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The United States Drug Enforcement Administration: Pertaining to Public Safety and Homeland Security

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THE UNITED STATES DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION:
PERTAINING TO PUBLIC SAFETY AND HOMELAND SECURITY

BY


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SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEGREE OF MASTERS OF
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APPROVED BY:

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Joseph F. Ryan". The signature is written in a cursive style with a horizontal line at the end.

Abstract

Despite the efforts of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, United States Government, Armed Forces, and other law enforcement agencies, illegal drug uses continues to be a major issue. The direct connection between illicit drugs and terrorism, specifically in Afghanistan, poses a major threat to America along with the effects these drugs have on public health. In order to continue to successfully countering illegal drug trafficking and abuse in the United States it is essential to bolster numerous aspects of the Drug Enforcement Administration its efforts. This includes management, public-private partnerships, and critical infrastructure protection. It is also necessary for the Drug Enforcement Administration to develop strategic plans and carry out assessments of all efforts to insure each programs success. This document will address all of these areas in order to illustrate how to move forward in combating illegal drug trafficking, sales, and abuse.

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Chapter 1

Drug Crop Eradication and Drug Interdiction Strategy: Afghanistan

Purposed Strategy for Drug Enforcement Administration and U.S. Efforts

Preface:

This strategy has been developed for the Drug Enforcement Administration and all other agencies and organizations participating in America's War on Drugs in Afghanistan. It depicts the drug issues in Afghanistan and its effects on America, what each agency and organization has done in the past, what they are doing currently, and recommendations for future programs, initiatives, and changes that are necessary to drastically reduce the drug production and trafficking in Afghanistan. In order to win the War on Terror, it is first necessary to win the War on Drugs in Afghanistan. This strategy is the first step to achieving both of these goals.

Introduction:

“It is so important for Americans to know that the trafficking in drugs finances the work of terror, sustaining terrorists. Terrorists use drug profits to fund their cells to commit acts of murder. If you quit drugs, you join the fight against terror in America.” President George W. Bush (2001)

The United States Government's (USG) Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO), formerly known as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), is inextricably linked to narcoterrorism and particularly in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. This memorandum proposes the creation of a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) led coalition to combat the growth, production, and trafficking of illicit drugs in Afghanistan to

underpin the OCO. The DEA-led coalition would include: the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DOS), the Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the United States Agency of International Development (USAID). In addition, the Coalition would enlist support from the United Nations (UN). The grand strategy includes a comprehensive effort to eradicate narcoterrorism that includes aerial spraying of extant opium crops, interdiction and seizure of narcotics, narcotics precursors, and narcotics paraphernalia, training and education to support alternate agricultural products, and the development of critical infrastructure that will support legitimate enterprises. The Coalition strategy would deny terrorist groups in Afghanistan, particularly Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, vital revenues that sustain their organizations and ability to conduct terrorist attacks.

Connection Between Terrorism and Drugs in Afghanistan:

America has been leading the War on Drugs for decades. However, it has only recently become clear that this war is directly related to the OCO. The OCO has become our nation's largest focus, with preventing the next terrorist attack being the main goal of all agencies and organizations in the homeland security field. The U.S. armed forces play a majority of the role in the effort but will never be fully successful. This is why it is important to cut off the resources of terrorist organizations and eliminate the avenues they possess to attack our nation. Terrorist narco-trafficking is one of the key methods terrorists utilize to make profits, attack our nation, and justify their actions.

Many of the world's terrorist organizations finance their operations with the proceeds of narcotics trafficking including the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, the Mexican Drug Cartels, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), and others.

Organizations like these are able to attack our nation on numerous levels through the trafficking and sales of illicit drugs. Primarily the profits made from drug sales allow them to invest in the resources needed to plan and carry out attacks against the United States and its allies. As American citizens continue to illegally purchase narcotics, especially those that were produced internationally, they are supplying terrorists with the funding they need. American drug users are partly responsible for terrorist attacks, including September 11th.

The second attack method utilized by terrorists is to disrupt our economy. They are continuously doing this in America by providing our citizens with drugs. First, our citizens continue to use money that could be spent to bolster the already struggling economy to purchase illicit drugs. In turn the government is forced to continue to support addicts by providing drug treatment programs and hospital costs. In 1999 American users spent \$63.2 billion on illicit drugs (*Who*). According to a study by the University of Maryland in 2000 the cost of illicit drug abuse was \$160.7 billion not including the \$19.3 billion spent on the war on drugs (Ehrenfeld, 2002, p. 394). It is further estimated that the government currently spends over \$40 billion a year fighting the war on drugs (Drug War, 2010). These are billions of dollars that could be put to better use and reinvested in our nation rather than invested in fighting America's drug issues.

Lastly, not only do terrorists make a profit off drug use and attack us economically, they are forcing us to play into their reasoning for attack. Most terrorist groups operating out of the Middle East want to attack our nation because of our way of life. One of the reasons is that Americans abuse alcohol and use drugs recreationally. These terrorist groups are then supplying Americans with the drugs they base their

reasoning for attacking us. Not only do terrorists use this as a premise for their hatred towards our society but they can also recruit new members with similar beliefs. As terrorists, particularly Islamic fundamentalist terrorists, continue to recruit and publicize their beliefs they will draw like-minded individuals who see Americas use of recreational drugs to be appalling.

In 2008 Afghanistan supplied 93% of the world's opium, while in 2001 it provided only 12% (Dreazen, 2009). In 2009 Afghanistan became one of the world's largest producers of hashish, with over 42,000 acres of cannabis plants producing three times the amount of hashish than Morocco, one of the world's larger providers (Walt, 2010). This increase in opium production and the addition of hashish occurred while the United States was occupying the nation. Every branch of the American Armed Services and numerous other agencies and organizations were in Afghanistan fighting the OCO, yet did not interfere with known drug production that facilitated the same insurgents they were combating. After the initial military surge in Afghanistan the American government opted to begin the process of poppy crop eradication knowing that terrorist organizations were being financed by the proceeds of the poppy crop. For the remainder of the Bush Administration this effort continued.

The Obama Administration has opted to utilize a new approach. Instead of destroying crops and creating a hostile relationship between U.S. forces and farmers the new approach is designed to locate and destroy "marketplaces that sell drug paraphernalia, precursor chemicals, laboratory equipment, as well as opium and poppy seeds," a process referred to as drug interdiction (Kaufman, 2009).

The 2010 National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) was written in response to the new policy changes of President Obama. According to the strategy:

This approach is focused on fostering rural economic and agricultural development and enhanced interdiction to wean Afghan farmers off opium poppy while depriving the insurgency and corrupt officials of the profits from this illegal economy. The United States is also working with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to conduct investigations and operations in Afghanistan targeting drug kingpins and high-value targets, including organizations funding the insurgency (p. 81).

Most of the NDCS has to do with national efforts and efforts in Mexico and South America, with limited information on exact operations in Afghanistan. However, as mentioned above the major goals are to wean farmers off poppy, eliminate drug paraphernalia and seeds, and assist the Afghan government to investigate and target drug kingpins. These are the tasks that are currently being administered in Afghanistan by the DEA, DOD, DoS, USDA, and USAID (National Drug, 2010, p. 81).

Agency/Organizational Current and Recommended Efforts:

There is a need for a new strategy to combat drug growth, production, and trafficking in Afghanistan. This strategy utilizes similar programs to what the Bush and Obama Administrations have utilized and are currently utilizing, while adding new recommendations. As mentioned previously the Bush administration utilized military and DEA agents to eradicate crops to insure they were not sold and exploited at the

production level. However, this turned farmers against American forces and toward the open arms of the Taliban while also destroying their means of life. Currently the Obama administration counternarcotics strategy focuses on destroying “marketplaces which sell drug paraphernalia, precursor chemicals, laboratory equipment, as well as opium and poppy seeds,” as well as covert farmers to licit crops (Kaufman, 2009). One plan allows for the initial farming of the crop and expects to stop the process at the preproduction/production level while the other never allows for the crops to be grown. This strategy combines the two and designates the Drug Enforcement Administration as the agency to lead, delegate, and monitor the success of the mission.

The DEA will maintain operational control of the Coalition via a Command Center in Washington D.C. and a forward Command Center in Afghanistan. The Command Centers will have representatives from all agencies, departments, and organizations contributing in Afghanistan, which will create an open line of communication and promote continuous planning and cooperation. The DEA will run the office and will be responsible for all efforts involving the diminishing of drug production in the country. An argument may be made that this command should be directed by the DoS; however, the DEA specializes in narcotics and their expertise can be a great addition to the management of America’s current efforts. Therefore the strategy suggests that the DEA take authority in this command. Although creating a command structure of such magnitude will take time, resources, and patience, clearer lines of communication and cooperation will result. Ultimately this type of structure will allow for America’s success in eliminating a vast majority of Afghanistan’s drug production.

In order to recognize that the efforts in Afghanistan are a success there must be a measurement tool. This is a role the DEA must play. It will be important to measure the acreage of crops grown, the tonnage of drugs leaving Afghanistan, traveling through transit zones, and entering the United States in order to indicate if our efforts are successful. The second is the most important aspect: if the drugs are successfully produced and shipped out of Afghanistan, the mission will have ultimately failed since a profit has already been made. It will then become the responsibility of DEA agents as well as state and local law enforcement to ensure the product is not sold on the streets of America. It is difficult to designate the level of drugs being exported. If the trafficking could be seen then it would be stopped. However this is not that case so new tactics and tools will be developed to accurately measure volume without seeing it. In 2008 Afghanistan produced 93% of the world's opium; this strategy recommends that this percentage must be cut in half over the next three to five years with the DEA closely monitoring this success.

The DEA is currently playing an essential role in the current efforts in Afghanistan, which they must continue. In 2006 there were a dozen DEA agents in Afghanistan, and currently there are over 100 (Holton, 2010). The majority of these agents are members of elite teams known as "Fast Teams" who carry out the same operations an agent would in America to include search and arrest warrants, seizures of drugs, and counternarcotics law enforcement, as well as the training of the Afghan police (Holton, 2010). While the Fast Teams are not part of the military, they receive training from the US armed services and many members of the Fast Teams have US military backgrounds (DEA, 2009). According to the DEA "coordination and cooperation with

federal, state, and local agencies, and with foreign governments, in programs designed to reduce the availability of illicit abuse-type drugs on the United States market through non-enforcement methods such as crop eradication, crop substitution, and training of foreign officials” is one of the main goals of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA Mission, 2010).

These teams investigate from the bottom up, utilizing low-level dealers to gather intelligence on drug kingpins (DEA, 2009). As the teams make their way through Southern Afghanistan they seize/destroy all weapons and drugs they are directed to and/or happen upon. In addition, the fast teams interview locals and interrogate suspected dealers to collect intelligence that may facilitate future operations. Training and assisting local Afghan forces insures that they can continue the process once the DEA leaves the area (DEA, 2009). In June of 2008 the DEA’s efforts were substantiated by a record setting seizure of 262 tons of hashish in Operation Albatross which was a combine effort between Afghan forces and DEA Fast Teams (DEA Releases, 2010). Operations like this are key to the success of President Obama’s new counternarcotics strategy. In order for the DEA Fast Teams efforts to be substantial doubling the total agents over the next 2 years is recommended.

Combining the Bush and Obama Administrations’ efforts will have the greatest effect on Afghanistan’s drug production. The DEA-led coalition will insure that each agency and organization is carrying out their designated actions. One of the first processes is to provide farmers with the assistance and materials needed to cultivate viable licit crops in lieu of poppy and cannabis. Many believe that there are few crops that will grow in Afghanistan’s less than fertile soil. However, food crops like corn, rice,

barley, wheat, vegetables, fruits, and nuts can thrive (Economy, 2010). Trellis grapes as well as a combination of corn and wheat can be 10 times more profitable than poppy (Soucy, 2009). Other profitable industrial crops consist of cotton, tobacco, madder, castor beans, and sugar beets (Economy, 2010).

The main economy of Afghanistan consists of farming and pastoralism with 85 percent of the population relying on this to make a living (Economy, 2010). However, only 6 percent of Afghanistan is cultivated for farming (Rebuilding, 2010). This is an opportunity for the DoS as well as USAID to provide funding and expertise to the Afghan government to develop new road and irrigation projects to increase this percentage.

Currently viable and secure roads are being built to help deliver farmers' products to market. USAID is currently rehabilitating over 1,677 kilometers of roads (Afghanistan-Programs, 2010). The desired outcome of rehabilitating the roadway system is to re-build the Ring Road which connects Kabul in the north with Kandahar in the south and Herat in the west (Afghanistan-Programs, 2010). This will allow for roughly 80 percent of Afghans to live within 50 kilometers of this new road system (Afghanistan-Programs, 2010). The 50 kilometer access is the beginning of what might be access to all arable Afghan land. It is recommended that efforts continue to reduce this to less than 20 kilometers.

The nation's irrigation systems also need to be vastly rehabilitated. What little irrigation that does exist is primitive and the water source is dependent on erratic winter snows and spring rains (Economy, 2010). The building of irrigation systems such as

canals and drilled wells can broaden the area of cultivatable land. Also bringing new irrigation techniques to the nation can increase the amount of land that can be farmed and the total crop output of a single field. The most viable option is drip irrigation, a system of suspended hoses that slowly drips water onto crops, which utilizes less water and accomplishes the same effect.

Another issue is the relatively little use of machinery, chemical fertilizer, and pesticides (Economy, 2010). These are all products that can greatly increase crop output. The use of trellising, leveling the land, and using trickle irrigation alone could bring a 50 percent increase in total crop production (Soucy, 2009). Some land that was previously considered to be non arable might be transformed into arable land through irrigation, the use of chemical fertilizers, and proper cultivation of soil by machinery. As mentioned before, drip irrigation uses the least water while still providing enough for optimal growth. The same drip irrigation can be used to administer fertilizer to plants, while machinery can spread the proper fertilizer to the soil prior to planting to insure the right chemical and ph levels in the soil. Pesticides have become a questionable chemical in the public eye, because many believe that it has a negative environmental effect. However, a country that is economically unstable like Afghanistan could greatly utilize the assurance that their crops will not be lost to pests.

The question is now how a war torn nation with an economy that fosters a 40 percent unemployment rate is going to afford all of these improvements. According to the DOS:

“The United States and the international community are helping to restore banking and credit services to rural lenders, which now administer loans in nearly two-thirds of the country’s provinces. As of September 2009, more than 52,300 agricultural loans ranging from approximately \$200 to \$2 million had gone to small businesses, with a repayment rate of 94%.”(Economy, 2010)

This type of financial support is pivotal to farmers advancing their agricultural techniques and procuring the machinery and chemicals needed. This allows for nations and organizations like the USG and the UN to help in the process but not have to fund the entire process. However, with a population of almost 30 million people, a mere 52,300 loans being distributed illustrates that a vast majority of the population has not taken advantage of this opportunity. The repayment rate of 94% illustrates that the program is effective and farmers are making a substantial profit off licit crops. It is necessary to utilize new means of promoting these loans to insure the entire population can utilize this opportunity.

Media promotions utilizing radio ads, papers, and flyers could be very useful in this process; also promoting at markets would disseminate the information to farmers directly. Although some loans will pay for farming projects there are also some projects that the USG and organizations like the UN may have to pay the brunt of the cost, such as expanding roadways and irrigation canals.

In recent years the Army National Guard has had Agribusiness Development teams deployed in Afghanistan for the sole purpose of teaching farmers sustainable

farming practices (Soucy, 2009). There are roughly a dozen of these teams engaging with local farmers, assisting them in achieving solutions to water and infrastructure issues (Soucy, 2009). According to Army Col. Marty Leppert "They know how to (farm). They need someone to help them with the more scientific aspects of agriculture." (Soucy, 2009) As mentioned previously very few farmers utilize chemical fertilizers and pesticides, these being the scientific aspects of agriculture that these teams can teach to farmers, insuring larger and healthier crops. This strategy recommends that at minimum it is necessary to double the number of National Guard Agribusiness teams in the nation over the next two years to enable a sustainable agricultural economy.

In addition to eradicating narco crops, the USG is helping farmers produce other crop. According to the Wall Street Journal, this "new \$300 million effort will give micro-grants to Afghan food-processing and food-storage businesses, fund the construction of new roads and irrigation channels, and sell Afghan farmers fruit seed and livestock at a heavy discount." (Dreazen, 2009) USAID initiatives include programs that facilitate farmer's transition from "narco" farming to licit crops. Those programs include training, agriculture machinery, seed, and fertilizer.

The USG should use the USDA more effectively in Afghanistan. This organization has the ability to provide seeds, techniques, and assistance that are already provided in America. Most of the USDA assistance has come from their food aid program. Since 2003 the USDA has given roughly \$256 million in food aid to Afghanistan (USDA, 2010). The issue here is that the USDA is spending money to provide the Afghan people with food; however, with the same money the USDA could have helped provide farmers with the seeds needed to raise crops to feed themselves and

for trade at market. This funding should be combined with the USAID efforts and roughly \$600 million could be allotted to provide seeds, fertilizer and other necessities to farmers. This combined effort could feed more than the USDA food aid program, thus this strategy recommends this funding be implemented.

Many farmers grow poppy and cannabis because it can be very profitable, but as mentioned before so can many crops such as grapes, corn and wheat. However, there is no substantial market for these crops and there is a high demand for poppy and cannabis. This is an opportunity for the United States to facilitate the development of new markets, with the assistance of the United Nations and the European Union (EU). There needs to be a market for the licit crops being grown in order to get farmers to stay with these crops instead of switching back to poppy and cannabis. According to Karl W. Eikenberry, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, "The narcotics problem never will be solved without economic development." (Garamone, 2009)

One market for poppy has been developed by two American businessmen, Wayne Arden and John Fox (Irvine, 2010). They have developed an idea that would allow the military to utilize biofuel, produced from poppy, for vehicles and power plants, thus insuring farmers a legal market to sell their poppy crops (Irvine, 2010). Although poppy can be utilized to create biofuel crops like safflower, which grows in the same conditions as poppy, would produce a better fuel (Irvine, 2010). According to Arden, "You can extract oil from poppies and make diesel from it. The issue is it doesn't necessarily do the job of moving the country away from an illicit drugs trade" (Irvine, 2010). Although this is a market that does not yet exist and it would continue to allow for poppy to be grown. It would also mean that the poppy could end up in American hands to be processed into

biofuel instead of into the hands of drug manufacturers and terrorists. Although, this market would mean America would have to invest in the technology to make the biofuel, it would be more environmentally friendly and would allow the military to become less dependent foreign oil. The Department of Defense needs to determine if this is a viable option, if it is worth the necessary investments and is achievable, they must begin the process of building the necessary plants and purchasing crops from local farmers.

While this may be a viable option it seems that creating a market for licit drugs to be sold and traded at would drastically reduce the production of poppy and cannabis, ultimately leading to a drastic decrease in drug production. There are already local markets that are utilized for trading and selling crops, food stuff, and livestock. Unfortunately these markets are not large and do not allow for a substantial profit margin for farmers. America needs to create more markets that allow for products to be sold and traded across all of Afghanistan and internationally. Initially if there is little interest by other nations to buy products from Afghanistan there is no substantial reason why America cannot. Also it seems that this is an excellent opportunity for the United Nations to purchase foodstuff that they can use for their World Food Program. As the United States and the United Nations provide assistance to farmers to get them on their feet and produce crops at a cheap cost they should seek in return to purchase these crops at a discounted rate for their food programs.

Another issue that a global market with Afghanistan can assist in is the belief that there is going to be a world food shortage in the upcoming years. Promoting nations like Afghanistan that are not well known for the mass production of food could be a key step in solving the food shortage issue. As the world population increases it is necessary to

increase the level of food produced. Unfortunately more jobs are becoming industrial which inevitably is decreasing the number of farmers and ranchers, especially in America. If Afghanistan can produce more crops and marketable foods then trade them on a global market the more their national economy can grow.

Crop eradication has been pushed aside by the Obama Administration but may still be a viable option. There is now a push to supply farmers with what they need to move away from poppy growth and towards licit crops. However, there will be some farmers that refuse to make the change and continue to cultivate poppy and cannabis. If these crops continue to produce illicit drugs then America's efforts will have been thwarted. It seems that if a portion of farmers continue cultivating poppy the best option is eradication. For the most part crop burning is the most common way of eliminating large fields of crops, as well as spraying herbicide. There is a set back and an advantage to burning crops; it adds nitrogen-rich fertilizer to the soil. As mentioned before there is a lack of fertilizer use in Afghanistan so this can be seen as a blessing. However, if the farmer proceeds to cultivate poppy once again the crop will then grow better than before. If this occurs it is necessary for farmer to be persuaded to begin growing legal crops. This is an opportunity for National Guard Agribusiness teams to assist the farmer in the scientific process of farming, while seeds and loans can be provided by USAID, USDA, and the DoS. If farmer are provided everything needed to produce legal crops soon after their illicit crops are burned then there is a much better chance that they will grow legal crops instead. Once the drug crop is destroyed the Agribusiness teams, USAID, USDA, and DoS officials will be informed of needed for assistance.

According to Richard Holbrooke, the Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, “Spraying the crops just penalizes the farmer and they grow crops somewhere else, the hundreds of millions of dollars we spend on crop eradication has not had any damage on the Taliban... On the contrary, it has helped them recruit. This is the least effective program ever.” (Crop, 2010) Unfortunately eradication also contributes to conflict, stimulates corruption, targets the poorest of the poor, and contributes to the breakdown of the relationship between the population and the state (Crop, 2010). This may be true when the only effort the United States was making was the destruction of illicit crops. However, there is the possibility that all of America’s new efforts combined with eradication could have a positive effect.

Drug interdiction is one of President Obama’s new initiatives that places extra efforts on the process of eliminating drug production facilities, production chemicals, paraphernalia needed for packaging and distribution, as well as the drugs themselves. This is carried out by the Department of Defense, the DEA, and Afghan forces. This coalition must collectively de-conflict overlapping initiatives and to insure that all resources are properly utilized. If one branch or organization is unknowingly focusing on the same market or drug lab as another branch or organization this becomes a waste of precious resources. This is one place where the DEA can take command. They will create active communication to insure that no organizations are focusing on the same target and promoting intelligence sharing and cooperation.

All branches of military are participating in the interdiction effort; however, the Marines have been dedicated to finding and destroy poppy seeds in drug markets. According to Ambassador Anthony Wayne the Marines are assisting due to the “Nexus

between poppy growth and drug trafficking and money for the insurgency” (War, 2009). Recently they destroyed over 16,000 sacks of poppy seeds that they seized in numerous markets (War, 2009). Seizing and destroying this many seeds could lead to a noticeable decrease in poppy growth this year (War, 2009). If efforts like this continue to succeed the total poppy harvest could be greatly decreased. As the number of forces increase it is increasingly likely that their efforts on this front will be more noticeable. The more the armed forces can do to assist in the efforts the quicker our goals can be achieved.

Conclusion:

The United States Government’s counternarcotics strategy underpins the Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) and is an integral part of National and Homeland Security. The Proposed DEA-led Coalition would reduce narcotrafficking particularly in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The Strategy is comprehensive with each agency having both a singular and collaborative role.

I, Benjamin Ogden, Pace University graduate student, recommends the following counternarcotic-counterterrorism initiatives and programs:

- USAID: Develop and rehabilitate road and irrigation systems, and provide licit crop seeds.
- U.S. Department of State: Partner with USAID to develop and rehabilitate roads, help create local and international markets for licit crop sales, purchase legal crops for world food programs, promote and provide loans to farmers.
- USDA: Prioritize agricultural training and education and deemphasize Food Aid Program

- Army National Guard Agribusiness Teams: Teach scientific aspect of farming to Afghan farmers, recommends doubling the number of teams over the next two years.
- USDA: Provide seeds that can be easily cultivated in Afghan soil conditions and help farmers grow crops instead of providing the USDA Food Aid Program.
- Department of Defense: Participate in crop eradication when necessary, continue and expand on the interdiction effort of destroying seeds, drugs, and drug paraphernalia; research the use of poppy seed to create bio fuel for military vehicles.
- United Nations: Purchase crops from farmers to bolster the Afghan economy (can be utilized for world food program's) and partner with USAID/Department of State to create local and international markets for farmers to sell crops.
- DoS, USAID, and the UN: Must continue to reduce the distance to any road to less than 20 kilometer to insure farmers can access land and markets.
- Drug Enforcement Administration: Utilize crop eradication when necessary, train local law enforcement, create and control new command offices for Afghan efforts in Washington DC and Afghanistan, develop a system to monitor success, investigate and arrest drug traffickers, destroy illicit seeds, drugs, and paraphernalia, and double the number of FAST Teams deployed in Afghanistan.

Developing and implementing all recommendations of this initiative will take time and political resolve but will cripple terrorists by cutting off their most vital resource, money. This strategy depicts efforts that not only directly decrease the production and sales of illicit drugs but allows for the Afghan people to prosper without needing to produce

poppy and hashish. Fully implemented, this strategy will begin the process of decreasing the quantity of crops grown, drugs produced, and profits made by terrorist organizations in Afghanistan.

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Chapter 2

The Drug Enforcement Administration:

Management Perspectives

“Good management is the art of making problems so interesting and their solutions so constructive that everyone wants to get to work and deal with them.” (Paul Hawken, 2010)

Management Principles:

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is a relatively small yet complex organization made up of numerous offices in all fifty states as well as a large international network of offices. As with many government agencies it is organized as a hierarchy. At the head of the agency are the Administrator and Deputy Administrator with assistants and support staff. Also there are numerous divisions, field offices, and international offices, each with their own leaders and management. In order for the DEA to be successful each year the agency depends on each level of management to lead the agency to success.

“The mission of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is to enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States and bring to the criminal and civil justice system of the United States, or any other competent jurisdiction, those organizations and principal members of organizations, involved in the growing, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances appearing in or destined for illicit traffic in the United States; and to recommend and support non-enforcement programs aimed at reducing the availability of illicit

controlled substances on the domestic and international markets.” (DEA Mission, 2010)

Based on the mission statement of the DEA it is apparent that management will be a difficult task. The mission depicts the far reaching jurisdiction of the administration, both domestically and internationally. The agency not only enforces laws on illicit substances but they must also control the misuse of over the counter drugs (OTC), which are often used to produce methamphetamines. Most people envision the DEA as arresting drug dealers; however, they do much more. It is necessary to track the crops, production chemicals, the trafficking and sales of, and the misuse of illicit drugs. For a manager, especially upper management, this will inevitably be a difficult organization to direct.

The vision and mission of an organization can be an excellent tool in motivating employees. The mission statement of the DEA is not overly motivational. It covers all aspects of the agency; however, is not written in a manner that will construct employee enthusiasm. Many agencies and organizations have a mission that fully encompasses what the organization is in existence to accomplish, but it does not give their employees a reason to strive to achieve more. This is possibly a major challenge in the management of the DEA that could easily be addressed by rewriting the mission.

For a manager in any government agency it is becoming more difficult to direct. With all management there is a focus on attaining the goal or mission of the agency and insuring that subordinates are doing their job well. There is also an added pressure from the public who are constantly scrutinizing everything that the government is doing. This is why President Obama stated that "building a high-performing government" is one of

his administrations main goals (The Presidential Transition, 2010). This is another added pressure that managers now must cope with. If the job wasn't hard enough, they must now streamline all offices to get the greatest performance possible. As a manager this is a difficult task.

In management it is also necessary to take into account today's societal environmental initiatives. In 2007 the DEA took an oath to enhance environmental awareness in all aspects of the agency. According to a 2007 document published by Michele Leonhart, the Deputy Administrator, "all DEA managers, employees, and contractors must incorporate environmental stewardship into their decision-making and day-to-day activities" (Leonhart, 2007). The DEA developed an Environmental Management System (EMS) that allows the agency to be a wise steward to "regulations relating to land, water, air, natural resources, and energy conservation" (Leonhart, 2007). This system was published but after that it is upon managers to insure that they incorporate these requirements into the daily function of their offices.

Communication is one of the most important aspects of a successful organization, and a successful mission. The DEA is not that large an organization but it has many field offices around the world making communication between each office crucial. As the public and those in the homeland security field know, there has been a communication issue in and between agencies over the past decade that has led to serious consequences, like the events of Sept. 11th. As a manager it is necessary to guarantee that these issues are resolved and that all lines of communication are open across the administration. It is necessary to promote communication between all levels of the organization, with no hindrance on field agents directly communicating important information to the acting

Administrator. There is a need for a structure that allows for this type of open communication, which will be discussed later.

Another managerial focus point needs to be the constant promotion of inter-agency cooperation. The DEA is already relatively experienced at this. Most of the missions and operations of the organization involve either local law enforcement or other federal agencies, including the Department of Defense (DOD). A small raid of a drug house will incorporate local police while destroying drug bazaars in Afghanistan will incorporate DOD cooperation. Other agencies that the DEA often works closely with are the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Department of Treasury (DOT), United States Coast Guard (USCG), as well as state and local authorities. Up until Sept. 11th many agencies did not promote inter-agency cooperation and communication, and preferred to work alone; however, this was not the case with the DEA who had, and continues to, promote cooperation and communication to this day.

One of the more significant aspects of management in the DEA is the environment in which field agents perform their duties. As a manager it is necessary to insure that all special agents are properly trained to go into a dangerous situation and insure that everyone comes out uninjured. Special agents in America often have to raid drug labs and drug/cash houses, all of which are typically guarded with armed individuals and other fortifications. The agents that do work overseas like the DEA "Fast Teams" in Afghanistan are armed and in military dress and are exposed to the same conditions and war zones that American troops are exposed to (DEA, The FAST Team, 2009). It is a

necessity that managers ensure that all subordinates get the proper training and are competent to go into these situations.

In most law enforcement there is the possibility of corruption. In the DEA the opportunity for corruption is increased with the elevated level of drugs, money, and firearms that agents come in contact with. As a manager it is necessary to ensure that all evidence is properly handled and that nothing goes missing. The possibility also exists that officers could begin using illicit drugs considering their constant contact; this risk must be taken seriously. Also substances like steroids and alcohol are sometimes abused by law enforcement officers. The issue with steroids is that they can lead to increased aggressions, something that cannot be tolerated, especially in law enforcement. It is important to monitor all subordinates to ensure that substance abuse does not develop into an issue.

A lot of these management issues are very specific to the DEA and the agency's efforts; however, the daily management issues that all managers have to deal with are also factors. Issues like promoting internal camaraderie and cooperation within an office or division, punishment, motivating, and increasing productivity must all be addressed. These are all issues that any manager will deal with on a daily basis. However, when it comes to the DEA and the homeland security field it is pivotal that these issues are properly handled by all levels of management.

Organization and History:


In the spring and summer of 1973, the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate heard months of testimony on Richard Nixon's

Reorganization Plan Number 2, which proposed the creation of a single federal agency to consolidate and coordinate the government's drug control activities. (Drug Enforcement Administration, 2010, p. 1)

In July of 1973 President Nixon took it upon himself to begin the process of expunging America's illicit drug problem. He opted to create a new agency, the Drug Enforcement Administration, through an executive order designed in Reorganization Plan Number 2 (Drug Enforcement Administration, 2010, p. 1). The purpose of this new administration was to combat "an all-out global war on the drug menace" (DEA History, 2010). This drug menace was growing yet there were numerous agencies working to fight the problem. These included the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Customs Service.


According to the DEA genealogy (below) five different organizations were combined to form the Drug Enforcement Administration. These agencies each performed diverse tasks and had different purposes; however, it was apparent that one organization could do the work of all five. Since the formation of the DEA America has witnessed a sharp increase in the use and trafficking of illicit drugs. When the Administration was formed in 1973 it consisted of 1,470 Special Agents and 43 foreign offices in 31 countries, with a budget of less than \$75 million (DEA History, 2010). As America's drug problems increased it was necessary to increase the capabilities do the agency. Today, the DEA has 5,235 Special Agents with 87 foreign offices in 63 countries and an operating budget of more than \$2.3 billion (DEA History, 2010).

DEA Genealogy




(Drug Enforcement Administration, 2010, p. 7)

Currently the DEA is still a relatively small agency, but a complex one. Considering there are offices in 63 countries as well as 227 national offices with at least one office in each state, it will inevitably be a complex organization. The structure of the agency can be described as divisionalized. Below is the diagram for this type of structure. The top consists of upper management, the Administrator and Deputy Administrator. Below them are middle management which consists of executive and specialized offices. To the sides are the “technostructure” and the support staff (Helgesen, 1995, p. 63). These individuals are the information technology staff, custodial staff, administrative assistants, and other supporting staff. At the bottom of the structure is each individual division and field office, each having its own divisionalized structure with the same basic design.



(Helgesen, 1995, p. 63)

Looking toward the future DEA managers will have to work more tightly with different field offices, divisions, and agencies. In order for this to occur it will be necessary to change the management structure of the agency. Sally Helgesen developed the idea of a “web of inclusion,” which is a circular structure that builds from the center (Helgesen, 1995, p. 63). In this type of structure upper management, in the case of the DEA the acting Administrator, is in the center of the organization and all other managers, offices, and divisions form around this. This allows for easier communication between offices/divisions because they are not working in a different section of the organizational structure. Instead, all offices, divisions, managers, and subordinates can easily communicate across the structure, with this type of communication being promoted as pivotal to the DEA’s success. The web’s center and periphery are interconnected and actions in one area ripple over the entire organization (Helgesen, 1995, p. 63). This is the type of structure that will allow for information sharing and cooperation not only in individual agencies, like the DEA, but across the homeland security field.



Core Functions:

Unlike many American agencies the Drug Enforcement Administration lacks a role in responding to catastrophic events. The daily function of the organization, drug enforcement, is the only role the administration plays. Numerous offices nationally and internationally are constantly investigating, gathering intelligence, carrying out search

and arrest warrants, and seizing drugs, drug paraphernalia, and weapons. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration the following are the functions of the agency:

- Investigation and preparation for the prosecution of major violators of controlled substance laws operating at interstate and international levels.
- Investigation and preparation for prosecution of criminals and drug gangs who perpetrate violence in our communities and terrorize citizens through fear and intimidation.
- Management of a national drug intelligence program in cooperation with federal, state, local, and foreign officials to collect, analyze, and disseminate strategic and operational drug intelligence information.
- Seizure and forfeiture of assets derived from, traceable to, or intended to be used for illicit drug trafficking.
- Enforcement of the provisions of the Controlled Substances Act as they pertain to the manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of legally produced controlled substances.
- Coordination and cooperation with federal, state and local law enforcement officials on mutual drug enforcement efforts and enhancement of such efforts through expansion of potential interstate and international investigations beyond local or limited federal jurisdictions and resources.
- Coordination and cooperation with federal, state, and local agencies, and with foreign governments, in programs designed to reduce the availability of illicit abuse-type drugs on the United States market through nonenforcement methods such as crop eradication, crop substitution, and training of foreign officials.
- Responsibility, under the policy guidance of the Secretary of State and U.S. Ambassadors, for all programs associated with drug law enforcement counterparts in foreign countries.
- Liaison with the United Nations, Interpol, and other organizations on matters relating to international drug control programs.

(DEA Mission, 2010)

There are numerous national and international functions that the agency carries out between itself and other local, state, and federal agencies and jurisdictions. However, there is limited work that they do that can be applied in a catastrophic event.

Major operations and efforts are the DEA's version of catastrophic events. These consist of large scale arrests and drug seizures that utilize numerous offices, jurisdictions, and agencies in a coordinated effort, often in numerous locations not always in the United States. These operations are what the everyday tasks of the agency lead up to, often with weeks or months of prior intelligence collection. As in the case of a catastrophic event, this is when any chaos in the agency will be noticed. Large coordinated efforts with numerous factors and players may cause dysfunction and chaos if not properly handled.

In these instances there should be a precise plan of action that must be known by all, with timing often being pivotal. There are numerous external factors that can also lead to chaos. Most of these large operations deal with copious amounts of drug product and/or money which dealers will do almost anything to protect. Often drug and money houses are fortified, dealers are often armed, and dogs and other "security" precautions are frequently present. It will be necessary for agents to stay calm and utilize all training to insure that they, and everyone else, remain safe throughout the entire incident.

Agency managers must make certain that everyone plays his/her role correctly in these events. Agents must be trained to be able to make quick decisions that were not originally planned upon. External factors will almost always change the original expectations of a situation. This is where checklists can be utilized, specifically mental checklists. The Checklist Manifesto by Atul Gawande shines light upon how checklists

can be utilized in numerous circumstances. With the DEA checklists can be utilized on several levels. A written checklist can ensure that all steps were taken in preparing to execute a warrant, or a checklist can be trained and memorized allowing for agents to make educated split second decisions that will have a desired outcome based on agency regulations.

Agents not only operate in America but are assigned to work other nations, like Afghanistan. There are unique groups known as FAST Teams (DEA, The FAST Team, 2009) deployed in Afghanistan who work with local law enforcement to eliminate drugs, labs, and dealers in Afghanistan before the drugs can be exported to America.. These agents are put into unstable war-like situations, which is why they are mostly ex-military and are trained like the armed forces. The reason why ex-military agents are utilized in these circumstances is because they are experienced in war time and will not have to adapt to the new surroundings. Of all the agents working in the DEA these elite groups must be able to take the normal duties of an agent and apply them in a war zone while still remain non-military as well as poised in all situations.

Individual and Group Dynamics:

A manager in the DEA must know the employees' strengths, weaknesses, how they work, and how they work together. It is believed that managers will have "higher-performing and more satisfied employees if personality types are matched to compatible jobs." According to Robbins and DeCenzo:

“By recognizing that people approach problem solving, decision making, and job interactions differently, a manager can better understand why, for instance, an employee is uncomfortable with making quick decisions or why an employee insists on gathering as much information as possible before addressing a problem.” (Robbins & DeCenzo, 2007, p. 228)

The administration is a relatively small agency compared to others so it is possible that in many offices managers will be capable of personally getting to know each of their subordinates. If the office is too large for this personal approach a test should be implemented to determine how best to utilize the individual and ascertain how they will work in a group.

There are a few tests that have been used over the years to determine an individual's personality and characteristics. These results can then in turn be engaged to determine the job an individual should have, how they will best be utilized in that position, and how they will work with others. The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) test is one of the most widely utilized methods and has been implemented in organizations like Apple, Honda, AT&T, Exxon, 3M, hospitals, educational institutions, and the U.S. Armed Forces (Robbins, 2007, p 223). This test combines factors like Extroversion vs. Introversion, Sensing vs. Intuition, Thinking vs. Feeling, and Judging vs. Perceiving (Robbins, 2007, p 223). Results present a personality type that can then be used to determine how the individual works best, and how he/she can work in groups. It is also essential to “know personality types because they influence the way people interact and solve problems” (Robbins, 2007, p 223). Managers need to assign projects and jobs to individuals who have a personality type that will match that work, and make sure individuals assigned to groups will be able to work well together.

Many people, including myself, would prefer to avoid working in a group. They find that working alone allows for complete control of the situation. However, in many careers, including the DEA, group work is imperative. Individuals will work with a partner almost daily and will work in larger teams when compiling evidence and executing search and arrest warrants. It is important that managers put together teams that will coherently and effectively work together based on individual and group characteristics.

Not only do some individuals avoid working in groups but they also avoid working with other groups. This is where the issue of cooperation between agencies can arise. Unfortunately the circumstances are outside of the manager's grasp when it comes to insuring that inter-agency groups will work well together. A manager in the DEA may have a group of individuals who historically work well together but when combined with a group from the Federal Bureau of Investigation in a group that has not been picked based on characteristics, there is the possibility for poor group dynamics.

It is common in chaotic and high adrenaline situations that individuals lose track of the goal, have trouble working as trained, and in their assigned position. Managers must prepare to ensure that this does not occur, and that in the case of a major event that subordinates will continue working together and effectively. As mentioned before depending on the individual it can be easy for a person to make split second decisions or they may need time to compile all of the information in order to make an educated decision. It is crucial for a manager to take this into account before determining who will be involved in these types of situations. Unfortunately, if individuals that must take time to compile information to make a decision are put into a chaotic emergency situation,

they are not going to do well. In the case of the DEA it is necessary that all individuals on the “front line” are going to be able to make a split second decision, considering that that decision may be a life or death decision.

Trust and Communication:

In any managerial position it is important to communicate clearly with your employees and upper management, as well as develop a level of trust. It can be difficult to gain the trust of individuals you manage due to the degree of power you hold over them. It is important not to proclaim as a manager that you are more essential than your employees, in that this may cause a division that could lead to a breakdown in trust. In order to maintain trust it is important to treat everyone as equals, including yourself. This is a skill that I feel I hold; however, it has not been fully developed. As my managerial duties increase, the more important it will be that I treat all subordinates as equals.

In today’s managerial atmosphere there is a need to avoid managers having large corner offices. This separates managers from subordinates and clearly defines the gap between the two. Mayor Bloomberg chose to utilize an innovative style while running New York City. He created a “bullpen” that put all “offices” into one large chamber (Fisher, 2007). This allowed for clear lines of communication between everyone, as well as the feeling that all work was equally as important. This can lead to a much more successful and trusting office.

It is difficult to define how to promote trust as a manager considering the lack of research and publications on the topic. However, a group of university professors

published a paper in this topic in 1996. They defined the process of initiating trust on three degrees:

“First trust in another party reflects an expectation or belief that the other party will act benevolently. Second, one cannot control or force the other party to fulfill this expectation – that is, trust involves a willingness to be vulnerable and risk that the other party may not fulfill that expectation. Third, trust involves some level of dependency on the other party so that the outcome of one individual are influenced by the actions of another.”
(Whitener, 1998, p. 513)

According to this excerpt it is necessary as a manager to act benevolently and provide for subordinates. There must also be an apparent level of dependency, which in most cases will be obvious. Managers are in constant need of subordinates to carry out various duties in order to ensure that the organization can succeed. In turn subordinates are dependent on managers for constant support, resources, and direction. If this type of relationship can be continued, then the basic level of trust will be constant.

Also according to this theory, there are numerous dimensions that lead to trust. These consist of behavioral consistency, behavioral integrity, sharing and delegation of control, communication, and demonstration of concern. The concept of behavioral consistency is that consistent behavior over time and situations can allow employees to reinforce trust in managers. Telling the truth and keeping promises are examples of behavioral integrity which strengthen trust. Also sharing and delegating control such as giving subordinates the opportunity to participate in decision making is related to trust. Clear and precise communication also fosters trust in an organization. Even if a manager does not know the exact answer to a question trust will be gained by clearly

communicating what information is known. Lastly, demonstrating concern for employees whether it is work related or personal will foster a relationship of trust (Whitener, 1998, p. 516).

In a chaotic emergency situation there is a need for managers and leaders to remain calm and continue their duties. If a manager is hectic and frenzied this will lead to a lack of trust in this individual's leadership. Personally, it is hard to say how I would react in this type of situation. I would like to think that I would clearly communicate all orders and information to my subordinates to ensure that trust is continued. Trust will create a far less chaotic response on the law enforcement side of the situation. As mentioned previously the DEA does not respond to many emergency situations. For the most part day to day operations do not become chaotic. There are instances where a scene can become chaotic, for instance during large scale operations. This is when managers must demonstrate the need for their subordinates and be poised to continue an effective level of management.

Managerial Challenges:

Many people are given the opportunity to move from field work or a line staff position to a management position. However, there are often individuals who do not take this promotion and would rather continue work in the field or as a lower level employee. There can often be numerous reasons for this and it appears that a major reason is they do not want to deal with the challenges of management. This is understandable considering the different challenges that are inevitable.

On a daily basis managers are in constant contact with subordinates and there will predictably be situations in which the level or quality of work is not sufficient. In these cases it will be necessary to convince them to improve their quality of work. It is often important that when individuals have done well in the past that managers acknowledge this. Before informing an employee that they must do a better job it is necessary to acknowledge that they did well on one aspect but that another needs to be addressed differently. Also positive energy in the work place can be a great motivator. Positive energy is often “generated when people can see something in their minds that really attracts and excites them” (Hersey, 1993, p 544). Managers hope that subordinates have chosen a field such as the DEA because they believe that this is what attracts and excites them.

According to Abraham Maslow (Maslow’s Theory, 2009) there are certain needs that individuals have which need to be fulfilled in order to motivate them to act unselfishly. There are five different aspects of motivation, the first being the easiest for a manager to provide, and the last being the hardest. First, physiological motivation which consists of salaries high enough to support life’s essentials and periodic breaks during the work day must be provided. Also supplying coffee and perhaps free lunches periodically can give incentive to continue high caliber work. The second necessity is safety needs; unfortunately these are hard to provide in law enforcement. However, the sense of job security and that some effort is being applied to keep agents safe, specifically in the field via training and up to date protective equipment, can fulfill this need.

Third, social needs for the feeling of acceptance and belonging must be available. This ties in with the previously mentioned group dynamics and successfully convincing

subordinates to work together. Also in all law enforcement there is a brotherhood which provides fellow officers with support, further fulfilling this need. Fourth, esteem needs which consist of the need for achievement recognition and making employees feel valued. It may seem simple, but a pat on the back and a “Good job” can be all an employee needs to continue high quality work. Lastly, self-actualization requires that work assignments are meaningful and challenging. This is the most challenging need because it requires the manager to understand what each individual finds meaningful in the work and provide challenging work in these parameters (Maslow, 2009).

Managers will also have to deal with personal privacy, which is becoming a hot topic in today’s society. The government is increasing the level of information that they collect. The PATRIOT Act vastly broadened the level of privacy invasion that can be exploited. This should not be something that employees need to worry about in the work place. Employees have safety needs, and one of these is that their work stations will remain private and safe. Therefore managers must guarantee subordinates that their privacy is assured and that they can come to you with any information or concerns and that anything said will remain between the two of you. Complaints about coworkers must remain private at all times; if not, issues could occur between two individuals. One of the issues that could arise could be that of communication monitoring. Managers may need to monitor who individuals are communicating with, when there is the possibility that the individual is not doing the job as directed, but should only do so when there is pertinent evidence of this.

It is indisputable that negative encounters in the work place could have unforeseen circumstances, especially in times where you as a manager are in dire need

for a subordinate to obey instructions. It is difficult to punish employees then expect them to do as told; however, if positive reinforcement is used whenever an individual does well and there is a lack of this when they do poorly, a manager can prove a point without punishing. At times it will be necessary to punish or acknowledge a problem. A first step would be informing an employee that a mistake was the first strike and that actions will not be taken, but that he/she must work to make sure it doesn't occur again.

Unfortunately there will be instances in which suspension may be necessary. If this individual then returns to active duty under the same manager it will be essential to begin the process of building trust from the beginning.

Ultimately in law enforcement field agents and officers are responsible for protecting lives. In an emergency situation managers need to rely on that fact that subordinates will do all in their power to save lives. Managers need to make this clear to those individuals with whom they may have personal issues. How the manager deals with this issue will depend on the situation. The worst situation would be that a subordinate is unable to perform his or her duty due to the disagreement. In this case it may be necessary to transfer the individual to insure that innocent lives are not lost in the case of an emergency. The best situation is that the issue can be worked out verbally or an agreement can be made to guarantee that the disagreement will not interfere with the individual's performance. In the end punishment is a difficult aspect of management that will take time for each manager to develop.

Conclusion:

Management is a very difficult task no matter what company, organization, or agency you work for. However, in law enforcement, specifically in the Drug Enforcement Administration, it is necessary that managers take extra time to communicate, build trust, and get to know their employees. Daily there will be difficult situations that managers will encounter, and they must be prepared to manage through all of them. In the end the success of the agency as a whole comes down to the actions of each individual manager.

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Chapter 3

2011 Drug Enforcement Administration

International Training Section Strategic Plan

Executive Summary:

This strategic plan has been developed for the Drug Enforcement Administration International Training Section (DEA TRI). This section of the DEA is:

“recognized as the world pioneer in international training and serves as the model for a variety of international law enforcement training efforts. DEA's role has grown to include that of international consultant to law enforcement agencies, as well as foreign governments seeking to develop quality narcotics law enforcement programs, organizational infrastructures, and judicial reforms.” (International Training, 2011)

Although they are considered the world pioneer in international training there are improvements that can be made. This strategy illustrates the strengths of the organization: what needs to be changed, methods to make these alterations, and how to implement them.

The United States government does not set official mandates for the International Training Section; however, a mandate can be translated for the unofficial expectations of the unit. This transformation is as follows:

The International Training Section is mandated to provide all counter drug training at the International Law Enforcement Academy locations. TRI is further mandated to incorporate both Practical Exercises and Desktop Exercises in all ILEA programs. Lastly, TRI is directed to continue adding

regional case studies and team teaching concepts with foreign instructor participation. (Summary, 2010)

These mandates are created not only to reduce the level of drugs trafficked into America, but to reduce the drugs produced and trafficked worldwide. Therefore, the stakeholders are not just the American taxpayers, they exist globally in all nations with illicit drug issues. This plan also takes the liberty of creating a vision and mission statement for the group, something it has been absent. The vision statement provides a goal for the future, what the DEA TRI should be achieving over the following years:

Striving to continually administer counter narcotics training to all law enforcement departments and agencies globally.

Then a mission statement that accurately portrayed the purpose, business and values of the organization was developed.

To reduce the level of narcotics produced and sold worldwide by providing support and training to international law enforcement to ensure success in fighting the global war on drugs.

These statements depict how the DEA TRI will address their duties and what they will achieve in the near future. With these new statements the DEA TRI have definitive direction to carry out operations.

There are numerous internal and external threats that affect this group which were determined through a SWOT analysis. The TRI have many strengths; however, this plan focused on the weaknesses, opportunities, and threats to develop strategies to address these issues. These strategies range from finding safe places for training to be administered, to creating new International Law Enforcement Academies, to starting new

a technology division to research and develop new tech for TRI agents to utilize during training. These strategies are further expanded by developing attainable goals and performance indicators that specify whether the strategy is successfully being achieved. An implementation strategy is then expanded to depict who will implement the strategy and how, followed by the timetable in which each step will be accomplished. Lastly the plan addresses the resources and budgetary funding that will be necessary for each strategy to be implemented. Some of these strategies will have multimillion dollar costs, while others will cost nothing. It will be the DEA administrations duties to determine which strategies are implemented first and decide if all are practical in today's economic recession.

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology:

This strategic plan is intended to prepare the group for the future. As the world evolves so does the manner in which international training for counter narcotics will change. There are new threats and weaknesses that were not issues in the past that if not addressed will become major concerns. The training this group does is crucial in the efforts of fighting not only the War on Drugs but the War on Terror.

The plan will address a majority of the DEA TRI unit. It spans developing new training and technology in American offices to continuing and creating new academies to train foreign law enforcement. In developing this plan the unit was researched and the mandates, stakeholders, mission, and vision were thoroughly scrutinized and developed/expanded. A SWOT Analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) was then utilized to evaluate the group as a whole. These factors were then examined and strategic issues were developed for those that needed immediate attention. At this point

each issue was developed into an actable strategy, goals were developed, performance indicators were defined, a timetable and strategy for implementation was resolved, and the necessary budget and resources for implementation were determined. This is a clear and developed strategic plan that will allow for the DEA TRI to remain up to date in the evolving world.

Mandates:

According to John Bryson organizations must know what they are formally required and not required to do, or not to do, by external authority such as government, voters, and stakeholders (Bryson, 2004, p. 97). It is then stated that “formal requirements are likely to be codified in laws, regulations, ordinances, articles of incorporation, charters, and so forth (Bryson, 2004, p. 97-98).” The DEA has a mandate on what is expected of it by the U.S. government and the people; it is as follows:

DEA’s mandate is to enforce the provisions of the controlled substances and chemical diversion trafficking laws and regulations of the United States and to serve as the nation's competent authority with regard to national compliance with provisions of international drug control treaties. Further, DEA serves as the single point of contact for the coordination of all international drug investigations by providing clear, concise, and dynamic leadership in the national and international drug and chemical control effort. (Cooper Davis, 2006)

This of course is the mandate for the entire DEA; however, the DEA TRI does not appear to have any published mandates. The DEA states that:

The International Training Section is responsible for providing all counter drug training at the ILEAs located in Budapest, Hungary; Bangkok, Thailand; Gaborone, Botswana; and the recently approved ILEA Latin

America to be situated in San Salvador, El Salvador. TRI has recently incorporated the use of both practical exercises and desktop exercises in all of its ILEA programs. Additionally, TRI has also added regional case studies and team teaching concepts with foreign instructor participation. All of these concepts are currently being replicated by many of the other U.S. Federal Agencies. (Summary, 2010)

This is not an official mandate but it does depict the requirements of the unit. According to Bryson a mandate is an official requirement; therefore, one can assume that the requirements put upon the DEA TRI are the unofficial mandated for the unit. An example of what could be utilized as an official mandate for TRI is:

The International Training Section is mandated to provide all counter drug training at the International Law Enforcement Academy locations. TRI is further mandated to incorporate both Practical Exercises and Desktop Exercises in all ILEA programs. Lastly, TRI is directed to continue adding regional case studies and team teaching concepts with foreign instructor participation.

Stakeholder Analysis:

Stakeholder analysis can be described as “a technique that can be used to identify and assess the priority, needs, goals, and requirements of key people that may significantly influence the success of the project (Stakeholder Analysis, 2010).” This is essential for all strategic plans, specifically this plan in particular. Part of this plan requires that all stakeholders realize the importance of the training done by the DEA TRI, expressly that the training both decreases drugs trafficked around the world and what

drugs enter America, but that training administered in certain nations, like Afghanistan, is greatly assisting in fighting the War on Terror.

The stakeholders involved in this strategy are numerous. First all of the nations, agencies, and police departments internationally who benefit from these programs are stakeholders. The continuation and success of this training will allow for them to continue becoming skilled in drug enforcement. The next stakeholder is the DEA; domestic drug levels decrease when drugs like cocaine are eliminated at the source. Next are the citizens of America and all other drug-using and drug-producing nations. The plan will allow for the DEA TRI to continue their efforts and be more successful thus hopefully reducing the drugs distributed internationally. This will decrease violence on the streets and decrease the level of tax money invested in drug treatment programs. Also, due to the inherent connection between terrorist groups and drug trafficking, the stakeholders become global. The decreased monetary funding these groups possess limits their resources to carry out large scale attacks. The priorities and needs of these stakeholders require the group to train as many officers internationally to ensure that drug production is reduced, trafficking routes and methods are eliminated, and terrorists and drug lords' profits are slashed. It is a difficult task yet the world stakeholders require for efforts to be increased.

Vision:

The organization will be striving continually to administer counter narcotics training to all law enforcement departments and agencies globally.

According to Erica Olsen a vision statement is essentially a futurecast, as to where the organization will be in roughly five years (Olsen, 2008). This vision statement indicates that the DEA TRI will be striving to administer counter narcotics training to all law enforcement departments and agencies globally. It does not set a timetable as to when this will be achieved; however, this is not possible because training material will always be changing based on current drug issues in different nations. Olsen also stated that the vision statement should be descriptive and include a gerund verb; in this case the verb is “striving.” This vision depicts exactly where the International Training Section wants to be in the future, hoping to be training all law enforcement globally and continuously.

Mission:

To reduce the level of narcotics produced and sold worldwide by providing support and training to international law enforcement to ensure success in fighting the global war on drugs.

This mission does the three things that Radtke emphasizes (Radtke, 1998, p. 2). First it must depict the purpose of the organization: to reduce the level of narcotics produced and sold worldwide. It should then describe the business of the organization: providing support and training to international law enforcement. This is the daily business of the organization. Finally it will describe the values of the organization; fighting the global war on drugs. This mission fully addresses the reasoning for the existence of the DEA TRI.

Internal and External Situational Analysis:

There are internal and external factors that affect every organization. Internal factors usually are made up of resources (input), present strategy (process), and

performance (output) (Bryson, 2004, p.136). External factors consist of forces and trends, key resource controllers, and actual or potential competition or collaborators and their affects (Bryson, 2004, p. 131). These factors are analyzed through what is known as a SWOT or SWOC analysis, looking at all the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats that the company or organization may encounter. The DEA TRI is a small group but has numerous external factors because they reach globally. Internal factors are also prevalent, specifically threats.

Internal Factors-

Threats

- Foreign nations may decide that it is not important for them to get trained in how to fight the war on drugs in their nation,
- Foreign nations may also decide that there is no need at all to fight the war on drugs
- Possible lack of funding in today's failing economy; as a small group it is possible that funding will be cut
- Drug training changes from nation to nation and from year to year making creating training curricula difficult
- New drugs, specifically synthetic drugs and methamphetamines, are becoming much more prevalent and is causing DEA TRI to have to analyze new methods of combating and developing training for these new drugs

Opportunities

- Nations like Afghanistan and Mexico have drug issues (Afghanistan funding terrorism, Mexico drug cartels over powering government) that create

opportunities for DEA TRI to spread knowledge through training these nations' law enforcement

- DEA can continue to open new international offices adding onto the current 87 offices in 63 countries allowing for more training prospects
- Direct connection has been made between terrorist funding and drug production and trafficking which will force U. S. Government to utilize DEA and DEA TRI to assist in dismantling this association
- Collaboration between DEA TRI and International Law Enforcement Training Academies provides training sites and opportunities in four locations globally
- The PATRIOT Act included \$5 million for the DEA to train law enforcement officers in South and East Asia

These threats and opportunists make up the external factors that affect the organization.

Threats and opportunities are more difficult for the group to factor in and prepare for.

Opportunities, if addressed correctly, provide the organization with the possibilities of expansion and improvement. Threats can do the same; however, they can also vastly influence the success of the group. If threats are not properly addressed they can become disastrous. External factors although out of the hands of the group can be utilized in their advantage.

Internal Factors-

Strengths

- Division of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the world's largest counter narcotics law enforcement agency

- TRI is recognized as the world pioneer in international training and serves as the model for a variety of international law enforcement training efforts (International Training)
- DEA's role has grown to include that of international consultant to law enforcement agencies, as well as foreign governments seeking to develop quality narcotics law enforcement programs, organizational infrastructures, and judicial reforms (International Training)
- The DEA has 87 foreign offices in 63 countries which allow the DEA TRI to have a variety of locations and atmospheres to train international law enforcement officers
- DEA TRI is directly affiliated with the four International Law Enforcement Academies giving them training locations and support
- DEA TRI offers 5 different programs/seminars offered both in-country and regionally conducted by mobile training teams
- DEA and DEA TRI have historically received the support needed from the Department of Justice
- Many nations have growing illicit drug issues creating numerous opportunities for new training venues for DEA TRI

Weaknesses

- Many nations that need the most training in drug enforcement, such as Afghanistan and Mexico, are also the most dangerous and corrupt nations, creating safety issues.

- There are not enough Academies providing DEA TRI training; there is a need to develop more Academies, either in affiliation with the International Law Enforcement Academies or separately, to assure training is available to all law enforcement in need
- May not be prepared to adapt to the changing drug world and the needs of each individual nation
- The possibility that another organization may begin doing the same training and may not be collaborating with the DEA TRI
- Must utilize new technology as it becomes available in the training process
- Language issues between training agents and international law enforcement officers

Due to that fact that this group does training in numerous different nations, it is going to be difficult to determine the exact strengths and weaknesses of each different aspect of the group. One training group may have no problem training law enforcement in Turkey but another group working in Mexico could encounter different internal issues because they are not prepared for the level of violence and corruption in the nation. The biggest issue that may need to be addressed in this plan is preparation for training in war zones and dangerous nations like Mexico and Afghanistan. Also the language barrier will need to be addressed in each nation.

Strategic Issues & Strategies, Performance Goals, Performance Indicator, Strategy for Implementation, Budget and Resources:

This section will create each individual strategy based on an issue raised during the previous SWOT analysis, the goals needed to achieve this, how, when and what is

needed to accomplish the strategy, and how success will be monitored. Below indicates how this will be achieved:

Issues: These are the issues that were raised while administering the SWOT analysis.

Eight issues were determined to be vital to the success of the DEA TRI.

Strategy: According to Bryson a strategy is a pattern of purposes, policies, programs, actions decisions, or resource allocations that define what an organization is, what it does, and why it does it (Bryson, 2004, p. 46).

Goals: These can allow for a few things. First, goals can replace the step of determining strategic issues and a strategy can be determined based on goals strictly (Bryson, 2004, p.167). Goals can also be utilized to strengthen and direct the strategy that was written based on the original issue. Also “goals should be designed and worded as much as possible to be specific, measurable, acceptable to those working to achieve the goals, realistic, timely, extending the capabilities of those working to achieve the goals (McNamara, 2011).”

Performance Indicators: Performance Indicators are quantifiable measurements, agreed upon in planning, that designate the success factors of the organization (Reh, 2010).

These allow the organizations to tell if they are achieving their previously determined goal.

Implementation Strategy and Timetable: This is who will implement the strategy, how it will be implemented, and when it will be implemented.

Budget/Resource: The budget of an organization usually will not include space for the organization to make major changes such as implementing a new strategic plan. Having a budget and resource section will depict the funding and resources needed to achieve the

goal in a timely manner. This will allow for a determination as to whether the strategy will be implemented immediately or until the next budget year.

Issue 1: Many nations that need the most training in drug enforcement are the most dangerous and corrupt nations, such as Mexico, Columbia, and Afghanistan.

Strategy: Utilize safe areas like embassies and neutral zones to do training. Those nations that have no safe areas should send officers to one of the International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEA) where the DEA offers Drug Enforcement Training. These academies are located in safe nations to insure everyone's safety. Also working with local government to not only train in drug enforcement but to make an area safer is another possible option.

Goals: If the planned area for training is unsafe guarantee a safe training location.

Performance Indicators: Eliminate all deaths that may occur to either DEA TRI agents or trainees due to dangerous training locations.

Implementation Strategy and Timetable: This will be implemented by the TRI agents determining which embassies are available. If there is no safe area agents must make decision as to which academy international officers will be asked to attend. This strategy will be initiated immediately as the availability of safe areas allows for immediate implementation.

Budget/Resource: There will be no budget necessary for this strategy. If a safe embassy is available this will be utilized as the training location. If no safe area is available the trainees will have to attend a safe ILEA in one of four current locations. If it is necessary for trainees to attend an ILEA they will have to pay for any additional costs. The only resources needed are currently allocated in DEA and USG budgets.

Issue 2: Needs to build more academies to achieve international training goals.

Strategy: Currently there are four academies currently in use (located in Hungary, Bangkok, Botswana, and El Salvador). Nations that America has good diplomatic relations with should also foster new academies. Afghanistan, South Africa, and numerous European nations could foster these new academies. These academies can be ILEA, or the DEA can branch out and develop their own training academies. Research which academy (European or South African) will be the best asset after Afghani academy is completed.

Goals: Build/Start academy in Kabul, Afghanistan because of the high level of drug production and America's current involvement. After the academy in Afghanistan is completed, start developing plans and building next academy in which ever location research supports.

Performance Indicators: Ground breaking for construction should occur 18 months before timetabled operations begin. It is necessary to compensate for attempting to construct new building in war zone. Construction should be finalized 3 months prior to planned operations to insure time to finalize academic aspect of academy.

Implementation Strategy and Timetable: Upper management of the DEA/DEA TRI and ILEA will determine exact locations, designs, necessary equipment and materials, and number of agents needed to successfully complete and operate new academies. Kabul Afghanistan Academy will be in operation and training by March 2013, determine next location (European or South African) by 2012 and have the academy in operation and

training by June 2014, with the last planned academy being in operation and training by October of 2015.

Budget/Resource: This strategy will depend greatly on government funds available as well as the willingness of the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) to provide support. The ILEA is where the DEA TRI does a majority of their training. These three academies will partly depend on the willingness of ILEA to build new academies. The DEA will be responsible for a fraction of the expense of building the academy and will need very few training agents on location. These agents will most likely be GS-7 or GS-9 with a pay grade of roughly \$31,740 to \$50,470. There would be a need for three to five agents in each academy requiring a total of \$158,700 to \$252,350 in salary each year. Depending on the schedule of training there may not need to be more than three to five agents. They can travel from academy to academy based on necessity. In 2005 the government supplied \$3.2 million in funding for the DEA TRI's efforts (Drug Enforcement Administration supplied \$1,258,217, Department of State supplied \$1,320,514, Department of Justice supplied \$589,215, and the Department of Defense supplied \$4,624). Based on this and adding more new academies the operating budget for all efforts will be over \$5 million.

Issue 3: Be ready to adapt to the changing drug world and the needs of different nations. Some nations have different drug issues from others.

Strategy: DEA TRI will utilize different American embassies to determine what drugs are being produced, trafficked and used in different nations, what new drugs are arising both in production and use, and then will develop individual strategies as to how the DEA TRI can train differently in each nation.

Goals: Determine exactly what drugs are being produced and traded in every nations, how they are transported internationally, and develop new training programs that can be utilized in each individual nation based on its needs.

Performance Indicators: Each year DEA TRI should be able to double the number of nations that are utilizing a training program specifically designed for that nation. For example, if in 2013 there are 5 nations with specific training developed for them, then in 2014 there will be 10 nations.

Implementation Strategy and Timetable: Current DEA TRI agents and newly hired agents will investigate each nation and design specific training programs. They will develop information and programs on all major nations between current time and June 2013, and all other nations including third world nations by 2017. These plans should be implemented immediately upon completion.

Budget/Resources: There will be human resources and space needed. A group of agents/analysts will need to be hired to research, analyze, and publish nation-specific training, a kind of fusion center. To start eight GS-9 level agents will be hired to begin working on project. This will require \$310,592 to \$403,760 in salary yearly. The space utilized can be space already owned by the DEA, but it will need to be outfitted with office supplies, computers, and other necessary equipment. This will depend on what is determined to be necessary and should cost roughly \$150,000 to \$250,000.

Issue 4: Must utilize all new technology as it becomes available in the training process.

Strategy: Create a sub-group in DEA TRI that is dedicated to technology. They work to establish and develop technology in a way that can be fully utilized by DEA TRI. The DEA must be consistently find funds to pay for the group and new technologies.

Goals: Implement new technology on a regular basis. This can be anything from improved security on training computers or new technology to determine if a building is being used to produce drugs based on heat sources.

Performance Indicators: The creation of the group will be the first indicator. From there the success of the group will depend on how much of the research and development will then become field applicable.

Implementation Strategy and Timetable: This will be implemented by hiring new employees specifically educated and experienced in the necessary fields and giving them all resources needed to complete and operate new technology development lab. The Tech Group needs to be established by January 2012 and all efforts should continue thereafter.

Budget/Resources: This will be one of the more expensive strategies. New tech employees will need to be hired, preferably with experience in the field and master's degrees in either information technology, electrical and mechanical engineering, or computer science. With these degrees they will fall into GS-9 – GS-11 positions requiring \$232,944 to \$366,408 in salary a year. The lab and new technology investments and alterations will be rather expensive. This is impossible to determine without these experts determining what they will need for equipment and how much they will need a year to purchase and alter new technologies. If there is a budgetary shortage, this is the last strategy that should be implemented.

Issue 5: Language issues/differences between training agents and international law enforcement officers.

Strategy: DEA TRI needs to be constantly training agents to become fluent in numerous languages. Applicants for the International Training group should be given preference for hire if they are fluent in two or more languages other than English.

Goals: Work to hire individuals who are fluent in English and at least two other languages. Develop training program to teach current agents new languages; utilize language learning programs like Rosetta Stone.

Performance Indicators: Each year the percentage of multi-lingual agents will increase beyond the percentage that existed the year before.

Implementation Strategy and Timetable: Human resources will begin hiring new agents that are multi-lingual, specifically in languages that apply to areas that need training.

Internal training managers will begin teaching agent's new languages as well as providing them with any language learning software or material needed. Utilizing the Defense Language Institute at Monterey would also be a feasible option.

Budget/Resources: The only budgeting necessary for this strategy would be to increase the salary for those fluent in more than two other non-English languages. The process of implementing training will be the cost of purchasing Rosetta Stone programs as well as hiring individuals to train. This will be very limited in comparison to other strategies.

Issue 6: Foreign nations with drug issues may decide that it is not necessary for their law enforcement to retrieve training in drug law enforcement. They may also decide that there is no need to enforce drug laws at all.

Strategy: DEA TRI must promote training programs to international law enforcement via law enforcement channels. It is essential to spread the intelligence and tactics that the DEA has acquired.

Goals: Utilize media and law enforcement channels to promote interest in program.

Performance Indicators: Over the next 5 years the DEA will determine how many new international law enforcement agencies/departments receive training that had never shown interest in the past.

Implementation Strategy and Timetable: This will be done by current agents and upper management. Increase advertising and promotions yearly as interest in training grows. Once it seems that training has peaked, reduce advertising and promotions until new programs have been developed then increase advertising and promotions for revamped programs once again.

Budget/Resources: The resources necessary will be the advertising such as internet ads and ads in law enforcement magazines and newsletters. Advertising in these sources will require some budgetary expenses.

Issue 7: Funding for the DEA International Training group may run out.

Strategy: Determine where funds can be saved throughout the DEA to insure that smaller groups like the DEA TRI retain funding. Utilize consultants to streamline groups to ensure they are not wasting any resources or time. The group must also make known that the work they do makes a difference in fighting terrorism and reducing the drugs that are typically trafficked to America.

Goals: Illustrate the direct connection between drug trade and terrorist profits to prove the necessity of the group. Check budgets, finances, and resources to find any money that can be saved to continue funding DEA TRI.

Performance Indicators: The continuation of the training group.

Implementation Strategy and Timetable: Office managers, accountants, and external consultants will do this work starting immediately and continuing.

Budget/Resources: There will little budgetary funds utilized for this. Current financial and budgetary analysts will be utilized to determine where money can be saved. Also office administrators will be responsible for saving money in each individual office. If the option of an outside consultant is utilized, it will be necessary to pay for that individual's time.

Issue 8: Must ensure successful training in nations like Afghanistan and Mexico which are extremely affected by drugs and are not necessarily safe.

Strategy: In dangerous areas utilize DEA FAST Teams combined with DEA TRI agents to insure that local law enforcement can take charge in fighting the War on Drugs; this way enforcement can continue once American forces are no longer in the nation/region.

Goals: Utilize DEA FAST Teams as a security force to train in dangerous locations; utilize three out of five existing DEA FAST Teams, two in Afghanistan and one in Mexico.

Performance Indicators: See training occurring in cities/towns that were previously too unsafe to do so; over time less effort in safety will be needed.

Implementation Strategy and Timetable: DEA administrators and FAST Team commanders must decide what teams will be deployed and should begin immediately in both nations, with training occurring on a regular basis by the end of 2011.

Budget/Resources: These Teams are already employees of the DEA and therefore can be utilized without the need of hiring new individuals. The only expense will be transporting

each team to the necessary location. The DEA has five FAST Teams: one is currently deployed in Afghanistan, and two others can be deployed.

Conclusion:

The DEA TRI is the world's pioneer in international counter narcotics training. However, even the best organization can be vastly improved. As this plan depicts, there are minor changes that will transform the organization. However, there are also major changes that could reshape the possibilities of that group. The group administers training around the world, but there is the opportunity to promote and administer training in places never before attempted. Training in these areas could create a major breakthrough in reducing drug production worldwide. This strategic plan, if implemented fully, can allow for major changes that will allow for the DEA TRI to not only become more effective but could save money and lives.

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Chapter 4

The Effect of the Constitution, Bill of Rights, PATRIOT Act, and Ethics on the U.S. Government Drug Eradication and Drug Interdiction Strategy in Afghanistan

Introduction:

The United States Constitution creates the backbone of America's democracy. Although there has not been a Constitutional Convention since 1787 as our founding fathers intended, it is still the guiding document of our nation and provides our citizens with their rights. Over the decades there have been numerous amendments added to the Constitution to adapt to the changes in society, proving that it is in fact a living document that is applicable in today's society. The first ten amendments create what is known as the Bill of Rights, providing American citizens with their individual rights. It is difficult to conceptualize applying the Constitution (including the Bill of Rights), the PATRIOT Act, and ethics to this Afghan Drug Crop Eradication and Interdiction Strategy. The issue is whether United States law enforcement, government organizations, and Armed Forces need to follow the American Constitution and our laws while operating in Afghanistan.

Constitution and Bill of Rights:

The Constitution and Bill of Rights provide freedoms to Americans and limitations on the American government and law enforcement. However, this strategy

will be implemented in Afghanistan by American law enforcement, government organizations, and the U.S. Armed Forces. This creates the dilemma as to whether these forces and organizations must follow the Constitution while abroad, and if not, what will be their guiding principles. The Supreme Court has ruled that the U.S. Constitution is in fact not applicable in other nations.

In the 1957 case of *Reid v. Covert* the Supreme Court ruled on the application of the Constitution in law enforcement efforts overseas. The Court stated that:

“The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution. When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield with the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another land” (Lowenfeld, 1990, p. 451).

This however applies to American citizens who are residing overseas. The court then stated that the Constitution applies “abroad with regard to U.S. nationals; but [does] not – or at least not fully – apply to action abroad under authority of the United States with respect to aliens” (Lowenfeld, 1990, p. 451). This ruling confirms that the Constitution is not applicable in the efforts of this strategy.

The DEA has further agreed on this ruling in their International Operations plan which states:

“The DEA’s legal operating authority abroad is different than in its domestic offices because DEA agents stationed overseas do not have law

enforcement jurisdiction. The DEA's operating authorities differ from country to country depending on host-country laws, agreements between governments, international treaties, and local policies issued to U.S. agencies by the U.S. Ambassador. Despite different working environments, DEA foreign offices pursue five principal objectives when working with foreign counterpart agencies: (1) participate in bilateral investigations; (2) cultivate and maintain quality liaison relations; (3) promote and contribute to foreign institution building; (4) support intelligence gathering and sharing efforts; and (5) provide training opportunities." (The Drug Enforcement, 2007)

The DEA has stated that it does not follow the same legal operating authority in other nations but instead will work bilaterally with Afghani law enforcement to execute the goals of this strategy. This forces agents to follow the Constitution of Afghanistan.

The current Afghani Constitution was enacted in 2003 after the Taliban government was toppled in December of 2001 and a new government lead by Hamid Karzai took control (Afghanistan, 2011). This Constitution is loosely based off of the U.S. Constitution; specifically, it defines the branches of government, grants human and civil rights, and sets national standards. The Constitution of Afghanistan establishes standards for arrest, search, and crime; all which are similar to American law. The one controversy is that it establishes Islam as the sacred and state religion.

According to Article Thirty-Eight an individual's home is immune from invasion. Like American law, no one is permitted to enter or inspect a private residence without prior permission of the resident or a court order. However, in the case of an evident crime the official in charge may enter or conduct a search prior to the permission of the

court. This individual is then required to obtain a court order for the home search within the period indicated by law (The Constitution, 2011). The Constitution does not clarify what is considered an evident crime. Drug production presumably does not fit this category and DEA and Afghan law enforcement will be required to obtain a search warrant prior to any search.

The DEA is strictly dealing with crimes involving drug production, which in Islamic society is inherently wrong. Article Twenty-Six states that a “Crime is a personal action and the prosecution, arrest, and detention of an accused and the execution of penalty can not affect another person” (The Constitution, 2011). Article Twenty-Seven then states that “No act is considered a crime, unless determined by a law adopted prior to the date the offense is committed. No person can be pursued, arrested or detained but in accordance with provisions of law” (The Constitution, 2011).

The U.S. Constitution grants an individual the right to representation. Article Thirty-One of the Afghan Constitution states that:

“Every person upon arrest can seek an advocate to defend his rights or to defend his case for which he is accused under the law. The accused upon arrest has the right to be informed of the attributed accusation and to be summoned to the court within the limits determined by law. In criminal cases, the state shall appoint an advocate for a destitute. The confidentiality of oral, written or telephonic communications between an advocate and his accused client are immune from invasion. The duties and authorities of advocates shall be regulated by law” (The Constitution, 2011).

This supplies an arrested individual with the same rights to an attorney and due process as an individual arrested in America. Also the Afghanistan Constitution includes sections on civil and human rights. Article 34 states:

"Freedom of expression shall be inviolable. Every Afghan shall have the right to express thoughts through speech, writing, illustrations as well as other means in accordance with provisions of this constitution. Every Afghan shall have the right, according to provisions of law, to print and publish on subjects without prior submission to state authorities.

Directives related to the press, radio and television as well as publications and other mass media shall be regulated by law “ (The Constitution, 2011).

These rights are very similar to the freedoms that Americans are provided, specifically freedom of speech and press. Due to the similarity between the Afghani Constitution and the U.S. Constitution, DEA agents will require little adaptation to new restrictions.

The next organizations involved in this strategy are the Department of Defense and U.S. Armed Forces. Currently America is still at war in Afghanistan with all branches of the U.S. Armed Forces currently deployed. The Obama Administration is also planning on increasing the number of deployed troops over the next year. While engaged in war, the Armed Forces do not follow the Constitution; they instead follow the Military Rules of Engagement (ROE). ROE determine when, where, and how force will be used during war times. Military Rules of Engagement are always kept classified and only the President, military leaders, and troops utilizing them are aware of their details. These rules are determined during each conflict by the general in command. In the case of the War in Afghanistan General Petraeus determined the ROE and when he took

control of the War in Afghanistan in 2009 it was released that he planned to “modify the rules of engagement to make it easier for U.S. troops to engage in combat with the enemy” (Centanni, 2010). However, any modifications have not been released to the public at this time.

The other organizations involved, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Army National Guard Agribusiness Teams, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the United Nations are all working to improve the markets, roads, and viable crops. Fortunately these organizations will be involved in positive programs and do not fall under any Constitutional guidance.

The PATRIOT Act:

The USA PATRIOT Act was passed in October of 2001 in response to the September 11th attack. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) Act has been controversial over the past decade with many critics charging that it intrudes on the privacy and freedoms of American citizens. However, it has been voted to be extended every time it expired, including recently in 2011. Much of the act has to do with domestic surveillance and intelligence collection but Part 3 of the Act deals with money-laundering, which relates to this strategy.

Money-laundering is not a major issue in this strategy. However the direct correlation between the means by which terrorists raise money, the production and trafficking of illicit drugs, and money-laundering is unmistakable. In order to launder or “clean” money that was illegally obtained through drug sales terrorists lucratively carry

out complex financial transactions so that investigators cannot find the original source and cannot prove that certain accounts were funded through drug sales. Due to this inherent connection it may also be in the interest of the strategy to develop an additional program to incorporate anti-money laundering objectives to further connect the PATRIOT Act to the strategy.

The PATRIOT Act also contains a section entitled Title X which contains miscellaneous appropriations and laws. This affects the DEA in that it provides \$5,000,000 to train law enforcement in South and East Asia (USA PATRIOT, 2011). The DEA International Training Section, the world pioneer in international narcotics training, would carry out a majority of this training (The Drug, 2007). This appropriation allows for local law enforcement to be trained, thus assuring that once American forces leave Afghanistan local police can continue the work American agents are currently assisting in. Overall the PATRIOT Act aids this strategy rather than limiting it.

Ethics:

This strategy is interesting in that it encompasses organizations from numerous aspects of the United States Government (USG). These organizations consist of law enforcement, armed forces, humanitarian aid groups, and training officials. This creates a dynamic with some agencies encountering ethical issues daily while others are carrying out ethical humanitarian aid.

Due to the work that DEA agents carry out, ethics training is an essential aspect. According to the DEA Ethics Training publication:

“Achieving an understanding of ethics is critical to enhancing professional judgment in that it provides a strong foundation for making wise decisions. In addition, it is important to learn the boundaries for accepted behavior, as established by the Government through the Constitution, as well as laws, regulations, and internal policies” (Domestic Training, 2011).

The DEA utilizes this program to teach agents how to properly behave both domestically and internationally. They utilize “case studies [and] practical problems based on a variety of ethical dilemmas, challenging up and supporting down the organizational structure, ensuring fairness, and caring about people” (Domestic Training, 2011). Utilizing methods other than lecture to develop different ethical dilemmas will allow for agents to leave the training program with “real world” ethics training that can be directly applied.

The DEA is currently utilizing one of their FAST Teams in Afghanistan and this strategy suggests increasing the number of deployed agents. A majority of these agents are ex-military with combat training, which can lead to possible ethical issues. While agents work alongside Afghan law enforcement, they must follow Afghan laws and proper police behavior, not the military ROE they were originally trained in. Having military trained agents will assist in an active war zone; however, they are not doing the work of the military. Ethical behavior in law enforcement necessitates that these agents carry out duties “objectively, courteously, safely, and in accordance to law” (Law Enforcement, 1992). Some of the possible unethical behaviors these agents may project are anger, bias, personal gain, and unnecessary use of force, this being a major issue when dealing with ex-military agents (Law Enforcement, 1992). DEA leadership must ensure each agent is acting ethically and legally.

The issues of anger and bias may become prominent in some agents. They will want to do what is best for America and may be angry with the deaths that have ensued from Taliban and Al Qaeda terrorist attacks. Also bias toward the American military may occur due to their previous enlistment and patriotism. Law Enforcement Ethics training material suggests that:

“Some factors that influence officers to act unethically are the pressure to achieve a goal without regard to the means used, the effect of poorly managed stress, emotional needs that are in conflict with ethical behavior, and a self-serving life orientation : (Law Enforcement, 1992).

All of these factors can be expected in Afghanistan. First, the pressure to achieve the goal, which is to drastically decreasing drug production to eliminate funding for terrorist groups, will always be present. Next, poorly managed stress can be experienced, especially due to the fact that DEA agents are always at risk of injury or death. Emotional needs, especially when thousands of miles from home, can also lead to unethical behavior. Lastly, self-serving life orientation is an individual characteristic that supervisors need to watch for to ensure it does not affect the DEA mission.

One ethical issue that is always a concern in counter drug law enforcement is the use of drugs by agents. As agents spend more time around drugs and drug paraphernalia, especially while deployed so far from family in a war zone, they could begin using drugs to help with depression and loneliness. The more contact agents have with drugs the more likely they are to abuse them. Commanding officers must diligently supervise field agents to ensure that drugs do not go missing, evidence is properly stored, the chain of command is followed, and that officers do not show symptoms of drug use.

Personal gain is yet another ethical issue that may occur. DEA agents, as with most law enforcement, are not highly paid government employees and may think that they are underpaid for putting their lives at stake in Afghanistan. In order to make up for their lower pay grade they may become corrupt. There is the possibility that agents could cut deals with drug dealers or they may attempt to sell seized drugs. This corruption is not likely to occur as corruption seems to be decreasing in law enforcement, but there is the possibility which needs to be monitored.

The DEA is not the only organization that may have ethical issues. Our military has been at war in Afghanistan since 2001 and the ethics of this conflict have been discussed on numerous occasions. The reasoning for the invasion and lasting conflict is not the ethical issue; it is the human suffering that innocent civilians have had to encounter, as well as the use of torture on military prisoners. There is an increasing “tension between implementing the strategy and risking soldiers or civilians.” It comes down to the ethical issue as to whether successfully combating the Taliban and Al Qaeda is the ultimate goal or preventing the deaths of civilians is. “Noncombatants rightly expect not to be targets, but separating civilians from combatants in Afghanistan is difficult, nevertheless there is an ethical requirement to keep them safe” (Who Dies in Afghanistan, 2010).

U.S. Armed Forces do not follow the Constitution while at war but instead they follow military Rules of Engagement. According to the Carnegie Council the “Rules of Engagement for soldiers that try to limit civilian deaths increase soldier deaths” (Who Dies in Afghanistan, 2010). This is unfortunate but we are not at war with Afghanistan, we are at war with terrorism. Eventually the military would like to succeed, but it is

crucial to avoid civilian deaths at all costs. The war in Afghanistan has been considered a justified war, but ethical war time behavior is essential.

The military is also active in the crop eradication and drug interdiction processes. When necessary they will assist in the burning of crops to eradicate poppy and cannabis before the crop can be harvested. This becomes an ethical issue because most of the farmers growing these crops are not producing drugs; instead they are simply selling the drug crops at market. When the crops are burned the military is destroying the livelihood of these poor farmers. The strategy provides efforts to assist farmers with growing legal crops; unfortunately, the military is forced into the unethical aspect of the strategy. They also destroy seeds and harvested crops that are for sale at market, causing the same effect of burning the crops. These actions are in fact unethical but they are crucial to the success of the strategy.

In 2005 the *New York Times* reported that “U.S. soldiers carried out widespread abuse of detainees at the US-run Bagram prison camp in Afghanistan” (S. Left, 2005). Not only were prisoners tortured, two were killed from the excessive use of torture. This is not the only case of torture in Afghanistan but it depicts how far it has been taken. Since this story broke it is less likely that torture to this extent has continued. However, pressure to achieve a goal without regard to the means used is an ethical issue that has been mentioned and must be monitored (Law Enforcement, 1992). If troops working at these prisons believe they can extort information from a prisoner that will be beneficial to military success, it is possible they will resort to torture. It is necessary that the military follows the ROE and act ethically at all times, including resisting the use of torture.

The other organizations like USAID, USDA, and DOS will be assisting farmers in the transition to cultivating licit crops. As far as ethics is concerned, these organizations are doing the positive work of the strategy. They are providing seeds, irrigation, loans, equipment, and are creating new legal markets for the crops to be sold. Providing these supplies to farmers eliminates ethical issues and it helps to decrease the total drug crop availability.

Conclusion:

This strategy is different from most in that it incorporates numerous government organizations. Also it is being implemented abroad in what is currently a war zone. This changes how organizations, agents, and troops must treat normal operations. When law enforcement is assisting local law enforcement abroad they must follow that nations laws, and unless they are arresting American citizens, the U.S. Constitution is no longer applicable. In this case DEA agents must follow the Constitution of Afghanistan while working bilaterally with Afghan law enforcement. The U.S. Armed Forces also have a different standard to follow in Afghanistan. Since America is still at war there, forces must follow the Rules of Engagement that have specifically been designed for this conflict. The Constitution is consequently not applicable to the efforts to be utilized in this strategy.

The PATRIOT Act is one of the most controversial acts that the government has enacted in the past decade; however, every time it has been close to expiring it has been extended. Although the act has measures that some find intrusive to the privacy of American citizens, it also contains tools to successfully combat the War on Terror. This strategy has little to do with the PATRIOT Act besides the fact that the DEA was granted

funds for training in South and East Asia and that it deals with the elusive money laundering efforts of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. There is the possibility of the strategy being adapted to incorporate anti-money laundering priorities that would be directed by the PATRIOT Act guidelines.

Ethics plays a major role in this strategy, especially since it is being enforced in a war zone. Failure is not an option and forces, even law enforcement, will do anything necessary to succeed. This is what needs to be avoided in Afghanistan while combining this strategy with the war strategy currently being imposed. The armed forces not only must avoid killing innocent civilians but DEA agents must follow Afghan law and prescribed behavior. Unethical behavior that may be practiced may include unnecessary use of force, bias, and anger; all of which leadership in the DEA and in the U.S. Armed Forces must be critical of.

This strategy has been developed to impact the financial infrastructure of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan as well as to eliminate drugs being trafficked into America. This combined with the current War on Terror in Afghanistan can lead to successfully combating insurgents and protecting America from future attacks. However, this success must be legal and ethical, following the Military Rules of Engagement, Constitution of Afghanistan, local laws, and ethics training.

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Chapter 5

Drug Crop Eradication and Drug Interdiction: Afghanistan Strategy Assessment and
Evaluation

Preface

This evaluation will illustrate the steps the Drug Enforcement Administration and U.S. Government will utilize to assess their drug eradication and drug interdiction strategy. Once the strategy is initiated, it will be essential that it be properly evaluated to insure its success. The U.S. government will be investing millions in their drug eradication and drug interdiction strategy and it is necessary to know if the investment is worthwhile. The assessment will also give a clear depiction of what aspects of the strategy are working and which are not. Based on the assessment the Drug Enforcement Administration and U.S. government can make the appropriate changes to the strategy to guarantee a successful outcome.

Introduction

This evaluation will be assessing the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and U.S. efforts to decrease the level of drugs produced in Afghanistan. Chapter 1 discussed the following:

This strategy has been developed to drastically decrease the level of illicit drugs produced and trafficked out of Afghanistan, drugs in which terrorist organizations like the Taliban and Al-Qaeda profit off of. The DEA is the lead agency receiving support from the Department of Defense, Department of State, United States Agency for International Development, United States Department of Agriculture, Army National Guard Agribusiness Teams, and the United Nations. In combination these

agencies will work to eradicate poppy and cannabis crops, interdict in the production and sales of drugs and drug paraphernalia, destroy seeds, create markets for licit crops to be sold, and provide licit crop seeds, fertilizer, machinery, loans, irrigation, and roads. With support farmers can switch from growing illicit crops to licit crops, which will in turn decrease the crops available to be produced into drugs. This decrease in drug production will lead to a decrease in profits by terrorist organizations making their recruiting, planning, and carry out of attacks much more difficult.

This strategy encompasses numerous agencies and organizations as well as attacks the drug issue from multiple angles. These factors will make evaluating this strategy more difficult than evaluating a more basic strategy. There are also many outcomes of evaluating a strategy; however, this evaluation will focus on obtaining knowledge and data. This will enhance the general understanding of the strategy as well as identify its effectiveness.

Evaluations

“The most effective evaluators are those who plan, design, and implement evaluations that are sufficiently relevant, responsive, and credible to stimulate program or policy improvement” (Wholey, 2010, p. 26). This evaluation is difficult because there are multiple agencies and organizations carrying out different missions. Also some aspects have been utilized in the past while some strategies are newly developed for Afghanistan. In order to determine if this strategy is operational, it is necessary to determine the effectiveness and to judge the strategy as whole. The goal for the strategy is to not only drastically decrease the level of drugs produced in Afghanistan but also to assist Afghan citizens in the transition from cultivating illicit crops to licit crops.

Stakeholder Analysis:

In order to properly evaluate this strategy there are factors that must be accounted for, such as stakeholders. Stakeholders are those individuals or groups who can affect or are affected by the strategy or evaluation (Wholey, 2010, p. 31). A stakeholder analysis must be performed to determine who will have an effect on the outcome of the strategy and if the strategy is successfully assisting those it is designed to affect. The United States Government is the major stakeholder investing millions of dollars into the programs. However, the American citizens who pay taxes to raise this money must also be seen as stakeholders. Citizens will be affected by a decrease in drugs on the American streets as well as success at combating terrorists in Afghanistan, making America a safer place. Another stakeholder is Afghanistan. The government will have a more successful democracy once terrorists are eliminated and American troops leave. Citizens will also be free to farm legal crops and step away from supporting terrorist groups. All of these stakeholders need to be accounted for and should be influential in the evaluation of the strategy.

Exploratory Evaluations:

This strategy as a whole has never been attempted. The United States has attempted some of the aspects of the strategy but never all together, so it will initially be very difficult to develop an in-depth evaluation. This is where an exploratory evaluation can be utilized because it looks at the reality and plausibility of the program. Evaluation findings will also be produced which will identify priorities for further evaluation and “ensure the feasibility and usefulness of future evaluation” (Wholey, 2010, p. 81). Not

only will this evaluation allow for assessors to determine what will be evaluated or if evaluation is possible, but it will also illustrate possible changes in design and implementation.

Another aspect of exploratory evaluations that may be utilized is rapid feedback evaluations. This type of evaluation will do a few things. It will evaluate program performance in terms of the goals to be used in future evaluation work as well as indicate the extent of uncertainty. It will also define what data will be collected, sources of the data, data collection instruments, sample sizes, techniques for analysis, and data analysis. This can be carried out early in the programs implementation and provide feedback extremely quickly. Considering that until the program is implemented it will be impossible to measure its success or failure it will be important to have an evaluation shortly after the programs initiation (Wholey, 2010, p. 91).

Multisite Evaluations:

Since this strategy is being implemented across the entire country of Afghanistan it will be essential to utilize multisite evaluations. Multisite evaluations allow for the examination of each program from two or more site, looking at the similarities and differences in the implementation of the strategy (Wholey, 2010, p. 211). Evaluating multiple sites in Afghanistan is crucial because regions differ in geography, population composition, and drug issues. These factors will affect how each program succeeds or fails. Also, if one aspect of the strategy is implemented differently in one region from another, advantages and disadvantages of the differences can be determined. From this changes can be made based on what implementation strategy was more successful.

One of the programs the strategy focuses on is the process of convincing farmers to switch from growing drug crops to growing legal crops. This program includes providing farmers with seeds, fertilizer, loans, machinery, irrigation systems, and training from the Army National Guard Agribusiness Teams. This guarantees that farmers can successfully cultivate enough legal crops to make the same profit they had been on illicit drug crops. Different regions of Afghanistan may accept these programs while others may not. Some may utilize the loans program but will refuse assistance from the Agribusiness Teams. Others may accept seeds and irrigation but nothing else. During the evaluation it will be necessary to determine the overall success of converting farmers in each region while also establishing what aspects of the program were utilized effectively in each region. If the Kandahar region sees 75% of their farmers switch to legal crops but only accept seeds and loans, then the strategy can be adjusted for the future.

Another aspect of the strategy that can be evaluated via multiple sites is the effectiveness of the training of local law enforcement in counter narcotics enforcement. The DEA has a training facility in Kabul in which they train local law enforcement officers in counter narcotics enforcement. This allows for local officers to assist the DEA in their efforts as well as receive necessary training so that they can continue the DEA's efforts after American forces leave. In order to know that the training being implemented is successful it is essential that an evaluation be done on each local law enforcement office that receives training, a multisite evaluation. If one department received training and has made one major bust a month while another has made no major busts it will be necessary to look at why one department is utilizing their training fully while the other is not. If one region has very few drug issues then this discrepancy is acceptable; however,

if not, it will be necessary to determine if there was an issue with the training that one group of officers received over the other.

With the vast array of programs being implemented over the entire nation of Afghanistan, multisite evaluations will need to be utilized. Data will be extrapolated based on different regions and implementation strategies. This data can then be used to fine tune the strategy, such as eliminating aspects that are not effective while increasing funding and focus on those that are working. Being able to compare different implementation successes and failures will in turn create a more effective strategy.

Performance Measures:

Performance measures allow for a goal or objective to be set that can be measured specifically by reaching a magnitude and a unit (Performance, 2010). This strategy has many aspects in which performance measures can be utilized to judge their success. The first is the drastic decrease in drug production. In 2010 Afghanistan produced 93% of the world's opium. Setting a performance measure will give a numerical standard that, if reached, will prove that the strategy is in fact performing to the standards that have been set. An example would be to successfully decrease the production percentage to 50% of the world's opium in the first three years of implementation. This of course is an example, but once all efforts begin, the DEA and U.S. officials can set a specific performance measure that they believe is achievable and will represent the success of the program.

Another performance measure that could be set is increasing the number of loans that farmers borrow from the Department of State and other international organizations. As of September 2009, more than 52,300 agricultural loans ranging from approximately

\$200 to \$2 million had gone to farmers and small businesses in Afghanistan (Economy, 2010). However, the population is roughly 30 million; meaning less than 1% of the population (80% of the population is involved in farming) has taken advantage of this program. A simple performance measure would be increasing this percentage to 5% of the population utilizing this program. With more farmers receiving the funding needed to convert their farms to cultivate legal crops, there will in turn be a decrease in drug crops produced.

The eradication of poppy fields has been utilized in nations like Columbia and was attempted in Afghanistan. This strategy recommends that this option be continued either by burning fields or spraying them with herbicide. Later in this paper the use of trained observers will illustrate how the DEA will determine how many acres of opium fields exist in Afghanistan. A performance measure should be set for the eradication of these fields, possibly destroying 10% of the total acreage of opium per year. Setting this standard will give agents, local law enforcement, and the U.S. Military a goal that will also prove that the strategy has laid out a successful program.

Overall, performance measures give programs a goal that can be specifically measured in units which can be easily utilized during the full evaluation of this strategy. There are two factors that must be considered while using performance measures to insure their accuracy. First they must have validity, the degree which an indicator accurately represents what is intended to be measured. Next is reliability, which is the consistency of data collection. The most prominent issue when addressing this strategy is that data collection may be an issue, especially when there are different agencies and organizations carrying out the same efforts in different areas. If data is not properly

collected from all fronts then there reliability becomes an issue and it is not possible to determine if a performance measure has been met. If, and only if, the designated performance indicators are valid and reliable then they can be properly utilized (Wholey, 2010, p. 107).

Trained Observers:

The use of trainer observers can be a great tool, specifically when conditions must be evaluated or rated by using observation. The collection of visual data is not always applicable in evaluations; however, there is one specific aspect of this evaluation that could exploit trained observers. As previously mentioned one of the performance measures would be to destroy a certain percentage of opium fields each year. This is when a trained observer could be utilized. Having someone specifically trained to be able to identify how many acres of fields have been destroyed each year, either by looking at satellite images or flying over crop regions, will insure reliability of data. Based on this data it will be possible to determine if a performance measure has been achieved (Wholey, 2010, p. 298).

Not only can the trained observer determine how many acres for crops were destroyed but determine how many acres were harvested. From this it is possible to estimate the total amount of drugs that could be produced, how many seeds could have been harvested for the next planting, and where eradication teams need to focus their efforts. This is also a cost effective manner of collecting substantial data. It will only be necessary to train a few individuals to be able to determine conditions by sight. They must then be provided satellite images or aerial transportation to collect and record data insure that that data is reliable. This is only one of the ways a trained observer could be

successfully used in the evaluation of this strategy but will be an effective tool if properly utilized.

Field Data Collection:

This strategy requires data to be collected in the field. It is essential that those carrying out field work know the focus or priorities of the program as well as the scope (intensity) of the data collection. This can be very difficult in the field, especially in Afghanistan, where there is a war and a lack of technology. This raises the issue of not only how much data to collect but how it is going to be saved/stored and eventually reported. U.S. agents and personnel may be equipped with the technology necessary to do this but Afghan forces assisting them may not. Evaluators must decide who is going to collect data: those implementing the program or an outside specialist. Since a major portion of this strategy is directly associated with field work, the data collection will be a challenge (Wholey, 2010, p. 322).

Surveys:

With this strategy being deployed in a war torn nation that does not have organized communications systems, nor is there organized communication available to the numerous agencies and organizations involved in this strategy, the collection of some data may be difficult. Local Afghan law enforcement is going to play a role in drug eradication and interdiction efforts which may cause data collection issues. These departments do not have computerized reporting systems. Also, what documentation officers do file will be difficult to translate because there are roughly 40 languages spoken in Afghanistan in 200 dialects (Languages, 2011). However, there are two official

languages which would be the preferred reporting languages for translators to then interpret.

The use of a general survey that can be given to all agencies, departments, and organizations that are carrying out drug eradication and interdiction programs will allow for proper data reporting in a cohesive form. The survey will cover basic information such as where operation was carried out, who performed efforts, how much drugs were destroyed, how many acres of crops were destroyed, and how many individuals were arrested. Every time any actions involving counter narcotics are carried out, this simple survey would be filled out and collected by evaluators. This would allow for basic data collection in an organized form that can then be translated for future analysis.

Interviews:

Interviews can also be a useful tool in the evaluation process. The previous section mentioned using surveys to collect data from local law enforcement that does not have reporting systems. Another option is the use of structured interviews. No matter how data is collected from Afghan officials, there is going to be a language barrier requiring an interpreter. If there is a translation issue, this can be clarified much more easily in person. Questions similar to those on the survey can be asked during the interview, but more in-depth answers are likely. This of course could create more issues about how to analyze data where there may be no organizational principle. Evaluators need to determine if this is practical.

One manner in which an interview could be very useful would be consultation. DEA agents and others can discuss the success of the strategy and suggest changes if necessary. A group interview with all those involved will allow for different comments,

concerns, and ideas about the strategy. This does not create numerical or analytical data but it will give administrators and evaluators a clear idea of the impressions and thinking of those carrying out the strategy. Interviews could be utilized in this evaluation if the right circumstances exist for its use.

Stories:

Stories can be also be used to evaluate this strategy. Success stories will do two things: prove that the strategy is succeeding and make a connection with the general public. One of the main stakeholders for this strategy is the tax-paying American public so they need to be given evidence that tax money is being used successfully.

An example of a success story is the record setting bust in 2010. The DEA along with U.S. military and local law enforcement assistance seized \$55 million worth of heroin. The operation was able to take down three heroin labs as well as a meth lab, disrupting one of Afghanistan's major drug traffickers (Ryan, 2010). Another success story was the record setting 92 tons of poppy seeds, tar opium, processed morphine, heroin and hashish that Afghan forces seized in 2009. This operation was led by Afghan forces trained by American agents and NATO forces. This was the largest drug bust in the history of Afghanistan (Webster, 2009).

Stories like these show that U.S. efforts in Afghanistan are worth the investment. It is important to depict the events accurately but in a manner that focuses on certain details. The story must set the stage, tension must build as the story is told, if possible using suspense and surprise to grab the attention of the audience, and lastly the story must portray a strong message (Wholey, 2010, p. 419-421). If the story can be developed in

this fashion and people can make a connection with the events, they will realize the success of the actions and support the efforts America is taking in Afghanistan.

Cost-Effectiveness Analysis and Cost-Benefit Analysis:

When evaluating this strategy it will be necessary to not only determine if the programs have been successful but if the cost is justifiable. The cost-effectiveness of a program places a dollar value on the cost and then relates it to specific measures of the program's effectiveness (Wholey, 2010, p. 493). In order to determine this, evaluators must first determine the effectiveness of the program which must then be rated and compared to the total cost. The previous section mentioned a bust that confiscated 92 tons of drugs representing millions of dollars that terrorists no longer have to fund their organizations and 92 tons of drugs that will not be trafficked around the world, including in America. This is just one example of the success of the strategy; however, if evaluators look at all the successful missions, they will be able to judge if the program is worth the taxpayers' investment.

Cost-benefit analysis can be utilized to evaluate the success of this strategy. The hope is that if this strategy can drastically decrease the level of drugs trafficked out of Afghanistan, there will be fewer drugs on the streets of America. A cost-benefit analysis takes the cost of the programs and compares it to the benefits (Wholey, 2010, p. 494). In this case two of the major benefits are the decreased amount of work law enforcement will need to do in America (saving money) because there will be less drugs on the streets; and lives and property will be saved because terrorists will have less funding to carry out major attacks. Some may say that all of America's efforts in Afghanistan have been

justifiable as long as another attack like September 11th is not carried out. If evaluators were to look at the total cost of the War in Afghanistan and the monetary loss of September 11 it is possible to determine the cost-benefit of this. An example of cost-benefit analysis would be the raid that confiscated \$55 million in drugs. If evaluators were to compare monetary value of the resources used to carry out the action to the \$55 million in drugs confiscated and destroyed, they would be able to determine if the cost of the resources necessary were worth the benefit. In the final evaluation of this strategy both cost-effectiveness analysis and cost-benefit analysis will need to be carried out, specifically to justify the strategy to both the U.S. government and the American public.

Increase Transparency, Strengthen Accountability, and Improve Performance:

“Evaluation is used in government to *increase transparency, strengthen accountability, and improve performance*—all terms in good political currency” (Wholey, 2010, p. 652). In order for a strategy and those organizations involved in it to be successful and accepted, they must be transparent, accountable, and perform to their highest potential. All three of these aspects seem to be lacking in today’s government. Although there needs to be an increased transparency, this is an issue because Afghanistan is still a very dangerous nation and in order to keep agents, personnel, and armed forces as safe as possible it is essential to keep some information secret. However, in recent years some believe, because of leaked intelligence, that information that the U.S. government considers secret is not worthy of this title. The DEA and collaborating agencies and organizations must do their best to release pertinent information to the U.S. public in order to gain American trust in these strategic efforts.

Next there must be increased accountability: if the DEA and other organizations are supposed to carry out certain actions in Afghanistan, they must do so. This strategy has the primary goal of drastically decreasing drug production in Afghanistan. It is important that this is achieved in order to prove that those involved are accountable for what they have been tasked with. The last issue is improving performance. This strategy is going to cost millions; therefore, if the DEA is given a hypothetical \$40 million for eradication efforts, it is essential that they eradicate as much drug crops as possible. Performing to the best of their ability will not only prove that they want to succeed, but that in the end they will succeed if given the right resources. If U.S. agencies and organizations are not transparent, accountable, and performing to the best of their ability, there is little reason to evaluate the strategy because the U.S. public will already have found U.S. efforts to be inadequate.

Conclusion:

In order to successfully evaluate this strategy there are several approaches that must be taken. First the evaluator must perform a stakeholder analysis to determine who will be affected by the strategy. In order to effectively evaluate the strategy, it is important that it be done for those specific stakeholders. In this case the main stakeholders are the U.S. government, the U.S. public, the Afghani public, and all agencies and organizations involved in the strategy. Next an exploratory evaluation should be performed in order to determine what aspects of the strategy will be evaluated, how to evaluate them, and what data will be needed.

The use of multisite evaluations will be necessary when evaluating this strategy. Based on the numerous programs that make up the strategy and its implementation across

an entire nation with many distinct regions, there will be different data collected about the success of programs per region. Evaluators must determine exactly what needs to be evaluated in what region in order to get a fair representation of the achievement.

Performance measures must also be set which will give a numerical data for certain programs.

In order to collect data there are some tactics that must be utilized. First it will be necessary to determine when to use trained observers, such as when checking crop eradication. Next evaluators must determine how to gather field data including where data will be collected, what data will be focused on, and the scope of the data that will be collected. Surveys are one tool that may be used. Because of the lack of reporting systems for law enforcement in Afghanistan, surveys can determine basic data on the amount of drugs confiscated and destroyed as well as the number of drug dealers arrested by individual police departments in each region. Lastly interviews can be conducted to determine if U.S. forces believe their efforts are working.

Stories that illustrate major accomplishments of the strategy, such as the largest drug raid in the history of Afghanistan, can convince both the public and government officials that the efforts are worth the investment. Lastly, cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analyses must be carried out to determine if the cost of the strategy is comparable to its effectiveness, as well as if the cost is comparable to the financial benefits. In order to convince tax payers and politicians that the strategy is worth their investment, it is necessary to prove it to them, and a thorough evaluation can achieve this.

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Chapter 6

Drug Enforcement Administration:

Afghanistan Security Strategy

Preface:

This strategy has been developed to insure that all Drug Enforcement Administration agents in Afghanistan, specifically those agents going into the field, have the proper training, protective gear, and security precautions to guarantee their safety. The possible threats to agents will be defined and steps will be illustrated to guarantee their safety in the field, the Kabul offices, training facilities, and housing. Due to the instability of Afghanistan from both America's War on Terror and the terrorists and insurgents residing there, it is a dangerous place for law enforcement operations, specifically counter narcotics enforcement.

Introduction:

In 1996 Afghanistan became a terrorist state when the Taliban, a Muslim fundamentalist group, took control of the government. Terrorists like Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda used this nation as a safe haven and were able to recruit, raise funding, and plan out attacks like that of September 11 (Kaplan, 2009). After this attack the United States invaded Afghanistan and forced the Taliban out of Kabul. It became obvious that if the U.S. and allies were going to succeed in eliminating the terrorist threats in Afghanistan, it was necessary to attack from all angles. One of these approaches includes counter narcotics operations utilizing the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

who have been operating in Afghanistan since 2000, reopening their Kabul office in 2003 (Braun, 2005).

The DEA has been appointed the difficult task of drastically decreasing the amount of drugs, specifically poppy based drugs, produced and trafficked out of Afghanistan. The major drugs being produced are opium, heroin, hashish, and marijuana. This task has been met with strong resistance both from the farmers who rely on these drug crops to make a living and the drug dealers/terrorist groups producing and selling these illicit drugs. Not only do they meet resistance from these groups, but they are deployed in a nation that America is currently at war in. This makes safety a major issue for DEA agents. In order to keep these individuals safe there are numerous steps the DEA must take.

Deployment:

The DEA has had agents deployed in Afghanistan since 2000. At that time there were roughly a dozen deployed agents, a number which has been significantly increased to over 100 currently (Holton, 2010). These range from special agents and intelligence/research specialists, to training staff, to full combat field agents (Braun, 2005). When first deployed agents were primarily focused in Kabul and fieldwork was extremely limited, but it has since been able to operate in much of the nation. This change occurred due to a decrease in security concerns and improved tactics.

The full combat field agents are members of five different DEA Foreign-deployed Advisory and Support Teams (FAST) which are positioned in Afghanistan on a rotation, usually two groups at a time, rotating every 120 days. The other three teams remain at the

DEA Training Academy in Quantico, Virginia and continue training while also providing operational support for the deployed teams. These agents were initially deployed to Afghanistan on March 30 2005 (Braun, 2005). FAST receives specialized training from the DEA and the U.S. Armed Services. Many members of the teams have U.S. military backgrounds making them well trained for the combat zones (DEA, 2009). These agents are deployed to carry out missions with support from fellow agents and intelligence specialists.

Safety and Security Threats:

When the DEA first began deploying agents to Afghanistan in 2000 they had numerous security issues which escalated following the United States led invasion after September 11. According to a 2005 Congressional testimony by DEA Chief of Operations Michael A. Braun (2005): “Security constraints, as well as other conditions in Afghanistan, initially severely limited our agents’ movements and their ability to conduct traditional drug enforcement operations. Fortunately, the DEA is now permitted to travel outside the Kabul city limits, if specific security criteria can be met.”

During the beginning of the DEA’s campaign in Afghanistan agents were not necessarily individually targeted; however, American forces in general were. Due to the turmoil of the nation it was too dangerous even for well trained agents to do counter narcotics work outside the city of Kabul. In 2003-04 the number of deployed agents was decreased to just two because of security issues, with efforts limited to the collection and analysis of narcotics intelligence (Tandy, 2004).

There are numerous terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan, the two most prominent being the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. These groups present one of the largest threats to DEA agents. Over the past decade they have carried out attacks ranging from suicide bombings to ambushes and improvised explosive devices (IED's). As U.S. and allied forces pushed the Taliban and Al-Qaeda out of major cities, more DEA agents were deployed. With more agents and safer regions agents have intensified the bilateral operations they carry out with Afghani police and the U.S. Military in the field.

In September 2009 ABC News did a special on the DEA FAST and their efforts in Afghanistan (DEA, 2009). They were able to shadow a team on raid of a lower level drug dealer's compound. The dealers fled but when agents searched the buildings, they found over a dozen weapons and even more loaded ammunition clips, including a rocket propelled grenade. Most drug seizures in Afghanistan are accompanied by the confiscation of weapons and the recovery of IED's, which makes the nation safer; however, these weapons could also be used against agents during these raids (North, 2009). Most drug dealers, including those not directly associated with terrorist groups, are armed in this fashion. These are the threats that these field agents must deal with on a daily basis.

The war in Afghanistan may have started in 2001 and the nation may be safer but over the past few years violence has been increasing. In 2008 there were roughly 5,500 armed attacks which radically increased to 13,000 in 2010 (Violent Incidents, 2011), chiefly against U.S. Armed Forces, not necessarily against civilians or other U.S. personnel. However, the fact that these attacks are occurring still presents a major threat

to DEA agents. If the number of attacks continues to increase over the next year it may be necessary to once again decrease the number of deployed agents.

Like armed attacks suicide bombings are still one of the major issues the DEA has to prepare for. However, the numbers of bombings have decreased drastically over the past 5 years. In 2007 there were roughly 480 individuals killed by suicide bombings while in 2009 there were 275 deaths, and this number continues to decrease (Norland, 2010). These bombings take place, for the most part, in major cities like Kabul where the DEA has its central office. The southern province of Kandahar has the most attacks, and Kabul has the second most suicide bombings each year (Suicide Bombings, 2011). It is important to guarantee that these bombers are kept clear of the DEA compound and personnel are kept safe while traveling outside the complex.

There have been a number of suicide bombings that have caused dozens of deaths in Kabul; however, the attacks on fortified embassies illustrate the threat level that the DEA office in Kabul endures. In 2008 a suicide bomber attacked the Indian embassy in Kabul killing 41 people and injuring 141 others (Siddique, 2008). Another suicide bombing on the German embassy in 2009 killed 5 and wounded another 14 (Farmer, 2009). These embassies were protected by armed guards and protective walls yet these deaths still occurred. Suicide bombers are a real threat even with security precautions are put in place, forcing DEA managers to consider advanced security options.

When agents are in the field, they have two means of travel, helicopters or wheeled vehicles. In most cases agents travel with U.S. Armed Forces in military helicopters or armored military vehicles. Even in armored vehicles the danger of

improvised explosive devices (IED's) is still prominent. Since the beginning of the war IED's have been a major threat to our troops, specifically roadside IED's. In 2010 the use of IED's was just as high as it had been in the past, however the rate of success decreased (IED, 2011). The lower success rate is most likely due to advances in personal protection of U.S. troops and agents.

Not only are there threats from terrorists, militants, and drug dealers but from civilians as well. During the Bush Administration the DEA and U.S. forces began the process of drug eradication by destroying drug crops. Poppy fields across Afghanistan were burned to insure that the crops were not harvested. This process not only created tension between Afghan farmers and U.S. forces but it caused farmers to fight back. Because their livelihoods were being destroyed some poppy farmers put explosive booby traps in their fields, causing the deaths of at least four eradicators (Braun, 2005). There were also numerous individuals that were injured while attempting crop eradication. In another instance an unidentified gunman opened fire on counter narcotics officers, killing one and injuring four (ZabuliMam, 2007). Although eradication has been discontinued the Obama Administration has considered reviving the program; if so, precautions will need to be taken to prevent these kinds of threats.

Despite these threats the DEA has successfully protected its agents over the past decade. There have only been three agents killed since 2000 in Afghanistan. These deaths were not caused by insurgents or terrorists, but by a helicopter crash (Fitzgerald, 2009). The DEA has done what has been needed to protect their personnel; however, if terrorists and insurgents adjust their strategies, DEA managers will need to make the appropriate changes.

Training:

The DEA has offices in 63 countries worldwide, so this, as well as the extensive work they do in the United States, makes it essential that agents receive proper training. This training can be the most important tool to insure the safety of all agents. The DEA can do all they can to protect their personnel but if agents cannot protect themselves the DEA's efforts are futile. Training for agents emphasizes leadership, ethics, and human dignity with an academic focus on report writing, law, automated information systems, and drug recognition. To go along with this there is 84 hours of physical fitness and defensive tactics training, plus 122 hours of firearms training won marksmanship, weapons safety, tactical shooting, and deadly force decision training (Domestic Training, 2011). This training prepares DEA agents for any scenarios they may encounter.

The DEA FAST is an elite group of special agents who go through extensive training to prepare them to work internationally. According to the DEA the FAST mission statement is: "Plan and conduct special enforcement operations; train, mentor, and advise foreign narcotics law enforcement units; collect and assess evidence and intelligence in support of US and bilateral investigations" (Dobric, 2010).

For the most part these teams are half ex-military and half original DEA Special Agents. This gives them the training background needed to successfully carry out their mission under any circumstances. During their training, mostly in Quantico Virginia, these agents go through three phases of training: the physical and tactical assessment, the specialized training, and advanced tactics, techniques and procedures (Dobric, 2010). The following are the aspects that FAST focus on during the training periods:

- Mission Planning; Small Unit Tactics
- Heavy/Foreign Weapons
- Close Quarter Combat Shooting
- IED and Demolitions Familiarization
- Surveillance Detection
- Counter- Threat Driving
- Combat Lifesaving
- Communications
- Land Warfare
- Escape and Evade Techniques
- Airmobile/Maritime Operations
- Convoy Operations
- Counterdrug Tactical Police Operations

This additional training prepares these agents for international deployment, specifically into unstable nations like Afghanistan. When it comes down to it training is the best protection that can be provided for these agents.

Strategy:

This strategy makes recommendations for Drug Enforcement Administration administrators to implement in order to insure the safety of DEA agents deployed in Afghanistan. As previously discussed there are numerous safety and security threats. There are also different agents with distinct training backgrounds carrying out diverse

operations. Depending on what operations agents are involved in there will be different strategies that must be implemented to keep them safe.

The previous section depicts the training that each DEA agent receives. Most agents in America do not receive the training necessary for field work in Afghanistan. FAST agents receive additional training on top of the mandatory DEA training that prepares them for this type of foreign deployment. Many FAST agents also have a military background that gives them combat training which allows them to be prepared for the situations they may experience in Afghanistan. It is essential that all field agents deployed to this region are properly trained and combat ready.

The main international office for the DEA in Afghanistan is located in Kabul. This is where the FAST teams are centrally located; where supporting agents collect and analyze intelligence, and where the DEA training center is. Kabul also has the most suicide bombings per year of all the cities in Afghanistan. In order to keep all DEA agents protected from these types of attacks it is essential that the training facility and main office building be properly fortified. This office has been described as a “secure base with modern electronics,” which, if true, is exactly the security precaution needed (Shannon, 2005). The DEA recently hired a company to construct a training facility for them on the outskirts of Kabul that they call a secure campus (Drug Enforcement, 2011). This consists of heavy duty gates and a protective wall tall enough to keep out intruders and thick enough to protect from a blast. This type of fortification is necessary at all DEA locations in Afghanistan, with a supporting surveillance system. In order for agents to leave Kabul to carry out field missions they must first be kept safe in the central office and training facility.

IED's, small arms fire, and suicide bombings are the three major threats that the DEA must deal with in Afghanistan. Roadside IED's have been a major threat to U.S. forces since 2001 and the only solution to this is training individuals to spot IED's as well as utilizing armored vehicles. The Humvee is the primary transport vehicle of the military, which has a fully armored passenger compartment surrounded with hardened steel and bullet-resistant glass (Humvee, 2011). Any time DEA agents are traveling in the field, including traveling in Kabul, they should be transported in armored vehicles with the same safety features that military vehicles possess. If possible the DEA should invest in and utilize military Humvees during field assignments.

As depicted in the ABC News special DEA FAST utilizes military assistance during their raids in the field (DEA, 2009). This includes military helicopters for transportation. The DEA has had only one issue with helicopters during missions, when one crashed killing three agents (Fitzgerald, 2009). Traveling by helicopter allows for a safer means of travel. IED's and small arms fire are not a threat, and although some insurgents possess rocket propelled grenades no DEA helicopters have been shot down at this point. Also, military helicopters usually are outfitted with weapons systems giving them an offensive position in the case of an altercation. In order to keep agents safe from roadside IED's and ambushes, travel by helicopter, when applicable, should be utilized.

When carrying out raids the DEA usually plans morning mission to protect agents. This allows for them to work in the cooler morning temperatures instead of the afternoon temperatures that frequently reach 120 degrees. The heat can be just as much of a danger to agents as the other mentioned threats. Morning raids also give agents an element of surprise, hoping to catch dealers off guard (DEA, 2009). As previously

mentioned many drug dealers are heavily armed; the use of morning raids may catch them unarmed. Continuing morning raids will provide agents with the edge they need to stay safe during the most dangerous aspect of their mission.

According to a study published in the Journal of the American College of Surgeons: “Body armor has a protective effect on victims of high velocity gunshot wounds; lower rates of head, brain, chest, and abdominal injuries are seen. In addition, armor reduces the severity of injuries to the chest and the abdomen” (Peleg, 2006).

This study looked at military personnel and the effectiveness of their body armor. Chest and abdominal protective vests, as well as helmets, protect the vital organs of the body. The Pentagon recently came out with a study proving that the current Advanced Combat Helmet used by the U.S. Armed Forces provides the best protection available. Increasing padding and thickness was looked at to increase protection but made the helmet too heavy for practical use (U.S. Army, 2011). DEA FAST agents are armed and armored with equipment similar to that of U.S. troops; this is the most advanced and practical armor available. This protective gear will protect from gunshots and some explosives such as IED’s. It is important that as new types of safety technologies and equipment become available for the military , the DEA follow suit and provide agents with the same gear.

These agents and personnel also require housing. As with their offices and training facility it is essential to construct security walls to protect employees. This also means that buildings and windows should be bullet and blast resistant. If possible each building should have a safe room, with extremely thick walls, that will protect occupants

from most attacks including bombings. The goal for the DEA should be to supply housing that is comfortable and safe.

If the Obama Administration, or the following administration, chooses to continue utilizing crop eradication, it is important to insure the safety of those DEA agents and others involved in the process. It is recommended that an alternate tactic be developed. The burning of crops put agents and troops on the ground in the line of fire, including when farmers use explosives as deterrents. Instead, aerial herbicide spraying should be implemented as it was in Columbia by the U.S. and the DEA. In 2006 the United Nations reported that 664 square miles of crops were sprayed with herbicides in Columbia, destroying a portion of the overall crop (Williams, 2009). Also in 2006 the Afghani government allowed for spraying to be utilized; it was not largely supported but due to the drastic spike in drug production it was utilized (Walsh, 2006). This type of operation should be the only form of crop eradication used to insure the safety of DEA agents and U.S. forces.

Over the past few years the U.S. military has been using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), also known as drones, to collect intelligence. These have also been armed to carry out stealth missions to keep forces out of harm's way. The DEA should also utilize UAV's to collect intelligence such as determining how many acres of poppy plants are being grown and to get aerial images of compounds they may plan to raid. Also, if the military has outfitted drones with weapons it should be possible to outfit them with spraying systems to be utilized in the previously mentioned herbicide spraying of drug crops. UAV's will allow for the pilot to be in a safe and secure location while carrying out essential assignments.

Lastly, if all the previous recommendations are implemented and agents begin losing their lives because of increase in violence, it may be necessary for DEA leadership to make a difficult decision. In 2003 administrators were forced to cut back the number of deployed agents to only two. If for some reason operations in Afghanistan become far too dangerous, then once again it might be necessary to cut back on the number of agents deployed. The other option would be limiting agents to intelligence collection and discontinuing field work and raids. The U.S. believes that in order to win the War on Terror in Afghanistan it is crucial to drastically decrease the production of drugs. If the DEA's efforts are forced to be halted, then the mission will be unsuccessful; therefore, the recommendations in this strategy should be implemented fully and immediately.

Conclusion:

The United States Drug Enforcement Administration's role in Afghanistan plays an integral part in the U.S. efforts to eliminate terrorist threats. This proposed strategy will insure that Drug Enforcement Administration agents and personnel are kept safe and secure while deployed in Afghanistan of decreasing the level of drugs currently being produced and trafficked.

I, Benjamin Ogden, Pace University Graduate Student, recommends the following safety and security initiatives and programs:

- Emphasis constant training, specifically for those agents working in the field, to insure they are prepared for all situations they may encounter, including combat situations.

- The Kabul office, and other facilities, should be protected by blast and bullet resistance walls and windows, security gates, and sophisticated surveillance systems.
- Anytime personnel travel outside of the DEA Kabul office it is recommended they are transported in military grade Humvees or vehicles with equivalent protective armor.
- When applicable, DEA agents should travel by helicopter to avoid roadside IED's and ambushes; this can also give them a stealth advantage.
- When DEA agents are carrying out raids these should be done in the early morning to utilize the element of surprise as well as avoid afternoon heat.
- Provide DEA agents, specifically those working in the field, with the most advanced and practical body armor and weaponry possible.
- Housing offered to personnel should be fortified similarly to offices insuring that individuals are safe at home. They should be provided with some sort of safe room, or bomb shelter, that can protect them from small arms fire and explosive blasts for an extended period of time.
- If the U.S. government restarts the drug eradication program the DEA, should utilize aerial spraying of herbicides to keep agents out of harm's way.
- DEA should utilize unmanned aerial vehicles to collect intelligence and equip them with herbicide straying equipment to keep pilots in a secure location while carrying out missions.

- DEA leadership must be prepared to reduce the number of deployed agents or discontinue field work if conditions become too unsafe for missions to continue.

Developing and implementing all recommendations of this initiative is necessary to insure the safety of all DEA agents both in the field and at the Kabul office and training facility. While the success of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan should be a priority, it is always a priority for all American forces to return alive. In a war zone this can be a difficult task. However, if fully implemented, this strategy will allow for the DEA to continue their efforts to decrease drug production and trafficking in Afghanistan while insuring that all agents will return intact.

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Chapter 7

Threat Assessment for Mumbai-Style Active Shooter Attack and the Role of the
United States Drug Enforcement Administration

Introduction:

Over the past decades terrorism has been evolving, new groups and ideologies have developed, and attack methods have changed as nations increase their grasp on what terrorist organizations are capable of. After the attacks on September 11, 2001 it became apparent that America and our intelligence community were not prepared for non-traditional threats. The 2008 Mumbai, India attacks brought the threat of elaborate and well organized active shooter attacks to the forefront of what terrorist groups, like Lashkar-i-Taiba, are capable of. As learned in this attack responding to multiple coordinated attacks is extremely difficult, putting an emphasis on preventing attacks before they can be carried out.

In order to prevent attacks before they occur it is essential that the intelligence community collect and analyze all homeland security related intelligence. According to Attorney General Eric Holder the intelligence community has improved their abilities since September 11, but there is still work to be done (Holder, 2010). The Lessons of Mumbai, published by the RAND Cooperation, supported this conclusion stating that “the Mumbai attack attests to ongoing shortcomings—if not outright failure—in the United States’ efforts to manage its various security interests in Pakistan and the region” (Rabasa, Blackwill & Chalk, 2009). Even with the large investments America has made

in the Afghani and Pakistani region there are still failures by the intelligence community to compile actionable intelligence on potential threats.

Active shooter attacks require intelligence that can mitigate the threat of an attack or prevent the attack entirely. If actionable intelligence is not developed to prevent the attack, then any intelligence that has been collected needs to be disseminated to all levels of law enforcement. Unlike some threats the intelligence consumers for these attacks will include federal law enforcement agencies, state police, local police, and possibly tribal police. As was learned in the Mumbai attack a fast and effective response is necessary when dealing with a collaborated active shooter attack. This means all levels of law enforcement will need access to intelligence that has been collected in order to insure the response efforts are swift and effective.

The Knowns and Unknowns of Active Shooter Attacks:

When it comes to active shooter attacks there are more unknowns than knowns. According to the Department of Homeland Security an active shooter is: “An individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area. In most cases active shooters use firearms(s) and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims” (Kelly, 2011). The strength of this style of attack is that there is limited intelligence that can be collected. Almost all aspects of these attacks are unknown, such as the number of attackers, the planned locations, and the type of firearms. The knowns are that a quick and tactical response will be necessary if the attack is not prevented. The success of the intelligence community determines the number of unknowns, making the prevention of the attack more likely. Without knowing all of the

variables the unknown will almost always outweigh the known. If it is known that six individuals are planning an active shooter attack in America this does not provide actionable intelligence. It is still unknown as to where and how the attack will be carried out. If the past has taught anything it is that the intelligence community must use imagination and form actionable intelligence to mitigate the likelihood of an attack.

2008 Mumbai India Terrorist Attacks:

On November 26, 2008 a group of terrorists carried out an extensive attack in Mumbai, India. The group, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), is a Jihadi group working to challenge India's sovereignty over the states of Jammu and Kashmir (Bajoria, 2010). The group, also known as the Army of the Righteous and the Soldiers of the Pure, outlined in their pamphlet "Why Are We Waging Jihad" that they want to restore Islamic rule over India as well as "bring about a union of all Muslim majority regions in countries that surround Pakistan" (Lashkar-e-toiba, 2001). The pamphlet also stated that India, Israel, and the United States are existential enemies of Islam, one of the reasons LeT is currently on the list of 49 terrorist organizations designated by the U.S. Department of States (Lashkar-e-toiba, 2001; Foreign Terrorist, 2011). On December 26th 2001 the United States officially announced that Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) had been designated as a foreign terrorist organization (Pike, 2011). Although LeT was added to the U.S. terrorist organization list shortly after the Sept. 11 attacks, there has yet to be a definitive connection made between LeT and Al-Qaeda. However, the ideologies of both groups are similar, specifically in that both groups have anti-Western beliefs and deem the United States is the enemy of Islam (Chalk, 2011).

The Mumbai terrorist attacks began on November 26th 2008 and led to at least 166 deaths, 172 when including the killed terrorists. These attacks were well planned and took advantage of the gaps in Mumbai's coastal surveillance (Rabasa, Blackwill & Chalk, 2009). This allowed for the ten terrorists, as well as their firearms and explosive devices, to enter the city via fishing trawler without anyone's knowledge. The ten men then split into four groups and continued to carry out pre-designed plans as well as followed current notifications by handlers in Pakistan via cell phones/satellite phones (Reed, 2009). The group had planned on attacking the central train station, the Cama & Albles Hospital, the Leopold Café, the Chabad Center, the Trident-Oberoi Hotel, and the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, all confined and populated locations (Rabasa, Blackwill & Chalk, 2009). Over the next 60 hours these men killed as many people as they could while also setting fire to a portion of the Taj Mahal Hotel. Nine of the terrorists were killed, with the exception of one individual who was captured and informed authorities that the mission was to kill as many people as possible (Reed, 2009).

After these attacks took place Indian officials recognized that changes were needed. In order to insure that this type of attack would be prevented or mitigated in the future: the government expanded police recruiting and training, bought high-tech equipment and updated its ancient police arsenal. It established a National Investigation Agency to probe attacks and set up commando bases across the country — including one in Mumbai — so rapid reaction forces could swiftly arrive at the scene of an attack (Mumbai, 2011).

Major long term changes were also developed and on December 17th 2008 the Indian Parliament passed two pieces of new legislation for this purpose, the National

Investigating Agency Bill and the Unlawful Activities Amendments Bill. These bills allow for the detention period of suspects to be doubled, facilitate the investigations and trials of terrorism cases, and restrict the flow of finances that abet terrorist activities (Kronstadt, 2008). Since these changes were implemented there have been more attacks in India, but none on the same level as the 2008 attacks.

Active Shooter Attacks:

The Mumbai attacks were far from the first active shooter attacks to take place. These kinds of attacks range back decades, with one of the first major attacks taking place in 1966. On 1 August 1966 Charles Joseph Whitman opened fire on the University of Texas campus killing 13 victims and wounded 31 others (Kelly, 2011). A more recent attack that took the nation by surprise was the Columbine high school shooting. The true capabilities of an active shooter attack had not been well known until two untrained high school students were able to kill 13 individuals and injure another 24 when they opened fire on their high school (Columbine, 2011). The term active shooter attack actually entered the “national lexicon” after the Columbine High School shooting (Buerger & Buerger, 2010).

Internationally the Utoya Norway attack on July 22, 2011 depicted how a well-planned attack, even with only one gunman could lead to dozens of deaths. This attack took place on a small island retreat, giving the shooter the ability to kill dozens before authorities could respond. The gunman, Anders Behring Breivik, killed seven individuals in a bombing before carrying out his attack at an island summer camp where he killed 80 (Norway, 2011). Attacks like this depict how difficult it is to respond to active shooter

attacks, especially when these attacks take place in locations that are cut off from normal response methods.

Drug Enforcement Administration Obligations:

The Mumbai attacks gave the world a view of what can be expected when terrorists exploit a nation's weakness in responding to a multi-location attack. For the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) first response is not a daily function, nor is the prevention of terrorist attacks. However, post September 11th it has become necessary for agencies, like Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, and the Drug Enforcement Administration, to carry out functions to protect the homeland, not just follow the original mission of the agency. The collection and analysis of intelligence, use of informants, and making connections between different intelligence sources will allow for potential terrorist attacks to be prevented and mitigated. These functions are the strengths of the DEA and have allowed the administration to play a more significant role in terror prevention. Agents can also be used on a first responder level as well as providing training to departments and agencies that lack extensive firearms and tactical training.

Informants are a standard tool utilized by the DEA for collecting drug related intelligence. There is intrinsic connection between drug trafficking and terrorist activities, with many terrorist organizations profiting from the sales of drugs, specifically in Afghanistan. This gives informants the ability to collect not only drug trafficking intelligence but also homeland security intelligence. Informants are located around the world, most of whom were arrested for drug-related crimes and agreed to work as informants as an alternative to prison. In 2011 a DEA informant reported that he had been

confronted by an Iranian man plotting to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador, intelligence which the DEA and FBI utilized to respond appropriately and mitigate the threat (DBAdmin, 2011). It is reported that there have been several recent cases where the DEA, using its underworld connection, has reached far beyond U.S. borders to investigate, arrest and bring to the U.S. those suspected of terror conspiracies (DB Administration, 2011). The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004) declared that there as a lack of information sharing between agencies. The DEA's utilization of informants and their collaboration with the FBI to prevent this attack perfectly depicts the changes the Commission requested.

Post Mumbai it became apparent that an informant for the DEA, David Coleman Headley, had been an active scout for Lashkar-i-Taiba in the planning stages of the Mumbai attack (Rotella, 2010). It is unclear if the DEA was aware of David's involvement with the planning of this attack; however, in 2005 David's wife informed federal investigators of his involvement with LeT and his extensive training in Pakistani camps (Rotella, 2010). According to a former senior law enforcement official informants are often "passed off to the FBI or CIA unless it [is] mainly drug" related (Rotella, 2010). Even if Headley had been passed off to another agency there was a clear failure to connect his involvement with LeT and his scouting in Mumbai. Making this connection could have prevented the attack from occurring. This failure illustrates the weaknesses that the Intelligence Community possesses.

A large majority of the work the DEA does is directly associated with the collection of data and intelligence. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration: the Office of Training provides instruction in the latest and best analytical techniques to

counter the rapidly growing sophistication of international drug syndicates. It endeavors to share and exchange drug intelligence experience and expertise with other law enforcement elements in support of a unified national counterdrug mission (Domestic Training Intelligence, n.d.).

DEA analysts go through extensive training on numerous levels, commencing at the beginning of employment with a nine week intensive basic training. After this initial training there are five additional levels of training that analysts can receive:

- **Advanced Intelligence Training:** Course provides updates regarding agency changes in priorities, programs, policies, and protocols; new or revised laws; and new or upgraded analytic tools and methodologies.
- **Intelligence Analyst Mentor Program:** This course prepares Senior Intelligence Research Specialists to serve as mentors to new Intelligence Research Specialists assigned to their office.
- **Intelligence Managers Seminar:** Designed to bring managers up to date on policies, procedures, employee-related issues, and intelligence analytical tools.
- **Merlin File Management Training:** Provides an overview of the DEA classified computer system, which is capable of handling information up to and including SECRET.
- **Strategic Intelligence Seminar:** Develops use of targeting tools, strategic writing skills, and improved critical thinking skills. (Domestic Training Intelligence, n.d.)

With the importance of homeland security intelligence all analysts should be required to take all training classes and seminars to insure that nothing goes unnoticed during the analysis period, whether it be drug related or terrorist related.

The DEA also participates in Federal Law Enforcement Training which is “designed to share DEA’s drug intelligence expertise, along with the best analytical tools and practices, with other federal, state, local, tribal, and international law enforcement agencies” (Domestic Training Intelligence, n.d.). For years the DEA has relied on intelligence analysis to build cases against drug traffickers. This program is designed to share this expertise with all levels of law enforcement. In order to share the DEA’s analytical experience this training should also be provided to all intelligence community analysts.

The other major aspect of the DEA’s involvement in a Mumbai style attack would be first response assistance, if needed. As seen on September 11, 2001 first responders began as police, EMT’s, and firefighters but quickly escalated to anyone willing to participate in efforts. In the Mumbai attack there were numerous coordinated attacks throughout the city, leading to massive confusion and a lack of response ability. Due to the unpredictable nature of an active shooter attack, response by U.S. law enforcement will require immediate and well organized response. Depending on the number of attackers and attack sights, as well as the location of the attack (rural vs. city), resources may be spread thin requiring additional law enforcement response. With 226 domestic offices and over 5,500 special agents the DEA could provide valuable assistance (DEA Office, n.d.; DEA Fact Sheet, 2011).

This assistance would fall into the mitigation level, or minimizing the threat level of an attack that is being carried out. The obvious goal of the intelligence community is to prevent attacks before they occur. When this fails law enforcement must respond in a manner that will terminate the attack before numerous civilians lose their lives. If a response and communications system were implemented, this would allow for the DEA, and any other federal law enforcement agents to respond to any such attacks, vastly increasing the effectiveness of law enforcement response. The Mumbai attack taught the world that quick, well trained, and organized first responders are the ultimate tool in mitigating any active shooter attacks.

DEA agents receive numerous levels of training with firearms and tactical training pertaining to their first response abilities. During firearms training they learn marksmanship, combat shooting skills and tactics, using shoulder-fired weapons and ballistic shields, as well as firing in low-light environments (Basic Training Firearms” n.d.). In the defensive tactical training agents receive self-defense skills, fighting skills, and mental conditioning to insure agents can overcome both armed and unarmed attacks (Basic Training Tactical, n.d.). Add to this training that many agents served in the U.S. armed forces before becoming special agents, creating agents that are well trained to be responding to active shooter attacks (Russo & Esposito, 2009).

Active shooter attacks can occur anywhere, not just in highly populated areas; this has been illustrated by school shootings in rural areas and the Utoya Norway attack. In these situations local police will be the first responders, requiring them to take a tactical approach to save lives. Many rural police departments do not receive the proper firearms and tactical training to effectively respond to an active shooter attack. Due to DEA

agent's extensive training in these areas, they can provide training to rural departments that request such assistance. The previously mentioned firearms and tactical training that DEA special agents receive gives them a knowledge that should be shared with undertrained agencies and departments, specifically in rural areas.

Conclusion:

The Mumbai terrorist attack, coupled with further active shooter attacks that have occurred in America, depicts the vast unknown that confronts the Intelligence community and homeland security stakeholders. This style of attack is hard to prevent and equally as difficult to respond to, specifically when there are multiple attacks on collaborated locations. The DEA, although not classified as an agency designed to prevent terror attacks, can and have begun to play a role in these efforts. The use of informants as well as the DEA's experienced intelligence analysts can greatly increase the range of intelligence collected and utilized. DEA agents can also be utilized, when the intelligence community fails, as first responding law enforcement. Although the DEA mission deals entirely with drug enforcement they have expanded their portfolio to include the war on terror and if given the opportunity they have the potential to increase their assistance.

I, Benjamin Ogden, Pace University graduate student recommend that the DEA:

- Collaborate with other agencies and departments, specifically the Federal Bureau of Investigation, when intelligence collected addresses terrorist activities
- Utilize confidential informants that may have contact with terrorist organizations to collect intelligence related to potential attacks

- Exploit the decades of DEA intelligence analysis experience to provide the Intelligence Community with actionable intelligence as well as provide assistance in developing a more successful Intelligence Community
- Develop a communications system to provide DEA agents with information when they are need as first responders in the incident of an active shooter attack
- Provide firearms and tactical training to rural law enforcement officers when requested

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Chapter 8

Human Rights Effect on the U.S. Government Drug Eradication and Drug
Interdiction Strategy in Afghanistan

Introduction:

Since 2001 the United States has been heavily invested in Afghanistan. After the September 11 attacks, rooting out terrorists located in Afghanistan became the primary focus of the U.S. Armed Forces. However, efforts have not only been fighting the War on Terror; the U.S. War on Drugs has also expanded and now focuses on stopping production at the source in the Afghani fields. This War on Drugs includes involvement by the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in collaboration with other departments and agencies creating an unusual coalition with the military, law enforcement, and humanitarian groups working collectively.

Over the past decade of U.S. military occupation in Afghanistan coalition forces have been accused of human rights violations against Afghan civilians and prisoners of war. Although this does not necessarily fall into this strategy, going forward, it is essential that the U.S. Armed Forces follow the Military Rules of Engagement and protect the rights of the Afghani civilian population. The DEA and other organizations working closely with the Afghanistan Police to eradicate and interdict drug production must continue to follow the laws depicted by the Constitution of Afghanistan, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Not only must human rights be followed but it is essential that

this coalition promote human rights in a society where it was absent under Taliban leadership.

Why Human Rights?

Human Rights is a topic that has been gaining momentum over the past decades. After the Cold War ended, nations were no longer entirely focusing international attention and resources on national security. Instead, they were able to utilize some of these resources on international aid and the protection of human rights worldwide. According to USAID, “international spending on peacekeeping jumped from \$464 million in 1990 to a high of \$3.6 billion in 1995” with the Cold War ending in 1991 (Conflicts, 2009).

Globalization is another factor that has increased the prevalence of human rights in today’s society. As the world becomes smaller human rights violations in all corners of the world become known. Non-governmental Organization’s (NGO’s) like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International also started playing a major role, reporting violations that had gone unseen. According to United for Human Rights, an NGO dedicated to implementing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “nongovernmental organizations have played a primary role in focusing the international community on human rights issues” (Non-Governmental, 2011). Currently there are dozens of human rights groups that are reporting violations while pressuring governments to abide by human rights laws. With human right violations being reported from around the world, the United States, and others, were able to provide aid to those nations, tribes, and groups that were in need.

There are cases where the previously mentioned aid will include military presence. However, according to Jack Donnelly (2007) international law prohibits any nation from using coercive force against another, which includes intervening in human rights violations. This limitation created an issue in Rwanda and Kosovo where nations were initially unwilling to take military action. After it became obvious that massive killings had taken place, actions were finally taken, but in both cases it was too late. In today's Afghanistan there have been no major human rights violations, such as genocide or systematic killings that require coercive force. However, when it comes to this strategy U.S. forces must work diligently to protect the human rights of those individuals growing, producing, and trafficking illegal drugs as well as the general population. It is also important that human rights promotion and protection be used as a tool to fight America's War on Drugs. By providing farmers with a means to provide for themselves and their families, ensuring their rights are protected by the Afghani government, and increasing their quality of living, it is more like that the general population will assist America in our efforts. Having the backing of the general population will greatly increase the ability for this strategy to succeed.

The Spread of Democracy:

Once America was able to overthrow the Taliban government that controlled Afghanistan, it became time for a new government to be implemented. As with most of America's efforts it was essential to instill a democratic government. This would allow the people of Afghanistan to develop the nation that they wanted, while also promoting America's agenda to spread democracy. After a transitional period a democratic

government with elected officials was instituted, along with a new constitution depicting a better respect for human rights. Where an Islamic fundamentalist group once held power there is now a democracy with a constitution that is based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

This new constitution depicts very similar rights to those guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution, with the main difference being that the Afghani Constitution establishes Islam as the national religion. This may not have been the goal when America invaded Afghanistan; however, our efforts have drastically increased the human rights provided to Afghan citizens.

Violations and Potential Violations:

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is based on the United States Bill of Rights. While instituting the transitional government in Afghanistan prominent Afghani representatives went to the United Nations for assistance (Bonn Agreement, 2011). Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was originally adopted by the United Nations, it was implied that the new government in Afghanistan would instill similar values as the U.S. government. The United Nations gave Afghanistan a limited time to establish their new constitution which, as expected, adopted the rights depicted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Preamble to the Afghani Constitution directly states they will observe “the United Nations Charter and respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”. Chapter 1 Article 7 of the Afghanistan Constitution further states that “the state shall abide by the UN charter, international treaties,

international conventions that Afghanistan has signed, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (The Constitution, 2011).

With this new constitution enacted, the rights of the Afghani people were greatly increased. To start, there was no longer a terrorist organization running the nation. All citizens were also given the right to elect and be elected .With elected officials in office, the government became better able to represent those who elected them. Every citizen now has the right to a “society free of oppression, atrocity, discrimination, and violence and based on the rule of law, social justice, protection of human rights, and dignity, and ensuring the fundamental rights and freedoms of the people” (The Constitution, 2011).

During the War on Terror, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, there have been reported human rights violations by U.S. military officials. In Afghanistan, these violations mainly encompass incidents at Baghram Prison where “innocent civilians endured torture, humiliating conditions, and inhumane treatment” (Human Rights, 2011). Since the DEA began deploying agents in Afghanistan in 2001, there have yet to be any reported violations of human rights by DEA agents. However, this new strategy depicted in the abstract will increase U.S. efforts on multiple levels, including military, law enforcement, and humanitarian. These increased efforts could lead to human rights violations if precautions are not made.

Although the major violations that have taken place in Afghanistan were carried out by the U.S. Armed Forces, it is important that this be discussed due to the connection between the DEA and the U.S. military. In order for the Drug Eradication and Interdiction Strategy to succeed, numerous agencies and military branches will need to collaborate in close coordination. Due to the close link between drug sales and terrorist

organizations in Afghanistan, the military must carry out crop eradication as well as destruction of drug paraphernalia and processed drug. Any military contact with drug traffickers requires that individuals be treated as legal offenders and not prisoners of war. Any torture or inhumane treatment, like that of the detainees who were chained to the ceiling, beaten, and murdered in Baghram prison, would be a direct violation of human rights, putting this strategy in jeopardy.

One aspect of this strategy that has been viewed as a violation in the past is the eradication of drug crops. Many farmers growing these cash crops, poppy plants, are not connected to the drug trade. They are simply growing the crop that makes the most profit for themselves and their families. During the Bush Administration the DEA and other U.S. forces actively burned poppy crops, destroying farmers' means of supporting their families. According to Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services" (The Universal, 2010).

When U.S. forces, such as the DEA, destroy a family's only form of income and make it impossible to maintain a proper quality of living then this can be seen as a human rights violation. These farmers have the right to raise crops in order to provide for their families, even if they chose to raise poppies. This strategy proposes humanitarian aid for those farmers whose drug crops are destroyed in order to provide them with what they need to grow legal crops to provide for their families. Although the initial act may be a violation, the U.S. must work to insure that any violation does not affect these civilians' standards of living.

Recently in September 2011 there were reports by the group Human Rights Watch (HRW) of Afghan militia and local police violating the rights of civilians. HRW cites a report that states that: “serious abuses, such as killings, rape, arbitrary detention, abductions, forcible land grabs, and illegal raids by irregular armed groups in northern Kunduz province and the Afghan Local Police (ALP) force in Baghlan, Herat, and Uruzgan provinces” (Afghanistan: Rein, 2011). This of course is an obvious violation of both the International Covenant (Article 7) and the Universal Declaration (Article 5) which states that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” (The Universal Declaration, 2011, International Covenant, 2007). It also violates Chapter 2 Article 8 of the Afghan Constitution which states that “torture of human beings is prohibited” (The Constitution, 2010). Human Rights Watch called for the United States to denounce these actions to insure that they do not continue. The United States insists that local police have improved security in some areas and that it is important that their efforts continue (Afghanistan: Rein, 2011).

It was also reported that some of these local police are those that U.S. forces have been training. This training is taking place so that once U.S. forces leave Afghanistan, estimated to be the end of 2014, the local police can continue protecting citizens and continue the work the U.S. military and law enforcement have been carrying out (Afghanistan: Rein, 2011). The DEA is also constantly training local Afghan police to continue anti-drug enforcement once DEA agents return to America. DEA teams and local police also carry out joint drug interdiction missions and raids together.

Having a close working relationship with local police that are violating human rights should create concerns for the United States. The first concern should be that it

may be implied by other nations and human rights organizations that the United States is accepting these violations by not preventing them. At this point, it is essential that the United States become involved in intervening in these violations. In order to insure interventions do not become coercive, the simplest way to deal with these violations would be to threaten to discontinue aid and training. In 2011, the United States Agency of International Development provided Afghanistan with \$3.9 billion in aid (Wingfield, 2011). Between the supplied aid, the military protection provided, and the training offered for Afghan law enforcement and military, the government should be willing to work with American forces to ensure that these violations do not continue.

The second concern is that the DEA carries out law enforcement missions and raids with the local Afghani police on an almost daily basis. During these operations, agents may be put in a situation where they unwillingly become part of any violations. The DEA works in teams which should provide them with an advantage, allowing for them to watch over their Afghani counterparts. Situations like these can be avoided, specifically by agents ensuring all of their actions follow the laws portrayed by the Afghani Constitution which are very similar to those of the United States Constitution, making the transition for the DEA from working in the United States to Afghanistan much simpler.

As mentioned earlier, the DEA must follow all the laws of the Afghani Constitution as well as not violate any rules set forth by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. One of the most important aspects that the DEA will have to follow is that everyone is considered innocent until proven guilty, which is illustrated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in Article 14, the Universal

Declaration in Article 11, and the Afghani Constitution in Chapter 2 Article 4 (The Universal, 2011, The Constitution, 2010, International Covenant, 2007). This is the same law that the DEA must follow in America; however, it is important to realize that the DEA is working outside of America's borders and in an active war zone. This situation could cloud the judgment of agents, specifically because many are ex-military and are returning to an active war zone as law enforcement agents not military officers.

This creates an issue that is not heavily discussed. When the DEA creates the FAST teams that are utilized overseas, many agents that were chosen had previous military experience, and all combat training. It is essential that these agents receive combat training since they are being deployed to a war zone. However, those agents who have served in the U.S. Armed Forces prior to becoming DEA agents have a background that does not carry the same values as law enforcement. When they are placed back in a war environment it will be pivotal that FAST supervisors monitor these individuals to ensure they do not fall back on their military training, as this could lead to potential human rights violations. According to a report by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (2009) there are intrinsic issues that can arise by hiring retired military personnel as law enforcement officers. The report makes the argument that these individuals do not receive the training needed to "address the heightened reactions veteran officers develop in combat to enemy threats and how to temper these reactions to appropriate levels in policing environments" (Employing, 2009). The report goes on to state that "[s]pecialized training and transition assistance that addresses such specific needs are required but have not yet been developed" (Employing Returning, 2009).

Without transitional training some military veterans in law enforcement positions may fall back on combat training instead of following law enforcement training.

Another right that the DEA must insure they protect is an individual's right to privacy, specifically protection from illegal search and seizure. The Universal Declaration states that individuals shall not be subject to arbitrary interference in their homes. This seems rather vague; however, Chapter 2 Article 15 of the Afghani Constitution states that "a person's residence is immune from invasion" and that "no one, including the state, is allowed to enter or inspect a private residence without prior permission of the resident or holding a court order" (The Constitution, 2010). This is further supported by Article 17 the ICCPR which states "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, or home" (International Covenant, 2007). As in America, it is necessary to have a court order, or a warrant, in order to enter and search an individual's private residence. The DEA currently works closely with the local police and courts to receive needed warrants before carrying out raids. However, for some operations this will not be necessary. When agents eradicate crops, raid markets and confiscate pre-processed drug crops there will be no warrant needed.

When the DEA and local law enforcement make an arrest those individuals are innocent until proven guilty. By Afghani law everyone is entitled to a fair trial, this is also dictated in Article 11 of the Universal Declaration. However, "fair trial principles are enshrined in the Afghan constitution and the criminal procedure but are frequently violated for various reasons, including the lack of well-educated, professional staff (especially defense lawyers), lack of material resources, corruption and unlawful

interference by warlords and politicians” (Human Rights, 2011). This is an area where the DEA’s efforts could be seen as a violation of the rights of those arrested. Those drug traffickers who are arrested by DEA agents go to trial in Afghanistan, not in the United States. Even though the arrests are made by DEA agents, they are made in violation of Afghani laws. There then becomes the dilemma as to whether it is the United States position to insure these individuals are given a proper trial, or if once they are in the hands of the Afghani legal system they are no longer America’s issue.

Arguments can be made for either point of view. Once the individual is in the Afghani legal system, the United States no longer has control of that individual. It can be argued that they committed a crime in Afghanistan and U.S. forces only assisted in the arrest process, which would mean the judicial process would be carried out by the Afghani courts with no burden being placed on the U.S. to insure they receive the trial they deserve. Another argument can be made that the U.S. and the DEA have brought the War on Drugs to Afghanistan and they should be responsible for protecting the rights of those individuals who are arrested. The policing being done in Afghanistan is due to America’s influence; therefore, it could be implied that it is in fact America’s job to insure that these individuals receive a fair trial. Many NGO’s would probably agree that it is a human rights violation by the United States if efforts are not made to ensure these individuals receive a fair and proper trial.

One violation that even the United States is guilty of is the use of capital punishment. According to Amnesty International, one of the world’s most highly renowned human rights groups, the use of the death penalty is: “the ultimate denial of human rights. It is the premeditated and cold-blooded killing of a human being by the

state. This cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment is done in the name of justice. It violates the right to life as proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (Abolish, 2011). Afghanistan also administers the death penalty, currently for the crimes of murder, homosexuality, and apostasy (Use, 2011). Amnesty International reports that, in 2010, there were more than 100 reported death sentences in Afghanistan. It would be difficult for the United States, who carried out 46 executions in 2010, to condemn Afghanistan’s use of the death penalty (Death Sentences, 2010, p. 5). Unlike some Asian nations, Afghanistan does not punish drug related crimes with the death penalty. This comes as an advantage in this strategy: if drug related crimes were punishable by death the U.S. would be directly violating human rights regulations.

Since the United States also utilizes the death penalty, we can advocate that Afghanistan only use capital punishment for the most obscene crimes. Besides murder the other two crimes, homosexuality and apostasy, are not crimes that are seen as punishable by death in most of the civilized world. These crimes are punishable by death because Afghanistan is an Islamic state, and these crimes, in the eyes of some followers, violate their religion. This is not to say that it is morally correct, nor does it follow the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but the United States cannot take an active stand against the current use of capital punishment. The only stand that can be made is protecting drug traffickers from receiving this punishment as well as attempting to limit any added crimes punishable by death.

To Protect American Citizens and Their Rights or to Protect Afghani Citizens Rights?

An issue that has been in the public spotlight for many years is whether the rights of American citizens should be diminished in order to protect our nation as a whole. Considering this, we have to assume that there is always the chance that our government could be willing to violate the rights of non-citizens in order to protect our nation. One example of this would be the indefinite detention of terror suspects in Guantanamo Bay. This could become a moral dilemma as to whether it is necessary to violate the rights of Afghani citizens in order to protect American citizens from drug trafficking. Up until this point this moral dilemma has not become an issue; however, if the DEA and American efforts do not succeed, preparations must be made in order to protect Afghani citizens from this possibility.

A Human Rights Approach:

As depicted in the abstract, this strategy is not just a military and law enforcement strategy. It also incorporated cooperation with the United Nations (UN), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of State (DOS), and the Army National Guard Agribusiness Development Teams (ARNG ADT). All of these agencies and departments are incorporated in this strategy for one reason, helping the nation of Afghanistan and their people recover and prosper. The main goal is to decrease the amount of drugs produced in Afghanistan, which in turn reduces the amount of drugs imported into the United States as well as reduces the profits terrorist groups make from the sales. In order

for this to succeed it is essential that America take a human rights approach to achieving this goal. This can be done by providing assistance to the nation as whole as well as individual farmers who are affected by the strategy.

As previously mentioned the United States gave Afghanistan \$3.9 billion in aid in 2011. When it applies to this strategy the aid would be used to develop and rehabilitate road and irrigation systems, as well as provide licit crop seeds in cooperation with the USDA. The ARNG ADT have been deployed to work with farmers to teach them the processes they need to know to insure they make the same profit from licit crops as they did off illicit crops. This goes back to the previous topic covering the idea that when the DEA and U.S. Military eradicate crop fields they are destroying farmers' ability to provide for themselves and their families. Providing the seeds, irrigation, and training necessary for farmers to grow licit crops provides the human rights aspect of this mission.

By providing Afghanistan with the aid they need to develop their nation the United States, as well as other international donors, have been able to improve the quality of living. The GDP is now two and a half times higher than it was in 2001 when the U.S. first invaded Afghanistan (Per Capita, 2011). When a nation, like Afghanistan, becomes more prosperous and institutes a democratic government it is able to protect the rights of their people. Also the previous sections have depicted the changes in the Afghan Constitution and the strict following, besides a few incidents, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Looking at a select few violations that have occurred in Afghanistan it seems the U.S. presence may have negatively affected human rights. However, it becomes apparent when looking at U.S. efforts that they have successfully increased the protection and rights of the Afghan citizens.

Conclusion:

The United States has attempted to decrease the level of drugs produced in Afghanistan and trafficked to the United States over the past two presidential administrations. This strategy combines both administrations' approaches as well as introducing new aspects that will incorporate numerous agencies and departments. Approaches will include military action, law enforcement training and missions, and humanitarian aid to rebuild and strengthen the nation as a whole. While implementing all aspects of this strategy human rights must be an underlying theme.

The military be obliged to avoid repeating violations that took place in Baghram prison. The DEA will need to follow the laws set forth by the Afghani Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. By doing so agents can provide citizens with the rights they deserve from the investigative level to the trial level of law enforcement actions. Lastly, human rights must be promoted on all levels, from the distribution of humanitarian aid, to U.S. and U.N. administrators ensuring that the Afghani government continues to follow the Universal Declaration of Human Rights like they pledged to do in the constitution.

This strategy seems to be designed to strengthen the United States agenda. This is true, if implemented fully it will drastically decrease funding to terrorist groups and decrease the quantity of poppy-based drugs that are trafficked into America. However, the strategy also has an underlying humanitarian and human rights emphasis. As the United States continues its involvement in Afghanistan it is essential that we provide them with what is needed for them to grow as a nation. As their democratic government

takes shape, with global humanitarian aid, citizens will be provided the protection they have deserved for decades.

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Chapter 9

Building Partnerships for the U.S. Government Drug Eradication and Drug
Interdiction Strategy in Afghanistan

Introduction:

As the preface discusses, this strategy includes entities from numerous agencies, departments, organizations, and nations. Some of those actors not previously mentioned are local Afghani farmers, businesses, markets, and Afghan police and government. In order for this strategy to succeed it is essential that every actor play an active role in the process. With U.S. military presence decreasing in Afghanistan there will be a need for an increased and more organized effort by the other entities. One of the best ways to do this will be to build partnerships. Utilizing public-private partnerships, or forming a megacommunity, will build relationships between entities that in turn will perpetuate this strategy. This will allow for a structured approach to solving the drug production and trafficking issues in Afghanistan.

Public-Private Partnerships:

Forming private-public partnerships creates a relationship between privately owned corporations/businesses and public agencies. These partnerships can be defined as: “a cooperative venture between the public and private sectors, built on the expertise of each partner, that best meets clearly define public needs through the appropriate allocation of resources, risks and rewards” (Keys, 2006). One of the essential aspects of this is that it meets clearly defined public needs. These needs are defined by a common

objective or goal among the collaborating parties. In many cases public-private partnerships are born out of necessity, not a preplanned effort, usually in response to an issue or disaster (Keys, 2006). In America an unprecedented number of public-private partnerships have been developed “in the wake of terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and other pressing public policy issues” (Keys, 2006).

In the case of this strategy an example of one of these partnerships is the Drug Enforcement Administration working closely with an export business in Afghanistan. This will create a trade avenue to assist in the exportation of the legal crops farmers will cultivate. One of the major reasons why farmers in Afghanistan grow illicit drug crops is they provide the greatest profit and easiest trade market. Creating this partnership could generate a means of exportation for legal crops without forcing the United States to create the necessary trade avenue. If U.S. efforts force Afghani farmers to begin cultivating legal crops it will be crucial that this partnership be built.

Another simple public-private partnership that the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) could create would be with those who operate the street markets around Afghanistan. In these markets illicit drug crop seeds are often traded and sold. If a partnership can be formed with the goal of eliminating these seeds from being sold at public markets, then this could decrease the availability nationwide. Another goal would be for market operators to inform the DEA when these seeds are present so that they can be destroyed. In order to form this partnership it will be necessary to share a common goal. Under Muslim religion the use of drugs is forbidden; so this can be used to persuade market operators to agree on a common objective to form this partnership.

These partnerships could greatly assist in the efforts of the United States to decrease the drug production and trafficking in Afghanistan. Creating partnerships of this kind may become difficult; however, creating a common objective that can be agreed upon will assist in the process. It is essential that the DEA and the United States work with Afghani farmers and business owners instead of being forceful to achieve one sided goals. Public-Private Partnerships should be utilized whenever possible to capitalize on this strategy.

What is a Megacommunity and Why Should One be Utilized?

According to Mark Gerencser (2008), a megacommunity is a: “public sphere in which organizations from three sectors – business, government, and civil society – deliberately join together around compelling issues of mutual importance, following a set of practices and principles that make it easier for them to achieve results without sacrificing their individual goals” (p. 53). This community of actors can work in a united effort toward a common goal, even if this goal does not fulfill the goals of any of the individual players. In this case there will be individual players whose specific goals are achieved, while others will provide only the effort. The reason for the members to come together is for a common interest, an interest that all members of the community wish to achieve.

In this case the common interest of the strategy is decreasing the amount of drugs produced and trafficked out of Afghanistan. In this situation not everyone in the community will see this as the common interest. The local farmers will be less worried about decreasing the level of drugs trafficked than they will be worried about providing

for their families, which many currently do by growing drug crops. However, it is necessary to have everyone who will be affected by the strategy involved in the megacommunity. The greatest advantage to forming this megacommunity is to create structure and form a set of protocols and principles that will provide guidance for the members.

Because of the extent and significance of this strategy, a customary approach will not suffice. Creating a megacommunity will bring together all sectors – business, government, and civil society – within a common organization. This strategy was originally developed for the DEA to be the lead agency and have command over all of the other organizations and groups involved. However, when you utilize the structure of a megacommunity all of these actors can be incorporated in one united effort.

The common goal of this megacommunity will be slightly different from the goal of the original strategy. The original goal was to drastically decrease the level of drugs produced and trafficked in Afghanistan in order to cut off funding for terrorist organizations. With the formation of this megacommunity there will be a goal of adding farmers, businessman, and those who run the trade markets as well as any social groups wishing to assist. With the addition of these groups the goal will have to change to create a common agreed upon goal. This common goal could be to drastically decrease the level of drugs produced and trafficked while establishing alternate crop growth and economic strengthening. This goal will achieve the United States' goal of reducing the level of drugs trafficked to the United States while cutting off funding for terrorist organizations. It will also provide alternate crops for farmers and work with businesses and markets to ensure that these crops help strengthen the Afghan economy. This of course is a

preliminary recommendation, an official goal cannot be defined until the megacommunity is formed and all parties are able to agree upon it.

Individual Expertise:

One of the greatest strengths to partnerships and megacommunities is that the actors bring their own strengths. The DEA's expertise in drug enforcement will be the guiding force in Afghanistan. This strength can also be shared with local Afghan law enforcement, creating a training partnership. With local law enforcement assisting in the War on Drugs the level of drug trafficking will decrease. Also when the DEA decreases its presence in Afghanistan, it will fall on local law enforcement to continue these efforts. Forming this partnership will not only shape the success of the strategy but will provide the DEA's expertise to local law enforcement for long term benefits.

It will be necessary to not only emphasize law enforcement but also include farmers who can grow licit crops to replace the drug crops they currently cultivate. Training for this is an expertise that the Army National Guard Agribusiness Teams possess, so when partnered with local farmers this can lead to a drastic decrease in illicit crop growth. The Agribusiness Team is designed to train farmers how to more effectively cultivate and profit from their crops. The Department of Agriculture can also assist in this effort. Sharing expertise of this kind will allow farmers to move to growing legal crops.

Each party involved in this strategy has its own expertise, whether it is the DEA, the Army National Guard Agribusiness Teams, or local religious groups; each possesses strengths and knowledge that the others do not. Without forming a partnership or megacommunity these different strengths would not be brought together.

Who is in Charge?

When it comes to partnerships and megacommunities the idea is to foster an environment where all participants can work together toward a common goal. However, there will be circumstances in which it will be necessary to have an agency or organization in charge. For the most part these situations are during emergencies and disasters when a true leader must emerge. In the case of this strategy the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) should be the agency to take charge when necessary. Since the strategy deals mostly with drugs enforcement and eradications, which is the focus of the DEA, it possesses the expertise of the main focus. Of course when at all possible groups should work as coherently without a single agency in charge, but when necessary the DEA must take control to insure continued success.

Creating Communication and a Common Language:

In order for partnerships, specifically megacommunities, to succeed Gerencser (2008) claims there needs to be communication and a common language. The first major challenge in creating this environment will be overcoming the actual language barrier. Those members of the community from the United States and United Nations will speak English; however, the local farmers, businessman, and government will speak a multitude of different languages. Afghanistan has over 30 different languages, the most prominent being Dari Persian (Languages, 2012). The megacommunity will first need to overcome this obstacle, most likely by using translators.

Once the language barrier is crossed, it will be important to open a dialogue. Before a dialogue can be opened it is essential that a common language be developed. This goes beyond speaking the same language. Among the sectors there are different languages, with different ways of phrasing the same statement (Gerencser, 2008, p. 171). If the community tries to solve situations and work towards their common interest without determining a common language, there will be miss understandings and potential disagreements.

Looking at the different actors in this megacommunity it is apparent that there will be numerous different languages. American law enforcement, the Drug Enforcement Administration, will have a different language from Afghani law enforcement. The United Nations is going to have a different language from farmers. Farmers are going to have a different language from businesses. The American government is going to have a different language from the Afghan government. With all of these different languages converging there is bound to be some confusion. A common language will have to be agreed upon and shared among all parties.

Taking a Business Approach:

Utilizing a business style approach to building this megacommunity will allow for a more structured organization. Structure in a multi-organizational community will be essential considering the numerous parties, with different strengths. The major issue that can arise from a business style structure is that of a hierarchy. In most businesses there are individuals in power and those who are not. In a megacommunity the goal is that this

does not happen; this requires that if a business structure is implemented, it is a flat structured organization where there is no intervening management.

Beyond the strength of an organized structure, a business approach develops the idea of return on investments (ROI). Return on investment is an evaluation of the efficiency of an investment where the gains of the investment are directly compared to the cost (Return, n.d.). In order to convince some parties to participate it will be necessary to prove that upon investment, in either time or monetary funds, there will be a positive return. For instance export companies will need proof of ROI before they work with the megacommunity to create trade routes for crops. Almost all businesses that become involved in the strategy will require proof of a return on their investment; tax payers may also want this proof since their tax dollars will be funding the efforts of government agencies.

Challenges to Success:

There are many challenges to creating a megacommunity/partnership and making them successful. A common goal must be agreed upon, a common language must be developed, means to achieve the goal must be developed and implemented, and all participants must be fully engaged for the life of the partnership until the goal or objective is met. Attaining just one of these challenges in this strategy will be difficult.

Getting all participants to agree on a common goal may be more difficult than expected. As mentioned previously, the United States' goal in this strategy is not the same as that of the farmers and businessmen in Afghanistan. When building a partnership it will be necessary for both sides to explain their individual goals which can then be combined in an encompassing shared goal. This may not succeed at first; however, it

should be emphasized that creating this type of partnership will be beneficial to all.

Proving this to all parties will help to convince them that creating a common goal is just the first step to success.

Another challenge to making this approach work will be the political issues. There are numerous U.S. agencies and organizations involved, all with their own political nuances. The DEA may have a different political agenda than the DOD. These may clash with the political beliefs of the Afghani government as well as the nation's farmers and businesses. Before there can be a true partnership each party will have to move past these differences. Political differences can be extremely difficult to overcome, especially since the United States has been at war in Afghanistan for years. In order for there to be a unified goal, these political issues will have to be settled.

This strategy is very elaborate, requiring the participation of numerous agencies, governments, groups, and businesses. Not only must law enforcement, military, governments, federal departments, business, and the general public form a community willing to stay together, they must actively participate. When a partnership or megacommunity is formed in this strategy, the longevity must be addressed. Due to the extent of the efforts encompassed in the strategy it could take years to achieve. This is something participants must be aware of and be prepared for. Participation will not be brief and all parties must be willing to devote years to assisting in the process. There is a reality that this strategy could take over a decade to fully achieve, and all participants will need to continue making the necessary efforts. If this happens then the strategy should achieve its goals.

Another major success could be measuring the success of individual achievements. In order to prove that the efforts are successful it will be necessary to define measurement standards.

Metrics and Measurements of Success:

In order to measure the success of these partnerships it is necessary to set goals, milestones, and identify performance indicators and metrics. Defining goals is the first step, which in a megacommunity relies on identifying an agreed upon, overlapping vital interest (Gerencser, 2008, p. 181). This interest becomes the ultimate goal of the partnership, which in this case is decreasing the level of drugs produced and trafficked while providing alternate crops for farmers to bolster the Afghani economy. During the process of achieving this goal it will be essential for the community to determine milestones, or incremental successes (Gerencser, 2008, p. 182). It will be important that all entities agree on what these milestones are so as they are achieved, the community can see their success. Metrics are very similar, allowing for goals to be set and achieved; they often include milestones (Developing Performance, 2005). Another form of metrics that could be utilized in this strategy is YES/NO metrics. These metrics can be used during startups of new programs or in establishing trends and targets (Developing Performance, 2005). Utilizing YES/NO metrics will be a decision that will have to be made by those entities involved, depending on the situation.

Another way to measure success is to utilize performance indicators. Performance indicators are quantifiable measurements, agreed upon in planning, that designate the success factors of the organization (Reh, 2010). These allow the organization to tell if it

is achieving a determined goal. Performance indicators set a numerical goal, such as cutting the tons of drugs trafficked by 50% or destroying 1000 acres of illicit crops. If the end goal were to destroy 5000 acres of illicit crops, then this performance indicator would show that they are working toward their goal, but have only been 20% successful. Both partnerships and megacommunities must set goals and have ways to measure the success of their efforts.

Much of this strategy will be extremely difficult to measure. Participants must understand that it may not seem that their efforts are achieving anything because it will not be visible or numerically obvious. This strategy encompasses an entire nation so it will be nearly impossible to collect data from all areas. One thing that will be a performance measurement will be the activity of the megacommunity. If all parties are actively participating, then this is a positive performance measure. As the strategy becomes fully developed, instituted successes will become more apparent.

Conclusion:

The strategy that has been developed for drug interdiction and eradication in Afghanistan provides an excellent platform for partnerships or a megacommunity to be built. Since there are multiple agencies, offices, departments, businesses and farmers that will ultimately be involved, it is clear that there will be a need for a unified effort toward a common goal. Each entity can then bring individual expertise to the process allowing for the ultimate goal to be achieved. This strategy requires numerous individual programs to succeed separately before the ultimate goal can be achieved, so forming a megacommunity will help create the environment for this to occur. The success of this

strategy is essential to protecting America from increased drug trafficking as well as decreasing terrorist organizations' ability to raise funds to carry out attacks against us.

There will be many challenges to success, both in creating these partnerships and implementing the strategy fully. Efforts must be made to overcome these challenges and fulfill this strategy.

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Chapter 10

El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)

Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategy

Introduction:

According to the Department of Homeland Security critical infrastructure are the: assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, public health or safety, or any combination thereof. (Critical Infrastructure, 2010)

To make this definition more applicable it is necessary to understand what these assets, systems, and networks consist of. The Department of Homeland Security has therefore defined eleven sectors and five key assets:

Critical Infrastructure Sectors

- Agriculture and Food
- Water
- Public Health
- Emergency Services
- Defense Industrial Base
- Telecommunications
- Energy
- Transportation
- Banking and Finance

- Chemical Industry and Hazardous Materials
- Postal and Shipping

Key Assets

- National Monuments
- Nuclear Power Plants
- Dams
- Government Facilities
- Commercial Assets

(National Strategy, 2003)

All of these sectors and assets are vital to the continued success of our nation. The incapacitation or destruction of any of these sectors, no matter how minute, could lead to failure in other sectors.

Government facilities stand out as assets that have been a consistent target for attacks, whether physical or cyber. On September 11 terrorists flew a plane into the Pentagon. Shortly after this the worst biological attack in U.S. history occurred during the anthrax attacks, with anthrax being mailed to U.S. Senators on Capitol Hill and affecting U.S. Postal workers who handled the mail (Amerithrax, n.d.). In 2010 an American man flew a small plane into the Austin Texas Internal Revenue Service's facility (Brick, 2010). Currently the White House and U.S. Capitol continue to carry a high threat level. Finally, the Pentagon, like other federal facilities, is a continuous target for cyber terrorism (Purewal, 2011).

Government facilities cover a vast array of locations such as capital buildings, court houses, federal agencies, prisons, etc. As previously mentioned there have been

numerous attacks on these facilities and this threat will continue far into the future. A growing number of intelligence centers have become major assets in protecting America's entire critical infrastructure as well as new targets for potential attacks in the government facility sector. As additional fusion and intelligence centers are created, more critical infrastructure targets are also created. It is necessary to protect them in order to ensure their function of protecting the rest of America's infrastructure. Intelligence centers therefore are major critical infrastructure hubs that also protect the remainder of America's infrastructure. One of these facilities is the Drug Enforcement Administration El Paso Intelligence Center, also known as EPIC.

El Paso Intelligence Center:

The El Paso Intelligence Center is a regional intelligence center created by the Department of Justice as a Drug Enforcement Administration facility to support drug trafficking interdiction efforts and investigation, illegal alien and weapons smuggling enforcement, and post September 11 counterterrorism efforts. Since the facility was established in 1974 it has expanded to serve federal agencies, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Canada, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, Australia, and the Netherlands (El Paso, n.d.). As the duties of the intelligence center expanded it became necessary for more agencies to become involved, with the following agencies being represented:

- Drug Enforcement Administration
- Department of Homeland Security
- Customs & Border Protection
- Immigration & Customs Enforcement

- U.S. Coast Guard
- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
- U.S. Secret Service
- U.S. Marshals Service
- National Drug Intelligence Center
- Internal Revenue Service
- U.S. Department of the Interior
- National Geospatial–Intelligence Agency
- U.S. Department of Defense
- Joint Task Force–North
- Joint Interagency Task Force–South
- Texas Department of Public Safety
- Texas Air National Guard
- El Paso County Sheriff’s Office

(El Paso, n.d.)

The Department of Homeland Security webpage on Critical Infrastructure describes two reasons why critical infrastructure protection is important. The first reason is that “Attacks on critical infrastructure could significantly disrupt the functioning of government and business alike and produce cascading effects far beyond the targeted sector and physical location of the incident” (Critical Infrastructure, 2010). An attack against EPIC would greatly disrupt other aspects of America’s government. The connection between EPIC and other agencies and governments worldwide illustrates its

importance as a critical infrastructure hub. It is essential to protect it, considering that hubs are the most important points of failure in the critical infrastructure configuration (Lewis, 2006). Attacks, whether physical or cyber, against any hub within a sector will inevitably cause the most widespread damage (Lewis, 2006). In this case if EPIC were incapacitated or destroyed intelligence analysis and dissemination would be halted, drastically decreasing the abilities of departments and agencies worldwide. Secondly, “Direct terrorist attacks and natural, manmade, or technological hazards could produce catastrophic losses in terms of human casualties, property destruction, and economic effects, as well as profound damage to public morale and confidence” (Critical Infrastructure, 2010).


Any type of physical attack could lead to the incapacitation or destruction of the 35 year old iconic center, as well as the possible loss of dozens of intelligence analysts. This would be extremely detrimental to the Drug Enforcement Administration and the intelligence community. Many of the intelligence analysts at EPIC have years of training and experience, something that cannot be easily replaced. Also if an attack were successfully carried out, specifically a physical attack such as an active shooter or a bombing this could profoundly affect the public, especially because EPIC is located on the Ft. Bliss military base. This could create a public view that if a secure location like a military base can be successfully attacked then is the general public safe and protected.

Potential Threats to EPIC:

The following analysis is based on *Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security* by T. G. Lewis (2006): There are two potential threat types that EPIC may

encounter; however, in order to properly identify the threats against EPIC it is essential to first determine the vulnerability of each section. Vulnerability is the probability of a successful attack on a component. In order to uncover this probability it is necessary to carry out a vulnerability analysis, with the first step being to take inventory of the components focusing on critical nodes. The critical components of EPIC would be databases, internet connection, computer networks, telecommunications, physical security systems, the intelligence center itself, and the intelligence analysts. The next step is to identify key hubs; EPIC has already been identified as one.

Next the utilization of a fault tree and the analysis of this can determine the vulnerability, or the probability of a successful attack that will incapacitate the sector. The following is an example of a possible fault tree in regards to EPIC and the threat vulnerabilities:



This is a very basic example of a fault tree that could be formed to analyze EPIC. The base of the diagram defines possible threats against different components of the sector. If

an attack occurred and was able to travel up the fault tree, the intelligence center would be greatly incapacitated.

There are a few different threats that could travel up a fault tree to debilitate the Center. The first would be a bombing that causes the destruction of the center, negating the ability to carry out intelligence operations. In order for this to occur the bomber would have to first pass through Fort Bliss security then pass through the security at EPIC. This is where logic gates become involved; logic gates are nodes in the fault tree that determine if the threat will continue to propagate up the tree. Because the explosive and delivery method would have to pass through at least two security checkpoints, it is unlikely that both would fail. The only other possibility would be that the explosive device be delivered through an aerial attack, which would have a low probability considering Fort Bliss possesses missile defense systems. The probability of any type of bombing occurring would be relatively low, probably in the 1% - 5% range.

The other form of direct attack that could occur would be an active shooter threat. Due to the location of EPIC along the Mexican border, as well as the counternarcotics efforts of the Center against Mexican cartels, there is a potential for an active shooter attack to occur. However, it is unlikely that an active shooter would be able to pass through base security, EPIC security, enter the building, and enter the secure location where the analysts work. The probability of all four occurring would be extremely low, in the 0%-5% range.

The probability of a physical attack against EPIC is far less likely than that of a cyber-attack. The reliance upon computers, databases, and internet connection is one of the greatest vulnerabilities of the intelligence center. Much of the Center's intelligence is

received via secure electronic transmissions. This intelligence is then accessed analysts at their work stations and saved to the Center's database. The analyzed data, if applicable, can then be disseminated again via secure electronic transmissions. With so much reliance on computers and internet connection, it is inevitable that there will be cyber threats.

There are numerous outside cyber threats. The first is that of hackers penetrating the computer network which would allow them to possibly take down the network, copy files, monitor intelligence collection and dissemination, and corrupt files. Each of these threats has individual probabilities of occurring. The probability of someone hacking into EPIC is rather high, considering there have been numerous incidents of government facilities being hacked, like the Pentagon. The probability of this would be rather high, in the 50%-75% range. This is because government computer security reacts to new hacking abilities rather than being preemptive and developing security features to protect against future threats. There will always be cyber threats against government facilities, from hackers, terror groups, and foreign governments alike.

Protecting EPIC:

The El Paso Intelligence Center is a critical piece of infrastructure that requires target hardening in order to protect the hub. As mentioned previously EPIC is located on Fort Bliss in El Paso, Texas, giving it an added layer of security. This helps protect the location from physical attacks such as bombings, active shooters, or an aerial attack.

Unfortunately, there is the potential threat that as the Department of Defense budgets are

reduced, there will be fewer guards available. This would require the DEA to provide additional guards for the EPIC facility as well as increase physical security.

As with all ageing facilities there are needs for security to stay updated with current technologies. One of the newer technologies that should be utilized in tandem with the current ID cards would be biometric scanners, retinal or fingerprint. This will protect from unauthorized individuals entering the facility using personnel ID cards by requiring a matching retinal or fingerprint scan to match the ID card. These scanners should be located at all entrances of the facility as well as all interior doors into secure areas.

Upgrading the facilities video surveillance system is the next necessary physical security improvement. High definition digital video surveillance should be installed to replace the existing system. A system like this will provide higher quality video, making it easier to identify threats; it will also allow for digital video to be stored for longer periods in the case it needs to be reviewed at a later date. Recently the Oklahoma City Sheriff's Office installed 138 high definition cameras in their detention facility that range from one to five megapixels and can store video for up to 90 days (Oklahoma County, n.d.). This is the type of system EPIC should install to insure protection, allowing for video to be collected from all areas of the facility and the digital version stored.

The last physical security upgrade necessary is that of roadway and parking security. Considering the location of the facility there will be wear and damage caused to fences, barriers, and gates over time. It is not necessary to replace all of these physical security assets; however, funds should be appropriate and kept available so that as issues

arise they can be repaired or replaced. Outdoor physical security could be the reason why a potential attack is thwarted, requiring that these assets be fully functional at all times.

Beyond physical security there several threats requiring upgraded computer security and added components. Computer security does not always have to deal with hackers and cyber-attacks. Due to the vital intelligence accessible by EPIC terminals it is essential that no workstation be left unattended. If this were to occur then individuals not permitted to access EPIC's computer systems could have that ability. In order to protect from this occurring, both at EPIC and at other agencies that have terminals designated for accessing EPIC systems, training should be administered on a bi-yearly basis. In order to be permitted to access EPIC's intelligence hotline, every user must receive eight hours of training at a DEA office, at this point they can then ask permission to be granted access via computer terminal. However, once individuals receive this training, they are never required to be trained again (O'Mara, 2012). In order to insure users are following the required protocols in accessing EPIC there should be a change in the training requirements. The initial eight hours will remain; however, every two years users will be required to attend a three hour refresher training course, emphasizing protocols including leaving terminals unattended and who should be accessing the terminal.

In the case where a terminal is left unattended there is another option on securing the connection. Installing some sort of timing out software could alleviate this issue. This software would log off users when their terminals are inactive for "x" number of minutes. Network administrators would be charged with determining how many minutes this "x" would be. This would ensure that if someone steps away from the terminal, for instance

for three minutes, that it would log off on its own to guarantee unauthorized individuals cannot access the system.

The next critical computer security protection has to deal with keeping the EPIC system updated. There are two ways to ensure this. The first is to sign licensing agreements with all the companies that supply software and hardware to provide updates as soon as they are available. Also having 24 hour IT specialist's onsite will insure that the system is always being monitored and updated when necessary. This will also guarantee a speedy recovery if the system crashes.

As mentioned one of the greatest threats against the intelligence center would be some sort of cyber-attack. Whether the attack is carried out simply to monitor the system and see what intelligence has been collected or to purposefully crash the system, the best way to protect from these attacks is a strong firewall. A firewall is designed to allow or block network traffic based upon rules set up by network administrators (How Firewalls Work, 2010). This will give EPIC the ability to block unauthorized users from accessing the network. During a cyber-attack the firewall could be compromised by a hacker, depending on what encryption is used and what algorithm is used. EPIC needs to constantly be installing the most updated firewalls while rotating encryption types to keep hackers fumbling to keep up.

Cyber-attacks are a real threat, but without internet connection EPIC is unable to carry out most of its duties. Fiber-optic internet connection has become the fastest most reliable source of internet connection and should be the intelligence centers' primary source of connection. In the event that this connection is lost, such as weather or an attack, there is a need for a backup system. The best onsite source is high speed satellite

internet. This would keep the source onsite and would only rely on a satellite dish and satellites, both possessing low vulnerability for attack. This way EPIC is never offline because of a lack of internet connection.

As with physical security, computers and components are also subject to wear and tear over time. Computers, servers, databases and other components become out of date quickly and become less effective and efficient. In order to protect from this threat, it will be necessary to replace computers and components on a yearly basis. If a quarter of all assets are replaced yearly this guarantees that no computers or components are ever more than four years old. Four year old technology is very outdated compared to new technology so it is not recommended that these components be kept any longer than this. Creating a program to replace these assets would insure that EPIC stay ahead of the technology curve.

Lastly, Cloud Computing is a relatively new idea that could change the way EPIC stores and accesses intelligence. It creates an online “cloud” where information can be securely stored, in theory. It not only increases storage capacity but can also add capabilities without investing in new infrastructure, training new personnel, or licensing new software (Knorr, 2010). Since cloud computing is still a new technology that has yet to be proven, specifically the security aspect, this is something that should be researched and tested thoroughly before being implemented, if it is found to be a viable option.

Expanding EPIC’s Budget:

EPIC currently has numerous threats, both from direct attacks and cyber-attacks. In order to properly allocate resources it is necessary to utilize ranked order risk

reduction. This approach allows for the highest vulnerability to be reduced first, followed by the next, until the budget is fully depleted (Lewis, 2006). Due to the vulnerabilities posing real threats to the continued success of EPIC it is essential that resources are delegated in a way that the threats with the highest probability of occurring are strengthened first.

In 2011 the Presidential budget provided EPIC with an additional \$54 million to help secure the border and bolster intelligence collection (Edwards, 2010). This additional funding has been appropriated to create a more effective intelligence center. In addition this strategy recommends that the 2013 budget for EPIC be further expanded by \$5.6 million in order to strengthen against the centers vulnerabilities. This is the total needed to insure all vulnerabilities are fully protected.

- Cyber Attack Protection/Computer Security
 - Budget Allocation: \$5,000,000
 - Hire five Information Technology specialists to work eight hour shifts to monitor traffic and repair system errors and crashes. This will provide 24 hour IT support so if there are any issues with the system it can be repaired as soon as possible to keep EPIC online. They will also be put in charge of monitoring traffic on the network for unauthorized access.
 - Purchase software and hardware licensing to insure systems are constantly updated. In order for the computer systems and databases to operate at an optimal level systems need to be constantly updated. Updating the system firewall will be essential.

- Install timing out software on all computers to insure that if computer is left logged onto and inactive the system will automatically logoff. This is for all terminals that can access the EPIC system, including off site terminals.
 - Install backup internet source. EPIC should use fiber-optic cables as the primary source of network and internet access. Fiber-optics can be affected by weather and can be deliberately damaged, causing access to EPIC's network to crash. A backup internet source via satellite should be installed so that EPIC will never be offline.
 - Create program to replace computers and components. Every year 25% of all computers and components should be replaced. This ensures that no computers become outdated and are never more than four years old. As computers and components age, they become slower and less efficient.
 - Research utilizing cloud computing which could increase the computing capacity and add capabilities of EPIC without investing in new infrastructure, training of new personnel, or licensing for new software. Before putting into practice research on security must be done to determine if cloud computing will work for EPIC.
- Physical Security Improvements
 - Budget Allocation: \$500,000
 - Install biometric scanners, either retinal or fingerprint, at all secure entrances. This in tandem with ID cards will fortify secure entrances

ensuring only those who possess clearance can enter these locations.

Using only ID cards is not overly secure since they can be stolen.

Biometrics ensures that the individual is indeed an employee permitted in that area.

- Upgrade all video surveillance systems. Video surveillance quality has drastically improved in recent years. High definition security cameras should be installed both inside and outside the facility. The video should live feed to security personnel, to both a security monitoring station as well as to smart phones or tablets provided to guards. Also a digital version of the video should be stored on a server for future access.
- Upgrade roadway and parking gates and barriers as needed. Normal wear and tear will require outdoor security gates and barriers be replaced as they age. Gates, barriers, and fences need to be full strength in order to properly supply security protection.
- Employee Training
 - Budget Allocation: \$100,000 (to be used over many years)
 - Train employees on proper use of Intelligence Center computers and networks. The current eight hours of initial training will be continued. However, there is no refresher training after the initial training so as policies and procedures change employees are not necessarily retrained. Retraining every two years will insure that employees are never a threat to the facility's computer systems and network.

- Train employees to notice possible security threats both inside and outside of the EPIC facility. This will be yearly eight hour training for personnel who work at EPIC, not for those off site. Training will cover different threats that personnel would visually be able to recognize.

If the \$5.6 million is not allocated, then ranked order risk reduction will be utilized to allot funding properly. Based on ranked order risk reduction all cyber-attack protection and computer security initiatives will be strengthened, then physical security improvements, followed by training. If there is not sufficient funding to fulfill all cyber-attack protection and computer security initiatives, then each initiative will be carried out in the following order until funding is fully depleted:

- Purchase software and hardware licensing to receive continuous updates, specifically for firewalls
- Hire five Information Technology Specialists
- Install satellite internet as backup to primary fiber-optic connection
- Install timing out programs on all terminals with access to EPIC systems
- Create program to replace 25% of computers and components yearly
- Research utilizing cloud computing to increase capacity and capabilities

Conclusion:

The El Paso Intelligence Center has become a critical intelligence hub over the past thirty-five years. It has also developed as a highly vulnerable critical infrastructure target for physical and cyber-attacks. Because the Intelligence Center is located on Fort

Bliss the risk of a physical attack is lower than that of a cyber-attack. However, there is still a need to protect EPIC in an effort to insure these threats cannot be successfully carried out.

I, Benjamin Ogden, Pace University graduate student recommend the following countermeasures to protect the El Paso Intelligence Center:

1. Designate \$5 million to secure EPIC's computer systems. This will need to be done on several levels:
 - Hire five Information Technology specialists
 - Purchase software and hardware licensing
 - Install timing out programs on all terminals with access to EPIC systems
 - Install satellite internet as backup to primary fiber-optic connection
 - Create program to replace 25% of computers and components yearly
 - Research utilizing cloud computing to increase capacity and capabilities
2. Designate \$500,000 for physical security improvements:
 - Install biometric scanners to work in tandem with ID cards for access to secure areas
 - Upgrade video surveillance to digital high definition system
 - Upgrade roadway and parking gates and barriers on EPIC campus
3. Designate \$100,000 for employee training:
 - Train users on proper use of EPIC computers and network
 - Train personnel on how to identify potential threats at the EPIC facility

These recommendations are designed to protect the El Paso Intelligence Center from numerous different threats. As a major intelligence hub in the government facility sector it is essential that it be protected. The continued success of EPIC is critical to the protection of the rest of America's infrastructure.

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Chapter 11

The Effect of Illicit Drugs on Public Health and Homeland Security

Introduction:

"Drug abuse threatens everything, everything that is best about our country. It breaks the bond between parent and child. It turns productive citizens into addicts. It transforms schools into places of violence and chaos. It makes playgrounds into crime scenes. It supports gangs at home. And abroad, it's important for Americans to know that trafficking of drugs finances the world of terror, sustaining terrorists" (Bush: War, 2009).

Public health has become a major part of American society and has become interconnected with homeland security. Viruses like influenza and mass triage situations following natural disasters are public health issues but are also directly connected to homeland security and the protection of American lives. One of the growing threats to public health is the use of illicit drugs by American citizens. This has been an issue in the United States for decades, but recent trends show new drugs being abused by diverse groups. As more drugs and more users emerge, the greater the effect will be on all aspects of America's public health and homeland security.

There are numerous connections between illegal drug use and homeland security, specifically with terrorism and funding. There are also numerous public health issues connected to illicit drug use. This includes the cost on society and health care systems, the burden on America's workplace, homelessness, addiction, treatment, the connection to HIV/AIDS, health conditions, and the threats of tainted drugs. All of these aspects affect our nation's health as well as the public sector's ability to fulfill its duties to the

American public. In order to better serve the nation it is essential that all of these issues be addressed. With advances in technology there is a possibility that fewer drugs will be available and that new treatments may become available which could be the first step in addressing many of these issues.

Illegal Drugs and Ties to Terrorism and Homeland Security:

There is an evident connection between the use of illicit drugs and public health. However, many people do not recognize the connection between drugs and terrorism/homeland security. In 2009 President Bush made the statement that “it's important for American's to know that trafficking of drugs finances the world of terror, sustaining terrorists” (Bush: War, 2009). Many of the world's terrorist organizations finance their operations with the profits of narcotics trafficking, including the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, the Mexican Drug Cartels, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), and others. Most of these organizations mean to do harm to America, and as drug users continue to purchase drugs, the revenue continues to support these groups. In 2008 Afghanistan supplied 93% of the world's opium, and a majority of the profits from the sales went to Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Dreazen, 2009). The connection between drug sales in America and the funding of attacks like that of September 11 is not often made, but the connection is apparent to homeland security professionals.

Not only do the profits of illegal drug sales go to terrorist organizations but illegal drug use also has a major effect on homeland security through economic disruption. The Office of National Drug Control policy has estimated that Americans purchase roughly \$65 billion a year in illegal drugs (Money Laundering, 2012). This is \$65 billion that

should be invested into legal purchases that would boost America's economy. Also there are numerous burdens put on the tax payers in order to fight the War on Drugs and pay for different health care initiatives which will be discussed in the next section. As Americans purchase and use illegal drugs, they not only have a negative impact on themselves but also America as a whole.

Illegal Drug Abuse Costs on Society:

“Each year, more than 33 million U.S. residents receive health care for mental problems and/or for conditions resulting from the use of alcohol, illicit drugs, or prescription medication” (England, 2006). The public sector at the federal, state, and local levels is forced to invest billions into each aspect of society that is affected by illicit drugs. It was reported in 2005 that all three levels spent a total of \$467.7 billion on substance abuse and addiction (Califano, 2009). The majority of this spending went towards “shoveling up the wreckage” according to the 2009 CASA Columbia University study. Included in “shoveling up the wreckage” is the cost of health care, justice, corrections, juvenile justice, judiciary processes, child/family assistance, education, mental health/developmental disabilities, and public safety (Califano, 2009). These negative consequences are reported to make up 96.5% of the total spending, roughly \$357.4 billion (Government Spends, 2012). This is while only 2% goes to prevention and treatment, 0.4% on research, 1.4% on taxation and regulation, and 0.7% on interdiction (Califano, 2009).

In the first four months of 2012 over \$14 billion has been spent on the War on Drugs (Drug War, 2012). The federal sector has spent \$5 billion while the individual

states have spent \$9 billion. This total only deals with the legal aspect and does not include areas like health care, child/family assistance, education, and mental health/developmental disabilities. While this spending is necessary, it is also just a fraction of the total burden put on federal, state, and local governments.

Looking at the total costs that illegal drug use puts on society, it is apparent that a different strategy needs to be taken. Continuing law enforcement and legal efforts are necessary to keep drugs and dealers off of the streets. However, considering only 2% of spending goes to prevention and treatment, it is apparent that this needs to be improved. The Chairman of the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse said that under any circumstances spending more than 95 percent of taxpayer dollars on the consequences of tobacco, alcohol and other drug abuse and addiction and less than two percent to relieve individuals and taxpayers of this burden would be considered a reckless misallocation of public funds. In these economic times, such upside-down-cake public policy is unconscionable (Government Spends, 2012).

In order to reduce the number of individuals abusing illegal drugs it will be necessary to provide more treatment options and institute more effective prevention programs.

Health Care Costs:

Today's health care system is already strained and drug abuse causes an added unnecessary burden on the system. A report in 2011 by the National Drug Intelligence Center stated that estimated the total financial burden on the health care system in 2007 by illegal drugs was \$11.4 billion (The Economic, 2011). It cannot be assumed that this financial burden has increased over the past few years; however, with the increases in

health care costs the trend certainly illustrates that in 2012 the burden will far exceed \$12 billion. This is a cost that in many cases will be picked up by America's tax payers.

In terms of utilizing the public health care system it is believed that more than two-thirds of drug addicted individuals see primary or urgent care physicians every six months, with many more being seen regularly by medical specialists (The Consequences, 1999). In 2009 there were a total of one million emergency room visits that involved illicit drugs (DrugFacts, 2011). The breakdown of visits based on drug type was as follows:

- Cocaine: 422,896 visits
- Marijuana: 376,467 visits
- Heroin: 213,118 visits
- Stimulants (amphetamines and methamphetamine): 93,562 visits
(DrugFacts, 2011)

While this is just a fraction of the 123 million visits in 2012, it puts an added burden on emergency rooms (Emergency, 2012). The one million visits are less than one percent of the total number of visits; however since 2004 the number of drug related visits as increased by 81% (DrugFacts, 2011). If this rate continues there will be nearly two million drug related emergency room visits in 2020.

Some of the individuals receiving care possess health insurance but there are many that do not and will be passing the costs onto the tax payers. According to the 2011 Economic Impact of Illicit Drugs on American Society study the public cost of different aspects of health care are as follows:

Detoxification: \$465,213,000

Residential: \$1,223,800,000

Outpatient: \$1,023,994,000

Outpatient Methadone Programs: \$650,557,000

Just these four sections of drug treatment/health care come to a \$3,723,338,000. This is while the total cost of hospital and emergency department treatment totals \$5,684,248,000 (The Economic, 2011). With a total of over \$9 billion spent on just these five areas of treatment , it is apparent that drug users are financially burdening the healthcare system to an unacceptable level.

Illegal Drugs Burden the Workplace:

It is evident that drug users decrease productivity in the workplace and can be a liability, costing both their employers and society. In 2007 it was estimated that the cost America incurred from lost productivity caused by drug abuse was \$68.4 billion (The Economic, 2011). An interesting study was conducted by the United States Postal Service in the late 1990's. The study showed that drug users absenteeism was 66% higher, health benefit use was 84% higher, and disciplinary actions were 90% higher than non-drug users (America's Drug, 1997). These rates occurred while one-fourth of all drug users left a job voluntarily (Consequences, 1999). All of this leads to an increased turnover rate in these employees, meaning new individuals must be hired and trained (Consequences, 1999). All of these issues create a situation where employing drug users creates a liability to both employers and tax payers.

The one strength to drug users being employed is that the threat of losing their job can often be the most effective way to promote abusers to get help (America's Drug, 1997). Being employed can provide drug users with treatment options that may not have been available to them when unemployed. Health insurance is often a benefit of employment and many drug users can greatly advance their ability to conquer their addiction. While some substance abusers will continue to use, even if they lose their job, others will receive treatment to better themselves and continue their employment.

Homelessness:

There seems to be a correlation between drug abuse and homelessness. Illegal drug use can both be a cause of and a result of homelessness; however, many homeless individuals abuse drugs due to mental health issues (The Consequences, 1999). The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration estimated in 2003 that 26% of homeless individuals abused drugs (Substance Abuse and Homelessness, 2009). In a 2008 survey of 25 cities substance abuse was reported by 68% of the cities as the single largest cause of homelessness in single adults (Substance Abuse and Homelessness, 2009). This was while two-thirds of homeless individuals questioned claimed that drugs and/or alcohol were a major reason for becoming homeless (Substance Abuse and Homelessness, 2009).

One of the major issues that the homeless incur is the lack of treatment options. It is believed that of those individuals who are homeless only 25% have received treatment (The Consequences, 1999). Of this group 38% received inpatient treatment three times or more, proving that inpatient treatment is ineffective (The Consequences, 1999). This

could be due to the fact that once they are released after receiving treatment, they are once again homeless. Even if homeless people obtain residential treatment, it is often ineffective because there is no recovery venue other than homeless shelters (The Consequences, 1999). Without a system in which homeless drug users receive treatment and some type of permanent housing, there will continue to be a direct connection between the homeless and illegal drug use.

Illicit Drug Addiction:

Many users of illegal drug users start out as recreational users but eventually become addicted or dependent upon them in order to function normally. Addiction means compulsive use even if there are negative or dangerous effects. Based on this it is very possible that an individual can become either dependent or addicted but not necessarily both. An example would be an individual addicted to heroin but not dependent on it to function normally. Individuals who abuse drugs over time can grow a tolerance for it causing them to need a higher dosage to gain the same effect (Dugdale, 2010). This is what leads to many of America's drug issues.

There are different reasons, no single factor, why someone can become addicted or dependent on illegal drugs. However, some factors that are believed to play a role are an individual's genes, the effect of the drug, peer pressure, emotional distress, anxiety, environmental stress, and depression (Dugdale, 2010). It is also believed that an individual's gender, ethnicity, developmental stage and social environment may play a role (Drug Abuse, 2010). Looking at the drug using population it is obvious that many of these factors are present.

Addiction is considered a disease because it changes the structure of the brain and how it works (Drug Abuse, 2010). This is proof that research and treatment options need to continue to develop. As with other diseases, research often leads to breakthroughs that help to cure or improve treatment that can help to reduce or eliminate the issue. Drug addiction is a disease and it needs to be treated that way in order to reduce the burden overall burden on society.

Drug Addiction Treatment:

Cleaning up the mess that addiction causes without rehabilitating the individual will only create a bigger problem. Without effective treatment available, they will continue to create problems for themselves, their family and those around them. When actually rehabilitated through effective treatment, they will begin to clean up their own lives and the problems that they so often cause. The key is improving their abilities to handle life so they are no longer being controlled by their addiction (Government Spends, 2012).

Treatment and rehabilitation for illegal drug users in America has been a major issue. Both rehabilitation centers and methods seem to have major flaws. An example of one of the main treatments, specifically for heroin, is the use of methadone. Methadone takes the place of opiate based drugs by binding to the same receptors, allowing addicts to discontinue the use of opiate drugs without going through painful withdrawal (Michelle, 2011). This treatment option can be effective, but there are also numerous drawbacks. Methadone is highly addictive and many users end their heroin or morphine addiction but become addicted to the treatment (Michelle, 2011). Also after the first

treatment of methadone the “high” experienced by users often decreases causing many to increase their dosage, potentially leading to an overdose which can cause loss of consciousness, coma, and breathing problems (Cohen, 2012). Lastly, many addicts become in danger of overdose when they combine methadone with other drugs or alcohol (Michelle, 2011). In some cases methadone can be very helpful in the treatment of opiate addictions, but there are numerous drawbacks that can lead to overdose or new addictions. This is one example of how flawed America’s treatment options are.

Over the past decades drug rehabilitation has expanded and now spans both the private and public sectors. Each of these sectors possesses strengths and weaknesses. Public drug rehabilitation centers provide a less expensive option, making them more accessible to the general public thanks to government funding (Terry, 2009). These facilities are often more equipped to treat a larger range of drug users than many comparable private rehabilitation centers (Terry, 2009). However, they are often overcrowded which causes delays in treatment. Public centers also utilize group therapy which does not provide the individual attention necessary to successfully treat users (Terry, 2009). On the other hand private rehabilitation centers provide a much more individualized treatment plan which often leads to higher success rates. These facilities also utilize activities like yoga and adventure therapy to replace or supplement treatment often used in public facilities (The Advantages, 2012). These private rehabilitation centers seem to be more successful and the government has noticed this so now many are receiving public funding (Terry, 2009).

Part of the treatment of drug addiction is teaching users new patterns of behavior. The most important part of this is teaching users how to behave in a drug free

environment. This means making new friends, avoiding their old life, and finding new activities to take part in (Rehabilitation, 2011). The most successful treatment programs offer options to users, such as residential inpatient, short-stay, and outpatient treatment as well as support groups, extended care centers, and sober houses (Rehabilitation, 2011). These centers must also be properly equipped and have competent medical staff. Programs could also be offered to family members because it is essential they provide support, encouragement, continued care, and assist in the process of reintegration into society (Rehabilitation, 2011).

Looking at the total costs of illegal drug use it is apparent that advances in treatment and prevention are necessary. In 2007 the federal government funded \$1.01 billion for substance abuse treatment and prevention research as well as \$1.43 billion for drug abuse prevention (The Economic, 2011). Comparing these investments to the total cost of over \$467 billion it becomes obvious that there is a lack of funding for research, prevention, and treatment. If more resources were allocated for research and treatment it would be possible to decrease the current investments in law enforcement and health care.

Illicit Drugs and HIV/AIDS:

Since the beginning of the HIV/AIDS pandemic it has been clear that illicit drug abuse is directly correlated to the spread of HIV/AIDS. The main connection is that HIV can be transmitted through the sharing of needles and other injection methods (What is HIV, 2011). This has caused the disease to spread through the illicit drug use community. Also, injection drug use has been shown to increase high risk sexual behavior which

increases the chances of the transmission and acquisition of HIV (America's Drug, 1997). It is believed that one-fourth of infection cases in the United States resulted from injection drug use (What is HIV, 2011). In the past decade the number of HIV/AIDS infections has decreased by 25% (Hayden, 2011). However, half of the new cases of infections are believed to have occurred among injection drug users (Substance Abuse, 2006). Intravenous drug use not only spreads the HIV/AIDS virus, but it adds additional health care costs to society.

A recent study shows that future treatment of those infected with HIV/AIDS, just in the United States, will cost \$12.1 billion annually (New U.S., 2006). This breaks down to \$2,100 a month per individual, with a lifetime cost of \$618,900 (New U.S., 2006). This cost can be covered by insurance; however, most infected individuals have trouble obtaining private health insurance after they are infected. Only 17% of those living with HIV having private insurance while 30% do not have any medical coverage (Health Care, 2011). One solution to this could be President Obama's Affordable Care Act that would provide these individuals with affordable health care (Health Care, 2011). The lack of insurance and the total costs not only affect each infected individual but the health care system, insurance companies, and tax payers. This is once again an additional cost that must be expended on top of the other financial burdens that illegal drug use puts on society.

Health Conditions and Illicit Drugs:

Illicit drugs use is connected with numerous health problems, the major being the previously mentioned HIV/AIDS. As with the spread of HIV, STD's are often also

spread through high risk sexual behaviors that have been associated with injection drugs (America's Drug, 1997). According to the 1999 National Drug Control Policy "chronic users are particularly susceptible to infectious diseases and are considered "core transmitters" of diseases" including gonorrhea and syphilis (Consequences, 1999). Other infectious diseases that are often associated with drug users are tuberculosis and hepatitis (America's Drug, 1997). Hepatitis B, C, and tuberculosis can be spread through unprotected sex with an infected person or by sharing needles (Hepatitis Awareness). Tuberculosis can also be spread simply by coughing, although individuals in the general public have immune systems that are capable of fighting off the disease. When it comes to drug users this is not always the case. There have been a number of studies that illustrates that drug use does harm to the immune system, causing an impairment of the cell-mediated immune response (Deiss, 2009). With a depleted immune system drug users will be much more susceptible to becoming infected with different diseases and viruses.

Tainted Drugs:

One of the major issues with illegal drugs is the lack of quality control. Drugs like cocaine, methamphetamine, and ecstasy are not regulated therefore never go through any process to insure the quality. Many of these drugs are "cut" with other substances so that dealers can sell more product than they originally obtained or created. An example of this would be cocaine being cut with a variety of things like baking soda, sugars, and different anesthetics (Cocaine, 2012). These examples will not necessarily cause much harm to users but there have been cases in which the agent used to taint the drug caused serious medical side effects.

According to an Associated Press story in August of 2009, nearly one-third of the cocaine in the United States was tainted, or “cut,” with a veterinary de-worming medication called levamisole (Smith, 2009). Health officials stated that “the cocaine tainted with levamisole is linked to an unusual incidence of agranulocytosis, a condition of a suppressed immune system, whose symptoms include persistent sore throat, persistent or recurrent fever, swollen glands, painful sores, skin infections with painful swelling, thrush, and other unusual infections” (Smith, 2009). It is believed that the medication may enhance the effects of the cocaine; however, it has also been linked to at least three deaths as well as causing sickness in over one hundred individuals (Smith, 2009). While cocaine itself possesses threats to the health of users, there are additional unknown threats caused by situations like this.

In another tainted drug case police have linked 25 deaths to tainted ecstasy in Canada over the past year and a half. It is believed that ecstasy dealers and producers are cutting the drug with PMMA (paramethoxymethamphetamine) in order to meet the rising demand for ecstasy both in Canada and internationally (Trifunov, 2012). However, PMMA is in a family of drugs which has known toxicity in humans and can cause seizures and severe hyperthermia in low dosages and death in higher dosages (paramethoxy, 2012). PMMA tainted ecstasy takes longer to affect the body than pure ecstasy which causes many users to take more, causing death (Trifunov, 2012). These are just two cases of tainted and cut drugs, but they strongly depict the dangers of using illegal drugs. With no way to know the purity of these drugs users are not only putting themselves in danger by using but also by not knowing exactly what they are using.

In order to regulate the purity of drugs the United States would first have to legalize these drugs. Of course for a majority of drugs this is not an option. But those, such as marijuana, that have been legalized in certain states can be regulated to insure they are not cut, tainted or laced. The United States Drug Enforcement Administration and Food and Drug Administration would be able to regulate who produces the drugs, test the purity and quality, and determine dosages. This could help protect drug users from the unknown additives in many drugs.

Technology:

Over the past decades technology has played a much more influential role in every aspect of life, including in the public health and homeland security fields. Although there has been a lack of funding for drug research, with only 0.4% of government funding going into this area, there are advances being made that will help in both enforcement and treatment areas. A new technology is currently being developed that would greatly assist the Drug Enforcement Administration and other homeland security offices. This new technology is being researched by numerous parties and could lead to a permanent replacement for drug and bomb sniffing dogs (Trafton, 2008). Researchers at Penn State, MIT, Tufts University, the University of Pennsylvania, Temple University, the University of Illinois, and the University of Miami have all been working on this project which is being sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) (Penn State, 2009). In essence they are developing a mechanical nose that will be able to identify different scents based on of their chemical makeup by utilizing olfactory receptors produced using wheat germ (Patterson, 2008).

According to one of the lead researchers, Paterson: "the RealNose project is a typical "DARPA-hard" program: high-risk, high-payoff. Should marketable technology evolve from the research, however, it could be tailored to sniff out drugs, explosives, chemical and biological weapons, and even certain types of cancer" (Penn State, 2009).

With this new technology the DEA and other law enforcement agencies will be able to eliminate the need to go through the lengthy process of training drug and bomb sniffing dogs. The implication of a technology like this could be huge. The DEA could utilize RealNose at shipping ports, border crossings, and truck stops to "sniff out" hidden drugs without needing extra man power and drug sniffing dogs. Depending on the range of the sensors one agent could possibly be all that is needed to monitor an entire border crossing or shipping port.

Technology has also developed new treatment methods for drug addiction. According to Cindy Thomas and Dennis McCarty "investments in neuroscience and the development of pharmacotherapies for drug abuse treatment seem to be near fruition," (Thomas, 2004). Pharmacotherapies, treatment through the use of drugs, already exists in the treatment by methadone. New drugs, such as Subutex (buprenorphine hydrochloride) and Suboxone (buprenorphine hydrochloride in combination with naltrexone), have been developed specifically for the treatment of opiate dependency (Thomas, 2004). With advances in therapy drug research it is possible to continue to take steps forward in treatment methods. In order to continue to make breakthroughs in drug treatment it is essential that new technologies are developed, and in order for this to occur it is necessary to increase funding for research.

Conclusion:

Illicit drug use has been an issue in America for decades. It has created a burden on federal, state, and local law enforcement, health care systems, workplaces, and families. In order to protect the health and security of the United States illegal drug enforcement must continue, if not increase. As drugs come across the borders like Mexico, it is necessary to increase funding and manpower to cut down on this. The intrinsic connection between terrorist groups, like Al-Qaeda and the Mexican cartels, and drug trafficking and sales is a strong reason to continue drug enforcement. This is possibly the easiest way to cut off funding to many terrorist organizations which would drastically decrease their ability to fund terrorist attacks.

The total cost that illegal drugs puts on society reached an astronomical \$467 billion and according to the Chairman of the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse it is a reckless misallocation of public funds. Between law enforcement, legal, societal, and health care costs it is apparent that a new strategy needs to be taken. Successful treatment centers need to be funded in order to create a system that can cure addicts to insure that they do not relapse and once again become a burden on society. The system is currently in a cyclic pattern which is the opposite of what America needs. In order to reduce spending it is necessary for the programs being funded to be successful. On top of this tainted drugs now pose a threat that in the past was not prevalent. Drugs are now being mixed with cutting agents and chemicals that are leading to additional deaths and extra medical costs.

Lastly, technology could be the next step in cutting the total funding of illegal drug related issues and treating users. With ways to detect drugs law enforcement could drastically decrease the level of drugs entering the nation. With fewer drugs there will be

fewer drug related arrests, decreased legal and judiciary spending, and a more productive workforce. Also with advances in treatment through technology those who receive treatment could successfully end their drug addictions or dependence. In order for all of this to occur funding will need to increase before it decreases; however, there is a possibility that in the future there is the opportunity to successfully eliminate much of America's drug issues.

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Conclusions

The research and analysis presented in this document further emphasize the need to counter illegal drug trafficking, sales and abuse. Throughout this document it has become clear that the United States Drug Enforcement Administration plays an important role in protecting America. Also, illicit drugs pose numerous threats to America's society, further reinforcing the necessity to continue the War on Drugs on all fronts. In order to do so, drug enforcement both nationally and internationally must continue and be further developed. Efforts like those depicted in the Afghanistan strategy (Chapter 1) must be utilized around the world to insure that terrorist organizations do not profit from illegal drug trafficking and sales. This is while continuing all national efforts at the federal, state, and local levels.

Law enforcement, of course, should not be the only focus. Increasing intelligence gathering and analysis will provide data that will strengthen our abilities, specifically for law enforcement. Emphasizing public health must also take a priority in order to develop new treatment methods and options which could reduce the number of users purchasing and abusing drugs in the United States. While increasing all of these efforts, it is crucial that assessments and evaluations be carried out on all programs, allowing for them to evolve when necessary to guarantee greater success. The most significant conclusion that can be made from this study is that a multi-disciplinary approaches, in both public and private sectors, needs to be taken to fight illegal drugs from all sides in order to ensure public safety.