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Linda Mederake

Opportunities for the
Local Government of Bremerhaven Provided by the
Project
"Klimastadt Bremerhaven"
in Times of Limited Municipal
Room for Manoeuvre

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List of abbreviations

AWI	Alfred Wegener Institute, Helmholtz Centre for Polar and Marine Research
BIS	Bremerhavener Gesellschaft für Investitionsförderung und Stadtentwicklung mbH (Bremerhaven Association for Investment and Urban Development)
BMU	Bundesministerium für Umwelt (Federal Ministry for the Environment)
CDU	Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union)
DFG	Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation)
eea	European Energy Award®
EnEV	Energieeinsparverordnung (Energy Saving Ordinance)
ERDF	European Regional Development Fund
ESF	European Social Fund
ifib	Institut für Informationsmanagement Bremen GmbH (Institute for Information Management Bremen Ltd)
IKSK	Integriertes Klimaschutzkonzept (Integrated Climate Protection Concept)
KEP 2020	Klimaschutz- und Energieprogramm 2020 (Climate Protection and Energy Policy Programme 2020)
KfW	KfW Förderbank (KfW promotional bank)
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NPM	New Public Management
OMC	Open Method of Coordination
PPP	Public-private Partnership
R&D	Research & Development
SEM	Single European Market
SGB	Sozialgesetzbuch (Social Security Code)
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

1. Introduction

"A City Reinvents Itself" (Schnorrenberger 2014).

"A City on the Rise" (Becker et al. 2013).

These are only two phrases that characterise the current structural developments in Bremerhaven. After a long period of time, during which the city mainly attracted attention with negative headlines on job cuts, unemployment rates, child poverty, and other social problems, the city is currently on the verge of changing its image (Arbeitnehmerkammer Bremen 2014; bremen.online GmbH 2013; Nordwestradio 2013).

One element driving this structural change is the project called "Klimastadt Bremerhaven" ('Climate City Bremerhaven') that was officially launched in 2010. One reason why this decision was taken is the understanding that Bremerhaven will be affected by climate change in the future. As a city located on the North Sea coast, rising sea levels, stronger storms, and heavy rains involve high financial costs for the protection of coastal and port facilities. This reinforces Bremerhaven's strong commitment to consider all opportunities that could limit climate change and to successfully adapt to its unavoidable impacts. However, climate protection will not only need infrastructure, but also societal changes. The Klimastadt project therefore also aims to stimulate public awareness of climate change and its impacts. Furthermore, it promotes Bremerhaven as a climate-friendly city and a centre of excellence for climate-related research across Europe, thus creating a positive image for the city and its citizens (PLACES 2014).

It is necessary to clarify exactly what is meant by the term "Klimastadt": According to the definition provided by the project coordinator, the term describes a city that actively promotes the protection of climate and resources. Therefore, it takes visible and authentic climate protection measures. This involves self-regulation; however it also includes binding climate protection goals and a regular, transparent publication of the interim results. Moreover, the Klimastadt should be a member of regional as well as national networks that promote the protection of climate and resources. Ultimately, a Klimastadt also depends on its citizens: They have to show an outstanding ecological awareness to actually call a city "Klimastadt" (Schulz-Baldes 2012b: 1).

The mission statement of the Klimastadt Bremerhaven project is supposed to serve as a model for all municipal action, but also behaviour and conduct of companies and citizens. It states "We, the citizens of Bremerhaven, act in a climate responsible manner, so that we and future generations can live in a city that is climate-friendly, worth living in, and that is prepared for the world of tomorrow. In Bremerhaven, climate expertise is visibly lived and experienced. Therefore, acceptance for joint action has to be created through mutual learning, competences have to be developed and expanded and responsibility has to be taken" (Schulz-Baldes 2012b: 2, translation by the author). The implementation of this vision includes an industry that is committed to the principle of sustainability, schools and higher education institutions offering specific projects or programmes, thematically related touristic attractions and exemplary urban planning and development in sectors such as facility management and public transport (AWI 2009: 3f.).

Naturally, a project such as the Klimastadt Bremerhaven was not created in a vacuum. On the contrary, environmental and climate issues are very prominent on the international agenda. An important milestone was the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, the largest international conference held to date. The Agenda 21 was

published at this conference and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was signed. Yet, climate change has proven to be more difficult to handle than anything that international level politics has encountered before: It threatens the living conditions of modern societies and questions our current energy use, transportation habits, and agricultural practices (Baylis et al. 2011: 347, 350, 356f.).

In terms of climate policies, in 2007 the Environmental Council adopted binding legislation which includes the well-known 20-20-20 targets[1] (European Commission 2014). Overall, environmental policy has grown from its initially marginal status to become one of the most active policy areas today. To respond to criticism concerning the effectiveness of policy measures, the EU has given increased attention especially to the implementation process, addressing, among other issues, the policy coordination across levels of governance (Lenschow 2010: 307ff.).

Besides national efforts, much responsibility for environmental policies has actually been devolved downwards through the Local Agenda 21 process (Schreurs 2008: 347) and the number of German municipalities engaged in the process increased rapidly in the 1990s (Bogumil/Holtkamp 2004: 157). But today, most local working groups in Germany have stopped meeting on a regular basis or have been dissolved (Bulkeley/Kern 2006: 2253). Therefore, it is even more important to emphasise that action to achieve international, supranational or national climate targets needs to be taken, not only at the global, but also at the regional and local level.

Municipalities produce a large share of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions because of spatial concentration and diverse forms of utilisation (e.g. housing, business and industry, transportation, and leisure activities). At the same time, they have the potential and the competence to tackle climate change challenges (Difu 2011: 9). Local actors in Bremerhaven recognise this potential, while highlighting that municipalities are predestined to become a driving force for climate policies (AWI 2009: 3; ARSU/RaUm 2013: 9f.).

Several analytical approaches deal with the challenges and opportunities of municipals' room for manoeuvre, relating to environmental and climate policies. These analytical approaches include, for instance, the concept of ecological modernisation, which was developed independently by the German social scientists Jänicke and Huber in the 1980s (Huber 1982; 1985; Jänicke 1983; 1984). They suggest that technological progress can help to solve environmental problems whilst at the same time increasing industrial competitiveness. This idea of a win-win situation for both the environment and the economy quickly influenced the political discourse in Germany. For example, a newly elected Red-Green federal government formulated a programme of 'ecological modernisation' in its coalition agreement in 1998 (e.g. Jänicke 2000, Mol/Jänicke 2010: 17ff.).

However, the theoretical background for this thesis is provided using a local government perspective and a multi-level governance approach. At least partially, those two approaches lead to opposing assumptions concerning the political room for manoeuvre of municipalities. Political scientists working on local government issues assume that the following three structural developments led to a decrease of the spheres of activity of local government since the 1990s (Libbe et al. 2002; Wollmann 2002): EU-liberalisation, New Public Management (NPM), and the budgetary crisis led to a loss of political steering capacity at the local level (see also Bogumil/Jann 2009: 252, Holtkamp 2007: 367; 2012: 147f.).

With regard to the broad literature on multi-level governance, a more differentiated picture emerges: Within the different approaches, European integration research describes the EU as

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1   These targets include a 20 % reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels, raising the share of EU energy consumption produced from renewable resources to 20 % and a 20 % improvement in the EU's energy efficiency.

an interweaving system: competences are dispersed across different, but interconnected levels of policy-making. Therefore, all actors can and need to operate at several governance levels at the same time (Hooghe/Marks 2001: 3f.; Knodt/Große Hüttmann 2013: 189ff.). These authors demonstrate that multi-level governance provides new opportunities for municipalities to exert influence, exchange knowledge and/or to receive funding. On the other hand, the obligation to communicate with a huge number of actors at several governance levels can overwhelm municipalities, especially smaller ones that do not posses the necessary financial and personal resources (cf. Fleurke/Willemse 2007; Münch 2006; Rechlin 2004; Schultze 2003).

Against this background, the following question arises: how does a structurally disadvantaged city such as Bremerhaven respond to the challenges and opportunities outlined above? To narrow down the scope of this work and to make manageable the empirical research within the time constraints, it focuses only on steering possibilities for the local government in climate change policies. That is why the main research question of this thesis is: To what extent does the project Klimastadt Bremerhaven enable the local authority to expand its scope of action and/or to develop new spheres of activity?

The thesis tests the hypothesis that the project Klimastadt Bremerhaven is a political instrument or, more precisely, a coordination mechanism used by the municipality (local authority) to increase its spheres of activity and its scope of action. The project is supposed to ensure that actions and measures taken by various actors are consistent and coherent as well as in line with political objectives.

To answer the research question and to test the hypothesis, this thesis explores the Klimastadt Bremerhaven project by analysing the political processes and key decisions, core actors and their positions, as well as the central administrative (or institutional) structures. It analyses how traditional institutional structures are changing in the area of local climate policy. The thesis focuses on Klimastadt project examples in the area of buildings, construction, and remediation, because those are of outstanding importance for climate protection measures: Around 40 percent of the energy consumed in Germany per year is currently spent on the supply of residential buildings (Klimastadt Bremerhaven 2013: 13). Moreover, private households as well as craft, trade, and services are predicted to have the potential for the highest reductions of CO2 emissions in Bremerhaven (up to 57 % by 2020 compared to 1990; BET/BEI/Wuppertal Institut 2010: 46f.)[2]. Accordingly, by 2010, the largest share of CO2 reductions (- 35.5 %) in the city state had been achieved by improvements in the heating supply of buildings (Der Senator für Umwelt, Bau und Verkehr 2013: 19). In addition, the area of construction and remediation requires commitment of state actors, business actors, and private homeowners and is therefore a suitable example in terms of municipal steering possibilities.

The Klimastadt initiative does not stop at the city's boundaries, but tries to establish a network via activities and programmes within the region (PLACES 2014). Yet, due to reasons of space, this thesis can neither include Bremerhaven's involvement in networks or alliances at the regional level nor at the national and international level.

The thesis is divided into the following four chapters. First, the methodical approach is presented. Secondly, the theoretical part of the dissertation explains the challenges German local self-government is facing, but also the opportunities that are provided by the EU multi-level system. Another focus is put on the socio-economic situation of Bremerhaven. Thirdly, the thesis analyses the role of three regional and local framework programmes for the

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[2]   Unfortunately, a further specification of the categories is not provided by this study on different energy and climate protection scenarios for Bremen or the KEP 2020 monitoring.

Klimastadt project, before the project and its development are presented and analysed in detail. This part includes the whole process from initiation to implementation as well as key actors of the Klimastadt project. Fourthly, the thesis will go on to the analysis of project examples in the area of buildings, construction, and remediation. Finally, the conclusion summarises the findings, answers the research question, and indicates whether the hypothesis proves to be true or not.

2. Methodology

The research methods for the empirical section of this thesis include an analysis of political and administrative documents of the Bremen Senate, the municipal council of Bremerhaven (Magistrat), the Bremen parliament (Bremische Bürgerschaft), the local parliament of Bremerhaven (Stadtverordnetenversammlung) including two of its committees, and the parliamentary factions of the Greens and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Moreover, the websites of the Klimastadt and several of its sub-projects form part of the analysis.

Secondly, semi-structured interviews with actors of the Klimastadt Bremerhaven project were conducted. This type of empirical social research can generally be used (a) in an exploratory manner, (b) to deepen one's own knowledge or (c) to generate theory. This thesis used the second type (systematising expert interview) which enables the interviewer to acquire practical knowledge from the expert's personal experience and to gain insight into the actor's perspective[3]. This permits the interviewer in a second step to reconstruct a process or social situation (Bogner/Menz 2009: 64ff., 71ff.; Gläser/Laudel 2010: 13).

Four semi-structured, face-to-face interviews have been conducted for this thesis. The interviewees were Mr Scherzinger (Umweltschutzamt; Office for Environmental Protection in Bremerhaven), Mr Becker (energiekonsens, the local climate protection agency), Mr Schneeberg and Mr Wöhlken (Seestadt Immobilien, municipally owned enterprise to manage public buildings), as well as Mr Lückehe (STÄWOG, housing association of Bremerhaven). The use of an interview guideline allowed a rather flexible conduction of the interviews (Gläser/Laudel 2010: 42). The interviews took place between 14 February and 4 March 2014 in Bremerhaven.[4]

The thesis uses the policy analysis approach. In this case, the major focus will be on three categories of analysis: (1) the institutional and administrative setting as well as the regulatory framework in which the Klimastadt project takes place; (2) the political process and key decisions; and (3) the actors involved in formulating and implementing the Klimastadt initiative, the relationship between actors in government, business, and civil society, and the special role of the local government in these local governance arrangements. Thus, it is possible to explore the questions of how actors are coordinated (process management and steering instruments), and whether the local government of Bremerhaven is still the steering centre of local climate policy action[5].

To get a clear idea of the policy options of local climate policy, the analysis further draws on four modes of governing described by Bulkeley and Kern (2006; see also Kern/Alber 2008) and a fifth mode that was identified by Bulkeley et al. (2009). First, self-governing describes "the capacity of local government to govern its own activities" (Bulkeley/Kern 2006: 2242). As cities have direct influence on their buildings, facilities, and vehicle fleet, they can easily implement energy management plans for municipal facilities or stricter regulations for new buildings. Secondly, governing by provision is "the shaping of practice through the delivery of particular forms of service and resource" (ibid.). This includes services such as energy supply or public transport, in other words infrastructure which is in public ownership. Thirdly, governing by authority refers to "the use of traditional forms of authority such as regulation and direction"

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[3] As is apparent from this sentence, an expert is a person who has thorough knowledge of the facts of the investigated cases or processes. This includes, for instance, knowledge related to the expert's place of work (e.g. the company or organisation) and the working processes (Gläser/Laudel 2010: 11f.).

[4] For details see the list of interviews in Annex I.

[5] The analysing categories broadly follow two studies that analyse empirical examples of regional (Adamaschenk/Pröhl 2003: 34) and local governance (Geißel 2007: 29). Both authors refer to the theory of actor-centred institutionalism (Scharpf 2000) as their conceptual basis. The category 'process' was introduced by Geißel, but is in general not central to the actor-centred institutionalism.

(ibid.), e.g. through the use of sanctions. Fourthly, governing through enabling characterises "the role of local government in facilitating, coordinating and encouraging action" (ibid.) through persuasion, argument, incentives or partnership with private actors. These are tools of 'soft' governing (Kern/Alber 2008:174; Alber 2009: 6)[6].

Finally, the fifth mode of governing is called partnership. It describes situations "in which non-state actors work together with state actors in order to address climate change through providing information, undertaking voluntary action, and implementing projects" (Bulkeley et al. 2009: 8). Bulkeley and Kern (2006) conclude that self-governing and governing through enabling are the two modes of governing most frequently used by municipalities. As Bremerhaven no longer has municipal utilities ("Stadtwerke"), governing by provision is of no importance for this thesis.

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[6]   See section 3.3.2 for further information on 'soft' forms of governance.

3. Theoretical Background

3.1 Public Service Provision and Other Responsibilities of Local Government

Municipalities represent the lowest level in the three-tiered administrative structure in Germany, but under constitutional law, German municipalities are part of the Länder (states). This implies that state parliaments determine, for instance, municipal constitutions. The Länder (and also the Federation) assign certain activities to the municipalities (Auftragsangelegenheiten) and allocate the corresponding funding to them (Bogumil/Jann 2009: 103f.).

Yet, in international comparative studies, German municipalities have long been considered to have the greatest autonomy and the most significant scope of action. This was primarily because of the wide range of administrative functions that German municipalities are responsible for (Holtkamp 2007: 367; 2012: 150; Wollmann 2006: 435).

The autonomy of German municipalities is based on the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) which guarantees municipalities the 'right of self-government'. In constitutional terms, "municipalities must be guaranteed the right to regulate all local affairs on their own responsibility, within the limits prescribed by the laws. Within the limits of their functions designated by a law, associations of municipalities shall also have the right of self-government according to the laws" (Basic Law, Article 28(2)).

Traditional tasks of self-government can be divided into several types: Some of the allocated tasks are supervised from the federal states by means of instructions, such as the payment of social benefits and rent subsidies or the maintenance of a fire brigade. Other allocated tasks are not directed from above and the municipality is free to decide how to deal with them. Those tasks include the provision of electricity, gas, and water, waste disposal, the construction of schools and kindergartens or urban development plans.

Moreover, there are voluntary activities, provided by municipalities at their own discretion and within their financial means. For example, municipalities can decide to build a new swimming pool or a new sports area, to buy new buses, to set up a museum etc. Municipalities are also in charge of regional business development. A major decision is how to distribute subsidies for cultural and social services (Bogumil/Jann 2009: 104; Walter-Rogg/Kunz/Gabriel 2005: 415 ff., Wollmann 2012: 427ff.).

Nearly all activities within the scope of responsibility of German municipalities belong to the task to provide (or ensure the provision of) public services. In general, public services are "provided by the government from taxes to be available to everyone" (Cambridge University Press 2008: 1146). In this dissertation the terms public services and services of general interest[7] are used interchangeably to refer to the German concept of Daseinsvorsorge (Forsthoff 1958). This term has come to be used to refer to basic services that are necessary for everyone's daily lives. These services encompass energy and water supply, waste management, public transportation and transport infrastructure, educational and cultural institutions, hospitals, and public housing (Bogumil/Jann 2009: 104, Münch 2006: 128ff.).

Municipal steering possibilities vary across the different areas of public services, but room for manoeuvre is generally highest among the voluntary services, which also include climate

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[7] The term 'services of general interest' has been framed by the EU; cf. Treaty of Lisbon, Article 14 TFEU and Protocol Nr. 26 on Services of General Interest as well as the White Paper on services of general interest (European Commission 2004, see also Wollmann 2012: 434).

protection measures. In other words, municipalities have the freedom, within the limits of financial possibilities, to choose whether to become active in climate protection and to decide how such measures should be implemented (Difu 2011: 11).

Despite their far-reaching autonomy, German municipalities are facing several challenges that affect their right to self-government, their scope of functions, and their room for manoeuvre. Two strands of research which focus on these issues are examined below: local government research and European multi-level governance.

3.2 Three Major Challenges for the Local Government

Political scientists working on local government issues assume that three major developments led to a decline of room for manoeuvre for local governments since the 1990s. These trends are EU-liberalisation, NPM and the budgetary crisis which all render privatisations more likely.[8] Early analyses were shaped in particular by the work of Wollmann (2002; 2004) as well as Libbe, Tomerius, and Trapp (2002; 2004). Nevertheless, their arguments are still valid (cf. Libbe 2008: 26; Bogumil/Jann 2009: 193f.; Kuhlmann/Wollmann 2013: 179ff.), even though NPM is now weakened by a slight trend towards remunicipalisation (Libbe et al. 2011; Schaefer/Papenfuß 2013).

3.2.1 EU-Liberalisation

The first trend, liberalisation, describes the idea to promote competition and enhance competitiveness through appropriate framework conditions. In the EU, this process is closely linked to the process of European integration: The development of the Single European Market (SEM) was largely based on the principle of implementing an EU-wide competitive market order (Sack 2006: 26). The implementation of the SEM by 1992 made the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital a top priority of the EU (Kuhlmann/Wollmann 2013: 167). Cities and municipalities were first affected by SEM regulations that had an impact on the traditionally protected 'local markets' including, in particular, the provision of energy supply, waste treatment, and public transport (Wollmann 2002: 32ff.; 2006: 438). Cross-sector regulations concerning state aid rules and the compulsory EU-wide tender process for public contracts (i.e. public procurement) are further characteristics of EU liberalisation (Bogumil/Jann 2009: 249f.). As the energy sector is the most frequently used example in this context, it is briefly outlined below.

In 1996 the EU started to intervene in the electricity sector with a first directive (96/92/EC) that was followed by another directive (2003/54/EC) which is often referred to as acceleration directive. The latter directive introduced the unbundling of the following three key functions in energy provision: generation, transmission, and distribution/supply. The basic idea was to ensure price competition and non-discriminatory access to the transmission networks for all providers. Moreover, the directive obliged member states to establish a national regulatory agency (Wollmann 2013: 11).

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[8] The 1990s have also witnessed more 'traditional' reforms of municipal constitutions, territorial reforms and the introduction of direct elections of the mayor in most federal states (Wollmann 2006: 436f.; Bogumil/Jann 2009: 193ff.; Kuhlmann/Wollmann 2013: 78f., 158ff.). Furthermore, cooperative elements of democracy such as the local Agenda 21 process gained importance (Bogumil/Jann 2009 193f.). Some authors mention globalisation as another trend that generally limits governmental scope of action at several political levels (Bogumil/Holtkamp 2004: 150; Libbe et al. 2004: 13).

In Germany, the 1998 Federal Energy Act aimed to transpose Directive 96/92/EC into national law. In the first phase, this legislation had the somewhat paradoxical effect of triggering several mergers of companies that resulted in the emergence of the so-called 'Big Four' (E.on, RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall) which dominate the German energy market. Meanwhile, lots of municipalities saw themselves obliged to sell local grids and shares of their municipal utilities to the 'Big Four' because of competitive pressure and growing financial distress (Sack 2006: 26; Wollmann 2013: 13).

To conclude, EU internal market liberalisation restricts the wide scope of functions that had been previously available to municipalities. Critics of liberalised markets also fear a 'race to the bottom' of environmental standards and a lack of climate protection efforts (Bogumil/Jann 2009: 251). Münch (2006: 24f.; 73, 75) explains that the EU constrains local self-government in three ways: first, by reducing municipalities' freedom of action and choice; second, by withdrawing competencies; and, third, by creating new dependencies through control mechanisms. According to Kuhlmann and Wollmann (2013: 43) the distribution of funds under the framework of EU cohesion and regional policy can only partially limit this trend.

3.2.2 New Public Management

While similar discussions had been prominent on the international level already in the 1980s (Kuhlmann/Wollmann 2013: 111), a reform concept for administrative procedures in Germany was only developed in the early 1990s[9]. This concept, called "Neues Steuerungsmodell" (Banner 1991), the German type of NPM, was based on experiences of the Dutch city of Tilburg and brought a change in the dominant understanding of the desirable administrative structures (Libbe et al. 2004: 44f.; Sack 2006: 31). The idea was to modernise the public sector, turn it into a public service provider with customer focus, enhance efficiency, and reduce costs.

The basic assumption of NPM states that the internal modernisation of administrations in terms of market-oriented management and competition principles leads to greater cost-efficiency without having any negative side-effects on other objectives and considerations of the public sector. To implement these ideas, large bureaucracies should, for instance, be divided into several smaller, rather autonomous units with their own budget (decentralisation). Along with performance management, this should not only lead to a competition between the different public agencies, but also between public agencies and private firms (Bogumil/Jann 2009: 237ff.; Kuhlmann/Wollmann 2013: 208ff.)

The traditional administration was also criticised for its 'political rationality' which was said to neglect economic efficiency while emphasising social, ecological, and other objectives in the public interest (Wollmann 2013: 3f., 9). Thus, NPM proponents argued for a clear separation of policy-making and strategic control on the one hand and service delivery on the other (Bogumil/Jann 2009: 240; Sack 2006: 31). All in all, the 'enabling' role of the state was emphasised while the provision of services was at least partially delegated to non-public actors (e.g. by contracting or privatisation) (Wollmann 2006: 437).

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[9] The concept was developed by the Municipal Association for Administration Management (Kommunale Gemeinschaftsstelle für Verwaltungsmanagement) (Wollmann 2012: 433).

3.2.3 Budgetary Crises of Local Government

In 2006, Wollmann (2006: 438f.) referred to the budgetary crisis at that time as the biggest challenge and threat to the German model of local self-government (see also Wollmann 2012: 437). Since the early 1990s, local governments have increasingly suffered from budgetary crises, because economic slowdown resulted in a loss in revenue, while expenditures increased due to higher unemployment rates. Moreover, the federal and the state governments have significantly contributed to the crisis with certain structural fiscal policy decisions. For instance, they shifted tasks to the local level without any financial compensation. A current example of this is the provision of daycare for children under the age of three years (Holtkamp 2012: 148f.; Junkernheinrich 2010: 5).

2003 constituted the peak of the crisis for local government finances which exhibited a severe deficit (Holtkamp 2012: 145). After a few years, which allowed municipalities to generate surpluses, the international financial crisis led to a further worsening of the situation in 2009 (Junkernheinrich 2010: 4). The major problem are so-called "Kassenkredite", short-term loans to public-sector institutions which are comparable to overdraft facilities. Until 2009, these loans have increased nearly sixfold in ten years (Holtkamp 2012: 147). In 2012, the short term loans added up to 47.5 billion Euros, which indicates that income and expenditures diverge increasingly (Deutscher Städtetag 2013: 8; Holtkamp 2012: 147).

Consolidation pressure can restrict local self-government significantly, for instance, through the dependence on directed state allocations and the intervention by the state in the supervision of local authorities (Kommunalaufsicht)[10]. At the local level, it is therefore not possible to accrue a municipal budget deficit at the expense of future governments; instead political actors (i.e. local authorities) have immediately reduced freedom of action (Bogumil/Holtkamp 2004: 150; Holtkamp 2012: 147f.). Financial plight therefore puts local governments under considerable pressure to adjust and pushes them into selling municipal assets and enterprises (Wollmann 2006: 438f.).

In addition, there is a link between demographic change and local government finances: demographic change[11] induces rising average costs in the provision of social and technical infrastructure and the growth of welfare expenses due to the ageing society (Libbe et al. 2004: 13, 39). Already from 2002 to 2008, social expenditure increased by almost 40 percent. As social services are mandatory tasks of local government, this strongly restricts municipal financial resources (Holtkamp 2012: 151).

Thus, there is a general trend that the financial share of voluntary tasks of self-management decreases and reductions in staff have been highest in this sector (Bogumil/Jann 2009: 105; Wollmann 2012: 431f.). The question arises: what remains of local self-government if voluntary tasks are cut further? In any case, these savings cannot close the budgetary gap anymore: In many towns and cities, the cash advances are already higher than the spending on voluntary tasks (Junkernheinrich 2010: 5).

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[10]   An instrument that considerably reduces municipal room for manoeuvre is the emergency budget (Nothaushalt). It replaces ordinary budget plans of highly indebted municipalities if the municipal budget security concept is not approved by the next higher authoritative level. In this case, the higher level determines the budget. In particular, municipalities in North Rhine-Westphalia are concerned (Holtkamp 2012:159ff.). Even though Bremerhaven witnesses continuous budgetary crises, the budget for 2014/15 has been approved by the Bremen Senate in February 2014 (Senatorin für Finanzen 2014: 7ff.).

[11]   This process has its origins in the early 1970s with a strong decline in birth rates. The phenomenon of shrinking cities has already existed in (West)Germany since the mid-1980s in regions with old and 'dying' industries like coal, steel, and shipbuilding (Ruhr District, Saarland, Bremen). Demographic change affects almost all areas of local policy. It is therefore a central framework condition for local authority action today and increasingly in the future (Libbe et al. 2004: 35ff.).

3.2.4 Consequences for Municipal Room for Manoeuvre

As a result of the three major developments explained above, a significant trend towards privatisation could be observed in the mid-1990s. Since then, all federal governments have pursued privatisation-friendly policies (Kuhlmann/Wollmann 2013: 179)

Privatisation describes the process of transferring the delivery of public services to organisations that have an economic interest to maximise profits. It is possible to differentiate between (1) formally (or organisationally) privatised organisations (e.g. organisations with a private legal status, but in public ownership), (2) functional privatisation (i.e. the transfer/delegation of tasks for a limited period of time – concession), and (3) material privatisation (i.e. the entire or partial sale) (Kuhlmann/Wollmann 2013: 168f., Wollmann 2013: 3).

Most municipalities have focused on formal privatisations. Thus, about half of the municipal staff is now employed in outsourced municipal businesses. Around 75 percent of those businesses are companies with limited liability (GmbHs – Ltds). Taking all private legal forms of local operations together (GmbH, GmbH & Co. KG, AG, GbR and others), the share of privatised municipal shareholdings is over 80 percent in municipalities with a population of more than 50,000 inhabitants. The energy sector has witnessed the highest percentage of privatisations. Less than a third of these companies is still 100 percent publicly owned (Kuhlmann/ Wollmann 2013: 180f.).

Hence, non-state actors have become increasingly important for the fulfilment of public tasks. Those actors are normally guided by individual and organisational self-interest. This creates tensions between the logic of competitiveness on the one hand, and demands for orientation towards the common good and democratic control of public service provision on the other. As a result, public interests are at risk of being marginalised (Sack 2006: 31; Wollmann 2006: 446). The question arises how decentralised unities, often in legal forms of enterprises and sometimes even in private ownership, can be coordinated with regards to political aims that do not follow the economic rationale?

Political scientists agree on a rather negative assessment of steering possibilities for municipal authorities. For example, Bogumil (2006: 11) and Wollmann (2006: 438) state that privatisation measures have led to a decisive loss of influence and control of politically legitimated municipal bodies. This includes even formal privatisation and public-private partnership (PPP), which means that actors operate outside the institutionally-established political and administrative structures of traditional local self-government. Kuhlmann (2006: 97f.) even states that the existing control vacuum and coordination gaps are proven by an almost complete absence of strategic political steering or mere steering concepts in cities using out-sourcing strategies. According to Sack (2006: 31ff.) this is due to several difficulties that occur with regard to the obligation to define clear objectives and detailed service descriptions in advance of the allocation of responsibilities, the drafting of contracts and contract negotiations, the complex coordination of different organisational units in public service provision, and the controlling of a growing number of different actors.

Most analysts therefore come to the conclusion that pluralisation of actors and decentralisation of tasks lead to a sectoral fragmentation of municipal tasks and, as a result, to the disintegration of cities' administrations (Bogumil/Jann 2009: 245; Kuhlmann 2006: 97). Bogumil summarises the developments very pointedly: "There is a barely coordinated coexistence of a partially decentralised core administration without central controlling but with municipal enterprises, of PPPs, elements of competition, negotiation systems, participation procedures, and forms of civil society coproduction. These structures are not

transparent and it is unclear who will assume overall responsibility [...]. The loss of steering possibilities and the increasing pluralism of forms of control and organisation can be rather pointedly interpreted as a fragmentation of local self-government" (Bogumil 2006: 11; translation by the author).

Particularly, local parliaments (i.e. the legislative power) face a reduction of their political influence as financial crisis and privatisations restrict traditional policy-making processes (Bogumil/Jann 2009: 194; Sack 2006: 25, 34).

In answer to the loss of steering capacity, a debate on remunicipalisation[12] emerged after the turn of the millennium (Libbe 2008: 26, Sack 2006: 37). While there are several reasons for remunicipalisation, the safeguarding of local influence and the recovery of political steering capacity are of high political salience for most municipalities (Libbe et al. 2011: 5; Schaefer/Papenfuß 2013: 76). Gerd Landsberg, general manager of the German Association of Towns and Municipalities, stresses that municipalities hope to regain political power by remunicipalisation to shape their urban development (Landsberg 2013: 84f.). In a study published in 2011, more than 80 percent of the interviewees stated that better targeted control and the preservation of local influence were the intended objectives of remunicipalisation. With the second highest value at nearly 75 percent interviewees hoped to generate additional revenues through remunicipalisation (Schaefer/Papenfuß 2013: 77).

With regard to the empirical evidence, a real trend of remunicipalisation is only evident in the energy sector; this is especially the case where functional privatisation took place. Since 1998, a large number of concession contracts have been concluded that expire now or in the coming years. This opens a 'window of opportunity' (Kingdon 1984) to create new municipal utilities (Landsberg 2013: 83, 86; Libbe et al. 2011: 6ff., 12; Schaefer/Papenfuß 2013: 77f.; Wollmann 2013: 18).

3.3 Municipalities in the European Multi-level System

3.3.1 The Concept of Multi-level Governance

The multi-level governance approach in EU integration theories became well-known through Hooghe and Marks' influential book Multi-level governance and European integration (2001). However, within the context of the EU, Gary Marks first used the phrase 'multi-level governance' in his earlier work on the reform of EU structural funds and its implementation (Marks 1992; 1993). Marks argued that national governments lost control both to the supra-national level, namely the Commission, and to local and regional governments which play an important role in the planning and implementation process. In this context, Marks added ideas from the policy networks approach to emphasise the growing role of non-state actors in decision-making and the emergence of territorially overarching public-private policy networks.

This thesis draws further on the work by Bache and Flinders (2004b: 2ff.) who have the following understanding of multi-level governance: the multi-level perspective assumes that EU governance is characterised by an interdependence of territorial governments at the subnational, national, and European level and by a dispersion of authoritative decision-making power from the national level both vertically, to supranational and sub-national institutions, and horizontally, to non-state actors.

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[12]   For further information on the term 'remunicipalisation' and its definition see Libbe et al. 2011: 4f.

However, this is not the only way to understand multi-level governance. For example, it is possible to distinguish two contrasting multi-level governance approaches in the literature which highlight differing qualities of multi-level governance (Hooghe/Marks 2004)[13]. Moreover, multi-level governance can be used as an analytical tool or understood as a normative concept (Bache/Flinders 2004a: 195ff.)[14]. In addition, the concept is also discussed beyond EU studies (Bache/Flinders 2004b: 4).

It should be noted that municipalities are often not considered as a policy-making level equivalent to the regional, the national, and the supranational levels. This is because they are neither an independent administrative level nor are they considered to be of the same political importance in the decision-making process (Rechlin 2004: 2, 15)[15]. Therefore, the number of political scientists that focus on German municipalities in multi-level governance is rather small (Rechlin 2004: 5; Münch/von Alemann 2006: 16)[16].

3.3.2 Impact on German Municipalities

The following two assumptions of multi-level governance theorists have considerable influence on local municipalities. First, because political decision-making levels are closely interconnected, actors can and have to be proactive on several political levels at the same time. Second, due to the dispersion of authority, traditional hierarchical top-down governmental action is complemented by transnational horizontal cooperation at regional and local level as well as across levels. In addition, 'soft' steering instruments have gained in importance (Brunnengräber 2007:333f.)[17]. Having said that, the question arises as to whether these trends create mainly new opportunities or challenges for municipalities? Additionally, what are the limitations of 'soft' forms of governance?

One major driver for 'soft' steering instruments constitutes the Lisbon Strategy that introduced the 'open method of coordination' (OMC). This coordination approach uses policy tools such as iterative, systematic comparison, through monitoring or benchmarking in order to shape the behaviour of governmental actors, relevant stakeholders, and civil society with the aim to encourage policy learning (Wallace 2010: 98f.).

Moreover, the EU institutions increasingly engage in cooperation with civil society actors and other stakeholders (Münch 2006: 41). The Commission therefore often initiates networks of experts, stakeholders and/or civil society. It coordinates the dialogue among these actors, while national, regional or local actors are still responsible for the actual policy formulation and implementation. Declaratory commitments and other non-binding forms of 'soft law' have gained in importance as well (Wallace 2010: 99).

The main problem with these 'soft' forms of governance is that they "diffuse and disperse political responsibilities among the relevant political actors" (Wallace 2010: 100) which makes it difficult to locate political 'ownership' and responsibility. For example, declaratory commitments and guidelines are often adopted outside the formal EU decision-making

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[13]   Type I multi-level governance creates general-purpose jurisdictions with non-intersecting memberships at a limited number of levels and with jurisdictions at lower tiers nested into higher ones. In this view authority is relatively stable. Type II multi-level governance consists of task-specific jurisdictions focusing on particular policy problems. It describes governance as a complex, but quite flexible patchwork of innumerable, overlapping jurisdictions (Hooghe/Marks 2004: 16ff.).

[14]   Also, the single term 'governance' has variable meanings, e.g. it can be used as an analytical tool or as a normative concept ('good governance') (Benz/Dose 2010).

[15]   See Münch 2006: 79ff. for a contrary opinion regarding the political importance.

[16]   The anthology of Münch/von Alemann (2006) is one of the exceptions.

[17]   The growing dependence of municipalities on 'soft' forms of governance has also been recognised by Wollmann (2006: 446).

procedures and thus without participation of the legislative power, raising questions of political legitimacy and accountability. Furthermore, monitoring processes signify increased supervision and higher costs for municipalities (Rechlin 2004: 22). On the other hand, OMC offers cities possibilities to participate in the policy process.

Within the European multi-level system, a growing number of EU directives and regulations affect the local scope of action. Examples for this are state aid rules, the obligation of public procurement, and environmental regulations (Münch 2006: 128ff.). EU legislation therefore constrains sub-national autonomy. What is more, decision-making power is primarily in the hands of the EU institutions and the member governments, while municipalities lack any institutional involvement. Therefore, municipalities can often only use informal channels of access and non-binding statements to articulate their interests (Rechlin 2004: 9ff).

National channels of influence have always been important for German municipalities to shape policy, funding, and programme decisions. Local authorities' umbrella organisations play an important role in this process. Meanwhile, municipalities also need to lobby EU institutions to influence supranational decision-making (Fleurke/Willemse 2007: 71; Rechlin 2004: 7). Thus, local representation offices of the local authorities' umbrella organisations have been established in Brussels. But both the local authorities' umbrella organisations and their Brussels offices often lack staff and financial resources, so they cannot act independently of their members (Münch 2006: 35). Overall local authorities are therefore still highly underrepresented compared to the German Länder. For example, municipalities only hold three out of the 24 German seats in the Committee of Regions (Frenz 2011: 373).

Schultze (2003: 122f.) suggests that differences in size and regional significance of cities (including economic importance) are the major factors for determining whether a city has the capacity to become active in EU-related activities: "Getting involved in EU-projects or European networks demands a considerable investment in political commitment and human resources. Smaller cities often cannot or do not want to afford a European Affairs officer or a European Liaison Department so they often lack the necessary administrative and organizational capacity" (Schultze 2003: 123). Moreover, only major cities have sufficient political clout on the national and the European level to be identified as a 'target group' by the EU Commission (Schultze 2003: 136).

The lack of resources is one reason why municipalities have a high incentive to seek collective interest representation through city networks or intermediary organisations. Moreover, the EU encourages transnational networks for good practice exchange and benchmarking of local policies and performances in local service delivery with 'soft' measures (Schultze 2003: 125). Thus, the major part of municipal European policy takes place in city networks and through umbrella organisations (Rechlin 2004: 8). For instance, Bremerhaven is member of the 'Climate Alliance' which is a European network of local authorities committed to climate protection (Klima-Bündnis 2014)[18]. Yet, membership in networks and organisations implies a high level of coordination, an effort that represents another challenge for smaller municipalities (Rechlin 2004: 14).

As most municipalities face financial crisis, European funds create new opportunities for local governments or facilitate, at least, scheduled projects (Fleurke/Willemse 2007: 84). This is especially true since the financial resources of the EU's structural policies have increased enormously since the establishment of its main instruments, the European Social Fund (ESF) and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), in the late 1950s and in 1975 respectively (Schultze 2003: 126). With regards to cohesion policy, Hooghe and Marks (2001)

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[18]   Betsill, Bulkeley, and Kern use a multi-level governance perspective to examine city networks, such as Climate Alliance, and cities' climate policies (e.g. Betsill/Bulkeley 2005, 2007; Bulkeley/Kern 2009).

argue that the EU's decision-making process increasingly involves authorities on the sub-national level, bypassing central governments. Accordingly, Schultze (2003: 135ff.) shows that cities can and do participate in the initial phases (agenda-setting and policy-formulation) of the policy-making cycle with regard to the structural funds. They can also exert influence in other phases although to varying degrees. Thus, local governments have especially enhanced their socio-economic capabilities due to the EU's regional policy (Fleurke/Willemse 2007: 71).

Schultze concludes that "Europeanization and sub-national mobiliziation [sic!] has thus 'unlocked' cities from the often rather hierarchical constraints of the national system by allowing them to build transnational coalitions, which suggests a careful re-labelling of cities as 'policy makers'" (Schultze 2003: 137) in the European multi-level system.

In conclusion, the relevant literature reveals ambiguous effects of the EU on sub-national authority. Sub-national decision-making in the EU multi-level system is enhanced and constrained at the same time. The large number of political interfaces signifies a particularly high need for coordination which is a major challenge for municipalities (Münch 2006: 35; Walter-Rogg/Kunz/Gabriel 2005: 454). However, Fleurke and Willemse (2007) show with the help of an empirical study conducted in two municipalities and one province in the Netherlands that the investigated municipalities are much more enhanced through EU-funds than constrained through EU-legislation.

3.4 Bremerhaven: A Structurally Disadvantaged Maritime Port City

The above-mentioned challenges are faced by all German municipalities. However, the local government of Bremerhaven faces particular structural problems that resulted in financial distress and make political steering even more difficult.

Actually, Bremerhaven was once the largest continental European fishing port and a major centre for the ship building industry. However, the city has been extremely hit by structural crises and experienced a significant economic decline since the 1970s because of the restructuring of work processes in industries such as shipbuilding, fisheries and other traditional industrial sectors, which resulted in severe job cuts (Becker et al. 2013: 19ff.). By 2010, nearly 92 percent of all jobs in the shipbuilding industry had been cut (Salot 2011: 5).

Moreover, the US Army was stationed in Bremerhaven, but in 1992/93 the last 3,000 soldiers left the city together with their families. As a result, the purchasing power in Bremerhaven strongly decreased and further jobs were lost, including 30 percent of all jobs in the retail sector alone (Salot 2011: 5). The significant structural change which took place over a period of more than ten years led to a decrease in employment by nearly 20 percent. The number of inhabitants decreased by 10 percent until 2005 and the city experienced a persistent pattern of above-average levels of unemployment, with a peak of 26 percent in 2005 (Salot 2011: 6).

Findings of recent studies using cluster analysis (soeb2 in 2009, Wegweiser Kommune in 2012, Zukunftsatlas 2013) conclude that Bremerhaven is part of the cluster of severely underprivileged and most rapidly shrinking municipalities in Germany. These cities are characterised by population losses and an above-average share of elderly citizens, extremely high underemployment rates, and a very high percentage of recipients of basic unemployment benefits according to Book II of the German Social Security Code

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(Sozialgesetzbuch II – SGB II)[19] (Neu 2012a, b; Wegweiser Kommune 2012; Prognos AG 2013).

Yet, in recent times, the labour market in Bremerhaven witnessed some positive developments: In the period from 2000 to 2011, the employment rate increased by about 10.5 percent. At the same time, the German average growth rate amounted to only 4.5 percent (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder 2012). This trend continued in 2012 with an increase of 1.4 percent compared to 2011 (Statistisches Landesamt Bremen 2013b). In 2012, the unemployment rate dropped to 16.4 percent (Statistisches Landesamt Bremen 2014). Moreover, the city's population grew by 1.34 percent to 113,137 inhabitants in 2012. This is the first population increase since 2002 (Statistisches Landesamt Bremen 2013a).

The positive development of the labour market resulted at least partially from specifically targeted public investments. These enabled Bremerhaven to become an important location for polar and marine research and the city was able to attract major investments for the production of offshore wind turbines (Becker et al. 2013: 30ff., Salot 2011: 8ff.). This success suggests that the local government might also be able to achieve its climate policy objectives within the framework of the project Klimastadt Bremerhaven.

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[19]   SGB II unemployment benefits belong to a basic benefit scheme with low benefits in comparison to full unemployment benefits (under SGB III).

4. The Project Klimastadt Bremerhaven

Mr Scherzinger from the Office of Environmental Protection called the brand name Klimastadt an 'unbeatable concept' (interview 14.02.14). But is the local authority actually able to expand its scope of action in climate policies or to develop new spheres of activity due to the Klimastadt Bremerhaven project?

First, this chapter introduces three regional and local climate policy framework programmes to explain the local framework conditions for the Klimastadt project. After the analysis of these framework programmes and their importance for political steering, this section concentrates on the political process that established the project and the actors involved.

4.1 Relevant Regional and Local Political Programmes

The Red-Green governments in Bremen and Bremerhaven chose climate protection as a major action focus of their term of office (Freie Hansestadt Bremen 2010: 4; SPD und Bündnis 90/DIE GRÜNEN 2011: 14). This commitment requires political framework programmes to coordinate the climate protection measures of the two cities and the city state. Anke Krein, City Councillor for Environmental Affairs until February 2014, called these programmes "our navigation instruments" (Krein 2012: 12). In other words, she talks about political steering instruments to achieve local climate policy objectives.

For Bremerhaven, the relevant programmes are (1) the European Energy Award®, (2) the 'master plan active climate policy', (3) the 'climate protection and energy policy programme' for Bremen and Bremerhaven (KEP 2020 – Klimaschutz- und Energieprogramm 2020), and (4) the 'integrated climate protection concept' (IKSK – Integriertes Klimaschutzkonzept), an initiative of the region Unterweser[20]. As the latter is still under development and does not yet provide any steering capacity, it will not be discussed in this thesis.

4.1.1 European Energy Award

The European Energy Award® (eea) is an instrument of self-governing and allows the local administration to present itself as a role model for climate-friendly behaviour in case of successful participation. As a quality management system and certification process, the eea allows the participating municipalities to systematically determine, assess, check, and coordinate all energy and climate protection activities of the local government to ensure their implementation. Today, the programme is used in 16 EU member states and Morocco.

The eea is process-oriented and a long-term strategy. Its core element is a catalogue of around 100 measures which are divided into six fields of action. The implementation of the eea involves an Energy Team audit (internal audit) and an audit performed by an external expert; the latter is in charge of the certification. A municipality is awarded the European Energy Award®, if it meets at least 50 percent of the maximum possible points. If a

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[20]   The region Unterweser includes the administrative districts of Cuxhaven and Wesermarsch (in Lower Saxony) as well as the city of Bremerhaven. For information on the IKSK see ARSU/RaUm 2012; 2013; Regionalforum Bremerhaven/ARSU/RaUm 2014.

municipality reaches 75 percent, it receives the European Energy Award® Gold (Forum European Energy Award e. V. 2014a, b; Klimastadtbüro 2012a).

Bremen and Bremerhaven started the eea process in December 2005 (energiekonsens 2005). While Bremen was able to receive the European Energy Award® already in 2007, Bremerhaven did not obtain it until 2011 when it managed to achieve 61 percent (Krein 2012: 7). In the same year, Bremen was awarded the European Energy Award® Gold (Der Senator für Umwelt, Bau und Verkehr 2011b). According to Mr Becker, the city of Bremen does so well in the eea, because of the activities of the local climate protection agency energiekonsens[21]. He referred especially to the points on 'communication and public relations'. This potential has not yet been fully utilised in Bremerhaven (Becker, interview 20.02.14). As a city-owned enterprise, Seestadt Immobilien[22] is part of the eea monitoring and passes on the results of its in-house energy controlling each year. However, Mr Schneeberg does not see the eea as a control instrument, but only as a 'feedback message' about current projects and achieved building standards. He has the impression that whether it is a year or more until Bremerhaven achieves the gold status is not of the greatest importance to the city (Schneeberg, interview 25.02.14). As Bremerhaven now intends to achieve the European Energy Award® Gold in 2015 (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14), it seems that Mr Schneebergs got the right impression. This also corresponds to the fact that monitoring processes are considered as 'soft' steering instruments.

To conclude, the eea only allows steering of municipal actors and should thus be considered mainly as a tool to increase public awareness for the exemplary behaviour of Bremerhaven's administration in terms of energy-efficiency and other climate-friendly measures.

4.1.2 Master Plan Active Climate Policy

In contrast to the European Energy Award®, the 'master plan active climate policy' is an instrument which allows the local government to define and include its own climate policy objectives (Krein 2012, Stadt Bremerhaven 2011). As a compendium of climate protection activities of the city of Bremerhaven, the 'master plan' could be seen as an umbrella strategy for an already existing variety of local state and non-state measures (Referat für Wirtschaft 2010a). For instance, the 'master plan', which is continuously revised, comprised nearly 90 detailed measures in its 2011 version (Stadt Bremerhaven 2011). Even though the 'master plan' puts emphasis on municipal-owned businesses, it also allows steering of non-state actors. Yet, this possibility only developed over time.

The 'master plan active climate policy' has its origin in the 'master plan active environmental policy' which was commissioned by the parliamentary groups of the SPD and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in Bremerhaven in 2007. This 'master plan' was supposed to document all climate protection efforts of Bremerhaven. Therefore, it should include individual measures and their costs in the areas of climate-friendly energy policy, transport policy, planning and construction policy, measures to integrate business, schools, and higher education institutions in the city's climate protection efforts, and measures that should be

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[21]   energiekonsens is the non-profit and independent climate protection agency of the city state Bremen. It was established in the course of the privatisation of the Stadtwerke Bremen (public utilities) in May 1997 as a PPP. Shareholders are the Free Hanseatic City of Bremen, the swb AG, as well as the EWE VERTRIEB GmbH. The agency is working towards the efficient use of energy and low-carbon energy production. energiekonsens therefore initiates and supports a variety of projects including information campaigns and advice services for different target groups ranging from households to companies and from construction workers to public institutions (Becker, interview 20.02.14; Bremer Energie-Konsens GmbH 2014a).

[22]   Seestadt Immobilien was founded in January 2003 as an owner-operated enterprise of the city of Bremerhaven. The enterprise manages municipal buildings and properties such as administrative buildings, schools and kindergartens, museums, leisure and cultural facilities, and sports venues. Seestadt Immobilien has approximately 350 employees (Seestadt Immobilien 2009).

taken within the administration of Bremerhaven (SPD-Fraktion/CDU-Fraktion 2007). This means that the 'master plan' was intended to include all eea measures (self-governing) plus additional activities based on regulation, enabling or partnership.

The motion was adopted unanimously in the local parliament of Bremerhaven on 7 February 2008 (StVV 2008: 309). Subsequently, a cross-departmental working group was established in Department VI (environment and construction), which was responsible for the annual report and further development of the 'master plan'. Its first meeting was held in September 2008 (Bau- und Umweltausschuss 2008: 6).

The increased importance of the 'master plan' manifested itself with its third report in 2011. First, a new local government was elected and the Greens entered a coalition with the SPD in July 2011. At the instigation of the Greens, the allocation of tasks changed and the Department VI was split into two departments with a new Environmental Department (Department IX) led by a green city councillor (Bündnis 90/DIE GRÜNEN Kreisverband Bremerhaven 2011: 32; SPD und Bündnis 90/DIE GRÜNEN 2011: 13). The Environmental Department also took over the responsibility for the renamed 'master plan active climate policy' (Umweltschutzamt 2011a; 2011b).

Secondly, the Environmental Committee unanimously adopted a binding target for the city of Bremerhaven to reduce CO2 emissions by 40 percent by 2020 on the initiative of the Greens[23] (governing by regulation). The party's aim was to demonstrate Bremerhaven's commitment to the objectives already set in KEP 2020. Moreover, the target allows the checking and even assessment and prioritisation of all local climate protection measures with regard to the reduction target (Fraktion Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2011). Thus, the Office for Environmental Protection was given an instrument to represent its position more strongly and to legitimately demand other actors to take action (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). The great significance of this political mandate, stated by Mr Scherzinger, has proven to be true as all other interviewees declared to be committed to the 40 percent reduction target (Becker, interview 20.02.14; Schneeberg, interview 25.02.14; Lückehe, interview 04.03.14).

Finally, the structure of the 'master plan active climate policy' was adjusted in 2011, so that it can now serve as the local update ("Fortschreibung") of the KEP 2020 (Umweltschutzamt 2011a; 2011b). Every single update of the 'master plan' has to be adopted by the local parliament. However other local actors (such as the Nord-Süd-Forum which is a civil society actor) advice the local government on measures the city should include in the 'master plan' (Krein 2012: 2). An updated version of the 'master plan' is supposed to be published in 2014 (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14).

4.1.3 KEP 2020

In contrast to the approach of the 'master plan active climate policy' which tried to develop an umbrella strategy for an already existing variety of measures, the regional programme KEP 2020 follows an approach from overall strategy to individual measures (Referat für Wirtschaft 2010a). Similar to the 'master plan', it includes project areas that go beyond the traditional municipal scope of action outlined in chapter 3.1.

On the initiative of the Red-Green coalition in Bremen, the Bremen Senate adopted an "Aktionsprogramm Klimaschutz 2010" (action programme climate protection 2010) on 11

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[23]   The binding target was adopted before the Greens entered the coalition government (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14).

November 2008. This climate policy action programme comprised immediate measures to reduce the state's greenhouse gas emissions by 2010 (Bremische Bürgerschaft 2008)[24]. On the same day, the Senate commissioned the Senator for Environmental Affairs, Construction, Transport and Europe to work out an ambitious climate protection and energy policy programme covering the period up to 2020 (KEP 2020). Beforehand, the coalition parties had already agreed on such a programme in their coalition agreement of June 2007 (SPD Landesorganisation Bremen/Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Landesverband Bremen 2007: 24ff).

The programme was developed through a participatory process, in which citizens and relevant actors of business and civil society were invited to enter into a dialogue with the Environmental Senator. This dialogue took place in 2009, in the formally structured way of a series of four workshops that were based on the work of independent experts who calculated a reference and a climate protection scenario and suggested measures for the city state to adopt[25]. The local government of Bremerhaven directly contributed to the KEP 2020 with its 'master plan' measures (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14)[26]. The programme KEP 2020 was then adopted by the Senate in December 2009.

The main objective of the KEP 2020 is a binding CO_2 reduction target for the city state: 40 percent by 2020 compared to 1990[27]. The climate protection scenario indicates that Bremerhaven could achieve the target while the forecast for Bremen is less optimistic (31.5 %) (BET/BEI/Wuppertal Institut 2010: 46). Moreover, the energy-intensive production of steel in Bremen is not yet part of the calculation. From 2005 to 2010, the steel industry accounted for around 42 percent of the CO_2 emissions of the city state. The exact amount of CO_2 emissions varies each year because the industry is highly dependent on economic trends. There is, as of yet, no clear downward trend to be observed, but emissions were comparably low in 2005, 2006, and 2009 (Der Senator für Umwelt, Bau und Verkehr 2013: 14).

The strategy paper KEP 2020 names concrete measures related to energy production and consumption, utilisation of heat, business and science, as well as transport and mobility to reach the reduction target and it includes the same modes of governing as the 'master plan'.

The individual measures include, for instance, the expansion of wind energy production by a factor 5, energy-focused building refurbishment of municipal buildings according to the Energy Saving Ordinance (EnEV), incentive programmes for private homeowners, information and advice services for companies and citizens provided by energiekonsens, the use of low-emission vehicles in local public transport, or the promotion of walking and cycling, e.g. through traffic-calmed areas (Freie Hansestadt Bremen 2010). This enumeration already shows that projects do not only belong to the traditional tasks of local self-government presented earlier.

Furthermore, the KEP 2020 includes a CO_2 monitoring for the cities Bremen and Bremerhaven as well as for the city state. This monitoring is the central steering instrument for the KEP 2020 and emphasises the importance of 'soft' steering instruments in accordance to the theoretical

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[24]   In March 2011, the programme results were assessed: By the end of 2010 only 65 percent of the desired CO_2 reduction was achieved. The full report is available at: http://www.umwelt.bremen.de/sixcms/media.php/13/ APK-Bilanz.pdf (Der Senator für Umwelt, Bau und Verkehr 2011a).

[25]   The expert team included members of the Büro für Energiewirtschaft und technische Planung GmbH (BET Aachen), the Bremer Energieinstitut (BEI), and the Wuppertal Institut für Klima, Umwelt, Energie GmbH. Their report can be accessed online: http://www.umwelt.bremen.de/sixcms/media.php/13/Endbericht_Langfassung _fin_28-06-10.pdf (BET/BEI/Wuppertal Institut 2010).

[26]   Moreover, the whole process was – and still is – accompanied by a cross-departmental working group with eight members who ensure the consent of all senatorial departments. The working has two members from Bremerhaven: Mr Scherzinger for the Office for Environmental Protection and Mr Polansky for the Magistrate Chancellery. Meetings of the working group are not held on a regular basis, but whenever they are needed (Der Senator für Umwelt, Bau und Verkehr 2014b).

[27]   It should be noted that it was the Bremen Senate (i.e. executive authority) which adopted the KEP 2020 and its 40 % target, while in Bremerhaven the decision was taken by the local parliament (i.e. legislature). Yet, this is likely to change because the Bremen Senate introduced a bill for a climate protection law in March 2014. This law would incorporate the KEP 2020 measures and the CO_2 monitoring (Gerling/Michel 2014; Schnase 2014).

assumptions of the multi-level governance approach. It allows for the periodic review of progress made towards meeting the CO2 reduction target.

The monitoring also includes non-state actors such as the STÄWOG[28] (and other housing associations) or energiekonsens which implies in case of the latter increased municipal influence in areas that have not been traditional areas of municipal responsibility. Mr Becker in particular pointed out that the Environmental Senator, who is the chairman of the supervisory board of energiekonsens, increasingly requests measureable results of all institutions involved to feed accurate figures into the KEP 2020 monitoring. Therefore, energiekonsens has to meet the challenge to quantify certain project results for the first time (Becker, interview 20.02.14).

Data for the period 1990–2010 shows heterogeneous, partially opposing trends: the greatest success in reducing CO2 emissions in absolute and relative terms was achieved in the heat supply of buildings (- 35.5 % or around 760,000t)[29], followed by reductions in the traffic sector (- 10 % or 163,000t). Conversely, emissions increased especially in the manufacturing industry (+ 80 % or ca. 260,000t). All in all, emissions decreased by 8.3 percent in the city state, yet Bremerhaven achieved a reduction by 10.7 percent. In total, the state emitted 6.3 million t of CO2 in 2010 (11.6 million t with the steel industry). Bremerhaven accounted for around 14 percent of those emissions, 900,000t (Der Senator für Umwelt, Bau und Verkehr 2013; Freie Hansestadt Bremen 2010: 24).

As mentioned above, the KEP 2020 is constantly developed further. Therefore, annual conferences are held to emphasise specific topics such as energy-efficient renovation or climate protection in businesses. Every second year the conference takes place in Bremerhaven (Freie Hansestadt Bremen 2010: 24; Scherzinger, 20.02.2014).

The implementation of the KEP 2020 is supported by the 'KEP 2020-Management' along with three employees. Its task is to help decision-makers to transform the strategic objectives into concrete measures. The 'KEP 2020-Management' therefore coordinates climate protection activities, it is in charge of project controlling (project database etc.) and PR work (including the organisation of the KEP 2020 conferences). Another part of its work is the monitoring of CO2 emissions.

Organisationally the 'KEP 2020-Management' is located in the Department for Energy and Environmental Technology with the Senator for Environmental Affairs, Construction, Transport and Europe (Der Senator für Umwelt, Bau und Verkehr 2014a). The 'KEP 2020 Management' is subsidised through the so-called "Kommunalrichtlinie" (BMU 2013) which is an incentive programme of the National Climate Protection Initiative (Nationale Klimaschutzinitiative) of the Federal Environment Ministry (BMU). One day per week, the management works in its Bremerhaven office (Krein 2012). Bremerhaven wants to apply for funding for its own management based on the next update of the 'master plan active climate policy'. Thus, the funding guidelines of the National Climate Protection Initiative influence the organisational structure of the Klimastadt project (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14).

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[28] The STÄWOG is the housing company of Bremerhaven. Its only shareholder is the city (formal privatisation). As a municipal company, the STÄWOG aims to promote the development of Bremerhaven on behalf of the city administration (Stäwog 2013: 2). Since its foundation in 1941, the corporate purpose of the STÄWOG is the socially responsible and affordable provision of housing for broad sections of the population. The provision of services for the city has become increasingly important in recent years (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14).While the STÄWOG is a traditional housing company maintaining around 5200 flats, the subsidiary STÄGRUND manages special buildings such as the theatre and the buildings of the zoo. The subsidiary STÄPARK is in charge of parking lots and all other parking facilities (Schmidt 2013: 170ff.). The energy subsidiary STÄWOG Service GmbH operates block-type thermal power stations and photovoltaic systems. It also sells the electricity that is self-produced to the tenants (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14, Schmidt 2013: 11, 166ff.).

[29] These are approximate values; see Der Senator für Umwelt, Bau und Verkehr 2013:15f. for a detailed explanation.

4.2 Klimastadt – From a First Idea to the Actual Project

4.2.1 The Conceptual Study

The whole Klimastadt Bremerhaven project started with a motion, tabled by the parliamentary groups of the SPD and the CDU on 27 September 2007. As a consequence, the local parliament unanimously requested the Magistrat to compile an R&D concept with the aim of allowing the already existing network of climate-related institutions to become a flagship project for Bremerhaven and to generate economic potential. The final study concluded that Bremerhaven has excellent prerequisites to promote itself as an internationally respected Klimastadt (AWI 2009). The term "Klimastadt" had thus emerged during the preparation of this concept (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14).

The initial idea was to turn the city into a centre for climate and climate-related research. The parliamentary motion further specified that the Alfred Wegener Institute (AWI), the University of Applied Sciences in Bremerhaven, and the science museum Klimahaus ('climate house') should be part of the concept and its development (StVV 2007: 125f.).

As the municipal council has no competence in sciences, the Department for Economics commissioned the AWI to draw up the required concept (Klimastadtbüro 2014b). Two members of the AWI and an employee of the business-oriented BAW Institut für regionale Wirtschaftsforschung were in charge of the study. They worked in close cooperation with a 15-member advisory board that accompanied the work. These actors mainly represented business interests and the political executive. Local citizens' groups and/or NGOs were not involved (AWI 2009).

The final conceptual study was published in December 2009. The study stated that promoting Bremerhaven as a Klimastadt requires close cooperation between politics, business and science not only within the city, but also in the city state and the region (Unterweser). Bremerhaven could thus stimulate climate mitigation and adaption as well as innovative structural change (AWI 2009). The study included the analysis of the current situation, future perspectives, and recommendations. It identified in particular three 'climate lighthouses' („Klimaleuchttürme") which could help to establish Bremerhaven as a well-known climate network and competence centre throughout Europe. These are: (1) regional business promotion in the offshore wind energy sector, (2) top-level, climate-related research activities, and (3) tourist attractions such as the Klimahaus.

The conceptual study and its recommendations were discussed in the plenary session of the Stadtverordnetenversammlung in June 2010. On the whole, all parliamentary groups expressed approval and the conceptual study with its recommendations was accepted as a starting point for the R&D development strategy called "Klimastadt Bremerhaven" (StVV 2010a: 12ff.). However, the concept was criticised by some, with the Greens especially criticising the focus on business (and science) and the neglect of municipal authorities' and citizens' commitments[30]. According to the Greens, the term "Klimastadt" should not become a marketing tool, but a daily common practice. Therefore, citizen participation should be strengthened.

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[30] The conceptual study included one chapter on the city's activities for which the municipal administration was taken on board. Apart from that the focus was only on R&D (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14).

Mayor Schulz (SPD) emphasised that the local parliament, the municipal authorities, and other public institutions should consider themselves as "the engine for further development" (StVV 2010a: 14; translation by the author). The local administration was instructed to propose an organisational structure for the implementation stage. At the same time, the local parliament also decided that the R&D strategy should be harmonised with the 'master plan active climate policy' and that both should be developed accordingly (StVV 2010a: 14).

4.2.2 Implementing an Organisational Structure

With the mission to implement the development strategy and to connect the different strands of climate-related initiatives ('master plan', R&D strategy), the local government had to work out a plan for the organisational and operative realisation of the project. In other words, the focus was now put on the distribution of tasks among the involved actors and the provision of the necessary financial resources. For this purpose, the Magistrat adopted a proposal in October 2010[31]. The local parliament approved this proposal with an identical decision a week later (Referat für Wirtschaft 2010a; StVV 2010b: 19ff.).

The proposal of the Magistrat included the creation of an administrative office with two employees, the already established advisory board as a supervisory generator of ideas, and the establishment of a 'virtual climate department' to coordinate the activities of the city council[32]. As requested by the Stadtverordnetenversammlung, the advisory board was extended to include members of the local parliament, the city district conferences and also the Bremen Senate (as well as other institutions). Nevertheless, civil society and especially NGOs were still underrepresented. The resolution further proposed the following eight climate projects that were derived from the conceptual study: (1) collaborative projects business/science, (2) scientific infrastructure, (3) logistics/climate, (4) demonstration facilities, (5) events/marketing, (6) environmental protection, nature conversation and urban development, (7) citizens and schools, and (8) sustainable tourism. For each of those projects the Department for Economics suggested a lead institution.

Finance was supposed to be mainly provided by ERDF funding from the Bremen priority area 2.3 – Enhancing the Image of the Cities of Bremen and Bremerhaven. Correspondingly, the Bremerhaven Association for Investment and Urban Development (BIS) was instructed to create a marketing concept (Referat für Wirtschaft 2010a).

Already in January 2011, Prof. Dr. Schulz-Baldes[33] was employed as the project coordinator by the city via a consultancy contract with the BIS (Referat für Wirtschaft 2011). The next important events took place several months later. In Mai 2011, the Department for Economics reported on the progress to implement an organisational structure for the project. In this process, the issue of finance had emerged as the main problem. The Bremen Senate refused to spend ERDF money for one employee of the not yet established administrative office for the Klimastadt and to pay for the activities of the project groups (e.g. the marketing concept or feasibility studies).

After negotiations among the involved senators, the BIS, energiekonsens, and the Department for Economics, Bremerhaven was despite its financial constraints able to establish an administrative Climate City Office ("Klimastadtbüro") in mid-2011. The office was

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31   In an additional statement to this proposal of October 2010, the Department for Environment and Construction emphasised once again that the strategy Klimastadt Bremerhaven was only a strategic flagship programme with a focus on R&D, but without any binding impact (Referat für Wirtschaft 2010a: 7).

32   The 'virtual climate department' consists of one employee of the Department for Economics, Mrs Claudia Harms, and one person working at the Office for Environmental Protection, Mr Till Scherzinger (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14; Stadt Bremerhaven 2014b). See also section 4.3.

33   Key actors of the Klimastadt project are described/characterised in section 4.3.

located in the so-called KLIMA*HAVEN, an office shared with energiekonsens and the 'KEP 2020-Management'. While energiekonsens paid for the common meeting room, photocopiers, and the data network, Bremerhaven covered the cost for the remaining rent and other expenditure. The payment of one employee was facilitated by the Environmental Senator (who covered 50 % of the costs i.e. 20 hours per week) and energiekonsens (which covered 10 hours per week) (Referat für Wirtschaft 2011: 2; Umweltschutzamt/Referat für Wirtschaft 2013: 4). The Financial and Economic Committee of the local parliament approved the decisions by the Magistrat in November 2011 (Finanz- und Wirtschaftsausschuss 2011).

In December 2010, the conceptual study was first presented to the public (Umweltschutzamt 2012). Subsequently, the term "Klimastadt" experienced considerable societal approval in the first half of 2011. However, people associated a rather broad understanding of a climate-friendly city with the term, in contrast to the narrow understanding of the conceptual study that had focused on an R&D strategy and location marketing for renewable energies, especially the offshore wind energy. Civil society in Bremerhaven expressed a clear demand for a comprehensive climate protection concept and a development strategy that would encompass the whole urban community (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14; Umweltschutzamt 2012). It was this societal understanding of the term that prevailed after the local elections in Mai 2011. These elections brought a significant political change to Bremerhaven. After 12 years of grand coalition government (Probst 2011: 123ff.), a Red-Green coalition came to power. The participation of the Greens in a coalition government implied a shift in focus of the Klimastadt project towards a comprehensive, societal climate protection strategy.

While the term "Klimastadt" appeared in the election programme of the SPD under the headings of maritime tourism, public transport, and the aim to become a leading industrial site for renewable energies (SPD – Unterbezirk Bremerhaven 2011: 5, 21), the Greens stated in their election programme the impression that the grand coalition (SPD – CDU) had promoted climate initiatives only half-heartedly and with the aim of enhancing the city's image or to acquire money. The Green party emphasised that it would focus more strongly on the participation of local initiatives, associations, and individual citizens instead (Bündnis 90/DIE GRÜNEN Kreisverband Bremerhaven 2011: 32).

Moreover, the Greens introduced the idea to use the Klimastadt project as a coordination mechanism to ensure that actions and measures taken by various actors were consistent and coherent as well as in line with political objectives. In their election programme, they described the 'R&D network Klimastadt' as an excellent instrument to develop and implement concrete projects within this framework, to make use of the existing scientific knowledge and to integrate those competences in the political work (Bündnis 90/DIE GRÜNEN Kreisverband Bremerhaven 2011: 32).

Apparently, the Green party managed to get the SPD to agree to its view on the concept Klimastadt during the coalition agreement negotiations. Already the preamble of the coalition agreement states: "We will advance an ecological reconstruction of the urban society under the objective Klimastadt Bremerhaven. For us, this includes the citizens as well as business, research, traffic, but also the quality of life and conditions for visitors in this city" (SPD und Bündnis 90/DIE GRÜNEN 2011: 3; translation by the author). Furthermore, the coalition agreement included a whole paragraph just on the Klimastadt. The two parties agreed that the term "Klimastadt" was more than a label related to the museum Klimahaus or offshore wind energy. Instead, the project should include all climate change mitigation and adaptation measures, such as in the areas of energy consumption and production, refurbishment of old buildings, and public transportation. The paragraph on the Klimastadt even dealt with green areas in the city.

The coalition agreement is also a sign that ecological modernisation perspectives have not

only been a major influence on policy-making at the national level, but also at the local level, e.g. the coalition agreement states that the coalition parties understand the structural change in Bremerhaven as one element of an "ecological and economic reconstruction of the economy" (SPD und Bündnis 90/DIE GRÜNEN 2011: 4).

To conclude, the previous findings suggest that the project Klimastadt Bremerhaven is indeed a political instrument or coordination mechanism used by the municipality to ensure that climate protection measures taken by various actors are consistent and coherent. Thus, the first part of the hypothesis can already be confirmed.

4.2.3 Setting Course for Klimastadt Bremerhaven

With a project coordinator and manager in place and a newly elected local government, the city of Bremerhaven was finally able to start moving towards its vision of a Klimastadt Bremerhaven in 2012. First of all, this meant the restructuring of the originally planned organisational structure. The main reason for this was the overstretch of the involved actors or an 'actor cannibalism' as Scherzinger (interview 14.2.14) has called it. From 2010 to 2012, the different strands of climate protection activities (municipal, regional, conceptual study) had created direct competition for project participants with a large number of events. Therefore, political decisions were taken to concentrate responsibility for all climate protection activities in the hands of municipal actors, after attempts to reach consensus had failed (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14).

The advisory board met for the last time in December 2011. It was abandoned because it had too many members (> 40), which made political steering impossible (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). Subsequently, a steering group for climate policies was created by the Office for Environmental Protection with members of the Environmental Department, the Department for Economics, the administrative office of the Klimastadt (programme manager and coordinator) as well as the project groups (Umweltschutzamt/Referat für Wirtschaft 2013: 4).

Moreover, the city had to define what the term "Klimastadt" meant, as the understanding of the term had already been misunderstood and caused some confusion. The aim was to establish the Klimastadt Bremerhaven as a local identifying feature in the long run. Therefore, a participatory process was started to create a declaratory commitment (a mission statement) for the future. It was the first time in the process that citizens could actually participate. The Institut für Informationsmanagement GmbH (ifib) in Bremen cooperated with the city of Bremerhaven to provide a website for an online consultation and the ifib also evaluated the participatory process as part of a German Research Foundation (DFG) project[34]. The Office for Environmental Protection opened a hotline for citizens without internet access who were able to submit suggestions in person during office hours (Umweltschutzamt 2012).

As of 18 January 2012, citizens discussed their views about the Klimastadt project under the following main guiding questions: "What is a climate city?", "How do we become a climate city?" and "How do we measure the success?"[35] Hence, a 'catalogue' was created to serve as a guideline and support for local decision-makers on the road to becoming the Klimastadt Bremerhaven. The whole participatory procedure was completed with a final presentation and discussion of the results on 22 May 2012 (Scherzinger 2012; Stadt Bremerhaven 2014a).

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[34]   For further information on the project, called "e2democracy", see: http://www.e2democracy.eu/content/sections/index.cfm/secid.1/secid2.0/lang.1 (ifib 2014).

[35]   After six weeks, the Office for Environmental Protection pooled 264 ideas and 202 comments into packages for which citizens could vote. Those were presented in a public meeting on 19 March 2012. From 21 March to 17 April 2012, citizens were able to vote for their preferred package (Stadt Bremerhaven 2014a).

The mission statement (see introduction) confirms the change in focus of what was understood by the term "Klimastadt"[36].

On 8 October 2012, the website "Kurs Klimastadt Bremerhaven" was activated. It documents all projects of the Klimastadt initiative and allows citizens to comment on all posts on the website (Klimastadtbüro 2012b).

The existing project groups went through a restructuring process as well, before they appointed spokespersons for the steering group. The reorganisation was shaped by the local perception of the problem climate change and the climate policy objectives set out in the 'master plan' and the KEP 2020 (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). In early 2014, there were six working groups, each responsible for projects in one thematic area of action, although all projects are supposed to contribute to a consistent, sustainable cityscape. The following three working groups still have the name proposed by the municipal council in 2010: (1) collaborative projects business/sciences, (2) citizens and schools, and (3) sustainable tourism. Moreover, there is the (4) communications working group, (5) the group on e-mobility and (6) the group focusing on construction and remediation (Klimastadtbüro 2014a, Umweltschutzamt/Referat für Wirtschaft 2013: 4f.).

Meanwhile, the city has also provided a basic financial foundation for the process. In 2012 and 2013, the environmental budget included € 70,000 for the Klimastadt working groups. In 2014 and 2015, there will be a budget of € 200,000 for the Klimastadt. Moreover, Bremerhaven' share from "BINGO - Die Umwelt Lotterie" ('environmental lottery') will be allocated to the project groups (ca. € 60,000/year) following a motion by the Greens.

On the initiative of the Environmental Councillor, a new Climate City Office was established at the beginning of 2014. It unites all actors of the Klimastadt process in one organisational unit including those working on issues of climate protection oriented public services, the sectoral development of the economic structure, and civil society commitment. In the long-run, this office should include two employees of the Office of Environmental Protection, two 'KEP 2020-Managers', the Klimastadt coordinator, its manager, one apprentice, one office employee (part-time), and one research assistant (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14; Umweltschutzamt/Referat für Wirtschaft 2013: 4ff.).

4.3 Key Actors of the Klimastadt Project

This section provides a more detailed assessment of the roles of the key actors of the Klimastadt[37]. It explains how non-state actors are integrated in the organisational structure of the Klimastadt, it identifies opportunities for municipal steering and it points out where local government can open up new spheres of activity and/or room for manoeuvre.

The Department IX (environment) is politically responsible for the Klimastadt project and the process of combining all climate protection activities in one comprehensive programme. It is led by an honorary councillor (Mrs Anke Krein from July 2011 to February 2014). The Office for Environmental Protection, which is subordinated to the Department IX, deals with issues of waste management, soil conservation, contaminated sites, nature conservation, forests, and water. It is also in charge of the eea quality management and the updating of the 'master plan active climate policy'. This also implies that it is the point of contact for the 'KEP 2020-Managers' (Stadt Bremerhaven 2012). The Office for Environmental Protection considers itself

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[36]   The change in focus of what was understood by the term "Klimastadt" becomes also visible, when two presentations of Mr Schulz-Baldes held in January and November 2012 are compared (Schulz-Baldes 2012a, b).

[37]   An organisational chart with key actors is provided in annex II.

as a "lobbyist for the climate" (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). That implies, all of its activities are oriented towards the 40 percent reduction target.

Since 2014, the Office for Environmental Protection is also officially responsible for climate protection and climate change adaptation (according to the municipal distribution of tasks). This allows it to act more forcefully within the administration and to legitimately claim the right to be consulted on all matters related to climate change. Mr Scherzinger explained: "Even if this new regulation is barely visible from outside the local administration, internally, this is significant progress for us, e.g. concerning the exact conditions of local financial incentive programmes related to climate protection measures" (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14; translation by the author).

The BIS supports the Klimastadt project with money for the Climate City Office and programmes for environmental promotion in local businesses ('green economy'[38]), as well as within its marketing strategy (BIS 2013: 6). The conceptual study assumed a leading role for the BIS (in addition to the Magistrat) (AWI 2009: 7ff.). Accordingly, the project management to implement the recommendations of the conceptual study has been carried out by the BIS. However, due to the project's shift in focus, the BIS is now neither directly represented in the new Climate City Office nor in the steering group (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14).

4.3.1 The Climate City Office

The new Climate City Office was established in the Environmental Department and under the supervision of the Environmental Councillor. It was created as a unit that would allow political steering of local government (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). Mr Becker noticed that: "The city wanted to be better organised" (Becker, interview 20.02.14; translation by the author). The aim was to allow local climate policy considerations and the CO2 reduction target to influence and shape not only the provision of services of general interest but also civil society processes which are not part of the traditional municipal scope of functions (Umweltschutzamt/Referat für Wirtschaft 2013: 1). The new institutional structure of the office also highlights its coordination function.

The new Climate City Office includes the climate protection activities in the traditional municipal areas of action (such as public infrastructure and services of general interest) which usually have no direct economic benefit and the former administrative office of the Klimastadt which has its origins in the R&D study and could be seen as the civil society/business strand of the project (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). While the traditional municipal sphere includes all self-governing activities of the Office for Environmental Protection and is shaped and developed by political decision-making, the civil society/business strand is where the local government opens up new spheres of activity and potential room for manoeuvre.

The former administrative office of the Klimastadt includes the programme coordinator and its manager. The program coordinator, Prof. Dr. Meinhard Schulz-Baldes, is a marine biologist who worked at the AWI and later as a professor at the University of Bremen. Furthermore, he was General Secretary of the German Advisory Council on Global Change to the Federal Government (Referat für Wirtschaft 2010b). His task is to advise the working groups, to

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[38]   'Green economy' is defined by the UNEP as "one that results in improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities. In its simplest expression, a green economy can be thought of as one which is low carbon, resource efficient and socially inclusive" (UNEP 2011: 16). Discussions around the concept of 'green economy' build in many ways on previous discourses, particularly discourses about ecological modernisation (Volkery/Rouabhi undated: 2, 6). The German federal government launched a 'green economy' initiative in 2012 (BMBF 2012).

generally coordinate all projects and to take forward their implementation. More-over, he represents the Klimastadt mainly through presentations and speeches as well as lobbying (BIS 2013: 6; Stadt Bremerhaven 2012).

The Klimastadt Bremerhaven project is managed by biologist Marc Liedke (Bremer Energie-Konsens GmbH 2014b, Umweltschutzamt/Referat für Wirtschaft 2013: 4). He coordinates the project groups and organises the external presentation in the media, e.g. he maintains the website (Stadt Bremerhaven 2012). In future, a new task for Mr Liedke could be to recruit and support businesses and companies that are willing to act as frontrunners of a 'green economy' in Bremerhaven. This plan was developed by the Environmental Department together with the BIS to strengthen the competitiveness of local companies (Umweltschutzamt/Referat für Wirtschaft 2013: 6).

The civil society/business strand allows no top-down steering. In contrast to the traditional municipal sphere, where the local government can directly control actions, political decision-making does not directly shape the work of the project groups that are administered and coordinated by Schulz-Baldes and Liedke. The collaboration of actors in the groups takes place on a voluntary basis through partnership and enabling. All action is therefore based on acceptance of the municipal procedures. Companies especially do not accept any predetermination regarding detailed project designs (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14).

Yet, to exert a certain authority vis-à-vis the former administrative office, Mr Liedke became an employee of the administration in April 2014 when he left his office in the KLIMA*HAVEN (Becker, interview 20.02.14). As an employee of the administration, new avenues open up for Mr Liedke inside local government. For instance, he is now authorised to write draft resolutions. On the other hand, he is subordinated to Mr Scherzinger which increases municipal influence on the former administrative office (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14).

4.3.2 The Steering Group for Climate Policies

The establishment of the steering group for climate policies was another attempt to enhance political steering capacity and thus increase political room for manoeuvre. Mr Scherzinger described the steering group as a coordination body that should allow the introduction of municipal climate policy objectives into the Klimastadt process through partnership. It can be seen as "the interface between local government and the project groups of the Klimastadt" (Umweltschutzamt/Referat für Wirtschaft 2013: 4, translated by the author, emphasis added). Though, it should be noted that the steering group is still in an orientation phase, and according to Mr Becker, it operates very much on the principle of 'learning by doing' (Becker, interview 20.02.14).

The following two departments of the Magistrat are represented in the steering group: the Environmental Department and the Department for Economics. They form the 'virtual climate department' to ensure the implementation of the R&D strategy (that was under responsibility of the Department for Economics) as well as the eea and the 'master plan active climate policy' (under responsibility of the Environmental Department). The 'virtual climate department' therefore was a tool to facilitate a consistent external communication and to ensure that the strategies and all measures were well coordinated with the region and the state (Referat für Wirtschaft 2010a: 2, Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). Thereby, the 'virtual climate department' functioned as an interface between the local government and the administrative office of the Klimastadt (Klimastadtbüro 2014b). Now, the new Climate City Office combines these two strands. However, the 'virtual climate department' is not yet

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outdated, because the Department for Economics provides knowledge about and access to funding pools such as the ERDF (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14).

The spokespersons from each of the working groups in the steering group shall promote exchange and networking among the groups. The steering group mainly discusses and recommends specific projects for funding. Thereby, the steering group is supposed to lead to transparent decision-making and to resolve the competition of project proposals. Decisions are taken on the basis of proposals with the obligatory objective to contribute to the 40 percent CO2 reduction target in some way[39]. According to Mr Scherzinger, financial incentives, which belong to governing through enabling, are crucial for the participation of business in the Klimastadt project[40]. The allocation of funds through the participation of the steering group signifies a partial integration of the voluntary working groups into the city's administrative procedures (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14).

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[39]   The money is released by the Environmental Department. Up to now, individual projects received € 5,000–20,000. To provide a budget for non-municipal projects has proven to be rather complicated, especially concerning projects that last longer than a financial biennium or the three-year-contracts for Mr Liedke and Mr Schulz-Baldes. This is why the funded projects are rather small in financial terms (Becker, interview 20.02.14; Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14).

[40]   Obviously, money is what the city does not have under the condition of budget plight. As assumed by local government experts, this represents a challenge for the local government. E.g. it has been difficult to achieve the participation of companies in the Klimastadt project (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14).

5. Project Area Buildings, Construction and Remediation

5.1 Working Group 'Construction and Remediation'

Of the six working groups, 'construction and remediation' is the most important one for this thesis. It originated from the working group 'environmental protection, nature conversation and urban development', which held its first meeting in July 2010 under leadership of the department head for buildings and construction, Volker Holm. At the second meeting in February 2011, the group was renamed 'construction and infrastructure' and still included members of the transportation infrastructure sector. By that time energiekonsens became a member of the group as well (Becker, interview 20.02.14).

The six group meetings under the leadership of Volker Holm were of an administrative manner for which no funding was made available. Thus, the actual outcome remained limited (as was also the case in other working groups). In May 2013, Mr Holm retired and Heinfried Becker, who is head of the Bremerhaven office of energiekonsens, took over the leadership while giving the group its current name. The group now includes actors from municipal and commercial construction as well as those working in the sector of single- and two-family houses (Becker, interview 20.02.14)[41]. Mr Becker also made other modifications, e.g. he changed the working methods of the group. Now, seven to eight people take general decisions on project issues. Specific projects are planned in smaller groups to save time for each member. Accordingly, Mr Wöhlken mentioned that the working group is luckily not meeting too often (Wöhlken, interview 25.02.14). Moreover, technicians and executive members often meet one after another to discuss problems that are specific to their field of knowledge or area of responsibility (Becker, interview 20.02.14).

Mr Wöhlken and Mr Lückehe both became members of the group in the summer 2013[42]. They pointed out that the benefits of the working group are especially its networking possibilities (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14; Wöhlken, interview 25.02.14).

5.2 The Project on Hydraulic Balancing

The working group 'construction and remediation' is currently working on a project on hydraulic balancing[43]. The project constitutes a very good example for assessing the motivation of the different actors. It also illustrates how topics enter the discussions within the group and are also taken up by individual members from the group.

The project, which is based on the enabling governing mode, was initiated after the idea by the local government and energiekonsens to train crafts enterprises in hydraulic balancing failed in Bremerhaven, because only one company showed interest (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). energiekonsens therefore approached the STÄWOG and the University of Applied

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[41] Apart from energiekonsens, Seestadt Immobilien, and the STÄWOG, the other members of the group are the administrative office of the Klimastadt, the Association of German Architects in Bremen, the Chamber of Handicrafts Bremen, the Chamber of Industry and Commerce Bremerhaven, the City Council of Bremerhaven (Department for Construction), the District Craft Trades Association Bremerhaven-Wesermünde, the Guild of the Building Trade Bremerhaven-Wesermünde, and the University of Applied Sciences Bremerhaven (Klimastadt Bremerhaven 2013: 15).

[42] The STÄWOG had been part of the working group since 2010. However, Mr Lückehe became general manager in August 2013, and therefore member of the group (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14; Stäwog 2013b: 2).

[43] The term hydraulic balancing describes the optimising of a building's heating or cooling system through a balanced distribution of water in different circuits to provide the intended indoor climate at optimum energy efficiency and minimal operating cost (Becker, interview 20.02.14). Hydraulic balancing is a rather simple and cheap possibility to significantly reduce CO2 emissions (Bremerhavener Modernisieren 2013; Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14).

Sciences within the working group to realise a pilot project on a simplified calculation method for hydraulic balancing. The STÄWOG now provides six structurally identical apartment buildings for the project. Two are run as before, two use the ordinary calculation method, and two use the new, simplified method of the University of Applied Sciences (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14; STÄWOG 2013a: 13). Mr Scherzinger and Mr Becker hope that the results of the study will have a stimulating effect on both businesses and citizens (Becker, interview 20.02.14; Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14).

With regard to the motivation of the various actors, Mr Scherzinger stated that the Office for Environmental Protection approached energiekonsens with the request to direct their attention to the private sector and especially the hydraulic balancing to take a further step towards the reduction target of the KEP 2020. Hydraulic balancing in private homes does definitely not fall within the traditional scope of functions of local governments. Therefore, this project supports the hypothesis of this thesis which is that the project Klimastadt Bremerhaven enables the city to increase its spheres of activity.

As the Office for Environmental Protection has neither the staff (or the technical knowledge) nor the financial resources to carry out its own projects, it depends on the cooperation (i.e. the governing mode partnership) with other actors such as energiekonsens or business companies (Becker, interview 20.02.14; Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). Accordingly, Mr Becker pointed out that the city has no priority fields of action, which means that energiekonsens or the working groups usually decide which specific project areas they want to work on. energiekonsens for instance, focuses currently on single- and two-family home owners (Becker, interview 20.02.14). Additionally, the issue of hydraulic balancing was not new to energiekonsens; on the contrary, they already had a programme on this issue in Bremen (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14).

For the Office for Environmental Protection and energiekonsens the reduction of CO_2 emissions according to the KEP 2020 is the primary goal for all activities. This is why energiekonsens is strongly committed to the Klimastadt project. In any case, the city of Bremer-haven has no direct influence on the work of energiekonsens as only the city of Bremen is one of the three shareholders. This implies guidelines and project areas are inter alia shaped by political considerations of the city of Bremen, e.g. Mr Becker explained that sensitising of consumers and similar 'soft' steering instruments have lately lost in importance for the benefit of projects concerning construction/remediation and businesses (Becker, interview 20.02.14). energiekonsens relies solely on the governing modes enabling and partnership. In the interview, Mr Becker explained that energiekonsens mostly coordinates projects and acts as a multiplier of best practices. Therefore, projects are typically implemented in cooperation with business or civil society actors, just as in the project on hydraulic balancing.

Mr Lückehe explained that the STÄWOG participates in the project, because of the collaboration with the University of Applied Sciences in Bremerhaven. He emphasised: "We want to support it as a study location and promote the quality of teaching through practical orientation" (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14, translation by the author). The STÄWOG does not depend on the (rather small amount of) money provided for the Klimastadt projects. Instead, Mr Lückehe participates because he believes "it is the right approach" (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14, translation by the author). Moreover, the steering group and the Climate City Office are of no relevance for Mr Lückehe. The same is true for Mr Wöhlken (Wöhlken, interview 25.02.14). This could be interpreted as a missed opportunity for political steering. Alternatively, it could be seen as a success to achieve a clear distribution of tasks that limits the 'actor cannibalism' mentioned by Scherzinger (interview 14.02.14).

Even though Seestadt Immobilien is not directly involved in the project on hydraulic

balancing, Mr Wöhlken stressed that the project topics are reflected by the various group members. For instance, Seestadt Immobilien decided to undertake its own study on hydraulic balancing. Two identical school buildings are part of this study. Hydraulic balancing will be carried out in one of the buildings. The energy consumption of both buildings is then measured over a period of one to two years. Moreover, Mr Wöhlken wants to introduce the issue of passive houses into the working group (Wöhlken, interview 25.02.14).

5.3 Modernisation Projects of the Interviewees and Municipal Influence

In the building sector, Bremerhaven has always been under pressure to reduce its energy costs because of its poverty (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). Therefore, energy-efficiency projects have been important to the interviewed group members even before the Klimastadt project was initiated. As stated by Wollmann (2006: 438f.; 2012: 437), the financial constraints of Bremerhaven prove to be a major limiting factor for municipal steering attempts and the possibility to increase municipal scope of action. The following project examples substantiate this finding.

The major energy efficiency projects of Seestadt Immobilien concern the new construction of day-care centres for children less than three years old (Seestadt Immobilien 2013: 53f.). Half of the new buildings (i.e. three) are constructed according to the certified passive house standard. The idea came from an employee and was then taken to the political level for a decision. This was necessary because the investment costs were considerably higher than for other new buildings. Mr Schneeberg stated that the Greens especially played an important role, as they highly appreciated the idea of passive house day-care centres (Schneeberg, interview 25.02.14).

The professional training of two employees for certified passive building was financed by Seestadt Immobilien with their own resources, "knowing that this is where the journey leads to" (Schneeberg, interview 25.02.14, translation by the author). Mr Schneeberg explained: "With regards to the EnEV, the differences in the standards are no longer so far apart […], and the guidelines of the EnEV are our benchmark for standard buildings" (Schneeberg, interview 25.02.14, translation by the author). The first daycare centre with passive house standard was supported by energiekonsens as a pilot project. For instance, the evaluation of the energy savings was paid by energiekonsens (and realised by the University of Applied Sciences Bremerhaven).

A 'show case project' was the renewal of the lighting system in the sports hall "Bogenstraße" that allowed energy savings of at least 60 percent, corresponding to the energy consumption of ten single-family houses. 40 percent of the costs were provided by funding from the National Climate Protection Initiative (Seestadt Immobilien 2014). Yet, most projects are funded through own municipal resources; additional grants are generally rare. This is one reason, why Seestadt Immobilien wants to enhance efforts to receive money from the KfW which is a state-owned investment bank (Schneeberg, interview 25.02.14).

Since 1997, the STÄWOG has improved the energy efficiency of approximately 2,000 of its 5,200 apartments. This energy-focused building refurbishment included at least a façade renovation and usually a renewed heating system. A major reason for this can be found in the declining housing market. The STÄWOG has to make an increased effort to rent apartments, and revenues are substantially lower than in growing markets. Moreover, energy costs

present an increasing challenge[44].

Thus, the STÄWOG has to find 'creative solutions' such as its own energy production. With its subsidiary STÄSERVICE, the STÄWOG has now served as an energy supplier for several years (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14; Schmidt 2013: 147f.). A decentralised generation of heat and electricity via combined heat and power technology is provided by nine block-type thermal power stations. Four of them have been put into operation in 2013. Currently, around 10 percent of all tenants are supplied with electricity produced in their own buildings. According to Mr Lückehe, this procedure is a win-win-win situation: environment benefits from reduced CO2 emissions, tenants pay 1.5 cents less per kWh than in the basic scheme of the local provider, and the company can generate additional profits (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14, STÄWOG 2013a: 4).

According to a study by the agWohnen[45], which was conducted by the Frauenhofer IFAM in Bremen, the STÄWOG emitted almost 9,500t CO2 in 2011. This corresponds to 24 kg/m2a which is the best result of all housing associations in the city state. The STÄWOG was able to reduce its emissions by 23 percent between 2005 and 2011 (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14).

The projects of the STÄWOG are highly appreciated. Mr Scherzinger stated "The STÄWOG develops its activities exactly where we need them" (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14; translation by the author). While the STÄWOG is in principle free to decide what it wants to do, in practice its staff is always open to discussions with the city and it has the community interest in mind. Moreover, local politicians have direct influence via the advisory board (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14; Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). In addition, the STÄWOG considers itself more of a service company for the city rather than a mere housing association as it formerly was (Stäwog 2013b: 7). Thus, the formal privatisation does not pose any problems.

Overall, the determining factor for modernisation projects is usually their financial feasibility. Thus, financial incentive programmes, are crucial for the work of the STÄWOG. These financial incentive programmes all belong to the 'soft' steering instruments of governing through enabling and highlight once again the importance of such steering instruments for the Klimastadt project.

Modernisation projects of the STÄWOG are almost exclusively supported by national funding programmes such as "Soziale Stadt" ('Socially Integrative City') and "Stadtumbau West" ('Urban Reconstruction West'), or the social housing promotion programme of Bremen which nevertheless includes requirements of a certain energy standard. The federal KfW programmes are basically used for every single energy-efficient modernisation project. The state programme "rationelle Energienutzung" ('rational energy use') helps to finance the block-type thermal power stations (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14).

Local politics only plays a very limited role in the allocation of funding, e.g. the local parliament and the building committee grant the money for the programme Stadtumbau West to the STÄWOG (Stäwog 2013b: 5). Besides, the incentive programmes, Mr Lückehe also mentioned local regulations that do matter, e.g. construction development areas ("Bauentwicklungsgebiete") with specific requirements (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14).

5.4 Overall Significance of the Brand Name "Klimastadt Bremerhaven"

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[44] There are two major challenges for housing associations: energy consumption and demographic change (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14).

[45] The agWohnen is a network of all major housing associations and companies in the state of Bremen.

In the interview, Mr Becker and Mr Wöhlken stressed that the term "Klimastadt" is still a rather vague term and has different meanings to different people. Mr Becker (interview 20.02.14) identified the existence of a kind of 'climate city spirit' ("Geist Klimastadt") which is stimulated by the climate protection measures of energiekonsens (among others). However, Mr Becker did not see the Klimastadt project as a tool to get citizens and business to actually take climate protection measures. On the contrary, he explained that several business actors had withdrawn from the process when the focus of the former R&D concept shifted and organisational structures remained unsettled (in the period 2010–2012).

Moreover, Mr Wöhlken (interview 25.02.14) mentioned that until now it has been difficult to motivate citizens to take action themselves. This poses a problem for the whole project as the local government is not able to implement the idea "Klimastadt Bremerhaven" on its own. Mr Scherzinger agrees: "On behalf of the Magistrat, we can usually only appeal to the private sector […]. Therefore, our project controlling with the 'master plan active climate policy' and the eea […] is effective only to a very limited extent. We are dependent on the initiative of businesses and private households in order to achieve our CO2 reduction target" (BIS 2013: 6, translation by the author).

Mr Becker therefore highlighted that Bremerhaven's societal actors should be integrated further into the project. In his opinion, the overall societal context of the project is very important, especially as the issues of climate change and climate protection are concerned. Yet, according to Mr Becker, political actors in Bremerhaven still hope that they will be able exert direct influence on non-state actors though the city's administration (Becker, interview 20.02.14).

As exemplified above, the STÄWOG and Seestadt Immobilien both stated in the interviews that climate protection projects are usually initiated within their own organisation and as a result of financial constraints. This finding suggests that the actors decide independently upon projects, so that the local government's scope of action would not be expanded. According to Mr Lückehe and Mr Wöhlken, the existence of the Klimastadt project only facilitates the communication of climate protection projects towards the local government. In addition, both stated that profitability is the major reason for action, including most energy-efficiency measures (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14; Schneeberg/Wöhlken, interview 25.02.14). These statements were confirmed by Mr Scherzinger who explained that lots of measures in the building sector are taken out of financial necessity (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14).

For the STÄWOG, Mr Lückehe described the relevance of the brand name "Klimastadt" as follows: "The brand name has a relevance to our shareholder, the city, and thus also for us" (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14, translation by the author). He perceived it as an 'orientation' that the STÄWOG picks up, although the project Klimastadt is not the reason why the STÄWOG undertakes modernisation projects. Instead the main reason is that the company wants to develop its housing stocks for the long term.

Nevertheless, municipal influence may be stronger, than it first appears as the Klimastadt project has also a rather concrete impact on the STÄWOG. As a municipal Ltd, the company takes a broader view towards the city's needs instead of concentrating solely on its own return as companies usually do. This implies that a renovation concept may sometimes be implemented even if this involves a financial loss for the STÄWOG. The decisive factor is the benefit for the shareholder which can be an improvement in urban structures, population growth or the contribution to an important political objective such as the Klimastadt[46]

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[46] This understanding of return of investment is discussed in the German literature under the term "Stadtrendite", meaning an added-value for the city apart from the financial return (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14), for further information see for instance Hartwig/Kroneberg 2012.

(Lückehe, interview 04.03.14).

Seestadt Immobilien attaches more importance to the Klimastadt project than the STÄWOG does. Mr Wöhlken explained: "The Klimastadt supports our own activities considerably" (Wöhlken, interview 25.02.14, translation by the author). The Klimastadt initiative becomes relevant if projects are on the brink of being unprofitable. In this case, the aim of becoming Klimastadt is an argument in favor of, for instance, passive houses, even if the payback period is ten years or more. In such cases, a balance has to be struck between economic considerations and the political goals.

As a city-owned enterprise, Seestadt Immobilien is aware of its exemplary function. This is why the visibility of climate protection measures is important to Seestadt Immobilien whose projects can motivate citizens to take similar action (Schneeberg/Wöhlken, interview 25.02.14). Mr Scherzinger also wants to create more publicity for the excellent facility management of Seestadt Immobilien (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14).

6. Conclusion and Perspectives

This dissertation has examined the potential of the project Klimastadt Bremerhaven to enable the local authority to expand its scope of action and to develop new spheres of activity in the policy area of climate protection.

The empirical part was based on several theoretical assumptions. As climate change policy is part of the voluntary tasks of local self-government, in principle the room for manoeuvre should be substantial (Difu 2011: 11). However, local government experts argue that it becomes more and more difficult for municipalities to fulfil those voluntary tasks. As was pointed out in chapter 3.2, this is due to three major trends – EU liberalisation, NPM, and budgetary crisis – that led to privatisations and, ultimately, to a fragmentation of cities' administrations. Therefore, local governments lost steering capacity (e.g. Bogumil 2006; Kuhlmann 2006; Wollmann 2006).

In general, this study has found that especially the budgetary crisis reduces municipal room for manoeuvre in the building sector, while EU liberalisation and NPM did not seem to considerably restrict the scope of action in this project area. This corresponds to more recent findings of Wollmann (2012: 437f.) who also identifies financial constraints as the major threat to local self-government.

Contrary to what had been suggested by Sack (2006: 31) and Wollmann (2006: 446), formal privatisation (as in the case of the STÄWOG) did not seem to cause any tensions between the logic of competitiveness on the one hand, and demands for orientation towards the general public interest on the other. This argument can be supported by the fact that Mr Scherzinger highlighted the valuable cooperation with the STÄWOG while Mr Lückehe explained the self-image of the STÄWOG as a service provider for the city (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14; Scherzinger, interview 14.04.14).

The assumptions of the multilevel governance approach in EU integration theories did not predict a clear cut trend for local steering capacity. While EU funding and opportunities for participation increase municipal room for manoeuvre, the necessity to operate on the supra-national or international level can also overstretch municipalities, especially those with limited resources (e.g. Fleurke/Willemse 2007; Münch 2006). The multilevel governance approach also emphasises 'soft' steering instruments such as city networks, monitoring and benchmarking or declaratory commitments in contrast to binding regulation (e.g. Wallace 2010: 98ff.).

The findings of this dissertation suggest that 'soft' steering instruments are indeed very important for the city to encourage the implementation of specific projects. Probably most important is the CO_2 monitoring of the KEP 2020 which is a central steering instrument for local climate protection measures. The working groups themselves and the project examples with municipal influence presented in this thesis can be categorised under the governing modes enabling and partnership. Even the mission statement is a declaratory commitment and therefore a 'soft' instrument. Governing by regulation proved to be important only for political framework programmes.

The empirical findings indicate that the hypothesis of this thesis can be confirmed. The analysis showed that the idea to make use of the project Klimastadt Bremerhaven as a coordination mechanism was introduced by the Greens in summer 2011. Moreover, the new institutional structure of the Climate City Office and the establishment of the steering group are supposed to ensure that actions and measures taken by various actors in government, business, and civil society are consistent and coherent as well as in line with the political

objective to reduce 40 percent of the city's CO2 emissions. To achieve this aim, the Climate City Office promotes networking, pools PR work, and coordinates activities of the participating actors.

With regards to the second part of the hypothesis of whether the project Klimastadt Bremerhaven is used by the municipality to increase its spheres of (political) influence and its scope of action, the empirical findings put forward in this thesis suggest that the local government has been partially successful in doing this.

The analysis of the development process of the Klimastadt revealed that the change of government in 2011 to a Red-Green coalition led to the launch of a process Klimastadt with the clear aim of a societal development and a participatory approach involving the population of Bremerhaven. Yet, according to the interviewed working group members, the Klimastadt has no motivating effect on them. On the contrary, they argued, the aim of becoming the Klimastadt Bremerhaven facilitates the communication of their climate protection and modernisation projects vis-à-vis the local government. This finding suggests that actors decide independently upon projects, so that the municipal scope of action would not be expanded.

However, concerning the local and regional political framework programmes, it was shown that the eea, but especially the KEP 2020 and the 'master plan active climate policy' are relevant instruments for political steering of state and non-state actors. The 'master plan' and the KEP 2020 are not only instruments of self-governing, but also tools to get other actors to contribute to the binding 40 percent target. As these programmes include projects of actors that cannot be directly controlled by the local authorities, the 40 percent target creates a certain obligation for all actors involved. It could be considered a success of political steering that all interviewees stated their willingness to contribute to this objective. That also implies that the local government increases its influence in spheres of climate protection activity that do not fall under the traditional scope of action of German municipalities.

The interview with Mr Scherzinger revealed that the new Climate City Office was mainly established to clarify responsibilities and to facilitate municipal steering. Thus, the confusion about the term "Klimastadt" and the different strands of the Klimastadt project, did not lead to unsettled responsibilities or a fragmentation of climate policies as local government experts might have argued. Instead the institutional structure with the new Climate City Office and the steering group was established to keep the whole project under the supervision of the Environmental Councillor.

The institutional arrangement was finally brought about by political decisions; in other words, through governing by regulation. Hence, the local legislative power (i.e. the Stadtverordnetenversammlung) did not face a decisive loss of influence as was suggested by Bogumil and Jann (2009: 194). Instead it has been crucial to establish the Klimastadt project and climate policy framework programmes.

The institutional set-up of the Klimastadt project now incorporates non-state actors in a partially administrative structure. This coincides with the growing role of non-state actors in decision-making processes assumed by Marks (1992; 1993) and is especially true for the steering group for climate policies and the working groups. The city is therefore able to influence areas that go beyond the traditionally municipal spheres of activity.

An illustrative example for this is the energy-efficient modernisation of public buildings and private houses in Bremerhaven examined in sections 5.2 and 5.3. As there are no direct steering possibilities vis-à-vis the working groups, the city uses 'soft' instruments such as networking and financial incentives to increase its scope of action in this area. Financial means (and in particular fiscal incentives) have proven to be crucial for the interviewed group

members. However, the sparse financial resources for the Klimastadt project groups were not of great importance to energiekonsens, Seestadt Immobilien and the STÄWOG. Instead, Mr Lückehe enumerated several financial incentive programmes of the German federal government and the state of Bremen that the STÄWOG uses for its modernisation projects. Thus, the financial constraints of Bremerhaven have proven to be a major limiting factor for steering attempts and the possibility to increase municipal scope of action in the area of building, construction, and remediation.

Energy-efficiency projects such as hydraulic balancing would have also been a suitable example to test the assumptions of ecological modernisation as environmental problems are tried to solve with the help of technological innovations in this case. Yet, this dissertation could not do so, due to reasons of space.

Another limitation of this dissertation is the fact that it focused almost exclusively on the local level. Therefore, several of the theoretical assumptions of the multilevel governance approach in EU integration studies can neither be confirmed nor rejected. Against this background, it would be interesting to conduct further research that should include action on the regional, national, supranational, and international level to assess the importance of such action (both in terms of opportunities and limitations). For example, it would be interesting to assess Bremerhaven's participation in city networks such as the Climate Alliance or the regional project IKSK. Both are suitable examples of horizontal cooperation which complements traditional hierarchical top-down governmental action according to the multi-level governance approach (Brunnengräber: 2007:333f.).

The 'integrated climate protection concept', for instance, was initiated by Bremerhaven and taken up by the well-established cross-state network Regionalforum Bremerhaven. In the long run, the IKSK could help to reduce emissions through an improved coordination of public transport and commuter streams in the region or it could facilitate district heating supply from Bremerhaven to Lower Saxony (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14).

Thirdly, this thesis only focused on the project area of buildings, construction and remediation. However, the KEP 2020 identified four areas of climate protection activities that are under the responsibility of cities and municipalities: (1) electricity and heat supply, (2) planning and construction, (3) mobility, and (4) traffic/transportation (Freie Hansestadt Bremen 2010: Preface). Taking an even broader view, Mr Schulz-Baldes determined six municipal areas of responsibility for climate protection while adding (5) internal organisation and (6) cooperation and communication (Schulz-Baldes 2012a: 6). Therefore, further research would be required to explore other areas of local climate action and to interview more actors from business and civil society with the aim of finding out whether the municipal scope for action, steering capacity, and modes of governing vary from one sphere of activity to another.

Fourthly, the area of climate change adaptation will gain more importance in the future. But for now, adaptation does not play any decisive role in Bremerhaven. Mr Scherzinger anticipated that it will not be until 2020 that the city starts to work on solid plans for climate change adaptation (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14).

Finally, the question concerning the long-term success of the project Klimastadt Bremerhaven cannot be conclusively answered as both the involvement of private sector actors and citizens has proven to be difficult to achieve. However, despite conceptual uncertainty, diverse understandings, and criticism, all interviewees agree that the idea of a Klimastadt is, in principle, a very good one. All interviewees supported the idea because they believe in the positive effects (both potential and realised) of the Klimastadt idea for both the city and its citizens in the long run. Mr Lückehe considered the positive image factor of the Klimastadt to be especially important (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14). Mr Becker was hopeful that the

Klimastadt can contribute to bring together the urban society in Bremerhaven while he concluded: "The brand name Klimastadt could result in an incredibly positive energy […], until now we can only guess what that could mean for Bremerhaven" (Becker, interview 20.02.14)

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Annex

Annex I: List of interviews

Date, Time	Interviewee(s)	Location	Duration
14.02.2014, 1 pm	Till Scherzinger, Office for Environmental Protection	Caspar David & Co., café-restaurant, Bremerhaven	1 h 45 min
20.02.2014, 11 am	Heinfried Becker, Head of the Office of energiekonsens in Bremerhaven	Office of energiekonsens in Bremerhaven (in the shared office KLIMA*HAVEN)	1 h 15 min
25.02.2014, 3 pm	Holger Schneeberg, Seestadt Immobilien, Head of Building Services Engineering Department; Lothar Wöhlken, Technical Operations Manager of Seestadt Immobilien (for the last 20 min)	Office of Seestadt Immobilien at the Stadthaus 4 of the municipal administration of Bremerhaven	1 h
04.03.2014, 3 pm	Sieghard Lückehe, General Manager of the STÄWOG	STÄWOG's registered office in Bremerhaven	1 h

Organisational chart of the *Klimastadt* project of Bremerhaven

Department for Environment

voluntary city councillor

- takes project funding decisions

Climate City Office

former administrative climate city office

(former R&D section)

- allows no authoritative steering

sector for public service provision, eg. eea, master plan

(traditionally in municipal hands)

- direct control
- shaped and developed by political decision-making

summons and leads the meetings

recommendations for project funding

steering group for climate policies

coordination

spokespersons, project proposals

working groups 1 - 6

(voluntary collaboration)

- planning and implementing climate city projects