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Ken I. Boodhoo

Florida International University, Department of International Relations

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GRENADA: THE BIRTH AND
DEATH OF A REVOLUTION

Dr. Ken I. Boodhoo

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PREFACE

Ken I. Boodhoo is Associate Professor of International Relations at Florida International University. A student of Caribbean affairs and a native of Trinidad, Dr. Boodhoo has recently conducted research throughout the Eastern Caribbean and is preparing a book-length work on the Grenadan Revolution and its destruction by the events of October, 1983. The essential outlines of this work were first presented to students and faculty in a colloquium at Florida International University shortly after the U.S.-led invasion of Grenada. Comments or inquiries about the paper are welcomed and should be addressed to the author at the Department of International Relations. Publication of this work has been made possible in part by a grant from the Florida International University Foundation, Inc.

Mark B. Rosenberg
Director

The Gairy Years

Until the coup staged by the New Jewel Movement on March 13, 1979 the modern history of Grenada was dominated by the figure of Eric Matthew Gairy, at that time Prime Minister and leader of the Grenada United Labor Party (GULP), the governing party in the elected legislature.

Born in 1922, Eric Gairy at age twenty had, like many of his countrymen, migrated to neighboring Trinidad to seek employment in the oilfields there. In particular, he followed a path earlier established by his fellow Grenadian, Tubal Uriah Butler, one of the foremost radical leaders of the colonial Caribbean black masses. Later, Gairy went to the Dutch colony of Aruba, also working in the oil industry, and for the first time became involved in trade union activities. When he returned to Grenada in 1949 he utilized his now developed trade union organizational skills, very rapidly developing a mass organization of over 20,000 agricultural and related workers.

By the early 1950's the Grenadian colonial economy was a classic example of a small-scale plantation type economic system. The economy, based on small-sized plantations of cocoa, nutmegs and sugar, was owned by the very small, light-skinned elite group. The peasantry eked out a living on their small plots of land or on seasonal employment offered by the export-oriented plantations. And until the arrival of Gairy employment in agriculture, as was the case throughout the region, offered extremely low wages. With a per capita income at about \$250,

unemployment and under-employment caused serious hardships for the Grenadian majority.

The politico-constitutional counterpart of this colonial economic system was that of a Crown Colony government in which power resided in the hands of the British Governor assisted by his civil servants. And indeed until the granting of universal adult suffrage in 1951 the majority of the Grenadian population did not participate in the political process.

During the first quarter of 1951, Grenada experienced the most widespread and violent strikes the country had experienced until that time, called by Gairy's Trade Union in support of increased wages in the sugar industry. These strikes culminated in the largest working class demonstration the country witnessed. The British, unfortunately for them, played into Gairy's hands by sending him to jail. As the demonstrations grew for his release, the British governor was forced to negotiate directly with Gairy in order to return peace to the colony. Gairy at once gained the legitimacy he had earnestly sought. The Governor eventually conceded Gairy as the leader of the country's working class.

Gairy and his GULP won the 1951 elections but quickly realized the major constraints placed on his power as a consequence of the colonial constitution. While he had obtained some degree of authority, ultimately, final decision-making resided with the British Governor. In the 1954 elections Gairy's GULP won 6 of the 8 seats, albeit with reduced voter

support, and in 1957 he lost control of the legislature by winning only 2 seats. The party was returned to office in the 1961 elections but financial mismanagement and charges of corruption resulted in suspension of the Constitution and a call for new elections the following year. In this election the GULP lost to the middle class, business oriented, Grenada National Party which went on to run the country until 1967.

One major reason for Gairy's defeat in 1962 was undoubtedly the issue of unitary status of Grenada with Trinidad, following the demise of the West Indies Federation. This status was opposed by the GULP. Additionally, by 1960, Grenada had begun to experience gradual restructuring of its economy to which Gairy had not taken account. The rise of the hotel industry, and with it increased employment opportunities in construction and transportation, was at the expense of the labor force in the agricultural sector. The latter was the base of Gairy's support. While the agricultural workforce had dropped from 12,432 in 1946 to 8,660 in 1970, employment in the construction industry had increased from 2,900 to 4,200 between 1960 and 1970. Overall while employment in the urban industrial sector had increased by 62 per cent in the decade of the '60's employment in the rural agricultural sector had declined by 30 per cent during that period.¹

Gairy had always counted heavily on support from the rural population. Since some of these people were now salaried urban workers their class interests were thereby altered.

However, after five years of GNP leadership, the elections of 1967 once again returned Gairy to office with an ammended constitution permitting him more latitude to manipulate his authority. Gairy's new title was 'Premier' as Grenada became an Associated State in free association with Britain. In general, this new relationship meant that Grenada, led by Gairy, controlled its internal welfare, with Britain responsible for defense and external relations.

By 1967 Eric Gairy had emerged as an extremely controversial figure who generated strong feelings, both for and against his leadership. His appeal was based on a curious admixture of a charismatic-type personality; a skillful manipulation of religious symbols including his involvement in voodoo-type worship; and ultimately as well, the emergence of the "Moongoose gang." This latter group comprised largely of thugs, roughly akin to the Tonton Macoute of Haiti, emerged during the 1967 elections and were not disbanded until the NJM coup twelve years later.

Gairy's cavalier attitude toward leadership and administration of state affairs contributed, during this period to his ultimate downfall. This administration was characterized by personal corruption, financial mismangement and inefficiency, and the emergence of arrogant and somewhat dictatorial leadership. There was little discernible government planning and programs. While the land reform program permitted the government to acquire twenty-six estates, very little of this

was redistributed to the poor and landless. Moreover, the ever present threat provided by Gairy's Moongoose gang did not contribute to open participation in the democratic process. It was this climate of fear and intimidation of the increasingly economically depressed masses that provided the setting for the New Jewel Movement.

The Rise of the NJM

During late 1960's the English Caribbean was hit by a wave of turmoil and civil unrest, that to one degree or another, affected every island. It was the legacy of the Bootstrap philosophy with its dependent capitalist approach to development introducing inappropriate technologies exacerbating the unemployment situation and class divisions. Simultaneously free university education provided the dispossessed with opportunities hitherto reserved to the elites. Major explosions were experienced in Jamaica in 1968 and in Trinidad in 1970. This was the era of the rise of the Black Power ideology, which built on the thought developed by the New World Group a decade earlier. In the smaller islands of the English-speaking Caribbean, the Forum group was established in St. Lucia, Yulimo in St. Vincent, the Antigua Caribbean Liberation Movement, the Movement for a New Dominica and the New Jewel Movement in Grenada.

What eventually became known as the NJM actually had its beginnings with the return of Unison Whiteman, a young economist,

to Grenada, in 1964. Disturbed by the conditions of the working class he organized a small discussion group confined largely to the strongly agricultural parish of St. David. In 1972, this group was formalized as the Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education and Liberation - "Jewel."

After legal training and involvement in the West Indian minority politics in England, Maurice Bishop, the son of a middle-class St. George's businessman, returned to Grenada in 1969. Immediately he became involved in domestic politics, protesting with, and later successfully defending, a group of nurses who took to the streets to dramatize the deplorable conditions at the government hospitals. In 1972, at Bishop's initiative, the Movement for the Assemblies of the People (MAP) was formed. The MAP opposed the existing Westminster model of government as non-functional to the needs of the society, and suggested a radical alternative--the establishment of Peoples Assemblies. The latter was viewed as a practical method for permitting the broader mass of the society to have more meaningful input into the state's decision-making process. Initially, Bishop's economic philosophy was strongly influenced by the ideas developed by Julius Nyerere.

By the early 1970's, therefore, power in Grenada, was firmly in the hands of Eric Gairy with some popular support from the rural areas, but reinforced by the Moongoose group. Formal opposition in the legislature was minimal and middle class in orientation. Nevertheless, arising in the rural area,

confronting Gairy's traditional power base, was Whiteman's Jewel group, and in St. George's the country's capital, was Bishop's MAP. While at that time separate organizations, both the Jewel and the MAP were the first groups to offer proposals for restructuring rather than modifying the existing political and economic systems. And to that extent it was almost inevitable that they would come to confrontation with Gairy.

An incident in late 1972 pushed the synthesis of the Jewel and the MAP. In the parish of St. David, the base for Jewel group, an English estate owner, with Gairy's assistance, had purchased land cutting off access to a local beach. The local protesters called on the Jewel for assistance, and defying the police forces sent to protect the estate, tore down fences regaining access to the beach. Within two months, in March 1973, the MAP and Jewel combined to form the New Jewel Movement. With the former having focused on political reorganization and the latter on agricultural development, for the first time was Gairy faced with a broadly based organization with mass appeal and a coherent program.

By this time Eric Gairy himself had sought to organize against any broadly-based opposition group. He had earlier gained legislative approval for an Emergency Powers Act strengthening police powers and restricting the movement and assembly of people. To further strengthen his security forces he boasted:

"We are now doubling the strength of our Police Force, we are getting in almost unlimited supplies of new and modern equipment...(the) Opposition referred to my recruiting criminals in a reserve force. To this I shall not say yea or nay. Does it not take steel to cut steel?...Indeed, hundreds have come and some of the toughest and roughest roughnecks have been recruited..."²

Confrontation between the NJM and Gairy's government was swift, and in most cases, violent. In late 1973 when the NJM was engaged in a brief alliance with the GNP organizing a series of strikes, Gairy responded with state force involving physical abuse of the opposition, the jailing of its leadership, and eventually, death to a few NJM sympathizers. The events of "Bloody Sunday" became a foremost example of state violence against the opposition; and eventually, the turning point of opposition against Gairy. Until that time the primary opposition group was the NJM. After the events of that day, when the entire leadership of the NJM was savagely beaten, tortured, and imprisoned by Gairy's Moongoose gang, opposition became broadly based, including the middle and upper classes, in revolution against Gairy-led brutality.

From Independence to NJM coup

Many have argued that the period between Independence in February 1974 to March 13, 1979, the date of the coup, Grenada, under Gairy, experienced the elements of an emerging fascist state, which thereby made the coup almost inevitable.

Technically, the parliament of the now independent

country was the seat of decision-making. Between 1974 and December 1976, Gairy's party controlled 14 of the 15 seats in parliament. The lone opposition member was rarely in attendance. During the second phase from December 1976 until the coup in March 1979 there was a strong opposition party since the government now controlled 9 of the 15 seats. However, during both periods the Parliament was a mere "rubber stamp for the government decisions that had already been made elsewhere."³ And moreover, because of "Gairy's decision style...questions in Cabinet were not always resolved by debate and majority resolutions (since) Cabinet members merely echoed the views of the Prime Minister."⁴ It is also interesting to note that during the entire duration of the second independence parliament--a period of twenty-seven months, the Parliament met for a total of eighteen days even though the constitution demanded more frequent meetings. It is clear, therefore, that while the formal structure of democratic institutions and processes existed, in practice decision-making over the five year period became increasingly concentrated in the hands of Prime Minister Gairy.

The events of "Bloody Sunday" heralded a new level of violence by the Gairy governments against opposition forces. Among opposition activists killed was Rupert Bishop, father of Maurice, while attempting to protect a group of women who were engaged in a demonstration against the government.

This murder served further to coalesce opposition to Gairy culminating in an Alliance between the NJM, the GNP and the United People's Party. It was this Alliance that won six of the fifteen parliamentary seats in 1976 and 48 per cent of the popular vote. In that election in particular, widespread charges were brought against the government concerning electoral fraud.

Concerned as he was with the consolidation of personal power and wealth, Gairy permitted the Grenadian economy to degenerate during the post-independence period. The basic infrastructure steadily deteriorated. The road system was in disrepair. The medical system was ill-equipped and understaffed. The educational system, at all levels, was neglected. However, the state system of repression: policemen, paid auxiliaries, soldiers, the secret police and police stations, all expanded steadily. It was largely as a consequence of the latter that the overall fiscal deficit problem exacerbated. And to compensate for the deficit, taxes were dramatically increased. By the late 1970's taxes accounted for 27 per cent of GDP, without the deficit situation being alleviated. This was one of the major reasons why the basic infrastructure of the society deteriorated.

The Gairy government did embark on a "land reform" program. Under this program he purchased mid-sized estates either from those elements of the plantocracy opposed to him, or from his friends, the latter, at inflated prices, and returned it, in

smaller parcels, in some cases, to his supporters. Many of these estates, though, were maintained under state control which later passed on to the Bishop government.

As a consequence of the physical deterioration of the society, and increased repression by the state, Gairy's government became increasingly isolated from its regional partners in the Caribbean Economic Community. At this point, Gairy turned to develop linkages with regimes akin to his in South Korea, Chile and Somoza's Nicaragua. The 1977 military agreement with Pinochet of Chile which called for the training of Grenadians in Chile, and arms transfers, clearly indicated the future course of the Grenadian government.

It was against the background of Gairyism: the concentration of power and accumulation of wealth in the hands of one individual; the tactics of repression increasingly resembling that of the right-wing Chilean regime, including five political assassinations; and the impending economic collapse of the state, did the NJM stage its pre-dawn coup on March 13, 1979. The NJM later claimed that the final decision on the coup was influenced by their belief that the Gairy regime was about to assassinate the entire NJM leadership. This claim was widely believed by Grenadians at that time.

The Consolidation of the Revolution

Within a few hours of the seizure of power the leader of the People's Revolution Government (PRG), Maurice Bishop, explained

the objectives of the revolution in a radio broadcast,

"People of Grenada, this revolution is for work, for food, for decent housing and health services, and for a bright future for our children and great grandchildren. The benefits of the revolution will be given to everyone regardless of political opinion or which political party they support. Let us all unite as one..."⁵

Thus did Bishop outline the broad goals of his government with the emphasis upon social and economic change for the Grenadian masses. But this is not to state that the PRG did not have political objectives as well.

Political Objectives:

A fundamental objective of Bishop's original MAP was to move Grenada away from the inherited Westminster-type parliamentary system, to the innovative, Assemblies of the People. The twenty-five year rule of Eric Gairy had demonstrated that while in principle, there was little fault with the British-type system of government, in practice, parliamentary democracy, in Grenada, was de facto replaced by one man rule. In spite of this, the formal trappings of the Westminster system: constitution, parliament and the opposition were all formally maintained.

Developing the ideas of the MAP, the 1973 NJM Manifesto had dismissed the existing political system as "five second democracy," that is, the opportunity to cast an electoral ballot once every five years. In its place the NJM had proposed a

system of direct democracy through assemblies of the people. These assemblies, as originally proposed, would be organized at the local village level, the parish and at the national level. At the latter level, a National Assembly would replace the former parliament. Representatives to the National Assembly were expected to be elected by the local assemblies.

In practice, the PRG established a system of parish and zonal councils which assumed some of the consultative functions previously undertaken by a state parliament. Immediately after the takeover of government the PRG suspended the constitution and established a governing committee of Ministers, which ruled through the issuance of People's Laws. While majority membership of the ruling committee were the leaders of the NJM--nine among a total of fourteen members--an alliance was formed with some representatives of the business community and the former middle-class oriented party, the GNP.

Non-members of the NJM were also given positions on statutory boards throughout Grenada, yet in general, power resided in the hands of the PRG. And during the years of the revolution there was an increased blurring of the boundaries between the PRG and the NJM. In addition, the two other political parties, Gairy's GULP and the GNP, for all interests and purposes, ceased to exist. At the national level, therefore, there was little or no opposition to the government's policies.

It was, however, at the level of the ordinary people that broad opportunity was provided to meaningfully participate in

the affairs of the state. One of the best examples of participation of the masses in government decision-making was in the structuring of the National Budget for 1982. That process began with a "Conference of Delegates of Mass Organizations on the Economy" held in late January 1982. About 1,000 delegates representing all the mass organizations participated. This was followed by a series of 25 zonal and parish Councils held throughout the country. In addition, meetings were also organized with the private sector, and then another general conference on the economy. Altogether, approximately 20,000 people were involved in the budget-making process which culminated in the budget presentation by Finance Minister Bernard Coard in a public gathering at the National Convention Center on March 9th, 1982.⁶

The success of the particular effort in the making of the 1982 budget lent credence to the view that the PRG was serious and successful in bringing direct democracy, through local assemblies and mass conferences to the Grenadian population. And, in fact, the establishment of a constitutional commission in July, 1983, led many to believe that the process of direct democracy would be entrenched in a new constitution. The crisis in the party leading to its takeover by Marxist Coard, the subsequent arrest and death of Maurice Bishop, and ultimately, the invasion by the United States, altogether effectively precluded any opportunity for constitutional change.

Economic Objectives:

Undoubtedly the PRG introduced significant change to the structures, processes and opportunities for broad participation in the Grenadian political system. The same cannot be said for its economic policies. This is not to state that the rhetoric and ideology of the revolution could lead the superficial observer to think of PRG's economic policy in Marxist terms. And even though the rhetoric was revolutionary, the major characteristic of economic policy was its pragmatism. Many factors contributed to this pragmatic approach.

Firstly, the PRG inherited an economy that was in shambles. While government revenues were extremely low due to a disorganized and almost non-functioning tax collection system, expenditures were inordinately high. This was the result of a combination of corruption in government and a well developed political patronage system, and extremely high expenditure for the security branch of the state. At the same time, agriculture, a mainstay of the economy, was allowed to deteriorate. Even the state-owned estates experienced much greater expenditure than income. By 1978 the value of imports was more than double that for exports, which further contributed to economic deterioration.

Secondly, much of the leadership of the NJM, now the ruling group in the PRG, were young university-educated professionals, with essentially middle-class parentage. And in large measure while their rhetoric reflected that of the oppressed

groups in the country, this approach served to weld the masses in unity against an increasing corrupt and dictatorial regime. But this is not to state that the NJM leadership was not also moved by conviction. Their cause, however, was more one of social justice than of violent leftist revolution. Theirs was in largely a populist movement. It is worth noting that the chief Marxist theoretician in the NJM, Bernard Coard, was a late comer to the movement.

Thirdly, the NJM, especially throughout the 1970's had worked in close alliance with the GNP, the party representing the Grenadian middle class. Especially after the events of Bloody Sunday, in April 1974, the middle class had turned against the corruption and brutality of the Gairy regime. In 1976 both groups had jointly fought the general elections, and after the takeover of government in March 1979, some representatives of middle class business, sat on the ruling PRG council. For all of the foregoing factors, therefore, it was almost inevitable that the PRG's approach to economic development would be influenced less by ideology and more by pragmatic considerations.

In broad outline the economic program of the PRG emphasized the following objectives:⁷

- a) concentration upon agriculture and tourism with the twin objectives of increasing employment and contributing to foreign exchange earnings;
- b) rehabilitate the existing infrastructure;
- c) stimulate productive investment in the private sector, through increased public investment, and in the co-operative sector;

d) improve the efficiency of the public sector.

It was not surprising that the PRG would emphasize agriculture, and more hesitatingly, tourism, as major focal points for economic development. Grenada, like all of the other former colonial Caribbean economies, with the possible exception of Trinidad, had inherited an economic system dependent upon the export of a few agricultural products, importing everything else, from the colonizer--a classic picture of a metropolitan dominated economy. And whereas over the long run, self-sustaining development processes, which would reduce the "openness" of the economy, must have been a primary objective of the PRG, the immediate demands for employment and foreign exchange earnings, meant that the existing agricultural system be maintained. Initially, the emphasis was upon increased output and efficiency of this sector as the immediate objectives. Tourism presented a similar problem.

The PRG must have been aware that there are basic problems, in terms of the development process, associated with the existing model of "plantation" tourism. Nevertheless, when world market prices for Grenada's major agricultural exports: nutmeg, cocoa and bananas fell 22 percent between 1979 and 1980, and when the entire agricultural economy, also suffered from the devastating effects of two hurricanes during that period, there was little choice for the government but to return to tourism as a major motivator of the economy.

Overall, the PRG was committed to a mixed economy, with

the private sector retaining control of about two-thirds of all economic activity. And in an apparent retreat from the 1973 manifesto, the only nationalizations undertaken were those of Eric Gairy's personal property: three hotels, four restaurants and thirty-five acres of land. These were maintained as state enterprises. As previously noted, the PRG had also inherited twenty-six state agricultural estates, the legacy of Gairy's attempt at state ownership.

The PRG was also determined to expand the state sector in order that the development process be hastened. It was logical that the state would turn initially to agro-industries, since the raw material was readily available, and since this would reduce the need for foreign food imports, and consequently, foreign exchange. A plant was established for the processing of local fruit into juices and jellies. Similarly, a fish processing plant was built by the National Fisheries Corporation. This latter body, itself, was established in 1981 to develop the fishing industry.

The state then turned its attention to the banking industry, this being one of the sectors historically controlled from the metropole. While the private banking system continued its activities, the state established an alternative in the publicly-owned National Commercial Bank (NCB). This bank acquired the holdings of the Royal Bank of Canada which had voluntarily decided to terminate its business in Grenada. The state-owned Grenada Development Bank, whose forerunner was Gairy's Agricul-

cultural Bank, continued to serve the loan needs of farmers and small business. Two foreign banks continued to function during the Bishop government controlling a little over 50 percent of the banking business.

Soon after the PRG began its rule a Marketing and National Import Board was established. This gave the state, through this Board, the exclusive right to import the basic food requirements for its population, including rice, sugar and cement. The state, in keeping with its primary objective of feeding the population, was determined that basic necessities would be available at reasonable prices. The Board also was required to locate export markets for domestic agricultural products.

In spite of the steadily expanding state sector in the economy, between 1979-1983, this sector, at the end of that four year period, accounted for less than 25 percent of the Gross National Product.

Appraisal of Domestic Policies and Programs

At every level the PRG faced a formidable task in efforts at reconstruction and transformation of the Grenadian economy and society. Many commentators would agree that while their performance exceeded expectations, for instance in social and economic programs, in other areas, deficiencies were apparent.

With regard to economic performance, the World Bank reported that the Grenadian economy grew by 2.1 percent in 1979, 3 percent in both 1980 and 1981 and 5.5 percent in 1982.⁸ This was

stimulated partly by the state's capital investment program. In the last year of Gairy's regime, capital investment was \$8m. This figure was doubled in 1979, the first year of the revolution, to \$40m. in 1980 and in 1982 over \$100m.⁹ As a consequence, while unemployment stood at 49 percent immediately prior to the revolution, it dropped to 14.2 percent in 1982.¹⁰ By that year while inflation stood at 7 percent, wages increased by 10 percent or a 3 percent increase in living standards.

With the emphasis upon meeting the basic needs of the population, the government's economic program went beyond the alleviation of the unemployment problem. Basic necessities as pipe-borne water and rural electrification programs were either upgraded, or begun in those areas where they were non-existent. By 1982, 49 miles of feeder roads, and 15 miles of main roads were built, facilitating the movement of agricultural products.

Major transformations were undertaken in social welfare programs. Thirty-seven cents of every dollar of capital investment were directed toward health and education.¹¹ The number of doctors was almost doubled, from a ratio of 1:4000 in 1978 to 1:2,700 in 1982.¹² Dental clinics increased from one to seven.

Secondary education, formerly the prerogative of the elite as a consequence of tuition fees, was made free. Additionally, free books, uniforms and lunches were provided, at the elementary level, for children from lower-income families. While under Gairy Grenada had defaulted on payments to the common University of the West Indies (UWI) thereby inhibiting access

for the qualified Grenadian students, such defaults were repaid after the revolution. Not only did Grenadians, therefore, regain access to UWI but overall 109 Grenadians were awarded university scholarships, many of these to Cuban universities. While illiteracy in Grenada was relatively low, it was substantially higher among the older population. The Center for Popular Education--a literacy program directed toward the adult population--was organized with the aim of eradicating adult illiteracy by 1985.

Other socio-economic programs included interest-free loans and low cost material to a substantial number of families for housing repair. In addition, the Sandino Housing Plant began production of prefabricated housing units, with an anticipated production schedule of 500 units per year. The two programs combined represented an imaginative effort to combat the problem of adequate housing. From all of the foregoing it is obvious that in the short four and one-half years of the PRG government substantial progress was made toward meeting basic needs of Grenadian population.

Analysis of the politics of the revolution presents a more mixed picture. Having rejected the Westminster model, the PRG turned to a radically different, and difficult to implement approach, with a system of direct democracy through people's assemblies. Whereas the political culture favored the system of representative democracy, inherent in the existing Westminster system, the country's tradition, was reflected in a people whose

primary concerns were essentially materialistic, and as a consequence, less concerned about a participatory democracy.¹³

Bishop himself explained the problem this way:¹⁴

"the nature of the struggle we have undergone, (is) not only to raise production and productivity, but is to instill new values into our people."

But having believed that some progress was already achieved in introducing people's assemblies, as evidenced by the mass budget hearings of 1982, the PRG had formally announced the establishment of a constitutional commission which would "institutionalize and entrench the systems of popular democracy."¹⁵

Relatedly, was the issue of elections. The PRG had gained office by forceful overthrow of the Gairy government. During their period of rule there was no attempt to legitimize their position through elections. Presumably, the new constitution would have been the forerunner to national elections. The government faced much criticism, from within the region, and internationally, as a consequence. Dissent was more muted at home. Many would argue that this was a consequence of the intimidating presence of the People's Revolutionary Army. Practically, as well, leaders of dissent were probably all in jail. There were about 100 political detainees by October 1983. Few had been charged with crimes and even fewer had gone to trial.

Among the dissenters jailed were the leaders of the non-

government press. Soon after the takeover of the government the three newspapers were closed down, including one which declared itself loyal, yet reserving for itself the right to criticize the revolution.

The consolidation of the revolution, domestically, did not detract from the external relationships developed and pursued by the PRG. Indeed the leadership pursued such relationships aggressively, even in the face of rapidly escalating tensions with the United States. To a large extent the revolution believed that the building of national independence domestically, was inextricably linked to independence in foreign policy and from supporters in the international environment.

The PRG in the International Environment

Between independence and the 1979 revolution Grenadian foreign policy, like the society, was dominated by Eric Gairy. Consequently, that foreign policy reflected the idiosyncratic tendencies of the leader, making issues as UFO's, the Bermuda Triangle, psychic research and the universality of God, as the significant issues articulated by Grenada at the United Nations.¹⁶

The PRG faced two immediate and urgent problems which arose from domestic pressures and served to shape the foreign policy of the nation-state. First was getting the economy moving, reflected in a foreign policy of search for development assistance from friendly states and international lending

agencies. The second problem was the perceived threat of a Gairy-led invasion of the island. This fear was reflected in a foreign policy that sought security assistance and recognition of the revolution especially from neighboring, and traditionally friendly states. This fear, nevertheless, encouraged Grenada to seek new allies to secure the revolution. This is not to state that the party, the NJM, had not previously outlined the broad principles of its foreign policy, since the thrust of the movement was predominantly anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist.

The broad foreign policy principles of Grenada, since February 1979, could be summarized as follows: respect for the principle of ideological pluralism; Latin America and the Caribbean should be recognized as a zone of peace; self-determination for all peoples; respect for sovereign equality and territorial integrity regardless of size; end to support for anti-democratic and anti-progressive regimes.¹⁷

To confront the two major problems, Prime Minister Bishop approached a number of countries including Cuba, Canada, Britain and the United States for assistance. Indeed, as Bishop later pointed out, on the second day of the revolution, Grenada had discussed with the United States' Ambassador to the region, Frank Ortiz, the urgent need for assistance in rebuilding its economy. The U.S., at that point, having no significant bilateral aid programs in the Caribbean, recommended Grenada look to the U.S. supported Caribbean Development Bank.

In addition, the U.S. Ambassador offered the now famous \$5,000 which was "the then-allowed level of funding per project which an Ambassador could make from (the) Special Development Assistance Fund."¹⁸

Among those countries from which assistance was requested, only Cuba responded promptly, which stirred the immediate wrath of the United States. Within one month of the revolution, the U.S. Ambassador on a visit to Grenada, conveyed the position of his government stating:¹⁹

"Although my government recognizes your concerns over the allegations of a possible counter-coup, it also believes that it would not be in Grenada's best interests to seek assistance from a country as Cuba to forestall such an attack. We would view with displeasure any tendency on the part of Grenada to develop closer ties with Cuba."

Bishop and the PRG were incensed by the insensitivity of the United States and in a public speech three days later reiterated the broad objectives of Grenadian foreign policy declaring²⁰ "we do not...recognize any right of the United States...to instruct us on whom we may develop relations with and who we may not..." And he continued:²¹

"Grenada is a sovereign and independent country... We are not in anybody's back-yard, and we are definitely not for sale."

And then in an act of seeming defiance of the United States, Grenada established formal diplomatic relations with Cuba the next day. In retrospect, Frank Ortiz, acting on behalf of the U.S. government, clearly blundered by perpetuating the big stick foreign policy of the United States on a new radical

government determined to exercise its sovereignty.

From that point onwards, the steady deterioration of Grenada's relations with the United States was matched by increasingly closer linkages to Cuba. This deterioration, which had actually begun during the Carter Administration, was greatly intensified during the Reagan period. Sally Shelton, Ortiz's successor, during the Carter years stated:²²

"I do believe that...the Carter and Reagan policies of distancing ourselves from Grenada, of refusing to exchange ambassadors, of declining to engage in serious discussions...were not conducive to improving relations and providing an alternative to Cuba."

She did, however, emphasize²³

"I am extremely skeptical...that a more sustained experiment with a positive U.S. policy would have succeeded. But we should have tried..."

Cuba's support for revolutionary Grenada, developed rapidly after the establishment of formal diplomatic relations. Much of that country's aid was in the form of technical assistance to facilitate Grenada's development process, scholarships for university education in Cuba, personnel to support the government's health programs and in sports and culture. During the period, too, ten fishing trawlers were provided to assist the building of Grenada's fishing industry. Eventually, however, that particular program was relatively unsuccessful, for it was later reported²⁴

"of the ten boats that were donated to us by Cuba only two that are working--eight are not functioning. ...It was also reported that the National Fishing Company lost about sixty percent of its revenue."

Within a year trade between the countries increased dramatically as Grenada began purchasing some of its basic necessities: food and housing material from Cuba. It was, however, Cuba's support for the building of the international airport in Grenada that was most dramatic, and to which the U.S. reacted most forcefully.

The Airport Issue

At the outset it is very important to understand that it was not the PRG who initiated the idea of a new airport. At one time or another, since 1955, the subject of a new airport was a major item for governmental discussion and study. The rationale was obvious. The existing airport at Pearls is 5,500 feet long, sufficient only for the needs of turbo-prop planes of less than 50 passengers. Its location between the mountain and the sea permits no room for expansion. It functions only during the daylight since there are no night landing facilities. Thus visitors to Grenada in the evening must stay overnight in Barbados. Previous governments have all recognized the importance of tourism to the economy demands an airport of at least 9,000 feet to accommodate modern jet aircraft. Further, neighboring St. Lucia had experienced an almost 300 percent increase in tourism after its new 9,000 foot Heranorra airport was constructed in the mid-1970's. And finally, there were at least ten airports in the region already of the size contemplated by Grenada. Ironically, the airport at Barbados, extensively used by the U.S. during the invasion is 11,000 feet. The U.S. never questioned the building of that one, nor, for

instance, those at St. Lucia, Martinique or Guadeloupe. It was not surprising, therefore, that the renewed emphasis upon tourism to the Grenadian economy, would again focus attention upon the need to construct a new airport. And this after a World Bank study had concluded that tourism was the main hope of the country for financial solvency.

Grenada first turned to the U.S., Britain, and Canada for assistance to build the airport. Not only did the U.S. refuse such assistance but sort to persuade other countries to do likewise. Some succumbed under U.S. pressure. In 1981 when Grenada organized a conference at Brussels seeking aid, the U.S. pressured its European allies to stay away. However, with assistance from Cuba, the EEC, acting independently of its individual members, Libya, Algeria, Syria, Iraq, Venezuela and Nigeria airport construction commenced with the anticipated date of completion set for the 1984 anniversary of the revolution.

Overall, Cuba's contribution to the airport construction project was substantial--about 40 percent of total cost. However, most of this contribution was in the form of manpower--about 300 workers, and construction supplies. Cuba developed a quarry and built the first rock-crushing plant and asphalt mixing facility--illustrations of the low level of pre-existing infrastructure, and the need for modernization of Grenada. In addition, excavation work at the airport was being undertaken by Layne Dredging Company of Miami, and the airport's communica-

tion system was being installed by Plessey, a British company.

Whereas Grenadians saw the airport as a major symbol of their independence and a primary contributor to their economic welfare, the U.S., and especially President Reagan, was increasingly obsessed with the notion that the sole purpose of the airport was to facilitate Cuban-Soviet expansion and threaten the security of the United States. The U.S. Administration believed that this airport would serve as a major refuelling point on Cuba's way to Angola and also as a base to harrass U.S. shipping especially regarding the passage of oil to the U.S. Cuba, however, had been involved in Angola since 1975 and therefore, obviously had no refuelling problems. Neither Trinidad nor Venezuela, the states whose shipping could have been most affected felt threatened. Indeed neither supported the U.S. invasion.

Even within the State Department there was skepticism concerning the Administration's hysteria over the airport.²⁵ One official in particular confessed to "not being terribly worried" about the airport construction elaborating that he "never put much stress on the statagic importance of this whole region." Another hypothesized that U.S. opposition to the airport construction had served only to "push Bishop further to the left."

Nevertheless, on March 23, 1983, Mr. Reagan, in his nationally-televised "Star Wars" speech declared²⁶

"On the small island of Grenada...the Cubans with Soviet financing and backing, are in the

process of building an airfield with a 10,000 foot runway. Grenada doesn't even have an airforce...More than half of all American oil imports now pass through the Caribbean...The Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada...can only be seen as power project into the region."

For six days after this speech various U.S. television crews sought the supposed Grenadian military base; the supposed military communication facilities, and finally the so-called military barracks, none of which were found. This did not prevent the Reagan Administration from resurrecting the same fraudulent charges as partial rationale for the invasion eight months later.

It was not so much the construction of the Grenada airport that peaked the hostility of the U.S., as it was the rapid shift of Grenada's foreign policy toward close relations with Cuba, and with revolutionary movements within and outside the region. Located within the American sphere of influence while Cuba, and to some degree Nicaragua, were able to pursue foreign policies which contradicted "sphere of influence" theory and policy, the U.S. was determined that no other country would be permitted this luxury.

Soon after the takeover of the government and in keeping with the 1973 manifesto of the NJM, the PRG had announced a foreign policy based on the principle of non-alignment. Grenada rapidly gained membership in that movement, and participated in the Sixth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, Havana, in September 1979. As if to further emphasize its commitment to

the group, it was elected to the Co-ordinating Bureau. None of this served to enhance Grenada's relationship to the United States.

A further radicalization of Grenada's foreign policy was evident when that country voted with the Soviet Union in the U.N. General Assembly's debate on the USSR's invasion of Afganistan. In retrospect, the consequences of that vote in terms of Washington's perception of the direction in which Grenada was going, must lead one to conclude that Grenada made a tactical error. For Grenada could have abstained, but did not. Consequently as seen through Washington's eyes, if Grenada was merely a close friend of Cuba before that vote, afterwards, it was viewed as firmly fixed in the Soviet camp.

The United States increased its pressure on Grenada, both on the level of rhetoric and more effectively, by pressuring its allies and international lending agencies, against supporting Grenada. In its turn, the Grenadian leadership, and especially Maurice Bishop, engaged in rhetorical exercises, much of which were equally excessive. This was done for two reasons. Possibly the only weapon that a small state, and in this case, a micro-state, can employ against the big, is rhetoric. And in Grenada's case, there was no such lack. More fundamentally, U.S. pressure, and Bishop's responses, served to weld the Grenadian society together, and build popular support for the revolution, in a manner clearly unintended by the U.S.

This is not to state, that the PRG was not increasingly

fearful of U.S. efforts at destabilization, and the repercussions of their inability to gain the support of the U.S.

This was precisely one of the reasons for Bishop's trip to the U.S. in June 1983, when he stated:²⁷

"...bad relations do not make sense. From our point of view, the need to ensure that even more American visitors come to our country every year is a critical and burning need."

Another objective of the trip, he continued²⁸

"was to try yet again to establish some form of official contact, an official dialogue, with the government of the United States."

Ironically for Maurice Bishop, this effort at attempting to mend relations with the U.S. only served to increase factionalism within the NJM domestically. Within the Central Committee of the party, its leader began to be perceived as soft, indeed "petit bourgeois" rather than "Marxist-Leninist." The result of which was the split in the party and ultimately the downfall of the revolution.

The Crisis in the New Jewel Movement

The struggle between Maurice Bishop and Bernard Coard as it manifested itself within the party, and its culmination in the death of the revolution, lends itself to analysis on two levels. The first is concerned with the issue of ideology, or more specifically, the ideological "purity" of the NJM. A study of the Minutes of NJM's Central Committee meetings, especially in the two months prior to the U.S. entry, reveals

the repeated charges of "ideological backwardness," "economism," "right opportunism," and "petit bourgeois" attitudes against Bishop and some NJM members. There was, therefore, the demand, emanating from the Central Committee, that a choice be made between "petit bourgeois" democratic socialism, perceived as the "rightist path," and the Marxist-Leninist approach. This appears, then, to be the classic struggle between the moderates and the extremists. The other level, more difficult to analyze because of its subjectivity, is that political theory, and even the employment of linguistic skills, was merely a cover for a group within the party, orchestrated by Bernard Coard, which was intent upon seizing power for their own opportunistic purposes.

Formerly, the struggle initially became evident, when Bernard Coard resigned from his positions on the Political Bureau and the Central Committee of the NJM in October 1982. His wife, Phyllis, nevertheless retained membership on the latter committee. The Central Committee's minutes claim the reason for his resignation was²⁴

"the slack and weak functioning of the C.C. (Central Committee) the P.B (Political Bureau), the vacillation and lack of collective leadership."

This was the first occasion when the issue of "collective leadership" was raised, but Coard appeared to lay blame on Central Committee members who were generally ill-prepared for meetings, thereby not able to "lead collectively."³⁰ It was

that same meeting which also charged Bishop with "weak chairmanship and leadership." Put together: the charges and the resignation by Coard, and similar charges levelled by the Central Committee against Bishop, could lead to the conclusion that this was the opening attempt by Coard and his group for takeover of the party and the government.

But the roots of the Coard faction go back to the early 1970's when Coard organized the Organization of Revolutionary Education and Liberation (OREL). OREL was a study group not a political party, which Coard used to teach basic principles of Marxism and its application to small-scale economies. Thus when the MAP and Jewel, two separate organizations, fused into the NJM in 1973, Coard's group came in as well, but as Don Rojas, Bishop's press secretary later claimed,³¹ "always maintained a kind of clique, an OREL clique, within the New Jewel Movement during the 1970's and even after the 1979 revolution."

Whereas the Coard faction had placed the struggle on firmly ideological grounds, Coard was however shrewd in also consolidating his political foundations. Simply put, he maneuvered, especially after resigning from positions in the party, to place his supporters in key positions within the apparatus of the government, the army and on the Central Committee. He did this in a very systematic way "so that when he decided to make his move for leadership of the party, he had already consolidated his power base."³² It is significant to note, though, that he never sought to gain any influence with the working class of the society. Indeed, he appears to have discounted their

participation in his drive for power. His underestimation of this group, and its support for Bishop, counted heavily in the final outcome of the struggle.

Even though the campaign against Bishop simmered for a year, it did not openly and very suddenly become the major crisis facing the party and the country until an extraordinary meeting of the Central Committee was called for September 14-16, 1983. And indeed it was not until the last day of that meeting were specific charges levelled at Bishop, followed by the proposal for "joint leadership." The timing is significant, in that the Central Committee had earlier met in a six and one-half day plenary in July 1983 and had conceded³³ that there was the continued failure of the party "to transform itself...along a Leninist path." The Committee also recognized there was "the spreading of anti-communism within the country." However, no criticisms were directed against Bishop and no proposals for joint leadership were offered.

When the Central Committee met again on August 26, 1983, Liam James, a protege of Coard asserted³⁴ "we are seeing the beginning of the disintegration of the party," the blame for which was placed with the Central Committee, according to Selwyn Strachan and Unison Whiteman.³⁵ Again, no criticisms were directed against Bishop's leadership.

The beginning of the end of the revolution came on the third morning of the mid-September meeting of the Central Committee. Having agreed with the earlier conclusions that the party was

in a serious state of disarray because the Central Committee "is on path of right opportunism" having "diverted from the correct path," the meeting went on to an analysis of the Central Committee itself.³⁶ Liam James led off the discussion claiming³⁷

"What is needed is firm Leninism...the fundamental problem is the quality of leadership...by Cde. Maurice Bishop."

While James was willing to concede that Bishop did possess many positive characteristics, he nevertheless concluded that³⁸

"today these strengths alone cannot put the party any further in this period. The qualities he lacks (are)..."

1. A Leninist level of organization and discipline.
2. Great depth in ideological clarity.
3. Brilliance in strategy and tactics.

These qualities...are essential for Marxist-Leninist leadership."

It is clear that the issue of leadership was being placed within the context of ideological "purity." Leon Cornwall continued the criticism in a similar vein, but more eloquently stated:³⁹

"history has placed a great responsibility on our shoulders which we must seek to deal with in the correct and scientific way."

Phyllis Coard was much more blunt in her criticism of Bishop.⁴⁰ She claimed that he was "disorganized" and "avoided responsibilities." She further asserted that "some comrades are scared to criticize him because he is hostile to criticism."

James, who had initiated the discussion, brought the issue to a head by formally proposing a model of joint leadership with

Bishop essentially responsible for working with the masses and in the international arena, and Coard concentrating upon party development. This proposal initiated further heated discussion with George Louison formly opposed to it on the basis that material conditions in Grenada were the source of difficulties. Whiteman suggested that Coard be delegated specific functions as deputy leader.⁴¹ But as Strachan emphasized⁴² the proposal was made for

"the transformation of the party which will also help to transform the Cde. leader into a Marxist-Leninist and to Leninise the Central Committee."

Phyllis Coard not only agreed with Strachan but further emphasized that dual leadership should be "not only for a short term but on a long term basis."⁴³ Even though Bernard Coard was not present at these meetings his interests were obviously well represented. When the vote was taken on the formalization of joint leadership nine were in favor, one (Louison) opposed, and three abstained. Significantly, on another vote to inform the masses of the decision nine were opposed with three abstentions. Bishop requested time to personally consider the joint leadership resolution but suggested to the Committee that they begin meeting with Coard on that issue.

While the Central Committee continued to meet daily between September 17 and 24, Bishop attended none of these meetings. He was persuaded by a Central Committee delegation on September 25th, 1983 to attend. One of the primary reasons was the fact

that after the meeting of September 16, power had clearly shifted to the Coard faction. Coard himself began attending Central Committee meetings on September 17, at which time he expressed the view that Bishop was "vacillating between the Marxist-Leninist trend and the petit bourgeois trend."⁴⁴ Playing upon the sympathies of the Central Committee he expressed an inability to criticise Bishop if he was forced to maintain the position of deputy leader. The implication was clear--he would only act authoritatively if given a position of authority, that is, joint leadership with Bishop. From September 19 sessions of the Central Committee were chaired by Coard.

The final confrontation between Bishop and the Coard faction over the leadership issue occurred on Sunday 25th September. In this meeting the question of the ideological direction of the party as compared to Bishop's supposed direction, became the focus of discussion, and the grounds for the determination of Bishop's future role in the party. Again, therefore, the Coard faction, at least, superficially, was able to shift the discussion to theoretical grounds. And as if to underscore that emphasis, Liam James stated⁴⁵ "our whole approach to this question must be totally cold-blooded, honest and objective."

At this meeting in particular, members outdid themselves with Marxist rhetorical excesses. All the "proper" words and phrases were employed. Indeed linguistic skill appeared almost to be an end in itself. As though to increase the drama of the moment, and possibly to impress their colleagues as well,

many came to the meeting armed with their little "red books." Thus did they each attempt to support individual arguments with quotations from Marx and Lenin. All of this would have been so funny--adults playing at a game of revolution--if the stakes were not so high - the future of a society, and the implications so tragic - the death of the leader and some of his followers.

Bishop was roundly criticized at this meeting largely for his supposed "petit bourgeois" attitudes, especially with reference to his reluctance to endorse the principle of joint leadership.⁴⁶ In response, he expressed serious doubts concerning the general opinion that the party had to be transformed into a Marxist-Leninist party.⁴⁷ But ultimately he appeared to accept, hesitantly, the proposal for joint leadership.

Whereas Coard and his OREL faction had continuously placed the leadership struggle in the context of ideological "purity," both the facts of the struggle, and close observers to the dispute, tend to have agreed that the struggle in the party was much more pragmatic - a desire to seize power by a particular group for its own opportunistic purposes. In that context, then, Coard's resignation from the Central Committee simply allowed him time and autonomy to maneuver for leadership. Even so, his wife and other trusted associates, remained on that committee.

Coard's attitude to the working class not only reveals his political motives but also his contempt for that group. This is hardly a reflection of ideological purity. Both he and

his faction consistently argued that the masses should not be involved and should not be informed of the joint leadership proposal. As James himself declared, "joint leadership is an internal party matter and is not to be brought to the masses."⁴⁸ As previously stated the Committee had voted down the proposal to inform the masses on the joint leadership issue. Indeed after large demonstrations commenced in St. Georges, after the house arrest of Bishop Coard's attitude was⁴⁹

"they (the people) could stay in the street for weeks, after a while they are bound to get tired and hungry and want peace...Williams did it in 1970 and survived, Gairy did it in '73 to us."

After the U.S. invasion Louison on reflection expressed the view that by the time of the house arrest "Bernard and company no longer cared about the masses of the people."⁵⁰

The general question to whether the Coard's group was motivated by ideological purity or a crass quest for power was later addressed by Fidel Castro in his funeral oration on November 14. Questioning these motivations he stated,⁵¹

"The fact is that allegedly revolutionary arguments were used, invoking the purest principles of Marxism-Leninism and charging Bishop with practising a cult of personality."

Somewhat rhetorically, he continued,

"were those who conspired against him (Bishop) within the Grenadian party...a group of extremists drunk on political theory, (or) were they simply a group of ambitious, opportunistic individuals?"

Don Rojas, Bishop's press secretary, answers Castro's somewhat rhetorical question:⁵²

"I think Lenin was being used as a cover... It appears that the call for a more Leninist organization was misused to cover up what was in its essence a bid for power."

From late September until October 8th, Bishop, Whiteman, Louison and Rojas were out of Grenada visiting Hungary, Czechoslovakia and lastly Cuba, seeking development assistance. Coard and his group used this period to consolidate their position, including disarming military groups loyal to Bishop. Soon after Bishop returned to Grenada events moved rapidly. He was placed under house arrest on October 12, and placed on "trial" the next day. Within an hour of his release by the Grenadian population on October 19, Bishop, three cabinet members and two labor leaders were executed by forces loyal to Coard. The U.S. invaded on October 25th.

Regional Responses to the Crisis

Whereas the English-speaking Caribbean was undoubtedly traumatized by the overthrow of Gairy in 1979, this being the first occasion where governmental change was initiated by non-peaceful means among these former British colonies, these territories had, more or less, come to terms with the Bishop regime during the intervening period. A number of factors promoted acceptance of the new status quo in Grenada.

Gairy, as Prime Minister, had at best been regarded as a maverick by Caribbean leadership, and at worst, an embarrassment to the region. Very few, therefore, shed tears at his departure, though the method employed, was harshly criticized. Secondly,

while Caribbean economies generally stagnated during the past five years, most were willing to agree that real economic progress was forthcoming in Grenada during the same period. Such economic progress became a major source for the legitimacy of the Bishop government. Thirdly, not only did the region finally accept the principle of "ideological pluralism," among its membership, but Bishop, during the last year of leadership, had gradually moved toward democratization of the political system--the establishment of the Constitutional Commission being the most tangible expression to this desire. And finally, Bishop had begun to achieve much of what Caribbean leadership desired: national mobilization domestically, together with autonomy and independence in international relationships. It is understandable, therefore, why Caribbean leadership reacted in horror to the assassination of Bishop and some of his colleagues.

The horror was intensified both by the brutality of the event, again contrary to the norms of regional behavior, and by the recognition that the group assuming power--"a group of Fascists"⁵³--were willing to employ whatever means necessary, to maintain such power. The employment of armored cars against the population in which over fifty were killed, and the declaration of the repressive curfew, were perceived as forerunners to the new regime's behavior. Moreover, members of the Organization of the Eastern Caribbean States (O.E.C.S.), were immediately alarmed by the precedent-setting nature of the Grenada situation, and the possibility that radical groups

within their own territories would declare support for the Coard group.

Response of the O.E.C.S.

It is difficult to separate the response of the O.E.C.S. from that of Barbados, and later, even Jamaica. While these two latter countries are non-members of that organization, Barbados participates with some O.E.C.S. members in a regional security arrangement, and partly for that reason, assumed leadership in coordinating responses to the rapidly deteriorating Grenada crisis. Further, all of the English-speaking countries have membership in the Caribbean Economic Community which later --some would say, too late--began debating possible responses.

Regardless of the overlapping regional institutions involved, the general sentiment of the O.E.C.S. was that Grenada was "our problem" which members were required to solve.⁵⁴ This attitude was in keeping with the rising "bloc" consciousness of the O.E.C.S. vis-a-vis other English-speaking states, supported by aggressive and articulate leadership provided by Charles of Dominica and Compton of St. Lucia. But this is not to discount the desire of Tom Adams of Barbados to upstage Trinidad for leadership in the Eastern Caribbean, and recognizing in the Grenadian crisis, and his close relationships with O.E.C.S. leadership, the opportunity to do so.

By October 20th, the day after Bishop's death it became apparent to the Revolutionary Military Council, ostensibly the

group assuming power in Grenada, that they were being rapidly isolated by regional members. Hudson Austin, the Council's leader, sought advice and guidance from Dr. Geoffrey Bourne, Vice Chancellor of the Medical School.⁵⁵ Austin also arranged a meeting with Milton Cato, Prime Minister of neighboring St. Vincent. Cato, for his part, was fearful for the potential of a Grenadian refugee situation developing, and conceivable adverse reaction from the Military Council. O.E.C.S. members, nevertheless, pressured Cato against meeting with Austin since they desired a policy of isolation and non-recognition of the Grenadian regime. Thus was the possible first attempt at peaceful settlement nullified.

At the same time while Austin was attempting to arrange a meeting with Cato, St. Lucia's Prime Minister Compton began calling for a meeting of all Caricom members. Tom Adams requested that such a meeting be held in Barbados, but when Prime Minister Chambers, of Trinidad, the then Chairman of the Caricom Heads of Government conference, arranged that meeting for Port of Spain on Saturday October 22, Adams was obviously peeved, since he would no longer be able to dominate activities, and the center of activity would shift from Barbados. Not only did he refuse to attend this meeting, but on Friday 21, scheduled a continuous series of negotiations, culminating in an O.E.C.S meeting held in Barbados, a non-member country, that evening.

It was at the Friday evening meeting of the O.E.C.S. that a formal decision was taken to invoke Article 8, paragraph 4,

concerning the use of a military force to restore peace to Grenada and to invite friendly states to participate.

Both legally and politically, that O.E.C.S decision has raised as much questions as it has provided answers. For instance, Article 8, paragraph 5 requires all decisions of that body be unanimous. Not only was a formal vote not taken at that meeting, but more importantly, all members did not participate. Robert Pastor has noted that only four of the seven O.E.C.S. members supported collective military action.⁵⁶ Grenada, of course, did not participate since the O.E.C.S refused recognition to the Military Council. Within a few days of the invasion though, the O.E.C.S. recognized Grenada's Governor General, Sir Paul Scoon as the official head of government.

Further, Article 8:4 permits collective action against "external aggression." How could a member of an organization participate in external aggression against fellow members? The argument has been made that the presence of Cubans in Grenada, "externalized" Grenada's relationship vis-a-vis other member states.⁵⁷ That argument, of course, accepted as fact, the numbers provided by the United States concerning the Cuban presence in Grenada, which numbers, the U.S. Administration later admitted, was incorrect. And further, one must now speculate, does not the presence of hundreds of American personnel in Grenada, in the post-invasion period further "externalize" the Grenadian situation?

The Invitation to the United States

Formally, the O.E.C.S.'s invitation to the United States to participate in the invasion force was made immediately following the O.E.C.S. meeting on Friday evening October 21st. This, however, was not the initial involvement of the U.S. in the Grenada situation. Indeed, one week earlier, the United States had privately approached Barbados concerning the prospects for rescuing Maurice Bishop from his captors.⁵⁸ Alan Romberg, spokesman for the U.S. State Department later claimed that it was the Caribbean states that had approached the U.S. on October 15th.⁵⁹ Further, the U.S. on October 20, had diverted some of its naval task forces on the way to Lebanon, to the Caribbean region, a day before the O.E.C.S. meeting, which formally invited the participation of the United States. The fact that the U.S. became, in one way or another, involved in the Grenada crisis, before a formal invitation was made, contradicts the assertion of Secretary of State Shultz that the U.S. did not become involved until October 20, the day after Bishop was killed.⁶⁰

It is also clear that before the O.E.C.S decision, Adams had in fact initiated discussions with the U.S. and Britain concerning the prospects for military intervention. He later admitted that discussions took place with various High Commissioners and ambassadors early on Friday October 20,⁶¹

The question arises, therefore: Did the U.S. pressure the O.E.C.S. for an invitation to be involved or did they merely

respond to an O.E.C.S. invitation? The New York Times reported on October 30, that the O.E.C.S. request was drafted in Washington and transmitted to Caribbean leadership.⁶² Another newspaper claimed⁶³

"U.S. plans for intervening in Grenada were drawn up secretly in Washington ten days before the invasion was launched."

And this same source corroborated the previous statements from the New York Times, claiming that the O.E.C.S.'s appeal was actually triggered by an offer from the United States. In effect, Washington's message was:⁶⁴ "Issue an appeal and we will respond."

There is also the mysterious letter of Governor General Scoon to the O.E.C.S. asking the U.S. and Caribbean countries to stabilize the situation in Grenada. The U.S. has claimed that this letter together with the O.E.C.S. invitation had provided sufficient justification for their involvement. This letter was supposedly sent on Saturday October 22. Yet on the following day, U.K. Deputy High Commissioner, David Montgomery, flew to Grenada and held discussions with Sir Paul. Sir Paul also spoke, by telephone, to the Commonwealth Secretariat on the same day. In neither case did he request assistance. It was afterwards claimed that the letter was drafted by the United States, to add legitimacy for its involvement, and signed by Sir Paul, after he was taken aboard the U.S.S. Guam on Tuesday, October 25th.⁶⁵

The U.S. Invasion: Legal and Political Aspects

In the early morning hours of October 25, over 1,900 U.S. Marines and Rangers invaded Grenada. The U.S. force eventually numbered over 6,000 accompanied by an assortment of naval forces, bombers and helicopter gunships. The U.S. force was supposedly part of a seven nation multinational force. After the U.S. forces had achieved its initial objectives some 300 Caribbean troops and policemen were flown to Grenada but did not engage in fighting. After three days of sporadic fighting, the official U.S. figure of those killed in action were U.S., 18; Cuba, 24; Grenada, 16. The Grenadian figures did not include the over 20 killed when a U.S. aircraft accidentally bombed a Grenadian mental asylum. Officially, over 400 were wounded. Grenadian accounts placed Grenadian citizens dead at over 50; hundreds wounded; and millions of dollars of property lost.

During the week of the U.S. invasion Americans only saw and read what the Reagan Administration wanted them to, through complete censorship by the Administration over events in Grenada. The footage shown on the national television was supplied by the U.S. military. All other information was provided by similar sources and the Administration. The effect was predictable. An overwhelming 85 percent of the population, in a scientific poll, supported the invasion.

The U.S. Administration had reason to fear independent source of information. Media coverage of the Vietnam War had Americans into the streets in the 1960s to protest U.S. involve-

ment. It was this protest that influenced Lyndon Johnson against running for the presidency in 1968. The U.S. would face presidential election in one year. The early impact of a "media" president had all but ended. Domestically, inflation has been curbed which facilitated business, but unemployment remained high. Polls had shown about 44 percent of the electorate willing to support President Reagan for four more years. Then came the Beirut massacre. This could have been for President Reagan what the Iran hostage crisis was for President Carter--a major instrument for the latter's defeat. If handled "appropriately," ridding Grenada of a left-leaning regime could enormous political rewards, in addition to meeting other objectives: Mr. Reagan's obsession with Grenada; teach Cuba a lesson: send a warning to Nicaragua; demonstrate to the U.S. public his willingness to confront Communism. To have maximum impact, however, control over information was vital. And this was not difficult to achieve. By simply preventing independent sources of information from getting to Grenada the Administration could monopolize control over all information. A few Navy vessels and take-over of the airports efficiently achieved this. Further it was important that the "facts" coming out of Grenada were in accordance with the rationale provided by the U.S. for its entry.

The Legality of U.S. Action

President Reagan's first official defense of the invasion in his public statement on October 25, was: to protect innocent

U.S. lives in Grenada; to forestall further chaos; to assist in the restoration of law and order. Later that day Secretary of State Shultz added the fear of hostage taking and the invitation of the O.E.C.S. since "the Caribbean is in our neighborhood." In a national T.V. address two days later President Reagan further claimed that U.S. national security was at stake since Moscow and Cuba had converted Grenada into a colony and were assisting in promoting violence there. He added very colorfully, and purely for domestic consumption "the nightmare of our hostages in Iran" and his resolve to prevent a repetition of that situation. The question remained: Were American arguments for invasion legally defensible?

International law recognizes the right of a state to protect its citizens in another if their lives are threatened and if the host government fails to protect them. Yet the extent of force employed must be only so much as to rescue these citizens. President Reagan claimed that the students' lives were threatened; that they had no way of getting out of Grenada since the airport was closed; and that the students were calling for help. Much of the facts later known were that the students' lives became threatened only after the invasion had begun--simply by having bullets flying around them. In fact, one-half of the student body remained in Grenada, even though U.S. crafts were willing to escort them out. Further, as the Administration itself later admitted, the airport was actually open all of the time, thus students could have left if they had so desired. It is also very

obvious, that the extent of force employed by the U.S. was clearly beyond that necessary to protect its citizens.

A broad legal question concerns the overall use of force by the U.S. With few and very limited exceptions, force is formally outlawed as an instrument in the conduct of international relations. Numerous articles in both the U.N. Charter and in the O.A.S. Agreement, two of the pertinent documents, not only repudiate the use of force but detail in clear language the respect for territorial integrity of a state. The U.N. permits individual or collective self defense if an "armed attack" occurs. The O.E.C.S. has, however, argued, as previously discussed, that the presence of Cubans in Grenada "externalized" Grenada's relationship with other O.E.C.S. members, and presumably, as well, provided grounds for claims of "prospective armed attack" against member states. As a consequence, the O.E.C.S. might be moved to argue on "pre-emptive self-defense" grounds.

Jeane Kirkpatrick, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., disagrees with the view that present norms of international conduct absolutely outlaws the use of force in the conduct of international relations. Speaking to the U.N.'s Security Council on the debate over the U.S. invasion of Grenada she argued:⁶⁶

"The prohibitions against the use of force in the U.N. Charter are contextual, not absolute. They provide ample justification for the use of force against force in the pursuit of other values also inscribed in the Charter."

This interpretation of the law is in keeping with the present Administration's policy of viewing its conception of the national interest, as providing its own law and morality.

One of the major bases for the U.S. invasion, is the Administration's claim of an invitation provided by the O.E.C.S. It has already been demonstrated that the O.E.C.S. violated its own established principle of unanimity provided for by Article 8:5 of its Treaty. Further serious questions are raised over the fact that the Treaty requires "external aggression" on behalf of a state to warrant a military response by the O.E.C.S. But moreover, since the O.E.C.S. Treaty was never deposited at the U.N., was it in fact a binding document? And again, since the U.S. was not a party to the Treaty, could member states request a non-member to act on their behalf? While the O.E.C.S. Treaty does not appear to answer this last question in the affirmative, Article 51 of the U.N. Charter does permit individual and collective self-defense. But such is permitted only in the face of "armed attack." There is no way that the activities occurring in Grenada could have constituted "armed attack" against O.E.C.S. members, or against the United States.

Finally, when President Reagan presented his first explanation claiming that the intervention was to "forestall further chaos" and to "restore law and order" he implied that the invasion was based on the principle of "humanitarian intervention." Such intervention is legitimate in the eyes of international law. But for such to be invoked a total breakdown is required within the society accompanied by a total suppression of human rights; mass murder of civilians; repeated calls by the international community to desist; and a moral consensus

that supports such intervention. This problem relates obviously to the degree of violence within a society. It is unlikely that the facts of the Grenada situation would therefore justify invasion on the grounds of humanitarian intervention.

From all of the foregoing it is clear that there is very little, if any, legal justification for the U.S. invasion of Grenada. The political dimensions of the operation are somewhat more clear.

Political Aspects of the U.S. Invasion

The militarily successful U.S. invasion of Grenada appears to herald a new era in U.S. foreign policy. And even if the legal arguments by the Administration in support of the invasion are unconvincing, it is the political symbolism of that event that has significant and frightening implications for a peaceful world. One of the more painful lessons of this invasion must be that, in a swift and decisive stroke, albeit against an island of one hundred thousand people, the U.S. has overcome the political and psychological obstacles of the Vietnam experience.

In the aftermath of the disastrous showing of the U.S. in Vietnam this country undoubtedly moved toward a posture of isolationism in world affairs. Thus, the U.S. played no official part in the Angola crisis and tacitly supported the overthrow of Somoza in Nicaragua. In between, the Shah's reign came to a swift and sudden end with the U.S. as a mere by-stander. But then came Grenada.

The rationale for the invasion of Grenada cannot be found in the brutal death of Prime Minister Bishop and some of his Cabinet. Neither was the foundation possibly in the mock invasion on the island of Vieques in August 1981. One apparent basis for the invasion may be in the ideas of U.S. foreign policy expressed by the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Jeane Kirkpatrick, in an article in Commentary⁶⁷ which catapulted her as a major architect of the Reagan Administration's foreign policy. In that article she argued for defense of the national interest at all cost; support for right wing pro-American dictatorships while squashing those of the left; and presented a view of the world as one of East/West confrontation, and implicitly, one in which the Third World becomes a mere object of U.S. foreign policy.

Indeed, the present Administration has largely adopted the approach to international relations which views the world as one large game of dominoes. And thus from the post-Vietnam mood of neo-isolationism the major lesson of Grenada is that the U.S. must now be seen as a global unilateralist. And after a decade-long policy of withdrawal the invasion of Grenada clearly demonstrates the willingness of the U.S. to go-it-alone, regardless of world opinion, and as significantly, of international law as well.

One is obviously led to pose the question: How different then, is U.S. foreign policy from that of the Soviet Union, and could one really expect different standards of international

behavior from the United States, especially when the latter perceives its vital interests to be threatened. The Brezhnev Doctrine enunciated the position that the U.S.S.R. had the right to determine the political orientation of governments within that country's sphere of influence. In that context, then, the U.S. invasion of Grenada is nothing more than a Reagan version of the Brezhnev Doctrine, otherwise termed the Monroe Doctrine. Ironically, however, this action was undertaken in the name of "defense of democracy" and the promotion of "freedom"--reminiscent of the Soviet Union's rationale for the invasion of Afghanistan.

But did the micro-state Grenada truly threaten the vital interests of the United States, and was Grenada a security threat to the U.S.? While the world still awaits the proof concerning the latter - the vintage arms caches and documentation of secret agreements being mere excuses of proof, in a certain sense Grenada did threaten the vital interests of the U.S. Indeed, Mr. Reagan is correct when he said "we got there just in time," but not for the reasons he presented.

Other than the self-proclaimed declaration of "world policeman," the vital interests of the U.S. lie in the promotion of capitalism. Indeed, one may argue, the former is pursued to protect the latter. To that extent, therefore, U.S. foreign policy, especially in the Caribbean region has been primarily directed toward the promotion and protection of its economic interests there. Grenada, under the New Jewel Movement, possibly threatened that interest by commencing the establishment

of an alternative economic system to capitalism, which was beginning to show results. Conversely, the U.S. showplaces for capitalism in the region: Puerto Rico since 1945, and Jamaica since 1980 are both failures. After forty years of Bootstrap, chaos in Puerto Rico is forestalled only by the largesse of the U.S. tax payer and unrestricted migration to the mainland. The Jamaican masses would probably agree that after four years under Mr. Seaga's leadership nothing has "trickled down" to them. At best their living conditions have stagnated during this period. The relative success of the Grenada model: a mixed system of private and public enterprise, could have provided a viable economic alternative for the Caribbean mini-states. But to the extent that such a system is essentially anti-capitalistic the U.S. could not permit it to be successful. The Caribbean has served historically as a major and stable region for U.S. investments. The U.S. needed to protect such interests at any cost.

If Grenada's economics were bold, its politics were even bolder. Located within the U.S. sphere of influence, it attempted to pursue an anti-U.S. foreign policy--a position only achieved by Cuba in this hemisphere. Moreover, the relationship between Bishop and Castro was very close. Recognizing that there were small but vocal leftist groups throughout the region, the U.S. State Department was fearful of others following the pattern that Bishop was attempting to establish. One such official said:⁶⁸ "Think of the precedent it would set." And he

continued:

"We obviously do not like being put in the position of the heavy. We want to act like a mature, responsible world power. But here's a little country saying insolent things, and we're forced to reply."

There is however, one final irony of the U.S. invasion of Grenada. The Bishop takeover of an elected government in the Commonwealth Caribbean, the first such incident among those countries, tended not only to alienate the latter from Grenada, but more than anything else served to reinforce the respect for peaceful change. And indeed rather than being a source for "infection" of the region, it was viewed more as an "innoculation" against Marxist policies. The death of Bishop only served to further alienate the region against Grenada, and indeed against Marxism in general. The U.S. invasion of Grenada, though, has served to increase sympathy for that country and among the larger countries in the region Barbados and Jamaica stand alone in support for U.S. action. On the one hand the U.S. demonstrated its willingness to flagrantly violate international agreements including the U.N. Charter and the O.A.S. Agreements, and to bend the O.E.C.S. Agreement, to suit its own purposes. On the other, the excesses associated with the invasion, including the crude treatment of Grenadian prisoners--keeping them in boxes for days, the parading in chains of Coard and Austin in the streets of St. Georges, and the massive and crude techniques of psychological warfare have altogether not enhanced the U.S. status in the region. Thus for yet another occasion, the results of U.S.

foreign policy have been the precise opposite of its stated intentions.

Footnotes

1. H. Gill, The Grenada Revolution. Mimeo. July, 1983. p. 3.
2. EPICA Task Force, Grenada: The Peaceful Revolution. Washington, 1982, p. 45.
3. D. Webster, The Role of "Leader Personality" in The Foreign Policy of Grenada. M.A. Thesis, University of the West Indies, Trinidad. October, 1983, pl. 19.
4. Ibid., p. 18
5. Radio broadcast was quoted in EPICA op. cit.
6. For details of the budget making process (1982) see To Construct from Morning: Making the People's Budget of Grenada. St. George's, Fedon Publishers, 1982.
7. As recorded in H. Gill op. cit., p. 12.
8. Current Economic Position and Prospects of Grenada. Documents of the World Bank. April, 1979.
8. Speeches of Maurice Bishop. Pathfinders Press. New York, 1983, p. 294.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., p. 295
12. Since many of these were Cuban doctors or para-medics who have returned to Cuba after the U.S. invasion, the ratio of doctors to the population has probably returned to the pre-revolution situation.
13. Bishop himself elaborated on this in his speech at Hunter College, and conceded the difficulties in trying to build the new Grenadian man. Op. cit., p. 297.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 302
16. For a detailed discussion see D. Webster, op. cit.
17. Summarized from H. Gill, op. cit., p. 19.
18. Testimony of Sally H. Shelton before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, Mimeo. November 3, 1983. p. 4.

19. As quoted in S. Dabreo, The Grenada Revolution. Castries: M.A.P.S. Publications. 1979, p. 304.
20. Ibid., p. 305.
21. Ibid., p. 309.
22. Sally Shelton, op. cit., p. 5-6.
23. Ibid.
24. Minutes of The Political Bureau Meeting on Wednesday, 15th September, 1982. (photocopy), p. 1.
25. As reported by Michael Massing, "Grenada Before and After." The Atlantic Monthly. Colorado, February, 1984. p. 83.
26. Excerpt from Mr. Reagan's speech was reported in "Grenadian Menace." The Nation, April 16, 1983, p. 466.
27. M. Bishop at Hunter College, op. cit. p. 289.
28. Ibid.
29. Minutes of the Meeting of the Central Committee of the NJM held on 26th August 1983. (photocopy). These minutes summarized the 26 October 1982 Plenary which criticized Bishop and announced Coard's resignation, p. 5-6.
30. Ibid., p. 6.
31. As quoted in Bishop's Speeches. Op. cit., p. xxxi.
32. Ibid.
33. Central Committee Report on First Plenary Session, 13-19 July, 1983. (Photocopy). p. 1.
34. Minutes of Emergency Meeting of NJM Central Committee, 6th August 1983. (Photocopy), p. 3.
35. Ibid., p. 4-5.
36. Extraordinary Meeting of the Central Committee NJM., 14-16 September, 1983. (Photocopy), p. 4-5.
37. Ibid., p. 14.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., p. 15.
40. Ibid., p. 17.

41. Ibid., p. 25.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., p. 26.
44. Ibid., p. 44.
45. "The Alienation of Leninist Group Therapy: Minutes of the Extraordinary General Meeting of Full Members of the NJM." Sunday, September 25th 1983. Caribbean Review, Volume XII, No. 4. Fall, 1983, p. 50.
46. Ibid., p. 53-54.
47. Ibid., p. 51.
48. Ibid.
49. "Interviewing George Louison," B. Diederich, Ibid., p. 18.
50. Ibid.
51. Funeral Address given by Commander in Chief, Fidel Castro in Tribute to the Heroes killed. Plaza de la Revolucion, November 14, 1983. Mimeo. p. 1.
52. As quoted in Maurice Bishop Speaks. Op. cit., p. xxxiii.
53. Interviews at the headquarters of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (O.E.C.S.). St. Lucia, December 13-15, 1983. Membership to the O.E.C.S. includes Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts/Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
54. Ibid.
55. Testimony by Dr. Geoffrey Bourne, Vice-Chancellor of St. George's University School of Medicine, Grenada, to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives. November 2, 1983.
56. Testimony of Robert Pastor before Ibid., p. 3.
57. Interviews at the O.E.C.S. Op. Cit.
58. Address by Prime Minister Adams on "The Military Intervention in Grenada." Trinidad Guardian. October 29, 1983, p. 5.
59. H. Jackson in The (U.K.) Guardian October 28, 1983, p. 6.

60. Transcript of Secretary Shultz's news conference on October 25. New York Times, October 26, 1983. p. 6.
61. Trinidad Guardian, op. cit.
62. As quoted in Robert Pastor, op. cit., p. 8.
63. The Observer. October 30, 1983. p. 10.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Mrs. Kirkpatrick's speech was reproduced in the Miami Herald. Section E. October 30, 1983, p. 1.
67. J. Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," Commentary. November, 1979.
68. As quoted in M. Massing, op. cit., p. 86-87.