

DOGUS UNIVERSITY
SOCIAL SCIENCES INSTITUTE
MA OF EUROPEAN UNION STUDIES (IMPREST)

THE FUTURE IN THE STARS

EUROPEAN POLICY-MAKING AND THE EXPLORATION OF THE
FUTURE

-THE TURKEY-EU ACCESSION DOSSIER-

Karin H.J. van der Ven

200587004

MA THESIS

Advisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Esra LaGro, Jean Monnet Chair

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PREFACE

This thesis is my final product for the IMPREST Master Programme *Analysing Europe*. As a student of the Bachelor Programme in European Studies at the University of Maastricht, I developed an interest in research in this area. In September 2005 I enrolled in the IMPREST Master, which as a final project allowed me to embark upon a study of my own, resulting in this thesis. This thesis is a combination of the skills I have acquired in the past four years, and the topics that I came to like most in this period: EU policy-making and future exploration, and Turkish accession.

The idea for the topic of this thesis developed approximately a year ago, when I had the pleasure of 'peeking in' on some of the research done by one of my earlier instructors, Prof. van Asselt. In the same period I wrote a Bachelor paper about future exploration in the European Commission, and became increasingly inquisitive about the topic, which is relatively new and has not been researched extensively, hence leaving a lot for me to explore. Consequently, when I was asked to come up with a topic for this thesis, this was not a difficult choice.

Turkish accession to the European Union is a very topical question today. In addition to making this the case study for my thesis, I was able to conduct a large part of my research at Doğuş University in Istanbul, while completing the second semester of the Master Programme there, allowing me a perspective not many European Studies students have a privilege to.

A number of people have helped me in writing this thesis, and deserves special thanks. My thesis supervisors Prof. van Asselt at the University of Maastricht, and Dr. LaGro at Doğuş University have provided me with dedicated guidance by taking time to review my work regularly and critically and giving me advice on how to proceed. Mr. Martijn van der Steen from the Netherlands School of Public Administration (NSOB) provided me with guidance on my research approach for which I am grateful. Many thanks as well to Dr. Randerad, who fulfilled a special role in keeping me 'in check' in the preparatory stage of the thesis by asking a 'plan' from time to time. Furthermore, I wish to thank my interviewees, Mr. Öztürk, Mr. Emerson, and M. Missir di Lusignano, who took the time to answer my questions, and contributed enormously to the research.

In my four years of study leading up to this thesis many people have contributed, to a greater or lesser extent, to the skills and knowledge that I needed to complete this Master Programme. They are too numerous to thank individually, but I want to stress my appreciation here for all of them. Finally, thanks to my parents who ‘saw it coming’ for the past 22 years, and always allowed and encouraged me to pursue my interests.

Writing this thesis has only increased my interest in conducting more research; I greatly enjoyed it. I hope this reflects in the final product, and hopefully you enjoy reading it as much as I liked writing it.

Karin H.J. van der Ven

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The role of future exploration as a type of expertise in the policy-making process has increased in the past decades. Research about the relationship between future exploration and policy-making is largely limited to national policy-making processes, and there has not been much research of the European Union in this context. The aim of this empirical study is to provide insights about future exploration and policy-making in the European Union structures. Its main focus is on the Turkey-EU accession dossier; a topical issue on the European agenda today, as well as one with certain presumed orientation towards the future, namely Turkish membership. On the basis of the Turkey-EU dossier, closely related to EU enlargement policy at large, the ambition of this study is to derive meaningful conclusions for the wider realm of European policy-making. The study focuses both on the formal (institutionalized) methods of future exploration, as well as the informal ways in which the future plays a role in European policy making. Qualitative methods are employed to detect and analyse relevant policy-documents from the European Parliament, European Commission, and Council, as well as those from their sub-units dedicated to enlargement policy. In addition, an inquiry of external future explorative bodies in the field of Turkey-EU relations is made to contribute to a comprehensive view of the existence of future explorations, as well as their role in policy-making. Interviews with three officials, active in the EU-Turkey policy-making process in different ways, serve to complement the analysis. Theoretical insights in relation to expertise and policy-making, as well as the more specific field future exploration and policy-making are employed to position the findings within their proper field. The realization that future exploration plays a very limited role in policy-making regarding the Turkey-EU accession dossier is among the most important finding of this study in relation to the formal role of future explorations in the EU. Furthermore, the practice of future exploration seems to be closely intertwined with the actual policy-making process, and the involvement of external agencies is marginal. About the more informal relationship between future exploration and policy-making, it can be said in this dossier, the EU seeks to plan its future rather than explore it, primarily by establishing objectives and creating policy for the long-term.

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INTRODUCTION

One needs only to open a newspaper to see that the future is a popular topic. Although uncertain and obscure, the future seems to fascinate us. We fantasize about the future, anticipate it, have expectations about it, and plan for it. If only we knew what the future would look like....

This is the car of the future

Philippine Daily Inquire, May 27, 2006

Global warming 'profound' threat to future

Daily Telegraph, May 10, 2006

Technology jobs the way of the future

Turkish Daily News, May 17, 2005

Does NATO have a future?

Economist, May 2, 2002

Pondering the future for Microsoft

Financial Times, April 30, 2006

Blair plays down talk about his future

The Times, May 29, 2006

Union aims for big role in future of Kosovo talks

The European Voice, October 20, 2005

This engagement with the anticipation of the future can be traced back to the earliest oracles in hunter and gatherer societies.¹ At the time it was mostly the weather which people sought to know. Since then, ways have been found to anticipate the weather, but other than that, the future seems as uncertain as it was centuries ago.

The rise of capitalist societies and the simultaneous rise of the idea of change as inherent of life at the end of the last centuries invoked an increased interest in future exploration from policy-makers.² Since the 1960s the exploration of the future has been approached as a form of science.³ Today ways of exploring the future that breath a spirit of 'scientific' have become very popular in the arena of policy-making. According to Schoonenboom it is the increased awareness of insecurity which has lead to the recent popularity of the practice.⁴

¹ Heilbroner, R. (1995). *Visions of the Future: the Distant Past, Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 10.

² Van Asselt, M., Van 't Klooster, M., & Notten, P. (2003). Verkennen in onzekerheid. *Beleid en Maatschappij*, 30, 4, pp. 230-241.

³ Van der Staal, P.M. (1988). Toekomstonderzoek en wetenschap: over de grondslagen van wetenschappelijke methoden en technieken van toekomstonderzoek. Delft: Delft University Press. p. 1.

⁴ Schoonenboom, I.J. (2003). Toekomstscenario's en beleid. *Beleid en Maatschappij*, 30, 4, p. 213.

Examples of ways in which future exploration and policy-making have become intertwined are apparent in the Netherlands, where a number of planning bureaus systematically engage in future exploration on a wide range of issues, from demography to environment, as a basis for government policy.

The relationship between future exploration and policy-making has been the topic of academic research, especially by Dutch authors such as Schoonenboom, Van Asselt, and van der Staal. In their publications they explore the roles future exploration could have in the policy-making process, problems to be expected, and occasionally how to counter these. The topic of their research is however almost always the Netherlands.

A consideration of the relationship between future exploration and policy-making on the level of the EU seems to lag far behind. In the *European Journal of European Public Policy*, *Journal of European Social Policy*, and *Journal of European Studies*, as well as *European Union Politics*, an inquiry of articles on the topic in the past three years did not yield a single result.

It cannot be said that the future is not topical on the level of the EU. *Europa. Quo vadis?* has been an important question throughout the recent history of the Union. The Convention on the Future of the European Union attempted to answer it in 2004. In 2005, the European Parliament organized a debate on the future of Europe. And in March 2006, a special Eurobarometer on the future of Europe was convened by the European Commission to find out what the European citizens had to say about it.

The future of Europe has also been a topic of inquiry outside of the EU structures. As early as 1977, Peter Hall published *Europe 2000*, in which he considered a number of scenarios for Europe as the beginning of the next century.⁵ More recently, in 2001, Duff and Williams produced *European Futures 2020*, in which a number of alternative long-term futures for the

⁵ Hall, P. (1977). *Europe 2000*. The European Cultural Foundation.

Union are considered.⁶ The Dutch Central Planning Office came up with *Four Futures of Europe*.⁷

Still this does not reveal if and how the European Union makes use of future exploration in policy-making. This is the question this study will attempt to answer.

The realm of policy-making of the European Union is large, and becoming ever larger as the Union ‘deepens’. It would therefore be impossible to consider this question for the entirety of European policy-making. The focus of the study is therefore one specific dossier: the Turkey-EU accession dossier.

If the future is not topical enough today, then Turkey’s possible accession to the European Union is. On 5 October 2005, the two parties engaged in negotiations towards accession. Association between Turkey and the EU dates back to 1963, and since then possible accession has been on and off the agenda as a topic. The outcome of the negotiations is officially open-ended, which means that eventual membership is still not a given prospect. Whether Turkey should or will become a member remains a topic of discussion to date. Hopes are high from both the official Turkish and European sides. On the level of the public, the belief in Turkish accession is less strong. Turkish writer Orhan Pamuk prophesizes: ‘A union will never be realized. Turkey’s place is in a continuous flux. This limbo is what Turkey is and will stay for ever. This is our way of life here’. The future will tell whether he is right.

The focus of this study is not the content of the debate on Turkish accession, but rather the role of the future in the policy-making on the topic. In general, the study evolves around two main questions. Firstly, it aims to evaluate the formal role of future exploration within European policy-making. This involves the investigation of possible future explorative bodies and references to future explorations in policy-documents. Secondly, it aims to find out how, apart from the formal structures, the future is a topic of discussion in the EU policy-making bodies.

⁶ Duff, A., & Williams, S. (2001). *European Futures: Alternative scenarios for 2020*. London: The Federal Trust for Education and Research.

⁷ Central Planning Office (2004). *Four futures of Europe*. The Hague: Central Planning Office.

In addition to choosing a specific area of European policy-making, a specific type of 'future' is also delineated for the study. The future is a wide open space, from tomorrow to eternity. This means that in essence all policy is aimed at the future. The research questions become all the more interesting when talking about the long-term future, approximately 20 years ahead.

The core of the research concerns empirical qualitative research. The aim is not to test a hypothesis, but rather to explore a new field of expertise, using existing theories as a frame of reference. This frame of reference will first be explored, before coming to the actual empirical findings of the research. The next two chapters will serve to give an overview of prior work in relation to expertise in general, future-exploration, and policy-making. Then, the niche within EU-policy making that is researched is further laid out in chapter 3 and 4, which will elaborate on EU enlargement policy in general, and the Turkey-EU dossier. Chapter 5 will set out the methodology that was used to acquire the data and interpret them. These will consequently be presented in chapter 6 and 7. Conclusions and suggestions for further research will be presented in the last chapter.

1. EXPERTISE AND POLICY-MAKING

‘Behind the headlines of our times stands an unobtrusive army of science advisors. (...) They predict the course of the economy and set standards for high-way design. They compare strategies for exploring Mars and assess the future of genetic engineering. In sum they advise the government on nearly every area of policy, playing an indispensable role in modern states’.⁸

The relationship between knowledge and policy-making is two-directional. Research knowledge can be a product of politics in the sense that the funding system of research is controlled by policy-making powers and decides who participates in it, and what network relations are maintained. Most research is supported by government funding; the balance of knowledge among fields is a political product. Moreover, the assumptions and worldviews of science are shaped by expectations conveyed through the funding system and by the access it allows to various social groups. Funding preference determines what is real, important, and less important.⁹ In this not only the government, but also industry and public opinion play a role. Although this relationship is of less interest to this chapter, it is important to remember the possible implications of it on the European level, for example that the European institutions play an active role in determining what expertise is created on the European level, either through funding or commissioning it.

In the opposite direction, research knowledge can also have a prominent role in policy-making. Scientists are important actors in the shaping of the problem definitions and procedures through which contemporary policies operate. This is the focus of this chapter.

The traditional ethos of science assumes a ‘complete separation between science and politics’.¹⁰ In this view scientists are considered producers of objective knowledge. This older, positivist understanding assumed that good science produced truth and that truth-producers deserved a special role in politics. Scientists would argue from this perspective that they should have

⁸ Hilgartner, S. (2000). *Science on stage: expert advice as public drama*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. p. 3.

⁹ Cozzens, S., & Woodhouse, E. (1995). Science, Government and the Politics of Knowledge. In: S. Jasanoff, G. Markle, J. Peterson & T. Pinch. (Eds.), *Handbook of Science and Technology Studies*. (pp. 533-553). London: Sage Publications. p. 540.

¹⁰ Ezrahi, Y. (1971). ‘The political resources of American science’. *Science Studies*, 1, pp. 117.

substantial influence over a range of government decisions by virtue of their claims to specialized knowledge, as long as science is separate from politics, hence used as a base for political decisions only. Politicians equally appreciate science in the regulatory arena as a neutral mediating force.

In the past two decades, this clear-cut separation has broken down. Social constructivist tendencies have come to look upon science and expertise as socially constructed. Scientific knowledge is treated as a negotiated product of human inquiry. According to the more sceptical version of this trend, scientists are now perceived as hired brains of special interests and lobbyists for their own. Boundaries established between science and politics are artificial, temporary, and moreover, subject to political preferences. It may serve a politician to claim separation of policy-making and scientific knowledge. The point of social constructivists is not only that political uses of science are inevitable, but rather that it is not even possible to think about what science is apart from its various constructions. Social constructivism rejects any claim for science to guardianship. Collingridge and Reeve go as far as the claim that science is of no use to policy now that it has become politically charged itself.¹¹

STS (Science and Technology Studies) has, as a relatively new branch of study supported the constructivist assumptions through two major trends. *Interest theory* traces how the concerns of various actors are embodied in knowledge and *social constructionism* demonstrates how actors attribute objectivity or fact status to the resulting knowledge through social processes. STS has various subfields, which share a number of assumptions:

1. The recognition that what we take to be matters of fact about the physical world are significant social achievement that may vary from one historical setting to another.
2. The understanding that supposedly inanimate technologies actually incorporate social beliefs and practices, such as legal rules and cultural judgements of fairness.
3. The idea that the capacity to produce particular forms of scientific knowledge and understanding is indissolubly linked with other kinds of social and political capacity.¹²

¹¹ Collingridge, D., & Reeve, C. (1986). *Science speaks to power: the role of experts in policy-making*. London: Pinter.

¹² Ezrahi, Y. (1990). *The descent of Icarus: Science and the transformation of contemporary democracy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Whereas on an academic level social constructivist tendencies have become more popular, they are still largely mistrusted by policy-makers and scientists equally for a number of reasons. Firstly, STS in the minds of policy-makers and scientists has become associated with relativism and deconstruction of everything that is produced as knowledge. As such it is viewed with incomprehension by scientists and policy-makers, who still have a pre-constructivist view and whose focus is on the creating of new facts and rules. For scientists deconstruction has become equalled with ‘moral nihilism’.¹³

Secondly, STS has failed to meet the test of *social relevance*.¹⁴ Instead of going into ways in which societies establish and maintain boundaries between scientific and political authority, STS has limited itself mainly to studies on the nature of knowledge and reality. Moreover, according to Jasanoff, few in the world of public policy intuitively understand a field whose very object seems to be the question the supremacy of scientific rationality.

The role of STS is, however not doomed. As a proponent of the discipline, Jasanoff argues that STS should position itself in a more positive light by focussing on construction rather than deconstruction and emphasizing itself relevance to current policy-making issues. STS has the potential to provide a more nuanced account of the boundary between policy-making and science. Furthermore, STS has a potential in training policy-makers in constructivism in order to make them more critical toward scientific evidence. There is a close link between the ideas policy-makers have of how science is created and how this knowledge is used in politics. STS can be particularly helpful with regard to the first question and thereby also influence the perception of the second. As a prominent proponent of STS, Jasanoff argues that the political function of good science is ‘to certify that an agency’s scientific approach is balanced... and that its conclusions are sufficiently supported by the evidence’.¹⁵

It seems that policy-makers and scientists have not yet come to terms with constructivism, but at the same time are forced to deal with the reality of it. Constructivist tendencies have had an impact on their relationship as becomes apparent in what is called a shift from ‘knowledge’ to

¹³ Jasanoff, S. (1999). STS and Public Policy. Getting Beyond Deconstruction. *Science, Technology & Society*, 4, 1. pp. 67.

¹⁴ Jasanoff, S. (1999). STS and Public Policy. Getting Beyond Deconstruction. *Science, Technology & Society*, 4, 1. pp. 59.

¹⁵ Jasanoff, S. (1990). *The fifth branch: science advisors as policy-makers*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. p. 241.

‘information’ as a basis for policy.¹⁶ The transition from knowledge to information as a more socially inclusive means of knowing facts or accounting for, and guiding action has been a response to the need to keep knowledge objective or technically valid in context. By comparison with knowledge, information is more detached from the theoretical context in which it was produced, systematically conceptualized and justified. Because it tends to be more mechanical, information seems more accessible, and less dependent upon mediation. Policy-makers and scientists do de-contextualize knowledge in an attempt to make it more neutral and useful in policy-making. Ezrahi takes this argument as far as to say that to politicians, science is not the resource it once was, with which policies and public choices could be legitimized as impersonal, technical and objective. As a result, he argues, scientists are much less in demand by those who seek to legitimize their argument before an informed public. Instead the provision of information has become more important. De Wilde adds onto this by stating that the democratic force for objectivity has led to a relation between the status of professional experts and the extent to which they use quantitative methods. Experts are no longer believed because they are experts, but rather because they produce numbers. Here again one can see a shift from knowledge to information in de Wilde’s views.¹⁷ In practice however models do not give much more certainty than qualitative data, because they also depend essentially on the definitions of the data put into them.

This recognition of the declining role of the scientists is also emphasised by Brickman, who argues that ‘European political processes tend to place ‘considerably lower demands upon the role of scientific evidence ... [where] both ‘experts’ and partisan interests are typically represented in a single deliberative forum ... [and] scientific uncertainties can be papered over in the drive for a political compromise’ among the most powerful groups concerned with an issue.¹⁸ Scientists have become one among many to defend their case to policy-makers, and no longer have a recognition to guardianship.

¹⁶ Waterton, C. & Wynne, B. (2004). Knowledge and political order in the European Environmental Agency. In: S. Jasanoff (Ed.), *States of Knowledge*. (pp. 88). New York: Routledge. p. 18.

Ezrahi: Y. (2004). Science and the political imagination in contemporary democracies. In: S. Jasanoff (Ed.), *States of Knowledge*. (pp. 257). New York: Routledge.

¹⁷ De Wilde, R. (2000). *De Voorspellers: een kritiek op de toekomstindustrie*. Amsterdam: De Balie.

¹⁸ Brickman, R. (1984) cited in Cozzens, S., & Woodhouse, E. (1995). Science, Government and the Politics of Knowledge. In: S. Jasanoff, G. Markle, J. Peterson & T. Pinch. (Eds.), *Handbook of Science and Technology Studies*. (pp. 533-553). London: Sage Publications.

On the other hand, one cannot ignore the tendency of policy-makers on the EU level to establish 'neutral' expertise in an effort to maintain their separatist position and the traditional positivist idea of science. A characterizing example of this can be found in the case of the European Environmental Agency, as described by Waterton and Wynne. The European Environmental Agency was conceived in the mid-1980s formally independent of the European Commission yet designed to fulfil the objectives of the European Treaty commitments. The agency's main constitutional responsibility was to provide 'objective, reliable and comparable' information about all aspects of Europe's environment, in order to inform the Commission, the EU member states, the European Parliament, other policy actors and the wider public. While it was expected that the EEA would provide information so as to be relevant to and effective for EU environmental policy, it was nevertheless also expected that this new institution would avoid trespassing into areas of policy prescription or advocacy. The European Commission had assumed that it would be possible for the Agency to provide information without directly influencing policy. This assumption became the root cause of many conflicts between the EEA and the DG Environment. The official role of the EEA was to provide only basic data on the state of the environment. The DG attempted to keep it away from any policy-influencing role. Furthermore, the EEA had no public axis. The DG opposed the idea that the EEA should generate information for the public and argued the DG should be the one to disperse this information. Likewise, it rejected the idea that knowledge sources such as NGO's, local authorities, or even university scientists outside the editorial control and sanction of central governments should be treated by the EEA as legitimate interlocutors for an 'independent' agency. In this scheme, proper information for environmental policy should pass from official scientific sources through officially controlled channels to the EEA, which is to render them reliable, objective and comparable, to then pass it on to European policy officials. Waterton and Wynne observe that the DG Environment's interpretation of the EEA regulation conformed more to a politically conservative and positivistic notion of information provision, with no imagined corresponding influence over policy or policy networks. The European Parliament, NGOs and by actors within the EEA had a far more ambitious view of the role of information in society. Waterton and Wynne touch upon the idea that within one policy-making structure, divergent ideas can exist of the relationship between science and policy.

In a case study on policy-making on the European level in relation to the North Sea, Elliot and Ducroty also conclude that decision-makers still have positivist tendencies. Generally, there is a

demand for over-simplification of reality (this can also be seen as an emphasis on information) and intolerance when environmental experts cannot give precise answers. Decision-makers according to the authors prefer to remain ignorant to variability.¹⁹

Clearly, there is no single model for the role of expertise in policy-making. Based on the different views above, three general relationships can be established to serve as a basis for further reflection in this paper.

Competitors: The relationship of experts and policy-makers may be determined by a system of competition in which the scientists are placed on equal footing with other stakeholders outside of the policy-process, such as NGOs, in one forum as stated by Brickman. In this relationship the claim to guardianship of science is denied and a more constructivist position is assumed. Science on the other hand may also have to compete with the policy-maker himself in controversial policy-issues. Here, the policy-maker will have to clarify itself to the public and justify its decisions by countering contradictive arguments.

Customers: The policy-maker can fulfil the role of customer in that it uses the information produced by experts as a basis for its policies. Here the more positivist assumption is apparent in that science and policy-making are separate domains. In this relationship variations may exist based on whether the expert works on the wing of the policy-maker, or is completely independent, as well as the extent to which expertise is used for political purposes (pick and choose) or formalized.

Partners: Policy-maker and expert may be partners in their responsibility to create sound and grounded policies that are legitimized to the public. Here both a positivist and constructivist point of view can be maintained. The dispersion of knowledge to public both by policy-maker and experts can be a way in which this partnership is realized.

¹⁹ Ducrotoy, J.P., & Elliott, M. (1997). Interrelations between Science and Policy-making: The North-Sea Example. *Marine Pollution Bulletin*, Vol. 34, No. 9, pp. 686-701. Elsevier Science.

Conclusion

This chapter concisely described the relationship between expertise and policy-making as it is being set out in academic literature. Positivism and social constructivism each have a different view of what this role should be like, and what science can contribute to policy-making. In general, the definition between expertise and policy-making can be described as partners, customer, or competitors. One the basis of this literary review an interesting question comes up which should be taken into consideration in the course of the empirical research.

1. Can the relationship between future exploration and policy-making in the EU be described along the line of partners, customers or competitors?

2. FUTURE EXPLORATION AND POLICY-MAKING

Literature on future exploration and policy-making is not available excessively. This is not a negative point, because although existing literature may not be sufficient to establish a theoretical framework for this study, it leaves plenty of room for new insights and interpretations. The aim of this chapter is therefore not to establish a framework for interpretations, but rather to give an overview of existing research which may come in handy in the positioning of later findings, as well as give insight to my own earlier insights.

The limited amount of literature available on the topic leads one to consider also the studies of national cases. Among these, the Netherlands seems to be the most studied. The relationship between future exploration and policy-making was established in the Netherlands in the 1970 and has since then been institutionalized.

The first section of this chapter will consider different kinds of future exploration. Much of the literature on the use of future exploration and policy-making and the challenges involved however focuses on one specific type, namely scenarios. The focus of the study is on long-term future explorations. Within this field, it allows for a more general approach to the relation between future exploration and policy-making and does not seek to maintain this distinction all along. In many cases it is possible to generalize to all long-term future explorations.

2.1 What is future exploration?

Van der Staal describes the practice of future exploration as

‘the research of facts and knowledge about important developments in the environment, society and science, in order to make reasonable statements about possible developments based on specified methods and expertise, which, under certain conditions and with a certain probability will take place at a specified point in the future, with the eventual aim of reducing uncertainty about the future’.²⁰

²⁰ Van der Staal, P.M. (1988). *Toekomstonderzoek en wetenschap: over de grondslagen van wetenschappelijke methoden en technieken van toekomstonderzoek*. Delft: Delft University Press. p. 3.

Van Asselt puts it more simply by stating that future explorations try to imagine the uncertain and unknown future in a consistent manner.²¹ Future exploration can take place along a wide spectrum of time-horizons; the future is by definition endless. Van Asselt distinguishes between three main types of future explorations, namely long-term explorations, essayistic contemplations, and diagnoses of today. The latter can be used as a base of thinking about the future, but make no statements about the future themselves. The focus of this study is on long-term explorations, so the first two will be left aside for the moment.

It is important to distinguish between two types of future explorations:

- *Scenarios*: A scenario is a consistent view ahead on potential future developments. Not one single development is anticipated, but rather a number of alternatives are positioned next to each other. A scenario comes into existence by elaborating on how a number of existing trends will develop and possibly influence each other in the future. Scenarios by definition look into the far future, so decades ahead, and assess developments over a broad domain.
- *Forecasts*: Generally speaking, forecasting takes as its point of departure the development of a relatively small number of very issue-specific factors. With this it implies the existence of closed systems.

Godet argues that forecasting studies do not do justice to the complexity of our society.

Organizations and systems never stand in isolation of the rest of the world. According to Godet, scenario studies have become more popular recently because they are the answer to the questions forecasting has left untouched, namely those related to the bigger picture.²²

In addition, one can distinguish between explorative and normative methods of exploration. In general, explorative studies have the aim of objectively exploring the future through trend analysis. At large, they are value-free, and meant as a tool for awareness rather than policy-making. In the normative approach, a wished for situation is taken as a point of departure for the development of scenarios. These thus have as their objective to realize a certain goal. Among the literature on scenarios, use of the 'term' normative is somewhat confusing. Godet refers to normative in relation to scenarios that take an envisaged point as their point of departure,

²¹ Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, Van Asselt, M. (2005). *Houdbaarheid verstreken: Toekomstverkenning en beleid*. Den Haag. p. 11.

²² Godet, M. (1991). Actors' Moves and Strategies: the Mactor Method. *Futures* July/August 1991, pp. 605-622.

whereas others also use it for scenarios which serve as a basis for strategic policy-choices. Van Notten argues that normative scenarios are more suitable for application in policy-advice.²³ Most scenarios show normative and explorative tendencies.

De Wilde makes a similar distinction in his differentiation between 'passive' and 'active' exploration. Passive explorations are expectations about the future which have no intention of changing it. The simplest version of this is the weather forecast. Active exploration is apparent in promises, wishes and prophecies. Active exploration is also referred to in relation to exploring the future in order to sustain a certain agenda, for example in order to receive funds for research. Even more so, explorations as a basis for policy-making are also referred to as active, because even though the exploration in itself may be passive, the aim of the study is to lead the discussion on the future of a certain policy area.²⁴

A future exploration is thus a construct of thought about a reality that has not come into existence yet.²⁵ Such a construct of thought may be created in a number of ways. The approach toward the acquired information as part of the research is determined beforehand and characterised by rationality and objectivity.²⁶ The method of coming to a future exploration may be more formal or intuitive. Intuitive methods creative thinking and panel discussion play a big role. An example of this is the Delphi method in which a panel of experts was asked to make a number of statements about the future and come to a consensus about them. The idea behind this method is that explorations created by a group of experts are more trustworthy than those created by individuals.²⁷ A more structured intuitive method is one used by the Dutch Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis in creating long-term future explorations. First, the policy-question is determined. Then, uncertainties which are important in order this question are acquired. Various possibilities for these uncertain factors are then combined along a 2, 2 axis system and accordingly, a number of scenarios are developed.

²³ Van Notten, P. W. F. (2005). *Writing on the Wall: Scenario development in times of discontinuity*. Boca Rotan, FL: Dissertation.com.

²⁴ De Wilde, R. (2000). *De Voorspellers: een kritiek op de toekomstindustrie*. Amsterdam: De Balie. p. 17.

²⁵ Vlaamse Overheid. (2005). *Verkennen van de toekomst met scenarios*. Brussels.

²⁶ Van der Staal, P.M. (1988). *Toekomstonderzoek en wetenschap: over de grondslagen van wetenschappelijke methoden en technieken van toekomstonderzoek*. Delft: Delft University Press. p. 3.

²⁷ De Wilde, R. (2000). *De Voorspellers: een kritiek op de toekomstindustrie*. Amsterdam: De Balie. p. 62.

The more formal methods of coming to a future exploration are grounded in structured trend analysis and scenario development. In this case trends are schematically depicted through systematic analyses and given a grade on the basis of their relation to each other. Often here the cross-impact matrix is used, which calculates on the basis of matrices a number of most likely combinations of developments. These then form the basis for scenarios.

The difficulty about future exploration remains that the future is obscure by definition, no matter what efforts are made to forecast it. A shared aim of future explorations is to reduce or address this uncertainty, in most cases to serve policy.²⁸ In reality, it is never possible to eliminate uncertainty about the future; future explorations are not predictions, they are explorations of possibilities.²⁹ A large number of decisive factors may have been taken into account, but it is impossible to predict which factor will carry the most weight in future developments. Van Asselt warns that even those studies which seem 'scientific', 'consistent' and 'quantitative' do not by definition offer more certainty about the future.

Closely related to the problem of uncertainty about the future is the lack of proof for the effectiveness of future exploration. There is no proof that conducting future exploration leads to better policy-making. In his evaluation of explorations produced by the Dutch Central Planning Office, Hers concludes that the amount of studies which later turns out to be true is rather disappointing.³⁰ Van der Staal refers to a study conducted by Ascher in which he states that in general most future explorations do not live up to empirical testing.³¹

2.2 The (potential) role of future exploration in policy-making

The use of scenarios in the public sector started in the 1960s.³² Schoonenboom argues that scenarios have become more important to policy-making in the last three decades. A policy-making sector that wants to be on the map has to be involved in creating scenarios. An increased

²⁸ Schoonenboom, I.J. (2003). Toekomstscenario's en beleid. *Beleid en Maatschappij*, 30, 4, p. 216; Van Asselt, M., Van 't Klooster, M., & Notten, P. (2003). Verkennen in onzekerheid. *Beleid en Maatschappij*, 30, 4, p. 234.

²⁹ Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, Van Asselt, M. (2005). *Houdbaarheid verstreken: Toekomstverkenning en beleid*. Den Haag.

³⁰ Hers, J.F.P. (1993). *De voorspelkwaliteit van de middel-lange termijn prognoses van het CPB*. The Hague: Central Planning Office.

³¹ Van der Staal, P.M. (1988). *Toekomstonderzoek en wetenschap: over de grondslagen van wetenschappelijke methoden en technieken van toekomstonderzoek*. Delft: Delft University Press. p. 3.

³² Ringland, G. (2002). *Scenarios in Public Policy*. Chichester: Wiley.

sense of insecurity seems to be at the root of this. Ringland equally states that ‘scenarios have become well-established in the public sector’.³³ In a general guidebook for using scenarios in public policy, she even goes as far as to say that strategy based on the knowledge and insight of scenarios is more likely to succeed, encouraging policy-makers to take up interest in the future.

According to Schoonenboom, in the non-profit sector, scenarios can be specifically used as input in the policy-making process by giving impulses to policy-change. In addition scenarios may be used to explore the social basis for a range of policy issues, or to bring together stakeholders in the discussion of these issues. In this latter case, the scenario then has a communicative or even consensus-building function. Scenarios can contribute to interactive policy-making by strengthening dialogue and debate.³⁴ They can also be used as an educational tool to help policy-makers think outside the box. Obviously the demands placed on a scenario depend on the function it has.³⁵ The goals that future explorative research can serve according to the Stuurgroep Toekomstonderzoek en Strategisch Omgevingsbeleid are: agenda-setting and generating options; coalition shaping; vision shaping; prior anticipation of policy effects; enlarging the learning capabilities of the organization; and changing the ideas the organization has about its own role.

2.3 Challenges of future exploration in policy-making

Although the use of scenarios by policy-makers has become more popular, according to Schoonenboom, they find very little resonance in policy.³⁶ In the literature different possible reasons are brought forward for this. A number of difficulties in the compatibility of future explorations and policy-making come to the fore.

The use of long-term scenarios requires policy-makers to thinking ahead and taking decisions which might not pay off until a long time ahead. In a dissertation on the use of long-term scenarios in the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Dobbinga concludes that the use of scenarios requires taking risks, and is a daring choice. Dobbinga touches upon the selective sharing of information, and the fact that this does not combine well with the fact that for scenarios, collective thinking is needed to get a bigger picture. According to Dobbinga, information is only

³³ Ringland, G. (2002). *Scenarios in Public Policy*. Chicester: Wiley.

³⁴ Schoonenboom, I.J. (2003). Toekomstscenario's en beleid. *Beleid en Maatschappij*, 30, 4, pp. 212-218

³⁵ Schoonenboom, I.J. (2003). Toekomstscenario's en beleid. *Beleid en Maatschappij*, 30, 4, pp. 212-218

³⁶ Schoonenboom, I.J. (2003). Toekomstscenario's en beleid. *Beleid en Maatschappij*, 30, 4, pp. 212-218.

shared if this will help an individual advance politically. Politicians are always subject to electoral pressures, which make them unlikely to make path breaking decisions and risk their image of reliability.

This links up directly with another point made by Schoonenboom who touches upon the second methodological challenge by stating that policy-makers do not want uncertainty, but rather a foundation for current policy based on arguments. In essence policy-makers always choose the plan that brings along the least change. These observations are based on a report of the Stuurgroep Toekomstonderzoek en strategisch Omgevingsbeleid, in which the effect of future studies on policy-making is evaluated.³⁷ Schoonenboom argues that scenarios often have no relation to today, and expect policy-makers therefore to ignore the current state of affairs. For policy-makers to make path breaking decisions the realization is needed that ‘one cannot continue like this’.

Another postulated incompatibility between future explorations and policy-making arises from the mode of policy-making, which has shifted in recent years from *classical steering* to *condition setting steering*. In scenario-thinking a bird’s eye view of society is assumed. In order to properly use scenario, a similar way of steering society should be used. An example of classical steering can be found at the basis of Kahn and Wiener’s early work on the topic in *The year 2000*. Here they state that ‘the aim of policy research is not only to anticipate the future and make the desirable more likely and the undesirable less likely, but also to deal with whatever future actually arises, to be able to alleviate the bad and exploit the good. At the basis of this statement is the *classical* view of steering, implying that governments are able to change society completely with policy-decisions. The answer to the uncertainty about the future according to these authors is therefore also ‘flexibility in programs and systems’. According to de Wilde, top-down classical steering is no more, and has been replaced by a system in which society has become self-regulating. The task of policy-makers is to set the conditions for this self-regulation, but it simply no longer has the influence to change society as a whole. The *creatability* of society has become a contested concept.³⁸ Even more so, because national policy-making has become increasingly entangled between higher (EU) and lower (regional) levels of policy-making. On

³⁷ Stuurgroep Toekomstonderzoek en strategisch Omgevingsbeleid. (2000). *Terugblik op toekomstverkenningen*. Werkdocument I. Den Haag.

³⁸ *Creatability* is a translation by author of the Dutch concept ‘maakbaarheid’.

the EU level, policy-making is subject to national and regional agendas in turn. De Wilde argues there is no hope for future-thinking now that we have left the domain of classical steering.

According to de Wilde, the general shift to more quantitative information in expertise used for policy-making is also apparent in future explorations. References to numbers and models here are also as a rhetorical device to create an image of future explorations being scientifically grounded.³⁹ Dammers on the other hand states the opposite, namely that scenarios are often formulated in qualitative and general terms, and insufficiently meet the needs of those who need to make policy and find supporting arguments for it. In the case of the energy scenarios researched by Dammers, VNO hardly took the scenarios into account precisely because of the lack of attention these scenarios paid to the cost aspect of the different energy-options, which made the discussion too non-committal and not suitable to function as a basis for real conclusions.⁴⁰ The Stuurgroep Toekomstonderzoek en Strategisch Omgevingsbeleid makes yet another observation, namely that politicians prefer a 'foggy' playing field and are less interested in objective, quantitative methods as a basis for creating clarity around political issues. A 'foggy' playing field is more attractive for the political game.

Different authors claim that the world of policy-makers is inherently different from the world of future explorers. Future explorers are too focused on the pseudo-scientific character of their work by attending to logical consistency and plausibility, while at the same time focusing on the long term. Policy-makers on the other hand are more interested in supporting existing or intended policy in the short run.⁴¹

Schoonenboom argues that future explorations are too holistic, and that by trying to take into account a broad spectrum, the interface with the policy-issue at hand becomes ever smaller.⁴² On the one hand, the creators of future explorations state that too little use is made of the

³⁹ De Wilde, R. (2000). *De Voorspellers: een kritiek op de toekomstindustrie*. Amsterdam: De Balie. p.19.

⁴⁰ Dammers, E. (2000). *Leren van de toekomst. Over de rol van scenario's bij strategische beleidsvorming*. Dissertation Universiteit Leiden. Delft: Uitgeverij Eburon.

⁴¹ Bakker, Wieger (2003). Scenario's tussen rationaliteit, systeemdwang en politieke rede. *Beleid en Maatschappij*, 2003, nr. 4, pp. 219-229.

⁴² Schoonenboom, I.J. (2003). Toekomstscenario's en beleid. *Beleid en Maatschappij*, 30, 4, pp. 212-218.

explorations in policy. On the other hand, policy-makers find that future explorations remain too general and have too little relations with the actual policy-issue at hand.⁴³

More structural specificities of future explorations may also account for a certain extent incompatibility between policy-making and future exploration. Future explorations are generally different from 'normal' expertise in that they examine a situation that is not existent yet. Schoonenboom states that the weakness of many of these studies is that this shortcoming is insufficiently recognized by suggesting too much certainty of what is explored.⁴⁴ Van Asselt touches upon three methodological challenges of future explorations, namely uncertainty, discontinuity, and the plurality of images.⁴⁵ It is argued that recognizing these challenges and exploring ways to incorporate them into research would improve the usefulness of the studies. In her paper, she poses that these challenges are insufficiently met, and that instead a tendency toward certainty, continuity, and single images is apparent. She does not go as far as to suggest a relationship between these shortcomings and the role future explorations seek in policy-making, but it is not unthinkable, especially with regard to uncertainty and plurality of images that meeting these challenges would imply widening the gap between policy-making and future exploration. Looking at it from the other side, largely positivist policy-makers might be turned off by the availability of plurality and uncertainty, and find it difficult to unite this kind of expertise with their view of 'science'.

2.4 Who explores the future?

A large part of the relationship between future exploration and policy-making is determined by the actual agencies and institutions conducting these two practices. Above, it is implicitly assumed that future explorations are conducted by bodies independent of the policy-maker. In the Netherlands on which most of the literature is based, this is the case, but it should not be taken as a given. The policy-maker himself may also very well engage in creating scenarios. The policy-maker may assume a number of roles with regard to future exploration. It may ensure the practice of future exploration by instating independent bodies and setting their agenda. Secondly

⁴³ Dammers, E. (2000). *Leren van de toekomst. Over de rol van scenario's bij strategische beleidsvorming*. Dissertation Universiteit Leiden. Delft: Uitgeverij Eburon.

⁴⁴ Schoonenboom, I.J. (2003). Toekomstscenario's en beleid. *Beleid en Maatschappij*, 30, 4, p. 213.

⁴⁵ Van Asselt, M., Van 't Klooster, M., & Notten, P. (2003). Verkennen in onzekerheid. *Beleid en Maatschappij*, 30, 4, pp. 230-241.

it may give direct impetus for future exploration when a problem arises. According to Scapolo, foresight exercises are often undertaken when a government faces a specific challenge.⁴⁶ This implies a commissioning role of the policy-maker in the creating of future explorations. And thirdly, the policy-maker may conduct the future explorations himself, or include a future explorative body directly into the policy-making cycle.

A better integration of future exploration and policy-making may solve a number of the above issues. Schoonenboom argues that the solution to the gap between both lies in the integration of policy-makers in the future explorative process. With this he does not imply that policy-makers should conduct this practice themselves. Van der Staal goes even further by suggesting that in an ideal situation, the policy makers would conduct all future research themselves; since they are best aware of the purpose the study will serve.⁴⁷ According to him, it is only due to their lack of time and expertise that they pass the task to experts. However, it is arguable that the positive side of this is a certain degree of neutrality of the study, although especially when studies are conducted for the sake of policy this should not be overestimated.

2.5 Prior insights

In earlier research on the topic I myself developed some insights on the relationship between future exploration and policy-making on the basis of case studies of the Netherlands, Belgium and the European policy-making system. This research was very limited and explorative, and therefore not suited to serve as a serious theoretical basis for this study. However, since it inspired me to investigate the topic in more detail in this study, and therefore to some extent serves as a point of departure, it is only fair to share these insights.


The objective of this study was to investigate how anticipation of the future is part of the policy-making process on European and national level and what kind of reflection it receives in policy-documents. For this, I explored for the three case studies which bodies conduct future exploration and how these future explorations are in turn reflected in policy-papers.

⁴⁶ Scapolo, F. (2005). *For Learn*. IPTS, Seville Spain.

⁴⁷ Van der Staal, P.M. (1988). *Toekomstonderzoek en wetenschap: over de grondslagen van wetenschappelijke methoden en technieken van toekomstonderzoek*. Delft: Delft University Press.


I found that future explorative studies in two of the EU member states, Belgium and the Netherlands were very well institutionalized in independent bodies receiving their mandate from the policy-maker (i.e. the government) and producing future explorations for the sole purpose of founding policy. This can be described through a linear model.

Fig. 2.1 Linear model future anticipation – policy-making



Within the European Commission however, this practice does not seem to be the same. Instead policy-making and the practice of future exploration seem to be more intertwined, as depicted in the model below.

Fig. 2.2 Intertwined model future anticipation – policy-making



In these two models, three variables in the relationship between policy-making and future exploration come to the fore.

1. Who conducts future explorations?
2. What is the incentive for future exploration?
3. Where in the policy-making process do they take place?

With regard to the Dutch and Belgian case, future explorations were conducted mainly by external agencies, whose mandate came directly from the policy-maker. The studies themselves took place either by specific request, or based on a research agenda for periodical future explorations. The order of events was such that future exploration was always conducted prior to policy-making.

In the case of the European Commission, the impression was at least invoked that the process of future exploration and policy-making is more cyclical. Firstly, the incentive to conduct future explorations seems to result more from a direct need for this, so when specific policy issues arise. Future exploration does not necessarily take place at the beginning of policy-making, but can be requested as one of the stages in the process itself. Secondly, future exploration was often not contracted out to other parties. In many cases they took place within the policymaking unit itself.

The findings of this prior study are not sufficient to serve as a basis for this study. To a certain extent this study seeks to re-examine more thoroughly this relationship on the European level. What we can take from this prior study is the three abovementioned questions as a basis for further research.

2.6 Conclusion

The focus of this study is on the role of long-term future explorations in policy-making. This chapter brought forward that there are different kinds of long-term future explorations and that a variety of methods are used to establish them. The role of future exploration in the policy-process depends on the relationship between the creators of the two; which can be captured in a single or two different entities. There are a number of challenges in the relationship between future exploration and policy-making, based on incompatibilities between modes of policy-making, demands placed on input for policy-making and specific characteristics of future explorative studies. On the basis of the above, one additional question comes to mind which might be considered in the course of the analysis:

1. Although perhaps only shortly elaborated upon it may be interesting to find out whether different forms of future exploration (scenarios, forecasts, foresights) are differently used in the policy-process.

3. ENLARGEMENT

In the earliest stages of the European Community, enlargement was already an important objective:

The high contracting parties, determined to lay the foundation for an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe, resolved to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries by common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe ... and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join their efforts. (Preamble to the Treaty of Rome)

The EU Treaty specifies the basic procedure for enlargement, and the EU developed the specific rules to conduct accession negotiations in its subsequent enlargements. Since the field that this study seeks to explore is policymaking in the field of EU enlargement, the aim of this chapter is to give an overview of the playing field and identify the main actors and processes involved in enlargement.

3.1 A special kind of policy

EU enlargement policy is different from any other kind of EU policy. In essence, it is not a policy in its own right and it does not have a single location in the policy process. The EU's enlargement policy has very particular characteristics. It is a broad policy framework that draws on policies in a broad range of issue areas. This is what Sedelmeier refers to as a 'composite policy'.⁴⁸ A composite policy has two dimensions: a 'macro-policy', and a range of distinctive 'meso-policies'. The macro-policy concerns the overall objectives and parameters of policy. In the case of enlargement, this would be decisions about the broad framework and which instruments to use. The meso-policies translate these broader objectives into substantive policy outputs. This dimension concerns specific decisions about the 'setting' of the policy instruments in the various policy areas that are part of the composite policy. In the case of enlargement, these decisions set for example the extent and speed of trade liberalization in particular sectors or the length of transition periods in particular areas. A key characteristic of composite policy is that different groups of policy-makers have the lead for its different components. The policy-makers responsible for the macro-policy include officials in the Commission's DG for Enlargement and

⁴⁸ Sedelmeier, U. (2005). Eastern Enlargement: Towards a European EU? In H. Wallace, W. Wallace, & M. Pollack. (Eds.), *Policy-making in the European Union*. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 402.

its Commissioner, as well as the officials of the Member States foreign ministries. These make the major decisions concerning enlargement. Decision-making competences for the various meso-policies rest with sectoral policy-makers.

The focus of this study is the macro-policy of enlargement. This chapter, as well as the rest of the study will therefore focus on the process and players on this level, while only occasionally referring to the meso-level. The chapter on methodology will elaborate further on how the data were selected on the basis on this distinction.

Another distinct characteristic of EU enlargement policy is that the decision-making takes place on the intergovernmental level. The Commission mainly plays an advisory, and to a limited extent initiating role, but the important decisions lie with the Council. Consequently, domestic foreign policy considerations of the Member States play an important role in the process. Hubel rightly observes that the policy with regard to enlargement is a three-level game. On the first level, the public and the policy objectives within the Member States have an important role in determining the stance of the Member State, which is brought forward on the second level, of Member States and EU institutions. Only when on this second level a certain degree of consensus is reached, results can be booked on the third level, between the EU and its candidate.⁴⁹ For the sake of simplicity this study focuses on the second and third level, and leaves the domestic considerations of the Member States aside, treating them as a black box. This it can do, because it is not primarily concerned with the outcome of the negotiations, but more with the process as such. The chapter on methodology will further elaborate on this.

3.2 Why enlarge?

Aside from the ideological motive for enlargement of creating an ever-closer union and spreading progress on the European continent, there are more practical reasons why the EU chooses to enlarge, and why non-members seek for membership, hereby giving up part of their cherished sovereignty.

For the EU, the following benefits are worth highlighting:

⁴⁹ Hubel, H. (2004). The EU's Three-level Game in Dealing with its Neighbours. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 9, pp. 347-362.

- Enlargement offers economic opportunities for the EU and its member states. New member states add to the internal market of the EU, and allows for better allocation of resources.
- The EU's role and weight as a global actor are enhanced by enlargement. A wide Europe possesses a larger internal market and a greater share of world trade and thus has a larger voice in international commercial and economic affairs.
- Enlargement makes the EU more secure by spreading stability and prosperity to its neighbours.

For the candidate, the following factors often play a role in the application:

- Accession to the EU in many cases is expected to bring economic advancement, resulting from the EU's four freedoms (free movement of goods, persons, services and capital).
- The EU is also perceived to bring security guarantees.
- EU membership allows participation in the decision-making of the major force in Europe, which is not available through trade agreements alone.
- The accession process to the EU often serves as an anchor for domestic reforms and the improvements of social standards.

In addition of the above, there are the costs of non-enlargement, which are generally more applicable to the candidate than to the EU. As more neighbours join the EU, the disadvantages of being outside the Union will increase.⁵⁰

3.3 Process and players

The enlargement process is anchored in the basic provisions of the EU treaties and established by the experience of previous enlargements. Initially, the expansion of the Community was subject only to the condition that applicants be 'European'. It was Article 49 of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty which added as further membership conditions the criteria mentioned in Article 6.1 TEU, i.e. the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. It, however, neither provides a definition of Europe, nor attempts to define Europe's geographical boundaries. Beyond the respect for basic democratic and human rights

⁵⁰ Henderson, K. (2000). The Challenges of EU Eastward Enlargement. *International Politics*, 37, pp. 1-17.

principles, it also does not specify the political and economic conditions for membership. These conditions were first defined by the June 1993 Copenhagen summit, which declared:

‘Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;... a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; [and] the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union’.⁵¹

[and]

‘The Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries’.⁵²

Nor, except in a very imprecise fashion, do the EU treaties specify the formal procedures of the enlargement process. The procedures have evolved over the course of successive enlargements, however, and are by now well established.

Box 1: Enlargement - the procedure in short

- Application submitted to the Council of Ministers
- Commission opinion on candidate
- Unanimous Council decision to start accession negotiations
- First phase of accession negotiations (conducted by the Commission): screening of the candidate ability to apply the *acquis* and identifying potential controversial issues for negotiations.
- Council conducts accession negotiations on the basis of common positions by Council and Commission
- Endorsement of accession treaty by Council (unanimity), Commission, and EP (simple majority)
- Ratification of accession treaty by applicant and member states.

The enlargement process begins with the formal application for membership of a non-member state. As specified in Article 49 of the TEU, this application is made to the Council of the

⁵¹ European Commission, Directorate General for Information. (1995). ‘European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993: Presidency Conclusions’, in *The European Councils, Conclusions of the Presidency, 1992-1994*. Brussels. p. 86.

⁵² Commission of the European Communities. (1993) *Bulletin of the European Communities, Vol. 26, No. 6*. p. 13.

European Union (see Box 2). The decision to apply is an autonomous decision of the applicant country. After formal application, the next major step is the Commission Opinion (*avis*). The Opinion is a detailed analysis of the preparedness of the applicant country for membership, especially its ability to take on the *acquis communautaire*. It furthermore identifies any problems for the EU that might result from the applicant country's membership. The Opinion is not a legal prerequisite for beginning accession negotiations but is meant to assist the Council in making its own decision on the application. However, it is customary for the Council to wait for the Commission to deliver its Opinion before deciding to open negotiations. Because it identifies the main issues to be dealt with in the accession negotiations, the Opinion can also exert an important shaping influence on the negotiations. After receiving the Commission's Opinion, the Council can decide by unanimity to open accession negotiations with the applicant state. This is a crucial decision, since the opening of accession negotiations involves a substantial commitment of resources by the EU and its Member States. The decision to begin entry negotiations also launches a politically difficult process, as attention now shifts to concrete issues, problems and interests.

Box 2: The European Council

The European Council, which meets in nine different configurations and is made up of the ministers of the member states of the subjects being examined, has the most decision-making power in the accession process. The Member States are the parties to the accession negotiations on the EU side. The Council of General Affairs and External Relations (GAERC) is responsible for enlargement issues. The other configurations may discuss specific topics during the negotiation process. The most important decisions in the process, such as the commitment to start accession negotiations, and the final decision to accept the Accession Treaty, are made at the level of heads of states and governments.

The European Council is also represented in the Association Council which is sometimes part of the Pre-accession strategy.

In order to ease the path to accession the Council may decide to develop a pre-accession strategy. The pre-accession strategy targets support towards the specific needs of the candidate country as it prepares for accession. In this way, the EU focuses support towards the priorities identified by the Commission and the candidate. The key instruments of the pre-accession strategy are *Association Agreements*, *Accession Partnerships*, *National Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis* and pre-accession financial assistance instruments. Association Agreements in particular may already be concluded with a third state even if accession is not a defined objective yet. In

the preparation and execution of these instruments from the side of the EU, the Commission plays an important role.

The accession negotiations are essentially an intergovernmental conference between the Member States and the individual applicant country. They are therefore different from other EU negotiations with third parties, which are usually led by the Commission acting on a negotiating mandate granted by the Council. Before beginning the ‘Accession Conference’, the Council adopts formal negotiating procedures. These procedures have become fairly standard. The Council is responsible for developing ‘common positions’ on all problems posed by the accession negotiations. These common positions are decided by the Council by unanimity, on the basis of proposals submitted by the Commission (see Box 3). For matters related to CFSP and JHA – since these are intergovernmental pillars not involving a formal policy role for the Commission – the Member State holding the Presidency makes the basic proposals for common positions, although the other Member States and the Commission are invited to submit proposals as well. Much of the work in preparing common positions is actually done by the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER).

Box 3: The European Commission

The European Commission carries out the screening exercise with the applicants, conducts the negotiations and draws up draft negotiating positions for the Member States. The Commission also monitors the progress made by candidate countries and checks whether the commitments they made during negotiations have been followed in practice. The Council has requests the Commission to provide detailed annual assessments of the candidate state's progress towards fulfilling the accession criteria, the 'Regular Reports'.

The European Commission is involved in the enlargement process with the following subdivisions:

- **The Directorate General for Enlargement**
The DG Enlargement is the unit within the Commission politically responsible for enlargement. To a large extent the documents brought forward by the Commission with regard to enlargement are produced by this DG. If they are not produced directly by the DG, in many cases they're a product of a close cooperation between this DG and others.
- **Delegation of the Commission to the Candidate Country**
On the diplomatic and political level the Delegation represents the Commission and serves as a contact point between authorities of the candidate country and the decision-makers at the Commission headquarters in Brussels. It is the channel for day-to-day relations between the Commission and the candidate, and reports to Brussels on the latest political, economic and commercial developments. The Delegation monitors the implementation of the reforms undertaken by the Turkish government in the light of the EU *acquis* and the accession partnership's short- and medium-term priorities. It also gives support to the establishment and development of the full operational capacity of the structures required for the management of EU-funded external assistance.

The other DGs of the Commission are also involved in shaping specific policy in the process of enlargement. Depending on the stage of enlargement and pre-accession, the various DGs develop policy-tools in their own area, such as trade liberalization. These other DGs are part of what Sedelmeier refers to as the meso-structure.

Negotiating sessions of the Accession Conference are generally held at the level of government ministers or ambassadors and are chaired by the EU presidency. Before the conference begins, there is an agreement on the specific chapters of the *acquis communautaire* that are to be negotiated.

The accession negotiations have two main phases. The first, the analytical or 'exploratory' phase, involves an intensive screening of the *acquis communautaire* that is carried out by the Commission together with the applicant country. The purpose of this screening process is to

determine the extent to which the applicant can apply EU laws and regulations and what adjustments by the applicant might be necessary. The second, 'substantive' phase of the negotiations involves actual intergovernmental bargaining on the terms of entry and possible derogations and transitions.

The two phases of the negotiations may overlap. As soon as the screening of one chapter of the *acquis* is completed, the candidate countries submit their negotiating positions. The Commission then prepares a draft common position and submits it to the Council, which unanimously adopts a common position and decides, unanimously, to open the negotiation chapter. The negotiation of one chapter may thus start while the screening of other chapters is still to be initiated. It is customary for the EU to start negotiations on those chapters of the *acquis* which are considered easiest.⁵³

The negotiations conclude with an agreement between the EU and the applicant country on a Draft Treaty of Accession, which is submitted to both the Council and the European Parliament. At this point, the Commission delivers another Opinion, in this case on the Accession Treaty. The Council must approve the treaty by unanimous vote, and the European Parliament (see Box 4) must give its assent by simple majority. Once these steps have occurred, the treaty is formally signed by the member states and the applicant country. The member states and the applicant country must then ratify the treaty – each according to its own constitutional rules and procedures. After final ratification, the treaty comes into effect in the appointed day of accession, on which date the applicant country officially becomes a member state of the EU.

⁵³ Falkner, G., & Nentwich, M. (2001). Enlarging the European Union: The short-term success of incrementalism and depoliticisation. In J. Richardson (Ed.), *Power and policy-making*. London and New York: Routledge. p. 260.

Box 4: *The European Parliament*

Parliament's most significant power in respect of enlargement is to give its assent (Article 49 TEU) before any country joins the EU. This power is exercised only at the final stage, once the negotiations have been completed. However, in view of Parliament's key role, it has been in the interest of the other institutions to ensure its participation from the beginning, and especially the Commission has the role to keep the European Parliament informed about the important stages of the accession process. The constitutional basis for the cooperation between the European Parliament and the Commission is the Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the Commission, which was signed by the Presidents of the two institutions on 5 July 2000.

Parliament also has a significant role to play with regard to the financial aspects of accession in its capacity as one of the two arms of the budgetary authority of the EU. In the European Parliament, it is the Committee on Foreign Affairs, which is responsible for coordinating the work on enlargement and ensuring consistency between the positions adopted by the Parliament and the activities of its specialist committees, as well as those of the joint parliamentary committees.

Apart from adopting resolutions on the enlargement process, the progress of the candidates and the preparation and conclusions of the European Council, the European Parliament is involved in the enlargement process through the following:

- The work of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy (AFET)
AFET is the committee politically responsible for the institution's work on enlargement. This means that it produces drafts for the large majority of resolutions and recommendations of the Parliament. The committee coordinates the work of the EP Delegation to the Joint Parliamentary Committee.
- The work of the Joint Parliamentary Committees established by the European Parliament
Members of the European Parliament meet on a regular basis with their counterparts from the candidate country within the Joint Parliamentary Committees. The relevant country rapporteur of the Foreign Affairs Committee attends the meetings. The JPC meetings take place twice a year in order to exercise parliamentary oversight of all aspects of bilateral relations and to examine in detail the progress in the accession preparations and negotiations. Each JPC meeting is concluded by joint Declarations and Recommendations which reflect the progress achieved and the commitments for future work.
- The work of the specialist committees
The EP specialist committees nominate individual members to follow sector-specific enlargement issues. Their opinions are incorporated into the enlargement resolutions. As the negotiations move towards tackling the most difficult negotiating chapters, the various specialist committees of the European Parliament become increasingly involved in monitoring the process of negotiations in the policy areas for which they are responsible and the administrative capacity of the candidates to implement the *acquis*. Sometimes, committees send delegations on fact-finding missions to a candidate country, or organize a special hearing on a specific issue.

The outcome of the accession process is essentially predetermined: full acceptance of the *acquis* by the applicant country, with the possibility of only limited derogations or transition periods for particular aspects of EU legislation. In addition, new member states are expected to the EU's evolving CFSP (*acquis politique*) and its long-term political union objective (*finalité politique*).⁵⁴ The only alternative is premature ending of the negotiations and hence losing the perspective of accession. This brings us to one of the key characteristics of what Preston calls the EU's classical enlargement method, namely the inclination to shift adjustment burdens to the new members.⁵⁵ Due to the fact that member states have a major say in the process, there is a conservative bias against changes that are unfavourable to existing members. This is why the candidate can only enlist for incremental adaptation of the EU's institutional structure and does not really have the option to reformulate or renegotiate existing policies or instruments. According the Henderson this process, in which the discussions focus only on how and in what time-span the candidate is to adopt the rules of the EU, is highly unfit for the word 'negotiation'.⁵⁶

The length of accession negotiations may vary considerably. The most important factor affecting it is the preparedness of the applicant country. In a descriptive paper on enlargement, the European Parliament states that 'progress in the negotiations goes hand in hand with progress in incorporating the *acquis* into national legislation and actually implementing and enforcing it'.⁵⁷ Another factor is the nature and difficulty of the issues to be negotiated by the Member States and the applicant. The internal negotiations among the member states that are a precondition for negotiations with the applicant country are also. The EU's common positions in the accession negotiations must be decided by unanimity, and taking into consideration the variety of national agendas, this allows for lengthy negotiations among the member states.

3.4 Challenges of enlargement

Enlargement is hardly ever a smooth transition from non-membership to membership. The following two challenges are apparent in every enlargement.

⁵⁴ Baun, M.J. (2000). *A Wider Europe. The Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. p. 14.

⁵⁵ Preston, C. (1997). *Enlargement and Integration in the European Union*. London: Routledge.

⁵⁶ Henderson, K. (2000). The Challenges of EU Eastward Enlargement. *International Politics*, 37, pp. 1-17.

⁵⁷ European Parliament (2003). *The European Parliament in the Enlargement Process – an Overview*. Brussels.

- Widening vs. deepening.

Along with enlargement, or ‘widening’, ‘deepening’, or the intensification of integration of the EU’s member states is a key dynamic of EU growth and development. The two concepts are not mutually exclusive, although many debates on the topic focus on a ‘wider vs. deeper’ discourse.⁵⁸ In fact, according to Mayes, deepening is needed to facilitate widening, as changes in the EU’s structures, decision-making and finances are needed to prevent it from becoming unworkable and unaffordable with the addition of new member states.⁵⁹ The accession of new member states puts strain on the existing structures of the EU, and in anticipation of this, deepening often takes place prior to a new enlargement.

- The EU as a *moving target*.

In the course of the EU’s existence, significant developments have occurred within in the Union itself, making it a moving target for the outside world. The Union a candidate country applies to today is not longer the Community it was thirty or so years ago. The latest developments of the Union into a political entity have increased adaptive pressures on national politics and state structures in applicant countries.⁶⁰ Due to the incremental nature of the EU, the target of membership becomes ever more demanding on the applicant.

3.5 Conclusion

The Enlargement policy of the EU is of a special nature. This chapter has identified the main bodies on the macro-level in this process as the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament, and their sub-units specifically focused on enlargement (DG Enlargement, AFET, JPC, and GAERC). The process takes place at various levels, of which the ‘European’ levels will be considered further in this study. Furthermore it has given an overview of the process of enlargement and some of the motivations and challenges that play a role.

On the basis of this chapter, some interesting questions arise which may be an addition to the main objectives of this study.

⁵⁸ Brainbridge, T. (2002). *The Penguin Companion to European Union*. (3rd. ed.). London: Penguin. p. 161.

⁵⁹ Mayes, D. (1998). EU Enlargement. In A. El-Agraa, (Ed.), *The European Union: History, Institutions, Economics and Policies*. London: Prentice Hall. p. 527.

⁶⁰ Falkner, G., & Nentwich, M. (2001). Enlarging the European Union: The short-term success of incrementalism and depoliticisation. In J. Richardson (Ed.), *Power and policy-making*. London and New York: Routledge. p. 263.

1. Do the different bodies involved in the Enlargement process deal differently with exploration of the future or with the long term future in general?
2. Do considerations about the future (formal and informal) in relation to earlier enlargements play a role in the current enlargement?

While proceeding into the analytical part of this study it might be interesting to keep these questions in mind.

4. THE TURKISH ACCESSION DOSSIER

On October 3rd 2005, the European Council took time in its own hands by stopping the clocks. A promise made a year earlier to start accession negotiations on this very date made the approach of October 4th an unacceptable future, since Turkish foreign minister Gül had not yet arrived at the scene. Once he did, negotiations were started, and time was allowed to proceed again.⁶¹

The start of accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey was a watershed in the relations between these two parties. In the light of the topic of this study, namely the Turkey-EU dossier in its entirety, this chapter seeks to explore the developments between Turkey and the EU leading up to this important watershed. In doing so, it will also address the most important documents in this dossier, as well as the considerations that lie at the heart of the debate. As the topic of research is confined to the European Union, this chapter will restrict itself largely to the European side of the story, leaving for example the structure of the Turkish negotiation team and the Turkish considerations for and against membership within the public and on diplomatic level untouched for deliberate reasons.

4.1 Chronology and important documents

Turkey has a history of association with Western values, which started in the last century of Ottoman reign and continued with the establishment of the Turkish republic. The Independence War which took place after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was a political and military operation against the Western states but was not against the Western value system. Atatürk started radical revolutions to make Turkey a modern state and parallel to this, directed Turkey's foreign policy towards the West. After the Second World War, when political, economic and social organizations started to take shape, Turkey pursued this orientation through membership of the Council of Europe and OECD, and as one of the founding members of NATO. Turkey also became a party to the European and most of the major UN human rights conventions, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights.

⁶¹ Kanli, Y. (2005, October 9). Walls of Vienna couldn't stop Turks on the third attempt. *Turkish Daily News*, p. 1.

Official relations between the EU and Turkey date back to 31 July 1959, when Turkey applied for associate membership under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome of what was then the EEC, consisting of the six founding states. The application was accepted on 11 September of that same year, which indicates that the application was welcomed by the Community members.

In March 1960 negotiations between the two entities started. After an incident of domestic turmoil following a coup d'état in 1960, negotiations were resumed in 1962 and completed in the following year. The resulting Ankara Agreement was signed on 12 September 1963, resulting in Turkey being one of the first countries to be associated with the Community. The Association Agreement was an international agreement, based on the equality of both sides, and was signed by the EC as well as the individual Member States, and Turkey. The agreement contained both an economic and political vision. As a cornerstone, it aimed at the establishment of the customs union by 1995, and in three phases (Art. 2). In addition, it set the goal of free movement of persons, services and establishment by 1986 (Art. 12). Politically, it foresaw the possible accession of Turkey to the European Union in the future (Art. 28).

The three stages envisaged in the establishment of the customs union were:

- A five-year preparation period
- A transition period (two separate periods of 12 and 22 years as of 1973)
- A final period

Box 4.1: Turkey-EU accession dossier, most important events

July 31, 1959	Turkey applies for associate membership of the EEC (application accepted on September 11, 1959)
September 12, 1963	Ankara Agreement (enters into force on December 1, 1964)
November 13, 1970	Additional Protocol signed and annexed to the Ankara Agreement
January 1982	European Community freezes relations with Ankara as result of military coup in 1980
September 1986	Relations between EC and Turkey resumed
April 14, 1987	Turkish application for full membership of the EEC
December 18, 1989	Commission rejects Turkish application for full membership, but recommends completion of the Customs Union
December 31, 1995	EC and Turkey Customs Union agreement (enters into force on January 1, 1996)
December 12, 1997	Luxembourg summit – Turkey is not named as a candidate country (as a result Turkey suspends its political dialogue with the EU)
December 10, 1999	Helsinki summit – Turkey is formally recognized as a candidate for membership
March 8, 2001	EU-Turkey Accession Partnership adopted by Council
December 12, 2002	Copenhagen summit – EU leaders agree to set a date for start of accession negotiations in December 2004 (a date for a date)
December 17, 2004	Council decides to open accession talks with Turkey on October 3, 2005
October 3, 2005	Official start of negotiations (phase 1: screening)

The Customs Union was thus originally agreed upon in the Ankara Association Agreement (1963), and the specificities of how it should unfold were elaborated upon in the Additional Protocol (1971). Furthermore, it excluded agricultural goods and only applied to industrial goods, and industrially processed agricultural goods. As a result of the establishment of the Customs Union, Turkish foreign trade policy became subject to that of the EU.

With the Ankara Agreement, an Association Council that meets periodically to discuss matters involving the partnership was also formed, thus institutionalizing the partnership. The Association Council is made up of members of the Turkish government, the European Council, and the European Commission. The EU and Turkey each have one vote in decisions taken.

With the ending of the preparation period, the responsibilities of the two sides were determined in an Additional Protocol which was signed in 1970 and took effect in 1973. The Additional Protocol envisaged the free movement of goods, people and services, Turkey's harmonization with the EC's Common Agricultural Policy, and legislation on issues such as transportation and economy. With the signing of the Additional Protocol, Turkey accepted abolishing customs duties on the EU's industrial exports and adopting the common external tariff of the EC that is applied to third countries in stages assigned to different time periods. At the time, Turkey's economy was far from being capable of withstanding the competitive pressures that would arise out of the customs union. The transition period was therefore instated to allow Turkey to gradually bridge the gap between its economy and that of its new partners in the Community. The EC on the other hand unilaterally abolished its tariffs for Turkey. A transition period of 12 years for lifting tariffs on industrial goods and a 22-year-long tariff removal calendar for weak industrial sectors were foreseen. The customs union was to be attained by the end of the transition period, in 1995.

The 'final period' was to be the period in which the customs union would be operating in full. The agreement was, however not entirely clear on what else this 'final period' would include. About this, one diplomat comments the following:

'The Ankara Agreement stated that once the customs union was completed, the association between Turkey and the Community would reach its "final stage"; in other words, it would be replaced by something else which could only be membership'.⁶²

To the goal of membership we will return at a later stage.

In December 1976, Turkey froze its responsibilities arising from the Additional Protocol (reduction of tariffs, customs, in order to facilitate customs union). Due to the worldwide economic situation (oil crisis), Turkey could not manage to meet its responsibilities toward the

⁶² F. Öztürk, personal interview, April 4, 2006.

Protocol, because at this time, customs duties formed its main sources of income and hence the country could not afford to reduce these.

During the transition period, Turkey thus did not fulfill its responsibilities arising from the Additional Protocol, and tariff removal halted entirely between 1978 and 1988. Following another military coup in 1980, the European Community decided to defer the Ankara Agreement officially and hereby froze the political relations with Turkey. The European Parliament also decided not to renew the European wing of the Joint Parliamentary Commission until a general election was held and a parliament established in Turkey.

In September 1986, the Turkey-EEC Association Council met and relations between the EC and Turkey resumed. During this meeting, Turkey signaled its intentions to go ahead with its long-expected application for full membership, opening a new chapter in the relations. In April 1987, Turkish Prime Minister Özal made the bid for membership. The European Council referred the application to the Commission for an opinion in accordance with the routine procedure. The European Commission's opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession acknowledged Turkey's eligibility for membership, but stressed that the enlargement for Turkey and other potential candidates could be contemplated only after the 1992, when the single market had come into operation. Moreover, a detailed analysis of Turkey's economic and social development stated that – in spite of important progress since 1980 in restructuring and opening the economy to the outside world – a major gap still existed in comparison with EC levels of development. The Commission recommended the completion of a customs union stating that progressive completion of the customs union would give the Community the opportunity to associate Turkey more closely with the operation of the single market.

EU-Turkey relations followed this recommendation in 1993 with the start of Customs Union negotiations. After two years of negotiating, the EC and Turkey entered into a formal customs union agreement on 31 December 1995, which entered into force the very next day. This agreement formalized the EC's first substantial functioning customs union with a third state, thereby creating the closest economic and political relationship between the EU and any non-member country.⁶³ Turkey took the position that the Customs Union could not be regarded as the

⁶³ Çarkoğlu, A., & Rubin, B. (Eds.). (2003). *Turkey and the European Union*. London: Frank Cass. p. 5.

ultimate stage in Turkey-EU relations; rather it should be completed by Turkey's admission to the European Union as a full member.⁶⁴

In the Additional Protocol it was anticipated that even after a gradual transitional lowering of tariffs, the implementation of the Customs Union might lead to an imbalance in trade, and hence to possible negative financial consequences for Turkey.⁶⁵ In the CU Protocol, financial assistance was planned for Turkey to cope with these negative forces. This promise however was not kept by the Union, due to a Greek veto against it. This 'breach' of the Union's financial commitment led to discontent on the Turkish side in the political sense.⁶⁶ Consequently the short-impacts of the Customs Union put larger strain on the Turkish economy than originally anticipated.⁶⁷

At the Luxembourg summit in 1997 the European Council excluded Turkey from the list of formal candidates. Turkey responded to this declaration by denying further political dialogue with the EU in the two years to follow.

In the second Regular Report on Turkey which was published by the EU Commission on 13 October 1999, giving Turkey a membership perspective was recommended, and consequently at the Helsinki Summit which met in December 1999, Turkey was given the status of candidate country for the EU membership. The EU Council decision at Helsinki reads:

'The Council welcomes the recent positive developments in Turkey and Turkey's willingness to continue its reforms in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey is a candidate country on the road to joining the Union based on the same criteria applied to the other candidate countries'.⁶⁸

The decision taken at Helsinki is a turning point in EU - Turkey relations. Following the Helsinki Summit, Turkey was taken into the pre-accession strategy directed towards encouraging and supporting reforms.

⁶⁴ Turkey and European Integration (1997). Istanbul: Intermedia.

⁶⁵ EC-Turkey Association Council. (1970). Additional Protocol and Financial Protocol, signed at Brussels, 23 November 1970. *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 24.12.73. Brussels.

⁶⁶ Turkey and European Integration (1997). Istanbul: Intermedia. p. 42.

⁶⁷ In the first year of the Customs Union, the EU exports to Turkey expanded significantly, resulting in a doubling of the balance of trade deficit from 5\$ to 10\$ billion. Turkey and European Integration (1997). Istanbul: Intermedia. p. 42.

⁶⁸ European Council. (1999). *Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999*. (Nr: 00300/99). Brussels.

The Association Council met for the first time in three years on April 2000. A number of important political decisions were taken by the Council. The first was about the establishment of eight sub-committees within the framework of the Association Council, and the second focused on starting negotiations for an agreement to be made for mutually opening EU and Turkish markets and the liberalization of services.

The Accession Partnership, which was officially adopted by the EU Council on 8 March 2001, is a road map for Turkey for determining the priorities for the progress that needs to be undertaken towards meeting the EU's accession criteria. The purpose of the Accession Partnership is to bring together under a single framework the priority areas that need to be worked on, which were described in the Commission's 2000 Regular Report concerning the progress Turkey had made on the road to European Union membership, the financial opportunities provided to Turkey for implementing these priorities and the conditions for this assistance. In the light of this Accession Partnership the Turkish Government adopted on 19 March 2001 the National Programme for the Adoption of the *Acquis* (NPAA). Turkey's National Programme was revised and published in the Official Gazette of 24 July 2003 within the framework of the latest developments. In the revised National Programme which was made public, short-term and medium-term targets were clearly stated.

The Programme sets forth a broad-ranged agenda of political and economic reform. At the same time an agreement about implementation, coordination and follow-up of the NPAA was signed. At the European Council held at Gothenburg on 15-16 June 2001 the National Programme was described as a positive development, and Turkey was encouraged to realize the Accession Partnership which is the milestone of the pre-accession strategy.

In 2001, Turkey made major alterations to its legislation, in order to align it with the EU *acquis*. Among these are 34 amendments to the Constitution, including partial abolishment of the death penalty and the authorization of greater use of languages other than Turkish in public life. In addition, amendments are made to the Turkish Penal Code and other legislation, affecting the freedom of expression and the press, the activities of associations, the closure of political parties and the prevention of torture. A year later, Turkey implemented a total abolition of the death penalty, the allowance of broadcasting in different languages, and improved educational possibilities for minorities.

At the Copenhagen Summit in 2002, the European Council seemingly appreciated these efforts by taking the following decisions:

- Preparation of a revised Accession Partnership;
- Concentration of work on the harmonization of legislation;
- Development and deepening of the Customs Union;
- Significantly increasing financial cooperation; and
- Inclusion of financial assistance to Turkey in the accession budget.

Furthermore the European Council announced that it would evaluate whether Turkey met the Copenhagen political criteria in December 2004, in which case the EU would open accession negotiations 'without delay'.⁶⁹

The Commission report in 2004 gave cautious support to opening the negotiations.⁷⁰ Not all thirty commissioners backed the negotiations and President Prodi emphasized that the approval implied no guarantees that the negotiations would succeed.⁷¹

Nevertheless, on 17 December 2004, the European Commission decided to open accession talks with Turkey as of 3 October 2005, provided that Turkey bring into force six pieces of legislation on political reforms.⁷² In June 2005, this condition was fulfilled, and the Commission presented a draft framework for accession negotiations, setting out the method and the guiding principles of the negotiations in line with the December 2004 European Council conclusions, as well as a Communication on the civil society dialogue between the EU and its candidate countries. Along with the Copenhagen criteria and the implementation of the *acquis*, civil society dialogue is an important pillar against which Turkish accession will be evaluated. The framework was adopted by the Council of Ministers on 3 October 2005. The EU-Turkey Intergovernmental Conference met for the first time on this date. In parallel, the Commission launched the analytical examination of the *acquis* (screening) which forms the first phase of accession negotiations. This process allows candidate countries to familiarize themselves with the *acquis* and allows the Commission and the Member States to evaluate the degree of preparedness of candidate

⁶⁹ European Council. (2002). Council Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council 12-13 December 2002. Brussels.

⁷⁰ Commission of the European Communities. (2004). *2004 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*. (COM(2004) 656 final). Brussels: European Commission.

⁷¹ Sedelmeider, U. (2005). Eastern Enlargement: Towards a European EU? In H. Wallace, W. Wallace, & M. Pollack. (Eds.), *Policy-making in the European Union*. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 425.

⁷² Law on Associations, Penal Code, Law on Intermediate Courts of Appeal, Code of Criminal Procedure, legislation establishing the judicial police, and law on execution of punishments.

countries before deciding whether a chapter can be opened for negotiations. In the first, so-called ‘analytical screening’ stage, the Commission explains its *acquis* to Turkey, while in the second, ‘detailed or bilateral screening’ stage it is Ankara’s turn to explain its laws. The screening process is scheduled to last for approximately a year.

The Council adopted, in December 2005, the revised Accession Partnership for Turkey.

The process toward membership is ongoing. At the time of writing approximately half of the 35 chapters of the *acquis* have been screened, and formal negotiations have been opened on a number of chapters, such as Science and Research, and Education and Culture.⁷³

4.2 The ‘promise’ of membership

Turkey has been the longest associated country to the EU, short of accession, as well as the one with the oldest application for accession. This gives adequate reason to assume that Turkish accession is at least somewhat problematic. Before going into the actual content of the discussion about the accession, it is worth noting that the actual ‘promise’ of EU membership to Turkey is also a source of conflict, between and within both sides. The possibility of membership was first mentioned in the Ankara Agreement of 1963. In this regard, Turkey’s eligibility as a member was first stressed here. To what extent this mention of membership should be the basis of further obligations on the side of the EU is the topic of debate. As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, some understand that the ‘final phase’ of the Customs Union is indeed membership and that hence this is a logical and determined step in the relations between the two. The last Commissioner Verheugen may not have been referring to this agreement, but was stressing a certain kind of obligation of the EU to take in Turkey when he said

‘This decision to accept Turkey was made long ago. For decades, Turkey has been told that it has prospects of becoming a full member. It would have disastrous consequences if we now tell Turkey: actually we did not mean this at all’.⁷⁴

⁷³ In the case of Turkey, the *Acquis Communautaire*, which originally consisted of 31 chapter, was re-divided into 35 chapters for practical reasons in order to better implement the negotiations. No issues were added.

⁷⁴ Müftüçler-Bac, M. (2002). *Enlarging the European Union: Where does Turkey Stand?* Istanbul: Tesev Publications. p. 5.

The statement that Turkey has been waiting for accession for more than forty years is commonly heard within Turkey. Commission representative Missir di Lusignano states however, that ‘we don’t buy this argument’. Turkey officially didn’t apply for membership until 1987, and did not start real political preparations until 2001. Furthermore, the wording of the Ankara Agreement was ‘when the time comes’, but did not specify a deadline. According the Missir di Lusignano, a broad, vague perspective for membership is all that can be distilled from this. In an article published in November 2004 in 15 European Dailies, former French President Giscard d’Estaing held that ‘the promises made in the 1960s were related to the question of whether Turkey would enter the Common Market which was exclusively economic.’ These promises were ‘fulfilled when the EU signed a customs Union with Turkey in 1995’.⁷⁵

4.3 The future

It is not the aim of this paper to speculate about the future of EU-Turkey relations from here on. Practical considerations ask for a limited time-frame, which will be elaborated upon later. Nevertheless, a paper that is inquisitive about the future can hardly go without a short glance on what might happen next. The aim of the current negotiation process for both sides is full membership of the Union. Even so, in a nod to public scepticism continuous emphasis is put on its open-endedness, which in effect allows for a variety of outcomes in the end.⁷⁶ There are thus three thinkable futures for EU-Turkey relations:

- An unconditional ‘yes’ to Turkish membership
- Privileged partnership between Turkey and the EU. This would mean continuing on the same footing as before the start of membership negotiations.
- A ‘no’ to Turkish membership.

In this last case, it is conceivable that Turkey develops a feeling of betrayal and consequently an agenda of association with other countries. About this, Bernard Lewis states that ‘should the Turkish people feel rejected by Europe, given that they have striven to join it for more than a century, there is a strong possibility that they might turn to the other side’.⁷⁷ In 2004, Turkish

⁷⁵ A better European bridge to Turkey. (2004, November 25). *Financial Times*.

⁷⁶ Üçer, E. (2005). Turkey’s accession to the European Union. *Futures*, 38, p. 199.

⁷⁷ Lewis, B. (2001). *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

prime minister implied a similar course of events: 'If the EU does not give the expected go-ahead, it will not be difficult for Turkey to channel its huge potential in another direction'.⁷⁸ Although membership negotiations have started, it is yet unclear if and when Turkey will become a member of the European Union. In any case, the completion of the negotiations and the eventual accession to Turkey to the EU will probably not take place in the next ten to twenty years. This assumption is supported by the fact that Turkey has not been included in the EU budget until 2014. As the Commission puts it: 'Turkey's accession is certainly not for tomorrow. [...] It will be a lengthy and difficult process that could take a decade or more'.⁷⁹

4.4 Challenges and key issues

In its 1999 Regular Report, the European Commission highlighted the major problems towards accession: the political Copenhagen criteria (stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the protection of minorities); justice (emergency courts system, training of judges, witness protection, creation of a Penal Code, abolition of the death penalty); the military has important influence through the National Security Council; human rights; political rights; protection of minorities (Kurds); functioning of market economy; economic structural reforms in certain fields.⁸⁰ Since then, the European Commission has recognized that Turkey has sufficiently met all of the Copenhagen criteria. Nonetheless, this does not mean that there are no more challenges to face in the light of accession negotiations. For an EU perspective on the challenges Turkey still faces, it is best to have a look at the latest Regular Report of the European Commission. This report stresses that the Copenhagen criteria, which in earlier reports were still considered bigger hurdles for Turkey, have been met in terms of legislation, but that enforcement remains a problem, primarily with regard to:

- *Civil-military relations.* Turkey has a long history of assigning a level of political power to its military. According to the Commission, although the government has reasserted control on the military on paper, armed forces continue to exercise power through a number of informal mechanisms.

⁷⁸ *Turkish Daily News*, 5 May 2004

⁷⁹ Commission of the European Communities. (2005). *Frequently asked questions about the accession negotiations and Turkey-EU relations*. (MEMO/05/227, 29 June 2005). Brussels.

⁸⁰ Commission of the European Communities. (1999). *1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*. (13/11/99). Brussels: European Commission.

- *Corruption.* Turkey has become a member of the European Agency fighting corruption, GRECO, and legislative developments have taken place, but despite that corruption remains prone in almost all areas of the economy and public services.
- *Human Rights.* Although the death penalty was abolished and torture is no longer systematic, numerous cases of ill-treatment including torture still continue to occur and further efforts will be required to eradicate such practices. Discrimination and violence against women, including ‘honor killings’, remain a major problem.
- *Minority rights.* The Turkish Constitution was amended to lift the ban on the use of Kurdish and other language, but considerable restrictions remain in the area of broadcasting and education.
- *Market economy:* Financial sector supervision has been strengthened. The banking sector’s surveillance and prudential rules should continue to be aligned with international standards.

The Regular Report of 2004 stated that sufficient progress had been booked with regard to the Copenhagen criteria, and that now the emphasis lies with the correct implementation of the *acquis*. With regard to implementation of the *acquis* ‘Turkey [...] remains at an early stage for most chapters. Major points of attention in this regard were:

- *The four freedoms:* On the free movement of goods, overall transposition of the *acquis* is advancing steadily, but is not complete, while implementation remains uneven. No progress has taken place concerning the *free movement of persons*, and overall legislative alignment is still at a very early stage. Alignment remains limited with the *acquis* on the free movement of capital.
- *Company law:* In the area of *company law*, the alignment with the *acquis* remains very limited.
- *Agriculture:* Little progress can be recorded since the previous Report in the area of *agriculture*, and overall alignment with the *acquis* remains limited. Progress has taken place concerning in particular veterinary, phytosanitary and food, but transposition and administrative capacity are still insufficient to ensure effective implementation.
- *Taxation:* As regards taxation, there has been limited progress in the area of indirect taxation, while no progress could be reported on direct taxation, or administrative co-operation.

- *Regional policy*: The *acquis* concerning *regional policy* is relevant for the implementation of Structural and Cohesion Funds. Very limited development has been made and the overall level of alignment with the *acquis* is limited.
- *Environment*: Overall transposition of the environment *acquis* remains low. Administrative capacity needs further reinforcement and improved co-ordination among the administrations involved. The most intense efforts are needed for horizontal legislation, air and water quality, waste management, nature protection, industrial pollution and risk management.

Moving ahead further, the Progress Report of 2005, the first report to be compiled after the start of accession negotiations, already identified further progress in these areas, but noted that the pace of reforms had slowed in 2005. It recognized that implementation of the main legislative instruments had taken place, but that enforcement in many areas is still lacking. Main areas of attention in this regard were identified to be human rights, civil-military relations, minority and women's rights. In the economy, the Progress Report identified significant progress in the banking sector and recognized the increase of FDI. It states that further attention should be directed to a better allocation of resources. With regard to the transposition of EU law, a lot of work was said to remain in the areas of agriculture, environment and other sectoral policies.⁸¹

With the start of negotiations, the main controversies about Turkish accession on the level of European officials have died down. The Commission has been cautiously supportive of membership. The former enlargement Commissioner Verheugen often emphasized that there is no alternative to full membership for Turkey as long as the country fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria. Responding to questions regarding a 'privileged partnership' with Turkey, he stated that 'Turkey is eligible for membership. It does not matter that Turkey is so big, that Turkey is so far, that Turkey is so poor and that Turkey is a country with a Muslim population'.⁸² A vigorous debate about Turkish accession is, however, continued at the level of the European public, the Member States, media, and academics. The issues in this debate are more diverse than those addressed within the official Community structures. The fact that Member States largely depend on their public for their position towards Turkey, and are perhaps torn between these public concerns and those of the European Union, makes it useful to address them here. In this

⁸¹ European Commission. (2005). *Turkey 2005 Progress Report*. (COM (2005) 561 final). Brussels: European Commission.

⁸² Interview with Gunther Verheugen, 16 April 2004. Retrieved February 20, 2006, from www.edition.cnn.com/2004/world/europe/04/16/eu.verheugen.

vein, some of the issues discussed earlier on the EU level will be elaborated on here as well, to give an idea of the discussion as a whole, and to emphasize that the debate that takes place within the Member States until recently prevailed on the EU level as well. Not all of these challenges are on the 'plate' of Turkey, but all play a role in the debate on her membership.

Civilizational and identity issues

- *Europeanness*: This first item relates directly to the most basic requirement for EU membership, namely that the candidate be 'European'. Walter Hallstein, the President of the EEC Commission at the conclusion of the Ankara Agreement, made clear this was not an issue as he declared 'Turkey is part of Europe'. Valeria Giscard-D'Estaing on the other hand, a known opponent of Turkish accession, stated that 'Turkish is a country that is close to Europe, an important country, but it is not a European country... Its capital is not in Europe, and 95 percent of its population is outside'.⁸³ Turkey is an Asian, not a European country.
- *Obstacle to identity*: There are widely shared counter-arguments against the Turkish membership for its expected negative impact on the EU's vision of creating a European demos. European history often points out to 'the Turk' as the 'other' with fundamental differences from the Europeans. It is too hard to digest the cultural/religious traits of 'the Turk' within a common European identity. Huntington stresses this 'indigestibility' of Muslims in Europe.⁸⁴ On the other hand, it may be argued that precisely this 'otherness' makes Turkey European, since the Ottomans (if not the relatively young Turkish Republic) were instrumental in the self-identification of Europe.⁸⁵
- *Turcophobia*: Many of the arguments against Turkish accession can be captured under the term 'they are just too different'. Valeria Giscard-D'Estaing, on the eve of the decision regarding the date for starting accession negotiations with Turkey, stated that Turkey does not have a place in the EU since 'it has a different culture, a different approach, a different way of life'.⁸⁶ For these reasons, he claimed that admitting Turkey would be the end of the European Union. According to Schimmelfenning et al. Kemalism, the statist and nationalist doctrine of the Turkish state is partially based on values alien to western liberal democracy

⁸³ *The Guardian*, 9 November 2002.

⁸⁴ Huntington, S. (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

⁸⁵ LaGro, E. (2006) Personal communication, February 22, 2006. Lecture: Turkey-EU Political Relations. Dogus University, Istanbul.

⁸⁶ *The Guardian*, 9 November 2002.

and has engendered domestic political practices in conflict with core European democratic and human rights norms.⁸⁷

- *Islam*: Many Europeans conceive of the European Union as a project rooted in Christian values. Tekin mentions that ‘for many European politicians, Europe is not a geographical or political culture, but a modern reincarnation of the ancient Christianity’.⁸⁸ On the other hand, Üçer argues that the admission of Turkey as a country whose majority of population is Muslim, could create advantages by convincing certain circles in the Muslim world which conceive of the EU as a ‘Christian club’ and as a threat to Islam to stop looking for an alternative to Western ideology.⁸⁹ Javier Solana, Secretary General of the European Council, stated ‘the developing culture in Europe encompasses all civilizations. We have, in the EU, millions of citizens or residents who recognize in themselves both the values of Europe and those of Islam’.⁹⁰
- *Culture*: Apart from religion discussions concerning Turkey’s application for membership have also centered on the opinion that there are differences between ‘European Culture’ and Turkey’s ‘Oriental Culture’, and that these differences have negative effects.⁹¹ Former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt reiterated his well-known view that the ‘fundamental cultural differences’ with Turkey are of ‘decisive importance’.⁹² Others argue that Turkish accession will strengthen multicultural characteristics of the European demos and indicate its inclusiveness of people with different beliefs and persuasions.⁹³

Political considerations

- *Power*: Due to the current institutional set-up of the European Union, the population of Turkey is of great concern to the Member States of the European Union. Turkey would be the second most influential country in the decision-making mechanisms of the Union, especially in the Parliament. Concerns are often expressed that such a latecomer should not have such an important place in the decision-making which affects the future of all the EU Member States.

⁸⁷ Schimmelfennig, F., Engert, S., & Knobel, H. (2003). ‘Costs, Commitment and Compliance: the Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey’. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 41, pp. 495-518.

⁸⁸ Tekin, A. (2005). Future of Turkey–EU relations: a civilisational discourse. *Futures*, 37, p. 293.

⁸⁹ Üçer, E. (2005). Turkey’s accession to the European Union. *Futures*, 38, pp. 206.

⁹⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, OIC-EU joint forum. Civilization and harmony: the political dimension, Istanbul, 12–13 February 2002, Ankara: Etki Yayıncılık, 2002. p. 35.

⁹¹ Üçer, E. (2005). Turkey’s accession to the European Union. *Futures*, 38, pp. 206.

⁹² Duner, B. (2002). Why let Turkey in? In B. Duner (Ed.), *Turkey: The road ahead*. Stockholm.

⁹³ Tekin, A. (2005). Future of Turkey–EU relations: a civilisational discourse. *Futures*, 37, p. 291.

- *The Cyprus issue*: The Cyprus question has become closely linked with the Turkey-EU accession process. The most important issues at stake are the lifting of the embargo on the Turkish-Cypriot part and the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. It has become a touchy issue on the side of the Turks, as the EU has expressed it wished for it to be solved before accession, but is unable to make demands in this direction officially, since this would imply EU interference in Turkish foreign policy, next to the fact that the issue that is officially under UN mandate. Therefore, instead of making a solution to the issue a pre-requisite for accession, the EU can only hope that the accession process will function as a catalyst in ending the conflict. Opponents of Turkish accession have argued that through Turkish accession the EU is importing conflicts which could easily be left outside.

Economic considerations

- *Migration*: Concerns about migration seem to be at the heart of public opinion on Turkish accession. With a relatively poor population, mass migration is expected from Turkey to especially the Western EU countries. It is expected that the income differential will not be equaled out even in the medium-term and that therefore it will remain a strong incentive for migration from Turkey to the EU.⁹⁴ It is feared that the immigrants will depress wages and boost unemployment. Proponents of accession address this fear by stating that free movement will not become effective directly upon accession and that it should therefore not be such a strong argument against. Furthermore, Flam argues that this concern only makes sense in the case of homogenous labor, which in the case of the EU and Turkey is not the case. He therefore argues that highly differentiated labor supplies and demands will complement each other.⁹⁵
- *Funding*: Turkey's size, its large agricultural sector, and low income would make it the largest net recipient from the EU budget in the current setting. The present net recipients from the EU budget have feared that they will be the ones to bear a disproportionate share of the cost and the net contributors that they will be required to raise their contributions, unless the basis for expenditure is altered. Calculations made by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1992 that Turkey would have been a recipient on the then rules of some 12 billion ECU per year, which would have been equivalent to 15 percent of the

⁹⁴ Flam, H. (2004). Turkey and the EU: Politics and Economics of Accession. *CESifo Economic Studies*, Vol. 50, 1, p. 179.

⁹⁵ Flam, H. (2004). Turkey and the EU: Politics and Economics of Accession. *CESifo Economic Studies*, Vol. 50, 1, p. 179.

country's GDP, and 5 percent of the total budget of the EU.⁹⁶ Likewise, although Germany has officially backs Turkey's bid, the Christian Democrats, who are currently in Germany's government, argue that Turkey's admission could be 'political suicide', alleging that Turkey's membership would 'overtax' the EU's capacity for integration and hinder economic growth within the bloc.⁹⁷

Note needs to be taken here that the European public, of which in 2005 52 percent did not welcome Turkish accession⁹⁸, is generally not well-informed about enlargement issues⁹⁹. Öztürk even suggests that 'in some polls in the Netherlands, some people said that Turkey was a member of the EU already, because of the discussion of Turkey-EU'.¹⁰⁰ Moreover perceptions are largely shaped by factors emanating from internal social and economic problems of the EU, such as xenophobia due to high unemployment and illegal migration and the perception of Islam as a threat.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, these ambiguities will have to be addressed at a certain point in time, if Turkish accession is to be pursued. According to Falkner and Nentwich, there has been a tendency so far to keep the controversy of Turkish accession out of the public debate, specifically in election campaigns, leaving the topic to opposition parties. This in turn brings into danger the entire objective of enlargement, and further indicates a discrepancy between what is discussed on EU level and on the national level, in the long run bringing the EU further away from citizens rather than closer.¹⁰² This brings an important task to Turkey to win the hearts and minds of the people.¹⁰³ In the meantime Turkey continues to present the EU with difficult dilemmas and to receive a mix of ambivalent signals from the EU's member governments.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁶ House of Lords. (1992). *Enlargement of the Community*, Select Commity on the European Communities., Session 1991-2 10th Report., HL55, HMSO.

⁹⁷ Müftüler-Bac, M., (2002). Turkey in the EU's enlargement process: obstacles and challenges. *Mediterranean Politics*, 7, (2), p. 79.

⁹⁸ European Commission. (2005). Standard Eurobarometer 63/ Spring 2005 TNS Opinion & Social. Brussels.

⁹⁹ In a Eurobarometer poll in 2001, 44% percent of the European respondents said they felt to be uninformed about EU enlargement in general. Ten percent said they thought Turkey would accede among the first wave of entrants in 2004, while at the time it still had not started accession negotiations yet. European Commission. (2001). Standard Eurobarometer. Spring 2001 TNS Opinion & Social. Brussels. In the 2005 Spring Eurobarometer, 51% percent of all respondents said they felt they knew little about the European Union's most important issues in general. European Commission. (2005). Standard Eurobarometer 63/ Spring 2005 TNS Opinion & Social. Brussels.

¹⁰⁰ F. Öztürk, personal interview, April 4, 2006.

¹⁰¹ Güney, A. (2005). The Future of Turkey in the European Union. *Futures*, 37, pp. 303–316.

¹⁰² Falkner, G., & Nentwich, M. (2001). Enlarging the European Union: The short-term success of incrementalism and depoliticisation. In J. Richardson (Ed.), *Power and policy-making*. London and New York: Routledge. p. 273.

¹⁰³ Grabbe, H. (2004). 'When Negotiations Begin: the Next Phase in EU-Turkey Relations'. Center for European Reform Essays. London. p. 3.

¹⁰⁴ Sedelmeider, U. (2005). Eastern Enlargement: Towards a European EU? In H. Wallace, W. Wallace, & M. Pollack. (Eds.), *Policy-making in the European Union*. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 425.

Note should be taken as well that these issues have not always been at the center of the debate about Turkish accession. As has been stated with regard to the point of Europeanness, this was not an issue in the mind of Walter Hallstein. In fact, such principle issues only came to the fore in 1997, when at a Conference of Christian Democrat Party leaders from European Member States, Chancellor Kohl announced that: 'The EU is a Christian Club, Turkey cannot join'¹⁰⁵ and Jacques Santer, the then President of the Commission states that Turkey did not have a serious chance of joining the European Union.¹⁰⁶ On the basis of sources of such objections found, it is hard to deny the idea that these have become more prominent as time passed. Furthermore, the EU's incremental nature has lifted the slat for Turkey, making membership more demanding for Turkey, or any candidate, as time passed. Based on these considerations some scholars argue that if had not been for domestic and international issues, and had Turkey been able to move in a steady pace since 1963, membership would have been attained long ago.¹⁰⁷ A more recent example of this type of reasoning is the fact that while for the CEEC enlargement wave the mere adoption of *acquis* was enough, now the emphasis is laid on the implementation of it for current negotiating states. The EU is learning by doing.¹⁰⁸

The issues above are largely those which cause opposition of Turkish accession. In the overview above, only limited attention is paid to the counter-arguments to these concerns. For the sake of balance, below you find as short excerpt of a Turkish paper advocating membership, and its ideas on the benefits of accession for the EU:¹⁰⁹

- Turkey has a large and dynamic market which could contribute to the internal market of the Union.
- The benefits from increased trade as a result of higher incomes in Turkey are hard to quantify, yet are likely to be very substantial over time.
- Regional stability and security will be consolidated. The incorporation of Turkey into the EU will help stabilize the situation in a large and potentially volatile region extending from the

¹⁰⁵ Cited in Güney, A. (2005). The Future of Turkey in the European Union. *Futures*, 37, pp. 303–316

¹⁰⁶ Emerson, M., Aydın, S., Noutcheva, G., Tocci, N., Vahl, M., & Youngs, R. (2005). *The Reluctant Debutante – The EU as a Promoter of Democracy in its Neighbourhood*. Center of European Policy Studies (CEPS) Working Document No. 223/ July 2005. Brussels: CEPS.

¹⁰⁷ LaGro, E. (2006) Personal communication, February 22, 2006. Lecture: Turkey-EU Political Relations. Dogus University, Istanbul.

¹⁰⁸ LaGro, E. (2006) Personal communication, February 22, 2006. Lecture: Turkey-EU Political Relations. Dogus University, Istanbul.

¹⁰⁹ *Turkey and European Integration*. (1997). Istanbul: Intermedia.

Balkans to the Caucasus. Due to this stability, the EU is likely to experience economic as well as political benefits. In addition the European countries should be able to reduce defence expenditures.

- Contemporary Turkey and Turkish culture are young and vigorous, but also have deep cultural and historical roots. Turkish society offers Europe as blend of centuries of experience and accomplishments combined with the principle of openness, pluralism and cosmopolitanism.
- The admission of a stable, secular and prosperous Turkey will have important consequences for Turkey's relationship with Islam. It will lessen polarization and reduce existing cultural tensions. It will show that a modern and a European destiny is conceivable for Islamic countries.

4.5 Attitudes

In accordance with the three possible futures that can take place, there are three 'camps' in the EU-Turkey debate: 1) the 'for' accession camp, 2) the 'against' accession camp and 3) the 'privileged partnership camp'. Tekin adds another important position, namely that of the 'wait and see' camp.¹¹⁰ According to Friss and Murphy, the 'wait and see' attitude is typical of decisions that are taken on the intergovernmental level, such as those relating to enlargement.¹¹¹ In this setting, the decision-making procedure creates an inbuilt tendency to postpone decisions to the very last minute or until crisis occurs. Accordingly, the big decision of 'yes' or 'no' to Turkey is deconstructed into smaller stages. Two examples of the 'wait and see' attitude, which according to Tekin is prevalent with regard to Turkish accession, are the decision at Nice to omit Turkey from the calculation of voting power in an enlarged Union and the fact that Turkey was not considered in the formation of the budget until 2013.¹¹² Grabbe argues that the EU secretly hopes that Turkey's accession negotiations will take a very long time, allowing the Union to put off the difficult issues implied by Turkey's membership.¹¹³ The 'wait and see' attitude has some benefits over the 'no' camp, because by not closing the door on membership, the EU remains

¹¹⁰ Tekin, A. (2005). Future of Turkey-EU relations: a civilisational discourse. *Futures*, 37, pp. 287-302.

¹¹¹ Friis, L., & Murphy, A. (1999). 'The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Governance and Boundaries'. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 37, 2, pp. 211-232.

¹¹² M. Müftüleri-Bac. (2002). *Enlarging the European Union: Where does Turkey Stand?* Istanbul: TESEV Publications. p. 13.

¹¹³ Grabbe, H. (2004). 'When Negotiations Begin: the Next Phase in EU-Turkey Relations'. Center for European Reform Essays. London. p. 2.

able to exert an influence on the candidate and export its model of political and economic standards. In the case of Yugoslavia and Albania, the Commission stated that ‘the European Union can best contribute to stability in the region by drawing it closer to the perspective of full integration within its structure’.¹¹⁴ The same argument might apply here.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter sought to bring forward the chronology of Turkey-EU relations leading up to the current state of negotiations, as well as to give an insight into the most important considerations that play a role in the debate on Turkish accession. The most important documents in the dossier can be considered the *Ankara Agreement (1963)*, the *Additional Protocol (1970)*, the Commission opinion on Turkey, the Commission *Regular Reports*, and the *Accession Partnership Documents*. Turkey has recently embarked upon the first stage in its accession negotiations, based on the Commission conclusion that it met all of the Copenhagen Criteria. This negotiation-process is open-ended, meaning that no obligations arise on the side of the European Union. The debate on Turkish accession takes place on a variety of levels, and focuses to a large extent on public concerns.

On the basis of the issues described in this chapter, some choices can be made with regard to the study at hand. Firstly, this chapter has illuminated that it is yet unclear if and when Turkish accession will take place. In our search for ‘thinking about the future’ bluntly stated, any document about Turkish accession could therefore qualify as a long-term policy-document. Allowing this would blind our view for more valuable data. Therefore, the choice has been made to focus on those policy-documents which take a long-term perspective on Turkey or the EU individually, or elaborate on the long-term effects of accession specifically.

Furthermore, as has been shown in this chapter, Turkey in October 2005 embarked upon a new stage in Turkey-EU relations, namely that of accession negotiations. For that reason, it seems logical to take this date as the end-date of our investigation, since the stage embarked upon since then has not been closed yet. The chapter on methodology will further elaborate on this.

On the basis of the above, a number of small questions may be considered when analyzing the date, in order to shed an extra light on the findings of this study:

¹¹⁴ European Commission. (1999). *Regular Report from the Commission on Progress towards Accession by each of the candidate countries*. Brussels: European Commission.

1. Are the challenges of Turkish enlargement as conceived in the overall debate addressed by 'thinking about the future'? This question can also be reversed (knowing that the conceived 'challenges/ arguments against have not always been the same): to what extent do considerations (explorations and thoughts) about the long-term future reflect the concerns in the accession debate?
2. What role did 'future exploration' and 'thinking about the long-term future' play in the course of the Turkey-EU accession dossier, especially with regard to the important decisions made, such as acceptance or rejection of Turkish applications for association and membership?
3. Are future explorations specifically or predominantly used to sustain arguments in favor or against membership?

5. METHODOLOGY

The previous chapters have set the scene of the research. This chapter comes to the practical research itself. The main aim of this chapter is to describe the methodology of the research, thus the way in which it went about getting an answer to its objectives. The research itself formed the bigger part of this study, so the methodology needs ample explanation.

5.1 Research questions

The grand aim of this study is to gain more insight into the use of future explorative studies in the European Union. To that end, it will attempt to investigate and describe the following:

1. The role of future explorative studies in policy-making
2. The long-term ‘future’ as it is being considered within the European Union

5.2 Link to existing theory

The core of this study concerns empirical qualitative research. This definitely does not mean that the research is a-theoretical. The conclusions will be translated into or connected to earlier theoretical work. In fact, the theoretical framework will serve as a way to interpret the findings and position them against and within earlier research. The aim of this study is not to test a hypothesis, but rather to explore a phenomenon which has not been much researched. Hence the research questions are open-ended, and were open for change in the course of the study, as was the research approach itself.

Existing theory on the topic of future exploration and policy-making, served to establish a basis for this study. In particular, it created a prior understanding of the fact that future exploration may be conducted both by the policy-maker or an external agency. The research approach was thus adapted to locate future explorations in both these cases.

Furthermore, personal prior research on the topic was not considered a framework of reference, but rather an idea in the making, which could be further supported or contradicted by the

findings of this research. This was considered especially relevant in relation to the model implying a cyclical relationship between the EU policy-making and future exploration.¹¹⁵

5.3 The case study

An attempt will be made to answer the above questions on the basis of the Turkey-EU accession dossier, and possibly draw conclusions which are meaningful for EU policy-making in general.

The case of Turkish accession provides an interesting case study for a number of reasons:

- The dossier dates back to 1963 and is still on the EU political agenda today. This allows for a long term spectrum of research.
- The Turkish accession as such is and has always been a point in the future.
- A longer time-frame would be hard to sustain in this case, because before the 1960s the practice of future exploration as a policy-support activity had not developed as such. This would hamper the research from a different side.

As shown by the short chronology of Turkey-EU relations since 1963 in the previous chapter, enlargement has not always been a priority in the relationship between the two. Especially at times when progress towards accession ceased such as in the 1970s, the relationship fell under the EU foreign policy rather than enlargement. Considering all relationships between the EU and Turkey is beyond the scope of this research. Instead it will focus on the EU-Turkey accession dossier, which as has been established in the previous chapter, was initialled in 1959 and is still on the agenda today. In this study, the terms ‘EU-Turkey dossier’ and ‘EU-Turkey accession dossier’ will be used alternately and will in all cases refer to the accession relations between Turkey and the European Union.

The specificities of the case study asked for a number of choices in relation to the research. Some of these were stipulated by earlier chapters, but it is useful to rephrase them here.

Apart from the three ‘main’ European institutions, European Commission, European Parliament, and the European Council, there are a large number of sub-institutions involved in the policy-

¹¹⁵ See chapter 2, Future exploration and policy-making; Prior insights.

making on the EU-Turkey dossier. The choice was made on the basis of Sedelmeier's theory to focus on the macro-structures only.

Note should be taken of the fact that much of the decision-making with regard to enlargement is of an intergovernmental nature and takes place in the Council. It is here that Member States exercise their national foreign policies, if necessary through veto-right. The scope of the research does not include politics in the EU Member States. It will consider the state a 'black box', not taking into consideration the ways in which it came to its national decision. What is of interest is the way in which on the level of the Council, reference is made to future explorative bodies. It is imaginable that here reference is made to national future explorative bodies. These national future explorative bodies themselves, however, will not be investigated as such.

Since Turkish accession has not taken place yet, there is no real natural end to the period under consideration. Therefore a pragmatic decision was made to delineate the period of research between two path-breaking events in the dossier, namely from the conclusion of the Turkey-EEC Association Agreement in 1963, until the opening of accession negotiations on 5 October 2005. Furthermore, and most importantly, one should be aware that Turkish accession is not a defined date. Therefore, one could, on the basis of the assumption that this is a long-term goal, designate all documents focussing on Turkish accession and the short, medium and long-term effects thereof as long-term explorative. This would blur the picture of what this study is looking for. Hence this study will not take into consideration explorations of the short and medium-term effects of enlargement, even though these may take place only in 20 years or so. Instead, the study focuses on 1) long-term future explorations in general; 2) explorations of the long-term effects of enlargement, irrespective of when this is to take place.

Apart from the EU institutions, there is also a Turkish side to the Turkish accession dossier. In a study which would seek a balanced analysis of each of these parties, this Turkish side would be indispensable. However, since this study aims to make more general statements about use of future exploration in the European Union, this time it was deemed less relevant. For this reason, none of the documents produced by Turkey were analysed.

5.4 Definitions


It is important to define what is meant by future exploration. In relation to both research objectives, the research was limited to those future explorative practices which take a long-term perspective, meaning beyond 15 years ahead.

As said above, the Turkey-EU dossier refers to Turkey-EU accession relations in the period 1963-2005.

5.5 Research methodology

In principle, one should imagine the following picture when considering future exploration and in policy-making.

Fig. 5.1 Preliminary overview



Research objective 1 can be divided into the following sub-questions:

- Is future exploration conducted on EU level, and if so, how?
- What is the relationship between future exploration bodies and policy-makers on the EU level? What are the incentives for future exploration?
- How are future explorative studies integrated into policy-making?

The first research objective thus refers to the role of future exploration in policy-making as well as the question whether future exploration is conducted. Literary review shows that future exploration may well be conducted by the policy-making himself or by an external agency. Evidently, not all future explorations conducted by external agencies end up in the policy-

process. Therefore, in order to get a proper insight into the existence of future exploration on EU level, as well as their use in the policy-making process, two perspectives are needed:


- 1) One needs to investigate the policy-process for the use of future explorations and the possible production of them. This does however not exclude the existence of future explorations (which, if these cannot be located in the policy-process, also provide important information to the non-role of future explorations in policy-making). Hence a second perspective is needed:
- 2) One needs to investigate the wider external context for the existence of future explorations, among which those which do not end up in the policy-process.

From research objective 2, the following sub-questions can be derived:

- What role does the future play in the minds of the European bureaucrats?
- When does it appear as a topic in discussions?
- What is said about the future when it is brought up?

The research methodology was designed transverse to the research objectives, meaning that instead of developing a different step for each of the objectives, one step was designed to cover both objectives, while another was designed to give a more elaborate answer to research objective 1.

Fig. 5.2 Questions and answers



5.5.1 Research step 1

Research step 1 was focused primarily in the output of the policy-making process, the policy-documents. Here (references to) future explorations served as a main indicator of establishing

the relationship between policy-making and future exploration (internal or external) in the EU structures.

The policy-maker

For both research objectives it was essential to define what was meant by the ‘policy-maker’ in the European Union. Factual research served as the most important basis for determining the decision-making structure with regard to Enlargement, in principle consisting of the European Council, the European Commission, and the European Parliament. It also highlighted the complicated nature of the EU Enlargement policy, as has been described in an earlier chapter. The macro structures in the enlargement policy process, namely the European Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament, as well as their enlargement-specific sub-units, were deemed the most relevant in this case.

For the European Commission, this meant that the focus was on the European Commission as an entity in itself, as well as the DG Enlargement, and the Commission Delegation in Turkey.¹¹⁶ The other DGs, which were designated earlier as meso-structures, were not considered.

With regard to the European Parliament, the macro-structures employed in enlargement were the European Parliament as an entity in itself, its Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy, and the EP Delegation to the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee. Not considered were the other EP committees and the political parties.

The European Council, as an intergovernmental body, consist of the member states representatives. These representatives were ignored as individual entities. Instead the focus was in the European Council as a whole, as well as its sub-constellation in the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC).

The focus of the study is on the European Union and its policy-making structures. It cannot be ignored that enlargement policy, as has been described earlier, contains a very large element of intergovernmental decision-making. It was nonetheless maintained throughout the study that the

¹¹⁶ The Commission Delegation does not produce any policy-papers on its own, but rather functions as an arm of the Commission.

actual content of the decision was less relevant than that decision-making procedure. Therefore, the considerations of the Member States as individual entities were not regarded.

The policy-documents

Not all documents of the European Union are publicly and easily accessible.¹¹⁷ The publicly accessible documents are spread between archives in Brussels and the Union's directories on the internet. The research was based on the latter, mainly due to practical considerations. Using the internet however implied access to an extensive body of documents from 1990 onwards, but only very limited documentation on the period before that. Those documents available for the period 1963-1990 were taken into account, allowing for a 'thin' analysis of the early stage, and the extensive body of younger documents allowed for a 'thick', more thorough analysis on the later stage. This limitation restricted the potential of the study to make a comparison between the earlier and later period of the dossier, or throughout the entire dossier.

In attempting to provide a (partial) answer to research objective 1 and 2, research step 1 used a single body of policy-documents.

In locating the relevant policy-documents, a wide scope was taken as a point of departure, initially leaving as little as possible outside of the field of vision. In a number consecutive steps the irrelevant documents were taken out again.

The entire body of available documents of the three institutions (and their subunits) was taken as a point of departure. The search strategy sought to establish an exhaustive a list as possible of all documents relating to the Turkey-EU enlargement dossier and an orientation towards the long-term future. This it did according to a number of steps.


1. The first step was to create as exhaustive a list as possible of documents on Turkey produced by the indicated policy-makers. This was done by searching all available documents for those which contained 'Turkey' or 'Turkish' in the text. A two fold approach was taken to have the best result: 1) first the individual pages of the sub-units (such as AFET and the DG

¹¹⁷ Article 255 of the Treaty establishing the European Community says that 'Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents'. This is not necessarily untrue, but this right is limited. The right of access may for example be restricted if public or private interests could be affected. Furthermore, access to documents is spread between archives (which are often only fully accessible if older than 30 years) in Brussels and the internet (which usually contains no documents older than approximately 15 years).

Enlargement) were searched, listing all documents available on the pages; 2) second, the search engines of the various institutions were employed, searching all documents for ‘Turkey’ and ‘Turkish’ in the text. The lack of one single search engine for the entire EU directory, and the variety of search strategies employed by the search engines of the individual policy-making bodies occasionally required slight adaptations in the approach.

Fig. 5.3 European Parliament search engine

Fig. 5.4 European Council search engine



Where the search engine did not allow for a search for ‘Turkey’ or ‘Turkish’ in the text, the entire directory was searched ‘by hand’ through opening every document individually and searching these for ‘Turkey’ and ‘Turkish’. Where the number of documents in the directory was too large for this (400 or more) instead the documents were selected on ‘Turkey’ or ‘Turkish’ in their title.

Where the outcome of the word selection was too large (400 or more), a second search was employed for ‘Turkey’ and ‘Turkish’ in the text.

Where the only search term was ‘Turkey’ as a topic, and the number of documents was too large to search by hand, this search strategy was employed.

The following documents were excluded by definition from the list of documents:

- Press releases
 - Agendas
2. As a second step those documents which were not related to Turkish accession were omitted from the list. This concerned only those documents which had a clear lack of relation to the dossier. The following documents were omitted:
- Those relating to EU foreign policy toward other countries than Turkey or the Turkish region.
 - Those concerning European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), based on the fact that Turkey is not involved in the ENP.
 - Those related to arms exports and weapons of mass destruction
 - Those related to the Turkish-Cypriot Community

The definition of documents related to Turkish accession was kept rather broad. Theoretical knowledge of the Turkey-EU dossier and the issues that play an important role in it serves as a justification to keeping the following documents on the list:

- Those related to human rights
- Those related to the European Defence Strategy
- Those related to the Common Foreign and Security Policy
- Those related to EU foreign policy towards the South Caucasus or the Mediterranean region.

It does not need explanation that all documents relating to enlargement, Customs Union, and pre-accession, and accession were left on the list.

3. In the third stage of the selection process, the documents of real interest to the research were selected on the basis of their association with the long term future, and thinking about the future. The quantity of documents remaining, 359 in total, and hence the fact that this process of selection would take several days, asked for a systematic approach to guarantee objectivity. The choice was made to subject all documents to a number of search terms, in order to select the relevant ones. Search terms would help in keeping the search consistent over a number of days, applying the same standards over time, without running the risk of slacking attention or different interpretations as would be the case in subjective selection.

Some of the remaining documents showed to have been captured twice, due to the fact that they had been mentioned in more than one directory. Double documents were taken out at this stage as well.

Intuitively ‘future’ and ‘long-term’ were identified as search terms. In order to check whether these search terms were representative, or so to say bound to ‘cover the load’, first a sample of documents was taken to test them. Five documents of which their orientation to the future has already been established, namely the *Ankara Agreement (1963)*, the *Additional Protocol (1970)*, the *2003 Strategy Paper* of the Commission, the *Negotiation Framework*, and the *European Council Conclusions* of 17 December 2004, functioned as a sample. The two documents recommended by the interviewees as the most future oriented in the dossier, namely the *Issues Paper* of the Commission, and *The European Transformation of Modern Turkey*, the latter of which was a non-policy, were also added. These documents were first read and then ‘checked’ with the search terms. Both the *Ankara Agreement* and the *Additional Protocol* were not highlighted on the basis of these terms. The conclusion was that the search vocabulary had to be expanded to cover all relevant documents. On the basis of the above mentioned sample, the following list of words was compiled.

- Future	- Effect(s)	- Will/ would	- Strategy
- Long-term/ long term	- Development	- May/ might	- Approach
- Achieve(d)	- Expect(ation)	- Period	- Perspective
- Transition	- View	- Timetable	- Potential
- Recommend	- Process	- Objectives	- Estimate/ion
- Framework	- Progress(ive)	- Outlook	- Forthcoming
- Confidence	- Years	- Decade	- Growth/ decline
- Impact	- Shall/ should	- Long run/ long-run	- Project(ion)
- Predict(ion)	- Challenge(s)	- Pace	- Attain(ment)
- Scenario	- Increase/ decrease	- Become	- Likely

For practical reasons, this list was reduced to four search terms, keeping in mind the following:

- Search terms would have to cover the entirety of relevant documents, but not much more, thus not cause too many ‘irrelevant hits’.
- The fact that different types of documents were under consideration, and that these may have a different use of language (e.g. legislative documents tend to use ‘shall’ rather than ‘will’)

- Some search terms overlap, i.e. they always appear in the same documents, or when one appears, the other one does as well (such as ‘perspective’ and ‘future’)

The final four search terms became:


- Future
- Long (‘long term’ did not show any hits for ‘long-term’ and vice versa, and ‘term’ had too many irrelevant hits, such as ‘determine’; moreover ‘long’ covers ‘long term’ and ‘long run’ at the same time).
- Timetable
- Outlook

It needs to be noted here this approach, although perhaps more systematic, excludes sensitivity to particular dates, which in case of individual review of all documents would be possible.

Although in most current policy-documents oriented towards the future with a quantitative orientation, 2025 and 2030 seem to be the years of focus; this of course is not applicable for documents which were produced at a much earlier stage. The number of documents however made it impossible for each document to be reviewed on its own, and hence the systematic approach of search terms was preferred.

It is important to understand here that first the documents with a relation to the Turkey-EU dossier were selected, and secondly, among those the documents with an orientation to the future were sought. The emphasis was clearly on future exploration within the EU-Turkey dossier, rather than the EU-Turkey dossier within the realm of future exploration or thinking about the future.

Fig. 5.5 What I do and what I don't do



The documents that had no relation to the future were grouped in *category A*.

The remaining documents were further distinguished on the basis the kind of future they focussed on. Documents related only to the short or medium term were added to those in *category A*.

Analysis

Based on the strategy employed, the following was true for all remaining documents:

- All had a role in the Turkey-EU accession dossier
- All had an orientation to the long-term future

The remaining documents were subjected to an analytical scheme. The main aim of this scheme was to distinguish between the future explorative documents, and those speaking about the future in a different method.

Fig. 5.6 Table of documents analyzed per institution


<i>Institution/ sub-unit</i>	<i>Selection criterion in step 1</i>	<i>Documents left for analysis</i>
European Commission <i>European Commission (directory)</i> <i>Del. Of European Commission in Ankara</i>	 ‘Turkey’/‘Turkish’ in text ‘Turkey’/‘Turkish’ in text	37
European Parliament (term 1999-2004 and 2004-2009) <i>EP Reports (AFET only)</i> <i>EP Joint motions of resolutions</i> <i>EP Minutes</i> <i>EP Debates</i> <i>EP Texts adopted</i> <i>EP Common positions</i> <i>EP Resolutions</i> <i>JPC Minutes</i> <i>JPC Recommendations</i> <i>AFET Reports</i> <i>Taskforce Enlargement</i>	 ‘Turkey’/‘Turkish’ in text ‘Turkey’ as subject ‘Turkey’/‘Turkish’ in title ‘Turkey’/‘Turkish’ in title ‘Turkey’/‘Turkish’ in title ‘Turkey’/‘Turkish’ in title ‘Turkey’/‘Turkish’ in text No selection No selection ‘Turkey’/‘Turkish’ in text ‘Turkey’/‘Turkish’ in text	191
European Council <i>Presidency Conclusions</i> <i>Council Acts</i> <i>European Council (directory)</i>	 ‘Turkey’/‘Turkish’ in text ‘Turkey’/‘Turkish’ in text ‘Turkey’ as subject	131

As said before, the selection of documents was meant to include all EU-Turkey related documents prepared by the main EU body (European Council, European Commission and European Parliament) as a whole, as well as the documents by the enlargement-specific sub-units of each of these institutions. For the European Commission and the Council, this did not result in any difficulties. With regard to the European Parliament, however, a different approach was needed, because of the decision-making procedure within in the Parliament. In the EP, the different committees prepare reports, which are approved by the entire EP, and then further referred to as EP policy-document. Thus, 1) the EP does generally not bring forward documents which did not originate in one of the committees, and 2) the committees do not bring forward documents as individual entities. The second point did not pose a problem as such, because the fact that a sub-unit should have a role in the decision-making itself was not a requirement for this study. However, the first point would mean that the output of all committees in the EP, and approved and forwarded by the EP, could be considered part of the policy-documents that should

be analysed. This would involve analysing hundreds of additional documents. Therefore, a choice was made to involve only those EP policy-documents which originated in AFET, based on the reasoning that those documents originating in other EP committees would most likely be more relevant to meso-policies of enlargement, and thus find no reflection in the rest of the documents analyzed.

The role of individual parties in the European Parliament was purposely left aside. Consequently, motions of resolutions were not analysed, and the analysis of the written reports of the debates and EP meetings did not pay consideration to the parties' standpoints, but instead treated these as EP discourse as a whole.

Fig. 5.7 Scheme of analysis



The aim of the above scheme for analysis was not to divide the body of documents into boxes, but rather to function as a scheme of thought, in order to ask the same questions with regard to every document, and assist in the systematic analysis of every document.

As a definition of ‘explorative’ the rather wide definition of Van Asselt was maintained, namely that future explorations try to imagine the uncertain and unknown future in a consistent manner.¹¹⁸ This definition was left open for adoption or further specification in the course of the research, but this was deemed unnecessary.

5.5.2 Research step 2

It is not possible on the basis of the first research step alone to give an answer as to the existence of future exploration on the level of the European Union. As has been shown by the literature, future exploration can be conducted by the policy-making body or an external entity. Although research step 1 can be expected to provide a rather exclusionary answer as to the existence of internal future explorations, making similar assumptions on the basis of these findings about externally produced future explorations would imply that all future explorations end up in the policy-process, which logically is not the case.

The second research step thus aimed at establishing whether future explorations are actually conducted. The rationale at the basis of this step was that if future explorations are not produced at all, the policy-making cannot (be expected to) incorporate those into the policy-decisions.

In allocating externally produced future explorations on the Turkey-EU dossier, the following steps were taken:

Meeting documents: The meetings of the EU institutions and their sub-units are prepared by their General Secretariats. For each meeting a number of meeting documents is assigned beforehand. Only in the case of the European Parliament sub-units AFET and JPC are these meeting documents public. In evaluating the meeting documents individually and in combination with the agenda of the meeting, it was assumed that these meeting documents were ‘on the plate’ of the policy-maker as part of a decision, as the formal input. A meeting document can thus be assumed

¹¹⁸ Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, Van Asselt, M. (2005). *Houdbaarheid verstreken: Toekomstverkenning en beleid*. Den Haag, p. 11.

to be taken into account in the policy-making. In analysing the meeting documents, the following questions were answered:

- 1) Are there any meeting documents that are future explorative?
- 2) Are there any documents retrieved from external advisory agencies?

Of course, it can not be assumed that meeting documents alone form the input for policy-making. However, what can be said is that meeting documents create a shared base of knowledge among all the policy-makers in a certain body, and that if the policy-maker is to seek his knowledge outside of the regular meeting documents, this knowledge is less likely to be shared by all. Moreover, it is likely that an extra effort would be required to gather this knowledge then.

Awareness: The interviews served to give an indication of to what extent there is an awareness of future explorations outside of the European Union. Here, the word ‘indication’ needs to be stressed, because the number of interviews was very limited and not suited to make any generalization. The interview with Mr. Missir di Lusignano was used to provide an indication of future explorative studies known to the DG Enlargement and used in the dossier and well as a short-list of external advisory bodies to the Commission.

By comparison, the interview with Emerson was used to give an indication of external bodies that were involved in the Turkey-EU dossier, and possibly has future explorative capacities as well.

EU internal advisory bodies: A step to evaluate the future explorative capacities and output of the EU’s was implemented as well. Here, the bodies indicated by the EU itself as official advisory bodies of the European Union institutions were taken as a guide. For the EU as a whole, these are the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the Committee of the Regions (CoR). In addition, the official advisory bodies of the individual institutions were located on the basis of what they indicated themselves. Official advisory body was understood here as a body with no legislative power. Only in the case of the Commission could such a body be located, namely the DG Bureau for Economic and Policy Analysis. Further research into the DG BEPA showed an earlier advisory body by the name of Forward Studies Unit, and GOPA. These were also included in the analysis. The documents of all these advisory bodies were evaluated to see whether they were future explorative.

It is important to establish here that the original research approach was maintained, meaning that future explorative documents were sought within the realm of Turkey-EU policy-making. In practice this meant that the following selection steps were applied:

1. Selection of advisory documents related to the Turkey-EU dossier
2. Among documents resulting from 1, selection on the basis of future exploration.

EU external advisory bodies: Here, again the original research approach was maintained, implying that future exploration was sought within the Turkey-EU dossier and not vice versa. In relation to the EU external advisory bodies, this complicated matters somewhat. Most likely, focussing on future explorative advisory bodies first, and then selecting those that might have a relation to the Turkey-EU dossier would have been easier, but this would have raised the chance of a too wide interpretation of 'relation to the Turkey-EU dossier'. For example, in essence even future explorations about the EU in general, or a specific meso-policy could have been interpreted as such. If this approach had been taken, it would have been needed to approach all the other steps in the same way as well to make an ample comparison.

Thus, first the external advisory bodies which have a role in the Turkey-EU dossier were determined, and then their future explorative capacities were located. The difficulty here lay in the large number of potential advisory bodies. Instead of searching all advisory bodies on the European level, a sample was taken on the basis of the following:

1. External advisory bodies revealed in the meeting documents of AFET and JPC.
2. External advisory bodies referred to in the interview by Missir di Lusignano

The rationale behind these steps was that these bodies were already known to the EU institutions and used for their expertise. In the steps referred to as *Meeting documents* and *Awareness*, it was already established whether these bodies were used for their future explorative expertise or referred to in a more general manner. This step served to answer the following questions:

1. Do these bodies create future explorations in relation to the Turkey-EU dossier?
2. Could these have been used by the EU (if they were referred to in a general manner)?

On the basis of the advisory bodies brought forward in relation to the meeting documents and the interviews, the following external advisory bodies were investigated:

- Independent Commission on Turkey
- Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS)

- Center for European Reform

The focus here was on external agencies on the European level.

By comparison, the future explorative agencies mentioned by Emerson were also investigated. Although these were mentioned by Emerson on the basis of their presumed future explorative capabilities, the research method was maintained still, by first establishing their relevance to the Turkey-EU dossier, and secondly their input in terms of future exploration in relation to this dossier. Again, the focus was on the bodies on the European level Emerson referred to.

The aim of the second research step was thus by no means to give an exclusionary overview of future explorative agencies on the European level in the Turkey-EU dossier, nor of the actual future exploration, but rather to give an indication of the availability of future explorations in relation to this dossier in general, as well as to establish to what extent ties between the EU and such agencies have been established already.

5.5.3 Research step 3: Interviews

In addition to the analysis of policy-documents of the EU and advisory bodies to the EU, interviews were conducted with a number of officials to get a better insight into both the formal and informal ways in which future exploration plays a role in the Turkey-EU dossier. The number of interviews was limited due to time-constraints. Their results are therefore not suited to be translated into representative data on 'what officials think'. Nevertheless, keeping in mind that these interviews concern a mere random and small sample of people involved in the European policy-making process, they were used as a reflection for findings and possible explanations for data acquired.

The interviewees were selected on their involvement in the EU-Turkey dossier, either as a policy-making, or as an external advisor in the process.¹¹⁹ The people interviewed were:

- Mr. A. Missir di Lusignano, Desk officer for Turkey in the DG Enlargement, European Commission. (Date of interview: 30 March 2006)

¹¹⁹ Logically, availability played an important role as well. Apart from the eventual interviewees, the following people were contacted: Mr. Y. Devuyt – Author of book 'The European Union Transformed'; Mr. C. Danielsson – DG Enlargement Turkey specialist; Mr. M. Leigh – Director General DG Enlargement; Mr. O. Rehn – Enlargement Commissioner; Mr. G. Bertrand – former Forward Studies Unit/ Commission.

- Mr. M. Emerson, Senior Research Fellow at the Center of European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels. (Date of interview: 4 April 2006)
- Mr. F. Öztürk, Undersecretary of the Turkish Delegation to the EU in Brussels. (Date of interview: 4 April 2006)

All of the interviewees were interviewed in person, allowing for the conversation to be recorded. In retrospect one can say that the interviews provided especially revealing results in relation to the first research objective.

The interviewees were all subjected to the interview guide below. Depending on the role of the interviewee, or in a single case time constraint, a number of questions were omitted from the interview guide to make the interview best serve its purpose.

Fig. 5.6 Interview guide

BLOCK I - INTRODUCTION

1. Introduction of the research project.
 - a. Aims and objectives
 - b. Specific interest in the interviewee
2. Positioning of the interviewee
 - a. Introduction of the interviewee
 - b. Day-to-day activities
 - c. Role of the interviewee in the 'actor'

BLOCK II – TURKEY-EU RELATIONS 1963-2005/ ANKARA AGREEMENT

In the Ankara Agreement (1963), three goals were mentioned with regard to the future.

1. Membership of the European Communities.
 - a. What role has this goal played in the relations to Turkey?
 - b. What was the picture of the future when this goal was agreed upon?
 - c. What was the idea of the road to membership?
 - d. What were the reasons that this goal was not specified further?
2. The establishment of free movement of persons by 1986.
 - a. What were the considerations about 1986 in 1963?
 - b. Why did this not occur? Could these reasons have been/ were they anticipated?
3. The establishment of the Customs Union by 1995.
 - a. What were the considerations about 1995 in 1963?

- b. What were the considerations about this 30-year period in between?
- c. What were the expectations in 1963 of the Turkish economy in 1995?

BLOCK III– ROLE OF THE ACTOR/ RELATIONSHIP WITH EU INSTITUTIONS

- 1. Relationship of the actor to the European institutions
 - a. What is the position of the ‘actor’?
 - b. What has been its influence on the policy-making process in the Turkey-EU dossier?
 - c. Has the relationship changed since the beginning of the dossier in 1963?
 - d. What is the relationship with the other actors in the Turkey-EU dossier?

BLOCK IV– EXPERTISE/ ADVISORY BODIES

- 1. The use of expertise
 - a. What kind of expertise does the ‘actor’ have with regard to future exploration?
 - b. Has this expertise changed in the past 40 years?
- 2. External expertise of the ‘actor’
 - a. Does the ‘actor’ use external expertise with regard to future exploration?
- 3. The European institutions
 - a. Do the European institutions make use of external expertise with regard to future exploration?
 - b. How is this expertise commissioned; what are the incentives for it?
 - c. Where does the European Commission find the long-term expertise which forms the basis on its reports in Turkey-EU relations?

BLOCK V– FORWARD STUDIES UNIT/ BEPA

- 1. Role of the former FSU in the Turkey-EU dossier
 - a. What has been the role of the FSU in the Turkey-EU dossier?
 - b. What happened to this function when it was incorporated into the BEPA?
- 2. Role of BEPS in the Turkey-EU dossier
 - a. What is the role of the BEPA in the Turkey-EU dossier?
 - b. What is its relationship to the policy-making bodies of the EU?

BLOCK VI– FUTURE EXPLORATION IN GENERAL

- 1. The implicit role of the future in EU policy-making
 - a. Is the long-term future a topic of discussion in the European institutions?
 - b. What does this future look like?
 - c. Is an idea of the long-term future incorporated in the Commission policy towards Turkey?

2. Systematic future explorative practices in the EU institutions
 - a. Is there a need within the European institutions for a systematic long-term explorative practice as a basis for its policies?
 - b. Is this need specifically apparent in the Turkey-EU dossier, or for policy-making in general?
 - c. What type of policy-issues would be suitable for more long-term exploration of the future?
3. Future oriented documents
 - a. What are the most future-oriented policy-documents in the Turkey-EU dossier?

The findings of the three research steps will be further elaborated upon in the next two chapters.

6. FINDINGS – PART 1

The following two chapters will present the findings of this study in a systematic manner, based on the methodological steps taken to acquire them. This section will elaborate on the first research step, involving the analysis of the policy-documents. As described in the previous chapter on methodology, the relevant documents of the European Council, European Commission, and European Parliament, were subjected to a number of search terms and then classified into three categories, namely A, B, and C. Accordingly, the documents in the last two categories were further studied on the basis of a ‘scheme of analysis’ consisting of twelve questions relating to the ‘future’ in those documents. These questions (depending on their relevance) will be answered in this section. In addition, further observations on the basis of the analysis will be presented. The findings of the second research step will be presented in the next chapter. The results of the third step, namely the interview, will be interwoven in both these chapters to complement the findings.

6.1 Findings according to institution

In general the overall numbers of documents per category do not give specific indications about to what extent ‘the future’ is considered, or explored. It becomes clear that the number of documents in category C is very limited, and within the total of the 359 documents analysed sufficiently small to say that in these documents, there was almost no tendency towards future exploration. The numbers in category A and B are equal for two of the institutions, meaning that a mention about the long-term future was made in as many documents as it was left out. The findings per category do give an indication of what type of documents are most relevant in future exploration or future thinking.

6.1.1 European Commission

Table 1: Overview of analysed documents – European Commission

	Category A	Category B	Category C	Total
<i>Reports</i>	3	8	0	11
<i>Proposals</i>	8	0	0	8
<i>Minutes</i>	2	2	0	4
<i>Communications</i>	1	4	0	5

<i>Working documents</i>	4	4	1	9
<i>Total</i>	18	18	1	37

In general, three types of documents can be distinguished: the ‘legislative’ documents, thus those involved in the legislative cycle (proposals, amendments, regulations, agreements and decisions), the ‘communicative’ documents, thus those which do not aim at policy directly, but are meant to inform to the benefit of policy (reports, communications, working documents), and the ‘speech’ documents, thus reports of spoken events (minutes, statements, speeches).

In the European Commission, the only category C document is a working document.

Furthermore, none of the legislative documents fall in category B. With regard to the category A documents, the largest portion of these is located in the ‘communicative’ documents, namely among reports, and communications. For working documents and minutes, the spread between category A and B is equal.

6.1.2 European Council

Table 2: Overview of analysed documents – European Council

	Category A	Category B	Category C	Total
<i>Statements</i>	14	8	0	22
<i>Presidency Conclusions</i>	7	7	0	14
<i>Agreements</i>	1	4	0	5
<i>Proposals</i>	5	0	0	5
<i>Common positions</i>	10	0	0	10
<i>Decisions</i>	19	2	0	21
<i>Overviews</i>	16	4	0	20
<i>Minutes</i>	15	9	0	24
<i>Report</i>	5	1	0	6
<i>Other</i>	4	0	0	4
<i>Total</i>	96	35	0	131

The European Council is the only institution of the three in which approximately three quarters of the documents make no relevant mention of the long-term future and which contains no category C document. It would be too easy to conclude, however, that the European Council thinks about the future the least. The types of documents of which almost all are located in

category A are all legislative, namely the proposals, common positions, and decisions.

Agreements are the only type of which a larger portion is located in category B than in A.

Furthermore, with regard to minutes and statements the division is more balanced, still leaving about two-thirds of these documents in category A. The balance within the Presidency

Conclusions is equal.

6.1.3 European Parliament

Table 3: Overview of analysed documents – European Parliament

	Category A	Category B	Category C	Total
<i>Reports</i>	25	26	3	54
<i>Common positions</i>	3	4	0	7
<i>Joint motions for resolutions</i>	3	0	0	3
<i>Resolutions</i>	33	19	0	52
<i>Briefing papers</i>	8	13	1	22
<i>Debates</i>	0	25	0	25
<i>Minutes</i>	9	0	0	9
<i>Minutes Joint Parliamentary Committee</i>	5	6	0	11
<i>Proposals</i>	7	0	0	7
<i>Working papers</i>	0	0	1	1
<i>Total</i>	93	93	5	191

The European Parliament had by far the largest number of publicly accessible documents, as well as the largest variety of documents. The research found five category C documents among them, all of them among the ‘communicative’ documents, namely reports, one briefing paper, and working paper. Of the joint motions for resolution, the EP minutes and the proposals not one document is located in category B. Interestingly, in comparison to the minutes; all of the reports of the debates were category B documents, meaning that in the debates, the long-term future was indeed a topic of discussion. The minutes of the Joint Parliamentary Committee and the common positions are spread equally between category A and B. Of the resolutions, a large majority was situated in category A, and the briefing papers were for the majority category B documents.

Overall the largest part of category A documents consisted of reports and resolutions.

It is difficult to draw conclusions from these data as to which type of document is most likely to ‘explore’ or ‘consider’ the future. All category C documents, thus all documents of an explorative nature were found among the communicative documents.

Table 4: Overview of all documents in three categories¹²⁰

	Category A	Category B
<i>Legislative</i>	89	29
<i>Communicative</i>	46	56
<i>Speech</i>	45	50

This last overview shows that as far as communicative and speech documents are concerned, there is an equal spread between category A and B. However, the large majority of legislative documents do not contain a relevant reference to the long-term future. From this table it can be derived that future considerations are least common in legislative documents.

6.2 Category A

The documents in category A, as can be seen in the scheme for analysis, are those that contain either no reference to the future, or one to the short or medium term. The analysis showed that in many cases, the ‘future’ is used without specific mention of a timeframe, but in fact as a rather empty word. Without resorting too much to discourse analysis, a number of observations can be made. Firstly, the concept of ‘future’ is used as ‘from here on’. This is best illustrated by sentences such as ‘the committee asked for future reports to elaborate more on.....’ and ‘the Joint Customs Union Committee should meet more frequently in the future’.¹²¹ Secondly, the ‘future’ is used as ‘who knows when’. ‘The prospect of future accession’¹²² is a frequently occurring phrase in the documents, as well as ‘the EU’s future strategy policy’ and ‘future treaty amendments’. Thirdly, the ‘future’ is often used in a possessive sense such as in ‘the future of Europe’, ‘if we want a better future...’, ‘the future of Turkey lies in Europe’, ‘to build a peaceful

¹²⁰ The European Council *Overviews* and *Presidency Conclusions* were not taken into account here. The *Overviews* contain a list of legislative acts by the European Council, hence including them would mean a double count of some legislative documents. Furthermore, the *Presidency Conclusions* were not included because they are of a debatable nature, and can be classified as ‘speech’, ‘legislative’ and ‘communicative’.

¹²¹ Council of the European Union, Presidency. (2005). *Report: Turkey: Preparation of EC-Turkey Association Council, Luxembourg, 11 April 2000 - Draft common position of the EU. 7495/00*. Brussels.

¹²² European Parliament. (2004). *Debate, Tuesday 16 November 2004, Strasbourg – Written report*.

and prosperous future'.¹²³ These last phrases give the idea of a future that is a creation. In a similar vein, the 'future' is often used in an ideological way. This partly overlaps with the future as a possessive, such as in 'enlargement is a moral, political and economic challenge for the EU and presents an historic opportunity to shape the future of Europe'. One of the reports of the European Parliament states that 'At the end of the twentieth century, the European Union took a far-reaching decision on its future by opening the accession process with (...) Turkey'.¹²⁴ Another ideological use of 'future' is 'hope of a better future after years of suffering'.¹²⁵ In his speech at the start of negotiations with Turkey, British minister of Foreign Affairs Straw stated on behalf of the Council that

'It's going to be a long road ahead but I'm in no doubt that bringing Turkey in to the European Union is a prize worth striving for and if the sentiment that has been around today, positive sentiment of co-operation continues which I think it will do then I think the future is good'.¹²⁶

Lastly, one can see that 'future' is a trigger word, a word that it used to engage people in debate. This can apply to the previously mentioned phrases as well, but also to phrases such as 'future generations' and 'the consumers of the future'.¹²⁷

6.3 Commonalities in categories B and C

Before going into the specific characteristics of the different categories, it is important to stress that the documents in these categories have a number of characteristics in common. Not only do

¹²³ European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. (2004). *Report on the 2003 Regular Report of the Commission on Turkey's progress towards accession*. (FINAL A5-0204/2004). Brussels.

¹²⁴ European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. (2000). *Report on the enlargement of the European Union: part 1 – Motion for a resolution*. (FINAL A5-0250/2000). Brussels. p. 83.

¹²⁵ European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. (2000). *Report on the communication from the Commission on the stabilisation and association process for countries of South-Eastern Europe*. (FINAL A5-0069/2000). Brussels.

¹²⁶ Straw, J., & Rehn, O. (2005, 3 October). *Turkey's accession to the European Union and Croatia's co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague*. Speech presented at the European Council in Luxembourg. Luxembourg.

¹²⁷ European Parliament. (2000). *Debate, Tuesday 11 April 2000, Strasbourg – Written report*.

they have an orientation towards the long-term future, but also do they bring forward similar conviction with regard to the task of future exploration and the need for it.

Exploring the future is in general considered a difficult endeavor, even more so in relation to Turkish accession. The Commission Working document on the *Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective* states the uncertainties that are involved in the assessment of (long-term) effects of Turkey's accession.

- The future evolution of the Union's policies, the possible creation of new ones, and the degree of further deepening of integration that might occur.
- Economic and structural developments both in Turkey and in the EU during the next decade, as well as exogenous factors, such as energy prices and the international economic environment at large
- The expansion of the Union to 27 members
- The timing and scope of the future enlargement process¹²⁸

Nevertheless, it is recognized that exploration, or at least consideration of the long-term future is wished for. About this Commission representative Missir di Lusignano states that,

'In order to know the medium term priorities, you need to be aware of the long-term perspectives. For example with regard to the Turkey-EU dossier, in terms of energy and political criteria, it is important to know what you can expect of what time; when circumstances are expected to change or not'.¹²⁹

European Parliament documents seem to stress a similar need for future exploration:

'Europe, more than anyone else, has to ask itself what kind of diplomacy must be practiced in the future and how international relations will be ordered in the twenty-first century'.¹³⁰

¹²⁸ Commission of the European Communities. (2004). *Commission staff working document: Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective*. (COM(2004) 656 final). Brussels: European Commission.

¹²⁹ A. Missir di Lusignano, personal interview, March 30, 2006.

¹³⁰ European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. (1997). *Report on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy - (January to December 1996)*. (A4-0193/97). Brussels.

‘The failure to look to the future has at times raised concern that the pending Member States may not have an equivalent commitment to ensure a high level of environmental protection’.¹³¹

‘Proposes therefore that the Member States assess their long-term needs, distinguishing between the short (2003/2005), medium (2010/2012) and long term (2020/2025) so that the necessary strategic, industrial and budgetary options may be taken up when appropriate’.¹³²

Most clearly the demand for future explorations is exemplified by this actual question of the EP to the Commission: ‘*Has the Commission drawn up forecasts or studies on the sectoral and regional impact of future enlargement in terms of its effects on production and employment?*’

And sometimes the question is raised whether the EU should not look ahead a little further:

‘It must therefore be asked whether this distribution of seats would gradually be readjusted with each further enlargement or whether there should be an adjustment which would last for all enlargements in the foreseeable future.’¹³³

Some documents go as far as to criticize lack of future perspective. It is said that

‘*Agenda 2000* is an interesting, accurate document, but one which lacks the vision required to sketch out the Europe of the future, together with that form of dynamic vision required to understand how the Union and its policies will change once enlargement has taken place’.¹³⁴

¹³¹ European Parliament, Directorate General for Research. (2003). *Working paper: The Enlargement Process of the EU: Consequences in the field of Environment*. Luxembourg: European Communities.

¹³² European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. (2000). *Report on the process achieved in the implementation of the common foreign and security policy*. (FINAL A5-0340/2000). Brussels.

¹³³ European Parliament, Secretariat Working Part Taskforce ‘Enlargement’. (1999). *Briefing paper: Briefing No. 15, The institutional aspects of enlargement of the European Union*. (PE 167.299/rev.1). Luxembourg.

¹³⁴ European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. (1997). *Report on the Communication from the Commission ‘Agenda 2000 - for a stronger and wider Union’*. (A4-0368/97). Brussels.

In one of the interviews, Öztürk even suggests that not exploring the future may have negative effects:

‘.....And this is where the projections come into the equation. These I think we lack at this moment. If you just look at Europe; after globalization now we are seeing a clash between globalization and protectionist measures coming from the Member States, and sometimes they even call it economic patriotism, because they cannot make projections for the long run’.¹³⁵

As can be seen from the raw data the general tendency is not to explore the future. However, even the documents in category B make sense of the long-term future, although through other means than exploring. The following sections, among other things, will show how the two categories aim to ‘satisfy’ the need for future thinking while countering the difficulties involved.

6.4 Category B

The documents in category B make a clear reference to the long-term future but cannot be designated as future-explorative.

Two important points can be made on the basis of the analysis:

- Focal points: the documents almost all have a tendency to have a focal point in relation to their considerations about the future. These two focal points are the attainment of the *Customs Union* and *Accession of Turkey* to the European Union. The main difference and similarities between these two focal points will be outlined below.
- Anticipation and planning: the documents have two main methods of dealing with the long-term future, namely through anticipating it, or through planning. This will be elaborated upon further down.

6.4.1 Focal points

¹³⁵ F. Öztürk, personal interview, April 4, 2006.

The achievement of the Customs Union¹³⁶ was first set as a goal in the Ankara Agreement of 1963, and was further elaborated upon in the Additional Protocol, which stipulated that exactly 22 years after it entered into force (in 1973) the Customs Union was to be achieved. The CU point was thus a tangible date in the future.

The accession of Turkey to the European Union as a Member State has been equally present from the beginning of the dossier, as was mentioned in Art. 28 of the Ankara Agreement:

‘as soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community’.¹³⁷

The reference to future membership of Turkey is very vague here. In the light of current events, knowing that future membership was discussed as early as 1963, and not been achieved to date, raises the question why it was mentioned at all. Was it really meant to take this long, or did the signatories at the time perhaps have a more concrete vision to accompany the vague wording of the article?

About this, Missir di Lusignano says:

‘The reference included in article 28 was not a promise in the vacuum, it was really something hard, and if you read the statement by the then Commission President Walter Hallstein, which was issued at the time, you see how much of an importance he attached to the evolution, into the deepening of this relation, which in his mind had no alternative but to evolve to an ever closer relations leading to accession’.

‘It was remote, it was very remote. It was a perspective, but it was not something towards which the country was striving as an immediate objective. It was like an overarching strategic objective, long-term, as it is right now in terms of its concrete achievement, but now

¹³⁶ I will refer to this from here on as *CU point* to avoid confusion with the Customs Union as a stage.

¹³⁷ European Council. (1963). Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey, signed at Ankara 12 September 1963. *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 24.12.73. Brussels. Art. 28.

it has really become pressing, more narrowly defined, because we have a strategy and we have an institutional framework’.

‘Now people argue ‘that was the European Community but now we’ve moved to the European Union, which was of a different nature, we do not consider ourselves to be bound by that’. Some people have dug into the archives of that period and you see that even de Gaulle himself had favoured an article 28 reference, in so far as to him the Turkey to the EU accession was a necessity, because of its strategic importance, so there is an indication that right from the start, accession was indeed something contemplated by the signatories of this treaty’.¹³⁸

Öztürk adds to this that:

‘If a date were to be fixed beyond the Customs Union, this would necessitate the planning of a time span of almost 40-50 years. That is neither rational, nor doable in international politics (...) but I do not think that it was anticipated that it would take this long at that time’.¹³⁹

The above partly explains why the goal of membership was kept vague, namely because at the time it was not an immediate objective, and planning so far ahead was not deemed appropriate. Yet, in later documents the goal of membership remains vague. Firstly, in relation to the start of negotiations, for which meeting the Copenhagen criteria was a prerequisite, it is stressed that:

‘Meeting the Copenhagen political criteria remains a long-term project whose outcome is still uncertain and which will require the combined efforts of all the social and economic players and Turkish society as a whole’.¹⁴⁰

Even closer to the actual negotiations on accession, the *vagueness* of this future is maintained. In the negotiation strategy proposed on 3 October 2005, the Council stresses that ‘These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed

¹³⁸ A. Missir di Lusignano, personal interview, March 30, 2006.

¹³⁹ F. Öztürk, personal interview, April 4, 2006.

¹⁴⁰ European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. (2004). *Report on the 2003 Regular Report of the Commission on Turkey's progress towards accession*. (FINAL A5-0204/2004). Brussels.

beforehand'.¹⁴¹ The negotiation process may thus well not lead to the envisaged future of accession. This raises another interesting point, namely that the *focal point* of Turkish accession is not only *vague* but may also not exist at all.

The policy-documents do, however, not sustain this possibility, as the very large majority of them remains focused on Turkish accession and rather puts questions with regard to *when* rather than *if* accession takes place. Moreover, only three documents make a reference to a future were accession not to take place. The *2005 Negotiation Strategy* states that

'If Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond'.¹⁴²

Here privileged partnership is referred to.

A 2001 AFET report stresses the need for a strong civil society *irrespective* of membership:

'(...) to raise awareness of the European Union amongst civil society and thus win its backing for the reforms from which it will benefit, irrespective of possible EU membership in the future'.¹⁴³

Alternatives to Turkish membership are thus not evident. This is endorsed by Olli Rehn, who, at the 2004 Council, declared that 'there is no place B for Turkey... we have the responsibility to accept the country as a member if it fulfills the criteria'.¹⁴⁴

There seems to be a clear consensus among the three institutions that Turkish accession, largely dependent on the implementation of the *acquis*, is a long term objective. In 2001, the EP notes that the 'necessary reform of the Turkish state and society will be a painful and long-lasting

¹⁴¹ European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. (1997). *Report on the Communication from the Commission 'Agenda 2000 - for a stronger and wider Union'*. (A4-0368/97). Brussels.

¹⁴² European Council. (2005). *EU-Turkey Negotiation Framework, Luxembourg 3 October 2005*. Brussels. p. 1.

¹⁴³ European Parliament. (2001). European Parliament resolution on the 2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's progress towards accession. (COM(2000) 713 - C5-0613/2000 - 2000/2014(COS))/ (A5-0343/2001). Strasbourg.

¹⁴⁴ O. Rehn. No 'Plan B' for Turkey. 7 December 2004.

process'. And the European Council 'realizes that this is a long process of reform in which Turkey is faced with crucial choices, and that European help will be necessary in this process'. The Commission, in its 1998 Regular Report says: 'In any case, complete adoption of the *acquis* is still only a long-term prospect and will entail large-scale investment for which detailed estimates are currently lacking'.¹⁴⁵

Nonetheless, the documents in category B give an indication of the timeframe within which Turkish accession can or cannot be expected. The *2005 Negotiations strategy paper* states that 'the negotiations can only be concluded after the establishment of the Financial Framework for the period from 2014'.¹⁴⁶ This idea is stressed throughout the category B documents.

The accession of Turkey thus remains a rather *vague* point in the future. The achievement of the Customs Union was on the contrary more concrete from the beginning. Not only are these two points clear focal point in the long-term future, but in addition they indicate a *path break*, a change in the status quo.

6.4.2 Anticipation and planning

The analysis of the documents in category B shows that, short of exploring the future, they have two different ways of considering it, best described as *anticipation* and *planning*. The latter method is by far the most prevalent, and will be elaborated upon first.

Planning

Planning the future can best be understood as policy-making towards the future. In planning the future, the two focal points seem to play an important role:

- Firstly, the CU point and the point of Turkish accession are not random focal points, but clear *path breaks*, changes in the situation of both Turkey and the European Union. The CU point indicates the start of liberalized trade between both parties. The accession of Turkey indicates a different international reality, and has received sufficient attention in previous chapters.
- Secondly, the *focal points* are the aiming point for policy documents. This is important to understand. They are thus not final stages of policy by random pick, but rather the long-term

¹⁴⁵ Commission of the European Communities. (1998). *Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*. Brussels: European Commission.

¹⁴⁶ European Council. (2005). *EU-Turkey Negotiation Framework, Luxembourg 3 October 2005*. Brussels. p. 1.

climax at which policy should be focused. The focal point is thus determined prior to the policy.

- Thirdly, a note: the combination of the above two points builds the understanding that the focal points, thus the Customs Union and Turkish accession to the EU, are, whether vague or tangible points in time, important in planning the long-term future. They serve as a framework, and are both path breaks in policy, and the aim of policy.

These focal points, or *path breaks* form the basis of the policy directed towards the future. The principle premise underlying this type of thinking about the future is that these goals are to be attained, either in a given period or at some point in the future. The time in between *today* and one of these focal points is often referred to as the *transitional* or *preparatory* stage. The transitional stage serves to secure the actual occurrence of the path break. In relation to this, the documents serve a number of purposes.

First they establish what is needed for the path break to occur.

In relation to the Customs Union, this is the topic of the Ankara Agreement, which stipulates that a Customs Union between the two parties requires the complete removal of barriers to trade, such as tariffs and quantitative restrictions, as well as measures having equivalent effect.

The point of Turkish accession to the EU is mentioned in the same document, but the requirements are best described by the Copenhagen Council in 1993, which sets the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria¹⁴⁷ and complete alignment of the candidate's legislation with the *acquis communautaire* as the most important requirement for membership.¹⁴⁸

In addition, a number of more detailed requirements are given in the documents:

¹⁴⁷ See chapter 4

¹⁴⁸ Here an important note should be made: In the case of Turkish accession, meeting the Copenhagen criteria was determined as a requirement for the start of accession negotiations. The implementation of the *acquis* consequently is a requirement for the accession of the country as a full member. Given the scope of research, consideration was given by the author to establishing the start of accession negotiations as a third *focal point* in the documents. However, the issue of Turkish accession is often treated by the documents as a single issue, not differentiating between the Copenhagen criteria and the *acquis*, and moreover, often adding alternative requirements. Consequently, the more logical choice was made for treatment of the 'start of negotiations' point as a point in the process towards accession. As a result, the two requirements will be used interchangeably in the remainder of the chapter.

‘The Commission underlined the importance of effectively incorporating Community legislation into national legislation, and the even greater importance of implementing it properly in the field, via the appropriate administrative and judicial structures. This is an essential pre-condition for creating the mutual trust indispensable for future membership.’

Furthermore ‘Turkey must accept the results of any other accession negotiations as they stand at the moment of its accession’. And another criterion lies in the development of the civil society dialogue, which is also designated by the Commission as a ‘long-term process’.¹⁴⁹

A number of requirements are long-term, and even reach beyond the focal point, but cannot be seen independently of it. Such as the case of the environmental *acquis*, of which it is indicated that ‘Complete adoption of the environmental *acquis* remains a long-term prospect’ that according to the rest of the Report, may well extend beyond the actual point of accession.¹⁵⁰ The same goes for the abolition of the National Security Council in its current form and position in order to align civilian control of the military with practice in EU Member States.¹⁵¹

Second they establish how *today's* situation is different from what is envisaged at the time of *path break*.

With regard to this a Turkish delegate says the following in relation to the CU point:

‘If you just look at the conditions at that time, the Western countries, at that time the EEC countries were much more developed than Turkey. The industrial development of Turkey was not at this point. That is why there were some periods given for harmonisation, lowering the customs tariffs for both sides’.

And

¹⁴⁹ Commission of the European Communities. (2005). *Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Civil Society Dialogue between the EU and Candidate countries*. COM(2005) 290 final. Brussels: European Commission.

¹⁵⁰ Commission of the European Communities. (2000). *2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*. (8 November 2000). Brussels: European Commission.

¹⁵¹ European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. (2003). Report on Turkey's application for membership of the European Union. (COM(2002) 700 – C5-0104/2003 – 2000/2014(COS))/ FINAL A5-0160/2003. Brussels.

‘Turkey’s economy then was very far from being capable of withstanding the competitive pressures that would arise out of membership. A transition period was therefore foreseen in the Agreement, to permit Turkey to bridge the gap between its economy, and that of its partners in the Community’.¹⁵²

And from the Commission perspective it is similarly stated that

‘In 1963 the status of the Turkish economy was not ready. The Association Agreement was signed back in 1963 with a country that had a very strong state sector. The country was almost a centrally planned economy, had a very strong state sector, and took basically from 1963 to 1983 to dismantle progressively this state sector, to introduce gradual liberalization, to restructure the different aspects of the economy, to reduce the funds of the agriculture, and to basically move towards a more open, more flexible economy that would parallel what was done at the level of the EU’.¹⁵³

The extent to which Turkey has met the Copenhagen criteria and implemented the *acquis* as a requirement for membership is the main focus of the Commission Regular Reports.¹⁵⁴ According to the 1998 Regular Report,

‘in making its assessment of the economic situation and outlook in Turkey the Commission has been guided by the conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council which specified that accession to the Union called for a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union’.¹⁵⁵

And based on the current state of affairs in Turkey, a 2001 AFET report judges that there are incompatibilities between the objectives and Turkish situation.

¹⁵² F. Öztürk, personal interview, April 4, 2006.

¹⁵³ A. Missir di Lusignano, personal interview, March 30, 2006.

¹⁵⁴ After the start of negotiations, the Commission Regular Reports are referred to as Progress Reports. These reports have not been considered in detail, as they are beyond the scope of this research, but a general reading shows that even though at the start of negotiations, meeting the Copenhagen criteria should no longer be an issue, the Progress reports still give in depth consideration to them.

¹⁵⁵ Commission of the European Communities. (1998). *Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession*. Brussels: European Commission. p. 22.

‘Underlines in particular that the structure of state and institutions in Turkey *as such* constitutes a barrier to implementation of the JHA *acquis*; therefore notes that the necessary reform of the Turkish state and society will be a painful and long-lasting process’.¹⁵⁶

Furthermore, the documents list the requirements on Turkey in order to attain the objectives: ‘Turkey needs to increase its level of investment in science and research to lay the foundation for the future competitiveness of its economy and to contribute rapidly to job creation’.¹⁵⁷

Third, they establish a method of getting ready for the requirements. The policy-documents show that this is a very precise process, regulated on the basis of 1) timetables or roadmaps, or 2) transitional periods to the conditions needed for the *path break*.

Timetables

The Additional Protocol to the Ankara agreement establishes the timetable according to which the Customs Union is to be attained. The document envisages several stages in which tariffs are to be lowered by Turkey, in a period of 22 years.

‘The timetable for the reductions to be effected by Turkey shall be as follows: the first reduction shall be made on the entry into force of this Protocol. The second and third shall be applied three years and five years later. The fourth and subsequent reductions shall be made each year in such a way that the final reduction is made at the end of the transitional stage. (...) Each reduction shall be made by lowering the basic duty on each product by 10 %.’¹⁵⁸

Council Decision 1/95 on the Customs Union calls on the Association Council to determine the timetable and rules for the progressive abolition of restrictions remaining at the time.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁶ European Parliament. (2001). European Parliament resolution on the 2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's progress towards accession. (COM(2000) 713 - C5-0613/2000 - 2000/2014(COS))/ (A5-0343/2001). Strasbourg.

¹⁵⁷ Commission of the European Communities. (2003). *2003 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*. (SEC(2003) 1212/ COM(2003) 676 final). Brussels: European Commission

¹⁵⁸ EC-Turkey Association Council. (1970). Additional Protocol and Financial Protocol, signed at Brussels, 23 November 1970. *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 24.12.73. Brussels. Art. 10.

¹⁵⁹ EC-Turkey Association Council. (1995). Council Decision no. 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 22 December 1995 on implementing the final phase of the Customs Union. (96/142/EC). *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 13.2.96.

According to the timetable specified in the Customs Union Decision of 1 January 1996, Turkey needs to have aligned itself with all the preferential agreements concluded between the EC and third countries and EC autonomous preferential regimes by 2001.

But the complete abolition of restrictions on trade took somewhat longer than expected as the documents show that discussion about timetables in relation to the Customs Union reaches well into 2002, when the main unsolved issues [were] the scope of the agreement, the type of service providers to be included and the timetable for liberalization. Consequently, the Association Council, according to its minutes stresses that ‘a clear timetable for the full liberalization of the market should be established without any further delay’.¹⁶⁰

In relation to Turkish accession, the Accession Partnership states that

‘In order to prepare for membership, Turkey should prepare a national programme for the adoption of the *acquis*. This programme should set out a timetable for achieving the priorities and intermediate objectives established in the Accession Partnership.’¹⁶¹

The Turkish *National Programme for the Adoption for the Acquis (NPAA)* sets out how Turkey envisages dealing with the Accession Partnership, the timetable for implementing the Partnership’s priorities, and implications in terms of human and financial resources. The *Accession Partnership* and the *NPAA* are revised in response to one another, with the mutual aim of setting a schedule according to which Turkey is to implement the *acquis*. Although the *NPAA* was not subject to the analysis, EU documents show that the burden of adaptation lies with Turkey in this case. The Council states in 2004 that ‘the dialogue with the Turkish administration to promote alignment is taking place, and the EU has requested a timetable for full alignment with the EC directives’.

The emphasis on timetables becomes clear from the only point of critique that the EP voices on the *NPAA*’s in 2001, namely that ‘the *NPAA*’s are ‘useful as a beginning of the vast

¹⁶⁰ European Commission. (2002). *Minutes of the 110th meeting of the EC-Turkey Association Committee Brussels, 24 January 2002*. (11859/02). Brussels.

¹⁶¹ European Council. (2001). *Council Decision of 8 March 2001 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey*. (2001/235/EC). Official Journal of the European Communities, 24.3.2001.

transformation needed for the modernization of Turkey, but unfortunately without a clear enough ‘road map’ and timetable’¹⁶² as well as in the 2001 Regular Report, which states with regard to visa policy that ‘steps have been taken to gradually come into alignment with the *acquis* and, in particular, the Common Consular Instructions and the relevant EC Regulation. However, there are no indications on precise targets and timetables’.¹⁶³ In the same report it is stated that

‘Although combating regional disparities in Turkey should be a major objective for strengthening internal socio-economic cohesion as well as preparing for accession, there is still no comprehensive, long-term strategy to address such issues’.¹⁶⁴

Note should be taken here of the fact that the *Accession Partnership* and the *NPAA* focus primarily on the implementation of the Community *acquis*. On the basis of the documents, this seems to be not the only formalized timetable of achieving accession. Two points come to the fore:

1. The achievement of the Customs Union is a prerequisite for the accession of Turkey. This, as has been shown above, is subject to a different timetable.
2. The implementation of the Copenhagen criteria is a prerequisite for the start of accession negotiations. The Copenhagen criteria are not the subject of the *Accession Partnership* and the *NPAA*, but they do form a step in the overall timetable to accession.

Timetables are thus a way of anchoring the road to the future.

Transition periods

In short transition periods are timetables that can reach beyond the focal point, thus for example beyond the moment of accession.

Although the documents in category B state the possibility of establishing transition periods for a number of chapters of the *acquis*, the scope of the research did not reach into the actual

¹⁶² European Parliament. (2001). *European Parliament resolution on the 2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's progress towards accession*. (A5-0343/2001). Strasbourg.

¹⁶³ Commission of the European Communities. (2001). *2001 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*. SEC(2001) 1756. Brussels: European Commission.

¹⁶⁴ Commission of the European Communities. (2001). *2001 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*. SEC(2001) 1756. Brussels: European Commission.

negotiation phase, during which this is actually determined. Furthermore, the EP stresses that ‘the Union may allow for transitional measures, provided that they are limited in scope and time (...) Transition periods should be short and few’.¹⁶⁵ Transition periods are thus always determined closer to accession, and are short; they do not really qualify as ‘long term’ planning.

Not knowing

Exploring the future does not become less uncertain as it is explored, but definitely remains uncertain when it is not explored, as is the case for all documents in category B, of which none include or make a reference to a future explorative practice as the basis for policy. In some documents this is made explicit. Especially in the documents which are oriented towards *planning* the future, attention is paid to ‘what if events do not or cannot unfold as planned’. The ways in which this scenario is dealt with differs for each of the focal points, or rather for the *vague* and *tangible* future, and are referred to as *re-evaluation* and *see you when you get there* respectively.

Re-evaluation: With regard to the CU point, it has been described already that the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement establishes a time-table for progressively lowering tariffs in order to meet the focal point, the installment of the Customs Union. The Protocol gives no indication of an exploration of the economic future of either the EU or Turkey as a possible base for the different stages. This gives reason to assume that exploration of what can be expected of the economies of either party does not lie at the basis of determining these various stages. It is implicitly assumed that the economies will be able to cope with the various stages of the timetable when they approach. The protocol itself recognizes that it is uncertain whether this will be the case. On how this is dealt with, Art. 22 states:

‘Six months before each of the dates of the last three increases the Council of Association shall review the consequences for the economic development of Turkey of increasing the degree of liberalization and shall, if this is necessary for achievement of an accelerated development of the Turkish economy, decide to postpone the increase for a period which it shall determine ‘.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁵ European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. (2000). *Report on the enlargement of the European Union: part 1 – Motion for a resolution*. (COM(1999) 500 – C5-0341/2000 – 2171/2000 (COS))/ FINAL A5-0250/2000. Brussels.

¹⁶⁶ EC-Turkey Association Council. (1970). Additional Protocol and Financial Protocol, signed at Brussels, 23 November 1970. *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 24.12.73. Brussels. Art. 22.

See you when you get there: With regard to the goal of Turkish accession, a different approach becomes evident from the documents. In short, if the requirements for the *path break* are not met, the accession will merely not take place, and the *path break* will move further into the future. This is best described in the *2005 Negotiation strategy*: ‘The negotiations will be based on Turkey’s own merits and the pace will depend on Turkey’s progress in meeting the requirements for membership’.¹⁶⁷ The European Parliament stresses that

‘European Parliament noted the decision to consider Turkey an applicant country and reiterated that negotiations could not be opened as Turkey fell well short of meeting the political criteria laid down in Copenhagen’.

and at a later stage

‘The Union side, for its part, will decide in due course whether the conditions for the conclusion of negotiations have been met; this will be done on the basis of a report from the Commission confirming the fulfillment by Turkey of the requirements’.¹⁶⁸

‘The Commission shall monitor this capacity during the negotiations, encompassing the whole range of issues set out in its October 2004 paper on issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective, in order to inform an assessment by the Council as to whether this condition of membership has been met’.

And with regard to the opening up of borders, one of the aspects of membership, it is said that

‘Turkey will not accede to the Schengen zone upon or for *some time*¹⁶⁹ after its accession, but at a later date to be determined by the Council following a stringent evaluation of its border management practices’.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁷ European Council. (2005). *EU-Turkey Negotiation Framework, Luxembourg 3 October 2005*. Brussels. p. 1.

¹⁶⁸ European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. (1997). *Report on the Communication from the Commission ‘Agenda 2000 - for a stronger and wider Union’*. (A4-0368/97). Brussels.

¹⁶⁹ Emphasis added by author.

¹⁷⁰ Commission of the European Communities. (2004). *Commission staff working document: Issues Arising from Turkey’s Membership Perspective*. (COM(2004) 656 final). Brussels: European Commission. p. 9.

The Commission can, on its own initiative or on the request of one third of the Member States, recommend the suspension of negotiations and propose the conditions for eventual resumption. It can thus postpone the focal point, or eliminate it entirely. This is what is often referred as the ‘emergency brake’ or a ‘guarantee against any deviation’.¹⁷¹

Here two important notes should be made:

- With regard to the point of Turkish accession, the burden of adjustment to the requirements seems to be on Turkey primarily. This is an important aspect in the *see you when you get there*-approach towards not knowing the future.
- A slight difference can be detected in the rigidity of the approach in relation to the Copenhagen criteria and the implementation of the *acquis*. The documents referring to the Copenhagen criteria seemed to be more stringent, whereas in respect of the *acquis* transition periods are brought forward as a way of attaining the *focal point* before all requirements have been met. This can be a way of softening the rigidity of the approach, based on a degree of confidence in the future. In the same vein it should be stressed again that transition periods usually do not apply to the long term.

The *see you when you get there* approach is not the same as the wait and see attitude described in earlier chapters. This is made explicit by one of the AFET reports on Turkish accession, which states that

‘(The EU) does not adopt wait-and-see’ approach but (supports) the government in actively fulfilling the political criteria of Copenhagen. This approach means that work on compliance with the criteria must not be postponed to some date in the future. The EU should not be a passive observer but should give the necessary assistance. In order for this approach¹⁷² to be effective it is necessary that no problems should be swept under the carpet, particularly not the most fundamental problems: it should be stated clearly where the problems lie’.

¹⁷¹ Missir di Lusignano, A. (2005). *EU-Turkey relations after 17 December 2004: the beginning of a new era?* European Commission: Directorate General for Enlargement.

¹⁷² Here the document does not refer to the *see you when you get there* approach.

Indeed, the EU, through actively pushing for the compilation of a timetable, and for example the pre-accession assistance does take an active role in determining the road to the *path break*. The *see you when you get there* approach stresses basically that this road is for the candidate to walk.

Furthermore, the documents showed that the *see you when you get there* approach with regard to not knowing the future is not usually combined with future anticipations. The approach is based on the evaluation of the status quo, and does generally not anticipate the long term future as a basis for decisions. The 1998 Regular Report of the Commission states that:

‘While Turkey has undeniably shown that it has the administrative and legal capacity to apply the *acquis* in the context of the customs union , it is not possible at this stage to offer an opinion on its future capacity regarding other areas of the *acquis* which have not yet been transposed’.

All of the Regular Reports make a number of statements about the short and medium-term future, but do not touch upon long-term expectations.

On the basis of the documents, among those focused on *planning* the future a difference can be established between what can be called policy-making for the long-term future and long-term policy-making. This mainly has to do with the existence of a certain focal point in the future, it seems. The previous paragraphs described how a point in the future can serve as a focus for policy-making. This policy-making as such does not necessarily have to be long-term. A long-term focus can be complemented by short-term policy-priorities.¹⁷³ A clear example of this is the EU role in the Middle East, in which it says to have ‘assumed a diplomatic mediation role with the aim of linking short-term operational crisis management measures to long-term prospects’.¹⁷⁴ The other way of *planning* the future is by means of long-term policy-making, meaning policy that is sustained for a longer period of time. Examples of this are for example the twinning policy as part of the Phare accession assistance, which involves the long-term secondment of civil servants to Turkey in the light of adaptation to the *acquis communautaire*, as well as the EU’s

¹⁷³European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. (2003). *Report on Turkey’s application for membership of the European Union*. (COM(2002) 700 – C5-0104/2003 – 2000/2014(COS))/ FINAL A5-0160/2003. Brussels.

¹⁷⁴European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. (2001). *Report on the progress achieved in the implementation of the common foreign and security policy*. (2001/2007(INI))/ (FINAL A5-0332/2001). Brussels.

‘long-term programme of enhanced, concerted and multilateral economic assistance for the reconstruction of the region’.¹⁷⁵ Here it involves a long-term commitment of the EU.¹⁷⁶ The difference between these two aspects of planning the future can be very subtle, and the documents show that in many cases they overlap.

Some of the long-term planning of the future is not directly related to one of the *focal* points. Some of the tasks or objectives established are not requirements for the achievement of one of the *path breaks*, but for success in general. For example in relation to education policy, it is said that participation by countries and people in the region itself remains a key factor in achieving positive outcomes in the medium and long term.¹⁷⁷ And with regard to the same policy, an example can be found of an objective which is not directly related to a *focal point*: ‘The aim in the long and medium term is to increase the educational standard of the population, to support an active employment policy, employability, lifelong learning’.¹⁷⁸

Anticipation

It has been stressed earlier that the documents in category B and D have a commonality in stressing the difficulties involved future exploration. In the category B documents, such statements are usually used as an explanation of why such an endeavor is not pursued. Nonetheless, short of a real future exploration, the documents in category B have a way to go about this without leaving the future as a black hole.

Many documents list the uncertainties involved in exploring the future, giving some indication of what could be expected in the future.

¹⁷⁵ European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. (1997). *Report on the Commission report on 'Prospects for the development of regional cooperation for the countries of the former Yugoslavia and what the Community could do to foster such cooperation'*. (SEC(96)0252 - C4-0274/96) and the Commission report on 'Common principles for future contractual relations with certain countries in South- Eastern Europe' (COM(96)0476 - C4-0644/96). PE 220.776/fin./ (A4-0127/97). Brussels.

¹⁷⁶ Commission of the European Communities. (2001). *Commission staff Working Document: Annex to the 2003 Report on Phare and the pre-accession instruments for Cyprus, Malta and Turkey – Country sections and additional information*. (COM(2005) 64 final). Brussels.

¹⁷⁷ Council of the European Union, President. (1999). *Note: Preparation for the Conference of European Ministers for Education from 24 to 26 June 1999 in Budapest*. (8947/1/99). Brussels.

¹⁷⁸ Commission of the European Communities. (2001). *Commission staff Working Document: Annex to the 2003 Report on Phare and the pre-accession instruments for Cyprus, Malta and Turkey – Country sections and additional information*. (COM(2005) 64 final). Brussels.

Others list a general expectation. Such is the case with the Commission report on enlargement which states that ‘impacts so far on the economy, society and the environment have been more marginal, more socio-economic impacts can be expected in the longer term’.¹⁷⁹ The same is true for the Regular Report 2000, which indicates that

‘Privatization in the telecommunications and energy sectors are expected to improve the business environment for Turkish industry in the future, provided that they are also accompanied by a lifting of monopolies and market liberalization.’¹⁸⁰

Here no reference is made to a future exploration or any other source on which this expectation is based. Furthermore, in many such documents, the expectation of the future is based on a current trend: ‘If one takes a long-term view it is apparent that the world is moving to a more interdependent system in which issues of global governance become ever more pressing’.¹⁸¹ Another example is:

‘recognizing the special part immigration has played in the past in securing mutual understanding, and considering that immigration will continue to occupy a prominent position in Euro-Mediterranean relations in the future’.¹⁸²

Or

‘A high, persistent level of inflation is sapping the strength of the Turkish economy by discouraging investment and hence future production potential’.¹⁸³

The most important example of expectations about the future on the basis of current trends is voiced in a number of documents, specifically by the Council, in which it voices its confidence about the reforms in Turkey:

¹⁷⁹ Commission of the European Communities. (2001). *Commission staff Working Document: Annex to the 2003 Report on Phare and the pre-accession instruments for Cyprus, Malta and Turkey – Country sections and additional information*. (COM(2005) 64 final). Brussels.

¹⁸⁰ Commission of the European Communities. (2000). *2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*. (8 November 2000). Brussels: European Commission.

¹⁸¹ European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. (1998). *Report on the role of the Union in the world: Implementation of the common foreign and security policy for 1997*. PE 226.282/fin./ (A4-0169/98). Brussels.

¹⁸² European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. (1997). *Report on the joint report by the Presidency of the Council and the Commission on Mediterranean Policy - follow-up to the Barcelona conference*. (7987/96 - C4-0414/96)/ PE 218.799/fin./ (A4-0027/97). Brussels.

¹⁸³ European Parliament, Secretariat Working Part Taskforce ‘Enlargement’. (2000). *Briefing paper: Briefing No. 7, Turkey and relations with the European Union*. (PE 167.407/rév.3). Luxembourg.

‘The European Council welcomed the decisive progress made by Turkey in its far-reaching reform process and expressed its confidence that Turkey will sustain that process of reform’.¹⁸⁴

Some documents, short of making an exploration, list concrete variables on which the future depends. The future may be uncertain, but the documents go as far as to state what will determine the future. With regard to an exploration of the farming sector it is said that ‘European farming sector will come under two types of competing pressures’.¹⁸⁵

In relation to the energy sector, the following variables are stipulated:

‘While future demand for electricity will be shaped by the overall economic growth, (the demand for electricity should grow at about the same rate as the general economic growth) predictions about economic growth in the transitional economies are highly uncertain’.

Lastly, a large number of documents contain what van Asselt refers to as *diagnoses of today*¹⁸⁶, indicating the trends and main developments that play a role today. Here it is not made explicit that these trends will continue in the future, but implicitly, by using the current status of events as a basis of policy, it is assumed that there will be some continuation in the future.

6.5 Category C

The documents in category C are those which either are, contain, or refer to a future explorative study. Although this seems like a broad definition, only six documents were designated as such. These were:

¹⁸⁴ European Council. (2005). *Council Presidency Conclusions, Brussels 16-17 December 2004*. (16238/1/04). Brussels.

¹⁸⁵ firstly from US agricultural policy and the CAIRNS Group which would like to see a total liberalization of agriculture based on the RICARDO principle of comparative advantage; secondly, as demonstrated by the European Parliament’s recent adoption of a resolution against the use of hormones in beef production, there is a counter pressure based on environmental, economic, social and cultural considerations which would like to reverse this trend.

¹⁸⁶ Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, Van Asselt, M. (2005). *Houdbaarheid verstreken: Toekomstverkenning en beleid*. Den Haag.

1. Commission of the European Communities. (2004). *Commission staff working document: Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective*. (COM(2004) 656 final). Brussels: European Commission.
2. European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. (2000). *Report on the enlargement of the European Union: part 1 – Motion for a resolution*. (COM(1999) 500 – C5-0341/2000 – 2171/2000 (COS))/ FINAL A5-0250/2000. Brussels.
3. European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. (2004). *Report with a proposal for a European Parliament recommendation to the Council on EU policy towards the South Caucasus*. 2003/2225(INI))/ FINAL A5-0052/2004. Brussels.
4. European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. (1997). *Report on the Communication from the Commission 'Agenda 2000 - for a stronger and wider Union'*. (COM(97)2000 - C4-0371/97)/ PE 224.339/fin./ A4-0368/97. Brussels.
5. European Parliament, Secretariat Working Party Taskforce 'Enlargement'. (1999). *Briefing paper: Briefing No. 37, Enlargement and external economic relations*. (PE 168.062/rev.1). Luxembourg.
6. European Parliament Working paper: *The Enlargement Process of the EU: Consequences in the field of Environment*. Luxembourg: European Communities.

Since the number of future explorative documents is limited it is best to consider them each individually before attempting to draw more general conclusions from them.

Commission staff working document: Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective. The Commission's *Issues paper* seems to enjoy a somewhat special place in the Turkey-EU dossier, judging by the fact that it was recommended by two of the interviewees as 'the most future oriented document in the dossier' and is situated at the top of the 'most important document list' on the Commission webpage on Turkish accession.

The document was produced by the Commission on request by the European Parliament. As such the Commission performed its role within the policy-making cycle of providing the other institutions with reports and information as the basis for policy decisions. The fact that this

document was commissioned outside of the regular system of Regular Reports also shows the role that the Commission can fulfil as an advisor on request. The report was presented in parallel with the Regular report and the Commission Recommendation. As such it was meant to serve as a basis for further policy-decisions, thus to inform for better policy. The paper positions itself within the policy-making field by stating that it does not include additional criteria or criteria to be fulfilled, but can be considered relevant in the light of the fourth Copenhagen criteria, namely the capacity of the European Union to absorb new members.

The aim of the document as stated in the introduction is to ‘conduct an assessment of the effects of Turkey’s possible accession’. The assessment primarily addresses the effects of Turkey’s integration in EU policies. It does so by subsequently investigating the following aspects: geo-political dimension, economic dimension, internal market and related politics, agriculture and fisheries, regional and structural policy, justice and home affairs, and budgetary issues. Many of these anticipated effects are short- and medium term. The paper establishes a number of expectations with regard to the long-term.

- There will be a relatively small, but positive long-term economic benefit of Turkish accession.
- Some labor migration from Turkey is to be expected. Here the report refers to ‘available studies giving varying estimates of expected additional migration following Turkish accession’. Estimates of the long-term impact, according to the report are based primarily on expected income difference and give very varying figures (ranging from 0.5 to 4 million potential Turkish immigrants). Here the study makes a reference to a number of external studies, conducted by the Dutch Planning Office, and the Osteuropa-Institute in Munich as well as the Eurobarometer.
- Furthermore, it is anticipated that this migration might have a contribution to offsetting the ageing of EU societies, hereby also making an assumption about the future of European countries. However, in the long run, the declining trend in Turkish population growth rates will turn the population structure into that similar to a Western European society. The estimation of population prospects here is based on the UN World Population Prospects 2002 Revision.
- Energy demand has grown at 4-5 percent per annum over the past three decades and will continue to grow rapidly, which will require enormous investments in coming years. Imports of solid fuels and hydrocarbons are expected to nearly double between 2000 and 2020.

- Provided that ambitious reforms can be sustained over the medium-term, Turkey's accession could have a positive effect on the internal market by enhancing access to a potentially large and fast growing banking, insurance and investment market.
- Among the expected positive effects resulting from possible Turkish accession are the reduction of cross-border air pollution and the improvement of Black Sea water quality.
- In the longer term, Turkish accession can be expected to lead to an increase of trade in both directions.

A number of expectations about the future are in first instance short or medium term but can also be applicable for the longer term.

- Turkey is expected to develop further as a major oil transit country.
- Water in the Middle East will increasingly become a strategic issue in the years to come.
- The shift in employment and value added away from the agricultural sector to the service sector can be expected to continue and generate additional productivity increases.

Furthermore, the paper establishes a number of objectives and requirements in order to avoid some negative consequences in the long run and thus allow for success.

- Turkey would need time to make a number of agricultural sectors more competitive. Turkey would need considerable time to restructure its agricultural sector and avoid substantial income losses for Turkish farmers.
- Given that Turkey faces the increasing threat of tobacco-related cancers and other health risks related to tobacco consumption continued efforts in transposing and implementing the Community *acquis* and activities aiming at controlling tobacco consumption are essential.

The above expectations about the future show that report considers the future of Turkey, that of the EU, and that of the both combined. Furthermore, it considers long-term events that are a consequence of accession, as well some events that would evolve independently of accession, but would play a role in the process.

It has been stipulated in an earlier section of this chapter already that overall, it is recognized that exploring the future is a difficult task. The Issues paper, after setting out the challenges which have been described at the beginning of this chapter, takes the following two steps to make exploration of the future doable:

- The assessment is based on existing policies.

- The implications of possible accession of the Western Balkan countries are not considered.

Furthermore, the evaluation is based on the extension of existing trends.

European Parliament. *Report on the enlargement of the European Union: part 1 – Motion for a resolution..*

The European Parliament report on enlargement has a similar approach, covering a range of areas, but only stipulates a long-term expectation with regard to the environment. The document considers the long-term effects on the environment of Turkish accession:

- air quality and pollution, climate change and ozone depletion: very high emissions of polluting substances and greenhouse gases from increased traffic and bad quality of fuels
- water pollution: a heavy load from agricultural, urban, suburban, and industrial sources, lack of sewage water treatment, eutrophication of fresh waters and pollution of river and marine waters
- soil depletion and degradation: increased use of chemical fertilisers, pesticides, herbicides, nitrates and sewage sludge on agricultural land; acidification and desertification, serious risks from insufficiently controlled human and industrial activities, including sports and mass tourism;
- waste management: increased quantities of domestic and industrial waste, very low level of recycling and re-use;
- industrial pollution and risk management: inadequate management of hazardous waste, high-risk substances and nuclear material.

These expectations are based on the current legislative situation in Turkey, and what effects it would have on the European environment if it is not changed before accession. Clearly in this case it thus concerns the future of the European Union including Turkey, and the exploration of the future after accession. The document as such does not make a reference to an external source to support these expectations.

In the same document, these expectations are used to word a number of policy objectives:

- Emphasis on compliance with the EU environmental *acquis*.
- European, regional and sectoral co-operation and the building of strong networks including a programme of active co-operation

European Parliament. *Report with a proposal for a European Parliament recommendation to the Council on EU policy towards the South Caucasus.*

The recommendation on the South Caucasus, is related primarily to the EU's foreign policy towards this area. It makes a statement about the long-term future in relation to energy policy, which is that the EU will become increasingly dependent on energy supply from neighbouring countries in the future. This expectation serves as the basis for the rest of the policy-paper, which argues for closer ties between the South Caucasus and the EU, especially in the field of energy. In this case it concerns the future of the European Union only. As a basis for this expectation, the document refers to the following document:

Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Development of the Energy Policy for the Enlarged European Union, its Neighbours and Partner Countries (COM (2003) 262 final/2).¹⁸⁷

European Parliament. *Report on the Communication from the Commission 'Agenda 2000 - for a stronger and wider Union'.*

The report on the Commission's 'Agenda 2000', is primarily concerned with the previous enlargement of the CEEC countries. Still, it makes a number of statements with regard to Turkey. The Report states:

- Speedy and full accession of all candidate Member States will, in the long term, improve the environment throughout Europe, assuming a more intensive approach to important policy areas such as the environment, transport and energy.
- Some experts estimate short-term job losses in farming and the rural economy at one million. Here no reference is made to any report supporting this number, nor is it stated who the experts are.
- At all events it can be assumed that, even with long-term transition rules on personal freedom of movement migration pressure will increase.
- Studies of the long-term impact of growth in trade point to a not inconsiderable increase in potential. They also show, however, that it is the northern EU states that derive the greatest advantages, while the southern ones are unevenly exposed to stronger competition. Again here it is not indicated which studies are meant.

¹⁸⁷ This document was not accessible for further research.

- In the long term it may be expected that the new Member States, as they gradually grow more prosperous themselves, will increase the EU's development cooperation resources.

European Parliament. *Briefing paper: Briefing No. 37, Enlargement and external economic relations.*

The EP briefing paper was produced by Parliament Secretariat's Task Force on Enlargement, which no longer exists as such. The Briefing focuses on the relation between enlargement and external economic relations. The paper states a number of relations with regard to the future:

- It is likely that the new countries will have to take on further moves towards trade liberalization within the framework of the WTO. By doing so and through a gradual integration of the new Member States into the EU, they will contribute to the expansion of the trade and economic stability in today's global economy.
- The prospective EU members can be expected to become even more attractive hosts of FDI in the future.

Here again, no reference is made to external sources to support these expectations. The paper as such seems to have a rather informative nature, and does not really elaborate on policy objectives. The document focuses on the long-term future before and after enlargement, as a consequence of enlargement policy.

European Parliament Working paper: *The Enlargement Process of the EU: Consequences in the field of Environment.* Luxembourg: European Communities.

The last paper in category A is one that is referred to a number of times in the European Parliament reports on Turkey-EU relations, but does not have a relationship to Turkish accession directly. This paper was requested by the European Parliament's committee on Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy and conducted by an external agency, namely Milieu Ltd. in Brussels. The paper focuses on the environmental consequences of accession of the CEEC countries, especially in the long term. The paper argues that the short-term costs of compliance with the *acquis* will in the long-run be compensated by long-term benefits such as reduced pressures on the environment through diminished pollution emissions and depositions. To support this it makes long-term estimations of the financial benefits from compliance. The paper thus primarily focuses on the post-accession period. Due to its limited scope, the paper can be considered a forecast rather than a scenario.

One should be careful not to make too many generalizations on the basis of the mere number of six future explorative documents. Nevertheless, it is possible to list some general observations:

1. There seems to be a tendency to intertwine policy-making and future exploration. This is based on three observations: 1) Four of the documents were policy-making documents by nature, and used the future exploration as a method of sustaining the proposed policy. Especially in the policy-documents policy-objectives were phrased alongside the future exploration; 2) Five of the documents were produced by an institution in the policy-making cycle; 3) All documents were produced on the basis of an incentive originating in one of the bodies in the policy-making cycle as part of the policy-making process, and thus in general aimed at assisting in policy-making as such.
2. There seems to be a tendency to produce the future exploration inside of the policy-making process. Only with regard to the last item on the list was the future exploration produced entirely by an external body. The other five documents were produced by the policy-maker or a sub-unit thereof. In a small number of cases a single statement or paragraph was referenced to a second source. In one case this was a Commission paper. The other references to external sources were made *only* in relation to quantitative data, thus statistics, and referred to the UN World Population Prospects, Eurostat, Eurobarometer, as well as national entities such as the Dutch Planning Office and the Osteuropa-Institut in Munich. In most cases, these were related to economic data such as labor migration and demography.
3. There seems to be an emphasis on explorative statements in the field of environment. The second most prominent topic seems to be economics. Even the papers which have the topic of Turkish accession as a whole seem to be most explorative in these two fields.
4. There seemed to be a *focal* point in Turkish accession. A large portion of the documents explores the long-term consequences of accession, either for Turkey, the EU, or the combination of the two. In addition, some expectations about Turkish accession are based on an exploration of the Turkish future, or that of the EU. In this case the future exploration did not necessarily take into account accession, but was rather a base for policy-objectives for accession, for example in the case of enlargement. Furthermore, a small number of documents explored the future independent of Turkish accession.
5. There seems to be a tendency to focus on forecasts rather than scenarios. In fact not one document in category C created one or multiple scenarios.

Furthermore, the documents give rise to the assumption that there is not a specific body either within the Commission or the European Parliament that systematically explores the future as a basis for policy. Instead, it seems like such exploration is conducted and incorporated into the policy 'when it comes up'. This assumption is sustained by Commission representative Missir de Lusignano who states that:

'There is not specific body which has it as its task to explore the future. Instead it is integrated into everyone's work, within the separate fields. The experts on energy supply explore the future in this area, and the same applies to civil-military relations. There is not a single person or body responsible for this. As a whole the exploration of the long term is mostly based on the internal expertise of the DG Enlargement'.

It has been stated earlier that the documents in category C, similar to those in category B, lay emphasis on the difficulties involved in exploring the future. Contrary to the category B documents, they explore the future nevertheless. The documents show a number of ways in relation to how the future is explored. In general, there is an emphasis on the extension of current trends. Especially when the exploration of the future does not incorporate a *path break*, the inclination is to prolong current trends into the future. This is not only the case in relation to statistical data, but also with more qualitative situations, such as for example when a policy has been put into place 'positive effects are expected in the future'.

Those documents aiming to consider the long-term effects of enlargement as a *path break* all took a similar approach. Firstly, they recognized the uncertainties involved in assessing these effects, due to the effect that accession of Turkey is a point in the future, and that both the EU and Turkey will evolve until then. The *Issues paper* contains an example of this, as has been shown above. Secondly, they emphasized that Turkish accession is not a determined point in the future, and that consequently anticipation of Turkey's and the EU's situation at the time of accession is impossible. Based on this, the documents go on to limit their scope, as to not include any changes in the status quo of either party in their analysis. The *Issues paper* states that:

'Although significant policy development can be expected in several areas over the next 10-15

years, the assessment is based on existing policies.. [and].. the implication of the possible accession of one or several of the Western Balkan countries are not considered'.¹⁸⁸

By accepting these assumptions, the exploration of the future becomes workable by limiting the number of options. Consequently, the underlying thought of these explorations is Turkey (*status quo*) + EU (*status quo*) = (long term) effects of enlargement. The basic premise of these papers is basically 'what if Turkey were to join the European Union today?' By evaluating the effects of Turkish accession based on the status quo, a concession is made in terms of relevancy of the documents. It is a given that Turkey will not accede at this moment. For example by evaluating the effects on the environment if Turkish legislation would not be changed is somewhat irrelevant, because the mandatory implementation of the *acquis* will change Turkish legislation.

6.6 Thinking about the future

Based on the analysis of category B and D, three types of 'thinking about the long-term future' can in general be sustained:

- *Exploring / anticipating the future (expecting)*
Anticipation or exploration of the future is related to the future of 'today'. It can be based on current trends that are extended, or on the reasoning through of current policies.
- *Exploring the future of a path break (reasoning)*
A path break can be considered a radical policy change, as clear discontinuity of the status quo. Such is the case with the accession of Turkey to the European Union.
- *Determining the future (planning)*
This is done by setting objectives to be attained for the future, and to plan how to reach them accordingly.

In general some inclination to these three types of thinking about the future is evident in categories B and D. A number of documents aim at a combination of two or all three types. The documents showed that a combination of two ways of thinking about the future was always problematic.

¹⁸⁸ Commission of the European Communities. (2004). *Commission staff working document: Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective*. (COM(2004) 656 final). Brussels: European Commission. p. 4.

One such combination was to explore the long-term effects of a path break, not today, but in the future. The most prominent example of this is the effects of Turkish accession to the European Union. This implies having to first explore what the situation of Turkey and the EU will be like at the time of accession, before ‘combining’ those and constructing the long term effects of this *path break*. There was not a single document that took on this challenge. Instead, the documents of category B and D had different ways to work around it.

The category B documents simply did not go beyond the *path break* in terms of long-term exploration. Instead, their focus was on the anticipation and planning of the future before the *path break*, and at the most listing the variables that would be at work at the time of the *path break*. The category C documents focussed on not exploring the future of the *path break*, but rather doing so after the path break. This required ruling our change before the path break, such as by stating that ‘policy changes are not taken into consideration’ and the idea of ‘what if Turkey were to join the EU today’.

Furthermore, a combination of *exploring the future* and *planning* seems to be a difficult one, although the reasons for this are not entirely clear. In the category C documents that explored the future, even though the majority was part of a policy-cycle, the focus seemed to be on objectives rather than a timetable for the achievement of such objectives. In those documents planning the future from category B, explorations of the future could not be detected. In fact, the method prevalent in category B with regard to *dealing with not knowing the future* seemed to rule out the necessity for knowing the future.

The data give the impression that consideration of the long-term effects of enlargement is limited; in fact that long term thinking about the future in general is very limited. In this respect it is interesting to point to an AFET report, which states that

‘Nor must any form of window-dressing be resorted to, with attention being drawn only to the long-term advantages; rather, it must also be acknowledged that, great as the need for

enlargement to the East undoubtedly is, we shall, at least in the medium term, have to face up to powerful restrictions'.¹⁸⁹

It is interesting to see that such clear 'attention to the long-term advantages' could not be detected in the policy-documents. This leads to the question of 'if there are such long-term advantages, why is not more attention drawn to them?'

6.7 The role of previous enlargements

In the Council minutes, it is stated that 'a lot of the considerations in the recommendation and strategy paper were outcomes of lessons learnt from the most recent enlargements'. More documents showed a relation between policy in relation to the Turkish accession and previous experiences with enlargement. For example: 'As witnessed by the ten new Member States, which joined the EU in May 2004, the perspective of EU membership triggers substantial FDI by EU companies'.¹⁹⁰ Also, the working paper on enlargement stresses that

'Previous steps towards closer EU integration have promoted FDI in EU member countries in several instances. Spain, for example, emerged as a major host country of FDI after the country joined the EU in 1986'.¹⁹¹

In relation to the expected migration flow from Turkey to the EU, emphasis is laid on studies recalling the developments observed over time in Spain and Portugal, where initial immigration was subsequently reversed.

Furthermore, based on earlier cost estimates for other candidate countries, the Issues paper estimates that 'the overall costs of public and private investment related to Turkey's full compliance with the environmental *acquis* is likely to reach several tens of billions of euros'.

¹⁸⁹ European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. (1997). *Report on the Communication from the Commission 'Agenda 2000 - for a stronger and wider Union'*. (COM(97)2000 - C4-0371/97)/ PE 224.339/fin./ A4-0368/97. Brussels.

¹⁹⁰ Commission of the European Communities. (2004). *Commission staff working document: Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective*. (COM(2004) 656 final). Brussels: European Commission. p. 15.

¹⁹¹ European Parliament, Secretariat Working Party Taskforce 'Enlargement'. (1999). *Briefing paper: Briefing No. 37, Enlargement and external economic relations*. (PE 168.062/rev.1). Luxembourg.

Moreover, the sixth document in category C is also an important example of how even explorations from the previous enlargement are used in the Turkey-EU dossier.

The use of experiences with former enlargement as a base for expectations about Turkish accession is to some extent logical, and may be a substitute for future explorations of the topic. Why explore the future when you have factual knowledge to build on? It may also point to the EU's nature of 'best practices', meaning that the EU continuously adapts its policies on the basis of past (rather than future) knowledge.

6.8 Thinking about Turkey when thinking about the future

This study, as has been pointed out several times, is concerned with the role of *thinking about the future* in the Turkey-EU dossier. During the research however, some impression about the role of Turkey in the EU's ways of considering the future also came to the fore. It is worth pointing to a few findings which would come in handy in an *up-side-down* version of the study.

Turkey participated in the discussion on the future of Europe within the European Convention, which concluded its work with a proposal for a Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe submitted to the European Council with a view to the Intergovernmental Conference on the future institutional architecture of the Union. The minutes, especially of the Joint Parliamentary Committee continuously stress 'the importance attached by the EU to the participation of Turkey in the debate on the future of Europe'.¹⁹² This is especially interesting compared to a statement in the *Issues paper*, namely that 'It is assumed that the Constitution will be adopted and in force by the time of possible Turkish accession'.¹⁹³

In some cases thinking about the future can obstruct Turkish accession. For example in the case of the French and Dutch 'no' to the Constitution which had been prepared by the Convention on

¹⁹² European Parliament, Delegation to the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee. (2003). Minutes 50th meeting of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, Istanbul 16-17 June 2003. Brussels.

¹⁹³ Commission of the European Communities. (2004). *Commission staff working document: Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective*. (COM(2004) 656 final). Brussels: European Commission. p. 15.

the Future of Europe, these public statements were interpreted as a ‘no’ to the totality of the project by the governments of the Member States.¹⁹⁴

Similarly, not thinking about Turkey when thinking about the future also makes an interesting point. This is the case in relation to the EU budget, which was determined until 2014, without taking into consideration Turkish accession. As a result, the budgetary impact, and thus the entirety of Turkish accession can only be contemplated from 2014 onwards.

6.9 Political vs. economic criteria

A close look at a number of documents related to the Copenhagen criteria gives rise to a remark on the different nature of political and economic criteria in the light of Turkish accession. This kind of comparison is outside the scope of the research, and the observation is very subtle, demanding more research would be needed to sustain it fully, but it is nevertheless worth mentioning. Having treated the *transition periods* with regard to planning the future, and the *see you when you get there approach* in terms of meeting the requirements for membership, as well as the documents exploring the future, the following can be carefully speculated:

There seems to be a relation between the exploration of the future, the rigidity of the Copenhagen criteria, and the willingness to allow transition periods.

First of all, there seems to an emphasis on exploration of the economic situation of Turkey rather than its political prospects, as can be seen from the documents in category C.

Secondly, statements with regard to the *see you when you get there aspect* of accession, seem to be aimed more toward the political than the economic Copenhagen criteria.¹⁹⁵

With regard to economic criteria, there seems to be a quest rather for ensured prospects rather than an attained situation. The Council for example states ‘despite the progress achieved,

¹⁹⁴ European Parliament, Delegation to the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee. (2006). *Information note on the work of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee*. Brussels.

¹⁹⁵ European Parliament, Delegation to the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee. (2000). *Minutes 45th meeting of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, Brussels 5-6 June 2000*. (PE 291.076). Brussels.

economic stability and predictability have not yet been achieved to a sufficient degree to ensure Turkey's longer-term growth prospects'.¹⁹⁶

Thirdly, there seems to be a tendency to refer more to the possibility of transition periods in relation to economic criteria.

'The European Parliament reaffirms that there can be no transitional period for democracy'.¹⁹⁷

This observation is somewhat arbitrary, but it may suggest that in the case of economic accession criteria, the EU tends to be more lenient and willing to allow transition periods on the basis of expectations about the future and confidence, whereas a stricter approach is applied with regard to political criteria. If this is true, in the case of Turkish accession, this may be explained by the tied economic bonds that already exist between the EU and Turkey as a result of the Customs Union.

6.10 Conclusions

This chapter has elaborated on the findings of the first step of the research, namely the analysis of policy documents. Among its most important intermediate findings were that 1) there was only a very small share of future explorative documents among the policy documents; 2) there is a tendency to produce those future explorations as part of the policy-making process and by the policy-maker; 3) the documents as a whole showed three ways of thinking about the future, namely through exploring the future in general, exploring the future of a path break, and determining the future by planning it; 4) planning the future was the most prevalent method in which the documents dealt with the future; 5) planning the future occurred in three stages: objectives, requirements and timetables.

¹⁹⁶ Council of the European Union, Southeast Europe Working Party. (2003) *Note: Relations with Turkey* - Approval of the EU position for the 42d meeting of the EC-Turkey Association Council (Luxembourg, 15 April 2003). 8003/03. Brussels.

¹⁹⁷ European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. (1997). *Report on the Communication from the Commission 'Agenda 2000 - for a stronger and wider Union'*. (COM(97)2000 - C4-0371/97)/ PE 224.339/fin./ A4-0368/97. Brussels.

In the next chapter the second part of the findings and analysis will be presented. These will complement the findings mentioned above, and allow for a balanced view as a basis for further conclusions.

7. FINDINGS – PART 2

The following chapter will present the findings and intermediate conclusions on the second step of the research, which aimed at answering research objective 1 by further investigating the formalized way of future exploration in the European Union. The second step involved an ‘outside-in’ approach, inquiring whether exploration of the future in relation to the Turkey-EU dossier actually takes place. The rationale behind this second step was that ‘what does go into the policy-process can also not be reflected in the policy-paper’. To establish what goes in, the study looked at meeting documents, awareness of the policy-maker himself, the official advisory bodies of the European Union institutions, and external advisory bodies with a link to the policy-making in the Turkey-EU accession dossier.

7.1 Meeting documents

Analysis of the meeting documents is the most direct way of establishing what a policy-maker takes in as part of the decision-making on the EU-Turkey dossier. The meetings documents of the EP Committee on Foreign Affairs and External Relations and the Joint Parliamentary Committee were searched in combination with their agendas.

In general the lists of meeting documents for every meeting of AFET and JPC primarily contained documents which were part of the policy-making cycle, by the other institutions.

For the JPC, it was assumed that Turkey was always on the agenda, and that all meeting documents had a relation to the Turkey-EU dossier. No meeting documents were found that originated in a meso- or macro structure of the European Union and explored the future.

Only a small number of external documents were found.

- Centre for European Policy Studies, Aydin, S. (2005). *Progress Report on Turkey –Problems and Prospects*. Brussels: CEPS.

Although the name of this document may suggest differently, this CEPS article by Aydin is a summary of the 2004 Regular Report.

- Turkish State Institute for Statistics. (2005). *Attitudes of Individuals towards European Union Membership in Turkey*. Ankara: Prime Ministry.

This document describes the public support for Turkish membership of the EU in Turkey. The majority of questions focus on what people would vote in case there was a referendum. There is only one question which refers to whether people believe their lives would be positively affected by membership. It does not become clear from this document whether this entails the long term future. Even if it does, the votes of the public in Turkey could be considered long-term consideration, but the document in itself is still a record of the moment.

- Center for European Reform, Grabbe, H. (2004). *When negotiations begin: the next phase in EU-Turkey relations*. London: CER.

The scope of this paper is short-term, focused on the implications of the start of negotiations on Turkey, and the Copenhagen criteria.

For the analysis of meeting documents for AFET, all meeting documents were searched for 'Turkey' or 'Turkish' in the text, even for those meetings during which Turkish accession was not an agenda-point. The only external paper found was:

- EuroMeSCo. (2005). *Barcelona Plus: Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States*. Lisbon: EuroMeSCO.

This report focuses on the EU Euro-Mediterranean Policy. It evaluates the current situation and established a number of objectives for the short-term. EuroMesCo is located in Italy.

This paper was brought forward for a meeting during which Turkish accession was not on the agenda. It is thus questionable whether, even if it had concerned the long-term future, it would have played a role in the decision-making in the EU-Turkey dossier.

Turkish accession was an AFET agenda-point on seven occasions during the 2004 and 2005.

None of the meeting documents for any of these meetings are future explorative.

From the analysis of meeting documents of AFET and JPC, the following becomes clear:

- Future explorative documents (produced within or outside of the EU structures) were not brought forward by the General Secretariat as meeting documents for any of the meetings in 2004 and 2005.
- There is in general a very small tendency to refer to documents produced outside of the EU structures as meeting documents.

It is difficult to fully evaluate where the policy-maker receives the input he needs for decision-making. The fact that future explorative documents are not formally made part of the decision does imply that the policy-maker, if he wishes to be informed about future exploration in relation to the Turkey-EU dossier, will have to seek this knowledge himself. Furthermore, future explorations are thus unlikely to be part of the general knowledge base that is shared by all members of AFET and JPC.

Although the number of meeting documents produced outside of the EU structures was low, the findings do show that on some occasions, input is sought from CER, CEPS and EuroMeSCo, as well as from national authorities.

7.2 Awareness

The interview with Commission representative Missir di Lusignano gives an indication of how future explorations and the use of external advice are perceived by the Commission. In general, the Commission makes extensive use of external advisory bodies,

‘including information received from the Turkish government, the Member States, our own diplomatic channels such as our delegation in Ankara, the embassies, NGOs, international NGOs, local NGOs, and other European and international organization, like the United Nations, the Council of Europe. These are all sources of experience and expertise that we of course consider very much. And then you have the information available at large like papers which are published at times by independent think-tanks, like the Crisis International Group, which has recently published something on Cyprus, and like the Independent Commission on Turkey which produced a document on Turkey in the EU, on the eve of the decision made in 2004.

An additional source of information Missir di Lusignano refers to is the Independent Commission on Turkey, which produced a document on Turkey in the EU, on the eve of the decision made in 2004.

In relation to the future explorative study Issues Arising from Turkey’s membership perspective, Missir di Lusignano says its contents was inspired by a number of different sources,

‘including international and European think-tanks such as the Centre for European Policy Studies, such as the European Union Institute for Security Studies in Paris... [as well as]... the Stiftung fur Wissenschaft und Politik in Germany, you have a number of institutions in the Netherlands’.

A further analysis of the external advisory bodies on the European level referred to here will be elaborated upon at a later point in this chapter, and will show whether the contributions of these organizations to the *Issues paper* could have been future explorative.

When asked directly, however, Missir di Lusignano says: ‘the exploration of the long term is mostly based on the internal expertise of the DG Enlargement’.¹⁹⁸

The scope of the study does not allow for further elaboration on the nationally based institutions which contribute advice to the Commission. The fact that they are names however shows that when seeking external advice, the Commission does not limit itself to the European level.

When asked about future explorative institutions on the European level, Emerson referred to the following list of institutions:

- The European Policy Centre
- ‘The Centre’
- The Bertelsmann Foundation

Beyond the scope of this research, but nevertheless worth mentioning, are IFRI and the Centre for Applied Policy Research, which according to Emerson plays an important role in future exploration on the national level, and the German Marshall Fund of the United States, which plays a marginal role when it comes to the Turkey-EU dossier, but is explorative rather in the realm of transatlantic relations.

¹⁹⁸ A. Missir di Lusignano, personal interview, March 30, 2006.

For the sake of completeness these will also be elaborated upon as part of the ‘external advisory bodies’ section of this chapter to establish to what extent future explorations, in particular in relation to the Turkey-EU dossier as actually available.

7.3 EU Internal advisory bodies

The official services of the European Union indicate three bodies as official advisory bodies: The Economic and Social Committee, The Committee of the Regions, and the Bureau for European Policy Analysis, into which the former Forward Studies Unit was integrated.

7.3.1 Economic and Social Committee

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) is a consultative body that gives representatives of Europe's socio-occupational interest groups, and others, a formal platform to express their points of views on the EU issues. Its opinions are forwarded to the larger institutions - the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament. The ESC was set up by the 1957 Rome Treaties in order to involve economic and social interest groups in the establishment of the common market and to provide institutional machinery for briefing the European Commission and the Council of Ministers on European Union issues. The 317 members of the EESC are drawn from economic and social interest groups in Europe. Members are nominated by national governments. The members of the EESC are drawn from one of three groups: employers, employees or various interests. The EESC issues opinions on matters of European interest to the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament. These can be opinions in response to a referral, own-initiative opinions, or explorative opinions.¹⁹⁹

Consultation of the EESC by the Commission or the Council is mandatory in certain cases; in others it is optional. The Committee has six sub-committees, among which one on External Relations.

A search of the EESC opinion directory on documents related to Turkey yielded 20 documents. The majority of these opinions are based directly on policy documents produced by European Parliament, European Council, or European Commission. In those documents, the EESC does not take a wider perspective than the document it refers to; hence it does not introduce the long-

¹⁹⁹ European Economic and Social Committee. (2004). *The EESC: A bridge between Europe and organized Civil Society*. Brussels: EESC.

term as a new perspective. In the other ‘own initiative’ opinions, no reference is made to a long-term exploration of the future. This is emphasized by the fact that another search on ‘Turkey’ and ‘future’ yields no results.

It is worth noting here that, whether future explorative or not, none of the documents produced by the EECS was mentioned as a meeting document for JPC or AFET.

The added value of reports by EESC, according to one Commission representative is small:

‘Occasionally they publish reports on specific subjects. The information on which these are based is largely drawn from the DG Enlargement. The DG Enlargement is often consulted, because it has the expertise. In the end all the institutions turn to the Commission for information’.²⁰⁰

7.3.2 The Committee of the Regions

The Committee of the Regions (CoR) is the political assembly that aims provides local and regional authorities with a voice in the European Union. The Treaties oblige the Commission and Council to consult the Committee of the Regions whenever new proposals are made in areas that have repercussions at regional or local level. The Maastricht Treaty set out 5 such areas - economic and social cohesion, trans-European infrastructure networks, health, education and culture. The Amsterdam Treaty added another five areas to the list - employment policy, social policy, the environment, vocational training and transport.²⁰¹

Outside these areas, the Commission, Council and European Parliament have the option to consult the CoR on issues if they see important regional or local implications to a proposal. The CoR can also draw up an opinion on its own initiative, which enables it to put issues on the EU agenda. The Committee organizes its work through six specialist committees, among which one for topics related to External Relations (RELEX). Similar to the EESC, the CoR issues opinion as a method of informing the European Union structures. In addition, it adopts resolutions and publishes studies on specific topical issues.²⁰²

²⁰⁰ A. Missir di Lusignano, personal interview, March 30, 2006.

²⁰¹ Committee of the Regions. (2006). *Presentation, role: The Committee of the Regions, members and mandate*. Retrieved May 10, 2006, from <http://www.cor.europa.eu/en/presentation/Role.htm>.

²⁰² Committee of the Regions. (2006). *Presentation, role: The Committee of the Regions, an introduction*. Retrieved May 10, 2006, from http://www.cor.europa.eu/en/presentation/member_mandate.htm.

A search of the CoR's documents on those relating to Turkey yields only one result. This is an draft opinion of the Commission for External Relations on the Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey's progress towards accession. Here no future explorative approach is taken. The document merely states the areas in which the CoR deems regional bodies capable in assisting Turkey in preparing for membership.

7.3.3 The Forward Studies Unit and the Bureau of European Policy Advisers

The European Commission Forward Studies Unit was established as a Commission service in 1989. The Forward Studies Unit was especially active in the field of European integration, in areas such as culture, governance, and economic, social and technological innovations. On the Forward Studies Unit Webpage, which still exists, it is stated that many of the documents published by the unit found their way into the mainstream of the Commission's work.²⁰³

The Forward Studies Unit was incorporated into GOPA and later the Bureau for European Policy Advisors in 2001. Only recently, BEPA became a Directorate General of the European Commission, reporting directly to the President and under his authority.²⁰⁴ The BEPA consists of policy-analysts and advisors, and is headed by a Director, which is appointed by the Commission President. Its aim is to 'provide professional and well-informed advice to the President and the Commissioners and to formulate recommendations on issues regarding the policy of the EU'.²⁰⁵ In doing so it pays special attention to policy issues of a strategic or structural nature. The mission statement of BEPA states that it shall 'concentrate on forward looking analysis at the early stages of the policy-planning cycle, and on the development of policy options for consideration by the President and by Members of the Commission'.

The activity of the DG Bureau of European Policy Advisors is organised into three main policy areas: economic, societal, and political. In two of these areas the DG has established a group of experts during the past year. In the economic area, this group is called the Group of Economic Policy Analysis (GEPA). The aim of GEPA is to 'to ensure a debate on economic policy issues between the European Commission and top European economists from academia and the

²⁰³ Forward Studies Unit. (2005). *Mission and Projects*. Retrieved August 01, 2005 from http://europa.eu.int/comm/cdp/mission/index_en.htm.

²⁰⁴ Bureau of European Policy Advisors (2005). *Who are we?* Retrieved June 25, 2005 from http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/policy_advisers/mission_statement/index_en.htm.

²⁰⁵ Bureau of European Policy Advisors (2005). *Who are we?* Retrieved June 25, 2005 from http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/policy_advisers/mission_statement/index_en.htm.

business sector'.²⁰⁶ Its political counterpart is established the Group of Political Analysis (GPA).²⁰⁷ The overall aim of the expert groups is 'to stimulate an ongoing dialogue between the European Commission and European experts from academia, business and civil society and to provide the President and Commissioners with objective, expert and impartial advice in the formulation of recommendations on policies of the European Union'.²⁰⁸

During the term of Commission President Prodi, DG BEPA was called Group of Policy Advisers (GOPA). This unit incorporated a Group of Economic Analysis (GEA) and a number of other expert groups, such as the Michalski Group, which was concerned with the spiritual and cultural dimensions of the European Union, and the Strauss-Kahn Group, which was active in the political realm. In its list of activities, GOPA shows to have been active in a number of policy areas, such as economy, foreign affairs, external relations, institutional affairs and religion.²⁰⁹ GOPA was established in May 2001, and restructured at the initiative of President Barroso at the beginning of his term. A number of GOPA units, such as the Strauss-Kahn group are no longer active. GOPA was turned into BEPA and GEA became one of the BEPA expert groups under the name of Group of Economic Policy Analysis.

In the GOPA archives, the following future explorative studies can be found:

- An Agenda for Growing Europe – Making the EU economic system deliver (Sapir Report)
- Building a Political Europe: 50 Proposals for Tomorrow's Europe (Kahn Report)
- Globalisation Study

These studies do not have a direct link to the Turkey-EU dossier.

Among the future explorative working papers of the FSU are:

- Scenarios Europe 2010, Five possible Futures for Europe,
- The Union we Need

²⁰⁶ Bureau of European Policy Advisers. (2005). *Group of Economic Policy Analysis*. Retrieved June 25, 2005 from http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/policy_advisers/experts_groups/gepa/index_en.htm.

²⁰⁷ European Commission (2005). *Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA) sets up new advisory "Group of Political Analysis" with leading political scientists and researchers*. MEMO 01/128, 15 April 2005. Retrieved June 25 2005 from http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/policy_advisers/press_release_bepa/index_en.htm.

²⁰⁸ European Commission (2005). *Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA) sets up new advisory "Group of Political Analysis" with leading political scientists and researchers*. MEMO 01/128, 15 April 2005. Retrieved June 25, 2005 from http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/policy_advisers/press_release_bepa/index_en.htm.

²⁰⁹ Group of Policy Advisers. (2005). *Activities*. Retrieved August 1, 2005 from http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/policy_advisers/activities/index_en.htm.

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Turkish accession does not play a role in these scenarios and in that regard their direct applicability to the dossier may be limited. However, especially the first study explores five ways in which Europe might develop in the future. These could be considered relevant from a European perspective on the dossier. Along these lines, it could be argued that all future explorations about Europe have an implicit relation to the Turkey-EU dossier. It is however beyond the scope of this research to further elaborate on all more general future explorations of Europe, and their potential applicability for the EU-Turkey accession dossier.

With regard to foreign policy, Commission representative Missir di Lusignano feels that the added value of the FSU was limited:

‘the studies conducted by the Forward Studies Unit are limited to examples about Russia, the Islam etc. and their added value in terms of policy-making is hard to detect. They are not really policy recommendations, and I feel they could have been conducted by universities or other external bodies’.

The list of publications of BEPA only consists of three publications, of which none are related to the Turkey-EU dossier, and moreover, all three are evaluative of the current situation rather than future explorative. The publications focus primarily on citizens’ attitudes and enlargement in retrospect. This gives rise to the idea that the new DG BEPA does not make future exploration a priority. This is supported by the website of the FSU, which gives an interesting hint as to what happened to the practice of future exploration after the incorporation of the FSU into GOPA. It states that

‘the futurological function has gradually developed outside the Unit, within several of the Commission’s Directorates-General which are keen to adopt a strategic approach. The Unit serves as a point where all these various future-oriented think tanks inside the Commission can meet together’.²¹⁰

²¹⁰ Forward Studies Unit. (2005). *Mission and Projects*. Retrieved on August 01, 2006 from http://europa.eu.int/comm/cdp/mission/index_en.htm.

Based on the fact that the FSU was incorporated into GOPA and then into DG BEPA, this statement gives support to the assumption that DG BEPA now functions as ground for exchange of ideas between conductors of future exploration within the DGs rather than a future explorative body itself. The actual practice of future exploration is rather to be found within the policy-making DGs, at least according to this statement.

From a first inquiry, BEPA thus seems to not play a large role in the Turkey-EU dossier. This is sustained by Turkish diplomat Öztürk, who says he ‘heard about it for the first time’ and Emerson, specialist on the topic of EU-Turkey relations, who suggested that not only does BEPA not play a role in the Turkey-EU dossier, but even in general the impact of BEPA on policy-making is limited:

‘I’m not really aware of the output and impact there. These are people who get highly bureaucratized, and the institutions get driven by immediate policy-priorities and the segmentation of policies in different DGs and under different Commissioners, and each Commission has its lobby and power groups, so it’s very difficult indeed for a unit like that to really have leverage on the system unless they have a ‘hot-line’ with a very strong president. Its role depends largely on the Commission president’.²¹¹

About the loss of the function of future exploration after the incorporation of the FSU, Emerson states:

‘It [the FSU] was a unit that started under Jacques Delors, who was a very intellectual and strong leader of the Commission, and indeed in the European Union as a whole, and he knew how to commission and to use heavy analysis on long run issues. Since then, I would say, the presidents of the Commission have not been in the same league again. And as a result this policy unit and the leadership of the policy unit has been used at times as dumping ground for cabinet members who went quite right but still had to be treated nicely’.²¹²

²¹¹ M. Emerson, personal interview, April 4, 2006.

²¹² M. Emerson, personal interview, April 4, 2006.

Along the same lines, a Commission representative says that ‘As far as [BEPA’s] function is concerned, there is little indication that the Commission leadership after Delors has wanted to use this expertise in the same way’.

7.4 External agencies

The list of agencies which potentially could function as an external advisory body to the European Union institutions is endless. The following inquiry is aimed at establishing whether future explorative studies are actually conducted in relation to the Turkey-EU debate. The list of organizations is based on 1) those of which (non-future explorative) publications were referred to as meeting documents of AFET and the JPC; and 2) those which were referred to as advisory bodies by the policy-makers in one of the interviews. The rationale behind this is that these institutions thus apparently already have a link with the EU and are considered for other issues. This makes it easier to establish whether potential future explorative studies they produce as well are not used because of choice or rather because of the fact that the agency is unknown within the EU institutions or has not established itself as an external advisory body. For the sake of completeness, a third group of external organization was investigated, namely those which were referred to as Michael Emerson as future explorative agencies on the European level.

7.4.1 Independent Commission on Turkey

The Independent Commission on Turkey was formed in March 2004 on the initiative of ‘a group of concerned Europeans, deeply committed to the European integration process and having held high public office, formed the Independent Commission on Turkey’.²¹³ Among its small group of members are former Commissioner Hans van den Broek, former President of Finland Ahtisaari, and former prime minister of France Rocard. The Commission aims to contribute to a more objective and rational debate on Turkey’s accession to the European Union, which it considers one of the major challenges for Europe in the coming years, by exploring the major challenges and opportunities connected with Turkey’s possible accession to the European Union.

In 2004, the Commission produced its only report, *Turkey in Europe: more than a promise?* The aim of the report is to inform the public of the challenges of Turkish accession in the light of the

²¹³ Independent Commission on Turkey. (2006). *Why an Independent Commission?* Retrieved on May 10, 2006 from <http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org>.

Council Decision of December 2004. Throughout the report a somewhat positive stance toward Turkish accession is maintained, depicted best by the conclusions which state that: ‘The Independent Commission on Turkey is of the view that accession negotiations should be opened as soon as Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria’.²¹⁴

The report as such is highly descriptive of the status quo of Turkey and the EU. Nonetheless, there are two instances of clearly defined long-term future exploration. First of all, the report elaborates on the changes that Turkey and the EU will experience before accession, and consequently what their situation will be like at the time of accession. The report thus does not depart from the status quo, but shortly explores the future of Turkey and EU independently. Furthermore, the report elaborates on the expected migration from Turkey to the EU. Here it makes combination of expected migration flows and changes in birth rates to give an estimation of the migration that is expected as well as the total population in 2050. For this it refers to quantitative data from the UN Population Division. At a third point, the report refers to the economic situation of Turkey, and claims that in the short run, the Turkish economy will benefit from accession talks, while in the long run, further stabilization of the economy can be expected. The report clearly addresses a number of issues of public concern in relation to the Turkey-EU debate, such as migration and economic stability. The overall premise is that ‘it will not be as bad as you think’.

7.4.2 Center for European Policy Studies

The Center of European Policy Studies is an independent policy research institute dedicated to producing sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the challenges facing Europe today’.²¹⁵ The research by CEPS is funded by membership fees and contributions from official institutions, multilateral and international institutions and national grants. CEPS conducts research in all areas of EU policy-making, among which EU external relations and enlargement.²¹⁶ It inhabits a staff of 30 experts.

²¹⁴ Independent Commission on Turkey. (2004). *Turkey in Europe: More than a promise?* Brussels: The British Council.

²¹⁵ Centre for European Policy Studies (2005). *About CEPS*. Retrieved June 20, 2005 from http://www.ceps.be/wAbout.php?article_id=1.

²¹⁶ Centre for European Policy Studies (2005). *Research areas*. Retrieved June 20, 2005 from http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=7.

The research produced by CEPS is aimed at informing anyone that has an interest in it, ranging from EU institutions, the Member States, to the governments of the European neighbourhood states. The relationship between the EU structures and CEPS is not institutionalised. CEPS is politically independent and financially independent of the EU.

The incentive for its research originates within the institution itself, or through tender. The latter occurs occasionally and means that the European Commission puts out to an open competitive tender the production of a study. CEPS then tenders for it, and is sometimes awarded the contract.

The principle method of working according to one CEPS senior research is as follows:

‘(We) assemble what we hope to be good quality policy-oriented analyses, which we publish, first of all on our website and also in printed publications. And our principle technique really is to establish that that website is a knowledge source for a continuing flow of relevant analyses, such that people go to it, and notice it, and take it into their work, including of course in all of the European institutions. So this is a very online model of an independent think-tank contributing to the policy-shaping process’.²¹⁷

There is thus no direct line between CEPS and the EU institutions, and the extent to which the reports are used in policy-makers depends entirely on the policy-maker.

‘We simply don’t have time in our work to go running after all of these people, so the method is simply to write what we think is good, and to publish it, and to let them take it from there’.

Furthermore, Emerson emphasize that CEPS is ‘not in the advocacy business. We’re in the clarification business as to what the issues are and provide a well-informed basis for political decisions and public opinion formation’.

²¹⁷ M. Emerson, personal interview, April 4, 2006.

The Centre for European Policy Studies was founded in 1983, primarily because twenty-three years ago there was no single European think-tank. There was no institution comparable to CEPS before neither in Brussels or anywhere else. The demand for the think-tank came interactively from the role of the founding director, who is called Peter Ludlow, who was an entrepreneur as it were and wanted to get it going, and he interacted with influential individuals in the Commission and on the Member State level.²¹⁸

When asked whether the relationship between the EU institutions and CEPS changed since 1983, senior researcher Michael Emerson answered:

‘In any formal sense, I would say no, because there is not real relationship there except that we are located in the same town and interested in the same subjects. I guess the main thing that has changed is that this institute has gradually built up analytical capacities, numbers of people working here, volume of published output has been building up, and I would say certainly with the internet revolution and the business of internet diffusion, a website with material, this has hugely increased. The other thing that has been happening is that CEPS has been acquiring, building reputation, like geological sediments, layer upon layer, year after year, of this project, that project which form part of the institutional memory, institutional reputation, so that’s a built up of strength I would say’.²¹⁹

CEPS produces a number of different types of documents. The *Paperbacks* present analysis and views of the CEPS experts on important questions in the arena of European public policy. These documents are written for policy-makers, corporate executives and government officials alike. The second type of document produced by CEPS is the *Task Force Report*. According to CEPS itself, task force reports contain the conclusions and policy recommendations that result from intense discussion, debate and analytical presentations made in the course of CEPS Task Force sessions. The last type of document published by CEPS is the *Working Document*. These working documents ‘are intended to give an early indication of work in progress within CEPS research programmes and to stimulate reactions from other experts in the field’.²²⁰

²¹⁸ M. Emerson, personal interview, April 4, 2006.

²¹⁹ M. Emerson, personal interview, April 4, 2006.

²²⁰ Center for European Policy Studies. (2006). *Publications*. Retrieved May 10, 2006 from http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=34.

An orientation of the research towards the future becomes clear from the slogan, ‘Thinking ahead for Europe’. The largest part of the research has a medium-term focus. In relation to the Turkish case, the time-horizon is 10 to 20 years.²²¹

A search of publications on Turkey yields a long list of working papers, briefings and commentaries, among which the following future explorative studies:

- Growth and Immigration Scenarios for Turkey and the EU
- Turkey’s Energy Prospects in the EU-Turkey context
- Turkey's Performance in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment: Implications of Enlargement
- Turkey’s Strategic Future

The most relevant publication by CEPS is *The European Transformation of Modern Turkey*, by Kemal Derviş, Michael Emerson, Daniel Gros and Sinan Ülgen. This study is a compilation of the findings and recommendations of a joint project of the CEPS and the Economics and Foreign Policy Forum (EFPF) of Istanbul.²²² The publication is supported by thirteen CEPS Working Papers. All of these papers have a long-term time horizon, of approximately 20 years.

The starting assumption of the publication as a whole is that the Turkish membership perspective will start materializing only in the long term, in at least 10 to 15 years. On the basis of that, all papers take a long-term approach in evaluating to what extent the parties could cooperate in the long-term in between. Furthermore, the book emphasizes, somewhat comparable to the publication by the Independent Commission on Turkey that Turkey and the EU will have changed dramatically before accession will take place. To that end, the first objective of study is ‘which Union would Turkey enter?’ A number of possible ‘visions’ are elaborated upon, such as Europe as a super-state, Europe as a community of traditional nation states, and Europe as a multi-layered system of governance. Subsequently, the same is asked for Turkey: ‘Which Turkey would enter the Union?’ The publication as such deals with not only the long-term perspective towards Turkish accession and how each of the entities will change until then, but also the consequences of Turkish accession on both parties.²²³

²²¹ M. Emerson, personal interview, April 4, 2006.

²²² The EFPF recently changed its name into EDAM.

²²³ Center for European Policy Studies. Derviş, K., Emerson, M., Gros, D., & Ülgen, S. (2004). *The European Transformation of Modern Turkey*. Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies. (This book is also available in Turkish).

7.4.3 Centre for European Reform

The Centre for European Reform is a think-tank devoted to reforming the European Union. It is a forum for people with ideas to discuss social, political and economic challenges facing Europe. It seeks to work with similar bodies in other European countries, in North America and elsewhere in the world. The CER calls itself 'pro-European but not uncritical'.²²⁴ It regards European integration as largely beneficial but recognizes that in many respects the Union does not work well. The CER is financially independent of the European Union. The CER therefore aims to promote new ideas and policies for reforming the European Union. Expertise is diffused through pamphlets, essays, working papers, policy briefs, briefing notes, opinion papers and the CER bulletin. The CER's work program is centered on seven themes, among which 'Enlargement of the European Union', which inhabits a special unit on the EU and Turkey.

It is difficult to determine whether the publications of CER are really future explorative. To a large extent, these are opinionated analytical papers by academics, among which Grabbe and Barysch. A small number of working documents may be classified as future explorative, e.g:

- The Constellation of Europe: how enlargement will transform the EU
- The Economics of Turkish accession

The remainder of the working papers is more an analysis of the current state of affairs, much in line with the paper by Grabbe used as a meeting document by the JPC.

7.4.4 The Centre

The Centre, referred to by Emerson as a future explorative body on EU level, refers to itself as 'Brussels' first think-do tank, operating at the interface of European public policy and communications'.²²⁵ Its aim is to pioneer new forms of dialogue and promote better communication among business, civil society and public policy leaders in Europe. The Centre operates two complementary spheres of activity: 1) a forum for developing, exchanging, and driving forward ideas on European and global policy issues, and 2) an intelligent communications consultancy. The Center cooperated with think tanks, foundations and other thinking communities around Europe and globally to produce new research and

²²⁴ Center for European Reform. (2006). *Objectives*. Retrieved May 10, 2006 from <http://www.cer.org.uk/about/index.html>.

²²⁵ The Centre. (2006). *Brussels' first Think-Do Tank*. Retrieved May 10, 2006 from <http://www.thecentre.eu.com/site/index.cfm?BID=26&SID=1&TID=1&MID=1&ART=11&LG=2>.

recommendations to provide a different perspective and revitalize debate on topical issues. The list of publications of The Centre entails a number of studies which are (at least partially) future explorative, such as *A postcard from the EU*, a study which explores the gains to be expected from the European-Latin American free trade area for the telecommunications sector. However, none of the articles seem to have a relation to the Turkey-EU dossier.

7.4.5 The European Policy Centre

The European Policy Centre (EPC) is an independent, non-profit think tank, committed to 'making European integration work'.²²⁶ The EPC works at the 'cutting edge' of European and global policy-making providing its members and the wider public with rapid, high-quality information and analysis on the EU and global policy agenda. It aims to promote a balanced dialogue between the different constituencies of its membership, comprising aspects of economic and social life. Members of the EPC comprise companies, professional and business federations, trade unions, diplomatic missions, regional and local bodies, as well as NGOs representing society interests, foundations, international and religious organizations. The EPC's method of working is similar to that of CEPS. It provides accessible analysis and reflection on its website and in print. The EPC produces Working Papers, Issue Papers and shorter Policy Briefs. The list of publications of the EPC reveals a number of long-term explorative studies, among which *The Strategic Impact of Turkey's bid*, *Turkey and the European Union: seeking an illusion*, and *Turkey, yes or no?*.

7.4.6 The Bertelsmann Foundation

The Bertelsmann Foundation, initially a German initiative, has recently lifted itself to the European level. It aims to identify social problems and challenges early on in order to develop and implement model solutions. The Bertelsmann Foundation is structured according to subject areas, namely Education, Health, Economics and Social Affairs, International Relations, Corporate Culture and Promoting Philanthropy. One of the projects of the foundation is Enlarged Europe, in which it attempts to combine international and interdisciplinary analyses with proposals and recommendations for political implementation. The project also focuses on communicating its findings and proposals to policy makers and the public. None of the

²²⁶ The European Policy Center. (2006). *Mission statement*. Retrieved May 10, 2005 from http://www.theepc.be/en/ae.asp?TYP=ABOUT&LV=224&PG=AE/en/direct_in&AI=1&see=n.

publications of the foundation are available on the internet. Their descriptions however imply a long-term approach.

7.5 Conclusions

Before continuing, it is useful to summarize the ideas that emanate from the findings in this chapter.

1. Among the meeting documents of AFET and the JPC, no future explorative documents could be located. From this, the idea arises that, at least on the level of the European Parliament, future explorations are not presented to the policy-maker as part of the policy-decision. Not only does this partially reveal how future exploration is not part of the formal decision-making, but also it may imply an extra effort from policy-makers to involve future explorations in their decisions. The lists of meeting documents do however show that occasionally, AFET and JPC may inquire information from external sources, such as CEPS and CER. Interestingly, the meeting documents of AFET and JPC did also not include a large number of documents from different policy-areas, such as Commission DGs or EP Committees active on the meso-level of EU enlargement policy.
2. The evidence shows what could be called a slight tendency toward ‘inbreeding’ of information. This becomes clear from the lists of meeting documents of AFET and JPC, which consist primarily of documents produced by other EU institutions, and not even the sub-units in a different policy-field. Furthermore, about the EESC, it is said that it gathers its knowledge primarily from the Commission. The EESC opinions indeed do not show a large body of knowledge additional to that circulating as part of the policy-making process. The Commission on the other hand seems to place more emphasis on the consultation of internal and external sources.
3. The Commission especially seems not reluctant to gather knowledge from external bodies. In reference to the *Issues Paper*, a large number of external bodies were mentioned from which expertise was drawn. Closer investigation of these bodies shows that all, except CEPS, have no relationship to future exploration, and thus it is likely that their expertise was not used for the future explorative elements of the report. This idea is further sustained by the statement that ‘the exploration of the long term is mostly based on the internal expertise of the DG Enlargement’.
4. The internal advisory bodies of the European Union, DG BEPA, the EESC, and the CoR do not engage in structural exploration of the future. The former Forward Studies Unit, as well

as GOPA, did play a role in this regard. According to Emerson, the role of internal bodies in exploration of the future is highly dependent on the role of the Commission President.

5. A number of European advisory bodies referred to implicitly in relation to meeting documents or as advisory bodies on other topics seem to have future explorative capacities as well. Among these bodies are the CER, the CEPS, and the Independent Commission on Turkey. It needs to be said here that none of these bodies have a formal relationship with the European Union institutions, and the usage of their expertise thus depends entirely on the willingness of the policy-makers. In the case of the Independent Commission, the future exploration was an occasional endeavor, more like a project, and although it was mentioned by the Commission as source of reference, it clearly was a document aimed at the European public, and not really suit for reference by policy-makers.
6. A number of institutes referred to by Emerson also showed to inhabit future explorative expertise in relation to the Turkey-EU dossier.

Furthermore, it can be observed from a number of reports, among which the one by the Independent Committee on Turkey, as well as the publication by CEPS, that similar to the policy-paper, a large emphasis is placed on the *focal point* of Turkish accession. A major difference seems to be however that in both these externally produced documents, an attempt is made to combine an exploration of Turkey and EU before accession, and after accession, while in the policy-papers examined in the previous chapter, this combination was not found.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

The aim of this study was to look in detail at the role of long term future exploration and thinking about the future in the European Union. In doing so it focused on the Turkey-EU accession dossier in the period between 1963 and 5 October 2005. This final chapter seeks to draw conclusions from the findings of this study, as well as position them within the framework of earlier academic research, and further discuss them.

8.1 Summary of most relevant findings

The research was divided into three main steps, consisting respectively of 1) analysis of policy-documents, 2) location and analysis of future explorative practices in relation to the dossier, and 3) interviews.

- The analysis of policy-documents revealed a very low number of papers which were either (partially) long term future explorative or referred to a future explorative paper.²²⁷ A second category, consisting of documents which made a clear reference to the long-term future but could be designated as explorative, was larger, comprising approximately half of all the documents. Documents with a reference to the future were spread rather equally over different types of documents as well as the three institutions, but were least likely to be found among those that were part of the legislative cycle.
- The six future explorative policy-documents were all found among working documents, briefing papers or reports by the European Parliament or the Commission. All but one of these documents were produced by the policy-making body, and as part of the policy-making cycle on a specific topic. Furthermore, there was a tendency to integrate the future explorative part into the policy-paper, using it as a basis for policy-proposal or change. The field of exploration was in most cases environment or economy. Turkish accession formed a focal point in most of the explorations. The possibility of non-accession of Turkey was by no means considered in an exploration. In addition, the explorations were forecasts rather than scenarios.
- The second category of documents showed, short of exploring the future, two main lines along which the long-term was considered, namely through 1) the focal points of Customs

²²⁷ Only six out of 391 papers in total met this requirement and were located in category C.

Union and the Turkish accession to the EU; and 2) through planning and anticipating the future. The focal points were path breaks in policy, moments at which the status quo was expected to change. They served as an aiming point for policy. The *focal points* were used in order to establish objectives to be met at the time of path break, requirements for policy, and time-tables toward the path-break. Anticipation, thinking about the future short of exploring it happened by listing the uncertainties in the future, or the variables that can play a role. In a number of cases, a general expectation was stated, or an implicit expectation based on the momentary situation.

- The second category of documents also gave an indication of how ‘not knowing the future’ is captured in policy. In relation to the *vague* focal point, Turkish accession, this approach was described as ‘see you when you get there’ meaning that the *focal point* in the future is dependent on the progress of Turkey in this case. The *focal point* is flexible in order to move if the timetable cannot be kept. In relation to the establishment of the Customs Union, the documents showed a method of re-evaluation according to which the time-table could be adjusted.
- In general, three ways of thinking about the future were distinguished on the basis of the findings, namely 1) exploring/ anticipating the future, 2) exploring the future of a path break, and 3) determining the future by planning. In the policy-documents of the European institutions, a combination of two of these, for example the exploration of a path break in the future, seemed to pose an additional challenge. This challenge was not actually taken on, but rather ways were found around it, for example by omitting the possibility of change before the path break, even if far ahead, and answering the question ‘what if Turkey were to accede the European Union today’. Interestingly, a number of externally produced documents did attempt to give a picture of the long-term effects of enlargements, taking into account even the changes Turkey and the EU will experience before accession will take place.


8.2 The research objectives and additional questions

Two main questions lie at the basis of this study. This section will attempt to answer them, as well as additional questions that were brought forward while establishing the framework, on the basis of the findings.

Research objective 1: The role of future explorative studies in policy-making

The formal, institutionalized relationship between the exploration of the future and policy-making in the Turkey-EU dossier can be considered very limited. Systematic exploration of the future does not seem to take place at all, and occasional exploration is also very rare. Where future exploration takes place, this is closely intertwined with the policy-making process. All future explorations that were detected were commissioned by the policy-maker, and in all but one case conducted by the policy-maker himself. The incentive for a future exploration thus seems to be rooted in the policy-making process, as is shown as well by the fact that future explorations in many cases were part of an actual policy-paper and thus not separate documents. The future exploration is thus often directly integrated into the policy-making process.

The limited number of future explorations does not allow for general conclusions about future exploration and policy-making in the EU, but the findings are in line with and endorse earlier findings on the topic. The findings of this study provide no evidence to the contrary. For the moment, the cyclical model of the relationship between future exploration and policy-making is thus maintained.



Where future exploration is conducted inside of the EU, this is done by the European Parliament and the European Commission. The official advisory bodies of the European Union do not seem to play a role in this. The data suggest an emphasis on quantitative data where internally produced future explorations referred to external sources.

Externally produced future explorations do not play a large role in the policy-making in the EU-Turkey dossier. The only case of such an externally produced future exploration was related to

the environment and commissioned in relation to the previous enlargement, thus not specifically for the Turkey-EU policy-making, but nevertheless referred to.

The limited use of future exploration in the Turkey-EU dossier could be related to a deliberate choice by the institutions or rather a lack of available future explorations on the topic. The latter, however, does not seem to be the case. Future explorations, in most cases forecasting studies, are conducted by a number of European agencies, among which some agencies which are already used by the EU as external advisory bodies for other non-future explorative advice. The external agencies that were found to conduct long term future explorative studies, did not have this as their only or main activity, but often next to, or integrated with short and medium-term studies.

Research objective 2: The long-term 'future' as it is being considered within the European Union

Two main ways of thinking about the long-term future in a non-explorative sense are apparent in relation to the Turkey-EU dossier. Firstly, the focus is on two *focal points*, also classifiable as *path breaks*, namely the Customs Union and the possible accession of Turkey to the European Union. The Customs Union is a tangible point in the future, accentuated by a specific date in time, whereas the accession of Turkey is a *vague* future, kept vague on purpose. Secondly, the methodology of thinking about the future can be based on planning of anticipation. In the case of planning focal points serve as a way to direct policy. They indicate a change with the status quo, and pose certain objectives for policy to aim for. On the basis of these objectives, requirements and timetables are constructed as a path to the future. Whether a focal point is a vague or tangible point in the future does not seem to make a difference here. They are however dealt with differently, in relation to the question 'what if the future turns out unlike expected?' In case of vague futures, the focal point can then be postponed until the objectives are met. In case of tangible futures, readjustment of the time-table takes place on the basis of re-evaluation, rather than future exploration. Anticipation is short of real exploration, expecting what will happen in the future, often on the basis of a number of variables, or *diagnoses of today*.

Placing ourselves in the mind of the European policy-maker, what would he think about the future? The analysis provokes five bold statements, taking the findings a bit of the edge:

1. The future is my *buzz word*: the future is referred to in a wide variety of contexts, often in relation to a conception of the future as ‘who knows when’, and ‘from here on’. The word future as such thus does not indicate a real concern with the future, especially not the long-term future.
2. The future is *not part of my reality*: the long-term future is not part of the day-to-day decisions made. These focus more on the current state of affairs, and if the future is concerned, it involves rather the short and medium-term.
3. The future is *unpredictable*: the future is too complicated to predict; an attempt at doing so would be speculative, and unsuited as a basis for policy-making. The future will get here eventually, whether explored beforehand or not.
4. The future is *negotiable*: the future is not something one is subject to, but rather it is subject to what we want from it. Planning the future is the best way to determine a positive outcome.
5. The future is *uncertain by choice*: the future is used as a ‘carrot’ for Turkey, and kept vague for political reasons.
6. The future is *Turkish accession*: although the accession process is open-ended, alternatives to Turkish accession are hardly considered.

Additional question 1: Can the relationship between future exploration and policy-making in the EU be described along the line of partners, customers or competitors?

The three different possible relationships between expertise and policy-making can indeed serve here as a clarification of the findings. A distinction should be made between the future explorative practice within and outside of the European Union structures. The future explorations conducted within the EU are closely intertwined with the policy-making process. Even stronger, they are often conducted merely for the sake of policy. Here, one could say the relationship is best described as partners. ‘Partners’ however assumes that the future explorative body and the policy-making body are two different entities. Note should be taken here that in the case of future exploration in the EU-Turkey dossier this is often not the case. Sometimes, the future exploration and the policy-document are not even different documents. Rather, one could say that the practice of future exploration and the practice of policy-making have a partner-like relationship. With regard to the relationship between future explorative practices outside of the EU and policy-making, one could say this is best described as ‘customers’. The EU picks and chooses which expertise in general it wants to acquire from external agencies. In the Turkey-EU dossier, this relationship is not institutionalized.

Additional question 2: Are different forms of future exploration used differently in the policy-process?

There seems to be a tendency to focus on forecasts rather than scenarios. In fact, not one document of the future explorative documents (category C) created one or multiple scenarios. Generally speaking, forecasting takes as its point of departure the development of a relatively small number of very issue-specific factors. In the case of the Turkey-EU dossier, these were often related to the environment or the economy. Also, there seemed to be an emphasis on quantitative data where information was acquired outside of the EU institutions.

The limited scope of the future explorations that are produced is a point of criticism brought forward by Öztürk.

‘... When these projections are made, I notice that they just focus on one element, whereas you cannot disregard other factors while trying to make these projections. You should know much more if you want to make projections’.

Additional question 3: Do the different bodies involved in the Enlargement process deal differently with exploration of the future or with the long term future in general?

The six future explorative policy-documents were all found among working documents, briefing papers or reports by the European Parliament or the Commission. No future explorative document was thus located among the Council documents. In relation to the broader definition of ‘thinking about the long-term future’ the documents were spread equally. It is, however, difficult to see whether one institution thinks more about the future than others.

Additional question 4: Do considerations about the future (formal and informal) in relation to earlier enlargements play a role in the current enlargement?

The findings in the first step of the research showed that occasionally, reference was made the earlier enlargements for expectations about Turkish accession and policy in relation to that. However, in most cases these references were to actual experiences and outcomes of the previous enlargement, hence to factual information, rather than future explorations. An exception to this was the future exploration on the environment, which was conducted in relation to the CEEC accession but also referred to in the Turkey-EU dossier. The limited findings are

insufficient to support the idea of an inclination of the EU to refer to previous experiences rather than explore the future, nor for a ‘trade-off’ between the two, meaning that one would make the other superfluous. More research would be needed to further elaborate on this.

Additional question 5: Are the challenges of Turkish enlargement as conceived in the overall debate addressed by ‘thinking about the future’?

Among the future explorative policy-papers there seems to be an emphasis on explorative statements in the field of environment. The second most prominent topic seems to be economics. Even the papers which have the topic of Turkish accession as a whole seem to be most explorative in these two fields. In thinking about the future in a more general sense, the policy-papers addressed primarily economic considerations in relation to the Customs Union,

Additional question 6: What role did ‘future exploration’ and ‘thinking about the long-term future’ play in the course of the Turkey-EU accession dossier, especially with regard to the important decisions made, such as acceptance or rejection of Turkish applications for association and membership?

The main body of available documents was located in the period 1990-2005. On the basis of these documents it is not feasible to draw conclusions over the entire time-period. What can be said however is the following. In general the use of future explorations is rather low, and in relation to the Turkey-EU dossier it can be expected that this has always been the case, except for perhaps the time-period of the Forward Studies Unit. In the course of the dossier, the ‘potential’ of the European Union to explore the future has altered, as well as the availability of external sources for such information. During the period of Delors as Commission President, more emphasis was placed on systematic exploration of the future, through establishing the Forward Studies Unit. This unit was later integrated into GOPA, and then into DG BEPA, after which the function of future exploration was relocated to the individual DG’s, which, as seems to be the case for the DG Enlargement, did not make it a priority. In 1983, CEPS was founded as the first European think-tank. Since then, a large number of other advisory bodies have been founded, and some of them contribute to the availability of future explorative studies.

For the important decisions to be made in the EU-Turkey dossier, such as the start of negotiations, long-term expectations do not play a role. The Regular Reports of the Commission focus primarily on the situation of Turkey as it is, and occasionally make statements about the

short or medium-term. The real decision on whether for example negotiations will start is based on the actual facts rather than what is expected in the future.

Additional question 7: Are future explorations specifically or predominantly used to sustain arguments in favor or against membership?

The future explorations used by the European institutions were part of the policy-making by the European Parliament and the European Commission, and in these cases, the aim was to ‘objectively’ establish the challenges ahead on the road to Turkish accession, or what could be expected after accession. Thus on the European level, there did not seem to be a specific agenda in favour or against Turkish accession at the basis of it. However, as Öztürk states rightly,

‘As a politician, you can pick and choose any kind of a projection which may suit to your own kind of policy decisions, and kind of aspirations, where you can disregard the others’.

Nonetheless, there was no specific argument pursued in the rest of the policy documents which included future exploration which might lead one to think that this might have been the case. Of the externally conducted future explorations, CEPS emphasized not to be in the ‘advocacy business’, but this of course does not exclude the possibility that their explorations would be used in argument for or against accession. Furthermore, one explorative document seemed to have a point in favour of accession, namely that of the Independent Committee on Turkey. Interestingly, the explorations that it made had a close relation to the general public concerns of the public about accession.

8.3 Possible reasons for limited use of future exploration

The research established that future explorations play a very limited role in the policy-making of the European Union on the Turkey-EU dossier. Possible explanations for this are brought forward by the research itself as well as earlier work on the subject.

Future exploration related reasons

Exploration of the future may be considered too cumbersome a challenge to take on. Öztürk states that:

‘It is difficult to make projections. To make a projection, you have to know what is going on, you have to know history and every kind of projection inherently has the possibility of making a wrong judgement to it’.²²⁸

and even argues that future exploration has become more difficult since 1990:

‘It was much easier before 1990, because the states were the main actors, decision-makers in this process. And (now) sometimes [future explorations] just miss the role of the NGOs, and the multinational companies, which may be very important. Then they just focus on a specific country or decision-making mechanism whereas they do not understand what is going on the other side’.

Indeed, exploring the future implies making statement about something that is per definition uncertain and cannot be tested. It depends on a wide range of variables, and can result in numerous outcomes, of which perhaps one is more likely than the other, but not a single one is certain. A method of limiting the range of possible outcomes may be to limit the number of variables, by restricting the scope of the future exploration to one specific area. This may be part of the reason why all of the future explorations found among the policy-documents were forecasts in certain specific areas rather than scenarios. The fact that the scope of these future explorations was limited also put limits on their applicability to policy.

This brings us to the second point in relation to the nature of future explorations, namely the specific issue areas they were related to. The focus in the future explorations of the European institutions was generally on economic factors and the environment. Why other areas were not explored remains unclear for the moment. Among the externally produced future explorations there were a number of scenarios, but the majority of documents consisted of forecasts, often in the area of migration, energy and economics.

The findings of the research give rise to the idea of a discrepancy between the topics explored by the EU institutions and those of concern to the public. This is an interesting point, due to the fact that especially since in the EU, future exploration is closely linked to policy-making, one would

²²⁸ F. Öztürk, personal interview, April 4, 2006.

expect the topic of future exploration to match those of concern to the people. Here one may argue that the priorities in the policy process may not be those of the public. The reluctance of the European institutions to use future explorations might be easily explained if future exploration were only conducted in these areas, and thus did not serve a purpose to answer to the questions of the public. However, this is not the case. In fact, future explorations are available about issues that concern the public more. These external explorations are however not considered. Unfortunately, an answer to why this is the case cannot be provided on the basis of the findings.

System-related reasons

In most of the policy-areas of the EU, the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the Council all play a role in policy-making. The decision-making is often a process of proposals and adjustments between the various institutions. In such a process, a future exploration would be likely to lose momentum, especially when brought forward by only one of the institutions, and be snowed under by more immediate concerns.

At the same time, one sees a certain degree of ‘inbreeding’ of documentation. This sustains the idea that there is a certain ‘flow’ of proposals, reports, and decisions going back and forth between the institutions, which may be uninviting to new insights such as such from future exploration. Furthermore, this ‘inbreeding’ raises question as to the reach of future explorations conducted in different policy-areas.

Or, like Öztürk suggests, the European Union is just like any other political system, where the short term concerns of politicians are prioritized over long-term considerations.

‘The projections are for medium term and long term, and the longest term for a politician is the next election. That’s why you don’t see politicians making use of future projections that do not support their general programme, because understandably it is very difficult to make decisions which may cause a loss of votes. And very understandably they will not be taking those decisions for the matters sake, or the country or the people, where they will reap the benefits 80 years later. Because then, another government will reap the benefit. That’s the difficulty at the level of the projections, because the projections are for people to take the necessary decisions for the good of people in that sense. The politicians which will be

making those decisions and implementing them, do not have the time to make these kinds of decisions, they are more short-sighted in that respect. Political considerations play a really important role in the use of these long-term projections'.²²⁹

This relates to the next point, namely that as long as the practice of future exploration is not institutionalized in the European Union, the emphasis placed on it will be subject to political preferences of for example the Commission President, as is suggested was the case with the establishment of the FSU and the role of Jacques Delors in this. According to Emerson it is very difficult for a unit like that to have any leverage on the system, unless it has a 'hot-line' with the President.²³⁰

Positivist tendencies: The fact that only one single future exploration from an external source was found among the policy-documents, as well as the fact that in the future explorations conducted, external expertise was only sought in relation to quantitative data may give an implication of a tendency within the Union to not consider qualitative explorations suited as external input. One could speculate that the institutions think: 'if it comes to future exploration, we can 'make it up' ourselves'. This speculation is not entirely ungrounded according to Emerson, who suggests that within the European institutions:

'The business of futurology is thoroughly discredited as being professionally lacking in credibility and professionalism. It is just becoming 'do a scenario, like this or like that'.

The public: The European Parliament, having the premise of representing the European public, seeks a democratic legitimacy in the policy that it pursues. Not only does it mean that they should pay specific attention to the concerns of the citizens in a certain policy-issues, but also that they should answer to the public with regard to the perspectives that they take. This may be discouraging for the use of future explorations, since those future explorations used within the European structures are in many cases not directly related to public concerns such as religion, labour migrations, and identity and civilization issues. Furthermore, even if the EP would want to take a long-term approach and perhaps a more constructivist understanding of input from outside, it would have to find the consent of the people in doing so. In line with this, Belgian

²²⁹ F. Öztürk, personal interview, April 4, 2006

²³⁰ M. Emerson, personal interview, April 4, 2006.

prime minister Verhofstadt suggested at the latest EP debate on the future of Europe, that politicians would like to think more about the future, but that he sometimes had the impression that ‘they are not allowed to’.

Case specific reasons

The very nature of EU Enlargement policy may be unsuited for the integration of future exploration into policy. Decision-making in this realm is intergovernmental to a large extent, and therefore dependent on the political priorities of the different Member States. Future explorations on a European level would be unlikely to answer to all these different agendas, and thus apart from being informative, would only play a very limited role in the actual policy-making. The argument may thus be that future exploration is left to the Member States in this case. In relation to the ‘wait and see’ attitude that is apparent in intergovernmental decision-making in general, indicating that decisions are often taken at the last moment, it is worth asking to what extent this really happens.

The actual impact of future exploration is difficult to determine. Emerson states that the fact that an external future exploration is considered by the European institutions does not mean it actually has an effect on the decisions.

‘Because the political positions taken by many Member States of the European Union are based on far more basic, if you like primitive, considerations. Like, ‘we are Christians, and they are not Christians’, say some’.

And referring to an exploration on demographic change:

‘This is also used by the European institutions in thinking about policy on Turkey. In principle there is a pretty good fit here in complementarity of Turkish population growth and demographic decline or stagnation in the European Union, but go ask Mrs. Merkel or Mr. Sarkozy whether he’s ready for it or not. Go and ask Mr. Balkenende, the Dutch Prime Minister whether he is ready to embrace this or not.

So basically just between you and me, we can say, well, we know what the demographic projections are, we know about the very serious societal problems with our Muslim minorities, but maybe this Turkey which has been successful in democratizing, modernizing

and secularizing Islam, maybe this will come to be viewed as a plus rather than a threat. But, you can't push that, can you? You cannot ram it down people's throats, it has to emerge. So this is the trump card that could be played at some point in favour of Turkey, together with by the way the energy security trump card'.

The above thus suggests that even where the future explorations relate to immediate concerns of the European Union, these may be 'overruled' by the Member States.

Furthermore, the analysis showed a tendency to leave the burden of adjustment of the acceding state. The attitude is often best described by 'see you when you get there', meaning that steps in the accession process are taken according to the progress made by the candidate. There may therefore not be a real conception of a need to explore the future beforehand. In focusing on membership, and when this to take place, one may find looking ahead further less relevant.

8.4 Potential

Even if exploration of the future does not play a large role now, this could change in the future. The upcoming debate on the future of Europe, in combination with the institutional changes Turkish accession might invoke, might prove an opportunity to integrate formal structures into the EU policy-making cycle to explore the long-term future systematically. Of course this will depend on the political priorities of the moment.

When asked whether the future should be explored more systematically,

As to where future exploration should take place a variety of ideas exist. Öztürk says that

'It should be done (more) in the Commission, in the Parliament, in basically every institution. It should be done at the state level, for example by government agencies, it should be done by NGOs, international institutions, and even by companies in case they want to understand what's going on, what will happen next. We have missed a lot already.

At the same time, he argues that objective future exploration by policy-making bodies might be hampered by political agenda's.

‘I think that as a government agency, your hands are tight when making future projections. That’s why I think these kinds of projections should be done by NGOs, by international companies, or think-tanks, or by academic people’.²³¹

Relating this to the fact that the European institutions seek limited knowledge, especially with regard to future exploration, outside of their own body of expertise, the question then remains how to get the future exploration to the policy-maker.

Missir di Lusignano makes an interesting statement by implying that the explorations that could have been done by external units are of limited usability.

‘With regard to foreign policy, the studies conducted by the Forward Studies Unit are limited to examples about Russia, the Islam etc. and their added value in terms of policy-making is hard to detect. They are not really policy recommendations, and I feel they could have been conducted by universities or other external bodies’.

Thus a certain link between the policy-issue and the future exploration is wished for. This, according to Van der Staal is best maintained when the policy-maker himself conducts the future exploration.²³²

In the current situation, it seems that the policy-maker would be the best entity to take on this challenge. Institutional changes have led to the allocation of at least the ‘responsibility’ and perhaps the potential within the individual DG’s of the Commission. If the demand for future exploration would rise, this would be most likely to have to be addressed by the Commission.

And if it does, the advice of Öztürk would be to approach the future in a more holistic manner, taking into account a wide range of topics and the interrelations between them.

²³¹ F. Öztürk, personal interview, April 4, 2006

²³² Van der Staal, P.M. (1988). *Toekomstonderzoek en wetenschap: over de grondslagen van wetenschappelijke methoden en technieken van toekomstonderzoek*. Delft: Delft University Press.

In any case, for the time being, future exploration should not be over-emphasized for the moment, because, according to Missir di Lusignano, ‘the risk of focusing too much on the long-term perspective is that you loose touch with reality’.

8.5 Methodological reflection

The method by which the data for this study were acquired and analysed was described in one of the previous chapters. In general, the research process was a constant process of back and forth reflection on data and methodology, adjusting the latter in the course of the research where a need for this was evident. There were a number of methodological decisions which were less easy to change in the course of the research. It is useful to reflect on these decisions in retrospect as a base for future research.

Of the four search term that were used in the third shifting of documents to determine a relation of the document to the long-term future, namely ‘future’, ‘long’, ‘timetable’, and ‘outlook’, the latter did not yield any results which were not highlighted by the three other search terms. Next time, ‘outlook’ thus can easily be left out.

In the first shifting of documents, most documents were selected on a reference to ‘Turkey’ or ‘Turkish’ in the text. A second group of documents, for which this was not possible, was subjected to a search for ‘Turkey’ or ‘Turkish’ in the title of the document. In a second shifting all of the selected documents were examined on their relation to Turkish accession. Most of the documents which had to be eliminated then were in the first group. The search for ‘Turkey’ and ‘Turkish’ in the text was thus too broad a selection criterion. Most of the documents that were found here on top of those with ‘Turkey’ or ‘Turkish’ in the title were deemed irrelevant. In the future, selection on the title of the document may thus be expected to yield perhaps not an exhaustive list of documents, but an equally representative one.

Lastly, a concern in the initial approach was that a selection of documents on the basis of search criteria would not allow different dates in the future to be selected as well. The analysis of the documents showed that dates did not play a large role in general and thus that the number of documents that was not selected as a result of this choice is absolutely minimal.

8.6 Final remarks

Among the most important lessons I learned during the past four years, is that those who think academic study will give all the answers, will come out disillusioned. Academic research has become known to me as answering one question while generating ten new ones at the same time. If nothing else, this study lives up to this premise. The results of the study lead to some questions which I find worth sharing, such as:

1. To what extent can these results be generalized for the whole of the EU policy-making process? Is there perhaps a relation between the way in which the future is explored and the kind of decision-making (intergovernmental/ supranational) involved? In short: can one expect more future exploration on the European level when the decision-making is concentrated there as well? And: does this mean that in intergovernmental decision-making, as is the case in enlargement, national positions do indeed get 'fed' by national future explorations?
2. Can the same findings be applied to the EU structures at the meso-level of enlargement policy? Are future explorations perhaps more systematically conducted in more issue-specific areas of enlargement, such as the different chapters of the *acquis*?

However dissatisfactory all these questions may seem, I am happy to find that there is more to research. The only unfortunate fact is that time is limited as always. These questions will therefore be left to research another time, by me, or others, in the future.....

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APPENDIX – LIST OF DOCUMENTS ANALYZED

European Commission

Table 1: Overview of analysed documents – European Commission

	Category A	Category B	Category C	Total
<i>Reports</i>	3	8	0	11
<i>Proposals</i>	8	0	0	8
<i>Minutes</i>	2	2	0	4
<i>Communications</i>	1	4	0	5
<i>Working documents</i>	4	4	1	9
<i>Total</i>	18	18	1	37

Reports

Category A

European Commission. (2001). *Report of 28th meeting of the EC/Turkey Customs Co-operation Committee Brussels, 5 December 2001*. 13475/02. Brussels.

European Commission. (2003). *Report from the Commission -2002 Report on PHARE and the pre-accession instruments for Cyprus, Malta and Turkey*. COM(2003) 497 final. Brussels.

Commission of the European Communities. (2005). *Report from the Commission: 2004 Report on Phare, Pre-accession and transition instruments*. (COM(2005)701 final). Brussels: European Commission.

Category B

Commission of the European Communities. (1998). *Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*. Brussels: European Commission.

Commission of the European Communities. (1999). *1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*. (13/11/99). Brussels: European Commission.

Commission of the European Communities. (2000). *2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*. (8 November 2000). Brussels: European Commission.

Commission of the European Communities. (2001). *2001 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*. SEC(2001) 1756. Brussels: European Commission.

Commission of the European Communities. (2002). *2002 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*. (COM(2002) 700 final). Brussels: European Commission.

Commission of the European Communities. (2003). *2003 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*. (SEC(2003) 1212/ COM(2003) 676 final). Brussels: European Commission

Commission of the European Communities. (2004). *2004 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*. (COM(2004) 656 final). Brussels: European Commission.

European Commission. (2003). *Continuing Enlargement: Strategy Paper and Report of the European Commission on the Progress towards Accession by Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey*. Brussels.

Category C

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Proposals

Category A

Commission of the European Communities. (2000). *Proposal for a Council Decision on the Community position within the EC-Turkey Association Council regarding the draft Decision amending Association Council Decision No 3/64 setting up the Association Committee*. (COM(2000) 357 final).

Commission of the European Communities. (2001). *Proposal for a Council Decision on the position to be adopted by the Community within the EC-Turkey Association Council, concerning a Decision of the EC-Turkey Association Council adopting the implementing rules necessary for the application of the provisions on competition policy referred to in Article 37 of Decision 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council*. COM(2001) 632 final. Brussels.

Commission of the European Communities. (2002). *Proposal for a Council on the signature and conclusion of the Agreement between the European Community and Turkey on precursors and chemical substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances*. (COM(2002) 500 final).

Commission of the European Communities. (2003). *Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Council Regulations (EEC), No 3906/89, (EC) No 555/2000, (EC) No 2500/2001, (EC) No 1268/1999 and (EC) No 1267/1999 in order to allow the Stabilisation and Association Process Countries to participate in tenders organised under the pre-accession Community assistance programmes*. (COM(2003) 793 final). Brussels.

Commission of the European Communities. (2004). *Draft Decision of the EC-Turkey Association Council amending Protocol 3 of Decision N° 1/98 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 25 February 1998 on trade regime for agricultural products: Draft Common Position by the Community*. SEC(2004) 1435 final. Brussels.

Commission of the European Communities. (2004). *Proposal: Draft Decision of the Joint Committee established under the Agreement between the European Coal and Steel Community and the Republic of Turkey of 25 July 1996 on trade in products covered by the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community amending Protocol 1 of the Agreement*. (SEC(2004) 1443 final). Brussels.

Commission of the European Communities. (2004). *Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2500/2001 to enable the implementation of Community assistance according to Article 54(2)(c) of the Financial Regulation*. COM(2004) 814 final. Brussels.

Commission of the European Communities. (2005). *Proposal for a Council Decision on the signature of the Additional Protocol to the Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey following the enlargement of the European Union*. COM(2005) 191 final. Brussels.

Commission of the European Communities. (2005). *Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of the Additional Protocol to the Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey following the enlargement of the European Union*. COM(2005) 191 final. Brussels.

Category B

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Category C

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Minutes

Category A

European Commission. (2002). *Minutes of the 29th EC/Turkey Co-operation Committee, Ankara, 4 October 2002*. (6893/03). Brussels.

European Commission, Directorate General Enlargement. (2002). *Report on EC-Turkey Customs Union Joint Committee: Rapid minutes of the 13th meeting of the EC-Turkey Customs Union Joint Committee, 10 December 2002, Ankara*. Turkey Team/SD D(2002). Brussels.

Category B

European Commission. (2002). *Minutes of the 110th meeting of the EC-Turkey Association Committee Brussels, 24 January 2002*. (11859/02). Brussels.

European Commission, Directorate General Enlargement. (2002). *Summary note of the 111th Meeting of the EC-Turkey Association Committee, Brussels, 13 March 2003*. 7910/03. Brussels.

Category C

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Communications

Category A

Commission of the European Communities. (2003). *Communication from the Commission: Enlargement Strategy Paper*. (COM (2003) 561 final). Brussels: European Commission.

Category B

Commission of the European Communities. (2001). *Communication from the Commission: The Challenge of Environmental Financing*. COM(2001) 304 final. Brussels: European Commission.

Commission of the European Communities. (2003). *Communication from the Commission to the Council strengthening the accession strategy for Turkey and a proposal for a Council Decision on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey*. (COM(2003) 144 final). Brussels.

Commission of the European Communities. (2004). *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey's Progress towards accession*. (COM(2004) 656 final) Brussels: European Commission.

Commission of the European Communities. (2005). *Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Civil Society Dialogue between the EU and Candidate countries*. COM(2005) 290 final. Brussels: European Commission.

Category C

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Working documents

Category A

European Commission. (1999) *Commission staff working paper on the Socrates and Leonardo programmes with a view to the Conference of Education Ministers of EU Member States, Phare countries, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey: "The European House of Education - education and the economy, a new partnership" (Budapest 24-26 June 1999)*. (SEC(99) 797). Brussels.

European Commission. (1999) *Commission staff working paper on the TEMPUS Programme with a view to the Conference of Education Ministers of EU Member States, PHARE countries, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey: "The European House of Education - Education and the Economy, a new partnership" (Budapest, June 24 to 26 June 1999)*. (SEC(99) 796 final). Brussels.

Commission of the European Communities. (2001). *Commission staff Working Paper: Financial Annex concerning estimated contributions from Cyprus, Malta and Turkey with a view to their participation in Community programmes*. (SEC(2001) 1576). Brussels: European Commission.

Commission of the European Communities. (2004). *Informal working document: Main administrative structures required for implementing the Acquis- Overview*.

Category B

European Commission, Directorate General Enlargement. (2003). *An Action Plan for the EC-Turkey Customs Union*. Turkey Team/SD D(2003) st11425.en03.doc. Brussels.

Commission of the European Communities. (2003). *Commission staff Working Document: Annex to 2002 Report on PHARE and the Pre-accession instruments for Cyprus, Malta and Turkey - country sections*. (SEC (2003) 910). Brussels.

Commission of the European Communities. (2005). *Commission staff Working Document: Annex to the 2003 Report on Phare and the pre-accession instruments for Cyprus, Malta and Turkey – Country sections and additional information*. (COM(2005) 64 final). Brussels.

Commission of the European Communities. (2005). *Commission staff working document: Annexes to 2004 Report on Phare - Country sections and additional information*. (SEC(2005) 1773). Brussels: European Commission.

Category C

Commission of the European Communities. (2004). *Commission staff working document: Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective*. (COM(2004) 656 final). Brussels: European Commission

Table 2: Overview of analysed documents – European Council

	Category A	Category B	Category C	Total
<i>Statements</i>	14	8	0	22
<i>Presidency Conclusions</i>	7	7	0	14
<i>Agreements</i>	1	4	0	5
<i>Proposals</i>	5	0	0	5
<i>Common positions</i>	10	0	0	10
<i>Decisions</i>	19	2	0	21
<i>Overviews</i>	16	4	0	20
<i>Minutes</i>	15	9	0	24
<i>Report</i>	5	1	0	6
<i>Other</i>	4	0	0	4
<i>Total</i>	96	35	0	131

Statements

Category A

Council of the European Union. (1999). *Presidency note: Preparation of the Conference of European Ministers for Education from 24 to 26 June 1999 in Budapest.* (8699/99). Brussels.

Council of the European Union. (2001) *Note: Adoption of a Council Decision on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey.* (6463/01). Brussels.

Council of the European Union. (2001). *Note: Turkey, Cyprus and Malta: Adoption of the Council Decisions concerning the conclusion of Framework Agreements between the European Community and Cyprus, Malta and Turkey on the general principles for the participation of Cyprus, Malta and Turkey in Community programmes.* (15215/01). Brussels.

Council of the European Union: (2003). *Note: Adoption of Council Decisions on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnerships with Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey.* (9122/03). Brussels

Council of the European Union. (2004). *Note: Involvement of Turkey in the Dublin group mechanism.* (5484/04). Brussels.

Council of the European Union, Southeast Europe Working Party. (2001). *Note: Establishment of the position of the European Union in view of the meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council (Luxembourg, 26 June 2001).* (9838/01). Brussels.

Council of the European Union, Southeast Europe Working Party. (2001). *Note: Relations with Turkey, Cyprus and Malta – Approval of the Council Decisions concerning the conclusion of Framework Agreements between the European Community and Cyprus, Malta and Turkey on the*

general principles for the participation of the Cyprus, Malta and Turkey in Community programmes. (14151/01). Brussels.

Council of the European Union, Southeast Europe Working Party. (2001) *Note: Turkey - Adoption of the Council Decision concerning a Decision of the EC-Turkey Association Council adopting the implementing rules necessary for the application of the provisions on competition policy.* (15043/01). Brussels.

Council of the European Union, Southeast Europe Working Party. (2001). *Note: Turkey - Adoption of a Council Regulation concerning pre-accession financial assistance for Turkey.* (2001/0097 (CNS)). Brussels.

Council of the European Union, Southeast Europe Working Party. (2003). *Corrigendum: Relations with Turkey: Approval of the EU position for the 42d meeting of the EC-Turkey Association Council (Luxembourg, 15 April 2003).* (8003/03). Brussels.

Council of the European Union, Southeast Europe Working Party. (2004) *Note: Relations with the candidate countries and with the stabilization and Association Process countries - Adoption of a Regulation amending Regulations (EEC) No 3906/89, (EC) No 555/2000, (EC) No 2500/2001, (EC) No 1268/1999 and (EC) No 1267/1999.* (7749/04). Brussels.

Council of the European Union, Southeast Europe Working Party. (2005) *Note: Relations with Turkey - Adoption of a Council Decision on the signature of the Additional Protocol to the Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey following the enlargement of the European Union.* (9618/05). Brussels.

Council of the European Union, Southeast Europe Working Party. (2005). *Note: Relations with Turkey - Adoption of a Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2500/2001.* (9080/05). Brussels.

European Council. (2005). *EU Opening Statement for the Accession Conference with Turkey.* 3 October 2005.

Category B

Council of the European Union. (1999). *Presidency note: Preparation for the Conference of European Ministers for Education from 24 to 26 June 1999 in Budapest - Points for a declaration by the Education Ministers participating in the Conference in Budapest and by the European Commission on overcoming the consequences of the Kosovo conflict in the education sector.* (9159/99). Brussels.

Council of the European Union, Enlargement Group. (2003). *Note: Agreement on Council Decision on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey.* (8208/03) Brussels.

Council of the European Union, Hungarian Delegation. (2004). *Notification to the Commission and the Member States of initialed agreement on economic co-operation between the Government of the Republic of Hungary and the Government of the Republic of Turkey.* (15436/04). Brussels.

Council of the European Union, President. (1999). *Note: Preparation for the Conference of European Ministers for Education from 24 to 26 June 1999 in Budapest.* (8947/1/99). Brussels.

Council of the European Union, Southeast Europe Working Party. (2002) *Note: Relations with Turkey - Approval of the position of the EU for the 41st meeting of the EC-Turkey Association Council (Luxembourg, 16 April 2002).* (7636/02). Brussels.

Council of the European Union, Southeast Europe Working Party. (2003) *Note: Relations with Turkey - Approval of the EU position for the 42d meeting of the EC-Turkey Association Council (Luxembourg, 15 April 2003).* (8003/03). Brussels.

Council of the European Union, Southeast Europe Working Party. (2004). *Note: Association with Turkey - Establishment of the position of the European Union for the 43rd meeting of the EC-Turkey Association Council.* (Brussels, 18 May 2004). (9289/04). Brussels.

Straw, J., & Rehn, O. (2005, 3 October). *Turkey's accession to the European Union and Croatia's co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague.* Speech presented at the European Council in Luxembourg. Luxembourg.

Category C

Presidency Conclusions

Category A

European Council. (1994). *Council Presidency Conclusions, Corfu European Council, 25 and 25 June 1994.* Brussels.

European Council. (1999). *Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999.* (Nr: 00300/99). Brussels.

European Council. (2000). *Council Presidency Conclusions, Nice, 7,8, and 9 December 2000.* (DOC/00/30). Brussels.

European Council. (2001). *Council Presidency Conclusions, Göteborg European Council, 15-16 June 2001.* Brussels.

European Council. (2002). *Council Presidency Conclusions, Seville European Council, 21 and 22 June 2002.* Brussels.

European Council. (2002). *Council Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 24 and 25 October 2002.* Brussels.

European Council. (2003). *Council Presidency Conclusions, Brussels 12 December 2003.* Brussels.

Category B

European Council. (1997). *Council Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg European Council, 12-13 December 1997*. Brussels.

European Council. (1998). *Council Presidency Conclusions, Cardiff European Council, 15 and 16 June 1998*. Brussels.

European Council. (1998). *Council Presidency Conclusions, Vienna European Council, 11 and 12 December 1998*. Brussels.

European Council. (2000). *Council Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19 and 20 June 2000*. Conseil/00/2000. Brussels.

European Council. (2001). *Council Presidency Conclusions, Laeken, 14-15 December 2001*. Brussels.

European Council. (2005). *EU-Turkey Negotiation Framework, Luxembourg 3 October 2005*. Brussels.

European Council. (2005). *Council Presidency Conclusions, Brussels 16-17 December 2004*. (16238/1/04). Brussels.

Category C

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Agreements

Category A

Council of the European Union. (2001). *Framework Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Turkey on the general principles for the participation of the Republic of Turkey in Community programmes*. (2001/0195 (AVC)). Brussels.

Category B

European Council. (1963). Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey, signed at Ankara 12 September 1963. *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 24.12.73. Brussels.

European Council. (1963). Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey, signed at Ankara 12 September 1963. *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 31.12.77. Brussels.

EC-Turkey Association Council. (1970). Additional Protocol and Financial Protocol, signed at Brussels, 23 November 1970. *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 24.12.73. Brussels.

EC-Turkey Association Council. (1977). Additional Protocol. *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 31.12.77. Brussels.

Category C

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Common Positions

Category A

Council of the European Union. (1999). *Common Position (EC) No /1999 adopted by the Council on ... with a view to the adoption of Decision No /1999/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending the basic decision relating to the Socrates Programme so as to include Turkey among the beneficiary countries.* 96/0130 (COD)) Brussels.

Council of the European Union. (1999). *Common Position (EC) No /1999 adopted by the Council on 12 July 1999 with a view to the adoption of Decision No /1999/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending the basic decision relating to the Socrates Programme so as to include Turkey among the beneficiary countries.* (96/0130 (COD)) Brussels.

Council of the European Union. (2000). *Common position adopted by the Council with a view to the adoption of a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding the implementation of measures to promote economic and social development in Turkey.* (1998/0300 (COD)). Brussels.

Council of the European Union. (2000). *Common Position adopted by the Council on 13 June 2000 with a view to the adoption of a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding the implementation of measures to promote economic and social development in Turkey.* 1998/0300 (COD). Brussels.

Council of the European Union. (2000). *Common Position adopted by the Council with a view to the adoption of a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council regarding the implementation of measures to promote economic and social development in Turkey – Draft statement of the Council's reasons.* 1998/0300 (COD). Brussels.

Category B

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Category C

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Proposals

Category A

Council of the European Union. (2000). *Note: Turkey: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding the implementation of measures to promote*

economic and social development in Turkey - Adoption of the common position. (1998/0300 (COD)). Brussels.

Council of the European Union. (2000). *Note: Turkey: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding the implementation of measures to promote economic and social development in Turkey - Adoption of the common position - Addendum.* (1998/0300 (COD)). Brussels.

Council of the European Union: (2000). *Note: Turkey: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding the implementation of measures to promote economic and social development in Turkey - Approval of the amendments proposed by the European Parliament.* 1998/0300 (COD). Brussels.

Council of the European Union. (2005). *Draft decision of the Joint Committee established under the Agreement between the European Coal and Steel Community and the Republic of Turkey of 25 July 1996 on trade in products covered by the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community amending Protocol 1 to the Agreement.* (9535/05). Brussels.

Council of the European Union, Political and Security Committee. (2003). *Draft declaration on the terrorist attacks in Istanbul.* 14870/03. Brussels.

Council of the European Union, Southeast Europe Working Party. (1996). *Note: Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council amending the basic Decision relating to the Socrates programme to include Turkey among the beneficiary countries - adoption of the Council's common position.* (96/0130 (COD)). Brussels.

Council of the European Union, Southeast Europe Working Party. (1998). *Note: Turkey - Proposal for a Council Regulation regarding the implementation of measures to intensify the EC-Turkey customs union.* (98/0299 (CNS)). Brussels.

Council of the European Union, Southeast Europe Working Party. (2005). *Note: Draft Decision of the EC-Turkey Association Council amending Protocol 3 to Decision No 1/98 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 25 February 1998 on trade regime for agricultural products.* (12584/05). Brussels.

Council of the European Union, Southeast Europe Working Party. (2005). *Note: Draft Decision of the Joint Committee established under the Agreement between the European Coal and Steel Community and the Republic of Turkey of 25 July 1996 on trade in products covered by the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community amending Protocol 1 to the Agreement.* (12584/05). Brussels.

EC-Turkey Association Council. (2005). *Draft decision of the EC-Turkey Association Council amending Protocol 3 to Decision No 1/98 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 25 February 1998 on trade regime for agricultural products.* (9534/05). Brussels.

Category B

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Category C

Decisions

Category A

Council of the European Union. (2000). *Council Regulation regarding the implementation of measures to intensify the EC-Turkey customs union.* (1998/0299 (CNS)). Brussels.

Council of the European Union. (2001). *Council Decision concerning the conclusion of a Framework Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Turkey on the general principles for the participation of the Republic of Turkey in Community programmes.* (2001/0195 (AVC)). Brussels.

Council of the European Union. (2001). *Council Decision on the Community position within the EC-Turkey Association Council regarding the draft Decision amending Association Council Decision No 3/64 setting up the Association Committee.* (13279/01). Brussels.

Council of the European Union. (2001). *Council Decision on the position to be adopted by the Community within the EC-Turkey Association Council concerning a Decision of the EC-Turkey Association Council adopting the rules necessary for the implementation of the provisions on competition policy referred to in Article 37 of Decision 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council.* (14657/01). Brussels.

Council of the European Union. (2001). *Council Regulation concerning pre-accession financial assistance for Turkey and amending Regulations (EEC) No 3906/89, (EC) No 1267/1999, (EC) No 1268/1999 and (EC) No 555/2000.* (2001/0097 (CNS)). Brussels.

Council of the European Union. (2002). *Council Decision on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Community and Turkey on precursors and chemical substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.* (2002/0223 (ACC)). Brussels.

Council of the European Union. (2002). *Council Decision on the signature and conclusion of the Agreement between the European Community and the Turkish Republic on precursors and chemical substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.* (14263/02). Brussels.

Council of the European Union. (2003). *Council Regulation amending Regulations (EEC) No 3906/89, (EC) No 555/2000, (EC) No 2500/2001, (EC) No 1268/1999 and (EC) No 1267/1999 in order to allow the Stabilisation and Association Process Countries to participate in tenders organised under the pre-accession Community assistance programmes.* (2003/0306 (CNS)). Brussels.

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Category B

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Category C

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Table 3: Overview of analysed documents – European Parliament

	Category A	Category B	Category C	Total
<i>Reports</i>	25	26	3	54
<i>Common positions</i>	3	4	0	7
<i>Joint motions for resolutions</i>	3	0	0	3
<i>Resolutions</i>	33	19	0	52
<i>Briefing papers</i>	8	13	1	22
<i>Debates</i>	0	25	0	25
<i>Minutes</i>	9	0	0	9
<i>Minutes Joint Parliamentary Committee</i>	5	6	0	11
<i>Proposals</i>	7	0	0	7
<i>Working papers</i>	0	0	1	1
<i>Total</i>	93	93	5	191

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