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Government and Opposition in EU Legislative Politics

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Abstract

This thesis presents a model of EU legislative politics. The model sees national political parties as actors, rather than institutions, countries or trans-national party groups. The empirical focus is on the Codecision procedure after the Amsterdam reform came into effect in 1999.

In essence, the thesis argues that governing parties dominate EU legislative politics. The governing parties' advantage stems from two factors. First, they are represented in the Upper House, the Council of Ministers, while opposition parties are not. Second, the shifting majority requirements in the European Parliament (EP) mean that a qualified majority in the Council can impose its preferences on the EP if the Council has the support from a blocking minority in the EP. Nevertheless, the qualified majority requirement in the Council also means that most governing parties would like to see a larger change in policy than what the Council can agree to in their common position.

This has implications for the legislative strategy of both governing and opposition parties. Three hypotheses are tested. Hypothesis 1: Governing parties are more active as Codecision agenda-setters (rapporteurs) than opposition parties. Hypothesis 2: Rapporteurs from governing parties are more likely to see their initial legislative proposal being accepted by the Council of Ministers in the first reading. Hypothesis 3: The majority of governing parties and ideologically close opposition parties are more likely to support second reading amendments than other parties. The empirical evidence supports the hypotheses. Thus, there are empirical grounds for arguing that government and opposition exist in EU legislative politics. The governing coalition is the qualified majority of the governing parties and its ideologically close parties in the EP. The opposition is the losing minority in the Council and its ideologically close parties in the EP. The

opposition also includes those parties that are neither ideologically close to the minority nor close to the majority of the governing parties.

The evidence shows that behaviour differences are more evident between governing and opposition parties from adversarial member states. In non-adversarial states, which often have minority or oversized coalition government, the difference between governing and opposition parties is smaller.

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Introduction

EU directives and regulations influence the lives of millions of Europeans. It is thus important to understand legislative politics in the European Union. The nature of EU legislation is a result of the interaction between the preferences of actors and the institutional rules (Hinich and Munger 1997; Hix 1999b). The collective actors in EU legislative politics are the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament (EP). The interaction and powers of these actors under the different institutional rules is well researched (e.g. Crombez 1996; 2000; Dowding 2000; Earnshaw and Judge 1997; Farrell and Héritier 2003; Garrett and Tsebelis 1996; König and Poter 2001; Rittberger 2000; Scully 1997a; Steunenberg 1994; Tsebelis 1994; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). However, inside these institutions political party affiliation influences behaviour and opinions of individual actors (e.g. Hix 1999a; 2002b; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2004; Hooghe 2001; Mattila 2004; Scully 1998; Scully and Farrell 2003). All of the institutional actors in EU legislative politics are constituted of political parties, which are capable of coordinating behaviour amongst its members to a larger extent than any other organising unit, e.g. national delegations or party groups (Hix 2004; Hix and Lord 1997; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2004; Noury 2002b). Hence, political parties should play a central role in a theory of EU politics (Lord 2002). Surprisingly, a model of the legislative process in the EU, which takes political parties as the key actors, is missing from the literature. The aim of this thesis is to develop and test such a theory. The scope is limited to the Codecision procedure, as reformed in the Amsterdam treaty, under which the EP and the Council as institutional actors are thought to be co-equal legislators (e.g. Crombez 2001; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000).

Argument of the thesis

The thesis argues that the equality between the institutional actors in the Codecision procedure does not translate into equality between the partisan actors. Governing parties have the advantage in EU legislative politics because they are, unlike opposition parties, represented both in the Council and in the EP. In addition, the shifting majority requirements imposed on the EP at the different stages of the Codecision procedure favours governing parties over the opposition. A qualified majority of governing parties in the Council and other ideologically close parties in the EP make up the legislative government, while the minority in the Council and ideologically close opposition parties make up the opposition in EU legislative politics together with anti EU parties and extremists from both the left and the right. The theory suggests that differences between government and opposition can be found in three areas. First, governing parties are more active as Codecision agenda-setters (rapporteurs) than opposition parties. Second, rapporteurs from governing parties are more likely to see their initial legislative proposal being accepted by the Council of Ministers in the first reading. Third, the majority of governing parties and ideologically close opposition parties are more likely to support second reading amendments than other parties. The theoretical argument is however limited to parties from adversarial member states. In non-adversarial states, which often have minority or oversized coalition government, the difference between governing and opposition parties is smaller.

Criticism of the argument

At least five arguments can be presented against the argument of this thesis. Some might say that there is no government and opposition at the EU level until the day when the Commission is chosen by the majority in the European Parliament. Others might argue that EU politics is all about ideology. Some might object that the Council and the EP are consensual institutions not

driven by competition between parties. Another possible critique is that the Commission, the sole actor to initiate EU legislation, is largely neglected in the model. Finally, some might say that there is nothing new in any analysis that emphasises the power of governments. These objections are addressed here in the introduction in order to make the reader aware of them at an early stage.

No government and opposition in the EU

This argument is presented by scholars comparing the EU with the parliamentary systems found in most of EU's member states. In a parliamentary system, the formal powers to appoint and dismiss the executive as well as to initiate and adopt legislation lie with the Parliament. The Parliament also has the power to raise taxes and has the final say on the budget. As pointed out by cadres of scholars, it is not hard to argue that the Union falls short of the characteristics of a parliamentary democracy (see for example Decker 2002; Lodge 1994; Mather 2001). The key executive, the Commission, is appointed by the governments and only approved by the EP. It does not rely on day-to-day support in the Parliament. Along similar lines, "the EP does not exist in a majoritarian system – there is no clear 'government' or 'opposition' in the EU" (Neunreither 1998; quoted in 2003: 45)

However, parliamentary unitary systems where the executive is formed directly from the majority of the legislature, hence formally responsible to it, is not the only model of democracy the EU can be evaluated against. After all, it is a bicameral separation of power system, more comparable to the US and other presidential systems than the national political systems found Western Europe (e.g. Coultrap 1999; Katz 2001). As we will see in the first chapter, the labels of government and opposition are applied in presidential systems as well. One example is the debate over divided versus unified government, where unified government tend to mean that the same

party controls the majority in all institutions whose support is necessary to introduce new legislation. The government is the legislative coalition that can change the policy in its preferred direction. This definition of government and opposition is also applicable in the EU context. As such, the argument presented here is an application of the insights from the study of legislative politics in the US to the similar, but far from identical, political system of the European Union (Hix 1999b:56-98).

EU politics is all about ideology

A second line of critique against this thesis could be that it just shows that EU politics is over some form of left-right issues. This is nothing new. It has been claimed by observers of legislative behaviour both inside the EP and in the Council (e.g. Attina 1990; Bardi 2002; Bell and Lord 1998; Brzinski 1995; Hix 1993; 1999a; 2001; Hix, Kreppel, and Noury 2003; Hix and Lord 1997; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2003; 2004; Hooghe and Marks 1999; Kreppel 2000; Kreppel and Hix 2003; Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999; Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Marks, Wilson, and Ray 2002; Mattila 2004; Noury 2002b; Raunio 1998).

While it is clear that ideology guides behaviour in EU legislative politics, just like in most other political systems, the thesis shows that a careful modelling and analysis of the institutional settings in which these coalitions form helps us not only to understand the coalitions, but also the strategic choices made by the actors. It is useful to know the coalitions, but it helps to be able to predict the action taken by these coalitions as well. For example, in chapter 6, where voting in the second reading is analysed, the results shows that location in the policy space can account for a significant proportion of the voting decisions. However, by investigating who supports amendments to the common position and who does not, new and surprising finding emerges.

Governing parties, rather than opposition parties, are more likely to vote in favour of second reading amendments than opposition parties. The reason is linked to strategic opportunities arising from shifting majority requirements in the EP exploited by the majority of the governing parties. The full explanation of this phenomenon is given in chapter 2. This, as well as insights regarding distribution of agenda-setting power through the rapporteurships system, and differences regarding when legislation is adopted would be missed if the differences in strategic opportunities for governing and opposition parties are not properly modelled. The theory developed in this thesis shows the effect of ideology given the institutional rules.

The EU is a consensual, not a competitive, political system

Different behaviour by governing and opposition parties implies a competitive political system. Some argue that the EU is consensual political system. The argument arises from several sources. One of its origins is the oft-heard claim that there is a consensual culture in the Council (e.g. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997; Lewis 1998). It could also be said that the EP is a consensual institution (Lord 1998). Others subscribes to this view as they see the EU primarily geared towards common problem solving and deliberation (e.g. Eriksen and Fossum 2000; 2002). Yet another line of presenting a similar objection is to argue that the EU is primarily concerned with regulation, through pareto efficient solutions, rather than redistribution (e.g. Majone 1994; 1996; 2000).

Recent research has established that voting in the Council occurs (Mattila 2004; Mattila and Lane 2001). Even when formal votes are not recorded, decisions are made 'in the shadow of the vote' (Golub 1999). All actors know that it is possible to call a vote and behave accordingly. There are winners and losers in EU decision-making (Stokman and Thomson 2004). While the

winner-takes-all phenomena of the Westminster system, and the US Congress, is not present in the EP, partly due to the lack of a majority party, the spoils are tilted in favour of the larger, more centrist party groups (Kaeding 2004; Kreppel 2002; Mamadouh and Raunio 2001; 2003; Raunio 1997).

Finally, even if the EU is geared towards regulation, not redistribution, the redistributive consequences of regulation should not be neglected. Regulative policies might be understood as being about the allocation of property rights. The allocation of property rights can be seen as one of the most fundamental issues to be resolved by the state (McNutt 2002: 164-207). The literature on rent-seeking has alerted us about the role interest groups may play in the decisions of both elected politicians as well as agencies (Becker 1983; Mitchell 1990; Mitchell and Munger 1991). The delegation to independent experts is a political move that needs to be justified from a democratic point of view. There are several reasons for delegating to agencies like time-consistency problems, reputation and the need for expertise (Drazen 2002). But agents might have their own agenda (Bendor, Taylor, and Van Gaalen 1985). Thus, delegation must be followed by control (Banks and Weingast 1992; Weingast 1984; Weingast and Moran 1983). The decision of how to control the agency is in itself a political decision which may favour some actors at the expense of others (Epstein and O'Halloran 1996; Epstein and O'Halloran 2003; McCubbins, Noll, and Schwartz 1984).

Neglecting the role of the Commission

It might be argued that this thesis neglects the role of the Commission in EU politics. The Commission has been seen by many as the engine of integration (Haaland Matlary 1997; Haas 1968; Pollack 2003; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). The Commission is the sole initiator of

EU legislation; surely it should be prominent in any analysis of EU legislative politics (Burns 2004; Schmidt 2000; Stacey 2003). Some observers also argue that it is a legislator in its own right, in particular in “soft law” (e.g. Cini 2003).

While it is right that the Commission is the sole initiator, it is a general agreement amongst formal theorists of EU legislative politics that the Commission does not have significant agenda-setting powers under the reformed Codecision procedure (see for example Crombez 2000; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). However, it is recognised that the Commission is elected by governing parties (Crombez 1997b; Crombez and Hix 2003). How parties view proposals from the Commission is very likely to be influenced by whether or not the Commission is composed by members of their parties or those with similar ideology. This has already been shown to be the case in executive polices in the EU (Jun and Hix 2004). However, incorporating the Commission in the model at this stage greatly complicates the analysis. Should the Commission be modelled as a unitary actor taking decisions by simple majority, or should one assume ministerial autonomy? Despite a large literature on the topic in national Western European settings, the issue remains unresolved (e.g. Dunleavy and Bastow 2001; Laver and Schofield 1990; Laver and Shepsle 1996; 1999a; 1999b; Warwick 1999a; 1999b). Thus, at this stage of developing and testing the theory, the relationship between the Commission and governing and opposition parties is not modelled. The issue of modelling the Commission will be returned to in the conclusion, as it may be a fruitful line of enquiry for an extension of the research.

The power of the governments all over again

A final line of critique is to argue that there is nothing new here. It shows that the governments run the show, just as intergovernmentalists have claimed since the 1960s (Hoffmann 1966; Milward 1993; Moravcsik 1991; 1993; 1998; 1999; Moravcsik and Nicolaidis 1998; 1999).

However, as Garrett and Tsebelis (1996) argue, it is necessary to understand the impact of the institutional rules on the legislative outcome in order to analyse the interaction of preferences in Intergovernmental Bargains. By focusing on parties, rather than the big member states, the analysis highlights the interaction across institutional barriers. While intergovernmentalists have shown how strong governments dominate IGCs, this theory shows how governing parties dominate day-to-day legislative politics in the EU. Rather than being a repetition of intergovernmentalism, it complements it by providing an understanding of the difference between governing and opposition parties in EU politics. As such, the theory might be better able to explain some of the decisions made by governments at IGCs, which are currently left only partially explained in the literature, such as the increase in Parliament's powers (e.g. Hix 2002a; Moravcsik and Nicolaidis 1999). This will be returned to in the conclusion.

Plan of the thesis

The thesis is divided into two parts. Each part consists of three chapters. The first part presents the background for the study through a literature review before presenting the theory. This is followed by a chapter describing the research design. The second part consists of the empirical chapters testing the hypotheses derived from the theory.

Chapter 1 shows that until recently the study of bicameralism neglected the role of political parties. Similarly, the study of legislative behaviour did not often adequately model the effect of bicameral arrangements on the behaviour incentives of actors. However, this is no longer the case, as several studies of both US legislative politics and comparative legislative politics have given the effects of bicameralism a prominent place. This state of affair does not prevail to the same extent in the area of EU legislative politics. Models of the legislative procedure tend to treat the European Parliament, in particular, as a unitary actor with a single ideal policy point, although it takes its decisions using two different preference aggregation rules, simple majority and absolute majority. The study of legislative behaviour tends to be confined to behaviour inside one institution only, often neglecting how the interaction between the institutions changes the behavioural incentives of actors. The review also establishes that national parties are better able to act as cohesive actors in EU legislative politics than trans-national party groups or national delegations.

Chapter 2 presents the theory. It starts by showing the effect on policy outcome of different preference aggregation rules, before moving on to identify the effects of changing majority requirements at different stages of a procedure. Then a model of the Codecision procedure is presented. Contrary to existing models, here the European Parliament is not a unitary actor with a unique ideal point, but a collective actor composed by two types of parties, governing parties and opposition parties. The former group of parties also makes up the Council of Ministers. An investigating of the procedure based on the assumptions that parties, rather than institutions and government are actors, offers new insights. The key argument is that governing parties have the upper hand in the Codecision procedure, in particular those governing parties that form the winning majority in the Council. Focusing on the difference between governing and opposition

parties, three testable hypotheses are derived. First, governing parties are more active as Codecision rapporteurs than opposition parties. Second, rapporteurs from governing parties are more likely to find their first reading proposal accepted by the Council. Third, governing parties and ideologically close opposition parties are more likely to vote in favour of second reading amendments than opposition parties. Having presented the hypotheses, the scope of the theory is then limited to apply only to parties from member states with adversarial national political systems.

Chapter 3 ends the first part of the thesis. It presents the data used to test the hypotheses. The different variables are discussed in detail. Descriptive statistics are presented. The expected effects of the variables, as predicted by the theory and by the existing literature, are presented in a summary table.

Part II presents the empirical findings. Chapter 4 tests the first hypothesis, related to difference in allocation of Codecision reports to governing and opposition parties. The empirical evidence shows that governing parties write more Codecision reports than opposition parties. Agenda-setting power in the EP is in the hands of governing parties. Being represented in the Council, as well as in the EP, gives a party more incentive to assign reports to their members. No significant effect of ideological proximity is found. This seems to suggest that the uptake of report is linked to their status in the national political system. Governing parties stand to take the blame for all policy development during their time in office, and hence choose to be involved as often as possible. Opposition parties, on the other hand, do not stand to take the blame, and can thus choose their involvement more selectively. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that the

difference between governing and opposition parties do not seem to exist amongst parties from non-adversarial member states.

Chapter 5 tests the second hypothesis, related to differences in when legislation is adopted. The evidence shows that governing rapporteurs are more likely to see “their” legislation adopted by the Council in the first reading than rapporteurs from opposition parties. Therefore, control the agenda-setting power inside the Parliament has an impact on when Codecision legislation is adopted.

Chapter 6 test the third hypothesis, which is related to voting behaviour in second reading votes. The findings show that there exist two groups of parties in the EP’s second reading. The governing parties from the largest party group in the Council together with ideologically close parties are more active in supporting amendments than the other groups, composed of the minority party group in the Council and parties ideologically close to it. A coalition of Socialists, Liberals and Greens were more eager than right of centre parties to push for second reading amendments in a period when the majority in the Council came from the centre-left.

In the conclusion, the findings are summarised and the overall effect of government and opposition in EU legislative politics is discussed. It argues that government and opposition exist in the EU. The “legislative government” is made up by a qualified majority of the governing parties in the Council and ideologically closely affiliated opposition parties. The opposition is made up by those governing parties that make up the losing minority in the Council and ideologically closely affiliated opposition parties, as well as extremists and anti-Europeans. Having summarised the support for alternative explanations, topics for further study are presented.

PART I

Chapter 1: Bicameralism and legislative politics

This chapter reviews the literature on legislative politics in bicameral systems. A theoretical justification of bicameralism is given by Riker (1992) and the history of bicameralism can be found in Shell (2001). Nevertheless, the authoritative theoretical and empirical account of bicameralism is Tsebelis and Money (1997). They argue that bicameralism tends to bring the conflict down to one privileged dimension of conflict even in a multi-dimensional setting. This argument rests on two assumptions.

The first assumption is that the two institutions have separate legislative cores. If the current policy is located inside the core, there will be no majority in favour of changing the policy. They argue that this tends to be the case because of different electoral/selection systems, different constituencies, difference timing of elections, differences between who the two chambers represent, or between the ability of party leadership to control the behaviour of the party delegations to the two chambers. Tsebelis and Money (1997: 39) acknowledge that the two chambers may not have separate cores if controlled by the same veto-player or have identical preferences.

The second assumption in Tsebelis and Money's argument is that the majority requirements in the two chambers are constant throughout the legislative procedure. While Tsebelis and Money clearly recognise the effect of different majority requirements, they stop short of discussing the effect of shifting majority requirements at different stages in the legislative process (see also Tsebelis 2002: 136-60). This is of particular importance if the majority requirements are not symmetrical. An example is the Codecision procedure in the European Union. A qualified

majority in the Council of Ministers is necessary to accept or amend in its first reading, and to accept in the second and in, and following, the Conciliation Committee. A simple majority in the European Parliament amend or accept the proposal from the Commission in the first reading. In the second reading, an absolute majority is required to reject or amend the common position of the Council. In, and following, the Conciliation Committee, a simple majority is necessary to accept (see Article 251).

To develop the argument that legislative politics needs to be analysed with a clear understanding of institutional rules, this chapter discusses two aspects of legislative politics. The first aspect is bicameralism. It is shown that political parties have not figured promptly in the analysis of bicameralism. The second aspect to be discussed is legislative partisan behaviour. Here it is shown that the full effect of institutional rules has, until recently been missing in the literature. The first section reviews the literature developed in the context of the US Congress. The second treats the topic from a comparative perspective. The third and fourth sections review the existing literature concerning the European Union, first concerning the bicameral rules, then legislative behaviour. This chapter is in no way meant as a complete review of legislative studies, neither in the US Congress, comparatively, nor in the case of the EU. Instead, the focus is on the role of parties in the literature on bicameralism and the role of the institutional setting in the literature on legislative politics.

Bicameralism and legislative politics in the US

Early accounts of bicameralism in the US emphasise institutional balance and policy stability. The two institutions need to agree in order for policy to change (e.g. de Tocqueville [1835-40] 1994). Although presented in a different language and with a different focus, most of the

contemporary literature on bicameralism in the US still sees institutions, rather than political parties, as the key actors. Some authors show how the constitution increases the chances of policy stability compared with unicameral systems (e.g. Hammond and Miller 1987; Miller, Hammond, and Kile 1996). Others argue that the informational interaction between the two chambers can increase the objective quality of legislation, even if the two chambers have congruent preferences (Rogers 2001). These arguments are however open to questioning (Cutrone and McCarty 2004). Investigating the use of Germaneness rules in the two institutions Back (1982) finds that the Senate has the upper hand in the final stage of the legislative process, the conference committee. The advantage is due to the more liberal approach to the use of the Germaneness rule in the Senate. In his view parties have neither the formal nor informal capacity to coordinate behaviour in the two institutions (p. 342). As we will see below, scholars have recently started to question this view.

The relationship between partisan actors holding office in different institutions is often discussed in the context of unified versus divided government. Unified government means that the President, the House of Representatives, and the Senate are controlled by the same party. Divided government exists when the President does not come from the party holding the majority in at least one of the two houses. The literature focuses on four different aspects, the reasons for divided government (e.g. Ingberman and Vilani 1993; Nicholson and Segura 1999), the effect on policy and the economy (see for example Alesina and Rosenthal 1995), legislative output (see amongst others Coleman 1999; Edwards III, Barrett, and Peake 1997; Mayhew 1991) and how it shapes actors behaviour. The focus here is on the latter aspect.

Krehbiel (1998: 8-19) provides a useful overview of the literature on unified versus divided government in the US. His starting point is the traditional normative theory of responsible party government, where parties adopt policy platforms and a unified government is elected. The majority party then enacts the policy platform. No bi-partisan coalition formation exists. It is thus easy to identify who is responsible for which policy and vote them out next time if they do not deliver on their promises (Schattschneider 1942). Rohde and Aldrich (1995; Aldrich and Rohde 1997-1998; Rohde 1991), present a theory of conditional party government. Party politics exclude the opposition in both chambers (Aldrich 1995). If parties have sufficiently different policy preferences and policy preferences are similar inside parties, the policy outcome will be non-centrist, skewed in the direction of the majority party (for applications, see Forgette and Sala 1999; Weatherford 1993). The predictions are less clear when these conditions do not hold. A third strand argues that divided government leads to gridlock (Fiorina 1992; 1996). Theories drawing from the median voter theorem (Black 1958), suggest that the policy-outcome will be identical to the ideal policy of the median voter, irrespective of partisan composition. Policy changes as the location of the median voter changes. Extensions of the median voter theorem to multiple dimensions have shown that a stable median voter location may not exist, hence policy is likely to be subject to constant change, cycling between different alternatives, or chaos (McKelvey 1976; Schofield 1978). Against the prediction of chaos come the stability-inducing theories (e.g. Shepsle 1979). Here the focus is on institutional rules which prevent policy-cycling, like agenda-setting, gate-keeping powers, amendment rules and ex post veto-powers (Shepsle and Weingast 1987).

Building on the institutional rules, a last set of approaches employs non-cooperative game theory to model the sequential aspects of the legislative process (Baron 1989; Baron and Ferejohn 1989). The advantages of non-cooperative game theory are that it offers clear predictions and allows for

an explicit modelling of majority requirements. Krehbiel (1998) relies on non-cooperatives game theory and spatial models to present his argument, which is that policy proposals do not form to obtain minimum winning coalitions in favour, instead oversized majorities form in order to be able to over-ride potential vetoes. As coalition formation is understood as a function of preference, coalitions are often bi-partisan. This is not in order to ensure that the legislation passes in each individual chamber, but to make sure that the policy is adopted (a similar argument is also presented in Brady and Volden 1998). Krehbiel's model has been criticised for ignoring the role of parties by focusing exclusively on preferences and for being essentially unicameral. Cox and McCubbins argue that party leadership, rather than individual representatives are the key actors in US politics (Cox and McCubbins 1993; 2004). Chiou and Rothenberg (2003) takes the opposite strategy of Krehbiel by explicitly modelling the two Congressional parties as unitary actors in a bicameral setting. They suggest that a model incorporating parties and a bicameral presidential institutional setting outperforms rival models. Legislative choices, they argue, can be explained by carefully modelling for the role of parties and their leadership, taking account of the institutional setting. Beyond roll-call votes, in the case of NAFTA agreement, it has been shown how Republican leaders signalled their position early on in an attempt to influence the behaviour of rank and file members of the party (Box-Steffensmeier, Arnold, and Zorn 1997).

Focusing on the effect of separation of powers on congressional decision-making, Martin (2001) question the assumption of sincere voting behaviour. Members of both the House of Representatives and the Senate are constrained by the other legislative chamber and the Supreme Court in their voting behaviour. Members of Congress use roll call votes both to claim credit and to ensure that their preferred policies are adopted. The cause of legislative gridlock might be found in intra-branch conflict rather than inter-branch rivalry (Wilkerson 1999).

In sum, the literature on bicameralism and legislative politics in the US has moved from studying the two phenomena separately toward an integrated approach, which aims to take into account the institutional rules influencing the choices made by actors. In the US literature, the role of parties is contested. Some argue that it is sufficient to model the ideal policy locations of the individual representatives, as there are some significant differences within the two parties. This debate has implications for the choice of actors in the theory developed in the next chapter. It will be argued when reviewing the literature on EU legislative politics that national parties rather than party groups are best understood as the central actors in EU politics. However, before the EU literature on bicameralism and legislative politics is reviewed, it is useful to consider how bicameralism and legislative politics have been dealt with from a comparative perspective.

Comparative bicameralism and legislative politics

One-third of the parliaments in the world are bi-cameral (Tsebelis 2002: 143). An overview is provided by Tsebelis and Money (Money and Tsebelis 1992; Tsebelis and Money 1997: 48-52). Lijphart (1984: 90-105) argues that “strong bicameralism”, meaning that the two houses are even-handed, leads to larger than minimum winning coalitions, i.e. a consensual model of democracy. Tsebelis and Rasch (1995) go more into details about the different institutional rules guiding bicameral negotiations. They find, in contrast to Lijphart, that even upper houses normally considered weak, “asymmetrical bicameralism”, have significant influence on policy outcomes. The influence of an upper house is a function of the number of negotiation rounds, stopping rules and the sequence of readings. However, beyond comparing the selection-procedures for the candidates in the second chambers, number of veto-players, and the possibility of an overlapping core, none of these works takes the role of parties into account. In general, the

literature on comparative bicameralism has, until recently, confined itself to describing and comparing the upper houses and their powers (e.g. Baldwin and Shell 2001; Patterson and Mughan 1999; 2001).

There is a large literature on comparative legislative politics in parliamentary systems focusing on cabinet formation and termination (e.g. Dunleavy and Bastow 2001; Laver and Schofield 1990; Laver and Shepsle 1990a; Laver and Shepsle 1990b; Laver and Shepsle 1996; Müller and Strøm 2000/2003; Strøm 1990b; Warwick 1999a). The literature on legislatures, on the other hand, tends to be devoted to describing individual institutions (Norton 1998a: xii) or classifying them in terms of their power vis-à-vis the executive (e.g. Mezey 1979; Norton 1998b). Döring (1995) provides a rational choice institutionalist account of how parliamentary structures influence legislative outcome. Nevertheless, when legislative politics is explained, it tends to be through the lenses of government and opposition (Elgie 2001; Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2001). Parties tend to be in the centre of this analysis (e.g. Blondel and Cotta 2000; Laver and Budge 1992; Müller and Strøm 1999). However, until recently full attention has not been paid to the influence of bicameralism versus unicameralism.

Political divisions in bicameral systems can take three forms, institutional, executive-legislative and partisan. Of these three Scully (2001: 96-7) argues that the latter is the most common. Hence, the relationship between the chambers is largely an effect of the composition and unity of the parties composing them. König (2001) builds on the Tsebelis and Money model but takes party politics into account by relaxing the assumption of unified chamber actors with homogeneous ideal points. He shows that when similar party majorities exist in both chambers bicameral

checks-and-balances are by-passed allowing for significant policy change. However, when the chambers have opposite majorities, status quo prevails.

This might be in line with what voters want. On the basis of the Danish and Swedish parliamentary reform, Congleton (2002) argues that in partisan politics, bicameral legislatures do not only produce more predictable public policies, moreover these policies are closer in line with the long-term preferences of the voters than unicameral legislatures. Contrary to the 'pork barrel' budgetary inflating outcome of the bicameral US institutions, where election strategies to a certain extent are candidate focused rather than partisan (but see Cox and Magar 1999), bicameral parliamentary systems with strong parties seem to reduce spending levels (Heller 2001). While bicameralism does not seem to have a major effect on cabinet formation in parliamentary systems, it does influence the duration. Cabinet with upper chamber partisan support tend to stay substantively longer in office than those without (Druckman and Thies 2002).

The study of legislative politics in Latin America has, like its US counterpart focused on the effect of inter-branch conflicts, in particular between the president and the Congress (Horowitz 1990; Linz 1990; Linz and Valenzuela 1994; Mainwaring 1993; O'Donnell 1994; Shugart and Carey 1992; Stepan and Skack 1993; Valenzuela 1993). Rather than focusing on legislative gridlock, this literature focuses on the effect of divided government on regime stability under conditions of presidentialism and multi-party legislatures (for a critique, see Cheibub 2002).

Recently, Latin American assemblies have changed from being studied as obstructions to presidential power, to a topic worth studying for their own merits. Morgenstern and Nacif (2002) investigate legislative politics in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. They look at legislative-

executive relations, political parties and legislative structure, and on the impact of legislatures in the policy process. The study demonstrates how incentive structures drive legislative behaviour. For example, when investigating legislative politics in Brazil, a bicameral system, Samuels (2002: 330) finds that '[a] "government – opposition" logic operating at the state level dominates the division of state delegation amendments, *not* a purely state-level partisan logic, and certainly not a *national* logic'. The reason, he notes, is that implementation is often state responsibility with some room of discretion to favour own supporters over the supporters of the opposition. Focusing on electoral incentives, candidates may cultivate direct personal ties with constituency groups, rather than develop responsible parties (Ames 1995a; Ames 1995b; Mainwaring 1999; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). On the other hand, institutional rules of the legislature might have the opposite effect (Figueiredo and Limongi 2000). The resulting legislative behaviour is a combination of personal and party strategy (Perreira and Mueller 2004; Samuels 2003). Using roll-call votes to investigate several Latin American countries as well as the US, Morgenstern (2004) finds that in addition to electoral system, it is necessary to consider ideology, cabinet membership and majority requirements in order to explain legislative coalitions. Investigating the relationship between the president and the Congress in Argentina, Mustapic finds an important difference between government and opposition parties: "Being in opposition makes things easier, since unlike the governing parties, it can choose when to act" (Mustapic 2002: 39).

In sum, the study of bicameralism has focused on institutions as actors, thereby ignored the role of parties and mainly confined itself to descriptive work. The study of legislative behaviour from a comparative perspective has, just like its US counterpart seen a turn towards taking the institutional setting more seriously, including the bicameral nature of many legislatures, with its

different majority requirements. It is now time to turn the focus to the existing literature on bicameralism in the EU.

Bicameralism in the European Union

This section takes a close look at how the legislative process in the EU is modelled. While the models do move beyond the institution-as-actor assumption concerning the Council of Ministers, they fail to do so in the case of the European Parliament (and the Commission for that matter).

This section first presents the “standard Tsebelis- Garrett model”. It moves on to reviews the criticism of the model. Then, the assumption of the EP as a unitary actor, shared by both Tsebelis and Garrett model and their rivals, is discussed.

The traditional debate in the EU literature between neo-functionalists, who focus on the role of societal actors and supranational institutions, and intergovernmentalists, who focus on the role of state actors, has for a long time dominated research on the European Community and later the European Union (Haas 1968; Hoffmann 1966; Moravcsik 1998; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). A review of the debate can be found in Rosamond (2000). The key difference is over who control the level of integration. The EU can be understood as an instance of carefully delegated tasks by rational heads of state with complete information. Alternatively, the governments may be seen only to react to the actions taken by societal interests aided by supranational agents with their own interests and capabilities to foster further integration once created. The effect of the legislative procedures does not feature in these accounts. Four different legislative procedures have been used by the European Union, consultation, co-operation, Codecision and assent. The involvement of the EP differs across these procedures (Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton 2000; Hix 1999b).

Garrett and Tsebelis (1996) criticise the neo-functionalists and intergovernmentalists for neglecting the effect of the institutional design. They are particularly sceptical of power indices approaches in particular for focusing solely on veto-power and assuming coalitions are formed randomly (e.g. Brams and Affuso 1985; Hosli 1995; 1996). Instead, they argue for an approach that also takes the institutional design of the decision-making procedure into account. Winning coalitions tend to be connected in the policy space (Axelrod 1970). Their model builds on the insight from Tsebelis' seminal paper on the European Parliament as a conditional agenda-setter, which argues that the EP has agenda-setting power under the Cooperation procedure under the conditions that an absolute majority in the EP can be found in favour of an amendment that the Commission and at least one member state support (Tsebelis 1994). It is then easier for the Council to accept EP's amendments (qualified majority) than to reject them (unanimity).

Garrett and Tsebelis (1996) develop a one-dimensional spatial model with 7 actors. A two-dimensional model is presented for illustrative purposes, as a critique of the power-indices approach, but not elaborated on when analysing the legislative procedures. The decision-rule, qualified majority (QMV) is modelled as five out of the seven actors. Actors belonging to the Pareto-set cannot be excluded. Coalitions do not form randomly in the European Union, not even in the Council of Ministers. Garrett and Tsebelis challenge the focus on veto-power rather than agenda-setting power. By veto-power, they mean the power to accept or reject proposals. Agenda-setting power is the ability to make a proposal that is harder for the veto-players to amend or reject than to accept. To present what is by now the classical spatial model of EU policy-making they rely on the shared assumption by both neo-functionalists and inter-governmentalist that the ordering policy dimension is the level of integration. They further


assume that all actors would like to increase the level of integration. The preferences of the Commission as well as the EP are extreme in favour of integration compared to any of the member states. Their focus is on the last stage of the procedure, assuming that all actors have complete information only at this stage in the process. They also assume that the actors do not believe it is feasible in the short run to reintroduce legislation in a policy area once it has been passed (Garrett and Tsebelis 1996: 279-81).

Given these assumptions, they enlighten the neo-functional-intergovernmentalist debate by showing that the Luxembourg compromise and the assent procedure produce lowest common denominator outcomes, while the Codecision I (Maastricht version) results in the level of integration moving to the ideal policy of the third least integrationist member state. Consultation and Cooperation lead to most integration, as the winning proposals are located at the ideal policy of the fifth least integrationist member state.

The predictions of the model is summarised in figure 1.1. On the basis of this model, Tsebelis and Garrett (2000) also model the Amsterdam version of the Codecision procedure (Codecision II). Holding preferences constant (the supranational scenario), they argue that Codecision II results in policy outcomes that are less integrationist than Cooperation and consultation but more integrationist than Codecision I. They also find that the EP and the Council are “co-equal” legislators under the procedure, which they characterise as a bicameral system with a severe status quo bias because of the oversized majority requirements both in the Council and in the EP.

Figure 1.1 The Garrett and Tsebelis model

Decision-making procedures and policy outcomes in the European Union, where 1-7 = governments' preferred positions



Adopted from Garrett and Tsebelis (1996:282) and Tsebelis and Garrett (2000) The location of the outcome under Luxembourg compromise follows the logic of Tsebelis and Kreppel (1998).

Figure 1.1 shows that the outcome under assent and the Luxembourg compromise is at the ideal point of country 2. That point makes the pivotal country under unanimity, country 1 indifferent between the current policy SQ and the new proposal. The same is the outcome under assent, where unanimity is needed as well¹. Under Codecision I, Tsebelis and Garrett argues that the outcome will be at the ideal location of country 3, the QMV pivot. As the actors are free to re-contract if a better alternative comes along, country number 3 will be able to impose its ideal point. Since the common position is the reversion point should the Conciliation Committee fail, and since the EP is better off from the ideal point of country 3 compared to the SQ, the EP will accept the common position of the Council. However, under consultation and co-operation, the Council needs unanimity to amend but only a qualified majority to accept the proposal from the

¹ In some areas where the Codecision procedure is used, unanimity is still required in the Council. In these areas, the predicted maximal change in the location of the status quo is to the point that makes the least integrationist member state indifferent between the new policy and the current status quo. In figure 1.1, it is the ideal point of member state 2.

Commission. This means that the Commission can successfully propose policy changes that make the pivotal country, country 3 indifferent between the SQ and the new policy. Hence, the Commission is able to move the policy closer to its ideal point. In figure 1.1, the Commission is able to move the policy to the ideal point of country 5. Following the introduction of the Cooperation procedure, Tsebelis (1994) argued that the EP was given conditional agenda-setting power, as it could subject to an absolute majority and support from the Commission, propose amendments that were easier for the Council to accept (QMV) than to reject or amend (unanimity). This argument relies on an assumption about incomplete information at the first stage of the procedure. With the reform from Codecision I to Codecision II in the treaty of Amsterdam, Tsebelis and Garret find that that the outcome will be located somewhere between the ideal point of country 3 and country 5, depending on how agenda-setting power is distributed in the Conciliation Committee (Tsebelis and Garrett 2000).

This model has not been left unchallenged. Focusing on the Cooperation procedure, Moser (1996; 1997) questions the assumptions behind the conditional agenda-setting power of the EP. It is in particular the incomplete information assumption that is questioned. Under complete information, there is no reason why the Commission cannot propose EP's amendments themselves if the Commission prefers them to their own proposal. Instead, Moser suggest that the EP only has conditional veto power under Cooperation, as the Council needs unanimity to override an EP veto. Thus, on the condition that at least one member state supports the Parliament, the EP can block legislation under Cooperation. This interpretation is also shared by Crombez (1996) and Steunenberg (1994). Hence, they argue that under in a single-shot game with the preference-locations assumed by Tsebelis and Garrett, the EP is almost powerless. The EP would have to veto something that will make them better off than the current policy in order to make user of

their veto power. However, the relevance of their veto-power increases as the preferences between the Commission and the EP diverge.

Garret and Tsebelis (1996; Tsebelis 1997) find that Codecision reduces the power of the EP, because it loses its conditional veto-agenda-setting power in exchange for unconditional veto-power, resulting in a policy outcome further away from its ideal policy location. The outcome of the procedure is located at the ideal point of country 3 under Codecision I, compared to the ideal point of country 5 under Cooperation. Crombez (1997a) and Steunenberg (1994) disagree. They argue that the Parliament is better off under Codecision I compared to Cooperation (see also Scully 1997a; 1997b). The conditional veto it had under Cooperation is exchanged with an unconditional veto. The EP is no longer dependent on the support from a member state in order to block legislation. Steunenberg find that the outcome of Cooperation and Codecision I is the identical under the preference distribution assumed by Garret and Tsebelis. In Crombez's model, the policy outcome under Codecision I is closer to the EP than the outcome under Cooperation. Provided that at least one member of the QMV majority in the Council is made better off from the outcome of the Conciliation Committee, the Council will not be able to re-introduce its common position following a breakdown in the Conciliation Committee. According to Crombez's logic, the policy outcome of Codecision I is somewhere between the ideal point of Country 3 and country 5. Steunenberg models the Conciliation Committee in Codecision I as a chance for the EP to accept or reject the common position of the Council by a two-thirds majority. According to the logic of his model, the outcome of Codecision I will be identical to the outcome under consultation and Cooperation when the ideal position of the Commission is located inside the core in the Council. It will be located at the ideal point of country 3 if the Commission and the EP are integrationist policy outliers, as in the Garrett and Tsebelis scenario. The debate is

unresolved. Empirical comparisons of the power of the EP under the two procedures show mixed results (Hubschmid and Moser 1997; König and Poter 2001; Tsebelis et al. 2001; Tsebelis and Kalandrakis 1999).

When comparing Codecision I with Codecision II Tsebelis and Garret find that the power of the EP has increased. This is because the common position of the Council no longer is the reversion point if the Conciliation Committee fails to adopt a joint text. Under the new Codecision procedure, agenda setting is shared between the EP and the Council in the Conciliation Committee. As the Commission does not have a formal role in Conciliation, its' powers are reduced compared to the other procedures. While being co-equal to the Council, they maintain that the EP was more powerful under Cooperation due to its conditional agenda-setting power. Crombez (2000; 2001) and Steunenberg (1997) take issue with this interpretation. Following their earlier analysis they maintain that the EP is more powerful under Codecision than under Cooperation. In Crombez model, the outcome under Codecision II is identical to the outcome under Codecision I, rather than strengthening the power of the EP, it makes the Commission powerless. As such, he argues that it may increase legislative gridlock in the EU. Crombez (1997b) also question too what extent the Commission is highly integrationist, given that it is selected by member state governments (until Nice by unanimity). Steunenberg assume that the EP has the sole agenda-setting power in the Conciliation Committee. The EP is able to make a take-it or leave it offer to the Council. Under the Tsebelis and Garrett supranational scenario, with the Commission and the EP as integrationist policy outliers, the policy outcome in Steunenberg's scenario is hence located at the ideal point of country 5. This point makes the QMV pivotal for an integrationist change in policy, country 3, indifferent between the current policy and the proposal from the EP.

The debate over formal rules neglects the effect of the internal rules of the institutions. For example, Rule 78 of Rules of Procedure in the EP. It stated that the EP would vote to reject if the Council re-introduced the Common Position following failure of the Conciliation Committee to agree on a text. The first time the Council tried to re-introduce its Common Position, on the draft directive on open network provision on voice telephony (ONP), the EP rejected by an absolute majority and the legislation fell (Rittberger 2000). It could however be argued that the ONP was a special case as the vote to reject was held in the first session of the fourth EP (Earnshaw and Judge 1995). The extent to which the EP would be able to produce an absolute majority another time should the Conciliation Committee fail again can be questioned. As such the Amsterdam reform of the Codecision procedure could be said to strengthen the EP by formalising the de facto operation of the procedure (Hix 2002a; Shackleton 2000), although the proportion of EP amendments being adopted may not have changed between Codecision I and II (Kasack 2004).

To sum up, there is a general consensus that the Council and the European Parliament are on equal footing in the Amsterdam version of the Codecision procedure (Codecision II). The agenda-setting power is shared in the Conciliation procedure and both institutions have a mutual veto. However, the literature has not fully acknowledged the effect of the different majority requirements in the EP at the different stages of the procedure. The EP adopts and amends by simple majority in the first reading. It amends and rejects by an absolute majority in the second reading. In and following Conciliation, the EP accepts by a simple majority. If the simple majority is different from the absolute majority, modeling the EP as a unitary actor might result in misleading conclusions regarding the outcome of the procedure. The above sections, which reviewed the literature on bicameralism in other political systems, showed that parties, across

institutions, might significantly influence policy. Hence, the next section reviews the literature on legislative behaviour in the EU in order to investigate to what extent it is reasonable to treat the EP as a unitary actor, i.e. that the ideal policy of the pivotal voters under simple majority pivot and is identical or similar to that of absolute majority. Showing that the EP cannot adequately be treated as a unitary actor in the Codecision procedure, the section moves on to discuss to what extent national parties, rather than trans-national party groups or country delegations should be seen as the key actors in EU legislative politics.

EU legislative politics

This section argues that the existing literature on behaviour inside the European Parliament shows that it is misleading to model the EP as a unitary actor. It argues that the pivotal voter under simple majority is unlikely to be identical to the absolute majority pivot. It is unreasonable to assume that they share the same preferences. The literature on coalition formation in the EP shows that the success-rate of coalitions differs under the alternative voting requirements. While the literature on EU legislative politics considers the institutional rules, there is nevertheless a need to re-think EU legislative politics, carefully modelling the institutional rules that create the incentive structure that guides parties' behaviour. Reviewing the literature on coalition formation inside the EP shows that national political parties, rather than trans-national party groups or nationalities are the key actors inside the EP.

Kreppel (1999) collected data on 24 legislative proposals passed under the Cooperation procedure between 1988 and 1996. These proposals contained 512 amendments. She finds that the Council adopts 44% of all EP amendments in the first reading and 24% of those proposed in the second. She also finds that the EP is more likely to be successful if it is not divided along party lines.

Studying a sample of roll-call votes in the 1987-1996 period, Kreppel (2000) finds that the EP grand coalition (PES and EPP) forms in almost 61% of the cases in the first reading, where only a simple majority is needed, and 69% of the times in the second reading, where an absolute, and hence a grand coalition, is needed. She notes that the grand coalition tends to form on resolutions, which do not have any legislative impact. This leads her to suggest that the reason for forming a grand coalition in this period was to strengthen the influence and power of the European Parliament vis-à-vis the Council and the Commission. In order for the EP to be able to see their amendments being adopted by the other institutions, it is necessary to present amendments, which enjoyed bipartisan support, given the partisan nature of the other institutions and the oversized majority requirement in the Council. She argues that '[t]his is particularly true when the ideological composition of the other institutions is internally divided (as it always has been) and / or leans towards the opposite ideological pole from the EP' (Kreppel 2000: 346).

Kreppel presents a spatial model of when we should expect the EPP and PES to compete, causing the first reading pivotal voter to differ from the second; and when we should expect them to collude, which implies that the behaviour of the first reading pivot is identical to that of the second reading pivot. The model is driven by the relative distance between the status quo and the position of the other institutions and the relative position of the two party groups. The two party groups will only collude in both the first and second reading if they are located on the same side of the other actors, in particular compared to the members in the Council. In the cases when the pivotal voter in the Council is located between the PES and the EPP, they will not compromise in the first round, but may or may not compromise in the second. Thus, the permissiveness of the "EP as a unitary actor" assumption rests on the relative location of the EPP and PES vis-à-vis the other actors. In her statistical analysis, she finds that the grand coalition is not more likely to form

in the second reading than in the first. Instead, it is more likely to form on final proposals rather than amendments. Thus, the EPP and PES compete on amendments in both the first and the second reading.

Kreppel and Tsebelis (1999) find that different coalitions form at different stages of the Cooperation procedure. Studying a period where the PES was the biggest party group in the EP, they found that several coalitions were successful in the first reading. The Socialists and the Liberals, with or without the Christian Democrats were winning in the first reading, as was a purely leftist coalition between the PES, the Greens and the GUL/NGL. Only the grand coalition of the PES and the EPP was successful in the second reading. While the EPP could not block first reading legislation, it was capable of blocking second reading amendments. Their study shows that all legislation that was not supported by the EPP in the second reading, fell. This indicates that the pivotal voter on first reading amendments, where a simple majority is needed, is not identical to the pivotal voter on second reading amendments, where an absolute majority is needed, at least not in the Cooperation procedure. Kreppel and Hix (2003) compare the behaviour in roll-call votes in 1996 and 1999. They find that the EPP and PES competed over amendments both years. While the absolute majority requirement made them less likely to cooperate in 1996, it had no significant effect in 1999. The two party groups competed more over amendments and internal matters in 1999 than in 1996, but cooperated over whole proposals. Hence, the pattern of competition holds for Codecision as well.

The average attendance level in the fifth parliament was just below 83%, as measured by signing the attendance record. The attendance in individual votes may be lower. If the simple majority pivot and the absolute majority pivot were to have the same preference, the preference of the

median voter would have to, as a minimum, be similar to the preferences of the 60% majority voter. This might be the case if the 50% pivot and the 60% pivot belong to the same party group on the dominant dimension in the European Parliament. To investigate to what extent this is the case; it might be useful to look at voting records.

Hix et al (2004) collected all roll call votes between 1979 and 2001 and calculated Nominat scores. Under simple majority, the preference of the pivotal voter is on average equal to the median voter in the parliament, MEP number 314 in the fifth EP. Under the absolute majority requirement it would also be MEP number 314 if everybody showed up to vote. However only about 80% of MEPs show up to vote, the absolute majority pivots is located at the 60th percentile of the EP, which is MEP number 377. In the 1999-2001 period, the first dimension simple majority pivot was Colette Flesch, a Luxembourg sitting in the ELDR group. The absolute majority pivot from the left was Adriana Poli Bortone, an Italian sitting in for the right wing Union for Europe of the Nations Group (UEN). From the right, the absolute majority pivot was David W Martin from the British Labour party. On the second dimension, the simple majority pivot was Luigi Ciriaco De Mita, sitting in the Italian delegation to the EPP. The absolute majority pivot, going from negative to positive was Rainer Wieland, a German, also sitting in the EPP. Going from positive to negative, the absolute majority pivot was Herve Novelli, a French delegate to the ELDR. Thus only in the second dimension, counting from the negative side was the pivotal voter under simple and absolute majority from the same party group, although not from the same country. In all the other cases, the absolute majority pivot was different from the simple majority pivot, both with regard to party group and member state.

Finally, Shackleton and Raunio (2003) find that a significant proportion of Codecision legislation,

25% by the end of 2000 was agreed between the EP and the Council in the first reading, thereby preventing the possibility that the absolute majority pivot could influence the legislation. They argue that a change in culture has made early conclusion more attractive. Surely, opening up for allowing early conclusion in the reform of the treaty might have made an impact as well.

There are several possible alternatives for how to model the EP once it has been established that the unitary actor assumption is not very satisfying. It can be modelled as composed by national delegations from the member states, similar to the Council except that the number of weighted votes is transformed in number of representative with one vote each. Another alternative is to model the EP as composed of transnational party groups. A third alternative is to argue that national parties dominate the EP. The remaining part of this section evaluates the support in the literature for the different alternatives. It argues that the EP is best modelled as made up by national parties forming transnational party groups to reduce coordination and informational costs as well as efficiently distribute benefits amongst the national parties within party groups.

The European Parliament is instead organised along partisan lines, unlike most other international assemblies tend to be organised along nationalities (Corbett 1998). Studies of roll-call votes are unison in pointing out the low voting cohesion of member states (Attina 1990; Brzinski 1995; Hix and Lord 1997; Noury 2002b). So, while the voting power of the different member states in the European Parliament might be of interest in terms of fair allocation of votes, it does not offer good predictions for coalition formation in the EP (Hosli 1997).

It might seem more useful to consider party groups as the relevant actors. Power indices based on the power of the party groups tend to predict outcomes similar to observed successful coalition

formation, predicting the grand coalition to be successful in oversized majority votes while the liberals are pivotal in simple majority votes (Raunio and Wiberg 2002). Observers had high hopes for the transnational party groups following the first direct elections to the EP in 1979, hoping for a 'Europe des partis' (e.g. Marquand 1978). While the party groups might not have lived up to these expectations, they have nevertheless been able to structure behaviour better than nationalities. Internal cohesion in roll call votes compares well with other national parliaments (Hix, Kreppel, and Noury 2003).

A competitive party system has developed with the relationship between EPP and PES forming the dominant axis of competition (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2003). However, within party groups, national party delegations influence the behaviour of their MEPs to a larger extent than the party group leadership or their own stated preferences over policy (Hix 2002b). The autonomy from the national party enjoyed by MEPs seems to be related to the power of the national party to control the candidate selection process (Hix 2004). Kreppel (2002: 198-211) points out that the party group leadership lacks the tools to discipline their MEPs as the allocation of offices is dominated by the national delegations within the party groups, not by the party group leadership independently. Survey evidence also point towards a domination by national parties over party groups, as '53 per cent of MEPs considered voting against the group line as "acceptable or most acceptable"' (Bowler and Farrell, 1999: 216, quoted in Raunio and Wiberg 2002: 78). There is evidence pointing towards differences between national parties in office in their member state and those in opposition. Whittaker (2001) found that MEPs from governing parties seemed to be influenced more by their national party than opposition parties, in particular in the Codecision procedure. Studies of the selection of the Commission have also found a behaviour difference between government and opposition parties (Gabel and Hix 2002; Hix and Lord 1996; Jun and

Hix 2004). Governing parties have been found to make party groups behave as more cohesive voting blocks (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2004). Ideological location seems to influence voting behaviour in the Council of Ministers (Mattila 2004). Thus, it seems to be reasonable to conclude that national parties, organized within party groups are the dominant actors in European Union politics. National party leaderships are capable of organizing their MEPs, making and breaking coalitions in day-to-day legislative politics in the European Union.

Summary

This chapter first surveyed the literature on bicameralism and legislative politics in the US setting and comparatively. It then discussed the main models of bicameralism in the EU and reviewed the literature on legislative behaviour inside the EP. The key insights is that studies of bicameralism have until recently neglected the role played by parties across institutions. Along similar lines, studies of legislative politics have until recently neglected how bicameralism shapes actors' incentive structures, and thus their behaviour. The sections on EU legislative politics showed that models of bicameralism in the EU have treated the EP as a unitary actor. Given that recent literature on bicameralism in other settings has focused on the interaction between parties and institutional rules, it might be fruitful to go beyond the assumption of the EP as a unitary actor when modelling EU legislative politics. The question that then arose was over who the actors were. The literature on legislative behaviour in the EP suggests that national parties are better able to act as unitary actors than either national delegations, or trans-national parties.

The next chapter presents a theory of EU legislative politics. Focusing on the Codecision procedure, original behavioural predictions are derived by treating political parties as strategic actors, considering the institutional rules when calculating their optimal behaviour. Consistent

with recent developments in US and comparative literature on legislative behaviour, the explanatory factors are whether a party is represented in the Council (Government or Opposition), location in the ideological policy space and majority requirements.

Chapter 2: A theory of Government and Opposition in EU

Legislative Politics

The previous chapter has suggested that national parties are important actors in the EU, just as they are in national political systems (Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2001; Hix and Lord 1997; Schattschneider 1942). National parties sitting in government are represented in the Council while those in opposition are not. The EU is a separation of power system where the Council and the European Parliament are co-legislators under the Codecision procedure. This chapter presents a theory of government and opposition in EU legislative politics. It argues that governing parties dominate day-to-day legislative politics in the EU.

The theory draws on the insights from non-cooperative game theory. The first section discusses to what extent its assumptions are appropriate in the case of EU legislative politics and to what extent national political parties can be modelled as cohesive actors in EU legislative politics. The second section shows that the expressed position of a collective actor is a function of the preferences of the individual actors and the decision rule. The third section derives the equilibrium outcomes in terms of policy location and preferred stage in of the game to adopt legislation in the case of the Amsterdam version of the Codecision procedure (Codecision II). This allows for predictions regarding national parties' behaviour to be derived. The predictions are presented as testable hypotheses in the fourth section. The fifth section discusses the scope of the theory. This results in a limitation of the key claim regarding differences between governing and opposition parties in EU legislative politics only to apply to parties from adversarial member

states. The final section summarises and compares the predictions with those in the existing literature.

Assumptions

Non-cooperative game theory is a standard tool in analytical politics (e.g. Baron 1989; Hinich and Munger 1997). Black (1958) introduced the median voter theorem. It proposes that an actor located in the centre on a single dimensional policy space will be a member of any winning coalition, and in effect be able to ensure that his preferred policy alternative will be final policy outcome, under simple majority voting with no monopoly on the agenda-setting power. It has however been shown that all collective decision rules, except simple majority decisions over only two alternatives are open to agenda-manipulation and vote cycling (Kelly 1987; May 1952; McKelvey 1976; Riker 1982; 1961; Schofield 1978; Sen 1982; Shepsle 1979; Shepsle and Bonchek 1997; Tullock 1981).

The analytical framework has been developed to cover the logical foundations of different decision-making rules (Buchanan and Tullock 1962). These insights have been applied to analyse coalition-formation (Baron and Ferejohn 1989; Laver and Shepsle 1996), as well as to compare political systems (Tsebelis 2002). This section argues that national parties can be modelled as cohesive actors even when represented in multiple EU institutions. It then discusses to what extent the assumptions of non-cooperative game theory hold in EU legislative politics.

As we saw in chapter 1, the existing literature tends to either focus on relationships between different institutional actors, or partisan actors within particular institutions. A fundamental assumption behind the theory presented here is that parties are able to act as cohesive actors, not

only inside individual institutions, but across institutional boundaries as well. Rather than simply assuming that this is the case, it may be useful to consider the existing evidence of parties' ability to coordinate the behaviour of their representatives across EU institutions.

Hix (2002b) found that in case of a conflict between the European party group and the national party MEPs vote with their national party. Studying the relationship between MEPs and national parties Raunio (2002) shows that while MEPs have a relative free role vis-à-vis their national party, the general tendency is one of institutionalisation of the contacts as a function of the growing importance of the EU and the EP in particular. He found that the issuing of voting instructions by national parties was not widespread. However, on the basis of interviews with MEPs from several member states, Whitaker (2001) found that governing parties issued voting instructions, in particular for Codecision votes. Noury (2002b) finds that membership in a transnational party group is a better predictor of voting behaviour than nationality. While not directly testing the effects of voting instructions from national parties, There is also evidence to suggest that a system of rewards and sanctions encouraging a close and disciplined relationship between national party leadership and MEPs is developing, at least in the case of the British Labour party (Messmer 2003). Furthermore, research on voting cohesion of party groups in the EP shows that the more members a party group has sitting in the Council, the more cohesive the party group becomes (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2004). In total, the national party's monitoring of MEPs behaviour might not be as close as their monitoring of MPs behaviour. Overall, it is empirical support for assuming that parties are indeed sufficiently cohesive to be modelled as actors even across EU institutions.

Having shown that the existing research support the notion that national parties are actors in EU legislative politics, it is necessary to evaluate the assumptions of non-cooperative game theory with respect to EU legislative politics with national parties as actors. Non-cooperative game theory rests on five assumptions. (1) Actors are fully rational. (2) Actors have well-defined preferences over alternatives. (3) They have perfect knowledge of preferences of other actors. (4) They have perfect knowledge of both their own and their opponents' strategies. (5) Actors' rationality is common knowledge.

National parties are fully rational in EU legislative politics

This assumption implies that national parties are purposeful actors. Their behaviour can be understood as attempts to secure policy outcome that is located as close as possible to their own ideal policy, while taking account of other considerations like office and votes (Hix, Raunio, and Scully 1999; Laver and Schofield 1990; Müller and Strøm 1999; Strøm 1990a). The theory proposes to model national parties as unitary actors even when their representatives sit in different institutions. Members of political parties share common goals. These common goals are pursued by all representatives regardless of the institution in which they are representing their party. If a party prefers alternative A to alternative B, it will pursue a common strategy to maximise the probability of realising the former alternative as the adopted policy of the EU. This does not imply that parties aim to bring the position of each of the institutions as closely as possible to their favourite position. Instead, their aim is to realise a policy outcome that is as close as possible to their ideal policy. This is in line with how parties are thought to behave in other political systems when understood as rational unitary actors (Huber 1996; Martin 2001).

This assumption presupposes that parties have the necessary skills to evaluate all possible alternatives. The ability of organisations to compute such calculations has been questioned by organisational theorists (e.g. March and Olsen 1989; March and Simon 1958). While there might be some merit to these objections, there might be reasons for arguing that it would be better to model actors' behaviour as if they were capable of making such calculations, rather than incapable. Only if the limitation to an organisation's cognitive capabilities is so severe, that perfect randomness is a better prediction than perfect rationality does it makes really sense to reject the rationality assumption in our model (Tsebelis 1990: 18-51).

National parties have well defined preferences over alternatives

This assumption implies that national parties know which policy alternative they want the EU to adopt on all legislative initiatives from the Commission. Parties act on the strategy that is most likely to produce the favoured alternative. This implies that they know which alternatives are possible and which are not. While they might change their expressed position at different stages of the procedure (e.g. Stokman and Thomson 2004), they do not change their preferences over the different alternatives. Alternative approaches to the study of EU politics have questioned this assumption. It is sometimes argued that policy-making in the EU is better understood as problem solving than hard bargaining. The actors then change their understanding of the problem through a deliberative process where both their information and understanding of the problem might be refined (Eriksen and Fossum 2000; Risse-Kappen 1996). The possibility that deliberation may change actors' preferences has been subject to both theoretical and experimental research. While deliberation might influence the probability that actors have single-peaked preferences, it is not at all certain that it may lead the actors to develop common preferences (Farrar et al. 2003).

National parties have perfect knowledge of the preferences of other parties

This assumption insures that parties are able to locate themselves in policy space and thus capable of choosing a strategy that will maximise payoff. Given that parties spend their time trying to get their position through to their potential voters, the position of other parties should not be difficult to obtain. While there may be cases where some parties misjudge the position of other parties, it is argued that it is more often than not the case that national parties know the position of the other parties when engaged in EU legislative politics on the matter.

National parties have perfect information about both own and their opponents' strategies

This means that they not only know what they should do in order to maximise their pay-off, they know what their opponents are likely to do. They thus consider this information when adopting their strategy. While the perfect information assumption might be implausible in some situations considered by game theorists, the highly institutionalised and information rich environment of EU legislative politics ensures that the actors' information regarding their own and others optimal strategies approximates perfect information.

It is common knowledge that national parties are rational

This assumption simply states that all parties know that the other parties are rational. This assumption is innocent if the previous assumptions are acceptable. It ensures that parties do not follow strategies that presuppose that the other parties do not know what they are doing. This type of strategies would if the above assumptions hold, lead to sub-optimal outcomes for parties pursuing them.

These assumptions are the basics for non-cooperative game theory. They can be relaxed in several ways. For example, by not assuming perfect information or by modelling the game as dynamic rather than static. While this complicates the calculations somewhat, the basic insight remains similar (e.g. Gibbons 1992). However, the essential assumption that actors are rational remains a cornerstone in this type of analysis.

Collective positions and preference aggregation rules

Now, consider the effect of different types of collective decision-making rules. Let two institutions (A and B) both consisting of 11 players. The institutions have collectively to agree in order to adopt new legislation. Institution A applies two different decision rules, simple majority, 6 out of 11 in the first stage and an oversized majority rule 7 out of 11 to amend or reject in second stage. Institution B adopts and amends by oversized majority, 8 out of 11. All players in A are also players in B, such that all players in B are also players in A. The preference profiles of all players are constant across the different decision rules. If a player prefers x over y under simple majority rule in institution A, then he also prefers x over y under oversized majority rule in institution A as well as under oversized majority rule in institution B. Neither the decision rule nor the institution changes the preferences of a player over alternatives x and y .


Consider a decision game where the sequences and the majority requirement needed at the different stages are as follows. Institution A adopts, amends, or rejects by simple majority at stage 1. This causes institution A to adopt the ideal position of the median voter, player 6 of 11, labelled SM in figure 2.1. Institution B rejects the proposal from institution A by 4 out of 11 votes if the current policy, the SQ, is located between its two pivotal voters, player 4 and player 8.

If the SQ is located outside the area between player 4 and player 8, B adopts the ideal policy of player 4 if the SQ is located to the left of player 4 and the ideal point of player 8 if located to the right of player 8 by a majority of 8 out of 11. Hence, even with identical preferences we observe a conflict between the two institutions as the ideal policy of institution A is 6, regardless of the SQ, while the ideal position of institution B is either 4 or 8. The different decision rules in the institutions create different collective positions even though the individual positions of the actors are identical in both institutions.

Now, for simplicity, assume that SQ is located to the left of player 1. Continuing the procedure, institution A rejects or amends the proposal of institution B by an oversized majority, 8 out of 11, labelled O_2 . Institution A, deciding by an absolute majority is only able to shift the policy back to ideal point of player 5, labelled O_1 . Again, we observe a difference in the collective ideal policy of the different institutions. If the two institutions split the difference in policy positions at the final stage, the end policy will be located at the midpoint of player 5 and player 4, provided that SQ is located further away from the pivotal voters in institutions A (simple majority) and B (oversized majority 8/11) than the new policy. Because the actors are aware of how the decision rules affect the policy outcome, they will only vote in favour of changing the status quo if they know that the adopted policy will be an improvement upon the status quo. Actors will not support a policy change if they know that the outcome will be worse than the current policy, even if the propose change represent an improvement. To illustrate, if player 4 prefers his own ideal point to the SQ, but not the midpoint between 5 and 4 to the status quo, he will not support a policy change in the first round in if he knows that the midpoint between 4 and 5 will be the outcome. By the same logic, if player 4 prefers the midpoint between 4 and 5 to the status quo, he can end the game by proposing that point already in the first round. The game is illustrated in figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1 The effect of majority requirement of policy change

Status quo located to the left, maximal possible policy change if no player monopolise agenda-setting power



SQ = the current policy, the status quo

O₂ = Policy outcome under 8/11 majority rule

O₁ = Policy outcome under 7/11 majority rule

SM = Policy outcome under simple majority rules

We see that a majority of the players in both institutions are in favour of moving the policy closer to the centre. Because institution B needs an oversized majority of 8 out of 11 to adopt legislation at every stage of the game, the most favourable position for the majority is to continue the game, ensuring that the pivotal players prefer the outcome to the SQ. The differences in majority requirement cause actors to vote against proposal they supported in institution B when they vote in institution A. They can improve their policy payoff if the SQ is located sufficiently far away from the pivotal players. Thus, a conflict between the two institutions may be observed even when the two institutions are composed of players sharing identical preferences, if the preference aggregation rule differs.

Parties and aggregation rules of EU's Codecision procedure


The game presented in the previous section can be thought of as a model of the Codecision procedure used in the EU since the reform in the treaty of Amsterdam, known in the literature as Codecision II. This section introduces two dimensions and allows two, rather than just one party from all member states to be represented in institution A. As such, institution A represents the European Parliament, while B represents the Council of Ministers.

Let C denote the Qualified Majority (QMV) pivotal government in the Council of Ministers. S denotes the simple majority pivotal voter in the European Parliament. A denotes the absolute majority pivotal voter in the European Parliament. SQ denotes the location of the current policy, the status quo.

The Commission will only initiate a proposal if the likely outcome is closer to Commission's ideal policy than the current policy, the status quo. At stage 2, the median voter in the European Parliament, S, rejects the proposal, p, if SQ is preferred to any possible outcome of the procedure, if not, S either accepts or amends the proposal. At stage 3, the Council's qualified majority pivot C rejects if SQ is preferred to any likely outcome. C accepts if S amends p to any point that makes him indifferent or better off than what he can obtain at a later stage. If not, C amends to his ideal position, which also is preferred by A over the status quo. At stage 4, the absolute majority pivotal, A, rejects only if SQ is preferred to p. A amends if any point preferred by both S and C to the SQ is closer to his ideal point than the Common position adopted by C. At stage 5, the Council qualified majority pivot C accepts A's proposal if it is preferred to any point he can agree to with S. C rejects some or all of the amendments if the likely outcome of an agreement with S makes him better off than the proposal from A. At stage 6, C and S will agree in Conciliation if they can find a common point that makes them both better off than the status quo. If so, a joint text is adopted by both institutions in the seventh stage.

There are two possible win-sets of the status quo $W(SQ)$, X, and Y in this game. $W(SQ)X$ is the area preferred to SQ by S, the simple majority pivot in the EP and C, the QMV This is illustrated in two dimensions in figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2. The Codecision game



The black area, Y, represents the win-set of the QMV majority pivot in the Council and the absolute majority pivot in the EP. The grey area X represents the win-set of the QMV majority pivot in the Council and the simple majority voter in the EP. C is the QMV majority pivot in the Council. A is the absolute majority pivot in the EP. S is the simple majority pivot in the EP. SQ represents the location of the current policy.

The grey area indicates the win-set of the simple majority pivot in the EP and the QMV majority pivot in the Council, $W(SQ)X$. C, the majority voter in the Council, is the only actor whose support is necessary for all possible win-set. The EP also is an institutional veto-player. However, the identity of the pivotal actor in the parliament changes at the different stages of the game. It is S, the simple majority pivotal voter at the first and third reading. A, the absolute majority pivotal voter, is pivotal only in the second reading. S and A are identical only if all MEPs participate in the vote, an empirically unlikely scenario. C can thus choose whom of the actors, S or A, it

prefers to form a winning coalition with. Its strategic advantage lies in the possibility of finding a policy proposal within Y , preferred by A to the SQ , or accepting the first reading proposal from the EP , if the proposal is located closer to C than any point inside Y .

There are four necessary conditions for a shift away from the Status Quo. First, $W(SQ)X$ and/or $W(SQ)Y$ are non-empty. Second, the Commission prefers any point inside $W(SQ)X$ and $W(SQ)Y$ to SQ . Third, S prefers any point inside $W(SQ)X$ and $W(SQ)Y$ to SQ . Fourth, C prefers any point inside $W(SQ)X$ and/or $W(SQ)Y$ to SQ . In short, they all prefer a policy change along similar directions. Note that A is not a veto-player in this game as C and S can agree in the first reading, before A is involved.

In order to derive testable predictions it is necessary to disaggregate the collective actors. The Council is composed of 11 players. The EP is composed of 22 players, where 11 of the players in the Council make up a subset of the players in the EP . All members have single-peaked preferences over the final policy. All actors maximise their policy pay-off.

The Council accepts or amends policies by an 8/11 majority. For the EP , the majority requirements differ as the game moves along. In the second stage, the EP amends or adopts by a simple majority (11/22). Simple majority is also used to accept in the sixth stage. In the fourth stage, Parliament amends or rejects by a 14/22 majority.

Outcome of the game


Applying backward induction as the solution concept, the game can be solved in terms of finding the smallest possible connected winning coalitions in equilibrium (see for example Crombez

1996; 1997a in the context of the EU; and Gibbons 1992 for a general treatment). At the sixth and final stage of the game, a new policy is adopted if both an 11/22 majority in the EP and an 8/11 majority in the Council prefer the outcome to the status quo. As the eleven governing parties of Council also sit in the EP, policy is adopted if one of the following minimum connected winning coalitions forms: (1) All parties of the Council prefer the agreed outcome to the SQ. (2) Ten of the governing parties in the Council and one of the opposition parties in the EP prefer the agreed outcome. (3) Nine of the governing parties in the Council and two opposition parties in the parliament agree on an outcome that is preferred to the SQ. (4) Eight governing parties the Council and 3 opposition parties in the EP prefer the agreed policy to the status quo.

In the fifth stage, 8 of the 11 governing parties in the Council can form a connected winning coalition with 14 out of the 22 parties in the EP. The minimum connected winning coalition that can form at this stage needs to include at least three opposition parties if the Council is unanimous. If the Council is minimum connected winning (8/11), it needs the support from at least 6 opposition parties. This is a larger connected winning coalition than the connected winning coalitions in the final stage. Some of the governing parties in the Council will be better off continuing the game. Hence, terminating the game in the fifth stage is not in equilibrium. Remember that the EP ends the game if 9 out of its 22 parties prefer the proposal made by Council in the fourth stage. Given that Council makes the decision to continue the game into the fifth stage if 8 governing parties can agree on how to amend the text, the support from one opposition party is sufficient to adopt the legislation at stage 4. If the 8-member majority in the Council is the only ones who favour the outcome from the final stage over the status quo, the legislation should be rejected at this stage. If not there must be one opposition party that prefers this outcome to the outcome of the final stage. The game should thus end here rather than

continuing to Conciliation, as the minimal winning coalition is realised at this stage. The sequence of the game is illustrated in figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3 Stages in the partisan Codecision game



At the third stage of the game, the Council can accept, by an 8/11 majority, the 14/22 majority proposal from the EP. It is sufficient for the proposal to pass in the EP if all of the governing parties support it. However, 8 of the governing parties will be able to form a smaller connected winning coalition by including one opposition party at the next stage. Thus, the game will end at

stage 3 only if at least three opposition parties in the EP are located between the eight-members-minimal-winning-coalition in the Council.

To establish an overview of the theoretical predictions, it is useful summarise the theory. There are three institutional actors, the simple majority pivot in the EP, the QMV pivot in the Council, and the absolute blocking minority in the EP. While the QMV pivot in the Council is by definition from a governing party, the two other institutional actors may be either from governing or opposition parties. The preferences of the different actors are summarised in table 2.1.

Table 2.1 Actors' preferences over when Codecision legislation is adopted

Stage	Simple majority EP pivot	Council QMV pivot	Blocking minority EP pivot	Governing parties	Opposition parties
1 st reading Council	1 st preference	2 nd preference	2 nd preference	1 st preference	3 rd preference
2 nd reading EP	3 rd preference	1 st preference	1 st preference	3 rd preference	2 nd preference
2 nd reading Council	Not equilibrium	Not equilibrium	Not equilibrium	Not equilibrium	Not equilibrium
Conciliation	2 nd preference	3 rd preference	3 rd preference	2 nd preference	1 st preference

The simple majority pivot prefers legislation to be adopted in the first reading in the Council, if the QMV pivot accepts her proposal. If not, she prefers the outcome of the Conciliation Committee to the common position of the Council, i.e. that legislation is adopted in EP 2nd reading.

The QMV pivot in the Council prefers to be able to choose its ideal policy amongst those alternatives absolute blocking minority would prefer to the outcome of the Conciliation

Committee. It does, however prefer to end the procedure in the first reading rather than ending up in Conciliation. The possible minimal connected winning coalitions are of identical size. It is thus better to adopt the policy at an earlier stage.

The absolute blocking minority pivot in the EP prefers legislation to be adopted in the second reading in the EP, as this connected winning coalition is smaller than any other possible connected winning coalitions. If not, she also prefers 1st reading to Conciliation as the size of the necessary majorities is identical, but the former alternative is realised at an earlier stage.

While the Council collectively prefers to adopt legislation in the second EP reading, this does not mean that this is the case for most of the parties sitting in the Council. Most governing parties are more likely to be better off by accepting the proposal from the simple majority EP, or concluding the negotiations in the Conciliation Committee than from having the common position of the Council accepted by a blocking minority in the EP second reading. The oversized majority requirement prevents the Council from collectively changing the outcome as much as the majority of the government would like to have seen it changed. These governing parties would thus like to use their MEPs in an attempt to force more change on the more reluctant members of the Council. These governing parties prefer the likely outcome of the Conciliation Committee to the common position of the Council adopted in the first reading. In the first reading, the common position of the Council is determined by the ideal location of the QMV pivot. The QMV pivot will propose its own ideal policy, or a policy located as close as possible while at the same time capable of being supported by a blocking minority in the EP to the likely outcome of the Conciliation Committee. In the Conciliation Committee, the joint text is adopted if both a simple majority in the EP and a qualified majority in the Council prefer it to the status quo. Thus as long

as the joint text makes the QMV pivot in the Council better off than the status quo, it is possible to move the policy outcome beyond the ideal point of the QMV pivot. Hence, the majority of the Council members gain upon the common position of the Council by supporting second reading amendments in the EP.

Having investigated the logic of the Codecision procedure, the next section spells out the behavioural predictions for governing and opposition parties.

Behavioural predictions

Based on the above investigation into the logic of the Codecision procedure, this section presents three behaviour predictions. The predictions are as follows. Hypothesis 1: Governing parties write more Codecision reports than opposition parties. Hypothesis 2: Codecision legislation on which the rapporteur comes from a governing party is more likely to be adopted in the first reading in the Council than Codecision legislation on which the rapporteur comes from an opposition party. Hypothesis 3: The majority of governing parties and ideologically close opposition parties are more likely to support second reading amendments than opposition parties.

Governing parties write more reports

The power of an agenda setter is to be able to choose between alternative winning majorities. The agenda setter inside the European Parliament is the rapporteur (Tsebelis 1995). The right to act as a rapporteur is determined by the size of the party delegation and national party within that delegation (Bowler and Farrell 1995; Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton 2000; Kreppel 2002; Mamadouh and Raunio 2003). The process of allocating reports to individual parties is a two-stage process. The right to write reports is a pure function of the size of the party group, and

within each party group, the size of the national party. This process determines the number of points each party has available to spend on reports. However, this does not imply that the number of reports each national party writes is a pure function of their size. The parties can decide for themselves how to spend their points.


To illuminate the process on allocating reports amongst parties it is useful to draw on insights from consumer theory in microeconomics (e.g. Jehle and Reny 2000: 3-60). Behaviour is explained as a function of preferences, the budget constraint, and relative prices. In the context of allocating Codecision report, the budgetary constraint can be understood as the number of points a party have, which is a pure function on number of MEPs. Hence, if preferences and relative prices are held constant, bigger party groups, countries and national parties should write more reports than smaller.

In microeconomics, it is usually assumed that actors prefer more rather than less of any given combination of consumption bundles. This will normally be the case for allocation of reports as well. Reports can be thought of as both office policy and vote benefits. It is common to consider these three types of benefits to be guiding party behaviour (see Hix, Raunio, and Scully 1999 in the case of the European Parliament ; and Müller and Strøm 1999; Strøm 1990a for a general treatment). As office-benefits, all parties may prefer more reports rather than fewer. This type of benefits is hence constant for all parties. Standard spatial theory would predict that all parties regardless of location would benefit equally from moving the policy closer to their ideal policy, regardless of the actual distance between the final policy and their ideal policy (see for example Hinich and Munger 1997). However, if the final policy outcome is sufficient far from the ideal policy of the party, with or without its involvement, it might choose not to reap the policy

benefits as the electoral cost of being associated with the final policy outcome might be high relative to the policy gain of being involved. Some parties might hence choose not to be involved in writing reports.

There should be a difference in terms of vote benefits between government and opposition parties. Voters can be thought of as acting retrospectively, evaluating governing parties on the overall policy performance (but see Cheibub and Przeworski 1999 for evidence questioning this link). This may be the case regardless of whether the legislation is purely domestic or of European origin. If so, governing parties have more of an incentive to get involved as rapporteurs in as many legislative initiatives as possible in order to claim credit or avoid blame. Opposition parties on the other hand are not able to take credit for the overall policy development, nor do they get any of the blame. Hence, it only makes sense for opposition parties to spend their points for electoral purposes on controversial issues or issues with a clear constituency interest. This type of legislative initiatives is likely to be of interest to all parties. The number of points necessary to secure the right to become a rapporteur is hence on average likely to be higher on these initiatives. Because opposition parties are mainly interested in salient Codecision reports while governing parties are interested in all Codecision reports, opposition parties are likely to write fewer Codecision reports than governing parties of similar size and policy location.

Figure 2.4 Effect of being a governing party on number of Codecision reports



The difference between government and opposition parties can be thought of as a shift in the payoff of writing winnable reports, holding the preference relation (ideal policy location) and the budgetary constraint (number of MEPs) constant. This is illustrated in figure 2.4. The curves represent the combination of saliency and policy pay-off that makes a party equally well off given the budget constraint (number of MEPs). The curves are convex, indicating that the trade-off between saliency and policy payoff are not constant. The more salient a report is, keeping policy payoff constant, the more interested is a party in writing it. Conversely, the less salient it is the higher the policy payoff will have to be in order for a party to be willing to write it.

In sum, governing parties consider all legislation salient to them given that they stand to take the blame or reward for all new policies. The evaluation of saliency is only a function of how likely it is that they can create some media attention around it for opposition parties. Not all EU

legislation has an equal potential of receiving media attention. Opposition parties will thus only be interested in a subset of all available Codecision reports, while governing parties will be interested in the whole universe of Codecision reports. This means that governing parties will on average write more reports than opposition parties.

Hypothesis 1: Governing parties write more Codecision reports than opposition parties

Rapporteurs from governing parties conclude negotiations in first reading

The question of when the Codecision procedure reaches the conclusion can be understood as an instance of sequential bargaining, similar to a classical divide the dollar game, but with no discount factors (Gibbons 1992: 68-71). Instead, the players at the different stages of the game change. As we saw above, an agreement is needed between the simple majority pivot in the EP and the QMV majority pivot in the Council in order to adopt legislation at the third stage. In order to adopt legislation at the fourth stage, in the second reading in the EP, the QMV majority in the Council needs to find support for its common position from a blocking minority in the EP, capable of preventing an absolute majority to form. At the fifth stage, if an absolute majority in the EP is found to amend the common position of the Council, a QMV majority needs to accept the amended proposal. If not the proposal goes to Conciliation. The outcome needs to be preferred to the status quo by a QMV majority in the Council and a simple majority in the EP. As we can see, a QMV majority is needed in the Council at every stage, while the required majority in the EP changes.

The EP simple majority pivot, S, makes an offer to the Council QMV pivot, C, over how to divide the payoff between all the actors. C then decides whether to accept the offer. If he accepts,

the game terminates. If C does not accept S's offer, he makes an offer to the EP absolute majority pivot, A. If A accepts the offer, the game ends and all players receive their payoff. If not, the legislation falls unless S and C agree on how to divide the payoffs. S and A are drawn from the same institution, where their location and identity is a function of different majority requirement. C is more likely to prefer the ideal point of A to the ideal point of S. Hence C prefers agreement in the fourth stage to agreement in the third or sixth. Agreement in any of these stages is preferred to agreement in the fifth stage, as termination in stage five offers C, the pivotal voter in the Council, the same payoffs as stage three, but at a later stage in the game.

This has implications for the predictions of when legislation will be adopted as a function of the preferences of the agenda-setter in the EP, from which S and A is drawn. The closer the preferences of that agenda-setter is to the preferences of C, the more likely it is that she will propose something that makes C indifferent or better off than it will be from agreeing on how to divide the payoff at a later stage. Hence, S can do C job by offering C an identical payoff to what C will obtain from A in the second stage of the game. C will accept this. It is the best possible outcome for both the simple majority pivot in the EP and qualified majority pivot in the Council.

Different rapporteurs seek to realise alternative winning coalitions. The theory predicts that the stage of agreement will be a function of whether the rapporteur comes from a government or opposition party. A rapporteur from a governing party is more likely to find a simple majority in favour of a proposal that a qualified majority in the Council will find acceptable than a rapporteur from an opposition party. Because of the absolute majority requirement to amend or reject the common position of the Council, rapporteurs from opposition parties are more likely to find the common position being adopted and the proposal ending in the second reading in the EP.

The assumption that the rapporteur is able to influence the policy position of the parliament is essential for the prediction that the rapporteur's identity as a member of a governing or an opposition party should influence when legislation is adopted. Existing empirical and theoretical work supports this assumption. Neuhold (2001) uses case studies to argue the importance of the committee system, highlighting the role of the rapporteur, focusing on the importance of previous experience. Bowler and Farrell (1995) also highlight the role of the rapporteur in the EP committee system as do Whitaker (2001). Tsebelis (1995) presents a theoretical argument of why the rapporteur can be thought of as an agenda-setter inside the EP, at least in the Cooperation procedure. Practitioners' accounts also lend support for the assumption (Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton 2000; Wurzel 1999).

Hypothesis 2: Codecision legislation on which the rapporteur comes from a governing party is more likely to be adopted in the first reading in the Council than Codecision legislation on which the rapporteur comes from an opposition party

Governing parties amend Council's common position

The pivotal voter in the EP changes between the first, second, and third reading. Parties that prefer an outcome inside the- QMV-in-Council-and-simple-majority-in-the-EP win set, labelled X in figure 2.3 to an outcome inside the QMV-plus-a-blocking minority in the EP win set, labelled Y, will vote to amend the Common position in the second reading in the EP. This is the case even if these parties may have supported the common position of the Council in the first reading. Figure 2.3 illustrates that any party located to the left of SQ and more integrationist than

the absolute majority pivot in the EP or the QMV pivot in the Council will try to pass an amendment to the common position. They do this in order to provoke the Conciliation Committee to form, as an agreement between the Council and a simple majority in the EP in the Conciliation Committee would most likely be closer to their ideal point than any deal reached between the Council and a blocking minority in EP in the second reading. If the QMV pivot in the Council, C, does not accept the proposal from the simple majority in the EP, S, then C will be able to propose its ideal policy as the common position of the Council. This position may be modified so that it is within the win set Y, that of the blocking minority in the EP, A. However, as most of the governments prefer outcomes that are inside win set X to those inside win set Y, they will vote in favour of amendments to the common position. They do this in the knowledge that the pivotal QMV voter in the Council is likely to prefer the outcome of the Conciliation Committee to the status quo. As the ranking of alternative policy outcomes is a function of location in the policy space, opposition parties that are ideologically close to the majority of the governing parties will also support second reading amendments.

Hypothesis 3: The majority of governing parties and ideologically close opposition parties are more likely to support second reading amendments than opposition parties

Limitations to the scope of the theory

The theory is limited to countries with adversarial national political systems. Marsh argues that whether the norm of government alternation exists in a country affects the second order effect in the European elections (Marsh 1998). The norm of government alternation equates having an adversarial national political system.

Modern theories of coalition politics start with Riker's (1962) minimum winning coalition theory. He argues that political parties will include the minimum number of partners necessary to hold the bare majority in the parliament. Any parties which's support is not necessary to control the median voter in the Parliament will be left outside the coalition, as there will be fewer parties to split the benefits of holding office between. Any coalition seeking office needs to control the majority of the votes, so minority governments are not possible, as the opposition will throw them out of office, preferring to take the seats in office themselves. However, Axelrod (1970) argues that controlling the government is also about policy, so coalitions need to be connected in the policy space. He predicts minimal *connected* winning coalitions will form. It is impossible to exclude potential excess parties that are located between two minimal winning coalition partners.

Empirically we observe both surplus majority government and minority governments (Laver and Schofield 1990; 1999a; Laver and Shepsle 1999b; Lijphart 1999; Strøm 1990b; Warwick 1999a; 1999b). The suggestion here is that in countries where either of these two types of governments is found, we have evidence of a weak government alternation norm, hence a non-adversarial political system. The reason is that in both of the cases, the value of holding office is not sufficiently high to encourage political parties to seek to monopolise the office power. The parties may prefer to invite parties into office that they do not have to. Alternatively, because opposition parties choose to support governing parties on a day-to-day basis without getting any office spoils in return, they are able to invite fewer parties into the cabinet than what is necessary to command a majority in the Parliament. This reduces the observable differences between governing and mainstream opposition parties from these countries. Hence, we should not expect to find support

for the hypotheses regarding differences between governing and opposition parties from non-adversarial member states.

Summary and comparison with existing literature

This chapter presented a theory of legislative politics in the EU. The building blocks of the theory are national political parties and institutional preference aggregating rules. The system of separation of powers in the EU causes national political parties to have different influence over policy outcomes. This is a function of being a governing or an opposition party. An opposition party is only represented in one of the legislative chambers, the Parliament, while a governing party is represented both in the Parliament and in the Council. Hence, governing parties have more influence over policies than opposition parties. The collective decision-rules used in the Codecision procedure create different behavioural incentives for governing and opposition parties. It is the oversized majority requirement in the Council and the shifting between simple and absolute majority requirements at different reading in the Parliament that creates these incentives.

The government in EU legislative politics are the parties that make up winning coalitions. These made up by a qualified majority of the parties in the Council supported by either a simple majority or a blocking minority of parties in the EP, located ideologically close to the QMV majority, regardless of their status as governing or opposition parties. The losing coalition, the opposition, is hence the minority parties in the Council and most of the opposition parties represented in the EP.

Three testable hypotheses were derived by applying non-cooperative game theory and spatial modelling.

First, governing parties are more willing to write Codecision reports than opposition parties as they have a bigger chance of influencing the outcome because they are represented in both institutions. EU legislation is also more salient to governing parties given that that stands to take the credit or blame from the voters for the overall policy output regardless of their actual involvement.

Second, Codecision reports written by representatives of governing parties are more likely to be adopted in 1st reading in the Council than in the Parliament's second reading. These rapporteurs from governing parties have more to gain by pitching their initial proposal inside the Council win-set than rapporteurs from opposition parties. Firstly, their representation in the Council gives them the ability to influence the size and location of the win-set. Secondly, in order for the efforts of the rapporteur to be noticed by the national party leadership, it is sufficient for MEPs from governing parties to make proposals where their own party is on the winning side. An opposition rapporteur needs to either make the Council agree to something the governing party from his country is against, be able to claim credit for something the government failed to secure through its position in the Council, or show its opposition to the policies promoted by the Council, in order to get noticed by the national party leadership.

Third, governing parties are more likely to vote against the common position of the Council in EP's second reading. The qualified majority requirement for establishing a common position in the Council means that most governments would prefer a further shift of the status quo than what they can collectively agree to. Hence, they will try to provoke the Conciliation Committee to

form. The likely outcome of an agreement between a simple majority of the EP and the Council will bring the policy outcome closer to their ideal point.

The scope of the theory is limited to parties from adversarial political systems. In systems that are more consensual based the coordination between government and opposition parties will be greater, hence the observed behavioural differences will be smaller. The explanatory force of the government – opposition party distinction might therefore be weaker in the case of parties from these member states.

This theory of legislative politics in the EU differs from the existing theories of EU politics as it sees national parties as actors, not supranational institutions and governments or trans-national party groups. It is thus useful to compare its predictions with those existing in the literature.

Consider voting behaviour in the second EP reading. I suggest that MEPs from most governing parties will vote in favour of amending the common position of as they predict that the outcome from the Conciliation Committee will be closer to their ideal policy while still be preferred to the status quo by the QMV pivot in the Council. As we saw in the previous chapter, there exists a large literature that emphasises the consensus of the Council (e.g. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997). Since it is so hard to get a deal in the Council, the implication is that government will try to prevent the EP from unpacking the deal from the Council. This leads us to the prediction that governing parties will vote against amending the common position in EP's second reading, contrary to the prediction of the third hypothesis. This logic would however be sympathetic to the prediction of the first and second hypotheses.

Kreppel (2000) models the two major party-groups in the EP, the Commission, and the governments as actors in EU legislative politics. She predicts that the EPP and PES will vote in favour of second reading amendments when both parties are located on the same side of the common position of the Council or if the distance from the common position of the Council to the ideal position of the party-group closest to it is greater than the distance from that party-group's ideal position to the compromise amendment the two party group can agree to. Voting behaviour in the second reading should hence be a function of party group membership. Whether a party is represented in the Council should not influence the voting behaviour of its MEPs in second reading votes if it is party groups that dictate MEPs behaviour. This logic seems to suggest that reports written by members of the EPP or PES are more likely to end up in the Conciliation Committee. Elsewhere, Kreppel (2002) has argued that the supranational party-system is set up to favour the two major party-groups. Hence, parties from these party-groups are likely to write more reports than MEPs from other party groups. While national parties might decide whom of their MEPs will be allocated reports within party groups, her logic does not seem to suggest any difference between governing and opposition parties, neither in terms of number of Codecision reports, nor when they are adopted.

Most formal models of EU decision-making treat the EP as a unitary actor. Garrett and Tsebelis (1996) place the EP as an extreme outlier in EU legislative politics. The dominant dimension is level of integration where the EP and the Commission want a large change whereas the member states want smaller changes. This implies that MEPs voting behaviour should be driven by their attitudes towards further integration. MEPs from parties hostile to integration should vote against EP amendments, while those that are pro-integrationist should vote in favour. The same logic should lead pro-integrationists parties to write more reports than those less integrationist or

hostile to further integration. Tsebelis (1995) argues that the rapporteur is an agenda-setter inside the EP. Given that his model only assume complete information from the second reading onwards, one would expect reports written by pro-integrationist MEPs to be more likely to go to the Conciliation Committee.

The theory presented in this chapter provides an institutional argument in favour of the liberal intergovernmental theory. Moravcsik (1993; 1998) argues that governments are the central actors in the grand bargains in the EU. The institutional set-up consolidates the interests of the governments that had the most bargaining power in the IGCs and ensures that the results of the bargain are translated into specific EU policies. I have here presented a theory showing how the majority of the governing parties are able to translate the grand bargains into favourable legislative policy outcomes in day-to-day legislative politics, thereby provided a reply to the institutional critique of liberal intergovernmentalism (Garrett and Tsebelis 1996). The next chapter presents an operationalisation of the theory. Empirical tests are carried out in subsequent chapters.

Chapter 3: Research Design

The previous chapter developed a theory of government and opposition in EU legislative politics. This chapter presents the empirical material subsequent chapters draw on to test the hypotheses. Morton (Morton 1999: 142-275) distinguishes between three types of evaluations of theoretical models: (1) the evaluation of assumptions; (2) evaluation of predictions; (3) comparison with alternative models. The evaluation of the assumptions is integrated in the theory chapter. The main task of the empirical chapters is to evaluate the predictions of the model as hypothesised in chapter 2 and compare the results with theoretical predictions existing in the literature. These theories are tested as alternatives. They may generate competing or complementing hypotheses. The model is evaluated both as a complete and as a partial data generating process. As a complete data-generating process, the relationship between the dependent and independent variables are expected to exist even after controlling for other potential intervening variables. As a partial data-generating process the relationship between the dependent and independent variables are expected to exist even when intervening variables are controlled for (Morton 1999: 101-41). The data used to test the theory is limited to the fifth Parliament, i.e. after the introduction of the Amsterdam version of the Codecision procedure.

The first section of this chapter presents the dependent variables. The second section describes the independent variables related to the different aspects of the model. The third section presents the control variables.

Dependent variables

Chapter 4 tests the first hypothesis. This hypothesis is related to the distribution of Codecision reports amongst parties in the EP. Data was collected on all Codecision reports initiated during the fifth parliament. Reports not assigned to any rapporteur were excluded, as were legislation initiated by the Commission before 1999. This is mainly Codecision legislation adopted under the simplified procedure without report, but also legislation initiated in 2004, where the EP had not allocated the report to any MEP by the time of the final plenary session in May 2004. Reports on which information is missing on some of the control variables (described below) are also excluded. Once these reports are excluded, we are left with 372 Codecision reports.

The unit of analysis here is number of reports allocated to a party per year. It is important to emphasize that the national delegations to party-groups, e.g. the British delegation to the Party of European Socialists (PES) is not the same as the British Labour party, as the former also includes the SDLP from Northern Ireland. Most data from the EP only labels the nationality and the party-group affiliation of the MEPs. However, the actors on national level, hence also in the Council, are national political parties, not national delegations to European party-groups. The unit of analysis here is political parties. A party scores 0 if none of its MEPs were allocated any Codecision reports initiated by the Commission a given year. The years included are 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003. The distribution of reports by year is as follows: 1999; 37 reports; 2000; 85, 2001; 74, 2002; 68 and 2003; 108 reports. The number of reports distributed per party per year range from 0 to 11. There are 530 observations in total, 106 parties observed over a period of 5 years. 361 of these observations take the value 0, while 169 observations take a positive value. The zero-observations are distributed as follows: 1999, 81; 2000, 67; 2001, 73; 2002, 75; 2003,

65. Thus, Codecision reports are allocated amongst less than 40% of parties represented in the EP. A complete list of all pieces of legislation is presented in appendix I. The data was collected from the official website of the European Parliament 21 May 2004².

Chapter 5 tests the second hypothesis. It relates to when Codecision legislation is adopted. The unit of analysis is the stage in the process when the legislation is adopted. It is coded 1 if the legislation is adopted in the first reading in the Council. It is coded 2 if it is adopted in the second reading in the EP. It takes the value 3 if it is adopted in the second reading in the Council and 4 if it is agreed in Conciliation. The data consists of all Codecision legislation initiated between 1999 and 2003 and adopted before the final plenary session of the fifth Parliament in May 2004. The reports where there was no rapporteur, where the proposal had lapsed, or was redrawn, or where information on some of the independent variables was missing, are excluded. This leaves us with 254 completed pieces of Codecision legislation. Of the 254, 36 were initiated in 2003, 46 in 2002, 61 in 2001, 78 in 2000 and 33 in 1999. 87 were completed in the first reading in the Council, 64 in the second reading in the EP, 58 in the second reading in the Council and 45 when to Conciliation.

In this study, only legislation where the first reading in the EP took place after 1 May 1999 is included. This means that the whole of the legislative process is conducted under the rules of the Amsterdam version of the Codecision procedure (Codecision II). The data hence differs from those presented by the EP itself (e.g. Dimitrakopoulos, Cedershiöld, and Imbeni 2004). The EP counts all legislation passed by the EP during the fifth parliament, regardless of when it was

² <http://www.europarl.eu.int/oeil/>

initiated. The stage of termination for all Codecision legislation initiated and completed during the fifth EP is presented in appendix I.

Chapter 6 tests the third hypothesis, related to the different voting behaviour by government and opposition parties in the second reading of the Codecision procedure. All second reading roll call votes in the first one and a half year of the fifth parliament were collected as a part of the Hix-Noury-Roland project on voting behaviour in the EP³. My contribution on the project was to code most of the vote characteristics of the votes. 1675 roll call votes were taken between July 1999 and the end of 2000. 380 of these were Codecision votes, of which 167 were second reading votes on amendments of the common position of the Council.

Not all votes in the EP are taken by roll call, only between 20-30% of the total. There are indeed reasons why some parties call roll-call votes on some amendments and not on others (Carrubba and Gabel 1999). It can also be shown that roll-call votes might not be a fully representative sample of all votes (Carrubba et al. 2003). In the second reading of Codecision, roll call votes might be called in order to ensure party discipline or to record its own view and the views of other parties for electoral purposes. This increase the potential costs and benefits of voting one way or the other in a roll call vote, compared to a "normal" vote. Thus, the results of roll call vote's studies might be bias downwards, showing fewer differences between actors than what really exist in the whole universe of votes. However, the opposite might also be true, when roll-call votes are taken; parties have a chance of showing opposition or support for something to a greater extent than with "normal" votes. Anyway, roll call votes are the only types of votes we can study in any detail.

³ <http://personal.lse.ac.uk/HIX/HixNouryRolandEPdata.HTM>

The voting decisions are on the disaggregated level, each voting decision for all MEPs on all second reading votes are analysed. This gives 167 times 626 voting decisions to analyse, in total 104,542 individual voting decisions. Of the 167 votes, 65 received the necessary support from an absolute majority while 102 failed. The distribution between the years is as follows; 1999: 26, 2000: 141. The characteristics of the votes show that second reading roll call votes were taken on all major policy areas covered by Codecision, environment, economics, social affairs, inter-institutional issues and external trade.

A challenge when testing voting behaviour in second reading votes is how to code decisions other than votes in favour. Yes-votes are the only voting decision counting towards the absolute majority requirement of 314. No votes, abstentions, those present but not voting, and those absents are all contributing towards the total number of non-positive votes. Nevertheless, not all of these possible lines of actions are equally likely to be a result of the policy-preference of the MEPs on the specific policy. As most of the voting takes place on Wednesdays and Thursdays, those absents cannot necessarily be assumed to be against a specific amendment. The reason for their absent might very well not be related to the specific policy at all. The same holds to some extent for MEPs who have sign in the day of the vote, but who are not present in the plenary when the vote is actually taken. Their absent from the plenary might be strategic, but it might also be due to reasons not related to the issues voted over. It is plausible that those that abstain or vote against a second reading amendment are in fact against the amendments. Their failure to support the amendment is most likely due to reasons related to the specific amendment. However, all non-positive votes count against the majority requirement. Thus, two alternative specifications of the dependent variable are tested. The first classify all non-positive votes as negative, while the second exclude all absents and present but not voting. The total number of observations, once

MEPs on which information on some of the independent variables are missing is excluded, is 97.644 and 87.817, respectively. A complete list of number of second reading roll call votes to amend the common position of the Council is included in Appendix II.

Independent variables

This section describes the independent variables. The theory distinguishes between governing and opposition parties. As the study goes over five years, the identity of some of the governing parties changes during the period. Data on governing status is coded on a yearly basis. Parties sitting in government at the start of each year are coded as government parties that year. This classification is not without problems related to change in governments. For example, if the government changes in February, the old governing parties are coded as governing parties throughout the year. Yet, in for example second reading votes in the EP will be related to amendments of the Common position adopted in the Council some months ago, so it is perhaps more plausible to believe that the old government had more influence over the common position of the Council than the new government.

The theory presented in chapter 2 is limited to parties from member states with adversarial political system. Müller and Strøm (2000/2003) assess the extent to which government formation tends to results in minimal winning coalitions (either connected or not) or in minority/over-sized governments. They do not discuss the UK, Greece or Spain, as these countries do not have a history of coalition governments. Since single party governments are by definition minimal winning, these countries are coded as having a strong norm of government alternation, hence an adversarial political system. The classification of the different countries is reported in table 3.1. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Sweden are seen as having a

weak norm of government alternation, hence a non-adversarial political system. In the rest of the EU countries, the norm is strong. Their political systems are adversarial. The classification corresponds with the one found in Marsh (1998), but here the member states that joined in 1995 are also classified. Table 3.1 presents a list of governing parties by country, by the start of each year. The table also indicates whether the country is classified as adversarial or not.

The type of party (governing or opposition) in the two types of national political systems (adversarial or non-adversarial) is categorised as a categorical variable with four different categories, *adgov*, *nongov*, *nonopp* and *adopp*. The latter category, *adopp*, which consists of opposition parties from adversarial member states, is the reference category. *Adgov* takes the value 1 if a party sits in government in a member state with adversarial national political system at the start of a given year. It takes the value 0 for all other parties. *Nongov* takes the value 1 if a party sits in government in a member state with non-adversarial national political system at the start of a given year, otherwise 0. *Nonopp* takes the value 1 if a party sits in opposition in a member state with non-adversarial national political system at the start of a given year, otherwise 0.

Table 3.1. Governing parties in the 15 EU member states 1999-2003, as of 1 January each year

	Adversarial	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Austria	No	SPÖ/ ÖVP	SPÖ/ ÖVP	ÖVP + FPÖ	ÖVP + FPÖ	ÖVP + FPÖ
Belgium	No	CVP + PSC + SP + PS	VLD + PRL/FDF + SP + PS + Ecolo + Agalev	VLD + PRL/FDF + SP + PS + Ecolo + Agalev	VLD + PRL/FDF + SP + PS + Ecolo + Agalev	VLD + PRL/FDF + SP + PS + Ecolo + Agalev
Denmark	No	SD + RV	SD + RV	SD + RV	V + KF	V + KF
Germany	Yes	SPD + Die Grünen	SPD + Die Grünen	SPD + Die Grünen	SPD + Die Grünen	SPD + Die Grünen
Finland	No	SDP + KOK + SFP + VAS + VIHR	SDP + KOK + SFP + VAS + VIHR	SDP + KOK + SFP + VAS + VIHR	SDP + KOK + SFP + VAS + VIHR	SDP + KOK + SFP + VAS + VIHR
France	Yes	PS + PCF + PRS + MDC + Verts	PS + PCF + PRS + MDC + Verts	PS + PCF + PRS/PRG + MDC + Verts	PS + PCF + PRS/PRG + MDC + Verts	RPR + UDF + DL
Greece	Yes	PASOK	PASOK	PASOK	PASOK	PASOK
Italy	Yes	DS + PPI + RI + UDR + PDCI + FV + SDI	DS + PPI + RI + PDCI + FV + D + Udeur	DS + PPI + RI + PDCI + FV + D + Udeur + SDI	FI + AN + LN + CCD + CDU	FI + AN + LN + CCD + CDU
Ireland	Yes	FF + PD	FF + PD	FF + PD	FF + PD	FF + PD
Luxembourg	No	CSV + LSAP	CSV + DP	CSV + DP	CSV + DP	CSV + DP
Netherlands	No	PvdA + VVD + D66	PvdA + VVD + D66	PvdA + VVD + D66	PvdA + VVD + D66	CDA + VVD + LPF
Portugal	Yes	PS	PS	PS	PS	PSD + CDS-PP
Spain	Yes	PP	PP	PP	PP	PP
Sweden	No	SAP	SAP	SAP	SAP	SAP
UK	Yes	LP	LP	LP	LP	LP

Austria SPÖ: Social Democratic Party of Austria; ÖVP: Austrian People's Party; FPÖ: Freedom Party of Austria

Belgium Agalev: (Flemish) ecologists; CVP: (Flemish) Christian People's Party; Ecolo: (Walloon) ecologists; FDF: (Brussels) Democratic Front of Francophones; PRL: (Walloon) Liberal Reformist Party; PS: (Walloon) Socialist Party; SP: (Flemish) Socialist Party (from 2001, SP.A); VLD: Flemish Liberals and Democrats;

Denmark KF: Conservative People's Party; V: Venstre, "Left", or Liberal Party; RV: Radical (Left-Social) Liberal Party; SD: Social Democracy in Denmark;

Germany SPD: Social Democratic Party; Die Grünen: The Greens

Finland KOK: national Coalition Party; SDP: Finnish Social Democratic Party; SFP: Swedish People's Party in Finland; VAS: Left-Wing Alliance; VIHR: Green League

France PS: Socialist Party; UDF: Union for the French Democracy (confederation to 1998, then single party); RPR: Rally for the Republic (disbanded 21 Sep 2002); PCF: French Communist Party;

PRS: Radical Socialist Party (then PRG); PRG: Radical Party of the Left; MDC: Citizens Movement; DL: Liberal Democracy; les Verts: The Greens;

Greece PASOK: Panhellenic Socialist Movement

Ireland FF: Fianna Fáil; PD: Progressive Democrats;

Italy DC: Christian Democracy; FI: Forward (Forza) Italy; LN: Northern League; AN: National Alliance; CCD: Christian Democratic Center; CDU: United Christian Democrats; PPI: Italian People's Party; RI: Italian Renewal; UDR: Democratic Union for the Republic; FV: Federation of Greens; PDCI: Party of the Italian Communists; SDI: Italian Democratic Socialists; Udeur: Union of the Democratic European Reformers;

Luxembourg CSV: Christian Social People's Party; LSAP: Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party; DP: Democratic Party

Netherlands CDA: Christian Democratic Appeal; PvdA: Labour Party; VVD: People's Party for Freedom and Democracy; D66: Democrats 66; LPF: List Pim Fortuyn **Portugal** PSD: Social Democratic Party; PS: Socialist Party; CDS-PP: Social Democratic Center-Popular Party

Spain PP: Partido Popular

Sweden SAP: Social Democratic Labour Party

United Kingdom LP: Labour Party

Source: <http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/00europa.htm>

Control variables

Since the theory is tested both as a complete and as a partial data generating mechanism, it is necessary to include some control variables. The control variables are introduced either to control for empirical irregularities, alternative explanations, or for statistical reasons. This section presents control variables of the two former types. The latter type is discussed in the relevant sections of subsequent chapters when the statistical technique is presented.

Some of the control variables are common for all empirical chapters. These are, amongst others, the dummy variables for the different party-groups. The biggest party group, the EPP, is the reference category. It is well known that committee chairs are over-represented as rapporteur and that the type of reports they write might be systematically different from the reports written by other MEPs. To control for this a dummy variable, *chair*, is included. It takes the value 1 if the rapporteur is the committee chair in the relevant committee at the time and 0 if not. This variable is used in chapter 5, where the dependent variable is at the individual MEP level. In chapter 4, the dependent variable is number of reports per party, per year. A continuous variable, *chairman*, captures the number of reports written by a committee chair from a party a particular year.

To control for the experience of the rapporteur, a continuous variable, *experience*, captures the number of Codecision reports written by an MEP under the Amsterdam version of the Codecision procedure. A dummy variable, *incumbent*, captures the effect of being familiar with the system through long service in the EP. It takes the value 1 if an MEP was a member of the fourth EP, 0 if not. It is conceivable that actors in the EP have changed their behaviour as they have updated their information about how the new version of the Codecision procedure works (Shackleton and

Raunio 2003). A variable to capture the general trend in behaviour of the actors in the EP regardless of the position of their party in national politics called *trend* is introduced to control for this development.

The difference in interest in EP activities is captured in a continuous variable measuring the average level of attendance in plenary sessions of the national delegations to the different party groups. It is conceivable that some MEPs frequently sign the attendance registry for purely financial reasons, without being active in the EP. Member of the European Parliament might also have other commitments on their time, preventing them from attending the plenary sessions as often as they would like. These other commitments and financial considerations may or may not differ systematically between different party delegations. Nevertheless, the attendance record in the plenary sessions is the most straightforward way to measure general interest in the EP's activities. As the average level of attendance is measure at party delegation level, individual differences should only marginally influence the score on the variable. In lack of a better, more accurate measure of MEP's interest in EP activities, attendance in plenary sessions is used (e.g. Kirchner 1984; Mamadouh and Raunio 2001; Scully 1997c). When this variable is used, it is labelled *attendance*. The data for this variable is taken from www.europarlament.net.

To control for the effect of the number of MEPs per party, a variable, *partysize*, is calculated using data from Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton (2000). Similarly, to control for the effect of MEPs per member state, a variable, *countrysize*, is calculated using official data. Nominate scores on the first dimension calculated by Hix, Noury and Roland (2004) is used to measure the relative location of MEPs and their national parties on the primary dimension in the EP. The location of MEPs and parties might vary over time but it is unlikely that it would significantly

change the results as the data on voting behaviour only cover the first one and a half years of the fifth EP. Furthermore, the nominate scores are used only as a proxy for the location on the left right scale, either on individual MEP level or averaged at party level. The variable is labelled *nominate*. The variable *absolute* is the absolute value of the nominate score, either at party level (chapter 4) or at individual level (chapter 5), measuring the distance from the MEPs or their parties to the centre in the EP on the first dimension.

To control for attitudes towards European integration, data from the expert survey conducted by Marks and Steenbergen (2004) is used. The dataset includes five relevant variables, *position*, *future*, *salience*, *dissent* and *EP*. Unfortunately, this data set does not include information about parties from Luxembourg. Hence, Luxembourg is excluded from the statistical analysis in the subsequent chapters.

Position aims to capture the party's overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration on a scale 1 to 7, where 1 is strongly opposed and 7 is strongly in favour. A score of 5 would suggest that the party is neutral on the issue of European integration. *Future* is the party's stance of a on the future of European integration. The scale is from 1 to 5; where 1 means that the party thinks that unification has gone too far, while 5 means that the party thinks that unification should be pushed much further.

Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics, allocation of Codecision reports

Variable	Description of variable	Obs	Mean	St.D.	Min	Max
Reports	Number of reports written by a party during a particular year	530	.704	1.569	0	11
Adgov	Adgov takes the value 1 if a party sits in government in a member state with adversarial national politic system at the start of a given year, otherwise 0	530	.145	.353	0	1
Nongov	Nongov takes the value 1 if a party sits in government in a member state with non-adversarial national politic system at the start of a given year, otherwise 0.	530	.170	.376	0	1
nonopp	Nonopp takes the value 1 if a party sits in opposition in a member state with non-adversarial national politic system at the start of a given year, otherwise 0.	530	.245	.431	0	1
Chairman	Number of Codecision reports written by committee chairs belonging to the party	530	.089	.585	0	10
Position	<i>Position</i> aims to capture the party's overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration on a scale 1 to 7, where 1 is strongly opposed and 7 is strongly in favour.	530	4.962	1.836	1	7
Salience	<i>Salience</i> is the relative importance of this issue in the party's public stance. A score of 1 means that the party does not think that European integration is important while a score of 7 means that it is the most important issue for the party.	530	3.042	.558	1.5	4
Dissent	<i>Dissent</i> is am measure of the internal dissent in the party over European integration on a scale from 1 to 5. 1 represents complete unity and 5 suggests that the majority of the party activists oppose the position of the leadership.	530	1.753	.555	1	3.56
Ep	The scale is 1 to 7, where 1 means that the party is strongly against expanding the powers of the EP, while 7 suggests that the party is strongly in favour	530	4.912	1.346	1	7
Absolute	National party location from the median voter on the left-right dimension. The higher the value, the further away from the median voter.	530	.406	.292	.005	.899
Partysize	Number of MEPs in the national party delegation	530	5.670	7.397	1	43
Attendance	Average attendance in plenary sessions, coded at national party-group delegation	530	82.613	8.196	60	97
countrysize	Number of MEPs from the same country	530	50.538	31.663	15	99
Eldr	Takes the value 1 if the party was a member of ELDR, 0 if not	530	.170	.376	0	1
Green	Takes the value 1 if the party was a member of The Greens, 0 if not	530	.132	.339	0	1
Pes	Takes the value 1 if the party was a member of PES, 0 if not	530	.160	.367	0	1
Small	Takes the value 1 if the party was a from a small party group, 0 if not	530	.283	.451	0	1

Table 3.3 Descriptive statistics, stage in the procedure legislation is adopted

Variable	Explanation	Obs	Mean	St. D.	Min	Max
reading	The stage in the procedure when the legislation was adopted, 1= Council 1 st reading, 2= EP second reading, 3= Council second reading and 4= Conciliation committee	254	2.240	1.108	1	4
Adgov	Adgov takes the value 1 if a party sits in government in a member state with adversarial national politic system at the start of a given year, otherwise 0	254	0.319	0.467	0	1
nongov	Nongov takes the value 1 if a party sits in government in a member state with non-adversarial national politic system at the start of a given year, otherwise 0.	254	0.118	0.323	0	1
experience	Number of Codecision reports already written in the fifth EP	254	0.713	1.149	0	6
Absolute	National party location from the median voter on the left-right dimension. The higher the value, the further away from the median voter.	254	0.417	0.246	.004	.874
Chair	Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the rapporteur is a committee chair, 0 otherwise	254	0.087	0.282	0	1
incumbent	Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the rapporteur was a member of the 4 th EP	251	0.454	0.499	0	1
position	<i>Position</i> aims to capture the overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration on a scale 1 to 7, where 1 is strongly opposed and 7 is strongly in favour.	254	5.605	1.491	1.33	7
salience	<i>Salience</i> is the relative importance of this issue in the party's public stance. A score of 1 means that the party does not think that European integration is important while a score of 7 means that it is the most important issue for the party.	254	3.318	0.487	2.33	4
dissent	<i>Dissent</i> is an measure of the internal dissent in the party over European integration on a scale from 1 to 5. 1 represents complete unity and 5 suggests that the majority of the party activists oppose the position of the leadership.	254	1.911	0.593	1	3.56
Ep	The scale is 1 to 7, where 1 means that the party is strongly against expanding the powers of the EP, while 7 suggests that the party is strongly in favour	254	5.329	1.151	1.71	6.79
countrysize	Number of MEPs from the same country	254	64.921	31.433	15	99
partysize	Number of MEPs in the national party delegation	254	17.972	13.948	1	43
attendance	Average attendance in plenary sessions, coded at national party-group delegation	254	84.055	7.020	60	96
Eldr	Takes the value 1 if the party was a member of ELDR, 0 if not	254	0.110	0.314	0	1
Green	Takes the value 1 if the party was a member of The Greens, 0 if not	254	0.441	0.497	0	1
Pes	Takes the value 1 if the party was a member of PES, 0 if not	254	0.083	0.276	0	1
Small	Takes the value 1 if the party was a from a small party group, 0 if not	254	0.280	0.450	0	1
y99	Takes the value 1 if the report was initiated in 1999, 0 if not	254	0.169	0.376	0	1
y01	Takes the value 1 if the report was initiated in 2001, 0 if not	254	0.240	0.428	0	1
y02	Takes the value 1 if the report was initiated in 2002, 0 if not	254	0.181	0.386	0	1
y03	Takes the value 1 if the report was initiated in 2003, 0 if not	254	0.142	0.349	0	1

Table 3.4 Descriptive statistics second reading Codecision votes, non-voting excluded

Variable	Description of variable	Obs	Mean	St.D.	Min	Max
Decision	Take the value 1 if the MEP voted in favour, 0 if he voted no or abstained	87817	0.521	.500	0	1
Adgov	Adgov takes the value 1 if a party sits in government in a member state with adversarial national politic system at the start of a given year, otherwise 0	87817	0.309	.462	0	1
Nongov	Nongov takes the value 1 if a party sits in government in a member state with non-adversarial national politic system at the start of a given year, otherwise 0.	87817	0.114	.318	0	1
Nonopp	Nonopp takes the value 1 if a party sits in opposition in a member state with non-adversarial national politic system at the start of a given year, otherwise 0.	87817	0.111	.314	0	1
Position	<i>Position</i> aims to capture the party's overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration on a scale 1 to 7, where 1 is strongly opposed and 7 is strongly in favour.	87817	5.381	1.697	1	7
Salience	<i>Salience</i> is the relative importance of this issue in the party's public stance. A score of 1 means that the party does not think that European integration is important while a score of 7 means that it is the most important issue for the party.	87817	3.278	.526	1.5	4
Dissent	<i>Dissent</i> is an measure of the internal dissent in the party over European integration on a scale from 1 to 5. 1 represents complete unity and 5 suggests that the majority of the party activists oppose the position of the leadership.	87817	1.886	.563	1	3.56
Ep	The scale is 1 to 7, where 1 means that the party is strongly against expanding the powers of the EP, while 7 suggests that the party is strongly in favour	87817	5.094	1.282	1	7
Nominate	National party location in the left-right policy-space. The scale is from -1 to 1, where -1 is extreme leftwing while 1 is the extreme rightwing score	87817	-0.010	.474	-.899	.821
Partysize	Number of MEPs in the national party delegation	87817	15.566	13.175	1	43
attendance	Average attendance in plenary sessions, coded at national party-group delegation	87817	82.943	7.016	60	97
countrysize	Number of MEPs from the same country	87817	65.588	31.248	15	99
Edd	Takes the value 1 if the MEP was a member of EDD, 0 if not	87817	0.016	.124	0	1
Eldr	Takes the value 1 if the MEP was a member of ELDR, 0 if not	87817	0.094	.291	0	1
Green	Takes the value 1 if the MEP was a member of The Greens, 0 if not	87817	0.066	.248	0	1
Gue	Takes the value 1 if the MEP was a member of GUE, 0 if not	87817	0.064	.245	0	1
Non	Takes the value 1 if the MEP was a non-attached member, 0 if not	87817	0.049	.215	0	1
Pes	Takes the value 1 if the MEP was a member of PES, 0 if not	87817	0.302	.459	0	1
Uen	Takes the value 1 if the MEP was a member of UEN, 0 if not	87817	0.035	.184	0	1

Table 3.5 Descriptive statistics second reading Codecision votes, all voting decisions

Variable	Description of variable	Obs	Mean	St.D.	Min	Max
Allneg	Take the value 1 if the MEP voted in favour, 0 if he voted no or abstained,, present but did not vote or was absent	97644	.493	.500	0	1
Adgov	Adgov takes the value 1 if a party sits in government in a member state with adversarial national politic system at the start of a given year, otherwise 0	97644	.309	.462	0	1
Nongov	Nongov takes the value 1 if a party sits in government in a member state with non-adversarial national politic system at the start of a given year, otherwise 0.	97644	.109	.311	0	1
Nonopp	Nonopp takes the value 1 if a party sits in opposition in a member state with non-adversarial national politic system at the start of a given year, otherwise 0.	97644	.107	.310	0	1
Position	<i>Position</i> aims to capture the party's overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration on a scale 1 to 7, where 1 is strongly opposed and 7 is strongly in favour.	97644	5.337	1.725	1	7
Salience	<i>Salience</i> is the relative importance of this issue in the party's public stance. A score of 1 means that the party does not think that European integration is important while a score of 7 means that it is the most important issue for the party.	97644	3.272	.534	1.5	4
Dissent	<i>Dissent</i> is am measure of the internal dissent in the party over European integration on a scale from 1 to 5. 1 represents complete unity and 5 suggests that the majority of the party activists oppose the position of the leadership.	97644	1.876	.562	1	3.56
Ep	The scale is 1 to 7, where 1 means that the party is strongly against expanding the powers of the EP, while 7 suggests that the party is strongly in favour	97644	5.063	1.296	1	7
Nominate	National party location in the left-right policy-space. The scale is from -1 to 1, where -1 is extreme leftwing while 1 is the extreme rightwing score	97644	-.009	.472	-.899	.821
Partysize	Number of MEPs in the national party delegation	97644	15.370	13.069	1	43
attendance	Average attendance in plenary sessions, coded at national party-group delegation	97644	82.681	7.149	60	97
countrysize	Number of MEPs from the same country	97644	66.069	31.021	15	99
Edd	Takes the value 1 if the MEP was a member of EDD, 0 if not	97644	.022	.148	0	1
Eldr	Takes the value 1 if the MEP was a member of ELDR, 0 if not	97644	.090	.286	0	1
Green	Takes the value 1 if the MEP was a member of The Greens, 0 if not	97644	.063	.243	0	1
Gue	Takes the value 1 if the MEP was a member of GUE, 0 if not	97644	.065	.246	0	1
Non	Takes the value 1 if the MEP was a non-attached member, 0 if not	97644	.055	.228	0	1

Saliency is the relative importance of this issue in the party's public stance. The scale is 1 to 7. A score of 1 means that the party does not think that European integration is important while a score of 7 means that it is the most important issue for the party. *Dissent* is a measure of the internal dissent in the party over European integration. The scale goes from 1 to 5. 1 represents complete unity and 5 suggests that the majority of the party activists oppose the position of the leadership. *EP* is the position of the party leadership on strengthening the powers of the European Parliament. The scale is 1 to 8, where 1 means that the party is strongly against expanding the powers of the EP, while 7 suggests that the party strongly favours expanding the powers of the EP. A value of 8 would indicate that the party has yet to take a position regarding the role of the EP in EU decision-making. None of the parties included in this study were coded yet to take a position. Hence, the scale in this sample goes from 1 to 7. Table 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 present the descriptive statistics for the dependent independent and control variables.

The correlation between the two variables taken from the Marks and Steenbergen (2004), *position* and *future* is high. The correlation is .96 in the allocation of reports dataset and .94 in the dataset looking at which stage Codecision legislation is adopted. This seems to suggest that the two variables are measuring the same phenomena. The correlation between *future* and *ep* is also quite high, .82 or higher. The correlation between *position* and *ep* is slightly lower, between .77 and .81. It is not surprising that these two variables are correlated as further integration usually means giving more power, or powers in new areas to supranational actors like the Commission, the European Court of Justice and the EP (Pollack 2003; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). It is nevertheless high. In order to limit the multicollinearity problem the variable *future* is not used in the further statistical analysis. However, as some multicollinearity problems are associated with the variables *position* and *ep* are still present, the coefficients and the standard error of these two

variables need to be interpreted carefully. There does not seem to any other problems of multicollinearity. We nevertheless note that the correlation between number of reports and size of national party is over .7, and between number of reports and committee chair is over .5.

In the dataset related to the stage in the Codecision procedure legislation is adopted there is a negative correlation between reading and trend of .29. More recently initiated legislation seems to be agreed at an earlier stage. This is in line with the report from practitioners who pointed to an inter-institutional understanding of the need to complete legislation before the 10 new member states from Eastern and Southern Europe joined in May 2004 (Dimitrakopoulos, Cederschild, and Imbeni 2004). It is also a function of the cut-off point. Legislation initiated in 2003 and 2002 are more likely to be included if it terminated early, rather than if it ended up in the Conciliation Committee. Correlation tables can be found in Appendix III.

Summary

This chapter has presented the dataset that will be used to test the theory. The theory is tested on a large dataset containing all Codecision reports issued (and, for hypothesis 2, completed) during the fifth European Parliament, 1999-2004. The data of second reading votes includes all relevant roll calls in the period from July 1999 to end of December 2000. Table 3.6 summarise the expected findings.

In chapter 4, the expected finding is that governing parties from adversarial member states write more Codecision reports than other parties. In chapter 5, it is expected that the result will show that Codecision legislation written by rapporteurs from governing parties from adversarial member states are more likely to be accepted in the first reading in the Council than legislation

written by rapporteurs from opposition parties or governing parties from non-adversarial member states. Finally, the evidence presented in chapter 6 is expected to show that governing parties will be more likely than opposition parties to vote in favour of second reading amendments. The predictions of the control variables are derived from the literature or implications from the theory, following King, Keohane, and Verba's (1994) advice to create as many observable implications of the theory as possible.

This chapter completes the first part of the thesis. In the second part, the hypotheses are tested on the data just described. The three empirical chapters have the same structure. A focused literature review presents alternative explanations. A bivariate analysis follows. Then the relevant statistical model is presented with the predicted directions of relevant variables offering a test of the hypothesis. The results are then discussed.

Table 3.6 Summary of predictions

Variable name	Chapter 4 reports	Chapter 5 agreement	Chapter 6 voting
Adgov	Positive (theory)	1 st reading positive (theory)	Positive (theory)
Nongov position	Not significant Positive (existing literature)	Not significant 1 st reading negative 2 nd reading EP positive Conciliation positive (existing literature)	Not significant Positive (existing literature)
salience	Positive (existing literature)	1 st reading negative (existing literature)	Positive (existing literature)
dissent	Both ways (existing literature)	Both ways (existing literature)	Positive (existing literature)
ep	Positive (existing literature)	1 st reading negative 2 nd reading EP positive (Existing literature)	Positive (existing literature)
Absolute nominate nominate partysize	Negative (theory) Positive (existing literature)	1 st reading positive (theory) 1 st reading positive 2 nd reading EP negative Conciliation committee positive (existing literature)	Negative (theory) Positive (existing literature)
attendance	Positive (existing literature)	1 st reading positive 2 nd reading EP negative Conciliation committee positive (existing literature)	Positive (existing literature)
countrysize	Positive (existing literature)	1 st reading positive 2 nd reading EP negative Conciliation committee positive (existing literature)	Positive (existing literature)
Chair		1 st reading positive 2 nd reading positive (existing literature)	
Chairman	Positive (existing literature)		
Experience		2 nd reading Council negative Conciliation committee negative (theory)	
Incumbent PES	Positive (theory)	No effect (existing literature) 1 st reading positive (theory), 1 st reading negative (existing literature)	Positive (theory)
ELDR	Negative (existing literature)	1 st reading negative (existing literature)	
Green	Negative (existing literature)	1 st reading negative (existing literature) 2 nd reading Council negative (theory)	
Small party groups	Negative (existing literature)	1 st reading negative (existing literature) 2 nd reading Council negative (theory)	Negative (theory)

PART II

Chapter 4: Governing parties write more Codecision reports

The EP organises its legislative activities through a committee system (Bowler and Farrell 1995). At the committee stage, responsibilities for Commission initiatives are delegated to individual MEPs, who are responsible for producing reports. The reports form the basis for deliberation, both in the committee and in the plenary session. Therefore, a MEP who is responsible for writing a report, a rapporteur, has agenda-setting power inside the European Parliament. He can propose his preferred policy amongst those acceptable to a majority inside the Parliament (Tsebelis 1995). In order to see his proposal being adopted, he needs to make it acceptable to a qualified majority of the Council. A rapporteur has the possibility to choose the dimensions on which the policy is evaluated. He can either choose to focus on amendments regarding the institutional balance, in which case the EP might be more easily able to unite against the Council, or he can choose to focus on left-right issues, where the divisions inside the Parliament may be more apparent. It is hence essential to understand how reports are allocated in the European Parliament. This allocation is the focus in this chapter.

The theory presented in chapter two suggests systematic differences in the number of Codecision reports parties write. It predicts that governing parties from adversarial member states will write more reports than other parties. This prediction is tested on a dataset of all Codecision reports initiated by the Commission under the Amsterdam version of the Codecision procedure until the end of the fifth Parliament in May 2004. The results support the theoretical predictions.

Significant differences only seem to exist between government and opposition parties from adversarial member states. Governing parties from adversarial member states write more codecision reports than opposition parties from these states. The results disconfirm the suggestion

that the party groups are powerful in the allocation of reports, at least in terms of the number of reports distributed amongst different party groups. The correlation between party group size and number of reports disappears once the size of national parties is controlled for. Parties more concerned with European integration write more Codecision reports than parties that do not find “Europe” salient.

To investigate how Codecision reports are allocated amongst parties in the European Parliament section one provides a review of the existing literature. It shows that the tendency has been to focus mainly on the size of party group and national delegations. Section 2 presents a bivariate analysis of the allocation of Codecision reports between governing and opposition parties. Section 3 presents the statistical technique and the relevant variables for testing hypothesis one. Section 4 discusses the results.

Existing Research on the Allocation of Reports in the European Parliament

‘The choice of rapporteurs and draftsmen is normally decided upon within individual committees by a system whose broad lines are common to all committees. Each Political Group receives a quota of points according to its size. Reports and opinions to be distributed are then discussed by the committee coordinators who decide on the number of points each subject is worth, and then make bids on behalf of their Group, the strength of their claim being based in theory (but not always in practice) on the relationship between the number of points already used by the Group and their original quota.’(Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton 2000: 117)

Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton highlight two aspects. First, groups not particularly interested in a report may attempt to make other groups pay more for it by raising the bid. Second, it may be advantageous to submit the name of their rapporteur, if he or she is considered an expert in the

area, in particular if the issue at hand is of a highly technical nature. Nevertheless, they point out the informality of the system and that trades between groups are common (Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton 2000:117-8). A potential problem with their descriptive account of the allocation of reports is that it does not address how reports are allocated amongst the national party delegations within the different party groups once the coordinator has secured the report for his party group.

Kreppel addresses this aspect:

'[b]ecause of the need to cater to national diversity as well as ideological affiliation, the general pattern within the EP has been to distribute positions pro-portionally first to the party group (ideology), which then go through a similar process internally on the basis of nationality. Thus, after a group is allocated its share of key positions (committee chairs etc.) it must then distribute these proportionally amongst its own membership on the basis of the various national delegations within the group' (Kreppel 2002: 190).

She shows that within the party group, there is no relationship between voting behaviour and the number of reports allocated to a particular member of the party group. Those who receive an unusually high number of Codecision or Cooperation reports are not more supportive of the party-group position than other MEPs. She argues that this is because the party group leadership does not have any power inside the group. The power is in the hands of the national delegations, in particular the larger ones (Kreppel 2002:202-6). However, since she only focuses on the two biggest party groups, it remains questionable to what extent her results are generalisable to the whole population of parties in the EP.

Mamadouh and Raunio (2001; 2003) test the relationship between size of party group and national delegation and the allocation of reports. In their studies, they investigate the allocation of

all reports in the third and fourth parliament. They find that the numbers of allocated reports is highly correlated both with the size of party groups and with size of national delegations. They also find big differences amongst individual MEPs. They suggest that these differences might be cultural or related to particularities of different national political systems, e.g. language skills or double mandates. Studying allocation of reports in the environmental committee 1995-99, Keading (2004) finds that the group of rapporteurs does not mirror the composition of the full plenary.

A problem with these studies is that they fail to distinguish between different types of reports. Being a rapporteur on a Codecision report gives the MEP far more potential influence than if he is responsible for an own initiative report or a consultation report. A second problem is that they do not control for potential omitted variables. By not controlling for other variables than size of party group and national delegations, factors like attitudes towards further integration and location on the left - right policy spectrum might be ignored. A third problem, which is common in all of these accounts, is the one-sided focus on the supply side, assuming that all parties and MEPs are equally interested in writing reports. Hall (1996) shows that this is not the case in the US Congress, where only a small number of actors are interested in any one piece of legislation. There is no reason why this may not be the case in the European Parliament. Indeed, Euro-sceptics are in general less interested in taking on committee work. Medium size party groups like the Greens chose their report with care. In only a limited number of policy areas are they likely to find a majority in the EP somewhat sympathetic to their views, making it worthwhile to attempt to obtain the right to write a report on the issue (Benedetto forthcoming). Whitaker (2001) hints of a possible difference between parties on the basis of whether or not they belong to the government or the opposition at the national scene.

Bivariate analysis

The data used in this chapter are described in chapter 3. The dependent variable is number of Codecision reports allocated to a national party per year during the period 1999-2003. Table 4.1 presents the distribution according to governing status and national political system.

Table 4.1 Number of Codecision reports per year per party by governing status

Number of parties writing codecision reports in a particular year*	Governing parties from adversary states	Governing parties from non-adversarial states	Opposition from adversarial states	Opposition from non-adversarial states	Total
0	40	56	176	89	361
1	15 (15)	25 (25)	25 (25)	30 (30)	95 (95)
2	7 (14)	5 (10)	12 (24)	8 (16)	32 (64)
3	1 (3)	4 (12)	5 (15)	3 (9)	13 (39)
4	3 (12)	0	6 (24)	0	9 (36)
5	3 (15)	0	1 (5)	0	4 (20)
6	3 (18)	0	2 (12)	0	5 (30)
7	0	0	3 (21)	0	3 (21)
8	1 (8)	0	1 (8)	0	2 (16)
9	1 (9)	0	1 (9)	0	2 (18)
11	2 (22)	0	1 (11)	0	3 (33)
Ratio: Parties writing reports to parties not writing reports	.900	.607	.324	.427	.465
Total number parties writing reports (total number reports in brackets)	36 (116)	34 (47)	57 (154)	41 (55)	168 (372)

* Total number of reports written by parties in brackets, e.g. 7 parties wrote 2 reports, in total 14 reports.

From this table we see that most parties are not allocated one or more new Codecision report every year. The total number of report to non-report observations was 168 to 361, a ratio of .465. Amongst the governing parties from adversarial member states, this was the case in 40 of the observations, compared to 36 times when this was not the case. Thus, almost half of the governing parties from adversarial member states were allocated at least one Codecision report

per year, a ratio of reports to non-reports of .9. This is the best ratio for any of the different groups. Opposition parties from adversarial member states were only allocated one or more reports in 57 out of 176 incidences. This corresponds to a ratio of less than one in three. The difference between governing and opposition parties is smaller in non-adversarial states. The ratio for governing parties from non-adversarial member states is 34 non-zero observations and 56 zero observations, or just over .6. Opposition parties from these countries were observed not to receive any Codecision reports 89 times, while receiving at least one 38 times, a ratio of .427.

It might be useful to compare the total number of reports written in the time-period by governing and opposition parties in different systems and different party groups. By calculating the total number of reports by governing status, we then find that governing parties from adversarial member states wrote 116 reports while opposition parties from adversarial states wrote 154. Opposition parties from non-adversarial member states wrote more report than governing parties from these countries, 55 versus 47.

It is useful to consider the relationship between party groups and number of reports, as it has been so dominant in the literature on rapporteurships. Table 4.2 presents the allocation of Codecision reports by year to the different party groups.

Table 4.2 Number of Codecision reports per year per party by party group

Number of parties writing codecision reports*	PES	EPP	ELDR	Green	GUE	UEN	EDD	Non	Total
0	43	84	62	49	47	24	18	34	361
1	18 (18)	20 (20)	17 (17)	18 (18)	11 (11)	1 (1)	6 (6)	4 (4)	95 (95)
2	8 (16)	13 (26)	6 (12)	2 (4)	2 (4)	0	1 (2)	0	32 (64)
3	4 (12)	2 (6)	5 (10)	1 (3)	0	0	0	1 (3)	13 (39)
4	6 (24)	2 (8)	0	0	0	0	0	1 (4)	9 (36)
5	2 (10)	2 (10)	0	0	0	0	0	0	4 (20)
6	2 (12)	3 (18)	0	0	0	0	0	0	5 (30)
7	0	3 (21)	0	0	0	0	0	0	3 (21)
8	0	2 (16)	0	0	0	0	0	0	2 (16)
9	1 (9)	1 (9)	0	0	0	0	0	0	2 (18)
11	0	3 (33)	0	0	0	0	0	0	3 (33)
Ratio: Parties writing reports to parties not writing reports	.953	.607	.452	.429	.277	.042	.389	.176	.465
Total number of parties writing reports, total number of reports in brackets	41 (101)	51 (167)	26 (44)	(21) 25	13 (15)	1 (1)	7 (8)	6 (11)	168 (372)

* Total number of reports written by parties in brackets, e.g. 8 parties wrote 2 reports, in total 16 reports.

The table shows that socialist parties are almost as often engaged as rapporteurs in any given year as not. The ratio of parties writing report to not writing is .953. This is a much larger proportion than the EPP where .6 of all national parties wrote one or more Codecision reports. The liberals and greens both have a ratio of just over .4, while the smaller party groups all have a ratio under .4, with the rightwing UEN hardly writing Codecision report at all. These figures seem to suggest that the coalition between governing parties from adversarial member states and socialist parties are most active as Codecision rapporteurs, thereby supporting the theory.

PES wrote 101 reports, EPP 167, ELDR 44 and the Greens 25. GUE wrote 15 reports, UEN 1, EDD 8, and the non-attached MEPs wrote 11 Codecision reports. On the one hand, the bivariate analysis supports the theory as more of the governing parties and their ideological close allies

tend to have more of their parities active through rapporteurships. On the other hand, opposition parties from adversarial member states and the EPP seem to write more Codecision reports overall. This latter finding might be a function of the fact that the EPP was the biggest party group in the fifth Parliament and that opposition parties from adversarial member states controlled more seats in the EP than governing parties. This gives the EPP and opposition parties more points to spend on Codecision reports. In order to control for party size and other possible intervening factors, the next section presents the statistical model and data used to test the hypothesis.

Operationalistion

Statistical method

Since it is the number of reports, rather than just whether a party wrote a report in the period that is of substantial interest, it is neither possible nor desirable to use a logistic regression model. Nor is it advisable to use an ordinary least square regression as it treats the count outcome as a continuous variable. This may lead to inefficient, inconsistent and biased results (Agresti and Finlay 1997; King 1988; Long 1997). The standard model for count data is the Poisson regression model. Here 'the probability of a count is determined by a Poisson distribution, where the mean of the distribution is a function of the independent variables. This model has the defining characteristic that the conditional mean of the outcome is equal to the conditional variance' (Long 1997: 217-8). Long notes that this might not always be the case in practice as the conditional variance often exceed the mean. The assumption can be relaxed through a binominal negative regression model, which allows for greater variance in the conditional variance. However, in the dataset used here, described in chapter 3, the dependent variable is not number of counts, but number of counts per year. It is time-series count data. It is also-cross section as the

interest is not in difference between different years, but between parties with different characteristics observed over several years. Hence, the suitable model is a longitudinal count model. Cameron and Trivedi (1998: 275-93) present the count versions of two commonly used models for longitudinal data. The conditional maximum likelihood approach, commonly known as a fixed effect model only provides estimates of time-varying regressors. The random effect model, on the other hand, implies that individual unobserved effects are uncorrelated with the observed effect. If not, the random effect estimator will be inconsistent. Cameron and Trivedi (1998: 291) advise us that '[t]he random effect model is appropriate if the sample is drawn from a population and one wants to do inference on the population; the fixed effects model is appropriate if one wishes to confine oneself to explaining the sample'. The results from both fixed and random effect models are reported. In order to control for possible heterogeneity, and to comply with the norm in the literature on count models, negative binomial models are also fitted and reported. However, given that longitudinal data methods control for heterogeneity, the difference between negative binomial and Poisson models should be minor. Thus five models are fitted; a simple Poisson regression model, and fixed and random effect longitudinal versions of the Poisson and negative binomial models. The structural model of the Poisson regression is:

$$\Pr(y_i | \mathbf{x}_i) = \exp(-\mu_i) \mu_i^{y_i} / y_i!$$

Where $\mu = \exp(\mathbf{x}\beta)$, $\mathbf{x}\beta$ is a vector of all the independent variables \mathbf{x} , times their effect β . In the negative binomial model μ is replaced with a random variable $\mu\sim$, where

$\mu\sim = \exp(\mathbf{x}_i\beta + \varepsilon_i)$. Then μ is the observed heterogeneity, different values of \mathbf{x} give different μ , but μ is the same for all cases with identical \mathbf{x} . Variation in $\mu\sim$ is due to both variation in \mathbf{x} and unobserved heterogeneity ε . Thus, for any value of the independent variables there is a

distribution of μ ~ not a single μ . The variation is a function of both μ and δ . As δ is unknown, we need to compute the distribution of y given only \mathbf{x} . Hence $\Pr(y | \mathbf{x})$ is computed by averaging $\Pr(y | \mathbf{x}_i, \delta_i)$ by the probability of the different values of δ . Hence, the model is specified as:

$$\Pr(y_i | \mathbf{x}_i) = \int_0^\infty [\Pr(y_i | \mathbf{x}_i, \delta_i) * g(\delta_i)] d \delta_i$$

The longitudinal models are somewhat more complex, but the insight is to add a time-period parameter to the models, either holding variance between individuals with the same value of \mathbf{x} constant, as in the fixed effect, or allowing it to vary as in the random effect specification. The interested reader can consult Cameron and Trivedi (1998: 279-92).

Variables

The dependent variable is the number of Codecision reports per national party, per year. The descriptive statistics and information regarding the collection of the data, both for the dependent and the independent variables can be found in chapter 3.

The dichotomous variable *adgov*, takes the value 1 if the party sat in a national government in an adversarial member state in the beginning of the year of the initiation of the report. The theoretical expectation is that the coefficient of the variable will be positive. The dichotomous variable *nongov* is the equivalent for governing parties from non-adversarial member states. The dichotomous variable *nonopp* takes the value 1 for opposition parties from non-adversarial member states. It takes the value 0 for other parties. The reference category is opposition parties from adversarial member states.

The continuous variable *chair* captures the number of reports written by a committee chair from the party. The expectation from the literature is that the direction of the effect will be positive, the higher the number of reports written by a chairperson, the more reports the party writes in total.

The continuous variable *position* captures the attitude of the party towards European integration. A high score indicates a favourable position toward European integration. A low score indicates Euro-scepticism. The existing literature expects the sign of this variable will be positive.

The continuous variable *salience* indicates how salient the issue of European integration is for the party. This variable is also predicted to have a positive effect on the number of reports.

Dissent is a continuous variable that indicates the degree of conflict within the party of EU integration. A higher score means more dissent. There is no clear prediction in the existing literature.

The variable *ep* is also continuous. It captures the party's attitude towards strengthening the powers of the EP. A high score means in favour, a low score means that the party is opposed to strengthening the powers of the EP. The expected effect of this variable is also positive.

Absolute is the absolute value of the nominate score of the MEPs in the party on the dominant division of conflict in the EP, normally understood as the left-right dimension (Hix 2001; Hix and Lord 1997; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2003). The absolute value hence indicates distance from the centre. The expected sign is negative. The existing literature would suggest that parties further away from the centre would write fewer reports than parties more centrally located would.

The continuous variable *partysize* measures the number of MEPs from the party. It is expected to be positive. More members lead to more reports.

Attendance is also continuous variable. It estimates the effect of the national party delegation attendance in plenary sessions on the number of Codecision reports the party writes. The effect is expected to be positive. Unfortunately, the attendance scores are not easily available on national party level; so data on national party group delegations is used. These only differ in cases where two or more parties from a particular country sit in the same party group. The continuous variable *countrysize* captures the number of MEPs from the same country as the party in question. Again, the literature suggests a positive effect.

A categorical variable for party groups is also included. In this variable, the smaller, less centrally located, party groups and the non-attached are merged into one category, *small*, while *PES*, *ELDR* and *Greens* have separate categories. The biggest party group *EPP* is the reference category. The theory expects socialist parties to write more reports than parties in the *EPP* of the same size. The existing literature expects all smaller party groups to write fewer Codecision reports than the two big party groups, even after controlling for size of national parties. For every model, two alternative specifications are fitted. In one of the specifications, only the variables in the theory are included. This provides a test of the relative merit of the model as a complete data generating process. In the other specification, the control variables, mainly derived from the existing literature, are included, providing a test of the model as a partial data generating process (Morton 1999).

Results

The overall fit of the Poisson version of model 2, the partial data-generating process, is good. The pseudo R^2 is .368. The reduction in the log-likelihood score by moving from a simple Poisson regression to cross sectional time series models (fixed and random effect Poisson and negative binominal) is not massive, between 5 and 35, while massively increasing the degrees of freedoms. The magnitude of the individual variables does not change a lot either, nor the statistical significance, with the exception of EP. The correlation between the predicted values using Poisson regression and the actual number of reports is .741, and highly significant beyond the .0001 level.

The results are reported in table 4.3. First, there is an effect of being a governing party from an adversarial member state is positive and significant across all specifications of the model. This is clear evidence in favour of the theory. The results hold for the model as both a complete (model 1) as well as a partial data generating process (model 2).

The statistical results support hypothesis one. Governing parties write more Codecision reports than opposition parties. However, this only holds for governing parties from adversarial member states. Being a governing party, rather than an opposition party, increases the probability of writing one or more reports in any given year. The effect is shown in figure 4.1, which provides a kernel density plot of the fitted probabilities for all parties, using the results of the Poisson version of model 2. A kernel density plot is a smoothed histogram, indicated the relative frequencies of the different predicted probabilities amongst observations in the different categories. The figure compares governing parties from adversarial member states with all other

parties. We see that the probability of writing zero reports is higher for opposition parties and governing parties from non-adversarial member states, while the probability of writing at least more than one report is higher for governing parties from adversarial member states. The probability of writing one report is higher for opposition parties. In line with the theory, it suggests that many opposition parties find only one report each year that is worth writing.


Table 4.3 Allocation of Codecision reports in the 5th European Parliament

Variables	H	Poisson		Random effect Poisson		Fixed effect Poisson		Random effect negative binominal		Fixed effect negative binominal	
		Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
adgov	+	0.832 ***	0.318 *	0.817 ***	0.334 *	0.815 ***	0.337 *	0.864 ***	0.367 *	0.858 ***	0.372 *
Nongov	0	-0.236	0.349	-0.245	0.331	-0.246	0.327	0.324	0.414	0.320	0.407
Nonopp	0	-0.446 **	0.261	-0.446 **	0.256	-0.446 **	0.254	0.132	0.355	0.132	0.353
chair	+		0.234 ***		0.206 ***		0.199 ***		0.239 ***		0.230 ***
Position	+		-0.065		-0.070		-0.072		-0.045		-0.047
Salience	+		0.508 **		0.492 **		0.488 **		0.494 **		0.488 **
dissent	+		0.228		0.233		0.234		0.166		0.168
ep	+		0.264 *		0.269 **		0.271 *		0.225		0.227
Absolute	-		-0.499		-0.482		-0.477		-0.296		-0.290
partysize	+		0.077 ***		0.077 ***		0.077 ***		0.077 ***		0.077 ***
Attendance	+		-0.005		-0.006		-0.007		0.004		0.003
countrysize	+		-0.004		-0.005		-0.005		-0.004		-0.004
eldr	-		-0.282		-0.283		-0.282		-0.141		-0.142
green	-		-0.266		-0.294		-0.302		-0.138		-0.149
pes	+		-0.270		-0.281		-0.283		-0.178		-0.182
small	-		-0.379		-0.404		-0.411		-0.270		-0.280
cons		-0.414 **	-3.416 ***	-0.410 **	-3.209 **			-1.272 ***	-3.113 *	-1.27 ***	-3.028 *
/ln_r				4.316	-2.887			4.316	3.203		
/ln_s				3.347	0.056			3.347	3.821		
r								74.857	24.600		
s								28.413	45.654		
Group				Years (5)	Years (5)	Years (5)	Years (5)	Years (5)	Years (5)	Years (5)	Years (5)
Pseudo R ²		.0508	.3680	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Log likelihood		-716.68	-477.21	-706.63	-472.49	-683.87	-450.59	-472.70	-463.31	-549.80	-441.42
N		530	530	530	530	530	530	530	530	530	530

* p-value < .05, ** p-value < .01, *** p-value < .001, H= hypothesised sign of the independent variable

Figure 4.1 Predicted difference in number of reports, government and opposition parties

Density



Predicted number of reports. Continuous line = governing parties from adversarial member states, dotted line = all other parties

It is also, as expected, strong statistical significant evidence supporting the view that Codecision reports are allocated according to number of MEPs per party, more MEPs means more Codecision reports. This supports the argument made by Kreppel (2002). The number of reports is not a function of the size of the party groups and the number of MEPs per country. These effects disappear once the effect of national parties is controlled for.

Interpretation of the other variables

While not statistically significant, the further away from the centre in the EP a party is, the less Codecision reports it writes. Thus, while the direction of the coefficient is as predicted in the existing literature, one should not draw any firm conclusion given the low level of statistical

significance. The position of the party towards further integration does not seem to have an impact on the number of reports a party writes. We should however be careful when interpreting this variable baring in mind the high correlation it has with the wish to strengthening the power of the EP.

As the direction, significance level and values of the coefficients are very similar across the different models, the remainder of this section provides a substantive interpretation of the Poisson version of model 2. The focus is on the change in probability holding all other variables at their base value. The base value is 0 for the dichotomous variables, i.e. the first four and the last four variables (adgov, nongov, nonopp, chair, eldr, green, pes, and small). The value of each of the continuous variables is fixed at its mean. The baseline probability for different number of reports per year is as follows. A party will write 0 reports with a likelihood of 70.2%. It will write 1 report with a likelihood of 20.9%. The chance of it writing 2 reports is 6.2%. The baseline party hence has a likeliness of writing 3 or more reports per year of less than 2.7%. The baseline probabilities, and the resulting chance in probabilities as a result of changing the value on one of the variable while keeping all other variables at their base values, is presented in table 4.4.

Table 4.4 Predicted probabilities of number of reports

Count	0	1	2	3 <
Base	.7023	.2091	.0622	.0264
Governing party from an adversarial state	.6319	.2326	.0856	.0499
Active Committee chair (mean)	.6980	.2108	.0637	.0275
Minimum salience attached to integration	.8378	.1359	.0220	.0043
Maximum salience attached to integration	.5918	.2416	.0986	.0680
Minimum salience attached to strengthen the EP	.8687	.1141	.0150	.0022
Maximum salience attached to strengthen the EP	.5764	.2442	.1034	.0760
Minimum party size	.7714	.1764	.0403	.0119
Maximum party size	.1191	.1049	.0924	.6836

Calculated by changing the value on one variable at the time, keeping all other variables at its base

From table 4.4 we can see that changing from being an opposition party to a governing party from an adversarial member state, holding all other variables at its base, decreases the likelihood of writing zero reports from 70.2% to 63.2%, a decrease of 7%. Hence, such a governing party has a likelihood of 36.2% of writing at least one report, compared to the chance in opposition of 29.8%. When comparing the probability of writing 3 reports or more a year, we see that the probability of this occurring for a governing party from an adversarial member state is twice as high (5% vs. 2.6%) compared to an opposition party with an identical score on all other variables.

Having an active chair has a marginal but significant positive effect on the number of Codecision reports a party writes. The change in the probability is in the region of .1 - .2%.

The salience a party attaches to European integration has a substantive impact on the predicted number of reports a party writes. A party that does not find "Europe" salient at all has a predicted chance of not writing reports of 83.8%, compared to the base of 70.2% and the chance of a party that attaches maximum level of salience of 59.2%. Thus, the chance of not writing reports increases or decreases by more than 10% from the base level as a party's salience of "Europe" increases or decreases to its maximum/minimum value. The effect of saliency has its strongest substantive effect on the probabilities in the lower range of the spectrum of number of reports. At the higher end of the spectrum, we see that the chance of writing three or more reports is less than .5% for parties that do not find "Europe" salient. This compares to a probability of 6.8% for parties that score a high value on the saliency variable.

The effect of parties' attitudes towards increasing the power of the EP were statistical significant in most specifications of the model. The lack of significance in the negative binominal fixed and

random effect specification may be due to the multicollinearity problem between the variables *position* and *ep*, discussed in chapter 3. The substantive interpretation of the difference shows, as expected, that the attitude towards increasing the power of the EP substantively change the probability of producing Codecision reports. The chance of not writing Codecision report in a given year of the fifth EP decreases from 70% to less than 58% if the party is very interested in strengthening the EP. Their predicted likelihood of writing at least three reports per year is 7.6%. Conversely, no interest in strengthening the power of the EP increases the chance of not writing any reports to over 86%. The likelihood of writing three or more reports is only one-fifth of the base, .43% compared to 2.64%.

The last variable showing up to be statistically significant in the model is the size of parties. The effect is, as expected, positive. The more MEPs, the more Codecision reports a party writes. This is not surprising and in line with both the theory and existing literature. The key added value of this study to our understanding of the effect of party size is to quantify the effect in terms on the predicted number of reports a party will write as a function of its size. The baseline, mean, value on the *partysize* variable is 5.6. When all other variables are also held at their base, there is a 70% chance that such a party will not write any Codecision reports in a given year. If the party has only one member, that chance rises to over 77%. Holding all other variables constant, the chances of not writing any reports in a given year decreases to less than 12% if the number of MEPs is equal to that of the biggest party in the fifth EP, the German CDU with 42 members. The chance of a one-member party writing at least three reports in a given year is just over 1%, while it is more than 68% for the biggest party.

Conclusion

Compared to the existing explanations, the theory of government and opposition adds additional explanatory force to the question of allocation of Codecision reports in the European Parliament. Governing parties from adversarial member states are more active as rapporteurs than opposition parties or governing parties from non-adversarial member states. This holds both when the theory is tested as a complete data-generating process and when other explanations are controlled for.

There is nothing to suggest that more centrally located parties write more reports, nor that some party groups are over-represented once the size of national parties has been controlled for.

The findings disconfirm the argument that European Party groups, independently from national parties, are significantly able to influence the allocation of Codecision reports once other factors are controlled for. While the allocation of reports between the party-group coordinators may be some kind of a poker-game, as Corbett et al argue (2000), no party group seems to be better than any other at “winning” more Codecision reports. Some might of course be better at winning the “important” reports. That aspect is not investigated here.

In addition to pointing out the difference between governing and opposition parties and the effect of party size, the number of Codecision reports a party writes depend on two sets of factors. The first is party saliency over “Europe” and the wish to increase power of the EP. The parties that find European integration, or want to strengthen the power of the EP, write more Codecision reports. The effect is both statistically significant and substantive. The second is whether the party controls a chair in a committee that deals with Codecision legislation. Having an active

committee chair has a significant, but marginal effect on the number of Codecision reports a party produces. Given that most Committee Chairs go to the biggest national parties in the larger party groups, there does not seem to be a large “top-up” effect of having the Committee Chair.

Large national parties normally tend to come from the bigger party groups as well as from the larger member states. This might explain why existing research has found correlation between number of reports and party group size as well as between number of MEPs per country and number of reports. The results presented here show that these correlations disappear once size of national parties is controlled for.

Having established that systematic differences exist in the number of Codecision reports each party writes even after controlling for size, the next chapter investigates to what extent government and opposition can explain decision speed in the Codecision procedure, or more precisely, at which stage of the procedure legislation is adopted.

Chapter 5: Rapporteurs from governing parties conclude the negotiations in the 1st reading

Decision-making in the European Union (EU) is often described as cumbersome and time-consuming. Studies of decision-making efficiency have compared different procedures and time-periods. The key finding in this literature is that while the increased use of qualified majority voting in the Council has increased decision-making speed, the increased participation by the European Parliament has partially devaluated the effect (Golub 1999; Schulz and König 2000). These studies focus on the differences between the procedures as well as over time. In this chapter, the focus is on differences within the same procedure, the Codecision procedure as amended in the Amsterdam treaty (Codecision II). Rather than measuring decision-making efficiency as the time lag between an initiative from the Commission and an inter-institutional agreement on policy, the focus is on the stage reached in the procedure. While largely neglected by observers of EU policy-making, the treaty of Amsterdam reformed the first reading of the Codecision procedure as well as the third reading. After Amsterdam, it is possible for the procedure to conclude in the first reading if there is an agreement between the Council of Minister and the European Parliament. As time limits do not exists in the first reading of the Codecision procedure, only in the second and third, looking at the time-lag between the proposal and the final agreement will be more a function of time spent in the first reading than a function of in which stage of the procedure an agreement was reached. The aim here is to shed light on what might explain at which stage of the procedure legislation is adopted under the new Codecision procedure.

This chapter tests the second hypothesis of the theory developed in chapter 2. It predicts that Codecision legislation where the rapporteur comes from a governing party is more likely to be adopted in the first reading than if the rapporteur comes from an opposition party. The empirical findings support the theory. There is a significant difference in the probability of Codecision legislation being adopted in the first reading in the Council, when the rapporteur comes from a governing party in an adversarial member state, compared to if he comes from an opposition party. The results also show that governing parties from non-adversarial member states are significantly less likely than opposition parties to see their legislation ending in the second reading in the Council rather than in the first reading.

The next section reviews the existing literature. Section 2 presents a bivariate variant analysis of the relationship between the adoption stage and the governing status of the party of the rapporteur as well the relationship between the adoption stage and the party group of the rapporteur. Section 3 presents a statistical method for testing the hypothesis. Section 4 reports the findings.

What the existing literature predicts

The literature suggests that several factors influence the role of the rapporteur, thereby also when the procedure is concluded. Although I am not aware of any alternative explanation of when Codecision legislation is adopted, it is possible to infer from this literature in order to present some alternative explanations. The dominant explanation of the influence of the rapporteur is experience (e.g. Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton 2000; Neuhold 2001). Experienced MEPs should be better able to conclude legislation at an early stage as they may have a better understanding of the procedure and the preferences of the Council. However, experienced MEPs might also be appointed as rapporteurs on more important and controversial legislation, which is

more likely to end up in the Conciliation Committee. Thus, experience might work both ways, but it does produce an alternative explanation that should be tested.

It is possible that the speed of adopting Codecision legislation is a pure function of the ideal policy location of the rapporteur. More centrally located MEPs or those from the main party-group might be more likely to find the necessary majority in the EP sympathetic to their views, hence making it more likely that their legislation will end up in Conciliation. Centrally located MEPs might, given the multiparty nature of the Council, also be more likely to see the Council accept their initial proposal (Kreppel 2000). Their policy preferences are likely to be closer to the policy core of the Council than the policy preferences of a rapporteur from a party group located further from the centre in the policy space.

Corbett et al (2000) mention that committee chairs have to take up reports which none of the committee coordinators want. Thus, reports written by committee chairs might be more likely to be adopted at an early stage than reports written by other MEPs.

Traditional integration theories like neo-functionalism (e.g. Haas 1968; Rosamond 2000; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998) and intergovernmentalism (e.g. Garrett 1995; Hoffmann 1966; Moravcsik 1998) as well as most existing spatial models of EU politics (e.g. Crombez 1996; 1997a; Garrett and Tsebelis 1996; Tsebelis and Garrett 2001) assume that the EP is highly integrationist. It follows that the policy preferences of MEPs over the level of integration might influence when legislation is agreed. One can think of two alternative scenarios. MEPs from pro-integrationist parties might be more willing to compromise on the wording of new legislation in order to see more integration. Alternatively, one might think that pro-integrationist rapporteurs

might be less willing to compromise, and bargain hard in order to push integration as far as possible (Rittberger 2000).

The size of the party of the rapporteur might influence her ability to secure support for her position. The EP is run by the larger national parties (e.g. Hix 2002). If the rapporteur comes from a large party, the chances of finding support for the amendments might increase. This makes it more likely that the legislation will be adopted in the first reading in the Council. When not concluded in the first reading, membership of a large party should increase the chances of seeing the legislation pass the absolute majority hurdle in the EP's second reading. National alliances, rather than party politics might also influence when legislation is adopted.

Bivariate analysis

The dependent variable is adoption stage. As we saw in the theory chapter, Codecision legislation can be adopted in either the first reading in the Council, the second reading in the EP, the second reading in the Council or following an agreement in the Conciliation Committee. Table 5.1 presents the bivariate relationship between adoption stage and whether the rapporteur came from a governing or an opposition party.

Table 5.1 Adoption stage by the governing status of the rapporteur's party

	Council 1 st reading	EP 2 nd reading	Council 2 nd reading	Conciliation Committee	Total
Governing parties from adversarial states	36 (44.4%)	17 (21.0%)	18 (22.2%)	10 (12.3%)	81 (99.9%)
Governing parties from non-adversarial states	10 (33.3%)	6 (20.0%)	3 (10%)	11 (36.7%)	30 (100.0%)
Opposition parties from non-adversarial states	8 (24.2%)	9 (27.3%)	9 (27.3%)	7 (21.2%)	33 (100.0%)
Opposition parties from adversarial states	33 (30.0%)	32 (29.1%)	28 (25.5%)	17 (15.5%)	110 (100.1%)
Total	87 (34.3%)	64 (25.2%)	58 (22.3%)	45 (17.7%)	254 (99.5%)

The table shows that one third of all Codecision legislation initiated between 1999 and 2003 was adopted in the first reading. However, for rapporteurs from governing parties in adversarial member states the first reading adoption rate was 44.4%. Governing parties from non-adversarial states were close to the average, having a first reading adoption rate of one in three. The lowest score came from rapporteurs from opposition parties in non-adversarial member states. They had a first reading adoption rate under 25%. Opposition parties from non-adversarial member states also had a first reading adoption rate below the average, seeing only 30% of its reports being adopted by the Council in the first reading. Thus, rapporteurs from governing parties are more likely to be successful agenda-setters in the first reading. This supports hypothesis two. Proposals from rapporteurs from governing parties are more often adopted in the first reading than proposals from rapporteurs from opposition parties.

The theory also suggest that parties ideologically close to the majority of the governing parties are more likely to see legislation adopted in the first reading compared to the parties that make up the opposition in EU legislative politics. These figures are compared in table 5.2.

Table 5.2 Adoption stage by party group of the rapporteur

	Council 1 st reading	EP 2 nd reading	Council 2 nd reading	Conciliation Committee	Total
PES	37 (52.1%)	12 (16.9%)	15 (21.1%)	7 (9.9%)	71 (100.0%)
EPP	33 (29.2%)	28 (24.8%)	33 (29.2%)	18 (15.9%)	113 (100.1%)
ELDR	8 (28.6%)	5 (17.9%)	5 (17.9%)	10 (35.7%)	28 (100.1%)
Green	5 (23.8%)	7 (33.3%)	2 (9.5%)	7 (33.3%)	21 (99.9%)
GUE	1 (12.5%)	4 (50.0%)	1 (12.5%)	2 (25.0%)	8 (100.0%)
EDD	3 (50.0%)	2 (33.3%)	1 (16.7%)	0	6 (100.0%)
UEN	0	0	0	1 (100.0%)	1 (100.0%)
Non	0	6 (85.7%)	1 (14.3%)	0	7 (100.0%)
Small *	4 (18.2%)	12 (54.5%)	3 (13.6%)	3 (13.6%)	22 (99.9%)
Total	87 (34.3%)	64 (25.2%)	58 (22.3%)	45 (17.7%)	254 (99.5%)

* Small is GUE, EDD, UEN and Non-attached together

The table supports for the theory. As described in chapter 3, most of the legislation that was adopted by the end of the fifth EP was initiated in the first part of the legislative term, when the PES held the majority of the seats in the Council. Consistent with the theory we would expect that rapporteurs from the PES would see their reports being adopted in the first reading in the Council more frequently than rapporteurs from other party groups. In fact, the PES saw 52.1% of its Codecision reports being adopted in the first reading, while the EPP saw only 29.2%. On average, smaller party groups (GUE, EDD, UEN and non-attached) saw only on average 18.2% of “their” legislation adopted in the first reading compared to an average of 34.3%.

Moving on to the second reading in the EP, we see that the proposals from the opposition, the small parties (54.5%), the Greens (33.3%) and the EPP (24.8%) have a much higher chance of being adopted at this stage, than proposals from the Liberals (17.9%) or the Socialists (16.9%). We also see that it is the Liberals (35.7%) and the Greens (33.3%) that have the biggest change of seeing their legislation ending up in Conciliation. In fact, rapporteurs from the Greens were just as often in Conciliation Committees as rapporteurs from PES. This is the case despite the fact that the Greens only wrote 21 reports, while the PES produced 71. To further test to what extent this interpretation holds once intervening factors are controlled for, the subsequent sections will present the statistical model and the independent and discuss the results of the statistical test.

Operationalisation

Statistical model

To test the hypothesis, the most appropriate statistical method is a multinomial logit regression. Multinomial logit regression works like a normal binary logistic regression, except that all the different outcomes are compared against each other. Hence, in a model with three alternative

outcomes, outcome A is compared to outcome B, outcome B to outcome C, and outcome C to outcome A. Although it is technically more complex, it can essentially be thought of as a series of binary logistic regression, comparing all possible outcomes (Long 1997). As the difference between A and C is given by the difference between A and B plus B and C, it is possible to use one of the categories as a baseline comparison category. A potential problem with this kind of analysis is that the number of parameters might get very large relatively fast. The structure of the model is:

$$\Pr(y_i=1 \mid \mathbf{x}_i) = 1 / (1 + \sum_{j=2}^J \exp(\mathbf{x}_i \beta_j))$$

$$\Pr(y_i=m \mid \mathbf{x}_i) = \exp(\mathbf{x}_i \beta_m) / (1 + \sum_{j=2}^J \exp(\mathbf{x}_i \beta_j)) \quad \text{for } m > 1$$

Here, y is the dependent variable with j nominal outcomes. The categories, while not assumed to be ordered, are numbered 1 to j . $\Pr(y=m \mid \mathbf{x})$ gives the probability of observing outcome m given \mathbf{x} (Long 1997: 152-4). The data are pooled over 4 years. The reference outcome is termination in the first reading. There are some differences in the frequency of the different outcomes between legislation initiated in different years, which is causing some problem with heteroskedasticity. This is solved by adjusting the standard error for clustering on year of initiation (Croux, Dhaene, and Hoorelbeke 2003; Zorn 2001; 2003).

If a multinomial model is used when the data can in fact be ordered, the result is a loss of efficiency, as not all the data is used. However, if an ordered logit regression is used when the data cannot in fact be ordered; the results may be biased or nonsensical. Biased or nonsensical

results are more problematic than a loss in efficiency, so ordered logit regression should only be used if there is no question about the order in the data (Long 1997: 149).

An ordered logic model is not appropriate here. It may seem obvious that it is possible to order the different stages of the Codecision procedure. It starts with the first reading, then the second and ends in Conciliation. However, the majority requirement for concluding the procedure at the different stages does not follow this order. To conclude the procedure in the first reading in the Council, it is necessary that a simple majority in the Parliament and a qualified majority in the Council agree. To conclude the legislation in the second reading in the Parliament, it is sufficient that a blocking minority in the EP prefers the position of the Council, as an absolute majority is needed to pass amendments. To conclude in the second reading in the Council, a qualified majority in the Council has to accept all the amendments passed by an absolute majority in the EP. To pass legislation in the Conciliation Committee it is sufficient that a simple majority from the parliament and a QMV majority in the Council agree, which is identical to the requirement for passing legislation in the first reading.

Independent variables

All of the independent variables are described in detail in chapter 3. *Adgov* is a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if the rapporteur comes from a party that held office in national politics in a member state with an adversarial political system at the start of the year when the legislation was initiated, It is coded 0 if this is not the case.

Nongov is also a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if the rapporteur comes from a party that held office in national politics in a member state with a non-adversarial political system at the

start of the year when the legislation was initiated, otherwise 0. It will not be distinguished between opposition parties from different political systems. This is primarily because the theory does not have any clear predictions and secondly to ensure a sizeable reference category. The predicted sign of *adgov* is negative when EP second reading is compared to the first reading in the Council. It is more likely for rapporteurs from governing parties than from opposition parties to see all their amendments being adopted by the Council in the first reading. *Nongov* is not expected to be significantly different from opposition parties. A dummy variable for opposition parties from non-adversarial member states was included in an alternative specification of the model, but taken out as no significant difference was found between the different types of opposition parties.

It is necessary to add a few control variables. This is in order to reduce the risk of having a bias in our results due to omitted variables and in order to test the alternative explanations presented above. *Experience* is a continuous variable counting the number of times the rapporteur has already acted as a rapporteur under the Amsterdam version of the Codecision procedure. The predicted sign is negative when comparing termination in the first reading in the Council with all other outcomes.

An alternative measure of experience is incumbency, i.e. whether the rapporteur was a member of the fourth Parliament. Data from Corbett et al (2000) is used to identify which rapporteurs were also members of the 4th EP. The variable, *incumbent*, is a dummy, which takes the value 1 if the rapporteur is an incumbent and 0 if not. The predicted sign of the coefficient is positive.

Nominate scores on the revealed ideal policy location of all MEPs in the first half of the 5th Parliament is used to locate each rapporteur in the EP policy space (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2004). I use the absolute distance from the centre on the first dimension as a measure of the rapporteurs' location vis-à-vis the rest of the EP. The variable is labelled *absolute*. The prediction is that rapporteurs who are located centrally in the policy space will have a better chance of seeing their report passing the absolute majority hurdle in the second reading. The sign of the coefficient should be negative.

There are two types of potential conflicts between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers that may arise in the Codecision procedure; policy-content and institutional balance. The latter may arise in the form of oversight of the implementation through the choice of comitology procedure (Ballmann, Epstein, and O'Halloran 2002; Franchino 2000; 2001; 2004; Hix 2000). It may be easier for the Parliament to unite, i.e. find an absolute majority; on issues related to institutional balance than policy-issues that divide the EP along the left-right dimension (Hix 2001; Kreppel 1999; Kreppel and Hix 2003). However, some parties in the EP are more interested in strengthening the role of the EP than others. The absolute majority requirement in the second reading to pass amendments presents a demanding hurdle for the rapporteur. The ability of the rapporteur to find the necessary support not only depends on the issue at hand, but also on the base of support, he can rely on. The core of this base is the national party. The bigger this is, the more votes behind his recommendations in all of the stages of decision-making in the Parliament; in the Committee, in the party-group week and in the plenary. A variable measuring the number of MEPs in the same party as the rapporteur is included. The variable is labelled *partysize*.

If loyalty exists along national, rather than party lines, the same logic should hold for the number of MEPs from the same country as the rapporteur. The number of MEPs per country corresponds very closely with number of votes in the Council, thus the variable *countrysize* captures both national support beyond the national party and the effect of the number of votes the country although not necessarily the party, commands in the Council. The prediction is negative when conclusion in the Council's first reading is compared with ending in second reading in the EP. The direction is positive when the EP's second reading is compared to terminating in the Council's second reading or in Conciliation.

All other things being equal, the bigger the party group, the more likely it is that the rapporteur will be able to find an absolute majority for his second reading amendments. However, since no party group is large enough to command an absolute majority by itself, support from other party groups will be necessary. Rapporteurs from the more centrally located parties, the EPP, PES and the liberal ELDR are more likely to have an advantage in terms of finding loyal support for their amendments, given both the size and location of the former two, and the central location of the ELDR. Four dummy variables, *PES*, *Green*, *ELDR* and *Small* compare the effect of belonging to any of these four party groups to membership of EPP, the biggest party group. The prediction is that rapporteurs from all party groups will have a harder time than rapporteurs from the EPP in finding the necessary majority in the second reading. Rapporteurs from the EPP are thus more likely than those from other party groups to end up in Conciliation or to see their amendments being adopted in the second reading in the Council.

If there is dissent over the issue of European integration in the party of the rapporteur, she will be wary of provoking any reactions from the national party that may be at the expense of her the seat

come the next elections, either to the national parliament or to the EP (Hix 2004). She will thus only seek reports on issues where the party is able to unite, and attempt to take the legislation all the way to Conciliation in order to make the most out of it. *Dissent* is a measure of the internal dissent in the party over European integration.

Position aims to capture the party's overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration. Most of the existing literature would predict pro-integrationist rapporteurs either to seek conclusion in the first reading in order to get "some Europe today", or fight legislation all the way to Conciliation to show that they are concerned with the institutional balance between the Council and the EP.

Salience is the relative importance of this issue in the party's public stance. The same prediction as for *position* should also hold here.

EP is the position of the party leadership on strengthening the powers of the European Parliament. The same prediction as for *position* and *salience* applies.

A committee chair writes reports that the committee has agreed to produce, but which none of the party-coordinators are willing to commit their group to write. These reports may be rather uncontroversial. It is thus necessary to control the effect of the rapporteur being the chair of the committee. This dummy variable is labelled *chair*. It takes the value 1 if the rapporteur is a chairperson and 0 if not. If the rapporteur is a committee chair, the prediction is that it will be concluded in the first reading in the Council, or in the second reading in the EP. It should not go to Conciliation.

Some parties might be more active in general than other parties regardless of policy position. Scarrow (1997) found that MEPs from Germany and the UK were more interested a career at the European level than French and Italian MEPs. Hence, it might be necessary to introduce a control variable for the general level of activity amongst MEPs from the different parties and member states. The variable *attendance* is included, testing the effect of average level of attendance in plenary session of the national delegations to the different party groups. The prediction is that rapporteurs from more active national party delegations are more likely to see the Council accepting their proposal in the first reading, or end up in Conciliation.

Finally, dummy variables controlling for the effect of the different years are included, using 2000, the year when most of the legislation included in the dataset was initiated as the reference category. Two alternative models are tested. Model 1 only includes the theoretical variables related to the governing status of party and the political system. It test the theory understood as a “complete data generating process”. Model 2 includes all the control variables listed above, testing the theory as a "partial data generating process" (Morton 1999).

Results

The results of the multinomial logit regressions are reported in table 5.3. There is support for the theoretical model. Government and opposition influence when Codecision legislation is adopted. The “pure” model finds governing parties from adversarial member states to be more likely to conclude the agreement in the first reading than in the second reading in the EP, the second reading in the Council or in the Conciliation Committee. While the relationship is the predicted direction in all readings, the difference is not statistically significant when the first reading is

compared with the second reading in the Council. The theory predicts that legislation will terminate at this stage in cases where incomplete information has been a problem at earlier stages. It is hence not surprising to find the difference not being statistically significant.

However, since the pseudo R^2 is only just over .02, there seem to be other factors influencing the process that need to be controlled for. As such, the model is perhaps better understood as only a partial data-generating process.

Model two also support the theory of government and opposition in EU legislative politics. Even when controlling for alternative explanations and intervening variables, rapporteurs from governing parties from adversarial member states are more likely to conclude Codecision legislation in the first reading than governing parties from non-adversarial member states or opposition parties. The pseudo R^2 is over .21, over ten times bigger than the simple model. Thus, the thrust of the interpretation will focus on the latter model.

Table 5.3 Multi-nominal logic, effects on completion of Codecision legislation


	<i>2nd Reading EP vs 1st Reading Council</i>						<i>2nd Reading Council vs 1st Reading</i>						<i>Conciliation vs 1st Reading</i>					
	H	B	Rst	B	Rst		H	B	Rst	B	Rst		H	B	Rst	B	Rst	
adgov	-	-.750	.325*	-.434	.198	*	-	-.590	.392	-.363	.438		-	-.745	.169***	.226	.761	
nongov	0	-.511	.652	-.059	1.050		-	-1.101	.671	-1.307	.601	*	-	.631	1.045	.173	1.424	
experience	0			-.045	.161		-			-.165	.234		-			-.375	.151	
Absolute	-			-1.622	1.190		0			-.089	.979		0			-1.312	2.280	
chair	-			.680	.579		-			-34.878	.706	***	-			-1.514	.612	
incumbent	0			-.324	.426		0			.149	.568		0			.254	.393	
position	+			-.380	.343					-.205	.193					-.170	.328	
salience				-.307	.631					-.909	.501					-1.254	.857	
dissent	+			.160	.518					-.452	.449		+			.684	.267	
ep	+			.662	.314	*	+			.195	.405		+			.476	.278	
Country	-			-.022	.018					-.004	.012		-			-.024	.010	
partysize	-			.059	.038					.011	.016		+			.048	.019	
attendance	-			-.030	.031					-.008	.032					-.055	.064	
eldr				-.969	1.399					-.199	.673					.421	1.145	
green				.634	1.072					-1.781	.623	**				.446	1.076	
pes				-.627	.425					-.612	.525					-1.627	.886	
small	+			1.611	1.007		-			-1.496	.485	**				.122	.748	
y99				.310	.191					-2.003	.156	***				-.545	.181	
y01				.435	.139	**				-.028	.107					-.545	.083	
y02				-1.189	.254	***				-.681	.133	***				-2.854	.202	
y03				-2.425	.319	***				-1.853	.155	***				-36.004	2.962	
_cons		.000	.523	3.330	1.665	*		-.103	.503	4.574	2.969			-.536	.721	7.604	4.458	
Pseudo R ²		.0213		.2147				.0213		.2147				.0213		.2147		
N		254		251				254		251				254		251		

* p-value < .05, ** p-value < .01, *** p-value < .001, H= hypothesised direction of coefficient, Rst = Robust standard errors adjusted for year of initiation, B= unstandardised beta-coefficient

Investigating the relative risk ratio, the exponential of the coefficient, we see that relative to belonging to the opposition, the probability of rapporteurs from adversarial member states seeing their legislation adopted in EP's second reading rather than first reading in the Council is .648. The chance of it happening is only two thirds of the chance for opposition MEPs. Thus, the difference between governing parties and opposition parties is not only statistically significant, but substantively significant as well. Whether the rapporteur come from a governing or an opposition party makes a difference in terms of when legislation is adopted. However, this only holds for governing parties from adversarial member states. Being from a governing party of a non-adversarial member state only has a significant effect on the probability of legislation being adopted in the second reading in the Council. The effect is negative. The risk of this occurring if the rapporteur comes from a governing party from a non-adversarial member state is only 27% of the risk of the rapporteur is from an opposition party. Whether the rapporteur comes from a governing or an opposition party does not seem to have an effect on the probability of the legislation ending up in the Conciliation Committee.

Figure 5.1 shows the density of the predicted probabilities of concluding legislation in the first reading in the Council. It compares governing party rapporteurs from adversarial member states with all other rapporteurs. The table shows that rapporteurs from governing parties in adversarial member states are over-represented amongst those with a probability of more than .3 of seeing legislation adopted in the first reading and under-represented amongst those rapporteurs with a lower probability than .3. This clearly shows support for the hypothesis.

**Figure 5.1 Predicted probability of adopting the legislation in Council's 1st reading,
government and opposition parties**



Interpretation of the other variables

Experience has the predicted direction concerning both second reading EP versus first reading Council and concerning Conciliation Committee versus first reading in the Council. Previous experience as Codecision rapporteur makes it more likely that the Council will adopt the initial proposal from the rapporteur. However, the effect is only significant when comparing Conciliation committee with the first reading in the Council. Here, every additional Codecision report decreases the chance of ending up in Conciliation rather than the first reading by one third.

The distance from the centre in the EP does not seem to have a significant effect on the probability of terminating in any particular reading. While not being statistically significant, the direction is contrary to the prediction from the existing literature. Being centrally located actually makes it more likely, not less, that the legislation will be adopted in the second reading in the EP, rather than the first reading in the Council. However, the standard error is large relative to the coefficient, resulting in a low significance level.

The effect of being a chair is significant when comparing the first two stages with the last two. When the rapporteur is the chairperson of a committee, legislation tends to be adopted either in the first reading in the Council, or in the second reading in the EP. Being a chair lowers the chance of ending up in Conciliation by 22% compared to other MEPs. Thus, having a committee chair may increase the number of write more Codecision reports, as shown in chapter 5, these reports tend to be adopted in an early stage in the procedure. This may indicate either that the reports a chairperson writes are uncontroversial, or that the chair is better than other rapporteurs are at finding the optimal policy at an early stage.

The findings support the existing literature with regard to the effect of incumbency on when reports are adopted (e.g. Bowler and Farrell 1995). Whether the rapporteur was a member of the fourth Parliament or not does not seem to have an impact on when legislation is adopted. This may be a result of the high turnover of MEPs in each election.

While most of the variables related to party attitudes towards European integration do not have any significant effects, internal party dissent over the issue seems to make their rapporteurs more likely to bring their legislation all the way to the Conciliation Committee. A one-unit change on the 5-units scale increases the chance of ending up in Conciliation by

97%. Being a member of the Greens or from any of the minor parties significantly decreases the likelihood of ending up in the second reading in the Council.

The size of the country and national party has an effect on the probability of ending up in the Conciliation Committee. The former decreases the probability by 2.2% per extra MEP, while the latter increases it by 4.9% per extra MEP. The former is the opposite of what is expected in the literature that emphasises the dominance of national interests in EU politics, while the latter is in line with the literature that understands the EU as a system of party politics (Hix and Lord 1997).

Rapporteurs from parties that want to strengthen the powers of the European Parliament are unlikely to write reports that are acceptable to the Council in its first reading. The effect is significant at the 5% level concerning the difference between first reading in Council and second reading in the EP and at the 10% level concerning the difference between first reading in the Council and Conciliation Committee. The effect is substantive. For every one-unit increase on the 7-units scale, the chance of ending in the second reading in the EP almost doubles. The chance of ending up in Conciliation increases by 60% for every one-unit change. This is in line with the logic found in Hix (2002a) and Rittberger (2000).

Conclusion

The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that there are systematic differences in the stage of the procedure where Codecision legislation is adopted. Some of these differences are related to the rapporteur. A rapporteur from a governing party in an adversarial member state is more likely to see the Council adopt his proposal in the first reading. This is in line with the theory.

Given that committee chairs write reports that none of the party coordinators wants any of their MEPs to write. It is likely that these reports are of low saliency. These reports tend to be concluded in the first reading in the Council, or in the second reading in the EP. It is not likely that legislation where a committee chair is the rapporteur will end up in Conciliation. This suggests that these reports are uncontroversial, or that committee chairs are better finding a winning majority at an early stage of the process.

The results also show that rapporteurs from parties that care strongly about the power of the European Parliament are more likely to see their legislation being adopted in the second reading in the EP. This is a function of the absolute majority requirement. If governing parties or parties that, if not in government themselves, are supporting the governing parties, are less interested in strengthening the powers of the EP, the theory suggests that votes from these parties are sufficient to ensure that the EP fails to find an absolute majority more favourable to strengthening the position of the EP. The empirical test also found that parties that were in dissent over European integration were more likely to supply rapporteurs who took the legislation all the way to Conciliation before agreeing with the Council. One interpretation of this finding might be that these rapporteurs have a larger scope for manoeuvring given the divisions in their own party. Hence, they can more easily find an absolute majority in favour of amending the common position.

It is interesting to note that the larger parties are more likely to see Codecision legislation adopted in the EP's second reading or end up in Conciliation than smaller parties. This could suggest that rapporteurs from bigger parties are able to get reports that are more important. The Council is more likely to have a diverging common position from the one proposed by the rapporteur on these reports. Reports that are more important are also more likely to divide

the EP along party lines. This makes it less likely that an absolute majority in favour of amending the common position of the Council will be found. However, when such a majority is found, some of the amendments are likely to be unacceptable to the Council, causing the Conciliation Committee to convene.

In total, there seems to be evidence in favour of hypothesis 2. While some alternative explanations have merit, they tend to be complementary. Factors such as attitudes towards European integration and wish to strengthen the role of the EP influence when rapporteurs conclude the negotiations with the Council. Nevertheless, rapporteurs from governing parties from adversarial member states have a distinctively different pattern than rapporteurs from other parties.

Having established that governing parties tend to prefer to end the procedure in the first reading, the next chapter investigates behaviour in those cases when the Council do not accept the first reading proposal from the European Parliament. Voting behaviour in EP's second reading is the subject of the chapter six, the final chapter of part two of the thesis.

Chapter 6: Governing parties amend Council's common position

This chapter tests hypothesis 3, whether the majority of governing parties and ideologically close opposition parties are the most likely parties to vote in favour of second reading amendments. The existing literature on voting behaviour in the European Parliament is reviewed in the first section. Section 2 presents a bivariate analysis of the relationship between second reading voting behaviour, government – opposition status and party-group membership, the core ingredients of the theory of government and opposition in EU legislative politics. Section 3 presents the statistical model and the variables. The results of the statistical analysis are presented in section four.

The empirical results support the hypothesis. Governing parties from adversarial member states, and their ideological close allies, are the most likely parties to support second reading amendments. Other findings suggest that pro-integrationist parties are less likely to vote in favour of second reading amendments, but those parties that want to strengthen the powers of the EP are more likely to support second reading votes. MEPs from a national party that holds EU politics to be salient or controversial are more likely to support second reading amendments. There is also a positive relationship between attending plenary session and supporting second reading amendments. Neither party- nor country-size does seem to influence voting behaviour.

Existing accounts of voting behaviour in the EP

The existing literature on voting behaviour in the EP can be divided into four different strands. One body of literature investigates the voting cohesion of party-groups in the EP. Most of this

research is based on samples of a few roll call votes. The key finding is that party groups in the EP have a surprisingly high level of cohesiveness, given their limited ability to sanction or reward behaviour. Bigger groups are, perhaps surprisingly, more cohesive than smaller ones, but party group fragmentation decreases cohesion (Brzinski 1995). Attina (1990) finds that cohesion seems to be higher on own initiative resolutions than on budgetary and legislative acts. Brzinski (1995) notes that the biggest problem facing party groups in the plenary sessions is not voting cohesion, but voting participation. A longitudinal study covering all roll call votes between 1979 and 2001 shows that party group size increases voting cohesion and that cohesion has increased over time (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2004). In contrast to earlier findings, the number of national delegations in a group did not seem to decrease voting cohesion. Instead, the results showed that increased ideological diversity inside a party group is responsible for decreasing cohesion. Of particular relevance to this study is the finding that the percentage of parties in government has a significant positive effect on voting cohesion of a party group. Hix et al (2004) suggest that this may be because national governments put pressure on their MEPs to ensure that legislation adopted in the Council is not amended in the EP.

The second strand in the literature investigates coalition formation under different majority requirements. The starting point for this literature is the claim that the two biggest party groups, the EPP and PES, form a grand coalition. They do it in response to the need to present a united front against the Council. This may be in order to ensure that its points are taken or to meet the absolute majority requirement given the high level of absenteeism during the plenary sessions (Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton 2000; Hix and Lord 1997; Hosli 1997; Nugent 1999; Raunio 1997; Westlake 1994).

Kreppel and Tsebelis (1999) use correspondence analysis at national party delegation level to investigate the patterns of coalition formation in the EP in different readings in the Cooperation procedure. They find that the pattern of coalition formation differ according to procedure. Only the grand coalition between the PES and the EPP seems to be able to find the necessary votes to form an absolute majority. The centre-right is capable of preventing legislation being amended in the second reading, but not in the first. Amendments seem to be pitted towards the left, both in the first and the second readings. Even on legislation where the rapporteur comes from the EPP, the majority in favour is sought through the support from parties to the left, rather than to the right of EPP. While coalition formation is based on ideology rather than nationality, Kreppel and Tsebelis find that some pairs of national delegations within the same party group are more likely to vote against each other than other pairs.

Kreppel (2000) argues that the formation of the grand coalition in second reading votes is not a function of the need to meet the absolute majority requirement. It is a function of the multi-partisan nature of the EU itself. Even if the grand coalition were not needed to find an absolute majority, support from the major groups in the EP makes it more likely that the amendments will be acceptable to the other institutions, which are also multi-partisan. Noting that the grand coalition frequently fails to form when an absolute majority is needed in order to amend the common position of the Council, she presents a policy-driven model to predict when the grand coalition should/ should not form. She treats the EPP and PES as unitary actors in the EP. The thrust of the model is that the grand coalition should only form if the compromise position is closer to the ideal point of both party groups than to the common position of the Council. However, given that Christian Democrats and Socialists predominantly make up the Council, Kreppel does not explain why the grand coalition made

up by Christian Democrats and Socialist in the EP should want to amend the position agreed by the Socialists and Christian Democrats in the Council.

Hix (2001) dismisses the claim that different majority requirements, simple or absolute, dictate MEPs voting behaviour. Coalitions forms along partisan lines (see also Hix, Noury, and Roland 2004). Most of the time when one major party group proposes an amendment the other major party group rejects it. However, Hix, Kreppel and Noury (2003) finds that the EPP and the PES are more likely to vote together when an absolute majority is required, compared to when only a simple majority is needed. The discrepancies between these different results seem to stem from different units of analysis. EPP and PES are more likely to vote together under absolute majority rules compared to simple majority. Nevertheless, at the individual level, voting behaviour is explained by ideological distance. This would suggest that only those MEPs located closest to the other big party group are likely to vote with the other party group under absolute majority rules, while those further away from the centre are less likely to vote with the opposite party group. This finding brings us on to the third strand in the literature.

A third strand assess to what extent voting behaviour in the EP can be characterised as competitive or consensual. A common critique against the democratic character of the European Union is its perceived lack of a competitive party system. The criticism is often based on the lack of competition over “European” issues in the elections to the European Parliament (Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996), as EP elections are fought by national parties along the organising policy-dimensions of individual countries. The EPP and PES collude more than they compete at the aggregate level (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2004). There are several reasons for why the PES and EPP should collude rather than compete, ranging from

ideological similarity, technical reasons, collective institutional interests, in order to prevent smaller party groups from being influential (see Hix, Kreppel, and Noury 2003: 318-21). Hix et al. find support for all of these reasons except the latter. EPP and PEP do not seem to vote together in order to keep the smaller parties out. A new finding is that the two big party groups compete more often as turnout increases. Turnout is likely to be higher on more the important votes (Noury 2002a; Scully 1997c). Hence, the EPP and PES are more likely to compete on issues that “matter”. Overall, the party system has grown more competitive as the powers of the EP have increased (Hix, Kreppel, and Noury 2003; see also Kreppel and Hix 2003). The evidence also suggests that the nature of competition and coalition formation differs by policy area (Hix 2001; Hix, Kreppel, and Noury 2003; Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999).

Finally, a fourth strand in the literature investigates which factors determine individual MEPs voting decisions. Hix (2002b) uses roll-call votes from the first year of the fifth parliament to investigate to what extent MEPs voting behaviour is driven by individual preferences, EP party groups or national parties. He finds that neither EP party groups nor personal preferences explain voting behaviour. MEPs voting decisions are driven by national parties. He thus concludes that MEPs care more about pleasing the principals responsible for the selection process to the EP, than the principal responsible for allocating the spoils inside the parliament. Faas (2003) finds that national parties level of defection from the party group line explains the overall level of cohesion in party groups. National parties are able to ensure that their MEPs vote together against the party group on issues where their opinions differ. Hix (2004) argues that the probability of an MEP defecting from the party group to follow the national party is a function of the candidate selection process in national parties and national electoral system. Candidates from centralised-centred electoral systems with decentralised candidate selection process listen to their parliamentary leaders. MEPs from party-centred

electoral system with centralised candidate selection are in the hands of local party leaders. Informal accounts suggest that parties in government are more interested in controlling the behaviour of their MEPs than opposition parties, in particular the behaviour in the Codecision procedure (Messmer 2003; Whitaker 2001). This suggests that there is a need to consider differences between government and opposition when investigating voting behaviour in the EP. The next section presents offers a bivariate analysis of the relationship.

Bivariate analysis

All roll call votes (RCVs) taken during the first one and a half years of the 1999-2004 EP were collected as a part of the “How MEPs Vote” project. During that period, 167 RCVs were on amendments in the second reading of the Codecision procedure. While the votes are limited to the first third of the parliament, they cover most of the areas in which the EU decides by Codecision. The votes range from environmental to economic and trade issues to social issues. As such, they should be a representative sample of all the votes taken at this stage of the procedure in the fifth EP. A more detailed description can be found in chapter 3 along with summary statistics of the all the variables.

A challenge when testing voting behaviour in second reading votes is how to code decisions other than votes in favour. Yes-votes are the only voting decisions counting towards the absolute majority requirement of 314. No votes, abstentions, those present but not voting, and those absents, are all contributing towards the total number of non-positive votes.

Nevertheless, not all of these possible lines of actions are equally likely to correspond with the policy-preferences of the MEPs. As most of the voting takes place on Wednesdays and Thursdays, those absent cannot necessarily be assumed to be against the specific amendment. The reason for their absence might very well not be related to the specific policy at all. The same holds to some extent for MEPs who have signed in the day of the vote, but who are not

present in the plenary when the vote is actually taken. Their absent from the plenary might be strategic, but it might also be due to reasons not related to the issues voted on. It is plausible that those that abstain or vote against a second reading amendment are in fact against the amendments. Their failure to support the amendment is most likely due to reasons related to the specific amendment.

As all non-positive votes count against the majority requirement, two alternative specifications of the dependent variable are tested. The first classifies all non-positive votes as negative, while the second excludes all absents and present but not voting. The total number of observations is 97.644 and 87.817, respectively. Before presenting the statistical model, it is useful to conduct a simple bivariate analysis of the central relationships. The bivariate relationships, counting all non-positive voting decisions as negative votes, are presented in table 6.1. Both raw-numbers as percentage are presented. The percentage is of the total number of voting decisions.

Table 6.1 Voting decisions by governing status, numbers and percentage

	Not in favour of 2 nd reading amendments	In favour of 2 nd reading amendments	Odds ratio of supporting 2 nd reading amendments
Governing parties from adversarial states	14,363 (14.71%)	15,836 (16.22%)	1.103
Governing parties from non-adversarial states	4,927 (5.05%)	5,696 (5.83%)	1.156
Opposition parties from non-adversarial states	5,068 (5.19%)	5,416 (5.55%)	1.069
Opposition parties from adversarial states	39,552 (25.79%)	21,149 (21.66%)	0.535
Total	49,547 (50.74%)	48,097 (49.26%)	0.971

From the frequency table of all voting decisions in EP second reading, we see that governing parties from adversarial member states are over 10% more likely to vote in favour of second reading amendments than to vote against them. They are more than twice as likely to vote in favour of such amendments compared to opposition parties from adversarial member states. The difference is smaller between governing and opposition parties from non-adversarial member states. Governing parties from these countries are almost 9% more likely to support second reading amendments. They are both more likely to support second reading amendments than to oppose. Both governing and opposition parties from these countries are about twice as likely as opposition parties from adversarial member states to support second reading amendments. However, since so much of the literature on voting behaviour in the EU sees party groups as actors, it might be useful to get an overview of their voting pattern as well. This is presented in table 6.2.

Table 6.2 Voting decisions by party group, numbers and percentage

	Not in favour of 2 nd reading amendments	In favour of 2 nd reading amendments	Odds ratio of supporting 2 nd reading amendments
EPP	20,086 (20.57%)	16,350 (16.74%)	0.814
PES	12,995 (13.31%)	15,877 (16.26%)	1.222
ELDR	3,971 (4.07%)	4,772 (4.89%)	1.202
Green	2,735 (2.80%)	3,421 (3.50%)	1.251
GUE	3,146 (3.22%)	3,193 (3.27%)	1.015
UEN	2,176 (2.23%)	1,382 (1.42%)	0.635
EDD	1,308 (1.34%)	872 (0.89%)	0.667
Non	3,130 (3.21%)	2,230 (2.28%)	0.712
Total	49,547 (50.7%)	48,097 (49.3%)	0.971

The voting behaviour of the party groups seems to provide further support for the theory. It is the PES, together with the Greens, and the liberals, that seem to be most likely to vote in favour of second reading amendments. The PES controlled most of the seats in the Council at the time. The EPP is almost 20% more likely to vote against second reading amendments than in favour of them. The opposite is the case for the PES, the ELDR and the Greens. They are all more than 20% more likely to vote in favour. The leftwing GUE are almost just as likely to

vote against as to support second reading amendments. The rightwing and Euro sceptic party groups (UEN, EDD, Non-attached) are all between 28 and 37 percent more likely to vote in against second reading amendments than to support them. This suggests that governing parties belonging to PES, together with ideological close opposition parties are attempting to use the EP to move the common position closer to their ideal point.

To ensure that the illustration is not driven by non-decisions, table 6.3 and 6.4 presents the frequencies once those present but not voting or not present are removed from the sample. From table 6.3 we see that MEPs from governing parties are more likely to support second reading amendment than opposition parties. The biggest difference is between government and opposition from adversarial member states where the difference is 30%. The odds ratios are 1.254 versus 0.943. Even those from the opposition that turn up to vote are more likely to vote against than in favour. The difference is much smaller between governing and opposition parties from non-adversarial member states. Both are more likely to support than to vote against amendments. Governing parties more likely to support second reading amendments than opposition parties in non-adversarial member states as well. The odds-ratio was 1.254 versus 1.157, a difference of almost 10%. We can also see that those that show up to vote are over 8 percent more likely to support amendments than to abstain or oppose.

Table 6.3 Voting decisions, non-voting excluded, by governing status, numbers and percentage

	Not in favour of 2 nd reading amendments	In favour of 2 nd reading amendments	Odds ratio of supporting 2 nd reading amendments
Governing parties from adversarial states	12,095 (13.77%)	15,058 (17.15%)	1.245
Governing parties from non-adversarial states	4,437 (5.05%)	5,564 (6.34%)	1.254
Opposition parties from non-adversarial states	4,513 (5.14%)	5,223 (5.95%)	1.157
Opposition parties from adversarial states	21,062 (23.99%)	19,865 (22.61%)	0.943
Total	42,107 (47.95%)	45,710 (52.05%)	1.086

Table 6.4 Voting decisions, non-voting excluded, voting decision by party groups, numbers and percentage

	Not in favour of 2 nd reading amendments	In favour of 2 nd reading amendments	Odds ratio of supporting 2 nd reading amendments
EPP	17,510 (19.94%)	15,466 (17.61%)	0.883
PES	11,235 (12.79%)	15,259 (17.38%)	1.358
ELDR	3,557 (4.05%)	4,657 (5.30%)	1.309
Green	2,430 (2.77%)	3,364 (3.83%)	1.384
GUE	2,647 (3.01%)	2,990 (3.40%)	1.130
UEN	1,775 (2.02%)	1,291 (1.47%)	0.731
EDD	722 (0.82%)	654 (0.74%)	0.906
Non	2,231 (2.54%)	2,029 (2.13%)	0.909
Total	42,107 (47.95%)	45,710 (52.05%)	1.086

There is still a clear left-right pattern even after excluding all non-voting decisions. The PES, together with the Liberals and the Greens, seem to be those most frequently in favour of amending Council's common position, with an odds ratio over 1.30. The EPP, together with the rightwing UEN and Euro-sceptic EDD and non-attached members are those less in favour of changing the position adopted by the Council in its first reading. All these party groups had an odds ratio of less than 0.91. In total, this confirms the pattern of a government opposition relationship operating at the EU level. Socialist governing parties together with ideologically close opposition parties are trying to amend the common position further left, while EPP and more rightwing parties, most of them in opposition are trying to prevent such a move by

preserving the status quo of the common position adopted in the first reading of the Council.

In order to further test whether governing parties support amendments in EP's second reading, the next section presents a statistical model, facilitating a statistical analysis.

Operationalisation

The dependent variable is coded as panel data, where the voting decision of each MEP is recorded in each vote. The decision is binary, either yes or no. Given the nature of the data, the question of model specification is whether to use a fixed effect or a random effect model. In linear models, fixed effect and random effect models give the same estimates of the covariates, and remains unbiased and consistent across various specification of the error term. However, the random effect can be biased if omitted variables correlate with the error-term. This has led to fixed effect models being the preferred choice, in particular amongst empirical minded economists. However, the properties of the fixed effect linear model are a special case and do not hold for non-linear models. Due to the incidental-parameter problem arising if the number of unknown specific effects increases at the same rate as the sample-size, fixed effect models of non-linear relationships may yield inconsistent estimators of the coefficients (Lancaster 2000). When the aim is to say something about all second reading Codecision votes, rather than just the sample, a random-effect, rather than fixed effect model should be used. The former model allows the individual effects to be treated as random. However, we have to assume that the conditional mean of the observed variables is linear. We also have to assume that the distribution of the effects can be specified parametrically (Hsiao 2003: 313-5 and 188-265). The probit version of the model is fitted using Stata 8SE, which used a Gaussian distribution of the random effects. The structure of the model is:

$$\text{Prob}(y_{it} = 1) = \Phi \left[(1 + \sigma_n^2)^{-1/2} (\beta' \mathbf{x}_{it} + \mathbf{a}' \mathbf{x}_i) \right]$$

Here, β is the estimated coefficients of the observations x , while a captures the random effects of these same observations. The subscripts i and t represent the individual i and time-period, in our case, vote, t . The variance σ is normally distributed. Thus the probability Φ is a function of the variance σ , the coefficients $\beta'x$ for individual i across the time-periods t and the random effects $a'x$ for individual i . The random effect is assumed to vary independently of the time-periods t . In our case, this means that the random effects should not correlate with the votes.

The key independent variables for the theory of government and opposition are; *adgov*, the governing parties from adversarial member states; *nongov*, the governing parties from non-adversarial member states and; *nonopp*, the opposition parties from non-adversarial member states. The prediction of the theory is that *adgov* will be positive and highly significant. While the expectation is that the direction of the *nongov* and *nonopp* will be positive, i.e. MEPs from these parties are more likely to vote in favour of second reading amendments, these effect are not likely to be as strong, nor as statistical significant as the coefficient of *adgov*. The pure test of the theory only includes these variables.

It is necessary to introduce some control variables in order to estimate the explanatory power of alternative theories. The dominant theory in the literature, developed by scholars originating from the field of International Relations, is that competition in the European Union is over the level of integration (Garrett and Tsebelis 1996; Moravcsik 1993; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). As a supranational organisation, the European Parliament and the Commission are seen as more integrationist than the Council. If this were the case, we would expect to find that parties in favour of more integration would be more likely to vote in favour of second reading amendments in an attempt to increase the

level of integration. To test the explanatory power of this argument, the variable *position* is included. The prediction of the IR theory is that the direction will be positive. Those parties more in favour of integration will vote in favour of second reading amendments, as these will tend to be integrationist, while those opposed will vote oppose.

A similar rationale can be used to defend the inclusion of the *salience* variable. Parties that hold European legislation salient are more likely to try to amend the common position of the Council. Either they do so in an attempt to change the policy, or if impossible, in order to signal to their voters and party leadership back home that they would prefer a different policy to the one adopted through the common position of the Council. Hence, the coefficient of the salience variable is expected to be positive. To control for the effect of division over European integration inside parties, a control variable, *dissent*, is included. The expectation can be derived from the principal agent literature (Pollack 2003; Rasmusen 2001; Weingast 1984). It would suggest that MEPs from parties with higher level of dissent would have a larger room for manoeuvring. The direction of this agency-drift may depend on the preference of individual MEPs. If MEPs self-select and thus are more integrationist than the average party member, and the EP votes to increase the level of integration in its second reading votes, one would expect the sign of this coefficient to be positive (Katz and Wessels 1999; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999).

MEPs from parties that want to strengthen the role of the EP should be expected not only to be willing to reject legislation which would give them some integration today in exchange for more integration tomorrow, but also be more likely to try to amend second reading proposals from the Council (Hix 2002a; Rittberger 2000). The variable *ep* is thus expected to be positive.

As it may be argued that second reading votes are business as usual, no different from other votes taken in the EP, the nominate scores of the national parties in the 1999-2001 period is used to measure to what extent the difference between government and opposition parties adds to explanatory power. If second reading votes are just business as usual, then the effect of government-opposition status should disappear once nominate scores are controlled for. Nominate scores also allow us to test which way the EP is most likely to be trying to move the policy, to the right or to the left. During the period under investigation, ministers from the centre-left made up the majority of the Council. The EP was dominated by the centre-right. If the effect is positive, it means that the EP on average tries to move the common position rightward. The further to the right a party is located, the more likely it is to vote in favour of second reading amendments. If it is negative, as the theory suggests, it means that left-wing parties are more likely to support second reading amendments.

The size of the party, *partysize*, as well as the member state, *countrysize*, is also included. This is in order to test to what extent the probability of a party/country to be pivotal as a function of their size explains how likely it is that their MEPs will vote in favour or against amendments (Albert 2003; Felsenthal et al. 2003; e.g. Hosli 1995; 1996; 1997; for a classic treatment, see Shapley and Shubik 1954).

Finally, it might be objected that the probability of voting in favour of amendments is a function of the probability of showing up to vote in the plenary sessions. Hence, the average level of *attendance* needs to be controlled for. The expectation is that MEPs from parties with higher average level of attendance in plenary sessions will also be more likely to vote in favour of second reading amendments. Dummy variables for the different party-groups are also included to test to what extent these have an effect of voting behaviour independent of

the party groups. The expectation is that the coefficient of PES will be positive while the coefficient of the smaller party groups will be negative.

Results

The results are presented in table 6.5. They show strong support for hypothesis 3. Governing parties are more likely to vote in favour of second reading amendments than opposition parties. The evidence suggests that there is a difference between types of national political systems. Governing parties from adversarial member states are much more likely to vote in favour of second reading amendments than opposition parties from these countries. There is not sufficient evidence to claim that this is also the case for parties from non-adversarial member states. The test of the pure theory shows a highly significant difference between government and opposition parties from adversarial member states. Governing parties are more likely to vote in favour of second reading amendments than opposition parties from these countries. Parties from non-adversarial member states are more likely to support second reading amendments than opposition parties from adversarial states. Opposition parties from non-adversarial member states are less likely to support second reading amendments than governing parties from either of the different types of political systems. This is in line with the theoretical predictions.

When alternative explanations are controlled for, we find that MEPs from governing parties in adversarial member states are more likely than opposition parties from these states to vote in favour of amendments in the second reading of the Codecision procedure. These results hold for both specifications of negative votes.

Table 6.5 Random-effects probit models, supporting for second reading amendments

	Model 1			Model 2		
	H	All voting decisions full DGP	All voting decisions partial DGP	H	Non-voting excluded full DGP	Non-voting excluded partial DGP
Adversarial governing party	+	.188 (19.43) ***	.036 (2.89) **	+	.193 (18.56) ***	.046 (3.52) ***
Non-adversarial governing party	0	.218 (15.39) ***	.018 (.87)	0	.200 (13.40) ***	.017 (.77)
Non-adversarial opposition party	0	.170 (11.99) ***	.064 (3.11) **	0	.146 (9.75) ***	.041 (1.90)
Position	+		-.017 (-2.00) *	+		-.022 (-2.40) *
Saliency	+		.049 (4.37) ***	+		.041 (3.41) **
Dissent	+		.031 (2.96) **	+		.031 (2.75) **
EP	+		.031 (3.20) **	+		.034 (3.32) **
Nominate, left-right	-		-.099 (-2.58) **	-		-.164 (-3.67) ***
Partysize	+		.001 (2.33) *	+		.001 (.93)
Attendance	+		.006 (6.76) ***	+		.003 (3.86) ***
Countrysize	+		-.001 (-2.56) *	+		-.001 (-1.67)
EDD	-		-.147 (-3.05) **	-		-.126 (-2.16) *
ELDR			.209 (8.20) ***			.181 (6.40) ***
GREEN			.132 (2.39) *			.049 (.78)
GUE	-		.062 (1.06)	-		-.043 (-.64)
NON	-		-.044 (-1.39)	-		.003 (.09)
PES	+		.173 (5.32) ***	+		.138 (3.67) ***
UEN	-		-.111 (-3.49) ***	-		-.128 (-3.63) ***
Constant		-.057 (-5.60) ***	-.779 (-9.50) ***		.009 (.61)	-.521 (-5.83) ***
/lnsig2u		-2.151	-2.130		-2.014	-1.997
Signm_a		.341	.345		.365	.368
Rho		.104	.106		.118	.119
Obs		97,644	97,644		87,817	87,817
Groups		167	167		167	167
Wald chi ²		521.15 ***	1606.67 ***		432.45 ***	1248.55 ***
log-likelihood		-60,441	-60,990		-53,388	-52,977

* < p-value .05, ** < p-value .01, *** < p-value .001

When all voting decisions except yes (i.e. absent and present but not voting) are counted as negative votes (model 1), opposition parties from non-adversarial member states turns out to be even more likely than governing parties from adversarial states to vote in favour of second reading amendments. This does not hold when absent and present but not voting decisions are excluded, as shown in model 2. As mentioned above, it is less plausible that these latter types of decisions are related to the policy issue, than the decision to vote no or to abstain from supporting second reading amendments. Model 1 also adds more noise. The difference in the log likelihood is large between the two models. Model 1 clearly has the larger values. This is partly because it has more observations, but also because the added observations to vote against second reading amendments were not necessary related to policy. The lower the value, the more of the variation in the data is explained by the model. The data used in model 2 has less random variation than the data used in model 1. Model 2 reduces the standard errors for most of the control variables compared to model 1.

The correlation between the predictions from the complete data generating process and partial data generating process in Model 2 is .588. This indicates that the simple model captures almost 60% of the variation in the larger model. The correlation is highly significant. However, the log likelihood scores are $-53,388$ and $-52,977$, a difference of 311. This difference is highly significant, thus we have to reject the proposition that the partial data-generating process does not provide a better fit.

The nominate scores of the party does explain a lot of the voting behaviour of MEPs in second reading votes. The effect is highly significant in Model 1. It just makes the 1% significance level in Model 2. While it is significant, it does not make the effect of

government and opposition status disappear. Thus, the behaviour in second reading voting is not purely a story about competition over left-right policy; it is also about government and opposition. The direction of the nominate coefficient is negative. This suggests that parties on the left in each party group are more likely to support second reading amendments compared to parties from the right. This is in line with the theoretical expectation.

Investigating the effect of the party group dummies, we see that the liberal ELDR and the social democratic PES are more likely to vote in favour of amendments than the EPP. Both the rightwing UEN and the Euro-sceptics in the EDD are more likely than the EPP to oppose. The coefficient of EDD is however only significant at the 5% level in model 2, but well beyond the 1% level in model 1. This indicates that they, as members of an anti-EU group, tend to vote not only with their hands, but with their feet as well. Thus, while the biggest party group in the EP was right of centre, most of the support for amendments seemed to come from the parties on the left, which indicates that the EP was trying to move the common position of the Council leftward more often than it tried to move it rightward. At the time, the Council was dominated by socialist governments. The finding lends support to the majority requirement argument of the theory forwarded in this thesis. It rejects the common assertion that governing parties in the EP attempt not to reopen negotiations concluded in the Council.


Socialist governing parties, holding most of the seats in the Council use the second reading in the EP in an attempt to move the final policy closer to their ideal policy by trying to amend the common position adopted in Council's first reading. The

oversized majority requirement in the Council means that most of its members are in favour of a larger policy change than what they are able to find a qualified majority in favour of in the first reading. These parties use the second reading in the EP to propose amendments. These amendments might eventually and possibly in a modified form, move the adopted policy closer to their ideal point, while being within the limits of what the pivotal government in the Council prefers to the status quo.

In order for this to be a successful policy strategy, the socialist governing parties have to form an alliance with opposition parties that share their preferences. This might be either socialist opposition parties or parties from the liberal ELDR or the Greens. During the period investigated here, the evidence seems to suggest that the legislative governing majority consisted of the socialist parties, the biggest party-group in the Council, with support from the Liberals. Although EPP was the biggest party in the EP, they seem to make up the opposition together with more right wing and Euro sceptic parties from the UEN and the EDD.

The existence of two groups, one with a probability of less than .5 of supporting amendments, the other with a probability around .6 is supported by density plot of the probability of voting in favour of second reading amendments. Figure 6.1 compares the probability of supporting second reading amendments for MEPs from governing parties in adversarial member states with the probabilities for all other MEPs.

Figure 6.1 Predicted probability of voting in favour of second reading amendments, government and opposition parties



Probability of supporting second reading amendments: The continuous line represents MEPs from governing parties from adversarial member states, the dotted line represents all other MEPs.

By investigating the mean predicted probability of party groups, the identity of those two groups can be revealed. The mean probability of the different party groups in government and opposition is presented in table 6.6.

Table 6.6 Mean predicted probability by governing status and party group

	Governing parties from adversarial states	Governing parties from non-adversarial states	Opposition parties from adversarial states	Opposition parties from non-adversarial states
PES	.593	.582	.590	.588
ELDR	.547	.585	.581	.584
Green	.600	.592	.596	.591
EPP	.481	.468	.470	.472
GUE	.523	.541	.537	---
UEN	.442	.408	.417	---
EDD	---	.463	.463	---
Non-attached	---	.477	.477	---
Average	.531	.515	.516	.558

The table shows that governing status makes a difference in the predicted probability for liberal parties, where the differences between belonging to the government in an adversarial member states and being either in opposition or from a non-adversarial state is 4%. The direction is negative, Liberals in these governments are less likely to support second reading amendments. It also has a negative effect on the probability of rightwing governing parties in the UEN. There are only minor differences in the mean predicted probability between governing and opposition parties from the other party groups. There is however a significant difference between the different categories on average. Governing parties are more likely than opposition parties to vote in favour of second reading amendments. It is thus possible to conclude that two groups oppose each other in the second reading. The party group holding the minority of the parties in the Council and thus pivotal in forming the common position in the first reading in the Council, teams up with parties further away from the majority view in the Council to attempt to prevent an amendment of the common position. Those parties that make up the majority of the Council members, on the other hand, ally themselves with other parties that favour a policy shift in the same direction in order to amend the common position of the Council.

As the composition of the Council changes, the expectation is that the identity of the two groups will change as well. The picture should nevertheless stay the same. A majority of governing parties supported by ideological closely located opposition parties will make up the group that is most likely to support amendments, while a second group made up by the minority in the Council and their other ideological close parties will tend not to support amendments.

Interpretation of the other variables

The position of the party on the pro-anti integration scale is only significant at the 5% level, but not at the 1% level. However, the direction is the opposite of what the IR theorists predict. Pro-Europeans are less, not more likely to support second reading amendments, once other factors have been controlled for. Within the different party groups, MEPs from parties in favour on more integration are more likely to vote against second reading amendments than MEPs from parties less supportive of further integration.

The level of saliency a party attaches to European integration does influence how its MEPs behave in second reading votes. The more salient, the more likely it is that its MEPs will support second reading amendments. This is significant well above the 1% level. This is in line with the predictions of the existing literature.

The level of dissent is also significant above the 1% level. As predicted from principal-agency-theory and the self-selection thesis, MEPs from parties with a higher level of dissent over European integration are more likely to support second reading amendments than MEPs from parties that agree over their position.

Also, as implied by Hix (2002a) and Rittberger (2000), MEPs from parties in favour of strengthening the position of the EP are more likely to vote in favour of second reading amendments. The effect is significant beyond the 1% significant level.

Neither the size of parties nor countries have a significant effect on voting behaviour in model 2. In model 1, the effects are only significant at the conventional 5% level,

not at the 1% level. Here, the effect of party size is positive. MEPs from bigger parties tend to be more likely to vote in favour of second reading amendments. The effect of country size is negative. MEPs from bigger member states are less likely to vote in favour of amendments.

As predicted, attendance in plenary sessions influences the probability of voting in favour of amendments. The higher average attendance of the national party-group delegation, the more likely it is that an MEP will vote in favour. This also holds in model 2. Those that are more likely to turn up are also more likely to vote yes, rather than no.

Conclusion

This chapter has tested the theory of government and opposition in EU legislative politics with respect to voting behaviour in second reading Codecision votes. Overall, the results support for the theory. There exist two groups of parties in EP's second reading. The governing parties from the largest party group in the Council together with ideologically close parties not necessarily represented in the Council are more active in supporting amendments than the other group, composed of the minority party group in the Council and parties ideologically close to it.

Chapter 2 showed that the common position adopted in the first reading in the Council would be a smaller move away from the status quo than what most of its member would like. This is a result of the oversized majority requirement to both accept and amend in the Council's first reading. This allows the pivotal voter to demand a high price for his Cooperation. The other parties in the Council, those who want a further move in the status quo, attempt to realise this through the EP. As long as the pivotal

voter in the Council is better off from the adopted policy than from the status quo, he will not veto it during or after Conciliation. Thus, the majority in the Council can push for amendments. The evidence presented here supports that notion. A coalition of Socialists, Liberals and Greens was much more eager than the parties on the right to push for amendments at a time when the majority in the Council came from the centre-left.

The findings question the logic put forward by the International Relations camp of EU studies. MEPs from integrationist parties are not more likely to vote in favour of second reading amendments. The evidence goes in the opposite direction. Controlling for other variables, coming from a pro-integrationist party makes an MEP less, not more, likely to support amendments of the common position of the Council. However, parties in favour of strengthening the role of the EP, tend to be more likely to vote in favour of second reading amendments. The same holds for MEPs from parties that regard EU politics to be salient, or that are in dissent over the issue. As expected, those who attend plenary session are more likely to support amendments. The size of the national party or the country might have an effect, but the evidence is not conclusive.

This concludes the empirical part of the thesis. It is time to summarise the finding, compare the theory with existing explanations, and discuss the implications of the findings. For all of this, we turn to the concluding chapter.

Conclusion


The argument presented in this thesis is that there is government and opposition dynamics in legislative politics in the European Union. The argument is twofold. First, there is a clear behavioural difference between those parties that participate in national governments and parties belonging to the opposition at the national level. Second, there is a legislative “government” consisting of the largest party group in the Council and ideologically close parties in the European Parliament. The conclusion first summarises the evidence in favour of the three hypotheses. Then, the evidence in favour of alternative explanations is presented. The final section discusses topics for further research.

Summary of the empirical evidence in favour of the theory

The first empirical test is related to differences in the level of committee activity, expressed through the writing of Codecision reports. The hypothesis is that governing parties write more Codecision reports than opposition parties. The writing of reports is important as it gives the MEPs responsible agenda setting power inside the EP, shaping the institution’s expressed position vis-à-vis the Council. As predicted by the theory, governing parties from adversarial member states are significantly more active as rapporteurs than opposition parties. It might be best illustrated by reproduce the predicted probability plot of number of Codecision reports per party per year, as a function of being in government or in opposition. This is done in figure 1 of the conclusion. The figure shows that opposition parties are much more likely not to write any Codecision in any given year than governing parties. The density of zero-observations is substantively higher for opposition parties. The same applies for the parties writing only one report in a given year. Conversely, the number of predicted

observations of at least 2 reports a year is highest for governing parties from adversarial member states. It might be useful to recall Mustapic's comment (2002: 39) that the opposition in Argentina, unlike governing parties "can choose when to act". The same seems to be the case in the EU, at least in terms of writing Codecision reports.


Conclusion Figure 1 Predicted difference in number of reports, government and opposition parties



The second empirical test focuses on when legislation is adopted as a function of whether the rapporteur comes from a governing or an opposition party. The second hypothesis suggests that the Council is more likely to adopt the proposal from the EP in the first reading if the rapporteur is from a governing, rather than an opposition party. The empirical evidence supports this hypothesis. Rapporteurs from governing

parties are more likely to conclude the negotiations in the first reading. It is again useful to illustrate with a plot of the predicted probabilities. Figure 2 of the conclusion reproduces figure 5.1. It shows that governing parties from adversarial member states have a much higher probability of seeing their report adopted in the first reading, the highest density of observations is found around a probability of .4, while the corresponding 'peak' for other parties is located between .1 and .2. The density of number of observations is lower for governing parties from adversarial member states for probabilities lower than .25. Beyond that point, it is substantively higher. Overall, this suggests a significant difference between governing and opposition parties in EU legislative politics. It suggests that governing parties are better able to get their preferred policy adopted at an early stage in the legislative process. This may fail if the pivotal party in the Council prefers a smaller change in the status quo than the majority in the Council, or the first reading proposal adopted in the EP. If so, that majority try to use the EP to force the Conciliation Committee to form, calculating that the pivotal governing party in the Council will prefer the outcome of the Conciliation committee to the status quo. To the extent that the outcome of the Conciliation committee represents a move towards the EP, compared to the common position adopted in the first reading, then the majority in the Council is successful in its strategy.


Conclusion Figure 2 Predicted probability of adopting legislation in Council's 1st reading, government and opposition parties



The third hypothesis is related to voting behaviour. It reads: “The majority of governing parties and ideologically close opposition parties are more likely to support second reading amendments than opposition parties.” The investigation of voting behaviour the Codecision procedure shows that the governing legislative coalition in the EU consists of governing parties from the largest party group in the Council and ideologically close opposition parties. The opposition is the governing parties from the minority party group in the Council and its ideologically close opposition parties, as well as extremists and anti-Europeans. This is perhaps best shown in figure 6.1, which shows the density plot of the predicted probabilities of voting in favour of

second reading amendments. We see that a large group of MEPs from governing parties from adversarial member states have a predicted probability of supporting second reading amendments of around .55-.6. The same is also the case for a small group of other parties. Conversely, a large group of opposition parties and a small group of governing parties have a predicted probability of around .45-.5. By comparing the mean probabilities of the different party groups, it became clear that the difference in probability had its roots in ideological differences. For convenience, figure 3 of the conclusion reproduces the results of figure 6.1.

Conclusion Figure 3 Predicted probability of voting in favour of second reading amendments, government and opposition parties



Probability of supporting second reading amendments: The continuous line represents MEPs from governing parties from adversarial member states, the dotted line represents all other MEPs.

In sum, the empirical evidence supports the theory of government and opposition in EU legislative politics. The difference between government and opposition can be found in three aspects. First, governing parties are more active as Codecision agenda-setters (rapporteurs) than opposition parties. Second, rapporteurs from governing parties are more likely to see their initial legislative proposal being accepted by the Council of Ministers in the first reading. Third, the majority of governing parties and ideologically close opposition parties are more likely to support second reading amendments than other parties. It should however be noted that the difference between governing and opposition parties exists to a lesser extent in member states with non-adversarial national political systems. The next section of the conclusion presents the evidence in favour of alternative explanations.

Evidence supporting alternative explanations

Table 3.6 summarised the predictions of the empirical tests. In order to evaluate the support of the alternative explanation, table 1 of the conclusion summarise the findings and compare them with the predictions from table 3.6. The table shows that some of the predictions from the existing literature are supported, while other aspects are questioned. Starting with those that are supported, we see that incumbency does not seem to have an independent effect. Having a committee chair seems to increase the number of Codecision reports written by a party. These reports tend to be adopted at an early stage of the legislative process.

Most of the findings show mixed support for claims in the existing literature. The attitude of a national party towards integration seems to have no significant effect its behaviour after controlling for the effect of other factors. As such it supports the claim the EU politics is not primarily over level of integration (Hix 2001; Hix, Noury, and

Roland 2003). Saliency of European integration has a behavioural effect in line with what the existing literature predicts when it comes to allocation of reports and voting behaviour. Parties to whom European integration is salient tend to write more reports than those parties that see European integration as a less salient issue. However, there is no effect on when legislation is agreed between the EP and the Council. Party size has a positive effect on number of Codecision reports. There is also evidence to suggest that rapporteurs from bigger parties are more likely to write reports that end up in Conciliation than rapporteurs from smaller parties. This supports the notion that big national parties dominate EU politics to the extent that the most important legislation tends to end up in Conciliation rather than being concluded at an earlier stage of the procedure. As expected, attendance in EP plenary sessions increases the chance of MEPs supporting second reading amendments (Noury 2002a; Scully 1997c).

The only significant effect of country-size is that rapporteurs from bigger countries were more likely than rapporteurs from smaller countries to end up in the Conciliation Committee. Having controlled for other factors, country-size did not seem to have an effect on second reading voting behaviour in the EP, nor on the allocation of Codecision reports. While the evidence shows partial support for the existing literature, it provided strong support for the behavioural predictions of the theory chapter. Not only did all key predictions find substantive and significant support, the secondary predictions related to other variables were also largely supported, although a few, while producing the predicted direction, were associated with a large standard error. Having summarised the findings, the remainder of the conclusion presents topics for further research in light of these findings.

Conclusion Table 1 Comparing predictions and findings

(Bold indicates that predictions = findings)

Variables	Chapter 4 reports	Chapter 5 agreement	Chapter 6 voting
Adgov	Positive (theory)	1st reading positive (theory)	Positive (theory)
Nongov	Not significant	Not significant	Not significant
Position	Positive (existing literature)	1 st reading negative 2 nd reading EP positive Conciliation positive (existing literature)	Positive (existing literature)
Saliency	Positive (existing literature)	1st reading negative (existing literature)	Positive (existing literature)
Dissent	Both ways (existing literature)	Both ways (existing literature) <u>Positive effect on ending up in Conciliation</u>	Positive (existing literature)
EP	Positive (existing literature)	1 st reading negative (Existing literature)	Positive (existing literature)
Nominate			Negative (theory)
Partysize	Positive (existing literature)	1 st reading positive 2 nd reading EP negative Conciliation positive (existing literature)	Positive (existing literature)
Attendance	Positive (existing literature)	1 st reading positive 2 nd reading EP negative Conciliation positive (existing literature)	Positive (existing literature)
Countrysize	Positive (existing literature)	2 nd reading EP positive Conciliation positive (existing literature)	Positive (existing literature)
Chair		1 st reading positive, only significant when compared to Conciliation 2 nd reading Council positive (existing literature)	
Chairman	Positive (existing literature)		
Absolute nominate	Negative (theory)	1st reading positive (theory)	
Experience		2 nd reading Council negative Conciliation negative (theory)	
Incumbent		No effect (existing literature)	
PES	Positive (theory)	1 st reading positive (theory), 1 st reading negative (existing literature)	Positive (theory)
ELDR	Negative (existing literature)	1 st reading negative (existing literature)	
Green	Negative (existing literature)	1 st reading negative (existing literature) 2 nd reading Council negative (theory)	
Small party groups	Negative (existing literature)	1 st reading negative (existing literature) 2 nd reading Council negative (theory)	Negative (theory)

Topics for further research

The findings summarised above seem to suggest a simple answer to the question of why governments have chosen to strengthen the role of the European Parliaments in successive treaty reforms. The existing literature focuses on reducing the democratic legitimisation, segmenting a particular partisan bias, or adjusting de jure rules in line with the de facto realities (Hix 2002a; Moravcsik and Nicolaidis 1999; Pollack 2003; Rittberger 2003). The argument developed here suggests that increasing the power of the EP strengthen the hand of the majority in the Council against the minority. It reduces the power of the pivotal governments, i.e. those more resistant to changing the status quo. Nevertheless, it ensures that the pivotal government is made better off, although the policy change is likely to be further than she would prefer if she could make a take-it-or-leave it offer to the rest of the Council. To the extent that different coalitions form around similar dimensions in the Council and in the EP (Hix 1999a; Hix 2001; Mattila and Lane 2001), increasing the power of the EP makes all governments better off. They are able to realise a further policy change than in all areas where they previously were in the winning majority, while not losing their power to block utility decreasing changes on issues where they are pivotal.

As mentioned in the introduction, this thesis neglects the role of the Commission in EU legislative politics. The Commission is chosen by the governing parties, incorporating it in the analysis should not change the conclusion that governing parties dominating EU legislative politics (Crombez 1997b; Crombez and Hix 2003). A model incorporating the role of the Commission is left for future research.

The thesis focuses on the role of national parties in the EU. A possible line of inquiry is to look at national party leadership's strategy in committee assignment as a function of their position as governing or opposition parties. This may lead to investigating intra-party politics in the context of committee assignments in the EP (Laver and Shepsle 1990b). If the national party leadership is understood as the principal, assigning party members to different committees can be seen as an act of delegation. As in all question of delegation, information-asymmetries and preferences are central. Will party leaders weight these two factors differently depending on whether they sit in the Council or have the Commissionaire in the area?

The findings also have implication for the research on lobbying in the European Union. Most of the existing literature on lobbying in the EU looks at contact between lobbyists, the institutions, its committees, or characteristics of the lobbying system (Bouwen 2002; 2004a; 2004b; Broscheid and Coen 2003; Greenwood and Aspinwall 1997; Mazey and Richardson 1993). An exception is Crombez (2002) who looks at which actors should be lobbied at the different stages of the process, given their location in the policy space. If governing parties are dominating legislative politics in the European Union, as this thesis argues, the payoff of influencing representatives from governing parties should be higher than influencing representatives from opposition parties of similar size. Empirical investigations of lobbying strategies should thus control for differences between governing and opposition parties.

The theory has implication for research on control of the EU executive. Recent research on executive politics in the EU suggests that there is a different between government and opposition parties in terms of approving the Commission President

and censuring of the European Commission (Gabel and Hix 2002; Hix and Lord 1996; Jun and Hix 2004). While these votes are highly profiles, the executive is also controlled on a day-to-day basis through parliamentary questions. Existing research on EP questions tend to be descriptive (Kirchner 1984; Raunio 1996; 1997). The theory developed here suggests that MEPs from opposition parties should more frequently be asking questions to the Council than governing parties. Parties without a Commissioner should be active in asking questions to the Commission, than those parties with a Commissioner. MEPs from the biggest party group in the Council and the Commission should ask fewer questions than those from minority groups and those not represented in the executive institutions.

Finally, the thesis has shown the fruitfulness of analysing legislative behaviour after carefully modelling the institutional rules guiding the behaviour of the actors involved, in particular in a bicameral setting. As such, it has followed Krebhiel (2004) recent suggestion to study micro-models in its macro context (see also Cox and McCubbins 2004). Legislative behaviour can better be understood if the incentive structure of the institutional arrangement is properly modelled. The analysis of institutional arrangements should move beyond the focus on institutions in order to investigate how parties use the institutional arrangement to forward their interests. The shift in focus can already be found in recent literature on legislative politics in the US and in some comparative work. This thesis has attempted to make this shift in the case of EU legislative politics through the careful modelling of the effect of institutional rules on how political parties behave in the Codecision procedure.

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Appendix I. All codecision legislation initiated during the 5th EP

Keys: * = not yet adopted, 1= adopted in the 1st reading in the Council, 2= adopted in EP 2nd reading, 3= adopted in Council 2nd reading, 4= adopted after conciliation, 99= failed to be adopted

Reading	Title	Committee	Rapporteur
*	Animal diseases, public health: zoonoses control and prevention, food-borne intoxications (amend. direct. 92/117/EEC)	Agriculture	
*	Car industry: front underrun protection of motor vehicles (amend. direct. 70/156/EEC)	Legal affairs, internal market	
3	Waste management : framework for the production of Community statistics	Environment, public health, consumers	BLOKLAND Johannes (Hans) (EDD)
*	Free movement of workers: posting of third-country nationals for the provision of cross-border services	Legal affairs, internal market	BERGER Maria (PSE)
1	Legal units of measurement of the Système international SI, supplementary after 31/12/1999 (amend. direct. 80/181/EEC)	Industry, external trade, research... **	CHICHESTER Giles Bryan (PPE-DE)
4	Tropical forests, developing countries: conservation and sustainable management	Conciliation delegation	FERNÁNDEZ MARTÍN Fernando (PPE-DE)
4	Developing countries: integrate the environment in the development process, sustainable development	Conciliation delegation	WIJLMAN Anders (PPE-DE)
2	Road transport: distribution of permits for heavy goods vehicles travelling in Switzerland	Regional, transport, tourism	APARICIO SÁNCHEZ Pedro (PSE)
*	Agricultural statistics: production potential of plantations of fruit trees (amend. direct. 76/625/ECC)	Agriculture	
4	Air pollution : national emission ceilings for pollutant gas (SO ₂ , NO _x , NH ₃ , VOCs)	Conciliation delegation	MYLLER Riitta (PSE)
4	Air pollution: ozone in ambient air, emission ceilings	Conciliation delegation	DAVIES Chris (ELDR)
3	Development cooperation, EC/South Africa relations (amend. regul. 2259/96/EC)	Development, cooperation	MARTÍNEZ MARTÍNEZ Miguel Angel (PSE)
2	Transport of dangerous goods by road: standards, European agreement ADR annexes (amend. direct. 94/55/EC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	KOCH Dieter-Lebrecht (PPE-DE)
*	Health at work: protection of workers from exposure to carcinogens (6th direct. 90/394/EEC). Codification	Legal affairs, internal market	GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
2	Transport of dangerous goods by rail (amend. direct. 96/49/EC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	HATZIDAKIS Konstantinos (PPE-DE)
1	Foodstuffs, consumers' protection : labelling, presentation and	Legal affairs, internal market	WUERMELING Joachim (PPE-DE)

	advertising. (codif. direct. 79/112/EEC)		
2	Transport safety: type-approval of two or three-wheel motorvehicles (amend. direct. 92/61/EEC)	Legal affairs, internal market	PALACIO VALLELERSUNDI Ana (PPE-DE)
2	Energy efficiency: requirements for ballasts for fluorescent lighting	Industry, external trade, research... **	TURMES Claude (VERTS/ALE)
1	Medicinal products for human use: Community code (codification)	Legal affairs, internal market	BEYSEN Ward (ELDR)
2	Community agricultural statistics: improvement and information (amend. dec. 96/411/EC)	Agriculture	REDONDO JIMÉNEZ Encarnación (PPE-DE)
4	Money laundering: prevention of the use of the financial system (amend. direct. 91/308/EEC)	Conciliation delegation	LEHNE Klaus-Heiner (PPE-DE)
1	Protection of personal data: application by the Community institutions of the directive 95/46/EC	Citizens' freedoms and rights, justice	PACIOTTI Elena Ornella (PSE)
2	Human consumption: food additives other than colours and sweeteners (amend. direct. 95/2/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	LANNOYE Paul A.A.J.G. (VERTS/ALE)
2	Forests: protection against atmospheric pollution (amend. regul. 3528/86/EEC)	Environment, public health, consumers	REDONDO JIMÉNEZ Encarnación (PPE-DE)
2	Forests: protection against fire (amend. regul. 2158/92/EEC)	Environment, public health, consumers	REDONDO JIMÉNEZ Encarnación (PPE-DE)
1	Veterinary medicinal products : Community code (codif. direct. 81/851/EEC, 81/852/EEC, 90/677/EEC, 92/74/EEC)	Legal affairs, internal market	BEYSEN Ward (ELDR)
1	Protection of workers: exposure to biological agents (direct. 89/391/EEC, 90/679/EEC). Codification	Legal affairs, internal market	WUERMELING Joachim (PPE-DE)
1	Humanitarian aid: uprooted people in Asian and Latin American developing countries (exten. regul. 443/97/EC)	Development, cooperation	DEVA Nirj (PPE-DE)
2	European System of national and regional accounts ESA: recording taxes and social contributions	Economic, monetary affairs	KNÖRR BORRÀS Gorka (VERTS/ALE)
2	Beef: identification and registration of animals and labelling of beef (repeal. regul. 820/97/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	PAPAYANNAKIS Mihail (GUE/NGL)
*	Beef: identification and registration of animals and labelling of beef and beef products (amend. regul. 820/97/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	PAPAYANNAKIS Mihail (GUE/NGL)
1	European year of languages 2001	Culture, youth, education, media, sport	GRAÇA MOURA Vasco (PPE-DE)
1	Health problems: intra-Community trade in bovine animals and swine (amend. direct. 64/432/EEC)	Agriculture	GRAEFE zu BARINGDORF Friedrich-Wilhelm (VERTS/ALE)
1	Sustainable urban development : environmental legislation at the local level, Community framework for cooperation	Environment, public health, consumers	LIENEMANN Marie-Noëlle (PSE)
*	Child health protection: phthalates, dangerous substances, safety of toys (amend. direct. 76/769/EEC, 88/378/EEC)	Environment, public health, consumers	ARVIDSSON Per-Arne (PPE-DE)

4	Tobacco: manufacture, presentation and sale of products (recast version direct. 89/622/EEC, 92/41/EEC, 90/239/EEC)	Conciliation delegation	MAATEN Jules (ELDR)
2	Rail transport: interoperability of the trans-European conventional rail system	Regional, transport, tourism **	SAVARY Gilles (PSE)
4	Animal nutrition: undesirable substances and products for the animal and human health (amend. direct. 1999/29/EC)	Conciliation delegation	PAULSEN Marit (ELDR)
1	Agreements EC/Bulgaria, EC/Hungary: road and combined transport, repartition of authorizations	Regional, transport, tourism **	MASTORAKIS Emmanouil (PSE)
2	Dangerous substances and preparations: azocolourants in textiles and leather (19th amend. direct. 76/769/EEC)	Environment, public health, consumers	BAKOPOULOS Emmanouil (GUE/NGL)
2	Audiovisual industry : training programme for professionals, MEDIA-Training 2001-2005	Culture, youth, education, media, sport	HIERONYMI Ruth (PPE-DE)
2	Dangerous substances: cancerogens, mutagens and toxic, c/m/r category 1 or 2 (21st amend. direct. 76/769/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	NISTICO' Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
1	Financial sector: information with third countries (amend. direct. 85/611/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC, 93/22/EEC)	Economic, monetary affairs	BERENGUER FUSTER Luis (PSE)
4	Compound feedingstuffs: marketing, tracing, labelling (amend. direct. 79/373/EC)	Conciliation delegation	GRAEFE zu BARINGDORF Friedrich-Wilhelm (VERTS/ALE)
1	European system of national and regional accounts ESA: swaps, forward rate (amend. regul. 2223/96/EC)	Economic, monetary affairs	KAUPPI Piia-Noora (PPE-DE)
*	Satellite personal communication services: co-ordination granting of the approval (exten. dec. 710/97/EC)	Industry, external trade, research... **	
3	Free movement of persons: mobility for students, persons undergoing training, young volunteers, teachers, trainers	Culture, youth, education, media, sport	EVANS Robert J.E. (PSE)
2	School education: european cooperation in quality evaluation. Recommendation	Culture, youth, education, media, sport	SANDERS-TEN HOLTE Maria Johanna (Marieke) (ELDR)
*	Transport by rail, road and inland waterway: aid for the coordination (repl. regul. 1107/70/EEC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	CAMISÓN ASENSIO Felipe (PPE-DE)
1	Documents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission: right of public access	Citizens' freedoms and rights, justice	CASHMAN Michael (PSE)
2	Energy efficiency products: office and communication technology equipment, labelling programme Energy Star	Industry, external trade, research... **	McNALLY Eryl Margaret (PSE)
2	EC Investment Partners financial instrument ECIP: closure and liquidation of projects (regul. 213/96/EC)	Development, cooperation	DELL'ALBA Gianfranco (NI)
1	Water policy: list of priority substances, protection of the ecosystem	Environment, public health, consumers	BREYER Hiltrud (VERTS/ALE)

and human health COMMPs		
2	Air pollution: emissions from motor vehicles, on-board diagnostic systems OBD (amend. direct. 70/220/EEC)	Environment, public health, consumers JACKSON Caroline F. (PPE-DE)
1	Companies: valuation of annual and consolidated accounts, financial information (amend. direct. 78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC)	Legal affairs, internal market INGLEWOOD (PPE-DE)
*	Transport of dangerous goods by road: uniform procedures for checks (amend. direct. 95/50/EC)	Regional, transport, tourism **
2	Road transport, national and international traffic : maximum dimensions and weights (amend. dir. 96/53/EC)	Regional, transport, tourism ** HATZIDAKIS Konstantinos (PPE-DE)
2	Action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries	Foreign affairs, human rights, security, defence BONINO Emma (TDI)
4	Ship safety: standards in respect of shipping using Community ports, package Erika I (amend. direct. 95/21/EC)	Conciliation delegation WATTS Mark Francis (PSE)
4	Ship safety: ship inspections and survey organisations, package Erika I (amend. direct. 94/57/EC)	Conciliation delegation ORTUONDO LARREA Josu (VERTS/ALE)
2	Ship safety: double hull or equivalent design for single hull oil tankers, package Erika I	Regional, transport, tourism ** HATZIDAKIS Konstantinos (PPE-DE)
3	Animal nutrition: official inspections, undesirable substances and products (amend. direct. 95/53/EC, 1999/29/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers PAULSEN Marit (ELDR)
*	Air transport, civil aviation: technical requirements and administrative procedures (amend. regul. 3922/91/EEC)	Regional, transport, tourism ** SIMPSON Brian (PSE)
1	Social security: employed persons, self-employed persons and their families (amend. regul. 1408/71/EEC, 574/72/EEC)	Employment, social affairs LAMBERT Jean (VERTS/ALE)
4	Protection of consumers: general product safety (rev. direct. 92/59/EEC)	Conciliation delegation GONZÁLEZ ÁLVAREZ Laura (GUE/NGL)
4	Cosmetic products: animal experiments (7th amend. direct. 76/768/EEC)	Conciliation delegation ROTH-BEHRENDT Dagmar (PSE)
3	Food supplements: approximation of the laws of the member States	Environment, public health, consumers MÜLLER Emilia Franziska (PPE-DE)
4	Dangerous substances and preparations: short chain chlorinated paraffins SCCP (20th amend. direct. 76/769/EEC)	Conciliation delegation NISTICO' Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
4	Public procurement, service and works contracts: coordination of procedures for the award, classical directive	Conciliation delegation ZAPPALA' Stefano (PPE-DE)
3	Electricity, internal market: production from renewable energy sources, RES-E	Industry, external trade, research... ** ROTHE Mechtild (PSE)
4	Procurement water, energy, transport and postal sectors: coordination	Conciliation delegation ZAPPALA' Stefano (PPE-DE)

	of procedures for award, utilities directive		
4	Public health: Community action programme 2003-2008	Conciliation delegation	TRAKATELLIS Antonios (PPE-DE)
2	Safe seas: safe loading and unloading of bulk carriers	Regional, transport, tourism **	van DAM Rijk (EDD)
1	Shipping: seafarers, minimum level of training. Consolidation	Legal affairs, internal market	MEDINA ORTEGA Manuel (PSE)
3	Stockfarming: prohibition of substances with hormonal or thyrostatic action, of beta-agonists (amend. direct. 96/22/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	OLSSON Karl Erik (ELDR)
4	Air quality: emissions from two or three-wheeled motor vehicles, motorcycles (amend. direct. 97/24/EC)	Conciliation delegation	LANGE Bernd (PSE)
3	Postal services: further opening to competition (amend. direct. 97/67/EC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	FERBER Markus (PPE-DE)
1	Summer-time arrangements: consequences and timetable for 2002 to 2006 (8th direct. 97/44/EC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	HONEYBALL Mary (PSE)
4	Equal opportunities between women and men: employment, vocational training, working conditions	Conciliation delegation	HAUTALA Heidi Anneli (VERTS/ALE)
2	Air carriage: liability in the event of accidents (amend. regul. 2027/97/EC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	SANDERS-TEN HOLTE Maria Johanna (Marieke) (ELDR)
4	Social exclusion: Community action programme 2001-2005 to encourage cooperation between Member States	Conciliation delegation	FIGUEIREDO Ilda (GUE/NGL)
4	Environment and health: waste electrical and electronic equipment WEEE	Conciliation delegation	FLORENZ Karl-Heinz (PPE-DE)
4	Environment and health: electrical and electronic equipments WEEE, restriction of hazardous substances RoHS	Conciliation delegation	FLORENZ Karl-Heinz (PPE-DE)
2	Life insurance (recast direct. 79/267/EEC, 90/619/EEC, 92/96/EEC)	Legal affairs, internal market	INGLEWOOD (PPE-DE)
4	Public access to environmental information (repl. direct. 90/313/EEC)	Conciliation delegation	KORHOLA Eija-Riitta Anneli (PPE-DE)
1	Environment: substances depleting the ozone layer, allocation of hydrochlorofluorocarbons HCFCs	Environment, public health, consumers	HULTHÉN Anneli (PSE)
1	Securities: admission to official stock exchange listing, information to be published. Codification	Legal affairs, internal market	MEDINA ORTEGA Manuel (PSE)
1	Environment: substances depleting the ozone layer, metered dose inhalers and medical drug pumps	Environment, public health, consumers	HULTHÉN Anneli (PSE)
3	Protection of human health: hygiene of foodstuffs	Environment, public health, consumers	SCHNELLDHARDT Horst (PPE-DE)
3	Protection of human health : food of animal origin, specific hygiene rules	Environment, public health, consumers	SCHNELLDHARDT Horst (PPE-DE)

99	Products of animal origin intended for human consumption: organisation of official controls	Environment, public health, consumers	SCHNELLDHARDT Horst (PPE-DE)
3	Products of animal origin, human consumption: health rules (amend. direct. 89/662/EEC, 91/67/EEC). Food hygiene package	Environment, public health, consumers	SCHNELLDHARDT Horst (PPE-DE)
3	Electronic communications, universal service : users' rights relating to networks and services	Legal affairs, internal market	HARBOUR Malcolm (PPE-DE)
3	Electronic communications: common regulatory framework for networks and services	Industry, external trade, research... **	PAASILINNA Reino (PSE)
1	Telecommunications: unbundled access to local loops of operators having significant market power	Industry, external trade, research... **	CLEGG Nicholas (ELDR)
3	Electronic communications: access to networks and interconnection, new regulatory framework	Industry, external trade, research... **	BRUNETTA Renato (PPE-DE)
3	Radiocommunications, broadcasting, transport: radio spectrum, regulatory framework	Industry, external trade, research... **	NIEBLER Angelika (PPE-DE)
3	Electronic communications: authorisation of networks and services (repl. direct. 97/13/EC)	Industry, external trade, research... **	NIEBLER Angelika (PPE-DE)
3	Electronic communications: processing of personal data, protection of privacy (repl. direct. 97/66/EC)	Citizens' freedoms and rights, justice	CAPPATO Marco (NI)
1	Public health : action programmes (exten. dec. 645/96/EC, 646/96/EC, 647/96/EC, 102/97/EC, 1400/97/EC, 1296/99/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	TRAKATELLIS Antonios (PPE-DE)
4	Noise pollution : assessment and management of exposure to environmental noise	Conciliation delegation	de ROO Alexander (/)
4	Employment: Community incentive measures	Conciliation delegation	JENSEN Anne Elisabet (ELDR)
1	Intra and extra-Community trading of goods: trans-european network for the collection of statistics, Edicom	Economic, monetary affairs	LULLING Astrid (PPE-DE)
2	Air pollution: cold start emission limits for motor vehicles during warming-up (amend. direct. 70/220/EEC)	Environment, public health, consumers	LANGE Bernd (PSE)
*	Passenger public transport by rail, road, inland waterway: competition (repl. regul. 1191/69/EEC, 1893/91/EEC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	MEIJER Erik (GUE/NGL)
3	Insurance: freedom of establishment and services of the intermediaries, protection of customers	Economic, monetary affairs	BERENGUER FUSTER Luis (PSE)
4	Animal-health requirements: non commercial movement of pet animals (amend. direct. 92/65/EEC)	Conciliation delegation	EVANS Jillian (VERTS/ALE)
3	Coastal zones: integrated management ICZM, implementation of a strategy	Environment, public health, consumers	McKENNA Patricia (VERTS/ALE)

2	Health police: animal wastes and by-products (amend. direct. 90/425/EEC, 92/118/EEC, dec. 94/278/CE)	Environment, public health, consumers	PAULSEN Marit (ELDR)
3	Measuring instruments: trading transactions and use of legally controlled instruments	Industry, external trade, research... **	CHICHESTER Giles Bryan (PPE-DE)
*	Coffee and chicory extracts: range of nominal weights (amend. direct. 80/232/EEC)	Environment, public health, consumers	JACKSON Caroline F. (PPE-DE)
2	Maritime safety and prevention of pollution from ships (amend. regul. 613/91/EEC, 2978/94/EC, 3051/95/EC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	BAKOPOULOS Emmanouil (GUE/NGL)
2	Maritime safety, prevention of pollution from ships (amend. direct. 93/75/EEC, dec. 1999/468/EC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	BAKOPOULOS Emmanouil (GUE/NGL)
2	European system of national and regional accounts ESA 95: VAT-based own resource (amend. regul. 2223/96/EC)	Budgets	HAUG Jutta D. (PSE)
3	Civil aviation: common rules, European Aviation Safety Agency	Regional, transport, tourism **	SCHMITT Ingo (PPE-DE)
*	Life insurance: solvency margin for undertakings (amend. direct. 79/267/EEC)	Economic, monetary affairs	ETTL Harald (PSE)
1	Non-life insurance: solvency margin for undertakings (amend. direct. 73/239/EEC)	Economic, monetary affairs	ETTL Harald (PSE)
*	Health police: animal by-products not intended for human consumption, animal proteins in animal feed	Conciliation delegation	PAULSEN Marit (ELDR)
*	Institutions for occupational retirement, pension funds: laws, regulations and administrative provisions	Economic, monetary affairs	KARAS Othmar (PPE-DE)
4	Recreational craft industry: exhaust and noise emissions from boat engines (amend. direct. 94/25/EC)	Conciliation delegation	CALLANAN Martin (PPE-DE)
3	Food safety: law, European Food Authority, safety of food supply	Environment, public health, consumers	WHITEHEAD Phillip (PSE)
*	Agricultural statistics: production potential of plantations of fruit trees (repeal. direct. 76/625/EEC)	Agriculture	
2	Access to the market in the carriage of goods by road: uniform driver attestation (amend. regul. 811/92/EEC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	van DAM Rijk (EDD)
2	Road safety: compulsory use of belts for children under 12 years of age (amend. direct. 91/671/EEC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	HEDKVIST PETERSEN Ewa (PSE)
4	Public health and human blood: quality and safety of transfusion chain (amend. direct. 89/381/EEC)	Conciliation delegation	NISTICO' Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
*	Maritime safety: monitoring, control and information for traffic, package Erika II (repeal. direct. 93/75/EEC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	STERCKX Dirk (ELDR)
1	Oil pollution: fund for damage compensation in European waters,	Regional, transport, tourism **	ESCLOPÉ Alain (EDD)

package Erika II			
2	Maritime safety: creation of a european Agency, package Erika II	Regional, transport, tourism **	MASTORAKIS Emmanouil (PSE)
3	Internet: Top Level Domain .eu, implementation	Industry, external trade, research... **	FLESCH Colette (ELDR)
4	Environment: public participation in plans and programmes (amend. direct. 85/337/EEC, 96/61/EC)	Conciliation delegation	KORHOLA Eija-Riitta Anneli (PPE-DE)
*	Cultural objects: restitution of those unlawfully removed from a territory of a Member State (amend. direct. 93/7/EEC)	Culture, youth, education, media, sport	
3	Air pollution: emissions from small park ignition engines, non-road mobile machinery (amend. direct. 97/68/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	LANGE Bernd (PSE)
1	Cooperation EC/Latin America and Asian countries: aid to uprooted people after 31/12/2000	Development, cooperation	CARRILHO Maria (PSE)
4	Air transport safety, civil aviation: prevention of accidents, collect and dissemination of information	Conciliation delegation	COLLINS Gerard (UEN)
*	Road transport: ecopoints for heavy vehicles travelling through Austria (amend. protocole 9 act of accession)	Regional, transport, tourism **	SWOBODA Johannes (Hannes) (PSE)
*	Machinery, lifts: free movement, safety, health and consumers protection (recast direct. 98/37/EC, amend. 95/16/EC)	Legal affairs, internal market	WIELAND Rainer (PPE-DE)
*	Food-aid policy: management and support of food security (amend. regul. 1292/96/EC, dec. 2000/421/EC)	Development, cooperation	
3	Protection of employees: insolvency of employee, transnational situations (amend. direct. 80/987/EEC)	Employment, social affairs	BOUWMAN Theodorus J.J. (VERTS/ALE)
1	Statute and financing of european political parties	Constitutional Affairs **	SCHLEICHER Ursula (PPE-DE)
4	Dangerous substances: marketing and use of pentaBDE in polyurethane foam (24th amend. direct. 76/769/CEE)	Conciliation delegation	RIES Frédérique (ELDR)
2	Structural business statistics: additional sectors, credit institutions and pension funds (amend. regul. 58/97/EC)	Economic, monetary affairs	LULLING Astrid (PPE-DE)
1	Maritime transport: formalities for ships arriving in and departing from Member States ports, IMO FAL convention	Regional, transport, tourism **	VATANEN Ari (PPE-DE)
4	Environment: 6th Community action programme 2001-2010	Conciliation delegation	MYLLER Riitta (PSE)
3	Road transport: training of professional drivers for the carriage of goods or passengers (regul. 3820/85/EEC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	GROSCH Mathieu J.H. (PPE-DE)
1	Capital market, financial services: application of international accounting standards	Legal affairs, internal market	INGLEWOOD (PPE-DE)
2	European statistical system: common classification of territorial units for statistics NUTS	Regional, transport, tourism **	MIGUÉLEZ RAMOS Rosa (PSE)

4	Port services: market access and financing of maritime ports	Conciliation delegation	JARZEMBOWSKI Georg (PPE-DE)
2	Transport policy: rail statistics for passengers, freight and safety	Regional, transport, tourism **	CAMISÓN ASENSIO Felipe (PPE-DE)
3	European research area: activities within the scope of the EC framework programme 2002-2006	Industry, external trade, research... **	CAUDRON Gérard (PSE)
1	General government: quarterly non-financial accounts, ESA 95 categories	Economic, monetary affairs	RANDZIO-PLATH Christa (PSE)
4	Europe's sky: framework for the creation of a single European sky and action programme	Conciliation delegation	FAVA Giovanni Claudio (PSE)
*	Environmental protection: combating crime, criminal offences and penalties	Environment, public health, consumers	OOMEN-RUIJTEN Ria G.H.C. (PPE-DE)
3	Energy: rules for the internal market in electricity (repeal. direct. 96/92/EC)	Industry, external trade, research... **	TURMES Claude (VERTS/ALE)
2	Energy: rules for the internal market in natural gas (repeal. direct. 98/30/EC)	Industry, external trade, research... **	RAPKAY Bernhard (PSE)
3	Energy: internal market in electricity, cross-border exchanges, access to network	Industry, external trade, research... **	MOMBAUR Peter Michael (PPE-DE)
2	European financial markets: financial collateral arrangements and legal certainty, consequences on the SMEs	Economic, monetary affairs	PÉREZ ROYO Fernando (PSE)
2	Financial markets and institutions: stability, prudential regulation, legal certainty (amend. directives)	Economic, monetary affairs	LIPIETZ Alain (VERTS/ALE)
3	Energy policy: energy performance of the buildings of the Union, energy saves and efficiency	Industry, external trade, research... **	VIDAL-QUADRAS ROCA Alejo (PPE-DE)
4	Quality of petrol and diesel fuels: level of sulphur (amend. direct. 98/70/EC)	Conciliation delegation	HAUTALA Heidi Anneli (VERTS/ALE)
4	Dangerous substances: carcinogens, mutagens or toxic to reproduction, c/m/r (23rd amend. direct. 76/769/EEC)	Conciliation delegation	NISTICO' Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
*	Union citizenship : free movement and residence for citizens and their families within the Member States' territory	Citizens' freedoms and rights, justice	SANTINI Giacomo (PPE-DE)
*	Fight against fraud: criminal-law protection of the Community's financial interests	Budgetary control	THEATO Diemut R. (PPE-DE)
3	Capital market: prospectus to be published for securities (overhaul direct. 80/390/EEC, 89/298/EEC, 2001/34/EC)	Economic, monetary affairs	HUHNE Christopher (ELDR)
3	Financial markets: insider dealing and market abuse (repeal. direct. 89/592/EEC)	Economic, monetary affairs	GOEBBELS Robert (PSE)
1	Tobacco products: advertising and sponsorship (repl. direct.	Legal affairs, internal market	MEDINA ORTEGA Manuel (PSE)

98/43/EC)		
2 Labour force in the Community: sample survey, follow-up of employment and unemployment (amend. regul. 577/98/EC)	Employment, social affairs	BOUWMAN Theodorus J.J. (VERTS/ALE)
2 Road safety: speed limitation devices for commercial motor vehicles (amend. direct. 92/6/EEC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	HATZIDAKIS Konstantinos (PPE-DE)
* European parliamentary assistants: application of social security schemes (amend. regul. 1408/71/EEC, 574/72/EEC)	Employment, social affairs	GILLIG Marie-Hélène (PSE)
* Agreement EC/Romania: road and combined transport, distribution of authorizations (amend. regul. 685/01/EC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	
2 Environment: promoting NGO primarily active in the environmental protection (repeal. dec. 97/872/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	JACKSON Caroline F. (PPE-DE)
* Air transport: slots at Community airports and competition (amend. regul. 95/93/EEC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	STOCKMANN Ulrich (PSE)
1 Air transport: slots at Community airports and competition (amend. regul. 95/93/EEC, art. 10b)	Regional, transport, tourism **	CAVERI Luciano (ELDR)
3 Safety and security at work: protection from the risks related to exposure to asbestos (amend. direct. 83/477/EEC)	Employment, social affairs	DAMIÃO Elisa Maria (PSE)
2 Labour market, statistics: labour cost index	Economic, monetary affairs	MAYOL i RAYNAL Miquel (VERTS/ALE)
3 Food safety: genetically modified food and feed	Environment, public health, consumers	SCHEELE Karin (PSE)
2 Cross-border payments in euro: reducing bank charges	Economic, monetary affairs	PEIJS Karla M.H. (PPE-DE)
2 Public health: monitoring of zoonoses and zoonotic agents (amend. dec. 90/424/EEC, repeal. direct. 92/117/EEC)	Environment, public health, consumers	PAULSEN Marit (ELDR)
3 Public health : control of salmonella and food-born zoonotic agents (amend. direct. 64/432/EEC, 72/462/EEC, 90/532/EEC)	Environment, public health, consumers	PAULSEN Marit (ELDR)
2 Public procurement: common vocabulary CPV	Legal affairs, internal market	ZAPPALA' Stefano (PPE-DE)
3 Genetically modified organisms GMOs: traceability and labelling (amend. direct. 2001/18/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	TRAKATELLIS Antonios (PPE-DE)
3 Excisable products: computerised intra-Community movement system	Economic, monetary affairs	KAUPPI Piia-Noora (PPE-DE)
* Medical devices incorporating stable derivatives of human blood or human plasma (amend. direct. 93/42/EEC, 2000/70/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	
2 Science and technology: production and development of Community statistics	Industry, external trade, research... **	NISTICO' Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
3 Health : indication of the ingredients in foodstuffs (amend. direct. 2000/13/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	KLASS Christa (PPE-DE)

1	Research EC framework programme 2002-2006: results dissemination, participation of undertakings and universities	Industry, external trade, research... **	QUISTHOUDT-ROWOHL Godelieve (PPE-DE)
1	Electronic interchange of data between administrations IDA II: guidelines (amend. dec. 1719/1999/EC)	Industry, external trade, research... **	READ Imelda Mary (PSE)
1	Electronic interchange of data between administrations IDA II: networks interoperability (amend. dec. 1720/1999/EC)	Industry, external trade, research... **	READ Imelda Mary (PSE)
2	Fertilizers (recast direct. 76/116/EEC, 80/876/EEC, 87/94/EEC, 77/535/EEC)	Legal affairs, internal market	LECHNER Kurt (PPE-DE)
2	Trans-european networks: rules for granting financial aid (amend. regul. 2236/95/EC)	Budgets	TURCHI Franz (UEN)
*	Internal market: sales promotions and consumer protection, transparency	Legal affairs, internal market	BEYSEN Ward (ELDR)
*	Transeuropean network of transport : Community guidelines of development (amend. dec. 1692/96/EC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	BRADBOURN Philip Charles (PPE-DE)
4	Air transport: common rules for civil aviation security	Conciliation delegation	FOSTER Jacqueline (PPE-DE)
4	Air transport : single European sky, provision of navigation services	Conciliation delegation	SANDERS-TEN HOLTE Maria Johanna (Marieke) (ELDR)
4	Air transport: single European sky, organisation and use of the airspace	Conciliation delegation	SANDERS-TEN HOLTE Maria Johanna (Marieke) (ELDR)
4	Air transport : single European sky, interoperability of the traffic management network	Conciliation delegation	SANDERS-TEN HOLTE Maria Johanna (Marieke) (ELDR)
*	Road transport: harmonisation of social legislation (repl. regul. 3820/85/EEC, amend. regul. 3821/85/EEC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	MARKOV Helmuth (GUE/NGL)
1	Cooperation for development: decentralised cooperation, extension until 31.12.2003 (amend. regul. 1659/98/EC)	Development, cooperation	CARRILHO Maria (PSE)
2	European Year of education through sport 2004	Culture, youth, education, media, sport	PACK Doris (PPE-DE)
3	Air pollution, greenhouse gas emission: scheme for allowance trading (amend. direct. 96/61/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	MOREIRA DA SILVA Jorge (PPE-DE)
*	Combating AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria: Community contribution to the Global Fund	Development, cooperation	
3	Medicinal products for human and veterinary use: authorisation and supervision, European Agency for evaluation	Environment, public health, consumers	MÜLLER Rosemarie (PSE)
*	Medicinal products for human use: Community code (amend. direct. 2001/83/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	GROSSETÊTE Françoise (PPE-DE)
3	Veterinary medicinal products: Community code (amend. direct. 2001/82/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	GROSSETÊTE Françoise (PPE-DE)

2	Air pollution: CO2 emissions, fuel consumption of N1 light commercial vehicles (amend. direct. 70/156/EEC, 80/1268/EEC)	Environment, public health, consumers	GOODWILL Robert (PPE-DE)
4	Industrial major-accidents: hazard control, dangerous substances (amend. direct. 96/82/EC, Seveso II)	Conciliation delegation	LISI Giorgio (PPE-DE)
3	Energy: use of biofuels for road transport	Industry, external trade, research... **	AYUSO GONZÁLEZ Maria del Pilar (PPE-DE)
1	Forests: protection against atmospheric pollution, extension to 2002 (amend. regul. 3528/86/EEC)	Environment, public health, consumers	REDONDO JIMÉNEZ Encarnación (PPE-DE)
1	Forests : protection against fire, extension to 2002 (amend. regul. 2158/92/EEC)	Environment, public health, consumers	REDONDO JIMÉNEZ Encarnación (PPE-DE)
2	Animal protection: use for experimental and scientific purposes (amend. direct. 86/609/EEC)	Environment, public health, consumers	JACKSON Caroline F. (PPE-DE)
2	Community statistics: 2003-2007 programme	Economic, monetary affairs	LULLING Astrid (PPE-DE)
1	Acoustic pollution : noise-related operating restrictions at Community airports	Regional, transport, tourism **	JARZEMBOWSKI Georg (PPE-DE)
4	Packaging and packaging waste (amend. direct. 94/62/EC)	Conciliation delegation	CORBET Dorette (PSE)
2	Community statistics: income and living conditions in the Union EU-SILC	Employment, social affairs	BOUWMAN Theodorus J.J. (VERTS/ALE)
1	Telecommunications: trans-european networks, guidelines (rev. annex I dec. 1336/97/EC)	Industry, external trade, research... **	FLESCH Colette (ELDR)
4	Air transport: compensation and assistance to air passengers for a denied boarding (repeal. regul. 295/91/EEC)	Conciliation delegation	LISI Giorgio (PPE-DE)
*	Noise pollution: noise classification of civil subsonic aircraft, calculation of noise charges	Environment, public health, consumers	BLOKLAND Johannes (Hans) (EDD)
4	Road transport: ecopoints for heavy vehicles transiting through Austria for 2004	Conciliation delegation	COSTA Paolo (ELDR)
2	Trans-European energy networks: guidelines (repeal. dec. 1254/96/EC)	Industry, external trade, research... **	CLEGG Nicholas (ELDR)
2	Commission, implementing powers: adapting provisions relating to committees, procedure art. 251 EC Treaty	Constitutional Affairs **	FRASSONI Monica (VERTS/ALE)
3	Road safety: mirrors, systems for indirect vision on vehicles (amend. direct. 70/156/EEC, repeal. direct. 71/127/EEC)	Legal affairs, internal market	GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
3	Public health: traditional herbal medicinal products (amend. direct. 2001/83/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	NISTICO' Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
*	Air transport: allocation of slots at Community airports (amend. regul. 95/93/EEC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	

4	Air safety: third countries aircraft using Community airports	Conciliation delegation	MAES Nelly (VERTS/ALE)
2	Indirect taxation in the internal market: Fiscalis programme 2003-2007	Economic, monetary affairs	GARCÍA-MARGALLO Y MARFIL José Manuel (PPE-DE)
2	Agricultural and forestry tractors: EC type-approval (repeal. direct. 74/50/EEC)	Legal affairs, internal market	GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
4	Environment: liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage	Conciliation delegation	MANDERS Toine (ELDR)
*	Community's railways: safety, licensing, levying of charges, certification (direct. 95/18/EC, 2001/14/EC). 2nd package	Conciliation delegation	STERCKX Dirk (ELDR)
*	Trans-European railway transport: interoperability (amend. direct. 96/48/EC, 2001/16/EC). 2nd package	Conciliation delegation	AINARDI Sylviane H. (GUE/NGL)
*	European railway area: European Railway Agency for interoperability and safety. 2nd package	Conciliation delegation	SAVARY Gilles (PSE)
*	Railway transport: development of the Community's railways (amend. direct. 91/440/EEC). 2nd package	Conciliation delegation	JARZEMBOWSKI Georg (PPE-DE)
1	Dangerous chemicals: export and import, Rotterdam Convention provisions	Environment, public health, consumers Legal affairs, internal market	BLOKLAND Johannes (Hans) (EDD) FOURTOU Janelly (PPE-DE)
1	Customs: action programme Customs 2007, 2003-2007		
2	Freight transport system: improving the environmental performance, programme Marco Polo PACT	Regional, transport, tourism **	BRADBURN Philip Charles (PPE-DE)
2	Dangerous substances: carcinogens, mutagens, toxic to reproduction c/m/r (25th amend. direct. 76/769/EEC)	Environment, public health, consumers	SCHÖRLING Inger (VERTS/ALE)
1	Agricultural statistics : improving and extension until 2007 (amend. dec. 96/411/EC)	Agriculture	JOVÉ PERES Salvador (GUE/NGL)
3	Biosafety: genetically modified organisms GMOs, Cartagena Protocol	Environment, public health, consumers Legal affairs, internal market	SJÖSTEDT Jonas (GUE/NGL) McCARTHY Arlene (PSE)
*	Patent law: patentability of computer-implemented inventions		
1	Developing countries, poverty diseases : combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis	Development, cooperation	WIJLMAN Anders (PPE-DE)
1	Health in developing countries: reproductive and sexual rights (repeal. regul. 1484/97/EC)	Development, cooperation	SANDBÆK Ulla Margrethe (EDD)
*	Professional qualifications: mutual recognition of the regulated professions to ensure free movement	Legal affairs, internal market	ZAPPALA' Stefano (PPE-DE)
3	Air transport: protection against unfair pricing practices from countries not members of the Community	Regional, transport, tourism **	CLEGG Nicholas (ELDR)

1	Internet: 1999-2002 action plan on promoting a safer use (amend. dec. 276/1999/EC), extension to 2004	Citizens' freedoms and rights, justice	NEWTON DUNN Bill (ELDR)
*	Temporary work: protective framework for workers, relationship with the temporary agency	Employment, social affairs	van den BURG Ieke (PSE)
3	Food safety: additive in feedingstuffs and in drinking water for animal nutrition	Agriculture	KEPPELHOFF-WIECHERT Hedwig (PPE-DE)
1	Safe seas: ro-ro passenger ships, specific stability requirements	Regional, transport, tourism **	POIGNANT Bernard (PSE)
1	Safe seas: passenger ships, safety rules and standards (amend. direct. 98/18/EC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	RIPOLL Y MARTÍNEZ DE BEDOYA Carlos (PPE-DE)
*	Expiry of the ECSC Treaty: prolongation of the statistics	Industry, external trade, research... **	
3	Energy and sustainable development: multiannual programme 'intelligent energy for Europe', 2003-2006	Industry, external trade, research... **	McNALLY Eryl Margaret (PSE)
2	Civil judicial cooperation: European enforcement order for uncontested claims	Legal affairs, internal market	WUERMELING Joachim (PPE-DE)
*	Education, training: programme Socrates, 2nd phase (amend. dec. 253/2000/EC)	Culture, youth, education, media, sport	ROCARD Michel (PSE)
2	EMU, statistics: transmission of the main aggregates national accounts, employment data (amend. regul. 2223/96/EC)	Economic, monetary affairs	LULLING Astrid (PPE-DE)
1	Insurance undertakings: annual and consolidated accounts and standards IAS (amend. direct. 78/660, 83/349, 91/674/EEC)	Legal affairs, internal market	THYSSEN Marianne L.P. (PPE-DE)
1	Company law: access to informations, disclosure requirements (amend. direct.68/151/EEC)	Legal affairs, internal market	LEHNE Klaus-Heiner (PPE-DE)
3	Information market: re-use and commercial exploitation of public sector documents	Industry, external trade, research... **	van VELZEN W.G. (PPE-DE)
*	Insurance of motor vehicles : civil liability, protection of victims of accidents (4th motor directive)	Legal affairs, internal market	ROTHLEY Willi (PSE)
*	Medicine: standards of quality and safety of human tissues and cells	Environment, public health, consumers	LIESE Peter (PPE-DE)
*	Organisation of working time (direct. 93/104/EC). Codified version	Legal affairs, internal market	GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
*	Money laundering: prevention by means of customs cooperation	Citizens' freedoms and rights, justice	SCHMITT Ingo (PPE-DE)
*	Cooperation to development: Asian and Latin America countries ALA (amend. regul. 2258/96/EC)	Development, cooperation	SANDERS-TEN HOLTE Maria Johanna (Marieke) (ELDR)
3	Products of animal origin, human consumption: safety, controls (amend. direct. 89/662, 91/67/EEC). Hygiene package	Environment, public health, consumers	SCHNELLDHARDT Horst (PPE-DE)
1	Environment : anti-fouling paints used on ships, prohibition of organotin compounds	Regional, transport, tourism **	CAVERI Luciano (ELDR)

3	Human consumption: nex sweeteners additives, sucralose and salt of aspartame (amend. direct. 94/35/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	FERREIRA Anne (PSE)
1	Food safety : smoke flavourings used on foods, authorisation procedure (direct. 88/388, regul. 178/2002/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	MALLIORI Minerva Melpomeni (PSE)
3	Forests : protection and monitoring of atmospheric pollution and fires, action 2003-2008 Forest Focus	Environment, public health, consumers	REDONDO JIMÉNEZ Encarnación (PPE-DE)
3	Higher education: co-operation with third countries, programme Erasmus Mundus 2004-2008	Culture, youth, education, media, sport	DE SARNEZ Marielle (PPE-DE)
2	European Environment Agency : budget and finances, access to documents (amend. regul. 1210/90/EEC)	Budgets	DELL'ALBA Gianfranco (NI)
2	European Food Safety Agency : budget and finances, access to documents (amend. regul. 178/2002/EC)	Budgets	DELL'ALBA Gianfranco (NI)
2	European Aviation Safety Agency: budget and finances, access to documents (amend. regul. 1592/2002/EC)	Budgets	DELL'ALBA Gianfranco (NI)
2	European Maritime Safety Agency: budget and finances, access to documents (amend. regul. 1406/2002/EC)	Budgets	DELL'ALBA Gianfranco (NI)
3	Energy: security of supply, providing heat and electricity by cogeneration (amend. direct. 92/42/EEC)	Industry, external trade, research... **	GLANTE Norbert (PSE)
3	Information society, eEurope: good practices and network security, MODINIS programme 2003-2005	Industry, external trade, research... **	READ Imelda Mary (PSE)
1	Human health, food additives: conditions of use for E 425 konjac (amend. direct. 95/2/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	PAULSEN Marit (ELDR)
1	Health and environment: use of nonylphenol, nonylphenol ethoxylate and cement (26th amend. direct. 76/769/EEC)	Environment, public health, consumers	LANNIYE Paul A.A.J.G. (VERTS/ALE)
1	Combating AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis: research partnership Europe/developing countries	Industry, external trade, research... **	CAUDRON Gérard (PSE)
3	Environmental protection: free movement of detergents, biodegradability and labelling	Environment, public health, consumers	NOBILIA Mauro (UEN)
*	Narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances: trade in drug precursors, monitoring and surveillance	Citizens' freedoms and rights, justice	PIRKER Hubert (PPE-DE)
*	Energy: petroleum products, security of supply	Industry, external trade, research... **	KARLSSON Hans (PSE)
*	Credit for consumers: harmonisation of the laws of the member States (repeal. direct. 87/102/EEC)	Legal affairs, internal market	WUERMEILING Joachim (PPE-DE)
1	Chemical substances: tests, good laboratory practice (direct. 87/18/EEC). Codified version	Legal affairs, internal market	GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)

1	Good laboratory practice: inspection and verification (direct. 88/320/EEC). Codified version	Legal affairs, internal market	GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
3	Air transport: insurance for air carriers and aircraft operators	Regional, transport, tourism **	NICHOLSON James (PPE-DE)
1	Company law: takeover bids	Legal affairs, internal market	LEHNE Klaus-Heiner (PPE-DE)
1	Steel industry: annual Community statistics on steel for 2003-2009	Industry, external trade, research... **	WESTENDORP Y CABEZA Carlos (PSE)
*	Pollution, public health : quality of bathing water (repeal. direct. 76/160/EEC)	Environment, public health, consumers	MAATEN Jules (ELDR)
*	Environment : sulphur content of marine fuels and heavy fueloils (amend. direct. 1999/32/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	de ROO Alexander (VERTS/ALE)
*	Environment, ozone layer: halons, chlorofluorocarbons CFCs and bromochloromethane (amend. regul. 2037/2000/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	JACKSON Caroline F. (PPE-DE)
3	Investment services and regulated markets (amend. direct. 85/611/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 2000/12/EC)	Economic, monetary affairs	VILLIERS Theresa (PPE-DE)
1	Foodstuff: additives facilitating the storage and the use of flavourings (amend direct. 95/2/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	AYUSO GONZÁLEZ María del Pilar (PPE-DE)
2	Air pollution: volatile organic compounds due to organic solvents, programme CAFE (amend. direct. 1999/13/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	LISI Giorgio (PPE-DE)
3	Education and training systems: eLearning programme 2004-2006 for integration of information technologies	Culture, youth, education, media, sport	MAURO Mario (PPE-DE)
1	Air pollution: compression ignition engines by non-road mobile machinery (amend. direct. 97/68/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	LANGE Bernd (PSE)
*	Electrical and electronic equipment: electromagnetic compatibility (revision direct. EMC 89/336/EEC)	Industry, external trade, research... **	BERENGUER FUSTER Luis (PSE)
*	Transeuropean road network : minimum safety requirements for tunnels	Regional, transport, tourism **	RACK Reinhard (PPE-DE)
1	Safety at sea: double hull or equivalent design requirements for oil tankers (regul. 417/2002, 2978/94/EC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	PIECYK Wilhelm Ernst (PSE)
1	Shipping: seafarers, minimum level of training (amend. direct. 2001/25/EC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	POIGNANT Bernard (PSE)
1	Consumers: financing Community actions 2004-2007, general framework	Environment, public health, consumers	WHITEHEAD Phillip (PSE)
1	Common agricultural policy CAP: economic accounts for agriculture EAA, methodology and time limits	Agriculture	IZQUIERDO ROJO María (PSE)
1	Intellectual property: enforcing the rights, measures and procedures	Legal affairs, internal market	FOURTOU Janelly (PPE-DE)
3	Daphne II programme 2004-2008: combating violence against	Women, equal opportunities	GRÖNER Lissy (PSE)

	children, young people and women		
1	Air pollution, greenhouse gas emissions, monitoring mechanism, Kyoto protocol (repeal. dec. 93/389/EEC)	Environment, public health, consumers	SACCONI Guido (PSE)
1	Food safety: feed and food, official controls	Environment, public health, consumers	PAULSEN Marit (ELDR)
1	Information society, eEurope 2005: European network and information security Agency	Industry, external trade, research... **	PAASILINNA Reino (PSE)
1	Road safety: protection of pedestrians, changes to the front of vehicles (amend. direct. 70/156/EEC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	VERMEER Herman (ELDR)
*	Maritime safety, prevention of pollution caused by ships: penalties for infringements	Regional, transport, tourism **	PEX Peter (PPE-DE)
1	Political parties at European level: statute and financing	Constitutional Affairs **	LEINEN Jo (PSE)
3	Air transport between the Community and third countries: negotiation and implementation of air service agreements	Regional, transport, tourism **	SCHMITT Ingo (PPE-DE)
*	Securities: issuers trading on a regulated market, transparency requirements (amend. direct. 2001/34/EC)	Economic, monetary affairs	SKINNER Peter William (PSE)
1	Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies TSE: prevention and control, transitional measures 1st July 2005	Environment, public health, consumers	JACKSON Caroline F. (PPE-DE)
1	Labour force in the Community: sample survey on employment and unemployment (amend. regul. 577/98/EC)	Employment, social affairs	BOUWMAN Theodorus J.J. (VERTS/ALE)
*	Pesticide: maximum levels of residue (repeal. direct. 76/895/EEC, 86/362/EEC, 86/363/EEC, 90/642/EEC)	Environment, public health, consumers	STURDY Robert William (PPE-DE)
*	Multimodal transport : intermodal loading units, transferred containers or swap bodies	Regional, transport, tourism **	STOCKMANN Ulrich (PSE)
*	Travel services: indirect taxation (VAT), administrative cooperation (amend. regul. 218/92/EEC)	Economic, monetary affairs	TORRES MARQUES Helena (PSE)
*	Road safety: two-wheel motor vehicles, passenger hand-holds. Codified version	Legal affairs, internal market	GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
*	Road safety: two-wheel motor vehicles, requirements for stands. Codified version	Legal affairs, internal market	GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
1	Milk and milk products : statistical surveys (amend. direct. 96/16/EC)	Agriculture	DAUL Joseph (PPE-DE)
1	Audiovisual industry : training programme for professionals, MEDIA-Training 2001-2005 (amend. dec. 163/2001/EC)	Culture, youth, education, media, sport	VATTIMO Gianni (PSE)
1	Audiovisual industry: development, distribution, promotion of works, MEDIA Plus for 2006 (amend. dec. 2000/821/EC)	Culture, youth, education, media, sport	VELTRONI Walter (PSE)
*	Animal feed: hygiene requirements and traceability of feed	Environment, public health, consumers	KEPPELHOFF-WIECHERT Hedwig (PPE-DE)

1	Culture 2000: framework programme 2000-2004, extension to 2006 (amend. dec. 508/2000/EC)	Culture, youth, education, media, sport	ROCARD Michel (PSE)
2	Trans-European transport network: electronic road toll systems, widespread introduction and interoperability	Regional, transport, tourism **	SOMMER Renate (PPE-DE)
1	Environment: waste electrical and electronic equipment WEEE, financing (amend. direct. 2002/96/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	FLORENZ Karl-Heinz (PPE-DE)
1	Agricultural statistics: aerial-surveys and remote-sensing techniques for 2004-2007 (amend. dec. 1445/2000/EC)	Agriculture	DAUL Joseph (PPE-DE)
*	Transeuropean networks: eTen telecommunications programme, funding ceiling (amend. regul. 2236/95/EC)	Industry, external trade, research... **	READ Imelda Mary (PSE)
1	Maritime transport: ship and port facility security	Regional, transport, tourism **	MIGUÉLEZ RAMOS Rosa (PSE)
*	Electrical industry: Community law on equipment subject to voltage limits (direct. 73/23/EEC). Codification	Legal affairs, internal market	GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
2	General government: quarterly financial accounts, ESA 95 categories	Economic, monetary affairs	LULLING Astrid (PPE-DE)
*	Protection of consumers' interests: Community law on injunctions (direct. 98/27/EC). Codification	Legal affairs, internal market	GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
*	Extractive industries: management of waste, juridical framework	Environment, public health, consumers	SJÖSTEDT Jonas (GUE/NGL)
3	Equality women and men: grants to organisations active at European level, 2004-2005 action programme	Women, equal opportunities	KRATSA-TSAGAROPOULOU Rodi (PPE-DE)
3	European youth: grants to bodies active at European level, 2004-2006 action programme	Culture, youth, education, media, sport	PRETS Christa (PSE)
3	Education and training : grants to bodies active at European level, 2004-2006 action programme	Culture, youth, education, media, sport	PACK Doris (PPE-DE)
2	Culture: grants to bodies active at European level, 2004-2006 action programme	Culture, youth, education, media, sport	IIVARI Ulpu (PSE)
*	Environment: persistent organic pollutants (amend. direct. 79/117/EEC and 96/59/EC), Stockholm Convention 2001	Environment, public health, consumers	FRAHM Pernille (GUE/NGL)
1	Road safety: motor vehicles, speed limitation devices and systèmes (amend. direct. 92/24/EEC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	COSTA Paolo (ELDR)
1	Asylum and migration : programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries, 2004-2008	Citizens' freedoms and rights, justice	SANTINI Giacomo (PPE-DE)
1	Statistics on the trading of goods between Member States Intrastat: common framework 2005 (repeal. regul. 3330/91/EEC)	Economic, monetary affairs	LULLING Astrid (PPE-DE)
*	Road safety: seats, anchorages, head restraints and safety belts (amend. direct. 74/408/EEC, 96/37/EC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	KOCH Dieter-Lebrecht (PPE-DE)

* Road safety: safety belts and restraint systems (amend. direct. 77/541/EEC, 2000/3/EC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	COSTA Paolo (ELDR)
* Consumer protection : unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices (amend. dir. 84/450/EEC, 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC)	Legal affairs, internal market	GHILARDOTTI Fiorella (PSE)
* Road safety: anchorages of safety belts (amend. direct. 76/115/EEC, 96/38/EC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	COSTA Paolo (ELDR)
1 Social security: employed persons, self-employed persons, and their families (amend. regul. 1408/71/EEC, 574/72/EEC)	Employment, social affairs	JENSEN Anne Elisabet (ELDR)
* Waste: supervision and control of shipments, Base Convention 1989 and OECD Decision 1992 (regul. 259/93/EEC)	Environment, public health, consumers	BLOKLAND Johannes (Hans) (EDD)
* Pan-European eGovernment services and networks: interoperable delivery, programme IDABC 2005-2009, follow-up IDA II	Industry, external trade, research... **	READ Imelda Mary (PSE)
* LIFE III, financial instrument for the environment (amend. regul. 1655/2000/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	JACKSON Caroline F. (PPE-DE)
1 Fight against fraud: protection of the Community financial interests, Hercule action programme 2004-2006	Budgetary control	BÖSCH Herbert (PSE)
* Car industry: harmonised approval of vehicles, trailers, systems (repeal., repl. direct. 70/156/EEC)	Legal affairs, internal market	GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
1 Development cooperation: decentralized cooperation, 2004-2006 (exten. and amend. regul. 1659/98/EC)	Development, cooperation	ZIMMERLING Jürgen (PPE-DE)
1 Marine pollution: European Maritime safety Agency (amend. regul. 1406/2002/EC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	MASTORAKIS Emmanouil (PSE)
* Consumer protection: cross-border infringements, administrative and legal cooperation	Legal affairs, internal market	GEBHARDT Evelyne (PSE)
* Air quality: heavy metals, arsenic, cadmium, mercury, nickel, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (direct. 96/62/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	KRONBERGER Hans (NI)
* Foodstuffs: nutrition or health claims used in the labelling (amend. direct. 2000/13/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	NOBILIA Mauro (UEN)
* Community customs code: treatments, controls and risk-related informations (amend. regul. 2913/92/EC)	Legal affairs, internal market	FOURTOU Janelly (PPE-DE)
* Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters: cross-border disputes, non-contractual obligations, Rome II	Legal affairs, internal market	WALLIS Diana (ELDR)
* Environment: setting of eco-design requirements for energy-using products (amend. direct. 92/42/EEC)	Environment, public health, consumers	THORS Astrid (ELDR)
* Air pollution: greenhouse gas emission allowance trading, Kyoto	Environment, public health, consumers	de ROO Alexander (VERTS/ALE)

	Protocol, linkage directive		
1	Public health: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control ECDC	Environment, public health, consumers	BOWIS John (PPE-DE)
*	Road transport: charging of heavy goods vehicles and infrastructures fees (amend. direct. 1999/62/CE Eurovignette)	Regional, transport, tourism **	COCILOVO Luigi (PPE-DE)
2	Development cooperation: promoting gender equality	Women, equal opportunities	ZRIHEN Olga (PSE)
1	Maritime transport and safety: transfer of cargo and passenger ships between registers within the Community	Regional, transport, tourism **	POIGNANT Bernard (PSE)
*	Foodstuff and food ingredients : extraction solvents used in the production (direct. 83/344/EEC). Codified version	Legal affairs, internal market	GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
*	Social security: employed, self employed persons and families (amend. regul. 1408/71/EEC, 574/72/EEC)	Employment, social affairs	GILLIG Marie-Hélène (PSE)
*	Climate change: fluorinated greenhouse gases, hydrofluorocarbons HFCs, perfluorocarbons PFCs, sulphur hexafluoride	Environment, public health, consumers	GOODWILL Robert (PPE-DE)
*	Schengen Convention: access for vehicle registration authorities to the Information System SIS	Citizens' freedoms and rights, justice	COELHO Carlos (PPE-DE)
1	Information society, eEurope: Community statistics	Industry, external trade, research... **	BERENGUER FUSTER Luis (PSE)
*	Community statistics: diffusion and creation of the Balance of Payments Committee	Industry, external trade, research... **	BERENGUER FUSTER Luis (PSE)
1	West Bank and Gaza Strip: financial and technical cooperation (amend. regul. 1734/94/EC)	Industry, external trade, research... **	BERENGUER FUSTER Luis (PSE)
*	Air pollution: compression-ignition or positive-ignition engines, natural or liquefied petroleum gas. Recast version	Environment, public health, consumers	LANGE Bernd (PSE)
*	Civil aviation: operation of civil subsonic jet aeroplanes (direct. 92/14/EEC). Codification	Legal affairs, internal market	GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
*	Protection of groundwater: prevention and control of pollution	Environment, public health, consumers	SCHLEICHER Ursula (PPE-DE)
*	Vehicles hired without drivers: use for the carriage of goods by road (direct. 84/647/EEC). Codified version	Legal affairs, internal market	GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
*	Air transport: common rules for civil aviation security (amend. regul. 2320/2002/EC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	DHAENE Jan (VERTS/ALE)
*	Road safety: frontal protection systems on motor vehicles (amend. Direct. 70/156/EEC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	HEDKVIST PETERSEN Ewa (PSE)
*	Agricultural surveys in 2005 and 2007: structure of holdings of the new Member States (amend. regul. 571/88/EEC)	Budgets	BÖGE Reimer (PPE-DE)
*	Environment: access to information and justice, public participation,	Environment, public health, consumers	KORHOLA Eija-Riitta Anneli (PPE-DE)

application of the Aarhus Convention		
* Development cooperation, EC/South Africa relations (amend. regul. 1726/2000/EC)	Development, cooperation	MAES Nelly (VERTS/ALE)
* Environment: public's right of access to justice	Environment, public health, consumers	SCHÖRLING Inger (VERTS/ALE)
* Cooperation to development: democracy, rule of law, human rights (prorog. regul. 975/1999/EC)	Development, cooperation	FERNÁNDEZ MARTÍN Fernando (PPE-DE)
* Driving licences: issue, validity, renewal. Recasting (repeal direct. 91/438/EEC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	GROSCH Mathieu J.H. (PPE-DE)
* Road transport, working time: enforcing social legislation (direct. 2002/15/CE)	Regional, transport, tourism **	MARKOV Helmuth (GUE/NGL)
* Chemicals : REACH system and European Agency (amend. direct. 999/45/EC, regul. on persistent organic pollutants)	Environment, public health, consumers	SACCONI Guido (PSE)
* Chemicals : classification, labelling, packaging, adaptation to the REACH regulation (amend. direct. 67/548/EEC)	Environment, public health, consumers	SACCONI Guido (PSE)
* LIFE III, financial instrument for the environment: extension till 31 December 2006 (amend. regul. 1655/2000/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers	JACKSON Caroline F. (PPE-DE)
* Protection of human health: addition of nutrients to food	Environment, public health, consumers	LUND Torben (PSE)
* Financial services: new organisational structure of the committees (amend. 8 directives)	Economic, monetary affairs	RANDZIO-PLATH Christa (PSE)
* Food safety: materials and articles intended to come into contact with food (repeal. direct. 8/109/EEC)	Environment, public health, consumers	THORS Astrid (ELDR)
* European capital of culture: criteria for submitting nomination of cities, 2009-2019 (amend. direct. 1419/1999/EC)	Culture, youth, education, media, sport	ROCARD Michel (PSE)
* Cross-border merges between various types of company with share capital	Legal affairs, internal market	ROTHLEY Willi (PSE)
* Environment: treating and disposing of batteries and accumulators (repeal direct. 91/157/EEC, 91/101/EC, 93/86/EEC)	Environment, public health, consumers	BLOKLAND Johannes (Hans) (EDD)
* Waste (direct. 75/442/EEC). Codification	Legal affairs, internal market	GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
* Maritime transport: activities of third countries in the field of cargo shipping (codif. direct. 78/774/EEC)	Legal affairs, internal market	GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
* Maritime transport: International Safety Management Code ISM, applic. to ro-ro passenger ferries (regul. 3051/95/EC)	Regional, transport, tourism **	COSTA Paolo (ELDR)
* Small and medium-sized enterprises SMEs: multiannual programme 2001-2005 (amend. dec. 2000/819/EC)	Industry, external trade, research... **	RÜBIG Paul (PPE-DE)
* European audiovisual Observatory: Community participation till	Culture, youth, education, media, sport	SANDERS-TEN HOLTE Maria Johanna (Marieke) (ELDR)

31.12.2006 (amend. dec. 1999/784/EC)		
* EMU statistics: quarterly non-financial accounts by institutional sector, common framework for Member States	Economic, monetary affairs	LULLING Astrid (PPE-DE)
* Trans-European energy networks: guidelines for the enlargement (repeal. dec. 96/391/EC, 1229/2003/EC)	Industry, external trade, research... **	FLESCH Colette (ELDR)
* Energy policy : promote the energy efficiency for end-users, energy saves	Industry, external trade, research... **	ROTHE Mechtild (PSE)
* Internal market for electricity: safeguard security of supplies, infrastructure investment	Industry, external trade, research... **	CHICHESTER Giles Bryan (PPE-DE)
* Energy: internal market in natural gas, cross-border exchanges, access to the transmission networks	Industry, external trade, research... **	SEPPÄNEN Esko Olavi (GUE/NGL)
* Enlargement: reference amounts of expenditure programmes adopted by co-decision (amend. decisions sui generis)	Budgets	BÖGE Reimer (PPE-DE)
1 Enlargement: reference amounts of expenditure programmes adopted by co-decision (amend. decisions)	Budgets	BÖGE Reimer (PPE-DE)
1 Enlargement: reference amounts of expenditure programmes adopted by co-decision (amend. regulations)	Budgets	BÖGE Reimer (PPE-DE)
* Education and training: transparency of qualifications and competences, single framework Europass	Culture, youth, education, media, sport	ZISSENER Sabine (PPE-DE)
* Excise duties: administrative cooperation and exchange of information (amend. direct. 77/799/EEC, 92/12/EEC)	Economic, monetary affairs	RANDZIO-PLATH Christa (PSE)
* Water pollution: dangerous substances discharged in the aquatic environment (direct. 76/464/EEC). Codified version	Legal affairs, internal market	MacCORMICK Neil (VERTS/ALE)
* Internal market: freedom of establishment for service providers and free movement of services	Legal affairs, internal market	GEBHARDT Evelyne (PSE)
* Water policy, pollution: quality of waters capable of supporting freshwater fish (codif. direct. 78/659/EEC)	Legal affairs, internal market	GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
* Carriage of goods by road (repeal. direct. 62/2005/EEC). Codified version	Legal affairs, internal market	GARGANI Giuseppe (PPE-DE)
* Internet: 2005-2008 action programme on promoting a safer use, Safer Internet plus.	Citizens' freedoms and rights, justice	
* European digital content: quality, access to, use and exploitation, eContentplus. 2005-2008 programme.	Industry, external trade, research... **	Van VELZEN W.G. (PPE-DE)
* Maritime transport: enhancing port security	Regional, transport, tourism **	
* Fight against fraud: investigations by the European anti-fraud Office	Budgetary control	BÖSCH Herbert (PSE)

OLAF (amend. regul. 1073/1999/EC)	
* Environment and health : polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons in extender oils and tyres (27th amend. direct. 76/769/EEC)	Environment, public health, consumers
* Cooperation EC/Asian and Latin America countries: aid to uprooted people after end 2004 (amend. regul. 2130/2001/EC)	Development, cooperation
* Community statistics: analysis of continuing vocational training in enterprises	Employment, social affairs
* Enlargement, environment: packaging and packaging waste (amend. direct. 94/62/EC)	Environment, public health, consumers
* Railway transport of passengers: opening to international competition (amend. direct. 91/440/EEC). 3rd package	Regional, transport, tourism **
* Railway transport: certification of train crews and drivers. 3rd package	Regional, transport, tourism **
* Railway transport: international rail passengers' rights and obligations. 3rd package	Regional, transport, tourism **
* Rail freight services: compensation in case of non-compliance with contractual quality requirements. 3rd package	Regional, transport, tourism **
* Motor vehicles : re-usability, recyclability and recovery of components (amend. direct. 70/156/CEE)	Environment, public health, consumers
* Civil judicial cooperation : recovery of uncontested claims,European order for payment procedure	
* Statutory audit of annual and consolidated accounts (amend. direct. 78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC, repeal. direct. 84/253/EEC)	
* Cinematographic heritage: collection and preservation, competitiveness of related industrial activities	Culture, youth, education, media, sport

Appendix II. Second reading codecision roll-call votes, start 5th EP to end 2000

Date	Rapporteur	RCV Sponsor	Yes	No	Abstain	Main Policy Issue
16/11/1999	Smet	? (no record in minutes)	455	3	29	
16/11/1999	Smet	? (no record in minutes)	341	115	37	
16/11/1999	Lange	? (no record in minutes)	291	204	9	
16/11/1999	Lange	? (no record in minutes)	229	257	15	Inter-Institutional
16/11/1999	Lange	? (no record in minutes)	274	208	22	
16/11/1999	Lange	? (no record in minutes)	235	251	16	
16/11/1999	Lange	? (no record in minutes)	274	207	18	
16/11/1999	Lange	? (no record in minutes)	274	211	11	Environment
16/11/1999	Lange	? (no record in minutes)	253	238	16	Economics
16/11/1999	Lange	? (no record in minutes)	232	256	16	Economics
02/12/1999	Gonzalez Alvarez	V/ALE	416	26	12	
02/12/1999	Gonzalez Alvarez	V/ALE	251	199	10	Environment
02/12/1999	Gonzalez Alvarez	V/ALE	43	412	22	Environment
15/12/1999	Hulthen	V/ALE	263	272	13	Environment
15/12/1999	Hulthen	PSE	285	239	10	Environment
15/12/1999	Hulthen	V/ALE	274	261	14	Environment
15/12/1999	Hulthen	PSE	264	237	35	Environment
15/12/1999	Hulthen	PSE	499	23	30	Environment
15/12/1999	Hulthen	PSE	304	222	22	Environment
15/12/1999	Hulthen	PSE	302	238	12	Environment
15/12/1999	Hulthen	V/ALE	299	230	26	Environment
15/12/1999	Hulthen	PPE-DE/DE	82	449	24	Environment
15/12/1999	Hulthen	PSE	533	5	18	Environment
15/12/1999	Hulthen	PPE-DE/DE	102	414	32	Environment
15/12/1999	Hulthen	PSE	310	223	22	Environment
15/12/1999	Hulthen	PPE-DE/DE	83	448	21	Environment
03/02/2000	Florenz	V/ALE	329	179	20	Economics
03/02/2000	Florenz	V/ALE	188	337	8	Economics
03/02/2000	Florenz	V/ALE, PPE-DE-ED	181	334	12	Economics
03/02/2000	Florenz	V/ALE, PPE-DE-ED	323	198	11	Environment
03/02/2000	Florenz	V/ALE	292	215	16	Environment
03/02/2000	Florenz	V/ALE	311	195	12	Environment
03/02/2000	Florenz	V/ALE	216	293	13	Environment
16/02/2000	Lienemann	EDD	17	422	12	Inter-Institutional
16/02/2000	Lienemann	EDD	57	422	4	Inter-Institutional
16/02/2000	Lienemann	V/ALE	393	145	19	
16/02/2000	Lienemann	V/ALE	374	170	10	
16/02/2000	Lienemann	V/ALE	456	76	18	
16/02/2000	Lienemann	V/ALE	516	23	10	
16/02/2000	Lienemann	PPE-DE-ED	495	49	12	
16/02/2000	Lienemann	PPE-DE-ED	289	240	13	
16/02/2000	Lienemann	PSE	278	269	8	
16/02/2000	Lienemann	PSE	481	61	11	
16/02/2000	Lienemann	PSE	457	85	14	
16/02/2000	Lienemann	V/ALE	500	49	7	
16/02/2000	Lienemann	V/ALE	534	3	16	
16/02/2000	Lienemann	V/ALE	267	271	15	
16/02/2000	Lienemann	UEN	420	90	41	

16/02/2000	Lienemann	UEN	356	145	42	
16/02/2000	Lienemann	V/ALE	117	419	12	
16/02/2000	Lienemann	V/ALE	385	122	44	
16/02/2000	Lienemann	V/ALE	405	103	34	
16/02/2000	Lienemann	V/ALE	360	136	47	
16/02/2000	Lienemann	PSE, V/ALE	451	80	15	
16/02/2000	Lienemann	V/ALE	136	397	20	
16/02/2000	Lienemann	V/ALE	448	80	23	
16/02/2000	Lienemann	V/ALE	363	134	51	
16/02/2000	Lienemann	V/ALE	291	213	42	
16/02/2000	Lienemann	V/ALE	331	199	19	
14/03/2000	Bouwman	UEN, PPE-DE-ED, ELDR	325	148	14	
14/03/2000	Bouwman	UEN, PPE-DE-ED, ELDR	355	120	13	
14/03/2000	Bouwman	PPE-DE-ED	436	33	17	
15/03/2000	Lannoye	GUE/NGL	174	335	22	Environment
15/03/2000	Lannoye	UEN	177	344	14	Environment
15/03/2000	Lannoye	V/ALE	204	317	14	Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000	Lannoye	UEN	170	341	29	Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000	Lannoye	V/ALE	216	305	15	Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000	Lannoye	V/ALE, UEN	204	312	27	Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000	Lannoye	V/ALE	236	296	15	Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000	Lannoye	UEN	165	311	18	Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000	Lannoye	V/ALE	208	302	33	Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000	Lannoye	V/ALE	196	329	19	Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000	Lannoye	V/ALE	189	319	41	Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000	Lannoye	V/ALE	190	342	14	Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000	Lannoye	V/ALE	311	218	11	Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000	Blockland	EDD	216	300	37	Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000	Blockland	EDD	245	269	37	Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000	Blockland	EDD	282	231	39	Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000	Blockland	EDD	276	233	39	Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000	Blockland	V/ALE	331	194	28	Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000	Blockland	EDD	298	220	33	
15/03/2000	Blockland	EDD	277	233	33	
15/03/2000	Blockland	EDD	253	263	26	
15/03/2000	Blockland	EDD	248	261	36	
15/03/2000	Blockland	EDD	245	268	38	
15/03/2000	Blockland	EDD	281	229	36	Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000	Blockland	EDD	292	222	37	Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000	Blockland	EDD	202	309	37	Inter-Institutional
15/03/2000	Blockland	EDD	239	229	38	External/Trade
15/03/2000	Blockland	EDD	205	311	35	External/Trade
15/03/2000	Blockland	EDD	121	390	33	External/Trade
15/03/2000	Blockland	EDD	102	418	35	External/Trade
15/03/2000	Blockland	EDD	233	281	33	External/Trade
15/03/2000	Blockland	EDD	206	306	39	Environment
15/03/2000	Blockland	EDD	388	122	45	Environment
15/03/2000	Blockland	EDD	237	280	35	Environment
15/03/2000	Blockland	EDD	422	86	42	Environment
15/03/2000	Blockland	EDD	228	266	40	Environment
15/03/2000	Blockland	EDD	261	251	34	Environment
11/04/2000	Kauppi	PPE-DE	34	360	3	Inter-Institutional
11/04/2000	Kauppi	PPE-DE	238	177	5	Inter-Institutional

11/04/2000	Kauppi	PPE-DE	86	333	6	Inter-Institutional
11/04/2000	Lannoye	PPE-DE	429	11	8	Inter-Institutional
12/04/2000	Bowe	PSE	454	46	2	Inter-Institutional
12/04/2000	Bowe	PSE	502	2	1	Environment
12/04/2000	Bowe	PSE, PPE-DE	407	101	2	
12/04/2000	Bowe	V/ALE	315	198	2	
12/04/2000	Bowe	PPE-DE	412	100	3	
12/04/2000	Bowe	PPE-DE	413	96	5	Economics
12/04/2000	Bowe	PPE-DE	379	128	8	Economics
12/04/2000	Bowe	PSE	415	59	43	Inter-Institutional
12/04/2000	Bowe	V/ALE	141	344	30	Inter-Institutional
12/04/2000	Bowe	GUE/NGL	283	201	36	Social
12/04/2000	Bowe	PSE	449	73	2	Economics
12/04/2000	Bowe	V/ALE	278	204	42	Economics
12/04/2000	Bowe	PSE	422	100	2	Economics
12/04/2000	Bowe	GUE/NGL	300	154	11	Economics
12/04/2000	Bowe	PPE-DE	184	307	8	
12/04/2000	Bowe	V/ALE	314	149	35	
12/04/2000	Bowe	GUE/NGL	286	203	13	Inter-Institutional
12/04/2000	Bowe	V/ALE	284	189	25	Inter-Institutional
13/06/2000	McKen	V/ALE	295	193	3	
13/06/2000	McKen	V/ALE	296	203	6	Environment
13/06/2000	McKen	PPE-DE	500	6	4	
13/06/2000	McKen	PPE-DE	517	1	5	Internal EP
13/06/2000	McKen	PPE-DE	512	0	5	
13/06/2000	McKen	PPE-DE	519	0	3	
13/06/2000	McKen	PPE-DE	515	6	4	
13/06/2000	McKen	PPE-DE	498	26	2	
05/07/2000	Jarzembowski	V/ALE	248	286	14	
05/07/2000	Jarzembowski	GUE/NGL, V/ALE	400	135	17	
05/07/2000	Jarzembowski	GUE/NGL, V/ALE	391	138	13	
05/07/2000	Jarzembowski	ELDR	248	289	16	
05/07/2000	Jarzembowski	ELDR	239	302	11	Environment
05/07/2000	Jarzembowski	GUE/NGL	426	115	11	Environment
05/07/2000	Jarzembowski	V/ALE	420	110	14	Environment
05/07/2000	Jarzembowski	ELDR, V/ALE	260	286	9	Environment
05/07/2000	Jarzembowski	GUE/NGL, V/ALE	380	162	7	Environment
05/07/2000	Jarzembowski	GUE/NGL	372	174	14	Environment
05/07/2000	Jarzembowski	GUE/NGL, V/ALE	239	293	13	Environment
05/07/2000	Jarzembowski	GUE/NGL	343	207	8	Environment
05/07/2000	Swoboda	V/ALE	40	502	10	Environment
05/07/2000	Swoboda	GUE/NGL	145	393	19	Environment
05/07/2000	Swoboda	GUE/NGL	415	123	17	Environment
05/07/2000	Swoboda	V/ALE	290	254	12	Environment
05/07/2000	Swoboda	GUE/NGL	466	66	16	Environment
05/07/2000	Swoboda	V/ALE	287	240	16	Social
06/07/2000	Garcia-Orcoyen Tormo	EPP-ED	487	6	5	External/Trade
06/07/2000	Garcia-Orcoyen Tormo	V/ALE	299	208	3	Inter-Institutional
06/07/2000	Garcia-Orcoyen Tormo	PSE	466	26	7	External/Trade
06/07/2000	Garcia-Orcoyen Tormo	V/ALE	280	218	4	External/Trade
06/07/2000	Garcia-Orcoyen	V/ALE	256	242	4	External/Trade

	Tormo					
	Garcia-Orcoyen					
06/07/2000	Tormo	V/ALE	287	216	8	External/Trade
	Garcia-Orcoyen					
06/07/2000	Tormo	V/ALE	290	219	5	
06/07/2000	Breyer	PSE	313	193	6	
06/07/2000	Breyer	PSE	309	193	4	
06/07/2000	Breyer	PSE	306	201	5	
06/07/2000	Breyer	PSE	296	208	6	
12/12/2000	Liese	EPP-ED	499	0	14	
12/12/2000	Liese	EPP-ED, V/ALE	516	0	13	
12/12/2000	Liese	V/ALE	92	429	9	
12/12/2000	Liese	EPP-ED, V/ALE	517	1	11	Internal EP
12/12/2000	Liese	EPP-ED, V/ALE	508	1	17	Internal EP
13/12/2000	Maaten	ELDR, V/ALE, PSE	187	330	15	Internal EP
13/12/2000	Maaten	EDD	422	92	27	Internal EP
13/12/2000	Maaten	EPP	227	308	15	Internal EP
13/12/2000	Maaten	V/ALE	205	327	21	Internal EP

Appendix III. Correlation tables

Correlation between variables, allocation of reports

	Reports	adgov	nongov	nonopp	chair	position	salience	dissent	ep	absolute	partysize	attendance	countrysize	Eldr	green	pes	small
Reports	1.000																
adgov	0.215 ***	1.000															
nongov	-0.052 ***	-0.187 ***	1.000														
nonopp	-0.102 **	-0.235 ***	-0.258 ***	1.000													
chair	0.519 ***	0.148 ***	-0.069 ***	-0.079 *	1.000												
position	0.143 ***	0.154 ***	0.289 ***	-0.225 ***	0.017	1.000											
salience	0.190 ***	0.082 *	-0.075 *	0.040	0.036	0.168 ***	1.000										
dissent	0.129 ***	0.084 *	0.072 *	0.011	0.108 **	-0.002	-0.015	1.000									
ep	0.124 ***	0.080	0.238 ***	-0.129 ***	0.009	0.770 ***	-0.091 **	-0.042	1.000								
absolutes	0.006	-0.002	-0.134 ***	-0.010	0.036	-0.240 ***	-0.058	0.164 ***	0.011	1.000							
partysize	0.714 ***	0.331 ***	-0.136 ***	-0.236 ***	0.303 ***	0.149 ***	0.295 ***	0.160 ***	0.082 *	-0.012	1.000						
attendance	0.049	-0.220 ***	0.285 ***	0.330 ***	-0.091 **	0.077 *	0.202 ***	0.162 ***	0.146 ***	0.067	-0.010	1.000					
countrysize	0.197 ***	0.300 ***	-0.402 ***	-0.512 ***	0.140 ***	-0.013 ***	-0.095 **	-0.049	0.025	0.034	0.381 ***	-0.570 ***	1.000				
eldr	-0.062 ***	-0.158 ***	0.210 ***	0.023	-0.034	0.273 ***	0.080	-0.007	0.219 ***	-0.434 ***	-0.167 ***	0.138 ***	-0.081 *	1.000			
green	-0.086	-0.019	0.002	0.076	-0.031	-0.048	-0.126 ***	0.148 ***	0.235 ***	0.539 ***	-0.149 ***	0.042	-0.055	-0.176 ***	1.000		
pes	0.138 ***	0.199 ***	0.200 ***	-0.178 ***	0.022	0.322 ***	0.222 ***	0.145 ***	0.173 ***	-0.110 **	0.267 ***	0.090 **	-0.051	-0.198 ***	-0.171 ***	1.000	
small	-0.188 ***	-0.057	-0.251 ***	0.051	-0.095 **	-0.734 ***	-0.201 ***	-0.180 ***	-0.556 ***	0.040	-0.153 ***	-0.088 **	0.059	-0.284 ***	-0.245 ***	-0.275 ***	1.000

*** Correlation significant at .01, ** Correlation significant at .05, * Correlation significant at .1

Correlation between variables, completion of legislation

start	reading	experience	nominate	adgov	Nongov	chair	trend	incumbent	position	salience	dissent	ep	country	party	Attend	eldr	green	pes	small	
reading	1.00																			
experience	0.051	1.00																		
Nominate	0.064	-0.123	1.00																	
Adgov	-0.066	-0.038	-0.228 ***	1.00																
Nongov	-0.007	-0.037	-0.179 ***	-0.249 ***	1.00															
Chair	-0.054	0.161 **	0.089	0.120	-0.112 *	1.00														
Trend	-0.096	0.264 ***	0.009	0.024	-0.037	0.127 **	1.00													
incumbent	0.098	-0.001	-0.034	0.069	-0.091	0.084	-0.067	1.00												
Position	0.031	0.049	-0.114 *	0.255 ***	0.124 **	-0.065	0.124 **	0.065	1.00											
Salience	-0.023	-0.019	0.148 **	0.207 ***	-0.188 ***	-0.014	0.123 **	-0.017	0.270 ***	1.00										
Dissent	-0.007	-0.066	0.171 ***	-0.068	0.097	0.107 *	-0.040	-0.127 **	-0.523 ***	-0.218 ***	1.00									
ep	0.059	0.104	-0.325 ***	0.127 **	-0.009	-0.087	0.089	0.088	0.809 ***	0.014	-0.514 ***	1.00								
countrysize	-0.056	-0.028	0.358 ***	0.217 ***	-0.492 ***	0.065	0.096	0.067	-0.011	0.138 **	0.258 ***	0.036	1.00							
partysize	0.103	0.009	0.517 ***	0.201 ***	-0.356 ***	0.006	0.084	0.229 ***	0.020	0.276 ***	0.163 ***	-0.008	0.712 ***	1.00						
attendance	0.37	-0.079	-0.140 **	-0.090	0.202 ***	-0.071	-0.149 **	0.246 ***	0.139 **	0.142 **	-0.131 **	0.123 **	-0.284 ***	-0.014	1.00					
eldr	-0.01	0.185 ***	-0.029	-0.213 ***	0.300 ***	-0.063	-0.041	-0.299 ***	0.154 **	0.075	-0.086	0.205 ***	-0.250 ***	-0.316 ***	0.024	1.00				
green	-0.005	-0.076	-0.533 ***	-0.082	0.068	0.060	-0.077	0.012	-0.150 **	-0.279 ***	0.062	0.151 **	-0.162 ***	-0.311 ***	0.056	-0.105	1.00			
pes	-0.074	-0.152 **	-0.470 ***	0.535 ***	0.099	-0.066	0.130 **	0.082	0.325 ***	0.228 ***	0.005	0.141 **	0.011	0.075	0.087	-0.218 ***	-0.186 ***	1.00		
small	-0.020	-0.010	-0.235 ***	0.150 **	-0.112 *	-0.094	-0.075 **	0.140 **	-0.316 ***	-0.187 ***	-0.224 ***	-0.149 **	-0.136 **	-0.300 ***	-0.47 *	-0.108 *	-0.092	-0.191 ***	1	

*** Correlation significant at .01, ** Correlation significant at .05, * Correlation significant at .1.

Correlation between variables, second reading voting, all voting decisions

	Adgov	nongov	nonopp	position	salience	dissent	ep	Nom- inate	partysize	attendance	Country- size	decision	edd	eldr	green	gue	non	pes	uen
Adgov	1																		
nongov	-0.234	1																	
nonopp	-0.232	-0.121	1																
position	0.267	0.184	-0.140	1															
salience	0.163	-0.194	-0.071	0.253	1														
dissent	-0.016	0.071	-0.060	-0.285	-0.126	1													
ep	0.215	0.123	-0.022	0.818	0.001	-0.289	1												
nominate	-0.300	-0.116	-0.067	0.047	0.229	0.083	-0.195	1											
partysize	0.206	-0.287	-0.302	0.103	0.305	0.245	0.100	0.409	1										
attendance	-0.109	0.249	0.192	0.204	0.289	0.116	0.203	0.006	0.184	1									
countrysize	0.235	-0.480	-0.484	-0.105	0.018	0.160	-0.010	0.164	0.578	-0.345	1								
decision	0.043	0.031	0.017	0.044	0.023	0.019	0.059	-0.075	0.000	0.059	-0.031	1							
edd	-0.101	-0.053	0.110	-0.314	0.058	-0.205	-0.283	-0.060	-0.129	-0.045	-0.010	-0.028	1						
eldr	-0.148	0.172	0.153	0.162	0.032	-0.067	0.166	-0.023	-0.250	0.029	-0.151	0.033	-0.047	1					
green	0.033	0.046	0.148	-0.070	-0.170	0.098	0.172	-0.442	-0.216	0.045	-0.090	0.033	-0.039	-0.081	1				
gue	-0.030	-0.092	0.017	-0.412	-0.284	-0.023	-0.171	-0.431	-0.233	-0.037	-0.018	0.006	-0.040	-0.083	-0.068	1			
non	-0.161	-0.084	0.081	-0.265	-0.294	-0.080	-0.139	0.018	-0.178	-0.261	0.050	-0.037	-0.036	-0.076	-0.063	-0.064	1		
pes	0.499	0.155	-0.225	0.368	0.201	0.081	0.263	-0.409	0.196	0.111	0.017	0.074	-0.098	-0.203	-0.168	-0.171	-0.156	1	
uen	-0.015	-0.068	-0.039	-0.185	0.017	-0.120	-0.341	0.039	-0.098	-0.185	-0.049	-0.041	-0.029	-0.061	-0.050	-0.051	-0.047	-0.126	1

All correlations are significant at .01 level except UEN and decision, party-size and decision and attendance and nominate score. The correlation only becomes significant for the latter two pairs at the .1 level. The correlation between UEN and decision is not significant even at this level.

Correlation between variables, second reading voting, non-voting excluded

	adgov	nongov	nonopp	position	saliency	dissent	ep	nominate	partysize	attendance	Country-size	Decision	edd	eldr	green	gue	non	pes	uen	
adgov	1																			
nongov	-0.240	1																		
nonopp	-0.236	-0.127	1																	
position	0.253	0.182	-0.140	1																
saliency	0.156	-0.208	-0.073	0.245	1															
dissent	-0.017	0.070	-0.066	-0.318	-0.122	1														
ep	0.208	0.118	-0.024	0.815	-0.004	-0.326	1													
nominate	-0.301	-0.118	-0.065	0.043	0.234	0.086	-0.205	1												
partysize	0.208	-0.298	-0.310	0.084	0.309	0.233	0.085	0.411	1											
attendance	-0.121	0.246	0.187	0.202	0.283	0.106	0.202	0.019	0.177	1										
countrysize	0.249	-0.483	-0.483	-0.102	0.026	0.171	-0.004	0.164	0.595	-0.334	1									
decision	0.046	0.026	0.011	0.034	0.012	0.010	0.052	-0.083	-0.013	0.038	-0.024	1								
edd	-0.084	-0.045	0.134	-0.266	0.055	-0.173	-0.239	-0.071	-0.110	-0.013	-0.038	-0.011	1							
eldr	-0.159	0.168	0.156	0.161	0.032	-0.071	0.165	-0.022	-0.258	0.033	-0.152	0.030	-0.041	1						
green	0.031	0.042	0.147	-0.080	-0.182	0.094	0.172	-0.450	-0.224	0.037	-0.088	0.032	-0.034	-0.085	1					
gue	-0.033	-0.094	0.025	-0.428	-0.282	-0.034	-0.178	-0.425	-0.234	-0.044	-0.019	0.005	-0.033	-0.084	-0.070	1				
non	-0.151	-0.081	0.075	-0.257	-0.280	-0.077	-0.139	0.028	-0.166	-0.268	0.052	-0.020	-0.029	-0.073	-0.060	-0.059	1			
pes	0.497	0.155	-0.232	0.361	0.192	0.078	0.254	-0.412	0.191	0.102	0.019	0.073	-0.083	-0.211	-0.175	-0.172	-0.148	1		
uen	-0.023	-0.068	-0.036	-0.198	0.021	-0.123	-0.349	0.039	-0.097	-0.197	-0.038	-0.038	-0.024	-0.061	-0.051	-0.050	-0.043	-0.125	1	

All correlations are significant at .01 level except UEN and decision and between ep and country-size. The correlation between these two pairs is not even significant at the .1 level.