# Moderate Relativism

## François Recanati

**HAL Id: ijn_00089223**

**http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00089223**

Submitted on 13 Aug 2006

# Moderate Relativism*

François Recanati
Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris
recanati@ens.fr

In modal logic, propositions are evaluated relative to possible worlds. A proposition may be true relative to a world $w$, and false relative to another world $w'$. A proposition whose truth-value varies across worlds is said to be *contingent* (as opposed to *necessary*). Relativism is the view that the relativization idea extends beyond possible worlds and modalities. Thus, in tense logic, propositions are evaluated relative to times. A proposition (e.g. the proposition that Socrates is sitting) may be true relative to a time $t$, and false relative to another time $t'$. A proposition that has this property is said to be *temporal* (as opposed to *eternal*). The view that there are such propositions may be called 'Temporal Relativism', or 'Temporalism' for short.

Further applications of the relativization idea easily come to mind. The proposition that it is raining (at a given time, in a given world) is true relative to some places, and false relative to others. The proposition that one is a philosopher is true relative to some persons, and false relative to others. The proposition that spinach is delicious is true relative to some standards of taste, and false relative to others. The proposition that the treasure might be under the palm tree is true relative to some epistemic situations, and false relative to others. The proposition that John is tall is true relative to some standards of height, and false relative to others.

---

In this paper I will discuss, and attempt to rebut, two classical objections to Relativism. Both objections are concerned specifically with Temporalism, but the issues they raise are quite general, as we shall see. Likewise, my responses are intended as a general defense of Relativism — not merely Temporalism.

The first objection, due to Frege, is the objection from incompleteness. I will distinguish two possible relativist responses to that objection, one of which corresponds to the view I actually defend : Moderate Relativism. Responding to that objection will therefore enable me to expound my view in some detail. The second objection is due to Mark Richard, who argued that the objects of belief cannot be relativistic (specifically, they cannot be 'temporal propositions'). I will show that that objection can be met within the Moderate Relativist framework.[1] In the last section, I will deal with special forms of disagreement that have loomed large in recent discussions of Relativism.

## I. The Objection from Incompleteness

*1.1 Content and circumstance*

As I understand it, the relativization idea has two component sub-ideas, which I will call 'Duality' and 'Distribution'. Distribution presupposes Duality, but it is possible to accept Duality while rejecting Distribution.

> [*Duality*] To get a truth-value, we need a circumstance of evaluation as well as a content to evaluate. (As Austin puts it, 'It takes two to make a truth'.)
> [*Distribution*] The determinants of truth-value distribute over the two basic components truth-evaluation involves : content and circumstance. That is, a determinant of truth-value, e.g. a time, is *either* given as an ingredient of content *or* as an aspect of the circumstance of evaluation.

The distribution idea is apparent in the litterature that stems from John Perry's work on unarticulated constituents. According to Perry (1986), if something is given as part

---

[1] For reasons of space, I cannot discuss the objections to Temporalism raised by King (2003), as I had planned. I will do so elsewhere.

of the situation which an utterance (or, for that matter, a mental representation) concerns, and against which it is evaluated, it does not have to be articulated in that representation. Thus Perry draws a distinction between 'It's raining here', which explicitly mentions a place, and 'It's raining', which leaves the place out of the picture. Perry describes the content of the latter not as a complete proposition but as a *propositional function*, true of some places and false of others. The place which actually determines the truth-value of the utterance is fixed not by the content of the utterance but by the situation which that utterance concerns (the situation the speaker manifestly intends to characterize). When I say 'It's raining here' the situation which my utterance concerns is typically more complex since it involves several places at once, between which a contrast is drawn (Recanati 1997, 2000). In this case the place must be articulated and cannot be left out of the picture, since it is not independently fixed by the situation talked about.

The distribution idea also comes up in Kaplan's well-known argument for temporal propositions (Kaplan 1989 : 502-4). Kaplan's argument is based on the existence of temporal operators. The contents temporal operators operate on must be temporally neutral, Kaplan argued, for if they are not — if they are temporally-specific — the temporal operators will be vacuous. A temporal operator specifies the time(s) with respect to which the proposition it operates on is to be evaluated. If the proposition itself specified a time, embedding the proposition under the temporal operator would have no effect whatsoever. Being already specified by the content to be evaluated, the time of evaluation would be fixed once for all and could no longer be shifted. So temporal operators must operate on temporally-neutral propositions — propositions which are true with respect to a time, and false with respect to another time, but which do not specify the time relative to which they are supposed to be evaluated.

The general principle which emerges is a principle of economy or optimality according to which a determinant of truth-value is either given as an ingredient of content or as an aspect of the circumstance of evaluation, but not both. The richer the circumstance, the poorer the content evaluated with respect to that circumstance ; and the richer the content, the poorer the circumstance. In particular :

• If the circumstance consists of a possible world only, the content must be a complete proposition (something that determines a function from possible worlds to truth-values).

• If the circumstance is richer and involves a time and a place in addition to a world, then the content can be less than fully propositional : it can be place- and time-neutral and determine only a propositional function (a function from place-time pairs to functions from possible worlds to truth-values, or equivalently, a function from centered worlds to truth-values).

*1.2 The objection*

Frege rejected the very idea of a temporal proposition, i.e. a proposition that is true at some times and false at other times. Such a proposition is not a genuine proposition, he held, because it is not evaluable as true or false, or at least, it is not evaluable *unless* we are given a particular time. In the absence of a time specification, the alleged proposition is only 'true-at' certain times and 'false-at' others. It is, therefore, *semantically incomplete* by Frege's lights:

> A thought is not true at one time and false at another, but it is either true or false, *tertium non datur*. The false appearance that a thought can be true at one time and false at another arises from an incomplete expression. A complete proposition or expression of a thought must also contain a time datum. (Frege 1967 : 338, quoted in Evans 1985 : 350)

As Evans points out, the problem of semantic incompleteness does not arise in the modal case. Even if a thought is said to be 'true at' one world and 'false at' another, as in modal logic, this does not prevent it from being true (or false) *tout court*. It is true *tout court* iff it is true-at the actual world. But the 'thought' that it is hot cannot be evaluated as true or false *tout court.* In the absence of a contextually supplied time it can *only* be ascribed relative, 'truth-at'-conditions. Only a particular, dated utterance of such a sentence can be endowed with genuine truth-conditions. What this shows is that the time of utterance is part of the (complete) content of the utterance, or, in a Fregean framework, part of the expression of such a content; hence it cannot be deemed external to content and treated like the world of evaluation. So the objection

goes. And the same objection applies to the place-neutral content of 'It's raining' : such a content is not complete, since the utterance cannot be evaluated unless a place is contextually provided.

There are two possible responses which a Relativist can make to that objection.[2] A Radical Relativist will insist that the nonclassical contents that we are led to encompass if we accept Distribution *are* complete. Thus the Stoics posited '*lekta*' that were « in many respects reminiscent of the 'propositions' that many modern philosophers postulate as meanings of eternal assertoric sentences », save for the fact that they were « temporally indefinite in the same way as occasion sentences » (Hintikka 1973 : 70). Such *lekta* were thought by them to be complete, despite their temporal neutrality. In his review of Mates 1953, which brought Stoic logic (and temporal propositions) to the forefront of attention, Geach wrote that for the Stoics, « though the truth-value of 'Dion is alive' changes at Dion's death, the sentence still expresses the same complete meaning (*lekton*) » (Geach 1955 : 144). This idea, which aroused Prior's interest, Evans later found incomprehensible and even incoherent (Prior 1967 : 17 ; Evans 1985 : 348-50). If the *lekton* is complete, Evans argued, it can be evaluated as correct or incorrect ; but if the *lekton* is temporally neutral, its evaluation as correct or incorrect will vary with time, hence it will not be evaluated as correct or incorrect once for all. Does this not entail that the lekton *cannot* be evaluated as correct or incorrect (*tout court*) after all ? Evans writes :

> To say that the sentence type 'Socrates is sitting'… expresses a complete meaning seems to imply that… to know what assertion is being made by an utterance of a tensed sentence all you need to know is which tensed sentence was uttered ; you do not need further information to tie the sentence down to a particular time… It would follow that such an 'assertion' would not admit of a stable evaluation as correct or incorrect ; if we are to speak of correctness or incorrectness at all, we must say that the assertion is correct at some times and not at others. (Evans 1985 : 349)

---

[2] See Garcia-Carpintero (this volume) for a similar distinction between two versions of Relativism.

For Evans, this consequence (the unstability of evaluation) is a *reductio* of the whole position. At this point, however, it is useful to consider MacFarlane's discussion of future contingents, for MacFarlane's seems to bite Evans' bullet. MacFarlane (2003) argues that a sentence like 'There will be a sea-battle tomorrow' is neither true nor false when it is uttered (since the future is indeterminate) but turns out to be true or false, as the case may be, when it is evaluated the next day. So MacFarlane gives up the constraint that the evaluation of a thought as correct or incorrect must be temporally stable : the truth-value of an utterance may well depend upon the context of evaluation (e.g. the time at which it is evaluated), so an utterance or thought that is evaluated in a certain way at a certain time may be evaluated differently at a different time. In such a framework, reminiscent of Aristotle, we could maintain that the tensed sentence 'Dion is alive' expresses a complete content, and is (therefore) evaluable (at any given time), since we reject the constraint that the evaluation process itself must be 'eternal', hence stable, rather than context-sensitive and unstable.[3]

Whatever we think of this line of argument, I will not be concerned with the radical forms of Relativism in this paper, but only with a moderate form which I myself advocate. In response to the Fregean objection, a Moderate Relativist will *concede* that the complete content of the utterance/thought 'Dion is alive' involves more than the temporally neutral *lekton* it expresses ; it additionally involves the time of

---

[3] Note, however, that this is not what MacFarlane himself would say. MacFarlane's brand of Radical Relativism consists in making room for a new form of context-sensitivity : sensitivity to the context of evaluation and not (or not merely) to the context of utterance. On MacFarlane's view, some expressions are 'assessment sensitive', and others are not — just as some expressions are utterance sensitive, and others are not. In this regard, future contingents are a *special* case. (Evans himself seems to accept that there is something special about future contingents, and for that reason, he says, he confines his discussion to sentences in the past. See Evans 1985 : 350, fn. 9.) As far as 'Dion is alive' is concerned, MacFarlane holds that its truth depends on the time of utterance, as Frege points out, but *not* on the time of assessment. This shows that one may be a Radical Relativist with respect to some sentences — those whose truth-value is assumed to depend upon the context of assessment and whose evaluation is therefore unstable — and not with respect to others.

utterance, which is tacitly referred to and against which the utterance is meant to be evaluated. Distribution can be construed as saying that the complete content, *in the sense of Frege and Evans,* distributes over the two components which Duality posits, namely the circumstance of evaluation (which may include more than a world) and the content to be evaluated, in the narrow sense of content. Once it is admitted that we need these two components, we can tolerate contents that are not 'semantically complete' in Frege's sense, i.e. endowed with absolute truth-conditions. We can, because the circumstance is there which enables the content to be suitably completed. Thus the content of tensed sentences is semantically incomplete, yet the circumstance (the time) relative to which such a sentence is evaluated is sufficient to complete it. It follows that we must distinguish *two* levels of content. The content we evaluate with respect to the circumstance is the content in the narrow sense; it may, but need not be, semantically complete by Frege's lights. What is semantically complete in any case is the content in the broad sense. It consists of the (narrow) content *and* the circumstance with respect to which that content is meant to be evaluated. Distribution only induces us to *analyse* the complete content of an utterance into two components, corresponding to those distinguished in Duality.

*1.3 Two levels of content*

The position I have sketched has been argued for by several authors, more or less explicitly. Thus Hintikka, in an interesting article on 'Time, Truth and Knowledge in Aristotle and Other Greek Philosophers', says the following :

> It is obvious that the sentence, 'It is raining', as uttered by me today, is made true or false by a set of facts different from those that verified or falsified my utterance yesterday, 'It is raining'. But it is very natural to say that in some sense the state of mind or attitude toward my environment that is expressed by the two utterances is the same. The facts to which yesterday's utterance refers are referred to today by the sentence, 'It was raining yesterday'. But the 'state of mind' that this utterance appears to express seems to be entirely different from that expressed by yesterday's present-tense utterance, 'It is raining'. (…) Hence the idea that spoken words are symbols for unspoken thoughts encourages the idea that one and the same temporally indefinite

form of words expresses one and the same belief or opinon at the different times when it is uttered. (Hintikka 1973 : 85)

To me at least, this suggests that the complete content of an utterance (that which determines its truth-conditions) involves two factors : the thought that is expressed, and the time at which it is expressed. The sentence 'It is raining' expresses the same thought whenever it is uttered, and that thought is evaluated with respect to the time of utterance. Since the latter changes, the truth-value is liable to change even though, in the narrow sense of content, the content is the same. The truth-*conditions* also change : An utterance of 'It's raining' at *t* is true iff the thought expressed by the sentence is true at *t* ; an utterance of the same sentence at *t'* is true iff the same thought is true *at t'*. On this view the complete content of two successive utterances of 'It is raining' need not be the same, since the speaker does not merely express a certain content, but also tacitly refers to a certain time (the time of utterance) as relevant for the evaluation of that content. The complete content corresponds to the utterance's truth-conditions which, according to Hintikka, depend upon an external factor, namely the actual time at which the utterance is made or the thought entertained.

In a similar vein, Dummett attempts to make sense of Prior's position (in response to Evans's critique) by distinguishing two levels. He points out that temporal propositions are, for Prior, the contents of *sentence-types*. The content of a sentence-type is a function from times to truth-values, hence a sentence-type only has relative truth-conditions: it is true at some times and false at other times. This does not prevent us from introducing a notion of absolute truth, by shifting to the level of *utterance* content. According to Dummett, when a sentence is uttered the function which is its content is applied to some contextually provided time (typically, the time of utterance). The time in question serves as circumstance of evaluation for the utterance: the utterance is true *tout court* iff the sentence is 'true-at' the contextually provided time. As Dummett emphasizes,

> The variable truth-value and the absolute truth-value attach to different things; it is the type sentence that is true at one time, false at another, but the utterance that is true or false simpliciter (Dummett forthcoming : 44)

Since there are two distinct levels, corresponding to the sentence-type and the utterance, there is no harm in taking the utterance to possess a 'content' also (content$_u$), distinct from that of the sentence (content$_s$). For example, we can treat the utterance as expressing a structured proposition consisting of (i) the contextually provided time as subject, and (ii) the content of the sentence-type, predicated of that time. But if we do so, we must acknowledge the unarticulated nature of the 'subject' in the content$_u$ of tensed utterances. As Prior says, « tensed propositions are understood as directly or indirectly characterising the *un*mentioned time of utterance » (Prior 1977 : 30). Hence there is a trade-off: if we want to restrict ourselves to what is linguistically articulated, we must focus on the content$_s$, which is 'semantically incomplete' by Frege's lights — it corresponds to the content of a predicate rather than to that of a complete sentence in a logically perfect language. If, following Frege, we want to focus on the complete content of the utterance, that which makes it truth-evaluable in absolute terms, we must acknowledge the role played in that content (content$_u$) by unarticulated constituents corresponding to the circumstances in which the content$_s$ is evaluated.

Another author who ought to be mentioned in connection with Moderate Relativism is Jon Barwise. Barwise also put forward a semantic theory with two levels of content : the 'infon' or 'state of affairs' and the 'Austinian proposition' (Barwise 1989, Barwise and Etchemendy 1987). The infon is the content to be evaluated with respect to a given situation, and the Austinian proposition is the proposition to the effect that that situation supports that infon. In what follows I will use the notion of Austinian proposition, corresponding to the complete content of an utterance/thought. But I will use the Stoic term '*lekton*', rather than Barwise's theoretically-loaded term 'infon', to refer to the content in the narrow sense.[4] So 'It is raining' expresses a constant *lekton* whenever and wherever it is used, a content that can be modeled as a function from situations to truth-values or as a set of situations (viz. the set {$s$ : it is raining in $s$}); but the complete content of an utterance of 'It is raining' is the Austinian proposition that a certain situation (that which the utterance/thought 'concerns') fits that *lekton*, i.e., belongs to the set of situations in question.

---

[4] Evans also has coined a term for that entity. He calls it the 'Stoic-proposition' (Evans 1985 : 350).

In Dummett's framework the partial content was the content of the sentence-type. Now the infon, according to Barwise, is the content of the sentence *with respect to context* : if the sentence contains indexicals, the contextual values of the indexicals contribute to the infon. I will retain that feature of Barwise's account. In my framework, the *lekton* is the content of the sentence in context, so an indexical sentence will express different *lekta* in different contexts. But the context comes into the picture a second time : it not only provides values for the indexicals, which values contribute to the *lekton*, but it also determines the situation against which the *lekton* is to be evaluated. The complete content of the utterance involves the *lekton* together with the situation of evaluation.[5]

*1.4 Moderate Relativism : two versions*

Following various authors, I have suggested that we need the *lekton* as a level of content even though it is not the complete content (that which determines the utterance's possible-worlds truth-conditions). The *lekton* is the content of the sentence (with respect to context, if the sentence is indexical), but the complete content of the utterance involves something more : it involves a situation with respect to which the utterance is meant to be evaluated. Change the situation of evaluation, you change the complete content of the utterance, even though the content of the sentence (with respect to context) remains constant.

The debate between classical theorists and Moderate Relativists bears upon the indispensability of the *lekton* as a level of content. According to the classical theorist, the only thing we need is the complete, truth-conditional content on the one hand and the meaning of the sentence-type on the other. One reason for positing an extra level of content, viz. the *lekton*, is that it enables us to represent what the sentence (or possibly the thought) explicitly articulates (in a possibly indexical manner). Again, 'It's raining here' says something different from what 'It's raining' says, even in a context in which they are both true iff it is raining at the place of

---

[5] Moderate Relativism, thus understood, is what MacFarlane calls 'Non-indexical Contextualism' (MacFarlane forthcoming). It also corresponds to Kaplan's own position, since Kaplanian 'contents' do not determine a classical proposition unless a circumstance (involving a time and, possibly, a place in addition to a world) is contextually provided.

utterance. The difference lies in the fact that the place in question is (indexically) articulated in the former case while it is left unarticulated in the latter. It follows that the *lekton* differs, even though the truth-conditions are the same.

There is another debate, concerning the special case in which what the sentence explicitly articulates is a classical proposition. Suppose the speaker says 'It is raining here and now', without leaving anything unarticulated (save the world of evaluation). Both the time and the place are explicitly articulated, hence they are both part of the *lekton*. It follows that we don't need a rich circumstance to evaluate that content : the *lekton* already determines a function from possible-worlds to truth-values, hence the only thing we need to determine a truth-value is a possible world. No further relativisation is needed. So it seems that, *with sentences whose content is not semantically incomplete*, there is no need to invoke a double layer of content. The content of the sentence-in-context, insofar as it has an absolute truth-value, is the only thing we need, as in the classical theory. Or, to put it in slightly different terms : in such cases the *lekton is* the complete content. This position defines one version of Moderate Relativism, namely the weak version ('WMR', for 'weak moderate relativism'). But there is another, strong version, which has been argued for by Barwise and which I also advocate.

On the strong version ('SMR'), the content of a sentence (*whatever* the sentence) is a function from situations to truth-values. Hence the relativity of truth, construed as a property of sentences: the same sentence may be true relative to a situation and false relative to another one. That is so *even if the sentence itself is not semantically incomplete*. Even when the sentence *is* truth-evaluable in the absolute sense — when it is 'semantically complete' by Frege's lights — SMR says there is a principled distinction between the content of the sentence (the *lekton*) and the content of the utterance (the Austinian proposition). In such a case, the *lekton* will be a 'classical' proposition (a function from possible worlds to truth-values), but the Austinian proposition will still contain a situation in addition to that proposition. What the utterance 'says' is that *the situation in question supports the proposition in question.* It follows that two distinct evaluations are possible, in such cases. We can evaluate the sentence itself (i.e. evaluate the proposition with respect to the actual world), or we can evaluate the utterance, that is, evaluate the proposition *with respect to the situation figuring in the Austinian proposition*.

To illustrate this point I usually quote my favourite example, from Barwise and Etchemendy 1987. Commenting upon a poker game I am watching, I say: 'Claire has a good hand now'. What I say is true, iff Claire has a good hand in the poker game I am watching at the moment of utterance. But suppose I made a mistake and Claire is not among the players in that game. Suppose further that, by coincidence, she happens to be playing bridge in some other part of town and has a good hand there. Still, my utterance is not intuitively true, because the situation it concerns (the poker game I am watching) is not one in which Claire has a good hand at the time of utterance. But we can say that the *sentence* (or the sentence-in-context) is true: for it says that Claire has a good hand at the time of utterance, and Claire *has* a good hand (somewhere) at the time of utterance. The unarticulated constituent which distinguishes the *lekton* from the Austinian proposition makes all the difference here, and it accounts for our intuitive classification of the utterance as non-true.

This sort of approach can easily be extended to deal with standard problems such as that of quantifier domain restriction. It is natural to hold that 'All *F*s are *G*' expresses a proposition that is true (in a world, at a time) if and only if all the *F*s are *G* (in that world, at that time). Thus 'All students are French' expresses the proposition that all students are French. Many theorists feel compelled to give up this natural view, and claim that the sentence is semantically incomplete or covertly indexical, so that it expresses no proposition (independent of context).[6] They say so because they are impressed by the fact that the truth-conditions of an utterance of that sentence typically involve a contextually restricted domain of quantification. In the SMR framework, however, we can stick to the simple and straightforward view regarding the proposition expressed by 'All the *F*s are *G*', while fully acknowledging contextual domain restriction. The two layers of content enable us to do just that. The sentence is said to express a proposition that is evaluable with respect to an arbitrary world (or, perhaps, an arbitrary world-time pair) — the proposition that all students are French — but that proposition can *also* be evaluated with respect to the specific situation that features in the Austinian proposition. That is what happens when we evaluate an utterance of this sentence, instead of evaluating the sentence itself.[7]

---

[6] See e.g. Stanley and Szabo 2000.

[7] A well-known difficulty for the situation-theoretic approach to contextual domain restriction comes from the fact that distinct quantifiers in a single sentence may involve distinct

## II. The Objection from Belief Reports

*2.1 Richard 1981*

In 'Temporalism and Eternalism', Mark Richard put forward what many take to be a knock-down argument against Temporalism (the view that there are temporal propositions). Since Temporalism is a particular form of Relativism, we must consider his argument to see whether or not it threatens SMR.

According to Richard's argument, « the temporalist is unable to give an adequate treatment of attributions of belief » (Richard 1981 : 3). Richard asks us to consider the following piece of reasoning :

[1] Mary believed that Nixon was president

[2] Mary still believes everything she once believed

*Ergo*

[3] Mary believes that Nixon is president

As Richard points out, « this argument is not a valid argument in English » and « we ought to reject any position which is committed to [its] validity » (Richard 1981 : 4). Temporalism, Richard claims, is one such position. For the temporalist holds that 'Nixon is president' expresses a temporal proposition $p_1$, true at any time $t$ iff Nixon is president at $t$. Let us assume, plausibly enough, that a belief report '$x$ believes that $S$' states that the individual referred to by the subject term is belief-related to the proposition expressed by the embedded sentence. It follows that 'Mary believes that Nixon is president' expresses the proposition that Mary believes $p_1$. On the equally plausible assumption that the past tense in the embedded clause of 'Mary believed that Nixon was president' is semantically vacuous, it follows that [1], 'Mary believed that Nixon was president', expresses the proposition that Mary believed $p_1$. Now this, together with [2](the proposition that Mary still believes everything she once believed), entails that she still believes $p_1$, i.e., that she still believes that Nixon is

---

restrictions. The answer to that difficulty consists in associating sub-sentential expressions with (local) circumstances of evaluation. See e.g. Recanati 1996.

president ! Since that conclusion does not actually follow, there is something wrong with Temporalism.

Richard takes his argument to show that « the objects of belief expressed by sentences are all eternal » (Richard 1981 : 10), i.e., they are classical propositions, not temporal propositions. Temporalism can be rescued, Richard points out, if we give up the assumption that « a sentence expresses at most one thing (a proposition) at a time » (1981 : 9). Moderate Relativism as I have described precisely rejects that claim, since it posits two levels of content for every utterance. I will return to Moderate Relativism shortly. Richard himself describes a view which he calls 'Moderate Temporalism', which rejects the 'single content' assumption :

> We distinguish two different relations of expressing (say, *expresses₁* and *expresses₂*) and two distinct classes of objects, which we may call contents and propositions. Expression₁ is a relation between sentences and contents ; expression₂ is a relation between sentences and propositions. Contents may be either eternal or temporal ; propositions are all eternal.
>
> We now take contents to be the bearers of truth and falsity expressed by sentences, propositions to be the objects of belief so expressed. A sentence *S* is true, relative to time *t*, iff there is a content *c* such that *S* expresses₁ *c* at *t* and *c* is true at *t*. A sentence *S* expresses, relative to *t*, a belief of a person *u* iff there is a proposition *p* such that *S* expresses₂ *p* at *t* and *u* believes *p* at *t*. (Richard 1981 : 10)

In terms of temporally neutral content, we can make sense of the claim that, in a certain sense, two persons who say that it is raining (at different times) 'say the same thing' : that it is raining. Their respective utterances are true iff and only if that constant *lekton* is true at the times of their respective utterances. But what Richard's argument about belief reports is supposed to establish is that the content of *belief* is not such a temporally neutral *lekton* : the content of belief is a classical (eternal) proposition. For a Moderate Temporalist of the sort Richard describes, what is said is a temporal proposition, but what is believed, or what the utterance presents the speaker as believing, is a classical proposition.

Richard does not find Moderate Temporalism particularly attractive, because there are utterances like 'What you say is true and I believe it, too' which show that the object of assertion is, or at least can be, the same as the object of belief. At this

point, Richard argues, the Moderate Temporalist will have to distinguish the object of assertion thus understood (a classical proposition, like the object of belief) from 'what the speaker says' in the temporally neutral sense (the *lekton*). But that temporalist notion of 'what the speaker says', distinct both from what the speaker asserts and from what she believes, becomes suspicious, and it is unclear that we need it. « Until some clarification of this notion of 'what is said' by an utterance is given », Richard concludes, « we should remain sceptical » (Richard 1981 : 12).

*2.2 Richard 2003*

I have spelled out Richard's argument in some detail, in order to make clear where the Moderate Relativist differs from the hypothetical Moderate Temporalist described by Richard. Like Richard's Moderate Temporalist, the Moderate Relativist distinguishes two types of content and two relations of expressing ; but he would deny that one type of content is what is said, and the other what is believed. The distinction between the two types of content cuts across the distinction between saying and believing. That means that, whether we consider the speaker's assertion or the speaker's belief, we can distinguish two things : the *lekton* (content in the narrow sense) and the complete content or Austinian proposition. Richard himself comes close to that conclusion when, on behalf of the Temporal Relativist, he draws a tentative distinction between what is asserted (a classical proposition) and what is 'said' (a temporal proposition). In a later paper, he gives example like

(1)    When Susan saw Kate two winters ago, she swore that Kate was pregnant, and when Mindy saw her this spring, that's what she said too.

and he comments as follows :

(1) seems to report Susan and Mindy as literally saying the same thing ; if they do, presumably they each say something temporally neuter. But… suppose that last spring Susan saw Kate and said to herself, '(I guess that) she wasn't pregnant two winters ago, but she is now'. Then we can surely go to Kate and say,

15

(2)     When Susan saw you two winters ago, she said that you were
        pregnant, but now she takes that back/denies that/denies what she
        said.

All this, it might be said, suggests what when someone utters a tensed, but temporally unspecific, sentence, two distinct reports of what she said will be possible : one reporting her as having said something temporally specific, and one reporting her as having said something temporally unspecific. And this suggests that utterances of temporally unspecific sentences express, or at least typically express, two things, one temporally unspecific, the other specific. (Richard 2003 : 39-40)

That is exactly what a Moderate Relativist will say ; and the Moderate Relativist will point out, as Richard himself does in the later paper, that the same point can be made with respect to belief. Richard gives the following example of a belief ascription where the object of belief seems to be a temporal proposition :

(3)     Bob went to the monkey house, and now he thinks that he's been infected
        with the Ebola virus. Every time he goes there he thinks that ; he's
        convinced one of the monkeys is a carrier.

Richard, however, thinks the evidence is misleading. He has a story to tell regarding examples like (3), which story does not appeal to temporal propositions as objects of belief.[8] His reason for resisting the view that there are two possibles objects of belief, corresponding to the two levels of content distinguished by the Moderate Relativist, is that « diachronic agreement or disagreement seems to be, of necessity, a matter of

---

[8] According to Richard (2003 : 41-2), in 'Every time he goes there he thinks that', 'that' does not refer to a temporal proposition denoted by the antecedent 'that'-clause 'that he has been infected with the Ebola virus'. Rather than construe 'that' as a device of cross-reference, we may, « with a fair amount of plausibility », construe it as a device of ellipsis, Richard says (p. 42). On that analysis 'Every time he goes there he thinks that' is *short for* 'Every time he goes there he thinks that he's been infected with the Ebola virus', and in *that* sentence the belief that is ascribed to Bob is temporally specific (eternal) rather than temporally neutral.

agreement or disagreement about something temporally specific » (Richard 2003 : 40). So we are back to Richard's original argument : whether one changes one's mind or retains one's belief is a matter of still believing (or ceasing to believe) the same classical propositions. *When it comes to assessing inter- or intra-individual (dis-)agreement, only classical contents count.* So if we know that Mary retained all of her previous beliefs, we will not conclude that she still believes that Nixon is president even though we know that, twenty years ago, she believed that Nixon was president. On this issue, Richard has not changed his mind from 1981 to 2003, and his objection to temporal propositions as the objects of belief still stands.

*2.3 Reply to Richard*

In response, the Moderate Relativist can point out that belief reports have (at least) two distinct functions. First, one may report someone's beliefs in order to assess their (dis)agreement with either (i) the facts, or (ii) the beliefs of other people, or the beliefs held by the same person at different times, about the same facts. Such belief reports will typically focus on the truth-conditional properties of the belief, hence on its complete content. Second, one may report someone's beliefs in order to link those beliefs to other states or acts of the same person, for example her sensory experiences, her actions, or other beliefs potentially or necessarily held by her. Such belief reports focus not on the truth-conditional properties of the belief but on what McGinn calls its 'intra-individual causal-explanatory role'. This distinction between two functions of belief reports is well-known and it has been extensively documented in the late seventies. In his classical paper on these issues, McGinn writes :

> Our concept of belief combines two separate elements, serving separate concerns : we view beliefs as causally explanatory states of the head whose semantic properties are, from that point of view, as may be ; and we view beliefs as relations to propositions that can be assigned referential truth-conditions, and so point outward to the world. This bifurcation of content can be seen as stemming from the point that beliefs involve internal representations, and these inherently present a dual aspect. (McGinn 1982 : 216)

Since there is this duality in our notion of belief, it is not surprising that there is an ambiguity in a belief report like 'Susan believes that Kate is pregnant'. This may ascribe to Susan either the internal state of believing Kate pregnant, a state one may be in at different times ('relativist' interpretation); or it may ascribe to her a belief with a certain truth-conditional content, which content depends, as we have seen, upon external factors such as the time at which the belief is held ('classical' interpretation). On the latter interpretation, Susan's belief can change from one occurrence of the internal state to the next, even though the internal state itself does not change. At *t*, Susan is in the state of believing Kate pregnant, and she thereby believes the classical proposition that Kate is pregnant at *t* ; at *t'* Susan is in the same state, but the classical proposition she now believes is the (distinct) proposition that Kate is pregnant at *t'*. If, on the classical interpretation, we say that someone's beliefs have not changed, then it follows that she believes all the *classical* propositions she formerly believed ; but it does not follow that her internal doxastic state has not changed. On that interpretation the argument Richard presents as invalid is indeed invalid. From the fact that, at a certain time *t*, Mary was in the state of believing Nixon president, and thereby believed the classical proposition that Nixon is president at *t*, plus the fact that she still believes all the classical propositions she once believed, it does not follow that she still is in the state of believing Nixon president and thereby believes the classical proposition that Nixon is president now.

So, on the classical interpretation of a belief report, the object of belief is indeed the complete content (which we can represent either as a classical proposition, or as an Austinian proposition). But that is not the only possible reading of a belief report. There is another reading, where the ascriber is interested in the intra-individual causal-explanatory role of the ascribed belief. In such cases what matters is the *lekton*, not the complete truth-conditional content.

That we need the *lekton* in such cases has been forcefully argued by Barwise, who gives the following example. Suppose Holmes and Watson face each other. In between stand the salt and the pepper. Holmes says 'The salt is left of the pepper', because the salt is left of the pepper from Holmes's perspective. From Watson's perspective, the pepper is left of the salt; however, Watson is mistaken as to which shaker is which, and he wrongly says 'The salt is left of the pepper'. Holmes and Watson apparently 'say the same thing' (so they express the same *lekton*) but Holmes is right and Watson wrong (so they believe different classical propositions, or

different Austinian propositions, because they each relativize the *lekton* to their own perspective). In the classical framework, Barwise points out,

> we have nothing in the theory that classifies the similarity in attitudes of Holmes and Watson in cases like these. And it is this similarity that leads them to make the same bodily movements, reaching in the same direction, though toward different objects, when they want the salt. (Barwise 1989: 240).[9]

In other words, if what we are interested in is the state Holmes and Watson are both in, and the causal-explanatory role of that state, then we should accept that (in the relevant sense) they believe the same thing : they both have a belief with a certain *lekton* as content, which *lekton* determines different truth-conditions when evaluated with respect to their distinct perspectives. So there is a sense in which Holmes and Watson believe the same thing in that situation, and there is also a sense in which they do not believe the same thing. When arguing that the content of belief must be eternal (classical), Richard simply focusses upon the sense which is relevant to belief reports whose function is to assess (dis)agreement with the facts ; but everybody knows that that is not the sole function of belief reports.

If I am right, shouldn't there be an interpretation in which the argument Richard discusses *is* valid ? Let us reconsider that argument :

[1] Mary believed that Nixon was president
[2] Mary still believes everything she once believed
*Ergo*
[3] Mary believes that Nixon is president

Since [3] does not follow, Richard argues that [1] cannot be interpreted as saying that Mary stood in a certain relation to the temporally indefinite *lekton* <Nixon, being president>; for if it could be so interpreted, [3] would follow. Now I hold that [1] *can* be interpreted in this 'relativist' manner. On that interpretation, indeed, [3] ought to follow

---

[9] A classical theorist could respond that the linguistic meaning of the sentence type (Kaplan's 'character') can be invoked to account for the relevant similarities. See Perry 1979 and Richard 1982. For reasons of space, I have to leave that issue aside.

— but it does not. Does this not show that Richard is right, and the Moderate Relativist wrong ?

I do not think so. The reason why [3] is hard to accept in this context may be due to the fact that the universal quantification over beliefs in premiss [2] has to be understood either as quantifying over complete contents or as quantifying over *lekta*, since those are different sorts of things. Let's assume that a choice has indeed to be made from the outset when interpreting [2]. Then, arguably, the 'classical proposition' interpretation of [2] is more salient, and that is why [3] does not follow from [1] and [2] even though [1] *can* be interpreted as saying that a certain relation obtains between the subject and a temporally indefinite *lekton*. To check that this is correct, we have only to rephrase [2] so as to make the *lekton* interpretation more salient.

To show this, let us go back to the Susan/Kate example and run the Richard argument in that context, while suitably modifying (the counterpart of) premiss [2]. We get :

[1'] Susan believed that Kate was pregnant
[2'] Susan is exactly in the same doxastic state she was in. (Imagine a Rip Van Winkle context in which, unbeknown to her, she has just awaken from a two-year sleep.)
[3'] *Ergo* : she still believes that Kate is pregnant.

This argument seems valid. Now the only substantial thing I have done (besides transposing the example) is change the second premiss in order to force the causal-explanatory reading of the first premiss. That is precisely the reading which Richard wrongly treats as nonexistent. So my example shows that, *pace* Richard, *there is* a reading in which the embedded clause in a belief report like [1] or [1'] is used to pick out the *lekton* rather than the complete content of the ascribed belief.

III. Relativistic Disagreement

*3.1 Shared circumstances*

In responding to Richard's argument, I have conceded that when the point of a belief report is to assess (dis)agreement with the facts or with other people or with oneself

at different times, it is the complete content of the belief that matters, since the complete content is what determines possible-worlds truth-conditions. But this too can be disputed.

There are two types of example which cast doubt on the idea that agreement or disagreement can only be about complete contents. The first type of example involves cases in which all the parties to the conversation are in the same situation — for example, they share their location. In such cases, there is no objection to one of them asserting a place-neutral proposition such as 'Sidney is nearby', true at any place *l* iff Sidney is near *l*. (I borrow the example, and the argument, from Egan forthcoming.) Let us assume the belief-transfer model of assertion, according to which the function of assertion is to transfer belief in the asserted proposition (Stalnaker 1978). In the present case the transfer can be described as follows :

> Speaker A, at place *l*, accepts the place-neutral proposition that Sidney is nearby, and thereby believes the classical proposition that Sidney is near *l*.

> Speaker A asserts the place-neutral proposition that Sidney is nearby.

> As a result, audience B, also at place *l*, comes to accept the place-neutral proposition that Sidney is nearby, and thereby believes the classical proposition that Sidney is near *l*.

Even though what is asserted, and what is transferred, is a place-neutral proposition, the audience comes to believe the same classical propositions as the speaker. Since their situations are the same, the *lekta* cannot determine different truth-conditions with respect to their respective situations. That is why the belief transfer can take place directly at the *lekton* level, in this type of case. So it is not true that the content of assertion can only be the complete content. In shared-situation cases, the *lekta* go proxy for the complete contents (Barwise 1989 : 253), and we can assert them (Egan forthcoming).

Just as we can assert *lekta* in shared-situation cases, we can agree or disagree about them. The function of assertion is to transfer belief : the speaker says something, and the audience is supposed to accept what the speaker has said. Sometimes, however, the speaker says something and the audience does *not* accept

what the speaker has said : they disagree.  Like assertion, disagreement, in shared-situation cases, can be over *lekta*. I say 'Sidney is nearby', and you respond 'No, it isn't'. If our locations were different, there would be no point in so disagreeing about *lekta* : our respectively accepting and denying the place-relative proposition that Sidney is nearby would not entail any truth-conditional incompatibility between our beliefs. But genuine (dis)agreement over *lekta* is possible whenever the situation of evaluation is shared.

This straightforwardly applies to the temporal case : there can be genuine agreement or disagreement over temporally neutral propositions whenever the time of evaluation is shared. If it is not — as in cases of diachronic disagreement — then the content in dispute must be temporally specific. Here, Richard seems to be right : « diachronic agreement or disagreement seems to be, of necessity, a matter of agreement or disagreement about something temporally specific » (Richard 2003 : 40).

Even that has been disputed, however. This brings us to the second type of example which casts doubt on the view that, in matters of agreement or disagreement, only complete contents count.

*3.2 Faultless disagreement*

Sometimes, it seems that we genuinely disagree about a certain *lekton*, even though we are not in the same situation. Thus, looking at a painting, I say : 'This is beautiful'. You disagree : 'No, it's ugly'. In a sense, we are both right, since for me it is beautiful, while for you it is ugly ; but we disagree nonetheless. Or consider epistemic modals. I say 'The treasure might be under the palm tree'. I am right since, for all I know, the treasure might be there — nothing in my epistemic state rules out the treasure's being there. Later, however, I learn that the treasure is not on the island (where the palm tree is). This rules out the treasure's being under the palm tree, and in my new epistemic situation, I assert : 'The treasure cannot be under the palm tree'. Again, I am right since, in my new epistemic situation, there is something that rules out the treasure's being under the palm tree. What is strange, however, is that I can now disagree with my former self. I can say : 'I was wrong — the treasure cannot be under the palm tree'. How can that be ? If I was right, given my epistemic situation then, how can I later judge that I was wrong ?

Such cases of 'faultess disagreement' suggest that sometimes at least, agreement or disagreement is about the *lekton*, even though the disagreeing parties evaluate the *lekton* with respect to distinct situations. This makes sense if one is a Radical Relativist. For a Radical Relativist, the *lekton* is complete. It *is* the content – that which one asserts, believes, and over which one agrees or disagrees with others.[10] The situation of evaluation is not an aspect of content (broadly understood) but something external to content. As Prior puts it,

> Aristotle… says that 'statements and opinions' vary in their truth and falsehoold with the times at which they are made or held, just as concrete things have different qualities at different times ; though the cases are different, because *the changes of truth-value of statements and opinions are not properly speaking changes in these statements and opinions themselves, but reflexions of changes in the objects to which they refer* (a statement being true when what it says is so, and ceasing to be true when that ceases to be so. (Prior 1967 : 16 ; emphasis mine)

So a Radical Relativist has a story to tell about faultless disagreement, and that involves giving up the claim that agreement or disagreement in non-shared situations is of necessity a matter of agreement or disagreement about classical

---

[10] MacFarlane protests that in many cases, *he* does not take the *lekton* to be complete, even though he is a Radical Relativist : « So, for example, I could say (with the temporalist) that the time of utterance is not part of the *lekton*, but rather part of what a use of the *lekton* concerns, and still tell my story about the assessment-sensitivity of future contingents » (MacFarlane, p.c.). But MacFarlane's Radical Relativism is not absolute, as we have seen (footnote 3) : MacFarlane is a Radical Relativist with respect to some examples but not with respect to others. My claim is conditional : *if* one is a Radical Relativist with respect to a given type of sentence, e.g. 'The treasure may be under the palm tree', whose truth-value is relative to something in addition to a possible world (in this case, an epistemic state), *then* one holds that the *lekton*, that is, the content of the sentence independent of that thing, is complete and can be the object or assertion, belief, or (dis)agreement.

content. (Strangely enough, Mark Richard is, or seems to be, among the recent advocates of Radical Relativism — see Richard 2004.)

Some authors have claimed that faultless disagreement merely calls for a distinction between the content over which we agree or disagree (the *lekton*) and the utterance's possible-world truth-conditions (Kölbel, this volume ; Lasersohn 2005[11]). The latter depend upon, and covary with, the situation of evaluation. On this view the Moderate Relativist framework, with its distinction between two levels of content, is sufficient to account for faultless disagreement. I think these authors are mistaken, however. There are plenty of cases in which we must distinguish between the *lekton* and the complete content, but in which there can be no genuine (dis)agreement about the *lekton*. Thus I call you on the phone, and commenting upon my situation I say 'It is raining'. If you say 'No, it isn't', meaning that there is no rain in *your* situation, there is misunderstanding rather than genuine disagreement. Or, adapting Barwise's example, suppose that Watson says 'The salt is left of the pepper', and Holmes, speaking from his own perspective, replies 'No it is not'. Clearly, there is no substantive disagreement here. If Watson and Holmes are each talking about their own perspective (distinct from that of the other), there is misunderstanding rather than genuine disagreement. The same considerations apply to the temporal case. At time *t*, you say 'It is raining'. Later, when the sun is shining again, you say 'It is not raining'. You cannot conclude 'so I was wrong'. Here, as Richard points out, genuine disagreement can only be about temporally specific contents.

So Moderate Relativism by itself, with its two levels of content, does not provide a solution to the problem of faultless disagreement, contrary to what Kölbel and Lasersohn believe. This does not mean that no solution is available within the Moderate Relativist framework, however. I think a solution is available, along the following lines.[12]

---

[11] My comments on Lasersohn's paper are based upon a draft dated 2004.

[12] I will discuss only a case involving standards of taste. Whether the type of solution I put forward extends to other cases (such as epistemic modals) is an issue I will leave for further research. (See von Fintel and Gillies 2004 and 2006 for a step in that direction.)

*3.3 Speaking for the community*

The speaker says 'The painting is beautiful', and her audience disagrees. In the Moderate Relativist framework, the statement that the painting is beautiful must be evaluated with respect to some esthetic standards, but those standards cannot be *the speaker's* aesthetic standards. If that were the case, then the speaker's 'It is beautiful' and the audience's reply 'No, it's ugly' would *not* contradict each other. When the speaker says 'It's beautiful', she means something intuitively stronger than merely 'It is beautiful by my standards' or 'I find it beautiful'. To be sure, when realizing that the audience does not share her taste, the speaker may retreat to the weaker statement : 'I find it beautiful'. This gives us a hint as to what the proper analysis of the stronger, unqualified statement should be. I suggest the following : 'It is beautiful' means something like *It is beautiful for us*, that is, for the community to which the speaker and his audience belong. When the audience says 'No it isn't', the speaker realizes that the stronger statement is incorrect (since the audience does not actually find the painting beautiful), and she retreats to the weaker statement.

Lasersohn has an objection to that analysis. Were it correct, he says, it would not be possible for the speaker to *maintain* the stronger statement and keep disagreeing with his audience. But this is clearly possible :

    A :    This painting is beautiful.
    B :    No, it's ugly.
    A :    I tell you it is beautiful !
    B :    Absolutely ugly !

To handle this type of counter-example, we must introduce a certain flexibility as to what counts as 'the community' from whose point of view the *lekton* is meant to be evaluated. I may judge that my audience deviates, by her bad taste, from the esthetic standards of the community to which we both belong, those standards being fixed by e.g. the community's experts. This enables me to disagree with my audience, even though what I claim is that the painting is beautiful *for us*, i.e., for our community.

Whether, at the second step, the speaker retreats to the weaker statement ('I find it beautiful') or not ('I tell you it's beautiful !'), the right conclusion to draw is that there is *no* genuine faultless disagreement in those cases (Stojanovic forthcoming).

The speaker who retreats to the weaker statement realizes that he was *mistaken* when he assumed that the painting was beautiful for both him and his audience ; so he was at fault. And when the speaker refuses to retreat and maintains his position, because he « judges that his audience deviates, by her bad taste, from the esthetic standards of the community to which they both belong, those standards being fixed by e.g. the community's experts », he finds *her* at fault. In both cases, there is genuine disagreement but it is not faultless. Nor are those cases cases in which the speaker and his audience evaluate the *lekton* with respect to different standards: they both appeal to the standards of the community to which they belong.

Those, however, are the simple cases. More difficult to handle is the following case (inspired from an example by Lasersohn). Suppose the speaker finds the painting beautiful, *and no one else (and in particular, no expert) does*. Suppose, moreover, that the speaker knows that he is alone in finding the painting beautiful. Still, as the opinionated person he is, he maintains : 'This is beautiful !' Clearly, he does not mean simply that *he* finds the painting beautiful. He refuses to retreat, and maintains the stronger claim. Can we handle that example consistently with the view that 'This is beautiful' means *This is beautiful for us* ? Can we maintain that the speaker, even in such a case, appeals to the standards of the community ?

I think we can. As Johan Brännmark writes (in connection with moral judgments),

> When speaking for a collective, I cannot deviate from its present view without ceasing to speak for the collective. But communities are multi-generational and by their very nature they always have one foot in the future... So I think we can distinguish between two ways in which we can speak for the community : first, there is the purely representative one ; second, there is a progressive one. In passing progressive moral judgment *I am deviating from the present community in the direction towards which I find that the community would move if the people in it thought things through really well*. (Brännmark forthcoming : 18 ; emphasis mine).

In this sort of case — when no appeal to experts is relevant and each of the two disputants is expressing his or her own taste and trying to impose it — it makes sense to say that they are « both right », even though they disagree : for they are

both entitled to interpret the community's standards the way they want in passing progressive judgment. This freedom explains how they can disagree about the truth-value of 'This is beautiful' even though, in evaluating the statement, *they both appeal to the standards of the community*. This is possible because the standards in question are not fixed once for all — they are up to us. Each of us can contribute to shaping them, and this is what we do in this type of case when we say 'It is beautiful' or 'It is ugly'. Austin would perhaps make this point by saying that there is a performative element in such statements.

If we accept this explanation of the phenomenon, we can maintain that agreement or disagreement is about complete contents, except when the situation of evaluation is shared (in which case the *lekton* can go proxy for the complete content). Alleged 'faultless disagreement' cases such as those we have discussed are no exception. In such cases, the disagreement is about the Austinian proposition consisting of the *lekton* together with the standards of the community.[13] The speaker says that the painting is beautiful (for the community), and the audience denies that it is beautiful (for the community). The disagreement ultimately bears upon what the community standards are, or should be. If the disagreement bears upon what the community standards *are*, it is not faultless. If, as in the last case we considered, it bears upon what the standards *should be*, then it is, arguably, faultless, but even in that case the disagreement is over the complete content.

## References

Barwise, J. (1989). Situations, facts, and true propositions. In his collection *The Situation in Logic*, Stanford : CSLI Publications, pp. 221-54.

Barwise, J. and J. Etchemendy (1987). *The Liar : An Essay on Truth and Circularity*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Brännmark, J. (forthcoming). Speaking for the Community : On Morality and We-Judgments. *Ms.*

Dummett, M. (forthcoming). Existence, possibility and time. *Ms.*

---

[13] Since both disputants implicitly appeal to the standards of the community, we can also treat that case as a case in which the situation of evaluation is shared.

Egan, A. (forthcoming). Epistemic Modals, Relativism and Assertion. *Ms.*

Evans, G. (1985). Does tense logic rest on a mistake? In his *Collected Papers*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 343-363.

Fintel, K.v. and Gillies, A (2004). « Might » Made Right. *Ms.*

Fintel, K.v. and Gillies, A (2006). CIA leaks. *Ms.*

Frege, G. (1967). *Kleine Schriften*. Hildesheim : Olms.

Garcia-Carpintero, M. (this volume). Relativism, Vagueness, and What is Said.

Geach, P. (1955). Review of Mates 1953. *Philosophical Review* 64 : 143-5.

Hintikka, J. (1973). *Time and Necessity : Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality*. Oxford : Clarendon Press.

Kaplan, D. (1989). Demonstratives. In Almog, J., Perry, J. and Wettstein, H. (eds.), *Themes from Kaplan*, New York : Oxford University Press, pp. 481-563.

King, J. (2003). Tense, Modality, and Semantic Values. *Philosophical Perspectives* 17 : 195-245.

Kölbel, M. (this volume). Increasing the Adicity of a Truth-Predicate.

Lasersohn, P. (2005). Context Dependence, Disagreement, and Predicates of Personal Taste. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 28: 643–686*.*

Mates, B. (1953). *Stoic Logic*. University of California Press.

MacFarlane, J. (2003). Future Contingents and Relative Truth. The *Philosophical Quarterly* 53 : 321-336.

MacFarlane, J. (forthcoming). Nonindexical Contextualism. *Ms.*

McGinn, C. (1982). The Structure of Content. In Woodfield, A. (ed.), *Thought and Object*, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 207-58.

Perry, J. (1979). The Problem of the Essential Indexical. Reprinted in Perry 1993, pp. 33-52.

Perry, J. (1986). Thought without Representation. Reprinted in Perry 1993, pp. 205-19.

Perry, J. (1993). *The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays*. New York : Oxford University Press.

Prior, A. (1967). *Past, Present and Future*. Oxford : Clarendon Press.

Prior, A. (1977), with K. Fine. *Worlds, Times and Selves*. London : Duckworth.

Recanati, F. (1996). Domains of Discourse. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 19 : 445-75.

Recanati, F. (1997). The Dynamics of Situations. *European Review of Philosophy* 2: 41-75

Recanati, F. (2000). *Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta. An Essay on Metarepresentation.* Cambridge, Mass : MIT Press/Bradford Book.

Richard, M. (1981). Temporalism and Eternalism. *Philosophical Studies* 39 : 1-13.

Richard, M. (1982). Tense, Propositions, and Meanings. *Philosophical Studies* 41 : 337-51.

Richard, M. (2003). Introduction to Part I : The Philosophy of Tensed Language. In Jokic, A. and Smith, Q. (eds.), *Time, Tense and Reference*, Cambridge, Mass : MIT Press/Bradford Books, 25-45.

Richard, M. (2004). Contextualism and Relativism. *Philosophical Studies* 119 : 215-42.

Stalnaker, R. (1978). Assertion. *Syntax and Semantics* 9 : 315-32.

Stanley, J. and Z. Szabo (2000). On Quantifier Domain Restriction. *Mind and Language* 15 : 219-61.

Stojanovic, I. (forthcoming). Talking about Taste : Disagreement, Implicit Arguments and Relativized Contents. *Ms.*