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THE EXIT FROM TOTALITARIANISM IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE AND GLOBALIZATION

Ivan Vejvoda

Le bonheur est une nouvelle idée en Europe.

—Louis Antoine Saint-Just (1793)

The fact that men are capable of actions means that the unexpected can be expected... that [they] are able to perform what is infinitely improbable.

—Hannah Arendt (1958)

I. Introduction

The two-century period stretching from 1789 to 1989 is one in which the modern democratic revolutions of the West evolved through violence, strife, conflict, and negotiation toward the creation of more or less stable pluralist democratic liberal polities. The greatest wonder of the bicentennial celebration of the last of these democratic revolutions, the French, was that the last two hundred years of this millennium have witnessed a belated offspring of such revolutions. East Central Europe and the Soviet Union managed to shed their oppressive harnesses and embark on the long road leading to the exit from totalitarianism.

The *annus mirabilis*, 1989, during which many had hoped to see the stone of democracy appear underneath the rapidly crumbling stucco façade of communist rule, proved to be an overwhelming but short-lived euphoria. The realities of these largely dispossessed and disabled societies suddenly appeared in full light behind the vanishing institutions based on the monopolistic ideology of the *ancien régime*. The path to democracy and to mixed, predominantly market economies was going to be long and arduous.

It took France nearly one hundred years after the fall of absolutist monarchy to achieve a stable republican political order at the moment of the Third Republic in 1870. France had shed its old institutions — along with the privileges of the nobility and

clergy—created new institutions, and promoted popular sovereignty instead of the divine transcendence of royal power. The break with the *ancien régime*¹ heralded a “new beginning” and a will to create a new type of society and individual by obliterating the old and bringing forth new norms, customs, and traditions.² The old proved to be well embedded and resistant. Continuity and change thus struggled through a series of regime changes in which constitutional monarchy, Jacobin dictatorship, republican directorium, Bonapartist dictatorship, empire, etc. succeeded one another until the Third Republic finally brought stability. This reminder of the dynamic of one of the major democratic revolutions in modernity is brought forth simply to underscore the complexity and difficulty of regime change entailing the “invention of liberty”³ and the consequent “invention of democracy.”⁴ The length of these processes is self-evident.

This analogy is historically, politically, and even sociologically revealing in many of its segments, but, as with all such analogies, it can neither explain the present nor help us in the task of fully understanding the contemporary political and social processes. It can offer us some useful indications as to the complexities and intricacies of social and political transformation.

The key differences with respect to the historical example of the French Revolution are in the twentieth-century experiences of totalitarianism and globalization. Both totalitarianism and globalization determine in important ways the current developments in modern societies, East and West, but also in a particularly forceful way the societal dynamics of postcommunist societies. What is clear is that the often spontaneous and bottom-up process that led to the formation of states and civil societies, the public/private divide, free markets and enterprise, the rule of law, and political and civic rights, and which took at least a century or two to achieve in the West, needs now to be established, as one author has put it—in a perhaps simplified but striking manner—from above, by design, and in a hurry.

II. Legacies of Totalitarianism

The novelty of the phenomenon of totalitarianism⁵ has been compounded in this *fin-de-siècle* by the novelty and surprise of the implosion of communist totalitarianism forty-five years after nazi/fascist totalitarianism's military defeat.

To fully comprehend the breadth of challenges confronting the societies of East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, it is crucial to understand the effects of long-lasting totalitarian rule in the region — seven decades in the former Soviet Union and four decades in the other countries.

The “grand narrative” that came forth through the combination of Marxism and the nineteenth-century labor movement of constructing an alternative type of society to capitalism would, in Eastern Europe, eventually end in the more or less total subordination of societal energies to an unaccountable ruling elite, the self-proclaimed bearer of historical truth. What we have been witness to has been the “dialectic of enlightenment,”⁶ i.e., the transformation of emancipatory dynamics into repression, servitude, and unfreedom. During this process, the societies of East Central Europe were crippled and rendered completely passive. Society was collapsed into the state. One of the most destructive results of this type of communist/totalitarian logic⁷ was the dissolution of a civic spirit through the manipulation and instrumentalization of politics.

Ferenc Feher described communist politics as based on a “double anthropology — positive and negative.”⁸ The positive, rhetorical anthropology stated — in Stalin's words — that “man was [the regime's] greatest wealth.” The negative but true anthropological outlook of the regime was that “man,” the human being, was born imperfect and, thus, could not be trusted to partake in the “construction of the radiant future of socialism;” this, therefore, had to be delegated to those who knew the “laws of history,” its teleology. The political formula for the implementation of this anthropological view was that to ensure the extensiveness and mass participation of all in the construction of the “new society” and the “new human being,” each and every person had to be implicated in some way in the “political life” of the regime, from the cradle to the grave. On the other hand, since no one except the chosen few could be trusted,

the people had to be kept at bay and allowed nowhere near any meaningful political decision-making processes.

The long negative experience of only the manipulative side of politics not only atomized and fragmented society, leaving it unable to coagulate around its individual or group interest, but it also left a spirit of disgust with politics as such. No notion of a rational politics ever made its face known to the inhabitants of these countries. The bitter consequences of this are being felt in the aftermath of 1989. Rejection of politics as a dishonorable activity—one used only to promote the private and power-mongering lust of the *nomenklatura* under the guise of “rationally” paving the path to the more equitable and free society devoid of injustices — created strong sentiments of apoliticism or antipoliticism. The social legacy of communism,⁹ closely linked to this dire political legacy, has proved just as detrimental and difficult for the processes of the exit from totalitarianism in a largely globalized but also fragmented world.

The “reward” the inhabitants of communist countries received in return for agreeing to legitimize, i.e., give their support to—or at least not to contest the rule of—the communist leadership, was the existential security given them by the regime in terms of secured, permanent, and full employment; a regular salary; health care and social security; a secured pension; and, often, housing. Salaries and pensions were usually low but allowed the recipient a certain modest standard of living, and services were often of poor quality but were more or less always available. Housing, when available and distributed through firms and enterprises, was very inexpensive. The adage “We pretend to work; you pretend to pay us” sums up quite simply the culture of pretense that existed under communism. This was the opposite of a modern “risk society,”¹⁰ in which individuals are not protected by a state/social cocoon from either the effects of competition in a free market or from the globalized economy. Very meager possibilities for choice of lifestyle or none at all, and, to a great extent, a system of “dictatorship over needs,”¹¹ prevailed in Soviet-type societies. The “reward” was certainty, a sense of existential knowledge about what the future brings within, albeit a totally irrational, “surreal,” and undifferentiated social system in which the society, economy, and culture are fully dominated by instrumental politics.

III. Democracy as Loss of Certainty

The absence of rational politics, democracy, and any meaningful free public sphere in which people could voice their opinions, grievances, or interests, suddenly opened East Central Europe (with all the differences between the individual countries) to the path of a free-market economy and free political institutions, to pluralism, to multiparty structures, to the heterogeneity of opinions and interests, to institutionalized conflict, and to uncertainty. Democracy is fundamentally “instituted and maintained within the framework of a dissolution of certainties;” it dissipates the image of society as an organic totality, while ideology tends always to reconstitute certainty and a unity of sorts.¹² This loss of ideological communist certainty has most significantly been one of the essential political and sociological features of the events of 1989, along with the formidable gain of freedom. It has been important because it was to determine many of the interests, sentiments, and passions in the ensuing years.

These societies had been kept closed within the Soviet empire, closed to the world, or in a greatly artificial relationship to it. The world had evolved over the postwar period, developing ever more intricate economic, financial, and commercial ties. The sudden exposure of East Central Europe to the cold winds of worldwide economic competition, blowing outside of the abandoned cocoon of COMECON and related institutions, simply meant that a fundamental transformation was needed if these societies and economies were to become part of the world and to create a solid economic basis for stable polities. Such a transition meant the deconstruction of the communist “welfare state,” the end of “full employment,” and the end of certainty.

In its confrontation and first close encounter with the globalized economy, the “integrated” European Community/Union, and return to the “common European home,” what simplistically seemed to be the “end of history” or the “triumph of liberalism” turned out, in many instances, to be a “rebirth of history”¹³ and hence a quickly realized awareness that what was required was a rethinking of the ways of adapting the external, liberal democratic model (much cherished and sought after amidst the dissident circles during communism) to the specific political, social, cultural, and economic conditions of post-com-

munist societies. In fact, the question “After communism what?”¹⁴ suddenly came forth in all its complexity, linked to the loss of certainty and the vacuum of legitimacy incurred through the disappearance of communism. During the last decade or so of communist rule, while the dissidents to the regime had been conquering, in the face of great adversity, pockets of free public space, thus creating embryos of “civil society,” the population was much more enthused by the “western (consumerist) way of life,” its riches and pleasures. When the open society appeared in all its potentiality, the various desires and dreams of a better, freer, and richer life gushed into the liberated space.

IV. Cold Ideas versus Warm Havens: Passions and Politics

Hegel pointed out at the beginning of the nineteenth century that nothing had been done in history without passions. Ralf Dahrendorf has recently stressed and warned of the difficulty of gathering support for the cold ideas of democracy and the free market when confronted with the images of warm havens of community, ethnicity, blood ties, and belonging.¹⁵ The simplicity of the formula of an open society based on parliamentary democracy and a free market was, by necessity, immediately overshadowed by a broader view of democracy as not just a set of institutions, rules, and procedures—therefore, not just formal democracy—but of democracy as a political order founded on a pluralist and tolerant political culture, on “habits of the heart” (Tocqueville), customs, norms, or, as Hegel put it, on a certain *Sittlichkeit* (morality), namely on something much deeper, embedded in a structured state, a civil society where political power is out of bounds, where social spheres are differentiated and autonomous with respect to politics and to each other, thus enabling the free expression and action of individuals and groups.¹⁶

What could be forged on the spot were the institutions, rules, and procedures. The *pouvoir constituant* (Abbé Sieyès) was used to draw up the new constitutions, set the electoral laws, and define the procedures and rules. The democratic skeleton that emerged had to be dressed, but the dressing in which it appeared would require a much longer and more complicated process. Political parties were founded and formed, but their

legitimacy proved to be fragile; they were catchall parties with undifferentiated target groups groping in the dark. It was difficult to see the emergence of a political spectrum according to the traditional left-right divide.

Sociologically, the absence of a relatively strong middle class did not promise any quick consolidation of the newly founded democratic institutions. Coupled with the absence of a relevant civil society or modern state, fostering the beginnings of a democratic political culture imposed the questions: What path can be taken to exit totalitarianism? What direction should the transition take? Transition to what? And, if the direction was a democratic polity and a free market, were the steps taken to get there the correct ones? Finally, the issue of the "sequencing" (as theoreticians of transitions have named the order of change) of the transition arose. Indeed, what also became evident was that "the price of free politics, indeed of peace could be high."¹⁷

The meandering of the change and its pitfalls began to appear: the transition is often "blind to the complaints of many ordinary people in East Europe that what has occurred so far has represented no real change of system but merely a change of elites, and of the ideologies through which they legitimize their rule . . . [U]nder the ideological cloak of a constitutional state a process of economic reorganization is taking place which is preparing the way for the rule of a new privileged class, doing away with social welfare planning."¹⁸ In this sense, it was no surprise that after the velvet revolutions of 1989, and the velvet divorce of the Czechs and Slovaks, there occurred a series of "velvet restorations"¹⁹ in Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary. The price paid for the changes and the acquisition of freedom took its toll in the form of the return to power of former/reformed communists-turned-socialists or social democrats on electoral tickets promising the return of certain schemes of social security and a reduced pace of transition. But these "restorations" in no way meant a return to the old regime. The old monopoly of power had been cast away; the new had been ushered in, even if most convincingly in its formal apparel, but nonetheless there to stay. The system of totalitarian dictatorships had been overthrown. There seemed to be no danger of a return to communism, but only to greater political sensitivity for the plight of those who had suffered from "shock therapy." A

favorite Tocquevillian theme of continuity in change had been proved on yet another example of social transformation.²⁰

Not only was it therefore going to be hard to shed in a brief period the legacy of “communist political culture” —the “habits of the heart” developed under totalitarian states—and not only was the consolidation of the new internal institutional political architecture going to require much time and effort, but there was also a social price to be paid. Not all could be securely employed anymore; the dole would become an everyday feature of postcommunist countries, declining social services would start plaguing the everyday lives of postcommunist citizens, and their standards of living would oscillate with the ups and downs of world markets.

This new and, in certain facets, socially costly awakening to the insertion of the countries of East Central Europe into the dynamics of world markets provoked a specific kind of reaction.

V. Nationalism and Liminality

The reaction to the loss of certainty, the loss of (or liberation from) the communist iron cage, triggered a search for a post-communist identity that was often a search for a new certainty to replace the one recently lost. The call of “blood and belonging”²¹ seemed to be the easiest and the first at hand. What simpler identity than that of ethnic bonds. No particular ideological rhetoric or justification, no grand narrative required here except belonging to an ethnic group, community, or people different from the neighboring ones. A call for ethnic (organic) homogeneity as a means of legitimizing political power is a dangerous one because it requires a division between us and them, which usually antagonizes the “other” (minorities) within society or those outside of the given borders (other nations, ethnic groups).

The integrative processes of globalization have been accompanied by a parallel dynamic variously defined as particularism, regionalism, localism, and fragmentation. This refers to a trend whereby the global integrative processes are being both challenged and compounded in a complex manner by attempts to preserve local, regional identities in the face of ever increasing global cultural, economic, and consumer homogeneity.

The forceful return of the "national question" in East Central Europe, explained in some quarters by the "icebox" theory, namely that under communism all ethnic and national rivalries were kept in the "cooler," repressed by the regime. Consequently, with the thaw of 1989, those rivalries sprang forth in the form in which they had been frozen some four decades earlier. There is an important element of truth in the icebox thesis, but it covers only part of the explanation. What the icebox explanation wholly neglects is the development of nationalist sentiments and dynamics during the communist period itself.

In the last decade of communist rule, with the waning and ever greater ritualization of the dominant ideology, there occurred regimes that relied more and more on a legitimization through nationalism that was greater or lesser depending on each individual country. These processes were engendered from above by the *nomenklatura* in an attempt to keep their firm grip on the levers of power. They were then coupled with the revival and "organizing" of national sentiments from below in a capillary way. This double movement (from above and below) combined into a strong current after the 1989 collapse of communism. It produced nationalist ideologies and brought nationalist leaders to power through the first democratic processes. "Millions of inhabitants of the former 'really-existing socialist' regimes actually chose nationalism as the way out of the old system. There is thus no democratic way of eliminating nationalism, and the consequences of employing non-democratic means are there in these societies for all to see."²²

In addition, these first transfers of power from the old to new regime were most often conducted in the name of the "prevailing ethnic group in the state...and, thus, the 'people' could only be interpreted as this ethnic group, which, of course, puts the question of minorities into a very specific context."²³ This reduction of the people to the majoritarian ethnic group in the state was, of course, in many cases highly detrimental to the very idea of democracy because it meant that any citizens belonging to minorities were relegated to second-class citizens. This situation provoked sentiments of xenophobia, ultranationalism, the consequent secession, irredentism and/or border conflicts in more or less violent forms throughout the region. A phrase was coined (in Macedonia, supposedly) that summarizes with the

utmost clarity the whole dilemma: "Why should we be a minority in your state, when you can be a minority in ours?", i.e., to secede means not only to acquire one's own nation-state but also to avoid becoming a minority in the state in which this particular group had existed up until then probably on an equal footing with the majority ethnic group or nation.

This phenomenon, which is clearly not *only* a specificity of the region of East Central Europe, has been termed a "growing tribalism... the greatest threat to our survival... in the post-communist world"²⁴ or, simply, the "new tribalism."²⁵ Many of the reasons for this particular solution to the search for identity lie in the "liminality" (a no-man's land, an in-between stage) of the passage from old to new: "The moment society is sunk in the liminal condition, there is no way of predicting the shape of things to come. The forces that authored the dismantling of old societal forms are used up and exhausted; they meet their demise the moment their talk has been accomplished.... [N]ew forces will eventually crystallize; but only the memorized symbols and hastily invented traditions will retrospectively, provide their link to the past."²⁶

The uncertainty produced by the opening of a democratic order in which transcendent determinations of power give way to a free public space in which individuals jointly define the present and future of their societal life without the intervention of an exterior force leads not only to exacerbated national sentiments but more concretely to the "ethnification of politics."²⁷ "It is evident that the current ethnification of politics in the postcommunist world, apart from the emotional gratifications it may have to offer, involves a number of serious dangers, such as "dangers of civil war and international war."²⁸ We have seen these conflicts erupt in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, particularly in the region of Transcaucasia.

More generally, the countries of East Central Europe have undergone a process of modernization without modernity, namely one in which they have achieved varying degrees of modern technological development as well as different levels of consumerism (in particular in urban areas and among the middle classes) but without the framework of modern democratic institutions and in an often pervasive traditional and paternalistic societal setting, including the "patronage state" that rein-

forced these traditionalist patterns of behavior. This situation has created great tensions manifest in the aftermath of 1989 between the “modernizers who embark upon a ‘return to Europe’ versus the conservative Christian, populist, and rural forces who prefer a ‘return to ourselves.’”²⁹ These tensions fall on fertile ground when the disaffection with democracy, produced by the impossibility of the fledgling political and economic institutions to deliver the unrealistic expected “riches” (dreamed of and cherished mainly by way of accessible Western television programs) lends to anti-Western sentiments. The race between “the falling standard of living and the rise in unemployment” (producing the “losers,” i.e., those paying the price of the change) and the need to “restructure” creates a situation in which “everybody wants to be rich, but no one wants to earn money.”³⁰

In these fragmented and disabled societies, memories of the old, communist “delivering state” link up with the firsthand experience of the undelivering new, democratic, free-market state, leaving “ethnicity and nationalism [as] virtually the only things [that can] provide guidance for collective action.”³¹ Depending on the specific situation, circumstances, and political culture of the country, these dynamics can deteriorate in such a way that the majority ethnic group seeks scapegoat minorities or cross-border animosities to “relieve” social tensions.

The need to entrench human and civil rights, to secure the status of minorities so that they do not dwell in limbo as second-rate human beings in “their state,” is fundamental to any process of crafting democracy in these countries. Again, in societies in which “legal nihilism” was the order of the day and the communist leadership was prosecutor, judge, and jury, it will be a lengthy process to assure the independence of the judiciary.

It is only through slow, painstaking simultaneous advance on all fronts of change and transformation (political, civil-societal, economic, cultural) that the foundations of modern democratic politics and society — legality, plurality, and publicity — can be installed and consolidated.

VI. Politics, Civil Society, and Democracy

Are we facing a postcommunist future of raw, or “low intensity,” democracy³² due to the likely possibility that the economy will not produce, in an acceptable time span, the highly desired and awaited prosperity, or will this have no bearing on the process of democratization? Will the need to “reconstruct society politically, by forming democratically accountable assemblies that can unite legitimacy and effectiveness, . . . [which] amounts to constructing the building of liberal democracy from the top floor down,”³³ allow the necessary space for social and political imagination to be fully developed?

The influential experience of “civil society” under communism has proved much weaker in conditions of postcommunism. In fact, the demands of public responsibility by a civil society are more arduous in a democratic system. “When one expects a reflex of political responsibility for the public good from it [civil society] one can see that on the political ‘market,’ a certain demagoguery and populism are much quicker at gaining support from it.”³⁴

Without civil society, democracy remains implausible.³⁵ Democratic habits can develop through a confrontation of interests, a debate of opinions in the public sphere, which is one of the poles of a civil society. But civil society without a redignifying, an “ennobling of politics,”³⁶ a clear manifestation of its rationality, will not be able to come forth. Postcommunist states must also develop their modern contours without waiting for the strengthening of civil society. But reciprocal controls are fundamental. In the absence of one or the other, dangers lurk that ultimately can delay, maybe even destroy, the ongoing positive processes of democratization and pluralization. It will be difficult to struggle upstream against the endemic apoliticism and the retreat into the private sphere, so tempting for individuals worn and torn by decades of communist repression and uniformity. The apprenticeship of conflict resolution through negotiation and compromise (a four-letter word under communist rule) and the awareness that homogeneity is a poison for democracy and that institutionalized conflict is the driving force of modern society and politics are of the utmost importance in East Central Europe today.

VII. Globalization and Solidarity

The “exit from the period of Terror”³⁷ in the French Revolution sparked an important debate on the way that particularly violent and bloody episode of the revolution was to be understood, interpreted, and situated (or not) within the framework of French history.

The sea of change of 1989 posed much the same questions to the individual countries as to the place of the “episode” of communism in their history, but it also posed to Europe as a whole the question of the broader, far-reaching effects of the post-1945 settlement. The “East Europe revolution against Yalta”³⁸ was the long exit from an international iron cage that had been imposed on East Central Europe by the Allied victory in the Second World War. East Europe was left to its fate under Soviet rule, with little chance of liberating itself. When the exit finally occurred in 1989, along with the euphoria, there were those in the West who were “shamefully obsessed” by fears of what it would all cost the taxpayer.³⁹

Because of the interconnectedness of Europe, the burden of responsibility fell equally, but in different ways, on the until-then divided sides of the old continent. Hopes of quick integration of the East into the Western/joint security, political, economic architecture were quickly dissipated. A considerable degree of solidarity and mutual involvement had to be demonstrated for the long-lasting imbalances to be overcome, but much more so to avert any possible backlash of totalitarianism, internal and external.

The 1989 events had changed more than just East Central Europe. The collapse of communism sent a shock wave that destroyed not only the cold war system, but also the enemy image against which the West had so successfully managed to integrate itself and create stable institutions and relations. The disappearance of the enemy proved to be a much greater problem than was first apparent. The relaxation of tension meant that Western nation-states were freer to pursue their national interests in the face of deepening economic problems. The progressive inward turn of these nation-states, their reluctance to support much more forcefully the changes in East Central

Europe with a comprehensive plan, have not helped the image of democracy in the East of the continent.

The disappearance of all three communist federations (USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia) was no particular surprise because of their part-federal-state character. The violence of the Yugoslav breakdown and the conflict in Transcaucasia were fortunately not the rule for the other "ethnic hot spots" in the region. But what the Yugoslav breakdown showed in particular was the absence of will (and resolution) to confront what has now turned into a long-lasting violent conflict (circumscribed to Bosnia and Herzegovina and parts of Croatia) but that at the beginning, with more determination and a greater understanding of the dangers of the exit from communism in multiethnic societies, could have been averted.

The stability of the Third French Republic of 1870 (in terms of East Central Europe) is a distant and, at the same time, not so distant prospect. The process will clearly be long. It is succeeding in many respects with all the concomitant back-stepping and pitfalls. What one should be fully aware of is that both good and bad scenarios are still possible in a Europe that is now only a mere six years away from 1989.

Tocqueville in his recollections wrote, "In terms of social constitution the domain of what is possible is much broader than people living in each particular society can even imagine."⁴⁰ He thought that the political life of nations constitutes a whole in which laws, institutions, sentiment, passions, ideas, religion, and morality are inextricably linked. It is in the complex chemistry of these elements that the unexpected is to be expected.

Notes

1. Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1973) especially chapter 1 on the issue of the "new beginning."
2. Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
3. Jean Starobinski, *L'invention de la liberté: 1700–1780* (Geneva: Skira, 1964).
4. Claude Lefort, *L'invention démocratique—les limites de la domination totalitaire* (Paris: Fayard, 1981).
5. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973): 460–79.

6. Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente* (Frankfurt: a.M. Fischer Taschenbuch Verl., 1971, c1969); and its translation, John Cumming, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (New York: Continuum, 1982, c1972).
7. Claude Lefort, "The Logic of Totalitarianism" in John B. Thompson, ed., *The Political Forms of Modern Society* (Cambridge, England: Polity, 1986).
8. Ferenc Feher used this analysis in a debate at a seminar at the Inter-University Center in Dubrovnik on April 10, 1984. See also Feher's somewhat different wording of the same idea whereby the official propaganda of the communists declares the mass of people to be "the paragon of all virtues but who are regarded in the 'secret doctrine' as the incorrigible waste product unworthy of their status as subjects," in Ferenc Feher, Agnes Heller, and Gyorgy Markus, *Dictatorship Over Needs* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983): 260.
9. See, e.g., James R. Millar and Sharon L. Wolchik, eds., *The Social Legacy of Communism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
10. Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society* (Cambridge, England: Polity, 1992).
11. Feher, Heller, and Markus, *Dictatorship Over Needs*.
12. Claude Lefort, *Essais sur le politique XIXe–XXe siècles* (Paris: Le Seuil, 1986). 28 and 29.
13. Michael Glenny, *The Rebirth of History* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1993).
14. Stephen R. Graubard, "After Communism What?" *Daedalus* 123, no. 3 (Summer 1994).
15. "The whole point of democracy and a market economy is that they are not ideologies or systems, but mechanisms for sensibly dealing with changes in society, transitions, changing viewpoints, positions, interests and taste. But this leaves an open question, namely: 'Where do I belong?'" Interview with Ralf Dahrendorf, *Lufthansa Bordbuch*, no. 6 (1992), 35.
16. Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).
17. Bernard Crick, *In Defense of Politics* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1993), 242.
18. Bill Lomax, "From Death to Resurrection: The Metamorphosis of Power in Eastern Europe," *Critique*, no. 23 (1993): 48–49.
19. Adam Michnik, "The Velvet Restoration," *Bulletin — East Central Europe Program of the New School for Social Research* 5/1, no. 16 (October 1994): 1–7.
20. Alexis de Tocqueville, *L'Ancien Régime et la révolution* (Paris: Flammarion, 1856).
21. Michael Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1994).
22. Z. Puhovski, "The moral basis of political restructuring," *Political Restructuring In Europe: Ethical Perspectives* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994): 219.
23. *Ibid.*, 218–19.

24. Ralf Dahrendorf's remark in the book-length debate with Francois Furet and Bronislaw Geremek on the problems of democracy in Europe after 1989. Ralf Dahrendorf, Francois Furet, Bronislaw Geremek, and L. Caracciolo, eds., *La democrazia in Europa* (Laterza, Italy: Bari, 1992): 86.
25. Michael Walzer, "Notes on the New Tribalism," *Dissent* (Spring 1992).
26. Zygmunt Bauman, "After the Patronage State" in *The New Great Transformation: Change and Continuity in East-Central Europe*, Christopher G. A. Bryant and Edmund Mokrzyck, eds., (London and New York: Routledge, 1994): 15–18.
27. Claus Offe, "Ethnic Politics in East European Transition," *Papers on East European Constitution Building*, no. 1 (1993), Zentrum für Europäische Rechtspolitik an der universität Bremen.
28. *Ibid.*, 13.
29. *Ibid.*, 15.
30. Bauman, "After the Patronage State," 24.
31. Offe, "Ethnic Politics in East European Transition," 26.
32. Barry Gills, Joel Rocamora, and Richard Wilson "Low Intensity Democracy," *Third World Quarterly* 13, no. 3 (1993): 501–23.
33. S. Holmes, "Back to the Drawing Board: An Argument for Constitutional Postponement in Eastern Europe," *East European Constitutional Review* (Winter 1993): 25.
34. Bronislaw Geremek, "Les déçus des 'révolutions de velours,'" *Le Monde des débats* (March 1993): 8.
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