

**US Foreign Policy to Pakistan, 1947-1960:
Re-Constructing Strategy**

by

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ABSTRACT

The thesis analyses US policy to Pakistan between 1947 and 1960 by using a theoretical framework beyond the positivist-empiricist nexus that dominates much of International Relations and especially its dominant school, Realism. This nexus considers the world to be self-evident, which requires independent observers to passively pick up. The thesis rejects this epistemological position by demonstrating that reality is interdependent between subject and object, that knowing reality depends on the subject that is analysing as much as the object that is being analysed. The first part of this thesis thus develops a framework to accommodate this interdependence, one based on identity narratives. Identity narratives are accounts of how the self came to be, where it came from, what it is and where it is going. These stories explain how political subjects categorise, attach meaning and ultimately engage reality. Thus, four American identities, with corresponding narratives, are selected: exceptionalism, capitalism, Anglo-Saxon and missionary. Further, a meta-identity in anti-communism is also used.

This framework is applied on archival and other material relating to US policy to Pakistan between 1947 and 1960. The thesis demonstrates Washington's exclusive deployment of its anti-communist narrative to understand Pakistan since America could only categorise and attach meaning to Pakistan in the context of communist issues and could not fit into any other American identity narrative. Initially in 1947, American failed to make sense of Pakistan given the speed of Pakistan's creation, American distraction elsewhere and its inability to place Karachi into any of its identity narratives. However, as the anti-communist identity intensified, as it did during 1950-1954, Pakistan was attached meaning as a supporter of America's anti-communist narrative and therefore was engaged as an ally, located in the communist-vulnerable Middle East. When American anti-communism eased and Pakistan overtly abandoned its anti-communist guise, both of which occurred during 1957-1960, Pakistan lost meaning to America, which led to American attempts to disengage Pakistan. Interestingly, neither of America's two policies, being the engagement and disengagement of Pakistan, was especially dependent on calculations of Pakistan's military or economic contribution to the Cold War. In contrast, policy to India reflected the dialectic deployment of anti-communist *and* missionary narratives for Washington re-located the continuation of its missionary identity narrative through India after China's sudden rejection of its aged role within that narrative.

PREFACE

One underlying personal trait that has perhaps been reflected in this thesis is that there is probably no human consensus that has universally and historically stood its ground without fundamental change or rejection. This belief has manifested itself in two strands during the subsequent analysis of US foreign policy to Pakistan prior to the Kennedy administration. First, there is the rejection of the dominant Realist approach to International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis – a rejection incidentally which dates back to the 1980s at least. That the methodological, epistemological and ontological assumptions of the power politics framework oft associated with Hobbes, Machiavelli and in modern times, Morgenthau, were dismembered several years before I started my thesis means that I therefore add little value to this debate.

The second manifestation of my anti-consensus bias forms the crux of this thesis, being the construction of a way, alternative to Realism, of analysing American policy to Pakistan. Few ‘facts’ of political life are as embedded in the fabric of Muslim reality as is the notion of a Western conspiracy premised on hard Realist assumptions either against Islam or the Muslim ‘Ummah’. The pervasion of this consensus is a global Muslim phenomenon, which is harnessed by the savvy urban Western metropolitan Muslim as much as the illiterate villager in the deep outback. In fact, the Rushdie case and the Gulf War, prime evidences in the conspiracy argument, triggered my own ruminations in this direction and eventually drew me into the subject matter of International Relations proper. I have however demonstrated in this thesis that not only is the power politics prism for US policy to Pakistan severely lacking during the selected period in which archival material is plentiful and available, but that an alternative understanding outside of the positivist-empiricist bankruptcy can yield a more effective insight into Washington’s policy – one which clearly avoids the entire conspiracy debate. Why for instance, I ask my Realist colleagues, did Washington ally itself from 1950 to 1954 with a Pakistan that was militarily, politically and economically weak and in the process incurred the wrath of the more powerful India?

That Pakistan represents the object state of US policy in this thesis is not surprising given that aside from its large Muslim population, not only did my own parents emigrate from there, but also my frequent interaction with its society and culture. There is much good in the people of Pakistan but whether I should be expectant of Pakistan’s upper societal or foreign policy strata to assess or engage anything of what I have written is however a different case, since Pakistan’s ‘educated’ classes, both indigenous and expatriate, have tended to exemplify neatly Einstein’s concerns about capitalism’s corruption of education,

“The crippling of individuals I consider the worst evil of capitalism. Our whole educational system suffers from this evil. An exaggerated competitive attitude is inculcated into the student, who is trained to worship acquisitive success (and the glorification of power) as a prerequisite for a future career.”¹

¹ A Einstein, “Why Socialism” Monthly Review, Volume 1

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On a final and personal note, my Lord has granted me abundant mercy that has been expressed in a multitude of forms, and for which I am infinitely grateful. I first want to thank my academic supervisor, Dr Christopher Coker, for his invaluable role in my thesis. His critical observations, help in locating material and constructive advice made my researching and writing this thesis a highly enjoyable and hassle-free experience and I shall sorely miss the regularity of our dryly humoured interaction. I also want to thank for their comments on my thesis, Professor Fred Halliday, Dr Khalid Al Mansour, Lord Meghnad Desai, and Mark Hoffman under whom I was also fortunate to complete my undergraduate degree. I am also grateful to the staff at the British Library of Political and Economic Science, the British Library, the University of London Senate House Library and the US Congress Library for their assistance.

At one level of something of an extended family, I have drawn support from, been forced to clarify my own thinking in order to explain and been brought back to earth repeatedly by my close gem-like friends in Reza 'Style' Adil, Dr Amir 'Donkey' Sheikh, Usman 'Greenspan' Aslam, Shahzad 'Negotiate' Bhatti and Hassan 'Lala' Khan. Within that group, there has also been Ali 'Smooth' Miraj whose astute forensic chartered accounting skills and International Relations background proved priceless. Symptomatic of the prevalence in Pakistan's educated classes of Einstein's concerns, perhaps the only adult outside of my household who actively encouraged my pursuing academia and life outside of banking's bankruptcy was Zakia Zubairi. I owe her thanks for having faith in me, which I drew upon when others frowned at my 'lack of ambition'. I also want to express appreciation for our many close family friends who have been there when we needed them, but especially the Adata's and Manzur's though this acknowledgement does neither their kindness nor our relationship the remotest of justice.

Finally, within our household, my brother and sister have had to put up with a lot while I have been engrossed in my thesis – admission of which will no doubt stretch their scientific smiles. I want to thank Asim and Farheen for their lenience while I have been engrossed in my work, an appreciation that also genuinely extends to the more recent arrivals of Isabelle and Sophia Ali into our household. I also have to thank Saman for her tolerance and support during my studies. The early stages of marriage do not deserve to be burdened with the type of heavy work load that this study has often demanded, especially since hopes of summer walks through Hyde Park or Sunday brunches in the West End were quickly dashed into my incoherent monologue brainstormings or my rushing from one text to the next.

Ultimately, the core expression of my Lord's Mercy has been through my parents. I am tempted to start by thanking my mother for the use of her dining table as my study centre for something close to a decade. I will of course resist the temptation. Yet in seriousness, without their sacrifices, love, support and dedication, it is impossible that I would either be as contented as I am or completing any formal studies whatsoever. Mom and Dad have played different and contrasting roles in this context and without the other, the platform on which I stand would certainly not exist. Nonetheless, this thesis's dedication, emphatically so as it is my first dedicated accomplishment, is to my mother under whose feet, the light of my heavens break through.

*When there was no land and no sky,
When there was absolutely nothing,
There was only You, there was only You*

Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan, "Allah Hoo"

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CHAPTER ONE

THE SUBJECTIVITY OF OBJECTIVITY: OPENING SPACE

International Relations academia ('IR') has been dominated by a single methodological and epistemological commitment, giving rise to a particular understanding of political reality. None of the subject's great debates, being those amongst Idealism, Realism and Behaviouralism ever involved detailed discussions of epistemology.¹ Underlying these theories is a nexus of Empiricist epistemology and Positivist methodology, a hugely unreflective and insolvent commitment, which suffocates traditional IR. Thus, this chapter's early part – to critique the nexus and open space for alternative analysis of international relations. From this, follows the chapter's mainstay, which is to provide an alternative construct to understand international relations and to deploy in the understanding of US policy to Pakistan between 1947 and 1960. This approach, it is intended, will provide explanatory insight beyond the traditional nexus by integrating into policy engagement the subject's role in constructing its object reality. The hub of this framework, as is later demonstrated, is identity and identity narratives, and specifically the stories we tell both others and ourselves to create and protect the self.

Before continuing, one issue confronting the current critical theories is the absence of stable terms. The flexible use of terms is confusing and thus needs immediate clarification.ⁱ Positivism is a methodology to understanding knowledge, and combines Objectivism and Naturalism. The latter is the commitment to understanding scientific and social reality through identical methods and assumes the existence of regularities

ⁱ For instance, Positivism is used in three ways in IR – as Empiricism, as a methodology and finally as Behaviouralism.

in both worlds. Objectivism claims that objective knowledge of reality is humanly possible. The most influential variant of Positivism in the social sciences moved away from Logical Positivism's insistence that all knowledge should be based on the principles of physics, and is based on four canons. First, that objective confirmation of scientific theory should conform to deductive logic. Second, that empirical verification is scientific. Third, that there is a distinction between fact and theory, with facts being theoretically neutral. Finally, the idea that establishing a causal relationship is a matter of discovering the invariant temporal relationship between observed events.

Positivism however must rely on a theory of how reality is known, an epistemology, and for this, it relies on Foundationalism's dominant strand, Empiricism, which grounds knowledge of reality purely on experience.ⁱⁱ Foundationalism more broadly assumes the integrity and neutrality of the human senses, insisting in Man's infallible knowledge of certain first principles, which can be used to build (secondary) knowledge. Epistemology should not be confused with ontology, being the study of the nature of reality and its principal categories even though the pair are closely linked – the categories used to filter reality, being an ontological issue, inevitably reflect and impact epistemology.

The Foundationalist will to knowledge, developed within modernity, reinforced an ancient Greece embryo into collective wisdom – the subject's independence from the

ⁱⁱ The second but unfashionable Foundationalist epistemology is Rationalism. Originating largely with Descartes and Leibniz, it insists that the senses cannot comprehend the mechanisms behind the observables. Rationalists thus use reason to link observations with laws. Aside from the difficulties of subject stability, which is later addressed, there is also the problematic notion of reason within analysis given that it is itself constitutive of and by the reality that it is trying to comprehend. There is thus more than a single 'reason', a highly intuitive concept, behind everything.

object.² During the Enlightenment, especially given science's development within Foundationalism, political modernity distanced subject from object. Acutely aware of its historical moment, the Enlightenment renewed confidence in mankind's ability to know the world, a transition from medievalism and into reason, a project which Kant described as mankind's 'dare to know'. Henceforth, the sciences and social sciences assumed that the rational and autonomous subject could objectively understand the knowledge of reality, being independent and stable. Thus at modernism's core was the distinction between fact and theory. The ontological and arbitrarily selected dualities within which reality developed, such as individual/society, capitalism/socialism, negative/positive, rational/irrational, mind/body, dominated the knowledge arena so extensively that deliberation beyond was stifled and disintegrated.

Most epistemological discussion until the 1960s focused on how this autonomous and independent subject could rely on sense perception to know reality. Thus, the focus was on the integrity, not the neutrality, of the human senses. Within this framework, the standard definition of knowledge became 'justified true belief', often called the tripartite account. Even Gettier's counter-example to this definition, and Nozick's Conditional Theory assumed a neutral subject, passively reacting to reality.³

Perceptual Realism, distinct from IR Realism, still persists in the belief that the objects that we perceive have at least some basic natural qualities to them, that at least part of their nature is independent of the perceiver.

Criticisms of modernism, and Foundationalism in particular, stem ultimately from Nietzsche, and can be presented in two related themes.⁴ Firstly, an attack on modernity's universalism. Modernism defines itself as an era of rational and objective

thought despite its epistemological stagnation and resemblance, in Foundationalism, to pre-modernity. Yet Adorno and Horkheimer argued that far from reason and science promoting liberty, they actually encourage false absolutisms between truths and falsehoods, influencing popular perceptions of the socially abnormal and justifying cruelties to misfits such as the old or sick who are desegregated into institutions.⁵

The second and more germane theme is the attack on the concept of the independent and neutral subject. In this regard, two epistemic tensions remained unresolved until Nietzsche, being faith in reason as an instrument to discover reality and the existence of a foundation of knowledge, a starting premise to build knowledge from. The Positivist-Empiricist nexus closed thinking space and suffocated alternative analysis, by making objective claims about reality, when in fact objectivity is impossible.⁶ Reality lacks self-evident qualities that enable it to define or identify itself,

“An enquiry into a series of facts to discover the relations between them presupposes a ‘concept’ that permits one to distinguish that series from other possible series of facts. How can there take place a choice of facts to be adduced as proof of the truth of one’s own assumption if one does not have a pre-existing criterion of choice? But what is this criterion of choice to be, if not something superior to each single fact under enquiry?”⁷

Einstein, Heisenberg and later Kuhn undermined Empiricism and Foundationalism from within science.⁸ Each cast doubt on the notion of an objective factual world as the foundation of knowledge or as the basis of scientific inquiry. Heisenberg explained,

“In atomic physics, observations can no longer be objectified in such a simple manner; that is they cannot be referred to something that takes place objectively or in a describable manner in space and time (thus) the science of nature does not deal with nature itself but in fact *with the science of nature as man thinks and describes it*” (emphasis added).⁹

This critique was further explored in Willard Quine’s essay ‘Two Dogmas of Experience’, which summarised two fundamental objections to the Empiricist view.¹⁰

First, that there was little to differentiate analytical and subjective statements since even basic analytical statements were not immune to revision by experience. Second, Empiricism’s claim to rest on pure observation was simply chimerical. Even basic observations require a web of belief that is more complex than the simple act of observation. There are no pure truths, no facts without interpretation, which in turn always and implicitly invoke a theory. Wittgenstein also touched exactly this issue through Foundationalism’s ‘Regress Problem’, by noting that, “at the foundation of well-founded beliefs lies belief that is unfounded”.¹¹

Put simply, irrespective of the selection of epistemology and methodology, there can neither be objective observation nor raw experience. Conceptual commitments, ontological categories, and sub-theoretical frameworks always affect observation and experience. There is no continuous structure of truth since knowledge has a historical dimension, which has no grounded principles. Reality as understood is a discursive reality, the construction of which reflects a subtle, functional and diffuse power form, stemming *from and within* all human relationships; analysis outside of this discourse

risks being marginalised.¹² Thus, the commanding relationship between power and production in which knowledge is not power, but a function of power. Truth is not reality, but *of* subject and reality, and reflective of particular discourses. The subject is implicated in the same power relationships, which allow the theoretical analysis to function, tightening the self further into the network of knowledge and power. Adorno noted science's terrorisation from this platform of philosophy, as also of religious thought. Scientific truth is not philosophical or religious truth, nor is there a hierarchy of truth amongst the three.¹³ Subjecting philosophy or religion to scientific investigation or criteria is analogous to analysing cricket with golfing laws and practice.ⁱⁱⁱ

There is neither a quick fix solution, nor a dais from which to redeem the truth – for none exists. Those who suggest that objective and pure analysis is possible, who insist on an Archimedean privileged point, cannot however provide it. At best, the subject can be aware of its limitations and seek to develop more sophisticated approaches, which in themselves while making ontological and epistemological assumptions, can be distinguished only in their pluralism, heterogeneity and self-consciousness, not their certainty. This thesis does not dispute reality's existence, but the assumption by most scientists and social analysts of the existence of an independent, stable and objective reality. If in reading this, one can within a specific framework simultaneously hold a collection of atoms, a thin object, a fuel and a weapon, a smooth object and even a rough object, the plethora of further 'objective' observations is immense, a point well articulated in a lesson given by George Lucas's

ⁱⁱⁱ Those for instance who seek to demonstrate scientific proofs for their religion or philosophy do their cause no favour, for science's own methodological, epistemological and ontological commitments render its search for the truth as meaningless.

venerable Jedi Master, Qui-Gon Jinn to the young Anakin Skywalker, “Your focus determines your reality”.¹⁴ Miner’s account further illustrates the point,

“The daily body ritual performed by everyone includes a mouth-rite. Despite the fact that these people are so punctilious about care of the mouth, this rite involves a practice which strikes the uninitiated stranger as revolting. It was reported to me that the ritual consists of inserting a small bundle of hog hairs into the mouth, along with certain magical powders, and then moving the bundle in a highly formalized series of gestures.”¹⁵

That Miner chose to describe the common modern Western routine of teeth brushing is not instantly obvious. Yet his particular categorising and attaching of meaning to the everyday process changes not reality itself but having altered the subject’s dominant discourse framework, reveals an analysis that bears no resemblance to how teeth brushing is commonly understood as.

This broad critique has significant implications for the humanities. For instance, the project of Mohammed Iqbal, the Indian poet-philosopher, shatters in its search alone for seeking, “nothing less than a direct vision of Reality”.¹⁶ In assuming the modernist neutrality of the subject who accesses from the fountain of knowledge, a pure insight of God, Iqbal’s project, like those of almost every modernist philosopher, is stillborn. His insistence that thought is, “incapable of limitation and cannot remain imprisoned” and is therefore able to understand the infinite, ignores the subject’s categorising and attaching meaning to reality, or put differently, reality’s partial creation by the

subject. There is in Iqbal, as in nearly every modernist thinker, scant if any notion of the subject in creating the reality that it engages. It is all too evident that Iqbal is caught in his own goldfish bowl.

The Empiricist-Positivist nexus's closing of space is not mere coffee table chat.^{iv}

Realism's dominance, which relies on this nexus, has encouraged theory into practice.

Practitioners have predominantly employed Realist notions of the international order as justification for war, genocide and to reinforce a variety of human silences.

Realism's reality, obsessed with power, anarchy and the privileging of the state as the primary agency in human relations is based on Positivism's distinction between facts on one side and theories and values on another, which has also helped practitioners accept search engines with Realist assumptions for Realist policies.

Not only does the subject craft the object, but clearly the object places limitations on the definition and meaning imparted by its subject. That the subject's epistemic and ontological frameworks mediate reality does not mean that reality consists exclusively of the subjects' understanding of reality. The mere physical characteristics of an object create an outer perimeter, however vague, within which the subject enjoys immense cognitive scope. Consequently, all analysis reflects an interdependence of subject and object. Yet none of the Foundationalist epistemologies, nor Positivism, accept the active role of the subject in categorising and attaching meaning to object reality. The rejection of the stability of the subject-object nexus initiated the

^{iv} One further consequence is the irreconcilable nature of the inter-paradigm debates. Realists and Pluralists see different realities and test their theories against different sources and meanings. Each theory filters political reality into different concepts and categories, preventing a genuine dialogue. Using Kuhn's paradigms, each paradigm constructs its own basic units of reference and tensions, with its own language and criteria for judgement. The theories to talk at, and not with, each other.

deconstruction of the subject, which Genette, Foucault and Barthes described as the 'death' of the author, or the shattering of the unity of the subject. From this, space is opened in IR for re-assessing political reality.¹⁷

Re-Constructing Realities

Given the interdependence of subject and object, analysis, including of foreign policy, must recognise the subject's role in seeing and giving meaning to its reality, before engaging it. Hence, the rejection of the final stages of the Foucaultian project, to reconstruct the subject by untying the, "knots that historians have patiently tied" to produce "pure description".¹⁸ A conceptual problem with this project is that it ignores its own new subject-object interdependence problematic. The conversion of a subject located in its own dominant socio-intellectual epoch with its ontological framework into a new object, merely creates a new subject – object relationship in which the 'Foucaultian' analyst assumes the role of subject. As post-positivist approaches insist, there is no Archimedean point to redeem analysis from since analysis is inherently trapped in particular regimes and can only operate from within specific terrains. The first person perspective, fundamental to objectivity since Augustine's inwardness of identity in search of God, is no more truthful than the second person perspective. Despite the wave of quasi-religious Foucaultism which has swept parts of the humanities, it is therefore impossible to develop a pure description of events by reconstructing the ordering of knowledge in a given epoch to understand the possibility for the emergence of any particular statement.

Foucault's ambition to pure objectivity also confronts a less conceptual obstacle, one that parallels Popperian concerns about totalitarian oppression and is succinctly described by Bloom:

“The study of history and of culture teaches that all the world was mad in the past; men always thought they were right, and that led to wars, persecutions, slavery, xenophobia, racism, and chauvinism. The point is not to correct the mistakes and really be right; rather it is not to think you are right at all.”¹⁹

The twentieth century is abound with examples of extensions of the Enlightenment project's knowing of and will towards romanticised exemplars, individual, societal and otherwise. The transition from believing in such ideals, then desiring them and finally obliging them on non-consenting others has a lengthy and painful subscription. Hitler's extermination of Slavs, Jews, homosexuals and gypsies is perhaps the premier twentieth century example of this aspect of the Enlightenment's logical conclusion. Yet notwithstanding its unusual crudity and scale, it is not isolated. Nehru's imposition of an artificially constructed India on dissenting minorities, Israel's expelling of Palestinians from Biblical Judea and West Pakistan's massacre of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971 were or are each premised on the imposition of romanticised ideals upon those unable to effectively resist.

Despite the impossibility of overcoming the subject-object interdependence, by refocusing analysis towards a subject that is responsible for seeing and attaching meaning to a reality, analytical tools enable a more refined insight. This, to

emphasise, does not mean that objective analyses is attainable; the subjective nature of objectivity is inherently a dissent for pluralism. To reposition is not to substitute, “it is rather to enrich one form of analysis with the insights of another”.²⁰ The destruction of a neutral analytical position leaves IR with bracing challenges because if analysis depends on a subject first categorising, then give meaning to and finally engaging a reality, foreign policy analysis can be re-analysed as the actors’ constructions of their reality, followed by reality engagement – the more conventional landscape of foreign policy analysis. To incorporate the subject-object interdependence, foreign policy academia must explore the first two stages of this problematic, the categorising (or seeing) and the attaching of meaning to political realities, critical stages that have hitherto attracted sub-skeletal study. That this is so, is paradoxical, since it is within the two earlier stages that realities are created and policy motives crystallised, which any subsequent ‘strategic’ engagement (conventional foreign policy) is hostage to. The cognitive construction of reality, not its engagement, is the primary policy consideration.²¹

Precisely how subjects construct realities is an intellectual black hole, which deserves exploration beyond this thesis’s remit. There is no all-encompassing explanation of how mankind sees or attaches meaning to reality as it does. Nor can there be, since the subject-object interdependence problematic would intrude even here. No single discipline can provide the solution, not least since these disciplines have themselves been categorised and developed within evolutions of and within particular subject-object terrains (often Western European culture and academia). The prisms of, for instance, physics as Kuhn has demonstrated, are contingent upon ‘paradigms’, which are akin to whole frameworks of subject-object interdependencies.²² Given these

insurmountable tensions, and the distraction from the thesis's focus, the alternative proposed is the construction of a coherent mechanism that furthers insight into how subjects categorise, give meaning to and finally engage reality.

Conventional foreign policy analysis skirts the problem of constructing reality.

McMahon, as a typical example, concludes that Washington's Cold War policy was driven not by, "material gain or geopolitical advantage", but by,

"amorphous - and largely illusory - military, strategic, and psychological fears...the threats to American interests by Moscow and Beijing were greatly exaggerated seems, in retrospect, blindingly obvious."²³

Kovel takes further this explanation of America's policy through the creation and use of a shapeless, unexplored yet highly convenient "overriding black hole".²⁴

Subjectivists offer a different gloss by coating the black box with a misperception-truth dialectic, thereby insisting that the Cold War was a function of mutual misreadings of various truths but stops short by failing to explore the ontology and discourse of the misreading in any significant detail.²⁵ These, as are most foreign policy analyses of America's Cold War policy, are spurious explanations for a US\$8 trillion military investment over forty years and eight presidents.²⁶ Yet it is precisely this convenient box of illusions that also holds the genesis of an alternative analysis – one that emphasises the subject, with closer analysis thereof, at the object's expense. Central to this framework is identity.

Identity

Despite identity's widespread discussion in psychology, and in the works of three of the most prominent social theorists of the last half-century in Habermas, Giddens and Parsons, identity as either a cognitive filter or behavioural imperative is rarely used in IR, being largely confined to discussions of ethnicity or nationalism and removed from explanations of the seeing of reality and the attaching of meaning. Yet identity provides considerable explanatory insight into international relations within the challenges of the subject-object interdependence.

Psychology has four major uses of identity. Experimental social psychology assumes the self can recognise itself as a unique processor of information, an awareness that emerges after about the age of two.²⁷ Within this approach, self-perception, and not introspection, is used to achieve self-knowledge. However, experimental social psychology, popular in North America, is premised on Watson's behaviouristic paradigm, with its curious obsession with hard 'scientific' facts and theories. Watson insisted that psychology could only study aspects of human behaviour that could be both measured and observed by more than one person – that is, psychologists should confine themselves to behaviour and ignore private mental processes.²⁸ Even in its most qualitative format, being Smith's Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis ('IPA'), which focuses on how people feel, the commitment to an (externally) knowable domain of facts about human experience persists.²⁹ The behaviourist basis of this approach leads Freeman to paradoxically describe it as the lifeless study of lifeless human beings.³⁰

Humanistic psychology, represented in the works of Abraham Maslow, Carl Rogers and George Kelly, has a greater focus on individual psycho-dynamics, and especially the uniqueness of meanings and perceptions within human experience.³¹ This branch of psychology seeks to capture the individual's subjective and perceptive understanding of self and environment. Using more qualitative approaches than experimental social psychology, such as auto/biographical and individual case-study methods, humanistic psychology places a strong emphasis on the individual. However, in doing so, it also over-emphasises human agency in the self's conception since implicit in humanistic psychology is that a true, stable and real self exists within.

Third, psychoanalytic or psychodynamic psychology makes extensive use of identity with its two base identification paradigms based on Freud's work.³² The first, in which identity is used as survival, notes that parents are a vulnerable infant's only means of survival. When a parent threatens the infant by not satisfying a need or important want, the infant's ultimate fear is of death. The infant mitigates this fear by defensively internalising the parental ideal as a source of survival. Freud's second paradigm was more sociological. The 'super-ego', though unique to each individual, identified with the super-ego of other individuals. Individuals thus shared common identities and inner censors of behaviour and consequently developed group identity and loyalty. Psychoanalysis nonetheless also has its own limitation, especially, "its implicit alliance with a juridical model of knowledge, which allows it to function in the schema of avowal, confession and interiorization."³³

The final approach, social constructivist theories led by Potter and Wetherall, extend into social theory, with ontological and epistemological implications beyond the traditional realms of psychology.³⁴ Developed over the last decade, this approach critiques the three older psychological approaches which each assume the existence of a stable self that awaits ‘discovery’ or realisation and can be described like an object in the natural or physical world. In contrast, social constructivist approaches emphasise linguistic practices that,

“displace attention from the self-as-entity and focus it on the methods of constructing the self. That is, the question becomes not what is the true nature of the self, but how is the self talked about, how is it theorised in discourse?”³⁵

Furthermore, narrative psychology places an emphasis on human experience, self-reflection and especially meaning systems and structures of meaning that produce both the self and reality. The extreme focus on attaching meaning, with its qualitative nuances and interpretation, replaces quantitative ‘scientific’ methods for the study of self and identity.³⁶ It is this broader and richer approach in psychology that relates to the use of identity in this thesis.

Bertrand Russell’s interpretation of Aristotle’s logic of identity, specifically its third law of ‘excluded middle’, which insists that everything must either be or not be, presupposes the existence of essential identities.³⁷ Such do not exist. Race, gender, citizenship and religion, some of the seemingly unmistakable categories through which people self-categorise, are neither universal nor ahistoric.³⁸ The responsibility

for identity's construction lies within the individual, in society and the spaces in between, "We are, not what we are, but what we make of ourselves."³⁹ And what we make of ourselves is not a universal process. David Novitz hence rightly compares the production of the self with that of a work of art.⁴⁰ Identities and the meanings attached are fluid, reactionary and to use Giddens' phrase, "reflexive".⁴¹ They are also not exclusive, as demonstrated by Virginia Woolf's fictional "Mrs Dalloway" a character through which Woolf perspicaciously conveys a profound depth and range of identities at varying moments.⁴² That this is so is hardly surprising given that the human personality is neither stable nor consistent. Identity's evolving configuration is neither achieved through a founding act nor is it merely given. Identity requires creation and sustenance through continual interaction within the feedback and evaluations of others.⁴³ Giddens suggestion that, "Self identity is the self as reflexively understood by the person in terms of her or his biography" is thus limited.⁴⁴ Identity is not only an ongoing and adaptive process functioned by an interaction within the perceived self, but is simultaneously a process between that interaction with that of a constructed and fluid reality. There is for instance the tendency of tourists to associate themselves more strongly with their originating state when on foreign travels.

Within this construction, identity need neither be 'individual' nor 'group' as Western ontology fences. Indeed, no categories of identity have remained historically and universally at the forefront of human consciousness.⁴⁵ It may seem that few people are sufficiently self-absorbed to create their identity, but in a less strenuous form than envisaged by Nietzsche, "self-creation is almost universal".⁴⁶ Baumeister's research suggests that even the category of 'individual' did not exist in the pre-modern era, and

demonstrates that the writing of (individual) autobiographies corresponds with the march of Enlightenment's individuality, being a recent historical and modern European event.⁴⁷ Likewise, Foucault traced the transformation of homosexuality from a crime in as recently as the nineteenth century to an identity in the late twentieth century.⁴⁸ Even gender is protean, corresponding to different peoples. Many feminists, whether cultural, radical, liberal or post-structuralist, agree that women are constructed and not born, that gender (unlike sex) is manufactured.⁴⁹ Gender, as other identities, has no ontological status other than various acts that constitute its reality. To attribute female essences, as essentialists do, is misleading since essentialism is merely a constructed re-vision of an initially constructed identity - hence the rejection of essentialist identity by post-structuralists and discourse theorists.⁵⁰ The implications of this for understanding and analysing the self are vividly articulated by Foucault's, "how is the I that I experience myself as constituted or fabricated?"⁵¹

Self-identity consequently depends either on complicity with *or reaction to* a pre-existing treasured stock of imperial identities. Against this background, Plato's mastery of unified self through reason transforms to Nietzsche's enslavement, a point which Iqbal's chilling forecast of post-colonial South Asia precisely touched upon,

Your light is only Europe's light reflected:
 You are four walls her architects have built,
 A shell of dry mud with no tenant soul
 An empty scabbard chased with flowery guilt.⁵²

Even though privileging a victim merely perpetuates the hegemon's identity framework, in which the victim remains both encapsulated and an unaware yet willing contributor to, grounding an identity in nature can nonetheless be an effective strategy to insulate it from political interference.⁵³ Speaking as an individual, homosexual or as a woman, while in themselves ontologically hollow, are important positions of varying political mobilisation and carry with them emotional meaning - notwithstanding the distance created from speaking for oneself.⁵⁴ Such identities and their meanings consequently cannot be ignored,

“we can conceive of the subject as yet nonessentialized and emergent from a historical experience and yet retain our political ability to take gender as an important point of departure. Thus we can say that at one and the same time that gender is not natural, biological, universal, ahistorical, or essential and yet still claim that gender is relevant because we are taking gender as a position from which to act politically.”⁵⁵

Identity Narratives

Having demonstrated that identities are constructed, the importance of creating and maintaining identity needs exploration.^v Erikson, who first made explicit the relationship between contentment and a secure sense of identity, argued, “man's need for a psychosocial identity is anchored in nothing less than his sociogenetic evolution”.⁵⁶ Erikson insisted that identity's “basic trust”, the linking of self with

^v Despite these convincing and wide-ranging explanations for the construction and maintenance of identity, a caveat should be issued. It is difficult to *prove* that identity creation and maintenance is an inherent human need. Aside from Karl Popper's proof problematic, Dennis Sandole has stressed the ambiguous nature of human needs, against the resurgent interest in human needs theory.

object world and the original nexus of orientation, was formed through identity. Without trusting self-identity, no differentiation or relationship with the external world could be relied upon.⁵⁷ Similarly, Giddens's "ontological security" is anchored in a framework of reality, which identity sustains. In order to engage our lives, existential issues such as time, space and identity are taken for granted – issues which conventional psychology and quantitative approaches neglect. Ontological security proceeds conscious and unconscious answers to fundamental existential questions, of which the prime question in early childhood is not time nor space but self-existence, against Kierkegaard's, "struggle of being against non-being".⁵⁸ Giddens drew on Garfinkel's experiments to demonstrate the chaotic disorganisation emotionally and cognitively in the absence of such existential stability.⁵⁹ The chaos becomes Kierkegaard's 'dread', an overwhelming anxiety that questions even self-existence, which Kristeva in turn relates to social breakdown.⁶⁰

Habermas and Sullivan elucidate two separate treatments of identity that can also be drawn upon. Habermas derived his epistemology for identity from philosophy. Complemented by anthropological and ethnomethodological observations of man's need to make meaningful sense of his environment, Habermas replaced Erikson's 'ideology' with an 'identity-securing interpretative system' and placed identity as philosophy's pivotal concern, and the central impetus of Hegelian philosophy, as individuals and groups seek to locate themselves and find their true selves. In parallel, Sullivan used a Freudian framework to explain why the need for identity security is, "much more important in the human being than the impulses resulting from a feeling of hunger". Sullivan suggested that anxiety stemmed from parental disapproval, which in turn led to a sense of helplessness.⁶¹

The cultural technology of identity, specifically for its maintenance and creation, is the identity narrative. Narratives, derived from the Indo-European root 'gna', which means 'to tell', have parallels with conventional storytelling.⁶² Disassociated with concepts of truth, they are often described as paradigms, capsule views of reality, interpretative devices and even worldviews.⁶³ They enable communication about complex events and explain sequences in simple and effective form. Indeed, the un-narrated action is impossible.⁶⁴ Narrative construction is not simple – there may be contradictions, time gaps and inconsistencies – thereby allowing for contingencies.⁶⁵ Ricoeur even suggests, "time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode."⁶⁶ This explains the existence of different concepts of time across different peoples.

Narratives as search frameworks, not only define the cognitive search and selection but also link the selected facts and are thus used not only in the humanities, but also in science. For instance, Nye illustrates the use of narrative to help make sense of technologies such as the nineteenth century railroad or the telephone.⁶⁷ Likewise, Kuhn demonstrates the extensive use of narrative-like paradigms within which all scientific work is undertaken, to select and bring together scientific facts. Also in this vein, Landau reveals the use of narrative in biology and geology, which both display a temporal and sequential structure analogous to conventional history.⁶⁸ Narrative theorists, as demonstrated by Kuhn, "use 'storytelling' to shift knowledge from a centre that purports to be impartial...to a margin that acknowledges the heterogeneity and inevitability of any standpoint."⁶⁹

The narrative of identity, a particular narrative type, plays a critical role for identity - giving an importance to human experience in contrast to both post-modern and scientific approaches. Carr classifies identity narratives between first-order narratives, being about the self and therefore important, in contrast to second-order narratives in which the subject is more detached from events such as in a scientific study or economic analysis.⁷⁰ Incidentally, Crites also distinguishes the two narrative classes, although he terms them as 'sacred' and 'mundane'.⁷¹ These first-order or sacred narratives, of which many cohabit within in an individual or community at any moment, often contradict each other, hence precipitating an inherently schizophrenic human existence. Further, they can be highly dynamic. Bruner's study reveals that the Amerindian narrative of the 1950s was one of cultural decline and assimilation, which compared to their narrative of the 1990s of resistance and renewal.⁷²

The relationship between identity narratives and reality is noteworthy. Narratives are not "historical half-truths", complete truths in any case being an epistemologically bankrupt concept.⁷³ Nor are they chronologies or annals, both of which fail to explain.⁷⁴ Susan Stephenson's analysis of Graham Swift's, 'Waterland' gives some insight into the relationship between narrative and reality, "Historical data, common knowledge and myth become difficult to separate".⁷⁵ Likewise, identity narratives, as Giddens explains, cannot be totally removed from the prevailing discourse-produced knowledge for they, "must continually integrate events which occur in the external world, and sort them into the ongoing 'story' about the self."⁷⁶ Recent and classical literature highlights the tendency to interpret reality to sustain prevailing identity narratives, hence assuming Bachelard's work of imagination.⁷⁷ Given that identity narratives are engineered, reality is often imaginatively reconstructed and

reinterpreted for narrative continuity and existential ease. Rigid traditionalists who avoid readapting identity narratives, thus filter reality through unyielding narrative accounts. Another type, which Erich Fromm calls the “authoritarian conformist”, evaporates into what, “all others are and as they expect him to be”.⁷⁸ Neither extreme offers sustainable ontological security.

Narratives perform two functions for identity. First, they create identity, “the self is not a *thing* in the metaphysical sense of being a substance, residing beneath experience.”⁷⁹ Identity narratives are an account of how the self came to be what it is, and where it is going, and to establish what that self is, “Stories are the womb of personhood.”⁸⁰ They are therefore constitutive of identity’s space and the technique from which the self is rendered and which is why constructed history plays a central role in conceptions of national identity. Self-identity cannot rely on generalities such as being friendly or wise; the imprecision neither defines nor consequently identifies. Mere description is insufficient. Instead, identity is demonstrated through narrative, “A self without a story contracts into the thinness of its personal pronoun.”⁸¹ Knowing someone means to know where they came from, where they stand and where they are going. James Adams’s description of ‘The Epic of America’, dedicated 371 pages on the (constructed narrative) history of Americans and only in a fourteen page Epilogue, did he introduce, even if most unconvincingly, the characteristics of Americans, “He loves humour and a good joke...He likes a good time and to be a good fellow and to have all around him enjoy themselves.”⁸² Identity’s unity is in its narrative not its actuality, stemming from narrative’s ability to re-contextualise fragments. Frank’s “narrative wreckage” occurs when a narrative cannot contain the significant fragments.⁸³

As well as creating the self, narrative is also identity's cocoon and prevents questions about self-existence, Erikson's trust or Giddens's ontological security. Narratives assume the role of Goffman's 'Umwelt', a core of normalcy that we surround ourselves that orders environments and with which we move forward. Identity narratives thus cocoon the self from existential instability. To readapt Giddens's acquired routines and lifestyles, narrative protects the existence of one's emotional acceptance of the external world to ground oneself in.⁸⁴ Ethnomethodologists have demonstrated that when people's worlds are breached, they become angry and defensive. Similarly, psychologists suggest that babies of about six months suffer from stranger anxiety as an ontogenetic phenomenon, which indicates the baby's insecurity of anything unfamiliar.⁸⁵ In both cases, both environment and self-understandings are challenged and meaning systems can no longer be relied upon, leading to anxiety, a personality breakdown and, in adults, even suicidal pressures. One such individual whose future narrative disintegrated after being diagnosed with HIV recalled, "Absolutely everything, everything that you have in life just breaks down, becomes dust, power, you know, and you become completely naked and utterly lost."⁸⁶ Without narrative and its continuity, the ontological reference points required for life to go on, crumble, "If all my memories were obliterated, this would obviously have a disastrous effect on my sense of who I am."⁸⁷

Identity Narratives: Categorising and Attaching Meaning

Reverting to the subject-object interdependence framework and specifically how actors categorise, attach meaning and engage reality, the use of identity narratives

redresses the subject-object imbalance of the Positivist-Empiricist nexus since narratives reflect the structures and meaning systems that constitute cognition. Though the separation of categorising or seeing and attaching meaning to, which parallels Clarke's 'art-culture' system that, "classifies objects and assigns them relative value", is awkward, identity narratives provide the basic analytical filters with which to compartmentalise reality.⁸⁸ The framework of auto-identification is necessarily that of allo-identification. Such ontological categories, those at the forefront of self-representation and consciousness though not necessarily biologically programmed, are also and simultaneously the filtering categories used to define others.

One example to illustrate the impact of this categorisation is found in classical Islamic theories of IR. The introduction nearly a century after the prophet Mohammed's death of the Dar al Islam (abode of Islam) and Dar al Harb (abode of war) duality to filter the world fundamentally altered the cognitive outlook of the early Abbasid period.⁸⁹ Notwithstanding the further and later invention of a third category, in Dar Al Ahd (abode of pledge) especially by Shafi jurists, this conceptual prism governed the Islamic polity's foreign policy in its various applications, transcending the traditional affiliation to tribe or sect, for more than a millennium.⁹⁰ The internalisation of the Muslim identity served to, amongst other effects, more clearly define others into various categories of non-Muslim.

Beyond categorising reality into manageable blocks, identity narratives also attach meaning to reality and as such are forms of discourse. Though Bennett is over-optimistic in hoping to eventually identify all forms of discourse, he insists that

identity narratives are amongst the most pervasive of discourse genre.⁹¹ Attaching meaning to the present can occur only against an analysis of the past and expectations of the future; the solitary note is meaningless without the melodious sequence.

According to Husserl, even the most passive of meaning experience is charged with the significance from narrative's constructed past and future expectations.⁹² Using Sarbin's 'narratory principal', identity narrative frameworks enable human beings to think and make choices, and in doing so, attach meaning. In treating narrative as the "organising principal for human action", meaning systems that reverberate across generations, Sarbin gives identity narratives an advantage in explaining persistent meanings or continuities of belief across generations.⁹³

Narratives, particularly through storytelling and fables give counsel and create choices:

"It is through hearing stories about wicked stepmothers, lost children, good but misguided kings, youngest sons who receive no inheritance but must make their own way in the world and eldest sons who waste their inheritance on riotous living and go into exile to live with the swine, that children learn, or mislearn, both what a child and what a parent is, what the cast of characters may be in the drama into which they have been born and what the ways of the world are. Deprive children of stories and you leave them unscripted, anxious stutterers in their action as in their words. Hence, there is no way to give an understanding of any society, including our own, except through the stock of stories which constitute its initial

dramatic resources. Mythology, in its original sense, is at the heart of things.”⁹⁴

By becoming a grid of intelligibility, identity narratives and particularly the analysis that they yield, reflect more the subject than the object of inquiry. The grid after all is not a product of the object. Anthropological research by James Boon concludes that knowledge of other cultures and eras, “depends on the cultures and eras doing the knowing” and that cultures meet, “according to conventional expectations of the cultures themselves.”⁹⁵ In E M Forster’s ‘A Passage to India’, from the moment they set foot in India, Mrs Moore and Miss Quested search for the ‘real’ India, the India beyond the colourful aspects that charm superficial tourists. Miss Quested’s quest takes her beyond what her colonial fiancé can offer her and what her Indian host, Dr Aziz, feels would cater to her English exoticism, and to the Marabar caves. There, she only finds an echo – for her object India only returns the sounds of the subjects who investigate it, evoking, in her case, a blind sexual anxiety.⁹⁶

Two techniques of identity narrative categorisation and discourse are especially prominent. The first is the subject’s categorising and attaching meaning to the object as conforming to or within the identity narrative. Given that the object does not therefore challenge the self’s production and cocoon, the object is imparted a more optimistic meaning, and engaged within the articles of the identity narrative. By being located into the subject’s cognitive narrative, the object, inadvertently reaffirms the subject’s self-identity and existential security. In achieving an understanding of the object, the subject can then proceed to engage the object within the specific narrative.

A second technique is alterity, where the analysed object cannot be located within the subject's identity narratives and is consequently feared because, if significant, and as an unknown, it threatens both the self and the cognitive grip on reality. The destabilising of narrative by non-locatable objects leads to anxiety though not necessarily fear. Anxiety is free floating, diffuse, and constitutes, "unconsciously formed emotive tensions that express 'internal dangers' rather than externalised tensions".⁹⁷ It therefore disregards the object. In contrast, fear involves an imparting of meaning to a specific and definite 'external' object. Freud suggested that individuals displaced their deepest anxieties from their private lives and into political Others. Objectification can thus become an attempt to convert an inner stimulus into an outer stimulus, an inner enemy into an outer enemy. Relating this insight into the narrative framework, the Other is not a description of reality, but the inversion or contradiction of a formulation and idealisation of particular and internalised constellation of identity narratives. It is thus that identity, and not the subject or self whole, enjoys alterity - itself often as a code to reinterpret and reinforce identity.^{vi}

Europe's interaction with non-Europeans from the fifteenth century provides a rich source to demonstrate the effects of both narrative categorisations and discourses. Given the cognitive dissonance caused by non-Europeans to European narratives, the former were initially categorised outside of the latter. Therefore as the earliest colonists set foot in foreign territories, European identity narratives enabled categorising of natives, through alterity, with hostile and fantastic terms of reference. Marco Polo described Javans with, "heads like dogs, and teeth and eyes like dogs; for I assure you that the whole aspect of their faces is that of a big mastiffs".⁹⁸ The

^{vi} Eugene Hartley demonstrated in 1946, that Americans who held prejudices against Hispanics, Afro-

fourteenth century English Sinologist, Sir John Mandeville, wrote of his visit to Java where he found people with lips,

“so big that when they sleep in the sun they cover all their faces with it. In another there are people of small stature, like dwarfs, a little bigger than pygmies. They have no mouth, but instead a little hole, and so, when they must eat they suck their food through a reed or pipe...In another isle there people who walk on their hands and their feet like four-footed beasts...There is another isle where the people live just on the smell of a kind of apple; and if they lost that smell, they would die forthwith.”⁹⁹

In the case of the earliest portrayals of Amerindians, the explorer, Walter Raleigh, in his, ‘The Discovery of the Large, Rich and Beautiful Empire of Guiana’ in 1596, described, “a nation of people, whose heades appeare not above their shoulders...” with, “eyes in their shoulders, and their mouths in the middle of their breasts”.¹⁰⁰ Columbus’s letter to Giuliano Dati in 1493 reported that men were bearded, which while not according with ethnographic reality, did conform to the European alterity of the Wild Man. Similarly, Vespucci’s depictions in 1504 of Amerindian women as sexually lascivious cannibals stemmed exclusively from a variety of European alterities and only the widespread European belief in anthropophagy prepared the European imagination’s location of it in the New World.^{101 vii}

Americans and Orientals held identical prejudices against Wallonians, Perineans and Danireans, none of which actually existed.

^{vii} Shakespeare, who often rearranged words, placed ‘Caliban’ (for cannibal) in the New World of ‘The Tempest’

The one identity that non-Europeans were most easily categorised with, albeit clearly outside of, was religious. Medieval Europeans strongly internalised Christianity identity, which offered a narrative cognition placing all non-Christians as either heathens or savages. This unambiguous categorisation became the, “central organising category governing much of Europe’s early relationship to the New World.”¹⁰² From the outset, Amerindians were denied culture and history and were nearly always described as savages or wild men, for, “there was indeed little in European traditions to support any other kind of understanding of Amerindians”.¹⁰³ A whole generation of explorers accordingly patronised Amerindians.¹⁰⁴ De Sepulveda’s 1550-1551 ‘Democrates Secundus’ described the Spanish as adults, gentle, reasonable, good and human in contrast to the Amerindians who were children, savage, unreasonable, bad and animal. Very few Spanish philosophers, such as Jose de Acosta, imparted rationality to Amerindians.¹⁰⁵ Puritans, whilst also believing that natives were culturally blank, were worse than the Spanish by attributing to the Amerindians a religion of evil.

In contrast to its inhabitants, the New World itself was categorised and given meaning from *within* European identity narratives. Though these narratives had no place for non-Europeans, with resultant anxieties often translated as fear, those same narratives nonetheless helped Europe categorise and understand the land of the American continent. Middle Ages Europe had long believed in the existence of a place, not a people, to the west of Europe, a place that lacked the corruption of the Old World, yet represented a continuation of its future.¹⁰⁶ Todorov notes for instance that Columbus was more interested in the geography and places of North America, which he could cognate, than in the people, who resided outside the European story.¹⁰⁷ While Thomas

More invented Utopia in 1515-16 and located it in the Atlantic, utopian writers such as Jonathan Swift constructed from within Europe's narrative past and representing its narrative future, their Atlantis, their City of the Sun.¹⁰⁸ By the mid-sixteenth century, America had acquired precisely this utopian flavour, becoming an arena for European narrative enactment.¹⁰⁹ The Enlightenment originated in Europe, but progress had reached a zenith in America. Europeans exchanged their ideal world lost in time, for one remote only in space.

Identity Narratives: Engaging

An economy of the discourses of truth, of which narratives as elucidated above are an important feature, is a pre-condition for engagement. However, not only is the distinction between categorising and attaching meaning to reality deceptive, but that between these two categories on the one hand and engaging reality is equally murky. Such engaging within the identity narrative framework is deeply intertwined with narrative's cognitive functions,

“It is not the case that we first live and act and then afterward, seated around the fire as it were, tell about what we have done.... The retrospective view of the narrator, with its capacity for seeing the whole in all its irony, is not an irreconcilable opposition to the agent's view but is an extension and refinement of a viewpoint inherent in action itself... narration, intertwined as it is with action, (creates meaning) in the course of life itself, not merely after the fact, at the hands of authors, in the pages of books.”¹¹⁰

While acknowledging this subtlety, identity narratives determine human engagement at two levels. First is the enactment of the identity narrative, as an impetus for motivating human behaviour. As Giddens notes, identity is not found in behaviour, or in others' reactions, but in *keeping a particular narrative going*.¹¹¹ As such, identity is not a stagnant given but requires, as Stryker emphasised, continual interaction, validation and affirmation. For this identity draws upon its narrative, the enactment of which hence is identity's living existence. As a behavioural imperative, identity narratives remind the self of its articles for repetition and pursuit, "The story of my past merges into the commentary I make on the present" and enables the self to colonise both the present and future.¹¹² Identity narratives, being partially scripted, are performed in accordance with the modes of thought that give unity to the self, "knowing who we are...is the ground for knowing what to do."¹¹³ Self-identify thus shapes and regulates human behaviour, so much so that Foote believed that all motivation was derived from identity as an expression of identity.¹¹⁴ It is thus that mankind, as Sartre noted seeks to live his life as though he were telling a story.¹¹⁵ The popular lack of awareness of this motivation may be explained by Mead's 'I – Me' dichotomy in which the less conscious 'I' is not reflexively aware of the 'me', being the conscious self in the past, present and future, identity narratives assume the role of 'I', leaving 'me' to engage dominant discourses.¹¹⁶

Narrative enactment is expressed and reinforced in even the most minor of everyday actions though the extent to which identity narratives affect behaviour is often underestimated despite the few attempts to relate performance and behaviour with identity.¹¹⁷ James Morris, a member of Edmund Hillary's expedition that climbed

Everest, underwent a sex-change operation and her insight as Jan Morris into the different world that men and women occupy is interesting. She noted not only that people treated her differently when she was a woman than as a man but,

“The more I was treated as a woman, the more woman I became. I adapted willy-nilly. If I was assumed to be incompetent at reversing cars, or opening bottles, oddly incompetent I found myself becoming. If a case was thought too heavy for me, inexplicably I found it so myself.”¹¹⁸

The Morris case strikes at the centre of the debate on whether behaviour between men and women is biologically determined or socially constructed, and thus also at the impact of gender narratives on behaviour. Few dispute the existence of biological differences between men and women, though their physiological origins are yet unidentified. However, it would seem that, “biological differences become a signal for, rather than a cause of, differentiation in social roles.”¹¹⁹ It was Morris’s enactment of female identity, through established Western female narratives, such as relative physical weakness or spatial disorientation, that caused behavioural or capability differentiation. Likewise, during World War Two, Japanese *kamikaze* pilots were not merely defending Japan by volunteering for suicide missions. The pilots, most of who were aged between seventeen and twenty-three, being an age group especially seeking new identities, vociferously internalised an ancient Japanese identity, the ‘sacred shield’ typhoon or *kamikaze*, and its narrative of protecting Japan in 1281 from China. In enacting and giving life to the typhoon identity, the pilots privileged the survival and maintenance of identity above that of their own.¹²⁰

Identity narrative's second determination of human behaviour is through engagement to eliminate narrative anomalies or threats, which otherwise generate anxiety. Such narrative elimination often accompanies the vociferous reassertion and enhancement of the original identity narrative - to protect the self's creation and cocoon it from existential questioning. This reassertion often leads to a more rigid identity construction and deeper internalisation of the threatened identity, such as demonstrated by the Islamist revival after the publication of 'The Satanic Verses' in 1988 and America's attack on an Iraq that, after more than two decades of Ba'ath fascist doctrine and an invasion of Islamically identified Iran, astoundingly and conveniently reclaimed the *Shahadah* and declared war on the infidels in 1991.^{viii} In both cases, Muslim populations worldwide felt a threat to their Islamic identity and responded by seeking to eliminate the threat, which for many meant killing Rushdie or *Jihad* against the West.^{ix} Both events were accompanied by the deepening internalisation and coagulation of Islamic identity, which proliferated a range of Islamic narrative enactments ranging from prayer to the pursuit of an inadvertently Westernised, Islamic political structure.

International Relations and Identity Narratives

The first step in addressing some implications of identity narratives in international relations draws comment on the transfer of individual identity and narrative to group

^{viii} *Shahadah* refers to the declaration of Islamic faith, specifically in the existence of the Oneness of God and in the prophet-hood of the Mohammed

^{ix} The Arabic term *Jihad* means 'exertion'. However, most non-Muslims and even Muslims mistakenly define it as 'holy war'

level.^x The distinction is however cosmetic. Most people's concept of identity involves reference to a community, which is often the state. In Pynchon's 'The Crying of Lot 49', the identity of Oedipa Mass, the ordinary Californian housewife, is strongly challenged with resultant angst when American narratives are disputed.¹²¹

The point that McIntyre cogently makes is that one's life story, unless one is a citizen from and of nowhere, is intertwined with the story of one's community. In turn, the community's stories constitute and are constitutive of the individual's.¹²² The Hinchmans express differently the same relationship, "Our micronarratives are typically 'nested' within, and inseparable from, cultural macronarratives that shape their possible outcomes and meanings."¹²³ Hence, the properties and discussion of individual identity, the prevailing focus of this chapter hitherto, are also applicable to group identity with subsequent parallels in dynamics. For instance, narratives create individual identity just as they create group identity. The nation can only exist when a narrative of 'we' exists; Barthes observed, "there does not exist and never has existed, a people without narratives."¹²⁴ Without the backbone of narrative, the nation cannot construct itself.

The impact of an identity narrative framework in IR is potentially considerable. The Realist approach to foreign policy assumes a state with a stable, fixed internal identity that interacts with another stable state, and thus the foreign policy.¹²⁵ This interpretation, as Campbell demonstrates, is based on a nineteenth century romanticist account, which depicts the state system's rise as a natural development following the Westphalia Treaty in 1648 - that suddenly, states existed and gave form to pre-existing identities.¹²⁶ Historical sociologists reject this clinical transition, insisting that

^x The use of narratives, let alone identity narratives, in IR is a recent phenomenon. *Millenium*, the

state structures were diverse, and that their dynamics were non-linear. Furthermore, the state, Iqbal's 'conjuror's art', only developed potency two centuries after Westphalia.¹²⁷ Hegel, Fichte and other romanticists insisted on the metaphysical nature of nationhood, that the clearly identified nation sought self-governance via statehood.¹²⁸ Yet most state creations have however preceded the existence of single or dominant nations within them. Indeed, state creations may have destroyed more nations than they have created or protected. Even those European states, which Seton-Watson misleadingly terms 'the old continuous nations', were formed prior to the creation of dominant national groups.¹²⁹

State elites sought to enact their new state identity narratives. Simultaneously, whereas the church saw the devil everywhere, state elites saw Hobbes's anarchy. The combination led to the use of foreign threats to justify the state's identity narrative enactment and protection. However foreign threats described and often objectified identity narrative threats, including anomalous domestic populations. Foreign policy thereby becomes the legitimising of one narrative over another, to confirm ones identity and reality over that of another.¹³⁰ Countries hence compete to impose and defend their identity and narrative visions. In this regard, identity narratives have had a powerful impact on foreign policy. Harff and Gurr suggest that identity and territory have been the two major causes of conflict since 1945, while Sivard supports their conclusions using a research database originating from 1700.¹³¹

One such demonstration may be found in South Asia. Machiavellian power politics frameworks barely explain Pakistan's near pathological antagonism towards India.

leading publication of IR theory over the last two decades, held its first conference on narratives in IR

Diarrhoea and cholera have killed and pose a greater threat to Pakistanis than do the Indian armed forces. Clean water and sanitation are the principal enemy weapons, not military hardware, yet military generals have dominated the country's political landscape. Nor can Pakistan's commitment to Kashmiri human rights be explained by liberal or Islamic ideology given the grossly systemic flagrant violations of those rights within Pakistan.^{xi} Pakistani antagonism towards India and support for Kashmiri self-determination reflect identity anxiety. Pakistan's identity was carved in opposition to India. Furthermore, the legacy of India's early questioning of the Pakistani identity's legitimacy, breed Pakistani insecurity for which anti-'Indianism' thus becomes the protection of Pakistani narratives. Preventing India from acquiring Kashmir is a first step to thwarting India's supposed de-legitimising designs and reaffirming the Pakistani self.

Foreign policy as a mechanism of identity enactment and protection, simultaneously within and outside of the state, has posed an acute problem for the state. Western ontology and discourse have disseminated globally so extensively that categories such as race, language, religion, state and gender now dominate identity, defining for most people their real self. Yet within this classification, very few states have possessed a single unifying feature exclusive to their citizens. One result of this has been the creative distinction between 'blue-blooded' nationals and immigrant pretenders, upon whom states use their monopoly of legitimate force and infrastructures, "those who are dominant within the State often wish to prevent people from adopting damaging

as recently as May 2001, and planned its first bespoke publication on the subject for December 2001
^{xi} Amnesty International noted in its May 2001 survey of Pakistan for the year 2000, that torture in police cells and custody and sexual abuse of detainees was widespread. During 2000, it was aware of at least twenty-five deaths in police custody. While General Musharaff's unaccountable government's focus on Kashmir increased, the survey concluded that Pakistan's commitment to human rights was weakening.

or potentially dangerous narrative identities.”¹³² Given that the enactment and protection of dominant state identity narratives embraces foreignness as a function of identity, and not politico-military security or state citizenship, the identity narrative approach consequently reveals the superficiality in the domestic-foreign dialectic, thereby enabling foreign policy analysis to incorporate a more organic interaction between the two areas.

There is however the continued fibre of a relationship between the Realist and identity narrative accounts. Identity narrative threat and assertion as foreign policy imperatives not only fundamentally challenge post-Enlightenment political discourse, but also require the sort of patience and conceptual depth that a discussion cloaked in self-interest presently does not. Modern political discourse simply cannot digest an identity narrative driven policy justification. For instance, Pedersen’s study of this phenomenon, termed ‘action theory’ emphasises the serious exclusionary consequences of breaking the dominant discourse.¹³³ Notwithstanding this, politicians compete to best articulate the sense of identity enactment or threat, using political rhetoric, often sprinkled with vague concepts of national interest and power, to give form to the vague and disordered narrative anxieties and enactments.

Modernity and Identity

Finally, and the last element within this alternative theoretical framework, the onset of modernity has created difficulties for this identity framework which, while not notably affecting US policy to Pakistan prior to Kennedy, is nevertheless worth briefly visiting. Modernity is an awkward term. Its use in sociology, art, architecture

and philosophy has added specificities to each that do not fit across disciplines. Nonetheless, one of its chief characteristics is a fragmentation of authority, where even the most reliable authorities are trusted only till further notice, “In this new Babel, whilst a multiplicity of voices claim authority, each is questioned and doubted: none can establish its hegemony.”¹³⁴ David Gross’s observation that the traditional Western socio-cultural framework of 1650 became modern by 1850 is a sensible timeframe to start modernity’s incursion in the West.¹³⁵ A part of this is the intensification of de-traditionalization, *Gemeinschaft* versus *Gesellschaft*. Traditional societies are characterised by established authoritative orders, “sacred” in the Durkheimian sense, in which identities are inscribed and stable.¹³⁶ In traditional societies, though the change in identity narrative from adolescence to adulthood is clearly marked out, the identities and narratives within those stages remain confined.

Modernity differs from the traditional society’s treatment of identity by challenging the unity of both identity and narrative. Fragmentation of authority becomes fragmentation of self. The process of self-identity creation becomes more open-ended and reflexive, “The normal biography becomes the ‘elective biography’, the ‘reflexive biography’, the ‘do-it-yourself biography’”.¹³⁷ Self-improvement manuals blossomed in the early modernity of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, focusing on individual identity building.¹³⁸ In contrast to traditional societies, modern societies demand the altered self to repeatedly reconstruct self-identity and narrative amongst a multitude of choices when “it is now all too easy to choose identity, but no longer possible to hold it.”¹³⁹ What to wear, eat and how to behave - all become identity narrative choices, who we want to be.

The increasing fluidity and defragmentation of identity narratives has a particular impact on foreign policy, especially in the US. If identity narratives demand articulated repetition to constitute their reality, and given identity narrative's importance to the self's creation and stability, those who locate themselves within the older authentic narratives, are impelled to enact and protect those narratives and precipitates two noteworthy effects. First, the tension between those who subscribe to the older 'authentic' identity narratives and those of the newer anomalous narratives increases. Though an identity narrative elite, whether one person or many, is responsible for articulating a particular set of state identity narratives, it is not necessarily able to control the identity's permanence. Officialdom, which tends to rest with the former group, acts to protect 'authentic' identity narratives, and dedicates increasing energy and focus to combating the foreign within. This occurs simultaneously to an intensified enactment of precisely those authentic narratives within and more often to compensate for the anxiety outside the state's borders.

Second, modernity's proliferation destabilises narrative's anchorages. Without clarity and acceptance of narrative, political discourse and engagement become fickle. Foreign policy, both within and outside, suffers from inadequate supporting narrative to grid reality and engage policy with. Those who undertake the task of preserving authentic narratives by engaging the foreign within, do so with increasing blindness. The combination of these two dynamics is a growing anxiety and destabilisation for those who identify with and position themselves within the older narratives. Concerns of identity narrative homogeneity, such as those raised recently in America by Schlesinger, Bloom et al become important consequently for the Balkanization of 'foreign' policy.¹⁴⁰ Policy engagement relies on reality cognition. Without the

existence of dominant identities and identity narratives in a state, discourse and engagement disintegrate.

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CHAPTER TWO

IDENTITY NARRATIVES: AMERICA

The use of identity narratives may be particularly useful for Americans given their interpretation of their short history as a lack of identity and narrative, which thus needs greater internalisation.¹ However, harvesting common American identities in any period of history, let alone narratives specifically for the onset of policy to Pakistan, is difficult.¹ The search for the ‘American’ neither leads into an etymological study of medieval Latin sources nor an Indo-European root. Indeed, given identity’s fluidity, capturing any collective American identity irrespective of era is taxing since American identities are unstable for they, as Kristeva stressed of all identities, are always in process.² Bloom seeks to answer, “what it means to be an American?” with the proposition that it is the acceptance of man’s natural rights.³ Yet most Americans have denied these nebulous rights to non-Caucasians. Further, his natural rights are dominated by, “Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, the US Founding Fathers, *inter alia*”, to whom non-Caucasians are principally unattached.⁴ Even before the legitimisation of various American identities during the twentieth century especially after the Vietnam War, Tocqueville noted that there was no exclusive unifying feature that identified all Americans, “the Union is an ideal nation which exists, so to say, only in men’s minds” and not Zelinsky’s “genuine ethnic group”.⁵

However, some conceptions of identity are so central to a community’s self-perception, though not to all its members, that Gordon refers to them as ‘factual self-conceptions’.⁶ Examples include the Jewish identity for Israel, despite the non-Jewish

¹ While ‘America’ or ‘American’ strictly used refers to the entire western hemisphere, it is however and unless otherwise specified, used in this thesis synonymously with the US.

population officially constituting eighteen percent of the country.⁷ To analyse American policy to Pakistan, this thesis will select American self-identities that fit Gordon's definition and that were internalised as exemplar American by mainstream American society, media and culture before 1947 and thereafter. These identities, henceforth and through this thesis repeatedly referred to as *real* American identities with corresponding *real* American narratives, represented a romanticised America and American, which implicitly excluded the, "existence of hyphenated Americans, or Native Americans or any other qualified kind".⁸ Real American identities were learned on street corners, in city parks, club meetings and saloons. The work of poets, novelists, artists, playwrights and academics reflected and reproduced these identities in a multitude of forms, in all aspects of social existence.⁹ Johnson's study of American history is typical of accounts that place this real American as an unacknowledged neutral subject.¹⁰ However, no identity narrative can dominate a society, as discourses can never achieve suture.¹¹ Consequently, those Americans, external to these identities, were mere citizens for only Anglo-Saxon Americans who identified with an amorphous mission, America's exceptionalism and a commitment to wealth acquisition were real Americans.

There is a reductionist danger that any identities, such as the aforementioned, can misleadingly be elevated.¹² The impression should be resisted that the selected identities and narrative interpretations, as expounded during this chapter, were exclusively those internalised by real America. Clifford's analysis of high art also applies to identity, "representing a culture, subculture, or indeed any coherent domain of collective activity is always strategic and selective."¹³ Hence there is a strong case that other self-identities also constituted real America. Coker's analysis for instance

stresses America's revolutionary identity, while Gibson's study harnesses America's masculine identity.¹⁴

The advantage in restricting to four identities goes beyond its mere manageability, though it is that too, and lies in its sufficiency for elucidating policy to Pakistan. Though Pakistan, for reasons explained in the following chapters, did not itself directly and affirmatively feature in any of real America's identity narratives; these narratives still dominated policy to Pakistan at two levels. At a global level, Pakistan was entirely categorised in, attached meaning to and engaged within American anti-communism. This fifth American identity, a meta-identity, which pre-dated the Bolshevik revolution, was a function of communism's defiance of each of real America's four identity narratives, with anxiety objectified into fear, first of communism and after 1917, Russia. The use of the four selected identities sufficiently demonstrates the precipitation of the anti-communist meta-identity and meta-narrative in which policy to Pakistan was chiefly executed. At a more regional level, America variably deployed and engaged its missionary narrative, beyond anti-communism, in policy to India, Pakistan's archenemy. America's categorisation of India within the American mission pre-dated Pakistan's creation, and assumed urgency after China rejected the role that America had imparted it for over a century. Such categorisation, meaning and engagement of India was acutely felt in Karachi, and intermittently featured in policy to Pakistan.

A final caveat before exploring four identities of real America - the distinction should be made between American self-identities and identities imparted to America by non-Americans.¹⁵ This distinction is important since if foreign policy is a competition to

impose and defend identity narrative visions, the identity that non-Americans impart to America assumes significance within the reality that non-Americans eventually engage. Heidegger identified America as man's greatest alienation, his profoundest loss of authenticity, obsessed with, "the same dreary technological frenzy and the same unrestricted organization of the average man".¹⁶ ⁱⁱ Edward Said observes that the most American of elements in America's heritage are the sources of the repression of difference.¹⁷ The plunder of Moorish wealth including the destruction of Granada's libraries and museums financed Columbus's famous voyage.¹⁸ That such identification of America is widespread, with different emphasises, in South and Central America, Asia and Africa inevitably affects the environment of America's own self-identity narrative engagement and protection.

The Mission

A glance at presidential inauguration speeches would detect the theme of America's quasi-secular mission to act, in Lincoln's words, as "the last, best hope of man".¹⁹ Generations of Americans have celebrated Herman Melville's claim, "we Americans are the peculiar chosen people; the Israel of our time; we bear the ark of the liberties of the world".²⁰ This mission has since enjoyed various mutations but at core remains a responsibility assumed by Americans for the progress of mankind. Wilson equated it with achieving the Fourteen Points, Franklin Roosevelt with the Four Freedoms.²¹ The Depression's working classes interpreted it as extending social justice, while Carter synonymised it with spreading human rights. Huntington's contemporary spin defines it as the spreading of individual liberty, property and market-based solutions.

ⁱⁱ This forefather of anti-technological ecology identified America as, "the land of the living dead"; J W Ceaser (1997:9)

Though the missionary narrative has had such varying endings, as with much of real America, its genesis lies in Jamestown. Early colonists identified themselves as part of a biblical epic mission to redeem mankind. They narrated their emigration from the Old World to establish God's Creed, a pure community in the New World. The objective of the Virginia Company which organised the Jamestown settlement was,

“to preach and baptise the Christian Religion and by propagation of the Gospell, to recover out of the arms of the Divell, a number of poure and miserable soules, wrapt up into death, in almost invincible ignorance.”²²

The contract that these colonists agreed in 1620 was based on God's Covenant with the Israelites,

“they were not ordinary pilgrims, travelling to a sacred shrine, and then returning home to resume everyday life. They were perpetual pilgrims, setting up a new, sanctified country as a permanent pilgrimage.”²³

God was not only a witness but also a symbolic contractual co-signatory with Winthrop comparing the second Puritan mission in 1623 and the third in 1628 to Moses's freeing of the Israelites.²⁴

Closer inspection of the colonists' motives reveals a quasi-theological and economic blend, yet the overt ceremonies and institutions that bound the settlers and imparted identity narrative depth, were immersed with missionary resonance. In Salem, each

household's head pledged, "to bynd ourselves in the presence of God, to walke together in all his waies." The Windsor community elected to, "erect a particular ecclesiastical body, and kingdom, and visible family and household of God".²⁵

Writing in 1705, Joseph Easterbrooks described Puritans as people who were asked to, "remove from the places of their nativity, into a country afar off...when they cannot live comfortably where they are, and have a plain prospect of mending themselves in another land."²⁶ The map of Philadelphia's map reveals a plethora of missionary associated town names - Edenville, Freedom, Harmony, Liberty, New Hope, New Jerusalem and Paradise.

Most Puritan traditions were discarded by 1789. Democracy, with argument, was acutely disturbing for the colonists. Secularism was prohibited, individuality crushed. Winthrop, Puritan America's outstanding figure, and the first great American, dictated a theocracy tougher than that of Khomeini's.²⁷ Nor were Puritans evangelists. Cotton Mather's "Magnalia Christi Americana" in 1702, one of America's mission's earliest articulations, stressed the exclusive obligation upon Puritans. Yet, the missionary identity, the Calvinist notion of the Elect, God Choosing a select few to lead, was transformed during the eighteenth century's Great Awakening to a belief in pan-America's election.²⁸ One Englishman who visited America in the 1750s, noted, "every one is looking forward with eager and impatient expectation to that destined moment when America is to give law to the rest of the world".²⁹ With the mission internalised, partly to differentiate America from England, Joel Barlow's "The Columbiad" in 1807 crystallised its new post-revolutionary secularised version.

Integral to the missionary narrative was the metaphysical concept of 'the Frontier', the imaginary line separating civility from what Puritans initially called wilderness. As colonists spread across the eastern seaboard, the Frontier gradually referred to the westward civilising of 'empty' land. Even before the eighteenth century, Americans assumed their manifest destiny was to use their God-Given resources to extend the Frontier, thus the capital's physical location in the midst of a swamp for its proximity to the base of the westward Potomac River. With manifest destiny concepts in ascendancy, one journalist described the ongoing Frontier as, "the civilised world has been rolling westward; and Americans of the present age will complete the circle."³⁰ Likewise, De Tocqueville noted that the westward frontier march, "has something providential in it: it is like some flood of humanity rising constantly and driven by the hand of God."³¹

After the continental Frontier closed in 1890, Americans looked to Asia as their next Frontier. In 1891, six thousand students pledged to enact the national missionary identity by becoming missionaries and travelled to Asia. During the next decade, the movement grew larger. One leading historian asked, "Who can doubt that the purpose of the American people is not only to make this nation felt as a world power, but also to spread western civilisation eastward?"³² Though the missionary narrative's enactment and the Frontier's extension into Asia were privately led, by amongst others, the Rockefeller Foundation, Washington eventually joined in. Months into his presidency, Theodore Roosevelt announced that the Pacific was an American lake and East Asia was its new Frontier.³³

It was from this narrative that China derived importance to America, as the American mission and Frontier's next fulfilment, with particular implications for policy to India after 1949, and therefore Pakistan. China was a special promise for successive American generations,

“China, so ancient, so vast, so rich, always beckoned in imagination with something which Americans wanted and needed...the oldest empire awaiting the completion of the newest to complete the transit of civilisation.”³⁴

Missionaries, despite their exploitation of China, convinced themselves and fellow Americans of China's role in the national mission.³⁵ Asia became a missionary ferment,

“When I turn my eyes to the East, two considerations strike my mind with great force. The one is, the multitude of people who inhabit these regions, most of who are sitting still in darkness, and in the region and shadow of death.”³⁶

Missionaries were convinced that, “China needed Christianity not to destroy its old life but to complete it and, where necessary, to reshape its valuable parts into a more valuable whole.”³⁷ American expectations of China cradled an emotive baggage, which despite Acheson appreciating, “Hardly a town in our land was without its society to collect funds and clothing for Chinese missions”, he himself would nonetheless become victim to in 1949.³⁸

Capitalism.

A second important identity of real America is that of a liberal, wealth acquisitive identity, and broadly termed as capitalism. Private enterprise and hard work, not ruthless impersonal big business, comprised real America, a distinction evidenced by Emerson's objections in the nineteenth century to America's industrialisation and commercialisation.³⁹ That capitalism is deemed a real American identity is not surprising. Jamestown was financed by private capital. In return for their investment, stockholders received land both when the grant was taken and when men were transported to America.⁴⁰ As with the missionary identity, capitalism was internalised to differentiate Americans. The revolution was itself triggered by the British threat, through taxation to American property while colonists had rallied around the cry of "no taxation – no representation". The French Revolution in 1793-94 and fear of the mob persuaded European liberals to prioritise liberty above economic equality well into the next century, and hence their rejection of property rights as a useful philosophic concept. Americans reacted with aghast at this dissociation from property. America's founding elite, Washington, Jefferson, Hamilton, Madison and Adams held closely to Locke's connection between property and freedom, "Property must be secured, or liberty cannot exist".⁴¹ Hamilton even defined the newborn America as a "commercial empire".⁴²

Two major narratives have supported this identity. Weber noted Puritan America's appetite for material wealth was religiously and not materially driven. Protestant fundamentalists eagerly searched for God's Assessment of them and, without other

signs, used material wealth to indicate His happiness with them. Furthermore, the Puritans were haunted by man's sinfulness and the need to tame man's passions. As a solution, they determined to complete their earthly duties with such dedication and discipline so as not to allow for sin to enter their lives. Hence, wealth acquisition's co-existence with frugal living.⁴³ Unlike in Europe, the struggle to earn a livelihood became spiritual nourishment and America's hardworking became virtuous, an identification which persisted in America throughout the 1947-1960 period.⁴⁴ For example, in 1958, three-quarters of Americans interpreted laziness as a sin and categorised anybody who did not demonstrate the utmost commitment to his work, as undeserving of respect.⁴⁵

The second and broader narrative is the 'greed is good' view, which co-habits with societal betterment through a skewered interpretation of Adam Smith's 'invisible hand', which theoretically moderates individual self-interest pursuit for societal good. Profit-driven private individual gains are viewed as societal gains, overlooking Smith's advocacy of government intervention since the 'invisible hand' would by itself be ineffective for society.⁴⁶ Capitalism is often viewed as an ideological framework to a better existence. However, Erikson's definition of ideology is in this context particularly useful. He defined ideology as, "not merely high privileges and lofty ideals", but the necessary social institution which guarded identity, and legitimised identity requirements within a society's discourse.⁴⁷ Erikson thus treated ideology itself as a quasi-narrative, providing policy prescription and requiring protection when threatened. It was incidentally specifically this concept that Habermas later converted to an identity-securing interpretative system.

The very nature of America's major exports, grain, machinery and mass-market goods compounded capitalism's association with the good life. American entrepreneurs consistently preached that exports could democratise medieval economies and raise living standards. Trade became a leveller of both country and class, overcoming Malthus's predictions of scarcity and Marx's of class conflict. Even Roosevelt, probably the most socialist twentieth century American president and after the worst economic crisis in American history, continued to link progress to capitalism's success. For this reason, Acheson supported lending money to Britain in 1946 not as a diplomatic exercise but to support the economic system which is the very basis of our life. Though not an economist, he grasped that lending money would help maintain America's capitalist identity narrative, "to help people who believe the way we do, to continue to live the way they want to live".⁴⁸

Exceptionalism

Americans are not unique to have defined themselves as exceptional - not least since criteria can be selected to distinguish any people as exceptional. Implicit within the Japanese *hakko ichiu*, 'the eight corners of the world under one (Japanese) roof' is a Japanese exceptionalism – uniqueness amongst unique.⁴⁹ Likewise, the Jewish concept of God's Chosen People and Hindu concept of *Hindutva* are embedded with exceptionalism.⁵⁰ Lipset, perhaps the most persistent contemporary exponent of American exceptionalism, nevertheless insists that America is exceptional because it originated from, "a revolutionary event and defined its *raison d'etre* ideologically. Other countries' sense of themselves is derived from a common history and not an ideology."⁵¹ Aside from the American 'revolution' resembling less a revolution and

more a change in political format, with existing internal relationships unchanged, Lipset's definition would also necessarily impart exceptionalism upon post-1979 Iran which few Americans would feel comfortable with.ⁱⁱⁱ An alternative account of American exceptionalism is Adam's, 'American spirit' derived from the, "electrically charged air which makes people walk faster, act more emphatically", stressing that, "America itself, that new environment which started so many strands of influence at work to make the world of character, outlook and institutions which we call 'America'".⁵²

Though American exceptionalism originated *before* 1492, its narrative invokes at its origin Columbus, who 'discovered' America in mythical proportions.^{iv} For the Puritans, amongst whom was Winthrop, the author of the widely appropriated "City on a hill", America combined exceptionalism and a mission as the 'redeemer nation'.⁵³ A Boston clergyman in 1639 described the Massachusetts Bay colony, "a special people, an only people – none like thee in all the earth."⁵⁴ Economic resource and success reinforced exceptionalism's narrative. The east coast's annual rainfall of forty inches and warm temperature was and remains ideal for farming. In fact, North America has amongst the world's best soil for regular food crops, which has meant the absence of famine in America for three centuries.⁵⁵ Timber was massively abundant. In the early seventeenth century there were 822 million acres of timberland in America.⁵⁶ In 1700, America's economic output was only five percent of Britain's. By 1775, it was forty percent⁵⁷

ⁱⁱⁱ Lipset's claim in the following pages that, "Americans are utopian moralists who press hard to institutionalise virtue to destroy evil people, and to eliminate wicked institutions and practices" is highly contentious.

^{iv} Eleventh century Vikings were the first European observers of America. Columbus, an Italian, employed by Spain, who spoke no English, never saw the American continent and died with the conviction that he had seen India.

The exceptionalist narrative was also romanticised in the nineteenth century.⁵⁸ Though science's racial proofs supported American exceptionalism, it was nonetheless historians, writers and artists such as Hawthorne, Whitman, Scott and Melville, who gave depth to exceptionalism narrative depth were consequently institutionalised for their architecture. Alexis De Tocqueville claims pride of place based on his early affirmation of American exceptionalism, one that rested on egalitarianism and individualism, notwithstanding the plight of non-Caucasians.⁵⁹ For De Tocqueville, America was modernity's leader, the only country in which the great revolution of democracy was taking place, "Working back through the centuries to the remotest antiquity, I see nothing at all similar to what is taking place before our eyes."⁶⁰ The French aristocrat, who became France's foreign minister soon after his nine-month tour of America, advised his European compatriots in 1848,

"I confess that in America I saw more than America; I sought the image of democracy itself, with its inclinations, its character, its prejudices, and its passions, in order to learn what we have to fear or hope from its progress."⁶¹

Ralph Waldo Emerson also features prominently because of his portrayal of American exceptionalism, "Separated from the contamination which infects all other civilised lands, this country has always boasted a great comparative purity."⁶² There was also Frederick Jackson Turner who converted the basis of America's exceptionalism from the Anglo Saxon antiquity (Teutonic) theory, to the 'Frontier' as Americans' defining experience. Americans, he insisted, were exceptional because of their experience at

the Frontier, which ignored both the issue that very few Americans ever experienced the Frontier, as well as its barbarism. American Romanticists, whose dialogue incidentally never absorbed non-Caucasians, relied on a common migratory experience. Immigration was portrayed as deliverance from misery to American hope. Puritans were persecuted from England in the seventeenth century; the Irish escaped a nineteenth century famine, while the Germans fled Europe's revolutions.

Aside from the strategic criteria of selection, that the American exceptionalist identity has remained strong is paradoxical given the dilute nature of exceptionalist claims. While the Founding Fathers roamed in holes to survive and ate, "dogs, cats, rice, and mice", a colonist reported,

"One of our colony murdered his wife, ripped the child out of her womb and threw it into the river, and after chopped the mother in pieces and salted her for his food, the same not being discovered before he had eaten part thereof. . . . a savage we slew and buried, the poorest sort took him up again and ate him."⁶³

Further, during a raid on Amerindians, the venerated early colonists, "put the Children to death...by throwing them overboard and shooting out their brains in the water."⁶⁴

In England, these great Americans were viewed as human offal,

"It is ... most profitable for our state to rid our multitudes of such who lie at home (inflicting on) the land pestilence and penury, and infecting one another with vice and villainy worse than the plague itself."⁶⁵

White Anglo-Saxon

The most visible real American identity, hence the most articulated, was Caucasian and specifically Anglo-Saxon. Race is a benign term given that there is only one human race albeit a range of physical variations.⁶⁶ Even the term Anglo-Saxon is misleading since it denotes an ethno-racial homogeneity which does not exist. The German tribes which migrated to England in the fifth century and integrated with the Celts, were not homogeneously Anglo-Saxon. Furthermore, the later Viking invasions and Norman conquest further diversified these people.^v That the early Virginian bloodline merged with Amerindians when an English colony of May 1657 was never traced and from the inter-racial breeding such as Jefferson's fathering of children with black mothers, complicates American claims to Anglo-Saxon identity.⁶⁷

Yet America has remained strongly committed to a Caucasian Anglo-Saxon identity, the celebration of which has been a persistent theme in and of American history. Only one of the eight paintings inside the Capitol's Rotunda, Chapman's 'Baptism of Pocahontas at Jamestown, Virginia, 1613' treats a non-Anglo Saxon as a subject, and even then only converting to the Anglo-Saxon way.⁶⁸ The constitution reserved citizenship for Caucasians; blacks did not get automatic citizenship rights until after 1865 and Amerindians not till 1924.⁶⁹ Architecture too reflected this identity. The capital's buildings could easily have been uprooted only from one of many Western European cities. The interior of Congress's dome was based on Rome's Pantheon, while nearly every bust in Capitol Hill is of a Caucasian. Two Amerindians, a

^v For instance, even the author of England's famous ethnic cricket 'test' should note that the names 'Norman' and 'Tebbit' do not have particularly English origins.

Hawaiian King and an Afro-American are meek contributions to racial diversity.^{70 vi}

Beyond the capital and more generally, it took more than three decades after Eisenhower's administration for Disney to let Afro-Americans portray Afro-American characters in an animation movie and for Peter Pan's savage and unusually red 'Injuns' of 1953 to become Pocahontas's spiritualistic defenders of the eco-system.⁷¹

America's Anglo-Saxon identity's differed from England's for the colonists were more aware of their contrast with Amerindians and the racial narratives were reinforced for anchorage in a new world.^{vii} Race was the hardest currency to articulate the uncertainties that colonists felt. The British, distanced by the Atlantic and therefore less threatened, were more sympathetic towards non-Anglo Saxons, and discontinued slavery ninety years before its abolition in America. The contradiction between the Declaration of Independence and treatment of non-Caucasians only swayed America from environmental racism to biological racism, a process begun before European scientists, using the same methodological and epistemological commitments as they still do, 'proved' Caucasian superiority.^{viii} Science thus further placed inequality's onus on the Negro. From the 1830s, Americans led Europeans in providing scientific evidence for Anglo-Saxon superiority, "the jarring note of rampant racialism that permeates the debates of mid-century".⁷² In 1840, one ex-Governor repudiated, "as ridiculously absurd, that much lauded but nowhere accredited dogma of Mr Jefferson, that 'all men are born equal'."⁷³ While ethnologists insisted there were irreversible differences amongst the races, The Democratic

^{vi} The term 'Amerindian' or 'Indian' is not indigenous to America's natives. It is a term imposed from outside by real Americans.

^{vii} Implicit in even the 'Afro-American' classification is America's Caucasian identity. There is no corresponding 'Euro-American' category that Caucasian Americans are categorised with.

^{viii} The term 'proved' is appropriate only to the extent that twenty-first century scientists share the same methodological and epistemological commitments, and hence concepts of proof, that were used by nineteenth century scientists.

Review noted in 1850, “none now seriously adhere to the theory of the unity of races”.⁷⁴ ix

The narrative of Anglo Saxon identity was embodied in the racial hierarchy, which, with the exception of the Amerindian, remained stagnant. Initially, Amerindians were ill-ranked - American hero, William Sherman wrote, “The more we can kill this year, the less will have to be killed the next war, for the more I see of these Indians the more convinced I am that all have to be killed”.⁷⁵ Those Amerindians who assimilated into European ways, such as the Cherokees, never became real American. As Amerindians dwindled after a holocaust of several million people, their threat to Anglo-Saxon narrative reduced, and they were promoted to just below the real American, as the noble Amerindian savage. In contrast, Afro-Americans remained, “a few generations removed from the wildest savagery”. Franklin, a slave owner, defined Negroes as the most horrendous race and opposed Negro immigration while Jefferson wanted Negroes expelled to Africa and Haiti.⁷⁶ Even Lincoln, under whose memorial Martin Luther King proudly delivered his powerful ‘I Have a Dream’ speech in 1963, was,

“not in favour of bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the white and black races.... There is a physical difference between the black and white races which I believe will forever forbid the two races living together on terms of social and political equality”.⁷⁷

^{ix} A minority rejected the biological hierarchy. Politician, Charles Anderson, rejected Anglo-Saxon superiority, citing that racial pride was a common historical phenomenon. Furthermore, the English were not homogeneously Anglo-Saxon and Americans were the most heterogeneous stock of people on earth.

The commitment to Anglo-Saxon and not merely Caucasian identity became evident vis-à-vis Latinos, who included the French, Spanish and Italian. The early Spanish “carnage and plunder” of Amerindians, initiated America to impart Latinos a reputation for hypocrisy, cruelty and misgovernment. John Quincy Adams observed that Latinos, “have not the first elements of good or free government. Arbitrary power, military and ecclesiastical, was stamped upon their education, upon their habits, and upon all their institutions.” Furthermore, shockingly to American society, Latinos openly mixed with non-Caucasians to produce degenerate mongrels.⁷⁸

Finally, Asians ranked below Latinos. Ordinarily and within the Anglo-Saxon narrative, they were unfeeling, cunning and evil. However, when placed within the missionary narrative they were also a people of promise, close to dispelling medieval culture. Americans thus felt on the one hand a responsibility to tutor and protect China into civility yet on the other hand with the arrival of Chinese labour after the 1850s, and the threat to Anglo-Saxon narratives, Americans enforced deportation while Sinologists who could neither speak Chinese nor had travelled to China, portrayed a yellow tide of rat huddled and sexually demonic Chinese about to debauch vulnerable white women.⁷⁹

Anti-Communism: America’s Meta-Identity

In America’s economy of identities, including the aforementioned four identities, more than any other identity, the most pervasive was, and perhaps still remains, anti-communism. Its segregation from the other four lies not because it is an identity built primarily in opposition to something though a case from this alone could be made, but

in that its origination was a function of the four aforementioned identities. The anti-communist narrative's importance in this thesis lies not only in America's privileging it to understand and engage the world after 1946, but also in that the anti-communist narrative was the exclusive narrative through which America understood and interacted with Pakistan. Accordingly, Washington recognised and engaged Pakistan during the high periods of anti-communist identity subscription and sense of communist threat, such as from 1950 to 1954, and failed to understand Pakistan, and sought to disengage it after 1957 when Eisenhower led a graduated *détente*.

America's anxiety about communism originated not from hostility to political radicalism, for nineteenth century America was a hotbed of radicalisms, appropriating the 'revolution' for legitimacy.⁸⁰ Furthermore, communism was neither a military or economic threat to America, especially not before 1945, nor was it exclusively a synthetic mechanism to preserve American identity as Noam Chomsky suggests.⁸¹ As early as 1871, the Paris Commune, a mere political speck, drew hysterical American denigration.⁸² That it did so can be coherently explained within the identity narrative framework since auto-identification's framework, being also that of allo-identification, sensitised America to communism's threat to American identity narratives. Friction and unease were generated from communism's proximity to American narratives, as well as its opposition to those narratives.⁸³ ^x Communism had its own global mission in the emancipation of the proletariat, and not the hardworking entrepreneur. With Marx describing the capital "beast" as corrupt as Babylon's Whore and treating it as transitory evil, communism offered its own economics framework

^x Though communism's manifestations can be dated to Plato's ruling elite, it was Marx and Engels who gave expression to communism. The term, in currency before the pair subscribed to it, was modified by their "scientific socialism", and came to mean as Geoffrey Stern suggests, "a society without private property or wealth accumulation" (G Stern, "The Rise and Decline of Communism", 1990, London: Edward Elgar Publishers, 60)

that frowned upon individualistic hardworking wealth acquisition. There was also communism's belief in its exceptionality as a historical agent for modernity, a point that Marx stressed in describing communism as, "the solution of the riddle of history."⁸⁴ Finally, though communism did not rigorously challenge Anglo-Saxon (economic) imperialism until Lenin, America's Anglo-Saxon hierarchy was nevertheless threatened by communism's association with Eastern Europeans.

Gilman has demonstrated a whole series of alterities in the history of European identities – blacks, the insane, women, Jews and homosexuals.⁸⁵ Communism's broad threat to American narratives promoted communism to America's alterity, that anti-communism was not primarily about communism but, "a way of being American" – the quintessence American identity, and synonymous with un-American.⁸⁶ This is especially apparent given communism threatened the American self and its ontological security by destabilising America's stories about itself. As anti-communism became real America's primary identity, the defeat of communism became real America's primary narrative. Communism's vortex was it could, "change our way of life so that we couldn't recognize it as American any longer".⁸⁷ "The very existence of the Soviet Union constituted a nightmare".⁸⁸ A journalist revealingly commented during the Depression that the unemployed were, "right on the edge...that it wouldn't take much to make Communists out of them."⁸⁹ As the alterity, communism also became a depository term for anomalies to real America and it was upon this basis that Kovel described Amerindians as the, "primal communist of American history."⁹⁰

It is precisely the metanarrative of the anti-communist meta-identity that replaces Kovel's nebulous anti-communist 'black hole', and assumes the function of America's categorising, attaching meaning to and engaging in world politics in this thesis.⁹¹ Clearly therefore Francois Lyotard's suggestion that metanarratives ended with postmodernity necessitates qualification for anti-communism remained America's metanarrative into early postmodernity during the Reagan administration.⁹² That this was so, may have reflected Jacques Derrida's idea that the monolithic Other, as alterity, furnished substance to the rhetorical illusion of an essentialist and unified identity.⁹³ It also however reflected the impact of communism's perpendicular location to American narratives, and the semiotic gravitas that the term acquired not only after 1946, but from the nineteenth century. That communism did not challenge the dominant identity narratives of other peoples, and thence did not precipitate the anxiety that it did in America, became painfully evident to Washington throughout the 1950s. For instance, in 1954, despite the anti-communist hysteria in America, Churchill refused to investigate communism in Britain.⁹⁴

The Bolshevik Revolution was the first state legitimised communist threat to America. Washington was unprepared for any state, itself a technology of modernity, to repudiate American narratives by adopting communism. Ordinarily, this would have necessitated policy to eliminate the narrative threat. However, America's distancing from Europe after Versailles left the paradoxical engagement of communism within during the Red Scare of 1919-20, while a refusal to engage it outside. One mayor described a shipyard strike as an attempt, "to take possession of our American government and try to duplicate the anarchy of Russia," while a senator announced that since from Russia the strike leaders had come, "to Russia they should

be made to go.”⁹⁵ The Wall Street Journal described the police industrial action in 1919 as, “Lenin and Trotsky are on their way.”⁹⁶ Negroes, including soldiers returning from war, were lynched during the ‘Red Scare’.⁹⁷ The administration’s first commitment to congregating narrative anomalies with communism demanded, “the preservation of a God fearing Anglo Saxon America in which property was sacrosanct.”⁹⁸ This anti-communism was the frenzied protection of real identity narratives, “several movements (arose) to restore tranquillity, old fashioned ways, old-time religion, undiluted patriotism, and unhyphenated Americanism.”⁹⁹

That communists worked with anomalous identities, further attested to and identified their un-Americanism. In the 1930s, communists organised the defence in many prominent black cases such as the Scottsboro Nine in Alabama. The American Communist Party, reflecting Stalin’s concerns about Hitler, changed strategy in 1935 and supported unions such as the United Auto Workers.¹⁰⁰ In parallel, John Lewis of the United Mine Workers facilitated blacks into the unions. The Communist Party’s fronts included the National Negro Congress, the Labor Press Committee and the Defense of the Foreign Born.¹⁰¹ The Civil Rights Congress, a communist organisation, denounced, “the shame of white supremacy ... It is time to wipe the scourge of Jim Crow from the face of America”.¹⁰² The Communist Party had no less than ten commissions seeking to appropriate non-Anglo-Saxons while Blacks constituted a fifth of the Communist Party’s membership in some regions.¹⁰³

With real American identity narratives crippled during the Depression, the 1930s witnessed a growth not only in anomalies to real American narratives, such as the civil rights movement and the challenge to American exceptionalism and capitalism

in the Depression, but also in American communism. Sidney Lens, a Trotskyite, recalled the 1930s when, “history was ready for quantum leaps”.¹⁰⁴ Communist Al Richmond remembered the, “exhilarating sense of being on the offensive, ideologically and morally.”¹⁰⁵ In 1931, the Communist Party had nine thousand members. By 1938, it had seventy-five thousand.¹⁰⁶ In 1933, Roosevelt ignored Americanism organisations by recognising Russia and appointing communists in government.¹⁰⁷ In 1938, after Roosevelt secured US\$3.7bn for public spending, even communist leader Earl Browder conceded that where socialism was unattainable, “it is a thousand times better to have a liberal and progressive New Deal.... than to have a new Hoover.”¹⁰⁸ One communist reflected that, “the Communist Party was very liberal, and very much the same kind of a sociological and political program as the Roosevelt administration... it didn’t seem to be too different.”¹⁰⁹

During this ‘Red Decade’, attempts to enact and protect American narratives with and through anti-communism began with economic recovery. The New Deal was labelled communistic in 1934 during congressional hearings to police the stock exchange. Elizabeth Dilling’s ‘The Red Network’ in 1934 was one of many anti-communist books that listed members from anomaly organisations such as the NAACP.¹¹⁰ The American Legion’s study in 1936 of foreign threats dedicated 256 pages to communism, in contrast to only fifteen to Nazism and three to fascism. Yet Russia’s benign foreign policy contrasted with German and Italian aggression. While Father Coughlin labelled the New Deal communistic to the world’s largest radio audiences, the Hearst newspapers, Du Pont and General Motors executives joined conservative Democrats to form the American Liberty League, ‘to combat radicalism’ and the Klan in 1936 subordinated race issues for communism. The American Legion, and blind to

the Nazi march, issued a study in 1936 entitled, "Isms: A Review of Alien Isms, Revolutionary Communism and Their Active Sympathisers in the United States".¹¹¹

One important instrument of narrative protection was the House Un-American Committee ('HUAC'). Created in 1938 originally to counter anti-Jewish attitudes, HUAC was hijacked by Martin Dies to enact anti-communism through the New Deal, unions, the Labour Department, socialists and non-Caucasians. Interestingly however, communism did not dominate the anti-communist committee for America's significant un-American elements, especially given the quasi-isolationist policy, were Afro-Americans and unions. Dies chairmanship was therefore apt. In 1942, the future chair of HUAC had noted in, "the South today subversive elements are attempting to convince the Negro that he should be placed on social equality with white people."¹¹² Later another committee member during office noted, "If someone insists that there is discrimination against Negroes in this country, or that there is inequality of wealth, there is every reason to believe that person is a Communist."¹¹³

And thus briefly to the Cold War. At the war's end, real America underwent a reaffirmation of faith in itself that ended the cognitive dissonance of the Depression. Confidence permeated the national aura.¹¹⁴ In 1945, America owned two-thirds of the world's gold reserves, three-quarters of invested capital, more than half of the world's manufacturing capacity and produced more than a third of the world's goods. America's GNP trebled Russia's and was five times Britain's.¹¹⁵ Art mirrored the buoyancy and American artists who had looked to Europe for inspiration, looked instead to New York. Jackson Pollock and Mark Rothko's response came in the confrontational aesthetics of Abstract Expressionism.¹¹⁶ Veterans, whose

understanding of protecting America was transformed during the war, committed to reviving America by expressing and protecting Anglo-Saxon and capitalist narratives, converged on race and labour. Black veterans were lynched across America.¹¹⁷ So pronounced did racism become in the armed forces, that even the NAACP supported segregation.¹¹⁸ Meanwhile, Congress dissected the New Deal and passed the Taft-Hartley Act, ending the Wagner Act's advantages to unions.

This America of 1945 had little anxiety about 'Uncle Joe's' Russia, "American officials did *not* regard the Soviet Union as an enemy and were *not* frightened by Soviet military prowess".¹¹⁹ Public discussion focused more on frozen orange juice, unemployment and homecoming than world politics. However with the desire to reaffirm and relocate self and renaissance ontological security by reaffirming American narratives, America extended the narrative enactment arena well beyond America hence magnifying communist Russia's prominence. In the extended arena, instead of attaining security, America's policymakers progressively noticed their American narratives' antithesis.^{xi} Furthermore, Roosevelt, who intended to work with Russia, left an ill-informed Truman, whose lessons of 'appeasement' were ideal for a State Department sceptical of Moscow, with America's most centralised federal government.¹²⁰ The anxieties from decades of narrative anomalies, including communism, originating from before the war, were thus converted to fear by objectifying communist Russia with a politico-military discourse. The anti-communist ontological and discourse framework stabilised America, "Cognitive dissonance was reduced and choices made easier by attributing to the Russians the most malevolent of motives and the most sinister of goals and by denying that their grievances had any

^{xi} The American Communist party's rigid rhetoric under William Foster further scared Washington.

legitimacy.”¹²¹ Kennan’s observation is especially poignant - enmity has little to do with reality but everything to do with the requirements of the group that invents its enemy.¹²²

America’s politico-military articulation of communism’s threat contrasted with Stalin having neither pretence nor capability for global conquest. Montgomery noted in 1945 that, “Devastation in Russia is appalling and the country is in no fit state to go to war.”¹²³ In 1945, Russia was demobilising and was, “too backward economically, too badly hurt by the Nazis, and too demoralized to contemplate war for a long time.”¹²⁴ Reports emphasised Russia’s economic weakness, its inability to strike America, lack of aviation gas, administrative and airfield deficiencies and low defence budget.¹²⁵ Stalin reduced the armed forces from twelve million in 1945 to three and a half million in 1947. An intelligence report in 1945 outlined Russia’s defence gaps would take fifteen years to fulfil.¹²⁶ Years later, Kennan recalled he saw no evidence, “of any Soviet desire to assume the burdens of occupation over any extensive territories” beyond those occupied in the war.¹²⁷

The communist state’s prominence and threat articulation encouraged the protection of real American narratives.¹²⁸ McCarthyism began before February 1950 as, “a banner around which various segments of the population could marshal their preservatist discontents and their general uneasiness”.¹²⁹ ^{xii} One moderate Republican believed, “we can’t continue to make mistakes with the people who are trying to destroy our Way of Life”.¹³⁰ In 1947, fifty-seven percent of Americans saw ‘a great many’ communists – thus Godden’s logistical problem of communists, “almost

^{xii} Nietzsche’s warning was pertinent, “He who fights with monsters should be careful lest he thereby become a monster.” J Kovel (1994:77)

everywhere and almost nowhere".¹³¹ Hollywood stopped movies that propagated (communistic) racial and wealth equality. The civil rights initiative was labelled communistic.¹³² While American hero, Walt Disney, produced films supporting the racial hierarchy and private individualistic enterprise, Robin Hood stories, with the 'from the rich - to the poor' theme, were banned from libraries.¹³³ Even Democrats, such as Hubert Humphrey, purged the unions.¹³⁴ Lillian Hellman noted about HUAC

"confusions of honest people were picked up in space by cheap baddies who, hearing a few bars of popular notes, made them into an opera of public disorder, staged and sung... in the wards of an insane asylum."¹³⁵

The FBI interfaced anti-communism with real American narrative protection inside America. That John Edgar Hoover told Richard Nixon in 1950 that he had never heard of Browder, the former American Communist Party chief, attests to the lower priority of communism itself to domestic anti-communism.¹³⁶ Moreover, the communist paranoia did not resemble its threat. There were as many communists in America as there were members of the Finnish Evangelical Lutheran church.¹³⁷ Despite twenty-six thousand investigations, the FBI did not detect a single communist espionage act. However, Hoover, who sought to protect real American narratives, despised socialists and blacks and propagated American's real identity.^{xiii} The FBI "had a devastating effect upon the cause of blacks' civil rights and civil liberties".¹³⁸ Not surprisingly, one of Hoover's first investigations in 1919 was against "a certain class of Negro leaders" who had demonstrated an "outspoken advocacy of the Bolsheviki or Soviet doctrines."

^{xiii} Ironically, this high priest of American security and identity during the era of conformity, lived only two days of his entire life outside of America and was a practicing homosexual and paedophile. Ibid, 107

Identity Narratives and India

The second and perhaps lesser impact of real identity American narratives on Pakistan originated in America's cognition and engagement of India. Pakistan's partition from India and the subsequent importance of India to Pakistan meant that US policy to India inevitably intimately impacted Pakistan. America's Anglo-Saxon identity narrative guided America's categorisation, meaning and engagement of India into the nineteenth century. America saw the Raj as a civilising force, a cognition strongly supported by America's Anglo-Saxon brethren in London, while the Indian cow, caste and religion were criticised for medievalism and symptomatic of racial regress. With Britain assuming direct authority in India from 1773 and resentful of foreign influence, Washington's disinterest in India insulated the missionary categorisation and discourse. Therefore, during the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny, a few missionaries excepted, Americans sympathised with Britain's harsh response. Ulysses Grant was, "very much pleased with English rule" while the American consular defended the Raj, stressing Indian immaturity for self-government. Theodore Roosevelt portrayed British rule as,

"one of the most notable achievements of the white race during the past two centuries.... If the English control were now withdrawn from India, the whole peninsula would become a chaos of bloodshed and violence".¹³⁹

In view of this, initially, the six thousand Punjabi 'Hindus' (irrespective of faith) who migrated to west America after 1898 were an Anglo-Saxon narrative anomaly.¹⁴⁰ One

Senator declared, “We don’t want these Hindus and they should be barred out just as the Chinese are excluded...There is plenty of room for good citizens, but there is no room at all for fakirs and mendicants.”¹⁴¹ Before 1907, only a tenth of Indian immigration applicants were rejected. Assisted by the Immigration Act and the 1924 National Origins Quota Act, the ratio of rejections increased to half.¹⁴² In 1923, the Supreme Court ruled that “Hindus” were ineligible for citizenship since they were not “white persons”.¹⁴³ Rabindranath Tagore, the Nobel laureate poet, noted in 1916 that even Jesus would be denied entry to America since, “he would not have the necessary money and ...he would be an Asiatic.”¹⁴⁴

At the century’s turn however, America’s missionary identity narrative replaced its Anglo-Saxon equivalent for understanding India. Central to this transformation was not only the closing of the continental Frontier, which initiated the westward missionary movement into Asia, but also the Indian presence in America, especially California’s Sikh community, which led India’s embryonic independence struggle against Britain. Har Dayal formed the Ghadar Party to help overthrow the Raj while Lala Lajpat Rai founded the India Home Rule League of America. They, and many other Indian political nationalists in America, located India within America’s missionary narrative by drawing parallels with America’s own independence.¹⁴⁵ Furthermore, nineteenth century philologists had created the myth of a special people, the ‘Aryan’ Indo-Europeans, who migrated west from India to build civilisation.¹⁴⁶ The prospect of connecting American modernity with India’s ancient spirituality, of completing the missionary circle, was especially attractive. Indian independence suddenly stimulated American sympathy. The missionary narrative’s growing application for understanding India was reflected in mounting American missionary

work in India. From 1813 to 1892, only 393 American missions were established in India. However, between 1893 and 1922, 2,085 enacted the missionary narrative.¹⁴⁷

Andrew Carnegie and William Jennings Bryant criticised British rule of India, insisting that an Anglo-Saxon hierarchical development could not substitute self-governance.¹⁴⁸ In December 1921, thirty-eight Americans including a few Congressmen sent a Christian message of sympathy to the Indian Congress while throughout the 1920s, the American consul's account of the independence movement and those of American articles became more upbeat.¹⁴⁹ xiv

That the inter-war years marked a transition of America's privileging the missionary narrative above the Anglo Saxon narrative for categorising, attaching meaning and engaging India meant that the latter narrative was still though infrequently employed used to understand India. Hollywood continued to emphasise Indian stereotypes, such as the rebellious tribesman or the soldier loyal to the British.¹⁵⁰ Katherine Mayo's 'Mother India' in 1927, America's most widely read book about India, described India's "inertia, helplessness, lack of initiative and originality, lack of staying power and sustained loyalties, sterility of enthusiasm, weakness of life vigour itself", hence justifying the Anglo-Saxon hierarchy and colonialism.¹⁵¹ xv

However, by the war's onset, America had predominantly locked India's categorisation within America's missionary narrative with implications for America's treatment of India's growing struggle for political identity and expression. The nucleus of the cementing of this cognitive privileging was Mohandis ('Mahatma') For

^{xiv} This was so despite the American press having to contend with British censorship and dominance of India's information production through Reuters

^{xv} Gandhi described Mayo's work as "a drainage inspector report", while an Indian professor asked if, "I wrote only of what I found in your slums, your night club dives, and your divorce courts, it would also be a shocking story, wouldn't it?" (See C Bowles, 1954:78)

most Americans, Gandhi personified David complete with loincloth, defying the British Goliath and re-enacting America's own inception. This depiction of Gandhi's posture resonated not only with America's narrative past, but its narrative future in the westward mission to emancipate, civilise and progress mankind. Gandhi's oddity also fixated America. His centrepiece Jain doctrine of *Ahimsa* (non-violence) fascinated America, as did his civil disobedience, such as his 241-mile march to make salt on India's coast in 1930 that was, in America, compared to the defiance of the Boston Tea Party.¹⁵² While Haridas Muzimdar, an American Indian, read the Declaration of Independence at Independence Hall, Americans mobilised behind Indian independence. A hundred clergymen petitioned Ramsay McDonald to accord with Gandhi, while ninety-nine students petitioned Hull to intervene.¹⁵³

Engagement Suppressant

War delayed America's engaging India within the missionary narrative.¹⁵⁴ The tension between India's categorisation within America's mission and America's support of its British ally intensified during the war. Indian nationalists, already inflamed after New Delhi declared war without consulting a single Indian, demanded Indian independence in return for supporting Britain's war effort and rejected offers of 'eventual' dominion status.¹⁵⁵ Britain in turn was reluctant to grant independence. In any case, Churchill's assumption as prime minister in 1940 complicated matters because Indian 'disloyalty' infuriated him perhaps more than it did any other senior British politician.¹⁵⁶ Indian nationalist cries in America thus initially competed against war's demands so when in 1940 Churchill imprisoned thousands of Indian Congress

party members for their non-co-operation in war, Washington was restrained while some newspapers criticised Nehru for betraying the war effort.

Hitler's racism nevertheless placed limits to the overt use of Anglo-Saxon narrative which meant that Britain's portrayal of India, led by Ambassador Lord Halifax, stressed Indian Congress's non-representation and the Japanese war, not independence's legitimacy nor Anglo-Saxon superiority. Britain stressed a fragmented India, unrepresentative Congress and the Japanese war.¹⁵⁷ Churchill explained in detail in 1942,

“Outside that party and fundamentally opposed to it are 90 million Muslims in British India...50 millions depressed or untouchables.... and 95 million subjects of Princes.... In all there are 235 millions in these large groupings alone out of the 390 millions in all India.”¹⁵⁸

Though American official support for Indian nationalists was consequently severely restricted, India's role in the missionary narrative continued to entice engagement. In May 1941, Assistant Secretary of State Adolph Berle proposed Britain seek India as an equal partner, Washington's first serious attempt to reconcile the dispute and first policy proposal in favour of Indian nationalists.¹⁵⁹ Roosevelt, who held deep concerns about British colonialism, privately stressed to Churchill during the lend-lease programme negotiations to grant greater autonomy to India. Thus Roosevelt's direction of the Atlantic Charter's third resolution especially at India, “the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live” which epitomised America's policy boundary between war's demands and the missionary

narrative engagement.¹⁶⁰ Though Churchill interpreted this resolution as applying only to Nazi areas, Roosevelt eventually pressured Churchill into allowing the Indians to sign the UN Declaration in December 1941.¹⁶¹

Pearl Harbour, Japan's conquests in early 1942 of Singapore and Burma and the attack on Ceylon and India, all of which came after the German conquest in the Middle East, helped re-balance the war's military impact on America's engagement of India.¹⁶² India's military value rose during 1942 in line with the prospect of the Axis powers controlling India, linking Germany and Japan. Roosevelt noted,

“From all I can gather the British defense will not have sufficiently enthusiastic support from the peoples of India themselves.... in a strict sense, it is not our business. It is, however, of great interest to us from the point of view of the conduct of the war.”¹⁶³

Furthermore, there was the growing risk that India's categorisation and meaning within the missionary narrative could be blown off course, as China's would later in 1949. Subhas Chandra Bose's pro-Japanese decrees vexed America, especially so after he met Ribbentrop and Tojo in 1942 and 1943 with a view to expelling Britain from India.¹⁶⁴ Bose's Azad Hind government, while ineffective, made headlines by boldly declaring war on America and Britain in 1943.¹⁶⁵ Even Gandhi, who barely distinguished between Japanese and American morality, gestured goodwill to Japan.¹⁶⁶

The combination of less restricted engagement of India within the missionary narrative, and protection of that narrative through India, increased, as Malik reveals, American pressure for Indian independence in 1942.¹⁶⁷ It mattered not that in that year, sixty percent of Americans could locate neither China nor India on a map.¹⁶⁸ Nor that America's trade with India accounted for a marginal two percent of its overall trade.¹⁶⁹ It was however important that while Consulate General Thomas Wilson, America's de facto ambassador in India, criticised Britain for not taking, "a realistic view", a member of the Cripps delegation to India noted the,

"interest of the American public in India is enduring and widespread... it is persistent; there is almost everywhere and at almost any period an audience for speakers or writers on India... interest in India arises from the seeming similarity between the relations of Britain to Indian independence and of Britain to the independence of the Thirteen Colonies".^{170 xvi}

Hull summarised the administration's new tension,

"any change in India's constitutional status would be brought about only if Great Britain were in agreement, and we realized full well that, with Britain for her life, we should take no step and utter no words that would impede her struggle. We also knew that the British Government, and Prime Minister Churchill in particular, considered India their own problem, and that any attempt by the United States to bring pressure to

^{xvi} The New York Times, Readers Digest, Newsweek, Time, Congress and the State Department were all strong Indian independence supporters

solve it might give rise to controversy between our two governments and peoples. It was therefore a delicate question how far we could go in any representations to the British to grant independence, or in any actions that might encourage the Indians to demand it immediately...But in private conversations the President talked very bluntly about India with Prime Minister Churchill... for the sake of good relations with Britain we could not tell the country what we were saying privately, we were saying everything that the most enthusiastic supporter of India's freedom could have expected, and we were convinced that the American people were with us."¹⁷¹

Till 1942, Churchill had used the Muslim voice to stall independence negotiations, insisting that he would not, "take any step which would alienate the Muslims".¹⁷²

However Japan's conquest of Rangoon in March 1942 and ongoing American pressure compelled Churchill to open negotiations through the subsequent Stafford Cripps mission, the American media's most closely followed event ever in India.

Roosevelt resumed direct petitioning by suggesting to Churchill that an interim Indian government would be useful as had been the Articles of Confederation for America.¹⁷³ Roosevelt maintained involvement by appointing a representative in April, Louis Johnson, who assumed de facto chief mediator responsibilities between Indians and the Raj.¹⁷⁴

In March 1942, Cripps offered India dominion status, with secession after the war – an offer that was made public simultaneously in London, New Delhi *and* Washington.¹⁷⁵ Congress rejected the plan, as Churchill knew it would, because

Britain retained defence responsibilities and Gandhi was in any case reluctant to join the war before independence.¹⁷⁶ However, Japan's bombing of India's coast in April enabled Johnson to win Linlithgow and Wavell's support to enlarge the Indians' defence role. Roosevelt again comparing India with, "the inception of the Government of the United States", pressed Churchill,

"The almost universal feeling is that the deadlock has been due to the unwillingness of the British Government to concede the right of self-government to the Indian people.... If the current negotiations are allowed to collapse and if India were subsequently to be invaded successfully by the Japanese with attendant serious military defeats for the Allies; it would be hard to overestimate the prejudicial effect of this on American public opinion".¹⁷⁷

However, Churchill terminated Cripps's mission when Hopkins advised Churchill,

"Johnson's original mission to India had nothing whatsoever to do with the British proposals and ... he was not acting as the representative of the President in mediating the Indian business... Cripps was using Johnson for his own ends, Cripps being very anxious to bring Roosevelt's name into the picture".¹⁷⁸

Johnson, hence redundant, was recalled in May 1942 and aside from the cosmetic stay by Roosevelt's confidant, William Phillips, to India from December 1942, Roosevelt halted attempts seeking to engage India within the missionary narrative. In fact, the

Cripps mission was Roosevelt's last opportunity to resolve the tension between engaging India in the missionary narrative and committing to Anglo-Saxon unity in war. With this proving irreconcilable and focus scarce because of war, Roosevelt preferred to delay the entire independence issue. In July therefore, though Roosevelt discussed strategy with the Indian leadership to obtain a British pledge for Indian independence, he outright rejected Azad's request for American involvement.¹⁷⁹ By the same token, when Churchill draconianly imprisoned a hundred thousand Indian Congress members after the 'Quit India' campaign in August, Washington maintained public silence.¹⁸⁰ From 1943, Washington's focus on the war intensified and in 1944, Washington also had elections. India was so removed from the American agenda during the second half of the World War that it was not even discussed at the Yalta or San Francisco conferences in 1945.¹⁸¹

Nonetheless, throughout the war, America's broader political fabric continued to privilege the missionary narrative to make sense of India, over and above the categorisation and meaning derived from the alliance between war and the Anglo-Saxon narrative. In August 1942, Senator Robert Reynolds requested the Senate to support mediation while in September, fifty-five leading Americans and South Asians signed a New York Times full-page advertisement, 'Time for Mediation Now', urging Roosevelt to re-open negotiations.¹⁸² Days later, two hundred prominent Americans signed a letter to the Senate expressing concern about Indian independence's slowdown bearing on the Asian war.¹⁸³ In October, Wendell Wilkie, the Republican presidential candidate of 1940, spoke to a radio audience of thirty-six million, criticising inaction in India, "When the aspirations of India for freedom were put aside to some future unguaranteed date, it was not Great Britain that suffered in public

esteem in the Far East. It was the United States.”¹⁸⁴ At the war’s end, and despite his abstinence from India, even Roosevelt had clearly though privately rejected the Anglo-Saxon for missionary narrative for understanding India, “there are over 1,100,000,000 brown people. In many Eastern countries, they are ruled by a handful of whites and they resent it. Our goal must be to help them achieve independence.”¹⁸⁵

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CHAPTER THREE

TRUMAN PART I: PAKISTAN AND COGNITIVE TEETHING

Having developed a theoretical framework in the first chapter, and expanded it during chapter two in the context of American policy with specific scrutiny of the two American identity narratives which governed policy to Pakistan, being the anti-communist and, less directly, missionary identity narratives, the analysis of US policy to Pakistan until 1960 thus commences. American policy to Karachi during the Truman administration and prior to the Korean War reflected two contrasting and opposed themes with quite differing kismets within the identity narrative framework. On the one hand, America failed to categorise and attach meaning within its narratives to a Pakistan that materialised too quickly in a cloud of considerable uncertainty, except the sparse negative meanings derived from Pakistan's threat to the unity of the India through which America had demonstrated an appetite to fulfil its missionary narrative. Even when Pakistan was partitioned, America could understand it little beyond neatly wrapping it with the country it had been carved out of. Since Washington had little neither understanding of nor interest Pakistan and given London's lead for South Asia, America consequently sought to avoid Pakistan all together.

Whereas such non-cognition inaugurated early policy to Pakistan in the ascendancy, it was well eroded by the time of the Korean War by a second contrasting theme within the identity narrative framework. The growing understanding of the world through the anti-communist narrative extended to South Asia – and specifically sources of potential communist growth, deemed to be deprivation and conflict. The American antennae were thus acutely sensitive to Pakistan's conflicts with India, specifically

Kashmir, and to a lesser extent with Afghanistan. This focus was accompanied by the further extension of anti-communist cognition from late 1948 with the threat and anxiety posed to the anti-communist and missionary narratives by China's conversion and then to the anti-communist narrative by troubles in the British Middle East. While India rejected supporting America's narratives in Asia, Pakistan responded enthusiastically to the anti-communist narrative. The coincidence of America's concerns about communism in the Middle East and Washington's emerging understanding of Pakistan within anti-communism meant that America geographically re-located Pakistan into the Middle East, as an anti-communist ally, and aside from South Asia – thereby reversing both its earlier location of Pakistan in South Asia and its cognitive difficulty with Karachi.

Non-Cognition

Focusing on Truman's America and Pakistan as subject and object respectively, with implications for the classification of and discourse relating to Pakistan, is particularly appealing since Truman's administration was the first American government to address Pakistan. Pakistan emerged during an intense period of American global cognition fuelled by and reflected in the politico-military reconstruction of communist Russia. By the time Mohammed Ali Jinnah was appointed Governor General in August 1947 of the then largest Muslim country in the world, the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan had been announced, and the Cold War was underway. It was within this environment that Washington first responded to Pakistan.

Early American policy to Pakistan was severely restricted by an inability to classify Pakistan. Jinnah himself was aware of the cognitive difficulties that Pakistan posed for Washington.¹ Chaudhri suggests a secular-religious origin to this impediment, the, “idea of dividing a country on the basis of religion was alien to their (American) secular psyche”.² This is in itself unconvincing since America’s own manufactured origins are religious, in the Puritan fundamentalists, and Washington’s support for religiously identified states in Israel and Saudi Arabia is well catalogued.¹ Nor was America’s inability to understand Pakistan a function of distance. With America’s globalised focus from late 1946, physical distance diminished as a factor in classifying and attaching meaning to object states. For instance, the Truman Doctrine focused five thousand miles away on Greece and Turkey.

America’s cognitive difficulty with Pakistan can be elucidated via America’s identity narratives. Unlike India and China, territories that Americans knew very little about, but which nonetheless gravitated with roles within American narratives, specifically in their cases - the mission, and excepting America’s glances to Pakistan during the Cripps mission to India in 1942, American narratives initially neither categorised nor applied meaning to Pakistan, hence denying any subsequent engagement. The anti-communist narrative only gained strong overriding currency in late 1946, and only spread beyond its application in Europe in 1948. Real Americans’ stories about themselves, that needed reaffirmation through enactment and protection, had little to declare about and thus engage Pakistan through. Key to this shortfall was Pakistan’s swift and uncertain birth, a shortfall widened by America’s distracted attention during the early Cold War, for whereas India had resided in the American consciousness

¹ Two particularly good studies in this regard are C Mansour, J A Cohen, “Beyond Alliance: Israel in US Foreign Policy”, 1994, New York: Columbia University Press, and T G Fraser, “The USA and the Middle East since the World War 2”, 1989, London: Palgrave

since Columbus's error of eight thousand miles, Pakistan's residency barely extended to four years.

Object Emergence: Pakistan

Washington, though familiar with the Indian independence movement, was unprepared for the decolonisation process's speed and within that, Pakistan's sudden and ambiguous emergence. Europe and America treated the war's conclusion as an end that required rest and reflection. In contrast, 1945 was a beginning for India's re-energised nationalists, who were lifted by three unexpected accelerations to independence over consecutive years.

First, was Attlee's shock defeat of Churchill in the 1945 election. Against forecasts of a Conservative victory by seventy seats, Labour won by a majority of a hundred and forty-six.³ In fact, the Attlee household only considered moving from Stanmore to Westminster on the election night itself.⁴ The new Labour government had a strong pro-Congress contingent including Secretary of State for India, Pethick-Lawrence, a friend of Gandhi's since 1926, and President of the Board of Trade, Stafford Cripps, as well as a commitment to Indian independence in its manifesto. Though doubts were expressed till June 1947 about Britain's commitment to Indian independence, few seriously queried whether Britain would soon leave India.⁵ Nonetheless, Labour did not initially accelerate devolution. Unprepared for government, it was paralysed in India for lack of a clear agenda.⁶ Furthermore, key government members had no ambition to wreck the empire. Imperialists such as Attlee, Bevin and Morrison, though less zealous than Churchill, dominated Labour's foreign policy.⁷

The second unexpected thrust came from the Indian mutinies in 1946. This triggered an urgency in London to solve India's tensions, reflected in the sending of a Cabinet Mission to India in March 1946, in its selection of members and its terms of reference. Cripps, Pethick-Lawrence and Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, were sent to India for an indefinite period with a cabinet mandate to agree independence.⁸ They went, "out with a new and almost exasperated determination to finish the business," and though they failed, Viceroy Wavell, who had pushed Churchill to expedite independence, suddenly felt London was rushing too fast.⁹

The final momentum arose in 1947 when a difficult winter hit Britain's economy. Electricity was rationed daily for a few hours, nearly all industry was shut and unemployment rose to six million. This amplified the disarray surrounding the Labour-Congress attempt to suppress Pakistan by creating a pan-Indian government. The combination of weakness and disarray precipitated a panicked withdrawal. In February 1947, Attlee announced the decision to leave India by June 1948. Louis Mountbatten, Viceroy from February, was concerned about India's communal violence, brought forward the deadline to August 1947.¹⁰ The final separation and independence deal was struck in May 1947 with most minor issues cleared in June.¹¹ The 1935 India Act had taken six years to complete. The 1947 Indian Independence Act was completed in six weeks.¹²

If India's rushed independence hampered Washington's understanding of events, Pakistan's creation was a whirlwind that even Whitehall had difficulty grasping. The Muslim League, formed in 1906, remained dormant till the late 1930s. It even had

difficulty raising its quorum of seventy-five members at the famous 1930 Allahabad session when Iqbal petitioned for a Muslim state.¹³ Though the intellectual origins of a separate Muslim state in India date at least to 1887, the political drive to Pakistan emerged late - the name 'Pakistan' was invented only in 1933.¹⁴ Further, in the 1937 Indian elections, only 4.4% of India's Muslims voted for the League and its separatist.¹⁵

Yet ten years later, the drive to Pakistan had become almost unstoppable. Congress's mismanagement of Indian Muslim identity sensitivities immediately after the 1937 elections, and the League's revitalisation through the Cripps Mission and Churchill's use of Pakistan to smother Indian independence, turned the League's fortunes. In the 1945 election, the League won 89% of the Muslim vote in the Central Assembly, hence all Muslim reserved seats. In the provincial elections, the League won 442 out of 509 Muslim seats. Though the League won only Bengal and Sindh and lost to Congress in the North-West Frontier Province ('NWFP'), Punjab and Assam, the British uncritically accepted the League's claim to all these territories.¹⁶ Precisely during this mercurial rise, Washington was focused on the European war and its only focus on South Asia was on India's independence and not its partition.

The difficulties that the League's rise presented were compounded by the reluctance of both Britain, from whom Washington took its lead, and the Indian Congress to accept Pakistan, a concept disadvantaged at birth by its synonymy with communalism in contrast to Congress's politically correct nationalism.¹⁷ London did not want to partition its imperial jewel into a "hopeless patchwork", for within the empire, the Raj was especially honoured, "The whole thing is and always has been a love affair".¹⁸

Even the June 1947 White Paper, which outlined Britain's departure and India's partition, barely identified itself as a partition plan. Viceroy Linlithgow, Wavell and Mountbatten, and the British generally, were strongly opposed to the emergence of Pakistan. Wavell, who was Commander in Chief of India in 1942 and despite remembering the League's wartime support that contrasted with Congress's disruption, went so far as to reject the viability of Pakistan.¹⁹ The Cabinet Mission preferred to give India to Nehru and ignore Pakistan, the central impediment in various guises throughout the independence process.²⁰ London also underestimated the League despite Wavell's warnings about the Pakistan demand's muscle.²¹ In March 1946, reflecting Whitehall's view, The Economist hence frowned, "the case for a complete partition of India has not been made out and is steadily being disproved by the hard facts of economics and strategy."²²

Only after 'Direct Action Day' in August 1946, when five thousand died in Hindu-Muslim clashes in Calcutta and which ignited massacres across India, including the killing of seven thousand Muslim children and women by Hindus in October in Bihar, did London seriously consider the possibility of Pakistan.²³ Even then, London was undecided though The Economist reversed its earlier analysis and noted the Muslim demand, "was something more than factional strife within a single nation."²⁴ Weeks later it added, India's "division into two or more separate states would accord with, rather than outrage, normal expectation by European standards."²⁵ Yet at this time, Cripps was adamant that Britain should leave India exclusively to Congress.²⁶ Further, when Mountbatten flew to India as late as March 1947, he did so quite uncertain of Pakistan's eventuality.²⁷

Congress, which had developed good contacts with Washington during the war, was even more reluctant than London to accept Pakistan. Gandhi made clear that Congress would accept partition only, “over my dead body”.²⁸ Nehru pursued a united India of a weak federation with strong provinces even as late as April 1947.²⁹ Congress’s Maulana Azad, a devout Muslim, rather hopefully expected as late as May 1947 that India would avert partition. Many Congress members felt in any case that Pakistan would collapse after partition and revert to Indian control.³⁰ Britain’s reluctance to accept Pakistan partly reflected Labour’s close associations with Congress. When the Cabinet Mission arrived in 1946, Wavell was “horrified at the deference shown”.³¹ Pethick-Lawrence requested, “penitence for Britain’s misdeeds in the past” from Gandhi.³²

“When he (Gandhi) expressed a wish for a glass of water, the Secretary was sent to fetch it himself, instead of sending for a *chaprassi*; and when it did not come at once Cripps hustled off himself to see about it.”³³

Within this Anglo-Indian resistance to Pakistan, conflicting reports made Washington’s understanding of events more difficult. British warnings that the Pakistan, “movement had now gained so much momentum that (it was) doubtful if Jinnah or anyone else could apply the brakes” contrasted with British confidence in solving the Pakistan tension.³⁴ Even the key players repeatedly misled. In April 1946, Jinnah tended towards the Cabinet Mission’s plan ‘A’, a federal India that Congress then rejected.³⁵ In October 1946, he gave the impression that he would join the Nehru-led interim government. Two months on, he held out the prospect of a federal India if Congress accepted London’s interpretation of the Cabinet Plan.³⁶

Along with the speed of South Asia's devolution, uncertainty of Pakistan's partition and resistance to Pakistan was also Pakistan's self-definitional ambiguity. What exactly Pakistan stood for then, nor incidentally since, was not very clear. In the 1930s, Iqbal thought an Indian Muslim state should consist of Punjab, NWFP, Sindh and Baluchistan – hence ignoring East Pakistan.³⁷ Syed Abdul Latif's scheme published in 1939 outlined 'four Muslim cultural zones' in an Indian federation. Professors Syed Zafarul Hasan and Muhammed Afzal Husain Qadri of Aligarh conceptualised an India of three sovereign states – Muslim Bengal, Muslim North-West India and Hindu main India. In 1939, the Punjab Muslim League president advocated an Indian federation of five states, including two Muslim states.³⁸ The March 1940 Pakistan Resolution, so named by the Hindu press, sketched a weak federal Pakistan with strong provinces.³⁹ Even this resolution was written in vague language to group at least six versions of 'Pakistan'.⁴⁰ Pakistan's ambiguity continued to 1947. In April 1947, Jinnah refused to define Pakistan beyond a meaningless 'sovereign Muslim state'.⁴¹ However, unlike his predecessor ideologues, his was an ambiguity of choice. An astute barrister, Jinnah avoided committing to a single Pakistan interpretation until the summer of 1947. Indeed, even territorially, Pakistan was defined only *after* partition when India took Calcutta and Pakistan took Lahore.⁴²

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The effect of Pakistan's rushed and ambiguous emergence was compounded by America's scarce contact with the League and Jinnah.ⁱⁱⁱ In 1939, Time described Jinnah as a Hindu by birth and in 1940, the American press virtually ignored the

ⁱⁱ Given Punjab's dominance of Pakistan, some argue that it was Lahore that took Pakistan in 1947.

ⁱⁱⁱ The scarce contact between American society and Pakistan continued throughout the period of study. The first book published in the US on Pakistan was by Norman Brown as late as 1963.

Pakistan resolution.⁴³ America first acknowledged an Indian Muslim political voice only during the 1942 Cripps Mission though, even then, The New York Times journalist Herbert Mathews was surprised when he visited India by the strength of the Pakistan movement, which contrasted to the perception of Pakistan in America.⁴⁴ The League's first unofficial representation in America came in 1944 with Mubarak Ali Khan, editor of The New India Bulletin, while its first official representatives in arrived in November 1946 with Mohammed Hasan Ispahani and Begum Shah Nawaz.⁴⁵

In contrast, the Indian Congress had an America presence since the early 1920s and a familiarity with America's polity and public alike. Nehru published 'Unity of India' in Foreign Affairs in 1938.⁴⁶ Anup Singh's, 'Nehru: The Rising Star of India' and Krishnalal Shridharani's, 'My India, My America' in 1939 and 1941 respectively were bestsellers in America.⁴⁷ Madam Pandit, Nehru's influential sister, was a lecture celebrity and friend to Eleanor Roosevelt well before 1945.⁴⁸ With Jinnah hardly heard of in America, American newspapers consistently presented the Congress viewpoint, such as the 1946 Time cover story which portrayed Jinnah as an aloof and wealthy troublemaker.⁴⁹

Not only could Washington not locate Pakistan within American narratives, but America was also reluctant to partition India, and hence disturb its missionary narrative through New Delhi. Pakistan was not alone in confronting America's demands for Indian unity. Secretary of State George Marshall discouraged officials from contact with India's princely states to avoid, "any action that might interfere with the sound objective of avoiding further Balkanization of India."⁵⁰ When

Hyderabad resisted joining India, Under-Secretary of State, Dean Acheson feared a, “fragmentation process which might have far reaching effects on any plan for ultimate Indian unity.”⁵¹ Marshall thus strongly encouraged Hyderabad to join India.⁵² In response to the Indian invasion of Hyderabad in September 1948, his only and meek instruction to American officials was to, “avoid any act which might be interpreted as a recognition of Hyderabad’s sovereignty or of right to conduct external affairs independently of GOI”.⁵³

Understanding Pakistan: Early Strategic Limitations

Given that both America could not understand Pakistan and Pakistan’s destabilising of the missionary narrative through India’s dismemberment, America initially categorised and attached meaning to Pakistan as an anomaly of the missionary narrative, with adverse and hostile implications for the application of meaning on it. A variety of gloomy categorisations and meanings were subsequently applied to make sense of Pakistan.^{iv} The least subscribed to though earliest American cognition of Pakistan came in the State Department’s first serious assessment of the Muslim League in March 1942, which equated the League with hostility to self-government.⁵⁴ Though Americans seldom employed it, even as late as March 1947, Jinnah was compelled to tackle Washington’s misperception that he preferred a continuation of British rule to independence.⁵⁵ That this perception developed was in part related to Jinnah’s fear that American pressure for immediate independence might force London to abandon the League.

^{iv} The Indian Congress did not hesitate to spice America’s search for meaning in Pakistan. Professor T P Sinha, a Congress member and Chicago academic, portrayed League members as Nazis, despite ex-Congress president Subas Chandra Bose’s working with precisely those Nazis to end British rule.

In 1942, a local American official reported from India,

“The Muslim position in a few words is that their leaders say that they can afford to wait...the League will accept an interim arrangement providing nothing is done to ‘torpedo or prejudice the Muslim claim for a national homeland’ ... All of which in my personal view is ... put forward for trading purposes.”⁵⁶

This, America’s bargaining chip theory of Pakistan, in contrast, persisted throughout the independence struggle. In 1943, George Merrell the senior State Department official in India, described Pakistan as, “the greatest, if not the only, bargaining point the League has”.⁵⁷ Four years later, despite his involvement in the independence discussions, Merrell still felt Pakistan was only a, “bargaining point” which Jinnah again inadvertently fuelled.⁵⁸ Better known for his Saville Row suits, ham sandwiches and bourbon than for religious adherence, Jinnah had in 1923 even supported the renewal of Hindu-Muslim unity and a return to Gandhi’s *swaraj*.⁵⁹ The stubborn Muslim Khwoja himself once addressed the oddity of his leadership of the League,

“Have I ever told you that I am your leader as a Mussulmans? I am an advocate, pleading the cause of Mussalmans, taking the part of Mussulmans, fighting the fight. Nothing more, nothing less.”⁶⁰

Given this, it was easy for distanced Americans to see Jinnah as an unprincipled political shark for whom the demand for Pakistan was mere rhetoric.

America's third early meaning of Pakistan as an anomaly to the missionary narrative was as a British stooge, an understanding which was strongly supported by Nehru, Azad, Bose and Gandhi who repeatedly emphasised Congress's role as the subcontinent's sole representative and insisted that the League who, in basing their claims on religion, were bigots. Jinnah was labelled a foreigner unlike natives Nehru and Gandhi.⁶¹ In April 1942, Louis Johnson, advised,

“I have not dealt with Moslem League represented by Jinnah because I know from Cripps' talk and actions and otherwise that the Moslem League has been used as a counter force to the Congress.”⁶²

That Churchill used the League to delay Indian independence is well documented and hence the analysis of Johnson and the later Cambridge school of Indian historiography has partial validity.⁶³ However, such analysis ignores the League's growth *before* both serious Anglo-Indian discussions about independence and Churchill's term as prime minister, and slights Muslim India's identity insecurity, which paralleled the growth of the *Hindutva* (Hindu nationalist) movement. Frightened Muslims flocked to the League after the 1937 elections not because of London but Hindu cultural and political nationalism. Ignorant of this, Americans tended to understand Pakistan as London's synthetic creation, “exploiting communal and native state issues to prolong British control”.⁶⁴

As a result, given these meanings of Pakistan, America was initially reluctant to accept Pakistan's creation. In 1946, Washington felt that the 'Pakistan' concept was unsound and Acheson hoped that the Executive Council would lead to a pan-Indian

government with Muslim involvement.⁶⁵ Washington even looked to Azad to become India's first leader in the spectacular hope that he could bridge the Congress-League gulf. The American Charge d'Affaires in London held a press conference in December 1946 still hoping for a united federal India. Similarly, Merrell believed until at least February 1947, that a federal Indian government was possible.⁶⁶ Washington only conceded the separate Muslim state after February 1947, when Attlee announced India's partition though even then Acheson continued to hope in April for a united India.⁶⁷ More so, in December 1947, Grady, encouraged briefly by Mountbatten, even hoped for an Indo-Pakistan federation, instigated by a customs union.⁶⁸ Only rarely prior to 14th August 1947, did an American official, and only at junior levels, impart positive meaning to the League or Pakistan.⁶⁹

Though America's reluctance to accept Pakistan remained only a very secluded feature of American policy to Pakistan after its partition, it was lent ongoing credibility by Pakistan's precarious post-independence circumstances. In October 1947, America's senior diplomat in Karachi, advised that Pakistan's economic and political difficulties were of, "such proportions as to threaten the very existence of the New State".⁷⁰ Pakistan lacked funds, had border disputes with India and Afghanistan, a massive immigration problem, incompetent government structure and a thousand miles of enemy territory dividing its population, "our first reaction is 'this can't work'".⁷¹ Likewise, Britain expressed concerns in November 1947 that India was trying, "to smother Pakistan in its crib before it can get going on a practical basis."⁷² Therefore, in December 1947, the State Department's chief for South Asian affairs, Raymond Hare, asked Ambassador Grady, "Should we be thinking still in terms of an eventual return of Pakistan to a united India?"⁷³ It was not surprising then that Malik

Feroz Khan Noon, a prominent Pakistani, felt compelled in December 1947 to stress to local American staff that Pakistan was a permanent entity.⁷⁴

South Asian Regionalism

There is nothing ‘natural’ about South Asia as a region, as perhaps some argue, is of Africa.^v Regions are problematic terms given the various heterogeneities within them. Two region’s borders tend to share more with each other than with their respective regional centres, an issue which Braudel raised in the context of the Mediterranean. Regional boundaries to some extent therefore falsify realities.⁷⁵ After Pakistan’s creation, Washington’s reluctance to accept India’s partition and inability to proactively place Pakistan within a narrative meant Washington treated Pakistan intimately with the country from which it had just emerged. Unable to comprehend Pakistan, Washington placed it with India into a single South Asia region. This cognition coincided with Indian aspirations,

“The All-India Congress Committee earnestly trusts that, when present passions have subsided, India’s problems will be viewed in their proper prospective and the false doctrine of two nations in India will be discredited and discarded”.⁷⁶

If that was mere public political rhetoric, Nehru repeatedly predicted privately that integration will inevitably come. Even many Pakistanis, as Faiz Ahmed Faiz demonstrated, regretted partition,

^v Even then, V Y Mudimbe’s study, “The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy and the Order of Knowledge”, 1988, Indiana University Press, reveals the construction of Africa as a European object of Otherness and exotic projections.

This stain-covered daybreak, this night-bitten dawn,
 This is not that dawn of which there was expectation;
 This is not the dawn with longing for which
 The friends set out (convinced) that somewhere they would meet ⁷⁷

Hence, throughout 1947 and 1948, America treated Pakistan exclusively within South Asia.⁷⁸ For instance, in September 1948, the CIA appraised Pakistan only within the context of South Asia – specifically India.⁷⁹ This report emphasised the most apparent aspect of treating Pakistan within South Asia - advising against the unilateral favouring of either India or Pakistan, which would be a, “very dangerous approach.”⁸⁰ The commitment to impartiality between Indian and Pakistan was broadly sustained throughout the first Truman administration, “Our policy is to remain impartial in all Pakistan-India disputes”.⁸¹ One committee reported, “We may defeat our own purposes if by extending friendship to any one country in this area we alienate the friendship of one or more of the other South Asian countries”.⁸² That Americans did not blame Jinnah alone for India’s dismemberment made impartiality easier for as Merrell felt, “the present situation is as much a result of Congress leaders’ political ineptitude and lack of vision as of Mr Jinnah’s intransigence.”⁸³

Indeed, impartiality was pursued with bizarre zeal. In October 1947, during partition’s mass migration of fifteen million people, Nehru requested ten transport planes from America to airlift from Pakistan, fifty thousand refugees who had fled in panic from Punjab to the NWFP. New Delhi feared a bloodbath particularly after four hundred of these refugees had been massacred by Pakistanis in September.⁸⁴ However, Truman

rejected the request since Pakistan had not acquiesced to such request nor would it likely do so. Truman's solution, that a joint Indo-Pakistan request be submitted, left Grady with the awkward explaining to New Delhi, "If we made a loan to Pakistan, India would resent it unless we gave the same to India. This applies to all matters right down the line."⁸⁵

Though Washington failed to recognise it, defining Pakistan intimately close to India, was strategically fortunate for the Truman administration, even if the inadvertency itself masked problems for later administrations. Fear of Indian Hinduism was, and remains, the nucleus of Pakistan's self identities and narratives. Attempting to engage Pakistan without recognising this, contends with a (identity narrative based) reality that does not correspond to that of Pakistan – and as such constitutes engaging Pakistan outside of its reality. Given the huge implications on American policy to Pakistan, especially felt during the Eisenhower presidency, it is worth dwelling on Karachi's political reality in some detail.

When Marshall first met independent India's first ambassador to Washington, the conspicuously Muslim Asif Ali, he admitted that, "my knowledge of India was not very great."⁸⁶ America's lack of detailed familiarity with India was important. In seeing parallels between Indian and American independence, Washington neglected Indian nationalism's Hindu origins and nuances, in contrast to Nehru who was aware that India's mass living and thinking was not secular.⁸⁷ *Hindutva* provided Indian political nationalism its backbone, and preceded by many decades the demand for political independence. In the 1820s, Rommohan Roy, who many consider modern India's father, founded the Brahma Samaj to purify Hinduism.⁸⁸ The Society for the

Promotion of National Feeling among the Educated Natives in Bengal was formed in 1861 to promote Hindu culture and medicine while concurrently, the Arya Samaj sought Hinduism's purification from foreignisms.⁸⁹ The celebrated 1857 rebellion was itself largely a religious not political reaction.⁹⁰ Soldiers were disciplined for refusing to bite cartridges greased with cow and pig fat – excruciating to Hindu and Muslim respectively.

In contrast, Indian political nationalism began later and was actually originally pro-British. When Disraeli proclaimed Victoria as Empress of India in 1877, Indians rejoiced.⁹¹ Nineteenth century Indian political leaders including even Bal Gangadhar Tilak were loyal to the crown.⁹² Congress's inaugural meeting in 1885 ended with Allan Octavian Hume leading three cheers for the empress and on her diamond jubilee, Gandhi celebrated by planting a tree and distributing presents.⁹³ Indian nationalism's founding fathers, Roy, Dayananda and Vivekananda never engaged British imperialism and Gandhi only did so in 1909 when London rejected improving Indian rights in South Africa. British nationals such as George Bernard Shaw in fact led Indian political nationalism's criticism of imperial rule before indigenous Indians did.⁹⁴ It took the Amritsar massacre to provoke Nehru to independence. Dyer's massacre in 1919, of nearly four hundred unarmed civilians in an enclosed garden, denying them warning and medical assistance, shocked Nehru, "I realised then, more vividly than I had ever done before, how brutal and immoral imperialism was and how it had eaten into the souls of the British upper-classes."⁹⁵

This developing political nationalism demanded an Indian past in which to root nationhood, exemplified by Chattopadhyay's "We have no history! We must have

history".⁹⁶ Hindu nationalism provided that history and backbone, "Indians were now speaking for themselves about their past and carving out an autonomous space in the decolonisation of the mind".⁹⁷ Hindu culture disseminated into Congress, which held its first session in a Brahmin institution. Among Congress's seventy-two founding delegates in 1885, only two were Muslim despite Muslims constituting a fifth of India. 'The Cow Protection Society', formed in 1882 to prevent Muslims, though not Britons, from killing cows, a Hindu symbol of fertility, was supported by many senior Congress members. The Society's meeting in 1893 was held in Congress's pavilion after its annual session at Nagpur. Tilak, the leader of Congress's larger faction at the century's turn, took a key role in reviving Hindu festivals. Gandhi's *Hind Swaraj* protest against India's Anglicisation in 1909 was immersed in Hinduism, as were his use of terms such as *swadeshi* for boycotting foreign goods.⁹⁸

"Congress's inclusive nationalist ideology lacked reassurance on two counts: firstly, because of the presence of Hindu communalists in its ranks; and, secondly, because of the influence of Hindu cultural symbols in the nationalist political discourse."⁹⁹

India's construction, imbued with Hindutva, thus had strong anti-Muslim elements, "Hinduness has been constantly constructed in opposition to the attributes of the Muslim 'other.'"¹⁰⁰ The construction of the mythical Vedic golden age characterised by pristine Hinduism, marginalized Muslims. It reduced India to a Hindu civilisation,

"Hindus are the true, legitimate children of the bharat Mata. No matter who confiscates their wealth, their dignity, their freedom, their princely

states, their landed property; the Hindus will still retain the right to use the adjective 'National'.”¹⁰¹

Deep-seated European fears of Islam combined with the work of Hindu reformers to popularise the perception of Muslims as cruel and depraved through works such as Kisorlal Goswami's novel 'Tara' in 1902.¹⁰² The Benarsi writer Bharatendu Harischandra enabled Chatterjee in 1932 to oddly enough view Clive's defeat of Muslim Siraj-ud-Daula at the 1757 Battle of Plassey, inaugurating British rule, as liberation from tyranny.¹⁰³ Vinayak Domodar Savarkar's 'Hindutva: Who is Hindu' in 1923 insisted Muslims were foreigners and the Hindu nation's future lay with a Hindu state. Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar's 'We, or Our Nationhood Defined' even praised Nazism's purging of Semitic races as a, “good example for us in Hindustan to learn and profit by”.¹⁰⁴ Resistance to Muslim Mughal rule metaphored resistance to Britain. The seventeenth century Shivaji Bhonsle, who fought Mughals, became an Indian hero. In contrast, the Muslim emperors Jahanghir and Aurangzeb, who banned Hindu festivals and the building of Hindu temples, were extensively vilified.¹⁰⁵ The foreign races, insisted Golwalkar,

“must either adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect and hold in reverence Hindu religion, must entertain no idea but those of glorification of the Hindu race and culture.”¹⁰⁶

Washington was totally oblivious to Pakistan's origination from Muslim India's fear of Hindu identity, as demonstrated in America's early cognition of Karachi.^{vi} The Muslim response to this insecurity paralleled *Hindutva's* growth, not Indian political nationalism, with significant implications for America's attempted geographic location of Pakistan as a Middle East state from 1950 to 1954. As early as 1860, Syed Ahmed Khan felt British colonial rule was needed to protect India's Muslims.¹⁰⁷ Khan, the intellectual inspiration for the Aligarh Movement and credited with the two-nation theory, advocated an Indian Muslim state in 1887 – decades before Congress demanded independence.¹⁰⁸ Muslim groups flowered years before Congress was established, but only after *Hindutva's* renaissance - 'The Muhammadan Literary Society' and the 'Central National Muhammadan Association' were formed in 1863 and 1877 respectively. The Muslim League was formed in 1906 to oppose Hindu *swadeshi* riots, and to involve Muslims in the ongoing constitutional reforms after Hindu revivalists had used the limited devolution in municipal committees to great advantage.¹⁰⁹

Though early twentieth century Muslim fear of Hinduism remained subdued, the Hindu-Muslim schism was never far from the surface. Ten thousand Molaphs, fanatical Muslims, rampaged in 1921, killing and forcibly converting thousands of Hindus, which triggered riots throughout the 1920s.¹¹⁰ Insensitive Congressional decisions coincided with the growing tension. From 1920, Congress conducted its affairs in Hindi while Gandhi campaigned to make Hindi's Devnagrahi script, India's official language. Whereas at the 1916 Lucknow Pact, Congress recognised the League's representation of India's Muslims, the Nehru Report of 1929 rejected

^{vi} A contemporary underestimation of this fear's role in defining Pakistan and its 'national interests' is found in Buzan's, "A Framework for Regional Security Analysis" in G Rizvi and B Buzan (1986).

outright the claim. At the September 1931 round table conference in London, Ramsay MacDonald welcomed, “My Hindu and Muslim friends” to which Gandhi interjected, “There are only Indians here.”¹¹¹

One key catalyst for Muslim insecurity was Congress’s insensitivity after the 1937 elections, which flooded Muslims to the League.¹¹² Congress excluded the League from the UP provincial government where the League and its allies captured twenty-nine of the thirty-five seats for Muslims.¹¹³ New provincial Congress governments banned the killing of cows or eating of beef. Hindu patronage, restrained by two centuries of the Raj, returned with a vengeance, inadvertently reviving the League. In October 1937, Jinnah traded his Savile Row suits for *sherwanis*. In the three months to October, the League established a hundred and seventy new branches and recruited a hundred thousand members – mostly from Muslim minority areas; thus Jinnah boasted, “Within less than six months we have succeeded in organising the Musalmans all over India as they never were during the last century and a half.”¹¹⁴ In 1939, while Muslims accused Congress of imposing a blasphemous national anthem, ‘Bande Mataram’, Jinnah pronounced partition the only solution.¹¹⁵

Consequently, Aitzaz Ahsan’s suggestion that Pakistan was the culmination of a long established cultural Indus tradition that created a distinctly Pakistani personality echoes Ayesha Jalal’s description of Pakistan as a, “veritable intellectual wasteland”.¹¹⁶ The Pakistan demand was strongest in precisely those areas *removed* from the Indus - such as Bombay, Aligarh and UP; and least pronounced in the areas of the Indus such as Sindh and Punjab.¹¹⁷ Indeed, the majority of Pakistanis (in Bengal) were almost a thousand miles away from the Indus. Nor was Pakistan, “an

Islamic state to save Moslems from Hindu Raj.”¹¹⁸ Syed Abul A’la Maudoodi, who founded the Jamaat-e-Islami, Pakistan’s largest Islamic political party, opposed Pakistan’s creation, using the vacuous argument that Islam prohibits nationalism.¹¹⁹ Iqbal, who helped legitimise Pakistan within Islam, emphatically repudiated Pakistan as a theocracy, “Nor should the Hindus fear that the creation of autonomous Muslim states will mean the introduction of a kind of religious rule in such states”.¹²⁰ Jinnah also emphasised, including in his Independence speech, Pakistan’s secularism.¹²¹

Pakistan was the outcome of Muslim India’s reaction to identity anxiety stemming from Hindu India’s development.¹²² Anxiety was compounded by partition’s brutality, in which a million people died. Hindu India was integral to Pakistan’s identity and creation. All identities use a narrative contrast as a technology for self-definition, but in Nehru’s observation of Pakistan, “a nation created out of opposition to things”, this was particularly so.¹²³ Resultantly, Pakistan’s policy was guided by its overwhelmingly dominant identity narrative, anti-Indianism.^{vii} Beyond using the anti-India lens, Pakistan could seldom and scarcely understand the world nor engage it. Other Pakistani identities were insufficiently internalised for Pakistan to categorise reality and attach meaning with.^{viii} Hence the Bengali agitation in the 1950s, based on West Pakistan’s stifling discrimination against East Pakistan, was seen by Karachi as exclusively a Hindu conspiracy.¹²⁴ The animosity continued throughout the Truman and Eisenhower period; for instance, the Indian Muslim actor Dilip Kumar avoided any Muslim role till the 1960 blockbuster, “Mughal-E-Azam”.

^{vii} At the nucleus of Pakistan’s reality, fifty years after its creation, the Indian presence remains dominant. Islamabad’s obsession with India continues to vastly exceed its concern for the welfare of its own population.

^{viii} A secondary Pakistani identity narrative existed in Islam but this was unpopular with Pakistan’s unelected Westernised elite who viewed the Islamic framework as impractical and medieval.

That the Truman administration stumbled into Pakistan's reality by locating Pakistan close to India was highly fortunate. America's cognition of Pakistan in South Asia, however derived, coincided with Karachi's reality. Washington's analysts, who never doubted the intensity of the Indo-Pakistan relationship, did nevertheless fail to appreciate its strength and centrality for Pakistan until the mid-1950s. They demonstrated only a starved understanding of Pakistan's driving impetus. This veiled a cognitive strategic failure that would later cost Eisenhower, by way of military and economic aid engagement, more than a billion dollars and immensely frustrated Kennedy and Johnson who had to contend with a Pakistan that America had already committed to outside of Karachi's reality, through the anti-communist SEATO and CENTO.

Lack of Interest

America's inability to categorise and attach meaning to Pakistan was intimately tied as cause and effect of America's distraction elsewhere. In its overall global policy, Washington had insufficient will, which extended into an opposition to engage. Resource was central to this reluctance, and was reflected in Truman and Congress's campaigns prior to July 1950 to reduce budget deficits and taxes by controlling military spending and foreign commitments. Truman was strongly committed to balancing budgets and was disinterested in foreign affairs. In January 1948, his request to Congress for a 1949 military budget of US\$10bn implied a thirteen percent reduction in personnel.¹²⁵ In April 1949, when presented with a US\$3bn-US\$5bn budget deficit forecast for 1950, and US\$6bn-US\$8bn for 1951 and 1952, Truman fixed the 1950 defence budget at US\$13bn, US\$2.5bn below his advisors' counsel.¹²⁶

Congress's antipathy to engaging foreign states impacted key policy. Eden has revealed that the senators elected in 1946, such as McCarthy, Bricker and Ecton, joined other isolationist leaning and tax-cutting Republicans whose, "antipathy to foreign entanglements and financial sacrifices was pronounced".¹²⁷ Congress severely criticised the Truman Doctrine for drawing America into a British problem and its eventual support was not an endorsement, "We are confronted with the fundamental fact that if we desert the President of the United States at (this) moment we cease to have any influence in the world forever."¹²⁸ Congress remained unresponsive for another priority, the Marshall Plan, which it deliberated for over three months while seeking spending reductions to control inflation.¹²⁹ Likewise, Congressional opposition to the North Atlantic Treaty ('NAT'), a later centrepiece, forced even the JCS to campaign at Capitol Hill.¹³⁰ Senator Connally, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, supported by Senators Donnell and Vandenberg, hesitated about America's 'automatic involvement' in Europe.¹³¹

One consequence of this was America's lack of resources even where it had political will. In early 1948, defense officials advised that they had only 29,000 troops to meet emergencies in Europe and the Middle East, and therefore insufficient troops to protect their bases in global war.¹³² The War Department doubted the country could support its obligations in Latin America, China, the Philippines, Iran, Western Europe, Greece, Turkey and Japan.¹³³ After the Czech crisis, the JCS pleaded for a "rock-bottom" US\$6bn to which Truman acceded only half. Armed forces' planners repeatedly complained about the resource gap.¹³⁴ Byrnes, Marshall and Acheson concurred that the erosion of military strength was undermining policy.¹³⁵ Even

Eisenhower, whose presidential defence policy was parsimonious and marked by his warnings of a military-industrial complex, complained about the resources gap.¹³⁶ Yet NSC 20/4, endorsed in November 1948, defined policy as global anti-communism. Truman was interested in neither increasing resources nor reducing commitments, and hence the origin of massive retaliation.¹³⁷

Washington's unwillingness to engage overseas and its restrictive funding closely intertwined with America's inability to make sense of the globe. For a people whose identity narratives included only three regions – Europe, East Asia and the American continent, the globe's sudden opening posed considerable cognitive challenges.^{ix} No systemisation process, such as Marshall's in the State Department during 1947, could prepare Washington,¹³⁸

“Not only was the future clouded, a common enough situation, but the present was equally clouded. We all had far more than the familiar difficulty of determining the capabilities and intentions of those who inhabit this planet with us. The significance of events was shrouded in ambiguity. We groped after interpretations of them, sometimes reversed lines of action based on earlier views, and hesitated long before grasping what now seems obvious.”¹³⁹

America's unwillingness to engage and inability to cognate the world reverberated in a planning famine. Army officials received no answer when they asked Byrnes in November 1945 from what areas in Asia and Europe, they could not retreat.¹⁴⁰ Four

^{ix} The American media were not immune to this. Acheson's speech to the Delta Council in May 1947 in which he highlighted Europe's economic crisis, “was received with rather monumental indifference and silence in most of the papers.” It only attracted interest after Europe strongly focused on it.

years later, Kennan and Bohlen confronted the military's increasingly devious attempts to define goals-and-measures.¹⁴¹ The Pentagon repeatedly demanded a strategic and prioritisation review, and clashed with the State Department and the NSC who insisted this was impossible. In fact, Washington's first global strategic plan, NSC 20/4, came out only as late as November 1948. The Pentagon thus unusually conducted its own strategic studies, including the first study of aid programmes in April 1947.¹⁴²

Within this restrictive policy framework, Americans focused on the two territories of narrative past and future – Europe and Asia. A JCS study in April 1947 listed the overseas priorities - Britain, France and Germany on top, followed by Italy, Greece, Turkey, Austria and Japan.¹⁴³ Washington was disinterested beyond Asia and Europe. The difficulties in securing aid for Turkey and Greece, despite Greece's vibrant communist community and Turkey's strategic location, curtailed the executive's appetite beyond Europe and Asia. Numerous Latin American aid requests in 1947 were rejected, only for a non-committal pact to be offered instead. Nor does the myth that America's tough stand in 1946 drove Russia from Armenia and Iran bear close scrutiny. In 1947, American officials warned that if Russia attacked Iran, "it is not believed that at present any assistance could be brought to Iran which would appreciably enhance Iranian resistance."¹⁴⁴

Anti-communism and Acheson, Truman's most influential foreign policy official and especially sympathetic to Anglo-Saxon identity, converged Washington's focus on

Europe.¹⁴⁵ x Washington's three aims – Western Europe's recovery, binding Germany to the West and eliminating Western European communism were respectively reflected in the Marshall Plan, NATO and the Truman Doctrine.¹⁴⁶ Europe's recovery dominated America's agenda in 1946-47. Freezing conditions accentuated food and fuel shortages and impeded Europe's fragile recovery. By early 1947, Washington committed to the recovery of Europe, "a rubble heap, a charnel house, a breeding ground of pestilence and hate."¹⁴⁷ Pakistan emerged precisely within this tumult. Before Pakistan's partition, American energy was dedicated to preparing the Marshall Plan. After partition, Kennan reported Britain's economy was, "deteriorating with terrific rapidity...tragic to a point that challenges description."¹⁴⁸ Intelligence reports concluded that America had, "to provide Europe with food and fuel this winter if the major European countries are to remain sufficiently strong that the basis will survive upon which to erect the Marshall Plan".¹⁴⁹ Marshall, Lovett, Kennan and Forrestal speculated whether Europe would survive the winter, and Truman requested Congress for aid for Europe before legislative debates.¹⁵⁰

America's second European focus was to bind German into the West. Unlike the economic crisis, which peaked in 1947-8, Germany reached crisis levels in 1948-49.¹⁵¹ Concerns heightened in 1949 when Schumacher won the election, promising to move to independent neutralism.¹⁵² The CIA warned that West Germany could look east for markets and gravitate into Russia.¹⁵³ Germany's priority for America was reflected by Washington's solution. Ireland's study demonstrates that America supported NAT not to deter Russia but to allow for German rehabilitation.¹⁵⁴

^x While Acheson was Undersecretary of State from August 1945 till June 1947, Byrnes was absent from Washington for 350 of his 562 days in office, and Marshall for two of his five months. Acheson's tenure as Secretary of State throughout Truman's second term came during a critical period of American policy.

America's third focus on Europe was European communism especially in Italy and France. Concerns about Italian communism ended through the CIA and Papal rigged elections in April 1948.¹⁵⁵ However, concerns about French communism continued America well into 1948. The October 1947 elections gave the Gaullist Right and the communist Left over seventy percent of the vote, reflecting France's polarising and encouraging Washington to believe that Paris faced either a civil war or a communist takeover.¹⁵⁶

Beyond Europe, East Asia, the America's missionary narrative westward Frontier, was the only region that attracted American focus. Acheson's perspective on this region contrasted with his views on Europe, he, "gave only glancing attention to the mass of the world's population who did not have white skins, advanced industrial economies, and homes in western Europe or the United States."¹⁵⁷ While campaigning for the Truman Doctrine, he even sidelined China's collapse.¹⁵⁸ Nonetheless, Capitol Hill especially and some administration officials maintained an interest in Asia, principally in Japan, China and Indochina. In 1947, growing concerns about Russian expansion and European economics encouraged Washington to focus on Japan as an engine for regional recovery, preserving the American presence's beacon.¹⁵⁹ Congress insisted on including US\$275m of technical and US\$125m of military aid to China, as part of the Marshall aid programme, threatening to otherwise block the package.

South Asia

In 1947, Washington recognised South Asia as home to a fifth of the world's population, and Pakistan as the world's most populous Muslim country, with links

into the Middle East.¹⁶⁰ Washington, especially the JCS, noted Pakistan's strategic value before partition. In July 1947, Marshall noticed that Pakistan, "occup(ied) one of the most strategic areas in the world", proximate to Russia's industrial heartland and oil supply, Middle Eastern oil and as an important communication link in the Indian ocean.¹⁶¹ A colonel, Nathaniel Hoskot, in 1948 stressed Pakistan's importance for long range bombing.¹⁶² Faint mentions of Pakistan's intelligence value were also made in Washington, as were South Asia's economic assets recognised,

"it ranks first or second in world production of such critical materials of war as cotton, mica, manganese, monazite (a source of thorium) and beryl, and is a major source of raw materials, investment income, and carrying charges for the UK".¹⁶³

Despite this, South Asia, including Pakistan, was ranked in fourth and last place of priority in a CIA report of September 1947. Within Washington's post-war reluctance to engage overseas and what attention there was in this regard diverted towards Europe and the Far East, Washington had little interest in South Asia. Even India's meaning within America's missionary narrative could not compare with Europe's importance to America's stories of their past nor with East Asia's, and especially China's, gravity in their future. In September 1947, Grady rejected Nehru's request for loans, and directed him to US Ex-Im and the IBRD.¹⁶⁴ A month later, Acheson rejected an Indian request for grain citing Marshall Plan requirements.¹⁶⁵ In April 1948, and after repeated appeals for American aid, when Girja Bajpai noted America's lack of interest in the region, Henderson outlined, "Unfortunately, at the moment the United States found it necessary to concentrate its efforts and resources

on resisting aggression in certain other parts of the world.”¹⁶⁶ The point was later reiterated,

“because of the multitudinous aspect of our overall relations, the American Government had not found it practicable in the past to conduct comprehensive over-all discussions of bilateral relations...it would not in all probability be desirable to establish a formal blueprint of relations in as much as a blueprint would imply detailed implementation, and possible failures of implementation.”¹⁶⁷

As late as 1951, there were fewer State Department employees at the Athens embassy than at the embassies of New Delhi and Karachi combined, “Some of the employees had come to look on their assignment to New Delhi as an unpleasant ordeal, a stepping stone to a more congenial post in Europe or South America”.¹⁶⁸

With interest in South Asia very restrained and given America’s familiarity with India in the missionary narrative, New Delhi dominated America’s minimal interest in South Asia. Without being able to categorise and attach meaning to Pakistan, Washington refrained from engaging it. State Department officials, “were clearly aware that the Secretaries of State and Defense attached no high priority to the location and exploitation of opportunities for a major American role in Pakistan.”¹⁶⁹

When illness forced the first ambassador to Pakistan, Paul Alling, to return to Washington after four months, his replacement, eventually Avra Warren, was not appointed for two years. This contrasted with the presence of experienced ambassadors to India, in Grady and Loy Henderson. There may in fact be merit in

Venkataramani's suspicion that Truman would not have been able to locate Pakistan on a map.¹⁷⁰ None of America's major strategic plans from 1945 to 1948 featured Pakistan. The JCS's first definition of primary and secondary bases in September 1945 only mentioned South Asia for its air transit and landing rights to connect the Atlantic and Pacific bases.¹⁷¹ Even as the value of foreign bases grew with military spending reductions, and as strategic planners realised that flights over the North Pole were prohibitive, American planners ignored Pakistan. In December 1948, the JCS's list of facilities for advancing security objectives did not feature Pakistan.¹⁷²

However, American apathy did not discourage Karachi or New Delhi from inviting American interest in South Asia. India, despite its uneasiness with America, wanted aid and even indicated interest in military collaboration with Washington.¹⁷³

Pakistan's finances were more perilous than India's since India withheld considerable financial and defence assets from Pakistan at partition. Pakistan was also more isolated because it distrusted Cripps and Mountbatten's London, thereby compelling Pakistan almost exclusively towards America for aid.¹⁷⁴ ^{xi} In October 1947, Jinnah offered to align Pakistan with America in the Cold War for an enormous US\$2bn aid over five years, a package that compared to the Marshall aid of US\$1.5bn to Italy and US\$1.4bn to Germany.¹⁷⁵ Before receiving the rejection, Jinnah requested a further five-year US\$305m military aid programme – which was also rejected.¹⁷⁶ With expectations plummeting to realism, a US\$45m loan was rejected in November 1947, with ambassador Ispahani advised to consult the IBRD, Ex-Im or philanthropic organisations.¹⁷⁷ Truman was fortunate to hide behind the Mutual Defense

^{xi} Karachi distrusted Mountbatten because of his delivering Kashmir to India, his closer bonding with the Indian Congress and terse relations with Jinnah. To this day Pakistani civil servants, such as Akbar Ahmed, continue a popular political pastime of 'Mountbatten bashing' – A S Ahmed, "Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity", 1997, London: Routledge, 117

Legislation, in which Congress approved aid only to specific countries, which did not include Pakistan, as he was fortunate that Pakistan was still in Britain's sphere of influence.¹⁷⁸

London and the Lack of Access

America's lack of interest was intertwined with its lack of access to Pakistan, remaining a mutually reinforcing feature of policy until late 1950. A major aspect of America's restricted access was the Anglo-American 'special relationship', special because of Britain's place within the Anglo-Saxon hierarchy and crystallised in a series of reciprocal preferential arrangements.¹⁷⁹ The relationship had developed during the war, and involved full military cooperation, coordination of allied strategy and production, joint planning, training and intelligence efforts, and was only briefly arrested in late 1945. By March 1946, Churchill and the Cold War had resumed it in the joint extensive military planning, such as Britain's agreement to accommodate the American air force bases.¹⁸⁰

An important feature within the special relationship was Britain's sensitivity to any encroachment on the Raj. In 1791, an American, William Duane, founded a Calcutta newspaper dedicated to the belief that, "all subjects whatever, ought, of right, to be publicly, openly, and undoubtedly discussed". Britain deported him immediately.¹⁸¹ During the nineteenth century, Britain used Afghanistan, as buffer against Tsarist leanings into India in the 'Forward Policy'.¹⁸² During the Second World War, the Raj and Churchill especially, prevented India's provincial governments from contact with American officials and refused diplomatic representation for American diplomats in

India.¹⁸³ In September 1942, Churchill even denied Merrell's request to forward a letter from Roosevelt to the imprisoned Gandhi.¹⁸⁴ Linthlithgow scorned American interference in India, "their zeal in teaching us our business is in inverse ratio to their understanding of even the most elementary of the problems which we have to deal."¹⁸⁵ In 1943, he prevented Phillips from seeing Gandhi, who was near death, and also denied the American United Press wire service a presence in India.¹⁸⁶

After war, with continued British pretensions as a global power, reflected in the pursuit until 1949 of an independent British-led European and Commonwealth group, British hostility to American access in South Asia continued.¹⁸⁷ Grady noted,

"The fact is that His Majesty's Government feels competitive toward the USA in India and does not look with favor on American cooperation with the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan".¹⁸⁸

Britain pressured America, with the special relationship leverage, to refrain from South Asia, which in turn Washington merrily abided with.

Another key part of America's restricted access to the region was Washington recognised Britain's familiarity with the region derived from a historical association, the intimacy between South Asia's leading politicians with Britain and Britain's continued role in the region. Orientalism existed parallel to Occidentalism. British frameworks were standardised across South Asia, demonstrating the imitative nature of 'independence'. When Jinnah and Nehru read their respective independence speeches, they did so with upper crust English accents and with English titled offices

in Governor General and Prime Minister. Britain's relationship with South Asia, especially India, but assumed by Americans with Pakistan too, remained strong – a relationship and connection which extended well beyond colonial history.^{xii} The post-partition Commanders in Chief of India and Pakistan were both British, in General Sir Robert Lockhart and General Sir Frank Messervy.¹⁸⁹

America also relying on Britain's multi-racial Commonwealth network as an indirect policy route, conducted every major American policy under Truman to South Asia with close British involvement. America felt no compulsion to acquaint with Pakistan, whose ministers lobbied hard for invitations.^{xiii} In fact, Washington, underestimating the crunch on British resources, resources that the British government exaggerated, pushed Britain to lead in South Asia.¹⁹⁰ Washington encouraged the UK to, "continue to assume responsibility for meeting the military requirements of the South Asian area".¹⁹¹ Five years after deepening American cognition of South Asia, America still advised Britain that the, "UK and Commonwealth should continue to have responsibility for seeking a solution to problems on the Indian subcontinent."¹⁹² Even when London invited Washington into South Asia, Truman declined. In January 1948, Washington rejected London's request that Washington lead Kashmir's conflict resolution because, "the familiarity which the British have with the problems of the area" and, "in essence the present situation is a further development in the evolution of the political problems connected with the British withdrawal from India."¹⁹³

^{xii} The LSE for instance linked Philip Noel-Baker, Pethick-Lawrence, Clement Attlee and Harold Laski who inspired Nehru's entire generation of Indian socialists, to Indian leaders in Krishna Menon, Braj Kumar (B K) Nehru, Tarlok Singh and Bhimrao R Ambedkar who wrote the Indian constitution

^{xiii} During his visit in 1949, Ghulam Mohammed was unable to see either Truman or Acheson while Zafrullah Khan managed an audience with Acheson only after extensive campaigning.

Anti-Communism

America's inability to categorise and attach meaning to post-partition Pakistan within a narrative and lack of interest in South Asia contrasted with the increasing internalisation and intensification of the anti-communist identity narrative in America from late 1946. This escalated America's (anti-communist) classification and attachment of meaning to reality worldwide and imposed an increasing degree of meaning on South Asia, sensitising Washington's realities to a framework of communist opportunity. That Washington tended not to focus on Russia's military opportunities reflected the widespread belief until 1949 that Moscow would not risk confronting the American bomb. This left tension, deprivation and conflict as the main communist opportunities – which American anti-communist identity narrative sought to eradicate. Given the prominence of South Asia's political disputes, Washington focused on these even if the underlying substance was often immaterial, and even the participants themselves were marginalized. Conflict elimination, not necessarily conflict resolution, was the prime anti-communist directive. When India invaded Junagadh in October 1947, Washington maintained silence to let the conflict dissipate. Similarly, Washington remained uninvolved when India invaded Hyderabad in 1948.¹⁹⁴

As a result, America's growing understanding of South Asia through anti-communism had little in common with the realities of anti-India Karachi. Washington's anti-communism narrative exclusively dealt with sources of potential South Asian communism. The engagements therefore derived from this identity narrative were not specifically *to* Pakistan, for the anti-communist narrative directed policy to sources of

communism. Indeed, Washington's attention and policy to Pakistan in the first Truman term was dwarfed by its anti-communist focus on Pakistan's conflicts about which Washington aimed accordingly to,

“bring about as great a degree of political, economic, and military stability in the South Asian countries, and (2) to prevent any encroachments with the Soviet Union may have in mind with respect to the area.”¹⁹⁵

In this sense, America's pro-active policy to Pakistani actually *preceded* 1947, as America worried about the implications of decolonisation's delays on South Asia. The American chargé in India focused on communism as early as January 1943.¹⁹⁶ Immediately after the Simla talks in June 1945, Washington pressed Britain to accelerate resolution of India's status. America's disappointment at the talks' failure, when the League refused Congress's assurances, carried meaning only within America's conflict elimination aims.¹⁹⁷ Anti-communism's growing political currency and the Congress-League deadlock intensified America's anti-communist focus on India. Local American officials needed to reassure Washington that Indian riots involved but were not instigated by communists.¹⁹⁸ Later reports emphasised that despite anti-imperialist Russian broadcasts in Hindi, there was no, “direct contact between Moscow and Indian Communists”.¹⁹⁹ In early 1947, the local embassy again calmed Washington, “Congress and Muslim League leaders in GOI recognise danger infiltration Indian political scene of outside totalitarian influences”.²⁰⁰

Washington's anti-communist narrative, as was the missionary narrative, was initially not conducive to Pakistan. If conflict elimination curtailed communist expansion,

eliminating the Pakistan conflict was reasonable policy. In September 1946, Washington recognised the Nehru-led interim government hoping to bulldoze Pakistan – unaware of the potentially resultant ensuing communal bloodbath.²⁰¹ In December 1946, Acheson wrote,

“early establishment of India Federal Union by peaceful means would be great step forward towards world stability at a time when there are so many dark clouds on the horizon elsewhere”.²⁰²

However and consistent with the anti-communist framework, and notwithstanding America wanting to preserve India for its missionary role, Acheson’s overt support for Indian unity lasted only until Pakistan’s seemed inevitable. On independence, congratulatory messages were promptly sent to Karachi, local officials instructed to establish friendly relations and US\$10m was donated for refugees, who may be otherwise susceptible to communist influence.

While America’s anti-communist identity and narrative intensified, South Asia’s conflicts continued after partition. The rushed partition spun-off a plethora of disputes, pursued by the disputants with unusual vehemence. Of South Asia’s three interstate tensions, two involved Pakistan – the dispute with Afghanistan that centred on Pushtunistan and various disputes with India of which Kashmir was the most important.^{xiv} Kashmir deserves elucidation given its importance to American - Pakistan relations. At partition, India’s princely states had the option of joining India or Pakistan, or remaining independent. Kashmir and Jammu, where a Hindu

^{xiv} The third dispute was between India and Ceylon concerning 900,000 Indian Tamils in Ceylon.

Maharajah governed four million people of whom eighty percent were Muslim, opted for independence. In October 1947, the Maharajah's Hindu army, Hindu fundamentalist RSS members and Sikh *jathas* killed thousands of Kashmiri Muslims.²⁰³ Muslim Pathan tribesmen, supported by Pakistan, invaded Kashmir, "they quite rightly saw that the killings were not random but formed a policy of 'ethnic cleansing'", a view which London shared.²⁰⁴ The tribesmen helped temporarily establish an independent Kashmir government.

With the tribesmen close to capturing Srinagar, the Maharajah pleaded for Indian help. Mountbatten insisted that Kashmir must first begin acceding to India, subject to a later plebiscite.²⁰⁵ The Maharajah panicked and on 26th October acceded to India. In November 1947, Nehru offered a plebiscite on condition that the tribesmen leave Kashmir – India's bargaining position since, knowing that Pakistan would not leave Kashmir's Muslims to Hindu troops and potentially rigged elections. Moreover, had the tribesmen withdrawn, India's military position would have become impregnable. Meanwhile, parallels with Junagadh poisoned the waters. Under a Muslim leader, Junagadh acceded to Pakistan despite eighty percent of its population being Hindu. However, Nehru ignored the leader and invaded Junagadh in October 1947. Hence Rizvi's assessment of Nehru's Kashmir policy as, "sheer hypocrisy."²⁰⁶ Kashmir was immediately an emotional issue for Nehru and Jinnah. Nehru located secularism at India's core. To preserve Indian identity against India's heterogeneity, he did not want religious affiliation to obstruct loyalty to an Indian identity. In contrast, Jinnah created Pakistan from India's Muslim majority areas; the aberration of which questioned the embryonic Pakistan identity.

War erupted in Kashmir in November 1947 after Pakistan supported the tribesmen to disturb the status quo. The first Security Council breakthrough in April 1948 created a five-man autonomous commission, the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan ('UNCIP'), and instructed that tribes withdraw from Kashmir, India reduce its troop presence and a plebiscite be conducted under an impartial commission or plebiscite administrator. When the UNCIP arrived in territory in May 1948, it learned that Pakistani troops were in Kashmir. While stating this presence improper, the UNCIP however accepted Karachi's case that without these violations, India would have taken positions vital for Pakistan's defence.

Initially, Washington viewed the tension as a minor legalistic dispute. But after the brief war, Kashmir gradually crystallised the two competing forces that shaped post-August 1947 American policy to Pakistan. On the one hand, Washington lacked sufficient cognition and interest to engage South Asia. On the other, given the internalisation and spread of anti-communist identity and narrative, some engagement was necessary for not only was, "Close economic and strategic cooperation between India and Pakistan ... essential if stability and progress to be attained", but disputes such as Kashmir would otherwise invite communist expansion.²⁰⁷ The tension from the two competing forces was modestly reconciled through the UNCIP, which Marshall supported and relied on.

The UNCIP fulfilled Washington's anti-communist engagement by trying to resolve the dispute, even if it did not succeed. Throughout the Truman presidency, Washington supported every UN policy on Kashmir, neither undermining nor superseding it bilaterally. Washington paid for sixty percent of the UNCIP's costs and

loaned it a plane for its missions.²⁰⁸ Marshall expedited the UNCIP to the region, and encouraged it to persist when it wanted to return in exasperation.²⁰⁹ America's few bilateral and lacklustre undertakings supported the UN effort as for instance, in March 1948, with London fearing a holocaust, Marshall placed a low-key arms embargo on India and Pakistan, relaxed only for spare parts and non-offensive equipment and only after both countries contemplated purchasing Czech hardware, but which otherwise lasted until April 1949. Ambassador Ispahani learned that America,

“would like to be able deal with Pakistan's requests for military material on their intrinsic merits, but this is not possible as long as the Kashmir dispute with its explosive potentialities continues”.²¹⁰

After the UNCIP obtained agreement on a ceasefire and elections in December 1948, Indian implementation delays attracted American pressure throughout 1949. Truman urged the use of independent arbitration, which India rejected.

Simultaneously, the UN gave expression to America's lack of interest by buffering America from Kashmir. Throughout 1948-49, Washington exhibited scant interest in the UNCIP or Kashmir's ground realities so much so that until 1950, America did not offer a single original proposal for the conflict,

“In formulating proposals for Kashmir settlement we do not have in mind US formal initiative in SC but have rather attempted to incorporate suggestions made by various members SC as well as GOI and GOP reps”.²¹¹

This, the first American proposal in February 1948, only summarised existing ideas – a truce under UN auspices, the tribes leaving, a neutral interim Kashmir government and the UNCIP and plebiscite administrator to oversee a plebiscite.²¹² When the UNCIP stalled, Washington worked behind London, “Although we wish to cooperate to maximum extent with UK we do not wish to take over lead in SC consideration”.²¹³ Though Marshall reluctantly allowed an American to serve as the plebiscite administrator, he strongly resisted appointing an American on the more politically exposed UNCIP.²¹⁴ Eventually however after extensive international pressure, he appointed J Klahr Huddle to the UNCIP in May 1948.²¹⁵

Though Kashmir dominated America’s focus on Pakistan’s conflicts, anti-communist cognition was extended to other conflicts. The border dispute with Afghanistan, centring on the 1893 Durand Line, was the second Pakistani dispute that concerned America. Kabul claimed that this ‘arbitrary’ boundary had split the Pushtun nation between British India and Afghanistan, which Pakistan’s partition merely reinforced. Kabul wanted a referendum to allow Pakistan’s Pushtuns to remain in Pakistan, join Afghanistan or create a new state, ‘Pushtunistan’. Despite the Pushtun not constituting Afghanistan’s majority, their claim had merit. Pushtun nationalists had dreamed of a united Pushtun polity long before Pakistan’s conceptual development.²¹⁶ London had accepted, in the 1921 Anglo-Afghani treaty, a limited Afghani interest in those same tribes that Kabul disputed after 1947. A Pushtun nationalist journal was launched in 1928.²¹⁷ The overall problem was complicated by Afghanistan and India supporting each other’s position against Pakistan and especially by India, despite its weak financial position, even giving Kabul funds for anti-Karachi propaganda.²¹⁸

That America lacked interest in the Pushtun dispute, as it did across South Asia, was apparent, “We did not possess the depth of experience in the complexities of tribal affairs – particularly in their psychological aspects – to intervene directly in a matter as involved as the ‘Pushtunistan’ dispute.”²¹⁹ ^{xv} However, unlike in Kashmir, the Pushtunistan dispute could not counterbalance America’s lack of interest with a mechanism to provide the minimalist anti-communist engagement that Washington achieved through the UN. There simply was no UN or British involvement in the Pushtun dispute for Washington to work behind. Furthermore, again in contrast to Kashmir, Washington felt it was possible that the conflict could be ignored into oblivion, as had been Hyderabad and Junagadh, by accepting Karachi and London’s interpretation of the Durand Line as Pakistan’s legitimate border, which Washington did in 1947.²²⁰

Consequently, early American policy to this dispute was inattentive while wishfully promoting reconciliation.²²¹ Beyond Marshall’s encouraging Karachi to dialogue with Kabul, while discouraging Kabul from raising the issue with Pakistan, and asking America’s allies to do likewise, Washington remained clear of the dispute. For instance, Pakistan’s trade embargo with Afghanistan in January 1950 attracted little criticism.²²² Indeed, “Pakistan had been quite reasonable in their relation with the Afghans” despite jeopardising American aid to Afghani economic development, especially the Helmand water irrigation project, which aimed to improve Kabul’s food supply.²²³

^{xv} America’s primary experience with tribal conflicts had been through Amerindians, and the policy pursued was, in being akin to genocide, not especially productive for this situation.

Emerging Meanings

In early 1949, the application of missionary and anti-communist categorisation and discourse intensified on India and South Asia respectively. Central to this development was China. China's importance to America was as an arena for missionary narrative enactment and as an integral part of America's colonised future. While American television serials depicted American adults adopting Oriental children for guidance and tutelage, Chiang commanded immense respect in missionary circles as, "the finest flowerings of the Protestant missionary tradition in the far east."²²⁴ China's loss, effectively from the end of 1948, was felt as America's missionary narrative's destruction. Daniel Poling, editor of The Christian Herald, demanded that Washington reclaim China.²²⁵ Though Truman viewed the 'loss' as a setback, hoping to recognise Mao after a settling period, the axis of American anxiety remained acute given, "(T)he recalcitrance of events in China in refusing to conform to any preconceived pattern".²²⁶ In contrast, Republicans portrayed the 'loss' as a narrative breach from which they generated significant political capital.^{xvi} Just as in 1900, when the Chinese Boxer Rebellion had gripped America like no single issue since 1865, the America of 1949 was gripped by China's revolution.²²⁷ The China debates from February 1949 when Republicans accused Truman of assisting the KMT's collapse were vociferous and soon engulfed the administration's agenda.²²⁸

Mao's success also extended American anti-communist categorisation and discourse into China and the region. With Europe's economy stable, America increasingly focused on Asia from late 1948, contrary to Tucker's suggestion that the focus

^{xvi} Though Chiang's strongest supporter in the Senate, Alexander Smith confided that, "further aid to the Nationalist government would be money poured down the 'rat hole'", Congress objected to Truman's proposal in February 1949 to suspend US\$60m of military aid to the KMT.

developed in late 1949.²²⁹ Washington feared that Stalin was using Mao to expand in Asia and Moscow's overtures to the Vietminh and support for China in international forums frightened Washington.²³⁰ In February 1950, Stalin and Mao signed a thirty-year mutual assistance treaty, and Russia gave China a US\$300m loan while Washington was shocked by the bellicosity of Chinese anti-Americanism.²³¹ This popular perception that China was, "at the beck and call of the Kremlin", lasted into Eisenhower's second term.²³²

Beyond China, the anti-communist prism spread across Asia. Policy Planning Staff ('PPS') paper 51 revealed that in 1948, Moscow established a Bangkok embassy and sent Musso to lead a communist rebellion in Indonesia.²³³ In 1947, America believed it could establish relations with the Vietminh but then after the anti-communist narrative's application in Asia, rejected Ho's requests for better relations in 1948.²³⁴ NSC 48-1 in December 1949 reflected, "If Southeast Asia is also swept by communism, we shall have suffered a major political rout, the repercussions of which will be felt throughout the rest of the world."²³⁵ In South Asia in 1949, American analysts noted Russia's establishment of an India embassy, diplomatic agreements with Pakistan, Czech commodity agreements and the visit of a Czech technical mission to South Asia.²³⁶ Further, communists organised the Southeast Asian Youth Conference in Calcutta in 1949.²³⁷

The Russian bomb compounded American concerns, as Kissinger explained,

“no conceivable acquisition of territory - not even the occupation of Western Europe - could have affected the strategic balance as profoundly as did the Soviet success in ending our atomic monopoly.”²³⁸

Russian power suddenly became alluring. Washington’s perceptions of Russian audacity changed too. Johnson’s cost-cutting campaign ended immediately while American sensitivity to communist subversion grew.²³⁹

Washington tentatively engaged Asia to protect its missionary and anti-communist narratives. In 1950, US\$40m was allocated for Southeast Asia, an Ex-Im loan for US\$100m was arranged for Indonesia and further funds were directed from the Point Four programme.²⁴⁰ PPS 51, approved in December 1949, urged greater American regional involvement and the, “development of an interdependent and integrated counterforce to Stalinism in this quarter of the world”, the impregnation of SEATO. In April 1950, Truman viewed South East Asia under immediate threat, and prioritised the protection of American regional concerns.²⁴¹ Concerned about Japan’s economy and affiliation, after China’s change, Acheson addressed Tokyo’s post-war status by advocating Japanese independence lest it otherwise drift to communism.²⁴² Against Pentagon advice, which demanded bases in Japan, and Australia’s angst, Acheson proceeded towards a Japanese peace settlement in 1950.²⁴³ To America’s existing goals in South Asia, being the region’s Western orientation, prevention of communist expansion and London’s continued leadership, another was introduced,

“b) Economic development in South Asia of a type which would ...also assist those countries to contribute to economic recovery in the Far East ”.²⁴⁴

Nehru: Independence and the Creation of India

The threat to America's anti-communist and missionary narratives from 1949 further induced South Asia's immersion within the two categorisations and discourses, and India's especially into the missionary narrative. That America's concerns for the sub-continent were not those associated with traditional Realism, needs emphasis.

Washington did not particularly value South Asia's economic assets,

“denial of South Asian resources would not necessitate any significant reduction in defense and essential civilian consumption in the US...in the short run, Communist control of South Asia would provide few economic benefits to the rest of the Soviet Bloc”.²⁴⁵

Nor was South Asia militarily threatened. In April 1949, the JCS suggested that,

“the inaccessibility of the area from the north and the fact that more remunerative objectives exist in Europe, the Middle East and the Far East, make it unlikely that in the event of war, the USSR would expend any substantial military effort in South Asia”.²⁴⁶

Washington thus sought to place South Asia and especially India within the two narratives. To do so, Washington needed geography to locate the two countries for without such, any narrative based understanding could not be translated into policy specifics. America thus re-located South Asia into the amphitheatre of both anti-

communist and missionary anxiety – being Asia. In February 1948, a PPS report on ‘Asia’ examined only the Far East and ignored South Asia.²⁴⁷ Less than two years on, the narrative unease propelled the re-location of South Asia with East Asia.²⁴⁸ The growing application of anti-communist discourse on South Asia meant that by December 1949, India and Pakistan became with Japan,

“the only major Asian power centres remaining outside the Soviet orbit. Should India and Pakistan fall to communism, the United States and its friends might find themselves denied any foothold on the Asian mainland”.²⁴⁹

However, it was China’s fall that became the primary background for America’s cognising of India, and from which Indian democracy became critical.²⁵⁰ America’s,

“long lost love affair with China had coming to a crashing halt, leaving Americans stunned and bewildered. Like many a jilted suitor, the American public sought to erase its bad memories of China by embracing India.”²⁵¹

America demanded that India assume meaning by replacing China in America’s missionary narrative, and to a much lesser extent within the anti-communist narrative, to surrogate a century of American stories about their missionary westward Frontier by becoming America’s chief lieutenant in Asia. Acheson noted of Nehru that if he, “did not exist – as Voltaire said of God – he would have to be invented.”²⁵² The first policy paper on South Asia, in April 1949 noted,

“Recent developments in China, which point to the probability that the greater part or even the whole of China may fall under the domination of Chinese Communists, increase our interest in and possible future dependence on South Asia.”²⁵³

However, placing India within the anti-communist and especially missionary narratives had two obstacles. First, anti-Americanism was prevalent in India. Henderson’s suggestion that anti-Americanism reflected low American aid and a Pakistani bias seem doubtful since anti-Americanism predated Pakistan and the Indian press seldom prioritised aid.²⁵⁴ In fact, three decades of unmet expectations of American policy had left a searing mark upon India. Indian nationalists had appropriated the Declaration of Independence for inspiration for more than a century. The Calcutta Gazette had in 1785 acclaimed George Washington as a great hero.²⁵⁵ During the American civil war, Bombay’s citizens financed a Union hospital.²⁵⁶ Indian nationalists drew on Wilson’s national self-determination in their struggle. Yet from Wilson’s racially selective self-determination, Indian nationalist expectations were met with successive disappointments – manifesting deep resentment. During the war, appeals to Roosevelt such as by the Maharaja of Indore in May 1942 in the Indian press were common, as were the subsequent disappointments.²⁵⁷ Even Gandhi, suspicious of America, appealed to Roosevelt in July 1942 to mediate independence.²⁵⁸ These expectations of America contrasted with Roosevelt’s outward policy of silence and restraint.²⁵⁹

Roosevelt's deference on India to Churchill occurred during one of the more tragic episodes in the war. The Bengali famine, which started in 1942, was India's worst famine of the twentieth century - killing three million people. In 1943, Churchill refused to accept war-specific UN funds for the famine since it had not been caused by the war - untrue since Burma's collapse reduced the rice supply to India. Capitol Hill changed the aid rules so that India could access funds. Yet Churchill, who felt Indians would breed "like rabbits", refused to authorise the necessary request.²⁶⁰ In exasperation, private American efforts were organised. J J Singh summarised Indian sentiment, "India will survive this famine as she survived famines in the past. But the memory of the hundreds of thousands who died because no help came from their allies, will be a ghost not quickly laid."²⁶¹

Washington simply failed to honour its publicised and rhetorical expectations at the critical hour. The Calcutta University riots in November 1945, though primarily anti-British, also targeted Americans. Thirty-three American soldiers were injured and an American army hospital was besieged.²⁶² In February 1946, Madam Pandit accused US officials of conspiring with Britain to conceal the independence struggle from America's public.²⁶³ During riots that month, thirty-seven Americans were injured in Calcutta, a Bombay mob attacked an embassy building, ransacked American vehicles and demanded America 'Quit India'. At the San Francisco conference, it was left to Molotov to fulfil the role that Indian leaders had expected from America, by condemning Britain in India and declaring the Raj's delegation unrepresentative.²⁶⁴

Given the built up expectations from America, and unlike the pre-independence hostility towards Britain, anti-Americanism persisted after 1947,

“We have always had great expectations about your country, while we have expected little from Soviet Russia.... You led us to believe in those standards. So when we think that you failed to live up to them we are disappointed and say so.”²⁶⁵

This resentment manifested in a variety of issues,

“our treatment of American Negroes, our tendency to support colonialism and to strive for continued world supremacy of white peoples, our economic imperialism, superficiality of our culture, our lack of emotional balance as evidenced by our present hysteria in combating Communism and our cynical use of ‘witch-hunting method’ in promoting domestic political ends, our practice of going economic and other assistance to foreign peoples only when we believe such assistance will aid in our struggle against Communism, our assumption of superiority merely because we have higher standards of living, our hypocrisy etc”.²⁶⁶

Had Nehru distanced from anti-Americanism, the undercurrent may not have mattered such was his dominance in India. But Nehru’s own views on America were not flattering given his accusing America during the war of, “a passive and sometimes even an active support of British propaganda” in India.²⁶⁷ America also irritated Nehru. Influenced by the LSE professor Harold Laski, Nehru was a socialist with a Brahmanical disdain for capitalistic business.²⁶⁸ His Labour friends were socialists, in contrast to his right wing antagonist, Churchill, and he had socialist ambitions –

reflected in Russian-styled Planning Commission.²⁶⁹ The Brahmin, Hinduism's highest Varna, told Bowles, "you can't see what Asia has in mind because of this lack of ability to imbibe anything outside yourselves, because you are so full of yourselves."²⁷⁰ Nehru's views baffled Washington. Henderson, with echoes of Freudian psychiatry, traced Nehru's anti-Americanism to his childhood days at The Harrow School,

"that the US was an overgrown, blundering, uncultured and somewhat crass nation, and that Americans in general were ill-manned and immature people, more interested in such toys as could be produced by modern technique and in satisfaction of their creature comforts than in endeavouring to gain an understanding of the great moral and social trends of the age."²⁷¹

This antagonism was in itself probably insufficient from preventing India's role within America's anti-communist and especially missionary narratives. Nehru's drive for an independent India was though. India was a highly heterogeneous state,

"there never was a united, single, homogenous India in the cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious sense of the word. It has always been a multinational subcontinent that thrived on diversity, with short-lived interludes in its history when a partial political unity was superimposed by administrative means.... the northern subcontinent has a political history which is quite different from its southern counterpart."²⁷²

Nehru feared this heterogeneity could disintegrate India, especially after Pakistan's creation. As a result, he prioritised building 'Indian' identity for distribution and internalisation amongst the masses, for instance, by encouraging those Indian writers who reverted to the third century BC Mauryan empire, for the last example of a central, pan-Indian, indigenous government authority, and introducing the Mauryan emperor Ashoka's wheel into the Indian flag.²⁷³ With this aim, Nehru emphasised India's existence based on its independence, without which, there was little value to the cry of hundreds and thousands of Congressmen who had been subjugated to beatings and imprisonment by the British. Specifically, Nehru demanded recognition of an Indian existence through respect for its right to independent policy, which would itself be bed-rocked by India's international and economic policy.²⁷⁴ Alliances encouraged military costs and hampered economic growth, thus restricting manoeuvrability and independence. Nehru thus co-opted atomic development to emphasise independence. Before India could feed its starving and homeless millions, and two decades before India's military requested for its military use, Nehru pursued India's atomic programme from 1947.²⁷⁵

However, American narratives did not lend towards cognitive third ways since bipolarity helped make sense of America's brave new world. Others were either anti-communist or communist, associates of America's mission or impediments. America was thus sensitive to Indian independence well before India's devolution.²⁷⁶ Asian independence and 'Asia for the Asiatics' movements were also frowned upon, and viewed as immature. Even Foggy Bottom's Asia experts, those officials most sympathetic to decolonisation, treated Asian neutralism antipathetically.²⁷⁷ Likewise, policymakers feared Germany and Japan's neutralism as much as their communist

conversion.²⁷⁸ Nehru acutely disrupted America's anti-communist and missionary narratives since his commitment to independent policy meant he had no intention of fulfilling America's mission, nor of fighting communism,

“the world might be far better off if there were a few less of these moral crusaders about. Everyone wants not only to carry on the moral crusade in his environment but to impose his moral crusade on others.”²⁷⁹

In March 1947, Nehru announced,

“we propose as far as possible to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led to in the past to world wars.... The countries of Asia can no longer be used as pawns by others ...we do not intend to be the plaything of others”.²⁸⁰

Weeks later he added, “India will follow an independent policy, keeping away from the power politics of groups”²⁸¹

Nehru's neutralism was inexplicable to America. Henderson, a vituperative anti-communist, found the refusal to chose sides incomprehensible.²⁸² Grady complained that Nehru, “often talks as though he regards the great struggle going on in the world today as one merely for power between two groups, particularly between Russia and the United States”.²⁸³ In 1947, Grady told Nehru, “this is a question that cannot be straddled and that India should get on the democratic side immediately”.²⁸⁴ Concerns about Nehru's oft-rumoured Asian bloc increased during the January 1949 Asian

conference on Indonesia.²⁸⁵ Philippines' Quirino told American officials that Nehru's 'Asian Organisation of States', planned for September 1949, was an anti-western platform.²⁸⁶ American unease was compounded by the Kashmir impasse, for which Washington rightly blamed Nehru, who had delayed a plebiscite on dubious technicalities, thereby inviting doubts about India's good faith.²⁸⁷

Washington, stuck with bipolar cognition, also under-appreciated the Moscow - New Delhi rift. Initially, Nehru was highly impressed by Russia.²⁸⁸ However, Stalin's prism, as rigid as Washington's, filtered reality between revolutionaries and imperialists, interpreting nonalignment as an, "imperialist device... to slander the USSR by placing it on the same level with American imperialism."²⁸⁹ The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia consequently described Gandhi as, "a reactionary who... betrayed the people and helped the imperialists against them"²⁹⁰ Stalin quickly dismissed Nehru as capitalist stooge and relations unsurprisingly deteriorated. In 1948, the Indian Communist Party's protests infuriated Nehru for their, "lack of integrity and decency".²⁹¹ Nehru was especially annoyed that Russia's ambassador seemed more involved in, "directing clandestine secret movements of Indian communists" than in meeting Congress leaders.²⁹²

With Asia dominating America's agenda and despite India's intransigence to play its part within the anti-communist and missionary narratives, America continued to hope on India, albeit through a more extended route - in the autumn of 1949, policymakers focused on, "the education of Indian leadership to the imminence of Communist danger".²⁹³ Washington hoped Nehru would change to accept America's story of itself, an aim which the SANAAC paper of April 1949 articulated as its third goal,

“b) Cooperation among the nations of South Asia for constructive purposes...”,
 (meaning, “guide any regional or Asian movement which may develop in the
 direction of constructive participation in UN activities”).²⁹⁴

America’s confidence in India’s education, itself part of America’s mission, enabled Washington to plan engaging India as the centrepiece of America’s Far Eastern defence plans.²⁹⁵ A State Department report in September 1949 listed “The central position of India in the Far East” as the first of four pillars of Far Eastern policy.²⁹⁶ Another State Department study in November for Truman, defined India as, “the most important existing centre of non-Communist strength in Asia.”²⁹⁷ Against this background, Nehru’s visit to America in October 1949 was particularly anticipated. Politicians and press gave glowing attributes to India and Nehru, corresponding less to realities than to American post-Mao narrative needs. The Washington Post characterised India as, “an island in a continent of turmoil”, Nations described Nehru as, “a figure of immense significance to the whole world”, and Time described him as “Asia’s key man”.²⁹⁸ In August 1949, Acheson told the Indian ambassador that both he and Truman considered Nehru, “a world figure of great influence and that we looked to him to assume the leadership in the rehabilitation of Asia”.²⁹⁹ Nehru’s address to a joint session of Congress was lauded with praise – Representative Celler described Nehru’s, “transcendental quality...an aura of the spiritual seems to hover over him.”³⁰⁰

However, Nehru’s tour was a disaster for America. He firmly asserted independence and non-alignment, “In short, Nehru’s visit jolted Americans into the realization that

India would resist playing the Cold War role that the United States hoped to assign it".³⁰¹ Personal frictions did not help. Acheson later noted, "I was convinced that Nehru and I were not destined to have a pleasant personal relationship...he was one of the most difficult men with whom I have ever had to deal with."³⁰² Truman did not connect with Nehru either, who in turn felt Americans were gregarious, uncivilised and uncouth, upset that they, "expected something more than gratitude and goodwill".³⁰³ Interestingly, Indian diplomats saw the visit, in restating independence, as a success, "If anything, it has fortified general conviction of the rightness of non-involvement and made any change in that policy difficult".³⁰⁴ Weeks later, Nehru forcefully demonstrated his independence through China.³⁰⁵ He hoped that friendship with Mao would lead to Asian prosperity and viewed the Chinese revolution as a democratic improvement on decades of turbulence.³⁰⁶ New Delhi's first ambassador to China shared with his prime minister,

"a deep feeling of sympathy for the Chinese people, a desire to see them stand united, strong and powerful, able to stand up against the nations which had oppressed them for a hundred years, a psychological appreciation of their desire to wipe out humiliations which followed the western domination of their country and to proclaim the message of Asia Resurgent."³⁰⁷

Thus, India was the first non-communist state to recognise China on 30th December 1949, for which Acheson described Nehru as highly deluded.³⁰⁸

Nehru's rejection of American narratives came during a sensitive period when American bipolarity toughened and anti-communist narrative insecurity grew. Truman's rhetoric had been blistering in the 1948 election and the Democrats had reduced the Republican representation on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.³⁰⁹ Bipartisanship faded despite Acheson's inclusion of Dean Rusk and John Foster Dulles for policy in Asia. Congress even raised concerns about Acheson's anti-communism when he was nominated as Secretary of State in January 1949.³¹⁰ McCarthy's political entrée in February 1950 charged Washington's atmosphere further. He and MacArthur brought anti-communist focus to Asia, accusing, in what Acheson would term, "the attack of the primitives", the State Department's 'pinkos' of selling Asia to the communists.³¹¹

Consequently, at the end of 1949, Washington was disappointed and frustrated with India. Henderson noted, "India was making no contribution to world problems, was unlikely to do so as long as the present policy persisted and that Nehru displayed little sense of the practical realms".³¹² As a result, Acheson rejected India's request for US\$500m in aid and a million tons of wheat. NSC 48/1 in December 1949 euphemistically outlined, "it would be unwise for us to regard South Asia, more particularly India, as the sole bulwark against the extension of communist control in Asia."³¹³ With India's rejection of its role in Asia, and narrative anxiety growing, Washington geographically divorced South Asia from East Asia. There was no longer any reason to classify South Asia with East Asia. The Jessup mission in February 1950 on the Far East reversed PPS 51 and NSC 48 by advocating treating South Asia distinct from East Asia.³¹⁴

Pakistan: Asiatic or Muslim Arab

While, “the Indians spat in America’s eye”, Pakistan placed itself firmly within the anti-communist narrative, “Compared with the wishy-washy neutralist Indians, they were a breath of fresh air”.³¹⁵ The Pakistani political leadership’s consistent acceptance and support for America’s anti-communism made Pakistan a rare unequivocal American supporter. Karachi not only supported the anti-communist narrative but also presented it as its own political blood and soul. That Pakistan looked to America reflected the views of a powerful highly westernised clique consisting of Zafrullah Khan, Ghulam Mohammed, Iskander Mirza, Ayub Khan and Ikramullah: Karachi’s campaign to cloak itself in anti-communism and attract American interest stemmed from insecurity about the new state-legitimised identity. India’s doubting of ‘Pakistan’, partition’s bitterness and Pakistan’s economic and military weakness precipitated hysterical fears of India.³¹⁶

Chaudhry’s suggestion that Jinnah, “preferred to pursue an independent course in world affairs” is markedly incongruous.³¹⁷ Jinnah wanted to align Pakistan with America to receive aid and repeatedly stressed Pakistan’s anti-communist identity and agenda.³¹⁸ In December 1947, Malik Feroz Khan, a prominent Pakistani, stressed to American officials that Pakistan needed aid to facilitate its anti-communist policy, as the West’s eastern bastion in the Middle East, complementary to Turkey, the western bastion.³¹⁹ In similar vein, Jinnah alerted American officials about Russian agents’ activities in Kalat and Gilgit, and aspirations for Afghanistan and a port in Kalat.³²⁰ Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammed emphasised in 1947 that the burden of India’s defence against Russia fell on Pakistan, the only route to India.³²¹ Pakistani politicians

visiting the US heralded their anti-communist diet. Foreign Secretary Mohammed Ikramullah met US officials in June 1948 and advertised Pakistan as a Western bulwark in a deteriorating Asia.³²² Throughout his American tour, Liaquat Ali Khan publicised Pakistan's willingness to align with America.³²³ In November 1949, Ghulam Mohammed lauded Truman's, "able men with brains as well as hearts."³²⁴

Moreover, Pakistan matched its words with deeds. The State Department's assessment of Pakistan, "went firmly down the line for the American position on all important questions".³²⁵ Karachi waited till May 1948 to establish diplomatic relations with Russia, and till March 1950 to exchange ambassadors. In contrast to India, Pakistan helped Chiang's generals and refugees when they left China and recognised Mao's government only after Britain had done so in January 1950.³²⁶ Even Liaquat's acceptance in 1949 to visit Moscow, did not alarm Washington. Americans knew that Pakistani officials were eager to fulfil their visits to America. Iskander Mirza arrived only days later seeking arms. Requests for military exports and economic aid continued to pour at the Karachi embassy.

America's commitment to South Asian regionalism, thus impartiality, marginally tilted in Pakistan's favour given its military weakness. Of the 249 armoured vehicles and 40,000 to 60,000 tons of ammunition Pakistan was allocated at partition, Pakistan had none of either a month later.³²⁷ Therefore, when the Kashmir related arms embargo was lifted in March 1949, and to offset the, "existing disparity in military strength between the two Dominions", Washington approved London's request to transfer 200,000 rounds of 75mm American ammunition to Pakistan and only 50,000 rounds to India.³²⁸ However, Pakistan's firm categorisation within the anti-communist

narrative enabled Washington to expedite attaching meaning to and faintly engage Karachi. Subsequently in March 1949, Pakistan, and not India, received arms for the, “maintenance of internal security and freedom from Communist domination”.³²⁹ Further, Zafrullah Khan and Chaudhry Mohammed Ali’s reception in November 1949 in Washington was notably friendly, while Acheson reminisced with them about Nehru’s dire trip.³³⁰ Such anti-communist profits only marginally eased Pakistan’s disappointment with America because despite Karachi’s unequivocal open support for nearly every American policy, except to Palestine, Pakistan had otherwise little to show for its chameleon performance while Nehru still grabbed American headlines.

Simultaneous to the categorisation and attachment of Pakistan within the anti-communist narrative, Washington also became involved in the Middle East, important only as an anti-communist war resource. America’s focus on the Middle East, which began in earnest during World War Two, intensified in 1949.³³¹ America ranked the region as of major strategic importance, an assessment built on oil and military strategy.³³² In 1945, the Persian Gulf supplied seven percent of the world’s oil. By 1950, it supplied sixteen percent.³³³ Known world oil reserves increased by sixty percent during the war, with nearly all growth in the Middle East, leaving it with half the world’s known oil reserves. Furthermore, Middle Eastern oil was easily extracted and transported for Europe’s economic recovery.³³⁴ In 1947, American oil concerns were sensitised by oil shortages from coincidental strong demand in reindustrialising Europe and the booming domestic economy.³³⁵ Oil’s strategic value grew as anti-communism intensified. Forecasts suggested that if war broke out, Russia would desperately need Middle Eastern oil.³³⁶ Though less gravely, the same was said of the West,

“If, during a major war, the United States and her allies are deprived of the oil reserves of the Iran-Near and Middle East area, it is highly improbable that other sources can supply the United States military and economic requirements together with those of her possible allies.”³³⁷

The Middle East’s secondary value was military. In preparing for war, Defense planners prioritised protecting Britain, controlling Western Europe and retaining the Middle East.³³⁸ The use of strategic air power was introduced in late 1945, for which access to Middle East bases was vital. Operation CALDRON in November 1946 stressed the Middle East’s strategic importance. Plans for an unexpected global war in June 1946, operation PINCHER, prioritised the Middle East, especially the Cairo-Suez area from where bombers could destroy more Russian cities and oil refineries than anywhere else.³³⁹ The Suez base, Okinawa and Britain constituted America’s three strategic bombing bases in operation BROILER.³⁴⁰ HALFMOON in May 1948 and OFFTACKLE in November 1949 also emphasised the Middle East while DROPSHOT from early 1949 upgraded Suez.³⁴¹

Despite the Middle East’s growing priority for Washington, there were parallels between America’s lack of access in South Asia and the Middle East. Since 1918, London had maintained extensive interests in the Middle East, owning the world’s largest oil refinery at Abadan, southern Iran’s oil fields, maintaining airfields in Transjordan, Iraq and Cyprus, holding troops in Aden, Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia and owning the Suez base.^{xvii} London was determined to maintain its presence and

^{xvii} France had left the region in 1946 having failed to re-impose itself, while Italy relinquished Libya.

dominance in the region, especially Suez, which guarded imperial communications and transportation routes. Indeed, London prioritised the area second only to itself.³⁴² As in South Asia, and despite the region's growing value, the White House and State Department were uninterested in the Middle East and relied on Britain to uphold Anglo-American interests in the region.³⁴³ Washington maintained only small bases at Dhahran and Bahrain and a tiny regional naval presence, while America's oil interests were amicably agreed with Britain in a series of interwar agreements viz Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi.³⁴⁴

The growing anti-communist value of the Middle East accompanied an increasing American concern about the West's position in the region. Britain's deterioration in the Middle East, especially in Iran and Egypt, provoked American focus from late 1948.³⁴⁵ In Iran, the British owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company ('AIOC') was in dispute with the Majlis. The AIOC had negotiated its concessions in 1933 to run till 1993, giving Iran a humiliating profit for its oil. The Majlis rejected the 1948 supplemental increase to 25%-30% of the profits, and also a revised offer in 1949.³⁴⁶ Meanwhile, Egypt demanded Britain's departure in January 1945. The Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 had sanctioned Britain's presence in Egypt, at core of which was the Suez base - a huge array of military installations and stores, and road, rail and air infrastructure. In 1945, Britain stationed 200,000 troops there and focused on Egypt as the centre of its Middle East plans.³⁴⁷ Bevin offered phased withdrawal, but demanded maintaining air defence and basic forces in peacetime in Suez and the right to return in the event of war - all of which Cairo rejected.³⁴⁸ The West's position also deteriorated with Israel's creation, uniting even the Saudi Wahabis and Hashemites Iraqis and Transjordanians, enemies since 1924, against the West. Truman's

recognition of Israel eleven minutes after its independence infuriated Arabs who through the Arab League projected hostility against Israel and Britain.³⁴⁹

Still, and despite the region's importance and the West's difficulties, America had paltry appetite for the Middle East. Acheson's request to Congress for US\$100m to protect Saudi oil for American corporations was refused in October 1945. Five years on, and given Europe's requirements, McGhee counselled Truman against military obligations in the region unless Turkey, Saudi or Iran neared communist defection.³⁵⁰

In August 1949, only after strong British pressure did the JCS plan troops for the Middle East in the event of war.³⁵¹ Washington instead preferred to keep Britain in the area and use its extensive facilities, despite nearly all the Middle East countries wanting either a military alliance or arrangement with America. From 1948, Turkey demanded a strong American military commitment that was declined despite America's use of Turkish airfields.³⁵² Acheson honoured Iran's US\$500m aid request with only US\$12m.³⁵³

This resistance gradually eroded with the growing application of anti-communist categorisation and discourse for the Middle East, as well as British weakness. In 1949, with considerable reluctance, America's involvement grew in the Middle East with complex talks about Middle East responsibilities taking place with Britain in November.³⁵⁴ Britain, France and America agreed the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950 to control Arab-Israeli tensions. One State Department paper boldly asked in March 1950, "Should the United States associate itself in security arrangements bilaterally or multilaterally with Greece, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia or other countries of the NEA area?"³⁵⁵ That such questions were represented was a considerable

change, even if Washington's eventual response did not. America ruled out involvement in any Middle Eastern pact, such as it did in a November 1949 conference and then again in March 1950, because of a combination of local crosscurrents, and inadequate cognition and interest.³⁵⁶

With Pakistan placed within the anti-communist narrative, and the Middle East slowly necessitating American anti-communist commitment, Washington located Pakistan within the Middle East. Engaging Pakistan, for when America would eventually categorise and attach meaning to it, required geography. If Pakistan could not be engaged in East Asia after Nehru blocked South Asia's narrative enactment, Washington's only practical engagement of Pakistan in the anti-communist narrative was through the Middle East. Initially, America did not locate Pakistan in the Middle East. Despite Forrestal's concerns about Russia's threat to Middle East oil, his diaries did not mention Pakistan for their defence.³⁵⁷ However, after 1948, with the anti-communist meaning of Pakistan and concern mounting about the Middle East, Pakistan infrequently featured in America's analysis of the Middle East, initially as its outer rim, and specifically in the extreme repercussions of Arab-Israeli politics, in which it thus became part of the Muslim world.³⁵⁸ Hence, Pakistan's discussion in America's Middle East strategy paralleled the coincidence of Karachi's increasingly evident anti-communist categorisation and American Middle East concerns. In 1949, White House analysts who argued for closer relations with Pakistan cited its proximity to Russia, the Gulf, and its military and Muslim credentials.³⁵⁹ In November 1949, McGhee recommended aid to Pakistan based on its strategic importance in the Middle East.³⁶⁰ In March 1949, the JCS suggested that,

“From the military point of view, the countries of South Asia, excepting Pakistan have, under present and prospective conditions, little value to the United States... The Karachi-Lahore area in Pakistan may, under certain conditions, become of strategic importance. In spite of tremendous logistic difficulties, this area might be required as a base for air operations against central USSR and as a staging area for forces engaged in the defense or recapture of Middle East oil areas.”³⁶¹

In June 1949, Pakistan was one of many countries mentioned in a discussion on whether Middle East countries should be included in NATO.³⁶² The State Department in planning aid for Pakistan proposed in February 1950,

“The purpose of military assistance to Pakistan at this time is to achieve a psychological effect by assuring Pakistan of our willingness to provide reasonable support on reimbursable basis.... Only token assistance is proposed.”³⁶³

Support for Pakistan’s location in the Middle East from British quarters was scant, but that which was there was amplified in Washington. In January 1950, William Barton, Knight Commander of the Indian Empire, supported Pakistan’s inclusion in a Muslim belt to protect oil.³⁶⁴ This was supported by Major A E G Davy, the Nawab of Bhopal’s advisor, who forwarded his report ‘The Strategic and Political Importance of Pakistan in the event of War with the USSR’ to American officials, which argued that in the event of global war, Western Pakistan needed to be developed as a base, since it occupied the, “most vitally important strategic position on the face of the globe.”³⁶⁵

Pakistan's transition from East Asia to the Middle East was not entirely incongruous. Buzan incorrectly states that Pakistan's cultivation of its Middle East and Islamic links began in the 1970s.³⁶⁶ Having protected the Muslim identity from Hindu encroachment, Pakistan felt a natural affinity with the fellow members of the *Ummah*. Jinnah stressed to US officials as early as February 1946 that India's Muslims were affiliated with the Arab states.³⁶⁷ In November 1946, the State Department recognised precisely the same relationship.³⁶⁸ In May 1947, Jinnah impressed upon American officials, Pakistan's role as a Muslim country.³⁶⁹ A major Islamic economic conference gathered in Karachi in late 1949 while Feroze Khan Noon, touring the Muslim world, forwarded a note to America's Ankara embassy, "The Mussalmans are against Communism. We the Mussalmans of Pakistan have no Ambassador in Moscow nor is there any Russian Ambassador in Karachi."³⁷⁰

With America's placement of Pakistan in the Middle East coinciding with Nehru's rejection of India's role in America's narratives, America inadvertently dissected South Asia. Pakistan became more Muslim and less Asiatic. Not only was India quarantined from both East Asia and the Middle East, but South Asia as a cognitive instrument was henceforth synonymised with India by the Truman administration. In 1948, Pakistan and India had regularly featured in America's analysis of Asia. However, in a policy review in November 1949, Pakistan was classified with the Muslim world, aside from India and Asia.³⁷¹ The State Department's policy paper on Pakistan in 1950 explained,

“With regard to Pakistan’s endeavour to assume leadership of a Middle East Muslim bloc, it may in time become desirable critically to review our concept that Pakistan’s destiny is or should be bound with India.”³⁷²

In the NSC’s report on the Far East in December 1949, there was no mention of Pakistan but was of India.³⁷³ A policy review of Asia noted,

“The Moslems, particularly in Pakistan, are an important element in the area but, as their orientation is chiefly toward the other Moslem states of the Near and Middle East, they are less likely than India or Japan to play a leading role in South and East Asia.”³⁷⁴

Likewise, the JCS’s assessment of South East Asia’s defence in April 1950 made no mention of Pakistan.³⁷⁵ However, though the first Truman administration located Pakistan within the Middle East, the latter was still not a sufficiently demanding priority, nor was Pakistan’s anti-communist cognition especially deep rooted or firm. Throughout Truman’s first administration, Washington neither committed to the Middle East nor engaged Pakistan. Some planners such as McGhee recognised the danger in this but most did not consider a defection in the region likely and in any case the budget was already stretched. They did not believe that there was an immediate need to commit to the Middle East by engaging Pakistan by providing it arms. Venkataramani’s suggestion that on 5th May 1950, the day of Liaquat’s arrival in Washington, arms supplies left for Pakistan is thus highly questionable, especially since he offers no supporting evidence whatsoever.³⁷⁶

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CHAPTER FOUR

TRUMAN PART II: KOREA – A COGNITIVE CATALYST

The advent of the Korean War, with implications for the anxiety from the communist threat, catalysed the internalisation, bipolarisation and protection of American anti-communist identity narrative as well as consequently its greater geographic application to understand the globe. Therefore, the coincidence of American concerns about the Middle East and its understanding of anti-communist Pakistan, which had originated in late 1948, became especially acute after June 1950. Washington's fears about the communist threat escalated in the Middle East, while its understanding of Pakistan as an anti-communist ally became more defined. As a result, and concerned by the continued British inability to arrest the West's decline in the Middle East, Washington placed Pakistan as a central country in its defence plans for the region through the Anglo-American Middle East Command. To settle Pakistan's geographic transfer from South Asia to the Middle East and in part also to immunise the former region from communism, Washington re-energized its focus on settling Pakistan's disputes with both India and Afghanistan.

Failure to resolve these marked a period of narrative frustration for America. Not only did communist potential persist in Kashmir and Pushtunistan but Pakistan was re-located back into South Asia by virtue of its border standoff with India from July 1951, a cognition that the British, who could not see Pakistan as a Middle Eastern state, locked into the MEC's development, thus denying America its anti-communist engagement of Pakistan in the Middle East. The final source of narrative frustration came from India's continued refusal of its roles within America's narratives,

necessitating an awkward yet incomplete coming to terms with Indian independence – one that was complicated by Ambassador Bowles.

However America's frustration calmed somewhat in 1952. After the border tension eased in October 1951, Pakistan again shed its South Asia associations. Meanwhile, America lost faith in the continually unsuccessful British policy in the Middle East, and took greater interest with corresponding access to arrest the region's communisation. At the helm of an increasingly unilateral policy to the Middle East, Washington reintroduced Pakistan to the area's defence and brought Karachi to the precipice of engagement. That this was not followed through, reflected not Realist calculations of power, in which Pakistan would have scored abysmally poorly, but an inadequacy of time. By the time America arrived at this precipice, Truman's presidency was in its concluding days.

Korea – A Cognitive Catalyst

In June 1950, North Korean troops crossed the thirty-eighth parallel to invade South Korea. The resultant war transformed Washington's categorisation, attaching meaning and engagement of the world. It also, and not events in 1951 as Cohen suggests, marked the 'turning point', intensifications of pre-existing trends, in American policy to Pakistan.¹ The Korean War had a double impact on America's political cognition.

First, it demonstrated the strength and threat of the communist alterity thereby necessitating sharp reassertion and protection of the anti-communist narrative. Even before the war, anti-communist identity was already acutely subscribed to across

America with Nitze arguing that, “the cold war is in fact a real war.”² Alger Hiss was convicted for perjury in January 1950, while in February McCarthy burst onto the map and Klaus Fuchs was arrested. After the Russian bomb in 1949, the US had expected greater Russian risk appetite but not Korea’s, “naked, deliberate, unprovoked aggression”.³ North Korea, seen as a Russian pawn, confirmed communist Russia’s threat, despite Moscow’s extensive conciliatory efforts to discuss the war.⁴ Acheson announced that, “Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war” and in December 1950, Truman declared a national emergency.⁵

The threat to anti-communist identity narrative triggered tighter subscription across America to its identity and narrative and polarised its discourse. In this fashion, after the war, when the American self was questioned and existential uncertainty amplified, the demand for clearer meaning within the anti-communist narrative reached new peaks in the “anticommunist delirium”.⁶ Bipartisanship deepened. While the Rosenbergs were arrested in July and August 1950, Republican senators battered Marshall and Life magazine demanded the supposedly insufficiently anti-communist Acheson’s sacking.⁷ The attack on Acheson reached such heights in December 1950 that Acheson was advised by Truman, “since my enemies had not taken kindly to a certain reference to Christian principles, I might find the same ideas expressed more acceptably in the Koran.”⁸ As part of the bipolarisation, communists were monolithised, hence abandoning Truman’s attempt since October 1949 to divide China and Russia.⁹

Before June 1950, Washington had lived, albeit uncomfortably, with New Delhi's neutralism. In December 1949, though annoyed with Nehru's neutralism, Washington even entertained the prospect of profiting from Indian neutralism in the Cold War as a, "bulwark against communist expansion."¹⁰ Korea changed this tolerance given the polarisation of anti-communist identity for within this intensification, neutralism suffered, "Neutrality is illusory in the context of East-West tensions".¹¹ Having been a mere annoyance, neutrality became according to Acheson a, "shortcut to suicide", or according to Bradley, "the suicide of neutralism", while MacArthur wrote his last report favouring Japanese neutrality in June 1950.¹²

Whereas the Truman administration was responsible for the politico-military reconstruction of communist Russia's narrative anxiety, once accepted, public opinion demanded the protection of anti-communist narratives through communism's elimination. Limits could not be set to affirming self-location or re-enacting self-identity's manifestation in anti-communist crusades. Having asked of Americans to support the quest, in calls such as the Truman Doctrine, to reaffirm their Americanism through anti-communism, the Korean War marked a high point for the popular involvement of that identity narrative. Once the identity narrative anxiety was objectified, the public demanded precisely the commitment that had been demonstrated in all victorious American wars from 1861 to 1945 - overwhelming force. Hence, despite MacArthur's apocalyptic visions of a third world war and his insubordination, he received a rapturous applause before Congress and a national that reception was, "nothing short of cataclysmic, the public outpouring religious".¹³

Korea's second impact was it augmented the application and scope of the anti-communist categorisation and discourse, encouraging America to use the communist grid of intelligibility more extensively on a worldwide level to make sense of political reality. Korea's impact was in fact global, "From the beginning Acheson was convinced that the North Korean attack was part of a Soviet 'grand design'".¹⁴ Every major American base and embassy was warned, "Possible that Korea is only the first of series of coordinated actions on part of Soviets. Maintain utmost vigilance".¹⁵ The first report at the NSC meeting immediately after the attack surveyed Russia's global, not regional, military preparation.¹⁶ Growing global scrutiny to communist opportunities increased resources, which in turn fuelled an even more ambitious global scrutiny. NSC-68, Acheson's *objet d'art* before June 1950, gained currency just as Acheson's influence declined.¹⁷ NSC 68/4 demanded US\$140bn for national security in 1951 and 1952 for a programme that was evidently global given that Washington expected the Korean War to last only a few months.¹⁸

With greater global anti-communist cognition, America's anti-communist engagement intensified. National security goals in NSC 114/2 reflected a renaissance in strengthening global anti-communist positions.¹⁹ Acheson abruptly accepted German troop participation in Europe's defence and pushed NATO members to rearm.²⁰ He also rammed through the Japanese treaty over the JCS's objections and anti-Japanese wartime sentiment.²¹ For peripheral areas, Congress passed the Mutual Security Act in 1951, stipulating that American foreign aid could only be directed to, "strengthen the free world in its resistance to Communism." East Asia was suddenly prioritised. Acheson, the Anglophile, concluded that US forces could not be withdrawn from Korea, not even strangely enough for a European emergency.²²

Pakistan and the Middle East

With policy's post-Korean militarisation, the bipolarisation and protection of anti-communist identity narrative and the globalisation of the anti-communist grid of intelligibility was manifested in the Middle East. Washington feared a Russian attack on the Middle East with Korea used as a mere distraction.²³ Truman instinctively felt that Iran would be overrun.²⁴ McGhee added that, "a re-evaluation of our Middle East plans is called for in the light of the US program for increased military stature and preparedness."²⁵ Washington exhaustively analysed Russia's options in the Middle East, and the implications for the Middle East in the event of global war.²⁶ Having deprioritised the Middle East in early 1950, the JCS changed their position in October – aware that if Russia invaded, "Israeli and Arab Armed Forces would be incapable of defending their countries even with the aid of Western Forces presently in the area."²⁷ Hence, the conclusion, "affirmative United States action is required to safeguard our vital security interests in the Middle East".²⁸ With greater anti-communist categorisation and discourse, the Middle East's representation grew from oil and military strategy, to also protecting Greece, Turkey and Iran (the 'GTI investment'), as a signal to the third world, and even as an African gateway.²⁹

America's rendezvous with the Middle East continued to contrast with Washington's regional detailed unfamiliarity – reflected in America's cognitive flux of the Middle East. Despite America's vigorous attempt to categorise the Middle East within the anti-communist narrative, which in 1952 alone was reflected by at least eight analysis papers and nine major conferences, Washington failed to congregate on a single

defined strategy to the Middle East.³⁰ This partially reflected America's continued lack of access to the region. London and especially Washington still wanted to maintain British responsibility for the Middle East, for which America had no intention to make, "any military sacrifice".³¹ In October 1950, Army Chief of Staff General Collins reminded London,

"The US Chiefs consider that Middle East is a British responsibility in case of a hot war, at least during the first two years of such a war ... our activity and interest in the area during the Cold war period should not give rise to any misunderstanding on this"³²

In any case, Washington was distracted by Korea and the military pushed to focus exclusively on Korea, Indochina and NATO. Collins explained, "We are kidding ourselves and kidding them (Arabs) if we do anything which indicates we are going to put forces in that area. The forces to do that are just not in sight."³³ The Defense Department in particular was reluctant to go beyond limited advisory, sales and training programmes to the Middle East.³⁴ The Cairo Conference of fifty-one American diplomats in March 1950 reaffirmed the 1949 Istanbul Conference's decision to discourage, "any Near Eastern regional defense pact."³⁵ Washington declined various requests for a regional pact, "the creation of a regional arrangement, pure and simple, of the Near Eastern countries offers no solution".³⁶ Even Turkey, a lynchpin given its airfields, its role in containing Russian submarines to the Black Sea and its strategic position, had its requests for formal structure shelved again.³⁷

Meanwhile and initially, with Washington stunned by Korea, there was little immediate change in cognition and engagement of Pakistan. As the application of anti-communist narrative and the need to protect narrative mounted, America's categorisation and engagement of Pakistan within the anti-communist narrative increased. The growing anti-communism prior to the Korean war was already lending to this trend. America's cognition of South Asia increased, leading McGhee to advocate a US\$200m aid package for South Asia, "India, Pakistan and Afghanistan constitute the only countries on the borders of the USSR and its satellites for which there is no programme of United States economic assistance."³⁸ Undersecretary James Webb strongly supported McGhee while Nitze added, "the need is stronger than the memorandum indicates".³⁹

However after, "the crisis in Korea, ... our policy had become somewhat more positive and we have taken an increased interest in their (countries of South Asia) military strength".⁴⁰ A bipolar anti-communist narrative encased South Asia for the anti-communist narrative, the struggle of the USSR and the free world was transferred to Asia. Washington was not only concerned about a direct Russian onslaught but also feared, "the Chinese Communists might move next in extended aggression to the South Asia areas."⁴¹ By January 1951, the threat to America's anti-communist narrative had inspired Washington to readjust its position for the subcontinent, "the time has come to pursue our objectives in South Asia with more vigor."⁴² Training programmes for South Asian languages were expanded, area specialists for South Asia were recruited or retrained, foreign observations bases increased, and Pakistan and India were regularly dropped into official speeches. Intelligence analysts were given further resources to scrutinise South Asia for communism more closely while

military officers from South Asia were offered training programmes in America to nurture pro-Western sympathies.⁴³

Meanwhile, Pakistan continued its anti-communist façade by for instance supporting America's Korean War analysis as a Russian invasion, even though it refused Capitol Hill's request for troops for the UN, on the pretext of its own security against India.⁴⁴ i With Washington attaching meaning to Pakistan within the anti-communist narrative as an ally, a sustainer of narrative, and Washington's concerns about the Middle East, the fashion before the Korean War of placing Pakistan in the Middle East and separate from India, hastened in late 1950,

“We had no confidence in the effectiveness of Egypt's influence, and, looking elsewhere for leadership, we were bound to think of Pakistan, which was the most progressive and capable of the Muslim countries”.⁴⁵

The State Department policy paper noted that Pakistan,

“has signed treaties of friendship with Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Syria, and sponsored conferences for Muslim countries, i.e. the World Muslim Conference, and the Islamic Economic Conference. Pakistan cemented its ties of friendship with Iran in 1950 by entertaining the Shah. Its stature among Muslim countries has grown. In the light of Pakistan's present orientation to the West, and its active cooperation with the countries of the

ⁱ Liaquat Ali Khan had no interest in the Korean war and was in any event annoyed with the UN for its passivity in Kashmir

Middle East, we should encourage its participation in problems common to the Middle East”.⁴⁶

Foggy Bottom and Whitehall agreed that Pakistan was one of the most capable countries to protect the region from Russia.⁴⁷ The Economist described Pakistan as, “the strongest and most stable Muslim state.”⁴⁸ The State Department noted in July 1951, “Pakistan has the military manpower which could assist Near East countries in blocking Russian aggression”.⁴⁹ Pakistan became a nucleus in Washington’s defence of the Middle East, “With Pakistan, the Middle East could be defended. Without Pakistan, I don’t see any way to defend the Middle East.”⁵⁰ Warren suggested that the US ask, “Liaquat what practical assistance he needs to reinforce his mil and industrial posture to assist in defense of Middle East”.⁵¹ While Washington took comfort from Pakistan’s Islamic God fearing faith, McGhee even wanted Pakistan to pro-actively stabilise the region by resolving the Palestinian problem.⁵² The JCS, excitedly drunk by Pakistan’s potential troop contribution, enjoyed delusions that Pakistan, “is proposing to adopt the Arab language”.⁵³

Forty American policy officials focusing on South Asia assembled in February 1951 reached two major conclusions - to encourage regional economic development and “recognition of the potential military importance of Pakistan with respect to the defense of South Asia and the Middle East.”⁵⁴ The conference recommended that America, “bring about an early build-up of Pakistani ground forces assisted by the provision of military equipment to Pakistan.”⁵⁵ In February 1951, another conference, the Conference of Middle Eastern Chiefs of Mission at Istanbul noted the potential benefits of Pakistan’s involvement in the Middle East, which, “presents possibilities

from the economic, social and political viewpoints, as well as from the point of view of regional security, which should be encouraged.”⁵⁶

Having attached meaning to Pakistan as anti-communist ally in the Middle East, Washington’s engagement of Pakistan expedited with the West’s worsening situation in the region throughout 1951, by the end of which the governments and peoples of Turkey, Iran, Greece, Saudi, Syria and Egypt detested the British.⁵⁷ In November 1950, with anti-American sentiment and anti-British riots as background, Cairo again demanded Britain’s immediate evacuation from Egypt and Sudan.⁵⁸ Washington worried about the Arab redirection in the Cold War,

“the United Nations resolution condemning Communist China as an aggressor in Korea, shows that only Lebanon, Israel and Iraq supported the resolution, with Syria, Egypt, Yemen and Saudi abstaining.”⁵⁹

Acheson, McGhee and Nitze were especially perturbed that neutralism’s associating with indigenous communism.⁶⁰ Acheson especially feared a communist coup in Iran after it concluded a trade agreement with Russia in November 1950, and blocked Voice of America broadcasts.

America initially planned its anti-communist engagement of Pakistan in the Middle East through the Northern Tier, a concept that gained currency in 1951. Before June 1950, America had considered as its primary defence of the Middle East, amongst other options, encouraging a Northern Tier of Greece, Turkey and Iran.⁶¹ Acheson’s ‘outer ring’ in 1950 and Olaf Caroe’s ‘Northern Screen’ in 1951 had articulated

precisely this concept.⁶² One advantage of it was that it avoided Arab-Israeli crosscurrents including the growing American Jewish lobby in Congress, since neither the Arabs nor Jews were directly involved. It also avoided using Western troops, which Congress and the Pentagon especially objected to.⁶³ Consequently, after June 1950, as America intensified its anti-communist focus on the Middle East and the Middle East itself slid further into anti-Westernism, Washington initially gravitated towards the Northern Tier as the Middle East's optimal anti-communist defence.

Pakistan's anti-communist credentials ensured its prominence during these early ruminations. A conference of US officials in February 1951 at Istanbul concluded that Pakistan should be encouraged to defend Iran and that, "Turkey and Pakistan should be encouraged to form an axis of cooperation on Middle Eastern matters".⁶⁴ In Washington, McGhee supported this conclusion, as did General Omar Bradley, the JCS chairman, who wanted Pakistan armed as Turkey was.⁶⁵ In March 1951, Truman asked Congress for US\$415m of military aid for the GTI states, of which Greece and Turkey had just joined NATO, and all of which might form the Northern Tier.⁶⁶ In April, McGhee raised Pakistan's inclusion in the Northern Tier, "The contribution that Pakistan could make was obvious and would probably be the decisive factor in ensuring defense of the area."⁶⁷ The following month, America initiated discussions with Britain for what became known as the Middle East Command ('MEC' or 'MECOM'). Though this diverged from the Northern Tier, in that Britain inserted Egypt as the lynchpin, it continued to reflect America's categorisation of Pakistan as an anti-communist state in the Middle East. Pakistan, without being aware of it, was mentioned in the opening meetings.⁶⁸ The MEC was initially envisaged as a Western-

dominated Middle Eastern planning and coordinating organisation without permanent forces in which American, British and French officers would lead non-permanent Turkish, Pakistani and Egyptian troops.⁶⁹

Dispute Settlement Revisited

The intensified internalisation and protection of anti-communist identity and the spread of the anti-communist narrative arena, gave a new dimension to America's treatment of Pakistan's conflicts. In January 1950, the NSC's Statement of Policy on South Asia had barely mentioned any conflict resolution goals for American policy.⁷⁰ However, in the aftermath of Korea, one American official in discussing the Kashmir conflict, advised his British counterparts, "The pressure of the world crisis no longer left us with the time to work out a gradual solution".⁷¹ The revival of America's conflict resolution interest in Pakistan had specifically two aspects that were crystallised in a revealing analysis by a State Department official in September 1951,

"military conflict would afford to USSR choice of volunteering to assist India in a movement to secure Asia for the Asiatics or could support Pak, thereby rallying loyalty of Muslim world."⁷²

The first aspect, which did not involve Afghanistan, was to complete America's detachment of Pakistan from South Asia, meaning India, and thereby allow America to freely give expression to its ongoing anti-communist cognition of Pakistan by engaging Karachi in the Middle East. Acheson's impatience over Kashmir paralleled America's cognitive placement of Pakistan within the anti-communist narrative and

geographic location in the Middle East – preceding the mildest Russian interest in Kashmir itself by more than a year. There were various facets to this detachment. Washington recognised the sensitivities of both India and Pakistan to each other. Analysts were aware that Pakistan was, “willing to make a significant contribution to the defense of the Middle East provided its fear of Indian attack can be removed.”⁷³ Hence, one facet was Pakistan’s unwillingness to partake wholeheartedly in America’s anti-communist engagement without protection. Another facet was that Americans also recognised that an Indo-Pakistan war would interrupt any American engagement of Pakistan in the Middle East’s defence.⁷⁴

Resolving the Kashmir dispute was not the only mechanism considered to effect Pakistan’s detachment from the South Asia for alternative mechanisms were assessed. In February 1951, a large gathering of American officials with responsibilities in South Asian policy recommended that consideration be given towards offering military reassurances to Pakistan in the event of Indian attack.⁷⁵ Another mechanism consisted of offering a collective security programme to Nehru, which would emerge still-born in the atmosphere of Indian independence, thus releasing Washington to engage Pakistan in the Middle East. Both were rejected – the former for the *carte blanche* nature of the commitment that Karachi could and probably would easily exploit; the latter for Nehru’s likely livid reaction.⁷⁶

The second aspect of America’s conflict resolution interest viz Pakistan originated with the intensified application of anti-communist categorisation and discourse for Kashmir and Pushtunistan, and as such involved both India and Afghanistan. As was the case before June 1950, America remained unconcerned about a communist

military invasion of either India or Pakistan during the Korean War.⁷⁷ However, by November 1950 and treating South Asia more acutely within the anti-communist narrative, American officials expressed concern that Indo-Pakistan tensions, “creates situation favourable Soviet intrigues and subversion”.⁷⁸ Washington felt that the Kashmir conflict limited Pakistan’s, “ability to carry forward economic development programs” resulting in, “fruitful soil for Communist doctrines”.⁷⁹ The Kashmir, “settlement seemed to be one of prerequisites for restoration normal political and economic conditions in SA.”⁸⁰ Washington feared that war over Kashmir would create regional disorder, which would foster communist growth in India, probably with Chinese assistance which,

“might open the way for a Communist seizure of power in parts or all of India. In addition, war would have a serious adverse effect on US relations with both countries, and would probably deprive the US of potential air bases in Pakistan and of important raw materials from India.”⁸¹

Consequently, Washington’s policy to Pakistan in 1950 and 1951 continued the trend of the first Truman administration and was dominated by efforts to resolve Pakistan’s tensions with India, and to a lesser extent with Afghanistan – neither of which neared settlement. Having ignored the Pushtunistan dispute throughout the first Truman administration, Washington suddenly took interest in it in November 1950. In spite of being overwhelmed with Korea, Acheson unexpectedly offered to act as ‘go-between’ between Afghanistan and Pakistan, notwithstanding his disinterest and ignorance in the conflict’s specifics.

However, America's major conflict resolution focus in South Asia remained on Kashmir, given its impending Pakistan's transition from South Asia to the Middle East, and its perception in Washington as South Asia's greatest communist vulnerability. Before June 1950, the Kashmir talks had ground to a halt after India refused to implement the UN resolutions of January 1949. Despite various UN effort, including mediation by Security Council President, General McNaughton, in December 1949 and by the Australian diplomat, Owen Dixon, in July 1950, there was no progress on either the demilitarisation or plebiscite. This lack of progress, accompanied by an Indo-Pakistan trade boycott as background, caused immense frustration to America.⁸² In January 1950, Acheson appealed for McNaughton's powers to be expanded by the UN and for the UN to pressure India to abide by the resolutions.⁸³ One American official, reflecting this aggravation, bluntly demanded from his British counterpart, "positive action now".⁸⁴

After Korea's initial distraction, the deepening anti-communist identity narrative and its search for potential communist sources acutely focused Washington on Kashmir more intensely than ever before. From late 1950, Acheson encouraged raising further the tempo of the UN's efforts by trying to resuscitate the Kashmir talks.⁸⁵ Meanwhile, and in chorus, he also threatened India by announcing that he would take all outstanding irresolvable matters to the Security Council, and in the process prickling Nehru's independence sensitivities.⁸⁶ The Ceylon Conference of American officials in February 1951 recommended exactly this.⁸⁷ That month, a joint UK-US resolution adopted at the UN advocated using UN troops in demilitarised areas and referring any unresolved issues to arbitration. By April 1951, Acheson gave this idea further expression, wanting the UN to, "establish machinery work out detailed specific

recommendations for solution, and then adopt res containing such recommendations.”⁸⁸ That the conflict’s substance continued to remain inconsequential should be reiterated. Acheson hoped for a quick-fix partition of Kashmir and a plebiscite in the Vale and paid little attention to the Office of the Legal Adviser who noted Kashmir’s ongoing legal ambiguity given that the,

“execution of an Instrument of Accession by the Maharajah in October 1947, could not finally accomplish the accession of Kashmir to either Dominion, in view of the circumstances prevailing at that time.”⁸⁹

Frustrated Narratives

Real American narratives especially after Korea, specifically in the American mission and the American anti-communist meta-narrative, demanded Pakistan and India conform to specific meanings and engagements that would confirm America’s own portrayal and identity of itself and provide existential stability. Washington wanted to pacify Pakistan’s conflicts with its neighbours to detach Pakistan from India and stifle opportunity for communist growth. Ideally, it also wanted to engage Pakistan, having given it meaning and geographic location through the anti-communist narrative, within the Middle East as an anti-communist ally. Finally, Washington hoped that India would subscribe to America’s anti-communist and missionary narratives and assume its role in America’s future and romanticised story. During the two years after Korea, Washington achieved none of these aims, hence marking a period of extended frustration of identity narratives.

Pushtunistan and Kashmir: Dogged Endurance

Washington failed to resolve Pakistan's conflict in South Asia, therefore failing both to complete Pakistan's detachment from South Asia and to immunise the region from communism. Karachi rejected Acheson's offer to help resolve its dispute with Kabul by acting as go-between.⁹⁰ Paralleling Nehru's obstinacy in Kashmir, Pakistan demanded that before any dialogue, the Durand Line be re-affirmed as the legitimate border by Afghanistan or America. Though Washington privately supported Pakistan's claim, it would not publicly endorse it since this would nullify the dialogue.⁹¹ Pakistani diplomats referred to Afghans as "those blackmailers" and refused to even accept the existence of a problem with Kabul. After the subsequent failure in Acheson's conflict resolution attempt, he changed tactics in early 1951 to immunise the region from communism.⁹² Acheson resorted to Marshall's earlier anti-communist policy towards Hyderabad and Junagadh - conflict suppression, "there is a serious question whether keeping the Pushtoonistan issue alive would not harm Afghanistan by creating conditions leading to Soviet intervention."⁹³ Acheson pressed Afghanistan unsuccessfully to stifle the conflict, even after successfully co-opting Muslim states, which, keen on establishing the primacy of state above ethno-national tribe, were generally supportive of Pakistan and similarly pressed upon Kabul.⁹⁴

American attempts in Kashmir were similarly unsuccessful – the prime responsibility for which resided with Nehru. The joint UK-US resolution in February 1951, which Pakistan accepted, infuriated Nehru who, in not being consulted prior to the resolution's submission, felt Indian independence challenged.⁹⁵ Nehru repudiated the resolution, which also instructed a UNCIP representative to demilitarise Kashmir

within three months, failing which, to proceed to imposed arbitration.⁹⁶ Nehru therefore refused to accept the representative, Senator Frank Porter Graham, in such capacity.⁹⁷ Most observers expected Kashmir to elect to join Pakistan; the Indians were not about to hold a plebiscite, which they might lose. Washington's suspicions of Nehru's intentions dated to February 1948 when he insisted that the pro-Indian Abdullah remain in power during the plebiscite period and the UN's supervisory powers be restricted.⁹⁸ These suspicions grew with Indian delays in implementing the UNCIP resolutions in 1949 and Nehru's rejection of the truce on dubious technicalities that led to the resolutions' collapse. By September 1949, Washington and London were convinced that, "Nehru was incapable of a reasonable approach to the Kashmir problem."⁹⁹ For instance, McGhee and Hickerson blamed,

"the intransigent attitude of India which has been primarily responsible during the past year for holding up progress toward demilitarization of Kashmir and final settlement within the framework of UNCIP resolutions."¹⁰⁰

Nehru complicated matters in October 1950 by supporting the All-Jammu and Kashmir National Conference's resolution, which moved Kashmir closer to Indian ascension. Then, when the major hurdle on Kashmir in 1952, the proportion of troops on either side of the ceasefire line after demilitarisation, was almost agreed in March 1952, India almost scuttled the progress by demanding unusually high force levels. Graham, unable to secure India and Pakistan's agreement on a plebiscite administrator in April 1952, then received Pakistan's concession of a four-to-one troop ratio after demilitarisation in exchange for immediate progress towards the tasks of the

Plebiscite Administrator, which was again rejected. India's rejections throughout the summer of 1952 led to America's exasperation while Nehru enjoyed sweet revenge, given the prevalent feeling in India that American pressure in Kashmir was a function of New Delhi's independence in the Korean war.¹⁰¹

An array of observers blamed Nehru for obstructing a resolution. The Brazilian delegate at the UN, Ouro-Preto, noted it was, "as plain as nose on your face" that India was blocking the Kashmir reconciliation.¹⁰² Attlee and Australia's Robert Menzies blamed the failure of the informal January 1951 Commonwealth talks on Kashmir on Nehru.¹⁰³ Nehru refused to reduce India's troops in Kashmir before a plebiscite as per Dixon's suggestion, yet, "Dixon could not support Nehru's fear of attack from Pakistan."¹⁰⁴ Nehru rejected a joint Burmese-Indonesian offer and an Australian offer to help resolve Kashmir.¹⁰⁵ Canada blamed India too.¹⁰⁶ Even the Indian military privately suggested they would agree a settlement if allowed to by Nehru since, "in spite of the official line of the Indian political leaders, the military officials are very concerned about the Communist threat".¹⁰⁷ By the end of 1951, one Australian minister commented that, "Mountbatten was the only one left in London who favoured India."¹⁰⁸

In fact, Nehru was unprepared to allow Kashmir to leave the young and heterogeneous union, and was aggressively trying to avoid demilitarisation.¹⁰⁹ Gradual realisation of this annoyed Acheson immensely, for the India position,

“may well be interpreted as meaning that while GOI does not intend follow through its commitment under UNCIP resolutions, in order not to take onus for scrapping them, it prepared to talk around them indefinitely.”¹¹⁰

New Delhi, through a naïve American ambassador in Chester Bowles, actually wanted Washington to propose alternative solutions on Kashmir. Convinced that the Indians were trying to avoid a plebiscite and furious at Bowles for not seeing it, Hickerson of the State Department, reflecting Washington’s deep anger with India, noted that Nehru wanted Graham to say to Pakistan,

“Let’s forget my demilitarisation program which the Security Council directed me to work out, and let’s forget two UNCIP resolutions to which you and the Indians agreed and upon which the Security Council long ago put its blessing. I have got an idea for partitioning the state and for a plebiscite in the Valley, and I hope you and the Indians will agree to it. If you don’t agree, I’ll not only have to report that I can’t get agreement on my demilitarisation program but also that you would not agree to my alternative proposal.”¹¹¹

Anger with India on Kashmir reached boiling point in May 1952,

“If India is sincere in its expressions of a wish for a settlement via partition, it must in the nature of things come forward with some sort of specific proposals. The pressure is on India because of its own record, and

has been for some years now, to give some convincing evidence of a genuine intention to do its part in settling this dispute.”¹¹²

In contrast to the Indian position, Graham reported, “Pak auths were prepared consider nearly any measure necessary to solve Kashmir question subject only to non-jeopardy Pak security”.¹¹³ Likewise, Acheson noted, “Pakistan has proved more cooperative than India.”¹¹⁴ The McNaughton report in February 1950 was accepted by Pakistan and rejected by India. In August 1950, Pakistan overcame sizeable political obstacles and accepted Nehru’s earlier proposals in June, which Nehru then himself bizarrely rejected. In September 1951, Graham was, “pleased with Pak attitude on demilitarization of Azad Kashmir.”¹¹⁵ Eight months later, Acheson noted the, “GOP has accepted all 12 proposals...Paks over three year period have consistently agreed to various UN suggestions for settlement”.¹¹⁶ Pakistan was willing to accept an independent arbitration on the truce stalemate by the Plebiscite Administrator designate but when Truman wrote to both prime ministers urging agreement to the commissioner’s suggestion, Nehru rejected it.

Despite the frustration with India and satisfaction with Pakistan, and America’s locating Pakistan within anti-communism in the Middle East, Washington did not consider publicly supporting Pakistan on Kashmir. Neither the anti-communist narrative nor Pakistan’s cognitive placement in the Middle East could support such partiality. The former gave meaning to Pakistan as an anti-communist, not as an anti-Indian state and with respect to the latter, India hardly ever featured in the Middle East. Therefore, when Liaquat asked that since Pakistan’s potentially providing troops for Korea would constitute an irrevocable tie to the West, would America then

commit itself to Pakistan in Kashmir, Acheson responded that if Pakistan troops meant India's alienation, then his answer was no.¹¹⁷ Similarly, in February 1952, Washington reiterated to the embassy in India, "Primary US consideration is maintenance strictest neutrality as between India and Pakistan".¹¹⁸

Pakistan and the Middle East II

America's second narrative frustration originated in Pakistan's two-staged removal, abetted by failure on the Kashmir talks, from America's preferred engagement of Pakistan within the Middle East. Indo-Pakistan relations deteriorated throughout early 1951 so much so that by July, the two countries stood off on the Punjab border. Washington was alarmed by India's ninety thousand troops positioned a few miles from forty-six thousand Pakistani troops.¹¹⁹ The high tension hauled Washington back into focusing on Indo-Pakistan relations after it had retracted from Kashmir since the failure of the UN resolution of February, and also into geographically re-locating Pakistan in South Asia. Washington, acutely aware of Pakistan's association with India throughout July and August, sought to ease tensions. Indeed, the Indo-Pak tension was sufficiently important to compel the commissioning of a full and resource intensive National Intelligence Estimate in September.¹²⁰

Consequently, America's anti-communist engagement of Pakistan in the Middle East, delicate and inadequately rooted given Washington's relative unfamiliarity with both Pakistan and the Middle East, the latter reflected in the continual policy assessment, suddenly halted. Pakistan, re-located into South Asia, was totally removed in the autumn of 1951 from America's Middle East defence plans, drawing General Bradley

to wonder, "I don't know how far we could get with Pakistan until the Kashmir problem has been solved. If we give military aid we will find ourselves in trouble with India."¹²¹ Bradley's thoughts were shared by a National Intelligence Estimate in September which suggested that in the event of war with India, "Militarily, war would almost certainly remove any early prospect of Pakistan's joining in plans for defense of the Middle East against a Communist attack".¹²²

However, despite this disengagement, America's denotation of Pakistan as an anti-communist state in the Middle East did not alter. Instead, Kashmir, more than a thousand miles away from any (conventional) Middle East state, became a Middle East problem for its implications for Pakistan's detachment from South Asia, and featured as the central issue in a paper titled, 'Alignment of US-UK Policies in the Middle East'.¹²³ As a result, resolving the Kashmir issue was prioritised further still and Acheson immediately intensified the search for a solution. In August, he asked America's UN representative to scan the UN for alternative ideas and lateral thinking to resolve the impasse.¹²⁴ Notwithstanding the British responsibility, eleven days later, he contemplated a "shot-gun" approach to Kashmir.¹²⁵ Acheson even invited Asian states unilaterally *without consulting* Washington to, "make independent and apparently spontaneous approaches to the parties" and, "to take a fresh look at what might bring about agreement between the two parties."¹²⁶ Weeks later, he urged Graham to persist in his negotiations and raised the issue of granting to him greater resolution powers.¹²⁷

Against this milieu, Graham's definitive solution in September to the UN magnetised Washington's attention.¹²⁸ Graham produced a twelve-point proposal for

demilitarisation to which he added a thirteenth point, which called for arbitration on further disputes.¹²⁹ Written in Geneva, to help preserve his impartiality, the proposal initially placed a ninety-day deadline for absolute demilitarisation and for a plebiscite administrator to be appointed immediately thereafter.¹³⁰ Weeks later, Graham revised the plan to allow Pakistan four thousand civil police on its side and for India to have eight thousand military troops on its side.¹³¹ Though Graham submitted his report to the UN in October and was instructed to resume his negotiations, his efforts proved by the year-end to be inconclusive.¹³²

Despite this failure, Washington maintained pressure towards a resolution into 1952. In America, the anti-communist identity narrative continued to polarise and be internalised, while its application on Kashmir and South Asia gained definition. Russia's first participation in Kashmir, in Yakov Aleksandrovich Malik's February 1952 speech in the Security Council against Graham's plebiscite offer, and in favour of Kashmir's constituent assembly deciding Kashmir's ascension, gave Acheson considerable anxiety.¹³³ Washington felt that, "Sovs and commies are intensifying their activities in and on borders of subcontinent".¹³⁴ As a result, the US increased its observer presence in the UN Military Observer Group in India-Pakistan in February 1952.¹³⁵ Further, as the CIA raised the possibility of an Indo-Pakistan war, Truman and Acheson continued their strong support for Graham's effort.¹³⁶ When talks stalemated, American pressure increased notably,

"we consider it of the greatest importance that Dr Graham continue in the Kashmir case...Failure to settle the dispute during the next few months

may well lead to hostilities in the subcontinent which would ultimately benefit no one but the Communist bloc.”¹³⁷

While America temporarily relocated Pakistan into South Asia, albeit simultaneous to its location in the Middle East, and shelved it from its Middle East plans, American concerns in the Middle East deepened. In March 1951, Tehran followed Cairo and officially demanded Britain's immediate withdrawal.¹³⁸ The Majlis nationalised the AIOC and chose nationalist Mohammed Musaddiq for prime minister. London, furious, plotted his overthrow, hatched numerous covert operations and considered an invasion.¹³⁹ In September, Iran seized the Abadan complex and military confrontation seemed imminent.¹⁴⁰ Iran's daily 660,000 oil barrels constituted one-third of the Middle East's oil output, making Iran the main supplier of aviation gas and oil to American and British regional air forces.¹⁴¹ Washington feared Iran becoming communist given its poor harvests and financial corruption and rumours abounded that Moscow was preparing its own solution to the Anglo-Iranian clash.¹⁴² Besides the persisting British disputes with Egypt and Iran, even Iraqi popular sentiment demanded Britain's evacuation from Iraq.

With this anxiety, America raised its involvement for as Acheson noted, the Middle East was explosive and in prime condition for Russia to exploit.¹⁴³ Even though Acheson generally disliked developing countries controlling their own resources, he pushed Britain for concessions in Iran.¹⁴⁴ McGhee eventually secured some concessions, as well as American loans and aid to Iran.¹⁴⁵ Averell Harriman spent several weeks on shuttle diplomacy from July between Tehran and London, though Britain's offer to share profits equally yet maintain control of oil production and

marketing was rejected and the talks collapsed in August.¹⁴⁶ As with Tito however, Washington underestimated nationalism and overestimated communism for Musaddiq had no communist affinity. Nor had Russia the capacity or intent to purchase and transport Iranian oil.¹⁴⁷ “British intransigence, not revolutionary nationalism or aggressive Soviet probing, endangered access to Persian Gulf oil.”¹⁴⁸

The MEC, as an instrument to arrest the West’s precarious Middle East position, assumed fresh importance and urgency. The immediate hope was that it would enable the transfer of Suez to a British MEC chief, in return for which, Egypt, after having joined the MEC, would achieve Britain’s exit from Suez and receive military aid.¹⁴⁹ The Pentagon’s treatment of the MEC as an exclusively military structure was hence lacking.¹⁵⁰ The immediate MEC agenda was, as Acheson recognised, a solution to the Anglo-Egyptian political dispute.¹⁵¹ A State Department paper noted that the MEC addressed,

“more a political problem than a military one and the United States seeks through the Middle East Command to gain active cooperation with the West in the defense of the Middle East on a cooperative basis.”¹⁵²

Washington’s cognition of Pakistan as primarily a Middle East country had not changed during this, the MEC’s planning stage, when Pakistan was also re-absorbed into South Asia, thus making Pakistan a state of two regions. For instance, in August 1951, McGhee pro-actively encouraged Ghulam Mohammed’s work towards Islamic economic co-operation.¹⁵³ Nor had Pakistan’s location within the anti-communist

narrative altered, which was reflected in the administration, Congress and the US press's support of Pakistan.¹⁵⁴

Given Britain's desire to arrest its regional decline through the MEC, which required American participation for credibility and resources, London and before Pakistan's border tension, at first worked with America's cognition of Pakistan in the Middle East and thus accepted Pakistan's inclusion in the MEC. Indeed, London so desperately relied on the MEC to arrest its regional decline, that it even traded supporting Turkey's inclusion into NATO for Turkey's agreement to participate in the MEC, a deal that infuriated Foggy Bottom.¹⁵⁵

However, critically for policy to Pakistan, London neither viewed Pakistan through the anti-communist narrative nor felt compelled to engage it within the Middle East. Britain only accommodated to America's view of Pakistan as a Middle East asset to seduce American support for the MEC since London could not separate Pakistan from India as Washington had, being more sensitive to Pakistan and India's perceived realities – in which each side gravitated the other's framework.¹⁵⁶ For instance, in April 1951, the British Joint Services Mission wanted Pakistan *and* India to defend the Iraqi-Persian line.¹⁵⁷ Britain was also more aware of the intensity of India's reaction to any such engagement and cautioned Washington about isolating India by offering security and aid to Pakistan.¹⁵⁸ Finally, Britain also better appreciated Pakistan's distance from the Middle East. London not only feared that Egypt, Turkey and Iran might resent a Pakistani attempt at regional leadership but was also sceptical as to whether Pakistan could provide leadership to the Muslim world given the ethnic, cultural and lingual barriers between it and the Arabs.¹⁵⁹

When America suspended engaging Pakistan in the Middle East due to the border tensions, and relocated it simultaneously in the Middle East and South Asia, London's domination of the MEC's development squeezed Pakistan from the Anglo-American Middle East strategy. After the Indo-Pakistan border tensions subsided by October 1951 and Pakistan emerged out of South Asia, the Pentagon and Truman sought to re-engage Pakistan in the Middle East by re-introducing Pakistan to the MEC. However, with Britain in control of the MEC and planning at an advanced stage, London rejected America's suggestion to accordingly re-engage Pakistan, and instead offered introducing Pakistan to the MEC for a later undefined date.¹⁶⁰ Washington had no intention of questioning Britain for America, "continues believe UK shld bear major responsibility" for both the Middle East and South Asia.¹⁶¹ Therefore, the first MEC list of participants in October 1951, which included America, France, Britain, Turkey, New Zealand, South Africa, Australia and Egypt, did not even mention Pakistan as an associate member. Indeed, Pakistan was not mentioned in the MEC throughout the final quarter of 1951 and the NSC's year-end report about Middle East strategy, anchored as it was by the MEC, similarly made no mention of Pakistan.¹⁶²

Pakistani leaders, desperate for aid and Western security, made several overtures to be included in the Middle East discussions. Until Liaquat Ali Khan's mysterious assassination in October 1951, Pakistan had demanded American weapons and a commitment on Kashmir in return for Pakistan joining a Western backed Middle East organisation.¹⁶³ After Liaquat, Pakistan's policy changed. Former foreign secretary Ikramullah's discussions with McGhee days after Liaquat's death revealed that Pakistan no longer made contingent its joining a pro-Western alliance upon American

support for Pakistan against India.¹⁶⁴ Similarly, Zafrullah Khan's conversation with Acheson the following month unusually made no mention of Kashmir.¹⁶⁵ In fact, Ikramullah actually marketed Pakistan to America, "Pakistan was interested in the defense of the Middle East ... it was so natural that the concept would not require 'selling' to the Pakistanis".¹⁶⁶ Karachi's anger with its removal from the MEC, meaning not receiving aid, consequently ran deep,

"the time was past for words, Pakistan wanted action...you must make up your mind about Pakistan.... If Pakistan does not get assistance from the West, the Government's position will be grave. Pakistan may turn away from the West".¹⁶⁷

India and Asia

While America failed to eliminate South Asia's conflicts and was denied an anti-communist engagement of Pakistan in the Middle East, the final American narrative frustration stemmed from India's refusal to conform to its place in both the missionary and polarised anti-communist narrative categorisations and discourses. Initially, as the Korean War broke out, Washington was relieved with Indian policy, which supported the early America position on Korea, including the Security Council's resolution on 25th June, "The Indians were becoming more and more realistic about Asian developments".¹⁶⁸ As a result, during the war's early weeks, Nehru received extensive praise in the American press.¹⁶⁹ Acheson, encouraged by Nehru's maturing support for America, even wanted to develop a forum for greater independent Asian involvement in Korea.¹⁷⁰ One State department official noted,

“The countries of South Asia now realize more clearly the aggressive intentions of Communist dominated governments...India and Pakistan, in particular, now see their own differences in better perspective.”¹⁷¹

But such hopes about India proved fallacious. Henderson rejected Acheson’s suggestions for an Asian involvement knowing full well Nehru’s commitment to independence and India’s to anti-Americanism.¹⁷² Nehru, whose views on foreign policy stood unchallenged especially after Patel’s death, saw Korea as a civil matter, at tangent to the interpretation from the anti-communist discourse. His proposal in July 1950 offered a Security Council seat to Mao’s China, at tangent to the missionary and anti-communist narratives, a cease-fire and a North Korean troop withdrawal. Acheson described such interventions as, “a terrible headache” and dismissed the initiatives as frivolous peace mongering.¹⁷³ That the American ambassador, the maverick Bowles, encouraged Nehru was however not apparent to Washington,

“Since no word of approval or disagreement came from Washington in response to my report of conversation, I urged Nehru a few days later to propose a new basis for a peaceful settlement among the UN, North Koreans and Chinese... This he did.”¹⁷⁴

Instead, Acheson was furious at seeing the pro-communist Defence Minister Krishna Menon’s hand underlying Indian intervention.¹⁷⁵ Though tensions with Nehru eased with MacArthur’s military success in the autumn of 1950, Nehru’s mediation severely antagonised Washington throughout the conflict.¹⁷⁶ He publicly requested

Washington to refrain from the thirty-eighth parallel and abstained in the UN resolution supporting Korea's reunification in October. When American forces crossed the thirty-eighth parallel with flippant talk of atomic bombs, Nehru was incensed and muted his criticism only due to India's food shortages. After China invaded Korea, Acheson wanted China brandished as an aggressor but an Indian effort to appoint a three-man group to determine the basis of the ceasefire and to make recommendations to the UNGA succeeded instead in December.¹⁷⁷ Most Asians viewed American involvement in Asia as imperialistic, and agreed with Nehru who,

“did not for a moment believe that Communist China had invaded Korea because it aggressive designs against that country. It had intervened in Korea, in his opinion, because it was convinced that the United States was intending to use Korea as a base for the subsequent invasion of China itself.”¹⁷⁸

Nor did Nehru share Washington's anti-communist analysis beyond Korea. In Indochina, Americans portrayed their dilemma as a choice, “to support the French in Indochina or face the extension of Communism over the remainder of the continental area of Southeast Asia and possible farther westward”.¹⁷⁹ In contrast, Nehru dismissed, “Indochina actions as not being clear evidence Chinese aggressiveness, explaining support Ho Chi-Minh forces had not yet involved any actual Chinese”.¹⁸⁰ Similarly, while the Senate ratified the Japanese Treaty in March 1952, Nehru rejected it because it kept America in Japan and did not recognise Beijing and even encouraged Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia to follow suit.¹⁸¹ Few areas were outside Nehru's remit, “it was an extremely dangerous thing for the Western powers to

furnish Western Germany with arms. Such action might well frighten Germany's neighbours to the East and kindle a war."¹⁸² Furthermore, Nehru's sensitivity to independence persisted so much so that in April 1951 he refused Washington from overseeing its own aid distribution in India, a standard requirement Congressional to ensure proper aid use.¹⁸³

Against a backdrop of Indian obstinacy in Kashmir and India's refusal to partake in America's narratives, American frustration with India grew, "India's attitude toward the United States position with respect to Japan is neither balanced nor objective."¹⁸⁴ Nehru was criticised by American officials for his naivety and immaturity, meaning his unwillingness to use the anti-communist categorisation and discourse. Given Nehru's profile in the third world, American officials were circumspect of criticising Nehru, and instead preferred to drip complaints to a compliant media. The Washington Post riled, "Never has Mr Nehru's neutralism shown such a bias, a bias in the Russian direction".¹⁸⁵ The Chicago Tribune titled an editorial, "Nehru, Battling for Stalin".¹⁸⁶ The New York Times attacked him as the, "voice of abnegation", while others called him the Hamlet of Asia.¹⁸⁷ Though India's Commonwealth ties, and especially Britain, endeared it to the West, the British High Commissioner in India noted in October 1950, "Indo-America public relations have reached a 'new low'".¹⁸⁸

While policymakers and Congress increasingly dismissed India as unworthy, Washington could not ignore the second largest country in Asia and thus risk the continued integrity of America's mission and anti-communism. The mere existence of a Chinese communist government, North Korea's invasion and Indochina's deterioration crystallised by the Vietminh offensive of September 1950, were each

categorised and attached meaning within American anti-communist and missionary cognition.¹⁸⁹ Since Americans assumed these events were directed by Moscow, it was America's anti-communist narrative above and beyond the missionary narrative that was most threatened, reasserted and thus privileged to understand India. Washington's policy options to India were consequently uncomfortably restricted by the possibility of India being re-categorised outside of the anti-communist narrative, as a communist anomaly. This threat had three interrelated principal sources - economic instability, indigenous Indian communism and direct Russian control.

America's fear for India's economic instability evolved in late 1950 and became particularly prominent in 1951.¹⁹⁰ In December 1950, India requested two million tons of grain, with the State Department noting, "The present threat of famine in India promises to create conditions ideally suited to the subversive activities of the Communist Party of India".¹⁹¹ The administration assessed the implications of giving aid exclusively within the anti-communist narrative.¹⁹² By mid-1951, intelligence assessments concluded that India's massive economic dissatisfaction left a reasonable chance that India would turn communist.¹⁹³ India's loss was a harrowing prospect for Asia. NSC 98/1, approved in January 1951, emphasised the potential politico-psychological damage more than the military, "The loss of India to the Communist orbit would mean that for all practical purposes all of Asia will have been lost".¹⁹⁴

In 1952, two political concerns complemented those derived from India's economy. Within India, the election in January gave sufficient material to both those optimistic and pessimistic about India. Congress, or more accurately Nehru, won 364 out of 420 seats.¹⁹⁵ However, this represented only forty-five percent of the national vote.

Socialists merged with the KMPP and Communists (5.1%) to take 21.5% of the vote. Communists emerged strong in Hyderabad, Madras, West Bengal and Travancore - the latter was especially worrying given it enjoyed India's highest literacy rate.¹⁹⁶ A study in October 1952, 'Consequences of Communist Control over South Asia', concluded, "Overt efforts of Communists to exploit their successes in the national elections in India left no doubt in the minds of government leaders as to Communist intentions".¹⁹⁷ Washington's second political concern was its perception of direct Russian control represented in Moscow's shifting attention to India.¹⁹⁸ Russian offers to supply industrial equipment, support India's position on Kashmir and further economic relations were carefully noted by America throughout 1951 and 1952.¹⁹⁹

Washington's inability to dismiss India, coupled with Nehru's determination to demonstrate Indian independence on a range of world issues, forced Washington to uncomfortably categorise and apply meaning to India outside of American bipolar anti-communism and missionary narratives. Given the post-Korea insecurity and bipolarisation of narratives, this was a difficult and reluctant process, and was clearly demonstrated as such in Truman's first discussion with Bowles after the latter was appointed ambassador to India in October 1951. Truman directed Bowles, "The first thing you've got to do is to find out if Nehru is a Communist. He sat right on that chair and he talked just like a Communist".²⁰⁰ Neutralism within the Cold War itself became a curiosity for Americans with many explanations offered. Nehru's personality was extensively studied, as for instance, it was by Graham who insisted that it was, "the single most important factor in any negotiations on the Kashmir dispute."²⁰¹

Resultantly, throughout 1951, while the embassy continued to press New Delhi to see the communist threat, Washington came to partial terms with Indian neutralism by opening space within anti-communist bipolarity. Intelligence estimates of India in mid-1951, separately supported by State Department officials, noted, “India can be expected to follow a policy of neutrality in the event of a third world”.²⁰² In August 1951, Foggy Bottom prepared a paper on ‘Means to Combat India’s Policy of Neutralism’.²⁰³ The CIA followed this with an extensive intelligence-wide analysis of ‘India’s position in the East – West Conflict’.²⁰⁴ Notwithstanding this recognition of neutralism, policymakers were still irritated with India for seeking to build a neutral third force, which scolded the West.²⁰⁵ This awkward cognition, made more difficult by a Congress and media that would not see beyond bipolarity, engendered a frustrating engagement of India. Subsequently, Washington’s confronting of Indian neutralism did not manifest beyond vague policy recommendations.

Despite the growing but uncomfortable acceptance of Indian neutralism, Washington also continued to persist in treating India simultaneously through anti-communism, even if reluctantly not its bipolar variant, yet nevertheless a cognition easier to translate to specific policy. In 1951, Washington and New Delhi entered an agreement on the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, enabling India to procure military hardware on a reimbursable basis and in 1952, America sold to India fifty-four C-119s for US\$48m and two hundred Sherman M4AF tanks for US\$19m.²⁰⁶ However, America’s major anti-communist engagement of India reflected America’s major anti-communist concern about India – its economy. Acheson, strongly supported by American officials, helped India’s economy to alleviate the prospect of indigenous communism developing. Two significant opportunities arose to accordingly engage

India within the anti-communist narrative.²⁰⁷ In late 1950, India had a food shortage after the summer's floods and a subsequent drought destroyed 2.6m tons of grain. Henderson forecast above a million deaths from famine.²⁰⁸ In November, India informally requested America for a million tons of grain either as gift or on credit. After Indian cabinet ministers pressed Nehru, Mrs Pandit advised that her brother was, "willing to accept" American aid providing it was unconditional. In December, she formally requested two million tons of grain, which even Henderson described as an absolute minimum need.²⁰⁹ Washington sited the problem within the anti-communist narrative, hoping to contain "Communist Imperialism".²¹⁰ With communist-inducing depravation on India's horizon, the administration requested Congress in February 1951 for two million tons of grain aid, a request for which Acheson gave operational priority and Truman lobbied vigorously.²¹¹

However, when the request was presented to Congress, despite rapid approval by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, legislative action stalled. Congress and the media could only understand India as a friend or enemy of communism, and refused to accept Nehru's place within the former so much so that Henderson was unsure if, "Congress would be willing approve dollar aid program of sufficient magnitude."²¹² Nehru's independent policy, magnified under the lens of Asian turbulence, did not reside within a bipolar anti-communist narrative. Many Congressmen were infuriated by India's veto of the UN resolution branding China an aggressor in Korea.²¹³ With the famine starting properly in April 1951, delays in turn angered independence-sensitive Indians into *threatening to retract their request*, news of which toughened Congress's mood.²¹⁴ Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, asked, "What are the Indians going to do for us?" Lodge added, "I just haven't got any faith at all that there is going to be

any gratitude or appreciation or anything else”.²¹⁵ Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, warned McGhee, “you are going to have one hell of a time getting this thing through Congress”.²¹⁶

In contrast, liberal activists, including civil rights leaders, whose conceptual flexibility extended beyond a bipolarised anti-communism, and many of whom were committed to placing India within the missionary narrative, lobbied Congress for aid. On 4th January 1951, the ‘American Emergency Food Committee for India’ was formed, whose influential members included Eleanor Roosevelt, Pearl Buck and Walter White, and was supported by many newspapers. Even The Washington Post, which had been a sharp critic of Nehru, insisted that, “Hunger and politics do not mix and any attempt to associate them would do this country incalculable harm in Asia”.²¹⁷

In April, the Senate offered the sale of million tons of grain and a grant of another million tons. However, Washington’s standard terms of grant aid required distribution supervision, which annoyed Nehru, as did Congressional discussion demanding that India export monazite sands to America. Nehru’s anger was reflected in his heated radio broadcast on 1st May 1951, which in turn led Congress to delay matters more.²¹⁸ Acheson recognised the damage being caused by this vicious circle especially after Russia offered to New Delhi a small but very well received aid package in March 1951. Finally in May, a desperate Nehru agreed terms with Congress for a US\$189.7m loan, less restrictive than a grant, and notably below Nehru and Truman’s request even if it enabled the first grain shipments to leave for India in August.²¹⁹

The entire event confirmed to Nehru his suspicions of America. Nehru found it humiliating, “to wait in this way for favours to be bestowed on us”.²²⁰ ii “Many Indians had become convinced that we wanted to take political advantage of their suffering”.²²¹ Russia in contrast had responded immediately, by sending 50,000 tons of wheat, being only 2.5% of the American contribution, and generated considerably more goodwill. Even before the grain left America, Nehru reasserted Indian independence by criticising the Japanese treaty. The Truman administration was in turn upset with India, especially furious with Nehru’s comments on the treaty, while McGhee, Grady and Bowles, supporters of aid to India, had their fingers burned.

The second opportunity to engage India within anti-communism arose in late 1952, and again demonstrated a similar tension between an Executive that reluctantly and partially accepted a neutral India, and a Congress that lived within severe bipolarity. The administration in Washington and Bowles wanted to increase long-term development aid to India and requested from Congress a minimum US\$115m for India for 1953.²²² In May 1952, an interdepartmental committee even recommended a further US\$125m since,

“The current political situation in India heavily underscores previous statements made by the Department regarding the interrelationship of economic development and political stability, the importance of India in the containment of communist aggression in Asia, and the need for early improvement of the Indian standard of living.”²²³

ⁱⁱ This was particularly upsetting for Indians given their customs of charity and gratitude (*‘Dana’*), in which the donor is *obliged* to give to the recipient, and the recipient *does not ask* from a donor.

Despite the extraordinary effort by Bowles to increase aid to India, further funds could not be obtained partly because of technical reasons of process and partly because of Congress's budget restraints and its continued bipolar anti-communist commitment to understanding India. Indeed, Congress actually reduced the aid to India from US\$115m to US\$77m in June and then in July to US\$34m.²²⁴ Nonetheless, this aid, unilaterally arranged and unconditional, did not infringe on Indian independence and which is why Nehru thus noted that, "aid from America has been given to us from the very best of motives and without strings of any kind. For this reason we welcome this assistance."²²⁵ By the eve of Eisenhower's election, sweetened by this aid allocation, American relations with India had improved considerably. The most important contributory factor to this improvement was however Chester Bowles.

Chester Bowles

The delicate nature of American-Indian relations demanded sensitive official touch, a tact and diplomacy rare amongst American ambassadors. Henderson's diplomatic touch was unusual even by this comparison, "Henderson detested Nehru and Nehru knew it."²²⁶ In October 1951, Chester Bowles, the New Dealer, replaced Henderson. More than any other American administration official in the twentieth century, except perhaps John Kennedy, Bowles crystallised America's categorisation of India within America's missionary narrative. A definition of 'ambassador' is, "a diplomatic minister of the highest order: a messenger or agent".²²⁷ The representation of one state to another is implicit in this. In the case of Bowles, he became simultaneously America's ambassador to New Delhi and New Delhi's de facto ambassador to

Washington, doing, “more than any other American to interpret America to India and India to America”.²²⁸ Such was his value to India’s representation that after Truman’s presidency, Madam Pandit took the unprecedented step to even lobby Eisenhower to retain Bowles as ambassador.²²⁹

Initially part of the America First Committee that opposed intervention in the war, Bowles was convinced that America’s future lay neither in Europe’s empires nor outside the American continent. He insisted that the American mission, represented by Roosevelt’s New Deal, needed to be fulfilled first in America.²³⁰ Bowles’s, “concern in the 1930s when he was a non-interventionist, the ‘America First’ period, was to keep the beacon alight here while the world went into darkness”.²³¹

After the war however, Bowles became deeply committed to continuing the American revolution outside of the continent through economic aid.²³² Indeed, he viewed aid as a moral obligation within America’s mission, its most outward and rewarding component.²³³ In this transformation, Bowles changed not his subscription of the mission but its narrative end,

“I am deeply convinced that the American Revolution, refreshed and strengthened and for the first time focussed on world affairs, can become a powerful political, social and economic force affecting the lives of every man, woman and child in the world.”²³⁴

“Bowles, with his eyes opened by India ... becomes a major proponent of the export of American benevolence to serve and save mankind.”²³⁵ If Thompson exaggerates

India's role in Bowles's transformation, it is only in that India itself did not induce that change, but acted as a catalyst to expedite Bowles's particular pre-existing narrative dynamics. Bowles, who had seldom expressed interest in India before 1951, demonstrated his conversion to exporting America's mission after China's revolution.²³⁶ In fact, it was this disruption of missionary narrative that compelled Bowles to intensely categorise India within the mission's future, leading to comparisons of not only India with the America of the early nineteenth century but also and repeatedly between India and China, "India stood in 1952 where China had stood in 1945".²³⁷ Bowles promoted India's as the next Frontier, as the next stage of America's self-affirmation. After his ambassadorial assignment, Bowles wrote,

"I believe that the heart of Asia and the key to her future lies in the billion or more peoples who live in the largely uncommitted nations.... The strategic, geographic and political centre of this area is India".²³⁸

Having thus categorised India, Bowles was determined to engage it as America's next missionary step and his enthusiasm with India blossomed. The Yale alumnus developed excellent relations with the Indian administration especially Nehru, and was the first American official to conduct a serious effort to understand Nehru's worldview. He travelled across the country, sent his children to an Indian school consisting of only twenty-five tents, an unprecedented choice for a Western diplomat, advised Indians on how to lobby in America, served *rotis*, *parathas* and *lasi* at the dinner table and conveyed the message that America cared about India. His 'Ambassador's Report', written in 1953, was less a recollection of his assignment and more a marketing to Americans of his cognition of India. The former marketing

consultant, ambitious enough to once consider himself a presidential candidate, intelligently used the dominant anti-communist cognition to sell his understanding of India within the mission to the American people,

“if democratic India ever fails, and if a Communist civil war ever breaks out there, the West would spend billions to save India from communism.. One would think that the time to aid India is now while she is saving herself, and while her chance for success is good.”²³⁹

Not only did Bowles ingeniously locate America’s mission within the anti-communist categorisation and discourse, but he reminded Americans of the origin of civilisation’s westward mission in the, “common ancestry of most of the European peoples and the Aryans of India is a well-established fact... the people of India are closer to us than are most of the peoples on the Asian and African continents.”²⁴⁰ Nehru’s neutralism thereby assumed a wholesome spirituality, “Hinduism's emphasis on the diversity of truth” in which,

“Buddha's voice and those of innumerable Hindu prophets also whisper in the ears of modern Indians that nothing is all good or all bad. In India's non-involvement in the Cold War and in her attitude towards the West and Russia, ancient themes are still at work”.²⁴¹

To this, Bowles imparted and marketed India’s perspective with the sort of political gravity explained in Pedersen’s ‘action theory’,

“when Nehru speaks on world issues, right or wrong, he expresses not only his own conviction but also the yearnings and the attitudes of the vast majority in free Asia and in Africa.... I am convinced that what Nehru says, most free Asians think.... We will have to come to terms with this Asian mind if we are to avoid adding dangerously to our already long series of failures in that part of the world.”²⁴²

Hence Bowles pursued an unremitting and extraordinary campaign throughout 1952 to secure aid for India. He demanded an aid package of US\$250m annually, not to induce India into the West, but as a somewhat costly demonstration of American tolerance, which would eventually draw India to the West. Though Truman and Acheson partly agreed with Bowles’s concerns about India, Congress did not. Truman, a lame duck president, rejected approaching Congress. The reduction of aid in February 1952 meant India’s grant allocation for 1953 fell to US\$70m. For Bowles, this was a, “blunder of extremely serious proportions”.²⁴³ When in July 1952, Congress reduced the foreign aid budget by sixty percent, and India’s allocation to US\$34m, Bowles was shocked, “the news hit like ton of bricks”.²⁴⁴

Bowles’s zealous commitment to fulfilling the American mission in India and his exaggerated assessment of his assignment’s remit, led him into direct conflict with Washington. Congress was already suspicious of Bowles outside of matters India and in the Senate hearing for his confirmation, Bowles had to defend himself, “I have never run away from the word ‘capitalist’. I am a capitalist.”²⁴⁵ His pro-Indian interpretation, unique amongst American officials, also attracted censure. After Nehru controversially rejected the Japanese treaty, particularly upsetting given America’s

US\$190m agriculture loan to India, Bowles was the only American official who could report positively on India, “every top Indian official with whom I have talked has gone out of his way to condemn the Soviet Union”.²⁴⁶

Furthermore, he was the only American official who thought that Nehru “desires early settlement” on Kashmir or that India would win a plebiscite.²⁴⁷ Bowles’s vigorous defence of India’s Kashmir policy earned him notoriety. His advocacy of partial partition followed by a Vale-wide election, which was Nehru’s preference and ignored all previous UN resolutions on Kashmir, infuriated Washington, “I should appreciate your critical analysis of Indian motives in talking to you about partition, while apparently maintaining silence, except on one occasion, in talks with Graham”²⁴⁸ As expected, Bowles soon noted his isolation and complained, “For some reason, our views on this whole question have been pretty much disregarded, and I can’t quite figure out why.”²⁴⁹ Yet, nearing his assignment’s end, even Bowles agreed on Kashmir with those who had strongly criticised India. In June 1952, when Pakistan agreed a four to one troops ratio on the Kashmir border, contingent on the demilitarisation being followed by the plebiscite administrator’s immediate appointment, Bowles noted, “it is difficult to see how Nehru can turn down this proposal”.²⁵⁰ Hence, when Nehru did precisely that, Bowles was stunned, “Nehru is acting in a wholly unreasonable manner and will probably continue to do so”.²⁵¹

Growing Interest

Throughout 1952, Washington’s interest in the Middle East intensified. The NSC warned Acheson that Western influence was fading, while nationalist neutralisms

were mounting.²⁵² Aside from events in French Tunisia and North Africa after the French arrested Bourguiba, Britain's difficulties continued. In Iran, London embargoed Iranian goods, froze Iranian assets, threatened any company trading with Iran and sabotaged Iranian assets.²⁵³ Washington was especially annoyed with London's 'rule or ruin' policy especially after Musaddiq satisfied officials in Washington during his October 1951 visit that he was not a communist.²⁵⁴ After separate plans against Musaddiq by the Shah to sack him and by the British to assassinate him failed and backfired in 1952, and while economic pressures swelled in Iran after the British sanctions, America feared that Britain was pushing Iran to communism and lost faith in British policy.²⁵⁵ Lovett advised that the situation,

“is running swiftly toward even more extreme and irresponsible anti-Westernism and dangers of a *coup d'etat*, whether by the communists alone or in combination with the National Front, are more serious than had been believed.”²⁵⁶

Nor did Anglo-Egyptian relations improve. Egyptian demands for British evacuation from Egypt and the granting to Farouk the title of King of Sudan, were never met. In January 1952, fighting erupted near the canal and spread beyond, ignited by the British bombing a police station that killed fifty Egyptians. Acheson's attempts to encourage Britain to negotiate were unsuccessful since Eden would not leave Suez, compromise on Sudan or evacuate British troops.²⁵⁷ In fact, Truman actually had to prevent Churchill from attacking Egypt. Then in July, Major General Mohammed Naguib overthrew Farouk and Egypt was aflame with anti-British sentiment. Yet as

with Iran, the new Egyptian leadership declared its pro-American attitude and quickly developed amicable relations with Washington.²⁵⁸

Resultantly, America's concerns about the communisation of the Middle East ballooned. Paul Nitze, the NSC 68's principal author, and director of the Policy Planning Staff advised that the Middle East's fragility was an invitation for Russian expansion especially since other regions were relatively secure.²⁵⁹ One important manifestation of this was noted in an NSC paper in April 1952,

“the danger in this arena to the security of the world arises not so much from the threat of direct Soviet military attack as from acute instability, anti-western nationalism and Arab-Israeli antagonism that could lead to disorder and eventually to a situation in which regimes orientated toward the Soviet Union could come to power”.

Another manifestation was the possible alliance between communism and Arab nationalism,

“There is a continuation of the gradual deterioration of the free world position in the Middle East...the tides of neutralism and nationalism, with which communism has successfully allied itself with to an increasing degree, continue to rise”.²⁶⁰

Likewise, the sixth UN general assembly in April demonstrated the unwillingness of Arab countries to support Washington, “these representatives, it became clear, were not anxious to align themselves with either party”.²⁶¹

Not only did the Western position decline but also London’s solution to its problems in the Middle East stalled in the summer of 1952. Arab distrust of the MEC was assiduous.²⁶² Egypt’s rejection of the MEC meant that all other Arab states, except Iraq, also rejected it. Britain’s unsuccessful yet desperate attempt to place Iraq as the Arab lynchpin was painfully transparent to Washington.²⁶³

“Egypt, not Iraq, is the key to this question and that no other Arab state would be willing to consider participation in the Middle East Defense Organisation until the present difficulties between Egypt and the United Kingdom are settled.”²⁶⁴

Washington waited with decreasing hope on MEC, until it accepted in late 1952 that there was no chance of Egyptian cooperation against Moscow through the MEC until Britain evacuated Suez.²⁶⁵ The MEC’s impending death drew out sharper American criticisms, which had hitherto been withheld. An interdepartmental group sarcastically asked how, “six states not indigenous to the area (plus one Middle Eastern state that has joined NATO) will succeed in gaining the confidence and support of the Arab peoples.”²⁶⁶ Integral to this new critical perspective was a greater acceptance of the negative impact of Britain on America’s policy in the Middle East, demonstrated by a State Department memo which noted the disadvantages of America’s relationship with the British,

“It is hard for many Americans, unless they have recently visited certain parts of this area, to realise how general and deep-seated is the distrust and in some cases hatred for the British and French...The US is increasingly being put in the same imperialist category”.²⁶⁷

Growing Access

Criticism of the British management of the region combined with the sustained and concerning anti-communist focus to act as an impetus for the growth of American access to the Middle East. The State Department had been aware of Britain’s military weakness and fragile economy well before its difficulties in the Middle East. In June 1949 Cripps announced the possibility of, “a complete collapse of sterling” and Britain’s reserves exhausting after twelve months.²⁶⁸ Such weakness explained why,

“the UK, which has the primary responsibility for the defense of the area, lacks both manpower and resources successfully to defend the area and has no plans for defense of Saudi Arabian oil field and the Dhahran Air Base.”²⁶⁹

In December 1950, the State Department noted, “It is noteworthy that even the defense of the Suez area is, according to the British, beyond the probable capability of the UK and Commonwealth.”²⁷⁰ From late 1951, there emerged a growing feeling in Washington that though the region was still a British responsibility, direct involvement was necessary if the Western position was to be maintained.²⁷¹ Britain’s

failure, in the steady collapse of the MEC merely resurrected and reinforced existing doubts,

“The defense of the Middle East is primarily a UK responsibility. As we understand it, however, capabilities available to the British are wholly inadequate to defend the Middle East against Soviet aggression and it appears that they are adequate to provide the minimum requirements for even the shortest line of defense east of the Suez canal.”²⁷²

Nitze, at the forefront of those who felt London was discrediting Washington, argued that support for the MEC only propped the British position.²⁷³

Consequently, and despite meek resistance by the Pentagon to committing US forces and troops, stretched because of NATO and Korea, America assumed an increasingly active role in the Middle East in 1952.²⁷⁴ By January, even the JCS had accepted in principal the use of limited American troops in the region to demonstrate Western commitment.²⁷⁵ In August, the JCS agreed to the State Department’s advocacy of more flexible forces for peripheral areas including the Middle East.²⁷⁶ Two months on, while recommending that the British temporarily persevere in the region, Acheson instructed that alternative arrangements beyond the MEC be assessed to preserve Western influence.²⁷⁷ By November, Washington had taken, “primary responsibility for political and military action to forestall Iran’s falling to communism” and authorised plans for Iran’s inclusion into a regional defence arrangement.²⁷⁸ Even the Defense Department, normally the most reluctant to engage the Middle East, while restating Britain’s responsibility for the Middle East, stated:

“we must in all honesty recognize and attempt to reassess

- the growing military weakness of the UK made more difficult by her unsolved crises in Iran and in Egypt and
- the increasing unpopularity and distrust of the UK on the part of the governments and the people of the area.”²⁷⁹

Indeed, the underlying assumptions of a National Intelligence Study which was completed a week before Truman’s last presidential day, indicated that Washington was preparing to takeover from London not only in Iran, but also in Egypt.²⁸⁰ Truman only held back from pursuing the ascendancy because of the termination of his presidency.

The Precipice of Engagement

Given that Washington had since 1949 located Pakistan in the Middle East, and had since 1951 sought to engage it in that region, America’s growing access to the Middle East precipitated its growing access to Pakistan. Furthermore, Pakistan continued its anti-communist theatrical performance. Zafrullah Khan told Acheson that Pakistan was trying to help Britain in Iran, and was encouraging Arab countries to join the MEC.²⁸¹ As a result, those background whispers in Washington from early 1951, especially from those more willing to apply an anti-communist prism on Pakistan, which urged a deeper and more independent engagement of Pakistan, moved towards the centre of America’s discussion about Pakistan.²⁸² By the same token, Henderson

advised McGhee that America should assume the lead in its self-representation in Pakistan and India.²⁸³ State Department officials such as McGhee increasingly inclined towards their Pentagon counterparts in advocating an independent American approach to Pakistan, reflecting the firm anti-communist cognitive placement of Pakistan.²⁸⁴ In respect of conflict elimination, having already realised that Britain's lead on Kashmir was, "completely devoid of ideas as to possible solution", Washington was similarly no longer prepared to work behind the persistently failing British.²⁸⁵

With America's growing concern and access to the Middle East, the Truman administration eventually left office on the brink of engaging Pakistan within the anti-communist narrative in the Middle East. The first step to engaging Pakistan was its reintroduction into America's Middle East defence planning and especially the MEC. This process paralleled the decline of both American confidence in Britain and Britain's influence in the Middle East, and the continuing concern about the Middle East. Having been absent for more than three months, Pakistan was included in Washington's long-term Middle East plans in January 1952.²⁸⁶ State Department officials throughout the first half of 1952 re-planned their Middle East strategy with Pakistan's inclusion.²⁸⁷ McGhee hoped, "We cld look forward to time when Pakistan wld make real contribution MEC bearing in mind had by far greatest military potential any country east of Turkey".²⁸⁸ NSC 129/1, the policy statement in April 1952 towards the 'The Arab States and Israel', firmly endorsed Pakistan's inclusion in the MEC.²⁸⁹ That same month, a joint State-Defense assessment concluded that Pakistan, "would contribute significantly to the military and political strength of the Organization".²⁹⁰ Foggy Bottom hoped, "the military strength of Pakistan might

become effective as a stabilising factor in the Middle East.”²⁹¹ In May, Nitze, who emphasised America’s need for direct involvement, offered Pakistan as a viable solution to London’s weakness.²⁹² Warren also applauded Pakistan in the Middle East context,

“the foremost objective of Pakistan in encouraging the kind of organizations of which we have been speaking can be summed up in one short phrase: political and economic stability in the Middle East.”²⁹³

When Byroade returned from a Middle East tour and reported to Truman, Pakistan was the first issue that Truman raised.²⁹⁴ Pakistan also met the military key’s concern because in answer to General Bradley’s question about the Middle East, “This is a very important area and it is highly desirable to do something about its defense. The question seems to be: Where will the stuff come from?”, at least Pakistan offered the required infantry numbers.²⁹⁵

In contrast to the autumn of 1951, Britain, with its precarious situation, quickly reconciled to Pakistan’s inclusion into the Middle East to conciliate American partialities.²⁹⁶ Britain’s standing amongst Arab Muslims was disintegrating quickly and antagonising yet another Muslim country was only undesirable. London’s Middle East concerns were so frantic that the MEC was changed to the Middle East Defence Organisation (‘MEDO’) for supposed psychological appeal.²⁹⁷ Hence, London’s invitation to Pakistan to join MEDO in consequence aimed only to generate indigenous Muslim and American support for the increasingly lifeless body.²⁹⁸

However, as before, London did not split South Asia, as could Washington so when London reaccepted Pakistan into MEDO, it also tried to include India.²⁹⁹

With MEDO's gradual death, Washington reassessed strategies towards the Middle East.³⁰⁰ The main problems in organising the area's defence were Iranian military weakness and political instability, Egyptian non-cooperation and Washington's resistance to using its own troops.³⁰¹ One idea of Nitze's to overcome these, which was briefly flirted with, was a defence of the Suez base, Saudi, Bahraini and Kuwaiti oilfields, by using Pakistani, Turkish and eventually Iranian troops. This would enable an independent American approach from Britain's and did not require American troops.³⁰² However, it was another Nitzean idea, drawing on the discussions before the MEC, to extend the Truman Doctrine to Iran that paralleled Truman's adopted Middle East strategy.³⁰³ In the autumn of 1952, America's strategy to the Middle East re-converged again on the Northern Tier. Though America originally envisaged the Northern Tier's key members as the GTI states, it also prioritised Pakistan, prized for its troops and not its bases, in the initial discussions and excluded non-Muslim Greece.³⁰⁴ Furthermore, Iran's weakness meant that the, "Pakistan-Turkish relation in particular could be very beneficial as a stabilizing factor in the Middle East and that Pakistan should explore all means of moving closer to Turkey."³⁰⁵

America, in detailing its engagement of Pakistan in the Middle East, again removed Pakistan from South Asia.³⁰⁶ For instance, in October 1952, National Intelligence Estimate 'Control of South Asia', noted that South Asia's communisation, "would precipitate the rapid transfer of much of Southeast Asia to Communist control". However, the study made no mention of the impact of South Asia's potential

conversion on the Middle East, despite America's intricate involvement of Pakistan in the latter, thereby implying Pakistan's removal from South Asia.³⁰⁷ Accordingly, Washington lost interest in Kashmir as it detached Pakistan from South Asia, although this disinterest was also partly fuelled by the talks themselves stagnating.³⁰⁸ Nehru became even less compromising after having relied on Abdullah's strong support in Kashmir, he then developed a rift with the Kashmiri leader.³⁰⁹ In November, Nehru blocked discussions on Kashmir and suddenly demanded that all Pakistani troops leave Kashmir, thereby terminating talks.

Likewise, America de-prioritised Pakistan's dispute with Afghanistan even after American officials observed growing Russian influence in Kabul, "earlier estimates of relative Soviet non-interest in this country to be in need of radical revision."³¹⁰ In August 1952, Moscow delivered an aide mémoire stating that France's drilling for oil in northern Afghanistan would constitute an unfriendly act. Despite this threat, Foggy Bottom insisted that, "The Department has no evidence to support the extreme position of our Chargé on the danger of Afghanistan's falling into the Soviet camp."³¹¹ Washington ignored the strain in relations throughout 1952 even after Karachi imposed an economic blockade on Afghanistan at the year end, thus denying the West its primary trade and aid route to Afghanistan.³¹²

America thus moved towards its first engagement of Pakistan within anti-communism. In February 1952, the Truman administration gave Pakistan small amounts of military and economic aid under the Point Four Program and signed an agreement bringing Pakistan into America's anti-communist mutual security program. Pakistani officials, who felt this was too little too late, also agreed to join MEDO in

exchange for military aid.³¹³ During the summer, Washington increasingly supported the principal of giving military aid to Pakistan. By November, the JCS recommended the allocation of military aid to select countries in the region including Pakistan and on the last day of the Truman administration, the Secretaries of Defense and State and the Director for Mutual Security recommended that there was a clear need for the US to make its interest in the Middle East and South Asia more explicit. It suggested that,

“The first instalments of substantial military aid to Pakistan should be supplied at an early date, provided this can be done in a manner which does not involve unmanageable problems with India.”³¹⁴

That this engagement was tentative was apparent. The Point Four Program aid was tiny and the recommendation of January 1953 envisaged contributions of only US\$100m of military aid for the first year for South Asia *and* the Middle East, and US\$250m of economic aid to South Asia.³¹⁵ Moreover, the departing Truman officials at the end of the administration’s term had no intention of any major committed engagement of Pakistan, as Bruce advised, “under present circumstances there obviously can be no firm program for 1954 FY”.³¹⁶ That the Truman government would only take America to the precipice of engaging Pakistan, having firmly understood it as anti-communist ally in the Middle East, without actually committing, reflected the inadequate time. By the time Washington mobilised towards engaging Pakistan, in the late summer of 1952, the Democrats knew that their twenty years in the White House would soon end. Truman, despite his animosity towards Eisenhower, was unprepared to commit the new administration with this new engagement.

Pakistan: Strategic Weakness

The Truman administration's delivering of Pakistan to this precipice, the anti-communist engagement within the Middle East, to stabilise and protect the region was however fraught with weaknesses. The Pakistan army proudly exhibited, especially to American observers, the heavy Russian battleship brass bell that decorated, and continues to do so, the entrance hall of the army's college at Quetta. That Pakistan had no role in its capture from the Red Navy was, in contrast, seldom advertised.³¹⁷ Washington misread Pakistan's commitment to anti-communism and the Middle East. Pakistan's leaders and public were never concerned about communism nor did they primarily locate themselves within the Middle East. In this regard, Washington would have done well to learn about Pakistan's chameleon abilities from The Economist, "an educated English-speaking Indian addressing a British and American audience is so often quite a different person from the same Indian rousing an Indian crowd".³¹⁸

India colonised Pakistan's anxiety. America's anti-communist cognitive framework failed to detect Pakistan's own reality, with Washington's senior policymakers failing to heed a variety of warnings. As early as December 1947, the JCS had forecast that,

"by the end of the decade they (Pakistan and India) will have rendered themselves (because of their mutual animosities and political, economic and social dislocations) even less capable of assisting the western powers in the event of war than was India during World War II."³¹⁹

In similar vein, Karachi was repeatedly furious with America for sending large-scale aid to India. More so, in July 1952, Pakistan's requests for the purchase of US\$200m of military equipment euphemistically appropriated the, "threat from the USSR, Communist China or from a possible future Communist India".³²⁰ London, deeply familiar with the cognitive framework of both countries, repeatedly warned America,

"The two countries seemed to be more preoccupied with the threat from each other than any from outside.... there was no guarantee that the equipment we might furnish the subcontinent would be used for the ends we desire".³²¹

Not only did America ignore Pakistan's reality, but in valuing Pakistan exclusively through the anti-communist narrative, and including it in its Middle East defence plans, Washington paid little attention to specifically what or why it was engaging Pakistan for. Without being conscious of it, America had sought to engage Pakistan because Karachi supported the anti-communist story, providing existential ease and stability by confirming back to real America the stories with which it defined, trusted and located itself. This engagement was not a function of Realist-type assessment of policy, as the pursuit of national power, for had America done so, it would not have been attracted but been highly repelled by Pakistan.

Economically, Pakistan remained weak. On the eve of partition, only one of the top fifty-seven Indian companies was Muslim owned.³²² Pakistan had no equivalent to the TATA steelworks at Jamshedpur or the industrial belts west of Calcutta. After partition, ministers could not find homes in Pakistan, offices lacked chairs and

desks.³²³ Only Gandhi's fasts gave Pakistan its due resources after partition, thereby preventing Karachi's economic haemorrhaging. Despite its tiny economic base, Pakistan's annual economic growth averaged only three percent throughout the Truman era, insufficient for the rapidly growing population.³²⁴ Pakistan faced food shortages in every of Truman's presidential years except one.³²⁵ The demonstration of Pakistan's resource shortage and administrative mismanagement was cruelly underlined by events on 11th September 1948, when the emergency ambulance that collected the dying Jinnah, broke down while the state's founder suffered inside in the sweltering heat only to die hours later.³²⁶

Closely related to Pakistan's economic weakness, was the issue of defence, which absorbed a crushing seventy percent of Pakistan's government expenditure from 1948 to 1950.³²⁷ However, even this proportion did not give a military potency to defend the Middle East. Despite the JCS's looking to Pakistan to provide troops, Pakistan had very limited military and troop capabilities.³²⁸ Ayub bemoaned the intentions of politicians and his colleagues who repeatedly wanted to strike India with the country's thirteen tanks, which had each about forty to fifty hours engine life in them to face the Indian army.³²⁹ In April 1949, Americans felt that not only that Pakistan could not defend the NWFP against Russian invasion, but every forecast prepared by US officials on an Indo-Pakistan military war predicted Pakistan's military collapse.³³⁰ For instance, in 1949, the CIA predicted that war, "would result in the disappearance of Pakistan as a political entity".³³¹ Similarly, a National Intelligence Estimate in September 1951 suggested,

“In a long war (with India) Pakistan would almost certainly lose East Pakistan (containing 60 per cent of its population) and major Punjab areas, and its economic and political stability - even its very existence - would be threatened.”³³²

Finally, in respect of political stability to the Middle East, Pakistan was hardly an island of solidity, “Perfectly sensible people, Brigadiers and Generals, would go about bemoaning their lot. Each one of them was a Bonaparte, albeit an unhappy one” in an environment that, “produced fantastic ideas and ambitions in people.”³³³ In 1945, Jinnah, talking to Sindh’s Governor, Sir Hugh Dow, about Sindh’s politicians, stated, “he could buy the lot of them for five lakhs of rupees, to which I replied I could do it a lot cheaper.”³³⁴ Pakistan’s political culture had changed little for the better after partition.ⁱⁱⁱ A May 1949 report from the US embassy in Karachi noted the cut-throat political environment in Pakistan where politicians were loyal “only to their self-interest”, and where, “Any marked decline in the power or prestige of the camp in which they happen to be working will find them scurrying for another where the weather may be fairer.”³³⁵ A government employee assassinated Liaquat Ali Khan, possibly the last financially unsoiled leader of Pakistan, in 1951 and the investigating Scotland Yard detective noted the lack of co-operation by the Pakistan authorities in his inquiries. Hence when State Department officials continued their bloated praise of Pakistani stability, Ambassador Warren in Karachi finally critiqued them in April 1950, “The statement that, ‘Pakistan has demonstrated a high degree of internal stability and vitality’ must be accepted with certain reservations.”³³⁶

ⁱⁱⁱ It is not surprising that in Shaukat Siddiqui’s ‘Khuda Ki Basti’, themes of corruption, incompetence and political stench still preponderate Pakistani politics

¹ S P Cohen (1984:137)

² C G Appy (2000:1)

³ Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S Truman

⁴ W W Stueck, "The Korean War: An International History", 1995, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 351-352

⁵ D G Acheson cited in *The New York Times*, 28th June 1950; D McCullough, "Truman" 1992, New York: Simon and Schuster, 832

⁶ J Kovel (1994:40)

⁷ *Life*, 20 November 1950

⁸ D G Acheson (1969:368)

⁹ CIA, "Consequences to the United States of Communist Domination of Mainland Southeast Asia", 13 October 1950, Harry S Truman Papers

¹⁰ NSC 48/2, 30 December 1949, FRUS, 1949

¹¹ M P Leffler, "Acheson, the Russians and American Power" in D Brinkley (1993:192); D G Acheson cited in J M Gabriel (1988:109)

¹² O Bradley, "Security in the Pacific", 22 January 1952, Bradley Papers; J M Gabriel (1988:111)

¹³ *Ibid*, 85

¹⁴ G Smith (1972:189)

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 184

¹⁶ H S Truman, "Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope: 1946-1952", 1987, London: Da Capo, 356, 358

¹⁷ S L Rearden, "Acheson and NSC 68" in D Brinkley (1993:159)

¹⁸ NSC 68/4, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security", 14 December 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol.1, 468; CIA, "Probable Developments in World Situation Through Mid-1953", 24 September 1951, FRUS, 1951

¹⁹ NSC 114/2, "United States Programs for National Security", 12 October 1951, FRUS, 1951, Vol.1, 208

²⁰ D G Acheson (1969:429, 436); T A Schwartz, "America's Germany: John J McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany", 1991, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 125-126

²¹ JCS 2180/2, "United States Policy Towards Japan", 28 December 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol.6, 1385

²² M P Leffler (1992:374)

²³ Memorandum by Bray to J O Ohly, 25 January 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol.5, 221

²⁴ H S Truman, "Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S Truman", 1980, New York: Harpers and Row, 185

²⁵ 'Re-Evaluation of US Plans for the Middle East' prepared in the DoS, attached to G C McGhee to D G Acheson, 28 December 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol.5, 271

²⁶ Paper Drafted by W Stabler, 24 October 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol.5, 103; W Barbour to DoS, 5 January 1951, FRUS, 1951, Vol.5, 14; United States Minutes of United States - United Kingdom Political-Military Conversation, 26 October 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol.5, 233

²⁷ Paper Drafted by Stabler, 24 October 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol.5, 220

²⁸ D G Acheson to G C McGhee, 27 January 1951, DoS, McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468

²⁹ DoS Draft Minutes of Discussion at the State-JCS Meeting, 30 January 1951, FRUS, 1951, Vol.5, 27

³⁰ Editorial Note, FRUS, 1950

³¹ 'United States Minutes of Meeting, Washington, The White House', 8 January 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol.9, 170; Memorandum of Conversation by J B Howard, 24 October 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol.5, 233

³² J L Collins cited in United States Minutes of United States - United Kingdom Political-Military Conversation, 26 October 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol.5, 233

³³ Collins cited in DoS Draft Minutes of Discussion at the State-JCS Meeting, 30 January 1951, FRUS, 1951, Vol.5, 27

³⁴ Paper Prepared in the International Security Affairs Committee, DoS, 20 February 1951, FRUS, 1951, Vol.5, 80

- ³⁵ 'Report of the Near East Regional Conference in Cairo, 7-11 March 1950', 16 March 1950, DoS, Central File, 120.4374/3-1650
- ³⁶ Report Prepared in the DoS, 11 May 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol.5, 152
- ³⁷ Ibid
- ³⁸ G C McGhee to D G Acheson, 7 June 1950, DoS, Central File, 890.00 TA/6-750
- ³⁹ P Nitze to D G Acheson, 7 June 1950, DoS, Central File, 890.00 TA/6-750; J Webb, 15 June 1950, cited in Footnotes of FRUS, 1950, Vol.5, 173
- ⁴⁰ G C McGhee in Informal UK-US Discussions, 18 September 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol.5, 196
- ⁴¹ G C McGhee in Memorandum of Conversation by A Z Gardiner, 1 September 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol.5, 181
- ⁴² NSC Staff Study on "The Position of the United States with Respect to South Asia" January 1951, cited in M S Venkataramani (1982:137)
- ⁴³ Policy Statement Prepared in the Office of South Asian Affairs, 9 October 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol.5, 245
- ⁴⁴ D G Acheson to the Embassy in Pakistan, 11 and 24 May 1951, FRUS, 1951, Vol.6, 2202
- ⁴⁵ G C McGhee cited in "Informal UK-US Discussion" 18 September 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol.5, 196
- ⁴⁶ DoS Policy Statement on Pakistan, 1 July 1951, FRUS, 1951, Vol.6, 2206
- ⁴⁷ Record of informal US-UK discussions, 18 September 1950, FRUS 1950, Vol.5, 196
- ⁴⁸ *The Economist*, 19 August 1950
- ⁴⁹ DoS Policy Statement on Pakistan, 1 July 1951, FRUS, 1951, Vol.6, 2206
- ⁵⁰ DoS Minutes of Discussion at the State-JCS Meeting, 2 May 1951, FRUS, 1951, Vol.6, 2200
- ⁵¹ Warren to D G Acheson, 15 May 1951, FRUS, 1951, Vol.6, 2204
- ⁵² Record of Informal United States - United Kingdom Discussions, 21 September 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol.5, 206; Paper Drafted by W Stabler, 24 October 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol.5, 221
- ⁵³ Commander in Chief US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean ('CINCNELM') and Commanders in Chief, Middle East to the British Chiefs of Staff, FRUS, 1951, Vol.5, 200
- ⁵⁴ Berry to D G Acheson, 20 March 1951, FRUS, 1951, Vol.5,
- ⁵⁵ 'South Asian Regional Conference of United States Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Nuwara Eliya, Ceylon, 26 February - 2 March 1951, Agreed Conclusions and Recommendations' attached to Berry to D G Acheson, 20 March 1951, FRUS, 1951, Vol.6, 1664
- ⁵⁶ 'Agreed Conclusions and Recommendations of the Conference of Middle Eastern Chiefs of Mission - Istanbul, 14-21 February 1951', DoS, Central File, 120.4382/3-1551
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- ⁶¹ 'Report of the Near East Regional Conference in Cairo, 7-11 March 1950', 16 March 1950, DoS, Central File, 120.4374/3-1650
- ⁶² Caroe's study is available as O Caroe, "Wells & Power: The Oilfields of South-Western Asia. A Regional and Global Study", 1976, Connecticut: Hyperion; See also A Jalal (1989:417-418)
- ⁶³ Draft Report by the NSC, NSC 65, 28 March 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol.5, 131; Memorandum of Conversation with various Congressmen by D G Acheson, DoS, Central File, 786.56/3-2850; Poole, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy"
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- ⁸¹ Memorandum by the CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, 'Probable Developments in the Kashmir Dispute to the end of 1951' NIE 14, 14 September 1951, FRUS, 1951, Vol.6, 1850
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CHAPTER FIVE

EISENHOWER PART I: DULLES AND THE ENGAGING OF PAKISTAN

America's change of government in 1953 inducted a practitioner with an unusually bipolar and rigid commitment to the anti-communist identity narrative. John Foster Dulles was particularly able to understand, and thus keen to engage, the ostensibly anti-communist Pakistan. Notwithstanding MEDO's brief revival, Washington engaged anti-communist Pakistan in the Middle East, through the Northern Tier, a process which Dulles protected, culminating in America's military aid pledge to Karachi in 1954. Early tensions originated not from Pakistan's ornamental joining of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation ('SEATO'), but in America's failure to translate engaging Pakistan in the anti-communist narrative into policy specifics. Furthermore, there was a gulf between senior officials, who understood Pakistan within anti-communism, and policy operators, who were attuned to Pakistan's existence beyond anti-communism and could not understand, and hence engage it.

Dulles's firm engagement of Karachi contrasted with his distance from India, which did not fit into his bipolar anti-communist narrative. However, middle ranking officials did find space and within the missionary narrative to give meaning to India. Still, Dulles's cognitive suspension of India was privileged, which contrasted with an engaged Pakistan, and thus the arrest of South Asia, including its conflicts, as a meaningful concept for America. However, Nehru's angry reaction to the aid to Pakistan forced Dulles to re-examine his bipolar anti-communist prism, for Dulles recognised that Nehru otherwise would inadvertently be pushed to Moscow and therefore when pressed, Dulles too found space beyond bipolarity for India, though not outside of anti-communism.

The first Eisenhower term, like the entire Truman presidency, was a tale of two halves in policy to Pakistan. From late 1954, America's anti-communist narrative protection and reassertion relaxed. This was accompanied by a severe jolt to the Northern Tier, the instrument to effect Pakistan's engagement. The Baghdad Pact in January 1955 enraged Arabs and vexed Israel, eroding two American anti-communist aims – harnessing Arab nationalism against Moscow and resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute to protect the area from communism. With this mechanism cracked, Washington retracted its engagement of Pakistan by attempting to reduce its aid commitment – an attempt that failed and only infuriated Karachi and embarrassed Washington.

Meanwhile, Pakistan's anomaly neighbours gained meaning by the end of Eisenhower's first term. In late 1954, China and America clashed, eliciting Washington's middle ranking officials to turn again to India to surrogate America's missionary narrative. Furthermore, America's aid commitment to Pakistan triggered Russian interest in India and Afghanistan, initiating greater American anti-communist focus on the latter pair. Consequently, to prevent India's communisation, America opened further space within its anti-communist prism, and tentatively sought to engage India, still cognitively detached from Pakistan, even though it was unable to reverse the poor American-Indian relations. Washington also sought to increase aid to Kabul and pressed it and Pakistan to resolve their differences, though given the minimalism underlying both policies, also without success.

Adjusting the Subject: John Foster Dulles and the Polarising of Meaning

Dwight David Eisenhower's election to the presidency inaugurated few dramatic shifts in American policy. The rhetorical refusal to recognise the 'enslavement' of Eastern Europe, in 'liberation' and 'rollback', did not originate in the 1952 Republican convention placards which read, "Containment is defensive, negative, futile and immoral; countless human beings to a despotism and Godless terrorism."¹ Not only did the administration later abandon 'rollback' and 'liberation', but both concepts were mere re-statements of Truman's policy. Acheson, Nitze and Lovett had earlier wanted to rollback Russia's frontiers to its 1939 border by controlling communism in the peripheries while Europe's heartland strengthened.² In 1948, Kennan had emphasised manoeuvring the Russian bear back into its cage while in January 1949 NSC 20/4 had sought the reduction of Russian influence in the satellite states.³ Even the 'Domino' theory, later synonymous with Eisenhower's policy to Vietnam, originated in Truman's State Department, "if Indochina falls, very likely all of Southeast Asia may come under communist domination."⁴ Truman was thus justified in reminding the electorate before November 1952 that Eisenhower had supported all his major policies.

However, Eisenhower's administration differed with Truman's on two issues. First, was the shift in focus between Europe, America's continued priority, and Asia. The European Defence Community ('EDC'), and German rearmament and integration into a Western defence system still vexed the new administration. Eisenhower remained

committed to the EDC to secure Germany's contribution to the West's defence and reduce America's burden.⁵ While Supreme Allied Commander, Europe during 1951-52, Eisenhower pushed hard for the EDC and then as president sent Dulles and Stassen in February 1953 on a European tour to encourage its ratification.⁶

Washington's commitment to Europe, through NATO and its American supreme commander, an institutional structure and a fully integrated staff paled the paltry later American commitments to SEATO and the Baghdad Pact.

Still, SEATO's mere creation in 1954 reflected a greater focus on Asia than had been given by Truman. This focus was in part due to the immediacy of circumstance for with European politics grinding to a stalemate, the Asian Cold War seemed fluid. Days after his election, Eisenhower flew to Korea and prioritised an armistice – eventually signed in July 1953. The worsening Indochina conflict and China's communist existence inclined attention towards Asia, as did Republicans' consistent criticisms of Truman's policy on Asia during the election campaign. Senior Republicans Taft and Knowland even prioritised Asia, as America's future, over Europe, America's past.⁷ The focus on Asia also reflected Eisenhower and Dulles's familiarity with the region. Dulles had orchestrated the Japanese peace treaty during 1950-51 while Eisenhower had been posted in the Philippines under MacArthur from 1935 to 1939, visited China in 1938 and 1946, and briefly assumed the military position of Deputy Chief for the Pacific and Far East in 1942.⁸

The second key difference with the Truman administration was John Foster Dulles.

Dulles brought to governance an unusually rigid bipolar and religious categorisation and discourse. The former trait, reflecting a greater insecurity, provided Dulles with a

more pronounced means to define and locate himself and his reality. Dulles was not a naturally confident man, either in youth or adulthood, as was Eisenhower. His categorising and attaching meaning to within identity narratives hence demanded greater clarity and certainty to ground his existential ease. Lawyers, like bankers, seldom develop conceptual flexibility. Professional engagement continually demands, as a precondition, stable frameworks and certainty, which reinforce existing categorisations and discourses and destroy dexterous and de-gravitated thought. Yet even compared to the lawyers who Dulles worked with prior to entering politics, “Dulles was never guilty of complex or sophisticated legal formations.”⁹ The Secretary, who rarely saw ambiguity, was forbidding and unapproachable, and tended to require data from his staff and officials simply to confirm pre-existing views.¹⁰

Dulles’s self-certainty and intolerance to other perspectives was especially so in international politics, where he was acutely sensitised to a superior claim. His grandfather, John Watson Foster, and uncle Robert Lansing, were both former Secretaries of State. The effect of this heritage was reinforced by Dulles’s status as the leading Republican on foreign affairs since 1944, having officially advised four Secretaries of State over a lengthy apprenticeship. The combination of a rigid cognitive framework and certainty in foreign policy had implications for the particular nature of his American narrative and Dulles’s highly bipolar political reality and policy. In one of his first acts as Secretary of State, Dulles advised his officials, we, “are being attacked by a political warfare which is as hostile in its purpose and as dangerous in its capabilities as any open war”, which meant that nothing less than “positive loyalty” was “tolerable at this time”.¹¹ His words left a bad taste with the professional diplomats.¹²

Added to his certainty and bipolarity was a strong Christian identity. Dulles was, “the only religious leader, lay or clerical, ever to become Secretary of State” with the exception of Edward Everett.¹³ After Dulles rediscovered religion, secularised Calvinism, in 1937 at an Oxford seminar, he held a succession of offices in the Presbyterian Church including as Chairman of the Federal Council of Churches in 1940, which represented twenty-five million Protestants.¹⁴ With this Christian identity, came Christian narrative categorisation, discourse and engagement, “For many years it never occurred to me that the Christian Gospel had any practical bearing on the solution of international problems.”¹⁵ In fact, Dulles placed Christian narrative central to understanding and engaging world affairs. His speeches were religiously titled, ‘Spiritual Bases of Peace’, ‘A Diplomat and his Faith’ and ‘Christian Responsibility’.¹⁶ It was thus that Dulles could describe the corrupt, incompetent and ruthless Chiang and Rhee as, “these two gentleman are the modern day equivalents of the founders of the Church. They are Christian gentlemen who have suffered for their faith.”¹⁷ Needless to say, not everyone appreciated this discourse; Churchill for instance described Dulles as, “a Methodist Minister”, whose, “bloody text is always the same.”¹⁸

Dulles’s rigid bipolar categorisation and discourse, and personal identification with Christianity accentuated his Americanism anxiety from communism, “Soviet Communism starts with an atheistic, Godless premise. Everything else flows from that premise”.¹⁹ Dulles was one of the earliest converts after the war to protecting the

anti-communist narrative.ⁱ God spoke through Dulles, there existed a moral law, which, “has been trampled by the Soviet rulers, and for that violation they can and should be made to pay.”²⁰ Dulles, who deeply internalised America’s anti-communist identity, was so perturbed by communism that he portrayed it as inherently and systemically sinful, “men are created as the children of God, in His image. The human personality is thus sacred and the State must not trample on it.”²¹ As a result, Foster, as Eisenhower affectionately knew him, understood and dealt with political reality exclusively within the anti-communist narrative, relying on Stalin’s ‘Problems of Leninism’ with its paranoid worldview to guide his assessment of world politics.²² The book, memorised and added to the Bible and his grandfather’s ‘Diplomatic Memoirs’ as his three-volume gospel for foreign policy, was often preferred above intelligence reports to understand Russian policy.²³ Thus for instance, despite the differences between China and Russia, which Washington was aware of and intelligence analysts repeatedly stressed, Dulles’s bipolar and rigid anti-communism led him to, “treat the Mao Tse-Tung regime for what it is, a puppet regime.”²⁴

The political environment that Dulles operated within was especially conducive to his particular use of anti-communism. During this, the high era of Americanism conformity through anti-communism, polarised anti-communism gripped Washington. While the influential ‘4-H Club’ shared Dulles’s worldview, HUAC enjoyed its most successful years in 1953 and 1954.²⁵ ⁱⁱ While Senator Taft wanted to repudiate the wartime agreements with Russia, McCarthy’s assistants searched American libraries for the thirty thousand plus books supposedly written by

ⁱ Dulles had himself warned to, “check the tendency to identify one’s personified state with deity” and to “check the tendency to identify the other nation personality with evil” in, “War, Peace and Change”

ⁱⁱ The ‘4-H Club’ consisted of Humphrey at Treasury, Hoover at State, Hughes at Budget and Hollister who oversaw foreign aid

communists.²⁶ In 1954 Congress passed a Communist Control Act and the phrase ‘under God’ was added to the Pledge of Allegiance. Conservative Republicans forced Bowles’s removal from India.²⁷ The Senate even upheld Walter Smith’s nomination as Under Secretary of State, despite his service as the CIA’s head and then as ambassador to Russia.²⁸ While James Dean could rebel only without a cause in 1953, Disney pursued the Americanisation project with the excavation of Disneyland, with its romanticist hegemonic ideals in Main Street, Frontierland and Mark Twain’s Riverboat. The Old Guard’s pressures to deepen the communist onslaught were defused only by Stalin’s death in March 1953, which would have made such move seem particularly callous.²⁹

To address the issue of American identity narrative anxiety, Dulles, a unilateralist, and critical of Truman’s containment policy, which he thought would militarise American society and bankrupt the economy, demanded energy and replenishment of American narratives.³⁰ Dulles felt that containment was defensive, inadequate and not a solution to communism. His long foreign policy essay, which he prepared for Eisenhower in the summer of 1952, developed two doctrines to re-energise real America’s narratives and place America on the offensive in the Cold War. The first was a global military defence, by creating a ‘community punishing force’, “There is one solution and only one: that is the means to retaliate instantly against open aggression by Red Armies”.³¹ Communist Russia needed to be pressured, “If there is no pressure, purges can occur, organizational wounds can be healed at leisure, and the despotism can go on.”³² This arms length approach, Dulles’s ‘pactomania’, relied on American allies and was reflected in the greater emphasis on Mutual Security Assistance.³³

The second concept was Liberation. Dulles neither defined liberation as war nor support for internal revolutions, which is how it was interpreted by Europeans who resultantly saw Dulles as a, “fire-breathing warmonger who would obliterate Europe with hydrogen bombs in order to free Poland and so gain votes in Hamtramck.”³⁴ For Dulles, liberation was synonymous with moral and spiritual dynamism, integral to the origins of real America’s story of itself, “Vigor, confidence, sense of destiny, belief in mission, all had led to the growth of the American Republic from feeble and humble origins to great power.”³⁵ Dulles made faith and purpose essential to liberation, without which, despotism would continue, “The first thing I would do would be to shift from a purely defensive policy to a psychological offensive, a liberation policy”.³⁶ As Schlesinger and Rovere described the impact, “unilateralism has become the new isolationism. Got it alone; meet force with maximum counterforce”.³⁷

Given that Dulles was however not the administration’s principal official, before assessing policy to Pakistan, it is poignant to therefore clarify his relationship with the president. In December 1941, General Marshall had told Brigadier Eisenhower,

“the Department is filled with able men who analyze their problems well but feel compelled always to bring them to me for final solution. I must have assistants who will solve their own problems and tell me later what they have done.”³⁸

Eisenhower’s management style tracked precisely this ethos. Government was delegated to outstanding people such as Charles Wilson, head of General Motors, the

world's largest private company, who became Secretary of Defense. Likewise, Eisenhower delegated foreign policy to Dulles, who himself had little pretence to control or usurp policy. In fact, Dulles always kept Eisenhower informed about policy matters and when Eisenhower was ill, Dulles was uncomfortable making important decisions.³⁹ Within this evident subordination, Ambrose's portrayal of Dulles as Eisenhower's mere "messenger boy" is nonetheless grossly inaccurate.⁴⁰ If during the first term Eisenhower oversaw foreign policy, it was, as Adams suggested, Dulles who, in dealing with detail, gave that policy its shape.⁴¹ Indeed, Dulles firmly directed foreign policy execution during the first Eisenhower term, especially outside of Europe, the only area where Eisenhower was less inclined to delegate.

Engaging Pakistan

Dulles's bipolarised and intense anti-communist categorisation and discourse looked favourably upon Pakistan's persistent anti-communist direction, "You know that Pakistan and the United States have commonly supported the same views in the United Nations and that Pakistan was a tower of strength on the Japanese Treaty."⁴² Pakistan's clarity within the anti-communist narrative drew Dulles's immediate engagement, whose commitment to activism did, "need not await formal defense arrangements as condition to some military assistance to Pakistan."⁴³ Immediately after Eisenhower's election, The New York Times reported Pakistan's imminent inclusion into America's defence system.⁴⁴ Years later, in 1958, an American ambassador to Pakistan claimed that, "the military program to Pakistan was launched as a political measure designed to induce Pakistan to join regional security pacts".⁴⁵ This was inaccurate since Dulles, and other hard-line anti-communists, sought to urgently engage Pakistan within anti-communism irrespective of pacts and before the

Arab rejection of MEDO. Pakistan's request for emergency wheat aid in February 1953 was rapidly assessed, approved and completed with US\$75m of wheat sent by June. Democratic Senator Richard Russell explained during the deliberations, "In my own scrutiny of the foreign-aid programs, I propose to be much more generous with nations whose friendship to us is unquestioned."⁴⁶ House Representative Adam Powell noted,

"Pakistan has demonstrated its dedication to the ideals of democracy and from its birth as a new nation has drawn inspiration from the United States in its efforts to resolve its problems."⁴⁷

Yet, as under Truman, engagement with Pakistan was again delayed by another MEDO resurgence.⁴⁸ America's analysis of the Middle East had not altered significantly after Truman's term. NSC 155/1 in July 1953 noted the West's continuing decline in the Middle East, and the need for American, "responsibility, initiative, and leadership" including, "the right to act with others or alone".⁴⁹ Nor had America de-prioritised the region. Washington's continued Middle East concerns were evidenced in May 1953 by Dulles becoming the first Secretary of State to visit the region and by NSC 155/1, which was more detailed and proactive on Middle East defence than Truman's NSC 129/1 had been. MEDO's rebirth was conceived in the Anglo-Egyptian settlement on Sudan in February 1953, after which London and Washington again hoped that Egypt would lead MEDO.⁵⁰ This time, the outstanding issue was London wanting to retain the base's management including authority over

the property, whereas Egypt wanted undiluted sovereignty.ⁱⁱⁱ Dulles subsequently held back engaging Pakistan for fear of disturbing the prospect of an Anglo-Egyptian deal navigating Egypt to lead MEDO.

It was for MEDO then that Dulles flew in May to the Middle East. He first tried to woo Naguib by offering to build the Aswam Dam and,

“Egypt is the country in the Middle East which under the leadership and guidance of the Prime Minister, contains the promise of a great future.... the US would be prepared to consider making the Egyptian Army a real force in the world”.⁵¹

However, Dulles’s hopes for MEDO were shattered on the tour’s first day. Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Fawzi, told Dulles that MEDO was, “definitely out of focus”.⁵² Naguib added, “Egyptian public opinion is alarmed and afraid whenever they hear of entering into a pact regarding Middle East defense involving the US and the UK.”⁵³ Nasser told Dulles, “‘nobody’ would now accept the statement that the UK can be genuine allies of the Arabs.”⁵⁴ With the Anglo-Egyptian talks at stalemate, Nasser added, “I can’t see myself waking up one morning to find that the Soviet Union is our enemy. We don’t know them. They are thousands of miles away from us.”⁵⁵ Dulles left Cairo disheartened, “situation in Egypt more serious than Department generally has recognized... almost impossible to over-emphasize the intensity of this feeling.”⁵⁶

ⁱⁱⁱ As a sweetener for the ongoing Anglo-Egyptian talks, Eisenhower gave US\$10m in economic aid, US\$11m of military sales to Egypt, and offered to train fifty Egyptian pilots without payment.

The rejection was pan-Arab. Syria's General Shishakli warned, "confidence among Arab peoples for the United States was now nearly lost because of our past support for Israel."⁵⁷ Lebanon's Chamoun advised, "The only answer in Egypt... is complete evacuation of the British... not even Iraq would dare sign a treaty with the British."⁵⁸ Iraq's Madfi focused on America's support for Israel in Palestine while Jeddah was obsessed by Britain's occupation of the Buraimi islands.⁵⁹ Dulles concluded that the Arabs, "engrossed with their problems with the British and with the Israeli and so forth" were unconcerned about the communist threat, they, "were too lacking in realization of the international situation."⁶⁰ Forty-eight hours into his tour, Dulles concluded, "MEDO at present does not have a chance."⁶¹

In contrast, Pakistan re-emphasised its support for the anti-communist narrative.

Dulles arrived in Pakistan on 22nd May 1953, and was immediately impressed by their "spiritual spirit" and their potential as a "dependable bulwark against Communism."⁶²

The Secretary wrote back that Pakistan was the, "one country that has moral courage to do its part in resisting communism" and offered friendship which, "exceeded to a marked degree that encountered in any country previously visited on this trip".⁶³

Ayub, whose anti-communist performances had been well rehearsed, "seemed aware of the global aspect of the present day conflict between the Communist and non-Communist worlds."⁶⁴ While Ayub and Iskander advised that the, "US has wasted too much time on Arab states", Dulles petitioned Congress for aid to Pakistan,

"One of my clearest impressions was that of the outstanding and sincere friendliness which the leaders of Pakistan feel for the United States, I was greatly impressed with their outstanding understanding of world politics. I

am convinced that they will resist the menace of communism as their strength permits.”⁶⁵

Having clearly defined Pakistan within the anti-communist narrative, America immediately planned engaging Pakistan within the Middle East, a process which began even before Dulles returned. His first three questions to Ayub focused on Pakistan’s military needs, its bases and its 250,000 strong armed forces, which in the region were second only to Turkey’s 330,000.⁶⁶ After Dulles’s return, support to engage Pakistan within the anti-communist narrative reached crescendo levels amongst the more vociferous anti-communists, as demonstrated by Richard Nixon, “Pakistan is a country I would like to do everything for.”⁶⁷ Washington, resuming from where the Truman administration had departed, quickly re-committed to engage Pakistan within the anti-communist narrative to defend the Middle East.

However unlike during the Truman administration, the Northern Tier was the chosen policy instrument to effect this engagement.⁶⁸ On Washington’s political horizon since 1951, it had been recently recommended to Dulles by Iraq’s Saad, who cited the 1937 Saadabad Defence Pact of Turkey, Iran and Iraq, as a pre-cursor.⁶⁹ Washington felt that in contrast to Egypt, Saudi and other Arab states, the Northern Tier countries were, “feeling the hot breath of the Soviet Union on their necks... and were accordingly less preoccupied with strictly internal problems or with British and French imperialism.”⁷⁰ On 1st June, within a week of Dulles’s return, the NSC concluded,

“the present concept of a Middle East Defence Organization ... was not a realistic basis for present planning... the US should concentrate now upon building a defense in the area based on the northern tier, including Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey”.⁷¹

Unlike in the previous discussions of both MEDO and Acheson’s Northern Tier, Dulles gave Pakistan a central role in his Northern Tier,

“In order to assure during peace time for the United States and its allies the resources (especially oil) and the strategic positions of the area and their denial to the Soviet bloc, the United States should build on Turkey and Pakistan”.⁷²

In fact, Turkey and Pakistan constituted for Dulles the Tier’s geographic “two strong points” and accordingly, encouraging and supporting a Western-backed Turco-Pakistan alliance became the nucleus of American strategy in the Middle East.⁷³

Senior policymakers supported Dulles’s engagement of Pakistan. The JCS and Wilson formally supported giving military aid to Pakistan.⁷⁴ A NSC Planning Board met in December 1953 and also supported equipping Pakistan for the Northern Tier.⁷⁵

If Dulles was at ease with the support for his policy from Washington, he was still sensitive to the earlier failure of MEDO – which he saw in its association with the West, Pakistan’s exclusion from MEDO, and Britain’s competing Middle East agenda. Consequently, Dulles protected the engagement of Pakistan and the Northern Tier’s development, which was carefully reflected in his precisely managing both

processes. So tightly was this orchestrated that even Karachi complained about the lack of information given to it - Ghulam Mohammed enlightened Americans by, “declaring he is neither beggar nor pawn.”⁷⁶ Karachi only received a basic sketch of the Northern Tier plans on 29th December 1953, almost six months after the US had decided to engage Pakistan through it, and it was two months later that final plans were sent to Karachi.⁷⁷

The first of the three dimensions to Dulles’s protection was Washington’s resistance to overt involvement in the Northern Tier, thereby limiting its Western association. American policy insisted that the Tier should, “grow from within”, with America “as far in background as possible.”⁷⁸ Dulles hoped that the “indigenous character arrangements should make it easier for other Middle Eastern countries associate themselves.”⁷⁹ Furthermore, bilateral agreements between the regional parties were, “more modest, more realistic, and more apt to produce results.”⁸⁰ Any request for military aid by Pakistan would therefore only be favourably received after the Turco-Pakistan treaty, the first stage of the Northern Tier, was completed.⁸¹ Even at a later stage, America wanted Turkey or Pakistan to lead the discussions with Iran and Iraq.⁸² Interestingly, Pakistan hampered this protection by demanding American aid before signing a Turkish alliance, “the Governor General put it on the ground that he had nothing to talk about that was of any use to Turkey until he was assured of military assistance by the US”.⁸³ That Karachi made this position flagrantly public caused Dulles considerable irritation.⁸⁴

The second dimension of Dulles’s protection aimed to insulate the engagement of Pakistan from India. It was from this underlying motive that Byroade drew inspiration

for his alternative suggestion that America engage Pakistan and militarily equip it on the pretext of Karachi's involvement in the Korean War, if a token contribution was offered.⁸⁵ It was also with this protection in mind that Washington conceived the idea of Pakistan's alliance with Turkey, to minimise the political repercussions upon India of aid to Pakistan,

“We think best way would be in form of support for some sort of regional defense cooperation.... to minimize political repercussions and maximize Pakistan area defense contribution... This would show that intent of US aid is to strengthen area defense against outside aggression rather than take sides in disputes within area such as those that exist between Pakistan and her neighbors.”⁸⁶

The third dimension and one which reflected Washington's increased activity and ability to understand Pakistan and the Middle East within the anti-communist narrative, was America's unilateralist approach to protect its engagement from British interference, “To tie ourselves to the tail of the British kite in the Middle East... would be to abandon all hope of a peaceful alignment of that area with the West.”⁸⁷ Dulles extended the late policy of the Truman administration by consciously excluding the UK from its plans for Pakistan and the Middle East.^{iv} Washington first informed London about discussions of military aid to Pakistan in October 1953 and only in December did the Foreign Office learn the depth of America's involvement.⁸⁸ Similarly, a respectable debriefing for London was only offered in January 1954, after the details had been agreed and on the basis that it, “be made clear to the British and

^{iv} Washington's growing application of meaning on the world stage meant that notwithstanding nuclear cooperation through the McMahon Act of 1952, differences with Britain arose on China, Korea, Indochina, the EDC and the Middle East.

French that they are only being informed of (not consulted about) the military aid aspect of the problem”.⁸⁹

American anti-communist narrative anxieties intensified when Russia detonated a hydrogen bomb in August 1953, which had also the effect, if only for a few months, of raising Pakistan’s strategic value. Washington lacked sufficient B-36s, America’s intercontinental atomic bomber, thereby bringing focus to potential bases near Russia. The NSC’s ‘Basic National Security Policy’ in October 1953 recommended,

“The effective use of strategic air power against the USSR will require overseas bases on foreign territory... Such bases will continue indefinitely to be an important additional element of US strategic air capability and to be essential for the conduct of our military operations on the Eurasian continent in case of general war”.⁹⁰

By the same token though more specific to Pakistan, in December, an American newspaper article mentioned,

“As a base for strategic bombers, Pakistan’s airfields, modern and numerous, are within easy reach of Soviet Central Asia, including the Ural and Siberian industrial areas far distant from US bases in the Mediterranean and Arabia.”⁹¹

This led observers to believe, however inaccurately, that Washington intended to acquire bases in Pakistan, to which China, Russia and India protested.⁹²

This strategic distraction had little impact on the Northern Tier's development however. In November 1953, Turkey and Pakistan agreed, in principal, a defence pact. The agreement, and Turkey in particular, became the backbone of America's defence in the Middle East and the Northern Tier's lead.⁹³ In January, Eisenhower agreed to provide military aid to Pakistan to, "increase the strength and stability in the Middle East."⁹⁴ NSC 5409 in February 1954, which superseded NSC 98 of January 1951, enshrined America's new policy to Pakistan by confirming its support for Pakistan's greater participation in a common front against communism and for the equipping of Pakistan's military.⁹⁵ NSC 5409 was strongly supported by all US ambassadors to South Asian countries,

*"it was the consensus that while India can and will cause difficulties for the United States in the region this should not deter us from pursuing policies we think important, such as military aid to Pakistan...all of those present agreed with the decision to give military aid to Pakistan."*⁹⁶

On 2nd April 1954, Pakistan signed the 'Agreement for Friendly Co-operation' on defence matters with Turkey, thus beginning the Northern Tier, with Iraq targeted as the next state.⁹⁷ On 19th May, Pakistan and America signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, which, while giving the administration discretion only to supply military aid to Pakistan, strangely enough obligated Pakistan to defending America.⁹⁸ In October, America specified its supply commitment. by pledging to supporting force objectives for five and a half army divisions (four infantry and one and a half armoured brigade divisions), covering 40,000 men, and to provide six

destroyers, six minesweepers and six air squadrons – a total military aid package costing US\$171m, for completion within three and a half years. Added to a further US\$105m of economic aid, the package went some way to help Ayub build Pakistan's army to combat India and usurp control of Pakistan.⁹⁹

Just as Pakistan's engagement through the Northern Tier settled, Washington's attention turned towards South East Asia. After the Korean War calmed, Eisenhower and Dulles focused on Indochina and China – encouraged by the China lobby, which warned against recognising China and any Munich-type settlements in Indochina.¹⁰⁰ The French position in Vietnam dwindled from March 1954.¹⁰¹ The Dien Bien Phu crisis, a psychological blow disproportionate to its military merit, frightened Paris in May 1954 to swiftly agree to, what Washington viewed as, surrender terms to the communists.¹⁰² Publicly, Eisenhower expressed satisfaction about the Geneva settlement for Vietnam, despite Congress's evident rage, "American foreign policy has never in all its history suffered such a stunning reversal".¹⁰³ Privately, he and Dulles were deeply concerned about communist growth in the region and had no intention to support the accords. Not only did they refuse to sign the treaty but they also broke its terms by sustaining Diem and then encouraging the corrupt and incompetent though anti-communist leader to avert the stipulated elections.¹⁰⁴

Washington's response to Vietnam and Geneva was SEATO.¹⁰⁵ In April 1954, the NSC agreed to organise a regional defence group including America, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines. No mention was made of Pakistan at the first meetings.¹⁰⁶ Indeed, Pakistan did not feature throughout the early stages of SEATO planning despite more than half of its population bordering

Burma.¹⁰⁷ Having placed Pakistan in the Middle East in order to engage it in the anti-communist narrative, Washington excluded Pakistan from Asia.

Yet in July 1954, Pakistan joined the Manila Conference and in September it signed the SEATO treaty. A variety of tactical reasons explain this seemingly sudden geographic reversal. Britain wanted to arrest SEATO's image as a white man's club and strongly advocated Pakistan's inclusion, "Pakistan's association with SEATO gives appearance more genuine Asiatic character".¹⁰⁸ Washington also feared the consequences of rejecting Pakistan's repeated advances to join. Pakistan was thus invited to SEATO purely for political cosmetics. Indeed, even in Pakistan there was little debate or recognition of its joining SEATO. Ayub's retrospective suggestion, "that Pakistan had no reason to join SEATO at all. Perhaps the main consideration was to oblige the United States," is remarkable if for no other reason than that Karachi had an extensive history of trying to involve America with itself.¹⁰⁹ Yet the irony of Pakistan's superficial inclusion was that SEATO was the only treaty that ever *committed* America to defending Pakistan, even if it was only against communist aggression at Washington's convenient unilateral determination.¹¹⁰

In any case, America's commitment to SEATO was very limited. Dulles clarified that actions under the treaty would apply only against communism, which Pakistan expressed concern with, and that SEATO members would not receive aid other than that agreed bi-laterally.¹¹¹ The Pentagon ensured that SEATO lacked backbone for there would be,

“no commitment by the United States to support the raising, equipping and maintenance of indigenous forces and/or to deploy US forces in such strength as to provide for an effective defense of all of the national territory of each signatory is implied or intended....the United States should not enter into combined military planning for the defense of the treaty area with the other Manila Pact powers nor should details of the United States unilateral plans for military action in the event of Communist aggression in Southeast Asia be disclosed to the other powers... In the event general war should develop, US forces will be deployed... to strategic areas considered more vital than Southeast Asia”¹¹²

Meanwhile, Washington continued its anti-communist engagement of Pakistan in the Middle East and welcomed the continuing pro-Western character of the Ghulam, Ayub and Mirza government. In October 1954, Bogra visited Washington, where Columbia University’s President, Grayson Kirk, described him as a, “sworn foe of the totalitarians” and a “warm friend of the United States”.¹¹³ Meanwhile, Bogra insisted on nudging the Indian ribcage, “The neutral has no mind of his own. God gave us a mind and we must use it to come to conclusions.”¹¹⁴ Pakistan also maintained its anti-communist credentials. At the Colombo Conference of South Asian countries in April 1954, Pakistan forcefully argued for the recognition of communism as equally threatening as colonialism, and in July, banned its Communist Party.

American senior policymakers’ exclusive application of anti-communist categorisation and discourse for Pakistan contrasted with its less successful

application by those at policy's operating level. Policy operators, those most involved with detail and implementation, were more sensitive to a Pakistan in its own anti-Indian reality, and outside of the anti-communist narrative. Consequently, such officials could not apply meaning to Pakistan, suspecting its anti-communism was only an upper crust synthetic phenomenon, and thus remained uncomfortable with its engagement. That senior policymakers engaged Pakistan from and in the discourse that they did was in part because Pakistan's involvement in the Northern Tier was never referred to the NSC's analysis staff, with their prolonged work and extensive circulation.¹¹⁵ For instance, CIA analysts were acutely aware of the futility of Pakistan's meaning within the anti-communist narrative.¹¹⁶ In fact, the Pakistani public was probably more anti-Western than it was anti-communist. Mohammed Ali had to calm infuriated crowds when rumours abounded that Pakistan had given bases to the US.¹¹⁷ Maulana Bhashani's powerful United Front accused the government of mortgaging the homeland to America and demanded repudiation of the US treaty while the East Bengal Provincial Assembly denounced the pact with America.¹¹⁸

These operating level officials were also more aware of the issue of Pakistan being a liability, and not an asset, in the Middle East. Pakistan's political polemics were reflected in Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed's imposing of governor's rule on East Pakistan and in September 1954, when Bogra failed to complete a constitutional coup. A CIA report of March 1955 outlined the Pakistan government's, "lack of organized political and popular support". Furthermore, Karachi's economy was poor. Surveys in 1954 by H J Heinz and then by the State Department outlined bleak pictures of Pakistan's economy. In August 1954, Washington even sent to Pakistan

emergency food to help relieve a flood.¹¹⁹ The weak economy in turn eroded Pakistan's military,

“Even with substantial Western military aid, Pakistan could probably furnish few if any troops for early employment outside the subcontinent in the absence of a comprehensive settlement with India. The shortage of qualified officer and administrative personnel and the lack of an adequate logistic organisation would make difficult any sizable increase of present forces, which are small even for their primary mission of defense of Pakistan's borders”.¹²⁰

As a result, at the end of 1954, Washington confronted two cognitive cleavages. The first resided within senior policymakers and reflected the engagement of Pakistan within the anti-communist narrative in the Middle East in contrast to Pakistan's inability to contribute to the Middle East's defence. Pakistan's specific role in the Northern Tier or in the defence of the Middle East was never made apparent. As early as October 1954, simultaneous to Washington's committing the US\$276m package to Pakistan, one State Department official hoped that, “*Eventually, we hope* Pakistan will be enabled to play an important role in Middle East area defense”(emphasis added).¹²¹ In short, Washington's senior echelons failed to bridge the transition from attaching meaning to engaging Pakistan within anti-communism, into specific and strategic advantage in the Middle East. Assistant Secretary of Defense Struve Hensel reported after visiting Pakistan in February 1955 that no American, “had any clear idea of the part Pakistan was expected to play in the defence of the Middle East or whether that role would be developed into an important one.”¹²²

A second cognitive cleavage that filtered policy was between senior policymakers and policy operators, who were unable to place Pakistan within the anti-communist narrative. Despite senior policymakers' enthusiasm for Pakistan, in early 1954, Brigadier Harry Meyers's assessment of Pakistan's military needs sketched Pakistan's force objectives at a total cost of only US\$45.85m.¹²³ Meyer's proposals, as expected, "disturbed" senior policymakers.¹²⁴ In August, another policy operator, Brigadier William Sexton, head of MAAG, confirmed Meyer's recommendations, this time with more dramatic consequences – Ayub was "broken hearted" and "dejected".¹²⁵ This inconsistent application of anti-communist discourse instigated inconsistent engagements of Pakistan, forcing Washington to apologise to Ambassador Hildreth about the, "confusing situation" in policy to Pakistan. John Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, explained that senior policymakers wanted a significant package for Pakistan, reflecting their attaching strong meaning to Pakistan within the anti-communist narrative. However, that discourse had not reached the operating level.¹²⁶

Both these cleavages annoyed Karachi. While Pakistan was relieved about the alliance, it was unaware of its specific anti-communist assignment even *after* receiving the aid commitment. From July 1954, Ayub persistently asked America, "What do you expect of us; how do we fit into your overall planning?"¹²⁷ Hildreth noted that Pakistan was increasingly frustrated by the vagueness about its Cold War role, a symptom of Washington's keenness to engage Pakistan within anti-communism but without clarifying for what specific purpose. The second cleavage, between senior policymakers and policy operators was exasperated by Pakistani

leaders having convinced themselves that they would receive a large military aid package despite US officials having never intimated that this was forthcoming. The magnitude of American aid, largely a responsibility of policy operators, immensely disappointed Pakistani officials, more than it did American policymakers, and started as early as April 1954, when the 1955 MDAP fund contained no aid to Pakistan because Washington had prepaid the 1955 allocation in 1954.¹²⁸

Suspending Anomalies

Dulles's bipolar anti-communist categorisation and discourse found Indian non-alignment particularly difficult to contend with. Having once described Bolshevism as the product of the Devil, the only thing for Dulles more abhorrent than containment, which left people to the Devil, was non-alignment - a refusal to recognise the Devil. Nehru did precisely that at a time when America was awash with theories about the (communist) manipulation of the human personality through 'brainwashing', advertising and subliminal messages.¹²⁹ Dulles's personal interaction with Nehru prior to 1952 had already been difficult. In January 1947, Dulles publicly complained that communism was influential in the interim Indian government, which Nehru vociferously refuted. Nor had Nehru had endeared himself to Dulles. Three years on, Nehru, "an utterly impractical statesman" rejected Dulles's prized Japanese Treaty.¹³⁰ More recently, Nehru encouraged Egypt to shun MEDO.¹³¹ Republican William Knowland, who assumed the Senate's majority leadership position following Taft's death in July 1953, supported Dulles and criticised Nehru's lack of realism while another Congressman noted, "India's voting record in the United Nations as far as the United States is concerned is not very palatable".¹³²

Since Eisenhower barely glanced at South Asia until 1955, and with Dulles at the helm of policymaking to South Asia, Washington scarcely engaged a non-categorised India. Dulles in actual fact preferred not to address the Indian cognitive anomaly. On the Korea commission, Dulles did not want, “India, as India all too often seemed to consider it necessary to be ‘more neutral’ toward the Chinese Communists than toward the UN,” and succeeded in avoiding India at Geneva much to Nehru’s annoyance.¹³³ Nor had Dulles planned to visit India after Pakistan and was dissuaded only by the outgoing administration.¹³⁴ His first interaction as Secretary with India was to settle the surplus property transferred to India in 1945, meaning Washington demanded US\$32.5m from New Delhi.¹³⁵ George Allen, “usually an accurate and objective reporter”, and “unlikely to adopt Bowles’s missionary approach to diplomacy” replaced the pro-Indian Bowles as ambassador in May 1953.¹³⁶ Bowles’s US\$200m Mutual Security commitment to India for 1954 was then reduced to US\$140m.^v Dulles, whose only concern was whether such reduction would reduce the amount allocated to Pakistan, overruled Bowles, Byroade, and Nitze, “I doubt that this amount is either justified by the facts or could be justified to the Congress.”^{137 vi}

However, Nehru, Asia’s leading spokesman, governed an India, which for many less bipolar anti-communist officials, resided within America’s missionary narrative.¹³⁸ For instance, the intelligence community, which conducted the first study of South Asia in June 1953, did not express discomfort with Indian neutralism.¹³⁹ Furthermore, junior State analysts advocated closer relations with India, “It is the largest country in free Asia and potentially it could be a powerful force on the side of the free world.”¹⁴⁰

^v The Republican Congress reduced this further to US\$110m

^{vi} Henry Byroade was the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs while Paul Nitze was then the Director of the Policy Planning Staff

Thus, the compromise of NSC 5409, the first Eisenhower policy paper on South Asia, between India's locations within the bipolar anti-communist and missionary narratives. In the short term, Dulles gave ground, India's "neutral position may have a short-range value to both South Asia and to the free world, giving South Asia the time in which to develop its strength". Within this cognition, economic aid to India, normally prepared by middle-ranking officers, was forecast to rise from US\$1.5m in 1954 to a significant US\$86m in 1956, compared to US\$16m to Pakistan for 1956.¹⁴¹ However, the overall American long-term aim echoed Dulles's placing India within a bipolar anti-communist framework, "South Asia must be made to realize that its ultimate choice lies with the Kremlin or the West."¹⁴²

America's ongoing intense engagement of Pakistan and Dulles's cognitive suspension of India meant the continued entombment of South Asia as a geographic concept. Persson wrongly suggests that Pakistan in 1953 was ascribed importance by senior policymakers in the context of South Asia.¹⁴³ NSC 5409 distinctly treated India in Asia separately from Pakistan in the Middle East. With South Asia buried, American did not recognise its tensions. When Jernegan was asked in January 1954 about the reactions of countries in the region to Pakistan's possible association with America, he interestingly omitted India.¹⁴⁴ Mansingh claims that Washington mortgaged friendship with India for a top-secret base in north Pakistan.¹⁴⁵ This analysis is vulnerable for two reasons. First, the U-2's development was authorised in November 1954, after the commitment to Pakistan, and base rights were not discussed with Pakistan throughout Eisenhower's first term.¹⁴⁶ More importantly, Washington had largely detached Pakistan from South Asia and India. There was in Washington little recognition of Mansingh's trade-off between India and Pakistan so when Dulles

advised Nehru that he had no plans to agree a relationship with Pakistan, which could be, “looked upon as unneutral” to India, he did so with a mixture of hope and belief that Pakistan was apart from South Asia.¹⁴⁷

In contrast to this view of Pakistan, as detached from South Asia, intelligence analysts from their first analysis of Pakistan, placed it in South Asia,

“a military assistance agreement between Pakistan and the West would be resented by India... The destinies of the states of mainland South Asia are closely linked.... The primary external mission of each force is defense against the other”¹⁴⁸

This view received some, if ineffective, support. Before aid was announced, the CIA’s assessment of granting or denying military aid to Pakistan focused on repercussions in India, not the Middle East.¹⁴⁹ Bowles added, “There is no doubt whatsoever that India will be deeply resentful.”¹⁵⁰ The sudden tilt towards Pakistan alarmed London, George Allen, and the South Asian Affairs staff in Washington who noted,

“any assistance (to Pakistan) would have to be on the premise that we had considered India’s cold war and hot war importance and had decided that the smaller and much weaker country of Pakistan was more useful to us.”¹⁵¹

Their commitment to India's place within America's mission was symbolised by practically all of the four thousand American missionary communities in India opposing US military aid to Pakistan.¹⁵²

Yet with the senior policymaking view prevailing, principally that of Dulles, Pakistan's conflict with India, having dominated Truman's policy to Pakistan, attracted trivial focus in the NSC 5409 South Asia study.¹⁵³ The Princeton alumnus who went on to the Sorbonne and George Washington Law School, and became Time's 'Man of the Year' in 1954, misled Nehru and later Zafrullah Khan of his "very great interest" in Kashmir.¹⁵⁴ Only briefly did Dulles explore Kashmir. In April 1953, he sent Paul Hoffman, formerly of the Ford Foundation, to India and Pakistan – and that too to discuss only Kashmir's immediate partition.¹⁵⁵ Dulles's unilateralism was clearly in evidence, with Washington only informing London of the mission after it had started, "since it is likely that word will now filter back to London".¹⁵⁶ Hoffman's mission was however unproductive.¹⁵⁷ The first day of talks, 25th July, was dominated by a, "lengthy historical monologue by Nehru which began pre-Alexander Great" and had "not reached British period by end day".¹⁵⁸ From then till 1956, Washington ignored Kashmir so much so that in 1954, Acting Secretary of State Smith admitted that the US knew, "next to nothing" about ongoing developments in Kashmir.¹⁵⁹

Venkataramani and Arya argue that America's aid to Pakistan wrecked the Kashmir talks.¹⁶⁰ This claim was supported in 1956 by a junior State analyst, "solution of the question failed when rumours of substantial American assistance to Pakistan were broadcast".¹⁶¹ This assertion however resides on blemished soil. By the summer of 1953, Pakistan and India had indeed made mild progress on Kashmir, the pinnacle

being Nehru's bravura reception in Karachi in July. However, it is unlikely that America's engagement of Pakistan in the Middle East, manifested in military aid, itself destroyed that progress. The Kashmir talks ground to a halt before Pakistan knew of American aid. By August 1953, Indo-Pakistan relations had, "sunk to all time low as far as Pakistan is concerned."¹⁶² That same month, Nehru blocked further progress in Kashmir by sacking Abdullah on false accusations of conspiring with Washington to create an independent Kashmir.¹⁶³ Seven months on but a month before the American-Pakistan treaty, Hildreth noted that Kashmir, "now where it was in 1949".¹⁶⁴ American aid neared the horizon after the Kashmir talks had already died.

Dulles, while hopeful that Pakistan was excluded from South Asia, expected aid to anger India, but hoped to, "ride out the storm without fatal effect on US-Indian relations".¹⁶⁵ However, the aid package to Pakistan, rumoured in India at a bloated annual US\$250m, came upon existing difficulties between New Delhi and Washington.¹⁶⁶ Republican Congressmen had criticised Nehru throughout the 1952 campaign, and Dulles's commitment to pursue the Cold War aggressively frightened Indians. The American thermonuclear bomb in November 1952 and 'rollback', did not comfort Indians who feared US bases in Pakistan on Eisenhower's election.¹⁶⁷ Tensions persisted into 1953. In May, Adlai Stevenson's meeting with Abdullah led Nehru to suspect that America offered Abdullah independence in return for aid and base rights, which although fabricated, "practically every high Indian official and writer has become firmly convinced of".¹⁶⁸ Furthermore, an Indian-American air transit agreement stalled, differences over Korea persisted and a sharp dispute broke out over India's export of thorium nitrate, an atomic material, to China in July. Therefore, even before 1954, Indian-American relations were brittle.

It was then not surprising that the American-Pakistan treaty made Nehru livid,

“Pakistan becomes practically a colony of the United States... The United States imagine that by this policy they have completely outflanked India’s so called neutralism and will thus bring India to her knees. Whatever the future may hold, this is not going to happen”. (McMahon – pg172)

Relations after the treaty deteriorated so rapidly that, “The US ambassador did not deem our relations with India sufficiently friendly to warrant his asking clearance for entry of the Flagship (USS Pittsburgh)” while Vice Admiral Wright received, “only the bare minimum of the customary courtesies from the Indian officials”.¹⁶⁹ Nehru refused permission for US aircraft in Indochina to use Indian airspace and in March 1954, asked US nationals of the UN observer group in Kashmir to leave, “No person”, he wrote to Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, “coming from that country can be considered as disinterested or impartial by us”.¹⁷⁰ Hammarskjold felt Nehru’s precedent would wreck the UN’s observer system.¹⁷¹

Nehru’s anger reflected selective amnesia. He was wrong to blame US aid to Pakistan for increasing India’s military expenditure or inviting the Cold War into South Asia. The American-Indian Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was effective from March 1951, three years before America’s military aid to Pakistan. Furthermore, India spent a sizable thirty-five percent of its budget on defence prior to the American military aid commitment to Pakistan.¹⁷² Indeed, prior to February 1954, India had purchased significantly more military equipment (US\$36.3m) from Washington than

had Pakistan (US\$26.5m).¹⁷³ Finally, the Indian concern with US military aid to Pakistan contrasted with India's own extensive attempts since before Pakistan's creation and thereafter to secure American aid and military exports.¹⁷⁴

Despite Nehru's anger and amnesia, Dulles was unprepared to nudge India as an anomaly to the anti-communist narrative and remained highly patient with India. In this restraint, Dulles evidently acknowledged an existence beyond bipolarity, albeit one that he was only prepared to contend in India's case given the potential consequences of its communist affiliation in the Cold War. Russian foreign policy had changed after Stalin's death. Stalin had never accommodated to India or any path outside the Marxist-Capitalist framework, seeing India as part of the Commonwealth and hence a Western stooge.¹⁷⁵ In contrast, Stalin's successors jettisoned the two camps theory and moved to a flexible approach to the Third World, a development that was recognised by Washington's analysts. The first high-level indications of Russia's altering perception of India came in August 1953 when Malenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers in the Supreme Soviet, expressed hope for continued improvement in Indo-Russian relations.¹⁷⁶

With rumours in India of a tripartite non-aggression pact among China, Russia and India, the Secretary's tolerance towards a third way was extensively tested by tensions over aircraft rights, and thorium nitrate and Beryl exports. In July 1953, India exported to China two tons of thorium nitrate, which had many uses including for atomic energy. However, India had signed the Battle Act with America in 1951, which barred it from exporting the material, amongst others, in return for American aid. Two tons was trivial in atomic contexts and Indian officials, who had inadequate

export controls over restricted materials, had committed an honest oversight, “Nehru admitted that prior to call from Deshmukh he had never read text Battle Act and had not been aware of full implications Section 103 (b).”¹⁷⁷ There were also logistical complications since the US realised the problem only after the transaction had been completed and the cargo was on a China-bound Polish ship.¹⁷⁸

However, difficulties began when Nehru changed his tone, “India had never agreed to attachment of political strings to aid and repeated that he could not accept the conditions of Battle Act as binding on India.”¹⁷⁹ In contrast, lower ranking Indian officials continued to accept that America’s request that India affirm future oversights would be avoided by implementation of stringent procedures was reasonable.¹⁸⁰ Nor was Nehru helpful. When Allen asked Nehru if he would advise Washington before any future affirmative decision were taken to exercise India’s sovereign right to ship restricted materials to barred areas, thereby again breaking the Battle Act, “Nehru stared at ceiling for full minute, smiled and turned to Ambassador Donovan, who was present, and asked if he had ever been to Thailand before.”¹⁸¹

Dulles’s acceptance of space within bipolar anti-communism was reflected in his conciliatory handling specifically in that he did not want to implement the Battle Act and thereby block American aid, thereby pushing India to communism, and sincerely emphasised that, “US Government exploring all possible means avoiding aid termination this single transaction.”¹⁸² Washington even absorbed the insulting comments of an Indian official who incorrectly stated that India had, whatever the case may be, never asked for American aid in the first place.¹⁸³ Dulles stretched legal definitions using verbal acrobatics to find a way of meeting American demands

against Nehru's sensitivity on Indian independence. One such example was to argue that since India "had not 'knowingly permitted' the shipment, "no violation calling for the termination of aid has occurred," though in this case, the gymnastics would not insulate against future Indian contraventions.¹⁸⁴ Unable to obtain India's commitment to a treaty that it had only signed two years before, an exasperated Dulles sought in September 1953 to instead purchase India's entire thorium nitrate export.¹⁸⁵

Washington's other anomaly in South Asia within the dominant anti-communist narrative was Afghanistan. In contrast to India, which could not be ignored given its role within the mission, itself renewed by India's role in *le tiers monde*, and Dulles's reluctance to nudge it to communism, Washington could not cognate Afghanistan within any identity narrative and ignored it throughout 1953. Dulles not only leap-frogged Kabul during his tour of the Middle East, but failed to mention it in any speech.¹⁸⁶ He went so far as to advise that he would not be interested in Afghanistan even if Kabul turned communist.¹⁸⁷ Thus, the Pakistan-Afghanistan dispute was also ignored to the extent that Afghani protests allowed them to be, as Ambassador Ward explained, "I see little advantage injecting ourselves this quarrel pending tangible indication GOA genuinely interested in settlement."¹⁸⁸ Continuing in this spirit, Dulles took six weeks to respond to Ward's analysis in July of the Pushtun dispute, and only offered meek and arms length cheer for conflict resolution.¹⁸⁹

Subject - Object Flux: Analytical Vacillation

From mid-1954 to 1955, both the policymaking subject and the Pakistan object underwent significant change. On the subject side, the intensity of anti-communist

identity, the application of its narrative categorisation and discourse and the need to enact and protect its narrative, waned. McCarthy's influence faded after the summer of 1954. The Senate's censure of him paralleled a distinct calming of American anti-communism, of which an integral part was America's reaction to its own anti-communist excesses. Though anti-communists insisted that the tougher communists remained, "numbers mean nothing", and that for every one card-carrying member, at least ten remained hidden and despite private anti-communist groups continuing their work such as 'Americans Battling Communism', grave doubts surfaced about anti-communism.¹⁹⁰

Americans questioned the reliability of the anti-communist campaign, especially of its informers, which in turn encouraged federal courts to limit powers to seek 'subversion'. Scandals such as the Mullen case in 1954 when John Mullen demonstrated that he was labelled a communist because he reported bribery at a coal operator in Pennsylvania, tarnished the anti-communist movement.¹⁹¹ Likewise, Harvey Matusow, a regular witness in communist trials, revealed that most of his testimonies were fictitious. The Ford Foundation gave the New York Bar Association funds to examine the legality of the security programmes, while the judiciary, under Earl Warren, dealt a number of legal blows to the anti-communist campaign, starting in 1955 and culminating in a series of knockout decisions in June 1957. The heightened anti-communist environment that had been so conducive to Dulles's anti-communist cognition and enactment, had notably diluted.

On the object side, America's instrument to engage Pakistan, the Northern Tier, was severely shaken. In October 1954, Turkey initiated a Turco-Iraqi defence treaty that

was signed in January 1955 as the 'Pact of Mutual Cooperation' (the Baghdad Pact), thereby furthering the Northern Tier. Washington maintained public distance from the Pact, but strongly supported it in private by giving military aid to Iraq.¹⁹² In December 1954, Dulles had encouraged American officials to,

“use every suitable opportunity discretely encourage and foster earliest Iraqi association with the (Turkish-Pakistani) Pact or conclusion of bilateral arrangements with either party.”¹⁹³

However, Iraq's accession to the Northern Tier cut across various Arab nationalisms.

Nuri, an anti-communist, was also an Anglophile and hence already unpopular amongst Arabs.¹⁹⁴ In November 1954, Turkey's Bayar had warned America that Iraq's inclusion into the Northern Tier would bring Arab political baggage.¹⁹⁵

Similarly, a US Chiefs of Mission conference concluded that Iraq's inclusion and Egypt's exclusion from the Northern Tier would anger Nasser.¹⁹⁶ In fact, Egypt felt threatened by the Northern Tier even before Iraq joined it, with the Cairo press portraying it as an anti-Arab League conspiracy.¹⁹⁷ London, upset by America's engagement of Iraq, forecast that if Iraq joined the Northern Tier, Egypt would try to, “whip up Arab nationalist feelings, leading to internal troubles in Iraq and the overthrow of Nuri's government”.¹⁹⁸ Even the JCS, the least culturally aware arm of American policy, advocated limiting the Turco-Pakistan pact to avoid Anglo-Egyptian and Arab-Israel differences.¹⁹⁹

Dulles did not heed the warnings for the Pact which transformed Middle East politics and was, “the most significant turning point in Arab politics since the 1948 war. It

shattered the Arab system”.²⁰⁰ That the Pact was followed by Israel’s attack on Egypt in February 1955, which killed thirty-eight people, heightened Arab emotions.²⁰¹

Egypt’s Foreign Minister said, “many Arabs will believe pact has been ‘fomented by the West’ and is Western effort to destroy Arab unity.”²⁰² Meanwhile, Faisal,

“lost confidence in the West. To regain it you (America) should drop this plan, strengthen and have confidence in Arab unity, work directly with Arab states and not behind the scenes through Turkey.”²⁰³

Arabs damned the Pact, which, “threaten the existence of the Arab League and expose Arab nationalism to grave dangers”.²⁰⁴ Saudi, Egypt and Syria placed their armies under unified command in March, which led to the ‘ESS’ alliance.²⁰⁵ The Pact even prompted a Russian - Egypt alliance.²⁰⁶ The American press further annoyed Egypt. The New York Times hailed the Pact as an Anglo-American victory against Nasser.²⁰⁷ Nor was Nuri helpful; at the League’s conference in January 1955 he stormed, “I have been given hell and now I am going to give you double hell.”²⁰⁸

Dulles was, “surprised at the vehemence of the Egyptian attack on Iraq’s action”.²⁰⁹ In fact he had optimistically felt that,

“even if such action by Iraq should result in the break-up of the Arab League...the Northern Tier would provide an alternative centre of attraction round which the Arab states might group themselves.”²¹⁰

During the spring of 1955, Washington realised the Pact was, “taken by Egypt as a direct challenge to its dominant role Arab League councils and as an indication that the US and UK no longer regarded Egypt as the key Arab country.”²¹¹ Additionally, the Pact cut across Arab-Israeli tensions, resolution of which had been prioritised to avoid Russia linking with the Arabs and prevent communism from breeding among Palestinian refugees.²¹² ^{vii} Yet, the Pact excluded Israel’s membership until Iraq recognised it and, the “Israeli Government did not agree with theory that association of Arabs with Turkey would bring benefits to Israel”, reflected in Israel’s attack.²¹³

In the midst of these flared reactions, London converted the Pact as a mechanism to maintain its influence, as it had hoped from MEDO. Initially, Britain opposed the Pact, which overlooked its renegotiation of Iraqi bases.²¹⁴ Eden however accelerated the Pact after the ageing Nuri Said was re-elected in September 1954, stirring British hopes that the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi agreement, expiring in 1957, could be easily renegotiated.²¹⁵ London joined the Pact in April 1955, annexed to which was a new Anglo-Iraqi agreement.²¹⁶ Britain thus wanted the Arabs and America to join and reaffirm Britain’s surprising regional resurgence, “there is immediate need to give renewed momentum to the Pact”.²¹⁷

As a result, Washington’s Middle East strategy became ensnared between British pressure and the commitment to the Northern Tier on the one hand and Arab nationalism and an Arab-Israeli resolution on the other. Joining the Pact would satisfy the Northern Tier states; abandoning it would satisfy Israel, Egypt, Saudi and Syria.²¹⁸ Originally, Washington wanted to protect the Pact much the same way that it had

^{vii} Washington and London jointly pursued Project Alpha from November 1954 to resolve Israeli-Palestinian and more general Israeli-Arab tensions

protected the Turco-Pakistan agreement, by not joining it lest the impression be given that the West imposed the Pact.²¹⁹ But by April 1955, Washington made contingent its joining on both Arab anger and Arab-Israeli tensions easing. Persson suggests that the latter goal was prioritised over the Northern Tier but this ignores a considerable body of evidence, such as offered by Nigel Ashton, which demonstrates Washington's fears about Arab nationalism's association with communism.²²⁰

Dulles was subjected to considerable pressure, nearly all of it originating within the continuation of anti-communist narrative, to join the Pact.²²¹ Admiral John Cassady recommended, "earliest possible adherence by US to the Pact is essential to its full capabilities, and perhaps even to the survival of the Pact."²²² Other defence officials strongly supported adherence, "if the US does not join the Baghdad Pact, there are signs the Pact may disintegrate."²²³ A State-Defence committee recommended joining the Pact and even giving it US\$300m annually for five years.²²⁴ All American ambassadors to the Northern Tier states repeatedly recommended Dulles to commit America to joining the Pact.²²⁵ Britain and the other Pact states henceforth maintained this pressure throughout Eisenhower's presidency. As early as May 1955, Turkey was,

"discouraged, and increasingly perplexed, by what seems to them an inexplicable indifference on our part toward Middle East defense.... puzzlement arises from contrast our present indifference with earlier fervent support 'northern tier' concept".²²⁶

Despite this pressure and as he had with India, Dulles feared that the imposition of bipolarity might inadvertently drive Arab nationalism to communism. However uncomfortable it was for the Secretary, when confronted by a sizable loss within the anti-communist narrative, he preferred to restrain his cognitive bipolarity than follow it to its logical conclusion. Rather than send Arab nationalism to communism, Dulles again opened space beyond bipolarity. His thoughts were mirrored in National Intelligence Estimate 30-4-55 in November 1955, which suggested that by Washington joining the Pact, Egypt and Syria would become closer to Russia.²²⁷ Dulles warned Wilson,

-----“adherence would be widely interpreted in the Arab world as a move against Arab unity and the action would thus seriously undermine our position in several states where we are endeavouring to exert useful influence in solving the area’s basic problems.”²²⁸

Furthermore, Dulles considered it, “not feasible for the United States to join the Baghdad Pact until there was a relaxation of tension between the Arab states and Israel.”²²⁹ By joining, he feared that the Arab-Israeli tension would stalemate, invite communism on the Arab side and encourage communist growth in the refugee camps. In any case, Dulles felt, “the Baghdad Pact was dealing about 90% with politics” and it did, “little to reduce the area’s vulnerability to Soviet aggression.”²³⁰ Clearly, Dulles had strong reasons within the anti-communist narrative, however uncomfortable to his bipolar framework, to refrain from adherence. He did not abandon the anti-communist narrative, but again suspended its bipolar application to achieve an eventually anti-communist result.

In this approach, Dulles was strongly supported by Eisenhower, who especially wanted to avoid pushing Nasser to Moscow and hoped that Nasser would eventually support an Arab-Israeli resolution and lead Arab nationalism against communism.²³¹

The president tried to reconcile tensions by secretly sending Robert Anderson, a confidant, to meet Nasser and Gurion.²³² Anderson's failure due to Israel's fears about its Arab neighbours and Cairo's post-Czech confidence, only inaugurated a new policy to improve relations with Egypt, project 'Omega' from March 1956.²³³

Dulles contended with the pressure to join the Pact through a three-pronged strategy.

First, he tried to satisfy Pact members by increasing aid, sending an observer to the first Pact Council meeting in November 1955 and allowing State Department officials to regularly meet Pact state ambassadors. Dulles also sent high-level officials to the April 1956 Pact meeting and joined the Pact's Economic and Counter-Subversion Committees in 1956, though neither demanded grave commitments.²³⁴ Second, Dulles vehemently pursued an Arab-Israeli resolution from March 1955; George Allen for instance advised London that if additional countries joined the Pact, a settlement would be more difficult.²³⁵ Further and hence Dulles's response that nothing was to, "encourage any of Israel's immediate neighbours to enter the Turco-Iraqi Pact".²³⁶

Third, he sought to placate Arab nationalism by keeping Arabs out of the Pact. The State Department, as early as March 1955 said, "Adherence of additional Arab states at this time to Turk-Iraq Pact will not be sought by US directly or indirectly."²³⁷

Dulles pro-actively discouraged Lebanon, Syria and Jordan from joining though Iran, a non-Arab state, did join in October 1955.²³⁸

Notwithstanding this immediate damage limitation exercise, America's overall strategy in the Middle East lay shattered,

“we lack a comprehensive political-military strategy for the defense of Middle East... There is accordingly an urgent need for us to re-examine the problems of Middle East defense and our own capabilities of contributing solution.”²³⁹

This was compounded by the Pact countries themselves being unaware of their particular roles, evidenced by America's country-specific programs being implemented without an overall framework.²⁴⁰ By June 1955, Dulles recommended,

“I feel that we must pursue a more arduous and expeditious reappraisal of our policies and plans than ever. I therefore propose that we begin at once to analyze each of the problems facing us in this area and formulate policies.”²⁴¹

Throughout 1955, the problem of the Middle East's defence resultantly gave severe stress to Washington, reflected in NIE 30-55, 'Middle East Defense Problems and Prospects', in June, followed by the Department of State Position Paper on 'Defense of the Middle East' in July and NIE 30-4-55, 'The Outlook for US Interests in the Middle East' in November.²⁴² Eisenhower retrospectively noted, “no region in the world received as much of my close attention and that of my colleagues as did the Middle East.”²⁴³ Dulles's difficult troubles in the Middle East were embellished further first by the region's rate of political change,

“Dulles stated that events were moving so fast in this area that he was finding himself obliged to make decisions and that he would prefer to make these decisions with more guidance than it might be possible to get from the Planning Board and the National Security Council.”²⁴⁴

If all this was insufficient headache, it was later compounded by ominous developments in 1955. First, was the prospect of Arab nationalism’s communisation after the September Czech arms deal with Egypt, which re-ignited an Arab nationalist outpouring and, “opened a new theatre of operations in the East-West struggle”.²⁴⁵ Then Britain became openly hostile to Cairo after Egypt pressured Jordan to remain out of the Pact in December 1955 and General Glubb was abruptly sacked as commander of the Jordanian Arab Legion in March 1956. Glubb’s dismissal, largely a domestic issue, shocked London, which blamed Nasser.²⁴⁶ As a result, Dulles noted with some annoyance that the, “the British are tending to run away with it”, thereby pushing Arab nationalists further towards communism.²⁴⁷ Yet America’s difficulties continued. Egypt recognised China in May 1956, and in July, Dulles’s tolerance to bipolarity’s restraint hit its limit as he withdrew the offer to fund the dam, finally pushing Nasser to Russia.

Pakistan – Diminishing Engagement

During the Eisenhower administration’s first two years, under Dulles’s direction, Washington had engaged Pakistan in the Middle East through the Northern Tier. In doing so, America located Pakistan aside from Asia. When Karachi officials noted

that Admiral Radford had mentioned that Pakistan had an important role to play in SEATO, itself a paper tiger, Radford explained that,

“he really did not remember making such a statement.... if he did much such a statement in substance, it no doubt was in reply to questions asked by newsmen and not an ‘off the cuff’ declaration of Pakistan’s importance to SEATO.”²⁴⁸

With the Northern Tier, the instrument to translate America’s engagement of Pakistan within the anti-communist narrative into policy, so shaken in the aftermath of the Baghdad Pact, America re-assessed its method of engaging Pakistan – though not the anti-communist categorisation and meaning applied to Pakistan. The origins of this re-assessment can be traced to before 1955. As early as July 1954, Hildreth recommended that,

“we believe our investment should be scrutinised with unrelenting care. Prospects of returns must be compared with those expected from India and from Pakistan’s Middle East neighbours.... let us carefully reappraise what we can and should do in Pakistan over a several year period.”²⁴⁹

However, the juddering of the Northern Tier brought to an end America’s translation of Pakistan in the Middle East. Thereafter, Pakistan was barely mentioned in America’s Middle East strategy, and its role in the Northern Tier was gradually marginalized. Criticism of this engagement through the Tier, took various forms. Robert Anderson, Deputy Secretary of Defense, wanted to know, “what we are

buying and what we are getting for our money”.²⁵⁰ In February, General Sexton noted, “Admiral Radford favoured increased military strength in Pakistan, but no one seemed to know precisely why except Pakistani obviously made reliable fighting soldiers.”²⁵¹ NIE 52-55 in March 1955 noted that, “Pakistan is unlikely to do much more than keep its head above water and will probably be a recurrent petitioner for economic assistance” and would not, “commit any more than token forces outside Pakistan territory unless its armed forces are considerably strengthened, its economy improved, and its fear of India greatly reduced.”²⁵² A report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee acknowledged the large gap between the Pentagon’s original hopes for Pakistan and the ongoing assessments about its potential contribution in the Middle East. The committee itself in fact saw no prospect for Pakistan to contribute to the Middle East’s defence.²⁵³ During talks among Britain, Turkey and US in early 1955 on the Middle East, Pakistan was ignored with London also insisting that Pakistan could not contribute defending beyond its borders.²⁵⁴

Dulles, reluctant to engage Pakistan in the Middle East, also did not want to encourage Pakistan in the Middle East lest it present another huge military demand.²⁵⁵ However, given Washington’s role in originating the Tier, encouraging its members to join and America’s credibility invested in it, the US was compelled to continue at least a semblance of engagement of Pakistan within the Tier and hence as a Middle East state.²⁵⁶ By joining the Northern Tier and SEATO, Pakistan became the only local state in two Western defence arrangements. Dulles feared the adverse repercussions in not only the Middle East but worldwide if Pakistan expressed dissatisfaction with its American alliance.²⁵⁷ Therefore, on the issue of Pakistan’s accession to the Pact, completed in September 1955, Washington did not object even

if the only reason Dulles had in favour of Pakistan's joining was inconsequential to America's new geographic location of Pakistan.

With Arab nationalism's reaction to the Baghdad Pact impeding America's placement of Pakistan in the Middle East, America's engagement to Pakistan consequently diluted. Though America broadly continued to categorise and attach meaning to Pakistan within the anti-communist identity narrative, its engagement of Pakistan through the Northern Tier was counterproductive precisely to that same narrative as applied in the Middle East. As a result, the Pentagon pursued two policies to limit the extent of its engagement of Pakistan. The 1954 October Aide-Mémoire had, "created triple obligation, namely time element, equipping 5½ Divisions and 171-million dollars."²⁵⁸ The Pentagon decided to acknowledge only the last element of this commitment.²⁵⁹

The Defense Department delayed the completion of the aid commitment. Immediately after the Pact was signed, the programme to Pakistan was extended from three and a half to five years.²⁶⁰ This timetable was thereafter in fact repeatedly extended. In August 1955, the MAAG chief forecast that the programme might extend to thirteen years.²⁶¹ In January 1956, he noted that it would take approximately fifteen years.²⁶² By March 1956 only US\$21m of aid out of an estimated total of US\$300m had been delivered, and that too after a brief increase following Egypt's Czech arms deal.²⁶³

Hildreth, furious at the delays, was, "at a loss at to what could be told them (Pakistanis) by way of explanation".²⁶⁴ Oblivious to the effect of the corrosion of the

Northern Tier, the instrument to effect America's engagement of Pakistan in the Middle East, the "deliberate slowdown" left Hildreth confused.²⁶⁵

"we do not adequately understand of US policy Pakistan or Washington has radically different appreciation of factors here...Any US plans based on prospect of significant contribution to general political stability and to security arrangements Middle East Southeast Asia will require drastic revision".²⁶⁶

The Pentagon's diluted engagement of Pakistan not only delayed the aid programme's completion but also reduced its magnitude. Only a month after making the commitment, the MAAG team concluded that US\$171m would not cover the force commitments that the US had promised.²⁶⁷ In July 1955, the Army forecast that these force commitments would in fact cost US\$301.1m.²⁶⁸ The JCS staff then suggested using the US\$171m as a ceiling, knowing full well it would not meet the force goals.²⁶⁹ In September, this 'amendment' was approved by the JCS despite MAAG informing the JCS that the new budget would allow for only two infantry divisions at reduced strength and one armoured division at limited combat strength.²⁷⁰ On 29th September, days after Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact, Hildreth rewarded Ayub with news that America had effectively halved its commitment to Karachi.²⁷¹

Washington's diluted engagement, crystallised in aid delays and the attempted reduction of military aid, led to tensions, which dominated relations with Pakistan during 1955 and 1956, and hardly constituted an American-Pakistan 'honeymoon' period as Shahi describes the period.²⁷² Throughout the summer of 1955, Pakistani

criticism of American aid was strong and widespread. Radford heard extensive complaints during his visit to Pakistan, and advised that the aid's overall impact upon relations with Pakistan might actually be negative.²⁷³ Ayub alarmed the US consul-general in Lahore by saying that he, "cannot trust the Americans' word...I've stuck my neck out for the Americans. But now I can't go on doing it, because you have gone back on your word".²⁷⁴ In November, Ayub in discussions with Congressman Clement Zablocki, accused America of bad faith, repeating the accusation publicly in The New York Times which particularly perturbed Washington.²⁷⁵

Tensions were exasperated by Pakistan's continued commitment to the anti-communist narrative, hoping to generate enough meaning for Washington to thereby engage Karachi with by way of offering security and aid. While India insisted at Bandung that, "colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end," Bogra defended the US and insisted on including Russian control of Eastern Europe into the agenda.²⁷⁶ Furthermore, in the UN, Pakistan voted with the US at the Suez and Hungary crises.²⁷⁷ While Pakistani newspapers mourned their country having been sold for a "mess of porridge", Karachi was increasingly annoyed that neutralism had, "paid off" for India and Afghanistan.²⁷⁸

Concerned about its credibility, Washington decided that it had to keep Ayub content, being especially worried about the implication for its Middle East strategy from the negative publicity from his sense of betrayal.²⁷⁹ To prevent Pakistan's anger damaging American credibility and further rupturing the Northern Tier, Dulles addressed the issue of diminished engagement by increasing the aid allocation to Pakistan.²⁸⁰ State Department officials thus urged their Defense counterparts,

“In view of the current Soviet efforts to increase their influence in the Middle East, I think it is very important we do everything we can to keep the confidence of countries like Iraq and Pakistan which are committed to our side... I hope the Department of Defense will give most careful consideration to supplying some additions to the assistance program for the Pakistan Army.”²⁸¹

In December 1955, Dulles finally raised the US\$171m ceiling figure. McMahon correctly notes that the change was, “most certainly not based on any revaluation of Pakistan’s intrinsic importance to the United States”.²⁸² Force goals, and not budgets, would determine the magnitude of US military aid to Pakistan. By March 1956, these costs had increased to US\$350m. Two months later, they stood at US\$400m – more than double what America had committed only eighteen months earlier.²⁸³

Re-Seeing Anomalies

Having been largely an undercurrent since 1949, the missionary narrative’s categorisation and discourse application on India underwent a renaissance in late 1954, at the core of which was China. America’s focus intensified on China, hence reminding America of its missionary narrative’s rupture. The administration was already predisposed to treating China harshly. While Project Solarium, from May to October 1953, recognised political bipolarity’s end, America felt greater anxiety from China than from Russia.²⁸⁴ China’s denial of the missionary narrative, and by converting to America’s alterity, left a stinging taste with Republicans. Eisenhower,

“had a particular dislike of the Chinese Communists” and considered China’s fall as the “greatest diplomatic defeat” in American history.²⁸⁵ Dulles was equally amenable, refusing to shake Chou En-lai’s hand at the Geneva Conference.²⁸⁶

The Quemoy and Matsu conflict with China in late 1954 probably brought America closer to general war than anything else during Eisenhower’s presidency.²⁸⁷ In September, China shelled Nationalist positions on Quemoy, an island held by Chiang but adjacent to China. By October, Mao seemed ready to launch an invasion while coastal battles continued. The Chinese build-up continued in November, made worse by harsh prison sentences to American POWs of the Korean War, which enraged the American public. In January 1955, the situation continued to deteriorate as Chiang promised an attack on the mainland “in the not distant future” and in April called for a “holy war”, followed by aggressive naval activity on the Chinese mainland coast.²⁸⁸

Dulles described Beijing, “an acute and imminent threat ... dizzy with success” and compared Mao to Hitler.²⁸⁹ America signed a security treaty with Chiang in December 1954 and in January 1955, expecting a Chinese invasion, Congress passed the Formosa Resolution, a blank cheque for Eisenhower to defend Formosa, the Pescadores and related positions.²⁹⁰ American warplanes flew over China in March while the JCS requested permission to bomb the mainland.²⁹¹ General John Hull, Commander in Chief for the Far East, described, “a serious likelihood that the situation would progress rather swiftly to that of general hostilities with Communist China” in which case, atomic weapons would be used.²⁹² Dulles felt there was, “at least an even chance” of war, “a question of time rather than a question of fact.”²⁹³ Dulles, Chiang and Radford wanted to use atomic weapons while Nixon redefined

tactical atomic weapons as, “conventional and will be used against the targets of any aggressive force.”²⁹⁴ The conflict, which lasted till April 1955, was pervasively felt across America. In 1955, Disney’s ‘Lady and the Tramp’ depicted Oriental looking dogs as the wily, duplicitous and troublemaking villains who estranged Lady and endangered the baby.²⁹⁵ The animation movie’s chief villain was interestingly a breed of cat called, ‘Yellow Peril’.

The acute public and government anxiety echoed China’s rupture of the American missionary narrative. With this narrative sensitised and necessitating reassertion and protection, Washington again turned to India, as it had in 1949, with resurgent hope that India would finally surrogate China’s role. Since 1951, middle ranking State Department and intelligence officials, both of whom viewed India outside of bipolar anti-communism and through the missionary narrative, had marginal concerns about India’s poor economic growth, particularly its inadequate machinery, high population growth and trade deficit.²⁹⁶ With narrative anxiety from China drawing middle ranking analysts to impart greater meaning to India within the missionary narrative, comparisons between India and China, particularly their economic development, became increasingly recurrent.²⁹⁷ NSC 5409, packed with such comparisons at the behest of such officials, noted India’s competition to, “satisfy the basic needs of their peoples within a democratic framework are being tested against developments in Communist China.”²⁹⁸ It added that,

“The outcome of the competition between Communist China and certain South Asian countries operating within a democratic framework, as to which can best satisfy the needs of peoples, will have a profound effect

throughout Asia...Communist imperialism elsewhere in Asia gives special urgency to progress in the solution of South Asia's problems...Communist China appears to be moving forward through totalitarian methods, the peoples of South Asia may turn to communist leadership and methods for a solution of their own problems."²⁹⁹

Two years on, the embassy in India noted that India was, "in competition with Communist China in the sense of demonstrating the superior capacity of democracy in Asia".³⁰⁰ However, despite the comparisons, Washington did not expect an Indo-China split, and therefore nor a significant opportunity to engage India accordingly,

"India will go to great lengths to win Red China's friendship...India's leaders are drawn to Communist China by legendary bonds of friendship and culture, and by psychological ties arising from the fact that the Chinese as a colored race and as Asians, have asserted themselves against the West."³⁰¹

India and China had resolved differences over China's 1950 takeover of Tibet, by the Sino-Indian agreement of April 1954, and in June, Chou en Lai made a successful trip to India. Though India's military and Patel repeatedly warned Nehru of China's threat, Nehru was, as would later prove unwise, disinterested, "In fact, the Chinese military will defend our Eastern frontier."³⁰² Furthermore, Eisenhower's commitment to a balanced budget and his electoral pledge of 'trade not aid' limited the aid to India and thus India's narrative comparisons with China remained mere abstracts. Though

NSC 5409 emphasised India's economic development and drew extensive comparisons with China, it did not outline specific programmes for India.

Simultaneously and in competition, there was also the growing application of anti-communist narrative categorisation and discourse upon India after mid-1954,

“South Asia has been receiving marked attention perhaps to a degree sufficient to support the surmise that the Soviets and the Communist Chinese have reached some agreement on the line within South Asia that demarcates their respective spheres of ‘influence’ or responsibility.”³⁰³

By early 1955, with Khrushchev surpassing Molotov in foreign affairs, the Kremlin's focus intensified on India. In February, Russia committed to building a US\$91m modern steel plant in India. In June, Nehru took a large team to Moscow where Khrushchev affirmed support of *Panchsheel*, Nehru's Five Principles with China and an alternative approach to world order, and backed India both on Kashmir, and against Portugal on Goa. In late 1955, Khrushchev and Bulganin visited India in a highly publicised trip and were received by a crowd of two million in Calcutta alone. Russian offers of aid, were music to Indian ears, “We are ready to share with you our economic and scientific and technical experience.”³⁰⁴ Millions of Indians chanted “*Hindi Russi bhai bhai*” as Indian relations with Russia improved into 1956,

“Nehru received a uniquely warm reception in Moscow and signed a joint communiqué with Bulganin calling for strengthened relations between their two countries in the economic and cultural fields as well as in

scientific and technical research. Arrangements for the Indo-Soviet steel mill project proceeded apace and Soviet assistance was also proffered in the fields of atomic energy, non-ferrous metals industries, coal mining and oil exploration.”³⁰⁵

US policymakers were convinced that Russia had changed the Cold War’s locus, and was aiding neutrals to undercut America’s alliances. Washington viewed this rapprochement with concern,

“The Free World is faced by a problem which will become increasingly serious in proportion to the success of Soviet bloc efforts to intensify economic penetration of the area. Soviet bloc economic influence in India is indicated by the Bhilhai steel plant in India, arrangements to train hundreds of Indian technicians in the USSR, offers of long-term loans and, technical assistance and expanded trade.”³⁰⁶

A Briefing Paper prepared by the Office of South Asian Affairs in January 1955, stated,

“there seems no doubt that the Soviet Union and its European Satellites and ComChina have recently increased the tempo and scope of their efforts to supplement political penetration of South Asia with economic penetration. This is particularly true with respect to Afghanistan and India. The realisation of the seriousness of this economic offensive has been heightened by the free world’s military reverses in Indochina”.³⁰⁷

Not only did America apply greater meaning, albeit with conflicting implications, to India through its missionary and anti-communist narratives, but Washington was also confronted, by India's growing neutralist expression, giving greater definition to existing policy. Indian independence's prime manifestation came in Indochina where Nehru criticised the Eden-Dulles proposal of April 1954 for regional collective security and both the French and the US for fighting against the communist Vietnamese.³⁰⁸ India even issued its own panacea to Indochina's problems, the 'Nehru Plan', which divided Indochina between the Vietminh and South Vietnam, ended French sovereignty, followed by a five year transitional period without foreign interference, all of which would be monitored and enforced by the five 'Colombo' powers (Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, India and Ceylon). *Panchsheel* became Indian foreign policy's touchstone and was lobbied at Bandung. India also gatecrashed the Geneva peace conference with its most controversial representative, Krishna Menon, whose anti-American views had been well circulated since before Indian independence.^{viii}

Though the growing application of missionary categorisation and discourse to comprehend India was not subscribed to by senior policymakers, the application of anti-communist narrative was. Within the latter, a debate precipitated about whether to privilege the bipolar and rigid framework, or to find cognitive space beyond, however temporary and difficult. Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, resided in the former and strongly discouraged American aid to an unfriendly state. Another State Department official objected to aid to India because

^{viii} Menon had a habit of antagonising people and was described by one Indian journalist as "our Mr Dulles".

of, “Mr Nehru’s consistent support of the Communist position and his opposition to US policy”.³⁰⁹ Congress too adopted a bipolar anti-communist approach for India. Eisenhower’s request for US\$70m of development aid for India in 1956 was reduced by US\$20m. Senate Majority Leader Knowland explained, “It would be bad if the impression got around the world that we reward neutralism”.³¹⁰ Hubert Humphrey’s attempt in July 1955 to restore some funds was crushed in the Senate by 68-16. Congress’s anger with India for its not supporting the anti-communist narrative was clearly widespread, not helped by Nehru’s contacts with China and Russia.

Eisenhower was however amongst those who preferred a third way for India, one which coincided with America’s application of missionary narrative on India and personally took the lead in expanding aid to India, which he advocated at an NSC meeting in December 1955.³¹¹ Dulles, though much more reluctant to go beyond a rigid bipolarity, followed his president’s lead and explained to the Senate,

“We believe that India’s own great effort should be supported so that its plan for economic development will succeed. We should remember that among free nations there is room for diversity of views. We should not let our wish to help the people of India be swayed by temporary differences, however important. It is essential that we continue to help, if for no other reason than to save our enlightened self-interest”.³¹²

With the administration’s principal policy official, loyally supported by his lieutenant, Washington initially planned engaging India in 1955 within the anti-communist and missionary narratives,

“our substantial economic aid program for India and our information and cultural efforts to improve United States – Indian relations have in a sense become holding operations rather than means of extending our influence.”³¹³

To this effect, various policy options were considered. Eisenhower requested Congress in 1955 to fund a US\$200m Asian Development Fund, with a large proportion for India. In June, Hoover recommended that Tata’s request for an Ex-Im loan of US\$90m to expand its steel plant be favourably considered, even if US\$75m was eventually given.³¹⁴ There was also an extensive aid program for fertilizer and tube wells, which increased Indian food production in 1955 by 400,000 tons. Washington continued to import Beryl from India despite not needing it.³¹⁵ While Dulles instructed the embassy in India to, “emphasise the common ground in our objectives”, Eisenhower, at the prompting of senior officials in August 1955, invited the Indian leader to America.³¹⁶

Relations with India however remained ambivalent in Eisenhower’s first term. India refused to allow the printing of The New York Times overseas edition in India and closed down American information centres except those at the embassy and consular offices.³¹⁷ Nehru himself was paranoid about supposed US intelligence activities, which neither Eisenhower nor the embassy in India were aware of.³¹⁸ American civil aircraft rights were cancelled in January 1955. Only after the Spirit of Geneva in July 1955 did relations show signs of improvement,

“The atmosphere of US-Indian relations improved during the period under review. Nehru’s criticisms of US collective security policies were less emotional than in other periods, and the Indian press moderated itself. . . . These trends did not however indicate any marked rapprochement on the major points at issue-international Communism and colonialism”.³¹⁹

The net effect at the year end was still finely balanced - while General Taylor was received graciously in India in December 1955, the State Department reported three months later on its position in India, “No progress was made towards imposing the Western position relative to that of the Communist Bloc and deterioration may have taken place.”³²⁰

One final point of interest in America’s relationship with India was the continued presumed detachment between India and Pakistan. Only in March 1956, when Dulles arrived in New Delhi, did he learn about a certain if perverse unity to South Asia. Jean Joyce, formerly of the US embassy, and then a Ford Foundation representative in India observed that,

“no one but no one thinks that (the) Dulles trip here did any good whatever in improving Indian attitudes toward the US or its policies. . . .

The only possible good that may have come out of the trip was that Dulles may have gotten at least a glimmer of the intensity of Indian feeling on arms to Pakistan”.³²¹

Despite this, Washington demonstrated little appetite to locate Pakistan and India within a single South Asia. Having been detached from South Asia, and then the Middle East, Washington had no convincing reason to re-categorise Pakistan into South Asia or with India. Hence, there were few implications for Pakistan at this stage of America's re-understanding India. Most importantly, America was still not interested in conflict resolution.³²²

Simultaneous to the altering meaning of India, the application of anti-communist categorisation and discourse also changed Washington's understanding of Afghanistan. The Turco-Pakistan Pact induced extensive Russian focus on Kabul,

“the USSR almost certainly views the cumulative effects over the last year of the Turk-Pakistani agreement, the initiation of military aid programs for Pakistan and Iraq, the strengthening of the Western position in Iran, and the settlement of the Suez dispute as a setback for Soviet interests in southwest Asia.”

Indeed, this was reinforced by Kabul's own military insecurity. Afghanistan had not purchased any foreign ammunition whatsoever since 1948. Thus and understandably, “following the granting of US military aid to Pakistan, the Afghan Government began to come under heavier pressure”.³²³ Military aid to Pakistan forced Afghanistan towards Russia.³²⁴ By June 1954, Afghanistan had accepted extensive Russian aid included the,

“erection of oil storage tanks, grain storage, milling and a bakery.

Apparently it now proposes to move into roads, more oil and gasoline storage, possibly pipeline construction etc. All evidence points to the probability that the Soviets will move quickly.”³²⁵

Hence, America’s concern, “There should be an appraisal by the appropriate US military authorities of the importance of Afghanistan both direct and indirect to the US”.³²⁶ American analysts felt that the increased Soviet attention to Afghanistan was part of a general effort to counter recent Western (particularly US) gains in the Middle East-South Asia area.³²⁷ America’s growing anti-communist focus on Afghanistan was reflected in NIE 53-54 of October 1954, “Soviet attentions to Afghanistan, particularly in the form of technical and economic assistance, have increased markedly within the last year.”³²⁸ Yet this contrasted with the hitherto lack of American aid to Afghanistan, which in October 1954, had foreign exchange reserves of only US\$2m.³²⁹ Total American aid forecast for 1955-1958 for Kabul prior to the growing Russian pressure on Afghanistan, was only US\$10.2m, adding to the measly US\$2.9m given in 1953 and 1954.³³⁰

With this growing anti-communist concern on Afghanistan, Washington focused on Pakistan in late 1954 both to encourage Kabul’s economic development and contain its communism by conflict resolution of Pushtunistan.³³¹ Initially, the dispute attracted little American attention.³³² Though NIE 53-54 referred to it, it was not an important theme, at least until 1955.³³³ America’s involvement in the dispute remained reactive and responsive to Afghan lobbying. While exerting only meek pressure to improve Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in late 1954, Washington instead focused on aid to

Afghanistan to protect the anti-communist narrative.³³⁴ However, even this issue was linked to Pakistan as Dulles hoped that in providing economic aid, he would also encourage better Afghan-Pakistan relations – a view which both local ambassadors shared.³³⁵ America hence decided, using the precedent of the Saar in Southern Europe, to increase economic, not military, aid to Afghanistan.³³⁶ America's first major suggestions in this regard, were transport and communication related – to integrate Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran through better communications.³³⁷

In early 1955, Dulles concerns about communism in Afghanistan had not eroded against a milieu of America's ineffective minimalist aid.³³⁸ Despite the lack of success, Dulles, "for one did not believe in quitting in a case like this. He wanted a program to save Afghanistan from Soviet control."³³⁹ As a result and having decided against increasing aid contributions to match Russia's, NIE 53-54, in its outlook for Afghanistan, focused more on Pakistan-Afghani tensions than almost any previous assessment of Afghanistan.³⁴⁰ Likewise, Dulles emphasised that, "Department's primary concern at moment is to do whatever possible prevent further serious deterioration Pak-Afghan relations with possible dangerous consequences peace sub-continent."³⁴¹ Washington was especially concerned about the closing of the Pakistan border, which Karachi had long been threatening, and which, "would result in strangulation Afghan economic life and in causing Afghans turn evidently to Soviets."³⁴²

However, despite this concern, and again as had been the case through much of Truman's administration, Washington was not interested in a deep involvement in the Pushtunistan dispute, "Department agrees your view US should not attempt role of

mediator in Afghan-Pakistan dispute.”³⁴³ Washington’s tension between its preference for non-involvement and the growing concern about communism became more apparent. On the one hand, “The Secretary said it did not make much sense to just sit around doing nothing and let Afghanistan pass by default into the control of the Soviets.”³⁴⁴ Further, “Strides made by Soviets towards position of dominance in Afghan affairs makes more urgent than ever development counter ties between Afghanistan and Western world. ...Accordingly US Government hopes for high level meetings between two at earliest possible moment.”³⁴⁵ Yet on the other hand merely encouraging and prodding the two parties towards a resolution, such as was the case in Eisenhower’s letter to King Zahir in December 1955, was a wholly ineffective and effortless approach that satisfied only Washington’s desire to maintain distance from Kabul.³⁴⁶

Hence, American policy did little to arrest the decline Afghanistan-Pakistan relations throughout 1955, notwithstanding a brief thaw in September, which lasted only until late October when Pakistan resurfaced the ‘One-Unit’ issue. In November, Pakistan placed an economic embargo on Afghanistan, which put pressure on Kabul to turn to Russia. Unwilling to increase aid to Kabul or commit itself to resolving its dispute with the pro-American Pakistan, it was thus that the CIA demonstrated continued serious concerns about Afghanistan, “if the present trend continues, the Soviet Union will probably be able within the next few years to influence effectively as well as economic policy.”³⁴⁷

¹ S E Ambrose, “Eisenhower: Soldier and President”, 1990, New York: Simon and Schuster, 273

² M P Leffler (1992:567)

³ T H Etzold and J L Gaddis, “Containment: Documents on American Foreign Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950”, 1978, New York: Columbia University Press, 97, 169

- ⁴ J Webb to H S Truman 13 September 1951, FRUS, 1951, Vol.6, 498
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- ⁶ S E Ambrose (1992:301)
- ⁷ Ibid, 330, 275
- ⁸ Ibid, 49, 55-8
- ⁹ H P de Vries cited in T Hoopes, "The Devil and John Foster Dulles", 1973, Boston: Little, Brown, 90
- ¹⁰ T Hoopes (1973:36,142)
- ¹¹ DoS Bulletin, 9 February 1953
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- ²⁰ J F Dulles, 'Life', 19 May 1952
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- ²³ L L Gerson (1977:45)
- ²⁴ Dulles's speech, DoS Press Release, Number 407, Dulles Papers
- ²⁵ Ibid
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- ²⁸ S E Ambrose (1990:307)
- ²⁹ Ibid, 311
- ³⁰ J F Dulles in *Life*, 19 May 1952
- ³¹ A H Berding, "Dulles on Diplomacy"
- ³² J F Dulles (1950:
- ³³ S E Ambrose (1990:322)
- ³⁴ *The New York Times*, 29 August 1953
- ³⁵ L L Gerson (1977:73)
- ³⁶ J F Dulles cited in T Hoopes (1973:39)
- ³⁷ Ibid
- ³⁸ G C Marshall in D D Eisenhower, "Crusade in Europe", 1948, New York: Doubleday and Co, 14
- ³⁹ T Hoopes (1973:138)
- ⁴⁰ S E Ambrose (1990:302)
- ⁴¹ S Adams, Oral History interview cited in T Hoopes (1973:140)
- ⁴² Testimony of Secretary of State, US House of Representatives, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, Committee on Agriculture, Hearings, Wheat Aid to Pakistan
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CHAPTER SIX

EISENHOWER PART II: PAKISTAN AND THE LOSS OF MEANING

Whereas Dulles's framework dominated the first term, the growing imprint of Eisenhower's framework filtered through by 1956 and prevailed in the second term. Central to this divergence was Eisenhower's personal confidence that enabled a greater conceptual flexibility beyond bipolar and rigid identity narrative structures, especially anti-communism, to create and protect the self, and from which to understand and engage reality. Eisenhower was also strongly committed to economic development, tying it closely to the American missionary identity.

This combination linked the long-standing cognition by middle ranking officials to India, outside of bipolar anti-communism, and within the missionary narrative, to policymaking's apex for Eisenhower comprehended India within the missionary narrative, a cognition reinforced by another clash with China in 1958. Thus, helped by Eisenhower's strong relationship with Nehru and fearing a second rupture of the missionary future, by way of India's economic crisis, Washington engaged India with extensive aid. In contrast, with the parallel Russian focus on India, those officials who persisted in cognising via the anti-communist narrative, frustratingly deliberated if its bipolar or flexible variant should be applied.

Focus on India's economy and its military spending to combat Pakistan, lent towards re-locating Pakistan, excluded from the Middle East, back into South Asia – as an anomaly to the missionary future. Furthermore, Ike's focus also spotlighted Pakistan's economic weakness. There thus emerged three tensions in policy to Pakistan. First, was the US's discomfort with Pakistan's economic weakness and its bloated military.

Second, was Washington's increasingly costly engagement of Pakistan in the Middle East despite its re-cognition with India. Finally was Pakistan's use of American aid against India, thereby disrupting the missionary narrative. Having acutely felt these tensions after Pakistan forced Washington against India in the UN over Kashmir, America sought to resolve the Indo-Pakistan disputes, thereby reducing Pakistan's military and its demands for Northern Tier weapons, which would be used against India. However, Nehru's unwillingness to reconcile Kashmir denied America from placing policy to Pakistan on this sound footing.

Notwithstanding this, during Eisenhower's final two presidential years, Pakistan lost meaning to America, first as an anomaly to the missionary narrative in India by virtue of thriving American-Indian relations which were no longer held back by the thorn of Pakistan. Second, and more critically, Pakistani frustration with America primarily over precisely the magnitude of that engagement and aid to India was vented in an increasingly anti-American rhetoric – thereby confirming Pakistan's departure from the anti-communist narrative, the only way that America had made any meaningful sense of Pakistan.

Dwight David Eisenhower and Narrative Reconfiguration

Whereas the Republican administration's first two years of policy to Pakistan were characterised predominantly with Dulles's identity narrative framework, being rigid and bipolar anti-communism, by 1956 America had transitioned to Eisenhower's contrasting structure. A central difference between the two policymakers lay in Eisenhower's personal confidence and security. From childhood, Eisenhower was a

self-assured and outgoing individual; as an adult, his, “storehouse of energy and warmth was sensed, felt, communicated to everyone around him.... Among most men, Eisenhower inspired confidence.”¹ His personal success in World War Two, even if overstated, merely reinforced that confidence, as Marshall told ‘Ike’,

“You have completed your mission with the greatest victory in the history of warfare... You have commanded with outstanding success the most powerful military force that has ever been assembled.”²

From this confidence, originated Eisenhower’s conceptual flexibility beyond the prevailing cognitive bipolarity. Strong personal security reduced his need for rigid and pervasive identity narrative subscription and application, such as needed by Dulles to provide stability and meaning. For instance, whereas General “Patton was dogmatic”, Eisenhower tended to qualify his observations and statements.³ Conceptual depth and self-confidence indeed strengthened his ability for self-criticism and reflection, “no one has a monopoly on the truth and on the facts that effect this country”.⁴

Furthermore, the sort of crisis that characterised rigid cognitive frameworks did not appeal to Eisenhower, “I have so often been through these periods of strain that I have become accustomed to the fact that most of the calamities that we anticipate never really occur.”⁵

This suppleness underlay Eisenhower’s ability to empathise. When in 1954, Cutler suggested pressuring Ceylon to stop exporting rubber to China, a trade that was vital to Colombo’s economy, Wilson’s proposed solution reflected appalling insensitivity, “rubber made an awful smell when you had to burn it”. Eisenhower slammed the

suggestion, furious for, “allowing a bunch of damned idiots to force us into policies with respect to trade that were absolutely foolish.”⁶ Empathy gave Eisenhower an immense ability for teamwork, leadership and getting along with people, reflected in his West Point football training sessions and by his being one of the very few people who was liked and respected by both MacArthur and Marshall.⁷ His conciliatory approach helped establish smooth relations with the British during the war and secured him the position of Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.¹ Similarly, Eisenhower changed his second inauguration speech from wanting to, “guide and lead all other people who love freedom” to, “walk with those who love freedom.”⁸

Eisenhower’s final significant difference with Dulles was his emphasis on economic development and repulsion of war. Eisenhower re-defined and deeply internalised the American missionary identity narrative, a point stressed in his second inauguration speech as, “a historical struggle for a new freedom: freedom from grinding poverty.”⁹ During his presidency, the Treasury Secretary and the Director of the Budget were automatic invitees to NSC meetings, while all policy papers were required to have budgetary appendices.¹⁰ Early policy made clear that, “excessive government spending leads to inflationary deficits or to repressive taxation” which undermined American security.¹¹ Such budgeting was reinforced by his distaste for war. Eisenhower, whose first combat experience came only in 1942, and whose military campaigns were mediocre, doubted

“whether any of these people, with their academic or dogmatic hatred of war, detest it as much as I do”. Others had not “seen bodies rotting on the

¹ Eisenhower’s conciliatory approach also had led to problems such as his agreeing the Darlan deal in North Africa in November 1941, for which he was extensively criticised.

ground and smelled the stench of decaying human flesh. They have not visited a field hospital crowded with the desperately wounded.”¹²

Decades later and after his tenure as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger compared his experiences as an historian with those as a policy practitioner, and noted that while the former, he underestimated the role of personality in policymaking.¹³ This impact is well demonstrated not only in Dulles but also in Eisenhower, for the latter’s combination of personal ontological security and conceptual suppleness, inducted a need for meaning and certainty through narrative categorisation and discourse that was more relaxed than Dulles’s and of the prevailing American cognitive fabric. The most important and critical policy translation of this was Ike’s demonstrated lesser internalisation and exercise of anti-communist narrative to understand and engage the world. Stated differently, Eisenhower did not rely on the anti-communist narrative to secure himself or his reality with. That he was a product of his era meant that, as with all real Americans, he remained suspicious of communism. But in his case, it was little more than that and not an identity that sustained reality and defined the self. Combined with his ability to empathise and his prioritisation of development over war, Eisenhower from the post-war breakdown in Russian relations remained uncomfortable with the centrality and dominance of anti-communism in America.¹⁴

Until 1955, Eisenhower oscillated between his scant appetite to understand the world through anti-communist narrative, and its intense application and use across America. On the one hand, his inaugural speech riposted communist Russia, “the forces of good and evil are massed and armed and opposed as rarely before in history.... freedom is

pitted against slavery, lightness against the dark.”¹⁵ On the other, in the same address, he emphasised conciliation, “science seems ready to confer upon us as its final gift, the power to erase human life from this planet.”¹⁶ Correspondingly, Eisenhower’s early slant to the Kremlin reflected a fine balance of caution and optimism. When Malenkov announced after Stalin’s death, Russia’s readiness to settle matters peacefully with America, Eisenhower was unsure how to respond.¹⁷ Strongly encouraged by Churchill, Ike reciprocated throughout 1953, “There are new governments in two great countries. The slate is clean – now let’s begin”.¹⁸ In April, Eisenhower gave his ‘The Chance for Peace’ speech,

— — — “The cost of one heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than thirty cities... This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron... We seek, throughout Asia as throughout the world, a peace that is true and total.”¹⁹

In June, Eisenhower criticised McCarthy when he told students, “Don’t join the book burners.... Don’t be afraid to go in your library and read every book.”²⁰ His ‘Atoms for Peace’ speech in December stressed limiting atomic energy for peaceful aims.²¹

These overtures clashed with the fierce pressure from McCarthy, Republicans, Dulles, Adenauer and the prevailing American political climate to enact and protect the anti-communist narrative.²² Responding to this and partly uncertain of his own policy direction, Eisenhower demanded impossible proofs of Russian goodwill, including releasing POWs held since 1945, signing the Austrian treaty, a Korean armistice,

settling Indochina and Malaya, uniting a free Germany and freeing Eastern Europe. In any case, in January 1954, Molotov reaffirmed the suspicions of Cold War warriors that Moscow was not ready for concessions by refusing to sign a treaty with Austria and wanting to link it with a German peace treaty.

The ‘Spirit of Geneva’ conference in July 1955 marked a significant *détente* of the anti-communist narrative in American policymaking, and the ascendancy of Eisenhower’s more agile cognitive framework, beyond bipolar anti-communism. With the Korean armistice and the Austrian treaty completed, Eisenhower, “came to Geneva because I believe mankind longs for freedom from war and rumors of war.”²³ Though there were no agreements on the agenda or on Eisenhower’s offer of mutual inspection of military sites, Geneva’s atmospherics altered the Cold War.ⁱⁱ Integral to this success was Eisenhower’s personal confidence, reflected not only in his ability to empathise and work with people, but more importantly and specifically in his willingness to categorise, attach meaning and engage outside of the anti-communist narrative. Even Le Monde, the French newspaper of anti-American disposition, proclaimed Eisenhower’s reputation, “as the kind of leader that humanity needs today.”²⁴ The New Look softened as nuclear war for Eisenhower became race suicide and Khrushchev denounced Stalin for his crimes in June 1956 - described by even Dulles as a, “permanent shift of direction”.²⁵ In the fine arts, anti-communism’s conformist pressures also eased - Barnett Newman even became a hero for his abstract expressionist exhibition in 1958.²⁶

ⁱⁱ The agenda at Geneva consisted of German reunification, European security, disarmament and *détente*

The previous chapter made mention of the relationship between Eisenhower and Dulles. Given the elucidation of both their frameworks, the contrast is briefly considered. Eisenhower did not subscribe to Dulles's insecurity from communism or his relative crudity and had misgivings about 'Liberation' when it was popularly accepted at the Republican convention in 1952, referring to it only when prodded by the Republican National Committee.²⁷ Understanding it in similar fashion to how Europe understood it – meaning war over Eastern Europe, and not as a commitment to renew American narratives threatened by communism, he told Dulles to always caveat its use with 'peaceful means'.²⁸ Eisenhower also had difficulty with Dulles's rigid bipolarity. For instance, though he agreed with most of Dulles's policy paper in 1952, he suspected the massive retaliatory responses in the event of minor attacks, "To my mind, this is a case where the theory of 'retaliation' falls down."²⁹

Nor did Eisenhower subscribe to Dulles's immersion into (bipolar) anti-communist identity narrative to locate self and reality. Malenkov's statements about 'peaceful coexistence' at Stalin's funeral were described by Ike as, "startling departures" with potential for détente, and demanded a positive approach to peace.³⁰ In contrast, Dulles, relying on Stalin's 'Problems of Leninism', emphasised the chapter on 'Tactical Retreats', and saw opportunity to further anti-communist narrative engagement by pressuring Russia, "I can say we have evaluated these speeches, but we do not receive any great comfort".³¹ It was Dulles who firmly insisted on the severe criteria to judge Russian intent and caveated Eisenhower's 'The Chance for Peace' speech, by emphasising that détente depended on Russian deeds not words.³²

The Geneva talks in 1955 not only marked Eisenhower's growing command of detailed policy, but also crystallised the contrast between the two officials. In a cartoon from Herblock's Here and Now, published just before the talks, a grumpy Dulles marked 'Dulles Doubts' looks annoyingly at a vibrant Eisenhower, marked 'Eisenhower Optimism', both on their way to the Geneva summit, saying, "Yes, We'll Be There, Rain And Shine."³³ As he left Geneva, Dulles noted, "Well, I think it is a little premature to talk about the 'era of good feelings'."³⁴ Whereas Eisenhower celebrated Geneva, Dulles feared the effect of destabilising America's nucleus identity narrative,

"Geneva has certainly created problems for the free nations. For eight years they have been held together largely by a cement compounded of fear and a sense of moral superiority. Now the fear is diminished and the moral demarcation is somewhat blurred.... We must assume that the Soviet leaders consider their recent change of policy to be an application of the classic Communist manoeuvre known as 'zig-zag' – i.e., resort to the tactics of retreat... 'to buy off a powerful enemy and gain a respite' (Stalin)".³⁵

Finally, just as America's environment of 1953 was highly conducive to Dulles, that from late 1956 was favourable to Eisenhower. Disney even co-opted the pride and joy of a potential holocaust in a Disneyland TV Show with a feature on 'Our Friend, the Atom'. With this détente, inspired in part by the Spirit of Geneva, and as Ike's effectiveness increased, that of Dulles diminished, "In word and deed Dulles seemed unable to articulate any purpose beyond preventing a further expansion of

Communism.”³⁶ Too cognitively rigid to understand the world outside of America’s anti-communist narrative, Dulles stuck to the right, ignoring the extensive openings with Russia and was consequently criticised throughout the second administration, being reduced to a comparable ineffectiveness that Acheson had been after Korea, albeit for quite opposing reasons.³⁷

The American Mission and Resurrecting ‘India’

Since Eisenhower did not subscribe in any substantive way to the anti-communist identity, he relied on other real American identity narratives to categorise and attach meaning, which in the case of India, was through its other privileged narrative – the American mission. Eisenhower, who felt that Nehru and Mao were Asia’s two main leaders, re-categorised, attached meaning to and engaged India within America’s mission. One advantage in this understanding of India, which had strong latent support amongst middle ranking officials, was India’s stature in the Third World, an arena that might later constitute a further stage in the missionary narrative. Since the last concerted attempt to engage India within the missionary narrative in 1949, India had emerged as the premier representative of the Asian-African or ‘Bandung’ region.³⁸ Glimmers of Eisenhower’s locating India within the mission were noticeable well before it translated into policy. Though Eisenhower felt India’s concern over aid to Pakistan was, “a nuisance”, he led assurances to Nehru that the aid would not be used against India and emphasised its purpose for regional anti-communist security.³⁹ In April 1953, Eisenhower accepted India’s inclusion as a member of the Korean War commission, annoying Dulles and the JCS, neither of whom could make much sense of India.⁴⁰ Eisenhower’s increasing cognition of India within the mission towards the

latter part of his first term coincided with the vocal emergence, within the diminishing anti-communist environment, of prominent others who shared his understanding.⁴¹

Chief amongst them was a friend of Nehru's, John Sherman Cooper, former ambassador to India and John Kennedy, who were elected to the Senate and House respectively in 1956.⁴²

India's growing categorisation and meaning within the missionary narrative was assisted by Eisenhower's ability to emancipate India from its categorisation within the anti-communist narrative by outright rejecting its bipolar reading and creating legitimate space within anti-communism for neutralism, "The President reiterated his belief that in some instances the neutrality of a foreign nation was to the direct advantage of the United States."⁴³ The advantage of this also extended into his concerns for economic development, for Eisenhower accepted neutralism partly to keep from military alliances and wasteful defence spending.⁴⁴ A few months later, he explained for those less able to share his understanding of India, the cruder material benefits of this cognition,

"we were better off with India following its policy of non-alignment than were she to join up actively on our side, with the consequent added burden on the American taxpayer and 2000 miles more of active frontier."⁴⁵

His lead was extensively followed, linking as it did for the first time a pool of middle ranking officials supportive of India within the missionary narrative to policymaking's summit, and was evidently reflected in the ease with which neutralism permeated policy, "It was no longer a very important or unduly held view that PM

Nehru was some kind of ‘fellow-traveller or crypto-Communist’.⁴⁶ In the same way, the Operations Plan for India in July 1957, and in contrast to NSC 5409 in 1954, did not demand that India align with the West.⁴⁷

In 1956, Eisenhower, sensitised to the Third World after Suez and Hungary, had the opportunity to reach to Nehru. Though Menon and Dulles clashed over Suez, Nehru was surprised by Eisenhower’s condemnation of the Anglo-French-Israeli conspiracy. Nehru and Eisenhower also criticised Russia over Hungary, albeit with differing public intensity. These pleasant jolts were followed by Nehru’s visit to Washington, delayed by Eisenhower’s earlier ill health, in December 1956. In 1954, Madame Pandit had suggested that American-Indian tensions would ease if Nehru and Eisenhower met informally. Though many Americans approached Nehru’s visit cautiously, especially Dulles, her advice was markedly accurate and the visit proved very successful.⁴⁸ Eisenhower and Nehru connected well, inaugurating strong American-Indian relations throughout the second Republican term. Nehru described Eisenhower as, “a truly great man” while Eisenhower empathised with Nehru’s independence for India’s development and as a reaction to Western arrogance.⁴⁹ Such was the success that the Indian Parliament even established an Indo-American Friendship Society to mark the visit.

Facilitated by this rapport, America’s categorisation of India within the missionary narrative was reinforced by Beijing’s increasingly militant and Marxist fundamentalist approach, which later led it to accuse Russia of social imperialism. China’s vociferous expression again aggravated the wound in America’s missionary narrative, earning Beijing promotion as Washington’s primary enemy. In 1957, while

the CIA expressed concern about increasing Chinese influence in Asia, Eisenhower placed tactical nuclear weapons in Taiwan.⁵⁰ The Agency's reports concluded that Russia wanted détente and was trying to restrain China and by 1958, there even emerged a Russo-American 'community of interest' against China.⁵¹ During the August 1958 Jinmen crisis, which, though lasting only six weeks, was more intense than the Quemoy scare, Dulles and the JCS repeated their requests to strike China with tactical nuclear weapons.ⁱⁱⁱ

As a result and throughout Eisenhower's second term, comparisons of China and the Indian missionary surrogate therefore became more direct and frequent,

“China's tacit yet certain rivalry with India is one of the basic facts of Asian politics.... The outcome of the race could have a very considerable effect on the other and much smaller Asian countries.”⁵²

India was promoted to, “the leading political contender with Communist China in Asia”.⁵³ In May 1959, Gray asked if India was, “a counterweight to Communist China or was India to be a successful example of an alternative to Communism in Asia”.⁵⁴ Though Eisenhower categorically denied that India could counterweight China, given India's non-alignment and the huge financial cost of supporting such a counterweight, Washington effectively saw India as precisely that, if only to counter the disturbance to America's understanding of its own identity. For instance, China intruded regularly in discussions between Eisenhower and Nehru and during the NSC meetings, such as in May 1959, where India as usual was discussed predominantly against the

ⁱⁱⁱ According to Wang Bingnan, China manufactured the crisis to arrest Khrushchev's détente with Eisenhower.

background of China.⁵⁵ Even India's Ambassador Chagla, borrowing Karachi's chameleon talent, spotlighted, "an economic race was taking place between India and Communist China".⁵⁶

The opportunity to engage India within the missionary narrative, crystallising it to policy, came in India's economic crisis in 1957. India's first five-year plan (1951-56) had focused on food production and distribution. Its second five-year plan (1956-61) was a US\$14.9bn industrialisation plan to raise economic output by twenty-five percent, but had an investment deficit forecast at above US\$2.5bn.⁵⁷ The magnitude of this deficit can be gauged by comparing it to India's total inward investment from 1948 to 1952 of only US\$115.9m.⁵⁸

At first and throughout 1956, most American officials agreed in principal to aid the plan but there was neither consensus nor urgency on a program.^{iv} However, as India's meaning within the missionary narrative became more prominent, Washington first digested the seriousness of India's economic problems in December 1956. Before Nehru's visit, even Indian ministers pleaded with Eisenhower to actually initiate discussions of aid with the far too proud Nehru, for a, "'moment of history' has arrived which if seized and exploited, can give US much firmer anti-Communist and anti-Red China counterpoise in India."⁵⁹ By early 1957, India's economic problems had ballooned. Rising defence and raw material costs, and food production shortfalls, left a huge foreign exchange gap. In January, India seemed perched on disaster. The prospect of another missionary narrative rupture in India's economic failure gave policymakers acute anxiety, "A failure of the Plan which resulted in a severe cutback

^{iv} Washington had a sound track record in aiding India, having given from 1952 to 1957, US\$343m in economic loans and grants, US\$57m in technical grants and US\$550m of commodity loans.

and a slowing down of the economy could have catastrophic results on the stability of democratic institutions in India.”⁶⁰ America’s new policy to India in January 1957, NSC 5701, emphasised the,

“risks to US security from a weak and vulnerable India would be greater than the risks of a stable and influential India. A weak India might lead to the loss of South and Southeast Asia to Communism”.⁶¹

India’s economic health came to embody America’s missionary identity’s future. Indeed, between May 1956 and October 1960, an impressive four National Intelligence Estimates were completed on India’s economy alone,

“A) Essentially, our objectives center about need for India to have stable, non-communist government, economically sound and favoring free world, which will give hope for building an Asian bulwark against challenges of international communism, especially Communist Chinese strength and ideology. B) Economic growth in India is essential to India’s future ability fill that role.”⁶²

By November 1957, the issue of aid to India had intensified from political background to centre stage.⁶³ The New Delhi embassy warned,

“If outside assistance is insufficient or too late and India fails substantially to continue its early progress and improve its people’s lot, not only will it suffer a severe, perhaps decisive, blow to its political and ideological

foundations, but Red China and its totalitarian system will emerge with added prestige and influence in Asian countries.”⁶⁴

With India’s categorisation in the mission in ascendancy and the five-year plan near collapse, Washington tentatively planned engaging India by explicitly assessing how to aid it. That Washington broadly accepted that a neutral state of the Cold War should receive substantial aid marked a watershed in policy. In February 1957, Assistant Secretary of State for the NEA, William Rountree and Ambassador Bunker recommended giving India US\$800m - US\$1bn to fill the foreign exchange gap. The administration considered a variety of aid sources, including rolling the annual Export Credit Agency (‘ECA’) debt servicing of US\$350m, seeking legislation to increase the DLF specifically for India, supplementing PL-480 agreements, increasing IBRD lending and securing German aid.⁶⁵ Foggy Bottom officials and New Delhi staff lobbied Dulles to appeal to Congress. However, America was in a mild recession and the public wanted tax cuts so Congress reduced Eisenhower’s request for a Development Loan Fund (‘DLF’) of US\$500m for 1958 and US\$750m for 1959, to US\$300m and US\$625m respectively.⁶⁶ In any case, neither Dulles nor Congress could attach substantive meaning to India within America’s mission.

While America deliberated, India’s economy deteriorated further. The 1957 monsoon failed and reduced the rice crop, while the West’s mild recession reduced India’s export earnings. Bunker advised, “I have frankly never seen the GOI so deeply concerned and worried about anything since I have been here.”⁶⁷ India was sufficiently worried and relations with Eisenhower sufficiently improved that Nehru sent his cousin, Braj Kumar (‘B K’) Nehru, the Ministry of Finance’s senior civil

servant on permanent assignment to Washington in June to expedite and increase aid.⁶⁸ In May 1957, B K advised that India's foreign exchange was US\$3bn short. Even after all aid included, it was still US\$1bn short and, "by the end of September India would be face to face with disaster."⁶⁹

Finally, in January 1958, Washington offered a US\$225m loan, a US\$150m Ex-Im loan, and a US\$75m DLF grant. In August, Washington convinced the IBRD, UK, Germany, Canada and Japan to provide US\$350m for India's foreign exchange crisis. However, to salvage the 'hard core' of her development program, US\$500m-US\$800m was still needed from the US alone.⁷⁰ Congressmen Kennedy and Sherman, strongly committed to understanding India within the missionary narrative, introduced a resolution calling for further aid to India,

"to join with other nations in providing support of the type, magnitude, and duration adequate to assist India to complete successfully its current program for economic development."⁷¹

By May 1959, America policy to India demonstrated a marked urgency to engaging and protecting the missionary narrative.⁷² Washington even strongly considered India's request to finance a variety of public sector projects and surprisingly even help build a 150MW atomic power plant.⁷³

Within engaging America's missionary narrative through India, the surprise election of an Indian Communist Party-led coalition in Kerala in March 1957 caused particular irritation to Washington and remained a prominent background for policy to India.⁷⁴

Washington treated Kerala as a communist satellite state, "Calls by US officials visiting or stationed in Kerala on the Chief Minister and other cabinet members should be kept to an absolute minimum."⁷⁵ America was also concerned about communist activity in Bengal where Calcutta's communists were prominent, by the recent weakening of the Congress Party and an increase in the Communist Party's strength.⁷⁶ Despite the Kerala government's dismissal in July 1959, concerns persisted in response to communists securing gradually larger number of votes and voting percentages in the late 1950s.⁷⁷

Meanwhile, India warmed to America. Nehru's growing ease with Indian identity lessened his need for its pronouncement, "Nehru privately, if not publicly, appears to have become somewhat more sympathetic to the US on some issues."⁷⁸ In any case, unlike Acheson, Henderson and Dulles, but similar to Bowles, Eisenhower, who was a popular personality in India since 1953, did not behave as Nehru's superior.⁷⁹ New Delhi even opened its books to American inspectors on the sensitive issue of Indian defence spending, an unimaginable prospect only a few years back and unlike the second five-year plan, Nehru directly approached Washington for the third plan beginning in 1961.⁸⁰ Nehru also began to view China hostilely, being especially upset by Chinese actions in Burma, Nepal and Tibet.⁸¹ Sino-Indian territorial boundary disputes dating from 1947 became a serious issue in 1957-58, especially after the Dalai Lama's arrival in India.⁸²

Contained by America and India's respective cognitions and urgencies, the rapport that Eisenhower and Nehru had established in 1956, became especially strong from 1957. Eisenhower wrote to Nehru,

“I believe that because you are a world leader for peace in your individual capacity, as well as a representative of the largest of the neutral nations, your influence is particularly valuable in stemming the global drift toward cynicism, mutual suspicion, materialistic opportunism and, finally, disaster.”⁸³

Likewise, on hearing that Nehru may retire, America’s thirty-fourth president encouraged India’s first prime minister to continue to serve, “it would indeed be a misfortune perhaps for us all, if at what may prove to be a critical, formative period, your own influence were not actively present over any really protracted period.”⁸⁴

Eisenhower’s discussions with Nehru, and unlike with Ayub, covered global issues. In December 1956, the pair discussed the Middle East, Hungary, German reunification, the Cold War and détente, and China.⁸⁵ In September 1959, they discussed issues of European security, the UN, Africa and global disarmament.⁸⁶ In September 1960, their agenda consisted of the potential transfer of the UN to Berlin, Congo, disarmament, the structure of the office of the UN Secretary General, an African UN bloc, the OAS, the EC, Khrushchev’s attack on the UN and Sino-Soviet relations.⁸⁷

Only London and Bonn were privy to more intimate and far-reaching discussions with Eisenhower.

While the missionary narrative dominated America’s understanding of India, the application of anti-communist categorisation and discourse, albeit as an undercurrent, also intensified around India. Russia’s Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (‘ICBM’) in August 1957, which led to ‘gaps everywhere’, and Sputnik in October 1957, shook

America and cast the impression that the Third World was vulnerable to Russian influence. Furthermore, from 1953 to 1958, Russia-India trade increased from US\$1.6m to US\$94.6m, while Russia gave to India almost US\$400m of aid.⁸⁸ In India's third five-year plan's planning stage, Russian aid forecasts to India ranged between US\$650m and US\$1bn.⁸⁹ That such economic aid cut across American theories of poverty-related communist growth seems not to have been questioned. A paper prepared by the embassy entitled, 'The Soviet Economic Offensive In India' in May 1959 noted,

"facts are available from several sources, which leave no doubt as to Soviet intentions in India, and reveal a Soviet economic warfare program of broad scope and considerable magnitude... They will give India 'anything it asks for' for development under the third Five Year Plan."⁹⁰

Those officials who understood India within the anti-communist narrative offered an inconsistent policy, reflecting the tension between cognising India within a bipolar against a more lithe structure. Thus on the one hand, India became a battleground in which the US massively increased its propaganda.⁹¹ Nixon and Dulles supported increasing aid to India,

"it is feared that if the second Five Year Plan fails they may extend their power to the more populous and strategically situated province of Bengal... the chances of chaos and a Communist advent to power in the sub-continent would be vastly increased."⁹²

Yet on the other hand, Dulles still had difficulties in locating India on America's side in bipolar anti-communism and in sustaining space for neutralism, a cocktail which triggered a seemingly schizophrenic engagement of India,

“The impact on Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan will be great – they will be deeply offended if we give major aid to India while they are so much in need, when they have been supporting us while India has been working against us.”⁹³

Indeed Dulles advised Ayub that, “The United States does not like to give aid to neutrals”.⁹⁴ Throughout his term in office, Dulles remained highly uncomfortable, unlike Eisenhower, in sustaining a third position within the anti-communist narrative – a frustration expressed for example in his bombastically accusing the Indian ambassador of using American aid to build military strength against Karachi.⁹⁵ Thus the Dulles – Eisenhower split in policy to South Asia, which was discernible over Kashmir. Eisenhower sympathised with Nehru's anxiety about Kashmir, “if they build the boundaries along religious lines, he is in a hole.” In contrast, Dulles sympathised with Pakistan's concern about India trying to undo Pakistan, “The Sec agreed but the trouble is that the Pakis think that position strikes at the existence of Pakistan – they are trying to undo Pakistan.”⁹⁶ Though this tension persisted until Dulles's death, the Secretary, to his credit, nonetheless faithfully executed Eisenhower's policy to India, by for instance facilitating Eisenhower's invitation to Nehru.⁹⁷

Dulles's difficulty in accepting a third way within anti-communism, which could expedite America's understanding and engagement of India within the missionary

narrative, was extensively shared in the legislative and executive. Congressman Malone insisted that Nehru was a communist, “who does not even know it.”⁹⁸ In 1956, a clause to the mutual security bill ending all aid to India fell short by only three votes in the House.⁹⁹ Treasury Secretary Humphrey, who kept to a bipolar anti-communist configuration, wanted to ignore India all together.¹⁰⁰ Eisenhower objected to Humphrey’s concerns about aiding India, “it was fatuous to imagine that private enterprise alone could achieve India’s economic objectives”.¹⁰¹ Robert Anderson, the next Treasury Secretary pointed that,

“Aid to India will be a very hard proposition to sell, because their behaviour has been very offensive on the Communist issue, and because they have gone out of their way to insult us on many occasions.”¹⁰²

Two years on, Eisenhower argued against Frederick Mueller, Commerce Secretary and Gordon Gray, NSA Adviser. Mueller expressed concern, “private industry in this country would not look with favor on financing the socialization of industry in these uncommitted nations, nor should we use taxpayers’ money for this purpose.”¹⁰³ He added that aid to India was exclusively for government projects, “which had the effect of putting the recipient government into business. This amounted to socialism.”¹⁰⁴ Eisenhower again defended India, not only was there, “a certain amount of socialistic activity mixed into American free enterprise” but,

“experience with US private enterprise investing in underdeveloped countries had not been too happy...If the US stayed out of the public sector of the Indian economy, this sector would be left to the USSR”.¹⁰⁵

Pakistan: Re-Cognition

While India was gradually given meaning to within America's missionary narrative, Eisenhower's ascendant framework also had implications for Pakistan. Having been unsuccessful in engaging Pakistan within the Middle East, America geographically re-located Pakistan into South Asia with India. One nub of this relocation was not anti-communism but America's concerns about India's economy. NSC 5701 noted the relationship between India's economic difficulties and its military spending to meet America's military aid to Pakistan,

“India's foreign exchange problem is aggravated by imports of military equipment. Indian officials have indicated that about US\$200 million in foreign exchange was spent for military purposes in FY 1957-1958 and that something under US\$400m is projected for the last three years of the Plan period...the defense budget rose to US\$640 million in FY 1958-59, i.e., about 35 percent of the ordinary budget.”¹⁰⁶

B K similarly warned that India's economic forecasts would only hold if, “the USG did not give additional arms to Pakistan.”¹⁰⁷ Therefore, to fulfil its missionary narrative, America categorised Pakistan, simultaneous to its continued categorisation within anti-communism, in the missionary narrative – albeit as an Indian incidental and partial anomaly.

Complementing this, Pakistan also catalysed its own geographic re-location into South Asia by more vocally expressing its political reality. Karachi's involvement in the two Western security regimes was in intent not anti-communist, but firmly anti-Indian. Ayub won support for the MSA and the Baghdad Pact only by portraying them as anti-Indians treaties.¹⁰⁸ Mohammed Ali told Zhou En Lai at Bandung that Pakistan's membership of SEATO was not directed at China.¹⁰⁹ Pakistani officials told Moscow that American military aid was not for use, "against Soviets but because of their difficulties with India."¹¹⁰ Similarly, Pakistan raised Kashmir and Pushtunistan at the SEATO Council meeting in Karachi in March 1956, and received support by way of recognition of the Durand line and calls for an early Kashmir settlement through a plebiscite.¹¹¹ Likewise, at a Baghdad Pact meeting, Nuri, "turned to Kashmir issue and expressed his conviction that Kashmiris should be allowed determine their own destiny pursuant right of self- determination."¹¹²

The Eisenhower administration first recorded Pakistan's fixation with India in early 1955 even if it was not deeply registered,

"Pakistan regards the Indian threat as much more serious to Pakistan than the Russian or Communist China threats. The Pakistan Army is now deployed along the Indian border and all tactical and strategic planning by the Pakistani centre on Indian problems as having first priority."¹¹³

It was however in March, after having already engaged Pakistan to the tune of more than US\$350m, that Dulles confessed he, "never appreciated before the full depth" of the Indo-Pakistan relationship.¹¹⁴ Still, translating Pakistan's re-location into South

Asia was a fractured process. At one end, ambassador to Pakistan, James Langley noted, “the overall problem is not India, or Pakistan, but the sub-continent, and should be treated as such” and the State Department added, “every Pakistani increase in the military expenditure had been justified in Pakistani eyes by the need to counter Indian military development”.¹¹⁵ On the other, Eisenhower proposed in December 1956 that the, “United States will deal with Pakistan quite separately from its policies towards India”.¹¹⁶ Additionally, a progress report on NSC 5409 in January 1957 implicitly understated the intensity of the Indo-Pakistan connection, “Pakistan and Indian military forces improved in quality, and the defense of the Free World was strengthened thereby”.¹¹⁷

Eisenhower’s emergent direction of policy also instigated emphasis on Pakistan’s economy. The intelligence community and middle-ranking State officials had maintained a strong economic focus of Pakistan since 1953.¹¹⁸ In October 1954, the Heinz mission’s extensive study of Pakistan’s economy led to an emergency US\$105m foreign exchange package. In that same month, middle-ranking State Department officials stressed building Karachi’s economy so it could support its own military needs.¹¹⁹ By 1956, Eisenhower’s pro-active economic approach was permeating policy’s core. NSC Action 1550, in May 1956, directed that no commitments involving expenditures be undertaken without executive approval, that any such commitments accord with policy, that relevant funds be clearly available, that the recipient use such funds efficiently and that timetables be outlined.¹²⁰ Against this background and Pakistan’s continuing economic deterioration, Washington’s focus on Karachi’s economy gradually intensified during the second Eisenhower term.¹²¹

Tension

Throughout the Eisenhower years, the notion of credibility became an increasingly important constituent of America's policy, especially because of the New Look upon which Western Europe rested its defence.¹²² Adenauer had only American credibility to ease his anxieties about whether Washington would use its nuclear arsenal to defend Europe.¹²³ Europe demanded control of atomic weapons, by transferring them to NATO commanders and the use of tactical weapons granted to the corps level. The only way to persuade the Dutch defence minister, Cornelius Staf, or his German counterpart, Franz-Josef Strauss otherwise and of their security against Moscow was through American credibility.¹²⁴

That credibility became especially vulnerable in the Middle East. Suez squeezed America's manoeuvrability by bonding Arab nationalism with Moscow. Russia, which had no relationships in the Middle East before 1939, sought joint regional responsibility with America after Suez.¹²⁵ Washington worried that, "Soviet prestige and influence in certain Near Eastern countries, particularly Syria and Egypt, has attained threatening proportions."¹²⁶ Confronted with a vibrant communised Arab nationalism, but restrained in its options by its commitment to the Pact, Washington reconsidered strategy.¹²⁷ Tensions were partly reconciled in December 1956 by the Middle East Resolution (the Eisenhower Doctrine), a flexible and broad-based resolution for the Middle East, to deter communist aggression in the area. To this, from early 1956 to 1958, Eisenhower also encouraged Jeddah to rival Cairo and pushed Britain to settle the Buraimi dispute, and possibly circumvent Nasser.¹²⁸

Nevertheless, these attempts to arrest the West's decline failed.^v In August 1957, Syria signed an agreement with Russia, expelled three American diplomats and appointed a communist sympathiser as its army chief.¹²⁹ Washington mistakenly assumed Moscow was establishing a satellite, which, Henderson insisted, would lead to the loss of the Middle East.¹³⁰ In February 1958, Syria and Egypt launched the United Arab Republic, which Dulles at first categorised as a communist adventure.¹³¹ Finally, Faisal replaced the American sympathetic Saud. Washington, uncertain about Nasser's relationship with Moscow, was on the defensive, "the UAR, with Soviet support, has seized the initiative in the Arab unity movement, which is the most dynamic political force in the area".¹³² Difficulties were compounded by the continual regional fluctuation, which America was unable to grasp,

"the President had recently stated that this review should not be completed until he determines that evolving conditions in that area make feasible the adoption of a new long-term policy toward the Near East."¹³³

At the end of 1957, America's strategy for the Middle East was, as it had been after the Baghdad Pact's signing, a wreck. The Middle East policy statement, NSC 5428, had in September 1957, "hardly a paragraph in the entire document, which fulfils the criteria of acceptability and accurate reflection of the current situation."¹³⁴

Without alternative strategy and given America's tenuous position, Washington feared it might be left in the Middle East with the, "choice of either using force to

^v Britain's retraction spread beyond the Middle East. In June 1957, Ceylon forced Britain to leave its base in Trincomalee.

maintain our position in the area or seeing it disappear entirely.”¹³⁵ Though the US still refrained from joining the Pact for fear of antagonising Saudi, Israel, and Nasser, it prioritised satisfying Pact members, the only stable pro-American group in the region.¹³⁶ As a result in March 1957, Washington joined the Pact’s military committee, and was represented by the prominent General Nathan Twining, who in August became the JCS chairman, and in January 1958, Dulles himself attended the Pact’s Ministerial Meeting which was fortunate since, at this meeting, if, “the United States had not undertaken a very active part in the proceedings and accepted a very positive role, the whole thing would have fallen apart.”¹³⁷

Therefore, and given the vulnerability of American credibility in the Middle East, in answer to why America could, “not take a complete new look at our military assistance program for Pakistan”, one official rightly emphasised American credibility, “we had made a commitment to Pakistan with respect to this program, and that from a political point of view we were obliged to live up to the commitment.”¹³⁸ The preservation of credibility, represented in America’s outmoded military engagement of Pakistan in the Middle East, underlay three tensions in American policy to Pakistan. The first was America’s focus on economic development, inspired by Eisenhower, which contrasted with Pakistan’s economic weakness and military obesity.^{vi} The ICA reported in February 1957, “The armed forces presently consume nearly 70 percent of current central government revenues... threatens the development of the longer-range political, economic and even military strength of the country”.¹³⁹ Langley continued this stream,

^{vi} E Benoit’s analysis in 1973 of the *positive* correlation between defence spending and economic growth in South Asia is noteworthy. The argument made in, “Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries” was that the armed forces used under-utilised or unutilised economic resources.

“Military strength, without a sound economic and political base, does not constitute real strength in South Asia or elsewhere. It is time to rethink our approach to the Pakistan problem.... A more comprehensive review, however, is called for, which gives greater weight to developing Pakistan as a strong viable ally of the US rather than concentrating on building of a military force which may not have vis-à-vis Communist bloc a value in proportion with its cost both to Pakistan and the US”.¹⁴⁰

Langley, at the forefront of the exploration of this tension, frequently cited and related Pakistan’s economic crisis and fat military.¹⁴¹ He added that,

“the only reason why Pakistan able to keep going is US aid...Military strength, without a sound economic and political base does not constitute real strength.... It is time to rethink our approach to the Pakistan problem”.¹⁴²

Nor did Washington hold out much room for Pakistan’s economic improvement. The embassy reported that Pakistan was barely keeping afloat due to its heavy military burden and that, “Pakistan offers little or no help for viability in the foreseeable future”.¹⁴³ Pakistani officials hardly offered comforting news when for instance in July 1957, Suhrawardy presented to Eisenhower a long list of aid needs to, “avoid starvation, revolution, inflation and chaos”.¹⁴⁴ In any case, according to Pakistani foreign minister, Zafrullah Khan, “it was Pakistan’s belief that the ‘beggar’s bowl’ should never be concealed.”¹⁴⁵ Eisenhower thus concluded that the military

commitment to Pakistan was, “perhaps the worst kind of a plan and decision we could have made... It was a terrible error but we now seem hopelessly involved in it.”¹⁴⁶

The second tension that American credibility underlay was Washington’s re-location of Pakistan out of the Middle East, against Washington’s increasingly costly engagement of Pakistan as a Middle East state. Throughout Eisenhower’s second term, US policymakers excluded Pakistan from the Middle East. Hoover’s detailed plan on the Middle East, presented to Eisenhower in November 1956, hardly mentioned Pakistan.¹⁴⁷ The State Department’s report in December 1956 and another one ten months later on American progress in the region made no mention of Pakistan.¹⁴⁸ NSC 5801 in January 1958, America’s first policy definition in the Middle East in Eisenhower’s second term, was dominated by Russia, Arab nationalism and Israel, without mention of Pakistan. Neither of NSC 5801’s replacements in NSC 5820 in October 1958 and NSC 6011 in July 1960, made reference to Pakistan.¹⁴⁹ Bespoke foci and studies on Pakistan similarly ignored the Middle East. NSC 5909’s goals for Pakistan and the May 1959 National Intelligence Estimate assessment of Pakistan did not mention the Middle East, and nor did Ambassador Rountree’s brief for Pakistan.¹⁵⁰

Only the Pentagon, incensed by the New Look’s budget reductions and cemented into an anti-communist framework, emphasised Pakistan’s cognition and engagement in the Middle East, without ever precisely outlining Karachi’s role.¹⁵¹ General Lemnitzer felt,

“the State Department approach does not afford adequate consideration of the Soviet military threat...in the light of the current threat against the Baghdad Pact nations he considered the present level of Pakistan forces essential.”¹⁵²

The Pentagon, which saw the South Asian arms race as a symptom, not a source of tension, concluded, “Pakistani military forces and programmed aid are essential to maintain what is considered minimum US defense objectives in this area.”¹⁵³ Defence analysts complained that reducing Pakistan’s military would reduce South Asia’s defences.¹⁵⁴ However, the military supported Pakistan’s role in the region almost exclusively on a non-military basis by insisting in NSC 5701 and NSC 5909 that, “Pakistan, as a major Muslim power, can exert a moderating influence on the extreme nationalism and anti-Western attitudes of the Arab states.”¹⁵⁵ The Pentagon’s strategic case was thus paradoxically exclusively a political one.

Despite America’s exclusion (notwithstanding the Pentagon) of Pakistan from the Middle East, America’s cost of engaging Pakistan in the Middle East was sizable and painfully growing. In June 1956, the Prochnow Committee reported that Pakistan’s five and a half divisions would cost America US\$505m to build, and a *further* US\$765m-US\$1.1bn to maintain during 1958-1960. Washington had to meet these costs, since Pakistan, “would be unable to maintain the military establishment or to develop its own economy.”¹⁵⁶ More concerning was that Pakistan’s demands grew in higher specifications B-66 bombers, military infrastructure, territorial guarantees and in August 1957, much to Washington’s ache, ‘phase two’ of its military aid, for

matters, “separate and distinct from their requirements deriving from their responsibility under the Baghdad Pact”.¹⁵⁷

Langley, referring to the Middle East, was understandably fed up by the conflict between the, “strategic role Pakistan forces vis-à-vis Soviet threat on which we have been seeking clarification several occasions, so far unsuccessfully,” meaning its redundancy in the Middle East, and the huge cost of engaging Pakistan in that region.¹⁵⁸ Having read General Truman’s report in 1957 forecasting that Pakistan could hold out from an India, let alone Russia, attack for only a month, Langley acutely doubted the Pentagon’s assessment of Pakistan’s contribution,

“I wonder if we have not collectively developed certain generalizations about Pakistan and then proceeded to accept them as gospel truth without sufficient periodic scrutiny. For example, I was told that Pakistan constitutes a cornerstone of US foreign policy in this part of the world, that Pakistan is the anchor of the Baghdad Pact and of SEATO, that the Paks are strong, direct, friendly and virile, and that Pakistan constitutes a bulwark of strength in the area, etc. What concerns me is that all this is in real danger of being wiped out if something is not done to arrest the deterioration in many aspects of Pakistani life”.¹⁵⁹

The third and final tension in American policy was Pakistan’s use of precisely this very reluctantly given American military aid against India – hence jeopardising America’s missionary narrative enactment. The difficulty lay not merely in America’s recognition of Pakistan’s political reality, though somewhat that too, but specifically

and primarily its extension, being Pakistan's actual harnessing of American aid against the missionary narrative. Although India reconciled to the completion of the military aid program to Pakistan, it still let it be known that the program wedged Indian-American relations.¹⁶⁰ India's fears were exasperated by not knowing the program's magnitude, which was kept unusually veiled, and which led it to suspect at one stage that Washington might even build atomic bases in Pakistan.¹⁶¹

Throughout 1956, Pakistan blatantly advertised its military focus on India.¹⁶² After India acquired seventy Canberra bombers from Britain, Pakistan demanded urgent supply of bombers promised in October 1954 to militarily balance South Asia.¹⁶³ Similarly, American aid to India in 1958 left Pakistan, as Ayub explained, with a "serious security position" that then demanded further military aid, "more related to the threat from India than threats from other sources."¹⁶⁴ Though occasionally Karachi argued its case more sophisticatedly, such as in August 1957, when it sought more aid without which it would be unable to, "contribute to area's defense against Communist aggression unless it was also able to defend itself against India," Washington felt a pinch from Karachi's primary motive.¹⁶⁵ Langley cynically wrote to Washington,

"I can only assume that this Pakistani fixation on India rather than on USSR was thoroughly taken into account when present policy of military aid to Pakistan was instituted in 1954."¹⁶⁶

America's fears about de-railing India from within the missionary narrative were compounded by budgetary constraints, as expressed by Percival Brundage, Director of

the Bureau of the Budget, “the more military assistance we give to Pakistan, the more assistance India in turn will expect from us.”¹⁶⁷

Conflict Resolution

The sharp point to these three tensions struck when Pakistan dragged America to support its position in Kashmir in the UN against New Delhi in early 1957.

Throughout 1956, Karachi became immensely antagonised by events leading to the Kashmir Constituent Assembly’s eventual ratification in November of the Kashmiri Maharajah’s instrument of accession of 1947, which thus made Kashmir an integral part of India.¹⁶⁸ As a consequence, from early 1956, Pakistan vigorously pursued the reaffirmation of previous UN declarations, especially those stressing Kashmir’s undecided status and promoting its urgent resolution through a plebiscite. Right through 1956, Ayub, believing that the Hindus were, as were the Afghanis and in fact all those who opposed him, fickle and susceptible to pressure, demanded that Washington, its ally of two alliances, pressure India on Kashmir.

In contrast, Washington had avoided Kashmir throughout Eisenhower’s first term reflecting its detachment of Pakistan from South Asia, and was reluctant to change for, “our interest avoid insofar as possible playing leading role which would incur wrath both sides”.¹⁶⁹ While NSC 5701 noted that, “A mutually acceptable resolution of the Kashmir issue and the early resolution of other differences must be an important aim of US policy”, it neither emphasised that America assist the conflict’s resolution nor offered considered thought to its resolution.¹⁷⁰ Even when Pakistan brought Kashmir to the UN, Washington remained only reactive, hoping the problem

would dissipate. By late 1956, America however found itself trapped by Pakistan's insistence on taking Kashmir through the Security Council, which hit improving relations with India. On 24th January 1957, despite repeated private American pleas, Pakistan forced Washington to support two successful Security Council resolutions that affirmed previous Kashmir resolutions and the plebiscite solution. A third resolution on 28th February, which Pakistan introduced, and called for the sending of a UN force and the Council's President to Kashmir, was blocked by Moscow on India's request. This was followed by a fourth and successful resolution that called only for the Council's president to visit Kashmir.¹⁷¹

With Graham running out of ideas and in an effort to resolve the three tensions, now sternly felt, Washington sought to reconcile Pakistan's disputes with India - hoping that by doing so, Pakistan's military demands from America's engagement of Pakistan in the Middle East would reduce, its militarisation would ease and help improve its economy, and Pakistan would have less incentive to use Northern Tier armaments against India, thus shielding India's place in the missionary narrative.¹⁷²

As a first and instinctive step, in January 1957, Washington decided not to further military aid to Pakistan beyond the committed program, described as the "mutual suicide pact", and instead encourage Pakistan to develop its economy.¹⁷³

However, given that nearly all middle-ranking State Department officials and intelligence analysts concerned with South Asia shared Langley's assessment that the sub-continent had interlocking problems and that a military cap itself was inadequate to address America's three woven tensions, in the late summer of 1957, Washington explored a fuller resolution. Thus the next consensus was for an immediate Indo-

Pakistan arms race halt followed by resolution of Kashmir and also the second major Indo-Pakistan dispute, being the Indus water dispute, which had hitherto been under exclusive IBRD auspices since 1954.¹⁷⁴ This latter dispute focused on the six Indus rivers, which constituted sixty percent of Pakistan's total agriculture water usage, but were given to India at partition.^{vii} Pakistan was highly concerned by India's threat to divert the waters if an agreement was not reached on the river flows, a threat reinforced by India building the Rajasthan canal, which could strangle Pakistan.¹⁷⁵

By the autumn of 1957, America's proposal settled on its third and final evolution. In October, the NEA's South Asia experts developed an integrated plan for the region.¹⁷⁶ They proposed that Washington defuse Indo-Pakistan tensions by *simultaneously* addressing Kashmir, the arms race and the Indus water dispute in what came to be known as the 'single package' solution.¹⁷⁷ It was the Eisenhower administration's first serious attempt at resolving the Indo-Pakistan tension, for which Eisenhower was especially keen on, "there is no inconvenience at which I would balk".¹⁷⁸ Meanwhile, Dulles, increasingly playing the role of the president's faithful policy executor and less the role of policy creator, especially after his role in the Suez debacle, instructed Langley to dissuade Karachi from re-approaching the Security Council because of the, "basic contradiction between proceeding with US package proposal and SC consideration", the latter which would again annoy Nehru.¹⁷⁹ Both American ambassadors approved this secret attempt to seek settlement of the major issues.¹⁸⁰ Interestingly, the State Department's conflict resolution drive necessitated reassurance for the Pentagon who still viewed Pakistan within the anti-communist narrative,

“We are convinced that the development of the economic strength of both countries is an essential part of the defense of the subcontinent as well as the Baghdad Pact and the SEATO areas.”¹⁸¹

America, comfortable with its cognition of India and Pakistan, excluded London from the single package process. In part this reflected London’s reluctance to engage the Third World immediately in the aftermath of Suez. Yet America presented the package deal to London six months after its conceptualisation and after the details were finalised.¹⁸² And when it did so, Washington invited London not for its expert assessment or to facilitate matters, but to help pay for the river agreement’s implementation.¹⁸³ In turn, London, insulted by its exclusion and determined to maintain vestiges of its imperial-era prestige, flouted Washington’s attempts to restrict arms to the region, on the basis that it could not deny supplying arms for cash payment from a Commonwealth state.¹⁸⁴ Washington was expectedly incensed, “UK attitude to supply arms and equipment to India or Pakistan (except submarine for cash on barrelhead) seems to us to ignore political facts of life in subcontinent.”¹⁸⁵

The single package solution was presented in May 1958 in Eisenhower’s offer to Ayub and Nehru to assist conflict resolution.¹⁸⁶ Specifically, Ike offered to send a special ambassador to facilitate a package solution.¹⁸⁷ Pakistan responded positively within minutes, Noon’s only caveat being that the representative be neither a Jew nor a Catholic.¹⁸⁸ In contrast, two weeks on, the Brahmin, “had not yet thought the problem through”.¹⁸⁹ Three weeks further still, Nehru rejected the offer, “We have always been of the view that a settlement of our various issues with Pakistan can only be arrived at satisfactorily by direct contacts between the two countries.”¹⁹⁰

Washington was angry at this response, which crippled Eisenhower's hopes for reconciling the three policy tensions with Pakistan, and placing policy to it on a sound footing. That Nehru should have responded as so was not surprising. A month into his ambassadorial post in New Delhi, Bunker had advised that Nehru had no interest in holding a Kashmir plebiscite.¹⁹¹ Similarly, only weeks before Eisenhower's offer, Graham described India's attitude as, "We stand behind our engagements but Kashmir is already part of India, in our constitution, and issue is settled."¹⁹²

Diminishing Cognition

Having removed Pakistan from the Middle East in 1955, America's understanding of Pakistan underwent a further two-stage destabilisation, a process that diminished America's categorising of and attaching meaning to Pakistan. Any engagement of Pakistan within the anti-communist narrative necessitated a geographic arena to translate engagement into policy specifics. During the second Truman and first Eisenhower administrations, the threat of communism in the Middle East coincided with Pakistan's categorisation and meaning within anti-communism, thereby inducing America's anti-communist engagement of Pakistan within the Middle East. However, after 1955, America retracted this geographic location of Pakistan, though not Pakistan's categorisation within anti-communism, and instead bound Karachi to South Asia, albeit as an irritant obstacle to India's role within the missionary narrative, which in turn had been reinforced by Pakistan's increasingly noted anti-Indian expression.

After Nehru blocked America's attempt to resolve the Indo-Pakistan conflict, the rapid improvement in American-Indian relations, crystallised in Eisenhower's visit to India in 1959, a "brilliant success", eclipsed Pakistan's impediment to India's role in America's missionary narrative. During the final two years of the Eisenhower presidency, the thorn of Karachi became increasingly immaterial, even as an anomaly, to America's enactment of missionary narrative through India. Thus began an extended American cognitive destabilisation with respect to Pakistan, being another geographic re-location of Pakistan, this time from South Asia and into a geographic suspension.

The centrepiece of this was America's understanding and engaging of India. Throughout Eisenhower's final two years, America moved beyond merely categorising and attaching meaning to India within the missionary narrative, to aggressively engaging it. This in turn reflected the deteriorating Sino-American relations,

"Asia is given new prominence by the rapid growth in Chinese Communist power. The likelihood that this growth will intensify the threat posed to Free World interests in Asia over the next decade underlines the desirability of developing in India a successful alternative to Communism in an Asiatic context."¹⁹³

NSC 5909, only weeks later, emphasised the growing impact of the challenge, "Asia and Africa will be watching and comparing what the Indian and the Chinese Communist regimes are achieving for their peoples."¹⁹⁴ Likewise, the first item of

discussion in the first NSC discussion paper for two years on South Asia in May 1959 was 'India's Role in Asia'.¹⁹⁵ While the CIA even used Indian soil for covert operations against China, Christian Herter's discussions with Nehru, in October 1960, orbited around China.¹⁹⁶

Washington was determined to enact its missionary narrative, the story of its progress of mankind through India by monopolising its development. When India bought twelve MI-4 helicopters from Russia in 1960, Washington flurried to stop the transaction by selling hugely subsidised American helicopters.¹⁹⁷ In reference to the Pakistani acquisition of Sidewinder missiles, an item denied to even some of America's allies, and ten F-104s, Eisenhower saw, "no reason why we should not sell similar equipment to the Indians, and in fact thought we should do so."¹⁹⁸ Washington signed a US\$239m PL-480 agreement with India in November 1959, another US\$1.28bn PL-480 and a C-119 aircraft contract in May 1960 and included US\$350m for India in the US\$1bn DLF request for 1960.¹⁹⁹ Bunker supported a flood of Indian requests including, "every possible effort be made to assist India in atomic power plants and also seek steadily to expand close US-Indian cooperation in all atomic matters", while Herter strongly supported the Atomic Energy Commission's mission to India in February 1960 to evaluate supporting its atomic ambitions.²⁰⁰

The continued improved relations also resonated from coincidental Indian concerns. Aside from the ongoing economic unease, China still worried Nehru.²⁰¹ Sino-Indian relations deteriorated after China's suppression of a Tibetan revolt in March 1959, and the Indian decision to grant asylum to Tibetans. In 1959, India felt that China was building a road in Indian territory, leading to armed patrols clashed along the border.

During talks in 1960, China demonstrated little appetite for compromise leaving Nehru to recognise the collapse of his China policy. Beijing's demand for an additional ten thousand square miles of Indian territory profoundly disturbed Nehru especially since China needed space, had a strong military capability and a political appetite for war.²⁰²

“Nehru said he was not afraid of the USSR... However the ChiComs were a different matter. He was not sure what ChiComs might do given the fact that it has always been a national trait of China to be expansive whenever the Chinese were confident as they seemed to be now.”²⁰³

While Nehru, in fear of China, delighted Eisenhower by insisting that aid to Pakistan was, “a matter of the past”, Pakistan's re-location from South Asia into a geographic suspension accompanied the second and critical American cognitive destabilisation of Pakistan.^{viii} Karachi's exit from the anti-communist narrative disabled Washington from categorising and attaching meaning to Karachi, which meant Washington failed to understand and resultantly engage Pakistan.²⁰⁴ Subscription of the anti-communist identity had already weakened in America, which was reflected in Eisenhower's successful push for détente from the summer of 1958 and especially after September 1959 when Khrushchev visited America. The superpowers moved towards arms control agreements, agreed cultural agreements and in 1958 exchanged national exhibitions that led to Nixon opening Gorki Park in Moscow.²⁰⁵ The continued easing of anti-communist identity, and specifically the need to enact and protect its narrative, may however not have mattered significantly since America was already committed

^{viii} This was assisted by the military aid programme to Pakistan coming to a conclusion in July 1959

to a variety of anti-communist structures, institutional and cultural, had it not been for the effect of Pakistan's own effective exit from the anti-communist narrative.

Unlike the ambassadors to Pakistan of the first administration, James Langley's appointment in 1957 brought an official who gave especially detailed attention to Karachi's dominant reality – one that did not involve anti-communism.²⁰⁶ Hence, the second administration was even more aware than the first of a Pakistan beyond the anti-communist narrative, and one that continued to stress an anti-India focus, "Qadir frankly stated India and not Soviet Union is the enemy in eyes of average Pakistani."²⁰⁷ In the same way, NIE 52-59 in May 1959 noted, "Both Pakistan's leaders and the mass of its people have tended to assess practically every development in foreign policy in terms of their own 'cold war' with India."²⁰⁸ At the CENTO meeting in October 1959, Eisenhower's discussions with Pakistani Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir focused exclusively on India.²⁰⁹ Other than the conceptually listless Pentagon, only Ambassador Rountree, who replaced Langley in 1959, and following in Bowles's footsteps in India, naïvely assumed that, "sometimes it appears that Pakistan's concern over India exceeds her concern over defense vis-à-vis international communism."²¹⁰

In Eisenhower's final two years however, not only did America develop greater awareness of Pakistan's anti-Indian reality, but Pakistan itself walked out of the anti-communist narrative by assuming an increasing anti-American posture.^{ix} Pakistan had many minor grievances against Washington. Ayub was annoyed by America's emphasis on economic development, which detracted from the general's plans to

^{ix} Senator Fulbright had advertised in Congress since early 1954, the persistent anti-American theme in Pakistan society, though without much success.

dominate Pakistan politics, and was imaginatively reinterpreted as interference in Pakistan's internal affairs. There was also a growing body in Pakistan that used Washington as a scapegoat for Pakistan's economic weakness. The opposition especially used the American alliance to beat the Karachi government.²¹¹ At a more populist level, Pakistan's public strongly supported Nasser for his standing to the West and rejected Israel – hence making America the people's enemy. Further, Washington's refusal to engage Pakistan within the Northern Tier, or any other security structure, denied Pakistan the security against India it had sought from a pro-Western policy. Even the military aid programme, clumsily managed especially in the attempt to reduce the 1954 agreement, proved counterproductive. Finally, there was the growing influence of the anti-American Ghulam Farooq, chairman of the influential PIDC industrial complex.

Karachi's primary complaint however originated in Washington's cognition and engagement of India within the American mission. Pakistani leaders incessantly complained about the substantial and growing American commitment to neutralist India that contrasted to the reluctant and detracting engagement with pro-Western Pakistan.²¹² Pakistan was extremely distressed that while it stood with the 'free world', non-committed India got a 'free-ride'.²¹³ Pakistan leaders strongly criticised Washington for impairing its security and Qadir noted, "there were so many advantages in a neutralist posture."²¹⁴ Pakistan claimed, "American aid to India saved India's foreign exchange which in turn was used to buy arms from the UK or USSR".²¹⁵ Alarming for Pakistan, the US worked towards reducing only Pakistan's, and not India's, since despite most of India's troops nestled on the Pakistan border,

America hoped that India was, “maintaining its present forces as a deterrent to Red China rather than only as a counter to the alleged military threat from Pakistan.”²¹⁶

These frustrations fuelled Pakistan’s leaders to shed their anti-communist guise, a chameleon act which had not delivered the results that Karachi had expected, “Pakistan officials and public opinion earnestly believe the best way to get most from US is to emulate example of Afghanistan, India and Egypt and try to play both sides.”²¹⁷ As early as 1957, Pakistan leaders threatened their departure from the anti-communist narrative by pursuing a neutralist policy if America did not support its Kashmir resolutions in the UN.²¹⁸ In this vein, a March 1957 State Department memo noted, “Many Pakistanis during the last year and a half have become increasingly disillusioned with their country’s Western ties and increasingly vocal in their advocacy of a more independent foreign policy”.²¹⁹ In June 1958, the US embassy reported, “pressures were already growing in the country to turn to the Communist bloc”.²²⁰ One especially upsetting aspect of this was Pakistan’s relationship with the Chinese nemesis. Hildreth expressed concern at the favourable impression made by Chou en Lai on Pakistani officials and noted that the Pakistani prime minister even had an autographed picture of Chou prominently displayed on his desk.²²¹

The fine line between a policy within anti-communism but bordering neutralism and a vocally anti-American policy was often breached, and noted in America. Prime Minister Noon’s harsh speech in March 1958 against the US, threatening to “embrace communism” unless America gave more assistance, was badly received in Washington. The following month, Langley reported the, “severe beating the United States has been taking here”.²²² By June 1960, anti-Americanism feeling was so

strong that Rountree recommended that US air force personnel dependents leave Peshawar immediately.²²³ By then, the very few Pakistani newspaper editorials favourable to Washington were nearly all written by CIA plants.²²⁴ American tolerance for this type of Pakistani hostility was severely stretched as Ali Khan Qizilbash, Pakistan's delegate to SEATO, humiliatingly learned. Qizilbash criticised the supposedly inadequate American aid to Pakistan, only to be confronted by a furious American official who,

“asked Qizilbash to state exactly how much assistance Pakistan is actually receiving from the United States. He was somewhat embarrassed to admit that he had no idea of the extent of US aid and was quite impressed when I informed him that in Mr Noon's own words, the United States is supplying almost 40% of the Pakistan Government's total annual expenditure.”²²⁵

Those Americans who remained fiercely committed to the anti-communist narrative, such as Nixon, persisted in accordingly understanding Pakistan, which was, “the one sold pro-US country in the area. It would be unwise to consider reducing assistance to Pakistan without remembering what the Soviets are doing.”²²⁶ However, Karachi's double coup in October 1958 reinforced Washington's diminished meaning of Pakistan within the anti-communist framework. Mirza proclaimed martial law with Ayub as Chief Martial Law Administrator, who then retired Mirza three weeks later to assume the presidency himself. With this, Pakistan's teetering claim to Western narratives was dealt a blow, a “semblance of democracy was replaced by a semblance of dictatorship”.²²⁷ Ayub's military dictatorship stood in stark contrast to Nehru's

democracy. By 1960, Washington had not only dislocated Pakistan from India, but no longer categorised or attached meaning to Pakistan within the anti-communist narrative.

Diminishing Engagement

America's lack of cognition of Pakistan after its departure from the anti-communist narrative, instigated a diminishing of engagement. Notwithstanding the attempts of Pakistani politicians to drag America into its politics, such as when Suhrawardy asked Langley to indicate that he, Suhrawardy, would support Mirza's presidential bid, Washington distanced itself from Pakistan in much the same way that Dulles had from India in 1953.²²⁸ Pakistan's double coup generated only mild interest in Washington, "foreign policy issues are not directly involved in the present crisis".²²⁹ In March 1958, the DLF had only two projects, amounting to US\$10m, near approval for Pakistan.²³⁰ When Ayub, Qadir and Minister for Finance Mohammed Shoaib visited Washington in January 1959, only secondary tier officials in Deputy Under Secretary of State Henderson, Assistance Secretary of Defense Irwin, General Lemnitzer and Langley, met them.²³¹ Though Ambassador Rountree and the Pentagon emphasised Pakistan's value, Ayub correctly noted the predominance of the critical stand against Pakistan in America.²³² American second thoughts about Pakistan thus began not under Kennedy, as Shahi suggests, but in Eisenhower's second term.²³³

One expression of this diminishing engagement with Pakistan was in the growing demands to reduce military aid to Pakistan. Even accepting Congress's desire to rectify its balance of payments deficit partly by reducing aid through Mutual Security

programmes from US\$2bn to US\$1.4bn, “Congressional criticism of military aid to underdeveloped countries tended to center around Pakistan”.²³⁴ From late 1958, with Pakistan increasingly difficult to place within anti-communism, Congress became averse to engaging Pakistan.²³⁵ The pretext often used to effect this disengagement, meaning predominantly reducing military aid, was the vogue economic development. For example, in April 1959, Senator Fulbright noted, “I hope the Administration will shift the emphasis from military aid to economic aid in places like Pakistan.”²³⁶ The following year, a State Department official noted, “we have become keenly aware of the fact that unless Pakistan is to remain forever a pensioner of the US it must achieve at least a substantial measure of economic efficiency.”²³⁷ However, despite this and though NIE 52-59 on Pakistan and NSC 5909, both in May 1959, focused on Pakistan’s economy, Washington had no plans to aid Pakistan’s economy.²³⁸ Karachi’s second five-year plan (1955-1960) of US\$4bn, prioritised in 1958 and requiring US\$1.6bn from foreign donors, was largely ignored in America.²³⁹

With America’s geographic suspension of Pakistan, as well as its inability to categorise and attach meaning to Karachi within America’s identity narratives, especially anti-communism which America had historically and exclusively used for Pakistan, Washington again sidelined the Indo-Pakistan conflict. Initially, America did keep the package solution alive, portraying Nehru’s rejection as a technical delay and advising Karachi, “We are now engaged in talking with Nehru as to methods of procedure... What is now going on is precisely how we had envisaged conversations might go.”²⁴⁰ However, Nehru’s assisting Pakistan’s detachment from South Asia and Pakistan’s persistent setting outside of the anti-communist narrative eroded Washington’s drive towards resolving the conflicts. In 1959 and 1960, Eisenhower

maintained only unspecific and vague pressure upon Pakistan and India to reconcile.²⁴¹ A November 1960 PPS paper on Kashmir concluded that, “the United States should continue to refrain from taking an initiative with the two parties.”²⁴² Washington also reduced its focus on the Indus river, though this was already effectively concluded by the IBRD in March 1959, with final details settled in September 1960.²⁴³ Given the World Bank’s lead in the Indus solution, there was thus little American focus on conflict resolution in 1959-1960 except Eisenhower’s commitment of US\$516m over ten years to fund the cost of the US\$1.03bn river agreement.²⁴⁴ x

Ironically, though perhaps because of America’s lack of involvement, Indo-Pakistan relations improved from mid-1959. Pakistan no longer felt so secure having learned of America’s increasingly limited enthusiasm to engage it while the, “Sino-Indian dispute, improved stability of GOP and increasing stature of Ayub have caused Indians to rethink some of their prejudices and to become more rational about Pakistan.”²⁴⁵ In December, Ayub and Nehru met to discuss border incidents while Ambassador Chagla speaking on Indo-Pakistan relations commented, “he had never known a time when these relations had been better.”²⁴⁶

Though anti-communism had lost much of its intensity during the second Eisenhower term, it still remained a prominent identity of real America. Consequently, Afghanistan’s reluctant but very pronounced drift to communism in 1959 drew American attention, which in turn re-focused American attention on Pakistan’s conflict with Afghanistan. From late 1956, Washington had remained removed from

^x The eventual agreement, as expected, gave to Pakistan the three western rivers of Indus, Jhelum and Chenab and to India, the three Eastern rivers of Ravi, Beas and Sutlej.

both Afghanistan and Afghan-Pakistan relations. However, that changed in late 1959. Shortfalls in Afghani crops in late 1958 invited considerable Russian aid.²⁴⁷ Russia's penetration into Afghanistan ignited Washington's application of anti-communist narrative categorisation and discourse on Kabul, and was reflected in a lengthy State Department study in September 1959 that classified Afghanistan as "emergency action area", requiring Washington to, "bear all our economic and diplomatic resources to thwart Soviet ambitions."²⁴⁸ In that same month, an interdepartmental 'Afghanistan Action Group' ('AAG') was created, as was a National Intelligence Report completed, entitled, 'Outlook for Afghanistan', which predicted that, "The USSR will almost certainly attempt gradually to tighten its grip on Afghanistan".²⁴⁹

Afghanistan's growing immersion into anti-communist narrative activated anti-communist engagement through two policies. First and in fact the dominant discussion was increased economic aid to Afghanistan. The AAG focused on economic matters and not conflict resolution while Ambassador Byroade similarly prioritised the insufficient Western aid and Russia's proximity to Afghanistan above the impact of Afghanistan – Pakistan tensions on communism's attraction in Kabul.²⁵⁰ Russia had given US\$300m of aid to Afghanistan since 1954, in contrast to American aid since 1952 of only US\$150m, of which none was sent after 1956 and much of which had in any case been mismanaged.²⁵¹ There was little appetite in Washington to seriously change this aspect of policy even if much was discussed about the type of aid that might be considered. Consequently, Byroade noted, "Since we unwilling make economic political and military commitments necessary to win kind of competition Soviets have initiated, US objectives are and must be cast in minimal terms."²⁵²

The second policy was the resolution of Pushtunistan and therefore did involve Pakistan.²⁵³ America's growing concern about Afghanistan's communisation occurred simultaneous to Ayub's arresting several politicians including Pushtun nationalists Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Abdul Samad Khan and Ayub's reaffirmation of the 'one-unit' West Pakistan, thereby solidifying Pakistani control over Pushtun tribes, which infuriated Kabul. Though Washington continued to see little validity in Afghani claims for Pushtunistan, it encouraged Pakistan to improve relations with Afghanistan in an effort to limit Russian influence in Kabul. Dulles, fearing a communised Afghanistan threatening the Baghdad Pact and American policy in the Middle East, privately encouraged Ayub to release the Pushtun leaders and soften on Kabul.²⁵⁴ From the late 1958 to mid-1959, Washington increasingly pressed Ayub to dialogue with Kabul and calm tensions by, for example, offering a propaganda truce.²⁵⁵

However, with Nehru-like obstinacy and in contrast to his predecessor Mirza, "Ayub's attitude towards Afghanistan ... profoundly discouraging."²⁵⁶ As far as Ayub was concerned, "Daud was very stupid, and that that was the key to the situation" and he was inclined "to let Afghans stew in their own juice".²⁵⁷ The general, who had graduated from the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst, recommended that America not show any weakness to Afghanistan.²⁵⁸ When Rountree pointed out that Pakistan should take the, "initiative in improving relations with Afghanistan" to protect the "free world", Ayub instead suggested that the US should, "give Afghanistan 'shock treatment' of informing leaders that if their policies remained unchanged US would withdraw all support."²⁵⁹ Qadir, who further outlined his president's message, wanted America to cut aid to Afghanistan unless it adopted a

more cooperative attitude. He argued that Kabul's royal family would submit to such a threat since otherwise, Russia would eventually dissolve the monarchy itself.²⁶⁰

Meanwhile, Ayub's, "indifference to increasing Soviet influence in Afghanistan" helped reinforce America's ongoing cognition of Pakistan outside of the anti-communist narrative.²⁶¹ Washington advised its Kabul embassy in June 1959,

"Present GOP attitude re Pushtunistan seems inconsistent with its concern Soviet presence in Afghanistan allegedly poses for Pakistan as expressed by Qadir and other GOP officials particularly in SEATO and Baghdad Pact forums"²⁶²

Eight months later, those concerns became more evident,

"USG seriously concerned over apparent divergence US and GOP policies towards Afghanistan. USG firmly believes 'tough' policy by GOP will only drive Afghans more firmly into Soviet fold...previous attempt in 1955 by GOP to bring Afghans to heel through economic pressure failed and was followed by Afghan acceptance large scale Soviet economic and military aid".²⁶³

Despite the brief improvement in Pakistan-Afghan relations in early 1959, by June and with Daud's return from Switzerland, and Russia's offer to build a major US\$80m highway and resume further aid, those relations again worsened.²⁶⁴ The road

was the first major Russian grant assistance to any country outside the Communist Bloc. Byroade despairingly noted,

“trend of events is running against us here and unless this trend can be halted Afghanistan will become de facto Soviet satellite... Nothing could be as effective in reversing this trend as a rapprochement with Pakistan which can only be brought about if tensions over Pushtunistan are eased.”²⁶⁵

By late 1959, Washington was gravely concerned that Afghanistan would become a Russian satellite. When Eisenhower visited Kabul for a few hours in December 1959, he landed on an airfield built by Russia, escorted in by Russian MIGs (although with Afghani pilots) and landed on airfield with parked Russian bombers given to Afghanistan.²⁶⁶ However by then, Washington had lost confidence, and also interest, in achieving a settlement. The Ayub-Naim talks in January 1960 were largely unsuccessful, and their failure only increased tensions and led to significant border skirmishes in late 1960. With this failure, America’s ambassadors to Karachi and Kabul, supported by Herter, advised Eisenhower that,

“we had not found any acceptable new approach that we might make.... it would not be helpful at this time for the United States to intervene in the ‘Pushtunistan’ controversy we should continue quietly to discourage further hostilities.”²⁶⁷

Eisenhower agreed. When Naim hoped to entice him in September 1960 by stressing that relations with Pakistan were worsening, Eisenhower retorted that the Afghan-Pakistan tension, “was not one in which outsiders should mix themselves”.²⁶⁸ Throughout the second half of 1960, Washington abstained from Pushtunistan.²⁶⁹ Furthermore, Byroade was no longer confident that Afghanistan could maintain its neutrality even if it wanted to.²⁷⁰ In July 1960, Moscow committed US\$500m for Afghanistan’s second five-year plan starting in 1961, constituting the plan’s entire foreign exchange requirement, and further funds were made available for other projects.²⁷¹ Byroade consequently reported, “that unless some such approach as above can be devised it is opinion this Embassy that we cannot expect much longer to be able accurately refer to Afghanistan as neutral nation.”²⁷² Hence during the administration’s final months not only did the US avoid engaging Karachi and Pushtunistan, but also refrained from Kabul.

And the Ghost of John Foster Dulles

In April 1959, Christian Herter replaced Dulles, who died of cancer the following month as Secretary of State. Despite America’s diminishing cognition of Pakistan, and attempts to accordingly diminish its engagement, Washington could not disengage Pakistan. For this, John Foster Dulles’s engagement of Pakistan in 1954 in the Middle East, through the Northern Tier and Baghdad Pact, haunted American administrators through till John Kennedy’s election and beyond.

In July 1958 Brigadier Abdel Karim Qassem’s nationalist soldiers replaced Iraq’s Hashemite royal family.²⁷³ The bedrock government of Western policy in the Middle

East disintegrated against a sloppy coup, shocking the West.²⁷⁴ Qassem had no regional or family network at his disposal and relied on the few local communists instead for support.²⁷⁵ Eisenhower, nervous by the communisation of the Middle East, sent three thousand and five hundred troops in July to Lebanon, an effortless way to reassert American presence and impress Nasser, Saud other Arab nationalists, as well as Moscow.²⁷⁶ Not only was America alarmed by the coup but Nasser was too showing real concern over the communist penetration of the Middle East.²⁷⁷ Washington, with the exception of Dulles, thus hoped for closer relations with Nasser and, complemented by an Anglo-Egyptian détente from May 1959, again trailed Nasser as the indigenous anti-communist warrior.²⁷⁸

The Iraqi coup also caused anxiety among the Baghdad Pact countries. In fact, the coup was such a shock that Pakistan and Turkey mourned the loss of Iraq comparable to a sibling's death and grimly re-assessed their own governmental stabilities and the threat of Nasserite, communist or other radical ideas.²⁷⁹ The Pact countries consequently again appealed to the US for security. Their call this time landed on fertile soil. Supported by his brother in the CIA, Foster continued to understand the member countries, including Pakistan, within the anti-communist narrative,

“Dulles thought that the United States would have to step up economic and military assistance in the Baghdad Pact area, which is under greatly increased pressure. Turkey, Iran and Pakistan fear that they now lie between two hostile areas - the USSR to the north and the Arabs to the south.”²⁸⁰

A week later, Dulles emphasised to Eisenhower, “it is absolutely necessary that we give some special reassurance to our support for Iran, Turkey and Pakistan.”²⁸¹ At the London meeting of the Baghdad Pact in July 1958, Dulles engaged them through anti-communism by pledging to cooperate in the defence of Pact members and began bilateral defence agreements with them, which were eventually signed in March 1959. These agreements were however, “pursuant to existing Congressional authorization”, which embodied in the Mutual Security Act of 1954, therefore limited America’s obligations only to communist aggression, and meant that the commitments were only re-emphasises of existing policy, even if publicised as otherwise.²⁸² America’s renewed interest, even if superficially effected, inspired a revival in the Central Treaty Organisation (‘CENTO’), the new name for the Pact after August 1958, and reflective of Baghdad’s withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact in that month.

Iraq’s fall rejuvenated debate in Washington on whether to join CENTO. The argument for joining was strengthened by CENTO’s detachment from the Middle East after Iraq’s exit, thereby protecting the organisation from Arab nationalism and the Arab-Israeli conflict.²⁸³ Thus, NSC 5820, America’s policy statement for the Middle East in October 1958, made no mention of CENTO.²⁸⁴ Some of the central officials had still not changed their opinions on CENTO since 1955. All American ambassadors to the CENTO countries supported America’s joining either the command structure or the organisation. While the JCS felt, as expected, “that a command structure was a ‘question of keeping CENTO alive.’”²⁸⁵ CENTO members expressed exasperation on the issue of American support for the command structure or America joining CENTO,

“Iran and Pakistan...have revealed high degree frustration and disillusionment.... high-ranking officials have said they felt US policy treats regional members as if they children, and that US gives lip service to CENTO but more and more clearly reveals US heart not in it.”²⁸⁶

In contrast, Eisenhower still had doubts because of CENTO's inclusion of Britain and thus its potential image as an instrument of imperialism in Suez's aftermath.²⁸⁷ Ike was also concerned that joining would raise expectations of American aid, which would probably be military in nature. Furthermore, Eisenhower and the State Department, except perhaps Dulles, had become aware of the realities of the CENTO countries, such as Pakistan, and their motivations for drawing in America.²⁸⁸

Within this resurgent debate, Eisenhower neither attached meaning to Pakistan within the anti-communist narrative nor located it as a Middle Eastern state. American discussions about the region continued, as they had since 1955, to exclude Pakistan. In the immediate aftermath of the Iraqi coup, there was no mention of Pakistan, but was of Iran, Turkey and Iraq in discussions with Britain on the new Middle East crisis.²⁸⁹ In fact, America's cognitive dislocation of Pakistan from the Middle East continued through to Eisenhower's final days in office. Eisenhower consciously categorised Pakistan as a second priority in the Middle East.²⁹⁰

However, with the concept of credibility continuing its ascendancy in the currency of American policy and Washington's resurgent concerns about the Middle East, policy to Pakistan remained bound as before, “It was important that none of the regional CENTO nations be permitted to become frustrated.”²⁹¹ NSC 5909 emphasised that

Pakistan should be kept satisfied during this difficult period in the Middle East.²⁹²

Furthermore, in 1957, Washington had constructed electronic facilities near Peshawar, and airfields near Lahore and Peshawar for U-2 flights to monitor Russia. Though Bowles exaggerated the point when he suggested that the U2 flights gave Ayub a “political hammer lock” on US policy to South Asia, Pakistan had value to America as an espionage centre that other CENTO members did not.²⁹³

It was against this background that Pakistan demands for military aid in 1960 were heard. Pakistan wanted more weapons, more aid, more modernization and faster delivery all of which Washington felt, “would tend increase Indo-Pakistan tensions”, and was at odds to an American cognition of Pakistan which neither recognised its anti-communism nor its location in the Middle East.²⁹⁴ In May 1959, Ayub presented visiting Secretary of Defense McElroy with a list of military needs, including F-86s, F-104s and Sidewinders.²⁹⁵ In doing so, he emphasised that though the CENTO studies indicated that Pakistan needed 395 jets, his programme was much more ‘modest’, being only thirty-five new F-86s and the modernisation of their existing F-86s.²⁹⁶ To further sell such demands, Ayub, who was concerned about détente, emphasised the anti-communist narrative and Pakistan’s role within it.²⁹⁷ He told Eisenhower in December 1959, that we should not “drop our guard” against Russia, “Tactically, the Soviet Union wishes to relax tensions temporarily in order to gain further opportunities.”²⁹⁸ Realising the implications for America’s engagement after its self-removal from the anti-communist narrative, Pakistan’s desperate attempts to recoup its anti-communist meaning by stressing the Chinese or Russian communist threats, fell on barren State Department soil.²⁹⁹

The Defense Department though continued to understand Pakistan within the anti-communist narrative and locate it in the Middle East, thereby supporting aid to the jittery Karachi government, which might otherwise turn to Russia. The JCS reaffirmed Pakistan's continued importance for America's global strategy and that, "Currently established JCS Strategic Force Objectives for Pakistan are considered the minimum essential for the stated purposes."³⁰⁰ Pakistan defence support for 1961 was proposed at US\$107m, constituting nearly half of America's proposed economic aid for Pakistan of US\$245.2m.³⁰¹ Rountree from late similarly continued to attach meaning to Pakistan as an anti-communist ally and resisted cuts in military aid to Pakistan, "austere nature MAP and fact we may desire and require Pakistan military contribution within framework our mutual collective security interests and obligations."³⁰²

Oddly, their intense case for providing military aid to Pakistan was still political and had little military substance. For example, the JCS paper prepared for Herter in October 1960 argued for aid exclusively on the basis of the political repercussions felt by other CENTO members and Pakistan's potential affiliation with Moscow.³⁰³ Rountree's summary of the case for aid, identical to that posed by the Pentagon, made no mention of Pakistan's military value,

"Having thus assisted Pakistan to develop its defense establishment, we have no acceptable alternative, it seems to me, but to continue to provide sufficient military and Defense support aid to protect our investment, which is considerable, not only in financial but also in strategic and foreign policy terms"³⁰⁴

This lack of military basis was reflected in the Pentagon's contradicting force goals for Pakistan. In May 1959, the Pentagon had no less than three sets of competing force goals for Pakistan,

- a) MAP force goal and JCS 'Strategic' force goal – 5½ divisions.
- b) Approved BP force goal 'for planning purposes' – 8 divisions.
- c) At the BPMC meeting in the fall of 1958, our military representatives reportedly concurred in a proposal for 6 divisions as a BP force goal.”³⁰⁵

Without being able to geographically locate and then categorise and attach meaning to Pakistan, the State Department and White House had long sought to retract engaging Pakistan. Langley continued to strongly lead the opposition to the Pentagon's attempt to re-engage Pakistan within anti-communism in the Middle East until his final days as ambassador,

“I would like to suggest that the Department of Defense conduct a thorough review of its purely military objectives in Pakistan. I can find no indication that such a fundamental strategic reappraisal in connection with the Pakistani military program – at least to the point of restated conclusions – has been conducted since the inception of our present course of action, which was inaugurated with the Aide-Mémoire of October 10, 1954...Subsequent to such a strictly military reappraisal, I assume that we would wish to inject political and economic considerations, some of which might be overriding...Is our main objective

nonetheless committed America's engagement of Pakistan in the form of military aid against a backdrop of the Middle East while placing the onus of Pakistan's military reduction *on Karachi alone*,

“the US should continue, beyond completion of the 1954 commitment, to extend military aid to Pakistan at the minimum level necessary to prevent the deterioration of the Pakistan military capability achieved through assistance programs”³⁰⁸

Hence, while Dillon could only direct the modest immediate aim as, “an agreement between India and Pakistan to freeze their forces at present levels”, he accepted that unless Indo-Pakistan tensions eased, and given the haunting legacy of Dulles's Northern Tier, it would be impossible for America to reduce its engagement of Pakistan.³⁰⁹ Indeed, by now, Eisenhower believed that the goal of reducing military aid to Pakistan and Pakistan's armed forces remained only a “pious hope”.³¹⁰ The only compromise belatedly offered to the State Department was in the new policy, enshrined in NSC 5909, which was approved in August 1959. While it emphasised that the current American military aid program should continue, it also added that any attempt to *increase* these should be strongly resisted and Pakistan be impressed upon the need to moderate its military.³¹¹

Despite the extensive debate on military aid to Pakistan leading to NSC 5909, the policy was largely unsuccessful. For one, Pakistan was determined not to let it succeed by demanding that Washington not merely help maintain and mildly modernise Pakistan's defences but also significantly build them. These demands, with

the accompanying tension in Pakistan-American relations, became increasingly persistent in Eisenhower's last year of office.³¹² When Eisenhower visited Pakistan in December 1959, he rejected Ayub's forceful request for Sidewinder missiles and a F-104 squadron, both of which represented state of the art military technology.^{xi} When in January 1960, Ayub again petitioned Eisenhower for the missiles and aircraft, Eisenhower, concerned about Ayub's publicising disappointment with America, gave marginal ground by instead offering a smaller number of Sidewinders and a few radar bombsights. Then when Ayub pressed again in March, Eisenhower, finally exasperated eventually gave ten F-104s albeit in utmost secrecy.³¹³ Almost a year after his death, Dulles continued to haunt Washington for his use of anti-communist narrative to understand and engage Pakistan, especially through the Northern Tier, once institutionalised, had become a highly effective fulcrum used by Ayub against which a credibility conscious Washington could offer little resistance.

There was bitter aftertaste even to this. Despite Eisenhower's relaxation of this policy, one that already had courtesy of the Pentagon tilted towards Pakistan, NSC 5909 failed to maintain Pakistan's allegiance to the West. Karachi increasingly questioned its ties to the West, which not even a bilateral agreement of co-operation in March 1959, arrested. Aside from the mounting anti-Americanism in Pakistan, the U-2 affair in 1960 struck a salient chord in Karachi for during the episode, Ayub stuck firmly with Eisenhower as a last demonstration of Pakistan's role in the anti-communist narrative, and argued that the incident had made Pakistan into an accomplice, thereby increasing its insecurity, for which it subsequently deserved more aid and

^{xi} Alarming for Eisenhower, neither requested item was a mediocre piece of weaponry. The Sidewinder, otherwise known as the AIM-9, was and remains the most important heat-seeking air-to-air missile in the American armoury. The F-104 was also a highly prized. Described as 'the missile with a man it', it was a supersonic interceptor jet which went into service only in 1958. Ayub wanted the F-104s for use against Indian bombers.

commitment from America. Pakistan fears heightened when it learned that Khrushchev mentioned after the U-2 incident, “Where is this place Peshawar? We have circled it red on our maps.”³¹⁴

However, Eisenhower failed to ingest Ayub’s final act. In the aftermath, and with this final rejection, Karachi, after thirteen years of frustrated expectations, totally abandoned its anti-communist performance. A US embassy analysis noted that the Pakistani leaders, “expressed a diminution in confidence in America’s ability to act quickly, decisively, and competently in a crisis.”³¹⁵ America’s ally opened talks with Russia in June 1960 and received a US\$30m loan for technical assistance and oil exploration from Moscow. Simultaneously, as Indo-China relations deteriorated, Pakistan protected its anti-Indian identity narrative by warming relations with China, causing Washington severe political constipation. Eisenhower thus left John Kennedy with the wrecked policy and cruel paradox of a Pakistan that was engaged through two anti-community security structures, with American credibility tied, and recipient to in excess of a billion dollars of aid, yet which nonetheless was edging closer towards not only Moscow but the pariah state of China and thereby especially likely to frustrate Kennedy’s long standing commitment to understanding and engaging India as part of America’s missionary narrative.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

The first of the two striking features of the identity narrative approach is its qualitative insight of American policy to Pakistan and in contrast to the Realist framework, which provides little explanation as to the first three of the four stages of American policy to Pakistan. Hans Morgenthau, whose text, 'Politics Among Nations' represents the most lucid summary of IR Realism, insists that international politics is, "a struggle for power".¹ Yet a detailed study of the primary documents relating to the first stage of American policy to Pakistan, being from before its partition to 1949, reveals not only the absence of Realist-type power calculations by Americans in respect of Pakistan, but also an inadequate understanding of and interest in Pakistan – neither of which rest easily in Realism's competitive environment and pseudo-objective reality.² Why, for instance, assuming a cold-blooded Hobbesian arena, did Washington not exercise its considerable economic and military muscle, something of a power monopoly after the war, and rush to dominate or neo-colonise Pakistan?

The contrasting identity narrative version of this first phase produces a considerably more plausible report. Pakistan's rushed creation gave huge cognitive challenges to an America that was already otherwise distracted by both the World War and its aftermath. Neither the concept of nor the term 'Pakistan' had resided in America's consciousness – neither in its narrative past nor future. This cognitive difficulty combined with Washington's understanding of India, analogous to China, as a future step in America's missionary story, to precipitate a sceptical and unwelcoming understanding of Pakistan before its creation. Once created, and given the continued cognitive difficulties of understanding what Pakistan was, America not only

maintained a considerable distance from Pakistan, but placed it alongside India, a treatment fortuitous for Truman, though not for later administrations, in that it worked within Karachi's obsession with India. The only significant interest Washington demonstrated in Pakistan during this phase, was in Kashmir, and reflected America's anti-communist identity narrative, and specifically concerns about communist expansion.

The Realist framework's failure to explain the first phase is repeated in the second phase from late 1949 to 1952. Washington's tilt towards Pakistan, which brought America to the precipice of an alliance, viewed within the Realist framework, fails to address why America sought to ally itself with a country besotted with economic and military weakness, as well as political polemics. That in doing so, it also infuriated Nehru, who by then had emerged as the leading statesman of the Third World, only compounds the explanatory difficulty.

The alternative proposed in this thesis is that Washington categorised and attached meaning to Pakistan within America's dominant identity narrative, being anti-communism after an extended theatrical performance by Pakistan's leaders and the catalyst of Korea, which extended the anti-communist arena and internalised and polarised America's anti-communist identity. Karachi's reaffirmation of this story imparted to real America, support for its 'real' self, against the backdrop of modernity's proliferation of identities and narratives, including the erosion of real American identities, as well as ontological security in an environment of considerable political unrest. That this internal battle of American identity was itself a corrosive undercurrent is perhaps not evident even if the preservation of the real American and

his story remained a primary objective throughout the post-War era. Yet it was precisely these comforts from Karachi's chameleon political elite that drew real America, the American who also dominated the political establishment, to Pakistan, and encouraged America to extend and reinforce its anti-communist narrative through Pakistan's inclusion in an anti-communist alliance in the Middle East. That Truman was unable to fulfil this was a function of inadequate time and Britain's scant appetite to accept Pakistan's anti-communist charade.

Much of the tension in the Realist explanation of this second phase extends into the third phase, from 1953 to early 1955, only with greater intensity. During this period, Washington, meaning Dulles who oversaw policy to Pakistan, ignored several warnings and signals not only about Pakistan's weakness and its inability to contribute to the anti-communist cause, but also about Nehru's vehement reaction if the US brought Karachi into its anti-communist alliance. In short, the Realist case for America to avoid Pakistan was considerable. Yet Dulles, not a naturally confident man, allied Pakistan not only through the MSA in May 1955 but also through SEATO. The thesis's narrative based framework demonstrates that Pakistan's conformity to the anti-communist narrative proved especially attractive to a practitioner who had a bipolar and fierce commitment to the American anti-communist identity and narrative. Pakistan, unlike its neighbours, offered support to Dulles's acute demand for greater definition of American self by clearly confirming the merit of the anti-communist narrative, reflecting Erikson's cognitive trust or Giddens's ontological security.

It is only in the fourth phase, from early 1955 till 1960, that the Realist framework provides explanatory insight in US policy to Pakistan. It can thus be argued that Washington attempted an extensive though uncomfortable withdrawal from a weak Pakistan and towards an India that was increasingly positioned in competition with communist China. However, given that this framework's only success lies in this limited period, the identity narrative explanation should also be addressed; and its consistent success for the first three analytical periods, it produces its own coherent account. Washington retracted from Pakistan because first the instrument to effect Pakistan's engagement, the Northern Tier, was ruptured with the Arab reaction to the Baghdad Pact. This was followed by Pakistan's relocation into South Asia, courtesy of both India's economic difficulties and Pakistan's continual Indian focus. Finally, and most importantly, Pakistan, frustrated with American aid to India and perceived inadequate aid to itself, withdrew from the anti-communist act by sounding off repeated neutralist and anti-American noises, the result of which was that America's exclusive means to categorise, attach meaning to and engage Pakistan, being anti-communism, self-destructively dissipated towards the final Eisenhower years. As a result, Washington's not only had difficulties in engaging Pakistan, but it, without Dulles, no longer understood what Pakistan was.

The second striking feature of the narrative based approach is that the dialogue in American policy to Pakistan was fundamentally not between America and Pakistan, but within America and of American narratives. US policy to Karachi was in fact not a dialogue at all, but a monologue of American self-affirmation in which Pakistan was an almost incidental observer, albeit one that played to the important anti-communist tune. The extent to which Pakistan was marginal, beyond that specific tune, is a touch

surprising. Throughout the period of consideration, Washington knew very little about Pakistan. Some of the blame for this may lie on the doorsteps of the Pakistani political elite, who repeatedly undervalued themselves when confronted by the West, and demonstrated an understanding of independence that was neither political nor cerebral. For instance, on 9th December 1956, Prime Minister Suhrawardy asked, “The question is asked: Why don’t we (the Muslim countries) get together rather than be tied to a big Power like the UK or America? My answer to that is zero plus zero plus zero plus zero is after all equal to zero”.³ As Venkataramani, poignantly asks, “What influence could a country rated as a ‘zero’ by its own Prime Minister hope to exert on big Powers to whom it attached itself as a camp-follower?”⁴

However, given that America’s categorisation and discourse search engines were a function of American narratives, Washington needed to know very little about Pakistan beyond its conformity or otherwise to those narratives in order to understand it. Pakistan itself was irrelevant, and only given meaning within the context of anti-communism. Consequently, the pattern of ignorance about Pakistan in Washington was both consistent during 1947 to 1960, as it was on occasion, breathtaking. During Liaquat’s trip to America in 1950, in the midst of widespread applaud from politicians and media, a guest at a San Francisco gathering confused him with Nehru, and another referred to his delegation as a group of Palestinians.⁵ After including Pakistan into the Western security sphere, House Congressman Adam Powell from America’s most cosmopolitan state, New York, rose in July 1955 to, “send greetings to the country of Pakistan and to their Prime Minister, the Honorable *Quaid-e-Azam* Mohammed Ali Jinnah”, *seven years after Jinnah had died*.⁶ Moreover, Dulles noted of the forty-year old Pakistan-Afghanistan dispute, “the quarrel between Afghanistan

and Pakistan had already been going on for hundreds of years, to which Admiral Radford added, thousands of years.”⁷ In December 1959, Eisenhower, referring to Kashmir, the earliest and one of the prime American considerations relating to Pakistan, confessed to Ayub that he did not, “know the details of the dispute”.⁸

That India fared no better also reflected its own role within the anti-communist and missionary narratives. When the wife of Admiral Arthur Radford, Eisenhower’s designated chief of staff, sat next to Indira Gandhi’s husband at a dinner in India in November 1952, she expressed exultation at having finally met the great Mahatma – long since dead.⁹ When Truman learned that Chester Bowles wanted the ambassador’s job in Delhi, he explained, “Well, I thought India was pretty jammed with poor people and cows wandering around the streets, witch doctors and people sitting on hot coals and bathing in the Ganges”.¹⁰ It was thus, drawing upon the fable of one-eyed man in the land of the blind, that one Senator could designate himself as a specialist on India given his recent five-day trip to the country in 1957.¹¹

The tension that this led to was of course an American engagement of Karachi as an anti-communist state in the Middle East, which failed to conform to Pakistan’s own political reality. Having been carved out of India and in opposition to Hindu identity’s threat to Muslim identity, Pakistan’s centre of cognitive gravity was then and has perhaps since been more dominated by India than has America’s by anti-communism. Consequently, Washington’s engagement of Pakistan, sensitised by American narratives, had little interest in Pakistan’s perspective so long as it fit neatly into and reaffirmed the American story.

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