnological observations, and are based on oral traditions and encompass family, villages, and dynastical oral traditions. External sources mainly consist of written European traditions and include socio-historical archives.

<sup>29</sup> According to Baron Roger, this is not surprising: "The Europeans have judged these people and things only from the decks of their ships" (January 1820)

### 3.1.1. Early capital penetration

A comprehensive approach to the land rush in the Valley requires a broad analysis of local and global connections and disruptions. In the 1970s, many scholars, mostly Marxist, were interested in when and how “*Black Africa*”<sup>30</sup> first came into contact with foreign capital, which they believed was key to understanding the state of capitalism in Africa (Amin 1970, 1971; Coquery-Vidrovitch 1976; Cruise O’Brien 1979; Rodney 1973). “Neo-colonialism”, a term used by this school to suggest continuities of domination and control over lucrative ventures after political independence, directed attention away from the nature of control over state apparatus in a context not yet dominated by capital (Boone 1992:15). Amin for instance (2012: quoted in Barry 2012), identifies different phases from pre-mercantilism to full integration into the capitalist system. The pre-mercantilist period which spans “the earliest days until the 17th century” is dominated by long-distance trade (including trans-Saharan trade).

According to Diouf (1994: 8), French presence in *Ndar* (Saint-Louis), since 1659, is not synonymous with continental penetration and colonisation, although he does acknowledge the pillages and destructions used to magnify the conquest. Other scholars, such as Saint-Martin (1991: 431), criticise some historians’ lack of engagement with French involvement in the slave trade<sup>31</sup>, despite the fact that the French presence in Bakel had been verified since 1820. Moreover, for scholars such as Shivji (2008: 55), slavery was not just a trade, or a minor event: “*The early encounter of Africa with Europe was not commercial involving the exchange of commodities, but rather the unilateral looting of human resources.*”

Regarding the origins of the dependency of Black Africa, Amin (2002: iii) suggests they are not to be found in the pre-mercantilist period as the continent was neither under any form of domination, nor inferior to the rest of the world. Amin identifies the tributary

---

<sup>30</sup> The authors use this term to refer to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)

<sup>31</sup> Diouf for instance engaging with English presence but only turns to French presence from 1855 in his work.

mode of production<sup>32</sup> as dominant in pre-capitalist Black Africa<sup>33</sup>, which he defines as a society in which a village community was subjugated to a political entity to which it paid a tribute and, in some cases, lost its land ownership rights (ibid: 4). Such a mode of production was characterised by low levels of technology, the irrelevance of market economy, and a stress on usage rather than market values. This society is divided in two main classes, the peasants and the aristocrats, with, in some cases, states involving the population in collective labour under generalised slavery<sup>34</sup>.

The mercantilist period stretched from 1600 to 1800 and led to *Black Africa* existing on the periphery of American and Western European mercantile centres as a source of labour via slavery, according to Amin (ibid.). Two salient features of the capitalist mode of production arrived as a result, namely the emergence of a proletariat born out of the disappearance of feudal relationships, and the accumulation of wealth in the form of money. In Senegal, this period also gave rise to a multitude of crises, the rise of an insecurity class, religious conflicts, and the simultaneous exports of goods mainly gum in the Waalo. Integration into the full-capitalist system in the 19th century constitutes another important phase, marked by the official end of slave trade and replaced by the (unequal) exchange of products. Africa provided raw materials and cheap exports as required by European markets (ibid: xii). In many newly independent countries, political coercion was used in the name of “national unity” with a compliant bureaucracy mainly composed of the dominant classes. “National development” was pursued mainly through import substitution with diverse and mitigated results across the continent (Ibid: xiv). These patterns are not dominant everywhere as Austin’s analyses of 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century Ghana makes clear (2006, 2007). Austin reveals a non-linear story of the coexistence of slavery (internal slavery) and wage labour, with no clear pattern in terms of increasing proletarianization but rather increased incorporation into the global agricultural trade in commodities. Senegal is no exception to the argument he outlines and its post-colonial leaders “inherited a country organised by and for merchant capital” (Boone 1992: 78).

---

<sup>32</sup> Yet, for Amin, a society cannot be defined on the sole basis of the nature of its mode of production, which has to be placed in its broader social context to be fully understood. Other scholars such as Friedmann (1980), Scott (1986) prefer to focus on forms of production, Bernstein (1986) also adjusted his ideal-type of simple/petty commodity production to contemporary forms of integration to more fully capitalist systems that pay attention to classes of labour. Feminist scholars such as Mies defined their own modes/forms of productions (Guyer 1984, Mackintosh 1989).

<sup>33</sup> Amin identifies 5 modes of production: primitive community, tributary, slave-based, small-scale trade, and capitalist.

<sup>34</sup> as in the Asian mode of production evoked by Marx

### 3.1.2. Waalo and Kajoor: Anatomy of inegalitarian societies?

In his study of the emergence of African capitalism, John Iliffe (1983: 27) asks how capitalist farming first took root in Africa: “The question is whether the rural capitalism that emerged in different areas according to the different pre-capitalist modes of production in those areas and varied in some regular way”. When and how did foreign capital take root in pre-colonial Waalo considered a “gift” of the Senegal River, dominated by tributary<sup>35</sup> modes of production? Similar to Weber’s central question of the *Protestant Ethic* (1905), Iliffe (1983: 45) asks what the ethical and religious drivers or constraints to the emergence of an African capitalism were: “How could indigenous beliefs, Islam or Christianity constitute sources or resources for or against an African capitalism?” Whilst this question has been studied by Copans (1988) and Cruise O’Brien (1971, 1975), this study is concerned with how Islam (the earliest and dominant religion in the Senegal River Valley Region) supported or hindered the development of foreign capital in the region.

The evolution of Waalo and Kajoor societies offers crucial insights to understand how capitalist modes of production became dominant by creating new classes of labour in charge of producing exports for the metropole. Indeed, since 1446 and 1448, both Waalo and Kajoor were already trading with the Portuguese (Barry 2012: 18). It allows us to analyse the simultaneous trade of labour (slave trade) and the increasing importance of exports, such as gum and groundnuts (Amin 1974, 1971, 2012). Moreover, both Waalo and Kajoor case studies allow us to comprehend the central role of Islam, both then and now, in liberating peasants under mercantilism, subjugating them under colonialism and lastly as a medium of - and an actor in - the land rush as it intersects (through collusion or alliance) with political and traditional powers.

---

<sup>35</sup> He also asked whether there was an articulation with small scale trade.

## Socio-Political organisation

This section analyses the social and political stratification and associated hierarchies of the two kingdoms. Waalo and Kajoor were part of the vast empire of Jolof, which also included Bawol, Sin Salum and Dimar (Barry 2012: 17). While Waalo was born next to the mouth of the River Basin before the 12<sup>th</sup> Century (ibid: 16-17), Kajoor (1566-1886) took its independence from the empire of Greater Jolof in 1549. It was located between the Senegal River and the Saloum River, with several provinces including those of Njambur (Louga) and Lebu (Cape Verde). The inhabitants of Kajoor are called *Ajoor*, and identify themselves today to the terroir covering some of the departments of Tivaouane and Kebemer. Our second case study involving The Third Company, is located in Kebemer, Louga. The inhabitants of Waalo are called *Waalo-Waalo* and share the same language as *the Ajoor: Wolof*.

In both kingdoms, the ruling classes were constituted by the free-born *geer* who dominated a highly-stratified society located between the upper nobility or *garmi* amongst which the kings or *Brak (Waalo) or Damel (Kajoor)* were chosen. Most important among the nobilities of both kingdoms were the *kangam*, who ruled as chiefs of the territorial divisions (Diagne 1967: 123; Diop 2012: 133-152). With the *garmi*, the *kangam* formed the aristocratic class which had strategic commercial ties with the Saint-Louis trading settlement and benefitted from the economic gains of the slave trade. At the bottom the free-born group were the peasantry or *baadolo* who paid the bitter price of the Atlantic trade, orchestrated with the consent and support of the two ruling groups. Beneath the aristocracy came other freemen, the *griots* or *troubadours* on the one hand, and the persons of caste or *nyeenyo* such as the leather workers, the smiths, the potters, etc. on the other. The lowest rank of this social pyramid came the slaves or *jaam* divided between the household slaves or slaves by birth or *jaam juddu* and the newly bought slaves or *jaam sayor* (Barry 1979: 40-41, 2012: 32; Diop 2012: 133-152).

Politically, Waalo was an oligarchy, an elective monarchy traditionally ruled by a Master of the land or *Lamaan Jaw*. All his successors were to have the title of *Brak* and were selected by the three great electors of the land who formed the council of electors. Similarly, all Kajoor's monarchs originated from the lineage of the Lamaan of Paleen dedd (Diagne 1967: 109; Diouf 1990: 32). There were checks and balances on the

*monarchs'* powers, which were balanced by the privileges of the council of electors on the one hand and that of the other social classes on the other (Barry 1979: 42). While in office, the main functions of the *Brak* or the *Damel* were to manage the kingdom, including the distribution of available land to either other royalty including his first lady, the *lingeer*, or to the religious leaders known as *marabouts* (Diagne 1967: 109, 279).

### **From a precolonial tributary form of production to the penetration Foreign Capital**

Before colonisation, Waalo's economy was based on the Senegal River, including agriculture which was organised at the extended family and lineage level (Barry 2012: 23-29). Similar to Kajoor, Waalo's subsistence economy was organised at a regional level involving frequent barter between animal husbandry and agricultural products, and later cotton, indigo, gum, fish and salt<sup>36</sup> (Diagne 1967: 96). Land - the main asset and resource of the kingdom - was owned communally, and any attempt to characterise its mode of production was complicated by this fact. Land was inalienable as it belonged to the family or lineage and could not be lost by the community because their survival depended upon it. Diop (1968) explains that another reason for land inalienability is it supposedly hosted the spirits of the ancestors and therefore could neither be sold nor exchanged.

The monarchs increasingly transferring land to their family, close collaborators and clients, contributed to "feudalisation of land tenure" through a tributary mode of production, which consequently impinged on the *Lamaan's* prerogatives (Barry 1979: 44). Diouf (1990: 23) describes this centrality of land ownership by distinguishing between "great property" - the exclusive rights of the monarch to dispose of all lands - and "small property" - land is defined as a means of production collectively shared by several villages, and is therefore inalienable. The *Brak* also decided whether to allocate land to outsiders or would refer them to the *Lamaan* for the later to decide. A vestige of the previous land tenure system which survived the monarchy is "the distinction between the control exercised over the land itself, and the right to cultivate that land. Inalienable property rights to land only came into being when these two rights were manifested in a single person" (Barry 1979: 44).

---

<sup>36</sup> These sometimes involved the Mauritanian neighbours.

However, there are several limitations of the historiography as it postulates the difficulty to analyse class conflict “given the simplicity of the needs of the more privileged strata of society” in this subsistence economy (Barry 2012)<sup>37</sup>. Through characterising *Waaló* as “the inegalitarian society *par excellence*”, Barry largely attributes this to external factors (mainly the contact with Europe) and fails to address internal class conflicts. As for Kajoor, increasing social differentiation was explained by the existence of great economic privileges which were to become the source of increasing political competition (Diagne 1967: 134-5). This led to the erosion of the respect of traditional social orders and pervasive violence, pillage, increased social differentiation, and ultimately the weaponisation of Islam for the conquest of political power until the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century (Diagne 1967: 135-144).

### **Understanding the successive waves of Foreign capital(s) penetration in the Valley**

Three crucial phases of European capital penetration form the “roots of neo-colonialism”. These are the early encounters between *Waaló* and Kajoor Kingdoms, mercantile Europe, and people travelling through the Sahara between the 15<sup>th</sup> century and the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Barry 1979, 2012: 31-45; Diagne 1967: 95). These contacts are marked by the disruption of political, social and economic orders, and dictated by the imperative to mobilise labour by any means necessary.

The first phase between the 15<sup>th</sup> and mid-17<sup>th</sup> centuries was dominated by barter trade. Trans-Saharan trade, which existed before European contact, was significant in the region - especially for Kajoor which depended on exchanges with *Waaló* and Maureish traders due to its geographical isolation and the fact that it did not produce gold (Diouf 1990: 30). The infamous Portuguese explorer and slave trader Ca da Mosto accosting in Kajoor, then still part of Jolof, was part of the first wave of European contacts with the coastal kingdom. Portugal, in particular, settled at the mouth of Senegal River in the second half of the 17<sup>th</sup> Century. Whilst their attempt to install a port at this strategic location failed, the Portuguese played a crucial role in freeing *Waaló* from *Jolof*, shortly after the

---

<sup>37</sup> “Wealth resided in the granaries, and doubtless in the herds of cattle, but prestige was in the blood, and was something to which one was born”. (Pathé Diagne 1967 quoted in Barry 2012)

independence of *Kajoor* in 1550. This political vacuum in the Senegambia region contributed significantly to the development of the Transatlantic slave trade.

From the 17th century to 1818, trading forts flourished across the African coast. This happened at the same time as the fragmentation of the continent by European powers to support the expansion of their domestic market, especially the sugar industry. Central to this tricontinental triangular trade was the looting of African slaves from Africa, orchestrated by European metropolises with the cooperation of ruling classes. In coastal West Africa, this was achieved through the creation, in 1659, of a trading post and slave depot in Saint-Louis. *Waaló* became one of the main West African ports along with *Jurbel*, *Moca* and *Buscar* and would pay its human toll to Saint-Louis. Saint-Louis oversaw this commerce with the cooperation of local aristocracies and used duties to pressurise the already dependent *Waaló* aristocracies.

During this period, Islam came to play a central role in the Maraboutic wars, which led to the 18th century *Toorodo* (*Pulaar* nobility) revolution in Fuuta Tooro. This revolution contributed to increased social stratification and labour exploitation by the minority of *Toorodo* leaders based on greater discrimination of castes, the Orient-inspired rule of the Almamy (Diagne 1967: 207-230). This resulted in the banning of Muslim enslavement,<sup>38</sup> the division of the lands of the *Waaló* between members of this nobility, and the replacement of taxes by a land-lease payment system (Barry 2012: 228). This historical division of land explains the large possession of lands by the heirs of these *toorodo* in Northern Senegal. With the demise of the Maureish *marabout* in 1874, the newly reinstated *Brak* suppressed the maraboutic movement and re-established the powers of the local aristocracies with the military support of Saint-Louis. The defeat of the marabout led to famine, increased slave trade, the accentuation of Saint-Louis's commerce, serious internal rivalry within the aristocracy and a more important political role for the warrior-slaves or *ceddo*. The last phase of agricultural colonisation (1819-1931) signals the irrevocability of conquest, further extraction and access to labour force.

---

<sup>38</sup> Yet domestic captives remained enslaved.



### 3.1.3. “Agricultural colonisation” in Waalo and Kajoor

As soon as they regained control of the Senegal colony from the English in 1817, the priority of the French was to mobilise the labour force necessary for tropical cultivation. With the abolition of the slave trade and the consequent human resources shortage, the French decided to “transport the workers to the work” (Barry 2012: 145). In May 1819, the Ndiaw treaty was signed to create what Barry terms agricultural colonisation in *Waalo*<sup>39</sup>, with three bases to be set up in Upper first, then Middle and Lower Valley and managed by Africans as independent producers (Manchuelle 1997: 43). *Waalo*’s proximity with Saint-Louis led the French to think it would allow for closer labour supervision and control. An initial investment of 1,200,000 Francs was injected to replicate at a larger scale the pilot garden of Richard Toll, and Dagana was selected to host this major cotton export project.

Six consecutive French governors<sup>40</sup> based in Saint-Louis attempted to implement the agricultural colonisation plan, with varied results. Whilst the first three, especially Baron Roger, experienced encouraging results, the last three were less successful. Barry (2012: 151-161, 1979: 58) suggests there were many reasons for the failure of agricultural colonisation including, the insecurity created by *Waalo*’s neighbours<sup>41</sup>, the resistance of merchant capital, the shortage of labour force and the land problem. The latter three elements are central for the focus of this thesis, as they provide some historical evidence through which to “read” the current land rush. Another key cause was that the upper region of the Valley, located 800 kilometres from the coast, was only navigable between July and December or January (Manchuelle 1997: 43).

The small businessmen of Saint-Louis resisted large-scale financial and industrial capital to protect the growth of merchant capital from the trade of ivory and gum, the latter considered “the Palladium of Senegalese industry and trade” (Barry 2012: 186). In 1824, Baron Roger created the Commercial and Agricultural Society of Galam and *Waalo*, to

---

<sup>39</sup> Fuuta Tooro and the Island of Morphil were initially selected to host the agricultural settlement.

<sup>40</sup> Schmaltz, Le Coupe, Roger. Gerbidon, Jubelin and the last one Brou.

<sup>41</sup> These are the trazaras, Tukulors, Kajoorians and Braknas. Jealous of French domination of the kingdom at their own expense, they led continued attacks on the kingdom and its famous capital, Nder, despite signing many treaties with France for peace to prevail in the Region.

create agricultural settlements with the view of merging trade and agriculture. This is central to understanding the resistance to export horticulture by other types of capital/interests, as we shall see in chapters 8.

The land problem is central to understanding today's land rush. The ambiguous wording of the Ndiaw treaty implied the transfer of title deeds by the traditional leaders to the *Waalos* islands. The treaties application caused problems with the populations who refused to accept that their aristocratic leaders had conceded to the French (Barry 2012: 156). Tensions due to the difficulty of reconciling "the African community's ownership of the land with its proposed sale in perpetuity" led to further acts of resistance from below, such as the systematic destruction of dams built by the French (Barry 2012:155; 1979: 58). Despite the consequential refusal of the French to pay the customary fees to traditional leaders, including the *Brak*, and the signature of a new clause to re-affirm the contents of the 1819 treaty and promote peace, the agricultural project did not survive. This was due to a combination of further large-scale irrigation and soil fertility problems and illustrates the diverging understandings of the terms of the land deals (Cotula 2011). Local elites' foregrounding their own interests through "politicised accumulation", (Boone 1992; Lanz 2018) and legal pluralism with its "triple heritage of African, Islamic and Colonial" influences, generated divergent understandings of how land should be governed (Basse and Sow 2006; Evans 2015).

The *Waalos* chiefs were unable to mobilise and supervise the labour force as per the 1819 treaty<sup>42</sup>. The labour force problem arose because of a combination of labour force shortages due to centuries of slave trading, wars, famine, and the refusal of the people of *Waalos* to work on the French farm (Barry 2012: 157). Such attitudes towards manual labour might be explained by its depreciation during the slave trade. This led most aristocrats, the upper nobility and even well-off peasants to hire surplus labour whenever possible for agricultural work which it left to lower classes, domestic captives, and women (Fall 2011: 43). This contributes to the colonial myth of the "lazy" *waalo-waalo*<sup>43</sup>

---

<sup>42</sup> The article V of the treaty stipulates that the *Brak* and his collaborators were responsible for the weeding and the planting and would be paid accordingly. Article IX emphasises that these authorities pledge to execute article V or replace the deserters, the sick, the dead and the lazy under the penalty of losing the entire allowance for each person (Ndiaw Treaty 1819)

<sup>43</sup> Inhabitant of the *Waalos*.

(Barry 2012: 157), and the figure of the *remma naama*<sup>44</sup> with its pejorative implications of laziness (Fall 2011: 44). As is the case with the current land rush, such social constructions do not consider the existence of reservation wages: the lowest wage rate at which a worker would be willing to accept a particular type of job, and the limited availability of workers who are only on the labour market for a limited time in order to earn/save a specific sum and will leave their job once they gather the necessary amount (Fall 2011: 92). Consequently, unless performed under unpaid collective labour: “*santaane*” or “*sant*” as a matter of community solidarity, working on someone else’s land was considered a form of servitude (ibid: 37, 76).

As a result of not having access to a suitable and willing labour force, French governors opted for indentured labour (due to long-distance migration) and created an intermediary servitude status, between freedom and slavery, which led to many abuses. The French recommended the recruitment of 20000 Chinese workers for the project to succeed as the *Waaloo-Waaloo* preferred to cultivate their subsistence rather than export crops (Barry, 2012: 159). Consequently, forced labour<sup>45</sup> was introduced in September 1823 until it was outlawed in 1948 (Zuccarelli 1962: 420-461).

The introduction of forced labour in many parts of Africa has subsequently created problems for the establishment of large-scale farms as the memories of forced labour continue to resonate in a post-colonial context. One can understand how in the context of the current land rush, several older peasants still have a vivid memory of colonialism and refer to export firms as neo-colonisers who found them on their land and want to turn them into wage-workers through dispossession. This, as well as the glorious history of some families, can also serve to further appreciate why some people still resist land deals.

During and after the project of agricultural colonisation, *Waaloo* and Saint-Louis established new relations through the levying of customary fees paid by the latter to the chiefs of the former, to secure their collaboration. *Waaloo* faced tensions due to the rise of religious leaders -*marabouts* - and later the Islamic revolution movement<sup>46</sup>, which was temporarily successful until it threatened French interests in the region. For the second

---

<sup>44</sup> Those who work in farming to feed themselves.

<sup>45</sup> In French, *régime des engagés à temps*.

<sup>46</sup> Led by Diile Fatiim Cam, of the jeweller caste.

time, Islam though embraced by the masses, failed to constitute a liberation “counter-movement” (Polanyi 2001: 80) because of capital’s interests in the status-quo. In 1826, the death of Brak Amar Faatim Mborso, who signed the Ndiaw treaty, buried hopes to develop new crops that year. Merchant capital eventually prevailed with the failure of agricultural colonisation (Boone 1992) following the adoption of “free trade” after Senegal was allowed to export gum to countries other than France in 1831 and subsequent “gum fever” (Manchuelle 1997: 44). This was met with great relief by domestic merchants who “had more or less been coerced into investing in it” (ibid.) According to Barry, the “roots of underdevelopment” in the region are to be found in this portion of Waalo’s history.

#### **3.1.4. The rise of export groundnut: New rural labour markets shaping and making footloose labour?**

This gradual shift to a capitalist form of production shaped the transition from coercive labour mobilisation under slavery to more polished ways of disciplining labour under increasingly capitalist relations of production. Groundnut was the new key strategic export and a major driver of Senegal’s incorporation into the world capitalist economy (Barry 2012; Fall 2011; Foucault 1975; Sender and Smith 1986: 46-66.). As Oya (2002: 68) suggests, the growing demand for vegetable oil “for soap, candies, and cooking purposes”, and a global shortage in European markets, constituted the decisive factors for groundnut production in Senegal. The introduction of the groundnut by the French to meet the needs of the colonial economy was to influence Senegal’s specialisation in a speculative and extraverted export-crop. At the national level, the consequences of this policy were the adoption, later, of an agricultural programme and the creation of a national development agency – ONCAD in 1957. This led to a dualist form of production which aimed at attaining a modern rent agriculture as well as a traditional and subsistence agriculture (Ba 2008: 13). Rice was imported mainly for the needs of urban areas in times of risk of food crises. Importation also connected different colonial territories so that African colonies could absorb the rice surpluses of Indochina. The price of the imported rice was lower than that of the groundnut in the 1930s, illustrating how colonial organisation put in place incentives for peasants to devote themselves to groundnut production without compromising their food security (ibid).

In the Senegal River, this led to disruption in the form of pillages by the *ceddo* warriors, the lack of a market for gum, and the replacement of River transportation by the “*autorail*” (railroads) (Barry 2012: 232). The groundnut economy created new synergies and connections with the emergence of new free peasants and French Commerce (Bordeaux) specialised in the trade of groundnut. Some of the latter obtained freedom of trade exchange due to the new governor Faidherbe, who also organised the collection of customs taxes (Barry 2002: 229). These traders became more successful than the previous merchant capitalists whose business was based on gum, and who faced the merciless competition of Maureish religious leaders (Barry 2012: 230). The colonial administration opted for pragmatic policies, withdrawing support for the Catholic mission which had tried without much success to convert locals whilst producing export cotton in The Petite Cote. Pragmatism also meant starting anew with religious leaders, the famous *marabouts-farmers*, to restore agricultural labour in the eyes of the peasantry (Fall 2011: 51-61). For religious leaders, it was a matter of reconverting the masses, most of whom joined the labour force as *talibes*<sup>4748</sup> - now integrated into the full capitalist system - while accruing economic gains from this lucrative activity. This marked the second transformation of Islam now “rehabilitated” by the ruling classes and the French and which would eventually become one of the greatest supporters of agrarian capitalism through the groundnut economy (Amin 2012).

With the introduction of groundnut, migration increasingly shaped the political economy of the Valley with rural dwellers joining the *nawetan*<sup>49</sup> labour reserves to work in the groundnut basin. Some of the migrants settled permanently, responding to the growing labour surplus required by the new crop which the groundnut basin could not supply. Not all Senegalese River region migrant labourers were new to migration (Barry, 2012:233; Fall 2011: 63; Manchuelle 1997). Whilst there was more than enough labour supply for the groundnut economy in the glorious years of the groundnut (1926-1930), the neighbouring Office du Niger was facing problems meeting its demand (Fall 2011: 66-68). Progressively, new urban destinations emerged for these migrants: Mauritania,

---

<sup>47</sup> Followers and at the same time peasant workers

<sup>48</sup> As evidenced by Sara Berry (1993: 147), “the ability to mobilise labour via social networks depended on one’s status, and status depended on one’s following comprising one’s workers and social subordinates”.

<sup>49</sup> Seasonal workers who migrate after the wet season (*nawet*).

Dagana, Podor; the new cotton basin in the South of Senegal, as well as Ivory Coast and France (Adam 1977; Bâ 1996a; Barry, 2011: 234; Diop 2008; Manchuelle 1997<sup>50</sup>).

Following the 1930s<sup>51</sup>, 1950s and 1970s droughts which led to severe food crises, migration became a form of social innovation (Tandian 2012 & 2013; Tandian et al. 2011). Seasonal labour migration usually took place after the harvest during the spring (*noor*), a practice called *noorani*, or during the opposite season of *nawetaan* (during the wet season). The literature highlights that men were the traditional outmigrants, while women and children undertook a more “passive” form of migration by following their husband or family (Ba 1996a, 1996b; Ba and Bredeloup 1997). However, with the groundnut economy, women started to travel for wage work more often (Bop and Truong 2014; Findley 1991; Hathie et al. 2014). The seasonal migration of workers, freed from agricultural labour duties, which ended with the wet season led many to Dakar, Diourbel, Tambacounda Ziguinchor, Saint-Louis, etc. This rural-urban straddling, of keeping “one foot in the city, one foot in the countryside”, is common in many parts of Africa as it allows migrants to defend their land rights and explore economic opportunities elsewhere (Boone 2014: 67). This has led to a great concentration of rural populations in urban centres, mostly Dakar, the capital city. Many outmigrants left Mauritania for Saint-Louis or their native villages after the tragic “*Evenement naar*”<sup>52</sup>. Many of my respondents who were in Mauritania or nearby still bear the vivid memory of this tragic event and remember exactly where they were and how it shaped their lives. Increasingly however, these migrations have become increasingly international: Spain, Italy, Americas, etc. whether clandestine or legal (Ba et al. 2008). Therefore, in the face of these migration waves, a key question is what leads some people to ask: “In the Valley, the question is not why migrants leave, but why non-migrants stay” (Ba 1992: 27).

These migrations, coupled with insufficient cereal production by the drought, affected Soninke and Haalpulaar populations of the Valley. These populations relegated these to

---

<sup>50</sup> The Soninke migration has been the subject of a personal book by Adriam Adams (1977).

<sup>51</sup> The Soninkes remember this as *dullu xooro sinu* or the era of great hunger (Chastanet 1991).

<sup>52</sup> These events started on 20 April 1989 with the death of two Senegalese nationals, at Diawara in Matam, in the bank of the River (Magistro 1999: 177-212). They ended with over 50 *Maures* dead in Senegal, and between 200 and 1000 Senegalese dead in Nouakchott, Mauritania. By late October 1991, an estimated 70000 people had sought refuge in Senegal and another 13000 had fled to Mali. In June 1989, the refugee count of Mauritians returning to their country was approximately 170000. (Magistro 1999: 177-212).

simple food crop because they covered their dietary and other needs thanks to migrant remittances, which alerted the Senegalese government (Lavigne-Delville 1991, 1994). Hence, the government's decision to invest heavily in the River region allowing for the development of productive activities in this region inaugurating the era of dams. In the Senegal River Valley Region, the State encouraged rice production to meet local demand through the creation in 1938 of the *Mission d'Aménagement du Sénégal* (MAS) whose focus was initially on improving production in Richard Toll<sup>53</sup>. Despite banking on the irrigation potential of the River Valley, the MAS did not reach the expected outcomes and severe food shortages were experienced during the World War 1 (Barry 2012: 235; Dahou, 2005: 67). Consequently, another agency, the *Organisation Autonome du Delta et de la Vallée* was created in 1960 and replaced five years later by the *Société d'Aménagement et d'Exploitation des terres du Delta du Fleuve Sénégal* (SAED) - created with the view to train peasants in the production, stocking and commercialisation of 60000 tons of rice on 30000 hectares.

This is the first major land deal in the River as the lands initially occupied by MAS were later allocated to a French capitalist, Mimran then part of the Dakar Big Mills - *Grands Moulins de Dakar* (GDM) in 1947, to produce sugarcane. This 50 billion CFA deal is an illustration of politicised accumulation when one considers the close ties of the companies' leaders with political parties. As a result, the then occupier *Refineries of Saint-Louis* were dispossessed of their lands despite total uncertainty regarding its future production capacities of GDM (Barry 2012: 236; Dahou 2005: 67).

GDM is not the sole case of a land deal resulting from pressures from above including an alliance between foreign capital and the ruling classes. The "*Société de conserves alimentaires au Sénégal*" (SOCAS), the future pioneer of tomato production in the region, was created in 1944 thanks to an investment of *Moulins Sentac* with the financial and technical support of the Big Mills of Paris, CFAO and SCOA all shareholders (Barry 2012: 236). From its early days, SOCAS was based on a contract-farming scheme connected with cooperatives of local producers who provided supplies, whilst the company processed the tomato industrially in its own factories situated on the lands provided by the state. Agricultural development was funded via the *Fonds d'Aide et de*

---

<sup>53</sup> Furthering the aborted agricultural endeavour of Baron Roger, a decade earlier.

*Coopération* (ibid). According to Barry, it was much more than a local import substitute, “it was the conquest of a new market” (ibid). The advantages for SOCAS were assurance of a sale outlet on the domestic market and putting the conditions in place for French capitalists to lead imports - especially from Italy, all of which predicted a return on investments, with little or no risks.

*In both cases, the state of Senegal created start-up conditions, encouraged contractors, provided them with lands, gave them a monopoly on sugar or tomatoes, protected their activities, made loans, gave warranties, and ensured the prosperity of the French industries established in Senegal* (ibid).

Whilst agribusinesses employed at the time almost 3000 workers, most of whom were day workers, SAED was busy with its mission to generate employment and limit outmigration by allowing villagers plant on their own Villagers Irrigated Perimeters (PIVs) whilst mastering the constraints of flooding and the invasion of seawater. This was the basis for the further major infrastructure in the region with inter-governmental cooperation between Senegal, Mali, Mauritania and Guinea through the creation of the Organisation for the Development of the Senegal River (OMVS) to manage irrigation and water issues and whose creation was to inaugurate the era of dams.

The construction of large-scale infrastructure development has generated a rich parallel literature on the expectations and realisations, hopes and discontents that dam-building has created<sup>54</sup>. On the Senegal River Valley, publications mainly focus on how large infrastructure development shapes places and territories (which we call *place-making*) (Adams 1979, 1985, 2000; Barry 2012; Boone 2003: 282-314; Crousse et al. 1991, Dahou 2005; Lavigne Delville 1991). Scholars such as Sidy Mohamed Seck and Tarik Dahou have critically assessed the outcomes of such projects - the latter emphasising the significant development of clientelist relations around irrigated agriculture in the delta of the River Senegal, based on the alliance between politics and kinship from the family to the village level and documented with rich oral histories (Dahou 2005). These clientelist dynamics and debt relations led to corrupt practices within village and peasant organisations, to which liberal policies sought to put an end, only to face their own

---

<sup>54</sup> For instance, in Zambia the Rhodes Livingstone Institute’s Gwembe Tonga Research Project (GTRP) led by anthropologists Elizabeth Colson and Thayer Scudder started in 1956 for the Kariba dam on the Zambezi River. Or in Ghana’s Volta Region, Dzodzi Tsikata’s research on the impacts of the Akosombo and Kpong dams in Ghana (2006).



contradictions and new contestations of the social order (Dahou 2005: 303-334). Other scholars have analysed tools such as POAS or the Chart of Irrigated Domain created by organisations like SAED to ensure land tenure security (Ka 2018; Toure et al. 2013;). In her 1979 Letter to a Young researcher, Adams (1979: 477) questions the preoccupations of development agencies such as SAED and OMVS, who fail even to acknowledge neighbouring villages as a living presence when undertaking such large-scale infrastructure projects.

Boone (1992: 10) suggests that the post-1960 Senegalese political economy was deeply marked by three main legacies:

*peasant production of an export crop, the primacy of trading networks rather than production itself as a locus of capital accumulation, and the weakness of the indigenous business class. With the help of the colonial state, merchant capital controlled the commercial circuits that integrated the economy, dominating the pace and rhythm of development.*

As analysed in this section, the first and second legacies were to shape the dynamics of the Senegalese countryside with the groundnut basin becoming a new Mecca and groundnut the vehicle of dependency (Mbodj 1992: 97). Merchant capital became increasingly important post-1970, with contract-farming encouraging the blooming of domestic capitalism<sup>55</sup>. Finally, production also became a site of capital(ist) accumulation from 1958 (Amin 1969) and “classes of capital” will indeed emerge in the aftermath of the 2006 land-rush as explained in chapters 6 and 7.

For a more comprehensive picture of transformations that followed capital(ist) accumulation, it is fruitful to analyse tenurial changes as well as socio-cultural changes with the still pervasive confusion between customary/ traditional rights on the one hand and plural legalism, and access to verses ownership of land on the other.

---

<sup>55</sup> The emergence of the local capitalist bourgeoisie in 1820 was to decline between 1900 and 1955. Yet since 1958, domestic capitalism(s) have re-emerged in all economic sectors (estates, agro-industries, transportation, services, land, diaspora-led businesses etc.) according to Samir Amin (1969) with an important role played by the marabouts (O’Brien 1971, 1975; Copans 1988).

## 3.2. Tenorial transformations in the Senegambia

This section argues that gaining deeper insights into social and cultural relations with land and land tenure systems is key to understanding the current land rush in Northern Senegal, and people's reactions to it. In accordance with the World Food Organisation (FAO 2002: 7<sup>56</sup>), land tenure will be taken to mean:

*the relationship, whether legally or customarily defined, among people, as individuals or groups, with respect to land. Land tenure is an institution, i.e., rules invented by societies to regulate behaviour...They define how access is granted to rights to use, control, and transfer land.*

Land rights are established either through statutory law (via land titles), through customary rules, or via the market.

### 3.2.1. “Customary though untraditional” tenure systems

Land is given a specific consideration in all societies. Despite the early existence of vernacular land markets, such as in the Gold Coast (Chimowhu and Woodhouse 2005; Hill 1963), the concept of “land ownership” does not adequately correspond to the reality of many traditional societies, in which maintaining peaceful relationships within a group was considered more important than having rights over land (Colson 1971: 199; Coquery-Vidrovitch 1982: 67; Tzeutschler 1999: 38). Rules existed for land use and transfer, as land was the main source of revenue and food. Indivisible rights were vested in every member of a kin groups, male or female, and defined by rules of age, caste, gender and kinship (Colson 1971: 201). Such rights were based on the rights of all group members to land for cultivation, and creative pre-emption – i.e. the right to anything one had created that could be transferred during a lifetime, subject to the consent of the local community (Lastarria-Cornhiel 1997: 1319).

Many studies on the evolution of land tenure systems consider customary tenure as a synthesis of traditional rules, a “*potpourri*” resulting from colonisation (Colson 1971; Diop 1985; Niang 2008; Peters 2004, 2009; Snyder 1981; Tzeutschler 1999; Vidrovitch

---

<sup>56</sup> <http://www.fao.org/3/a-y4307e/>

1982 ). The confusion between “customary” and traditional rules may result from the fact that many customary and traditional rules are oral and the product of social relations (Snyder 1981: 49; Whitehead and Tsikata 2003: 76). For Berry (1993: 103), “customary law created under colonial rule and legalism, laid the foundation for a pattern of collaboration between colonial officials and senior African men”. Tenurial transformations significantly altered the strength of women’s precolonial land interests, which were to continue to change under colonialism (Mbilinyi 1988; Pala-Okeyo 1980; Tsikata 2016).

Under colonialism, tenurial forms changed significantly while land became increasingly commoditised. Colonial officials and missionaries’ attitude toward “communal” land tenure was deeply entrenched in a preconception that individual and private ownership is superior to communal tenure forms<sup>57</sup>. Land could be exchanged through lease, sale or pawn leading to demands from communities and foreign officials for the reform of customary law, suggesting it was not appropriate for “modernisation” and economic development.

State-led land reforms, which took place after independence, and more recently (neo) liberal policies have often failed to produce the expected outcomes (Moyo 2012). Banda (2011: 314-323) explains the failure of customary land reform through the dominant “communal paradigm”, as most lands were collectively managed, roles of chiefs and elders were exalted especially under indirect rule, and women’s land rights were altered under colonisation. This points to issues of “governability”, and the active encouragement of patriarchy and the subordination of women to male kin by colonial rulers (Rogers 1980). Niang (2005: 17) denounces the current “Western” and feminist advocacy for individualised rights and suggests African landholding systems granted the same cultivation rights to all individuals within kinship groups, regardless of their gender. This argument suggests that gender was constructed along with customary codes for colonial and neo-colonial purposes, buttressing claims that gender did not exist in traditional pre-Christian/Islamic Africa (Nzegwu 2006: 189-239). In her study of pre-colonial Yoruba society, Oyěwùmí (1997) suggests that the category of “women” and the concept of “gender” was invented by Western feminists. She was criticised for focusing too much

---

<sup>57</sup> This is illustrated by expressions such as: “one sheep in an enclosure is worth two in a common” or “that which is everyman’s is no man”.

on gender and not enough on the language-power nexus, and for being essentialist by failing to engage with the plural nature of Yoruba ways of knowing (Bakare-Yusuf 2003). As further explored in Chapter 7, today some women and junior men may not own land but gain access to it through family, constituting a problem for advocates of equal rights (Camara 2007).

The continuous transformation of land tenure forms in Africa is partly due to “pressures from above”, including state initiatives, the influence of large-scale foreign companies and settlers on the colonial state. Simultaneously, “pressures from below” encompass processes of rural differentiation and the *de facto* development of vernacular land markets, resulting from social and economic forces that operate independently of state intervention (Sender and Smith, 1986:19; Moyo 2008). This section focuses on the evolution of land tenure and labour relations under pressures from above and below, and details social relations of labour in Senegal, the former capital of the *Afrique Occidentale Francaise (AOF)*<sup>58</sup> – focusing on the *Waaloo* and *Kajoor* kingdoms.

### **3.2.2. Evolution of land tenure in Senegal**

This section offers a brief history of the main tenurial transformations in Senegal, from the reign of the *Lamaan* to the national domain to decentralised governance systems.

#### **The *Lamaan* land system**

As introduced above, *lamanat* is Senegal’s oldest tenure system, practiced particularly in Wolof society<sup>59</sup>. It has existed in the region since the epoch of the 16<sup>th</sup> century *Sereer*, continuing in the 17<sup>th</sup> century with the *Jolof Empire* (Diop 1968: 48). There were two ways to acquire land in the *lamanat* system, commonly practiced by *Sereer*, *Wolof* and *Pulaar* communities, and called by each of them, ‘virtue of the fire’ or ‘by virtue of the axe’. In the first, fire symbolises the new alliance between the Master of the Land, its holder (*Lamaan* in *Wolof* and *Sereer*) and its new inhabitants. The descendent of the first

---

<sup>58</sup> The AOF (1895-1960) was a federation of eight French colonial territories in Africa: Mauritania, Senegal, French Sudan (now Mali), French Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Dahomey (now Benin) and Niger. The capital of the federation was Dakar.

<sup>59</sup> In the old groundnut basin constituted by Western Baol and Kayor kingdoms.

to burn the forest, the master of the fire, perpetuates the tradition and becomes *Lamaan*. The *Lamaan* is also known as “*borom daay*” whose territory was circumscribed by a three, four, or six-day fire (Pélissier 1966: 124; Tine and Sy 2003: 212 in Wanyeki 2003). In the second, land is acquired by virtue of the axe with the permission of the *Lamaan*, who receives in exchange a symbolic in-kind payment traditionally of millet. The use of the axe to clear land of trees fire could not burn is arduous (Gravrand 1981: 191). The *Lamaan* can be seen as an early class of landed ‘nobility’, with substantial power over land allocation and the social reproduction of ‘subjects’ within the *Lamaan*’s territories. Many *Lamaan* were both community/kinship leaders and masters of the land (Diop 1968: 49; Diouf 1990: 31-39). The *Lamaan* did not own the land, but was the representative of the people and managed lands for them in a socially stratified society dominated by aristocrats served by slaves, the “lower castes” and women. The power of the *Lamaan* is political and mystical, allowing him to manage land allocations and transfers, but not to sell it (Diop and Sy 2008: 212).

*Lamaans* received royalties from the land they managed but these were symbolic and could be in-kind and not particularly valuable. In turn, the right holder, as long as he was paying her/his royalties, could not be dispossessed of their land even when the *Lamaan* was lacking land to distribute. The *Lamaan* could only take back the land when it was not being cultivated and became “reforested”. A deadline of 10 years was in force and no land leases, sales or rentals existed at the time (Diop 1968). Beyond this deadline, the former cultivator-user loses his/her rights and the land can be re-allocated to someone else. This shows the supremacy of the right of the user over all other land rights. Someone who cleared the land and is paying the required royalties cannot be expelled from the land<sup>60</sup>(Pélissier 1966: 126).

The *Lamanat* system of land management was presented as egalitarian by the mainstream historiography (Diop 1968), though as we have seen above, its final outcomes were not. The introduction of Islam and the attribution of lands to religious leaders (*marabouts*) facilitated an increase in royalties and the “feudalisation” of tenure<sup>61</sup>.

---

<sup>60</sup> Except when these are *gormoom* lands managed by the political leaders through the *Brak* as I explain in the Waalo case

<sup>61</sup> This process occurred more in regions where monarchs settled and took lands from the *Lamaan*, such as the North of the Wolof region, Louga for instance where Islamic leaders settled and one of the companies in this research is based (Diop, 1968: 50).

## Colonialism, Islam and legal pluralism

Colonisation of Senegal allowed the French metropole to have a direct, easy access to land and labour. Senegal was subjected to France's civil code from 15 November 1830, which created dual statutory and customary law (Niang 2004: 9). Local allies of French rule expropriated large domains, for example in the Kajoor, while receiving royalties. District leaders put in place after colonisation ousted most masters of the land or *lamaan* by expropriating both land and royalties. The facilitating of land accumulation by local elites was not a new idea, as demonstrated by Berry's (1983: 67) concept of "politicised accumulation" (Boone 1992). At the same time, a Muslim opposition movement rapidly emerged facilitating the spread of Islam. This pre-configures how religion and the capital-power alliance have come to structure tenurial transformations in Senegal. This is similar to Linares findings with her research on Kujamaat Joola of Jipalom, lower Senegal: "...islamisation, cash-cropping and colonialism were all interrelated processes, acting in complex ways (Linares,1992:101)".

Private ownership of land inspired from the French Civil Code was extended to the entire *AOF*, with colonial administration adopting several measures to introduce and implement private and individual property that favoured the colonisers (Niang 2004: 10). They composed unequal treaties such as the order of the 11 March 1865 by Faidherbe, to put an end to traditional forms of sovereignty including the *Lamaan* system. To dispossess the traditional owners of land, mostly "*suufu maam*"<sup>62</sup> or "*toolu baay*" acquired through inheritance, colonial rulers forged sophisticated texts using opaque concepts, such as "*vague*" lands, enabling them to appropriate the so-called idle lands (Niang 2004). This order obliged indigenous landholders to request regular property titles because they were considered precarious owners. Colonial administrators used the 23 October 1904 decree to introduce the concept of "*terres vacantes et sans maîtres*", vacant land without an owner, which made this land the property of the State. This was followed by a decree allowing rights of registration to the indigenous, but which did not state how the availability of such lands would be established. Indigenous people continued to consider themselves owners of the land they occupied based on socially and politically embedded practices (Niang 2004). The French rulers adopted a decree on the 8 October 1925 to enable the *indigènes*, or local citizens, to register their customary rights. Yet again,

---

<sup>62</sup> Literally: "grandfathers' lands" and "fathers' lands".

despite this simplification of the registration procedure, it was hardly used by the indigenous owners of traditional rights, most of whom were not accustomed to written rules and formal procedures. The colonial legislators then decided to introduce eminent domain (or right to expropriate on the ground of “public utility”) as complementary to the legal tenurial transformation process started with the introduction of “*terres vacantes et sans maîtres*”. Eminent domain is key to the first wave of land dispossession by the French and the national ruling classes (Moyo 2004: 7; Sender and Smith 1986: 19.). The State, managing the national domain on behalf of citizens, created motives of “unproductive use” or “ineffective occupation” of the land to expropriate land from previous users in the name of public interest. These notions are not clearly defined in the law, and dispossessions based on this concept of land rights created social conflict, as we will see is the case with land rush (Tzeutschler 1999).

Two additional decrees further formalisation land tenure. The first, since 1935, specifies that “lands left unoccupied for 10 years would automatically become the state”, and the second from 1955 reduced the deadline for inoccupation to five years. Successive attempts to establish eminent property rights with titling were in vain as colonial administrators failed to fully grasp the specific nature of customary-traditional tenure. As explained by Niang (2004), local populations had various ways to access land without needing such formal land titling, such as holding cultivation rights over a land they did not own, having traditional power over the land as the *Lamaan* did, or in some cases owning the land. As a result, much of the population, especially in rural areas, felt neither the urge or need to use land titling procedures as they were still able to provide evidence of their rights over land (Diop 1968: 50). Yet land was increasingly used as collateral or was pawned (*tayle*), a process which could lead to its loss. This was largely a result of district administrators wanting to coerce local populations to pay their debts. Despite these transformations, direct forms of land sales existed, even where the state claimed there were no vernacular markets (Diop 1968). Land tenure underwent deep transformations with the introduction of the notion of eminent domain and legal-pluralism, a dynamic which was to continue with decentralisation after 1960.

### **Governing territories and bodies in the post-colony: Pressures from above and from below**

After political independence in 1960, several land reforms took place. The first was the

adoption of the LDN June 1964, constituting a major change. Through this law, the State inherited customary powers but not ownership over land, thereby becoming the one and only ‘master of the land’ in charge of managing it on behalf of the nation. This law had three objectives: i) legal, to establish one legislation based on traditional, religious and modern-legal statutes; ii) economic, to promote rural and national development with the participation of all, especially rural populations, to productively use natural resources; and iii) social, to ensure equitable access of all, especially rural populations, to natural resources (Niang 2004: 11). This law recognises three types of land: “(i) private property (ii) public ownership; (iii) rural lands” (Faye 2008: 7). Rural land is the largest, accounting for over 95% of the nation. All unregistered land not subject to a pending procedure claim has been added to the national domain. The land held by the peasantry was classified as ‘zones de terroir’ and transferred to the rural communities who manage them. The land must be shared and distributed by the “rural community” (now *commune*) and its president (now Mayor), who act as gatekeepers and guarantors of the application of land legislation and de facto govern access to land in rural areas. This 1964 LDN had provisions that “the proposed reform would be achieved progressively” and that “the proposed tenure regime was, for the time being, transitory and prospective” (Pélissier 1966: 123). Yet this 1964 law is still in force.

In 1972, two further reforms took place, the implementation of the family code and the first act of decentralisation. The family code is conservative and places the whole family under the responsibility of the father who decides where the family resides (Camara 2007). Women do not own land in Wolof society, having only enjoyment and use (usufruct) rights permitted by Islamic succession laws around which most current family law is built. Therefore, women inherit property as a wife (a quarter or one eighth of a male share considering the existence or lack of offspring), as a daughter (half of a male share), or as a mother or relative. Women can also receive land as a gift or obtain it through local authorities. Legal-pluralism, the reference to both law and religion, as well as customary practices, allows women access to family lands complicating the picture. Statutory law formally grants women the same equal rights as men, though this does not happen in practice (Wanyeki 2003: 27). The father is generally the only parent to exercise authority. Women and junior men (often single) who are under the authority of the head



of household (*borom kër*) are also called *surga*<sup>63</sup> (Diop 1985: 154). They access land through more informal and traditional kinship rules, though rarer because of land scarcity, a reality often not enough acknowledged by advocacy for equal (formal) land rights (ibid: 161). As a result, studies have found that women access land mainly through their husbands, and to a lesser extent through Rural Councils when they establish or join women's groups, GIEs - Economic Interest Groups - or collectives (Diop and Sy 2003; Sow 1992;). In chapter 6, I explore the consequences of this, post-2006, in the context of the land rush.

The third major change is decentralisation, which began in 1972 in parallel with the reforming of the land governance architecture nationally. The first steps took place before independence in Senegal's four communes, Saint-Louis, Gorée, Rufisque and Dakar whose populations had the status of French citizens (Alissoutin 2008: 7; Faye 2008: 2;). With independence, this progressive decentralisation was ended with the recognition of the same statutes for all 33 Senegalese communes. Simultaneously, a progressive transfer of powers started in January 1960, with a law that established seven regions and 87 districts. The local authorities code was adopted in 1966. This process is referred to as "urban decentralization" by Alissoutin (2008) who differentiates it with the rural process that began with the General Code of Local Government of 1972. The rural decentralisation law created rural communities and specified arrangements for the appointment of municipalities (by the central government) and rural communities (by an elected rural council) (Alissoutin 2008: 8). This was complemented by the 1990 reform, which introduced fully-fledged municipalities and provided the presidents of rural councils with executive powers (Faye 2008). The local government code of 1996 (act two of decentralisation) transferred nine areas of competence from the State to rural communities among which management and use of state, public and government lands. Under decentralisation and de-concentration, rural communities became responsible for assigning land to plaintiffs who were rural residents. This legislation broke with traditional forms of land management vested in chiefs and was completed in 2013. The third act of decentralisation lead to more state disengagement and provided local authorities with greater power. Customary and traditional modes of governance have been

---

<sup>63</sup> This sense of *surga* differs from its other use (migrant worker) but all translate the same idea of being economically dependent (Diop 1985: 156).

maintained in the shadow of these legal land reforms.

In some rural areas of Senegal, traditional land management remains the primary mode activated before engaging with local authorities. Several studies of land in Senegal show how social conflicts arose as a result of “everyday politics” (Blundo 2001; Dahou 2005) or African bureaucracies (Bierschenk et al 2014; Dahou 2005; De Sardan 1999). With the current land rush, access to land remains a crucial issue, in the peri-urban area of Niayes and other major cities (Baglioni 2015; Diop 1968: 51). Recent surveys by IIED/IPAR in Niayes and the River Valley region highlight competing dynamics regarding land use. A shortage of rich lands (*takk*), especially in the delta where most rich land is dedicated to rice or given to agribusinesses, has increased tensions in cases where land was obtained through inheritance, land rentals or sales - although such practices are not supposed to take place officially. New social issues have emerged in Niayes, following increased urbanisation that has created tensions surrounding the practice of market-gardening (Niang et al. 2017: 23-24). The intersections between these changes and the plurality of political governance systems deserve further emphasis.

A few anthropological studies highlight the challenge of reconciling local governance and local development imperatives in the context of decentralisation in Senegal. For scholars such as Fatou Sow (1992: 28) and Mafeje (2013: 19), kinship and neighbourliness are central to African forms of social production and reproduction and create links to land, consequently maintaining social cohesion. This centrality of family and kinship is stressed in many other studies of Senegalese society by Diagne (1967), Diop (1981, 1985), and Diop (2013a, 2013b). Dahou (2005: 24) proposes, in his study of the delta of the Senegal River Valley, that being part of a social group is seen as desirable because it ensures respect for family and kinship laws and contributes to shaping one’s identity in relationship to the broader group. Profit maximisation is therefore sacrificed for the social cohesion of the group. He suggests a diachronic analysis that can reveal how when faced with the same situation, different groups behave differently.

### **3.3. Feed ourselves first, then export? Agricultural policy, export horticulture and agricultural commercialisation**

The “golden age” of large-scale estates farming was between 1920 and 1960, followed by the dominance of small-scale farming post-1960 (Baglioni and Gibbon 2015: 1563-1569). The period after 1980 was marked by the rise of higher-value crops<sup>64</sup> including FFVs and the increase of domestic capitalists owning estates (ibid). In Senegal, the expansion of FFVs was to accelerate in the 1970s, especially in the Niayes area, leading this sector to be ranked among the three most promising export sectors with potential for future growth: tourism, horticulture and the service sector (English 2016).

Food security has been a central preoccupation of successive development strategies in post-1960 Senegal, with agriculture a priority sector. Yet, the country has only experienced limited structural transformations in agriculture, the service sector and its small-size uncompetitive manufacturing sector. Industry as a share of GDP increased between 1960 and 2017 from 12% to 20.5%, whereas in the same period, agriculture as a share of GDP decreased from 22.1% to 15.4%. As for the most important sector, services, it decreased from 54.8% of GDP to 53.8% between 1980 and 2017 (World Bank Development Indicators 2018, table in annex). This lack of either a “green revolution” or industrialisation can be, in part, explained by failed development policies particularly post-1980, and external dependencies as discussed in the previous chapter. The Senegalese rural population constituted 76% of the total population in 1960 and 53 % in 2017, confirming the rural exodus highlighted in the literature. In 1991, 46% of the population were employed in agriculture which increased to 53, 6% by 2016.

This section focuses on the history and politics of agricultural policy-making in post-1960 Senegal, with a focus on the River Valley Region where public investments in agriculture was more significant than the rest of the country. It also analyses the transition from a ‘failed’ attempt to develop rice production for self-sufficiency to an export-oriented horticultural model (Niayes-type path). The River Valley Region is currently Senegal’s leading commercial horticultural export-earning production zone besides the Niayes

---

<sup>64</sup> Other higher-value crops include cut flowers, lemons, and grapes.

(which produces almost 60% of the Senegalese horticultural production), Casamance and Dakar regions (Matsumoto-Izadifar 2008b; PADEN 2018).

### **3.3.1. The factsheet of the first two decades (1960–end of the 1970s)**

The main outcomes of the first two decades of state agricultural interventionism in the post-independence period are: i) the modernisation of agricultural techniques and practices through light mechanisation, ii) the diffusion of good quality green material (improvement of species varieties and some becoming hybrid), iii) the use of mineral fertiliser (Oya and Ba 2013: 149-178). The decades 1960-1970 were characterised by the continuation of the colonial system of marketing boards, which provided farmers with some predictability and an institutional apparatus that permitted improvement in farming methods, intensification, and an important market challenge in groundnuts. The State sought to develop a legal and institutional framework to support agricultural modernisation programmes with mixed results. Part of the problem was the unsustainability of interventions, their lack of focus on viable areas and producers to create a modern and productive agricultural sector. Justification for the bold reforms in the groundnut economy was based on fiscal considerations and the objective of maintaining institutional support to almost all farmers in the country. By spreading their efforts thinly, the positive effects on agricultural productivity were neither large nor sustainable.

The end of the 1970s was marked by fluctuating economic trends generally characterised by low GDP growth, drought and falling export revenues. This and the resulting macroeconomic imbalance led Senegal and Ivory Coast to be the first countries to call on the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) for assistance, in 1979. A stop-go process from the 1980s to the mid-90s with the Stabilisation Plan was followed by the brutal adoption of Economic and Financial Adjustment Plans (PREF). Senegal adopted a series of measures such as state withdrawal, trade reforms, market and prices liberalisation, privatisation and civil service reforms (Anseeuw 2008: 251; Oya 2006). This was far from the promises of *Naatange*<sup>65</sup> made by President Leopold Senghor. The table below, summarising the main policy programmes, illustrates the centrality of agriculture to policy in the decades following independence and the recurring objective of food self-

---

<sup>65</sup> Abundance in *Wolof*: The electoral motto of President Senghor

sufficiency which started with the irrigation of rice fields in the Senegal River Valley. The New Agricultural Policy (NPA) was Senegal's first major agricultural reform, albeit preceded by reform of ONCAD, the state's agricultural development agency. The failure of the institutional framework created by ONCAD's and its inability to deliver due to its financial problems led to a dramatic decline in fertiliser distribution and consumption.

**Table 1: Main Policy instruments between 1960 and 2018**

<b>Year</b>	<b>National Programme/Plan</b>	<b>Agricultural Policy/Programme</b>
<b>1960-78</b>	National development Plans	Agricultural Programme
<b>1978</b>	Stabilization Plan	Agricultural Programme
<b>1978-85</b>	Economic and Financial Adjustment Plan (PREF)	Agricultural Programme
<b>1985-92</b>	Medium and long terms Adjustment Programme (PAMLT)	First major agricultural reform: The New Agricultural Policy (NPA)
<b>1993-95</b>	Emergency Plan in 1993 Devaluation of the FCFA 1994 Plan	New Agricultural Policy (NPA)
<b>1995-00</b>	Preparation and adoption of the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (I-PRSP)	Agricultural Policy Programmes: letters and declarations and deepening of structural adjustment,
<b>2003-05</b>	First PRSP	Agriculture, Forestry, and Livestock Act (LOASP)
<b>2006-10</b>	Second PRSP	Agriculture, Forestry, and Livestock Act (LOASP) and Presidential Initiatives (GOANA, REVA, PANAR), Accelerated Growth Strategy (SCA) <sup>66</sup>
<b>2011-15</b>	Third PRSP also called National Economic and Social Development Plan (PDES)	Agriculture, Forestry, and Livestock Act (LOASP)
<b>2013-2019</b>	National Strategy of Economic and Social Development (NSED) / Senegal Emerging Plan	LOASP with focus on PRACAS ( <i>Programme d'Accélération de la Cadence de l'Agriculture Sénégalaise</i> ) for Rice, Onions, Groundnuts & off-season fruits and vegetables self-sufficiency. Phase 1 (2012-2014) completed. Phase 2 has started.

Source: Assembled by researcher from desk research

<sup>66</sup> This was designed to boost commercial agriculture in some niches (notably horticulture).

### **3.3.2. The Rise and fall of contract-farming in the Niayes and the Bud experience (1970s- 2000s)**

#### **Boom of the horticulture in the Niayes**

Niayes, a peri-urban region of Senegal is known as one of the first Special Economic Zones (SEZ) on the continent. Located in the Mbao area, The Industrial Free Zone of Dakar, was created in 1974 but it did not yield the expected results and was only operationalised in the 2000s (Baissac 2011; Farole and Moberg 2014). It was during the same decade that Bud, a foreign agribusiness firm was to introduce contract-farming to this region (Baglioni 2015: 22; Mackintosh 1989; Rassas 1988:4.). While initial production was under 3000 tonnes under Bud Senegal, FFV exports reached a peak of 12000 tonnes (Baglioni 2015; Mackintosh 1989).

*Bud Antle* was vertically integrated and in a monopoly seller position thanks to acquiring the status of export-free company (EFC). This, according to Mackintosh (1989: 14), gave total freedom to Bud to “manipulate the balance sheet of the Senegalese enterprise through transfer pricing to the benefit of the European company”. This special status (discussed in chapter 6) allows vertically integrated firms to charge themselves full price for transfers of goods between different processing stages or parent companies within the firm to reduce or avoid taxes on profit repatriation (Mackintosh 1989: 14). Instead of creating a partnership based on domestic resources with the aim of promoting a new export sector between the government and a foreign private company, the scheme under which BUD was integrated gave the company hegemony over agricultural development within their sectors of activities. Mackintosh concludes that the Bud Antle case “might be used as a case study demonstrating how not to negotiate with a foreign investor” (ibid). When Bud Senegal went bankrupt in 1979 and was obliged to stop its activities, this had dramatic consequences on the socio-economies of nearby villages (Kirene, next to Thies and Baobab, in the Cap-Vert, closer to Dakar).

Although there was a strong drive to modernise agriculture, large-scale foreign capital was only one mechanism and was limited to certain sub-sectors, such as horticulture and rice. Otherwise, most public investments were spent on “modernising” peasant farming, such as in the groundnut basin. One might ask how representative Bud really was of agrarian developments during that time. Market-gardening, which was dominant in

Niayes, did not have the economic scale of the groundnut economy and was mostly the business of domestic accumulators. After emerging in the 1950s, export horticulture in that area had yet to attract foreign capital, or the interest of the local elite including the *Mourides* (Baglioni 2015: 22) However, Mackintosh's study represents a rare account of how BUD's presence was to attract urban investors, increase the scale of FFV exports, raise the cost of land and labour, and consequently lead to the rise of contract-farming (Baglioni, 2015:23). In the following decade, only 12% of FFV was produced by estates through direct production (Rassas 1988: 4). With almost no state intervention, export horticulture in the Niayes flourished mostly based on outgrowing with small farmers.

The above contrasts with the developments seen in the Senegal River Valley, which concentrated all of the State's infrastructural development efforts and was already experiencing the presence of foreign capital (as evidenced with case of SOCAS and Mimran in the previous chapter).

### **Disappointing performance of agriculture in the Valley despite heavy investments**

Despite heavy state and donors' investments, Senegal's River Valley region has yet to reach expected development outcomes regarding production performance. Massive investments in irrigation infrastructure were made through the state agency (SAED): between 3 and 5 million CFA francs and over 150 billion for the 60,000 hectares targeted (in 1989 CFA francs – before the devaluation of the currency) (Dahou 2005: 71; Englehard 1991: 59-60 in Crousse 1991). It was expected that such highly-mechanised irrigation schemes would solve the problems faced in irrigating rice production during the preparation of soils, harvesting and threshing (Dahou 2005: 71). In addition to SAED interventions, the River Valley's landscape was to be transformed by the construction of the Diama and Manantali dams fully-funded by foreign donors. These had an impact on the socio-economy as they included an irrigation scheme of 375,000 hectares of land, navigation infrastructure, electricity production and the development of diverse parallel industries (ibid: 69). The Diama anti-salinity barrage was built upstream from the mouth of the River by the OMVS in 1986 to prevent saltwater intrusion into the lower barrage, and to retain fresh water for irrigation purposes.

Agricultural production results were not satisfactory in the first decade compared to the level of investment. For example, 6,300 hectares were planted in 1965 and production



was 10,600 tonnes which represents 1.8t/ha. This yield was to dramatically fall during the 1970-72 droughts. From the 1970s, the River Valley recorded more encouraging results with the promotion of cereals (mainly rice and sorgho) and FFVs in the irrigated areas (mainly tomato, maize and onion). Between 1981 and 1991, rice production rose from 10,600ha to 33,700 ha (SAED 2004: 37), with a record of paddy rice produced in 1991. The devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 was to have a great impact on production as cultivated areas decreased from 34,600ha in 1993 to 23,000ha in 1996. Between 2000 and 2002, the area of cultivation continued to decline (SAED 2004: 37). Fruits and vegetables had a different fortune with the creation of Irrigated Village Perimeters (PIVs) as a policy initiative to meet food safety objectives especially in the context of the 1963-73 drought (SAED 2004).

Senegal is one of the few West African countries to possess a tinned tomato industry (Fall et al. in Duteurtre et al. 2010: 197). Mostly produced by SOCAS and SNTI (National Company for Tomato Production), it has experienced a rapid rise with an increase in cultivated areas. In 1991, these amounted to 2,867ha with a production of 81,850 tonnes (28t/ha). These figures fell to less than 10t/ha in 1996 before rising again in 2000 with 2,046ha cultivated and 3,039ha in 2002 (Fall et al. 2010: 206 in Duteurtre et al.; SAED 2004;). As of 2004, only SOCAS was still in production and SNTI has stopped its activities after being privatised.

Another key product is the onion, largely produced in the Niayes area. 80% of production in the Valley originates from the region of Podor, in Saint-Louis where onions are cultivated on small plots (David-Benz et al. 2010: 173). The commercialisation of the onion, similarly to that of the potato and most market-gardening produce, is organised around the following main actors: *Baana-baana* (travelling resellers) who buy the produce from the fields in rural markets (*loumo*), producer's-wholesalers who buy from small producers to send to consumption centers where they are stocked (some have their own stocking facilities), and brokers on commission (*coxeurs*), who allow buyers to meet the final retailers in three channels, the rural markets (*loumo*), the transportation systems, or in urban markets (David-Benz et al. 2010: 175-176). Potato commercialisation is dominated by the *baana-baana*, the trader's-producers who commercialise their own production, traders-wholesalers who are mostly based in urban markets such as Dakar, and the *coxeurs* who play the role of intermediaries for commercialisation in urban and

rural areas (Ndoye-Niane and Seck 2010; 219-220). Transporters play a central role in sending this quickly perishable product from (sometimes enclaved) rural areas to urban areas. Inputs suppliers (mostly *baana-baana*) provide the seeds, organic and artificial fertilizers, and crop protection products that are central to production (Ndoye-Niane and Seck 2010: 222 in Duteurtre et al.). Importers are the final actors in this sector as potatoes alone constitute 40% of the total annual market-gardening imports and constituted 50,000t/year in 2010 (Ndoye-Niane and Seck, 2010: 217 in Duteurtre et al.). This explains recurrent government import-substitution measures to boost local production, which also poses some concern to the main actors as I will explain in chapter 7. This sector is highly segmented with most producers and traders making comfortable margins, contrary to other exploitations who struggle financially and use migrant wage work (*surgas*) (Ndoye-Niane and Seck 2010: 230).

From the mid-1990s, SAED has undertaken major projects to restructure agricultural value chains with the support and establishment of interprofessional organisations for rice, industrial tomato, and onion (SAED 2004). It has also reorganised and reoriented its interventions by putting in place technical programs to support the development of a so-called commodity-chain (or *filière*) approach, with the aim of increasing the quality of technical supervision and fostering production networks. As a result, three commodity-chains were constituted towards the end of the 1990s, supported by dedicated technical programmes and partnerships between producers, suppliers and credit and research institutions. These are i) rice: the most important sector; ii) agro-industries including tomatoes, maize, sorghum, cotton and peanuts; iii) the horticultural sector (SAED).

Figures on horticultural production in the Senegal River Valley from the 1970s to the 1990s shows a landscape where production performance does not match the level of public investment. The 1995 devaluation was to hit the Senegalese agriculture severely, after it had managed to overcome the 1970s droughts. The 1980s were marked by a dramatic performance in other crops (groundnuts from the 1980s onwards, rice, millet and other cereals during the 1990s). Horticulture, which has a specific commercialisation arrangement experienced a steady growth, especially tomato and onion. How this growth will be sustained, or not, in the following decades is the object of the following section.

### **3.3.3. International market tightening, “Renaissance” of estates and the Rise of FFV exports (2000 to nowadays)**

To explain Africa’s changing role in the contemporary international division of labour, Ponte and Gibbon (2005: 31-33) have raised three important points: i) the effects of the resurgence of economies of scale as a key source of advantage and differentiation globally; ii) supply chain reorganisation in a context of corporate restructuring; iii) and the issue of entry barriers, determining which Africa-based suppliers can take part in global commodity chains. The latter are the key determinants of the governance of GVCs (Gibbon and Ponte 2005: 200). Towards the end of the 1990s, the restructuring of European markets was to drastically transform horticulture. This was especially the case for exporters who were submitted to the increasing power of retailers and had to comply with a plethora of global rules, practices and standards (Baglioni 2015; Maertens and Swinnen 2009).

Consequently, with entry barriers tightening participation in the GVCs, the FFVs sector was to become increasingly buyer driven<sup>67</sup>, forcing export companies to be more competitive by controlling all the production through estates, or produce for the domestic market with the possibility of using contract farming, or to disappear (Baglioni 2015; Gibbon and Ponte 2005: 200; Maertens and Swinnen 2009,). The tightening of the market led farming estates to rise anew whilst augmenting a process of market concentration and segmentation with increased differentiation among producers. This is well illustrated by three big export firms: SAFINA, SEPAM and GDS. These firms operated in Niayes, in the 2000s, and held certifications such as Tesco’s Nature Choice and EurepGap. Thus, they were able to produce two-thirds of all FFV exports (Baglioni 2015). The 2000s were to witness the rise of estates which had started with the Bud Antle adventure over three decades earlier.

Global developments were also to have an impact on local labour. Drawing on the literature on labour regimes, and Mackintosh’s account of the evolution of estates farming in the 1970s. Baglioni (2015, 2018) shows that the development discourse of those decades was based on modernising large-scale farming through scientific methods of

---

<sup>67</sup> Of the six GVCs examined by Gibbon & Ponte: citrus, clothing, fresh vegetables, coffee, cocoa and cotton, all the later was not buyer-driven then.

production and labour control. Estates farming was then marked on the one hand by a large capital agency, dominated by labour exploitation via large-scale wage employment, mechanisation, informality, segmentation (Baglioni 2018: 121-123). Social disciplining of labour was exerted via gendered repartition of tasks, jobs and labour markets. In a nutshell, firms resorted to the spatial disciplining of labour across many sites to strengthen their social disciplining (ibid.). In the 1970s an informal, casual, large-scale female labour force emerged. Organised labour was structured around collective labour actions, strikes and walkouts. Women combined domestic work, as “housewives” (Mies 2014: 116), and wage labour as agricultural workers: “CF came to replace estate farming as a more family-friendly inclusion in the global production network (Baglioni 2018: 123). The estates and contract-farming schemes of the 2000s boomed in a context where supply chain inclusion and compliance to standards was supported by the State, with technical and infrastructural assistance to encourage both large- and small-scale farms. European supermarkets, around which capital was organised, dictated a vertical integration to commodity value chains through the indirect control of labour. As for standards, they acted as non-tariff barriers shaping the type of labour regime. In the context of the land grab, resorting to contract farming whilst being vertically integrated could be conceptualised as “production grabbing” (Anseeuw and Ducastel 2013; Baglioni 2017).

In 2005, the Senegalese horticulture agro-industry was constituted by 20 medium-to-large domestic companies exporting mainly French beans, mangoes, melons and tomatoes (Baglioni 2017). The significant growth of the sector post-2005 is exemplified by the exponential rise in production from less than 3,000 tonnes in the early 1990s to almost 16,000 tonnes in 2005 and 106,200 tonnes by 2017 (DPV 2018; Martens 2009; SNSAR 2015: 24-25). In 2017, agricultural and agri-food products made up 33% of the total exports from Senegal (French Treasury) with the main destination Europe. According to the Direction for the Protection of Vegetables – DPV- (Senegalese Ministry of Agriculture), focusing on a pool of 63 firms, total FFV exports represented 88,275,424 tonnes, 93% of which were for the EU market and 7% for the African market (DPV July 2018).

In 2018, the main FFV exports from Senegal were green beans, chillies, melons, watermelons, sweet potatoes, okra (*gombo*), courgettes, butternut squash, tomatoes, green onions and mangoes. The table below illustrates the growth of fruit and vegetable

production between 1996 and 2016. Carrots, turnips, eggplants, dry chilies, peppers and okra are also grown FFVs, some of which are not for export. Potato production grew from 10,300 to 63,828 tonnes in a decade, due to state import substitution measures. Rice production represents the most spectacular growth, from 148,780 to 885,284 tonnes between 1996 and 2016. Limited growth to 190,493 tonnes in the decade 1996-2006 begs us to question these figures which may have been fabricated to support GOANA (Dahou 2005; Oya and Ba 2013: 21-22). The combination of political influences, liberalisation, lack of protection for the domestic market vis-à-vis imported rice, the inability of small producers to survive the cost of inputs and mobilise sufficient labour and capital, led to a crisis of rice production during this decade (Dahou 2005; Oya and Ba 2013: 21-22).

Several studies on Senegal focus on the agricultural sector, analysing the potential of agribusiness (Matsumo-Izadifar 2008, English 2018) and the impact of rural wage labour (Maertens, Colen, and Swinnen 2011; Van den Broeck et al. 2017). Research on the Senegal Valley Region has concentrated on household effects, including income mobility, poverty reduction, the increase in foreign trade and investments in the horticultural sector (Maertens 2009; Van den Broeck and Maertens 2017a; Van den Broeck et al. 2017), peasant happiness regarding contract farming (Martens et al, 2013), and women's happiness regarding off-farm wages (Van den Broeck and Maertens 2017b). Findings reveal that despite many constraints in FFV exports (in the Niayes, Baglioni 2015), FDI in the horticultural sector expanded the FFV sector has benefitted poor rural households through wage employment which "smooths and boosts" rural employment, despite the casual nature of the jobs (Van Hoyweghen et al. 2018: 22).

**Table 2: Main FFV production figures in Senegal in 1996, 2006 & 2016 (in tonnes).**

Years	1996	2006	2016
Beans, green	6 000	10 600	14 674
Carrots and turnips		11 500	7 116
Onions, dry	63 785	60 000	416 217
Sweet potatoes	3 421	33 784	35 056
Tomatoes	30 420	104 780	162 700
Bananas	8 640	30 000	37 863
Cassava	36 985	120 041	420 772
Chillies and peppers, dry	2 911	5 800	4 825
Eggplants	-	19 694	4 897
Maize	-	181 585	314 703
Mangoes, mangosteens, guavas	78 140	82 194	123 606
Okra		25 961	19 073
Potatoes	6 220	10 500	63 828
Cabbages and other brassicas	12 000	55 674	59 675
Millet	601 359	494 345	612 563
Rice, paddy	148 780	190 493	885 284
Watermelons	219 540	225 928	259 225

Source: Assembled from FAO Stats (consulted on 31 October 2018)

More specifically, this recent study on RNFE in the Delta of the Valley found that wage employment increased by 140% per capita income, reducing the probability of people falling into poverty by 34% and their chance of remaining in poverty to 16%. Furthermore, “casual and agricultural wage employment” by assuring workers for at least half of every year was found to improve household well-being. Another finding is the welfare benefits of casual employment. Finally, year-round employment – both in agriculture and other sectors – leads to “higher wages, larger and smoother incomes and lower poverty rates than casual employment” (Van Hoyweghen et al. 2018: 22-23). The study’s findings were *despite* the “substantially lower wages for casual work and for agricultural employment” (ibid). In chapter 7, I argue that it is precisely this dependency on off-farm work (which was not year-round for all horticultural workers) and casual labour that constitute a significant challenge faced by women, in particular.

To understand these developments, recent trends in agricultural policy and the focus on attaining food security offers interesting avenues for considering the current land rush. The institutional environment I found when conducting fieldwork was more favourable to agribusiness than a few years previously. Since 2013, the Senegal Emerging Plan (PSE) articulates new development priorities for the country to become an emerging country by 2035. PSE demonstrates how policy, as a political and technical process, uses discourse to ensure wide networks of support and validation (Dieng 2015, Dimé et al. 2016).

Regarding agriculture, the new administration sought to pursue the implementation of LOASP and launched the *Programme to Accelerate the Pace of Senegalese Agriculture* (PRACAS) to operationalise the agricultural objectives of PSE for economic transformation and growth. PRACAS covered the period of 2014-2017 and aimed at meeting food security objectives through the production of i) 1.6 million tonnes of paddy rice; ii) 350,000 tonnes of onions for the domestic market, and 1 million tonnes of groundnuts per year with a minimum of 100,000 tons for export in 2017; and iii) 157,500 tonnes of out-of-season FFVs for export in 2017. The strategy to implement these objectives is based on encouraging agricultural and rural entrepreneurship (pillar 2), modernisation of family farming through increased capacity building, adequate financing and provision of agricultural equipment (pillar 1), as well as the involvement of youth and women in agriculture through job creation (pillar 4). The total cost of PRACAS is 581 billion CFA including 43,50 billion CFA (7%) for the development of the Out-Of-Season FFVs sub-sector (*Gouvernement du Sénégal*, 2014).

While it might be hasty to evaluate the overall success of ESP, President Macky Sall himself released a mid-term evaluation of the PSE, in 2015<sup>68</sup>. At the regional level, Senegal met the 10% target of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). Notwithstanding these constraints, the country has experienced a renewed interest in agribusiness.

## Conclusion

---

<sup>68</sup> For agriculture, the evaluation focused on PDIDAS funded by the World Bank (CFA Francs 43 billion) and supported by the government to develop agribusinesses in the Lac de Guiers and Ngalam Valley, in the Delta of the River. Its main objective is to attain food self-sufficiency by 2017 with the production of 1,600,000 tonnes of paddy rice.

This chapter has shown that the Delta of the Senegal River Valley Region, once home to the much socially and politically differentiated kingdom of *Waaloo*, has become one of the most attractive destinations for export horticulture; illustrating how the Senegal River truly became the “Nile of the Valley”. This chapter sought to delineate the reinvention of forms of stratification across historical epochs. By paying attention to interconnected global and local changes in the organisation of labour and production in the horticultural sector, it has argued that social differentiation is a long uneven and protracted process that has multiple determinants over different time periods. In Northern Senegal, it involved pre-colonial hierarchical systems as we have seen in *Waaloo* and *Kajoor*, conquest, slavery, the rise of “legitimate commerce” and its impact on labour regimes, and a gradual incorporation into the global capitalist system, market compulsion and migration.

All of the above ascertains that the difficulty in establishing large-scale plantation systems is to be understood in relation to the evolutions of land governance systems labour regimes, and other social and political constraints. Whilst colonial administrations in Senegal were happy to incorporate peasant agriculture into circuits of global capital, they also faced the realities of hybrid land governance systems shaped by plural-legalism and the triple heritage of “African, Islamic and Colonial” influences (Basse and Sow 2006; Evans 2015,). This historical legacy explains in part current labour regimes and business models, as well as tensions over acquisitions of land by foreign capitalists, as we will see in chapter 5.



# CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY, AND DATA

## Introduction

As indicated in chapter 2, the literature on the global land rush has been mainly preoccupied with macro level and theoretical studies. Only recently, with the second phase of knowledge production, has in-depth empirical research that captures the broader picture of land deals been carried out. Previous chapters inform the research questions developed here, as well as the methodological choice for a comparative case-study approach. The selected companies located in the delta of the Senegal River Valley Region – a region focused on in this study due to it being a leading commercial horticultural export-earning production zone- were involved in commercial estate production and contract-farming. The study concentrates on the period after 2006, which was characterised by the land rush. This chapter addresses the main research questions, design and methodology, before discussing data collection and related ethical issues. Special attention is paid to positionality and location.

## 4.1. Research questions

The primary research question of this thesis is as follows:

**How and why did the ‘land grabbing’ take place in the delta of the Senegal River’s agriculture after 2006 and with what outcomes?**

Sub-questions:

1. Under what circumstances did the land rush take place in the Northern Senegal’s agricultural sector?
2. What are the roles of the different stakeholders at different levels?

3. What are the differentiated outcomes of the interactions between new and old classes of capital and labour in the context of land deals?

These questions have allowed me to document both processes and outcomes of land deals, considering the role of different players and the differentiated and contradictory outcomes these deals generated in the intersection of land/labour as well as class/gender. More specifically, I have operationalised them by asking:

- 1.1. Who are the capitalists? (classes of capital)
- 1.2. Who are the workers? (classes of labour) and what are the conditions of labour?
- 1.3. How and why did some classes of capital and labour benefit or lose from the recent wave of land deals?
- 1.4. What are the agrarian change and social reproduction implications of the interactions between these two classes?
- 1.5. What are the implications of the land rush for the agrarian questions of capital and labour

Whilst the literature examines both foreign and domestic investors in Senegal, this research concentrates on the former.

## **4.2. Designing the research**

I am conscious of the political nature of this topic and how different stages from the choice of the topic to the writing of this thesis have their ideological underpinnings. The fact that land is the main basis for social reproduction in these rural non-farm economies might indeed influence its “perceived” or “real” outcomes. I decided to focus on how factors such as gender, generation, ethnicity, caste and marital status shape or are shaped by class, which determines who does and gets what. Having a feminist lens allows me to analyse the gender of power.

### **4.2.1. Decolonial? Intersectional? Two caveats.**

I undertook this research in and about my own country, which required a number of

methodological considerations and reflections regarding my positionality. When thinking this through, I first reflected on a question posed by Jok Madut Jok: Is it enough to simply acknowledge the degree of ambivalence involved “when one writes from the perspective of one’s own people, and when one has a responsibility toward the whole country”? (Jok 2001: ix). While I recognise the urgency to re-think critically and transform methodically “how we know” about “others”, how we disseminate what we know, and how we teach and train students in International Development, for example, this is easier said than done. (Cornwall 2017; Kothari 2005; Mohanty 1991; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015; Rutazibwa 2017; Sarr 2016. Tuhiwai-Smith 1991). It is essential that researchers consider the problematic aspects of conducting and disseminating research.

I will not use the term “decolonial” throughout this thesis because my research questions were neither formulated with the research subjects nor do they meet all the criteria of a decolonial research project. This is because it is a piece of academic work that must meet a number of school regulations. However, throughout the research design and its operationalisation, I have tried to privilege reciprocity, collaboration and mutual engagement whenever possible. Therefore, my approach might be the first step towards a truly decolonial research project. This is the reason why I have tried to approach land relations in their complexity, and research subjects as experts on their own lives.

I am also aware of the debates between intersectional feminists and material feminists about the value of intersectionality as a starting point and as a method of research. Coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw, this concept provides a frame of analysis of intersecting identities such as race, class, ability, gender are experienced in relation to systems of oppression in her seminal 1989 text: *Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics*. Materialist feminist scholars such as Martha Gimenez (2019: 94-109) and Tithi Bhattacharya (2017:17) do not believe in the explanatory power of “intersectionality” and propose to replace it/ complement it by social reproduction theory (SRT) to enrich it with the theory of totality. Other scholars prefer to use a *Bourdieuian* lens to analysing how certain practices and institutional processes generate multidimensional inequality (Yuval-Davis 2006, 2011)

In addition, by considering the *longue-durée* and how yesteryear developments still shape current outcomes, I resist the mainstream conception of temporality often present in

development studies to also consider other non-Western conceptions of time. In the same way that temporality is valued differently in Chinese political thought, there are also other theories, sometimes colloquial, of “African time”, among which John Mbiti’s: “time is a two-dimensional phenomenon, with a long past, a present and virtually no future.” (Mbiti 1969: 12). Moreover, by integrating oral narratives – e.g. the oral histories, views and expectations of my research participants, and their subjective assessments of land deals - I clearly demonstrate a critical stance towards the unidirectionality of knowledge production in development studies, and the sacrosanct vow of objectivity and non-neutrality. Using oral histories allows me to go beyond economic outcomes and explore meanings attributed to, and ways of relating to land. In doing so, I have also renounced to the “privilege of the last word”: the act of saying things about realities of others without caring for these peoples’ priorities, analyses and struggles (Charter of Decolonial Research Ethics)<sup>69</sup>. Throughout this thesis I critically engage with ideas and aspects of the land grab literature that I find to be problematic. As a feminist, I believe in the necessity to engage with issues that are daughters of our time. I also agree with Mwangola (2008: 16-20) that there is an imperative for post and de-colonial African (feminist) scholars to find their historical mission and fulfilling it while at the same time nurturing the fourth generation of intellectuals. This rediscovery requires defining innovative ways to address our own issues rather than just defining ourselves by resistance to what we are not<sup>70</sup>.

#### **4.2.2. A feminist critical agrarian political economy approach**

Feminist scholars researching agrarian change have made significant contributions to documenting the pervasiveness of the “unpaid care economy” on women. Through time use surveys, for example, they seek recognition of care work against the “commodity economy” (Folbre 2006; Randriamaro 2013; Razavi 2007), investigating women’s participation in rural labour markets (Baglioni 2018; Mbilinyi 1986; Whitehead and Kabeer 2001), analysing changing livelihoods (Razavi 2009; Tsikata 2009, 2016) and the mutual constitution of production and reproduction (Bryceson 1995; Carney and Whatts

---

<sup>69</sup> <http://decolonialityeurope.wixsite.com/decoloniality/charter-of-decolonial-research-ethics>

<sup>70</sup> As Gola puts it: African feminists “are no longer just concerned with writing back - to white feminists, to colonialism, to patriarchy, to apartheid, etc. - but are about refashioning the world in exciting ways where the difference within is not a threat but a source of energy” (Gqola, 2001:11).

1990; Mbilinyi 2016; O’Laughlin 1995; Razavi 2009; Tsikata 2016) or “social reproduction” (Katz 2001; Razavi 2007), as defined in chapter 2. My research acknowledges and builds on the significant contributions of feminist political economists who “blazed the trail” and theorised the urgency to engender critical political economy (Razavi 2009).

Of the personal history of my mother I narrated you in the introduction of this thesis, I am not aiming for neutrality or cold objectivity. Rather, I will use my own and my mother’s experiences as a strength and the basis of my feminist objectivity. My research also seeks to address a flaw in most research on the subject, which considers the main actors as genderless, a-sexual, atomised beings. They are not. Therefore, I argue that it is the conjugated power of -capitalist-patriarchies that shapes dynamics of inclusion, exclusion and adverse incorporation in rural labour markets, and the distribution of rents, such as jobs, contracts, and so on.

In all three case studies in the 20+ villages around the selected companies, the division of labour in the concession (group of households) or in the family “household” level (not nuclear family) was highly gendered. The terms “household” and “family” has been discussed and criticised for its neoclassical analogy with a productive firm and for its lacunae as a conceptual tool (Johnston et al, 2007; Kabeer 1994; Koopman 1991; O’Laughlin 1995, Bryceson et al 2000). In her study, Mackintosh suggests a definition recognising domestic work which produces the “common pot” which, she suggests, is more generally used to define the household. An alternative ‘economic’ definition of the household may better capture members who are not resident but who are contributor to the household (Cramer et al. 2014; Oya 2015). This is relevant considering that decision-making about production or expenses goes far beyond the “nuclear family or *ménage*” and involves the whole *compound* or *kër gu mag*<sup>71</sup> (Diop 1985: 153-154).

I examine the different units of analysis where relevant to consider the divisions of labour, changing nature of social relations depending on the type of village, its location, nature of conjugal relations, availability of paid off-farm activities and family size and composition, etc. to delve into intricate social relations of production and reproduction, including the domestic level (Mies 2013: 209-238). Therefore, as previously discussed, I

---

<sup>71</sup> Groups of households or nuclear families who have the same patronym

believe that the production/reproduction dichotomy should be approached as one interconnected reality. It is precisely maintaining a separation between them that allows patriarchies/capitalisms to flourish.

Related and not less important is the necessity to resist the dangers of the single narrative (Adichie 2009). Indeed, feminist scholars have critiqued the essentialising of rural African women in gender and development discourse (Cornwall et al. 2007, 2008; Mohanty 1984; Oyewumi 1997). Mohanty's *Under Western Eyes* highlights the ways in which "Third-World women" have often been presented "as a homogeneous 'powerless' group often located as implicit victims of particular socio-economic systems" (Mohanty 1984: 338). Similarly, Win (2004) highlights the focus in the development industry on "Very Poor, Powerless or Pregnant Women", and asks whether this tells the full and complex story of African women and if this is all that women's development organisations should be concerned about. Other studies have sought to show the multidimensionality of African women by "lifting the blinkers" from the usual suspects of poverty, to show that divorced, single and poor women do take care of their children's education (Sender et al. 2006), daughters of poor women are not always doom to inherit deprivation, and women may indeed find some forms of emancipation through the labour market (Oya and Sender 2009; Van den Broeck et al. 2015, 2017a).

### **4.2.3. Comparative case-study perspective**

In this research, I combine individualizing comparison<sup>72</sup> and variation-finding comparison<sup>73</sup> (Tilly 1984: 82). This comparative approach enables me to pay close attention to the specificities of each case, whilst contrasting them in order to discover what led to the different outcomes. The selected cases are representative; selected to exemplify the diversity of actors of land deals "chosen not because they are extreme, or unusual in some ways but because they either epitomise a broader category of cases or they will provide a suitable context for certain research questions to be answered" (Bryman 2016: 62).

---

<sup>72</sup> When a small number of cases are contrasted in order to grasp the peculiarities of each case.

<sup>73</sup> This seeks to "establish a principle of variation in the character or intensity of a phenomenon by examining systematic differences between instances" (1984:82).

Such an approach allows for a holistic grasp of the multidimensional drivers of the post-2006 land rush, as well as the differentiated outcomes of the selected land deals and their implications for agrarian change. This contrastive approach is key to proving the irrelevance of the main binaries replete in the current land grab literature, large versus small, winners versus losers, and unsegregated and gender-less categories such as “the peasants” and “the investors”. Finally, such an approach allows me to appreciate the dynamics at play and provides for the bigger picture of the multiplicity of actors and social groups involved in each agricultural investment beyond narratives of an “homogenous local community” (Gilfoy 2015).

Yet, this approach would not be sufficient if it did not historicise social and political dynamics through documenting the complexity and conjugated effects of legal texts, land tenure and customary and traditional practices. The focus of this study is also the terms of the deals through detailed analysis of the contents of the contracts. I believe that there is value in “trespassing” disciplinary rigidities by studying the economy sociologically, and by combining “rigorous hardness” and “qualitative softness” (Harriss 2002). Eventually, I hope this will help me hear out Adams’ lament on how we fail to grasp multidimensional outcomes of development interventions. She wrote the following in her *Open Letter to a Young Researcher* (1979: 479) about a village named Jamaane<sup>74</sup>, in the Upper Senegalese River Valley:

*I am not [...] talking about any form of “development studies”. I am talking about the disciplines most specifically concerned with African social realities: anthropology and history [...]. I am saying that the practice of history as a discipline denies Jamaane present life, because it covers only the period between contact and conquest. I am saying that the practice of social anthropology as a discipline denies Jamaane present life, because it can speak of Jamaane only in an intemporal present tense which is a disguised past tense; or, more straightforwardly, in the pre-capitalist past. I am saying that [...] this is what makes it possible for Africanists to countenance the practice of development experts and the very existence of the category “development studies”, which makes nonsense of everything they might be thought to have aimed for.*

---

<sup>74</sup> Jamaane is not the real name of the village, situated near Bakel.

#### 4.2.4. Case study selection and design

This research started with an initial desk review to gather relevant information about the selected cases studies. Cases were selected during desk research on the main land databases, and triangulated with NGO reports, academic scholarship and grey literature. In April 2017, I conducted a two-day scoping study<sup>75</sup>. This visit was organised at four farms that met the following criteria:


- entail a transfer of rights to use, control or own land through lease or concession;
- *allegedly* lack transparency (local communities not informed of the term of land deal);
- take place in the fresh fruits and vegetables sector in the same region or in two different regions;
- be either for exports in a European country preferably the UK to study the compliance to international standards and follow-up the value chain after returning to the UK, or a top producer for the domestic market;
- be still in operation (currently under implementation);
- take place in the countryside, and involve people whose livelihoods or income were originating from agrarian activities
- disrespect at least two\_of the principles for responsible agro-investment (see below)

---

<sup>75</sup> A week before the actual start of the field research.



**Figure 1: The 2010 UNCTAD, FAO, IFAD and The World Bank’s Principles for responsible agricultural investment that respects rights, livelihoods and resources (PRAI).**



Source: Assembled by researcher from FAO website

I decided not to focus primarily on size because land deals may not be large-scale but can still be ‘land grabs’, either if the capital involved is significant, or they are in the form of conglomerate of smaller acquisitions, or the intended investments are sufficiently important. This led me to focus on processes of contracts and other MoUs to understand the terms of the deals and whether they are transparent and based on free, informed and prior consent as per the PRAI and the International Land Coalition’s (ILC) Tirana Declaration.

I focus on deals that started after 2006 and before 2012 because the Land Matrix data on Senegal suggests that most deals took place between 2007 and 2012<sup>76</sup>. I chose to focus on cases that started after 2006 and before 2012, and which were under production so that outcomes had materialised by the start of my fieldwork in 2017.

<sup>76</sup> [https://landmatrix.org/media/filer\\_public/c5/20/c520a5a1-d407-464b-a89d-d364edecaef6/7969\\_up\\_psard\\_land\\_matrix\\_senegal\\_country\\_portfolio1.pdf](https://landmatrix.org/media/filer_public/c5/20/c520a5a1-d407-464b-a89d-d364edecaef6/7969_up_psard_land_matrix_senegal_country_portfolio1.pdf)

After considering two very similar cases, it became clear that analysing two cases would add little new material. I decided to add a third case-study should the opportunity present itself and should conditions for feasibility be met (time, resources, finance). That case needed to be clearly identified as a *failed deal*, stopped either during negotiation or in the initial phases of implementation. Mixing potentially successful with failed deals, or deals with mixed results, served to identify potential reasons that could *explain* success or failure. As suggested by Hall et al. (2015: 9), “what might be worse than a land grab to enable commercial farming is a land grab in which land is enclosed for investments that fail to materialise”. Analysing cases of failed deals allows for a close examination of the processes and/or mechanisms that, over a certain time, lead to outcomes, whether intended or not, to enable us if not to establish causation, then to identify correlation (Shaffer 2015).

#### **4.2.5. Case study selection and rationale**

Based on the above criteria, I focus on the three following case-studies:

1. A case concerning a vertically integrated estates export agribusiness with under 500ha involving British capital (The Second Company). This features a case of North-South investment involving global value and investment chains involving over six villages in Saint-Louis.
2. A case concerning another vertically export agribusiness (The First Company) with over 1500 hectares involving French and British capital and operating on three different sites across 12 villages in Saint-Louis. This firm combines estates and CF with another Senegalese firm and sells both on the local and European (mainly UK markets).
3. A “South-South” investment case involving an estate with Indian (and maybe British) capital: the main producer of potato for the domestic market: The Third Company. This firm’s primary activity is real estate, while it runs agricultural farms at two different locations; one project under operation involving five villages in Saint-louis (5000ha) and another contentious case aborted during the negotiations (1000ha) in Louga.

A caveat to this case study selection is the lack of primary focus on domestic investors especially when previous studies suggest they might be an important actor (Cotula 2013).

The objective was to adopt a contrastive approach, which would go beyond the hype and analyse outcomes after at least five or more years of production and would not focus on the more opportunistic investors interested in speculation<sup>77</sup>. Emerging domestic capitalists are involved in this study because I am interested in outcomes of capital(ist) accumulation.

Access to the firm constituted a major determinant in the case study selection. In all three cases, the state facilitated access to land. As for the choice of The Third Company, it has two projects that it claims are part of realising the national strategy for food self-sufficiency. One project is in operation and one is considered failed, this is important for the analysis of variations in outcomes: understanding why it failed. Based on the promise of access, I included it in my study only to learn a few months after starting fieldwork that access was withdrawn. I nonetheless decided to carry on despite this limitation of access to same data as other 2 cases.

## **4.3. Research methods**

### **4.3.1. Planning the empirical work**

All research methods have their advantages and disadvantages. I used triangulation to mitigate the side effects of my exploratory sequential design, which consisted of two phases: qualitative followed by quantitative. First, qualitative data on rural labour markets and outcomes of land deals was collected through immersive research based on participant observation. Other methods of collecting qualitative data included the collection of life histories, focus group discussions (FGD), semi-structured interviews, informal conversations, an analysis of very hard to obtain contract signed for the transfer of land rights, and memoranda of understanding (MoUs) between investors and communities. I documented much of my research in fieldwork diaries and took photographs and videos when appropriate. As this research is not a before and after evaluation, I also analysed company reports from the early stages of their activity. I triangulated this data with responses from my research respondents, in order to fill in gaps caused by the lack of baseline data. Due to difficulties in accessing some of the

---

<sup>77</sup> I decided not to focus on cases that were already over-mediatised such as the Senhuile/Senethanol.

stakeholders, owing to the political nature of this topic, I used snowballing techniques to access the relevant resource persons or documents.

Second, the first stage of qualitative research collection was a questionnaire for semi-structured interviews, designed and administered by me. The questionnaire was intended to analyse livelihood strategies, labour mobilisation and working conditions, intra and inter-household dynamics in the selected villages as well as migration dynamics. Interviews were also conducted on the nature of the labour my respondents were engaging in (familial or hiring out, seasonal or permanent), which type of labour, crop or livestock they worked with, the number of day or hours worked per week or month, and the types of remuneration received (in-kind or services, cash or none). As this research concerns analyses of the socio-economic effects of agricultural land deals on the neighbouring populations, *ex post* and without baseline, additional desk and field research was undertaken to gather secondary data from national statistics agencies and previous social and environmental impact assessments (SEIA). This was complemented by a combination of local<sup>78</sup> indigenous knowledge (mythologies, family history, village history, traditional practices, etc.) and literature including global literature was fruitful. This allowed me to understand how different people relate to land and how this can impact their interaction with others during land deals.

The rationale for this approach is that the qualitative data would provide the situational understanding of rural labour markets and differentiated and gendered outcomes of land deals, while the quantitative data would build on that, test the in-depth initial exploratory framework, and provide specific and measurable data on the nature of agrarian change and social differentiation. Finally, I hoped that participant observation would transform my consciousness as a fieldworker through the process of immersing myself in the world of my respondents before distancing myself geographically and emotionally after my return in the UK to complete my analysis. Equally important, I vowed to try as much as possible to include the voices of all my research participants and in the end, to share the outcome of my research with all parties, despite me being acutely aware of the critiques towards “giving voice” and “consciousness raising” (Mies 1982, 1983; Spivak 1988). I

---

<sup>78</sup> Local knowledge “is knowledge that is created by local people and shared within particular communities, capturing both the voices and values of local people (...), these are also views that are not always included in dominant discourses” (McIlwaine in Desai and Porter, 2006; 222-230).

am aware that such an approach cannot be a “co-production of knowledge” because of the power dynamics at play (Abu-Lughod 1993; Behar 1993; Wolf 1996).

### **4.3.2. Mixed research methods**

#### **Qualitative methods**

The first phase of research was conducted through qualitative methods as the design was observational. The data was mainly gathered through participant observation and total immersion. Therefore, the respondents were selected using purposive and snowball sampling based on criteria such as age, gender, residence, ethnic group, class, type of work, land ownership, and whether or not their family owned and/or gave land to the agricultural project. Establishing such criteria enabled me to ensure the target population was representative of the sample population, since the latter was to inform the survey design to be conducted in the second phase of fieldwork. Only on specific and rare occasions did I conduct quota sampling; a mix of convenience (selecting easier to reach sample) and purposive sampling. Quota sampling allowed me to carefully select interviewees with certain characteristics. This was for instance the case during a strike that occurred in The First Company, or a union meeting, or a visit to a village where I interviewed people who were in attendance. The limitation of this method is that I mostly interviewed respondents from the extended family of village leaders or religious leaders since our ‘guide’ was himself a village chief and would gather people who had a stake in the project for discussion.

Most of my visits were during the day verifying the observation that rural African villages are “repositories for the very old, the very young, and the female” (Ferguson 1994: 119). Most young women and men were busy working at family farms or projects. To adjust the selection bias likely to occur, I changed the time of my visits. I also used snowball sampling to select interviewees considered hard-to-reach.

The limitations of using non-probabilistic sampling techniques is that the results are not generalisable to the population. Nonetheless, the data I collected is analytically relevant for my research questions and was a relevant step towards designing the survey.

## Survey design

Based on the qualitative data gathered during the first round and scoping study, my intention was to design a survey questionnaire. This, in turn, would enable me to collect data that would be generalisable to the whole population after analysis. As previous feminist social scientists have shown, surveys have been a useful complement to fieldwork in order to provide a broader picture of the groups and communities that constitute the research participants (Davis et al 2016: 89).

This is especially appropriate given that the categories of rural wage employment are difficult to investigate as shown by Cramer et al. (2014) and Oya & Pontara (2015), and further discussed in chapters 6 and 7. During the scoping study and first round of fieldwork, information was gathered at the village level including:

- data on the demographics of the villages from the village chiefs, the mayors' office and the local communes
- from the latest census, also summarised in the *Plans d'Occupation et d'Affectation des Sols* (POAS),
- from firms: workers lists' and workers' registers constituted the workers' survey sample frame.
- From APIX and PDIDAS: previous reports covering the same areas.

The unit of analysis of the survey is the individual worker. As for individual capitalists, they were identified purposively on the basis of the worker surveys and in-depth interviews and oral histories. This individual could be either self-employed, or employed on or off-farm.

I used two methods for sampling, based on constraints regarding to access, and depending on the relationship with the firms: i) for the permanent and seasonal workers (and sometimes interns) at the first and second companies, I used the workers lists' to construct our sample through stratified random sampling, but ended up using purposive sampling because some randomly selected respondents had left the firms. i followed the two steps to stratified random sampling, which consist of firstly dividing the sampling frame into "mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive" strata depending on the relevant variables. Secondly, a simple random sample is taken out of each stratum. The main

difficulty of for permanent and seasonal workers sampling was to consider the variations in staff turnover especially in this highly volatile agricultural sector. Therefore, we ended up using purposive sampling to compensate for staff turnover, and to ensure the sample includes under-represented social groups such as women farm managers because they were rare, or male “onion trimmers”<sup>79</sup> because this was considered a “female job”.

The lists below served as a sampling frame for the survey.

**Table 3: Total number of workers**

COMPANIES	THE FIRST COMPANY	THE SECOND COMPANY	THE THIRD COMPANY
<b>Total number of workers</b>	<b>3289</b>	<b>1146</b>	<b>1145</b>

Source: Assembled by Researcher from the first and second companies’ Workers registers and interview with The Third Company Management

ii) For the day workers of first and second companies, I used the registers of day workers that the farm sites managers agreed to shared with us, in order to operate stratified random sampling on the morning of the surveys. However, I had some issues as a few workers with different ages had the same names, and worked at different farms. Therefore, this led me to exclude certain randomly sampled individuals whom we were not able to find/reach, and do a new sampling on the site, when needed.

A few workers outside the three companies were selected through purposive and snowball sampling, especially for the case of The Third Company’s first site, with interview categories encompassing clustering between seasonal, permanent and day workers. Because the company refused us access to its firm, I had to meet research participants mostly in their homes, in the village, after union meetings. For the case of the failed deal of The Third Company in Louga, I preferred to conduct semi-structured interviews in villages and rural institutions such as the mayor’s office or the sous-prefecture, rather than administer the questionnaire as there was no farm workers.

---

<sup>79</sup> *Takk soble* in annex

The data on private investors was gathered from semi-structured interviews and life-stories, and information on local capitalists was purposively collected from the survey and semi-structured interviews.

**Table 4: Main villages visited (see maps in annex):**

<b>Region</b>	<b>Department</b>	<i>Administrative District</i>	<b>Commune villages</b>
<b>Saint-Louis</b>	D1	AD1	<b>Commune 1</b> (4 villages)
			<b>Commune 2</b> (5 villages)
	D2	AD2	<b>Commune 3</b> (6 villages)
			<b>Commune 4</b> (8 villages)
			<b>Commune 5</b> (7 villages)
<b>Louga</b>	D3	AD4	<b>Commune 6</b> (4 villages)

Source: Assembled by Researcher from POAS, field notes and desk research

## **4.4. Fieldwork**

### **4.4.1. Negotiating access**

My multi-sited research focuses on cases of land acquisitions by three different companies in the Delta and the Valley of River Senegal: Louga and Saint-Louis more specifically (see maps in annex). Before embarking on fieldwork, I contacted The First Company through their relevant Embassy in Senegal. After weeks of email and Skype



conversations about the purposes of my research with the company, I was able to meet with the Director's assistant and the mayor of the area where the company is located as they were visiting the mother-company based in the UK. They promised I would be welcome in the village and that I could stay in a self-contained studio apartment the company would provide to support my research. I politely refused after consulting my supervisor as I did not want to jeopardise my chances of establishing rapport with the villagers and company workers. I learned before fieldwork that where I lived, who I spent my free time with, who spoke on my behalf, would influence the data collected.

The first phase of fieldwork started in Dakar, where I was also able to conduct several interviews with academics and policy officials. Valuable lessons were learnt that would better prepare me for the second, three-month stage of fieldwork (see below).

#### **4.4.2. Fieldwork dates**

I first met the company leaders in London in June 2016. The scoping study took place in April 2017. Data collection in Senegal started in May 2017 and was completed in December 2017. The first trip to Senegal took place between April and July 2017, the second between October and December 2017. These dates were chosen to respect the seasonal calendar of the selected agricultural projects<sup>80</sup>. Data collection in the UK continued until May 2018 with a visit to the mother company of THE SECOND COMPANY in England.

For the first two cases, I stayed in each area twice to visit all involved villages. For the final case, I met a senior manager of the Indian company on the last week of my first stay and stayed in the villages where their farms were located (first site of the third company in Saint-Louis), or planned to be located for the failed deal (second site of the third company in Louga) during my second visit.

---

<sup>80</sup> Most of them operate between October and June and are closed during the wet season.

### **4.4.3. Fieldwork Limitations**

#### **Over-researched?**

During fieldwork, it became clear that the target populations had been surveyed many times before, especially the THE FIRST COMPANY and THE SECOND COMPANY cases. Consequently, most respondents experienced a level of “research fatigue” (Clark 2008), with some refusing to engage with the project or avoiding taking part. This meant that I needed to probe and triangulate further.

#### **“Fieldworking while parenting”**

I conducted my fieldwork with my baby. At first, I tried to hire a babysitter. Some women questioned my need for help, being a “lone woman who spent her day having conversations with other people”<sup>81</sup>. As I was solely responsible for the care of my daughter, I started adapting my planning to my daughter’s sleeping times. I continued working from Monday to Saturday as per the schedule of most agricultural exploitations in Senegal.

During the first stage of fieldwork, I could access most parts of the farm including the packhouse where I interviewed several workers. However, it was forbidden to enter the fields with my child, due to the chemical products used. Instead, I waited for the second round of fieldwork. I also opted to interview workers at their homes after work hours when the weather was cooler for my child.

#### **Mobility**

Because most of the fieldwork sites are very enclaved, I had to rely on staff with cars. Therefore, I decided to travel with my daughter on my back in the mornings. To go to other villages, I sought to hire a taxi during the day in vain. I had to postpone going to the neighbouring villages until the second round of fieldwork when I was able to arrange for transportation.

---

<sup>81</sup> This is a comment from a member of my host family.

## **Gendered Dynamics**

Obtaining access to conduct research was a key challenge, and, many questioned why I was travelling alone with a baby. Both stays in Senegal were facilitated by my parents, who did not physically accompany me but called the families that I (and my baby) were to stay with. For them, it was a question of “attesting” my respectability as I was travelling unaccompanied by my husband for the first time. Such processes are well described by Berik in Wolf (1996) and Lila Abu-Lughod (1999: 11-12), who narrates how her father insisted on accompanying her on her first trip to the field<sup>82</sup>. In addition, my supervisor supplied a letter in French and English which I had on me at all times. This helped a lot, especially with companies who were suspicious about me.

### **4.4.4. Fieldwork Dilemmas**

Dilemmas in the field are well documented (Davis and Craven 2016; Wolf 1996).

#### **On “independent research”**

Research independence is never total, and the meaning of full research independence is yet to be defined (Cramer et al. 2015). Despite this, fieldwork involves a level of autonomy and freedom in decision-making without which research outcomes could be compromised. This was a crucial concern during my first stay when I depended entirely on the company for mobility. The village in which I conducted research was in an enclave with no public transportation. This allowed the company some control over where I could go and what information I could gather. All three company leaders insisted on having my timetable as well as the list of people I would be talking to, which I refused to do. The First Company chose to them as I had to guarantee confidentiality to my interviewees. I responded to this by organising my own transportation for my second stay.

When sampling, I worked with the list of employees provided by the employers, which was quicker and cheaper for my student budget. I sometimes conducted interviews at the employees place of work. The main difficulty was that the office I was allocated was not

---

<sup>82</sup> She travelled to the field with both her father and her husband the second time (1993).

far from the assistant of the director's and frequent interruptions of interviews. In The Second Company, issues relating to independent research manifested when the director asked me whether I would be interested in writing a paper commissioned by the company to respond to the claims of negative outcomes by an NGO I knew well. I declined the offer.

### **Respectability politics**

I needed to “demonstrate respectability” and modesty by adhering to local norms, adapting to formal and informal rules and expectations, including dressing in a certain way. This would prove to be decisive for my research outcomes.

### **On Research collaborators**

The choice of research assistants is important (Deane and Stevano 2016). I did not have another choice than going with my still breastfeeding baby during the first round of fieldwork. I also chose to go with her and my older sister, a social scientist, who helped me with my child and whom I trained to conduct tablet surveys for the second round. I wanted to ensure I had someone reliable, tactful, the same gender as most of the interviewees to mitigate power asymmetries, and whose presence would not raise any suspicion given the sensitive nature of the research topic. For this reason, I also asked my uncle to be our driver. His fluency in *Maure* and *Pulaar* languages spoken in some villages helped a lot.

### **On privilege**

Another dilemma for me was whether to accept being assigned a “functional male” role with the privileges attached to it such as accessing male-only spaces. This dilemma manifested itself on three occasions in two different villages. In the first village, I was asked by the first wife of the village leader to attend a key meeting with “development partners”. As soon as she saw the 4x4 car, she started looking for me and told me: “Go with them before they are trumped (again)!”. I hesitated, but eventually accept the invitation to attend, given the risk this woman had taken by telling her husband to wait for me in front of the important guests. Another dilemma concerned financial contributions, as was done by other “migrant” workers, to share in family meals. At first,

the family prepared a separate dish for me, but I insisted on sharing the food from a communal plate with everyone in the house. I noticed they refused to do this for the dinner because they ate rice or millet porridge every evening and would buy a meal from a local woman who had a small restaurant for me. After finding out, I increased my contribution and started inviting the younger children to share my meal. Their father forbade them to come to my room.

### **“Gone native”.**

Amina Mama (2011: 14) said that “when we are conducting research in our local contexts, we are situated with epistemic advantages, as well as challenges and demands”. Having to navigate my different roles and ethnographic positionality, I ask myself if I did “go native<sup>83</sup>”. For me this is particularly relevant as I am a native of the country I am researching. Being a young married female researcher, educated in European universities and a new mother also affected my interactions with interviewees. Land, in rural Senegal, is the business of middle-aged or old “big men” with patriarchal, traditional or religious power. I was conscious of the difficulties associated with the reaction of dominant classes to research that focuses on their interaction with “subordinate” classes (Breman 1985; Wolf 1996), as well as the latter’s reactions to my studying the dominant class.

In Senegal, I encountered many dilemmas to which I decided I could not remain silent or passive as a feminist researcher and all these points are noted in this thesis. I stopped trying not “to go native”. I went native before beginning fieldwork: this is my country, this is where I grew up, where my family lives. I acknowledge my potential biases and share these reflections on the decisions taken during this research, and how they might affect my findings.

#### **4.4.5. Language**

The majority of interviews were conducted in *Wolof*, the Senegalese *lingua franca* and my mother tongue, or in French my second language. I took notes in the same languages and translated them to English after my return. There were also interviews in *Pulaar* and

---

<sup>83</sup> Malinowski (1922: 290) suggested “going native” in order “to grasp the native's point of view, his relations to life, to realize his vision of his world”. This makes me feel uncomfortable since I *am* a native.

*Maure*, for which my uncle did the translation to *Wolof*. I am conscious of the “Italian adage “*traduttore, traditore*”, “translator, traitor” which signifies that translation can never be totally faithful to the initially meant. Yet, I also agree with the philosopher Souleymane Bachir Diagne (2016: 51-52) that, “Translation is betrayal? Certainly, but betrayal is the only true fidelity. In the sense that there is no perfect translation against which we could measure the gap between what is and what could have been”.

The questionnaire was in French and filled in French/and or Wolof with my sister. We agreed beforehand on a glossary of most important concepts in both languages, after several tests. While in Saint-louis and Louga, we also discussed new concepts encountered. This would prove critical during the data analysis phase.

## **4.5. Collecting and analysing data**

### **4.5.1. Data Collection**

During the first stage of qualitative data collection, I targeted the workers of three companies, some of them senior managers and company directors. Outside the companies, I targeted migrant seasonal workers (*surga*) and villagers who used to work in the farm or had never worked there, traditional, political and administrative leaders, as well as a number of policy officials, were purposively selected.

When conducting survey interviews during the second round of fieldwork, I re-interviewed some of the workers from the first round, and gathered new qualitative data. The survey questionnaire was completed in French (with Wolof expressions sometimes<sup>84</sup>) on tablets using Survey Solutions<sup>85</sup>, a software offered free of charge, developed by the Data Group of the World-Bank<sup>86</sup> (See annexes 5, 8, 12). I only had to request access to a Survey Solutions server before fieldwork, which enabled me design the survey online.

---

<sup>84</sup> These are expressions we were not able to translate into French and that we decided to keep as such and discuss at the end of the day/week with the research assistant, my sister.

<sup>85</sup> <https://mysurvey.solutions>

<sup>86</sup> The development of Survey Solutions is being co-financed by the World Bank, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

The survey questionnaire was inspired by Fair Trade, Employment and Poverty Reduction (FTEPR) research<sup>87</sup>. The main questions targeted basic socio-demographic information including education, data on rural wage participation, earnings and assets, as well as capital, expenses, re-investments and migration. I added questions relating to subjective preferences in relation to the deals, which complements the analysis of agrarian change processes and outcomes (working conditions, capitalist accumulation, social differentiation based on gender, age, etc.). The main interest of using Survey Solutions is that it allowed for data collection on tablets with limited or no internet connection, which was ideal in the mostly remote areas of data collection. In addition to reducing the coding errors, as supervisor, I was able to access and check in real time the collected information as soon as my research assistant or I finished the interviews, together with possible error reports. Last but not least, I could validate the data validation in the time of data collection and the information was ready for statistical analysis as soon as surveying was completed.

Nonetheless, research subjects were not always willing to give information on salary, assets, and earnings from other activities, especially when their spouse was present and we could not change the setting to a more private format. As a result, we had some issues with missing data. Sometimes, this was just due to the fact that respondents did not consider such activities as “work” as explained in chapter 7. Information on the number of children was sometimes incorrect with women making less mistakes than men for instance. The many interruptions from conducting research with a child had an impact, hence the decision that the research enumerator would take care of most surveys on tablets whilst I pursued the paper semi-structured interviews.

#### **4.5.2. Data Analysis**

---

<sup>87</sup> <http://ftepr.org/>

## **Qualitative data collected**

The full list of semi-structured interviews (including oral histories), group discussions and focus groups including the numbers and location of the interviews is listed in annex 1 and summarised in the below table.

**Table 5: Qualitative research activities undertaken (exhaustive list in annex)**

<b>Interviews</b>	<b>Group Interviews</b>	<b>Managers' discussion</b>	<b>FGDs</b>	<b>Union meeting</b>	<b>Immersion days</b>
<b>206</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>

## **Contracts and Memorandum of understanding (MoU)**

The data analysis of this rich data was the most arduous part of research. Data analysis include reading three workbooks full of contracts, MoU, and other documents (over a hundred) gathered from the different local communities and administrative agencies. These were hard to obtain given their very sensitive nature. I was eventually able to obtain most of the relevant documents either from the company or the local authorities. Reading and processing the contents of the contracts and MoUs took me the first few months of my return from the field.

## **Analysis**

The workers survey involved 170 respondents (82 from THE FIRST COMPANY, 68 from THE SECOND COMPANY and 20 from The Third Company). Because the sample size for The Third Company was too small, I had decided to leave it out of this analysis (in chapter 7 too). I first saved the workers' survey data collected on Survey Solutions by downloading it in multiple formats in SPSS, Stata, and Excel. To analyse the data, it was easier to work with Excel Sheets and Stata, which I was more acquainted to. Making Excel tables with the most immediately needed data, mostly for descriptive statistics based on basic demographic data (gender, age, marital status, education), facilitated the analysis. These were further transformed into pivot tables with some multi-cross information. The analysis was mostly based on descriptive statistics mostly and also



selected variables such as employment, assets, migration data, which pivot tables allowed to “read” more easily. For these, Stata is more interactive and intuitive. Such data is mainly used in chapter 7 to respond to the main research questions: Who are the classes of labour? What do they get? What do they do with it? What do they do to each other?

As for the analysis of qualitative data from the respondents listed in the table below, they were saved at multiple locations: four notebooks, laptops and tablets. I initially used Nvivo to record them verbatim but soon realised Microsoft Office was simpler for me. During the first months of my return, I read the data several times, taking notes of fascinating details. Then, I started transcribing semi-structured interviews in an easily accessible format on Google Docs. I started coding them using a codebook on Google Sheets. I subsequently established key themes and organised the data into relevant building blocks. Then I translated coded data from Wolof and French into English. I did the same with oral histories, FGDs, and group interviews. Data analysis was mainly “theoretical” which means that I read and analysed the data specifically through the lens of my research questions, it was more “analyst-driven” (Braun & Clarke 2006:10). The subsequent data analysis (reading and coding) led me to more interesting themes, and required shifts in my focus (illustrated by the initial focus on female workers oral histories, which now integrates also male workers because I realised that would render a fuller picture of workers diversity).

The analysis of photographs, videos, and audio material also took a considerable amount of time. This was helped by organising them in NVivo. The particularly interesting excerpts were translated and quoted while anonymising the identity of the respondent. This was more difficult to do when the respondent was a senior manager or the director of the company.

## **4.6. Ethics**

Ethics are central to research methodology, especially when handling data belonging to companies and individuals. This research has sought to gather both qualitative and quantitative data, and obtaining informed consent from my research respondents was critical.

For companies based in Senegal, I approached them first by email with a summary of my research project and the supporting letter from my supervisor in English<sup>88</sup>. These explained that the research was undertaken for a doctoral project, shared the research questions, and the type of information I required from them. I also stated that the research would be in line with the ethical code of my university, and that all sensitive data would be anonymised. The three companies understand that because they constitute the main cases studies, there would be some data about their company size, workers and working conditions, investors' trajectory, capital that would be made public.

For individual respondents, I asked them in their own language to give their informed consent after explaining to them the purposes of this research. I explained how their data would be used and informed them about their access rights to the final thesis as research subjects. Some of them insisted that I should not anonymise their data, yet due to the sensitive nature of this research, I anonymised their data.

I also comply with the lasted May 2018 European Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) as a controller of the personal data of my respondents. I developed a safety-first approach to protect both myself and my participants, especially when selecting interview venues to create safe spaces much as possible (Scheyvens and Storey 2003). I also conducted ethics checks (Desai and Porter 2006):

- i) *“What are likely to be the practical consequences? Who will use the information generated and how?”*
- ii) *Are the most disadvantageous and vulnerable participants adequately represented and protected at all stages?*

---

<sup>88</sup> Also, in French when they requested it.

Finally, I tried to mitigate the power relations with my research subjects by establishing reciprocity to allow them to learn as much from me than I did from them. Though my intention was to share my research findings with all the research subjects, this thesis contains sensitive internal information for all three companies and people, some of whom are identifiable.

## **Conclusion: Researching “others” and finding yourself**

Being a woman influenced my research in several ways. Conducting fieldwork in my own country influenced my ways of being human. I went home to research “others”, but I am glad to have found another part of myself during the process.

To conclude, I agree with Amina Mama (2011: 14):

*An activist research ethic demands that we not only defy the academic canon by not maintaining distance, but go a great deal further, to actively relate to and engage with our “research subjects” and explore ways of joining them and supporting their struggles.*

As I stand on the shoulders of generations of feminists before me and for those who are yet to come, I ask: “What is my contribution”?



**Photo 1: The Senegal River (facing Mauritania). December 2017. (Photograph by researcher)**



**Photo 2: Near the lake . Summer 2017. (Photograph by from the second company)**



**Photo 3: Saint-Louis (Ndar). June 2017. (Photograph by researcher)**



**Photo 4: Interview (DW26) Saint-Louis November 2017.**

# **CHAPTER 5: 5 STEPS TO “GRAB” LAND SUCCESSFULLY, AND GET AWAY WITH IT!**

## **Introduction**

Several studies in the field of politics, political ecology and political economy have sought to understand the role of the ruling classes both as actors and referees in the context of land deals (Hall et al. 2015), and state-capital alliances (Harvey 2003). Anthropologists have examined how states use different kinds of powers (Lanz et al 2018; Lund and Boone 2013; Wolford et al. 2015<sup>89</sup>). Paul Nugent (2010: 43) suggests that only by returning to political economy can we provide a comprehensive picture of the complexity of African states and their relations with their subjects. He proposes that three key variables, “revenue streams, control of land and population, and administrative capacity”, have together shaped different social contracts (ibid).

This chapter argues that land deals are an instance of renegotiation of the social contract between the neoliberal “decentralised” state, corporate players and communities. To ascertain this, I thoroughly examine processes of acquiring land and the shifting roles of political and policy actors, in and around the state. I pay specific attention to political actors and discursive strategies, economic and extra-economic means used to augment bargaining power and shape social relations around the distribution of rents in land deals. I unpack the terms of the deals for each case by analysing evidence based on over a hundred contracts, MoUs, as well as discourse analysis based on interviews with various actors.

## **STEP 1: Understanding the national political economy**

This section approaches the State not as a monolithic entity, but as a space of plural positions and interests in which power is exercised to shape the outcomes of deals and

---

<sup>89</sup> Wolford et al, 2015: 5)

the capture of rents. It analyses the motives of dispossession, the role of the State, its agencies in incentivising foreign direct investment in Northern Senegal, as well as local authorities who play an increasingly important role in negotiating deals.

### **5.1.1. Agricultural policy in service of politicised accumulation?**

John Iliffe (1983: 76) was of the opinion that the state has always been crucial in the relationship between foreign and domestic capital. In Senegal, the State has facilitated private capital's access to land using a development discourse. Here is how:

Structural adjustment policies led to the destruction of one of Senegal's main agricultural exports, groundnuts and groundnut oil. The shift in focus from rain-fed agriculture to irrigated rice in public investment programmes, post-1980, is key to understanding the groundnut sector crisis, due to a severe lack of public investment during the 1980s and 1990s (Oya 2006: 214-215). The final years of the socialist regime (late 1990s) were characterised by a return to agricultural programming through the subsidising of inputs. Though adjustment programs targeted the withdrawal of direct state support to peasants (*désengagement*) and food self-sufficiency, the State remained economically active in the River Valley through the SAED and the Food Security Commission (CSA).

With the change of political leadership in 2000, Senegal was to embrace poverty reduction strategies (PRSP), while the 2004 *Loi d'Orientation Agro-Sylvo-Pastorale* (LOASP) reaffirmed the country's commitment to revitalising its agricultural sector. LOASP's objectives targeted poverty reduction, especially in rural areas and focused on food sovereignty and increased employment in line with the PRSP 1. Food self-sufficiency objectives, promoted everywhere by officials, were in stark contrast with the continuing increase in food imports, especially rice. In 2007, the Accelerated Growth Strategy (SCA), based on a cluster<sup>90</sup> approach, was launched to operationalise PRSP 2. Agriculture and agro-industry constituted one of the five target areas of SCA, which sought to modernise it and create the conditions for adapting to global supply chains in both national and export markets, while developing an investment friendly environment. SCA was launched with the objective not only to create wealth with a focus on high-

---

<sup>90</sup> Clusters can be defined as "geographic concentrations of inter-connected companies and institutions in a particular field" (Porter 1998).

growth sectors, but to attain inclusive growth, i.e. developing trickle-down mechanisms that could help incorporate the working classes and rural poor in faster growing clusters. Of the thirty-eight clusters, five were selected using five criteria: growth potential, new employment creation potential, value-added margin, technical and technological innovation, and the potential for exportation. Because of the lack of leadership commitment to SCA and extra-budgetary expenses, its implementation was stalled (MEF-EXA Consulting 2013: 116-118). It only survived the regime alternation thanks to private sector funding and the Orientation Law of January 2008. Similarly, LOASP was hardly implemented due to a plethora of presidential initiatives targeting an increase in national agricultural production through special projects and programmes including FFVs, cereals and biofuels<sup>91</sup>.

These initiatives were launched festively to strengthen the then president's legitimacy. The REVA Plan, launched in 2006 by President Wade, intended to reduce clandestine immigration by improving employment rates for women and young cultivators in agriculture through the creation of economic poles. The National Programme for rice self-sufficiency and its unrealistic production objectives aimed to complement the government's main responses to the 2008 food crisis (Ba et al. 2009: 19, Oya and Ba 2013: 149-17). The third important presidential initiative GOANA, launched in April 2008, with an initial budget of 345 billion CFA to cultivate 3,900,000 hectares. These unrealistic objectives engendered much criticism from the CNCR, a major producers' organisation. Faye (2008: 4) suggests that:

*Senegal does not possess the areas necessary to meet the objectives of production of the GOANA: the labour force required for the crops would not be available unless we emptied both Dakar and Touba and sent all the Senegalese population to cultivate on them. (See also Oya and Ba 2013: 21)*

The government decided to improve its "business climate" to attract investment in the agricultural sector after food riots across the main cities in 2008 (introduction). Additional agricultural programmes include the World Bank-funded Programme for the

---

<sup>91</sup> Sorel, cassava, sesame, jatropha or biofuels, maize.



Development of Agricultural Markets (PDMAS)<sup>92</sup>, the Great Green Wall, and The National Programme to support Food Security (PNASA).

These special programmes were put in place as part of a series of incentives to promote agricultural investments resulting in several land deals that have increased the number of “land grabs”. Certainly, the collusion between the ruling classes and interest groups (private sector, religious leaders, lobbies, etc.) is an important factor in the land rush. Oya and Ba (2013: 24), for instance, indicate that in Senegal, “nearly 400 000ha of the 1,400,000ha of land reserves available have already been awarded”. This illustrates the opportunistic behaviour of both domestic and foreign investors, attracted to the sector by appealing incentives and agribusiness opportunities (Faye 2011; Kaag et al. 2011).

The second reason for the increase in “land grabs” is that many deals were reportedly operated by (and often for), government officials, domestic investors and religious leaders (*marabouts*), especially during pre-election periods, such as in 2009<sup>93</sup> (Dieng 2016; Kaag et al. 2011). As part of the GOANA policy, each rural community was encouraged to provide 1000 hectares for the programme but management and control over land use was difficult afterwards. South-South (including Indian) investment in agricultural development was promoted by the country’s main agricultural programmes, in an effort to achieve food self-sufficiency and develop the agricultural and livestock sector (Anseeuw and Rahal 2007 quoted by Anseeuw 2010). Consequently, these initiatives, while rallying the masses around the objective of “self-reliance”, did not reach the objectives of boosting horticulture and food security. On the contrary, they encouraged the rise of speculative and opportunistic investments in horticulture, with a multitude of domestic and foreign actors playing a significant role in this land rush.

The third reason for the increase in “land grabs” is that the mobilisation of public and private actors around “emergence” might have concealed the extent of the land rush. After his election in March 2012, President Macky Sall launched a new strategy, SNDES<sup>94</sup>

---

<sup>92</sup> The objective of the PDMAS was to improve the modernisation and competitiveness of the Senegalese agriculture sector through a better integration of producers in high-value-added domestic and international markets. PDMAS was replaced by PDIDAS.

<sup>93</sup> In 2008, noticing 60,000ha in excess of what the community had in its control, the PCR of Mbane in the Region of Saint-Louis decided to deallocate 190,600 hectares of land<sup>93</sup>. He published a list of all recent land allocations, which included politicians and businessmen close to the liberals. This led to the replacement of the PCR by a special delegation from 2009 to 2011.

<sup>94</sup> 2012 and based on his electoral programme called *Yoonu Yokkute* (The road to Emergence)

(2013-2017), with a central role for export horticulture and agro-processing<sup>95</sup>. Amongst the key measures adopted were the reform of rural land to recognise the legal status of familial farm and secure peasant land rights, massive investments in the development and irrigation of arable lands, as well as the construction of production poles<sup>96</sup>. In 2013, this political programme became the Senegal Emerging Plan 2035 (PSE) articulating new development priorities and demonstrating how policy, as a political and technical process, manipulates discourse to ensure wide networks of support and validation, even in the private sector (Dieng 2015, Dimé et al. 2016).

Several sectoral programmes were adopted. SNSAR 2015-2035 targeted off-season fruits and vegetables with the aim of exporting a volume of 157 500 tonnes to Europe in 2017. The *Programme to Accelerate the Pace of Senegalese Agriculture* (PRACAS), to operationalise the agricultural objectives of PSE for economic transformation and growth. PRACAS targets food security and self-sufficiency objectives through increasing the production of rice, onions, groundnuts, and off-season FFVs for export. PRACAS 1 covered the period 2014-2017 and aimed at meeting food security objectives through the production of i) 1.6 million tonnes of paddy rice; ii) 350,000 tonnes of onions for the domestic market to be self-sufficient in 2016, and 1 million tonnes of groundnut per year with a minimum of 100,000 tonnes for export in 2017; and iii) 157,500 tonnes of out-of season FFVs for export in 2017. The total cost of PRACAS is 581 billion CFA including 43,50 billion CFA (7%) for the development of the FFVs sub-sector (Gouvernement du Sénégal, 2014).

In early 2018, the Ministry of Agriculture published the factsheet for the first phase of the PRACAS 1 (2014-2017), according to which 63.4% of the objectives were reached. PRACAS 2 covers the period 2018-2022<sup>97</sup>. It might be hasty to evaluate the overall success of ESP. Moreover, several civil society organisations, such as IPAR, have contested the results announced by the government. At the regional level, Senegal met the 10% target of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme

---

<sup>95</sup> Agriculture is key to *Yoonu Yokkute*, because of its positive externalities for the rest of the economy. (Sall 2012:18).

<sup>96</sup> The creation, in each integrated economic pole, of companies providing agricultural and livestock services (mechanisation, maintenance, warehouse, conservation and commercialisation<sup>96</sup>) in private partnerships with a view to mechanising agriculture and developing livestock in order to reach food self-sufficiency<sup>96</sup> (Sall 2012:18).

<sup>97</sup> This is after the end of the President's mandate. The next presidential election is being planned for March 2019.

(CAADP). Notwithstanding these limitations, the country has experienced a renewed interest in agribusiness. This is illustrated by the PDIDAS funded by the World Bank (CFA Francs 43 billion) and supported by the government to develop agribusinesses in the Lac de Guiers and Ngalam Valley, in the River Valley Region. Its main objective is to attain food self-sufficiency<sup>1</sup> by 2017 with the production of 1,600,000 tonnes of paddy rice. In addition, the national investment agency (APIX) has committed to promoting FDI in this sector for a greater incorporation of the country into GVCs.

### **5.1.2. APIX: A broker for capital**

Promoting “destination Senegal” has always been a key priority of the State, including local authorities. Since the election of the liberal regime in the 2000s, successive governments have implemented this outward oriented strategy by putting in place the institutions to build an “enabling environment” and “sell” Senegal as a favourable destination for agricultural investment, trade and tourism. APIX has been active in emphasising the country’s assets including the different types of soil, favourable weather, strategic geographic location, dense hydraulic and roads network (English 2016). In addition, the government has conducted several reforms including its investment codes to facilitate the “ease of doing business”, encouraging entrepreneurs and promoting its attractiveness to investors. As a result, Senegal has been recognised as one of five most reformed countries on the continent and one of the 10 most attractive destinations for investors according to the 2018 Africa Investment Index<sup>98</sup>. This echoes Kenya’s and other African countries experience as the focus has been to promote pro-poor growth (and CSR strategies) as part of a “benevolent” development discourse and policy in African horticulture (Dolan 2005).

APIX have been highlighting the existence of many investment facilities in agriculture and agri-food processing in Lower Senegal and the Valley of the River. Agricultural actors in this Region, corporate or not, are now more familiar with import and export processes, and are better acquainted with regulations for obtaining irrigation equipment<sup>99</sup>

---

<sup>98</sup> [http://quantumglobalgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/AII2018-Final\\_Web\\_26.03.2018.pdf](http://quantumglobalgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/AII2018-Final_Web_26.03.2018.pdf)

<sup>99</sup> While providers of irrigation equipment are mainly located in Dakar, a number of suppliers are also based in the Region of Saint-Louis to be closer and be more reactive to the requirements of their clients.

(Paglietti and Machado 2016). They are aware of the possible exemptions on import duties through joining the FZC scheme (Paglietti and Machado 2016: 19). The “Entreprise Franche d’Exportation” or Free-Zone Company (FZC) model constitutes a “counter-revolution in development economics” according to Daviron & Ponte (2005: 19). In Senegal, it was established in 1997 for firms exporting 80% or more of their output as a way of creating “enabling environments” as in Ghana (Ouma 2015: 67). Qualifying for the FZC scheme entitles companies to advantages lasting for 25-years including i) fiscal: such as tax exemptions or exonerations on inputs imports (including 18% of VAT) and payment of corporate tax of 15% ii) exonerations related to customs such as duty-free on import and export, iii) freedom in the recruitment of staff (Senegalese or foreign), and vi) No barrier for capital permitted by free repatriation of dividends or profits for foreign shareholders. THE FIRST COMPANY for instance imported its irrigation equipment through these incentive mechanisms. A few firms benefitted from this status without meeting the minimum export criteria. Since 2012, there have been initiatives by the government to end this status but they are faced with resistance from exporters concerned about their viability as the government promised them FZC status for at least 25- years in 1997. “In the end, the number of FZCs was reduced from 439 to 77. However, continued concern over tax exemptions in 2015 led to a tightening of the rules for existing FZC companies and a decision to stop offering FZC status to new investors” (English 2016:12).

The main selling points on which the State is building its horticultural development discourse are the presence of irrigation infrastructures and the presence of a few globally competitive export horticulture firms concentrated in the Valley. Despite APIX’ emphasis on bringing in new investments, their primary focus has been on attracting investors not so much dealing with approved investments and monitor implementation ex-post. This is reflected in their reluctance to intervene in cases where investors do not respect the signed agreements. In these cases, they are referred to other state agencies. “It is the role of the Labour inspectorate and the Direction for Fiscal affairs and Domain - DGID” interjected our respondent from APIX (Interview PO4<sup>100</sup>). This led one of the investors we

---

<sup>100</sup> 22/12/2017

interviewed to state that “APIX people are not helpful, they just talk” (Interview SMP4<sup>101</sup>).

### **5.1.3. Analysing the rise of local authorities since decentralisation**

As explained in chapter 3 decentralisation has been a major change in Senegal, and as result, power dynamics operate at multiple levels since the State is no longer the sole major actor. From a legal-administrative point of view, the 3rd Act of Decentralisation transferred powers to the regions, communes and rural communities (see chapter 3). This is well illustrated by this joke made during an interview by a mayor, “I am for the project; therefore, the State also is, I am the State!” (interview CLP3<sup>102</sup>).


The implications of land deals for these actors, particularly for local authorities, are first and foremost economic. The budget of local communities originates from: i) internally generated or ordinary revenues from tax receipts, activities relating to the exploitation of the national land domain and local services, discounts by the state or author public authorities, the donation fund for decentralisation; ii) investment revenues from a) temporary or accidental receipts, b) allocations from the state budget through the Decentralisation Endowment Fund (FDD) and the Local Communities' Infrastructure and Equipment Fund (FECL), or by any other public body in the form of deliberate competition funds by the council of the local community; c) samples taken at profit from the investment section or from the section of operation. The commitment from investors to grant communes yearly financial assistance sometimes amounts to several million Francs CFA and contributes to funding the annual investment plan of the commune.

---

<sup>101</sup>30/05/2017

<sup>102</sup> 18/12/17

**Figure 2: Main decentralised authorities in Senegal**



Source: Assembled by Researcher from desk research

## **STEP 2: Aim to attract FDI by all means possible: All that you need is Land, water, people and Sun!**

The creation of a vast irrigation network in the 1970s (chapter 3) benefited prospective private investors in this area, and in particular those who require irrigation to produce horticultural products. This is illustrated by the experience of SOCAS which joined this irrigation scheme in 1965. This section discusses the centrality of water in the Delta of the River Valley region and presents the main horticultural actors in this region.

### **5.2.1. Horticultural expansion in the delta and the Senegal River Valley: Between opportunities and constraints**

Water availability is described by APIX as the crucial determinant of agricultural production in addition to the diversity of soil types. Water resources are central for horticultural firms. Irrigation infrastructure put in place several decades ago by SAED,

combined with the geographical and institutional environment, began yielding the expected results only from the 2000s. In the Valley, APIX outlines four climate zones and specifies that most of the Delta of the River and Niayes surface are Zone A soils characterised by irrigated agriculture whereas zones B, C and D are rainfed. The Valley's four main varieties of land allow for a diversity of crop production.

According to the FAO, Senegal's irrigation sub-sector is divided into two farming systems, irrigated cereals dominated by paddy rice (Delta and Upper River Valley), intercropped with maize and sorghum and smallholder irrigated horticulture with a large range of fresh fruits and vegetables, of which tomato and onion are the most produced (Paglietti and Machado 2016: 3). Export-oriented commercial agriculture in the Valley region mostly focuses on fruits, vegetables and sugarcane. However, according to the FAO, Senegal's irrigation potential remains untapped; Senegal's potential irrigable land is estimated to be 350,000 hectares, yet 30% of this is not yet irrigated. Of the equipped land, approximately 60% was under cultivation in 2009 mostly cultivating rice and vegetables (Ibid.).

Besides water, investors consider warm weather to be crucial, since this enables the production of off-season fresh produces for sale to European markets (interviews with senior company managers). This is facilitated by direct access to nearby European markets through the ocean with low maritime transport costs, through road transportation via Mauritania and Morocco. The fact that peace and relatively good governance prevail in Senegal has also encouraged investors. Investors receive institutional support from APIX and several schemes relating to exports such as the FZC status.

While the presence of irrigation infrastructures is one of the main strengths in the Delta of the River, water supply has represented a pressing issue. This is despite the \$540 million compact signed in 2009 between the Senegalese government and the U.S. as part of the Millennium Challenge Corporation whose objective is to support poverty reduction and boost agricultural productivity. The two principal projects, Roads Rehabilitation and Irrigation and Water Resource Management, targeted the strengthening of irrigation infrastructure and the densification of road networks in those two regions.

SAED plays a crucial role in the creation of irrigation infrastructures to improve agricultural production and manage agro-hydraulic resources. This supports private entrepreneurship and helps local authorities to identify types of land and associated water resources to inform land deliberations, as well as facilitating access to agricultural equipment and advising medium and small-scale farmers during their installation. In return, peasants pay a user fee after each agricultural campaign. Smallholder farmers have marginal access to the irrigated parameters for paddy rice and resort to small scale irrigation techniques, using surface water as well as flood recession to produce market gardening largely dependent on rainfed agriculture, especially in the Delta of the River (Paglietti and Machado 2016).

SAED 's crucial role in Northern Senegal is also illustrated by the land allocation and use plans (POAS), which allows for an effective occupation of lands. Produced by SAED, they are the main instruments used by local authorities in the zoning and management of land. POAS distinguishes four main types of land use:

- i) Agro-Pastoral with priority for Agriculture (ZAPA): Except for cultivated areas, all uncultivated areas of this zone may be used to graze cattle throughout the year. The breeder is responsible for any damage resulting from his cattle, and cultivated fields may only be used by the cattle at the end of the harvest. Otherwise a fine is to be paid by the owner of the cattle as compensation.
- ii) Agro-Pastoral with priority to Livestock farming (ZAPE): In this area, grazing cattle is allowed all year round with no fines applied to livestock owners. The onus for the protection of the cultivated plots against cattle is on their owners.
- iii) Pastoral (ZP): Agriculture is prohibited in any such zone and cattle grazing is permitted all year round. No fine for damage to fields is applicable to cattle breeders.

As we will see later, change in land use is a source of land conflict.

Notwithstanding, the main constraints for horticulture remain the same as in the previous decades: water supply, access to credit, agricultural commercialisation and the increasing scarcity of agricultural land. As a result, many government-supported irrigation



programmes aim at attracting commercial farmers in order to meet the goal of food self-sufficiency.

### **5.2.2. Contextualising the land rush in the Senegal**

Regarding land deals, I found the information published in the Land Matrix (the leading large-scale acquisition global database) correct on the three case-studies selected for this study. This is in spite of many methodological flaws in existing databases on land deals, due to their reliance on potentially misleading crowd-sourcing (Grain 2013; Oya 2013b). The Land Matrix only surveyed sites with cases of contestation or dispossessions (THE FIRST COMPANY's third site, THE SECOND COMPANY, and The Third Company Louga). This section presents a brief overview of the scale of land rush in Senegal based on the database.

The Land Matrix reports a total of 34 intended, concluded and failed land deals in Senegal between 2003 and 2018. As shown in the table below, the total intended size of the deals was 539,460 hectares, the contract size 327,229 ha, and surprisingly as of 2018, only 21,686 hectares were in production. This shows that only a tiny portion of the land deals hectareage has been used, and confirms that, "What might be worse than a land grab to enable commercial farming is a land grab in which land is enclosed for investments that fail to materialise" (Hall et al. 2015: 9).

11% of those land deals included contract farming and the rest estate farming. 8% of the deals failed includes one by an Indian investor of 60,000 hectares for rice production, widely reported in the media<sup>103</sup>. 70% of deals on the Land Matrix were concluded and the rest were intentions. Based on this data, 63.6% of the total deals took place between 2006 and 2012, 12% before 2006 and 6% after 2012. 12% did not have a clear starting date. This confirms that most deals took place between 2006 and 2012, however caution is recommended as the first case reported dates from 2003 and the lack of data for the pre-2006 period may be due to the recent creation of the database.

---

<sup>103</sup> A cross-check led me to an interview with former president Wade's Great Offensive for Food Sufficiency (GOANA) mentioning a partnership with Indian Investors' to grow 240000ha of rice in the Delta of the River (Le Soleil, October 2008).

**Table 6: Main land deals in Senegal surveyed by the Land Matrix**

Location	Investor Country	Intention	Negotiation Status	Implementation Status	Intended Size	Contract size	Production size	Crop
Lac de Guiers	Nigeria	Biofuels, Food crops, Renewable Energy	[2011] Concluded	In operation (production)	40000	8000		Sugar Cane
Podor	Saudi Arabia	Food crops	[2012] Failed		100000			Rice
Senegal River Valley	Saudi Arabia	Food crops	[2010] Failed		116435			Rice
Dagana	Belgium	Biofuels, Other (please specify)	[2007] Concluded	[2012] Project abandoned		5000	6	Jatropha
Makhana	France	Food crops	[2003] Concluded	In operation (production)	5000	418	418	Tomatoes, Corn, Fruit
Gandon	France	Food crops	[2009] Concluded	In operation (production)	3000	1430	900	Out-of-season FFVs
Anambe Velingara	India	Food crops	[2011] Intended		60000			Rice
Ngnith, Ross Bethio, Fass Ngom	Senegal	Biofuels, Food crops	[2012] Concluded	[2014] In operation (production)	26500	10000	2000	Cereals, Out-of-season FFVs, Sun Flower
Mbane	Spain	Biofuels, Food crops	[2009] Failed		20000	20000		Food crops, Jatropha
Ross Bethio	France	Food crops	[2014] Concluded	[2015] In operation (production)	4500	571	215	Rice
Syer	Senegal	Food crops	[2005] Concluded	[2013] In operation (production)	5000	5000		Vegetables
Ourour, Kaffrine	Italy	Biofuels, For carbon sequestration/REDD	[2009] Concluded	[2013] In operation (production)	2750	2750	574	Peanut, Jatropha
Yamane	UK	Food crops	[2011] Concluded	In operation (production)	310	310	310	Onion, Out-of-season FFVs
Mbane	India	Food crops	[2008] Concluded	In operation (production)	5700	5700	346	Out-of-season FFVs, Cereals
Mbane	Saudi Arabia	Food crops	[2003] Concluded	[2006] In operation (production)	250	250	217	Fruit, Onion
Kaolack, Ziguinchor, Diourbel, Louga, and Dakar	Senegal	Food crops	[2005] Concluded	In operation (production)	20000	20000		Fruit
Senegal	Senegal	Food crops	Intended		300			Corn
Diokoul	India	Food crops	[2016] Concluded	Start-up phase (no production)	1000	1000		Potatoes
Dodel	Morocco	Food crops	[2017] Failed		10000	10000		FFVs, Cereals
Lac de Guiers	Senegal	Food crops	Concluded	In operation (production)	6000	6000	1000	Peanut, cereals, FFVs

Source: Land Matrix (Accessed on 20 October 2018)

### 5.2.3. Contemporary land rush Northern Senegal

The Delta of the River is home to companies producing crops such as rice, millet, sugarcane as well as FFV for local and international markets. The below table provides an overview of some of the horticultural exports in the region. It shows that SOCAS is one of the big players in the production of industrial tomatoes<sup>104</sup>. Most of the fresh tomatoes are harvested on its 150ha Bango farm. The rest is collected from contracted family-farmers in order to be transformed on the SOCAS Savoigne farm created in 1971. The Senegalese tomato sector was marked by the creation in 1999 of a national cluster (*filière*), organised around the National Committee for Industrial Tomato (CNCFTI), with the aim to boost the sector. This has proved effective as illustrated by the emergence of a new company, Agroline (Fall et al. 2010: 198). Yet, in 2005 SOCAS still accounted for 58% of tomato importations, compared to 42% for Agroline. The quantities of fresh tomatoes collected by both companies through contract-farming were, however, below national needs. Consequently, SOCAS imports millions of tonnes of triple-concentrated tomatoes, which it then transforms into double-concentrated similar to the one made from fresh tomatoes.

Another important export firm is GDS (*Grands Domaines du Sénégal*). It is part of the French group *Compagnie Fruitière* based in West Africa and the Caribbean. *Compagnie Fruitière* was founded in 1939 in Marseille and is now based in Rungis<sup>105</sup>, France. It sources exotic FFVs and is certified by Tesco Nurture, Global Gap and SMETA Audit. It started its operations in Mauritania<sup>106</sup> for ease of obtaining land before opening a branch in Senegal in 2003. In Senegal, the main crops are cherry tomatoes, sweet corn and mangoes, all prepared at the company's packing station. The company's headquarters are in Ndiawdoune and Mbarigo in the Saint-Louis Region where it operates on 300ha

---

<sup>104</sup> *The Société Nationale de Tomate Séchée* (SNTS) was not included in this table due to a lack of reliable information.

<sup>105</sup> It is the biggest European wholesaler food market.

<sup>106</sup> It is named *Grands Domaines de Mauritanie*.

**Table 7: An overview of the main horticultural companies in the Delta of the River**

Source: Assembled by Researcher from desk research

Equally important is SOLDIVES, created in 2006 in Mbeurbeuf, specialising in melons for the French market thanks to holding a Global GAP certification.

The remaining companies- THE SECOND COMPANY-The Second Company, THE FIRST COMPANY-*The First Company* and The Third Company - are my three case-studies, discussed below THE SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST COMPANY export out-of-season FFVs to Europe as they hold the required certifications. Only The Third Company's (owned by Indian Investors) production is in totality sold in the local market as THE FIRST COMPANY sells on the local market only during the rainy season. As discussed in chapter 3, the presence of foreign capital(s) in Northern Senegal has long been established, especially French capital with the *Compagnie du Sénégal* in 1659.

Private Indian investment in Northern Senegal's agriculture, such as the case of The Third Company, is new although the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1962 (Colom-Jaen 2013). There were approximately 380 Indian companies operating in Senegal in August 2017 (Government of India 2017<sup>107</sup>). All these companies are estate producers except for THE FIRST COMPANY, which also uses CF. The Third Company has used CF in the past to produce for both local and international markets, with varying degrees of success<sup>108</sup>.

---

<sup>107</sup> [https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Senegal\\_Aug\\_2017.pdf](https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Senegal_Aug_2017.pdf)

## **STEP 3: Map and master the area of intervention, then carefully select your champions!**

As explained in the previous section, THE SECOND COMPANY, THE FIRST COMPANY, and The Third Company (*first site*) are based in the region of Saint-Louis, while the third company's (second site) is in the Niayes near Louga. The information presented in this section is based on interviews, secondary sources such as the POAS, and local knowledge - for example, the memory and books of village chiefs or *griots*.

### **5.3.1. Socio-economic context**

This section offers an overview of the socio-economic context and social relations of production and reproduction at family and village levels. There are differences in the availability and affordability of wage labour, conjugal and familial arrangements, and degree of rurality.

#### **The village hosting the Second company**

The village hosting THE SECOND COMPANY is located in Saint-Louis. There were six main villages neighbouring the farm (see table 1 and maps in annex). Most workers from this village were practicing rainfed agriculture, market gardening or cattle-breeding, with only a minority practicing fishing. Before the project, most families cultivated on the *jeeri* - upper lands (as opposed to the *waalo*) - and practiced rainfed agriculture along the *Lake*. The village used to be characterised by high levels of rural exodus, which is now in decline. From 1991-92, the main neighbouring village, practiced intensive irrigated groundnut production and had little irrigation infrastructure. Many respondents from this village and neighbouring villages testified to travelling to the city of Saint-Louis, in search of work at another export horticulture farm.

## **The villages hosting the First Company**

Approximately twelve villages are directly impacted by THE FIRST COMPANY activities (see table and maps). In 2017, 11 years after its establishment, THE FIRST COMPANY totalled over 2500-day workers and around 1000 seasonal and permanent workers across its three sites. This Commune is home to the headquarters of two out of three THE FIRST COMPANY sites, the S. farms, and the famous eponym OMVS dam.

The villages are part of the Region of Saint-Louis, including the one which hosts the partnering THE FIRST COMPANY CF schemes.

As for N., it is the name given by THE FIRST COMPANY to its latest and third agricultural farm, which straddles several villages in the neighbouring communes.

These villages depend more on rainfed agriculture and cattle-breeding than on market-gardening. It used to depend on rice cultivation and fishing but these activities have sharply decreased in the last decades due to salt intrusion and soil degradation (Interview CL28<sup>109</sup>). If most of these village economies now practice irrigated agriculture (especially for rice), and rainfed market-gardening (Ibid.). Most *Pulaar*<sup>110</sup> villagers, in particular, are cattle-herders, peasants and traders, and are therefore used to travelling for several weeks to find grassland and water points for their cattle (*mangi*). Traditionally, when cows and goats produced milk, women would walk long distances to commercialise it. The droughts of the 1970s in the Sahel combined with the agricultural crisis later, would have a lasting agrarian impact on the region with most pastoralists temporarily shifting to fishing and trading (Fall 2002: 285-306; Sen 1983; Schmitz 1990: 499-504;). This is the cases of most *Beydan Maures*<sup>11112</sup> in one of the villages, who have become fishermen and *boutiquiers* (shop owners) in other cities such as Fatick. As evidenced in chapter 3, labour migration is a widespread practice in the Valley and male *Maures* are no exception. They also migrate to Dakar, Saint-Louis and Mauritania, though this has decreased due

---

<sup>109</sup> 05/11/17

<sup>110</sup> Of the Haal Pulaareen or Fulani community made of the Peulh and the Tukuler.

<sup>111</sup> In the course of this thesis, I was made aware of the racist connotation and pejorative use of the term “Moor” therefore, I decided to replace it by “Maureish”: derived from “Maure”: originally, Muslim inhabitants of the Maghreb, many of them are part and parcel of the rich Senegalese culture.

<sup>112</sup> *Beydans* are “*White Maures*” of *Berber Arab* and *black African* groups from the Sahara while *Haratins* are “*Black Maures*”.

to formal documentation increasingly being required at the border. Many male *Maure workers* spend half of the year in their village and the other half at their place of work. One such respondent said: “I went to [the city of] Fatick in 1949 with my mother. I returned to settle there as a *boutiquier* (shop-keeper) in 1974. I also lived in Usine Benn Tally in Dakar in 1965. Now I live in Fatick from December to August as a *boutiquier* and I return in my village for my annual leave to fish from August to December” (Interview CL33<sup>113</sup>).

In the N.area, several *Pulaar* villages were established with the settlement of the nomad population who decided to stay closer to roads, markets and schools. This is also the case of N.which was established close to a big market connected to other big trade centres such as M. where a big *loumo*<sup>114</sup> is held every weekend. Before the droughts, peasants would produce millet, groundnut, dry beans, sorel and red watermelon amongst other produce. They would cultivate rice if they were close to the rich lands “*takk*”. They did not focus on market-gardening then as they do now (Interviews CL22<sup>115</sup> CL46<sup>116</sup>).

Most households were no longer able to cultivate millet because of the water shortage, preferring to cultivate other crops such as FFV for their subsistence. The poorest amongst them resorted to selling their cattle to obtain cash. In N., older women recalled walking almost 15km to go to Saint-Louis to exchange milk for crops, cereals or money (Interview CL39<sup>117</sup>). Later there was the train (*autorail*) and then the public transportation system (*horaires*). This trading of milk (*sippi soow*) has largely declined because of the shortage of grazing lands and scarcity of rainfall (Interview CL43<sup>118</sup>). This, according to many, is part of the reason why they accepted THE FIRST COMPANY deal, to gain access to water and crops to feed their cattle, and for the prospects of employment that would help them settle instead of travelling.

---

<sup>113</sup> 30/05/17

<sup>114</sup> Rural Market

<sup>115</sup> 03/11/17

<sup>116</sup> 17/11/17

<sup>117</sup> 12/11/17

<sup>118</sup> 14/11/17



### **The villages hosting The Third Company**

The village hosting The Third Company's potato farm, is located in Saint-Louis. It is home to many agribusinesses. Agriculture was the most important economic activity for the Wolof who also practiced cattle-breeding (Interview CL53<sup>119</sup>). *Pulaar* villages such as M. main problem was that they could only use the dedicated cattle grazing land near the rich soils for their type of cattle-breeding<sup>120</sup> (Interview CL48<sup>121</sup>; See glossary: Table 22)

As for the second deal of The Third Company, it is in Louga, in the former kingdom of *Kajoor*. According to its Commune, this high density is explained by the high presence of "*surgas*", the rural migrant workers that they estimated as 1405 (8% of the population). The population of this village was relatively young, with 44% of the population under 14 in 2015. Rainfed agriculture was practiced by 66% of the population, mainly for cereals including millet, as opposed to 12% for market-gardening (onions, sweet-potato, aubergines, carrots, cassava), and 9% for cattle breeding (POAS, 2015). Most villages such as M. had access to water but not electricity. In the neighbouring villages, the main activities were agriculture (market-gardening and horticulture), cattle-breeding and trade (boutiques) especially by outmigrants (Interviews CL55<sup>122</sup> CL57<sup>123</sup>).

---

<sup>119</sup> 20/11/17.

<sup>120</sup> "*gaynaako*"

<sup>121</sup> 19/11/17.

<sup>122</sup> 19/12/17

<sup>123</sup> 20/12/17



***Photo 5: Men under the palaver tree waiting for lunch. N.November 2017. (Photograph by Researcher)***



**Photo 6: A woman in the fields<sup>124</sup>. May 2017. (Photograph by researcher)**



**Photo 7: A donkey charrette in N. November 2017**

---

<sup>124</sup> She just collected the cereals (*curri*) she left soaking in the water she left soaking overnight in the water, and would prepare and sell to primary school children despite the risks of bilharzias



**Photo 8: Children playing in Louga. December 2017. (Photograph by researcher)**

This section has presented the general socio-economic context of this research. Observations, interviews and discussions with a few families still practicing agriculture reveal the extent of state disengagement. There is a common narrative of scarcity and “*bricolage*”: “agriculture is a struggling business” (interview SF1)<sup>125</sup>, “we are just trying our luck with bad quality seeds, no soil treatment, no training”, “the State seldom provide seeds through the local community and we don’t hear from them until next elections” (Interview CL8<sup>126</sup>), “sometimes we start cultivating but have to stop because of the lack of means” (Interviews CLC2<sup>127</sup>). The socio-economic conditions also show that despite the diversity of villages according to their demographic and ethnic composition, they shared common patterns of migration and division of labour. While labour migration is not new, and nor is social differentiation, this research seeks to analyse the extent to which they might have been exacerbated by the arrival of new investors and new class formation.

---

<sup>125</sup> 14/05/2017

<sup>126</sup> 24/10/2017

<sup>127</sup> 20/10/2017

### 5.3.2. Profiling our champions: Stylised facts about the three firms

This section presents the background of each firm: business model, crop, investors, sector, calendar of production, and terms of land acquisition.

#### **The first Company**

THE FIRST COMPANY is a joint-farming venture. It is a vertically integrated farming, processing and marketing business, employing over 300 full-time and 400 seasonal staff.

THE FIRST COMPANY was established in Senegal, after 2005. When it began its activities, THE FIRST COMPANY leased an area of land smaller than 500 ha. The deliberation for those first 420ha was only delivered in 2008 and 2012. Between 2012 and 2017, THE FIRST COMPANY grew extensively (see organogram below). THE FIRST COMPANY is mainly estate farming and recruits wage labour for its three sites.

The management of THE FIRST COMPANY provided several reasons for choosing Senegal, including land availability, shipping connections to Northern Europe through the River and the Port of Dakar, and the presence of irrigation infrastructure. Another strategic reason was that the CFA Franc is fixed to the Euro and therefore subject to less fluctuation. Other reasons according to THE FIRST COMPANY's director included "peace and democracy, limited corruption, cheap labour provision, the ease of doing business, and the culture of "*masla*"<sup>128</sup>(interview SMP<sup>129</sup>).

THE FIRST COMPANY produces mainly FFVs intended for export to the UK, and for the domestic market. Farming of export fresh fruits and vegetables spans November to May. The other crops (onion, carrots, and peanuts) are produced during the wet season and sold to the local market. There is no summer interruption of activities (see THE FIRST COMPANY calendar of production below), hence THE FIRST COMPANY hires wage labour throughout the year, though at a reduced rate from May. Memoranda of

---

<sup>128</sup> The culture of tolerance for the self and for others, which facilitates community life and helps to prevent conflict.

<sup>129</sup> 03/05/2017

understanding (MoUs) were signed with local communities to compensate their loss of grazing lands with the leftover produce to feed their livestock.

**Table 8: The First Company’s Calendar of Production**

Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec

See Legend below (different vegetables)

The First Company is registered as an FZC (with the fiscal advantages presented earlier in this chapter) and has several certifications including Tesco Nurture and Supplier Ethical Data Exchange. It is also certified by S. which assesses labour practices, ethical performance and allows retailers to share data, promote good practices in health and safety, environmental and business ethics. Not least, it holds Global G.A.P. L.E.A.F Marque and BRC certifications, the leading brand evaluating food safety, packaging, storage, distribution and retailing standards.

These certifications are evidence that exporting FFV to markets such as the UK is highly regulated with high standards (Baglioni 2015; Gibbon and Ponte 2005). The Global GAP certification leads to longer employment through the farming season for workers (Colen and Maertens 2011). This has engendered the shift from CF to estates seen in Senegal since the 1990s and allows for direct control of production (Baglioni 2015; Maertens and Swinnen 2009, 2014). Since the 1980s, the export FFV sector has become very competitive with the emergence of big European wholesalers and large retailers with strict quality standards leading to further vertical integration and market segmentation (Dolan and Humphrey 2000; Gibbon and Ponte 2005). As a result, the direct competitors of THE FIRST COMPANY in the FFV business are based in Egypt, Morocco, Mexico and Eastern Europe.

## **Table 9: Description of the production by THE FIRST COMPANY**

Assembled from field notes

### **The Second Company**

THE SECOND COMPANY SARL Senegal was set up after 2010. As of March 2018, 80% of THE SECOND COMPANY is owned by a group based in the UK

THE SECOND COMPANY began activities in Senegal with the installation of the farm including a pack house, the construction of a canal and irrigation systems. THE SECOND COMPANY source and grows vegetables to supply the UK in winter. The farming season lasts eight months from October to May, and all the production is exported to the UK (see table below). The remainder of the vegetables needed by the UK firm are produced in the UK three months per year.

## **Table 10: Distance between THE SECOND COMPANY and main neighbouring villages, Infrastructures and Venues**

Source: Assembled from THE SECOND COMPANY impact assessment Report

According to the firm's UK resource person, Senegal was selected instead of Egypt, Morocco, or Mexico for the following reasons. Egypt and Morocco were excluded because of long-term sustainability issues and because they “are not water abundant, in addition, labour regulations were getting tighter” (interview SMP<sup>130</sup>). Mexico was excluded due to its dollar-based economy, which would provide advantages for importing but not exporting. Senegal was chosen because of the ease of sea-freight and doing business as an FZC. After a 10-day trip hosted by APIX, the first director was mandated with the mission of setting up THE SECOND COMPANYS in Senegal which was “politically stable, good climate, land plentiful, sustainable source of water, pro-investment government, great logistical route back to the UK, calm country” (ibid.). In 2011, the managing director “found” the land and following registration procedures established the business. In 2017, there was a restructuring at the top of the company with

---

<sup>130</sup> 26/10/2017



the arrival of a new Managing Director of THE SECOND COMPANY (see organogram in chapter 6).

**Table 11: Main Vegetables produced by the Second Company and their Characteristics**

Product	Production Months	Certifications	Sold in	Irrigation	Destination
Vegetables	8 out of 12 (October to May)	Global G.A.P., Tesco Nurture, SMETA Audit	Waitrose, Tesco, Sainsbury's	6 pivots	Export

Source: Assembled by Researcher from fieldnotes

THE SECOND COMPANY's 2011 agreement with the Rural Community involved the equal allocation of land to the company and to the local populations. Senegal is the only site of the UK Group in Africa where such vegetables are sourced. The company's products in Senegal have two certifications: Tesco Nurture and Global G.A.P. They have also been audited by SMETA.

### **The Third Company**

The Third Company Senegal was born from the partnership of a group established in 1995 and another Farm, based in Asia. Before becoming involved in agriculture, their principal activities in Senegal were in real estate.

After starting negotiations with the Senegalese government in 2008, The Third Company secured land in Saint-Louis through the deliberation of the relevant Rural Community. That year, several land deals scandals involving political leaders from the liberal regime were revealed by the incoming PCR (as discussed in the previous chapter). In 2010, the farm installation process started and by 2011, the first planting had been done. The Third Company started producing vegetables. Of the 5000 ha, 1000 were farmed in 2016. By 2017, this had risen to 1500 ha.

The Third Company's permanent workers were mainly "costly accountants" and supervisors according to our respondents, with the remaining staff coming from Senegal

as seasonal and day workers (interview SMP 10<sup>131</sup>). The harvesting period was between January and March. Between June and July, The Third Company usually had no more stock, according to our respondent.

**Figure 3: Evolution of The Third Company**

\_Source: Assembled from The Third Company website and research notes

**Table 12: Main data of the The Third Company Potato farm Production**

Year	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total land use (ha)</b>	500	1 000	1 480
<b>Total Commercial Potato Production (Tons)</b>	21 000	450 00	60 000
<b>Total Seed Production</b>	-	-	12 000
<b>Total Capacity of Cold room storage (Tons)</b>	10 000	40 000	40 000
<b>Total Job creations</b>	500	1 000	1 200
<b>Total Pivot System</b>			28 on 50ha
<b>Irrigation</b>			1480ha with 24ha of retention capacity

Source: Assembled by Researcher from ...visited on 13 July 2018

This section has demonstrated how all three companies relied on day and seasonal workers. THE FIRST COMPANY is now able to produce all year long in contrast to THE SECOND COMPANY and The Third Company who have a shorter farming season. FFVs also varied across cases as these companies do not grow the same crops. They occupy different segments of the GVCs that they dominate respectively in Senegal (the

---

<sup>131</sup> 04/07/2019

First and Second companies), while The Third Company leads the domestic production of potatoes.

## **STEP 4: Get an official contract first, then an unofficial symbolic contract to seal the deal!**

There are two types of agreement. Official agreements are when companies approach local authorities to negotiate land rights. If successful, a deliberation is delivered by the local authority (representing the State), with information on the objective of the land allocation, the types of activities planned by the company, and the size of the deal. Following the deliberation, some companies sign an additional unofficial agreement with the local authority. This memorandum of understanding (MoU) is more informal and generally constitutes a summary of the verbal agreements. After signing the deal, the *sous-prefet* is responsible for ensuring their application helps promote social dialogue between the different parties.

### **5.4.1. What's in the contracts? Agreements between investors and communities**

All three companies had leases through deliberations by the respective rural communities in order to access the land. Each deliberation states the area concerned, the number of hectares, and sometimes the duration of the lease. These deliberations were completed by an agreement of partnership stating clearly the responsibilities of each party and the duration of each convention. (The contents of all MoUs and agreements are summarised in the annex).

In the case of THE FIRST COMPANY, the company has land leases through deliberations with the respective rural communities for its three farms. The various agreements are for periods of 2-5 years and are renewable. The Commune's<sup>132</sup> responsibility is to manage and mediate the relationships with the population; to help

---

<sup>132</sup> The commune has replaced Rural Communities since the Act Three of Decentralisation, and is led by a Mayor who replaces the former President of the Rural Community

THE FIRST COMPANY solve any problem that might result in contestation from neighbouring populations. The protocols clearly specify that THE FIRST COMPANY's land will not be reduced in the future. In return, THE FIRST COMPANY commit to respecting the allocated land according to the norms of the POAS. Contracts contain other social commitments towards the previous occupants of the land, for example giving them access to company crop residues, watering points, vaccination parks for the cattle, etc.

It is crucial to note that THE FIRST COMPANY made a commitment in the protocol not to have any discriminating behaviour in their recruitment, contrary to the THE SECOND COMPANY protocol which I discuss later. THE FIRST COMPANY's policy is said to be based on skills only, though it appears that THE FIRST COMPANY's intermediaries behave differently. This constitutes a source of tensions with some villages.

Agreements also commit THE FIRST COMPANY to support the populations in social projects regarding health, education, drinking water supply, improvement of access to the villages, etc. The most important financial commitment of THE FIRST COMPANY is its yearly assistance of 4,000,000 CFA Francs to fund the yearly investment plan of the Commune managed by the Mayor.

**Table 13: Summary of the main agreements of the THE FIRST COMPANY land deal**

Source: Assembled by researcher from contract and MoUs

THE SECOND COMPANY's contract is different, as the 2011 agreement was complemented by two successive 2013 acts: a deliberation with the rural and an agreement with Chiefs of the two Pulaar villages for increased land size. The 2011 agreement involves a different type of partnership from that of THE FIRST COMPANY, a shared-allocation of land between investors and neighbouring villages. 200ha were allocated to THE SECOND COMPANY and 200ha to the neighbouring villages, with the possibility for THE SECOND COMPANY to be allocated additional land provided the two parties met the terms of the agreement. THE SECOND COMPANY's model has been presented as a "win-win" by its representatives. It has been replicated in other areas of the Valley, with the aim to contributing to a greater incorporation of smallholder producers in GVCs.

There were three points to the 2011 Strategic Agreement signed by the then PCR (now mayor), the *Sous-Préfet* and THE SECOND COMPANYS: Recruitment and Personnel Management, Land Management, Canal Management. The first significant element of the strategic agreement between THE SECOND COMPANY and the Rural Community of Ngnith is that it is written in English and French as requested by the English partners. This enables the English partners to control the contents of the contracts, avoiding issues of interpretation – a main source of problems between parties in land deals. This did not, however, prevent "interpretation problems" arising later.

**Table 14: Summary of the main agreements of the THE SECOND COMPANY land deal**

Source: Assembled by researcher from contract and MoUs

THE SECOND COMPANYS' recruitment policy is to explicitly give priority to the people of Ngnith both for "skilled and unskilled employment" despite having the possibility to recruit skilled labour from outside the rural community as an FZC. Other provisions focus on safety, hygiene, quality of the working environment, and compliance of working conditions with the laws of Senegal. THE SECOND COMPANYs have tried to increase workplace standards to those of the UK according to the UK Firm's respondent.

Land management arrangements were as follows: equal sharing of the land, digging of a water canal to separate the two shares of 200ha by THE SECOND COMPANY "as a compensation for the loss of land", and yearly payment of an income to the treasury of D. (administratively responsible). There is no information on the exact amount paid or its final use and it is possible it goes to the Mayor of N. as is the case for THE FIRST COMPANY.

As for The Third Company, they have acquired 5000ha of agricultural farmlands in Saint-Louis and 1000ha in Louga. The 5000 ha, situated in Saint-Louis were obtained through a deliberation. In 2013, the Cadastre of Saint-Louis decided to deliberate 1004 ha, rather than 5000. This reduction in the size of the land allocated to The Third Company may be a consequence of the 2009 local elections and the arrival of a new local authority, 2012's political changes, the eviction of the liberal government and the nomination of new administrative authorities.



**Table 15: Summary of the main agreements and background of the THE THIRD COMPANY deal**

Source: Assembled by researcher from contract and MoUs

Later, the DGID issued an emphyteutic lease to The Third Company for a duration of 30 years specifying the amount of rent and an obligation to put the land to productive use (*mettre en valeur*) under two years by implementing planned agricultural project.

Finally, an agreement was signed between the company and the Mayor of the Commune in 2015. The obligations of the commune are to delimit the targeted area of 1,500ha (not 1004 as per previous documents) while deallocating 3,500 hectares for other agricultural projects in the region at the request of The Third Company. An additional area of 500ha could be allocated to The Third Company if requested. The obligations of the company, consisted of increasing the daily wage, providing remaining crops to a committee in charge of cattle food coordinated by the Mayor himself, transporting the workers from neighbouring villages to their place of work, authorising the digging of an irrigation canal for local agricultural entrepreneurs, equipping the 500ha of land allocated to the populations by the mayor, and assisting the commune's development projects as part of The Third Company's Corporate social Responsibility (CSR) activities.

Regarding the Louga deal, The Third Company SARL were allocated a lease for a 1,000-hectare concession by the Municipal Council. The intended use of the land is the production of potato. A delegation from the village visited the The Third Company site in Saint-Louis before signing the agreement, and almost half of the delegation recall not being satisfied by the outcomes. Those I interviewed and who agreed to the deal were happy about the prospect of wage employment. Those who opposed the deal were not convinced by "mechanised agriculture": some did not trust "machine's work". Others had heard testimony from workers about the very "physical nature of the job". Some respondents had heard from smallholders who signed individual deals with the company against technical assistance or financial compensation and were already regretting agreeing to the deal. Yet another category of respondents were discouraged by the "low salary" and considered it to be a form of "modern slavery" claiming they preferred to work on their fields of cassava. This later group is organised around a *Mourid* religious leader and they constitute the main resistance to the installation of the farm which implied the displacement of some peasants and pastoralists living near the project.

As for the company, it needed some portions of the land not comprised in the lease to install its irrigation infrastructure and started negotiating individually with local peasants. Some respondents who were approached by the company were told the farm is “approved by the President of the Republic himself and they should rather accept the modest financial compensation they were offered for their land than lose it for nothing”. While some ceded, the majority -114 peasants initially and over 90 in the end from the neighbouring villages - refused and constituted a Collective. Its leader died in January 2017. Those who resisted the deal mainly accuse The Third Company and the Municipal Council of giving their lands away to a private enterprise without consulting them.

In light of these processes of land acquisition, it seems that whether or not the company used a bottom-up approach, by consulting with local communities, influenced the outcome. Was the conflict in this village due to the forcible top-down approach, the presence of the failed farm of former president Wade, or different political sensibilities? The Third Company had learned lessons from THE SECOND COMPANY’s and THE FIRST COMPANY’s agreements. It copied the THE SECOND COMPANY model and a share of land was allocated to the population, with local farmers receiving access to the canal. While this seems impeccable, there are areas of the THE SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST COMPANY agreement that remain vague: When and how were the beneficiaries from the population selected? Who are they? Who are the members of the committee to receive the remaining crops? And to whose cattle will it be fed? What is the nature of CSR support to the commune and is the mayor to receive it directly? In the case of The Third Company, an important question is why is a Senegalese MP, president of a Senegalese departmental council and representative of the ruling party, co-signing the agreement and acting as a representative of The Third Company?

This section on the terms of the deals allows us to understand the initial roots of resistance, acquiescence or adverse incorporation during or just after the negotiation. It highlights how some rural communities and their leaders struggle to make their institutions work with insufficient financial resources and inadequate skills (for example in contract-negotiation) while competing to attract providential investors. Left with

almost no support from the State (interview CL19, SF1)<sup>133</sup>, they attempt to attract providential investors, thus establishing a new kind of public-private partnership. This confirms what Kojo Amanor (1999: 190) discovered during his field research in Ghana: “alienation of land usually occurs with the collaboration of political leaders at the community level”. Ruling classes facilitating or taking part in dispossession is not new as evidenced in writings on pre-colonial or post-colonial Senegal (Barry 1979, 2012; Faye 2013) and Ghana (Amanor 1999: 19; Austin 2006, 2007; Lanz et al. 2018). However, in all three cases, after the signature of deals “from above” came the critical step of validating them “from below” before the effective occupation of the land.

#### **5.4.2. “When the government gives you land, it does not mean a thing<sup>134</sup>”!**

All three companies had signed agreements with individual villages neighbouring the projects, and in the case of The Third Company, these included agreements with individual farmers. Initially, these agreements between companies and the representatives of local communities were oral, but with increasing land conflicts, they started to be written sometimes in the presence of witnesses.

#### **THE FIRST COMPANY**

In the case of THE FIRST COMPANY, various MoUs were signed with the main neighbouring villages. Though more comprehensive than the conventions of partnerships between THE FIRST COMPANY and the Communes, the MoUs were not always applied. This is in part because the terms of the agreements were not specific enough on their conditions of application, timeline, tasks division, etc. One of the 2017 agreements between a *Pulaar* village and THE FIRST COMPANY states that the company committed to securing the cemetery now situated inside the company perimeter, and to build a new collective cemetery to be identified by the villagers. This comes first in the agreement and shows the emotional dimensions of people’s relationship to land. The company promised to grant preferential recruitment to neighbouring villages, establish a

---

<sup>133</sup> Except for the seeds they rarely receive from the commune, and the government’s motor-pumps, such as the 3000 offered by President Wade, were distributed through clientelist networks (interviews)

<sup>134</sup> Interview SMP10, 04/07/2017

partnership to develop cattle breeding in the neighbouring villages, and produce a forage culture on a plot outside of THE FIRST COMPANY's farm. Yet details as to how when and where these commitments would take place were missing from the document.

In 2017 THE FIRST COMPANY signed an MoU committing them to support a village mosque and install a prayer facility for women without giving any indication of the date this would be completed. In addition, THE FIRST COMPANY promised to install an access road to the village, without any mention of the specific location and limits of the road to be built. Finally, the company promised to install a solar panel for the students of the village. All these actions however, should have been performed by the State.

### **THE SECOND COMPANY**

With regards to THE SECOND COMPANY, only the deal for extending its land size was concluded in the form of an MoU. This 2013 Agreement for THE SECOND COMPANY Farm extension was between the firm and two village chiefs and their sons, in the presence of witnesses, both employees of the company. The reason for the extension was to enable the installation of more irrigation pivots on the upper side of the farms, in the areas occupied by *Pulaar* leaders for their cattle grazing as THE SECOND COMPANY had then glacial relations with the *Wolof* village where the farm is located. Consequently, the village chief was reluctant to grant the extension. This village chief is affiliated to an opposition group led by a *marabout* (a religious leader) whose ambition was to replace the current mayor affiliated with the majority group. That land was initially allocated by the rural community through a deliberation in favour of THE SECOND COMPANYS, as explained above. The agreement states that the population of the said-villages which are a *Pulaar village-hameau* affiliated to the main *Wolof* village willingly accept to leave it to THE SECOND COMPANY and therefore, they "authorise" the rural community to deliberate in favour of THE SECOND COMPANYS. It is worth noting that the second "village" is made of three different families living together in the same concession and without legal administrative recognition.

The agreement stipulates that "as a compensation", THE SECOND COMPANY would help the socio-economic development of one of the villages. In addition, a yearly compensation of 5.800.000 CFA Francs is given, without specifying to whom. The agreement was signed for a period of seven years and was renewable after a transition

period of one year. The final points concern the conditions of the bank transfer in favour of a GIE whose members are not identified. As a result of this deliberation and the subsequent agreement, THE SECOND COMPANY now holds 384 ha.

This case illustrates how THE SECOND COMPANY, aware of the high expectations of local communities and their elites, was able to obtain the desired extension of its land. To do so, it navigated the ethnic tensions that arose between the *Wolof* and *Pulaar* villages as well as the political divisions between the *Wolof* chef de village hosting and the Mayor of the area.

### **THE THIRD COMPANY**

In the Third Company Saint-Louis case, MoUs were signed against diverse mutually-agreed counterparts such as financial compensation. I have analysed ten such MoUs signed between 2008 and 2015 between The Third Company and specific villages, individual landholders as well as an unidentifiable association (table below).

As in the SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST COMPANY cases, a few local community groups were negotiating their own contract terms for services or infrastructure usually delivered by the State. Different from the SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST COMPANY cases, The Third Company had signed several agreements with groups and individuals. The first agreement in the table above might constitute a case of “green grab” as the object was a transfer of 50ha of land from the village agro-forest exploitation in exchange for technical and financial assistance. In light of the increasing land rush, this case constitutes a type of valuation, and appropriation of nature by capital highlighted by Fairhead and Leach (2012) or Zoomers (2010).

**Table 16: Main agreements between The Third Company and other parties**

Source: Assembled by the Researcher from contracts and MoUs

Other agreements concerned village leaders acting on their own behalf for personal benefit. The rents included jobs for themselves or their own families, motor-pumps and other agricultural equipment, access to water and seemingly ridiculous amounts of money against lands comprised between 5 to 50 ha. These transactions were validated by the administrative authority who sometimes even collected the money on behalf of the transferring party. This administrative authority was the same *Sous-Préfet* supposed to ensure both parties respect their part of the deal. Most of the village leaders who took part in these transactions to meet their own needs were from the neighbouring *Pulaar* villages. My interviews with three of them revealed the following:

i) One village leader was recruited by The Third Company as the manager of the guards with a permanent contract in 2012. Another had family members working for the project. Despite both complaining of a lack of space for their cattle, they claimed to have been given respectively 20 and 4 ha. This was allegedly because they had land, but no access to water or agricultural equipment to cultivate the land. None of the village leaders mentioned the deals they signed, and they refused to The First Company's the terms of the deals when questioned. ii) At the third *Pulaar* village, the son of the deceased leader who signed the deal, said they had no other option. iii) Another respondent who preferred not to disclose The First Company's terms of his deal said that when they first arrived, The Third Company claimed they had a bail from "presidency" and recalled the company leaders using the President's visit to their farm as part of a tour to several agribusiness to claim close ties with high notables. The investor's claim of powerful connection gave authority and legitimacy to their request for people to leave their land. This was corroborated by other respondents from the Region of Louga (second case-study) who testified to also being told: "come take the compensation money or you will lose your land" (interview). A few people agreed to this out of fear and are consequently no longer cultivating. Over 100 farmers refused to take the money. The attitude of village leaders who put their interests above those of the community they were supposedly representing (and who did not have access to the deal) led to resistance and adverse incorporation in one case, and acquiescence and adverse incorporation in the other.

In conclusion, this analysis of agreements and "commitments" reveals three striking pieces of knowledge. Firstly, villagers and their elites expected from private investors



what the state could not (or would not) provide. They sought assurance that the company would provide social services under the cover of CSR. In the context of reduced state support and insufficient provision of “social goods”, it is perhaps unsurprising that villagers sought to obtain these from corporate actors. Yet, this likely created the kinds of clashes of expectations observed in land deals. Investors thought it was enough to provide nearby villagers with employment and productive infrastructure, whereas some villagers and local community leaders took these jobs for granted, expecting much more in terms of local infrastructure. Such expectations essentially reproduced the kind of paternalism sometimes observed of agribusinesses investing in relatively poor areas, as discussed in the following chapter.

Secondly, after signing official deals, some investors created additional unofficial (or informal) agreements. However, investors avoided accountability of these agreements by remaining vague about their timeframe and conditions, or by cultivating polysemic agreements. Thirdly, my findings reveal how companies send their intermediaries to create different channels of communication with nearby communities. This will be further explored in the next section<sup>135</sup>.

## **STEP 5: Get your own middle(wo)men (It helps, a lot!)**

In previous sections, I have tried to establish how land deals were negotiated, demonstrating how the actors involved significantly affected whether land deals were accepted or resisted. In this section, the key role of middle(wo)men in these negotiations is analysed. I propose to move away from neo-patrimonialism and consider diverse actors renegotiating power dynamics within the “stratified” decentralised State during land deals.

Instead, I attempt to describe and analyse the role of key resource persons with a huge influence across the three cases; those in charge of maintaining social relations between a company and the community - either through their personal networks, their personal

---

<sup>135</sup> However, because these strategic allies are easily identifiable, that will not be further developed for ethical considerations.

skills, or other “unofficial”, “informal” means necessary to arrive at a desired outcome. In all three companies, these strategic actors played a decisive role in negotiating MoUs and creating different channels of accountability and responsibility between the company and the communities. The most used words in the interviews with these respondents were: “trust”, “land” and “family”.

At THE FIRST COMPANY, the director’s closest strategic team had played a key role in the signing of MoUs, in this case verbal agreements between THE FIRST COMPANY and the villages. Officially the mediator was an external consultant at THE FIRST COMPANY advising THE FIRST COMPANY President. He had been the key negotiator of land deals especially using her vast personal networks in the Saint-Louis Region. Before THE FIRST COMPANY, he was the resource person in charge of obtaining land for many other foreign investors. Most of the villages he approached for THE FIRST COMPANY agreed firstly because they had witnessed the “positive outcomes” of the first business he brought to the region. Inspired by this model they all wanted their own.

During our conversations, he repeatedly insisted that “family” and “trust” were central to her relationship with the villagers and that she only takes the land he is given: “My philosophy is to negotiate with my parents or neighbours first. If they give me land, I take, otherwise I don’t”. (Interview SMC<sup>136</sup>) He also considers having used his personal networks a lot, and this had led him to be in constant stress. This is because when issues arise, people would go to him directly and remind him of what they had given to the company, on her recommendation, in order to solve the issue: “I have mixed the personal with the professional” (Interview SM7<sup>137</sup>). He also admitted to being constantly asked for money. Indeed, most of his salary was spent on solving other people’s problems. Despite this, he claimed that this was is the greatest reward; to witness the new horticultural landscape he had helped to create (Interview SMC<sup>138</sup>).

Along with the Director of Corporate Social Responsibility, the middle (wo)men are key collaborators of the Director. They are therefore key in THE FIRST COMPANY’s signature of MoU with the various villages and their following-up with finding key social

---

<sup>136</sup> 02/06/2017

<sup>137</sup> 16/06/2017

<sup>138</sup> 02/06/2017

partnerships to build social infrastructures such as roads, classrooms, cemetery walls, etc. Most of the time, this bears no cost for the company, who also build strategic partnerships with NGOs, to tap into the international development and CSR monies intended for LMIC countries.

THE SECOND COMPANY and The Third Company also have benefited from the expertise of such middle(wo)men. For The Third Company, this key resource person is its administrator and an experienced parliamentarian representing Senegal at a sub-regional level. He is at once a powerful politician (with connections and the legitimacy of belonging to, and speaking for, the current regime in his commune), the leader of a department, and an entrepreneur (with his own HR business where he is in charge of recruiting The Third Company's workers). He is part of that category of businesspersons straddling across sectors to accumulate more economic, cultural and social capital, as well as political legitimacy and authority.

At THE SECOND COMPANY, two local collaborators and a family member of the managing Director played a key role in the process of setting up the company and its social affairs. The first collaborator was also the first "negotiator". He regularly worked for THE SECOND COMPANY as an independent consultant, despite living in another city. He did this when important negotiations were taking place. The second negotiator climbed the company's social ladder and is now a senior manager. He is the one presenting THE SECOND COMPANY as a "South-South" cooperation between Senegal and South Africa, and a "win-win" model even before the project started operating, and such terms have been widely echoed in Senegalese media (GDMM<sup>139</sup>, Interview SMP2<sup>140</sup>).

These middle(wo)men understand that they are more than translators yet less than full business partners. As both domestic actors, and part of the company<sup>141</sup>, they bridge two worlds. These middle(wo)men appear to be in fact "social brokers" translating the language of capitalist accumulation into one that is understandable, and acceptable, to local communities. This confirms the importance of respecting local realities and

---

<sup>139</sup> 09/06/2016

<sup>140</sup> 06/05/2017

<sup>141</sup> Sometimes a consultant bearing the risks of this apparently prestigious yet precarious type of employment

customary social arrangements. The above demonstrates the companies' willingness to reinforce its links with the communities, and make them "as much a part of us as we are of them" (Ouma 2015: 105). Consequently, the host groups treat investors with high regard, as they would treat their own family. Maybe this is the reason I noticed a discourse of an "imaginary" scapegoat from a few local respondents whenever there were discontents with the firm's management: "it is not the company director, neither is it our negotiators, who are good people, it is their entourage in the company" (Interviews CL33<sup>142</sup> CLC2<sup>143</sup>CL7<sup>144</sup>). These resource persons are the brokers keeping the deals together, just as griots and religious spokesmen historically maintained social, spiritual and symbolic contracts in Waalo and Kajoor societies.

## Conclusion

This chapter has analysed why, how, and with whom land deals take place from investor and government perspectives. Section 1 introduced the political administrative context and examined how economic constraints faced by the decentralised authorities motivated their quest for providential investors. Is the government supporting these investments with a package of fiscal incentives in order to meet its food security and horticultural exports imperatives? Section 2 presented the context of the land rush in Northern Senegal and its scale post-2006, while trying to move away from hectare-centric analysis. It presented the three case studies and provided information on location, types of crop, etc. Section 3 set the scene by presenting the socio-economic context of the land deals. Section 4 examined the contents of both contracts (agreements) on the one hand and MoUs on the other. It argued that local communities and their leaders were seeking to attract investors in their communities as a way to develop their territories in a context of relative state disengagement. Section 5 further demonstrated the central role played by middlemen in charge of protecting symbolic contracts between investors and communities, arguing that even when land deals were signed, they were still open to negotiation.

All the above illustrates how the Senegal River has truly become the "Nile of the Valley" by transforming the landscape with an impact on rural labour markets and exacerbating

---

<sup>142</sup> 30/05/2017

<sup>143</sup> 20/10/17

<sup>144</sup> 24/10/17

migration dynamics. In addition, this chapter has introduced the political dimensions of land deals, which will be further discussed in the following chapter with perspectives from local authorities and various social groups.

# CHAPTER 6: WHEN CAPITAL NEEDS LAND AND LABOUR: “CSR PATERNALISM” AND POLITICAL REACTIONS TO LAND DEALS

## Introduction

This chapter provides a critical analysis of Senegal’s political and economic context, and argues that the Emerging Senegal Plan (ESP) discourse of the ruling classes is what dictates the main actors’ strategies. This chapter offers a birds-eye view of how the various strategies and discourses stakeholders in land deals use to take ownership of this at all levels:

- Local authorities’ in dire need of financial resources to develop their territories and deploying all means necessary to attract investors whilst needing to secure their political authority “from above” and strengthening their legitimacy “from below” by maintaining clientelist relations;
- Customary and religious authorities seeking to renew “symbolic contracts”;
- Investors embracing the governmental development strategy because it works for business, while performing their “CSR duty” as a way of respecting the social contract;
- The not so homogenous “local community” divided between resistance, adverse incorporation, or adhesion to the land deals.

I argue that CSR paternalism allows private investors to produce and reproduce themselves through continuously defining their mission and ethos to respond to societal demands. I bring this evidence by combining “studying up”, semi-structured interviews with employers that are the champions in their segments of the export FFV market and policy officials, with “studying down” workers and non-workers (Nader 1972).

## 6.1. Power battles within the state

This section approaches the State not as a monolithic entity, but as a space of a plurality of positions and interests. Combining everyday politics and state resources, legal administrative means, intangible resources such as charisma, trust or faith to legitimise its processes and influence the political status quo through bargaining power. For this study, a sample of seventy-seven administrative, political, traditional and religious authorities were interviewed.

### 6.1.1. At the administrative level: Preventing conflicts and maintaining peace

Authority and sovereignty are demonstrated in the manners in which actors' roles shift across time and location according to their changing interests and bargaining power. Power battles within administrative levels is illustrated in the case of The Third Company. The *Sous-Préfet* initially refused to allocate land to The Third Company for two reasons. First, as a municipal employee, he did not have the powers to allocate 1000ha to a private investor, he could only advise the state represented by APIX. Second, he was not entitled to deliver land to non-residents of the Louga village. Yet, in the summer 2016 he received a letter from the Prefect demanding he approves the deal. On 1 August, the sous-prefect approved the deal leading its opponents (the Collective of Peasants) to hire a lawyer and protest what they called the legalisation of an "illegal act" (Interview RPG<sup>145</sup>). In this instance, the prefect used powers attributed to him by the law to assert his authority over the sous-prefect as the representative of the President in the region (article 13 et 14, Decree 72-636 of 29 May 1972).

Administrative authorities are also responsible for governing the territory and ensuring peace prevails before, during, and after the signature of the deals. One of the *Sous-Préfet* told me how he had to convene several mediation meetings between investors and workers' representatives to find solutions, which stopped all other farm activities for several days (Interview CLA1<sup>146</sup>). A different *Sous-Préfet* in another region, had to oversee all meetings between workers, their newly established union, and the farm managers in his own offices, and is now ensuring enactment of the mutually-agreed

---

<sup>145</sup> 15/12/17

<sup>146</sup> 22/12/17

timetable of activities, as promises by the employer, and conforming to Senegalese labour law (Interview CLA<sup>147</sup>). Another role of the *Sous-Préfet* is ensuring not only respect for agreements and subsequent payment of financial contributions by investors to the commune, but also the resettlement of the populations who have been subjected to development-induced displacement.

Political and administrative leaders play a role that can be decisive regarding the outcomes of land deals. As I have illustrated, they have sometimes advocated for a project to take place, prevented tensions, or helped to manage them. However, they are not always successful in resolving conflicts that may arise, especially when these are an outcome of land use change.

### **6.1.2. “I am the state!”: On political visions and deferred realities**

Eager to be seen performing for their own communities, local political elites seek to divert land deals to their own villages, as was the case of the leaders interviewed in this section.

THE SECOND COMPANY’s, THE FIRST COMPANY in Saint-Louis, and The Third Company (also in Saint-Louis) have encountered less contestation or resistance over time compared with THE FIRST COMPANY last deal and The Third Company deal in Louga. In the THE SECOND COMPANY case, tensions between political leaders (mayor versus village chief), who both manoeuvred in favour of the company’s establishment in Saint-Louis, were noted in 2013. In Saint-Louis, the mayor was an experienced political leader and a successful businessman, who is currently on his 4th mandate in the commune. He admitted to “actively” encouraging investors to come in: “I accepted them despite the difficulties with the people. It is easier to bring them in than to send them away when things do not work out” (interview SMC<sup>148</sup>). He also admitted not knowing then that “investor’s FZC status granted them special derogations, “for something like 20 or 30 years, I heard. Only the firm S\* (one of the oldest in Saint-Louis) pays 70,000,000 CFA francs a year” (ibid). Yet he told me that he believes politics should not be pursued for personal aggrandisement: “one should engage in politics to improve the lives of others, and once this is done, that is your greater reward. I am proud to have THE FIRST

---

<sup>147</sup> 22/11/17

<sup>148</sup> 02/06/17



COMPANY in my region and to witness the high levels of job creation and other professional opportunities” (ibid.).

Conversely, while these two leaders succeeded in managing real or potential tensions around land acquisitions, the mayor of the Louga municipality faced a suspended deal in the Third Company case. He was less lucky despite having the vision to transform his Commune into a “*Pole of Emergence*”, in line with state development, and eventually becoming the biggest wholesale food market in Africa, the “Rungis<sup>149</sup> of Senegal” (Interview CLP3<sup>150</sup>). The power of these administrative and local authorities can also become a source of conflict between the authorities and their subjects. In this case, a determined mayor faced an equally resourceful population who led an inquisition on the outcomes of The Third Company farm in Saint-Louis, and who did not want the same result. This led to an impasse, though the mayor was resolved for the project to continue, “*if the village becomes a handicap, we will transfer it somewhere else, but the project will happen: Once I take a decision, it cannot be undone by a child(literally) = it cannot be undone easily*”<sup>151</sup> (ibid.). This is similar to the vocabulary of one of the senior managers of THE SECOND COMPANY, who was looking for the population to “be removed as planned” so he could pursue his activities (ibid.).

The variations in the level of success of leaders to implement their vision can be explained by their personal experience, charisma, political affiliations, and how much they invest in their networks (Berry 1993). This is corroborated by a study based on in-depth interviews with approximately 350 local and traditional leaders in rural Senegal, which argues that “variation in local government performance is a function of elites’ ability to divert projects and resources to their own villages and that their ability to do so is shaped by historical social cleavages” (Wilfhart 2018: 150). This is especially true in regions that are home to pre-colonial kingdoms, which is the case of the Delta and the River Valley regions. The study concludes that “where cross-village social relations are denser, local governments perform better and distribute broadly. Where cross-village social relations

---

<sup>149</sup> Rungis is a nearby city known for being the largest wholesale food market serving the Paris metropolitan area and beyond. It is said to be the largest food market in the world.

<sup>150</sup> 18/12/17

<sup>151</sup> *Lu ma xass ba rëdd, gone du ko dindi*

are weaker, elites see local institutions as a zero-sum game among villages” (Wilfhart 2018: 149).

### **6.1.3. “There is not much to be earned from being *chef de village* <sup>152</sup>”**

The local management of land deals owes much to village chiefs. In fact, most chiefs, though locally elected by the *Préfet* (after proposal by the *Sous-préfet* and approval by the Interior Minister), have inherited their role (and power) from their male family descendants. Almost half of the village chiefs interviewed have also occupied/continue to be members of the rural council or act as municipal councillors. A common expression used to describe the position of village chiefs is that of “*a mother of twins*”, doomed to exhibit equal fairness towards the populations and their hierarchy (Interviews CL29<sup>153</sup> CLP<sup>154</sup>). For most chiefs, theirs is a difficult job for which they receive little gratitude: “*People come night and day to your house to ask you to solve their problems and you hardly find time for your own activities*” (Interview CLP7<sup>155</sup>). While the former President Wade granted them, a salary increase and a car<sup>156</sup>, President Sall withdrew all such privileges. This is considered by most village chiefs as representing a lack of political support for their role (Interviews CL54<sup>157</sup> CL40<sup>158</sup>). This shows the centrality of kinship and neighbourliness in African modes of social production and how they create links to land, consequently maintaining social cohesion (A. B. Diop 1981, 1985, and M. C. Diop 2013a, 2013b; Diagne 1967; Mafeje 2013: 19; Sow, 1992: 28). It also verifies the proposition that, in the Delta of the River, being part of a social group is seen as desirable because it ensures respect for family and kinship laws and contributes to shaping one’s identity in relationship to the broader group (Dahou 2005: 24). Profit maximisation is therefore often sacrificed for the social cohesion of the group (ibid).

Besides their official political responsibilities, all of the local leaders interviewed had a “side job” as farmer or herder. Regarding their professional activities, most smallholder

---

<sup>153</sup> 06/11/17

<sup>154</sup> 25/10/17

<sup>155</sup> 01/05/17

<sup>156</sup> It was decided before the 2012 presidential elections.

<sup>157</sup> 13/12/17

<sup>158</sup> 14/11/2017

agricultural entrepreneurs told a narrative of scarcity, hardship and “*bricolage*”: “agriculture is a struggling business” (Interview SF1<sup>159</sup><sup>160</sup>). As a result, they all exhibited the same discourse as the providential investor (Interviews CL46<sup>161</sup>CLP<sup>162</sup>CL47<sup>163</sup>). As for herders, they were of the opinion that the State is more committed to supporting agriculture than cattle-breeding (interview CL11<sup>164</sup>). This was certainly the case if successful investments might grant the State leverage, additional rents, and even potentially increase their popularity and legitimacy. The lack of sufficient public sector compensation incentivises opportunistic behaviour vis-à-vis (especially foreign) investors, sometimes leading to attracting the wrong type of investor, i.e. speculators, or “cowboy capitalists” who may easily deceive scarcely educated local leaders with empty promises. This was denounced by one investor who expressed his/her frustration with “corrupt” local and traditional authorities who are “talking the talk but not walking the walk (Interview Senior Manager<sup>165</sup>).” This explains their decision to put any oral agreement in writing, and supports the findings of studies on corruption, land-based or otherwise (Bierschenk and de Sardan 2014; Blundo 2006 in Senegal, De Sardan 1999; Chiweshe in Zimbabwe 2017: 112-123).

Faced with multiple challenges, village chiefs engage in various strategies simultaneously in order to make ends meet. Shaping land deals is one opportunity for them to assert their authority and sovereignty, control their territory, and influence subjects and subjectivities. This was illustrated by the ambiguous behaviour of one respondent who publicly supported land deals while revealing to me in private that he is against them and recognises the shortfalls of the project! “My no echoes the no of my subjects. Because most of my population said no, I have to follow their desiderata” (Interview CL54<sup>166</sup>). Once again, the interest of the social group was priorities. However, it is unclear as to whether this can be interpreted as part of the hidden, opaque and cryptic repertoires of everyday resistance, which this leader needed to hide from investors (Scott 1985), or just an illustration of his combination of official and unofficial discourse to serve his own

---

<sup>159</sup> 14/05/2017

<sup>160</sup> 20/10/2017

<sup>161</sup> 17/11/17

<sup>162</sup> 25/10/17

<sup>163</sup> 19/11/17

<sup>164</sup> 24/10/2017

<sup>165</sup> I am not indicating date and location for anonymity

<sup>166</sup> 13/12/2017

interest. Straddling livelihood activities may sometimes cause a conflict of interest. This, for instance, was the case in The Third Company where a parliamentary leader (therefore a public official) was also the administrator of the company, and managed a private company hiring workers for The Third Company.

The evidence presented above illustrates the “*pouvoirisme*<sup>167</sup>” of some elected local authorities, a lack of synergy between the local population and ruling classes, a lack of domestic resource mobilisation strategy, the prevalence of personal gain by officials when business opportunities arose, and the replacement of local modes of governance by politicians (Alissoutin 2008; Blundo 1998, 2001). This section thus has underscored the different layers of power that are influencing and are influence by land deals in order to shaping new social contracts (Nugent 2010). Equally important are the promises made by investors, and the many dimensions in which capital manifests itself to mobilise and control labour.

## **6.2. Varieties of capitalists and unicity of labour exploitation goals**

Agrarian change is not only about the fate of peasants and the emergence of differentiated classes of labour, it is also about capital and capitalists. Until recently the land rush debate, often framed within the accumulation by dispossession debate, has focused primarily on the dispossession aspect and less on the reasons why land is being accumulated by capital, and how land becomes capital. This section analyses three central dimensions of capital: labour regimes, companies’ management ethos, and accumulation of capital<sup>168</sup> (Lee 2014:35), and how they are combined mainly for one goal: to control and discipline labour.

### **6.2.1. Between casualisation and deferred dreams of permanent jobs?**

The arrival of horticultural investors with substantial injections of capital and infrastructure development, for all-year production, generates significant expectations in

---

<sup>167</sup> Attraction to exercise power

<sup>168</sup> As suggested by Ching Kwan Lee in her *Spectre of Global China*, drawing from Marx, Weber, and Polanyi

relation to job creation given the relative scarcity of decent jobs in agriculture. This was illustrated by many respondents demanding “priority recruitment from the farm” (interview CL3)<sup>169</sup>, or “good salaries” (FGD 3)<sup>170171</sup>. Indeed, the nature of agricultural employment, whether as self- or wage employment, is generally highly seasonal and casual, due to the natural cycles of agricultural production and the vagaries of weather, which affect these cycles and production patterns. In contexts of low rainfall and short rainy seasons like Northern Senegal, seasonal patterns are exacerbated<sup>172</sup> and the gaps between agricultural operations<sup>173</sup> create important phases of labour slack alongside phases of high labour demand that may result in labour shortages for some producers. Therefore, employment patterns in capitalist plantations also follow seasonal patterns, and requirements for casual labour fluctuate. As a result, only a small number of permanent jobs are created<sup>174</sup>.

When such investments arrive, the dominant narrative is that stable employment will be generated, and firms, in their search for land do not always make realistic promises. Hiring casual wage labour provides employers with flexibility, and allows them to respond to labour peaks and reduce costs during periods of labour slack, thereby transferring the risks of operational fluctuations to workers. It also allows employers to hire labour at lower costs and at shorter notice. All three companies took pride in job creation without acknowledging its casual nature. THE SECOND COMPANY announced that they were no longer planning to close during the summer so that they could keep employing their workers without interruption (SMGD2)<sup>175</sup>. This was uncertain as production was exclusively off-season export oriented, and the farm did not produce crops that are consumed locally. It is no surprise then that most workers had second and even third jobs.

Nonetheless, this may be altered by irrigation and multiple-cropping. High-tech capitalist enterprises with irrigation may operate for much longer periods than rainfed small-scale

---

<sup>169</sup> 23/10/17

<sup>170</sup> 25/10/2017

<sup>171</sup> During FGD3, several young men testified to being asked by the company to tell their fellow villagers that their salaries and working conditions were good.

<sup>172</sup> Especially if reliable irrigation is not available.

<sup>173</sup> Land preparation, sowing, fertilizer application, weeding, harvesting, etc.

<sup>174</sup> Of course, more technologically dynamic farms operating through an all-year round cycle are more likely to generate more permanent jobs.

<sup>175</sup> 27/10/2017

farms without access to irrigation and other technology. Studies in Africa and Latin America have shown that irrigated horticultural production with good infrastructure and high technology is associated with labour requirements in number of persons per day per hectare that are high, indeed much higher than the non-irrigated production of staples in the same agro-ecological settings (Cramer et al. 2014; Damiani 2003; Oya and Pontara 2015; Selwyn 2012).

These studies emphasise the substantial employment-generation potential of such ventures. Many studies in the “land rush” literature continue to focus on the lower than expected creation of permanent and highly skilled jobs. This is not always possible for farms producing agricultural commodities according to seasonal cultivation cycles (Cotula 2012; Hall et al. 2013). To gauge the real potential of these ventures in terms of job creation, it will be necessary to: a) show the effective number of remunerated days of work per year that employees get, compared with the status quo of equally seasonal and insecure small-scale farming and; b) the total annual income earned after a year of work as a daily worker in a labour intensive horticultural plantation, compared to total net income (after operational costs) obtained by someone with a small piece of land. But this is not the focus of this research.

## **6.2.2. Understanding labour regimes in the three companies**

### **Management ethos**

To mobilise labour for their estates, companies need a clear strategy to meet specific goals based on firm’s core values. All three firms applied a private management ethos based on principles of professionalism, efficiency, trust and responsibility. The Third Company’s ethos is summarised on their website as follows: “We are (a) Certified Valued Group: In our vision being best is (what) really matters (*sic*). We take care in providing a quality product, meeting the requirements of the specifications and by delivering sustainable projects.”<sup>176</sup>

---

<sup>176</sup> Yet, a senior manager at a The Third Company manager responded to my request for workers lists by writing: “our structure is very small may be The Second Company are much more professional, so please don’t insist on having the same” by email on 16/10/2017.

Echoing this, THE FIRST COMPANY states that its principles are based on “the respect of the environment, respect of workers (non-discrimination), populations, and the fight against corruption” *sic*. A presentation received from a UK-based Senior Manager contained the following lines about the company ethos: “How we work?<sup>177</sup>: With drive and entrepreneurial spirit; respecting each other, our environment and the wider community; Being innovative and seeking continuous improvement; focusing on results and striving for excellence; Acting with integrity in all we do”.

As for THE SECOND COMPANY’s, the main pillars of its managerial ethos are: Environment, Community, Product and People: similar to the UK counterpart’s.

---

<sup>177</sup> Email from Senior Agronomy Manager, 29/05/2018.

**Figure 4: THE SECOND COMPANY main values**



Source: website

THE SECOND COMPANY's objective to "supply fresh produce that delights our customers every day" as evidenced by the many posters in their premises. This is articulated on the principles of trust, efficiency, quality, expertise and can-do.

**Photo 9: THE SECOND COMPANY's ethics in the workplace. Senegal . May 2017. (Photograph by researcher)**

However, juxtaposed to these laudable principles is their very patronising list of cultural challenges that international employees would face in Senegal (THE SECOND COMPANY Health and Safety Assessment). In order to handle these issues and "create an African business with UK H&S standards", they recommended "training, Audit by UK managers" and last but not least: "not to go native!" *sic* (Ibid) During an interview with a manager, he suggested that THE SECOND COMPANY generates "profit to give more value to our people", suggesting that CSR allows them to reinvest in the community (Interview SMP2)<sup>178</sup>.

---

<sup>178</sup> 26/10/2017



**Photo 10: Capture of one of the slides of a THE SECOND COMPANY Health and Safety assessment found on the internet (accessed June 2017)**

Beyond the workplace, companies' ethos was also reflected in their being part of professional organisations. All companies interviewed were keen to highlight the fact that they were "creating shared value" (ibid), even suggesting that this was the main reason for them establishing and running a professional umbrella organisation gathering the main Agro-businesses of the region. This can be interpreted as a response to attacks by the Coopérative Fédérative des Acteurs de l'Horticulture du Sénégal, which lobbied for *a major player based in Saint-Louis* who were at the time responsible for 25% of total exports to start paying taxes (del Pozo-Vergnes and Vorley, 2015). THE SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST COMPANY suggested the objective of the umbrella organisation is to strategize about agribusiness in the Valley, discussing issues such as access to water, land, plant protection products, labour law and the wider business environment. They stressed their collaboration is fruitful because of these values, and admission is only granted to like-minded ethical businesses. Another infamous agribusiness company was denied membership because "membership is only for model companies with civic behaviour, and who pay taxes, respect the legislation of the country, and have sizeable activities in agroindustry" (GDMM<sup>179</sup>). Indeed, this preoccupation with pursuing "creating shared value" echoes a famous eponym presentation by Porter (2011: 20), in which he suggests this represents "the next evolution of capitalism" because addressing societal issues give purpose to firms.

Management ethos' and LLCRs are generally reflected in the firms' organisational form: controlling labour for estates requires arrangements based on a clear chain of command, discipline in the workplace, a strategy to meet specific goals. Organograms, where they exist, can provide valuable information about the companies' production goals and how that is translated in the way labour is mobilised, controlled and disciplined. All three firms are multi-sited with a chief of farm and their teams managed by the central administration of the company, which helps the geographical disciplining of labour (Baglioni 2018). In addition, internal hierarchy is pyramidal at THE SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST COMPANY as reflected in the figures below.

---

<sup>179</sup> 09/06/2016

**Figure 5: THE SECOND COMPANYS' Organogram in French (provided by the company)**

**Figure 6: Organogram of THE FIRST COMPANY**

Assembled by researcher

In addition, local teams are generally managed by senior international staff, or local staff that are not native of the areas where the firms are implanted. This led to frequent complaints about “migrant workers”. According to the workers lists provided by the company, THE SECOND COMPANY, in the summer of 2017, had eight international workers among whom six held leadership positions. At THE FIRST COMPANY, there were 20 International staff. These staff were all permanent, and occupied the key leadership positions: Head of Admin and Finance, Head of Operations, Head of Growing, and Heads of Technique and Machinery, but two. Four of the nine non-Senegalese staff also held senior positions. Moreover, according to a Senior Manager of The Third Company, the company had a team of 60 permanent workers, including 25 International technicians described by the manager as “costly accountants” (Interview SMP10)<sup>180</sup>. The remaining permanent workers were Senegalese. The team also comprised 80-85 seasonal workers and 800–1000 day-workers, employed for four months each year.

**Figure 7: Understanding the pyramidal nature of labour control at THE FIRST COMPANY and THE SECOND COMPANY**

Source: Assembled by Researcher from THE FIRST COMPANY & THE SECOND COMPANY Workers registers and interview with The Third Company Management<sup>181</sup>

**Paternalism in labour management systems**

Labour management systems were found to be organised around paternalism. Paternalism can be described as the managerial practices used by companies to discipline their labour force (Sage 2004) considered to be only rightfully exercised when preventing harm to others (Mill 1859: 93-94). A more exhaustive working definition is that of Gibbon et al. (2014: 172), which emphasises the following characteristics: i) a common discourse for justifying government on behalf of the governed for their own moral improvement, their edification; ii) practices of care or welfare (for the governed) with the provision of accommodation or land, wage and non-wage benefits such as health benefits and pension, against provision of labour, etc. iii) practices of coercion. Here it should be noted that care and coercion do not always take place.

---

<sup>180</sup> 04/07/2018

<sup>181</sup> 04/07/2017

I found that all three companies presented various traits of paternalism, with THE SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST COMPANY being more paternalistic perhaps because their managers had previously worked as farm senior managers in France, Francophone Africa and Southern Africa. In the literature, paternalism was common in firms in France and South Africa (Boltanski and Thevenot 1991; Du Toit 1992, 1993). The spouse of one of the two farm directors acted like a mother to her staff despite her young age. She also used a narrative of “enlightenment”, talking about the “Christian mission to educate and assist those in need” (Interview). In addition, THE SECOND COMPANY senior officials believed they had to help their staff “lead their finances”, “manage their diet”, “not follow the consumerism that TV promotes”, “encourage them to invest in the education of their children rather than purchasing goods”, and “reduce their addiction to medicines” (SMGD2<sup>182</sup>). The management system was mostly domestic according to the typology by Gibbon and Riisgaard (2014: 101-102) and sometimes industrial. What does this mean?

---

<sup>182</sup> 27/10/2017.

Hiring at THE SECOND COMPANY and The Third Company was mostly based on personal ties for low-paid jobs (domestic type of management) and largely impersonal, based on merit and qualifications (industrial type) when it came to more skilled and permanent jobs. For other recruitments, the selected candidates were either outsiders or suitably trained and qualified villagers. In the case of The Third Company, the labour management system was mostly domestic as the company itself was born out of a partnership between two relatives. As for promotion, skills development and apprenticeship, it was also mostly domestic at The Third Company and THE SECOND COMPANY, and industrial at THE FIRST COMPANY: the first two companies based this on a seniority, trust-based promotion and family approach rather than on formal written rules, as in THE FIRST COMPANY.

The reference to “traditional values” by Gibbon et al. (2014) is particularly relevant as most small to medium size agricultural businesses in rural Senegal are run like families. A respondent reported having heard the South African director of the farm saying to them “my son will one day lead you in this farm, just as I did” (Interview). This confirms the domestic nature of labour relations and the idea that “sons work with their fathers”, a form of familial relationship more common at The Third Company and THE SECOND COMPANY (ibid).

The paternalism of these companies (THE SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST COMPANY) was also illustrated by their provision of accommodation and subsidising a cook for their permanent workers, as well as providing all workers with breakfast (see below). This is not surprising as on large estates, “control of work itself and control of workers’ private lives, including that of their families” are the two features of labour control (Barral 2014: 240). Since their implantation, plantation companies have always provided accommodation for their workers, and have subsequently played a central role in the supervision of the domestic sphere.

Regarding the overall management of staff, companies have made care and negotiation, coercion, and rewards part and parcel of their relationships. A relationship that is dynamic as workers seek to augment their bargaining power and resist employer’s strategies to maximise profit whilst controlling capital and labour.

## **6.3. Private paternalism and working conditions: Between care and coercion**

This section offers empirical evidence of the diverse nature of encounters between private paternalism and rural wage employment in horticulture. It discusses the challenges of sourcing labour and disciplining the world of work in relation to emerging agrarian change trends. It also discusses labour regimes in export horticulture and agro-processing farms operate and details the working conditions in the three selected case-studies.

### **6.3.1. Diversity and variation of wages at THE FIRST COMPANY, THE SECOND COMPANY and The Third Company**

This section focuses on the existence of various payment systems, evidence of the various strategies used by companies to control their cash-flow, and discipline labour.

In Senegal, the minimum wage in the agricultural sector (SMAG) was FCFA 32040 (CFA 182,96 per hour)<sup>183</sup>. The SMAG is lower than the minimum salary in other sectors, which was 36243 CFA F (£47.55) monthly prior to the 2018 raise <sup>184</sup>. According to the last national survey on employment, published in December 2017, the average monthly salary of an urban worker is 187 975 FCFA against 179 134 FCFA for a rural worker (ANSD 2017). The ANSD survey underscored a gender wage gap: the average salary for a male worker was 192 477 FCFA compared with 171 759 FCFA for a female worker. The monthly salary of day workers in all three farms ranged from 50000 to 75000 in the fields (for non-supervisors). Therefore, in all three farms wages were substantially superior to the minimum wage.

Calculating wage estimates for day workers was a “methodological nightmare” largely because of the variety and complexity of payment systems in agriculture (Cramer et al. 2014). Therefore, I have decided to present both data collected from semi-structured

---

<sup>183</sup> The Senegalese Direction for labour raised it to (F CFA37436 = 213,92 per hour in June 2018.

<sup>184</sup> Before that, the latest salary revision dates from the Decree of 19 February 1996 from the Diouf-Thiam government.

interviews and ranges of salaries obtained from survey, but not aggregate estimates which risk mixing apples and bananas for the reasons explained below. Both the day wage and the monthly salary were asked in the survey. Many respondents preferred to respond to one or the other, while only a few answered both. Salaries were affected by the previous period in the farming season (harvest, planting, weeding, etc.). According to the worker survey and interviews, different modes of payment for day workers could be found within one company:

- Some were being paid according to piece-rates<sup>185</sup>, which links payment to the productivity of the worker. Instances of this occurred at THE SECOND COMPANY, but not at THE FIRST COMPANY. At the end of each day, workers (usually woman) were paid according to the number of cases of fruits and vegetables produced. Each full case was paid 300 FCFA, so a day's wage depended on the number of cases produced. In this system, a very fast and productive worker could easily earn twice as much as a less productive worker.
- Some workers were paid a "fixed" daily wage, although this was also performance based to a lesser extent; wages could vary according to whether minimum tasks were performed or not. For employers in the agriculture, daily wages made sense, especially in operations where quality matters and special care is necessary, rather than speed. Daily wages were comprised of between 2000 and 3000 FCFA, depending on the operation.
- Variations in wages were also noticed in jobs related to the hiring and managing of teams. For example, there were variations in the salary of a female team recruiter who also worked as a supervisor. Her wage changed according to her daily work plan; on how many female workers she brought into work on a given day. For recruiting a team of 55 day-workers, she would earn 2000 FCFA. This was reduced to 1000 FCFA for a team of 35 and nothing for less than 30. On these days, she worked and was paid as a day-worker. This has implications on sampling because teams were supposed to comprise women from the same village. Moreover, because I recognised names from other villages, she admitted that she preferred recruiting women from another village than not making her day wage. Other workers such as male carriers earned the same amount per day.

---

<sup>185</sup> *A la tâche.*



- Finally, daily wages significantly varied according to the type of operation or task and the skills and seniority of the worker. For example, I noticed that workers in packing houses, where skills were in demand, earned on average more than workers in the fields. Skilled workers, mostly recruited from urban areas, also earned more than workers in the fields and in the packing houses, but less than the central administration.
- There were also variations across companies, since they had different internal payment systems. When analysing salaries, it is almost important to consider how and when a salary is paid, e.g. fortnightly or monthly. Day-workers were paid every two weeks. Because many employees worked a different number of hours each month, what they reported as earning after just one month was not necessarily reliable – or at least not reflective of what they earn every month of the year. For instance, at THE SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST COMPANY there were various work shifts for teams in different departments according to the crop, but generally they all worked 8 hours per day. Despite this, a few workers reported unpaid additional hours or cuts in their monthly salary, which was a largely reported cause of tension between workers and management. Those who worked full-time on farms worked six days a week, Monday to Saturday, which is the norm in the agricultural sector.

Many wage workers who lived in areas where there were opportunities to work on neighbours' or family farms often said during interview they would rather work on these than the commercial farms. They found such opportunities more flexible, with the possibility to take home some of the produce for family consumption, or for sale in local markets, with a higher or equal salary for a shorter workday. This can be explained by the relatively short need by local petty commodity producers who, needing surplus labour to complement unpaid and/or paid family labour and migrant labour, do not hesitate to offer premium wages to mobilise labour force. A problem is that this type of employment is not offered all year-round and results in surplus labour. To be able to compare the data, one would have to ask how much workers would earn by working for these local farmers in any given year compared to how much they can earn in the plantation. This illustrates the very segmented nature of rural labour markets, the diversity of wages and the various strategies used to mobilise and control labour.

The workers survey involved 170 respondents (82 from THE FIRST COMPANY, 68 from THE SECOND COMPANY and 20 from The Third Company). Because the sample size for The Third Company was too small, I will leave it out of this analysis (in chapter 7 too). However, semi-structured interviews show that The Third Company day workers were paid more than THE FIRST COMPANY and THE SECOND COMPANY's. This can be justified by the fact that as relatively late comers in the horticulture and agro-processing need to offer wages above average, especially those of direct competitors, offer transportation, and other advantages if they want to recruit day workers due to local labour market tightening. In addition, The Third Company's farming season was shorter (4 months) and potato was less labour-intensive than other FFVs such as beans. The survey shows that male day-workers at THE FIRST COMPANY received the highest wages, earning between 2000 and 2500 (95% confidence interval). Male day workers at THE SECOND COMPANY earned on average 2233 FCFA. At THE SECOND COMPANY, there were complaints of frequent mistakes with wages or salary cuts.

Female day-workers earned on average between 2000 and 2500 at THE FIRST COMPANY whereas at THE SECOND COMPANY, depending on whether they worked "à la tâche", according to productivity or with a fix day rate, they earned between 1800 and 2500 FCFA daily (95% confidence interval for the mean). The gender wage gap varied a lot and was lower in THE SECOND COMPANY than in the other farms and was also lower for workers in the packing houses at THE SECOND COMPANY and The Third Company, corroborating previous research findings in Senegal (Baglioni 2018; Mackintosh 1989), Latin America (Deere, 2005:35) and Dolan's in Kenya (2004:118).

### **6.3.2. Non-salary benefits**

Non-salary benefits consisted mainly of accommodation or housing allowances for permanent workers, transportation and provision of meals, health, hygiene and safety, and workers' freedom to organise themselves to defend their rights.

#### **Accommodation and food**

During fieldwork, THE SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST COMPANY both provided accommodation or a housing allowance to some of their (mainly) permanent

workers and those in central administration. Other permanent workers were provided with a contribution to housing fees. Regarding meals, there was a system at THE SECOND COMPANY that allowed workers to pay for a partly subsidised cook, with breakfast also being subsidised for all workers. Breakfast consisted mainly of local porridge without sugar, and employees could opt to add milk or sugar for a small fee. The breakfast cooks were also recruited by the company. Food sellers trained by THE SECOND COMPANY were admitted inside its premises, while untrained ones remained outside the main gates. Most day-workers at both companies, and even some contractual workers, ate their lunch at home as they were not used to eating out - or more specifically, paying for it (semi-structured interviews). At THE FIRST COMPANY, breakfast was provided to all staff and consisted mainly of loaves of bread. The company also employed cooks to work in their canteen, selling meals for a fee. None of the day-workers interviewed bought meals at work due to them being unaffordable (Interviews DW26<sup>186</sup>DW5<sup>187</sup>). A female supervisor whose family lived closed to THE FIRST COMPANY reported having her meals delivered to her at the farm (Interview SW11)<sup>188</sup>. All of the THE SECOND COMPANY middle managers interviewed had their meals at the *popotte* (internal canteen)<sup>189</sup>.

Regarding transportation, all companies provided it to workers whose villages were far away from the farm, even though interviews showed they did not agree with workers on what “far” meant. THE FIRST COMPANY and THE SECOND COMPANY provide minibuses to the farms (see picture of buses in section of local capitalists).

**Photo 11: THE SECOND COMPANY field workers going home after a day of work. October 2017. (Photograph by Researcher)**

**Photo 12: The Third Company Tractors, also used for transporting staff. November 2017. (Photograph by Researcher)**

---

<sup>186</sup> 24/10/2017

<sup>187</sup> 10/05/2017

<sup>188</sup> 19/06/2017

<sup>189</sup> Except for one international worker, whose migrant wife also worked at the farm and cooked the meals for them both (interview 22/05/2017).

THE SECOND COMPANY transported workers in a tractor (see picture), The Third Company transport workers with the tractors from their villages to the farms, and to the fields.

With regards to health services, THE FIRST COMPANY and THE SECOND COMPANY had their own internal infirmary on the farm. The medicines were subsidised and the cost was deduced from the salary. THE FIRST COMPANY had an occupational therapist managing the internal infirmary, with nurses based on all three sites. During an interview, the occupational therapist said that when undertaking field visits, training and prevention was key because she realised this proactive approach was more efficient than the clinical approach: curing people (Interview HW2<sup>190</sup>). This allowed her to know the staff better and sensitise them regarding their diet and offer advice on handling the use of pesticides. A contract was signed between THE FIRST COMPANY and a national emergency services provider (HW3)<sup>191</sup>.

**Photo 13: THE FIRST COMPANY Infirmary. June 2017. (Photograph by Researcher)**

Workers were generally satisfied with the nurses, but some complained that they were made to do tests and not given their results. THE SECOND COMPANY had a state nurse who estimated the number of daily patients to be 25-30. The infirmary was also open to the immediate families of the workers. At THE SECOND COMPANY, the doctor bemoaned the lack of an ambulance for emergencies and called for the improvement of the technical platform and equipment for staff including gloves, masks, hermetically sealed cars (Interview HW1)<sup>192</sup>. Pregnant women were made to stop work or take a 7-month break. Children were not allowed inside the fields. The SECOND COMPANY doctor worked closely with the site's infirmary nurse, also paid by THE SECOND COMPANY (Ibid.). A dispensary was built and equipped by THE SECOND COMPANY and offered to the State. Training and handling of Hygiene, Security and Environment (HSE) responsibilities were shared between the director, HR, the doctor and the health and safety manager.

---

<sup>190</sup> 17/06/17

<sup>191</sup> 18/11/17.

<sup>192</sup> 13/05/17

## **Manufacturing consensus: Freedom of association and workers' representation**

Senegalese labour law mandates any company with between 501 and 1000 workers to have elected nine permanent workers to represent them in their union<sup>193</sup>. Some international certifications held by companies such as SMETA, also require measures to ensure freedom of association, sound health, safety conditions, no child labour, that the national minimum salary is met, and a working week of no more than 48 hours. In practice, not all these regulations are respected.

Freedom of association and workers' representation are key to understanding the internal labour control regimes. Baglioni (2018: 130), who has made important contributions to this question, suggests the 1970s Senegalese labour control regime was dominated by collective labour actions, strikes and walkouts, whereas the 2000s labour agency is marked by the absence of labour unionism.

Baglioni's claim is maybe specific to the Niayes. I found that despite a climate of weak trade unions, THE FIRST COMPANY, THE SECOND COMPANY and The Third Company present exceptions. In fact, all three companies did have workers' representation and organised industrial actions and/or strikes. This is worth noting as a "positive deviance" from the rest of the FFV exporters in the Niayes. THE FIRST COMPANY and THE SECOND COMPANY are different to other companies in being members of a professional association VALLAGRI, and in holding the most difficult to obtain certifications that allow them to export to the UK under specific regulations. The Third Company also stood out for being the leading company in potato production domestically. These three companies, then, represent more dynamic and market-exposed capitalist private investment in agriculture and are, therefore, expected to offer superior working conditions.

---

<sup>193</sup> Candidates must be Senegalese nationals, at least 21, fluent in French and must have worked in the company without interruption for at least 12 months with the exception of relatives and allies to the same degree of the entrepreneur

The three companies had different approaches to, and experiences of, workers' representation and freedom of association. THE SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST COMPANY both had workers committees. The Third Company had self-appointed representatives being assisted by the workers' union as of November 2017. THE SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST COMPANY had seemingly encouraged the formation of workers' committees rather than official union representatives, due to managers preferring to "solve problems internally".

At THE FIRST COMPANY, the delegates were free to meet and had a dedicated, office however, its site under CF however had workers committees rather than unions because for the manager: "it is best we solve our problems internally, if you include unions in your business, you lose internal cohesion" (Interview SMP 7<sup>194</sup>). This suggests employers were circumventing some of the regulations and standards they are bound to by the standards they hold.

THE SECOND COMPANY and The Third Company had a different approach to THE FIRST COMPANY. At THE SECOND COMPANY, I experienced this when trying to access the farm during a staff strike<sup>195</sup>, following the end of agricultural season celebration held on labour day. My main contact tried to restrict my access to the farm, but this was in vain. The *Sous-Préfet*, THE SECOND COMPANY senior management, staff reps and village chiefs were meeting in the office. I eventually conducted interviews and a focus group with the agricultural workers who had gathered outside the farm, whilst the office staff went in the fields and packhouse to replace them. Many workers, especially the staff representatives, thought THE SECOND COMPANY was trying to interfere with the elections of worker's committees by dismissing the list they submitted. Female candidates were replaced with the suggestion they could neither read or speak French. A manager stated the reasons for their rejection of the list is that these were outgoing candidates whose term limit had arrived and that the elections were overdue (Interview SMP1)<sup>196</sup>. Due to issues with the candidates (age, French proficiency, lack of union affiliation), they received an order for the labour inspectorate to stop the elections. Hence the multi- stakeholder dialogue organised at THE SECOND COMPANY during

---

<sup>194</sup> 18/11/2017

<sup>195</sup> Very similar to the one described by Mackintosh at Bud (1989)

<sup>196</sup> 19/05/17.

elections to find an amicable solution to the problem<sup>197</sup>(FGD1)<sup>198</sup> . Workers suggested the main problem with the candidates was their personal affiliations to some key social influencers, the wife of a religious leader who is very critical of THE SECOND COMPANY, the wife of the mayor who gave THE SECOND COMPANY the land and the son and nephew of two of the village chiefs. As for the alleged French-language proficiency, most of the day workers or seasonal staff had low levels of education. THE SECOND COMPANY wanted “rules” to be followed which would mean candidates from the supposedly “less educated” day workers would be excluded, and candidates would come from the central administration. There were other constraints on day workers, as representation often requires a minimum period of employment in the company or minimum contract terms.

Of the three cases, the third company’s working conditions were closer to the “national norm”, therefore comparatively worse than the other two, with wage arrears and limited benefits. What was certainly outside the norm was that workers had the chance to attend union meetings and voice their concerns. I could attend one such meeting on a Sunday as workers decided to organise themselves because The Third Company did not respect Senegalese Labour law. According to the workers representatives<sup>199</sup>, the areas of concern were hygiene and security, medical cover, salary and gender equality (Union Meeting<sup>200</sup>). At the meeting attended by over 100 staff, 95% of which were male, the Union leader asked workers to be patient because they were engaging in a long-term struggle. Workers confessed they had not seen their contract since they signed them with the subcontractor because the employer held them, and they were not given a copy. Additional issues were noted regarding the delay in receiving the payment at the end of the month (ibid.). A complaint was filed with the labour inspection for the regularisation and the signature of new contracts, and the introduction of play slips. As for working hours, the union advised, they should not exceed 48 hours a week and overtime should be paid at 250 cfa per hour (ibid.). In addition, the prefect demanded from the chief of staff the re-employment of arbitrarily dismissed staff, following a complaint to the gendarmerie.

---

<sup>197</sup> She confirmed that in attendance were the *Sous-Préfet*, members of the executive direction, village chiefs, the main staff representatives, and religious leaders as well as the gendarmerie

<sup>198</sup> 19/05/17.

<sup>199</sup> elected by the staff and yet to be recognised as such through the affiliation to a union

<sup>200</sup> 19/11/17



**Photo 14: The Third Company workers union meeting November 2017.  
(Photograph by researcher)**

Another pressing issue was gender parity amongst staff representatives, and the Union advised that a commission be set up. The most urgent measure for union staff was the introduction of internal rules and the training and sensitisation of staff. Recommendations were formulated to workers to avoid coming to blows with the Indian supervisors and the *Sous-Préfet* thanked for mediating between the two parties rather than referring the matter to the labour inspectorate (ibid).

This reflects the diversity of practices and experiences in freedom of association, depending on the type of certification, “visibility” of the company and subsequent differential treatment by labour authorities. The Third Company were operating more to the standards of a local company compared to THE FIRST COMPANY and THE SECOND COMPANY whose certifications obliged them to provide better standards.



## **Training, hygiene and safety**

Training, hygiene, and safety were key issues for THE FIRST COMPANY and THE SECOND COMPANY, as both were exporting FFVs and were consequently required to meet high standards. Both THE SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST COMPANY had relevant basic health and safety infrastructure and trained their staff to use them during their induction<sup>201</sup>. Managers and workers interviewed at THE SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST COMPANY said all staff received a safety and hygiene induction, as well as leadership training at the beginning of each farming season. At The Third Company, training was limited to the seasonal and permanent staff. At THE SECOND COMPANY, canteen staff and women food sellers based inside the farm received hygiene and first-aid training. Those in charge of using pesticides (driving engines, etc.) were also trained accordingly before starting the job. Whereas the companies claimed to have provided personal protective equipment to *all* their staff<sup>202</sup>, most day-workers claimed, during interview, that this was mostly the case for permanent and seasonal workers in the cold room/packhouse, but not for the other workers in the fields who had to equip themselves with gloves, shoes and/or hats to protect themselves from the burning heat.

Skills development training was generally offered to workers according to the needs assessment and the position of requesting staff. Each year, the top management of THE SECOND COMPANY sent two to three workers to the UK for training, either at the mother-company or for further skills enhancement (quality training, agricultural business management) through a UK Fund. Most of the managers working in Growing, Irrigation and Packhouse claimed to have travelled to the UK at least once to develop their skills (interviews). At THE FIRST COMPANY, most of the managers in the central administration (HR and Payroll) and IT, HSE, Production and Irrigation had been granted the opportunity to further their skills, either in Senegal or another country.

At THE FIRST COMPANY, there was an HSE-RSE Manager (Hygiene, Security and Environment, Social corporate Responsibility Manager) in charge of hygiene, training and health and safety, to meet the requirements of certifications<sup>203</sup> in the global

---

<sup>201</sup> For instance, there were taps and detergent at the entry of each farm, and staff were not allowed to go in the packhouse or cold storage room with jewellery on or their heads uncovered.

<sup>202</sup> Safety shoes, jouscas boots; phyto uniforms, gloves, phytosanitary masks, etc.

<sup>203</sup> GlobalGAP, Tesco NATURE, LeaF, the SMETA Pillar 4

horticultural trade for produce exported to Europe. Beyond private voluntary codes, the standards that mattered most were those of Senegal law<sup>204</sup>. THE FIRST COMPANY had a Hygiene, Safety, and Training Committee for discussing labour conditions and company priorities.

At The Third Company, hygiene and security conditions were almost non-existent. I, for instance, was able to join the village team as a day-worker despite not living in the village and no ID check was done prior to my entering the farm (Immersion as a Potato Day Worker<sup>205</sup>). This lack of rigorous checks, which some respondents confirmed were more common in other Senegalese farms, was likely the result of the farm illegally employing underaged workers. Hygiene was also a point of concern, with workers demanding more non-gender-neutral toilets be built. The potato lines had over 300 workers daily and there were only two toilets at the entrance of the farm. An important security concern was the transportation of the workers from their village to the field: THE SECOND COMPANY workers were transported on the back of a tractor without any security measures<sup>206</sup> (Photo 9).

At the union meeting, staff representatives requested an increase in the number of staffs on the payroll, as slow processing had led to cases of physical abuse and threats to current payroll employees. Even if payers faced security issues in all three companies, THE FIRST COMPANY and THE SECOND COMPANY implemented measures to address them. The Third Company was not bound by private certifications only by the national labour law. Therefore, the situation at this farm might be more reminiscent of a typical Senegalese farm. Lack of compliance to regulations suggests either a lack of checks, or complacency by the responsible authorities.

The above illustrates impressive conditions unlike most agricultural employers in Senegal. This was partly due to THE SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST COMPANY having to comply with external standards requirements, partly because of their own commitments to “social responsibility”. By comparison, The Third Company

---

<sup>204</sup> These are mostly the environment code, and the labour code.

<sup>205</sup> 21/11/17

<sup>206</sup> This led some workers to take pictures that they showed to the prefect and the sous-prefect. And faced with this evidence, The Third Company committed to address the issue by a specific deadline, or pay fines.

did not seem to meet any standard. The differences between workers' conditions at The Third Company and the two other farms might be explained by the fact that the hiring of The Third Company workers was externalised and managed by another private entity. Nonetheless, The Third Company promised to recruit a nurse specialising in occupational health and to offer first aid provision in the fields.

These variations in the working conditions of the three farms can also be explained by different management ethos, business model and labour regime, status (FZC such as THE FIRST COMPANY and THE SECOND COMPANY or company regulated by the national labour law such as The Third Company), types of certifications held and destination of crops (EU or domestic market), and firms' strategic priorities.

## **6.4. Socialising capitalism and banking on shared development, win-world and resilient narratives**

Besides the dimensions of the labour regime discussed in previous sections, it is also key to analyse investors' discourses, and how they are made to embrace national policy priorities as well as care to fully understand the facets of private paternalism.

### **6.4.1 Private investors' discourses on capitalism: “Benevolent intent”<sup>207</sup> or socialising capitalism?**

This section ascertains that, since they contribute shaping reactions to the land rush, discourses of capitalists matters as much as the strategies discussed below.

The land grab debate has produced a significant “literature rush” acknowledged even by entrepreneurs who are very cautious regarding concepts; especially when they suggest a link to capitalism. Reflecting on the term “agribusiness”, a senior manager of THE FIRST COMPANY found it is unsuitable because of the focus on the “business” in agribusiness (Interview SMP4<sup>208</sup>). This, he suggested, implies either a speculative dimension, that investors come only for a short period and that profit is being made (ibid.). He suggested there is no distinction between small and big farms, or the nationality of capital. “Once

---

<sup>207</sup> Dolan (2005).

<sup>208</sup> 16/06/17

we make this our premise, we may call everyone an agribusiness without the pejorative side to it” (ibid.). This reflects the impact of media and advocacy representation of land deals as outcomes of speculative or short-term profit-driven capitalism. As “agribusinesses” becomes conflated with these forms of (usually foreign) “capital”, investors react by rejecting the term arguing that “me I am a Senegalese company” (ibid.). He further interrogates the focus on size: “What is an agribusiness? More than 200ha maybe, large numbers of workers? The capital? Small farmers are also agribusiness”. And the “grabbing is done by ministers and other government officials who take 2000 or more hectares without deliberation” (ibid).

THE SECOND COMPANY’s representative also took a similar stance, claiming to prefer the term “social agro-industry” to that of “agribusiness” (Interview SMP2<sup>209</sup>). Stressing the win-win nature of this kind of enterprise, he stated that it is high time:

*to inaugurate the era of the new socialising agroindustry which involves the populations in the development process. The SECOND COMPANY model is based on a win-win approach that shows that the land question can be flattened if one manages to have official and formal processes, while having a bottom-up approach, not the opposite* (Interview SMP2, 26/10/17).

It is not sufficient to add the label “social” to render agribusiness less preoccupied with capitalist accumulation. The very definition of agroindustry - the industrial production, processing, and packaging of products from agriculture - is to produce or transform products, normally for market, and meet “business productivity and efficiency” goals from a profit-making point of view. However, though sometimes instrumental, CSR gestures are valued by workers (and communities), who in turn engage positively with corporate players (Amaeshi et al. 2016a: 27)

“Win-win” and South-South discourses are very similar to what Ergström and Hajdu (2018) have called “win-world”, the production and sustenance of a resilient development narrative to refute tangible counter-evidence and/or criticism. The authors identify three mechanisms at work in this process:

---

<sup>209</sup> 27/05/17

*1) lack of certain types of knowledge among project proponents or inability to take such knowledge seriously; 2) deflection of criticisms using certain value assumptions and material practices and a wide range of deflection practices; and 3) “accepted knowledge” about current realities, largely produced by a company seeking to portray the investment in a profitable light, was circulated and consumed by the other proponents of the project (ibid).*

All three company directors interviewed were better educated than most villagers directly involved in negotiations. These managers could articulate a rhetoric that conceals the realities of market competition, profits and production processes. This was the logic of profit not of philanthropy. By rejecting the term agro-business, both business leaders displayed an awareness of current development issues and built a more favourable narrative to improve their reputation, which also becomes a form of capital. It is telling that CSR departments, and their relationships with local authorities and population outreach, were the most important departments in the company after the central management team. These were growing departments in both companies, whilst The Third Company had also recently started working on its public brand.

#### **6.4.2. When Private Paternalism espouses CSR: A new tripartite social contract?**

Building on the above, this section highlights the rise of paternalism through its confluence with Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). According to McWilliams and Siegel (2001: 117), CSR involves “actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by law”. In brief, CSR is “the private provision of a public good” (ibid: 1481).

Görg et al. (2017) find that in the context of GVCs, CSR matters more for vertically oriented firms that export their output to developed countries. Local subsidiaries are more likely to implement CSR if they are autonomous in their decision-making processes. They conclude: “this may reflect the fact that local affiliates have better knowledge about the

local conditions and may be more concerned about implementing ethical standards locally than a headquarter located abroad” (ibid: 208).

The rise of CSR in global business, particularly when investing in poorer countries, has produced diverse outcomes. The win-win discourse is a common part of the CSR narrative, increasingly deployed to mask the real face of accumulation and profit-driven production. By adopting this narrative and eponym strategies, the three companies were aware that creating jobs is not enough to justify their investments, whether vis-à-vis host governments, the local population, or, importantly, international observers, who might threaten the brand’s reputation in the context of the land rush. This explains the importance of investing in marketing actions for “greenwashing”, to paraphrase Greer and Bruno (1996). This also confirms the suggestion that, “CSR [...] is more than corporate philanthropy. It is also an essential governance mechanism of the market in advanced capitalist economies” (Amaeshi et al. 2016b: 10; Brammer et al. 2012). As a result, companies invested in more sophisticated strategies to handle the narrative of land grab and responded to local communities’ demands for a new tripartite social contract. They were becoming increasingly involved in the privatisation of the reproduction of the labour force by providing jobs, education and health services. This rise of CSR was not without creating concerns, justified by the current context where capital *disciplines and punishes*, operating as in a panopticon (Foucault 1975) when markets, the state and civil society “*and the boundaries between them are all shifting, and the ways that we envision them have shifted even more[...]In a world so marked by sharp inequalities of both income and conditions of life, how can corporate initiatives be both profitable and consistent with the interests of the poor?*” (O’Laughlin 2008: 946).

**Regarding Education:** The Third Company has renovated a government school, while THE SECOND COMPANY has contributed to strengthening the educational system locally. At the time of this research, they had built a pre-school inside THE SECOND COMPANY with children from each village (family of the local elite) and had employed two qualified teachers. As of 2017, they were “planning to build two more classes as their children progress academically” (Interview SMP<sup>210</sup>). THE FIRST COMPANY built a

---

<sup>210</sup> 26/10/17

cybercafé in 2009 to promote access to IT. In addition, in 2012, it improved the desks of the Elementary School and renovated two classrooms in the neighbouring village's Primary School. In 2014, THE FIRST COMPANY built a new classroom for a nearby village's Primary School, in addition to offering maintenance materials and T-shirts for the students.

**Regarding Public Health: In 2012,** THE FIRST COMPANY took part in the renovation of the health post near one of its sites. Moreover, there were medical centres in every THE FIRST COMPANY site for workers and their families to access. The Third Company was renovating an old health post near its host village. In March 2015, THE SECOND COMPANY built a fully-equipped health post in its host village, which it offered to the Senegalese government<sup>211</sup>. Following several months of inactivity due to the Senegalese government's failure to hire staff for the post, THE SECOND COMPANY hired a nurse to work closely with the State's medical doctor<sup>212</sup>.

Local **religious** leaders also played a role in the social validation of CSR. In April 2018 for instance, The Third Company donated 3000 potato bags to Quranic schools and poor households in a religious city of Kaolack through a religious leader.

The companies therefore sought to “demonstrate” that “they care” through social performance, confirming that land deals are also “theatres of virtue” with the ethical turn of corporate capitalisms seeking a more “humane” face (Dolan and Rajak 2016: 3). For example, all three companies were investing a lot in charity and “socially-relevant” activities<sup>213</sup>. A local village worker found such investments from the company to be normal: “We deserve it, and it is not even enough: an empty calabash does not trump the goat and we are grown-ups”<sup>214</sup> (interview DW8<sup>215</sup>). THE FIRST COMPANY's director, who was much appreciated locally, had even offered a sheep for *Tabaski*, and groceries such as sugar for Ramadan. At THE SECOND COMPANY, on labour day, there was a

---

<sup>211</sup> This was one of the principal commitments of THE SECOND COMPANY in the strategic agreement (point 2.4) with the former Rural Community.

<sup>212</sup> Both worked closely with the doctor in charge of the THE SECOND COMPANY medical centre inside the farm.

<sup>213</sup> These included providing school supplies, water, electricity, transport, drinks, the organisation of cultural festivities for children, sports activities for the villages and financial assistance during religious events.

<sup>214</sup> “*Juste sunu geudd lagn gnu joxxul. Lekeetu kesse naxul bey. Mak du segg fu dara nekkul* »

<sup>215</sup> 13/05/2017

celebration organised by the spouse of the director for the children of all villages during which they were offered gifts. The Third Company offered the leftovers of the potato production to the neighbouring villages several times. They had also restored their corporate reputation and brand through sponsoring two of the currently most-watched locally-produced TV-series<sup>216</sup>. And they impacted local popular culture by passing on paid advertisement during the movies. In addition, The Third Company sought to show its public utility and redistributive impact by financially supporting the most deprived populations, especially during Ramadan, embracing cultural norms of empathy and generosity. Lastly, at the end of every year the company organised a concert with popular artists (such as Youssou Ndour), dedicated to Senegalese youth with free attendance.

Besides these interventions, the selected companies were also investing in infrastructure development for the selected farms. This included road construction, water adduction installation, troughs, power poles for electrification, providing potable water for neighbouring villages, renovation of Bridges, and a submerged pump offered to Villages. Materials such as millet mills were also offered to a few villages, but some were yet to be used due to a lack of knowledge. There had been suggestions that they might support the local political elite by funding them during their campaigns.

Yet, questions remain as to how such corporate capitals and their CSR with “shifting morphologies” can really address the needs of an agrarian question they have contributed to creating in the first place (Dolan and Rajak 2016; O’Laughlin 2008) with care and harm (Rajak 2011). All the companies had invested in providing what was previously delivered by an increasingly disengaged state. A state which seems to promote FDI as a way to delegate the delivery of certain public goods or services it cannot deliver, such as health, education, access to water, and infrastructure to private paternalism. The disengaged “neoliberal” central state has left an ever-increasing role to a “responsible” private sector combining paternalism and brand management to create a new tripartite social contract, which bridges the broken state-citizen links in order maintain access to demanding markets (as discussed in the following chapter).

---

<sup>216</sup> These are *Maitresse d’un homme marié & Golden*.



In doing so, CSR were delivering social goods in a way similar to how paternalism was disciplining labour inside the firms, but I suggest the intention of this “CSR paternalism” was to establish a semi-domestic government (Rutherford 2008: 82) outside the firm, as evidenced in the literature on the “company-town”. Domestic government is described as the hegemonic form of cultural politics of recognition (Rutherford 2008: 83), to define and acknowledge who belongs in the community or in the firm, and therefore, who deserves employment, social services, or compensation following land deals. Therefore, CSR paternalism has become a way for private investors, as a semi-domestic government to partly privatise the social reproduction of labour. This, I propose, allows them to manipulate redistributive means to influence local power dynamics. In a similar fashion, establishing the contours of belonging and citizenship allows villagers to defend their rights to jobs by making corporate powers “as much a part of us as we are of them” (Geschiere et al 2000, Kuba et al 2006, Ouma 2015), while ‘othering’ the migrants, as we will see in chapter 7. This leads to increased competition between villages and their chiefs, regarding which of them is to receive the next school or hospital: “mine is better than ours”<sup>217</sup> (Interview CL6).<sup>218</sup>

This illustrates how investors represent the “company village” or “capitalists with a conscience” (Mackintosh 1989: 162). This huge investment in social and now cultural goods through CSR seems to confirm how companies demonstrate and socially perform care, often to conceal the capitalist nature of their venture. This also challenges dominant views that “CSR cannot occur in this non-philanthropic manner in weak institutional contexts” (Amaeshi et al. 2016b: 34). Despite this, some of them still feel that no matter how much they do, it will never be enough to meet the expectations of the communities: “we are doomed to fail” (Interview SMP4)<sup>219</sup>. Indeed, despite CSR paternalism ever re-inventing itself and re-investing back into communities, some of them feel their expectations have not, cannot, or will not be met. The next section analyses the nature of resistance to and contestations of land deals.

---

<sup>217</sup> Similar to “that which is everyman’s is no man”.

<sup>218</sup> 24/10/2017

<sup>219</sup> 12/06/2017

**Photo 15: THE FIRST COMPANY Greenhouses. Saint-Louis. July 2017. (Photograph by researcher)**



**Photo 16: Irrigation infrastructures. Saint-Louis. December 2017. (Photograph by researcher)**



**Photo 17: The Third Company Potato bags ready for commercialisation. November 2017. (Photograph by researcher)**

## **6.5. Private investors' accumulation strategies: Straddling across business models, sectors and activities**

It is the aim of this section to shed light on these questions by analysing investors' accumulation strategies, beyond sanitised discourses tinted with CSR paternalism. Contrary to the dichotomies replete in the literature based on size (big versus small farms or inverse relationship), which is recurrent in agrarian debates (Baglioni & Gibbon 2013; Bernstein 2009; Hazell, Poulton, Wiggins & Dorward 2010; Johnston & Roux 2007; Lipton 2006)), the land rush reveals a more complex reality.

This section illustrates some key accumulation trajectories and strategies of investors, set against the background of agrarian capitalist experiences in Senegalese horticulture and across rural Africa. It argues that these investors straddle production and labour regimes in order to reproduce capital.

### **6.5.1. Various forms and motivations for straddling**

“Straddling” describes the ways in which indigenous classes of capital combined different activities sometimes navigating different sectors to reproduce themselves (Cowen and Shenton 1996). Straddling different types of business is common and has been found in many cases of rural accumulation in SSA. This section considers straddling from two perspectives:

1. As origin of capital to invest/venture into agriculture
2. As a way of diversifying risks and finding new opportunities for accumulation, after starting in agribusiness as in the case of our three company directors.

The first scenario is the case of Niayes accumulators in Senegalese farming straddling different ways of organising production in order to survive in the FFV value chains increasingly subject to the demands of large-scale European retailers and food standards (Baglioni 2015). In the Groundnut Basin, substantial “accumulation from below” has occurred among over 200 groundnut farmer-traders. Dynamic medium-scale farmers took advantage of new trading opportunities in the changing market conditions of the 1980s

and 1990s and were able to accumulate by reinvesting in other economic endeavours (Oya 2007, 2006). It is often the case that possibilities for accumulation in agriculture attract investors from outside the sector, some of whom finance their farms with savings from salaried employment or trade (Chapter 7).

The second scenario, exemplified in this comparative study, shows that investors take up opportunities offered by governments as an entry point to further accumulation. In the case of THE FIRST COMPANY and THE SECOND COMPANY, starting as an exporter of FFV constituted the entry point to later becoming an FZC, with the fiscal advantages examined in chapter 6. As for The Third Company, its initial purpose was to be a real-estates developer of the state's new SEZ in Diamniadio. This SEZ, as well as its Diass neighbour, targets the following sectors: services, agribusiness, industry, IT, tourism, and medical services. For these purposes, the government allocated land to The Third Company without any cost other than the responsibility to realise and commercialise their projects. Recent studies on the relationship between land rush and SEZs found flagrant cases of accumulation by dispossession with the support of public authorities (Basu 2007; Levien 2012)<sup>220</sup>.

### **6.5.2. Led by demand and responding to the government's *émergence* strategy**

The Third Company decided to invest in agriculture because, according to their director, "The Ministry of Agriculture showed an interest to produce for the domestic market", so they quickly organised a meeting with APIX. He added: "Where people live should be distinct from where the projects are. There are many opportunities in agriculture, but it is difficult to resolve issues with people" (Interview SMP10<sup>221</sup>). These affirmations need to be placed in the context of domestic political economy in India and its increasing engagement with Africa (Cairo-i-Cespedes and Colom-Jaen 2014; Cheru and Modi, 2010.). African countries provide half the food production of India, which is experiencing a reduction in available groundwater reserves (Carmody 2013: 122). In the case of Senegal and India, the merchandise traded between them almost tripled between 1996

---

<sup>220</sup> This is notwithstanding the fact that SEZs in countries such as Senegal, Mali, and Nigeria are struggling to deliver on institutional performance and infrastructure needed for attracting FDI (Newman and Page 2017)

<sup>221</sup> 04/07/17

(when it was estimated at 117 million USD) and 2010 (when it was 333 million USD). The two countries consider themselves “equal partners” (Cairo-i-Cespedes and Colom-Jaen 2014: 11). There seems to be a new private-public framework of cooperation between Senegal and India as the latter has never produced in Senegalese agriculture before<sup>222</sup>.

In the cases of THE FIRST COMPANY and THE SECOND COMPANY, they managed to get very prestigious certifications. This allowed them to export to the most competitive UK market and to incorporate global commodity chains via UK supermarkets (Baglioni 2015: 25; Maertens and Swinnens 2008: 6-7.). A few years after being established as an exporter estate, THE FIRST COMPANY also started producing for the local market, straddling markets and making profits locally. Officially, this was because it needed to produce during the wet season to keep local jobs for the villagers and to keep its commitment to providing the remaining produce to the local communities’ cattle. As shown in table 13, the most exported crop for THE FIRST COMPANY was corn and sweet potato. In the domestic market, butternuts, sweet potatoes, peanuts and carrots constituted most of the production, which increased competition (chapter 7).

THE FIRST COMPANY explained they are oriented towards the needs of the market: “we produce specific volumes based on requests, which is not possible on the French and more generally EU market. Our UK based clients are more demanding regarding the quality of products but trust us because we meet the standards”. To work with the UK group, he told them that the company existed already. He also took a “long view” and rented 70 hectares of land and paid approximately 150 million FCFA in salaries. They also rented equipment from two small farms previously run by European investors for 18 million FCFA. At the beginning, they produced only corn making a profit of 120 million FCFA. It was only during the second year that the UK firm bought shares, as the main investor had over 30 years of experience of large-scale plantation farming in Africa. They both had the cultural capital (being educated at university level in agricultural management), and the necessary economic capital to take risks and gain the confidence of the UK retailer. THE FIRST COMPANY investors were also able to access land

---

<sup>222</sup> 80% of Senegalese exports to India focus on phosphoric acid produced by the *Industries Chimiques du Sénégal* (ICS) and cashew nuts exported via The Gambia and sold with the label “made in India” (Cairo-i-Cespedes and Colom-Jaen 2014).

virtually free thanks to their FZC status and Senegal's national development discourse and desire to use land productively. Whilst access to land has constituted a major challenge in the last 5 years (World Bank 2018), it was not the case then. As a result, transfer of land rights took place thanks to the State's mediation. THE FIRST COMPANY's accumulation continued not only on the basis of capital thanks to vertical integration which allowed for significant economies of scale. Accumulation was also permitted by cheap wage labour. Investors also accumulated the trust of local communities whose expectations were for a new social contract in the form of private paternalism replacing state paternalism.

**Table 17: THE FIRST COMPANY exports and domestic market sales between 2014 and 2017 (CFA Francs)**

Source: Assembled by the researcher from the Company

The table above illustrates that THE FIRST COMPANY's claims to be mostly producing for export is not tenable as it has consistently increased the quantities sold in the domestic market since 2015 on all vegetables except courgettes:

- Their Sweet potato sales on the local market has tripled between 2016 and 2017 and represent more than 2/3 of export sales.
- THE FIRST COMPANY gained almost as much from beans sales on local market than for export (\*23 times more than in 2014).
- In 2017, THE FIRST COMPANY sold almost 5 times the quantity of Chili it did export, locally in 2014, and 8 times as much carrots in 2017(862 701) than it sold in 2015 on the local market.
- In 2016, it sold far more corn than previous years, reaching half of export sales.
- It sold almost as much beans domestically than for export.

THE FIRST COMPANY also straddles markets both vertically and horizontally and shifts between estate and contract-farming (CF). This straddling makes it difficult to distinguish the proportion of exporters relying on contract and estate farming (Baglioni, 2018). For THE FIRST COMPANY, outgrowing is operated only in the CF scheme farms, which offers the company great flexibility. The former manager of the three locally-based farms, an experienced and well-respected technician, and his eight permanent staff and 40 seasonal workers were under contract with another agribusiness but put at the disposal of THE FIRST COMPANY through CF. THE FIRST COMPANY was also renting land and equipment from SOCAS and paid a monthly fee for the provision of services. On the other hand, approximately 15 workers on the payroll of THE FIRST COMPANY were based at this site, a secretary, irrigators, drivers, nurserymen and the supervisor of day workers. These staff were mostly permanent and seasonal and there were approximately 350 day-workers, though the number increased during the harvest. There were 10 guards under contract with a private company hired by THE FIRST COMPANY. Yet this illustrates that day-workers whose number varied according to the needs of the company were the ones most likely to bear the risks of the fluctuant

needs of production by THE FIRST COMPANY, the contracting company. Not only were they casualised and bore the brunt of precarious labour, they were also made more dependent on the dynamics of global and local labour regimes and production networks. This argument has been made in an influential publication by Little and Watts in 1994, which states that there is, in fact, a proletarianization of “nominally independent growers” through their integration to the world market, in order to produce “global fresh” through contract farming (see also Friedmann 1993). This led Ouma (2015: 98-101) to argue that growers are far from being integrated into the world markets, they are just enrolled in it. Hall (2011) theorises this as an adverse incorporation of workers: it is the terms of their integration in the GVCs that causes problem as it indeed constitutes a form of “labour grabbing” due to their increase dependence on this labour market for wage work.

Employers sometimes circumvent regulations and standards that they are bound to. For example, SMETA Audit<sup>223</sup> clearly specifies: “There should be no subcontracting unless previously agreed with the main client” (SEDEX 2014: 39). Yet, THE FIRST COMPANY sub-contracts SOCAS. The secrecy around CF practices, as well as other hidden practices such as short-term renting of land amongst big players, is evidenced by a conversation I witnessed involving a senior member of a farm (included in this study). He discussed covertly with another person the practices of another of the companies in this comparative case-study (which I cannot mention for anonymity). This section used histories of investors accumulation “from above” to show how business endeavours are motivated *simply by capital*, and by the need to respond “to the demand, to the market”.

Similar to what has been described in Ghana, the Gambia and Kenya (Carney 1994; Dolan 2016; Little 2000: 7; Little and Whatts 1994; Ouma 2015), Private investors were therefore organising to articulate and defend their own interests through VALLAGRI, an association grouping the top producers of the FFV sector in Northern Senegal. However, these companies have been accused by their national competitors of not producing the same crops as other VALLAGRI members, so as not to compete against each other.

---

<sup>223</sup> One of the certifications of labels.



## 6.6. Reactions to the land deals: Who resists? Why and how?

“To obtain a deliberation is not difficult. But when the time comes to occupy your land, it is an issue. And you cannot sue or take legal action because of your image. We resolve such issues with time” said a farm senior manager (Interview SMP10<sup>224</sup>). What are the reasons for resistance, acquiescence or contestations of land deals? I argue that whether a deal is accepted or resisted is impacted by how land deals are negotiated, and who the actors involved are. Those resisting were usually former land users, local producers and community members, with religion and ethnicity playing a major role (see below table).

### 6.6.1. Who resists and why?

One might expect conflicts and tensions to arise from particular outcomes of land deals, such as an asymmetric distribution of rents through which a particular group may lose out. The case-studies in this research show that in addition to this, tensions are structured along political, ethnic and/or religious lines, and are based on the increasing scarcity of land. In the case of political tensions, which occurred in all three cases, this was most often the result of political change – for example, a newly elected official from a different party - or because leaders, villagers or groups of producers were affiliated to different religious groups. Land deals thus became a battlefield for other kinds of grievances and conflict.

This was particularly visible in cases of tensions between the commune and village chiefs. A few months after the deal for the extension of THE SECOND COMPANYS’ farmlands, the first divisions between the political local authority and the traditional leader started to appear. The village chief organised a conference in the host vilage to support the local villagers who were now denouncing this as a case of “land grab”. At the time, the village leader had become affiliated to an opposition political party led by a well-known religious leader and his political coordinator, then President of the rural community. The chief of village and his followers started accusing the *Mayor* and *Sous-Prefet* of “trumping” them, and even suggested they were “corrupt” (Interviews CLP7<sup>225</sup>). Most of the host village people are now against the project, especially members of one of

---

<sup>224</sup> 04/07/17

<sup>225</sup> 01/05/2017, 25/10/2017

the three big families who feel that the expectations they conveyed to THE SECOND COMPANY through their officials were not included in the contract. The Chief of the host village who was also in favour of the deal and key to the negotiations, has been criticised by some fellow villagers (Interviews PW/SR<sup>226</sup> SW9<sup>227</sup>). Therefore, whenever I tried to interview those people, he stayed not far away, and his presence was dissuasive. All the accusations were expressed in a subtle way<sup>228</sup>, never overtly as they were with rumours of corruption.

This conflict was not only political but ran along religious and ethnic lines. Initially *Pulaar* and *Wolof* village leaders agreed to the deal. When the investor requested more land, the *Pulaar* supposedly went on to sign without agreeing with the *Wolof* leaders who no longer had land on the side of the canal requested. The effects of this unilateral move were resistance from the *Wolof* village leaders whose main source of livelihood is agriculture and who therefore needed land. The *Pulaar* are mostly pastoralists and, despite being fewer in number than the *Wolof*, their leaders (a marabout and a businessman) were in a position to sign the deal since they were less dependent on land for their livelihood activities.

---

<sup>226</sup> 13/05/2017

<sup>227</sup> 26/052017

<sup>228</sup> Similarly, a religious authority who was also critical of the investment asked me after our interview: “even if I do not agree with him, please do not report what I said if it was to hurt personally any member of the community: I am telling you so you know the truth”. Thus, the above renders research on deals sealed in hidden transcripts and difficult to interpret.

**Table 18: Summary of the First, Second and Third Company deals and main reactions (source: contracts & semi-structured interviews)**

	Second Company	Third Company	Third Company	First Company	First Company	First Company
<b>Location</b>	Saint Louis	First site	Second Site	First Site	Second Site CF	Third Site
<b>Hectares (Contract)</b>	Anonymised	Anonymised	Anonymised	Anonymised	Anonymised	Anonymised
<b>Hectares under operation (as of 2017)</b>		1500	Land conflict	418	150	272
<b>Type of contract</b>	Deliberation for Rural Community + MoUs with Representatives of villages	30-year emphyteutic lease + MoUs with Representatives of villages and individual farmers	Deliberation for Rural Community	Deliberation for Rural Community + MoUs with Representatives of villages	Deliberation for Rural Community + MoUs with Representatives of villages	Deliberation for Rural Community + MoUs with Representatives of villages
<b>Access to water</b>	Own equipment + Lake Infrastructure (SAED)	Own Canal + Lake	-	Own equipment+ River+ SAED Infrastructure	CF firm equipment+ MCA & other SAED	Own equipment + SAED Infrastructure
<b>Business Model and labour regime</b>	Exports Estates Farming/ Mostly day and seasonal workers	Estates Farming mostly day and seasonal workers + possibility and failed past CF	Not stated	Estates Farming Mostly day and seasonal workers	Contract-Farming Mostly day and seasonal workers	Estates Farming Mostly day and seasonal workers
<b>Previous land use (POAS)</b>	Agropastoral	Agro	Agro-Pastoral	Pastoral	Agro-pastoral	Pastoral
<b>Previous land use (Neighbouring populations)</b>	Rainfed Market-Gardening near Cattle Walks			Grazing + Cattle walks		Grazing + Cattle walks
<b>Post-investment land use change</b>	Production of Radish and Salad onions	Production of Potato for local market	Intended production of Potato	Production of export FFVs + other crops for domestic market	Production of export FFVs + other crops for domestic market	Production of export FFVs + other crops for domestic market
<b>Types of resources</b>	Financial contribution, Jobs, "Contracts", Access to water, car rentals, CSR, etc.	Financial contribution, Jobs, "Contracts", Access to water, car rentals, CSR, etc.		Financial contribution, Jobs, "Contracts", Access to water, car rentals, CSR, etc	Financial contribution, Jobs, "Contracts", Access to water, car rentals, CSR, etc	Financial contribution, Jobs, "Contracts", Access to water, car rentals, CSR, etc
<b>Who resists?</b>	Previous land users / Political & Religious leaders, some pastoralists, different family members		Previous land users / Political & Religious leaders close to opposition, petty commodity producers & unions, Civil Society	Some producers & agricultural unions, Civil Society	Some producers & agricultural unions, Civil Society	Some producers & agricultural unions, Civil Society
<b>Nature of Resistance</b>	Staff Reps (from within) & Demonstrations (from outside), Media appearance, Resistance to extension of farm and installation of metallic wire	Unionisation (from within)	Constitution of a Collective, Law suits, occupation of the farm leading to arrests and 1 death	Demonstrations, Media appearance	Demonstrations, Media appearance	Demonstrations, Media appearance
<b>Reaction to Resistance</b>	Policing, Arrests and beating, Mediation by state & community leaders, Staff reps made redundant	Staff reps put on leave or fired + media appearance + mediation by state, outreach & offerings of potato to villagers	Arrests followed by one death and several casualties, conciliation attempts by administrative authority	"Counter-movements" of producers + media appearance + training & outreach	"Counter-movements" of producers + media appearance + training & outreach	"Counter-movements" of producers + media appearance + training & outreach
<b>Displacement</b>	None	2 villages displaced	None	None	None	None

The causes of resistance were multiple. They included previously unsuccessful land deals having taken place, as well as political change (i.e. if the mayor who signed the deal had been replaced). This can shape the political outcome of land deals, as was the case with the deliberation allocating 1000ha of land to The Third Company in Louga. Therefore, the resistance to the The Third Company Investment in this area was likely to be linked to the failure of a former major political actor, and his forceful attempt to be re-elected in 2012. Resistance was also linked to the nomination of a mayor from the new majority, as well as the activism of a religious leader affiliated to an opposition group whose fields of cassava were targeted by The Third Company for their extension.

The allocation of land to The Third Company in Louga marked the beginning of a long judicial battle, after a lawsuit was initiated by a collective of 100 peasants and petty commodity producers from that village. At the end of 2016, the Supreme Court decided to relieve the execution of the deliberation by the Rural Community. In mid-2017, a direct order was sent to The Third Company for it to stop its activities in Louga. Though not a definitive victory of the peasants, this historical court decision was celebrated as one by opponents of The Third Company land deal. This case illustrates an “inconclusive encounter” characterised by disruption rather than transformation, intrusion rather than hegemony (Berry 1993: 139). It is likely that the collective decision to resist was due to the high mediatisation of the failure of the previous farm, the political change which occurred later, as well as the involvement of religious leaders who were interested in recovering part of their *talibes*’ plots to resume their farming activities. Therefore, it seems that religion once again intersected with economic interest to determine the outcome of this judicial battle over land.

### **What are the major reasons for conflict?**

Change in land use, “productive use” of the land, “messy hectares”, and political and religious divisions are important causes for social conflicts.

Land use is determined by POAS in rural communities as explained in chapter 5. In principle, all the users of different types of land should know which type of land they have access to. A 2011 study in Northern Senegal shows this is not the case. 69% of respondents did not know, 17% had heard about it, 9% were informed and only 5% took part in its elaboration according to POAS (Toure 2011). As a result, change in land use is

one of the major determinants of the outcome of land deals. Many users think they own the land they or they family have access to, by tradition, ignoring the transfers of competence to the commune since the act 3 of decentralisation in Senegal.

Investors settling in pastoral zones is the most likely scenario for conflict. THE FIRST COMPANY settled in a ZAPE zone destined for pastoralists, despite rural communities knowing that the land was allocated for pastoralists. THE FIRST COMPANY accepted, as compensation for the population, to produce crops for the cattle deprived of grazing land. Nonetheless, conflicts continued to increase between fields owners (cultivators) and cattle breeders in Saint-Louis. One of the Pulaar herders confided with a smile: “You can’t share a forest with a pastoralist, and you can’t share land with a farmer”(Interview<sup>229</sup>). Most herders interviewed, no matter which zone they were part of, reported a similar problem with “scarcity of land and forest resources” (FGD<sup>230</sup>). Most of the respondents interviewed in Saint-Louis and on the outer limits of the THE SECOND COMPANY farm, reported increasing conflicts due to the lack of grazing areas or the investor burning the crops (mostly peanut) to transform it into stoves for the cattle that they sell in the local market<sup>231</sup> (FGD<sup>232</sup>). This was never recognised by any of the company staff.

The SECOND COMPANY deal was also located on former cattle grazing land, hence the reactions of neighbouring villages whose chief is the President of the cattle-breeders of Dagana and a unionist who led resistance to the company SenHuile SenEthanol (Interview CL6<sup>233</sup>FGD2<sup>234</sup>). Some respondents from the villages situated in front of THE SECOND COMPANY sites, also talked about the problem of land scarcity: “Why did we give our land to a foreigner to now feel tight? We need space to cultivate, have a local market, play football, etc.” (VLGI<sup>235</sup>). To which the chief of the host village responded: “What you had in the past, an area isolated from all and everyone, is no longer possible: the future is one of intercultural mix, and you need to accept it” (ibid.). The Louga deal was not located in ZAPA, so conflicts in this area were not due to changes in land use.

---

<sup>229</sup> with Community worker 23/12/17

<sup>230</sup> 24/10/2017

<sup>231</sup> At 900 fca the unit

<sup>232</sup> 13/07/2017

<sup>233</sup> 24/10/2017

<sup>234</sup> 24/10/2017

<sup>235</sup> 05/05/17



**Photo 18: Cattle walk near THE SECOND COMPANY. April 2017. (Photograph by researcher)**

The case of The Third Company and indeed to a lesser extent the FIRST COMPANY case (third site) provides us with examples of the tensions around “productive use”. For The Third Company, local authorities specified that the State reserved the right to deallocate the land for reasons of public interest. This case illustrates some of the imperfections of the 1964 LDN, which does not specify what “productive use” means (Tzeuschler 1999; Niang 2004). What kind of use is productive? Is leaving equipment on the land or installing a metallic wire as many land users do, while not undertaking any production, enough? How about notions of public interest or eminent domain? These imprecisions represent a weakness in the land law and have created land conflicts between users or between users and the State. In the case of THE FIRST COMPANY third site, 900 hectares were allocated and so far, only 272 are being used by the farm, which creates tensions with neighbouring villages. First, implementation of such projects is slow, and because the investor might have requested more land than he immediately needed foreseeing future difficulties getting more land. Secondly, the local communities failed to appreciate the real surface involved.

Many rural communities who sign deals do not realise the amount of land entailed, neither do they really know how much land they really hold, as per Edelman’s study of “messy hectares” in Costa Rica (2012). As in the Saint-Louis and Louga, it is not until the

commission in charge of the national domain comes to investigate and measure the plots, or when the investor starts its installation, that those who sign the deal understand the amount of land involved. By then, it is sometimes too late to protect a sacred tree, for example, or a cemetery located on the plot. This has led to the signature of further MoUs when communities seek access to their sacred places. In the case of the cemetery, it is still located inside the company's land, but the cemetery has been enclosed as requested by the community.

Instances of political tensions regarding land deals included a case in the second company's host village, when the company sought to install a metallic wire around contested fields to enclose them. The police intervened and arrested several protestors, who were then subjected to brutality. The Mayor of the neighbouring village explained his enthusiasm for the project, stating that he believes that a synergy between local communities and investors is needed (Interview with CLP<sup>236</sup>). He was much involved in projects related to water adduction in his village, and took pride in the significant reduction of outmigration from his village compared to the neighbouring ones, thanks to irrigated horticulture. Due to this, his commune had also attributed 2000ha of land to another Moroccan investor, and other hectares to pastoralists in his region. The tensions arose with the political alternation, the village chief's affiliation to a local religious leader of a different political party than the mayor: "I am saying no, but there is something I want" referring to his newly declared political intentions (Interview CLC)<sup>237</sup>.

### **6.6.2. How are land deals resisted?**

In the case of THE SECOND COMPANY, contestations over the use of the water canal, and the extension of the company land, took place on the day they were supposed to enclose the new land acquisition in 2013, with demonstrations and occupation of the land surrounding the farm. The team who resisted were physically beaten and arrested by the police. The protestors called the media and held several press conferences with their

---

<sup>236</sup> 25/10/17

<sup>237</sup> 20/10/2017

leader, a *Marabout*-political leader from a religious brotherhood<sup>238</sup>. After these events, several staff who addressed the media were fired. Dialogues were held to bring back peace. After those events, contestations were organised around the type of rents, better jobs, formalisation of employment via contracts, salaries, CSR support, etc. and are mostly voiced either through the workers representatives inside the company or through community leaders.

In the case of THE FIRST COMPANY, it was the third site which faced most contestations articulated around the use of cattle grazing land. Two neighbouring villages decided to contest the deal in 2016, by protesting with red armbands and with great media coverage. When I visited THE FIRST COMPANY in 2017, tensions remained, and the company said they would grant me access but only on the two first sites. It was during my second visit that I visited the third site<sup>239</sup>.

In the case of The Third Company, resistance and contestations were articulated both from within via the to-be-union and with solidarity from Saint-Louis villagers. It was during the installation of the farm in the host village that two villages were displaced and relocated. The Louga case represents the most advanced form of resistance, with court appearances, police arrests, one death, and a legal decision to temporarily close the farm. The contestations were led by the collective of Peasants, and this case has received the greatest intervention from the public authorities including the police, the judiciary, and community leaders.

I argue here that the reaction to deals differs across time and space with the object of resistance changing to adapt to current issues and the actors shifting interests. This illustrates the centrality of negotiation and its corollary, that deals are never totally “signed and done”. Even after the signature of the contracts, MoUs or other agreements, there is still a possibility either to negotiate peacefully, or through more organised and coercive means, especially in the current context where the “local community” receive

---

<sup>238</sup> *Tidjane*

<sup>239</sup> To illustrate how fieldwork can constitute evidence, once, the company invited me to a meeting with the 8 village leaders, only to tell me at the eve of the meeting it was cancelled. Yet, I went and it was still being held, but I was told I could not attend. Later, a few village chiefs confirmed what was being discussed: more secure jobs, transportation to the place of work, salaries, etc...and voice through the unions and community leaders



much media support and in the presence of NGO activism. This confirms the proposition that four main factors were important in shaping the failure or success of resistance to land deals: “i) strong mobilisation of local populations (group cohesion and level of determination being decisive), assistance of national and international NGOs in scaling up protests, capacity of opponents to harness the support of influential elites and decision-makers, and the legal status of the land under contention.” (Gagné 2019)

With this in mind, the following lessons can be learned regarding the causes of support and resistance for land deals:

First, private investors’ approach to community relations is key: The case with the least issues were THE SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST COMPANY. The leader of the company did much outreach work in the local community. The company even had villager-workers representatives who acted as spokesmen for their villages. At THE SECOND COMPANY, land was acquired through rural communities guided by the vision of their mayors, who were well-respected and considered as “visionaries”. This limited resistance to deals.

Second, memories of past failures can limit future possibilities: In Louga, the failed farm of a major political leader caused caution and suspicion. In contrast, THE FIRST COMPANY already had a well-known farm in Saint-Louis and was able to build on its positive reputation.

Third, the outcomes of the deals are sometimes shaped by the distribution of rents, such as salaries, recognition, access to water, services and political support. Therefore, some social groups gatekeeping these resources will lead other groups to also try to influence their distribution.

This is related to the fourth important dimension: the presence of alternative sources of livelihood are another factor: when fewer other options were available, communities were more likely to support the land deal.

Fifth, non-tangible dimensions are also significant, for example people's relationship to the land regarding their history and group identity can also weigh in their response to horticultural projects.

Equally crucial is the political history of the region is another factor: As we have seen in chapter 3, the collective memory and history of coercive collective labour is vivid, particularly in Louga— a former fief of the Kingdom of Cayor and Ngnith, which is very close to Nder, one of the former capitals of the Waalo, known for the courage of its women<sup>240</sup> (Wilfhart 2018). In addition, kinship and clientelism influence the level of support or resistance.

Last but not least, current politics, legitimacy and popularity of political and traditional leaders, and development vision are critical factors to be considered when analysing why communities support or resist a given land deal.

## **Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have analysed the role of political actors within and around the State, and that of investors' discursive and capitalist strategies to gain a greater bargaining power to influence land deals, or partake in the distribution of rents (resources and

---

<sup>240</sup> In November 1819 the women of Nder immolated themselves collectively rather than fall into the hands of the Moorish and Toucouleur slavers at the end of resistance.

opportunities from land deals). Firstly, I analysed the ways in which gatekeeping from political and traditional authorities serves the purposes of accumulating capital by capturing rents from land deals; and maintaining domination in the context of changes in the land governance systems, erosion of traditional forms of leadership and decentralisation (Pattenden 2010, Nugent 2010). Secondly, I focused on labour regimes and their implications of the type of the procurement for labour dynamics inside and outside the land deals. I argued, with several empirical illustrations, that in the context of an almost absent “neoliberal state”, local authorities in need of financial resources as well as individual villages in need for “public goods” such as basic health and hygiene were seeking to redefine new tripartite “social contracts” with incoming investors who were also eager to embellish their profit-driven capitalist accumulation endeavours through what I have term “Corporate Social Responsibility - paternalism”. Last but not least, I have demonstrated with ample evidence that CSR paternalism constitute the form chosen by corporate actors, encouraged by the institutional void left by state authorities, to “compensate” communities with “societal goods”. This CSR paternalism constitutes the ties that binds harm and care together. It encapsulates strategies and discourses of corporate players to manage their disrespect of promises of permanent jobs and failure to use all the lands “productively”, while reviving their brand and public reputation. In short, CSR paternalism allows companies to continuously re-invent their societal mission and purpose, as this represents their “best chance to legitimise business again” (Porter 2011: 20) and respond to the demands of local communities.

# CHAPTER 7: UNPACKING OUTCOMES

## Introduction

Land deals “do not occur in a socio-economic or political vacuum” (Oya 2015b: 1550). They are external interventions, connecting capital with labour with previous and ongoing dynamics of place-making resulting in uneven, unfinished processes of social change. Not only do land deals re-shape the places in which they occur, they are also an expression of capitalist expansion across the globe, as Bebbington and Bebbington (2018) have shown with regards to mining. With this in mind, I question whether the kinds of social change I observed were a continuation of pre-existing long-term processes of social differentiation, exacerbated by the land rush, or whether the land rush had led to the emergence of an entirely new class formation. Rarely in the land rush debate has the impact on class formation been analysed, beyond thinking about categories that oppose undifferentiated classes of capital and labour represented. In addition, there is a dearth of literature about the implications on wage employment trends associated with export-oriented land deals, a gap that this chapter seeks to fill. I argue with Deere and De Janvry (1979: 602) that the incorporation of the peasantry into rural labour markets, either as *suppliers* of wage labour to capitalist firms or as *buyers of wage labour* in the process of capitalisation, “most closely characterises the process of class formation among direct producers and, hence, their incorporation into the dominant capitalist mode of production”.

Previous chapters have offered a brief history of land and agricultural commercialisation (chapter 3) and a discussion over who has access and control of land (politics and CSR paternalism) (chapters 5-6). This chapter discusses various processes of agrarian change and social differentiation by analysing the social-embeddedness of land (Polanyi 2001), bringing together the main propositions of this thesis so far. More specifically, the chapter “studies through” the power dynamics of rural wage employment and class formation by capturing perspectives within and outside the companies under study. In

part 1, I examine social differentiation from below (fragmented classes of labour) and argue that the ‘neo-housewifisation’ of female workers (combined with CSR paternalism analysed in previous chapter) is what holds together women’s exploitation without dispossession by classes of capital following land deals. I argue for the debunking of single and reductionist narratives about “the rural worker” through a life-histories approach to understanding female and male workers. The oral histories I collected exemplify the singularity and diversity of workers conditions and focus on migration, care and reproduction, and the gender of power. In part 2, I argue that land deals produce both winners and losers, and examine cases of social differentiation from above (classes of capital). In part 3, I examine market outcomes of land deals and argue that there is increased competition for labour hiring and competition on local horticultural markets. This outcome, I suggest, increases competition at the selling point (downstream), but not in the number of those who can be part of GVCs (upstream). In part 4, I propose to ‘bring back the social’ in our analysis of land deals, going beyond capitalism to focus on shifts in social constructions of identity, belonging, inclusion and success.

This chapter draws upon participant observation (through total immersion), the workers survey, semi-structured interviews, life-stories, and focus group discussions with workers (inside and outside the farms), management, community leaders and capitalists.

# **UNPACKING OUTCOMES (1): SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION FROM BELOW (CLASSES OF LABOUR) AND EXPLOITATION WITHOUT DISPOSSESSION**

This chapter zooms in on the world of work, to offer a fine-grained view of labour regimes and social differentiation from below by examining the “fragmented classes of labour” (Bernstein 2010: 125). Some of the data originates from companies’ lists obtained during fieldwork, in addition to the above-mentioned methodology.

## **7.1. “Fields or packing house”? Division of labour within the three companies**

Despite the seasonal nature of rural wage labour, land deals uncover different dynamics of social differentiation. The objective of this section is to present the main socio-demographics of workers in a segmented and gendered horticultural sector. The main argument is that the nature of encounters taking place in estates between “new” agrarian capital and different “classes of labour” following land investments is varied.

### **7.1.1. Segmented and gendered dynamics within and across companies**

Hiring casual wage labour provides employers with flexibility and allows them to respond to labour peaks and reduce costs in periods of labour slack, thereby transferring the risks of operational fluctuations to workers. It allows employers to hire labour at lower costs and at short notice; this also facilitates the social disciplining of labour, alongside with its geographical disciplining (as discussed in previous chapter on LLCRs). As explained in chapter 4, the sample size for The Third Company (workers survey) is too small to be significant, therefore, we will not analyse it here.

All three companies relied mostly on day-workers. 90% of THE SECOND COMPANY and The Third Company workers were day-workers during peak times. Seasonal workers were the second largest number at THE SECOND COMPANY (7%) and The Third Company (8%), though not at THE FIRST COMPANY (1%). The data presented here

may be slightly biased because the lists provided by THE FIRST COMPANY contained only employees directly employed by THE FIRST COMPANY and detached to SOCAS farms, not those contracted directly with SOCAS under CF (see chapter 6).

The higher level of contractual workers at THE FIRST COMPANY (16%) shows that the company also invested in retaining good collaborators by offering them some security. THE SECOND COMPANY and The Third Company had a pyramid form of organisation driven by wage labour.

According to the company lists, most day and contractual workers were in the fields, sorting chains, and in the packhouse at all three companies. At THE FIRST COMPANY, women outnumbered men in the fields and in the greenhouses. Men outnumbered women in the Technique Division, at the packing houses. The other farms (Agrinord, Agroval, Djama) had almost the same gender division. Most workers at the Al Ngourane farm were female, which might be explained by the dissatisfaction of young active men with the land deal (informal group conversation), and/or the high levels of migrant labour<sup>241</sup> in these two villages<sup>242</sup>. It is also related to the recruitment of workers from these village as permanent and seasonal workers. At the Ngalam farm, the gender division can be explained by the fact that young men preferred other jobs than THE FIRST COMPANY, if it was not on a permanent contract.

Seasonal and day workers can be abruptly 'let go', despite assurances from employers. A few seasonal workers testified to their dependence on labour availability and on the production calendar<sup>243</sup>. Depending on crops and the time of year, they could work additional hours, including night shifts in the case of THE FIRST COMPANY, during the harvesting of corn for instance.

---

<sup>241</sup> To Guinea Bissau, Dakar, and other African cities

<sup>242</sup> Al Ngourane 1 and Al Ngourane 2

<sup>243</sup> At the end of the season, many workers I interviewed said they had been put on "forced leave" until there was more work. Other respondents, near the Ngalam site complained about "lost days", due to the long distances to the farm<sup>243</sup> when on arrival they would be told there was no work and that they would be called another day.

**Table 19: Labour segmentation in all three farms (according to type of contract)**

COMPANIES	THE FIRST COMPANY	THE SECOND COMPANY	THE THIRD COMPANY
<b>Total number of workers</b>	<b>3289</b>	<b>1146</b>	<b>1145</b>
<b>% Day workers</b>	<b>82%</b>	<b>90%</b>	<b>87%</b>
% Male	45 %	12%	-
% Female	55%	88%	-
<b>% Seasonal workers</b>	<b>1.6%</b>	<b>7%</b>	<b>8%</b>
% Male	26%	85%	-
% Female	74%	15%	-
<b>% Permanent workers</b>	<b>16 %</b>	<b>3%</b>	<b>5%</b>
% Male	69%	67%	-
% Female	31%	33%	-
<b>% of interns</b>	<b>0.4%</b>	-	-
% Male	0.2%	-	-
% Female	0.2%	-	-
<b>% Total male workers</b>	<b>49%</b>	<b>19%</b>	-
<b>% Total female workers</b>	<b>51%</b>	<b>81%</b>	-

Source: Assembled by Researcher from THE FIRST COMPANY & THE SECOND COMPANY Workers registers and interview with The Third Company Management<sup>244</sup>

### **Gendered dynamics**

Female workers were over-represented among casual labourers in all three companies, reflecting the gendered nature of labour hiring (see also Johnston 1997; Mies 2014). However, there were some significant differences: at THE FIRST COMPANY the proportion of female workers was only 55% compared to nearly 90% at THE SECOND COMPANY as illustrated in the below table.

As per this table, over 88% of day-workers were women. Female day and seasonal workers would choose which days they could work to suit patriarchal norms or personal

---

<sup>244</sup> 04/07/2017



preferences, as will be discussed in the final section. Male workers constituted just 7% of seasonal workers and nearly 3% of contractual workers, permanent and fixed-term. Seasonal workers' contracts were for 8 months, though they could decide to do another off-farm job or work as a day-worker at THE SECOND COMPANY, if wage workers were required.

Women formed 16 teams of day-workers from neighbouring villages and were supervised by men. Locally, THE SECOND COMPANY was referred to by most of its workers as “West Africa Femmes”: a company for women. This illustrates that women were, indeed, the backbone of the workforce in this firm. Male day-workers constituted 12% of day-workers according THE SECOND COMPANY's list, and they specialised in stacking, weeding, trimming and radish lines, jobs which were physically more demanding (table below).

Management at THE SECOND COMPANY reported that most male day-workers refused to work on spring onions (*takk soble*), which involves sorting the spring onions before tying and packing them:

*At our English farm, male day-workers do perform this task, not here in Senegal. It is cultural, because men believe it is a woman's work. Some men even resigned when we tried to enrol them in those teams as we need more staff for the spring onion (Interview SMP3<sup>245</sup>).*

Two younger men who had previously worked at THE SECOND COMPANY said, in FGD3<sup>246</sup>, that they did not mind doing this job but the pay needed to be increased for them to agree. Three male trimmers and stackers said they did not leave their households to come and “work like women and be paid like women” (FGD1<sup>247</sup>). Male day-workers either worked on the flat-trimming (cutting the roots of the radish and conditioning), or formed lines to carry the radish before loading them onto trucks, or offloading the trucks and carrying the heavy boxes after women had sorted the onions (Interview SW4)<sup>248</sup>.

---

<sup>245</sup> 23/05/2017

<sup>246</sup> 25/10/2017

<sup>247</sup> 19/05/17

<sup>248</sup> 23/05/17

Increasing numbers of men were agreeing to take part in weeding “*ngoos*” (Interview SMP2)<sup>249</sup>.

**Table 20: THE SECOND COMPANY Total day workforce represented by village/team during summer 2017**

Source: Assembled by Researcher from THE SECOND COMPANY registers of workers

This gendered division of labour is not unique to my case-study. Dolan (2001: 47) has shown that Kenyan companies exporting French beans have contributed to this “naturalisation” of labour division by regarding women as “better bean pickers”: “Their hands are smaller and they have more patience for the work than the men”. The specificity of the crop and the gendered construction of THE SECOND COMPANY could explain lower male participation as day-workers. Men are subjected to their counterparts’ gaze and the dominant understanding of masculinity constructed around virility and economic power (Biaya 2001; Diop 1985; Perry 2005).

**Marital status and number of children**

---

<sup>249</sup> 26/10/17

Regarding workers' marital status, more female day-workers than men reported being married (respectively 31 and 32% of female respondents in THE FIRST COMPANY and THE SECOND COMPANY), and married polygamous conjugal relationships with respectively 32% and 52% as illustrated in survey data below. These workers attempted to make their jobs compatible with their unpaid tasks in the household, such as taking care of their children, cooking, finding wood and fetching water.

**Table 21: Workers' according to Gender, Marital Status and Number of Children. n=166**

Gender	Marital Status	THE FIRST COMPANY	THE THIRD COMPANY	THE SECOND COMPANY	Total
	Single	34.4	20.0	16.7	26.7
<b>Male (%)</b>	Married	62.5	70.0	38.9	56.7
	Married Poly	3.1	10.0	44.4	16.67
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
	% of male respondents with at least 1 child	51.5	60.0	83.3	62.3
<b>Female (%)</b>	Single	24.5	22.2	8.0	16.7
	Married	30.6	33.3	32.0	31.5
	Married Poly	32.7	33.3	52	41.7
	Divorced	6.1	11.1	0.0	3.7
	Separated	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.9
	Widower	4.1	0.0	8.0	5.6
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
	% of female respondents with at least 1 child	67.4	44.4	86.3	74.3
	M/F Average Number of Children (SD*)	1.9 (2.2*)	1.8 (2.2*)	4.2 (3.4*)	2.8 (2.9*)

Source: Workers survey

As per table below, the average of children per woman was 2.8 children in all cases, with a higher average of 4.2 children per woman at THE SECOND COMPANY. Unsurprisingly, workers in married and married polygamic relationships were more likely

to have multiple children according to survey data. Both interviews and survey data confirmed that many children were living with relatives (generally richer) or schooled in a different city. That was for instance, the case of the children in my host family, who were schooled in a nearby village at their uncle's house, and only returned to their parents' house in the firm's host village during the weekend.

### **7.1.2. Education: Achille's heel of wage workers?**

The below tabulation, which involves all male and female workers regardless of type of contract, tells us a few things about workers' education rates. The majority of wage workers had either no education or were educated at primary school level. 49% of THE SECOND COMPANY workers did not have any education against 26% of THE FIRST COMPANY workers. These education rates were below the gross enrolment rates for the region of Saint-Louis, which were 89% for female students and 76.7% for male students in 2014<sup>250</sup>. These regional rates were below national averages indicated by UNICEF: 83.4% gross enrolment for male students against 89% for female students between 2008 and 2012.

#### **Figure 8: : Workers' Education Levels by company (n = 170)**

Source: Workers survey

THE FIRST COMPANY workers were in general more educated than THE SECOND COMPANY and The Third Company: 9.74% of THE FIRST COMPANY workers had a Bachelor or Master Degree, and 23% had completed primary school. By comparison,

---

<sup>250</sup> <http://www.ansd.sn/ressources/ses/SES-StLouis-2015.pdf>

1.5% had university degrees at THE SECOND COMPANY, while 14.5% were educated at primary school level (see below). Many workers reported an alternative type of education/training, generally known as “*jang métier*”: to learn a trade”. This was the case for 13.41% of THE FIRST COMPANY workers and 20.29% of THE SECOND COMPANY workers. This illustrates how traditional ways of learning the ropes of the trade were still used.

**Table 22: Workers’ other socio-economic activity and school enrolment n=170**

<b>Ed1</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Cum.</b>
<b>Yes</b>	<u>111</u>	<u>65%</u>	<u>65.29</u>
<b>No</b>	<u>59</u>	<u>35%</u>	<u>100%</u>
<b>Total</b>	<u>170</u>	<u>100.00</u>	

Source: Workers survey

This tabulation below (n=170) focuses on obtaining a frequency of the two types of response about Ed1 (Have you ever been to school? Yes or No).

In general, the interviews showed that the following mattered for progression within the firms: previous work experience seniority and length of service, education/skills, and social networks<sup>251</sup>. Therefore, most uneducated, inexperienced or unqualified (migrant) workers were more likely to be at the bottom of the firm’s ladder.

### **7.1.3. Straddling to survive or Emancipating oneself though multiple occupation?**

As in many other parts of Africa, lower wages in Senegal are partly explained by the safety net provided by land availability (scarcer now) and the possibility to work in family farms, which affects workers’ participation in rural labour markets and their reservation wage.

---

<sup>251</sup> This is summarised by “*bras long*” which means “to be well-connected”

**Table 23: Workers’ other socio-economic activities according to gender and marital status; and workers’ labour hiring. n=166**

	THE FIRST COMPANY	THE THIRD COMPANY	THE SECOND COMPANY
<b>Do you have another job? = yes</b>	41%	21%	70%
<b>Gender of respondent</b>			
Male	60%	47%	74%
Female	40%	53%	26%
<b>Marital status of respondent</b>			
Married (Mono)	43%	53%	34%
Married (Poly)	21%	21%	50%
Widowed	2%	0	6%
Divorced	4%	5%	0
Separated	1%	0	0
Single	28%	21%	10%
<b>Do you hire labour outside of your own family?</b>			
Labour Hiring	24%	16%	52%

Source: Workers survey

70% of THE SECOND COMPANY workers and 41% of THE FIRST COMPANY’s workers reported having a second job. Most workers sought additional resources to complement their earnings from the farm. In the host village, I observed some of these working in other potato or cassava fields as *surgas* on afternoons (from 4pm to 7pm). They were paid an additional 2000 fcfa for this work, while women returned home mostly for unpaid domestic work.

In all three companies, males were more likely than women to work in more than one job: 74% more likely at THE SECOND COMPANY and 60% more likely at THE FIRST COMPANY. Most of the men I got to know, who were not working in export horticulture, told me that a single horticultural wage could not sustain their financial obligations as the head of household (*kilifë*), and thought that WHAT? was a “woman’s job”. As the above table shows, most of the people working in more than one job were in conjugal marital relation, regardless of their gender. A 32-year-old male non-farm worker from the host

village confirmed this during an interview: “*Someone, like me, who has daily expenses (dépense) of 5000 fcfa, cannot be accommodated with a day wage of 2000fcfa. I initially welcomed THE SECOND COMPANY because I wanted funding to develop my share of the land*” (Interview Tr1 <sup>252</sup>). Another 36-year-old worker, who had lived 8 years in host village for eight years and had worked at THE SECOND COMPANY for two months, testified that, “THE SECOND COMPANY is not good for a family man or an ambitious single man” (Oral history CW<sup>253</sup>). Despite recognising that THE SECOND COMPANY’s work was less physically demanding, he preferred working shorter hours. Another common trait of non/former-company workers I met was that they generally felt freer working for someone they knew well, who would be more flexible regarding working hours, and who would pay them immediately after their day of work (rather than at the end of the week or every fortnight as companies did. One of the non-THE SECOND COMPANY workers and two of non-THE FIRST COMPANY workers interviewed also perceived company work to be demeaning.

In all three companies, workers reporting multiple occupations were more likely to take up another job that did not take up much of their time to earn money for a specific purpose. A 57-year-old P day-worker at THE SECOND COMPANY also managed to work in the selling and buying of cattle (Interview DW3)<sup>254</sup>. He did not do this job all-year round, but mostly closer to national celebrations such as Eid. Some of the workers interviewed also reported taking up another job opportunistically, or for a specific objective. This was also the case for a 27-year-old Pulaar supervisor who, at the end of his day, worked at THE SECOND COMPANY, taking care of other people’s (Wolof clients’) cattle against a salary (interview)<sup>255</sup>. This worker was involved in agricultural work with his brothers, but because he was older than them (seniority rules), had more flexible working hours. Several other respondents, THE FIRST COMPANY workers (DW28<sup>256</sup>, DW31<sup>257</sup> and DW34<sup>258</sup>) also reported similar activities during interviews.

---

<sup>252</sup> 05/05/17

<sup>253</sup> 11/05/2017

<sup>254</sup> 05/05/2017

<sup>255</sup> 13/05/2017

<sup>256</sup> 04/11/2017

<sup>257</sup> 05/11/2017

<sup>258</sup> 05/11/2017



Women also made a significant part of this share: 26% of THE SECOND COMPANY workers, and 40% of THE FIRST COMPANY female workers, reported working in “other activities” though they only reported such additional activities after further probing and explaining that my question meant “work” at large. Interestingly some activities were not perceived as work, but as their “role” (*wall*) or “duties” (*wareef*) within the family or community (Interviews<sup>259</sup>).

In the villages around THE SECOND COMPANY, the main other socio-economic activities reported are explained in the table below. For women in rural settings, such as in the Saint-Louis villages, these included family farming, taking care of the cattle, selling food or milk, *gawe* collection, etc. In “peri-urban” areas around THE FIRST COMPANY, such as Saint-Louis, this included hairdressing, seam-stressing, etc. Hardly any of the women included unpaid work in their responses, for these are done to conform to patriarchal norms. Women socially performed that they can manage professional activities without household chores suffering from it. For male respondents, the most common types of other jobs were trading, driving and family-farming. Again, this demonstrated that farm wages, though above the national minimum income, were either insufficient to meet some workers expectations or, in the case of unpaid activities, were part of the social division of labour. Some additional jobs, although increasingly rare – such as helping to harvest vegetables (sweet potatoes and cassava mostly) at a neighbour’s farm (*gasaanu* or *gasaatu*) - represents in-kind remuneration, and/or is done to demonstrate solidarity with the given neighbour or family. Such activities of community self-help combine moral purpose, redistribution and material security. This “production and reproduction of solidarity” tends to disappear with the rise of new lifestyle aspirations and economic hardship (Dimé 2007-151-171, Fall 2007). These dynamics corroborate the suggestion that there is an increasing tension between working for oneself and caring for others (Li, 2014:81).

---

<sup>259</sup> Interviews held between 4 and 8 November 2017.

**Table 24: Glossary of most common jobs**

Mostly Female jobs	Mostly male jobs
<p>Family farming (mostly harvesting)  <i>Gasaatu</i> or <i>gasaanu</i>, Taking care of family cattle  <i>Ngoos</i>: clearing of the grass  <i>Mbindaanu</i>: working as a domestic worker (mostly female migrant working in another household)  <i>Sant</i>: working for neighbours of family for a short period  <i>Gawe</i> : collection of perfuming plant  <i>Sippi soow</i> : bartering milk against money or in-kind products                      Small scale commerce : food, shoes, perfume and other cosmetics, cloth and fabriks, underwear.  <i>bajanu gox</i>: older women community workers visiting sick people and pregnant women                      Trading with no physical shop.</p>	<p>Family farming                      Petty commodity production  <i>Bay waricce</i> : market-gardening of crops such as aubergines, sweet potato, butternut, cucumber, chili, and peanuts  <i>Njollere</i> : travelling to sell cattle  <i>Mangi</i> : following the cattle to graze them (pastoralists)  <i>Bay nawet</i> : cultivation during the rainy season  <i>Bay noor</i> : cultivation during spring  <i>Bay nawet ak noor</i> : both  <i>Mbayum dex</i> : agriculture irriguée                      Driving                      Cattle-breeding  <i>Surga</i>: Wage worker in a farm</p>

Source : Observation, informal conversations and interviews

There was also significant labour hiring, either paid or unpaid family labour, especially around THE SECOND COMPANY (51,61%) and THE FIRST COMPANY (23,61%). There was competition for selling markets between THE SECOND COMPANY and other local commodity producers who produce different crops. Consequently, this greater demand for increased labour productivity had resulted in higher competition for hiring labour. Consequently, this leads to the recruitment of migrant workers, *surga*. Forms of collective labour with sharecropping dimensions, such as “*bokk bay*”, were more prevalent in rural villages of Saint-Louis. This allowed petty commodity producers and/or workers, some of whom might be landless or in need of each other for the provision of capital and labour, to collaborate and share benefits later.

The link between multiple occupations and education is illustrated in the below tabulation.

#### 7.1.4. “Dem-Dem”<sup>260</sup>? Footloose labour on the road again

As discussed in chapter 3, Waalo and Kajoor are historically big outmigration regions. Here are the findings from the workers survey.

**Table 25: Gender and Migration n=164**

Current Migration (Have you migrated to come and settle at your current location?)	Male	Female	Total
<b>Yes</b>	27	54	81
	33	67	100.00
	49	51	100.00
<b>No</b>	31	52	83
	37.35	62.65	100.00
	53.45	49.06	100.00
<b>Total</b>	58	106	164
	35.37	64.63	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: Workers Survey

The first row of this table shows that **27 (33%) respondents** were male and **54** were female (67%). These figures confirm that women accounted for a larger share of migrant workers than men. The third row of the table indicates that both women (51%) and men (49%) were more or less equally likely to migrate. These figures underscore gender biases in historiography, as the masculinity of the labour force was taken for granted while women were relegated to the subsistence economy (Rodet 2008, 2009, Tandian 2012). Both the host villages of the second and first companies are known for female outmigration to Mauritania, Dakar and other urban areas, as illustrated in chapter 3. The table also shows that almost half of horticultural workers (81 respondents) had migrated to the place where they were interviewed, against 83 respondents who had not migrated. This illustrates the magnitude of migrant labour in the FFV sector in Northern Senegal.

<sup>260</sup> Title of a famous song by Youssou N'dour on the impetus some youth feel to leave at all costs.

**Table 26: Workers' Migration and School enrolment history n=164**

<b>Current Migration</b> (Have you migrated to come and settle at your current location?)	<b>Ed1</b> Have you ever been to school? <b>Yes</b>	<b>Ed1</b> Have you ever been to school? <b>No</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Yes</b>	55 68%	26 32%	81 100%
<b>No</b>	51 61%	32 39%	83 100%
<b>Total</b>	106 65%	58 35%	164 100%

Source: Workers survey

The above table shows that 68% of migrant workers went (at least) to primary school, against 61% of local workers. When it come to the reasons for migrating, 25 respondents migrated for work, out of whom 20 were male. 37 female migrant workers migrated to join the house of their husbands (*sëyi*), and 7 female respondents did so for “family reasons”. Indeed, previous studies have shown that women rarely migrate independently in search of paid work, but rather to marry or join kin (MackIntosh 1989), as patrilocality (joining the husband’s house) is still dominant in rural Northern Senegal (Diop 1985). What the data shows however is that patriarchal norms do not impede married women’s participation in rural wage labour. The possible reasons for this are examined in the following section.

**Table 27: Workers' Gender and Reasons for migrating n=75**

<b>Reason Current Migration</b> (Why did you migrated to come and settle at your current location?)	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Job</b>	20 80%	5 20%	25 100%
	83%	10%	33%
<b>Family</b>	2 22%	7 78%	9 100%
	8%	14%	12%
<b>Marital home</b>	0	37	37
	0	100%	100%
	0	72%	49%

<b>Other</b>	2	2	4
	50.00	50.00	100%
	8.33	3.92	5.33
<b>Total</b>	24	51	75
	32%	68%	100%
	100%	100%	100%

Source: Workers survey

This life story of a female horticultural worker brings to life much of the above-mentioned evidence:

*When I was young, my father had a shop in the second company's host village, and I would replace him when he went to the fields as I was his oldest daughter. My mother cultivated watermelons, beans and millet. Before, my father and my mother each had their field. She had land from her husband as she moved to her husband's home. She consumed with her family what she cultivated and the other part she sold. Everything she reaped belonged to her. Children of working age also had their share. In the morning men went to work on their father's fields, and in the evening, on their own field. Their father did not pay them but would provide for their food and shelter. My mother and I went to Mauritania 30 years or more ago to work there. I was a babysitter and she worked as a domestic worker "mbindaan". She sent her father a portion of her salary to help him. I could not help as much because of my low salary. Before leaving for Mauritania, I learned Arabic. In those days, it was difficult to find a job. Those who had a job found it in the fields. Shortly before the tragic "événements naar", my mother passed away. I therefore stopped going to Mauritania and went to St. Louis. I went there twice, staying there every time for a year to work as a domestic worker. Those days were gorgeous. I did not have children or anything, you only took care of yourself. What I earned allowed me to help my family while keeping a part for myself. I can now appreciate what that meant now that I am older and have a family to take care of (DW1<sup>261</sup>).*

This short excerpt reveals patterns of migration and scarcity of wage labour 30 years ago compared to today's more vibrant rural labour markets. As evidenced in chapter 3, pre

---

<sup>261</sup> 02/05/2017

and post-colonial labour migration in the Valley has been extensively documented, and Mauritania was one of the key destinations (Barry 2012; Cross 2013: 51; David 1980; Diop 1965; Manchuelle 1997). It also showcases the fascinating complexity of female workers' lives and the intricacy of work (paid and unpaid). For instance, how she "helped" (not considering it as "work") at her father's shop for him to appropriate her earnings and that of her siblings against food and cover; her mother's remittances to support her family. It also shows how tragic events made her change her destination of work. Finally, her nostalgia of her life as a single woman and the burden of unpaid care work.

### **7.1.5. Tell me what you own, and I will tell you your class and your gender!**

83% of THE FIRST COMPANY's workers and 62% of THE SECOND COMPANY's reported that their family had land, though more female workers than male reported so, as per the table below. In general, 13% of THE FIRST COMPANY workers and 17% of THE SECOND COMPANY's did report owning land of their own. This high number of workers sharing land with family, the high proportion of landless workers (personal lands) and multiple occupations suggests increased scarcity of land and exploitation without dispossession (Berry 1993).

#### **Table 28: Workers' type of Land Holdings (family or personal) n=164**

Source: Workers survey

The THE SECOND COMPANY case illustrates this. THE SECOND COMPANY received 200ha from the rural community, in much the same way as "local villagers" also received 200ha, without mention of how the land would be shared between individual recipients. My host family in the host village received in total 13.4ha which they shared with their cousins<sup>262</sup>. Following the land deal, the populations of these villages were grouped into GIEs led by community leaders to share the land. The head of my host family received 6ha whilst all the other married men in the family received either 0.5 or 0.55ha and other families also shared the land in this way. One of the two *Pulaar* villages (Al Wathiam) received in total 45ha. In both cases, women and unmarried men did not

---

<sup>262</sup> As I explained previously, there are three main families in the village, divided into different concessions and have had to relocate/separate after they built their own house

receive individual land titles but two female GIE were created and received collective land titles. This illustrates how shrinking land resources have been redistributed between families, contributing to reducing individual ownership of female and unmarried junior men who still have access to family land. The latter group's access to land was determined by their position in the family or kin group, with older, wealthier and high caste men being more likely to own/access/control land (Lastarria-Cornhiel 1997: 1320). Regarding women, previous research has shown that collective and/or customary land rights can offer them rights to access land, though access is not ownership (Carney and Watts 1990; Ossome 2014; Verma 2001; Wanyeki 2003).

**Table 29: Workers' Ownership of their current Accommodation according to Marital Status and Gender across the 3 companies. n=166**

		THE FIRST COMPANY		THE THIRD COMPANY		THE SECOND COMPANY		Grand Total
Gender	Stat Mat	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	
<b>F</b>	Divorced	1	2		1			4
	Married	6	9	1	2	5	11	34
	Married Poly	1	15		3	6	19	44
	Separated		1					1
	Single	5	7		2	2	2	18
	Widower		2				4	6
	<b>Total F</b>		<b>13</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>H</b>	Married	6	13	3	4	1	6	33
	Married Poly	1			1	1	7	10
	Single	6	5	2		3		16
	<b>Total H</b>		<b>13</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>13</b>

<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>166</b>	
--------------------	-----------	-----------	----------	-----------	-----------	-----------	------------	--

Source: Workers survey

Married women (78 respondents) were the largest group of women owning accommodation. This shows that landholding and property ownership was based on gender and marital status. These findings corroborate Tine and Sy<sup>263</sup>(2003), illustrating that women’s access to land is mostly shaped by their marital status and social networks.

**Photo 19: THE SECOND COMPANY April 2017 (scoping study). (Photograph by researcher)**

**Photo 20: THE SECOND COMPANY field workers during a break. October 2017. (Photograph by researcher)**



**Photo 21: A day as a The Third Company wage worker (1): In the Potato Lines. November 2017. (Photograph by researcher)**

<sup>263</sup> Their study compared the ways through which *Sereer*, *Wolof* and *Pulaar* women accessed land in Senegal.





**Photo 22: A day as a The Third Company wage worker (2): Breakfast time. November 2017. (Photograph by researcher)**

## 7.2. Engendering the “classes of labour”: Wage workers out of the invisible (Oral histories)

This section highlights the conditions of women workers who had been totally or partly incorporated in these capitalist enterprises. The focus is mostly on women because they constituted the majority of workers on these farms. It hopefully contributes to more nuanced yet radical approaches of casual wage workers, by focusing on the oral histories of a women and men under 45, some of whom were wage workers, others qualified workers or managers. Some were part of the workers survey, some others of the semi-structured interviews or FGD, purposively selected and presented here as they might present some key features of the world of work. In doing so, this study contributes to “*engendering agrarian political economy*”, whilst reflecting the diverse faces of “classes of labour”, sometimes statistically invisible (Chung 2017; Dancer & Tsikata 2015; Katz 2001; Razavi, 2009: 198; Sender et al. 1996).

Feminist scholars have critiqued the essentialising of rural African women in gender and development discourse (Cornwall et al 2007, 2008; Mohanty 1984; Oyewumi 1997). Mohanty’s *Under Western Eyes* highlights the ways in which “Third-World women” have often been presented “as a homogeneous ‘powerless’ group often located as implicit victims of particular socio-economic systems” (Mohanty 1984: 338). Similarly, Win (2004) highlights the focus in the development industry on “Very Poor, Powerless or Pregnant Women” and asks whether this tells the full and complex story of African women, and if this is the only woman development organisations should be concerned about. Other studies have sought to show the multidimensionality of African women by “lifting the blinkers” from the usual suspects of poverty, to show that divorced, single and poor women do take care of their children’s education (Sender et al. 2006), daughters of poor women are not always doomed to inherit deprivation, and women may indeed find some forms of emancipation through the labour market (Oya and Sender 2009; Van den Broeck et al. 2015, 2017a).

**1. Maajigeen**<sup>264\*</sup> is a 42-year old woman. Of her eight children, five were working at THE FIRST COMPANY. She had previously worked as ‘domestic help’ in another city,

---

<sup>264</sup> 13/06/2017

but stopped this when her father died. During fieldwork, she was living with two co-wives and her husband in a *concession*, comprising of 20-25 people. Before joining THE FIRST COMPANY, she sold fish from the River but gave up because this was not profitable. She then worked as a laundry woman and cook in another village. At THE FIRST COMPANY, she was working eight hours every day as a cleaner. She was initially a day-worker, weeding and harvesting. But, when after two days of working she had no money for her *dépense*, she decided to become a cleaner. After one year without a contract she became a permanent member of staff in 2012.

Her previous house flooded whenever it rained. Because her husband was old and not working, she rented a room. At the beginning, she started saving a small amount. When her salary increased, she started buying cement bricks and ended up building a room: “even if the roof still has problems and I still cannot fix it, it is my place”. She also told me that since she started working, there was a redistribution of household roles<sup>265</sup>. Maajigeen was earning between 86000 and 92000 FCFA.

**2. Zaynab<sup>266\*</sup>** is a 30-year woman who lives in village near THE FIRST COMPANY. During her first interview, she was single and living in a house left by her deceased father, along with her eight brothers and mother. Before joining THE FIRST COMPANY at 18, she had stopped school at primary level and used to weave mats (carpets), or work on leather. At THE FIRST COMPANY, she started as a day-worker on asparagus, then was moved to the packing house. She was been a permanent worker for one year, sorting and packaging sweet potatoes, corn and butternut. Her daily working hours were 7am-2pm, but during the sweet corn season she could be made to finish at 7pm. She preferred working at THE FIRST COMPANY because, as a single woman, she did not want to stay at home and depend on her mother and brothers. Her monthly salary was between 75,000 and 80,000 CFA Francs. She would share it with her mother, spending it on rent and on herself. Working on the farm was also useful in allowing her and her family free to access the company clinic.

---

<sup>265</sup> “Thanks to God my husband took care of the children and most of the domestic labour when they were younger, and I went to work: I thank him. My husband is glad that I work and says: “focus on your work and don’t listen to anyone.”

<sup>266</sup> 19/06/2017 and 13/11/2017

Most of the active population of her village were working at THE FIRST COMPANY, including four people from her house. However, she said she was struggling to make ends meet (*taqale*): “But I must admit things are better now: I have taken over from my mum because I have a secure, permanent job. We are here from six to three pm with a 30-minute break. You stand the whole time, supervisors shout at you, and you are not allowed to sit, you are fired if you do.”

When I interviewed Zaynab for the second time four months later, she was married and permanently employed. She wanted to continue working but her husband was not keen.

**3.Codou<sup>267\*</sup>** was one of the female breakfast sellers at THE SECOND COMPANY. She had never worked before and started as an agricultural worker. She later joined the canteen to serve breakfast, after receiving hygiene training. At 44, Codou considered herself lucky: her work enabled her to manage her household while earning an income and becoming autonomous. Her working hours at THE SECOND COMPANY were 9am-11am. Before that she would sell breakfast (eggs, pasta, tuna sauce, mayonnaise, coffee and bread coming from Richard-Toll, and millet porridge) between 6 and 8am.

**4.Marie<sup>268\*</sup>** is a 29-year single woman and lives in another city for work, separate from her six brothers, sisters and her parents. She holds a Bachelor’s Degree from the University of Dakar, and after an internship, worked for a producer of FFVs in the Niayes. She joined THE FIRST COMPANY in 2014 as a farm supervisor. She was supervising between 15 and 35 people, 50 during the peak season. Sometimes more senior men were credited for her work. She found the management staff to be better treated than the production staff. Works from 7 am to 2pm, she told me she has to run after people to try and have them do what they are supposed to. With regards to her gender and age, she said her staff respect her because she is not there to show she is the boss but to listen and make herself available. She was earning FCFA 200,000 net and took the company bus to work. She would eat the bread distributed by the company for breakfast but ate lunch at home after work between 2 or 3pm. She managed her salary, splitting it between her personal expenses and the needs of her family. She was also saving a small amount at the bank.

---

<sup>267</sup> 05/05/2017

<sup>268</sup> 19/06/2017 and 13/11/2017

Her salary, she told me, was all accounted for before it even reached her account. Thus, she hoped for a salary raise. She would visit her family every 2-3 months.

During a follow-up interview three months later, Marie was working in the same position. Her young female manager had left, and she took over her responsibilities in another farm in addition to her responsibilities at the greenhouse. She said she is having a hard time finding her place. The direction had brought in new staff and were asking her to collaborate with them until December. Following this, they had promised to evaluate her so that she might become chief of the farm. Despite the additional workload, her salary had not increased, nor her contract amended. She told me that she would leave the farm if she finds another job because she can clearly see she is being asked to train the one who will take over from her despite being less qualified.

**5.Mbougar\*<sup>269</sup>** is a 36-year-old male migrant worker from Touba. He had three children and had been married for nine years. His family stayed in Touba, where he would work as a street vendor from June to the end of September every year. He migrated to the second company's host village eight years ago where he was still living and working the rest of the year as a surge in a potato farm. He worked at THE SECOND COMPANY in 2015, but only for a few months. He worked from 3am to 11am at his current farm and was free the rest of the day. He was staying at a friend's house, which was home to nine family members.

**6.Hamet\*<sup>270</sup>** was 40 years-old and married with three children. He was from one of the Maureish village next to THE FIRST COMPANY. He learned Quran, then stopped primary school before finishing it. Then he went to Dakar, where his father worked to learn a trade when he was 15 years old and returned to his village at 21, before moving to Fatick where he stayed until he was 33 because he heard of THE FIRST COMPANY. He started there as a day-worker and 2 years later was offered a fixed-term contract. However, he had issues with his management and was dismissed for two months before being called back. He had to start again as a day-worker and five months later was offered

---

<sup>269</sup> 02/05/2017

<sup>270</sup> 19/06/2017

a permanent contract as a supervisor. He was able to build a four-bedroom house in his village.

**7.Maïga**<sup>\*271</sup> was aged 16 and single. He had been working for The Third Company for three months. He is from Rosso and joined his brother who had also arrived to work at the farm a year before. He was previously a tailor before but was happy to be paid 3500 FCFA per day to manage one of the center pivot -irrigation

**8.Sobel**<sup>\*272</sup> was 26 years-old on his papers but really was 31. He was a migrant worker from Kaolack and had joined THE SECOND COMPANY in 2013 as a day-worker. During fieldwork, he was a supervisor because of his hard work, but also because of being from the same village as one of the senior managers. He said he has acquired new skills at THE SECOND COMPANY and the company sent him to England for 10 weeks a few years ago for a training. He was married and had one child, but his wife was still living in his native village. He said he is an example of integration as he met his wife at THE SECOND COMPANY and she is from one of the neighbouring villages. He was living with a colleague at THE SECOND COMPANY but has asked for a private room so his wife (who was also working at THE SECOND COMPANY) could join him permanently. He said he returns to Kaolack for one month every year to visit his family and sometimes helps cultivate the family farm. Every month, when he received his salary of 200000 (sometimes he has a bonus and does additional hours), he would save 20000 FCFA, send 120000 to his family, pay 15000 FCFA for lunch (with a family in a nearby village), leave 10000 FCFA at the *boutique* for his groceries, and keep the rest for his other expenses. He did not have any loans.

**9.Boury**\* was 24, single, and had worked at THE FIRST COMPANY as the chief of a farm for 5 months. When I contacted her via Skype three months after our interview she was working in another farm in another country. She attended a prestigious university in another country, then returned to Senegal. After that, she started her Bachelors in Senegal before being admitted in Agronomy at a University abroad where she spent a few years. As a family member was working at THE FIRST COMPANY, she applied for an

---

<sup>271</sup> 21/11/2017

<sup>272</sup> 19/05 2017 and 26/10/2017

internship there, and joined in 2016. After finishing her BA in 2016, she returned to Senegal and started at THE FIRST COMPANY due to a friend of her father who gave her CV to the director. She started as an intern and was hired after a few months as a chief of farm on a permanent contract.

What she liked most about the company, she told me, is that it is investing in her country, in the city she grew up in and she can give back to her community. The company was creating employment through using the soil, and she is passionate about agronomy. There was some rivalry with colleagues who started at the bottom of the ladder with no degree but with experience. She had a degree but no experience and was younger, therefore they did not accept her. She did not feel comfortable and had not expected that. She was living in her father's house with seven other family members. She was earning more than them, 500,000 FCFA plus a housing allowance of 150,000 FCFA. She was not eating at the company. Her concerns were for the environment as before the company: she was worried that if the company leaves there will be contamination and fungal diseases that might affect both the people and the cattle.



**Photo 23: Zaynab's mom & her friends working on the leather before evening near THE FIRST COMPANY. May 2017. (Photograph by researcher)**

**Photo 24: Boury used to managed one of these teams in THE FIRST COMPANY's fields. April 2017 (scoping study). (Photograph by researcher)**

**Photo 25: Breakfast time at THE SECOND COMPANY: Workers gather around Codou and other sellers' stalls in front of the packing house. May 2017. (Photograph by researcher)**

This section illustrates that being a wage-worker represents for some a great opportunity to access a sustainable and reliable source of livelihood without having to migrate for work. This was the case for Maajigeen, Zaynab and Hamet for whom not having to travel is important as they have a vivid memory of relatives having to travel for work. Some female participants were not sure they could take the same decision and leave their family behind, neither were they sure their male relatives would let them travel. The situation of Boury and Marie, both below 30, single *footloose and fancy-free* was quite singular as they were living by themselves. Marie, Maïga, Sobel, and Mbougar were migrant workers. While the first represented the face of migration of urban educated workers, the others represented the more traditional type of labour migration from previous groundnut centres (Kaolack and Touba) to horticultural labour markets with a huge contribution in remittances to their native villages. These stories also highlight less rosier aspects of estates monopolising livelihood opportunities in the areas where they establish themselves. By becoming a company town, they acquire the power to manage and discipline, hire and fire, coerce or reward.

These stories exemplify the many working lives these women and men have had in one life. Sometimes these shifts in their *work* was due to an adverse event in their personal life (death of male significant others, Maajigen and Zainab, inability of Maajigen's husband to work led to shifts in gender roles, etc.) or just mundane migrant labour in the case of Mbougar who still lives between Touba and the second company's host village. They highlight the financial emancipation they have gained with their work: Zainab and Maajigeen, for instance occupy the role of an honorary male *borom kër*, which is rarer for Zainab, then a single woman. Yet, she now faces an uncertain working future due to her newly-wed status which means she is under the responsibility of her *borom kër*. Codou manages to combine jobs, and yet limits her paid work to half a day. There is also the risk of, once again, falling below the poverty line for women such as Maajigen.



Maajigen for instance earns much above the minimum wage, but what will happen to her and her family if for any reason she stops working?

It is also worth noting that from the highest earning to the lowest, all the respondents invested significant parts of their earnings in their families (children's education, 17-year-old son's wedding, supporting their *borom kër*, etc). Those who earned higher incomes in the fields or the packhouse, such as Boury and Marie, despite being more educated and from urban centres, still faced additional though different charges: accommodation, maintenance, groceries.

Finally, what seems an essential conclusion of these working oral histories is that they illustrate the real extent of the already on-going capitalisation of life which the land rush seems to have exacerbated. Exacerbated, because they were 'hustling' before the farm to earn an income but are now dependent on this horticultural economy for regular income. Another striking conclusion is to be found in the ways in which exploitation without dispossession (Berry 1993) cohabits almost unexceptionally with continued social differentiation between winners and losers of land deals, with some winning an income and losing at the same time forest resources for example.

### 7.3. Discussing Class, Gender, and Social reproduction

Companies discourses insist on the importance of gender equality and enabling women to stay close to their families (therefore insisting on their roles as *housewives*) to reduce “*noorani*”, the seasonal migration to nearby cities. In doing so, THE SECOND COMPANY and SengIndia follow a common pattern in export horticultural production perceiving female workers as more docile, more conscientious and with “nimble fingers” (Elson and Pearson 1981: 93). During an FGD<sup>273</sup> with five of THE FIRST COMPANY’s female mid-level managers aged between 24 and 39, they reported having heard one of the company senior managers say that “women have a rigor and honesty that men don’t have”, most concluding by this that he was a feminist. As argued by Elson and Pearson, the process through which women acquire more dexterity and become more docile is not natural but the result of training (ibid; Mbilinyi 1986; Whitehead 1979), which results in the subordination of women to capitalist patriarchies.

#### **An urban exodus?**

As illustrated by Boury and Marie, there seems to be an inverse migration of young and skilled labour from urban areas to rural areas. The reasons for this reverse labour migration are, however, diverse. I asked the question: “why have you chosen to work for THE FIRST COMPANY?” in an FGD with five female THE FIRST COMPANY workers (middle managers)<sup>274</sup>, aged between 24 and 39. The responses were: “I have worked far from where I was from, so wanted to return home”, “my training is in line with experience proposed at THE FIRST COMPANY”, “I wanted to work for a company with social values”, “I needed a job after my internship”. Despite earning more, they seemed to be facing different professional challenges, of having their leadership and skills recognised and accepted, especially by their male counterparts. Marie, in particular, recognised that “working in the office” is more socially valued and rewarded than being “in the fields”, illustrating the social differentiation that also exists “up the ladder”. Three of them, the youngest, found it difficult to adapt to the company’s culture: “there is a tension between your qualifications and how you need to approach people in order to do and deliver your work objectives”, “there are too many informal norms you have to adapt

---

<sup>274</sup> FGD4 (08/06/2017): 3 permanent and 2 seasonal staff

to that were not on the job description”, “ sometimes you are asked to train people, and you know they might just become your boss, it has already happened”.

Despite these challenges, they all reported having acquired new skills, though often in the hard way because of the high degree of misogyny: “Men workers doubt our capability and experience. When I gave directives, they would go to other (male) supervisors to confirm the order...”. To counter this, they had developed strategies: “As a woman, you have to do twice as much and work harder”. “Be punctual and assiduous, doing additional hours so no one doubts your competency. And as a result, you don’t have time, you don’t have a private life, I have been trying to have a child with my husband and even the engines we drive may and the products we use in the fields may put us at risk”. Marital status also mattered in how women were treated: “And when you are single, you raise another form of suspicion or are subjected to harassment”. “Even when you smile too much, they think they can try their luck with you.” (ibid). As evidenced by several studies, female workers indeed face gender specific challenges in horticultural value chains which include:

*Occupational segregation, low pay, precarious work (casual and informal), poor access to maternity rights and childcare, poor education and skills training, long working hours combined with significant care responsibilities, discrimination and sexual harassment.* (Barrientos & Pallangyo 2018: 7).

## **Sexual harassment and sexism**

Three frequently repeated stories in two different farms were told to me. The first was that of a Senegalese manager who, despite being married, asked young women from the village to visit him in his flat. Women who refused would face “professional punishment” later (conversations). A case of attempted rape had also emerged during my research. Narratives that “Indians like women” and “they make us advances” have also been reported (Immersion at THE THIRD COMPANY<sup>275</sup>). In all three cases, the accused was not from the village in which the farm was located: two were local migrants, one a senior

---

<sup>275</sup> 21/11/17

member of staff and one a mid-level permanent worker, as well stories about international staff<sup>276</sup>.

### **Workers combining jobs**

As shown by survey data and discussed in the previous section, many workers such as Coudou, Mayram, Satou, Sobel and Mbougar, had several jobs. Most of the second company's host village women work on their husband's land from December to January. At THE SECOND COMPANY, there were also horticultural workers such as Mariétou<sup>277\*</sup>, a migrant from another African country, who prepared *beignets* (fritters) to sell during the break, before returning home after work to prepare meals for herself and her husband (also a migrant worker). Mbougar and Sobel's cases are also compelling, as they illustrate urban-rural straddling or how male horticultural workers keep one foot in the countryside and one foot in the city to claim land or property or take part in the political life of their native villages (Boone 2014: 50)

### **Appropriating women and junior horticultural workers' wages?**

Some of the junior men and women (*surga*) I met gave part of their income to older men or reinvested it in the household. The oldest son of the *Wolof* family with whom I stayed (and this was also true for some of his friends I observed) was pressured by his parents to earn an income and support the family. Having worked at THE SECOND COMPANY for over six years, he wished he could leave the farm and do something else. He resigned twice but his father always found a way to get him to agree to resume work because his income was valuable to the family. This policing to respect the patriarchal contract is in line with Diop's analysis of the social status of single junior men in the Waalo, and the difficulty for them to become autonomous because they still rely on the head of household's daily *dépense* meals and accommodation (Diop 1985: 170-171). Control over the labour of others was key to patriarchal power and authority in traditional agricultural societies (Linares 1992; O'Laughlin 2001; Sender and Smith 1986: 39; Sow 1992; Tsikata 2016; Whitehead 2001,).

---

<sup>276</sup> I, too, was subjected to advances twice, first by a senior member of staff and secondly a worker I had frequent discussions with, and who started visiting me where I lived. As Neveu-Kringelbach (2016) states "for a female researcher, her reputation is her most valuable asset". I asked the worker to stop visiting me.

<sup>277</sup> 26/10/2017

For the *borom kër* and older men who overtly demanded a financial contribution from junior *surga*, and more covertly from their working wives, success was measured by the size of the house and land, the number of wives, household and agricultural equipment, quality of meals and means of transportation.

Older women also re-invested part of their earnings in the household. During interview, most of the married women said it was important to use the money to “please their husband” (DW22)<sup>278</sup> (which has deep roots in how girls and women are socialised in Senegal) and take care of their children’s education and food. The rest of the money went to equipping their room, taking part in the women’s tontine (*natt*), and re-investing in their other parallel socio-economic activities, mostly of social redistribution during ceremonies (Diop 1985). How women and young men’s money was spent sometimes created tensions with the *borom kër*, causing women to surrender control over their earnings - another way to “re-instate the male breadwinner” (Kabeer 1997: 277).

The above highlights the need to pay closer attention to intra-household dynamics and livelihood strategies, as well as the impacts of agricultural commodification, to understand women’s increased participation in irrigation agriculture in the Delta and River Valley Region (Nation 2009). Indeed, feminist scholars such as Johnston (1997: 219) have suggested that participation in wage labour cannot be analysed purely “in relationship to “the household”, but must consider “the historical, social and cultural relationship forces that determine gendered production”.

### **Dilemmas in Women’s work and patriarchal (conjugal) contracts**

Participation in labour markets and domestic labour is shaped by complex social relations. Most women interviewed highlighted that working hours at horticultural farms are incompatible with their domestic duties. This interview with a 34-year married woman ascertains this: “If you are a single woman, it can work. My husband refused to let me start early. In addition, I did not have anyone to help me with the kids. But once they are

---

<sup>278</sup> 25/10/2017

old enough, I will return to work at THE SECOND COMPANY”<sup>279</sup>. DW13<sup>280</sup>, 27, said that her husband did not like her working hours, but he let her work because she interrupted her studies for him. When I met with her four months later, she was pregnant and had stopped working at THE SECOND COMPANY. This contrasts with the findings of a previous study in Mozambique whereby a large proportion of women labourers were divorced or widowed, suggesting that their labour market participation was facilitated or pushed by the breakdown in conjugal ties and the absence of patriarchal control (Oya and Sender 2009). The lower divorce rate in rural Senegal can be explained by socio-cultural norms<sup>281</sup> (Diop 1985: 210), which confirms that female workers feared or experienced being refused wage work by their male partners (Sender et al. 2006).

Even the language used suggested working outside was still not socially accepted: “I help on my husband’s farm, but I also “steal time<sup>282</sup>” to work at the company a few days.” (Interview DW24<sup>283</sup>, THE SECOND COMPANY Worker). This substantiates previous studies in Bangladesh considering women’s income as “a supplement, a form of helping out” (Kabeer 1997: 273). Another female THE SECOND COMPANY worker told me in a resigned tone, “But what can we do? One with family responsibilities cannot complain.” (Interview DW1<sup>284</sup>). This illustrates the tension between working for wages and taking part in “family labour” or helping neighbours as used to be the case in the Saloum and the Gambia. Indeed, collective groups of workers sometimes called “*santaane*” were set up to provide farming labour for other group members without salary, though food and drinks were provided (Fall 2011: 46). This tension has been well described as one between profit-making or caring for others (Li 2014: 8)

My interviews with their male family members also suggest they were not very happy with the working hours, and some suggested it did not reduce their expenses: “I still give her 250 FCFA for breakfast and 250FCFA for the tea<sup>285</sup>”). Even the THE FIRST

---

<sup>279</sup> Conversation with a THE SECOND COMPANY former worker 22/05/2017

<sup>280</sup> 23/07/ 2017

<sup>281</sup> Because” it is easier t get married than get divorced” (Diop 1985:210)

<sup>282</sup> *sacce*

<sup>283</sup> 28/10/2017

<sup>284</sup> 02/05/2017 “*Borom njaboot xamuli jambatt*”

<sup>285</sup> *Ataya*, the local tea is very respected in Waalo and women, even when they worked, needed to be home in time to prepare tea for their husband and his friends.

COMPANY night bus driver confirmed issues of trust between husbands and wives due to the working hours as he testifies with the change in working hours:

*When we wanted to change the organization of work to put 2 because until 15h and 15h and 23h, it was very difficult and we had to raise the awareness of husbands. Similarly, for the night harvest shift starting at 3am, we have to collect and bring back everyone to work. I was told by the leadership to wait until the head of the family had confirmed that the woman has returned. (Interview SW21, 16/06/2017)*

This illustrates how paternalist companies also complied with patriarchal rules in order, once again, not to jeopardise their housewives-workers labour participation.

This situation leads female workers to seek the help of relatives or neighbours to be able to participate in wage labour as illustrated by the case of the 29-year-old divorced female worker who resorted to paying a family member to look after her daughter so she could work at the farm (Interview DW6)<sup>286</sup>. Consequently, other women are increasingly involved in domestic chores, as well as husbands and older men, showing how women's social reproduction activities still shape their participation in the labour market in these areas. This substantiates previous studies, suggesting that, in order to combine wage and domestic labour, women reorganise the burden of domestic labour by sharing it with other (mostly female) family members including daughters or co-wives or neighbours (Gadio et al. 1999; Mackintosh 1989: 79; Nation 1997). Again, this illustrates that women and children bear the brunt of the absence of public services of childcare. Despite the supposed existence of 28 publicly funded *Cases des tous-petits*<sup>287</sup>, the state-funded early childhood programme in Saint-Louis (ANSD 2015:28), there were none in the areas of research<sup>288</sup>. Only THE SECOND COMPANY's private nursery existed around the second company's host village and incorporated only a few children from the village (25 on the day I visited). In the areas next to THE FIRST COMPANY, there were far more private nurseries<sup>289</sup> as it was less rural than the second and third company's host villages.

---

<sup>286</sup> 10/05/2017

<sup>287</sup> These were launched in 2000 and were supposed to welcome 0-6years.

<sup>288</sup> The same study distinguishes the *Cases des tous-petits* with other publicly funded childcare programmes, the number of which was 0 in 2015 against 52 private ones (ANSD 2015:29)

<sup>289</sup> For instance, there was the nursery of the University Gaston Berger (for staff and students), where I was able to leave my child during fieldwork as I was affiliated with one of the University's research centres.

## **Markets -as- a road to emancipation or markets-for continued exploitation ?**

Expenses are increasingly shared within the family, adding to women's bargaining power. This economic pressure on men to be the male breadwinner, responsible for providing *dépense*, encourages them to approve women's (mostly wives') participation in rural wage labour. A 23-year-old THE FIRST COMPANY worker from Saint-Louis confirmed this:

*Before THE FIRST COMPANY, I was staying at home, penniless, waiting for my husband who lives in Dakar to send me money. And I could not ask my aunt whom I stay with. Now even if he does not send me money, I cover my own expenses. When he was marrying me, he did not want me to work, but now that I am helping him, he cannot tell me anything (Interview SW18, 19/06/2017).*

This increase in women's bargaining power due to their "perceived contribution" (Kabeer 1997: 272) confirms partially the empowerment and poverty reduction potential of employment in horticulture (Doss 2013; Maertens and Swinnens 2012,). Yet, this might also reflect distress participation in wage employment as studies have shown, explaining why women accept lower wages in off-farm employment: "where the income potential of their own production is low, where the income generating opportunities off farm are few, or give low returns to labour, and where there is urgent need" (Whitehead and Kabeer 2001: 16). This is illustrated by this interview (SW12)<sup>290</sup> with a 23-year-old seasonal THE FIRST COMPANY worker sorting potatoes and butternuts. She 'dropped out' of secondary school in 2013 because she became pregnant after marriage. She was obliged to find a job because her husband has a serious condition and couldn't work, and she lived with her son and husband's family. She started as a day-worker in another horticultural farm, in 2015, then at THE FIRST COMPANY as a day-worker. While the job allowed her to cover her and her son's expenses, help her husband and her own parents, she claimed it was still difficult for her to make ends meet. Therefore, she was not part of any *tontine*, and could not save any money. This illustrates how through being

---

<sup>290</sup> 20/06/2016



a *housewife*, embedded in a complex set of redistributive social relations, she became dependent on wage labour.

Indeed as illustrated above in the section on multiple occupations and care work, women's work also defines their womanhood – on which depends them being perceived as “good” women or mothers serving the male head of household (*borom kër*) or master of the food (*borom njël*) (Diop 1981, 1985). This is summed up by popular expressions of “*mën sa kër*”, “*jonge*” (Biaya 2001) and “*Mokk pooj*” (Gilbert 2019), all referring to women's art of pleasing one's husband and family. Based on their patriarchal conjugal contract, women are socially praised and empowered as “good women” or blamed and socially “disempowered” as “bad women” or “bitches” (Mies 2014: 120-125; Perry 2005: 217). In addition, women do not always equate these relations to their subjugation by/to men (Linares 1991) as “labour effort in terms of being part of a natural order to ensure adequate food production and basic survival of their dependents and themselves”. For Bryceson, this has more to do with “force of habit, rather than male coercion” and is part of the social division of labour (Bryceson 1995: 14). Colonial administrations contributed to shaping the gendered division of labour, involving mainly male labour in the extraction of raw materials and promoting agricultural commodity production. This gendered division of labour increased with the conversion of land from food to cash crops in the Gambia, for example (Carney and Whatts 1991). It was during the 1960s that additional forms of associative labour organised along gender, age or social status or residential criteria emerged in Senegal's Lower Casamance (Linares 1991: 132). But very quickly, individual labour became more common than collective working groups.

This tension between the empowering potential of work and its alienating dimensions has been central to Mies' concept of “housewifisation” (1986)<sup>291</sup>. Employers, the new paternalistic father figure, deliberately use a new form of “housewifisation”, not to exclude women from wage work but to subordinate them to it. In doing so, capitalist patriarchies transpose the values of the family to that of the firm, “the second family”,

---

<sup>291</sup> It described how in the 19th century Scottish lace makers taught poor Southern Indian women to make lace in their homes only for the final product to be sold in Western markets (Europe, Australia and the US). The industry used the labour-power of women as piece workers in the domestic sphere for free, thus enabling industry to accumulate more capital. I propose with Mies (2014) that “housewifisation” has extended its domain from the household to the company town using private paternalism to make the firm resemble a household.

which is built on values of “trust” and “co-development”. Capitalist-patriarchy pretends to concentrate its efforts on “leaving no one behind” as per the new development zeitgeist of “inclusivity”. The problem, I argue here, is not one of women being excluded from labour as in 19<sup>th</sup> century Scotland, but rather of the ways in which capitalism includes them (Mies 2014: 116-117), or “*adversely* incorporates” them (Du Toit 2004; Hall 2011; McCarthy 2010) and exploits their labour without formally dispossessing them (at least just a few of them), while not ascribing the correct *value* to their labour, a value that would be at least equivalent to the price the product of their labour is sold at in *Tesco* or *Waitrose*.

This reflects the ways in which patriarchy-capitalism extends its paternalism to villages through CSR, making workers dependent on wages in the horticultural commodity chain, and leading female workers (on whose labour power the capitalist system’s survival depends) to perceive themselves first as housewives and accessorially as workers. In doing so, the companies undermine female workers’ class consciousness and minimise their power to organise from a *class in itself* to a *class for itself*.

### **Un-disciplining and renegotiating wage work conditions**

The disciplining of women workers is nothing new in Senegal (Baglioni 2018; Mackintosh 1989), Tanzania (Mbilinyi 1986, 2016), or even Kenya (Dolan 2001). Female wage workers are asked to conform to paternalistic rules in the workplace: “do not sit down”, “do not talk”, “the way you tied the onion is not good, re-do it”. Agricultural companies create standards and rules for the “good” female worker the same way the patriarchal conjugal contract ask them to humble themselves. With their allegedly *nimble fingers*, female workers are asked to deliver “fresh” against a wage.

Despite all this disciplining, women find ways to renegotiate their working hours/conditions whenever possible. Observation and total immersion allowed me to grasp how female workers would deploy an arsenal of strategies to counter their rigid disciplining using everyday form of resistance (Scott 1985), as illustrated in the following examples. Some young mothers who were not allowed to bring their breastfeeding baby to the fields, as young children were not allowed in the farms, would either go home during the break or have a family member bring their child to the company gate to be fed.

Furthermore, some female workers, especially those in conjugal monogamous relations and young mothers, began shaping their work hours to accommodate their productive and social reproductive duties. This was especially the case if it was their turn to prepare the family meal (*njël*). They would invariably go missing during their break which led the management at THE SECOND COMPANY to comment that “workers lack the basic notions of the culture of enterprise” (Interview SMP2<sup>292</sup>). As a response, supervisors started to be more flexible to keep their labour force, yet still pretending these were “exceptional favours” to workers. This highlights the use of corporate paternalism and patriarchies to control, discipline, and punish<sup>293</sup> labour. The above examples ascertain the centrality of negotiability in labour relations, especially when workers resort to subtle and hidden *weapons of the weak* to force the management to officially accommodate their demands (Scott 1985). The companies did so while still attempting to show they are in control.

## **Partial conclusion**

The main objective of this section was to explain the social relations of labour in the rural horticultural economy. The evidence presented implies that patriarchal norms in Senegal, at least in this region, do not militate against women’s labour market participation, rather they may even encourage it. Nonetheless, women’s social reproductive burden and marital status still shapes participation in labour markets. There is a tension between compulsion to work for economic reasons and the empowerment and emancipatory potential of being a working woman, illustrating the tension between market- as-opportunity to market- as-compulsion (Brenner 2002). This could mean a greater autonomy for these women or on the contrary, their significant others: fathers, husbands or other male relatives consider this as a normal aspect of the household division of labour. While this can be an outcome of the so-called crisis of masculinity (Perry 2005), or just an evolution towards greater gender equality, this mutually co-exists with the crisis of social reproduction itself, not least a crisis of care (Fraser 2017). In any case, the above has shown that more women are earning cash in plantations - as long as this doesn’t

---

<sup>292</sup> 26/10/17

<sup>293</sup> Through salary cuts, or suspensions from the farm.

compromise their basic reproductive activities and they contribute in household expenses - which increases their market dependence.

Therefore, while not undermining the transformative effects of participation in agricultural wage labour, this discussion's main purpose was to highlight a central contradiction and uncover labour management systems and *technologies* (in a Foucauldian sense) to make women's work worth less, while subjugating further to markets. How do we make these expanding markets fairer to women who are its reserve army of labour?

## **UNPACKING OUTCOMES (2): SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION FROM ABOVE (CLASSES OF CAPITAL)**

It is urgent to analyse the multiple kind of other capitals generated by investments in horticulture. In the land grab literature, one of the main key questions Oya (2013b) has raised is whether the land rush reflects a ‘return’ to the agrarian question of capital, in the sense of a renewed interest in the development of capitalist agriculture as an aspect of broader capitalist development. This leads to empirical questions on whether the land rush has accelerated agrarian change, which would actually still represent a rather slow and short parenthesis in the long history of Waalo and Kajoor. That constitutes the focus of this section.

### **7.4. Querying “emerging” classes of capital**

Analysing the nexus between labour exploitation and surplus appropriation in relation to production has been proposed as a method for understanding class formation. Patnaik (1976)<sup>294</sup>, for instance, rejected farm size as a basis of analysis and constructed a labour-exploitation index by classifying peasant households into class groups reflecting the relations of production, hence of economic strength. This allowed her to identify six class categories in Haryana, South Asia (1987). Patnaik’s intuition was followed by other political economists (e.g. Akram Lodhi 1993; Deere and de Janvry 1979). However, Oya’s (2001, 2002, 2007) studies in the Senegalese Groundnut Basin are more relevant to our query, as he was able to classify large and middle scale farmers into groupings of non-capitalist farmers, semi-capitalist farmers and capitalist farmers. Through the construction of “heuristic devices”, he complemented the two criteria mostly used by

---

<sup>294</sup> Following the steps of Lenin (1964) and his three indices: i) ownership of land and other means of production, ii) basis of production dependent on type of labour hiring, and iii) farm’s ability to generate a sufficient surplus for satisfying consumption requirements, investment and depreciation (Lenin 1968) – see also Kautsky 1987.

historical materialists: “(i) the nature of labour appropriation, that is, forms of labour mobilisation and labour surplus appropriation, and (ii) the degree of reliance on their own means of production (including land) as opposed to labour-power.” (Oya 2002, Oya 2004: 303–304) with the degree of capitalisation, education and wealth and distribution of possessions (2001: 132). This method allowed him to reveal dynamics of class formation and patterns of accumulation “from below” or “from above” by paying attention to the ways in which land is acquired, labour mobilised, and capital accumulated (ibid.). Considering this, I set to analyse these new classes of capital.

The data presented in this section was purposively was purposively collected from the survey and semi-structured interviews by targeting those who declared to be capitalists, had land and other productive assets, hired surplus labour in addition to exploiting family labour, had a replacement fund to grow their business, invested in their children’s education (for those who had children). Those who met the above criteria from the survey and semi-structured interviews. It reveals the following socio-demographics of the 18 respondents: 80% of the potential “rural capitalists” were in polygynous relationships and 83% were over 40 years of age. 77% had on average 5.7 children who were in one way or another involved in their businesses, as well as their spouses. Seven out of the 18 had attended school, four reaching high school level and at least three with a university degree.

**Table 30: Rural accumulators’ marital status n=15**

<b>StatMat</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Cum.</b>
<b>Married</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>13%</b>	<b>13%</b>
<b>Poly</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>80%</b>	<b>93%</b>
<b>Single</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>7%</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>100%</b>	

Source: Semi-structured interviews and survey

Questioning who employs migrant labour can allow us to uncover different classes of capital. As Ba (1996a: 27) suggests, “*In the Valley, the question is not why migrants leave but why the non-migrants stay*”. The above table shows that on average, 11 of the 15 capitalists (73%) had employed six workers. 64% of these rural capitalists had at least two workers and only 27 % had more than 10 workers.

**Table 31: Rural accumulators’ labour hiring (of non-family-members) n=11**

<b>Workers</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Cum.</b>
1	1	9%	9%
2	2	18%	27%
3	1	9%	36%
5	3	27%	64%
9	1	9%	73%
10	1	9%	82%
17	1	9%	91%
20	1	9%	100%
<b>Total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>100%</b>	

Source: Semi-structured interviews and workers’ survey

This suggests that the majority of respondents are examples of small-scale rural accumulators. The middle-larger scale ones being those who were already capitalist before the rush, but who had gone stronger by diversifying their portfolio and seizing market opportunities arising for agricultural investments. In order to grow their business, they needed surplus labour. However, labour hiring is not all that matters: we know with Oya (2013b) that the degree and level of capitalisation matters, as well as type of crop, use of land, agro-ecological context. Most of the respondents were growing FFVs and some of them were engaged in ‘side’ activities.

## **7.5. “Emerging” and “old” classes of capital: A selection of oral histories**

I conducted interviews with “newer” entrepreneurs and owners of businesses that emerged after the deal and “older” ones who were already capitalists before the rush but who had had new expansion opportunities as entrepreneurs. The oral histories of these individuals with characteristics of petty-commodity producers/capitalists are presented below. While the list of interviews is attached, some of the capitalists were interviewed in other qualities (community leader, politician, worker), but further purposive analysis of survey and semi-structured interview data allowed us to also identify 18 of them as rural accumulators as well.

**1.Ifra\*<sup>295</sup>:** In the host village of the first company’s first site, most of the new businesses installed nearby belonged to this 39-year old polygamous *Pulaar* entrepreneur. Ifra stopped school at primary level and did vocational training in transport for five years before obtaining a license in 1998 to drive in Saint-Louis. At the same time, Ifra cultivated rice in his family farms before working at THE FIRST COMPANY. With the company’s arrival, he noticed there was a need for such services and saw it as a new business opportunity. After a few months, THE FIRST COMPANY acted as a guarantor for him to obtain a bank loan to open his businesses. Ifra had provided transportation services to THE FIRST COMPANY since 2006. He started with one car but now owned five. He had a fixed-term service-provider contract with THE FIRST COMPANY, renewed every year, to provide day and night transport collecting workers from the neighbouring villages between Saint-Louis and THE FIRST COMPANY’s headquarters. The day shifts were from 05.30-15:30 and the night shifts ended at around midnight, sometimes his cars also transported workers to the farm as early as 3 or 4 am for the harvest. He had built a *boutique* providing groceries as well as money transfer services and hot food. Ifra owned agricultural land and had over 20 workers across his businesses some of whom were living in his house. He told me that he wishes to open a cattle breeding business. For him, THE FIRST COMPANY has had only positive impact on the host village from favoured economic in-migration, job creation to real-estate including renting. This is exemplified by the many accommodation services that were now flourishing, especially those of the Mayor. With a happy smile on his face, Ifra profusely thanked THE FIRST COMPANY’s director for trusting him and concluding: “Long live THE FIRST COMPANY!” at the end of our interview.

**Photo 26: Ifra’s buses in front of THE FIRST COMPANY. June 2017.  
(Photograph by researcher)**

---

<sup>295</sup> 02/06/2017



**Photo 27: Ifra's businesses: a grocery shop<sup>296</sup> which also offers money sending services, and his restaurants. June 2017. (Photograph by researcher)**

**2. Hamidou\***: In Saint-Louis where THE SECOND COMPANY is located, transport is a lucrative business. Hamidou is a 67-year entrepreneur with three wives and 16 or 17 children (he could not remember clearly). He is also an entrepreneur and one of the traditional leaders of the area. He was the first *Pulaar* in the region to work on market-gardening, 32 years ago, while pretty much everyone else was focusing on cattle-breeding. He inspired many, *Wolof and Pulaar*, to follow his ideas. He said that when he started, lands were abundant in Waalo, and no one needed land titles. Especially in his *Pulaar* culture, no one owned land, or practiced “*goormoom*<sup>297</sup>”. Land was transmitted from father to son (his family was part of the *Pulaar* nobility). According to him, it was with the arrival of the *communauté rurale* (of which he is a former member) that land issues started as they became the only ones able to give land rights. He deplores that there are now people who don't live in the village, who sometime manage to have land, though residency is one of the main criteria to obtain land. His fields are near the lake and he used to cultivate between 3 or 10 hectares each year. At the time of interview, he owned cattle, cars, land and an estate, his three cars were “placed” at the company and managed by his sons. He paid his three drivers 50,000-80,000 FCFA francs per month. He also had three migrant workers. His older son and wives helped him on the family farm when they did not work at THE FIRST COMPANY. Thanks to the deal with THE SECOND COMPANY and \*, he said he can now achieve the vision he had had for agriculture for decades.

**3. Alan\*<sup>298</sup>** Still in Saint-Louis, an interesting accumulator straddling across businesses sectors swas a businessman previously involved in setting-up THE SECOND COMPANY. He started his small private cattle-breeding business while working for THE SECOND COMPANY, feeding the cattle some of the leftover crops. At the end of 2017, he sold his THE SECOND COMPANY shares and other shares he owned in Southern Africa-based companies, to set up a new firm. This company has been established with South African investors on 10.5ha allocated to him by the *Communauté Rurale*. At the

---

<sup>296</sup> *Boutique*

<sup>297</sup> Cleared with the axe as explained in chapter 5.

<sup>298</sup> 26/10/2017

time of research, he was producing animal feed, meat and processing milk. To date, he has imported 400 animals (sheep, goats, cattle, milking cows, poultry and pigs) from Southern Africa to Senegal. He said he uses private vets for “state of the art vets” artificial insemination and embryo transplantation procedures.

Alan had also signed a partnership with THE SECOND COMPANY to feed his cattle with THE SECOND COMPANY’s crops, and for him to produce compost to grow better crops at THE SECOND COMPANY. He was discussing opportunities with political leaders and religious families to contribute to the Emerging Senegal Plan.



**Photo 28: Animals from Alan’s farm (source, Facebook page of the farm) Accessed December 2017**

**4.Mod\*:** In the host village of the second farm, there were two young part-time university students working part-time as labourers. Both aged below 30, they resembled the “farmer-scholars” studied by Polly Hill (1963) in Ghana. Both had inherited land and one was engaged in “*bokk bay*”, a partnership which brings together the means of production including land and labour (a variant of sharecropping). The other was on his own. They were both members of families who had once worked at THE SECOND COMPANY but did not agree to the land deal. Here is the story of Moda, one of the two farmer-scholars.

Moda was born in 1991, but according to his official documents he was born in 1993. He told me he had been financially independent since 2016. During fieldwork, he was living lived between his village and Dakar to accommodate both his studies and farming activities. He defined himself as “a learner and a farmer”. From October to November, he was in the fields, in January and September, he returned to Dakar where he was

finishing his second year of a Master's Degree. His plot was bequeathed to him by his father and everyone in the family cultivated their share.

Moda told me that he finds combining both activities "hard but interesting" and it has not been a drag on his studies. Moda had hired a migrant worker for his field and his brother also "kept an eye on his plot". His brother was the one who was supervising and paying the workers on his behalf. He was paying for his own school fees because his father was no longer alive. According to him, other young and unmarried people his age had problems accessing land. He found a loan at the Agricultural Bank (CNCA) and paid everything himself (fertiliser, diesel). He had also partnered with someone who has a tractor for its use (20,000 or 45,000 FCFA per ha), and had hired labourers as well as women for the period of planting (approximately 30) and men to cultivate. He was paying women approximately 1,500 FCFA per head, six male day workers he paid for "cap" (digging holes for cuttings) approximately 2,500 FCFA per person. He was working with about 40 labourers per year per hectare, selling his produce in *loumos* and the final market destination is Thiaroye in Dakar. He did not sell it himself but gave it to the *baana baana* traders, paying them a commission. He did not keep any share of what he cultivated for his own consumption.

**5. Satou<sup>299\*</sup>**, a 33-year woman, worked as a street vendor selling fabrics in Dakar for 5 years before joining THE SECOND COMPANY. She decided to return to her village when she heard the farm was opening and started selling food to the workers. She was then recruited by THE SECOND COMPANY who wanted its own workers for the canteen whom they would train to meet health standards of preparing food. Satou was soon hired to manage the company canteen after satisfactory evaluation by the farm management. At the time of research, she was earning over 200,000 FCFA per month. Thanks to working at THE SECOND COMPANY for the past 7 years, Satou was able to open her own shop in her native village where she was living with her husband's family. She was also part of a tontine (*natt*), re-investing her money in her business and was able to contribute financially and "help her husband" with the household expenses. Therefore, she had moved from a very uncertain and exploitative form of informal work to a more secure and highly paid form of employment. She is the third wife and had adopted several

---

<sup>299</sup> 27/10/17

children since she was not able to have one of her own. Satou married at 20 and came to settle at her husband's village, yet she has had to travel to Mauritania or Dakar to earn a living returned to the village when the farm opened. She told me that she prefers her life after THE SECOND COMPANY because her own mother was obliged to migrate for work.

**6. Faty<sup>300\*</sup>**, a 45-year-old woman from a pastoralist community, was one of the food sellers occupying one of the shelters established four years ago around The Third Company. When she was 17, she lost her first husband whom she married at 13. She then remarried to her late husband's brother with whom she had a 17-year-old son. Faty was due to travel to another region to bring back her son's 10-year-old future wife. Since this project requires money, she planned, in addition to her work, to offer her labour in the neighbouring potato fields (so she could sell the remaining potato she would be offered or that was thrown away - *gasaanu*) or work on collecting the *Gawe* in order to sell it to women who use it to perfume their rooms. During the farming season, Fatima has a shop (see picture) in which she prepares and sells breakfast and lunch to farm workers on credit. Everything was carefully noted in her notebook, and she was paid every fortnight, allowing her to repay her debts. It was her own business. She would wake up at around 6am to walk 7-8km to the market of the main village where she would buy (sometimes on credit) fish and the other things she needed. Then from 9am she would start cooking and selling breakfast followed by lunch. She would sell each dish for 500 FCFA and half the dish for 250 FCFA, allowing her to have around 25000 FCFA every fortnight that to re-invest in her business for the next fortnight. Before The Third Company came, Faty\* claimed she had a forest and a small garden that she and her village could use for grazing cattle and her own family needs. With The Third Company, she could choose her working hours and have a regular income.

**7. Mayram<sup>301\*</sup>**: Faty's 36-year neighbour, had a similar story. She had three children and was working in her restaurant with her 15-year-old daughter, also married. In addition to the restaurant, they also sold tea, dried beans, tomato and sugar. When she finished serving lunch at 3pm, she would return home after washing the dishes. Once she arrived

---

<sup>300</sup> 20/11/2017

<sup>301</sup> 20/11/2017

at the village at 4pm, she would gather the cattle and collect the milk for family use. She complained they no longer have enough milk to re-sell since the cattle no longer have green pastures. Despite having a relatively regular income, Mayram said she prefers her previous livelihood, because she has more work now, walks long distances and this has an impact on her well-being. She still has a lot of debts.

**8. Haby<sup>302\*</sup>** was from the same village. She sold condiments and vegetables, niebe, tamarin, salt, spice cubes, butternut, aubergines, sorel, onions, chilies and dried fish (picture). As her restaurant was still under construction, a relative was hosting her in her own shelter so she could sell food. This allowed her to bring home approximately 2000 FCFA daily.



**Photo 29: Faty's restaurant. November 2017. (Photograph by researcher)**

---

<sup>302</sup> 20/11/2017



**Photo 30: Mayram & her daughter in their restaurant with Haby's condiments, near The Third Company. November 2017. (Photograph by researcher)**



**Photo 31: Interview with Mayram. November 2017. (Photograph by researcher)**

**9. Mayécor<sup>303\*</sup>:** In the village hosting The Third Company, a 53-year-old producer of market-gardening confided in me that, in 2008, the company came and enclosed his lands situated towards the canal while he was working on them. He had held 10ha since 1988 but was now working on 5ha because of The Third Company’s actions. When he tried to stop them, the *sous-prefet* called him on the phone of one of the company’s employees (the manager of the farm) to tell him their installation was legal. He said he tried to talk with the director of the company, who refused to meet him. The *sous-prefet* told him to write a letter copying the mayor and The Third Company, but the company refused to take the letter. The mayor asked the company to leave his land as he was “family”, but the companies director said they had a lease. What bothers Mayécor most is that they were using forceful methods. “Because of them (big horticultural firms), all of us (petty commodity producers) face labour shortage”. There is another type of competition both for wage labour and access to water. He testified, “My fellow commodity producers and I are forced i) either sell the land at a price that is not convenient for us or ii) wait until the company decides it can dig the canal it promised for us to access water. I have nothing against the Indians coming to work in Senegal, or even near my fields, what I think is my right to refuse, is being forcefully dispossessed of my land against a ridiculous compensation (700000 FCFA). But I can appreciate it is in the interest of the village to have such an opportunity to have regular wages.”



**Photo 32: Mayécor’s Plot: November 2017. (Photograph by researcher)**

---

<sup>303</sup> 19/11/2017

**Photo 33: A view of The Third Company from Mayécor's plot. November 2017. (Photograph by researcher)**

## **7.6. Profiling emerging capitalists**

Self-employed entrepreneurs like Faty and Mayram acknowledged that providing food to the workers allowed them a sustainable and quite decent income compared to the minimum wage on the farms. As members of pastoralist groups who used to benefit from land and forest resources, as well as the milk they used to collect from the cattle, they mentioned the loss of forest resources and the health repercussions of having to combine their professional activities and their reproductive roles. Indeed, previous studies have shown that land deals are gender-blind and seldom consider the fact that pastoral lands have diverse use and meanings for their owners (Traore 2002). They have also shown a tendency to view pastoralists as male contributes to the erasure of women's domestic work in cattle herding (Mathieu et al. in Crousse et al 1986: 236; Verma 2014). Even the enclosure of land for corporate activities was not totally understood by pastoralists and this was the reason why pastoralists around THE FIRST COMPANY had negotiated for their cattle to still have a route through the company, thereby illustrating the need to stray fields and stray livestock for such purposes (Traore 2002:151).

These women were embedded in the capitalisation of life and the marketisation of activities they would normally do in their houses such as cooking. However, cooking "as work" interferes with cooking as "marriage" and other care activities such as childcare (Clark 1994: 344-357). Therefore, these food retailers had to rely on family members help to combine both as we have seen in previous sections (Nation 2004), and family members who relied on their work were also obliged to find alternatives such as migrant labour. Faty's opportunity to sell food allowed her to have access to credit. Work, for her, took different changing forms and fit different purposes throughout the year. She was combining jobs for a specific project: gathering enough money for her son's wedding. Interestingly, that solidarity still cohabits with the capitalisation of life between these Pulaar women is also illustrated by Haby being hosted by a relative in their own shop. Maryam for instance, did not call "work" what she did after 4 pm: she considered this to be her duty. Yet, was *itmaternal altruism* (Kabeer 1994: 95) that was reflected in her and Faty's performance of these tasks? Faty can be considered a semi-capitalist re-investing



her profit into developing her business (replacement fund) and using the rest of her income as consumption and ceremonial funds (Bernstein 2010:18, Oya 2002, 2004; Wolf 1966). Maryam is perhaps more of a non-capitalist entrepreneur still at risk of falling below the poverty line again as she is still paying her debts despite earning an income. The above shows that accumulation of *wealth* is not accumulation of *capital*, as the later implied a change in social relations of property (Marx, 1976). It also shows us that not all old and new entrepreneurs are also capitalists, some may just be seizing market or business opportunities created by agricultural land deals.

Capital as a social relation, is well illustrated in the case of Ifra, Satou, and Hamidou who had benefitted from the land rush. This illustrates the fact that the arrival of investors in the horticultural sector reconfigures horticultural labour markets and their surroundings through a variety of indirect<sup>304</sup> and induced<sup>305</sup> jobs. Indeed, there are important linkages between the wage bill generated by a large capitalist farm such as THE SECOND COMPANY, THE FIRST COMPANY or The Third Company in a location and the consumption patterns and demand for new services in that location. These three oral histories have shown how the emergence of small capitalist businesses such as restaurants, transportation, grocery shops, money transfer services flourish to respond to the needs of the companies and their workers constitute an important outcome of the arrival of (foreign-owned) agribusinesses. This also casts some doubt on the emphasis on CSR initiatives by corporate management as their key contributions to the “community”.

Another key question which emerges from these three oral histories is that of the capital and the capitalists themselves. Hamidou, clearly from the Toroodo nobility, and had inherited plentiful land from his family and so had Ifra. However, the first was already established and used the revenues from his agricultural farms to diversify and capitalise further by seizing a market, opportunities and taking a “long view” (Hill 1963, 1970). Alan’s trajectory combines a bit of both: having been instrumental in the setting up of THE SECOND COMPANY in Senegal, he decided to take a longer view and risks selling his shares at THE SECOND COMPANY and seize the opportunity to go full-time in developing his cattle-breeding business when he was sure it became viable. As for Satou,

---

<sup>304</sup> As a result of direct/indirect employee's spending money

<sup>305</sup> i.e. not direct employment by the company

she chose the merchant path and claims she earns at least as much from her business than from her work and was able to hire staff to look after her other business. This further substantiates Oya's (2013b) suggestion that "different trajectories of transition and accumulation, from 'above' or 'below', may be evolving in different directions during the current 'land rush'".

Social networks also played a key role as exemplified by the cases of Alan, Hamidou and Ifra who had a very good understanding of the national political economy. Similarly, Satou had a very good knowledge of her market and took fewer risks, as only giving credit to clients she knew well, or who had a regular income. Her husband was also a well-connected man. Therefore, while some of these activities are new, they also insert themselves into existing sets of socio-political and economic relations and contribute to social differentiation from above. As previous studies have shown, there is a close connection between political, social and economic accumulation in Senegal. Political, economic and traditional powers interests do intersect (Barry 1979, 2012; Berry 1993: 67; Boone 1992; Diagne 1967; Dahou 2005; Diop 1981, 1985, 2013a, 2013b; Oya 2002, 2004). Even Moda, our struggling farmer/scholar, also took the long view and used his family and relatives to access sharecropping and surplus labour when needed, which allowed him to further his studies and rest assured his fields were being looked after.

Not all aspiring capitalists were successful, or had access to such networks, as is the case of Mayécor. The petty-commodity producer had difficulties pursuing his capitalist accumulation ventures since The Third Company used extra-economic means of coercion (political networks) to enclose half of his land. His accumulation story was interrupted by a company town who needed more land but not his labour.

The evidence presented above shows that increasing social differentiation is taking place as a direct outcome of land deals. More generally, four categories of accumulators emerge:

The first is a segment of the local elite (such as Hamidou and Ifra) and foreign private capital (such as Alan) exploiting new business opportunities. This category's initial capital was accumulated on the basis of land they inherited/bought but was no longer *only* accumulating based on land since they no longer hold significant portions of it either

because they sold it to agricultural investors or because of land scarcity and economic diversification. However, they still mobilised family and non-family resident surplus labour at higher costs than the other petty commodity producers. Mobilising family networks has been a common pattern for rural capitalists (Berry 1975, 1985, 1993; Diop 1985: 153-174; Hill 1961; Oya 2002-2004). Most of them were in polygamous conjugal relationship, which attests to them being financially better-off, and also invested a lot in the education of their children. One of the capitalists interviewed, who had two male children at the University of Dakar and four others living with siblings in the neighbouring village to attend high school, told me, “I believe in my children’s education: I am not playing with it and prefer to recruit labour than taking the younger ones out of school (Interview, CLC1)<sup>306</sup>.” His older sons returned to the village during school holidays to help him. They also had other mostly merchant sources of income (cars, estate, services, trade including of cattle) which allowed them to access cash. Though the amount of land they hold was decreasing (10ha and more) they still held more land than the average respondents. I interviewed a few male politicians in this category and some of the middle economic entrepreneurs whose businesses had flourished around the land deals. They mobilised the local *surgas* who chose not work for the farm as these local accumulators were able to offer them more. These businessmen had greater access to credit and a bigger social network, which they relied on to develop their business. In addition, these entrepreneurs had relatively well-educated children in other cities or working as managers in their various businesses. Their children, and wives, had access to land or capital mainly through them.

The second class was one of various “upgraded” petty commodity producers and entrepreneurs (such as Satou) and turning into micro-capitalists who were also hiring *surgas* (from other cities) with lower wages and for short periods. Most of them possessed enough land and engaged in other activities to enable them a certain amount of accumulation. This category was reliant on family labour (mostly wives, junior sons and other family) and the collaborative free labour of neighbours and relatives, “*santaane*”. They were in competition with agribusinesses regarding access to labour due to the market tightening (as I explain below). They could offer higher wages since they only hired for a shorter period and most likely *surgas* from faraway areas if required for

---

<sup>306</sup> Interview 28/10/2017

farming. Their landholdings comprised between 2 and 15 hectares, and they also invested in more rural agrarian types of business (cattle-breeding, market-gardening, transportation).

The third class was mostly semi-entrepreneurs/capitalists who straddled between their own commodity production and wage labour in horticulture (Faty and Moda, for instance). Due to partial wage employment, they managed to improve other micro-businesses or their own agricultural petty commodity production. Indeed, Maertens and Swinnen have shown that earnings from this type of horticultural wage labour are partially invested in family farms resulting in larger farm sizes, higher farm expenditures, and increased farm incomes (Maertens and Swinnen, 2018:19). This suggests that wage employment opportunities are generating cash that supports other activities, sometimes beyond simple reproduction, making them more viable than before the farms. As a result, some previous landholders may have less land to farm, but they now have more cash to invest in their farming due to new “induced or spin-off businesses”.

At the bottom of this grouping were the occasionally capitalist, petty commodity producers and simple entrepreneurs, who lack means of production, technology and sometimes knowledge – and who farmed more by force of habit, though they were willing to work as self-employed farmers dependent on climate for a regular salary. Most of these simple commodity producers face a “blurring of their identity” (Bryceson et al 2000:311). They equated “farming” with narratives of scarcity and “*bricolage*”, “agriculture is a struggling business” (Interview CLC)<sup>307</sup>, “we are just trying our luck with bad quality seeds, no soil treatment, no training”, “sometimes we start cultivating but have to stop because of the lack of means” (Interviews<sup>308</sup>).

## **Partial conclusion**

This section has analysed processes of class formation from above and capitalists’ and entrepreneurs’ strategies of accumulation. It has shown how the emergence of small capitalist business is an important outcome of the arrival of (foreign-owned) agribusiness

---

<sup>307</sup> 20/10/2017 “*mbayum demmerder la*”

<sup>308</sup> 20/10/2017

and casts some doubt on the emphasis on CSR initiatives by corporate management as their key contributions to the ‘community’. The virtuous dynamics of capitalist accumulation, when set in motion, may generate a wider range of positive outcomes which ultimately obscure the alleged benefits of ‘charity’. As capital accumulates more land, which it transforms into different types of capital, it affects people differently and exacerbates social inequalities. One group of winners seems to be domestic accumulators taking a longer view to sized opportunities induced by the presence of these businesses.

Gatekeeping allows some political and traditional authorities to accumulate capital by capturing rents (here business opportunities and networks) from land deals; and maintain domination in the context of changes in the land governance systems, traditional forms of leadership and decentralisation. Some others loose out as the company uses extra economic means to enclose their land with the complacency of political leaders. While other classes outside the one described here (and even within these classes) might (and certainly do) exist (Oya 2004, 2006), the above represents the main stylised groups observed in the villages where fieldwork was conducted. If anything, this can document dynamics of differentiation (both sociological and material) and should lead those seeing middle classes in Africa (among others) as an “elusive reality” (Darbon 2018) to reconsider their views.

## **UNPACKING OUTCOMES (3): MORE THAN MARKETS: LAND IS LIFE**

Two main outcomes are observed in the accumulation dynamics from above and below. First is the local labour market tightening which leads to increased competition for labour, which leaves some producers facing labour shortages at peak times.

## 7.7. Local labour market tightening

Local labour market tightening can lead to some mechanisation, but also improves working conditions, especially wages. Wages may be low in an absolute sense, for example workers may deem them unfair and expect foreign firms to pay high wages, but in comparison with the national average their wages are often higher. Labour shortages at peak times force local petty commodity producers and employers of casual labour to pay more for casual workers. THE SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST COMPANY are offering the largest number of work days to local and migrant workers.

In the Delta of the River, there is competition for labour between different horticultural exporters in the region both foreign and domestic. This is also one of the findings of Mackintosh in the Niayes, after Bud's arrival (1989). Local labour market tightening is less prominent after the wet season as seasonal wage workers (*nawetaan*) from the Southern regions return from home. This explains the increasing mechanisation of farms. SOCAS Management said, "We are mechanised at 40%, we were forced to because we had labour force constraints" (Interview SMP7<sup>309</sup>). THE FIRST COMPANY's first two sites are located close to other export FFV producers in the Saint-Louis Region. THE FIRST COMPANY workers buses have to travel further than usual, up to Ross-Bethio, Bango or Saint-Louis (the city) seeking to hire labour.

At THE SECOND COMPANY there was a conflict between on-farm activities and off-farm wage labour because *Wolof* women were working on their husband's farms at the end of the year. This was the case for host village women and the company hire workers from *Pulaar* villages<sup>310</sup> situated further away. Other commodity producers were hiring migrant workers from Fatick, Mali, Guinee or even further afield for 6-8 months. Labour shortage was not only affecting the areas near the farms, other households interviewed in the peri-urban region of Saint-Louis confided that it was no longer possible to find female domestic workers as they all preferred to work in export horticulture where they earn more (domestic workers outside Dakar are paid between 25,000 and 40,000 FCFA).

---

<sup>309</sup> 18/11/17

<sup>310</sup> For instance, Tidiele Toucouleur, Zahra Alassane, and even near Pokotane (after Keur Momar Sarr)

## 7.8. Competition for the local markets for products

Increased market competition is another dimension of land deals that can significantly shape horticultural producers' relations with each other, retailers and distributors. Where THE SECOND COMPANY represented no threat to local petty commodity producers because of the type of crops it grows (radish and green onions are seldom consumed locally, nor produced for the domestic market), this was not the case for The Third Company and THE FIRST COMPANY. Not only was The Third Company producing potatoes for the local market, it was also making the most of the government's frequent decision to block imports of potatoes. The Authority in charge of Markets Regulation (ARM) set the seller price, in July 2018, at 300 FCFA on the fields, 350 from the wholesalers, and 400 from the retailers. THE FIRST COMPANY was producing onions and carrots between May and August, and peanuts between June and October for the local market in addition to its other counter seasonal fresh fruits and vegetables (chilies, courgettes, butternut, sweet potatoes, corn) also sold locally.

In THE FIRST COMPANY's case, the neighbouring market-gardening producers were direct competitors with THE FIRST COMPANY. In August 2018, they took to the streets with red armbands and other accessories to denounce the unfair competition of foreign companies, especially "L<sup>311</sup>". They accused THE FIRST COMPANY of being behind their difficulties in selling their chili production and creating changes to local market prices. On 15 August 2018, one week before the Tabaski Celebration (Aid), the union UNACOIS<sup>312</sup> Jappo made a press statement denouncing unfair competition, and the "monopoly and abuse of dominant position" by The Third Company. It is currently one of the most established unions and plays a significant consultative role locally and nationally. UNACOIS' accusation contradicts The Third Company's official statement that, "even when we are the sole producers, we don't get any advantages as there is a fix purchase price" (Interview SMP10<sup>313</sup>).

Government import substitution measures taken in the past 5 years, such as freezing potato imports and setting prices, has allowed local producers to sell their stocks while

---

<sup>311</sup> The director of THE FIRST COMPANY they call by his first name

<sup>312</sup> UNACOIS (*Union Nationale des Commerçants et Industriels* du Sénégal) is a professional association of industrialists and traders, and was created in 1990 with a strong lobby of the *Mouride* brotherhood.

<sup>313</sup> 04/07/17

protecting the “infant” sector (Ndoye-Niane and Seck 2010: 217-31). The production of potato has grown from 10,500 tonnes in 2006 to 63,828 in 2016, according to FAO Stats and according to ANSD reached 67,485 tonnes in 2018. This represents substantial growth given it is a product for the local market and it is critical to reduce foreign exchange leakage. Of those 63,828 tonnes, The Third Company claim to have produced 21,000 whilst projecting production for 2017 to reach 45,000. The person responsible for agriculture in The Third Company claimed that, “Senegal is no longer importing potato as now, we cover the supply for the local market” (Interview SMP10<sup>314</sup>). The data shows that for two consecutive years there was a shortage of potatoes, especially during national celebrations such as *korite* and *tabaski*. Whilst The Third Company may have met their production objectives, there were many problems with shortages. The storage of potatoes means they were in a bad state when reaching the main cities from the company’s headquarters, and urban consumers preferred to buy frozen fries from supermarkets such as Auchan. The company made a heavy investment in cold storage, inaugurated by President Sall in 2017.

These debates - as well as the Auchan row, which started in July 2018 with local retailers accusing the European supermarket of unfair competition - need to be situated in its political economic context. Both petty commodity producer groups and unions were using the discourse of economic patriotism to urge the State to stop the supposedly dominant position and unfair competition practices of these vertically integrated firms. The government and its agencies, mostly the ministry of agriculture and ARM, responded using the same discourse of “economic nationalism” to calm smallholders, agricultural unions and producers’ attitudes towards the bigger players. The State and producers were also promoting the consumption of locally-produced FFVs by consumers, as was already the case in the 1980s with ITA<sup>315</sup>. Consumers do benefit from increased market competition through lower prices. Groups benefiting from the tightening are *bana-bana* (retailers) in the region who prefer to buy their provision at THE FIRST COMPANY, as well as some of wage workers who benefit through increased work and sales. According to the manager of local sales, the wholesalers were mainly from Touba. They buy the most significant quantities, followed by local *baana baana* and retailers from neighbouring cities (mostly women) who resell the products from their fields to their

---

<sup>314</sup> 04/07/17

<sup>315</sup> The national Institute for Food Technology



clients, and THE FIRST COMPANY female day-workers. She said that butternut, onions and chilies are the most lucrative crops, whilst the red potatoes are not very successful due to local consumer preferences. This product is currently more popular in Europe, while Senegalese clients are more familiar with the white sweet potato.

Despite great improvements in FFV production to meet government objectives and consumer preferences, there was still discontent. As shown in chapter 5, the religious brotherhood affiliation to commodity producer organisation and some *bana-bana* illustrate their significant role as a lobby. They may have even been behind these counter-movements to lobby against THE FIRST COMPANY or The Third Company. As in the precolonial and colonial periods, Islam plays an important role in shaping political reactions to land. As explained in chapter 6, the religious leader of the Louga peasants and petty commodity producers in suing The Third Company, has consistently said in interviews, “The marabout wants us to resume work on our fields, but we cannot because of the presence of The Third Company” (interview<sup>316</sup>). The THE SECOND COMPANY case also illustrates the central role occupied by the religion-politics nexus, as seen in the *Tidjane* religious and political leaders organising resistance to the deal.

### **Partial conclusion**

I have analysed market outcomes of land deals and argue that there is increased competition for labour hiring and competition on selling points. This outcome, I suggest, increases competition downstream, but does not address the concentration of companies who benefit from non-tariff barriers (certifications of labels) and thus can be part of GVCs (upstream). This confirms suggestions that “land grabbing” emerges from the internal logic of agribusiness accumulation, which increases competition and concentration rather than because of exogenous developments (Amanor 2012: 744). Therefore, we should examine the ways in which mainstream agribusiness activities and land grabs do intersect.

---

<sup>316</sup> 18/11/2017

## 7.9. More than Markets: Being, Belonging and Becoming

In this section, I argue that there is a need to consider the social order of markets. As shown in oral histories, these “classes of labour and capital” are also individuals with dreams and aspirations that make them human, hence “irrational” at times.

As proposed in chapter 2, it is important to analyse the socio-cultural outcomes of land deals without falling into essentialist categories, beyond jobs, capitalisation and marketisation. Words such as “history”, “identity”, “life”, “honour”, “blood” and “legacy” evoked the meaning of land for many respondents. I focus in this section on social relations over land and the shifts in the meanings of “having a job”.

### 7.9.1. Being and becoming

Increasingly, there has been a blurring of social values and norms which valued the collective over the individual<sup>317</sup> due to increasing marketisation and capitalisation. Young people, for instance, were earning a living earlier than usual thus contest various forms of social hierarchies or traditions. Some young horticultural workers, for instance, would no longer give the largest share of their salary to their parents as is traditionally the norm. Junior working men generally built a room of their own at the back of their father’s house with their support to have some private space (*beru*) (Diop 1985). They had access to a small plot of the family land to cultivate, however their independence would only be total when they marry. Even then, they would still remain *surga* to their father and elders. Rather than rooms, more and more junior men were investing in building a flat of their own in the family compound, which they could occupy with their future wife. Therefore, there was competition amongst young men (and their families): how far a man went up the social ladder was measured by the material used to build a house (cement or not), the number of storeys, the equipment in their rooms and how well they dressed<sup>318</sup> (Interview SW5). There was also an increased competition amongst villages (and their chiefs) about

---

<sup>317</sup> As illustrated by the expression: Man is Man's best remedy

<sup>318</sup> Younger women will remain a *surga* forever, leaving their father’s and brother’s guardianship only to be placed under their husband’s, if they marry (Diop 1985).

attracting providential investors (chapter 6) summarised by this laconic sentence “mine is better than ours” (Interview CL6<sup>319</sup>). This situation underscores the rise of individualism in societies where previously the group was more valued (Diop 1985), and solidarity constituted a social safety net for the most deprived<sup>320</sup> (Dimé 2007-151-171), Fall 2007: 113-120).

Figures of success and being a “person of value” have also shifted and opened up possibilities to “becoming with”. Success was generally defined by wealth, social networks, and status. Pathways to success were also shaped by migration and mobility as illustrated by the 4 Ts<sup>321</sup> : “Travelling, making it, succeeding socially, and helping family and friends” (Sall et al 2010:24). A general tendency observed in the interviews and life stories in previous sections is that wage work provided new avenues for upward social mobility. Becoming someone was now possible without having to travel as illustrated by the many stories of workers who returned at home and their recurrent claims to “have made it at home” (*tekki fii*). Becoming someone in the farms allowed workers to “have a name” without travelling for everyone to witness (Interview SW15<sup>322</sup>). In addition, the implantation of horticultural farms has also widened the aspirations of uneducated workers which somehow opened pathways of success far away from the “Empire of the literates”<sup>323</sup> (Coulon 2010, Banégas et al 2011). In doing so, it also allows for new itineraries of accumulation as illustrated by the stories of Ifra and Hamidou.

Despite this, the values of seniority were less eroded. Several interviews revealed that even old and powerful men still respected older men or women no matter their class. The notion of “*kilife*”, authority, is still central (Group Interview<sup>324</sup>). This can make the oldest son return to the village immediately after the demise of the father or other older male figures to take over their duties towards the family, lineage and social group. Community life remains gendered, perhaps more so in *Wolof* and *Pulaar* villages, and less in the other villages in which men and particularly husbands tend to take part in domestic work. In the Saint-Louis villages, most men were part of cooperative groups who articulate and

---

<sup>319</sup> “Sunu, sama ko gën” 24/10/2017

<sup>320</sup> This led to complaints from paternalist company managers concerned about the rise of consumerism (SMG2<sup>320</sup>).

<sup>321</sup> “*Tukki, Tekki Tedd, Terale*”

<sup>322</sup> 21/06/2017

<sup>323</sup> *Ku jang ekool*

<sup>324</sup> 05/05/2017

defend their common interests. They would sit under the village's palaver tree to discuss important issues whilst women took care of unpaid care work. Women remained central in the organisation of ceremonies and used an important part of their salaries as a ceremonial fund (Bernstein 2010: 20; Diop 1985; Wolf 1966). They were also engaged in collective forms of saving: their monthly *natt* (tontines) allowed them to combine ceremonial activities and forms of social reproduction and organising (economic interest groups GIE). Through these GIEs, junior men and women sought to obtain land, not through inheritance or gifts from family, but through other channels such as the local community (Commune), or through privately-funded schemes such as PDIDAS. The women I lived with in all the villages were conforming to dominant subservient gender roles in public, but in private they voiced their opinions loud and clear. Several interesting stories were relayed by the village chief who played the role of mediator in conjugal or domestic conflicts.

These shifts towards more individualistic and cross-cultural understandings are certainly part of a long-term process of change (Diop 1985). I suggest that they are unexceptional elements of every dynamic and evolving society, though marketisation might have given economic means for some to exercise their rights to decision-making over their own destiny.

### **7.9.2. (Politics of) Belonging and Owning**

An important socio-cultural dynamic is the politics of difference. Most villagers reported changes in local habits, a “rise in crime and violence”, or simply “smoking” and “moral deprivation” (FGD1 & FGD6<sup>325</sup>). Rising levels of violence and insecurity that follow land grabs have been largely documented (Li 2017). As one villager said: “before, you could leave your bag on the road, go to the village and come back, and it will still be there until tomorrow” (Interview CW1<sup>326</sup>). While this might seem like a romanticising of the past, it also cohabits with politics of othering between different groups: “before THE SECOND COMPANY if you lost your cattle, you immediately knew it was the *Pulaar*, now they are busy working” (VLGI<sup>327</sup>). This shows how social groups reorganise against new

---

<sup>325</sup> 19/05/17, 14/11/17

<sup>326</sup> 02/11/17

<sup>327</sup> 05/05/17

outsiders<sup>328</sup>. Studies in Botswana (Peters 1994) and Ghana (Amanor 1999, 2001) highlight a “narrowing of the definition of belonging” and new divisions within family, lineage, kinship group, neighbourhood, the broader village and company. However, these sediment with previous ongoing dynamics while reinforcing yesteryear micropolitics between “late-comers” and “new-comers”, “natives and strangers”, which is a particular feature in West Africa (Kuba and Lentz 2006:12). This is also illustrated within capitalists: the main competitors of THE FIRST COMPANY used the argument of “economic nationalism” to re-define the contours of belonging, even though in this case, othering clearly serves the purpose of excluding an economic competitor. This illustrates how identities are weaponised against certain social groups to influence the distribution of rents, thus the need to differentiate between belonging per se and “politics of belonging” as illustrated here in the case of land deals (Yuval-Davis 2011).

Migrant worker’s experiences in more traditional villages (first and second companies host villages) are revealing of the politics of othering. A supervisor and senior manager both testified to being socially discriminated against when they arrived in the village (Interviews SW10 PW/SR1<sup>329</sup>). After residing in the village and sharing the same food they felt more accepted. On the first two sites of the first company, European supervisors were courted, respected and feared while African migrants faced unfriendly treatment, as they were considered “*ñakk*”. This Wolof word is used to “other” other African nationals. Though increasingly taken to mean stranger or outsider, this term originally meant “frontier or barrier”. This is an example of “the politics of belonging” (Geschiere et al. 2000; Githigaro 2017; Kuba et al. 2006,) defining the social fabrication of “autochthony” and “indigeneity” (Moyo 2008). The claim “that one is an original inhabitant of a given area and therefore belongs to the area, leading to the exclusion of those not considered original inhabitants”, is a pervasive social phenomenon in the North Rift Region of Kenya (Githigaro 2017: 83-95 in Mpofu et al. 2017). Such images of community allow different social groups to articulate claims using a “vocabulary of legitimation for requests to be made and pressure to be exerted (Li 1996:509). The above and previous sections on CSR paternalism confirms that there are stakes behind the redefinition of contours of belonging

---

<sup>328</sup> “I against my brother, I and my brother against our cousin, I, my brother and our cousin against the neighbours, all of us against the foreigner”

<sup>329</sup> 16/05/17, 31/05/17

and citizenship. This allows villagers to defend their rights to jobs, or other elements of rent (redistribution) by making corporate powers “as much a part of us as we are of them” (Ouma 2015), while othering outside the family, the lineage, the village, etc.

Whether the current increasing of labour mobility leads to more forceful forms of exclusion through the politics of belonging (Crosse 2013; Geschiere et al. 2000:448-9;) in the aftermath of the land rush is uncertain. However, increasing politics of identity may just represent a more “mundane” manifestation of already existent capitalist relation (Li 2019).

What is certain is that migrants do manage to exert their rights to acquire property despite rural communities’ formal conditions of residence and primacy of rights of “autochthones” compared to “allochthones”.

**Table 32: Migration and house property. n=164**

Source: Workers survey

The above table tells us that 61.25% of the migrants were (sole or joint with their spouse) house owners, which is evidence of the tendency of migrants to acquire **land assets** and settle (regardless of reason for migration, and gender) against 80.49% for locals.

In addition, across all villages, workers testified that working in agribusinesses had created new social relations, fostered cross-cultural understanding and led to inter-marriages. There is evidence to suggest there has been a decrease in discrimination on the basis of social stratification because at the farm “we are all wage labourers” (FGD7<sup>330</sup>). As a worker who is *ñyeeño* (supposedly lower caste) testified, while recognising that at the beginning, especially at the Ngalam farm, those originating from families of previous slave-owners and their former slaves or supposedly lower caste, would not mix or talk” (FGD6<sup>331</sup>). This was confirmed by a supervisor who said: “each group would stay in their corner. But things are much better now: they even invite each other to social events outside the farm” (Interview SMP6<sup>332</sup>).

---

<sup>330</sup> 22/11/17

<sup>331</sup> 14/11/17

<sup>332</sup> 19/06/17

### **7.9.3. “Being with” and “Doing with”: The Power of “Inclusion”, “Participation”**

I found that in the selected areas, though land holdings had not significantly changed, modes of access and enjoyment of land and forest resources were affected by the land rush. I offer to illustrate this with THE SECOND COMPANY and the Inclusive and Sustainable Agribusiness Development Project – PDIDAS projects. Before that, I provide a short overview of the main routes for women and junior men to access land. Previous studies have found that women access land mainly through their husbands and to a lesser extent through Rural Councils when organised in women’s groups, GIEs - Economic Interest Groups - or collectives (Sow 1992; Tine and Sy 2003). This is corroborated by my survey: women were found to access land mainly through inheritance or gifts from their husbands in the selected areas. This can be explained by the fact that traditionally women do not own land in the *Wolof* society, and only have enjoyment and use (usufruct) rights permitted by Islamic succession laws on which most current family law is built. Therefore, women inherit property as a wife (a quarter or one eighth of a male share depending upon whether there are children), as a daughter (half of a male share), or as a mother or relative. Women can also receive land as a gift or obtain it through the local authorities. Access to land through male intermediation poses a problem for women’s rights.

As illustrated in chapter 3, article 15 of the Senegalese Constitution recognises formal equal land rights whereas article 152 of the Family Code recognises the husband as the head of the household entitled to use this power in the interest of his women and children. As for Junior men’s access to land, it has been seldom studied in Senegal, but their access and control of land is determined by their position in the family or kin group and older, wealthier and high caste men are more likely to own/access/control more land (Lastarria-Cornhiel 1997: 1320). Therefore, household heads and oldest sons are more likely to control land in *Wolof* and *Pulaar* society, whilst younger men’s ownership of land is less likely in a context of scarce land availability. Land plays a major role in shaping masculinity as land is decisive in constructing gendered roles and identities. However, both unmarried men and women still have access to family lands as explained in previous

sections. For women, ownership is not access, they can access family lands as is the case for unmarried men in the second company's host village.

THE SECOND COMPANY received the same hectares of land from the rural community, and "villagers" did also receive similar hectares of land, without recipients being named and with no mention of how the land would be shared. My host family in the second company's host village received in total 13.4ha which they shared with their cousins<sup>333</sup>. Following the land deal, the populations of these villages were grouped into GIEs led by community leaders to improve sharing the land. The head of my host family received (6ha) whilst all the other married men in the family received either 0.5 or 0.55ha and other families also shared the land in this way. One of the two *Pulaar* village received in total 45 hectares. In both cases, women and unmarried men did not receive individual land titles but two female GIE were created and received collective land titles. This illustrates how shrinking land resources have been redistributed at the village level.

Inspired by THE SECOND COMPANY model, PDIDAS sought and was allocated 500ha by the commune to develop an agriculture project between THE SECOND COMPANY and small producers. As in the previous THE SECOND COMPANY model, 230ha were for the population and 270 for THE SECOND COMPANY, with 50ha for women and another 50ha for youth groups. Those who had put in 20ha at the beginning received 11ha and 9 were for investor. PDIDAS was not able to install the irrigation schemes as planned. They conducted surveys to assess the loss of opportunity for the population who were not able to start producing at the same time as THE SECOND COMPANY due to delays in irrigation. Based on these surveys, and after several meetings, compensations were offered to the landholders (mainly senior men) and preparation started on enabling them to work on their plots. Those who received compensations were very satisfied. But most women I interviewed were never invited to the meetings and at one of the meetings I attended, the only women present were the wives of one local chief and another senior woman. As for younger men, those present were also part of the local elite (sons or nephews). I use this example to illustrate how the same way genderless "winners" and "losers" do not help us to understand the complex effects of these deals, approaches that just "add women and stir" do not work (Cornwall 2003:1338).

---

<sup>333</sup> As I explained previously, there are three main families in the village, divided into different concessions and have had to relocate/separate after they built their own house



Whilst this example shows how most women were not “at the table”, the attendance of senior women led me to reconsider my views. They attested to being elected to represent other women, yet the meeting was being held at 2pm and so many women could not attend. The wife of the *Pulaar* chief said she was nominated by her peers to attend the meeting on their behalf. This reproduces the elitist nature of representative democracy with the female elite occupying the same privileged class position as men. I use this example to illustrate how ideas of the “add women and stir” approaches to being inclusive do not work as “voice does not automatically translate into influence” (Cornwall 2003: 1329; Mohanty 2002). Participation does not guarantee inclusiveness. How best to conclude then than with the irreverence of a *Wolof* woman I interviewed who deplored the lack of transparency of male villagers involved in the negotiation process who failed to include them: “They did not have a good deal the first time because they are a bunch of uneducated officials” (Interview DW)<sup>334</sup>.

These are not granted on the basis of the application of statutory law but through “the triple heritage” evoked in chapter 3 which shapes plural-legalism as well as customary practices. I do not seek to denigrate customary land practices, as previous research has shown it can offer women secure land rights (Carney and Watts 1990; Ossome 2014; Verma 2001; Wanyeki 2003). I however recommend reconsidering what our understanding of inclusion and participation at the light of the results obtained through such processes (do they increase the target populations’ influence over decision-making or not?).<sup>335</sup>

---

<sup>334</sup> 02/05/2017

<sup>335</sup> Additional data on subjective perceptions of outcomes is provided in the annex.

## **Conclusion: All very poor, powerless or victims?**

Previous studies have suggested that in West Africa, rural inequality develops not because of increasing social differentiation between big landowners and a mostly landless rural proletariat as in ex-settler and settler regions of East and Southern Africa (Kuba and Lentz 2006: 30). However, a focus on such prominent, albeit not necessarily very large-scale land deals, reveals a more complicated picture of class formation with workers at the bottom, middle-classes and at the top our export agribusiness investors (as seen in previous chapters).

I have argued in the first section that “classes of labour” needed to be further disaggregated to acknowledge the variety of wage workers, as well as the diversity of their conditions, aspirations, social reproduction and life-making. The diversity of their lives challenge constructions of the genderless and undifferentiated “local community” that falls prey to an “undifferentiated capital”. The oral histories presented in this chapter indeed confirm that, “One cannot understand the making of a class without understanding how male-female relations change in the process since those changes are integral to the way classes are structured and reproduced - and experienced” (Mackintosh 1989: 37). I therefore suggest that class and gender do not just “intersect,” but are mutually-constituted. A totality.

The first section also offered an overview of the main socio-economic and demographic characteristics of farms and explained how migration for work structured these rural areas. We have seen that rural labour markets provided new sources of livelihoods with relatively good working conditions compared to other Senegalese farms’ standards. What is specific to these markets is their highly segmented and gendered nature, with some workers clearly benefitting from taking part while others not. The feminist critique articulated in this chapter contends that firms’ objective of increasing accumulation has kept these women on wage labour while disciplining and controlling them in paternalistic ways. Faced with a shortage of alternatives, workers are made to depend further on these farms, creating a reserve army of labour, in need of complementary jobs to meet the cost of social reproduction.

As the previous sections have shown, most wage labourers desperately looking for opportunities at the bottom of global production networks are women. This was particularly the case in global production networks of FFVs, where the presence of female workers was particularly marked. This pyramidal system of production in the global South has at its bottom, the female labour force wrestling to get a foot in the market and keep one in the household. In all three case studies, women continued to produce all the necessary unpaid care work, domestic and extra-family labour, whether emotional or physical, to help the family, the first system of exploitation, to reproduce itself. This repeated work may seem natural, it is not, it occurs on a battlefield of patriarchal and capitalist relations (Carney and Watts 1990; Guyer and Peters 1987). Child or adult, women constitute the reserve army of cheap labour servicing the men/employers in their lives. In addition, the control over women and junior men's (also *surga*) horticultural incomes is a battle within the household.

While we can see the differential impact on classes of labour, it is also possible to link land deals that generate significant employment opportunities with business opportunities that provide impetus to local entrepreneurs, who form a range of emerging "classes of capital". Often related to local leaders, many emerging capitalists particularly thrive on services linked to the new agribusiness investments. Transport services tend to be especially lucrative. The success in these businesses then fuels further accumulation in other activities, including farming, which in turn generate an additional demand for labour, often migrant agricultural workers. This highlights the importance of the merchant path to capitalist accumulation in the countryside. This simultaneous emergence of new classes marries pre-existing longer-term dynamics of (labour) migration, capitalisation and social stratification highlighting various dynamics of agrarian change in the countryside: exploitation without dispossession, accumulation by dispossession, and accumulation from above and from below.

Therefore, based on the above, a plausible response is that the land rush might have exacerbated these previous ongoing processes of "savagely sorting winners and losers" (Sassen 2010: 23-50). All these dynamics indicate how elites, including some political, traditional and religious leaders and emerging entrepreneurs, are to varying degrees, the ones who benefit the most from land deals. This is so, not only because of differences in access to land (a position defended by Peters 2002: 47 and Toulmin et al. 2002: 22), but

also these intersect with differences in labour hiring as we have just demonstrated, extent of capitalisation, use of land, and policy and political context.

In the last sections, I focus on land as a source and a resource, within and beyond all the dynamics already discussed; land as history, past, present and future; and land as identity to analyse the meaning of cultural shifts from “having land” to “having a job”. This led me to underscore what ongoing and new shifts appeared with regards to “being, becoming, belonging and succeeding” with the emergence of horticultural labour markets.

# CHAPTER 8: HOW TO NOT CONCLUDE?

The “global land rush” emerged in the turbulent context of socio-economic and political transformations, post 2007. It made media headlines in the late 2000s, prompting the “literature rush” both from NGOs and later the academy (Oya 2013a). While the drivers, scale and actors in this renewed interest in land (and labour) are still contested, a body of knowledge interested in its differentiated impact and outcomes, as well as political reactions to these deals, is growing (Hall et al. 2015). This research is part of a second wave of “making-sense” research (Edelman et al. 2013), which goes beyond an earlier emphasis on processes, governance and resistance, juxtaposing and linking encounters between classes of labour, classes of capital, the state and local elites/authorities. It has sought to understand what dynamics of agrarian change emerge out of land deals concerning export horticulture in the regions of Saint-Louis and Louga, between 2006 and 2017, by addressing the contemporary questions of labour and capital.

## **8.1. In a nutshell: key arguments and findings**

Drawing on my own original data – collected over 2 years through my multi-methodological approach including 7 months of immersive fieldwork in villages in Northern Senegal and visits to UK branches of the three selected companies: THE FIRST COMPANY, The Third Company and The Second Company in Northern Senegal, I have investigated the following questions:

### **How and why did the land rush take place in Northern Senegal’s FFV sector?**

When addressing this question, I began by situating the contemporary “land grab” debate within agrarian political economy. Then, I anchored my Senegalese case-study in a long tradition of critical African and development studies (chapter 1). I surveyed the main

strands of “land grab” debate and conceptual frameworks for analysing large-scale land deals: on the one hand agrarian political economy and on the other neo-populist theories (Edelman 2013). Re-actualising the agrarian question of capital and labour in light of “land grab” debates was a crucial step to addressing the gap in existing literature (Oya 2013b). Doing so required a method of inquiry, revisiting global and local elements of historiography - from yesterday’s Waalo and Kajoor, to today’s Saint-Louis and Louga (Chapter 2). Many events have had to sediment for the post-2006 land rush to take place. With this in mind I established, in Chapter 3, the ways in which implantation of estates by a variety of foreign capital led first to the production of produce cotton, then groundnuts in the beginning of the 20th century and eventually the current focus on export horticulture. Together this exacerbated labour mobility, migration and socio-economic stratification of already hierarchical societies *par excellence* (Barry 2012). These conjugated global and local dynamics intersected with pre-existing transformations in land tenure and shifts in agricultural and industrial policy and developed export horticulture and agro-processing as an alternative way to industrialise through “industries without smokestacks”<sup>336</sup> (Newfarmer et al. 2018:1-2).

Taking stock of this rich history, I developed, in chapter 4, an epistemology of the land rush that combines feminism and critical political economy by exploring the nature of power relations: Who owns what? Who does what? Who gets what? What do they do with it? What do they do to each other? Central to this were the gendered relations of power: How does gender impact upon who is able to do, own, or get what?

## **What are the roles of the different stakeholders at different levels?**

My focus on global-local dynamics followed by national-level analysis, and then on local-level interaction, allowed me to demonstrate the politicised nature of accumulation from above and the pluralism of the state.

---

<sup>336</sup> The common features between industries without smokestacks such as horticulture and tourism are that they are “tradable and have high value added per worker. Like manufacturing, they benefit from technological change and productivity growth. Some exhibit scale and agglomeration economies” (Newfarmer, 2018:1-2).

To examine closely the interrelated processes that impact upon land deal agreements, I provocatively unpacked the “5 steps to ‘grab’ land successfully” in chapter 5. I did so by firstly mapping the national political economy, detailing how the emerging Senegal plan encouraged agribusiness investments through the main State agency, APIX, in order to address food security and agricultural modernisation initiatives. I analysed the reforms in the political-administrative architecture and state pluralism at the local level, since the Act Three of decentralisation has given more powers to local authorities. Secondly, I articulated how historical irrigation and infrastructure development initiatives has led to today’s blooming export horticulture in the Delta and the Valley of River Senegal by zooming in on my three cases-studies. The first two companies, THE FIRST COMPANY and THE SECOND COMPANY, evolved in export horticulture and the third, The Third Company, was providing the bulk of potato supply for the national market (The Third Company). I then critically examined *how* deals have been negotiated through agreements with decentralised and local authorities in dire need of funds and reinforced through bilateral conventions with separate groups or individuals with the key intervention of key middle(women). I did so by evaluating the contents of contracts and MoUs, arguing that the diverse outcomes in the interpretation of those deals may be a result of the central place of “negotiability” with some actors still trying to find better deals even after they are signed. This verifies that indeed “no condition is permanent” (Berry 1993).

This analysis would not have been complete if it did not involve an analysis of encounters between capital and labour, the subject of chapter 6. I concentrated on the roles of investors and their strategic use of labour regimes to mobilise and discipline labour, but also “counter-movements” to land deals. I argued that in the context of an almost absent “neoliberal state”, local authorities as well as individual villages in need of “public goods”, were seeking to redefine a new tripartite “social contract” with incoming investors who were also eager to embellish their profit-driven accumulation endeavours. They did this through what I have termed “Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) - paternalism”: the combination of management ethos and labour management systems to accumulate and reproduce capital further while concealing this profit-driven accumulation under a discourse of care and social responsibility. This has arguably bridged the broken link between the State and the communities in order maintain access to demanding markets. However, the initial use of economic and extra-economic means of coercion by companies to accumulate land has so far not been met by broad-based

acceptance, despite the facilitation of state agencies. Instead, I observed differentiated responses from below, namely acquiescence, resistance and the weapons of the weak (Scott 1985). The nature and reasons for this were analysed with detailed empirical evidence.

### **What are the differentiated outcomes of interactions between new and old classes of capital and labour in the context of land deals?**

This question, addressed in chapter 7, asks whether the land rush signals a return of the agrarian questions of capital and labour (Oya 2013b). I argued that “classes of labour” are not being exploited in a vacuum, by challenging constructions of a genderless and undifferentiated “local community” that falls prey to an “undifferentiated capital”. I unpacked the multidimensional outcomes of agrarian change that has occurred in the decade following the land rush by focusing on social differentiation from below (classes of labour), from above (classes of capital), and on the wider Anthropocene beyond markets.

The first section analysed the empirical evidence on the fragmented nature of classes of labour by scrutinising workers’ diversity, segmentation and gender polarisation in the three horticultural companies. Using a critical feminist political economy stance, I argued that capitalist-investors have integrated women into the labour force, using a form of “neo-housewificality” to reproduce the logic of the “domestic economy” to that of the market. Corporate capitalist patriarchies continue to address female workers as housewives primarily, rather than as workers – a strategy of control and discipline in line with the logic of reproduction of labour markets. Consequently, firms have re-invented themselves as a new “family” in which capitalism-patriarchy disciplines and controls wage labour with the fallacious objective to “leave no-one behind”. By closely examining the oral histories of nine male and female workers, I established that some workers were benefiting from the land deals more than others, hence their fragmentation. My oral histories approach also allowed me to gain new insights into workers’ social reproduction and life-making, counter-movements and acts of everyday resistance, when attempting to navigate their adverse incorporation into labour markets and the diverse (emancipatory and alienating) potentials of wage employment. All this allowed me to articulate a critique



of blanket narratives around “the rural worker” and their invisibility in national statistics and, instead, emphasise the diversity of their conditions, livelihoods and aspirations. The data I collected suggests that migration and livelihood strategies are crucial dimensions that shape, and are shaped by, participation in rural labour markets and social reproduction.

Following this, I analysed social differentiation from above: who are the newer and older classes of capital emerging in the aftermath of the land rush? It appears that different capitalist accumulators and entrepreneurs are emerging. Those most successful were taking a long view and seizing opportunities “induced” by the land rush. Others were struggling and appeared to be more “wealth accumulators” in the sense of entrepreneurs, rather than capitalist accumulators. A few others were semi-proletarianised, navigating between wage labour and capitalist/entrepreneurial activities. Whether or not these are direct outcomes of the land rush or the result of pre-existing processes is to be clearly determined. However, what did become clear is that the land rush contributes to the savage sorting of winners and losers. Importantly, the boundaries between winning and losing are not clear cut, but often intermingle.

In section three, I continued to unpack outcomes by focusing on the effects of capitalisation and integration into global value chains on the domestic economy. I found that there is on the one hand an increased tightening of labour markets and on the other intensified market competition for FFVs.

In section four, I proposed to move beyond the compartmentalisation of land deal outcomes by going further than the triple heritage and policy (chapter 3), economic and extra-economic means of coercion to “acquire” (and capitalise on) land (chapter 4), antagonisms between classes of labour and capital (chapter 6 and previous sections), to analyse the social orders of markets and the Anthropocene at large. By examining how “being”, (politics of) “belonging”, “becoming”, have been altered in the land rush, this allows me to reconcile social formations *and* forms of production, base *and* superstructure for a more holistic analysis of land deals outcomes rather than a fragmented reality of its alleged “intersecting” facets.

Finally, I proposed a survey-based subjective evaluation of the land deals by the populations living around those deals. I found that from Saint-Louis to Louga, there were as many preferences and assessments of the advantages and inconveniences of the deals as there were of research subjects, echoing the words of one investor: “we are doomed to fail” (Interview)<sup>337</sup>. Respondents’ varied perceptions allowed me to first give them the privilege of the last word, while bringing back complexity to the analysis of “land grabs”, and thus avoid binary interpretations.

The main contribution of this thesis is its documentation of various interlinked processes between the most direct actors in these deals: investors, political and administrative authorities, and emerging classes of labour and capital. This has hopefully demonstrated that the differentiated nature of land deal outcomes is better understood through more interdisciplinary and time-consuming research. While I have sought to offer more nuanced perspectives on the differentiated outcomes of land deals, I have also found that gender, ethnicity, age and marital status mattered, in shaping class formation.

Regarding the implications of the land rush for agrarian questions of capital, the main finding is that the already ongoing slow and imbalanced processes of accumulation and social differentiation in Louga and Saint-Louis were *exacerbated* by the post-2006 land rush, confirming Oya’s initial intuition (2013b). Indeed, its roots are to be found in the enduring dynamics of extraversion and stratification of social contracts inherited from the past kingdoms of Waalo and Kajoor, and still being renegotiated.

## 8.2. Policy recommendations

In her discussion of the agreement between House of Bud and the Senegalese government, Mackintosh (1989: 14) stated that “the agreement might be used as a case study demonstrating how not to negotiate with a foreign investor”. Some thirty-five years after her study, contract-negotiation, implementation and ex-post evaluation still seems to be Senegal’s Achille’s heel. Based on this thesis, and daring to end with a ‘policy hat’, I propose a few recommendations:

---

<sup>337</sup> Interview with senior management

**For the Senegalese government:**

First, the government should reconsider the conditions laid out for investors (both foreign and domestic) in the export horticulture and agro-processing sectors in favour of a real strategy of resource mobilisation. This requires perusing more critically the conditions of VAT re-imburement (including under which companies can obtain the ZFC status) with more regular performance and commitments' reviews. In addition, the government should seek to invest further in "self-discovery" to find out what it is good at producing and potential returns (Hausman et al. 2003). Learning and implementing in more productive activities it will take time, will allow Senegal to finance its structural transformation strategy also through domestic resource mobilisation.

Second, while it must support "champions" in the FFV sector such as THE FIRST COMPANY, The Third Company and The Second Company, the government should also encourage increased competition and limit any concentration or anti-competitive agreement (there are less than 30 such companies). It can do so by improving intra-industry competition through encouraging the apparition of new champions either in the Northern Senegal or other regions, as well as other types of competition. This is one of the best practices identified by previous research (Newfarmer 2018: 424; Newfarmer and Sztajerowska 2012). Simultaneously, the government should be transparent with how much those firms pay in tax and about how the fiscal revenues are re-invested.

Third, the government should review its specifications for investors. This can be done first with APIX playing a more central role to ensure clear mutually beneficial objectives agreed upon and operationalised by investors; not just improving the "ease" of doing business but also overseeing the afterlives of each investment project. SMART (Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant and Timely) objectives should be established beforehand, with the possibility of sanctions of withdrawal of tax, or other advantages if mutually agreed upon specifications are not respected. This would discourage speculation or opportunistic behaviour. In addition, APIX needs to re-evaluate the financial returns for the State, evaluate what has been done by the investor and set new milestones. This will allow the government to have a clear, responsible and pro-active policy with investors well-informed of their rights and obligations.

Fourth, the Senegalese government should invest in developing the skills of its project officers in its local administration, especially in contract negotiation<sup>338</sup> and project evaluation. Despite this having been initiated with PDIDAS, which opened land offices<sup>339</sup> in the communes for registration procedures, there should be a more systematic effort from the government.

Fifth, the government should undertake a national sector and gender-mapping of work conditions in its export horticulture and agro-processing value-chain for more gender equity. This is much needed because of the gendered and segmented nature of export horticulture and local FFV value chains. This should be conducted for all companies in Senegal (foreign and domestic). In addition, documenting best and worst practices and sharing it through a multi-stakeholder initiative could help benchmark practices and improve policy based on evidence.

Sixth, despite the hierarchisation of power at the administrative level, sub-levels of hierarchies (for instance the *sous-préfet* vis-à-vis the *préfet*), should be able to disobey some rules if they deem the deal does not conform to specifications or “public interest” (more clearly defined). Moreover, a mechanism should be put in place to protect civil servants and other whistle-blowers of corrupt practices within the state. This is the domain of agencies such as OFNAC, established to fight against corruption with General Inspectors of States (IGE) who are independent in the exercise of their duties (normally<sup>340</sup>).

Seventh, National Labour institutions such as the Labour Directorate must be strengthened through the establishment of a sectoral system of collective bargaining with some basic “minima” to be respected by ALL investors. This will ensure working conditions are not simply left to the different degrees of “paternalism” manifested by different investors: so, a sector-level collective bargaining system. This is also a matter for CSOs and unions to engage with.

---

<sup>338</sup> Institutions such as IDEP (The African Institute for Economic Development and Planning) have been training officials from diverse ministries including Agriculture in contract negotiations since decades.

<sup>339</sup> *Bureau foncier de la commune* (French)

<sup>340</sup> In 2017, the former head of OFNAC published a report exposing corrupt civil servants at the highest levels of the state. She was subsequently dismissed and replaced despite being independent. The Government claimed it was the end of her mandate, and her removal had nothing to do with the report.

Eighth, village chiefs should be provided with financial compensation for the exercise of their duties.

Lastly, the government should finalise the reform of the land law. The latest option of the National Commission for the Reform of the Land Law, supported by the World Bank, was for the state to use its private lands<sup>341</sup> and convert it into public land that can be leased (*bail*) to private operators. This proposed reform would allow the local authorities to sign a sub-lease (*sous-bail*) with the investor of their choice. This has not yet been validated.

**For academic researchers:**

While the existence of databases has considerably improved data accessibility and have allowed more transparency in land deals, we need to bank on methods to improve our niche. A major insight from this research is that, to fully comprehend the implications of the land rush for the contemporary questions of capital and labour, a more holistic analysis of class formation and agrarian change coupled with a methodical move away from the focus on sole economic outcomes, is necessary. As I have demonstrated, land deals take place in socio-cultural institutions, we need to re-embed them in these to have the full picture, not the contrary. Research institutions should also be more opened to alternative “ways of knowing” and researching and value more “local knowledge.” It is also important to recognise our positionality vis-à-vis our research, and find a way to use it favourably in our research.

**For companies:**

Because of the certifications of labels they hold, companies comply to many standards, mostly regarding the quality of “Fresh” products delivered and the social and ethical reputation of brands. It requires much work and financial investment from corporate players to comply with CSR and HSR regulations, as these measures of social compliance are often gender-blind nonetheless (Barrientos & Pallangyo: 3). To address this, there should be i) a review of the working conditions (salary and non-salary) at company-level, but this could also be undertaken by professional organisations such as VALLAGRI to

---

<sup>341</sup> *Domaine Privé de l'Etat.*

benchmark standards; ii) mechanisms in place to allow workers at each level of the company to have their needs assessed through an annual review, with an imperative for the company to address gender-specific needs. Workers should also access adequate training opportunities.

Additionally, there should be mechanisms in place to ensure that sexual harassment and sexism is punished, and therefore hopefully reduced. Companies could set a positive example by providing equal leadership opportunities for male and female workers.

**For the government, IGE (the independent body inspecting public institutions), investors, and civil society organisations CSOs:**

First, financial contributions by the investor should be made more transparent: how much has been transferred by the investor and how it has been spent by the commune?

Second, all political and administrative leaders including at the local level must submit a statement of their assets when taking up or leaving an official position. While this exists<sup>342</sup> and is managed by OFNAC, it should be dealt with totally by the IGE (which is a more independent body) or shared between IGE and OFNAC. This will improve transparency and accountability at all levels.

**For activists:**

There is a need to recognise positionality, and invest in more rigorous evidence-based advocacy. As this research has shown, not all land deals are “land grabs”. And not all “land grabs” are controversial, or just operated by foreign investors. There is a need to look further, beyond usual suspects, beyond usual topics, beyond usual methods.

**General recommendations**

Vertically-integrated firms and the government should be bound to the transnational treaties already in place where applicable (principles for responsible investments, the Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Government of Tenure of Land). The problem is

---

<sup>342</sup> <https://www.ofnac.sn/resources/pdf/FORMULAIRE%20DDP%20-%20VERSION%20ELECTRONIQUE.pdf>

that most of these are voluntary with little binding force. The Binding Treaty for Transnational Corporations, if approved, could be a game changer.

### **8.3. Directions for future research**

Several studies illustrate the possibility to diversify on- and off-farm incomes and the contribution of agricultural investments (large and small) for poverty reduction and growth in household incomes (Van den Broeck and Maertens 2017; Van den Broeck, Swinnen and Maertens 2017). Other studies in Kenya and Senegal found that wage employment in horticultural exports also improve households' food security (Von Braun and Kennedy 1987; Van den Broeck; Van Hoyweghen and Maertens 2018). Moreover, studies such as Adamczewski ask if land markets are a new way of managing land in the Delta of the Senegal River, in the context of land governance reforms (Adamczewski 2018). Ndiaye (2018: 14) asked: "Can the exclusionary appropriation of agricultural land by private interests really be necessary to increase the performance of peasant production or should land rather be a "common good?" (Ndiaye 2018:14).

As illustrated in this thesis, processes of rural labour market formation and increasing proletarianization, especially of the young, constitutes a windfall for many and a curse for others. Here are questions that require further attention:

1. Can and should a country's poverty reduction and food security be left to foreign capital?
2. Regarding integration or Enrolment into global GVCs: is "contract-farming" THE path to agrarian transition in the countryside?
3. "Africa rising", "Senegal Emerging"? Are industries without smokestacks the bullet silver to industrialisation in SSA?

## 8.4. Towards a conclusion?

Having established high levels of local expectations from investments, especially with emerging types of social contract between communities and private investors, what is revealed is that there are no straightforward answers, of the kind governments or NGO activists seem to support. What would have happened to these populations in the absence of land deals?

As I close this thesis, I would like to acknowledge the people of the Delta of the River whose lives move on notwithstanding the dams, the irrigation plans, exports, and deals. In the rich words of Adams (1979: 479), who chose to live her life by the River:

*But Jamaane exists; as I write, pitched towards sundown, with gathering rain-clouds. That stands the world on its feet again; and I am here to acknowledge it. That unlocks and makes sense of everything.*

Jamaane could be one of the villages I visited.

Adams writes again:

*Researchers come here asking things they wouldn't dare ask people in France. They think we're still asleep. When they come here asking what we do with our money, some people here say 'This lot don't know anything. Soon they'll be asking us what we do with our wives'. Don't they know people need to live? No chercheur<sup>343</sup> can understand this country to the depths. This is a living country. There are live people here. This river has been here since the world began (ibid).*

When I started this research, I was full of certainties and clear-cut positions. I have more uncertainties now than when I began because these land deals are much more complex than a “single narrative”. Simply being Senegalese does not allow me to understand it to the depths: “This is a *living* country”.

---

<sup>343</sup> Researcher



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abu-Lughod, L. (1991) *Veiled Sentiments: Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society*, (Berkeley: University of California Press).

Abu-Lughod, L. (1993) *Writing Women's Worlds: Bedouin Stories*. (Berkeley: University of California Press).

Adams, A. (1979) 'An open letter to a young researcher', *African Affairs*: 451–79

Adams, A. (1977) *Le long voyage des gens du fleuve*, Paris, Maspero.

Adams, J. (1991), *The Rural Labour Market in Zimbabwe*. *Development and Change*, 22: 297-320. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7660.1991.tb00413.x

Adamczewski A., Bourgoin J. (2018) Land markets as a new way of managing lands in Senegal River Valley?

Adelman, Irma. 2000, *Fifty Years of Economic Development: What Have We Learned?* Paris, the World Bank, Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics.

Agarwal, Bina (2003) Gender and land rights revisited: exploring new prospects via state, family and market, *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 3(1/2): 184-224.

Agarwal, Bina (2003) Women's Land Rights and the Trap of Neo-Conservatism: A Response to Jackson', *Journal of Agrarian Change* (Oxford), 3 (4)

Aidoo, A. (1992) 'The African Woman Today', *Dissent*, Summer, pp. 319-25.

Akram-Lodhi, A.H.,(2018), What is Critical Agrarian Studies? Review of African Political Economy, <http://roape.net/2018/03/28/what-is-critical-agrarian-studies/>

Akram-Lodhi, A.H., Kay, C. (Eds.), 2009. *Peasants and globalization: political economy, rural transformation and the agrarian question*, Routledge ISS studies in rural livelihoods. Routledge, London; New York.

Akram-Lodhi, A.H., Kay, C., 2010a. Surveying the agrarian question (part 1): unearthing foundations, exploring diversity. *J. Peasant Stud.* 37, 177–202. doi:10.1080/03066150903498838

Akram-Lodhi, A.H., Kay, C., 2010b. Surveying the agrarian question (part 2): current debates and beyond. *J. Peasant Stud.* 37, 255–284. doi:10.1080/03066151003594906

Akram-Lodhi, A.H. (1993) Agrarian classes in Pakistan: An empirical test of Patnaik's labour-exploitation criterion, *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 20:4, 557-589

Alden Wily, L., 2012. Looking back to see forward: the legal niceties of land theft in land rushes. *J. Peasant Stud.* 39, 751–775. doi:10.1080/03066150.2012.674033

Alden-Wily, L., 2012. The Global Land Grab: The New Enclosures [WWW Document]. URL <http://wealthofthecommons.org/essay/global-land-grab-new-enclosures> (accessed 4.8.16).

Alhassan, S., Shaibu M., & Kuwornu, J. (2018) Is land grabbing an opportunity or a menace to development in developing countries? Evidence from Ghana, *Local Environment*, 23:12, 1121-1140

Alissoutin, R. L. (2008) *Les défis du développement local au Sénégal*, CODESRIA, Dakar, Senegal

Allan, J.A. (Ed.), 2013. *Handbook of land and water grabs in Africa: foreign direct investment and food and water security*, 1st ed. ed, Routledge international handbooks. Routledge, Abingdon, United Kingdom; New York, NY.

Amadiume, I. (1997), *The Mouth that Spoke a Falsehood Will Later Speak the Truth: Going Home to the Field in Eastern Nigeria*, 182 -198 in Bell, D., Caplan, P and Karim, W.J. (eds), 1993, *Gendered Fields: Women, Men and Ethnography*. London: Routledge

Amaeshi, K, Adegbite, E, Ogbechie, C, Idemudia, U, Seny kan, KA, Issa, M & Anakwue, OIJ 2016, 'Corporate social responsibility in SMEs: A shift from philanthropy to institutional works?', *Journal of Business Ethics*, vol. 138, no. 2, pp. 385-400. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-015-2633-1>

Amaeshi, K, Adegbite, E & Rajwani, T 2016b, 'Corporate social responsibility in challenging and non-enabling institutional contexts: Do institutional voids matter?', *Journal of Business Ethics*, vol. 134, no. 1, pp. 135- 153. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-014-2420-4>

Amanor, K. (1999), *Global Restructuring and Land Rights in Ghana Research Report No. 108*. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala.

Amanor, K.S., 2012. Global resource grabs, agribusiness concentration and the smallholder: two West African case studies. *J. Peasant Stud.* 39, 731–749. doi:10.1080/03066150.2012.676543

Amin, S. 1969. *Le Monde des Affaires Sénégalais*. Paris: Editions de Minuit.

Amin, S. 1970, *L'accumulation à l'échelle mondiale: Critique de la théorie du Sous-Développement*, IFAN

Amin, S. *Only people make their own history*, 2019

Anseeuw, W. (2010) *Agricultural policy in Africa – renewal or status quo? A spotlight on Kenya and Senegal*. In V. Padayachee (2010) *The political economy of Africa*. Routledge

Anseeuw, W., Wily, L.A., Cotula, L., Taylor, M., 2012. *Land rights and the rush for land: Findings of the global commercial*. ILC Rome Italy.

Anseeuw W., Ducastel A. 2013. *QA - Rivista dell'Associazione Rossi-Doria*, 2: p. 37-55.

Arnfred, S., Bakare-Yusuf, B., Waswa Kisiang'ani, E., Lewis, D. Oyewumi, O. and F. Steady. (2004) *African Genderscholarship: concepts, methodologies and paradigms*, CODESRIA Gender Series 1. Dakar Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa.

Ariyo, J.A., Mortimore, M. (2013) *State, Land and Agricultural Commercialisation in Kwara State, Nigeria* in Hall et al. 2015

Austin, G (2006) 'The political economy of the natural environment in West African history: Asante and its savanna neighbors in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries', in Richard Kuba and Carola Lentz (eds), *Land and the Politics of Belonging in West Africa* (Brill Academic Publishers, Leiden), pp. 187-21

Austin, G (2007) 'Labour and land in Ghana, 1879-1939: a shifting ratio and an institutional revolution', *Australian Economic History Review* (special issue on 'Factor Prices and the Performance of Less Industrialised Countries), 47:1), pp. 95-120.

Azan (Cap. Henri), « Notice sur le Oualo », *Revue mar et col.*, nov. 1863 (pp. 395-422), déc. 1863 (pp. 607-655), janv. 1864 (pp. 327-360)

Ba, B., 2008. *Agriculture et Sécurité alimentaire au Sénégal*, L'Harmattan

Bâ, C.O., Hathie, I., Dieye P.N., Diagana B. 2009 – *Changements structurels dans l'agriculture et le monde rural au Sénégal*,

Ba C.O., Ndiaye, A.I., 2008, « L'émigration clandestine sénégalaise », *Asylon(s)*, 3, mars 2008

Ba C.O., Bredeloup Sylvie. (1997). *Migrations inter-africaines des femmes de la vallée du fleuve Sénégal*. In: Bisilliat Jeanne (ed.) *Face aux changements : les femmes du Sud*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 61-86. ISBN 2-7384-5637-5

Bâ, C.O., (1996) *Dynamiques Migratoires et Changements sociaux au sein des relations de genre et des rapport jeunes/vieux des originaires de la Moyenne Vallée du Fleuve*. PhD thesis, Université Cheikh Anta Diop Dakar

Bâ, C.O., (1996): "Migrations régionales et relations de genre dans la vallée du fleuve Sénégal", in: *Africa Development*, 23,3: 95-119.

Baglioni, E & Gibbon, p. (2013) *Land Grabbing, Large- and Small-scale Farming: what can evidence and policy from 20th century Africa contribute to the debate?* *Third World Quarterly*, 34:9, 1558-1581, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2013.843838

Baglioni, E., 2015. *Straddling Contract and Estate Farming: Accumulation Strategies of Senegalese Horticultural Exporters*. *J. Agrar. Change* 15, 17–42. doi:10.1111/joac.12032

Baglioni, E. (2018) *Labour control and the labour question in global production networks: exploitation and disciplining in Senegalese export horticulture*, *Journal of Economic Geography*, Volume 18, Issue 1, Pages 111–137, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbx013>

- Baissac, C. (2011), Brief History of SEZs and Overview of Policy Debates Special Economic Zones in Africa. February 2011, 23-60
- Banda, Janet L. (2011) *Romancing customary tenure: challenges and prospects for the neo-liberal suitor in Fenrich Jeanmarie, Galizzi Paolo and Higgins, Tracy The Future of African Customary Law (2011), Cambridge University Press*
- Banégas, R.& Warnier, J.-P. (2001) « Nouvelles figures de la réussite et du pouvoir » *Politique Africaine*, n° 82, p. 5-21.
- Barral, S. (2014), *Paternalistic Supervision of Labour in Indonesian Plantations. Journal of Agrarian Change*, 14: 240-259. doi:[10.1111/joac.12063](https://doi.org/10.1111/joac.12063)
- Barrientos, S & Pallangyo, C 2018, *Gender, Global Value Chain Policy Series*, World Economic Forum
- Barrow, C.J. 1950-, 2000. *Social impact assessment: an introduction /*. Arnold, London
- Barry, B. (1979) « The subordination of power and the mercantile economy: the kingdom of Waalo 1600-1831 », dans Cruise O'Brien éd., *The political economy of underdevelopment*, Londres, Sage,
- Barry, B. (2012) *The Kingdom of Waalo Senegal Before the Conquest*. New York: Diasporic Africa Press.
- Bass, Loretta and Sow, Fatou (2006) 'Senegalese families: the confluence of ethnicity, history and social change', in Oheneba-Sakyi, Yaw and Takyi, Baffour (Eds.), *African Families at the Turn of the 21st Century*, Westport: Praeger Publishers, pp.83-102.
- Bathily, Abdoulaye. 1975. *Imperialism and colonial expansion in Senegal in the nineteenth century. With particular reference to the economic, social and political developments of the kingdom of Gadiaga (Galam)*. Birmingham, Ph.D., Center of West African Studies, 517 p
- Bhattacharya, T. 2017. "Introduction: Mapping Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Centering Oppression", Pluto Press
- Bayart, J.F. (1989) *L'Etat en Afrique. La politique du ventre*, Paris: Fayard.
- Bebbington A, Humphreys Bebbington D. (2018) *Mining, movements and sustainable development: Concepts for a framework. Sustainable Development.*;26:441–449. <https://doi.org/10.1002/sd.1888>
- Becker. C & Martin, V. (1975) *Kayor et Baol, royaumes sénégalais et traite des eThe First Companyaves au XVIIIe siècle*. In: *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, tome 62, n°226-227
- Beckert, S. 2014, *Empire of Cotton. A New History of Global Capitalism*

- Beckert, J., 2009, "The social order of markets", *Theory and Society*, 38 (3)
- Behar, R. (1993) *Translated Woman: Crossing the Border with Esperanza's Story*, Boston, Beacon Press
- Behrman, J., Meinzen-Dick, R., Quisumbing, A., 2012. The gender implications of large-scale land deals. *J. Peasant Stud.* 39, 49–79. doi:10.1080/03066150.2011.652621
- Belcher, B., & Palenberg, M. (2018). Outcomes and Impacts of Development Interventions: Toward Conceptual Clarity. *American Journal of Evaluation*, 39(4), 478–495. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1098214018765698>
- Benaria, L. (2001), *Structural Adjustment Policies*, in Janice Peterson and Margaret Lewis, eds., *The Elgar Companion to Feminist Economics*, Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, USA, Edward Elgar 1999.
- Bernstein, H and Oya, C. (2014) *Rural Futures, How much should markets rule? IIED* <http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/14639IIED.pdf>
- Bernstein, H. 2010. *Class Dynamics of Agrarian Change*. Halifax, NS and Sterling, VA: Fernwood Publishing and Kumarian Press.
- Bernstein, H., 2009. Agrarian questions from transition to globalization, in: Akram-Lodhi, A.H., Kay, C. (Eds.), *Peasants and Globalization. Political Economy, Rural Transformation and the Agrarian Question*. Routledge, London.
- Bernstein, H. (2007) 'Capital and Labour from Centre to Margins'. Keynote speech at the conference 'Living on the Margins', Stellenbosch University (26–28 March).
- Bernstein, H., 2004. Considering Africa's Agrarian Questions. *Hist. Mater.* 12, 115–144.
- Bernstein, H. (1977). Notes on Capital and Peasantry. *Review of African Political Economy*, (10), 60-73.
- Berry, S. 1993. *No Condition is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- Biaya, T. (2001). Les plaisirs de la ville: Masculinité, sexualité et féminité à Dakar (1997–2000). *African Studies Review*, 44(2), 71-86. doi:10.2307/525575
- Bierschenk, T. and J.-P. Olivier de Sardan. 2014. *States at Work: Dynamics of African Bureaucracies*. Leiden: Brill.
- Bin, D. (2018). So-called Accumulation by Dispossession. *Critical Sociology*, 44(1), 75–88. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0896920516651687>
- Binswanger, H. P., and K. Deininger. 1997. "Explaining agricultural and agrarian policies in developing countries." *Journal of Economic Literature*, 35 (4): 1958–2005.

- Blundo, G. (2006) Bureaucracies in Senegal », *Development and Change*, 37(4) 799-819.
- Blundo, G. (2001), « La corruption comme mode de gouvernance locale : trois décennies de décentralisation au Sénégal », *Afrique contemporaine*, 199, 3e trimestre, 106-118.
- Blundo, G. (1998) « Logiques de gestion publique dans la décentralisation sénégalaise : participation factionnelle et ubiquité réticulaire », *Bulletin de l'APAD*, n° 15, 1998, pp. 21-47.
- Boltanski, L. and Thévenot, L., 1991. *De la justification*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Boone, C., 2015. Land tenure regimes and state structure in rural Africa: implications for forms of resistance to large-scale land acquisitions by outsiders. *J. Contemp. Afr. Stud.* 33, 171–190. doi:10.1080/02589001.2015.1065576
- Boone, C. (2014) *Property and Political Order in Africa, Land Rights and the Structure of Politics in Africa*, Cambridge
- Boone, C (2003) *Political topographies of the African state: territorial authority and institutional choice*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. ISBN 9780521532648
- Boone, C (1992) *Merchant Capital and the Roots of State Power in Senegal, 1930–1985*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bop C., Truong TD. (2014) 14 Complexity of Gender and Age in Precarious Lives: Malian Men, Women, and Girls in Communities of Blind Beggars in Senegal. In: Truong TD., Gasper D., Handmaker J., Bergh S. (eds) *Migration, Gender and Social Justice*. Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace, vol 9. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
- Borras, S.M., Franco, J.C., 2013. Global Land Grabbing and Political Reactions “From Below.” *Third World Q.* 34, 1723–1747. doi:10.1080/01436597.2013.843845
- Bourdieu, P. (2003) ‘Participant objectivation’, *Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute*, 9(2) pp. 281-94.
- Brammer, S., Jackson, G., and Matten, D. (2012). Corporate Social Responsibility and institutional theory: new perspectives on private governance. *Socioeconomic Review*, 10(1):3-28
- Braudel, F. (1958) 'History and the Social Sciences: The Longue Durée' (1958), in Braudel, *On History* (trans.) Sarah Matthews (Chicago, 1982), 47.
- Braudel, F. (1977) *Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism*.
- Braudel, F. (1984) *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century*.

- Braun, V. and Clarke, V. (2006) Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, 3 (2). pp. 77-101. ISSN 1478-0887
- Braun, von, J., Meinzen-Dick, R., 2009. 'Land Grabbing' by Foreign Investors in Developing Countries: Risks and Opportunities. IFPRI Policy Brief 13. Washington DC: International Food Policy Research Institute
- Brautigam, D., 2015. *Will Africa feed China? /*. Oxford University Press, New York:
- Bräutigam, D., Zhang, H., 2013. Green Dreams: Myth and Reality in China's Agricultural Investment in Africa. *Third World Q.* 34, 1676–1696. doi:10.1080/01436597.2013.843846
- Brayer, J., Cuzon, J.R., Diène, M.N., 2004. La loi d'orientation agro-sylvo-pastorale sénégalaise, résultat d'une large concertation, L'histoire immédiate. Seuil, Paris.
- Breman, J. 1985. Between Accumulation and Immiseration: The Partiality of Fieldwork in Rural India. *Journal of Peasant Studies* 13: 5–36. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03066158508438281>.
- Brenner, R. (1976) "Agrarian class structure and economic development in pre-industrial Europe", *Past and Present*, 70/1, 30-75.
- Bryceson, D. (1980) 'The Proletarianization of Women in Tanzania', *Review of African Political Economy*, 17: 4-27.
- Bryceson, D. (1990) *Food insecurity and the social division of labour in Tanzania, 1919-85: (Macmillan, London)*
- Bryceson, D.F. (1995) 'Gender Relations in Rural Tanzania: Power Poetics or Cultural Consensus?', in C. Creighton and C.K. Omari (eds) *Gender, Family and Household in Tanzania*, pp. 37–69. Aldershot: Avebury.
- Bryceson, D.F., Mooij, J.E., Kay, C. (Eds.), 2000. *Disappearing peasantries? rural labour in Africa, Asia and Latin America*. Intermediate Technology Publications, London.
- Bryman, A. (2016). *Social Research Methods (5th ed.)*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Buckley, L., 2013. Chinese Land-Based Interventions in Senegal. *Dev. Change* 44, 429–450. doi:10.1111/dech.12016
- Burawoy, M. 1985. *Politics of Production. Factory regimes under capitalism and socialism*, London: Verso.
- Byres, T. J. 1995. "Political economy, the agrarian question and the comparative method." *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 22 (4): 561–80.
- Byres, T. 1996. *Capitalism from above and capitalism from below: an essay in comparative political economy*. London: Macmillan.

Byres, T (2003) Agriculture and development: the dominant orthodoxy and an alternative view. In Chang, H-J (ed.) Rethinking Development Economics. Anthem Press, London.

Byres, T.J., 2004. Neo-Classical Neo-Populism 25 Years On: Déjà Vu and Déjà Passé. Towards a Critique. *J. Agrar. Change* 4, 17–44. doi:10.1111/j.1471-0366.2004.00071.x

Byres, T. J. 2006. “Agriculture and development: towards a critique of the ‘new neoclassical development economics’ and of ‘neoclassical neo-populism’”. In *The new development economics: after the Washington consensus*, Edited by: J. K.S. and Fine, B. 222–48. London: Zed Books.

Cairó-i-Céspedes, G. & Colom-Jaén, A. (2014) A political economy approach of India in Senegal. A “win–win” partnership?, *Canadian Journal of Development Studies / Revue canadienne d'études du développement*, 35:3, 376-395, DOI: [10.1080/02255189.2014.936368](https://doi.org/10.1080/02255189.2014.936368)

Camara, F. K. (2007) 'Women and the Law: A Critique of Senegalese Family Law', *Social Identities*, 13, 787-800.

Carmody P. (2013) A Global Enclosure: The Geo-Logics of Indian Agro-Investments in Africa, *Capitalism Nature Socialism*, 24:1, 84-103, DOI: [10.1080/10455752.2012.759247](https://doi.org/10.1080/10455752.2012.759247)

Carney, J., & Watts, M. (1991). Disciplining Women? Rice, Mechanization, and the Evolution of Mandinka Gender Relations in Senegambia. *Signs*, 16(4), 651-681. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3174568>

Carney, J. and M. Watts (1990) ‘Manufacturing Dissent: Work, Gender and the Politics of Meaning in a Peasant Society’, *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 60(2):207–41.

Chambati, W. (2017) Changing Forms of Wage Labour in Zimbabwe’s New Agrarian Structure, *Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy*, 6, 1, (79)

Chang, H.-J. (Ed.), 2003. Rethinking development economics, Anthem studies in political economy and globalization. Anthem Press, London.

Chang, H.-J., 2011. *23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism*. Penguin.

Chang, Ha-Joon (1999) 'The economic theory of the developmental state', Chapter 6 in *The Developmental State*, edited by Meredith Woo-Cummings, 182-199, London: Cornell University Press.

Chant, S. and Sweetman, C. (2012) ‘Fixing women or fixing the world? Smart economics’, efficiency approaches, and gender equality in development’, *Gender & Development*, 20(3): 517-529. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13552074.2012.731812>

Chastanet M., (1991) : Crises et régulation en pays soninké (Sénégal) depuis le milieu du XIXe siècle. *Cahiers des Sciences Humaines*, 27 (1-2), pp. 131-145



Cheru, F., Modi, R., 2013. Agricultural development and food security in Africa: the impact of Chinese, Indian and Brazilian investments.

Chimhowu, A., & Woodhouse, P. (2005). Vernacular land markets and the changing face of customary land tenure in Africa. *Forum for Development Studies*, 32(2), 385-414. DOI: 10.1080/08039410.2005.9666321

Chiweshe, M.K. 2017. Analysis of Land-related Corruption in Zimbabwe, *Africa Insight* 46 (4): 112-124

Chung, B. Y. (2017). Engendering the land grab: Development, involuntary resettlement and the struggles for social reproduction in coastal Tanzania. *Development and Change*, 48(1), 98–120.

CICODEV Afrique (2011) Exporter ou nourrir les populations, impacts sur les consommateurs ruraux  
[http://www.hubrural.org/IMG/pdf/accaparement\\_des\\_terres\\_rapport\\_diokoul\\_1sur2.pdf](http://www.hubrural.org/IMG/pdf/accaparement_des_terres_rapport_diokoul_1sur2.pdf)

Clark, G. (2010) *African Market Women: seven life stories from Ghana*. Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press

Clark, G. (1994) *Onions are my husband, Survival and Accumulation by West African Market Women*, The university of Chicago Press

Clark, T. (2008). 'We're Over-Researched Here!': Exploring Accounts of Research Fatigue within Qualitative Research Engagements. *Sociology*, 42(5), 953–970. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038508094573>

Collins, P.H. (2004) Learning from the outsider within: The sociological significance of black feminist thought. In: Harding, S (ed.) *The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader: Intellectual and Political Controversies*. New York and London: Routledge

Colom-Jaén, A. (2013) La coopération Sud-Sud au Sénégal: de réelles opportunités de développement ? in Momar coumba Diop 2013

Colson, Elisabeth. (1971). The Impact of the Colonial Period on the Definition of Land Rights. In V. Turner (Ed.) *Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Commune de D., Plan d'occupation et d'affectation des sols de la CR de D.

Commune de N., Plan d'Occupation et d'Affectation des Sols de la CR de N.

COPAGEN (2012) 'Étude participative sur les acquisitions massives de terres agricoles en Afrique de l'Ouest et leur impact sur l'agriculture familiale et la sécurité alimentaire des populations locales'

COPAGEN, Inter Pares & REDTAC (2013), Étude participative sur les acquisitions massives de terres agricoles en Afrique de l'ouest et leur impact sur l'agriculture familiale

et la sécurité alimentaire des populations locales: État des lieux [http://terres-copagen.inadesfo.net/IMG/pdf/rapport\\_senegal.pdf](http://terres-copagen.inadesfo.net/IMG/pdf/rapport_senegal.pdf)

Coquery-Vidrovitch C. (1976). La mise en dépendance de l'Afrique noire. Essai de périodisation, 1800-1970. In: *Cahiers d'études africaines*, vol. 16, n°61-62. Histoire africaine: constatations, contestations. pp. 7-58.

Coquery-Vidrovitch C. (1982). Approches thématiques: 4- le régime foncier rural en Afrique noire. In : Le Bris Emile (ed.), Le Roy E. (ed.), Leimdorfer F. (ed.)

Cornwall, A. (2017) Decolonising Gender and Development <http://www.ids.ac.uk/events/decolonising-gender-and-development>

Cornwall, A.; Harrison, E. and Whitehead, A. (eds) (2008) *Gender Myths and Feminist Fables: The Struggle for Interpretative Power in Gender and Development*, Oxford: Blackwell

Cornwall, A.; Harrison, E. and Whitehead, A. (eds) (2007) *Feminisms in Development: Contradictions, Contestations and Challenges*, London: Zed Books

Cotula, L. and Blackmore, E. (2014) Understanding agricultural investment chains: Lessons to improve governance, Rome and London: FAO and IIED

Cotula, L. 2013. The Great African Land Grab? Agricultural Investments and the Global Food System. London: Zed Books.

Cotula, L., Oya, C., Codjoe, E.A., Eid, A., Kakraba-Ampeh, M., Keeley, J., Kidewa, A.L., Makwarimba, M., Seide, W.M., Nasha, W.O., Asare, R.O., Rizzo, M., 2014. Testing Claims about Large Land Deals in Africa: Findings from a Multi-Country Study. *J. Dev. Stud.* 50, 903–925. doi:10.1080/00220388.2014.901501

Cotula, L., Vermeulen, S., Leonard, R., Keeley, J., 2009. Land grab or development opportunity? Agricultural investment and international land deals in Africa. IIED.

Coulon, C. 2000. La tradition démocratique au Sénégal, Histoire d'un mythe In: Christophe Jaffrelot. (ed.) *Démocraties d'ailleurs*. Paris: Karthala, p.

Cousins, B. Dubb, A. , Hornby, D. & Mtero, F. (2018) Social reproduction of 'classes of labour' in the rural areas of South Africa: contradictions and contestations, *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 45:5-6, 1060-1085, DOI: [10.1080/03066150.2018.1482876](https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2018.1482876)

Cowaloosur, H. (2014) Land grab in new garb: Chinese special economic zones in Africa, *African Identities*, 12:1,94-109, DOI: [10.1080/14725843.2013.868674](https://doi.org/10.1080/14725843.2013.868674)

Cowen, M. and Shenton, R. (1996) *Doctrines of Development*, London: Routledge

Cramer, C., Di John, J. and Sender., J. (2018), "Poinsettia Assembly and Selling Emotion: High Value Agricultural Exports in Ethiopia", AFD Research Papers Series, No. 2018-78, August.

Cramer, C., Johnston, D., Oya, C. and J. Sender, J. (2015) 'Research Note: Mistakes, crises, and research independence: The perils of fieldwork as a form of evidence', *African Affairs*, 115(458), pp.145-160.

Cramer, C., Johnston, D., Oya, C., Sender., J. (2014) Fairtrade cooperatives in Ethiopia and Uganda: uncensored. *Review of African Political Economy* 41:sup1, pages S115-S127.

Crehan K. (1991) 'Listening to Different Voices', in Panini, M.N. (ed.), *From the Female Eye: Accounts of Women Field Workers Studying Their Own Communities* (Delhi, Hindustan Publishing Corporation) pp. 99-106.

Cross, H. (2013), *Migrants, Borders and Global Capitalism : West African labour mobility and EU Borders*, Routledge

Crousse Bernard (Ed.), LE BRIS EMILE (ED.), Le Roy Etienne (Ed.). (1986). *Espaces Disputés En Afrique Noire : Pratiques Foncières Locales*. Paris : Karthala, 426 P. (Hommes Et Sociétés). ISBN 2-86537-146-8

Crousse B., Mathieu P., Seck S.-M.,. 1993, *La vallée du fleuve Sénégal. Évaluations et perspectives d'une décennie D'aménagements*, Karthala

Cruise O'Brien, R. (1979): *The Political Economy of Underdevelopment: Dependence in Senegal*.

Dahou T., 2005, *Entre parenté et politique. Développement et clientélisme dans le Delta du Sénégal*, Paris, Karthala - Dakar, Enda.

Dahou, T. (ed) 2008, *Libéralisation et politique agricole au Sénégal*, Paris, Karthala,

Damiani, O. (2003) 'Effects on Employment, Wages, and Labor Standards of Non-Traditional Export Crops in Northeast Brazil', *Latin American Research Review*, 38

Dancer, H., & Sulle, E. (2015). *Gender implications of agricultural commercialisation: The case of sugarcane production in Kilombero district, Tanzania* (Working Paper No. 118). Brighton: Future Agricultures Consortium, PLAAS.

Dancer, H., & Tsikata, D. (2015). *Researching land and commercial agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa with a gender perspective: Concepts, issues and methods* (Working Paper No. 32). Brighton: Future Agriculture Consortium, PLAAS.

Davis D.A. and C. Graven. (2016) *Feminist Ethnography: Thinking Through Methodologies, Challenges and Possibilities*, London, New York, Rowman and Littlefield.

Darbon D. (2018) *Turning the Poor into Something more Inspiring: The Creation of the African Middle Class Controversy*. In: Kroeker L., O'Kane D., Scharrer T. (eds) *Middle Classes in Africa*. *Frontiers of Globalization*. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

Daviron, B. and Ponte, S. (2005) *The Coffee Paradox*, London: Zed Books.

Davis, J.H. and Goldberg, R.A. (1957) A Concept of Agribusiness. Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston

Davis, D.A., and C. Graven. 2016. *Feminist Ethnography: Thinking Through Methodologies, Challenges and Possibilities*. London and New York: Rowman and Littlefield.

De Schutter, O. 2011. How not to think of land-grabbing: three critiques of large-scale investments in farmland. *J. Peasant Stud.* 38, 249–279.  
doi:10.1080/03066150.2011.559008

Deane, K. and S. Stevano. (2016) 'Towards a political economy of the use of research assistants: Reflections from fieldwork in Tanzania and Mozambique', *Qualitative Research*, 16 (2). pp. 213-228.

Dedehouanou, S.F.A., Swinnen, J., Maertens, M., 2013. Does Contracting Make Farmers Happy? Evidence from Senegal. *Rev. Income Wealth* 59, S138–S160.  
doi:10.1111/roiw.12041

Deere, CD (2005) *The Feminization of Agriculture? Economic Restructuring in Rural Latin America*. Occasional Paper 2005 No.1. Geneva Geneva: United National Research Institute for Social Development

Deininger, K., Byerlee, D., 2011. *Rising Global Interest in Farmland*. The World Bank, Herndon, US.

Deininger, K., Byerlee, D., 2012. The Rise of Large Farms in Land Abundant Countries: Do They Have a Future? *World Dev.* 40, 701–714. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.04.030

Del Pozo-Vergnes, E. & Vorley, B. 2015. *Global or local food chains? Uncovering the dilemmas in Senegal and Peru*. Issue Paper. IIED

Denzin, Norman K (2013) 'The elephant in the living room or extending the conversation about the politics of evidence', Chapter 16 in In Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, eds., *Collecting and interpreting qualitative materials* (London: Sage.)

Desai, V., Porter, R.B., 2006. *Doing development research*. SAGE, London

de Sardan, J.P.O. (1999) A Moral Economy of Corruption in Africa? *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 37, 25-52.

Dey, J. 1981. 'Gambian women: unequal partners in rice development projects', *Journal of Development Studies*, 17(3): 109–22. CrossRef | Google Scholar

Diagne, Pathé (1967): *Pouvoir politique traditionnel en Afrique occidentale: essais sur les institutions politiques précoloniales*.

Diagne, S.B (2016) *The Ink of the Scholars: Reflections on Philosophy in Africa*, CODESRIA, Dakar

Diao, X., Hazell, P. and Thurlow, J. (2010) *The Role of Agriculture in African Development*, *World Development*, doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2009.06.011

Dieng, R.S. (2017) 'Land grabbing' and the politics of evidence - the case of Senegal,' *Africa Insight*, 46(4) pp. 25–40.

Dieng, R.S. (2016) 'Book Review: Ndèye Sokhna Guèye (Ed.) (2015), *Mouvements sociaux des femmes au Sénégal*', *Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy*, 5(1) pp. 126-128.

Dieng, R.S. (2015) "The politics of Policy-making and the shift from Poverty reduction to "Emergence (1995-2014), SOAS MSc Dissertation

Dimé, M., B. Ba, (2016). « L'émergence en lieu et place du développement au Sénégal: changement cosmétique, nouvelle mode institutionnelle ou (r)évolution paradigmatique? » *Journal of African Transformation* 1 (2): 1–21.

Dimé, M. N. (2007). Remise en cause, reconfiguration ou recomposition ? Des solidarités familiales à l'épreuve de la précarité à Dakar. *Sociologie et sociétés*, 39 (2), 151–171. <https://doi.org/10.7202/019088ar>

Diop, A. B. (1965) *Société toucouleur et migration. Enquête sur l'immigration toucouleur à Dakar* Université de Dakar - IFAN - Dakar

Diop, A. B., 1968. *La tenure foncière en milieu rural Wolof (Sénégal): Historique et actualité*. Notes Africains No. 118

Diop, A. B. (1981) *La Société wolof, tradition et changement: les systèmes d'inégalité et de domination* / Paris: Éditions Karthala

Diop, A. B. (1985) *La Famille Wolof: tradition et changement*. Paris, Editions Karthala

Diop, M.C. (Ed.), 2013a. *Le Sénégal sous Abdoulaye Wade: le Sopi à l'épreuve du pouvoir, Hommes et sociétés*. CRES; Karthala, Dakar-Médina: Paris.

Diop, M.C. (Ed.), 2013b. *Sénégal (2000-2012): les institutions et politiques publiques à l'épreuve d'une gouvernance libérale, Hommes et sociétés*. CRES; Karthala, Dakar-Médina: Paris.

Diop, Momar Coumba 2008: *Le Sénégal des Migrations, Mobilités, Identités et Sociétés* (Paris: Khartala).

Diouf, M. (1990), *Le Kajoor au XIXe siècle. Pouvoir ceddo et conquête coloniale*. — Paris, Karthala

Diouf, N.C., 2015. Catalysing farmers' influence in shaping law reform: Experience from Senegal - IIED Publications Database [WWW Document]. URL <http://pubs.iied.org/17574IIED.html> (accessed 4.4.16).

Dolan, Catherine (2005) 'Benevolent Intent: The Development Encounter in Kenya's Horticulture Industry'. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, (40) 6, pp 411-437.

Dolan, Catherine (2004a) 'On Farm and Packhouse: Employment at the Bottom of a Global Commodity Chain'. *Rural Sociology*, (69) 1, pp 99-126.

Dolan, Catherine and Humphrey, John (2004b) 'Changing Governance Patterns in the Trade in Fresh Vegetables between Africa and the United Kingdom'. *Environment and Planning A*, (36) 3, pp 491-509.

Dolan, C. (2001) 'The "Good Wife": Struggles over Resources in the Kenyan Horticultural Sector', *The Journal of Development Studies*, 37(3):39-70

Dolan, C. J. Humphrey. 2000. "Governance and Trade in Fresh Vegetables: The Impact of UK Supermarkets on the African Horticulture Industry." *Journal of Development Studies*, 37(2):147-176.

Dorward A, 1999, Farm size and productivity in Malawian smallholder agriculture, *JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES*, Vol: 35, Pages: 141-161, ISSN: 0022-0388

Doss, C., G. Summerfield, and D. Tsikata. 2014. Land, Gender, and Food Security. *Feminist Economics* 20: 1-23. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13545701.2014.89502>.

Doss, C.R. (2002) 'Men's Crops? Women's Crops? The Gender Patterns of Cropping in Ghana', *World Development*, 30(11):1987-2000

Ducastel A., Anseuw W. 2013. *Farm Policy Journal*, 10 (3): p. 35-43.

Du Toit, A., 1992. *The Farm as a Family: Paternalism, Management and Modernisation on Western Cape Wine and Fruit Farms*. Stellenbosch: Centre for Rural Legal Studies.

Du Toit, A., 1993. 'The Micro-Politics of Paternalism: The Discourses of Management and Resistance on South African Fruit and Wine Farms'. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 19 (2): 314-36.

Du Toit, A., 2004. *Forgotten by the Highway: Globalisation, Adverse Incorporation and Chronic Poverty in a Commercial Farming District of South Africa*. Chronic Poverty and Development Policy Series No. 4. Cape Town: PLAAS.

Duteurtre G. (ed.), Faye M.D. (ed.), Dieye P.N. (ed.). 2010 *L'agriculture sénégalaise à l'épreuve du marché* Paris: Karthala, 451 p. (Hommes et sociétés).

Edelman, M., 2013. Messy hectares: questions about the epistemology of land grabbing data. *J. Peasant Stud.* 40, 485-501. doi:10.1080/03066150.2013.801340

Edelman, M., Oya, C., Borras, S.M., 2013. Global Land Grabs: historical processes, theoretical and methodological implications and current trajectories. *Third World Q.* 34, 1517–1531. doi:10.1080/01436597.2013.850190

Edelman, M., Oya, C., Borras, S.M., 2015. *Global land grabs: history, theory and method* /. Routledge, London

Elson, D., & Pearson, R. (1981). 'Nimble Fingers Make Cheap Workers': An Analysis of Women's Employment in Third World Export Manufacturing. *Feminist Review*, (7), 87-107. doi:10.2307/139476

Engels, F., 1884 *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*

English, E. Philip (2016) *Senegal: A service economy in need of an export boost*. WIDER Working Paper, No. 2016/150.

Engström, L. & Hajdu, F. (2018) Conjuring 'Win-World' – Resilient Development Narratives in a Large-Scale Agro-Investment in Tanzania, *The Journal of Development Studies*, DOI: [10.1080/00220388.2018.1438599](https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2018.1438599)

Evans, Peter B., 1944–. *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation*

Evans, R. (2015). Working with legal pluralism: Widowhood, property inheritance and poverty alleviation in urban Senegal. *Gender and Development*. 23(1).

Evers, S.J.T.M., Seagle, C., Krijtenburg, F., 2013. Africa for Sale? Positioning the State, Land and Society in Foreign Large-Scale Land Acquisitions in Africa [WWW Document]. URL <http://www.landgovernance.org/system/files/03-Zoomers.pdf> (accessed 4.8.16).

Fairhead, J., Leach, M., Scoones, I., 2012. Green Grabbing: a new appropriation of nature? *J. Peasant Stud.* 39, 237–261. doi:10.1080/03066150.2012.671770

Fall B., 2011, *Le Travail au Sénégal au xxe siècle*, Paris, Karthala, 320 p.

FAO. 2013. *Contract farming for inclusive market access*. Rome

FAO (Ed.), 2002. *Land tenure and rural development*, FAO land tenure studies. Food and Agricultural Organization, Rome.

Farole, T., & Moberg, L. 2014. "It worked in China, so why not in Africa? The political economy challenge of Special Economic Zones," *WIDER Working Paper Series 152*, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).

Farole, T., Winkler, D., 2014. Making foreign direct investment work for Sub-Saharan Africa: local spillovers and competitiveness in global value chains, *Directions in development*. Trade. The World Bank, Washington, DC.

Faye, J., 2008. *Land and decentralisation in Senegal*. IIED.

Faye I.M., Benkahla A., Touré O., Seck S.M., Ba C.O., 2011, Les acquisitions de terres à grande échelle au Sénégal: description d'un nouveau phénomène, Initiative Prospective Agricole et Rurale

Federici, S. (2004) *Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation*. New York: Autonomedia.

Ferguson, J. (1994) *The Anti-Politics Machine: 'Development', depoliticization, and bureaucratic power in Lesotho*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

Findley, Sally E., 1991: "Sécheresse et migration dans la vallée du fleuve Sénégal. Les femmes et les enfants dominant le nouveau type du migrant", in: *Pop Sahel*, 16 (April): 19-28.

Fine, B., Milonakis, D., 2009. *From economics imperialism to freakonomics: the shifting boundaries between economics and other social sciences, Economics as social theory*. Routledge, London; New York

Fine, B., Sundaram, J.K., 2006. *The new development economics: after the Washington Consensus /*. Zed Books, London

Folbre, N. (2006) 'Measuring Care: Gender, Empowerment, and the Care Economy', *Journal of Human Development* 7(2): 183–99.

Foucault, Michel 1977 [1975]: *Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison*

Franco, J.C. 2014. *Reclaiming free prior and informed consent (FPIC) in the context of global land grabs*. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute (TNI).

Franco J. and Kay, S (2012), *The Global Water Grab: A Primer*. TNI [https://www.tni.org/files/download/the\\_global\\_water\\_grab.pdf](https://www.tni.org/files/download/the_global_water_grab.pdf)

Franks, M. (2002) 'Feminisms and Cross-ideological Feminist Social Research: Standpoint, Situatedness and Positionality – Developing Cross-ideological Feminist Research'. *Journal of International Women's Studies*, 3(2), pp. 38-50. Available at: <http://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol3/iss2/3>

Gadio, C. M., and Rakowski, C. A. (1999). *Farmers' Changing Roles in Thieudeme, Senegal: The Impact of Local and Global Factors on Three Generations of Women*. *Gender & Society*, 13(6), 733–757. <https://doi.org/10.1177/089124399013006004>

Galvan, D.C., 2004. *The state must be our master of fire: how peasants craft sustainable development in Senegal /*. University of California Press, Berkeley

Gaye M. (1994). "Les cultures céréalières dans le bassin arachidier : Motivations et contraintes chez les producteurs" - *Etude et Document*, vol. 5, N°2, 26p.

Geschiere, P. and Nyamnjoh, F. "Capitalism and Autochthony: The Seesaw of Mobility and Belonging," *Public Culture* 12 (2000): 423-52. 53.



Gibbon, P., Daviron, B. and Barral, S. (2014), Lineages of Paternalism: An Introduction. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 14: 165-189. doi:10.1111/joac.12066

Gibbon, P. & Riisgaard, L. (2014) “A New System of Labour Management in African Large-Scale Agriculture?” *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 14: 94–128

Gibbon, P. and Ponte, S. 2005, *Trading Down: Africa, Value Chains, and the Global Economy*, Temple University Press, Philadelphia.

Gilbert, V. (2019) A Slut, a Saint, and Everything in Between”: Senegalese Women's Mokka Pooj, Interpretive Labor, and Agency ; *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 2019, vol. 44, no. 2

Gilfoy, K. 2015. Land Grabbing and NGO Advocacy in Liberia: A Deconstruction of the “Homogeneous Community”. Available at <http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/114/455/185.abstract>. Accessed 13 May 2016.

Gimenez, M. 2018, *Marx, Women, and Capitalist Social Reproduction: Marxist Feminist Essays*, Brill

Golde, P. (ed) (1970) *Women in the field: Anthropological experiences*, Berkeley, University of California Press.

Görg,H., Hanley, A., Hoffmann, S., and Seric, A. (2016). When do multinational companies consider corporate social responsibility? A multi-country study in Sub Saharan Africa European University Institute, Italy.

Gouvernement du Sénégal. (2014). Programme to Accelerate the Pace of Senegalese Agriculture (PRACAS), 108.

GRAIN, 2008. SEIZED! The October 2008 land grab for food and financial security. GRAIN.

Gravrand, H. (1983) *La civilisation Sereer. Cossaan. Les origines*. Dakar, NEA,

Greco, E., 2015. Landlords in the making: class dynamics of the land grab in Mbarali, Tanzania. *Rev. Afr. Polit. Econ.* 42, 225–244. doi:10.1080/03056244.2014.992403

Griffin, K., Rahman Khan, A. and Ickwotiz, A. (2004), In Defence of Neo-Classical Neo-Populism. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 4: 361-386. doi:[10.1111/j.1471-0366.2004.00083.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0366.2004.00083.x)

Guyer, J.I. and Peters, P. (1987) ‘Conceptualising the Household: issues of Theory and Policy in Africa’, *Development and Change*, 18.

Haggblade, S., Hazell, P., & Reardon, T. (2010). The Rural Non-Farm Economy: Prospects for Growth and Poverty Reduction. *World Development*, 38(10), 1429–1441. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2009.06.008>

Haggblade, S., P. Hazell, and T. Reardon, (2007) “Strategies for Stimulating Equitable Growth in the Rural Nonfarm Economy”in Haggblade, et. al, eds., *Transforming the Rural Nonfarm Economy* (Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, MD)

Hajjar, R., Ayana, A.N., Rutt,R. Hinde,O., Liao, C., Keene, S., Bandiaky-Badji, S. & Agrawal, A. (2019) Capital, labor, and gender: the consequences of large-scale land transactions on household labor allocation, *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, DOI: [10.1080/03066150.2019.1602520](https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2019.1602520)

Hall, D., 2013. Primitive Accumulation, Accumulation by Dispossession and the Global Land Grab. *Third World Q.* 34, 1582–1604. doi:10.1080/01436597.2013.843854

Hall, R., Scoones, I., Tsikata, D. (Eds.), 2015. *Africa's Land Rush: Rural Livelihoods and Agrarian Change*, NED-New edition. ed. Boydell & Brewer.

Hall, R. Edelman, M ; Borrás, S. ; Scoones, I. , White, B. & Wolford, W (2015) Resistance, acquiescence or incorporation? An introduction to land grabbing and political reactions 'from below', *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 42:3-4, 467-488, DOI: [10.1080/03066150.2015.1036746](https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2015.1036746)

Hall, R. (2011) [Land grabbing in Southern Africa: the many faces of the investor rush](#). *Review of African Political Economy* 38:128, pages 193-214.

Harrison, M., 1975. Chayanov and the economics of the Russian Peasantry. *J. Peasant Stud.* 2, 389–417. doi:10.1080/03066157508437947

Harriss, J. (2002) 'The Case for Cross-disciplinary approaches in international development', *World Development* 30 (3) pp. 487–96.

Harvey D (2007) *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Harvey, D., 2003. *The new imperialism*. Oxford University Press, Oxford; New York.

Hathie I., Wade I. , Ba S. , Niang A. , Niang M. , Sow M., Ndione Y.C., & Ba C.O. (2004), *Emploi des jeunes et migration en Afrique de l'Ouest (EJMAO)*, Senegal Research report, IPAR, IDRC, AFD, <https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/bitstream/handle/10625/54153/IDL-54153.pdf>

Hilhorst, T., Nelen, J., Traoré, N., 2011. Agrarian change below the radar screen: Rising farmland acquisitions by domestic investors in West Africa. Results from a survey in Benin, Burkina Faso and Niger, *International Conference on Global Land Grabbing*. Land Deals Politics Initiative (LDPI), University of Sussex, Sussex

Hill, P.. 1970. *Studies in rural capitalism in West Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Hill, P., (1963). *The migrant cocoa-farmers of Southern Ghana: a study in rural capitalism*. Cambridge U.P, Cambridge

Hirschman, A. (1993) Interview with Carmine Donzelli, excerpted in "A Bias for Hope: Commemorating the Life of Albert O. Hirschman," *School of Social Science Occasional Papers*

Hofman, I., Ho, P., 2012. China's "Developmental Outsourcing": A critical examination of Chinese global "land grabs" discourse. *J. Peasant Stud.* 39, 1–48. doi:10.1080/03066150.2011.653109

Holmén, H. (2015). Is Land Grabbing Always What It Is Supposed to Be? Large-scale Land Investments in sub-Saharan Africa. *Development Policy Review* 33(4), 457-478

Hommes et sociétés. CRES Karthala, Dakar Médina: Paris.

<http://theconversation.com/decolonising-research-methodology-must-include-undoing-its-dirty-history-83912>

Huggins, C.D. (2014) 'Control Grabbing' and small-scale agricultural intensification: emerging patterns of state-facilitated 'agricultural investment' in Rwanda, *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 41:3, 365-384, DOI: [10.1080/03066150.2014.910765](https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2014.910765)

Huggins, M. K. and Glebeek, M.L. (Eds.) (2009) *Women fielding danger: Negotiating ethnographic identities in field research.* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield).

IDEP-UNISA (2013) *Land Reform, Land Grabbing and Agricultural Development in Africa in the 21st Century: A Proceedings Report of The Roundtable Dialogue*, Harmony Hotel, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 17-18 June 2013

Iliffe, J., 1983. *The emergence of African capitalism /, The Anstey memorial lectures in the University of Kent at Canterbury*; Macmillan, London

ILC, (2011) *Tirana Declaration: Securing Land Access for the Poor in Times of Intensified Natural Resources Competition* (Rome,)

International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie), 2012, *Impact Evaluation Glossary* [http://www.3ieimpact.org/media/filer\\_public/2012/07/11/impact\\_evaluation\\_glossary\\_-\\_july\\_2012\\_3.pdf](http://www.3ieimpact.org/media/filer_public/2012/07/11/impact_evaluation_glossary_-_july_2012_3.pdf)

ITC. 2006. *Sustainable Agriculture and Value Networks: An Opportunity for Small Growers to Export Successfully?* Alvarez, G. ITC Executive Forum 2006, International Trade Centre UNCTAD/WTO. Geneva, Switzerland.

Jabeen, S (2018), *Unintended outcomes evaluation approach: A plausible way to evaluate unintended outcomes of social development programmes*, *Evaluation and Program Planning* Volume 68, June 2018, Pages 262-274

Jackson, C. (2008) *'Feminism Spoken Here. Epistemologies for Interdisciplinary Development Research'*, in Bardhan, P. And I. Ray (eds.), *The Contested Commons. Conversations between Economists and Anthropologists*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Jackson, C. (2004), *Projections and Labels: A Reply to Bina Agarwal*. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 4: 387–388.

Jackson, C. (2003) *Gender analysis of land: beyond land rights for women*, *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 3(4): 453-480.

Jackson, C. and Palmer-Jones, R. (1999) 'Rethinking Gendered Poverty and Work', School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia

Jaffrelot, C. (Ed.) 2008. *L'enjeu mondial; Les pays émergents*.

Jok, M.J., 2001. *War and slavery in Sudan /, Ethnography of political violence*. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia

Johnston, B. and Mellor, J., (1961) 'The Rôle of Agriculture in Economic Development', in *The American Economic Review* (Providence, R.I.), LI, 4, 09

Johnston, D. and H. Le Roux (2007) 'Leaving the household out of family labour? The European journal of development research 19 (3), 355-371

Johnston, D. (1997) 'Migration and Poverty in Lesotho: a Case Study of Female Farm Labourers', unpublished PhD thesis, SOAS, University of London

Kaag, M., Zoomers, A., 2014. *The Global Land Grab: Beyond the Hype*. Zed Books Ltd, Halifax: London.

Kabeer, N. (1994) *Reversed Realities: Gender Hierarchies in Development Thought*, London: Verso.

Kabeer, N. (1997), *Women, Wages and Intra-household Power Relations in Urban Bangladesh*. *Development and Change*, 28: 261-302. doi:[10.1111/1467-7660.00043](https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7660.00043)

Kabeer, N. (2012). *Women's economic empowerment and inclusive growth: Labour markets and enterprise development*. SOAS, Department for International Development (DFID) and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC)

Kachingwe, Nancy. 2012. *From Under Their Feet: A Think Piece on the Gender Dimensions of Land Grabs in Africa* (Johannesburg, South Africa: ActionAid).

Katz, C. (2001) 'Vagabond Capitalism and the Necessity of Social Reproduction', *Antipode* 33(4): 709–28.

Katz, C. (1983), *Claude Meillassoux, Maidens Meal and Money: Capitalism and the Domestic Community*. *Antipode* 15(1) 42-45.

Kelsall, T. 2013. *Business, Politics, and the State in Africa: Challenging the Orthodoxies on Growth and Transformation*. London; New York: Zed Books.

Kennedy, P. T. 1988. *African capitalism: the struggle for ascendancy*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press

Koopman, J. and I. Faye (2012) *Land Grabs, Women's Farming, and Women's Activism in Africa* In International Conference on Global Land Grabbing II. Land Deals Political Initiative, Department of Development Sociology, Cornell University, 17–19 October, Ithaca, NY

Kothari, U. (2005) *A Radical History of Development Studies. Individuals, Institutionals and Ideologies* (London and New York: Zed Books).

Kuba R. and Lentz C. (eds.) 2006. *Land and the Politics of Belonging in West Africa*, Brill

Kugelman, M., Levenstein, S.L., Atkin, C. (Eds.), 2013. *The global farms race: land grabs, agricultural investment, and the scramble for food security*. Island Press, Washington, D.C.

Kuznets, 1966. S. Kuznets *Modern economic growth, rate structure and spread*. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT

La Via Campesina, 2012. *International Conference of Peasants and Farmers: Stop Land Grabbing (Mali)*, La Via Campesina Notebook No 3 [WWW Document]. URL <http://viacampesina.org/downloads/pdf/en/mali-report-2012-en1.pdf> (accessed 5.13.16).

Lanz, K., Gerber, J.D., Haller, T. (2018). *Land grabbing, the state and chiefs. The politics of extending commercial agriculture in Ghana. Development and Change*

Lanz, K., Prügl, E. & Gerber, J.D., (2019) *The poverty of neoliberalized feminism: gender equality in a ‘best practice’ large-scale land investment in Ghana*, *The Journal of Peasant Studies*

Laslett, B. and J. Brenner (1989) ‘Gender and Social Reproduction: Historical Perspectives’, *Annual Review of Sociology* 15(1989): 381–404.

Lastarria-Cornhiel, Susana (1997), ‘Impact of privatization on gender and property rights in Africa’, *World Development*, Volume 25, Issue 8, August 1997, Pages 1317-1333,

Lavers, T., 2012. “Land grab” as development strategy? The political economy of agricultural investment in Ethiopia. *J. Peasant Stud.* 39, 105–132. doi:10.1080/03066150.2011.652091

Lavigne-Delville P., (1994) : *Migrations internationales, restructurations agraires et dynamiques associatives en pays soninké et haalpulaar (1975-1990)*, essai d’anthropologie du changement social et du développement. Thèse de doctorat, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), 394 p.

Lavigne Delville ,P. (1991), « Irrigation, émigration et sécurité alimentaire sur le fleuve Sénégal », *Cah. Sci. Hum.* 27 (7-2) 1991 : 705-116

Lee, CK (2014). *The spectre of global China*. *New Left Review*, (89), pp 29–65

Lee, C. K, 2017, *The Specter of Global Capital : Politics, Labour, and Foreign Investment in Africa*, The University of Chicago Press.

Levien, M., 2011. *Special Economic Zones and Accumulation by Dispossession in India*. *J. Agrar. Change* 11, 454–483. doi:10.1111/j.1471-0366.2011.00329.x

- Lewis, W. A. 1954. "Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour." *The Manchester School*, 22 (2): 139–91.
- Li, T. M. (1996), *Images of Community: Discourse and Strategy in Property Relations*. *Development and Change*, 27: 501-527. doi:[10.1111/j.1467-7660.1996.tb00601.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.1996.tb00601.x)
- Li, T.M., 2011. Centering labor in the land grab debate. *J. Peasant Stud.* 38, 281–298. doi:10.1080/03066150.2011.559009
- Li, TM (2014) *Land's End: Capitalist Relations on an Indigenous Frontier*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Li TM (2017) After the land grab: Infrastructural violence and the 'mafia system' in Indonesia's oil palm plantation zones. *Geoforum*. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2017.10.012>.
- Liberti, S., 2013. *Land Grabbing: Journeys in the New Colonialism*, Reprint edition. ed. Verso Books, London; New York.
- Lipton, M. (2006). 'Can small farmers survive, prosper, or be the key channel to cut mass poverty?', *Electronic Journal of Agricultural and Development Economics*, Vol.3 no1
- Lipton, M. 1977. *Why poor people stay poor: a study of urban bias in world development*. London: Temple Smith.
- Little, P. & Watts, M. J. (1994). *Living under contract: Contract farming and agrarian transformation in SubSaharan Africa*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Little, P. D. (2000). *Confronting change: Contract farming and production relations in peri-urban areas of subSaharan Africa* (Working Paper for Broadening Access and Strengthening Input Market Systems-Collaborative Research Support Program). Binghamton, NY: Institute for Development Anthropology.
- Lund, C. & Boone, C. (2013). Introduction: Land Politics in Africa – Constituting Authority Over Territory, Property And Persons. *Africa*, 83, pp 1-13 doi:10.1017/S000197201200068X
- Luxemburg, Rosa. 1913. *The Accumulation of Capital*. London, New York: Routledge 2003.
- Mackintosh, M. (1989) *Gender, Class and Rural Transition: Agrobusiness and the Food Crisis in Senegal*. Zed Books, London.
- Mackintosh, M. (1977) *Reproduction and Patriarchy: A Critique of Femmes, Greniers et Capitaux* (1975) by Claude Meillassoux, *Capital & Class*, 1(2), 119–127. <https://doi.org/10.1177/030981687700200106>
- Maertens, M., 2009. Horticulture exports, agro-industrialization, and farm–nonfarm linkages with the smallholder farm sector: evidence from Senegal. *Agric. Econ.* 40, 219–229. doi:10.1111/j.1574-0862.2009.00371.

Maertens, M., Colen, L., & Swinnen, J. F. M. (2011). Globalisation and poverty in Senegal: A worst case scenario? *European Review of Agricultural Economics*, 38(1), 31–54. <https://doi.org/10.1093/erae/jbq053>

Mafeje, A., 2003, *The Agrarian Question, Access to Land, and Peasant Responses in sub-Saharan Africa*, UNRISD Programme Papers on Civil Society and Social Movements, Geneva

Magistro, J. (1999) *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict in a Transboundary Context, The Senegalese River Valley (177-212)* in Reyna, S.P, & Downs, R.E.: *Deadly Developments: Capitalism, State and War, War and Society Volume 5*, Gordon and Breach Publishers

Malinowski, B. (1922). *Argonauts of the western Pacific: An account of native enterprise and adventure in the archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea.*

Mama, A. (2011) *What does it mean to do feminist research in African contexts?* *Feminist Review Proceedings conference*

Malinowski, B. 1922. *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*. London: George Routledge & Sons

Manchuelle, F. (1997). *Willing Migrants: Sonike Labour Diasporas, 1848-1960*, Ohio University Press

Margulis, M., McKeon, N., Borrás, S., 2013. *Land Grabbing and Global Governance: Critical Perspectives Introduction*, *Globalisations* 10, 1–23.

Martiniello, G. 2015. *Social Struggles in Uganda's Acholiland: Understanding Responses and Resistance to Amuru Sugar Works*. *Journal Peasant Studies* 42: 653–669. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2015.1032269>.

Marx, K. (1973) *Grundrisse*. Translated by Martin Nicolaus, Penguin, London.

Marx, K., 1976. *Capital: a critique of political economy.*, New Left Review, 4th ed. / ed. Penguin Books in association with New Left Review, Harmondsworth:

Matondi, P.B., Havnevik, K.J., Atakilte Beyene, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet (Eds.), 2011. *Biofuels, land grabbing and food security in Africa, Africa now*. Zed Books;

Matsumoto-Izadifar, 2008a. *Senegal, Making better use of agribusiness potential*, OCDE.

Matsumoto-Izadifar, 2008b. *Senegal – Challenges of Diversification and Food Security*, OCDE

Mayoux, L. 2001. *Qualitative Methods. Tool Box Resour.* EDIAIS. [http://library.uniteddiversity.coop/Measuring\\_Progress\\_and\\_Eco\\_Footprinting/QualMethods.pdf](http://library.uniteddiversity.coop/Measuring_Progress_and_Eco_Footprinting/QualMethods.pdf).

- Mbembe, A. (2015) *Decolonizing knowledge and the question of the archive*.
- Mbilinyi, M. (1986) "Agribusiness and Casual Labor in Tanzania." *African Economic History*, no.15 (1986): 107–141.
- Mbilinyi, M. (2016). Debating Land and Agrarian Issues from a Gender Perspective. *Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy*, 5(2–3), 164–186. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2277976017699312>
- Mbiti, J. S. (1969). *African religions and philosophy*. Kenya: Sunlitho.
- Mbodj, M (1992) « La crise trentenaire de l'économie arachidière », in M. C. Diop, (éd.), *Sénégal. Trajectoire d'un Etat*, Dakar: Codesria,
- McCarthy, J.F., 2010. Processes of inclusion and adverse incorporation: oil palm and agrarian change in Sumatra, Indonesia. *J. Peasant Stud.* 37, 821–850. doi:10.1080/03066150.2010.512460
- McMichael, P. (2012) The land grab and corporate food regime restructuring, *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 39:3-4, 681-701, DOI: 10.1080/03066150.2012.661369
- McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. (2011). Creating and capturing value: Strategic corporate social responsibility, resource-based theory, and sustainable competitive advantage. *Journal of Management*, 37(5), 1480-1495. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206310385696>
- McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. (2001). Corporate social responsibility: A theory of the firm perspective. *Academy of Management Review*, 26: 117-127.
- Meagher, K. (1995) 'Crisis, Informalization and the Urban Informal Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa' *Development and Change*, 26(2): 259-284.
- Meagher, K. (2010) 'The empowerment trap: gender, poverty and the informal economy in sub-Saharan Africa', in: Chant, Sylvia, (ed.) *The International Handbook of Gender and Poverty: Concepts, Research, Policy*, Edward Elgar Publishing, Gloucestershire, UK.
- Mehta, L.; Veldwisch, G.J. and Franco, J. (2012). Introduction to the Special Issue: Water grabbing? Focus on the (re)appropriation of finite water resources. *Water Alternatives* 5(2): 193-207
- Mezzadri, A. and Srivastava, R. (2015) 'Labour regimes in the Indian garment sector: capital-labour relations, social reproduction & labour standards in the National Capital Region'. CDPR SOAS Report, (<https://www.soas.ac.uk/cdpr/publications/reports/file106927.pdf>),
- Mies, M. (2013) Housewifisation – Globalisation – Subsistence-Perspective, In van der Linden, M and Roth, K.H. eds., *Beyond Marx: Theorising the Global Labour Relations of the Twenty-First Century* (Leiden and Boston: Brill 2014) 209-237
- Mies, M. (1982) *Fighting on two fronts: Women's Struggles and Research*. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies



Mies, M. (1983) 'Towards a methodology for Feminist Research?' in Bowles, G. and R. Klein, (eds). *Theories of Women's Studies* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul) pp. 121-122.

Mies, M. (1986). *Patriarchy and accumulation on a world scale: Women in the international division of labour*. London: Zed Books.

Mill, J.S. (1859), *On Liberty*

Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances (Avril 2014) MEF\_ Diagnostic organisationnel et fonctionnel - Etat des lieux \_ FINAL by Dalberg, Sénégal

Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances (Février 2014) Plan d'Actions Prioritaires (PAP) du Plan Sénégal Émergent, Sénégal

Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances (MEF) 2012, *Stratégie Nationale de Développement Economique et Sociale (SNDES 2013-2017): Sur la Rampe de l'émergence*, Sénégal

Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances-Exa-Consulting, Bureau d'Etudes et de Conseil (Février 2013), *Rapport d'avancement de la mise en œuvre du Plan d'action du Document de Stratégie de Croissance Accélérée (DSCA)*, Sénégal

Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances (MEF), Comité Technique SCA – Performances Management Consulting (Juillet 2013), *Rapport d'actualisation du Document de Stratégie de Croissance Accélérée (DSCA)*, Sénégal

Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances, Unité de Coordination et de Suivi de la Politique Economique (UCSPE), (Juin 2014), (RAC) *Rapport de Revue Annuelle Conjointe de la Politique Economique Et Sociale*

Ministry of Agriculture, and SAED 2004, *Etude sur le financement de l'agriculture irriguée dans la vallée du Fleuve Sénégal*

DPV, Ministry of Agriculture (2018), *Situation import/export fruits et légumes contrôlés en juillet 2018*

Mkandawire, T. and Soludo, C. C., eds. (2003) *African voices on structural adjustment: a companion to 'Our continent, our future'*. Africa World Press, Trenton, N.J., USA. ISBN 0865437793

Mkandawire, T. 1989. "Structural adjustment and the agrarian crisis in Africa: A research agenda." Working Paper No. 2/89. Dakar: CODESRIA.

Mohanty, C. T. (1991) 'Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses' in Mohanty, C.T. *Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity*. (Durham and London. Duke University Press) pp. 17–42.

- Mkandawire, Thandika (2001) Thinking about developmental states in Africa. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 25 (3). pp. 289-314.
- Mohanty, R. (2002). Women's participation in JFM in Uttaranchal villages, Mimeo.
- Moran, T., E. Graham and M. Blomstrom (eds.) Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development? Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2005.
- Morse, Janice M. (2006) 'The Politics of Evidence', *Qualitative Health Research* 16(3): 395– 404.
- Mosse, D. (2015) 'Misunderstood, misrepresented, and contested? Anthropological knowledge production in question', *Focaal: Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology* 72, pp. 128-37.
- Mosse, D. (2005) *Cultivating development: An ethnography of aid policy and practice*
- Moyo, S., P. Yeros, and P. Jha. (2019 Forthcoming) *Reclaiming Africa Scramble and Resistance in the 21st Century*, Springer
- Moyo, S., 2008. African land questions, Agrarian transition and the State: Contradictions of neoliberal land reforms. CODESRIA.
- Moyo, S., P. Yeros, and P. Jha. 2012. Imperialism and Primitive Accumulation: Notes on the New Scramble for Africa. *Agrarian South Journal of Political Economy* 1 (2): 181–203. <https://doi.org/10.1177/227797601200100203>.
- Moyo, S., Yeros, P., 2005. *Reclaiming the land: the resurgence of rural movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America /*. Zed Books in association with the African Institute for Agrarian Studies, Harare, London; New York:
- Moyo, Sam (2008), *African Land Questions, Agrarian Transitions and the State: Contradictions of Neo-Liberal Land Reforms*. Codesria Working Paper Series, Dakar. (Chapter 2: The African Land Questions, Chapter 4: Gender Land Inequalities and Tenure Insecurity; and Chapter 5: The African State, Land Reform and Politics)
- Mpofu, Busani. 2017 Investment on land or land grabbing? Land reform, agricultural production and food security challenges in Africa - an introduction, *Africa Insight*, 46 (4): 1-8.
- Mukherjee, C. and M. Wuyts (2007). Thinking with quantitative data. In: A. Thomas and G. Mohan, eds. *Research skills for policy and development: how to find out fast*. London: Sage, pp. 231–253.
- Mwangola M.S. (2008) 'Nurturing the Fourth Generation: Defining the Historical Mission for Our Generation', *Africa Development*, vol. XXXIII, no. 1, pp.7-24.

Nader, L. (1972) Up the Anthropologist—Perspectives Gained from Studying Up. In *Reinventing Anthropology*, edited by Dell H. Hymes, 284-311. New York: Pantheon Books.

Naidu, S. C., & Osome, L. (2016). Social Reproduction and the Agrarian Question of Women's Labour in India. *Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy*, 5(1), 50–76. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2277976016658737>

Ndikumana, L. and Mannah-Blankson, T. (2015). Financing Domestic Investment in African Countries: Does the Source of Financing Matter? *Journal of African Development*, 17 (2), 21-44.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. (2015). Genealogies of coloniality and implications for Africa's development. *Africa Development*, 40(3), 13-40.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. (2017). Decolonising research methodology must include undoing its dirty history  
<http://theconversation.com/decolonising-research-methodology-must-include-undoing-its-dirty-history-83912>

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J. (2014). Why Decoloniality in the 21st Century? *The Thinker for Thought Leaders*  
<http://www.thethinker.co.za/resources/48%20Thinker%20full%20mag.pdf>

Neveu Kringelbach, H.(2015) Keynote Speech: 'Doing fieldwork in Africa and beyond: some personal reflections.' Invited keynote lecture at student-led, Africa Research Student Network (AfNET) Research Day, SOAS, London (25.05.2016).

Newman, C. & Page, J. 2017. "Industrial clusters: The case for Special Economic Zones in Africa," WIDER Working Paper Series 015,

Niang, M., (Ed) 2004. Participation paysanne et développement rural au Sénégal /. Codesria, Dakar, Sénégal

Nichols, R., 2015. Disaggregating primitive accumulation [WWW Document]. *Radic. Philos.* URL [http://www.radicalphilosophy.com/wp-content/files\\_mf/rp194\\_dossier\\_propertypowerlaw\\_nichols.pdf](http://www.radicalphilosophy.com/wp-content/files_mf/rp194_dossier_propertypowerlaw_nichols.pdf) (accessed 5.4.16).

Nolte, K.; Chamberlain, W.; Giger, M. (2016). International Land Deals for Agriculture. Fresh insights from the Land Matrix: Analytical Report II.

Nugent, P. 2010, 'States and Social Contracts in Africa' *New Left Review*, vol. 63, pp. 35-68.

Nyong'o, P.A., 2013. The land question, land grabbing and agriculture in Africa. *Int. J. Afr. Renaiss. Stud. - Multi- Inter- Transdiscipl.* 8, 23–31. doi:10.1080/18186874.2013.861098

O’Laughlin, B. (n.d.) ‘Unsettled Debates in Development Thinking: Conceptualising Households in Rural Africa’, *Development and Change*. [http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/pdf/Virtual\\_Issue\\_Papers.pdf](http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/pdf/Virtual_Issue_Papers.pdf)

O’Laughlin, B. (2008), *Governing Capital? Corporate Social Responsibility and the Limits of Regulation*. *Development and Change*, 39: 945-957. doi:[10.1111/j.1467-7660.2008.00522.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2008.00522.x)

O’Laughlin, Bridget. (2001). *Proletarianisation, agency and changing rural livelihoods: Forced labour and resistance in colonial Mozambique* (ISS Working Paper Series, No. 354). Den Haag.

O’Laughlin, B. (1995) “Myth of the African family in the world of development” in: Bryceson D. ed. *Women Wielding the Hoe*

O’Laughlin, Bridget. 1977. “Production and Reproduction: Meillassoux’s Femmes, Greniers et Capitaux.” *Critique of Anthropology*. Vol. 2, No. 8:3-32.

Oakland Institute 2011, *Land Investment Deals in Africa: Country Report: Ethiopia* [https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/OI\\_Ethiopia\\_Land\\_Investment\\_report.pdf](https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/OI_Ethiopia_Land_Investment_report.pdf)

OECD (2010) *Impact Evaluation Glossary*. <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/2754804.pdf>

Olaniyan, K., 2014. *Corruption and Human Rights Law in Africa*, Hart Publishing, Oxford.

Olukoshi, A. (2005). *Changing Patterns of Politics in Africa. En libro: Politics and Social Movements in an Hegemonic World: Lessons from Africa, Asia and Latin America*. Boron, Atilio A.; Lechini, Gladys. CLACSO, Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, Argentina. Junio. 2005. pp: 177-201.

Ossome, L (2014) *Can the Law Secure Women's Rights to Land in Africa? Revisiting Tensions Between Culture and Land Commercialization*, *Feminist Economics*, 20:1, 155-177

Ouma, S. (2015). *Assembling Export Markets: The Making and Unmaking of Global Food Connections in West Africa*. Oxford: John Wiley

OXFAM (2011) *The growing scandal surrounding the new wave of investments in land*, Briefing Paper 151

Oya, C., 2001. *Large- and Middle-scale Farmers in the Groundnut Sector in Senegal in the Context of Liberalization and Structural Adjustment*. *J. Agrar. Change* 1, 124–163. doi:10.1111/1471-0366.00005

Oya C., 2002, *Groundnut Production Crisis and Liberalization in Senegal: A Focus on Large-Middle Farmers*, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, SOAS, University of London

Oya, C., 2004. The empirical investigation of rural class formation: methodological issues in a study of large-and mid-scale farmers in Senegal. *Hist. Mater.* 12, 289–326.

Oya, C. (2006) 'Regimi di accumulazione, democrazia e strutture di classe in Senegal [Accumulation regimes, Democracy and Class Structures in Senegal].' *Afriche e Orienti*, 2006 (3-4). pp. 22-44.

[https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/11805/1/Article\\_on\\_Senegal\\_class\\_English\\_version\\_draft\\_Oya.pdf](https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/11805/1/Article_on_Senegal_class_English_version_draft_Oya.pdf)

Oya, C., 2007a. Stories of Rural Accumulation in Africa: Trajectories and Transitions among Rural Capitalists in Senegal. *J. Agrar. Change* 7, 453–493. doi:10.1111/j.1471-0366.2007.00153.

Oya, C., 2007b. Agricultural Maladjustment in Africa: What Have We Learned after Two Decades of Liberalisation? *J. Contemp. Afr. Stud.* 25, 275–297. doi:10.1080/02589000701396355

Oya, C. (2010) *Rural inequality, wage employment and labour market formation in Africa: Historical and micro-level evidence.* Geneva: International Labour Office.

Oya, C., 2013b. The Land Rush and Classic Agrarian Questions of Capital and Labour: a systematic scoping review of the socioeconomic impact of land grabs in Africa. *Third World Q.* 34, 1532–1557. doi:10.1080/01436597.2013.843855

Oya, C., Ba, C.O., 2013a. Les politiques agricoles 2000-2012: entre volontarisme et incohérence [Agricultural policies 2000-2012: between voluntarism and incoherence].

Oya, C. (2015) 'Who counts? Challenges and biases in defining 'households' in research on poverty.' *Journal of Development Effectiveness*, 7 (3). pp. 336-345.

Oya, C., Pontara, N. (Eds.), 2015. *Rural wage employment in developing countries: theory, evidence and policy*, Routledge ISS studies in rural livelihoods; Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY.

Oya, C. (2012) 'Contract Farming in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Survey of Approaches, Debates and Issues.' *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 12 (1). pp. 1-33.

Oyewumi, O. 1997. *The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

PADEN 2013, Rapport sur les Filières Horticoles Nationales

Paglietti, L., Sabrie, R., 2013. Review of smallholder linkages for inclusive agribusiness development. FAO, Rome.

Paglietti, L. Machado Mendes, D. (2010), *Senegal Irrigation market brief*, FAO, Rome (Italy).

Pala-Okeyo, Achola. (1980). The joluo equation: Land reform = lower status for women. *Ceres*, 13(3), 37–42.

- Panini, M. (ed). (1991) *From the Female Eye: Accounts of Women Field Workers Studying Their Own Communities*. (Delhi, Hindustan Publishing Corporation).
- Patnaik, P. (2019). Contemporary Capitalism and the World of Work. *Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2277976019845736>
- Patnaik, U. and Moyo, S. 2011. *The Agrarian Question in the Neoliberal Era: Primitive Accumulation and the Peasantry*, Oxford: Pambazuka Press
- Patnaik, U., 1987, *Peasant Class Differentiation: A Study in Method with Reference to Haryana*, Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Patnaik, U., 1976, 'Class Differentiation Within the Peasantry: An Approach to the Analysis of Indian Agriculture', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 11, No. 39.
- Pattenden, J. (2018) The politics of classes of labour: fragmentation, reproduction zones and collective action in Karnataka, India, *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 45:5-6, 1039-1059, DOI: [10.1080/03066150.2018.1495625](https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2018.1495625)
- Pearce, F. (2013). *The Land Grabbers: The New Fight over Who Owns the Earth*. Beacon Press, 336 pages
- Pélissier, P (1966) *Les paysans du Sénégal. Les civilisations agraires du Cayor à la Casamance*. Saint- Yrieix (Haute- Vienne), Impr. Fabrègue, 944 p., 64
- Perry, D. (2005). Wolof Women, Economic Liberalization, and the Crisis of Masculinity in Rural Senegal. *Ethnology*, 44(3), 207-226. doi:10.2307/3774056
- Peters, P.E., 2004. Inequality and Social Conflict Over Land in Africa. *J. Agrar. Change* 4, 269–314. doi:10.1111/j.1471-0366.2004.00080.x
- Peters, P.E., 2013a. Conflicts Over Land and Threats to Customary Tenure in Africa. *Afr. Aff.* adt047. doi:10.1093/afraf/adt047
- Peters, P.E., 2013b. Land appropriation, surplus people and a battle over visions of agrarian futures in Africa. *J. Peasant Stud.* 40, 537–562. doi:10.1080/03066150.2013.803070
- Peters, Pauline E. (2009) Challenges in Land Tenure and Land Reform in Africa: Anthropological Contributions, *World Development*, Volume 37, Issue 8, August 2009, Pages 1317-1325
- Polanyi, K. (2001) *The great transformation: the political and economic origins of our time [electronic resource]* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press).
- Porter, Michael E. "Creating Shared Value: Redefining Capitalism and the Role of the Corporation in Society." (pdf) Unilever CEO Forum, June 22, 2011.

Porter, Michael E. (1998) Clusters and the New Economics of Competition Documentation. Harvard Business Review, Boston.

Pradella, L., Marois, T. (Eds.), 2015. Polarizing Development: Alternatives to Neoliberalism and the Crisis. Pluto Press.

Pradhan, M. P., & Ravallion, M. (2000). Measuring Poverty using Qualitative Perceptions of Consumption Adequacy. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 82(3), 462-471. DOI: 10.1162/00346530055882

Pumla Dineo Gqola. (2001) "Ufanele Uqavile: Blackwomen, Feminisms and Postcoloniality in Africa". *Agenda: Empowering Women for Gender Equity*, (50), 11-22.

Quisumbing, A. R. and Meinzen-Dick, R. S. (2001) Empowering women to achieve food security, (No. 6), Washington DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

Rahmato, D., 2011. Land to Investors: Large-Scale Land Transfers in Ethiopia.

Rajak, D. (2011) *In Good Company: An Anatomy of Corporate Social Responsibility*. Stanford University Press

Ralph, M. (2015), *Forensics of Capital*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Randriamaro, Zo (2013) The hidden crisis: women, social reproduction and the political economy of care in Africa, Presentation at the first 2013 IDEP Monthly Development Seminar Series

Ranis, G. and Fei, J., (1961) 'A Theory of Economic Development', in *The American Economic Review*, LI, 4, 09

Rassas, B. and Institute for Development Anthropology (Binghamton, N.Y.), (1988), "Contract farming in the horticultural sector in Senegal : Contract Farming in Africa Project" Institute for Development Anthropology Papers. 42.

Ravallion, M., 2009. Evaluation in the Practice of Development. *World Bank Res. Obs.* 24, 29–53. doi:10.1093/wbro/lkp002

Razavi, S. and Miller, C. 1995. From WID to GAD: Conceptual Shifts in the Women and Development Discourse, UN Fourth World Conference on Women, Occasional Paper No. 1. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD).

Razavi, S. (2009) Engendering the political economy of agrarian change, *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 36:1, 197-226, DOI: 10.1080/03066150902820412

Razavi, S. (2007) 'The Political and Social Economy of Care in Development Context: Conceptual Issues, Research Questions and Policy Options'. *Gender and Development Programme Paper Number 3*. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Reardon, T., Stamoulis, K. and Pingali, P. (2007), Rural nonfarm employment in developing countries in an era of globalization. *Agricultural Economics*, 37: 173-183. doi:10.1111/j.1574-0862.2007.00243.

Reid Ross, A. (2014), *Grabbing Back, Essays against the global land grab*

Rizzo, M. (2011) Rural wage employment in Rwanda and Ethiopia: a review of the current policy neglect and a framework to begin addressing it / ; International Labour Office, Policy Integration Department. - Geneva: ILO,

Rodet, M.(2009) 'Genre, migration et réseaux familiaux au Haut-Sénégal, 1907-1950.' *Revue Diasporas, 11: Etrangères*. pp. 25-36.

Rodet, M. (2008) 'Migrants in French Sudan: Gender Biases in the Historiography.' In: Afolabi, Niyi and Falola, Toyin, (eds.), *Trans-Atlantic Migration: The Paradoxes of Exile*. New York: Routledge, pp. 165-181.

Rodney, W. (1973) *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, London, Bogle-L'Overture.

Rodrik D., X. Diao, and M. McMillan (2017). 'The Recent Growth Boom in Developing Economies: A Structural-Change Perspective'. Available at: <http://j.mp/2ip24it>

Rogers, B. (1980) *The Domestication of Women: Discrimination in Developing Societies*, Kogan Page

Rutazibwa, O. (2017) *On Babies and Bathwater: Decolonising International Development Studies* <https://www.ids.ac.uk/events/on-babies-and-bathwater-decolonising-international-development-studies>

Rutten, M., 2009. Why De Soto's land-tenure ideas of formalized property rights are failing to benefit Africa's poor. *J. ASC Infosheet* 6, 4.

SAED, Rapport D'activité 2015

SAED, Rapport D'activité 2016

Sage, E. 2004. *Disciplinary Practice and the Practice of Discipline, or Political Economy and Paternalism in Nineteenth-Century France* 2004 BHC Meeting

Saint-Martin, Yv. J. ,Diouf (Mamadou) : *Le Kajoor au XIXe siècle. Pouvoir cedido et conquête coloniale*. In: *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, tome 78, n°292, 3e trimestre 1991. pp. 430-432.

[www.persee.fr/doc/outre\\_0300-9513\\_1991\\_num\\_78\\_292\\_2916\\_t1\\_0430\\_0000\\_2](http://www.persee.fr/doc/outre_0300-9513_1991_num_78_292_2916_t1_0430_0000_2)

Sall, M. (2012) *Yoonu Yokkute, Le Chemin du Véritable Développement*, Programme Présidentiel <https://www.mackymetre.com/uploads/assets/yonu%20yokutte.pdf>

Sall, M. Tall, D.S.M., Tandia, D.A. , Samb, A. , Sano, A.K. and Sylla, S. 2010: *International Migration, Social Change and Local*



Governance in Ourossogui and Louga, Two Small Urban Centres in Senegal, IIED Working Paper <https://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/10581IIED.pdf>

Sarr, F. (2016) *Afrotopia* (Paris, Philippe Rey).

Sassen S. (2010) A Savage Sorting of Winners and Losers: Contemporary Versions of Primitive Accumulation, *Globalizations*, 7:1-2, 23-50, DOI: [10.1080/14747731003593091](https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731003593091)

Scheyvens, R., Storey, D. (Eds.), 2003. *Development Fieldwork: A Practical Guide*. SAGE Publications Ltd, London; Thousand Oaks, Calif.

Schoneveld, G., 2011. The anatomy of large-scale farmland acquisitions in sub-Saharan Africa. Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Bogor, Indonesia.

Schutter, O.D., 2011. How not to think of land-grabbing: three critiques of large-scale investments in farmland. *J. Peasant Stud.* 38, 249–279. doi:10.1080/03066150.2011.559008

Schultz, T. W. 1983. *Transforming traditional agriculture*. Studies in Comparative Economics 3. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Scoones, I., Hall, R., Jr, S.M.B., White, B., Wolford, W., 2013. The politics of evidence: methodologies for understanding the global land rush. *J. Peasant Stud.* 40, 469–483. doi:10.1080/03066150.2013.801341

SE/CNSA (Secrétariat Exécutif / Conseil National de Sécurité alimentaire). 2015. “Stratégie nationale de sécurité alimentaire et de résilience,” SNSAR, 2015-2035. Novembre 2015.

Sedex (2014) Members Ethical Trade Audit (SMETA) Measurement Criteria <https://cdn.sedexglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/SMETA-Measurement-Criteria.pdf>

Selwyn, B. (2012) *Workers, State and Development in Brazil: Powers of Labour, Chains of Value*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press. ISBN: 978 0 7190 8 5314

Sen, A., 1985, *Commodities and Capabilities*. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Sender, J., Oya, C., and C. Cramer (2006) ‘Women Working for Wages: Putting Flesh on the Bones of a Rural Labour Market Survey in Mozambique’, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 32(2): 313-333.

Sender, J. & Johnston, D. (1996) Some poor and invisible women: Farm labourers in South Africa, *Development Southern Africa*, 13:1, 3-16, DOI: [10.1080/03768359608439870](https://doi.org/10.1080/03768359608439870)

- Sender, J., Smith, S., 1986. *The development of capitalism in Africa* /. Methuen, London
- Shaffer, P. (2015), Two Concepts of Causation: Implications for Poverty. *Development and Change*, 46: 148–166. doi: 10.1111/dech.12140
- Shanin, T (2018): 1881 Letters of Vera Zasulich and Karl Marx, *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/03066150.2018.1536370
- Shivji, I. G. (2019). Sam Moyo and Samir Amin on the Peasant Question. *Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2277976019845737>
- Shijvi, I. (2008): *Accumulation in an African Periphery: A theoretical Framework*, Mkuki Na Nyoka Publishers
- Shiva, V., Chomsky, N., 2014. *Grabbing Back: Essays Against the Global Land Grab*. AK Press, Oakland, CA.
- Smalley, R. (2013) *Plantations, Contract Farming and Commercial Farming Areas in Africa: A Comparative Review*. FAC Working Paper 55, Brighton, UK: Future Agricultures Consortium
- Smith, L. (1999) *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples* (London and New York, Zed Books Ltd.; Dunedin: University of Otago Press).
- Sow, Fatou (1992). *Femmes et Tenure Fonciere au Senegal*, IDRC, Universite Cheikh Anta Diop <http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/13238/1/99474.pdf>
- Spivak, G. 1988. *Can the Subaltern Speak?* Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Staudt, K. (1985), A planning-centred approach to project evaluation: Women in mainstream development projects. *Public Admin. Dev.*, 5: 25-37. doi:10.1002/pad.4230050104
- Stein, H., & Cunningham, S. (2015). *Land Grabbing and Formalization in Africa: A Critical Inquiry*. (African Studies Center Working Paper No. 124/2015). Retrieved from <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/37024/ASC-075287668-3722-01.pdf?sequence=2>
- Tafira, C.K & Ndlovu Gatsheni, S.J. (March 2017), *Beyond coloniality of markets - exploring the neglected dimensions of the land question from endogenous African decolonial epistemological perspectives*, *Africa Insight*, 46(4) pp. 9–24
- Tandian, A. 2013, "Nouvelles figures des migrations au Sénégal. Quand les migrants internes et internationaux se côtoient", *Blocs*, n°1, mai, 20 p.
- Tandian, A. 2012, "Migrations internationales des Sénégalaises : nouveaux profils des migrantes et insertion professionnelle en Espagne" in Papa Demba Fall et Jordi Garreta Bochaca (eds), *Les migrations africaines vers l'Europe. Entre mutations et adaptation des acteurs sénégalais*, Dakar, Remigraf-Ifan/GrAse Lleida, pp.209-240.

Tandian, A. Tall S.M. et Sall M., 2011, "Climate change, adaptation strategies and mobility: evidence from four settlements in Senegal", Human Settlements Working Paper, 33, 41 p.

Tilly, C. (1984) *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons*, Russell Sage Foundation, New York.

Tine, N. D & Sy, M. (2003). "Women and Land in Africa: A case Study from Senegal", In Wanyeki, M. *Women and Land in Africa : Culture, Religion and Realizing Women's Rights*. Cape Town, David Philip Publishers

Top, A. (2014) *Évolution des systèmes de production agricole dans un contexte de changement climatique et de migration et effet de genre dans les trois zones éco-géographiques de la région de Matam au Sénégal*. Sociologie. Université Toulouse le Mirail - Toulouse II, Français. (NNT : 2014TOU20030). (tel-01141123)

Torvikey, G. D., Yaro, J. A., & Teye, J. K. (2016). Farm to Factory Gendered Employment: The Case of Blue Skies Outgrower Scheme in Ghana. *Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy*, 5(1), 77–97. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2277976016669188>

Toulmin, C., Lavigne-Delville, P. and Traore, S. (2002) *The Dynamics of Resource Tenure in West Africa*, James Currey, IIED.

Touré, E.h. (2011) « Les conventions locales pour la gestion des ressources naturelles au Sénégal : Entre autonomisation et problème d'appropriation », *VertigoO - la revue électronique en sciences de l'environnement [Online]*, Volume 11 Numéro 1 | mai 2011 URL : <http://journals.openedition.org/vertigo/10863> ; DOI : 10.4000/vertigo.10863

Touré, O., & Seck, S. M. (2005). Family and commercial farming in the Niayes area of Senegal, 57.

Tsikata, D. (2016). Gender, Land Tenure and Agrarian, Production Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Agrarian, South: Journal of Political Economy*, 5(1), 1–19. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2277976016658738>

Tsikata, D., 2009. Gender, land and labour relations and livelihoods in sub-Saharan Africa in the era of economic liberalisation: Towards a research agenda. *Fem. Afr.* 12.

Tsikata, D., Yaro, J.A., 2014. When a Good Business Model is Not Enough: Land Transactions and Gendered Livelihood Prospects in Rural Ghana. *Fem. Econ.* 20, 202–226. doi:10.1080/13545701.2013.866261

Tsikata D. and Golah P. (2010), *Land Tenure, Gender and Globalization: Research and Analysis from Africa, Asia, and Latin America*

Tuhiwai-Smith, L. 1999. *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples*. London and New York: Zed Books Ltd.; Dunedin: University of Otago Press.

Tzeuschler, G.G.A. 1999. *Growing Security: Land Rights and Agricultural Development in Northern Senegal*, 43 *Journal of African Law* 36

UNCTAD, FAO, IFAD and The World Bank (2010) Principles for responsible agricultural investment that respects rights, livelihoods and resources (PRAI).

Van den Broeck G, Maertens M (2015) Female Employment Reduces Fertility in Rural Senegal. PLoS ONE 10(3): e0122086. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0122086

Van den Broeck, G. and M. Maertens (2017a) Does Off-farm Wage Employment Make Women in Rural Senegal Happy? Feminist Economics, DOI: 10.1080/13545701.2017.1338834[RJ14]

Van den Broeck, G., Swinnen, J., & Maertens, M. (2017b). Global value chains, large-scale farming, and poverty: Long-term effects in Senegal. *Food Policy*, 66, 97–107. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.12.003>

Van den Broeck, G. & Kilic, T. 2018. "Dynamics of off-farm employment in Sub-Saharan Africa: A gender perspective," Policy Research Working Paper Series 8540, The World Bank.

Van Hoyweghen, K. & Van Den Broek, G. & Maertens, M., 2018. "Understanding the importance of wage employment for rural development: Evidence from Senegal," Working Papers 272323, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centre for Agricultural and Food Economics.

Vergara-Camus, L. (2014). Land and freedom: The MST, the Zapatistas and peasant alternatives to neoliberalism.

Verma, R. 2014. Land Grabs, Power and Gender in East and Southern Africa: So, What's New? *Feminist Economics*. [Online]. 20 (1), pp.52-75.

Verma, R. (2001). Gender, land and livelihoods in East Africa: Through farmers' eyes. Ottawa: IDRC.

Vermeulen, S. & Cotula, L. (2010) Over the heads of local people: consultation, consent, and recompense in large-scale land deals for biofuels projects in Africa, *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 37:4, 899-916, DOI: [10.1080/03066150.2010.512463](https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2010.512463)

Vicol, M. (2017) Is contract farming an inclusive alternative to land grabbing? The case of potato contract farming in Maharashtra, India *Geoforum*, Volume 85, 2017, Pages 157-166, ISSN 0016-7185, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2017.07.012>.

Vidal, J., 2008. The great green land grab. *The Guardian*.

von Braun J. and Kennedy E., 1987. 'Cash crops versus subsistence crops: income and nutritional effects in developing countries. In *Food Policy: integration supply, distribution, and consumption*, eds. Gittinger J.P., Leslie J and Hoisington C., 179-194.

von Braun, J. (1995) 'Agricultural Commercialisation: Impacts on Income and Nutrition and Implications for Policy', *Food Policy*, 20(3): 187-202.

Wanyeki Muthoni, L. (ed.) *Women and land in Africa: Culture, religion and realizing women's rights*, pp. 67-95. London and New York: Zed Books, Cape Town: David Philip Publishers.

Warren, Carol A. B. 1988. *Gender issues in field research*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

White, B., Dasgupta, A., 2010. Agrofuels capitalism: a view from political economy. *J. Peasant Stud.* 37, 593–607. doi:10.1080/03066150.2010.512449

White, B., Jr, S.M.B., Hall, R., Scoones, I., Wolford, W., 2012. The new enclosures: critical perspectives on corporate land deals. *J. Peasant Stud.* 39, 619–647. doi:10.1080/03066150.2012.691879

Whitehead, A. (1979) 'Some Preliminary Notes on the Subordination of Women' *IDS Bulletin* Vol. 10 No. 3, pp. 10-13.

Whitehead, A. and D. Tsikata. 2003. Policy discourses on women's land rights in sub-Saharan Africa: the implications of the return to the customary. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 3(1–2), 67–112.

Whitehead, A. and N. Kabeer. 2001. *Living with uncertainty: gender, livelihoods and pro-poor growth in rural sub-Saharan Africa*. IDS working paper 134. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.

Wilfhart, M., 2018. "The politics of local government performance: Elite cohesion and cross-village constraints in decentralized Senegal," *World Development*, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 149-161.

Win, E. J. (2004), *Not Very Poor, Powerless or Pregnant: The African Woman Forgotten by Development*. *IDS Bulletin*, 35: 61-64. doi:[10.1111/j.1759-5436.2004.tb00156.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-5436.2004.tb00156.x)

Woodhouse P. (2012) *New investment, old challenges. Land deals and the water constraint in African agriculture*, *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 39:3-4, 777-794, DOI: [10.1080/03066150.2012.660481](https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2012.660481)

Wolf, D. (ed.) (1996) *Feminist Dilemmas in Fieldwork*, (Colorado: Westview Press).

Wolf, E.R., 2001a. *Is the "Peasantry" a Class?* University of California Press.

Wolford, W., Borras, S., Hall, R., 2013. *Wiley: Governing Global Land Deals: The Role of the State in the Rush for Land*, [WWW Document]. URL <http://eu.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-1118688260.html> (accessed 3.18.16).

Wood, E.M. (1999) *The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View*, London: Verso.

Wood, E.M., 2009. *Peasants and the market imperative: the origins of capitalism*. *Peasants Glob. Polit. Econ. Rural Transform. Agrar. Quest.*, *Peasants and globalization: political economy, rural transformation and the agrarian question*. - London [u.a.]: Routledge, ISBN 978-0-415-44629-7. - 2009, p. 37-56.

Woodhouse, P., 'New Investment, Old Challenges. Land Deals and the Water Constraint in African Agriculture' (2012) 39(3–4) *Journal of Peasant Studies*, pp. 777–794

World Food Organisation (FAO), Gender and land compendium of country studies, FAO Land Tenure Studies, Rome <http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/a0297e/a0297e00.htm>

World Bank. 2018. *Senegal - Systematic Country Diagnostic (English)*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/336611539873310474/Senegal-Systematic-Country-Diagnostic>

Yuval-Davis, N. (2006). Intersectionality and Feminist Politics. *European Journal of Women's Studies*, SAGE Publications (UK and US), pp.193-209. [ff10.1177/1350506806065752](https://doi.org/10.1177/1350506806065752). [ffhal00571274](https://doi.org/10.1177/1350506806065752)

Yuval-Davis, N. (2011). Beyond the recognition and re-distribution dichotomy: intersectionality as stratification, in H. Lutz, M.T. Herrera Vivar and L. Supic

Zhang, Q. F. (2015), Accumulation, Commodification and State Intervention. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 15: 338-365. [doi:10.1111/joac.12120](https://doi.org/10.1111/joac.12120)

Zoomers, A., 2010. Globalisation and the foreignisation of space: seven processes driving the current global land grab. *J. Peasant Stud.* 37, 429–447. [doi:10.1080/03066151003595325](https://doi.org/10.1080/03066151003595325)

Zuccarelli, F. (1962) "Le Régime des engagés à temps au Sénégal (1817–1848)," *Cahiers d'études africaines* 2, 420–61

## **ANNEX**

**Annex 1: Qualitative Data (list of semi-structured interviews, group interviews and focus group discussions (FGD) – summarised in the following table**

	Code	Position	Date of 1st Interview	Date of 2nd Interview	Date of 3rd Interview
<b>Semi-Structured Interviews</b>					
1	SMP	Senior Manager - Permanent	03/05/17	26/10/17	
2	SMP1	Senior Manager - Permanent	19/05/17		
3	SMP2	Senior Manager - Permanent	06/05/16	27/05/17	26/10/17
4	SMP3	Senior Manager - Permanent	23/05/17	21/10/17	
5	SMP4	Senior Manager - Permanent	30/05/17	12/06/17	16/06/17
6	SMP5	Senior Manager - Permanent	31/05/17		
7	SMP6	Senior Manager - Permanent	19/06/17		
8	SMP7	Senior Manager - Permanent	16/06/17	18/11/17	
9	SMP8	Senior Manager - Permanent	09/06/17		
10	SMP9	Senior Manager - Permanent	09/06/17		
11	SMP10	Senior Manager - Permanent	04/07/17		
12	SMC	Senior Manager-Consultant	02/06/17	16/06/17	
13	MM	Middle Manager	27/10/17		
14	SW	Seasonal Worker	19/05/17		
15	SW1	Seasonal Worker	19/05/17	26/10/17	
16	SW2	Seasonal Worker	08/05/17	26/10/17	
17	SW3	Seasonal Worker	23/05/17		
18	SW4	Seasonal Worker	23/05/17		
19	SW5	Seasonal Worker	24/05/17		
20	SW6	Seasonal Worker	10/05/17		
21	SW7	Seasonal Worker	24/05/17		
22	SW8	Seasonal Worker	26/05/17		
23	SW9	Seasonal Worker	26/05/17		
24	SW10	Seasonal Worker	16/05/17		
25	SW11	Seasonal Worker	01/05/17		



26	SW11	Seasonal Worker	19/06/17	13/11/17	
27	SW12	Seasonal Worker	20/06/17		
28	SW13	Seasonal Worker	20/06/17		
29	SW14	Seasonal Worker	21/06/17		
30	SW15	Seasonal Worker	21/06/17		
31	SW16	Seasonal Worker	08/06/17		
32	SW17	Seasonal Worker	20/06/17		
33	SW18	Seasonal Worker	19/06/17	13/11/17	
34	SW19	Seasonal Worker	19/06/17		
35	SW20	Seasonal Worker	20/06/17		
36	SW21	Seasonal Worker	20/06/17		
37	SW22	Seasonal Worker	19/11/17		
38	SW23	Seasonal Worker	20/11/17		
39	SW24	Seasonal Worker	21/11/17		
40	SW25	Seasonal Worker	05/11/17		
41	SW26	Seasonal Worker	05/11/17		
42	PW	Permanent Worker	13/06/17		
43	PW1	Permanent Worker	17/06/17		
44	PW2	Permanent Worker	16/06/17		
45	PW3	Permanent Worker	17/06/17		
46	PW/SR	Permanent Worker/Staff Rep	13/05/17		
47	PW/SR1	Permanent Worker/Staff Rep	31/05/17		
48	PW/SR2	Permanent Worker/Staff Rep	12/06/17		
49	SW/SR	Seasonal Worker/ Staff Rep	18/11/17		
50	DW	Day worker	02/05/17		
51	DW1	Day worker	02/05/17		
52	DW2	Day worker	04/05/17		
53	DW3	Day worker	05/05/17		
54	DW4	Day worker	08/05/17		
55	DW5	Day worker	10/05/17		
56	DW6	Day worker	10/05/17		
57	DW7	Day worker	10/05/17		
58	DW8	Day worker	13/05/17		
59	DW9	Day worker	16/05/17		
60	DW10	Day worker	16/05/17		
61	DW11	Day worker	22/05/17		
62	DW12	Day worker	22/05/17		
63	DW13	Day worker	23/05/17		
64	DW14	Day worker	23/05/17	21/10/17	
65	DW15	Day worker	19/06/17		
66	DW16	Day worker	21/06/17		
67	DW17	Day worker	16/06/17	13/11/17	
68	DW18	Day worker	21/06/17		
69	DW19	Day worker	19/06/17		

70	DW20	Day worker	21/06/17		
71	DW21	Day worker	22/06/17	13/11/17	
72	DW22	Day worker	25/10/17		
73	DW23	Day worker	25/10/17		
74	DW24	Day worker	28/10/17		
75	DW25	Day worker	24/10/17		
76	DW26	Day worker	24/10/17		
77	DW27	Day worker	04/11/17		
78	DW28	Day worker	04/11/17		
79	DW29	Day worker	04/11/17		
80	DW30	Day worker	05/11/17		
81	DW31	Day worker	05/11/17		
82	DW32	Day worker	05/11/17		
83	DW33	Day worker	05/11/17		
84	DW34	Day worker	05/11/17		
85	DW35	Day worker	05/11/17		
86	DW36	Day worker	05/11/17		
87	DW37	Day worker	07/11/17		
88	DW38	Day worker	08/11/17		
89	DW39	Day worker	08/11/17		
90	DW40	Day worker	09/11/17		
91	DW41	Day worker	09/11/17		
92	DW42	Day worker	09/11/17		
93	DW43	Day worker	09/11/17		
94	DW44	Day worker	12/11/17		
95	DW45	Day worker	12/11/17		
96	DW46	Day worker	12/11/17		
97	DW47	Day worker	12/11/17		
98	DW48	Day worker	20/11/17		
99	DW49	Day worker	20/11/17		
100	DW50	Day worker	20/11/17		
101	DW51	Day worker	20/11/17		
102	DW52	Day worker	21/11/17		
103	DW53	Day worker	21/11/17		
104	DW54	Day worker	21/11/17		
105	CL	Community Leader	28/10/17		
106	CL1	Community Leader	22/10/17		
107	CL3	Community Leader	23/10/17		
108	CL4	Community Leader	23/10/17		
109	CL5	Community Leader	23/10/17		
110	CL6	Community Leader	24/10/17		
111	CL7	Community Leader	24/10/17		
112	CL8	Community Leader	24/10/17		

113	CL9	Community Leader	26/10/17		
114	CL10	Community Leader	26/10/17		
115	CL11	Community Leader	25/10/17		
116	CL12	Community Leader	25/10/17		
117	CL13	Community Leader	25/10/17		
118	CL14	Community Leader	25/10/17		
119	CL15	Community Leader	26/10/17		
120	CL16	Community Leader	27/10/17		
121	CL17	Community Leader	28/10/17		
122	CL18	Community Leader	28/10/17		
123	CL19	Community Leader	28/10/17		
124	CL20	Community Leader	01/11/17		
125	CL21	Community Leader	03/11/17		
126	CL22	Community Leader	03/11/17		
127	CL23	Community Leader	03/11/17		
128	CL24	Community Leader	04/11/17		
129	CL25	Community Leader	04/11/17		
130	CL26	Community Leader	05/11/17		
131	CL27	Community Leader	05/11/17		
132	CL28	Community Leader	05/11/17		
133	CL29	Community Leader	06/11/17		
134	CL30	Community Leader	07/06/17	06/11/17	
135	CL31	Community Leader	07/06/17	06/11/17	
136	CL32	Community Leader	07/11/17		
137	CL33	Community Leader	30/05/17	08/11/17	
138	CL34	Community Leader	08/11/17		
139	CL35	Community Leader	08/11/17		
140	CL36	Community Leader	10/11/17		
141	CL37	Community Leader	10/11/17		
142	CL38	Community Leader	12/11/17		
143	CL39	Community Leader	12/11/17		
144	CL40	Community Leader	14/11/17		
145	CL41	Community Leader	14/11/17		
146	CL42	Community Leader	14/11/17		
147	CL43	Community Leader	14/11/17		
148	CL44	Community Leader	17/11/17		
149	CL45	Community Leader	07/12/17		
150	CL46	Community Leader	17/11/17		
151	CL47	Community Leader	19/11/17		
152	CL48	Community Leader	19/11/17		
153	CL49	Community Leader	18/11/17		
154	CL50	Community Leader	19/11/17		

155	CL51	Community Leader	19/11/17		
156	CL52	Community Leader	20/11/17		
157	CL53	Community Leader	20/11/17		
158	CL54	Community Leader	13/12/17		
159	CL55	Community Leader	19/12/17		
160	CL56	Community Leader	18/12/17		
161	CL57	Community Leader	20/12/17		
162	CL58	Community Leader	12/12/17		
163	CLP	Community Leader/ Politician	25/10/17		
164	CLP1	Community Leader/ Politician	25/10/17		
165	CLP2	Community Leader/ Politician	28/10/17		
166	CLP3	Community Leader/ Politician	18/12/17		
167	CLP4	Community Leader/ Politician	22/12/17		
168	CLP5	Community Leader/ Politician	23/12/17		
169	CLP6	Community Leader/ Politician	02/06/17		
170	CLP7	Community Leader/ Politician	01/05/17	21/10/17	22/10/17
171	CLC	Community Leader/ Capitalist	02/05/17	20/10/17	
172	CLC1	Community Leader/ Capitalist	22/05/17	22/10/17	
173	CLC2	Community Leader/ Capitalist/Religious	17/06/17	20/10/17	
174	C1	Capitalist	02/06/17		
175	CLPO	Community Leader/ Peasant Organisation		18/11/17	
176	CLA	Community Leader/Administrative	22/11/17		
177	CLA1	Community Leader/Administrative	22/12/17		
178	CLA3	Community Leader/Administrative	15/12/17		
179	CLA4	Community Leader/Administrative	19/12/17		
180	CW	Community Worker	11/05/17		
181	CW1	Community Worker	12/05/17	02/11/17	
182	HW	Health Worker	13/05/17		
183	HW1	Health Worker	13/05/17	27/10/17	
184	HW2	Health Worker	17/06/17		

185	HW3	Health Worker	18/11/17		
186	SF	Student Farmer	13/05/17		
187	SF1	Student Farmer	14/05/17	26/10/17	
188	SF3	Student Farmer		27/10/17	
189	PO	Policy Official - PDIDAS	21/06/17		
190	PO1	Policy Official - SAED	14/11/17	17/11/17	
191	PO2	Policy Official - PDIDAS	17/11/17		
192	PO3	Policy Official - SAED	22/11/17		
193	PO4	Policy-Official - APIX	22/12/17		
194	CW	Community Worker	11/05/17		
195	CW1	Community Worker	12/05/17	02/11/17	
196	CW2	Community Worker	23/06/17		
197	CW3	Community Worker	18/11/17		
198	SF	Student Farmer	13/05/17		
199	SF1	Student Farmer	14/05/17	27/10/17	
200	DF	Displaced Farmer	18/11/17		
201	DF1	Displaced Farmer	19/11/17		
202	FS	Food Seller	20/11/17		
203	FS1	Food Seller	20/11/17		
204	FS2	Food Seller	20/11/17		
205	Tr	Trader ( <i>Commerçant</i> )	05/05/17		
206	Tr1	Trader ( <i>Commerçant</i> )	05/05/17		

Group Interviews					
1	STr2	Trader ( <i>Commerçant</i> )	17/06/17		
2	RPG	Representative of Peasant Group	15/12/17	17/12/17	
3	RPG1	Representative of Peasant Group	15/12/17		
4	RPG2	Representative of Peasant Group	17/12/17		
5	RLV	Religious Leader / Villager	20/12/17		
6	Vil	Villager	21/12/17		
7	VLGI	Village leaders Group Interview	05/05/17		
Discussions with Firm Managers					
1	GDMM	Group Discussion with Senior THE SECOND	09/06/16		

		COMPANY Manager and Mayor	(before fieldwork )		
2	SMGD1	Senior Managers' Group Discussion 1		30/05/17	
3	SMGD2	Senior Managers' Group Discussion 2		27/10/17	
4	SMGD3	Senior Managers' Group Discussion 3 (Shropshire Group – G's)	20/02/18	18/04/18	
5	SMGD4	Senior Managers' Group Discussion 4 (UK firm – first company)	12/06/18		

Focus Groups					
1	FGD1		19/05/17		
2	FGD2		24/10/17		
3	FGD3		25/10/17		
4	FGD4		08/06/17		
5	FGD5		13/07/17		
6	FGD6		14/11/17		
7	FGD7		22/11/17		
8	FGD 8		21/12/17		
	UNION MEETING		19/11/17		
	POTATO WORKER IMMERSION		21/11/17		
	VISIT to the UK mother company Farm (2 <sup>nd</sup> company)		18/04/18		
	<b>ORAL HISTORIES</b>		<b>Total</b>		
	Workers (All Cases)		20+		
	Company Directors		3		
	Capitalists		25+		

**Annex 2: Map of THE FIRST COMPANY sites of research (Survey solutions)**

**Annex 3: Map of THE FIRST COMPANY Neighbouring villages (Source: SEIA Impact Assessment)**

**Annex 4: Map of THE FIRST COMPANY Location**

**Annex 5: Map of THE SECOND COMPANY sites of research (Survey solutions)**



**Annex 6:Map of THE SECOND COMPANY Neighbouring Villages (Source: SEIA Impact Assessment)**

**Annex 7: Map of Land occupation around THE SECOND COMPANY (Source: SEIA Impact Assessment)**

**Annex 8: Map of THE THIRD COMPANY Saint-Louis research sites (Survey solutions)**

## **Annex 9: Main socio-economic activities in the areas of study**

Source: Assembled from the Land Use Plan

**Annex 10: Interview Request Letter (French)**

**Annex 11 : Semi-Structured Interview Questionnaire  
(French)**

## **Annex 13: In their own words: Perceptions of Agrarian Change**

A Wolof Proverb says: "No need to draw a painting, if its subject is standing before you."<sup>344</sup> I think it is important to reflect what people thought of the land deals in their own words as per my initial methodological promise: to give “the privilege of the last word” to research participants (chapter 4). This choice is dictated by the belief that “feminist research practice defies definition” (Mama 2011:11).

My survey contained the question: “Do you prefer your life before or after the company’s arrival?” and the possible responses were: Yes/No/NoDifference/PreferNotTosay. I also asked questions about perceived advantages and inconveniences associated with investor’s installation. These subjective evaluations combined with previous sections provide some assessment of the dynamics of agrarian change.

The self-explanatory table below shows that mostly female workers with children preferred “after” rather than “before” land deals, except for THE FIRST COMPANY male respondents. At THE FIRST COMPANY, 72% of those who prefer “after” are female workers with children against 81% at THE SECOND COMPANY. The responses are more mitigated within male workers.

---

<sup>344</sup> *Tungune du teew ñuy nataal*

**Table 33: Do you prefer your life before or after the company's arrival? By gender and company**

Source: Workers survey