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Searching for a Place to Call Home: The Challenges Facing Europe's Cosmopolitan Citizens

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I. Introduction

*A*uthor Ulrich Beck writes that processes of globalization encourage a sort of "transnational place polygamy," in which migrating individuals become attached to "several places at once, belonging in different worlds" through a process of cultural mixing, adaptation, and the "globalization of biography."[1] For students, modern professionals, and even tourists, increased opportunities to travel, study, and work abroad magnify the "globalization of biography" that Beck identifies. For migrant communities, however, the experiences of "transnational place polygamy" can often be more harrowing than the experiences of the average tourist or student. Indeed, many families and communities find themselves stretched painfully between multiple localities across thousands of miles. In the search for belonging, many individuals find that "home" no longer corresponds with political, legal, or territorial boundaries. In addition, many find official acquisition of European or Western citizenship and residence increasingly difficult or impossible.

Macalester College's Institute for Global Citizenship program on Globalization in Comparative Perspective provides a particularly appropriate context from which to analyze the complexities of globalization and the difficulties of transnational identity formation faced by migrants. This essay serves as a capstone to my research and experiences as a student at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) at the University of London, and at the University of Maastricht in the Netherlands. Despite the vastness of comparative possibilities between

the two semesters abroad, the central focus of my independent research is an exploration of the legal obstacles that are faced by minority communities seeking to integrate into European society. The goal is to reflect on the challenges of legal integration for ethnic minorities in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The essay will conclude that obstacles to pluralism represent the larger difficulties that states confront in managing globalization and dynamic international affairs. In order to meet the stated goals, this article will be divided into four main parts. The first will describe in more depth the area of focus and outline its importance. The second part will apply relevant research materials and experiences from my first semester studying in London, while the third section will rely on resources from a second semester in Maastricht, Netherlands. A final component will explore the relevance of "globalization of biography" to the larger phenomenon of globalization itself.

II. Definition of Focus and its Importance

The modern era of globalization is characterized by unprecedented movement and migration—of capital, cultures, ideas, and people—both across and within borders. The movement of people can be a positive development, particularly where multiculturalism nurtures tolerance, cultural exchange, and innovation. In contrast, individuals who embody multiple cultural codes can come into conflict with the traditional state conceptions of minority rights, citizenship, and cultural identity. The focus of this essay approaches the phenomenon of globalization from a cultural perspective, using theories from both political science and international studies. While the globalization of culture can be studied from a variety of perspectives (the most common being related to anthropology, philosophy, and the humanities), viewing the cultural impacts of globalization from the perspective of current international affairs and law offers two advantages. First, the field of political science offers strong theoretical traditions which help define the role of the state and its relations with other state and non-state actors in the international system. The growing robustness of the European Union and the increasing number of migrants crossing European borders are phenomena that challenge traditional political theories and encourage new ones. Secondly, the impact of multiple cultures on individuals and national polities is most clearly illustrated in the legislation and political rhetoric emerging from international

political affairs. Legislation that places increased restrictions on "non-Western" migrant communities is of particular importance as a result of its relevance to increased isolationism following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the attacks in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005. Understanding state legislation is equally valuable for its ability to reflect attempts at creating national political identity—often to the detriment of migrants and aliens seeking entry or asylum.

The topics of multiculturalism and transnational identity are vital for a variety of reasons. One of the most important results of increased migration and the amalgam of cultural codes it creates is that the nations of the world are forced to re-evaluate the relevance of traditional territorial identities in light of increasing cosmopolitanism. The plurality of identity identified by Beck and others speaks to a larger discussion of global citizenship and global community.[2] For nation-states that have retained their sovereignty for centuries, global citizens are often seen as obstacles rather than assets. Fragmented legal and political responses to immigration, integration, and citizenship represent the dilemmas of cultural globalization facing states today. As Will Kymlicka notes, "finding morally defensible and politically viable answers" to the challenges of diversity and human rights is "the greatest challenge facing democracies today."[3] In the end, pluralism and global citizenship offer unique theoretical challenges for scholars, but they are most important for their potential to redefine the nature of democratic statehood in an era of globalization. Cosmopolitanism and the recognition of multiple cultural identities could provide a unique avenue for defining a global community based on democratic values.

A final note on the European geographical focus should also be put forward briefly. Pluralism and multicultural developments in the European Union are of particular relevance today. First, the birth and growth of the European Union illustrates another facet of globalization: supranational economic and political governance. This supranational element may prove vital in creating political structures that accommodate global citizenship. Secondly, the European Union, one of the most ambitious transnational integration projects to date, has introduced legislation that gives foundation to the rights and obligations of European nationality and citizenship. This legislation makes it the first non-state polity that can confer the rights and obligations of citizenship. Third, in sharp contrast to the apparent success of this universalizing political effort, the shift toward multiculturalism and pluralism is a continuous struggle for the democracies of the European Union.

Legal resistance to non-Western immigration and waning support of ethnic minorities in many European countries confirms this conflict. Finally, as a result of my research in Great Britain and the Netherlands, geographical narrowing was convenient. A more thorough comparative study would benefit from the inclusion of both additional European and non-European cases.

III. Research from the Fall Semester in the United Kingdom

A. History of Multiculturalism in the United Kingdom

The Institute for Public Policy Research estimates that 678,000 individuals born outside of the United Kingdom currently call London home.[4] Despite the existence of diverse cities like London and statistics that suggest a non-white ethnic minority presence of almost 8% across the whole of the United Kingdom, the struggle to welcome difference is still very real for politicians and policymakers. This section will briefly outline the modern development of the ethnic minority presence in the U.K. This diversity is apparent upon walking through London streets filled with diverse languages, schools, places of worship, outdoor markets, and restaurants. The goal of this section is to offer a synopsis of the obstacles ethnic minorities face when attempting to become a part of British society. Engaging primarily with texts and case studies from a SOAS course entitled Ethnic Minorities and the Law, the section will outline the ethnic minority presence in the U.K., followed by reflections on British perspectives on pluralism and national identity. The section will conclude with several case studies relevant to the topic of ethnic minority integration and citizenship in the U.K.

   As a result of Britain's colonial past, the issue of migration and citizenship has been a prominent one in British legislation. As Randall Hansen notes, "at the empire's peak in the twentieth century some 600,000,000 individuals had the technical right to enter the UK and avail themselves of all the rights now associated with British citizenship."[5] Though small groups of minority communities existed before the 1940s, much of the significant immigration occurred under the 1948 British Nationality Act, which still maintained the right of colonial subjects to enter the U.K. freely.[6] From 1948 until 1962, the existing British Nationality Act supported the entrance of over 500,000 non-white British subjects from the Commonwealth. As ethnic minority communities grew, the U.K. was forced to recognize the foundations of

a multicultural society. Throughout the 1950s, however, the liberal British perspective on the freedoms of Commonwealth subjects began to change.[7] As a result, changes in legislation in 1962 increased immigration controls and discouraged non-white migrants from seeking entry into the U.K.[8] Although a variety of legal developments discourage multicultural migration, Great Britain has not been able to ignore the reality of an existing and significant multicultural community. European migration has also played a role in the development of an ethnic minority presence, while migration from New Commonwealth countries in the West Indies, the Indian subcontinent, and East Africa has solidified Britain's status as a multicultural polity.[9] As Hansen notes, the predominantly non-white immigration from "new" commonwealth countries peaked in the years leading up to 1962.

Despite legislative changes that continue today, however, Britain's multicultural community continues to grow both in size and diversity. According to the 2001 Census, half of the U.K.'s non-white ethnic minority population is of Indian, Pakistani, or Bangladeshi origin.[10] This amounts to over three percent of the total population. Additionally, just under two percent of the total population, or around 25 percent of the ethnic minority population, represents black Caribbean and black African communities.[11] Individuals with mixed ethnic identity represent 1.2 percent of Great Britain's total population, and account for approximately 15 percent of the ethnic minority presence.[12] As current events and security concerns prompt worries over a diversifying population, Britain's policymakers and academics continue to contend with the subject of ethnicity in law. The current failure to accommodate difference and define a dynamic British identity suggests that the U.K., like other European nations, is finding it difficult to navigate a road towards pluralism.

B. Legal Obstacles

Several perspectives on integration and pluralism underlie the legislation on immigration and nationality in the U.K. Whether legislation demands assimilation or searches out pluralism, the confusion and incompleteness of many laws suggests an incomplete and multifaceted understanding of what a multicultural democracy should embody. Several legal developments will be discussed here. The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act marked the first time that immigration and nationality legislation began to define British nationality in terms

of United Kingdom residency and "belonging," rather than by official citizenship and passport possession.[13] Under the 1962 Act, a system of labor vouchers was employed in order to police the entry of unskilled workers. Particularly those with non-white ethnic backgrounds were affected.[14] As Randall Hansen writes, the most important impact of the legislation was to deny "millions of largely non-white 'colonial' British subjects across the globe" the rights and opportunities normally associated with British nationality.[15] The 1962 Act was the first of many changes that would radically redefine the British legal approach to the immigration and naturalization of ethnic minorities.

The second significant change in British legislation was the 1971 Immigration Act. This Act officially codified the earlier Acts of the 1960s, and also introduced a system of immigration "rules" that, although not legislation, could be used as legal guidance for the administration of the Act.[16] These rules often meant that immigration officials could haphazardly interpret the 1971 Act. The 1971 Immigration Act had serious consequences for Commonwealth subjects seeking entry into the U.K. While the 1962 Act established the recognition of differences between passports issued under U.K. central authorities and those issued by colonial offices, the 1971 Act reinforced these differences through a new concept known as "patriality."[17] Beginning with the 1971 Act, Commonwealth subjects seeking entry clearance to the U.K. would need to prove that either they or their parents or grandparents were born on U.K. soil.[18] In short, the 1971 Act had the permanent effect of placing "Commonwealth citizens on the same legal footing as aliens for the purposes of immigration."[19] For many Commonwealth subjects from former British colonies in Africa, the impact of the 1971 Act was particularly acute. Indeed, the 1971 Act was initially conceived as a way to quell official and public resistance to the possibility of a mass immigration of Kenyan Asians with British nationality following Africanization policies in Kenya.[20] Nuruddin Farah also notes that opposition to African migration was later repeated when the British Nationality Act of 1981 was passed in response to the immigration of Ugandan Asians following their expulsion from Uganda under Idi Amin's rule.[21] Though the 1971 Act was not a direct result of the Ugandan crisis which occurred in 1972, Ugandan Asians, many of whom also held British passports, were either accepted into the U.K. as refugees or were turned away if they could not prove patriality under the stringent provisions of the 1971 Act.[22] Nonetheless, the 1971 Act had obvious implications for Commonwealth citizens seeking the protec-

tion of the British government, particularly in cases in which independence movements brought civil unrest and governmental instability.

From the perspective of the Commonwealth, the 1971 legislation meant an oppressive immigration regime which closed the doors of British legal rights to anyone who could not prove patrial family lineage, U.K. birth, or a five-year residence permitted by labor vouchers.[23] In contrast, Great Britain may have viewed the 1971 Act as a way to prepare itself for the arrival of European migrants upon its entry into the European Union in 1973. As Sanjiv Sachdeva explains, the 1971 Act reflected a move toward European Economic Community provisions, which gave European citizens primacy over those from the colonial states.[24] Britain's efforts to meet the demands of European Union membership are not enough, however, to excuse the global implications of the 1971 Act. As Nuruddin Farah writes, the 1971 Act had a clearly "racist logic" underneath it—a logic that meant "one was treated differently if one came from what was referred to as the Old Commonwealth…Ready to join…the European Community, Britain has lately negotiated away its imperial responsibility."[25] Whether the 1971 Immigration Act is a matter of Britain's successful European integration or one of postcolonial irresponsibility, its impact on Commonwealth subjects and the atmosphere of exclusion it has created continue to exist today.

Perhaps the most important legal development after the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act is the more recent British Nationality Act of 1981. The 1981 Act radically redefined the legislation surrounding nationality and citizenship in the U.K. and the Commonwealth. Its most important effect was to replace the more liberal 1948 British Nationality Act with three new types of citizenship that made distinctions between full British (or patrial) citizenship, British Dependent Territories Citizenship, and British Overseas Citizenship.[26] As Andrew Geddes writes, the creation of official British Overseas Citizenship (or BOC) largely stripped Commonwealth citizens in East Africa of any rights associated with their ties to British nationality.[27] For the countless individuals who had once been considered British nationals under colonial rule, the 1981 legislation meant that their British citizenship no longer had any rights associated with it.[28] In the end, even the strictest legislation embodied by the 1981 Act could not completely close Britain's doors to the flow of family members and asylum seekers who would cross its borders in the decades following the new Nationality Act. Try as it might, the U.K. and its government officials cannot

ignore the reality that Britain is a growing multicultural polity with the potential to be either innovative or destructive in the development of a cosmopolitan democracy.

While the challenges regarding the immigration of British Overseas Citizens have not disappeared altogether, more modern attempts to control immigration have centered on the control of asylum applications. The 1993 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act, the 1996 Asylum and Immigration Act, and four additional Acts on immigration and asylum between 1999 and 2006 are the most recent attempts to manage immigration. While the impact of the earlier Acts can be evaluated, the scholarly research on the most recent Acts is limited or nonexistent. Because of space constraints, the modern legislation will be discussed more generally, outlining its universal impacts and motivations. The 1993 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act was the first to respond to massive increases in immigration during the period from 1989 to 1993. One impact of this Act was to introduce a body of legislation that dealt specifically with "the backlog of asylum cases" that confronted officials in the early 1990s.[29] The legislation limited not only the number of asylum-seekers who were given official refugee status, but also withdrew the government provision of housing for asylum-seekers.[30] Even so, the 1993 Act did not officially have an impact on the number of applications for asylum overall; indeed, the applications continued to rise dramatically after 1993.[31] Even so, the 1993 Act had the impact of increased refusals and a decrease in the numbers of asylum-seekers given Exceptional Leave to Remain, or ELR. As a Home Office report notes, "In 1993, 48 per cent of initial decisions were to grant ELR and 46 per cent were refused asylum. In 1995, 16 per cent were granted ELR while 79 per cent were refused."[32]

The Asylum and Immigration Act of 1996 also sought to limit asylum applications by denying many asylum-seekers welfare and housing benefits, and the absence of government efforts to remedy the social and economic deprivation that plagued the majority of asylum communities placed crushing responsibility on local organizations, which developed temporary, improvised, and uncoordinated solutions to widespread problems.[33] Additionally, the 1996 Act removed the right of appeal within the U.K. for asylum-seekers who first traveled through another country considered "safe" by immigration officials before arriving in the U.K.[34] Overall, as Andrew Geddes observes, each new Act passed on asylum between 1993 and today has "sought to correct the errors of the previous legislation."[35] The result, in the end,

is a collection of asylum legislation that seeks both to close off external borders and to build more complicated internal measures for discouraging asylum applications.[36] Despite a legacy of tough legislation, however, the newest legislation passed in 2002 may hold some promise for a successful multicultural Britain. The 2002 legislation in particular began to seek out alternative routes to "positive immigration" in the form of the Highly Skilled Migrants Program. Increased attention to anti-discrimination legislation may also encourage new approaches to pluralism in the U.K.[37] In the end, beginning to understand the social and legal impacts of immigration and nationality legislation will be an essential first step in moving forward the discussions about pluralism and integration in the United Kingdom and worldwide.

IV. Research from the Spring Semester in the Netherlands

A. History of Multiculturalism in the Netherlands

According to authors Jan Lucassen and Rinus Penninx, waves of immigration and emigration in the Netherlands have existed for more than four centuries.[38] Although the discourse and political rhetoric about these "newcomers" has changed over time, the challenges remain the same. Despite the long history of immigration in the Netherlands, this section is concerned specifically with the more modern realities of newcomers in the period following the Second World War.

Following the end of World War II, three categories of migration can be identified in the history of the Netherlands: those migrating for political reasons, as a result of economic factors, or as asylum-seekers.[39] First, the Netherlands saw an increase in political migration as a result of independence movements in its colonial territories. The first important group of migrants was from the Dutch colony in Indonesia. Lucassen and Penninx estimate that from 1945 to 1965, around 300,000 migrants traveled from Indonesia to settle in the Netherlands.[40] Following Japan's occupation of Indonesia between 1942 and 1945, about 120,000 Dutch nationals escaped political persecution and instability to return *en masse* to the Netherlands.[41] In addition, these hundreds of thousands of native Dutch were joined by 180,000 mixed Dutch-Indonesians (who were born to at least one Dutch parent and chose Dutch nationality over Indonesian nationality).[42] Finally, the migration of a third group of Moluccans resulted from political instability in Indonesia in the late 1940s. Originally, the Moluccans served in the

Netherlands Indies Army and opposed the Indonesian government's rule in an effort to gain Moluccan independence.[43] The Indonesian government refused to negotiate with the Moluccans, and the Netherlands government eventually agreed to allow the temporary migration of 12,500 Moluccans to the Netherlands.[44] Initially, the Moluccans were housed in camps in the Netherlands, forbidden to work, and completely isolated from the larger Dutch society.[45] Beginning in the 1950s, the Moluccan community numbered approximately 32,000, and they were increasingly granted work opportunities and relocated to Dutch towns.[46] Despite these attempts at integration, a Moluccan terrorist group, comprised of second-generation Moluccan immigrants, carried out a series of attacks on Dutch soil between 1975 and 1978.[47] In 1977, terrorist occupation of a school and attacks on a Dutch train led to a forceful reaction on the part of the government to free hostages.[48] Following the attacks in 1977, Moluccan terrorism ceased. Now a more successfully integrated community of Moluccans and their descendants numbers around 40,000.[49]

A second group of colonial migrants arrived between 1973 and 1975, when the approaching independence of Surinam threatened to bring an end to the substantial benefits of Dutch citizenship for the Surinamese.[50] Though the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands of 1954 allowed the free movement of Surinamese citizens, the expiration of this provision upon Surinamese independence meant that thousands of Surinamese sought to take advantage of their "last chance" at the full rights associated with official Dutch citizenship. In 1975 alone, the Netherlands saw almost 40,000 Surinamese cross the Dutch border, bringing its population in the Netherlands to just over 100,000.[51] In the end, almost a third of the Surinamese population immigrated to the Netherlands.[52] Provisional data for the year 2007 estimate that more than 300,000 individuals of Surinamese origin or second-generation descent currently reside in the Netherlands.[53]

The second major reason for immigration to the Netherlands was a result of economic incentive, illustrated first by government supported guest-worker programs introduced in the 1960s, and later by more modern permanent economic migration.[54] The first workers were recruited from Spain and Italy, though a larger percentage arrived from Turkey, Morocco, and Tunisia during the mid-1960s. Like many other countries in Western Europe, the Dutch government believed that these "guest" workers would be resident in the Netherlands for the short term only, and the migrants initially acted under similar sen-

timents. Again in following with other European countries at the time, the Netherlands ended its guest-worker programs in 1974, following the 1973 oil crisis, which led to massive economic restructuring and a decrease in the need for foreign labor.[55] Though migration had existed for decades, the Netherlands began to realize quickly that the guest-worker population was determined to stay.

More modern immigration as a result of economic motivations has been the more common type of movement since the 1970s. This development has transformed the demographic composition of the minority presence in the Netherlands.[56] Many of the Italians and Spaniards recruited during the 1960s returned to their home countries when labor opportunities declined, though large numbers of Turks and Moroccans stayed and invited their families to the Netherlands.[57] Family formation also increased in the 1990s, as legal migrants invited spouses from their home countries to the Netherlands. Lucassen and Penninx write that by 1992, "the Turks and Moroccans constituted the largest groups of immigrants in the Netherlands (250,000 and 195,000 respectively) after the Surinamese."[58] Today the Turkish community in the Netherlands exceeds 360,000, if second-generation Turkish are included.[59]

In addition to political and economic migrants, large-scale asylum applications to the Netherlands began in 1974 following the end of official guest-worker programs. Rising trends in asylum applications began in the 1980s, with a record number of over 52,000 in 1994 alone.[60] Applications have decreased dramatically since 1994, although they increased between 2004 and 2005, when 12,350 applications for asylum were received.[61]

In conclusion, the modern history of migration in the Netherlands is both dynamic and multi-faceted. One report suggests that communities of non-Western immigrants in the Netherlands are as large as 1.6 million, or ten percent of the country's population.[62] According to the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, first- and second-generation individuals with at least one parent born abroad make up 19.4% of the population in the Netherlands.[63] The climate of immigration in the Netherlands may be changing yet again, influenced largely by the social tension that has increased following the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh in November 2004.[64] Restrictive immigration and asylum policies, and continuing debates over family reunion and the social integration of minority groups suggest that the history of immigration to the Netherlands is far from complete.

B. Legal Obstacles

The challenges of migration and the growth of multicultural communities in the Netherlands parallel a changing legal regime of immigration, integration, and asylum policies. Despite innovative commitments to a more inclusive and respectful "minorities policy" during the 1970s, contemporary immigration and integration policies have moved away from a focus on multiculturalism toward a focus on civic integration, or *inburgering*, policy.[65] From the 1970s until today, two competing approaches have pursued divergent legal and political solutions to the challenges of a multicultural Dutch society.

   The first approach toward minorities policy, prevalent between the 1970s and early 1980s, was a result of "pillarization," or *verzuiling*, which defined a political system of "institutionalised separateness" for Dutch religious and cultural communities.[66] Though the recognition of separate pillars largely disappeared in the 1960s, policies directly affecting minority groups were influenced by the "identity-affirming" qualities of pillarization, though the recognition of separateness had largely disappeared by the 1960s.[67] Perhaps the most influential legal development reflecting the affirming approach of this early period was the 1983 Minorities Policy. According to Andrew Geddes, this policy "saw the Netherlands as a multi-ethnic society with the expression of ethnic differences by immigrants an important part of their social identity, which should be protected."[68] The policy contained three central goals which advocated the promotion of minority equality before law, the promotion of "multiculturalism and the emancipation of ethnic communities," and improvements in the social and economic realities of minorities.[69] Combining legal equality with equal opportunities, the 1983 Minorities Policy embraced a method for integration that did not require a renunciation of unique cultural identities.[70] Dutch policies granting voting rights to residents with third-country national status after five years of legal residence make the Netherlands, to this day, one of the few states to grant limited political participation rights to non-nationals.[71] Despite concerted attempts at encouraging a pluralistic minorities policy, political changes and historical evaluations slowly began to erode the ambitious steps toward multicultural integration of the 1970s and 1980s.

   It is difficult to pinpoint a single year or event between the 1980s and today that decided the official decline of the plural minorities policy, though several trends greatly stimulated the rising popularity of fewer

multicultural integration policies. First, political and academic statistics in the late 1980s began to reflect a growing gap of inequality and marginalization between native Dutch and minority communities.[72] As a result, political sentiments shifted, and multiculturalism was challenged by individuals seeking to encourage a universal commitment to "the Dutch way of life."[73] This new commitment is illustrated most recently by the introduction of the 2006 Integration Abroad Act and the 2007 New Integration Act. While the 1983 Minorities Policy "explicitly safe-guarded" the cultural autonomy of minorities and rejected forced assimilation, modern policies focus on civic integration through *inburgering*, or integration through adaptation.[74] Among other conditions, the New Integration Act and the Integration Abroad Act place an obligation on individuals applying for residence status in the Netherlands to achieve integration through an "integration programme…consisting of courses in Dutch and social and vocational orientation, career planning, social guidance."[75] The New Integration Act and the Integration Abroad Act follow legislation made with the 1998 Law on the Civic Integration of Newcomers, which requires "500 hours of language training and 100 hours of civic education" in order to meet integration requirements.[76]

In addition to changing political sentiments surrounding the process of integration, the increasing size, diversity, and economic status of ethnic minority and immigrant communities confronted policymakers at the turn of the century.[77] Several legislative changes beginning in 1984 attempted to calm the growing excitement over the evolving identity of Dutch minority communities. First, the Nationality Act of 1984 presented significant challenges to newcomers seeking naturalization. The 1984 Act followed an attempt by right-wing politicians to reduce minority naturalization through a bill that would have excluded Surinamese immigrants from a "rapid naturalisation procedure…for persons who had lost their Dutch nationality."[78] While the 1984 Act was not as openly xenophobic, two modifications "were clearly related to the desire to restrict immigration."[79] First, the Act abolished the option for non-Dutch women to choose Dutch nationality after marriage to a Dutch citizen.[80] As Groenendijk and Heijs note, this change had the effect of reducing the number of marriages whose primary purpose was to acquire Dutch nationality. A second provision granting stateless children born in the Netherlands Dutch nationality was also removed—introducing a three-year residence requirement, which would have the effect of preventing children born to stateless

Roma and Moluccan parents from acquiring Dutch citizenship.[81] This same rule was also used to prevent stateless children's parents from acquiring residence status and eventual citizenship. Overall, the shift in approaches to migration has been significant, and political and legal debates are far from over. In an era of globalization that encourages transnational communities and the free movement of people and cultures, modern democracies face challenges unlike any seen in the past.

V. Citizenship, Identity, and Belonging in an Age of Globalization

Identifying the growth of multiculturalism among the world's nations, along with state responses to this pluralism, is a useful first step in understanding that globalization demands innovative changes for the world's individuals and polities. Macalester's endeavor to explore the phenomenon of globalization within the context of a two-semester program abroad is a unique example of a forum in which an understanding of global citizenship can be cultivated. In my own particular case, two semesters in different European Union member states provided me with the opportunity to explore multicultural citizenship from the perspectives of the state and minority communities. Despite the economic innovation embodied in the progress of the European Union, political and legal jurisdiction still lies predominantly with state governments. Often this negatively impacts the potential successes of cosmopolitan citizens. The modern nation-state in many cases attempts to "discipline away" the complexities and dynamism of human cultures and plurality of identity, while the cosmopolitan forces of globalization nurture and increase "transnational place polygamy."[82] Furthermore, multicultural individuals find it difficult to identify solely with a national identity that is more stagnant than dynamic. It is an inescapable reality that the identities of individuals are no longer, if they ever were, tied to a single locality. In both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, as well as across the member states of the European Union and the world, globalization is challenging both state sovereignty and national identity. This is especially clear with the phenomenon of global citizenship. As John Tomlinson writes, the world is faced with the fact that "the shrinking of distance and complex interdependence of the globalization process produces what we might call 'enforced proximity.'"[83] In other words, it is becoming much more difficult for individuals and states to dismiss the reality of a growing global society. Individuals are increasingly aware that choices made in their own lives have global

impacts, and states are equally conscious that isolation and homogeneity are no longer acceptable in an international community. With its variety of potential dangers and innovative promises, embracing a global cosmopolitan society may be the only way to manage the pluralities of identity that accompany a growing population of cosmopolitan citizens. As Tomlinson suggests, cosmopolitanism may be "the sort of cultural disposition people living in a globalized world need to cultivate."[84] It is also important to note that cosmopolitanism would not "insist that all values are equivalent, but would emphasize the responsibility that individuals and groups have for the ideas that they hold and the practices in which they engage."[85] A world of global cosmopolitanism would not be a cultural "free for all," but would represent a world in which individuals can maintain their local identities while being able to "think beyond the local to the long-distance and long-term consequences of actions…and be able to enter into an intelligent relationship of dialogue with others who start from different assumptions."[86] The state cannot, of course, be held wholly responsible for cultivating global citizens, but it is nonetheless the obligation of democratic polities to support their citizenry in the creation of the type of cosmopolitanism that Tomlinson and others identify. Cosmopolitanism is both the promise and the risk of globalization, and it may also be the answer to effectively weathering globalization's storms. Many of globalization's best navigators are also its authors. Global citizens who redefine their identities with each cross-border excursion not only feel the pressures of globalization, but they are also the newest members of a growing global community. With the help of strong democratic leadership, these citizens stand ready to encourage successful structures for global governance and international accountability. Like many of the international organizations that guide the global community today, however, the support of the world's states is a necessary element for growth. Indeed, the strength of the democracy in an era of globalization may depend on the nation-state's capacity to begin cosmopolitan dialogue with its citizens and the rest of the world.

VI. Conclusion

From the multicultural marketplaces and international avenues of central London, to the household worries about "*those* people taking *our* jobs" in small towns throughout England, and to the larger fear of terrorism caused by threats on U.K. soil, the impact of diversity can be felt. In the small city of Maastricht, Netherlands, cosmopolitanism can be found in the kebab and satay restaurants, and in the multilingual Dutch, French, and English conversations, which are a daily occurrence between the Dutch and Belgian borders. The impact of cosmopolitanism can also be found in the potentially oppressive "whiteness" of the city's permanent population and in the stereotypes that minorities face when trying to become "Dutch." The potential of cosmopolitanism, of course, is neither absolutely positive nor negative. At its best, cosmopolitanism can support a multicultural community of endless diversity and cultural change, brought together in global responsibility and accountability. At its worst, the presence of cultural diversity can become oppressive—breeding hatred, violence, and illusions of cultural and moral supremacy that threaten to separate the world into culturally based centers of opposition. In either case, the role that the nation-state plays in the current decades is essential in creating a global environment in which the core values of democracy can be given cosmopolitan relevance. As many of the world's global citizens search for a place to call home, their globalized biographies can be an instructive way to explore the potential of cultural diversity and cosmopolitanism that is nurtured by the powerful forces of globalization. In the end, for all of us to call the world "home" would be a powerful step toward the creation of an international community with the capacity to confront some of the most pressing global challenges.   ◉

Notes

1. Ulrich Beck, *What is Globalization?* (Malden: Polity, 2000), p. 73.

2. Ibid.

3. Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 2.

4. Institute for Public Policy Research. *Ethnicity Profiles: London*. Commission for Racial Equality. Accessed online at http://83.137.212.42/sitearchive/cre/diversity/map/london/index.html.

5. Randall Hansen, "From Subjects to Citizens: Immigration and Nationality Law in the United Kingdom," in *Towards a European Nationality: Citizenship, Immigration, and Nation-*

ality Law in the EU, eds. Randall Hansen and Patrick Weil (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 74.

6. Ibid., pp. 74–76.

7. Ibid., p. 76.

8. Ibid., pp. 76–77.

9. Ibid., p. 70.

10. National Statistics. *Focus on Ethnicity and Identity: Population Size*. Office for National Statistics. Accessed online at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=455.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Hansen, p 76.

14. Ibid., p. 77.

15. Ibid.

16. Sanjiv Sachdeva, *The Primary Purpose Rule in British Immigration Law* (Stoke-on-Trent: Trentham Books, 1993), p. 23.

17. Hansen, p. 77.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., p. 78.

20. Hansen 2001; and Randall Hansen, "The Kenyan Asians, British Politics, and the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1968," *The Historical Journal* 42, no. 3 (1999).

21. Nuruddin Farah, *Yesterday, Tomorrow: Voices from the Somali Diaspora* (New York: Cassell, 2000), p. 54.

22. Hansen, p. 79.

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