

University of Warwick institutional repository: <http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap>

**A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick**

<http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/2321>

This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.

Please scroll down to view the document itself.

Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.

Chile: Political Parties, Democracy and  
Dictatorship, 1970-1990

by

Ricardo Yocelvezky

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of Warwick, Department of History  
December 2000

## CONTENTS

Introduction. The disappearance and restitution of democracy in Chile: a research problem	1
Chapter 1. Political parties in the 1970 Chilean election	29
Chapter 2. Unidad Popular and the crisis of the political system in 1973	71
Chapter 3. The rise of the dictatorship, destruction and replacement of a political system	115
Chapter 4. Crisis and erosion of the dictatorship: reconstruction of the Right	161
Chapter 5. The Christian Democrats and Pinochet's dictatorship	190
Chapter 6. The transformations of the Left	257
Chapter 7. Conclusions	294
Methodological Notes	308
Appendices	312
Bibliography	321

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work would have never been completed without the help of Professor Julio Faúndez. Only a long friendship, resistant to time and distance, and a community of interests on the subject of this research enabled his persistent stimulus and support.

Throughout the many years of exile, I have acquired more debts of gratitude than those I can mention here. However, risking some important omissions, I remember that when I first came to Warwick I had the support of Professor Alastair Hennessy, then head of Comparative American Studies (CAS). I enjoyed the friendship and solidarity of John King, Anthony McFarlane and Guy Thomson, and I had the privilege of sharing the unforgettable sense of humour of Callum MacDonald.

In Mexico, I have shared work and had the support of Fernando Cortés.

The University of Warwick and The World University Service made the first stages of this research possible. A Ford Foundation grant allowed me to go back to Latin America in 1979. The Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Unidad Xochimilco, where I have worked since 1980, has supported me permanently.

My wife Gabriela has provided me with a constant critical dialogue (she is a captive reader). Tere, Julián and Nany, each in their very important way, have been of great help.



## DECLARATION

The author confirms that this thesis has not been submitted for a degree at another university.

## **Abstract**

The politics of Chile between 1970 and 1990 is analysed in this thesis from the point of view of the political parties. These are treated as parts of a system and not considered individually. This allows for a different explanation of the actions of the parties and the politicians in a process which is vastly known.

In these twenty years, Chile went from democracy, destroyed by a brutal coup d'etat, to a sixteen year dictatorship, ended by a very complex reconstruction of a renewed democracy. These changes take on a new look if seen from the perspective offered here.

Taking the party system as the axis of the history, the elements of continuity and change observable in the collective and individual actors reveal themselves to be different from established accounts of this era. This amounts to a new explanation that makes intelligible parts of the process that were, until recently, explained away by moral judgements about the behaviour of individuals.

Attention is given to properties of the system which are not evident at first sight but determined the conduct of leaders and organisations. From this more distant

point of view it is possible to find new meanings to the positions and actions of the many protagonists of the story, different again from the ones that they themselves offer.

The first chapters (1 and 2) examine the structure of the democratic regime and the role of the party system in it. Chapters 3 and 4 analyse the dictatorship and its attempts to destroy the parties and the party system, as well as the way the parties reappeared as a model of organisation among the same forces that supported the dictatorship. Chapters 5 and 6 examine the survival of the opposition parties and the changes they suffered under the dictatorship. The concluding chapter describes the results of all these by looking at the new democratic regime, the continuity of the party system and the changes in it that resulted from its accepting the inheritance of the dictatorship.



## ABBREVIATIONS

AD	Alianza Democrática (Democratic Alliance)
AN	Acuerdo Nacional (Para la Transición a la Plena Democracia) (National Agreement [For the Transition to Full Democracy])
CEPAL ECLAC	Comisión Económica Para América Latina Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
CNI	Central Nacional de Información (National Center for Information)
DINA	Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (Directorate for National Intelligence)
IC	Izquierda Cristiana (Christian Left)
MAPU	Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria (Unitary Popular Action Movement)
MDP	Movimiento Democrático Popular (Popular Democratic Movement)
MIR	Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Movement of the Revolutionary Left)
MUN	Movimiento de Unión Nacional (Movement of National Union)
PAIS	Partido Amplio de la Izquierda Socialista (Open Party of the Socialist Left)
PC	Partido Comunista (Communist Party)
PDC	Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democrat Party)
PN	Partido Nacional (National Party)
PPD	Partido por la Democracia (Party for Democracy)
PR	Partido Radical (Radical Party)
PRODEN	Programa de Desarrollo Nacional (National Development Programme)
PS	Partido Socialista (Socialist Party)
RN	Renovación Nacional (National Renewal)
UDI	Unión Demócrata Independiente (Independent Democratic Union)
UP	Unidad Popular (Popular Unity)

**Introduction. The disappearance and restitution of  
democracy in Chile: a research problem.**

0.1. The problem.

The interpretation of recent Chilean political history proposed in this work requires a redefinition of the theoretical concepts used to analyse these processes. As will be seen, these concepts do not derive from a single theory. Rather, components of several theories have been adopted to suit the different aspects of a reality, which is too complex to be explained by only one theory. It has been necessary to select pieces of different theoretical frameworks which have proved their worth in the analysis of particular historical cases.

The theoretical apparatus used here to analyse party systems, and is especially concerned with their democratic character on the one hand and with their stability or instability on the other. One of several factors considered is that of polarisation. This derives from the manner in which the components of the system define themselves. It relates the party system, as a group of actors, to both the symbolic framework (its ideological expression) and to the social system. Within this social system, the parties are made up of actors who seek political representation by means of ideological proposals (their doctrines and programmes). The theory put forward in this study will try to correct



this perspective. An attempt will be made here to analyse those factors whose function is to integrate the political system and whose existence means that the ideologies of the individual parties are unable by themselves to define any property of the system as a totality. Such a property is the degree of polarization of the system.

These elements are to be found in other theoretical frameworks which have sought to explain aspects of the political parties. For example, the theory of elites (or that of oligarchies of Michels) states that these justify their existence as guilds of professional politicians by means of an ideology. This is sometimes implicit and it takes the form of a "national project". It is within this generalised ideology of "the party system" that the individual ideologies of the parties are defined. These can, at times, show a degree of extreme polarisation in the form of alternative projects for the restructuring of society. However, the integrated elite takes charge of redefining and introducing "realism" to the ideas, which the rank and file of the party may have expressed. Thus the analysis must assume a greater degree of complexity when it tries to place the causes of particular actions on one or another ideological level. It must avoid the trap of attributing to individuals the moral responsibility for the inconsistencies which the actions and positions adopted by



the individual parties show. It is a precondition for the existence of a party system that the actors who make it up must subordinate their individual programmes in order to obtain alliances. The first priority of these alliances is to maintain the relationships which keep the system together. This creates a chain of subordination which extends even to the relationships within the parties themselves where groups, factions, and individual leaders must subordinate their expressions to the limits imposed by participation in the party system.

The system of parties is an organism open to the system of social domination. The political order expresses this domination. Moreover, it is so constituted as to keep this domination in being by means of the ideological integration of the representatives of different classes. The social classes reproduce their positions of dominant and subordinate by means of their organisations and ideologies. The fact that the party system contains social class differences does not automatically mean that it is unstable. Proposals for social reorganisation may be subordinated to a national project. The parties and the system they make up may or may not be permeable to ideological changes or to the demands which social movements put forward. This property of the system, and its possible relationship with the system's stability, has almost always been considered in

negative terms. An example would be the idea of "hypermobilisation" in the case of Chile.

The coup d'etat of 1973 began a period of military dictatorship in Chile which lasted more than 16 years. The elections of 1989 and the change of government from Pinochet to Aylwin in March 1990 were celebrated as a return to democracy. The history of this interruption of democracy in Chile, together with its reconstruction, could be told, and has, in fact, been told from a variety of points of view. Many of these accounts, chronicles and analyses have been written to justify a particular political position with respect to the events themselves. This means that their value as historical documents is, from the point of view of the present analysis, limited.

To retrace yet again a story whose main events are widely known needs justification. Such an undertaking should make some new contribution. This is especially the case with events widely regarded as being of considerable importance. What will be attempted here is an analytic reconstruction of events as they occurred, taking as a starting point a framework which is, in itself, not free from ambiguities: the system of political parties in Chile. On the one hand, the party system is so controversial that even its conditions of existence are questionable. On the other, it is a structure within which the individual actors



define their own roles and from which they attribute meaning to their actions.

To set up the analysis of two decades of Chilean politics in this way permits us to avoid some of the clichés which have dominated accounts of this era. Indeed, these received ideas also seem to influence the actions of some of the participants in the present political scene. To bring about a different and, (it is hoped) more effective analysis, two questions are fundamental: first the relationship between social forces and their political and ideological expressions; second, the meaning of the positions taken up by the main political actors. Normally, there are inconsistencies between the explicit ideology of political organisations and the positions they assume. These inconsistencies are explained, more often than not, by resorting to (positive or negative) moral judgements, which result from the relationship of a given analyst with his subject. The present analysis starts from the party system and its context and provides for the activities of the parties, allowing the conditions in which political processes take place to be revealed without distortion. Thus, a complex group of predetermining factors to which the privileged political actors (the parties) are obliged to subject themselves is thrown into high relief.

Some received ideas (which may even now be encountered in government circles) which are given alternative readings are: in this thesis are:

1) That the destruction of the Chilean political system in 1973 was the result of polarisation of the local ideology induced, at least partly, from the outside, by such factors as the Cuban revolution.

2) That this could have been avoided if the Popular Unity and the Christian Democrat parties had been able to reach some kind of agreement.

3) That Pinochet and his group "opened up" the possibility of a return to democracy.

4) That the make-up of the political alliances at present in power in Chile is the result of a new "maturity" and the acceptance of the lessons taught by the past.

The alternative ideas proposed are:

1) That the process of polarisation was produced by the permeability of the parties, especially those on the left, to the demands of the subordinated social classes. If exterior ideological radicalisation (then general in Latin America) played any part in this, it found expression in radicalisation within the party political framework. Examples would be the alliances between socialists, communists and others in Popular Unity or in left wing groups outside parliament.



2) That what was negotiated between the Christian Democrats and the Popular Unity Party government in 1973 was the survival of the system when the Christian Democrats were however already committed to its destruction by their subordination to the right-wing opposition strategy.

3) That the transition of power in Chile was result of a confrontation in which there was a redefinition of the relationships between the forces at work in society and their political representatives, the parties. Both the width of the ideological spectrum and the permeability of the parties to social demands were redefined by means of a reconstruction of the party system.

4) That the agreements and alliances which make up the basis of the present reconstructed party system, are a reflection of the ideological power relationships between different sections of the political elite. These relationships, in turn, stem from the way in which the dictatorship redefined the future development of Chile.

#### 0.2. Political science and history define the parties.

The political parties and the framework within which they operate are not independent constructions which can be defined or analysed without referring to other data or other structures. The empirical approaches which have been generally used to study them take their existence as a given. However, from the start,

analysts are required to adopt a relativist position with regard to the statements they make because of the undeniably historical nature of the phenomenon.<sup>1</sup> The parties are inextricably linked in the first place, to the idea of democracy. This concept has been the subject of innumerable philosophical, normative and scientific discussions.<sup>2</sup> The existence of political parties which compete for the right to govern in elections is normally considered an indicator of a functioning liberal democratic system. Like all indicators, however, this one does not exhaust the idea of democracy. Nevertheless there exists a consensus that if parties and elections do not exist, democracy in the modern sense of the word cannot be said to exist either.<sup>3</sup>

This competitive democracy, however, gives rise to such problems as the nature of the relationship between politics and society. On the one hand, the existence of different parties implies differences of opinion about who should govern and what a government should do. It might be thought that these divisions are simply a product of human nature itself, some in-built ambition to possess power, which leads individuals to organise themselves in such a way as to obtain, exercise and retain it. Yet, since the formation of the first modern party systems, the notion arose that there existed not

---

<sup>1</sup> The most recent example is the title of the book by Scott Mainwaring: *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratisation*.

See Giovanni Sartori: *Teoria de la democracia*, 2 volumes.

<sup>2</sup> Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully (Eds.) *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*, p.3.



only a competition between people and ideas, but also that this competition "expresses" and "channels" conflicts of interests which go beyond politics and administration, to the very basis of the social structure. This changes the basis of the ideological problem. It now becomes concerned with the definition of society: how it may and should develop. When an attempt is made within this framework to explain the actions of political parties, it leads to a "sociological" approach in which the analysis is centred on the "representativity" of the parties and their ideology.

On the other hand the existence of peaceful coexistence within the political system and the regular competition for power between the parties has resulted in the creation of different kinds of institutions. The role of the parties in the functioning of the government differs from one system to another. This, in turn, has had the effect of producing an analysis of the parties as something more than mere participants in elections. They are seen as component parts of other, larger more complex systems. This is what has given rise to a form of political science which has been called "institutionalist".<sup>4</sup>

A parallel exists between the history of political parties as accepted parts of the system, and as legitimate subjects for analysis in political science. From the earliest

---

constitutional discussions the problem arose of how to incorporate unavoidable and permanent differences of opinion. Finally it was decided to accept this situation as inevitable and try to limit its consequences by regulating the framework within which competition for power would take place: that is, elections.<sup>5</sup> This had the effect, from the normative point of view, of making the evolution of the political parties dependent on the extension of the right to vote, together with the regulations which govern this. Until quite recently, constitutions have not made any reference to political parties beyond establishing the right of citizens to form them and belong to them. The laws which govern electoral processes, however, deal with the way the political parties may participate in them. In this way, the political parties as entities, from a normative point of view, acquire only a subordinate existence as participants in electoral processes.<sup>6</sup>

Since the middle of the nineteenth century, socialist ideology has generated a new kind of party. From the outset, the problem of taking up a class position vis-a-vis the bourgeois state defined its agenda. These parties also confronted the problem of whether or not to participate in elections and to conform to the parliamentary system, issues which formed the subject of heated doctrinal discussion.

---

Alan Ware, *Political Parties and Party Systems*, pp. 8-9.

<sup>5</sup> Giovanni Sartori, *Partidos y sistemas de partidos*, pp. 35-44.

<sup>6</sup> Max Weber, *Economía y sociedad*, p. 1076.



After the First World War, however, the argument was settled, at least for Western Europe, as a result of the failure of those attempts to carry out a proletarian revolution that sought to imitate the Bolshevik Model.<sup>7</sup> The actions of socialist parties in some countries, mainly Germany and Italy, have been scrutinised and criticised by Robert Michels. Michels has identified a common characteristic of political life organised around parties: the tendency to produce an élite which reproduces itself within the party organisation.<sup>8</sup>

Taking into account the points of view set out above-and there are still others- at least some of the misunderstandings generated by the terms "parties" and "party systems" can be seen.<sup>9</sup> In brief, contained within these terms are varying conceptions of society and the political order. The problem is whether these conceptions are based on the individual as such or whether the political order is not the product of a structure of conflicting relationships between different categories of individuals. This is a very complex problem because, despite initial observations, some parties may

---

<sup>7</sup> Adam Przeworski sees this change as a question of electoral strategy with fluctuations in the definition of "class". Nonetheless, he states that in 1918 the British Labour Party opened its ranks to "workers by brain". *Capitalism and Social Democracy*, p. 25.

<sup>8</sup> Robert Michels, *Political Parties: Sociological Study of the Oligarchic Tendencies of Modern Democracy*.

<sup>9</sup> On the difficulties of formulating an empirical definition of "political party" see Alan Ware, *Op. cit.*, pp. 2-6.

introduce this distinction into their ideology, and structure their strategies accordingly.<sup>10</sup>

By observing the existence of the parties as actors which compete within a system of electoral norms accepted by all of them, this issue can be sidestepped. The parties also seek positions of power in a system of government which is generally accepted by all of them. If the system is to be changed, the change must be subject to the outcome of an electoral process together with norms of transformation accepted by all the actors. The following, from Alan Ware, may be cited as a potentially valid definition: "A political party is an institution that (a) seeks influence in a state, often by attempting to occupy positions in government and (b) usually consists of more than a single interest in the society and so, to some degree, attempts to "aggregate interest".<sup>11</sup> Another definition is given by Mainwaring and Scully. "We follow a slightly amended version of Sartori's definition of a political party, by which a party is 'any political group that presents at elections and is capable of placing through elections candidates for public office' The amendment is that a political group that would present candidates for public office, but is

---

<sup>10</sup> The problem of how a social class may be constituted as a social and political actor is discussed by Przeworski, *Op. cit.* Chap. 2.

<sup>11</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 5.



unable to do so either because it is proscribed or because elections are not being held, is also a party".<sup>12</sup>

In this way, the limits of the system would be defined by norms and by the acceptance of these norms by the participants. However, these definitions displace us towards another framework -the electoral system- whose characteristics strongly influence the party system. This is the case, for example, in the size of the electorate relative to the total population.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, the parties represent interests and opinions which are defined in function of lines of conflict (cleavages). These, in given historical periods, define their societies. However, these conflicts should amount to something less than ruptures in order to avoid breaking the basic consensus. Sartori observes that: "conflict about fundamentals is not a possible basis for democracy nor is it, in fact, for any political community. Such conflict - real confrontation- leads to civil war, with secession as the only solution."<sup>14</sup> In this way, either a society is seen as a community in which there are no fundamental conflicts or a democratic political community is structured in such a way that these conflicts are not expressed in terms of alternative forms of political arrangements.

---

<sup>12</sup> Op. cit., p. 2.

<sup>13</sup> Arend Lijphart, *Sistemas electorales y sistemas de partidos*.

<sup>14</sup> Giovanni Sartori, *Partidos y sistemas de partidos*, p. 40.

Despite all these limitations, the field of studies which examines party systems has made advances as a form of empirical research. As such it seeks to answer the many theoretical questions which previous attempts to formulate definitions have left unsatisfied. Thus, the study of party systems is, in itself, taken to be an indicator of the functioning of a democratic system. In the absence of a generally agreed definition of democracy which would serve as a parameter for the evaluation of different political systems, it is necessary to take as a starting point the idea that democracy, as a quality of a political system, is a question of degree. The difference between a dictatorship and a democracy can be clearly established by the point of origin (elections). However the consolidation of a democracy through the existence of an institutionalised party system can only be registered as a point on a continuum. The idea of a continuum suggests a process: placing any particular case at a point on the continuum indicates its relationship to this political polarity. One of the possible consequences of adopting this point of view is that the modern political process can be presented as a democratic progression. Nevertheless, this does not seem to be possible in most of the Western political processes. It would seem that the process of becoming democratic can be described in terms of particular stages which seem to repeat



themselves but which are not irreversible.<sup>15</sup> Thus, what has frequently seemed an appropriate strategy is not to opt for an abstract description or for a historical consideration of particular examples but rather to analyse one particular case. This permits the examination of the genesis of some characteristic features of the liberal democracies, with particular reference to parties and the party systems. Such a methodology seems promising in view of the fact that some recent instances have acquired the status of models. Moreover, the similarity -real or imaginary- of the structures of particular situations has led to the spread of parties, ideologies and programmes on an international scale.

The difficulty of analysing party systems is summed up by Ware when he observes that the study of party systems implies simultaneously more and less than the analysis of the individual parties.<sup>16</sup> This complexity is generated by the relationships between the parties within the system: ie., the structure of the system. Given that each presents a different kind of dynamic, the problem cannot be resolved by deciding to give causal priority to one or the other of the two levels of analysis. An empirical problem must be resolved in each particular investigation given that no theoretical model exists for the simultaneous investigating

---

<sup>15</sup> Mainwaring and Scully, *Op. cit.*, p. 6.

of both the individual parties and their interactive dynamic. Thus Ware observes that, in the case of the British parties, a book about the parties themselves would have to be focussed differently from one about the party system. The point is to decide which historical process is to be analysed and which of the two levels would contribute more to the explanation of this process.

The process of constructing democracy may be described as the reduction of conflict to competition. The framework of the competition is fixed by the constitution which instigates the norms of the party system. The electoral system defines the posts which will be competed for, and sets the rules for the form of the competition. The party system permits the organisation of the competitors. This last component comes to occupy the position of mediator between three elements whose relationships are not clearly defined. First, there is the citizen, as an individual with voting rights. These constitute the primary definition of citizenship. Second, there is the individual as part of a social category, defined by some factor which may or may not be considered in the definition of the parties. Third, there are the ideologies which make possible the constitution and the functioning of the political system, of which the party system is a part. This is structured on the

---

Ware, *Op. cit.*, p. 7.



following two levels: a) the party identity as representative of the ideas which a group of citizens identify with and, (b) the ideology taken as a whole, which puts limits on who can participate in the competition and on the ideological identities which they can assume.

The ideological factor which has marked out the limits of present-day political systems is nationalism. This term is understood here in its widest sense as the justification and legitimising of the existence of the nation state, which has become the dominant form of political organisation in the modern world. Nationalism has to do with the fissures which gave rise to those conflicts whose resolution constituted the foundation of, at least in embryonic form, the modern political structures that we today define as liberal democracies. These fissures were either religious, as in the English civil war of the seventeenth century; political, as in the French revolution of 1789; or of colonial separation as in the case of the United States. Each of these fissures ideologically imprinted the resulting constitutions and political parties. In terms of organisation, the social classes who were the protagonists of these processes made up an élite who reserved for themselves the right to participate in political affairs as electors, candidates and members of governments. The first

great expansion of suffrage, in the nineteenth century, was directed towards the working class.

The twentieth century saw the incorporation of the urban working class and its organisations into the political system in the form of political parties. Thus the right to vote was granted to a larger number of citizens. Revolutionary and internationalist tendencies were defeated, politically and ideologically during the First World War and within the social democratic parties. In this way, the independent nation state, particularly the republic, became the dominant model of political organisation in Europe and the world. This is a phenomenon of the twentieth century.<sup>17</sup> The years after 1918 saw the establishment of the nation states which resulted from the dissolution of the empires. After 1945, this model was generalised through the process of decolonisation. Obviously, this is a model of processes defined by their results. Except in a few instances, among which are those of Switzerland, the United States and the United Kingdom, the liberal democratic systems did not survive the twentieth century and its conflicts in any important country. The structures described here correspond to reconstruction carried out in the West during the cold war period. It is at this time when an integrated national politics can be observed. The working class parties are

---

<sup>17</sup> Arno J. Mayer, *The Persistence of the Old Regime*.



either part of the government or in opposition but competing for power within the norms laid down by the electoral system.

From the sociological point of view, this situation is explained by saying that a compromise has been reached between the material interests of the classes in conflict within the capitalist system. The working people receive increased welfare on the condition that they do not call into question the continuance of capitalist accumulation. As the state is the broker of this arrangement, political competition is defined as the seeking of electoral support by parties which are allowed to participate on the condition that they do not question the system as such.<sup>18</sup>

### 03. Latin America and liberal democracy

The processes and ideas described above had a very important influence in Latin America. However, simple imitation was never possible. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, the former Spanish colonies in America had to adopt a modern form of political organisation. After various attempts, they all became republican nation-states, formally defined as such. This formal definition acquired great importance in the drafting of many constitutions.<sup>19</sup> The

---

<sup>18</sup> Przeworski, *Op. cit.*, Chapter 4.

<sup>19</sup> As evident in more than 200 constitutions in 170 years in the 21 countries represented by Spain, Portugal and their former American colonies. Bernardino

model represented by England, the United States and France was translated into an infinite number of proposals for political organisation. The aim was to imitate the ideas and political solutions which had characterised the processes of formation of these systems. However, the confrontation of interests in these peripheral former colonies contained features which did not permit a mechanical application of the institutional solutions from the societies taken as models.

Something which must be taken into account when considering this lack of correspondence between model and reality is the elitist form assumed by the political parties. These were often factions, proto-parties or groupings of powerful men who resolved their differences by negotiation or by agreements between leaders. Moreover, the extension of the suffrage, when it occurred, in predominantly rural societies, was not the result of a process of modernisation (industrialisation and urban growth). Nor was it the consequence of the incorporation of new independent social sectors. Rather, it was a means of reinforcing the dominant social groups in the rural areas. These controlled the results of the elections.<sup>20</sup>

---

Bravo Lira, *De Portales a Pinochet: Gobierno y régimen de gobierno en Chile*, p. 11.

<sup>20</sup> Karen L. Remmer, *Party Competition in Argentina and Chile*.



All these factors meant that political systems with regular elections and the increasing participation of the social sectors which economic development was creating, were rare in the region. Chile, from the 1930s to 1960s, was one such. It must be emphasised that this situation did not stop the local political parties in other Latin American countries from acting as if they formed part of functioning democratic systems. Their names and ideologies suggest self-images which sought to absorb their European and North American models. Their main problem lay in the fact that they did not manage to construct a system which would exclude both direct action by state institutions such as the armed forces, and the all pervasive influence of the Roman Catholic Church.<sup>21</sup> In fact, the post war period in Latin America was characterised by the domination of a political ideology given the name "Latin American populism". This was made up of organisations dependent on governments whose *raison d'être* was to provide support for the ideology together with the social and political mobilisation of the people. Such organisations as the PRI in Mexico and movements like Peronism in Argentina or Vargasism in Brazil, would be examples of this phenomenon. There are exceptions, but these have not occurred in any of the three largest

---

<sup>21</sup> Whether these concepts are applicable in Latin America is controversial. See, for example, Mainwaring's discussion with Sartori about whether or not a party system exists in Colombia and Brasil. *Op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.

Latin American countries. Uruguay had a functioning democracy which lasted through a long period of prosperity until 1973. Colombia y Venezuela developed two-party democracies after the dissolution of the dictatorships at the end of the 1950's.

#### 0.4 Chilean democracy, the exception

Democracy in Chile functioned from 1932 until the catastrophic rupture of 1973. This exceptional history gave rise to all kinds of explanations. A metaphysical hypothesis attributed it to Chilean "flair". Sociologists such as Cardoso and Faletto put it down to the kind of social classes which emerged out of the "enclave" situation in the mining industry, the way in which Chile was inserted into the world economy, and the politico-ideological form of representation they found in the political parties as a "model" of organisation.<sup>22</sup>

The main hypothesis of this study consists of a reconstruction of the history of this period which takes the party system as its starting point. This system evolved in such a way that it gradually included rising social groups within its ranks. This stable group of political parties was made up of an élite of professional politicians which virtually monopolised the political representation of the different social classes. There were periods of volatility but, in general, it may be said



that a stable nucleus of professional politicians, whose careers depended on their being affiliated to a given party, continued to exist. The key problem here is how such a system could come into existence when the participating parties represented ideologies whose social projects were completely antagonistic. This polarised situation would seem to indicate that Chilean party system was essentially unstable. Nevertheless, the obvious ideological inconsistencies of the period from the 1930's to 1960's indicate the existence of an underlying ideological structure which unites these parties. This structure was, in the opinion of the present author, a project for national development. This did not differ in essence, from similar projects in other Latin American countries. These projects were adopted by governments which represented alliances of similar social groups. However, these alliances were founded within ideological and organisational frameworks which had little to do with those of the political parties. Different versions of this ideology of the system were incorporated in each of the parties. These, in turn, became proposals which, in parliamentary terms, are presented as "technical" problems which do not affect the ideologies proposed by each party as its social project.<sup>23</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup> Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina*, pp126-129.

<sup>23</sup> See later in Chapter 1.



The reconstruction of this all-inclusive national project has been placed at the level of the state. (The development state, the compromise state, the welfare state, etc.). However it is on the level of the system of government, the parties and the electoral system where the effects of the consensus can be observed, without resorting to other metaconstitutional factors.

In the first chapter of this study the existence of this élite of professional politicians, especially those who form the nucleus of the system is shown, together with their dependence on the parties. At the same time, the parties represent particular social classes, especially those on the left, despite their integration into the national project of the élite. This explains why the "Chilean road to socialism" was, at the same time (or only) the extreme ideological expression of a project of industrial development later described as statist and populist.

The second chapter describes the crisis of the political system which took this national development project to its limit. This was the programme of the Unidad Popular. The result was that the capacity of the party system to maintain social domination was exhausted. Slowly, new élites began to appear on the right and the left at the edges of the party system and began to have an influence on the strategies of the parties which made up the system. This led to a threat to the arrangements of social domination which the system was perceived

as unable to maintain. Thus, the forces on the right, who from outside the party system counselled the hard line policy which led to the coup d'état, were able to triumph. The central question of this chapter is whether the crisis of social domination in itself provoked the break in the party system. It is also possible that the development of alternative élites outside the party system, particularly on the right generated the conditions for the crisis.

Chapter 3 describes the phase of the rise to power of the dictatorship. The partial destruction of the political system (in particular, the party system) was achieved. This was done by the repression and setting aside of the professional politicians, including those of the right. A scheme of economic development was imposed which none of the participants in the party system of the era before 1973 would have been able to implement. Thus a new project, different from that which had formed the basis of the ulterior consensus, was imposed. Parallel to these changes in the economy, projects for the replacement of the political system were also put forward. These culminated in the imposition of a new constitution which would have impeded the reconstruction of the party system by excluding groups on ideological grounds.

Chapter 4 is concerned with the crisis in the dictatorship. It is shown how the reconstruction of the party system generated a move towards a different democracy. This



involved a new scheme of economic development being imposed as a national project. As the main characteristic of the dictatorship was social exclusion, exactly the opposite of the inclusive project which was destroyed by the coup d'état, the party system had to be modified. This process produced, mainly, a generational and ideological renewal of the right. Two new right wing parties were formed. These (together with some elements of the previous right wing élite, reactivated because of the social protest which threatened the dictatorship) make up the groups which generated the political and economic projects which the dictatorship imposed. They were however marginal with respect to the party system which existed before 1973.

Chapter 5 tries to demonstrate where the main element of continuity lies. The core of the earlier party system was the Christian Democrat Party. This group managed to arrogate to itself a key role in the process of reconstruction of the system of political parties. Originally this group supported the coup d'état, only to find itself excluded from power by the military. Later, it recovered political legitimacy by initiating a dialogue with the government and becoming the axis of an alliance of opposition parties which negotiated the terms of the re-democratisation. Thus, it could impose the results of its negotiation with the dictatorship upon its left wing allies. The agreement reached with the dictatorship



depended on the acceptance of the two main elements of the national project of the dictatorship by the Christian Democrats. These entailed (a) a new political system that was accepted with modifications which were not unimportant but neither were they fundamental; and (b) a new model of economic development that was adopted together with all of its social consequences.

Chapter 6 describes the fate of the left. Defeated by the dictatorship both militarily and politically, it suffered a slow ideological erosion which ended with its incorporation into the reconstructed system of political parties. Here it was subordinated to a political élite with an ideology which had moved either to the centre or the right during the long years of the dictatorship. The ideological evolution of the left in the world generally and the disintegration of the Eastern bloc seemed to justify their adoption of the national project of the dictatorship.

The last chapter contains the study's conclusions. It seeks to show how these separate narratives of the evolutions of different political groups through the cycle democracy - dictatorship- new democracy can be understood only if the characteristics of the party system are analysed. Its ideological and organisational destruction and reconstruction show a certain rewriting of the rules. Some factors such as stability; the relation of the party system to society; the

domination of some groups and the possibility of participation by other subordinate groups; have been changed though, perhaps in some cases, not completely. A balance of continuities and changes has been effected between the two periods of democracy interrupted by the dictatorship.

On the theoretical level, the main conclusion is that the use of the concepts "party" and "party system" should be redefined in the analysis of specific historical situations. This is because of the difficulties that occur when the characteristics of a system, especially its limits, are defined in general terms and on an abstract level. Moreover, as in every analysis of complex structures, it is very difficult to justify realigning the axis of explanation from one level to another, in purely abstract terms. In this case, the difficulty arises when we move from the analysis of the action of a party as an individual unit to the meaning of the parties as players operating together within the totality of the system, considering not only their reciprocal effects but also the wider implications for social domination.



## **Chapter 1. Political parties in the 1970 Chilean election**

### 1.1 Introduction, the 1970 Chilean presidential election

The possibility that Salvador Allende might be the winning candidate in the presidential election of September 4, 1970 aroused comment not only in Chile but in the world press. What appeared to be unusual was not so much that Unidad Popular and the socialist candidate were offering "a peaceful road to socialism,"<sup>1</sup> but that the real possibility existed that they might win the election and Allende assume the office for which he had been nominated.

Explanations for such an event turned upon the idiosyncrasies of Chile, the Chileans and the historical crossroads at which they had arrived. Such metaphysical embellishments as the "Chilean national character" were used to explain these events.<sup>2</sup> One wholly subordinated explanation changes the entire view of the Chilean political process. That is, the existence of a system of parties that acted as the principal part of the political

---

<sup>1</sup> Which was, after all, an old motto of the international communist movement directed by the Soviet Union. Alonso Daire studies the course of this thesis in the Chilean Communist Party in "La política del partido Comunista desde la post-guerra hasta la Unidad Popular", in *El Partido Comunista en Chile: Estudio multidisciplinario*, Augusto Varas, compiler pp. 180-190, .

<sup>2</sup> "In their pluralistic politics, the Chileans lay bare their souls," Richard E. Feinberg, *The Triumph of Allende: Chile's Legal Revolution*, p. 89



system (the latter being understood as the structure constituted by the system of government, the system of parties and the electoral system). In that sense, it was basic in determining the conduct of the most outstanding actors in the process. In other words, if the political confrontation implied a strategic social confrontation, the latter was expressed (channelled) by the rules of the political system. And that to break those rules, as in fact occurred, was a decision requiring a prior process of maturation and accumulation of forces disposed to do so by wearing down the rules of the political system as they had functioned up to that moment. In the world of 1970, of a general upsurge of the left and, in particular, of the "new lefts," "Castro-like" in Latin America and "Post-'68" in the world at large, the Chilean political process was particularly resonant to the ears of foreign observers. In the first place, political actors identified themselves by the names of parties obedient to universal ideologies, that is, originating in Europe. Secondly, the period of stable functioning of the Chilean political system went back to the thirties, thereby having lasted longer than the systems of most

European<sup>3</sup> nations, not to mention the rest of Latin America where the Chilean case was frankly exceptional.

Once Allende assumed office, discussion turned upon his chances of implementing his programme and completing his term of office, the two being related in different ways. If the simplistic view is accepted, according to which the violent end of the process in 1973 was not only unavoidable but predictable, given the insoluble contradictions it posited to the nation's prevailing social domination, an explanation is required for the one thousand days it took to come to its end. Those thousand days of a highly troubled political and social process may be seen as the road to a prefigured finale, or as the oscillations of a system which, by a series of failed attempts to stabilize led to its unforeseen restructuring at a point far from equilibrium.<sup>4</sup>

Discussion should be posited in terms of legitimacy, in view of the fact that a violent outcome was imposed in the face of the impossibility of changing the government by legal means and the rules of the system being worn out. However, legitimacy, as a process of social

---

<sup>3</sup> Only the United Kingdom and the United States preserved a liberal democratic regime functioning normally during the crisis period of World War II.



acceptance, is not exhausted in legality. The legitimacy of the Unidad Popular administration must be measured by the intensity of the violence employed by the insurgents to topple it in 1973.<sup>5</sup> Repression, always justified in terms of the presence of armed groups, was aimed at social and political organizations that supported the government. This support may be measured by the scope of the sectors affected by the first stage of dictatorial repression.

#### 1.2 Definition of the temporal framework of the process

The search for a genetic explanation for the situation in 1970, in the evolution of the party system, raises the problem of definition and periodisation. It is a matter of temporally delimiting the system constituted by the principal actors in the electoral political process. If the presidential candidacies are considered as blocs of parties and tendencies, left, right and center, the system may be taken back to 1958, when the same three forces also competed for the presidency of the republic. Two of the three candidates

---

<sup>4</sup> Using the formulation expressed by Wallerstein in *Unthinking Social Science*, p. 235, of the dissipative systems proposed by Ilya Prigogine and Isabel Stengers in *The New Alliance*.

<sup>5</sup> "Official" accounting of dead and disappeared is contained in the so-called "Rettig Report." Informe de la Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación, texto oficial completo. A commentary that adds other sources is contained in Genaro Arriagada, *Por la razón o la fuerza, Chile bajo Pinochet*, pp. 22-27.



competing for election in 1970 had also campaigned in 1958, along with a further two candidates (absent on the latter date).<sup>6</sup> However, if analysis is applied to the party system, the forming of blocs was a "normal" effect of presidential races, but was not the regular functional structure in parliamentary and municipal life. If the parties are taken as components of a system and the rules of the game among them as criteria for periodisation, the evolution of the system must refer to the applicability of the Constitution of 1925. That is, to the period that begins in 1932 and the genesis thereafter of elements that would come together in 1970 as collective (party) and individual (leaders) actors.

The period to be considered, 1932-1970 is characterized by regular and normal functioning without violent interruptions of a government established under the Constitution of 1925. This prominently includes the holding of periodic elections, the results of which were not questioned in significant terms by any of the principal actors, i.e. the political parties. The latter, came to constitute a system that functioned throughout the period with only one major crisis, the period of exclusion of the Communist Party from legality

---

<sup>6</sup> The 1958 candidates were Alessandri, Allende, Bossay, Frei and

between 1948 and 1957.<sup>7</sup> The 1925 Constitution was the result of an extraordinary negotiation to establish a rule to replace the parliamentary system of government established in 1891 based on interpretation of the Constitution of 1833. This form of government had been eliminated by a number of military *pronunciamentos* beginning in 1924, culminating in the military dictatorship of Carlos Ibañez del Campo, 1927-1931.<sup>8</sup>

Features of Chile's political development pertinent to this subject include: 1) the early organization of a state and system of government rarely challenged internally by force as a significant threat<sup>9</sup>; 2) the conversion of factious forces into political parties or proto-parties which channel their activities within constitutional rules<sup>10</sup>; 3) a quasi-monopoly of political activity and posts within the political system by a party elite devoted to politics as a profession; 4) the

---

Zamorano. In 1970 the candidates were Alessandri, Allende and Tomic.

<sup>7</sup> On the outlawing of the Communist Party see: Julio Faúndez, *Marxism and Democracy in Chile*, pp. 73-75; Furci, Carmelo Faúndez, *The Chilean Communist Party and the Road to Socialism*, pp. 38-61; María Soledad Gómez, "Factores nacionales e internacionales de la política interna del Partido Comunista de Chile (1922-1952)," *El Partido Comunista en Chile: Estudio multidisciplinario*, Augusto Varas (compiler), pp. 114-133.

<sup>8</sup> See Ricardo Donoso, *Alessandri, agitador y demoledor*. Also Gonzalo Vial, *Historia de Chile (1891-1973)*, Vol. III, Chap. 13.

<sup>9</sup> Periods of considerable threat to order were few after 1830: 1851, 1859, 1891 (in which the revolution was victorious), 1924-1927 and the dictatorship which lasted until 1931, 1938, 1939, and 1969.

<sup>10</sup> Karen Remmer, *Party Competition in Argentina and Chile, Political Recruitment and Public Policy, 1890-1930*.



broadening of the electoral clientele for these parties by extending suffrage and incorporating new social sectors into political participation which, in turn, increased the elite by the creation of new almost always short-lived parties, and 5) a rooting of political parties in the social conscience to the extent of making membership in or sympathy for a party a factor in social, individual and group identification.

### 1.3 The order of the system in 1932

In 1932 a system of government was put into operation prescribed by the Constitution of 1925, by virtue of which only once under that regime was a president of the republic and a bicameral legislature elected simultaneously. The first presidential term under that scheme (the second term of office for president Arturo Alessandri Palma), was a period of reorganization of parties affected by external and internal crises expressed ideologically as divisions and alliances carried out within and among parties.

Three processes that took place in this period are important in the formation of party characteristics and in the system constituted by them. The first was the exclusion of the military from politics and the open

social rejection of their participation in the Ibañez<sup>11</sup> dictatorship by means of, among other features, a curious militarization of party youth active in street clashes<sup>12</sup>. The second was the formation of a left consisting of two parties the names of which, Socialist and Communist, deceptively recall the situation of the left and the labour movement in Europe during the same period. A third feature was the formation, under Ibañez, of a generation of university leaders who would quickly step into the foreground once democracy was reinstated and become career models within the political elite.<sup>13</sup>

What was deceptive about the parties of the left was that the Chilean Communist Party was not a breakaway from the Socialist Party as was normal in Europe. On the contrary, the foundation of the Chilean Socialist Party in 1933 represents the regrouping of labour and ideological tendencies and organizations among which there were anarchists, anarcho-syndicalists, left nationalists, Trotskyites, and other splinters from the Communist Party.<sup>14</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup> See the chapter in General Carlos Prats' *Memorias* entitled "La reacción civilista contra la dictadura de Ibañez".

<sup>12</sup> Fernando Pinto Lagarrigue, *Crónica política del siglo XX*, Chapter XI.

<sup>13</sup> Salvador Allende and Eduardo Frei M. belong to this generation.

<sup>14</sup> Fernando Casanueva Valencia and Manuel Fernández Canque. *El Partido Socialista y la lucha de clases Chile*, chapters II and III.



This first period, 1932-1938, may be seen as a test run for the system. All the actors who would contribute to the character of Chilean politics for the next three decades would be deployed in the 1938 presidential election. By then, all the features that would form the nucleus of the party system that would last until 1973 would have already been activated.

#### 1.4 The normal functioning of the system and the Radical administrations of 1938-1952.

The events of 1938 were perceived by some of those affected by them as a change of epoch<sup>15</sup>. Three candidates took the field in the presidential election. The candidate of the traditional oligarchy was Gustavo Ross Santa María, backed by the most traditional Liberal and Conservative parties. Pedro Aguirre Cerda was the candidate of the new social forces, workers organized in the Socialist and Communist parties, and subordinated by the middle classes who, dependent upon the state, organized themselves into the Radical Party, all allied in what was called the Popular Front in the language of the time. A third candidate, the former dictator Carlos Ibañez del Campo was supported by marginal forces (the

---

<sup>15</sup> Eduardo Balmaceda Valdés, *Un mundo que se fue...* Alberto Faltra Cortés, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, quoted by German Urzua Valenzuela, *La democracia práctica. Los gobiernos radicales*, p. 41.

National Socialist Workers' Party) and had contacts among the military, mainly the army. The latter was eliminated from the contest after some of his followers (home-grown Nazis) attempted a coup d'etat which was not joined by the army and was ferociously crushed by the police.<sup>16</sup>

This threw the Chilean Nazi vote, which had in the previous election (1937) won only 4% of the vote, to the Popular Front. In view of the close results of the presidential election (50.17% for Aguirre Cerda against 49.24% for Gustavo Ross), there is almost general agreement that the Chilean Popular Front victory was due to the decided last minute support of the Nazis.<sup>17</sup>

The Popular Front victory caused a crisis among Conservative Party youth who split off to form the Falange Nacional.<sup>18</sup> Thus, on the level of the political elite this left six principal actors on stage who, with changes that need to be explained, would form the system of Chilean political parties until 1973. The parties that would constitute this system were: the Conservative and Liberal parties on the right, Radical and Falange

---

<sup>16</sup> A more recent testimony to these events is to be found in the *Memorias* of General Carlos Prats, pp. 74-76.

<sup>17</sup> This paradox of Chilean politics is one among many others that suggests to me the importance of the party system in explaining the concrete conduct of political actors and the differences between them and their declared principles.

<sup>18</sup> Ricardo Yocelvezky, *La Democracia Cristiana Chilena y el gobierno de Eduardo Frei. 1964-1970*, pp. 85-86.



Nacional (Christian Democrats after 1957) at the center and, on the left, the Communist and Socialist parties.

From the point of view of the composition of the professional political elite, this configuration represents an expansion that would culminate in the incorporation of middle classes via university student political movements. The road to individual political ascent would continue to function under party control until the sixties.<sup>19</sup>

At the same time, the military on active duty were excluded from participation in the political process at this level.

As for the electorate, it grew to the point of opening the possibility of including working class sectors that could be encouraged to vote by their organizations or by some clientelist relationship. The right to vote included males over 21 years of age, capable of reading and writing, and registered as voters.<sup>20</sup>

The composition of party rank-and-file and party structure as a relation between elite, rank-and-file and

---

<sup>19</sup> Even today, the elite dominating the political system reconstructed in the late eighties originates from the university youth of the parties of the sixties.

electoral clientele differed in each sector. On the right, the historical parties are parties of notables who co-opt each other by virtue of their social relations. Both the Liberals and Conservatives claim captive electoral clienteles by virtue of their regional influence as landowners and, therefore, control of the campesino vote which lacks autonomous organization. The Conservative Party also has the Catholic hierarchy on its side. The Liberal Party, on the other hand, was the first to attempt the mobilization of popular urban sectors for electoral ends. It was in this party that the most noteworthy professional demagogue of the twentieth century, Arturo Alessandri, took part and whose political performance became legend.<sup>21</sup>

In the center, a segment of the Radical Party's<sup>22</sup> leaders resembles the liberals but also has a broad base of support in the urban middle classes politicized by discussion of contingent and doctrinaire political

---

<sup>20</sup> Germán Urzúa Valenzuela, *Diccionario político institucional de Chile*, pp. 154 and 155; and *Historia política electoral de Chile (1931-1973)*, pp. 14 and 15.

<sup>21</sup> Ricardo Donoso, *Alessandri, agitador y demoleedor*, Vol. I, and Gonzalo Vial, *Historia de Chile (1891-1973)*, Vol. III, *Arturo Alessandri y los golpes militares (1920-1925)*.

<sup>22</sup> Bibliography on the Radical Party includes Florencio Durán, *El Partido Radical*, 1958; Germán Urzúa Valenzuela., *El Partido Radical, su evolución política*, 1961; Jorge Mario Quinzio Figueiredo "El Partido Radical, origen-doctrina - convenciones", in *Party Competition in Argentina and Chile: Political Recruitment and*



subjects in party assemblies throughout the country.<sup>23</sup> These functioned regularly in a national network of restaurants and cantinas (the so-called Radical Clubs), which became the most popular but not the only ones of their kind<sup>24</sup>

It should also be mentioned that the middle class was influenced in its intellectual activities by the Masonic lodges mostly attended by militant radicals but also by some liberals and, later on, by growing numbers of socialists. For its part, the Falange Nacional had been born closely associated with the activities of Catholic Action<sup>25</sup> and the growth of its militant rank-and-file was linked to the Church's social action in working class sectors inaccessible to the conservatives, and among university youth.

On the left, party militancy became, in the case of the Communist Party, part of the cultural life of the urban working classes. This is also true to a lesser degree of the Socialist Party. From the beginning of the

---

*Public Policy*, 1984; Luis Palma Zúñiga, *Historia del Partido Radical*, 1967; Peter G. Snow, *Radicalismo Chileno*, 1972;

<sup>23</sup> Remmer, *Op.cit.* p. 17 situates this form of organization as existing in the 1880s.

<sup>24</sup> There was still a Democratic Club and even a Liberal Club in Santiago in the sixties. However, their survival cannot be explained by any political activity, but apparently because of a tax exemption consequent to the name of some organization registered in the name of the establishment.

organization of working class sectors in the nineteenth century, activities of solidarity, education<sup>26</sup> and recreation facilitated access of the most politicized groups to political organization and mobilization.

The Popular Front alliance coincided ideologically with the global political tendencies dominant during World War II. However, what is more specific to a peripheral economy like the Chilean, is that it expressed politically the social alliance which backed development throughout Latin America. These social alliances and this development ideology became the dominant national strategy in almost all the countries of the region. They were carried out by a variety of political-ideological combinations<sup>27</sup> generically called "populism" in the analysis of Latin American social sciences until the eighties at which time the term came to be used to refer pejoratively to the whole model of development implemented in those years.<sup>28</sup> In its classical political meaning in Latin America, populism designates such varied regimes and tendencies as Peronism in Argentina, Varguism

---

<sup>25</sup> Oscar Larson, *La ANEC y la Democracia Cristiana*.

<sup>26</sup> The "Sociedad de Artesanos La Unión" founded in the XIX century by Malaquías Concha, a democratic leader, was still functioning in the sixties in the interest of mass education.

<sup>27</sup> Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina*.

<sup>28</sup> Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastián Edwards, *The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America*.



in Brazil, and Cardenism in 1930s Mexico. What all these had in common is the social alliance in which the axis is constituted by an industrial bourgeoisie allied to the state elite (civil or military) and that subordinates the urban and rural working classes. In Chile, this social alliance specifically expresses itself, ideologically and politically, in an alliance of socialist, communist and radical political parties.

The achievements of the Chilean Popular Front, which the Radical Party always claimed as its own,<sup>29</sup> consisted of a policy of industrialization by import substitution; the creation of a development bank (Corporación de Fomento de la Producción, CORFO); the establishment of protectionist tariff barriers; and the subordination of the organized working class movement to "national goals" of development. These political foundations crumbled at the beginning of the Cold War.<sup>30</sup> At the same time, this policy, which had been largely spontaneous and reactive in terms of the world economic situation created by the 1929 crisis and was aggravated by the war, became a

---

<sup>29</sup> Germán Urzua Valenzuela. *La democracia práctica. Los gobiernos radicales.*

<sup>30</sup> Julio Faúndes, *Op.cit.*

conscious technical proposal for development promoted by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America [ECLA].<sup>31</sup>

In formal terms, the breakdown of the alliance occurred in a number of stages, but its culmination was the proscription of the Communist Party and related organizations in 1948. This was a crisis for the entire party system.<sup>32</sup> In fact, this process constituted Chile's adaptation to the post-war world. The alternatives were either to maintain the political system centred on the party system or to "normalise" the political system in Latin American terms by replacing the alliance of parties that politically and ideologically expressed the developmental social alliance by a "movement" similar to those existing in Argentina and Brazil. Ibañism represented this alternative in 1952.<sup>33</sup>

1.5 The failure of Ibañism, a Chilean attempt at classical populism.

In the face of a combined reaction from the party system, Ibañism failed to consolidate itself. However, it did experience a realignment of forces leading some authors to say that this crisis was in fact the

---

<sup>31</sup> Raul Prebisch, *El desarrollo de la América Latina y algunos de sus principales problemas*.

<sup>32</sup> Germán Urzúa Valenzuela. *Historia política electoral de Chile. 1931-1973*, pp. 68-71.

<sup>33</sup> Urzúa V. *Op.cit.* chapter III.



replacement of one party system by another.<sup>34</sup> The party system that re-emerged in the fifties to present candidates in the presidential elections of 1958 remained the same with a few significant, but not thoroughgoing, changes. The stabilizing features that characterized the continuity of the system are the survival of the elite, the relative constancy of electoral influence and the continuation of the dominant ideological model as a national strategy for development. This only becomes explicit and refined through the replacement of the Radical Party by the Christian Democratic Party as the principal force of the center and axis of the system of alliances.<sup>35</sup>

The survival of the elite is demonstrated by the failure of leaders associated with multiple short-lived movements created to support Ibañez or to consolidate their position within that elite. Those who were able to establish themselves earlier or later were the ones that associated themselves with established parties, principally the Christian Democrats at the moment of its founding in 1957. Of the five presidential candidates who

---

<sup>34</sup> Genaro Arriagada, *¿Hacia un "Big Bang" del sistema de partidos?*

<sup>35</sup> It may be said that during its administration after the *República Front*, the Radical Party represented in the practice the strategy for national development. Later this was given a theoretical basis

competed in 1958, four were "respectable" members of the elite. They were associated with parties and alliances thereof. Alessandri was supported by conservatives and liberals; Bossay, by the Radical Party; Frey by the Christian Democrats; Allende was nominated by the recently created Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP), an alliance of communists and socialists. The exception was the caricatural "priest from Catapilco" Antonio Zamorano Herrera who tried to create a populist mobilization on the fringes of the left, by organising the (reunified) Socialist Party and the (re-legalized) Communist Party.

The stability of electoral support, a structural feature, must be considered in the light of its intrinsic relativity. This is principally due to the considerable increase in the number of electors as women obtained the right to vote in 1949.<sup>36</sup> Secondly, the Ibañez victory of 1952 had especially erosive effect on the socialist party, which by contrast underscores the relative stability of the communist vote.<sup>37</sup>

Table N°1 Deputies of the six principal parties, by legislature 1932-1973:

---

by ECLA and ideologically appropriated by the Christian Democrats on the basis of their contact with the latter organization.

<sup>36</sup> The electorate almost doubled between 1949 and 1953, rising from 592,000 to 1,100,000. Urzúa V. *Op.cit.* p. 15.

<sup>37</sup> The communists obtained 10.2% of the vote in 1945 were then outlawed and did not participate again until 1961, when they obtained 11.37%. The socialists got 12.8% in 1945, 9.3% in 1949, 9.8% in 1953, 8.7% in 1957 and 11% in 1961.



Election year	Deputies of the Six principal Parties	Total number of deputies
1932	83	142
1937	124	147
1941	132	147
1945	130	147
1949	106	147
1953	52	147
1957	113	147
1961	135	147
1965	144	147
1969	150	150
1973	142	150

Sources: Compiled on the basis of data contained in Ricardo Cruz-Coke, *Historia electoral de Chile, 1925-1973*, German Urzúa Valenzuela, *Diccionario político e institucional de Chile*.

Only in 1932, in a reorganizing election, and in 1953, partially as a consequence of Ibañez' election to the Presidency six months before, did the principal parties get less than two-thirds of the deputies. Two-thirds was the only qualified majority specified in the 1925 Constitution<sup>38</sup>, by virtue of which, theoretically, any agreement among the six principal actors in the system could be made law.

The period of least relative influence of the six principal parties, at its lowest in 1953, also includes

---

<sup>38</sup> There are laws defined as being of greater importance, whereby it is believed that a simple majority (50% plus 1) of the members of the two chambers is insufficient to pass them.

the previous election (1949 with 106 deputies among the six), and the period immediately after (1957, with 113).

Table 2 Composition of the Chamber of Deputies by Parties 1932-1973

		Legislature (by year of general election)										
PARTY		32	37	41	45	49	53	57	61	65	69	73
NATIONAL											33	34
CONSERV.		34	35	32	36	31	2	23	17	3		
LIBERAL		18	35	22	31	33	23	30	28	6		
CHRISTIAN DEM (FALANGE)				3	3	3	3	17	23	82	56	50
RADICAL		31	29	44	39	34	19	36	39	20	24	5
SOCIALIST			19	15	6	5	5	7	12	15	15	27
COMMUNIST			6	16	15				16	18	22	26
SUB-TOTAL		83	124	132	130	106	52	113	135	144	150	142
MINOR AND UNSTABLE PARTIES*		(4)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(7)	(6)	(2)	(1)	(1)		
(REPRESENTED MORE THAN ONCE)		30	15	12	16	32	73	15	12	3		
PART REREPRESENTED ONLY ONCE*		(12)	(2)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(7)	(4)				(5)
		25	5	3	1	9	17	17			8	
INDEPENDENT		4	3				5	2				
SUB-TOTAL		59	23	15	17	41	95	34	12	3		8
TOTAL NUMBER OF DEPUTIES		142	147	147	147	147	147	147	147	147	150	150



\*(0) is THE NUMBER OF PARTIES excepting the 6 principal parties which won representation in the Chamber of Deputies in that year's election.

Sources: Compiled according to data in Lia Cortés and Jordi Fuentes, *Diccionario Político de Chile*, and Ricardo Cruz-Coke, *Electoral History of Chile 1925-1973*.

The minor and unstable parties that won representation in the Chamber of Deputies and the legislatures in which they took part, indicated by year of the general election, are as follows. Agrarian Party (1932, 1937, 1941, 1945 and 1953); Democratic Party (1932, 1937, 1941 and 1945); Democratic Party of Chile (1932, 1937, 1941, 1945, 1949 and 1953); Radical Socialist (1932 and 1941); Liberal Progressive Party (1945 and 1949); Authentic Socialist Party (1945 and 1949) Agrarian Labour Party (1949, 1953 and 1957); Popular Socialist Party (1949, 1953 and 1957); The People's Democratic Party (1949 and 1953); Traditionalist Conservative Party (1949 and 1953); National Democratic Party (1961 and 1965).<sup>39</sup>

---

<sup>39</sup> Parties winning parliamentary representation only once beginning in 1932 were: 1932: Employees Guild of Chile (AGECH), Independent Democratic, Social Democratic, Liberal Democratic, Doctrinaire Liberal, Unified Liberal, New Public Action, Independent Radical, Independent Radical Socialist, Socialist, Unified Socialist and Social Republican (total: 12); 1937: Republican Action and National Socialist Movement (total: 2); 1941: Socialist Workers Party and Popular Socialist Vanguard (total: 2); 1945: Popular Liberating Alliance (total: 1); 1949: Revolutionary Action, Radical Democratic (total: 2); 1953: Renovating Action, Labour, National Peoples' Movement, National Ibañista Movement, National Christian Movement, Radical Doctrinaire, United Popular (total: 7); 1957: Democratic

This development of parliamentary life, seen through elections to the Chamber of Deputies makes it possible to demonstrate certain characteristics of the system that it is important to emphasize: first, the existence of a professional political elite is based largely on the careers of deputies. In the eleven ordinary general elections to the Chamber of Deputies held between 1932 and 1973 the electorate was required to vote for representatives to 1618 seats. These were occupied by 903 individuals of which, 81 continued their political career in the Senate and three of them reached the Presidency of the Republic. It should be added that the total number of presidents in this same period, eight, had occupied seats in the Senate before being elected to head the executive.

This, in principle, recognizes the existence of a "political profession" pursued by a limited number of individuals. It is true that a political profession is not limited to parliamentary representation, however, we have substantiated that in this period no president reached the top of national politics without having previously occupied a place in one of the chambers.

---

Workers Party, National Republican Movement (total: 4); 1973: Independent Popular Action (API), Radical Democracy, Christian Left, Radical Left, Movement of Popular Action (MAPU) (total: 5).



The crux of the argument is the relationship existing among this professional political elite, although it may be made visible only in the space of a parliamentary career in which more individuals take part - the Chamber of Deputies - and the party system. We consider the latter to have been formed by the six principal parties, reduced to five in some periods.<sup>40</sup>

This connection may be seen in the statistical relation between individuals and parties occupying seats in the Chamber of Deputies only once during the entire period under consideration. This turned out to be low (0.226)<sup>41</sup>, which indicates that seeking and achieving a parliamentary career is best associated with some of the principal parties. Hence, it is highly probable that deputies elected by parties entering parliament only once subsequently sought continuity by joining one of the principal parties as individuals or by alliance or fusion, as part of an organization.

#### 1.6 Politics in three blocks, 1958-1970

---

<sup>40</sup> At the outset there was no Socialist Party, founded in 1933 (the fact that representation was achieved once in 1932 does not lead to the conclusion that it was part of the system thereafter), not even Falange Nacional, founded in 1938, between 1948 and 1957, the Communist Party was outlaw and finally in 1965 Conservatives and Liberals were joined in the National Party.

<sup>41</sup> The Pearson coefficient of correlation was calculated for the variables "proportion of deputies elected only once over the total number of deputies and proportion of parties that reached parliament only once over all parties"

The result of the 1958 presidential election prefigured in several senses what would occur in subsequent strategic confrontations within the political system, that is, in the subsequent presidential elections of 1964 and 1970. In the first place, in 1958, three principal figures appeared on the scene and remained for the rest of this historical period: Jorge Alessandri, Salvador Allende and Eduardo Frei. Victory fell to Alessandri, but Allende, who held second place obtained only 33,416 votes less. The "Priest of Catapilco"<sup>42</sup> obtained 41,304 votes, wherefore analysts agreed in attributing Allende's defeat to his populist campaign. This made a victory for the left seem probable in another election of the same kind. In the second place, this election marked the definitive replacement of the Radical Party by the Christian Democrats as the prime power in the center of a party system and the ideological spectrum. This change would have important consequences, for the Christian Democrats represented a new generation of young politicians who would assume the ideology dominant in the overall party system.

The Radical Party was the axis of the system of party alliances that had, in Chile's case, politically

---

<sup>42</sup> See above page 45.



represented the social alliance that responded throughout Latin America to the consequences of the 1929 world crisis. This social alliance typically joined industrial interests (a weak bourgeoisie) to personnel dominating the state apparatus and simultaneously dependent upon it (civil and military middle classes). It was to this main axis that worker organizations and in some cases campesino mobilizations were subordinated. The ideological and organic forms this social alliance took were diverse (populist movements). But in the Chilean case these took the shape of a unified alliance of political parties (the Popular Front), in which what was most noteworthy was the participation of the working class subordinated to its parties (socialist and communist), but ideologically independent when both declared themselves Marxist.<sup>43</sup>

Reorganization of the capitalist world under the hegemony of the United States at the end of the Second World War was carried out by means of ideological-political instruments like the United Nations. Within these lay the implementation of a strategy for organizing

---

<sup>43</sup> See Faúndez, *Op.cit.*

a world of nation-states, all of them in theory able to develop as such.<sup>44</sup>

The UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) theoretically coded the experience of the largest states in the region (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) and converted them into a technical program for economic development, access to which would be gained by industrialization via import substitution. ECLA director, Raul Prebisch, formulated the ideas shaping that strategy. They became the doctrine around which pre-existing curricula in the social sciences in Latin American universities were reformulated and new schools for social sciences were founded (in sociology, political science, demography, social anthropology, etc.) where none had previously existed. This constituted a forceful move toward the modernisation of those institutes and a renewal of ideas under discussion, and generations of university; students in the 1950s were the first to benefit.

In the early 1950s, Christian Democrats, still in the guise of Falange Nacional, began to partake of these ideas and appropriate them via some of their leaders and

---

<sup>44</sup>Immanuel Wallerstein,. "Development: Lodestar or Illusion?" in *Unthinking Social Science*, pp. 104-124.



intellectuals.<sup>45</sup> They thus became the principal attraction for young Chilean university students in search of a ideological home in which to begin their political careers. By the end of the decade, Christian Democrats, through university membership, were leading student federations in the eight Chilean universities.

It was also at the end of the decade, in 1959, that the Cuban Revolution changed the political and ideological landscape of Latin America. In the early sixties, priority U.S. foreign policy toward the nations of the region was expressed in "The Alliance for Progress." This was a U.S. government fund aimed at promoting development in the Latin American countries, conditioning their participation in it to the undertaking of "structural reforms" along the policy lines proposed by ECLA.<sup>46</sup> At the same time that the armed forces of all the region's nations were reorganized and equipped for a hypothetical "internal war," i.e. they were converted into counterinsurgency forces, the armed forces of the United States were developing the means to intervene in

---

<sup>45</sup> In 1954 Frei appeared as the spokesman for a Committee of the Interamerican Economic and Social Council of the OAS, expounding the viewpoints of ECLA's in an Annual Report in the discussion of which he had participated as an expert. Jerome Levinson, and Juan de Onís, *The Alliance that Lost its Way* p. 39

<sup>46</sup> Levinson and De Onís, *Op.cit.*

those countries threatened by insurgent movements.<sup>47</sup> To this should be added the intent to use these burgeoning Latin American social sciences as an instrument to evaluate the risk of social and political destabilization.<sup>48</sup> It was in this scenario, with the Cold War as an internal element of the region, that Chile faced presidential elections in 1964.

### 1.7 Christian Democrat reformism.

The left, organized in the Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP), and composed of communist and socialist and other minor parties, again nominated Salvador Allende. The Christian Democrats also re-nominated their 1958 candidate, Eduardo Frei M. The right, in power at the time with Jorge Alessandri as president, decided to support Julio Durán, candidate of the Radical Party, which had been integrated into the governing alliance during the period.<sup>49</sup>

Party campaigns and party alliances backing three candidates favored the probability of a victory for the alliance in power. However, a prior trial of strength, a

---

<sup>47</sup> *Operaciones contra fuerzas irregulares*, translation of English Manual FM 31-15, May 31, 1961. Cuartel General, Ministerio del Ejército. Included in the *Report of the Special Commission of the Chamber of Deputies on Operation Camelot*, pp. 273-313.

<sup>48</sup> *Report of the Special Commission of the Chamber of Deputies of Chile on Operation Camelot* in 1965.



special election of a deputy at the beginning of 1964 gave the victory to the FRAP, suggesting the danger of an imminent victory of the left in the presidential election scheduled for September.<sup>50</sup> The parties of the right, liberals and conservatives, therefore withdrew their support from Durán and gave it to Frei. Simultaneously, and with the help of the US government, an advertising campaign was launched known as "the campaign of terror," full of truculent anticommunist invective, disseminating the idea that a victory for Allende would mean the imposition of a Marxist dictatorship, and describing Allende in the worst possible terms.<sup>51</sup> This nevertheless, represented a profound crisis in the political right. In the first place, its electoral support was declining<sup>52</sup> in the agrarian provinces, stronghold of its social power. Second, acceptance of its support by Frei and the Christian Democrats without negotiation or concessions, turned the right into a negative factor, in the sense that it only sought to prevent a left victory, without proposing its own platform. To this was added, between

---

<sup>49</sup> The Radical Party entered Jorge Alessandri's administration on August 26, 1961, with four secretaries. Jorge Mario Quinzio Figueiredo, *Op.cit.* p. 86.

<sup>50</sup> Yocelévsky, *Op.cit.* pp. 129-134.

<sup>51</sup> *Covert action in Chile*, pp. 14-16.

<sup>52</sup> Tomás Moulian, *La forja de ilusiones: el sistema de partidos 1932-1973*, pp. 109-122.

1963 and 1964, the presidential candidacy of Jorge Prat, withdrawn in April 1964, in which nationalist and fascist elements were mobilized, accentuating the anti-system and anti-party character of Acción Nacional. Nevertheless, the organization they created would subsequently be the embryo of right wing reconstruction.<sup>53</sup>

The Christian Democrat candidacy accepted the support of the right, disseminating the (evidently false) supposition that support of Frei meant support of his reform program.<sup>54</sup> This consisted of a detailed plan for development prepared by party professionals and technicians and their sympathizers and containing the ideas associated with ECLA and in the final period, with the Alliance for Progress.<sup>55</sup>

For its part, the left also prepared an economic development program, also based on the ideas of ECLA, with the participation of economists linked to that organ of the United Nations<sup>56</sup> (as in the case of the Christian Democrats). The left was put on the defensive by the

---

<sup>53</sup> Mario Arnello, *Proceso a una democracia, pensamiento político de Jorge Prat*.

<sup>54</sup> See for example the "Discurso de la patria joven" of June 21, 1964.

<sup>55</sup> *Informe preliminar para un programa de gobierno de la Democracia Cristiana*. Primer Congreso Nacional de Profesionales y Técnicos de la Democracia Cristiana e Independientes (*Libro Azul*).

<sup>56</sup> *Las bases técnicas del plan de acción del gobierno popular*, OCEPLAN, Comando Nacional de la Candidatura Presidencial del Dr. Salvador Allende.



"campaign of terror" and tried to project an image of moderation, encouraging political-electoral organization and mobilization, but discouraging labour mobilization and de-emphasizing solidarity with the Cuban Revolution, the principal source of images for the "campaign of terror".<sup>57</sup> The whole party system thus appeared to be shifted toward the left, leaving the parties of the right without an ideological platform of their own. The center and left shared and quarreled over the ideas for national economic development, the center showing only a more technocratic bent. At the same time, the Christian Democrats sought to replace the left in their influence on urban and rural working class sectors by executing a plan of organization and mobilization of sectors not politically influenced (according to them), such as campesinos, shantytown dwellers and women.<sup>58</sup>

The most important measures carried out by the administration of Eduardo Frei Montalva between 1964 and 1970 were the Chileanization of copper,<sup>59</sup> campesino union organization and agrarian reform.<sup>60</sup> All three were linked

---

<sup>57</sup> This was emphatically denied by Allende in an interview with the journalist Carlos Núñez, in 1970, included in the book *Chile, ¿la última opción electoral?* pp. 94-95.

<sup>58</sup> With respect to the ideology and practice of this concept see Yocelvezky, *Op.cit.* chap. V, pp. 189-212.

<sup>59</sup> Luis Maira, *Camino a la nacionalización del cobre.*

<sup>60</sup> David Lehman, *Agrarian Reform in Chile.*

to economic development plans and to the political and ideological struggle with the parties of the left. The Christian Democrats' strategic goal was to make themselves into the governing party that would carry out within itself the social alliance necessary to promote and back the reforms it proposed. In this it broke with the functional style of the party system. This was due to, in the first place, the right had had, in the Frei election, no alternative in the face of a victory from the left, but to unconditionally support the lesser evil. It was also due to the Frei presidential election of September 1964 being followed by a parliamentary election in March 1965, in which the Christian Democrats obtained a never-to-be-seen-again majority in the Chamber of Deputies. This was in part a product of a "band-wagon effect", and in part a result of the politicization of society in the presidential year.

The reforms introduced by the Christian Democrats reached neither the specific goals proposed nor the political effects envisioned by those who had proposed them. In the light of its importance for the Chilean economy, the fact that the Chileanization of copper turned out to be insufficient was a weighty argument in producing the consensus with which the following



administration intended to nationalise all mineral resources.<sup>61</sup> Campesino union organisation combined with agrarian reform finally eliminated the captive electoral influence of the landholding oligarchy, the foundation of liberal and conservative representation in parliament. However, when the goals of agrarian reform were not fulfilled in terms of the number of beneficiaries, social and political mobilization in the rural sector ended by favoring the left.<sup>62</sup> The same thing occurred in the urban sector where organization and mobilization of city dwellers, instead of creating a popular foundation without class ideology, which was the view of Promoción Popular, ended by reinforcing the presence of Marxist parties in that sector as well.<sup>63</sup>

The development of a generation of students aspiring to political careers in the sixties, was influenced by phenomena of international ideologies on the one hand and, on the other, by their prospects for promotion and development within the system of political parties. The Cuban Revolution had an impact on Latin America that is

---

<sup>61</sup> Julio Faúndez, "A Decision without a Strategy: Excess Profits in the Nationalization of Copper in Chile"

<sup>62</sup> From the promulgation of the law for campesino union organization in 1967, the growth of campesino organizations was explosive. Among the fastest growing, between 1968 and 1969, was the Confederación Nacional de Campesinos e Indígenas *Ranquil* affiliated to the CUT.

<sup>63</sup> Franz Vanderschueren, "Political Significance of Neighbourhood Committees in the Settlements of Santiago."

difficult to exaggerate.<sup>64</sup> Nevertheless, in each country, those who were the first to join what was later called "castrismo" came not from Marxist or Socialist tendencies. They were middle class youths with a university education, generally formed in the parties and movements that had been dominant in the fifties, influenced by nationalist and developmental ideologies and who found their political careers obstructed or retarded by a generation aging too slowly for its interest.

In Chile, the first manifestation of this tendency would occur before 1964, among the youth of the Radical Party. As soon as that party subordinated itself to the right and joined Jorge Alessandri's administration, with some of its members in the presidential cabinet, a large segment of the Radical Youth abandoned the party and created the Movimiento Social-Progresista.<sup>65</sup> After the 1964 elections, a segment of the Juventud Socialista de Concepción, made up mostly of university students, joined extra-parliamentary Marxist groups. These included communist and socialist dissidents of previous decades

---

<sup>64</sup> Costa Rica is the only Latin American country that had no armed movement inspired by the Cuban guerrilla model.

<sup>65</sup> Some of the names associated with this movement are surprising today. In spite of the fact that this movement, in the best Chilean



and formed the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario (MIR),<sup>66</sup> which became the most important group on the left external to the system of political parties.

A similar, but not symmetrical, movement occurred on the right. The left included elements seeking development outside the party system, for the most part positing armed struggle as the road to power, within the Guevarist movement then in style. On the right there was an ideological realignment that added members to the party system who had lived a more or less marginal political life. These were mainly nationalists who assumed leadership positions in the new National Party, that after 1966 joined Conservatives, Liberals and the National Action Movement which had launched the presidential candidacy of Jorge Pratt in 1963. Other youths, situated outside the party system and possessed of ideologies contrary to the course of development taken by Chile were also represented. These groups were of three types: 1) Catholic "integristas" opposed to the limitation of property rights which the agrarian reform

---

style, was not an armed movement, it attached itself ideologically to the Second Havana Declaration.

<sup>66</sup> The founding of MIR in 1965, consisted in the unification of marginal left tendencies: Trotskyists and "reinocistas" of the forties with castroist youth.

was imposing;<sup>67</sup> 2) Catholic university students opposed to the domination of university political life and later of national life by the political parties ("gremialistas");<sup>68</sup> and 3) Nationalists who remained outside the National Party.<sup>69</sup>

Both on the left and the right, these developments had an influence that was not explicitly recognized by the actors belonging to the party system. The right took advantage of the presence of a violently inclined left. And the retrograde thinking of the burgeoning new right scandalized the left. However, the party system as whole continued to channel what was fundamental in national political life and, in general, expressed social demands while extra-legal acts were sporadic.

The environment in which the 1970 presidential electoral campaign took place was characterized by growing social mobilization begun in 1964, presenting fertile ground on which the Christian Democrats tried

---

<sup>67</sup> This is the public origin of the Chilean Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family and Property (TFP), known by the title of its publication, the journal *Fiducia*. In 1965, they collected signatures to protest the constitutional reform of the right to property, which would facilitate the expropriations necessary for agrarian reform, sent to Congress by Frei administration in December 1964. That protest was published in *El Mercurio* of May 15, 1965.

<sup>68</sup> Their origin goes back to 1966 in the Law School of the Catholic University. Jaime Guzmán, *Escritos personales*, p. 39.

<sup>69</sup> Traditional marginal fascists, like the MRNS, or mobilized by the opportunities for change drawing near, like Patria y Libertad.



first to compete with the left, but then in the second part of Frei's administration decided to repress it.<sup>70</sup>

A polarization occurred in the ideological sphere that took shape in sectors on the right and left organized outside the party system, but that influenced the closest parties above all through youth sectors for whom they represented an alternative.

Ideological change even reached the center, the party of the government which, at the middle of its period in office, ought to have opted for a radicalization of its reform program, to compete with the left, or adopt an attitude of moderation that might permit it to present itself as an alternative to the left among sectors of the right, as had occurred in 1964. By resolving in favor of the latter possibility, the Christian Democrats saw youth sectors separate from the party and form their own organization, the Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria (MAPU).<sup>71</sup>

In cultural terms, Chilean society was shaken by abstract universal ideological polemics. For example the above mentioned Catholic ultra-right organized its

---

<sup>70</sup> On the social and political mobilization under the Frei administration see Faúndez, Julio Guzmán, *Marxism and Democracy in Chile*, p. 152.

<sup>71</sup> On the internal struggles in the Christian Democratic Party during the Frei administration see Yocelévsky, *Op.cit.*, pp. 279-315.

Chilean Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family and Property (FIDUCIA), which, according to its best known expression, viewed the Christian Democratic government and its reform programs as the anteroom to communism. Such people rejected the vogue of the period -- shoulder length hair on men, rock groups and so on -- and caused violent incidents among middle and upper class youths. Student movements culminated in 1967 with the occupation of the main building of the Universidad Católica and a sign on the façade denouncing Chile's principal and, naturally, right wing newspaper, *El Mercurio*, as a purveyor of falsehoods.

Meanwhile in public universities the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), which directed the Universidad de Concepción Federation of Students, became popular among the students. This was the main "castroist"-type movement in Chile. They rejected the elections as a way to power and carried out several bank robberies in 1968 and 1969.

The victory of Christian Democratic reformism lent the overall political system the appearance of a shift to the left, by subordinating the right in the presidential election and then defeating it in parliamentary elections the following year. At the beginning of 1970 the system



still appeared to have shifted in that direction but with the right on the way to rapid recovery.<sup>72</sup> The perception of a threat from outside the party system as part of this reconstruction of the process enjoys the advantage of hindsight. For the actors, if there was a perception of threat, it was no more than the victory of one of their adversaries. The Partido Nacional appeared to be reinforcing the system by incorporating nationalistic currents that had been until then blatantly anti-system and anti-party.<sup>73</sup> Only the right, and not all of it, perceived Allende's victory as a threat to the system itself. If there was an explicit threat to the existence of the system it came from the ultra-left which could not be considered capable of creating a crisis even in the Chilean politics of the moment. It was a feature of right wing propaganda to try to associate Allende's candidacy with the armed activities of the MIR and other groups, or to confuse occasionally illegal social mobilizations with acts threatening the system.

---

<sup>72</sup> The recently created Partido Nacional enjoyed a noteworthy success in the 1969 parliamentary elections, tripling the representation in the Chamber of Deputies, which the conservative and liberal parties had obtained in 1965.

<sup>73</sup> Such is the case of the National Action Movement which lent its name to the new party which concluded former Ibañists and nazis, who were earlier still.

Apparently, the system faced the 1970 presidential election with a repetition of previously confronting forces (the worn out thesis of the three thirds), represented by already well-known candidates, one even having been previously elected to the same position for which he was being nominated again. A more careful analysis reveals elements of continuity and change related in a complex fashion.

On the right, the factor for continuity was the candidate Jorge Alessandri who, as was pointed out earlier, had already held that investiture between 1958 and 1964. He had the support of conservatives and liberals now joined in the new Partido Nacional. However, this new party had among its leaders individuals who until then had been marginal to the party system. Some of them, from as far back as the Creole Nazism of the thirties, had participated with others in the ephemeral populist experience of Ibañez, with a nationalistic ideology that had always remained subordinate within the system. However, they aspired to conquer an electoral clientele among the urban middle classes that would replace the comfortable captive vote of the campesinos now mobilized by both the Christian Democrats and the



left since the advent of new forms of organization in the rural sector.

The crisis suffered by the traditional parties of the right had also mobilized entrepreneurial corporative organizations within which, during the Frei administration, competition appeared between Christian Democrats and the traditional right for influence in those sectors. This produced the paradoxical result of increasing the influence of entrepreneurial sectors in the government at the cost of the more ideological influence of the Christian Democrat Party itself, but also activated new political forces outside the party system.<sup>74</sup>

All the same, Alessandri's candidacy had a centripetal effect on the political system, attracting and subordinating to its rules the new arrivals who represented a renewal of the right within and outside the party system. This renewal seemed to make the right strong enough to avoid subordinating itself to the Christian Democrats (as they had done in 1964) even with the increasing possibility of an electoral victory of the left. Nevertheless, this Alessandrist right of 1970 continued to fall within the ideological model of the

party system as far as the economic development of the country was concerned. With respect to the formulation of its program of government, Alessandri's campaign brought "the Chicago boys" head to head with "the brains of the captains of industry who had flourished under the protection of import substitution."<sup>75</sup>

Although it is possible to detect the beginning of the demise of the party system as far back as the 1960s, it cannot be said that the system was in a state of crisis in 1970. On the contrary, if neither the left nor the right electoral campaigns were able to introduce centrifugal forces into the party system, they were indeed able to neutralize them. What unleashed the critical process was the result of the elections of September 4, 1970, and the victory of Salvador Allende and the Unidad Popular.

---

<sup>74</sup> See Yocelvezky, *Op.cit.* pp. 222-228.

<sup>75</sup> Arturo Fontaine Aldunate, *La historia no contada de los economistas y el presidente Pinochet*, p. 32. He adds, "From De Castro and his people came a letter to the candidate establishing their positions and declining to continue in their posts."



## **Chapter 2. Unidad Popular and the crisis of the political system in 1973**

2.1 The problem and the points of view from which it has been examined

Chile's experience from 1970 to 1973 has produced a veritable avalanche of books since Allende's election and even more after the tragic end to his incumbency.<sup>1</sup> The thematic axes of this extensive and growing literature are various. The most common are attempts to evaluate the chances of a peaceful transition to socialism, both among its supporters in general and among its enemies.<sup>2</sup> Later, after the Chilean left was defeated, appraisals of the experience appeared which largely preserved the same earlier positions.<sup>3</sup> To these must be added justifications for the roles played by some of the actors, individual and collective, who survived the

---

<sup>1</sup> Just collecting and classifying the bibliography on the subject would constitute a full-fledged research project. Here only representative examples of it will be mentioned.

<sup>2</sup> Examples of publications subsequent to Allende's election include: Clark, Kate. *Chile, Reality and Prospects of Popular Unity*, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1972; Debray, Régis. *Conversations with Allende*, New Left Books, London, 1971; Feinberg, Richard E., *The Triumph of Allende: Chile's Legal Revolution*, Mentor Books, New York, 1972; Garcés, Joan. *Chile: el camino político hacia el socialismo*, Ed. Ariel, Barcelona, 1972; Labarca, Eduardo. *Chile al rojo*, Juan Pablos Editor, México, 1971; Morris, David J. *We Must Make Haste-Slowly. The Process of Revolution in Chile*, Vintage Books, New York, 1973; Vitale, Luis. *¿Y después del 4, ¿qué?* Ediciones Prensa Latinoamericana, Santiago, 1970.

<sup>3</sup> This example is cited because of the significance of the author, a friend and advisor to Salvador Allende, see Garcés, Joan. *Allende y la experiencia Chilena. Las armas de la política*.

events as victors or vanquished.<sup>4</sup> Amongst supporters of socialism, there were those who credited the chances of a peaceful path to socialism and those who denied that possibility, proposing armed struggle as the only way to take power.<sup>5</sup> However, among the former, there was a difference between those who justified their hopes in general on doctrinaire theoretical terms and those who accepted the exceptional nature of the "Chilean case."<sup>6</sup> Among its enemies, the predominant view was of the Unidad Popular government as a "communist conspiracy" which, peaceful or not, would sooner or later lead to dictatorship, thus the whole discussion taking place on the left made no sense to them.<sup>7</sup>

After the denouement of the process, the same arguments assumed new significance. For those who believed in a peaceful road to socialism, the causes of its defeat were to be found in the immorality of its

---

<sup>4</sup> Altamirano, Carlos. *Dialéctica de una derrota*. Arriagada, Genaro. *De la "vía Chilena" a la "vía insurreccional"*, (with the prologue by Eduardo Frei M.). Arriagada, Genaro and Claudio Orrego, *Leninismo y democracia*. Prieto, Helios. *Los gorilas estaban entre nosotros*.

<sup>5</sup> See Joan Garcés, *Op.cit.*, as an example of those who believed in the Chilean way, and "MIR, mouvement de la gauche revolutionnaire" 1970-1973 Recueil du Textes," *Politique Hebdo*, Paris, 1974, as an example of the other position.

<sup>6</sup> The difference, however, is a matter of nuance. An interesting example of this phenomenon can be seen in the difference between president Allende's first message to the full Congress, May 21, 1971, and the reasons given by Joan Garcés in *El Estado y los problemas tácticos en el gobierno de Allende*, pp. 225-277.

<sup>7</sup> Echeverría, Andrés y Luis Frei B., (compilers). *1970-1973: La lucha por la juridicidad en Chile*, vol. I, p. 9.



enemies, the Chilean right and the government of the United States, and in the irresponsible acts of the ultra-left.<sup>8</sup> For those who criticized the peaceful attempt from the left, responsibility falls on the "reformists" who led the process and the people to defeat.<sup>9</sup> For the enemies of socialism, now triumphant, it is a matter of "proving" the existence of the Communist conspiracy which, again, vitiates the prior discussion and, furthermore, morally justifies the acts of all those who took part in the coup d'etat.<sup>10</sup>

Only exceptionally is a study to be found that seeks to frame in other terms the situation that led Chile to a victory of the left in 1970 and to military dictatorship in 1973. This is doubtless due to the paradigmatic importance attributed from the outset to the Chilean experience, setting aside any connection with the country's importance in the world. This makes it practically impossible to adopt an indifferent point of view toward the values that were in play and the results of the entire process.

---

<sup>8</sup> *El pleno de agosto de 1977 del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Chile.*

<sup>9</sup> "¿QUÉ ES EL MIR?" document prepared by the Central Committee of the MIR in hiding. December 1974. In *MIR, 1973-1975*. The position of the small "Maoist" sector is described by Palacios, Jorge. *Chile: An Attempt at "Historic" Compromise. The Real Story of the Allende Years.*

<sup>10</sup> Moss, Robert. *Chile's Marxist Experiment.*

It is not my intention to respond to the questions raised by all the literature on the case. The purpose of this analysis is to examine the evolution of its actors between 1970 and 1973, with special attention to the organizational and ideological forms adhering to each of the opposing forces for the final encounter.

Rather than evaluate the Chilean road to socialism, it is here sought to describe the destiny of the political parties and the system of conflict resolution established among them, in a situation that put their ability to channel a crucial social conflict to the test.<sup>11</sup>

## 2.2 The Unidad Popular Program and its interpretations

The problems of Allende's administration and of the Chilean left tend to be conceptualized, both then and subsequently, as an ideological conflict. This would be centered on tactical questions that posited the application of Unidad Popular's Basic Program of Government, assuming a degree of consensus around this program as a strategic definition. Two positions may be defined in this conflict, corresponding to two power blocs within the left. On the one hand, the Communist

---

<sup>11</sup> An analysis of the genesis of the system may be found in: Yocelvezky, Ricardo. "El desarrollo de los partidos políticos



Party and Allende himself represented a position on fundamental matters, described as "reformist" by its critics. On the other hand, the position represented by the MIR, and other sectors of the Socialist Party and MAPU, was described as "revolutionary" or "ultra-leftist", according to the favourable or critical character of the definition intended. In confrontations subsequent to 1973, arguments are expressed as if the acts of these sectors had been independent one from the other and explained preferably by their consistency or lack of it with doctrinaire points of view expressed by each of them. Thus a cross-fire of mutual recriminations appears in which the facts described are fundamentally the acts of the "other."

The operative part of this version of the process is limited to the existence of the ideological conflict. From it, matters of organizational shape and social representativity on either side tend to be arbitrary and, in some cases, frankly abusive.<sup>12</sup> One way around this problem is to define the ideological conflict in the light of relations established between the sectors instead of supposing their total division or, even, their

---

chilenos hasta 1970." *Argumentos*, N° 7, Mexico, Agosto, 1989 and summarized in the previous chapter.

<sup>12</sup> For examples of this, see Prieto, *Op.cit.* and Palacios, *Op.cit.*

absolute independence. This offers a much more complex picture at the organizational level, and casts doubt on some suppositions as to the social representativity of each of the adversaries, although a degree of inconclusiveness, in comparison to other commentaries of this period, is an unavoidable corollary.

The ideological conflict seems well defined if adherence to the Chilean road, as a possible shift to socialism without violent rupture in the institutional framework, is taken as the axis of commitment. If social forces were expressed as supporting the government, then the transition to a socialist society, within the same institutional framework, was possible.<sup>13</sup> Opposing this view was another that took Allende's 1970 election as merely an accident of history. And to the extent that the strategic blueprint was really a shift to socialism and not only a collection of reforms, the process would "become normalized" via a violent break which, if the socialist forces were victorious, would have to yield to a dictatorship of the proletariat.<sup>14</sup>

---

<sup>13</sup> Corvalán, Luis. "Nada hay más revolucionario que luchar por el éxito del Gobierno Popular" *Informe al pleno del Comité Central del Partido Comunista November, 1970.*

<sup>14</sup> "Análisis de la significación y las consecuencias de la elección de Salvador Allende a la Presidencia de la Republica." Document prepared by the MIR National Secretariat and published in the journal *Punto Final* in October 1970.



The first consequence of these positions were two different definitions of the meaning of the actions the government should undertake. One entailed the legitimation of the administration on three essential levels: respect for legality, economic development and satisfaction of the demands of urban and rural working class people.<sup>15</sup> These three different levels of government action would have to yield electoral support and social mobilization which, expressed within legal limits, would have the effect of demobilizing the opposition. This point made the need for coherence between the blueprint for economic development and political strategy evident.

The second involved the sector we will call "pro-rupture" (to avoid its chosen name of "revolutionary" or the pejorative "ultra-left" or "violent" used respectively by their critics within the government and by the right opposition), for whom political tactics should have no other axis than mobilizing the masses to consciousness of the imminence of confrontation. With that as the starting point the levels at which the government sought to legitimate its actions changed in relative importance. What shifted to the foreground were the immediate benefits to rural and urban working class

---

<sup>15</sup> With respect to the latter, see *"Las primeras cuarenta medidas del*

sectors even at the price of planned objectives for economic development and the maintenance of the legal framework.<sup>16</sup> Thus, the two tactical views clashed at concrete points that required policy definition by the government. These included the question of rhythm and depth in the application of the economic program. Another was the problem of social alliances, particularly, the need to adjust policies to the goal of broadening government support among the middle classes. A further point was the maintenance of legal order in the presence of social mobilizations the likes of which had never been seen before.

These three points largely summarize the multiplicity of axes of encounter between the two interpretations. The first postulated harmonizing the two different objectives: economic growth and transformation of structure. The Basic Program of Government, oriented by the view of economic development that links the distribution of income and the redefinition of a growth strategy<sup>17</sup>, sought to harmonize

---

*Gobierno Popular*"

<sup>16</sup> See the critique of this position in Corvalán, Luis. *Informe al pleno de agosto de 1977 del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Chile*.

<sup>17</sup> Vuskovic, Pedro. "Distribución del ingreso y opciones de desarrollo" in *Economía política en la Unidad Popular*, Editorial Fontanella, Barcelona, 1975.



these objectives via the definition of three areas of property in the economy: the area of social property, the area of mixed-property, and the area of private property. The area of social property would have to guarantee the government the capability of strategic management of the country's development, whereas the other two areas, mixed and private, would be subject to that strategy stimulated by other instruments of economic policy. These were basically the control of foreign trade and banking by the state and by a level of demand that would be the product of redistribution of income and would compensate for the restriction of profits by price control with an increase in the volume of sales.<sup>18</sup>

This development strategy seemed coherent with the political strategy that sought to broaden support for the blueprint among the middle classes. Dependent sectors among the latter would be the direct beneficiaries of the redistribution of income while independent sectors (small merchants and manufacturers) would benefit indirectly to the extent that their production and sales increased at the rate of demand. This would make it possible to isolate the groups affected socially and politically by

---

<sup>18</sup> *Programa básico de gobierno de la Unidad Popular.*

the expropriations needed to bring about state control of strategic economic sectors.

All these presupposed popular support expressed in mobilizations within legal party and union organizational frameworks. In addition to growing support from the middle classes they would provide social and political backing for the government allowing it to isolate the dominant classes and neutralize their opposition activities within the political system.<sup>19</sup>

The alternative to this point of view, which developed throughout the process, came from the inevitability of confrontation. Hence the tasks of legitimation lost their importance in face of the need to achieve rapid and profound changes. Thus, the limits of expropriation should not be determined by strategy aimed at the middle classes, but by the urgency of achieving the organization and mobilization of urban and rural working class sectors. This required the creation of new forms of organization and of government support for recovery that would reinforce consciousness of the depths of the changes. Thereby, leaving to demonstrations of social power thus accumulated, the resolution of middle

---

<sup>19</sup> Marín, Gladys. "La clase obrera y su política de alianzas" in *Los mil días de revolución*, Editorial Paz y Socialismo, Praga, 1978, pp. 88-105.



class inclinations by demonstrating the inevitability of those changes or, as it was called, the "irreversibility" of the process.<sup>20</sup> The coexistence of these two approaches to tactics defined government action but not in the sense of one of them being chosen by the government and the alternative being external to it, but rather as both coexisting within the government. Even though one might predominate, the other acted in part outside the government but always attempting to improve positions within it. This situation determined the ambiguities of government action and of the forces supporting it.<sup>21</sup>

### 2.3 Government action and its ambiguities.

The situation posed by Allende's victory in 1970 revealed the contradictions that would frame his administration. On the one hand legitimacy was derived from acting within the rules of the system and, on the other, support was obtained from expectations of change in that very system. In a previous chapter it was pointed out that there existed a duality in the political forces of the right and of the left. This was

---

<sup>20</sup> See the speech by Nelson Gutiérrez, member of the MIR Secretariat and president of the Federation of Students of the University of Concepción in 1971. Reproduced in *MIR Mouvement*, *Op.cit.* pp. 22-26.

constituted by the presence in them of some actors seeking to situate their action within the system with to the aim of dominating it and others who, from outside the system sought its destruction. In the case of the left, with the prospect of becoming an elected government, subordination of factors external to the system (basically the MIR) was reinforced at the outset.

If the content of the program and the style defining the campaign had left MIR without alternative banners other than of exploring ways of taking power, the electoral victory contradicted any arguments brought against the electoral route as a valid political path. However, the hegemony of the strategy which acted within the system was accentuated to the extent that the period from the election to Allende's inauguration was marked by acts from the right that sought by legal and illegal means to prevent that accession to the presidency. In the face of that eventuality, MIR and other smaller groups acting outside the system considered the possibility of having to participate in a confrontation in which they would defend the legitimacy of the electoral victory.<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>21</sup> In this respect, see the ambiguity of the Political Resolution at the Socialist Party Congress at La Serena. Maurice Najman (Ed.) *Le Chili est proche*, pp. 37-40.

<sup>22</sup> MIR: "Análisis de la significación de las consecuencias de la elección de Salvador Allende..." *Op.cit.*



Throughout the entire period of Unidad Popular administration these ambiguities meant the tactical subordination by the government of the extra-parliamentary left, but not the loss of its relative independence which was expressed practically on all points of encounter between the administration and the opposition. Among them it is necessary to examine at least four fields of action. These were the electoral processes, as tests of strength between the government and the opposition; the mobilization of masses; the use of legal recourse by the administration in its confrontation with the opposition; and, finally, policy toward the armed forces.

On the organizational level, the duality of actions (within and outside the system) constituted a middle ground in which some parties, acting within the system and forming part of the government, began to be influenced by positions and factors that had situated themselves, until then, outside it.<sup>23</sup> This was due to changes that had begun before 1970, but the importance of

---

<sup>23</sup> The parties that received these cadres were principally, the Socialist Party and to a lesser extent, MAPU (Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria).

which was reinforced after the electoral victory and affected all levels of the political system.<sup>24</sup>

Among the professional leaders, some of them had since the sixties adopted a position which, in a very broad sense, might be characterized as "Castroist."<sup>25</sup> After 1970 this position became, in general, what has been defined as "pro-rupture," and was reinforced by new adherents. The most important representatives of this position are unquestionably Carlos Altamirano, who became Secretary General of the Socialist Party in its National Congress at La Serena in 1971, and Oscar Guillermo Garretón, Secretary General of MAPU after the death of that party's founder Rodrigo Ambrosio.

Something similar, and perhaps even more important, occurring at the rank-and-file level of party membership was the entry into the Socialist Party of cadres, and even complete organizations, coming from the extra-parliamentary left.<sup>26</sup> However, this is not the only tendency that was reinforced at this level. One must also consider the reactivation of generally passive members of the parties and the recruitment of new members

---

<sup>24</sup> See Yocelvezky, *Op.cit.* and, by the same author *La Democracia Cristiana Chilena y el gobierno de Eduardo Frei, 1964-1970.*

<sup>25</sup> See for example the lecture delivered by Carlos Altamirano on his return from a trip to Cuba and published by the journal *Punto Final*, N° 31, 2<sup>nd</sup> fortnight of June, 1967.



brought about by access to the government by left wing organizations and their consequent expectations of obtaining posts and emoluments at all levels of the public sector.<sup>27</sup>

At the third level, that of party clientele, there were other changes at the rate of the general increase in social mobilization caused by the 1970 election. Among worker, campesino and shantytown dwellers there was a veritable explosion of organization and mobilization which, in many cases, significantly strengthened the pro-rupture position within and outside the parties of Unidad Popular. In this case, the principal beneficiary of the phenomenon was MIR.<sup>28</sup>

Under these conditions, the political problem facing the government could be formulated in abstract terms as follows. It should transform the economy, the State and the political system without breaking the State's regulatory framework and by reinforcing the political system to the extent that the parties in the government were part of it. In this formulation, government strategy and tactics were defined as strengthening the parties of

---

<sup>26</sup> The Movimiento Revolucionario Manuel Rodríguez (MR-2).

<sup>27</sup> Part of the rooting of the parties in society was due to the capability of professional politicians of all parties to dispense patronage, that is, in the interest of promoting individual or group interests.

Unidad Popular. By implementing a re-distributive policy,<sup>29</sup> their social basis of support would be extended by deepening their influence on working class sectors and would even reach the middle classes. Thus, economic policy would make it possible to further political change without rupture but rather by a self-transformation of the political system.

Economic policy became the preferred field of confrontation between government and opposition but also the point of concentration of demands promoted among working class sectors by cadres committed to the pro-rupture position. For those cadres, leading that type of mobilization was justified by the level of consciousness attained through them in the mobilized sectors, and at the same time, it allowed them to broaden their degree of penetration and influence among social sectors considered strategic to the victory of the socialist blueprint. In this way, new developments appeared in the labor union struggle among campesinos and among shantytown dwellers.<sup>30</sup>

---

<sup>28</sup> Najman, Maurice. *Op.cit.* pp. 14-22.

<sup>29</sup> Cortés, Fernando and Ricardo Yocelévsky, "la distribución del ingreso en el gobierno de la Unidad Popular (1970-1972)", *Demografía y Economía*, N°43, México, 1980.

<sup>30</sup> Growth of union affiliation is a good example. During the three years of Unidad Popular government, the number of union members increased in absolute terms to a level similar to that achieved in the previous eight years. Campero, Guillermo and José A. Valenzuela. *El movimiento sindical en el régimen militar chileno, 1973-1981*, ILET, Santiago, 1984, p. 154.



All these mobilizations were ambiguous. On the one hand, the extra-parliamentary left seemed to strengthen its mass support in mobilization. But, at the same time, it refused to enter the system, resulting in its clientele supporting the government at the polls even though this occurred via the vote for candidates who, acting within the system, identified themselves with the pro-rupture position (basically the Socialist Party).

On the other hand, given the corporative nature of the demands around which the pro-rupture sector organized its mobilizations, there was no guarantee that political consciousness developed in these sectors would coincide with the expectations of the political cadres who organized them. Depending on achievement and not on demands, the effect might be integration or, at least, greater contact with the political system, its professional cadres and its functional channels. This is quite clear in the case of industries in which the demands of workers were for their integration into the social area of the economy, and of campesinos who demanded incorporation of land into the agrarian reform, and shantytown dwellers demanding housing and urban services. Even though the movement was organized with the participation of the extra-parliamentary left, the middle

sector, the pro-rupture forces within the system acted as negotiators of the demands and their satisfaction depended on the government. Thus, it may not to be said that all corporative movements amongst the working class sectors -- that made demands querying the tactical limits established by the government for the application of its program -- would necessarily strengthen the pro-rupture position or weaken the government or those who supported its tactical version of the general strategy.

Given their content, the accumulation of demands became a problem for the government. At least in the most general sense, this was one of the components of the principal tactical dilemma that it sought to resolve in 1972 by changing the Minister of Economy and short-term economic policy.<sup>31</sup> However, this reflection in the sphere of economic policy disguised another, perhaps deeper, problem. By virtue of their content, as much as of their methods of mobilization and action to achieve their demands, these movements brought tension to relations between the government and the State apparatus, in particular, the police, the armed forces and the judicial branch. For the opposition, the point was to be able to demonstrate that the administration tolerated the



overstepping of legality by its supporters and, later, that the government's own acts were outside the law.<sup>32</sup>

This point leads to unstable ground if it may not be affirmed that all actions in support of demands outside the administration's tactical limits would strengthen the pro-rupture position. It is equally unclear that government policy to avoid repression, if at all possible, placed it outside the law as the opposition claimed. As it is unclear that the result of any mobilization not controlled by the government would, by providing fuel to the right, reinforce the opposition. Both accusations were formulated and supported by inconclusive proof.<sup>33</sup> However, this point in the ideological struggle was resolved in favor of the opposition at a deeper level. Not because its statements were true, but because they deepened the gulf between State and administration. This was ultimately crucial in resolving the opposition's own internal situation in favor of another, successful rupture: the coup d'etat.

Undoubtedly, the whole process increased popular participation and developed the consciousness of working

---

<sup>31</sup> Mistral, Carlos. *Chile: del triunfo Popular al golpe fascista*, Ed. Era, México, 1974. pp. 67-73.

<sup>32</sup> Echeverría and Frei. (Compilers), *Op.cit.*, Volume II, "Acusaciones constitucionales."

class sectors in terms of a strategic option for socialism. This may be seen in patterns of social and political conduct little remembered today.<sup>33</sup> Nevertheless, in terms of explicit tactical options what is clear is that, in practice, the pro-rupture option had to subordinate itself to the government and to the alliance of parties supporting it until the end. Consequently, its actions were situated within the system.

If this took place at a level of mass clientele that could be mobilized by social organizations and for electoral purposes, expressions of contradiction between tactical options that co-existed reached their greatest ideological and practical virulence at the intermediate level, that of the militant party rank-and-file. It is here that the sense of the irreducibility of this contradiction most obtains, yet the ambiguities visible at this level have already been pointed out.

It was at the top level, that of the professional political elite that contradictions were resolved in favor of the political system. Evidence in this respect

---

<sup>33</sup> See for example, the report to the plenum of the Central Party of the Chilean Communist Party, August 1977, *Op.cit.* pp. 22-23.

<sup>34</sup> As an example, see the story of textile workers of the Yarur industry told by Peter Winn, *Weavers of Revolution*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1986.



is certainly not abundant. Not even actors who today assume positions similar to or distant from those that identified them then would be very willing to accept this conclusion. However, the very endurance of this political elite to this day may be considered a good indicator of this resolution. On the other hand, we have already mentioned the ambiguity characteristic of the actions of leaders seeking to improve their position within the system by the use of pro-rupture discourse. In part they fulfilled the task of subordinating sectors which, on all three levels, situated their action as well as their discourse outside the system (the other part was fulfilled by direct contact at the upper levels among leaders of the two positions).<sup>35</sup>

The real subordination of the pro-rupture position to the government and to those supporting the tactic of maintaining the institutional system is obscured by two factors leading to consequences beyond their real significance in the correlation of forces within the left. These were the policy toward the armed forces and the impact of the ideological confrontation in intellectual sectors.

---

<sup>35</sup> Alain Touraine seems to point to the same type of events without this supposing that he would be in agreement with the analysis

In the light of their actions in the coup d'état, the armed forces have been the object of controversy in almost all subsequent commentaries on the Chilean experience. Emphasis has been given to the contradiction between the policies of the government and those of the pro-rupture sector toward them. Apparently, the duality was expressed in the government's intent to maintain the structure of the armed forces as part of the institutional system and obtain, if not their adherence, at least their obedience and their forbearance from politics as a result of direct government influence on the high command.<sup>36</sup> Pro-rupture policy sought influence on the basis of the social composition of the armed forces, calling upon non-commissioned officers and other ranks to adopt a class stance,<sup>37</sup> and seeking to attract officer and non-commissioned officer sectors to activities of a conspiratorial nature in expectation of a crucial confrontation.<sup>38</sup> It is important to recall that all these activities were far from new. They acquired a different significance in the situation of the Unidad Popular

---

proposed here. See, *Vida y muerte del Chile Popular*, Siglo XXI Eds., México, 1974, p. 21.

<sup>36</sup> Altamirano, Carlos. *Op.cit.*, p. 153.

<sup>37</sup> MIR, *Op.cit.* pp. 84-85.

<sup>38</sup> The best known cases are, before the coup d'état, that of the sailors, and subsequently, the trial in the air force. For the former, see Politzer, Patricia. *Altamirano*, Ediciones Melquiades, Buenos Aires, 1989, pp. 133-140.



administration, but each could appeal to a tradition in Chilean politics. As for an evaluation, it may only be stated that, in the negative sense, the fact that the coup did not occur earlier may be taken as indicative of the predominance of government policy over the policy of the pro-rupture sectors. However, the image that the opposition sought to project was precisely the opposite, and that was part its policy toward the armed forces. As to the significance of left policies toward the military, it may be said that they reflected consciousness of the separation between state and government that characterised the situation. Nevertheless, they were incapable of producing adequate action on those grounds, whereas the opposition, after Allende's victory, (as will be seen below) focused its tactics precisely around that point.

It is important to indicate that the role of the intellectuals was twofold, contributing to a blurring of a tactical duality within the left. On the one hand, it was they who, during and after Allende's administration, expressed the ideological conflicts and therefore, defined the views that predominated with respect to him. However, on the other hand, they were privileged actors in more senses than simply functioning as ideologues. In

the general sense of the term intellectual, the Unidad Popular government produced an unprecedented political mobilization of the intellectual sector. Both the need to provide personnel for the multiple tasks of government and the intensity of the ideological struggle created new tasks for intellectuals and threw them, though not for the first time, into unusual political activity. Here, it should be remembered that these kinds of personnel were characteristic of the professional elite of almost all parties and, in this sense, there is a clear tendency toward radicalization and the taking of pro-rupture positions among the intellectual sectors of shorter or lesser integration into party dominated politics before 1970. Undoubtedly, criteria for the duration of the integration was affected by age, underscoring a generational break that places the components of the newer organizations, generally directed by university students of the sixties (MIR, MAPU and, to a lesser degree the Christian Left) among the pro-rupture sectors. However, there is also a degree of radicalization toward pro-rupture stances among intellectuals of earlier generations. These older intellectuals had not made a career as professional politicians. They stepped from academic or technocratic activities into the practice of



government and, from there to the political parties to which they might have been affiliated before but in which they had not been active leaders.

Ultimately, it does not seem possible, from the point of view adopted here, to attribute the defeat to the existence of two tendencies, nor to the predominance of one over the other. Available evidence shows that the breach between them was not absolute and that, on the contrary, contact between the two introduced a degree of ambiguity to their activities. On the other hand, though the predominance of the government and institutional positions among those who supported it is quite clear, it may not be deduced therefrom that defeat was the product of this correlation of forces on the left. At least it seems reasonable to accept that if defeat did not occur before, it was due to the tactical predominance of the government. Doubts about the strategic validity of this position endure, nevertheless, inasmuch as what decided the confrontation was that in a division of the opposition similar to that described here in the case of the left, it was the pro-rupture position that prevailed over the other forces.

#### 2.4 Opposition strategies

Within the political symmetry that has been postulated in terms of division within the government and within the opposition, the situation of the latter reveals clear differences on other levels. From the social point of view, the problem of the new right was to create a base of electoral support that would take the place of the rural vote, the loss of which had determined the crisis of the traditional right in the middle of the previous decade. Recourse to urban middle sectors as clienteles nevertheless required a radical change in organizational and ideological models of political action.<sup>39</sup> This, which seemed far from clear before the 1970 election, became the predominant feature of opposition to the Allende administration.

The fact that there never was an agreement between the right and the Christian Democrats to face the "Communist threat", represented by Unidad Popular in 1970, in a co-ordinated manner, indicates that the right either had not correctly assessed the real danger of an electoral victory from the left, or did not limit its own options to those that appeared within the legality that ruled the political system. The two reasons are not mutually exclusive. Subsequent evidence as well as other

---

<sup>39</sup> See Yocelvezky, *Op. cit.* pp. 258-263.



indicators suggests that the co-existence of both positions antedates 1970.<sup>40</sup> What did change for good after Allende's victory was the correlation of forces between both. In this sense, if the history of the administration is the history of ambiguity produced by the prominence of the institutional position, the subordination of the pro-rupture position and the relation between them, then the history of the opposition is the change from the predominance of an institutional position to a position of rupture. However, this is not only a change in opposition opinion. These are ideological and organizational changes and part of a process of social and political mobilization which, finally, translated into both deliberate and inadvertent support for the destruction of the political system.<sup>41</sup>

From the outset of the 1970 election and until resolution of the conflict, the opposition tried ideologically to project a movement we shall call "pro-

---

<sup>40</sup> In 1967, the Christian Democrat government ordered the arrest of the National Party leaders accusing them of promoting a coup d'etat. The courts released them unconditionally. This attitude on the part of the judiciary is adduced as proof of innocence by Sergio Onofre Jarpa (in an interview by Silvia Pinto and reproduced in Jarpa's book, *Creo en Chile*, Sociedad Impresora Chile, Ltda., Santiago, 1973, p. 79. Even so, the antecedents of this arrest are revealed by the Minister of the Interior of the time, Bernardo Leighton, in an interview about his political life. See Boye, Otto. *El hermano Bernardo*, Editorial Aconcagua, Santiago, 1986, pp. 150-152.

restoration."<sup>42</sup> Opposition discourse thereby effectively formulated the government and the forces supporting it as the threat to the system. In this sense, ideological expressions (just as in the case of the left), obscured the view of the true correlation of forces in the opposition.<sup>43</sup>

As to the characteristics of the cadres making up the rank-and-file and the professional elite of the opposition, the same principles of differentiation may be observed on the right as were noted for the left. On the one hand a generational break that delimits a new elite and a sector with a militant rank-and-file that aspired to fit into the professional elite of the period but was only partially successful.<sup>44</sup> On the other hand, cadres became active who had remained on the periphery of the main course of political events, dominated as they were

---

<sup>41</sup> See Yocelévsky, Ricardo. "Agrupamiento corporativo y estrategia política: el golpe de estado en Chile," *International Review of Sociology*, Série IIe, Vol. XIX, N° 1-2-3, Rome, 1983, pp. 137-154.

<sup>42</sup> Even at the moment of the coup d'état, the junta committed itself to "restoring the fractured institutionality". See *Decreto Ley N° 1, Acta de Constitución de la Junta de Gobierno del 11 de septiembre de 1973*, Editorial Jurídica de Chile, *100 Primeros Decretos Leyes dictados por la Junta de Gobierno de la República de Chile*, Santiago, 1973, pp. 6-8.

<sup>43</sup> The principal dupes in this sense were the Christian Democrats who supported the coup believing that "restoration" would carry them back into power. On the contrary, they had to wait more than 16 years.

<sup>44</sup> Among these sectors principal attention must be paid to the "gremialistas" of the Catholic University and some youths from the Partido Nacional.



by parties and the established system of negotiations among them.<sup>45</sup>

The ideological content of this renewal of the right shared a common point with its corresponding number on the left: those expressing a tendency toward pro-rupture considered the achievement of its strategic objectives to be incompatible with maintenance of the political system.<sup>46</sup> However, they enjoyed nothing like the common ground that unified the left. If on the left agreement was based on the definition of socialism as a desirable model of society and a road to development, on the right the proposals were more varied. There was criticism of economic development and the political system, but they did not necessarily become unified in an alternative proposal. Largely ideological criticism were brought to bear as nationalists of widely diverse beliefs coincided in their view of the current period of Chile's history as "decadent".<sup>47</sup> Proposals of all kinds for the "reconstruction" of the country, from corporativist to

---

<sup>45</sup> Included here are the Nationalists, who made up the Partido Nacional since 1965, as well as those who became active as a result of the left victory in 1970, like those of Patria y Libertad.

<sup>46</sup> This too is subject to nuance, beginning with Jarpa who considered it necessary to outlaw the Communist Party (*Op.cit.* p. 75) to Pablo Rodríguez Grez, who proposed replacing the political system with one of a corporative nature. See his book *Entre la democracia y la tiranía*, Self-published, Santiago, 1972, pp. 121-130.

<sup>47</sup> Perez de Arce, Hermógenes. *Comentarios escogidos*, Ediciones Portada, Santiago 1973, pp. 325-359.

liberal approaches, were made, yet it is unclear whether undertaking the formulation of an alternative program would have been the way to create an opposition bloc capable of defeating the Unidad Popular administration.

This overwhelming diversity was reflected in the Alessandri "movement's" program<sup>48</sup> and in its candidate's speeches. Nevertheless, the very context of the presidential campaign caused this feature to remain in abeyance. Alternatives were only and suddenly revealed after the electoral victory of the left in September 1970. Between that date and Allende's inauguration in November 1970, all actors and all positions that would later become involved in the overthrow of the Unidad Popular administration were brought to light.<sup>49</sup> Nevertheless, between those dates and the moment of the coup, two important changes took place, one in the consolidation of all these expressions into one single political bloc and, the other, a predominant shift of opinion within that bloc in favour of the break up of the political system. Both changes were the result of

---

<sup>48</sup> Garcés, Joan and Frédéric Debuyst. "La opción de 1970 y la ideología, análisis de los tres programas presidenciales," in *Chile: el camino político hacia el socialismo*, op.cit. pp. 79-143.

<sup>49</sup> This period witnessed terrorist acts that included the assassination of the army commander-in-chief, General Schneider and even parliamentary manoeuvres to elect the second place candidate, Alessandri, as well as military conspiracies for a coup d'état.



complex process of maturation in the practice of a consolidated opposition vis-à-vis the government.

Reactions to the results of the presidential election reveal the lines of development that the opposition would have to follow. These were situated both within and outside of the system. The first contacts between the right and the Christian Democrats occurred within the system as they searched for a constitutional way to forestall assumption of power by the winning candidate. The first movement for an economic boycott (supported ideologically by the incumbent government) appeared outside the system. The first terrorist attempts came from right wing groups (even though, from the outset, they tried to attribute them to the left). The first conspiracies involved the military, with a view to abetting a coup d'etat (one of these resulted in the assassination of the Commander in Chief of the Army, General Schneider). The active support of the United States government for these expressions must also be noted.<sup>50</sup>

---

<sup>50</sup> There is a great deal of literature on all these, but one testimony that carries great force in proving the occurrence of these events, even though their veracity in many details is questionable, is Kissinger, Henry. *White House Years*, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1979, pp. 670-678.

Amongst both the right-wing and newly formed Christian Democrat factions, the practical impossibilities facing more extreme endeavours at this stage, on the whole gave predominance to institutional procedures. Adherence to the political system among Christian Democrats was unquestionably predominant, within which the very existence of the party made sense.<sup>51</sup> Christian Democrat participation in these manoeuvrings was limited to a search for a formula that would make it possible to swindle Allende out of his electoral victory but that would preserve the legitimacy and the functionality of the system. Not finding a formula that would guarantee that result, they opted for an encircling strategy vis-à-vis the new administration. To secure the Christian Democrat votes in Congress, in order to confirm Allende's victory, senators and deputies of the Left had to support the previous approval of the constitutional reforms known as the "Statute of Democratic Guarantees". This generally limited presidential powers, but perhaps ultimately even more significant, sought to make the state independent of the acts of the government. The

---

<sup>51</sup> Otto Boye, *Op.cit.* pp. 160-168, presents an analysis written by Bernardo Leighton in 1970, at the time of the events, but unpublished until 1986.



intent to forestall the changes contained in Unidad Popular's "Basic Program of Government" was explicit.<sup>52</sup>

Separation of the state from the government may seem an unnecessary abstraction for understanding the final result of the confrontation. However, to understand the developments that led to that result, it is important to examine how ideological and practical conditions came together within that confrontation. To begin with, foremost among the ideological aspects is the sense of the legitimacy of Allende's government being limited by the relative majority that led to his victory. Even though the vote permitted Allende to legitimately occupy the presidency and organize his government, it denied, in the absence of an absolute majority, that his government might legitimately embark on the changes contained in its programme.<sup>53</sup> On this point, the attempt is made to preserve the political system from the transformational activity of the government, but, as mentioned above, the

---

<sup>52</sup> See the text of the Constitutional Reform contained in the Statutes of Democratic Guarantees and its principal forerunners, including the discussion and vote in the Senate, in Echeverría and Frei (Compilers), *Op.cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 29-101.

<sup>53</sup> The first to publicly express these arguments was the most traditional voice of the Chilean right, the daily, *El Mercurio*. Its editorial of September 23, 1970, described the paradox represented by a solid democracy allowing, with less than a third of the electorate, to open a way for a revolutionary change in its institutions. The same argument is picked up by Jaime Castillo Velasco, ideologue of the Christian Democrats, in an interview

measures proposed for this included the separation of a state apparatus as important as the armed forces.<sup>54</sup>

The ambiguity of this argument is revealed in the April 1971 municipal elections. In these, the forces of the government won 50% of the vote. Nevertheless, being an election to renew municipal governments, any action the government might undertake could not be seen as a substantial increase in its opportunities. Hence, the opposition was not disposed to concede any meaning to the vote beyond the institutional consequences that might derive from the election itself.<sup>55</sup> The notion of a dual significance to the vote, institutional on the one hand and as expression of social force in favor of or against the change, was on this occasion taken by the government, but without noticeable consequences anywhere but in the context of ideological argument.<sup>56</sup>

---

granted the same newspaper a few days later, (*El Mercurio*, Santiago, September 27, 1970).

<sup>54</sup> See the reform of Article 22 of the 1925 Constitution contained in the statutes of Democratic Guarantees mentioned above, Echeverría and Frei (Compiladores) *Op.cit.* p. 35

<sup>55</sup> In its comments on the results of the April 1971 election, *El Mercurio* declared that Unidad Popular increased its share of the vote by 5% with respect to the 1967 election for councillor and failed in its attempt to achieve an absolute majority. See, FLACSO: *Chile, cronología del periodo 1970-1973*, Santiago, mimeographed, p. IV.87.

<sup>56</sup> According to some, due to the result of the election destabilising the internal correlation of forces within Unidad Popular by virtue of the Socialist Party's increased number of votes, the Communist Party's share remaining stable and the vote for the radicals dropping. Boye, *Op.cit.* p. 172.



In the opposition, on the other hand, this election had the effect of reinforcing the predominance of the "institutional" position, represented by the Christian Democrats. When that party received the greatest number of votes against the government, it appeared to be a hegemonic force over the opposition as a whole. From this correlation of forces in the opposition and the increase in the government's electoral support, opposition strategy began to concentrate on the attempt to limit implementation of the government's program by institutional means. The center of activity for this strategy lay in the parliament where the dominant form of organization lay with the parties and within them, and predominance in the opposition camp unquestionably belonged to the Christian Democrats.<sup>57</sup>

In appearance, the right, represented by the Partido Nacional, was subordinate to Christian Democrat institutional strategy. However, the Partido Nacional was not the limit of ideological and organizational options for the right. Outside the party system, a fascist style group called Patria y Libertad was being organized, and linked to the Partido Nacional a youth organization that in its actions tended to be conflated with Patria y

---

<sup>57</sup> See Echeverría and Frei (compilers), *Op.cit.*, Vol. II, *Acusaciones*

Libertad, called the Comando Rolando Matus<sup>58</sup>. Furthermore, the "anti-political system" position was also expressed in a "gremialista" movement which arose in the Universidad Católica and represented an ideological model that would lend coherence to a form of organization later decisive in mobilizing corporative groups and social movements outside the party system against the government.<sup>59</sup>

All the same, the opposition looked mismatched and ambiguous and, like the government forces, points of contact between the various forms of organization caused forces within the opposition to redefine their characteristics in practice even while preserving their several ideological positions. It was particularly in the opposition's field social mobilization that it was possible to resolve otherwise insurmountable ideological problems.

The first occasion on which the opposition demonstrated the new course it planned to take was the "march of the empty casseroles." It demonstrated the mobilization of a given social sector, women, that was

---

*Constitucionales.*

<sup>58</sup> Parker, Dick. *La nueva cara del fascismo*, Ed. Quimantú, Santiago, 1972, pp. 150-151.



not directly controlled by the parties. In positing criticism of the government's economic policy, and of scarcity, it did not imply an alternative to that policy and could therefore be supported by all sectors of the opposition. Street demonstration opened the way for action by paramilitary groups from within and outside of the party system and, finally, created a climate of agitation in which even some terrorist acts failed to provoke clear repudiation on the part of the opposition sectors closest to the political system.<sup>60</sup>

The strike by employer groups (from October 11 to November 5, 1972) marked a new stage in the conflict. It was at that moment that repudiation of the part of the government's strategy that rested on support from the private sector's economic power made itself visible, but in this instance as a mass organization mobilising middle and small entrepreneurs of all kinds as well as members of the liberal professions. This was the first time that the organised opposition within the party system lost its leadership of the opposition movement as a whole.

---

<sup>59</sup> This line of ideology and action was promoted in editorials published in *El Mercurio* even before Allende assumed the presidency as a reaction to the result of the presidential election.

<sup>60</sup> The march took place December 1, 1971, giving rise to incidents that lasted for almost a week in Santiago leading the government to declare the capital a "zona de emergencia." In the same month the Christian Democrats undertook their first electoral alliances with the Partido Nacional. FLACSO, *Op.cit.* pp. IV. 163-IV. 170.

However, that sector's main strength, the Christian Democrats, failed to realize the importance and future significance of this event.<sup>61</sup>

The government, aware of the danger and already on the defensive, fell back on the power of the state to stop the strategic confrontation by incorporating the heads of the armed forces into the cabinet. This move, no matter how unquestionably successful it was in the short run, would have a contrary effect in the long run. For the moment, however, the inclusion of the commandants of the armed forces contributed to ending that particular confrontation. It also temporarily stabilized the system until the parliamentary election in March 1973 whereby, at least in appearance, the hegemony of the opposition bloc returned to the hands of the political parties acting within the system.<sup>62</sup>

It was apparent in this last change that the election became a confrontation between electoral blocs in which the Christian Democrats appeared to be led by their most extreme right sector, Frei's. But also, within

---

<sup>61</sup> See the chronicle and analysis of these events from the Christian Democrat point of view in Orrego Vicuña, Claudio. *El paro nacional. Vía Chilena contra el totalitarismo*, Editorial del Pacífico, Santiago, 1972.

<sup>62</sup> See a version of this period in the posthumous memoirs of the Commander in Chief of the Army who became Secretary of the Interior, Carlos Prats González, *Memorias, testimonio de un soldado*, Editorial Pehuén, Santiago, 1985, pp. 297-375.



the whole, the Confederación Democrática, CODE, in which the Partido Nacional introduced a pro-rupture feature that was both intrinsic to it and, at the same time, linked the bloc as a whole to pro-rupture components acting outside the system.<sup>63</sup> The climate of electoral mobilization increased social mobilization, and though it did not bring about a strategic confrontation like the one in October 1972, neither was that possibility completely removed. It contributed to a radicalization of the opposition as a whole from the rank-and-file members upwards, a gradual and almost imperceptible process by which the Christian Democrats lost their ideological profile and became subordinated to other forces within the opposition.<sup>64</sup>

The result of the parliamentary election demonstrated the inviability of the opposition that was expecting to eliminate the government before the end of

---

<sup>63</sup> "During the entrepreneurs' strike of October 1972, the president of the Partido Nacional, Sergio Onofre Jarpa, changed the programme to include a 'gremialista' or semi-corporative feature which produced closer relations among various manifestations of the right (Frente Nacionalista Patria y Libertad and Movimiento Gremialista)." Friedmann, Reinhard 1964-1988, *La política Chilena de la A a la Z*, Ed. Melquiades, Santiago, 1988, p. 103.

<sup>64</sup> The analysis of the October, 1972, strike offered by Orrego (*Op.cit.*) pp. 20-22 correctly posits the relation parties-gremios in the Chilean structure. However, in the events of that movement, it simultaneously overestimates the role of the parties in general and of his party in particular. It is true that the strike grew and held thanks to the participation of gremios whose rank-and-file were identified with the Christian Democrats, but this was not proof of

the presidential tenure. This fact accelerated the move towards a pro-rupture strategy.<sup>65</sup> To this end, the decisive steps were taken to increase the conflict between the other powers of the state and government on the one hand, and to grant independence of action and apply pressure to the apparatus of the state to bring it in line against the government on the other. This last stage saw completion of the subordination of the Christian Democrats to the right and the adherence of both to a pro-rupture strategy. The right sought its military and political arm in the armed forces, legitimated by a bloc of political and social opposition to the Unidad Popular regime, but not representing a clear ideological alternative.<sup>66</sup> The consensus in the opposition bloc was purely negative and the programme to be implemented by the government that would succeed Allende's had no part in its proposals.

## 2.5 The coup d'Etat of September 11, 1973.

The foregoing section has concentrated on the formation of the social and political power bloc, which,

---

the influence of that party in the movement, on the contrary, it was proof of its subordination to a strategy foreign to it.

<sup>65</sup> *El Mercurio* returned to the double character of the elections, this time declaring that it had been a "plebiscite." Editorial, March 5, 1973.

<sup>66</sup> This is the clearest meaning of the declaration approved by the Chamber of Deputies on August 23, 1973, with National, Christian Democrats and Social Democrats voting.



by its support, made the coup possible. There is no question but that the coup in itself was the product of conspiratorial activity that complemented what was observable in the social, political and ideological spheres. However, due to the very nature of this part of the story, its reconstruction remains unsatisfactory in light of the information available today and it would not be surprising if it should always remain unsatisfactory.<sup>67</sup>

However, it is not simply curiosity that leads to inquiry about what happened at this other level of opposition activity. Part of what is observable in the opposition, as it has been described here, can only be explained by what remains hidden. The character of the future government, as indicated, could not be openly discussed by the opposition forces because broaching the subject would, most probably, have made formation of the bloc impossible. It was therefore defined at a level of "technical" activity which permitted the ideological subordination of part of the Christian Democrat cadres (in particular, economists) and allowed a plan for the reconstruction of Chilean capitalism to be discussed in

---

<sup>67</sup> Pinochet's "Memorias" are even more to be doubted than those of Kissinger. Nevertheless, see, Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto. *El día decisivo, 11 de septiembre de 1973*, Ed. Andrés Bello, Santiago, (fourth edition), 1980.

such in terms that the destruction of the political system was the sine qua non of the plan's execution.<sup>68</sup>

The organic form taken by the preparation of this alternative blueprint -- direct contact between private economic power and the economists in their role as technicians free of their political affiliations -- reveals the social and political costs that the model they were designing would incur. This went on beyond other forms of opposition organization, the heterogeneity of which, with respect to their view of the future became obvious in their earliest post-coup declarations. It was therefore clear that, with the exception of the Christian Democrats, the opposition accepted the elimination of political activity as such. This is part of the explanation of the bloody nature of the repression. The point was not only to overthrow the government and disperse the forces that supported it, but to redefine relations between classes. The repression was political

---

<sup>68</sup> "The profound economic crisis had to be reflected in a grave social and political conflict which should conclude in a change of government whose shape, of course, no one knew, but that obviously would clearly not be socialist... This conviction arose first among the economists rather than the politicians and it is therefore not to be wondered at that they would carry out a joint venture from as early as late 1971. During that time, economists of the technical departments of the opposition parties met without their leaders to advise the parliamentary deputies who specialised in financial and budget matters... When the change of government occurred (sic) on September 11, 1973, there was already a well developed draft program..." Bardón, Álvaro, Camilo Carrasco and Álvaro Vial, *Una*



in general, in the sense of affecting the parties of the left and their cadres, but the true "terror" applied was social, directed at re-subordinating the urban and rural working classes so that their conquests of the last forty years might be destroyed.

Another aspect that remains hidden is the process by which the armed forces came to intervene and the decision as to how they would do so. The position they occupied in the institutional apparatus, the social composition of the officer class, the ideological influences predominant among them, and the process of making them autonomous that they endured during the Unidad Popular administration, were conditions that facilitated their intervention. Political marginalisation of the armed forces and their personnel, which at the outset appeared to be one of the conditions for making Unidad Popular's blueprint viable, gradually became the principal instrument of its destruction. It can be said that the political process effectively forced the military to take cognisance of their position as the backbone of the state. The social composition of the officers, predominantly middle class, put them in contact with the mobilisation of those sectors proceeding toward the

construction of a new right and inimical to the current political system. Anticommunist ideology became the doctrine of their professional training. Linked to their corporative interests of technical modernisation and equipment, it also made them dependent on the United States. This, added to their traditional inclination toward "order", had unavoidably to set them against the government's very strategy and, moreover, against the social and political mobilisation that would necessarily have to accompany extensive processes of change. Finally, the opposition was able to steadily develop a role for the armed forces in which it acted as part of the state apparatus yet operated independently of the government, and ended by legitimating and inciting it to intervene. The opposition thus constructed an armed apparatus that saw its "historical mission" as the reordering of a society that had become distanced from its "healthy" and "normal" channels of development by politics and the activities of "politicians."



### **Chapter 3. The rise of the dictatorship, destruction and replacement of a political system**

#### 3.1. Introduction

Two of the three basic elements essential to understanding the history of sixteen years of military dictatorship are also generally recognised as the enduring heritage of the dictatorial government. They are the change in Chile's economic model of development and the new political system established by the Constitution of 1980. The third, which conditioned and defined the entire process, refers to the participation of the Armed Forces as expressing a state apparatus in the restoration, reordering and stabilisation of social domination. This description is debatable, however, due to contradictions within some of its basic characteristics. From my point of view, to consider them a state apparatus implies establishing their role as guarantors of the relations of domination that constitute Chilean society. That role explains their actions as a repressive force and defines an institutional responsibility in the crimes of the dictatorship.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> A radically different view of the significance of the Armed Forces' intervention in 1973, emphasizing however its character as a state apparatus may be seen in the *Ensayo histórico sobre la noción del Estado en Chile en los siglos XIX y XX*, by Mario Góngora.

Besides, some basic political processes of the period can only be explained by army structures acting as political power.

The relation between these three elements is basic to establishing a periodization that divides the dictatorship into two parts. First, a period of ascent and the consequent destruction of the previous political system, with the very express intention of eliminating political parties and the system of which they were a part, the culmination of which was the imposition of the 1980 Constitution. And a second part, one of erosion, decay and crisis of the dictatorship, the axis of which is the reconstruction of the system of political parties. This chapter will concern itself with the first phase.

Controversy about Pinochet's personal participation in the conspiracy which led to the coup d'etat was aimed at to either enhancing or destroying him as an individual. However, for the analysis of this history this fact is of importance because the likelihood of Pinochet's prior non-participation brings to the fore the army's institutional participation in the movement.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Patricia Verdugo, *Interferencia secreta*, Chapter 1 denies any participation on the part of Pinochet before the end of the week prior to the coup, quoting testimony by Generals Leigh and Arellano Stark. Pinochet himself dates the beginning of his preparations for the coup to June 23, 1972. See, *El día decisivo*, p. 78.



This leads to the understanding that Pinochet's personal ascent to power took place on the basis of the institutional platform. The idea of his supposed leadership is a subsequent publicity construct that sought to legitimate him outside the Armed Forces, since within them the source of power lies in the preservation of hierarchical structures.

It is not to be expected that any of the actors who at different times were part of the political and social bloc that, in the first instance, made the coup d'état possible, and that subsequently supported and benefited from the dictatorship, will accept this interpretation of events. But the plausibility of this interpretation does not depend on such confirmation, but on providing a clear view of the events and the processes that are equivocal and controversial but lie in the foundations of the post-dictatorial situation. Treatment of the three aspects of the process already enunciated is complex because their interrelations were changeable throughout the period and this implies changes in each one of them.

### 3.2. Militarism and repression

The repressive nature of the military dictatorship has been the object of denunciations from the very moment

of the coup d'etat<sup>3</sup> and continues to be the object of judicial controversy, now at the international level.<sup>4</sup> The first characteristic of military violence was its objective of demobilization. It must be remembered that the Chilean politico-social process had been characterized as "hyper-mobilization."<sup>5</sup> Demobilising a society from the level of organization achieved in Chile by the political parties, labour unions and other social organizations required a terrorist government. The state terrorism inflicted on Chile is remembered today primarily for the number of dead and disappeared, and these are the figures most precisely recorded. But they are only part - the most irreparable part of the story. The data substantiating the massive scope of the repression also must not be forgotten.

Justification for the repression was found in a supposed situation of civil war; an idea that some insist on to this day. However, it must be established that if indeed there were groups in favour of taking power by force of arms among those supporting Allende's government, they were subordinate to the administration's

---

<sup>3</sup> NACLA's *Latin America & Empire Report*, Vol. VII, No. 8, October 1973, p. 29.

<sup>4</sup> See documents containing the accusations by judge Garzón in *El País*, on the Web, <http://www.elpais.es>.



strategy in the first place. In the second, the arms at their disposal would have been insufficient to offer significant military resistance to the insurrectionists.<sup>6</sup> It is an established fact today that justification for the coup d'etat and the subsequent political repression, contained in the "Libro Blanco," principally Plan Z, published after the fact, constitutes a historical falsification by its known authors.<sup>7</sup>

The massive aspect of the demobilizing repression is what gives the Chilean dictatorship its terrorist character. Under conditions of exception, state of war, state of siege, etc., with a curfew that lasted years, the numbers of victims of the regime are unquestionably shocking. Fugitives granted asylum in embassies during the first months of the dictatorship, numbered 10,000 before the end of 1973. In 1979, the United Nations special rapporteur for human rights in Chile reported

---

<sup>5</sup> Henry Lansberger and Tim McDaniel: "Hyper-mobilization in Chile 1970-1973".

<sup>6</sup> "The battle on September 11<sup>th</sup> lasted almost four hours," Augusto Pinochet interviewed by the journal *Ercilla* six months after the coup. *Ercilla* N° 2015, 1974. Quoted by Nancy Guzmán J., in *Un grito desde el silencio*, pp. 44-45.

<sup>7</sup> *Libro Blanco del Cambio de Gobierno en Chile, 11 de Septiembre de 1973*, Diario la Tercera, Santiago, Abril 11, 1999. Reportaje Nacional, "Gonzalo Vial Correa, chastised by the left and recriminated by the right. The misunderstood conservative". This fact which is public today, i.e. Vial's participation in publishing the "Libro Blanco" in 1973, and in the publication of the report of the Rettig Commission in 1990-1991, was insinuated by general Manuel Contreras (Ret) in his response to the Rettig Report, in an

that up to mid-1975, between 40,000 and 50,000 Chileans had been arrested for more than 24 hours, a figure representing around one in every 125 economically active adults in the population.<sup>8</sup> The dictatorship's official figures coincide only partially with this report. None of the data can reflect what massive repression meant for the victims. In October 1974, the Minister of the Interior declared those as arrested pursuant to an administrative measure, in view of the state of siege (that is without formal charge or trial of any kind) numbered 748. The following figures were released in March 1975: arrested since September 11, 1973, 41,759; released, 36,605 (among them 9,167 expelled from the country or living as refugees abroad); persons condemned in some form of judicial procedure, 1,557; persons awaiting trial, 1,780; persons detained under the state of siege, 1,116.<sup>9</sup> It should be noted that between the two dates quoted, the number of political prisoners was still increasing.

---

interview for the daily *La Tercera*, published March 26, 1991. In it he insists on a version of Plan Z, (See p. 3).

<sup>8</sup> Data quoted by C.G. Brown: *10 Años de atropellos a los derechos humanos en Chile*, report of America's Watch Committee, p. 44.

<sup>9</sup> *La documentation Française, notes et études documentaires*, No. 4421, 4422, 4423. *Cronologie du Chili, Septembre, 1973-Décembre 1975*, pp. 31 and 34.



After emptying the stadiums and sports facilities, improvised as detention and interrogation centres for the suspect during the early months, concentration camps were established. It is important to highlight the ambiguities attached to the treatment of prisoners in Chile. To begin with, mistreatment and torture became routine procedure in the handling of the enemy from the very moment of their arrest. Also, mistreatment and torture were neither in principal nor in general, methods of investigation, but rather forms of punishment. And finally, although officially denied as a practice, part of its effectiveness was gained through a public awareness that such a threat existed. Therefore the spread of information regarding the frequency and degree of such incidents was not hindered, especially as disseminated by former victims who had either been freed or, though under detention, were no longer incommunicado.

The following figures come from the concentration camp established in the former Chacabuco saltpetre mine and from its operation between November 10, 1973 and August 17, 1974.<sup>10</sup> The total number of prisoners held

---

<sup>10</sup> Chacabuco is situated almost 110 kms from Antofagasta in the middle of the Atacama Desert. Abandoned in 1938, it was used for army manoeuvres. It functioned as a prison camp from early November 1973 to April of 1975. Dossier on Human Rights in Chile, *El País*, on the Internet <http://www.elpais.es>.

there during that period was 1,253, with the average length of stay in the camp being 177 days. It should be remembered that this was only part of the period of detention. Only exceptionally was one of them tried, as indicated in the official figures quoted above. The average number of prisoners in the camp during the period was 802.<sup>11</sup> Later, the dictatorship counted more than 300 of them (including this author) as released, who were expelled from the country and denied the right to return for more than ten years (authorization to do so began as late as 1983).<sup>12</sup> And this was not the only prison camp.<sup>13</sup>

Repression became a very complex phenomenon. To maintain its extensive character and to prolong itself in time and acquire a character that was no less terrifying for being more selective, was to define several different but complementary objectives. The first of these was to establish the necessary unity and discipline within the Armed Forces. This objective implied several types of

---

<sup>11</sup> All these calculations are based on the register kept by the political prisoners themselves of those detained and released from Chacabuco, where they came from, and where they went.

<sup>12</sup> The first list of those authorized to return to Chile contains 1,160 names of exiles and was published in *El Mercurio* in Santiago, August 28, 1983.

<sup>13</sup> The previously quoted dossier of the daily *El País* of Madrid on the Internet, also describes the camps at Pisagua, Melinka (Puchuncaví), Ritoque, the prison ships at Valparaíso, Tejas Verdes, Colonia Dignidad and the Quiriquina and Dawson islands. Furthermore, in another chapter, it describes detention and torture centres in Santiago.



actions. First, direct repression of any demonstration of disagreement with actions undertaken since the coup.<sup>14</sup> Second, to involve the irresolute in actions of repression against the civilian population.<sup>15</sup> Third, to exercise measures exemplary of the decisiveness with which those in command were prepared to act.<sup>16</sup> A problem that arose later on was the anomaly within the structure of the Armed Forces of an apparatus of repression and intelligence, specialized and obedient to the military high command in its political function, the DINA. This implied structural and functional ambiguities such as the involvement of civilian personnel.

The other level of the demobilizing repression was the "selective" level, aimed at cadres of organizations defining themselves as armed or capable of arming themselves against the dictatorship. It is in this area that systematic disappearances of individuals took place

---

<sup>14</sup> Pinochet recounts in *El día decisivo*, p. 131, "... my Aide, who expressed his disagreement to me with what was going to be carried out. I accepted his position and ordered his immediate arrest in a room of the Army Telecommunications building."

<sup>15</sup> "Another fear that also played a role in the consolidation and impunity of the group [DINA] was its high degree of efficiency in manoeuvring within military spheres and particularly in the army paralyzing or cutting off the professional careers of those who opposed them (and who were called "softies"). Parallel to these, it was noteworthy that high ranking officers considered "softies" were peremptorily summoned, court-martialed, dismissed from their commands, and even subjected to physical abuse and loss of their careers." *Informe Rettig*, p. 11

after the first wave of summary executions. This became a circle of horror of repeated detentions, systematic torture and the most horrible murders.<sup>17</sup> This is the level that is best documented, case by case, thanks to the organization of relatives of the victims, the churches and other human rights organizations and, finally, the Committee for Truth and Reconciliation.<sup>18</sup>

The degree of compliance with the coup and the dictatorship on the part of both individuals and organizations may be determined by the type of justification they offer for repressive practices. At one extreme, were the committed supporters of the dictatorship who continue to affirm the thesis of a civil war and the providential intervention of the Armed Forces that saved them from communism. However, this is an example of political primitivism rare among the professional political elite. More common among the old and new right is the habit of blaming the victims, a more sophisticated version of the former. The most widespread

---

<sup>16</sup> With respect to the trial of the "Caravana de la Muerte" by judge Guzmán, he has revealed the facts already published by the journalist Patricia Verdugo in her book *Los zarpazos del puma*.

<sup>17</sup> The earliest cases, recently documented, affected the MIR, Bautista van Schowen and Patricio Munita, Lumi Videla and Sergio Pérez, Edgardo Enriquez and many others. Later, some of the most notorious cases affected the Communist Party, as was the case of "Operación Albania" and those whose throats were cut.

<sup>18</sup> Report of the National Committee for Truth and Reconciliation (Rettig Report).



conciliatory view is that of "excesses," pointing to individuals guilty of abuses. The most hypocritical clouds the facts by appealing to the "context" as is followed by condemnation of the political use of claims for abuses against human rights.<sup>19</sup>

The evolution of the repression and of the apparatus that within the Armed Forces specialized in it, is a record of the evolution of the dictatorship. The first important change subsequent to the coup d'etat was the rupture in the consensus within the insurrectionist bloc and the appearance of a political strategy adopted by the dictatorship as its own that went beyond the restoration of a normally functioning political system and indicated a replacement. This change was expressed in the loss of the sense of temporality of the dictatorship and the construction of institutions that lengthened the prospect of its hold on power. This was expressed first in the appearance of DINA as an apparatus of intelligence and repression that was new and alien to the intelligence services of the several branches of the Armed Forces.

The origin of this organ is blurred. In late 1973, massive repression, the object of which was social and political demobilization of the masses, had produced an

---

<sup>19</sup> Jaime Guzmán Errazuriz, *Escritos personales*, pp. 133-156.

accumulation of detainees for politico-ideological reasons without indictment or trial possible under current legislation. The various intelligence services participated in this without achieving any real coordination amongst them. The Military Junta approved the secret decree creating the National Executive Secretariat for Detainees (SENDET), that Colonel Jorge Espinoza was appointed to lead. It is only possible to approximately deduce the date from the sequential number assigned to it, 117. SENDET would unify and organize records, advise the families of detainees, grant information, authorise visits to prisoners etc. "However, article three of decree law 117, had sown the seed: the Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) would now be a dependency of SENDET and its mission would be to establish rules for interrogation, classification of prisoners and coordination of intelligence functions."<sup>20</sup> The point was that, although in the decree DINA appeared as a subordinated part of SENDET, it became the main apparatus of repression.

DINA's growing independence in spite of its humble legal status seems to have been due to three factors. 1) A change in the nature of the repression which shifted

---

<sup>20</sup> Ascanio Cavallo, Manuel Salazar and Oscar Sepúlveda, *La historia*



from its first stage, in which the objective of mass demobilization was predominant, to a new stage in which a kind of "dirty war" came to the fore focused on certain organisations that had been partly initiated by intelligence services of one or the other Armed Forces.<sup>21</sup>

2) Its partial conformity to the organization of the Armed Forces (with a colonel in command, when the intelligence services of other branches were usually led by a general). 3) Incorporation of civilian collaborators who, adhering ideologically to the bloc opposing Allende and supporting the dictatorship, represented a particular kind of action and political strategy albeit discarded more or less rapidly and who may be characterized as generally nationalist but who might also be the most ludicrous examples of Creole fascism.<sup>22</sup> All this has been explained by the direct subordination of the entire apparatus to Pinochet, and its leader, the then colonel Contreras, who seemed to enjoy the absolute confidence of the dictator and was answerable only to him.

At that time, the transition and transformation of the repression expressed the first signs that the political process of the dictatorship was abandoning the

---

*oculta del régimen militar, Chile, 1973-1988, p. 44.*

<sup>21</sup> Ricardo Boizard: *Proceso a una traición. Detalles íntimos del sumario de la FACH.*

restorative sense of the coup d'etat which drew together the consensus of the bloc opposing Unidad Popular. Elements began to appear that were outside the structure of the Armed Forces, but which, protected by their status of belonging to the state apparatus, sought to promote political projects aimed at replacing the previous political system, particularly that of parties and their personnel, the politicians.

The most visible of these processes is the concentration of power in the person of Pinochet who from *primus inter pares* in the Military Junta became President of the Republic, monopolized executive power and relegated the other commanders to the role of legislators. According to Leigh, at the moment of the coup, the rotation of the Presidency of the Military Junta was established by a "gentlemen's agreement" that was never fulfilled.<sup>23</sup> "Decree-law 527 of June 17, 1974, reserved the exercise of executive power to the President of the governing Junta, without prejudice to the other members of the Junta collaborating with him in its exercise by assuming, for the purpose: 'the highest direction of the activities, areas and functions that he might charge them with'. Later, this situation was

---

<sup>22</sup> Manuel Salazar, Contreras, *Historia de un intocable*, pp. 73-74.



regulated by Decree-law 806 of December 16, 1974, which referred to the ruler by the title of President of the Republic."<sup>24</sup>

Pinochet was subject to determining factors that operated as limits. Of these, the most important is the preservation of the military institution, its source of power and legitimacy, which nevertheless had to be controlled so as to maintain loyalties that went beyond the simple line of command. Though the Armed Forces were never entirely depoliticised or entirely devoid of ideology, now, political decisions that ought to have been made by officers at various levels of state administration threatened to instigate ideological allegiances, even party allegiances held with discretion in normal times.

A second element that changed the apparatus of repression into an instrument of government, was the political move to reduce the scope of the insurrectionist bloc, in particular the dismantling of the Christian Democrats, which was symbolic of the decision to eliminate the political parties in general. In this case, repression was always the lesser and selective evil. However, since the spirit of the coup was

---

<sup>23</sup> Florencia Varas, *Op.cit.*, p. 56.

perpetuated in the theory of an international communist conspiracy against Chile, those Christian Democrats who repudiated the coup and participated in denouncing the dictatorship's abuses became DINA's targets. Intelligence gathering was broadened to take in any expression of dissidence including from personnel of the Armed Forces that had nothing to do with the left or the Allende government. Foreseeing rejection and possible opposition to some of the measures, the intelligence community was included in some of the crucial decisions taken by the dictatorship.

An important element in the analysis of the relations between the political components of the dictatorship is that civilians linked to the apparatus of repression constituted by DINA represented an ideological contradiction. They also presented a sociological problem, forming a case of cultural, ideological and political marginality. Both on the national level and in international contacts, civilians linked to DINA, inasmuch as it has been possible to identify them, were largely recruited from the extra-parliamentary fringe of the right.<sup>25</sup> This included some individuals from the left

---

<sup>24</sup> Luis Valencia Avaría, *Anales de la República*, p. I-711, note 206.

<sup>25</sup> A noteworthy group consisted of lawyers incorporated as functionaries, recruited among people linked to nationalist



who had attained notoriety but who shared with their peers of the right the marginal characteristic of their political participation.<sup>26</sup> Predominant among them were individuals with an inclination towards violence and political intrigue, largely not members of political parties but of sects, lodges and other models of organization with conditions for clandestine action. Another noteworthy feature is their explicit rejection of politicians and their models of action. The psychological profiles of these individuals appear to be too stereotyped. What is of interest is their almost permanent existence and availability for use under conditions such as those created by the dictatorship in Chile.

The activities that from the ideological and political point of view lent the more fascist-like nationalists notoriety, must have been yet another source of frustration. The nationalists whose ideological defeat in this sphere led to their marginalization but not to

---

publications such as *Tacna*, *Tizona* and *Orden Nuevo*. Salazar, *Op.cit.* p. 65. An ideological feature that identifies the civil elements collaborating with DINA is its nationalism. The marginality of the nationalists and their subordinate place within the party system until 1973, has been pointed out in Chapter 1.

<sup>26</sup> The most notorious cases are those of Luz Arce, "Flaca" Alejandra, "Guatón" Romo and, less cited because he did not survive, a militant member of the Juventudes Comunistas, René Basoa, who was executed by his ex-comrades. Cases of left wing collaborators with DINA seem to

their opposition, rejected the economic blueprint set in motion by the dictatorship. The political model proposed repeatedly by them, the establishment of a civil-military movement that would replace the political parties, never found the conditions under which to flourish in spite of appearing to be considered by Pinochet more than once during those years.<sup>27</sup>

Civil participation in the repression, beyond the grotesque anecdotes represented by its members, reveals the ideological and political evolution of the dictatorship toward the search for a new political model of government and of social participation that would replace the political parties and the system formed by them. This signified the erosion of the anti-Allende consensus that had allowed the coup to take place, and eliminated the principal ally within the party system, the Christian Democrats. The new negative consensus was anti-politicians and anti-party. It gathered together the most plebeian fascists, incorporated the dirtiest repressive tasks; extended to the most intellectualised nationalists, who sought not to mix in those kinds of

---

have been the product of pressures on the individual, rather than an ideological affinity.

<sup>27</sup> The most typical example of this phenomenon, not personally linked to the apparatus of repression although some of his followers achieved notoriety in it, is Pablo Rodríguez Grez.



activities; and included the most elitist intellectuals, the "gremialistas," represented by their foremost ideologue, Guzmán, who embodied it better than anyone else. Guzmán, in fact, formulated the new blueprint for the political system.

### 3.3. Ambiguities of the victory and formation of a strategic alliance

To this day, the Chilean military imagine themselves to have been the protagonists of a liberating geste that saved the country from the claws of communism. This belief is the cement of the bloc that supported the coup d'état on September 11, 1973, and the argument that seeks to legitimate it. It is also the justification for the repression and, among those who even today do not condemn the repression, a vehicle for shifting the blame to the victims.<sup>28</sup> The negative character of the consensus that permitted the simultaneous existence of such a heterogeneous bloc was expressed, with some logic, in the "restoration" tone of the first pronouncements of the insurrectionists. They declared the illegitimacy of

---

<sup>28</sup> For the currency of these arguments see "El engaño," by Arturo Fontaine in the journal *¿Qué pasa?*, N° 1444, December 1998. Fontaine was Director of *El Mercurio* in the worst period of journalistic falsifications aimed at hiding attacks on human rights. See also the speech by General Ricardo Izurieta (successor to Pinochet in command of the Chilean army) reviewed in the daily, *La Tercera*, of Santiago, June 8, 1999.

Allende's government and defined the government established by the coup as "transitory" without committing to deadlines. The oft-cited Bando N° 5, issued by the military Junta, declared that

"the Armed Forces, have assumed the moral duty imposed upon them by the fatherland, to depose the government which, though initially legitimate has fallen into flagrant illegality, by assuming power only for the time required by circumstances, supported by the evident feelings of the great national majority, which by itself, before God and history, makes their action just."<sup>29</sup>

One of the first communiqués broadcast by radio during the coup d'état and that had been signed by the conspirators the previous afternoon, stated, "Chilean workers may rest assured that their economic and social conquests to date will not be fundamentally changed."<sup>30</sup> Leigh himself quotes Pinochet who, in the first interview he granted foreign correspondents in the Escuela Militar

---

<sup>29</sup> Bando N° 5 of the Government Junta, *Libro blanco...* pp. 248-249. This direct quote from the Bando N° 5 has been incorporated into the secondary school "History of Chile" text by Francisco Frías Valenzuela, (p. 492).

<sup>30</sup> Florencia Varas, *Gustavo Leigh, El general disidente*, p. 55.



stated: "As soon as the country recovers, the Junta will hand over the government to whomever the people wish."<sup>31</sup>

Undoubtedly, the restorationist position was most clearly expressed by the Christian Democrats in point 3 of their declaration of September 12, 1973. "The purposes of restoring institutional normality, peace and unity among Chileans expressed by the Military Junta of Government, interpret the general feeling and merit the patriotic collaboration of all sectors. Their success requires solidarity and just action, respectful of the rights of workers, that combines collective effort in the national task of constructing the future of Chile, alien to minority purposes of those who seek regressive models and those contrary to the democratic vocation of our people".<sup>32</sup> The other significant component of the insurrectionist bloc within the party system, the Partido Nacional, expressed its "unrestricted support" and called for "unreserved support of the rectifying activities of the Governing Military Junta."<sup>33</sup> These political parties, the ones that supported the coup, were declared in "recess," a situation that was ordered in January 1974.<sup>34</sup> The parties supporting the Allende government shifted to

---

<sup>31</sup> *Op.cit.* p. 56, (emphasis mine).

<sup>32</sup> *Chile-América*, N° 4, Rome, 1975, p. 43.

<sup>33</sup> Rafael Valdivieso Ariztía, *Crónica de un rescate*, p. 13.

clandestine action as a consequence of the repression unleashed against their members.

The presence of political actors alien to the parties that were legitimate by virtue of their participation in the system, appears to be insinuated in the Christian Democrat declarations. That suspicion was confirmed *a posteriori* by General Leigh when he attributed the restorationist position to himself. "Ideologues, advisors, courtesans and, mainly, economic groups of the greatest diversity began to emerge.. Slogans began to flourish to the effect that: this is not a government of transition; goals, not deadlines; hands off the state, etc."<sup>35</sup>

The ambiguity of the Military Junta's position began to show within six months. "The Declaration of Principles of the Chilean Government," released March 11, 1974, signed by its four members, establishes its position with respect to these questions:

The Armed Forces and the Forces of Order do not set deadlines for their leadership of the government, because the task of moral, institutional and material reconstruction of the country require profound and prolonged activity."

---

<sup>34</sup> *Chile-América*, N° 5, Rome, 1975, p. 48.



"The present government has been categorical in declaring that it does not pretend to limit itself to being a government of mere administration, which signifies a parenthesis between two similar *party* governments, in other words, it is not a matter of a "truce" for reordering toward return of power to *the same politicians* who had so much responsibility, by action or omission in the virtual destruction of the country.<sup>36</sup>

Today the authorship of Jaime Guzmán and, consequently the "gremialista" tone of that declaration is recognised. In it the principle of the state as subsidiary and its intended "apoliticism," stand out. However, the ambiguity of the situation persists to the extent that the processes of relocation of power centres continue their course.

Relations with the Christian Democrat party appeared, in fact, the same as relations with all political parties in general. The Christian Democrats, as the axis of the party system questioned the limits of the situation it defined as abnormal. Communications between the government and the Christian Democrats were answered

---

<sup>35</sup> Florencia Varas, *Op.cit.*, p. 53.

indirectly as resolutions with respect to the political parties in general. Decree-law 27 of September 21, 1973, had dissolved the National Congress, the centre of party activity. In December, it had been pronounced that members of political parties occupying public posts were required to resign their party affiliation in order to continue in their jobs.<sup>37</sup>

Junta members and other representatives of the Armed Forces had contacts with civilians coming from political parties integrated into the system, who continued to collaborate with the dictatorship on a personal basis, but also with political-ideological groups that were marginal to the system prior to 1973. Some of these had been very active in the opposition to Allende<sup>38</sup> and others were of well-defined marginal ideologies. But they would find a place from which to collaborate in the apparatus of repression developed by the dictatorship.<sup>39</sup>

A second set of ambiguities generated by the victory and formation of the dictatorship occurred in the contentious formulation of a new economic field. Here

---

<sup>36</sup> *Declaración de principios...* pp. 28-29, emphasis mine.

<sup>37</sup> Ascanio Cavallo, Manuel Salazar and Oscar Sepúlveda, *La historia secreta del régimen militar*, p. 28.

<sup>38</sup> Of these, the one that achieved the broadest projection was the group known as the "gremialistas" originating in the Universidad Católica.



there was an ideological confrontation, the resolution of which would be decisive for the historical significance of the dictatorship. From the 1970 presidential campaign, in the candidacy of Jorge Alessandri, there was a confrontation between a group of economists and entrepreneurs later known as the "Chicago boys," and the ideological leaders of the traditional right. The latter have been characterized as "the thinking minds of the captains of industry grown in the shade of import substitution."<sup>40</sup> The latter were victorious during the first confrontation regarding the construction Alessandri's economic program for the 1970 campaign. After the coup, one of the heads of the "Chicago" group, Sergio de Castro, was appointed advisor to the Minister of Economy, General Rolando González. However, Raúl Sáez, the principal economic advisor during the early stages of the dictatorship did not belong to the "Chicago boys". He arrived in Santiago toward the end of September of 1973 and, on his recommendation, the Junta appointed Fernando Leniz Minister of Economy on October 10. This left the ideological conflict unresolved due to the fact

---

<sup>39</sup> Pre-existing fascist conglomerations like the MRNS [Movimiento Revolucionario Nacional Sindicalista], or the more ephemeral *Avanzada Nacional* are examples of this phenomenon.

<sup>40</sup> Arturo Fontaine Aldunate, *Los economistas y el Presidente Pinochet*, p. 32.

that Leniz was an ex-executive of the Compañía Manufacturera de Papeles y Cartones and, during Allende's government, was chairman of the board of *El Mercurio*, all of which linked him to the most traditional right.<sup>41</sup>

For a time Sáez functioned as referee in the conflict between the two groups of economic advisors. In that role, he was appointed Minister of Economic Coordination in July 1974.<sup>42</sup> However, ideological development was uneven. The proposal of the "Chicago boys" that had matured during the Unidad Popular government into a document produced by a group of opposition economists that even included Christian Democrats, that became a legend known as: "El ladrillo" (The Brick). In actuality, these economists did not confront an ideological opposition but ideological inertia. In previous chapters<sup>43</sup> it has been demonstrated how the ideology of economic development centred on industrialization by import substitution was the ground for a relative consensus that permitted the party system to function. In it, on other levels, models of global organization of society were confronted that, in a

---

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 59-61.

<sup>42</sup> A ministry created by Decree-law 558, of July 8, 1974, of which Raúl Sáez took charge three days later on the 11<sup>th</sup>. Valencia Avaría, *Op.cit.*, I-713, note 208.

<sup>43</sup> See Chapter 1.



universal sort of language, were promoted by each party. The consensus as to the model of economic development, however, reduced these differences to issues regarding the form and velocity with which changes ought to be implemented; the general spirit and goals of the new ideology were the object of basic consensus. This consensus made it possible to separate "technical" from "political" questions in the field of economic policy. Thus, one of the main objectives of the new economic ideology was successfully fulfilled

The key political ally in this phase was Jaime Guzmán, the "gremialista" ideologist, to whom a fundamental role in the writing of the above mentioned "Declaración de Principios" is attributed. In 1974, Guzmán joined a group of neoliberal economists, despite the fact that in the first stage of the regime he felt closer to Alessandri's entrepreneurs". As advisor to the dictatorship, "as soon as it was practicable, he suggested announcing the line of economic freedom and used the principle of subsidiarity to support the market economy." Invited by these economists to a meeting in the offices of the Sociedad de Fomento Fabril, in 1974, "He noted that all, except Kelly, held the title of advisors and exhorted them to take over executive posts.

Guzmán was convinced that it was absolutely necessary that the economists carry forward their ideas and plans by themselves."<sup>44</sup>

An alliance between Jaime Guzmán and the group of economists was emblematic of the significance of the whole period of dictatorship. At first glance it is impossible to establish their connections or affinities. It was even considered an abdication or "betrayal" by Jaime Guzman of his declared principles.<sup>45</sup> Guzmán and the neoliberal economists, brought about two of the most radical changes subsequently produced during the dictatorship. These were the new constitution and the new model for economic development. Under conditions prevailing before the coup, that is, conditions that included a political system, a party system and an ideological model that constituted both as such, neither the new constitution nor the new model for economic development appeared as a viable blueprint. To implement these new blueprints, it was necessary to eliminate the political system, to place the parties on recess, to suspend their actions and clear the scene. That would only be possible under conditions of dictatorship, by a government that was not responsible to anyone and in

---

<sup>44</sup> Fontaine, *Op.cit.* pp. 84-85.



which the "technical" elements could be presented as "apolitical." Once these conditions were created by the military coup and the subsequent repression, politics took on a different aspect from the normal interplay in parliament. Guzmán's clandestine contact with the economists is an example that clearly illustrates the conspiratorial shape assumed by politics.

Renewal of political cadres of the dominant class during the dictatorship reflected a change in social structure due to replacement of the interests of industrial capital with the interests of financial capital as a strategic axis. These were represented by technocrats who nevertheless had to ally with political cadres of the right who, defeated in the field of economic ideology, entrenched themselves in the design of a new political system.<sup>46</sup> The ideological victory by economists of the new model took place in April 1975, when on renewing the cabinet in light of the prospect of his first economic crisis, Pinochet handed over command of the economy as a whole to this group and adopted their "shock treatment" as official economic policy.

The power structures of the dictatorship are revealed in accounts of meetings at Viña del Mar where

---

<sup>45</sup> Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt, *El Chile perplejo*, p. 238.

crucial decisions were made. Fontaine writes that the presence of "Colonel Manuel Contreras and other officers of the Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia [DINA] was mustered to contribute their appraisal of the effects of the plan on public opinion."<sup>47</sup> The same meeting saw the replacement of Raul Sáez as principal economic advisor to the government, his tasks were thereby practically reduced to negotiating the foreign debt.<sup>48</sup>

The depth of the economic policy change as a break with the past can be seen as a rejection of the previous political system. The Christian Democrats were the only political party that was not proscribed (as parties on the Left were) and the Right had dismantled themselves after the coup to support the military.

As late as the end of 1975, a pamphlet written by Eduardo Frei Montalva, adopted a decisive distance between the party that represented the axis of the previous system and the dictatorship.<sup>49</sup> Relations between the dictatorship and the Christian Democrats are the best

<sup>46</sup> This is the case of Alessandri, but not that of Guzmán.

<sup>47</sup> Fontaine, *Op.cit.* p. 89.

<sup>48</sup> Cavallo, *et.al.*, *Op.cit.*, p. 87. Furthermore a Decree-law of April 10, 1975, number 966, called Sáez's ministry "Economic and Development Coordination" Decree-law, 1263, completely erased the ministry. Sáez, resigned November 3, 1977, and his resignation was accepted from February 10, 1976 (D.S., 25-XI-1975). See Valencia Avaría, *Op.cit.*, p. I-713, note 208.

<sup>49</sup> *El mandato de la historia y las exigencias del porvenir*, in *Chile-América*, No. 14-15, Roma, January-February 1976, pp. 92-110.



indicator of the progress of the blueprint to replace the previous political system, because the parties of the left were subject to implacable persecution and those of the right had subscribed their unconditional support. Thus, the interests of the Christian Democrat party became identified with the interests of the party system as a whole inasmuch as it represented the right to exist of any and all parties. The Christian Democrat party was, however, in an ambiguous situation. Its legitimacy as interlocutor of the dictatorship rested on its support for the coup d'etat. Consequently, its denunciations and protests with respect to the repressive character of the dictatorship were limited to those affecting the party directly and referred only in a general way to the worst aspects of the repression affecting the parties of the left. The alliance between the "Chicago" economists and the "gremialistas" faced still other alternatives before consolidating as a blueprint for the military. On the one hand, the nationalists were ideologically influential in a diffuse sense among the military, and Pinochet took them into account when he thought of a civic-military movement to replace the parties. On the other, the ambiguity of the Christian Democrat's position allowed some of the party's technical cadres to continue contact.

with the dictatorship and some officers, particularly generals, recalled their earlier sympathy for them. This multiplicity of unresolved ideological positions unleashed a covert struggle between conspirators, government functionaries installed by the dictator, who sought to gain influence over him through conspiracies and intrigue.

The "gremialistas" were affected by scandals that arose from the collapse of the "La Familia" co-operative for savings and credit. When a group of savers brought suit for fraud, it was revealed that among the directors of the cooperative were some of the principal "gremialista" leaders including Jaime Guzmán, who remonstrated that he had nothing to do with the co-operative after he was confined to the city.<sup>50</sup>

In 1977, the Christian Democrats suffered the closure of their radio station, Radio Balmaseda. In the financial field, it is supposed that pursuit of the Fluxá-Yaconi economic group was due to the fact that it, through the offices of Banco Osorno y La Unión, was a channel for CDP financing. Finally, on March 11, 1977, a decree was issued dissolving all parties so far in recess, aimed explicitly at forestalling a Christian



Democrat conspiracy. Two internal party documents drawn up by Andrés Zaldivar and Tomás Reyes were drawn in as proof of the conspiracy.<sup>51</sup>

With the elimination of all political parties, the road to normalizing the nation's political life seemed to be abandoned. However, in that same year, outlines of the new system that would eventually be imposed by the dictatorship began to appear, along with the stages that it would go through, and a tentative timetable of that transition. All of this was specified in what was known as the "Discurso de Chacarillas" read by Pinochet July 9, 1977, on the hill of that name in a ceremony organized by the National Youth Secretariat, an organ of the General Secretariat of Government, and a Frente Juvenil de Unidad Nacional, organized by the "gremialistas" of the Universidad Católica. The speech, written by Jaime Guzmán, according to available information, repeats the essence of the "Declaración de Principios" of 1974, but defines the new regime toward which the country was advancing as: "... a new democracy that will be authoritarian, protected, integrative, 'technified,' and of authentic social participation." Transition to this

---

<sup>50</sup> The lawyer for the defrauded savers was the nationalist leader Pablo Rodríguez. See Cavallo, *et.al.* *Op.cit.* p. 157.

new system of government was designed to take place in stages:

The process, conceived as gradual, provides for three stages: recovery, transition and normality or consolidation. These stages differ in the changing roles assigned to the Armed Forces and the forces of order on the one hand, and the civilian population on the other. They are also distinguished by the legal-institutional instruments that will be created and employed in each one.

In the stage of recovery, political power has had to be entirely assumed by the Armed Forces and the forces of order with the collaboration of the civilian population, however, later its most contingent aspects will be shared with the civilian population, which will thus shift from collaboration to participation."

Finally, we will enter into a stage of normality and consolidation. Power will be exercised directly and basically by the civilian population, it being reserved constitutionally to the Armed Forces and forces of order to provide care for the essential bases of institutions and national security in their broad and decisive modern projections.<sup>52</sup>

Other characteristics of the stages and the timetable associated with them, referred to the kind of regulatory ordering that would rule them and the degrees and forms that civil participation would assume. The first stage, of "recovery," would last until December 31, 1980, when the abrogation of the 1925 Constitution and its replacement by "constitutional acts" would be completed. In the second stage, that of "transition,"

---

<sup>51</sup> The documents appeared in a special supplement of the daily *La Tercera*, March 12, 1977.



beginning in 1981, the Constituent power of the Junta would be exercised in consultation with the Council of state. A mixed legislative chamber of a "tripartite nature" would be installed, though without the participation of parties traditionally designated as the "three parts." Instead, one third would be designated by Pinochet and the remainder would come from the twelve regions with prior approval of the government.

The third phase of "Constitutional Normality" would begin in 1985. Power would return to the civilian population. This implied an offer of free and direct elections in eight years time. In this third stage of the period of transition, two thirds of the legislative chamber would be elected by popular and direct suffrage and one third, would be appointed by the government. That same chamber would elect the next president for six years.<sup>53</sup> The new constitution would also enter into effect on that day.<sup>54</sup>

The circumstances of the ceremony in which the speech was read and its content, marked a total victory for the "gremialistas" over nationalists and

---

<sup>52</sup> Extracts from "Discurso en el Cerro Chacarillas 9.7.1977". In *Pinochet: Patria y Democracia*.

<sup>53</sup> Cavallo, et.al. *Op.cit.* p. 162.

<sup>54</sup> Genaro Arriagada, *Por la razón o la fuerza. Chile bajo Pinochet*, p. 91.

corporativist tendencies. Starting from the supposed success of the "Chicago boys" economic program, the "gremialistas" would see their political struggle culminate in Pinochet's assumption of their program of institutionalisation. The contents of this speech are cited by Pinochet as being among the first elements of conflict with General Leigh which culminated a year later in his removal from both command of the air force and the governing Junta.<sup>55</sup> From here on, political conflict would centre on the characteristics of the new political order and the forms and deadlines of its being put into effect.

#### 3.4. The bases of a new political system, a new Constitution

It should be noted that, with respect to regulations during this process, the Governing Junta in its "Act of Constitution" of September 11, 1973, "Declares that the Junta... will respect the Constitution and the laws of the Republic to the extent that the present situation of the country permits."<sup>56</sup> A decree-law clarifying the meaning and scope of Article 1 of Decree-law No. 1 (the act quoted above), established that from the coup forward the Junta had undertaken to "exercise Constitutional, Legislative and Executive powers," setting forth its

---

<sup>55</sup> Florencia Varas, *Op.cit.* pp. 41-43.



ability to reform the Constitution by means of decree-laws. By December 1975, fifteen such decrees were handed down, all reforming the Constitution of 1925. After December 31 of that year, four Constitutional Acts were issued and, thereafter until July 1, 1980, seven Decree-laws were issued reforming the Constitutional Acts.<sup>57</sup> On that date, the Council of state (created by Constitutional Act No. 1, of December 31, 1975) handed down its report on the draft of a new Constitution to the military Junta. On August 10 1980, Pinochet announced that a plebiscite would be held on September 11<sup>th</sup> to approve that draft.

Study of the new Constitution had taken five years in the committee framing the draft; twenty two months for the 'Report to the Council of State'; forty two days for its approval by the Military Junta; but allowed only thirty days for presentation, discussion and vote by the people in the plebiscite.<sup>58</sup>

There has been much discussion among jurists regarding the characteristics of this Constitution. However, the central question was not technical except in a secondary sense. The central purpose of the entire draft never varied: to avoid at all costs the possibility of a repetition of the Unidad Popular experience. There

---

<sup>56</sup> Valencia Avaría, *Op.cit.* p. 268.

<sup>57</sup> Valencia Avaría, *Op.cit.*, pp. 269-330.

was also a negative consensus from the outset. Subsequently, implementation of the central idea inspired a variety of views, and interests became diversified just as had occurred in the case of the economic blueprint. Pinochet and the Armed Forces ultimately imposed a draft, written by their civilian supporters, which could not have been approved if the political party system had still been functioning. Moreover, this draft was explicitly designed so that its proposals for the general participation of the population would go into effect only after any threat of resurgence by the pre-coup d'etat political actors had disappeared. In Pinochet's words:

To step abruptly from the present regime to full democracy, with the generation of authority by election, would only meet with former political groups and parties as prepared actors whose activities were fatal for Chile.

We must not only create new institutions that favour the sustained spiritual and material progress of the country. It is not enough to promote practices that confer solidity on these new institutions. It is just as indispensable to promote the development of a new civil generation impregnated with these values.<sup>59</sup>

Six years of dictatorship, equivalent to the duration of a constitutional administration, were about to end. Beside the guarantees that could be included in

---

<sup>58</sup> Genaro Arriagada, *Op.cit.*, p. 107.

<sup>59</sup> Clase magistral de Su Excelencia el Presidente de la República, General de Ejército Don Augusto Pinochet Ugarte con motivo de la



the regulations, they now included periods of transition that could last for an indeterminate period in view of the goals imposed. What is significant about the new political order established by the dictatorship's Constitution is the way in which it sought to ensure certain strategic ends. Among them was the ideological exclusion of the left and a guarantee by force of the stability of the domination. Another was to grant the advantage to a new elite sponsored by the dictatorship. Fulfilment of these objectives implied facing grave ideological obstacles. Universal suffrage was finally included in the new constitution, but not without opposition to it. Jaime Guzmán, for one, did not adhere to the idea of popular sovereignty. Even so, there were those who proposed a right to vote conditioned by property or income.<sup>60</sup>

From the outset, the work of the designers of the new order was directed toward limiting party activity. The Committee to Study the New Constitution<sup>61</sup> held its

---

inauguración del año académico de la Universidad de Chile (Santiago, April 6, 1979), p. 46.

<sup>60</sup> The minority vote, signed by Pedro Ibañez and Carlos Cáceres in the Council of State "Established the discrepancy of both with respect to several points of the draft, of which the most noteworthy was its opposition to universal suffrage and its suggestion that the highest authorities be elected by indirect vote." Cavallo, *et.al.* *Op.cit.* p. 314.

<sup>61</sup> The information and quotations that follow have been taken from the work of Rafael Larrain Cruz and Leopoldo Nuñez Tomé, *Protección*

first session September 24, 1973, with Enrique Ortúzar presiding. On November 26, of the same year, they presented a "Memorandum of Constitutional Intentions" for the consideration of the governing Junta. This was the first result of intense ideological labour.<sup>62</sup>

However, all this fell short of the draft that was finally imposed. The Committee was gradually purged of members that might have represented views linked to political parties. Three of its members who had resigned were Alejandro Silva Bascuñán, Enrique Evans and Jorge Ovalle. The former two were linked to the Christian Democrats after the dissolution of political parties by decree-law in 1977. The third was associated with Democracia Radical, through his association with General Leigh<sup>63</sup> and probably held the position generally attributed to the air force that it was sufficient to reform the 1925 Constitution, and that little need existed for a new one.<sup>64</sup> "The Committee was reconstituted with Don Juan de Dios Carmona who had been a Christian Democrat but was already politically supporting the

---

*de la democracia. ¿Deben proscribirse los partidos marxistas?, pp. 13-15.*

<sup>62</sup> See Appendix 1 for relevant extracts from report of Committee to Study the New Constitution

<sup>63</sup> Cavallo, *et.al. Op.cit.* p. 310 and Pinochet himself quoted by Florencia Varas *Op.cit.* p. 41.

<sup>64</sup> Cavallo, *et.al. Op.cit.* p. 224-236.



regime (...). Among other new members there were professors of constitutional law without a given political affiliation like Raul Bertelsen and Luz Bulnes."<sup>65</sup>

The Committee's labours were intense, 417 sessions, and the discussion in the Council of State required "57 plenary sessions and an unrecorded number of Committee meetings and interviews with specialists."<sup>66</sup>

These discussions demonstrate most clearly the thinking of the framers of the new Constitution.<sup>67</sup> What is even more important the clearly expressed idea that the penetration of political parties in society is undesirable for the maintenance of the regime of government.<sup>68</sup> The Constitution of 1980 sought to restrict ideological and social representation of the new party system that it expected to come into being. Ideological exclusion was established in Article 8,<sup>69</sup> and in Article 19 it is established that to preserve the independence of

---

<sup>65</sup> Jaime Guzmán interviewed by Juan Pablo Illanes, in Jaime Guzmán, *Escritos personales*, p. 163.

<sup>66</sup> Quoted by Rafael Valdivieso, *Crónica de un rescate*, p. 218.

<sup>67</sup> For example, the statement by Jaime Guzmán on October 25, 1973, in which he declared that "to speak of pluralist democracy is conflictive as long as the precise limits of pluralism are not known and there is a risk of falling into contradictions." (*Ibid.* p. 15).

<sup>68</sup> See the previous chapter.

<sup>69</sup> A comparison of the three versions of Article 8, the one presented by the Committee, the one by the Council of State and the one that was finally incorporated into the Constitution, may be seen in Larrain y Nuñez *Op.cit.* pp. 207-209.

labour organizations, it is prohibited that they "and their leaders" intervene in party politics.

The principles guiding the framing of these articles are contained in an order from Pinochet to the chairman of the "Committee to Study the New Constitution," Enrique Ortúzar, on November 10, 1977.<sup>70</sup> Point N° 5, contained, "certain ideas that I (Pinochet) consider basic to establishing the politico-institutional criteria that guide the government."<sup>71</sup>

If this resulted in a discourse that seems to be that of a puppet manipulated by a gremialista ventriloquist, the explanation is that the official copy editor, Mónica Madariaga, Minister of Justice at the time, enjoyed the advice of Jaime Guzmán, a member of the Committee and, therefore, also a recipient of the same document.<sup>72</sup> As mentioned above, articles 8 and 19 of the Constitution established regulations of ideological exclusion as well as the principle of separation between society and politics manifest in the prohibition of parties participating in gremial activities and by labour leaders in party activities.

---

<sup>70</sup> Reproduced in *Constitución de 1980. Comentarios de juristas internacionales*, pp. 137-143.

<sup>71</sup> See index for citation of relevant passages.

<sup>72</sup> Cavallo, *et.al.*, *Op.cit.*, p. 310.



The rules of the new Constitution affecting political parties were among those that most worried the critics at the time of their approval by plebiscite in 1980. The Committee for Constitutional Studies presided by the lawyer Manuel Sanhueza, known as the "Group of 24," had been questioning the Constitutional draft from the moment it was made public by its delivery to the Council of State. On January 27, 1979, the daily *El Mercurio*, published the document of the "Group of 24" entitled "Observations on Ortúzar's draft,"<sup>73</sup> in which "This Committee undertakes to warn the country about aspects that it esteems most grave in this attempt to hand down a new Political Constitution for the State"

From the present perspective, it is of interest to set down the central points of the critique of the draft as it was finally approved. These were that the draft: 1) established the crime of opinion (Article 8, to which reference has already been made); 2) "subordinated the principle of the people's sovereignty to the higher control of the Armed Forces"; 3) increased presidential power to a point incompatible with a democratic system; 4) distorted the function of the judiciary by limiting it with respect to Military Tribunals in matters of crimes

---

<sup>73</sup> Reproduced in *Chile-América*, N° 50-51.

of terrorism, and mixed the judiciary in political questions with reference to the Constitutional Tribunal and the Tribunal to Evaluate Elections; 5) did not recognize legal status under Public Law to political parties and did not preserve the Constitutional guarantee of autonomy allowing them to organise as they will; 6) and finally, its intent was to prevent a change in the current economic model. Furthermore, the absence of opportunity for public debate on the approval of the new Constitution was also questioned.

Approval of the Constitution in the plebiscite of September 11, 1980, marked the culmination of the dictatorship's victory and the consequent defeat of the political parties. In his enthusiasm for the victory that night, Pinochet announced the creation of "a great civil-military movement of Chile," (Membership in which would require registration in the municipalities).<sup>74</sup> *El Mercurio* expressed it thus:

"The politicians who allowed or generated the state of affairs that brought about the failure of Chilean democracy were defeated by an alliance of the military and the economists. The contents of the Thursday 11<sup>th</sup> plebiscite may be summarized as follows.



The military provided order, security and confidence, the economists provided new ideas capable of raising the nation from its prostration and liberating the energy to undertake a speedy march toward development. The military and the economists of this regime fulfilled the task that was not carried out by the politicians who now desperately lead the opposition... such is the meaning of the noteworthy alliance between the military and the economists."<sup>75</sup>

This triumphalism was based on perception of the success of the economic policy. Nineteenseventy-nine is still remembered as the year of uncontrolled expectations. On September 11, 1979 Pinochet declared that "by 1985 or 1986 every Chilean worker will have a car, a house and a television set."<sup>76</sup> In June the United States dollar was pegged at \$39 pesos and a wave of imports of consumer goods and dollar debt was unleashed. This situation may have influenced the decision to hold the plebiscite in 1980, and certainly was part of the explanation of its result, which the defeated accepted and, largely, eventually, legitimated.

---

<sup>74</sup> Cavallo, *et.al. Op.cit.* p. 331.

<sup>75</sup> "La Semana Política", *El Mercurio*, September 21, 1980, quoted by Genaro Arriagada *Op.cit.* p. 103.

<sup>76</sup> Quoted in *La Tercera* August 29, 1999, Reportajes, "1979: El año del cuesco Cabrera."

The irregularities surrounding the entire plebiscite were denounced in multiple locations and by several media.<sup>77</sup> However, accepting to carry out a limited campaign in favour of rejecting the draft Constitution by the party elite as a whole - formally outlawed at the time - provided all the legitimacy the dictatorship needed to impose its Constitution.<sup>78</sup> In fact, those who opposed the Constitution made up a heterogeneous bloc that included such diverse representatives as General Leigh, expelled from the governing Junta by Pinochet, to members of the the left who had no other option but to join Frei's call. The Christian Democrats rejected an alliance *with* the left preferring instead to lead a project in which the Left would have to play a subordinate role. At the only public act of opposition to the draft Constitution authorised by the dictatorship, Frei was received by an audience shouting Unidad Popular slogans.<sup>79</sup> This was but one example of the capacity for survival in the consciousness of the masses, in view of the fact that the parties of the left were passing through their worst moment of doubts and vacillations.

---

<sup>77</sup> See, Cavallo *et.al.*, *Op.cit.*, pp. 322-332, and *Chile-América* N.º. 64-65, June-September, 1980, and 66-67, Oct-Nov, Dic. 1980.

<sup>78</sup> See Jaime Guzmán, *Op.cit.*, pp. 102-106 and Enrique Cañas Kirby, *Proceso político en Chile: 1973-1990*, pp. 92-93.

<sup>79</sup> See Cavallo *et.al.*, *Op.cit.* pp. 327-329.



**Chapter 4. Crisis and erosion of the dictatorship:  
reconstruction of the right**

4.1 Change in the correlation of forces and reactivation of the political elite

The euphoria that followed the 1980 plebiscite among supporters of the dictatorship provoked two kinds of concern that would become the source of conflict. On the one hand, the participation of civilians in the government lacked an institutionalised structure and, on the other, the most controversial part of the new constitution was at the outset that of the transitory articles regulating the gradual enforcement of the new political order and its normalization. It was in these articles that the extraordinary powers at the disposal of the dictator and the Military Junta were established along with the opportunity for them to perpetuate themselves in power for another sixteen years. This possible period was divided into two presidential terms of eight years each (the period established by the Constitution for the position of President of the Republic). The first of the two would begin in March 1981, with Pinochet in the Presidency and the second would be subject to ratification by a plebiscite in which

the Military Junta would propose a candidate for consideration by the electorate in 1988.

The idea and design of this set of transitory articles was the inspiration of Jorge Alessandri as president of the Council of State.<sup>1</sup> Pinochet's advisors and the Military Junta, however, designed the version approved simultaneously with the Constitution.<sup>2</sup> The interpretation and application of these rules provided more issues of contention among tendencies supporting the dictatorship rather than with the opposition. Given the political retreat and the absence of formal organization, the members of distinguishable ideological currents within the bloc supporting the dictatorship were characterized by journalists, analysts, and ultimately, among themselves, as "hardliners" and "softies."<sup>3</sup> Among the problems facing them was state economic activity. In this the "hard-liners" appeared to have been defeated since the launching of the economic model in 1975. But, all the same, they had obtained within it a small victory by ensuring the preservation of big copper mining in the

---

<sup>1</sup> Jaime Guzmán, *Op.cit.* pp. 171-172.

<sup>2</sup> Cavallo et.al. *op.cit.*, pp. 316-318. On the other hand, Alessandri in 1983 said: "I claim for myself the honour for the fact that a new political charter had been composed. I do not agree with the changes introduced into the project approved by the Council of State, much less with the rules of transition introduced into the text." Quoted by Andrés Allamand, *La travesía del desierto*, p. 36.



hands of the state in the new constitution. Remaining unresolved was the question of a new structure for political participation. This, linked to the duration of the dictatorship and the terms for gradual normalization, shifted to the foreground.

The "hard-liner" sectors included nationalists, corporativists and supporters of permanent militarisation of politics via a civic-military structure. However, as noted by a contemporary analysis, "General Pinochet's recent announcement of the creation of a civic-military front had barely been formulated when it lost its vitality. Without serious political change, it did not seem probable that such a political movement would be formed mainly because of the resistance it would probably encounter in the Armed Forces themselves."<sup>4</sup> The idea of a "movement" had been posited previously in 1975, by the Movimiento de Unidad Nacional, MUN,<sup>5</sup> in which some union leaders in the opposition to Unidad Popular took part and was announced in the "Declaration of Codegua." Later, in 1978, an attempt was made to create a "Pinochetist" Movement. In 1980, Pinochet himself, in his victory

---

<sup>3</sup> Sergio Fernández, "Génesis de la Constitución de 1880".

<sup>4</sup> Taller de Análisis Político, Informe Mensual de Coyuntura Política N°4, October, 1980, p. 3.

<sup>5</sup> Later, there would be another movement with the same acronym but different in all other respects.

speech after the plebiscite called for the creation of a Civic Military Movement by registration in the municipalities. In 1981, Pinochet's advisor, Federico Willoughby, campaigned to organize such a movement, visiting cities all over the country and, even in 1982 and 1983 nationalists like Pablo Rodríguez and Willoughby himself insisted on the project.<sup>6</sup>

Though victory in the plebiscite meant prolongation of the dictatorship, civilians involved in the government perceived the beginning of a first term presided over by Pinochet on March 11, 1981, as the beginning of a different stage. This brought about an acceleration of the process of change called "modernizations" by the dictatorship's publicists<sup>7</sup> and was accompanied by a "hardening" of the regime in late 1980 and early 1981.<sup>8</sup>

There was a degree of ambiguity among the forces supporting the dictatorship, repeating in some senses the

---

<sup>6</sup> This brief summary appeared in *El Mercurio*, May 29, 1983, p. D3. In August 1983, Federico Willoughby with Gastón Acuña and Pablo Rodríguez published a pamphlet entitled, *¿Qué es el nacionalismo hoy?* in which they did not insist on the idea for the time being but rejected parties as a model of political participation.

<sup>7</sup> "...while the social security reform was under study, precisely in his message of September 11, 1979, Pinochet solemnly proclaimed the 'Seven modernisations': a labour plan; social security reform; an educational directive; restructuring of the health sector; modernization of justice; agricultural development; administrative reform and regionalisation." Victor Osorio and Iván Cabezas, *Los hijos de Pinochet*, p. 76.

<sup>8</sup> For example, the designation of officers on active service as delegate rectors in almost all universities, at a time when it was hoped that there would be a return of the academic variety, see



bloc that had opposed the Allende administration.<sup>9</sup> At that time, it was the process by means of which forces acting from outside the political system and the party system subordinated those who operated within both systems to their strategy. Now it was on one hand those who saw the prospect of institutionalising the regime as a process in which former allies ought to have a role, and on the other those who thought the old system should be replaced by another that was radically different. This difference created breaches through which "soft" sectors communicated with sectors of the right in recess and even with representatives of the Christian Democrats formally in recess and in opposition to the dictatorship.<sup>10</sup> The arbiter of all these movements was Pinochet himself, who at times seemed to favour the "hardliners" and nationalists, or at least that is what one is led to believe by his daughter Lucía, spokeswoman for a "Studies Centre."<sup>11</sup>

---

Informe Mensual de Coyuntura Política, N° 6, December 1980, p. 4.

<sup>9</sup> See the previous chapter.

<sup>10</sup> Testimony to these contacts between the Minister of the Interior, Sergio Fernández and ex-Senators of the right and Christian Democrats appears in the interview with Francisco Bulnes San Fuentes in the journal *¿Qué pasa?* of December 5, 1979, reproduced in part in *Chile-América*, N° 58-59 Nov.-Dec. 1979, p. 149.

<sup>11</sup> The "Corporación de Estudios Nacionales". This model organization the Center for Studies, became of considerable importance as a refuge for ideological activities among intellectuals of all sectors in the absence of political parties. Furthermore, some of them, particularly those linked to opposition to the dictatorship assumed

The Christian Democrat opposition maintained its traditional ambiguity, rejecting calls from the Communist Party to join a united opposition front, manoeuvring with ex-Christian Democrat sectors who were themselves joining the Socialist Party, and holding themselves available for any contact that might come up with government sectors via the former party system right-wing. This situation implied a moderate and unsteady reactivation of the old political elite that had led the parties ("the gentleman politicians" in the dictator's words) who moved, in expectation of the institutionalisation of the regime upon entry into effect of the new Constitution. However, a parallel process in the social base marked the limits of this opposition strategy. Particularly among students, the most active social opposition in the early eighties, there appeared a unity of action in the left opposition and the Christian Democrats.<sup>12</sup>

The forces supporting the dictatorship did not remain long in a state of withdrawal. Even though they did not form political parties, their ideological

---

the status of non-governmental organizations (NGO), serving to channel foreign solidarity funds aimed at supporting the opposition of a variety of tendencies.

<sup>12</sup> An anecdotal example of this is found in Jorge Lavandero, *El precio de sostener un sueño*, p. 59. On the other hand, Christian Democrats politicians and others of the left participated in 1981 in the formation of a Committee for the Defense of Labour Union Freedom backed by the Catholic Church. Cavallo, et.al. Op.cit. p. 357.



tendencies generated organizations of various types. Beginning in the seventies, the "gremialistas" devoted themselves to recruiting young people through the National Secretariat for Youth, a government organ, and a front for secondary school students, Frente Juvenil Unidad Nacional. In 1981, they also set up an "Instituto para una Sociedad Libre."<sup>13</sup> We have already mentioned nationalist activity in this area. All these alternatives to the organization of political parties were explored as channels of ideological activity, including the formation of cadres, in the expectation of a political activation for which there was no timetable. In the same absence of party organisation, some sectors of the opposition also explored the possibilities of armed struggle and clandestine military organisation, which were answered with repression by the apparatus of the dictatorship, renamed CNI. This hardened the regime in its relations with social and political opposition and tipped the balance in favour of the "hardliners" and nationalists in the internal confrontation within the dictatorship's bloc of support.

What finally set in motion a process of realignment among the factors we have considered so far, was the

---

<sup>13</sup> "Nuestra Historia," on the UDI's Web page.

economic crisis which made the bloc in power vacillate and reactivate the opposition at a level unimagined a short time before the most spectacular events took place. These were the national protests of 1983. However, they were a reaction to the by then undeniable effects felt by the vast majority of the population as an economic crisis that in the intervening time has been termed a "collapse."<sup>14</sup> The first symptom of weakness in the economy, until then the source of the triumphalism we have already described, was the bankruptcy of the Compañía Refinadora de Azúcar de Viña del Mar (CRAV) in 1981. This was the result of the vulnerability of the industrial sector in the face of Chile's trade opening; low prices for sugar on the international market and the company's errors of financial strategy. Connections throughout the financial arena caused the collapse to resonate through the economy. Furthermore, the policy of a fixed rate of exchange with open trade made the economy as a whole vulnerable to an external recession.

An attack by the nationalists was not long in coming. Their expectations were not only to step into the political foreground but also to hinder progress in the establishment of the economic blueprint led by the

---

<sup>14</sup> Ricardo French-Davies, *Macroeconomic Performance and Achievements*



"Chicago boys." The doctrinaire character of the inspiration for the Chicago boys' policies made it very difficult for their implementation to be flexible. As a result, The devaluation of currency in 1982 and the termination of fixed parity policy was a dramatic experience for some of them.<sup>15</sup> The most important political effect was that the crisis brought about the disappearance of the "internal consensus of the government in respect to the policies involved."<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, opposition continued to be centred on advancing the institutionalisation and application of the guarantees defined by the new Constitution. The full weight of the cost of the crisis fell, of course, on the weakest sectors, the workers and small indebted entrepreneurs, while the state concerned itself with saving the financial sector in spite of the fall of some economic power groups.

The conditions of defeat and disarray in which the opposition in all its forms and expressions found itself made it impossible to foresee what in fact happened. Workers in the copper industry attempted a movement and, despite the prospect of failing in their mobilization as

---

*in Chile*, ECLAC, 1998, p. 4.

<sup>15</sup> Joaquín Lavín, Miguel Kast. *Pasión de vivir*, pp. 86-89.

a union, sent out a call for "a day of national protest," on May 11, 1983. Its success and its repercussions transformed that day into a watershed of the national political process. Days of national protest became monthly occurrences, each one marking a change in the correlation of social and political forces. As a result of the first protest, a second was called, in June, by a National Workers' Commando. A third protest was convoked by social organizations and opposition political parties, marking the full reactivation of the political elite based on the axis constituted by the Christian Democrats. These events had a marked effect on the right and the fourth protest, in August, 1983, coincided with the designation of Sergio Onofre Jarpa, as Minister of the Interior, thereby reactivating the political elite of the right which had been part of the party system prior to 1973.

In a sense, this was the beginning of the end for the dictatorial regime or, in other words, the beginning of the transition to full application of the new Constitution. Although this was the result of an ongoing process, analysis will show that it was not the only possibility nor the only strategy possible, but the

---

<sup>16</sup> Edgardo Boeninger, *Democracia en Chile. Lecciones para la*



result of the composition of forces that had begun to take shape. Civilian participation supporting the dictatorship from a variety of positions and in several forms requires careful analysis because the situation changed with such great speed that the positions the diverse actors were adopting were determined by the prospects as and when they appeared. In a sense, the process became pendular, oscillating between the power of Pinochet and the Armed Forces, while at every turn new sectors of the right were integrated that became active more or less rapidly.

Jarpa epitomised the confusion that took hold of the dictatorship's bloc of support in the face of the social protest. The bloc's response to it could only be ambiguous. Jarpa represented the nationalist positions that had entered the right within the party system after the crises of conservatives and liberals in the sixties.<sup>17</sup> He formed, therefore, in a sense, a bridge between the nationalists associated with the dictatorship and the old political elite of the National Party, that had dissolved itself after the coup. He represented a move to revive the bloc of opposition to Allende that had promoted the

---

*governabilidad*, p. 297.

coup, but this time, the Christian Democrats were on the other side. Jarpa at first tried to negotiate, however, with an informal interlocutor, the PRODEN, via his old friendship with Jorge Lavandero, even offering himself as the eventual replacement for Pinochet.<sup>18</sup> Subsequently, negotiations continued with the political parties which, although they continued to be formally illegal had been reactivated in a greater number than before the coup. With the Christian Democrats as the axis, the party system reactivated its elite leadership, making agreements with parties of diverse sizes and diverse degrees of communication with the government and separate from the social process. They took into account, however, the identification of social movements with political parties and the designations which lent them authority to speak in the name of the overall social opposition.

The events of 1983 signified the opening of a prospect for the end of the dictatorship or, at least, for its transformation into a form of government with a greater formality for civilian participation. The right, feeling the stability of the dictatorship threatened, reactivated itself in the dictatorship's defence, yet

---

<sup>17</sup> Sergio Onofre Jarpa had been a leader of the Juventud Agrario-Laborista, President of the Accion Nacional Party in 1963 and vice-president of the Partido Nacional when it was formed in 1966.



with a different set of aspirations; their aim was to constitute an eventual replacement if the continuation of Pinochet and the Armed Forces' became untenable. It was under these circumstances that those who would finally become the principal axis of the reshuffling of the right appeared. These were the Union Democrática Independiente (UDI) and the Movimiento de Unión Nacional (MUN) which would come together later (1987) as the Renovación Nacional, from which the UDI would subsequently break away (1988), recovering its independence as a party.

The processes that constituted these two parties, making up the right of the new party system that would replace the dictatorship, and of other organisations sharing positions with them, may be analysed in terms of their varying and changeable adherence to the three basic elements of long range action projected by the dictatorship. Again, these were: first, the new model of economic development; second, the new political institutionality; and third, no less important though more conflictive, the repression that was required to impose the foregoing on the country. This last element would unfold in the course of the process, giving rise to different ideological questions, especially regarding the

---

<sup>18</sup> Jorge Lavandero, *Op.cit.* pp. 100-102.

justification and affirmation of the legitimacy of the 1973 coup d'etat, and the guarantee of impunity for those responsible for such acts of repression that might turn out to be punishable. Behind these elements were more general ideological issues, such as the relation that should exist between the parties and the social forces and, more immediately, the personal leaderships and their relation to the organizational models proposed for channelling political action.

Those civilians that collaborated with the dictatorship rejected the idea of the very existence of parties as a form of organising political action and participation. Jarpa's appointment activated a part of the elite that had belonged to the Partido Nacional, leading to the collection of close to 60,000 signatures on his behalf.<sup>19</sup> They tried to portray the cabinet led by Jarpa as an "opening" in the dictatorship. The establishment of the Movimiento de Union Nacional [MUN] came about as the result of this campaign. It coexisted with the reactivation of the ex-parliamentary representatives of the Partido Nacional led by Francisco Bulnes, which still could not resolve the dilemma of whether to revive the party or create a new organization.



Another group tried to gather "Those who share the fundamental aspirations of the Armed Forces' government" into a new party.<sup>20</sup> However, the "gremialista" group which retained its cohesiveness and whose ideology had served the dictatorship to generate the new Constitution took the lead, announcing the creation of UDI on September 25, 1983.<sup>21</sup>

The issue of organising civil support for the dictatorship could no longer be postponed. The principal goal was to reject the protest demonstrations, but this would draw attention to the problem of the dictatorship's intransigence. Officially, the implementation of the Constitution, ruled by transitory articles, lay in the future, but the instability introduced by the economic crisis, to begin with, and the social protest, later, had quickly ushered in unlimited prospects and the attendant ambitions. The two most immediate goals were to define the terms for the integration of civilians into the government of the dictatorship and, at varying intervals, to clarify the role that each would play in the new civilian-led political system. This implied redefining

---

<sup>19</sup> Reinhard Friemann, 1964-1988. *La política chilena de la A a la Z*, p. 91 and Andrés Allamand, *La travesía del desierto*, p. 35.

<sup>20</sup> Allamand, *Op.cit.*, p. 57.

the terms and periods of the transition, assuming positions and proposing to the government measures that would be evaluated by it and, particularly by the dictator. Furthermore, these proposals were couched in terms unusual for politicians such as "loyalty" and "fidelity to the mission", which were part of the current military rhetoric.

At the far right of the spectrum were the doctrinaire fascists, eternally and unquestioningly loyal to the military dictatorship, as well as extra-parliamentary movements whose existence went back at least to the 1960s. Some of these were linked to the dictatorship's apparatus of repression and to all projects aimed at organising civil support via "movements" of nationalist ideology. Only those most integrated into the tasks of the government or harbouring political or intellectual ambitions of other kinds, objected to the imposition of the economic blueprint. And in the context of 1983 they had the occasion not only to express their criticisms of the "Chicago boys" but also to enjoy the brief "populist interlude" represented by the return of structuralist-inspired economic policies.

---

<sup>21</sup> The new organisation named among its directives Sergio Fernández, Jaime Guzmán, Guillermo Elton, Javier Leturia, Luis Cordero and Pablo Longueira. *El Mercurio*, Internacional, Octubre 2, 1983.



Jarpa and the UDI occupied a middle ground between those fascists and a more organic, and party-inclined right seen as a continuation or renewal of the right represented within the system prior to 1973 by the Partido Nacional. However, both Jarpa and Jaime Guzmán consistent opponents to the party system. It was only force of circumstances that led them to join Unión Nacional, a movement with prospects for replacing the old Partido Nacional from which they would found Renovación Nacional in 1987, and from which UDI would retire before the end of the year.

The proliferation of parties, movements and other organizations that followed on the reactivation of the political elite beginning with the "opening" provoked by the protest movement between 1983 and 1986, had several motivating forces. First, was the organisation of the defence and support of the dictatorship, the dictator and his "achievements". Subsequently, at the prospect of an eventual replacement of the dictatorship, came the dispute for its inheritance, and finally, before the assured prospect of the end of the dictatorship and the "normalization" of political life, arose the impulse to ensure oneself a role in the party system that would replace the inorganic civil support enjoyed by the

dictatorship. The pursuit of this range of objectives gave rise to a series of political events the distinctive mark of which was to assure a role and influence in the "layout of the playing field" for the eventual return of politics. It was in that perspective that groups of many parties and organizations began to appear, leaving their mark on the long way of the transition from the dictatorship to the full application of the 1980 Constitution.

The reactivation of the elite began in the opposition where, in 1982, changes occurred in the Christian Democrat axis, the centre of the old party system.<sup>22</sup> The "Democratic Manifesto" was issued in March, 1983, and in August, in the heat of the social protests, the Democratic Alliance was formed, representing the embryo of what would finally be the axis of reorganization of the party system, its centre and its centre-left.<sup>23</sup> As if reacting to these two events, the "Comité Nacional Constitucionalista" was formed, followed in August by the formation of the Frente

---

<sup>22</sup> On the death of Eduardo Frei Montalva, in January 1982, the leadership of the party fell to Gabriel Valdéz, but at the same time there arose the PRODEN Blueprint for National Development, promoted by Jorge Landeros, a Christian Democrat with a "movementist," record. See above, Note 18.

<sup>23</sup> It included the following parties, Christian Democrat, Liberal, Republican, Socialist (Briones-Nuñez) and a Popular Socialist Union.



Constitucional, to which 48 ex-parliamentarians of the Partido Nacional adhered.<sup>24</sup> At the time, controversy centred on the validity of the 1980 Constitution, questioned in the Manifiesto and by Alianza Democrática. By early 1984, the right was reactivated in the Grupo de los 8.<sup>25</sup> Jarpa's incumbency bore no more fruit than as a stimulus to the reactivation of political parties with the abiding problem of alternatives to transition. The proposal that got the most support was the "Acuerdo Nacional para la Transición a la Plena Democracia," drafted in August 1985, on the initiative of Juan Francisco Fresno, archbishop of Santiago. This was subscribed to by parties of the New Right, seeking to distance themselves from the dictatorship, and by parties of the opposition.<sup>26</sup> There was never any dialogue with the government about the bases of the Acuerdo, and

---

<sup>24</sup> Reinhard, Friedmann, *Op.cit.*, p. 186.

<sup>25</sup> Movimiento Unión Nacional (MUN), Democracia Radical, Movimiento Social Cristiano, Movimiento Acción Nacional (MAN), Talleres Socialistas Democráticos, PADENA, Partido Nacional and Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI).

<sup>26</sup> The parties signing the "Acuerdo" on August 25, 1985, were: Social Democracia, Unión Nacional, Democracia Cristiana, Nacional Republicano, Radical, Unión Socialista Popular, Liberal, Socialista (Núñez), Socialista (Mandujano), Izquierda Cristiana and Socialista Histórico. Subsequently the MAPU subscribed to its postulates. Reinhard, Friedmann, *Op.cit.*, p. 177.

Pinochet's response to the archbishop became famous, "Let us turn the page."<sup>27</sup>

Pinochet never participated in the negotiations or lent his support to the idea of "opening" the dictatorship. He made ample use of the faculties granted him by the transitory articles of the Constitution declaring a state of siege and implementing massive repression of the protests and selective repression by means of the murder of well known militants of the MIR and the Communist Party. His strategy remained firm in the fulfilment of the itinerary for transition which divided it into two presidential periods, separated by a plebiscite with a single candidate proposed by the four commanders in chief, who in case of defeat would bring about direct election of the President. All the proposed alternatives sought to change this route. They ranged from those offered by UDI reviving the idea of a "termal"<sup>28</sup> Congress, to the first proposal by Alianza Democrática demanding Pinochet's resignation and a Constitutional Congress. They were only the preparations to form a complex of organizations that would carry out

---

<sup>27</sup> Reinhard, Friedmann, *Op.cit.* p. 178, Andrés Allamand, *Op.cit.*, p. 104; Ascanio Cavallo, *Et.al.*, *Op.cit.* p. 488; Edgardo Boeninger, *Op.cit.*, p. 311.

<sup>28</sup> Reference to a Congress appointed solely by the dictator himself, which is what Carlos Ibañez did during his incumbency.



an intense ideological and political struggle. The result was the constitution of a party system whose limits would be marked by overall recognition of the 1980 Constitution, a transition linked to the schedule stipulated by the transitory articles and a mutual recognition of the participants in the negotiations.

The composition of the Acuerdo Nacional marked the limits of left and right for the nucleus of the future party system. Members of the Movimiento Democrático Popular (MDP) on the left were excluded, as was the UDI on the right, which did not participate in the Acuerdo and requested a Declaration of Unconstitutionality of those organisations from the Constitutional Tribunal pursuant to Article 8 of the 1980 Constitution. The Acuerdo excluded the Communists and the socialist groups that continued to be allied with them (particularly, the MDP). It included those socialists prepared to ally themselves with the Christian Democrats, thereby altering the trajectory the Left had followed since the 1950s. The parties of the Acuerdo, considering social mobilisation (such as the protests) dangerous and inefficient, aimed for the demobilisation of the social forces of the opposition.

As a system in reconstitution or re-articulation, this complex of parties occupied itself with the establishment of their internal relations and fixing their external limits. The difference in tactics between UDI and MUN was more their differences in opinion of the role of political parties than strategic differences. What UDI wanted from the Constitutional Tribunal, the exclusion of the left, the MUN requested from the signers of the "Acuerdo," achieving only the legitimation of the exclusion for its acts and not for the ideas, in a paraphrase of Article 8 included in the "Acuerdo".<sup>29</sup> For the rest, even though the "Acuerdo" accepted the adherence of other organisations, under the operative conditions, the parties of the MDP rejected that possibility.<sup>30</sup>

The border between the party system and the social movement was more difficult to establish and the process was less clear. On one hand, the border was blurred as to alliances that were not coincidental at all levels, for example, alliances of parties in the student movement did not coincide with the limits of the alliances of the party leaders. On the other, Unión Nacional was against

---

<sup>29</sup> Andrés Allamand , *Op.cit.*, pp. 92-97, telephone interview with Luis Maira, September 29, 1999.

<sup>30</sup> Edgardo Boeninger, *Op.cit.*, p. 311.



opposition social mobilization, and especially against the public demonstrations that continued. The achievement of the dictator and his supporters was that the opposition parties abandoned the social mobilization and condemned both street violence and the armed struggle against the dictatorship carried on by organizations close to the Communist Party and the parties of the MDP. In this they were aided by the inversion of the situation that began in 1986. The economic team led by Hernán Büchi returned to pre-crisis policy, but in a less doctrinaire and more pragmatic manner, with signs of recovery beginning after the economic results of 1985. Concurrently, repression wore out social protests and, particularly after the failed attempt upon Pinochet's life in 1986, all conviction in the efficacy of armed struggle against the dictatorship was eroded.

Under the new conditions, the dictatorship's and particularly Pinochet's political actions, centred on recovering their own schedule for transition, and included a plebiscite in 1988. To this end, activity centred largely on defining what the regulations would be for the existence and functioning of political parties defined by the "political laws", that is, the organic constitutional laws laid down by the Military Junta as

legislative branch, between late 1985 and 1988,<sup>31</sup> and alternatives offered by the Constitution to face the plebiscite. In the month following the the legislation of political parties, the organization uniting all the forces of the right, Renovación Nacional, was registered. It included MUN, UDI and Jarpa's creation, the Frente Nacional de Trabajo. The group that the Partido Nacional intended to revive, and the groups seeking to constitute a Liberal Party, remained outside Renovación Nacional. Its declaration of principles reaffirmed its adherence to the legitimacy of the coup d'etat of September 11, 1973, to the Constitution of 1980 and to a market economy. With respect to the repression, the distance taken from the dictatorship went no farther than a conditioned condemnation of Letelier's assassination once Fernandez Larios had confessed in the United States,<sup>32</sup> and persisted in the defence of the 1978 amnesty as the solution to what was called "the problem of human rights."

The precarious unity of the organization was reinforced by designating a consensual president, Ricardo

---

<sup>31</sup> The principal laws are: Law 18.460, Ley Orgánica Constitucional sobre el Tribunal Calificador de Elecciones, November 12, 1985. Law 18.556, Ley Orgánica Constitucional sobre Sistema de Inscripciones Electorales y Servicio Electoral, Octubre 1<sup>o</sup>, 1986. Law 18.593, Ley de los Tribunales Electorales Regionales, January 9, 1987. Law 18.603, Ley Orgánica Constitucional de los Partidos Políticos, March 23, 1987. Law 18.700, Ley Orgánica Constitucional sobre votaciones populares y escrutinios, May 6, 1988.



Rivadeneira, and assigning a vice-presidency to the member organizations, each one to be occupied by recognised leaders. These were Andrés Allamand for the MUN, Jaime Guzmán for UDI, and surprisingly, Juan de Dios Carmona for the FNT, he being subsequently replaced by the real leader of the group, Sergio Onofre Jarpa. This attempt at consolidation would end in the break away of the UDI in less than a year, due to "differences in style," revealing the political culture that is an attribute of the party system and of the individuals created and participating in it. Renovación Nacional's internal elections in 1988 provoked accusations and counter-accusation between its MUN and UDI sectors centred around the use of improper methods in the elections of delegates. In Allamand's account of these events emphasis is placed on the popular character of UDI's strategy (mobilization of shanty town dwellers), and support from the dictatorship (official organs at the service of Jaime Guzmán) and quotes descriptions of the methods used by the UDI in the party's internal politics as "nazi-like" and, even, "communist."<sup>33</sup> A broadside, entitled "La historia de la Unión Democrática Independiente," declares that, "There was no real

---

<sup>32</sup> Andrés Allamand, *Op.cit.* pp. 123-124.

interest in changing the political style on the part of the other two members."<sup>34</sup> UDI persisted as a movement. Only in the following year did it achieve legal registration as a political party. Prior to that, however, both the Renovación Nacional and UDI parties took part in a campaign in favour of the "Yes" in the 1988 plebiscite, that is to retain Pinochet as president until 1996.

To have mutually lent their support to Pinochet in the plebiscite is proof that even in 1988 the new parties of the right were incapable of decision in the face of Pinochet's leadership and manoeuvring. The transition designed by his advisors included a plebiscite in which the electors would approve or reject a candidate proposed by Commanders in Chief of the Armed Forces and Carabineros. Both, Renovación Nacional and UDI itself, the latter being closer to the dictator, offered alternatives to this plebiscite, ranging from a candidate that was not Pinochet, to him as candidate but in a competitive election open to other nominees. Ultimately, Pinochet had himself nominated as the sole candidate by the other commanders and lost the plebiscite despite the support of the two parties that would constitute the

---

<sup>33</sup> Andres Allamand, *Op.cit.* pp. 140-147.



right in the new party system represented in the chambers beginning in 1990.

After the plebiscite, UDI completed the requirements for registration as a political party. The governing Junta issued a law that completed the election law and contained stabilizing features for the system from which both parties have benefited: the binominal system for electing deputies and senators and the configuration of districts for deputies in light of the plebiscite's results.<sup>35</sup>

#### 4.2. The new right in the new party system

UDI and Renovación Nacional though constituting a two-party right, nevertheless, was different from the right constituted by liberals and conservatives. Both parties shared a true "national blueprint". This they had been able to impose on the party system as a whole via a complex ideological struggle that had taken place in the substratum of political struggle framed by the process of transition from the dictatorship to the implementation of the 1980 Constitution. This national blueprint is made explicit in a large part of the declarations of principles of both parties, which literally have more than half of their texts in common. This could not be due

---

<sup>34</sup> Political propaganda from UDI, undated.

simply to a lack of time, since RN has a revised version, dated November, 1994. This national blueprint is composed of some general principles: 1) Legitimacy of the 1973 coup d'etat,<sup>36</sup> 2) Legitimacy of the Constitution of the 1980,<sup>37</sup> 3) Immutability of the dictatorship's model for economic development.<sup>38</sup>

Other safety catches of this kind are contained in the Constitution and its complementary laws. The legislation on political parties isolates them from the social movement, and the electoral system favours a minority that prevents the legislature from changing this state of affairs. Furthermore, the reconstitution of the political sphere raises doubts about the commitment to

---

<sup>35</sup> Law 18.799, May 26, 1989.

<sup>36</sup> In both declarations it is affirmed: (UDI or RN) "Emphasises the patriotism and spirit of service of the Armed Forces and the forces of order of Chile whose origin and glorious traditions are identified with the rise and defence of Chilenism, throughout the entire history of the country, including their liberating action of September 11, 1973, which saved the country from the imminent threat of irreversible totalitarianism and foreign domination, thereby culminating a valiant civilian resistance and taking up an overwhelming and majority popular clamour." Declaración de Principios, UDI, p. 6; RN, p. 4.

<sup>37</sup> Their adherence to the Constitution of 1980, includes a restatement of exclusion for ideological reasons (Article 8, abrogated in 1989). "The democratic system can only be stable if the electoral options competing for power share essential features and maintain a minimum of reciprocal respect. No election or plebiscite may represent threats to the fundamental values of Chilenism, nor threaten legitimate principles that are essential to the members of society. It must be accepted therefore that political pluralism has limits."

<sup>38</sup> The elevation to principle of the characteristics of the model for development, called "Economía social de mercado," is specified in the sections entitled "Sistema económico-social" and "The State, economic and social sphere," Nos. 14 and 15 for RN and 16 and 17 for UDI.



change some anti-democratic features of this kind. Paradoxically the corporative interests of the political elite appear to be protected by the same laws that it would be desirable to change if what were wanted were a democratisation of the system.

Out of the formation of this new system, it is interesting to note the dialectic that imposed the organisational model of the political party as an instrument of action on the anti-party winners. And upon the defeated who rejected the legitimacy of this new order, first de facto and later de jure, it imposed not only the new order, but limitations on their own organisation and action. It is thus that one comes to understand this complex movement, in which the social protest which caused the dictatorship to hesitate, reactivated the political elite in pursuit of the strategic goal of demobilising social protest. It also contributed to the reconstruction of the political party system by imposing upon it the limits mentioned above. Personal or collective ideological inconsistencies cannot explain this result, which lies rather in the constitution of a political arena, the limits of which would be drawn by relations between those who participate in the game of alliances and negotiations and by means of

**Chapter 5. The Christian Democrats and Pinochet's  
Dictatorship**

5.1 Introduction

The study of relations between the Christian Democrat Party and the dictatorship may be framed in the following periodisation:

1) Subordination of the Christian Democrats to the social and political bloc supporting the dictatorship, a situation that arose from the PDC's participation in the opposition to Allende, and to the party's support for and justification of the coup d'etat. This initial phase covers from 1973 to the PDC's expulsion from the political bloc supporting the regime by declaration of the illegality of the party in early 1977.<sup>1</sup>

2) Subordination of the Christian Democrat rank-and-file to the social bloc supporting the dictatorship while the party remained outside the political bloc defending itself from the government's attempt to identify it with the "Marxist" opposition (ie., the "enemy"). This phase lasted until the 1980 plebiscite in

---

<sup>1</sup> Decree-Law N° 1697, March 12, 1977, dissolving all political parties maintaining their legal existence as legally in "political recess."



which Pinochet's new Constitution was approved. This made it possible to force the party to appear beside the Left and, according to official interpretation of the plebiscite results, nullified Christian Democrat influence on the social bloc supporting the government.<sup>2</sup>

3) Retreat of the party, re-composition of its leadership (further precipitated by the death of Eduardo Frei Montalva) and social and political activities independent of the dictatorship but with no capability of initiative. During this phase the conditions were created for a shift to the offensive that was observed in 1983 and that reversed the overall situation of the period begun in 1973. Basically, this transformation was brought about by the decomposition of the social bloc supporting the dictatorship, a deterioration instigated by a crisis within the imposed economic development model. This decomposition provided the opportunity not only for reactivation of the Christian Democrat party but also instigated initial attempts at reorganisation of a right wing political representation relatively independent of the dictatorship.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> See chapter 3.

<sup>3</sup> This period saw the beginning of re-grouping of right wing sectors outside the government. Isolated elements, such as General Leigh, had been breaking away from the bloc supporting the dictatorship, or

4) Participation in the political opposition (the various party groups) and the social opposition (principally the protests); competition for leadership with the forces of the Left; contention with respect to strategy for putting an end to the dictatorship. In particular, disagreements were expressed regarding armed struggle, social mobilisation and acceptance of the timetable and terms of the transition designed by the dictatorship itself and contained in transitory articles of the Constitution of 1980. However, the solution of these controversies marked the limits of the new party system, reconstructed upon the central axis constituted by the Christian Democrats.

5) Recovery by the Christian Democrats, beginning in 1986, of their role as axis of the system of political parties. Under the leadership of Patricio Aylwin they were able to subordinate the complex of political opposition to their strategy, marginalising the Communist Left and subordinating the reconstruction of the political system to the dictatorship's strategy.

---

expressing their opposition to some of the dictatorship's plans, such as Hugo Zepeda who announced publicly that he would vote "No" in the 1980 plebiscite. The political right organised itself to support the dictatorship, envisaging, at the same time, its replacement, for which reason they tried increasingly to distance themselves from Pinochet and the military character of the dictatorship. See the previous chapter.



This periodisation is built upon the basis of the dictatorship's actions with respect to the Christian Democrats, which persisted in defining the PDC's actions as subordinate, defensive and reactive during the first phase of the dictatorship's ascent to power. Nevertheless, during the second phase of decay and decadence of the dictatorship, the Christian Democrats were significant protagonists. Analysis of each one of these phases should focus on Christian Democrat action, considering the characteristics already mentioned, both in respect to the government and to other political and social actors (fundamentally the Left and the social movements).

5.2 1973-1977. The subordinate participation of the Christian Democrats in the dictatorship's bloc of support.

Upon joining the victors of September 1973, Christian Democrat action was based on two suppositions that proved to be false. First, the neutrality of the Armed Forces as political actors and, second, the possibility of a restoration in the short term of a political system, even with the exclusion of at least a large part of the forces that had supported the Unidad Popular government. The two suppositions are related, the

first being a condition of the second. That is, the restoration of the political system (with any number of changes) supposed that armed action would operate "neutrally" and not as part of strategic demolition of the political system and its replacement by another of a different kind. However, it was impossible for the Christian Democrats to perceive this while they based their expectations on an evaluation of the situation before the coup that placed them, without a doubt, as the principal force of opposition *within the institutional system*. This wrong perception by the PDC miss the fact that the opposition "within the system" was by then subordinated to the opposition "outside the system", willing to replace it. For the PDC, the problem lie in that the political system, as constructed by Pinochet and upheld by the armed forces as state apparatus, led to a general dismantling of legitimat processes of opposition, consigning any forms of resistance to an extra-political role. On renouncing defence of the political-institutional system, the Christian Democrats renounced their position as leaders of right wing opposition to Allende.

Once the Military Government was established, the supposition of "neutrality" of the Armed Forces caused



the Christian Democrats to define their strategy in terms of constructing an alliance with the Armed Forces in which the latter would guarantee exclusion of the Left. Based on a reconstruction of the political system "normalised" by the military and political defeat of the Left, it would then be possible to carry out the programme that could not be implemented during Frei's administration<sup>4</sup>. During the final months of 1973, conditions seemed entirely favourable. The Left had been proscribed and the Right had dissolved itself leaving the Christian Democrats the only important political party able to bring about a restoration in which it would ideologically subordinate the working class sectors and assume political representation of the dominant classes. However, the more visible advantages of the Christian Democrats' position belied its true weakness: it was the only political party because the very system of parties, linchpin of the former political system, had practically disappeared. If they saw themselves as an option for creating social support for the military government within a restorationist strategy, the dictatorship saw them as the last obstacle to recreating the Chilean

---

<sup>4</sup> See Ricardo Yocelévsky, *La Democracia Cristiana chilena y el gobierno de Eduardo Frei 1964-1970*.

political system on an authoritarian basis in which the political parties, if they were included at all, would play a subordinate role.<sup>5</sup>

Greater Christian Democrat participation in the government under the conditions created by the coup d'etat implied the dissolution of the party itself into a political bloc without a clearly defined organisational model. Diverse ideological tendencies were distinguishable among those who, supporting the dictatorship, operated within the administration as individual cadres and struggled to occupy positions in the administrative apparatus, or worked as advisors to the military executives. The crudity of these connections implied that the victors were primarily interested in the spoils of victory. Concerns to construct new channels of political participation would be postponed until sufficient systems of repression existed to exclude subordinate social sectors.<sup>6</sup> The matter of political

---

<sup>5</sup> On the "foundational character" of the dictatorship see Manuel Antonio Garretón, *El proceso político chileno*. On the other hand with respect to political participation and its regulation, the pertinent laws were handed down at the end of the dictatorship.

<sup>6</sup> It is important to note that, among the cadres of the "new Right" who had achieved notoriety during the Unidad Popular administration, those, like Pablo Rodríguez, who aspired to leadership roles, found themselves sidelined during the dictatorship by such "ideologues" as Jaime Guzmán. Those who sought to be "concessionaires" of the political organisation in support of the dictatorship, or of the



restoration, that is, the re-opening of an even limited interplay of parties, would imply a re-opening of social and political participation to the middle and working sectors. This appeared to the Christian Democrats as a matter of some import since prolongation of the conditions imposed by the coup weighed doubly against their own political interests due to the fact that they appeared to be associated with the military dictatorship. On the one hand, their participation in the government was limited to those cadres who, individually, occupied administrative posts. This meant that, in theory, the dictatorship was not disposed to take into account the political interests of any organisation as such that might have belonged to the destroyed political system. In practice, the party was being subjected to erosion by virtue of the cooptation of its cadres by the dictatorship, which sought to weaken and, eventually, integrate it within a bloc that would support the dictatorship. On the other hand, the prospects for preserving and increasing their working class clientele by "staying in the game" from which the Left (or at least its most radical part) was excluded, was being weakened

---

dictator himself, never saw plans come to fruition. See the previous two chapters.

by the prolongation of the exceptional conditions (the repression and social and political exclusion) that threatened to become the norm, and with which they appeared to be associated.

This uncomfortable situation appeared to have few possible solutions. To accept the strategy of the dictatorship and subordinate itself even further meant the disappearance of the party and its political interests. This seemed an unviable alternative, even if they had been reduced to a minority sector rejecting the coup d'etat. On the other hand, to denounce the purposes of the dictatorship implied taking cognisance of the role which, objectively, they had played against the Unidad Popular government and in its overthrow (recognising along the way that the only real option for the preservation of the institutional system ought to have been an alliance of the PDC with Allende's government). This, in turn, would have implied assuming the position of a minority tendency within the party and situating itself, suddenly, in opposition to the dictatorship at a moment when the party rank-and-file itself would not have followed suit.

As a means of avoiding this rather uncomfortable outcome the PDC chose to adhere to the supposition of the



political neutrality of the armed forces. According to the view they propounded, the dictatorship's action was based on the resolution of an ideological conflict amongst the civilian elements that supported the dictatorship and in which the most reactionary sectors were victorious in politics and voracious in the field of economics. In this situation, in which they defined themselves as losers in the ideological conflict among civilians, the Christian Democrats appealed to the Military Junta and its leader, Pinochet. They intended to point out that the government's economic policy, the repression and the political consequences of both made it difficult to restore the political system. This situation appeared irrational from the point of view of those in the PDC who were interested in capitalising on popular support available after the recent defeat of the Left. For them, instead of allowing a capitalisation of support in a political opening aimed at restoration, the prolongation of conditions created by the coup d'etat strengthened the most extreme positions in the opposition which, per force, ought to have developed in clandestine circumstances that would contribute to reinforcing their politically unsuitable radicalism.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> "We are convinced that the absolute inactivity of the democratic

This entire supposed misunderstanding allowed the Christian Democrats to establish a distance between themselves and the dictatorship without being pushed into the opposition. This was a way to define their identity in terms of a political strategy different from the dictatorship's without forcing their rank-and-file to opt for one or the other. From this first moment, criticism of the government's actions established three lines along which it would develop from then on: economic policy, human rights and the construction of a political system. These lines of critical argumentation each developed differently also shared common limitations, which it is necessary to clarify in order to justify the periodisation proposed as a mode of analysis of the evolution of the Christian Democrat's strategy under the dictatorship.

Of the Christian Democrats' three lines of criticism directed at the dictatorship, none questioned its origin. That is, the legitimacy of the government was not questioned in terms of its relation to the institutional

---

sectors facilitates the clandestine operations of Marxist groups, without orientation from its leaders, our rank-and-file and its supporters remained at the mercy of rumours, tricks, and even infiltrations of which they might be the object." Letter of Patricio Aylwin, National President of the PDC and Oswaldo Olguín first Vice-president, addressed to General Augusto Pinochet, January 18, 1974, published abroad in February of that year.



system it destroyed, but only in terms of the possible consequences of prolonging the situation defined by its presence. This is central to understanding the characteristics of the Christian Democrat's strategy for reconstruction.<sup>8</sup> However, here it is important to emphasise that the limitations to an openly political critique of the dictatorship determine limitations to the other two aspects of the same critique (human rights and economic policy). It is necessary to stress that what explains the cohesion and persistence of the PDC is the clarity with which its leaders perceived their common political interests and how they tried to construct a strategy around them. It is for this reason that their position vis-à-vis the dictatorship was subordinate. Their political interests led them to support the overthrow of the government without taking cognisance of the consequences that this might have for the political system as a whole, of which they were a part. Now, after

---

<sup>8</sup> "We understand the need for an effort of moral, economic and political rectification of the crisis at which the country had arrived (...) such an effort, though by its nature it cannot go on indefinitely, requires time. It would be a mistake to constrain it to a very short term. (...) Our history shows other periods analogous to the present such as that of Portales or the first term of President Ibañez, which allowed Chile to rediscover its path to democratic institutionalism and progress." Letter by Aylwin and Olguín quoted above. It should be noticed that Ibañez dictatorship is changed to "first term" and that the dictatorship "allowed" what followed as if one of the remotest antecedents of the Christian Democrats was not involved in the overthrow of Ibañez in 1931.

the coup d'etat, their proposal for reconstruction of the system (correcting the "defects" that had permitted the victory of the Left in 1970), was an alternative to the current dictatorship. Their arguments, therefore, centred on affirming that the exceptional conditions justifying the coup (the presence of the Unidad Popular government) no longer existed and therefore, the prolongation of the military government and the conditions imposed by it - both the repression and the measures of the economic policy - hampered a return to the "normality" that appeared to them to be necessary.

The PDC's critique of the dictatorship's economic policy suffers two kinds of limitations. The first, to which references have already been made, arises out of the limits to political criticism which led to evaluating the consequences of the dictatorship's actions in the economic field only as a function of the strategy for political reconstruction. The second limitation stems from the prevalence of a "negative" economic policy, in the first phase of the dictatorship, that is, one defined more in terms of a negation of Unidad Popular achievements. Thus, what is criticised is an action defined as the vengeance of the powerful economic sectors

---



voraciously seeking to recover what they had lost during the prior period. In addition, the deterioration of living conditions among urban and rural working class sectors hampered a rapid return to normality. Their demands could lead them to support Left wing tendencies instead of allowing the capitalisation of that social support, apparently available to moderate tendencies like the Christian Democrats (Aylwin, Olguín letter already quoted).

Criticism of human rights under the dictatorship also suffered two limitations. The first was the need, imposed by the Christian Democrat's political position to refrain from referring to the coup d'état itself but to the prolongation of its repressive measures over time.<sup>9</sup> The other limitation stems from fear that that repression might be indiscriminately extended to members of the PDC. This, besides the obvious consequences, would have had the effect of pushing them into the opposition or at least into a situation shared with the Left. Conversely,

---

<sup>9</sup> Even a year after, the coup d'état, the differences between the PDC and the dictatorship being explicit, the chief leaders of the party, Frei and Aylwin, were particularly careful to justify the coup by attacking Allende and Unidad Popular. Aylwin did so in his report on the Chilean situation before the meeting of OCDA, the original Latin American Organization of the Christian Democrats, held at Curaçao, August 24 to September 10, 1974. Frei does the same in the prologue he wrote for a book by Genaro Arriagada, *De la "vía Chilena" a la "vía insurreccional"* pp. 9-31, published in 1974.

the same reasoning may explain the moderation with which the dictatorship repressed the Christian Democrats. This, however, produced an ambiguous situation in which the Christian Democrats appeared to be defending human rights but always based on cases affecting their members who did not constitute the severest transgressions of the dictatorship in this field, making these protests appear even ridiculous on some occasions.<sup>10</sup>

The moderation with which the dictatorship repressed the Christian Democrats, is a corollary of the ambiguous relations between the two. Fundamentally, repression affected those who signed the declaration condemning the coup with later repression aimed at controlling the media owned by or at the disposal of the party.<sup>11</sup> At no time,

---

<sup>10</sup> Letter from Claudio Orrego to General Pinochet, dated March 31, 1975. In it he complains of the destruction of his book while on the printing presses carried out by government personnel on March 27 of the same year. Every paragraph about freedom of expression cannot but sound ridiculous coming from someone who, until then, had kept complicitous silence about all the violations of human rights perpetrated by the dictatorship. The full text of the letter was published in *Chile-América*, N° 8-9, Rome, 1975, pp. 73-74.

<sup>11</sup> Repressive action against Christian Democrat leaders reached the following extremes: September 17, 1974, first arrest of Claudio Huepe; October 7, 1974, Bernardo Leighton forbidden to return to Chile; October 15, 1974, second arrest of Claudio Huepe, who is finally expelled from the country on February 12, 1975; November 26, 1974, arrest and expulsion from the country of Renán Fuentealba; October 6, 1975, attack in Rome on Bernardo Leighton; August 6, 1976, arrest and expulsion from Chile of Jaime Castillo Velasco; October 17, 1980, Andrés Zaldivar is prohibited from returning to Chile. To this must be added the self-imposed exile of Radomiro Tomic which seemed reasonable in view of attacks against him in the pro-dictatorship press. It is noteworthy that until 1976, those affected were all signers of the declaration that rejected the coup.



was repression exercised in a way that could be ascribed to the purpose of eliminating the organisation as such or, even preventing the functioning of its leadership. This is due not so much in the political subordination of the Christian Democrats as to the significant role the participation of their rank-and-file and their clientele played in the social bloc supporting the dictatorship. The military government's objectives with respect to the PDC were to eliminate their structure by absorbing their rank-and-file into the government's social bloc of support and of its cadres in its corresponding political bloc. However, the subordination to which the Christian Democrats had been reduced in the bloc opposing the Unidad Popular government did not guarantee the success of these objectives since the very nature of the party and its existence depended on the political system previous to 1973. Therefore, the true nature of the coup could not be expressed without pushing Christian

---

As to the mass media controlled by the Christian Democrats, or influenced by them, the principal events are as follows: February 21, 1974, the theoretical journal of the PDC, *Política y espíritu* is closed indefinitely; March, 1976, Radio Balmaceda is closed for six days (for the fourth time); at the end of that same month, number 21-21 of the journal *Ercilla* still under control of the Christian Democrats at the time, was confiscated; also in 1976 the director of Radio Balmaceda, Belisario Velasco, vanished to Putre. To all this must be added the raid carried out on TV channel 13, property of the Universidad Católica, by the delegate rector, retired Admiral Swett, from March 18 to 29, 1974, in which numerous Christian Democrats

Democrats into the field of the opposition. Objectively, the coup sought to destroy the entire political system but, for the purpose of creating a supportive social and political bloc, it was presented as a reaction against the Allende government and its programme. Now, after the military government had been established, the strategic goal shifted from the objective of "restoring normality" (shared by the Christian Democrats) to "eliminating the conditions that made possible the Unidad Popular government,". This meant to the Christian Democrats restoration of the system in the short run with exclusion of the Left or part of it. Whereas to the Armed Forces and the social sectors dominant in the government it meant destruction of the whole political system existing up to 1973 particularly, the elimination of the party system.<sup>12</sup>

To make its true objective explicit, the government had to be sure that the Christian Democrats would not abandon their social bloc of support, which was only possible if its potential for political action was

---

were expelled from their jobs. (*Chile-América*, several numbers) Rome, 1975 and 1976.

<sup>12</sup> The first programmatic expression making the intent of completely recreating the political system explicit was the "Declaración de Principios" of the Military Junta of March 11, 1974. The first schedule for the implementation of this purpose appears in a speech by Pinochet on July 19, 1977, on Chacarilla hill.



neutralised. To this end it was sought to neutralise the media belonging to the Christian Democrats at the same time as they were being confronted on ideological grounds. Little by little the "enemy" in official rhetoric, ceased to be the "Marxists" and became "politicians" in general. If the Christian Democrats sought to disseminate an image of "normality" having been lost because of Allende coming to power, for the dictatorship, the loss of "normality" was due to the Frei administration losing control to the Marxists in 1970.

The Military Government's success in this ideological confrontation is difficult to evaluate. It appears, however, that its own evaluation was satisfactory, in view of the fact that in 1977 it decided to eliminate the Christian Democrats from its political bloc by means of a decree prohibiting all political parties "in recess" since the coup d'etat. In the event, this only affected the PDC. The explicit reasons for this measure point to the objective of adding the PDC to the "enemy bloc," to the "politicians" with international connections who acted against the nation represented by the military government.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>13</sup> In his speech on the third anniversary of the coup d'etat, September 11, 1976. Pinochet announced "That the government has

5.3 1977-1980: The struggle for political independence and the recovery of the rank-and-file.

For the Christian Democrats to be expelled from the government's political bloc represented a complex of new problems due to the ambiguity of their position (but not their elimination). The government's action raised questions about the significance of the expulsion in itself, as well as the reasons or motives that led to it.

As to the significance of the political act itself, it seemed plausible to interpret the outlawing of the Christian Democrats as a reaction by the government to criticisms of its administration coming from that party. However, the limitations of those criticisms, to which we refer above, did not seem to justify the apparent severity of the decision. Furthermore, the government's justification in terms of the participation of the Christian Democrats in an international conspiracy against Chile and its government had different effects both within the country and abroad. On the national scene

---

resolved to drastically regulate the political party recess." That under the "new institutionalism" it would have to be "very clear" that the traditional political parties, today in recess, could not and would not fit in because their structure, leaders, habits and mentality all grew under the inspiration of an institutional regime that had already died once and for all." (*Chile-América*, N<sup>o</sup> 22, 23 and 24, Rome, August, September, October, 1976, p. 69).



it was sought to coalesce the social bloc of support for the dictatorship as the representative of nationality, as opposed to the unscrupulous "politicians" who never hesitated to associate with foreign forces to achieve their egotistical objectives. Abroad, the effect was the opposite, as the Christian Democrats appeared tarnished by their support and justification of the coup d'etat thereby incommoding their foreign associates (like the European Christian Democrats). Now they would appear to be victims of the dictatorship, their strategy an alternative to it (no longer a variant of it) and, therefore, deserving of open solidarity from ideologically like minded governments and parties.<sup>14</sup>

For the dictatorship, this decision meant expelling a critical sector from its political bloc, while at the same time seeking to preserve its social bloc of support. In this sense, the presence of the Christian Democrats, though a party in "recess," was the last link that joined

---

<sup>14</sup> In the early days of the dictatorship, the Chilean Christian Democrats tried actively to justify the coup d'etat before their colleagues in other countries. This line is illustrated by Frei's letter to Mariano Rumor of November 1973, and the international tours of such Christian Democrat leaders as Enrique Krauss, Juan de Dios Carmona y Juan Hamilton, in October 1973. Notwithstanding, the international Christian Democrats became progressively more critical of the dictatorship, reaching the point in 1975, of a specific denunciation of the political repression affecting Chilean Christian Democrat intermediate cadres. (*Chile-América*, N° 8-9, Rome, 1975, p. 18).

the dictatorship to the destroyed political system: one that had made it possible to interpret the the eventual re-establishment of normality expressed at the moment of the coup as a promise to restore the system. The decision therefore reflects a need on the part of the dictatorship to intensify its action in the area of economic policy and the design of a new political system. Furthermore, and as a function of those necessities, it may be supposed that the decision to formally eliminate the PDC was based on the assumption that doing so would not fundamentally affect the government's social support. That is to say, the decision assumes that the separation between the party organisation and its rank-and-file was deep enough and that not much value was placed on the intent to co-opt its cadres individually.<sup>15</sup> Thus the

---

<sup>15</sup> The most distinguished cadres among the Christian Democrats co-opted by the dictatorship were Juan de Dios Carmona, who played a particularly ambiguous role during the first period trying to subordinate the party to the Military Junta's policies before abandoning it completely, and William Thayer, who accepted the appointment to represent the dictatorship at UNESCO. Both of them were later leaders of a Social Christian Movement situated within the dictatorship's bloc of support. Nevertheless, there are many Christian Democrats who supported the dictatorship beyond the position of their party. For example, among Chilean politicians who publicly protested against the condemnation of the dictatorship for its violations of human Rights, voted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1974, were the following Christian Democrat ex-Ministers: Ramón Valdivieso, Carlos Figueroa, Modesto Callado, Eduardo León and Sergio Ossa Pretot; ex-Senators: Juan de Dios Carmona (also an ex-Minister), José Mausalem, Alejandro Lorca, José Fonseca, Luis Papic, and Jorge Lavanderos; ex-Deputies: Víctor González, Juana Dip, Carlos Garcés, Gustavo Ramírez, Enrique Krauss (also an ex-Minister) and Javier Lira Merino (*Chile-América*, N° 6-7, Rome, 1975, p. 62). To the foregoing politicians must be added some



military dictatorship installed in September 1973, "jettisoned ballast" and advanced in its structuring of the strategic blueprint that inspired the hegemonic sectors within the opposition to Unidad Popular.<sup>16</sup>

The dictatorship's victory was enhanced by adding the Christian Democrats to the field of the defeated. There was no need to destroy it, in view of the fact that it could not activate its clientele since the mechanism that made that relationship possible (the elections) had disappeared along with the dismantled political system. Nor could it act efficiently on its rank-and-file since such action, already proscribed under the conditions of political "recess" was now illegal. The party organisation being forced into "recess" and control of the mass media being in the hands of the dictatorship, the rank-and-file continued as a social bloc of support for the dictatorship. As it was sufficient to simply threaten the Christian Democrats with destruction, the dictatorship's victory over them was different from its

---

of the most outstanding technocrats linked to the PDC or to Frei who collaborated with the dictatorship such as Raúl Saéz, Jorge Cauas and Carlos Massad.

<sup>16</sup> In the speech at Chacarillas quoted above (Note 12) Pinochet announced a schedule to apply his blueprint for institutionalisation along those lines. On the importance of the latter, the changes in plans and timetable for the transition that was finally proposed see the preceding chapter.

actual and physical defeat of the Unidad Popular government and its supporting parties.

Situated in the field of the political opposition on the initiative of the dictatorship, the Christian Democrats found themselves obliged to redefine their position. An obvious alternative was to join the Left and establish a political bloc for restoration (or an anti-fascist front as proposed by the Communists). However this did not seem acceptable to the party leadership. The objective reasons for this evaluation are important to understanding that the rejection of an alliance with the Left was not a product of ill will or Christian Democrat sectarianism, but of the social nature of the party and its ideology.

If the party was isolated from its social base, which remained subordinate in the social bloc of support of the dictatorship, by associating with the Left it could only deepen that breach. This was due to the fact that even if an alliance with the Left had not imposed unacceptable *practical* conditions, an alliance at this juncture, might have implied unacceptable *ideological* contradictions. On this course, the Christian Democrats would have become an important force, though not hegemonic, within an opposition bloc constituted on the



basis of that alliance. By the same token, situating themselves in the same place as the Left, could change them into the target of repression similar to that suffered by the Left. This would ultimately lend credibility to the view disseminated by the dictatorship of a single opposition constituted by politicians seeking to return to a past that would make repetition of the Unidad Popular government possible.

For the PDC, the priority was to recover influence over the social base that was still supporting the dictatorship. For that purpose it was fundamental to define a political identity that could not be confused with that of the Left and that would not allow ideological distortion by the dictatorship which presented socialism as the only alternative to its blueprint.<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup> In a review of the situation of the PDC at the beginning of 1978, *Chile-América*, pointed out the following: "In the PDC's judgement pro-Pinochet opinion occurs in a variety of areas founded on fear, mental inertia, ignorance, prejudice, social interests and also on a great disappointment with the political parties, the democratic governments and the extremist lines of political action [...]. This, always in the opinion of the PDC, affects a great number of Chileans and the task, therefore, is to attract them again to democratic methods. Unidad Popular plays its role with those who have reasons to be more clearly against the government. The Christian Democratic Party plays its role first with individuals who are openly against but also with those who are not. This last, Unidad Popular cannot do and it is impossible to do so if the PDC were to appear sharing the line of the UP." "The Christian Democrats and Their Viewpoints on a Political Agreement with Unidad Popular," *Chile-América*, N° 39-40, Rome, January-February, 1978, p. 80.

This period encompasses the dictatorship's greatest advances in consolidating its projects in both the economic and political fields. Conversely, it produced the lowest point in relations among the political parties in general and their former rank-and-file. Obviously, the process most affected the organisations of the opposition which now included the Christian Democrats. However, the particular forms in which this process affected the Left in general in general and the Christian Democrats in particular, must be indicated. What for the Christian Democrats implied a separation from their rank-and-file and its clientele, for the Left meant a much deeper disarticulation. The homogenous composition of the cadres and of the rank-and-file of the Christian Democrats and their unified political interests preserved the organisation even when it was isolated from the sectors it represented or sought to represent. Altogether, the same characteristics caused its future and strategy to be defined and, with the exception of the eventuality of dissolution of the party, assured its importance. Both, the Left and the Christian Democrats faced the problem of keeping the political parties alive in the absence of a political system that would link the parties to each other and to the social forces they represented. For the



Left, given the clandestine conditions imposed by the situation, the model of insurrectional organisation, strategy and tactics appeared as a "natural alternative." For the Christian Democrats this alternative did not exist. Therefore, they could only concentrate on intellectual criticism of the projects developed by the dictatorship and on working out theoretical alternatives for them.

An important effect of the disarticulation between the political parties and their rank-and-file during this period was the autonomy acquired by the intellectual cadres with respect to their organisations. This process, which should be studied in depth some day, produced an ideological field where cadres of the Left coming from the former political elite and from the social base where it was recruited, found forms of activity similar to those of the Christian Democrats. On this ground, it should be recalled that discussion of drafts of the Constitution, proposed by the dictatorship, was undertaken by opposition jurists. What is most important in this development is that it gave the Christian Democrats a field in which to preserve the potential of converting themselves into the axis of a re-articulation of the party system in the eventuality of a political re-

activation. The intellectuals of the Left, however, by rejecting the alternative of constituting revolutionary organisations based on what remained of the parties, situated themselves in an area in which they could only be subordinate to the ideological initiative of the Christian Democrats.<sup>18</sup>

This general retreat of the parties as organisations was also reflected in other, non-intellectual sectors. Amongst workers, it was unsuccessfully attempted to construct political unity in the trade unions. The parties continued to act, but principally through cadres who, like the intellectuals, acquired progressively more autonomy with respect to the parties and their ideologies.<sup>19</sup> Pinochet caused the Constitution, as well as the regulations for its gradual entry, to be approved and brought into effect. With it he legitimated his continuance in power until at least the end of the eighties and within the content of the Constitution that was approved he consolidated the bases for reformulating

---

<sup>18</sup> The group of Estudios Constitucionales, known as "Grupo de los 24" was the first important case of open Christian Democrat collaboration with some people of the Left and, at the same time, with representatives of the old Right (*Chile-América* N° 64-65, Rome, June-September, 1980, p.27.

<sup>19</sup> During the period of the dictatorship's ascendancy the labour movement was the object of an extremely close study by Guillermo Campero and Jose A. Valenzuela, *El movimiento sindical en el regimen militar Chileno, 1973-1981*.



all mechanisms of social and political representation. The moment chosen for this confrontation, the 1980 plebiscite, had the added sense of culminating this stage of the dictatorship's strategy. It allowed the government to feel confident of its ability to consider the historical experience of the prior political system as nullified, forcing everything remaining from it, including most especially the Christian Democrats, to present themselves as united in opposition to the draft Constitution. The intention to eliminate Christian Democrat representativity from the social bloc supporting the dictatorship was expressed in official interpretations of the government's success in the plebiscite.

5.4. 1980-1983. The ideological struggle in the opposition.

The very result of the plebiscite contributed to deepen the characteristics of the ongoing process of disarticulation suffered by the political parties in general and the Christian Democrats in particular ever since the previous period. What to the Left had appeared to be a temporary weakening was now projected as a permanent condition. The theoretical and ideological

---

formulation of the situation assumed the form of proposals for sociological analysis in which it was sought to constitute historical actors from social movements resistant to interpretation in defined class terms based on a structure of exploitation. From those social movements it was proposed to seek political alternatives to democratisation which would require for their development that the political parties could not or would not attempt to integrate them into defined projects from the perspective of any other type of analysis.<sup>20</sup>

Even though this kind of argument appeared to be more important to the Left, the Christian Democrats played a fundamental part in their production. In the overall conditions that caused this result it must be recognised that the intensification of ideological activity was due to the general retreat of the parties and, particularly of their disengagement from their rank-and-file and clientele. In the field of ideology, and in particular the area of activity of intellectual cadres, the party that preserved the greatest integrity was the Christian Democrat due to its social composition.

---

<sup>20</sup> A description of these positions and of their relation to what remained of the parties is to be found in Chapter X, "La oposición al régimen militar," in the book by Manuel Antonio Garretón, already quoted.



Moreover, the thesis of the incapacity of the parties of the Left to express the needs of social forces originated in Chile with the PDC. Since this was the period of greatest dissemination of discussion about this subject among Chilean intellectuals, it seems appropriate to recall its origins and development here.

The limitations of the Chilean political system to express the interests of the complex of social forces were first perceived by the Left as obstacles to the independent participation of the campesinos. However, those parties could not break the barriers that guaranteed over-representation of the parties of the Right. From the time of the Frente Popular, repression appeared immediately in response to any attempt at penetration by the Left in rural Chile or of any independent labour organisation of campesinos.<sup>21</sup>

To the Christian Democrats, the aforementioned limitations seemed circumventable by perfecting the electoral system.<sup>22</sup> Roger Vekemans, in his theory of

---

<sup>21</sup> "The communists, like all Chilean parties, maintained essentially an urban organisation. Rural activities were high risk. They were highly exposed attacks on the bastion of the Chilean oligarchy." Brian Loveman, *Struggle in the countryside. Politics and Rural Labour in Chile, 1919-1973*, p. 206.

<sup>22</sup> At the end of Gabriel González Videla's incumbency as President, (1946-1952), during the participation of Falange Nacional in the so-called "Cabinet of Social Sensitivity," from 1950 to 1952, two members of the party, Jorge Rogers and Gastón Saint Jean, designed a

marginality, formulated the first thesis that highlighted the "incapacity" of the party system, in its then-current organic and ideological models, to represent large sectors of society. His proposal was to change the relationship between party and social base, converting Democracia Cristiana into the expression of an alliance of social sectors organised in movements or fronts that would maintain the relation of clientele with the party and with an eventual government of that party (Promoción Popular).

The failure of this project during Frei's administration, seemed to reinforce the party system. However, the political crisis in the Right, on losing control of the campesino vote, provoked criticism of the party system in that political sector. After reorganising itself into the National Party, the broadest Alessandrist movement, they reactivated the corporate organisations of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie. Finally, after failing in the 1970 presidential election, the Right set out to develop opposition to the Unidad Popular Government by means of "Social organisations, neighbourhood associations, unions, etc."

---

draft for an electoral reform that was sent to congress with the support of the government although it was later not approved. George Grayson, *El Partido Demócrata Cristiano Chileno*, p. 275.



Ultimately, after the 1973 defeat, the Left, or better said, the intellectuals, also assumed criticism of the parties, questioning their capacity to promote development and further social movements.

After the liquidation of the parties, the link between what was political and what was social would assume different forms for each one of these sectors. For the Christian Democrats it became a redefinition of the parties as areas in which to make social alliances thus passing from one multi-party system to a regime of only one party and of crushing hegemony by one party. For the Right, in its attempt under Pinochet to apply its blueprint, the alternative became de-politicisation, and a lengthy suppression of the parties and the system they constituted. Their eventual reconstruction would come only under conditions of subordination, not very clearly defined (whether corporative or ideological), but in any case, limiting the ideological spectrum they could cover under the requirements of exclusion of the Left. The alternative pointed out by the intellectuals of the Left, found no formulation beyond apologetic commentaries about social democracy in its multiple varieties, for it to be possible to review.

---

If criticism of the parties and the functioning of the party system as it existed in Chile until 1973, found formulas in all political sectors, the carriers of those positions in each sector also showed common characteristics. In the three sectors, Right, Christian Democrat, and Left, the cadres that assumed these positions were the intellectuals seeking their insertion into the professional political elite beginning in the sixties.<sup>23</sup>

On the Right it was the Nationalists, gremialistas and other varieties of Fascists. Among the Christian Democrats it was principally the youth and, during the Frei government, the rebel and "tercerista" tendencies. Today's Left still remains made up of the same Christian Democrat rebels and terceristas, broken away from the PDC in 1969 and 1971 to form MAPU and the Izquierda Cristiana, plus Socialist cadres resembling them in their social, generational and professional composition.

Other forms of criticism of the party system that do not extend to the party as organic model were represented by political cadres of the same generation of the '60s but that joined some form of "Castroism" proposing some variant of the "Leninist" view of the party. These

---

<sup>23</sup> Though the analysis is not the same, the distribution between organisations of the Left in what Garretón describes as "matrices" of "classic" and "emergent" political action, coincides with the characterization of the cadres made here, at least for this sector. (Manuel Antonio Garretón, *Op.cit.*, p. 188).



tendencies resided fundamentally in the MIR, some Socialist fractions, besides their traditional influence in the Communist Party not associated with Castroism.<sup>24</sup>

This digression aims at deriving meaning from the ideological activity that developed in this period and formed a major influence on the political parties. The results were significant for Christian Democrats, even though this may not be evident at first glance. For this to become clear it must be remembered that the Christian Democrats are a party of "professional representatives", linked among themselves by their common political interests which seek to represent social sectors that the party does not aspire to integrate into itself except to a limited extent. In this sense it is different from the parties of the Left. In them, popular sectors were not only integrated into the party organisation itself but could establish limits to the positions which, in theory, might be taken by the leadership, who share a social

---

<sup>24</sup> The quotes around "Leninism" refer to the role that the model of a revolutionary party played in the ideological debate in Pinochet's Chile. It should be remembered that in Chile questions relating to strategy and tactics of the Left and criticisms of real socialism appear mixed, starting from the supposition that the latter is the inevitable consequence of the adoption of Leninism in the former. In this discussion, facing the ideological offensive of the social Democrats is a Left that has fallen back on a kind of assumed or imputed Leninist "orthodoxy". Both positions are expressions of the defeat and "ideological disarmament" of the current Chilean Left. What is essential in the case of the Leninist model is that it makes it possible to justify the existence of the "party", as an organisational model, making a concrete situation into an abstraction, in the sense of its insertion or not in a party system. The position of those who imputed some form of "Leninism" to the Chilean Left is clearly expounded in the declarations of Ricardo Lagos to the daily *Excelsior*, México, Jan.6, 1984, pp. 1,16 and 18.)

composition similar to that of the Christian Democrats. This is particularly important in the case of the Socialist party.<sup>25</sup> Having each been members of a professional political elite, and the Christian Democrats expressing the "purest" kind of member of such an elite, the political interests all these groups of intellectual cadres enjoyed numerous points of contact. The issue lies with how they are perceived and how they are channelled.

For the Christian Democrats the only model possible is a party. There the strategy continues to be a redefinition of the relationships between the rest of the parties, their rank-and-file and clientele, making it possible to restructure the party system or eliminate it on the basis of the pre-eminence of the PDC. For intellectuals of the Left there were two perceivable possibilities. One, to restructure the party system making possible its reinsertion into politics, either as organisations and individual cadres or, two, the redefinition of its organisations around a revolutionary

---

<sup>25</sup> The degree of autonomy that the leadership of each party might exercise with respect to its rank-and-file and clientele was, undoubtedly, variable from case to case. Determining factors also varied from party to party as indicated by the differing variability of voting in each party. Nevertheless, in the Left and even more so among the Socialists, everything leads to accepting as plausible the hypothesis that in the 1970 situation, subordination to the Christian Democrats, for example, in a Popular Front type alliance that might have supported Tomic, could have also strengthened the PDC, on one hand, and the "Castroist" Left on the other. This seems to be the reason for the agreements on which Unidad Popular was founded, particularly in the "Basic Program of Government" and the "Agreement on the style and conduct of the campaign". See chapter 2.



strategy which could only be structured by a military policy aimed at overthrowing the dictatorship.<sup>26</sup> The culminative effect of the defeat in 1973, and the loss of the plebescite in 1980, lead to the party reaching its political nadir in in 1982. Since then, the parties, tended toward recomposition around two axes. One of them assembled the most traditional organisations of the Left. These were the Communists, some Socialist fractions, the MIR, some fractions of organisations originating among the Christian Democrats and, also, the radicals. After recovery of their role as parties, they also recognised the need to reconstitute a system of party alliances, even though this might be reduced to only themselves. Even so, they maintained their call (by now permanent and also permanently rejected) to the Christian Democrats to join a unitary opposition bloc (antifascist front or whatever it might be called), and, at the same time, accepted at least the theoretical possibility, the

---

<sup>26</sup> Reference to the absence of "a military policy aimed at overthrowing the dictatorship", must be understood as a relative statement. In fact there were two military policies in progress, both the stemming from abstract considerations and being more the expression of desires than the product of analysis. It is clear that the Christian Democrats were always disposed to an agreement between the leadership and the armed forces from which a process of transition would derive. An abstract military policy naturally arises associated with the model of a revolutionary party, whether expecting this crisis (or another) to upset the armed forces and weaken them (as in Argentina after the Falkland Islands debacle) or that the construction of an autonomous armed apparatus begin which, in the long run, could challenge the control exercised by the armed forces on strategic grounds, a position that was always of little significance to the Left as a whole.

eventuality, of the use of violence to overthrow the dictatorship ("Call to unity and combat", México, May 21, 1982, signed by the Communist, PS-Almeyda, Radical and MIR parties.) The other axis was constituted by the Socialist Convergence which assembled the most important intellectual cadres from the Left, who undertook the criticism of the parties and proposed the "recasting" of Chilean politics based on social movements.<sup>27</sup>

Everything that seemed irrelevant in political activity, characteristic of an opposition reduced to impotence, takes on meaning when examined as an ideological confrontation in the opposition camp. This opposition consisted largely, but not entirely of the defeated of 1973. Initially, the Christian Democrats unquestionably figured among the winners of 1973, but their proposal for restoration was subsequently defeated by the dictatorship. However, their subsequent shift to the opposition, on the initiative of the dictatorship (as stated above), did not automatically add them to the defeated of 1973. In their relationship to the Left, the Christian Democrats are situated in the winning camp. By not accepting proposals for unity in an opposition bloc defined by the Left, they set themselves to the task of assuming leadership of the opposition whose strategy

---

<sup>27</sup> "Nuestra propuesta, unidad y solidaridad frente a la crisis nacional", Santiago, May 1, 1982. Secretariat of Socialist Convergence (24th Congress), MAPU, MOC, and Izquierda Cristiana.



would be defined by the Christian Democrat blueprint.<sup>28</sup>

This project has enjoyed noteworthy continuity if seen as proceeding from the experience of the Frei government, to the opposition to the government of Allende, and to Christian Democrat subordinate participation in Pinochet's bloc of support. In essence, it is the same project of redefinition of relations between social alliances based on PDC hegemony. As such, the PDC represents a social alliance offering a programme of economic development to its popular sector clientele and to sectors of the bourgeoisie whose interests will be represented by the party. The party, in turn, retains in its rank-and-file and its cadres a political and technocratic middle-class composition.

In the context of the early 1980s, it did not seem possible or very fruitful for the Christian Democrats to struggle to represent a part of the bourgeoisie. The fact

---

<sup>28</sup> This has always been the position of Zaldívar, who in 1977 concluded that "the formulation of a historical blueprint common to both the Communists and the Christian Democrats was impossible. Expressed more clearly, the Christian Democrats reject an alliance or programmes of government with the Chilean Communist Party. (Andrés Zaldívar, "the construction of a new social blueprint is a process of gradual change", summary of the report presented to the Plenary Session of the Christian Democrats in early 1977, *Chile-America*, No. 28-29-30, Rome February, March, April 1977, p.198) a few years later he declared: "We as Christian Democrats, if we wish to be consistent with our position and with what we are in that sense, I believe that the leadership is clear in that sense and there is a document of consensus which is also clear, we cannot take any action tending toward the search for an alliance to establish a government including the Communist Party, nor with any other party which as a party, as in organisation, has been committed to dictatorship as an ideological blueprint". (Andrés Zaldívar, "La Otra Voz de la DC", *El Mercurio*, Santiago, April 1, 1984, p.D3.)

was that the latter as a whole was involved in support of the dictatorship and concerned with the future of its economic interests in the new model of depoliticised development. However, on the side of the urban and rural working class sectors, the PDC's new situation in the opposition could be used to take on another, perhaps greater obstacle: resistance to the implementation of their blueprint. This was the political independence of the working class sectors voiced by the Marxist parties. The concrete task undertaken by the Christian Democrats in this, was the ideological disarmament of the Left.<sup>29</sup>

In this undertaking, the situation of the Left since the political and military defeat of 1973 was in their favour. Their task was then to inflict the only defeat the dictatorship was incapable of producing, the ideological defeat of the Left. Among the conditions defining the situation of the Left, the most favourable to the Christian Democrats was the disarray the parties were in and, in particular, the independence that the intellectuals (their ideological reserve) had acquired in respect to their organisations.<sup>30</sup> Upon joining the Left

---

<sup>29</sup> The first to explicitly prescribe massive injections of "Eurocommunism" into the Chilean Left were Genaro Arriaga and Claudio Orrego, *Leninismo y democracia*.

<sup>30</sup> Under the conditions of the repression, organic links were strengthened undercover, but the majority of the rank-and-file and



opposition, the Christian Democrats, rather than expressing regret for their participation in the destruction of the political system, were committed to "learning the lesson of Unidad Popular", spreading criticism of the political system that made Allende's victory possible and repeated, (10 years later!), the same criticisms the insurrectionists had raised against Allende's government.<sup>31</sup> This was the Christian Democrat's ideological victory in the midst of their political defeat. The consequences would only become clear in the period begun by the national day of protest on May 11, 1983.

5.5 1983-1986 the political crisis of the dictatorship and social mobilisation of the opposition.

In the first protest of 1983, the fragmentation of the parties; the ideological struggles; the political

---

the clientele were excluded from them and only maintained an ideological link through those intellectuals who could occupy the spaces permitted by the dictatorship in the cultural field in general and particularly in this case, political journalism. The intellectuals had assumed great independence from the parties because, among other things that had happened, they were not employed in state institutions in which even their personal situation might depend on the vagaries of politics and on their party affiliation.

<sup>31</sup> "Above all, we understand that Allende failed in his basic premise," stated Tomás Mulian, a political scientist of the Left. "He thought Chile could be taken to socialism with the support of only 30 percent of the population. Now we understand that no political programme can be successful unless a great majority of Chileans support it." (Excelsior, México, Sept. 25, 1983, p. 31).

struggles and social processes; the overall retreat by the political parties as a whole; and, in general the party's loss of historical currency as organic model was clearly revealed. Nevertheless, beginning with those protests the process of political reactivation or repolitisation of Chilean society began, particularly characterised by the reactivation of what remained of the parties, their fractions and sectors, and the appearance of the new organisations aspiring to the same status.<sup>32</sup> The old political elite and new elements that shared some of its characteristics participated in an intense political life which, objectively and subjectively displaced social protest and channelled itself along lines of creation, consolidation and development of party structures, and linkage in blocs both within the government and the opposition.

What the offensive of 1983 showed was the organic incapacity of the political opposition to organise the protests of working class sectors, and the

---

<sup>32</sup> A year after the process of political reactivation began, *El Mercurio* listed the following actors as the most significant: ALIANZA DEMOCRATICA (composed of the Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Radical Party, Republican Right, Socialist Party, MAPU, MAPU-OC, Group for Convergence, Movement of University Convergence); GROUP OF EIGHT (National Union, Independent Democratic Union, National Party, Social Christianity, Radical Democracy, Movement for National Action, Democratic Socialist Workshops, PADENA); POPULAR DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT (Communist Party, Almeydista Socialist Party, MIR). (*El Mercurio*, Santiago, June 17, 1984, p.D1).



crumbling of the dictatorship's social bloc of support which provided the opportunity for the protests to be expressed and extended in society toward the middle-class and even to sectors of the bourgeoisie. What stands out in this view of the process is the scope of the protest rather than its intensity. This is also confirmed by the organic weakness that led the copper workers to call for a more diffuse, but more extended expression of protest when they found themselves unable to carry out their planned national strike in the copper mines.<sup>33</sup> The overall characteristics of the protest movement constituted the subject matter for analysis in its initial phase. The general characteristics spontaneity and violence established some differences between its various expressions in different social sectors.<sup>34</sup> These ideological images of the protests, at the same time, are a good reference point by which to evaluate the meaning

---

<sup>33</sup> The Confederation of Copper Workers agreed on April 21 1983, at its Extraordinary Congress at Punta de Tralca, to call a **"24-HOUR NATIONAL STRIKE** to protest against current labor legislation and economic and social policy". The strike could not be agreed upon in Chuquicamata nor in the three unions at El Teniente controlled by officials nor in the professional union of the Andean zone, directed by a vice president of the Chilean Workers Confederation (CTC). ("Chile Itinerario de la Protesta nacional", *Convergencia*, No. 9, México, July 1983, pp.37-38.)

<sup>34</sup> A very detailed description of the first protests where a noteworthy attempt is made to evaluate the importance of these characteristics, can be found in the Informe Mensual de Coyuntura Política, number 35, Santiago, May 1983.

of three parallel processes that characterised Chilean politics beginning in May 1983: first, the politicisation of protests, and second, closely linked to it, the formation of political blocs in the opposition, composed by (or decomposed by) an accelerated reconstruction of the political parties. Finally, there were attempts to recompose the dictatorship's support bloc, a process expressed not only in the military government's policies but also in a politicisation of its party members that suggested the structuring of parties or at least began moving in that direction.<sup>35</sup> Examination of these processes can be an effective way of evaluating Christian Democrat strategies in the context prevailing at the beginning of 1983.

If the protests' scope and spontaneity are related in their origins, it is because of the social manifestations' low level of political articulation observed from 1977 to 1983. However, the change in the correlation of social forces that the 1983 protest signified had to look for means of expression that reflected this change. Vis-a-vis the dictatorship's de-politicisation project, the opposition's politicisation

---

<sup>35</sup> See previous chapter.



was a way of advancing toward the creation of alternatives. From this point of view, the protests' development, as it happened, could be considered "natural". If the protests scope "exploded" in May 1983, the characteristics of its development can be traced to before this date. On one hand, as has been said, the protests' sphere of influence found its base in the decomposition of the dictatorship's social support bloc, but on the other hand, the organic forms that channelled this decomposition would not allow a political process of the dimensions that the protest provoked. The dictatorship's social support decomposed naturally through the corporate channels that had concentrated the bourgeoisie's political representation since the crisis of their traditional political parties. The levels of radicalisation possible within this organic model were reaching their limits (among truckers, wheat producers, merchants, etc.) while, synchronically with the economic crisis a reactivation of the political elite began to appear.<sup>36</sup>

---

<sup>36</sup> This process is registered in the monthly reports of the Political Analysis Workshop, specifically the transition from the corporate model to the reactivation of the parties, detected through the first attempts to recast the National Party, can be seen in the *Informe Mensual de Coyuntura Política*, Numbers 30 and 31, December 1982 and January 1983.

The May 1983 protest broke this line of development, not to interrupt these processes but to put them on another level, in which they accelerated considerably. The call to a day of protest on the part of the Confederation of Copper Workers was complex. On one hand, on social grounds, the working class sectors became a vanguard in an expression of discontent that in the bourgeoisie and middle classes could not overcome their ideological and organic limitations. It was those sectors that were able to recruit others in the middle classes, and, even, the bourgeoisie, to their movement, but not the other way around.

The generalised character of the protests, however, is defined by the presence of sectors that came from the dictatorship's social support bloc. On the other hand, the same call was of an undoubtedly political nature, however ambiguous. The labour union leaders, despite the parties' disarray, still had identifiable political affiliations and, in this sense, the copper workers' call implied a unitary participation even if it was in a corporate organisation of the Christian Democrats and the Left. Finally, despite the same political content, for the middle classes and the bourgeoisie the copper workers



still represented the working class sector that shared their opposition against the Unidad Popular.<sup>37</sup>

The protest's politicisation advanced from the reactivation of the party leadership to the reactivation, reconstruction or formation of political organisations. Because of their composition and the characteristics of their project, the Christian Democrats were able to take advantage of the situation, becoming the axis of two significant processes. The first was the reactivation of the old political elite and its grouping into what could become the embryo of a political party system reconstructed according to the guidelines of the Christian Democrat blueprint, ie. the Alianza Democrática. The second was the re-establishing of the social representativity of this reactivated elite, and specifically the PDC, via the politicisation of the protest. To achieve this it seemed to be enough that the Christian Democrats nominally assumed the responsibility to head a "spontaneous" movement. This is what they did from July 1983. However, this type of politicisation of

---

<sup>37</sup> All the ambiguity of the significance of the copper workers is reflected in the internal problems that in the Confederación de Trabajadores del Cobre (CTC) preceded the rise of Seguel to the leadership and the call to the first day of protest.

the protests revealed, in its limitations, the processes' complexity.<sup>38</sup>

If the protest's spontaneity and scope indicated the degree of disarticulation between politics and society attained as an effect of the application of the dictatorship's project, the variety of the protests' expressions, specifically its acts of violence and social distribution, as indicated by its spatial distribution, made it clear that it was not about an undifferentiated "social movement". The parties' disengagement from their social bases, specifically among the Left, was not so thoroughgoing so as to suppose that the Christian Democrats used the protest to fill an absolute political vacuum in the ideological and organic sense.<sup>39</sup> For the PDC to match the image it wanted to project and the supposedly consequential action that it began in this process, it was necessary to make some cuts in the political contents as well as in the "spontaneous"

---

<sup>38</sup> On this protest see Jorge Lavandero, *El precio de sostener un sueño*, pp. 91-96.

<sup>39</sup> For example, the distribution of the events in Santiago and the degree of violence involved in them during the protest of 14 June 1983 give the impression that despite the time that had passed and the indubitable changes in Chilean society, there were political elements that had a greater permanence than they are usually attributed. Not only nostalgia leads us to observe the importance of that day's events produced around the "Pedagógico". (Macul sector, Greece Avenue-Dr. Johow). (*Hechos Urbanos*, Number 22, Santiago, June 1983.)



expressions of social protest. However this posited some dilemmas for the Christian Democrats.

To present themselves as a democratic alternative the Christian Democrats had to maintain the protest's size in the social sectors that had supported the dictatorship, but, at the same time, this meant controlling the most violent expressions of protest among the working class sectors and radicalised social groups (students). For the Christian Democrats this situation constituted one of the typical dilemmas of a politically central position; a dilemma that they have never been able to solve satisfactorily. Acting on all these components of social protest put them in a position of having to recognise that other elements of political juncture existed.

In the bourgeoisie and the middle classes the Christian Democrats had to compete with the military government which represented the political engagement of those classes, and with the new political organisations that aspired to carry out that role. For this, the Christian Democrats counted on the cadres of the "old Right" and the organisations reconstructed by them. However, both the government and the new organisations that supported it looked to reconstruct the

---

dictatorship's social support beginning with condemning the "violence" and "chaos" that were made to be synonymous with the opposition. For the Christian Democrats, fighting this image implied winning the dictator's recognition of their being a "democratic" alternative. This was perhaps its greatest political achievement in 1983: to have its their democratic credentials confirmed by the dictatorship's agreement to a political dialogue.<sup>40</sup>

The cost of this achievement was paid on the ground of the working class sectors. Here the Christian Democrats had to limit the spectrum of possible alliances. It did this with some relief since it was not a tactical question; the exclusion of the Left was assumed in their strategic blueprint. Thus, among their tasks, it gave priority to stimulating the development of social democrat tendencies in the Left. At the same time, in terms of social protest, it had to condemn violent demonstrations and appear in line with the government in facing the left wing that identified with these

---

<sup>40</sup> The dialogue's merits only exist in the fact that it took place. Jarpa's meetings with the Democratic Alliance were on 25 August, 5 September and 29 September. The Democratic Alliance cancelled the dialogue on 20 October 1983. In the first meeting Pinochet's resignation was requested which in turn Jarpa rejected. In the third meeting the opposition only asked for an agenda to be set.



demonstrations. In this way it defined the environment and some of the traits of the Left's opposition bloc. The Christian Democrat decision was to construct an alternative to the dictatorship that would contest its social support on its own grounds, before a unified opposition could; an opposition that incorporated the popular sectors with its own political expressions. The cost of this strategic position was, according to some of the Christian Democrats and analysts close to them, a radical change in the way the party acted: the abandonment of their "own path".<sup>41</sup>

The process of politicising the protests was completed with the formation of a second opposition bloc, the Popular Democratic Movement (MDP), the axis of which was the Communist Party. As with the Christian Democrats and the Democratic Alliance, what allowed the Communists to play such an important role in this second opposition bloc was their ability to survive as a party during the dictatorship, both in the organic sense as in that of the preservation of their social representation. However, the delay in the formation of this bloc indicated that the Communist Party valued the possibility of forming a

---

<sup>41</sup> For Edgardo Boeninger, the decision to open himself to specific agreements with other forces dates from 1979. (op.cit., p.299)

unified opposition over the constitution of an exclusively leftist regroupment. It was the Christian Democrat rejection of any alliance with the Left, except with sectors aspiring to constitute some sort of social democracy, that finally pushed the Communists to join groups which, in general, were inclined to oppose the dictatorship by all possible means, including violence, but which did not have a serious political strategy.

The politicisation of protest through both opposition blocs was due to several factors. As has been pointed out, some were the result of the nature of protest itself while others derived from the strategies the parties formulated to join the protest. In this sense the role the Christian Democratic's strategy played was fundamental. On the other hand, before the first protests, this strategy translated into attempts to reactivate the old political elite as a step towards a re-composition of the party system in which the central role of the Christian Democrats would be indisputable. In this way, the scope and complexity of the protests reinforced the formation of blocs as a way of re-politising society. However, the blocs, and mainly the

---



Democratic Alliance, were a means to regroup the political elite and facilitate the reconstruction of the parties. As the protest accelerated the re-politicisation process an inconsistency appeared: the blocs were a better expression of the protests in their size and heterogeneity but, within them, each party had to search for its own re-engagement with the social bases it sought to represent. Thus, the blocs created the environment that made party re-composition possible, but this environment required definitions far more precise than those allowed by the protests and blocs themselves. The result was an apparent decline and loss of strength by the protest, a paralysis of the blocs at the level of their original definitions and an intense political life of the leadership in which the militants searched for the ideological and organic formulae that would permit the reconstruction of their parties.<sup>42</sup>

---

<sup>42</sup>The problem for each sector of the reactivated political elite was, on the one hand, to articulate a mass movement that had no legitimate ways of expression, and on the other, to search for a way to improve the image of its own representation vis a vis their competitors within the political class. By not having contrasting methods of their assumed social representation, the participation by blocs implied an acknowledgement by peers in the political class. The identification of social support with the blocs could have helped the mobilisation as long as the support for each party could not be measured. Nevertheless, the stagnation of the blocs was due to a large extent to the priority given by the leadership to the reconstruction of each political party on separate terms.

Within the Democratic Alliance, the Christian Democrats, in their role as axis, searched for the reconstruction of a "democratic Right", privileging their contacts with the old Right, and the constitution of a democratic Left, privileging the presence of their bloc of cadres coming from socialism. However, the relations of power did not develop symmetrical. On the Right, the Democratic Alliance had to face the dictatorship's attempts to re-define its support, while in the Left, the Communist Party was an axis around which other forces regrouped.

The protests' main achievement was, without a doubt, to express the change of the correlation of social forces in an overall process of social re-politicisation. This is also reflected in a politicisation of the dictatorship and the forces that supported it.<sup>43</sup>

If the dictatorship's economic development blueprint and the fact that it was carried out successfully for a period deepened the overall de-politicisation, the economic crisis decomposed the dictatorship's support

---

<sup>43</sup> The dictatorship's politicisation can be seen in the Cabinet. It started to include old politicians like Jarpa, Collados and Escobar in the key ministries. The politicisation of its support can be seen in the variety of organisations from the Right, the most important of which were mentioned in the Group of Eight.



bloc in certain sectors, the interests of which were differently affected and which expressed their protests in corporate ways. On the other hand, the importance of protests and their rapid politicisation forced the government to respond on the grounds chosen by the opposition: political grounds. The increasing politicisation of the administration reflected these determinations in the appointment of first Jarpa as Minister of the Interior and then the Collados and Escobar in key economic ministries.

For the new Right it seemed the time had come to assume the political role that until then they had been denied by the dictatorship. At last, cadres could aspire to leadership positions and did not need to settle for being civilian advisors to a military government or for being isolated ideologues whose only means of communication with the masses was journalism. On the other hand, also within the pro-dictatorship sphere, cadres of the old political elite were reactivated, especially nationalists coming from the National Party, but also conservatives. In this way, a border was formed around the old Right where the Democratic Alliance and the different sectors that supported the dictatorship competed but also, where they communicated.

The balance from this period shows that the pendular movement of the Christian Democrats was strategically fruitful for both main sectors into which the party leadership divided. They contributed to determining the party's lead role in the transition. By pushing the party towards the Left, Gabriel Valdés' leadership allowed him to link up with the social protest and to attract the Socialist Party (Briones-Núñez) to a party alliance that excluded the Communists. Thus the alliance that represented the unity of the working class was broken.<sup>44</sup> The ideological cost was to take on the most radical opposing programme (repudiation of the Constitution, Pinochet's resignation, elections in a constituent assembly), but, in exchange, it allowed the party alliance to link up with social protest. This pushed the Left towards an even greater radicalisation, forming a party alliance that represented the tradition of the Left defeated in 1973 (the MDP) and, shortly after, the beginning of the activities of an armed organisation (the FPMR).<sup>45</sup>

---

<sup>44</sup> See Chapters 1 and 2.

<sup>45</sup> The MDP was formed in October 1983 and the FPMR produced the first "blackout" in December of the same year.



Another sector of the Christian Democrats led by Aylwin, the party's vice-president at the time, looked for agreements with the traditional Right. The rejection of the demands of the Democratic Alliance and cancellation of the dialogue with Jarpa left a vacuum of significant political activity among the elite, although the protests continued monthly. The collapse of this situation came in July 1984, in a seminar in which Francisco Bulnes, patriarch of the traditional Right presented his idea of the legitimacy of the 1980 constitution.<sup>46</sup> The position stated by Patricio Aylwin at the close of that seminar represented the beginning of the subordination of the opposition to the transition's itinerary designed by Pinochet's advisers and, according to one commentator, marked the real beginning of the transition in Chile.<sup>47</sup> In his statement Aylwin said:

"Not even I can hope that General Pinochet would recognise that his Constitution is illegitimate, not

---

<sup>46</sup> Bulnes' position was that the opposition programme should centre on the proposal to reform the Constitution and not on its total rejection and that Pinochet should accept that his Constitution was subject to reform. "The democratic opposition should stop attacking the President and recognise not the legitimacy of the Constitution of 1980, that would be asking too much, but the fact that it is current and that it is *the only juridical framework we have for the transition.*" (Underlined by R.Y.) Comment by Francisco Bulnes in the seminar Una salida político constitucional para Chile, p. 141.

<sup>47</sup> Rafael Otano, *Crónica de la transición*, p. 21.

even he can demand that I should recognise it to be legitimate.

The only advantage that he has over me, in this respect, is that that Constitution -whether I like it or not- is operative. This is a fact that I accept."<sup>48</sup>

The importance of this fact only appears in retrospect. At the moment it happened, the PDC, headed by Gabriel Valdés, was dominated by the faction closest to an alliance with the Left and mobilised itself to appear at protests, the opposition's most ample social expression. However, in the internal struggles within the DC and negotiations with the dictatorship, instead of resolving the explicit ideological and political conflicts, the framework that would lead to the transition was being formed. The most important point in this period is the separation between social and political opposition. The first aimed for the unity of opposing forces and its action pointed towards radicalisation. The second, centred on the DC in the party reconstruction process, impeded the union in limiting the size of the alliance by seeking to isolate the Communists. Explicitly, the rejection was of violence

---

<sup>48</sup> Patricio Aylwin's participation in the aforementioned seminar. Pp. 148-149.



"wherever it came from", as the chosen motto said. Nevertheless, the violence of organisations such as the FPMR was confused with the violence of street demonstrations that were part of the protest movement. Ultimately, this was a concession to the dictatorship that, since the negotiations with Jarpa, had demanded an end to the violence.

The National Agreement, an initiative from the Catholic Church that established an ideological spectrum that excluded the Communists was the next step in the party reconstruction process. Formally, the agreement excluded the extreme right UDI that fought not only to keep the Constitution without any amendments, but also for the rigorous enforcement of its most questioned article, article number 8, by asking the constitutional tribunal to outlaw the MDP. The National Agreement gave in to the dictatorship in accepting the principle of exclusion of some political forces as a way of protecting democracy. However, it accepted this because of specific "acts" of anti-democratic organisations and not as an exclusion of doctrines or ideas.<sup>49</sup> The meaning of this

---

<sup>49</sup> The text of the "National Agreement for the Transition to Full Democracy" was published in the magazine *CAUCE*, year 3, No. 50, from 26 November to 2 December 1985, pp. 23-25.

agreement was limited to the ideological setback of the political opposition expressed in the elite, since Pinochet did not even agree to talk about the matter with Cardinal Juan Francisco Fresno, then Archbishop of Santiago.<sup>50</sup>

5.6. 1986-1990: The Subordination of the opposition hegemonised by the PDC to the Dictatorship's Blueprint for Transition.

At first, this failure of the negotiating opposition seemed to strengthen social mobilisation as an alternative. The strategies were evaluated in terms of periods to end the dictatorship. Clearly, Pinochet was looking to arrive at the plebiscite planned for 1988 supported by the transitory articles in the Constitution. The opposition was looking for ways to end the dictatorship sooner. The formation of the Assembly for Civility and its Demand for Chile published in April 1986,<sup>51</sup> looked to recover the initiative the mobilisations of 1983 had provoked. It was made up of the 18 most important social organisations in Chile but all their leaders also were familiar with party militancy, even though none of them were national party leaders. The

---

<sup>50</sup> See previous chapter.



demands were of a socio-economic type but they began by establishing the dictatorship's inability to meet such them, and so called for democracy as a prior condition.

The opposition's possible strategies created problems for their components, especially the DC. The MDP's proposal for unity caused discrepancies in the Democratic Alliance because it meant an alliance with the Communists. In the end the year's events cleared the way: the national protest called for by the Assembly for Civility faced the most brutal repression ever seen until then by these mobilisations.<sup>52</sup> That same year arsenals attributed to the FPMR were discovered, and on 7 September the failed attempt on Pinochet's life occurred. All this contributed to cancel the image of the viability of armed struggle and, according to some, strengthened the dictatorship vis-a-vis the opposition with which it looked to negotiate.<sup>53</sup>

Pinochet's tactical advances had repercussions on the opposition and particularly on the DC's interior. At the

---

<sup>51</sup> In the magazine, "CAUCE".

<sup>52</sup> The strike of July 2 and 3 that led to the highest level of street protests was marked by a horrible incident in which a couple of young people were burned by a military patrol. One of them, a boy, died. Cavallo et al., op. cit., pp. 36-37.

<sup>53</sup> Rafael Otano, op.cit., pp. 36-37.

end of 1986, without any advances in the negotiating strategy, and with the advances of the MDP in social movements, particularly among students, the Socialist Party (Núñez), represented by Ricardo Lagos, announced its retirement from the Democratic Alliance. The presence of the PS-Núñez, separate from the PS-Almeyda and the PC, in an alliance that even included the Right as it sought to distance itself from Pinochet, and in which the PDC had hegemonic control was Gabriel Valdés' great achievement as party leader. It was the renovation of the PS and at the same time as its subordination to the Christian Democrat blueprint. However, upon the failure of a union of the Left, the subordination of the PS-Núñez to the DC was renewed in a new pact: the Committee for Free Elections (CEL) created on 13 March 1987, and co-ordinated by Sergio Molina.<sup>54</sup>

At the same time the opposition's subordination to the dictatorship's strategy was being imposed through the always conflictive and incomplete acceptance of political legislation. From February 1987 the new electoral registers were opened and in March the new law for political parties was issued. The PDC, not to mention the

---

<sup>54</sup> Edgardo Boeninger, *op. cit.*, p. 331.



Socialists, debated calling their adherents and sympathisers to register as voters and, later, to begin the legal registration procedures of political organisations. It was clearly understood on the part of some of its leaders that these facts represented the acceptance of the Constitution, and of its strategy for transition, as legitimate. The electoralist party line supported by those who already "thought the plebiscite to be inevitable"<sup>55</sup> triumphed in the National Meeting of the DC, held 31 July and 2 August 1987. A new leadership headed by Patricio Aylwin as president and Andrés Zaldívar, Narciso Irureta y Edgardo Boeninger as vice-presidents was elected. Gutenberg Martínez became the new Secretary General. The old DC was reconstructed to subordinate itself to the dictatorship's transition blueprint, thus subordinating the Left as well. The Left soon had to join the electoral campaign since in Aylwin's words the mobilisation was "a waste of gunpowder"<sup>56</sup> The character and limitations of these social mobilisations were clear to the DC strategists. In October 1986, in a letter to the Christian Democrat party, Edgardo Boeninger highlighted the "difference in motivation and behaviour

---

<sup>55</sup> Edgardo Boeninger, *op. cit.*, p. 333.

<sup>56</sup> Rafael Otano, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

of the key sectors of the middle class when comparing the present process to the events of October 1972 and May 1973. At that time the aforementioned sectors mobilised with the firm intention of ending the Unidad Popular government [...], today it is essentially a party devoted to the recovery of lost ground vis-a-vis the government it contributed to establish."<sup>57</sup>

What should be added is that those mobilisations subordinated the DC in a bloc led by the strikers.<sup>58</sup> The danger was that the mobilisation could lead to the radicalisation of working class sectors and to the Left's avoidance of subordination to the DC, the other opposing force. The lesson was that the party system guaranteed the DC's central role even when this juncture had to subordinate itself to the dictatorship's blueprint since, in exchange, it had the opportunity to neutralise the Left.

Discussion about inclusion in the electoral rolls separated the PS-Almeyda from its Communist allies. In January 1988, the Christian Democrats and the PS-A worked together in an Agreement for the NO which improved on the

---

<sup>57</sup> Edgardo Boeninger quoting himself in *op. cit.*, pp. 329-330.

<sup>58</sup> See Chapter 2.



Democratic Alliance and gave rise on February 2 to the formation of the Accord of Parties for the NO. This agreement was subscribed to by a total of 17 parties and minor groups. It was the embryo for the reconstruction of a party system centred on the Christian Democrats' initiatives, whose president, Aylwin was designated "spokesman" for the Accord<sup>59</sup> which excluded only the PC, the MIR, and other minor Left socialist groups.

The triumph of the NO in the plebiscite inspired the idea that Aylwin was the natural candidate for the presidency of the republic if the alliance of parties that had been formed for the plebiscite were preserved. Objections arose within his own party where Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle also had both ambitions and support. Discussion around a necessary generational renewal obscured real observable changes and continuities. The Christian Democrats arose as the axis of the system and their actions were independent of the movement of society. Decisions were taken by a generation of "operators" who, though they came from before 1973, had never been so powerful. In fact, a new elite, with the same cast of characters but a new political culture

---

<sup>59</sup> Edgardo Boeninger, *op. cit.*, p. 338.

assumed control of the system. Aylwin's candidacy was imposed as a consensus to cover up the shameful frauds carried out in the party's internal elections.<sup>60</sup>

This Right-wing Christian Democrat line was to make alliances with small groups within the greater Alliance for the NO, for the purpose of confronting a socialist contender for the candidacy. In particular, Ricardo Lagos accepted that socialist ambitions could be postponed for a second transition administration.<sup>61</sup> In the end, Aylwin's candidacy concentrated the support of the majority of the NO forces.

If Aylwin's victory meant legitimisation of the 1980 Constitution, with reforms that did not change its nature beyond eliminating of Article 8, regarding the exclusion for ideas, and the acceptance of the timetable for transition to full enforcement of that Constitution contained in the transitory articles, it is necessary to explain what was gained by the parties that assumed the administration and whose axis was the Christian Democrat-Socialist alliance. The victory of the Christian

---

<sup>60</sup> Rafael Otano, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-79.

<sup>61</sup> "To me it seems very difficult that there not be a Socialist candidate in 1994. Because if that does not happen, it will mean that this transition was a failure." Quoted by Otano, *op. cit.*, p. 79.



Democrat political blueprint was reflected in the subordination of the Socialists and the practical expulsion from the party system of the Communists who now belonged to the extra-parliamentary Left. The Christian Democrat role as axis of the entire party system was guaranteed by its ideological influence in the renewed Socialist Party<sup>62</sup> and by the reinforcement of the political parties against the social demands contained in the Constitution.

What signified a radical change in the form of Christian Democrat thinking was their acceptance of the economic development model imposed by the dictatorship. Christian Democrat ideas and programmes had given substance better than those of any other party to Latin-American development thinking and its structuralist roots in economics. This way of thinking inspired Christian Democrat's "technical" criticism of the management of the Chilean economy under the dictatorship well into the 80's.<sup>63</sup> However, at the time of Aylwin's presidential campaign, the thinking which, at its roots, had inspired the dictatorship's economists had become dominant in the international academic field. It also dominated designs of plans for economic policy throughout Latin America after the 1982 debt crisis, and finally, the Chilean

---

<sup>62</sup> See following chapter.

<sup>63</sup> Alejandro Foxley, *Experimentos neoliberales en América Latina*, Chapter III, *El Experimento Neoliberal en Chile*, pp. 44-92.

model was reputed as successful and had admirers and imitators in other countries. With all this, the problem was not the conversion of Christian Democrat economists (and their renewed socialist colleagues)<sup>64</sup> but that the conversion be convincing to Chilean and foreign investors and entrepreneurs present in Chile.<sup>65</sup>

---

<sup>64</sup> Edgardo Boeninger, *op. cit.*, p. 356.

<sup>65</sup> Rafael Otano, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-135.



## **Chapter 6. The Transformations of the Left**

### 6.1. Introduction

On becoming President of the Republic in 1990, Patricio Aylwin was backed by a coalition of 16 political parties of which the main partners were the Christian Democrats and the Chilean Socialist Party. This may have given the impression that the Chilean political process was returning to a point in its development similar to the one interrupted in 1973. An alliance between Christian Democrats and Socialists seemed the solution to the dilemma Allende could not solve in order to preserve the political system and continue with the transition to socialism. Aylwin himself, however, had been the Christian Democrat leader that prevented an agreement with Allende and opened the door to the coup d'etat. The alliance Aylwin led in 1990 represented something quite different from the alliance that might have been effected between the Christian Democrat Party and government of the Unidad Popular. There were differences in each aspect of the alliance, with the Socialists revealing the most noticeable ones. In fact, their presence in the alliance epitomised the changes suffered by the Chilean Left during the military dictatorship: the break-up of the Communist-Socialist alliance as axis of the Left and the

transformation of the Chilean Socialist Party into something similar to a social democratic party. This was the result of a process that culminated in the subordination of the Left to the Christian Democrats as the axis of reconstruction of the political party system and, at the same time, of the subordination of the parties to the national blueprint imposed by the dictatorship.

Once the dictatorship dissolved parliament and suppressed formal party activity, the population was disengaged from political participation. The organic link between the parties and their clientele, structured through elections, was severed. This does not mean, however, that the parties' organised rank-and-file and, even less their leaderships, had been completely deactivated. For the entire period of the dictatorship, politics became mostly super-structural in the sense that the actors were mainly members and organisations of a prior political elite and also that those ideological matters came permanently to the fore whereby the intellectual side of politics became fundamentally important. These general characteristics of the political process would be reflected in the Left as well and particularly in the Socialist Party.

## 6.2. The Left after 1973.

The coup d'etat was immediately successful in some



of its objectives: the destruction of the government of the UP and the dispersal of its members. However, at the level of political organisation and ideology, things were not so easy. The political organisations of the Left were defeated, militarily and politically with great speed, but this meant neither their complete destruction nor disappearance of their social influence, even though careful evaluation is necessary of the degrees and forms of survival of these elements under the conditions of the dictatorship.

In the first period after the coup, the Left's complex of parties was shaken not only by repression, but also by arguments over the causes of their defeat and their future perspectives. In general, the arguments and alignments corresponded to positions prior to 1973. On one hand were those who criticised the ultra-Left's actions, in and out of the UP. They considered the ultra-Left's lack of appreciation of the importance of maintaining institutionality as one of the causes of defeat.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand were those who criticised the reformism they imputed to the entire UP strategy and the rituals with which institutional forms had been maintained, that may have impeded the development of elements that could have allowed them to successfully

---

<sup>1</sup> Chilean Communist Party, "El ultraizquierdismo, caballo de Troya del imperialismo", and Jaime Gazmuri, "Aprender las lecciones del pasado para construir el futuro".

confront the coup.<sup>2</sup>

In the fundamentally important matter of organisation, no new significant organisations appear other than the parties in the first period of regrouping after defeat.<sup>3</sup> In general, the parties remained intact and within them their pre-coup tendencies remained dominant, with the exception of the PS, in which some changes were observed. But even the UP, as an alliance of parties, was reconstituted as such.<sup>4</sup> This organic situation reflects a first result of the ideological confrontation. In other words, the hegemonic sectors during the UP government maintained their positions with greater or lesser difficulty within each party. This meant that, as a whole, the Left assumed an "anti-fascist front" party line. This line was promoted by the PC and implied the search for an alliance with the DC in a blueprint to reconstruct the political system beginning with an evaluation of the already noticeable discrepancies between the dictatorship and the PDC.<sup>5</sup>

---

2 Chilean Socialist Party (Coordinadora Nacional de Regionales, CNR), "Posición política".

3 There is news of highly restricted spontaneous youth organisations, that were dismantled by repression in the first months after the coup.

4 It may be said that the UP existed as an alliance of parties, at least in exile, until 1980. In 1981, in Mexico, there was a call for a "Chilean Left" that includes the MIR, (18 September 1981).

5 See, for example, the declaration of the External Political Committee of the UP, in London from October 14-16 1975, where the effect of the DC's rejection of the proposal for unity stands out. Chilean Communist Party, *Boletín del Exterior*, No. 14, October-November 1975.



Beginning in 1977, this general party line was reinforced when the dictatorship outlawed the PDC. However, it failed ignominiously on the PDC's refusal to enter into any agreement with the Left. Moreover, in this second period, when conditions seemed optimal for consolidation of strategy for the anti-fascist front, the ideological discussion changed within the Left and, again, the main symptoms were observable within the PS. In this period, the axis of the ideological confrontation within the Left became the question of democracy and socialism.<sup>6</sup>

At this point it is important to establish the connections between what happened in Chile and what happened abroad among Chilean exiles. At first glance, taking the explicit terms in which the ideological question was posited, the impression is of an echo of world-wide ideological confrontations reproduced among the exiles. This seemed to imply a shallow adoption of "vogues" such as quotes from Gramsci, historical compromise, Euro-communism, the critiques of real socialism etc., among Chilean intellectuals. Doubtless, there was some of this. In fact, not only the language was borrowed but money was as well. Chilean exiles became involved, through a sense of international solidarity, in

---

<sup>6</sup> The problem appeared openly in January 1977 with Julio Silva Solar's criticisms of Luis Corvalán's speech in Moscow, January 4 that same year, in which Corvalán reaffirmed the strategic validity of the dictatorship of the proletariat. *Chile-América*, No 28.

a network of contacts that favoured a democratic outcome for Chile through a modified reconstruction of the pre-1973 party system. Among the important elements of this process was the Socialist International's support of the contacts between Socialist and Christian Democrat sectors.<sup>7</sup> However, this process should not and, ultimately, cannot be reduced to a dynamic of individual opportunism on the part of the exiles.

The internal correlative of this confrontation in Chile was the PDC's ideological offensive against the Left. At the same time that it began distancing itself from the dictatorship, the PDC was compelled to justify its support of the coup d'etat (which it had never condemned) and it did this through an attack on the "Leninism" of the UP government. It explicitly proposed the formation of a Chilean "Euro-communist" Left with which it could negotiate.<sup>8</sup> Given the then-current conditions in Chile, the PDC's ideological offensive developed fundamentally among the intellectual sectors and within this context was quite successful. The reasons for its success had to do with the situation in which the Left reconstructed its organisations under the dictatorship.

---

7 The first meeting of this type took place in Colonia Tovar, Venezuela from July 7-11 1975. Among those present were Bernardo Leighton and Renán Fuentealba, from the DC, and Aniceto Rodríguez and Clodomiro Almeyda, of the PS.

8 Genaro Arriagada Herrera y Claudio Orrego Vicuña, *Leninismo y democracia*, Santiago, 1976.



Repression had forced the parties to reconstruct clandestinely, which gave them very different characteristics to the ones they had before 1973. On one hand, it established a limit to activity among the masses. The organisations could disseminate their propaganda clandestinely, but did not have the organic channels to measure its response, and even less to gather support. The organisations' internal characteristics established social and generational divisions that, under the dictatorship's conditions, made a large part of the party members unable to participate in its activities. All this resulted in that, in Chile, sectors that before 1973 were organised and in many cases subordinate to the parties in their political activities, acquired ideological independence. Among them, the most important were the intellectuals and the labour union cadres.

The expulsion of the Left's intellectuals from the universities placed them in a "market" situation. There arose a complex of research institutes and schools which, being independent of the state, were not susceptible to party intervention as had been the case before 1973. The financing on which these new academic institutions depended came from the same external sources that supported the exiles. When some of the Christian Democrats were excluded from the universities, they developed common corporate interests with previously excluded left wing intellectuals. This made their

eventual ideological subordination to the PDC easier.<sup>9</sup>

Also, in the labour sector, the PDC developed a relatively successful offensive. Beginning with the repression of the Left's labour union cadres and the PDC's distancing from the dictatorship, the labour movement appeared "available" to the Christian Democrat labour cadres. However, the weakness of labour organisations under the dictatorship, and the persistence of leftist political affiliations amongst the workers in general, did not allow them to consummate their purpose, despite some important achievements.<sup>10</sup>

In this situation, the socialist cadres that directed the clandestine party organisation showed shortcomings in facing their own intellectuals on ideological ground and their "military" or "apparatchik" type tendencies made neither dialogue nor the broadening of party influence any easier.<sup>11</sup>

An obvious question that arises from the observation of this process, is why didn't the DC accept the anti-fascist alliance, thus reinforcing the sector's

---

9 Harry Diaz, Peter Lanstreet y María Teresa Lladser, *Centros privados de investigación en ciencias sociales en Chile*, published in 1984, records information on 33 centres that appeared during the preceding 10 years.

10 On the first part of the dictatorship, see, Guillermo Campero and José A. Valenzuela, *El movimiento sindical en el régimen militar*.

11 The parties' adaptation to new conditions had a high cost. In 1977, the list of the missing included eleven members of the PC's Central Committee and some of the main Socialist leaders that had stayed in the country. Among them were Excequiel Ponce, Carlos Lorca, Ricardo Lagos and Ariel Mancilla. They were replaced by young cadres or those who learned a new form of politics.



support of the system's reconstruction from within the Left? Instead, they positioned themselves against the PC leading those sectors that would support the reconstruction of the system over an ideological point on which it could not give in: Leninism. The answer lies in the project the PDC supported: the replacement of social alliances by party alliances with one representative dominant party, obviously themselves. This meant eliminating the class orientation of political participation in Chile and the main obstacle this project met with was the political and ideological independence of the working class, expressed in their Marxist-Leninist groups, through the PS and the PC.

The PDC's ideological proposal began to penetrate the Left's elite through its closest area of influence, the sectors that came from the DC, the MAPU and the Christian Left.<sup>12</sup> There began to be questions about the class character of the Socialist projects, Leninism and the leadership of the proletariat. Only later would the Socialist and even ultra-leftist sectors join this ideological proposal.<sup>13</sup>

---

12 See the essays presented by Julio Silva Solar, José Antonio Viera Gallo, Sergio Bitar, Claudio Huepe, Pedro Felipe Ramírez, José Miguel Inzulsa, Esteban Tomic and Herman Schwemberg in the New York meeting (1-6 September 1976) sponsored by the Nation Council of Churches of the United States. *Chile América*, No. 25, 26, 27 November, December 1976 and January 1977.

13 First Christians from the left, MAPU and Christian Left coincided in criticising the parties and questioning their social representation (Acta de Ariccia, Rome, 13 January 1980). The true content of the terms "renovation" and "convergence" was revealed in the document "Por la Convergencia Socialista", (Milan, July 1982), in which some of the signing members of Ariccia no longer appeared.

As for the PC, because of its international affiliations, it first had to withstand an ideological offensive,<sup>14</sup> and then, abandon, at least apparently, the "reconstructionist" blueprint through an alliance with the DC.<sup>15</sup>

### 6.3. The Socialist Party in the period after 1973

The evolution of the PS after the UP's defeat in 1973 was characterised by a series of internal confrontations that ended in expulsions, marginalisations, excisions and separations. However, these phenomena, which together resembled a process of decomposition,<sup>16</sup> were always accompanied by movements that at least in their explicit intentions sought to revert the tendency by promotion of regrouping.

A detailed description of these processes is impossible, and might not even be very useful. What is being attempted here is to propose a more general scheme of interpretation that will allow exploration of the

---

14 "Despite all the specificities -and there obviously were- in the Chilean Revolution, as in all revolutions, no Marxist-Leninist thesis can be questioned in light of this experience. On the contrary, it confirms it." Luis Corvalán, "Cómo se dio en Chile la vía no armada". Corvalán, Secretary General of the PC, could not accept the discussion of the Marxist-Leninist thesis, that was being questioned by left wing Christians and the Socialists linked with them.

15 Luis Corvalán, "El derecho del pueblo a la rebelión es indiscutible". Speech given 3 September 1980.

16 "The outstanding feature of the PSCh under the military rule is the malignant spreading of breakaway factions to the extent that there are now [1985] over twenty groups which claim to be Socialist offspring." Benny Pollack and Hernan Rosenkranz. *Revolutionary Social democracy. The Chilean Socialist Party*, p. 167.



meaning of these conflicts, either individually or as a whole. To fail to do so would imply accepting the explicit terms by which the conflicts themselves appeared to be leading to a highly ideological discussion. The determination of positions taken therein appears obscured by imputations either favourable or pejorative made by the actors themselves.

The main stage for these conflicts was the Chilean exile community spread throughout the world.<sup>17</sup> Since debates regarding "interior" and "exile" figures prominently in discussions between the actors, each situation under analysis must be evaluated separately. In general, the supposition here is that, regardless of the complexity of establishing relations, in the end the main internal political conflicts of the PS were determined by Chilean political processes and the political actors both within and outside the country, and perceptions of those processes whether accurate or not.

The consequences of the 1973 coup d'etat for the PS were, to a great extent, foreseeable. Not only was it the Left's largest party, but due to its organisation and the positions it held it was the most affected by the

---

17 One example: Clodomiro Almeyda's designation as Secretary General, in 1979 was accepted by organised Socialist groups in Austria, Switzerland, Finland, France, Bulgaria, Hungary, Cuba, U.S.A., Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, West Germany, Sweden, Belgium, the German Democratic Republic, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, England, Australia and Norway, in a declaration signed by the local heads of the Chilean Socialist Party in all these countries.

repression in the first period. Its Secretary General Carlos Altamirano managed to leave Chile clandestinely but a large part of the national leadership suffered one, or more, of the three worst forms of the repression: imprisonment, exile or death.<sup>18</sup> Despite all this, the reconstitution of the PS leadership within Chile was relatively quick. In fact, at the end of 1974, there had already been two national leaders who had aspired to take control of what was left of the organisation but, above all, sought recognition of their leadership by Chilean Socialists spread all over the world and by the other parties of the Left, both Chilean and international.

The first relatively long official pronouncement of any instance of the leadership of the PS in Chile is dated March 19, 1974 and was issued by the Central Committee reconstituted around Excequiél Ponce. This document would go down in party history as the "Documento de Marzo"<sup>19</sup> and would become a necessary reference in all following debates. The moment it was released, the Secretary General Carlos Altamirano and other leaders installed a headquarters of the party in exile in East Berlin. From there they tried to retake control of the

---

18 At the beginning of 1974, the balance was: four members of the Central Committee and seven regional secretaries dead; twelve members of the Central Committee and twenty regional secretaries in prison.

19 "In the heat of battle against fascism, to build the people's leading force to insure victory!", Document of the Chilean Socialist Party Central Committee, March 1974 (reproduced in Berlin).



various party organisations that arose in different countries as the militant exiles reorganised. Depending on where the exiles lived, the reorganisation process took on its own characteristics. Shortly thereafter, the socialist regrouping took place in the midst of multiple conflicts which were channelled into two competing factions which faced each other inside Chile. Since it is not possible to reconstruct the variety of situations that arose in exile, only the main conflicts will be mentioned. Also there is no direct way to evaluate the influence within the country that each Socialist group attributed to itself. However, an effort will be made to clarify the criteria being used in each case.

Criticism of the "Documento de Marzo" by the reconstituted Central Committee came from an organisation that had not existed in the previous political structure.<sup>20</sup> The Coordinadora Nacional de Regionales (National Co-ordinator of Regional Committees, CNR), self-proclaimed national leader of the PS, generated a document denouncing the desertion of the Central Committee and the irregularity of the procedures used for its reconstitution in Chile.

Two fundamental questions formed the main points of conflict between the polarised sectors in exile. What were the causes of the UP's failure that led to the coup

---

20 "Entrevista a un dirigente de la Coordinadora de Regionales del Partido Socialista de Chile", Documentos No.1, Paris, March 1975, pp.3-5.

d'etat? And what were the party's and the Chilean Left's general prospects within the new situation? These two explicit issues, besides the relations, conflictive or not, of each group of exiles with the party leadership installed in Berlin, ranked in primary importance before all other local conflicts.

On ideological grounds, both the "Document de marzo" and the "Entrevista a un dirigente de la coordinadora.." revealed a continuity of positions already expressed prior to the outcome of the political process in Chile. In other words, interpretations from both perspectives, with respect to the UP's strategy, reaffirmed arguments blaming the other for the final defeat.<sup>21</sup> From that evaluation on, propositions with respect to the second position were a proposal for the party's reorganisation under a leadership that followed the party line. However, the conflict also posited an urgent organic question: which constituted the leadership of the Chilean party?

Given the party's heterogeneous characteristics the exiled leadership did not face the problem immediately. It maintained the ambiguity of the situation for almost three years.<sup>22</sup> This period was marked by intense

---

21 See chapter 2.

22 Only in September 1976, the exile secretariat in Berlin exhorted the members of the party constituting the groups called MR-2, Coordinadora de Regionales and Dirección de Consenso, to suspend their divisive activities for thirty days. Documento No.8 del Departamento de Difusión del PSCh en México p.14.



ideological activity in exile and by the reconstructive processes of all the parties of the Left inside and out of Chile. This, of course, produced in the PS a proliferation of groups, factions and tendencies that reproduced their previous composition. However, in Chile, there were only two groups with apparent organisational capabilities, thus they subordinated most of the more varied external factions.

The central ideological points were evaluation of the defeat and the response from the party's leadership. The main organic question depended on acknowledgement (or not) of the Central Committee elected at the 1971 congress of La Serena, of its capacity to reform itself during the emergency and even the organisation of a new general party congress.<sup>23</sup>

According to the "Documento de Marzo" the main cause of defeat in 1973 was the political isolation of the proletariat and this, in turn, was the result of an inability to impose the hegemony of the proletariat on the implementation of the process. It recognised the PS's responsibility for these deficiencies because of its petit bourgeois leadership and its being the source of

---

23 In the interview with the head of the Coordinadora mentioned in footnote 22, he says: "Of the forty five members elected in the last ordinary general congress of La Serena, at this time in Chile, there are no more than five members of the Central Committee (including the Secretary General of the Socialist Youth Federation). These members tried to reorganise themselves through the co-option of others to integrate them into the Central Committee. However, they failed in their attempt to relate to the party rank-and-file and to speak for the rank-and-file which is where the Coordinadora came from."

politically dissipating tendencies during the UP government. Mastery of these defects would again be possible, according to the document, if the party's reorganisation were based on its previous Marxist-Leninist definitions and if the hegemony of the proletariat were based on a solid PS-PC alliance that would propel an anti-fascist front with a popular, democratic and anti-imperialist programme.<sup>24</sup>

Criticism of these positions on the part of the CNR began with a different evaluation of the defeat. First of all, it considered the 1973 coup as the "defeat of reformism". Based on this definition, it proposed the creation of a new working class vanguard starting with a regrouping of the Socialist rank-and-file it represented, and ignoring the reconstituted Central Committee as well as the alliances previous to the coup in which the PS participated. The new class unity would have to be created at the base through the formation of "workers' committees", which implied ignoring the leaderships of other parties, especially those of the PC, and therefore assumed the end of the entire pre-1973 political system.<sup>25</sup>

The PS's overseas leadership accepted the ambiguity of the situation and tried to reconcile positions, seeking to maintain its leadership status by preserving

---

24 "Documento de Marzo", especially pp.19,39,46,54 and 60-63.

25 "Interview with the top leader of the CNR of the PSCh. Chile, 7 February 1976". (Mimeographed).



the unity and heterogeneity of the PS. In the first plenary meeting of the Central Committee (Havana, May 1975) a representative of the CNR was accepted.<sup>26</sup>

This first internal conflict, reiterates some of the characteristics that are the product of the period's general situation, like, for example, the ideological subjects discussed and the organic consequences arising from them. Those characteristics also replicate the Left's general situation. Evaluation of the defeat only repeated anew the positions prior held to the coup; the questions regarding the survival of the party system and the PS's role in it appeared organically.

What characterises the conflict is that it translated into the PS's own components. The over-emphasising of ideological activity of the exiles added to the conflicts springing from regrouping in a foreign environment contributed to magnifying their internal repercussions. This at the same time contributed to magnifying the importance of the CNR in its prospective of political success. When the conflict was resolved, in 1977, the main questions were resolved in the general tendency of the reconstitution of the Left's organisations.

---

<sup>26</sup> Interview with a participant at the Havana plenum.

<sup>27</sup> The episode of the expulsions was very murky. Nevertheless, it is clear that all things considered, the departure of the CNR cannot be called a split in the party as was the breakaway of 1979.

Despite the unquestionable influence of the CNR in some organisations of the Socialist Party in exile, when the party separated from it, only very minority sectors followed the CNR. The conflict was resolved by the expulsion of two notable figures of the Socialist Party in exile and the marginalisation of small groups.<sup>27</sup>

Taking the Socialist Party as the axis rather than the groups that left it, it is noteworthy that in 1977 it was only able to reaffirm its organic existence. It clearly continued to exist as a party and as part of the system of alliances constituted by the Left. Its social and ideological heterogeneity persisted. But the very departure of the CNR was proof that its function as the centre of centrifugal tendencies in the party system was weakening, which may be taken as a sign of the dictatorship's progress in destroying the political system in general.<sup>28</sup>

Once the CNR had split from the PS, it demonstrated that it was in no way different from the latter that might justify its existence as a party within the party system (to which, moreover, it had no desire to belong). It showed no considerable progress in generating a new

---

<sup>28</sup> With respect to CNR policy, particularly its line of unity at the base in "worker committees" these do not figure in any way in the development of the labour or political movement during all the years of the dictatorship.



vanguard of the Chilean proletariat. At the first meeting of adherents to the CNR in exile, it was shown to be as heterogeneous as the PS itself.<sup>29</sup> The result was a process of divisions and decompositions of the CNR that reduced it to a fraction that retained the characteristics of the extra-parliamentary Left that had arisen in Chile in the sixties<sup>30</sup> and was partially absorbed by the PS during the UP experience.

This first breakaway was not the only one to happen in the PS during this first period. At the same time that its re-composition required resolution of the situation created by the CNR, some influential members split from the party. They assumed personal leadership in exile assembling a small number of individuals around them but participating actively in the ideological struggle, expressing opinions about Chile, the party and the future. The most noteworthy was Aniceto Rodríguez, who

---

<sup>29</sup> "The world meeting [of the CNR in exile] was held last May [1978] in Paris. All its agreements and proposals await the COPOL's ratification, due to the fact that divergences of form and content arose in their development." Published by *Revolución* (official organ of the CNR abroad) N°7, May-July, 1978, p.1.

<sup>30</sup> One of these characteristics was the tendency to minute fragmentation. The internal leadership of the CNR denounced members who "motivated by political caudillismo and opportunism have repeatedly not hesitated to fraudulently and secretly assume the name and representation of our National Directorate and Political Committee." *Resistencia Socialista*, N°10, January-February, 1978, p.11. Furthermore, as a continuation of their "line of rupture" during the UP administration, the CNR made agreements with sectors that held a similar position in other parties, MAPU, MIR, IC. *Revolución*, N° 5, January-February 1978, p.33.

had been secretary General of the PS until 1971 and who established residence in Venezuela. The departure of regional and ideological caudillos, whom the PS used to absorb when the political system was operative in Chile, occurred slowly and without fanfare.<sup>31</sup> However, it is well known that none of these groups managed to create a party based on the expression of a "pure" form of any of the tendencies that coexisted within the PS.

The greatest intensification of the dictatorship's strategy and the lowest point in political party activity was witnessed in 1977. The break-up of the political system reached its highest level in 1980 and the tendency would not be reversed until 1983. Even so, this period generated the greatest ideological activity to the extent that party activity became introverted and that, in Chile, intellectuals sought, found and conquered spaces independent of the parties in which to express their political proposals.<sup>32</sup>

It is in this period that the ideological offensive against "Leninism" and the dictatorship of the

---

<sup>31</sup> Adherence to CNR of Mario Palestro, caudillo of the San Miguel commune in Santiago still causes curiosity. His positions bore no resemblance whatsoever to the general postulates of the CNR. See *Resistencia Socialista* N°9, October-November 1977, pp 46-50.

<sup>32</sup> Press activity by intellectuals holding identifiable political posts came to substitute for the relationship between the political parties and their clientele, both among supporters of the dictatorship and the opposition. The latter gradually found and received space in the mass media.



proletariat - disputes raised abroad and in Chile - was echoed within the PS. The fact that conflicts were resolved by the PS office in Berlin broached the matter of authoritarianism from outside leadership on one hand, and the loss of party independence on the international scene due to dependence on the GDR for its foreign office on the other. The same was true domestically because the Communist Party could use its contacts with the governments of Socialist countries to pressure the PS leadership to adopt positions more coincident with their own.<sup>33</sup> In response, its critics emphasised their financial dependence upon the Socialist parties of Western Europe and their inclination toward positions characteristic of those kinds of parties.<sup>34</sup>

In Chile, the differences between the clandestine leadership and groups of intellectuals grew for different reasons. The ideological gap between the "apparatchiki" of the leadership and the "sociologists" who found possibilities of expression under the conditions of the dictatorship, was evident. It must be remembered that these were the years of the "consumerist" boom among the

---

<sup>33</sup> According to Carlos Altamirano, Chilean socialism ought to be "non-aligned" *ab origine*. It should not rely on any "Marxist-Leninist dogma". Remarks by Carlos Altamirano to Marcel Niedergang, *Le Monde*, May 5, 1979.

<sup>34</sup> Clodomiro Almeyda, "All advances have their cost", interview in Sweden, May 1979 (mimeographed).

Chilean middle classes that contributed to a demobilisation and consequent disarticulation of the political parties in general.

When the conflict exploded in April 1979, the PS suffered its most serious division. On the ideological side the positions outlined above were reaffirmed, but organically little was resolved. The leadership in Chile reaffirmed itself as a clandestine apparatus but under the conditions of general retreat by the parties. The PS lost standing amongst intellectual groups in Chile whereas in exile, organisations in general were weakened not only by the division, but because the wear and tear of the internal conflict contributed to a growing number of exiles leaving party activity altogether.

If there is one characteristic shared by both sectors after 1979 it is heterogeneity. Even so, within this movement of general retreat, Almeyda's PS was still able to preserve the unity of its heterogeneous sectors until 1983 because of its role with respect to the rest of the Left. On the other hand, Altamirano's sector revealed a different composition between the exiles and those supporting them in Chile. In fact, in Chile, they associated themselves with a small apparatus left over from the Castro-ism of the sixties which was absorbed

---



into the PS during the UP government and preserved its autonomous structure as a fraction of the PS throughout all those years.<sup>35</sup> With the intention of settling ideological and organic questions once and for all and producing a regular and legitimate Central Committee, the Altamirano sector called the 24th party congress (which assumed the name PS 24 Congress). Just as in the experience of the CNR, the Altamirano sector did not survive the confrontation and divided. This time the result was two PS 24 congresses: one basically constituted by the Castro-ist faction mentioned above (MR-2) and the other consisting principally of middle class intellectual sectors inclined toward social democracy.

#### 6.4 The re-composition of the Left in the '80s

The period of retreat ended with the plebiscite of 1980. In it, the dictatorship consolidated its strategy of a new political structure by causing the approval of its new Constitution in which the role of the political parties remained undefined but limited.<sup>36</sup> The campaign preceding the plebiscite provided the first occasion for a meeting of opposition masses organised under the

---

<sup>35</sup> The MR-2.

<sup>36</sup> Constitution of 1980, article 8, eliminated in 1989, and article 19, No. 15. See chapter 3 above.

leadership of the Christian Democrats, but in which the Left reaffirmed its presence. The most unexpected event in the days prior to the plebiscite, however, was the speech by Luis Corvalán, General Secretary of the PC, in which he affirmed the peoples' right to rebellion and the use of violence<sup>37</sup>. In the same speech he reaffirmed the alliance of the Left constituted by Unidad Popular. Setting aside the causes of an event such as this change of course by the Chilean PC after so many years of being the principal promoter of the peaceful way to socialism, it can only be interpreted as an indicator of the depth of disarticulation of the party system which led to abandoning attempts at an alliance with the Christian Democrats. From that moment on, the Left as a whole was divided in a new way. On one side, what remained of Unidad Popular, as well as the new Left, now grouped without differences that might exclude MIR and other movements or fractions previously discarded as ultra-left. On the other side was a group that in July 1982 launched the manifesto "For a Socialist Convergence",<sup>38</sup> a call for "the ideological, political and organic renewal of Socialism". With the signatures supporting the document, this meant the rejection of the party structure

---

<sup>37</sup> Quoted in note 17.

<sup>38</sup> "Por la Convergencia Socialista", (mimeo), p.4.



and the incorporation of individuals until then foreign to the Socialist Party of Chile into the movement of exiles. It is on this basis that later, when the Núñez faction of the PS reorganised, it was joined by members of MAPU, MAPU-OC and MIR.

The process of re-composition of the Left did not arise solely out of its internal dynamics. The processes determining it were on two external and more general levels. They were constituted by the crisis of the dictatorship on the one hand, and on the other by the reconstruction of the political party system, the axis of which was formed by the Christian Democrats. Previous chapters have described how the economic crisis of the early '80s provoked opposition social mobilisation. This reactivated the professional political elite which set out to reconstruct their party organisations. This movement as a whole tipped the balance from the forces of the dictatorship toward the construction of political parties and ensured the projection of the regime in that direction rather than toward other alternatives.

Under the conditions prevalent in 1983, the Left saw the chance to put an end to the dictatorship by means of social mobilisation and launched itself to promote that mobilisation by popular protests. However, as

---

demonstrated above, the political parties and particularly the Christian Democrats very quickly placed themselves at the head of those mobilisations, seeking control of the transition from the dictatorship via the reconstruction of the party system of which they were undoubtedly best situated to become the axis.

The lines of action coexisting in the Left seem paradoxical at first glance. Social mobilisation reactivated old groups in Chile and abroad that had suffered a sharp fall in their levels of activity after the dictatorship was successful in its attempt to impose its new Constitution by means of the plebiscite. This raised doubts about the very possibility of instigating opposition action through a party apparatuses which existed under progressively more precarious conditions due to the repression. This predicament, in turn, strengthened two divergent tendencies. The first was the militarism or "apparatus-ism" of the youngest and most radicalised sectors under the conditions of the dictatorship. Among them those who achieved the most development were members of the Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez (FPMR), linked to the Communist Party. The second tendency assembled intellectual sectors of the middle class reinforced within Chile by assistance from abroad and over-represented in the exile community. The



latter questioned the representativity of the parties as such, that is as models of organisation for the expression of social sectors. At first, the situation created by protests against the dictatorship and its social rather than its political base seemed to support both positions. Both sides faced the problem of how to bind themselves to the social protest movement. The militant sector, or "Rodriguist militias", tried to create an appropriate organisation for struggle in the streets to which the protests gave rise. Meanwhile, in the political elite sectors of the middle class there was a proliferation of "referents", groups of politicians and intellectuals wishing to participate in the discussions and search for alternatives to political solutions which, even supporters of the dictatorship, perceived as unsustainable.

The reactivation of the old political elite and the situation created in the Socialist party by disputes and divisions from previous decades placed the Christian Democrats in a situation of axis and arbiter of the elements with which the political party system would be reconstructed. The nucleus about which the Socialist Party of Chile was finally reconstituted was composed of cadres grouped around Ricardo Nuñez and Carlos Briones. They were joined by Jorge Arrate after his return to

Chile from exile in Holland. For this reason, during the 1980s the organisation eventually became known as PS-Briones, PS-Nuñez and PS-Arrate. The other important fraction that only joined the final reunification in 1989 was led and directed at all times throughout the period under the name of Clodomiro Almeyda. These groups preserve roots traceable to the Salvador Allende's Socialist party. Around them fluctuated other minor Socialist groups of the same genesis.<sup>39</sup> To these diverse groups of cadres of the professional political elite finally gravitated whose origins were different but who, to a large extent, assumed ultimate control of the party in the system reconstructed after the 1988 plebiscite.

Between the plebiscite and Aylwin's election as president, the conditions under which the political process of reconstruction developed determined the final form of the organisations of the Left in a recomposed and redesigned party system.

The preceding chapter described how possible lines of action defined alliances within the ideological restrictions that each party determined. The line that finally dominated the process was the one defined by the Christian Democrats as the axis of reconstruction of the

---

<sup>39</sup> Among the 16 parties constituting the Accord for the NO, on February 2, 1988, there are five of more or less remote origin in the former PS.



party system. However it wavered with respect to social mobilisation, a weakness which reflected its internal conflicts and the struggles for leadership. The insurmountable limitations of the Christian Democrat strategy stemmed from its specific aim to isolate the Communists and its more general aim of attracting and subordinating all Socialists to their strategy.

The goals and transformations of the various Socialist factions were framed by the same limits, with the additional drawback of being the permanent target of a repressive action or the threat of repressive action by the dictatorship. In August 1983, the first significant alliance of a faction of the PS with the Christian Democrats and without the Communists was the Alianza Democrática with the participation of the PS Briones-Nuñez. In September of the same year, the other important faction, the PS-Almeyda formed the Movimiento Popular Democrático (MDP), with the Communists, the MIR and Izquierda Cristiana. The obvious difference being that the AD came to Jarpa for a dialogue, excluding the Communists from that alliance in spite of their attempts to be included.<sup>40</sup> Only at the close of that year, with the

---

<sup>40</sup> Cavallo et al. op.cit.413

failure of the attempt to negotiate with the AD, did the Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez (FPMR) go into action.

In 1984, there was great ideological activity amongst the leadership of the political parties that would have significant consequences. At the same time that social mobilisation and the dictatorship's response of repression continued, Aylwin, as the vice president of the Christian Democrats, proposed his thesis of a search for a "negotiated end" to the dictatorship. He did this in a seminar attended not only by intellectuals and Socialist leaders but also by "organic" intellectuals of the dictatorship.<sup>41</sup>

The leadership of the party was reinforced by the return of exiled leaders and the next attempt at negotiation, promoted by the Archbishop of the Catholic Church in 1985, was attended by leaders of Izquierda Cristiana. Several important features of the political process emerged during the dictatorship's decline: first, the process of self-selection amongst the political elite, that is, the weight that recognition amongst peers carried in the absence of criteria of representativity to allow individuals to qualify for participation. Second, the ideological-practical

---

<sup>41</sup> See previous chapter.



character of the matters at hand, that is, the significance of proposals for institutional arrangements in terms of the correlation of forces in favour or against the blueprint for national development presented by the dictatorship.

The principal Socialist component in all these dealings was the faction led by Núñez and Ricardo Lagos or other lesser representatives. This is the group that best undertook the ideological and membership overhaul begun by the manifesto for Socialist Convergence of 1982. The firmness with which Pinochet pursued his objectives caused those who tended to negotiate to hesitate, so the maintenance of Socialist unity became key. This, however, remained an abstract aspiration as long as the Socialist fraction, Almeyda's, remained united to the Communists and, in the conditions of the 1980s, to the insurrectionist Left.

In the light of seemingly interminable difficulties regarding alliances and ideological limitations, more practical participants sought new ways to unify opposition to the dictatorship. Some "realistic" politicians also perceived the possibility of reordering priorities. Thus, at the beginning of 1987 the idea arose of an organisation that would unify the opposition behind

one single objective, democracy<sup>42</sup>. This is the earliest instance of the idea that would subsequently permit reorganisation of part of the Socialists into the "instrumental" party, the Partido por la Democracia (PPD). The idea, whose strongest advocate was Ricardo Lagos, to some extent voiced the opinion of a sector of generally Socialist intellectuals like himself, who considered the debate justifying the multiplication of Socialist fractions and groups to be overly ideological. This group was known as "the Swiss".

With respect to their original priorities, the political laws handed down in early 1987 put all the politicians and all organisations into another dimension. The opening of the election rolls to citizens and the law of political parties made their decisions more urgent. Nevertheless, it was the practical criteria that hid the ideological conditions under which the "normalisation" of political life was being carried out. The Constitution and the law of political parties established ideological and organisational exclusions and limitations that meant many radical changes in the party system in comparison to how it had existed before 1973. The acceptance of these rules and the correlation of forces that Christian Democrat hegemony imposed on the reconstruction of the

---

<sup>42</sup> Rafael Otano, *op.cit.* p.46.



party system was the price paid by the parties entering the system and by the professional politicians to continuing to exercise their profession.

The PS-Nuñez constituted the organised nucleus within the PPD, which nevertheless attracted a large number of political cadres from the broad spectrum of the ideological tendencies known as Socialist "renovación" or renewal, and of which Socialist "convergence" had been the most organic. This included members of the various breakaway groups from the Christian Democrats during the '60s and '70s (MAPU and IC). There were also independents on the Left and Communists who had been disoriented by the militarising of their party's politics at the same time that in the Soviet Union reforms, that had been unforeseeable, were being undertaken.

There were still sectors that resisted some aspects of the new imposed conditions, especially the isolation of the Communists, and who generated another "instrumental" party, the Partido Amplio de la Izquierda Socialista, or PAIS.

The framework of restrictions within which the re-composition and reconstruction of the parties was carried out was defined by the situation of the ideological forces in the elite; the legal framework imposed by the

---

dictatorship; and, finally, the electoral result of the whole historical process reflected in the general elections of December 1989.

The ideological defeat of traditional Chilean Left thinking was expressed in the subordination of the Socialists to the Christian Democrats, their separation from the Communists and new definitions of the problems they considered important<sup>43</sup>. The document of unity between the Arrate and Almeyda sectors brought about on December 29, 1989, the *Bases doctrinarias y políticas del Partido Socialista de Chile*, defined the ideological foundation of the party with a scope that would have perplexed pre-1973 Socialists<sup>44</sup>. This union included besides PS-Arrate and PS-Almeyda, MAPU and MAPU-OC<sup>45</sup>.

The electorate had already expressed its opinion in mid-December in electing Aylwin as president, as well as

---

<sup>43</sup> Describing the discussion of the possible entry of the PS-Núñez into Izquierda Unida en 1988, Rafael Otano notes that the debate showed "the paralysis implied in joining a conglomerate that would again float boring and sterile discussions of armed struggle, alliances, the impossibility of negotiating with the military regime..." op. cit. p.47.

<sup>44</sup> "Today there is in Chilean Socialism a re-encounter of the diverse emancipating and revolutionary directions of the contemporary world, that restate their diverse origins and experiences, inserted into the critical matrix of capitalist society, from Marxist thought enriched and rectified by all the contributions of scientific and social progress, from the development of the best humanistic traditions and the creative contribution of values of solidarity and liberation in the Christian tradition." *Bases doctrinarias y políticas del Partido Socialista de Chile*, December 1989, (mimeo), p.3.

<sup>45</sup> Rafael Otano, op.cit. p.92.



the corresponding part of the Senate and the entire Chamber of Deputies. Legal restrictions caused the Socialists to appear in this election as members of diverse organisations (PPD) or as independents. The problem lay with the electoral rolls that included only the "instrumental" parties, the PPD and the PAIS. These elections determined the exclusion of the Communists from parliament and the failure of the PAIS infused realism into those who still thought the Left, with the Communists included, could be incorporated into the system.<sup>46</sup>

Some reforms of the Constitution were negotiated between the 1988 plebiscite and the elections of 1989. Principal among these was the elimination of Article 8 containing proscription for ideological reasons. The distinctions that separated the political parties from social movements remained in the Constitution and in the organic constitutional law of political parties<sup>47</sup>. Furthermore, an addition was made in May 1989 to the Organic Constitutional Law on Popular Voting and Scrutiny, article 109bis, which established the "binomial" system for assigning parliamentary seats. This

---

<sup>46</sup> In this sense, the most noteworthy failure was the candidacy of Luis Maira, leader of Izquierda Cristiana.

<sup>47</sup> See chapter 3 above.

had a double stabilising affect on the system by favouring the first minority (the Right has been the great beneficiary of this feature) and pushing the parties toward the formation of large blocs and alliances.<sup>48</sup> (The most widely commented effect of this system in 1989 was the defeat of Ricardo Lagos as candidate for senator from Santiago, where Jaime Guzmán was elected with fewer votes than Lagos). Finally, in 1990 the Socialists accepted all of the new order and registered their party, fulfilling all the requirements stipulated by the law (which contains regulations referring to the organisation and internal life of the parties),<sup>49</sup> recording to this end a declaration of principles similar in its terms to the *Bases doctrinarias*.. cited earlier.<sup>50</sup> Toward the end of 1990 the Communist Party also fulfilled the requirements for legal

---

<sup>48</sup> Article 109 bis: "In the case of parliamentary elections, the tribunal shall proclaim elected senators or deputies the two candidates on the same list when that list reaches the majority number of votes and has a total number of votes that exceeds double those received by the next largest list or register that follows it in number of votes."

"If no list obtain the two seats, each of the lists or registers obtaining the two highest majorities of total votes by list or register shall elect to one seat, the Tribunal proclaiming elected Senators or Deputies those candidates or deputies who, within each list or register, shall obtain the highest majorities."

<sup>49</sup> Title IV, On the internal organisation of parties prohibits the participation of leaders of social organisations (associations and labour unions) and guarantees a role in the party to parliamentary representatives.

<sup>50</sup> Declaration of principles in the legal registration of the Socialist party (1990) Cuadernos del Avión Rojo, year I, N°1, pp.73-75).



registration, collecting more than 60,000 signatures.<sup>51</sup> However, its political isolation, its abandonment by its Socialist allies, its ideological decadence caused by the slowness of its changes<sup>52</sup> which caused politicians and intellectuals to depart from the organisation, all translated into electoral failures, condemning it to an extra-parliamentary life yet with a degree of unquestionable value in the ideological struggle to rewrite recent history<sup>53</sup> and electoral capital that may become decisive in a draw between the large blocs.<sup>56</sup>

---

<sup>51</sup> Rafael Otano, op.cit. p.130.

<sup>52</sup> See *Proyecto de nuevo programa del partido Comunista de Chile*, document for discussion by the Party and the people, prepared by the Central Committee, November 1991; and *Estatutos del partido Comunista de Chile*, Approved in the 20th National Congress of the Party, 1994, and Reformed in the 2nd National Conference, 1997..

<sup>53</sup> The PC never failed to support the relatives of the victims of the dictatorship.

<sup>56</sup> The contribution of the Communist vote to Lagos' victory over Lavin in the second round of the 1999 presidencial election is still a matter of discussion.

## **Chapter 7. Conclusions.**

The characteristics that the parties assume individually as a result of their participation in a party system do not seem to merit the same attention as the characteristics that individual party ideologies produce in the system of which they are a part. The existence of an overall ideological level, characteristic of the system, appears as a concern in another kind of theorising which seeks to establish the foundation of the political order at a more abstract level. The consequences of the establishment of an ideology of the system as a whole, point toward relations of subordination between political actors, justified on ideological and political grounds, but that are presented normally as individual characteristics of leaders and organisations ("realism", "pragmatism" etc.). The system sets the limits not only of what is possible in action but also the limits of programmatic discourses and, as has been demonstrated here, may indeed reach the limits of the thinkable or conceivable on intellectual grounds as a condition of becoming or remaining a professional politician.

What has been made evident in the case studied here



is the genesis of a system, out of a brutal, physical confrontation, which resulted in the political and ideological subordination of a cohort of professional politicians who, having participated in another earlier system founded on a different ideology on the whole, and individually assumed positions differing from those that they maintain today. The system's dynamic establishes ideological limits that determine the acceptance and recognition of participants by their "peers", i.e. the other politicians already established in negotiations whereby the system is structured. There may be politicians who continue to operate on the same terms that they developed from the positions maintained before 1973, but, undoubtedly, they are not part of the system or, at the very most, they subsist on its periphery. The party system, like any other social system, prolongs itself by producing the elements, parties and individuals that have the characteristics that permit its functioning and its reproduction, by means of the practice of relations that constitute it as such.

The most widely disseminated images of the process that led Chile from democracy to dictatorship and back to democracy again contain explicit interpretations of the causal mechanisms in action. Normally, these appear as

judgements about the individual or collective actors, for example, the "mistakes" made by Allende and his administration as the cause of the coup d'etat of 1973, or the democratic spirit of the Chilean people in the plebiscite of 1988 that put an end to the dictatorship. There is a level at which these judgements are undeniable, and which justifies their place in common sense. However, they are also part of the justifications formulated by the actors for their own role in the story, which makes them highly suspect when used in the field of political science. This dissertation seeks to move beyond these types of explanations as they too easily allow the actors to repeat once again the same justifications they offered at the time. The danger of these types of overly-simplistic explanations taking on the legitimacy of "analysis" is all too present. In other words, it has been attempted to locate a mechanism of the production of events on a different level, that constitutes an explanation of the events and not a mere reiteration of descriptions based on value judgements about the actors. This does not mean that this analysis takes no position with respect to the process, its actors and its results. What is important, however, is that the foundation of this analysis does not satisfy itself with that reductive



position.

The party system has been presented here as the mechanism determining the positions and the actions of all the parties participating in any way and in any form in it. Two features of the party system have been emphasised: first, its having an ideology that sets limits which, in practice, modulate, correct and may even contradict the ideological expressions of parties that constitute it; and, second its determination by means of ideological limits the probable entry and continuance of individuals in the professional association of politics, which they enter either as individuals or preferably through the parties. This is what associates the ideological schema with a corporative interest among politicians as a professional body.

The explanation offered in this dissertation for the breakdown of the democratic system is centred on the crisis over an ideology of the party system that reached limits in its strategy for a peaceful transition to socialism. This, in turn, expressed the demands of all the social sectors mobilised as electoral clienteles and as the militant rank-and-file of parties whose leading cadres saw their representativity threatened by the appearance of alternatives of political action that fell

outside the party system. This radicalisation of the overall party system had its counterpart in the growth of alternatives outside the system at the other end of the ideological spectrum. Some of these were pre-existing and others appeared for the occasion provoked by the crisis represented by the victory of Allende and Unidad Popular in the 1970 elections. The development of this crisis led to the sharpening of the conflict, to the point that the very existence of the party system was placed in question. On the Left, the government was able to subordinate rupture-inclined sectors to its strategy of defence and maintenance of the political system as instrument and framework for social and economic change. On the right, the pro-rupture position was imposed by a process of decay which progressively subordinated the actors participating in the party system to a strategy formulated outside the system and that would have had no chance of foreseeable success if the system had not been destroyed.

Once the coup d'etat had taken place, the right wing bloc that had supported it as opposition to the government had to replace its negative consensus by a proposal to reconfigure the system. It is at this point that the armed forces assumed a critical role as the



apparatus of repression that fixed the terms of a political recess and thereafter the suppression of the political parties. This imposed a radical reform of Chile's model for economic development and the remaking of the political system by means of a new constitution. In this process, the situation described above for the government of Unidad Popular appeared inverted. This time it was the opposition that saw to the reconstruction of the party system while the dictatorship and its supporters at their most extreme opposed the very existence of political parties or at least postponed their reappearance to an unspecified future.

The opposition to the dictatorship fundamentally agreed to the necessity of reconstructing the party system. However, each faction had its own version of the changes that the reconstruction should include. For the Communist Party, the reconstruction should have been undertaken on the basis of an antifascist alliance that would include the parties all of Unidad Popular and Democracia Cristiana. The latter, having succeeded in its purpose of overthrowing Allende, promptly shifted to the side of the vanquished upon being excluded as an organisation and as a strategy for the future by those sectors that took over power in the shadow of the armed

forces.

Only the actions of the dictatorship pushed the Christian Democrats onto the side of the opposition, while the Left suffered a process of decomposition particularly visible in the Socialist Party and in the frustrations of the Communists who saw their strategy becoming more sterile day by day. The retreat of the parties reached its extreme in 1980, at the same time as the culmination of the dictatorship's projects. By then all the parties seemed to be irreconcilable, with the exception of the Christian Democrats which, more than any other party, maintained its identity but was incapable of producing political events on its own initiative. The isolation of the parties from their electoral clienteles, the disarticulation of rank-and-file organisations by the repression, the exposure of the elites to international ideological debates through the exile community and their growing dependency on the solidarity of like-minded political organisations brought about an ideological evolution that caused them to doubt the very idea of the social representativity of political parties in a democratic regime. This was the beginning of the dictatorship's ideological victory.

The imposition of a national blueprint is a process



by means of which those who are to be in the subordinate position accept the limits of the blueprint as the limits of what is possible. This is a highly complex process that involves all the sectors producing ideology and, in a technocratic age such as our own, most particularly the social sciences. The ideological revolution carried out on the right had as its cutting-edge a group of neoclassical economists who, allied with thoroughly reactionary sectors restructured the Chilean economy while their associates wrote a new constitution. The most traditional Chilean right never completely accepted this blueprint but remained subordinated in a bloc that was urgently required to defend the dictatorship and its works from the first symptoms of the decomposition of its social support in 1983.

The opposition took the initiative in 1983 without a model of organisation or any clearer ideology. The very situation of decomposition in which it found itself and its doubts about the model of party organisation facilitated its parallel coexistence with the developing movement that sought an end to the dictatorship. This movement functioned in three ways: mass rebellion based on social protest, always suspicious of attempts by the parties to channel their movement; guerrilla military

strategy supported by armed action within the social protest, and efforts by the parties to reconstruct or renew a professional political elite that would be capable of negotiating the terms of an opening for political and social participation within the framework of the dictatorship's national blueprint.

Recognition of this last as a reality of the Chilean transition is not very popular among those who were its political actors. But this has been established even in versions have no connection to Left-wing criticism, such as the work by historian Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt, first as an article of opinion in the daily *El Mercurio* and later expressed in detail in a book.<sup>1</sup> The problem posited by this situation is that its critique is sterilised in the denunciation of the political operators who carried out the pacts.

Referring to the above, Rafael Otano, chronicler of this transition and much quoted in previous chapters, establishes that "majority opinion accepts that the collective actors who have gained the most in this political business of the transition have been the Armed Forces, the Catholic Church, the entrepreneurs, El

---

<sup>1</sup> *El Mercurio*, January 22, 1998 and *El Chile perplejo. Del avanzar sin transar al transar sin parar.*



Mercurio, the malls, and also Concertación de Partidos para la Democracia. The losers have been the trade unions, the world of classic laicism, the traditional Left, progressive Christian's and community organisations."<sup>2</sup>

The view presented in the preceding chapter's reveals the chain of ideological subordination progressively established for membership in the political elite, which reconstructed itself as the basis of recognition among "peers". This race was unleashed by the social protest, in the first place, and later by the eagerness to assume the supposed representativity conferred to the party with which one could legitimately undertake negotiations. Negotiation among the parties of the dictatorship and the tendency among the Christian Democrats led Patricio Aylwin to struggle first for leadership within his party and then for leadership of an alliance of parties that would accept the itinerary contained in Pinochet's constitution for the normalisation of Chile's political life. This process implied subordinating social protests to the dictated line and eliminating the vestiges of failed militant structures created by some sectors of the Left,

---

<sup>2</sup> Op. cit., p. 11.

principally the Communist Party. At the other end of the spectrum, the right needed to organise itself as a party. In fact it appeared as two new parties in spite of the ideological repugnance felt in some sectors for this model of organisation since at least the 1960s.

The political modernisation introduced by this reconstructed party system is centred on the separation of social movements from parties. Social atomisation and barriers to the intervention of social organisations in political parties and vice versa, was established in the Constitution, and reinforced by an electoral system designed in the light of the results of the 1988 plebiscite. The intent was to stabilise the system, guaranteeing a representativity to the right that would impede fundamental changes to the Constitution. The Constitution itself contains features that guarantee its immutability.

Exclusion of the Left, and in particular the Communists which continues to think of its existence as a political act representing a social class, was completed after Aylwin's election, mainly by the subordination of the Almeyda wing of the Socialist Party to leadership controlled by the "renewed" sectors. Ideological adaptations have been made obligatory by the laws



regulating the existence of political parties and their participation in elections.

The stability of pre-1973 democracy had been guaranteed by denying campesinos the right to independent organisation and by control of their votes by landowners. This resulted in the overrepresentation of the rural sector once deputies were assigned by districts. In the new democracy stability has been achieved by a combination of the independence of the political elite with respect to social organisations and movements, plus an electoral system that favours the formation of coalitions in which ideological control is easier. The result of this is that the ideology of the political parties loses importance in the face of the pragmatism of electoral strategies. These are progressively more like marketing strategies for any other product directed at individual consumers grouped by practical criteria of classification of demands and not by an analysis of the structure of society that assigns them some collective characteristic that might transform them into historical actors.

Criticism of this state of affairs has concentrated on the ideological content of the imposed national blueprint and the consequences of the subordination of

the political elite. Omitting part of the Left, the Communists, from representation causes the ideological spectrum represented in parliament to appear displaced towards the right. This is particularly evident when comparing today's spectrum to those of parliaments previous to 1973: the UDI, included in today's parliament as representing the right, was then considered an extra-parliamentary group because of its right wing leanings. Debate inspired by the problem of the social representativity of the alliance in the government generated by levels of observable abstention in the parliamentary elections of December 1997, disappeared as a matter of electoral strategy in the presidential elections of 1999 in which positions, rather than ideological problems, were treated as attitudes and states of mind. What began as a debate over the the perception held by some sectors within the coalition of government parties regarding the transition from dictatorship, eventually ended in the mocking of such concerns as "self-indulgent" and "self-flagellating".<sup>3</sup>

Beyond these questions, which occupy an important place in the debates in Chilean social sciences on the

---

<sup>3</sup> See my article "Democratización y Transición en Chile" in *Perfiles Ilatinoamericanos*, Number 14, June 1999.



significance of the dictatorship in the modernisation of the country and the recovery of democracy, the case presented in this dissertation may hold some significance for theoretical discussions about parties and party systems. In large measure, the characteristics assumed by the Chilean experience are not particularly original. In fact, they are justified as an expression of the general process of change.

METHODOLOGICAL NOTES

Every methodological decision taken was subordinated to the interpretative hypothesis. This is natural in a historical research project. The main task to be carried out in this regard was the search for correlational elements that were visible as definable units of analysis. That is to say, the political parties viewed as part of a system, and therefore defined by the relations they establish and the role they play in it.

The existence of such a system, or at least a nucleus of one formed by the main parties, is shown by their pre-eminence in Congress [Parliament] during the 1932 - 1970 period. They successfully prevented the consolidation of an alternative political model, so common throughout the rest of Latin America. The composition of the lower chamber is clear evidence of this dynamic. Concomitantly, the attraction of the professional politicians to the main parties is established through statistical (correlation) analysis that indicates that individual parliamentary careers were dependent upon their joining one of the main parties,



even though they may have been elected to the chamber for the first time by a centrifugal political force.

The cohesion of the members of the political profession, organised in these main parties, and their joint administration of the country, through the interplay of alliances in government and in parliament, was made possible by the existence of a national development project shared by all of them. This constituted a common ideology, relegating to a second plane other statements of individual party programmes. In this way, these programmes became alternative strategies for the attainment of a common goal. Analysis of the 1970 presidential campaign documents shows this clearly.

The Salvador Allende government saw the erosion of the relationships that made up the party system, to the point where the mere existence of the system was at issue. Both sides within the system had to compete against proposals and alternative elites emerging from the fringes or even from outside the system. The evolution of the balance of forces within each side, and between the two of them, produced the final breakdown of the system in 1973.

To make this process visible, a rereading, and indeed, an essential revision of documents and

contemporary accounts was required. These revealed a very variable degree of consciousness among the main actors about the meaning of their actions. This required viewing social and political history as a struggle, a process of conflict, in which the final result is anything but planned or wished by any of the forces taking part in it.

The difficulties faced in the third chapter are those involved in any attempt to bring to light the necessary connections of three processes that have been separated by the present dominant ideology. Established thinking about the period under study would like to suggest that the economic development model was beneficial and necessary, and connected only incidentally with the reconstruction of the political system and only chronologically (and regretfully) to a bloody dictatorship. This necessarily renders a very repetitive account of the events that marked the years of military rule.

The last process, the reconstruction of the political system started as a renewing of the relations that brought together the elite of professional politicians. First, the reconstruction of the party system appeared as an alternative to the dictatorship, but the process of redefinition of the external limits of



the party system and the alliances taking place within it were directed to make impossible a repetition of the 1970 events. In this way, the new democratic party system shared the goals of the dictatorship.

Although interviews were conducted with political leaders of the right, left and centre at various times in the last years, their content was not used in the thesis as evidence due to the self-justificatory tone of most of the answers to the questions about the main events of the period. On the other hand, they did not reveal any facts relevant to the thesis that were not known previously.

## APPENDICES

1) The report of the third session of the Committee to Study the New Constitution (September 26, 1973),

The report includes the first memorandum in which it is stated that the new Constitution:

b) Must take into account a precept declaring that political parties which according to their stated objectives or the conduct of their followers run counter to the democratic system of government are contrary to the Constitution. Analogous dispositions are considered in the most modern constitutions of countries that have experienced this kind of emergency. Suffice it to quote as an example the German Constitution. Furthermore, individuals who promote the alteration of the democratic regime may not occupy public office, whether they enjoy popular representation or not.

c) With respect to the other political parties, the Constitution should include general rules aimed at ensuring that their labours further subjects that are in pursuit of and inspired in the common good. In this sense, it should consider an express prohibition against extending their activities to public administration and elections taking place in labour unions, universities and



educational institutions and in general to other analogous activities, establishing the appropriate sanctions."<sup>1</sup> In the 6<sup>th</sup> session (October 9, 1973) "...Mr. Ortúzar pointed out that according to the postulates and purposes manifested by the Junta, the Marxist parties should remain outside the law since they constitute illicit associations. With respect to the rest, it would be necessary to consider regulations that would force them to comply with their mission of protecting the public good by separating party influence from other activities of the Nation foreign to their field of endeavour. On October 23, in the ninth session, "Mr. Evans (...) remarked that he considered it useful so as not to fall into negative statements to dispose that political parties should commit themselves ideologically to the rule of law and to the democratic and republican regime." He proposed the following wording for that part of the memorandum. "Political parties should be organised and act according to principles of internal democracy established by law. They should maintain in their ideological description and in

---

<sup>1</sup> Up to this point, the Committee had been presided over by Enrique Ortúzar and included Sergio Diéz, Jaime Guzmán and Jorge Ovalle. The 6<sup>th</sup> session (October 9, 1973) saw the inclusion of Enrique Evans, Gustavo Lorca and Alejandro Silva Bascuñan.

the conduct of their supporters, unrestricted and permanent adherence to the democratic and republican system of government and to the principles and values that sustain the state dedicated to the rule of law."



- 2) From an order from Pinochet to the chairman of the "Committee to Study the New Constitution," Enrique Ortúzar, on November 10, 1977:

Paragraph h

(for) the establishment of electoral systems that prevent political parties from becoming monopolistic conduits for citizen participation and gigantic power apparatuses that subordinate legislators to 'party orders' imposed by small oligarchies that lead the parties without real title or responsibility at all, and dispose of large sums of money of unknown origin.

The new constitutional and electoral regime should favour the existence of new forms of political groups understood as currents of opinion that prevail by virtue of the quality of their members and the seriousness of their doctrinal and practical proposals. Furthermore, it is imperative that basic requirements of suitability be established for those who aspire to public office.

Paragraph n

Preservation of intermediate bodies between the individual and the state, according to the principle of subsidiarity is an irreplaceable

vehicle for social participation in a free community. This autonomy should extend only to the field appropriate and specific to the circumscription of reference, outside of which it would have no legitimacy. The above mentioned intermediary bodies must have institutionally legitimated means of communication with the source of political power. However, it is inadmissible in all cases that this be generated on the basis of the organs in question as mistakenly favoured by so-called corporativism. Since the state's specific mission is to protect the common good, that objective becomes impossible if a system is structured in which more powerful interest groups can impose themselves without control upon the weaker, or in which laws may be the fruit of simple arrangements between private interests.

It is my opinion that it is necessary to prevent the intervention of future parliamentary representatives or political groups in the generation and functioning of gremialista, labour, student, professional and neighbourhood associations, particularly including labour or student conflicts. sanctions against those who transgress this prohibition should be precise and drastic.



In the same way, I consider it basic to study rules of incompatibility that would make it impossible for gremial activities be confused with the political variety, or serve as a springboard for them. The use of gremial posts as a means to begin future political careers seriously prejudices the country and should be rejected out of hand by the new institutional system.

## 3a) Constitution of 1980, Article 8

Any act of an individual or group aimed at propagating doctrines that attack the family, propound violence or a concept of society, the state or the legal order, of a totalitarian nature or founded on the class struggle, is illegal and contrary to the institutional order of the Republic.

Organizations, movements and political parties that by virtue of their aims or the activities of their adherents tend toward to those objectives are unconstitutional.

It will be the duty of the Constitutional Tribunal to judge infringements of the foregoing dispositions.

Without prejudice to other sanctions established in the Constitution or by law, individuals who incur or who may have incurred in the violations indicated above, may not undertake public posts or functions whether of popular election or not for a period of ten years from the date of the Tribunal's decision. Nor can they be Rectors or Directors of educational institutions, nor can they exercise teaching functions in them, nor exploit a medium of social communication or be Directors or administrators of the same, nor exercise functions related to the



broadcast or dissemination of opinions or information; nor can they be leaders of political organizations or organizations related to education or of a neighbourhood, professional, entrepreneurial, labour union, student or gremialista nature in general during that period.

If persons such as those referred to above were at the time of the Tribunal's decision in possession of public employment or posts, whether or not of popular election, they shall lose them by law.

Individuals sanctioned by virtue of this provision may not be rehabilitated during the period stipulated in paragraph four.

The duration of the prohibitions contained in this article shall be doubled in case of recidivism.

### 3b) Constitution of 1980, Article 19

The Constitution assures all persons: (...) The right of association without prior permission. To enjoy legal status, associations shall constitute themselves according to law.

No one may be obliged to belong to an association.

Associations contrary to morals, public order and the security of the state are prohibited.

Political parties may not participate in activities foreign to those for which they were

established, nor may they have any privilege or monopoly on citizen participation. Their records and accounts shall be public; their sources of financing may not consist of funds, goods, donations, contributions or credits of foreign provenance. Their statutes shall obey the regulations assuring effective internal democracy. A constitutional law shall regulate all other matters concerning them and include the sanctions that shall be applied in the event of non-fulfilment of these precepts, among which their dissolution may be considered. Associations, movements, organizations and groups of individuals that pursue or carry out activities appropriate to political parties, without following the above regulations, are illegal and shall be sanctioned according to the above mentioned Constitutional law.



BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ACUÑA, Gastón, Federico Willoughby M. y Pablo Rodríguez Grez, *¿Qué es el nacionalismo hoy?*, (Santiago, Impresión Artimpres, 1983)
- AGOR, Weston H., *El senado chileno: Distribución interna de la influencia*, (Santiago, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1973)
- AGUILAR, Alonso, Alvaro Briones, Theotonio Dos Santos, Pío García, Clarisa Hardy, Eduardo Novoa, Jaime Osorio, Fernando Rosa, Pedro Vuskovic y Jorge Witker, *El gobierno de Allende y la lucha por el socialismo en Chile*, (México, Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México UNAM, 1976)
- AHUMADA, Jorge, *En vez de la miseria*, (Santiago, Editorial del Pacífico, 1956)
- ALAMINOS, Antonio, *Chile: transición política y sociedad* (Madrid, Siglo XXI de España Editores-Instituto de Investigaciones Sociológicas CIS, 1991)
- ALDUNATE, Adolfo, Angel Flisfisch y Tomás Moulian, *Estudios sobre el sistema de partidos en Chile*, (Santiago, FLACSO, 1985)
- ALEGRÍA, Fernando et.al., *Eugenio González: Maestro del socialismo chileno*, México, Centro de Estudios del Movimiento Obrero Salvador Allende, 1981)
- ALEXANDER, Robert J., *The Tragedy of Chile*, Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1978)
- ALLAMAND, Andrés, *Discursos, entrevistas y conferencias*, (Santiago, Editorial Andante, 1989)
- ALLAMAND, Andrés, *La travesía del desierto*, (Santiago, Editorial Aguilar, 1999)
- ALLENDE, Salvador et. al., *La vía chilena al socialismo*, (México, Siglo XXI Editores, 1973)
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Compañero presidente: Ideario político de Salvador Allende*, México, Editorial Samo, 1973)
- \_\_\_\_\_, *El pensamiento de Salvador Allende*, selection by Hugo Latorre Cabal, (México, Fondo de Cultura Económica,

1974)

\_\_\_\_\_, *Discursos*, (La Habana, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1975)

\_\_\_\_\_, *Salvador Allende y América Latina*, 2 discussions and 2 press conferences, (México, Casa de Chile, 1978)

\_\_\_\_\_, *Salvador Allende, 1908 - 1973: Prócer de la liberación nacional*, Biography, anthology, chronology and bibliography by Alejandro Witker, (México, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, (UNAM), 1980)

\_\_\_\_\_, *Salvador Allende 1908 - 1973: Obras escogidas (período 1939 - 1973)*, Presentation, Víctor Pey C.; Prologue, Joan E. Garcés; Compilation, Gonzalo Martner G, (Santiago, Ediciones del Centro de Estudios Políticos Latinoamericanos Simón Bolívar Fundación Presidente Allende (España), 1992)

ALMEYDA, Clodomiro, *Reflexiones políticas*, (Santiago, Prensa Latinoamericana, 1958)

\_\_\_\_\_, *Sociologismo e ideologismo en la teoría revolucionaria*, (Santiago, Editorial Universitaria, 1972)

\_\_\_\_\_, *Liberación y fascismo*, (México, Editorial Nuestro Tiempo - Casa de Chile, 1979)

\_\_\_\_\_, *Acusación a la dictadura: En defensa de la patria, la libertad y la democracia*, (Guadalajara, Universidad de Guadalajara, 1987)

\_\_\_\_\_, *Pensando a Chile*, (Guadalajara, Universidad de Guadalajara, 1987)

\_\_\_\_\_, *Reencuentro con mi vida*, (Santiago, Las Ediciones del Ornitorrinco, (1987?))

ALTAMIRANO, Carlos, *Dialéctica de una derrota*, (México, Siglo XXI Editores, 1977)

\_\_\_\_\_, *Una propuesta socialista para Chile*, (México, Partido Socialista de Chile, 1978)

ALVAREZ, José, Raúl Atria, Fernando Galofre, Raúl Urzúa, Mario Zañartu, *Ciencia y mito en el análisis social: Una crítica a las categorías marxistas de análisis*, (Santiago, Editorial del Pacífico - Instituto de Estudios Políticos



IDEP, 1972)

AMBROSIO, Rodrigo, *Sobre el problema del poder*, (Santiago, Ediciones Lobo de Mar, 1973)

\_\_\_\_\_, *Sobre la construcción del partido*, (Santiago, imprenta Rada, publication date unknown)

ANGELL, Alan, *Partidos políticos y movimiento obrero en Chile: De los orígenes hasta el triunfo de la Unidad Popular*, (México, Editorial ERA, 1974)

\_\_\_\_\_, *La cooperación internacional en apoyo de la democracia política en América latina: el caso de Chile*, Foro Internacional, Vol. XXX No 2 (Oct-Dec, 1989)

ARCE, Luz, *El infierno*, (Santiago, Editorial Planeta, 1993)

ARELLANO, José Pablo, *Políticas sociales y desarrollo: Chile 1924 - 1984*, (Santiago, CIEPLAN, 1985)

ARNELLO Romo, Mario, *Proceso a una democracia: el pensamiento político de Jorge Prat*, (Santiago, Talleres Gráficos El Imparcial, publication date unknown)

ARRATE, Jorge, *El socialismo chileno: rescate y renovación*, (Rotterdam, Instituto Para el Nuevo Chile, 1983)

\_\_\_\_\_, *La fuerza democrática de la idea socialista*, (Barcelona y Santiago, Ediciones Documentas y Ediciones del Ornitorrinco, 1985)

ARRIAGADA, Genaro y Claudio Orrego V, *Leninismo y democracia*, (Santiago, 1976)

ARRIAGADA, Genaro, *La oligarquía patronal chilena*, (Santiago, Editorial Nueva Universidad, 1970)

\_\_\_\_\_, *De la "vía chilena" a la "vía insurreccional"*, Prologue by Eduardo Frei Montalva, (Santiago, editorial del pacífico -Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1974)

\_\_\_\_\_, *El pensamiento político de los militares*, (Santiago, Centro de Investigaciones Socioeconómicas (CISEC) de la Compañía de Jesús en Chile, publication date uncertain, 1981?)

\_\_\_\_\_, *La política militar de Pinochet*, (Santiago, Imprenta Salecianos, 1985)

- , *¿Hacia un "big bang" del sistema de partidos?*, (Santiago, Editorial Los Andes, 1997)
- , *Por la razón o la fuerza, Chile bajo Pinochet*, (Santiago, Editorial Sudamericana, 1998)
- AYLWIN A., Patricio, *La alternativa democrática*, (Santiago, Editorial Andante, 1984)
- AYLWIN A., Patricio, Carlos Briones, Francisco Bulnes, Pedro Correa, Francisco Cumplido, Sergio Diez, Manuel Sanhueza, Alejandro Silva, Enrique Silva, *Una salida político constitucional para Chile*, (Santiago, Instituto Chileno de Estudios Humanísticos, 1985)
- AYLWIN A., Patricio, José Joaquín Brunner y Gustavo Lagos, *Ética y política*, (Santiago, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1991)
- AYLWIN O., Mariana, Carlos Bascuñán, Sofía Correa, Cristián Gazmuri, Sol Serrano y Matías Tagle, *Chile en el siglo XX*, (Santiago, Editorial Emisión, publication date unknown)
- BALMACEDA Valdés, Eduardo, *Un mundo que se fue...* (Santiago, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1969)
- BAÑO, Rodrigo, *Lo social y lo político, un dilema clave del movimiento popular*, (Santiago, FLACSO, 1985)
- BAÑO, Rodrigo y Enzo Faletto, *Institucionalidad política y proceso social: el debate sobre presidencialismo o parlamentarismo*, Cuadernos de Trabajo No 1, (Santiago, Departamento de Sociología, U. de Chile, 1992)
- BAÑO, Rodrigo y Enzo Faletto, *Estructura social y estilo de desarrollo*, Cuadernos de Trabajo No 2, (Santiago, Departamento de Sociología, U. de Chile, 1992)
- BARAONA, Pablo et. al., *Visión crítica de Chile*, (Santiago, Ediciones Portada, 1972)
- BARDINI, Roberto, Miguel Bonasso y Laura Restrepo, *Operación príncipe*, (México, Editorial Planeta, 1988)
- BARDON, Alvaro, Camilo Carrasco A. y Alvaro Vial, *Una década de cambios económicos; La experiencia chilena 1973 - 1983*, (Santiago, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1985)



- BARRIOS, Alicia y José Joaquín Brunner, *La sociología en Chile: Instituciones y practicantes*, (Santiago, FLACSO, 1988)
- BASTÍAS, Alberto, Rodolfo Gálvez, *Chile 1973 - 1979: Estrategia políticoeconómica, empleo y migraciones*, (Santiago, VECTOR - PISPAL, 1983)
- BAUER, Arnold J., *Chilean Rural Society from the Spanish Conquest to 1930*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975)
- BENAVENTE Urbina, Andrés, *El triángulo del terror; El Frente Manuel Rodríguez*, (Santiago, Oficina del Abogado Procurador General, 1988)
- BICHENO, H. E., "Anti-Parliamentary Themes in Chilean History: 1920-1970" in *Allende's Chile*, Kenneth Medhurst, editor, (London, Hart-Davis MacGibbon, 1972)
- BITAR, Sergio, *Transición socialismo y democracia; La experiencia chilena*, (México, Siglo XXI Editores, 1979)
- \_\_\_, *Isla 10*, (Santiago, Editorial Pehuén, 1987)
- BITAR, Sergio, Ernesto Edwards y Carlos Ominani, *Cambiar la vida*, (Santiago, Ediciones Melquiádes, 1988)
- BLANCO, Marta, *Entrevistas*, (Santiago, Editorial La Noria, 1988)
- BLUMENWITZ, Dieter, *La nueva constitución de la República de Chile*, (Santiago, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1983)
- BOENINGER, Edgardo, *Democracia en Chile; Lecciones para la gobernabilidad*, (Santiago, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1997)
- BOIZARD, Ricardo, *Proceso a una traición; Detalles íntimos del sumario de la FACH*, (Santiago, Editorial Encina, 1974)
- BORJA, Jordi, Teresa Valdés, Hernán Pozo y Eduardo Morales, *Descentralización del Estado: Movimiento social y gestión local*, (Santiago, FLACSO, 1987)
- BOSSLE, Lothar, *Allende y el socialismo europeo*, (Santiago, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1979)
- BOSSLE, Lothar, Jaime del Valle, Dieter Blumenwitz, Maximiano Errázuriz y Gerhard Wolfgang Goldberg, *La democracia en el*



- mundo de hoy*, (Santiago, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1980)
- BOSSLE, Lothar, Heinrich Lummer, Dieter Blumenwitz, Gerhard Goldberg, Jaime del Valle, Hernán Larraín, *Autoridad y libertad para la democracia*, (Santiago, Universidad Católica de Chile, 1983)
- BOSWORTH, Barry P., Rudiger Dornbusch, Raúl Labán (Eds.), *The Chilean Economy: Policy Lessons and Challenges*, (Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1994)
- BOYE, Otto, Hermano Bernardo, *50 años de política vistos por Bernardo Leighton*, (Santiago, Editorial Aconcagua, 1986)
- BRAVO, Lira, Bernardino, *Régimen de gobierno y partidos políticos en Chile: 1924 - 1973*, (Santiago, Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1978)
- \_\_\_\_\_, *De Portales a Pinochet: Gobierno y régimen de gobierno en Chile*, (Santiago, Editorial Jurídica de Chile - Editorial Andrés Bello, 1985)
- BROWN, C.G., *10 años de atropellos a los derechos humanos en Chile*, Informe del Americas Watch Committee, (México, Casa de Chile, 1983)
- BRUNA, Susana, *Chile: La legalidad vencida*, (México, Editorial ERA, 1976)
- BRUNNER, José Joaquín, *El caso de la sociología en Chile, Foración de una disciplina*, (Santiago, FLACSO, 1988)
- BRUNNER, José Joaquín y Alicia Barros, *Inquisición, mercado y filantropía Ciencias Sociales y autoritarismo en Argentina, Brasil, Chile y Uruguay*, (Santiago, FLACSO, 1987)
- BUSINESS SCHOOL OF VALPARAISO, Adolfo Ibañez Foundation, *The Chilean Economy Under the popular Unity Government: The Chilean Way to Marxist Socialism*, (Santiago, Editora Nacional Gabriela Mistral, 1974)
- CALDERA Delgado, Hugo, *La Ley Orgánica Constitucional en la Constitución Política de 1980*, (Santiago, Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1985)
- CAMPERO, Guillermo, *Los gremios empresariales en el período 1970-1983: comportamiento sociopolítico y orientaciones*



*ideológicas*, (Santiago, ILET, 1984)

CAMPERO, Guillermo y José A. Valenzuela, *El movimiento sindical en el régimen militar chileno 1973 - 1981*, (Santiago, ILET, 1984)

CAMPOS Harriet, Fernando, *Historia constitucional de Chile*, 6<sup>th</sup> edition, (Santiago, Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1983)

CAMPOS Menéndez, Enrique, *Chile vence al marxismo*, (Santiago, Ediciones Portada, 1973)

CAÑAS Kirby, Enrique, *Proceso político en Chile: 1973 - 1990*, (Santiago, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1997)

CARDENAS, Cuauhtemoc, et. al., *Imágenes de Salvador Allende*, (Morelia-Michoacán, Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo y Centro de Estudios del Movimiento Obrero Salvador Allende, 1981)

CARDOSO, Fernando H. y Enzo Faletto, *Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina*, 15<sup>th</sup> edition, (México, Siglo XXI editores, 1979)

CARRIERE, Jean, "Conflict and Cooperation among Chilean Sectoral Elites", *Boletín de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe*, No 19, December 1975)

CARVAJAL, Diego, *La toma de lo cotidiano: La política de las cosas útiles para el pueblo*, (Ediciones Lautaro, further publication information unknown)

CASANUEVA Valencia, Fernando y Manuel Fernández Canque, *El Partido Socialista y la lucha de clases en Chile*, (Santiago, Editorial Quimantú, 1972)

CASH Molina, Jorge, *Bosquejo de una historia: Falange nacional, 1935 - 1957*, (Periodista colaborador Sergio España), (Santiago, Imprenta Pucara, 1986)

CASTELLS, Manuel, *La lucha de clases en Chile*, (Buenos Aires, Siglo XXI Editores, 1974)

CASTILLO, Jaime, *Las fuentes de la Democracia Cristiana*, (Santiago, Editorial del Pacífico, 1968)

\_\_\_\_\_, *Teoría y Práctica de la Democracia Cristiana Chilena*, (Santiago, Editorial del Pacífico - Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1973)



- CASTRO Sauritain, Carlos, *Política, violencia, terrorismo*, (Santiago, Corporación de Estudios Nacionales, 1987)
- CAVALLA, Antonio, *Estados Unidos, América Latina: fuerzas armadas y defensa nacional*, (México, Universidad Autónoma de Sinaloa, 1980)
- CAVALLO C., Ascanio, Manuel Salazar Salvo y Oscar Sepúlveda Pacheco, *La historia oculta del régimen militar: Chile 1973 - 1988*, (México, Editorial Diana, 1990)
- CAVAROZZI, Marcelo y Manuel Antonio Garretón, *Muerte y resurrección: Los partidos políticos en el autoritarismo y las transiciones del cono sur*, (Santiago, FLACSO, 1989)
- CAVIEDES, César N., *Elections in Chile: The Road Toward Redemocratization*, (London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991)
- CENTRO DE INFORMACION "LUIS EMILIO RECABARREN", *Chile: la lucha por el poder*, (México, Universidad Autónoma de Guerrero, 1983)
- CERECEDA, Luz Eugenia y Fernando Dahse, *Dos décadas de cambio en el agro chileno*, Cuadernos del Instituto de Sociología, (Santiago, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 1980)
- CHAMUDES, Marcos, *Chile: una advertencia americana*, (Ediciones P.E.C., 1972)
- CHATEAU, Jorge, Bernarda Gallardo, Eduardo Morales, Carlos Piña, Hernán Pozo, Sergio Rojas, Daniela Sánchez y Teresa Valdés, *Espacio y poder, Los pobladores*, (Santiago, FLACSO, 1987)
- CHILE, Banco Central, *Alternativas de políticas financieras de economías pequeñas y abiertas al exterior*, (Santiago: Estudios Monetarios VII, 1981)
- CHILE, Cámara de Diputados, *Informe de la Comisión especial para investigar el llamado "Plan Camelot"*, (1965)
- CHILE, Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación, *Informe completo de la Comisión...*, special edition of *La Nación*, (Santiago, 1991)
- CHILE, *Constitucion política de la República de Chile 1925*, Edición revisada y puesta al día, Noviembre de 1972,



(Santiago, Editorial Universitaria, 1973)

CHILE, *Constitución política de la República de Chile 1980*, (Santiago, Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1981, EDICIÓN REFORMADA, 1991)

CHILE, *Declaración de Principios del Gobierno de Chile*, (Santiago, Talleres de la Editora Nacional Gabriela Mistral, Marzo de 1974)

CHILE, *Dirección del Registro Electoral: Variación porcentual de los partidos políticos 1957-1971*, mimeo, (Santiago, publication date unknown)

CHILE, *Junta militar de gobierno: Los 100 primeros decretos leyes dictados por la Junta de Gobierno de la República de Chile*, (Santiago, Editorial Jurídica, 1973)

CHILE, *Legislación sobre seguridad del estado, control de armas y terrorismo*, recopilación e índice Ana María Zúñiga San Martín, (Santiago, Editorial jurídica de Chile, 1985)

CHILE, *Ministerio de RR.EE.(?) Confidential Memorandum of the Chilean Foreign Ministry*, (Publication date unknown)

CHILE, *Nueva legislación sobre salud y previsión social*, Recopilación, Patricio Novoa Fuenzalida, (Santiago, Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1982)

CHILE, *Oficina de Planificación Nacional, ODEPLAN: Antecedentes sobre el desarrollo chileno 1960-70*, (Santiago, ODEPLAN, 1971)

CHILE, *Sistema Electoral Público*, recopilación e índices. Ana María Zúñiga San Martín, (Santiago, Editorial Jurídica de Chile, Vol. I y II, 1987, Vol III 1988)

CISEC (Centro de Investigaciones Socioeconómicas del centro Bellarmino), *Futura institucionalidad de la paz en Chile*, (Santiago, 1977)

CISEC, *Hacia un estatuto para la paz en Chile*, (Santiago, 1977)

CLARK, Kate, *Chile, Reality and Prospects of Popular Unity*, (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1972)

CLAUDE, Marcel, *Una vez más la miseria: ¿Es Chile un país sustentable?*, (Santiago, LOM Ediciones, 1997)

- CLEAVES, Peter S., *Bureaucratic Politics and Administration in Chile*, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974)
- COLLADOS, Modesto, *Formas de vida para Chile*, (Santiago, Zig-Zag, 1988)
- COLLINS, Joseph, *Agrarian Reform and Counter-Reform in Chile*, (San Francisco, Cal., Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1979)
- CONDAMINES, Charles, *Chili: l'Eglise Catholique 1958 - 1976: Complicite ou resistance?*, Paris, Librairie-Editions L'Harmattan, 1977)
- CORTAZAR, René, *Necesidades básicas y extrema pobreza*, Estudios CIEPLAN No 17, (Santiago, 1977)
- CORTES C., Fernando y Ricardo Yocelvezky, "La distribución del ingreso en el gobierno de la Unidad Popular (1970-1972)", *Demografía y Economía* N°43, (México, 1980)
- CORTES Terzi, Antonio, *Problemas estratégicos en la lucha del pueblo chileno*, (México, Ediciones Solidaridad, 1978)
- CORTES, Lía y Jordi Fuentes, *Diccionario político de Chile*, (Santiago, Editorial Orbe, 1967)
- CORVALAN, Luis, "Nada hay más revolucionario que luchar por el éxito del gobierno popular". *Informe al Pleno del Comité Central del partido comunista*, 26 de noviembre de 1970)
- \_\_\_, *Algo de mi vida*, (México, Editorial Posada, 1977)
- \_\_\_, *Chile: 1970-1973*, (Sofia, Sofia Press, 1978)
- \_\_\_, *Tres períodos en nuestra línea revolucionaria*, (Dresden, Verlag Zeit Im Bild, 1982)
- \_\_\_, *La rebelión popular se abre camino en Chile*, (Discursos 1980-1981) (No further publication details)
- CRUZ-COKE, Ricardo, *Historia electoral de Chile: 1925-1973*, (Santiago, Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1984)
- DAIRE, Alonso, "La política del partido Comunista desde la post-guerra a la Unidad popular", in *El Partido Comunista de Chile*, Augusto Varas (Compilador), (Santiago, CESOC -



FLACSO, 1988)

DAVIS, Nathaniel, *The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende*, (London, I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1985)

DE SHAZO, Peter, *Urban Workers and Labor Unions in Chile, 1902-1927*, (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1983)

DEBRAY, Régis, *Conversations with Allende: Socialism in Chile*, (London, New Left Books, 1971)

DIAZ, Harry, Peter Landstreet y María Teresa Lladser, *Centros privados de investigación en ciencias sociales en Chile*, (Santiago, Academia de Humanismo Cristiano, 1984)

DIEZ Arriagada, Sergio, *¿Qué es la democracia?*, (Santiago, Editorial Andrés Bello, Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1988)

DINGES, John y Saul Landau, *Asesinato en Washington*, (México, Lasser Press, 1982)

DOMIC, Juraj, *La política militar del partido Comunista de Chile*, (Santiago, Impresores TT.GG. Instituto Geográfico Militar, 1988)

DONOSO, Crescente, "Notas sobre el origen, acatamiento y desgaste del régimen presidencial: 1925-1973", *Historia*, (Revista del Instituto de Historia, Universidad Católica de Chile) No 13, (1976)

DONOSO, Ricardo, *Alessandri, agitador y demoledor*, 2 volúmenes, Buenos Aires, Fondo de Cultura económica, 1952 y 1954)

DOONER, Patricio, *Cambios sociales y conflicto político: El conflicto político nacional durante el gobierno de Eduardo Frei (1964 - 1970)*, (Santiago, Corporación de Promoción Universitaria - Instituto Chileno de Estudios Humanísticos, 1984)

—, *Crónica de una democracia cansada: El Partido Demócrata Cristiano durante el gobierno de Allende*, (Santiago, Instituto Chileno de Estudios Humanísticos ICHEH, 1985)

—, *Periodismo y política: La prensa de izquierda en Chile 1970 - 1973*, (Santiago, ICHEH, 1985)

DORNBUSH, Rudiger y Sebastián Edwards, *The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America*, The World Bank, Working Papers



(WPS 316), (Washington D.C., Dec 1989)

DRAKE, Paul W., *Socialism and Populism in Chile, 1932-1952*, (Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1978)

DURAN Bernales, Florencio, *El Partido Radical*, (Santiago, Editorial Nascimento, 1958)

ECHAIZ, René León, *Evolución histórica de los partidos políticos chilenos*, (Buenos Aires, Editorial Francisco de Aguirre, 1971, first edition 1939)

ECHEVERRIA B., Andrés y Luis Frei B. (Compiladores), *1970 - 1973: la lucha por la juridicidad en Chile*, (3 tomos), (Santiago, Editorial del Pacífico, 1974)

ECHEVERRIA, Magdalena, *Enfermedades de los trabajadores y crisis económica*, (Santiago, Programa de Economía del Trabajo, Academia de Humanismo Cristiano, 1984)

EDITORIAL QUIMQNTU, *Documentos especiales, Los gremios patronales*, (Santiago, 1972)

EDWARDS, Sebastián y Alejandra Cox Edwards, *Monetarismo y liberalización: El experimento chileno*, (México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1992)

ENRIQUEZ Fröeden, Edgardo, *Dos momentos históricos paralelos en la sociedad chilena: Patria vieja, 1810 - 1814 y gobierno de la Unidad Popular, 1970 - 1973*, Cuadernos Casa de Chile, No 38, (México, 1983)

\_\_\_\_\_, *Testimonio de un destierro*, (Santiago, Mosquito Editores, 1992)

ERRAZURIZ Eguiguren, Maximiano, *La participación ciudadana en la constitución política*, (Santiago, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1983)

ESCOBAR R., Miguel, *Contribución al estudio del poder*, (México, UNAM-ENEP Acatlán, 1988)

ESPINOSA, Juan G. y Andrew S. Zimbalist, *Democracia Económica: La participación de los trabajadores en la industria chilena, 1970 - 1973*, (México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1984)

FALETTO, Enzo, Eduardo Ruíz y Hugo Zemelman, *Génesis histórica del proceso político chileno*, (Santiago,



Editorial Quimantú, 1972)

FALETTI, Enzo y Julieta Kirkwood, *El liberalismo: Sociedad burguesa y liberalismo romántico*, (Caracas, Buenos Aires, El Cid Editor, 1977)

FARREL, Joseph P., *The National Unified School in Allende's Chile: The Role of Education in the Destruction of a Revolution*, (Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 1986)

FAUNDEZ, Julio, "The Chilean Road to Socialism: Problems of Interpretation", *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 46, No3, (July-September 1975)

\_\_\_\_\_, "A Decision Without a Strategy: Excess Profits in the Nationalisation of Copper in Chile", in *The Nationalisation of Multinationals in Peripheral Economies*, Faundez and Picciotto (Eds.), (London, The Macmillan Press, 1978)

\_\_\_\_\_, "The Defeat of Politics: Chile under Allende", *Boletín de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe*, No 28, (June, 1980)

\_\_\_\_\_, *Marxism and Democracy in Chile: From 1932 to the Fall of Allende*, (London, Yale University Press, 1988)

FAZIO, Hugo, *El programa abandonado: Balance económico social del gobierno de Aylwin*, (Santiago, LOM Ediciones, 1996)

FEINBERG, Richard E., *The Triumph of Allende: Chile's Legal Revolution*, (New York, New American Library, 1972)

FERNANDEZ Jiliberto, A. E., *Dictadura militar y oposición política en Chile 1973 - 1981*, (Amsterdam, CEDLA, 1985)

FFRENCH-DAVIS, Ricardo, *Políticas económicas en Chile 1952-1970*, (Santiago, Ediciones Nueva Universidad, 1973)

FFRENCH-DAVIS, Ricardo, *Macroeconomic Performance and Achievements in Chile*, (ECLAC, 1998)

FFRENCH-DAVIS, Ricardo y Ernesto Tironi (Eds.), *El cobre en el desarrollo nacional*, (Santiago, Ediciones Nueva Universidad, 1974)

FILIPPI, Emilio, *Libertad de pensar, libertad de decir*, (Santiago, CISEC, Centro de Investigaciones

Socioeconómicas de la Compañía de Jesús, 1979)

FLACSO, *Cronología del período 1970-1973*, 7 vols, (mimeo), Dirección General de Manuel A. Garretón y Coordinación de Cristián Cox y Eugenia Hola. (Santiago, publication date unknown)

FLEET, Michael, *The Rise and Fall of Chilean Christian Democracy*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1985)

FLISFISCH, Angel, *La política como compromiso democrático*, (Santiago, 1987)

FONTAINE Aldunate, Arturo, *La historia no contada de los economistas y el presidente Pinochet*, (Santiago, Zig-Zag, 1988)

FOXLEY, Alejandro, Eduardo Aninat y José Pablo Arellano, *Las desigualdades económicas y la acción del estado*, (México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1980)

FOXLEY, Alejandro, *Experimentos neoliberales en América latina*, (México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1988)

\_\_\_, *Chile y su futuro: Un país posible*, (Santiago, CIEPLAN, 1987)

FOXLEY, Felipe y Jorge Rodríguez, *Los derechos económico - sociales del hombre*, (Santiago, ICHEH, 1986)

FREI Montalva, Eduardo, *Eduardo Frei Montalva (1911-1982)*, Selección y biografía de Cristián Gazmuri, Patricia Arancibia y Alvaro Góngora, (Santiago, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1996)

\_\_\_, *El pensamiento de Eduardo Frei*, Selección y notas de Oscar Pinochet de la Barra, (Santiago, Editorial Aconcagua, 1982)

\_\_\_, *Humanismo y democracia*, Entrevista concedida al diario Nueva Frontera de Colombia, May 1975)

\_\_\_, "El mandato de la historia y las exigencias del porvenir", *Chile-América*, No 14-15, Jan-Feb 1976)

\_\_\_, *América Latina: opción y esperanza*, (Barcelona, Editorial Pomaire, 1977)

\_\_\_, *Futura institucionalidad de la paz en Chile*, (Santiago,



CISEC, Centro de Investigaciones Socioeconómicas del Centro Bellarmino, 1977)

—, Opinión sobre el momento actual, Discurso pronunciado el 24 de agosto de 1979 en el Hotel O'Higgins de Viña del Mar

—, *El mensaje humanista*, (Santiago, Editorial Aconcagua [con patrocinio del CISEC], 1981)

FREI M., Eduardo, Radomiro Tomic, Jaime Castillo Y Genaro Arriagada, *Democracia Cristiana y Partido Comunista*, (Santiago, Editorial Aconcagua, 1986)

FREI Ruiz-Tagle, Eduardo, *Gobernabilidad democrática*, (Santiago, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1997)

FRIAS Valenzuela, Francisco, *Nuevo Manual de Historia de Chile*, (Santiago, Zig-Zag, 1986)

FRIEDMANN, John y Thomas Lackington, *La hiperurbanización y el desarrollo nacional en Chile: algunas hipótesis*, (Santiago, CIDU Comité Interdisciplinario de Desarrollo Urbano, Universidad Católica de Chile, 1967)

FRIEDMANN, Reinhard, 1964-1988, (with the collaboration of Jorge Pozo B. y Felipe Pozo R.) *La política chilena de la A a la Z.*, (Santiago, Editorial Melquíades, 1988)

FUNDACIÓN DE INVESTIGACIONES SOCIALES, *Vamos Chile!*, (Buenos Aires, 1987)

FURCI, Carmelo, *The Chilean Communist Party and the Road to Socialism*, (London, Zed Books, 1984)

—, *The Crisis of the Chilean Socialist Party (PSCh) in 1979*, Working Papers No 11 (London, University of London, Institute of Latin American Studies,)

GALDAMES, Luis, *Historia de Chile*, (Santiago, Zig-Zag, 1952)

GAMBOA, Alberto, *Un viaje por el infierno*, Vol IV, (Santiago, Libros de HOY - Editora Araucaria, 1984)

GARCES, Joan, *Chile: el camino político hacia el socialismo*, (Barcelona, Editorial Ariel, 1972)

—, *El estado y los problemas tácticos en el gobierno de Allende*, (Madrid, Siglo XXI de España Editores, 1974)

- \_\_\_\_\_, *Allende y la experiencia chilena*, (Barcelona, Editorial Ariel, 1976)
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Soberanos e intervenidos, Chile, la guerra fría y después*, (Santiago, Ediciones BAT, 1995)
- \_\_\_\_\_, y Saul Landau, Orlando Letelier: *Testimonio y vindicación*, (Madrid, Siglo XXI de España Editores, 1995)
- GARCÍA, Pío (compilador), *Las Fuerzas Armadas y el golpe de estado en Chile*, (México, Siglo XXI Editores, 1974)
- GARCÍA, Rolando, "Conceptos básicos para el estudio de sistemas complejos", in, *Los problemas del conocimiento y la perspectiva ambiental del desarrollo*, Enrique Leff (coordinator), (México, Siglo XXI Editores, 1986)
- GARCÍA-HUIDOBRO Correa, Joaquín, *Tentación del poder: Expresión política de las creencias religiosas*, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1986)
- GARRETON, Manuel A., H. Valdés, L. Domínguez, C. Ossa, A. Dorfmann, C. Maldonado y A. y M. Mattelart, *Cultura y comunicación de masas: Materiales de la discusión chilena 1970 - 1973*, (Barcelona, Editorial Laia, 1975)
- GARRETON, Manuel Antonio (presentador), *Economía política en la Unidad Popular: Materiales de los Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional (1970 - 1973)*, (Barcelona, Editorial Fontanella, 1975)
- GARRETON, Manuel A. y Tomás Moulian, *La Unidad Popular y el conflicto político en Chile*, (Santiago, Editorial Minga, 1983)
- GARRETON, Manuel Antonio, *Las Ciencias Sociales en Chile: Situación, problemas y perspectivas*, (Santiago, Edición de la Academia de Humanismo Cristiano, publication date unknown)
- \_\_\_\_\_, *El proceso político chileno*, (Santiago, FLACSO, 1983)
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Dictaduras y democratización*, (Santiago, FLACSO, 1984)
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Reconstruir la política: Transición y consolidación democrática en Chile*, (Santiago, Editorial Andante, 1987)
- \_\_\_\_\_, "La redemocratización política en Chile: transición,



- inauguración y evolución", *Estudios Públicos* No 42, (Santiago, 1991)
- GARRIDO, Manuel S., *Crítica de una posición en crisis*, (México, Universidad Autónoma de Sinaloa, 1980)
- GAZMURI, Jaime, *Aprender las lecciones del pasado para construir el futuro*, (Edición Nueva Democracia, 1975)
- GAZMURI R., Cristián, *Testimonios de una crisis: Chile 1900-1925*: (Santiago, Editorial Universitaria, 1980)
- GEISSE, Guillermo, *Economía política de la concentración urbana en Chile*, (México, El Colegio de México-PISPAL, 1983)
- GEMINES Ltda., *Informe GEMINES: Perfil económico para ejecutivos y empresarios*, No9, tercer trimestre de 1976, (Santiago)
- GIL, Federico G., Ricardo Lagos E., y Henry A. Landsberger (Eds.), *Chile 1970 - 1973: Lecciones de una experiencia*, (Madrid, Editorial Tecnos, 1977)
- GITTINGS, John (Ed.), *The Lessons of Chile*, (Nottingham, Spokesman Books and the Transnational Institute, 1975)
- GODOY, Hernán (Ed.), *Estructura social de Chile*, (Santiago, Editorial Universitaria, 1971)
- GOLDBERG, Gerhard Wolfgang et. al., *Chile y Europa: doctrinas políticas*, (Santiago, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1981)
- GOMEZ, María Soledad, "Factores nacionales e internacionales de la política interna del Partido Comunista de Chile (1922-1952)", in *El Partido Comunista de Chile*, Augusto Varas (Compiler) (Santiago, CESOC-FLACSO, 1988)
- GOMEZ Oyarzún, Galo, *Chile de hoy: Educación, cultura y ciencia*, (México, Casa de Chile, 1976)
- \_\_\_, *La universidad en el umbral del siglo XXI*, (México, Cuadernos de Casa de Chile, No 44, 1991)
- GOMEZ, Sergio y Jorge Echenique, *La agricultura chilena: Las dos caras de la modernización*, (Santiago, FLACSO - AGRARIA, publication date unknown)
- GONGORA, Mario, *Ensayo histórico sobre la noción de estado en*

*Chile en los siglos XIX y XX*, (Santiago, Editorial Universitaria, 1986)

GRAYSON, George, *El Partido Demócrata Cristiano chileno*, (Buenos Aires y Santiago, Editorial Francisco de Aguirre, 1968)

GRISHÁEV, Pável y Stanislav Chibiriáev, *Chile: "legisla" el fascismo*, (Moscow, Editorial Progreso, 1980)

GUTIERREZ Aicardi, Enrique, *Negro septiembre*, (México, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana - Xochimilco y Casa de Chile, publication date unknown)

GUTIERREZ Fuente, Juan Ignacio, *Chile: la Vicaría de la Solidaridad*, (Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1986)

GUZMAN Errázuriz, Jaime, *Escritos personales*, 3rd edition, (Santiago, Zig-Zag, 1993)

GUZMAN J., Nancy, *Un grito desde el silencio: Detención, asesinato y desaparición de Bautista Van Schowen y Patricio Munita*, (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 1999)

GYARMATI, Gabriel y colaboradores, *Las profesiones: Dilemas del conocimiento y del poder*, (Santiago, Ediciones de la Universidad Católica de Chile, 1984)

HIDALGO CALVO, César, *Teoría y práctica de la propaganda contemporánea*, (Santiago, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1986)

HOURTON P, Jorge (Auxiliary Bishop of Santiago), *Iglesia y democracia: La enseñanza de Pío XII*, (Santiago, Editorial Aconcagua, 1976)

HUNNEUS, Carlos, *Movimientos universitarios y generación de élites dirigentes*, (Santiago, Corporación de Promoción Universitaria, CPU, 1973)

—, *Los chilenos y la política: Cambio y continuidad en el autoritarismo*, (Santiago, CERC - ICHEH, 1987)

—, (Compiler), *Para vivir la democracia: Dilemas de su consolidación*, (Santiago, CERC - Editorial Andante, 1987)

HUNNEUS, Pablo, *¿Qué te pasó Pablo?: La vida en Chile Hoy - crónicas*, 8th edition, (Santiago, Editora "Nueva generación", 1983)



- HUNNEUS, Pablo, Claudio Orrego, Eduardo Palma, Sebastián Piñera y Andrés Sanfuentes, *Chile: El costo social de la dependencia ideológica*, (Santiago, Editorial del Pacífico - Instituto de Estudios políticos IDEP, 1973)
- INSTITUTO DE ECONOMIA Y PLANIFICACION, UNIVERSIDAD DE CHILE, *La economía chilena en 1971*, (Santiago, Sala Gráfica del Instituto, 1972)
- \_\_\_\_\_, *La economía chilena en 1972*, (Santiago, Sala Gráfica del Instituto, 1972)
- IZQUIERDA CRISTIANA, *Gauche Chrétienne 1970 - 1973*. Recueil de textes, (Paris, Politique Hebdo, 1974)
- JARPA, Sergio Onofre, *Creo en Chile*, (Santiago, Sociedad Impresora Chile Ltda., 1973)
- JOBET, Julio César, *El Partido Socialista de Chile*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, 2 vols., (Santiago, Ediciones Prensa Latinoamericana, 1971)
- JOBET, Julio César, *Desarrollo económico y social de Chile*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, (México, Casa de Chile, 1982)
- JOCELYN-HOLT Letelier, Alfredo, *El Chile perplejo: Del avanzar sin transar al transar sin parar*, (Santiago, Editorial Planeta/Ariel, 1998)
- JOHNSON, Dale L. (Ed.), *The Chilean Road to Socialism*, (New York, Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1973)
- KISSINGER, Henry, *White House Years*, (Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1979)
- KUDACHKIN, M., *Chile: la experiencia de la lucha por la unidad de las fuerzas de izquierda y las transformaciones revolucionarias*, (URSS, Editorial Progreso, 1978)
- LABARCA, Eduardo, *Chile al rojo*, (México, Juan Pablos Editor, 1971)
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Chile invadido*, (Santiago, Editora Austral, (publication date unknown)
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Corvalán de Chile*, (Moscow: Editorial de la Agencia de Prensa Novosti, 1975)
- LABIN, Suzanne; *Chile: the Crime of Resistance*, (England,

Foreign Affairs Publishing Co., 1982)

LAGOS E., Ricardo, *La concentración del poder económico: Su teoría. Realidad Chilena*, 5th edition, (Santiago, Editorial del Pacífico, 1965)

—, *La industria en Chile: Antecedentes estructurales*, (Santiago, Instituto de Economía, Universidad de Chile, 1966)

—, *Democracia para Chile: Proposiciones de un socialista*, (Santiago, Pehuén Editores, 1985)

LAGOS Schuffeneger, Humberto, *Sectas religiosas en Chile: ¿Fe o ideología?*, (Concepción, PRESOR - LAR, 1987)

LANDAU, Saul, *They Educated the Crows: An Institute Report on the Letelier - Moffit Murders*, (Washington D.C., The Transnational Institute, 1978)

LANDSBERGER, Henry and Tim McDaniel, "Hypermobilization in Chile 1970-1973", *World Politics*, Vol. XXVIII, No 4, (July 1976)

LARRAIN A., Luis (editor), *1990 - 1994 Chile: políticas públicas durante el gobierno de Aylwin*, (Santiago, Editorial Los Andes - Fundación Libertad y Desarrollo, 1997)

LARRAIN Cruz, Rafael y Leopoldo Núñez Tomé, *Protección de la democracia: ¿Deben proscribirse los partidos marxistas?:* (Santiago, Instituto de Ciencia Política, Universidad de Chile - Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1984)

LARRAIN F., Hernán, *Ideología y democracia en Chile*, (Santiago, Editorial Andante, 1988)

LARSON, Oscar, *La ANEC y la Democracia Cristiana*, (Santiago, Ediciones Ráfaga, 1967)

LATIN AMERICA BUREAU, *Chile: The Pinochet Decade: The Rise and Fall of the Chicago Boys*, (London, LAB, 1983)

LATORRE, Carmen Luz, "The Chilean Crisis: A Note on the Consequences of Liberal Policies towards the Private Sector", *The Developing Economies*, Vol. XXII, No 3, (Tokyo, Institute of Developing Economies, September 1984)

LAVANDERO, Jorge, *El precio de sostener un sueño*, (Santiago,



LOM Editores, 1997)

LAVIN, Joaquín, *El enriquecimiento de las personas en Chile: Cuando ha beneficiado y cuando ha perjudicado al país*, (Chile, Editorial Ciencia y tecnología, 1980)

\_\_\_, Chile, *Revolución silenciosa*, (Santiago, Zig-Zag, 1987)

\_\_\_, Miguel Kast, *Pasión de vivir*, (Santiago, Zig-Zag, 1986)

LECHNER, Norbert, *La conflictiva y nunca acabada construcción del orden deseado*, (Madrid, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas CIS -Siglo XXI de España Editores, 1986)

LECHNER, Norbert, (editor), *Estado y política en América Latina*, (México, Siglo XXI Editores, 1981)

LECHNER, Norbert, et. al. (editors), *Partidos y democracia*, (Santiago, FLACSO, 1985)

LECHNER, Norbert, (compiler), *Cultura política y democratización*, (Santiago, CLACSO - FLACSO - ICI, 1987)

LEHMAN, David: *Agrarian reform in Chile: 1965-1972*, D. Phil. Thesis, (Oxford, 1974)

LEIVA, Fernando Ignacio y James Petras, "Chile's Poor in the Struggle for Democracy", *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol 13, No 4, (Fall 1986)

LEON, Samuel y Lilia Bermúdez (compilers), *La prensa internacional y el golpe de estado chileno*, (México, FCPyS - UNAM, publication date unknown)

LEVINSON, Jerome y Juan de Onís, *The alliance that lost its way*, (Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1970)

LINDHOLM, Stig, *Seeing for Oneself: A Report on an Experiment in Development Education*, SIDA, Swedish International Development Authority, Stockholm, 1975)

LIJPHART, Arend, *Sistemas electorales y sistemas de partidos*, (Madrid, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1995)

LOVEMAN, Brian, *Struggle in the Countryside: Politics and Rural Labor in Chile, 1919-1973*, (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1976)

LÖW, Konrad, *La fascinación del comunismo: Una investigación*

- sistemática*, (Santiago, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1983)
- LOZZA, Arturo, *Chile sublevado*, Reportaje al FPMR, (Buenos Aires, Editorial Antarca, 1986)
- MAINWARING, Scott, *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization*, (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1999)
- MAINWARING, Scott and Timothy Scully (Editors), *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*, (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1995)
- MAIRA Aguirre, Luis, *Chile: autoritarismo, democracia y movimiento popular*, (México, CIDE, 1984)
- , ■ Camino a la nacionalización del cobre ■, *Derecho Económico*, año VIII, N° 27-28; año IX, N° 29-30 y 31-32, 1969 y 1970)
- , *Los tres Chiles de la segunda mitad del siglo XX*, (Santiago, LOM Editores, 1998)
- MAMALAKIS, Markos J., *The Growth and Structure of the Chilean Economy: From Independence to Allende*, (London, Yale University Press, 1976)
- MAPU, Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria, *El primer año del gobierno popular en Chile*, (Buenos Aires, Distribuidora BAIRE, 1974)
- , "La construcción de una alternativa revolucionaria. Entrevista con un dirigente del MAPU en la clandestinidad", in *Causa Proletaria* No 22, (Quito, publication date unknown)
- MARIN, Germán, *Una historia fantástica y calculada*, (México, Siglo XXI Editores, 1976)
- MARIN, Germán (argumento) y Armino Cardoso (fotos), *Chile o muerte*, (México, Editorial Diógenes, 1974)
- MARINI, Ruy Mauro, *El reformismo y la contrarrevolución*, Estudios sobre Chile, (México, ERA, 1976)
- , *Sobre el patrón de reproducción de capital en Chile*, (México, Cuadernos de CIDAMO No7, 1984)
- MARTINEZ, Javier y Eugenio Tironi, *Las clases sociales en*



*Chile: Cambio y estratificación, 1970 - 1980*, (Santiago, Ediciones SUR, 1985)

MARTNER, Gonzalo, "La vía pacífica al socialismo", *El Trimestre Económico*, Vol. LI (4), No 204

MARTNER, Gonzalo (coordinador), *Chile hacia el 2000: Desafíos y opciones*, 2 tomos, (Caracas, Editorial Nueva Sociedad - UNITAR - PROFAL, 1988)

MATTELART, Armand y Michèle, *Frentes culturales y movilización de masas*, (Barcelona, Editorial Anagrama, 1977)

MAYER, Arno J., *The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War*, (New York, Pantheon Books, 1982)

MEDHURST, Kenneth (editor), *Allende's Chile*, (London, Hart - Davis MacGibbon, 1972)

MELLER, Patricio, *Enfoques sobre demanda de trabajo: relevancia para América latina*, Estudios CIEPLAN No 24, (Santiago, 1978)

\_\_\_\_\_, *Un siglo de economía política chilena (1890 - 1990)*, (Santiago, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1996)

MENSAJE, *Chile visto por "Mensaje", 1971 - 1981*, Editorial selections, (Santiago, Editorial Aconcagua, publication date unknown)

MENSAJE, *"Mensaje": Testimonio en la historia, 1971 - 1981*, (Santiago, Editorial Aconcagua, publication date unknown)

MICHELS, Robert, *Political Parties*, (New York, Dover Publications, Inc., 1959)

MILLAS, Hernán, *Los señores censores*, (Santiago, Ediciones Caperucita Rojas de Feroz, 1985)

MILLAS, Jorge, *Idea y defensa de la universidad*, (Santiago, Editorial del Pacífico - Corporación de Promoción Universitaria CPU, 1981)

MILLAS, Orlando, *El antimilitarista Diego Portales*, (publication location unknown, Ediciones Colo Colo, 1977)

MIR, *Mouvement de la Gauche Revolutionnaire 1970 - 1973*, *Recueil de textes*, (Paris, Politique Hebdo, 1974)

- MIR, Movimiento de Izquierda revolucionaria, *MIR 1973-1975*, (Bilbao, Editorial Zero, 1976)
- MIR, Movimiento de Izquierda revolucionaria, "Análisis de la significación y de las consecuencias de la elección de Salvador Allende a la Presidencia de la República." Documento elaborado por el Secretariado Nacional del MIR, *Punto Final*, Oct 1970)
- MISTRAL, Carlos (Pseud), *Chile: del triunfo popular al golpe fascista*, (Editorial ERA, México, 1974)
- MOLINA Silva, Sergio, *El proceso de cambio en Chile*, (México, Siglo XXI editores, 1972)
- MOLINA S., Sergio, Claudio Orrego V., Eugenio Ortega R. y Raúl Troncoso C., *Cristianos en política: Una experiencia de reflexión*, (Santiago, Instituto Chileno de Estudios Humanísticos, publication date unknown)
- MONCKEBERG, Fernando, *Jaque al subdesarrollo*. (4th edition, corrected and augmented), (Santiago, Editora Nacional Gabriela Mistral, 1981)
- MONTERO, Cecilia, *La revolución empresarial chilena*, (Santiago, DOLMEN - CIEPLAN, 1997)
- MORALES Abarzúa, Carlos: *Trayectoria y perspectivas de la Internacional Socialista en América latina y el Caribe*, (México, FCPyS - UNAM, 1982)
- \_\_\_\_\_, *La Internacional Socialista, América Latina y el Caribe*, (Buenos Aires, Michka & Asociados, 1986)
- MORALES, Eduardo, Hernán Pozo y Sergio Rojas, *Municipio, desarrollo local y sectores populares*, (Santiago, FLACSO, 1988)
- MORAN, Theodore H., *Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1974)
- MORRIS, David J., *We Must Make Haste-Slowly: The Process of Revolution in Chile*, (New York, Vintage Books, 1973)
- MOSS, Robert, *Chile's Marxist Experiment*, (Newton Abbot, Devon, David & Charles, 1973)



- MOULIAN, Tomás, *La forja de ilusiones: el sistema de partidos 1932 - 1973*, (Santiago, ARCIS - FLACSO, 1993)
- MOULIAN, Tomás e Isabel Torres Dujisin, *Discusiones entre honorables: Las candidaturas presidenciales de la derecha 1938 - 1946*, (Santiago, FLACSO, S.F)
- MUNIZAGA, Giselle, *El discurso Público de Pinochet (1973 - 1976): Un análisis semiológico*, (Buenos Aires, CLACSO, 1983)
- MUNOZ, Herald, "La política exterior chilena: la crisis continúa", *Foro Internacional*, Vol. XXVI No2, (1985)
- MUÑOZ, Herald y Carlos Portales, *Una amistad esquivada: Las relaciones de Estados Unidos y Chile*, (Santiago Editorial Pehuén, 1987)
- MUÑOZ Gomá, Oscar, *Orígenes políticos y económicos del estado empresarial en Chile*, Estudios CIEPLAN No 16, (Santiago, 1977)
- MUSALEM, José, *Crónica de un fracaso: Frustración de un pueblo*, (Santiago, Editorial del Pacífico - IDEP, 1973)
- NACLA (North American Congress on latin America), *Latin America & Empire Report*, Vol. VII, N°8, (October 1973)
- NAJMAN, Maurice (compiler), *Le Chili est proche, Révolution et contre - révolution dans le Chili de l'Unité Populaire*, (Paris, François Maspero, 1974)
- NOVOA Monreal, Eduardo, *La batalla por el cobre: Comentarios y documentos*, (Santiago, Editorial Quimantú, 1972)
- \_\_\_\_\_, *El derecho como obstáculo al cambio social*, 7<sup>th</sup> edition, (México, Siglo XXI Editores, 1985)
- NUEZ, Iván de la, *La Democracia Cristiana en la historia de Chile*, (La Habana, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1989)
- NUÑEZ, Carlos, *Chile ¿la última opción electoral?*, (Santiago, Ediciones El Umbral - PLA, 1970)
- OCEPLAN, Oficina Central de Planificación del Comando Nacional de la Candidatura Presidencial del Dr. Salvador Allende, *Las bases técnicas del plan de acción del gobierno popular*, mimeo (Santiago, 1964)

- ORREGO V., Claudio, *El paro nacional: Vía chilena contra el totalitarismo*, (Santiago, Editorial del Pacífico - Instituto de Estudios Políticos IDEP, 1972)
- \_\_\_, *Tres ensayos acerca del futuro*, (Santiago, Editorial Aconcagua, 1978)
- \_\_\_, *La difícil senda del desarrollo político en América Latina*, (Santiago, CISEC, 1983)
- ORTEGA, Hugo (editor), *La economía campesina chilena*, (Santiago, Editorial Aconcagua, 1981)
- ORTIZ, Eduardo (editor), *Temas socialistas*, (Santiago, VECTOR, 1984 (2nd edition), (1st edition, 1983)
- \_\_\_, *Temas Socialistas No 2*, (Santiago, VECTOR, 1984)
- OSSA, Juan Luis, *Nacionalismo hoy*, (Santiago, Instituto de Estudios Generales, publication date unknown)
- OSSANDON G., Jorge, *Economía de guerra: ¿vía chilena hacia el hambre?*, (Santiago, Editorial del Pacífico, 1973)
- OSORIO, Víctor e Iván Cabezas, *Los hijos de Pinochet*, (Santiago, Editorial Planeta, 1995)
- OTANO, Rafael, *Crónica de la transición*, (Santiago, Editorial Planeta, 1995)
- PALACIOS, Jorge, *Chile: An Attempt at "Historic Compromise": The Real Story of the Allende Years*, (Chicago, Banner Press, 1979)
- PALMA Zúñiga, Luis, *Historia del Partido Radical*, (Santiago, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1967)
- PARKER, Dick, *La nueva cara del fascismo*, (Santiago, Editorial Quimantú, 1972)
- PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE CHILE, *Programa del PC de CH, Approved in the XIV National Congress of the Party, November 23-29, 1969*, (Santiago, Imprenta Horizonte, 1972)
- , *El Pleno de agosto de 1977 del Comité Central del partido Comunista de Chile*, (Publication location unknown, Ediciones Colo - Colo, 1978)
- \_\_\_, *Los 1000 días de revolución: Dirigentes del PC de Chile*



*analizan las enseñanzas de la experiencia chilena,*  
(Prague, Editorial Paz y Socialismo, 1978)

PARTIDO DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO, *Informe preliminar para un programa de gobierno de la Democracia Cristiana*, Primer Congreso Nacional de Profesionales y Técnicos de la Democracia Cristiana e Independientes, 6-7-8 y 9 de diciembre de 1962. (Libro azul), (Santiago, Editorial del Pacífico, 1962)

—, *Proposiciones para una acción política en el período 1967-1970 de una vía no capitalista de desarrollo*, mimeo, (Santiago, 1967)

PARTIDO SOCIALISTA DE CHILE, *¡Unidad de acción, si; capitulación ideológica, no!*, (Puebla, Linotipografía Primavera, 1976)

—, *Unidad opositora y movilización social para abrir paso a cambios democratizadores*, 5th Pleno del Comité Central, *Boletín del Comité Central No 73*, (Nov 1988)

PAYRO, Ana Lía, Laura Robles, Miguel Donoso Pareja, Carlos Suárez, *Chile: ¿cambio de gobierno o toma del poder?*, (México, Editorial extemporáneos, 1<sup>st</sup> edition 1971, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition 1974)

PEREZ DE ARCE, Hermógenes, *Comentarios escogidos*, (Santiago, Ediciones Portada, 1973)

—, *Durante la UP: Comentarios radiales 1971 - 72*, (abridged, with selected commentaries) 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, (Santiago, Editorial el Roble, publication date unknown)

—, *Detrás de mi columna*, (Santiago, editorial El Roble, publication date unknown)

PETRAS, James, *Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development*, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969)

PETRAS, James y Maurice Zeitlin, *El radicalismo político de la clase trabajadora chilena*, (Buenos Aires, Centro editor de América Latina, 1969)

PETRAS, James y Morris H. Morley, *How Allende Fell: A Study in U.S. - Chilean Relations*, (England, Spokesman Books, 1974, (Spanish version, *La conspiración yanqui para derrocar a Allende*, prologue by Pedro Vuskovic Bravo,

(México, Editorial Nuestro Tiempo, 1974)

PINOCHET, Augusto, *Clase magistral de inauguración del año académico de la Universidad de Chile*, (Santiago, April 6, 1979)

\_\_\_\_\_, *El día decisivo: 11 de septiembre de 1973*, (Santiago, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1980)

\_\_\_\_\_, *Política, politiquería, demagogia*, (Santiago, Editorial Renacimiento, 1983)

\_\_\_\_\_, *Pinochet: patria y democracia*, (Selection and thematical order by the Corporación de Estudios Nacionales.) (Santiago, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1985)

PINTO, Aníbal et. al., *Chile hoy*, (Santiago, Siglo XXI Editores, 1970)

\_\_\_\_\_, *Chile, un caso de desarrollo frustrado*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition (Santiago, Editorial Universitaria, 1973)

\_\_\_\_\_, "Estado y empresa privada: una visión retrospectiva de la experiencia chilena", *El Trimestre Económico*, Vol. LIII (1), No 209, (enero-marzo de 1986)

PINTO Lagarrigue, Fernando, *Crónica Política del siglo XX: Desde Errázuriz Echaurren hasta Alessandri Palma*, (Santiago, Editorial Orbe, 1972)

\_\_\_\_\_, *La masonería y su influencia en Chile*, 4<sup>th</sup> complemented edition, (Buenos Aires, Editorial Orbe (Chie), 1973)

PIZARRO, Crisóstomo, *Rol de los sindicatos en Chile*, Estudios CIEPLAN No 22, (Santiago, 1978)

\_\_\_\_\_, *Políticas públicas y grupos de presión en Chile: 1965 - 1970: un análisis exploratorio*, Estudios CIEPLAN No 26, (Santiago, 1978)

\_\_\_\_\_, *La huelga obrera en Chile 1890 - 1970*, (Santiago, Ediciones SUR, 1986)

POLITZER, Patricia, *Altamirano*, (Santiago, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Melquiádes, 1989)

POLLACK, Benny y Hernán Rosenkranz, *Revolutionary Social Democracy: The Chilean Socialist Party*, (London, Frances Pinter (Publishers), 1986)



- POLLONI R., Alberto, Tte. Coronel (R), *las fuerzas armadas de Chile en la vida nacional, Compendio cívico-militar*, (Santiago, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1972)
- POZO, Hernán, *Administración interior del estado y sistema de participación*, COREDES y CODECOS, (Santiago, FLACSO, 1988)
- PRATS, Carlos, *Una vida por la legalidad*, (México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1976)
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Memorias: Testimonio de un soldado*, (Santiago, Pehuén Editores, 1985)
- PREBISCH, Raúl, "El desarrollo de la América Latina y algunos de sus principales problemas", in *La obra de Prebisch en la CEPAL*, Selección de Adolfo Gurrieri, Vol. I, (México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1982)
- PRIETO, Helios, *Chile: los gorilas estaban entre nosotros*, (Buenos Aires, Editorial Tiempo Contemporáneo, 1973)
- PROGRAMA DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS PARA EL DESARROLLO (PNUD), *Desarrollo humano en Chile 1996*, (Santiago, 1996)
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Desarrollo humano en Chile 1998: Modernización y malestar*, (Santiago, 1998)
- PROPPER, Eugene y Taylor Branch, *Laberinto: El mayor crimen de la dictadura de Pinochet: el asesinato del ex-canciller Orlando Letelier*, (Buenos Aires, 1990, (English version, Branch & Propper, *Labyrinth*, (New York: Penguin Books, 1983))
- PRZEWORSKI, Adam, *Capitalism and Social Democracy*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986)
- QUINCIO Figueiredo, Jorge Mario, *El Partido Radical: Origen-doctrina-convenciones*, (Santiago, Ediciones Bocanegra, 1964)
- QUINTEROS Yáñez, Luis, *La constitución chilena de 1980*, (México, Casa de Chile, 1988)
- RACZYNSKI Von O., Dagmar et. al., *Los actores de la realidad chilena*, (Santiago, Editorial del Pacífico - IDEP, 1974)
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Características del empleo informal urbano en Chile*, Estudios CIEPLAN No 23 (Santiago, 1978)

- \_\_\_\_\_, *Empleo, pobreza y migraciones en Chile*, Estudios CIEPLAN No 29 (Santiago, 1978)
- RAMIREZ Necochea, Hernán, *Origen y formación del Partido Comunista de Chile*, (Moscow, Editorial Progreso, 1984)
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Las fuerzas armadas y la política en Chile (1810 - 1970): (Antecedentes para una historia)*, (México, Cultura SEP - Casa de Chile, 1984)
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Historia del movimiento obrero en Chile*, (Concepción, Ediciones LAR, 1986)
- RAMOS Córdoba, Sergio, *Chile: ¿una economía en transición?*, La Habana, Casa de las Américas, (Premio Ensayo), 1972)
- RAZETO Migliaro, Luis, *Economía popular de solidaridad: identidad y proyecto en una visión integradora*, (Santiago, Area Pastoral Social de la Conferencia Episcopal de Chile, 1986)
- RAZETO M., Luis, Arno Klenner, Apolonia Ramírez y Roberto Urmeneta, *Las organizaciones económicas populares*, (2<sup>nd</sup> edition actualised), (Santiago, Programa de Economía del Trabajo, Academia de Humanismo Cristiano, 1986)
- REMMER, Karen L., *Party Competition in Argentina and Chile: Political Recruitment and Public Policy, 1890 - 1930*, (Lincoln and London, University of Nebraska Press, 1984)
- REYES Castillo, Fidel, *Naufraga la Unidad Popular?*, (Santiago, Edición del autor, 1973)
- RIVAS Sánchez, Fernando y Elisabeth Reimann Weigert, *Las fuerzas armadas de Chile: un caso de penetración imperialista*, (México, Ediciones 75, 1976)
- RIZ, Liliana de, *Sociedad y política en Chile (de Portales a Pinochet)*, México, UNAM, 1979)
- RODRIGUEZ, Felipe, *Crítica de la Unidad popular (Chile 1970 - 1973)*, (Barcelona, Editorial Fontamara, 1975)
- RODRIGUEZ Elizondo, José, *Introducción al fascismo chileno*, (México, Editorial Ayuso, 1976)
- RODRIGUEZ Grez, Pablo, *Entre la democracia y la tiranía*, (Santiago, Edición del autor, 1972)



- , *El mito de la democracia en Chile, Vol I, 1833-1973*, (Santiago, EVES Ediciones, 1985)
- , *El mito de la democracia en Chile, Tomo II, Una revolución pendiente*, (Santiago, EVES Ediciones, 1986)
- RODRIGUEZ Grossi, Jorge (editor), *Perspectivas económicas para la democracia: balance y lecciones para la experiencia chilena*, (Santiago, Instituto Chileno de Estudios Humanísticos ICHEH, 1984)
- ROXBOROUGH, Ian, Phil O'Brien & Jackie Roddick, *Chile: The State and Revolution*, (London, The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1977)
- RUIZ-TAGLE, Jaime y Roberto Urmeneta, *Los trabajadores del programa del empleo mínimo*, (Santiago, Programa de Economía del Trabajo, Academia de Humanismo Cristiano, 1984)
- SALAZAR Salvo, Manuel, *Contreras: Historia de un intocable*, (Santiago, Editorial Grijalbo, publication date unknown)
- SALAZAR Vergara, Gabriel, *Labradores, peones y proletarios: Formación y crisis de la sociedad popular chilena del siglo XIX*, (Santiago, ediciones SUR, 1985)
- SALINAS, Luis Alejandro, *¡Sursum corda! ¡Arriba los corazones!*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, (Santiago, Editorial Todos, 1984)
- SANTIBAÑEZ, Abraham, *Manual del ciudadano: Los partidos políticos chilenos*, (Santiago, Editorial Andante, 1988)
- , *Manual del ciudadano, Comentario a la ley 18.700 sobre votaciones populares y escrutinios, Instructivo para apoderados de mesa*, (Santiago, Editorial Andante, 1988)
- SARTORI, Giovanni, *Partidos y sistemas de partidos*, (Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1980)
- , *Teoría de la democracia*, 2 vol. (México, Alianza Editorial Mexicana, 1989)
- SCULLY, Timothy R., *Los partidos de centro y la evolución política chilena*, (Santiago, CIEPLAN - Notre Dame, 1992)
- SERRANO Fernández, Miguel, *La resurrección del héroe*, (Santiago, Alfabetas Impresores, 1986)

- SIGMUND, Paul, *The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile 1964-1976*, (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh, 1977)
- SILVA Henríquez, Raúl (cardenal) y Monseñor Cristián Precht Bañados, *El alma de Chile*, (Santiago, Ediciones CIEPLAN, 1986)
- SMIRNOW, Gabriel, *La revolución desarmada: Chile 1970 - 1973*, (México, Editorial ERA, 1977)
- SMITH, Brian H., *The Church and Politics in Chile*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1982)
- SNOW, Peter G., *Radicalismo chileno*, (Buenos Aires, Editorial Francisco de Aguirre, 1972)
- SOCIEDAD CHILENA DE DEFENSA DE LA TRADICION, FAMILIA Y PROPIEDAD, *Por detrás del caos la revolución juega sus cartas*, (Santiago, TFP, 1986)
- SOSA, Ignacio, *Conciencia y proyecto nacional en Chile (1891 - 1973)*, (México, UNAM, 1981)
- SOTO, Francisco, *Fascismo y Opus Dei en Chile*, (Barcelona, Editorial Avance, 1976)
- SULE, Anselmo, *Testimonos de lucha por la democracia*, (México, ILESCO, 1987)
- SUNKEL, Guillermo, *El Mercurio: 10 años de educación político - ideológica, 1969 - 1979*, (Santiago, ILET, 1983)
- \_\_\_, *Razón y pasión en la prensa popular: Un estudio sobre cultura popular, cultura de masas y cultura política*, (Santiago, ILET, 1985)
- SWEEZY, Paul and Harry Magdoff (editores), *Revolution and counter-revolution in Chile*, (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1974)
- TAPIA Valdés, Jorge, *Estrategocracia: El gobierno de los generales*, (Santiago, Las Ediciones del Ornitorrinco, 1986)
- TEITELBOIM, Volodia, *La lucha continúa: Pólvora del exilio*, (México, Ediciones de Cultura Popular, 1976)



- THAYER, William, *Empresa y universidad*, (Santiago, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1974)
- , *La apertura política*, (Santiago, Talleres de la Editorial Universitaria, 1984)
- THEBERGE, James D., *Reflexiones de un diplomático, Estados Unidos y América Latina*, (Santiago, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1985)
- TIRONI, Ernesto, *Recursos naturales y desarrollo: Generación de empleo y rentas en el cobre*, Estudios CIEPLAN No 28, (Santiago, 1978)
- , *Integración en presencia de corporaciones transnacionales*, Estudios CIEPLAN No 31, (Santiago, 1979)
- TIRONI, Eugenio, *La torre de Babel: Ensayos de crítica y renovación política*, (Santiago, Ediciones SUR, 1984)
- , *Los silencios de la revolución*, (Santiago, Editorial La Puerta Abierta, 1988)
- TOER, Mario, *La "vía chilena": Un balance necesario*, (Buenos Aires, Editorial Tiempo Contemporáneo, 1974)
- TOURAINÉ, Alain, *Vida y muerte del Chile popular: México, Siglo XXI Editores*, 1974)
- TRUCCO B., Marcelo y Luis Vargas F. (editores), *Stress, salud y trabajo en la sociedad contemporánea*, (Santiago, Ediciones de la Universidad Católica de Chile, publication date unknown)
- TUPPER, Patricio (editor), *Entrvistas de la periodista Silvia Riquelme: 89/90 opciones políticas en Chile*, (Santiago, Ediciones Colchagua, 1987)
- TURRENT, Isabel, *La Unión Soviética en América latina: El caso de la Unidad Popular chilena*, (México, El Colegio de México, 1984)
- UNIDAD POPULAR, *Programa básico de gobierno de la U.P.*, Various editions
- , *Las primeras cuarenta medidas del gobierno popular*
- , *Declaración de "El Arrayán"*

UNITED STATES SENATE, *Hearings Before The Subcommittee On Multinational Corporations of The Committee On Foreign Relations, On The International Telephone And Telegraph Company And Chile, 1970 - 71, March 20, 21, 22, 27, 28, 29 And April 2, 1973, (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973)*

\_\_\_\_\_, *Report To The Committee on Foreign Relations, By The Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations: The International Telephone and Telegraph Company and Chile, 1970 - 71, June 21, 1973, (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973)*

\_\_\_\_\_, *Select Committee to study governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities, Staff Report: Covert action in Chile 1963-1973, (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975)*

URIBE, Armando, *Le livre noir de l'intervention américaine au Chili, (Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1974)*

URZUA Valenzuela, Germán, *El Partido Radical: Su evolución política, (Santiago, ECPA, 1961)*

\_\_\_\_\_, *Los partidos políticos chilenos, Las fuerzas políticas: Ensayos de insurgencia política en Chile, (Santiago, Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1968)*

\_\_\_\_\_, *Diccionario político institucional de Chile, (Santiago, Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1984)*

\_\_\_\_\_, *Historia política electoral de Chile (1931-1973), (Santiago, Tamarcos-Van S.A., 1986)*

\_\_\_\_\_, *La democracia práctica: Los gobiernos radicales, (Santiago, CIEDES, 1988?)*

URZUA Valenzuela, Germán y Anamaria García Barcelatto, *Diagnóstico de la burocracia chilena (1818 - 1969), (Santiago, Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1971)*

VALDES, Jaime, *La clase dorada (o el gobierno secreto de Allende), México, Editora Latino Americana, 1973)*

VALDES S., Gabriel, *Por la libertad: Discursos y entrevistas 1982 -1986, (Santiago, Ediciones Chile y América, CESOC, 1986)*

VALDIVIESO, Jaime, *Chile: un mito y su ruptura, (Santiago,*



Ediciones LAR, Literatura Americana Reunida, 1987)

VALDIVIESO Ariztía, Rafael, *Testigos de la historia*, (Santiago, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1985)

—, *Crónica de un rescate (Chile 1973 - 1988)*, (Santiago, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1988)

VALENCIA Avaría, Luis (Compilador), *Anales de la República*, Tomos I y II actualizados, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, (Santiago, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1986)

VALENZUELA, Arturo, *Political Brokers in Chile: Local Government in a Centralized Polity*, (Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1977)

VANDERSCHUEREN, Franz, "Political significance of neighbourhood committees in the settlements of Santiago", in *The Chilean Road to Socialism*, Dale Johnson (Ed.), (New York, Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1973)

VARAS, Augusto, Felipe Agüero y Fernando Bustamante, *Chile, democracia, fuerzas armadas*, (Santiago, FLACSO, 1980)

VARAS, Augusto (compiler), *El Partido Comunista de Chile*, (Santiago, CESOC - FLACSO, 1988)

VARAS, Florencia, Gustavo Leigh, *El general disidente*, (Santiago, Editorial Aconcagua, 1979)

VARAS, Florencia y Claudio Orrego, *El caso Letelier*, (Santiago, Editorial Aconcagua, 1979)

VARIOS AUTORES, *Chile en todas partes, Los escritores chilenos exiliados brindan homenaje a Allende*, (México, Casa de Chile, 1983)

VASCONI, Tomás A. y Sergio Arancibia, *Chile: economía y política (1983 - 1986)*, (La Habana, Centro de Estudios Sobre América CEA, 1988)

VAYSSIERE, Pierre, *Un siècle de capitalisme minier au Chili 1830-1930*, (Paris, Editions du C.N.R.S., 1980)

VAZQUEZ Montalbán, Manuel, *La vía chilena al golpe de estado*, (Barcelona, Los libros De La Frontera, 1973)

VEGA, Luis, *La caída de Allende: Anatomía de un golpe de estado*, (Jerusalem, La Semana Publicaciones, 1983)

- VEKEMANS, Roger, *Marginalidad, incorporación e integración*, Cuadernos de CIDOC, No 34
- VERGARA, Pilar, *Necesidades básicas y políticas contra la pobreza: la experiencia de Chile*, Estudios CIEPLAN No 27 (Santiago, 1978)
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Auge y caída del neoliberalismo en Chile*, (Santiago, FLACSO, 1985)
- VIAL, Gonzalo, *Historia de Chile (1891-1973)*, (Santiago, Editorial Santillana, Vols I-IV, Editorial Fundación, 1996)
- VITALE, LUIS, *¿Y después del 4, qué?: Perspectivas de Chile después de las elecciones presidenciales*, (Santiago, PLA, 1970)
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Génesis y evolución del movimiento obrero chileno hasta el Frente Popular*, (Caracas, Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1979)
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Los movimientos sociales ponen en jaque a la Junta militar de Chile*, (Buenos Aires, Editorial Recabarren, 1985)
- VON BRUNN, Reinhard, *Chile: ¿con leyes tradicionales hacia una nueva economía?*, (Santiago, ILDIS, 1972)
- VUSKOVIC, Pedro, "Distribución del ingreso y opciones de desarrollo", in *Economía política en la Unidad Popular*, Materiales de los Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional (1970-1973), (Barcelona, Editorial Fontanella, 1975)
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Acusación al imperialismo*, (México, Casa de Chile en México - Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1975)
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Una sola lucha*, (México, Editorial Nuestro Tiempo, 1978)
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Los problemas económicos de la transición", *El Trimestre Económico*, Vol. L, No 197, (Jan-Mar 1983)
- VUSKOVIC et. al., *El golpe de estado en Chile*, (México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1975)
- VUSKOVIC, Sergio, *Problemática D.C.: propiedad, revolución, estado*, (Santiago, Editora Austral, 1968)



- VYLDER, Stefan de, *Allende's Chile: The political economy of the rise and fall of the Unidad Popular*, (London, Cambridge University Press, 1976)
- , *From Colonialism to Dependence: An Introduction to Chile's Economic History*, (SIDA, Swedish International Development Authority, Stockholm, 1974)
- WAISS, Oscar, *Memorias de un socialista 1928 - 1970*, (Madrid, Centro de Estudios Salvador Allende, 1986)
- WALLERSTEIN, Immanuel, *Unthinking Social Science*, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991)
- WARE, Alan, *Political Parties and Party Systems*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996)
- WEBER, Max, *Economía y sociedad*, 2 vol., (México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1964)
- WINN, Peter, *Weavers of Revolution: The Yarur Workers and Chile's Road to Socialism*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1986)
- WITKER, Alejandro, *Prisión en Chile*, (México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1975)
- WOLL, Allen, *A Functional Past: The Uses of History in Nineteenth Century Chile*, (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1982)
- YOCELEVZKY, Ricardo, *La Democracia Cristiana Chilena y el gobierno de Eduardo Frei (1964-1970)*, (México, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Unidad Xochimilco, 1988)
- , "El desarrollo de los partidos políticos chilenos hasta 1970", *Revista Argumentos* N°7, (Aug 1989)
- ZALDIVAR, Andrés, *Por la democracia ahora y siempre*, (Santiago, Editorial Aconcagua - Editorial Andante, 1984)
- ZAPATA, Francisco, "Crisis económica y movilización social en Chile (1981 - 1984)", *Foro Internacional*, Vol XXVI, No 2 (1985)
- , *Clases sociales y acción obrera en Chile*, (México, El Colegio de México, 1986)
- ZEITLIN, Maurice, *The Civil Wars in Chile: Or the Bourgeois*

*Revolutions That Never Were*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984)

ZEMELMAN, Hugo, *Estado, poder y lucha política*, (México, Editorial Villicaña, 1986)

Documents and Periodicals

*Cuadernos de la Casa de Chile en México*

- Nº1 P. Vuskovic, H. Facio, O. Caputo y A. Varela. Chile: ¿Milagro o fracaso económico? 1976,  
 Nº5 La verdad sobre Chile. Párrafos del informe del grupo de trabajo de las Naciones Unidas. 1976.  
 Nº7 H. Facio y P. F. Ramírez. El carácter de la política económica de la Junta Militar. s. f.  
 Nº9 René Largo Farías. La nueva canción chilena. 1977  
 Nº11 Galo Gómez. Los desaparecidos. Problema de todos los chilenos. 1977.  
 Nº12 Condena mundial a la Junta Militar chilena. Textos de las principales resoluciones. 1977.  
 Nº13 A. Witker. O'Higgins y el proyecto nacional inconcluso de Chile. 1977.  
 Nº14 Las malas relaciones exteriores de la junta chilena. Pretoria - Santiago: cronología de un contubernio. 1977.  
 Nº16 Por una restauración democrática en Chile. Documento de la Democracia Cristiana y respuesta de la Unidad Popular. 1977.  
 Nº23 Galo Gómez. La autonomía universitaria en Chile. 1979.  
 Nº32 A. Zegbe y A. Sule. Pinochet pretende constitucionalizar el fascismo. s. f.  
 Nº33 Laura Allende murió luchando por el regreso de todos. Documentos de un caso que conmovió al mundo. 1981.

La documentation française: Notes et Etudes Documentaires.

- Nº 3215, 4 septembre 1965. L'Experience Chilienne. (Les premières mesures réformistes).  
 Nº 3248, 24 décembre 1965. L'experience Chilienne. (La politique extérieure).  
 Nº 3423, 29 septembre 1967. Problemes D'Amérique Latine. 6.  
 Nº 3558-3559, 31 janvier 1969. Problemes D'Amérique Latine. 11.  
 Nº 3776-3777, 31 mars 1971. Problemes D'Amérique Latine.  
 XIX. CHILI 1970.  
 Nº 4006-4007, 17 juillet 1973. Problemes D'Amérique Latin. XXVIII.



N° 4421-4422-4423, 21 octubre 1977. Problemes D'amerique Latin. XLV. Chronologie du Chili: septembre 1973 - decembre 1976.

Partido Comunista de Chile. Boletín del Exterior.

N°20 Nov. - Dic. 1976  
 N°21 Ene. - Feb. 1977  
 N°26 Nov. - Dic. 1977  
 N°27 Ene. - Feb. 1978  
 N°28 Mar. - Abr. 1978  
 N°32 Nov. - Dic. 1978  
 N°33 Ene. - Feb. 1979  
 N°37 Sep. - Oct. 1979  
 N°51 Ene. - Feb. 1982  
 N°56 Nov. - Dic. 1982  
 N°66 Jul. - Ago. 1984  
 N°67 Sep. - Oct. 1984  
 N°68 Nov. - Dic. 1984  
 N°71 Extraordin. 1985  
 N°77 Mar. - Abr. 1986  
 N°83 Mar. - Abr. 1987

Partido Demócrata Cristiano de Chile.

1. Informe Preliminar Para un Programa de Gobierno de la Democracia Cristiana. Primer Congreso de Profesionales y Técnicos de la democracia Cristiana e Independientes. 6, 7, 8 y 9 de diciembre de 1962. (Libro Azul). Santiago, Imprenta del pacífico
2. Propositiones para una acción política en el período 1967-70 de una vía no capitalista de desarrollo. Documento de trabajo para la Junta Nacional del P.D.C., Julio de 1967.
3. Ficha de los 81 diputados del P.D.C. Punto Final, 1ª quincena de diciembre (?) de 1967.
4. Carta de Patricio Aylwin, Presidente del P.D.C., Y Osvaldo Olguín, Primer vicepresidente del P.D.C., al General Augusto Pinochet, del 18 de enero de 1974, (mecanografiada)
5. Eduardo Frei Montalva. El mandato de la historia y las exigencias del porvenir. 1975, Reproducido en Chile América, Roma, 1976.
6. Andrés Zaldívar y Tomás Reyes. Documentos internos de la DC con los que la dictadura que justificó la prohibición del partido. Diario La tercera 12 de marzo de 1977.
7. "Una patria para todos". Primer documento orgánico de la DC analizando la situación del país. Circuló el 12 de octubre de 1977.
8. "Propositiones concretas y actuales para el

restablecimiento de la democracia en Chile". Santiago, agosto de 1982, (mimeo).

9. Pensando en Chile. Documentos del IV Congreso nacional del P.D.C. Política y Espíritu, Año XLVI, N° 389. Santiago, septiembre -octubre de 1991.

10. Estatuto del P.D.C., Santiago, 1995, sin pie de imprenta.

Partido Socialista de Chile.  
(Coordinadora Nacional de Regionales).

#### REVOLUCION.

N°5 (o6?) octubre, 1976. Sin lugar de publicación.

N°14 octubre, 1977. Sin lugar de publicación.

N°9 Sep.- Oct. - Nov., 1978. Sin lugar de publicación.

Año 3, Primer trimestre de 1979. Sin lugar de publicación.

N°27 Sep. - Oct. - Nov., 1979. Caracas

#### REUNION MUNDIAL.

Comunicaciones de la Comisión Organizadora.

N°1. Documentos de orientación inicial. 1977

N°2. Decisiones sobre la Reunión Mundial. 1978.

#### RESISTENCIA SOCIALISTA.

N°6 Febrero de 1977, Bogotá

N°12 Octubre/Diciembre de 1978. Bogotá?

Partido Socialista de Chile.

LIBERACION. Boletín oficial del P.S. de Chile en Gran Bretaña.

N°2. Junio de 1978

N°3 Julio de 1978

P.S.Ch. Regional Europa. De la dialéctica de la derrota, a la victoria: un nuevo socialismo para Latinoamérica. Septiembre de 1978, sin lugar de publicación.

P.S. de Chile. Una salida creadora para la crisis del Partido Socialista. 1983, Impreso en los Talleres Oscar Polanco . (Berlin?) (Documento de ruptura de la fracción de "los comandantes" o "comanche").

Boletín Informativo. Febrero - Marzo de 1983. PS Altamirano, sin lugar de publicación.

Convocatoria al XXIV Congreso del Partido Socialista de Chile. PS Almeyda, Febrero de 1984, Talleres Eduardo Charme, (Berlin?)



El Partido socialista a las Fuerzas Armadas. PS Almeyda, Noviembre de 1985, Talleres Eduardo Charne, (Berlin?).

Partido Socialista de Chile (Almeyda).

CUADERNOS DE ORIENTACION SOCIALISTA.

N°16 Oct. 1983, Stuttgart.

N°17 Feb. 1984, Stuttgart.

N°19 Nov. 1984, Berlín.

N°21 Sep. 1985, Berlín.

N°22 Dic. 1985, Berlín.

N°23 Mar. 1986, Berlín.

N°26 - 1987, Berlín.