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Late for a Very Important Date: The United Nations in Wonderland

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The United Nations at Fifty:
A Reform Agenda

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[L]et us be frank with each other, and with the peoples of the United Nations. We have not yet achieved the sweeping and fundamental reform that I and many others believe is required. Sharp differences, some of them substantive and legitimate, have played their part in preventing that.[1]

<div align="right">Secretary-General Kofi Annan</div>

I. Introduction

*T*he United Nations has just gone through a very unhappy birthday year. Its sixtieth birthday was supposed to be a year of reform, renewal, and regeneration. Secretary-General Kofi Annan launched the reform process, fully aware that the credibility of the U.N. was at stake. Two years before its birthday, in 2003, the Security Council was marginalized when the United States and its allies went around the deadlocked Council to go to war against Iraq. A serious and damaging story of U.N. mismanagement of the important Oil-for-Food program in Iraq came to light in 2004, and the Volcker Commission that investigated it reached into the Secretary-General's office when it assigned responsibility. The run-up year to the birthday party can best be described—in the words of the Secretary-General—as an *annus horribilis.* The legitimacy of the United Nations, its capacity, and its relevance, were all at issue.

Partly in response to these very difficult years, but also in recognition of deep structural changes in the post-Cold War global order, the Secretary-General commissioned a series of high-level panels and reports to advise him on a process of reform that would better equip the United Nations to face the challenges of the twenty-first century. The world in which the United Nations was created in 1945—one of all-encompassing war among states and formal empires—was no more. The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, the long frozen stalemate through the heart of Europe and proxy wars

worldwide, ended forty years later. The post-Cold War euphoria and the hope that a newly invigorated U.N. would finally be free to fulfill its founders' hopes dissipated in the killing fields of Rwanda and the Balkans. The early years of the twenty-first century, especially after September 11th in New York, were like a splash of cold water, inviting a sober reappraisal of security and sovereignty.

The first high-level panel, appointed to examine the growing importance of civil society and non-governmental organizations to the work of the U.N., released its report in 2004. The second high-level panel was asked to examine the challenges to collective security, the core of the United Nations' mandate. In its report, released in the autumn of 2004, it looked first at the prevention of threats to collective security, then at the conditions that shape the use of force, and, finally, at the institutional reforms necessary to equip the U.N. to deal with the new challenges. A third appointed panel published its commissioned report in January 2005 on the responsibilities of the United Nations in meeting the challenges of development.[2]

The three reports provided a rich source of analysis and commentary that informed the thinking of the Secretary-General as he prepared for the special summit of world leaders on the sixtieth anniversary of the United Nations. In his response, the Secretary-General knit together the fundamental values and commitments that would inform a reinvigorated United Nations. He defined the interconnected challenges as development, security, and human rights—freedom from want, freedom from fear, and freedom to live in dignity.[3] Annan issued a series of challenges, requiring specific decisions, to the 154 heads of state and government that came to New York for the World Summit, held September 14–16, 2005.

The year of reform has now passed. How well did members of the United Nations do in meeting the challenges outlined by the Secretary-General? The short answer is that the glass is half full. We can argue about whether the glass is half empty or at least half full, as the Secretary-General concluded after the summit.[4] To explain why I reached the judgment that the glass is at best half full, I begin by looking at the conceptual innovation the three reports provide to frame contemporary challenges in security, development, and human rights. What kind of world order, if any, do we have? Is the U.N. protecting a global order that is structured and legitimate, or is it an important part of restructuring a global system that is fragmented and contested? The

answer to this question matters in creating reasonable expectations of what the U.N. can and cannot do.

As I consider the three broad normative categories of freedom from want, freedom from fear, and freedom to live in dignity, I look at particular clusters of challenges that speak to each of these normative concerns and constitute the core of the reform agenda. I stay away from the thorny issue of Security Council reform, a perennial issue, which has resisted solution for decades and, for that reason, seems an unfair test of the adaptability of the United Nations.

- In considering the freedom from want, I assess how well the U.N. has done in putting in place a global partnership for development, in moving toward goals of debt reduction, in setting standards for development assistance, and in putting in place the coalitions and machinery that will enable progress toward the Millennium Development Goals.

- In considering the freedom from fear, I look at changes in the conception of sovereignty and their consequences for peace and security. Has the U.N. been able to develop the capacity to respond to threats to human security that challenge deeply embedded concepts of state sovereignty? Has the U.N. moved forward on the basket of issues that we call peace building and post-conflict reconstruction? Is the U.N. better equipped to address the security challenges that are likely to emerge when states are only one of many players, military technologies are being miniaturized, and militias are armed with technologies that cross borders?

- In considering the freedom to live in dignity, I look at how far the U.N. has moved on making human rights a meaningful and important component of its institutional machinery. Has it been able to build in an element of accountability, so that states that routinely and massively violate human rights are no longer represented in key institutions?

- Finally, I look at the important, if unglamorous, issue of management reform. Without improvement to its capacity to manage, the U.N. will be unable to deliver better performance. In this birthday year, have some of the glaring deficiencies in management processes that hobble the United Nations been corrected?

This kind of assessment should permit a balanced scorecard, an evaluation of how far the U.N. has come in the last year, and how well equipped it is to face the big challenges of the decade ahead. Is the U.N. likely to be one of the core institutional building blocks of global security, or is it likely to fade into voluble obscurity, a place to stop and talk, but not much more?

One caveat: It is paradoxical that defenders of the U.N. routinely attack the convenient fiction that there is a United Nations. There is no United Nations, they insist, but rather a collection of governments that come together in the General Assembly, in the Security Council, in the Human Rights Council. The U.N. is "us," the member states. When the U.N. fails to act, to manage, to reform, it is not the U.N. that is failing, its proponents claim, but its members. It is "we" who are failing. It is, by extension, unfair to hold this abstraction we call the United Nations accountable for our failings.

This argument strikes me as disingenuous. If the argument is that intergovernmental bodies with broad mandates are crippled *ab initio*, that they are by nature suboptimal performers, then we need to take the argument seriously indeed and look creatively to other kinds of institutions to meet the challenges of global security. This is an argument that many admirers of the U.N. resist, and resist strongly.

Alternatively, one can argue there are many bodies that are intergovernmental and there are many institutions that have both very difficult stakeholder communities and principal-agent relationships. The U.N. is unique in the extraordinarily broad scope of its membership and its mandate, but not in its intergovernmental composition or its stakeholders. Its challenges differ in degree but not in kind.

A more fruitful way of conceiving the United Nations is not as a single institution but as at least three: an intergovernmental organization of states that constitute its core membership; the secretariat that staffs, manages, and leads the work of the intergovernmental organization; and the communities of experts and non-governmental organizations that work closely with the first two.[5] It is up to the leadership of all three United Nations to navigate the shoals of governments as members and to manage through to better outcomes. Although the responsibilities and the performance of all three are closely intertwined, it is possible to develop reasonable expectations of each in their respective areas of responsibility. The mandate of the U.N. makes it too important to have no expectations whatsoever because it is an intergovernmental institution.

II. The Freedom from Want

Perhaps the best place to dissect the emergent architecture in which the United Nations lives is the report the Secretary-General prepared to inform the debate of the special session of the General Assembly in 2005. Much of what Kofi Annan tells us about development would be familiar to students of global politics reading a similar document twenty or thirty years ago, but some would not. What is also new is the dense interconnections that he draws across his reform agenda.

The Secretary-General begins with the most basic: freedom from want, the fundamental right of people to live free from hunger and with drinkable water, decent shelter, and freedom from preventable disease. These basic economic and social rights have been recognized for decades as fundamental, but the report treats them as bedrock, as foundational. The report moves beyond these foundational rights, however, to connect them to a bigger basket of rights. "In larger freedom," the Secretary-General writes, "encapsulates the idea that development, security, and human rights go hand in hand… . Not only are development, security, and human rights all imperative; they also reinforce each other."[6] This phrase merits attention. It captures fragments of the new paradigm that the Secretary-General uses to frame the global environment of the United Nations.

First, development is justified not only for its own sake, but also as the critical underpinning of global security. Poverty (which kills 20,000 people every day), disease, inequality, displaced people that number approximately 25 million (nearly one-third of whom cannot be reached by the U.N.), and permanent communities of refugees all degrade the human and social condition. They simultaneously create the preconditions for the militarization of states and for the "militiazation" of politics by aggrieved young people who see no hope and no future. Threats to world peace and security, at the core of the mandate of the United Nations, are no longer restricted to territorial disputes among sovereign states. They take many forms but they all grow and thrive in an ecology of scarcity.

The focus of the United Nations is on the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, agreed to in 2000, elaborated in Monterrey in 2002, and targeted by 2015.[7] Jeffrey Sachs, in his commissioned report, urged the U.N. to promote a number of "quick wins" to create momentum and also to dispel widespread donor fatigue and cynicism that development assistance can be effectively used and actually con-

tribute to development. In his response, the Secretary-General urged developing states to recommit themselves to increasing development assistance to 0.7% of their budgets—a longstanding target—in order to better help countries with honest, committed governments to escape "poverty traps." In language that would not have been familiar twenty years ago, however, he also urged developing countries to take "primary responsibility" for their own development by "strengthening governance, combating corruption, and putting in place the policies and instruments to drive private-sector-led growth and maximize domestic resources to fund national development strategies."[8]

The Secretary-General's report reflects the new forces that are shaping the environment of the U.N. and redefining the challenges. A second core element of the new paradigm of development is that states and international institutions are no longer the only or, at times, the primary actors in development. Although part of the new paradigm is certainly an emphasis on the responsibilities of the developed world, there is also an emphasis on the responsibilities of developing countries, on their nationally developed and "owned" strategies to reduce poverty. Less expected is the attention given to strengthening the role of the private sector, and to the role of civil society.[9] The leadership of the U.N. no longer sees development exclusively as a state-based responsibility, but as a partnership among international institutions, the private sector, global and local civil society, and the developed and the developing world. In this complex and closely connected environment, the U.N. emerges as one among several nodes with a special responsibility to enable and facilitate development.

A. Progress on Development

How much progress has been made on development? Over half the final outcome document of the World Summit deals with development, an indication of its central importance to the vast majority of members of the General Assembly. But how much new ground was broken? Very little. The United States, unenthusiastic originally about the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), did agree to accept them as the frame of reference for ongoing work in development. Yet it is already transparently clear that most of the Millennium goals will not be met, and that, in some cases, the gap is widening. To be fair, expectations were set very high and the United Nations has played a key role in setting the norms that shaped these expectations.[10]

More to the point, the World Summit affirmed work that had already been done, without pushing the agenda much further. Under the leadership of the Secretary-General, leaders knit together the new players in international development in a much more comprehensive way. Nevertheless, progress on the core building blocks has been very limited, even in the months following the special session of the General Assembly. The World Summit did push forward some very general proposals for financing development, even though no new major commitments were made.

The Secretary-General, as we have seen, asked member states to recognize the global partnership for development, with an interlocking set of roles and responsibilities. This the World Summit did, paying special attention to the responsibility of states receiving development assistance to enact good governance and mobilize domestic resources. In return, the final document speaks of a graduated increase in development assistance, with specific deadlines. However, these deadlines had been largely agreed to by the European Union before the Summit. The final document also speaks of innovative financing instruments: an International Finance Facility and a levy on airline travel, an idea proposed over a decade ago. No binding commitments were made at the Summit. Progress on both these issues took place among a "coalition of the willing" around the edges. The Summit did not put global capital markets and the international financial institutions on its agenda. At most, we can argue that the World Summit was a spur to activity by other institutions outside the U.N. family.

Members were also asked to accomplish a focused set of objectives.[11] The rate of progress tells us something important about the complexity of the development environment, and about the challenging role of the U.N. as enabler.

- There has been some limited progress on debt reduction, largely as a result of civil society working through the Group of Eight. The G-8 proposed in 2005 to cancel 100 percent of the outstanding debt that the eighteen most heavily indebted poor countries owed to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Development Association (IDA), and the African Development Bank (ADB)—a nominal value of $40 billion over 40 years, or a savings of $1 billion annually for all the 18 countries. They will still have to pay their debt to other multilateral creditors. Moreover, the IDA and the ADB will be reducing gross aid payments to each of these countries by

the amount of debt cancelled, and redistribute the funding among all IDA and ADB lenders within the category. This means that these eighteen most heavily indebted countries will benefit much less from the reduction of their debt. The G-8 also agreed to provide additional resources to the three lenders so that their financing capacity is not reduced by the cancellation of the debt payment.

Much of this work took place outside formal U.N. machinery. The World Summit meeting did recommend cancellation of 100 percent of the official multilateral and bilateral debt of twenty other heavily indebted poor countries.[12] Beyond the most heavily indebted, the Summit spoke only in the vaguest of generalities: relief would be on a case-by-case basis, based largely on the sustainability of the individual debt. There was no progress on the long-demanded redefinition of what constitutes a sustainable debt. This kind of commitment does not provide much of a road map forward on responsible debt forgiveness.

- The Doha Round of multilateral negotiations, managed within the World Trade Organization, remains deadlocked over the contentious issue of agricultural subsidies in developed countries, which effectively block agricultural exports from developing countries.

- Some of the "quick win" initiatives suggested have been led by private foundations, notably the Gates Foundation, and by non-governmental organizations. Progress has been greatest in public health, but it has been made largely outside the World Health Organization and UNAIDS. This kind of pattern is likely to grow in importance over time.

On the fringe of the Summit, the "Lula Group" (Brazil, France, Chile, Spain, Germany, and Algeria) proposed the introduction of a solidarity contribution on airline tickets.[13] The proceeds would go in part to refinance the International Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFIm), which was created just before the World Summit by Britain, Spain, Italy, Sweden, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. They expect the IFFIm to help raise $4 billion in international capital markets over the next decade to support the work of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI). The British hope to demonstrate the possibility of raising development assistance through capital markets. Although the concept of development aid on credit garnered little

support in the final document of the World Summit, the first proceeds from the tax on air travel have begun to flow to IFFIm.[14]

- On increasing development assistance, the World Summit codified what individual and groups of countries had already agreed to do. In June 2005, for example, the EU agreed to increase ODA to an EU average of 0.56% of GDP by 2010 and to 0.7% by 2015.

How do we assess the role of the United Nations on a set of issues that the Secretary-General has identified as critically connected to the foundational mandate of the organization? The Secretary-General played an important role in setting norms, defining expectations, and drawing out key decisions and markers that should be met. His was the "bully pulpit," a not inconsiderable role and responsibility. That bully pulpit was effective in stimulating governments and non-governmental organizations to make new commitments and launch new initiatives in preparation for the World Summit. Even though decision making was situated in multiple sites—a few within the United Nations but many outside of its formal structure, even its extended structure—the Secretary-General set the table, focused attention on development, and prodded others to action. The U.N. is today only one node, an important node but still only one, in a complex network of institutions, states, civil society organizations, and private sector firms that shape development. Nevertheless, it has special responsibilities in enabling and pushing the development agenda forward. Even though the U.N. is unlikely to be the driver of the development agenda in the next decade, it can and should be its enabler.

III. The Freedom from Fear

Perhaps the most sweeping changes to the traditional framing of the mandate of the United Nations have taken place on the issues of peace and security. It is these issues which are at the core of the Charter and constitute the principal preoccupation of the United Nations. These issues engage the most central institutions of the United Nations, the Security Council and the General Assembly. And yet, as the Secretary-General noted, "While, in the development sphere, we suffer from weak implementation, on the security side, despite a heightened sense of threat among many we lack even a basic consensus and implementation, where it occurs, is all too often contested."[15] The diagnosis is apt. The report goes further: "These are not theoretical issues but

issues of deadly urgency," the Secretary-General writes. "If we do not reach a consensus on them this year and start to act on it, we may not have another chance."[16] It is this urgent warning that inspired the title of my original paper: "The United Nations is late, very late, for a very important date."

This sense of urgency underlies three significant changes to the traditional concept of threats to peace and security that is embedded in the U.N. Charter and has informed the work of the U.N., particularly the Security Council. These three seminal changes are the explicit recognition of the shortness of time, the interconnectedness among threats, and the radical revision of the concept of sovereignty. All three have profound consequences for what the United Nations takes on and for the way the Security Council does its work.

A. The Shortness of Time

The global security environment, like other global environments, has changed significantly in the last several decades. The time to make decisions is much shorter than it used to be, making the world far more dangerous and accident-prone than before. Technology and politics together have created a set of threats that allows very little time for deliberation before a response. The shortness of time first became a recognized security issue when nuclear weapons entered the arsenals of the major powers. Yet their conceptual and practical consequences were limited, perhaps unfairly, because it was the large established states with strong established machineries of command and control that had a monopoly on nuclear weapons. As miniaturization developed and unit costs went down, increasingly destructive technologies with the capacity to reach farther and farther across borders proliferated. Response times shortened. Add to the brevity of time the privatization of the arms trade, including nuclear arms, and the dual use of civilian technologies, and the time for Security Council deliberation on an urgent threat shrinks.

It is within this shrinking window for Security Council action that the Secretary-General asked U.N. members to consider when and how it was appropriate to consider "the early authorization of coercive measures."[17] The high-level panel responded that the Security Council, but *only* the Security Council, may authorize preventive war against an attack that was apparently or immediately imminent. However, individual states may *not* invoke a right to prevention under the clause

of the Charter, Article 51, which authorizes the use of force in self-defense. The panel ruled out unilateral prevention as legitimate under the Charter, even as it moved to fundamentally change the concept of state sovereignty that was the foundation of the United Nations.

The Secretary-General also invoked the shortness of time for decisions, the corresponding sense of urgency to identify the interconnectedness of threats, and a changing concept of sovereignty as major challenges to global security.

B. The Interconnectedness of Threats

The deepening of complex linkages around the world in the last thirty years, which we summarize conveniently with the term "globalization," has also connected the consequences of breaches of security much more tightly. The consequences of a nuclear attack in the Middle East, for example, would spread worldwide. Indeed, the costs and consequences of the attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, attacks carried out with commercial airplanes, have cost in the billions of dollars and have rippled around the globe. The Secretary-General identified not only international war and conflict, but civil violence, organized crime, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, poverty, deadly infectious disease, and environmental degradation as interconnected in the basket of threats to peace and security. The occurrence of one exacerbates many of the others and heightens global security challenges.

IV. Sovereignty as Responsibility

The Secretary-General also drew on the bitter failure of the United Nations in Rwanda to engage directly with the meaning of sovereignty, when security no longer means only state security but human security. In his analysis of the growing crises of the internally displaced, Francis Deng pioneered a concept of sovereignty not only as a right but also as a responsibility.[18] The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), an independent panel created by Canada which worked closely with the Secretary-General, extended the concept of sovereignty as responsibility in its 2001 report, *The Responsibility to Protect*.[19] The Commission noted the gap in the mandate of international institutions to deal with governments that turned against their own citizens, engaged in widespread and systematic abuse, and

created massive human suffering. International institutions, the commissioners observed, have no mandate to intervene to stop this kind of suffering. The responsibility to protect, the report argued, is an emerging principle of customary international law supported both by a range of legal sources and by state practice.[20]

The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change underlined and extended the principle of the responsibility to protect in its report. It insisted that all signatories to the U.N. Charter accept not only their obligations to their fellow members, as the conventional understanding of collective security suggests, but also a responsibility to protect their own citizens.[21] Sovereignty is contingent, then, as much on internal as on external behavior. This concept of sovereignty changes the foundation of the post-Westphalian order, which had governed states for the last three-and-a-half centuries. Sovereignty is no longer defined exclusively as autonomy and can no longer be invoked to shield a government's failure to protect its own citizens from the interference of others. On the contrary, states are obligated to come to the assistance of citizens who are being systematically harmed or abused by their own governments.

The panel was careful to specify the kinds of actions that obligate member states to exercise their responsibility to protect the citizens of other states. These include genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, actions that are at the highest end of the conflict spectrum and the most severe abuses of human rights. Here the panel joins human rights with global security, and extends the meaning of security beyond states to individuals, to groups, and to citizens. The Secretary-General affirmed all of these conceptual changes and more. He asked explicitly that heads of government make the decision at the special 60th-anniversary session of the General Assembly to affirm "the right of the Security Council to use military force, including *preventively*, to preserve international peace and security, including in cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other such crimes against humanity."

A. Progress on Sovereignty as Responsibility

On the issue of sovereignty as responsibility, the Secretary-General achieved an extraordinary success. The change to the meaning of sovereignty was highly controversial. For many within the developing world contending with colonial histories and memories, this language was a

thinly veiled disguise of a new imperialism, an imperialism which wrapped itself in international law to justify the forcible intervention by the North against the South. Only hard and persistent work by the Secretary-General and like-minded states allayed some of these fears. Pushed forward by Canada, 162 world leaders unanimously accepted the principle of the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P), a responsibility which is engaged when populations are at risk of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. In April 2006, the Security Council reaffirmed the principle in Resolution 1674. The passage of these resolutions constitutes the most sweeping changes to legal concepts of sovereignty in modern times, and extends the protection of international humanitarian law inside states. From the introduction of the concept by ICISS to its codification by the General Assembly and the Security Council, it was only a matter of some five years.

The practice, not surprisingly, has fallen short of the normative standard. The Security Council was famously and shamefully inactive during the genocide in Rwanda. It was deadlocked during the ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. It was these failures to act that led to the creation of the ICISS and to the revision of customary international law. Yet when large-scale massacres of civilians and the displacement of millions of people occurred in Darfur, it took the Security Council almost eighteen months to pass a resolution condemning the killings. At no point has the Security Council threatened to use military force, after the fact, to enforce the responsibility to protect. So, although law and norms may have changed, the Security Council through acts of omission stands in violation of the changes to law and norms that it has promulgated.

V. Progress on Arms Control and Disarmament

What about the other decisions the Secretary-General asked leaders to make at the World Summit? Here the record is far less encouraging. Most obvious was the failure to make even rhetorical progress on the control of weapons of mass destruction. The World Summit took place only a few months after the disappointing failure of the review conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty to come to agreement. The Secretary-General had asked world leaders to come into compliance with existing treaties on non-proliferation, biological weapons, and chemical weapons conventions. Particularly pressing—and long outstanding—was the need for progress on a fissile material cut-off treaty and a

moratorium on nuclear test explosions, which has lapsed. The ongoing crises with North Korea and Iran, the leading threshold nuclear states, made progress on nuclear arms control by the nuclear powers imperative, if states are to be dissuaded from breaking out of existing treaties that restrain the development of nuclear weapons.

There was no substantive forward movement during or after the World Summit. The lack of progress is not surprising, given the longstanding refusal of some of the major nuclear powers to accept additional restraints. It is nevertheless deeply discouraging that an assembly of world leaders, celebrating the sixtieth anniversary of the United Nations, was unable even to agree on appropriate language on nuclear arms control and disarmament to insert into the outcome document of the summit. Clearly disappointed, Kofi Annan called the failure to include a section on reducing the threat from weapons of mass destruction a "disgrace." This comes at a time when the existing fabric of non-proliferation appears to be shredding. It is clear that the General Assembly of the United Nations is no longer able even to give voice to its formal responsibilities on arms control and disarmament.

VI. Progress on Terrorism

A second issue to which the Secretary-General gave great weight was an unequivocal condemnation of terrorism. The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change had broken new ground in its recommendations on terrorism. The panel dismissed the conventional bromide that one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter. It rejected outright any targeting of civilians, intentional or unintentional, for any political purpose, and it proposed a clear, if controversial, definition of terrorism. It defined terrorism as "any action…intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act."[22]

The language of the Secretary-General's charge to the World Summit was even stronger than that of the high-level panel. The moral authority of the United Nations, he insisted, had been compromised by the inability of members to agree on a definition of terrorism. He urged the assembled leaders to:

…affirm that no cause or grievance, no matter how legitimate, justifies the targeting and deliberate killing of civilians and non-combatants; and declare that any action that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act, constitutes an act of terrorism.[23]

He asked as well that world leaders agree to implement a comprehensive U.N. counter-terrorism strategy to dissuade people from resorting to terrorism or supporting it, to deny terrorists access to funds and materials, to deter states from supporting terrorism, and to develop state capacity to defeat terrorism and defend human rights. The Secretary-General asked specifically that leaders conclude a convention on nuclear terrorism "as a matter of urgency" and a comprehensive convention on terrorism before the end of the sixtieth session of the General Assembly.[24]

The urgent tone of the Secretary-General's language is not surprising. Agreement on a definition and action on terrorism was important conceptually and practically to the reform of the United Nations. The new emphasis on human security, he insisted, dictates that, "the dignity, justice, worth, and safety" of every citizen be at the heart of a twenty-first century system of collective security.[25] The conceptual shift to human security as the foundation of collective security is inconsistent with the targeting of civilians, no matter what the reason. It is also, as the Secretary-General made clear, part of the seamless integration of human rights with security and development; and terrorism is a fundamental violation of human rights. Finally, in the wake of September 11th, global attention to terrorism has increased. Measures to constrain terrorism, along with an unequivocal rejection of any action that targets civilians, is part of the grand bargain of the reform of international organizations. Without forward movement on terrorism, Great Power engagement—especially on the part of the United States—on development and collective security was unlikely. To some degree, progress on dealing with terrorism, promoting development, and enhancing human rights were the exposed nerves of the reform movement.

How did the World Summit deal with terrorism, conceptually and practically? Here too, the record is mixed. World leaders could not agree on a definition of terrorism. Consequently, no definition is included in the outcome document. They did agree to try again at the

next meeting of the General Assembly. The Summit did condemn terrorism, without specifying precisely what constitutes terrorism and "welcomed" the Secretary-General's identification of elements of a counter-terrorism strategy. The debate about the meaning of terrorism simmered just below the surface of the Summit's deliberations: states must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with their obligations under international law, in particular human rights law, refugee law, and international humanitarian law. The strongest action by the World Summit was clear support for the early entry into effect of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

The Secretary-General followed up with recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy in his report to the General Assembly in April 2006.[26] He urged members to dissuade, deny, and deter terrorists; to build state capacity to deal with terrorism; and to defend human rights even while they struggled against terrorism. In his report, Kofi Annan again unequivocally condemned terrorism, no matter what cause its perpetrators claim to serve, and urged member states to conclude a comprehensive convention on terrorism.

What is the scorecard of the United Nations on terrorism? Certainly, the Secretary-General did not succeed in persuading world leaders to speak with clarity on the meaning of terrorism. There was no unequivocal rejection of the targeting of civilians under any circumstances; no agreement on the illegitimacy of the violation of the rights of non-combatants. Leaders did move, however, on nuclear terrorism, a peril that all could recognize. It is difficult to conclude that significant progress was made, especially given the high priority the Secretary-General attached to this issue. One of the principal fault lines of twenty-first-century conflict, a fault line that goes to the heart of human security, remains exposed and contested.

VII. Progress on Peace Building

A third big issue in the Secretary-General's report on security was peace building. Despite the massive investment by the United Nations over the last decade and a half in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peace building, the record of sustained success has been discouraging. Approximately half of those societies that emerge from war and civil conflict relapse back into violence within five years.[27] Senior leadership at the U.N. recognizes that while the problems in societies

that undergo prolonged civil war are deeply-rooted and challenging, resources could be better managed within the United Nations so that peace building becomes more effective and robust.[28]

The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change strongly recommended the creation of a Peace-Building Commission to identify countries that are under stress and at risk of collapse. The Commission's mandate should be to lead and sustain the efforts of the international community in post-conflict peace building over "whatever period may be necessary."[29] In partnership with the national government, the Commission should organize proactive assistance and plan for the transition between conflict and post-conflict peace building. The subtext of the panel was not difficult to read. The U.N. needed far better integration of its policy instruments and resources, and the capacity to coherently sustain its efforts over the lengthy periods of time that may be necessary to support a society struggling with the transition from war to peace.

The Secretary-General underlined and amplified the recommendation. He asked for a new intergovernmental Peace-Building Commission as well as a Peace-Building Support Office within the Secretariat. The Commission would have the capacity to coordinate all the relevant players, both within the broad institutional structure of the United Nations—across economic and security institutions—and with outside institutions. It would fill the "gaping hole" in the institutional capacity of the U.N. to address the transition from war to peace.

The Commission would serve as the focal point for expertise and provide money and strategic guidance for recovery work, reconstruction, and institution building in fragile states. In the immediate aftermath of war, it would help to ensure predictable financing for the recovery of national institutions; review and coordinate funding mechanisms, programs and agencies; provide a forum for sharing information about post-conflict recovery strategies; review progress; and, especially important, extend the period of political attention to post-conflict recovery. The Secretary-General asked for new institutional machinery to focus and sustain attention on post-conflict recovery, one of the difficult challenges that the United Nations has faced in the last two decades.

The Peace-Building Commission is one of the most significant outcomes of the World Summit. Here the Summit displayed some creativity: it created the Commission and enabled subsequent negotiations to highlight some of the contentious issues of composition and report-

ing. After several months of negotiations, the Security Council and the General Assembly adopted joint resolutions on 20 December 2005, establishing the Peace-Building Commission. Permanent members of the Commission are drawn from the Security Council (7), ECOSOC (7), top financial contributors (5), top troop contributors (5), and the General Assembly (5). The Commission would report annually to the General Assembly and to the international financial institutions. It is led by an Assistant Secretary-General, Carolyn McAskie from Canada, who is in charge of the Peace-Building Support Office within the U.N. Secretariat. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) will administer a multi-year standing Peace-Building Fund to support post-conflict stabilization and capacity building.

The Commission will, of course, have to demonstrate its usefulness and effectiveness over the long trajectory of post-conflict recovery. Much of what shapes recovery is clearly beyond its control, yet it does have the capacity to coordinate across institutional jurisdictions, to identify anomalies that can exist among the strategies of different kinds of institutions, to share best practices, to work together with state and non-governmental organizations, and to draw attention to the need for ongoing support, especially after political attention has shifted elsewhere. In all these ways, the Commission reflects the environment in which the United Nations now operates: a dense web of international, state, and non-governmental organizations that all bring resources into the field, pursuing short- and long-term strategies in ways that can contradict one another.

VIII. Freedom to Live in Dignity

Nowhere has the imperative for reform been more apparent than in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. The Commission was widely regarded as dysfunctional. "The Commission's capacity to perform its tasks," the Secretary-General concluded, "has been increasingly undermined by its declining credibility and professionalism… . a credibility deficit has developed, which casts a shadow on the reputation of the United Nations system as a whole."[30] The active presence of some of the most egregious violators of human rights, Libya and Sudan, made a mockery of human rights norms. To make matters worse, as Kofi Annan acknowledged, these states were able to use Commission procedures to prevent any investigation and reporting of their practices. In an era when protection of human rights is widely

recognized as a fundamental obligation of states, when an emergent concept of sovereignty focuses on the obligations of states to protect the rights of its citizens, and when concepts of human security are beginning to inform the understanding and practice of collective security, nothing discredited the United Nations more than the practices of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.

In its early days, the Commission on Human Rights made a significant contribution to international law. It passed the seminal Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 1948, followed by two International Covenants and several human rights treaties. In subsequent years, however, the Commission became increasingly ineffective in its work, partly because of its procedures for membership selection, particularly because of its working practices, and partly because of its accountability. The Commission was created by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC) in 1946 to examine, monitor, and report on human rights issues and human rights violations worldwide. It was subsidiary to ECOSOC, and its 53 members were elected by regional groupings. There were no qualifications whatsoever for membership aside from being selected by a regional group. It is this procedure for membership selection that allowed egregious violators of human rights to become members of the Commission. Six of the 53 member countries, for example, were ranked as among the "worst of the worst" abusers of human rights by Freedom House.[31]

The Secretary-General asked the World Summit to abolish the Commission and replace it with a standing Human Rights Council. He left open whether the Council should be a principal organ of the U.N. or a subsidiary of the General Assembly. In either case, he recommended that its members be elected directly by the General Assembly by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting. This kind of procedure would break the hold of regional groupings on the selection of members.[32] In part because this recommendation went against the long-established tradition of regional voting, the World Summit said little about the Human Rights Council other than to endorse its creation.[33] It then asked the President of the General Assembly to pursue negotiations to establish the mandate, functions, size, composition, membership, working methods, and procedures of the Council.

In March of 2006, the General Assembly passed a resolution creating the new Human Rights Council. The negotiations produced less than a wholly satisfactory outcome. The Council became a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly rather than an independent Council

within the United Nations. Its size was reduced only minimally, from 53 to 47 members. The most disappointing outcome is its composition: *regional blocs are given a specified number of seats and they are not required to nominate more countries than blocs so that General Assembly members could vote against a particularly unqualified candidate*. Nor are countries currently under sanction by the United Nations barred from standing for membership. Finally, members are elected by a simple majority of those present and voting in the General Assembly, making it easier for a state with a questionable human rights record to get elected. Clearly, the safeguards built in to improve the quality of the membership on the Council are weak.

There were a few encouraging signs as the first members of the new Council were elected and held their first meeting in June 2006. The Commission's members were selected behind closed doors and then usually elected by acclamation. Many members of the new Council had to compete for seats and all needed the support of a majority of all member states in a secret ballot. Algeria, China, Cuba, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, prominent on lists of rights abusers, are again members of the new Council, but Iran was not. Some members of the Commission—Sudan, Libya, Zimbabwe—were discouraged from running. This procedure clearly is an improvement, even if a modest one, over its predecessor. More important, candidate members made voluntary commitments to promote and uphold human rights, and will be expected to meet them or face possible suspension from the Council.[34] Council members will be the first to undergo the periodic annual review of their human rights record. Here, norm setting appears to define the boundaries of membership.

The Council has also established a new universal review mechanism, which will periodically review the human rights records of all 192 member states of the United Nations. It will meet at least three times a year, for a minimum of ten weeks per year (unlike the Commission, which met only for six weeks every spring). Early work in the preparation of the Council has emphasized the importance of preventive initiatives to defuse simmering crises. The Council will have an improved mechanism for meeting to deal with urgent human rights crises in real time.[35]

Much will depend on how the new Council interprets its mandate and enforces its standards, beginning with its own members. Centrally important will be how the Council exercises its reporting function and the role the Council gives to non-governmental organizations.

At its first meeting, the Council replicated a longstanding pattern of the Commission and condemned only Israel as a violator of human rights. If states with poor human rights records continue to be elected and serve, without review and without suspension, the Council will quickly lose legitimacy and credibility, as did its predecessor. Bloc voting continues to dominate and the record of the first six months is not at all encouraging. If the record remains as disappointing as it is currently, states and non-governmental organizations will look outside the U.N. as they seek to move the human rights agenda forward. The United Nations will fade into irrelevance when human rights are on the table.

IX. Managing the United Nations

Only a week before the opening of the World Summit, the Volcker Commission published a damning report on the corruption that had infected the U.N.'s Oil-for-Food program in Iraq. The program was begun in the mid-1990s to supervise Iraq's sale of oil and use of the funds to buy food, medicine, and other goods and services necessary for the civilian population. A final report, published in October 2005, found that more than 2,000 companies from sixty countries had paid kickbacks to Saddam Hussein's government. The program was jointly run by the Security Council and the U.N. Secretariat, but the report criticized senior staff at the U.N. for its failure to identify and stop the corruption. The report stung. From the top down, something had gone terribly awry in U.N. management.

The failure to manage the Oil-for-Food program appropriately and the charge that U.N. peacekeeping forces sexually exploited local women and children are troubling. They are disturbing for two quite different reasons. They demonstrate serious failures of discipline, financial control, and accountability on the part of U.N. staff and management. Both these failures go directly to the heart of the U.N. peace and security agenda. A capacity to manage a program of sanctions is critical in a world organization that seeks effective alternatives to war. Insuring discipline among peacekeepers is a critical requirement for a U.N. that is expanding its role in peacekeeping and peace building. Neither of these are trivial failures at the margin of the organization. The Secretary-General made the unglamorous subject of improved management one of the top priorities of U.N. reform. The timing could not have been worse.

Some of the reforms that are necessary were obvious. The Volcker Commission pointed to the confusion of responsibility between the Security Council and the Secretariat as a principal cause of the dilution of the authority of the Secretariat and the evasion of responsibility. It was nevertheless clear that significant change was necessary in the operating structures of the Secretariat. The Secretary-General had a deputy secretary-general, with whom he shared responsibility for management, but he had no chief operating officer who had the kinds of responsibilities—and accountability—that most large organizations find necessary. It is the Fifth Committee, a committee of the whole, which currently has overall responsibility for management. In other words, 192 member states formally supervise senior management.

The outcome document of the World Summit identified a set of broad priorities to guide reform. It recommended the creation of an ethics office and enactment of rules to protect "whistleblowers" who come forward within the organization. It asked that policies of financial disclosure and conflict of interest be reviewed and upgraded; that the Office of Internal Oversight Services, which performs an audit-like function, be strengthened on an urgent basis; and that the Secretary-General submit an independent external review of performance within the United Nations and within the specialized agencies. It also requested that the General Assembly create an independent oversight advisory committee. Finally, it asked that all mandates older than five years be reviewed. There are literally thousands of these mandates still on U.N. books.

Much of what the World Summit asked for is routine in large organizations and would significantly improve performance. Nevertheless, at the United Nations, these instructions had bite. They touched directly on sharp disagreements between the Group of 77 and developed states about the direction and importance of secretariat reform, in particular, and a review of mandates more generally. The G-77 countries worried that they would lose their political control to the Security Council and the Secretary-General if some of these recommendations were implemented. The high-profile engagement of the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. on the issues of both management and mandates provoked hostility rather than support. Not only did these recommendations bite, they also stung.

To jump-start the reform process, Ambassadors Allan Rock of Canada and Munir Akram of Pakistan were asked to co-chair a committee

charged with management reform. Their agenda looked much like that identified by the World Summit:

- To improve the management of human resources to promote a merit-based system of recruitment and retention.

- To reform budget processes through improvement in accounting, auditing, and external oversight to meet international standards.

- To review the mandates, rules, and regulations of the U.N., as part of a broader examination of the relevance and effectiveness of the work of the U.N.

I look at each of these in turn. The management of human resources, the first of the three big planks of management reform, is central to the functioning of the U.N. The Office of the Secretary-General has no discretion in the hiring of senior officials, there is no chief operating officer tasked with overseeing day-to-day administration, and management systems and financial systems have not kept pace with other public institutions. The Secretary-General made specific proposals for change in six areas: people, leadership, information and communications technology, delivery of services, budget and finance, and governance.[36] He proposed increasing his authority and discretion to reallocate jobs and money without approval from the budgeting committee; professionalizing recruitment and training practices; outsourcing abroad costly services that are now provided by its New York headquarters; regrouping and clustering by function twenty-five departments that now report directly to the Secretary-General; and delegating authority for management policies and overall operational matters to the Deputy Secretary-General. The Secretary-General was trying to reduce ineffective, cumbersome, and at times archaic management by the General Assembly.

A firestorm erupted. G-77 countries interpreted these reforms as a dilution of their already limited authority within the General Assembly and a transfer of power to the Security Council, particularly its permanent members. Kofi Annan withdrew two of the most controversial proposals redistributing authority from the General Assembly to the Secretary-General on budgeting. Nevertheless, the Budget Committee, which usually works by consensus, voted 108 to 50 in favor of a resolution offered by South Africa in the name of the Group of 77 and China.

The resolution rejected or delayed most of the management reforms that had been submitted to the committee. Dumisano Kumalo of South Africa, the leader of the Group of 77, complained that the reform proposals transferred authority from the General Assembly to the Security Council and the Office of the Secretary-General, in which Northern countries are far more influential. The Secretary-General lost a crucial round in the battle to move management procedures within the U.N. closer to international standards.[37] It is possible that some of these proposals will re-emerge during the honeymoon that the new Secretary-General will enjoy in the first six months of 2007.

Much more progress has been made in the reform of the budget process. An ethics office has been created, new protection has been put in place for whistleblowers, a panel of outside experts has been appointed to support the internal oversight office at the United Nations, and an external audit procedure has been instituted. All this has been accomplished in less than a year. Major challenges still remain, however, in streamlining budget procedures and in introducing much-needed flexibility in the capacity to transfer funds within existing budgetary allocations.

The review of mandates is likely to be a much longer and less productive process. Just a few weeks after the Secretary-General delivered his report on management reform, he submitted his report on the review of mandates to the General Assembly, along with an electronic database of mandates that are over five years old.[38] There are over 3,000 such mandates.

The selection of mandates for review is itself politically controversial, closely linked to the issue of Palestine. Alongside the review of mandates, which is currently the object of consultations within the General Assembly, a parallel review of rules and regulations looks at the organizing rules of the central U.N. agencies. For example, is it appropriate to vest the Fifth Committee with overall managerial responsibility or to establish a Select Committee, with a representative group of nations serving on a rotating basis? This kind of question, too, is highly charged and currently blocked. The process of mandate review is likely to be long and time consuming, with little or no short-term or even medium-term outcomes.

The glacially slow process of management reform is discouraging because it speaks to the lack of core competencies in the areas of peace-keeping, peace building, and security, and to the quality of staff the United Nations can recruit and retain. The deep divisions within the

U.N. are predictable and understandable, even if they can be disabling at times. Any "grand bargain," which is designed to bridge these differences on development, security, and human rights, will depend on an enhanced capacity of the U.N. to manage and deliver results. It is discouraging that this Secretary-General was unable to bridge the gap on management. The new Secretary-General will have a short window at the beginning of his term. If no progress is made, the U.N. may well become an increasingly disabled and marginalized institution, capable of doing much less than its members need.

X. The United Nations as Global Metaphor

I asked in the introduction to this essay whether the U.N. is managing a global order that is structured and legitimate, or whether it is an important part of restructuring a global system that is fragmented and contested? The answer to this question, I argue, matters in creating reasonable expectations of what the U.N. can and cannot do. This review of the challenges the Secretary-General faced in trying to reform the U.N. provides a preliminary answer.

The structure and the legitimacy of the global "order" are both in question. The global system is simultaneously fragmenting and re-forming as new kinds of organizations—non-governmental with governments, private as well as public, international institutions alongside states—are recognized and given official voice in the international machinery. Not only are new *kinds* of organizations participating actively in shaping the global order but some are organized in different ways. Both war and peace are being made by organizations joined together as *networks*. They are characterized by flatter structures, with decentralized structures of decision-making and built-in redundancy so that they are better able to survive in challenging environments. Networks of non-governmental organizations raise funds and orchestrate strategies of recovery in post-conflict societies. Al-Qaida and Hizbollah, structured as distributed networks with decentralized capabilities, wage war against states. These networks are resilient, flexible, and nimble, with a capacity to move information quickly, to deploy sophisticated technologies, and to operate "close to the ground."

In this complex and diverse ecology of a global order with multiple species, and with new forms of organizations that play new roles, the newly created Peace-Building Commission may well stand as a metaphor for the broader United Nations. The Commission emerges, I

argue, as one among many important nodes, but with unique capacities to serve as a clearinghouse for information and as a traffic coordinator in a crowded and noisy environment that is in the process of reshaping itself. This description of the Commission may well be an apt description of the United Nations in the decade ahead. It may be apt because the global environment is not well structured or with clear rules that are widely accepted. Rather, the U.N. is working in an environment that is simultaneously fragmenting and re-forming. Norms are contested and the meanings of some of its most fundamental institutions, such as sovereignty, are in the process of redefinition.

What can we expect of the United Nations in this complex and diverse ecology? Most of the answer we already see but some we do not. We need a U.N. that is deeply embedded in a chain of connections that functions as a central node in the network of global institutions. More and more, this is what the U.N. is doing—in the Peace-Building Commission, in the Global Compact that brings together corporate leaders with non-governmental organizations under the auspices of the U.N., and in the dialogue the Secretary-General sponsored among world religions. The United Nations is the world's convener, enabler, and facilitator, and that is no small accomplishment.

To succeed as a central node in newly emergent global networks, though, the U.N. will have to become more than a convener and enabler. It will have to bring to the table a capacity to manage and to manage well. Good management is boring, unglamorous, and pedestrian in comparison to other dramatic challenges the U.N. faces, but it is a prerequisite for effective performance in all that it does. In network language, the U.N. must be able to share information quickly and effectively, and to move resources and people nimbly, with a minimum of bureaucratic consultation and delay. If it is slow, cumbersome, and hobbled with consultations up and down the chain of command, it becomes an unattractive partner for networks that are moving in real time. If its staff becomes corruptible, the damage to its credibility, legitimacy, and effectiveness will be incalculable. Here, as I have argued, the U.N. secretariat faces real challenges that its leadership, through the Secretary-General, must meet. It is legitimate, in my view, to hold the Secretary-General and his senior staff accountable for the performance of those who are responsible for the management of the United Nations.

Born in an age in which states were the only legitimate participants in world politics, can the United Nations adapt to an ecology wherein

states are joined by non-governmental organizations and global corporations, other international institutions (both public and private), and militias, each networked together across borders? Can the U.N. adapt to a world in which technology is revolutionizing the global movement of information, warfare, disease, and production? If it is to become more than merely a convenient place to stop and talk, it must be able to deploy its resources with the same speed, flexibility, and effectiveness as the best of the rest in its environment. This is the challenge for the new Secretary-General.   ◉

Notes

1. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Address to the 2005 World Summit, New York, 14 September 2005.

2. *We the Peoples: Civil Society, the United Nations, and Global Governance*, Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations, available at http://www.un-ngls.org/Final%20report%20-%20HLP.doc; *A More Secure World Order: Our Shared Responsibility*, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. U.N. Doc. A/59/565, at 8(2004), available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report; and *Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals*, U.N. Doc. 05.III.B. 4, available at http://www.unmilleniumproject.org.

3. *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All*, Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005+annex (2005), available at http://www.un.org/largerfreedom. These are the three foundational documents of U.N. reform.

4. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, "A Glass at Least Half Full," *Wall Street Journal*, 19 September 2005.

5. I am indebted to Thomas Weiss, the head of the United Nations Intellectual History Project, for this three-fold distinction. See Thomas G. Weiss, Tatiana Carayannis, Louis Emmerij, and Richard Jolly, *UN Voices: The Struggle for Development and Social Justice* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005).

6. *In Larger Freedom*, A/59/2005, p.5.

7. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; and develop a global partnership for development.

8. *In Larger Freedom*, A/59/2005, p. 12.

9. See also *Unleashing Entrepreneurship: Making Business Work for the Poor*, U.N. Doc. 4.III.B.4; and *A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities for All* (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2004).

10. On the role of development goals and how many have been met, see Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij, Dharam Ghai, and Frederic Lapeyre, *UN Contributions to Development Thinking and Practice* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004).

11. *In Larger Freedom*, Annex, For decisions by Heads of State and Government, A/59/2005, pp. 55–57.

12. Draft resolution referred to the High-Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly by the General Assembly at its 59th session, 2005 World Summit Outcome, U.N. Doc. A/60/L.1, p. 8.

13. Declaration on Innovative Sources of Financing for Development (New York, 14 September 2005). Available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/develop/oda/2005/0721martens.htm.

14. Jens Martens, *The International Finance Facility: Development on Credit* (New York: GPF, 2005). Available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/develop/oda/2005/0721martens.htm.

15. *In Larger Freedom*, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005, p. 24.

16. Ibid., p. 25.

17. Secretary-General's Speech to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/58/PV.7, pp. 3–4 (23 September 2003).

18. See Francis M. Deng, "Reconciling Sovereignty with Responsibility: A Basis for International Humanitarian Action," in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothschild, *Africa in World Politics: Post-Cold War Challenges* (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1995), pp. 295–310; and "Frontiers of Sovereignty," *Leiden Journal of International Law* 8, no. 2 (1995): 249–286. See also Thomas G. Weiss and David A. Korn, *Internal Displacement: Conceptualization and its Consequences* (London: Routledge, 2006).

19. *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, 2001, available at http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp.

20. Ibid., pp. 15–16.

21. *In Larger Freedom*, Annex, p. 58.

22. *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, p. 49, para 164.

23. *In Larger Freedom*, p. 58.

24. Ibid.

25. *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, p. 22. The concept of "human security," as distinct from state security, enters the literature in the early 1990s, but gets serious political attention when Lloyd Axworthy, then the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Canada, champions the concept. See Lloyd Axworthy, "Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership," *International Journal* 52 (1997). The Secretary-General first refers to the imperative of a "human-centered" approach to security in *We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century*, U.N. Sales No. 00.1.16 (2000), available at http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/reportfull.htm. See also Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of U.N. Reform," *American Journal of International Law* 99 (July 2005): 619–32.

26. "Uniting against Terrorism: Recommendations for a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy," Report of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc A/60/825, available at http://www.un.org/unitingagainstterrorism/sg-terrorism-2may06.pdf.

27. *In Larger Freedom*, p. 31, para 114.

28. Author's interviews, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), April 2006.

29. High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (2 December 2004), pt. 264.

30. *In Larger Freedom*, p. 45, para 182.

31. Freedom House, "World's Worst Regimes Revealed" (31 March 2005), available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=255.

32. *In Larger Freedom*, p. 45, para 183.

33. Human Rights Council, 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, General Assembly Resolution A/Res/60/1, p. 33, available at http://www.daccessdds.un.org/UNDOC/GEN/NO5/487/60/PDF/NO548760.pdf?OpenElement.

34. Louise Arbour, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, "A New Dawn for U.N. and Human Rights," *Toronto Star* (18 June 2006): A17.

35. Ibid.

36. *Investing in the United Nations: For a Stronger Organization Worldwide*, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/60/692, available at http://www.un.org/reform/reform7march06.pdf.

37. Some experts consider that the vote was a response to an arrangement, pushed with great vigor by U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. John Bolton, which tied budgeting for the second half of this year to progress on broad changes in management reform. Theoretically, the wealthy nations could withhold the $950 million needed to pay U.N. salaries after 30 June, although they did not do so even after the failure of management reform. The two largest contributors to the budget are the United States (22%) and Japan (19.5%), and both have threatened to cut their contributions in the future if there is no progress on management reform.

38. *Mandating and Delivering: Analysis and Recommendations to Facilitate the Review of Mandates*, Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc A/60/733, available at http://www.un.org/mandatereview/index.html.