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## MASTER'S THESIS

# **Factionalism in the CCP and the DPP** -One's Obstruction, the Other's Impetus

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Drawing from extensive existing sources which focus respectively on two types of intra-party politics, including books, journals, PhD dissertations and media accounts, this thesis sets out to compare two types of factionalism as seen in Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan. Factionalism is examined under two dimensions: the historical dimension and contemporary dimension. This thesis explores how factionalism has influenced their respective party affairs. I divide this factional comparison into three stages according to certain political background, namely, the opposition stage, the ruling stage and the present stage. By comparing two manifestations of factionalism in each stage, I identify their shared characteristics and respective uniqueness. Through examining each factionalism chronically during the selected three stages, two detailed factionalism evolvement pictures are presented. My key discovery is that factionalism plays contrasting roles in the two parties. Specifically, factionalism acts as a destructive factor that causes disunity, political conflicts of all sorts and eventually leads to legitimacy erosion in the CCP. However, at the same time, it is factionalism that elicits the strongest political forces and helps facilitate compromise formation in the DPP.

Key words: factionalism, factions, CCP, DPP, China, Taiwan, party politics, patron-client, guanxi, Chinese politics, Taiwanese politics.

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## Abbreviations

CCP	Chinese Communist Party
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
KMT	Chinese Nationalist Party
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSC	Politburo Standing Committee
Xi Thought	Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era
OTA	Orientation Towards Authority
DSI	Definition of Self-interest
Comintern	Communist International
CEC	Central Executive Committee
CSC	Central Standing Committee
OBC	Oriental Bureau of Comintern
LR	Li'san Route
TSU	Taiwan Solidarity Union
GLF	Great Leap Forward
CMC	Central Military Committee
CRG	Cultural Revolution Group
PLA	People's Liberation Army
TNST	Taiwan New Society Think Tank

NFTT	New Future Think Tank
NPCC	National Political Consultative Conference
NPP	New Power Party
TIP	Taiwan Independence Party

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## **Note on the Romanization of Chinese names**

As the Chinese *pinyin* and Taiwanese in roman alphabets are quite different, for most of the names mentioned in this paper I adopt the Chinese *pinyin* to represent. However, when it comes to the names of certain Taiwanese politicians which have already become predominantly well-known in their original formats, such as Tsai Ing-wen and Ma Ying-jeou, I made no changes. As to the majority of Taiwanese names, I use Chinese pinyin to represent for the convenience of my own and also for Chinese *pinyin* is relatively more recognizable than Taiwanese Romanization to the readers.

# 1. Introduction

With the conclusion of the 19th Party Congress in late October, 2017, Xi Jinping secured himself a solid position on par with Deng Xiaoping (if not Mao Zedong) in the party-state regime. While the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) was preserved, the fact that Xi Thought (or *Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era*) was chartered to Party Constitution and Xi Jinping's own political position being elevated to the "Core" denounced the end of intra-party democracy in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). CCP factionalism entered into a stage where Xi faction is the only dominant force and other factions were either completely uprooted or forced to operate covertly. Across the Taiwan Strait, the DPP is posing a diametrically different stance. Having just made a glorious return in the presidential election as well as in the Legislative Yuan election, the DPP's widely-acknowledged factional collectivism survived numerous severe political turmoil, showing high degree of resilience.

Factionalism that deals with both the splitting of groups (parties) and conflicts of factions (see, Wikitionary) has long been the undisputed inlet towards understanding Chinese and Taiwanese politics. Academics (for example, Nathan 1995; Dittmer 2003, Chen 2012, and Huang 2017) concur that the two political systems both encompass a myriad of interpersonal networks that are hinged on *guanxi*. On the party level, nearly all of the parties present themselves as homogeneous. Instead, they are uniformly comprised of multiple intra-party groups that are highly active and inclined to dissonance. In the past, studies on factionalism within the CCP were either overly occupied with the Cultural Revolution (CR) or revolved around the power succession themes. Works from a comparative angle were meager if not completely absent. In Taiwanese party politics, factionalism was first brought to public's attention through the studies of Kuomintang's (KMT) co-option over local elites for electoral ends (see, Chen 1995). Later, as the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) slowly joined in the power game against the KMT, factionalism began to be intimately associated with the DPP's intra-party rivalry and cooperation in elite politics. In fact, the DPP's birth was essentially the coalescing of out-party groups (*Dang Wai Zu Zhi*). However, despite the fact that DPP was always empowered by factional cooperation, it suffered from factional conflicts that eventually would undercut its electoral capacity. Similar to the CCP, factionalism of the DPP was barely scrutinized from a comparative perspective, despite the fact that these two parties share large ground of similarities such as their origin backgrounds and the extent of elitism of party members .

The thesis is designed to identify the similarities and differences of factionalism in the CCP and the DPP with a dyadic coordinate, i.e., the historical Y-axis (vertical) and the contemporary X-axis (horizontal). Through historical comparison of the two party's factional activities, I hope to present a fluid factionalism evolution picture culminating with the findings of similarities and



differences between the subjects, and possibly some ambiguities in between. This historical approach is entrusted to lay a solid foundation for factionalism comparison that is in contemporary context. In the contemporary comparison section, I will apply the findings to the explanation of current factional configuration of both two parties while expecting new discoveries. Ultimately, readers of this thesis are expected to identify three contributions: first, a systematic streamlining of factionalism history of the major Cross-Strait parties; second, an outline of current politics in China and Taiwan; and lastly, an effective paradigm that helps the observers of grand China politics to dive deeper into regional political analysis. In the first section, I will touch upon factionalism in general and probe for the special characteristics of factionalism in the Chinese culture context. The second section deals with brief factional chronologies of the two parties: I plan to include consensual informal groups that were frequently used by previous scholars or overseas media agencies for the CCP due to the covertness of its factional activities, such as the Shanghai faction led by Jiang Zemin, Xi Jinping would naturally be characterized as a member from the princelings, the famous youth league and so on. Factions within the DPP have always been an obvious existence, hence a comparatively clearer historical summary. Throughout this paper, analytical weight will be put on the characteristics of factions including composition, operation, the degree of institutionalization, functionality, stability as well as sustainability in order to identify similarities and differences between the parties. At the center of today's political reality across the Taiwan Strait are two party leaders, namely, Xi Jinping and Tsai Ing-wen. Arguably, it is Xi Jinping's sole resolution that altered the direction of the Chinese elitist politics. In terms of personal power, Tsai is not on par with her mainland counterpart, however, Tsai's victory is the perfect manifestation of resilience of the DPP. Therefore, the third section will concentrate on comparing these two leaders. By reviewing their political endeavors and comparing factional activities, I wish to shed light on current factional landscape of the two parties. The last section will be a final conclusion drawing upon findings from both historical and contemporary factional politics.

## 2. Factionalism as Seen in the Theories

In this chapter, I will touch upon the theoretical basis of this thesis by defining a factionalism that is best suitable for the grand Chinese politics. Then, I will present a comprehensive review on the existing studies on Chinese factionalism so as to lay a solid foundation for the factionalism comparison theory in chapter 3 of which I intend to apply in this thesis.

### 2.1 Defining Factionalism

What is a faction? Different scholars at different times formulated different definitions, however, the variation of these definitions is quite small. Most of these definitions share common grounds stemming from Webster's explanation that emphasizes two traits, i.e., the groups within group and the excludability. Zariski (1960, p.33) tends to equate factions to intra-party clique—that is, groupings that consist of members who are organized to act collectively based on senses of common purpose and identity. Belloni (1978, p.419) defined faction as “any relatively organized group that exists within the context of some other group and which competes with rivals for power advantages within the larger group it is a part of”. This definition was drawn, in part from Kollner and Basedau's understanding that factionalism “does not assume the necessity of certain cultural dispositions as some other definitions do” (2005). The ideal faction definition must be the opposite of what Kollner's and Basedau's predilection, for successful comparison of two oriental factionalisms cannot be fulfilled if the conceptual basis faction has no cultural linkages. Therefore, I opt to use Huntington's perspective that factions are seen as peculiarities owned by polities that are in early stages of modernization process where albeit groups and individuals have departed from conventional patterns of political behaviors and begun institutionalization, yet the extent of political institutionalization is still low (1968, p.412-15). This connotation of faction fits well into both China's and Taiwan's political realities, as it retains certain political space for cultural factor to play. Traditionally, the two polities are both Confucian societies where political networks built upon cultural norms such as clientelism and *guanxi*. Furthermore, neither of the two polities has developed into a fully-fledged political system despite the fact that both of the two remain a relatively stable political scene for roughly three decades (if calculations start from 1989 for China and 1987 the year when the marshal law was abolished). China is essentially an authoritarian regime and party politics of Taiwan is fraught with deviations comparing with other highly-democratic countries. For example, Chen (2006) noted that in Taiwanese politics, identity recognition is more important than good public policies, and personal bounds are based on sensibility rather than rationality. Taiwanese democracy also shows lower levels of civility, which is epitomized by the frequent take-it-to-the-street practices,

as opposed to partisan differences in the West, which are often resolved by means of negotiation (Zaobao 2009).

The Chinese factional heritage is derived from *Pengdang* (translated as Friend Faction), which comprises of two separate Chinese characters according to *Ancient Chinese Dictionary Peng* and *Dang*. *Peng* means, a) friends and b) forming political groups; *Dang* was used to represent political cliques (see, *Ancient Chinese Dictionary Online*). Over thousands of years of feudalist history, *Pengdang* was adopted to represent factional activities in the court politics. Out of many ancient Chinese political works, the most famous would be *Pengdang Lun* (On the Partisanship of Friends Party) by Ou-Yang Xiu (1007–22 September 1072 CE) in which Ou-Yang, in order to lessen emperor's suspicion over factions in the court, justified the existence of factions by differentiating the virtuous factions from the vicious ones. *Pengdang* was viewed as a major political threat to emperors in most of Chinese dynasties (Yang 1997 ; Lü 2013 ; Zeng 2010). Mao inherited this mentality from his imperial predecessors. Terms that contain strong negative connotations such as *Quanzi* (circle), *Shantou* (mountaintop), *Bangpai* (gang) were often used by Mao to represent his political enemies. What is noteworthy is that there are apparent differences between Chinese traditional *Pengdang* and western factions in the political science context. Zhu and Chen (1992, p.3) noted that *Pengdang* was merely surreptitious coalitions of feudalistic lords, and included no modernistic factional characteristics such as official regulations, organizations, rights and responsibilities of members.

## 2.2 Previous Theoretical Framework Revisited

The following factionalism theoretical findings are mostly stemmed from studies on the CCP factions. I tentatively extend these findings to the DPP case, despite the fact that it has been operating in a democratic political system for nearly four decades. In other words, theoretical framework of factionalism of the two research subjects are premised on that the CCP factional traits are contingently applicable to the DPP. Behind this generalization are two justifications. First and foremost, the most convincing support comes from Shi Tianjian's conclusion that despite mainland China and Taiwan having been politically isolated from each other for more than one century, their political cultures in terms of Orientation Towards Authority (OTA) and Definition of Self-interest (DSI) remained almost in congruence until 2004 (2004, p.68); both OTA and DSI are closely related to the high politics studies as OTA can be seen as a vital indicator of the relationship between leader and subordinates and DSI defines how one view his/her interests in the collective social or political group he/she belongs to. The second justification is that the existing factionalism studies on the DPP are not as rich as that on the CCP, and their theoretical basis converge with studies on the CCP factionalism in terms of cultural norms such as *guanxi*, clientele's ties (see: Chen 1995; Cheng. M 2003; Wu 2002; Peng

2010; Hsieh 2013). In order to avoid the incompatibilities caused by different political environments, formulating structures, and political ambitions of the two parties, I will issue disclaimer whenever the findings are exclusive to only one party.

Nathan's (1973) factionalism model for the CCP politics derived from the clientelist ties which particularly referred to "an exchange relationship of a limited and specific kind". According to his argument, political conflict is inclined to be organized through clientelist ties rather than corporate lineage units or formal organizations. Based upon this premise, participants of political conflict may either become power brokers and formulate mass political organizations or mobilize their networks that contains only one or a few layers of networks. Those mobilized networks constitute a faction in which relationships between leaders and followers are characterized by one-to-one linkages instead of corporatism. Nathan proposed 15 characteristics to factional politics, including a code of civility, doctrinarism, legitimacy taboo, and immobilism of factional systems. These 15 traits were not all identified at the time when this model was constructed in the early 1970s. Tang (1995) noted that this model's incapability of fully cover the CCP's factional phenomena was essentially related to Nathan's principal thesis that factions in a given arena will end up with relative power equalities. In addition, Nathan's observation was restricted to the high politics and factional violence that contradicts his code of civility characterization including death sentences and torture in the wake of the Cultural Revolution.

Contrary to the power equality theory from Nathan, Tang (1995) held that factional struggles between Chinese communist elites is a zero-sum game, noting that "the struggle for power among the Chinese elites, involving either supreme political power or power one level below, always involves one side winning all and/or the other side." In his argument, Tang uses numerous examples from the history of the CCP. Dittmer and Wu (1995) argued that factionalism, as a form of informal politics, is of supplementary to formal politics within Chinese political system. Factions, as informal politics come into play when formal politics fail to deliver interests to factional members. In informal politics it is *Shili* that is built on value-rational networks that exerts influence; whereas *quanli* (referring to power associating with official positions) has the final say in formal politics. Nathan (1995), later, devised a typology in which the CCP was classified as agreement-based and hierarchical party whereas the DPP was classified as exchange-based and segmentary party according to four associating bases and four coordinative communication patterns. Taking essence and discarding dregs of Tang's "winners-takes-all" theory and Goldstein's (1991) "bandwagon" and "balance of power" models, Bo (2007) devised the "power balancing" model that is entrusted to have more elucidative power on the 21st century Chinese elitist politics. Bo's power balancing theory (which stems from Tang's hierarchical structure and critique of Goldstein's take of CR political struggles as a form of balancing) argues that Chinese elite politics has turned more institutionalized where the authority of positions has increased, institutional loyalty outran personal loyalty, and multiple

winners were permitted to exist. These are all premised on a fact that functional differentiation has widened.

In terms of the function of faction, scholars (Pye 1980; Nathan 1995; Kollner and Basedau 2005) hold various opinions. According to Nathan's revised factionalism model, there are four functions of factions in a hierarchical order: the top priority being security, material interests, and then policy preferences and ideological considerations. However, Pye did not ascribe as much importance to policy issues, bureaucratic interests, or ideological considerations as to security (1980, p.vi). Deng Xiaoping's resultant institutionalization and legalization of Chinese elitist politics reduced security importance; economic reform increased factional interests towards policy orientations. Kollner and Basedau's take on the factional functions is more applicable to the DPP factions. The functions of factions can be: 1) distributive: allocation of electoral goodies such as posts; 2) representative: representing ethical groups, unions, etc.; 3) articulative: mediation of ideologies and political issues (Kollner and Basedau 2005).

In Taiwan, factionalism, for a long period of time, was exclusively used to represent the KMT's cozy relationship with local elites in Taiwan. Due to this, people tend to hold the viewpoint that the DPP factionalism also represents the patron-client connection between party elitists and grass-roots, but that is not the case. As noted earlier, the DPP was born from the coalescing of different activist groups that consisted of writers and editors as well as local cadres prior to democratization era (or when Taiwan was under the martial law). Understandably, factions are regarded as relationships formulated between these elitist activists within the DPP. Consequently, in the initial stage the relations between the DPP factions were rather cooperative and on equal terms. The other aspects of the DPP factionalism are very similar with those of the CCP except for its function and goals. The priority of the DPP factions is not seeking security—after all, they are overt sub-party organizations with some of them even holding administrative offices, staffs and rules. Rather, their priority is to win elections. Without rewarding factional members with electoral interests continuously, factions lose materialistic foundation of existence.

Chen (1995 p.36-43) built the *Factional Stability and Change* theory drawing upon coalition-building theory to explain the DPP's factional phenomena. According to Chen, there are three types of factional configurations: 1) the extremely imbalanced structure referring to the situation in which only two equal factions co-exist; 2) the fragile balanced structure represents a delicate situation that consists of two almost equally powerful factions and other small weak factions in which anyone's subtle move would easily cause disruption of such balance; 3) and the balanced structure in which exists an overwhelmingly dominant faction and no faction possesses the strengths to challenge it. Wu (2008) reminded us the convenience of using political scientific tools to analyze the DPP factionalism. Specifically, he raises the contradiction between collective interests of factions and leaders' personal interest. Peng (2010, p.22) adopted *Mobilization of Bias* theory in his Ph.D. dissertation on the DPP's factionalism. His theory was rooted in the fact

that the patterns of interest distribution are inclined to “bias” from within institutions. Owing to the then unique political circumstances, Hsieh (2013, p.46) formulated the so-called *Factional Realignment under President* theory (or *Zongtong Zhudao Xia De Paixi Chongzu* ), which by nature was a reflection of power centralization centering around president during the Chen Shui-bian era. It is widely agreed that Chen Shui-bian’s successful breaking through of the factional entanglement was by virtue of *Party-led Governance* (*Yi Dang Ling Zheng*), which was enabled by making president simultaneous the party boss of the DPP. The significance of *Party-led Governance* is that it empowers incumbent president to push through favorable policies or laws in the Legislative Yuan by uniting the DPP legislators with the rich political clout granted by his/her party boss position (See, Chen 2012, p.110-112; Hsieh p.47). *Party-led Governance* has become a common practice in Taiwan party politics. Chen Shui-bian’s successor, Ma Ying-jeou also resorted to it when he experienced great immobility from the KMT legislators at the Legislative Yuan. Now, albeit being criticized having broken her promise, Tsai has remained as party boss of the DPP since being elected.

Building upon the research above, I wish to compare high politics between the CCP and the DPP using factionalism as the perspective. Factionalism, in this thesis, comes with a heavy dose of Chinese characteristics including the Chinese type of clintelist ties or *guanxi*, as well as participants’ attitudes towards OTA and DSI. Furthermore, by taking the forms of political struggles and cooperation, it ultimately illuminates the dilemma of factional members when facing the choice between collectivism and individualism. If the current factional configuration of the CCP and the DPP have to be subsumed into a tree structure, then the former is in a hierarchy order and the latter is in an anarchic organizational fashion. The CCP politics has achieved a decent-degree of institutionalization since Deng’s reform. Specifically, superiority in bureaucratic hierarchy has attained sufficient deference, factional conflicts have been confined within the code of civility, and power succession norms remained efficient as before Xi’s altercation. Xi has proven to be a disturber of the *status quo* after one term in charge. His anti-corruption campaign has swept all non-Xi factions under the rug; and the *ad hoc* commissions and military reform has further consolidated his power. However, factions are far from having been eliminated, instead they operate in a dormant fashion. As to the DPP, after Tsai Ing-wen restored the presidency on behalf of DPP in 2016, DPP factions have ushered in another quasi-Chen Shui-bian concordances. Correspondingly, Tsai is permitted to alter factional equilibrium using her political knacks and the rich electoral resources at her disposal. The *Party-led Governance* model cleared obstacles for her altercation.

## 3. A Comparison Theory

### 3.1 Outline of Two Systems

I argue that under the same cultural norms, factionalism in a closed political entity such as the one-party state would cause legitimacy erosion of the ruling party, which eventually leads to a vicious circle rotating between power dispersion and power centralization, until the dangling legitimacy disappears. In stark contrast, in open political entities such as democratic parties, factionalism tends to function as a kind of social Darwinist device, i.e. an organic way of power aggregation and dispersion which eventually results in the selection of the fittest (or the most powerful).

The cultural congruence in the comparison theory makes sure that the factionalism under scrutiny connotes the same elements. In this case, it would be the way based on which political actioners link with one another, which can be *guanxi*-based including shared school, work or inhabitation experiences, or interest-based that consists of patron-client relationships. The one-party state excludes any contestants who do not belong to the party, which creates the political arena for factionalism to play (i.e. intra-party competition). Barring the extreme incidents such as an invasion from outside or an insurrection from within, the intra-party competitions have great latitude to test its boundaries. Such a premise constitutes the best gauging field for Tang Tsou's (1995) "winner-takes-all" observation, for whoever intends to win the factional conflicts would have to defeat the rest of all rivals completely. Either due to the morality constrain that leads to power hand-down, or that the ruling legitimacy has been too devastated by intra-party competition, the dominants have to cede power to others in order to salvage the crippling legitimacy. Consequently, power is factionalized dispersing to a number of political elites. As the ruling legitimacy goes back to upward, the intra-party competition resurfaced fiercely. That propels the strong leader to recentralize the dispersed power. Up to this, a complete cycle of power dispersion and power centralization takes place. This rotation repeats itself until the legitimacy goes oblivious owing to both the devastation from intra-party conflicts and societal and economic reforms that the ruling party has to initiate, ironically, in order to salvage the down-falling legitimacy.

Arguably, factionalism in democratic party politics acts as a kind of mechanism of Natural Selection. In order to win elections, parties are forced to compete with the rest of the parties on critical issues that are of great interests to the voters. The know-hows would come up with effective policies and make the most of the rules by coalescing with other powerful figures in the intra-party and national election, or legislature election. Such political maneuvers would not be possible to realize without a democratic arrangement on both the party and national level.

Eventually, a mutual-facilitating relation is established between factionalism and democratization, meaning the democratic arrangement provides factions an arena to conduct Natural Selection through factional conflicts and cooperation, in return, the actions and rhetoric of the fittest brought about by Natural Selection would reinforce the democratic arrangement.

## 3.2 Methods of Comparison

Based on the argument above mentioned, the weight of this comparison will be put on how factionalism respectively influence the two parties' political performance. In another words, I wish to demonstrate the argument that factionalism functions as a positive force for the DPP and a negative force for the CCP. I adopt a historiographical review approach. By briefly reviewing two party histories that will be divided into respective three stages according to specific milestones in the party politics, I will present a fluid and no less detailed factionalism-influencing-party-performance analysis. Hence, the comparison would have more possibility to be a rigorous one.

Throughout the comparison, other important elements of factionalism such as the types of factions (whether one faction is institutionalized or not), structure of factions, and robustness of factions will also be included. However, these elements are not going to be the key focus of this thesis. For one, their existences are to serve the demonstration of the argument. I have no intention to accomplish an in-depth investigation on a very complex subject which is worthy the volume of a comprehensive monograph with a MA thesis. And two, some of these elements are too elusive to be analyzed, for example, scientifically, one cannot conduct a thorough comparison on the institutionalization of the two sets of factions if the factions in one of the parties (the CCP) are in a status of uncertainty.



## 4. Types of Factions

Throughout this thesis, factions will be primarily categorized into different types according to the extent of institutionalization. As noted above, all of the CCP factions are non-institutionalized political groups which do not have official offices, rules and responsibilities and their members remaining rather too obscure to be discerned. The types of factions of the DPP are more diversified than those from the CCP, some of them are highly institutionalized such as the New Tide faction (*Xin Chaoliu*), the Justice League faction (*Zhengyi Lianxian*), the Fuliguo faction. Others are moderately institutionalized, for instance, the Meilidao faction, and the Mainstream faction (*Zhu Liu Lianmeng*) and some are minimally institutionalized, such as the Tsai faction, which is merely a symbolic term for the united DPP with Tsai Ing-wen being the party boss. The following factions are to be analyzed in different chapters throughout this thesis.

Party \ Faction	Institutionalized	Non-institutionalized
CCP	X	√
DPP	√	√

Table 1 shows the extent of institutionalization of factions as seen in the CCP and DPP.

### 4.1 Non-institutionalized factions from the CCP

<i>Name of the Faction</i>	<i>Members</i>
<i>Dootrinairism</i>	<i>Li Lisan, Wang Ming, Bo Gu, the Russian returned students.</i>
<i>Local Technocrats</i>	<i>Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi.</i>
<i>Mao faction</i>	<i>Mao and his allies in different stages.</i>
<i>Gang of Four</i>	<i>Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, Yao Wenyuan, Zhang Chunqiao.</i>
<i>Lin Biao faction</i>	<i>Lin Biao, Ye Qun, Lin Ligu.</i>
<i>Zhong Gong Ba Lao(Eight Senior Politicians)</i>	<i>Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Peng Zhen, Bo Yibo, Yang Shangkun, Li Xiannian, Wan Li, Song Renqiong, Xi Zhongxun(father of Xi Jinping).</i>
<i>Reformist faction</i>	<i>Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang.</i>

<i>Conservative faction</i>	<i>Chen Yun, Li Peng, Deng Liqun.</i>
<i>Shanghai Gang</i>	<i>Jiang Zemin, Huang Ju, Wu Bangguo, Zhou Yongkang, Chen Liangyu, Zhang Gaoli, Liu Yunshan, Zhang Dejiang.</i>
<i>New Gang of Four</i>	<i>Bo Xilai, Zhou Yongkang, Ling Jihua, Xu Caihou.</i>
<i>Youth League</i>	<i>Hu Yaobang, Hu Jintao, Li Keqiang, Hu Chunhua, Wang Yang.</i>
<i>Xi Jinping faction</i>	<i>Xi Jinping, Chen Miner, Liu He, Wang Qishan, Chen Xi, Li Zhanshu, Wang Hunin, Cai Qi.</i>

## 4.2 Institutionalized Factions from the DPP

<i>Name of the Faction</i>	<i>Members</i>
<i>Association of out-of-Party Writers and Editors</i>	<i>Su Qingli, Zhong Guluo, Lin Zhengjie, Lin Zhuoshui, Qiu Yiren, Zhou Bolun, Jiang Pengjian, etc.</i>
<i>Association of out-of-Party Public Servants</i>	<i>Fei Xiping, Zhou Yuqing, You Qing, Zhang Junxiong, Huang Yujiao, Cai Jiexiong, Xie Changting, Chen Jinde, Lin Wenlang,</i>
	<i>Kang Ningxiang, Chen Shenhong.</i>
<i>Meilidao Faction</i>	<i>Huang Xinjie, Zhang Junhong, Xu Xinliang, Xu Rongshu, Zhou Bolun, Xu Guotai, Chen wenqian, Chen Shuibian, Wang Tuo, Zhang Xueshun, etc.</i>
<i>New Era Institute Faction</i>	<i>Zhang Junhong, Zhou Bolun, Lin Zhongzheng , Lin Zongnan, He Jiale, Lin Wenlang, Liu Junxiong, Chen Zhaonan, Cai Renjian, etc.</i>
<i>Action &amp; Vision Faction</i>	<i>Xu Rongshu, Chen Shenghong, Lin Fengxi, Chen Zhongxin, Qiu Maonan, Qiu Yiyi, Wang Tuo, Hong Fuyao, etc.</i>
<i>New Tide Faction</i>	<i>Qiu Yiren, Hong Qichang, Lin Zhuoshui, Wu Nairen, Chen Ju, Duan Yikang, Ong Jinzhu, Su Huanzhi, Yang Qiuyu, Li Wenzhong, Lin Xiyao, etc.</i>
<i>Justice League Faction</i>	<i>Chen Shuibian, Yu Zhengxian, Chen Qimai, Gao</i>

*Zhipeng, Cai Huanglang, Shen Fuxiong, Luo Wenjia,  
Wang Xuefeng, Cai Qifang, Zheng Guilian, etc.*

*Fuliguo Faction*

*Xie Changting, Yao Jiawen, Zhang Junxiong, Cai  
Tongrong, Su Zhenchang, Ke Jianming, Li Junxiong,  
Lin Yusheng, etc.*

*World United Formosans for Independence(WUFI)  
Xingnan, Lin Guofeng, Yan Jinfu,  
Liang Muyang, etc.*

*Li Yingyuan, Chen Tangshan, Wang*

*Mainstream League Faction*

*Cai Tongrong, Xu Rongshu, Shen Fuxiong, You  
Qing, Li Yingyuan, Ke Jianming, etc.*

### 4.3 Non-institutionalized Factions from the DPP

*Name of the Faction*

*Members*

*Tsai Faction*

*Tsai Ing-wen, Lin Quan, Su Jiaquan, Lin Junxian,  
Huang Jinchun, Chen Mingwen, Chen Ju, etc.*

## 5. Two Brief Factionalism Stories Three Stages

The CCP and the DPP share a number of characteristics with their common political enemy Kuomintang, including the extent of elitism of the founders and the organizational structure. KMT coincidentally played the antagonist in both the CCP's and the DPP's heroic stories, with itself in the former being much more humiliated than in the latter. However, the factional comparison between the two poses an exceptionally complicated stance. In this chapter, I set out to investigate the differences and commonalities of the two parties. To facilitate this comparative approach, I divide both parties' factional history into three phases.

In the DPP case, the starting and ending years of the first DPP president Chen Shui-bian's tenure serve as the two demarcation lines of the three stages. The primary stage, from 1986 to 2000, saw how different out-of-party activists coalesced and formed the DPP, intense factional conflicts and cooperation along the way fighting for democracy and electoral achievements, and finally how those early factions evolved, metabolized and reached a delicate balance. Then, Chen Shui-bian's tenure of eight years, from 2000 to 2008, marks the second stage. During this period of time, Chen's Justice League faction (*Zhengyi Lianxian*) outweighed the rest of factions owing to the enormous amount of political resources brought about by both his presidential victory and his serving simultaneously as the party boss. Lastly, the third stage of the DPP's factional movement starts from after 2008 up to now. In the last stage, the factional movements experienced reshuffling and reformation along with the DPP's stinging loss and eventual restoration of power (Chen, 2011).

Generally speaking, the CCP's factional narrative also has three distinct stages with two demarcation lines falling at the significant milestones of the party history. Namely, the Yan'an Round table in 1943 when Mao achieved complete dominance, and the commencement of Reform and Opening up in 1978 under Deng's watch.

Until Mao became the supreme leader of the CCP in 1943 when he attained the title of Chairman of Politburo, the CCP's revolutionary journey was fraught with intense factional conflict. This period, from 1921 to 1943, will be classified as the first stage of the CCP's factional history. The second period is relatively longer than the first extending from 1943 to 1978. This period consists of two significant events from factionalism point of view, the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the breaking-out of the disastrous Cultural Revolution. Between 1943 to 1957, the factional struggles were nearly non-existent given the incremental authority that Mao had garnered from the successful revolution and the fact that the political agenda of the CCP was preoccupied with reconstruction and economic development. However, from 1957 to 1978, factional conflict

reemerged as seen in a series of social campaigns and intra-party struggles, such as the Gao-Rao incident, the purge of General Peng Dehuai, and the chaotic CR. Particularly, the CR which lasts from 1966 to 1976 was the most catastrophic episode among all of the CCP factional struggles. Academia generally agrees that it was a period of anarchy, confusion and vicious fighting instigated by Mao. Pyn (1986) noted that “so much at that time defies conventional theory of politics”. whereas, Fairbank (1992, p.372) held that some of the factional fighting tactics from this time find origins in early Yan’an period. However, its complexity and scale exceed the scope of this thesis. Even till today research on the CR continues.

The third period started from 1978 when Deng Xiaoping launched the reform initiatives. As the Reform and Opening up unfolded, Chinese politics began the process of institutionalization in which rule-by-law and authority of institutions and bureaucracies were credited much more weight. Factional conflicts revolving around the issue of leadership selection was effectively contained due to the institutionalization of succession, as seen in the two consecutive smooth power transitions up to 2012. But that did not mean factional struggles were completely eliminated, rather, the situation intra-party struggles reached a state in which different factions kept a delicate balance in which the supreme leader was comparatively weak in the center. Consequently, CCP managed to maintain a harmonious picture at least from the outlook. Until recently, Xi Jinping unexpectedly played as the disrupter of factional balance. By adopting an anti-corruption campaign, institutional reform as well as tightening his grip on the military, he nearly uprooted all non-Xi factions. Today, referring to the CCP as a party of Xi would not meet much disagreement.

## 5.1 Stage One: Soviets Meddling vs. Striving for Power Balance

This chapter sets out to present two early factional stories of the DPP and the CCP. Embedded in two short stories are: the origins and demographics of factions, the way different factions operated, the construction of party rules and institutions, respective factional conflicts and cooperation, etc. By comparing factionalism of the two parties, I argue that early struggles of the CCP factions were dominated by exogenous force, i.e., the Communist International (Comintern), whereas, the DPP factions were confined within endogenous parameter with each faction probing for the best electoral formula, be it the rules of candidacy nomination for elections or the evolution of the DPP’s Taiwan Independence policy, in order to gain more political interests.

The factional story of the DPP started from the out-of-party period when Taiwan was still under the martial law. Into 1970s, Taiwan’s economy achieved great success and average

education levels of public increased steadily. It is only a matter of time before young Taiwanese started to demand more political rights, especially because they were forced to a dead end on the way of climbing social ladders when the retreated KMT elitists formed an alliance on the very top which denied any outsiders from entering (Chen 2012 p.22-32). Internationally, Taiwanese government was facing a domino type of isolation losing its diplomatic relations one by one, which further jeopardized its dangling legitimacy. Owing to that, a series of anti-establishment social conflicts broke out between the KMT government and political activists, which includes the Zhongli Incident<sup>1</sup>, the Meilidao Incident. These bloodshed incidents led the strategy of Taiwan democratization transformed from an election one to the one that was largely characterized by protests and strikes (Chen, 2011). Along the way fighting for democracy, different dissent groups naturally joined together by enacting rules and institutions and so on. Eventually, in 1986 multiple out-of-party activist groups including the relatives of Meilidao Incident victims, the lawyers of Meilidao Incidents, *BianLianHui* ( Association of out-of-Party Writers and Editors ), and *GongZhengHui* (out-of-Party Officials Association for Public Policy), coalesced together and formed the DPP. These early members of the DPP were unanimously well-educated holding bachelors degree or even masters degree, some of them were lawyers and others were political commentators. In other words, the DPP was initially an elitist party.

Similarly, the early CCP members also came from the higher echelon of Chinese society. As shown in Table 2, all of the 13 party representatives in the first Party Congress held college degrees, and some even went to the best universities in China and Japan.

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<sup>1</sup> Zhongli Incident was a riot in the Taiwanese town of Zhongli (now Zhongli District, Taoyuan City) in 1977, after a voter reported to witness the Kuomintang rigging the election.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Locality</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>School of graduate or drop-out</i>
<i>Li Da</i>	<i>Hunan</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>Imperial University of Japan</i>
<i>Li Hanjun</i>	<i>Hubei</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>Imperial University of Japan</i>
<i>Dong Biwu</i>	<i>Hubei</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>Nihon University</i>
<i>Zhou Fuhai</i>	<i>Hunan</i>	<i>24</i>	<i>First Higher School, Japan</i>
<i>Chen Gongbo</i>	<i>Guangdong</i>	<i>29</i>	<i>Columbia University</i>
<i>Zhang Guotao</i>	<i>Jiangxi</i>	<i>24</i>	<i>Peking University</i>
<i>Liu Renjing</i>	<i>Hubei</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>Peking University</i>
<i>Chen Tanqiu</i>	<i>Hubei</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>National Wuchang Normal University</i>
<i>Mao Zedong</i>	<i>Hunan</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>Hunan No.1 Normal College</i>
<i>He Shuheng</i>	<i>Hunan</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>Hunan No.4 Normal College</i>
<i>Wang Jinmei</i>	<i>Shandong</i>	<i>23</i>	<i>Shandong No.1 Normal College</i>
<i>Bao Huiseng</i>	<i>Hubei</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>Hubei No.1 Normal College</i>
<i>Deng Enming</i>	<i>Guizhou</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>Shandong No.1 High School</i>

Source: Website of the Communist Party of China ( <http://cpc.people.com.cn/> ).

Table 2 Education details of the first CCP Party Congress representatives

Yet, contrary to the nearly natural birth of the DPP, the establishment of the CCP was under direct instruction of an exogenous influence, namely, the Comintern (See, History of the Chinese Communist Party p.40). There were many regional communist organizations before the CCP was declared established, however none of them qualified as a party, let alone the existence of factions. Mao's main rival, the Russian returned students would only be sent to Moscow Sun Yat-sen University in a later stage. These students formed various factions at different stages that seek to dominate the party in terms of revolution strategy and ideological doctrine.

### 5.1.1 Factions of the DPP: Cooperation & Contestation

Chen argues that the reason that the DPP is not inclined to splinter is due to its robust structure (2012, p. 66). Although intra-party democracy was the principle of the DPP since the first day, the DPP also copied a series of hierarchical institutions and operation rules from the KMT when formed. For example, the DPP adopted the Central Executive Committee (CEC) institution, which holds supreme authority of the DPP. Currently, CEC has 35 members; fighting for the dominant presence in CEC is an important item on each faction's agenda. Then, out of the 35 members 14 members are selected to constitute Central Standing Committee (CSC).

Moreover, the party central has absolute authority over party subdivisions. In spite of being a rigid party, the DPP also has multiple characteristics of electoral party, as seen in prioritizing gaining more votes so as to win elections as opposed to recruiting a large number of party members (Chen 2012, 68). In the initial stage of the DPP's factional activities, despite the fact that factions diverged on a number of critical issues, they reached a delicate factional balance which served the party well to compete against the KMT as the times went by.

Intra-party struggle in the DPP was revolved around factions; power transition is reflected by ups and downs of certain factions. Lin (2002, 76) tends to classify factions in the DPP as the institutionalized faction, meaning that factions are built upon the spirit of equality, impersonal and operate within formal regulation parameters. Until 1986, the KMT had been ruling Taiwan for approximately three decades. What the newly-formed DPP faced was a formidable enemy. Early factions had to join together to compete in the elections against the powerful KMT regime. Sun (2003, 222-223) added that constant local elections made it inevitable for these political dissents to eventually build a party machine. Because elections demanded the capabilities of organizing, fund-raising, and strategic planning out of anti-establishment political dissents. Individually, these out-of-party activists are feeble, therefore, they have to coalesce and coordinate with each other. As a consequence, institutions and rules were developed and modified in order to achieve better electoral results. In the early days, due to the coercive political environment caused by the Meilidao Incident and that the leading figures of the Meilidao Incident were sentenced to jail for many years, Kang Ningxiang who came from within the establishment with a title of Taipei lawmaker, was able to hold the party helm by opting for a moderate strategy, i.e., taking power by winning elections. Kang faction garnered 9 seats out of 31 CEC seats and 5 seats out of 11 CSC seats in the first All Party Member Congress. But the factional conflict in the early DPP quickly became a dual-play between the Meilidao faction and the New Tide faction after the release of the Meilidao Incident leaders. Kang faction swiftly petered out the intra-party struggle scene (Chen, 2011).

The Meilidao faction was a faction that is comprised of direct participants, relatives and lawyers of the participants. Its early members includes Huang Xinjie, Zhang Junhong, Xu Xinliang, Xu Rongshu (Zhang Junhong's ex-wife), Chen Shuibian, etc. Many held legislative positions before the Melidao Incident, for instances, Xu Xinjiang and Zhang Junhong were KMT members before joining the DPP and both were provincial lawmakers. Xu Rongshu's and Chen Shui-bian's early sacrifice paved their ways for legislative positions in a later stage. This faction is considered as the less revolutionary division or a political group who preferred election strategy than social movement strategy. The main rival of the Melidao faction, the New Tide faction, was originated from *The Movement* magazine that was co-edited by Wu Nairen, Qiu Yiren, Lin Zhuoshui, Hong Qichang, etc. Disgusted by the DPP's chronicle moderate strategy that was characterized by election strategy which was led by office-holders and fraught with



factional protectionism, the New Tide claimed to draw a clear demarcation line from the vested interests groups and started over a brand new opposition campaign by resorting to a strategy that mixes both election and social movements (see, Zheng's dissertation 2004, 307-309).

In the first few years of the DPP, the Meilidao faction and the New Tide faction diverged on a number of key issues. First, Taiwan independence and democratizing Taiwan, which comes first? Chen (1990, p.85) defined this issue as the debate between nationalism strategy and democratization strategy. On the one hand, Yao Jiawen, a key member from the New Tide faction spearheaded the nationalism strategy. Analyzing the then Taiwan's geopolitical ambience, Yao identified that the KMT's persistence of reclaiming mainland China as the biggest obstacle of Taiwan democratization. "Without an independent Taiwan, KMT will always hold onto such an illusion, hence, it would be impossible for the KMT to lift the martial law and abolish the 'Eternal Congress'" or *Wan Nian Guo Hui*<sup>2</sup>. Therefore, Taiwan democratization would never be fulfilled. (Yao 1988, 152-162). On the other hand, Zhang Junhong from the Meilidao faction cautioned that despite he agreed that Taiwan should be an independent country, yet, adopting an aggressive Taiwan independence strategy could very likely 1) decrease the size of constituency that support the call for Taiwan democratization and 2) result in more war threats from CCP 3) and lead to more repression from the KMT regime.

Second, social movements strategy or election strategy? The Meilidao faction iterated its roadmap to Taiwan democracy through Zhang Junhong's and Lü Yu's book "A Road to Power" (*Dao Zhizheng Zhi Lu*). As the Meilidao faction imagined it, the DPP should opt for the election strategy. Specifically, the book suggested the DPP to tap into the existing conflicts between vested interest groups from localities and the KMT central government. When the disadvantaged constituents see the DPP attacking the privileges of local vested interest groups, they were expected to side with the DPP against central KMT government. Little by little, the DPP would build a united front among local governments by defeating the KMT's local clients in local elections. It would be only a matter of time before the KMT to be stripped off power. Such a strategy was termed as "Local Encircling Central" (*Di Fang Bao Wei Zhong Yang*) by Zhang and Lü (1989, 12), which bizarrely resembles Mao's "Rural Encircling Cities" (*Nong Cun Bao Wei Cheng Shi*) in the revolution time. To this idea, the New Tide faction rebutted that the Meilidao faction overlooked the long-existing rigid patron-client bound between central KMT government and local factions. The New Tide insisted that the road to power shall be a way filled with social movements in which as many citizens as possible to be mobilized. Further, the New Tide faction was rather pessimistic about the prospective result of "Local Encircling Central" strategy, it held that local politics were already factionalized. What would follow after the uprooting of previous

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<sup>2</sup> Wan Nian Guo Hui represents the first batch congressmen elected since KMT government retreat to Taiwan, they had continuously being the congressmen until the abolishment of the martial law.

vested interest groups is only another batch of vested interest groups. The old entrenched interest distribution mechanism will remain intact.

Such disagreements would slowly resolve by itself in the 1990s as the number of elections increased. The Meilidao faction would consequently take the first lead in this early factional conflict. Zheng(p.178) pointed out that the majority of elites from the DPP began to realize that election strategy was more realistic as time goes by. The effectiveness of election strategy is buttressed by two supportive facts. One, under the leadership of Xu Xinliang who was a steadfast pro-election strategy figure, the DPP's approval rate rose steadily. The DPP received 33.1% of all votes and 1/3 of all seats in Legislative Yuan election in 1992; in 1993 provincial election the DPP garnered 41.2% of all votes, only 6 point less than the KMT, which created the best approval rate record for the DPP (Xia,1999, p.194-250). Two, as a critical indicator of power configuration of different factions the transformation of CSC seats would further reinforce the importance of the election strategy. Based on Guo's (1997 P.206) analysis, the percentage of CSC seats holder who also occupied public offices increased from 6/11 in 1989, to 7/11 in 1991, to 8/11 in 1993. That means election played an increasingly important role when it comes to the generation of new political elites in the DPP. Nevertheless, the New Tide faction managed to squeeze the Meilidao faction's power space by tapping into the Taiwan independence issue when the latter was winning the strategic debate.

The political environment turned permissive in the early 1990s when the then president Li Denghui terminated the martial law, was legalized the formation of party organizations. Under such circumstances, the New Tide faction launched a series of initiatives that propelled the DPP for an immediate transition on its Taiwan independence policy. The New Tide faction nearly chartered the Taiwan independence clause to the Party Constitution of the DPP in the 7<sup>th</sup> Plenary Session of the First Central Committee; the passage of "4.17 Resolution" further consolidated the DPP's ground towards Taiwan independence in 1988. Taiwan independence topic proved to be rather handy for the New Tide faction to alter the disadvantaged factional bout with the Meilidao faction, which was evidenced in the CEC and CSC elections that ensued respectively in October and November 1991. Table 3 shows the nearly equal presence of the Meilidao faction and the New Tide faction since 1988 shifted to the latter's dominance in 1991.

Year	Meilidao	New Tide	Justice League	Fuliguo	Others	Total	Party Boss
1986	0.00	0.45	non-exist	non-exist	0.55	1.00	non-exist
1987	0.25	0.17	non-exist	non-exist	0.58	1.00	New Tide
1988	0.55	0.45	non-exist	non-exist	0.00	1.00	Meilidao
1989	0.55	0.45	non-exist	non-exist	0.00	1.00	Meilidao
1991	0.36	0.55	non-exist	non-exist	0.09	1.00	Meilidao

Table 3 Factions as reflected in CSC seats from 1986 to 1991, Based on Xu & Chen, 2007.

Table 3 demonstrates that the Meilidao faction held the majority of CSC seats in 1988 and 1989, the rest of the CSC seats were occupied by the New Tide faction. But the situation developed towards the favor of the New Tide faction, with its CSC seats exceedingly surpass those of the Meilidao faction.

Deeply concerned with its power shrinking, the Meilidao faction chose to side with the New Tide faction on Taiwan independence issue. As a result, Taiwan independence clause was eventually enlisted on Party Constitution on November 13<sup>th</sup>, 1991 without encountering much resistance, which officially declared the DPP a pro-Taiwan independence party. Unexpectedly, the agreement on Taiwan independence issue was not welcomed by the public. The DPP merely reaped 66 seats out of 325 legislator seats with a record-low approval rate, only 23.9 % in the second Legislative Yuan election in the end of 1991. Chen (2012, p.92) believed the DPP's landslide defeat was owing to its campaign strategy that is centered on building a Taiwan sovereign.

The New Tide faction exerted high-extent of adaptability shifting its aggressive Taiwan independence policy to a practical one. That propelled the DPP to adopt a practical Taiwan independence policy. What is worth adding is that even though the DPP is praised for its structural robustness and not prone to splitter, party splitting nevertheless occurred two times as a direct result of extremely different opinions on Taiwan independence issue. Lin Zhengjie who is dedicated to the idea that Taiwan needs to unite with mainland China renounced himself from the DPP in 1991, and rejoined the KMT in 2016. Quite surprisingly, a number of adamant pro-Taiwan independence party members also quit the DPP and established the Taiwan Independence Party (TIP) in 2015 because they were unsatisfied seeing the DPP's derailing from Taiwan independence track.

The dual-play factional bout between the Meilidao faction and the New Tide faction would be disrupted when the Justice League faction and the Fuliguo League faction were formed in 1992. Both of them adopted a rigid structure like the one the New Tide faction was practicing, which

consisted of official office, regular meetings, prioritizing factional resolution over party policies. In addition, a few other factions, such as the Taiwan Independence Alliance faction, the Mainstream Alliance faction and the New Momentum faction were also established around the same time; the DPP factional story entered a new chapter that was heavily diversified. Chen (2012, p.85) noted that the generation of the DPP elites relied on two approaches: a) those who already have political assets at their disposal keep cashing out by taking advantage of the existing interests distribution mechanism; b) political newcomers were not left without options, instead, they could break into the core circle with audacious political endeavors, be it challenging the incumbent factional leaders or campaigning with policies that were attracted to wider constituents. Chen Shui-bian is one of the most strategic newcomers. Although Chen Shui-bian made his name in Meilidao Incident as a civil rights lawyer, his political career started slower than his peers. However, he would catch up and even lead the cohort in this period of time.

Chen Shui-bian defeat his life-long friend and rival Xie Changting winning the right to participate in 1994 Taipei mayor election. His successful election as Taipei mayor boosted his prestige in the DPP. When Xu Xinliang landed the second time on the party boss position after a humiliated defeat in the 1996 presidential election, Chen Shui-bian did not hesitate to attack Xu and the Meilidao faction behind him. Chen's Justice League faction diverged on a number of issues including Taiwan identity, party cooperation, and the constitution revision with the Meilidao faction. In 1997, Chen Shui-bian moved one step further. The Justice League faction and the Fuliguo faction launched a "coup" against party central and forced it to tear apart the pre-signed constitutional reform deal with the KMT (Xu 2003, p.172). Moreover, Chen Shui-bian formed an alliance with the New Tide faction on Taiwan independence issue, which eventually pressed Xu Xinliang to withdraw from party boss election in 1998. The more aggressive initiatives Chen Shui-bian launched, the more political gains he would reap. As Chen Shui-bian become the first DPP president by winning 2000 election, the factional configuration entered the second stage in which the hard-earned factional balance was disrupted. I will address it in next chapter.

### 5.1.2 Early Factions in CCP: the Comintern Manipulation v.s. Local Political Elites

Unlike factions in the DPP, the CCP factions are far from institutionalized organizations, their existence was strictly forbidden by Comintern which acted as the paramount patron of the CCP in the early stage. Political group is more precise than faction to describe these factions. Members joining together may have happened out of the typical *guanxi*-based linkages, for instance, they may have come from same localities, went to the same school or were colleagues at some point.

In this stage, there were mainly three critical factions, the Doctrinairism faction, the local bureaucrat faction and the Mao faction. The Doctrinairism faction was comprised of students who had come back from Russia, its members included yet not exhaustive, the prominent twenty-eight and half Bolsheviks, Liu Bocheng, Liu Shaoqi, Ye Jianying. Members from this faction held orthodox authority due to their educational background and support from Moscow, indeed, they were also assigned critical responsibilities by Comintern. The Doctrinairism faction later become the biggest opponent of the Mao faction. Local Bureaucrats faction represents the prestigious party seniors whose career took off rather early and whose influence persisted regardless of the political environment, such as Zhou Enlai, Xiang Ying, etc. Mao spearheaded his own faction. Depending on his actual political goals, his faction members would be constantly in flux. As noted above, the CCP factions were not institutionalized, they were at most unofficial cliques that would form and disband as the factional struggles move along. Therefore, the members of the CCP factions were not fixed, rather, they were inclined to change.

The CCP grew rapidly during the first CCP-KMT cooperation (1923-1927), which alerted the KMT. Chiang Kai-shek ripped this cooperation apart and the KMT turned against the CCP viciously hunting down its members in 1927. The following civil wars between Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xi-shan created an illusion on the CCP key leaders' mind that if they could take a few weak fort cities domino effect would be triggered and more cities would fall, China would be taken over in the end.

Firmly obsessed with this illusion, the incumbent leader Li Lisan resorted to what Comintern called an adventurism route. Li Lisan and his close comrades were determined to overtake the KMT-ruled China by military action. In order to achieve this goal, they even conspired to subvert Manchuria so as to drag the Soviet Union into the war against the imperial Japanese army (Yang, 2005 & Gao, 2000, 19) which they regarded as the critical obstacle of building a communist China. The Oriental Bureau of Comintern (OBC) strongly opposed to this idea and ordered that revolution should start from rural China. Against the vehement condemnation from Comintern, Li-led red army took over Changsha city which boosted their confidence greatly and they began defying more orders from Comintern. The CCP embarked on the so-called Lisan Route (LR) resolutely. During this time, Wang Ming who had just come back from Moscow Sun Yat-sen University firmly believed that his understanding of Leninism was much more profound than Li Lisan, and questioned LR route with the support from his close associates who were mostly also just returned China from Moscow like him. Li Lisan was agitated by Wang's defiance. He mobilized politburo to punish Wang's doctrinarism faction (Gao, 2000).

This factional conflict would not be put out until the Comintern directly intervened, resulting the power erection of Wang Ming on the cost of Li Lisan. On the 4<sup>th</sup> Plenary Session of 6<sup>th</sup> Party Congress, Wang's doctrinarism faction was redressed with himself being erected as the member of the politburo, and later he was elevated to the PSC marking his authoritative leadership status

in the CCP. In this episode, the CCP's early factional bouts were under the absolute influence of exogenous force, the Comintern. To a large extent, the Comintern was directly involved with the factional struggle. Nevertheless, despite that Wang Ming had a powerful external supporter, he did not lead the CCP to success, on the contrary, and under his even more audacious initiatives the CCP's revolution was severely damaged. In contrast, Mao whose early career base was remote from the party central, achieved a series of small triumphs and built both the first troop and first territory of the CCP, which gained him early political assets paving his entry into the party central. But Wang Ming's political advancement was supported by the doctrinarism faction that was comprised almost unanimously by Russian returned students who indiscriminately believed in the Soviet's experience, namely, the "Rural Encircling Cities". Most importantly, the doctrinarism faction had the firm support from the Comintern. The CCP factional struggle swiftly entered into the Wang-Mao phase as party central merged Mao's army. Later, Mao would defeat Wang Ming by exercising his political wits that were characterized by constantly building alliances with key political figures based upon his practical needs (See Gao 2000, p.37-40).

To pave his way towards the ultimate power, Mao purposefully co-opted Zhang Wentian who was a high-level party official belonging to the twenty-eight and half Bolsheviks. Zhang was an academic in the CCP who had good connections with Moscow. His pick ensured that no party reform would stir up anxiousness within the Comintern. Zhang's replacement of doctrinaristic Bo Gu made him the political leader of the CCP. As Mao reclaimed his sole military authority, Mao-Zhang faction became the cornerstone of the party politics. Mao would repeat this trick again by supporting Liu Shaoqi to attack the Soviet-backed party central in a later stage. Despite viewing the Comintern as his major political obstacle, Mao was also well aware of the Soviets' significance in his revolutionary career. The Soviet Union not only loaned Mao a plausible ideology which later would be developed into Mao thoughts but also provided war bloodline to the CCP by supplying large amount of heavy weaponry (Yang 2010).

In the beginning of the anti-Japanese war, the cooperative strategy towards the KMT insisted by Wang Ming and Zhou Enlai gained wide support from the party central as well as the Comintern. Because Mao was suspicious of the CCP-KMT cooperation, his position was largely undermined by Wang Ming. But Mao was clever enough to send Russian returned officials to Moscow to win over the Comintern's favor. As His army grew bigger and powerful, he then won back the trust of military commands. In comparison with Mao, Wang Ming was much less adept at *guanxi* building and lacking of power struggle crafts. For example, Mao's lobbyist Wang Jiaxiang was once Wang Ming's close ally, and yet went to Moscow on behalf of Mao. Gao(2000, p.60) pointed out one of Wang's most detrimental mistake was that he never had any military access even though his party ranking once was equal to that of Mao.

Ideology became a vital component of the ultimate leadership in the initial stage of factional struggle. When Mao devised Mao Zedong Thoughts based on Sinification of Marxism, he finally defeated the Wang Ming faction and assumed the ultimate leadership. Because the CCP was formed upon an imported ideology, whoever intended to dominate the party had to obtain the exclusive right of interpreting Marxism. In comparison with Stalin who assumed the ideologic authority by purposefully borrowing certain conceptions and screening out the rest from Marxism, Mao adopted the simplification and sinification approach meaning that Mao would simplify and explain the obscure alien ideology with daily language, often in the slang fashion. For instance, *Qiang Gan Zi Li Mian Chu Zheng Quan* (power coming from the barrel of a gun) and *Zao Fan You Li* (Revolution is Justice) (Gao 2000, p.69). The CCP's factional activities reached a peaceful status after Yan'an Rectification Movement in which Mao's power was consolidated by his ideological dominance and his exclusive control over the party machine and the Red Army. Misra (2002) describes this situation as a hierarchical balance with Mao at the hegemonic position and a few "mountaintops" formed by sub-leaders along the way of revolution. She concluded that any potential move by sub-leader to enlarge his faction would trigger fierce resistance from other mountaintops as well as from the paramount leader, Mao Zedong.

### 5.1.3 Summary

<i>Characteristics Party</i>	<i>Composition &amp; Stability</i>	<i>Extent of Institutionalization</i>	<i>Role of Ideology</i>	<i>Role of Military</i>
<i>CCP</i>	<i>Social elites, small groups; Very unstable</i>	<i>No Institutionalization, Guanxi and Shared background based</i>	<i>Vital component of ultimate leadership Transition from Lenenim to Maoism</i>	<i>Critical</i>
<i>DPP</i>	<i>Social elites, middle size groups; Stable</i>	<i>High: New Tide, Fuliguo League, Justice League Low: Meilidao Faction</i>	<i>Centered on specific issues, e.g., Taiwan Independence, Social movements or election?</i>	<i>Non- existence</i>

Table 4 Comparison of Early Faction Activities between the CCP and the DPP

To summarize, the first stage of the CCP and the DPP factionalism share less similarities than differences. In terms of similarities, factions from the two parties are comprised of social elites, most of them holding college degrees and some of them even graduated from foreign universities. Nevertheless, the differences are more overwhelming: a) due to their respectively distinctive political environments, the formation and disbanding of the CCP factions are more frequent than those of the DPP, hence, the CCP factions are less stable than the DPP factions; b) as to the extent of institutionalization, the DPP factions surpass those of the CCP, which is

owing to the fact that the CCP factions mostly are formed based on *guanxi* or shared background, whereas the DPP factions need a high-extent of institutionalization to succeed in both the intra-party and general elections; c) ideology is a very important element to both factions, it constitutes a vital and indispensable component of ultimate leadership in the CCP factions and transforms into many specific issues in the DPP case, such as Taiwan Independence and opposition strategy; d) while military factor is another critical component to faction power of the CCP, it cannot be found in the DPP factions. Additionally, it is easy to notice that exogenous influence, the Comintern, played a decisive role in the CCP's early factional story, whereas the DPP's factional conflicts mostly revolved around endogenous issues.

## 5.2 Stage Two: Factionalism in the Ruling Stage

Admittedly, the factional balance of DPP collapsed immediately after Chen Shui-bian won the 2000 presidential election (Chen 2012, p.121). Following that, the DPP factions embarked on a process of bandwagon in pursuit of sharing the enormous amount of electoral interests. Chen Shui-bian achieved the dominant power that spanned across the party, government and Legislative Yuan by co-opting these factions. As a result, factions, apart from Chen's Justice League, were greatly contained and factionalism entered into a phase in which factions gathered around Chen to jointly rule the newly gained polity.

In contrast to the tamed factional situation in the DPP, the CCP's factional struggles did not peter out as people would expect in this period, despite the fact that Mao had attained absolute dominant power owing to the Yan'an Rectification Movement and the CCP's epic military victory over the KMT government under his leadership. Rather, factional activities entered into a stage where power struggles and policy disputes frequently broke out under Mao's sole discretion in the early phase and with Deng playing a dominant role in the late period.

In this chapter, my analysis wishes to unravel: 1) how factionalism elicits the best of the DPP's talents who would help smooth over the power transition period before the DPP's first governance, while impeding the institutionalization of the CCP's governance; 2) although faction imbalance leads to power centralization, this comes with a side-effect of damaging the political resilience of the DPP; 3) ultimately, factionalism in this stage, had a subversive influence on the CCP. For relentless factional conflicts facilitated political pluralism that will eventually give rise to China's democratization.



### 5.2.1 Rising of Bian Faction and the DPP's Governing Challenge

As Chen Shui-bian won the presidential election, the hard-earned factional cooperation between the different DPP factions was immediately disrupted. The DPP factionalism ushered in a new chapter as the party, for the first time, assumed the governing right of Taiwan polity. Understandably, Chen Shui-bian's faction, the Justice League faction, became the major beneficiary of the tremendous amount of electoral resources and hastily grew into the most powerful faction. Members of the Justice League faction were rewarded generously: Hsu Tain-tsair won the candidacy for the mayor of Tainan city; Chen Qimai, a disciple of Chen Shui-bian, was assigned to the press spokesman for Taiwan Cabinet, which was considered to be an appealing position for whoever performs its duty would automatically be granted extra media limelight. At one point, the mini-cabinet team from Chen's earlier Taipei mayor days constituted the backbone of the Cabinet (Chen 2012, p. 131).

Moreover, the New Tide faction had already been closely cooperating with Chen Shui-bian since the campaign stage. Members of the New Tide faction were very adept at drafting ideologies and devising effective policies, therefore, Chen Shui-bian valued them greatly. The New Tide faction was gratified with political posts immediately after the presidential victory. For example, a leading figure, Qiu Yiren was appointed to be the Cabinet Secretary. Other factions did not hesitate to bandwagon with Chen Shui-bian in order to seek political reward too. Zhang Junhong, a vital character from the Fuliguo faction assumed the position of Head of Cabinet; You Xikun, head of You faction, became the General Secretary to the presidency. However, the power transition was not an easy process for the DPP. For one, the DPP did not have any administrative experience of managing a semi-sovereign entity, and for two, the DPP was still a minority in the Legislative Yuan with the KMT exerting overwhelming resistance. Xu (2003 p.351-352) precisely pointed out that, although the victory of the DPP declared the collapse of an old political system (in which the KMT had been ruling solely for decades), the DPP was not yet well equipped to establish a new political order. "The DPP's shortage of administrative authority would potentially lead Taiwan into a phase of political and economic turmoil" Xu (2003 p.351-352). To cope with this challenge, it was a strategy of joint governance that Chen Shui-bian and the DPP adopted.

Instead of nominating someone from his party as the first cabinet head, Chen Shui-bian picked Tang Fei who is a senior politician from the KMT. Furthermore, the concept of joint governance was widely enforced with the demographic ratio of civil servants from the two parties being more or less 1:1 in nearly every government

department. In many critical departments, the KMT officials were allowed to keep the leading positions and the DPP officials assumed the vice seats so as to learn how to run the offices from their KMT counterparts. In Liu's research, she classified the process of the DPP's power transition into three stages, namely, high-degree coalition stage in the beginning of the DPP's rule, low-degree coalition stage as the DPP was learning from the experienced KMT, and non-coalition stage when the DPP took over the complete control (2004 p.3-4). Moreover, talents from different factions guaranteed Chen Shui-bian's presidency a smooth transition. Chen made the most of the DPP talent pool by assigning key leaders to do what they most excelled at: Hong Qichang, Wu Nairen, and Qiu Yiren, who were leaders of the New Tide faction, functioned as his political brain because of their extraordinary expertise with political ideology innovations; owing to his seniority in the Legislative Yuan (six-term legislator), Zhang Junxiong, who was a member from the Justice League faction, was appointed to be the cabinet head two times, in 2000 and 2007; the Fuliguo faction leader Xie Changting became the party boss of the DPP because of his rich know-hows of organizing and winning elections.

Not even reaching one complete year since assuming the head of cabinet, Tang Fei was forced into resignation in the "Fourth Nuclear Plant" incident in 2000, which ushered the non-coalition rule of the DPP. At this stage, the DPP's administrative capacity had improved greatly. In the election of Legislative Yuan that took place in the following year, the DPP defeated the KMT and became the majority party by securing 87 seats itself, together with 13 alliance seats from the pro-DPP party Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). Having dominated at the Legislative Yuan, Chen Shui-bian did not hesitate to promote You Xikun, who had an enormous amount of economic expertise, to be the head of cabinet, wishing to boost the sluggish economy and also prepare for a re-election in 2005. Through the distribution of political resources and winning a series of important elections, the Chen Shui-bian faction grew into the most powerful faction, so did Chen's personal power. In April 2002, spurred on by the Justice League faction, an amendment that stipulated president should automatically assume party boss position was passed in one interim all-representative meeting of the DPP. Moreover, the members of CEC and CSC were respectively expanded to 35 and 15. Among the CEC's 15 members, four were "Automatic Members" or *Dang Ran Zhong Chang Wei*, three of whom would be appointed by president and one to be assumed by party the whip in the Legislative Yuan. These changes, which were considered to tailor to Chen Shui-bian's need, empowered Chen to a great extent. Apart from the reasons listed above, it is believed

that the then candidate nomination regulations had also contributed largely to the growth of Chen's faction. The following figures demonstrate this point.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Increase Rate</i>	<i>Votes Percentage</i>	<i>Seats Rate</i>	<i>Balance of Seats Rate</i>	<i>Legislator Nomination Rules</i>
1986	0.04	0.25	0.20	-0.05	Non-exist
1989	0.44	0.30	0.23	-0.07	Party Members Votes
1992	0.51	0.31	0.32	0.01	Party Members Votes
1995	0.02	0.34	0.34	0.00	Evaluation by Party Cadres Accounting for 50%, Voting from Party Members Accounting for 50%
1998	0.38	0.30	0.31	0.01	Evaluation by Party Cadres Accounting for 50%, Voting from Party Members Accounting for 50%
2001	0.00	0.34	0.41	0.07	Evaluation by Party Cadres Accounting for 70%, Voting from Party Members Accounting for 30%
2004	0.00	0.36	0.41	0.07	Evaluation by Party Cadres Accounting for 70%, Voting from Party Members Accounting for 30%
<i>Average</i>	0.13	0.28	0.34	0.06	

Table 5 the DPP Regulations of Legislator Nomination and Election Results from 1986 to 2004 (Hsu & Chen,2007).

Table 5 documented the nomination rules for legislator election and the final election results from 1986 to 2004. When select candidates for legislators, votes from party members and polls constituted 70% and 30% respectively in 2001 and 2004. Understandably, the total party members that have certain factional affiliation became a decisive factor when it came to decide which factions' candidates were eligible to represent the DPP to compete in elections. Owing to that, factions almost unanimously chose to expand their grass-roots members. Convener of the Fuliguo faction, Qiu, estimated that the Justice League affiliated

party members skyrocketed from approximately 20,000 to 200,000 during this period time (See Hsieh's dissertation 2013, 239).

<i>Faction</i>	<i>Numbers of Candidates</i>	<i>Nomination Rate</i>	<i>Numbers of Elected</i>	<i>Rate of Election</i>	<i>Share within all Legislator-at-Large and Overseas Taiwanese Legislators(18 in total)</i>
<i>New Century</i>	7	7/36	2	28.5%	11.11%
<i>New Power</i>	5	5/36	3	60%	16.67%
<i>New Tide</i>	3	3/36	3	100%	16.67%
<i>Justice League</i>	5	5/36	5	100%	27.78%
<i>Fuliguo</i>	6	6/36	3	50%	16.67%
<i>Taiwan Independence Alliance</i>	1	1/36	0	0	0
<i>Non-factional members</i>	2	2/36	2	100%	11.11%

Table 6 Factions Seen in Legislator-at-Large and Overseas Taiwanese Legislators, 2001( Zheng Mingde, 2003).

Table 6 details numbers of seats that different factions won in Legislator-at-large and Overseas Taiwanese Legislator. As it indicates, five candidates from Justice League were nominated and elected, occupying the biggest share 27.78%.

<i>Faction</i>	<i>Numbers of Participants</i>	<i>Numbers of Nomination</i>	<i>Nomination Rate</i>	<i>Share in all Successful Nomination(75 in total)</i>
<i>New Century</i>	5	5	100%	6.67%
<i>New Power</i>	5	2	40%	2.67%
<i>New Tide</i>	22	16	72.73%	21.33%
<i>Justice League</i>	31	29	93.55%	38.67%
<i>Fuliguo</i>	17	12	70.59%	16%
<i>Taiwan Independence Alliance</i>	9	5	55.56%	6.67%
<i>Non-factional members</i>	51	6	11.76%	8%

Table 7 Legislator Nomination as Seen in the DPP Factions in 2001( Zheng Mingde, 2003).

Table 7 shows intra-party candidates nomination before 2001 Legislative Yuan election. Out of 31 the Justice League affiliated candidates 29 won the candidacy, which made up the biggest share, 38.67%, of all qualified candidates.

<i>Faction</i>	<i>Numbers of Candidates</i>
<i>New Tide</i>	25
<i>Fuliguo</i>	19
<i>Justice League</i>	28
<i>Meilidao</i>	5
<i>Non-factional Affiliation</i>	9

Table 8 Factional Affiliation of Legislators in the 6th Legislative Yuan Election in 2004, based on DPP open information and Hsieh's Classification, 2013.

Table 8 contains the numbers of legislators from different factions in 2004 Legislative Yuan election, we can see that Justice League remained the most powerful faction.

In order to emphasize the role of party in governance and also to allow more factions to enjoy the political benefits brought by governance, a series of institutional reforms were made among the party, Legislative Yuan, cabinet, and the presidential office. In the beginning, party central and presidency established "Bian-Chang Meeting" between the president

Chen Shui-bian and the party boss Xie Changting to facilitate coordination. Later, “Party and Government Discussion Meeting” which was comprised by members from party, government and Legislative Yuan was introduced in order to tackle the challenges brought by the “Fourth Nuclear Plant”<sup>3</sup> incident. In the later stage of Chen’s second term, “Nine-person Decision-making Group” that consisted of leaders from factions, party central and Legislative Yuan, functioned as the power-sharing mechanism. As a matter of fact, along with the power consolidation of Chen’s faction, these mechanisms turned less and less important. Chen Shui-bian retained sole dominant authority in all arrangements; to some extent, these groups became the main enforcers of Chen’s policies. As confirmed by the general organizer of the Justice League faction, Qiu Chuizhen, “all these institutional arrangements are meant to endorse Chen Shui-bian, the ultimate decision-making right lies exclusively on A’Bian’s (Chen Shui-bian’s) hand” (Hsieh’s PhD dissertation 2013, 239).

### 5.2.2 Oligarchization of the DPP Factions

Zhan Yizhan, who was the director of the Justice League faction office, summarized the first term of Chen as a period of resource distribution, and the second term as a phase of fighting for the throne, meaning competing for the presidential candidacy that was forthcoming in 2008 (See Zhan’s interview in Hsieh 2013, 231). In the past, factions represented a mechanism that compromises all different groups within the DPP, and also an effective channel of interest distribution. However, this stage of factionalism was swiftly replaced by oligarchization due to two changes in the DPP. One is that the empowerment of the Justice League faction abated the importance of other factions. The other one is that, instead of assigning political resources along the factional line, Chen opted for direct interaction with factional leaders who would take advantage of what they got from Chen to develop their “mountaintops”. Party heavyweights, Su

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<sup>3</sup> The KMT and the DPP hold diametrically attitudes towards nuclear power, especially on the issue whether the fourth nuclear plant should continue operating. A series of anti-nuclear plants were organized by the DPP. A referendum was nearly held in 2013.

Zhenchang, Xie Changting and You Xikun, each captured a host of loyal subordinates using the political interests at their disposal.

The transition from factionalism to oligarchization might have been organic, but an oligarchized DPP jeopardized the effectiveness of governance in many ways. First of all, the incumbent officials would put the interests of their factional leaders before the interests of the government department to which they belong whenever contradictions arose between the two. That dragged down the effectiveness of governance. Secondly, oligarchization caused policy speculations. Mountaintops would not waver to devise many short-term policies to please their constituencies once the vicious competitions were triggered among them. For instance, the party heavyweight Su Zhenchang was caught between petty and superficial societal problems that were cited by newspapers, struggling to come up with solutions that were merely able to cope with symptoms rather than the root causes (See Xie, 2006). Last but not least, oligarchization caused a huge amount of administrative resources to be wasted. The frequent promotions, demotions and transfers of different factional members from one post to another made the training programs, that are designed for new officials, almost futile. In no time, even before the newly appointed official had fully grasped the responsibilities and skills corresponding to the seat, he or she would be replaced by someone without experience from another mountaintop.

Approaching the end of second term, Chen Shui-bian intended to extend his power influence beyond his presidential term within the party, seeking for permanent dominance. In order to do so, he adopted a strategy of balance, as seen in the complete-circle rotation among You Xikun, Su Zhenchang, Xie Changting and Zhang Junxiong, in the position of cabinet head from 2005 to 2008 (see, Executive Yuan Official Site, Republic of China). Moreover, the balancing strategy was also considered to a certain extent as a way of containing these mountaintops (or factions) that the leaders had behind their backs.

### 5.2.3 Precariousness of Power Centralization

Chen (2006) noted that little by little a mechanism of co-existence, that relied on sharing interests, formed between Chen Shui-bian and the rest of the factions within DPP. In this mechanism, factional elites were contracted by Chen Shui-bian's mesh of interests. A hierarchical semi-patron-client relationship was formed, with Chen Shui-bian being the paramount patron at the top, which crippled the tradition of intra-party democracy of the DPP. That means that no one in the system could perform the duty of checks and balances on Chen Shui-bian any more. As a result, the resilience of the DPP as a whole was greatly undermined, for the entire party's fate was exclusively dependent on Chen Shui-bian's personal political ups and downs. As an individual politician has the tendency to fail the voters' expectations, the DPP was effectively entrapped by Chen Shui-bian. Unfortunately, Chen Shui-bian did not survive the corruption test. The "Chen Family Corruption" case surfaced in November 2006, which stormed the Taiwan political world and hit the DPP hard (Chen, 2011).

Chen's corruption storm hit DPP from within, which triggered a series of mysterious changes, including splintering of the New Tide faction that was famous for unity, as well the disbandment of all factions. As the case of Chen Shui-bian's corruption was developing, the dormant factional struggle was awakened. Facing the fierce criticism and "Red Tide Anti-Corruption Protest" campaign from the KMT and Chen Shui-bian's political rivals, 11 legislators of the DPP, that consisted of 7 members of the New Tide faction, 3 members from the Justice League faction, and 1 Chen's loyal disciple, not only did not respond, they even went along with these anti-Chen Shui-bian movements. That antagonized the so-called "deep green" party members who were mostly pro-Chen Shui-bian. The 11 members were labelled as the "Eleven Renegades" or *Shi Yi Kou* and isolated by pro-Chen Shui-bian factions. All of them failed to be nominated to represent the DPP and participate in the 7th Legislative Yuan election in 2008 due to the "anti-Blue Polls" that strictly invalidated any interviewees who had voted for the KMT before. The New Tide faction were greatly



belittled by losing seven seats in Legislative Yuan and splintered (Chen, 2011).

Moreover, in order to protect the vested interests centering around Chen Shui-bian, Chen's political alliances proposed to disband factions. The proposal was surprisingly passed without experiencing much resistance in the All-Representative Assembly. As Chinatimes (2006) reported after the proposal was passed, the justification for disbandment of factions was that "the DPP lacked effective governance rather than intra-party democracy", which precisely mirrored the reality that power concentration surrounding Chen Shui-bian jeopardized the DPP's political resilience. One person's misconduct would inculcate the whole organization. As Shih (2007, p.95) readily summarized the party politics during this phase, "Taiwanese politics has for a long time been dominated by elections, personalities and ideologies rather than policies, issues and substantial debates...".

The power of Chen Shui-bian and his faction was diminished due to his corruption case, once again the DPP returned to a status that did not have any dominant faction. Following that, a full-out factional struggle broke out, eventually concluding in the All-Representative Assembly in July 2006 with the CEC and CSC seats being evenly distributed to the Su Zhenchang faction, the New Tide faction, the Green Friendship Union faction, and the Xie Changting faction. Out of all the factional leaders, Su Zhenchang and Xie Changting grew into the most powerful ones. They were to compete with each other for the presidential candidacy in 2008.

#### 5.2.4 the Revolutionary Mentality in the Reconstruction Stage

Similar with the DPP, the CCP entered into a stage of governing the whole China for the first time after ousting the nationalist regime, yet the power that Mao enjoyed was something beyond Chen Shui-bian's imagination, Mao's power was absolute. The power Mao had gathered at the Yan'an Rectification Movement peaked when the Mao-led red army drove out the nationalist government and established PRC. Fairbank (1992, p.441) holds that equating Mao to Chinese ancient emperors is an

easier way for people to fully understand the power that he had at his disposal at that time. China was in a state of total catastrophe after decades of war, what lay in front of Mao and his comrades was a difficult task of reconstruction and economy development. To give a better sense of how difficult this responsibility must have been, a number of marshals had little knowledge apart from how to defeat their enemies on the battlefield. What made the task even more difficult was that Mao, as the paramount leader, had not adjusted his class-struggle mentality to a nation-building one. In fact, he would keep a revolutionary mind until the very end of his life.

It turned out that Mao's governance, which was based upon loyalty (Huang,2000), was incompatible with the economy's development which required certain degree of institutionalization and respect of rules. Mao's insistence on a series of irrational economic policies, such as the Great Leap Forward (GLF) led to disastrous aftermath causing tens of millions of casualties. All these catastrophic policies were to blame for the huge problems that were brewing, including marshal Peng Dehuai's purge and the CR that were to come before long.

Albeit, Mao being the dominant figure, the factions within the CCP did not cease to exist, rather they entered into a dormant status, waiting for the appropriate time to resurface. As a matter of fact, military factions naturally became structurally more robust after decades of fighting shoulder to shoulders with one another. Mao once jokingly called the military factions "*Gefang Zhouhou*" meaning powerful warlords from all over China. Mao viewed this, together with Liu Shaoqi's power expansion, as two great threats. Liu Shaoqi was appointed to be the party leader in charge of party affairs for Mao starting from the Yan'an era. Naturally Liu's reputation and authority would grow as time went by. Mao devised one solution with two purposes which were both to refrain the military mountaintops and to contain Liu Shaoqi. Mao ingeniously broke the factional structure and realized power redistribution among factions by transferring military marshals from their respective field armies that spans all over China to Beijing. This move unavoidably set the stage ready for factional conflicts between the newcomers and the ones who were already in Beijing,

specifically Mao's threat, Liu Shaoqi. In the Gao-Rao incident, prior to CR, Mao deliberately misled the newcomer marshal Gao Gang to pick on Liu Shaoqi, however, when Gao intended to mobilized his military influence Mao "backstabbed" Gao. In an enlarged Politburo meeting, Mao sarcastically bashed Gao by claiming there existed another "commanding center" (or *Si Ling Bu*) headed by Gao in Beijing in 1953(Gao, 2000).

During the primary stage of governance, Mao tried to control all aspects of decision-making, however, he quickly relinquished such a fruitless effort after he realized that the amount of governing workload was beyond an individual's capacity. Therefore, Mao retreated to the send-front, overseeing the general affairs by distributing responsibilities to several senior officials: Liu Shaoqi continuing performing his management of the party business; Zhou Enlai taking care of government; and the Central Military Committee (CMC) being managed by several key marshals. That constituted the so-called "two-front" arrangement (Gao, 2000).

#### 5.2.5 the "Two-front" Arrangement and "Successor Dilemma"

Although, the "two-front" arrangement might have successfully set Mao free from the tremendous burden of petty office work, it also came with a side-effect that Mao later had to battle with. Huang (2000, p.14) identified an intricate contradiction within this arrangement. Despite the fact that the sub-leaders who were entrusted to manage different affairs by Mao proved their loyalty, their political careers tended to rely only incrementally on the actual results of the policies that the department which he was in charge of had been carrying out rather than on Mao's sole confidence. As there pre-existed differences regarding specific policies between Mao and his first-front sub-leaders, eventually a wedge was driven in between. These sub-leaders grew closer and closer due to their common interests that had been developed during their respective administrative experiences and also because of their shared experience defying Mao's will. Consequently, a sense of power invalidation caught Mao. To reclaim the power that he thought he had lost, Mao chose to look for support from outside of the establishment or by establishing new institutions, for example, the Cultural

Revolution Group (CRG), headed by Jiang Qing, was formed to execute Mao's will in the beginning of the CR in 1965.

As the CR unfolded, Mao's sense of being threatened by the party system aggregated. This time, Mao did not hesitate to purge Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping who were in charge of the party machine. However, the fall of Liu and Deng meant that the party shackle on the factional struggle was removed. Since then, CCP politics started a severely bloody phase of factional struggles. Marshal Lin Biao was chosen to be Mao's ally and heir apparent due to his orthodox origin of military from the revolution period and his deep-rooted power base in the Red Army by Mao. However, after Lin Biao gained dominant control in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) by expanding the fierce CR to military, Mao was forced into a "successor dilemma" that the more powerful the chosen successor becomes the less secured the incumbent leader would feel (Huang, 2000). Surprisingly, before Mao got a chance to showdown on Lin, the latter bizarrely "defected" and crashed when flying to Moscow. Mao faced a dire situation in which no capable leaders were helpful to him. The CRG could not be relied on, for its entire power hinged upon Mao's patronage, and it did not have any legitimate access to military and party, either. Without Mao's patronage, its influence was merely trivial in the party politics (Huang, 2000).

It was under such a context that Zhou Enlai reentered Mao's political vision. He was assigned to deal with the aftermath caused by Lin Biao's defection. By finishing cleaning up Lin Biao's mess, Zhou Enlai proved himself again to Mao that he was a loyal and competent executive of Mao's will. In addition, Zhou also had access to both party and military just like Mao did. Again, Mao grew paranoid. When Zhou's prominence provoked Mao's suspicion, Mao brought Deng back into the game to contain Zhou's expanding clout. He did this as Deng, too, had connections both in military and in party line, and moreover, had always had Mao's trust.

### 5.2.6 the Power Paradigm in the CCP Politics

This period in the CR qualified Goldstein's definition of power balancing theory (1991). "No faction will be able to achieve overwhelmingly superior power", as Nathan noted (1973, p.66). The falls of Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, and Deng Xiaoping mirrored what constituted the base of ultimate political power, namely, the command of military and the ideological dominance. Military power is a form of coercive force functioning as an intimidation before being put into enforcement, which was best manifested in Mao's famous remark "power comes from the barrel of a gun" or "*Qiang Ganzi Li Chu Zhengquan*". In terms of the role of ideology, despite scholars of Chinese politics concurring that it bears great importance to the CCP, how and in what ways it is critical is not sufficiently studied. Brown (2012) noted that ideology is crucial to the CCP in two aspects: 1) it offered the CCP a justification for revolution at the time when China was in chaos; 2) it facilitates compromise and agreements during peaceful governing periods. Apparently, Mao was like a prophet for he seized the pulse of the era in which people were desperate for a modern sovereign that would not tolerate being bullied by the western imperialists. He was also well aware that pure imported ideology from the Soviet Union would not be appealing to the majority of party members and more importantly the masses. In reality it was the sinicized version of Marx-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thoughts, that helped him claimed the ideological high ground over all his contestants. In contrast, Deng never held any ideological advantage over his rivals in the party. That explained why factional conflicts during Deng's rule became less violent. Deng was often forced to compromises whenever factions could not reach agreements, largely owing to his weakness in the ideological aspect.

The paradigm of power base that Mao had invented, military command and ideological dominance, was inherited by party leaders in the leadership generations to come, from Deng, to Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, to Xi Jinping. Over the generations, however, the nature and content of ideology per se had changed greatly. I will come back to this point in next

chapter using Franz Schurmann categorization of ideology (1968, p.18-24).

### 5.2.7 Deng's Relative Weakness and Factionalism Eroding Legitimacy

After Mao's death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping ousted Mao's designated successor Hua Guofeng by invalidating his "Two Whatevers"<sup>4</sup>. Deng filled the power void left by Mao. As mentioned above, Deng did not attain ideological dominance like Mao did, what he had under his absolute control was the PLA. Indeed, Deng had to compromise on the ideological front with his rivals by jointly issuing the so-called "Four Cardinal Principles" or *Si Xiang Ji Ben Yuan Ze* that consists of upholding the socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the CCP, Marxism-Leninism and Mao Thought. The "Four Cardinal Principles", built upon Mao's legacy, utterly denied Deng the possibility of innovating ideology. Therefore, Deng's position would always be inferior to Mao's no matter what he achieved. Huang (2000, p.22) discovered that factional conflicts broke out frequently and were particularly flammable in Deng's relatively weak domain, ideology. For whoever gained an upper hand in the ideological bout would have a better chance to pass the policies that he favored. There was also a generational dissolution on the individual party elitist level from Mao-in-command to Deng-in-command in regards to ideology. Having gone through the catastrophic CR, the new generation became less passionate about ideology than about being practical.

All in all, factions at this stage agreed almost unanimously that the priority of the CCP was to salvage its crippled ruling legitimacy. Deng had the right formula for this, economic development. Consequently, factional struggles flowed into the decision-making of economic policies, which was responsible for the "incomplete reform" as Dittmer noted in 1990s. Huang (2000, p.24) also discovered that the interests of various political groups

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<sup>4</sup> The "Two Whatevers" (simplified Chinese: 两个凡是; traditional Chinese: 兩個凡是; pinyin: Liǎng gè fán shì) refers to the statement that "We will resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave" (凡是毛主席作出的决策, 我们都坚决维护; 凡是毛主席的指示, 我们都始终不渝地遵循). The policy was advocated by the Communist Party of China chairman Hua Guofeng, Mao's successor, who had earlier ended the Cultural Revolution and arrested the Gang of Four. However, this policy proved unpopular with Deng Xiaoping and other party leaders advocating market reform.

cannot be represented whenever there existed a dominant force. The divergence from the paramount leader's will is, to a certain extent, an indirect way of expressing their political demands by different political groups led by sub-leaders. Unavoidably, factional conflicts often erupted between the paramount leader and his sub-leaders. On the contrary, when the factions co-existed in a status of balance, meaning no particular person has overwhelmingly clout over the rest, such as in the middle of 1960s and post-1989, the CCP would always score in the economic front. As the Reform and Opening up deepened, political pluralism began to thrive. Compromises reached between factions enabled those plural interest groups to be represented, eventually, Huang hinted that factionalism in the CCP would bring democratization to China.

Nevertheless, the ruler and the ruled are each others' antithesis in the Political Science world, hence, it is safe to say that what is good for the ruled, democratization in this case, can only be detrimental to the ruler, the CCP. Factionalism would cause indefinite power struggles that led to ineffective governance, military "mountaintopization" as well as the distortion of good policies. Chronic factional bouts would eventually lead party members to ideological disillusion. The legitimacy of the ruler would only expect to be grinded to nil in the end.

### 5.2.8 Comparing the Two Factionalisms in the Ruling Stage

There are two common characteristics of the factionalism the two parties share in this stage: 1) the two kept similar factional structures. Chen, Mao and Deng occupied a dominant position with the rest of the factions underneath them. In the DPP case, factional structure first went through a process of centralization, then turned oligarchized. Despite the frequent and violent factional struggles, Mao was able to contain all factions. He was simultaneously the referee and perpetrator of all factional conflicts. Factional struggle attained civility during Deng's rule, however, it kept haunting the CCP in the domains of economy and ideology owing to the fact that Deng never achieved ideological dominance! 2) Institutionalization functions as an effective way to power strengthening.

Chen Shui-bian extended his power in the government to the DPP with the passing of the “President-Party Boss” clause. Similarly, institutionalization as seen in the case of CCP was also an indispensable part to the power base of the DPP. The “Nine-person Decision-making Group” legitimized other factions to claim their own share of the rich political resources. The fact that Mao preferred court rule did not affect the amount of power that the political elitists possessed was partly due to the power that was granted to them by their posts in the functioning institutions, such as party organs and military institutions. This point was particularly obvious in the CMC. Both Lin Biao and Deng obtained solid power after they have gained control of the PLA, Lin being the only vice president of the CMC and Deng maintaining the title of president of the CMC until his death. Lin Biao's zealous insistence that Mao should remain in the post of president also reflected the importance of institution, for Lin Biao would lose his only official title in the government, the vice president, if Mao abdicated from his position as China's president (Huang 2012).

There are also two apparent differences in regards to the two factionalisms. One is that their origins of power varies. Compared with the CCP, the DPP operates in an open democratic system, which means that the power of factions can either originate from official appointment or elections (including senior party positions election, Legislator election, and governmental positions elections). In contrast, as the CCP is the only ruling party in China, the origins of factional power unanimously follows the paradigm initiated by Mao, namely, the command of military and the ideological dominance. The other difference is that factionalism has the opposite effect on the administrative effectiveness of the two parties. At the beginning of its first governing experience, factionalism helped the DPP go through the transition period smoothly, in which talents from different factions contributed their respective strengths. Later, as the factions moved towards oligarchization many detrimental effects emerged, such as policy speculations and the waste of administrative resources (Chen, 2011). Factionalism brought disastrous consequences to the CCP governance during Mao-in-command period, and brought about the “incomplete reform” when Deng was in charge.



To summarize, factionalism impacted the two parties very differently during the ruling period for both the DPP and the CCP. In the case of the DPP, factionalism elicited the best talents from different factions, together they innovated institutions, made practical developmental policies and won elections. However, power centralization of Chen Shui-bian diminished the intra-party democracy tradition, which undermined the resilience of party. Factionalism as seen in the CCP caused discontinuity of policies, ineffective governance, ideology disillusion, and eventually endangered the ruling legitimacy of the CCP.

### 5.3 the Making of Xi Party and Tsai Faction

In this chapter, I fast forward to present. Through concentrating on two dominant leaders, i.e., Xi Jinping and Tsai Ing-wen, analyzing how they have achieved power and the initiatives they have been championing, two very recent factional stories would be presented. Then, I plan to measure similarities and differences between the two factionalisms in current political reality.

#### 5.3.1 Factional Evolvement of the DPP in the Second Opposition Stage

After the landslide defeat in 2008 presidential election, the power configuration of the DPP faced the fate of a reshuffle. Factionalism of the DPP had come to a point where an intergenerational transition was inevitable, which would understandably alter factional structure that entails the mechanism of intra-party interests distribution and election strategy. It was in such a pivotal moment that Tsai Ing-wen who came from the technocrat background with no obvious factional affiliation was elected to be the new party boss. What lied in front of Tsai Ing-wen were two tricky tasks: cleaning up the mess left by Chen Shui-bian and leading the dispirited DPP to win as many elections as they could. The DPP was suffering in many fronts in the beginning of its second opposition stage. The deprivation of administration right due to election defeat, the brewing of Chen Shui-bian's corruption scandal as well as the ferocious factional conflicts caused by these two causes are all to blame for precipitous drop

of the DPP's approval rate. On paper, factions were all disbanded in 2006. But, in reality, factions persisted. Instead of existing in the original institutionalized form, they were operating covertly using the banners of different think tanks or political offices. For instance, shortly after the disbandment of the New Tide faction, Taiwan New Society Think Tank (TNST) was established which was comprised of nearly the same members with the New Tide faction; New Future Think Tank (NFTT) was believed to be the embodiment of Su Zhenchang faction. Nevertheless, Huang (2017) noted that those think tanks were at most loose political alliances between elite politicians, in terms of formality and rules-binding they were far behind factions.

As demonstrated above, factions experienced oligarchization during Chen's terms. Correspondingly, binding mechanism between factions and its members and the way faction interacts with one another changed, too. Tracing back to the budding phase of the DPP factionalism, despite that factions possessed the characteristics of institutionalization, they were nonetheless rather erratic due to low extent of trustiness and loyalties within the factions (Lin 2012). Factions cooperate with factions; members of faction work equally with other members from the same faction. They shared a common goal that is democratizing Taiwan, which bound them together in a cooperative manner. Immediately after Chen Shui-bian was elected, such an equal relation started transforming into the patron-client form that was based upon interests distribution, which suited seamlessly well with the oligarchized factions. Presumably, the binding mechanism has reversed to the cooperative theme during the period of time when Tsai Ing-wen acts as the party boss, as was already illustrated by new factionalism evolvments within the party, such as how Tsai herself recruited Chen Shui-bian faction members and co-opted members from the New Tide faction.

As to the power configuration of different factions, it was in this period that the political power of the DPP founders including the Meilidao generation and the Meilidao civil rights lawyers quickly weakened. On the contrary, young technocrat generation such as Tsai Ing-wen and Lai Qingde began to rise. For example, in the municipal election that was held

in 2010, apart from Su Zhenchang and Chen Ju, two prominent founders of the DPP, the rest of candidates were all from the new generation. Lin (2016) identified that this new generation shared a myriad of traits, they have similar political beliefs; they mostly come from a technocrat background, either were practicing law or used to be disciples of senior politicians. Same background and political experience bind them closely together. In strikingly contrast with that the new generation widely expanded their political turf, the political seniors were losing strengths at an even faster speed. The corruption accusation dragged Chen Shui-bian down, the loss of a general election means he no more had affluent political resources. The rest of party tycoons, Su Zhenchang, Xie Changting, You Xikun were deeply entrenched in the interests mesh weaved by Chen during the past eight years as discussed in stage two, Chen's fall resultantly brought them down. In other words, Chen's political incompetence escalated the intergenerational renewal.

This intergenerational transition created a power void, which was filled by Tsai using party boss position as an inlet towards faction politics. Tsai recruited a number of capable figures from other factions along the way accomplishing a few successful elections; Tsai faction started taking shape. Concerned with the disunity of the party, Tsai insisted that Tsai faction should not be an exclusive political force, rather, it encapsulates every practitioners and every dreamer in Taiwan (Tsai, 2015).

### 5.3.2 Factors behind the DPP Factional Evolvments

In retrospect, Chen's corruption case had a great impact on the power structure of the DPP factions. On the party level, the core values as well as the political ambition of the DPP, which includes "integrity", "indigenous", were shattered. As the KMT completed the transition from a Chinese nationalist party to a Taiwanese nationalist party, the DPP lost its exclusive right of claiming to be "indigenous". In addition, Chen's corruption case also divided the DPP into two opposite camps, one side calling for thorough reflection and reform and the other side claiming it was a case of political purge. Furthermore, it was to be believed that the DPP became a

minority party in the Legislative Yuan had also pounded the factional configuration greatly. Lin Gang (2012) identified the institutional reasons of the DPP factional power transition with the changes of election rules. The reason that the DPP is very factionalized is due to that the non-transferable voting system is adopted to select party leadership. Moreover, before the reform on Legislative Yuan election, the multiple seats in one district arrangement is believed to be beneficial to middle-size factions. Later, when the Legislative Yuan elections adopted the one-seat district solution and the candidacy selection became purely based upon public approval rate as shown in polls, the factional cooperation was encouraged. However, to a certain extent factional cooperation was compromised by factional competition that was brought about by the intra-party leadership selection and “Legislator-at-Large” nomination in which factional linkage play the vital role.

### 5.3.3 Road to Taiwan President

Tsai’s attitude towards Chen Shui-bian and his political legacy was regarded irresolute and hesitant by both pro-Chen and anti-Chen camps (Chen, 2011). On the one hand, she tried to prevent any manipulation from Chen Shui-bian in the DPP politics. For example, in the case of mayor and county chief election in 2009, Tsai wittily substituted the candidate favored by Chen with Li Junyi for Tainan county. On the other hand, Tsai also called for Ma Ying-jeou to grant Chen amnesty in multiple occasions. However, Chen did not appreciate these overtures from Tsai, for by law amnesty means that Chen would have admitted that he had committed a crime in the first place. That was far from what Chen had been claiming, not guilty. Tsai’s irresolute attitude towards Chen and his political legacy is rather comprehensible. What Chen had left at that point was a semi-patron-client mechanism which encapsulated nearly all party members including Tsai Ing-wen herself. That means that almost everyone at some point was a beneficiary of Chen’s political favors. Whoever rashly levels the gun to Chen Shui-bian would automatically render himself/herself the antithesis of the whole party. Tsai adopted a soft and gradual approach to

clean up Chen's political legacy. On the party level, she skillfully induced pressure coming from society and from within the party to push through reforming the DPP (Chen 2012). To the factions, she recruited members from Chen's faction as her strategists and the "shadow cabinet" while cooperating with other factions.

#### 5.3.3.1 Back to Streets, Boosting Supportive Rate

Facing the dilemma caused by occupying only a small portion of seats in the Legislative Yuan, Tsai had to take it back to the street, namely, the DPP readopted the long-relinquished social movement strategy. 2009 was declared to be "the year of social movement" by Tsai; the DPP rehung the billboard of Social Movement department that had not been used since 1996. The social movement strategy calls for the DPP to mobilize as many people as possible to go to the street to force the ruling government to make concessions in respect to certain policies that are favored by the DPP and its supporters taking the measures including protests, strikes, sometimes low-degree violence. In other words, the DPP tried to have the biggest say in making policy decisions even though it was the minority in the Legislative Yuan.

According to Chen's analysis (2012, p.25), the DPP's resorting to social movement had its justifications in different aspects: first, in the time when party confidence was at its historically low point, social mobilization can effectively combat depression and lift the spirit; second, the intense rivalry between the ruling party KMT and the DPP diverted public attention from Chen's corruption to other practical matters, which was considered beneficial to the party as a whole. By taking it to street, the DPP was able to both dominate conversations centering around specific policies and excise power. The effectiveness of social movements strategy was hard to measure. But, Chen (2012) did not think much of it because he held that the political ambience in post-Chen Shui-bian era was diametrically different from the era when Taiwan was a one-party authoritarian regime, i.e., the early days of the DPP. The reality was that Taiwan has been democratized, regular citizens started detaching themselves from social movements.

In addition, Tsai also modified DPP's deconstructive China policy. Before 2012, Tsai Ing-wen's China policy can be summarized as "Taiwan Consensus" which denies "92 Consensus", and regarded "Taiwan Future Resolution" clause as the bottom line and insisted China to treat Taiwan as an equal sovereign. However, Tsai and the DPP were defeated by the KMT in the election in 2012, which forced them to the realization that "Taiwan Consensus" was to blame as the biggest obstacle on the way to power. When Tsai restored the party boss in 2014, she reevaluated Cross-Strait relations and substituted the previous China policy with one that emphasizes "Maintaining the Status Quo". The DPP's attitude towards "92 Consensus" which is regarded as China's bottom line to Taiwan was toned down by Tsai. Tsai claimed that the DPP respect historical facts. The formation of DPP's China policy is a joint result of compromise between factions (Wu 2016). It is widely accepted that there existed diverse opinions regarding Taiwan independence among factions, some factions have been vehemently calling for an immediate Taiwan independence from China and others preferred a more constructive resolution that does not provoke China and jeopardize Taiwanese economy. Tsai's China policy absorbed suggestions from different factions, for example, she adopted Xie Changting's "One China Constitution" and reached an agreement with New Tide on "Temperate Independence". Owing to her rich hands-on working experience in the economic sector before becoming a full-time politician, Tsai formed her own China policy preference. She was fully aware the profound reliance that Taiwanese economy has on Chinese economy, so she infused the idea that when dealing with China politics and economy should be dealt separately into the DPP's China policy.

The DPP has always been constrained by its dire fundraising capacity competing with the KMT for elections in past years; the latter often overwhelmed the former with the large amount of assets that Chiang family brought to Taiwan when they fled mainland China after the civil war. This challenge would automatically fell on the party boss Tsai Ing-wen's shoulder. Tsai ingeniously devised the "Three Little Pigs" initiative that successfully collected an enormous amount of money by distributing large

quantity of piggy banks to individual supporters during the 2012 election. Eventually, “Three Little Pigs” received 140,000 donations in total, which was 86.9% of all political donation that the DPP had collected. In comparison, Ma Ying-jeou only had 11,000 donations. But Ma still managed to financially outweighed Tsai with the tremendous amount of injection from the KMT party asset. By collecting small donations from large amount of constituents, Tsai not only solved the election funds problem, she also assured the DPP that they had wide support from a great many voters. That contributed decisively to her power consolidation in the DPP factional politics. “Three Little Pigs” initiative was extended to her personal political base after 2012 election, she formed “THINKINGTAIWAN” foundation which is an organization that helps train young party members and draft social policies. Later, this small sum donation initiative proved again its value in the 2016 presidential election in which Tsai finally won the president office.

#### 5.3.3.2 The Composition of Tsai faction

Two forces, the established party elites who were already active in the party politics and the newcomers who were cultivated by Tsai, make up the so-called Tsai faction. When Tsai decided to participate in the Xinbei city mayor election, many factions from the DPP loaned political forces to Tsai. The calculation behind such a generous overture from other factions is that they could expand their power base by helping Tsai win elections. However, Tsai took this great opportunity to develop formal and informal relationship with those political elites. In the end, Tsai convinced them to join her camp. Those included the backbones of the Justice League Su Jiaquan, Liu Jianqi and Chen Qimai. In addition, initiatives that aims at training young party members such as “Democratic Hope 2014 Youth Participation” and “Youth Congress” illustrated that Tsai was also devoted to fostering young members. Eventually, the concept of Tsai faction officially surfaced right before the 2016 election. In order to win the election, factions voluntarily gathered around Tsai, the DPP unity was formed again, with Tsai Ying-wen as the core this time. The unity of the DPP was particularly well mirrored in the final sheet of “Legislator-at-

Large” which is usually considered the most fractured arena for intra-party politics. It turned out to be a list that was free from factional bargain and manipulation. Ostensibly, the DPP reached a status that “everyone belongs to Tsai faction” (Tsai, 2015).

The formation of Tsai faction is a result of factional compromise. Tsai faction members situated at the middle of Tsai faction and other factions in the political spectrum, which required that they have to show loyalty simultaneously to both Tsai faction and their original factions. Scholar Hu Wensheng (2012 p.106) noted that this double allegiance resulted into a power balance between Tsai faction and other factions within the DPP.

In reality this balance is rather fragile, when subjected to external pressure, it can fall into pieces in no time. Currently, Tsai Ing-wen is experiencing an ineffective administration, a sluggish economy growth and a chilly relationship with China. In recent years, newly-emerged middle-left political forces such as New Power Party (NPP) and Taipei mayor Ke Wen-zhe are nibbling away DPP’s constituency emanating great pressure upon Tsai. In the diplomatic front, Tsai’s “temperate Taiwan independence” policy antagonized Beijing. As a revenge, Beijing instigated the long-suspended diplomatic extrusion strategy, and Taiwan’s diplomatic partners decreased from 24 to 20 since Tsai took office. In order to lessen Taiwan’s economic dependence on China, Tsai launched the so-called “New Southbound Policy” wishing to engage more Southeast Asian countries economically. But the result of this policy was meager (Zhou, 2018). At present, there are a few new evolvments from within the DPP that ratcheted up the pressure on Tsai’s shoulder. Firstly, new factional force that is represented by local government chiefs from municipal cities and large counties starts entering into the DPP power center. This diverges from the traditional model of how factional leaders are generated. As Chen and Wen noted (2017), because the DPP did not have access to the localities factions existed almost only in the party central in the earlier days. As the Taiwanese democratization deepened, more and more sub-national elections were allowed, which created perfect breeding ground for local leaders to expand their power bases, using the rich and exclusive political resources at their disposals. There are a few newly-emerged



factions centering around municipal governors within the DPP now. Comparing with the old generations, these factional leaders are physically younger but not without rich political experiences. The image that they have created is passionate, practical and caring on the mind of their respective constituencies. Some of them included the mayor of Taizhong city, Lin Jialong, previous mayor of Tainan city Lai Qingde, now the cabinet boss. In the case of Lai Qingde, his political career in Taiwan was so successful that there have been voices from the DPP and society calling for him to join in the 2020 presidential election as a candidate, which is seen as a direct threat to Tsai Ing-wen, hence a successor dilemma to the DPP politics. To mitigate the threat from Lai Qingde, Tsai had to uplift him from Tainan and put him in charge of the government. Moreover, the newly-emerged middle-left political forces also have an impact on the factional structure of the DPP. The DPP factions still could not reach agreement on how to deal with Ke Wenzhe, the mayor of Taiwan capital Taipei, whose successful election in 2014 was considered impossible without the support of the DPP. At time of writing the DPP still has not decide who would be the candidate for Taipei mayor, or whether or not there will even be one. That is all because Ke Wenzhe has grown too powerful, a bitter defeat would likely to fall on whoever represents the DPP to compete with him.

It is safe to say that once again factions within the DPP are in a status of balance centering around Tsai. Comparing with the time when Chen Shui-bian was simultaneously the president and party boss, Tsai's power is obviously weaker despite that she enjoys the same power arrangement. The reason to this are of twofold: one is that many of Tsai faction members are in the same time members of other factions too, which means Tsai does not have exclusive control over any of them; two, after the devastation caused by Chen's power centralization, the DPP becomes more democratic when it comes to the decision-making on candidate nomination and party leadership election. Ultimately, a weakened political head who is at the same time president of Taiwan and party boss is resulted as the deepening of Taiwan democratization.

### 5.3.4 The Making of Xi-party

When Xi Jinping took over the power from his predecessor in the 18th Party Congress in 2012, what he faced was a party that was fraught with epidemic corruption, factional struggles and gerontocracy. Among all the tricky problems, Xi chose to clean up factions that had been left by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, invalidated gerontocracy and the old successor selection mechanism. Fighting against factions is also an initiative of power centralization for Xi Jinping. Before diving into the details of how Xi Jinping use anti-graft campaign to self-strengthen his power, let us review what evolvments the CCP factionalism has made.

#### 5.3.4.1 Factionalism during Jiang's and Hu's rule

To certain extent, Jiang resembled what Tsai was to the DPP in the devastated defeat in 2008 in the political incident that happened almost 30 years ago to the CCP. They both came from a technocrat background and were both adept with dealing political crisis. Most importantly, none of them had formed their factional base. Jiang's power was effectively constrained by party seniors despite that he had two paramount titles, namely, the party general secretary and the chairman of CMC, under his belt. The amount of power that was at his disposal was decided by Deng's gerontocracy. Deng seized this precious window and introduced institutionalization to the party politics, for example, the selection of successor, and routine retirement. Some of Deng's legacy are still exerting influence till today.

After comparing the institutionalization between Mao-in-command and Deng-in-command, Huang (2008, p.86-87) concluded that Jiang's power relied completely on institutionalized arrangement. In the beginning of political institutionalization, Deng forced party seniors into retirement by installing new regulations. Then Deng picked Jiang Zemin as the new leader, five years later, in the 14th Party Congress Hu Jintao was erected as hair apparent after Jiang. According to Deng's vision, the power of the CCP supreme leader is based upon the "three-in-one" and "first among equals" arrangement. The former represents the notion that the leader

should assume three official positions, president of PRC, general secretary of the party machine, and the chairman of CMC; the latter emphasizes the principle of “intra-party democracy” by putting the supreme leader at the superior position of all PSC members. These two arrangements reflected the power paradigm as I have demonstrated in the earlier chapters. Assuming the chairman of CMC means that the supreme leader is entitled to exercise military power if he wishes to; he is not qualified to be the president of PRC and general secretary of the party without charting his own ideological innovations to the party constitution.

As the primary beneficiary of Deng’s political institutionalization, Jiang upheld these regulations and made the most use of them. For instance, he forced his main political rival Qiao Shi into retirement in 1997 using these rules. Dittmer (2003) held that there was little divergence in ideology and policies in this stage between Jiang Zemin and other faction leaders, which makes it rather difficult to identify specific factions. However, following what have been agreed by the media and Chinese politics observers (for example, *dwnews*, *VOA*, *Huang Jing*, *Bo Zhiyue*, etc.), I manage to come up with some general faction classifications. During Jiang’s tenure there were the Jiang faction, Li Peng’s power faction (whose members controlled China’s energy and electricity industry) and Youth League faction. The Jiang faction was comprised of Shanghai gang (politicians who have served or are working in Shanghai) and many high officials in whose careers Jiang played the master patron, for instance, Zeng Qionghong who was a long-time subordinate of Jiang since Shanghai era, the party boss of Shanghai Huang Ju, and Wu Bangguo who was a member of PSC and the chairman of National Political Consultative Conference (NPCC) at that time. In summary, Jiang’s faction was characterized with favoring protégées and localism.

When the power was handed to Hu Jintao in 2002, factions within the CCP experienced a slight reshuffle. Generally speaking, the biggest difference was that Jiang Zemin’s power was greatly weakened, even though he extended his control of the military for another two years and assigned his disciples to many crucial positions before he retreated into full retirement. While political institutionalization helped Jiang consolidate his

power in the early days, it also effectively refrained Jiang's power from lingering on. Jiang's political clout quickly eroded once he stepped down completely. After all, different from Mao and Deng, whose paramount power grew out of their personal authority rather than from the official positions they were in charge of, Jiang's power was hinged ultimately upon the offices he oversees. Without these official titles corresponding with these offices, he was essentially powerless. Indeed, the Jiang faction members in the new PSC failed to serve as his power agent, for their political well-beings were not so much decided by their erstwhile patron as by the incumbent supreme leader Hu Jintao. "Jiang's alleged protégés do not need him to remain politically powerful. Rather, it is Jiang himself who must count on their continuous support if he wishes to extend his relevance in policymaking."; "What really matters to Jiang's former protégés is how, and by what means, they can strike a bargain with the current "Big Brother" in charge, Hu Jintao", marked Huang (2008, p.91).

Under such circumstances, Hu Jintao inherited the power without experiencing much difficulties, becoming the "first among equals". Nevertheless, similar to what Tsai Ing-wen had encountered, Hu's power base was feebler in comparison with that of Jiang's, which was epitomized by the fact that Hu never achieved the "Core" title.

"The term core can perhaps best be understood as that combination of informal and formal authority that makes a leader the final arbiter of Party issues", noted Fewsmith (2001, p.163). There were multiple factors that were responsible for an incrementally weak leader of the CCP. First of all, Jiang is to blame for that he excised gerontocracy on Hu Jintao by retaining control over military for extra two years. Secondly, the side-effect of an institutionalized party politics is that it caused the power to be evenly distributed among different factions, which indirectly resulted in undermining the authority of the party central, i.e., Hu Jintao. Factions mind their own business in their respective departments which have been assigned to them according to the formal politics. Party central is not able to discipline factions. The so-called "New Gang of Four" is the best showcase when the party organs failed to constrain different factions, particularly, in the case Zhou Yongkang which was a mix of nepotism,

localism and monopolism. Zhou's career started in the oil industry, where he established the so-called "Petroleum Clique" whose members constituted a critical portion of his power base. Later when Zhou Yongkang became the party boss of Sichuan province, he turned Sichuan into his second faction base where most of the high officials joined his faction. When Zhou Yongkang was put in charge of the judiciary department as one of nine PSC members, his power naturally extended to law enforcement sector. This period of highly fractured Chinese politics was defined as Gang Politics by eminent Chinese political scientist He Qinglian. She identified the reason of Gang Politics with the rule by man (He 2013) and the "Tiao Kuai" administrative structure (He 2015). During Jiang's and Hu's eras, Chinese factional elites were safeguarded soundly by the "Unwritten Rule" or *qian guize*, which granted the PSC members persecution immunity. As a result, the political struggles would spontaneously end at the Politburo level. The factional leaders above Politburo would be left intact; they would persist undermining the supreme leader.

Hu Jintao's unprecedented weakness provided the conditions for other factions to grow. The extent of factionalization of the CCP peaked in the end of Hu's second term with the party organ, military and many localities being controlled by different factions. Two of the so-called "New Gang of Four", Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou had the liberation army under their firm control, where corruption was epidemic and battle capacity was suspiciously far behind China's potential enemies. A politburo member Bo Xilai challenged party central with the Sing Red Song, Strike Mafia or *Changhong Dahei* campaign in the middle-west industrial center, Chongqing.

From Jiang to Hu, the factional structure within the CCP can be summarized by the modified nested pyramid model (see, Figure 1) whose original version nested pyramid was first used by Mattlin (2004) to describe political support mechanism in Taiwan. Based on Mattlin's nested pyramid model, typical elite Taiwanese politicians' support are comprised of "their personal networks combine forces to form larger agglomerates of dyadic support networks (factions), which in turn form yet larger agglomerates of

factions (parties) (Mattlin, 2004).” The nested pyramid model of the CCP in this period are different in two aspects from Taiwanese politics: first, the default power setting of high politicians in the CCP are confined to the “first among equals” norm meaning that on the very top layer of this nested pyramid there ought to be several equally situated politicians; second, owing to the essence of the party-state regime, the CCP’s model does not contain any support from regular grassroots, whereas in the very bottom of Taiwanese politician’s pyramid are commonly regular voters.




Figure 1 Modified Nested Pyramid Model, different cubes used to represent different factions in the party. Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping are the “Cores”.

When Xi took over the power from Hu Jintao, he had to adopt the historically famous strategy to fight his political rivals, the anti-corruption campaign.

#### 5.3.4.2 Anti-corruption as the Weapon of Political Struggle

Zhu and Zhang (2016) have discovered a positive correlation between political struggles and corruption accusations in the authoritarian states. They found that there would be more corruption accusations against senior politicians when the political conflict is in a fierce state. On the contrary, there would be less politicians involved with corruption when high politics is in a harmonious situation. Anti-corruption is proved to be beneficial to the

initiator because not only can it boost his/her approval rate in the public, but also is he/she able to oust his/her political rivals.

The history of anti-corruption to be used as a political struggle weapon has not been long for the CCP. It started taking shape in Jiang Zemin era. The case of the previous politburo member and simultaneously Beijing party boss Chen Xitong can be seen as the beginning of such a practice. Before Chen Xitong case in 1995, political struggles within the CCP were dealt with politically in the way that whoever was involved would be charged with primarily political accusations in which political labels such as revisionist, rightist or “two whatevers” were frequently used. Chen Xitong was the first senior politician who was prosecuted for corruption whereas the actual reason was widely believed to be his rivalry with Jiang Zemin. Chen’s case was also believed to have drawn a boundary in terms of politicians on what levels can be indicted. Later, it materialized as an unwritten rule that whoever enters the PSC would have judicial immunity, namely, no PSC members would be prosecuted.

Corruption accusation as the political struggle weapon was finalized as a paradigm of intra-party struggle in Chen Liangyu case. When Hu Jintao devastated the Shanghai Gang by prosecuting the Shanghai party boss and politburo member Chen Liangyu for illegal appropriation in 2006. It was widely believed to be a punch thrown by Hu to consolidate his power by taking down Jiang’s major protégé. Corruption charge became an episode of bizarre soap drama in Bo Xilai’s case in which love affairs, poisoning and homicide were enigmatically mixed. Xi Jinping added more political connotations to corruption. In addition to the usual corruption and seduction from morality accusations, Xi does not hesitate to warn his political rivals that they failed to demonstrate political allegiance to him. The 19th Party Congress report called Zhou Yongkang, Sun Zhengcai and Ling Jihua “bloated with political ambition” or (*zhengzhi yexin pengzhang*) ( the Report of 19th Party Congress). Party media outlet *Qiushi* criticized Bo Xilai for defying political norms and conventions (Bai 2015). Xi Jinping borrowed the inspection system from ancient dynasties to conduct anti-corruption campaign that was spearheaded by Wang Qishan. However, the anti-corruption campaign cannot skew itself from the suspicion that it is

essentially a political struggle weapon for what it practices is merely ineffective self-inspection. The right of who is to be taken down by anti-corruption inspection lies solely in the hand of Xi Jinping.

Using anti-corruption to take down his political rivals is simultaneously a process of power centralization for Xi Jinping. Xi's princeling background made him a widely acceptable heir apparent in the party. Constrained by the "successor dilemma", Xi Jinping was a naturally weak leader even though he took up all of "three-in-one" arrangement attained the "first among equals" status when he took the power from Hu Jintao. His grip on military was far from absolute; he has not yet devised his own ideological contribution. By carrying out anti-corruption campaign, Xi cleaned his political rivals in the party, government and military, he then filled in those seats with his protégés. Eventually, Xi has obtained exclusive control over the regime. Moreover, anti-corruption campaign has also conveniently salvaged the ruling legitimacy for the party.

Based upon the paradigm of power in the CCP, Xi Jinping now has absolute control on both the military and ideology. In the military, Xi Jinping uprooted Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou as well as their protégés. Then, He dismissed the old "Four General Departments" (*Si Zongbu*, including the General Logistics Department, the Headquarters of the General Staff, General political Department, General equipment department), and substituted seven military regions with five theatres of battle operation.

On the ideological front, while keeping previous contributions from Mao Thought to "Scientific Outlook on Development" intact he also made a very tangible contribution. Almost immediately after he assumed the power the "Chinese Dream" was launched, by reviewing and summarizing the first three-decade under Mao and second three-decade under Deng, he made a commitment that his tenure would see to the realization of Chinese grand rejuvenation (Wang Yi, 2016).

Comparing Xi's ideological discourses with those from Jiang and Hu, it is obvious that despite the persistence of opaque political languages its volume is shrinking and its content is more materialized. The "Three Representatives" from Jiang was viewed by He Qinglian (2013) as a justification for Chinese political elites, wealthy class and intellectual elites,



it helped the CCP improved legitimacy and consolidated ruling foundation; when interpreting from the literal meaning Hu Jintao's "the Scientific Outlook on Development", it is not difficult to discover that the primary goal of Hu's ideological contribution is to combat with environmental problems and cope with the worsening income inequality issue. The "Chinese Dream" that connotes a rejuvenated China whose people will be happily living in a well-off society is undeniably a more concrete one than both Jiang's and Hu's ideological claims. To consolidate his ideological contribution, Xi Jinping chartered the "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" to both party constitution and national constitution. The fact that Xi Thought bears his name proves that his position in the ideological aspect is much stronger than his two predecessors, which put him in a position shouldering Mao.

#### 5.3.4.3 The Composition of Xi-faction

At the moment, Xi Jinping faction is mostly comprised of his friends and previous subordinates from his earlier political years. Wang Qishan, the anti-corruption czar, was reportedly Xi Jinping's friend from the Educated Youth days; the newly-promoted vice premier Liu He who is also a politburo member was Xi's classmate from middle school; many members of Xi Jinping faction whose relationships with Xi trace back to when Xi was in charge of Fujian and Zhejiang province are now occupying crucial seats in the government, party organs as well as the military, such as the current Chongqing party boss and politburo member Chen Miner who was overseeing the propaganda department in Xi Jinping's provincial administrative team in Zhejiang province. The personnel arrangement of 19th Party Congress illustrated that Xi Jinping had broken many conventions created by Deng. First, although the PSC had not been abolished as predicted by some observers, Xi Jinping does distance himself from other members in the PSC in terms of the amount of power they each possess informally and formally. Xi Jinping ordered that all members of politburo to submit a yearly report to himself and party central; the responsibilities that used to be covered by members of PSC are purposefully distributed to Xi's protégés, for instance, conventionally the

president of central party school is to be assumed by the PSC member who is in charge of ideology, Wang Huning in this case, rather than by a politburo member Chen'xi who is coincidentally Xi Jinping's classmate from their Tsinghua University days. Another example would be Liu He whose vice premier position is suspiciously overshadowing Premier Li Keqiang (Hornby and Mitchell 2018).

Secondly, the so-called "Seven up, Eight down" or *Qishang Baxia*, age limitation was unshackled, as seen in Wang Qishan's case. Although Wang's age had reached 68, he did not retire from formal positions like other fellow PSC members, instead he just swore in to be the vice president of PRC in this year's Two Sessions. Thirdly, by aborting the 10-year tenure limitation clause in the constitution, Xi would likely to remain in the power for more than two terms, which is considered a major disruption of Deng's succession arrangement.

Apart from his endeavors to centralize power in party, government and military as discussed above, Xi once and for all solved the chronic succession dilemma for himself. First, Xi sidelined the speculative leader of 6th generation Hu Chunhua by postponing his promotion to the PSC and put Sun Zhengcai who was the party boss of Chongqing and politburo member on trial for corruption. It is safe to conclude that the CCP is currently unprecedentedly "harmonious". Jiang's last batch of protégés were forced into retirement in the 19th Party Congress; Hu did not plan to excise gerontocracy when he stepped down. Xi has the CCP under his control. Officially, he enjoys the "Three-in-One" arrangement. In the informal factional politics, he uprooted nearly all active factions and promoted his protégés to the vital posts left by those faction members. Currently, the CCP factional status can be seen has achieved a hierarchy structure (see, Figure 2) with Xi at the very top, the CCP's hierarchy system comprises of the rest of elitist politicians and the retired party seniors behind them, one level lower than Xi Jinping. Each of these politicians from the second level has a similar hierarchical structure with himself at a position resembling that of Xi's. Horizontally, it is possible that

they keep relationships or alignments with someone at the same level in such a system.




Figure 2 the current Hierarchy Structure of the CCP Factions.

## 6. Conclusion

In review of the two factional stories in this thesis, I have demonstrated the general similarities and differences between the two manifestations of factionalism that operate in the same Confucian cultural context.

The early phase of the two factionalisms poses more differences than similarities as detailed in chapter 5.1. For the CCP, it was during this period that the power paradigm which consists of militaristic and ideological dominance that was established, which would become a common practice adopted by generations to come. What I also discovered is that the revolutionary stage demands a united and spiritually-localized political force, as reflected in the fact that until Mao had achieved the dominant power the CCP's political gains were rather meager and unstable. However, under Mao's strong man leadership, the CCP managed to contribute to the eventual defeat of the Japanese imperial army and drove the KMT out of mainland China. As to the factionalism in the initial stage of the DPP, what I want to highlight is that the factionalism set up a stage for all political forces to discuss, debate and devise the most effective power-achieving or democratization strategy, which is thoroughly mirrored in the strategic debate between the Meilidao faction and the New Tide faction. Factionalism is fairly compatible with the democratic ambience in the DPP case. The democratic decision-making arrangement regarding party affairs created a permissive provision for the political intellectuals to excel. In order to sustain this facilitating mutual-beneficial mechanism, the DPP has to safeguard the intra-party democracy from being jeopardized, which has become increasingly challenge when they have achieved power.

In the ruling stage, historical facts from the two parties reinforce what have been established during the first phase. Regardless of whether Mao's ultimate power was undermined by the "Two-Front" arrangement or not, the fierce factional conflicts caused by destroying the party arrangement in the CR showcased the importance of the existence of a dominant political force in the CCP. Mao's detachment and letting factions fight against

factions greatly damaged the ruling legitimacy of the party. In addition, the reason that Mao was able to hold onto the paramount position in one of the most anarchic political movements in human history is due to that he was the only one who had both the military force and the ideology under his absolute control. The power centralization of power by Chen Shui-bian devastated the intra-party democratic arrangement that is essential for the factionalism to function, which is to blame for the deprivation of power in 2008 in the DPP case.

The recent political maneuvers from both Xi Jinping and Tsai Ing-wen, to some extent, are the manifestations of the two factionalisms in comparison. All Xi's political initiatives, be it anti-corruption campaign or the establishment of multiple *ad hoc* institutions can be summarized into the power centralization theme. For Xi, rich political experience and privileged information access owing to his princeling background assured him that a factionalized party would only accelerate the erosion of the crippling legitimacy resulted by the market reform during the past four decades. Comparing with her predecessors, the concessions that Tsai has made in order to unite the factionalized DPP is more obvious. For the starters, Tsai faction is no more a faction *per se*, instead it is a term that represents the incumbent political force centering on Tsai Ing-wen. As a result, Tsai has to share her protégés with other factional leaders in the party politics, namely, the double-allegiance. Such a double-allegiance is a result of a more democratized DPP and Taiwan politics.

To summarize, the comparison between two factionalisms in the same cultural pre-text points to that factionalism in the closed one-party system tends to be a critical obstructive factor for the ruling party creating instability, moutaintoppism and dictatorship while eliciting the best political talents from the party in the open democratic settings.

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