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# The World of the United States Foreign Policy Elite: A Case Study of the U.S. Foreign Policy Think Tanks' Debates in the General Elections of 2004, 2008, and 2012

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FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Miami, Florida

THE WORLD OF THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY ELITE:  
A CASE STUDY OF THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY THINK TANKS' DEBATES IN  
THE GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 2004, 2008, AND 2012

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

by

Seyed Hamidreza Serri

2015

To: Dean Michael R. Heithaus  
College of Arts and Sciences

This dissertation, written by Seyed Hamidreza Serri, and entitled The World of the United States Foreign Policy Elite: A Case Study of the U.S. Foreign Policy Think Tanks' Debates in the General Elections of 2004, 2008, and 2012, having been approved in respect to style and intellectual content, is referred to you for judgment.

We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved.

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Date of Defense: April 2, 2015

The dissertation of Seyed Hamidreza Serri is approved.

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College of Arts and Sciences

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Dean Lakshmi N. Reddi  
University Graduate School

Florida International University, 2015

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DEDICATION

To My Parents

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

THE WORLD OF THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY ELITE:  
A CASE STUDY OF THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY THINK TANKS' DEBATES IN  
THE GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 2004, 2008, AND 2012

by

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Florida International University, 2015

Miami, Florida

Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor

American foreign policy think tanks are an important part of the American foreign policy elite. By gathering data, publishing research, and reaching out to the public and government, think tanks help set the public debate agenda. The question I asked was whether these American foreign policy think tanks exhibited a shared worldview during the past three election cycles. I analyzed 7,000 documents (half a million verbs) published by the seven American foreign policy think tanks active in the three general elections of 2004, 2008, and 2012: the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Cato Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Heritage Foundation, and the RAND Corporation. To measure the collective and individual worldviews of these seven think tanks, I used the Profiler Plus software, which answered Alexander George's operational code questions based on the transitive verbs for the Self and the Other. My research showed that the collectivity of the seven think tanks had three separate worlds of action with three different worldviews. It also showed that the worldview of the American collective Self



was very stable across time. Another empirical finding was that from the perspective of the seven think tanks, the United States' actions were the most similar to the actions of other great powers: Europe, China, and Russia. It was also shown that from the perspective of the seven think tanks, China was the most cooperative nation and Terrorists were the most conflictual actors in the world.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
CHAPTER 1 : RESEARCH QUESTION .....	1
1- General Statement.....	1
2- Research Question .....	5
3- Definition of Concepts.....	6
3-1 Worldview .....	6
3-2 The American Foreign Policy Elite .....	10
4- Measuring Worldview .....	14
4-1 Types of Operational Code Analysis by Their Targets .....	17
4-2 Types of Operational Code Analysis by Their Methods .....	23
5- Structure of the Research.....	27
 CHAPTER 2 : METHOD AND DATA ACQUISITION.....	 31
Introduction.....	31
1- Data Acquisition.....	31
2- Text Preprocessing .....	34
3- Supervised Topic Classification .....	40
4- Profiler Plus .....	43
5- Sensitivity of Method .....	50
Summary .....	58
 CHAPTER 3 : THE WORLDS OF THE SEVEN THINK TANKS .....	 59
Introduction.....	59
1- The Worlds of the Collectivity of the Seven Think Tanks.....	59
1-1 The Impact of Time on the Rules of Conduct for the Collectivity of the Think Tanks .....	60
1-2 The Impact of Topic on the Rules of Conduct for the Collectivity of the Think Tanks .....	63
1-3 The Impact of Time on the Three Worlds for the Collectivity of the Think Tanks.....	65
2- The Worlds of Each of the Seven Think Tanks.....	66
2-1 The World of All the Issues.....	67
2-2 The World of Military Issues.....	72
2-3 The World of Political Issues .....	78
2-4 The World of Social Issues.....	84
Summary.....	89
 CHAPTER 4 : THE AMERICAN COLLECTIVE SELF .....	 90
Introduction.....	90
1- The Collectivity of the Seven Think Tanks.....	94
2- Seven Think Tanks, Seven Rules of Conduct?.....	97

2-1 The American Collective Self and Differences among the Seven Think Tanks.....	97
2-2 The World of All the Issues.....	99
2-3 The World of Military Issues.....	103
2-4 The World of Political Issues .....	106
Summary .....	109
CHAPTER 5 : U.S. SIGNIFICANT OTHERS .....	110
Introduction.....	110
1- Significant Others in Relation to the United States.....	111
2- Operational Code of the Actor.....	113
3- Comparing Think Tanks.....	114
4- Similarity of the Actors .....	115
Afghanistan.....	118
Britain .....	123
China .....	128
Europe.....	133
France.....	138
Germany.....	143
India .....	148
Iran .....	153
Iraq .....	158
Israel.....	163
Japan .....	168
Muslim World.....	173
North Korea .....	179
Pakistan.....	183
Russia.....	188
South Korea .....	193
Syria .....	198
Taiwan.....	203
Terrorists.....	208
Turkey .....	213
United Nations .....	218
United States.....	224
Summary .....	228
CHAPTER 6 : CONCLUSION AND ASSESSMENT .....	230
LIST OF REFERENCES.....	244
APPENDICES .....	254
VITA.....	304

## LIST OF TABLES

TABLE	PAGE
Table 2-1 Think Tanks' Publications in Three General Elections.....	34
Table 2-2 POS Tags Kept in the Texts .....	39
Table 2-3 The Consensus Agreement on File Labeling.....	41
Table 2-4 The Consensus Agreement on Sentence Labeling .....	43
Table 2-5 Number of Political and Nonpolitical Documents .....	50
Table 2-6 MANOVA - Impact of Type of Texts on the VICS Indexes .....	51
Table 2-7 Impact of Type of Texts on the Individual VICS Indexes .....	53
Table 2-8 VICS Indexes of Political and Nonpolitical Batches .....	54
Table 2-9 Comparison of Political and Nonpolitical Batches .....	55
Table 2-10 MANOVA - Impact of Subcategories of Texts on the VICS Indexes .....	56
Table 2-11 Impact of Subcategories of Texts on the Individual VICS Indexes .....	57
Table 2-12 Eigenvalues - Subcategories of Political and Nonpolitical Texts .....	57
Table 2-13 Wilks' Lambda - Subcategories of Political and Nonpolitical Texts.....	57
Table 3-1 VICS Indexes of the Collectivity of the Think Tanks.....	61
Table 3-2 MANOVA - Impact of Time on the VICS Indexes of the Collectivity of the Think Tanks .....	62
Table 3-3 Impact of Time on the Individual VICS Indexes of the Collectivity of the Think Tanks .....	63
Table 3-4 MANOVA - Impact of Topic on the VICS Indexes of the Collectivity of the Think Tanks .....	64
Table 3-5 Impact of Topic on the Individual VICS Indexes of the Collectivity of the Think Tanks .....	64
Table 3-6 MANOVA - Impact of Time on Each World.....	65
Table 3-7 Impact of Topic on the Individual VICS Indexes of the Collectivity of the Think Tanks – World of Political Issues.....	66

Table 3-8 MANOVA - Impact of Think Tanks on the VICS Indexes of the World of All the Issues.....	68
Table 3-9 Impact of Think Tanks on the Individual VICS Indexes .....	68
Table 3-10 VICS Indexes of the Individual Think Tanks - World of All the Issues.....	69
Table 3-11 Dissimilarity among the Pairs of Think Tanks in the World of All the Issues.....	70
Table 3-12 Eigenvalues - Think Tanks' World of All the Issues .....	71
Table 3-13 Wilks' Lambda - Think Tanks' World of All the Issues .....	71
Table 3-14 MANOVA - Impact of Think Tanks on the VICS Indexes of the World of Military Issues.....	73
Table 3-15 Impact of Think Tanks on the Individual VICS Indexes of the World of Military Issues.....	74
Table 3-16 Dissimilarity among the Pairs of Think Tanks in the World of Military Issues.....	74
Table 3-17 VICS Indexes of the Individual Think Tanks - World of Military Issues.....	75
Table 3-18 Eigenvalues - Think Tanks' World of Military Issues .....	77
Table 3-19 Wilks' Lambda - Think Tanks' World of Military Issues .....	77
Table 3-20 MANOVA - Impact of Think Tanks on the VICS Indexes of the World of Political Issues .....	79
Table 3-21 VICS Indexes of the Individual Think Tanks - World of Political Issues.....	80
Table 3-22 Impact of Think Tanks on the Individual VICS Indexes of the World of Political Issues .....	81
Table 3-23 Dissimilarity among the Pairs of Think Tanks in the World of Political Issues.....	81
Table 3-24 Eigenvalues - Think Tanks' World of Political Issues.....	82
Table 3-25 Wilks' Lambda - Think Tanks' World of Political Issues .....	83
Table 3-26 MANOVA - Impact of Think Tanks on the VICS Indexes of the World of Social Issues.....	85

Table 3-27 Impact of Think Tanks on the Individual VICS Indexes of the World of Social Issue .....	85
Table 3-28 VICS Indexes of the Individual Think Tanks - World of Social Issues .....	86
Table 3-29 Dissimilarity among the Pairs of Think Tanks in the World of Social Issues	87
Table 3-30 Eigenvalues - Think Tanks' World of Social Issues .....	88
Table 3-31 Wilks' Lambda - Think Tanks' World of Social Issues .....	88
Table 4-1 MANOVA - Difference Between the Broad and Narrow Definitions of the Self .....	92
Table 4-2 VICS Indexes of the American Collective Self - World of All the Issues .....	93
Table 4-3 MANOVA - Impact of Time on the VICS Indexes of the American Collective Self - All the Four Worlds .....	94
Table 4-4 VICS Indexes of the American Collective Self over Time - World of All the Issues .....	95
Table 4-5 MANOVA - Impact of Topic on the VICS Indexes of the American Collective Self.....	96
Table 4-6 Impact of Topic on the Individual VICS Indexes of the American Collective Self .....	97
Table 4-7 MANOVA - Impact of Think Tanks on the VICS Indexes of the American Collective Self.....	98
Table 4-8 VICS Indexes of the Individual Think Tanks - World of All the Issues - Self .....	100
Table 4-9 Dissimilarity among the Pairs of Think Tanks in the World of All the Issues - Self.....	101
Table 4-10 Eigenvalues - Think Tanks' Collective Self in the World of All the Issues	102
Table 4-11 Wilks' Lambda - Think Tanks' Collective Self in the World of All the Issues.....	102
Table 4-12 Dissimilarity among the Pairs of Think Tanks in the World of Military Issues - Self.....	104
Table 4-13 VICS Indexes of the Individual Think Tanks - World of Military Issues - Self .....	105

Table 4-14 Eigenvalues - Think Tanks' Collective Self in the World of Military Issues.....	106
Table 4-15 Wilks' Lambda - Think Tanks' Collective Self in the World of Military Issues.....	106
Table 4-16 Dissimilarity among the Pairs of Think Tanks in the World of Political Issues - Self.....	107
Table 4-17 VICS Indexes of the Individual Think Tanks - World of Political Issues - Self.....	108
Table 4-18 Eigenvalues - Think Tanks' Collective Self in the World of Political Issues.....	109
Table 4-19 Wilks' Lambda - Think Tanks' Collective Self in the World of Political Issues.....	109
Table 5-1 Most Frequent Subjects with Transitive Verbs .....	112
Table 5-2 Forty-Four Levels of Verb Aggregation/Comparison.....	117
Table 5-3 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Afghanistan....	119
Table 5-4 Ranking of Twenty-two Actors Based on their Direction of Strategy .....	119
Table 5-5 Operational Code of Afghanistan from the Perspective of American Think Tanks .....	120
Table 5-6 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Britain.....	124
Table 5-7 Operational Code of Britain from the Perspective of American Think Tanks	125
Table 5-8 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to China.....	129
Table 5-9 Operational Code of China from the Perspective of American Think Tanks	130
Table 5-10 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Europe.....	134
Table 5-11 Operational Code of Europe from the Perspective of American Think Tanks.....	135
Table 5-12 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to France .....	139
Table 5-13 Operational Code of France from the Perspective of American Think Tanks.....	140
Table 5-14 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Germany .....	144

Table 5-15 Operational Code of Germany from the Perspective of American Think Tanks.....	145
Table 5-16 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to India.....	149
Table 5-17 Operational Code of India from the Perspective of American Think Tanks	150
Table 5-18 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Iran.....	154
Table 5-19 Operational Code of Iran from the Perspective of American Think Tanks .	155
Table 5-20 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Iraq.....	159
Table 5-21 Operational Code of Iraq from the Perspective of American Think Tanks .	160
Table 5-22 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Israel .....	164
Table 5-23 Operational Code of Israel from the Perspective of American Think Tanks	165
Table 5-24 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Japan .....	169
Table 5-25 Operational Code of Japan from the Perspective of American Think Tanks	170
Table 5-26 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to the Muslim World .....	174
Table 5-27 Operational Code of the Muslim World from the Perspective of American Think Tanks .....	175
Table 5-28 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to North Korea .	179
Table 5-29 Operational Code of North Korea from the Perspective of American Think Tanks .....	180
Table 5-30 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Pakistan.....	184
Table 5-31 Operational Code of Pakistan from the Perspective of American Think Tanks.....	185
Table 5-32 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Russia .....	189
Table 5-33 Operational Code of Russia from the Perspective of American Think Tanks.....	190
Table 5-34 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to South Korea .	194
Table 5-35 Operational Code of South Korea from the Perspective of American Think Tanks .....	195



Table 5-36 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Syria.....	199
Table 5-37 Operational Code of Syria from the Perspective of American Think Tanks	200
Table 5-38 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Taiwan .....	204
Table 5-39 Operational Code of Taiwan from the Perspective of American Think Tanks.....	205
Table 5-40 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Terrorists.....	209
Table 5-41 Operational Code of Terrorists from the Perspective of American Think Tanks.....	210
Table 5-42 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Turkey.....	214
Table 5-43 Operational Code of Turkey from the Perspective of American Think Tanks.....	215
Table 5-44 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to the United Nations .....	219
Table 5-45 Operational Code of the United Nations from the Perspective of American Think Tanks .....	220
Table 5-46 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to the United States .....	224
Table 5-47 Operational Code of the United States from the Perspective of American Think Tanks .....	225
Table 6-1 Ranking of Countries in the National Material Capabilities Database.....	241
Table 6-2 Similarity of Countries - VICS vs. the National Material Capabilities Database.....	243

## LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE	PAGE
Figure 1-1 Frequency of worldview in the English Literature between 1800-2008.....	10
Figure 1-2 Corporate Community, Upper Class, and the Policy-Planning Network.....	13
Figure 1-3 Verbs In Context System (VICS).....	26
Figure 2-1 VICS Indexes and their Formulas.....	48
Figure 2-2 Discriminant Functions Plot – Subcategories of Political and Nonpolitical Texts.....	58
Figure 3-1 Discriminant Functions Plot – Think Tanks’ World of All the Issues.....	72
Figure 3-2 Discriminant Functions Plot – Think Tanks’ World of Military Issues.....	78
Figure 3-3 Discriminant Functions Plot – Think Tanks’ World of Political Issues .....	84
Figure 3-4 Discriminant Functions Plot – Think Tanks’ World of Social Issues.....	89
Figure 4-1 Discriminant Functions Plot – Think Tanks’ Collective Self in the World of All the Issues .....	103
Figure 5-1 Similarity of Actions of Afghanistan to other Actors.....	123
Figure 5-2 Similarity of Actions of Britain to other Actors.....	128
Figure 5-3 Similarity of Actions of China to other Actors.....	133
Figure 5-4 Similarity of Actions of Europe to other Actors.....	138
Figure 5-5 Similarity of Actions of France to other Actors.....	143
Figure 5-6 Similarity of Actions of Germany to other Actors.....	148
Figure 5-7 Similarity of Actions of India to other Actors .....	153
Figure 5-8 Similarity of Actions of Iran to other Actors .....	158
Figure 5-9 Similarity of Actions of Iraq to other Actors .....	163
Figure 5-10 Similarity of Actions of Israel to other Actors.....	168
Figure 5-11 Similarity of Actions of Japan to other Actors.....	173

Figure 5-12 Similarity of Actions of the Muslim World to other Actors .....	178
Figure 5-13 Similarity of Actions of North Korea to other Actors.....	183
Figure 5-14 Similarity of Actions of Pakistan to other Actors .....	188
Figure 5-15 Similarity of Actions of Russia to other Actors .....	193
Figure 5-16 Similarity of Actions of South Korea to other Actors.....	198
Figure 5-17 Similarity of Actions of Syria to other Actors .....	203
Figure 5-18 Similarity of Actions of Taiwan to other Actors.....	208
Figure 5-19 Similarity of Actions of Terrorists to other Actors .....	213
Figure 5-20 Similarity of Actions of Turkey to other Actors .....	218
Figure 5-21 Similarity of Actions of the United Nations to other Actors .....	223
Figure 5-22 Similarity of Actions of the United States to other Actors .....	228
Figure 6-1 Relative Position of the Seven Think Tanks in the Four Worlds.....	236
Figure 6-2 Comparison of the Seven Think Tanks based on the Number of Conflictual and Cooperative Strategies Assigned to the Actors.....	236

## CHAPTER 1 : RESEARCH QUESTION

### 1- General Statement

The importance of the United States in world affairs makes explaining U.S. foreign policy crucial for understanding world politics. Therefore, numerous theories about foreign policy and international relations have addressed U.S. foreign policy, employing different levels of analysis.<sup>1</sup>

Some scholars, such as Kenneth Waltz<sup>2</sup> and John Mearsheimer,<sup>3</sup> choose the level of international system. Others, like William Appleman Williams and the scholars of the Wisconsin School, argue that American foreign policy should be interpreted according to the imperial intentions of the United States.<sup>4</sup> However, in place of these systemic studies, researchers can use lower levels of analysis, such as sub-state, organizational, and individual levels. Graham Allison, for instance, examines bureaucratic politics;<sup>5</sup> David Barber focuses on presidential character;<sup>6</sup> and Peter Trubowitz addresses the role of the *economic regions* in the United States to explain American foreign policy.<sup>7</sup> Stephen Walt

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<sup>1</sup> J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," *World Politics* 14, no. 1 (1961): 77-92.

<sup>2</sup> Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Boston, Mass.: McGraw-Hill, 1979).

<sup>3</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001).

<sup>4</sup> William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1988).

<sup>5</sup> Graham Allison and Zelikow Philip, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Longman, 1999).

<sup>6</sup> James David Barber, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992).

<sup>7</sup> Peter Trubowitz, *Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

and others emphasize the role of domestic pressure groups in shaping U.S. foreign policy.<sup>1</sup>

Some proponents of a lower/domestic level of analysis choose elites as their explanatory level of analysis. They argue that U.S. foreign policy is shaped and conducted by a group of individuals whose influence is significantly greater than the general public's.<sup>2</sup> Elites influence American foreign policy disproportionately through their exercise of the power of ideas, the power of instructions/rules, and the power of purse.<sup>3</sup> Using any combination of these powers, elites set the foreign policy agenda and define the possible and acceptable solutions for issues they are concerned with. Elite Theory peaked during the 1960s and 1970s. In 1967, G. William Domhoff published *Who Rules America?*, the seminal book in this category. Domhoff argues that although Americans despise the terms *class* and *power elite*, there is, in fact, an economic upper-class that rules the nation.<sup>4</sup>

Some scholars study the elites by extracting their worldviews through surveys.<sup>5</sup> In the 1970s Ole R. Holsti and James Rosenau started the most famous survey studies of the U.S. foreign policy elite. In a series of surveys taken between 1976 to 1996 that

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<sup>1</sup> Stephen M. Walt and John J. Mearsheimer, *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Girous, 2007).

<sup>2</sup> See G. William Domhoff, *The Higher Circles; The Governing Class in America* (New York: Vintage, 1971); G. William Domhoff, *Who Rules America?: The Triumph of the Corporate Rich* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2014).

<sup>3</sup> James McGann, *The Competition for Dollars, Scholars and Influence in the Public Policy Research Industry* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1995).

<sup>4</sup> Domhoff, *The Triumph of the Corporate Rich*.

<sup>5</sup> Ole R. Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004).

categorized the elites' beliefs regarding militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism, the authors demonstrated that significant divisions exist among the elites.<sup>1</sup> Holsti and Rosenau divided the elites into four categories. They classified those who opposed both kinds of internationalism as Isolationists, those who supported both types of internationalism as Internationalists, those who supported cooperative internationalism and opposed militant internationalism as Accommodationists, and finally those who opposed cooperative internationalism and supported militant internationalism as Hardliners.<sup>2</sup>

In 2002, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs conducted another study of the U.S. elite centered around an issue-oriented perspective on the elites' worldviews.<sup>3</sup> For instance, on the issue of the U.S. unilateralism, non-governmental members of the elite argued that the United States needs the support of allies in order to act successfully in the world. On the other hand, a majority of elite members from the U.S. House of Representatives, the Senate, and the administration said that the United States had the right to act alone. Or, in the case of Israel and Palestine, most of the U.S. elite supported neutrality, whereas the elite in the Senate expressed pro-Israeli sentiments.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, "Foreign Policy Leadership Project, 1976-1996 (ICPSR 2614)," *ICPSR*, accessed March 12, 2015, <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/2614/version/1/>.

<sup>2</sup> Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, "The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes among American Leaders," *The Journal of Politics* 52, no. 1 (1990): 94-125.

<sup>3</sup> Marshall M. Bouton, *Worldviews 2002: American Public Opinion & Foreign Policy* (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 2002).

<sup>4</sup> James McCormick, *American Foreign Policy and Process* (Boston, MA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2010), 603.

A recent study of the U.S. foreign policy elite is the 2005 Pew survey,<sup>1</sup> to which more than 520 individuals in key leadership positions, including members of think tanks, responded.<sup>2</sup> The Pew survey showed that there are some issues about which a majority of elite members share the same view. For instance, a majority of the participants identified China not as an adversary but as a serious problem. On the other hand, one of the main lines of disagreement was about whether the United States should be the only military superpower. A majority of the military officers, local officials and foreign affairs specialists were in favor of the United States being the only military superpower, whereas a majority of the religious leaders, think tank scholars, and academic individuals were opposed.<sup>3</sup>

Extracting worldviews via surveys has several problems, especially with foreign policy experts and leaders. Surveys are very expensive and time consuming. In addition, many policy makers decline to participate. As a result of these problems, there have been very few attempts in the literature to extract the worldview of the elites by using surveys.

My research uses texts instead of surveys to extract the worldviews of the American foreign policy elite. Using texts as the source of raw data offers many advantages. It is less expensive, more accessible, and more reliable. Also, all aspects of human life are now being recorded in digital format on the Internet. By tapping into this online resource to answer a question that has not been answered before, my research

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<sup>1</sup> In association with the Council on Foreign Relations.

<sup>2</sup> "America's Place in the World 2005," *PEW*, November 2005, <http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/263.pdf>.

<sup>3</sup> McCormick, *American Foreign Policy and Process*.

makes a substantive and original contribution to the literature about American foreign policy and to methodology in political science.

## **2- Research Question**

This research is exploratory rather than explanatory.<sup>1</sup> The purpose of exploratory research is to “investigate little-understood phenomena” and “to identify or discover important categories of meaning.” However, the purpose of explanatory research is to “explain the pattern related to the phenomena in question” and “to identify plausible relationships shaping the phenomena.”<sup>2</sup> The exploratory questions can best be answered by using the strategy of data immersion. In this strategy, the research does not start with *a priori* hypothesis; instead it allows data to “speak for themselves.”<sup>3</sup>

The following are the main questions of the research: On the basis of the texts published by the American foreign policy elite, what are the worldviews of the elite? Does analysis of these texts show any shared patterns of belief across time, topic, and target? If so, were these patterns shared across the political spectrum?

Each of the analytic chapters (Chapters Three, Four, and Five) approaches the main questions differently. Chapter Three considers all the verbs of all the actors and asks whether the worldview of the collectivity of the think tanks changes across time (2004, 2008, and 2012) and topic (all the topics, military topics, political topics, and social topics).

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<sup>1</sup> John W. Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003).

<sup>2</sup> Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B. Rossman, *Designing Qualitative Research* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage publications, 2010), 33.

<sup>3</sup> Richards J. Heuer, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* (Pittsburgh, PA: Government Printing Office, 1999), 32.



Chapter Four answers the main questions by considering only the verbs used in conjunction with the United States. Considering the verbs used for the American collective Self, does the worldview of the American foreign policy elite show stability over time? Does the American collective Self have distinct worldviews in relation to the issue areas?

Chapter Five answers the main questions by considering only the verbs used for the twenty-two most frequent actors in the texts of the American foreign policy elite. For instance, considering the verbs used in conjunction with Afghanistan, Chapter Five asks the following questions: How does the American foreign policy elite perceive Afghanistan's operational code? What is Afghanistan's relative position in the world of the American foreign policy elite? Which actors are most similar to Afghanistan?

### **3- Definition of Concepts**

The following three sections explain the main concepts of this research. The first section explains the concept of worldview, its origins, and its relation to operational code analysis. The second section defines the American foreign policy elite and why think tanks are considered part of the elite. The third section briefly reviews operational code analysis, its history and the Verbs In Context System (VICS).

#### **3-1 Worldview**

The term *worldview* was first used in English in 1858.<sup>1</sup> It is the translation of the German word *Weltanschauung*, which comes from the words *welt*, which means *world*,

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<sup>1</sup> David K. Naugle, *Worldview: The History of a Concept* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2002), 69.

and *anschauung*, which means *perception*.<sup>1</sup> *Weltanschauung* was first used by Immanuel Kant in 1790 in the *Critique of Judgment*.<sup>2</sup>

If the human mind is nonetheless to be able to even to think the given infinite without contradiction, it must have within itself a power that is supersensible, whose idea of the *noumenon* cannot be intuited but can yet be regarded as the substrate underlying what is mere appearance, namely, our intuition of the world [*Weltanschauung*]. For only by means of this power and its idea do we, in a pure intellectual estimation of magnitude, comprehend the infinite in the world of sense entirely under a concept, even though in a mathematical estimation of magnitude by means of numerical concepts we can never think it in its entirety.

The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines *worldview* as, “fundamental beliefs, values, etc., determining or constituting a comprehensive outlook on the world; a perspective on life.”<sup>3</sup> The concept of worldview has been studied from the linguistic, ideological, philosophical and cognitive perspectives.<sup>4</sup> This research applies the concept of worldview as a cognitive tool and to operationalize this cognitive tool, it uses the *operational code* method developed by Nathan Leites in the 1950s.<sup>5</sup>

In the mid-twentieth century, three groups of scholars became interested in researching the views of the collectivity of individuals. Some anthropologists began

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<sup>1</sup> “Weltanschauung, n.,” *OED Online*, accessed March 16, 2015, <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/227763/>.

<sup>2</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment: Including the First Introduction*, translated and Introduction by Werner S. Pluhar, with a forward by Mary J. Gregor (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), 111-112, quoted in David K. Naugle, *Worldview: The History of a Concept*, 58-59.

<sup>3</sup> “World, n.,” *OED Online*, accessed March 16, 2015, <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/230262?redirectedFrom=Worldview>.

<sup>4</sup> Naugle, *Worldview: The History of A concept*.

<sup>5</sup> The operational code method is not the only attempt to extract worldview of political actors. Beside operational code, there are three other main approaches: Robert Axelrod’s Cognitive Mapping method; Rochard Cottam’s Image Theory; and Conceptual Complexity by Peter Suedfeld and Margaret Hermann. Michael D. Young and Mark Schafer, “Is There Method in our Madness? Ways of Assessing Cognition in International Relations,” *Mershon International Studies Review* 42, no. 1 (1998): 63-96.

applying the methods and theories of cultural anthropology to complex groups, like literate and technologically advanced societies, rather than just focusing on non-literate primitive societies. On the other hand, psychologists and psychiatrists studied patterns in large groups. Political scientists also became interested in studying large groups and complex societies, and they began asking how elites view different problems of international relations.<sup>1</sup> In this context, Nathan Leites' psycho-cultural work on *Study of Bolshevism* became a breakthrough for the scholars who wanted to conduct psychoanalysis of large groups and those who were interested in studying the elites.<sup>2</sup>

Leites did not use the term *worldview* in his work. Instead, he used *operational code*, *rules of conduct*, and *rules of strategy*. Leites defined the operational code as the rules of strategy or the rules of conduct of Bolshevism that were developed as the result of the in-group struggles of Russian Socialists in the past.<sup>3</sup> "Ideology, socialization, and leadership pressures result in a consistent, identifiable set of behavioral patterns in Soviet foreign policy."<sup>4</sup> According to Leites, operational code describes the implicit and explicit necessary rules for "effective political conduct."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Nathan Leites, "Psycho-Cultural Hypotheses about Political Acts," *World Politics* 1, no. 1 (1948): 102-119.

<sup>2</sup> Alexander L. George, "The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making," *International Studies Quarterly* 13, no. 2 (1969): 192.

<sup>3</sup> Nathan Leites, *The Operational Code of the Politburo* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951), xiv.

<sup>4</sup> Young and Schafer, "Method in our Madness," 69.

<sup>5</sup> Leites, *The Operational Code of the Politburo*, xi.

Ole R. Holsti was perhaps the first scholar in the operational code research program to use the term *world view* for the operational code method.<sup>1</sup> Today, the operational code literature uses the terms *belief system*,<sup>2</sup> *worldview*,<sup>3</sup> and *operational code*<sup>4</sup> interchangeably. The later and widespread use of the term *worldview* in the operational code research might result from the general trend in English literature to use the term *worldview* and its derivatives. Figure 1-1 shows the usage of the five words of *worldview*, *world-view*, *world view*, *belief system*, and *operational code* in English literature from 1800 to 2008. This chart was built using the Google Books Ngram viewer.<sup>5</sup> The Google Ngram Project has indexed the frequency of the use of one-word, two-word, three-word, and n-word terms in the printed materials from 1800 to 2008.<sup>6</sup> The x-axis in Figure 1-1 shows the years of publication. The y-axis shows the percentage of all the two-word phrases contained in the Google books written in English and published in the United States that are *world-view*, *world view*, *belief system*, or *operational code*.<sup>7</sup> It also shows the percentage of all the one-word phrases that the term *worldview* accounts

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<sup>1</sup> Ole R. Holsti, "The "Operational Code" Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles' Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 3, no. 1 (1970): 131.

<sup>2</sup> Stephen G. Walker, "The Motivational Foundations of Political Belief Systems: A Re-Analysis of the Operational Code Construct," *International Studies Quarterly* 27, no. 2 (1983): 179-202.

<sup>3</sup> Bertjan Verbeek, "The Worldview of Sir Anthony Eden," in *Decision Making in Great Britain during the Suez Crisis*, ed. Verbeek Bertjan (Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate, 2003), 61–80.

<sup>4</sup> Stephen G. Walker, "The Evolution of Operational Code Analysis," *Political Psychology* 11, no. 2 (1990): 403-418.

<sup>5</sup> "Google Books Ngram Viewer," *Google*, 2013, <https://books.google.com/ngrams>.

<sup>6</sup> Jean-Baptiste Michel et al., "Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books," *Science* 331, no. 6014 (2011): 176-182.

<sup>7</sup> Also called bigram.

for.<sup>1</sup> Figure 1-1 shows that since 1900, the term *worldview* has been used exponentially in English literature. From the different terms that the operational code literature has used to refer to the concept of worldview, this research uses Leites’ original term, *rules of conduct*, along with the terms *worldview* and *operational code*.



**Figure 1-1 Frequency of “worldview” in the English Literature between 1800-2008**

### 3-2 The American Foreign Policy Elite

G. William Domhoff argues in his seminal work, *Who Rules America?*, that a *power elite* created from the collaboration of a *social upper class*, a *corporate community*, and a *policy-planning network* rules the United States.<sup>2</sup> By *social upper class* Domhoff means “intermarrying and interacting families who see each other as equals, share a common style of life, and have a common viewpoint on the world.” They constitute between 0.5% and 1% of the American population. This social upper class is

<sup>1</sup> Also called unigram.

<sup>2</sup> G. William Domhoff, “The Class-Domination Theory of Power,” *Who Rules America?*, 2012, [http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/class\\_domination.html](http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/class_domination.html).

“nationwide in its scope” and because its members attend the same schools and belong to the same clubs and other social institutions, the upper class maintains its social cohesion.<sup>1</sup>

The *corporate community* refers to ongoing concentration, since the nineteenth century, of power among a few financial, consulting, legal and accounting firms in the United States. The members of the corporate community create boards of directors that are dominated by just a few families. The inner circle of the corporate directorate owns eighty to ninety percent of the corporations in the United States.<sup>2</sup>

The *policy-planning network* consists of cultural and civic nonpartisan organizations, foundations and think tanks. Its main task is to define the standards of what is important, beautiful or classy for the society. They communicate their ideas to the public through their publications, conferences and roundtables. The members of policy-planning network are typically tax-exempt organizations that receive most of their funding from the corporate community. By supporting certain priorities and ideas, the policy-planning network sets the tone and agenda for the public debates in the United States. According to Domhoff, think tanks are one of the main components of the policy-planning network:<sup>3</sup>

Think tanks are nonprofit organizations that provide settings for experts in various academic disciplines to devote their time to the study of policy alternatives, free from the teaching, committee meetings, and departmental duties that are part of the daily routine for most members of the academic community. Supported by foundation grants, corporate donations, and government contracts, think tanks are a major source of the new ideas discussed in the policy-planning network.

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.


<sup>3</sup> Domhoff, *The Triumph of the Corporate Rich*, 71.

Think tanks perform several functions within the power elite. They educate the leaders of the corporate community about different policy options, and the corporate leaders use this knowledge to convince and influence the public. Think tanks “serve as sorting and screening mechanisms for the emergence of new leadership for the corporate rich in general” by providing a venue for the corporate executives to show their wit and debating strength. Also, think tanks act like a venue for corporate executives to show to the public that the members of the corporate community care about nonpartisan issues. By doing so, think tanks present corporate executives as “national leaders” and “statesmen.” Finally, think tanks provide a venue for the corporate community to know and employ experts.<sup>1</sup>

Figure 1-2 shows how Domhoff envisions the relations among the three segments of the power elite. It shows the flow of financial resources, ideas and policy among the social upper class, the corporate community, and the policy-planning network. The corporate community controls the think tanks indirectly through universities and foundations, universities provide think tanks with experts, and the foundations provide them with funding. The corporate community also controls the think tanks by participating on the think tanks’ boards of trustees. Think tanks, on the other hand, produce ideas and influence government by presenting papers, publishing reports, and giving testimonies. Following Domhoff’s theory of power elite in the United States, this research regards think tanks part of the American foreign policy elite.

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<sup>1</sup> Domhoff, “The Class-Domination Theory of Power.”



**Figure 1-2 Corporate Community, Upper Class, and the Policy-Planning Network**  
 Source: Figure adopted from G. William Domhoff, *Who Rules America? The Triumph of the Corporate Rich* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2014), 78.

After much discussion with foreign policy specialists and considering the availability of data, I concluded that the following seven think tanks constitute a representative sample of the United States foreign policy think tanks. On the basis of extensive reading and discussion, I located each think tank on an ideological continuum, from the Left to Right. The three think tanks on the Right (conservative) are the American Enterprise Institute (hereafter cited in text as AEI), the Heritage Foundation (hereafter cited in text as Heritage), and the Cato Institute (hereafter cited in text as Cato). The Council on Foreign Relations (hereafter cited in text as CFR) and the RAND Corporation (hereafter cited in text as RAND) stand in the Center, and the Brookings Institution (hereafter cited in text as Brookings) and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (hereafter cited in text as Carnegie) are on the Left (liberal).



Domhoff argues that think tanks influence the government by presenting papers, publishing reports and presenting testimonies. Following Domhoff, I used think tanks' articles, op-eds, reports and testimonies as the sources of data. I located 7,000 foreign policy reports, articles, op-eds, and testimonies that were digitally available and published in the periods of six months before and after the three general elections of 2004, 2008, and 2012.

There were two reasons for choosing the months close to general elections. Close to general elections, think tanks do their best to sell their ideas to the public and the upcoming executive branch. They enter to a virtual debate with each other about the key issues and publish competing fact-sheets and background briefs. Therefore, in the period close to elections, the difference between the think tanks becomes more visible in their texts. Another reason for choosing the time periods bracketing the general elections was the availability of a greater number of publications.

#### **4- Measuring Worldview**

At the beginning of the Cold War, as the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union intensified, understanding the Soviet leadership's worldview, goals and aspirations became paramount for the United States. The main tools for extracting the worldview of world leaders were traditionally interviews and surveys. However, these methods could not be used to assess the Soviet leadership, which was unavailable to Western scholars. Therefore, scholars and politicians developed *at-a-distance* methods to study the beliefs of the Soviet leaders.

The first scholarly works to study the Soviet Union leadership at a distance emanated from a project by RAND. In 1951 and 1953, Nathan Leites published two

works describing the worldview of the Soviet Union. In *Operational Code of Politburo*<sup>1</sup> and *Study of Bolshevism*<sup>2</sup> Leites studied all the publications that Lenin and Stalin issued before 1930. Leites' main goal was "to discover the rules which Bolsheviks believe to be necessary for effective political conduct."<sup>3</sup> He wanted to extract the "spirit of the Bolshevik elite" from their texts and was particularly interested in their *strategy of action*, or what he called the "operational code" of the Soviet Union.<sup>4</sup>

In the *Study of Bolshevism* Leites applied psychoanalytical theories for studying the human mind. Using LeDoux's trilogy of cognition, emotion, and motivation,<sup>5</sup> Leites concluded that the *cognitive dimensions* of the Soviet leaders revealed their operational codes, or political strategies. The *affective dimensions* revealed the fears of the Bolshevik elite and the *motivational dimensions* showed how and why the Bolsheviks pursued power.<sup>6</sup>

In 1967, RAND commissioned Alexander George to conduct another study on the operational code method. In "The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision Making," George criticized Leites' study of Bolshevism for not making the structure of the belief system explicit. He also criticized

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<sup>1</sup> Leites, *The Operational Code of the Politburo*.

<sup>2</sup> Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism* (Illinois: Free Press, 1953).

<sup>3</sup> Leites, *The Operational Code of the Politburo*, xi.

<sup>4</sup> Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism*, 15.

<sup>5</sup> Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer, "Operational Code Theory: Beliefs and Foreign Policy Decisions," *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, 2010, [http://www.isacompendium.com/subscriber/tocnode?id=g9781444336597\\_chunk\\_g978144433659715\\_ss1-1](http://www.isacompendium.com/subscriber/tocnode?id=g9781444336597_chunk_g978144433659715_ss1-1).

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

Leites for not putting the elements of the operational code in a hierarchy. According to George, the operational code acts as a set of cognitive limits/boundaries on the rational decision making of the actors. To give structure to the operational code method, George proposed that an actor's cognitive boundaries can be grouped into two categories. The Philosophical category is comprised of the cognitive boundaries that constrained how actors made sense of the context of the situations they faced. The Instrumental category is comprised of the cognitive boundaries that constrained the means the actors preferred to use to achieve their goals. George proposed ten questions to map these two sets of boundaries: five Philosophical questions to discern the cognitive boundaries of the context of action and five Instrumental questions to draw the cognitive boundaries of available means. Below are George's Instrumental and Philosophical questions:

**Alexander George's Philosophical Questions:**

P1: What is the "essential" nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?<sup>1</sup>

P2: What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other?<sup>2</sup>

P3: Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?<sup>3</sup>

P4: How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical development? What is one's role in "moving" and "shaping" history in the desired direction?<sup>4</sup>

P5: What is the role of "chance" in human affairs and in historical development?<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> George, "Operational Code: A Neglected approach," 201.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 203.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 204.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

### **Alexander George's Instrumental Questions:**

I1: What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?<sup>1</sup>

I2: How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?<sup>2</sup>

I3: How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?<sup>3</sup>

I4: What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interest?<sup>4</sup>

I5: What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interest?<sup>5</sup>

George also placed the elements of the operational code into a hierarchy.

Following the cognitive consistency theory, he argued that the first philosophical question is the master belief.<sup>6</sup> According to the cognitive consistency theory, master/key beliefs direct other beliefs of an actor.<sup>7</sup>

#### **4-1 Types of Operational Code Analysis by Their Targets**

From the early stages of the evolution of the operational code research, it was accepted that both the individual and the collectivity of individuals can have operational codes. For instance, the target of the first study of the operational code was a collective entity called *Bolshevik elite*. In other words, it was tacitly accepted in the operational code research that a collectivity of individuals has attributes that are not reducible to the attributes of its members. Most operational code research, however, have focused on

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., 205.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 211.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 212.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 215.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 216.

<sup>6</sup> Walker and Schafer, "Operational Code Theory."

<sup>7</sup> Jerel A. Rosati, "A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy," in *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second Generation*, ed. Neack Jeanne et al. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1995), 49-70.

individual political leaders. Some of these leaders are American, some are foreign, and some belong to other political entities. Despite the proliferation of targets of operational code studies, no work until now has studied American foreign policy think tanks.

Many of the studies in the operational code literature have focused on American presidents, including Theodore Roosevelt,<sup>1</sup> Woodrow Wilson,<sup>2</sup> John F. Kennedy,<sup>3</sup> Lyndon Johnson,<sup>4</sup> Jimmy Carter,<sup>5</sup> Ronald Reagan,<sup>6</sup> George H. W. Bush,<sup>7</sup> Bill Clinton,<sup>8</sup> George W. Bush,<sup>9</sup> and Barak Obama.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer, "Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson as Cultural Icons of US Foreign Policy," *Political Psychology* 28, no. 6 (2007): 747-776.

<sup>2</sup> Stephen G. Walker, "Psychodynamic Processes and Framing Effects in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Woodrow Wilson's Operational Code," *Political Psychology* 16, no. 4 (1995): 697-717.

<sup>3</sup> Gregory Marfleet, "The Operational Code of John F. Kennedy During the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Comparison of Public and Private Rhetoric," *Political Psychology* 21, no. 3 (2000): 545-558.

<sup>4</sup> Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer, "The Political Universe of Lyndon B. Johnson and His Advisors: Diagnostic and Strategic Propensities in Their Operational Codes," *Political Psychology* 21, no. 3 (2000): 529-543.

<sup>5</sup> Stephen G. Walker, Mark Schafer, and Michael D. Young, "Systematic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis: Measuring and Modeling Jimmy Carter's Operational Code," *International Studies Quarterly* 42, no. 1 (1998): 175-189.

<sup>6</sup> Brian Dille, "The Prepared and Spontaneous Remarks of Presidents Reagan and Bush: A Validity Comparison for At-a-Distance Measurements," *Political Psychology* 21, no. 3 (2000): 573-585.

<sup>7</sup> David G. Winter et al., "The Personalities of Bush and Gorbachev at a Distance: Follow-up on Predictions," *Political Psychology* 12, no. 3 (1991): 457-464.

<sup>8</sup> Mark Schafer and Scott Crichlow, "Bill Clinton's Operational Code: Assessing Source Material Bias," *Political Psychology* 21, no. 3 (2000): 559-571.

<sup>9</sup> Jonathan Renshon, "Stability and Change in Belief Systems: The Operational Code of George W. Bush," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52, no. 6 (2008): 820-849.

<sup>10</sup> See Stephen G. Walker, "Quantum Politics and Operational Code Analysis," in *Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States, Leaders, and the Microfoundations of Behavioral International Relations*, ed. Stephen G. Walker et al. (New York: Routledge, 2011): 62-80; David G. Winter, "Philosopher-King or Polarizing Politician? A Personality Profile of Barack Obama," *Political Psychology* 32, no. 6 (2011): 1059-1081.

Some studies examined the operational codes of American senators. However, no recent study of operational code has focused on an American senator. This might be an indication of possible weakening of the Senate as an institution,<sup>1</sup> empowerment of the institution of presidency at the expense of Congress,<sup>2</sup> or lack of strong and influential personalities in the Senate. Nonetheless, Senators Frank Church,<sup>3</sup> James William Fulbright,<sup>4</sup> and Arthur Vandenberg<sup>5</sup> have been the subjects of studies about operational codes.

A few studies in the operational code literature have focused on American Cabinet members, mostly from the Cold War. After the Cold War, however, only members of George W. Bush's Cabinet were subjects of operational code research. The following Cabinet members were subjects of operational code studies: Dean Acheson,<sup>6</sup> John Foster Dulles,<sup>7</sup> Dean Rusk,<sup>1</sup> Henry Kissinger,<sup>2</sup> Cyrus Vance,<sup>3</sup> Donald Rumsfeld,<sup>4</sup> and Colin Powell.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Peter Hanson, *Too Weak to Govern: Majority Party Power and Appropriations in the US Senate* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

<sup>2</sup> Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991).

<sup>3</sup> Loch K. Johnson, "Operational Codes and the Prediction of Leadership Behavior: Senator Frank Church at Midcareer," in *A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders*, ed. Margaret G. Hermann et al. (New York: Free Press, 1977), 82-120.

<sup>4</sup> Kurt K. Tweraser, *Changing Patterns of Political Beliefs: The Foreign Policy Operational Codes of J. William Fulbright, 1943-1967* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1974).

<sup>5</sup> Joel E. Jr. Anderson, "The 'Operational Code' Belief System of Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg: An Application of the George Construct" (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 1973).

<sup>6</sup> David S. McLellan, "The 'Operational Code' Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: Dean Acheson's Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 4, no. 1 (1971): 52-75.

<sup>7</sup> Holsti, "John Foster Dulles' Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs."

Many of the operational code studies have chosen non-American leaders as their target of study. Among them are Mikhail Gorbachev,<sup>6</sup> Vladimir Putin<sup>7</sup>, Mao Zedong<sup>8</sup> Xi Jinping,<sup>9</sup> Hu Jintao,<sup>10</sup> Chen Shuibian,<sup>11</sup> Jacques Chirac,<sup>12</sup> Jack Straw,<sup>13</sup> Toney Blair,<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Gilbert George Gutierrez, "Dean Rusk and Southeast Asia: An Operational Code Analysis" (PhD diss., University of California (Riverside), 1974).

<sup>2</sup> Stephen G. Walker, "The Interface between Beliefs and Behavior Henry Kissinger's Operational Code and the Vietnam War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 21, no. 1 (1977): 129-168.

<sup>3</sup> Melchior Joseph Laucella, "Cyrus Vance's Worldview: The Relevance of the Motivated Tactician Perspective" (PhD diss., The Union Institute, 1996).

<sup>4</sup> Sam Robison, "George W. Bush and the Vulcans: Leader-Advisor Relations and America's Response to the 9/11 Attacks," in *Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics: Methods and Applications of Operational Code Analysis*, ed. Mark Schafer et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 101-126.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Winter et al., "The Personalities of Bush and Gorbachev."

<sup>7</sup> Stephen Benedict Dyson, "Drawing Policy Implications from the 'Operational Code' of a 'New' Political Actor: Russian President Vladimir Putin," *Policy Sciences* 34, no. 3-4 (2001): 329-346.

<sup>8</sup> Huiyun Feng, "The Operational Code of Mao Zedong: Defensive or Offensive Realist?" *Security Studies* 14, no. 4 (2005): 637-662.

<sup>9</sup> Kai He and Huiyun Feng, "Xi Jinping's Operational Code Beliefs and China's Foreign Policy," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 6, no. 3 (2013): 209-231.

<sup>10</sup> Huiyun Feng, "Crisis Deferred: an Operational Code Analysis of Chinese Leaders across the Strait," in *Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics: Methods and Applications of Operational Code Analysis*, ed. Mark Schafer et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 151-170.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Akan Malici, "Alliances and their Microfoundations: France and Britain in the 9/11 Era," in *Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States, Leaders, and the Microfoundations of Behavioral International Relations*, ed. Stephen G. Walker et al. (New York: Routledge, 2011), 130-150.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> See Mark Schafer and Stephen G. Walker, "Political Leadership and the Democratic Peace: The Operational Code of Prime Minister Tony Blair," in *Profiling Political Leaders: Cross-Cultural Studies of Personality and Behavior*, ed. Ofer Feldman et al. (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2001), 21-37; Hanneke Derksen, "The Role of Tony Blair's Belief System in Great Britain's Decision to Support the War in Iraq" (master's thesis, University of Wyoming, 2007).

Margaret Thatcher,<sup>1</sup> Saddam Husain,<sup>2</sup> Kim Il Sung,<sup>3</sup> Fidel Castro,<sup>4</sup> Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,<sup>5</sup> Bashar al-Asad,<sup>6</sup> Gamal Abdel-Nasser,<sup>7</sup> Anwar Sadat,<sup>8</sup> Shimon Peres,<sup>9</sup> Yitzhak Rabin,<sup>10</sup> Indira Gandhi,<sup>11</sup> Kenneth Kaunda,<sup>12</sup> Konrad Adenauer,<sup>13</sup> Lester B. Pearson,<sup>14</sup> Pierre E. Trudeau,<sup>1</sup> Lloyd Axworthy,<sup>2</sup> Franjo Tudjman,<sup>3</sup> Slobodan Milosevic,<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Scott Crichlow, "The Eyes of Kesteven: How the Worldviews of Margaret Thatcher and Her Cabinet Influenced British Foreign Policy," in *Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics: Methods and Applications of Operational Code Analysis*, ed. Mark Schafer et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 77-98.

<sup>2</sup> Jerrold M. Post, *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003).

<sup>3</sup> Akan Malici and Johnna Malici, "The Operational Codes of Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung: The Last Cold Warriors?" *Political Psychology* 26, no. 3 (2005): 387-412.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Akan Malici and Allison L. Buckner, "Empathizing with Rogue Leaders: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Bashar al-Asad," *Journal of Peace Research* 45, no. 6 (2008): 783-800.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Mohammad El-Sayed Selim, "The Operational Code Belief System and Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Case of Gamal Abdel-Nasser" (PhD. diss., Carleton University (Canada), 1979).

<sup>8</sup> Gregory Marfleet and Stephen G. Walker, "A World of Beliefs: Modeling Interactions Among Agents with Different Operational Codes," in *Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics: Methods and Applications of Operational Code Analysis*, ed. Mark Schafer et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 53-64.

<sup>9</sup> Scott Crichlow, "Idealism or Pragmatism? an Operational Code Analysis of Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres," *Political Psychology* 19, no. 4 (1998): 683-706.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Rukmani Jayaraman, "The Operational Code Belief System and Leadership Behaviour: The Case of Indira Gandhi" (PhD diss., Carleton University (Canada), 1991).

<sup>12</sup> Ibrahim S. Kanu, "The "Operational Code" Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: President Kenneth Kaunda's Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs" (PhD diss., University of Windsor (Canada), 1978).

<sup>13</sup> Adele Randall Brand, "An Appraisal of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's Operational Code, 1949-1963" (PhD diss., University of Southern California, 1969).

<sup>14</sup> Heather E. Michael, "Philosophical Similarities and Instrumental Differences: An Operational Code Analysis of Lester B. Pearson, Pierre E. Trudeau and Lloyd Axworthy" (PhD diss., Dalhousie University (Canada), 2005).



Romulo Betancourt,<sup>5</sup> and Eric Williams.<sup>6</sup> Recently, the operational code literature has become interested in studying non-state actors, especially terrorist organizations and leaders, including Osama Bin Laden,<sup>7</sup> Ayman al-Zawahiri,<sup>8</sup> the Muslim Brotherhood,<sup>9</sup> international bankers,<sup>10</sup> Islamists in Turkey,<sup>11</sup> Hamas and Al-Qaida,<sup>12</sup> and the U.S. Intelligence Community.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Arian Spahiu, "Franjo Tudjman's and Slobodan Milosevic's Operational Code and Leadership Trait Analysis" (PhD diss., West Virginia University, 2011).

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Herbert Koeneke, "Person and Situational Components of Political Leadership: A Case Study of Romulo Betancourt (Venezuela)" (PhD diss., Tulane University, 1983).

<sup>6</sup> Kathleen A. Weekes, "An Application of the "Operational Code" to Eric Williams, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago" (PhD diss., University of Windsor - Canada, 1974).

<sup>7</sup> Stephen G. Walker, "Anticipating Attacks from the Operational Codes of Terrorist Groups," *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 4, no. 2 (2011): 135-143.

<sup>8</sup> James D. Jacquier, "An Operational Code of Terrorism: The Political Psychology of Ayman Al-Zawahiri," *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 6, no. 1 (2014): 19-40.

<sup>9</sup> Robert Kevin Thomson, "Operational Code and Al-Ikhwan: An Assessment of the Evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood's Operational Code and Possible Public Diplomacy Options for the United States" (PhD diss., the University of Texas at El Paso, 2014).

<sup>10</sup> Cameron G. Thies, "Bankers and Beliefs: the Political Psychology of the Asian Financial Crisis," in *Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics: Methods and Applications of Operational Code Analysis*, ed. Mark Schafer et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 219-233.

<sup>11</sup> Şerif Mardin, "Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture and Reconstruction in Operational Codes," *Turkish Studies* 6, no. 2 (2005): 145-165.

<sup>12</sup> Peter Michael Picucci, "Terrorism's Operational Code: An Examination of the Belief Systems of Al-Qaeda and Hamas" (PhD diss., University of Kansas, 2008).

<sup>13</sup> David Alex Mastro, "Cognitions of the Community: The Worldview of U.S. Intelligence" (PhD diss., West Virginia University, 2008).

## 4-2 Types of Operational Code Analysis by Their Methods

The operational code literature has used different methods for extracting the operational code of an actor. Some researchers identified operational code by analyzing interviews and questionnaires and by closely observing the actors. However, these types of methods are not always applicable to many actors, such as presidents or the leaders of an adversary.<sup>1</sup> To address this lack of access, operational code researchers have developed methods to study operational codes *at a distance*. At-a-distance extraction of operational codes relies on the texts published by the actor(s) or published under the name of the actor(s) as its source of data.

At-a-distance study of the texts can be conducted qualitatively or quantitatively. Qualitative at-a-distance extraction is similar to the method that Leites applied to extract the operational code of the Bolshevik elite. Leites read the texts published by the Soviet leadership and tried to find patterns using the psychoanalytic paradigms. Researchers conducting qualitative at-a-distance operational code analysis based on Alexander George's framework must read the actor's texts and look for the answers to George's questions. Operational codes of John Foster Dulles, Dean Acheson, William Fulbright, Frank Church, and Henry Kissinger have been extracted using the qualitative at-a-distance method.<sup>2</sup>

One can argue that the qualitative at-a-distance method is the best approach to discern the operational code of an actor from the texts, especially when the target of study is an individual and the number of texts is limited. Because it factors in such qualities as

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<sup>1</sup> Walker and Schafer, "Operational Code Theory."

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

human conciseness and analytic adaptability, the qualitative at-a-distance method can find patterns and nuances in the texts that the quantitative at-a-distance approach is unable to discern. As of this writing, humans can read between the lines much easier and more effectively than a computer program pre-designed with some sets of rules. However, the qualitative at-a-distance approach is not efficient or effective when the number of texts is in thousands. Also, it is very difficult to aggregate the qualitative findings of multiple actors.<sup>1</sup> To overcome these two obstacles and be able to tap into the resources available at today's digital age, scholars have no other choice but to use quantitative at-a-distance methods.

Researchers conduct quantitative at-a-distance analysis by analyzing content. The idea behind content analysis is that the frequency of the words can reveal patterns in and among texts.<sup>2</sup> The main shift toward quantitative extraction of the operational code analysis occurred after the introduction of the Verbs in Context System (VICS) by Stephen Walker, Mark Schafer and Michael Young in 1998.<sup>3</sup> According to VICS, the balance, central tendency, and range of *action verbs* reveal the *exercise of power* and the underlying beliefs in a text.<sup>4</sup> VICS assigns a range of positive and negative values to the transitive verbs. Then, after calculating the balance, central tendency and variation of positive/negative transitive verbs for the Self and the Other, it answers George's ten

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Ole R. Holsti, *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities* (Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1969).

<sup>3</sup> Walker, Schafer, and Young, "Systemic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis."

<sup>4</sup> Walker and Schafer, "Operational Code Theory."

questions. Figure 1-3 presents VICS and the steps it takes to extract the operational code from a text.<sup>1</sup>

The implementation of VICS has brought several benefits for the operational code research program: a) it added to the reliability of the operational code analysis; b) it made the operational code analysis easier; and c) it made the comparison of different actors possible. It has also resulted in creation of typology of beliefs.<sup>2</sup> These categories of beliefs have been used to build “agent-based models of subjective games” like the Theory of Inference and Preferences.<sup>3</sup>

The aim of this dissertation is to conduct research similar to Leites’ study of Bolshevism, but by using the VICS method. It is similar to Leites’ *Study of Bolshevism* in that it chooses a collective entity as its target of study, conducts the research using the immersion-in-data strategy, and extracts the operational code using an at-a-distance method. However, unlike Leites, who adopted a qualitative at-a-distance approach, I use an automated at-a-distance approach based on VICS. To extract the operational code of the American foreign policy elite at-a-distance, I use Profiler Plus content analysis software. Profiler Plus, developed by Social Science Automation Incorporation, automates extraction of operational code using VICS.<sup>4</sup> It counts the number of transitive verbs used for a subject and assigns values to them based on a predefined dictionary of transitive verbs.


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<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Gregory Marfleet and Hannah Simpson, “Cognitive Responses by U.S. Presidents to Foreign Policy Crisis,” in *Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States, Leaders, and the Microfoundations of Behavioral International Relations*, ed. Stephen G. Walker et al. (New York: Routledge, 2011), 206-219.

<sup>3</sup> Marfleet and Walker, “A world of beliefs: Modeling Interactions Among Agents.”

<sup>4</sup> “Profiler Plus,” *Social Science Automation*, 2013, <http://socialscience.net/tech/profilerplus.aspx>.



**Figure 1-3 Verbs In Context System (VICS)**

**Source: Figure adopted from Stephen G. Walker, Mark Schafer, and Michael Young, "Systemic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis: Measuring and Modeling Jimmy Carter's Operational Code," *International Studies Quarterly* 42, no. 1 (1998): 183.**

The verbs used for a subject can be grouped in several levels of verb aggregation. Some studies choose a document as the aggregating level and count verbs used for a subject in each of the documents. Other studies select a specific time period, such as a particular year or a presidential term, as their level of verb aggregation. For instance, they

might count the verbs used for a president in each of his terms.<sup>1</sup> This research counts the verbs on the levels of texts, subjects, topics, time, and think tanks, and for each level there are two levels of aggregation under study.

The two levels of aggregation of the verbs used in texts are the level of the document and the level of the sentence. The two levels of verb aggregation for the subjects of sentences are the verbs used in conjunction with all the subjects and verbs used for the most frequent actors in the texts. The following twenty-two actors appeared most frequently in the texts, and the verbs used in conjunction with these actors were studied: Afghanistan, Britain, China, Europe, France, German, India, Iran, Iraq, the Muslim World, Israel, Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan, Terrorists, Turkey, the United Nations, and the United States. The two levels of verb aggregation for topics are verbs used for all topics and verbs employed in conjunction with military issues, political issues, and social issues. There are two levels of verb aggregation for time: verbs of all the time periods and verbs used in conjunction with each of the three time periods of the 2004 general election, 2008 general election, and 2012 general election. Finally, for think tanks there are verbs used in conjunction with all the think tanks and verbs associated with each of the seven individual think tanks: AEI, Brookings, Carnegie, Cato, CFR, Heritage and RAND.

## **5- Structure of the Research**

This research is presented in six chapters. Chapter One presents the research design, main question, definition of concepts and structure of research. Chapter Two

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<sup>1</sup> Mark Schafer and Stephen G. Walker, "Operational Code Analysis at a Distance: The Verbs in Context System of Content Analysis," in *Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics: Methods and Applications of Operational Code Analysis*, ed. Mark Schafer et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 43.

covers the data acquisition and methodology, and addresses the steps taken for gathering and polishing 7,000 documents. Then, it reviews the steps taken to label documents and sentences according to their topics. The supervised topic classification of the texts is done separately for the 7,000 documents and for the half a million sentences. To test the sensitivity of the VICS method, the operational code of the think tanks' political texts is compared to the operational code of a batch of 5,000 nonpolitical texts from LexisNexis.

Chapter Three studies the elite by treating all the subjects as the Self. The first section of Chapter Three examines the overall rules of conduct of the seven think tanks. The second section analyzes dissimilarities among the seven think tanks according to their rules of conduct across the four worlds of action. The unit of analysis of the first section is the collectivity of the seven think tanks, which will be studied across the following four worlds of action: the world of all the issues and the worlds of military, political, and social issues. The unit of analysis of the second section is each individual think tank, which will also be studied across the four worlds of action. In Chapter Three, the smallest unit for the verb aggregation and for the topic/issue classification is the individual document. Texts will be compared using VICS indexes and the one-way Multivariate Analysis of Variance (hereafter cited in text as MANOVA) test. To examine the difference between any two think tanks, the MANOVA test is followed by *post hoc* comparisons using the Tukey HSD test. To map the approximate relative position of the seven think tanks from each other, the MANOVA test is followed by a Discriminant Function Analysis (hereafter cited in text as discriminant analysis).

Chapter Four studies the elite by considering only the American collective Self and it has two sections. The first section studies the collectivity of the seven think tanks

across the four worlds of action and tests the stability of the rules of conduct for the Self. The unit of analysis of the first section is the collectivity of the seven think tanks. The second section extracts the rules of conduct of the American collective Self from the perspective of each of the seven think tanks. It also compares the think tanks based on the actions they assigned to the American collective Self across the four worlds of action. The unit of analysis of the second section is the individual think tank. In Chapter Four, the smallest unit for the verb aggregation and for the topic classification is the individual document. The texts are compared using VICS indexes and the MANOVA test. To examine the difference between any two think tanks, the MANOVA test is followed by *post hoc* comparisons using the Tukey HSD test. To map the approximate relative position of the seven think tanks from each other, the MANOVA test is followed by a discriminant analysis.

Chapter Five studies the elite by comparing the rules of conduct of the twenty-two most frequent actors. It extracts the operational code/rules of conduct of the United States and twenty-one of the other actors from the perspective of the seven think tanks: Afghanistan, Britain, China, Europe, France, German, India, Iran, Iraq, the Muslim World, Israel, Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan, Terrorists, Turkey, and the United Nations. In Chapter Five and for each actor, the operational code of the actor, agreement among the seven think tanks in describing the strategy of the actor, and similarity of the actor to the other actors will be presented. The operational code calculations in this chapter are derived from the verbs used for each of the twenty-two actors across time, topic, and think tank. The index of direction of strategy (II) will be used as the basis for comparing think tank perceptions towards an



actor. To show the similarity of the actors using their multiple operational codes, ALSCAL Multi-Dimensional Scaling (MDS) is used to reduce the dimensions of comparison to two dimensions. Then, number of times any two actors shared a quadrant in any of the four worlds are counted. This process creates twenty-two different cognitive maps of the American foreign policy elite. In Chapter Five, the smallest unit for the verb aggregation is the actor and the smallest unit for the topic classification is the sentence.<sup>1</sup>

Chapter Six is dedicated to assessment and conclusion. In this chapter, the findings and contributions of the research are presented in four sections: contribution to text classification methods; contribution to think tank studies; contribution to theories of IR; and contributions to VICS and operational code method.

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<sup>1</sup> For lack of a better word I chose the word, *cognitive map*, to refer to the relative positions of different actors from the perspective of the American foreign policy elite. This application of the concept of *cognitive map* is different from Robert Axelrod's approach: Robert Axelrod, *Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).

## CHAPTER 2 : METHOD AND DATA ACQUISITION

### **Introduction**

Chapter Two describes the data acquisition, text preprocessing, the supervised automatic topic labeling, and the details of automated operational code analysis. It also tests the sensitivity of the VICS method. To identify the topics of documents and sentences and to increase the reliability of the analysis, I chose the *supervised automatic topic labeling* approach.<sup>1</sup> The supervised topic labeling employed the RtextTools package in R and on two levels of text classification: supervised labeling of the 7,000 documents and supervised labeling of the 500,000 sentences. This chapter presents the details of the operational code method and the automated calculations of the Philosophical and Instrumental indexes. The automated operational code method is based on VICS, which measures the exercise of power by indexing the transitive verbs in a text. Chapter Two analyzes the sensitivity of VICS by evaluating how the VICS indexes of the political and nonpolitical texts differ from one another.

### **1- Data Acquisition**

The raw data used in this research were comprised of articles, op-eds, reports and testimonies published by the seven think tanks. For each of the seven think tanks, I visited the subsections of their websites related to foreign policy, international security, defense, intelligence, international trade, and international political economy. I manually imported the Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) of the publications that met the above

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<sup>1</sup> Peter Turney and Patrick Pantel, "From Frequency to Meaning: Vector Space Models of Semantics," *Journal of artificial intelligence research* 37, no. 1 (2010): 141-188.

criteria and were published from May 1, 2004 to May 1, 2005; May 1, 2008 to May 1, 2009; and May 1, 2012 to May 1, 2013, to a Mozilla Firefox Zotero database.<sup>1</sup>

There were several problems associated with this step. Some think tanks only post summaries and refer to the full text of an article via an external link. To rectify the problem, all the articles had to be checked thoroughly to make sure that they included the full text. If an article did not include the main text, the correct external link had to be added to the Zotero database manually. Also, sometimes the websites published a particular report under different names. The problem was recurrent enough that I included several measures to detect and eliminate the duplicates. Another problem was that some think tanks did not always include correct dates of publication on their websites. For instance, an article that was shown as published in 2012, in fact published in 2007. Therefore, the dates of the articles had to be checked to make sure that the articles were published in the three designated time periods.

The website of each think tank has a tagging system to classify its publications. In addition to the title and the URL, some of the think tanks assign topic tags to their publications in the format of HTML metadata. Websites use these tags to organize their publications. The advantage of using Zotero is that it automatically imports the metadata attached to any article to its database. Later, I used these topic tags to create a training batch for supervised automatic topic labeling. In this step, more than 8,000 URLs and

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<sup>1</sup> “Zotero is a project of the Roy Rosenzweig Center for History and New Media, and was initially funded by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the Institute of Museum and Library Services, and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation.”

“About,” *ZOTERO*, accessed March 16, 2015, <https://www.zotero.org/about>.

their metadata were manually imported to a Zotero database.<sup>1</sup> While Zotero is a good tool for gathering online data, it is not an efficient database for information retrieval. Therefore, I migrated the Zotero database first to a SQLite database<sup>2</sup> and then to an Excel file.

In the next step, all the URLs were downloaded. The problem in this step was to find a way to connect the downloaded files to the tags associated to their URLs. To resolve this problem, I wrote a BASH script in Linux and invoked the GNU Wget program.<sup>3</sup> This script used the *primary key* associated to each URL in the Zotero database and renamed the downloaded document files using the *primary key*. Using the primary keys to rename the files enabled me to download the files and virtually connect the files to metadata associated to the URLs.

Duplicate reports were removed in two steps. First, the URLs were checked for exact duplicate addresses. Then, the duplicates were found and removed with a BASH script in Linux that invoked the FDUPS program. The FDUPS first checks files for similar size and MD5 signatures and then scans for byte to byte similarity.<sup>4</sup> This step reduced the number of documents to 7,352 (Table 2-1).

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<sup>1</sup> At this stage the metadata included: URL, title, author, year of publication, think tank, and sometimes topic or geographical focus.

<sup>2</sup> “About SQLite,” *SQLite*, accessed March 16, 2015. <https://sqlite.org>.

<sup>3</sup> “GNU Wget is a free utility for non-interactive download of files from the Web. It supports HTTP, HTTPS, and FTP protocols, as well as retrieval through HTTP proxies.” “GNU Wget 1.16.2 Manual,” *GNU Operating System*, accessed March 16, 2015, <https://www.gnu.org/software/wget/manual/>.

<sup>4</sup> “Script to find duplicate files via their md5 sum. A batch script that executes `find | md5sum | sort | uniq | xargs | sed`. Duplicate files' whole path and their size are output.” Danriti, “fdups.py,” *GitHub Gist*, 2013, <https://gist.github.com/danriti/5193327/>.

	2004	2008	2012	Total
<b>Carnegie</b>	228	404	1166	<b>1798</b>
<b>Brookings</b>	223	492	662	<b>1377</b>
<b>RAND</b>	147	165	44	<b>356</b>
<b>CFR</b>	287	437	299	<b>1023</b>
<b>Heritage</b>	239	384	214	<b>837</b>
<b>AEI</b>	428	334	569	<b>1331</b>
<b>Cato</b>	159	294	177	<b>630</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>1711</b>	<b>2510</b>	<b>3131</b>	<b>7352</b>

Table 2-1 Think Tanks' Publications in Three General Elections

## 2- Text Preprocessing

After all the files were downloaded, the HTML documents were converted into plain text files. However, when the HTML files were converted to plain text, the HTML codes were also imported with the main body of the text. These HTML codes caused several warnings in the Profiler Plus software. Moreover, almost always the HTML files included summaries of other articles and sometimes commercial ads. To solve these two problems and avoid processing sentences that were not the target of this research, the extra texts needed to be removed. The 4,000 files of the 2004 and 2008 general elections were checked individually, and the unwanted segments were deleted manually. For the 2012 general election, this task was done by writing a python script that invoked the BoilerPipe Java library, which is taken from the paper presented by Kohlschütter, Fankhauser and Nejdil in 2010.<sup>1</sup> The BoilerPipe library has several strategies to extract the main text of an HTML file, of which I used the ArticleExtractor strategy.<sup>2</sup> Some of the reports from the think tanks were only available in PDF format. To extract the texts

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<sup>1</sup> Christian Kohlschütter, Peter Fankhauser, and Wolfgang Nejdil, "Boilerplate Detection using Shallow Text Features," in *The Third ACM International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining* (New York: ACM, 2010), 441-450.

<sup>2</sup> "Boilerpipe is a Java library written by Christian Kohlschütter. It is released under the Apache License 2.0." Christian Kohlschütter, "Boilerpipe," *Google*, 2011, <https://code.google.com/p/boilerpipe>.

from the PDF files, the Apache PDFBox library was used under Linux. This software proved to be the most accurate and effective PDF-to-text converter program.<sup>1</sup>

Most of the articles and reports have an abstract/summary section that typically repeats some parts of the document. The Profiler Plus counts transitive verbs, and when some sections were repeated twice, they were counted twice. However, despite this repetition, the abstract/summary sections were retained in this study because, if an author repeated something in the abstract section, then those points were presumably especially important to the author, and the duplicate consideration of those sections was warranted.

As mentioned earlier, the metadata imported to the Zotero database included tags pertaining to the topic or geographical location of the article. I used these topic tags as the starting point to create a training batch for the supervised topic labeling. To do so, the first step was to gather the think tanks' tags and group them into the three main groups in this study: military issues, political issues, and social issues.<sup>2</sup> There were three problems associated with this step. Most importantly, only 2,000 documents had topic tags. Also the seven think tanks used different criteria for assigning topic tags. A political article in one think tank could be tagged as a military article in another. Finally, some of the think tanks did not even have a consistent tagging system in their own websites.

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<sup>1</sup> "The Apache PDFBox™ library is an open source Java tool for working with PDF documents. This project allows creation of new PDF documents, manipulation of existing documents and the ability to extract content from documents. Apache PDFBox also includes several command line utilities. Apache PDFBox is published under the Apache License v2.0."  
"Apache PDFBox - A Java PDF Library," *PDFBox*, accessed March 16, 2015, <https://pdfbox.apache.org/index.html>.

<sup>2</sup> Please refer to the Appendix for the details of this step.

To automatically tag the documents, I used the RTextTools package in R, which has nine text classifying algorithms, to find patterns in texts.<sup>1</sup> The RTextTools package classifies the text files in the following steps. First, the plain text files are fed to the package in a training batch and a labeling batch. The training batch includes the already-tagged documents. The labeling batch includes the documents designated to be tagged on the basis of the patterns found in the training batch. After importing the documents, the RTextTools package creates a document-term matrix. This matrix includes the frequency of words for each document. This is a very sparse matrix that generates memory shortage problems. To solve this problem, the RTextTools package has included several preprocessing functions, such as stripping whitespaces, defining the maximum length of words, removing numbers, removing punctuation, stemming the words, removing stop-words, and removing sparse terms.<sup>2</sup> In the next step, each of the nine classifying algorithms looks for possible patterns in the document-term matrix of the training group. Then, each of the nine algorithms labels the documents on the basis of the patterns found in the training batch. At the end, a summary of results is produced by the program, including a consensus tag, the number of algorithms in agreement with the assigned tag, and the probability of the correctness of the tag.

Each of the nine algorithms applies a different method to identify patterns inside the documents. The nine algorithms used in the RTextTools package are as follows:

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<sup>1</sup> Timothy P. Jurka et al., “RTextTools: Automatic Text Classification via Supervised Learning,” *The Comprehensive R Archive Network*, 2012, <http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=RTextTools/>.

<sup>2</sup> Stop-words are the most frequent words that do not help differentiating among the documents.

support vector machine,<sup>1</sup> glmnet,<sup>2</sup> maximum entropy,<sup>3</sup> scaled linear discriminant analysis,<sup>4</sup> bagging,<sup>5</sup> boosting,<sup>6</sup> random forest,<sup>7</sup> neural networks,<sup>8</sup> and classification and regression tree.<sup>9</sup> Greater agreement among the nine algorithms on labeling a document creates greater confidence in the automatic labeling. According to Collingwood and Wilkerson, if four of the algorithms agree on a label there is a 90% chance that the automatic labeling is correct.<sup>10</sup> Since generally in the social sciences, an inter-coder agreement of 90% is an acceptable agreement threshold, if four of the nine algorithms agree on a tag, the labeling process meets the acceptable standards of human coding.<sup>11</sup>

There were two problems associated with automatic tagging using the RTextTools package. Supervised tagging using the RTextTools package is very memory intensive. To

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<sup>1</sup> David Meyer et al., “e1071: Misc Functions of the Department of Statistics (e1071), TU Wien, 2012,” *The Comprehensive R Archive Network*, February 15, 2013, [http://web.mit.edu/r\\_v3.0.1/e1071.pdf/](http://web.mit.edu/r_v3.0.1/e1071.pdf/).

<sup>2</sup> Jerome Friedman, Trevor Hastie, and Rob Tibshirani, “Regularization Paths for Generalized Linear Models via Coordinate Descent,” *Journal of Statistical Software* 33, no. 1 (2010): 1-22.

<sup>3</sup> Timothy P. Jurka, “maxent: An R Package for Low-memory Multinomial Logistic Regression with Support for Semi-automated Text Classification,” *R Journal* 4, no. 1 (2012): 56-59.

<sup>4</sup> Andrea Peters, Torsten Hothorn, and Berthold Lausen, “ipred: Improved Predictors,” *R News* 2, no. 2 (2002): 33-36.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Jarek Tuszynski, “CaTools: Tools: Moving Window Statistics, GIF, Base64, ROC AUC, etc.,” *The Comprehensive R Archive Network*, 2014, <http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/caTools/index.html/>.

<sup>7</sup> Andy Liaw and Matthew Wiener, “Classification and Regression by Random Forest,” *R News* 2, no. 3 (2002): 18-22.

<sup>8</sup> William N. Venables and Brian D. Ripley, *Modern Applied Statistics with S* (New York: Springer Science & Business Media, 2002).

<sup>9</sup> Brian Ripley, “tree: Classification and Regression Trees,” *The Comprehensive R Archive Network*, 2015, <http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/tree/tree.pdf/>.

<sup>10</sup> Loren Collingwood and J. Wilkerson, “Tradeoffs in Accuracy and Efficiency in Supervised Learning Methods,” *Journal of Information Technology & Politics* 9, no. 3 (2012):298–318.

<sup>11</sup> Jurka et al., “RTextTools.”



solve this problem, one possibility was to use less memory-intensive algorithms. Among the nine algorithms, the first three (support vector machine, glmnet, and maximum entropy) use relatively less memory than the other six. However, in order to increase the probability of meeting the four-algorithm agreement threshold, it is important to include as many of the nine algorithms as possible. Another solution was to use computers with higher memory capacities. I used the servers of the High Performance Computing (HPC) center at Florida International University (FIU) to perform the supervised tagging. The HPC provided servers with 256 gigabytes of RAM to run the tagging task. However, even this amount of memory was not enough, and multiple attempts at tagging failed because of the lack of available memory. From the nine algorithms, the two algorithms of *neural networks* and *classification and regression tree* used the most memory.

Another solution was to make the document-term matrix less sparse. Usually, the text classification packages have a list of words known as the stop-word list. The stop-word list includes the most frequent words that do not help differentiate among documents: words like *is*, *has*, and *am*, among others. The RTextTools uses the *tm* package that has a stop-word list with 174 words.<sup>1</sup> However, several attempts to label the texts using the default stop-word list did not produce satisfactory results. Therefore, I created a specific list of stop-words for this research.

To create the specific stop-word list, a list of the unique words used in all the documents was compiled to create a document file with thousands of words. Then, the words that were unrelated to topics were marked by the Stanford Part of Speech (POS)

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<sup>1</sup> Ingo Feinerer, Kurt Hornik, and Artifex Software Inc., “tm: Text Mining Package a framework for Text Mining Applications within R,” *The Comprehensive R Archive Network*, 2014, <http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/tm/index.html/>.

tagger.<sup>1</sup> The Stanford POS tagger is a package that uses the log-linear part-of-speech tagging of Toutanova, Klein, Manning, and Singer.<sup>2</sup> It uses several statistical taggers and assigns one of the thirty-six *POS Pen Treebank* tags to each word.<sup>3</sup> From the different taggers that the Stanford POS tagger provides, I chose the `english-left3words-distsim.tagger` model.<sup>4</sup> Then, from the thirty-six possible POS tags, only the following tags (Table 2-2) were selected for topic classifications.

Tag	Description
FW	Foreign word
JJ	Adjective
NN	Noun, singular or mass
NNS	Noun, plural
NNP	Proper noun, singular
NNPS	Proper noun, plural
RB	Adverb

**Table 2-2 POS Tags Kept in the Texts**

As a result of the above steps, a stop-word list with more than 12,000 unique words was created. Most of the words of the stop-word list belonged to the category of verbs. While the `RTextTools` package has a stop-word removal function of its own, several tests showed that removal of stop-words is done more efficiently before the documents are fed to the `RTextTools` package. Therefore, I invoked the `tm` package separately and outside the `RTextTools` package. The `tm` package used the above-mentioned 12,000 stop-word list instead of its default list.

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<sup>1</sup> “Stanford Log-linear Part-Of-Speech Tagger,” *The Stanford Natural Language Processing Group*, accessed February 23, 2014, <http://nlp.stanford.edu/software/tagger.shtml>.

<sup>2</sup> Kristina Toutanova et al., “Feature-Rich Part-of-Speech Tagging with a Cyclic Dependency Network,” in *HLT-NAACL, 2003* (Edmonton, Canada: HLT-NAACL, 2003), 252-259.

<sup>3</sup> Please refer to the Appendix.

<sup>4</sup> “Stanford POS tagger FAQ,” *The Stanford Natural Language Processing Group*, accessed February 23, 2014, <http://nlp.stanford.edu/software/pos-tagger-faq.shtml>.

The benefits of creating a specific list of stop-words were twofold. Removing more words that did not differentiate among documents enabled the algorithms to identify more precise word patterns for each topic. Also, removing the unnecessary words significantly reduced the size of the document-term matrix, thereby reducing the amount of memory required for the topic classification.

### **3- Supervised Topic Classification**

More than 2,000 documents were tagged by the think tanks in the 2004 and 2008 general elections as military, political, or social.<sup>1</sup> These documents created the training batch. However, there was little agreement among the think tanks' tagging systems. Several tests showed that the tagging systems of the think tanks were not reliable enough to produce consistent tagging results. To resolve this problem, the training batch of already-tagged documents was used to tag itself. The documents were divided into nine groups of 300 documents. In each group, 270 documents were assigned the role of training batch and thirty documents the role of labeling group. On two occasions, the result of this automatic tagging was checked manually: when the result of the automatic labeling differed from the tag that the think tank had assigned to the document, and when fewer than four algorithms agreed with the think tanks' tagging. The manual checking of the documents showed that in the majority of cases, the automatic tagging by the nine algorithms was correct. In cases where there was not an agreement between the human manual coding and the nine algorithms, the document was removed from the training batch. This process was repeated until a group of 1769 documents labeled itself correctly

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<sup>1</sup> For the complete list of the tags and how they were grouped into these three general tags, please refer to the Appendix.

90% of the time. This batch of 1769 documents became the training batch used to tag the remaining documents.

After the training batch was created, the rest of the documents were divided into 125 groups of fifty documents. For each group, 1769 documents were assigned the role of training batch and fifty documents the role of labeling batch. Table 2-3 shows the frequency of each of the topics and level of agreement between the algorithms. As Table 2-3 shows, the majority of the documents in all the three topics had consensus agreement on more than four algorithms. Table 2-3 shows that the confidence of tagging in my research is higher than the 90% human inter-coder agreement. The high confidence on topic labeling increases the confidence on the subsequent analysis.

<b>Number of Algorithms in Agreement</b>	<b>Military</b>	<b>Political</b>	<b>Social</b>	<b>Grand Total</b>
<b>4</b>	99	51	13	163
<b>5</b>	150	310	150	610
<b>6</b>	123	442	149	714
<b>7</b>	148	557	191	896
<b>8</b>	127	897	296	1320
<b>9</b>	30	2001	519	2550
<b>1769 Training</b>	298	896	575	1769
<b>Manually Coded</b>	9	31	10	50
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>984</b>	<b>5185</b>	<b>1903</b>	<b>8072</b>

**Table 2-3 The Consensus Agreement on File Labeling**

Document labeling is useful when one wants to extract the operational code of a subject with the highest frequency. However, if one wants to extract the operational code of subjects with low frequency, the overall label of the document can be misleading. Any document has several sentences, and not all the sentences necessarily share the same

topic. In the case of low-frequency subjects, the probability that the topic of a sentence differs from the overall topic of the document is considerable.

To assign a topic to a sentence, first the sentences with transitive verbs were identified. The documents produced almost 500,000 sentences, of which more than 366,000 were unique. To automatically label the 366,000 sentences, I employed the RTextTools package. I also used the University of Texas Policy Agendas Project coding system for News Media as the training batch.<sup>1</sup> The Policy Agendas Project systematically gathers and manually labels the *New York Times Index* by topic. By 2014, its codebook had the records of more than 49,000 *New York Times* indexes published between 1946 to 2008.<sup>2</sup> “The New York Times Index Data Codebook” of 2014 had twenty-seven topic codes, of which I chose the following six indexes related to foreign relations: macroeconomics, environment, energy, defense, foreign trade, and security. Of the available 49,000 indexes, the labels of more than 20,000 *New York Times* indexes were found to be relevant for my research. However, since automatic labeling is a memory-intensive task, I chose a sample of 20,000 indexes. To create a manageable training batch, I randomly chose 5,000 indexes from the 20,000 indexes.

In the next step, the 366,000 sentences were divided into 733 groups of 500 sentences. Then, the *New York Times* training batch was invoked, and the 366,000

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<sup>1</sup> “The data used here were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant numbers SBR 9320922 and 0111611, and were distributed through the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any responsibility for the analysis reported here.” “How to Cite,” *Policy Agendas Project*, accessed March 28, 2014, [http://www.policyagendas.org/page/datasets-codebooks#new\\_york\\_times\\_index](http://www.policyagendas.org/page/datasets-codebooks#new_york_times_index).

<sup>2</sup> “New York Times Index Data Codebook,” *University of Texas*, accessed March 28, 2014, <http://www.utexas.edu/cola/files/4341573>.

sentences were tagged by the nine classifying algorithms of the RTextTools package. For each group, 5,000 *New York Times* indexes were assigned the role of training batch and 500 sentences the role of labeling batch. Then, the 366,000 unique and tagged sentences were used to tag the duplicate sentences. Overall, 486,882 sentences were tagged in this step. To adopt a consistent and more manageable coding system, the above six labels were grouped into three macro groups of *military*, *political*, and *social*.<sup>1</sup> Table 2-4 shows the results of the supervised topic labeling of the sentences. It shows the frequency of each of the topics and level of agreement between the algorithms. As Table 2-4 shows, in 98% of the sentences, at least four algorithms agreed on the assigned tag. Table 2-4 shows that the tagging system of my research enjoys a high degree of accuracy, which increases the confidence in the subsequent analysis.

<b>Algorithms in Agreement</b>	<b>Military</b>	<b>Political</b>	<b>Social</b>	<b>Grand Total</b>
2	31	2	286	319
3	1876	1657	5815	9348
4	8373	14383	14607	37363
5	19670	39864	15727	75261
6	27497	45580	14046	87123
7	18778	68183	10575	97536
8	258	83881	10175	94314
9	0	83564	2054	85618
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>76483</b>	<b>337114</b>	<b>73285</b>	<b>486882</b>

**Table 2-4 The Consensus Agreement on Sentence Labeling**

#### **4- Profiler Plus**

The software Profiler Plus performs the steps used by VICS automatically. It first identifies/parses transitive verbs and their subjects in each sentence. Then, using the VICS dictionary, it assigns a range of positive and negative values to the verbs. Next,

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<sup>1</sup> For more information, please refer to the Appendix.

using ten different formulas, it answers George's ten questions about the operational code below.<sup>1</sup>

**P1-Nature of Politics:** *What is the "essential" nature of political life? Is the political universe one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?* The answer to the first philosophical question is based on the assumption that the types of verbs used by the Self to describe the action of the Other will reveal how the Self views political life. The first philosophical question is answered by subtracting the percentage of positive verbs from negative verbs. The result is an index between -1 (very hostile) and +1 (very friendly).

**P2-Realization of Political Values:** *What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic or must one be pessimistic on this score, and in what respects the one and/or the other?* The answer to the second philosophical question assumes that the intensity of positive and negative verbs used for the Other shows how optimistic or pessimistic the Self is. To calculate P2, first the frequency of each verb, mentioned in Figure 1-3, is multiplied by its assigned value in that figure, and then the sum of all the results is divided by the total number of the verbs. The result is an index between -1 (very pessimistic) and +1 (very optimistic).

**P3-Predictability of Political Future:** *Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?* The answer to the third philosophical question follows the information theory's assertion that greater uniformity among the categories in a situation

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<sup>1</sup> The entire section on the operational code method is a summary of the works by Michael Young, Stephen G. Walker, and Mark Schafer including: Mark Schafer and Stephen G. Walker, *Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics: Methods and Applications of Operational Code Analysis* (New York: Palgrave, 2006).

suggests greater certainty. The third philosophical question is answered by measuring the Index of Qualitative Variation (IQV) for each text: “The Index of Qualitative Variation is a ratio of different pairs of observations in a distribution to the maximum possible number of different pairs for a distribution with the same N and the same number of variable classifications.”<sup>1</sup> The third philosophical index varies between 0 (very low predictability) and +1 (very high predictability).

**P4-Control over Historical Developments:** *How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical development? What is one's role in “moving” and “shaping” history in the desired direction?* The fourth philosophical question is derived from the locus-of-control literature.<sup>2</sup> The ratio of the frequency of transitive verbs for the Self to transitive verbs for the Other shows how in control the Self is. The index varies between 0 (very low control) and +1 (very high control).

**P5-Role of Chance:** *What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development?* The answer to the fifth philosophical question is derived from the assumption that if an actor's control over history is low, and the actor cannot predict the future, then the role of chance is high. In other words, the answer to the fifth philosophical question is based on the answers to the third and fourth philosophical questions. The answer to the fifth philosophical question is measured by multiplying P3 by P4. This index varies between 0 (very low role of chance) and +1 (very high role of chance).

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<sup>1</sup> George Watson and Dickinson McGaw, *Statistical Inquiry* (New York: Wiley, 1980), 88.

<sup>2</sup> Herbert M. Lefcourt, *Locus of Control: Current Trends in Theory & Research* (Hillsdale, N.J.: L. Erlbaum Associates, 1982).



**I1-Direction of Strategy:** *What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?* The first instrumental question is like the first philosophical question. The only difference is that this index measures the verbs used for the Self. The index varies between -1 (very conflictual) and +1 (very cooperative).

**I2-Intensity of Tactics:** *How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?* The second instrumental question is like the second philosophical question, with the exception that the transitive verbs for the Self are considered. The index varies between -1 (very conflictual) and +1 (very cooperative).

**I3-Risk Orientation:** *How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?* The third instrumental index measures the risk propensity of the Self. The more choices the Self has, the average risk associated with the failure of any of those choices will be lower. The lower risk for loss across choices makes the Self risk-averse. The fewer choices the Self has, the average risk associated with the failure of any of those choices will be higher. The higher risk for loss across choices makes the Self risk-acceptant. To measure the index of Risk Orientation, 1 is subtracted from the Index of Qualitative Variation for the Self. The index varies between 0 (very risk-averse) and +1 (very risk-acceptant).

**I4-Flexibility of Tactics:** *What is the best “timing” of action to advance one's interests?* The fourth instrumental index deals with the issue of timing of action and flexibility of the Self in taking action. The index of Flexibility of Tactics has two subcategories of I4a and I4b. The assumption behind I4a index is that higher degrees of shift between conflictual and cooperative verbs show higher flexibility, urgency for action and the fact that the strategy of the Self is not fixed. A text which is mainly

cooperative or mainly conflictual has less flexibility and depicts a fixed strategy that will not change, no matter what the other actors do. A text with a balanced distribution of cooperative and conflictual verbs shows the readiness to change strategy, higher degrees of flexibility and more readiness to act. I4a is measured by subtracting 1 from the absolute difference of the percentage of cooperative and conflictual verbs. It varies between 0 (very low flexibility) and +1 (very high flexibility). In measuring the I4b index the assumption is that higher shift propensity between words and deeds indicates a more risk-averse orientation. A lower degree of shift between words and deeds shows a more risk acceptant orientation. It varies between 0 (very risk-averse) and +1 (very risk-acceptant).

**I5-Utility of Means:** *What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?* The fifth instrumental question measures the utility of different means to achieve goals. It includes six different indexes and is measured by computing the percentage of the total number of verbs that each of the six categories of verbs accounts for: Utility of Appealing (I5ap); Utility of promising (I5pr); Utility of Rewarding (I5re); Utility of Opposing (I5op); Utility of Threatening (I5th); and Utility of Punishing (I5pu). The measurement for each category varies between 0 (very low utility) and +1 (very high utility). Figure 2-1 presents the summary and calculations of the Philosophical and Instrumental Indexes.

### PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS

	<u>Elements</u>	<u>Index</u>	<u>Interpretation</u>
P-1.	NATURE OF THE POLITICAL UNIVERSE (Image of Others)	%Positive minus %Negative Transitive Other Attributions	+1.0 friendly to -1.0 hostile
P-2.	REALIZATION OF POLITICAL VALUES (Optimism/Pessimism)	Mean Intensity of Transitive Other Attributions divided by 3	+1.0 optimistic to -1.0 pessimistic
P-3.	POLITICAL FUTURE (Predictability of Others Tactics)	1 minus Index of Qualitative Variation for Other Attributions	1.0 predictable to 0.0 uncertain
P-4.	HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT (Locus of Control)	Self (P4a) or Other (P4b) Attributions +[Self plus Other Attributions]	1.0 high to 0.0 low self control
P-5.	ROLE OF CHANCE (Absence of Control)	1 minus [Political Future x Historical Development Index]	1.0 high role to 0.0 low role

### INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS

	<u>Elements</u>	<u>Index</u>	<u>Interpretation</u>
I-1.	APPROACH TO GOALS (Direction of Strategy)	%Positive minus %Negative Self Attributions	+1.0 high cooperation to -1.0 high conflict
I-2.	PURSUIT OF GOALS (Intensity of Tactics)	Mean Intensity of Transitive Self Attributions divided by 3	+1.0 high cooperation to -1.0 high conflict
I-3.	RISK ORIENTATION (Predictability of Tactics)	1 minus Index of Qualitative Variation for Self Attributions	1.0 risk acceptant to 0.0 risk averse
I-4.	TIMING OF ACTION (Flexibility of Tactics) a. Coop v. Conf Tactics b. Word v. Deed Tactics	1 minus Absolute Value [%X minus %Y Self Attributions]  Where X = Coop and Y = Conf Where X = Word and Y = Deed	1.0 high to 0.0 low shift propensity
I-5.	UTILITY OF MEANS (Exercise of Power)  a. Reward b. Promise c. Appeal/Support d. Oppose/Resist e. Threaten f. Punish	Percentages for Exercise of Power Categories a through f  a's frequency divided by total b's frequency divided by total c's frequency divided by total d's frequency divided by total e's frequency divided by total f's frequency divided by total	+1.0 very frequent to 0.0 infrequent

**Figure 2-1 VICS Indexes and their Formulas**

**Source:** Figure adopted with some modifications from Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer, "Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson as Cultural Icons of US Foreign Policy," *Political Psychology* 28, no. 6 (2007): 758.

## **VICS Indexes Used in this Research**

VICS is all about counting the number of transitive verbs. When the number of texts is in the thousands, as in the case of this research, the frequency of the verbs of the Others will be exponentially higher than the frequency of the transitive verbs of the Self. For instance, the total number of transitive verbs of the Other will be in tens of thousands and the total number of transitive verbs of the Self will be at most in the hundreds. Because of this large difference, indexes like P4 and P5, which incorporate frequencies of the Self and the Other, lose their sensitivity. On the other hand and with the exception of the two indexes of P4 and P5, the formulas of the Philosophical indexes have exact counterparts in the Instrumental indexes. The two sets of formulas differ because Instrumental formulas use the transitive verbs of the Self, and the Philosophical formulas use the transitive verbs of the Other. Because of lack of sensitivity, I did not use the P4 and P5 indexes. Instead, I used the eleven Instrumental formulas for the Other. By doing so, this research lost the two less sensitive indexes, but gained seven additional indexes to compare the texts (I4a, I4b, I5ap, I5pr, I5re, I5op, and I5th). This practice not only resolves the problem of lack of sensitivity of some indexes, it also creates more indexes for studying the Other. Instead of creating five operational code indexes, treating the Other as the Self will create eleven indexes for the Other. Therefore, in this research, the Instrumental formulas and their respective indexes are calculated both for the Self and the Other. Throughout the research, all of the VICS indexes are named Instrumental indexes (I-indexes), even if they measure the operational code of the Other.

## **5- Sensitivity of Method**

Is the VICS method sensitive enough to produce indexes that differ between political<sup>1</sup> and nonpolitical texts? To answer this question, a batch of random nonpolitical documents was gathered as a basis of comparison. The nonpolitical batch came from the LexisNexis database. The LexisNexis database was queried for the three random nonpolitical keywords, *perfume*, *violin*, and *pasta* in the exact three time periods of the project. Nine queries were conducted, and documents with at least 500 words were chosen. The data-gathering phase produced 7,000 nonpolitical documents from LexisNexis. In the next step, the nonpolitical texts were processed by the Profiler Plus software, using the same set of schemas that was used to process the think tank political texts.<sup>2</sup>

	2004	2008	2012	Grand Total
<b>Think Tank Texts</b>	<b>1711</b>	<b>2510</b>	<b>3131</b>	<b>7352</b>
Military	228	379	381	988
Political	1169	1488	2041	4698
Social	314	643	709	1666
<b>LexisNexis Texts</b>	<b>1794</b>	<b>1747</b>	<b>1662</b>	<b>5203</b>
Pasta	604	569	558	1731
Perfume	670	671	558	1899
Violin	520	507	546	1573
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>3505</b>	<b>4257</b>	<b>4793</b>	<b>12555</b>

**Table 2-5 Number of Political and Nonpolitical Documents**

In the next step, the positive and negative transitive verbs of all the subjects in each batch were aggregated, thereby treating all the subjects as the Self. After aggregating the number of positive and negative transitive verbs, those files that had

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<sup>1</sup> Here “political” refers to all the three categories of the think tanks’ texts.

<sup>2</sup> For the list of schemas, please refer to the Appendix.

fifteen or more transitive verbs were selected. This step reduced the number of nonpolitical texts to 5,000 (Table 2-5). After treating all the subjects as the Self, eleven Instrumental indexes were calculated for each batch. Table 2-8 shows the VICS indexes for both batches. Table 2-9 presents the description of the I-indexes according to their range. As Table 2-9 shows, without exception, nonpolitical texts were clearly more cooperative than the think tanks' texts.

The differences in the Instrumental indexes of the two batches show that the VICS method is sensitive enough to separate the political and nonpolitical texts. To test the statistical significance of this difference, a MANOVA test was conducted using Batch as the independent variable and the eleven Instrumental indexes as the dependent variables.<sup>1</sup> All statistical analysis was performed using IBM SPSS Statistics (v. 20). SPSS rounds off p-values less than 0.0005 to 0.000.<sup>2</sup> The expectation was that political and nonpolitical texts would have different rules of conduct. Table 2-6 shows the result of the MANOVA test. Using Pillai's trace, there was a significant effect of type of text (Batch) on the eleven I-indexes. The MANOVA test showed that the political and nonpolitical texts produced different VICS indexes (rules of conduct/operational codes).

**Multivariate Tests**

Effect		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Batch	Pillai's Trace	.372	675.858	11	12543	0.000	.372

**Table 2-6 MANOVA - Impact of Type of Texts on the VICS Indexes**

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<sup>1</sup> An alpha level of 0.05 was used for all statistical tests.

<sup>2</sup> Lee A. Kirkpatrick and Brooke C. Feeney, *A Simple Guide to IBM SPSS Statistics for Version 20.0*, (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2013), 36.

However, how much does Batch differentiate between the two types of texts? In other words, considering the VICS indexes, how dissimilar were the political and nonpolitical batches? To answer this question, the effect size of the impact of Batch on the eleven I-indexes was calculated by estimating the Partial Eta Squared value ( $\eta_p^2$ ). The Partial Eta Squared value shows how much of the variance in the dependent variable is attributable to the independent variable. I used the following established convention to interpret the Partial Eta Squared estimate:<sup>1</sup>

- Partial Eta Squared < 0.06 : Effect size is small. Less than 6% of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variable;
- $0.06 \leq$  Partial Eta Squared < 0.14 : Effect size is medium. Between 6% to 14% of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variable;
- $0.14 \leq$  Partial Eta Squared : Effect size is large. More than 14% of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variable.

Table 2-6 shows that the effect of Batch on the eleven I-indexes was large. In other words, the type of texts (political or nonpolitical) made a large difference in the VICS indexes. Then, does the impact of type of text on the operational code indexes manifest itself in all the eleven indexes? The univariate tests of between-subject effects showed that Batch had a significant effect on all the eleven I-indexes, of which the indexes of Direction of Strategy (I1), Risk Aversion (I3), Flexibility of Tactics (I4a) and Utility of Opposing (I5-Oppose) had the largest effect size (Table 2-7).

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<sup>1</sup> Karabi Nandy, "Understanding and Quantifying Effect Sizes," *University of California Los Angeles (UCLA)*, 2012, <http://nursing.ucla.edu/workfiles/research/Effect%20Size%204-9-2012.pdf>

**Tests of Between-Subjects Effects**

Source		Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Batch	I1: Direction of Strategy	189.248	1	189.248	2553.852	0.000	.169
	I2: Intensity of Tactics	57.881	1	57.881	1359.072	0.000	.098
	I3: Risk Aversion	130.605	1	130.605	4076.181	0.000	.245
	I4a: Flexibility of Tactics	172.252	1	172.252	3008.379	0.000	.193
	I4b: Words and Deeds	21.244	1	21.244	421.165	0.000	.032
	I5: Appeal	17.607	1	17.607	1077.842	0.000	.079
	I5: Promise	.145	1	.145	7.173	0.007	.001
	I5: Reward	3.892	1	3.892	299.310	0.000	.023
	I5: Oppose	46.179	1	46.179	4831.082	0.000	.278
	I5: Threaten	14.860	1	14.860	1149.850	0.000	.084
	I5: Punish	8.386	1	8.386	447.040	0.000	.034

**Table 2-7 Impact of Type of Texts on the Individual VICS Indexes**

After showing that VICS indexes could differentiate between the political and nonpolitical texts, the research asked whether their subcategories could be differentiated as well. As Table 2-8 shows, each of the two batches had three sub-groups. The files of the batch of think tank were labeled in categories of *military*, *political*, and *social*. The LexisNexis nonpolitical batch was divided into subcategories of *pasta*, *perfume*, and *violin*. While the subcategories of the think tanks' texts resulted from supervised labeling, the nonpolitical subcategories resulted from a keyword search conducted at the time the nonpolitical batch was gathered.



		N	I1		I2		I3		I4a		I4b		I5ap		I5pr		I5re		I5th		I5op		I5pu		
			Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
Think Tank Texts	Military	2004	228	0.18	0.24	0.05	0.19	0.14	0.05	0.76	0.17	0.82	0.14	0.32	0.10	0.02	0.03	0.24	0.09	0.13	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.26	0.11
		2008	379	0.16	0.26	0.04	0.21	0.14	0.06	0.75	0.18	0.84	0.12	0.31	0.09	0.02	0.03	0.24	0.10	0.14	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.26	0.11
		2012	381	0.13	0.26	0.02	0.21	0.14	0.06	0.76	0.17	0.85	0.13	0.30	0.09	0.02	0.03	0.23	0.09	0.14	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.27	0.12
		Total	988	0.15	0.26	0.03	0.20	0.14	0.06	0.76	0.17	0.84	0.13	0.31	0.09	0.02	0.03	0.24	0.09	0.14	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.27	0.11
	Political	2004	1169	0.21	0.23	0.07	0.17	0.14	0.05	0.74	0.17	0.80	0.15	0.36	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.22	0.09	0.15	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.22	0.10
		2008	1488	0.22	0.25	0.08	0.18	0.15	0.06	0.73	0.19	0.79	0.15	0.37	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.22	0.09	0.16	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.21	0.10
		2012	2041	0.21	0.25	0.08	0.18	0.14	0.06	0.73	0.19	0.79	0.15	0.36	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.22	0.09	0.16	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.22	0.10
		Total	4698	0.21	0.25	0.08	0.18	0.14	0.06	0.73	0.18	0.80	0.15	0.36	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.22	0.09	0.16	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.22	0.10
	Social	2004	314	0.33	0.23	0.18	0.17	0.15	0.05	0.64	0.19	0.84	0.13	0.35	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.29	0.09	0.13	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.19	0.09
		2008	643	0.33	0.24	0.19	0.18	0.15	0.06	0.64	0.20	0.83	0.14	0.35	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.29	0.10	0.13	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.18	0.09
		2012	709	0.32	0.24	0.17	0.17	0.15	0.06	0.65	0.20	0.82	0.14	0.35	0.11	0.03	0.04	0.28	0.10	0.13	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.19	0.09
		Total	1666	0.33	0.24	0.18	0.18	0.15	0.06	0.65	0.20	0.82	0.14	0.35	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.29	0.10	0.13	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.19	0.09
	Total	2004	1711	0.23	0.24	0.09	0.18	0.14	0.05	0.72	0.18	0.81	0.15	0.35	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.23	0.09	0.15	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.22	0.10
	2008	2510	0.24	0.25	0.10	0.19	0.15	0.06	0.71	0.19	0.81	0.15	0.35	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.24	0.10	0.15	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.21	0.10	
	2012	3131	0.23	0.26	0.09	0.19	0.14	0.06	0.72	0.19	0.81	0.15	0.35	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.24	0.09	0.15	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.22	0.11	
	Total	7352	0.23	0.25	0.09	0.19	0.14	0.06	0.72	0.19	0.81	0.15	0.35	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.24	0.10	0.15	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.22	0.10	
LexisNexis Texts	Pasta	2004	604	0.45	0.31	0.22	0.25	0.23	0.09	0.52	0.26	0.76	0.20	0.38	0.15	0.04	0.06	0.31	0.13	0.05	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.21	0.14
		2008	569	0.43	0.31	0.20	0.24	0.22	0.09	0.54	0.26	0.74	0.20	0.38	0.15	0.04	0.06	0.29	0.13	0.05	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.22	0.14
		2012	558	0.46	0.30	0.23	0.24	0.22	0.08	0.52	0.26	0.75	0.19	0.38	0.14	0.04	0.06	0.31	0.13	0.05	0.06	0.01	0.03	0.21	0.14
		Total	1731	0.45	0.31	0.22	0.25	0.22	0.09	0.53	0.26	0.75	0.19	0.38	0.15	0.04	0.06	0.30	0.13	0.05	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.22	0.14
	Perfume	2004	670	0.43	0.32	0.20	0.25	0.23	0.11	0.52	0.24	0.73	0.19	0.41	0.15	0.04	0.06	0.26	0.12	0.08	0.07	0.01	0.03	0.19	0.15
		2008	671	0.45	0.31	0.21	0.24	0.22	0.10	0.52	0.24	0.76	0.18	0.42	0.15	0.04	0.06	0.27	0.12	0.08	0.07	0.01	0.02	0.19	0.14
		2012	558	0.47	0.28	0.24	0.22	0.22	0.10	0.51	0.24	0.75	0.17	0.42	0.15	0.04	0.05	0.28	0.13	0.08	0.07	0.01	0.03	0.17	0.11
		Total	1899	0.45	0.31	0.21	0.24	0.22	0.10	0.51	0.24	0.75	0.18	0.42	0.15	0.04	0.06	0.27	0.12	0.08	0.07	0.01	0.03	0.18	0.13
	Violin	2004	520	0.55	0.27	0.26	0.21	0.27	0.12	0.44	0.24	0.73	0.20	0.49	0.15	0.03	0.05	0.25	0.12	0.07	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.15	0.11
		2008	507	0.56	0.25	0.27	0.19	0.27	0.12	0.43	0.24	0.73	0.19	0.49	0.15	0.03	0.05	0.26	0.12	0.06	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.15	0.10
		2012	546	0.57	0.26	0.27	0.20	0.28	0.12	0.42	0.25	0.73	0.19	0.49	0.15	0.03	0.04	0.27	0.13	0.06	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.15	0.10
		Total	1573	0.56	0.26	0.27	0.20	0.27	0.12	0.43	0.24	0.73	0.19	0.49	0.15	0.03	0.05	0.26	0.12	0.06	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.15	0.11
	Total	2004	1794	0.47	0.31	0.22	0.24	0.24	0.11	0.50	0.25	0.74	0.19	0.43	0.16	0.04	0.05	0.27	0.13	0.07	0.07	0.01	0.02	0.19	0.14
	2008	1747	0.47	0.30	0.22	0.23	0.24	0.11	0.50	0.25	0.75	0.19	0.43	0.15	0.03	0.06	0.28	0.12	0.07	0.07	0.01	0.02	0.19	0.13	
	2012	1662	0.50	0.29	0.25	0.22	0.24	0.11	0.48	0.25	0.75	0.18	0.43	0.15	0.04	0.05	0.28	0.13	0.06	0.07	0.01	0.03	0.18	0.12	
	Total	5203	0.48	0.30	0.23	0.23	0.24	0.11	0.49	0.25	0.74	0.19	0.43	0.15	0.04	0.05	0.28	0.13	0.07	0.07	0.01	0.02	0.18	0.13	

Table 2-8 VICS Indexes of Political and Nonpolitical Batches

			<b>I1 - Direction of Strategy</b>	<b>I2 - Intensity of Tactics</b>	<b>I3 - Risk Orientation</b>	<b>I4a - Urgency of Action</b>	<b>Flexibility of Action</b>	<b>I5 - Utility of Appeal</b>	<b>I5 - Utility of Promise</b>	<b>I5 - Utility of Reward</b>	<b>I5 - Utility of Oppose</b>	<b>I5 - Utility of Threaten</b>	<b>I5 - Utility of Punish</b>	
<b>Think Tank Texts</b>	<b>Military</b>	2004	Mixed	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	High	High	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Low	
		2008	Mixed	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	High	High	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Low	
		2012	Mixed	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	High	High	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Low	
		Total	Mixed	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	High	High	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Low
	<b>Political</b>	2004	Mixed	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	Medium	High	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low
		2008	Mixed	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	Medium	High	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low
		2012	Mixed	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	Medium	High	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low
		Total	Mixed	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	Medium	High	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low
	<b>Social</b>	2004	Somewhat Cooperative	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	Medium	High	Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low
		2008	Somewhat Cooperative	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	Medium	High	Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low
		2012	Somewhat Cooperative	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	Medium	High	Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low
		Total	Somewhat Cooperative	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	Medium	High	Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low
	<b>Total</b>	2004	Mixed	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	Medium	High	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low
		2008	Mixed	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	Medium	High	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low
		2012	Mixed	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	Medium	High	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low
		Total	Mixed	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	Medium	High	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low
<b>LexisNexis Texts</b>	<b>Pasta</b>	2004	Somewhat Cooperative	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	Medium	High	Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	
		2008	Somewhat Cooperative	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	Medium	Medium	Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	
		2012	Somewhat Cooperative	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	Medium	High	Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	
		Total	Somewhat Cooperative	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	Medium	High	Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	
	<b>Perfume</b>	2004	Somewhat Cooperative	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	Medium	Medium	Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low
		2008	Somewhat Cooperative	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	Medium	High	Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low
		2012	Somewhat Cooperative	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	Medium	High	Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low
		Total	Somewhat Cooperative	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	Medium	High	Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low
	<b>Violin</b>	2004	Definitely Cooperative	Somewhat Cooperative	Risk-Averse	Low	Medium	Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low
		2008	Definitely Cooperative	Somewhat Cooperative	Risk-Averse	Low	Medium	Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low
		2012	Definitely Cooperative	Somewhat Cooperative	Risk-Averse	Low	Medium	Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low
		Total	Definitely Cooperative	Somewhat Cooperative	Risk-Averse	Low	Medium	Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low
	<b>Total</b>	2004	Somewhat Cooperative	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	Medium	Medium	Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low
		2008	Somewhat Cooperative	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	Medium	High	Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low
		2012	Definitely Cooperative	Somewhat Cooperative	Very Risk-Averse	Low	High	Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low
		Total	Somewhat Cooperative	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	Low	Medium	Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low
<b>Total</b>	2004	Somewhat Cooperative	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	Medium	High	Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	
	2008	Somewhat Cooperative	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	Medium	High	Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	
	2012	Somewhat Cooperative	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	Medium	High	Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	
	Total	Somewhat Cooperative	Mixed	Very Risk-Averse	Medium	High	Low	Very Low	Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	

**Table 2-9 Comparison of Political and Nonpolitical Batches**

To examine the effect of subcategories on the VICS indexes of the texts, a MANOVA test was conducted using Topic as the independent variable and the eleven Instrumental indexes as the dependent variables. The expectation was that texts with different topics (military, social, political, violin, pasta, perfume) would have different rules of conduct. Table 2-10 shows the result of the MANOVA test. Using Pillai's trace, there was a significant effect of Topic on the eleven Instrumental indexes. However, the effect of Topic on the eleven Instrumental indexes was medium.

**Multivariate Tests**

Effect	Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Topic Pillai's Trace	.518	131.882	55	62,715	0.000	.104

**Table 2-10 MANOVA - Impact of Subcategories of Texts on the VICS Indexes**

In terms of the six subcategories, does the impact of type of text on the operational code indexes manifest in all the eleven I-indexes? The univariate tests of between-subject effects showed that Topic had a significant effect on the individual VICS indexes, of which the indexes of Direction of Strategy (I1), Risk Aversion (I3), Flexibility of Tactics (I4a) and Utility of Opposing (I5op) had the largest effect size (Table 2-11).

To test the difference between the six subcategories, the MANOVA test was followed by a discriminant analysis. The discriminant analysis was conducted using the VICS indexes as the independent variables and Topic as the grouping variable. The results of the discriminant analysis are shown in Table 2-12 and Table 2-13. The discriminant analysis revealed five functions, all of which were statistically significant (Table 2-13). As Table 2-12 shows, the first two functions explained 93% of the variance. Figure 2-2 shows the discriminant function plot produced by the first two functions. As

the plot shows, the first function clearly differentiated the texts of the think tanks from the LexisNexis nonpolitical texts.

**Tests of Between-Subjects Effects**

Source		Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Topic	I1: Direction of Strategy	227.456	5	45.491	639.985	0.000	.203
	I2: Intensity of Tactics	78.256	5	15.651	381.934	0.000	.132
	I3: Risk Aversion	138.369	5	27.674	880.418	0.000	.260
	I4a: Flexibility of Tactics	196.144	5	39.229	708.463	0.000	.220
	I4b: Words and Deeds	26.088	5	5.218	104.202	0.000	.040
	I5: Appeal	29.680	5	5.936	385.993	0.000	.133
	I5: Promise	1.301	5	.260	12.883	0.000	.005
	I5: Reward	11.335	5	2.267	182.622	0.000	.068
	I5: Oppose	50.027	5	10.005	1081.064	0.000	.301
	I5: Threaten	15.196	5	3.039	235.574	0.000	.086
	I5: Punish	17.567	5	3.513	194.836	0.000	.072

**Table 2-11 Impact of Subcategories of Texts on the Individual VICS Indexes**

**Eigenvalues**


Function	Eigenvalue	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Canonical Correlation
1	.639	82.4	82.4	.624
2	.082	10.6	93.0	.275
3	.033	4.3	97.3	.179
4	.013	1.7	99.0	.115
5	.008	1.0	100.0	.087

**Table 2-12 Eigenvalues - Subcategories of Political and Nonpolitical Texts**

**Wilks' Lambda**

Test of Function(s)	Wilks' Lambda	Chi-square	df	Sig.
1 through 5	0.535	7855.531	55	.000
2 through 5	0.876	1658.646	40	.000
3 through 5	0.948	672.07	27	.000
4 through 5	0.979	261.226	16	.000
5	0.992	94.617	7	.000

**Table 2-13 Wilks' Lambda - Subcategories of Political and Nonpolitical Texts**



**Figure 2-2 Discriminant Functions Plot – Subcategories of Political and Nonpolitical Texts**

**Summary**

This chapter described the data acquisition process and identified the most important segment of data acquisition as the supervised automatic labeling of files and sentences. Then, the operational code method and its indexes were reviewed. At the end, the sensitivity of the VICS method was tested. As this chapter shows, the difference between the VICS indexes of the political and nonpolitical texts was statistically significant and large. However, while the difference between the VICS indexes of the six subcategories of political and nonpolitical texts was significant, the magnitude of this difference was medium.

## CHAPTER 3 : THE WORLDS OF THE SEVEN THINK TANKS

### **Introduction**

Chapter Three studies the American foreign policy elite by treating all the subjects as the Self. It uses all the transitive verbs and their subsequent I-indexes to differentiate among the worlds of American foreign policy think tanks. This chapter has two sections. Section one examines the existence of different worlds of action for the collectivity of American foreign policy think tanks. Second section examines the dissimilarity among the seven think tanks in different worlds of action. The unit of analysis of the first section is the collectivity of the seven think tanks; in the second section it is the individual think tanks. The smallest unit for the verb aggregation and for the topic classification is the individual document.

### **1- The Worlds of the Collectivity of the Seven Think Tanks**

Nicholas Onuf argues that agents act in multiple worlds<sup>1</sup> with different governing rules, and these rules are constructed via speech acts.<sup>2</sup> The collectivity of the seven think tanks can potentially have many worlds of action as well. On the basis of the topic classifications of Chapter Two, the collectivity of the seven think tanks can potentially have four worlds: the world of all the issues and the worlds of military issues, political issues, and social issues. The task of this section is to use the VICS indexes to empirically test the existence of these worlds. The main questions ask whether the rules of conduct for the collectivity of the think tanks changed over time (2004, 2008, and 2012). What is the impact of the issue areas on the rules of conduct for the collectivity of think tanks?

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<sup>1</sup> The title of my research was inspired from Nicholas Onuf's theory.

<sup>2</sup> Nicholas Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1989).

What is the impact of time on the rules of conduct for the collectivity of think tanks, in each of the issue areas?

To answer the above questions, the text files were grouped in the following sixteen groups: Four groups consisted of all the texts published by the collectivity of the seven think tanks regardless of time, and twelve groups consisted of the texts in each general election. Table 3-1 presents the rules of conduct (eleven VICS indexes) related to these sixteen groups.

### **1-1 The Impact of Time on the Rules of Conduct for the Collectivity of the Think Tanks**

The collectivity of the seven think tanks published documents before and after the three elections of 2004, 2008, and 2012. In each of these elections the political contexts (domestic and international) in which these texts were published differed, raising the question whether, considering all the verbs, the difference in the context had any impact on the VICS indexes of the collectivity of the think tanks. On this level, all the texts of the think tanks were considered together, regardless of the think tank, subject, or topic of the texts. The Instrumental indexes derived from this level of verb aggregation reflected the rules of conduct for the collectivity of the American think tanks towards the world in three different periods.

	N	I1		I2		I3		I4a		I4b		I5ap		I5pr		I5re		I5th		I5op		I5pu		
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
<b>2004</b>	Military	228	0.18	0.24	0.05	0.19	0.14	0.05	0.76	0.17	0.82	0.14	0.32	0.10	0.02	0.03	0.24	0.09	0.13	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.26	0.11
	Political	1169	0.21	0.23	0.07	0.17	0.14	0.05	0.74	0.17	0.80	0.15	0.36	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.22	0.09	0.15	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.22	0.10
	Social	314	0.33	0.23	0.18	0.17	0.15	0.05	0.64	0.19	0.84	0.13	0.35	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.29	0.09	0.13	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.19	0.09
	Total	1711	0.23	0.24	0.09	0.18	0.14	0.05	0.72	0.18	0.81	0.15	0.35	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.23	0.09	0.15	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.22	0.10
<b>2008</b>	Military	379	0.16	0.26	0.04	0.21	0.14	0.06	0.75	0.18	0.84	0.12	0.31	0.09	0.02	0.03	0.24	0.10	0.14	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.26	0.11
	Political	1488	0.22	0.25	0.08	0.18	0.15	0.06	0.73	0.19	0.79	0.15	0.37	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.22	0.09	0.16	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.21	0.10
	Social	643	0.33	0.24	0.19	0.18	0.15	0.06	0.64	0.20	0.83	0.14	0.35	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.29	0.10	0.13	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.18	0.09
	Total	2510	0.24	0.25	0.10	0.19	0.15	0.06	0.71	0.19	0.81	0.15	0.35	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.24	0.10	0.15	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.21	0.10
<b>2012</b>	Military	381	0.13	0.26	0.02	0.21	0.14	0.06	0.76	0.17	0.85	0.13	0.30	0.09	0.02	0.03	0.23	0.09	0.14	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.27	0.12
	Political	2041	0.21	0.25	0.08	0.18	0.14	0.06	0.73	0.19	0.79	0.15	0.36	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.22	0.09	0.16	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.22	0.10
	Social	709	0.32	0.24	0.17	0.17	0.15	0.06	0.65	0.20	0.82	0.14	0.35	0.11	0.03	0.04	0.28	0.10	0.13	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.19	0.09
	Total	3131	0.23	0.26	0.09	0.19	0.14	0.06	0.72	0.19	0.81	0.15	0.35	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.24	0.09	0.15	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.22	0.11
<b>Total</b>	Military	988	0.15	0.26	0.03	0.20	0.14	0.06	0.76	0.17	0.84	0.13	0.31	0.09	0.02	0.03	0.24	0.09	0.14	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.27	0.11
	Political	4698	0.21	0.25	0.08	0.18	0.14	0.06	0.73	0.18	0.80	0.15	0.36	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.22	0.09	0.16	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.22	0.10
	Social	1666	0.33	0.24	0.18	0.18	0.15	0.06	0.65	0.20	0.82	0.14	0.35	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.29	0.10	0.13	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.19	0.09
	Total	7352	0.23	0.25	0.09	0.19	0.14	0.06	0.72	0.19	0.81	0.15	0.35	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.24	0.10	0.15	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.22	0.10

**Table 3-1 VICs Indexes of the Collectivity of the Think Tanks**



As Table 3-1 shows, the Instrumental indexes in the three general elections, Total-2004, Total-2008, and Total-2012, were very similar. This finding shows that the rules of conduct for the collectivity of the think tanks did not change between 2004, 2008, and 2012. To test the statistical significance of this finding, a MANOVA test was conducted using Time as the independent variable and the eleven Instrumental indexes as the dependent variables. The expectation was that texts published in different periods (2004, 2008, and 2012) would have similar rules of conduct. The result of the MANOVA test appears in Table 3-2. Using Pillai's trace, there was a significant effect of Time on the eleven Instrumental indexes. However, the effect of Time on the I-indexes was small.

**Multivariate Tests**

Effect	Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Time Pillai's Trace	0.007	2.363	22	14680	0.000	0.004

**Table 3-2 MANOVA - Impact of Time on the VICS Indexes of the Collectivity of the Think Tanks**

The above test shows that while the rules of conduct for the collectivity of think tanks differed among the three general elections, the magnitude of difference was small. The tests of between-subjects effects showed that Time had significant effect on three indexes of Intensity of Tactics (I2), Flexibility of Tactics (I4a), and Utility of Punishing (I5pu). However, the effect of Time on these indexes was small (Table 3-3). The VICS indexes and the subsequent MANVOVA test showed that the rules of conduct for the collectivity of the think tanks did not change much between the three general elections.

**Tests of Between-Subjects Effects**

Source		Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Time	I1: Direction of Strategy	.327	2	.163	2.585	.075	.001
	I2: Intensity of Tactics	.265	2	.132	3.763	.023	.001
	I3: Risk Orientation	.065	2	.033	1.158	.314	.000
	I4a: Flexibility of Tactics	.326	2	.163	3.367	.035	.001
	I4b: Words and Deeds	.034	2	.017	.402	.669	.000
	I5: Appeal	.019	2	.010	.863	.422	.000
	I5: Promise	.001	2	.001	.055	.946	.000
	I5: Reward	.056	2	.028	2.683	.068	.001
	I5: Oppose	.008	2	.004	.407	.666	.000
	I5: Threaten	.011	2	.006	.459	.632	.000
	I5: Punish	.097	2	.048	3.656	.026	.001

**Table 3-3 Impact of Time on the Individual VICIS Indexes of the Collectivity of the Think Tanks**

**1-2 The Impact of Topic on the Rules of Conduct for the Collectivity of the Think Tanks**

As mentioned in Chapter Two, the texts of the think tanks were categorized according to military, political and social issues. This section (1-2) tests the impact of issue area on the rules of conduct for the collectivity of the think tanks. As Table 3-1 shows, the Instrumental indexes in the three topics differed significantly from one another. Generally, the social texts were the most cooperative and military texts were the most conflictual. Table 3-1 shows that the rules of conduct for the collectivity of the think tanks changed based on the issue area. To test the statistical significance of this difference, a MANOVA test was conducted using Topic as the independent variable and the eleven Instrumental indexes as the dependent variables. The expectation was that texts with different topics (military, social, and political) would have different rules of conduct. The result of the MANOVA test appears in Table 3-4. Using Pillai's trace, there was a significant effect of Topic on the eleven Instrumental indexes, and the estimated

effect of Topic was medium. The MANOVA test showed that the rules of conduct for the collectivity of the think tanks in the three issue areas differed moderately from one another. The tests of between-subjects effects (Table 3-5) showed that the impact of Topic on the rules of conduct for the collectivity of the think tanks was statistically significant in all the Instrumental indexes. However and with the exception of I2 and I5re, the effect of Topic on the rest of indexes was small. The impact of Topic on two indexes of Intensity of Tactics (I2) and Utility of Rewarding (I5re) was medium. The VICS indexes and the subsequent MANVOVA test showed that the collectivity of the think tanks had at least three different worlds of action: world of military issues, world of political issues, and world of social issues.

**Multivariate Tests**

Effect	Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Topic Pillai's Trace	.137	49.027	22	14680	.000	.068

**Table 3-4 MANOVA - Impact of Topic on the VICS Indexes of the Collectivity of the Think Tanks**

**Tests of Between-Subjects Effects**

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Topic I1: Direction of Strategy	23.890	2	11.945	199.079	.000	.051
I2: Intensity of Tactics	17.484	2	8.742	266.479	.000	.068
I3: Risk Orientation	.787	2	.393	14.002	.000	.004
I4a: Flexibility of Tactics	14.356	2	7.178	154.273	.000	.040
I4b: Words and Deeds	4.156	2	2.078	49.235	.000	.013
I5: Appeal	1.988	2	.994	91.978	.000	.024
I5: Promise	.120	2	.060	6.360	.002	.002
I5: Reward	5.716	2	2.858	292.840	.000	.074
I5: Oppose	1.695	2	.847	83.141	.000	.022
I5: Threaten	.134	2	.067	5.523	.004	.002
I5: Punish	4.583	2	2.292	181.423	.000	.047

**Table 3-5 Impact of Topic on the Individual VICS Indexes of the Collectivity of the Think Tanks**

### 1-3 The Impact of Time on the Three Worlds for the Collectivity of the Think Tanks

After establishing that the collectivity of the think tanks had separate worlds of action, the next question asks how stable these three worlds were over time. As the topic segments of Table 3-1 show, the VICS indexes in each of the three topics remained very similar across time. Therefore, the VICS indexes support the idea that the rules of conduct of the three worlds were very stable across time. To statistically examine the significance of this finding, a MANOVA test was conducted using Time as the independent variable and the eleven I-indexes as the dependent variables in each of the three issue areas. For each topic, the expectation was that texts published in different periods (2004, 2008, and 2012) would have similar rules of conduct. Table 3-6 presents the result of the MANOVA test for each of the three worlds.

			Multivariate Tests					
Topic			Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Military	Time	Pillai's Trace	.029	1.298	22	1952	.160	.014
Political	Time	Pillai's Trace	.010	2.229	22	9372	.001	.005
Social	Time	Pillai's Trace	.017	1.261	22	3308	.186	.008

**Table 3-6 MANOVA - Impact of Time on Each World**

The Pillai's trace method showed that only in the political world was there a significant effect of Time on the eleven Instrumental indexes. The military and social worlds did not show statistically significant change between 2004, 2008, and 2012. The MANOVA test showed that the social and military worlds were more stable than the political world. On the other hand, even in the case of the political world, where the MANOVA test showed a significant effect of Time, the estimated effect size of Time was small. The tests of between-subjects effects showed that, in the world of political issues, Time had significant effect on one index: Utility of Punishing (I5pu). However, the effect

of Time on Utility of Punishing was small (Table 3-7). The VICS indexes and the subsequent MANVOVA tests showed that the collectivity of the American foreign policy think tanks had three separate worlds of action, and two of these worlds (military and social) were stable across time.

**Tests of Between-Subjects Effects**

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Year						
I1: Direction of Strategy	.166	2	.083	1.379	.252	.001
I2: Intensity of Tactics	.131	2	.066	2.068	.126	.001
I3: Risk Orientation	.036	2	.018	.625	.535	.000
I4a: Flexibility of Tactics	.129	2	.065	1.399	.247	.001
I4b: Words and Deeds	.092	2	.046	1.030	.357	.000
I5: Appeal	.041	2	.020	1.823	.162	.001
I5: Promise	.029	2	.015	1.557	.211	.001
I5: Reward	.031	2	.016	1.606	.201	.001
I5: Oppose	.002	2	.001	.112	.894	.000
I5: Threaten	.032	2	.016	1.310	.270	.001
I5: Punish	.095	2	.047	3.672	.026	.002

**Table 3-7 Impact of Topic on the Individual VICS Indexes of the Collectivity of the Think Tanks – World of Political Issues**

## **2- The Worlds of Each of the Seven Think Tanks**

In the first section of this chapter the rules of conduct for the collectivity of the think tanks were calculated and compared based on the transitive verbs used for all the subjects. The main aim of the first section was to examine the existence and stability of different worlds of the collectivity of the think tanks. In the second section, the level of verb aggregation drops down to the individual think tanks. In other words, the VICS indexes are calculated and compared based on all the transitive verbs used by a think tank.

Like the collectivity of the think tanks, each think tank as a collective entity or organization can potentially have its own sets of worlds. The rules of conduct in each of those worlds can be similar or different inside and between the think tanks and across

time and issues. The task of the second section is to explore the existence of these worlds for each think tank and compare think tanks in any of these worlds. The next segments of this chapter ask whether the rules of conduct of the seven think tanks differed from each other. If they did, which think tanks were the most different?

## **2-1 The World of All the Issues**

The main question of this section (2-1) asks whether the rules of conduct of the seven think tanks differed from each other in the world of all the issues, and if they did, which think tanks were the most different. Table 3-10 presents the VICS indexes of the seven think tanks in the world of all the issues. The VICS indexes were calculated using the transitive verbs that each think tank used in the three general elections and without any topic specification. As Table 3-10 shows, and without any topic specification, the VICS indexes of the seven think tanks were generally similar. The only exceptions were AEI and Cato, which used more conflictual verbs than the other six think tanks. To statistically examine the significance of this finding, a MANOVA test was conducted using Think Tank as the independent variable and the eleven Instrumental indexes as the dependent variables. The expectation was that different think tanks (AEI, Brookings, Carnegie, Cato, CFR, Heritage, and RAND) would have different rules of conduct. The result of the MANOVA test appears in Table 3-8. Using Pillai's trace, there was a significant effect of Think Tank on the eleven Instrumental indexes. However, the estimated effect size was small. In other words, in the world of all the issues, the rules of conduct of the seven think tanks were slightly different from one another. The tests of between-subjects effects (Table 3-9) showed that the effect of Think Tank on all the

eleven Instrumental indexes was significant. However, as expected, on each of the Instrumental indexes, the effect of Think Tank was small.

**Multivariate Tests**

Effect	Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Think Tank Pillai's Trace	.064	7.220	66	44040	.000	.011

**Table 3-8 MANOVA - Impact of Think Tanks on the VICS Indexes of the World of All the Issues**

**Tests of Between-Subjects Effects**

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Think Tank I1: Direction of Strategy	12.085	6	2.014	32.676	.000	.026
I2: Intensity of Tactics	6.762	6	1.127	32.871	.000	.026
I3: Risk Orientation	1.616	6	.269	9.620	.000	.008
I4a: Flexibility of Tactics	8.289	6	1.381	29.158	.000	.023
I4b: Words and Deeds	1.459	6	.243	5.708	.000	.005
I5: Appeal	.962	6	.160	14.635	.000	.012
I5: Promise	.405	6	.067	7.210	.000	.006
I5: Reward	1.355	6	.226	21.803	.000	.017
I5: Oppose	.586	6	.098	9.442	.000	.008
I5: Threaten	.286	6	.048	3.933	.001	.003
I5: Punish	1.944	6	.324	24.929	.000	.020

**Table 3-9 Impact of Think Tanks on the Individual VICS Indexes**

The question then arises, in the world of all the issues, which think tanks were the most different? I used two methods to address this question: *post hoc* comparisons using the Tukey HSD test, which examined the dissimilarity among the rules of conduct of any two think tanks, and discriminant analysis, which examined the relative position of the seven think tanks based on their rules of conduct. The Tukey's test examined the difference between any two think tanks in each of the eleven Instrumental indexes. Table 3-11 shows the number of times that any two think tanks were statistically different.<sup>1</sup> The maximum number of times any two think tanks could differ from each other was eleven times.

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<sup>1</sup>  $p \leq 0.05$

		I1		I2		I3		I4a		I4b		I5ap		I5pr		I5re		I5th		I5op		I5pu		
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
<b>Carnegie</b>	2004	114	0.20	0.23	0.08	0.18	0.13	0.05	0.74	0.17	0.85	0.11	0.32	0.09	0.02	0.02	0.26	0.09	0.14	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.23	0.10
	2008	1286	0.25	0.25	0.10	0.18	0.15	0.06	0.71	0.19	0.79	0.15	0.37	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.23	0.09	0.15	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.20	0.10
	2012	398	0.34	0.22	0.19	0.17	0.15	0.06	0.64	0.19	0.82	0.14	0.35	0.10	0.03	0.04	0.29	0.09	0.13	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.18	0.09
	Total	1798	0.26	0.25	0.12	0.18	0.15	0.06	0.70	0.19	0.80	0.15	0.36	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.24	0.09	0.15	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.20	0.10
<b>Brookings</b>	2004	144	0.15	0.27	0.02	0.21	0.15	0.06	0.74	0.17	0.82	0.14	0.32	0.11	0.02	0.03	0.23	0.09	0.13	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.28	0.13
	2008	849	0.25	0.25	0.10	0.18	0.15	0.06	0.71	0.19	0.78	0.15	0.37	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.22	0.09	0.15	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.20	0.10
	2012	384	0.38	0.24	0.21	0.18	0.16	0.06	0.61	0.21	0.83	0.14	0.36	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.29	0.10	0.12	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.18	0.09
	Total	1377	0.28	0.26	0.12	0.19	0.15	0.06	0.68	0.20	0.80	0.15	0.36	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.24	0.10	0.14	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.20	0.10
<b>RAND</b>	2004	161	0.23	0.25	0.09	0.19	0.14	0.05	0.71	0.19	0.85	0.13	0.32	0.09	0.03	0.02	0.27	0.09	0.12	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.25	0.11
	2008	138	0.26	0.24	0.11	0.18	0.14	0.05	0.69	0.17	0.83	0.14	0.36	0.09	0.03	0.03	0.25	0.08	0.14	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.21	0.10
	2012	57	0.47	0.21	0.29	0.16	0.17	0.05	0.52	0.18	0.86	0.12	0.37	0.09	0.03	0.03	0.34	0.09	0.10	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.15	0.08
	Total	356	0.28	0.26	0.13	0.19	0.14	0.05	0.67	0.19	0.84	0.13	0.34	0.09	0.03	0.03	0.27	0.09	0.13	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.22	0.10
<b>CFR</b>	2004	167	0.07	0.24	-0.03	0.20	0.14	0.05	0.80	0.15	0.84	0.12	0.30	0.09	0.02	0.02	0.22	0.09	0.15	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.30	0.11
	2008	608	0.21	0.24	0.07	0.17	0.14	0.06	0.74	0.18	0.80	0.15	0.36	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.22	0.09	0.15	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.22	0.10
	2012	248	0.30	0.23	0.16	0.18	0.14	0.06	0.67	0.19	0.84	0.13	0.34	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.28	0.10	0.14	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.19	0.09
	Total	1023	0.21	0.25	0.07	0.19	0.14	0.06	0.73	0.18	0.81	0.15	0.34	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.23	0.09	0.15	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.23	0.11
<b>Heritage</b>	2004	160	0.16	0.26	0.05	0.20	0.13	0.05	0.75	0.18	0.85	0.13	0.31	0.09	0.03	0.03	0.25	0.08	0.14	0.06	0.02	0.03	0.26	0.12
	2008	563	0.23	0.23	0.08	0.16	0.14	0.06	0.73	0.18	0.79	0.15	0.37	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.22	0.08	0.16	0.06	0.02	0.03	0.21	0.09
	2012	114	0.33	0.24	0.18	0.18	0.15	0.06	0.65	0.22	0.82	0.13	0.35	0.10	0.03	0.04	0.28	0.10	0.13	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.18	0.09
	Total	837	0.23	0.24	0.09	0.18	0.14	0.06	0.72	0.19	0.81	0.15	0.35	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.23	0.08	0.15	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.21	0.10
<b>AEI</b>	2004	172	0.11	0.25	0.00	0.19	0.14	0.05	0.78	0.15	0.83	0.13	0.31	0.10	0.02	0.03	0.22	0.09	0.15	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.28	0.11
	2008	952	0.16	0.24	0.03	0.18	0.14	0.06	0.77	0.17	0.80	0.15	0.35	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.20	0.09	0.16	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.24	0.10
	2012	207	0.27	0.25	0.14	0.18	0.15	0.06	0.69	0.19	0.81	0.15	0.34	0.11	0.03	0.04	0.27	0.10	0.14	0.08	0.03	0.04	0.20	0.10
	Total	1331	0.17	0.25	0.04	0.18	0.14	0.06	0.76	0.17	0.81	0.15	0.34	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.22	0.09	0.16	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.24	0.10
<b>Cato</b>	2004	70	0.13	0.26	0.02	0.23	0.14	0.09	0.77	0.18	0.83	0.14	0.30	0.09	0.02	0.03	0.24	0.14	0.14	0.06	0.02	0.03	0.27	0.10
	2008	302	0.14	0.24	0.02	0.18	0.14	0.05	0.78	0.17	0.81	0.14	0.33	0.10	0.02	0.03	0.21	0.09	0.16	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.24	0.10
	2012	258	0.29	0.22	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.06	0.69	0.18	0.82	0.14	0.33	0.11	0.02	0.03	0.29	0.11	0.13	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.21	0.09
	Total	630	0.20	0.25	0.08	0.19	0.14	0.06	0.74	0.18	0.82	0.14	0.33	0.11	0.02	0.03	0.25	0.11	0.15	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.23	0.10

**Table 3-10 VICs Indexes of the Individual Think Tanks - World of All the Issues**



	AEI	Brookings	Carnegie	Cato	CFR	Heritage	RAND	Grand Total
AEI		10	7	2	3	6	7	35
Brookings	10		2	7	8	6	3	36
Carnegie	7	2		6	5	5	4	29
Cato	2	7	6		1	3	7	26
CFR	3	8	5	1		0	6	23
Heritage	6	6	5	3	0		7	27
RAND	7	3	4	7	6	7		34
Grand Total	35	36	29	26	23	27	34	210

**Table 3-11 Dissimilarity among the Pairs of Think Tanks in the World of All the Issues**

As Table 3-11 shows, AEI differed most from Brookings and least from Cato. Brookings was most different from AEI and least different from Carnegie. Carnegie differed most from AEI and least from Brookings. Cato differed most from Brookings and RAND and least from CFR. CFR differed most from Brookings and least from Heritage. Heritage was most different from RAND and least different from CFR. RAND differed most from AEI, Cato, and Heritage and least from Brookings. The above analysis shows that, with the exception of CFR, the ideological orientation assigned to the think tanks at the beginning of the research was mainly correct. The Left think tanks differed least from each other and most from the Right. The Right think tanks differed least from each other and most from the Left. However, CFR differed less from the Right than from RAND and the Left.

To map the approximate relative position of the seven think tanks from each other, the MANOVA test was followed by a discriminant analysis to investigate how the eleven Instrumental indexes could separate texts of think tanks from one another. The discriminant analysis was conducted using eleven I-indexes as the independent variables and Think Tank as the grouping variable. The results of the discriminant analysis appear in Table 3-12 and Table 3-13. As Table 3-13 shows, the analysis found six discriminant

functions of which five were statistically significant. According to Table 3-12, the first two discriminant functions explained 79% of the variance thus the discriminant analysis plot is the representative of 79% of variance. Figure 3-1 presents the discriminant function plot, which is produced by the first two functions. This plot reveals the closeness of the think tanks' centroids, which suggests that the separation between the seven think tanks was not very strong, thus confirming the small effect size.

**Eigenvalues**

Function	Eigenvalue	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Canonical Correlation
1	.036	54.1	54.1	0.185
2	.016	24.6	78.7	0.126
3	.007	11.2	89.9	0.086
4	.003	4.9	94.8	0.057
5	.002	3.3	98.1	0.047
6	.001	1.9	100	0.035

**Table 3-12 Eigenvalues - Think Tanks' World of All the Issues**

**Wilks' Lambda**

Test of Function(s)	Wilks' Lambda	Chi-square	df	Sig.
1 through 6	.937	477.178	66	.000
2 through 6	.970	220.534	50	.000
3 through 6	.986	102.603	36	.000
4 through 6	.993	48.684	24	.002
5 through 6	.997	25.139	14	.033
6	.999	9.118	6	.167

**Table 3-13 Wilks' Lambda - Think Tanks' World of All the Issues**

The quadrants of Figure 3-1 place the seven think tanks into the following groups: Brookings paired with Carnegie; Cato paired with CFR; AEI paired with Heritage, and RAND stood alone as a single member.




Figure 3-1 Discriminant Functions Plot – Think Tanks’ World of All the Issues

## 2-2 The World of Military Issues

In the previous sections (1-1 and 2-1) it was established that the rules of conduct of the seven think tanks differed from each other, though this difference was small. It was also shown that the ideological grouping of a think tank can generally be estimated by its VICS indexes. In this section (2-2), the same comparison will be done among the think tanks but only considering the military texts. The subsequent sections (2-3 and 2-4) will repeat the comparison and use the identical methodology, but for political and social texts, respectively.

The main question asks whether the rules of conduct of the seven think tanks differ from each other in regard to military texts. Table 3-17 presents the VICS indexes of

the seven think tanks in the world of military issues. The VICS indexes were calculated using the transitive verbs that each think tank used in the world of military issues. As Table 3-17 shows, and relative to other think tanks, RAND and to some extent Carnegie used more cooperative verbs in the world of military issues. To statistically examine the significance of this finding, a MANOVA test was conducted using Think Tank as the independent variable and the eleven Instrumental indexes as the dependent variables. The expectation was that different think tanks (AEI, Brookings, Carnegie, Cato, CFR, Heritage, and RAND) would have different rules of conduct. The result of the MANOVA test appears in Table 3-14. Using Pillai's trace, there was a significant effect of Think Tank on the eleven Instrumental indexes. However, the estimated effect size was small, and therefore the rules of conduct of the seven think tanks differed slightly from one another.

**Multivariate Tests**

Topic			Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Military	Think Tank	Pillai's Trace	.128	1.935	66	5856	.000	.021

**Table 3-14 MANOVA - Impact of Think Tanks on the VICS Indexes of the World of Military Issues**

The tests of between-subjects effects (Table 3-15) showed that in regard to the military world the effect of Think Tank on all but three Instrumental indexes was significant. The three non-significant Instrumental indexes were Words and Deeds (I4b), Utility of Appealing (I5ap), and Utility of Threatening (I5th). In other words, in the world of military issues, the seven think tanks used transitive verbs associated with appealing and threatening actions at about the same frequency. As expected, the effect of Think Tank on the eight significant Instrumental indexes was also small.

**Tests of Between-Subjects Effects**

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Think Tank						
I1: Direction of Strategy	2.785	6	.464	7.313	.000	.043
I2: Intensity of Tactics	1.852	6	.309	7.920	.000	.046
I3: Risk Orientation	.421	6	.070	2.886	.009	.017
I4a: Flexibility of Tactics	1.177	6	.196	4.933	.000	.029
I4b: Words and Deeds	.172	6	.029	.808	.564	.005
I5: Appeal	.079	6	.013	1.505	.173	.009
I5: Promise	.104	6	.017	2.206	.040	.013
I5: Reward	.394	6	.066	6.642	.000	.039
I5: Oppose	.152	6	.025	2.822	.010	.017
I5: Threaten	.066	6	.011	.994	.428	.006
I5: Punish	.368	6	.061	5.000	.000	.030

**Table 3-15 Impact of Think Tanks on the Individual VICS Indexes of the World of Military Issues**

To test the dissimilarity of rules of conduct of any two think tanks in the world of military issues, the MANOVA test was followed by *post hoc* comparisons using the Tukey HSD test. Table 3-16 shows the number of times that any two think tanks were statistically different in the world of military issues.<sup>1</sup>

	AEI	Brookings	Carnegie	Cato	CFR	Heritage	RAND	Grand Total
AEI		0	3	0	0	0	5	8
Brookings	0		1	0	1	1	2	5
Carnegie	3	1		0	5	0	0	9
Cato	0	0	0		0	0	0	0
CFR	0	1	5	0		4	6	16
Heritage	0	1	0	0	4		0	5
RAND	5	2	0	0	6	0		13
Grand Total	8	5	9	0	16	5	13	56

**Table 3-16 Dissimilarity among the Pairs of Think Tanks in the World of Military Issues**

<sup>1</sup>  $p \leq 0.05$

		I1		I2		I3		I4a		I4b		I5ap		I5pr		I5re		I5th		I5op		I5pu		
		N	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Carnegie	2004	15	0.24	0.19	0.10	0.15	0.14	0.04	0.73	0.15	0.81	0.11	0.34	0.08	0.02	0.02	0.26	0.08	0.13	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.24	0.09
	2008	27	0.25	0.25	0.10	0.21	0.14	0.04	0.71	0.19	0.86	0.12	0.34	0.08	0.03	0.03	0.25	0.10	0.13	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.23	0.11
	2012	72	0.18	0.24	0.08	0.18	0.13	0.05	0.76	0.17	0.86	0.11	0.31	0.09	0.02	0.02	0.26	0.09	0.15	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.24	0.09
	Total	114	0.20	0.23	0.08	0.18	0.13	0.05	0.74	0.17	0.85	0.11	0.32	0.09	0.02	0.02	0.26	0.09	0.14	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.23	0.10
Brookings	2004	25	0.19	0.24	0.05	0.17	0.17	0.08	0.75	0.18	0.77	0.18	0.35	0.14	0.02	0.03	0.23	0.11	0.15	0.09	0.01	0.02	0.24	0.10
	2008	51	0.18	0.25	0.05	0.19	0.14	0.04	0.74	0.16	0.85	0.12	0.32	0.09	0.02	0.02	0.25	0.08	0.13	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.26	0.11
	2012	68	0.11	0.29	-0.01	0.23	0.16	0.06	0.73	0.17	0.82	0.14	0.31	0.12	0.02	0.04	0.22	0.08	0.13	0.06	0.02	0.03	0.30	0.14
	Total	144	0.15	0.27	0.02	0.21	0.15	0.06	0.74	0.17	0.82	0.14	0.32	0.11	0.02	0.03	0.23	0.09	0.13	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.28	0.13
RAND	2004	63	0.23	0.25	0.10	0.20	0.15	0.05	0.72	0.18	0.82	0.14	0.31	0.09	0.02	0.03	0.28	0.10	0.12	0.07	0.01	0.02	0.25	0.11
	2008	80	0.23	0.27	0.09	0.20	0.14	0.05	0.70	0.19	0.85	0.11	0.33	0.09	0.03	0.02	0.26	0.08	0.13	0.08	0.02	0.02	0.24	0.11
	2012	18	0.24	0.18	0.11	0.14	0.13	0.05	0.75	0.17	0.90	0.13	0.32	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.29	0.05	0.12	0.05	0.01	0.02	0.25	0.09
	Total	161	0.23	0.25	0.09	0.19	0.14	0.05	0.71	0.19	0.85	0.13	0.32	0.09	0.03	0.02	0.27	0.09	0.12	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.25	0.11
CFR	2004	59	0.11	0.23	0.01	0.19	0.13	0.05	0.80	0.15	0.82	0.12	0.29	0.09	0.03	0.02	0.24	0.10	0.14	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.29	0.11
	2008	71	0.02	0.22	-0.08	0.19	0.14	0.06	0.82	0.14	0.85	0.13	0.30	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.19	0.09	0.15	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.32	0.12
	2012	37	0.10	0.27	0.00	0.20	0.14	0.04	0.77	0.16	0.84	0.14	0.30	0.09	0.02	0.02	0.23	0.10	0.16	0.08	0.02	0.02	0.27	0.11
	Total	167	0.07	0.24	-0.03	0.20	0.14	0.05	0.80	0.15	0.84	0.12	0.30	0.09	0.02	0.02	0.22	0.09	0.15	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.30	0.11
Heritage	2004	26	0.16	0.26	0.05	0.20	0.13	0.05	0.74	0.16	0.85	0.15	0.30	0.09	0.03	0.04	0.25	0.07	0.14	0.06	0.03	0.05	0.26	0.12
	2008	58	0.17	0.28	0.05	0.19	0.14	0.05	0.74	0.19	0.81	0.13	0.32	0.11	0.02	0.03	0.24	0.08	0.14	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.25	0.11
	2012	76	0.16	0.24	0.05	0.20	0.13	0.06	0.77	0.17	0.87	0.12	0.30	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.25	0.08	0.14	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.26	0.12
	Total	160	0.16	0.26	0.05	0.20	0.13	0.05	0.75	0.18	0.85	0.13	0.31	0.09	0.03	0.03	0.25	0.08	0.14	0.06	0.02	0.03	0.26	0.12
AEI	2004	33	0.19	0.19	0.04	0.14	0.15	0.06	0.78	0.16	0.82	0.13	0.36	0.10	0.02	0.02	0.21	0.07	0.14	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.25	0.09
	2008	48	0.14	0.23	0.03	0.20	0.13	0.04	0.77	0.15	0.85	0.12	0.30	0.08	0.02	0.02	0.24	0.10	0.14	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.27	0.11
	2012	91	0.06	0.26	-0.03	0.20	0.14	0.06	0.78	0.16	0.82	0.14	0.30	0.11	0.02	0.03	0.21	0.09	0.15	0.08	0.03	0.04	0.29	0.11
	Total	172	0.11	0.25	0.00	0.19	0.14	0.05	0.78	0.15	0.83	0.13	0.31	0.10	0.02	0.03	0.22	0.09	0.15	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.28	0.11
Cato	2004	7	0.04	0.30	-0.08	0.21	0.16	0.06	0.78	0.18	0.82	0.14	0.34	0.13	0.02	0.02	0.17	0.08	0.15	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.31	0.12
	2008	44	0.17	0.24	0.06	0.22	0.15	0.10	0.77	0.19	0.83	0.15	0.30	0.09	0.02	0.03	0.27	0.15	0.13	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.26	0.09
	2012	19	0.06	0.28	-0.03	0.24	0.13	0.06	0.77	0.17	0.86	0.12	0.29	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.21	0.12	0.16	0.06	0.03	0.04	0.29	0.12
	Total	70	0.13	0.26	0.02	0.23	0.14	0.09	0.77	0.18	0.83	0.14	0.30	0.09	0.02	0.03	0.24	0.14	0.14	0.06	0.02	0.03	0.27	0.10

Table 3-17 VICS Indexes of the Individual Think Tanks - World of Military Issues

As Table 3-16 shows, AEI was most different from RAND and least different from Cato, Brookings, CFR, and Heritage. Brookings did not show much difference from other think tanks. Carnegie differed most from CFR and least from Cato, Heritage, and RAND. Cato was not different from any of the other six think tanks. CFR differed most from RAND and least from Cato and AEI. Heritage differed most from CFR and least from AEI, Carnegie, Cato, and RAND. RAND was most different from CFR and least different from Carnegie, Heritage, and Cato. The above analysis shows that the ideological groupings of think tanks could not be estimated by the verbs they used in the military world. In the world of military issues, Cato and RAND were closer to the Left, Heritage was closer to the Center, and CFR was closer to the Right.

The MANOVA test was followed by a discriminant analysis to investigate how the eleven Instrumental indexes could separate the seven think tanks from each other. The discriminant analysis used the eleven Instrumental indexes as the independent variables and Think Tank as the grouping variable. The result of this discriminant analysis appears in Table 3-18 and Table 3-19. As Table 3-19 shows, the analysis found six discriminant functions, of which only the first two were significant. As Table 3-18 shows, the first two discriminant functions explained 70% of the variance among the think tanks. Figure 3-2 presents the discriminant function plot, which is produced by the first two functions. It shows the closeness of the think tanks' centroids, which suggests that the separation among the seven think tanks was not very strong, thus confirming the small effect size.

**Eigenvalues**

Topic	Eigenvalue	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Canonical Correlation
Military 1	0.064	47.8	47.8	.245
2	0.029	22.1	69.9	.169
3	0.016	12.2	82.1	.127
4	0.011	8.3	90.4	.105
5	0.008	5.6	96.1	.086
6	0.005	3.9	100.0	.072

**Table 3-18 Eigenvalues - Think Tanks' World of Military Issues**

**Wilks' Lambda**

Topic	Wilks' Lambda	Chi-square	df	Sig.
Military 1 through 6	.878	127.700	66	.000
2 through 6	.933	67.346	50	.051
3 through 6	.961	38.998	36	.336
4 through 6	.977	23.194	24	.508
5 through 6	.987	12.399	14	.574
6	.995	5.074	6	.534

**Table 3-19 Wilks' Lambda - Think Tanks' World of Military Issues**

Considering only the first two significant functions, the discriminant analysis positioned the centroids of the seven think tanks as follows: Heritage paired with Carnegie; AEI paired with CFR, and Brookings; and RAND and Cato were each single-member groups.






Figure 3-2 Discriminant Functions Plot – Think Tanks’ World of Military Issues

### 2-3 The World of Political Issues

In the previous section (2-2) it was established that in terms of the military issues, the rules of conduct of the seven think tanks differed from each other, although this difference was small. It was also shown that the ideological groupings of think tanks could not be estimated by the verbs they used in the military world. This section (2-3) considers whether a significant difference in the political world existed among the rules of conduct of the seven think tanks.

Table 3-21 presents the VICS indexes of the seven think tanks in the world of political issues. The VICS indexes were calculated using the transitive verbs that each think tank used in the world of political issues. As Table 3-21 shows, and relative to other think tanks, AEI and Cato used more conflictual verbs in the world of political issues. To statistically examine the significance of this finding, a MANOVA test was conducted using Think Tank, as the independent variable, and the eleven Instrumental indexes, as the dependent variables. The expectation was that different think tanks (AEI, Brookings, Carnegie, Cato, CFR, Heritage, and RAND) would have different rules of conduct. The result of the MANOVA test appears in Table 3-20. The Pillai's trace method showed that Think Tank had a significant effect on the eleven Instrumental indexes. However, the effect of Think Tank on the eleven Instrumental indexes was small, and the rules of conduct of the seven think tanks differed only slightly from each other. The tests of between-subjects effects (Table 3-22) showed that the effect of Think Tank on all of the Instrumental indexes was significant. As expected, the effect of Think Tank on all of the Instrumental indexes was also small.

**Multivariate Tests**

Topic			Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Political	Think Tank	Pillai's Trace	.059	4.206	66	28116	.000	.010

**Table 3-20 MANOVA - Impact of Think Tanks on the VICS Indexes of the World of Political Issues**

	N	I1		I2		I3		I4a		I4b		I5ap		I5pr		I5re		I5th		I5op		I5pu		
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
Carnegie	2004	189	0.20	0.22	0.07	0.16	0.14	0.05	0.74	0.15	0.81	0.15	0.36	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.21	0.08	0.16	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.22	0.09
	2008	299	0.23	0.25	0.08	0.19	0.15	0.06	0.72	0.20	0.80	0.15	0.36	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.23	0.09	0.15	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.22	0.10
	2012	798	0.26	0.25	0.11	0.18	0.15	0.07	0.69	0.20	0.79	0.15	0.37	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.23	0.09	0.15	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.20	0.10
	Total	1286	0.25	0.25	0.10	0.18	0.15	0.06	0.71	0.19	0.79	0.15	0.37	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.23	0.09	0.15	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.20	0.10
Brookings	2004	156	0.26	0.22	0.09	0.16	0.15	0.06	0.71	0.17	0.77	0.16	0.38	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.22	0.08	0.14	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.21	0.10
	2008	253	0.33	0.24	0.15	0.18	0.16	0.07	0.65	0.20	0.79	0.14	0.39	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.24	0.10	0.14	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.18	0.09
	2012	440	0.21	0.25	0.07	0.18	0.14	0.06	0.74	0.19	0.78	0.16	0.36	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.22	0.09	0.16	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.21	0.10
	Total	849	0.25	0.25	0.10	0.18	0.15	0.06	0.71	0.19	0.78	0.15	0.37	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.22	0.09	0.15	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.20	0.10
RAND	2004	61	0.33	0.24	0.17	0.17	0.15	0.06	0.64	0.18	0.80	0.16	0.37	0.10	0.03	0.04	0.26	0.09	0.14	0.08	0.02	0.02	0.18	0.09
	2008	63	0.20	0.26	0.06	0.19	0.14	0.05	0.72	0.16	0.84	0.12	0.35	0.09	0.03	0.03	0.23	0.07	0.15	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.23	0.11
	2012	14	0.24	0.15	0.12	0.11	0.11	0.02	0.75	0.14	0.95	0.05	0.33	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.27	0.03	0.14	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.21	0.06
	Total	138	0.26	0.24	0.11	0.18	0.14	0.05	0.69	0.17	0.83	0.14	0.36	0.09	0.03	0.03	0.25	0.08	0.14	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.21	0.10
CFR	2004	184	0.20	0.24	0.06	0.19	0.14	0.05	0.74	0.18	0.80	0.14	0.36	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.21	0.09	0.14	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.24	0.11
	2008	248	0.22	0.23	0.08	0.16	0.14	0.07	0.73	0.18	0.78	0.17	0.37	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.21	0.09	0.16	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.20	0.09
	2012	176	0.19	0.24	0.06	0.18	0.14	0.05	0.76	0.18	0.82	0.14	0.34	0.10	0.02	0.03	0.23	0.08	0.15	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.24	0.11
	Total	608	0.21	0.24	0.07	0.17	0.14	0.06	0.74	0.18	0.80	0.15	0.36	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.22	0.09	0.15	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.22	0.10
Heritage	2004	188	0.23	0.22	0.09	0.16	0.13	0.06	0.73	0.18	0.82	0.14	0.36	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.23	0.08	0.15	0.06	0.02	0.03	0.21	0.09
	2008	256	0.22	0.25	0.08	0.17	0.14	0.07	0.73	0.19	0.78	0.15	0.37	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.21	0.08	0.16	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.21	0.09
	2012	119	0.23	0.23	0.08	0.17	0.14	0.06	0.73	0.17	0.79	0.15	0.36	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.22	0.08	0.16	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.21	0.11
	Total	563	0.23	0.23	0.08	0.16	0.14	0.06	0.73	0.18	0.79	0.15	0.37	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.22	0.08	0.16	0.06	0.02	0.03	0.21	0.09
AEI	2004	336	0.17	0.22	0.03	0.17	0.14	0.05	0.77	0.16	0.80	0.15	0.36	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.20	0.09	0.16	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.24	0.10
	2008	243	0.15	0.24	0.03	0.17	0.14	0.06	0.77	0.16	0.81	0.15	0.34	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.21	0.08	0.17	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.24	0.11
	2012	373	0.15	0.25	0.03	0.18	0.14	0.06	0.77	0.18	0.80	0.16	0.34	0.10	0.02	0.03	0.21	0.09	0.16	0.09	0.03	0.03	0.24	0.11
	Total	952	0.16	0.24	0.03	0.18	0.14	0.06	0.77	0.17	0.80	0.15	0.35	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.20	0.09	0.16	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.24	0.10
Cato	2004	55	0.15	0.25	0.04	0.19	0.14	0.05	0.77	0.16	0.82	0.15	0.33	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.21	0.10	0.17	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.23	0.10
	2008	126	0.17	0.23	0.04	0.16	0.14	0.05	0.77	0.18	0.80	0.15	0.35	0.10	0.02	0.03	0.21	0.09	0.16	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.23	0.09
	2012	121	0.10	0.24	-0.01	0.19	0.14	0.06	0.79	0.16	0.81	0.13	0.31	0.11	0.02	0.03	0.21	0.09	0.16	0.08	0.03	0.03	0.26	0.11
	Total	302	0.14	0.24	0.02	0.18	0.14	0.05	0.78	0.17	0.81	0.14	0.33	0.10	0.02	0.03	0.21	0.09	0.16	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.24	0.10

Table 3-21 VICS Indexes of the Individual Think Tanks - World of Political Issues

**Tests of Between-Subjects Effects**

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Think Tank I1: Direction of Strategy	7.891	6	1.315	22.44	0.000	0.028
I2: Intensity of Tactics	4.346	6	0.724	23.5	0.000	0.029
I3: Risk Orientation	0.746	6	0.124	4.331	0.000	0.006
I4a: Flexibility of Tactics	5.038	6	0.84	18.58	0.000	0.023
I4b: Words and Deeds	1.019	6	0.17	3.803	0.001	0.005
I5: Appeal	0.577	6	0.096	8.636	0.000	0.011
I5: Promise	0.25	6	0.042	4.443	0.000	0.006
I5: Reward	0.546	6	0.091	9.415	0.000	0.012
I5: Oppose	0.13	6	0.022	2.116	0.048	0.003
I5: Threaten	0.195	6	0.033	2.656	0.014	0.003
I5: Punish	1.424	6	0.237	18.79	0.000	0.023

**Table 3-22 Impact of Think Tanks on the Individual VICS Indexes of the World of Political Issues**

	AEI	Brookings	Carnegie	Cato	CFR	Heritage	RAND	Grand Total
AEI		9	6	0	3	7	4	29
Brookings	9		0	6	4	1	1	21
Carnegie	6	0		5	4	2	1	18
Cato	0	6	5		5	6	5	27
CFR	3	4	4	5		0	2	18
Heritage	7	1	2	6	0		1	17
RAND	4	1	1	5	2	1		14
Grand Total	29	21	18	27	18	17	14	144

**Table 3-23 Dissimilarity among the Pairs of Think Tanks in the World of Political Issues**

To test the dissimilarity of rules of conduct of any two think tanks, the MANOVA test was followed by *post hoc* comparisons using the Tukey HSD test. Table 3-23 shows the number of times that any two think tanks were statistically different.<sup>1</sup> As Table 3-23 shows, AEI differed most from Brookings and least from Cato. Brookings was most different from AEI and least different from Carnegie. Carnegie differed most from AEI, and least from Brookings. Cato was most different from Heritage and Brookings and least different from AEI. CFR differed most from Cato and least from Heritage. Heritage was most different from AEI and least different from CFR. RAND differed most from Cato

<sup>1</sup>  $p \leq 0.05$

and least from Carnegie, Brookings, and Heritage. The above analysis shows that in terms of the political issues, the ideological categorization of the seven think tanks remained generally valid. In this world, Heritage distanced itself from the other two conservative think tanks (AEI and Cato) and landed more in the Center. Also, in the world of the political issues CFR was less Right than in the worlds of all the issues and military issues.

The MANOVA test was followed by a discriminant analysis to investigate how the eleven Instrumental indexes could separate political texts issued by any think tank from those of the others. The discriminant analysis was conducted using the eleven Instrumental indexes, as the independent variables, and Think Tank, as the grouping variable. The result of this discriminant analysis appears in Table 3-24 and in Table 3-25, which shows that the discriminant analysis found six discriminant functions, of which the first three discriminant functions were statistically significant.

<b>Eigenvalues</b>					
Topic		Eigenvalue	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Canonical Correlation
Political	1	0.04	65.9	65.9	.196
	2	0.008	14.0	79.9	.091
	3	0.005	8.7	88.7	.072
	4	0.004	6.3	95.0	.061
	5	0.002	3.3	98.3	.044
	6	0.001	1.7	100.0	.032


**Table 3-24 Eigenvalues - Think Tanks' World of Political Issues**

**Wilks' Lambda**

Topic		Wilks' Lambda	Chi-square	df	Sig.
Political	1 through 6	.942	278.800	66	.000
	2 through 6	.980	96.002	50	.000
	3 through 6	.988	56.600	36	.016
	4 through 6	.993	31.959	24	.128
	5 through 6	.997	14.202	14	.435
	6	.999	4.911	6	.555

**Table 3-25 Wilks' Lambda - Think Tanks' World of Political Issues**

As Table 3-24 shows, the first two functions explained 80% of the total variance. The discriminant function plot (Figure 3-3) reveals closeness of the think tanks' centroids, suggesting that the separation among the seven think tanks in the political world was not strong. Considering the first two functions, the discriminant analysis positioned the centroids of the seven think tanks in the following groups: Heritage paired with RAND; CFR paired with Cato; Brookings paired with Carnegie, and AEI stood alone as a single member.



**Figure 3-3 Discriminant Functions Plot – Think Tanks’ World of Political Issues**

#### **2-4 The World of Social Issues**

This section (2-4) asks if there exists any difference among the seven think tanks in terms of social issues. Table 3-28 presents the VICS indexes of the seven think tanks in the world of social issues. The VICS indexes were calculated using the transitive verbs that each think tank used in the world of social issues. As Table 3-28 shows, and relative to other think tanks, RAND used more cooperative verbs in the world of social issues. To statistically examine the significance of this finding, a MANOVA test was conducted using Think Tank as the independent variable, and the eleven Instrumental indexes as the

dependent variables. The expectation was that different think tanks (AEI, Brookings, Carnegie, Cato, CFR, Heritage, and RAND) would have different rules of conduct. The result appears in Table 3-26. Using Pillai's trace, there was a significant effect of Think Tank on the eleven Instrumental indexes. However, the estimated effect size was small. The tests of between-subjects effects (Table 3-27) showed that the effect of Think Tank on all of the Instrumental indexes was significant but small.

**Multivariate Tests**

Topic	Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Social Think Tank Pillai's Trace	.092	2.347	66	9924	.000	.015

**Table 3-26 MANOVA - Impact of Think Tanks on the VICS Indexes of the World of Social Issues**

**Tests of Between-Subjects Effects**

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Think Tank						
I1: Direction of Strategy	3.349	6	.558	10.325	.000	.036
I2: Intensity of Tactics	1.608	6	.268	8.807	.000	.031
I3: Risk Orientation	.889	6	.148	5.367	.000	.019
I4a: Flexibility of Tactics	3.137	6	.523	10.632	.000	.037
I4b: Words and Deeds	.525	6	.088	2.272	.035	.008
I5: Appeal	.232	6	.039	3.633	.001	.013
I5: Promise	.152	6	.025	2.488	.021	.009
I5: Reward	.248	6	.041	4.421	.000	.016
I5: Oppose	.325	6	.054	5.150	.000	.018
I5: Threaten	.186	6	.031	2.532	.019	.009
I5: Punish	.391	6	.065	5.591	.000	.020

**Table 3-27 Impact of Think Tanks on the Individual VICS Indexes of the World of Social Issue**



	N	I1		I2		I3		I4a		I4b		I5ap		I5pr		I5re		I5th		I5op		I5pu		
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
Carnegie	2004	24	0.35	0.17	0.22	0.13	0.13	0.04	0.65	0.17	0.87	0.11	0.32	0.06	0.03	0.04	0.32	0.07	0.13	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.18	0.07
	2008	78	0.36	0.23	0.21	0.18	0.15	0.05	0.63	0.21	0.85	0.13	0.35	0.09	0.03	0.03	0.30	0.09	0.12	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.18	0.10
	2012	296	0.33	0.23	0.18	0.17	0.15	0.06	0.65	0.19	0.81	0.14	0.35	0.11	0.03	0.04	0.28	0.10	0.13	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.18	0.09
	Total	398	0.34	0.22	0.19	0.17	0.15	0.06	0.64	0.19	0.82	0.14	0.35	0.10	0.03	0.04	0.29	0.09	0.13	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.18	0.09
Brookings	2004	42	0.34	0.23	0.19	0.18	0.14	0.04	0.65	0.20	0.87	0.11	0.34	0.08	0.03	0.03	0.30	0.10	0.12	0.05	0.01	0.02	0.19	0.08
	2008	188	0.40	0.22	0.22	0.17	0.16	0.06	0.59	0.19	0.84	0.13	0.37	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.30	0.10	0.11	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.17	0.09
	2012	154	0.36	0.26	0.19	0.19	0.16	0.07	0.62	0.23	0.81	0.15	0.36	0.10	0.03	0.04	0.29	0.10	0.12	0.08	0.01	0.02	0.19	0.10
	Total	384	0.38	0.24	0.21	0.18	0.16	0.06	0.61	0.21	0.83	0.14	0.36	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.29	0.10	0.12	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.18	0.09
RAND	2004	23	0.39	0.24	0.23	0.17	0.16	0.05	0.57	0.17	0.86	0.12	0.36	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.32	0.09	0.12	0.08	0.01	0.02	0.17	0.08
	2008	22	0.54	0.15	0.33	0.13	0.19	0.05	0.46	0.15	0.84	0.14	0.39	0.09	0.03	0.03	0.34	0.10	0.09	0.05	0.01	0.03	0.13	0.07
	2012	12	0.48	0.22	0.31	0.16	0.16	0.05	0.52	0.22	0.92	0.06	0.34	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.37	0.06	0.10	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.15	0.08
	Total	57	0.47	0.21	0.29	0.16	0.17	0.05	0.52	0.18	0.86	0.12	0.37	0.09	0.03	0.03	0.34	0.09	0.10	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.15	0.08
CFR	2004	44	0.31	0.18	0.16	0.14	0.14	0.04	0.67	0.15	0.87	0.10	0.36	0.09	0.03	0.03	0.28	0.08	0.14	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.19	0.08
	2008	118	0.29	0.26	0.16	0.19	0.14	0.06	0.67	0.20	0.83	0.13	0.34	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.27	0.10	0.15	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.18	0.09
	2012	86	0.31	0.22	0.17	0.18	0.14	0.06	0.67	0.19	0.85	0.13	0.34	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.28	0.10	0.14	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.19	0.09
	Total	248	0.30	0.23	0.16	0.18	0.14	0.06	0.67	0.19	0.84	0.13	0.34	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.28	0.10	0.14	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.19	0.09
Heritage	2004	25	0.42	0.29	0.24	0.21	0.17	0.07	0.56	0.26	0.85	0.11	0.37	0.10	0.03	0.04	0.31	0.09	0.12	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.16	0.11
	2008	70	0.29	0.22	0.16	0.17	0.14	0.06	0.69	0.20	0.82	0.14	0.34	0.09	0.03	0.03	0.28	0.10	0.14	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.19	0.08
	2012	19	0.39	0.21	0.19	0.16	0.16	0.07	0.61	0.21	0.78	0.12	0.40	0.09	0.04	0.04	0.25	0.09	0.11	0.06	0.01	0.01	0.18	0.10
	Total	114	0.33	0.24	0.18	0.18	0.15	0.06	0.65	0.22	0.82	0.13	0.35	0.10	0.03	0.04	0.28	0.10	0.13	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.18	0.09
AEI	2004	59	0.32	0.26	0.16	0.19	0.16	0.06	0.64	0.19	0.78	0.15	0.37	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.26	0.10	0.14	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.18	0.11
	2008	43	0.24	0.24	0.13	0.18	0.14	0.06	0.70	0.17	0.81	0.16	0.33	0.11	0.02	0.02	0.28	0.11	0.14	0.08	0.03	0.05	0.20	0.10
	2012	105	0.26	0.24	0.13	0.16	0.14	0.06	0.70	0.20	0.82	0.14	0.33	0.12	0.03	0.04	0.27	0.09	0.14	0.07	0.03	0.04	0.21	0.09
	Total	207	0.27	0.25	0.14	0.18	0.15	0.06	0.69	0.19	0.81	0.15	0.34	0.11	0.03	0.04	0.27	0.10	0.14	0.08	0.03	0.04	0.20	0.10
Cato	2004	97	0.31	0.20	0.17	0.15	0.14	0.05	0.67	0.18	0.83	0.14	0.34	0.10	0.03	0.04	0.29	0.09	0.13	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.20	0.09
	2008	124	0.28	0.24	0.15	0.19	0.15	0.06	0.69	0.19	0.81	0.13	0.32	0.11	0.02	0.03	0.30	0.12	0.13	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.21	0.09
	2012	37	0.23	0.23	0.10	0.15	0.14	0.07	0.73	0.18	0.82	0.14	0.34	0.13	0.03	0.05	0.25	0.10	0.15	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.22	0.08
	Total	258	0.29	0.22	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.06	0.69	0.18	0.82	0.14	0.33	0.11	0.02	0.03	0.29	0.11	0.13	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.21	0.09

Table 3-28 VICS Indexes of the Individual Think Tanks - World of Social Issues

	AEI	Brookings	Carnegie	Cato	CFR	Heritage	RAND	Grand Total
AEI		6	2	0	0	0	7	15
Brookings	6		1	6	5	0	3	21
Carnegie	2	1		2	0	0	6	11
Cato	0	6	2		0	0	5	13
CFR	0	5	0	0		0	6	11
Heritage	0	0	0	0	0		5	5
RAND	7	3	6	5	6	5		32
Grand Total	15	21	11	13	11	5	32	108

**Table 3-29 Dissimilarity among the Pairs of Think Tanks in the World of Social Issues**

Which think tanks were the most different in terms of social issues? Relying on the same procedures used in the sections for military and political issues, Table 3-29 shows the number of times that any two think tanks were statistically different.<sup>1</sup> As Table 3-29 shows, AEI was most different from RAND and least different from Cato, Heritage, and CFR. Brookings was most different from AEI and Cato and differed least from Heritage. Carnegie differed most from RAND and was least different from CFR and Heritage. Cato was most different from Brookings and least different from AEI, CFR, and Heritage. CFR differed most from RAND and least from AEI, Carnegie, Cato, and Heritage. Heritage differed most from RAND and had no difference from the other think tanks. RAND differed most from AEI and least from Brookings. The above test shows that I-indexes for social issues did not position the think tanks according to the expected ideological orientations assigned to them. The above analysis shows that, in the world of social issues, the Left became closer to the Right, but the difference between RAND and both Right and Left think tanks increased.

The MANOVA test was followed by a discriminant analysis to investigate how the eleven Instrumental indexes could separate the think tanks based on their social texts.

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<sup>1</sup>  $p \leq 0.05$

The discriminant analysis was conducted using the eleven Instrumental indexes as the independent variables and Think Tank as the grouping variable. The result of this discriminant analysis appears in Table 3-30 and Table 3-31. As Table 3-31 shows, the discriminant analysis found six discriminant functions, of which only the first two functions were significant.

**Eigenvalues**

Topics	Eigenvalue	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Canonical Correlation
Social 1	0.052	54.4	54.4	.222
2	0.02	21.5	75.9	.142
3	0.01	10.2	86.2	.098
4	0.008	8.0	94.1	.087
5	0.005	4.9	99.1	.068
6	0.001	.9	100.0	.030

**Table 3-30 Eigenvalues - Think Tanks' World of Social Issues**

**Wilks' Lambda**

Topics	Wilks' Lambda	Chi-square	df	Sig.
Social 1 through 6	.911	155.262	66	.000
2 through 6	.958	71.482	50	.025
3 through 6	.977	37.895	36	.383
4 through 6	.987	21.799	24	.591
5 through 6	.994	9.227	14	.816
6	.999	1.469	6	.962

**Table 3-31 Wilks' Lambda - Think Tanks' World of Social Issues**

As Table 3-30 shows, the first two discriminant functions explained 76% of the total variance. Figure 3-4 shows the discriminant function plot. This figure reveals closeness of the think tanks' centroids, suggesting that the separation between the seven think tanks was not very strong. Considering the first two functions, the discriminant analysis positioned the centroids of the seven think tanks in the following groups:

Brookings paired with RAND; AEI paired with Heritage, CFR, and Carnegie; and Cato stood alone as a single-member group.




Figure 3-4 Discriminant Functions Plot – Think Tanks’ World of Social Issues

**Summary**

In the third chapter, it was shown that the collectivity of the seven think tanks had three separate worlds of action: the worlds of military issues, political issues, and social issues. This chapter also showed that verbs used by the seven think tanks in conjunction with the subsequent VICS indexes could sometimes predict the ideological orientation of the think tanks.

## CHAPTER 4 : THE AMERICAN COLLECTIVE SELF

### Introduction

Chapter Three compared the worlds of the American foreign policy elite by considering all the subjects without differentiating between the Self and the Other. Chapter Four examines the rules of conduct of the United States by calculating the VICS indexes of the American collective Self. The first section studies rules of conduct of the United States based on the verbs of the collectivity of the think tanks. The second section studies rules of conduct of the United States based on the verbs used by individual think tanks. In this chapter, only the subjects related to the American collective Self are considered, and the smallest unit for the verb aggregation and for the topic classification is the document.

The first section of Chapter Four asks whether the rules of conduct of the American collective Self showed stability over time and whether the Self had distinct rules of conduct for military, political, and social issues. The second section examines the stability of rules of conduct attributed to the American collective Self by each of the individual think tanks. The main questions ask about the rules of conduct that each of the think tanks assigned to the American collective Self, and they seek to identify differences among the think tanks in terms of those rules of conduct.

To answer the above questions, two lists of subjects were compiled to represent the American collective Self. First, all of the subjects of the sentences were gathered. Then, two lists consisting of subjects related to the government of the United States were created. The first list (Narrow) narrowed the definition of the Self by including only the nouns related directly to the U.S. government, nouns like *Washington*, *United States*,

*United States government, White House, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Defense Department, USAID.* This list did not include proper names.<sup>1</sup> The second list (Broad) provided a broad definition of the Self: this list included most of the nouns that related to the U.S. government. It included the Narrow list plus the names of people who have hold official positions in the U.S. government, names like *Rumsfeld, Cheney, Powell, Clinton, Albright, and Rice* among others.

There were two reasons for creating two datasets for the American collective Self. While names like *Rumsfeld* and *Kerry* are not always considered as part of the Self, they obviously should not be counted as the Other. On the other hand, the expectation is that the inclusion of more nouns will increase the frequencies of the considered transitive verbs, which might lead to different VICS indexes for the American collective Self. To control for the impact of definition of the Self in the measurement of I-indexes, two separate datasets were compiled to represent the American collective Self.

After preparing the two lists of the Self, only those files that had six or more instances of the American collective Self were selected. The operational code literature chooses a threshold of fifteen to twenty verbs.<sup>2</sup> However, unlike my research, that literature includes formulas that consider both the Self and the Other. Also in their texts with fifteen transitive verbs, the majority of the verbs belong to the Other, and the Self very rarely is assigned more than six transitive verbs. Then, the I-indexes of the American collective Self were calculated for all the levels of analysis in this chapter

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<sup>1</sup> With the exception of President Barack Obama and President George W. Bush.

<sup>2</sup> Schafer and Walker, "Operational Code Analysis at a Distance," 44.

The first question asks whether the two definitions of the Self differ from each other. Table 4-2 shows the VICS indexes of the American collective Self on all the levels of topic, time, and definition of the Self. As this table shows, the VICS indexes of the two definitions of the Self were not always similar. To statistically examine the significance of this finding, a MANOVA test was conducted using Batch as the independent variable and the eleven Instrumental indexes as the dependent variables in each of the four worlds. The expectation was that the two definitions of the Self (Narrow and Broad) would have different VICS indexes. The results appear in Table 4-1. Using Pillai's trace, there was a statistically significant difference between the two definitions of the Self in all of the four worlds. More importantly, as the Partial Eta Squared values show, the size of difference between the operational code of Narrow and Broad definitions of the Self was large in all four worlds. This finding shows that the two definitions of the Self produced different VICS indexes.

**Multivariate Tests**

World			Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared	Tests of Between-Subjects Effects Non-Significant Indexes
All	Batch	Pillai's Trace	.491	183.308	11	2092	.000	0.49	I1; I5ap; I5pr
Military	Batch	Pillai's Trace	.554	52.266	11	462	.000	.554	I5pr
Political	Batch	Pillai's Trace	.464	104.793	11	1331	.000	.464	I1
Social	Batch	Pillai's Trace	.586	35.448	11	275	.000	.586	I2; I3; I4a; I4b; I5pr; I5re; I5th; I5pu

**Table 4-1 MANOVA - Difference Between the Broad and Narrow Definitions of the Self**

	N	I1		I2		I3		I4a		I4b		I5ap		I5pr		I5re		I5th		I5op		I5pu	
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
<b>Broad Military</b>	252	0.37	0.48	0.15	0.33	0.37	0.20	0.48	0.32	0.53	0.32	0.48	0.24	0.02	0.07	0.18	0.17	0.16	0.18	0.01	0.04	0.15	0.19
<b>Political</b>	815	0.32	0.47	0.12	0.30	0.36	0.22	0.52	0.30	0.50	0.31	0.47	0.25	0.02	0.07	0.17	0.18	0.17	0.19	0.02	0.06	0.15	0.17
<b>Social</b>	170	0.36	0.48	0.15	0.33	0.36	0.23	0.49	0.33	0.55	0.29	0.45	0.25	0.03	0.07	0.20	0.19	0.14	0.17	0.01	0.06	0.17	0.18
<b>Total</b>	1237	0.34	0.47	0.13	0.31	0.36	0.22	0.51	0.31	0.51	0.31	0.47	0.25	0.02	0.07	0.17	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.02	0.06	0.15	0.18
<b>Narrow Military</b>	222	0.28	0.40	0.11	0.29	0.27	0.15	0.59	0.26	0.64	0.25	0.42	0.20	0.02	0.05	0.20	0.16	0.16	0.13	0.01	0.02	0.19	0.16
<b>Political</b>	528	0.35	0.39	0.14	0.25	0.30	0.18	0.56	0.28	0.56	0.28	0.48	0.20	0.02	0.05	0.18	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.01	0.04	0.15	0.14
<b>Social</b>	117	0.51	0.32	0.24	0.22	0.33	0.16	0.46	0.27	0.56	0.27	0.52	0.20	0.02	0.05	0.21	0.16	0.11	0.11	0.01	0.03	0.12	0.12
<b>Total</b>	867	0.35	0.39	0.14	0.26	0.29	0.17	0.56	0.28	0.58	0.27	0.47	0.20	0.02	0.05	0.19	0.15	0.16	0.14	0.01	0.03	0.15	0.14
<b>Broad 2004</b>	351	0.34	0.46	0.13	0.31	0.36	0.21	0.52	0.31	0.53	0.30	0.47	0.24	0.02	0.07	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.01	0.05	0.15	0.17
<b>2008</b>	495	0.34	0.49	0.13	0.33	0.37	0.22	0.49	0.31	0.50	0.31	0.47	0.25	0.03	0.07	0.17	0.19	0.16	0.18	0.02	0.06	0.15	0.19
<b>2012</b>	391	0.33	0.47	0.12	0.30	0.37	0.23	0.52	0.32	0.51	0.32	0.47	0.25	0.02	0.07	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.02	0.06	0.15	0.18
<b>Total</b>	1237	0.34	0.47	0.13	0.31	0.36	0.22	0.51	0.31	0.51	0.31	0.47	0.25	0.02	0.07	0.17	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.02	0.06	0.15	0.18
<b>Narrow 2004</b>	228	0.33	0.41	0.13	0.29	0.31	0.18	0.56	0.29	0.56	0.28	0.45	0.21	0.02	0.05	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.15	0.01	0.04	0.16	0.17
<b>2008</b>	380	0.37	0.37	0.16	0.24	0.29	0.16	0.55	0.28	0.57	0.27	0.47	0.20	0.02	0.05	0.19	0.15	0.15	0.13	0.01	0.03	0.15	0.14
<b>2012</b>	259	0.35	0.38	0.14	0.25	0.29	0.17	0.56	0.27	0.62	0.28	0.47	0.20	0.02	0.05	0.18	0.13	0.16	0.15	0.01	0.03	0.15	0.14
<b>Total</b>	867	0.35	0.39	0.14	0.26	0.29	0.17	0.56	0.28	0.58	0.27	0.47	0.20	0.02	0.05	0.19	0.15	0.16	0.14	0.01	0.03	0.15	0.14

Table 4-2 VICs Indexes of the American Collective Self - World of All the Issues



## **1- The Collectivity of the Seven Think Tanks**

The main goal of this section is to investigate the rules of conduct of the American collective Self from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks. It examines the stability of the rules of conduct of the American collective Self over time in the four issue areas. The first question asks whether the rules of conduct of the American collective Self changed over time. Table 4-4, presents the VICS indexes of the American Collective Self in each world and over time. To answer the question of this section, a MANOVA test was conducted using Time as the independent variable and the eleven Instrumental indexes as the dependent variables. The MANOVA test was conducted for each of the definitions of the Self (Narrow and Broad) and for each of the four worlds. The expectation was that the American collective Self would not have different rules of conduct across time (2004, 2008, and 2012). The results of these eight MANOVA tests are shown in Table 4-3. As this table shows, neither the Broad definition nor the Narrow definition showed any statistically significant change across time in any of their four worlds. The MANOVA tests show that the rules of conduct of the American collective Self were stable across time, regardless of the definition of the Self as Broad or Narrow.

**Multivariate Tests**

Batch				Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Broad	All	Time	Pillai's Trace	.016	.881	22	2450	.622	.008
	Military	Time	Pillai's Trace	.086	.984	22	480	.484	.043
	Political	Time	Pillai's Trace	.032	1.201	22	1606	.236	.016
	Social	Time	Pillai's Trace	.114	.870	22	316	.635	.057
Narrow	All	Time	Pillai's Trace	.037	1.483	22	1710	.069	.019
	Military	Time	Pillai's Trace	.103	1.042	22	420	.411	.052
	Political	Time	Pillai's Trace	.052	1.247	22	1032	.199	.026
	Social	Time	Pillai's Trace	.178	.930	22	210	.556	.089

**Table 4-3 MANOVA - Impact of Time on the VICS Indexes of the American Collective Self - All the Four Worlds**

			I1		I2		I3		I4a		I4b		I5ap		I5pr		I5re		I5th		I5op		I5pu		
			N	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Broad	2004	Military	59	0.45	0.50	0.18	0.34	0.39	0.22	0.42	0.33	0.55	0.30	0.51	0.25	0.02	0.06	0.20	0.17	0.12	0.14	0.00	0.01	0.15	0.20
		Political	257	0.32	0.45	0.13	0.30	0.36	0.21	0.53	0.29	0.51	0.31	0.48	0.24	0.02	0.06	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.02	0.06	0.14	0.16
		Social	35	0.30	0.45	0.11	0.35	0.30	0.18	0.58	0.33	0.60	0.27	0.40	0.21	0.04	0.09	0.21	0.18	0.13	0.15	0.00	0.01	0.22	0.22
	2008	Military	111	0.39	0.46	0.15	0.32	0.37	0.19	0.49	0.31	0.50	0.32	0.50	0.22	0.02	0.06	0.17	0.17	0.15	0.17	0.01	0.05	0.14	0.19
		Political	307	0.31	0.50	0.12	0.33	0.37	0.23	0.49	0.30	0.49	0.32	0.46	0.26	0.03	0.08	0.17	0.18	0.17	0.19	0.02	0.06	0.15	0.19
		Social	77	0.38	0.48	0.17	0.34	0.35	0.22	0.48	0.31	0.57	0.26	0.45	0.25	0.03	0.07	0.21	0.21	0.14	0.17	0.01	0.05	0.16	0.17
	2012	Military	82	0.30	0.50	0.13	0.32	0.36	0.20	0.50	0.30	0.55	0.33	0.44	0.25	0.03	0.07	0.18	0.17	0.19	0.20	0.01	0.04	0.15	0.19
		Political	251	0.33	0.44	0.12	0.28	0.36	0.24	0.55	0.31	0.50	0.31	0.48	0.24	0.02	0.06	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.02	0.07	0.15	0.18
		Social	58	0.38	0.51	0.15	0.32	0.40	0.27	0.46	0.34	0.51	0.34	0.49	0.28	0.03	0.08	0.17	0.18	0.14	0.19	0.02	0.08	0.15	0.18
	Total	Military	252	0.37	0.48	0.15	0.33	0.37	0.20	0.48	0.32	0.53	0.32	0.48	0.24	0.02	0.07	0.18	0.17	0.16	0.18	0.01	0.04	0.15	0.19
		Political	815	0.32	0.47	0.12	0.30	0.36	0.22	0.52	0.30	0.50	0.31	0.47	0.25	0.02	0.07	0.17	0.18	0.17	0.19	0.02	0.06	0.15	0.17
		Social	170	0.36	0.48	0.15	0.33	0.36	0.23	0.49	0.33	0.55	0.29	0.45	0.25	0.03	0.07	0.20	0.19	0.14	0.17	0.01	0.06	0.17	0.18
Narrow	2004	Military	54	0.24	0.44	0.08	0.37	0.30	0.20	0.59	0.28	0.62	0.24	0.39	0.20	0.02	0.04	0.21	0.20	0.16	0.13	0.00	0.01	0.22	0.22
		Political	152	0.34	0.40	0.13	0.27	0.31	0.18	0.56	0.29	0.53	0.29	0.47	0.21	0.03	0.06	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.15	0.02	0.04	0.15	0.14
		Social	22	0.47	0.36	0.21	0.21	0.33	0.20	0.49	0.30	0.56	0.28	0.50	0.23	0.01	0.03	0.22	0.15	0.12	0.12	0.00	0.01	0.14	0.13
	2008	Military	104	0.35	0.38	0.14	0.26	0.27	0.13	0.56	0.26	0.63	0.26	0.45	0.19	0.02	0.04	0.21	0.15	0.14	0.12	0.01	0.03	0.17	0.14
		Political	219	0.35	0.37	0.14	0.24	0.29	0.17	0.57	0.28	0.55	0.27	0.48	0.20	0.02	0.05	0.17	0.14	0.17	0.14	0.01	0.03	0.14	0.13
		Social	57	0.48	0.35	0.22	0.24	0.33	0.16	0.48	0.27	0.55	0.27	0.49	0.22	0.02	0.06	0.22	0.18	0.11	0.12	0.01	0.04	0.14	0.13
	2012	Military	64	0.22	0.37	0.07	0.25	0.25	0.14	0.64	0.24	0.65	0.26	0.41	0.19	0.02	0.07	0.18	0.14	0.19	0.15	0.01	0.03	0.19	0.14
		Political	157	0.35	0.39	0.14	0.25	0.29	0.18	0.56	0.28	0.61	0.29	0.47	0.20	0.02	0.05	0.18	0.14	0.17	0.15	0.01	0.03	0.15	0.14
		Social	38	0.59	0.24	0.27	0.18	0.32	0.15	0.41	0.23	0.58	0.26	0.57	0.13	0.03	0.05	0.20	0.12	0.10	0.08	0.01	0.03	0.09	0.10
	Total	Military	222	0.28	0.40	0.11	0.29	0.27	0.15	0.59	0.26	0.64	0.25	0.42	0.20	0.02	0.05	0.20	0.16	0.16	0.13	0.01	0.02	0.19	0.16
		Political	528	0.35	0.39	0.14	0.25	0.30	0.18	0.56	0.28	0.56	0.28	0.48	0.20	0.02	0.05	0.18	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.01	0.04	0.15	0.14
		Social	117	0.51	0.32	0.24	0.22	0.33	0.16	0.46	0.27	0.56	0.27	0.52	0.20	0.02	0.05	0.21	0.16	0.11	0.11	0.01	0.03	0.12	0.12

**Table 4-4 VICs Indexes of the American Collective Self over Time - World of All the Issues**

The question arises whether the rules of conduct of the American collective Self differed across topics. To answer this question, a MANOVA test was conducted using Topic as the independent variable and eleven instrumental indexes as the dependent variables. The MANOVA test was conducted for each of the definitions of the Self. The expectation was that the American collective Self would have different rules of conduct in each issue area (military, political, and social). The results of the two MANOVA tests appear in Table 4-5, which indicates that the results for two definitions of the Self were different. For the Broad definition, there was no statistically significant effect of Topic on VICS indexes. However, based on the Narrow definition, there was a statistically significant effect of Topic on VICS indexes, but the effect size was small. The tests of between-subjects effects (Table 4-6) showed that using the Narrow definition of American collective Self, the difference among the three worlds was significant in all but two of the eleven Instrumental indexes: Utility of Promising (I5pr) and Utility of Threatening (I5th). However, as expected, the effect of Topic on the rest of the VICS indexes was small.

**Multivariate Tests**

Batch			Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Broad	Topic	Pillai's Trace	.026	1.481	22	2450	.069	.013
Narrow	Topic	Pillai's Trace	.063	2.528	22	1710	.000	.032

**Table 4-5 MANOVA - Impact of Topic on the VICS Indexes of the American Collective Self**

**Tests of Between-Subjects Effects**

Batch			Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Narrow	Topic	I1: Direction of Strategy	5.052	2	2.526	14.073	.000	.032
		I2: Intensity of Tactics	1.294	2	.647	9.915	.000	.022
		I3: Risk Orientation	3.241	2	1.621	5.326	.005	.012
		I4a: Flexibility of Tactics	1.421	2	.710	9.388	.000	.021
		I4b: Words and Deeds	.410	2	.205	5.495	.004	.013
		I5: Appeal	.797	2	.398	10.049	.000	.023
		I5: Promise	.004	2	.002	.701	.496	.002
		I5: Reward	1.739	2	.870	4.605	.010	.011
		I5: Oppose	3.337	2	1.668	9.426	.000	.021
		I5: Threaten	.003	2	.001	1.307	.271	.003
		I5: Punish	3.135	2	1.567	7.887	.000	.018

**Table 4-6 Impact of Topic on the Individual VICs Indexes of the American Collective Self**

**2- Seven Think Tanks, Seven Rules of Conduct?**

The focus of the second section is to compare the American collective Self from the perspective of the seven think tanks. The main question asks whether the seven think tanks assigned different rules of conduct to the American collective Self. If they did, which think tanks were the most different?

**2-1 The American Collective Self and Differences among the Seven Think Tanks**

Section 2-1 asks whether the seven think tanks assigned different rules of conduct to the American collective Self. To answer this question, a MANOVA test was conducted using Think Tank as the independent variable and the eleven Instrumental indexes as the dependent variables. The MANOVA test was conducted for both of definitions of the Self (Broad and Narrow) and in any of the four worlds of action. The expectation was that different think tanks (AEI, Brookings, Carnegie, Cato, CFR, Heritage, and RAND) would assign different rules of conduct to the American collective Self. Table 4-7 shows the results of these eight MANOVA tests. The Pillai's trace method showed that based on

the Broad definition of the Self there was no statistically significant difference among the seven think tanks when they allocated actions to the American collective Self.

				<b>Multivariate Tests</b>					
Batch				Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Broad	All	Think Tank	Pillai's Trace	0.038	0.719	66	7350	0.96	0.006
	Military	Think Tank	Pillai's Trace	0.189	0.711	66	1440	0.96	0.032
	Political	Think Tank	Pillai's Trace	0.068	0.832	66	4818	0.83	0.011
	Social	Think Tank	Pillai's Trace	0.272	0.682	66	948	0.97	0.045
Narrow	All	Think Tank	Pillai's Trace	0.161	2.143	66	5130	0.00	0.027
	Military	Think Tank	Pillai's Trace	0.423	1.447	66	1260	0.01	0.070
	Political	Think Tank	Pillai's Trace	0.188	1.516	66	3096	0.00	0.031
	Social	Think Tank	Pillai's Trace	0.601	1.063	66	630	0.35	0.100

**Table 4-7 MANOVA - Impact of Think Tanks on the VICS Indexes of the American Collective Self**

On the other hand, the Pillai's trace method showed that, based on the Narrow definition of the Self, there was a statistically significant difference among the seven think tanks in the three worlds of all the issues, military issues, and political issues. In the worlds of all the issues and political issues, the magnitude of difference among the seven think tanks was small. On the other hand, the magnitude of difference among the seven think tanks in regard to military issues was medium. In the world of social issues, the seven think tanks' allocation of action to the United States did not show any significant difference.

Now that it has been established that the seven think tanks differed in allocation of action to American collective Self in the three worlds of all the issues, political issues and military issues, the question becomes which think tanks differed most in any of the three worlds. Since only the Narrow definition of the Self showed statistically significant difference among the think tanks, only the Narrow batch will be considered. To test the

dissimilarity of rules of conduct of any two think tanks, the MANOVA test was followed by *post hoc* comparisons using the Tukey HSD test. To map the approximate relative position of the seven think tanks from each other, the MANOVA test was followed by a discriminant analysis.

## **2-2 The World of All the Issues**

In the previous section (2-1), it was shown that when considering all the issues, the seven think tanks differed from each other when they allocated actions to the American collective Self. It was also shown that the magnitude of this difference was small. The main question of this section (2-2) asks which think tanks were the most dissimilar in assigning actions to the American collective Self in regard to all the issues. Table 4-8 presents the VICS indexes of the seven think tanks in the world of all the issues. The VICS indexes were calculated using the transitive verbs that each think tank used for the American collective Self in the world of all the issues. As Table 4-8 shows, in the world of all the issues, and relative to other think tanks, CATO, AEI, and CFR used more conflictual verbs for the American collective self, while Heritage, Brookings, and RAND used more cooperative verbs.

	N	I1		I2		I3		I4a		I4b		I5ap		I5pr		I5re		I5th		I5op		I5pu	
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
<b>Carnegie</b> <b>Narrow</b>	127	0.35	0.41	0.14	0.27	0.30	0.17	0.55	0.29	0.58	0.29	0.48	0.21	0.02	0.06	0.17	0.14	0.16	0.14	0.01	0.03	0.15	0.16
<b>Brookings</b> <b>Narrow</b>	176	0.42	0.39	0.16	0.25	0.33	0.18	0.50	0.29	0.55	0.26	0.52	0.20	0.02	0.05	0.16	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.01	0.04	0.14	0.13
<b>RAND</b> <b>Narrow</b>	127	0.40	0.34	0.17	0.21	0.26	0.15	0.55	0.26	0.64	0.23	0.48	0.17	0.02	0.03	0.20	0.11	0.15	0.12	0.01	0.02	0.15	0.12
<b>CFR</b> <b>Narrow</b>	92	0.23	0.44	0.07	0.32	0.29	0.17	0.58	0.26	0.60	0.28	0.40	0.22	0.02	0.04	0.20	0.18	0.16	0.14	0.01	0.03	0.22	0.19
<b>Heritage</b> <b>Narrow</b>	182	0.44	0.34	0.21	0.24	0.31	0.19	0.53	0.29	0.55	0.30	0.48	0.20	0.02	0.05	0.21	0.18	0.15	0.13	0.01	0.03	0.12	0.13
<b>AEI</b> <b>Narrow</b>	103	0.23	0.37	0.07	0.27	0.25	0.13	0.65	0.25	0.61	0.27	0.41	0.18	0.02	0.06	0.18	0.15	0.18	0.15	0.01	0.03	0.20	0.16
<b>Cato</b> <b>Narrow</b>	60	0.22	0.39	0.08	0.22	0.25	0.14	0.63	0.25	0.57	0.27	0.42	0.21	0.02	0.05	0.17	0.14	0.21	0.15	0.02	0.04	0.16	0.12
<b>Total</b> <b>Narrow</b>	867	0.35	0.39	0.14	0.26	0.29	0.17	0.56	0.28	0.58	0.27	0.47	0.20	0.02	0.05	0.19	0.15	0.16	0.14	0.01	0.03	0.15	0.14

**Table 4-8 VICS Indexes of the Individual Think Tanks - World of All the Issues - Self**

	AEI	Brookings	Carnegie	Cato	CFR	Heritage	RAND	Grand Total
AEI		7	5	0	0	6	4	22
Brookings	7		0	6	4	1	0	18
Carnegie	5	0		3	4	0	0	12
Cato	0	6	3		0	4	3	16
CFR	0	4	4	0		4	4	16
Heritage	6	1	0	4	4		1	16
RAND	4	0	0	3	4	1		12
Grand Total	22	18	12	16	16	16	12	112

**Table 4-9 Dissimilarity among the Pairs of Think Tanks in the World of All the Issues - Self**

Table 4-9 shows the number of times that the allocation of action to the American collective Self by any two think tanks were found statistically different in the eleven *post hoc* comparison tests using the Tukey HSD test.<sup>1</sup> As Table 4-9 shows, AEI was most different from Brookings and least different from Cato and CFR. Brookings differed most from AEI and least from Carnegie and RAND. Carnegie was most different from AEI and least different from Brookings, Heritage, and RAND. Cato differed most from Brookings and least from AEI and CFR. CFR was most different from Brookings, Carnegie, Heritage, and RAND and least different from AEI and Cato. Heritage differed most from AEI and least from Carnegie. RAND was most different from AEI and CFR and least different from Brookings and Carnegie. The above analysis shows that, in the world of all the issues, the allocation of action to the American collective Self could be generally used to predict the ideological grouping of a think tank. The two exceptions were Heritage and CFR. As in the other levels of comparison, CFR was least different from the Right than from the Left or the Center. In regard to the American collective Self, Heritage showed a sharp difference from the conservative camp. Allocation of action to

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<sup>1</sup>  $p \leq 0.05$



the American collective Self by Heritage was the most different from the Right and least different from the Left.

To map the relative position of the seven think tanks from one another, a discriminant analysis was conducted using the eleven Instrumental indexes as the independent variables and Think Tank as the grouping variable. The results of the discriminant analysis are presented in Table 4-10 and Table 4-11. As Table 4-11 shows, the discriminant analysis revealed three statistically significant functions.

Eigenvalues					
Batch		Eigenvalue	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Canonical Correlation
Narrow	1	.066	39.5	39.5	.249
	2	.038	22.9	62.4	.192
	3	.027	15.9	78.3	.161
	4	.017	10.1	88.5	.129
	5	.014	8.1	96.5	.116
	6	.006	3.5	100.0	.076

**Table 4-10 Eigenvalues - Think Tanks' Collective Self in the World of All the Issues**

Wilks' Lambda					
Batch		Wilks' Lambda	Chi-square	df	Sig.
Narrow	1 through 6	.849	140.791	66	.000
	2 through 6	.905	85.760	50	.001
	3 through 6	.940	53.471	36	.031
	4 through 6	.965	30.933	24	.156
	5 through 6	.981	16.497	14	.284
	6	.994	4.977	6	.547

**Table 4-11 Wilks' Lambda - Think Tanks' Collective Self in the World of All the Issues**

As Table 4-10 shows, the first two functions explained 62% of the total variance. The discriminant function plot (Figure 4-1) shows how the centroids of the seven think tanks were positioned relative to each other based on the first two discriminant functions. As Figure 4-1 shows, and based on the 62% variance, the two discriminant functions

separated the think tanks into four groups, Heritage paired with Brookings and Carnegie; RAND and Cato were each single-member groups, and AEI paired with CFR.




Figure 4-1 Discriminant Functions Plot – Think Tanks’ Collective Self in the World of All the Issues

### 2-3 The World of Military Issues

Section 2-2 showed the dissimilarity among the think tanks in the world of all the issues and based on their perception of the rules of conduct of the American collective Self. This section (2-3) compares the seven think tanks on the basis of their allocation of action to the American collective Self in the world of military issues. Table 4-13 presents the VICS indexes of the seven think tanks in the world of military issues. The VICS

indexes were calculated using the transitive verbs that each think tank used for the American collective Self in the world of military issues. As Table 4-13 shows, in the world of military issues, and relative to other think tanks, CFR used more conflictual verbs for the American collective self, while Heritage used more cooperative verbs.

	AEI	Brookings	Carnegie	Cato	CFR	Heritage	RAND	Grand Total
AEI		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brookings	0		0	2	2	0	0	4
Carnegie	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
Cato	0	2	0		1	3	1	7
CFR	0	2	0	1		3	1	7
Heritage	0	0	0	3	3		0	6
RAND	0	0	0	1	1	0		2
Grand Total	0	4	0	7	7	6	2	26

**Table 4-12 Dissimilarity among the Pairs of Think Tanks in the World of Military Issues - Self**

Table 4-12 shows the number of times that the allocation of action to the American collective Self by any two think tanks was found to be statistically different in the eleven *post hoc* comparison tests using the Tukey HSD test.<sup>1</sup> As Table 4-12 shows, no two think tanks were different from each other with moderate confidence.

To map the relative position of the seven think tanks from each other, a discriminant analysis was conducted using the eleven Instrumental indexes as the independent variables and Think Tank as the grouping variable. The results of the discriminant analysis appear in Table 4-14 and Table 4-15. As Table 4-15 shows, the discriminant analysis found only one statistically significant function, which explained 43% of the variance (Table 4-14). Since there was only one significant function, the discriminant plot and its subsequent analysis were not computed at this level.

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<sup>1</sup>  $p \leq 0.05$

	N	I1		I2		I3		I4a		I4b		I5ap		I5pr		I5re		I5th		I5op		I5pu	
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
<b>Carnegie</b> Narrow	18	0.15	0.40	0.02	0.26	0.24	0.14	0.66	0.25	0.66	0.26	0.40	0.17	0.01	0.03	0.16	0.10	0.21	0.16	0.01	0.02	0.21	0.17
<b>Brookings</b> Narrow	27	0.38	0.33	0.12	0.25	0.30	0.14	0.57	0.25	0.61	0.26	0.50	0.19	0.02	0.05	0.17	0.18	0.12	0.10	0.01	0.03	0.18	0.12
<b>RAND</b> Narrow	66	0.33	0.35	0.12	0.23	0.25	0.15	0.61	0.27	0.65	0.23	0.45	0.17	0.02	0.03	0.19	0.10	0.16	0.13	0.01	0.02	0.17	0.14
<b>CFR</b> Narrow	28	0.06	0.56	-0.04	0.43	0.33	0.21	0.54	0.31	0.64	0.26	0.31	0.24	0.01	0.02	0.21	0.21	0.16	0.16	0.01	0.02	0.31	0.24
<b>Heritage</b> Narrow	44	0.43	0.32	0.24	0.27	0.29	0.16	0.54	0.27	0.62	0.27	0.43	0.19	0.02	0.04	0.27	0.20	0.14	0.12	0.01	0.03	0.13	0.14
<b>AEI</b> Narrow	26	0.23	0.35	0.08	0.27	0.23	0.11	0.64	0.21	0.69	0.24	0.39	0.18	0.03	0.10	0.20	0.13	0.18	0.12	0.00	0.01	0.20	0.15
<b>Cato</b> Narrow	13	0.15	0.42	0.05	0.24	0.26	0.10	0.61	0.19	0.49	0.31	0.40	0.22	0.02	0.05	0.15	0.15	0.26	0.15	0.01	0.04	0.15	0.13
<b>Total</b> Narrow	222	0.28	0.40	0.11	0.29	0.27	0.15	0.59	0.26	0.64	0.25	0.42	0.20	0.02	0.05	0.20	0.16	0.16	0.13	0.01	0.02	0.19	0.16

**Table 4-13 VICS Indexes of the Individual Think Tanks - World of Military Issues - Self**

**Eigenvalues**

Batch			Eigenvalue	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Canonical Correlation
Narrow Military	1		0.203	42.6	42.6	.410
	2		0.091	19.1	61.7	.288
	3		0.083	17.4	79.1	.276
	4		0.057	12.1	91.2	.233
	5		0.03	6.3	97.6	.171
	6		0.012	2.4	100.0	.107

**Table 4-14 Eigenvalues - Think Tanks' Collective Self in the World of Military Issues**

**Wilks' Lambda**

Batch			Wilks' Lambda	Chi-square	df	Sig.
Narrow Military	1 through 6		.639	94.886	66	.011
	2 through 6		.769	55.792	50	.266
	3 through 6		.838	37.386	36	.405
	4 through 6		.908	20.559	24	.665
	5 through 6		.960	8.715	14	.849
	6		.989	2.434	6	.876

**Table 4-15 Wilks' Lambda - Think Tanks' Collective Self in the World of Military Issues**

**2-4 The World of Political Issues**

This section (2-4) compares the seven think tanks based on their allocation of action to the American collective Self in the world of political issues. Table 4-17 presents the VICS indexes of the seven think tanks in the world of political issues. The VICS indexes were calculated using the transitive verbs that each think tank used for the American collective Self in the world of political issues. As Table 4-17 shows, in the world of political issues, and relative to other think tanks, AEI, CFR, and CATO used more conflictual verbs for the American collective Self, while Heritage, RAND, and Brookings used more cooperative verbs. Table 4-16 shows the number of times that the

allocation of action to the American collective Self by any two think tanks was found to be statistically different in the eleven *post hoc* comparison tests using the Tukey HSD.<sup>1</sup>

	AEI	Brookings	Carnegie	Cato	CFR	Heritage	RAND	Grand Total
AEI		4	3	0	1	6	4	18
Brookings	4		0	0	2	0	1	7
Carnegie	3	0		0	0	1	0	4
Cato	0	0	0		0	1	1	2
CFR	1	2	0	0		2	2	7
Heritage	6	0	1	1	2		2	12
RAND	4	1	0	1	2	2		10
Grand Total	18	7	4	2	7	12	10	60

**Table 4-16 Dissimilarity among the Pairs of Think Tanks in the World of Political Issues - Self**

As Table 4-16 shows, AEI was most different from Heritage and least different from Cato. Brookings was most different from AEI and least different from Carnegie, Cato, and Heritage. Carnegie, Cato, and CFR did not show with at least moderate confidence any dissimilarity to the other think tanks. Heritage differed most from AEI and least from Brookings. RAND was most different from AEI and least different from Carnegie. The above analysis shows that in the world of political issues, the VICS indexes were not able to predict the political orientation of the think tanks all the time.

To map the relative position of the seven think tanks from each other, a discriminant analysis was conducted using the eleven Instrumental indexes as the independent variables and Think Tank as the grouping variable. The result of this discriminant analysis appears in Table 4-18 and Table 4-19. As Table 4-18 shows, the discriminant analysis found only one statistically significant function, which explained 43% of the variance (Table 4-19). Since there was only one significant function, the discriminant plot and its subsequent analysis were not computed at this level.

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<sup>1</sup>  $p \leq 0.05$

		I1		I2		I3		I4a		I4b		I5ap		I5pr		I5re		I5th		I5op		I5pu		
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
	Narrow	N																						
<b>Carnegie</b>	<b>Narrow</b>	87	0.33	0.41	0.13	0.27	0.30	0.18	0.56	0.29	0.59	0.30	0.47	0.22	0.03	0.06	0.17	0.14	0.17	0.13	0.01	0.03	0.15	0.16
<b>Brookings</b>	<b>Narrow</b>	119	0.40	0.42	0.15	0.25	0.33	0.20	0.51	0.30	0.53	0.27	0.52	0.21	0.02	0.05	0.15	0.13	0.16	0.16	0.02	0.04	0.13	0.13
<b>RAND</b>	<b>Narrow</b>	43	0.43	0.30	0.21	0.19	0.25	0.10	0.53	0.22	0.63	0.22	0.48	0.14	0.01	0.03	0.22	0.11	0.16	0.13	0.01	0.03	0.12	0.09
<b>CFR</b>	<b>Narrow</b>	47	0.23	0.35	0.07	0.23	0.25	0.15	0.65	0.23	0.59	0.29	0.41	0.20	0.02	0.05	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.13	0.01	0.03	0.20	0.14
<b>Heritage</b>	<b>Narrow</b>	122	0.44	0.35	0.21	0.24	0.33	0.20	0.52	0.29	0.52	0.30	0.50	0.20	0.02	0.05	0.20	0.17	0.16	0.14	0.01	0.03	0.11	0.12
<b>AEI</b>	<b>Narrow</b>	71	0.21	0.38	0.05	0.26	0.27	0.14	0.66	0.27	0.58	0.29	0.42	0.18	0.02	0.04	0.17	0.16	0.18	0.16	0.01	0.04	0.20	0.17
<b>Cato</b>	<b>Narrow</b>	39	0.25	0.35	0.09	0.20	0.23	0.13	0.65	0.25	0.61	0.27	0.43	0.19	0.03	0.06	0.17	0.12	0.20	0.14	0.02	0.04	0.16	0.10
<b>Total</b>	<b>Narrow</b>	528	0.35	0.39	0.14	0.25	0.30	0.18	0.56	0.28	0.56	0.28	0.48	0.20	0.02	0.05	0.18	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.01	0.04	0.15	0.14

**Table 4-17 VICS Indexes of the Individual Think Tanks - World of Political Issues - Self**

**Eigenvalues**

Batch			Eigenvalue	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Canonical Correlation
Narrow	Political	1	0.085	42.8	42.8	.279
		2	0.046	23.5	66.3	.211
		3	0.031	15.5	81.8	.173
		4	0.023	11.8	93.6	.151
		5	0.008	4.2	97.8	.091
		6	0.004	2.2	100.0	.066

**Table 4-18 Eigenvalues - Think Tanks' Collective Self in the World of Political Issues**

Batch			Wilks' Lambda	Chi-square	df	Sig.
Narrow	Political	1 through 6	.825	99.875	66	.005
		2 through 6	.895	57.745	50	.211
		3 through 6	.936	34.214	36	.554
		4 through 6	.965	18.539	24	.776
		5 through 6	.987	6.564	14	.950
		6	.996	2.265	6	.894

**Table 4-19 Wilks' Lambda - Think Tanks' Collective Self in the World of Political Issues**

**Summary**

Chapter Four showed that the rules of conduct of the American collective Self were very stable across time and not very different across topics. It showed that Broad and Narrow definitions of the American collective Self differed from each other and that the Broad definition was more stable than the Narrow definition. This chapter also showed that, pertaining to social actions of the American collective Self, there was no statistically significant difference among the think tanks. It also showed that, in terms of the world of all the issues, the allocation of action to the American collective Self could generally predict the ideological grouping of a think tank.



## CHAPTER 5 : U.S. SIGNIFICANT OTHERS

### Introduction

In this chapter, the view of the American foreign policy think tanks towards other actors will be assessed and compared. The operational code literature does not differentiate among members of the Other. Therefore, the operational code of the Other is calculated based on the transitive verbs that are used for allies, enemies, and rivals combined. Some of these actors are countries and some are non-state actors. I argue that the Other should not be treated as a single entity. The operational code of a status quo actor is likely to differ from the operational code of a revolutionary actor. Also, it is likely that states assign different types of actions to other countries based on their power. I also argue that the operational code of the Other should be calculated separately for each of the issue areas (all topics, military, political, and social).

This chapter will calculate and compare the operational code of the United States and its twenty-one most frequent “significant Others” in the four worlds of action. It first describes the process of identifying the twenty-two actors and then studies the United States and its twenty-one significant Others from the following three perspectives: **Operational Code of the Actor**, which asks what were the rules of conduct of the actor from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks; **Agreement among Think Tanks**, which asks which think tanks assigned overall cooperative/conflictual strategy to the actor, and **Similarity of the Actors**, which asks what was the relative position of the actor to other actors in the four worlds of American foreign policy think tanks. The smallest unit for the verb aggregation is the political actor and the smallest unit for the

topic classification is the sentence. Therefore, 500,000 labeled sentences are used in this chapter.

### **1- Significant Others in Relation to the United States**

To find the significant Others in relation to the United States, first all the documents published by the think tanks in the time periods bracketing the three general elections of 2004, 2008, and 2012, were merged together. Then all the sentences that had transitive verbs were separated out. In this step, a total of 580,493 sentences was identified. Then the subjects of these sentences were extracted. In this step, 9,000 unique subjects were found, of which the majority were sparsely known or unknown subjects. In the next step, all the 9,000 subjects were checked manually, and those subjects referring to a particular political entity were tagged to be grouped under one name. For instance, the words, *Russia*, *Russians*, *Moscow*, *Putin*, *Gorbachev*, and *Kremlin* were all grouped under the general noun of *Russia*. Then, using a python script, all the subjects of the sentences were changed to more general nouns. Table 5-1 presents the result of this process and shows the most frequent general subjects that were mentioned by the American foreign policy think tanks.

<b>The Most Frequent Actors</b>								
	<b>AEI</b>	<b>Brookings</b>	<b>Carnegie</b>	<b>Cato</b>	<b>CFR</b>	<b>Heritage</b>	<b>RAND</b>	<b>Grand Total</b>
<b>OTHER SUBJECTS</b>	58679	104217	105750	26109	49714	51202	116298	511969
<b>USA*</b>	2779	3676	2854	1289	2166	3538	4283	20585
<b>CHINA*</b>	569	1154	1312	392	573	645	1834	6479
<b>RUSSIA*</b>	712	807	2038	136	244	646	537	5120
<b>IRAN*</b>	1077	603	772	94	335	291	1164	4336
<b>EUROPE*</b>	602	638	1198	272	219	424	623	3976
<b>TERRORIST*</b>	485	589	676	94	417	481	1088	3830
<b>IRAQ*</b>	505	450	231	119	330	133	844	2612
<b>INDIA*</b>	152	261	518	139	132	265	253	1720
<b>NORTH KOREA*</b>	266	331	107	162	102	301	309	1578
<b>ARAB WORLD</b>	111	297	466	25	137	52	288	1376
<b>PAKISTAN*</b>	53	271	330	70	133	132	260	1249
<b>TURKEY*</b>	206	270	330	36	43	68	271	1224
<b>JAPAN*</b>	248	284	208	47	78	150	201	1216
<b>ISRAEL*</b>	154	257	286	45	250	84	125	1201
<b>AFGHANISTAN*</b>	147	221	232	46	124	80	349	1199
<b>MUSLIM WORLD*</b>	129	166	380	36	103	64	261	1139
<b>UNITED NATIONS*</b>	117	231	93	39	185	140	187	992
<b>EGYPT</b>	60	245	436	9	83	27	100	960
<b>SYRIA*</b>	114	174	317	34	86	73	90	888
<b>BRITAIN*</b>	139	111	164	42	74	168	138	836
<b>SOUTH KOREA*</b>	41	91	41	63	89	73	413	811
<b>GERMANY*</b>	111	78	295	51	45	57	93	730
<b>TAIWAN*</b>	50	179	109	52	24	58	181	653
<b>FRANCE*</b>	83	145	167	38	62	68	34	597
<b>VENEZUELA</b>	60	57	43	26	65	277	31	559
<b>PALESTINE</b>	62	81	150	18	90	38	50	489
<b>AFRICA</b>	51	159	28	72	56	56	54	476
<b>MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD</b>	14	108	195	1	10	14	25	367
<b>SUNNI</b>	34	38	43	10	38	14	86	263
<b>MEXICO</b>	11	72	22	3	36	67	27	238
<b>SHIAH</b>	41	20	26	9	36	7	29	168
<b>LEBANON</b>	8	11	116	2	7	4	7	155
<b>BREZIL</b>	17	54	20		15	7	2	115
<b>VIETNAM</b>	15	14	15	4	20	22	19	109
<b>TALIBAN</b>	12	22	30	6	4	7	25	106
<b>LATIN AMERICA</b>	8	17	5	2	5	18	9	64
<b>SALAFIS</b>	1	11	41			1	9	63
<b>CHRISTIAN</b>	6	13	7	11	2	3	3	45
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>67929</b>	<b>116423</b>	<b>120051</b>	<b>29603</b>	<b>56132</b>	<b>59755</b>	<b>130600</b>	<b>580493</b>

**Table 5-1 Most Frequent Subjects with Transitive Verbs**

As this table shows, the United States was the most frequent subject. The rest of the table is the list of the most frequent significant Others in relation to the United States. As Table 5-1 shows, not all of the significant Others of the United States were nation states. The American foreign policy think tanks frequently referred to political entities such as Terrorists, Arab world, Muslims, Europe, Shiahs, and Sunnis. Some of these non-state actors were geographical (e.g., Europe); some were ideological (e.g., the Muslim World); some were international organizations (e.g., the United Nations and the European Union); some were based on a tactic of warfare (e.g., Terrorists); and some were based on ethnicity (e.g., Arab World). In the next step, the political entities were selected that had overall high frequency and utterances in all the three worlds of military issues, political issues, and social issues. The result was the following list of twenty-two actors:

- |                |                 |                    |
|----------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| 1. Afghanistan | 9. Iraq         | 17. Syria          |
| 2. Britain     | 10. Islam       | 18. Taiwan         |
| 3. China       | 11. Israel      | 19. Terrorist      |
| 4. Europe      | 12. Japan       | 20. Turkey         |
| 5. France      | 13. North Korea | 21. United Nations |
| 6. Germany     | 14. Pakistan    | 22. United States  |
| 7. India       | 15. Russia      |                    |
| 8. Iran        | 16. South Korea |                    |

## **2- Operational Code of the Actor**

To extract the rules of conduct of a particular actor the sentences in which that actor was the subject of a transitive verb were chosen. These sentences were then grouped according to the time period during which they were published, the think tank that published them, and the topic of each sentence (all the issues, military issues, political issues, and social issues). Based on these attributes, the operational code of the actor was measured on fifty-seven levels:

- 1) Level of the transitive verbs used for an actor by each of the seven think tanks in each of the three elections (21 levels);
- 2) Level of the transitive verbs used for an actor by each of the seven think tanks in each of the three topics (21 levels);
- 3) Average of operational codes of an actor for each of the seven think tanks (7 levels);
- 4) Level of the transitive verbs used for an actor by the collectivity of the think tanks in each of the three elections (3 levels);
- 5) Level of transitive verbs used for an actor by the collectivity of the think tanks in all of the three elections (1 level);
- 6) Level of the transitive verbs used for an actor by the collectivity of the think tanks in each of the three topics (3 levels);
- 7) Average of operational codes of an actor by the collectivity of the think tanks. (1 Level).

As the result of these fifty-seven levels of verb aggregation, the operational code of any actor was calculated fifty-seven times. The result of this process appears in tables such as Table 5-5, which shows the operational code of Afghanistan from the perspective of the American foreign policy elite on fifty-seven levels. As Table 5-5 shows, the I-indexes of Afghanistan are colored relative to the I-indexes of other actors. Indexes with (+1) value are colored dark green and the indexes with (-1) or (0) value are colored dark red. The rest of the values are colored by different shades of green and red.

### **3- Comparing Think Tanks**

The index of direction of strategy (I1) was chosen as the basis for comparing think tanks' attitudes towards an actor. As Table 5-5 shows, each think tank produced seven instances of I1 index (2004, 2008, 2012, Military, Political, Social, and Three Topics) for an actor. Any time an I1 index was above the average of its level, it was considered cooperative; otherwise, it was classified as conflictual. The maximum number of times a think tank could attribute cooperative or conflictual actions/strategies to an actor was seven times. The result of this comparison was a table like Table 5-3. As this

table shows, RAND attributed cooperative actions to Afghanistan seven times (100% attribution of cooperative strategy to Afghanistan). On the other hand, Cato assigned conflictual actions to Afghanistan for all of the same seven instances (100% attribution of conflictual strategy to Afghanistan).

Table 5-4 shows the relative confidence of the seven think tanks in assigning strategy to a political actor. For instance, as Table 5-4 shows, the seven think tanks described the strategy of Terrorists fifty-seven times as conflictual. This shows that the seven think tanks had 100% confidence/certainty/agreement in describing the direction of the strategy of Terrorists. To compare different levels of confidence of the American foreign policy think tanks in describing the strategy of the actors, the following standard was used. A percentage of confidence between 100% and 50% indicated a high level of confidence/certainty/agreement; a percentage of confidence between 25% and 50% indicated a medium level of confidence/certainty/agreement; and less than 25% indicated a low level of confidence/certainty/agreement.

#### **4- Similarity of the Actors**

Based on the actions assigned to the United States and its significant Others, what was the relative similarity of these actors in the four worlds of American foreign policy think tanks? Which actors were most similar and which were least similar? To answer these questions, I used the eleven Instrumental indexes as the basis of comparison. I used the ALSCAL Multi-Dimensional Scaling (MDS) method to reduce the dimensions of comparison to two dimensions.<sup>1</sup> The ALSCAL scaling method looks for patterns in the

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<sup>1</sup> Forrest W. Young, "ALSCAL Software for Multidimensional Scaling," *ALSCAL*, accessed May 3, 2015, <http://forrest.psych.unc.edu/research/alscal.html>.

distances among the actors. It first calculates the Euclidian distance between any two actors based on their I-indexes. Then it creates a distance matrix from all the distances between actors. Then, using Young's S-stress formula and S-stress convergence of 0.001, it reduces the dimensions between the actors to two dimensions. By reducing the dimension to two, the ALSCAL creates a two dimensional map and locates actors relative to each other.

I compared the twenty-two actors on forty-four levels of verb aggregation. Table 5-2 shows the details of these forty-four levels of comparison. As this table shows, the actors were compared eleven times in any of the four worlds. The Appendix presents the plots of these forty-four multi-dimensional comparisons. As these plots show, any multidimensional scaling map has four quadrants. To estimate the similarity/dissimilarity of any two actors, I counted the number of times any two actors shared a quadrant in any of the four worlds. The result was four similarity-tables for each of the twenty-two actors. The maximum number of times that any two actors could be grouped together was forty-four times, which indicates 100% of similarity (0% of dissimilarity). If, in the forty-four times of comparison, two actors never shared a quadrant, they were regarded as 100% dissimilar (0% similar).

Think Tank	Year	Topic	Level(s)
Each of the Seven Think Tanks	All	All	7
Each of the Seven Think Tanks	All	Social	7
Each of the Seven Think Tanks	All	Political	7
Each of the Seven Think Tanks	All	Military	7
All the Think Tanks	All	All	1
All the Think Tanks	2012	All	1
All the Think Tanks	2012	Social	1
All the Think Tanks	2012	Political	1
All the Think Tanks	2012	Military	1
All the Think Tanks	2008	All	1
All the Think Tanks	2008	Social	1
All the Think Tanks	2008	Political	1
All the Think Tanks	2008	Military	1
All the Think Tanks	2004	All	1
All the Think Tanks	2004	Social	1
All the Think Tanks	2004	Political	1
All the Think Tanks	2004	Military	1
All the Think Tanks	All	Military	1
All the Think Tanks	All	Political	1
All the Think Tanks	All	Social	1

Table 5-2 Forty-Four Levels of Verb Aggregation/Comparison

To visualize the relative position of the actors in the worlds of American foreign policy think tanks, I created twenty-two separate radar charts based on the four similarity-tables. These radar charts should be read clockwise, with most similar actor positioned at the end of the hour. These radar charts visualize the similarity of an actor to other twenty-one actors in five colors:

- 1) **Red**: shows the number of times an actor shared a quadrant with another actor in the world of military issues;
- 2) **Green**: shows the number of times an actor shared a quadrant with another actor in the world of social issues;
- 3) **Yellow**: shows the number of times an actor shared a quadrant with another actor in the world of political issues;
- 4) **Light Blue**: shows the number of times an actor shared a quadrant with another actor in the world of all the issues;
- 5) **Black**: shows the total number of times an actor shared a quadrant with another actor.



The next section presents the result of the above analysis for all the twenty-two actors. For each of the actors, the following three questions will be answered:

- 1) How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive the actor's operational code, and did they agree in their assessment?
- 2) Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to the actor? Did any of the think tanks show consistency in assigning actions to the actor across the levels of time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view the actions by the actor?
- 3) What was the actor's relative position in the world of American foreign policy think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to that actor?

## **Afghanistan**

### **How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Afghanistan's operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of Afghanistan's actions?**

Table 5-5 shows the I-indexes of Afghanistan on fifty-seven levels of time and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Afghanistan, the overall perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was neither cooperative nor conflictual. Table 5-3 presents the number of times Afghanistan's index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of I1 (direction of strategy) on seven levels.<sup>1</sup> In this table, whenever the index of direction of strategy was above the average of its level it was considered cooperative; otherwise it was considered conflictual. As Table 5-3 shows, the American think tanks described Afghanistan's strategy as conflictual twenty-seven times and cooperative thirty times. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American foreign policy think tanks had a very low level of certainty about the direction of strategy of Afghanistan. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 5% agreement in describing

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<sup>1</sup> 2004, 2008, 2012, military issues, political issues, social issues, and all the issues. From now on, they are referred to as "seven levels" or "seven instances."

Afghanistan's direction of strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked Afghanistan tenth based on its conflictual actions and fourteenth based on its cooperative actions.

<b>AFGHANISTAN</b>		
	<b>CONFLICTUAL</b>	<b>COOPERATIVE</b>
RAND		7
Brookings	1	6
Carnegie	2	5
CFR	2	5
Seven Think Tanks	3	5
AEI	6	1
Heritage	6	1
Cato	7	
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>30</b>

**Table 5-3 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Afghanistan**

	<b>CONFLICTUAL</b>	<b>COOPERATIVE</b>	<b>CONFLICTUAL-RANK</b>	<b>COOPERATIVE-RANK</b>	<b>% CONFIDENCE</b>
<b>Terrorists</b>	57	0	1	22	100
<b>Muslim World</b>	45	12	2	21	58
<b>Israel</b>	44	13	3	20	54
<b>Britain</b>	41	16	4	19	44
<b>Syria</b>	40	17	5	18	40
<b>North Korea</b>	35	22	6	16	23
<b>Iraq</b>	35	22	7	17	23
<b>Germany</b>	29	28	8	15	2
<b>Iran</b>	27	30	9	13	5
<b>Afghanistan</b>	27	30	10	14	5
<b>Turkey</b>	26	31	11	12	9
<b>Russia</b>	25	32	12	11	12
<b>Pakistan</b>	22	35	13	10	23
<b>France</b>	21	36	14	9	26
<b>India</b>	18	39	15	8	37
<b>Japan</b>	16	41	16	6	44
<b>Taiwan</b>	16	41	17	7	44
<b>United Nations</b>	15	42	18	5	47
<b>Europe</b>	11	46	19	3	61
<b>United States</b>	11	46	20	4	61
<b>South Korea</b>	9	48	21	2	68
<b>China</b>	7	50	22	1	75

**Table 5-4 Ranking of Twenty-two Actors Based on their Direction of Strategy**

Country	Think Tank	Year/Topic	I1	I2	I3	I4a	I4b	I5ap	I5pr	I5re	I5op	I5th	I5pu
AFGHANISTAN	AEI	2004	0.20	-0.02	0.23	0.74	0.83	0.37	0.00	0.23	0.05	0.01	0.35
AFGHANISTAN	AEI	2008	-0.03	-0.14	0.34	0.53	0.65	0.24	0.03	0.22	0.08	0.03	0.42
AFGHANISTAN	AEI	2012	0.05	0.03	0.24	0.70	0.80	0.24	0.00	0.29	0.17	0.05	0.25
AFGHANISTAN	AEI	Military	-0.19	-0.29	0.22	0.76	0.70	0.24	0.00	0.17	0.05	0.07	0.48
AFGHANISTAN	AEI	Political	0.45	0.26	0.16	0.55	0.88	0.41	0.02	0.30	0.12	0.01	0.14
AFGHANISTAN	AEI	Social	-0.18	-0.19	0.58	0.51	0.51	0.14	0.00	0.27	0.11	0.00	0.48
AFGHANISTAN	AEI	Three Topics	0.20	0.06	0.11	0.80	0.95	0.34	0.01	0.24	0.12	0.03	0.25
AFGHANISTAN	Brookings	2004	0.58	0.36	0.47	0.42	0.73	0.36	0.00	0.43	0.02	0.00	0.19
AFGHANISTAN	Brookings	2008	0.41	0.21	0.19	0.60	0.85	0.40	0.01	0.30	0.10	0.03	0.17
AFGHANISTAN	Brookings	2012	0.27	0.06	0.16	0.73	0.81	0.40	0.01	0.22	0.08	0.02	0.27
AFGHANISTAN	Brookings	Military	0.09	-0.11	0.21	0.91	0.92	0.38	0.01	0.16	0.07	0.04	0.35
AFGHANISTAN	Brookings	Political	0.43	0.21	0.18	0.57	0.89	0.43	0.01	0.28	0.11	0.01	0.17
AFGHANISTAN	Brookings	Social	0.78	0.56	0.56	0.22	0.45	0.33	0.00	0.55	0.00	0.00	0.11
AFGHANISTAN	Brookings	Three Topics	0.39	0.18	0.16	0.61	0.92	0.41	0.01	0.27	0.10	0.02	0.19
AFGHANISTAN	Carnegie	2004	0.36	0.19	0.26	0.64	0.82	0.18	0.20	0.30	0.03	0.00	0.29
AFGHANISTAN	Carnegie	2008	0.15	-0.01	0.14	0.85	0.97	0.35	0.02	0.21	0.12	0.01	0.31
AFGHANISTAN	Carnegie	2012	0.29	0.15	0.24	0.71	0.76	0.27	0.08	0.29	0.11	0.01	0.24
AFGHANISTAN	Carnegie	Military	0.04	-0.10	0.23	0.96	0.87	0.24	0.17	0.11	0.10	0.02	0.36
AFGHANISTAN	Carnegie	Political	0.38	0.22	0.15	0.62	0.76	0.33	0.05	0.31	0.12	0.01	0.19
AFGHANISTAN	Carnegie	Social	0.50	0.42	0.59	0.50	0.50	0.19	0.00	0.57	0.07	0.00	0.19
AFGHANISTAN	Carnegie	Three Topics	0.29	0.15	0.10	0.71	0.81	0.30	0.07	0.26	0.14	0.01	0.21
AFGHANISTAN	Cato	2004	0.17	-0.03	0.23	0.84	0.59	0.29	0.00	0.29	0.00	0.00	0.42
AFGHANISTAN	Cato	2008	-0.39	-0.32	0.34	0.57	0.65	0.11	0.00	0.19	0.20	0.03	0.47
AFGHANISTAN	Cato	2012	-0.40	-0.43	0.31	0.60	0.51	0.15	0.00	0.15	0.10	0.00	0.59
AFGHANISTAN	Cato	Military	-0.42	-0.33	0.19	0.59	0.75	0.13	0.00	0.17	0.25	0.00	0.46
AFGHANISTAN	Cato	Political	-0.01	-0.10	0.25	0.72	0.63	0.23	0.00	0.26	0.08	0.03	0.40
AFGHANISTAN	Cato	Social	-1.00	-1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
AFGHANISTAN	Cato	Three Topics	-0.19	-0.22	0.21	0.81	0.64	0.18	0.00	0.23	0.13	0.01	0.45
AFGHANISTAN	CFR	2004	0.60	0.37	0.59	0.40	0.26	0.48	0.00	0.32	0.13	0.02	0.06
AFGHANISTAN	CFR	2008	0.35	0.11	0.35	0.65	0.53	0.43	0.01	0.24	0.06	0.01	0.25
AFGHANISTAN	CFR	2012	0.33	0.20	0.38	0.62	0.62	0.25	0.00	0.41	0.06	0.00	0.28
AFGHANISTAN	CFR	Military	0.33	0.02	0.46	0.60	0.46	0.51	0.00	0.15	0.05	0.00	0.28
AFGHANISTAN	CFR	Political	0.21	0.08	0.16	0.79	0.69	0.36	0.01	0.24	0.15	0.01	0.23
AFGHANISTAN	CFR	Social	1.00	0.78	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.33	0.00	0.67	0.00	0.00	0.00
AFGHANISTAN	CFR	Three Topics	0.16	0.02	0.14	0.84	0.71	0.34	0.00	0.24	0.12	0.03	0.27
AFGHANISTAN	Heritage	2004	0.00	0.00	0.45	0.78	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.50
AFGHANISTAN	Heritage	2008	-0.14	-0.24	0.17	0.86	0.85	0.33	0.00	0.10	0.11	0.13	0.34
AFGHANISTAN	Heritage	2012	0.25	0.04	0.15	0.75	0.83	0.43	0.00	0.19	0.09	0.06	0.23
AFGHANISTAN	Heritage	Military	-0.19	-0.25	0.25	0.68	0.50	0.23	0.00	0.18	0.09	0.10	0.41
AFGHANISTAN	Heritage	Political	0.19	0.11	0.23	0.78	0.56	0.24	0.00	0.36	0.07	0.07	0.26
AFGHANISTAN	Heritage	Social	0.00	-0.33	0.40	1.00	1.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50
AFGHANISTAN	Heritage	Three Topics	0.06	-0.03	0.20	0.89	0.57	0.24	0.00	0.29	0.08	0.07	0.33
AFGHANISTAN	RAND	2004	0.32	0.13	0.16	0.69	0.89	0.38	0.01	0.27	0.10	0.00	0.24
AFGHANISTAN	RAND	2008	0.53	0.30	0.16	0.48	0.83	0.40	0.05	0.32	0.09	0.00	0.15
AFGHANISTAN	RAND	2012	0.43	0.12	0.41	0.58	0.42	0.62	0.00	0.10	0.15	0.03	0.12
AFGHANISTAN	RAND	Military	0.22	0.05	0.19	0.78	0.79	0.39	0.01	0.22	0.14	0.00	0.25
AFGHANISTAN	RAND	Political	0.32	0.16	0.13	0.68	0.76	0.40	0.03	0.23	0.17	0.03	0.15
AFGHANISTAN	RAND	Social	0.78	0.35	0.50	0.22	0.51	0.64	0.03	0.23	0.00	0.00	0.11
AFGHANISTAN	RAND	Three Topics	0.37	0.16	0.15	0.63	0.80	0.43	0.02	0.23	0.14	0.01	0.17
AFGHANISTAN	Seven Think Tanks	2004	0.34	0.16	0.35	0.62	0.60	0.31	0.03	0.33	0.05	0.00	0.27
AFGHANISTAN	Seven Think Tanks	2008	0.13	-0.01	0.24	0.65	0.76	0.32	0.02	0.22	0.11	0.03	0.30
AFGHANISTAN	Seven Think Tanks	2012	0.21	0.06	0.29	0.66	0.64	0.34	0.01	0.25	0.12	0.03	0.26
AFGHANISTAN	Seven Think Tanks	3 Elections	0.22	0.07	0.29	0.64	0.67	0.33	0.02	0.27	0.09	0.02	0.28
AFGHANISTAN	Seven Think Tanks	Military	0.01	-0.13	0.25	0.76	0.71	0.31	0.03	0.17	0.10	0.03	0.37
AFGHANISTAN	Seven Think Tanks	Political	0.28	0.13	0.18	0.67	0.74	0.34	0.02	0.28	0.12	0.02	0.22
AFGHANISTAN	Seven Think Tanks	Social	0.45	0.25	0.66	0.30	0.40	0.33	0.01	0.39	0.03	0.00	0.25
AFGHANISTAN	Seven Think Tanks	Three Topics	0.18	0.05	0.15	0.76	0.77	0.32	0.02	0.25	0.12	0.03	0.27

**Table 5-5 Operational Code of Afghanistan from the Perspective of American Think Tanks**

**Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Afghanistan?  
Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Afghanistan's actions  
across time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view  
Afghanistan's actions?**

As Table 5-3 shows, relative to other think tanks, Cato assigned the most conflictual actions to Afghanistan, while RAND assigned the most cooperative actions. Two think tanks showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking about Afghanistan. Cato assigned conflictual actions to Afghanistan across the seven instances of 2004, 2008, 2012, military, political, social, and the three topics considered together. RAND, on the other hand, assigned cooperative actions to Afghanistan in the same seven instances. This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational identity relating to Afghanistan. As Table 5-3 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of Afghanistan was 63% cooperative.

**What was Afghanistan's relative position in the world of American foreign policy  
think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Afghanistan?**

As Figure 5-1 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks, actions of Afghanistan were most similar to those of the Muslim World and Pakistan and least similar to actions of Turkey and South Korea. From the total of forty-four instances, Afghanistan was placed seventeen times in the same quadrant as the Muslim World and Pakistan, which shows 39% similarity (61% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Afghanistan was placed five times in the same quadrant as Turkey and South Korea which shows 89% dissimilarity (11% similarity).

No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Afghanistan were most similar to actions of Pakistan and North Korea and least similar to actions of Turkey, South Korea, the United States, Syria, Russia, Europe, and the United Nations. From the total of eleven instances, Afghanistan was placed six times in the same quadrant as Pakistan and North Korea, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Afghanistan was placed only once in the same quadrant as Turkey, South Korea, the United States, Syria, Russia, Europe, and the United Nations, which indicates 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).

Political Issues: Political actions of Afghanistan were most similar to political actions of China and least similar to those of France. From the total of eleven instances, Afghanistan appeared seven times in the same quadrant as China, which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Afghanistan never appeared in the same quadrant as France, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Social Issues: Social actions of Afghanistan were most similar to social actions of the Muslim World and France and least similar to social actions of South Korea, the United States, Europe, and China. From the total of eleven instances, Afghanistan was placed six times in the same quadrant as the Muslim World and France, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of Afghanistan never appeared in the same quadrant as social actions of South Korea, the United States, Europe, and China, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Military Issues: Military actions of Afghanistan were most similar to military actions of Terrorists and least similar to military actions of Taiwan. From the total of eleven instances, Afghanistan was placed seven times in the same quadrant as Terrorists,

which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of Afghanistan did not appear in the same quadrant as military actions of Taiwan, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.




Figure 5-1 Similarity of Actions of Afghanistan to other Actors

## Britain

**How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Britain's operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of Britain's actions?**

Table 5-7 shows the operational code of Britain on fifty-seven levels of time and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Britain, the overall perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was conflictual. Table 5-6 presents the number of times Britain's index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of

direction of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks described Britain’s strategy as conflictual forty-one times and cooperative sixteen times. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American foreign policy think tanks had a medium level of certainty about the direction of strategy of Britain. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 44% agreement in describing Britain’s strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked Britain fourth based on its conflictual actions and nineteenth based on its cooperative actions.

<b>BRITAIN</b>		
	<b>CONFLICTUAL</b>	<b>COOPERATIVE</b>
Brookings	2	5
AEI	3	4
CFR	3	4
Heritage	4	3
Cato	7	
RAND	7	
Carnegie	7	
Seven Think Tanks	8	
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>16</b>

**Table 5-6 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Britain**

Country	Think Tank	Year/Topic	I1	I2	I3	I4a	I4b	I5ap	I5pr	I5re	I5op	I5th	I5pu
BRITAIN	AEI	2004	0.20	0.16	0.19	0.75	0.58	0.22	0.04	0.34	0.17	0.03	0.21
BRITAIN	AEI	2008	0.40	0.35	0.23	0.61	0.95	0.27	0.01	0.42	0.20	0.02	0.09
BRITAIN	AEI	2012	0.22	0.15	0.15	0.78	0.72	0.14	0.12	0.35	0.10	0.00	0.29
BRITAIN	AEI	Military	0.45	0.37	0.34	0.56	0.45	0.17	0.00	0.56	0.06	0.00	0.22
BRITAIN	AEI	Political	0.21	0.10	0.13	0.72	0.85	0.31	0.01	0.29	0.13	0.04	0.23
BRITAIN	AEI	Social	0.25	0.31	0.24	0.75	0.75	0.10	0.16	0.37	0.26	0.00	0.11
BRITAIN	AEI	Three Topics	0.25	0.17	0.11	0.75	0.88	0.28	0.02	0.32	0.15	0.02	0.20
BRITAIN	Brookings	2004	0.62	0.62	0.49	0.38	0.38	0.06	0.06	0.70	0.08	0.00	0.11
BRITAIN	Brookings	2008	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.85	0.79	0.22	0.01	0.35	0.19	0.02	0.21
BRITAIN	Brookings	2012	0.32	0.05	0.23	0.69	0.61	0.47	0.10	0.09	0.13	0.00	0.22
BRITAIN	Brookings	Military	0.00	-0.33	0.40	1.00	1.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50
BRITAIN	Brookings	Political	0.34	0.21	0.12	0.66	0.77	0.29	0.08	0.30	0.12	0.01	0.19
BRITAIN	Brookings	Social	0.48	0.45	0.52	0.52	0.17	0.19	0.05	0.50	0.18	0.00	0.08
BRITAIN	Brookings	Three Topics	0.38	0.28	0.18	0.62	0.71	0.26	0.07	0.36	0.13	0.01	0.17
BRITAIN	Carnegie	2004	-0.44	-0.59	0.64	0.44	0.42	0.25	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.68
BRITAIN	Carnegie	2008	0.24	-0.07	0.32	0.74	0.62	0.51	0.09	0.02	0.09	0.00	0.29
BRITAIN	Carnegie	2012	0.03	-0.18	0.37	0.62	0.63	0.38	0.04	0.10	0.07	0.01	0.40
BRITAIN	Carnegie	Military	-0.03	-0.22	0.53	0.30	0.24	0.28	0.11	0.09	0.06	0.00	0.45
BRITAIN	Carnegie	Political	0.16	-0.07	0.20	0.81	0.82	0.45	0.01	0.12	0.09	0.03	0.29
BRITAIN	Carnegie	Social	-0.14	-0.35	0.54	0.48	0.62	0.33	0.00	0.10	0.02	0.00	0.55
BRITAIN	Carnegie	Three Topics	0.12	-0.10	0.20	0.88	0.82	0.44	0.02	0.10	0.11	0.02	0.31
BRITAIN	Cato	2004	-0.40	-0.15	0.23	0.60	0.82	0.03	0.03	0.24	0.37	0.09	0.23
BRITAIN	Cato	2008	-0.03	0.07	0.43	0.53	0.42	0.13	0.02	0.34	0.27	0.05	0.20
BRITAIN	Cato	2012	-0.42	-0.32	0.36	0.59	0.53	0.09	0.00	0.20	0.21	0.05	0.45
BRITAIN	Cato	Military	-1.00	-0.63	0.82	0.00	0.22	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.56	0.00	0.44
BRITAIN	Cato	Political	0.01	0.05	0.14	0.64	0.79	0.18	0.00	0.32	0.18	0.14	0.18
BRITAIN	Cato	Social	0.00	0.09	0.33	1.00	0.25	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.13	0.00	0.38
BRITAIN	Cato	Three Topics	0.00	0.04	0.09	0.78	0.91	0.14	0.05	0.31	0.20	0.07	0.23
BRITAIN	CFR	2004	0.14	-0.05	0.43	0.64	0.58	0.18	0.30	0.09	0.03	0.03	0.37
BRITAIN	CFR	2008	0.28	-0.01	0.32	0.73	0.77	0.52	0.00	0.12	0.10	0.00	0.27
BRITAIN	CFR	2012	0.30	0.07	0.30	0.46	0.86	0.38	0.02	0.25	0.05	0.00	0.31
BRITAIN	CFR	Military	0.17	-0.11	0.65	0.50	0.50	0.25	0.33	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.42
BRITAIN	CFR	Political	0.03	-0.08	0.16	0.78	0.72	0.29	0.04	0.18	0.14	0.02	0.32
BRITAIN	CFR	Social	0.67	0.30	0.42	0.33	0.89	0.56	0.00	0.28	0.00	0.00	0.17
BRITAIN	CFR	Three Topics	0.08	-0.10	0.17	0.81	0.83	0.34	0.05	0.15	0.09	0.02	0.35
BRITAIN	Heritage	2004	0.37	0.27	0.42	0.63	0.45	0.17	0.02	0.49	0.03	0.00	0.29
BRITAIN	Heritage	2008	-0.13	-0.09	0.17	0.71	0.61	0.30	0.01	0.13	0.34	0.05	0.18
BRITAIN	Heritage	2012	0.00	-0.07	0.31	0.50	0.58	0.19	0.03	0.29	0.09	0.01	0.40
BRITAIN	Heritage	Military	-0.44	-0.31	0.39	0.56	0.22	0.08	0.00	0.19	0.25	0.06	0.42
BRITAIN	Heritage	Political	0.38	0.16	0.15	0.62	0.92	0.40	0.04	0.25	0.08	0.01	0.22
BRITAIN	Heritage	Social	0.17	0.22	0.55	0.50	0.17	0.08	0.00	0.50	0.17	0.00	0.25
BRITAIN	Heritage	Three Topics	0.23	0.09	0.11	0.77	0.86	0.31	0.04	0.26	0.12	0.02	0.25
BRITAIN	RAND	2004	0.00	-0.02	0.22	0.51	0.83	0.21	0.00	0.29	0.19	0.02	0.30
BRITAIN	RAND	2008	0.09	-0.01	0.15	0.72	0.76	0.34	0.00	0.21	0.17	0.03	0.26
BRITAIN	RAND	2012	0.04	-0.11	0.19	0.91	0.86	0.37	0.02	0.13	0.16	0.00	0.33
BRITAIN	RAND	Military	0.00	-0.01	0.16	0.67	0.67	0.23	0.00	0.27	0.20	0.03	0.27
BRITAIN	RAND	Political	0.23	0.07	0.13	0.77	0.88	0.38	0.01	0.22	0.14	0.01	0.23
BRITAIN	RAND	Social	-0.22	-0.30	0.33	0.56	0.89	0.28	0.00	0.11	0.17	0.00	0.44
BRITAIN	RAND	Three Topics	0.15	0.05	0.12	0.85	0.82	0.34	0.01	0.23	0.18	0.02	0.23
BRITAIN	Seven Think Tanks	2004	0.07	0.02	0.38	0.57	0.58	0.17	0.06	0.30	0.12	0.03	0.32
BRITAIN	Seven Think Tanks	2008	0.14	0.05	0.25	0.69	0.70	0.33	0.02	0.22	0.19	0.02	0.21
BRITAIN	Seven Think Tanks	2012	0.10	-0.02	0.24	0.65	0.71	0.29	0.04	0.22	0.12	0.01	0.32
BRITAIN	Seven Think Tanks	3 Elections	0.10	0.02	0.29	0.64	0.66	0.27	0.04	0.24	0.14	0.02	0.28
BRITAIN	Seven Think Tanks	Military	-0.17	-0.19	0.49	0.46	0.42	0.19	0.07	0.15	0.18	0.01	0.39
BRITAIN	Seven Think Tanks	Political	0.19	0.06	0.15	0.71	0.82	0.33	0.03	0.24	0.13	0.04	0.24
BRITAIN	Seven Think Tanks	Social	0.18	0.11	0.42	0.57	0.55	0.23	0.03	0.33	0.13	0.00	0.28
BRITAIN	Seven Think Tanks	Three Topics	0.17	0.06	0.14	0.78	0.83	0.30	0.04	0.25	0.14	0.03	0.25

Table 5-7 Operational Code of Britain from the Perspective of American Think Tanks



**Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Britain? Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Britain's actions across time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view Britain's actions?**

As Table 5-6 shows, relative to other think tanks, Brookings assigned the most cooperative actions to Britain, while Carnegie, RAND, and Cato assigned the most conflictual actions. Three think tanks showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking about Britain. Carnegie, RAND, and Cato assigned conflictual actions to Britain across all seven instances. This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational identity in relation to Britain. As Table 5-6 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of Britain was 100% conflictual.

**What was Britain's relative position in the world of American foreign policy think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Britain?**

As Figure 5-2 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks, Britain's actions were most similar to actions of Japan and China and least similar to those of the United States and Syria. From the total of forty-four instances, Britain was placed thirteen times in the same quadrant as Japan and China, which shows 30% similarity (70% dissimilarity). Britain was placed six times in the same quadrant as the United States and Syria, which shows 86% dissimilarity (14% similarity).

No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Britain were most similar to actions of Afghanistan and least similar to actions of the United States and Iran. From the total of eleven instances, Britain was placed five times in the same quadrant as Afghanistan, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other

hand, Britain was not placed in the same quadrant as the United States and Iran, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

**Political Issues:** Political actions of Britain were most similar to political actions of China, Japan, Iraq, Europe, and South Korea and least similar to political actions of Syria, Israel, and Terrorists. From the total of eleven instances, Britain was placed four times in the same quadrant as China, Japan, Iraq, Europe, and South Korea, which shows 36% similarity (64% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Britain was not placed in the same quadrant as Syria, Israel, and Terrorists, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

**Social Issues:** Social actions of Britain were most similar to social actions of Terrorists and Russia and least similar to those of Syria. From the total of eleven instances, Britain was placed five times in the same quadrant as Russia and Terrorists, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of Britain were not placed in the same quadrant as social actions of Syria, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

**Military Issues:** Military actions of Britain were most similar to those of the Muslim World and least similar to military actions of Iran, South Korea, the United Nations, Europe, Iraq, and Russia. From the total of eleven instances, Britain was placed six times in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of Britain were not placed in the same quadrant as military actions of Iran, South Korea, the United Nations, Europe, Iraq, and Russia, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.




Figure 5-2 Similarity of Actions of Britain to other Actors

## China

**How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive China’s operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of China’s strategy?**

Table 5-9 shows the operational code of China on fifty-seven levels of time and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to China, the overall perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was cooperative. Table 5-8 presents the number of times China’s index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of direction of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks described China’s strategy as conflictual seven times and cooperative fifty times, which was the highest allocation of cooperative actions ascribed to any of the twenty-two actors. The difference between the

frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American foreign policy think tanks had a very high level of certainty about the direction of strategy of China. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 75% agreement in describing China's strategy. This is the highest level of confidence expressed for actors with a cooperative strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked China twenty-second based on its conflictual actions and first based on its cooperative actions.

CHINA	CONFLECTUAL COOPERATIVE	
	CONFLECTUAL	COOPERATIVE
Brookings		7
Seven Think Tanks		8
Heritage		7
Cato	1	6
AEI	1	6
RAND	1	6
Carnegie	2	5
CFR	2	5
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>50</b>

**Table 5-8 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to China**

Country	Think Tank	Year/Topic	I1	I2	I3	I4a	I4b	I5ap	I5pr	I5re	I5op	I5th	I5pu
CHINA	AEI	2004	0.40	0.27	0.16	0.60	0.85	0.35	0.02	0.34	0.16	0.02	0.13
CHINA	AEI	2008	0.42	0.24	0.17	0.58	0.78	0.42	0.01	0.28	0.14	0.02	0.13
CHINA	AEI	2012	0.20	0.03	0.17	0.80	0.83	0.39	0.01	0.21	0.15	0.01	0.25
CHINA	AEI	Military	0.32	0.14	0.23	0.68	0.79	0.40	0.00	0.26	0.13	0.00	0.21
CHINA	AEI	Political	0.22	0.12	0.11	0.78	0.76	0.36	0.02	0.23	0.22	0.03	0.15
CHINA	AEI	Social	0.55	0.32	0.20	0.45	0.89	0.41	0.00	0.37	0.06	0.00	0.16
CHINA	AEI	Three Topics	0.27	0.14	0.12	0.73	0.84	0.37	0.02	0.25	0.18	0.02	0.17
CHINA	Brookings	2004	0.44	0.25	0.14	0.57	0.78	0.42	0.03	0.27	0.13	0.03	0.12
CHINA	Brookings	2008	0.48	0.27	0.19	0.52	0.77	0.46	0.01	0.27	0.14	0.01	0.11
CHINA	Brookings	2012	0.35	0.22	0.11	0.65	0.79	0.34	0.08	0.26	0.18	0.01	0.14
CHINA	Brookings	Military	0.46	0.29	0.14	0.54	0.64	0.39	0.10	0.24	0.17	0.02	0.08
CHINA	Brookings	Political	0.40	0.22	0.15	0.60	0.77	0.42	0.02	0.25	0.15	0.01	0.13
CHINA	Brookings	Social	0.43	0.23	0.16	0.57	0.91	0.41	0.01	0.30	0.11	0.02	0.16
CHINA	Brookings	Three Topics	0.40	0.23	0.14	0.60	0.80	0.41	0.02	0.27	0.16	0.01	0.12
CHINA	Carnegie	2004	-0.04	-0.13	0.26	0.54	0.58	0.32	0.03	0.14	0.18	0.03	0.31
CHINA	Carnegie	2008	0.40	0.21	0.14	0.60	0.73	0.43	0.03	0.24	0.14	0.03	0.13
CHINA	Carnegie	2012	0.24	0.09	0.18	0.60	0.69	0.39	0.03	0.20	0.16	0.03	0.19
CHINA	Carnegie	Military	-0.12	-0.18	0.29	0.45	0.63	0.26	0.02	0.16	0.18	0.02	0.36
CHINA	Carnegie	Political	0.35	0.16	0.16	0.65	0.58	0.46	0.04	0.18	0.18	0.02	0.12
CHINA	Carnegie	Social	0.42	0.22	0.14	0.58	0.87	0.40	0.03	0.28	0.11	0.03	0.15
CHINA	Carnegie	Three Topics	0.30	0.14	0.13	0.70	0.67	0.42	0.03	0.20	0.18	0.03	0.14
CHINA	Cato	2004	0.56	0.46	0.35	0.44	0.59	0.26	0.03	0.50	0.12	0.01	0.10
CHINA	Cato	2008	0.40	0.23	0.15	0.60	0.82	0.37	0.02	0.31	0.12	0.01	0.17
CHINA	Cato	2012	0.13	0.02	0.12	0.87	0.68	0.35	0.08	0.14	0.22	0.02	0.20
CHINA	Cato	Military	0.48	0.38	0.45	0.52	0.43	0.26	0.00	0.48	0.09	0.02	0.15
CHINA	Cato	Political	0.24	0.15	0.11	0.76	0.77	0.35	0.03	0.24	0.22	0.01	0.15
CHINA	Cato	Social	0.43	0.24	0.15	0.57	0.79	0.33	0.09	0.28	0.11	0.00	0.18
CHINA	Cato	Three Topics	0.31	0.18	0.11	0.69	0.79	0.36	0.04	0.25	0.19	0.01	0.15
CHINA	CFR	2004	0.36	0.28	0.32	0.55	0.62	0.23	0.04	0.42	0.10	0.03	0.19
CHINA	CFR	2008	0.26	0.11	0.13	0.74	0.80	0.37	0.04	0.22	0.16	0.01	0.21
CHINA	CFR	2012	0.05	0.02	0.10	0.78	0.84	0.25	0.05	0.23	0.21	0.01	0.25
CHINA	CFR	Military	0.33	0.28	0.46	0.45	0.61	0.19	0.00	0.47	0.11	0.00	0.22
CHINA	CFR	Political	0.29	0.15	0.11	0.71	0.75	0.39	0.04	0.22	0.18	0.02	0.15
CHINA	CFR	Social	0.07	0.00	0.08	0.81	0.83	0.22	0.09	0.23	0.15	0.02	0.29
CHINA	CFR	Three Topics	0.21	0.10	0.08	0.79	0.82	0.34	0.04	0.22	0.19	0.02	0.19
CHINA	Heritage	2004	0.38	0.18	0.14	0.62	0.80	0.41	0.05	0.24	0.10	0.06	0.16
CHINA	Heritage	2008	0.30	0.15	0.13	0.70	0.94	0.34	0.01	0.31	0.11	0.02	0.23
CHINA	Heritage	2012	0.29	0.17	0.12	0.71	0.78	0.37	0.02	0.25	0.19	0.03	0.14
CHINA	Heritage	Military	0.22	0.07	0.13	0.78	0.89	0.37	0.00	0.24	0.11	0.06	0.22
CHINA	Heritage	Political	0.24	0.12	0.12	0.76	0.78	0.37	0.03	0.22	0.18	0.02	0.18
CHINA	Heritage	Social	0.55	0.35	0.16	0.45	0.88	0.37	0.04	0.37	0.07	0.02	0.13
CHINA	Heritage	Three Topics	0.27	0.13	0.11	0.73	0.81	0.38	0.03	0.23	0.16	0.03	0.17
CHINA	RAND	2004	0.42	0.21	0.16	0.58	0.78	0.44	0.03	0.24	0.13	0.01	0.15
CHINA	RAND	2008	0.44	0.24	0.16	0.56	0.87	0.41	0.02	0.29	0.12	0.02	0.15
CHINA	RAND	2012	0.19	0.08	0.11	0.80	0.90	0.30	0.02	0.27	0.15	0.03	0.23
CHINA	RAND	Military	0.06	-0.05	0.12	0.92	0.86	0.33	0.02	0.18	0.16	0.02	0.29
CHINA	RAND	Political	0.36	0.20	0.13	0.64	0.82	0.39	0.02	0.26	0.16	0.01	0.15
CHINA	RAND	Social	0.61	0.36	0.19	0.39	0.85	0.42	0.04	0.35	0.06	0.02	0.11
CHINA	RAND	Three Topics	0.35	0.19	0.13	0.65	0.86	0.38	0.02	0.27	0.15	0.02	0.16
CHINA	Seven Think Tanks	2004	0.36	0.22	0.22	0.56	0.71	0.34	0.03	0.31	0.13	0.03	0.16
CHINA	Seven Think Tanks	2008	0.39	0.21	0.15	0.61	0.81	0.40	0.02	0.27	0.13	0.01	0.16
CHINA	Seven Think Tanks	2012	0.22	0.10	0.12	0.75	0.80	0.35	0.04	0.23	0.18	0.02	0.19
CHINA	Seven Think Tanks	3 Elections	0.32	0.17	0.16	0.64	0.77	0.36	0.03	0.27	0.15	0.02	0.17
CHINA	Seven Think Tanks	Military	0.25	0.13	0.26	0.62	0.69	0.32	0.02	0.29	0.14	0.02	0.22
CHINA	Seven Think Tanks	Political	0.30	0.16	0.13	0.70	0.75	0.39	0.03	0.23	0.18	0.02	0.15
CHINA	Seven Think Tanks	Social	0.44	0.25	0.15	0.55	0.86	0.37	0.04	0.31	0.10	0.02	0.17
CHINA	Seven Think Tanks	Three Topics	0.30	0.16	0.12	0.70	0.80	0.38	0.03	0.24	0.17	0.02	0.16

**Table 5-9 Operational Code of China from the Perspective of American Think Tanks**

**Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to China? Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing China's actions across time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view China's actions?**

As Table 5-8 shows, relative to other think tanks, Brookings and Heritage assigned the most cooperative actions to China, while CFR and Carnegie assigned the most conflictual actions. Two think tanks showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking about China. Brookings and Heritage assigned cooperative actions to China across the seven instances. This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational identity in relation to China. As Table 5-8 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of China was 100% cooperative.

**What was China's relative position in the world of American foreign policy think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to China?**

As Figure 5-3 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks, actions of China were most similar to actions of Europe and least similar to actions of the Muslim World. From the total of forty-four instances, China was placed twenty-eight times in the same quadrant as Europe, which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). China was not placed in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, which shows 100% dissimilarity.

No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of China were most similar to actions of Japan and Iran and least similar to actions of the Muslim World, Israel, Terrorists, Syria, and Iraq. From the total of eleven instances, China was placed seven times in the same quadrant as Japan and Iran, which shows 64% similarity

(36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, China was not placed in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, Israel, Terrorists, Syria, and Iraq, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Political Issues: Political actions of China were most similar to political actions of Europe and least similar to those of the Muslim World, Terrorists, and France. From the total of eleven instances, China was placed nine times in the same quadrant as Europe, which shows 82% similarity (18% dissimilarity). On the other hand, China was not placed in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, Terrorists, and France, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Social Issues: Social actions of China were most similar to social actions of Europe and least similar to social actions of the Muslim World, Pakistan, France, and Afghanistan. From the total of eleven instances, China was placed ten times in the same quadrant as Europe, which shows 91% similarity (9% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of China were not placed in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, Pakistan, France, and Afghanistan, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Military Issues: Military actions of China were most similar to military actions of South Korea and France and least similar to military actions of Syria and the Muslim World. From the total of eleven instances, China was placed seven times in the same quadrant as South Korea and France, which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of China were not placed in the same quadrant as Syria and the Muslim World, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.




Figure 5-3 Similarity of Actions of China to other Actors

## Europe

**How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Europe’s operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of Europe’s actions?**

Table 5-11 shows the operational code of Europe on fifty-seven levels of time and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Europe, the overall perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was cooperative. Table 5-10 presents the number of times Europe’s index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of the direction of strategy on each of the seven levels. As Table 5-10 shows, the direction of strategy of Europe was conflictual eleven times and cooperative forty-six times, which is among the highest allocations of cooperative actions for any of the twenty-two actors. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American foreign policy think tanks had a high level of certainty about the direction



of strategy of Europe. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 61% agreement in describing the direction of strategy of Europe. This was the third highest level of confidence expressed for actors with a cooperative strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked Europe nineteenth based on its conflictual actions and third based on its cooperative actions.

<b>EUROPE</b>	<b>CONFICTUAL COOPERATIVE</b>	
	<b>CONFICTUAL</b>	<b>COOPERATIVE</b>
Brookings		7
Seven Think Tanks		8
RAND		7
CFR	1	6
Carnegie	2	5
Heritage	2	5
Cato	3	4
AEI	3	4
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>46</b>

**Table 5-10 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Europe**

Country	Think Tank	Year/Topic	I1	I2	I3	I4a	I4b	I5ap	I5pr	I5re	I5op	I5th	I5pu
EUROPE	AEI	2004	0.24	0.10	0.12	0.77	0.78	0.38	0.03	0.21	0.18	0.03	0.18
EUROPE	AEI	2008	0.27	0.14	0.11	0.73	0.73	0.37	0.05	0.22	0.19	0.03	0.15
EUROPE	AEI	2012	0.03	-0.08	0.12	0.94	0.86	0.28	0.04	0.20	0.14	0.02	0.33
EUROPE	AEI	Military	0.03	-0.01	0.11	0.92	0.73	0.27	0.01	0.24	0.21	0.01	0.26
EUROPE	AEI	Political	0.26	0.10	0.12	0.74	0.78	0.39	0.04	0.20	0.15	0.03	0.19
EUROPE	AEI	Social	0.18	0.05	0.11	0.82	0.82	0.34	0.06	0.19	0.16	0.03	0.22
EUROPE	AEI	Three Topics	0.24	0.08	0.12	0.76	0.80	0.38	0.04	0.20	0.16	0.02	0.21
EUROPE	Brookings	2004	0.49	0.30	0.22	0.52	0.63	0.48	0.00	0.27	0.19	0.02	0.05
EUROPE	Brookings	2008	0.45	0.22	0.19	0.55	0.66	0.45	0.04	0.24	0.12	0.01	0.16
EUROPE	Brookings	2012	0.33	0.11	0.17	0.67	0.72	0.46	0.03	0.18	0.12	0.04	0.18
EUROPE	Brookings	Military	0.39	0.20	0.17	0.61	0.76	0.39	0.02	0.29	0.09	0.03	0.18
EUROPE	Brookings	Political	0.31	0.15	0.17	0.69	0.60	0.45	0.01	0.19	0.21	0.03	0.11
EUROPE	Brookings	Social	0.62	0.31	0.26	0.38	0.69	0.53	0.04	0.24	0.09	0.00	0.10
EUROPE	Brookings	Three Topics	0.37	0.17	0.16	0.63	0.64	0.46	0.03	0.20	0.17	0.02	0.12
EUROPE	Carnegie	2004	-0.07	-0.01	0.12	0.72	0.73	0.24	0.02	0.21	0.30	0.08	0.16
EUROPE	Carnegie	2008	0.60	0.33	0.24	0.40	0.73	0.51	0.02	0.27	0.10	0.01	0.09
EUROPE	Carnegie	2012	0.31	0.17	0.17	0.57	0.70	0.41	0.03	0.22	0.18	0.04	0.13
EUROPE	Carnegie	Military	0.12	0.07	0.13	0.54	0.78	0.30	0.03	0.23	0.19	0.09	0.16
EUROPE	Carnegie	Political	0.40	0.21	0.17	0.60	0.60	0.47	0.03	0.21	0.19	0.02	0.09
EUROPE	Carnegie	Social	0.35	0.18	0.22	0.52	0.79	0.42	0.01	0.24	0.17	0.00	0.15
EUROPE	Carnegie	Three Topics	0.36	0.20	0.16	0.64	0.64	0.44	0.03	0.21	0.19	0.02	0.10
EUROPE	Cato	2004	0.27	0.12	0.13	0.73	0.81	0.40	0.01	0.23	0.17	0.02	0.18
EUROPE	Cato	2008	0.08	0.10	0.14	0.85	0.75	0.27	0.01	0.25	0.30	0.04	0.12
EUROPE	Cato	2012	0.35	0.11	0.26	0.65	0.51	0.54	0.01	0.12	0.18	0.01	0.13
EUROPE	Cato	Military	0.29	0.07	0.23	0.71	0.63	0.50	0.00	0.15	0.15	0.03	0.17
EUROPE	Cato	Political	0.20	0.08	0.11	0.80	0.78	0.38	0.02	0.20	0.19	0.03	0.18
EUROPE	Cato	Social	0.20	0.19	0.25	0.70	0.61	0.35	0.00	0.25	0.34	0.00	0.06
EUROPE	Cato	Three Topics	0.24	0.11	0.12	0.76	0.74	0.39	0.02	0.21	0.20	0.03	0.16
EUROPE	CFR	2004	0.40	0.23	0.32	0.60	0.33	0.55	0.00	0.15	0.28	0.01	0.01
EUROPE	CFR	2008	0.32	0.04	0.35	0.63	0.64	0.53	0.01	0.12	0.10	0.05	0.20
EUROPE	CFR	2012	0.43	0.29	0.17	0.57	0.73	0.33	0.05	0.34	0.13	0.01	0.15
EUROPE	CFR	Military	0.82	0.43	0.49	0.18	0.52	0.61	0.04	0.26	0.06	0.00	0.04
EUROPE	CFR	Political	0.33	0.13	0.19	0.67	0.67	0.46	0.01	0.19	0.16	0.02	0.15
EUROPE	CFR	Social	0.09	0.03	0.28	0.84	0.43	0.36	0.00	0.18	0.25	0.04	0.16
EUROPE	CFR	Three Topics	0.30	0.14	0.17	0.70	0.64	0.44	0.02	0.19	0.20	0.02	0.13
EUROPE	Heritage	2004	0.38	0.21	0.20	0.62	0.76	0.41	0.03	0.26	0.17	0.01	0.14
EUROPE	Heritage	2008	0.10	0.00	0.12	0.80	0.51	0.40	0.05	0.11	0.24	0.07	0.15
EUROPE	Heritage	2012	0.45	0.11	0.40	0.55	0.60	0.60	0.01	0.12	0.10	0.00	0.18
EUROPE	Heritage	Military	0.10	-0.02	0.15	0.90	0.77	0.36	0.03	0.16	0.19	0.02	0.24
EUROPE	Heritage	Political	0.35	0.17	0.15	0.65	0.68	0.44	0.03	0.21	0.18	0.01	0.14
EUROPE	Heritage	Social	0.53	0.18	0.51	0.33	0.33	0.66	0.02	0.09	0.11	0.04	0.08
EUROPE	Heritage	Three Topics	0.26	0.10	0.14	0.74	0.70	0.42	0.03	0.19	0.18	0.02	0.16
EUROPE	RAND	2004	0.53	0.39	0.21	0.47	0.79	0.37	0.02	0.38	0.16	0.01	0.08
EUROPE	RAND	2008	0.53	0.24	0.24	0.47	0.67	0.53	0.02	0.22	0.09	0.03	0.12
EUROPE	RAND	2012	0.67	0.39	0.25	0.33	0.82	0.48	0.03	0.33	0.07	0.01	0.09
EUROPE	RAND	Military	0.50	0.24	0.25	0.50	0.66	0.53	0.00	0.22	0.14	0.00	0.11
EUROPE	RAND	Political	0.60	0.38	0.19	0.40	0.79	0.44	0.04	0.33	0.12	0.01	0.07
EUROPE	RAND	Social	0.64	0.39	0.29	0.36	0.82	0.42	0.01	0.38	0.04	0.03	0.11
EUROPE	RAND	Three Topics	0.57	0.34	0.20	0.43	0.77	0.46	0.03	0.30	0.12	0.01	0.08
EUROPE	Seven Think Tanks	2004	0.32	0.19	0.19	0.63	0.69	0.40	0.01	0.24	0.21	0.02	0.11
EUROPE	Seven Think Tanks	2008	0.33	0.15	0.20	0.63	0.67	0.44	0.03	0.20	0.16	0.03	0.14
EUROPE	Seven Think Tanks	2012	0.38	0.16	0.22	0.62	0.70	0.45	0.03	0.21	0.13	0.01	0.17
EUROPE	Seven Think Tanks	3 Elections	0.34	0.17	0.20	0.63	0.68	0.43	0.02	0.22	0.16	0.02	0.14
EUROPE	Seven Think Tanks	Military	0.32	0.14	0.22	0.62	0.69	0.42	0.02	0.22	0.15	0.03	0.17
EUROPE	Seven Think Tanks	Political	0.35	0.17	0.16	0.65	0.70	0.43	0.03	0.22	0.17	0.02	0.13
EUROPE	Seven Think Tanks	Social	0.37	0.19	0.27	0.57	0.64	0.44	0.02	0.23	0.17	0.02	0.13
EUROPE	Seven Think Tanks	Three Topics	0.33	0.16	0.15	0.67	0.70	0.43	0.03	0.21	0.17	0.02	0.14

**Table 5-11 Operational Code of Europe from the Perspective of American Think Tanks**

**Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Europe? Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Europe's actions across time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view Europe's actions?**

As Table 5-10 shows, relative to other think tanks, AEI and Cato assigned the most conflictual actions to Europe, while Brookings and RAND assigned the most cooperative actions. Two think tanks showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking about Europe. Brookings and RAND assigned cooperative actions to Europe across all seven instances. This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational identity in relation to Europe. As Table 5-10 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of Europe was 100% cooperative.

**What was Europe's relative position in the world of American foreign policy think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Europe?**

As Figure 5-4 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks, actions of Europe were most similar to actions of China and least similar to those of the Muslim World. From the total of forty-four instances, Europe was placed twenty-eight times in the same quadrant as China, which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). Europe was not placed in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, which shows 100% dissimilarity.

No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Europe were most similar to actions of the United Nations and South Korea and least similar to those of the Muslim World, Israel, Terrorists, and Iraq. From the total of eleven instances, Europe was placed nine times in the same quadrant as the United Nations and South

Korea, which shows 82% similarity (18% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Europe was not placed in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, Israel, Terrorists, and Iraq, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Political Issues: Political actions of Europe were most similar to political actions of China and least similar to those of the Muslim World, Israel, Terrorists, and Syria. From the total of eleven instances, Europe was placed nine times in the same quadrant as China, which shows 82% similarity (18% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Europe was not placed in the same quadrant as Israel, the Muslim World, Terrorists, and Syria which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Social Issues: Social actions of Europe were most similar to social actions of China and least similar to those of France, the Muslim World, and Afghanistan. From the total of eleven instances, Europe was placed ten times in the same quadrant as China, which shows 91% similarity (9% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of Europe were not placed in the same quadrant as social actions of Afghanistan, the Muslim World, and France, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Military Issues: Military actions of Europe were most similar to military actions of France and least similar to those of the Muslim World, Israel, Terrorists, Britain, and Turkey. From the total of eleven instances, Europe was placed eight times in the same quadrant as France, which shows 73% similarity (27% dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of Europe were not placed in the same quadrant as those of the Muslim World, Israel, Terrorists, Britain, and Turkey, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.




Figure 5-4 Similarity of Actions of Europe to other Actors

## France

**How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive France’s operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of France’s actions?**

Table 5-13 shows the operational code of France on fifty-seven levels of time and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to France, the overall perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was cooperative. Table 5-12 presents the number of times France’s index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of direction of strategy on each of the seven levels. As Table 5-12 shows, France’s strategy was twenty-one times conflictual and thirty-six times cooperative. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American

foreign policy think tanks had a medium level of certainty about the direction of strategy of France. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 26% agreement in describing the direction of strategy of France. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked France fourteenth based on its conflictual actions and ninth based on its cooperative actions.

<b>FRANCE</b>		
	<b>CONFLICTUAL</b>	<b>COOPERATIVE</b>
RAND		7
Carnegie	1	6
Brookings	1	6
Heritage	2	5
Seven Think Tanks	2	6
Cato	5	2
CFR	5	2
AEI	5	2
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>36</b>

**Table 5-12 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to France**

Country	Think Tank	Year/Topic	I1	I2	I3	I4a	I4b	I5ap	I5pr	I5re	I5op	I5th	I5pu
FRANCE	AEI	2004	0.19	-0.03	0.28	0.65	0.70	0.42	0.00	0.18	0.05	0.09	0.26
FRANCE	AEI	2008	0.33	0.13	0.18	0.67	0.83	0.40	0.00	0.27	0.11	0.00	0.23
FRANCE	AEI	2012	-0.05	-0.27	0.35	0.70	0.74	0.41	0.07	0.00	0.11	0.00	0.42
FRANCE	AEI	Military	0.50	0.06	0.45	0.50	0.67	0.67	0.00	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.25
FRANCE	AEI	Political	0.17	-0.02	0.20	0.83	0.77	0.45	0.00	0.14	0.17	0.00	0.25
FRANCE	AEI	Social	-0.20	-0.21	0.24	0.58	0.71	0.11	0.07	0.22	0.07	0.11	0.42
FRANCE	AEI	Three Topics	0.15	-0.04	0.18	0.77	0.87	0.41	0.02	0.15	0.12	0.01	0.29
FRANCE	Brookings	2004	0.61	0.22	0.41	0.40	0.45	0.64	0.06	0.11	0.07	0.01	0.11
FRANCE	Brookings	2008	0.53	0.22	0.38	0.47	0.39	0.60	0.03	0.14	0.10	0.08	0.06
FRANCE	Brookings	2012	0.16	0.19	0.25	0.84	0.81	0.26	0.01	0.32	0.29	0.02	0.11
FRANCE	Brookings	Military	0.43	0.27	0.23	0.57	0.70	0.36	0.07	0.28	0.12	0.07	0.10
FRANCE	Brookings	Political	0.33	0.10	0.20	0.67	0.55	0.51	0.02	0.14	0.15	0.05	0.14
FRANCE	Brookings	Social	0.67	0.33	0.80	0.33	0.33	0.67	0.00	0.17	0.17	0.00	0.00
FRANCE	Brookings	Three Topics	0.31	0.12	0.16	0.69	0.60	0.46	0.03	0.17	0.18	0.03	0.13
FRANCE	Carnegie	2004	0.21	-0.12	0.75	0.29	0.06	0.61	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.00	0.28
FRANCE	Carnegie	2008	0.63	0.40	0.23	0.37	0.89	0.39	0.03	0.40	0.06	0.00	0.13
FRANCE	Carnegie	2012	0.40	0.15	0.37	0.43	0.59	0.46	0.03	0.22	0.09	0.00	0.20
FRANCE	Carnegie	Military	0.13	-0.03	0.49	0.21	0.64	0.24	0.05	0.27	0.03	0.00	0.41
FRANCE	Carnegie	Political	0.56	0.23	0.41	0.44	0.52	0.59	0.03	0.16	0.11	0.00	0.11
FRANCE	Carnegie	Social	0.48	0.23	0.32	0.52	0.51	0.48	0.00	0.26	0.11	0.00	0.15
FRANCE	Carnegie	Three Topics	0.45	0.19	0.26	0.55	0.67	0.51	0.02	0.19	0.13	0.01	0.14
FRANCE	Cato	2004	0.02	0.08	0.45	0.48	0.50	0.27	0.00	0.24	0.36	0.00	0.14
FRANCE	Cato	2008	0.01	-0.04	0.39	0.49	0.46	0.29	0.00	0.22	0.09	0.27	0.14
FRANCE	Cato	2012	0.00	0.11	0.36	0.78	0.45	0.17	0.00	0.33	0.17	0.33	0.00
FRANCE	Cato	Military	0.28	0.35	0.32	0.72	0.56	0.08	0.00	0.56	0.19	0.00	0.17
FRANCE	Cato	Political	0.26	0.04	0.36	0.52	0.45	0.50	0.00	0.13	0.06	0.22	0.09
FRANCE	Cato	Social	-1.00	-0.50	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.50	0.00
FRANCE	Cato	Three Topics	0.16	0.11	0.13	0.84	0.72	0.33	0.00	0.26	0.18	0.13	0.10
FRANCE	CFR	2004	0.18	-0.06	0.19	0.82	0.65	0.47	0.06	0.06	0.15	0.00	0.27
FRANCE	CFR	2008	0.21	0.03	0.52	0.46	0.18	0.58	0.01	0.01	0.32	0.00	0.08
FRANCE	CFR	2012	0.15	-0.04	0.12	0.71	0.90	0.26	0.16	0.16	0.00	0.10	0.32
FRANCE	CFR	Military	0.53	0.25	0.33	0.47	0.45	0.49	0.11	0.17	0.13	0.00	0.11
FRANCE	CFR	Political	-0.18	-0.24	0.23	0.65	0.61	0.33	0.05	0.02	0.24	0.07	0.28
FRANCE	CFR	Social	1.00	0.33	1.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
FRANCE	CFR	Three Topics	0.04	-0.08	0.15	0.90	0.67	0.36	0.08	0.08	0.20	0.03	0.25
FRANCE	Heritage	2004	0.66	0.44	0.44	0.35	0.54	0.44	0.12	0.27	0.17	0.00	0.00
FRANCE	Heritage	2008	0.35	0.20	0.37	0.58	0.56	0.44	0.00	0.23	0.21	0.03	0.09
FRANCE	Heritage	2012	0.06	0.07	0.16	0.69	0.76	0.18	0.07	0.27	0.23	0.00	0.23
FRANCE	Heritage	Military	0.00	0.10	0.22	0.78	0.83	0.14	0.06	0.31	0.30	0.03	0.17
FRANCE	Heritage	Political	0.47	0.40	0.23	0.43	0.64	0.25	0.11	0.37	0.20	0.00	0.06
FRANCE	Heritage	Social	1.00	0.33	1.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
FRANCE	Heritage	Three Topics	0.26	0.20	0.12	0.71	0.77	0.30	0.06	0.27	0.23	0.01	0.13
FRANCE	RAND	2004	0.64	0.35	0.45	0.36	0.58	0.53	0.00	0.29	0.09	0.00	0.09
FRANCE	RAND	2008	0.37	0.10	0.31	0.63	0.38	0.56	0.06	0.06	0.18	0.00	0.13
FRANCE	RAND	2012	0.50	0.31	0.55	0.50	0.00	0.33	0.42	0.00	0.25	0.00	0.00
FRANCE	RAND	Military	0.25	0.00	0.48	0.75	0.25	0.63	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.00	0.13
FRANCE	RAND	Political	0.59	0.41	0.46	0.41	0.36	0.24	0.37	0.18	0.16	0.00	0.05
FRANCE	RAND	Social	1.00	0.33	1.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
FRANCE	RAND	Three Topics	0.43	0.23	0.21	0.57	0.44	0.44	0.11	0.17	0.20	0.00	0.09
FRANCE	Seven Think Tanks	2004	0.36	0.13	0.44	0.45	0.48	0.48	0.03	0.17	0.15	0.02	0.16
FRANCE	Seven Think Tanks	2008	0.35	0.15	0.34	0.52	0.53	0.46	0.02	0.19	0.15	0.06	0.12
FRANCE	Seven Think Tanks	2012	0.17	0.07	0.27	0.70	0.65	0.29	0.10	0.19	0.17	0.06	0.19
FRANCE	Seven Think Tanks	3 Elections	0.29	0.12	0.35	0.55	0.55	0.41	0.05	0.18	0.15	0.04	0.16
FRANCE	Seven Think Tanks	Military	0.29	0.14	0.36	0.57	0.61	0.35	0.04	0.25	0.14	0.01	0.20
FRANCE	Seven Think Tanks	Political	0.31	0.13	0.30	0.57	0.56	0.41	0.08	0.16	0.16	0.05	0.14
FRANCE	Seven Think Tanks	Social	0.32	0.09	0.67	0.29	0.31	0.52	0.01	0.13	0.14	0.09	0.11
FRANCE	Seven Think Tanks	Three Topics	0.26	0.10	0.17	0.72	0.67	0.40	0.05	0.18	0.18	0.03	0.16

**Table 5-13 Operational Code of France from the Perspective of American Think Tanks**

**Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to France? Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing France's actions across time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view France's actions?**

As Table 5-12 shows, relative to other think tanks, AEI, CFR, and Cato assigned the most conflictual actions to France, while RAND assigned the most cooperative actions. One think tank showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking about France. RAND assigned cooperative actions to France across the seven instances. This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational identity in relation to France. As Table 5-12 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of France was 75% cooperative.

**What was France's relative position in the world of American foreign policy think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to France?**

As Figure 5-5 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks, actions of France were most similar to actions of the United Nations and least similar to actions of India, Terrorists, Syria, and North Korea. From the total of forty-four instances, France was placed twenty-one times in the same quadrant as the United Nations, which shows 48% similarity (52% dissimilarity). France was placed four times in the same quadrant as India, Terrorists, Syria, and North Korea, which shows 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).

No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of France were most similar to actions of the United Nations and least similar to those of India. From the total of eleven instances, France was placed seven times in the same quadrant as the



United Nations, which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, France was not placed in the same quadrant as India, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Political Issues: Political actions of France were most similar to political actions of Turkey and least similar to those of Terrorists, North Korea, Afghanistan, and China. From the total of eleven instances, France was placed seven times in the same quadrant as Turkey, which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, France was not placed in the same quadrant as Terrorists, North Korea, Afghanistan, and China, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Social Issues: Social actions of France were most similar to those of the Muslim World and Afghanistan and least similar to social actions of Russia, China, the United States, Europe, and South Korea. From the total of eleven instances, France was placed six times in the same quadrant as the Muslim World and Afghanistan, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of France were not placed in the same quadrant as those of Russia, China, the United States, Europe, and South Korea, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Military Issues: Military actions of France were most similar to military actions of Europe and least similar to those of India, Terrorists, Syria, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, the United States, the Muslim World, Turkey, and Germany. From the total of eleven instances, France was placed eight times in the same quadrant as Europe, which shows 73% similarity (27% dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of France was placed once in the same quadrant as India, Terrorists, Syria, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, the United States, the Muslim World, Turkey, and Germany, which indicates 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).




Figure 5-5 Similarity of Actions of France to other Actors

## Germany

**How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Germany's operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of Germany's actions?**

Table 5-15 shows the operational code of Germany on fifty-seven levels of time and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Germany, the overall perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was neither cooperative nor conflictual. Table 5-14 presents the number of times Germany's index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of direction of strategy on each of the seven levels. As Table 5-14 shows, the direction of strategy of Germany was conflictual twenty-nine times and cooperative twenty-eight times. The small difference between the

frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that American foreign policy think tanks had a very low level of certainty about the direction of strategy of Germany. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 2% agreement in describing the direction of strategy of Germany. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked Germany eighth based on its conflictual actions and fifteenth based on its cooperative actions.

<b>GERMANY</b>		
	<b>CONFLICTUAL</b>	<b>COOPERATIVE</b>
Brookings	1	6
Cato	2	5
Carnegie	2	5
RAND	3	4
AEI	4	3
Seven Think Tanks	5	3
Heritage	5	2
CFR	7	
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>28</b>

**Table 5-14 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Germany**

Country	Think Tank	Year/Topic	I1	I2	I3	I4a	I4b	I5ap	I5pr	I5re	I5op	I5th	I5pu
GERMANY	AEI	2004	0.40	0.33	0.20	0.60	0.75	0.24	0.15	0.32	0.16	0.08	0.06
GERMANY	AEI	2008	-0.02	0.00	0.21	0.98	0.48	0.18	0.08	0.23	0.25	0.00	0.27
GERMANY	AEI	2012	0.24	0.10	0.13	0.76	0.84	0.33	0.02	0.27	0.12	0.00	0.26
GERMANY	AEI	Military	0.00	0.05	0.12	1.00	0.63	0.19	0.13	0.19	0.25	0.13	0.13
GERMANY	AEI	Political	0.18	0.13	0.17	0.82	0.66	0.35	0.03	0.21	0.29	0.00	0.12
GERMANY	AEI	Social	0.44	0.31	0.33	0.56	0.56	0.11	0.17	0.44	0.00	0.00	0.28
GERMANY	AEI	Three Topics	0.13	0.06	0.08	0.82	0.84	0.30	0.05	0.21	0.21	0.02	0.21
GERMANY	Brookings	2004	0.31	0.25	0.40	0.69	0.31	0.30	0.00	0.35	0.13	0.17	0.05
GERMANY	Brookings	2008	0.65	0.53	0.47	0.35	0.45	0.31	0.00	0.51	0.13	0.00	0.05
GERMANY	Brookings	2012	0.46	0.14	0.43	0.55	0.48	0.61	0.00	0.12	0.14	0.01	0.13
GERMANY	Brookings	Military	1.00	0.78	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.33	0.00	0.67	0.00	0.00	0.00
GERMANY	Brookings	Political	0.28	0.15	0.16	0.72	0.68	0.43	0.00	0.21	0.22	0.02	0.12
GERMANY	Brookings	Social	0.00	-0.17	0.40	1.00	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.00
GERMANY	Brookings	Three Topics	0.24	0.13	0.14	0.77	0.67	0.40	0.00	0.22	0.22	0.05	0.12
GERMANY	Carnegie	2004	0.57	0.18	0.39	0.43	0.85	0.58	0.00	0.21	0.00	0.00	0.22
GERMANY	Carnegie	2008	0.08	0.16	0.43	0.42	0.69	0.08	0.00	0.46	0.13	0.14	0.20
GERMANY	Carnegie	2012	0.22	0.11	0.32	0.54	0.74	0.31	0.01	0.29	0.12	0.05	0.21
GERMANY	Carnegie	Military	-0.62	-0.57	0.28	0.39	0.89	0.16	0.04	0.00	0.12	0.25	0.44
GERMANY	Carnegie	Political	0.30	0.12	0.27	0.70	0.77	0.42	0.00	0.22	0.15	0.01	0.19
GERMANY	Carnegie	Social	0.64	0.55	0.51	0.31	0.59	0.22	0.00	0.60	0.08	0.00	0.10
GERMANY	Carnegie	Three Topics	0.29	0.13	0.20	0.71	0.77	0.40	0.01	0.25	0.15	0.02	0.19
GERMANY	Cato	2004	0.02	-0.02	0.14	0.86	0.80	0.30	0.00	0.21	0.23	0.04	0.23
GERMANY	Cato	2008	0.25	0.06	0.69	0.25	0.31	0.28	0.00	0.35	0.00	0.00	0.38
GERMANY	Cato	2012	0.48	0.14	0.50	0.52	0.40	0.52	0.00	0.23	0.00	0.00	0.26
GERMANY	Cato	Military	-0.33	-0.33	0.51	0.67	0.22	0.11	0.00	0.22	0.11	0.00	0.56
GERMANY	Cato	Political	0.43	0.03	0.38	0.57	0.70	0.60	0.00	0.11	0.00	0.00	0.29
GERMANY	Cato	Social	0.58	0.43	0.70	0.25	0.25	0.38	0.00	0.42	0.13	0.04	0.04
GERMANY	Cato	Three Topics	0.32	0.12	0.17	0.68	0.84	0.37	0.00	0.29	0.07	0.01	0.26
GERMANY	CFR	2004	-0.08	-0.04	0.62	0.33	0.38	0.38	0.00	0.08	0.44	0.00	0.11
GERMANY	CFR	2008	0.13	-0.16	0.59	0.38	0.38	0.46	0.00	0.11	0.00	0.06	0.38
GERMANY	CFR	2012	0.14	-0.01	0.28	0.36	0.72	0.32	0.14	0.12	0.17	0.00	0.27
GERMANY	CFR	Military	-0.33	-0.45	0.80	0.00	0.33	0.33	0.00	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.50
GERMANY	CFR	Political	0.05	0.00	0.21	0.61	0.87	0.30	0.00	0.23	0.19	0.06	0.23
GERMANY	CFR	Social	0.33	0.17	0.80	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.17	0.00	0.33	0.00	0.00
GERMANY	CFR	Three Topics	0.19	0.00	0.17	0.81	0.76	0.40	0.02	0.17	0.12	0.03	0.26
GERMANY	Heritage	2004	-0.08	-0.20	0.24	0.58	0.78	0.31	0.13	0.03	0.18	0.00	0.36
GERMANY	Heritage	2008	0.62	0.39	0.60	0.38	0.25	0.48	0.00	0.33	0.14	0.00	0.05
GERMANY	Heritage	2012	-0.37	-0.25	0.29	0.63	0.34	0.31	0.00	0.00	0.48	0.03	0.17
GERMANY	Heritage	Military	-0.11	-0.15	0.62	0.22	0.33	0.44	0.00	0.00	0.39	0.00	0.17
GERMANY	Heritage	Political	0.00	-0.11	0.20	0.78	0.63	0.41	0.03	0.06	0.25	0.00	0.25
GERMANY	Heritage	Social	0.67	0.50	0.60	0.34	0.34	0.17	0.17	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.17
GERMANY	Heritage	Three Topics	0.02	-0.06	0.18	0.68	0.53	0.39	0.03	0.08	0.28	0.03	0.18
GERMANY	RAND	2004	0.38	0.32	0.42	0.62	0.53	0.18	0.00	0.51	0.09	0.00	0.22
GERMANY	RAND	2008	0.12	-0.06	0.37	0.38	0.65	0.31	0.04	0.22	0.03	0.05	0.36
GERMANY	RAND	2012	-0.02	-0.13	0.21	0.71	0.73	0.34	0.00	0.15	0.18	0.01	0.33
GERMANY	RAND	Military	0.30	0.31	0.45	0.41	0.52	0.11	0.00	0.54	0.10	0.06	0.20
GERMANY	RAND	Political	0.35	0.13	0.18	0.65	0.78	0.43	0.02	0.23	0.11	0.00	0.22
GERMANY	RAND	Social	-0.60	-0.67	0.62	0.40	0.40	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.00	0.70
GERMANY	RAND	Three Topics	0.27	0.07	0.14	0.73	0.81	0.38	0.02	0.23	0.09	0.02	0.25
GERMANY	Seven Think Tanks	2004	0.20	0.11	0.34	0.59	0.62	0.32	0.04	0.24	0.19	0.04	0.17
GERMANY	Seven Think Tanks	2008	0.25	0.12	0.48	0.45	0.46	0.30	0.02	0.30	0.09	0.04	0.25
GERMANY	Seven Think Tanks	2012	0.15	0.00	0.28	0.60	0.61	0.39	0.03	0.16	0.18	0.01	0.24
GERMANY	Seven Think Tanks	3 Elections	0.20	0.08	0.37	0.55	0.56	0.34	0.03	0.23	0.15	0.03	0.22
GERMANY	Seven Think Tanks	Military	0.02	-0.03	0.58	0.35	0.38	0.25	0.02	0.25	0.16	0.05	0.28
GERMANY	Seven Think Tanks	Political	0.23	0.06	0.22	0.69	0.73	0.42	0.01	0.18	0.17	0.01	0.20
GERMANY	Seven Think Tanks	Social	0.36	0.23	0.58	0.34	0.33	0.28	0.08	0.32	0.11	0.04	0.18
GERMANY	Seven Think Tanks	Three Topics	0.21	0.07	0.16	0.74	0.74	0.38	0.02	0.21	0.16	0.03	0.21

**Table 5-15 Operational Code of Germany from the Perspective of American Think Tanks**

**Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Germany?  
Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Germany's actions across  
time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view Germany's actions?**

As Table 5-14 shows, relative to other think tanks, CFR assigned the most conflictual actions to Germany, while Brookings assigned the most cooperative actions. One think tank showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking about Germany. CFR assigned conflictual actions to Germany across the seven instances. This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational identity in relation to Germany. As Table 5-14 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of Germany was 63% conflictual.

**What was Germany's relative position in the world of American foreign policy think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Germany?**

As Figure 5-6 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks, actions of Germany were most similar to actions of the Muslim World and least similar to those of Syria and Terrorists. From the total of forty-four instances, Germany was placed sixteen times in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, which shows 36% similarity (64% dissimilarity). Germany was placed five times in the same quadrant as Syria and Terrorists, which shows 89% dissimilarity (11% similarity).

No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Germany were most similar to actions of Pakistan and least similar to those of Syria. From the total of eleven instances, Germany was placed five times in the same quadrant as Pakistan, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Germany was placed

only once in the same quadrant as Syria which indicates 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).

**Political Issues:** Political actions of Germany were most similar to political actions of Europe and the United Nations and least similar to those of Syria and Terrorists. From the total of eleven instances, Germany was placed five times in the same quadrant as Europe and the United Nations, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible instances, Germany was not placed in the same quadrant as Syria and Terrorists, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

**Social Issues:** Social actions of Germany were most similar to social actions of France, South Korea, and the Muslim World and least similar to social actions of India. From the total of eleven instances, Germany was placed five times in the same quadrant as France, South Korea, and the Muslim World, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of Germany were not placed in the same quadrant as social actions of India, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

**Military Issues:** Military actions of Germany were most similar to military actions of the Muslim World and least similar to military actions of Terrorists. From the total of eleven instances, Germany was placed six times in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of Germany were not placed in the same quadrant as military actions of Terrorists, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.




Figure 5-6 Similarity of Actions of Germany to other Actors

## India

**How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive India's operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of India's actions?**

Table 5-17 shows the operational code of India on fifty-seven levels of time and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to India, the overall perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was cooperative. Table 5-16 presents the number of times India's index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of direction of strategy on each of the seven levels. As Table 5-16 shows, the direction of strategy of India was conflictual eighteen times and cooperative thirty-nine times. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American

foreign policy think tanks had a medium level of certainty about the direction of strategy of India. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 37% agreement in describing the direction of strategy of India. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked India fifteenth based on its conflictual actions and eighths based on its cooperative actions.

<b>INDIA</b>		
	<b>CONFLICTUAL</b>	<b>COOPERATIVE</b>
Brookings		7
Cato	1	6
Seven Think Tanks	1	7
RAND	2	5
Heritage	2	5
Carnegie	3	4
AEI	4	3
CFR	5	2
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>39</b>

**Table 5-16 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to India**



Country	Think Tank	Year/Topic	I1	I2	I3	I4a	I4b	I5ap	I5pr	I5re	I5op	I5th	I5pu
INDIA	AEI	2004	0.37	0.30	0.09	0.64	0.85	0.26	0.11	0.32	0.21	0.00	0.11
INDIA	AEI	2008	0.06	-0.13	0.22	0.84	0.93	0.41	0.01	0.12	0.12	0.00	0.35
INDIA	AEI	2012	0.03	-0.10	0.16	0.76	0.91	0.34	0.03	0.15	0.14	0.01	0.34
INDIA	AEI	Military	-0.22	-0.43	0.36	0.79	0.93	0.40	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.54
INDIA	AEI	Political	0.26	0.15	0.10	0.74	0.92	0.32	0.05	0.26	0.17	0.01	0.19
INDIA	AEI	Social	0.03	-0.14	0.17	0.78	0.84	0.39	0.03	0.10	0.17	0.00	0.33
INDIA	AEI	Three Topics	0.23	0.11	0.10	0.77	0.91	0.32	0.05	0.24	0.17	0.00	0.21
INDIA	Brookings	2004	0.47	0.29	0.23	0.53	0.73	0.44	0.00	0.30	0.14	0.06	0.07
INDIA	Brookings	2008	0.37	0.13	0.23	0.64	0.83	0.47	0.01	0.21	0.11	0.01	0.21
INDIA	Brookings	2012	0.27	0.09	0.16	0.74	0.88	0.42	0.00	0.22	0.13	0.02	0.22
INDIA	Brookings	Military	0.18	0.01	0.24	0.82	0.76	0.44	0.00	0.15	0.18	0.00	0.22
INDIA	Brookings	Political	0.29	0.10	0.16	0.71	0.73	0.44	0.00	0.20	0.14	0.05	0.17
INDIA	Brookings	Social	0.73	0.46	0.28	0.28	0.96	0.46	0.00	0.40	0.04	0.02	0.08
INDIA	Brookings	Three Topics	0.27	0.10	0.14	0.73	0.81	0.42	0.00	0.22	0.14	0.04	0.19
INDIA	Carnegie	2004	0.22	0.09	0.24	0.78	0.54	0.29	0.00	0.32	0.11	0.00	0.29
INDIA	Carnegie	2008	0.28	0.15	0.11	0.66	0.83	0.27	0.16	0.21	0.16	0.00	0.20
INDIA	Carnegie	2012	0.28	0.14	0.15	0.70	0.73	0.33	0.07	0.24	0.15	0.00	0.21
INDIA	Carnegie	Military	0.09	0.02	0.18	0.91	0.56	0.18	0.08	0.28	0.13	0.00	0.33
INDIA	Carnegie	Political	0.17	0.05	0.14	0.75	0.78	0.39	0.02	0.19	0.20	0.01	0.21
INDIA	Carnegie	Social	0.78	0.49	0.19	0.23	0.70	0.40	0.19	0.30	0.06	0.00	0.05
INDIA	Carnegie	Three Topics	0.24	0.11	0.12	0.76	0.87	0.36	0.03	0.23	0.17	0.00	0.21
INDIA	Cato	2004	0.49	0.26	0.23	0.51	0.72	0.34	0.00	0.40	0.01	0.00	0.25
INDIA	Cato	2008	0.55	0.30	0.31	0.45	0.77	0.41	0.07	0.30	0.06	0.00	0.17
INDIA	Cato	2012	0.28	0.19	0.24	0.72	0.68	0.24	0.00	0.40	0.11	0.02	0.24
INDIA	Cato	Military	0.00	-0.21	0.25	1.00	0.75	0.25	0.13	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.50
INDIA	Cato	Political	0.37	0.21	0.21	0.63	0.66	0.35	0.00	0.33	0.12	0.01	0.19
INDIA	Cato	Social	0.85	0.61	0.41	0.15	0.69	0.34	0.00	0.58	0.00	0.00	0.08
INDIA	Cato	Three Topics	0.38	0.23	0.16	0.62	0.79	0.34	0.01	0.35	0.11	0.01	0.19
INDIA	CFR	2004	-0.04	-0.23	0.24	0.96	0.91	0.42	0.00	0.06	0.13	0.00	0.39
INDIA	CFR	2008	0.03	0.09	0.24	0.78	0.51	0.20	0.00	0.32	0.29	0.01	0.19
INDIA	CFR	2012	0.42	0.41	0.34	0.58	0.68	0.18	0.00	0.53	0.15	0.03	0.10
INDIA	CFR	Military	0.29	0.21	0.52	0.62	0.52	0.26	0.00	0.38	0.14	0.00	0.21
INDIA	CFR	Political	0.03	0.01	0.14	0.82	0.82	0.29	0.00	0.22	0.26	0.01	0.21
INDIA	CFR	Social	0.31	0.33	0.32	0.70	0.45	0.11	0.00	0.54	0.11	0.06	0.18
INDIA	CFR	Three Topics	0.04	0.01	0.14	0.87	0.85	0.30	0.00	0.22	0.24	0.02	0.23
INDIA	Heritage	2004	0.21	0.07	0.35	0.79	0.17	0.56	0.00	0.04	0.35	0.00	0.04
INDIA	Heritage	2008	0.26	0.15	0.12	0.74	0.92	0.34	0.02	0.27	0.18	0.00	0.20
INDIA	Heritage	2012	0.50	0.28	0.17	0.50	0.82	0.43	0.03	0.30	0.09	0.02	0.14
INDIA	Heritage	Military	0.29	0.19	0.15	0.72	0.86	0.36	0.00	0.29	0.22	0.00	0.14
INDIA	Heritage	Political	0.35	0.15	0.19	0.65	0.65	0.46	0.03	0.18	0.17	0.01	0.15
INDIA	Heritage	Social	0.33	0.19	0.26	0.67	0.58	0.43	0.01	0.22	0.22	0.00	0.12
INDIA	Heritage	Three Topics	0.35	0.17	0.19	0.65	0.68	0.45	0.02	0.20	0.18	0.01	0.14
INDIA	RAND	2004	0.57	0.37	0.42	0.43	0.53	0.39	0.00	0.39	0.09	0.01	0.12
INDIA	RAND	2008	0.25	0.13	0.16	0.75	0.82	0.34	0.02	0.27	0.17	0.00	0.21
INDIA	RAND	2012	0.09	-0.06	0.42	0.42	0.70	0.41	0.00	0.14	0.19	0.00	0.27
INDIA	RAND	Military	-0.11	-0.15	0.28	0.44	0.78	0.33	0.00	0.11	0.28	0.00	0.28
INDIA	RAND	Political	0.31	0.10	0.17	0.69	0.85	0.42	0.00	0.23	0.11	0.00	0.23
INDIA	RAND	Social	0.77	0.56	0.73	0.23	0.23	0.37	0.02	0.50	0.07	0.00	0.05
INDIA	RAND	Three Topics	0.24	0.07	0.15	0.76	0.87	0.39	0.01	0.22	0.14	0.00	0.24
INDIA	Seven Think Tanks	2004	0.34	0.17	0.27	0.65	0.62	0.39	0.01	0.27	0.14	0.01	0.18
INDIA	Seven Think Tanks	2008	0.26	0.12	0.20	0.69	0.80	0.35	0.04	0.24	0.15	0.00	0.22
INDIA	Seven Think Tanks	2012	0.27	0.14	0.23	0.63	0.78	0.35	0.01	0.28	0.14	0.01	0.21
INDIA	Seven Think Tanks	3 Elections	0.29	0.14	0.23	0.66	0.74	0.36	0.02	0.26	0.15	0.01	0.20
INDIA	Seven Think Tanks	Military	0.08	-0.03	0.29	0.74	0.72	0.32	0.03	0.20	0.15	0.00	0.30
INDIA	Seven Think Tanks	Political	0.25	0.11	0.16	0.71	0.77	0.38	0.01	0.23	0.17	0.01	0.19
INDIA	Seven Think Tanks	Social	0.57	0.38	0.35	0.41	0.63	0.37	0.03	0.39	0.09	0.01	0.12
INDIA	Seven Think Tanks	Three Topics	0.25	0.11	0.14	0.74	0.83	0.37	0.02	0.24	0.16	0.01	0.20

**Table 5-17 Operational Code of India from the Perspective of American Think Tanks**

**Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to India? Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing India's actions across time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view India's actions?**

As Table 5-16 shows, relative to other think tanks, CFR assigned the most conflictual actions to India, while Brookings assigned the most cooperative actions to India. One think tank showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking about India. Brookings assigned cooperative actions to India across the seven instances. This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational identity in regard to India. As Table 5-16 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of India was 88% cooperative.

**What was India's relative position in the world of American foreign policy think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to India?**

As Figure 5-7 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks, actions of India were most similar to actions of the United States and Europe and least similar to actions of France. From the total of forty-four instances, India was placed seventeen times in the same quadrant as the United States and Europe, which shows 39% similarity (61% dissimilarity). India was placed four times in the same quadrant as France, which shows 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).

No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of India were most similar to actions of China and least similar to those of France. From the total of eleven instances, India was placed five times in the same quadrant as China, which shows

45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, India was not placed in the same quadrant as France, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Political Issues: Political actions of India were most similar to political actions of Europe and least similar to political actions of Turkey. From the total of eleven instances, India was placed five times in the same quadrant as Europe, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, India was not placed in the same quadrant as Turkey, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Social Issues: Social actions of India were most similar to social actions of Europe and Taiwan and least similar to those of Iraq and Germany. From the total of eleven instances, India was placed five times in the same quadrant as Europe and Taiwan, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of India were not placed in the same quadrant as those of Germany and Iraq, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Military Issues: Military actions of India were most similar to military actions of the United States and Iran and least similar to military actions of the United Nations. From the total of eleven instances, India was placed seven times in the same quadrant as the United States and Iran, which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of India were not placed in the same quadrant as military actions of the United Nations, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.




Figure 5-7 Similarity of Actions of India to other Actors

## Iran

**How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Iran's operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of Iran's actions?**

Table 5-19 shows the operational code of Iran on fifty-seven levels of time and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Iran, the overall perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was neither cooperative nor conflictual. Table 5-18 presents the number of times Iran's index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of direction of strategy on each of the seven levels. As Table 5-18 shows, the direction of strategy of Iran was conflictual twenty-seven times and cooperative thirty times. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American foreign policy think tanks had a very low level of certainty

about the direction of strategy of Iran. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 5% agreement in describing Iran’s strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked Iran ninth based on its conflictual actions and thirteenth based on its cooperative actions.

IRAN	CONFFLICTUAL COOPERATIVE	
	CONFICTUAL	COOPERATIVE
Carnegie		7
CFR	1	6
RAND	2	5
Seven Think Tanks	3	5
AEI	4	3
Brookings	4	3
Cato	6	1
Heritage	7	
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>30</b>

**Table 5-18 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Iran**

Country	Think Tank	Year/Topic	I1	I2	I3	I4a	I4b	I5ap	I5pr	I5re	I5op	I5th	I5pu
IRAN	AEI	2004	0.35	0.20	0.14	0.65	0.70	0.39	0.05	0.24	0.17	0.05	0.11
IRAN	AEI	2008	0.04	-0.03	0.09	0.90	0.84	0.31	0.01	0.20	0.20	0.06	0.23
IRAN	AEI	2012	0.22	0.12	0.09	0.78	0.86	0.32	0.04	0.25	0.18	0.02	0.20
IRAN	AEI	Military	0.08	0.05	0.09	0.89	0.81	0.28	0.01	0.25	0.21	0.08	0.18
IRAN	AEI	Political	0.16	0.04	0.08	0.84	0.78	0.35	0.04	0.19	0.18	0.04	0.20
IRAN	AEI	Social	0.39	0.23	0.16	0.55	0.80	0.38	0.05	0.27	0.16	0.01	0.14
IRAN	AEI	Three Topics	0.17	0.06	0.08	0.83	0.79	0.35	0.04	0.20	0.18	0.04	0.20
IRAN	Brookings	2004	0.21	-0.06	0.24	0.75	0.73	0.46	0.03	0.12	0.07	0.01	0.32
IRAN	Brookings	2008	0.27	0.16	0.12	0.73	0.77	0.34	0.03	0.27	0.19	0.01	0.17
IRAN	Brookings	2012	0.25	0.14	0.16	0.74	0.80	0.31	0.01	0.31	0.15	0.01	0.22
IRAN	Brookings	Military	0.04	-0.09	0.18	0.88	0.83	0.32	0.01	0.18	0.13	0.00	0.35
IRAN	Brookings	Political	0.23	0.09	0.11	0.77	0.74	0.39	0.05	0.18	0.18	0.01	0.19
IRAN	Brookings	Social	0.50	0.28	0.27	0.50	0.72	0.37	0.01	0.37	0.04	0.00	0.20
IRAN	Brookings	Three Topics	0.19	0.05	0.12	0.81	0.79	0.39	0.03	0.18	0.18	0.01	0.21
IRAN	Carnegie	2004	0.38	0.20	0.17	0.62	0.72	0.44	0.02	0.23	0.17	0.01	0.13
IRAN	Carnegie	2008	0.34	0.18	0.14	0.66	0.77	0.41	0.02	0.24	0.17	0.02	0.14
IRAN	Carnegie	2012	0.38	0.18	0.17	0.62	0.72	0.45	0.02	0.22	0.16	0.02	0.14
IRAN	Carnegie	Military	0.24	0.08	0.14	0.76	0.79	0.40	0.02	0.20	0.17	0.01	0.20
IRAN	Carnegie	Political	0.34	0.14	0.17	0.66	0.59	0.47	0.03	0.17	0.17	0.03	0.13
IRAN	Carnegie	Social	0.58	0.35	0.21	0.42	0.85	0.45	0.01	0.33	0.11	0.00	0.09
IRAN	Carnegie	Three Topics	0.36	0.16	0.16	0.64	0.65	0.46	0.02	0.19	0.17	0.02	0.13
IRAN	Cato	2004	0.16	0.09	0.14	0.84	0.71	0.18	0.07	0.34	0.11	0.00	0.31
IRAN	Cato	2008	-0.11	0.06	0.32	0.61	0.62	0.17	0.06	0.21	0.46	0.00	0.10
IRAN	Cato	2012	0.27	0.06	0.16	0.66	0.74	0.37	0.11	0.15	0.10	0.02	0.25
IRAN	Cato	Military	0.06	0.07	0.12	0.84	0.75	0.24	0.10	0.19	0.29	0.00	0.18
IRAN	Cato	Political	0.12	0.02	0.14	0.88	0.77	0.24	0.06	0.27	0.10	0.01	0.33
IRAN	Cato	Social	0.00	0.13	0.63	0.00	0.25	0.25	0.13	0.13	0.50	0.00	0.00
IRAN	Cato	Three Topics	0.19	0.09	0.10	0.81	0.84	0.25	0.06	0.28	0.13	0.01	0.27
IRAN	CFR	2004	0.46	0.19	0.28	0.54	0.58	0.54	0.03	0.17	0.13	0.03	0.12
IRAN	CFR	2008	0.29	0.21	0.16	0.71	0.78	0.26	0.05	0.34	0.16	0.00	0.19
IRAN	CFR	2012	0.44	0.26	0.15	0.56	0.90	0.35	0.08	0.30	0.11	0.02	0.15
IRAN	CFR	Military	0.48	0.28	0.15	0.52	0.92	0.38	0.04	0.32	0.09	0.00	0.17
IRAN	CFR	Political	0.17	0.03	0.11	0.83	0.73	0.38	0.03	0.17	0.19	0.03	0.19
IRAN	CFR	Social	0.67	0.45	0.41	0.33	0.58	0.38	0.08	0.38	0.08	0.00	0.08
IRAN	CFR	Three Topics	0.27	0.12	0.12	0.73	0.77	0.39	0.04	0.21	0.16	0.03	0.18
IRAN	Heritage	2004	0.09	0.08	0.18	0.81	0.50	0.34	0.03	0.18	0.31	0.08	0.08
IRAN	Heritage	2008	0.18	0.04	0.13	0.82	0.90	0.35	0.01	0.23	0.12	0.05	0.25
IRAN	Heritage	2012	-0.12	-0.18	0.10	0.88	0.93	0.28	0.00	0.16	0.15	0.09	0.33
IRAN	Heritage	Military	0.06	0.06	0.10	0.94	0.77	0.26	0.00	0.27	0.21	0.11	0.15
IRAN	Heritage	Political	0.20	0.03	0.13	0.77	0.87	0.38	0.02	0.19	0.13	0.01	0.26
IRAN	Heritage	Social	-0.16	-0.19	0.22	0.81	0.58	0.35	0.00	0.07	0.25	0.11	0.22
IRAN	Heritage	Three Topics	0.09	0.02	0.09	0.83	0.89	0.31	0.02	0.22	0.18	0.05	0.23
IRAN	RAND	2004	-0.02	-0.11	0.34	0.52	0.59	0.23	0.04	0.23	0.12	0.01	0.38
IRAN	RAND	2008	0.34	0.19	0.12	0.66	0.89	0.36	0.03	0.28	0.15	0.01	0.17
IRAN	RAND	2012	0.27	0.13	0.11	0.74	0.84	0.38	0.01	0.25	0.15	0.04	0.17
IRAN	RAND	Military	0.25	0.16	0.11	0.75	0.80	0.30	0.04	0.29	0.17	0.01	0.20
IRAN	RAND	Political	0.31	0.15	0.12	0.69	0.80	0.40	0.03	0.23	0.16	0.02	0.17
IRAN	RAND	Social	-0.06	-0.15	0.42	0.39	0.63	0.22	0.01	0.24	0.07	0.04	0.42
IRAN	RAND	Three Topics	0.28	0.14	0.11	0.72	0.86	0.37	0.03	0.25	0.16	0.02	0.18
IRAN	Seven Think Tanks	2004	0.23	0.08	0.21	0.67	0.64	0.37	0.04	0.21	0.15	0.03	0.20
IRAN	Seven Think Tanks	2008	0.19	0.12	0.15	0.73	0.79	0.31	0.03	0.25	0.21	0.02	0.18
IRAN	Seven Think Tanks	2012	0.25	0.10	0.14	0.71	0.82	0.36	0.04	0.23	0.14	0.03	0.21
IRAN	Seven Think Tanks	3 Elections	0.22	0.10	0.17	0.70	0.75	0.35	0.03	0.23	0.17	0.03	0.20
IRAN	Seven Think Tanks	Military	0.17	0.09	0.13	0.80	0.81	0.31	0.03	0.24	0.18	0.03	0.20
IRAN	Seven Think Tanks	Political	0.22	0.07	0.12	0.78	0.75	0.37	0.04	0.20	0.16	0.02	0.21
IRAN	Seven Think Tanks	Social	0.29	0.16	0.32	0.45	0.65	0.35	0.04	0.26	0.16	0.02	0.17
IRAN	Seven Think Tanks	Three Topics	0.22	0.09	0.11	0.77	0.80	0.36	0.03	0.22	0.16	0.02	0.20

**Table 5-19 Operational Code of Iran from the Perspective of American Think Tanks**

**Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Iran? Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Iran's actions across time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view Iran's actions?**

As Table 5-18 shows, relative to other think tanks, Heritage assigned the most conflictual actions to Iran, while Carnegie assigned the most cooperative actions. Two think tanks showed consistency in the seven instances of talking about Iran. Heritage assigned conflictual actions to Iran across the seven instances, and Carnegie assigned cooperative actions to Iran across the seven instances. This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational identity in regard to Iran. As Table 5-18 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of Iran was 63% cooperative.

**What was Iran's relative position in the world of American foreign policy think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Iran?**

As Figure 5-8 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks, actions of Iran were most similar to actions of North Korea and Russia and least similar to actions of the Muslim World. From the total of forty-four instances, Iran was placed nineteen times in the same quadrant as North Korea and Russia, which shows 43% similarity (57% dissimilarity). Iran was placed four times in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, which shows 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).

No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Iran were most similar to actions of China and least similar to actions of the Muslim World and Britain. From the total of eleven instances, Iran was placed seven times in the same quadrant as China, which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand,

Iran was not placed in the same quadrant as the Muslim World and Britain, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Political Issues: Political actions of Iran were most similar to political actions of North Korea and least similar to those of Taiwan. From the total of eleven instances, Iran was placed six times in the same quadrant as North Korea, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, political actions of Iran were not placed in the same quadrant as political actions of Taiwan, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Social Issues: Social actions of Iran were most similar to social actions of Russia and least similar to those of Israel and the Muslim World. From the total of eleven instances, Iran was placed five times in the same quadrant as Russia, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of Iran were not placed in the same quadrant as social actions of Israel and the Muslim World, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Military Issues: Military actions of Iran were most similar to military actions of the United States and least similar to those of Britain. From the total of eleven instances, Iran was placed nine times in the same quadrant as the United States, which shows 82% similarity (18% dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of Iran were not placed in the same quadrant as military actions of Britain, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.






Figure 5-8 Similarity of Actions of Iran to other Actors

## Iraq

**How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Iraq’s operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of Iraq’s actions?**

Table 5-21 shows the operational code of Iraq on fifty-seven levels of time and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Iraq, the overall perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was conflictual. Table 5-20 presents the number of times Iraq’s index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of direction of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks described Iraq’s strategy as conflictual thirty-five times and cooperative twenty-two times. The difference between

the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American foreign policy think tanks had a low level of certainty about the direction of strategy of Iraq. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 23% agreement in describing Iraq's strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked Iraq seventh based on its conflictual actions and seventeenth based on its cooperative actions.

IRAQ	CONFFLICTUAL COOPERATIVE	
	CONFICTUAL	COOPERATIVE
RAND		7
Cato	3	4
Carnegie	4	3
Heritage	4	3
Seven Think Tanks	5	3
CFR	6	1
AEI	6	1
Brookings	7	
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>22</b>

**Table 5-20 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Iraq**

Country	Think Tank	Year/Topic	I1	I2	I3	I4a	I4b	I5ap	I5pr	I5re	I5op	I5th	I5pu
IRAQ	AEI	2004	0.12	0.01	0.12	0.88	0.72	0.37	0.03	0.16	0.22	0.02	0.20
IRAQ	AEI	2008	0.45	0.21	0.22	0.55	0.91	0.42	0.01	0.30	0.05	0.01	0.22
IRAQ	AEI	2012	-0.02	-0.10	0.22	0.98	0.59	0.20	0.02	0.27	0.09	0.00	0.42
IRAQ	AEI	Military	0.08	-0.09	0.18	0.92	0.66	0.32	0.02	0.20	0.08	0.00	0.38
IRAQ	AEI	Political	0.18	0.02	0.12	0.80	0.82	0.38	0.03	0.18	0.16	0.02	0.24
IRAQ	AEI	Social	0.33	0.22	0.30	0.67	0.60	0.27	0.00	0.40	0.10	0.00	0.23
IRAQ	AEI	Three Topics	0.14	-0.01	0.13	0.83	0.87	0.36	0.03	0.19	0.14	0.01	0.28
IRAQ	Brookings	2004	0.13	0.08	0.12	0.87	0.80	0.29	0.01	0.26	0.21	0.03	0.20
IRAQ	Brookings	2008	-0.02	-0.11	0.14	0.86	0.82	0.32	0.01	0.16	0.19	0.01	0.31
IRAQ	Brookings	2012	-0.18	-0.21	0.13	0.82	0.82	0.20	0.02	0.19	0.13	0.06	0.40
IRAQ	Brookings	Military	-0.08	-0.10	0.12	0.89	0.76	0.20	0.01	0.25	0.16	0.01	0.37
IRAQ	Brookings	Political	0.03	-0.06	0.10	0.86	0.90	0.30	0.03	0.18	0.17	0.03	0.29
IRAQ	Brookings	Social	0.00	-0.06	0.19	0.78	0.68	0.32	0.00	0.18	0.21	0.07	0.23
IRAQ	Brookings	Three Topics	-0.04	-0.10	0.10	0.88	0.91	0.26	0.02	0.20	0.17	0.03	0.33
IRAQ	Carnegie	2004	0.00	-0.09	0.21	0.93	0.59	0.38	0.00	0.12	0.24	0.02	0.25
IRAQ	Carnegie	2008	0.29	0.11	0.31	0.71	0.71	0.42	0.02	0.20	0.15	0.02	0.18
IRAQ	Carnegie	2012	0.20	0.07	0.23	0.78	0.68	0.36	0.01	0.23	0.16	0.01	0.23
IRAQ	Carnegie	Military	0.01	-0.02	0.15	0.90	0.68	0.17	0.02	0.31	0.15	0.00	0.35
IRAQ	Carnegie	Political	0.15	0.04	0.11	0.85	0.86	0.31	0.02	0.24	0.16	0.02	0.25
IRAQ	Carnegie	Social	0.52	0.20	0.54	0.48	0.30	0.65	0.00	0.11	0.17	0.00	0.07
IRAQ	Carnegie	Three Topics	0.13	0.04	0.10	0.87	0.88	0.29	0.02	0.25	0.16	0.02	0.25
IRAQ	Cato	2004	0.51	0.18	0.43	0.49	0.50	0.62	0.00	0.13	0.13	0.00	0.12
IRAQ	Cato	2008	0.63	0.50	0.41	0.37	0.56	0.24	0.02	0.56	0.05	0.00	0.14
IRAQ	Cato	2012	-0.40	-0.20	0.28	0.60	0.44	0.22	0.02	0.06	0.54	0.00	0.16
IRAQ	Cato	Military	0.23	0.14	0.32	0.55	0.49	0.36	0.02	0.24	0.24	0.00	0.15
IRAQ	Cato	Political	0.12	0.07	0.25	0.50	0.71	0.35	0.00	0.20	0.29	0.00	0.16
IRAQ	Cato	Social	1.00	0.67	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00
IRAQ	Cato	Three Topics	0.11	0.05	0.17	0.69	0.65	0.32	0.02	0.21	0.25	0.00	0.20
IRAQ	CFR	2004	0.29	0.07	0.18	0.71	0.85	0.40	0.04	0.21	0.06	0.04	0.26
IRAQ	CFR	2008	0.01	-0.03	0.15	0.85	0.78	0.23	0.01	0.26	0.17	0.03	0.30
IRAQ	CFR	2012	-0.16	-0.16	0.31	0.60	0.67	0.17	0.05	0.21	0.19	0.01	0.38
IRAQ	CFR	Military	-0.08	-0.08	0.09	0.81	0.85	0.17	0.07	0.22	0.19	0.04	0.32
IRAQ	CFR	Political	0.20	0.06	0.11	0.80	0.87	0.36	0.03	0.21	0.14	0.04	0.22
IRAQ	CFR	Social	-0.11	-0.20	0.55	0.44	0.39	0.22	0.00	0.22	0.08	0.00	0.47
IRAQ	CFR	Three Topics	0.19	0.07	0.10	0.81	0.95	0.32	0.03	0.24	0.15	0.03	0.23
IRAQ	Heritage	2004	0.10	0.03	0.09	0.82	0.92	0.30	0.01	0.24	0.15	0.08	0.22
IRAQ	Heritage	2008	0.43	0.32	0.32	0.57	0.72	0.23	0.05	0.43	0.09	0.03	0.17
IRAQ	Heritage	2012	-0.04	-0.16	0.18	0.85	0.74	0.26	0.00	0.22	0.05	0.05	0.41
IRAQ	Heritage	Military	0.23	0.13	0.09	0.77	0.97	0.29	0.03	0.29	0.11	0.08	0.19
IRAQ	Heritage	Political	0.00	-0.13	0.18	0.80	0.75	0.29	0.02	0.19	0.09	0.03	0.39
IRAQ	Heritage	Social	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
IRAQ	Heritage	Three Topics	0.08	-0.03	0.09	0.86	0.89	0.29	0.02	0.22	0.12	0.06	0.28
IRAQ	RAND	2004	0.46	0.30	0.14	0.54	0.91	0.33	0.04	0.37	0.09	0.01	0.17
IRAQ	RAND	2008	0.34	0.18	0.12	0.66	0.93	0.34	0.05	0.28	0.12	0.02	0.19
IRAQ	RAND	2012	0.33	0.27	0.36	0.68	0.61	0.25	0.00	0.42	0.16	0.00	0.18
IRAQ	RAND	Military	0.23	0.18	0.12	0.77	0.86	0.23	0.03	0.36	0.17	0.01	0.21
IRAQ	RAND	Political	0.24	0.08	0.13	0.76	0.87	0.38	0.02	0.22	0.14	0.02	0.22
IRAQ	RAND	Social	0.77	0.61	0.46	0.23	0.61	0.25	0.04	0.59	0.04	0.00	0.08
IRAQ	RAND	Three Topics	0.26	0.12	0.12	0.74	0.91	0.35	0.02	0.26	0.14	0.01	0.21
IRAQ	Seven Think Tanks	2004	0.24	0.08	0.19	0.74	0.75	0.39	0.02	0.21	0.16	0.02	0.20
IRAQ	Seven Think Tanks	2008	0.30	0.17	0.24	0.65	0.77	0.31	0.02	0.31	0.12	0.02	0.22
IRAQ	Seven Think Tanks	2012	-0.01	-0.05	0.23	0.75	0.66	0.22	0.02	0.25	0.17	0.02	0.32
IRAQ	Seven Think Tanks	3 Elections	0.18	0.07	0.22	0.71	0.73	0.31	0.02	0.26	0.15	0.02	0.24
IRAQ	Seven Think Tanks	Military	0.09	0.02	0.15	0.80	0.75	0.25	0.03	0.27	0.16	0.02	0.28
IRAQ	Seven Think Tanks	Political	0.13	0.01	0.14	0.77	0.83	0.34	0.02	0.20	0.16	0.02	0.25
IRAQ	Seven Think Tanks	Social	0.42	0.26	0.51	0.43	0.43	0.34	0.01	0.36	0.10	0.01	0.18
IRAQ	Seven Think Tanks	Three Topics	0.12	0.02	0.11	0.81	0.87	0.31	0.02	0.22	0.16	0.02	0.25

Table 5-21 Operational Code of Iraq from the Perspective of American Think Tanks

**Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Iraq? Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Iraq's actions across time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view Iraq's actions?**

As Table 5-20 shows, relative to other think tanks, Brookings assigned the most conflictual actions to Iraq, while RAND assigned the most cooperative actions. Two think tanks showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking about Iraq. RAND assigned cooperative actions to Iraq in all seven instances, while Brookings assigned conflictual actions in all the instances. This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational identity in relation to Iraq. As Table 5-20 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of Iraq was 63% conflictual.

**What was Iraq's relative position in the world of American foreign policy think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Iraq?**

As Figure 5-9 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks, actions of Iraq were most similar to actions of North Korea and least similar to actions of Taiwan. From the total of forty-four instances, Iraq was placed sixteen times in the same quadrant as North Korea, which shows 36% similarity (64% dissimilarity). Iraq was placed four times in the same quadrant as Taiwan, which shows 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).

No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Iraq were most similar to actions of the Muslim World and least similar to actions of Taiwan, South Korea, China, the United Nations, Europe, and the United States. From the total of eleven instances, Iraq was placed seven times in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, which

shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Iraq was not placed in the same quadrant as Taiwan, South Korea, China, the United Nations, Europe, and the United States, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

**Political Issues:** Political actions of Iraq were most similar to political actions of Iran and the Muslim World and least similar to those of the United States and South Korea. From the total of eleven instances, Iraq was placed five times in the same quadrant as Iran and the Muslim World, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Iraq was not placed in the same quadrant as the United States and South Korea, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

**Social Issues:** Social actions of Iraq were most similar to social actions of North Korea and Germany and least similar to social actions of India. From the total of eleven instances, Iraq was placed four times in the same quadrant as Germany and North Korea, which shows 36% similarity (64% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of Iraq were not placed in the same quadrant as social actions of India, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

**Military Issues:** Military actions of Iraq were most similar to military actions of the United States and Iran and least similar to those of Britain, Turkey and Taiwan. From the total of eleven instances, Iraq was placed seven times in the same quadrant as the United States and Iran, which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of Iraq were not placed in the same quadrant as military actions of Britain, Turkey, and Taiwan, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.




Figure 5-9 Similarity of Actions of Iraq to other Actors

## Israel

**How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Israel’s operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of Israel’s actions?**

Table 5-23 shows the operational code of Israel on fifty-seven levels of time and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Israel, the overall perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was conflictual. Table 5-22 presents the number of times Israel’s index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of direction of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks described Israel’s strategy as conflictual forty-four times and cooperative thirteen times. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American foreign

policy think tanks had a high level of certainty about the direction of strategy of Israel. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 54% agreement in describing Israel's strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked Israel third based on its conflictual actions and twentieth based on its cooperative actions.

<b>ISRAEL</b>		
	<b>CONFLICTUAL</b>	<b>COOPERATIVE</b>
Heritage	4	3
Cato	5	2
Brookings	5	2
AEI	5	2
CFR	6	1
RAND	6	1
Carnegie	6	1
Seven Think Tanks	7	1
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>13</b>

**Table 5-22 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Israel**

Country	Think Tank	Year/Topic	I1	I2	I3	I4a	I4b	I5ap	I5pr	I5re	I5op	I5th	I5pu
ISRAEL	AEI	2004	0.20	0.17	0.44	0.53	0.55	0.08	0.28	0.25	0.16	0.02	0.23
ISRAEL	AEI	2008	-0.27	-0.35	0.25	0.74	0.78	0.25	0.01	0.12	0.11	0.04	0.50
ISRAEL	AEI	2012	0.27	0.03	0.36	0.60	0.50	0.55	0.00	0.09	0.17	0.04	0.16
ISRAEL	AEI	Military	-0.04	0.02	0.30	0.74	0.53	0.15	0.00	0.33	0.23	0.04	0.25
ISRAEL	AEI	Political	-0.19	-0.23	0.17	0.66	0.78	0.25	0.01	0.14	0.17	0.04	0.39
ISRAEL	AEI	Social	0.67	0.22	0.80	0.33	0.33	0.50	0.33	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.17
ISRAEL	AEI	Three Topics	-0.17	-0.22	0.14	0.75	0.78	0.26	0.03	0.14	0.18	0.04	0.37
ISRAEL	Brookings	2004	-0.03	0.01	0.18	0.81	0.61	0.27	0.00	0.22	0.32	0.00	0.20
ISRAEL	Brookings	2008	0.28	0.19	0.33	0.70	0.59	0.25	0.03	0.35	0.11	0.06	0.19
ISRAEL	Brookings	2012	0.12	0.06	0.22	0.78	0.77	0.33	0.02	0.21	0.23	0.04	0.18
ISRAEL	Brookings	Military	-0.03	-0.11	0.18	0.77	0.83	0.28	0.00	0.21	0.11	0.09	0.31
ISRAEL	Brookings	Political	0.17	0.05	0.15	0.83	0.58	0.41	0.04	0.13	0.25	0.01	0.16
ISRAEL	Brookings	Social	0.40	0.60	0.71	0.40	0.40	0.00	0.00	0.70	0.30	0.00	0.00
ISRAEL	Brookings	Three Topics	0.09	0.00	0.10	0.91	0.75	0.35	0.03	0.16	0.21	0.03	0.21
ISRAEL	Carnegie	2004	0.29	0.24	0.41	0.71	0.32	0.20	0.00	0.45	0.10	0.05	0.22
ISRAEL	Carnegie	2008	-0.15	-0.26	0.37	0.65	0.52	0.32	0.01	0.10	0.16	0.00	0.41
ISRAEL	Carnegie	2012	-0.05	-0.08	0.31	0.69	0.51	0.26	0.00	0.22	0.20	0.03	0.29
ISRAEL	Carnegie	Military	-0.15	-0.12	0.25	0.75	0.38	0.20	0.00	0.22	0.23	0.04	0.30
ISRAEL	Carnegie	Political	0.05	-0.05	0.11	0.95	0.74	0.37	0.01	0.15	0.21	0.04	0.22
ISRAEL	Carnegie	Social	-0.17	-0.11	0.75	0.17	0.17	0.08	0.00	0.33	0.17	0.00	0.42
ISRAEL	Carnegie	Three Topics	0.08	-0.03	0.12	0.90	0.76	0.37	0.01	0.16	0.21	0.03	0.22
ISRAEL	Cato	2008	0.31	-0.07	0.50	0.64	0.47	0.66	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.06	0.23
ISRAEL	Cato	2012	0.07	-0.11	0.33	0.73	0.39	0.39	0.00	0.14	0.13	0.00	0.33
ISRAEL	Cato	Military	0.75	0.25	0.78	0.25	0.00	0.88	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.00	0.00
ISRAEL	Cato	Political	-0.05	-0.22	0.23	0.95	0.55	0.35	0.00	0.13	0.08	0.05	0.40
ISRAEL	Cato	Three Topics	-0.14	-0.30	0.24	0.87	0.74	0.35	0.00	0.09	0.09	0.04	0.45
ISRAEL	CFR	2004	-0.18	-0.18	0.14	0.78	0.76	0.29	0.03	0.09	0.30	0.00	0.29
ISRAEL	CFR	2008	-0.48	-0.32	0.37	0.53	0.65	0.18	0.01	0.08	0.41	0.03	0.30
ISRAEL	CFR	2012	0.19	0.01	0.32	0.69	0.72	0.44	0.01	0.15	0.15	0.03	0.23
ISRAEL	CFR	Military	-0.47	-0.37	0.18	0.53	0.84	0.15	0.00	0.11	0.28	0.05	0.40
ISRAEL	CFR	Political	-0.01	-0.08	0.10	0.96	0.85	0.32	0.03	0.15	0.22	0.01	0.28
ISRAEL	CFR	Social	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.00
ISRAEL	CFR	Three Topics	-0.08	-0.14	0.10	0.91	0.90	0.30	0.02	0.14	0.21	0.02	0.31
ISRAEL	Heritage	2004	-1.00	-0.78	0.47	0.00	0.67	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.33	0.00	0.67
ISRAEL	Heritage	2008	0.32	0.19	0.40	0.43	0.66	0.30	0.00	0.37	0.07	0.06	0.21
ISRAEL	Heritage	2012	-0.18	-0.21	0.08	0.78	0.62	0.28	0.07	0.07	0.18	0.17	0.24
ISRAEL	Heritage	Military	0.20	-0.02	0.25	0.42	0.72	0.41	0.04	0.15	0.04	0.16	0.21
ISRAEL	Heritage	Political	-0.44	-0.41	0.23	0.52	0.71	0.21	0.02	0.05	0.24	0.06	0.42
ISRAEL	Heritage	Social	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
ISRAEL	Heritage	Three Topics	-0.45	-0.40	0.20	0.56	0.75	0.19	0.02	0.07	0.22	0.08	0.41
ISRAEL	RAND	2004	-0.08	-0.08	0.27	0.67	0.56	0.14	0.00	0.32	0.14	0.00	0.40
ISRAEL	RAND	2008	0.08	0.06	0.38	0.58	0.54	0.19	0.00	0.35	0.16	0.01	0.29
ISRAEL	RAND	2012	0.14	-0.01	0.15	0.81	0.82	0.31	0.01	0.25	0.09	0.01	0.34
ISRAEL	RAND	Military	-0.30	-0.28	0.23	0.70	0.55	0.18	0.00	0.17	0.22	0.00	0.43
ISRAEL	RAND	Political	-0.02	-0.13	0.21	0.78	0.66	0.25	0.00	0.24	0.07	0.01	0.43
ISRAEL	RAND	Social	0.75	0.75	0.63	0.25	0.50	0.13	0.00	0.75	0.13	0.00	0.00
ISRAEL	RAND	Three Topics	-0.05	-0.13	0.15	0.82	0.75	0.23	0.01	0.23	0.12	0.01	0.39
ISRAEL	Seven Think Tanks	2004	-0.05	-0.04	0.32	0.62	0.56	0.17	0.06	0.25	0.20	0.01	0.31
ISRAEL	Seven Think Tanks	2008	0.00	-0.08	0.37	0.61	0.61	0.29	0.01	0.20	0.16	0.04	0.31
ISRAEL	Seven Think Tanks	2012	0.05	-0.06	0.23	0.72	0.65	0.37	0.01	0.14	0.19	0.04	0.24
ISRAEL	Seven Think Tanks	3 Elections	0.00	-0.06	0.31	0.65	0.61	0.28	0.02	0.19	0.18	0.03	0.28
ISRAEL	Seven Think Tanks	Military	-0.06	-0.11	0.29	0.62	0.57	0.29	0.00	0.18	0.19	0.05	0.29
ISRAEL	Seven Think Tanks	Political	-0.07	-0.15	0.17	0.80	0.71	0.31	0.02	0.14	0.18	0.03	0.33
ISRAEL	Seven Think Tanks	Social	0.37	0.31	0.79	0.22	0.25	0.23	0.08	0.38	0.18	0.00	0.13
ISRAEL	Seven Think Tanks	Three Topics	-0.10	-0.17	0.15	0.81	0.78	0.29	0.02	0.14	0.18	0.04	0.33

**Table 5-23 Operational Code of Israel from the Perspective of American Think Tanks**



**Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Israel? Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Israel's actions across time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view Israel's actions?**

As Table 5-22 shows, relative to other think tanks, Carnegie, RAND, and CFR assigned the most conflictual actions to Israel, while Heritage assigned the most cooperative actions. Significantly, Table 5-22 shows that the frequency of cooperative actions of Israel never exceeded the frequency of its conflictual actions. In other words, all American foreign policy think tanks believed that Israel was more conflictual than cooperative. As Table 5-22 indicates, no think tank showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking about Israel. As Table 5-22 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of Israel was 88% conflictual.

**What was Israel's relative position in the world of American foreign policy think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Israel?**

As Figure 5-10 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks, actions of Israel were most similar to actions of Terrorists and least similar to actions of South Korea. From the total of forty-four instances, Israel was placed twenty times in the same quadrant as Terrorists, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). Israel was not placed in the same quadrant as South Korea, which shows 100% dissimilarity.

No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Israel were most similar to actions of Terrorists and least similar to actions of South Korea, Europe, the United States, China, Japan, and Taiwan. From the total of eleven instances, Israel

was placed six times in the same quadrant as Terrorists, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Israel was not placed in the same quadrant as South Korea, Europe, the United States, China, Japan, and Taiwan, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

**Political Issues:** Political actions of Israel were most similar to political actions of Syria and least similar to those of South Korea, the United States, Europe, Japan, the United Nations, and Britain. From the total of eleven instances, Israel was placed eight times in the same quadrant as Syria, which shows 73% similarity (27% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Israel was not placed in the same quadrant as South Korea, the United States, Europe, Japan, the United Nations, and Britain, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

**Social Issues:** Social actions of Israel were most similar to social actions of Afghanistan, the United Nations, and France and least similar to social actions of South Korea, the United States, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. From the total of eleven instances, Israel was placed four times in the same quadrant as Afghanistan, the United Nations, and France, which shows 36% similarity (64% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of Israel were not placed in the same quadrant as social actions of South Korea, the United States, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

**Military Issues:** Military actions of Israel were most similar to those of Terrorists and least similar to military actions of South Korea and Europe. From the total of eleven instances, Israel was placed seven times in the same quadrant as Terrorists, which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of Israel were not

placed in the same quadrant as those of South Korea and Europe, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.




Figure 5-10 Similarity of Actions of Israel to other Actors

## Japan

**How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Japan’s operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of Japan’s actions?**

Table 5-25 shows the operational code of Japan on fifty-seven levels of time and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Japan, the overall perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was cooperative. Table 5-24 presents the number of times Japan’s index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of direction of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks described Japan’s strategy as

conflictual sixteen times and cooperative forty-one times. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American foreign policy think tanks had a medium level of certainty about the direction of strategy of Japan. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 44% agreement in describing the direction of Japan’s strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked Japan sixteenth based on its conflictual actions and sixth based on its cooperative actions.

<b>JAPAN</b>		
	<b>CONFLICTUAL</b>	<b>COOPERATIVE</b>
Heritage		7
Seven Think Tanks		8
RAND		7
Cato	1	6
Carnegie	2	5
Brookings	3	4
CFR	4	3
AEI	6	1
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>41</b>

**Table 5-24 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Japan**

Country	Think Tank	Year/Topic	I1	I2	I3	I4a	I4b	I5ap	I5pr	I5re	I5op	I5th	I5pu
JAPAN	AEI	2004	0.33	0.12	0.22	0.67	0.69	0.38	0.00	0.29	0.07	0.00	0.27
JAPAN	AEI	2008	-0.15	-0.02	0.18	0.86	0.73	0.21	0.01	0.20	0.42	0.00	0.16
JAPAN	AEI	2012	0.14	0.06	0.09	0.82	0.96	0.25	0.05	0.27	0.15	0.03	0.26
JAPAN	AEI	Military	-0.11	-0.04	0.21	0.72	0.72	0.10	0.03	0.31	0.23	0.00	0.33
JAPAN	AEI	Political	0.17	0.03	0.14	0.81	0.85	0.37	0.02	0.19	0.16	0.01	0.24
JAPAN	AEI	Social	0.21	0.18	0.18	0.79	0.71	0.33	0.01	0.27	0.27	0.02	0.10
JAPAN	AEI	Three Topics	0.16	0.06	0.12	0.81	0.88	0.32	0.02	0.24	0.18	0.01	0.23
JAPAN	Brookings	2004	0.31	0.22	0.23	0.69	0.67	0.30	0.13	0.23	0.22	0.00	0.12
JAPAN	Brookings	2008	0.06	0.04	0.16	0.62	0.82	0.31	0.00	0.23	0.25	0.03	0.18
JAPAN	Brookings	2012	0.27	0.08	0.16	0.73	0.80	0.41	0.02	0.20	0.14	0.01	0.22
JAPAN	Brookings	Military	-0.16	-0.17	0.17	0.74	0.92	0.25	0.00	0.17	0.24	0.00	0.34
JAPAN	Brookings	Political	0.42	0.24	0.16	0.58	0.83	0.42	0.01	0.28	0.14	0.02	0.13
JAPAN	Brookings	Social	0.24	0.19	0.26	0.76	0.48	0.29	0.17	0.17	0.28	0.02	0.07
JAPAN	Brookings	Three Topics	0.36	0.19	0.14	0.64	0.82	0.40	0.02	0.26	0.15	0.01	0.15
JAPAN	Carnegie	2004	0.38	0.29	0.25	0.62	0.62	0.18	0.08	0.43	0.08	0.00	0.23
JAPAN	Carnegie	2008	0.23	0.13	0.26	0.56	0.52	0.43	0.00	0.18	0.27	0.05	0.07
JAPAN	Carnegie	2012	0.40	0.26	0.22	0.53	0.62	0.34	0.06	0.30	0.16	0.02	0.13
JAPAN	Carnegie	Military	0.24	0.20	0.25	0.76	0.48	0.24	0.00	0.38	0.19	0.00	0.19
JAPAN	Carnegie	Political	0.11	0.06	0.15	0.60	0.62	0.31	0.08	0.17	0.25	0.05	0.14
JAPAN	Carnegie	Social	0.91	0.57	0.36	0.09	0.66	0.47	0.11	0.37	0.02	0.00	0.02
JAPAN	Carnegie	Three Topics	0.34	0.21	0.13	0.66	0.72	0.34	0.05	0.28	0.17	0.02	0.15
JAPAN	Cato	2004	0.70	0.46	0.50	0.30	0.43	0.40	0.08	0.38	0.08	0.00	0.08
JAPAN	Cato	2008	0.86	0.56	0.64	0.14	0.47	0.48	0.00	0.45	0.04	0.00	0.04
JAPAN	Cato	2012	0.08	-0.05	0.16	0.86	0.51	0.41	0.08	0.06	0.26	0.00	0.20
JAPAN	Cato	Military	0.78	0.47	0.75	0.22	0.07	0.52	0.04	0.33	0.07	0.00	0.04
JAPAN	Cato	Political	0.47	0.25	0.48	0.47	0.40	0.43	0.06	0.24	0.14	0.00	0.13
JAPAN	Cato	Social	1.00	0.67	0.40	0.00	1.00	0.50	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00
JAPAN	Cato	Three Topics	0.34	0.22	0.16	0.66	0.75	0.33	0.06	0.29	0.17	0.00	0.16
JAPAN	CFR	2004	0.08	0.03	0.56	0.42	0.38	0.12	0.00	0.42	0.02	0.05	0.39
JAPAN	CFR	2008	0.22	0.22	0.20	0.78	0.78	0.25	0.00	0.37	0.24	0.00	0.15
JAPAN	CFR	2012	0.29	0.09	0.21	0.71	0.59	0.48	0.04	0.13	0.19	0.00	0.17
JAPAN	CFR	Military	0.33	0.33	0.50	0.67	0.33	0.17	0.00	0.50	0.17	0.00	0.17
JAPAN	CFR	Political	0.29	0.16	0.16	0.71	0.72	0.37	0.00	0.28	0.14	0.04	0.17
JAPAN	CFR	Social	-0.02	-0.13	0.51	0.36	0.43	0.27	0.05	0.17	0.13	0.00	0.38
JAPAN	CFR	Three Topics	0.19	0.09	0.12	0.81	0.85	0.31	0.01	0.28	0.15	0.03	0.23
JAPAN	Heritage	2004	0.42	0.35	0.36	0.59	0.65	0.25	0.00	0.46	0.12	0.06	0.12
JAPAN	Heritage	2008	0.66	0.53	0.37	0.34	0.68	0.25	0.06	0.52	0.08	0.02	0.07
JAPAN	Heritage	2012	0.47	0.29	0.24	0.54	0.72	0.45	0.00	0.29	0.18	0.01	0.07
JAPAN	Heritage	Military	0.63	0.53	0.48	0.37	0.57	0.25	0.00	0.57	0.07	0.07	0.05
JAPAN	Heritage	Political	0.28	0.11	0.16	0.72	0.75	0.42	0.01	0.20	0.16	0.03	0.17
JAPAN	Heritage	Social	0.73	0.68	0.50	0.27	0.60	0.18	0.06	0.63	0.13	0.00	0.00
JAPAN	Heritage	Three Topics	0.41	0.23	0.15	0.59	0.80	0.42	0.01	0.28	0.14	0.03	0.12
JAPAN	RAND	2004	0.41	0.30	0.20	0.59	0.77	0.25	0.03	0.43	0.10	0.01	0.19
JAPAN	RAND	2008	0.26	0.20	0.17	0.74	0.70	0.29	0.02	0.32	0.20	0.00	0.17
JAPAN	RAND	2012	0.40	0.20	0.17	0.61	0.83	0.44	0.00	0.25	0.14	0.00	0.16
JAPAN	RAND	Military	0.27	0.20	0.21	0.73	0.58	0.33	0.00	0.31	0.21	0.00	0.15
JAPAN	RAND	Political	0.36	0.22	0.13	0.64	0.95	0.34	0.03	0.31	0.14	0.00	0.18
JAPAN	RAND	Social	0.48	0.34	0.26	0.52	0.65	0.32	0.00	0.42	0.10	0.00	0.16
JAPAN	RAND	Three Topics	0.31	0.18	0.12	0.69	0.88	0.32	0.03	0.30	0.13	0.01	0.20
JAPAN	Seven Think Tanks	2004	0.36	0.24	0.32	0.56	0.61	0.26	0.04	0.38	0.10	0.02	0.20
JAPAN	Seven Think Tanks	2008	0.31	0.24	0.28	0.58	0.67	0.32	0.01	0.32	0.21	0.01	0.12
JAPAN	Seven Think Tanks	2012	0.33	0.16	0.17	0.66	0.74	0.41	0.04	0.22	0.16	0.01	0.16
JAPAN	Seven Think Tanks	3 Elections	0.33	0.21	0.26	0.60	0.67	0.33	0.03	0.31	0.16	0.01	0.16
JAPAN	Seven Think Tanks	Military	0.28	0.22	0.37	0.60	0.53	0.26	0.01	0.37	0.17	0.01	0.18
JAPAN	Seven Think Tanks	Political	0.30	0.15	0.20	0.65	0.73	0.38	0.03	0.24	0.16	0.02	0.17
JAPAN	Seven Think Tanks	Social	0.46	0.32	0.35	0.44	0.61	0.32	0.06	0.35	0.15	0.01	0.12
JAPAN	Seven Think Tanks	Three Topics	0.30	0.17	0.14	0.69	0.81	0.35	0.03	0.27	0.16	0.02	0.18

Table 5-25 Operational Code of Japan from the Perspective of American Think Tanks

**Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Japan? Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Japan's actions across time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view Japan's actions?**

As Table 5-24 shows, relative to other think tanks, AEI assigned the most conflictual actions to Japan, while Heritage and RAND assigned the most cooperative actions. Two think tanks showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking about Japan. Heritage and RAND assigned cooperative actions to Japan across the seven instances. This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational identity in regard to Japan. As Table 5-24 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of Japan was 100% cooperative.

**What was Japan's relative position in the world of American foreign policy think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Japan?**

As Figure 5-11 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks, actions of Japan were most similar to actions of China and least similar to actions of Terrorists. From the total of forty-four instances, Japan was placed twenty-three times in the same quadrant as China, which shows 52% similarity (48% dissimilarity). Japan was placed three times in the same quadrant as Terrorists, which shows 93% dissimilarity (7% similarity).

No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Japan were most similar to actions of China and Taiwan and least similar to actions of Terrorists, Israel and the United States. From the total of eleven instances, Japan was placed seven times in the same quadrant as China and Taiwan, which shows 64% similarity (36%

dissimilarity). On the other hand, Japan was not placed in the same quadrant as Terrorists, Israel, and the United States, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Political Issues: Political actions of Japan were most similar to political actions of China, Europe, the United Nations, and Afghanistan and least similar to those of Terrorists, Israel, and Syria. From the total of eleven instances, Japan was placed six times in the same quadrant as China, Europe, the United Nations, and Afghanistan, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Japan was not placed in the same quadrant as Terrorists, Israel, and Syria, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Social Issues: Social actions of Japan were most similar to social actions of the United States and least similar to social actions of France and Pakistan. From the total of eleven instances, Japan was placed seven times in the same quadrant as the United States, which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of Japan were placed once in the same quadrant as social actions of France and Pakistan, which indicates 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).

Military Issues: Military actions of Japan were most similar to military actions of the United Nations and least similar to military actions of the United States, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Terrorists. From the total of eleven instances, Japan was placed six times in the same quadrant as the United Nations, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Japan was placed only once in the same quadrant as the United States, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Terrorists, which indicates 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).




Figure 5-11 Similarity of Actions of Japan to other Actors

### Muslim World

**How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive the Muslim World’s operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of the Muslim World’s actions?**

Table 5-27 shows the operational code of the Muslim World on fifty-seven levels of time and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to the Muslim World, the overall perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was conflictual. Table 5-26 presents the number of times the Muslim World’s index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of direction of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks described the Muslim World’s strategy as conflictual forty-five times and



cooperative twelve times. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American foreign policy think tanks had a high level of certainty about the direction of strategy of the Muslim World. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 58% agreement in describing the Muslim World's strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked the Muslim World second based on its conflictual actions and twenty-first based on its cooperative actions.

<b>MUSLIM WORLD</b>	<b>CONFFLICTUAL COOPERATIVE</b>	
CFR	3	4
Cato	5	2
Carnegie	5	2
Heritage	6	1
Seven Think Tanks	6	2
RAND	6	1
Brookings	7	
AEI	7	
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>12</b>

**Table 5-26 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to the Muslim World**

Country	Think Tank	Year/Topic	I1	I2	I3	I4a	I4b	I5ap	I5pr	I5re	I5op	I5th	I5pu
ISLAM	AEI	2004	-0.39	-0.43	0.42	0.61	0.48	0.24	0.00	0.07	0.17	0.02	0.51
ISLAM	AEI	2008	0.06	-0.03	0.19	0.69	0.77	0.30	0.01	0.22	0.17	0.01	0.29
ISLAM	AEI	2012	0.08	-0.09	0.41	0.42	0.69	0.32	0.02	0.21	0.06	0.02	0.39
ISLAM	AEI	Military	-0.75	-0.67	0.63	0.25	0.25	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.13	0.00	0.75
ISLAM	AEI	Political	0.04	-0.05	0.12	0.90	0.79	0.36	0.01	0.15	0.21	0.03	0.24
ISLAM	AEI	Social	0.20	-0.04	0.58	0.13	0.60	0.37	0.00	0.23	0.00	0.00	0.40
ISLAM	AEI	Three Topics	0.06	-0.05	0.11	0.88	0.88	0.34	0.02	0.17	0.18	0.02	0.27
ISLAM	Brookings	2004	-0.27	-0.20	0.42	0.57	0.60	0.07	0.00	0.30	0.12	0.11	0.40
ISLAM	Brookings	2008	0.15	0.08	0.55	0.35	0.47	0.41	0.02	0.15	0.30	0.01	0.11
ISLAM	Brookings	2012	-0.17	-0.18	0.27	0.80	0.51	0.18	0.01	0.22	0.16	0.01	0.41
ISLAM	Brookings	Military	-0.25	-0.47	0.84	0.08	0.17	0.38	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.58
ISLAM	Brookings	Political	0.06	0.03	0.10	0.82	0.81	0.26	0.03	0.25	0.20	0.02	0.25
ISLAM	Brookings	Social	-0.22	0.04	0.62	0.56	0.22	0.00	0.00	0.39	0.33	0.11	0.17
ISLAM	Brookings	Three Topics	0.03	0.02	0.08	0.82	0.90	0.24	0.02	0.26	0.20	0.05	0.23
ISLAM	Carnegie	2004	0.26	0.07	0.43	0.58	0.42	0.53	0.01	0.09	0.25	0.01	0.12
ISLAM	Carnegie	2008	0.21	0.20	0.20	0.79	0.87	0.26	0.03	0.32	0.25	0.02	0.13
ISLAM	Carnegie	2012	0.15	0.05	0.25	0.74	0.74	0.36	0.02	0.19	0.23	0.02	0.19
ISLAM	Carnegie	Military	-0.04	0.03	0.39	0.82	0.67	0.28	0.00	0.20	0.39	0.00	0.13
ISLAM	Carnegie	Political	0.05	-0.05	0.11	0.89	0.85	0.34	0.02	0.16	0.19	0.02	0.26
ISLAM	Carnegie	Social	0.46	0.22	0.42	0.39	0.61	0.48	0.04	0.21	0.13	0.02	0.12
ISLAM	Carnegie	Three Topics	0.11	0.00	0.10	0.86	0.84	0.34	0.03	0.18	0.19	0.03	0.24
ISLAM	Cato	2004	0.50	0.17	0.25	0.50	1.00	0.50	0.00	0.25	0.00	0.00	0.25
ISLAM	Cato	2008	-0.03	-0.11	0.19	0.75	0.71	0.29	0.00	0.19	0.17	0.00	0.34
ISLAM	Cato	2012	-0.14	-0.11	0.26	0.86	0.09	0.43	0.00	0.00	0.43	0.10	0.04
ISLAM	Cato	Military	-0.43	-0.43	0.27	0.57	0.57	0.14	0.00	0.14	0.14	0.00	0.57
ISLAM	Cato	Political	0.24	0.10	0.24	0.69	0.56	0.46	0.00	0.16	0.22	0.04	0.12
ISLAM	Cato	Three Topics	0.11	-0.02	0.20	0.78	0.69	0.41	0.00	0.15	0.19	0.03	0.23
ISLAM	CFR	2004	0.41	0.14	0.40	0.59	0.66	0.30	0.26	0.15	0.01	0.01	0.26
ISLAM	CFR	2008	0.51	0.21	0.42	0.49	0.64	0.57	0.00	0.19	0.11	0.01	0.13
ISLAM	CFR	2012	0.06	0.07	0.35	0.56	0.67	0.16	0.00	0.37	0.16	0.02	0.29
ISLAM	CFR	Military	0.38	0.19	0.25	0.49	0.82	0.34	0.00	0.34	0.07	0.00	0.24
ISLAM	CFR	Political	-0.09	-0.20	0.17	0.85	0.89	0.34	0.00	0.12	0.16	0.03	0.36
ISLAM	CFR	Social	1.00	0.67	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.00	0.00	0.00
ISLAM	CFR	Three Topics	0.01	-0.11	0.14	0.85	0.90	0.34	0.02	0.15	0.15	0.03	0.31
ISLAM	Heritage	2004	-0.06	-0.24	0.48	0.39	0.27	0.36	0.06	0.06	0.11	0.00	0.41
ISLAM	Heritage	2008	0.35	0.07	0.40	0.65	0.54	0.55	0.02	0.10	0.16	0.00	0.17
ISLAM	Heritage	2012	-0.52	-0.55	0.51	0.49	0.44	0.14	0.00	0.11	0.08	0.00	0.68
ISLAM	Heritage	Military	-0.50	-0.67	0.70	0.50	0.50	0.25	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.75
ISLAM	Heritage	Political	-0.05	-0.12	0.23	0.63	0.54	0.29	0.04	0.15	0.19	0.00	0.33
ISLAM	Heritage	Social	0.00	-0.34	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50
ISLAM	Heritage	Three Topics	-0.02	-0.11	0.21	0.73	0.52	0.31	0.04	0.15	0.19	0.00	0.32
ISLAM	RAND	2004	0.00	-0.06	0.24	0.83	0.51	0.41	0.00	0.09	0.30	0.05	0.17
ISLAM	RAND	2008	0.12	0.00	0.16	0.78	0.85	0.31	0.02	0.23	0.14	0.00	0.30
ISLAM	RAND	2012	0.15	-0.02	0.37	0.65	0.53	0.36	0.03	0.19	0.12	0.01	0.30
ISLAM	RAND	Military	-0.28	-0.16	0.30	0.72	0.42	0.17	0.02	0.17	0.35	0.00	0.29
ISLAM	RAND	Political	-0.02	-0.13	0.15	0.96	0.78	0.32	0.02	0.15	0.16	0.01	0.34
ISLAM	RAND	Social	0.63	0.25	0.47	0.38	0.50	0.65	0.00	0.17	0.06	0.04	0.09
ISLAM	RAND	Three Topics	0.04	-0.06	0.11	0.96	0.82	0.30	0.02	0.20	0.16	0.02	0.30
ISLAM	Seven Think Tanks	2004	0.05	-0.08	0.38	0.59	0.54	0.33	0.05	0.14	0.15	0.03	0.29
ISLAM	Seven Think Tanks	2008	-0.08	-0.14	0.33	0.65	0.59	0.26	0.01	0.19	0.15	0.02	0.37
ISLAM	Seven Think Tanks	2012	0.20	0.07	0.30	0.64	0.70	0.38	0.01	0.20	0.19	0.01	0.21
ISLAM	Seven Think Tanks	3 Elections	0.06	-0.05	0.34	0.63	0.61	0.32	0.03	0.18	0.16	0.02	0.29
ISLAM	Seven Think Tanks	Military	-0.21	-0.25	0.48	0.50	0.49	0.24	0.00	0.15	0.17	0.00	0.43
ISLAM	Seven Think Tanks	Political	0.03	-0.06	0.16	0.82	0.74	0.34	0.02	0.16	0.19	0.02	0.27
ISLAM	Seven Think Tanks	Social	0.36	0.16	0.66	0.26	0.34	0.38	0.07	0.24	0.09	0.03	0.19
ISLAM	Seven Think Tanks	Three Topics	0.05	-0.05	0.14	0.84	0.79	0.33	0.02	0.18	0.18	0.03	0.27

**Table 5-27 Operational Code of the Muslim World from the Perspective of American Think Tanks**

**Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to the Muslim World? Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing the Muslim World's actions across time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view the Muslim World's actions?**

As Table 5-26 shows, relative to other think tanks, AEI and Brookings assigned the most conflictual actions to the Muslim World, while CFR assigned the most cooperative actions to the Muslim World. Two think tanks showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking about the Muslim World. AEI and Brookings assigned conflictual actions to the Muslim World across the seven instances. This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational identity in regard to the Muslim World. As Table 5-26 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of the Muslim World was 75% conflictual.

**What was the Muslim World's relative position in the world of American foreign policy think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to the Muslim World?**

As Figure 5-12 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks, actions of the Muslim World were most similar to actions of Afghanistan and least similar to actions of Europe, the United States, and China. From the total of forty-four instances, the Muslim World was placed seventeen times in the same quadrant as Afghanistan, which shows 39% similarity (61% dissimilarity). The Muslim world was not placed in the same quadrant as Europe, the United States, and China, which shows 100% dissimilarity.

No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of the Muslim World were most similar to actions of Iraq and least similar to those of Europe, the United States, China, South Korea, Russia, Iran, Taiwan, and the United Nations. From the total of eleven instances, the Muslim World was placed seven times in the same quadrant as Iraq, which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, the Muslim World was not placed in the same quadrant as Europe, the United States, China, South Korea, Russia, Iran, Taiwan, and the United Nations, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Political Issues: Political actions of the Muslim World were most similar to political actions of Terrorists, North Korea, and Iraq and least similar to those of Europe, the United States, China, and South Korea. From the total of eleven instances, the Muslim World was placed five times in the same quadrant as Terrorists, North Korea, and Iraq, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, the Muslim World was not placed in the same quadrant as Europe, the United States, China, and South Korea, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Social Issues: Social actions of the Muslim World were most similar to social actions of Afghanistan, the United Nations, and France and least similar to those of Europe, the United States, China, Syria, Iran, and Russia. From the total of eleven instances, the Muslim World was placed six times in the same quadrant as Afghanistan, the United Nations, and France, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of the Muslim World were not placed in the same quadrant as social actions of Europe, the United States, China, Syria, Iran, and Russia, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Military Issues: Military actions of the Muslim World were most similar to military actions of Germany and Britain and least similar to those of Europe, the United States, China, South Korea, and North Korea. From the total of eleven instances, the Muslim World was placed six times in the same quadrant as Britain and Germany, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of the Muslim World were not placed in the same quadrant as military actions of Europe, the United States, China, South Korea, and North Korea, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.




Figure 5-12 Similarity of Actions of the Muslim World to other Actors

## North Korea

### How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive North Korea's operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of North Korea's actions?

Table 5-29 shows the operational code of North Korea on fifty-seven levels of time and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to North Korea, the overall perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was conflictual. Table 5-28 presents the number of times North Korea's index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of direction of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks described North Korea's strategy as conflictual thirty-five times and cooperative twenty-two times. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American foreign policy think tanks had a low level of certainty about the direction of strategy of North Korea. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 23% agreement in describing North Korea's strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked North Korea sixth based on its conflictual actions and sixteenth based on its cooperative actions.

<b>NORTH KOREA</b>		
	<b>CONFLICTUAL</b>	<b>COOPERATIVE</b>
Carnegie		7
RAND	2	5
Brookings	3	4
CFR	4	3
AEI	5	2
Heritage	6	1
Cato	7	
Seven Think Tanks	8	
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>22</b>

**Table 5-28 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to North Korea**

Country	Think Tank	Year/Topic	I1	I2	I3	I4a	I4b	I5ap	I5pr	I5re	I5op	I5th	I5pu
NORTH KOREA	AEI	2004	0.15	0.12	0.12	0.80	0.76	0.22	0.05	0.31	0.17	0.06	0.20
NORTH KOREA	AEI	2008	0.30	0.10	0.19	0.70	0.76	0.44	0.02	0.19	0.15	0.01	0.20
NORTH KOREA	AEI	2012	-0.09	-0.20	0.34	0.59	0.64	0.28	0.03	0.15	0.12	0.01	0.42
NORTH KOREA	AEI	Military	0.07	0.03	0.10	0.87	0.87	0.23	0.06	0.24	0.18	0.06	0.23
NORTH KOREA	AEI	Political	0.27	0.08	0.13	0.73	0.81	0.41	0.04	0.19	0.14	0.01	0.21
NORTH KOREA	AEI	Social	-0.03	-0.15	0.53	0.36	0.34	0.27	0.00	0.22	0.08	0.00	0.43
NORTH KOREA	AEI	Three Topics	0.17	0.06	0.09	0.83	0.86	0.34	0.03	0.21	0.17	0.03	0.21
NORTH KOREA	Brookings	2004	0.24	0.11	0.13	0.74	0.80	0.36	0.06	0.21	0.18	0.01	0.19
NORTH KOREA	Brookings	2008	0.43	0.20	0.22	0.57	0.61	0.50	0.03	0.20	0.17	0.01	0.11
NORTH KOREA	Brookings	2012	0.06	0.10	0.15	0.94	0.78	0.23	0.04	0.26	0.28	0.06	0.13
NORTH KOREA	Brookings	Military	0.02	-0.04	0.09	0.95	0.64	0.34	0.04	0.13	0.24	0.06	0.19
NORTH KOREA	Brookings	Political	0.22	0.13	0.10	0.78	0.83	0.33	0.03	0.25	0.20	0.02	0.16
NORTH KOREA	Brookings	Social	0.50	0.33	0.36	0.50	0.68	0.41	0.06	0.28	0.20	0.00	0.06
NORTH KOREA	Brookings	Three Topics	0.23	0.12	0.10	0.77	0.76	0.36	0.03	0.22	0.20	0.03	0.16
NORTH KOREA	Carnegie	2004	0.51	0.17	0.39	0.49	0.67	0.58	0.00	0.18	0.07	0.00	0.18
NORTH KOREA	Carnegie	2008	0.35	0.16	0.11	0.65	0.74	0.30	0.13	0.25	0.05	0.07	0.20
NORTH KOREA	Carnegie	2012	0.39	0.20	0.28	0.61	0.66	0.34	0.04	0.31	0.06	0.05	0.20
NORTH KOREA	Carnegie	Military	0.23	0.12	0.14	0.77	0.64	0.24	0.08	0.30	0.04	0.13	0.22
NORTH KOREA	Carnegie	Political	0.24	0.07	0.13	0.76	0.89	0.36	0.04	0.21	0.12	0.03	0.23
NORTH KOREA	Carnegie	Social	0.78	0.48	0.73	0.22	0.22	0.44	0.00	0.44	0.00	0.00	0.11
NORTH KOREA	Carnegie	Three Topics	0.30	0.13	0.12	0.70	0.89	0.33	0.04	0.28	0.08	0.04	0.23
NORTH KOREA	Cato	2004	0.03	-0.21	0.25	0.83	0.49	0.52	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.17	0.25
NORTH KOREA	Cato	2008	0.13	0.02	0.23	0.82	0.61	0.19	0.05	0.33	0.06	0.01	0.37
NORTH KOREA	Cato	2012	-0.14	-0.08	0.11	0.87	0.89	0.23	0.00	0.20	0.30	0.03	0.24
NORTH KOREA	Cato	Military	-0.19	-0.24	0.17	0.81	0.79	0.20	0.06	0.15	0.14	0.05	0.42
NORTH KOREA	Cato	Political	0.10	-0.06	0.18	0.85	0.73	0.40	0.01	0.14	0.12	0.07	0.26
NORTH KOREA	Cato	Social	0.10	0.19	0.32	0.77	0.43	0.07	0.00	0.48	0.22	0.00	0.24
NORTH KOREA	Cato	Three Topics	-0.02	-0.12	0.12	0.89	0.77	0.33	0.02	0.14	0.16	0.06	0.29
NORTH KOREA	CFR	2004	-0.26	-0.15	0.19	0.74	0.57	0.00	0.09	0.28	0.20	0.00	0.43
NORTH KOREA	CFR	2008	0.06	-0.08	0.27	0.64	0.72	0.34	0.01	0.18	0.12	0.03	0.33
NORTH KOREA	CFR	2012	0.34	0.01	0.31	0.58	0.64	0.54	0.03	0.10	0.04	0.03	0.26
NORTH KOREA	CFR	Military	-0.42	-0.47	0.37	0.58	0.58	0.18	0.00	0.11	0.08	0.03	0.60
NORTH KOREA	CFR	Political	0.28	0.08	0.23	0.72	0.62	0.36	0.09	0.18	0.11	0.02	0.24
NORTH KOREA	CFR	Social	0.52	0.31	0.25	0.49	0.69	0.49	0.00	0.27	0.17	0.00	0.07
NORTH KOREA	CFR	Three Topics	0.08	-0.06	0.19	0.74	0.73	0.31	0.05	0.19	0.11	0.03	0.32
NORTH KOREA	Heritage	2004	0.23	0.13	0.14	0.78	0.57	0.39	0.03	0.19	0.23	0.06	0.10
NORTH KOREA	Heritage	2008	0.06	-0.05	0.11	0.90	0.71	0.37	0.01	0.15	0.17	0.10	0.21
NORTH KOREA	Heritage	2012	0.04	0.06	0.15	0.89	0.57	0.27	0.07	0.18	0.33	0.00	0.15
NORTH KOREA	Heritage	Military	0.13	0.04	0.07	0.87	0.78	0.29	0.06	0.22	0.15	0.06	0.22
NORTH KOREA	Heritage	Political	0.07	0.02	0.16	0.84	0.55	0.38	0.01	0.14	0.30	0.03	0.13
NORTH KOREA	Heritage	Social	0.13	0.07	0.19	0.81	0.47	0.37	0.05	0.14	0.28	0.06	0.09
NORTH KOREA	Heritage	Three Topics	0.11	0.05	0.10	0.89	0.69	0.34	0.03	0.19	0.24	0.05	0.16
NORTH KOREA	RAND	2004	0.45	0.15	0.30	0.48	0.65	0.54	0.04	0.15	0.10	0.00	0.17
NORTH KOREA	RAND	2008	0.32	0.12	0.18	0.68	0.79	0.44	0.01	0.21	0.14	0.01	0.19
NORTH KOREA	RAND	2012	0.18	0.04	0.17	0.83	0.76	0.28	0.01	0.30	0.08	0.00	0.33
NORTH KOREA	RAND	Military	0.04	-0.09	0.16	0.87	0.68	0.36	0.05	0.11	0.20	0.00	0.29
NORTH KOREA	RAND	Political	0.44	0.18	0.22	0.56	0.86	0.46	0.01	0.25	0.07	0.01	0.20
NORTH KOREA	RAND	Social	0.42	0.19	0.30	0.58	0.54	0.42	0.00	0.29	0.07	0.00	0.22
NORTH KOREA	RAND	Three Topics	0.37	0.14	0.18	0.63	0.83	0.44	0.01	0.23	0.10	0.00	0.21
NORTH KOREA	Seven Think Tanks	2004	0.22	0.07	0.21	0.68	0.66	0.37	0.04	0.20	0.15	0.03	0.20
NORTH KOREA	Seven Think Tanks	2008	0.24	0.07	0.19	0.71	0.71	0.37	0.04	0.21	0.12	0.03	0.23
NORTH KOREA	Seven Think Tanks	2012	0.10	0.03	0.22	0.77	0.69	0.28	0.02	0.24	0.17	0.03	0.25
NORTH KOREA	Seven Think Tanks	3 Elections	0.18	0.06	0.21	0.72	0.69	0.34	0.03	0.22	0.15	0.03	0.23
NORTH KOREA	Seven Think Tanks	Military	-0.01	-0.09	0.16	0.82	0.71	0.27	0.05	0.18	0.15	0.05	0.30
NORTH KOREA	Seven Think Tanks	Political	0.23	0.07	0.16	0.75	0.76	0.39	0.03	0.20	0.15	0.03	0.20
NORTH KOREA	Seven Think Tanks	Social	0.35	0.20	0.39	0.52	0.47	0.36	0.02	0.30	0.14	0.01	0.17
NORTH KOREA	Seven Think Tanks	Three Topics	0.18	0.05	0.13	0.78	0.79	0.35	0.03	0.21	0.15	0.03	0.23

**Table 5-29 Operational Code of North Korea from the Perspective of American Think Tanks**

**Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to North Korea? Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing North Korea's actions across time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view North Korea's actions?**

As Table 5-28 shows, relative to other think tanks, Cato assigned the most conflictual actions to North Korea, while Carnegie assigned the most cooperative actions. Two think tanks showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking about North Korea. Carnegie assigned cooperative actions to North Korea in all seven instances, while Cato assigned conflictual actions in every instance. This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational identity in regard to North Korea. As Table 5-28 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of North Korea was 100% conflictual.

**What was North Korea's relative position in the world of American foreign policy think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to North Korea?**

As Figure 5-13 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks, actions of North Korea were most similar to actions of Iran and Terrorists and least similar to actions of the United Nations. From the total of forty-four instances, North Korea was placed nineteen times in the same quadrant as Iran and Terrorists, which shows 43% similarity (57% dissimilarity). North Korea was placed three times in the same quadrant as the United Nations, which shows 93% dissimilarity (7% similarity).

No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of North Korea were most similar to actions of Terrorists and Afghanistan and least similar to actions of



the United States and South Korea. From the total of eleven instances, North Korea was placed six times in the same quadrant as Terrorists and Afghanistan, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, North Korea was not placed in the same quadrant as the United States and South Korea, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Political Issues: Political actions of North Korea were most similar to political actions of Iran and Pakistan and least similar to those of the United Nations, Turkey, and France. From the total of eleven instances, North Korea was placed six times in the same quadrant as Iran and Pakistan, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible instances, North Korea was not placed in the same quadrant as the United Nations, Turkey, and France, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Social Issues: Social actions of North Korea were most similar to social actions of the United States and least similar to those of Pakistan and Israel. From the total of eleven instances, North Korea was placed six times in the same quadrant as the United States, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of North Korea were not placed in the same quadrant as social actions of Israel and Pakistan, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Military Issues: Military actions of North Korea were most similar to military actions of the United States and least similar to military actions of the Muslim World. From the total of eleven instances, North Korea was placed eight times in the same quadrant as the United States, which shows 73% similarity (27% dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of North Korea were not placed in the same quadrant as those of the Muslim World, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.




Figure 5-13 Similarity of Actions of North Korea to other Actors

## Pakistan

**How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Pakistan’s operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of Pakistan’s actions?**

Table 5-31 shows the operational code of Pakistan on fifty-seven levels of time and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Pakistan, the overall perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was cooperative. Table 5-30 presents the number of times Pakistan’s index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of direction of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks described Pakistan’s strategy as conflictual twenty-two times and cooperative thirty-five times. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American

foreign policy think tanks had a low level of certainty about the direction of strategy of Pakistan. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 23% agreement in describing Pakistan’s strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked Pakistan thirteenth based on its conflictual actions and tenth based on its cooperative actions.

<b>PAKISTAN</b>		
	<b>CONFLICTUAL</b>	<b>COOPERATIVE</b>
RAND		7
Cato	1	6
AEI	2	5
Carnegie	2	5
Seven Think Tanks	3	5
Brookings	3	4
CFR	5	2
Heritage	6	1
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>35</b>

**Table 5-30 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Pakistan**

Country	Think Tank	Year/Topic	I1	I2	I3	I4a	I4b	I5ap	I5pr	I5re	I5op	I5th	I5pu
PAKISTAN	AEI	2004	1.00	0.84	0.70	0.00	0.50	0.25	0.00	0.75	0.00	0.00	0.00
PAKISTAN	AEI	2008	0.08	0.06	0.13	0.92	0.84	0.26	0.00	0.28	0.24	0.00	0.22
PAKISTAN	AEI	2012	0.37	0.08	0.38	0.64	0.61	0.49	0.00	0.20	0.07	0.00	0.25
PAKISTAN	AEI	Military	0.00	-0.05	0.20	1.00	0.63	0.19	0.00	0.32	0.13	0.00	0.38
PAKISTAN	AEI	Political	0.50	0.40	0.42	0.50	0.60	0.25	0.00	0.50	0.11	0.00	0.14
PAKISTAN	AEI	Social	1.00	0.33	1.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
PAKISTAN	AEI	Three Topics	0.40	0.25	0.21	0.60	0.96	0.36	0.00	0.34	0.13	0.00	0.17
PAKISTAN	Brookings	2004	0.24	0.07	0.16	0.76	0.85	0.37	0.00	0.25	0.09	0.04	0.25
PAKISTAN	Brookings	2008	0.23	0.01	0.33	0.57	0.68	0.44	0.02	0.15	0.11	0.02	0.25
PAKISTAN	Brookings	2012	0.34	0.12	0.14	0.66	0.93	0.35	0.05	0.27	0.03	0.03	0.27
PAKISTAN	Brookings	Military	-0.03	-0.08	0.13	0.77	0.88	0.25	0.00	0.24	0.16	0.04	0.32
PAKISTAN	Brookings	Political	0.21	0.03	0.12	0.79	0.95	0.35	0.02	0.23	0.08	0.05	0.28
PAKISTAN	Brookings	Social	0.67	0.28	0.44	0.33	0.56	0.55	0.06	0.22	0.00	0.00	0.17
PAKISTAN	Brookings	Three Topics	0.24	0.04	0.14	0.76	0.88	0.39	0.02	0.21	0.08	0.04	0.26
PAKISTAN	Carnegie	2004	0.50	0.20	0.23	0.50	0.54	0.48	0.14	0.13	0.11	0.00	0.14
PAKISTAN	Carnegie	2008	0.10	0.02	0.13	0.85	0.79	0.25	0.09	0.21	0.17	0.01	0.27
PAKISTAN	Carnegie	2012	0.30	0.13	0.16	0.68	0.72	0.36	0.09	0.21	0.13	0.01	0.21
PAKISTAN	Carnegie	Military	0.39	0.13	0.25	0.54	0.57	0.47	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.01	0.17
PAKISTAN	Carnegie	Political	0.18	0.05	0.11	0.82	0.80	0.38	0.03	0.19	0.18	0.01	0.22
PAKISTAN	Carnegie	Social	0.49	0.32	0.20	0.52	0.70	0.14	0.21	0.39	0.00	0.00	0.26
PAKISTAN	Carnegie	Three Topics	0.21	0.07	0.11	0.79	0.80	0.38	0.04	0.19	0.17	0.01	0.21
PAKISTAN	Cato	2004	0.71	0.24	0.46	0.29	0.57	0.71	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.14
PAKISTAN	Cato	2008	0.29	0.12	0.33	0.71	0.69	0.42	0.00	0.23	0.15	0.03	0.18
PAKISTAN	Cato	2012	0.44	0.33	0.56	0.44	0.44	0.15	0.27	0.30	0.11	0.00	0.17
PAKISTAN	Cato	Military	0.59	0.60	0.56	0.42	0.42	0.09	0.00	0.71	0.09	0.04	0.09
PAKISTAN	Cato	Political	0.18	-0.01	0.24	0.71	0.77	0.44	0.00	0.15	0.15	0.00	0.26
PAKISTAN	Cato	Social	1.00	0.50	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
PAKISTAN	Cato	Three Topics	0.21	0.03	0.21	0.74	0.83	0.41	0.02	0.17	0.14	0.01	0.24
PAKISTAN	CFR	2004	0.42	0.34	0.38	0.58	0.51	0.31	0.00	0.40	0.18	0.00	0.11
PAKISTAN	CFR	2008	0.12	0.10	0.22	0.82	0.59	0.14	0.04	0.39	0.12	0.00	0.32
PAKISTAN	CFR	2012	-0.68	-0.68	0.52	0.32	0.48	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.10	0.03	0.71
PAKISTAN	CFR	Military	-0.37	-0.40	0.42	0.63	0.56	0.16	0.00	0.16	0.12	0.00	0.56
PAKISTAN	CFR	Political	0.03	-0.04	0.13	0.75	0.75	0.29	0.05	0.17	0.20	0.02	0.26
PAKISTAN	CFR	Social	0.75	0.75	0.78	0.25	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.88	0.00	0.00	0.13
PAKISTAN	CFR	Three Topics	-0.11	-0.16	0.25	0.64	0.63	0.25	0.03	0.17	0.18	0.01	0.37
PAKISTAN	Heritage	2004	-0.11	-0.04	0.82	0.22	0.00	0.44	0.00	0.00	0.56	0.00	0.00
PAKISTAN	Heritage	2008	0.22	0.21	0.28	0.73	0.65	0.18	0.00	0.43	0.16	0.01	0.23
PAKISTAN	Heritage	2012	-0.01	0.01	0.35	0.51	0.57	0.31	0.04	0.14	0.35	0.01	0.14
PAKISTAN	Heritage	Military	0.11	-0.02	0.19	0.78	0.47	0.31	0.04	0.21	0.14	0.00	0.31
PAKISTAN	Heritage	Political	0.50	0.19	0.40	0.50	0.62	0.56	0.01	0.18	0.10	0.02	0.14
PAKISTAN	Heritage	Social	-0.43	0.05	0.90	0.10	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.29	0.71	0.00	0.00
PAKISTAN	Heritage	Three Topics	0.02	0.02	0.23	0.76	0.59	0.33	0.01	0.16	0.33	0.02	0.15
PAKISTAN	RAND	2004	0.57	0.36	0.44	0.43	0.51	0.40	0.00	0.38	0.09	0.01	0.12
PAKISTAN	RAND	2008	0.35	0.19	0.20	0.51	0.77	0.42	0.01	0.25	0.17	0.00	0.16
PAKISTAN	RAND	2012	0.53	0.29	0.47	0.48	0.70	0.50	0.00	0.27	0.14	0.00	0.10
PAKISTAN	RAND	Military	0.14	0.14	0.31	0.68	0.81	0.28	0.00	0.29	0.28	0.00	0.14
PAKISTAN	RAND	Political	0.43	0.17	0.20	0.57	0.80	0.47	0.01	0.23	0.10	0.00	0.18
PAKISTAN	RAND	Social	0.92	0.61	0.76	0.08	0.25	0.50	0.00	0.46	0.04	0.00	0.00
PAKISTAN	RAND	Three Topics	0.44	0.18	0.20	0.56	0.77	0.50	0.01	0.22	0.12	0.00	0.16
PAKISTAN	Seven Think Tanks	2004	0.43	0.26	0.43	0.45	0.51	0.41	0.02	0.29	0.16	0.01	0.12
PAKISTAN	Seven Think Tanks	2008	0.20	0.10	0.24	0.72	0.71	0.30	0.02	0.28	0.15	0.01	0.23
PAKISTAN	Seven Think Tanks	2012	0.22	0.07	0.36	0.53	0.65	0.33	0.06	0.22	0.13	0.01	0.24
PAKISTAN	Seven Think Tanks	3 Elections	0.28	0.14	0.33	0.58	0.63	0.34	0.04	0.26	0.15	0.01	0.20
PAKISTAN	Seven Think Tanks	Military	0.10	0.03	0.29	0.68	0.64	0.26	0.02	0.27	0.15	0.01	0.28
PAKISTAN	Seven Think Tanks	Political	0.29	0.11	0.23	0.66	0.76	0.39	0.02	0.24	0.13	0.01	0.21
PAKISTAN	Seven Think Tanks	Social	0.56	0.39	0.70	0.19	0.26	0.34	0.10	0.34	0.14	0.00	0.08
PAKISTAN	Seven Think Tanks	Three Topics	0.20	0.06	0.19	0.69	0.78	0.37	0.02	0.21	0.16	0.01	0.22

**Table 5-31 Operational Code of Pakistan from the Perspective of American Think Tanks**

**Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Pakistan?  
Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Pakistan's actions across  
time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view Pakistan's actions?**

As Table 5-30 shows, relative to other think tanks, Heritage assigned the most conflictual actions to Pakistan, while RAND assigned the most cooperative actions. One think tank showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking about Pakistan. RAND assigned cooperative actions to Pakistan across the seven instances. This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational identity in regard to Pakistan. As Table 5-30 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of Pakistan was 63% conflictual.

**What was Pakistan's relative position in the world of American foreign policy think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Pakistan?**

As Figure 5-14 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks, actions of Pakistan were most similar to actions of Afghanistan and least similar to those of Japan and Russia. From the total of forty-four instances, Pakistan was placed seventeen times in the same quadrant as Afghanistan, which shows 39% similarity (61% dissimilarity). Pakistan was placed five times in the same quadrant as Japan and Russia, which shows 89% dissimilarity (11% similarity).

No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Pakistan were most similar to those of Afghanistan and least similar to actions of Taiwan and Russia. From the total of eleven instances, Pakistan was placed six times in the same quadrant as Afghanistan, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other

hand, Pakistan was not placed in the same quadrant as Taiwan and Russia, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

**Political Issues:** Political actions of Pakistan were most similar to political actions of North Korea and least similar to those of the United Nations, Russia, and Germany. From the total of eleven instances, Pakistan was placed six times in the same quadrant as North Korea, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Pakistan was placed just once in the same quadrant as the United Nations, Russia, and Germany, which indicates 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).

**Social Issues:** Social actions of Pakistan were most similar to social actions of Syria and least similar to those of Russia, China, the United States, and North Korea. From the total of eleven instances, Pakistan was placed five times in the same quadrant as Syria, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of Pakistan were not placed in the same quadrant as social actions of Russia, China, the United States, and North Korea, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

**Military Issues:** Military actions of Pakistan were most similar to military actions of Iraq and least similar to those of Japan, the United Nations, China, Germany, Britain, Turkey, Syria, and the Muslim World. From the total of eleven instances, Pakistan was placed six times in the same quadrant as Iraq, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of Pakistan were placed just once in the same quadrant as military actions of Japan, the United Nations, China, Germany, Britain, Turkey, Syria, and the Muslim World, which indicates 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).




Figure 5-14 Similarity of Actions of Pakistan to other Actors

## Russia

**How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Russia’s operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of Russia’s actions?**

Table 5-33 shows the operational code of Russia on fifty-seven levels of time and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Russia, the overall perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was neither cooperative nor conflictual. Table 5-32 presents the number of times Russia’s index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of direction of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks described Russia’s strategy as conflictual twenty-five times and cooperative thirty-two times. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts

indicates that the American foreign policy think tanks had a low level of certainty about the direction of strategy of Russia. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 12% agreement in describing Russia’s strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked Russia twelfth based on its conflictual actions and eleventh based on its cooperative actions.

<b>RUSSIA</b>		
	<b>CONFLICTUAL</b>	<b>COOPERATIVE</b>
Brookings		7
Carnegie		7
CFR		7
Seven Think Tanks	3	5
Cato	5	2
RAND	5	2
Heritage	5	2
AEI	7	
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>32</b>

**Table 5-32 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Russia**



Country	Think Tank	Year/Topic	I1	I2	I3	I4a	I4b	I5ap	I5pr	I5re	I5op	I5th	I5pu
RUSSIA	AEI	2004	0.16	0.07	0.17	0.69	0.75	0.30	0.02	0.27	0.16	0.01	0.25
RUSSIA	AEI	2008	0.09	-0.04	0.11	0.92	0.87	0.34	0.02	0.19	0.15	0.03	0.28
RUSSIA	AEI	2012	0.15	0.05	0.13	0.85	0.61	0.41	0.01	0.16	0.24	0.05	0.14
RUSSIA	AEI	Military	0.02	-0.03	0.16	0.78	0.68	0.25	0.00	0.25	0.18	0.02	0.30
RUSSIA	AEI	Political	0.12	0.00	0.13	0.88	0.68	0.41	0.02	0.14	0.20	0.03	0.20
RUSSIA	AEI	Social	0.26	0.13	0.13	0.74	0.85	0.35	0.02	0.26	0.15	0.03	0.19
RUSSIA	AEI	Three Topics	0.12	0.01	0.11	0.88	0.75	0.38	0.01	0.17	0.19	0.03	0.21
RUSSIA	Brookings	2004	0.37	0.24	0.14	0.63	0.73	0.33	0.04	0.32	0.13	0.03	0.15
RUSSIA	Brookings	2008	0.34	0.16	0.14	0.66	0.81	0.41	0.04	0.23	0.15	0.01	0.18
RUSSIA	Brookings	2012	0.33	0.15	0.13	0.67	0.78	0.41	0.04	0.23	0.14	0.04	0.16
RUSSIA	Brookings	Military	0.30	0.17	0.17	0.70	0.74	0.32	0.02	0.31	0.14	0.01	0.21
RUSSIA	Brookings	Political	0.34	0.15	0.14	0.66	0.73	0.43	0.02	0.21	0.14	0.04	0.15
RUSSIA	Brookings	Social	0.44	0.26	0.11	0.56	0.85	0.35	0.08	0.29	0.11	0.03	0.14
RUSSIA	Brookings	Three Topics	0.31	0.15	0.12	0.69	0.75	0.40	0.03	0.22	0.16	0.03	0.16
RUSSIA	Carnegie	2004	0.34	0.18	0.12	0.66	0.83	0.37	0.04	0.25	0.15	0.01	0.18
RUSSIA	Carnegie	2008	0.26	0.12	0.11	0.74	0.76	0.39	0.04	0.21	0.18	0.02	0.17
RUSSIA	Carnegie	2012	0.30	0.14	0.12	0.71	0.81	0.37	0.04	0.23	0.16	0.02	0.18
RUSSIA	Carnegie	Military	0.13	0.04	0.09	0.87	0.84	0.30	0.04	0.22	0.17	0.02	0.24
RUSSIA	Carnegie	Political	0.32	0.14	0.12	0.68	0.74	0.41	0.04	0.21	0.16	0.02	0.16
RUSSIA	Carnegie	Social	0.43	0.24	0.14	0.57	0.89	0.39	0.04	0.29	0.13	0.01	0.16
RUSSIA	Carnegie	Three Topics	0.30	0.14	0.12	0.70	0.78	0.40	0.04	0.22	0.16	0.01	0.17
RUSSIA	Cato	2004	0.12	-0.02	0.30	0.39	0.62	0.36	0.05	0.15	0.17	0.03	0.25
RUSSIA	Cato	2008	0.04	0.00	0.16	0.54	0.78	0.28	0.00	0.24	0.17	0.12	0.20
RUSSIA	Cato	2012	0.32	0.18	0.18	0.68	0.80	0.41	0.00	0.26	0.20	0.00	0.15
RUSSIA	Cato	Military	0.54	0.31	0.28	0.34	0.87	0.45	0.00	0.32	0.06	0.06	0.11
RUSSIA	Cato	Political	0.00	-0.08	0.14	0.72	0.62	0.35	0.04	0.10	0.23	0.07	0.20
RUSSIA	Cato	Social	0.00	-0.02	0.34	0.33	0.71	0.24	0.00	0.26	0.22	0.00	0.28
RUSSIA	Cato	Three Topics	0.09	0.00	0.10	0.74	0.73	0.35	0.03	0.17	0.19	0.06	0.20
RUSSIA	CFR	2004	0.58	0.27	0.43	0.42	0.59	0.56	0.00	0.23	0.09	0.00	0.12
RUSSIA	CFR	2008	0.32	0.13	0.20	0.68	0.70	0.47	0.00	0.20	0.17	0.02	0.15
RUSSIA	CFR	2012	0.21	0.06	0.16	0.78	0.74	0.36	0.00	0.25	0.10	0.07	0.22
RUSSIA	CFR	Military	0.43	0.13	0.42	0.57	0.65	0.55	0.00	0.17	0.07	0.04	0.18
RUSSIA	CFR	Political	0.25	0.12	0.15	0.74	0.67	0.39	0.00	0.23	0.18	0.04	0.15
RUSSIA	CFR	Social	0.54	0.26	0.29	0.47	0.64	0.47	0.00	0.30	0.05	0.00	0.19
RUSSIA	CFR	Three Topics	0.25	0.11	0.14	0.75	0.77	0.41	0.00	0.22	0.17	0.04	0.16
RUSSIA	Heritage	2004	0.11	-0.02	0.16	0.83	0.81	0.34	0.02	0.19	0.14	0.06	0.25
RUSSIA	Heritage	2008	0.21	0.08	0.10	0.80	0.82	0.36	0.04	0.21	0.17	0.03	0.20
RUSSIA	Heritage	2012	0.23	0.10	0.12	0.77	0.85	0.34	0.01	0.27	0.12	0.05	0.22
RUSSIA	Heritage	Military	0.29	0.23	0.12	0.71	0.82	0.30	0.02	0.33	0.19	0.03	0.13
RUSSIA	Heritage	Political	0.21	0.07	0.11	0.79	0.79	0.38	0.03	0.20	0.18	0.02	0.19
RUSSIA	Heritage	Social	0.04	-0.15	0.18	0.87	0.86	0.35	0.01	0.15	0.03	0.09	0.36
RUSSIA	Heritage	Three Topics	0.18	0.06	0.10	0.82	0.84	0.36	0.03	0.21	0.17	0.03	0.21
RUSSIA	RAND	2004	0.38	0.16	0.16	0.62	0.87	0.43	0.02	0.24	0.11	0.01	0.19
RUSSIA	RAND	2008	0.12	0.10	0.14	0.76	0.83	0.24	0.01	0.31	0.22	0.01	0.21
RUSSIA	RAND	2012	0.16	0.03	0.15	0.84	0.75	0.38	0.01	0.19	0.16	0.04	0.22
RUSSIA	RAND	Military	0.18	0.08	0.15	0.65	0.77	0.37	0.02	0.21	0.21	0.03	0.18
RUSSIA	RAND	Political	0.19	0.08	0.11	0.81	0.82	0.35	0.01	0.23	0.18	0.03	0.19
RUSSIA	RAND	Social	0.31	0.14	0.22	0.69	0.80	0.34	0.00	0.31	0.10	0.00	0.25
RUSSIA	RAND	Three Topics	0.20	0.08	0.11	0.80	0.88	0.35	0.01	0.24	0.17	0.02	0.21
RUSSIA	Seven Think Tanks	2004	0.28	0.12	0.20	0.61	0.75	0.38	0.03	0.23	0.14	0.02	0.20
RUSSIA	Seven Think Tanks	2008	0.20	0.08	0.14	0.73	0.79	0.35	0.02	0.23	0.17	0.03	0.20
RUSSIA	Seven Think Tanks	2012	0.24	0.10	0.14	0.76	0.77	0.38	0.01	0.23	0.16	0.04	0.19
RUSSIA	Seven Think Tanks	3 Elections	0.24	0.10	0.16	0.70	0.77	0.37	0.02	0.23	0.15	0.03	0.20
RUSSIA	Seven Think Tanks	Military	0.27	0.13	0.20	0.66	0.77	0.36	0.01	0.26	0.14	0.03	0.19
RUSSIA	Seven Think Tanks	Political	0.20	0.07	0.13	0.75	0.72	0.39	0.02	0.19	0.18	0.03	0.18
RUSSIA	Seven Think Tanks	Social	0.28	0.12	0.20	0.61	0.81	0.35	0.02	0.26	0.12	0.02	0.22
RUSSIA	Seven Think Tanks	Three Topics	0.21	0.08	0.12	0.77	0.79	0.38	0.02	0.21	0.17	0.03	0.19

Table 5-33 Operational Code of Russia from the Perspective of American Think Tanks

**Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Russia? Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Russia's actions across time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view Russia's actions?**

As Table 5-32 shows, relative to other think tanks, AEI assigned the most conflictual actions to Russia, while Brookings, Carnegie, and CFR assigned the most cooperative actions. Four think tanks showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking about Russia. Brookings, Carnegie, and CFR assigned cooperative actions to Russia across the seven instances. On the other hand, AEI assigned conflictual actions to Russia across the same seven instances. This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational identity in regard to Russia. As Table 5-32 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of Russia was 63% cooperative.

**What was Russia's relative position in the world of American foreign policy think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Russia?**

As Figure 5-15 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks, actions of Russia were most similar to actions of the United States and China and least similar to actions of the Muslim World. From the total of forty-four instances, Russia was placed 20 times in the same quadrant as the United States and China, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). Russia was placed twice in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, which shows 95% dissimilarity (5% similarity).

No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Russia were most similar to actions of China and least similar to those of the Muslim World, Pakistan, and Syria. From the total of eleven instances, Russia was placed five times in the same

quadrant as China, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Russia was not placed in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, Pakistan, and Syria, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Political Issues: Political actions of Russia were most similar to political actions of the United Nations and least similar to those of South Korea. From the total of eleven instances, Russia was placed five times in the same quadrant as the United Nations, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible instances, Russia was not placed in the same quadrant as South Korea, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Social Issues: Social actions of Russia were most similar to social actions of the United States and least similar to those of the Muslim World, Pakistan, Israel, and France. From the total of eleven instances, Russia was placed eight times in the same quadrant as the United States, which shows 73% similarity (27% dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible instances, social actions of Russia were not placed in the same quadrant as social actions of the Muslim World, Pakistan, Israel, and France, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Military Issues: Military actions of Russia were most similar to military actions of Iran and least similar to those of Terrorists and Britain. From the total of eleven instances, Russia was placed seven times in the same quadrant as Iran, which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible instances, military actions of Russia were not placed in the same quadrant as military actions of Terrorists and Britain, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.




Figure 5-15 Similarity of Actions of Russia to other Actors

### South Korea

How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive South Korea’s operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of South Korea’s actions?

Table 5-35 shows the operational code of South Korea on fifty-seven levels of time and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to South Korea, the overall perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was cooperative. Table 5-34 presents the number of times South Korea’s index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of direction of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks described South Korea’s strategy as conflictual nine times and cooperative forty-eight times. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts

indicates that the American foreign policy think tanks had a high level of certainty about the direction of strategy of South Korea. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 68% agreement in describing South Korea’s strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked South Korea twenty-first based on its conflictual actions and second based on its cooperative actions.

<b>SOUTH KOREA</b>		
	<b>CONFLICTUAL</b>	<b>COOPERATIVE</b>
CFR		7
RAND		7
Carnegie	1	6
Brookings	1	6
Seven Think Tanks	1	7
Heritage	1	6
AEI	2	5
Cato	3	4
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>48</b>

**Table 5-34 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to South Korea**

Country	Think Tank	Year/Topic	I1	I2	I3	I4a	I4b	I5ap	I5pr	I5re	I5op	I5th	I5pu
SOUTH KOREA	AEI	2004	0.53	0.16	0.45	0.47	0.00	0.71	0.06	0.00	0.12	0.12	0.00
SOUTH KOREA	AEI	2008	0.18	-0.02	0.20	0.82	0.88	0.25	0.24	0.10	0.07	0.00	0.34
SOUTH KOREA	AEI	2012	0.36	0.20	0.16	0.64	0.58	0.36	0.10	0.21	0.18	0.00	0.15
SOUTH KOREA	AEI	Military	0.25	0.04	0.33	0.75	0.50	0.25	0.38	0.00	0.13	0.00	0.25
SOUTH KOREA	AEI	Political	0.41	0.16	0.27	0.59	0.54	0.49	0.03	0.19	0.10	0.04	0.15
SOUTH KOREA	AEI	Three Topics	0.31	0.10	0.18	0.69	0.58	0.43	0.10	0.12	0.14	0.04	0.17
SOUTH KOREA	Brookings	2004	0.25	0.13	0.21	0.75	0.64	0.43	0.00	0.19	0.23	0.02	0.13
SOUTH KOREA	Brookings	2008	0.17	0.03	0.29	0.83	0.62	0.26	0.00	0.33	0.05	0.00	0.36
SOUTH KOREA	Brookings	2012	0.69	0.48	0.38	0.31	0.47	0.25	0.32	0.28	0.08	0.00	0.08
SOUTH KOREA	Brookings	Military	0.23	0.02	0.26	0.77	0.77	0.38	0.00	0.23	0.07	0.00	0.32
SOUTH KOREA	Brookings	Political	0.43	0.26	0.15	0.57	0.78	0.36	0.04	0.31	0.13	0.01	0.14
SOUTH KOREA	Brookings	Social	0.44	0.33	0.62	0.56	0.00	0.17	0.33	0.22	0.17	0.00	0.11
SOUTH KOREA	Brookings	Three Topics	0.38	0.22	0.14	0.62	0.75	0.34	0.05	0.30	0.13	0.01	0.18
SOUTH KOREA	Carnegie	2004	0.56	0.42	0.41	0.44	0.72	0.42	0.00	0.36	0.22	0.00	0.00
SOUTH KOREA	Carnegie	2008	1.00	0.45	0.74	0.00	0.34	0.84	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.00
SOUTH KOREA	Carnegie	2012	0.58	0.36	0.42	0.42	0.60	0.50	0.01	0.29	0.14	0.06	0.01
SOUTH KOREA	Carnegie	Military	0.00	0.25	0.40	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.25	0.25	0.00
SOUTH KOREA	Carnegie	Political	0.87	0.38	0.61	0.13	0.33	0.77	0.02	0.15	0.05	0.00	0.02
SOUTH KOREA	Carnegie	Social	0.50	0.33	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.00	0.25	0.25	0.00	0.00
SOUTH KOREA	Carnegie	Three Topics	0.70	0.41	0.30	0.30	0.63	0.55	0.01	0.29	0.11	0.02	0.02
SOUTH KOREA	Cato	2004	0.53	0.18	0.38	0.47	0.93	0.53	0.00	0.23	0.00	0.00	0.23
SOUTH KOREA	Cato	2008	0.49	0.30	0.46	0.51	0.54	0.41	0.00	0.34	0.11	0.00	0.14
SOUTH KOREA	Cato	2012	0.22	0.22	0.31	0.71	0.57	0.21	0.02	0.38	0.20	0.04	0.16
SOUTH KOREA	Cato	Military	0.48	0.41	0.34	0.48	0.68	0.28	0.02	0.44	0.17	0.02	0.07
SOUTH KOREA	Cato	Political	0.04	-0.03	0.12	0.87	0.87	0.28	0.00	0.24	0.18	0.03	0.28
SOUTH KOREA	Cato	Social	0.67	0.33	0.80	0.33	0.33	0.50	0.00	0.33	0.00	0.00	0.17
SOUTH KOREA	Cato	Three Topics	0.30	0.13	0.18	0.70	0.82	0.39	0.01	0.26	0.12	0.02	0.21
SOUTH KOREA	CFR	2004	0.54	0.22	0.51	0.46	0.00	0.66	0.11	0.00	0.23	0.00	0.00
SOUTH KOREA	CFR	2008	0.62	0.28	0.27	0.38	0.68	0.47	0.14	0.20	0.00	0.05	0.14
SOUTH KOREA	CFR	2012	0.64	0.42	0.22	0.37	0.82	0.40	0.02	0.40	0.08	0.01	0.10
SOUTH KOREA	CFR	Military	0.78	0.33	0.62	0.22	0.34	0.67	0.00	0.22	0.00	0.00	0.11
SOUTH KOREA	CFR	Political	0.64	0.39	0.30	0.36	0.54	0.49	0.08	0.25	0.15	0.01	0.02
SOUTH KOREA	CFR	Social	0.47	0.24	0.22	0.54	0.74	0.37	0.17	0.20	0.10	0.00	0.17
SOUTH KOREA	CFR	Three Topics	0.54	0.29	0.22	0.46	0.52	0.48	0.08	0.20	0.12	0.05	0.06
SOUTH KOREA	Heritage	2004	0.57	0.20	0.38	0.44	0.73	0.60	0.00	0.18	0.04	0.00	0.18
SOUTH KOREA	Heritage	2008	0.49	0.20	0.45	0.51	0.52	0.38	0.28	0.09	0.09	0.00	0.17
SOUTH KOREA	Heritage	2012	0.41	0.35	0.12	0.59	0.72	0.28	0.12	0.31	0.24	0.00	0.05
SOUTH KOREA	Heritage	Military	0.13	-0.14	0.30	0.87	0.87	0.47	0.03	0.07	0.07	0.00	0.37
SOUTH KOREA	Heritage	Political	0.54	0.36	0.23	0.46	0.69	0.42	0.06	0.29	0.18	0.00	0.05
SOUTH KOREA	Heritage	Social	1.00	0.62	0.74	0.00	0.34	0.34	0.50	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.00
SOUTH KOREA	Heritage	Three Topics	0.48	0.25	0.20	0.52	0.60	0.47	0.06	0.20	0.17	0.00	0.09
SOUTH KOREA	RAND	2004	0.21	-0.02	0.26	0.63	0.82	0.43	0.00	0.18	0.08	0.00	0.32
SOUTH KOREA	RAND	2008	0.54	0.37	0.34	0.47	0.52	0.32	0.00	0.45	0.06	0.03	0.15
SOUTH KOREA	RAND	2012	0.43	0.15	0.24	0.58	0.63	0.54	0.02	0.16	0.13	0.01	0.16
SOUTH KOREA	RAND	Military	0.44	0.25	0.20	0.56	0.75	0.38	0.02	0.32	0.11	0.01	0.16
SOUTH KOREA	RAND	Political	0.39	0.12	0.23	0.61	0.67	0.53	0.00	0.17	0.11	0.02	0.17
SOUTH KOREA	RAND	Social	0.30	0.10	0.47	0.48	0.41	0.32	0.00	0.33	0.03	0.00	0.32
SOUTH KOREA	RAND	Three Topics	0.43	0.18	0.20	0.57	0.79	0.48	0.01	0.22	0.09	0.01	0.17
SOUTH KOREA	Seven Think Tanks	2004	0.44	0.17	0.35	0.53	0.60	0.52	0.02	0.17	0.13	0.01	0.14
SOUTH KOREA	Seven Think Tanks	2008	0.46	0.22	0.38	0.54	0.59	0.39	0.09	0.25	0.06	0.01	0.20
SOUTH KOREA	Seven Think Tanks	2012	0.45	0.30	0.25	0.54	0.63	0.35	0.09	0.29	0.14	0.03	0.10
SOUTH KOREA	Seven Think Tanks	3 Elections	0.45	0.23	0.32	0.54	0.61	0.42	0.07	0.24	0.11	0.02	0.14
SOUTH KOREA	Seven Think Tanks	Military	0.33	0.16	0.33	0.66	0.71	0.35	0.05	0.26	0.11	0.03	0.19
SOUTH KOREA	Seven Think Tanks	Political	0.50	0.25	0.28	0.49	0.62	0.49	0.04	0.23	0.13	0.02	0.11
SOUTH KOREA	Seven Think Tanks	Social	0.55	0.31	0.56	0.41	0.35	0.35	0.17	0.26	0.08	0.00	0.15
SOUTH KOREA	Seven Think Tanks	Three Topics	0.45	0.23	0.20	0.55	0.67	0.45	0.04	0.23	0.13	0.02	0.13

**Table 5-35 Operational Code of South Korea from the Perspective of American Think Tanks**

**Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to South Korea? Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing South Korea's actions across time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view South Korea's actions?**

As Table 5-34 shows, relative to other think tanks, Cato assigned the most conflictual actions to South Korea, while CFR and RAND assigned the most cooperative actions. Two think tanks showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking about South Korea. CFR and RAND assigned cooperative actions to South Korea across the seven instances. This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational identity in regard to South Korea. As Table 5-34 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of South Korea was 88% cooperative.

**What was South Korea's relative position in the world of American foreign policy think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to South Korea?**

As Figure 5-16 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks, actions of South Korea were most similar to actions of Europe and least similar to actions of Israel. From the total of forty-four instances, South Korea was placed nineteen times in the same quadrant as Europe, which shows 43% similarity (57% dissimilarity). South Korea was not placed in the same quadrant as Israel, which shows 100% dissimilarity.

No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of South Korea were most similar to actions of Europe and least similar to actions of Israel, the Muslim World, Terrorists, North Korea, and Iraq. From the total of eleven instances, South Korea

was placed nine times in the same quadrant as Europe, which shows 82% similarity (18% dissimilarity). On the other hand, South Korea was not placed in the same quadrant as Israel, the Muslim World, Terrorists, North Korea, and Iraq, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Political Issues: Political actions of South Korea were most similar to political actions of Taiwan and France and least similar to those of Israel, the Muslim World, Terrorists, Iraq, Syria, and Russia. From the total of eleven instances, South Korea was placed five times in the same quadrant as Taiwan and France, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, South Korea was not placed in the same quadrant as Israel, the Muslim World, Terrorists, Iraq, Syria, and Russia, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Social Issues: Social actions of South Korea were most similar to social actions of Turkey and Germany, and least similar to social actions of Israel, Afghanistan, and France. From the total of eleven instances, South Korea was placed five times in the same quadrant as Turkey and Germany, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible instances, social actions of South Korea were not placed in the same quadrant as social actions of Israel, Afghanistan, and France, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Military Issues: Military actions of South Korea were most similar to military actions of China and least similar to military actions of Israel, the Muslim World, Terrorists, Britain, and Turkey. From the total of eleven instances, South Korea was placed seven times in the same quadrant as China, which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of South Korea were not placed in the



same quadrant as military actions of Israel, the Muslim World, Terrorists, Britain, and Turkey, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.




Figure 5-16 Similarity of Actions of South Korea to other Actors

## Syria

**How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Syria’s operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of Syria’s actions?**

Table 5-37 shows the operational code of Syria on fifty-seven levels of time and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Syria, the overall perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was conflictual. Table 5-36 presents the number of times Syria’s index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of direction of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks described Syria’s strategy as

conflictual forty times and cooperative seventeen times. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American foreign policy think tanks had a medium level of certainty about the direction of strategy of Syria. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 40% agreement in describing Syria’s strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked Syria fifth based on its conflictual actions and eighteenth based on its cooperative actions.

SYRIA	CONFFLICTUAL COOPERATIVE	
	CONFFLICTUAL	COOPERATIVE
AEI	4	3
RAND	4	3
CFR	4	3
Brookings	4	3
Carnegie	5	2
Seven Think Tanks	6	2
Heritage	6	1
Cato	7	
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>17</b>

**Table 5-36 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Syria**

Country	Think Tank	Year/Topic	I1	I2	I3	I4a	I4b	I5ap	I5pr	I5re	I5op	I5th	I5pu
SYRIA	AEI	2004	0.20	0.10	0.48	0.50	0.62	0.23	0.00	0.37	0.05	0.05	0.30
SYRIA	AEI	2008	0.86	0.54	0.37	0.14	0.68	0.51	0.03	0.40	0.05	0.00	0.03
SYRIA	AEI	2012	-0.18	-0.29	0.18	0.82	0.94	0.31	0.00	0.10	0.13	0.04	0.42
SYRIA	AEI	Military	0.64	0.50	0.57	0.31	0.53	0.24	0.00	0.58	0.01	0.01	0.15
SYRIA	AEI	Political	0.00	-0.17	0.25	0.50	0.79	0.39	0.02	0.09	0.12	0.04	0.34
SYRIA	AEI	Social	1.00	0.67	0.40	0.00	1.00	0.50	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00
SYRIA	AEI	Three Topics	0.19	-0.01	0.20	0.70	0.81	0.42	0.01	0.17	0.11	0.03	0.26
SYRIA	Brookings	2004	0.24	-0.05	0.44	0.57	0.60	0.53	0.00	0.09	0.10	0.00	0.28
SYRIA	Brookings	2008	0.34	0.12	0.25	0.67	0.92	0.43	0.01	0.23	0.11	0.00	0.23
SYRIA	Brookings	2012	0.06	0.00	0.13	0.67	0.85	0.21	0.07	0.25	0.14	0.05	0.29
SYRIA	Brookings	Military	-0.17	-0.33	0.28	0.84	0.84	0.32	0.00	0.11	0.02	0.09	0.48
SYRIA	Brookings	Political	0.00	-0.11	0.15	0.80	0.87	0.32	0.01	0.17	0.16	0.00	0.34
SYRIA	Brookings	Social	0.82	0.51	0.48	0.18	0.63	0.52	0.07	0.31	0.09	0.00	0.00
SYRIA	Brookings	Three Topics	0.06	-0.06	0.13	0.81	0.89	0.32	0.02	0.18	0.16	0.01	0.30
SYRIA	Carnegie	2004	-0.57	-0.48	0.36	0.43	0.89	0.21	0.00	0.00	0.34	0.00	0.44
SYRIA	Carnegie	2008	0.24	0.11	0.17	0.76	0.72	0.41	0.02	0.20	0.21	0.01	0.16
SYRIA	Carnegie	2012	0.02	-0.05	0.20	0.67	0.83	0.32	0.02	0.16	0.21	0.02	0.26
SYRIA	Carnegie	Military	0.21	-0.03	0.27	0.79	0.77	0.47	0.02	0.11	0.10	0.02	0.27
SYRIA	Carnegie	Political	-0.28	-0.20	0.20	0.61	0.84	0.22	0.02	0.12	0.33	0.01	0.30
SYRIA	Carnegie	Social	0.40	0.27	0.15	0.60	0.91	0.32	0.04	0.34	0.11	0.04	0.15
SYRIA	Carnegie	Three Topics	-0.12	-0.14	0.16	0.65	0.84	0.29	0.02	0.13	0.26	0.01	0.29
SYRIA	Cato	2004	-0.50	-0.50	0.70	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.00	0.00	0.75
SYRIA	Cato	2008	0.00	0.00	0.40	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.50
SYRIA	Cato	2012	-0.13	-0.03	0.09	0.87	0.67	0.14	0.09	0.21	0.30	0.09	0.18
SYRIA	Cato	Military	-0.14	-0.05	0.07	0.86	0.86	0.00	0.14	0.29	0.14	0.14	0.29
SYRIA	Cato	Political	-0.03	0.03	0.27	0.98	0.21	0.13	0.03	0.33	0.21	0.03	0.28
SYRIA	Cato	Social	-1.00	-1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
SYRIA	Cato	Three Topics	-0.07	-0.03	0.29	0.93	0.24	0.06	0.02	0.39	0.11	0.02	0.40
SYRIA	CFR	2004	0.49	0.39	0.24	0.51	0.88	0.25	0.10	0.40	0.10	0.08	0.08
SYRIA	CFR	2008	-0.39	-0.37	0.41	0.61	0.61	0.17	0.00	0.14	0.19	0.00	0.50
SYRIA	CFR	2012	0.21	0.10	0.39	0.52	0.66	0.25	0.04	0.32	0.11	0.00	0.29
SYRIA	CFR	Military	-0.30	-0.32	0.52	0.26	0.63	0.07	0.11	0.17	0.07	0.06	0.52
SYRIA	CFR	Political	0.06	0.03	0.14	0.83	0.85	0.27	0.03	0.23	0.23	0.02	0.22
SYRIA	CFR	Social	1.00	0.78	0.74	0.00	0.34	0.34	0.00	0.67	0.00	0.00	0.00
SYRIA	CFR	Three Topics	0.10	0.04	0.09	0.90	0.96	0.25	0.05	0.25	0.17	0.02	0.25
SYRIA	Heritage	2004	0.10	-0.16	0.58	0.40	0.47	0.44	0.00	0.12	0.05	0.00	0.40
SYRIA	Heritage	2008	0.21	0.14	0.38	0.67	0.68	0.26	0.00	0.35	0.15	0.00	0.24
SYRIA	Heritage	2012	0.02	-0.05	0.11	0.88	0.92	0.22	0.11	0.18	0.14	0.04	0.31
SYRIA	Heritage	Military	-0.05	-0.08	0.72	0.29	0.29	0.05	0.10	0.33	0.05	0.00	0.48
SYRIA	Heritage	Political	0.13	0.05	0.11	0.87	0.91	0.32	0.00	0.25	0.19	0.02	0.23
SYRIA	Heritage	Social	0.38	-0.05	0.65	0.38	0.50	0.69	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.25
SYRIA	Heritage	Three Topics	0.10	-0.02	0.12	0.90	0.91	0.32	0.02	0.21	0.13	0.02	0.30
SYRIA	RAND	2004	0.26	0.15	0.31	0.74	0.27	0.52	0.00	0.12	0.35	0.00	0.02
SYRIA	RAND	2008	0.42	0.12	0.37	0.58	0.59	0.49	0.00	0.22	0.05	0.00	0.24
SYRIA	RAND	2012	-0.24	-0.27	0.20	0.76	0.75	0.27	0.02	0.09	0.23	0.03	0.37
SYRIA	RAND	Military	-0.03	-0.04	0.27	0.81	0.47	0.29	0.00	0.19	0.28	0.00	0.24
SYRIA	RAND	Political	0.10	-0.03	0.21	0.69	0.67	0.37	0.01	0.17	0.17	0.02	0.26
SYRIA	RAND	Social	0.50	0.08	0.63	0.50	0.25	0.75	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.00	0.13
SYRIA	RAND	Three Topics	0.09	-0.03	0.18	0.69	0.74	0.37	0.01	0.17	0.18	0.02	0.26
SYRIA	Seven Think Tanks	2004	0.08	-0.04	0.43	0.52	0.57	0.33	0.02	0.20	0.14	0.02	0.30
SYRIA	Seven Think Tanks	2008	0.28	0.12	0.33	0.60	0.65	0.36	0.01	0.28	0.11	0.00	0.24
SYRIA	Seven Think Tanks	2012	0.01	-0.05	0.18	0.74	0.81	0.25	0.05	0.20	0.16	0.04	0.30
SYRIA	Seven Think Tanks	3 Elections	0.13	0.01	0.31	0.62	0.68	0.31	0.03	0.23	0.14	0.02	0.28
SYRIA	Seven Think Tanks	Military	0.05	-0.03	0.43	0.55	0.59	0.22	0.05	0.26	0.09	0.03	0.35
SYRIA	Seven Think Tanks	Political	0.00	-0.06	0.19	0.74	0.76	0.30	0.02	0.19	0.20	0.02	0.28
SYRIA	Seven Think Tanks	Social	0.54	0.26	0.55	0.27	0.53	0.48	0.02	0.27	0.07	0.01	0.16
SYRIA	Seven Think Tanks	Three Topics	0.05	-0.04	0.17	0.80	0.77	0.29	0.02	0.21	0.16	0.02	0.29

**Table 5-37 Operational Code of Syria from the Perspective of American Think Tanks**

**Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Syria? Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Syria's actions across time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view Syria's actions?**

As Table 5-36 shows, relative to other think tanks, Cato assigned the most conflictual actions to Syria. Also, the same table shows that no think tank assigned predominantly cooperative actions to Syria. One think tank, Cato, showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking about Syria. It assigned conflictual actions in every instance. This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational identity in regard to Syria. As Table 5-36 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of Syria was 75% conflictual.

**What was Syria's relative position in the world of American foreign policy think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Syria?**

As Figure 5-17 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks, actions of Syria were most similar to actions of Terrorists and Israel and least similar to actions of China and the United Nations. From the total of forty-four instances, Syria was placed eighteen times in the same quadrant as Terrorists and Israel, which shows 41% similarity (59% dissimilarity). Syria was placed three times in the same quadrant as the United Nations and China, which shows 93% dissimilarity (7% similarity).

No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Syria were most similar to actions of Terrorists and least similar to actions of China and Russia. From the total of eleven instances, Syria was placed six times in the same quadrant as

Terrorists, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Syria was not placed in the same quadrant as China and Russia, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Political Issues: Political actions of Syria were most similar to political actions of Terrorists and Israel and least similar to political actions of the United Nations, Germany, Japan, Britain, South Korea, Europe, the United States, and Taiwan. From the total of eleven instances, Syria was placed eight times in the same quadrant as Terrorists and Israel, which shows 73% similarity (27% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Syria was not placed in the same quadrant as the United Nations, Germany, Japan, Britain, South Korea, Europe, the United States, and Taiwan, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Social Issues: Social actions of Syria were most similar to social actions of India and Pakistan and least similar to those of Britain and the Muslim World. From the total of eleven instances, Syria was placed five times in the same quadrant as India and Pakistan, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of Syria were not placed in the same quadrant as social actions of Britain and the Muslim World, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Military Issues: Military actions of Syria were most similar to military actions of Turkey and least similar to those of China. From the total of eleven instances, Syria was placed six times in the same quadrant as Turkey, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of Syria were not placed in the same quadrant as military actions of China, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.




Figure 5-17 Similarity of Actions of Syria to other Actors

## Taiwan

**How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Taiwan’s operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of Taiwan’s actions?**

Table 5-39 shows the operational code of Taiwan on fifty-seven levels of time and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Taiwan, the overall perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was cooperative. Table 5-38 presents the number of times Taiwan’s index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of direction of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks described Taiwan’s strategy as conflictual sixteen times and cooperative forty-one times. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American

foreign policy think tanks had a medium level of certainty about the direction of strategy of Taiwan. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 44% agreement in describing Taiwan’s strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked Taiwan seventeenth based on its conflictual actions and seventh based on its cooperative actions.

<b>TAIWAN</b>		
	<b>CONFLICTUAL</b>	<b>COOPERATIVE</b>
Seven Think Tanks		8
Carnegie		7
Cato	2	5
CFR	2	5
RAND	2	5
Brookings	2	5
AEI	3	4
Heritage	5	2
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>41</b>

**Table 5-38 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Taiwan**

Country	Think Tank	Year/Topic	I1	I2	I3	I4a	I4b	I5ap	I5pr	I5re	I5op	I5th	I5pu
TAIWAN	AEI	2004	-0.11	0.06	0.47	0.44	0.33	0.28	0.00	0.17	0.50	0.06	0.00
TAIWAN	AEI	2008	0.62	0.42	0.47	0.38	0.63	0.35	0.00	0.46	0.05	0.00	0.14
TAIWAN	AEI	2012	0.19	0.11	0.12	0.81	0.94	0.30	0.00	0.30	0.17	0.00	0.23
TAIWAN	AEI	Military	0.00	0.34	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.50	0.00	0.00
TAIWAN	AEI	Political	0.52	0.35	0.20	0.48	0.82	0.39	0.00	0.37	0.13	0.00	0.11
TAIWAN	AEI	Social	0.17	-0.06	0.29	0.84	0.84	0.46	0.00	0.13	0.13	0.00	0.29
TAIWAN	AEI	Three Topics	0.28	0.19	0.15	0.72	0.74	0.35	0.00	0.29	0.19	0.06	0.12
TAIWAN	Brookings	2004	0.63	0.44	0.18	0.37	0.79	0.28	0.13	0.41	0.03	0.06	0.10
TAIWAN	Brookings	2008	0.09	0.11	0.25	0.41	0.94	0.23	0.03	0.29	0.27	0.00	0.19
TAIWAN	Brookings	2012	0.73	0.49	0.34	0.28	0.63	0.44	0.01	0.42	0.08	0.02	0.04
TAIWAN	Brookings	Military	0.68	0.46	0.33	0.32	0.66	0.41	0.00	0.42	0.07	0.05	0.05
TAIWAN	Brookings	Political	0.46	0.33	0.15	0.54	0.91	0.32	0.06	0.35	0.13	0.03	0.11
TAIWAN	Brookings	Social	0.33	0.28	0.40	0.00	0.70	0.18	0.11	0.37	0.17	0.00	0.17
TAIWAN	Brookings	Three Topics	0.46	0.31	0.15	0.55	0.88	0.35	0.04	0.33	0.14	0.03	0.11
TAIWAN	Carnegie	2004	0.27	0.17	0.22	0.73	0.63	0.26	0.00	0.38	0.10	0.02	0.24
TAIWAN	Carnegie	2008	0.40	0.18	0.43	0.60	0.45	0.55	0.00	0.15	0.23	0.00	0.08
TAIWAN	Carnegie	2012	0.41	0.20	0.36	0.59	0.45	0.42	0.02	0.26	0.11	0.02	0.16
TAIWAN	Carnegie	Military	0.47	0.16	0.52	0.53	0.27	0.49	0.00	0.24	0.02	0.02	0.22
TAIWAN	Carnegie	Political	0.26	0.22	0.15	0.74	0.66	0.29	0.04	0.30	0.24	0.04	0.10
TAIWAN	Carnegie	Social	0.50	0.17	0.70	0.50	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.25	0.00	0.00	0.25
TAIWAN	Carnegie	Three Topics	0.44	0.25	0.18	0.56	0.71	0.44	0.02	0.26	0.16	0.03	0.10
TAIWAN	Cato	2004	0.09	-0.15	0.27	0.75	0.87	0.38	0.04	0.12	0.06	0.00	0.40
TAIWAN	Cato	2008	0.35	0.24	0.24	0.56	0.69	0.34	0.00	0.33	0.17	0.00	0.16
TAIWAN	Cato	2012	0.69	0.33	0.43	0.31	0.31	0.69	0.00	0.16	0.16	0.00	0.00
TAIWAN	Cato	Military	0.00	-0.12	0.34	0.67	0.67	0.33	0.00	0.17	0.17	0.00	0.34
TAIWAN	Cato	Political	0.31	0.16	0.23	0.58	0.56	0.37	0.02	0.26	0.16	0.00	0.19
TAIWAN	Cato	Social	0.50	0.12	0.44	0.50	0.84	0.59	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.25
TAIWAN	Cato	Three Topics	0.40	0.18	0.23	0.60	0.72	0.44	0.03	0.22	0.14	0.00	0.17
TAIWAN	CFR	2004	0.72	0.45	0.30	0.29	0.69	0.52	0.00	0.35	0.07	0.07	0.00
TAIWAN	CFR	2008	-0.17	0.00	0.53	0.50	0.17	0.33	0.00	0.08	0.58	0.00	0.00
TAIWAN	CFR	2012	0.53	0.49	0.58	0.47	0.13	0.07	0.00	0.70	0.00	0.00	0.23
TAIWAN	CFR	Military	-1.00	-0.33	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00
TAIWAN	CFR	Political	0.44	0.27	0.36	0.56	0.38	0.37	0.00	0.36	0.11	0.00	0.17
TAIWAN	CFR	Social	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
TAIWAN	CFR	Three Topics	0.40	0.29	0.27	0.60	0.38	0.38	0.00	0.32	0.19	0.05	0.07
TAIWAN	Heritage	2004	0.06	-0.07	0.24	0.78	0.62	0.26	0.01	0.27	0.06	0.00	0.41
TAIWAN	Heritage	2008	0.43	0.37	0.22	0.57	0.57	0.32	0.06	0.34	0.27	0.00	0.02
TAIWAN	Heritage	2012	-0.40	0.07	0.61	0.60	0.60	0.00	0.00	0.30	0.70	0.00	0.00
TAIWAN	Heritage	Military	0.28	0.32	0.31	0.72	0.81	0.17	0.00	0.47	0.23	0.00	0.13
TAIWAN	Heritage	Political	-0.18	-0.03	0.44	0.52	0.39	0.26	0.04	0.11	0.50	0.00	0.09
TAIWAN	Heritage	Social	-0.33	-0.33	0.47	0.67	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.33	0.00	0.00	0.67
TAIWAN	Heritage	Three Topics	0.13	0.17	0.23	0.74	0.79	0.23	0.03	0.30	0.31	0.00	0.12
TAIWAN	RAND	2004	0.30	0.22	0.24	0.53	0.59	0.39	0.02	0.24	0.27	0.03	0.06
TAIWAN	RAND	2008	0.27	0.22	0.17	0.66	0.71	0.27	0.02	0.34	0.20	0.04	0.14
TAIWAN	RAND	2012	0.05	0.08	0.32	0.95	0.95	0.21	0.00	0.31	0.26	0.00	0.21
TAIWAN	RAND	Military	-0.16	0.06	0.33	0.84	0.62	0.18	0.00	0.24	0.51	0.00	0.07
TAIWAN	RAND	Political	0.28	0.04	0.22	0.72	0.80	0.45	0.03	0.16	0.08	0.05	0.24
TAIWAN	RAND	Social	0.61	0.50	0.28	0.40	0.69	0.27	0.02	0.52	0.11	0.02	0.08
TAIWAN	RAND	Three Topics	0.28	0.24	0.13	0.72	0.81	0.29	0.02	0.34	0.22	0.03	0.11
TAIWAN	Seven Think Tanks	2004	0.26	0.14	0.26	0.58	0.65	0.32	0.03	0.27	0.15	0.03	0.19
TAIWAN	Seven Think Tanks	2008	0.29	0.22	0.32	0.52	0.62	0.34	0.02	0.30	0.24	0.01	0.11
TAIWAN	Seven Think Tanks	2012	0.35	0.27	0.40	0.55	0.55	0.31	0.01	0.35	0.19	0.01	0.13
TAIWAN	Seven Think Tanks	3 Elections	0.30	0.21	0.33	0.55	0.61	0.32	0.02	0.30	0.19	0.02	0.14
TAIWAN	Seven Think Tanks	Military	0.16	0.18	0.48	0.51	0.49	0.26	0.00	0.32	0.28	0.01	0.12
TAIWAN	Seven Think Tanks	Political	0.30	0.19	0.25	0.59	0.65	0.35	0.03	0.27	0.19	0.02	0.14
TAIWAN	Seven Think Tanks	Social	0.40	0.23	0.47	0.39	0.53	0.32	0.03	0.35	0.07	0.00	0.22
TAIWAN	Seven Think Tanks	Three Topics	0.34	0.23	0.19	0.64	0.72	0.35	0.02	0.30	0.19	0.03	0.11

**Table 5-39 Operational Code of Taiwan from the Perspective of American Think Tanks**



**Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Taiwan? Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Taiwan's actions across time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view Taiwan's actions?**

As Table 5-38 shows, relative to other think tanks, Heritage assigned the most conflictual actions to Taiwan, while Carnegie assigned the most cooperative actions. One think tank showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking about Taiwan. Carnegie assigned cooperative actions to Taiwan across the seven instances. This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational identity in regard to Taiwan. As Table 5-38 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of Taiwan was 100% cooperative.

**What was Taiwan's relative position in the world of American foreign policy think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Taiwan?**

As Figure 5-18 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks, actions of Taiwan were most similar to actions of Japan and least similar to actions of Iraq. From the total of forty-four instances, Taiwan was placed fifteen times in the same quadrant as Japan, which shows 34% similarity (66% dissimilarity). Taiwan was placed four times in the same quadrant as Iraq, which shows 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).

No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Taiwan were most similar to actions of Japan and least similar to actions of Iraq, the Muslim World, Terrorists, Israel, and Pakistan. From the total of eleven instances, Taiwan was placed seven times in the same quadrant as Japan, which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible instances, Taiwan was not

placed in the same quadrant as Iraq, the Muslim World, Terrorists, Israel, and Pakistan, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Political Issues: Political actions of Taiwan were most similar to political actions of South Korea and least similar to those of Terrorists, Syria, and Iran. From the total of eleven instances, Taiwan was placed five times in the same quadrant as South Korea, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Taiwan was not placed in the same quadrant as Terrorists, Syria, and Iran, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Social Issues: Social actions of Taiwan were most similar to social actions of India and least similar to social actions of Iraq, the Muslim World, North Korea, Afghanistan, Germany, France, and the United Nations. From the total of eleven instances, Taiwan was placed five times in the same quadrant as India, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of Taiwan were placed only once in the same quadrant as social actions of Iraq, the Muslim World, North Korea, Afghanistan, Germany, France, and the United Nations, which indicates 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).

Military Issues: Military actions of Taiwan were most similar to military actions of France and least similar to those of Iraq and Afghanistan. From the total of eleven instances, Taiwan was placed five times in the same quadrant as France, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of Taiwan were not placed in the same quadrant as military actions of Iraq and Afghanistan, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.




Figure 5-18 Similarity of Actions of Taiwan to other Actors

### Terrorists

**How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Terrorists' operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of Terrorists' actions?**

Table 5-41 shows the operational code of Terrorists on fifty-seven levels of time and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Terrorists, the overall perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was very conflictual. Table 5-40 presents the number of times Terrorists' index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of direction of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks described Terrorists' strategy as conflictual fifty-seven times. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American foreign

policy think tanks had ultimate certainty about the direction of strategy of Terrorists. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 100% agreement in describing Terrorists' strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked Terrorists first based on its conflictual actions and twenty-second based on its cooperative actions.

<b>TERRORISTS</b>	
	<b>CONFLICTUAL</b>
Cato	7
CFR	7
Brookings	7
Heritage	7
AEI	7
RAND	7
Carnegie	7
Seven Think Tanks	8
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>57</b>

**Table 5-40 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Terrorists**

Country	Think Tank	Year/Topic	I1	I2	I3	I4a	I4b	I5ap	I5pr	I5re	I5op	I5th	I5pu
TERRORIST	AEI	2004	-0.01	-0.14	0.17	0.83	0.88	0.33	0.01	0.17	0.11	0.01	0.38
TERRORIST	AEI	2008	-0.39	-0.32	0.23	0.61	0.73	0.15	0.02	0.13	0.26	0.02	0.42
TERRORIST	AEI	2012	-0.17	-0.27	0.22	0.73	0.74	0.25	0.01	0.16	0.11	0.01	0.47
TERRORIST	AEI	Military	-0.30	-0.36	0.25	0.70	0.68	0.20	0.02	0.12	0.12	0.01	0.52
TERRORIST	AEI	Political	-0.13	-0.21	0.13	0.87	0.89	0.27	0.01	0.16	0.15	0.02	0.40
TERRORIST	AEI	Social	-0.16	-0.17	0.30	0.49	0.71	0.24	0.00	0.18	0.22	0.00	0.35
TERRORIST	AEI	Three Topics	-0.16	-0.23	0.14	0.84	0.85	0.25	0.02	0.16	0.15	0.02	0.42
TERRORIST	Brookings	2004	-0.07	-0.20	0.32	0.68	0.55	0.40	0.00	0.07	0.20	0.00	0.34
TERRORIST	Brookings	2008	-0.03	-0.06	0.10	0.93	0.99	0.26	0.01	0.22	0.22	0.01	0.29
TERRORIST	Brookings	2012	-0.01	-0.15	0.15	0.93	0.89	0.32	0.02	0.16	0.10	0.04	0.37
TERRORIST	Brookings	Military	-0.06	-0.12	0.18	0.86	0.72	0.36	0.00	0.11	0.25	0.03	0.25
TERRORIST	Brookings	Political	-0.20	-0.24	0.16	0.77	0.85	0.23	0.02	0.15	0.18	0.02	0.41
TERRORIST	Brookings	Social	0.17	-0.07	0.31	0.83	0.72	0.44	0.00	0.14	0.08	0.00	0.33
TERRORIST	Brookings	Three Topics	-0.05	-0.12	0.11	0.93	0.94	0.28	0.01	0.18	0.17	0.02	0.34
TERRORIST	Carnegie	2004	-0.37	-0.42	0.45	0.63	0.42	0.14	0.00	0.18	0.06	0.01	0.61
TERRORIST	Carnegie	2008	-0.09	-0.13	0.10	0.90	0.92	0.26	0.01	0.19	0.19	0.03	0.32
TERRORIST	Carnegie	2012	-0.12	-0.20	0.23	0.79	0.77	0.25	0.01	0.18	0.13	0.02	0.42
TERRORIST	Carnegie	Military	-0.38	-0.43	0.41	0.61	0.62	0.18	0.02	0.12	0.11	0.01	0.57
TERRORIST	Carnegie	Political	-0.09	-0.18	0.14	0.86	0.93	0.29	0.01	0.16	0.15	0.02	0.38
TERRORIST	Carnegie	Social	0.03	-0.03	0.22	0.78	0.59	0.22	0.00	0.29	0.12	0.02	0.34
TERRORIST	Carnegie	Three Topics	-0.05	-0.16	0.13	0.91	0.93	0.30	0.01	0.17	0.14	0.02	0.37
TERRORIST	Cato	2004	-0.53	-0.52	0.39	0.47	0.54	0.11	0.00	0.13	0.10	0.06	0.60
TERRORIST	Cato	2008	-0.44	-0.38	0.24	0.57	0.83	0.14	0.05	0.10	0.24	0.00	0.48
TERRORIST	Cato	2012	-0.14	-0.15	0.21	0.76	0.79	0.27	0.02	0.14	0.27	0.00	0.30
TERRORIST	Cato	Military	-0.15	-0.20	0.16	0.75	0.89	0.20	0.06	0.17	0.12	0.07	0.39
TERRORIST	Cato	Political	-0.29	-0.24	0.23	0.71	0.65	0.20	0.00	0.15	0.27	0.00	0.38
TERRORIST	Cato	Social	-1.00	-0.84	0.70	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.00	0.75
TERRORIST	Cato	Three Topics	-0.32	-0.34	0.20	0.68	0.75	0.20	0.02	0.12	0.16	0.01	0.48
TERRORIST	CFR	2004	-0.40	-0.36	0.21	0.60	0.92	0.20	0.00	0.11	0.26	0.01	0.44
TERRORIST	CFR	2008	-0.03	-0.16	0.18	0.96	0.73	0.28	0.02	0.19	0.09	0.01	0.42
TERRORIST	CFR	2012	-0.14	-0.26	0.21	0.86	0.80	0.25	0.05	0.13	0.09	0.01	0.47
TERRORIST	CFR	Military	-0.08	-0.17	0.16	0.92	0.75	0.22	0.06	0.19	0.11	0.00	0.44
TERRORIST	CFR	Political	-0.08	-0.17	0.13	0.90	0.88	0.29	0.01	0.15	0.16	0.01	0.37
TERRORIST	CFR	Social	-0.44	-0.47	0.37	0.56	0.72	0.19	0.00	0.08	0.17	0.00	0.56
TERRORIST	CFR	Three Topics	-0.15	-0.22	0.13	0.85	0.91	0.26	0.02	0.14	0.15	0.03	0.40
TERRORIST	Heritage	2004	-0.42	-0.46	0.39	0.58	0.58	0.18	0.00	0.12	0.10	0.01	0.60
TERRORIST	Heritage	2008	-0.41	-0.45	0.28	0.60	0.76	0.22	0.01	0.07	0.14	0.01	0.55
TERRORIST	Heritage	2012	0.10	-0.12	0.39	0.60	0.53	0.41	0.01	0.13	0.08	0.01	0.36
TERRORIST	Heritage	Military	-0.23	-0.32	0.21	0.77	0.86	0.27	0.01	0.10	0.14	0.00	0.47
TERRORIST	Heritage	Political	-0.25	-0.29	0.17	0.75	0.72	0.20	0.01	0.17	0.13	0.03	0.47
TERRORIST	Heritage	Social	-0.26	-0.48	0.85	0.07	0.15	0.37	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.59
TERRORIST	Heritage	Three Topics	-0.22	-0.28	0.17	0.78	0.76	0.23	0.01	0.15	0.13	0.02	0.47
TERRORIST	RAND	2004	-0.05	-0.11	0.14	0.93	0.73	0.22	0.01	0.25	0.12	0.01	0.39
TERRORIST	RAND	2008	0.02	-0.06	0.11	0.95	0.87	0.27	0.01	0.23	0.14	0.02	0.33
TERRORIST	RAND	2012	0.02	-0.03	0.16	0.82	0.70	0.23	0.02	0.26	0.17	0.01	0.31
TERRORIST	RAND	Military	-0.05	-0.12	0.13	0.91	0.75	0.22	0.02	0.24	0.12	0.01	0.39
TERRORIST	RAND	Political	-0.09	-0.16	0.13	0.91	0.80	0.23	0.02	0.21	0.13	0.02	0.39
TERRORIST	RAND	Social	0.17	0.14	0.15	0.83	0.73	0.26	0.00	0.32	0.21	0.00	0.20
TERRORIST	RAND	Three Topics	-0.05	-0.12	0.12	0.95	0.79	0.24	0.02	0.22	0.12	0.02	0.38
TERRORIST	Seven Think Tanks	2004	-0.26	-0.32	0.29	0.67	0.66	0.22	0.00	0.15	0.14	0.02	0.48
TERRORIST	Seven Think Tanks	2008	-0.19	-0.22	0.18	0.79	0.83	0.22	0.02	0.16	0.18	0.01	0.40
TERRORIST	Seven Think Tanks	2012	-0.03	-0.15	0.21	0.79	0.77	0.30	0.02	0.17	0.13	0.01	0.37
TERRORIST	Seven Think Tanks	3 Elections	-0.16	-0.23	0.23	0.75	0.75	0.25	0.01	0.16	0.15	0.01	0.42
TERRORIST	Seven Think Tanks	Military	-0.18	-0.25	0.21	0.79	0.75	0.24	0.03	0.15	0.14	0.02	0.43
TERRORIST	Seven Think Tanks	Political	-0.16	-0.21	0.16	0.82	0.82	0.24	0.01	0.17	0.16	0.02	0.40
TERRORIST	Seven Think Tanks	Social	-0.17	-0.25	0.40	0.53	0.59	0.26	0.00	0.15	0.15	0.00	0.43
TERRORIST	Seven Think Tanks	Three Topics	-0.14	-0.21	0.14	0.85	0.85	0.25	0.02	0.16	0.15	0.02	0.41

Table 5-41 Operational Code of Terrorists from the Perspective of American Think Tanks

**Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Terrorists?  
Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Terrorists' actions across  
time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view Terrorists' actions?**

As Table 5-40 shows, all the think tanks and also the collectivity of the think tanks assigned conflictual actions to Terrorists. All the think tanks exhibited complete consistency in the seven instances of talking about Terrorists. This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of a national collective identity in regard to Terrorists.

**What was Terrorists' relative position in the world of American foreign policy think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Terrorists?**

As Figure 5-19 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks, actions of Terrorists were most similar to actions of Israel and least similar to actions of Europe and South Korea. From the total of forty-four instances, Terrorists were placed twenty times in the same quadrant as Israel, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Terrorists were placed once in the same quadrant as Europe and South Korea, which indicates 98% dissimilarity (2% similarity).

No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Terrorists were most similar to actions of Israel, North Korea, and Syria and least similar to actions of Europe, South Korea, China, Japan, Taiwan, the United Nations, and the United States. From the total of eleven instances, Terrorists were placed six times in the same quadrant as Israel, North Korea, and Syria, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Terrorists were not placed in the same quadrant as Europe, South Korea,

China, Japan, Taiwan, the United Nations, and the United States, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Political Issues: Political actions of Terrorists were most similar to political actions of Syria and least similar to those of Europe, South Korea, China, Japan, France, Taiwan, the United Nations, Germany, the United States, and Britain. From the total of eleven instances, Terrorists were placed eight times in the same quadrant as Syria, which shows 73% similarity (27% dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible instances, Terrorists were not placed in the same quadrant as Europe, South Korea, China, Japan, France, Taiwan, the United Nations, Germany, the United States and Britain, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Social Issues: Social actions of Terrorists were most similar to social actions of Russia and Britain and least similar to social actions of Europe, South Korea, China, India, Turkey, Pakistan, the Muslim World, Afghanistan, Syria, and Israel. From the total of eleven instances, Terrorists were placed five times in the same quadrant as Russia and Britain, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of Terrorists were placed once in the same quadrant as those of Europe, South Korea, China, India, Turkey, Pakistan, the Muslim World, Afghanistan, Syria, and Israel, which shows 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).

Military Issues: Military actions of Terrorists were most similar to military actions of Israel, North Korea, and Afghanistan and least similar to military actions of Europe, South Korea, Germany, and Russia. From the total of eleven instances, Terrorists were placed seven times in the same quadrant as Israel, North Korea, and Afghanistan, which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of

Terrorists were not placed in the same quadrant as military actions of Europe, South Korea, Germany, and Russia, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.




Figure 5-19 Similarity of Actions of Terrorists to other Actors

## Turkey

**How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Turkey's operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of Turkey's actions?**

Table 5-43 shows the operational code of Turkey on fifty-seven levels of time and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Turkey, the overall perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was neither cooperative nor conflictual. Table 5-42 presents the number of times Turkey's index of direction of strategy was above or



below the average of direction of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks described Turkey’s strategy as conflictual twenty-six times and cooperative thirty-one times. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American foreign policy think tanks had a very low level of certainty about the direction of strategy of Turkey. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 9% agreement in describing Turkey’s strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked Turkey eleventh based on its conflictual actions and twelfth based on its cooperative actions.

<b>TURKEY</b>		
	<b>CONFLICTUAL</b>	<b>COOPERATIVE</b>
Carnegie		7
Seven Think Tanks	2	6
Heritage	3	4
Brookings	3	4
RAND	3	4
Cato	5	2
CFR	5	2
AEI	5	2
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>31</b>

**Table 5-42 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Turkey**

Country	Think Tank	Year/Topic	I1	I2	I3	I4a	I4b	I5ap	I5pr	I5re	I5op	I5th	I5pu
TURKEY	AEI	2004	-0.45	-0.35	0.24	0.54	0.72	0.16	0.01	0.11	0.31	0.04	0.38
TURKEY	AEI	2008	0.38	0.25	0.46	0.62	0.57	0.29	0.00	0.40	0.09	0.00	0.22
TURKEY	AEI	2012	0.22	0.08	0.13	0.78	0.81	0.35	0.04	0.23	0.15	0.01	0.23
TURKEY	AEI	Military	-0.36	-0.31	0.21	0.65	0.90	0.24	0.00	0.09	0.32	0.00	0.37
TURKEY	AEI	Political	0.09	-0.01	0.13	0.91	0.76	0.37	0.01	0.17	0.21	0.04	0.21
TURKEY	AEI	Social	0.13	0.11	0.56	0.20	0.43	0.10	0.03	0.43	0.08	0.00	0.35
TURKEY	AEI	Three Topics	0.08	0.00	0.11	0.83	0.82	0.35	0.01	0.19	0.21	0.02	0.23
TURKEY	Brookings	2004	-0.31	-0.04	0.43	0.56	0.53	0.15	0.02	0.18	0.57	0.00	0.09
TURKEY	Brookings	2008	0.62	0.50	0.24	0.38	0.81	0.28	0.06	0.48	0.12	0.00	0.07
TURKEY	Brookings	2012	0.36	0.22	0.16	0.47	0.80	0.37	0.04	0.27	0.16	0.02	0.13
TURKEY	Brookings	Military	-0.13	0.05	0.34	0.58	0.68	0.16	0.00	0.27	0.43	0.03	0.11
TURKEY	Brookings	Political	0.50	0.33	0.16	0.50	0.86	0.38	0.05	0.32	0.14	0.00	0.11
TURKEY	Brookings	Social	0.15	0.27	0.50	0.18	0.48	0.17	0.07	0.34	0.38	0.00	0.05
TURKEY	Brookings	Three Topics	0.37	0.25	0.13	0.63	0.83	0.35	0.04	0.29	0.18	0.01	0.12
TURKEY	Carnegie	2004	1.00	0.62	0.22	0.00	0.57	0.43	0.29	0.29	0.00	0.00	0.00
TURKEY	Carnegie	2008	0.34	0.20	0.16	0.66	0.65	0.41	0.05	0.22	0.21	0.02	0.11
TURKEY	Carnegie	2012	0.47	0.30	0.17	0.53	0.68	0.38	0.08	0.28	0.15	0.01	0.10
TURKEY	Carnegie	Military	0.29	0.15	0.23	0.72	0.54	0.47	0.00	0.18	0.26	0.00	0.10
TURKEY	Carnegie	Political	0.58	0.37	0.16	0.42	0.75	0.39	0.11	0.30	0.12	0.02	0.08
TURKEY	Carnegie	Social	0.37	0.26	0.15	0.63	0.63	0.26	0.09	0.35	0.12	0.03	0.18
TURKEY	Carnegie	Three Topics	0.55	0.35	0.15	0.45	0.74	0.39	0.11	0.29	0.12	0.01	0.09
TURKEY	Cato	2004	0.44	0.15	0.62	0.56	0.00	0.72	0.00	0.00	0.28	0.00	0.00
TURKEY	Cato	2008	0.10	0.19	0.20	0.90	0.65	0.10	0.00	0.45	0.23	0.00	0.23
TURKEY	Cato	2012	-0.02	-0.08	0.19	0.98	0.63	0.38	0.00	0.11	0.31	0.00	0.21
TURKEY	Cato	Military	0.00	-0.03	0.26	1.00	0.50	0.40	0.00	0.11	0.36	0.00	0.15
TURKEY	Cato	Political	0.33	0.15	0.52	0.67	0.22	0.50	0.00	0.17	0.22	0.00	0.11
TURKEY	Cato	Three Topics	0.15	0.06	0.25	0.80	0.50	0.41	0.00	0.17	0.27	0.00	0.15
TURKEY	CFR	2004	0.15	-0.10	0.45	0.49	0.58	0.54	0.00	0.04	0.17	0.00	0.25
TURKEY	CFR	2008	0.05	0.20	0.58	0.45	0.30	0.19	0.00	0.34	0.41	0.00	0.07
TURKEY	CFR	2012	0.40	0.36	0.21	0.60	0.66	0.19	0.05	0.47	0.14	0.00	0.15
TURKEY	CFR	Military	0.14	0.14	0.74	0.19	0.29	0.43	0.00	0.14	0.43	0.00	0.00
TURKEY	CFR	Political	0.04	-0.01	0.23	0.67	0.55	0.27	0.03	0.22	0.21	0.00	0.27
TURKEY	CFR	Social	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
TURKEY	CFR	Three Topics	0.10	0.06	0.13	0.83	0.81	0.28	0.02	0.26	0.22	0.00	0.22
TURKEY	Heritage	2004	0.00	0.00	0.80	0.33	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.50
TURKEY	Heritage	2008	0.41	0.25	0.26	0.59	0.62	0.37	0.00	0.34	0.08	0.08	0.13
TURKEY	Heritage	2012	0.51	0.48	0.36	0.49	0.51	0.25	0.03	0.48	0.22	0.00	0.03
TURKEY	Heritage	Military	0.01	-0.11	0.55	0.32	0.32	0.35	0.00	0.16	0.16	0.00	0.33
TURKEY	Heritage	Political	0.55	0.49	0.41	0.45	0.54	0.22	0.02	0.53	0.12	0.02	0.09
TURKEY	Heritage	Social	0.60	0.64	0.67	0.40	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.80	0.00	0.10	0.10
TURKEY	Heritage	Three Topics	0.26	0.17	0.23	0.74	0.51	0.26	0.01	0.36	0.12	0.02	0.23
TURKEY	RAND	2004	0.11	-0.04	0.26	0.89	0.67	0.45	0.00	0.11	0.22	0.00	0.23
TURKEY	RAND	2008	0.12	0.06	0.11	0.88	0.78	0.33	0.01	0.23	0.23	0.02	0.20
TURKEY	RAND	2012	0.57	0.44	0.40	0.43	0.47	0.36	0.00	0.43	0.16	0.00	0.06
TURKEY	RAND	Military	0.33	0.10	0.27	0.67	0.74	0.50	0.00	0.18	0.14	0.00	0.19
TURKEY	RAND	Political	0.17	0.12	0.16	0.83	0.61	0.38	0.01	0.20	0.30	0.01	0.11
TURKEY	RAND	Social	0.57	0.53	0.56	0.43	0.43	0.15	0.00	0.65	0.07	0.00	0.15
TURKEY	RAND	Three Topics	0.15	0.06	0.14	0.85	0.71	0.39	0.00	0.19	0.25	0.01	0.17
TURKEY	Seven Think Tanks	2004	0.05	-0.01	0.43	0.51	0.45	0.33	0.03	0.17	0.25	0.01	0.22
TURKEY	Seven Think Tanks	2008	0.30	0.24	0.29	0.62	0.63	0.29	0.02	0.34	0.20	0.02	0.14
TURKEY	Seven Think Tanks	2012	0.35	0.26	0.23	0.62	0.67	0.32	0.02	0.33	0.18	0.01	0.13
TURKEY	Seven Think Tanks	3 Elections	0.24	0.17	0.31	0.59	0.59	0.31	0.02	0.29	0.21	0.01	0.16
TURKEY	Seven Think Tanks	Military	0.05	0.01	0.39	0.56	0.55	0.36	0.00	0.17	0.30	0.00	0.17
TURKEY	Seven Think Tanks	Political	0.32	0.20	0.25	0.63	0.61	0.36	0.03	0.27	0.19	0.01	0.14
TURKEY	Seven Think Tanks	Social	0.38	0.38	0.53	0.31	0.41	0.12	0.04	0.53	0.13	0.02	0.16
TURKEY	Seven Think Tanks	Three Topics	0.24	0.14	0.16	0.73	0.70	0.34	0.03	0.25	0.20	0.01	0.17

**Table 5-43 Operational Code of Turkey from the Perspective of American Think Tanks**

**Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Turkey? Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Turkey's actions across time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view Turkey's actions?**

As Table 5-42 shows, relative to other think tanks, AEI, CFR, and Cato assigned the most conflictual actions to Turkey, while Carnegie assigned the most cooperative actions. One think tank showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking about Turkey. Carnegie assigned cooperative actions to Turkey across the seven instances. This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational identity in regard to Turkey. As Table 5-42 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of Turkey was 75% cooperative.

**What was Turkey's relative position in the world of American foreign policy think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Turkey?**

As Figure 5-20 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks actions of Turkey were most similar to actions of Japan and least similar to actions of North Korea. From the total of forty-four instances, actions of Turkey were placed sixteen times in the same quadrant as actions of Japan, which shows 36% similarity (64% dissimilarity). Turkey was placed four times in the same quadrant as North Korea, which shows 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).

No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Turkey were most similar to actions of Japan and least similar to actions of North Korea, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. From the total of eleven instances, Turkey was placed six times in the same quadrant as Japan, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity).

On the other hand, from the eleven possible instances, Turkey was placed once in the same quadrant as North Korea, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, which indicates 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).

Political Issues: Political actions of Turkey were most similar to political actions of France and least similar to those of North Korea and India. From the total of eleven instances, Turkey was placed seven times in the same quadrant as France, which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible instances, Turkey was not placed in the same quadrant as North Korea and India, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Social Issues: Social actions of Turkey were most similar to social actions of South Korea and least similar to social actions of North Korea, India, Iran, Afghanistan, Israel, Terrorists, Russia, Britain, and France. From the total of eleven instances, Turkey was placed five times in the same quadrant as South Korea, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible instances, social actions of Turkey was placed only once in the same quadrant as social actions of North Korea, India, Iran, Afghanistan, Israel, Terrorists, Russia, Britain, and France, which indicates 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).

Military Issues: Military actions of Turkey were most similar to military actions of Syria and least similar to those of Iraq, Europe, and South Korea. From the total of eleven instances, Turkey was placed six times in the same quadrant as Syria, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible instances, military actions of Turkey were not placed in the same quadrant as military actions of Iraq, Europe, and South Korea, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.




Figure 5-20 Similarity of Actions of Turkey to other Actors

### United Nations

**How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive the United Nations’ operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of the United Nations’ actions?**

Table 5-45 shows the operational code of the United Nations on fifty-seven levels of time and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to the United Nations, the overall perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was cooperative. Table 5-44 presents the number of times the United Nations’ index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of direction of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks described the United Nations’ strategy as conflictual fifteen times and cooperative forty-two times. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative

counts indicates that the American foreign policy think tanks had a medium level of certainty about the direction of strategy of the United Nations. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 47% agreement in describing the United Nations' strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked the United Nations eighteenth based on its conflictual actions and fifth based on its cooperative actions.

	UNITED NATIONS	
	CONFLICTUAL	COOPERATIVE
Cato		7
Brookings		7
RAND		7
Seven Think Tanks	1	7
CFR	2	5
Carnegie	2	5
Heritage	3	4
AEI	7	
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>42</b>

**Table 5-44 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to the United Nations**

Country	Think Tank	Year/Topic	I1	I2	I3	I4a	I4b	I5ap	I5pr	I5re	I5op	I5th	I5pu
UNITED NATIONS	AEI	2004	0.14	0.03	0.14	0.86	0.68	0.35	0.00	0.22	0.17	0.03	0.23
UNITED NATIONS	AEI	2008	-0.20	-0.09	0.35	0.68	0.53	0.28	0.00	0.13	0.43	0.03	0.14
UNITED NATIONS	AEI	2012	-0.16	-0.13	0.19	0.50	0.92	0.18	0.05	0.19	0.25	0.00	0.33
UNITED NATIONS	AEI	Military	-0.14	-0.16	0.27	0.47	0.72	0.28	0.00	0.15	0.25	0.00	0.32
UNITED NATIONS	AEI	Political	0.10	0.03	0.10	0.87	0.80	0.30	0.03	0.23	0.18	0.04	0.23
UNITED NATIONS	AEI	Social	-1.00	-0.33	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00
UNITED NATIONS	AEI	Three Topics	0.08	0.02	0.10	0.92	0.78	0.33	0.02	0.19	0.23	0.03	0.20
UNITED NATIONS	Brookings	2004	0.49	0.35	0.42	0.52	0.28	0.38	0.01	0.35	0.13	0.09	0.04
UNITED NATIONS	Brookings	2008	0.69	0.49	0.50	0.31	0.38	0.37	0.02	0.45	0.08	0.00	0.07
UNITED NATIONS	Brookings	2012	0.32	0.13	0.18	0.69	0.62	0.35	0.02	0.29	0.07	0.02	0.25
UNITED NATIONS	Brookings	Military	0.17	-0.03	0.26	0.83	0.30	0.44	0.00	0.15	0.07	0.15	0.20
UNITED NATIONS	Brookings	Political	0.40	0.18	0.18	0.60	0.58	0.48	0.03	0.18	0.16	0.03	0.11
UNITED NATIONS	Brookings	Social	0.83	0.78	0.75	0.17	0.17	0.08	0.00	0.83	0.00	0.00	0.08
UNITED NATIONS	Brookings	Three Topics	0.42	0.18	0.20	0.59	0.64	0.49	0.02	0.19	0.13	0.03	0.13
UNITED NATIONS	Carnegie	2004	0.03	0.12	0.18	0.97	0.60	0.12	0.22	0.18	0.35	0.00	0.14
UNITED NATIONS	Carnegie	2008	0.83	0.31	0.66	0.17	0.23	0.83	0.00	0.09	0.06	0.00	0.03
UNITED NATIONS	Carnegie	2012	0.38	0.15	0.34	0.62	0.60	0.46	0.07	0.16	0.16	0.00	0.16
UNITED NATIONS	Carnegie	Military	0.37	0.10	0.56	0.63	0.30	0.48	0.17	0.04	0.17	0.00	0.15
UNITED NATIONS	Carnegie	Political	0.44	0.22	0.25	0.56	0.71	0.47	0.02	0.23	0.14	0.00	0.14
UNITED NATIONS	Carnegie	Social	0.20	0.07	0.14	0.80	0.80	0.40	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.20
UNITED NATIONS	Carnegie	Three Topics	0.37	0.16	0.26	0.63	0.72	0.46	0.03	0.20	0.15	0.00	0.16
UNITED NATIONS	Cato	2004	0.90	0.42	0.68	0.10	0.35	0.78	0.00	0.18	0.05	0.00	0.00
UNITED NATIONS	Cato	2008	0.49	0.14	0.50	0.51	0.29	0.70	0.00	0.05	0.16	0.00	0.09
UNITED NATIONS	Cato	2012	0.33	0.17	0.13	0.67	1.00	0.33	0.00	0.33	0.00	0.17	0.17
UNITED NATIONS	Cato	Military	1.00	0.50	0.70	0.00	0.50	0.75	0.00	0.25	0.00	0.00	0.00
UNITED NATIONS	Cato	Political	0.53	0.19	0.46	0.47	0.48	0.63	0.00	0.14	0.08	0.06	0.10
UNITED NATIONS	Cato	Social	1.00	0.33	1.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
UNITED NATIONS	Cato	Three Topics	0.38	0.17	0.24	0.62	0.61	0.49	0.00	0.20	0.15	0.06	0.10
UNITED NATIONS	CFR	2004	0.18	0.06	0.30	0.66	0.49	0.44	0.00	0.15	0.22	0.10	0.10
UNITED NATIONS	CFR	2008	0.55	0.20	0.42	0.46	0.51	0.63	0.00	0.15	0.11	0.01	0.11
UNITED NATIONS	CFR	2012	0.30	0.06	0.22	0.71	0.85	0.45	0.00	0.20	0.10	0.00	0.26
UNITED NATIONS	CFR	Military	0.40	0.02	0.38	0.60	0.65	0.63	0.00	0.07	0.05	0.00	0.25
UNITED NATIONS	CFR	Political	0.35	0.18	0.19	0.65	0.66	0.46	0.00	0.22	0.19	0.02	0.11
UNITED NATIONS	CFR	Social	0.25	0.08	0.46	0.53	0.53	0.45	0.00	0.17	0.14	0.11	0.12
UNITED NATIONS	CFR	Three Topics	0.35	0.14	0.21	0.65	0.62	0.49	0.00	0.18	0.18	0.02	0.13
UNITED NATIONS	Heritage	2004	-0.08	0.03	0.45	0.41	0.36	0.32	0.02	0.12	0.48	0.00	0.06
UNITED NATIONS	Heritage	2008	0.04	0.04	0.40	0.46	0.59	0.35	0.01	0.17	0.35	0.00	0.13
UNITED NATIONS	Heritage	2012	0.30	0.08	0.20	0.70	0.79	0.45	0.03	0.17	0.13	0.00	0.22
UNITED NATIONS	Heritage	Military	0.17	-0.06	0.20	0.84	1.00	0.42	0.00	0.17	0.09	0.00	0.33
UNITED NATIONS	Heritage	Political	0.33	0.13	0.18	0.67	0.68	0.45	0.04	0.17	0.17	0.00	0.17
UNITED NATIONS	Heritage	Social	-0.43	-0.08	0.77	0.10	0.19	0.19	0.00	0.10	0.71	0.00	0.00
UNITED NATIONS	Heritage	Three Topics	0.36	0.17	0.17	0.64	0.66	0.46	0.03	0.19	0.18	0.00	0.14
UNITED NATIONS	RAND	2004	0.49	0.19	0.26	0.51	0.73	0.52	0.03	0.20	0.08	0.00	0.17
UNITED NATIONS	RAND	2008	0.41	0.16	0.22	0.59	0.80	0.46	0.00	0.25	0.08	0.02	0.20
UNITED NATIONS	RAND	2012	0.42	0.11	0.37	0.58	0.50	0.54	0.05	0.12	0.10	0.00	0.20
UNITED NATIONS	RAND	Military	0.56	0.24	0.29	0.44	0.50	0.58	0.06	0.15	0.12	0.00	0.10
UNITED NATIONS	RAND	Political	0.24	0.07	0.13	0.76	0.84	0.34	0.02	0.24	0.10	0.02	0.26
UNITED NATIONS	RAND	Social	0.64	0.18	0.57	0.36	0.49	0.69	0.00	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.18
UNITED NATIONS	RAND	Three Topics	0.32	0.11	0.14	0.68	0.88	0.41	0.03	0.22	0.12	0.01	0.22
UNITED NATIONS	Seven Think Tanks	2004	0.34	0.18	0.36	0.55	0.49	0.43	0.03	0.20	0.20	0.03	0.10
UNITED NATIONS	Seven Think Tanks	2008	0.37	0.16	0.42	0.47	0.50	0.50	0.00	0.18	0.19	0.01	0.12
UNITED NATIONS	Seven Think Tanks	2012	0.27	0.07	0.22	0.65	0.77	0.41	0.02	0.20	0.11	0.02	0.24
UNITED NATIONS	Seven Think Tanks	3 Elections	0.33	0.14	0.33	0.56	0.59	0.45	0.02	0.20	0.16	0.02	0.15
UNITED NATIONS	Seven Think Tanks	Military	0.35	0.08	0.38	0.54	0.56	0.50	0.04	0.13	0.11	0.02	0.20
UNITED NATIONS	Seven Think Tanks	Political	0.34	0.14	0.21	0.65	0.68	0.45	0.02	0.20	0.15	0.02	0.16
UNITED NATIONS	Seven Think Tanks	Social	0.27	0.20	0.65	0.28	0.33	0.38	0.00	0.26	0.25	0.02	0.09
UNITED NATIONS	Seven Think Tanks	Three Topics	0.33	0.14	0.19	0.67	0.70	0.45	0.02	0.20	0.16	0.02	0.15

**Table 5-45 Operational Code of the United Nations from the Perspective of American Think Tanks**

**Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to the United Nations? Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing the United Nations' actions across time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view the United Nations' actions?**

As Table 5-44 shows, relative to other think tanks, AEI assigned the most conflictual actions to the United Nations, while Cato, Brookings, and RAND assigned the most cooperative actions. Four think tanks showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking about the United Nations. Across the seven instances, Cato, Brookings, and RAND assigned cooperative actions to the United Nations, while AEI consistently assigned conflictual actions to it. This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational identity in regard to the United Nations. As Table 5-44 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of the United Nations was 88% cooperative.

**What was the United Nations' relative position in the world of American foreign policy think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to the United Nations?**

As Figure 5-21 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks actions of the United Nations were most similar to those of France and least similar to those of North Korea and Syria. From the total of forty-four instances, the United Nations was placed twenty-one times in the same quadrant as France, which shows 48% similarity (52% dissimilarity). The United Nations was placed three times in the same quadrant as North Korea and Syria, which shows 93% dissimilarity (7% similarity).



No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of the United Nations were most similar to actions of Europe and least similar to those of Terrorists, Iraq, and the Muslim World. From the total of eleven instances, the United Nations was placed nine times in the same quadrant as Europe, which shows 82% similarity (18% dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible instances, the United Nations was not placed in the same quadrant as Terrorists, Iraq, and the Muslim World, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Political Issues: Political actions of the United Nations were most similar to political actions of Japan and least similar to those of North Korea, Syria, Terrorists, and Israel. From the total of eleven instances, the United Nations was placed six times in the same quadrant as Japan, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible instances, the United Nations was not placed in the same quadrant as North Korea, Syria, Terrorists, and Israel, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

Social Issues: Social actions of the United Nations were most similar to social actions of the Muslim World and least similar to social actions of North Korea, Syria, Iran, India, Taiwan, and South Korea. From the total of eleven instances, the United Nations was placed six times in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible instances, social actions of the United Nations were placed once in the same quadrant as social actions of North Korea, Syria, Iran, India, Taiwan, and South Korea, which indicates 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).

Military Issues: Military actions of the United Nations were most similar to military actions of Japan and least similar to military actions of India and Britain. From the total of eleven instances, the United Nations was placed six times in the same quadrant as Japan, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible instances, military actions of the United Nations were not placed in the same quadrant as military actions of India and Britain, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.




Figure 5-21 Similarity of Actions of the United Nations to other Actors

## United States

**How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive the United States’ operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of the United States’ actions?**

Table 5-47 shows the operational code of the United States on fifty-seven levels of time and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to the United States, the overall perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was cooperative. Table 5-46 presents the number of times the United States’ index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of direction of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks described the United States’ strategy as conflictual eleven times and cooperative forty-six times. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American foreign policy think tanks had a high level of certainty about the direction of strategy of the United States. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 61% agreement in describing the United States’ strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked the United States twentieth based on its conflictual actions and fourth based on its cooperative actions.

UNITED STATES	CONFICTUAL COOPERATIVE	
	CONFICTUAL	COOPERATIVE
Brookings		7
Heritage		7
Seven Think Tanks		8
Carnegie	1	6
RAND	1	6
CFR	2	5
Cato	3	4
AEI	4	3
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>46</b>

**Table 5-46 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to the United States**

Country	Think Tank	Year/Topic	I1	I2	I3	I4a	I4b	I5ap	I5pr	I5re	I5op	I5th	I5pu
USA	AEI	2004	0.17	0.03	0.12	0.83	0.72	0.39	0.03	0.16	0.18	0.03	0.20
USA	AEI	2008	0.21	0.06	0.13	0.80	0.82	0.39	0.02	0.20	0.17	0.01	0.21
USA	AEI	2012	0.23	0.05	0.14	0.77	0.73	0.43	0.02	0.16	0.17	0.02	0.20
USA	AEI	Military	0.06	-0.07	0.12	0.94	0.84	0.37	0.02	0.15	0.18	0.03	0.27
USA	AEI	Political	0.25	0.09	0.14	0.75	0.74	0.42	0.01	0.19	0.18	0.02	0.18
USA	AEI	Social	0.29	0.10	0.13	0.71	0.70	0.42	0.04	0.18	0.16	0.02	0.17
USA	AEI	Three Topics	0.21	0.06	0.13	0.79	0.74	0.41	0.02	0.18	0.18	0.02	0.20
USA	Brookings	2004	0.24	0.07	0.14	0.76	0.72	0.42	0.03	0.17	0.18	0.01	0.19
USA	Brookings	2008	0.42	0.18	0.19	0.58	0.64	0.49	0.03	0.19	0.14	0.02	0.14
USA	Brookings	2012	0.40	0.17	0.19	0.60	0.71	0.48	0.02	0.21	0.14	0.01	0.15
USA	Brookings	Military	0.14	-0.01	0.12	0.86	0.82	0.38	0.02	0.16	0.17	0.01	0.25
USA	Brookings	Political	0.41	0.16	0.21	0.59	0.60	0.52	0.02	0.16	0.14	0.01	0.14
USA	Brookings	Social	0.49	0.27	0.18	0.51	0.69	0.47	0.03	0.25	0.15	0.01	0.10
USA	Brookings	Three Topics	0.37	0.14	0.18	0.63	0.65	0.48	0.02	0.17	0.15	0.01	0.15
USA	Carnegie	2004	0.29	0.10	0.15	0.71	0.73	0.43	0.04	0.19	0.15	0.03	0.18
USA	Carnegie	2008	0.35	0.17	0.16	0.65	0.71	0.45	0.02	0.22	0.17	0.01	0.14
USA	Carnegie	2012	0.34	0.14	0.16	0.66	0.72	0.45	0.03	0.20	0.15	0.02	0.16
USA	Carnegie	Military	0.23	0.07	0.13	0.77	0.73	0.42	0.03	0.18	0.16	0.04	0.19
USA	Carnegie	Political	0.41	0.18	0.18	0.59	0.63	0.48	0.03	0.19	0.16	0.01	0.12
USA	Carnegie	Social	0.35	0.15	0.17	0.65	0.82	0.43	0.02	0.23	0.14	0.00	0.18
USA	Carnegie	Three Topics	0.37	0.16	0.16	0.63	0.67	0.46	0.03	0.19	0.16	0.01	0.14
USA	Cato	2004	0.26	0.09	0.16	0.74	0.67	0.45	0.02	0.17	0.19	0.01	0.17
USA	Cato	2008	0.17	0.10	0.11	0.80	0.81	0.32	0.04	0.23	0.22	0.03	0.18
USA	Cato	2012	0.24	0.09	0.12	0.77	0.78	0.39	0.03	0.20	0.18	0.01	0.20
USA	Cato	Military	0.15	0.02	0.15	0.80	0.76	0.39	0.02	0.16	0.19	0.02	0.22
USA	Cato	Political	0.22	0.06	0.14	0.78	0.69	0.43	0.02	0.16	0.20	0.02	0.18
USA	Cato	Social	0.29	0.20	0.11	0.71	0.82	0.32	0.05	0.27	0.20	0.01	0.14
USA	Cato	Three Topics	0.22	0.08	0.13	0.78	0.74	0.40	0.02	0.19	0.19	0.01	0.18
USA	CFR	2004	0.24	0.06	0.15	0.67	0.84	0.40	0.03	0.19	0.14	0.01	0.24
USA	CFR	2008	0.21	0.07	0.12	0.79	0.84	0.38	0.02	0.21	0.17	0.02	0.22
USA	CFR	2012	0.30	0.13	0.14	0.70	0.76	0.42	0.03	0.21	0.16	0.02	0.17
USA	CFR	Military	0.00	-0.07	0.11	0.88	0.91	0.31	0.02	0.18	0.20	0.01	0.28
USA	CFR	Political	0.29	0.11	0.15	0.71	0.71	0.44	0.02	0.19	0.17	0.01	0.17
USA	CFR	Social	0.46	0.21	0.16	0.54	0.84	0.44	0.04	0.25	0.08	0.02	0.17
USA	CFR	Three Topics	0.25	0.08	0.13	0.75	0.79	0.41	0.02	0.20	0.16	0.01	0.20
USA	Heritage	2004	0.49	0.28	0.17	0.51	0.77	0.44	0.03	0.28	0.13	0.02	0.11
USA	Heritage	2008	0.43	0.20	0.18	0.58	0.71	0.47	0.02	0.22	0.14	0.01	0.14
USA	Heritage	2012	0.39	0.15	0.20	0.61	0.63	0.51	0.02	0.17	0.15	0.01	0.15
USA	Heritage	Military	0.31	0.12	0.15	0.69	0.81	0.42	0.02	0.21	0.13	0.02	0.19
USA	Heritage	Political	0.40	0.19	0.19	0.60	0.62	0.49	0.02	0.19	0.17	0.01	0.12
USA	Heritage	Social	0.62	0.34	0.23	0.38	0.71	0.51	0.04	0.27	0.10	0.00	0.08
USA	Heritage	Three Topics	0.41	0.20	0.18	0.59	0.67	0.48	0.02	0.21	0.15	0.01	0.13
USA	RAND	2004	0.43	0.21	0.17	0.57	0.81	0.44	0.03	0.25	0.12	0.01	0.16
USA	RAND	2008	0.39	0.16	0.17	0.62	0.76	0.46	0.02	0.21	0.13	0.01	0.17
USA	RAND	2012	0.16	0.03	0.13	0.84	0.82	0.38	0.01	0.19	0.19	0.01	0.22
USA	RAND	Military	0.18	0.06	0.10	0.82	0.93	0.33	0.03	0.22	0.17	0.01	0.24
USA	RAND	Political	0.38	0.15	0.17	0.62	0.70	0.48	0.02	0.19	0.14	0.01	0.16
USA	RAND	Social	0.41	0.19	0.19	0.59	0.81	0.46	0.01	0.24	0.12	0.01	0.16
USA	RAND	Three Topics	0.34	0.14	0.15	0.66	0.75	0.45	0.02	0.20	0.15	0.01	0.17
USA	Seven Think Tanks	2004	0.30	0.12	0.15	0.68	0.75	0.42	0.03	0.20	0.16	0.02	0.18
USA	Seven Think Tanks	2008	0.31	0.13	0.15	0.69	0.76	0.42	0.02	0.21	0.16	0.01	0.17
USA	Seven Think Tanks	2012	0.30	0.11	0.16	0.70	0.73	0.44	0.02	0.19	0.16	0.01	0.18
USA	Seven Think Tanks	3 Elections	0.30	0.12	0.15	0.69	0.75	0.43	0.02	0.20	0.16	0.01	0.17
USA	Seven Think Tanks	Military	0.15	0.02	0.12	0.82	0.83	0.38	0.02	0.18	0.17	0.02	0.23
USA	Seven Think Tanks	Political	0.34	0.14	0.17	0.66	0.67	0.46	0.02	0.18	0.17	0.01	0.15
USA	Seven Think Tanks	Social	0.41	0.21	0.17	0.59	0.77	0.43	0.03	0.24	0.14	0.01	0.14
USA	Seven Think Tanks	Three Topics	0.31	0.12	0.15	0.69	0.72	0.44	0.02	0.19	0.17	0.01	0.17

**Table 5-47 Operational Code of the United States from the Perspective of American Think Tanks**

**Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to the United States? Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing the United States' actions across time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view the United States' actions?**

As Table 5-46 shows, relative to other think tanks, AEI assigned the most conflictual actions to the United States, while Brookings and Heritage assigned the most cooperative actions. Two think tanks showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking about the United States. Brookings and Heritage assigned cooperative actions to the United States across the seven instances. This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational identity in regard to the United States. As Table 5-46 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of the United States was 100% cooperative.

**What was the United States' relative position in the world of American foreign policy think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to the United States?**

As Figure 5-22 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks, actions of the United States were most similar to actions of Europe and least similar to actions of the Muslim World. From the total of forty-four instances, the United States was placed twenty-seven times in the same quadrant as Europe, which shows 61% similarity (39% dissimilarity). On the other hand, the United States was not placed in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, which shows 100% dissimilarity.

No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of the United States were most similar to actions of Europe and South Korea and least similar to those of the Muslim World, Israel, Britain, Terrorists, Iraq, Japan, and North Korea. From the

total of eleven instances, the United States was placed seven times in the same quadrant as Europe and South Korea, which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible instances, the United States was not placed in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, Israel, Britain, Terrorists, Iraq, Japan, and North Korea, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

**Political Issues:** Political actions of the United States were most similar to political actions of Europe and least similar to political actions of the Muslim World, Israel, Britain, Syria, Terrorists, Iraq, and Iran. From the total of eleven instances, the United States was placed six times in the same quadrant as Europe, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible instances, the United States was not placed in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, Israel, Britain, Syria, Terrorists, Iraq, and Iran, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

**Social Issues:** Social actions of the United States were most similar to social actions of Europe and China and least similar to social actions of the Muslim World, Israel, Afghanistan, France, and Pakistan. From the total of eleven instances, the United States was placed nine times in the same quadrant as Europe and China, which shows 82% similarity (18% dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible instances, social actions of the United States were not placed in the same quadrant as social actions of the Muslim World, Israel, Afghanistan, France, and Pakistan, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.

**Military Issues:** Military actions of the United States were most similar to military actions of Iran and least similar to military actions of the Muslim World. From the total of eleven instances, the United States was placed ten times in the same quadrant as Iran,

which shows 91% similarity (9% dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of the United States were not placed in the same quadrant as military actions of the Muslim World which indicates 100% dissimilarity.




Figure 5-22 Similarity of Actions of the United States to other Actors

**Summary**

In chapter five, the operational code of the United States and its significant Others were extracted. This task was done by reducing the unit of verb aggregation to sentence. Using the operational codes of the U.S. significant Others and the operational code of the United States, I was able to draw cognitive maps of the American elite. These cognitive maps showed the similarity of action of the actors from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks. There were separate cognitive maps for each of the twenty-

two most frequent actors discussed in the texts. The findings of this chapter have revealed many nuances about the worldview of the American foreign policy elite, and have opened the door for future research. For instance, the transitive verbs and their subsequent VICS indexes have shown that from the perspective of the American foreign policy elite: The actions of the United Nations were most similar to the actions of its supporters, France and Europe. The actions of Pakistan were most similar to the actions of its neighbor, Afghanistan. The actions of Japan were most similar to the actions of its neighbor and rival, China. Iran and North Korea, the two members of the Axis of Evil, were most similar to each other. And, the military actions of the United States were most similar to the military actions of Iran and North Korea, which are the two countries with the highest possibility of war with the United States. There were also some anomalies. For instance, the actions of Israel, which is one of the closest allies of the United States, were most similar to the actions of the enemies of the United States, Terrorists and Syria.



## CHAPTER 6 : CONCLUSION AND ASSESSMENT

This research started with one main question: what is the worldview of the American foreign policy elite? Unlike other related works about the American foreign policy elite, it included the seven American foreign policy think tanks as members of the elite. Also, unlike other scholarship, it chose to study the elite/think tanks via their texts rather than via surveys and interviews. It answered the main question by adopting the strategy of immersion in data and through a multi-level, multi-actor, and multi-topic approach. The following sections present some of the main findings and contributions to different fields of study.

### **Contribution to Topic Classification Methods**

*Validity of the Four-Algorithm Agreement Threshold:* The fact that VICS could differentiate among subcategories of the political texts can be used as a validity test for the supervised topic classification method. Collingwood and Wilkerson have argued that if at least four algorithms agree on a topic, then there is a 90% chance that the topic classification is correct.<sup>1</sup> During the supervised topic classification phase of my research, I removed all the verbs from the texts and assigned the topic of the texts based mainly on nouns. Therefore, the supervised topic classification of files for military, political, and social issues was based on the use of nouns and not verbs.

On the other hand, VICS, which is based on the use of verbs, measures the exercise of power in each of the topics. One expects that relative to the political and social topics, the exercise of power in the world of military issues would be the most conflictual. One also expects that relative to political and military topics, the exercise of

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<sup>1</sup> Collingwood and Wilkerson, "Tradeoffs in Accuracy."

power in the world of social issues would be the most cooperative. VICS showed this to be the case in both worlds. In other words, the topic classification based on nouns produced the expected VICS indexes based on verbs. The VICS indexes showed that the topic classification by nouns was correct, and therefore the four-algorithm agreement threshold is a valid threshold.

*Supervised Topic Classification:* As mentioned in Chapter Two, supervised topic classification requires much computational power. To solve that problem, I created a stop-word list with 12,000 words. However, this is not a practical solution for many scholars. Future research should focus on producing lists of verbs or nouns for labeling political text and its subcategories. These lists will act as *whitelists*<sup>1</sup> in supervised topic classification and will reduce the required computational power for text classification. These whitelists will also increase the accuracy of topic classification.

*Sentence, A Better Level for Topic Classification:* I attempted to label the documents based on their geographic focus. I created whitelists of the words that could identify a country: words like the names of the leaders of that country, cities in that country, and nouns related to the name of the country and its ethnic groups. However, the between-algorithm consensus rarely met the threshold of the four-algorithm agreement. To solve this problem, I reduced the level of verb aggregation from file to sentence. At the level of sentence, one can choose the subject or the object of the sentence as the keywords for identifying the geographical orientation of the sentence.

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<sup>1</sup> In contrast to a stop-word list, a whitelist is a list of words that will be included in text classification.

## **Contribution to Theories of IR**

This research showed that the collectivity of the seven think tanks had three distinct worlds of action: the world of military issues, the world of political issues, and the world of social issues. It was shown that the strategy of action in the world of military issues was more conflictual than in the other two worlds. Also, the strategy of action in the world of social issues was more cooperative than in the other two worlds. This finding closely connects the automated operational code based on VICS to constructivism from the perspective of Alexander Wendt.

Wendt argues that there are three distinct cultures of anarchy in international politics: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian.<sup>1</sup> In the Hobbesian culture of anarchy/interaction, the Self sees itself as an enemy of the Other. In the Lockean culture of anarchy, the Self identifies itself as a rival of the Other. And in the Kantian culture of anarchy, the Self adopts the role of a friend of the Other. According to Wendt, each of these three cultures of anarchy has “different rules of engagement” and “interaction logics.”<sup>2</sup>

Based on the findings of this research, I argue that different types of identification between the Self and the Other manifest in the types of verbs used by the Self. One expects that enemies punish and oppose, while friends support and reward. Based on this logic, the difference in the operational code of the three worlds of action can be interpreted as the result of three types of identification between the Self and the Other.

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<sup>1</sup> Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 246-313.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 43.

In the world of social issues, actions are more cooperative. Therefore, from the three roles of friend, rival and enemy, the Self is closer to the role of friend. As such, the culture of anarchy in the world of social issues is closer to Kantian. In the world of military issues, actions are more conflictual. Therefore, from the three roles of friend, rival and enemy, the Self is closer to the role of enemy, and the culture of interaction is closer to Hobbesian. In the world of political issues, actions are less conflictual than in the world of military issues and less cooperative than in the world of social issues. Therefore, from the three roles of friend, rival and enemy, the Self is closer to the role of rival, and the culture of interaction in the world of political issues is closer to Lockean. The above analysis shows that the operational code based on VICS can empirically estimate the culture of anarchy from the texts.

This research also showed that the rules of conduct of the American collective Self were very stable across time and not very different across topics. Following Wendt, one can argue that the stability of the operational code of the American collective Self over time is empirical evidence of the existence of an American collective being, or what he calls the personhood of the United States. According to Wendt, states are like persons with stable collective identity.<sup>1</sup>

However, drawing on Onuf's work on rules, one can argue that the stability of the operational code of the American collective Self over time does not necessarily come from a stable collective identity. The stability of the operational code of the American collective Self is the result of dominance of certain rules and these rules are not always

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<sup>1</sup> Alexander Wendt, "The State as Person in International Theory," *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 2 (2004): 289-316.

the result of the identity of agents.<sup>1</sup> They are tools that agents have learned to use to achieve their goals. Also according to Onuf, agency does not equate with personhood: “agents need not be individual human beings to be able to act on behalf of others (here I refer to agents in the third person to emphasize that the terms *people* and *agents* are not completely interchangeable).”<sup>2</sup>

### **Contribution to the Study of Think Tanks**

This research showed that in some of the worlds of action the relative ideological orientation of think tanks could be estimated based on the verbs they used in their publications. Figure 6-1 presents the relative position of the seven think tanks in the four worlds of, all the issues, military issues, political issues, and social issues. In the world of all the issues, the seven think tanks were positioned as expected. The only exception was CFR, which was closer to the Right than the Center. Considering only the American collective Self, Heritage moved from the Right to Left, while CFR stayed with the Right. In the world of military issues, VICS indexes were not able to predict the political orientation of the think tanks all the time. In the world of military issues, Cato moved closer to the Center, and Heritage distanced itself from the Right. Considering only the American collective Self, the seven think tanks did not differ from one another. In the world of political issues, the texts were generally able to predict the political orientation of the think tanks. In the world of political issues, CFR stayed in the Center, and Heritage moved closer to the Center and distanced itself from the Right. Considering only the American collective Self, Heritage moved closer to the Left. In the world of social issues,

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<sup>1</sup> Nicholas Onuf, “Constructivism: A User’s Manual,” in *International Relations in a Constructed World*, ed. Vendulka Kubálková et al. (Monk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 58-79.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 60.

the VICS indexes were not able to predict the political orientation of the think tanks. In the world of social issues, the Left and the Right moved closer to each other, while RAND distanced itself from both the Left and the Right. Considering only the American collective self, there was no difference among the seven think tanks.

Another way of positioning the seven think tanks relative to each other is by comparing them based on the number of times they assigned cooperative and conflictual strategy to the twenty-two actors. Figure 6-2 shows that this approach could clearly separate the conservative think tanks from the Center and Left ones. It also shows that CFR was closer to the conservative think tanks than to the Center and the Left.

To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time in the fields of American foreign policy, operational code analysis, social psychology, and organizational theory that relative ideological positions of think tanks/organizations have been computed and compared based on their operational codes. These findings open the door for many future studies about think tanks and organizational theory. Possible research questions can ask why verbs predict the ideological orientations of the think tanks. Is it because conservative and liberal organizations write the same way or because they have similar understanding of the exercise of power? How generalizable are these findings? Will we find the same results, if we analyze the think tanks' publications about domestic politics? Answers to these questions will have major theoretical and policy implications in several fields of study.



## **Contributions to VICS and Operational Code Method**

*Validity of VICS:* This research showed that verbs used in the political and nonpolitical texts and the subsequent Instrumental indexes were very different. This finding can be used as a successful validity test for VICS, which purports that it has created a tool for measuring exercise of power from the text.<sup>1</sup> One expects that the exercise of power in different domains of life would be different. If the VICS argument is valid, then the nonpolitical and political texts should have different operational codes. This research has shown that, indeed, the operational codes associated with power in political texts differed extensively from the operational codes in nonpolitical texts.

One also expects that if the VICS argument is valid, then exercise of power in the worlds of military, political and social issues would be different. This research has shown that military, political and social texts had different ways of exercising power. Military texts were the most conflictual; social texts were the most cooperative, and the political texts fell between these two extremes. In other words, this research has shown that VICS is sensitive enough not only to differentiate between nonpolitical and political texts but to differentiate between subcategories of think tanks' texts.

*The Other:* As the results of Chapter Five show, the Other should not be treated as a unified and homogenous group. Different significant Others of the United States have different operational codes. For instance, the operational code indexes of Terrorists and China were very different. However, when all of the Others are placed in one category, different Others cancel each other's effects, producing indexes that are always in the middle and do not change much.

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<sup>1</sup> Walker, Schafer, and Young, "Systematic Procedures for Operational Code."



VICS has two sets of formulas to extract the operational code of a text based on its transitive verbs. There are five formulas to extract operational code of the Other and eleven formulas to extract the operational code of the Self. I argue that in order to create more indexes to study the Other, the eleven Instrumental formulas should also be used for the Other.

*The Self*: Chapter Four studied the operational code of the American collective Self at different levels of verb aggregation. Although the findings of this chapter are reliable, their generalizability requires future tests and investigation. This is due to the lack of a standard criterion for selecting words that represent the Self. The operational code literature does not have a clear answer to who the Self is and what words would represent the Self.

I created two datasets (Broad and Narrow) to control for the impact of the definition of the Self. In this process, however, I had to make several judgment calls on what should be included as the Self. For instance, if a text is mentioning General David Petraeus' action in Iraq, should Petraeus be considered a representative of the Self? If the research does not include Petraeus as part of the Self, then does his action belong to the Other? If the research considers Petraeus as the Self, what other names should also be considered as part of the Self? Should the research include the names of ambassadors and special envoys, as well as members of Congress? Due to the lack of a standard definition of the Self in the operational code literature, the findings of this chapter require further investigation.

*VICS and Distribution of Power*: Chapter Five makes several theoretical and policy contributions. It uses the operational codes of the United States and its significant

Others to draw the cognitive maps of the American foreign policy elite. To the best of my knowledge, no other work in the American foreign policy literature has been able to map the similarity of actions of the United States to its significant Others.

While, this research has only presented a preliminary assessment, there is a suggestive pattern in the twenty-two cognitive maps that requires further investigation. The twenty-two cognitive maps reveal that actors with roughly the same amount of power are clustered together. For instance, the cognitive maps show that the United States is most similar to Europe, China, Russia, and Iran; China is most similar to Europe, the United States, Japan, and Russia; India is most similar to the United States, Europe, and Russia; and Russia is most similar to the United States, China, Iran, and Europe.

While these similarities are based on the verbs used by the seven think tanks and the subsequent Instrumental indexes, the clustering of actors closely reflects the distribution of power in the real world. Stephen Walker suggested to me that the similarity of actors in my research could be compared to the similarity of actors in the Correlates of War Project. The goal of this comparison is to investigate whether the countries that are found to be similar in my research are also similar in the dataset of Correlates of War Project.

One of the datasets of the Correlates of War Project is the National Material Capabilities of the countries.<sup>1</sup> This dataset has measured and ranked the material

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<sup>1</sup> See J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965," in *Peace, War, and Numbers* ed. Bruce M. Russett (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1972), 19-48; J. David Singer, "Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985," *International Interactions* 14, no.2 (1988): 115-32.

capabilities of countries using the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC). The CINC index is based on six variables: 1) *irst*: Iron and steel production (thousands of tons), 2) *milex*: Military Expenditures (thousands of current year US Dollars), 3) *ilper*: Military Personnel (thousands), 4) *pec*: Primary Energy Consumption (thousands of coal-ton equivalents), 5) *tpop*: Total Population (thousands), and 6) *upop*: Urban population (population living in cities with population greater than 100,000; in thousands).<sup>1</sup>

To compare the similarity of actors in this research with similarity of actors based on their CINC index, the following steps were taken:<sup>2</sup> Since the National Material Capabilities only measures the capabilities of countries, the actors in my research that were not countries were excluded from the comparison. Then the rankings of the eighteen countries were extracted from the National Material Capabilities dataset (Table 6-1). As this table shows, the most frequent countries in the texts of the seven think tanks are also the countries with the highest material capability rankings in the National Material Capabilities dataset.

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<sup>1</sup> “National Material Capabilities (v4.0),” *The Correlates of War Project*, 2010, [http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities/nmc-codebook/at\\_download/file/](http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities/nmc-codebook/at_download/file/).

<sup>2</sup> The latest version is the National Material Capabilities (v4.0).

Country	Ranking	irst	milex	milper	pec	tpop	upop	cinc
China	1	494899	46174000	2255	4116892	1324655	748534	0.198578
U.S.	2	98102	5.53E+08	1506	5548023	301621	82969	0.142149
India	3	53080	26513000	1316	1573433	1134023	198077	0.073444
Japan	4	120203	41039000	240	1934963	127772	84414	0.042675
Russia	5	72387	32215000	1027	1558502	142115	68232	0.039274
Germany	7	48550	42108000	246	1158061	82263	25337	0.024082
South Korea	8	51517	26588000	687	943873.3	48456	22826	0.023878
Britain	9	14317	63258000	191	684113.4	60975	55259	0.021158
France	10	19250	60662000	255	712940.6	61707	11861	0.018924
Turkey	12	25754	13643000	515	370437	73875	14180	0.014317
Pakistan	13	1090	4530000	619	133722.8	159570	40864	0.013772
Iran	15	10051	7451000	545	412138	71532	33723	0.01345
North Korea	16	300	-9	1106	29147.73	24056	8752	0.012925
Taiwan	24	20903	9585000	290	26541.71	22958	13513	0.00801
Iraq	36	0	-9	227	37481.42	29682	19879	0.005222
Syria	40	70	1465000	308	32932.75	19172	13314	0.004454
Israel	46	300	11607000	168	44961.18	7180	3160	0.003638
Afghanistan	77	0	153000	50	725.6503	22488	5456	0.00142

**Table 6-1 Ranking of Countries in the National Material Capabilities Database**

In the next step, for each country the closest four neighbors were extracted from both the material capability dataset (Table 6-1) and the cognitive maps of Chapter Five. As Table 6-2 shows, there is a high degree of overlap between the results of two datasets, especially for the great powers.

My research presents a multi-level, multi-actor, and multi-topic picture of the American foreign policy elite's rules of conduct. It has produced tidy data for the fields of American foreign policy, political psychology, international relations, organizational theory and text classification. Much future research can be conducted based on the data, findings, patterns, anomalies and lessons discerned. It is dynamic and living. In every general election, a new batch of texts by think tanks can be analyzed and added to the repositories of data. At the 2013 ISA conference, Steven Hook from Kent University described this research as an original, multi-level research that opens many possibilities

for theory and policy and at the 2015 ISA conference; Stephen Walker described it as a research program rather than a research project.

	American Foreign Policy Think Tanks Most Similar Based on the VICS Indexes	Correlates of War Project Most Similar Based on The National Material Capabilities Dataset	Agreement (out of 4)
China	U.S., Japan, Russia, South Korea	U.S., India, Japan, Russia	3
U.S.	China, Russia, Iran, India	China, India, Japan, Russia	3
France	South Korea, Germany, Turkey, Pakistan	Britain, Turkey, South Korea, Pakistan	3
India	U.S., Russia, Iran, North Korea	U.S., Japan, China, Russia	2
North Korea	Iran, U.S., Iraq, Afghanistan	Iran, Taiwan, Pakistan, Iraq	2
Israel	Syria, Afghanistan, North Korea, Pakistan	Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Taiwan	2
Germany	France, Turkey, Japan, South Korea	Russia, South Korea, Japan, Britain	2
Japan	China, Turkey, Russia, Taiwan	India, Russia, U.S., Germany	1
Russia	U.S., China, Iran, India	Japan, Germany, India, South Korea	1
South Korea	U.S., France, Pakistan, China	Germany, Britain, Russia, France	1
Pakistan	Afghanistan, South Korea, North Korea, Iraq	Turkey, Iran, France, North Korea	1
Iran	North Korea, Russia, U.S., India	Pakistan, North Korea, Turkey, Taiwan	1
Iraq	North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, India	Taiwan, Syria, North Korea, Israel	1
Syria	Israel, Turkey, Iran, India	Iraq, Israel, Taiwan, Afghanistan	1
Britain	China, Japan, North Korea, Afghanistan	South Korea, France, Germany, Turkey	0
Turkey	Japan, Syria, Taiwan, South Korea	France, Pakistan, Britain, Iran	0
Taiwan	Japan, India, Turkey, China	North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria	0
Afghanistan	Pakistan, North Korea, Japan, India	Israel, Syria, Iraq, Taiwan	0

Table 6-2 Similarity of Countries - VICS vs. the National Material Capabilities Database

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
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


# APPENDICES


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
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
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
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
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
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


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





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
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
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
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
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
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


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





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
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
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
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
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
# Multi-Dimensional Scaling Brookings Social



# Multi-Dimensional Scaling Brookings Political




# Multi-Dimensional Scaling Brookings Military







# Multi-Dimensional Scaling Carnegie All




# Multi-Dimensional Scaling Carnegie Social




# Multi-Dimensional Scaling Carnegie Political




# Multi-Dimensional Scaling Carnegie Military




# Multi-Dimensional Scaling All Think Tanks All Years Military




# Multi-Dimensional Scaling All Think Tanks All Years Social



# Multi-Dimensional Scaling All Think Tanks All Years Political




# Multi-Dimensional Scaling All Think Tanks All Topics All Years







# Multi-Dimensional Scaling All Think Tanks All Topics 2012




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
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
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
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
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


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





# Multi-Dimensional Scaling All Think Tanks All Topics 2004




# Multi-Dimensional Scaling All Think Tanks Social 2004



# Multi-Dimensional Scaling All Think Tanks Political 2004



# Multi-Dimensional Scaling All Think Tanks Military 2004



## Part-Of-Speech Tags of the Penn Treebank Project<sup>1</sup>

Number	Tag	Description
1.	CC	Coordinating conjunction
2.	CD	Cardinal number
3.	DT	Determiner
4.	EX	Existential there
5.	FW	Foreign word
6.	IN	Preposition or subordinating conjunction
7.	JJ	Adjective
8.	JJR	Adjective, comparative
9.	JJS	Adjective, superlative
10.	LS	List item marker
11.	MD	Modal
12.	NN	Noun, singular or mass
13.	NNS	Noun, plural
14.	NNP	Proper noun, singular
15.	NNPS	Proper noun, plural
16.	PDT	Predetermine
17.	POS	Possessive ending
18.	PRP	Personal pronoun
19.	PRP\$	Possessive pronoun
20.	RB	Adverb
21.	RBR	Adverb, comparative
22.	RBS	Adverb, superlative
23.	RP	Particle
24.	SYM	Symbol
25.	TO	to
26.	UH	Interjection
27.	VB	Verb, base form
28.	VBD	Verb, past tense
29.	VBG	Verb, gerund or present participle
30.	VBN	Verb, past participle
31.	VBP	Verb, non-3rd person singular present
32.	VBZ	Verb, 3rd person singular present
33.	WDT	Wh-determiner
34.	WP	Wh-pronoun
35.	WP\$	Possessive wh-pronoun
36.	WRB	Wh-adverb

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Table adopted from “Alphabetical list of part-of-speech tags used in the Penn Treebank Project,” *Penn Treebank Project*, accessed February 12, 2014, [https://www.ling.upenn.edu/courses/Fall\\_2003/ling001/penn\\_treebank\\_pos.html](https://www.ling.upenn.edu/courses/Fall_2003/ling001/penn_treebank_pos.html).

## **New York Times Index Data Codebook Major Topic Policy Agendas Project - 2014<sup>1</sup>**

1. Macroeconomics
2. Civil Rights
3. Health
4. Agriculture
5. Labor, Immigration, and Employment
6. Education
7. Environment
8. Energy
10. Transportation
12. Law, Crime, and Family Issues
13. Social Welfare
14. Community Development and Housing
15. Banking, Finance and Domestic Commerce
16. Defense
17. Space, Science, Technology, and Communications
18. Foreign Trade
19. International Affairs
20. Federal Government Operations
21. Public Lands and Water Management
24. State and Local Government Administration
26. Weather and Natural Disasters
27. Fires
28. Arts and Entertainment
29. Sports and Recreation
30. Death Notices
31. Churches and Religion
99. Other, Miscellaneous, and Human Interest

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<sup>1</sup> “New York Times Index Data Codebook,” *University of Texas*, accessed March 28, 2014, <http://www.utexas.edu/cola/files/4341573>.

## Foreign Policy Related Tags Imported From Think Tanks' Websites

Row Labels	2004	2008	Grand Total
<b>Military</b>	<b>220</b>	<b>347</b>	<b>567</b>
Defense	62	101	163
Intelligence	19	6	25
Military	34	56	90
National Security	11	48	59
Piracy		7	7
Proliferation	23	25	48
Terrorism	70	99	169
War	1	5	6
<b>Political</b>	<b>402</b>	<b>427</b>	<b>829</b>
Election	11	19	30
Foreign Policy	383	385	768
International Law		2	2
Nation Building	5	4	9
Soft power		7	7
Strategy	3	10	13
<b>Social</b>	<b>241</b>	<b>508</b>	<b>749</b>
Climate Change	1	6	7
International Crime		2	2
Democracy	27	18	45
Development	2	20	22
Drugs	1	8	9
Economy	133	313	446
Education	1	6	7
Energy	3	31	34
Environment	2	6	8
Extremism	1		1
Food		1	1
Foreign Aid	1	17	18
Globalization	3		3
Health	12	12	24
Human Development	1		1
Human Rights	15	22	37
Humanitarian	7	3	10
Internally displaced People	15	25	40
Immigration	2	1	3
Nationalism		1	1
Olympics	1	4	5
Poverty		2	2
Reform	4	5	9
Religion	6	4	10
Technology	2	1	3
Women	1		1
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>863</b>	<b>1282</b>	<b>2145</b>

## General Foreign Policy Tags Imported From Think Tanks' Websites

Topics	2004	2008	Total
<b>Military</b>	<b>220</b>	<b>347</b>	<b>567</b>
AEI	31	43	74
Brookings	35	57	92
Carnegie	2	3	5
Cato	5	33	38
CFR	50	80	130
Heritage	34	46	80
RAND	63	85	148
<b>Political</b>	<b>402</b>	<b>427</b>	<b>829</b>
AEI	94	80	174
Brookings	85	112	197
Carnegie	3	11	14
Cato	37	30	67
CFR	84	91	175
Heritage	84	92	176
RAND	15	11	26
<b>Social</b>	<b>241</b>	<b>508</b>	<b>749</b>
AEI	36	32	68
Brookings	38	158	196
Carnegie	14	9	23
Cato	63	102	165
CFR	52	124	176
Heritage	18	68	86
RAND	20	15	35
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>863</b>	<b>1282</b>	<b>2145</b>



## Detailed Results of Supervised Tagging of Sentences

<b>MILITARY</b>	<b>76483</b>
Defense	76483
<b>POLITICAL</b>	<b>337114</b>
International Affairs	337114
<b>SOCIAL</b>	<b>73285</b>
Macroeconomics	8863
Civil Rights	5086
Health	6500
Agriculture	1155
Labor, Immigration, Employment	4799
Education	8285
Environment	3157
Energy	10295
Space, Science, Technology	6588
Foreign Trade	16953
Sports and Recreation	1054
Churches and Religion	550
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>486882</b>

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    OPCode/OP06PostActorsPreVerbs
    OPCode/OP07CasesTensesVoice
    OPCode/OP08PostVerbs
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    OPCode/OP21IdentifyIntransitives
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## VITA

### SEYED HAMIDREZA SERRI

1997-2000	B.A., Political Science School of International Relations Tehran, Iran
2000-2002	M.A., Regional Studies Tehran University Tehran, Iran
2004-2008	M.A., International Relations Florida International University Miami, Florida
2006-2015	Adjunct Lecturer Florida International University Miami, Florida

### PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS

Serri, Seyed Hamidreza. "Offensive Realism and the U.S. Foreign Policy in the 90s." Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Conference (South), Miami, Florida, 2005.

Serri, Seyed Hamidreza and Yentzu Chen. "Engagement on Indo-Iranian Relations." Paper presented at the Middle East and Central Asia Conference, Salt Lake City, Utah, 2007.

Serri, Seyed Hamidreza. "Prospect Theory and the Iranian 2003 Offer to the U.S." Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Conference, San Francisco, California, 2008.

Serri, Seyed Hamidreza. "American Elite's Narratives and Iran's Nuclear Program; case study of American elites' publications from 2000 to 2010." Paper presented at the Middle East Studies Association Annual Conference, Washington, D.C., 2011.

Serri, Seyed Hamidreza. "Worldview of American Foreign Policy Think Tanks." Poster presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Conference, Washington, D.C., 2012.

Serri, Seyed Hamidreza. "Iran and the American Foreign Policy Elite." Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Conference, San Francisco, California, 2013.

Serri, Seyed Hamidreza. "Continuity and Change in Views of the US Foreign Policy Elite." Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Conference, San Francisco, California, 2013.

Serri, Seyed Hamidreza. "Classification of Political Texts Based on Topic and Geographical Focus." Poster presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Conference, Washington, D.C., 2014.

Serri, Seyed Hamidreza. "The Worldview of the U.S. Foreign Policy Think Tanks in the 2012 General Election." Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Conference, New Orleans, Louisiana, 2015.