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The 2000 FIU Cuba Poll

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2000 FIU/Cuba Poll

Cuban Research Institute Institute for Public Opinion Research Center for Labor Research and Studies

Florida International University

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Guillermo Grenier Hugh Gladwin

http://www.fiu.edu/orgs/ipor/cuba2000/

General Findings

The Cuban American residents of Miami-Dade County are generally concerned about the lack of change on the island but they are far from monolithic in their support for different publicies. There are major differences of opinion and a number of these vary systematically across different groups in the community.

There appears to be an increasing frustration about the lack of political changes occurring on the island and the growing realization that desired changes are not likely to occur mytime soon. Only 10.3% of the Cuban-American respondents feel that changes will occur within one year. (9.1% local nen-Cuban and 3.5% National). An additional 33.3% percent anticipate that major changes are more than one year but less than five ways away. (37.5% local non-Cuban and 35.3% National). At the same time, 28.2% stated that change would never come to the island (17.9% basel non-Cuban, 12.1% National.)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This years marks the tenth anniversary of the beginning of the FIU Cuba Poll. Five times since 1991 FIU researchers from the Center for Labor Research and Studies, the Institute of Public Opinion Research and the Cuban Research Institute have develop a detailed methodology for measuring the political attitudes of the Cuban-American community in Miami-Dade County. The poll is specifically designed to measure the attitudes of the Cuban-American community towards US/Cuba policy and how these attitudes have an impact on Greater Miami. This year, thanks to the funding by the Christopher Reynolds Foundation and the university's Office of the President., the poll was expanded to include a local, non-Cuban sample as well as a national sample.

The first Cuba Poll was conducted 10 years ago, in March of 1991. Subsequent polls were conducted in October of 1991, in June of 1993 and March of 1995 and July of 1997. As in the four previous polls, the researchers this year found a diversity of opinions on what policies would facilitate political changes on the island. The consistency of some of the responses, as well as the shift in others, present us with the most complete picture to date of the Cuban-American political attitudes towards Cuba. While most of the responses were consistent with the previous surveys, no poll is without surprises. Some long standing attitudes seem to have changed, while some new events have generated diverse responses from Cuban-Americans as well as the non-Cubans and national communities. Of particular interest in this poll was to take the pulse of the Greater Miami region six months after the Elian Gonzalez controversy. This brief summary presents selected findings from the 2000 Cuba Poll.

General Findings

The Cuban American residents of Miami-Dade County are generally concerned about the lack of change on the island but they are far from monolithic in their support for different policies. There are major differences of opinion and a number of these vary systematically across different groups in the community.

• There appears to be an increasing <u>frustration about the lack of political change</u> occurring on the island and the growing realization that desired changes are not likely to occur anytime soon. Only 10.3% of the Cuban-American respondents feel that changes will occur within one year. (9.1% local non-Cuban and 3.5% National). An additional 33.3% percent anticipate that major changes are more than one year but less than five years away. (37.5% local non-Cuban and 35.3% National) At the same time, 28.2% stated that change would never come to the island (17.9% local non-Cuban, 12.1% National.) • Over fifty one percent of the Cuban respondents signal that they would <u>support a</u> <u>dialogue</u> with the Cuban government. In the context of the other responses, this desire can be interpreted as signifying that among some within the Cuban-American community in Miami-Dade County, a dialogue is seen as an agent of positive change. (78.6% local non-Cuban and 80.2 National)

• Although only 25.8% feel that the <u>embargo has worked well</u>, (16.9% local non-Cuban and 34.2% National) the Cuban American population expressed strong support for its continuation 64.2%. (39.1% local non-Cuban and 42.6% national).

• When asked about the <u>specific restrictions imposed by the embargo</u>, the respondents show a somewhat more moderate side. Approximately over 48% of the respondents support the prohibition on U.S. companies from doing business in Cuba. (38.2% local non-Cuban and 34.8% National). At the same time, approximately 66% would favor allowing companies to sell medicine to the people on the island. (88.4% local non-Cuban and 89.8% National) and 56% would favor the sale of food (83% local non-Cuban, 86.3% National.)

• Echoing the results of the other surveys, the Cuban-American community is willing to lend <u>support to human rights groups</u> working inside Cuba. Over 94.5% of respondents support lending a hand to such groups. (92.4% local non-Cuban and 83.5% National)

• There continues to be support for <u>military action by exile groups</u> 69.6% (45.3% local non-Cuban and 21.8% National) as well as a <u>U.S. invasion of the island 61%</u>. (39.9% local non-Cuban and 17.9% National)

• A large majority 78.9% feels that <u>all points of view on how to deal with Castro are</u> <u>not being heard</u> in Miami. (67.5% local non-Cuban). Cubans feel that the opinions supporting stronger opposition are not being heard (48%) whereas a similar number of non-Cubans in the area believe that the views supporting more open relations are not being heard (45%).

• Nearly 80.5% of the respondents feel that the <u>number of visas</u> currently being given to Cubans on the island to come to the United States to live is appropriate. (52.8% local non-Cuban and 54.9% National)

• Approximately 54% of Cuban-Americans believe that <u>Cubans leave the island</u> primarily to seek political freedom while 26% think that the motivations are primarily economic in nature. About 39% of the non-Cuban locals believe that lack of freedom drives the exodus while 42% point to economic issues. Falling in between these two groups are the national respondents, 33% of whom respondents highlight economic reasons while 45% say that lack of freedom drives those fleeing.

• A large majority of respondents 77.9% report that a <u>political candidate's position on</u> <u>Cuba is important</u> in determining their vote. (62.3% local non-Cuban and 46.6% National) • 22.6% percent would be very likely and 17.5% somewhat likely to <u>return to live on</u> the island if the country's government changed to a democratic form.

ON THE CASE OF ELIAN GONZALEZ

Few events in the long history of the Cuban-Americans in the United States have mobilized the community as did the plight of Elian Gonzalez. While this and other studies of the Cuban-American community show that there is a broad diversity within the population on most issues, seldom has the community behaved as monolithically as it did in its attempt to influence the outcome of the Elian case. The numbers clearly show the different perspectives held by the local non-Cuban community as well as the national sample.

• 78.5 % of Cuban-Americans believed that <u>Elian should have stayed</u> in the United States. This opinion was held by only 33.6% of local non-Cubans and 28.3% of national respondents.

• Over 62% of the Cuban-Americans felt that the <u>local media presented the issues in</u> <u>the Elian case</u> in a fair and objective manner while 53% of non-Cubans held this opinion. The difference among the samples is greater when the question deals with the national coverage of the Elian case. Only 40% of Cubans felt that the <u>national media</u> covered the case fairly and objectively while 65% of local non-Cubans and 51% of national respondents had a positive view of media coverage.

• When asked whether the <u>interests of the Cuban-American community were helped</u> or hurt by the Elian affair, all samples agreed with overwhelming certitude that the case had hurt the Cuban-American community. (Cubans: 82%, Local non-Cubans 80.4%, National 84.6%).

• On the theme of ethnic relations, most Cubans and local non-Cubans felt that relations between the ethnic groups after the Elian affair were about the same as they were before Elian came and went. Nearly 60% of Cubans and 54 % of local non-Cubans felt that relations had not changed. While 31% of Cubans and 37% of non-Cubans felt that they had worsen.

County residents of Cuban descent, 400 non-Cuban residents of the same county, and a national of 400 U.S. residents

Each was a random sample generated from telephone exchanges using standard randomdigit-dialing procedures that ensure that each residential phone has an equal chance of being chosen for the sample. Bilingual (Spanish/English) interviewers conducted the

OTHER OPINIONS

As always, the poll serves to support or debunk many of the views held about the Cuban-American community. There were no surprises associated with the electoral preferences of the community. About 72.8% percent of the respondents are <u>U.S. citizens</u>. Of these, 90.2 percent report being registered to vote. And of these, 67.1 percent are registered in the <u>Republican Party</u>, 17.2 percent are registered <u>Democrats</u> and 14.1 percent are <u>Independents</u>.

• In the upcoming Presidential election, 64 percent are expecting to <u>vote for George</u> <u>W. Bush</u> and 15 percent will <u>cast their ballot for Al Gore</u>. This signals another division with the local non-Cuban population which indicated a significant support for Gore (49% to 21% for Bush.) The national sample was fairly evenly divided, with 36% favoring Gore and 28% leaning towards Bush, but with an impressive 30% declaring themselves to be undecided.

• While most Cubans believe that <u>the next president of Cuba should be someone</u> <u>currently living on the island (48%)</u> as opposed to someone now living in exile (27%), a large percentage feel that <u>some local politicians</u> will play a major role in Cuba when a transition occurs (65%). Most of the respondents felt that Congressman Lincoln Diaz-Balart would be the local politician to play the most significant role in Cuba's future (42%).

• Contradicting the popular view of a monolithically intolerant community, most Cubans (54.7%) disagreed with the idea that <u>musical groups that come from Cuba, such as Los Van Van, should not be allowed to perform in Miami</u>. While this number is much lower than the 85% of the local non-Cuban sample that reject this policy of exclusion, it is still a surprisingly high number. Similarly, 52% of Cubans <u>disagreed with the recently repealed County ordinance</u> which prevented the use of County funds to be used for events that include artists from Cuba. An overwhelming 75.5% of non-Cubans disagreed with the now defunct policy.

METHODOLOGY (PRELIMINARY NOTES)

From September 20 to October 17, 1,975 people were interviewed about their support of policies toward Cuba. Three samples were interviewed: a sample of 1,975 Miami-Dade County residents of Cuban descent, 400 non-Cuban residents of the same county, and a national of 400 U.S. residents.

Each was a random sample generated from telephone exchanges using standard randomdigit-dialing procedures that ensure that each residential phone has an equal chance of being chosen for the sample. Bilingual (Spanish/English) interviewers conducted the interviews from IPOR'S telephone lab at the Biscayne Bay Campus of Florida International University. The margin of error for the Cuban sample of 1,975 is +/- 3% at the 95% confidence level. The margin of error for the two other samples is +/- 5%.

About half of the Cuban sample were people who came to the United States from Cuba before 1975. 14% (227) arrived in the years 1959-1964. Results for this group have a margin of error of +/- 7%. Other groups by years arrived in the US are: 278 in 1965-1974 (+/- 6%), 167 in 1975-1984 (+/- 8%), and 239 arrived after 1984 (+/- 6%). 150 respondents were born in the U.S. (+/- 8%). These margins of error are precise enough to make many of the differences in opinion between these groups statistically significant.

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS

Dr. Guillermo J. Grenier is Associate Professor of Sociology and Anthropology and Director of the Center for Labor Research and Studies at Florida International University. Dr. Hugh Gladwin is Director of the Institute for Public Opinion Research (IPOR) at FIU and Associate Professor of Sociology and Anthropology.

Question number 1

Over the past few years, people have been talking about the possibility of political changes in Cuba. When do you think that major political changes are likely to occur in Cuba? Would you say within one year, in two to five years, in six to ten years, over ten years, or never?

	Local	Local Non-	National	
	Cuban	Cuban		
Within 1 year	9.7%	9.1%	3.5%	
in 2 to 5 years	33.1%	37.5%	35.3%	
in 6 to 10 years	11.8%	15.6%	27.9%	
over ten years	14.7%	16.6%	17.9%	
never	28.2%	17.9%	12.1%	
Don't care	2.5%	3.3%	3.2%	

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		Local Cuban	Local Non- Cuban	National	
	Strongly Favor	44.3%	59.5%	38.4%	- 200
	Mostly Favor	21.8%		51.4%	
	Mostly Oppose	6.6%	3.6%	4.7%	
A STATE OF	Strongly Oppose	27.4%	8.0%	5.5%	
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Allowing U.S. companies to sell food to Cuba. Do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this? Local Local Non- National Cuban Cuban Strongly Favor 38.4% 56.9% 39.7% Mostly Favor 17.9% 26.2% 46.6% Mostly Oppose 8.9% 6.8% 7.0% Strongly Oppose 34.8% 10.1% 6.7%				umber		
Local Local Non- National Cuban Cuban Strongly Favor 38.4% 56.9% 39.7% Mostly Favor 17.9% 26.2% 46.6% Mostly Oppose 8.9% 6.8% 7.0%	Allowing U.S. co	mpanies to sell f	ood to C	uba. Do you	strongly favor	mostly
Cuban Cuban Strongly Favor 38.4% 56.9% 39.7% Mostly Favor 17.9% 26.2% 46.6% Mostly Oppose 8.9% 6.8% 7.0%	navor, mostry op	pose, or strongly	oppose	unər		
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Strongly Fav Mostly Favo Mostly Oppo Strongly Op	or 11.0% ose 10.0%	16.1%	National 8.1% 9.8% 29.0% 53.1%	


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Supporting n Government. oppose this?	nilitary action by the Do you strongly fav	exile con vor, mostly	nmunity to ov y favor, most	verthrow the C ly oppose, or	uban strong
		Local	Local Non-	National	
	Strongly Favor	Cuban 55.5%	Cuban 27.6%	5.8%	
	Mostly Favor	13.5%		A REAL PROPERTY AND A REAL	
	Mostly Oppose		18.2%	29.9%	
	Strongly Oppose	21.4%	36.5%	48.3%	
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g human rights groups stly oppose, or strongly		strongly favor	, mostly
Strongly Favor Mostly Favor Mostly Oppose Strongly Oppose	Local Cuban 79.9% 14.7% 1.9% 3.5%	National 43.6% 39.9% 11.2% 5.3%	
		N.	

resentatives of the Cuban government. Do you strongly favor, mostly fav stly oppose, or strongly oppose this? Local Local Non- National Cuban Cuban Strongly Favor 34.4% 49.0% 29.3% Mostly Favor 17.2% 29.6% 50.9% Mostly Oppose 11.8% 8.7% 12.0% Strongly Oppose 36.6% 12.8% 7.8%	Establishin	g a national dialogue	among Cut	oan exiles, C	uban dissider	nts, and
Cuban Cuban Strongly Favor 34.4% 49.0% 29.3% Mostly Favor 17.2% 29.6% 50.9% Mostly Oppose 11.8% 8.7% 12.0%				o you strong	gly favor, mos	stiy favo
Strongly Favor 34.4% 49.0% 29.3% Mostly Favor 17.2% 29.6% 50.9% Mostly Oppose 11.8% 8.7% 12.0%		See Sheet	Local	Local Non-	National	Electron a
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		Strongly Oppose	30.0%	12.8%	1.8%	
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	Local	Local Non-	National	
Strongly Approve	Cuban 37.1%	Cuban 23.5%	12.4%	
Mostly Approve	Contractor Contractor	14.7%	22.4%	
Mostly Disapprove Strongly Disapprove		14.8% 37.1%	33.2% 31.9%	
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
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very well, or	you think the U.S. en not at all?	mbargo of	Cuba nas wo	rked very well	, wen, no
	Very Well Well Not Very Well Not At All	Local Cuban 8.4% 17.3% 33.4% 40.9%		National 3.7% 30.5% 44.05 21.8%	
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
Que	estion nun	ider 11	
Immediately after Fidel and F States should be very involv	Raul Castro leave	power, do you thin	ik the United
involved, or not involved at a		ns politically in Cu	ba, somewin
	Local Cuban	Local Non- Natio	nal
Very involved	44.9%	26.6% 19.	1.0
Somewhat involved at a			
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	Question n	umber	12	
Immediately after Fidel	and Raul Castro le	ave power, w	hich do you th	ink would
be better: that the next someone from the exile	president of Cuba	be someone i	now living in C	uba, or be
	Local	Local Non-	National	
	Cuban	Cuban		
SALE BERNESS	e in Cuba 48.0%		60.2%	
	mmunity 26.6%		21.5%	
Either Neither	23.2% 2.3%		16.6% 1.7%	
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
	Question 1	Tumb	el 15	
In your opinio	n, are there any Cuban-A	merican p	oliticians or individ	uals wi
will play a maj occurs?	or role in Cuba when the	transition	n to a democratic sy	stem
		Local	Local Non-	
	ry inconsist	Cuban	Cuban	
	Yes No	64.7% 35.3%	58.2% 41.8%	
	Lincoln Diaz-Balart			
	Jorge Mas Santos	10.3%		
	Alex Penelas	8.3%	35.3%	
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



Queseio	n num	ber 15	
In political elections, how important determining your vote - would you important, not very important, or n	say it is ve	ry important,	on on Cuba in moderately
Very Important Moderately Important Not Very Important Not At All Important	Local Cuban 56.4% 21.0% 8.8% 13.8%		National 11.8% 34.8% 34.8% 18.7%
an Providence	i sana di s		



Question num		
Which views do you think are not being heard? open relations with Cuba or those supporting s Cuban government, or some other views?	? Those su stronger o	pporting more pposition to the
	Local Cuban	Local Non- Cuban
Views Supporting More Open Relations Views Supporting Stronger Opposition Other, Specify	17.4% 50.8% 31.8%	44.7% 30.7% 24.6%
		and a










Question number 21 If you have to choose only one reason, do you think the primary reason people want to come from Cuba to the U.S. is for economic reasons or is due to lack of freedom in Cuba? Local Non- National Local Cuban Cuban 33.2% 25.5% 41.6% Economic Reasons 45.0% 21.9% 53.9% 39.0% Lack of Freedom 20.5% 19.4% Insist on Both Being Equally Important

Do you think exchanging teacher	s and rese	archers betw	veen universit	ies
in Cuba and the United States is a make any difference?	a good thi	ng, a bad thir	ng, or doesn't	it
Good Thing Bad Thing Doesn't Make a difference	Local Cuban 41.1% 27.7% 31.1%		National 66.0% 9.8% 24.3%	
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
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How closel	d like to ask you a few y did you follow the new mewhat closely, not ver	ws about	the story? D	id you follow i	t very
	Very Closely Moderately Closely Not Too Closely Not Attention At All	Local Cuban 72.9% 19.5% 6.1% 1.4%	Local Non- Cuban 55.0% 31.9% 10.1% 3.0%	National 26.9% 49.0% 19.6% 4.5%	




	Quest		umber 2		
opinion c	beginning of the Elian on what should have be ou thought should be o	en done,	to now, have or were there	e you had the s e changes over	ame • time
	Held Same Opinion Changed Over Time	Local Cuban 93.5% 6.5%	Local Non- Cuban 90.6% 9.4%	National 88.9% 11.1%	
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
Now I want to ask you wh	at you think (of how officia	als and other r	people
handled the Elian situatio DISAPPROVE of what the	n. First, who	are the peop	le whom you	MOST
	Local Cuban	Local Non- Cuban	National	
Miami Relative	The Property Contraction of the second	26.0%	26.5%	
Alex Penelas	3.3%		1.8%	
Janet Reno	46.2%	15.3% 9.5%	30.3% 22.8%	
The INS Bill Clinton	18.7% 30.6%	9.5% 6.8%	8.0%	
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
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Who	are the people who	om you MC	OST APPROV	ED of what	
tney	did?				and the second se
		Local	Local Non-	National	
	Miami Relatives	Cuban 35.4%	Cuban 15.8%	14.5%	
	Alex Penelas	9.9%	3.5%	.5%	
	Cuban American	16.5%		3.0%	- Aller
	Community				
and the second	Janet Reno	4.9%	30.0%	14.5%	
	Bill Clinton	2.0%	8.5%	1.8%	
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



run by what the	re people or groups hey did in the Elian	case, whet	ther or not th	ney did the rig	ht thing?
[IF YES] Who	were they?				
		Local	Local Non-	National	
		Cuban	Cuban		
	Miami Relatives	15.9%	15.8%	14.0%	
	The INS	2.4%		3.0% 3.8%	
	Janet Reno	3.0% 22.6%	2.5% 21.5%	9.3%	
	Cuban/American Community	22.0%	21.5%	3.370	
	Elian Gonzalez	16.4%	15.5%	12.3%	
	Lindii Gonzaloa				
					Call Sugar
London, C.		1 August		News	
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
















	Questi	on nu	mber.	58
From wha Gonzalez	t you know about t situation should h	the case n ave been	low, do you handled diff	think that the Elian erently than it was?
	Yes No	Local Cuban 92.0% 8.0%	Local Non Cuban 83.4% 16.6%	- National 87.9% 12.1%
In what v different	vay do you think th ly?	ne situatio	n should ha	ve been handled
Counts for "yes" (multiple	Should have let Elian stay in Miami	296	41	51
response "check all that apply")	US should have acted sooner	119	103	160
	Elian's father allowed to stay In US	41	18	3
	Other	465	187	150


	uestion nu		
In what way do you thir differently? "OTHE	k the situation sh R" RESPONSES	ould have been hand	led
	local Cuban	local non-Cuban	National
Family affair, keep politics, gov't out	90	25	9
Should have used family court	58	8	7
Better media		20	31
coverage	38	20	, ji
Use of force excessive	79	20	33
US should have returned Elian to	33	21	12

















Comparison of selected questions over the last to year

Question number 48

Suppose that on Election Day this year you could vote on key issues as well as candidates. Please tell me whether you would vote for or against each one of the following propositions: Would you vote for or against: re-establishing US diplomatic relations with Cuba?

	Local Cuban	Local Non- Cuban	National	
For re-establishing US diplomatic relations with Cuba	38.2%	70.1%	82.1%	
Against re-establishing US diplomatic relations with Cuba	61.8%	29.9%	17.9%	

Question number 49										
Wou Cuba	ld you vote for or against: er a?	nding the U	JS trade emb	argo with	Х. н. н. н.					
	For ending Embargo Against ending Embargo	Local Cuban 37.5% 62.5%	Local Non- Cuban 59.2% 40.8%	National 64.7% 35.3%						
	North Add. and				00000					
					9%40					
	11.079 5.398 5.44									
			A.19.	8.079	8,976 					

Comparison of selected questions over the last 10 years

% CUBAN SAMPLES preliminary)	11.0%	10.4%	8.894	10.094	13.794	0.394	
WHEN WILL MAJOR F CUBA?	POLITICA	L CHANC	JE OCCU	JR IN	9.5%	0.0%	
Des t anowing adswer	Mar-91	Oct-91	Jun-93	Mar-95	Jun-97	Oct-00	
Within 1 year	28%	47%	28%	15%	11%	7.3%	
in 2 to 5 years	35%	30%	29%	26%	25%	25.1%	
in 6 to 10 years	5%	3%	4%	9%	14%	8.9%	
over ten years	3%	2%	4%	4%	11%	11.1%	
never	9%	4%	8%	18%	17%	21.4%	an an an hann an a' a san a'
don't know/nr	21%	14%	26%	27%	23%	1.9%	
ESTABLISH NATIONA	L 7 0%	4.5%	5.7%	6.1%	3.0%	6.9%	
SUPPORT INTERNAL	Mar-91	Oct-91	Jun-93	Mar-95	Jun-97	Oct-00	
Strongly Favor	20.0%	29.1%	20.6%	18.9%	27.8%	31.3%	
Mostly Favor	15.5%	17.1%	18.8%	17.7%	20.5%	15.7%	
Mostly Oppose	5.7%	7.6%	3.2%	6.2%	13.0%	10.7%	
Strongly Oppose	40.8%	29.1%	37.3%	37.8%	32.3%	33.3%	
Not with Fidel/Raul	7.2%	10.8%	11.8%	9.7%	0.0%	0.0%	
Don't' know/no answer	10.8%	6.3%	8.3%	9.8%	6.4%	9.0%	
TIGHTENING THE EMBARGO?	Mar-91	Oct-91	Jun-93	Mar-95	Jun-97	Oct-00	
Strongly Fovor	68.2%	74.0%	69.1%	71.0%			(Favor)
Strongly Favor	11.8%	8.4%	10.8%	9.0%		00.070	(
Mostly Favor	5.3%	5.1%	5.3%	4.6%		34 2%	(Oppose)
Mostly Oppose	7.0%	6.6%	9.0%			01.270	(oppood)
Strongly Oppose	0.0%	0.5%	0.0%			2 702	
Not with Fidel/Raul Don't' know/no answer	7.7%	5.3%	5.8%			8 9%	(Don't' kr
note: different wording throughout years.	7.770	5.570	5.070	4.170	0.070	0.970	

TTOM WEDCINE 30	Mar 01	04.01	Lune 0.2	Mar 05	hrs.07	Oct-00	
SUPPORT US INVASIC	N OF CUI	347	20.20/	25.2%	28.19/	43.1%	
	Mar-91	Oct-91	Jun-93	Mar-95	Jun-97	Oct-00	
Strongly Favor	44.3%	37.1%	43.8%	44.6%	49.7%	46.0%	
Mostly Favor	12.0%	12.4%	11.5%	10.1%	13.3%	10.2%	
Mostly Oppose	11.0%	10.4%	8.8%	10.5%	13.7%	9.3%	
Strongly Oppose	22.7%	32.1%	27.8%	27.9%		27.6%	
Not with Fidel/Raul	0.0%	1.0%	0.0%	0.2%		0.0%	
Don't' know/no answer	10.0%	7.0%	8.2%	6.7%	3.8%	7.0%	
SUPPORT EXILE INVA	SION	0.4.91	5.m.03	Mar. 95	hun-97	Oct-00	
SUPPORT EXILE INVP		Oct-91	Jun-93	Mar-95	Jun-97	Oct-00	
	Mar-91 57.7%	58.1%	56.9%	55.4%		51.7%	
Strongly Favor	13.3%	11.1%	11.8%	13.4%		12.6%	
Mostly Favor	8.3%	8.3%	7.5%	7.7%		8.9%	
Mostly Oppose	13.7%	17.2%	18.1%		14.5%	19.9%	
Strongly Oppose		0.8%	0.0%		0.0%	0.0%	
Not with Fidel/Raul	0.0%	4.5%	5.7%	6.1%		6.9%	
Don't' know/no answer	7.0%	4.5%	5.770	0.170	5.070	0.770	
SUPPORT INTERNAL			Jun-93	Mar-95		0,100	
Strongly Favor	Mar-91	Oct-91	Jun-93	Mar-95			ALLON
Strongly Favor	61.0%	52.3%	53.2%	52.0%		N/A	
Mostly Favor	18.3%	21.2%	18.3%	17.6%		N/A	NOT A
Mostly Oppose	4.2%	9.6%	7.2%	9.7%		N/A	
Strongly Oppose	9.7%	11.8%	14.0%	14.6%		N/A	
Not with Fidel/Raul	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%		N/A	DONT
Don't' know/no answer	6.8%	5.1%	7.30%	5.70%	N/A	N/A	
SUPPORT HUMAN RI	GHTS GR	OUP INS	IDE OF O	CUBA?			
	Mar-91	Oct-91	Jun-93	Mar-95			
Strongly Favor	69.0%	73.2%	71.4%	73.9%	6 71.6%		
Mostly Favor	14.5%	15.1%	15.0%				
Mostly Oppose	2.2%	2.0%	2.3%		All the second se		
Strongly Oppose	4.8%	3.8%	4.7%	3.6%	64.4%	3.4%	
Not with Fidel/Raul	2.0%	3.0%	2.2%	2.1%	60.0%	0.0%	
Don't' know/no answer	7.5%	3.0%	4.5%	4.8%	6 3.2%	6 3.7%	

ALLOW MEDCINE SA			Jun-93	Mar-95	Jun-97	Oct-00	
- 1.5	Mar-91				28.1%	43.1%	
Strongly Favor		N/A	29.3%	35.2%	25.8%	43.1%	
Mostly Favor		N/A	18.5%	24.5%	25.8%		
Mostly Oppose	N/A	N/A	7.5%	7.3%		6.4%	
Strongly Oppose	N/A	N/A	31.8%	25.2%		26.6%	
Not with Fidel/Raul	N/A	N/A	8.8%	4.5%		0.0%	
Don't' know/no answer	N/A	N/A	4.2%	3.3%	3.0%	2.6%	
ALLOW FOOD SALE CUBA?	S TO	PO 480	n				
UBA?	Mar-91	Oct-91	Jun-93	Mar-95	Jun-97	Oct-00	
Strongly Favor	N/A	N/A	14.8%	16.3%	20.3%	37.3%	
Mostly Favor	N/A	N/A	7.8%	11.0%	18.6%	17.4%	
Mostly Oppose	N/A	N/A	9.3%	11.2%	16.1%	8.6%	
Strongly Oppose	N/A	N/A	53.1%	51.4%	41.4%	33.8%	
Not with Fidel/Raul	N/A	N/A	11.8%	6.4%	0.0%	0.0%	
Don't' know/no answer	N/A	N/A	3.2%	3.8%	3.2%	3.0%	
ALLOW UNRESTRIC	Mar-91	Oct-91	Jun-93	Mar-95		Oct-00	
Strongly Favor	29.8%		21.6%	21.1%		50.6%	(ALLOW)
Mostly Favor	13.3%		17.0%	14.5%		45.00/	
Mostly Oppose	5.5%		4.8%	8.6%		45.3%	(NOT ALI
Strongly Oppose	38.8%		43.4%	47.5%		0.004	
Not with Fidel/Raul	7.8%		8.7%	4.9%		0.0%	
Don't' know/no answer	4.7%	3.5%	4.5%	3.5%	N/A	4.1%	(DON'T K
IF DEMOCRATIC CH LIVE?	ANGE OC	CCURS W	OULD Y				
	Mar-91		Jun-93			Oct-00	
Very Likely	15.7%		17.5%				
Some What Likely	11.2%	12.7%	11.1%	12.9%	14.7%	16.5%	
Not Very Likely	17.0%	5 15.4%	18.8%			18.6%	the second second second second
Not at all Likely	50.7%	50.0%	50.1%	49.8%	51.1%	40.7%	
Don't' know/no answer	5.5%	3.8%	2.5%	3.9%	1.9%	3.1%	
	<u> </u>						

	Mar-91	Oct-91	Jun-93	Mar-95	Jun-97	Oct-00	r.
Very Likely	23.3%	27.2%	23.3%	25.8%	N/A	N/A	
Some What Likely	12.7%	12.7%	9.2%	14.3%	N/A	N/A	
Not Very Likely	10.0%	7.1%	8.3%	8.7%	N/A	N/A	
Not at all Likely	39.0%	23.2%	24.1%	18.8%	N/A	N/A	
Not with Fidel/Raul	13.2%	28.1%	32.8%	31.4%	N/A	N/A	
Don't' know/no answer	1.8%	1.7%	2.3%	1.0%	N/A	N/A	
a target and the second	··· +	S. Allening	.1 Th	hugm	2音音观7		
WHERE DO YOU GET CUBA?							
	Mar-91	Oct-91	Jun-93	Mar-95			
Television	48.7%	41.9%	40.4%	62.0%	51.3%	55.3%	
		22 20/	24.3%	31.6%	21.2%	14.4%	
Radio	41.2%	23.2%	24.370	51.070	=11=70		
and the second s	41.2%	18.4%	18.0%	32.1%		16.7%	
Newspaper	and the second	and the second second second			19.7%		
Newspaper Word of Mouth	31.1%	18.4%	18.0%	32.1%	19.7% 0.0%	3.5% 0.0%	
Newspaper Word of Mouth Friends living in Cuba	31.1% 0.0%	18.4% 0.0%	18.0% 0.0%	32.1% 0.0%	19.7% 0.0% 0.0%	3.5% 0.0% 0.0%	
RadioNewspaperWord of MouthFriends living in CubaFriends living hereOther	31.1% 0.0% 11.0%	18.4% 0.0% 5.5%	18.0% 0.0% 4.8%	32.1% 0.0% 4.6%	19.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%	3.5% 0.0% 0.0%	

note: may add up to more than 100% because one respondent may have listed more than one source of information.