DECONSTRUCTING THE BEAST

CONTEMPORARY REPRESENTATIONS AND DISCOURSES

ON THE NATURE OF ANIMALS IN URBAN BRITAIN

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To

Sula

I shall be telling this with a sigh

Somewhere ages and ages hence:

Two roads diverged in a wood and I -

I took the one less travelled by,

And that has made all the difference.

(from *The Road Not Taken*

by Robert Frost 1874 - 1963)

ABSTRACT

This thesis explores contemporary representations and discourses on the nature of animals through the development and investigation of the psychodynamics of dehumanisation. Psychodynamics integrates the discursive structuring of knowledge with the psychoanalytical defence mechanisms of projection and introjection. Hollway's (1989) theory of psychodynamic investment is applied here to account for the reproduction of species-differentiated beliefs and behaviours. This provides the parameters for a model of dehumanisation which is the referent for the empirical exploration.

The methodological approach employed centres on triangulation. Semi-structured interviews with vegetarians and non-vegetarians are discourse analysed to reveal patterns of naturalisation in the production of social meanings and the participation in social practices. The analysis reveals the content of the psychodynamic investments in three hegemonic discourses: nonhuman animals as Objects, Referents and Utensils. In order to explore representations of the referent, 'beast', newspaper articles are semiologically content analysed. This analysis identifies aspects of human experience which are projected onto nonhuman animal representations, through anthropomorphism and zoomorphism. To explore one example of these metaphors, the fantasy 'beast', a semiotic analysis of narrative was conducted on *Wilderness*, the book and derived drama, further articulating the symbolic dimension of irresolute species boundaries in a modern twist on the lycanthropic myth. The model of dehumanisation is developed to interpret the analysis of the texts.

Deconstruction of these texts provide evidence for the anthropocentric, anthropomorphic and zoomorphic dialectics of self:other reflected in the violent construction of human versus nonhuman animal identity. The synthesised model of dehumanisation illustrates both the human desire to acknowledge and oppress nonhuman animals and the ubiquitous 'beast within', as part of the psychodynamic construction of subjectivity. In conclusion, the deconstructed 'beast' is revealed as a modern-day ideological chimera which signifies the ambivalence of humans' understanding of themselves as animals.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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1: THE NATURE OF THE BEAST

The fact that we are simultaneously both animal and human poses a real problem as to how the two categories should be distinguished (Leach, 1982:121).

Leach's identification of this problem summarises the motivation behind this thesis. In the following chapters, I shall be exploring the ways in which this problem is conceptualised through the psychodynamic construction of 'human' in relation to 'animal'. Through my experiences, reading and analyses I have been continually confronted with a pervasive theme - the idea that humans are not 'real' animals. We may share animal bodies but the human 'mind' or, in other discourses, the 'soul' elevates humans beyond the animal kingdom. Scientifically speaking, in terms of life forms, there are two predominant kingdoms - plant and animal. In the taxonomy of things, humans are classified as animals. Yet in the ideologies that circulate in Western cultures, humans aspire to another kingdom, whether that be the religious kingdom of a god or the more secular kingdom of culture, reason and art. This dual existence of humans as both animal and not-animal is the focus of my thesis.

Relations between humans and other animals centre on an issue which currently preoccupies the social sciences - the nature of reality. This issue is characterised by two competing paradigms - realism versus social constructionism. The emergence of a variety of theories within the social constructionist framework has been an attempt to deal with the ideology of realism - positivism - the idea that the world can be objectively known, that there is a knowable truth which can be identified, measured and predicted. The social control aspects of positivistic inquiry have not been lost of those who wish to deconstruct this form of scientific knowledge to reveal the subjective investments which all researchers bring to their research. The desire to eliminate this 'bias' through appeals to 'reliability' and 'validity' have not assuaged fears that positivist methods are inherently biassed and, therefore, they do not have an indelible hold on the observation of reality. The debates between the social constructionists and the realists rest on this notion - either there is a real world which can only be subjectively observed or there is a real world which can actually be objectively observed. This is, of course, an oversimplification but to talk to protagonists on either side of the debate,

this is certainly my experience of how one camp views the other.

The question of whether there is an objectively knowable reality is important to psychology because, historically, psychology has modelled itself on a natural, scientific model which aims to observe, measure, explain and predict. The extent to which this is said to be more plausible in the natural sciences as opposed to the social sciences neglects the fact that humans are, simultaneously, natural and social. That is to say, humans belong to the evolved biological world - the animal kingdom - and also to a social, cultural and linguistic world - the human domain. This conflation of 'animal' with 'natural' and 'human' with 'cultural/social' is at the heart of dualistic assumptions about humans versus all other animals.

One way in which social science has recently attempted to address these issues has been to acknowledge the problem posed by the human body. Ussher (1997:1) characterises this as the 'material-discursive divide'. Her recent edited collection on human sexuality, madness and reproduction, *Body Talk*, is one of an increasing number (see also Yardley, 1997) of attempts to address this issue of the relation between the physical body and the discursive body. In her analysis of the debate, Ussher states:

> It is arguable that one of the factors which acts to hinder the development of coherent and pluralistic theories of sexuality, reproduction or madness, is the disciplinary split between those who focus on the corporeal body and those who focus on representation - the split between analyses of the material and discursive body. Yet this is a false divide, an inappropriate separation. To understand phenomena such as sexuality, madness or reproduction, we need to examine both bodily processes and practices, and ways in which these processes and practices are constructed in the realm of the symbolic. We cannot separate the two (Ussher, 1997:7).

Ussher's edited contribution to the debate is timely and progressive. However, although these works go some way to deconstruct the biological:social dichotomy without simply neglecting or denying the biological, a strategy which has characterised much of the social constructionist work, the focus on the 'human' body does not do enough justice to the complexity of this

'disciplinary split'. The crux of the matter is that humans have *animal* bodies. Humans also have animal minds simply because humans *are* animals - evolved, biological, social, cultural and linguistic animals. The complexity of the human animal has historically resulted in the polarisation of our understanding of humans as either 'mere' animals - as evident in the behaviourist paradigm - or, in opposition, supreme humans capable of infinite constructions of reality - as evident in some social constructionist writings. As with most things, this oversimplification reflects the biases of each paradigm. Ussher's identification of a 'false split' is crucial to the critique of the 'material-discursive divide'. However, the focus on the divide *within* humans neglects the primary split *between* humans and all other animals.

Social constructionism has gone far in exposing the ethno- and androcentrism of scientific knowledge. What it has neglected to espouse is the *anthropo*centric basis of knowledge and meaning. Terms like anthropomorphism only make sense in an anthropocentric world which defines humans as not-animal. Because humans are not 'real' animals, attributing human behaviour to animals (anthropomorphism) is commonly held to be a scientific sin. This links the realist claim that humans are simply material animals with the socially constructed claim of humans as primarily discursive animals. Human relations to other animals, characterised by intense contradictions between eating some and loving others, and to themselves as 'not-animals' can only be explained by an understanding of how 'human' is constructed in relation to 'animal'. My use of the term 'construction' requires elucidation. I believe that 'objective representation' is a contradiction in terms. Language is inherently representative, and the re-presentation of reality involves a symbolic dimension which is partly defined by human subjectivity. I agree with Ussher (1997:7) that:

> One of the more constructive consequences of the 'turn to language' has been
> the development of qualitative studies of the discursive context and meaning
> of the body and bodily experience.

Where *Body Talk* addresses the integration of the physical and the material within humans, I extend this analysis of discursive meanings to those which are constituted within human

relations to *other* animals. This is not to say, however, that social constructionism has all the answers. Evidently it does not - the move away from the purely social to address the unconscious elements in the processes of constructing meanings and identities, as well as the problem of the 'material-discursive divide', are evidence of the need to address the inadequacies of the socially constructivist paradigm.

There may not be an objectively known reality but there are degrees of accuracy. The notion of 'truth' contains within it moral overtones which make questions of the true or false difficult to apply to human life, they too easily take on the value assumptions of right or wrong. However, 'accuracy' tells of levels of knowledge which can describe a phenomenon as closely as possible to the objective reality of that phenomenon. There may be different ways of knowing that are equally valid descriptions of social life but different epistemologies are not equally accurate. How we decide definitely which are more accurate than others is as yet an unresolved issue. The problems of ethnocentrism, androcentrism and anthropocentrism will perhaps always get in the way. But social constructionism itself has implicit measures of accuracy; deconstructing these prejudices has contributed to an increase in the accuracy with which the construction of knowledge is understood. If it had not, what would have been the point of its initial criticisms of positivist methods?

A major part of this academic battlefield is rooted in the nature:nurture debate, a debate which many social psychologists thought they had won by simply denying any influence on the part of nature. In a recent article, *New Creationism: Biology Under Attack* by Ehrenreich and McIntosh (1997:12) the debate was succinctly summarised as:

> The notion that humans have no shared, biologically based 'nature' constitutes a theory of human nature itself. No one, after all, is challenging the idea that chimpanzees have a chimpanzee nature - that is, a set of genetically scripted tendencies and potential responses that evolved along with the physical characteristics we recognise as chimpanzee-like. To set humans apart from even our closest animal relatives as the one species that is exempt from the influences of biology is to suggest that we do indeed possess a defining 'essence', and that it is defined by our unique and

miraculous freedom from biology. The result is an ideological outlook eerily similar to that of religious creationism. Like their fundamentalist Christian counterparts, the most extreme antibiologists suggest that humans occupy a status utterly different from and clearly 'above' that of all other living beings.

The message here is that humans perceive themselves to exist in a disembodied world defined by what is purely social and cultural. Nonhuman animals, on the other hand, are relegated to nature. This dualism distorts human perception of all nonhuman animal behaviour by elevating humans to the ephemeral status of 'mind' and expelling all other animals to the biological constraints of the natural world. This dichotomy has religious, scientific and cultural implications, and the consequences for other animals are devastating.

My contribution to this debate centres on two main issues. The first is that I shall retain the insights of social constructionism whilst upgrading it to a psychodynamic level. The integration of the unconscious in some social constructionist theories has been another thorn in the side of theoretical determinism. The second is that, although this thesis is not research in evolutionary theory, it is, in part, *about* evolutionary theory and its place in modern social science. The basic tenets of evolutionary theory that there is continuity amongst species and that humans are, indeed, animals will inform my argument against biological:social dualisms. Whilst remaining cogent of the arguments against crude sociobiological accounts of human life, I shall also attempt to avoid the equally determinist traps of purely social or discursive explanations. In exploring Ussher's (1997) identification of the 'disciplinary split' between the material body and the discursive body, I begin with the assumption that humans have evolved animal bodies and, consequently, I dispense with creationism, religious or secular, as the bedfellow of determinism. However, in theory, I am focussing on *human* psychodynamic constructions of 'human' versus 'animal' meanings and, in empirical practice, I shall be limited by the culture at hand - contemporary British animals - of both the human and nonhuman kind.

1.1   Psychodynamic Constructions

The legitimate concern about social Darwinism in the 1970s, by social and biological scientists alike, has become a mythological legacy for modern social science. The reasons for this academic orthodoxy are psychodynamic in nature, they spring from the unconscious and conscious fear of acknowledging that humans are animals. The consequences of this fear are staggering. It constitutes no less than the systematic, institutionalised oppression and exploitation of other animals, *all* other animals. Moreover, it provides the legitimising foundations for the dehumanisation of people based on the paradoxical, psychodynamic construction of humans *as* animals. Humans are animals and the bases of that fact can be found in biological literature that spans more than a century. Establishing, or even defending, that fact is not my concern here. I wish to show that, in the first place, social construction is an inadequate account of human beliefs and behaviour. In order to do this, I extend Hollway's (1989) theory of psychodynamics to theorise the construction of human subjectivity in relation to nonhuman animal identity. Furthermore, I want to demonstrate why and how people deny that they are animals.

The notion of the 'beast' has become a mythologised cultural surrogate for the human animal. Where humans are afraid of the relative meaninglessness of being an animal, and succumb to the misunderstandings of evolutionary theory and genetics, they need to address the fact that humans are flesh and blood like many other animals. One way of doing this is, of course, to invoke religious creation myths and supernatural stories. However, a more specific and informative psychological strategy is the psychodynamic projection and displacement of this animal identity. Humans are 'beasts' when they act like 'animals'. But 'beasts' are more than that. They encompass human fear and desire to know themselves, to account for their animal natures, to displace, culturally or morally, unacceptable behaviour and to construct the Other as bestial. The polysemic nature of the 'beast' is, paradoxically, a means of denying the 'beast' in the *human* animal.

This thesis is a contribution to social psychological knowledge about human beliefs and behaviours in relation to nonhuman animals. It is also an implicit critique of the modern social psychology social constructionist paradigm. The irony here is that in order to explore the reasons why people deny the fact that humans are animals, it is necessary to invoke much of the social constructionist concerns about the nature of beliefs. My aim is not to dismiss the social constructionist enterprise but to upgrade it to the psychodynamic level of analysis and to provide a strongly theorised rationale for why social psychology must embrace both psychodynamics and the implications of evolutionary theory if it is not to succumb to accusations of new creationism.

Psychodynamics is a hybrid of psychoanalytical concepts and the deconstruction of ideological discourse. Psychodynamics also represents a threat to modern social psychology. With the current popularity of 'discourse analysis', any attempt to delve into the unconscious is viewed with condescension. Psychoanalysis has long been denounced as a serious academic enterprise. The simplistic teaching of Freudian theory, the over prescriptive accounts of behaviour, the perceived biological essentialism and reductionism and the mere difficulty of accessing the unconscious have all conspired to render psychoanalytical concepts as nonsensical and irrelevant to modern social psychology. There have been some recent exceptions from notable social psychologists (see Parker, 1994), however, apart from Hollway (1989), psychodynamics has been dismissed as a serious theoretical approach. 'Discourse' has become a catchall and, in its attempt to explain everything, is running the risk of explaining nothing. In light of this, evolutionary psychology and psychodynamics are unsurprisingly compatible bedfellows.

My purpose in conducting this research has itself evolved over the years. Originally I thought I was just interested in what people thought of other animals. And, to some extent, that does remain the focus of this exploration. However, this research has become much more than that or, rather, it has given me some insight as to why I found that original question so enthralling. As a social psychology researcher, I am interested in what

people think and do, and why. So, understanding people's relationships with other animals is not so much about these animals themselves, although the best of the ethologists have given us tremendous insight to their lives. For me, exploring what people believe about other animals and how they should be treated is significantly about what people believe about people and how they should be treated. What we think about nonhuman animals speaks volumes about what we think about ourselves. And if we do not think that we are animals, we have a ready made rationale for justifying the every day violence we inflict on other animals, and humans who are perceived as animals.

To the extent that this thesis is motivated by my concern for animal rights, it is a concept of rights which includes our own species. Beyond asking 'what is an animal?' my research has led to questions of subjectivity, rationality, femininity, masculinity and the social psychological paradigm. My thoughts and feelings about animals motivated me to find out more and at the end of this thesis I am simply at the beginning. Social psychology needs to address these issues, not least because psychology has been responsible for some of the most painful, exploitative and redundant experiments on nonhuman animals, because if we are to reinstate our interest in the prejudice and violence, enhanced by social constructionism not detracted by it, then we must recognise that the primary power relation which informs all other inequities is that of humans and other animals.

To this aim, the foci of the thesis are centred on the following theoretical questions:

- What kind of representations do people hold about animals?
- What kind of discourses do these representations support?
- Which discourses are marginalised?
- What are the meanings attached to beast metaphors?
- How does the beast mediate representations of humans and animals?
- How are these representations and discourses used in the psychodynamic construction of human subjectivity?

1.2 Terminology

The word 'human' is more than just a noun, it is also an adjective and has implicit polysemic meanings. One of those meanings is of human as not-animal and, consequently, many people refer to 'humans and animals'. This discursive practice is somewhat analogous to the generic 'man' or 'he'. It would be nonsensical to talk about 'men and humans' as if men are not humans. It is equally nonsensical, from my point of view, to talk about humans as if we are not animals. The estrangement of these terms, however, makes it difficult to describe humans in relation to other animals without being linguistically cumbersome. Nonetheless, for the sake of theoretical coherence, I shall use the phrase 'humans and other animals' or 'nonhuman animals' when necessary. The implicit anthropocentrism is these terms is justified only because I am talking about the human perspective and not any other animal's.

The 'beast' is a central concept of the thesis. It signifies, more so than 'animal', the extent to which nonhuman animals are symbolised as cultural artefacts. It provides a hybrid theoretical concept to account for the 'human' and 'animal' dimensions of animality. It is a common image, a rhetorical device used to summarise ideas about human and animal behaviour. 'Beasts' are implicitly, as well as explicitly, mythological. The legendary 'beasts' of folklore are the distillation of ubiquitous cultural representations which support oppressive discourses about nonhuman animals. The clandestine 'beast', the creature which haunts the human unconscious, is the subject of this research. From this concept of the 'beast', I take the adjective 'bestial' and the noun 'bestiality'. In common parlance, bestiality is exclusively a reference to sexual practices between humans and other animals. Again, this culturally manifest representation of animality is an example of the explicitness of taboo human-animal relations. In this thesis, bestiality is about the nature of the 'beast' and, where sexuality is relevant, it is not in the extremities of interspecies sex but in the zoomorphism of human sexuality and the representation of what it means to be an 'animal lover'.

Another term with which the reader may not be familiar is 'speciesism'. Speciesism is a term which was coined by Ryder (1989). It refers to discrimination against any being based purely on the fact that the being belongs to another species. Speciesism is analogous to sexism and racism, discrimination based purely on someone's sex or ethnicity. Speciesism is systematic discrimination against nonhuman animals. Speciesism is an ideology and, therefore, permeates hegemonic discourses about nonhuman animals.

Part of the psychodynamic approach to human behaviour are the concepts of subjectivity and subject positions. Although these terms are also used as part of ideological discourse, Foucauldian accounts, they are more properly utilised to account for the *unconscious* and conscious positioning of the individual within a given discourse of knowledge. The inadequacies of a purely Foucauldian account are centred on the assumed lack of individual agency. The lack of theorising about the complex, contradictory and fragmented nature of the human self renders discursive accounts about power/knowledge incomplete. Subject positioning and, therefore, the totality of an individual's subjectivity are as much to do with the unconscious desires to affirm one's social identity as they are to do with conscious discursive collusions.

The concept of subjectivity is central to qualitative reflexivity. The aim of qualitative research is not simply to acknowledge and then eliminate researcher bias but to make that 'bias' explicit as part of the research process. This thesis is not intellectually estranged from other areas of my life, rather is it the culmination, at this point, of my thoughts about what is means to be 'human' and what it means to be 'animal'. The consequences of those meanings are catastrophic. The naturalisation of violence is the most pernicious of human behaviours and, here, naturalisation requires further definition. To naturalise a social phenomenon is to render it 'natural' and the meaning of what is natural is what makes naturalisation so powerful. Both secular and religious accounts of what is natural, psychologically normal, biologically evolved or God-given, prescribe that what is natural is what is right. The conflation of tradition, or evolution, with what is perceived to be

morally desirable is the confusion at the heart of violence against nonhuman animals. Simply because something has always existed does not make it desirable, simply because some behaviours have evolved does not make them uncontrollable. Evolution has no implicit morality. Humans imbue the natural world with human meanings. Naturalisation, therefore, is a psychological strategy for justifying inequity and legitimising violence.

Three other terms will appear throughout the course of the thesis: anthropocentrism, anthropomorphism and zoomorphism. Anthropocentrism is used here in the moral and epistemological sense, the world viewed not only from the standpoint of humans, but also from their position of benefit and superiority. Anthropocentrism is analogous to androcentrism in which the world is viewed from the moral and epistemological point of view of men. Anthropomorphism is relatively widely used to mean the attribution of human characteristics to nonhumans. It is predominantly used to describe the representation of nonhuman animals with human characteristics. As will be seen, it is a problematic term because of its negative scientific status. However, recent calls for the redefinition of anthropomorphism as a heuristic rather than an ontological divide have mirrored the increase in ethological knowledge about other animals. Zoomorphism is the counterpoint to anthropomorphism. It is the attribution of animal characteristics to non-animals, including humans. The way in which anthropomorphism and zoomorphism are used to construct and interpret animals (including human beings) will be a major concern throughout the thesis.

My personal aim has been to illuminate the relation amongst these social phenomena - humans, animals, beasts, speciesism, subjectivity, naturalisation, anthropocentrism, anthropomorphism and zoomorphism. Through psychodynamics, I believe that I have found a way of modelling this relationship. The concept of dehumanisation will be defined throughout the thesis as it is developed and explored. This concept is your guide to my motivations, my subjectivity and the meanings that I hope you will draw from this research.

1.3 Overview

Part One, *Constructing the Beast,* locates this thesis as a contribution to the social psychology of nonhuman animal representation, and to human-animal relations, by proposing a theoretical dialogue between structuralist anthropology and psychodynamic modelling. I establish my conceptual model of dehumanisation, based on the dynamic relation between discourse and the unconscious human mind, through the psychodynamic construction of the Self and the Other. This model contributes to the psychological understanding of violence, and the processes of naturalisation which legitimise violence, by exploring the symbolic use of nonhuman animals. This exploration continues through a contextual and historical account of British relations with these animals, to an updated post-structuralist account of patterns of animal use which establishes categories of human and other animals. The use of taboo to reconcile anomalies between those categories is examined through the lenses of metaphor and metonymy.

Chapter 2, *The Structuralist Framework* examines whether non-speciesist research is possible in the current social psychology paradigm. The prerequisites for identity construction are explored in terms of subject-object relations, hierarchical constructions of identity and ideological violence. Having assessed social psychological contemporary theories on the construction of identity, this chapter establishes Saussure's structuralism as the most appropriate theoretical basis for understanding language use and its central role in identity construction. The structuralist platform leads to an exposition of Leach's framework for nonhuman animal categories and verbal abuse. I relate this framework to the construction of bestiality and show how the Leach system threatens the theological and ontological separation of humans and other animals. This linguistic categorisation allows profanity outside human categories but also allows the possible subversion of that structure. This chapter proposes my theoretical position through the critical upgrading of Leach's framework to explore how and why the symbolic representations of nonhuman animals cause problems which can only be reconciled through mythological or taboo status - the

rationalisation of contradiction through beliefs, dependent on the psychodynamic construction of the 'beast'. I propose an exploration, through psychodynamic modelling, of the concepts of anthropocentrism, anthropomorphism, zoomorphism and dehumanisation. These concepts are located in the social psychology of the invisibility of violence. From this perspective, discrimination against other animals, speciesism, provides both a structural and functional framework for the justification of discrimination against people.

Before examining my proposed theory of dehumanisation, in chapter 3, *The Historical Beast*, I provide a British historical and cultural context for emerging modern-day representations of nonhuman animals. This history of the 'beast' examines the impact of Christianity on the ontological and moral separation between humans and other animals. It explores the dichotomy between humans and God, and between human and nonhuman animals. The church's need to maintain guilt through reference to the doctrine of original sin is explored with reference to the notion of bestiality and the soulless nature of nonhuman animals. It is proposed that this separation produces conflict in terms of evolutionary continuity and rights for other animals. I examine the effects of Cartesian dualism on science in relation to the status of nonhuman animals, effects which are characterised as the mind:body split which chastises the body, thus producing somatophobia, the fear and, consequently, the denial of the body to the Self. This chapter shows how somatophobia leads to the projection of the body (and denial of the mind) onto the Other, the nonhuman animal, the 'beast'. Furthermore, I explore anthropomorphism as scientific sin, or scientific heuristic, which allows either continuity or discontinuity between humans and other animals. I place Darwinism in relation to contemporary rhetoric on animal rights and compare animal welfare to animal rights as currently emergent phenomena. Finally, I move from the history of the 'beast' to modern-day representations and discourses on feminism and animal rights, and social relations.

In chapter 4, *The Psychodynamics of Dehumanisation*, through my reading of Hollway's (1989) psychodynamics, I produce a critical integration of Saussure's structuralism, Lacan's psychoanalysis, Derrida's deconstruction, Foucault's theory of discourse and Klein's defence mechanisms to update Leach's framework of animal categories and verbal abuse aimed towards an expose of the system of dehumanisation. I illustrate how mechanisms based on signification and symbolism are key to the maintenance of this system. The mythical naturalisation of these structures is analysed in relation to the construction of binary oppositions and the exclusion, or marginalisation, of alternative identities and discourses. Deconstruction, as both theory and method, is articulated in this context of dehumanisation. Structures at both the level of the unconscious and the level of language are shown to be implicated in the process of dehumanisation. Investment, as a psychological concept, is reviewed as a bridge between individual subjects and their contexts. This reproduction of subjectivity, through differential investments in hegemonic discourses, is considered central to this argument of human prejudice against other animals. In conjunction to this, the content of those investments, in terms of linguistic devices, is contextualised. Processes founded on the Lacanian interpretation of metaphor and metonymy are seen to serve well as the guardians of dehumanisation. I apply this hybrid theoretical framework to develop the conceptual model of dehumanisation to account for the psychodynamic construction of the Other as bestial. The possibility of incorporating agency to account for change and resistance is examined. A diagrammatic representation of the process model is used to frame the exploration of how links between moral beliefs and interaction with nonhuman animals can be handled.

In Part Two, *Deconstructing the Beast*, I explore the contradictions in transactions with nonhuman animals, the transformation into pets, meat or metaphor and accounts of perception of conflict. I examine the dialectics of Self and Other in constructing subjectivities, how the notion of the 'beast' contains specific and generalised processes which constitute domination and, therefore, prejudice. Here, I investigate how people take subject positions within given discourses, and, therefore, reproduce speciesist ideologies.

Representations, as autonomous reference systems which link the psychodynamic construction of the 'beast' to social interaction between humans and other animals, are examined with reference to systems of legitimised violence. 'Beast' metaphors are semiologically analysed to reveal the dynamics of anthropomorphism and zoomorphism. A specific representation of the 'beast' as a fantasy animal is explored through the semiological analysis of a narrative, *Wilderness*. The model of dehumanisation is used to interpret these texts.

Beginning with chapter 5, *Synthesising Theory and Methods: The Empirical Design*, I explore the synthesis of the theory, presented in Part One, and methods. Here I set the scene for the empirical procedures and analyses. Starting with a review of research methodology, scientific knowledge and its relation to psychological empiricism, I review the social constructionist perspective in relation to qualitative methods. The concepts of triangulation and reflexivity are established as methods of evaluating qualitative research. The chapter explores the psychodynamic playground through the integration of discourse analytical concepts and psychoanalytical strategies, as well as the symbolic construction of the Other. A semiological content analysis is introduced as a method beyond denotation and I establish its role in the analysis of animal representations in the media. The media are discussed as forms of discourse in which texts can be analysed in order to deconstruct representations of nonhuman animals. The structuralist analysis of semiological systems is articulated through exploring levels of signification and the concept of the labyrinth as applied to a narrative analysis. Finally, this chapter concludes with an account of the relation between the design of the empirical studies and the questions of the thesis providing justification for the mix of methods employed.

The analyses begin with chapter 6, *Bestial Discourses,* where interviews are analysed to reveal the dynamics of the individual's internal rhetorical dialogue which constitutes thinking. The interview explores the production and reproduction of social meanings from the perspective of the individual within the social context of the interview. Here, I focus

on the analysis of texts. I present the deconstruction of primary texts, the interview transcripts, to reveal the social and psychological construction of bestial discourse. I examine the naturalisation of violence, and deconstruct the assumptions of the hegemonic ideologies to reveal those marginalised or muted subtexts which form part of the system of dehumanisation. I examine the contradictions in practice of eating meat and keeping pets. Both awareness of the rules of eating meat and breaking those rules are investigated. I explore the processes of both anthropomorphism and zoomorphism, the use of 'humane' to refer to the unhuman, the connection with animal welfare, and the relation between that ideological violence and dehumanisation. I illustrate interpretations of the 'beast' through psychodynamics. This analysis identifies patterns of association and dissociation as forms of discourse which constitute subjectivity. The production of social reality and the participation in social practices are related and located within the symbolic and cultural web which defines the model of dehumanisation.

In chapter 7, *Representations of the Beast*, I analyse representations of the 'beast' in the British press by exploring linguistic taboos concerning nonhuman animal categories, through the strategies of anthropomorphism and zoomorphism. I investigate when, how and why 'beast' metaphors are used; what aspects of human experience are projected onto the image of animality; what is the structure, function and content of these metaphors; to what extent are taboo characteristics dealt with through 'beast' metaphors and how taboo mediates binary oppositions between humans and other animals. This semantic analysis defines the use of 'beast' metaphors as units of analysis within signifying systems and compares the function of these metaphors in the different domains of Human, Animal and Object. The results of this analysis are cross-referenced with the model of dehumanisation.

In chapter 8, *Wilderness: A Semiotic Analysis of Narrative*, I explore the media representation of a particular 'beast', the werewolf. Through a semiotic analysis of this novel and derived television drama, I examine associations amongst werewolves, sexuality, rationality and freedom and the parallel narratives of lupine symbolisation and social

commentary on the nature of humans. Signifying bestiality, this semiotic analysis reveals the social meanings surrounding concepts of 'wild' and 'civilised'. It marks the transformation (physical, metaphorical and ideological) from human to nonhuman animal through a semiotic analysis of the plot. Concepts of natural gender and gendered nature are utilised to explore the androcentrism of male-female dualism reflected in the anthropocentrism of human-animal dichotomies. Anthropomorphism demarcates the points of continuity and discontinuity within the dynamics of human-animal relations and is assessed for its heuristic values and pitfalls. Bestial sexuality is perused as a play of signs. Their meanings, interactions and consequences are related to stereotypical representations. The main themes of transformation, sexuality, rationality and freedom are compared between the original text and the drama derived from that text. These findings enrich the model of dehumanisation.

In Part Three, *Reconstructing the Beast*, I draw together the empirical findings of the research and evaluate the theoretical development of the model of dehumanisation. To this end, I examine the discourses on the notion of the 'beast' in relation to interactions with nonhuman animals as pets, as food and as referents. I synthesise the various discourses in order to establish the model of dehumanisation to account for the interplay between species-differentiated beliefs and behaviours. The texture of denotative and connotative meanings is concluded to be a dynamic multilayered matrix of signification. The model is not presented as a concrete reference system but as a guide to the analysis of differentiation and integration of the beast signs. Its utility resides in its flexibility. The texts and analyses are subject to an intertextual reflexivity, with the awareness that analysis produces further representations and supports certain discourses. Production of this text, the thesis, is testament to knowledge of the machinery of signification and the ubiquity of the sign.

Chapter 9, *Family, Food or Fantasy: Reconstructing the 'Beast Within'*, uses the conceptual model of dehumanisation to interpret species-differentiated discourses and behaviour. I explore how the notion of the 'beast' is used to justify violence against human and nonhuman 'beasts', and to blame human behaviours as animalistic and bestial. Inconsistencies and contradictions in behaviour are seen to depend on dehumanisation, ideological violence and the psychodynamic construction of the 'beast'. Anthropocentrism, anthropomorphism and zoomorphism, as organising principles for understanding nonhuman animals in relation to humans, are deconstructed with reference to the model of dehumanisation. The deconstructed 'beast' reveals the multiple dimensions of human ambivalence towards species identity. In this chapter, I assess the development of the model of dehumanisation through the empirical findings. The main theoretical developments are examined and the final model of dehumanisation is established to account for the role of the 'beast' in constructing, mediating, legitimising and mystifying relations between humans and other animals. I conclude the thesis with a short review of future directions in the social psychology of the 'beast' with reference to the extra-terrestrial 'beast' and bestial representations of aliens.

PART ONE: CONSTRUCTING THE BEAST

Part One, *Constructing the Beast,* locates this thesis as a contribution to the social psychology of nonhuman animal representation, and to animal-human relations, by extending a theoretical dialogue between discourse analysis, psychoanalysis and structuralist anthopology. It begins with a review of the requirements for identity construction and identifies subject-object relations, hierarchical definitions and ideological violence as the basic tenets of construction. It also contributes to the psychological understanding of violence, and the processes of naturalisation which legitimise violence, by exploring the conflation between history, culture and morality. I compare the basic elements of identity construction with contemporary theories on identity, namely Social Identity Theory and Social Representations Theory. This assessment concludes that these theories fail to grasp the complexities of identity by ignoring the hierarchical structure of identity formation. I propose structuralism as the most appropriate framework from which to develop a theory of subjectivity and apply it to Leach's categorisation of nonhuman animals and verbal abuse. This exploration continues through a contextual and historical account of British relations with nonhuman animals. I explore the change in the status of nonhuman animals from industrialisation, through Victorian Britain, to modern discourses on animal welfare and animal rights. This historical and cultural tapestry provides a backdrop to the development of the theory of dehumanisation. An account of post-structuralist theories of subjectivity is applied to patterns of nonhuman animal use which establish categories of human and nonhuman animals. The use of taboo to reconcile anomalies between those categories is examined through metaphor and metonymy. The conceptual model of dehumanisation is used as the theoretical referent for the empirical procedures in Part Two.

2: THE STRUCTURALIST FRAMEWORK

It was a comment on human nature that the concept of 'animality' was devised. (Thomas, 1983:41)

Overview

This chapter explores the concept of identity, its origins, transformations and theoretical accounts. Identity, here, is presented as a social label, the way people view another person. It is different to subjectivity because subjectivity contains all the necessary elements required to constitute an individual: unconscious and conscious discursive positioning *and* the social identity of a given person. Identity is more restrictive, it is part of subjectivity but it is not the whole story. It is, however, a good starting point to get to grips with the basic tenets of human relations to other animals. Humans certainly do not know enough about the mental lives of other animals to comment on their subjectivities, still there is no reason to believe that some of those animals do not have subjectivities. Here, however, I am concerned with the subject life of a particular animal, the British human. The relation between identity and subjectivity is important because these concepts are applied differentially to humans and other animals. This chapter will show how the concept of identity construction is relevant to human constructions of animal identity but is inadequate as an explanation for human subjectivity. Furthermore, it will explore the structure of identity, the relations, hierarchies, implications and consequences of human versus animal identity. I identify subject-object relations, the hierarchical nature of definition and the invisibility of violence as key elements in the structure of identity. Then I review two of the main contemporary theories in social psychology, Social Identity Theory and the theory of Social Representations, designed to explain identity construction. Given the initial required elements, these theories are found to be inadequate accounts and, therefore, I turn to structuralism's various schools of thought and identify Saussurean linguistics, and Leach's structural analysis of nonhuman animal categories and verbal abuse, as the most appropriate framework for the development of the model of dehumanisation.

2.1 Human and Animal Identities

What people think of nonhuman animals, and the way they behave towards them, is significantly affected by definitions of 'animal' in relation to 'human'. This section explores the meaning of these terms through an examination of subject-object relations, the hierarchical nature of the definitions, and the concept of ideological violence.

Subject-Object Relations

Social constructionism is an interactive and continual process which produces and reproduces knowledge and power relations. Through this process, the dominant culture is rendered invisible, or 'natural', through its own construction of reality. All cultures depend on subject-object relations. Objectification is the removal, or denial, of agency; dehumanisation is a specific form of objectification involving the removal, or denial, of human-defining characteristics. Therefore, the definition of 'subject' in relation to 'object' is dependent on the perceived absence or presence of sentience and agency. This relationship exists through the general objectification and specific dehumanisation of certain groups which are constructed as 'other', as opposed to 'natural'. An acknowledgement of the relational construction of identity has the potential to incapacitate this form of oppression by analysing and, hence, revealing the relationship amongst knowledge, power and violence - by making the invisible visible.

To this end, it is important to recognise that meaning is negotiated and reproduced through discourses, and that power is derived from privileged access to the interpretations of such meaning (Foucault, 1981). As reality is culturally and socially constituted, the power of the norm/given, masked as truth or objectivity, is also the product of social exchange. Historically, the matter of truth is one of epistemological objectivity, a masculine rationality as Lloyd (1984:2) comments:

> Rational knowledge has been constructed as a transcending, transformation
> or control of natural forces; and the feminine has been associated with what
> rational knowledge transcends, dominates or simply leaves behind.

On the one hand, part of what defines humans is the subjective element of emotions, what makes people human and, indeed, subjects of life is their ability to feel things. We are, after all, not robots. However, the intertwined relation between emotions and irrationality is a psychological tool used to discriminate against people, and other animals, on the basis of their supposed lack of rationality or, more precisely, their absent objectivity. Discrimination works because the process of objectification transforms the 'subject' into an 'object'. Humans are generally considered to have both sentience, the capacity to feel pain and pleasure, and agency, therefore, they are attributed with certain rights, including the right to life. Conversely, the 'object' status of nonhuman animals means that they have no such rights. Indeed, based on their ideological status as objects, it would appear logical not to grant them rights. This paradoxical relation between what constitutes subjectivity, and how it defines the subject, and what defines objectivity, and how it relates to the object, underpins this research. In Chapter 3 we shall see how the predominance of rationalism, based on the subject:object dichotomy, in the animal rights movement, actually undermines the status of nonhuman animal and weakens the rationalist argument for their rights.

Subject-object relations are located in this struggle between the true and the false, the norm and the abnormal, the given and the other, the masculine and the feminine, the human and the 'beast'. Within these dichotomous battles, power is produced and reproduced through definition, naming, discourse and all others arenas of knowledge. These are the unseen battles, the 'invisible' myriads of violence. In this sense, ideology, literally a body of ideas, remains the locus of power production and abuse. Ideology in a psychological sense prescribes power relations as commonsense, that which is taken for granted (Parker, 1990). The people who produce and disseminate knowledge directly affect the hegemony of any given ideology. The power of ideology is based on the representation of discourses as

'natural' or commonsensical. Here, I follow Weedon's (1987:108) definition of discourse
as:

> ...ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms
> of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and the
> relations between them. Discourses are more than ways of thinking and
> producing meaning. They constitute the 'nature' of the body, unconscious
> and conscious mind and the emotional life of the subject they seek to
> govern.

Consequently, everything from acts of objectification to acts of exploitation are imbued
with power relations. Indeed, naturalised power relations will determine what is culturally
acceptable and unacceptable. The relation between subject and object may appear natural,
commonsensical and, therefore, morally desirable.

The Hierarchical Nature of Definition

Once the construction of human and nonhuman animal identity is seen as a relational
subject-object process, and ideology, also the product of social construction, seen as a
legitimate source of violence, it is possible to explore the structure of these identities.
Here, I consider whether or not identity is fundamentally hierarchical, and how hierarchy
functions in the question of ideological violence. To determine whether or not definitions
of human identity are structured hierarchically, it is essential to explore the influences on
ideas that generate these definitions.

The primary influences in modern culture on the construction of identity are religious texts
designed to order life, scientific knowledge constructed to explain difference, and cultural
images manipulated for exploitation and consumerism. On the face of it, Christianity and
Cartesian philosophy would appear to have little to do with each other. However, both
Christian and Cartesian dualism, between mind and body, inform our ideas about humans
and other animals. Christian theology is based on the notion that God created people in
His own image. Humans, therefore, have divine-given souls which transcend the body.
Nonhuman animals, on the other hand, are resources which God has given humans

dominion over. Here, the dichotomy between humans and other animals is mediated by the notion of God-given souls. As Leach puts it so eloquently:

> We are human beings, not because we have souls but because we are able
> to conceive of the possibility that we might have souls (Leach, 1982:108).

In the Christian tradition, nonhuman animals, although frequently used as symbols of the son of God, peace and love, are *mere* animals, soulless and without the prospect entering Heaven. On the other hand, traditional Cartesian philosophy, the origin of secular mind:body dualism, proposed that nonhuman animals were automata. Not only did they not possess souls, they could not feel pain. Their reactions to vivisection were mechanical reflexes and, as machines, animals could be used and treated in any way that suited humans (Birke, 1994). The effects of Christianity and Cartesianism on the status of nonhuman animals will be explored further in Chapter 3.

The legacies of Christian and Cartesian dualism have converged. In the face of Darwin's theory of evolution, Christians began to submit that it was possible that humans were also animals but they remained special, God-given animals, and Cartesians, now aware that many animals shared human capacities for pain and pleasure, compensated by sustaining the mind:body dualism and claiming that the human mind was qualitatively different to the nonhuman animal mind. The far reaching results of this was that only humans were considered rational, because only humans possess language, and, therefore, only humans could be objects of moral concern. This Cartesian ideology is based on Kant's social contract theory which states that only rational beings are capable of participating in the social contract of acting morally and therefore, deserving moral concern (Rollin, 1992). However, as we shall see in the following chapter, the argument of rationality is not relevant to the inclusion/exclusion of nonhuman animals in moral consideration because there are many cases of humans who are not rational, yet are indiscriminately included in the sphere of moral concern. Human and animal definitions, and identities, are, consequently, hierarchical. Moreover, consumerism trades in these images of humans and

animals, thus, reinforcing them (Baker, 1993).

Modern scientific reason, with its insistence on reductionist rationality has used its self-imposed legitimacy to justify and promote this hierarchical dichotomous ideology. Science is valuational and philosophically based (Rollin, 1992). However, the dominant scientific position holds that science is value-free, and it is this assumption that has important implications for representations of nonhuman animals. At the heart of modern, Western thinking is this preoccupation with a masculine-defined rationality which attempts to account for all humanity, and, in doing so, excludes and oppresses those groups seen, or rather constructed, as non-rational or irrational (Hekman, 1994). This presence or absence of rationality provides the arena for a continual struggle amongst people, and between people and other animals. It is the benchmark for the hierarchical definition of 'human' in relation to 'animal'. Consequently, people and other animals suffer in this attempt to continually define and legitimise specific definitions of rationality through access to the powerful and dominant status of caste, class, nation, religion, sexuality, ethnicity, gender and species. This leads to destruction against the ethically, and economically, marginalised cultural and natural environments.

Social Hierarchy

Further analysis of the hierarchical concept of identity must include an exploration of the antecedents and consequences of such hierarchies. The subservient categories are positioned in binary opposition to the 'given' status of the powerful (Derrida, 1978). Both human and nonhuman animal identity are constructed in hierarchical opposition to each other. These dichotomies are dependent on one another, through contrast, for definition, function and structure, however, they are perceived as separate, incompatible entities. In the value dualisms which comprise these hierarchies, the pairs are oppositional and exclusive. The human:animal dualism is constructed as distinct and independent. The relative power of the category 'human' supersedes the category 'animal' so as to render invisible the interconnectedness between these constructions. It not only denies the

biological classification of humans as types of animal, but it further dissociates itself by claiming its own superiority at the expense of the animal category (Midgeley, 1978). Consequently, humans are constructed as both distinct from, and superior to, all other animals.

Social hierarchy is based on numerous fundamental dichotomies. The dominant group forms the major part of the dichotomy yet its definition is created through contrast and comparison to the minor, suppressed, part of the dichotomy. This part is externalised and repressed as the 'other'. Any desire for this part can only be legitimised through sentimentality or romanticism (Adams, 1995). Hierarchy is valued as a means of establishing status and control. A further consequence of this is that people are devalued through their association with the already devalued status of 'animal'. In turn, this constitutes the 'logic of domination' (Plumwood, 1993) which permits the subordination of those groups who are on the 'wrong' side of the dualism. It further allows suppression and exploitation as acts of violence. Here Scott's (1991) analysis of the structuralist theory for feminism is equally pertinent to the case of nonhuman animals. Traditionally, 'equality' and 'difference' have been presented as antithetical. Thus, it would be illogical to talk of any kind of equality for nonhuman animals considering all the actual and supposed differences between them and human animals. However, this is a fundamental, and common, misinterpretation of the relationship. The concept of equality necessitates accommodating the differences. If there were no differences amongst groups there would be no need for the concept of equality because everyone would be the same.

Many nonhuman animal myths are structured on such binary oppositions. Nonhuman animals, often constructed as an undifferentiated category, are perceived to be ontologically different to humans, therefore, the human concepts of rights are not applied to other animals. The difference assigned to the object status means that other animals can be subjected to systematic violence. The identity of these animals as objects prescribes this violence as natural and, therefore, desirable. Violence is both a consequence and a cause

of these dichotomies, it is linked to their inherent social control aspects.

The Invisibility of Violence

Relevant to this context, Kappeler (1995) defines institutional violence as:

1. An infringement on or failure to acknowledge another's inviolability.

2. Treatment and/or physical force that injures or abuses others.

3. Involving a series of denial mechanisms that deflect attention from violence.

4. Targeting of 'appropriate' victims.

5. Having detrimental effects on society as a whole.

6. The manipulation of the public (e.g. consumers) into passivity.

Part of this prescription is the naturalisation of violence. Violence may be physical or ideological, the two are often intertwined with one determining or legitimising the other. Significantly, it is the violence of everyday behaviour which is culturally acceptable, indeed, culturally desirable. Such violence is naturalised so that it is reproduced and maintained through the status quo. Moreover, it provides an effective framework for the production and maintenance of the more visible forms of violence which are not culturally accepted (Kappeler, 1995). The main strength of this form of violence is its invisibility, so that the victimisation of certain groups of individuals becomes morally acceptable. Within this framework, animal abuse in the form of meat eating, hunting and experimentation becomes part of discourses which dictate that status of nonhuman animals. This invisibility is structured so that its breakdown requires the deconstruction of the dominant value hierarchy, and a change in the collective mindset of people, to recognise the interdependence amongst humans and other animals at an ethical, instead of a purely economical, level.

Ideological violence gives people the 'right' to violate others within that particular ethical framework of exploitation. Therefore, the justified exploitation of nonhuman animals not only violates their rights, but further legitimises the exploitation of people constructed as animal-like. Empirical evidence supports the view that threatened or actual sexual/physical violence often involves violence against nonhuman animals (Adams, 1995). For example, in domestic situations the threat or actual killing of a pet animal establishes control over women and children (Adams, 1995). Sexual exploitation in the form of battering, rape, pornography, child sexual abuse, ritual abuse, serial killing and sexual harassment may often involve the explicit use of nonhuman animal imagery, if not the actual animals. Significantly, the abuse of nonhuman animals has been recognised in DSM-111-R as symptoms indicative of a Conduct Disorder (Adams, 1995). Men, women and children become victims of this kind of exploitation based partly on their association with other animals.

Ideological violence is the collective result of institutionalised violence, that which is deliberately, yet clandestinely, used to achieve the submission of society's members. Institutionalised violence goes hand in hand with institutionalised prejudice. These constitute systems of mass control in which widespread prejudice legitimises violence in relation to certain 'victimised' groups. This kind of institutionalised oppression is wholly dependent on the perceived existence of an hierarchy which values the status of certain identities at the expense of others. Christian divisions between the spirit and the body are mirrored by scientific dualism between humans and other animals, and are further repeated in cultural representations of rationality versus instinct, and masculinity versus femininity. A culture of domination provides numerous other sites for the production and reproduction of epistemological and ontological assumptions about human and nonhuman animal identities. Such assumptions are inherently violent because they violate the integrity and reality of those with less access to knowledge and, therefore, power production. In essence, ideological violence denies (or ignores) issues of sentience, agency or subjectivity in other animals.

2.2   The Social Psychology of Identity

Having seen that ideological violence is both the cause and consequence of hierarchical definitions of identity, it is important to look at how social psychology has theorised identity.   Identity is constructed through numerous social psychological processes. However, the main approaches to be explored here are social identity theory and the theory of social representations.

Social Identity Theory

In order to comprehend social reality, people categorise themselves and other beings.   In doing so they may strive to categorise themselves within a highly valued group and, therefore, devalue other groups.   Categorisation, comparison and self esteem form the crux of Tajfel's (1979) Social Identity Theory (SIT), which is essentially a theory of social cognition.   People categorise others according to salient characteristics and tend to exaggerate inter-group differences and intra-group similarities.   Categorisation structures knowledge, creating both patterns and variances.   Prejudice is thought to arise from the distortion of reality produced by the process of categorisation.   The distorted perception of reality would lead, inevitably, to prejudice.   In effect, it produces an 'error and bias' model of human understanding (Henriques *et al*, 1984) based on the assumption that humans are fundamentally rational and unitary individuals.

As Billig (1987) suggests, categorisation can only be one half of human cognition.   Its fundamental flaw is that it suggests that prejudice is inevitable and, therefore, does not theorise the possibility of tolerance.   Billig posits that an opposite, yet complementary, process of particularisation balances the cognitive system.   Categorisation and particularisation are inter-related strategies which depend on each other.   Specifically, the ability to categorise depends on the ability to select criteria for comparison.   Consequently, the human mind operates through the tension produced by two opposing strategies.   Neither similarity or difference alone can account for human perception and comprehension of

social reality. Tajfel overcame the inadequacies of social categorisation in later developments of the theory, namely the introduction of issues of status and power, group boundaries and legitimacy. Nevertheless, Henriques' and Billig's critiques remain valid for exposing the individual:social dualism, and demonstrating that supposedly unitary concepts, such as categorisation, are, in fact, subject to the theory of binary oppositions.

A further problem with theories of social cognition is that they presuppose a rational, objective representation of the world, and rational, unitary individuals who interpret that world. Rationalism promotes dualism and denies contradictions. One consequence of this is that, because individualistic accounts of prejudice locate the source of the problem in the human information processing system, the object of study is not the prejudiced person but the object of prejudice (Henriques *et al*, 1984). This leads to further stigmatisation of the 'other'. In doing so, people unconsciously project those denied characteristics onto other groups and individuals. Not only does this suggest that people are not fundamentally rational, but these projections are naturalised and the actual construction of the 'other's' identity becomes mythologised.

Social Representations

Social representations theory provides a framework for describing and conceptualising ways of understanding the world and, therefore, it has the potential for understanding notions of 'human' and 'animal'. As a meeting place between ideological assumptions and discursive practices, social representations theory denies Cartesian individualism and expounds instead the view that thinking is social, that is to say, that the nature of thought itself is defined by the external world. Social representations comprise each individual's mental and social environment (Moscovici, 1982). They are bound by time and culture and, therefore, they change, evolve and, simultaneously, reflect and determine the course of history. Through social constructionism all objects are transformed through the process of representation.

The theory of social representations overcomes the individualistic assumptions of theories of social cognition. Furthermore, the French theorisation and empirical findings in the field go well beyond the rationalism of traditional psychology (e.g. Moscovici, 1984; Jodelet, 1991). Recent work by Joffe (1996) has addressed the relationship between social representations theory and psychodynamic approaches to human behaviour.

Anchoring and objectification are the twin processes in social representations theory which account for the formation of representations. Joffe defines anchoring as the way in which, 'Unfamiliar concepts are compared and interpreted in the light of phenomena which are already understood' (Joffe, 1996:198). In this way, social representations theory may provide a useful analysis of the way in which the 'unfamiliar' nature of nonhuman animals may be understood in light of what we know about human animals. The anthropomorphic projections onto nonhuman animals may be evidence of this, however, the traditional concept of anthropomorphism relies heavily on the ontological distinction between humans and all other animals. Therefore, an understanding of this process of rendering the unfamiliar familiar must recognise the foundational difference in meaning between the terms 'human' and 'animal'. Furthermore, Joffe describes the other major feature of social representations, objectification, as:

> ...a...process [which] transforms the abstract links to past ideas which anchoring sets up, into concrete mental content...It is in the process of objectification that new referents, new and creative links, may be inserted into existing social representations, making this a more dynamic aspect of the theory, which allows for theorisation of how thinking changes over time (Joffe, 1996: 198).

The way in which the theory of social representations accounts for the historical and cultural construction of meaning is evident here. At this point, however, it is vital to recognise that this specific theoretical definition of 'objectification', as part of the theory of social representations, is unrelated to my use of the term. As mentioned previously, I take the term 'objectification' to refer to the process by which subjects are constructed, through dehumanisation, as objects.

Joffe (1996) refers to Moscovici's (1976) original claim that social representations are used to protect people's identities against threat. Joffe's integration of psychodynamic theory to social representations is influenced by the need to account for the emotional response to threat:

> It [psychodynamic theory] complements a theory of the process of representation formation, adding a further dimension. It provides an explanation for the recurrence of certain *contents* in representations of threatening phenomena (Joffe, 1996:199).

To the extent that nonhuman animals pose a literal and symbolic threat to humans, this integration of psychodynamic and social representations theories may be useful. Certainly, human desire to protect 'human' identity against nonhuman 'animal' identity is a key concern in this thesis. Indeed, Joffe (1994, 1996) identifies social representations of AIDS with behavioural characteristics of the 'other' that includes the notion of bestiality. Sexual relations between humans and other species constitutes one of the biggest moral taboos not least because it transgresses the integrity of the 'human' body and dehumanises it to the level of the 'animal' body. Social representations theory, here, can address the social construction of the 'other' as bestial in response to threat of AIDS. However, is does not explicitly account for the hierarchical nature of the emergence of meaning. In the case of bestiality, it is the ontological divide between humans and all other animals, and the subsequent hierarchical status of humans as 'superior' to all other animals and, therefore, 'not-animal', that partly informs the taboo on human-animal sexual relations.

Social representations theory is sensitive to the historical and cultural factors which constitute identity and, as such, it moves considerably from the social cognition accounts of identity. Joffe's (1996) psychodynamic extension of the theory also moves it beyond the rationalist assumptions of the more traditional social psychology of identity. Nevertheless, she does cite SIT as being a useful model of inter-group splitting:

> In the process of forming a personal identity, values and ideologies are imbibed from the social environment. Certain groups are integrated into the 'good' self and others are construed as the 'bad' other (Joffe, 1996:209).

Whilst SIT may provides a good theoretical account of group identity formation at a rational, conscious level, its concentration on process results in a neglect of content. To counter this, Joffe incorporates Kleinian object relations in order to theorise the unconscious component in the way in which social forces impact on individuals. Joffe claims that:

> Her [Klein's] conceptualisation of the unconscious defence termed 'splitting' - with its projective and introjective components - is an essential aspect of any theory of representation of threat (Joffe, 1996:205).

Here, I am in complete agreement. The way in which people handle perceived threats to their identity necessarily entails an analysis of the unconscious as well as the conscious processes of defence. Joffe's analysis successfully integrates the *process* of representation formation with the *content* of those representations:

> Social representations theory can be enriched by a psycho-dynamic, developmental angle which postulates that fantasises that occur during early development account for some of the energy with which people attach themselves to particular representations...the Kleinian model is remarkably useful in terms of positing the origin of the tendency to represent others in polarised terms, as either all 'good' or all 'bad'. As a function of the life force, people attempt to protect the 'good' facets of themselves and others. This is done by splitting the 'good' from the 'bad' and projecting the 'bad' outside of the self. However, the 'other', who is the target of the projection, is viewed as dangerous and powerful (Joffe, 1996:208).

The details of Kleinian theory will be drawn upon in Chapter 4 as described by Joffe but also by theorists in the post-structuralist tradition such as Hollway (1989). The use of 'splitting' as an explanatory framework for both the process and content of belief systems will also underpin my theoretical framework and model of dehumanisation. Here, although Klein's work is evidently related to my theoretical research questions, the role of social representations theory is less applicable. Starting from the basis of meaning emerging through

difference, a structuralist concept, my theoretical model requires the explicit conceptualisation of difference and hierarchy.

By integrating social representations theory, SIT, Kleinian defence mechanism and also cultural theory, Joffe provides an in-depth, non-determinist account of how and why social representations emerge, are established and also change. At one level, this synthesis is a useful explanation of human relations with other animals. However, the ontological basis of the splitting of animals into humans and beasts (on the 'bad' side) or animals into humans and pets (on the 'good' side) requires another level of analysis, one which accounts for the hierarchical construction of meaning as well as the subsequent defence of meaningful identities. For this purpose, I shall leave social representations theory here, but I shall expand on the relevance of Kleinian defence mechanisms in Chapter 4.

At this point, it may be useful to distinguish between the use of the term 'representation' in social representations theory and my own use of the term in this thesis. I use 'representations' in the ordinary sense to refer to the re-presentation of reality, here through psychodynamic constructions. To this end, I shall explore linguistic representations in terms of metaphors and metonymies, and visual representations of the 'beast' in the empirical chapter on *Wilderness*. Again, my use of the term 'discourse' follows Weedon's (1987) definition (see page 28). Thus, I shall explore representations and discourses throughout this thesis. There is a certain degree of overlap between these terms, although broadly speaking discourses are more verbal (written and oral) whilst representations are more visual (pictorial or linguistic images). Representations and discourses interplay to produce meanings which may reinforce or contest dominant meanings. My aim throughout this thesis shall be to explore these constructions within a psychodynamic framework, using individual accounts, and media representations, both linguistic and visual, to contribute to the social psychological understanding of human relations to other animals. To begin that exploration, I now turn to structuralism and identify the key tenets from which post-structuralism emerges as a dynamic, non-determinist account of the use of nonhuman animals in the psychodynamic constructions of human subjectivity.

2.3 Structural Linguistics: Signifying Animals

Structuralism is a theoretical framework involving many, often conflicting, theoreticians which retains some sense of cohesion by attempting to explain surface beliefs and behaviours through deconstruction to reveal underlying systems. Much of structuralist thought has emerged from Saussure's (1915) concept of semiology, the science of signs, which investigates the arbitrary relation between the signifier and the signified. The work of Saussure contains within it this revolutionary idea that would eventually give rise to the post-structuralist critiques of Derrida and Foucault. Although structuralism has been placed firmly in modernity, without Saussure's investigation into linguistic systems and language as a semiological system, it is difficult to imagine what form post-modernism would have taken. Furthermore, Lacan's (1977) adoption of Saussure's notion of the structure of language and its application to the structure of the unconscious, led to feminist interpretations of discourse and psychoanalysis which allow space for resistance and opposition to oppression (Minsky, 1992).

The basic tenets of structuralism are centred on the concept of structured systems. Both content and function may vary across times and contexts, but the structural organisation of social phenomena remains systematic. Moreover, there is an inextricable link between mythology and semiology - the science of signs. Saussure defined semiology as the science which studied what constituted a sign and what laws governed signs. Such an aim necessarily entails the analysis of language. Saussure stated that the 'social' should be distinguished from the 'individual', as being outside the individual. Furthermore, what is 'essential' must be separated from what is 'accessory'. Therefore, in language (langue) the only essential thing is the 'union of meaning and sound images'. This is the psychological aspect of the sign. Saussure also distinguished La Langue (language system) from La Parole (word or usage in speech or writing) in order to identify an object of linguistics from within language usages. Structuralists identify and analyse the fundamental rules of language in terms of its social nature not its individual use.

Saussure's La Parole is based on binary oppositions. The process of signification involves the arbitrary relation of the signifier to the signified. Signs are, thus, based on binary oppositions. Another opposition involves the paradigmatic versus the syntagmatic. The paradigmatic involves linguistic substitution or metaphor, whilst the syntagmatic involves combinations in the form of metonymy or synecdoche. Both paradigmatic substitution and syntagmatic combination produce extended discourses. These are systems of signs based on cultural convention which construct meaning. We shall see how metaphor and metonymy conspire to dehumanise people in later chapters. The key concept for now is the Saussurean sign and Lacan's (1977) revision of it.

Saussure defined the sign as binomial: the signifier being the acoustic image and the signified being the concept. The relationship between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary. However, once they are united as the sign their position within the linguistic system is objectified. The Saussurean sign is symmetrical, however, Lacan interpreted the concept of the sign with the algorithm: $\underline{S}$

$$s$$

Here Lacan places the signifier over the signified. It is Lacan's first revision of the Saussurean sign, and it extols the signifier. This asymmetry relates to the endless degeneration of the signified into signifiers. All meaning is, thus, derived from the signifier, and with any signified thing being the amalgamation of an indeterminate number of signifiers, meaning is pluralistic. Reality, truth, everyday experience are all determined by such a 'signifying chain'. For Lacan, symbols were the primary language upon which all other languages were based. He believed implicitly that 'Man speaks...but it is because the symbol has made him man' (1977:65). The symbolic order, according to Lacan, is defined by exclusions. The notion of exclusion will be pivotal to our understanding of subjectivity and prejudice determined through hierarchical opposition. Initially, though, let us turn to two areas of structural analysis - structural anthropology and mythology.

The Meaning of Myth

Nonhuman animal myths are discourses which have altered the concept of what a nonhuman animal is into a collection of stereotyped simplicities which are compatible with contemporary ideologies such as anthropocentrism and speciesism. There are many mythical examples of nonhuman animals. In psychological terms, myth imposes structure onto reality through which people comprehend reality. Barthes (1972) stated that myth is a language, it resides in discourse and is, essentially, a mode of signification. Myth is also a Saussurean semiological sign in the sense that it is the study of signification severed from content. In myth there are two semiological systems. One is the linguistic system (language-object) whereby myth creates its own system. The other is myth (metalanguage) which is a second language in which one speaks about the first. Myth's dual function is to signify something and to impose that signification onto reality. The signifier is simultaneously the meaning and the form. The meaning of the signifier is the idea behind it. The form does not suppress the meaning but it distances it. This form is not a symbol but an image; it is abstract. The mythological concept, however, is imbued with history. The concept is an interpretation of reality, it is a particular kind of knowledge. The content and the form of such knowledge is wholly dependent on its function. Thus, the mythological concept closely corresponds to its function. Barthes (1972) likens the signification of myth to the Saussurean sign. He elucidates the function of myth thus:

> Myth *hides* nothing; its function is to distort, not to make disappear. There
> is no latency of the concept in relation to the form: there is no need of an
> unconscious in order to explain myths. (Barthes, 1972:121)

We shall see how Barthes' dismissal of the unconscious is unjustified. Indeed, the relevance of Lacan's concept of a linguistically structured unconscious and Hollway's theory of investment supports whole-heartedly the idea that the unconscious is central to the establishment and maintenance of myths. Nevertheless, at this point we shall elucidate the relevance of mythology to our contemporary understanding of the term 'animal'.

Many nonhuman animal myths are structured on binary oppositions. As has been shown, the meaning of nonhuman animals is defined through reference to humans. Such meanings constitute myths which are conveyed in language. People comprehend and order social practices through language. There is no intrinsic connection between language and the world. The construction of meanings, of myths, occurs in discursive fields. Indeed, Foucault (1972) states that ideology emerges from the conflict of such discourses. Inherent, also, to Saussure's structuralist linguistics is the notion that meaning emerges from implicit or explicit contrast. Thus, any unitary concept necessarily contains a negated argument. Fixed oppositions (animal:human; nature:culture) conceal the extent to which entities are interdependent (Scott, 1991).

Structural Anthropology

Semiology is essential for understanding the representation of nonhuman animals in human culture, as have been explored through structural anthropology. Many nonhuman animals have been assigned special significance. Representations of these nonhuman animals, rooted in mythology, signify a range of human qualities and experiences. Perhaps the most explicit use of these animals as signifiers is to be found in this field. The symbolic construction of the notion of 'beast' is itself both the signifier and the signified. 'Beasts' exist through what they signify, and often the term 'beast' is a signification for negative human attributes. It is in this area of signification that totemism is particularly salient. A totem can be any species of living or inanimate thing that is regarded by a group with superstitious respect as an outward symbol of an existing intimate unseen relation.

Structural anthropology also focuses on the concept of binary oppositions through the influence of digital binarism. Binary classification produced both social relationships and categories that, in turn, constituted totemism. Totems are a method of linking codes in the world, mainly between nonhuman nature and human culture through classifications of plants, animals, gods, society and kinship (Levi-Strauss, 1973). Totemism is, thus, a logical (re)production of society in which the natural world is connected to the human

(cultural) world. Nonhuman animals figure prominently in totemism. Human are, simultaneously, defined as continuous with nature and fundamentally separate from it. The 'beast' within humans both mirrors and signifies nonhuman animals.

Within nonhuman animal symbolism the concept of taboo is central. Leach (1964) has proposed that the continual use of nonhuman animal categories in terms of abuse signifies the fact that such nonhuman animals are taboo. Leach defines taboo as 'expression which is inhibited' (Leach 1964:24). It is the social aspects of taboo that Leach is interested in. He describes broken taboo as obscenity and divides obscenity into three categories:

> (1) dirty words - usually referring to sex and excretion; (2) blasphemy and profanity; (3) animal abuse - in which a human being is equated with an animal of another category (Leach, 1964:28).

Leach's focus is on the last category - the relation between animal categories and verbal abuse. For Leach, the use of animal names in this way indicates the value attached to the animal:

> When an animal name is used in this way as an imprecation, it indicates that the name itself is credited with potency. It clearly signifies that the animal category is in some way taboo (Leach, 1964:29).

Leach uses the concept of taboo to 'cover all classes of food prohibition, explicit and implicit, conscious and unconscious' (Leach, 1964:30). He submits that this classification is 'a matter of language and culture, not of nature' (Leach, 1964:31), and, significantly:

> *Our* classification is not only correct, it is morally right and a mark of our superiority. The fact that frogs' legs are a gourmet's delicacy in France but not food at all in England provokes the English to refer to Frenchman as Frogs, with implications of withering contempt (Leach, 1964:31).

Leach's thesis is based on the structuralist concept of meaning emerging through difference. He proposes that naming objects creates discontinuity. Central to Leach's essay is the idea that language and taboo break the continuum between the physical and social environment. Language shapes the environment, and taboo signifies the anxieties within that environment. Specifically, taboo refers to those categories that are anomalous:

> Language gives us the names to distinguish the things; taboo inhibits the recognition of those parts of the continuum which separate the things (Leach, 1964:35).

Perceiving the environment containing separate things requires that the 'nonthings' which fill the interstices are suppressed. The suppressed area becomes taboo. Leach posits the example of excretions, such as faeces, urine, semen, menstrual blood, hair clippings, nail parings, body dirt, spittle and mother's milk which are all substances which are 'ambiguous'. These substances are 'both me and not me' (Leach, 1964:38):

> So here again it is the ambiguous categories that attract maximum interest and the most intense feelings of taboo. The general theory of taboo applies to categories which are anomalous with respect to clear-cut category oppositions (Leach, 1964:39).

Leach further submitted that the edibility of a species is linked to belief systems. Here, he sheds light on the ambiguous nature of human relations with other animals. Leach suggests that the strictest taboo applies to those nonhuman animals who are most anomalous, for example, snakes are land animals with no legs who lay eggs. Similarly, the concept of cruelty is applicable to birds and mammals but not to fish because birds and mammals are perceived (constructed) as more similar to humans. The predominance of fish-eating vegetarians is testament to this categorisation. Leach's analysis of animal categories and verbal abuse demonstrates how the animate objects are structured in relation to the self:

The implication of all this is that if we arrange the familiar animals in a series according to their social distance from the human SELF then we can see that the occurrence of taboo, as indicated by different types and intensities of killing and eating restrictions, verbal abuse, metaphysical associations, ritual performance, the intrusion of euphemism, etc., is not just randomly distributed. The varieties of taboo are located at intervals across the chart in such a way as to break up the continuum into sections. Taboo serves to separate the SELF from the world, and the world itself is divided into zones of social distance corresponding here to the words farm, field and remote (Leach, 1964:53).

With reference to these 'zones', Leach (1964) submits that there is an universal inclination to associate eating and sexual intercourse. With reference to the male human, Leach posits four categories of women in terms of their sexual availability (Leach, 1964:43):

i). Very close 'true sisters'; strongly incestuous.

ii). Kin, i.e. 'first cousins'.

iii). Neighbours and friends from which to expect a wife; also potential enemies and friends.

iv). Distant strangers; known to exist but there are no social relations.

With reference to humans, Leach also proposes four categories of nonhuman animals in terms of their edibility (Leach, 1964:44):

i). 'Pets'; strongly inedible.

ii). Tame but not close, such as 'farm animals'; edible if immature or castrated.

iii). Field animals, 'game'; potential friendship and hostility; edible when sexually intact but killed only in certain seasons.

iv). Remote wild animals; inedible.

Leach, thus, makes the following pairings:

Incest---Inedible

Marriage prohibition   Castration &

premarital sex-------------------------------------edibility

Marriage   Edible

Alliance---sexually intact

No sex---edible

Leach's analysis adds to the concept of binary oppositions by positing the mediating category of taboo. This intermediate category is, inevitably, anomalous and ambiguous, therefore, it is also loaded with taboo. 'Pet' nonhuman animals are an example of this taboo category; they are neither fully 'animal' nor fully 'human' (Leach, 1964:45):

> ...we make binary distinctions and then mediate the distinction by creating an ambiguous (and taboo-laden) intermediate category. Thus:

p	both p & ~p	~p
man	'man-animal'	not man
(not animal)	('pets')	(animal)
TAME	GAME	WILD
(friendly)	(friendly:hostile)	(hostile)

Leach details how nonhuman animals are used symbolically for a range of terms such as insults (bitch, pig, cow, dog, etc.), affection (lamb, duck, etc.) or obscenity (cock, pussy, cunny, ass, etc.). Leach suggests that the long complex names of certain 'close' nonhuman animals, such as donkey and rabbit results from their substitution for phonetically simple words (ass - donkey: coney - rabbit) as the original name has become too deeply identified with all meanings of the subject. Hence donkey is an attempt to restrict ass to the category 'farm animal' away from the 'private' (sacred) discourse. Thus, donkey is shortened to

'ass'. Coney is the etymological derivation from the Latin for rabbit 'cuniculus'. In the fifteenth century it was shortened to 'coney' which was pronounced 'cunny' and was euphemistically used for 'cunnus', the Latin word for pudendum. This development lead from 'cunny' to 'cunt'. In baby language the rabbit is referred to as 'bunny', whereas the adult coney remains 'rabbit'. Leach likens the 'cunny houses' of the nineteenth century to the modern-day 'bunny clubs'. The rabbit is so taboo-laden because it occupies an intermediate position between the farm and field categories, and between the farm and pet categories, it is, therefore, anomalous and ambiguous. Taboo separates the self from the world which is divided into areas of social distance corresponding to farm, field and remote. Such distances lead to complex identifications.

Table 2.1: Leach's (1964) Analysis of Animal Categories

*The species underlined on the bottom line are those which appear to be specially loaded with taboo values, as indicated by their use in obscenity and abuse or by metaphysical associations or by the intrusion of euphemism.

Leach concludes that the linguistic approach to these categories reflects their taboo value. Lawrence comments on Leach's system as:

> The use of such substances to articulate symbolically certain ideological themes makes sense in terms of Leach's theory about tabooed elements of the environment that serve to separate the self from the world external to it (Lawrence 1982:212-22).

Leach's analysis of nonhuman animal categories and verbal abuse is useful as it demonstrates how structuralist principles can be applied to the question of human relations to other animals. The structure of 'social distance' which locates the self and constructs meaning through differences amongst categories is a strong starting point in my conceptualisation of representations and discourses on the nature of nonhuman animals. The content, in terms of types of nonhuman animals, will vary across cultures but the symbolic use of nonhuman animals is a universal construct. My concern in the following chapters will be to explore Leach's framework in the British cultural context. In theorising a model of dehumanisation, I will attempt to integrate Leach's insights with the post-structuralist concept of subjectivity.

Discussion

The relationship between human and animal identities serves to illuminate the relationship between dehumanisation and prejudice. The cultural myths about human and nonhuman identity are composed of binary oppositions, and meaning is derived from opposition, human as norm and animal as 'other'. In Leach's (1982:116) words, 'We are the prototype of normality; abnormality is the other'. Consequently, living nonhuman animals are only comprehended in terms of their (human) representation. These myths impose structure on reality through which people comprehend reality. The political notion of equality depends on the acknowledgement of difference, not of equality and difference as antithetical. However, those who are dehumanised are seen as different and therefore, in

opposition to equality. Consequently, dehumanisation leads to prejudice and the denial of equality. The implications of this system of dehumanisation correspond to Donovan's analysis:

> It is clear that one of the main sources of the continuing atrocious abuse of animals by humans is an attitude that allows their reification or objectification. That ontology conveniently allows their commodification for mass-produced slaughter and their mechanisation for laboratory experimentation. In fact, the reduction of animals to 'its' is at the root of most animal abuse. The attribution of deadness to what is alive, conscious, and sensitive involves a psychology of denial that conveniently facilitates the interests of the powerful. Such denial unquestionably has allowed the great human atrocities of the century to occur, and such denial continues to allow unspeakable animal suffering to proceed as a commonplace norm (Donovan, 1996:7-8).

Saussure's structuralism provides the key point about the arbitrary relation between the signifier and the signified. The arbitrariness provides a space for resistance to hegemonic meanings. As the signified does not determine the signifier, this arbitrariness allows changes in meaning. The mythologisation of meaning, the denial of history and culture, leading to the naturalisation of discourse, provides a contextual perspective on the emergence of 'commonsense' ideas. The anthropological use of nonhuman animals as means to identify 'human' characteristics also produces anomalies and ambiguities which can only be addressed through ritual and taboo. These basic tenets of identity as structured, relational, historically and culturally constituted provide a decentred account of human individuals. These foundations will lead further to Lacan's interpretation of the culturally constituted unconscious, Derrida's concept of deconstruction and the endless play of textual signification, and Hollway's integration of Lacanian symbolism, Kleinian defence mechanisms and Foucauldian discourse as an account of psychodynamic investment and the contradictory nature of subjectivity.

This chapter has attempted to show that the strength of ideological violence exists through its invisibility. Everyday people unknowingly conspire in everyday ways to maintain the

social hierarchies which produce violence. Such prejudiced and violent behaviour is sanctioned through the process of naturalisation. The cultural myths which arise from this process are based on psychodynamically constructed realities and identities. Some of these myths, as they have emerged through history and the cultural contexts of Britain will be explored in the following chapter. Many social psychological strategies and mechanisms are incorporated to maintain this deception. These are strong, historically and culturally rooted, forces which do not easily succumb to the theory or practice of liberation, or demands for equality. Many forms of prejudice and violence amongst people are both latent and explicit expressions of a fundamental relationship. In effect, they are the result of the denial of the relationship between nature and culture, and attempts of people to punish others for their own inadequacies. Any effectual challenge to this violence must attempt to deconstruct the dualisms, internalise the projections and reinstate the invisible in an acknowledgement of the *human* beast.

3: THE HISTORICAL BEAST

The emancipation of men from cruelty and injustice will bring with it in due course the emancipation of animals also. The two reforms are inseparably connected, and neither can be fully realised alone (Salt, 1921)

Overview

The question of 'animal rights' has a long past and a relatively short history. Indeed, the history of the animal rights movement is one which has been inspired by the other recent social liberation movements, notably of the 1960s and 1970s. In this chapter, I provide a British historical and cultural context for emerging modern-day representations of nonhuman animals. This history of the 'beast' examines the impact of the Christian religion on the ontological and moral separation between humans and other animals. It explores the dichotomy between humans and God, and between humans and nonhuman animals. I examine the effects of Cartesian dualism on science in relation to the status of animals, effects which are characterised as the mind:body split which chastises the body, thus producing somatophobia, the fear and, consequently, the denial of the body to the Self. Nonhuman animals have also been the subjects of moral philosophy and social justice from early debates on soul possession to recent polemics on the nature of rights. I place Darwinism in relation to this contemporary rhetoric on animal rights. In the context of this, I explore anthropomorphism as a scientific sin which allows either continuity or discontinuity between humans and other animals, or as a scientific heuristic which can, simultaneously, regard humans and other animals as having some shared characteristics, whilst maintaining the distinctiveness of all species. Finally, I compare and contrast animal welfare and animal rights as currently emergent phenomena, and move from the history of the 'beast' to modern-day representations and discourses incorporating feminist theory and an analysis of social relations.

3.1   Animal as the 'Other'

This chapter begins with a review of historical accounts of the nature of nonhuman versus human animal life since the industrial revolution. The growth of animal welfare is set in the context of Victorian sentimentality and increasing urbanisation. Throughout this review, the threads of animal rights are seen to emerge only to be crushed by both Christian and Cartesian appeals to dualism and the subordination of nonhuman animals.

The Industrial and Scientific Revolutions

Noske (1989) has proposed that the change in the status of nonhuman animals emerged from the transforming relation between human civilisation and nature, and that this was based on subject-object relations:

> By drawing a sharp dividing line between human and non-human, a vast gap increased between *subject* (the free acting human agent) and *object* (the passive acted-upon *thing*). This division is related to the notion that we, as Homo sapiens, are unique among the natural species (as if not every species were unique in itself!). We perceive ourselves as belonging to a totally different order: the realm of *culture*, while all other beings and inanimate things are only *nature* (Noske, 1989:40).

Noske describes how the Renaissance and the Reformation brought a change from contemplating nature to exploiting it for production. The gap increased between science and technology. With the new market societies came secularisation as the intellectuals and artists began to question the medieval patterns and the omnipotence of the Church. Europe became increasingly secular and individualistic. The closed cosmos of tradition was replaced with an open, infinite system. Man was no longer at the centre of the universe, however, he remained the measure of all things. The new mechanistic philosophy objectified the world around man, and, thus, severed him ontologically from women and the feminised natural

world (Noske, 1989).

Modern science in the seventeenth century found itself struggling amongst scholastic Aristotelianism, natural magic and the new mechanical philosophy (Easlea, 1980). The organic theory of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries came from the alchemists and natural magicians. They believed the world was a living whole, sentient and conscious and humanity was, therefore, placed within nature rather than above it, whereas, the androcentric philosophy of Bacon devalued nature. For Bacon, it was men who made science, culture and history. Women belonged to the realm of nature and the environment. Hollway (1989:110) quotes Keller's assessment of Bacon's impact of science:

> [Francis Bacon] first and most vividly articulated the equation between scientific knowledge and power, who identified the aims of science as the control and domination of nature (Keller, 1985:33).

Nature was acceptable only as a means to an end. It was devalued so that it could be used economically and technically. However, this devaluation could only occur when humanity detached itself from nature. There was the simultaneous objectification of nature and autonomisation of humanity (Noske, 1989). The increased distance between the human observer and the natural observed led to a value-free, removed moral status. The science of Galileo, Bacon, Descartes, Boyle and Newton was not concerned with the reason of things but with their function. Ultimately, nature had no purpose at all and this loss was replaced by the new mechanical science:

> During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the conception of nature changed from an active, powerful partner (as in alchemy) to something passive, determined by mechanical laws (Hollway, 1989:111).

Post Galileo scientists had to blame the theories underlying their inferences and discoveries on 'natural laws' rather than own their own constructions in order to gain freedom from persecution from the Church. Hence, 'nature', not the scientists, was responsible for the theories they were promoting as 'scientific truth'. The aim to discover nature's laws had further in-built prejudices. Scientists wanted to repeat quantitative measures of the processes and events in nature. This selected nature was restricted to the part of natural reality that was believed to be objective. Such objectivity based on *a priori* principles of selection singled out isolated factors. Nature was bifurcated into the objective part fit to be examined by natural science and, therefore, useful, and the subjective part that had no scientific use. Nature was itself distorted by investigation and that distortion came to represent all nature (Noske, 1989).

As the psychological distance increased between the scientist and the object of study, there was a decrease in the concern for the object's integrity and an increased desire to dissect it into its 'fundamentals'. Indeed, the more there was a hierarchical observer-object relation in science, the more respect there was for that science. Scientists were supposed to observe objects and this process inevitably displaced the object. The 'hard' versus the 'soft' sciences were dependent on the degree of transformation practiced by the scientist on the object (Noske, 1989). Scientists tried to eliminate their subjectivities from their observations, so that their evidence could exist as 'facts', in a unitary form, independent of the observer. As science sought to be value-free, due to this estranged observer-object relation, it actually engaged in a particular value associated with the subjugation of nature.

To the French philosopher Descartes all natural things were mechanistic (Garner, 1993). They were God's machines and there was no discernible difference between artefacts and nonhuman animals. These animals had only bodies, no soul, no feeling and no language. Descartes described them as automata whose behaviour was involuntary and unconscious. This construction of the nonhuman animal world allowed scientists to rationalise away the cries of

those 'objects' who were subject to experimentation. Their responses were not to pain. They were part of the new Cartesian creation. Cartesian dualism has been cited as the origin of somatophobia:

> Somatophobia refers to the hostility to the body that is a characteristic of Western philosophy and its emphasis on reason (Spelman, 1982). Spelman explains that somatophobia, a legacy of the soul/body distinction, is often enacted in unequal relationships such as men to women, masters to slaves, fathers to children, humans to animals. (Donovan, 1996:2).

Descartes did not want to oppose the Church with mechanical philosophy, rather he sought to maintain the political and religious status quo with his dualism between matter and mind. By stating that there was a qualitative difference between humans and animals, the mind and body, value and fact, religion and nature, Descartes was able to defend the Christian religion against atheism, vitalism and natural magic (Noske, 1989) In this way, scientists could be credibly split as human beings, on the one hand, and 'scientific observers' on the other. Indeed, scientific progress that increased human mastery and exploitation of nature mirrored what was widely perceived to be the divine plan for dominion over nature (Plumwood, 1993).

In the West, the establishment of scientific hierarchies preserved a sense of control and collective power. Boundaries were an artefact of this and they legitimised the domination of the species in power - humans - over others. Fluidity between boundaries has generally been consigned to the realm of the supernatural and mystical. Leach (1964) draws on his notion of taboo as the mediator of these boundaries:

> To be useful, gods must be near at hand. So religion sets about reconstructing a continuum between this world and the other world...The gap between the two logically distinct categories, this world/other world, is filled in with tabooed ambiguity. The gap is bridged by supernatural beings of a highly ambiguous kind - incarnate deities, virgin mothers, supernatural monsters which are half

-60-

man/half beast. These marginal, ambiguous creatures are specifically credited with the power of mediating between gods and men. They are the object of the most intense taboos, more sacred than the gods themselves (Leach, 1964:39).

Greater fluidity in linguistic constructs characterised peoples who were more integrated with the natural world and who created less environmental destruction. It has been proposed that softening the boundaries of these constructs and Western reintegration with the natural world would produce ecological and animal rights benefits (Greene, 1995).

This history of religious and cultural hegemony has produced a modern conflicting relationship between humans and other animals. Since the Biblical description of human dominion over other animals was interpreted as having power over nature, Christian humans have continually believed that all life on earth is for the benefit of the human species:

> Then God said, 'Let us make man in our image, after our likeness, and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth' (Genesis 1:26).

Consequently, with divine direction, people have used other animals as resources in food, transport, medicine and entertainment. Complementing this Christian notion of dualism and hierarchy between humans and other animals, was the Cartesian philosophy that denied that nonhuman animals had souls, thoughts or feelings. This objectification of these animals made their use in unanaesthetised vivisection seem logical, even desirable and necessary. Merchant (1980) argues that the intellectual transformation of the scientific revolution replaced the organic world view of nature as alive and sensitive with a mechanistic world view of nature as passive, lifeless and devoid of purpose. It was not until the Eighteenth century and the Age of Enlightenment that the role of nonhuman animals was redefined.

Victorian Sentimentality and the Growth of the Humane Movement

The treatment of nonhuman animals formed a significant part of Victorian sentimentality as it became an important issue for the respectable middle-classes. Queen Victoria herself opposed vivisection, and her association with animal welfare increasing legitimised this concern for the upper and middle social classes. People projected their beliefs about nature, hierarchy, social organisation, language, rationality and moral behaviour onto other animals. Nonhuman animals were romanticised as good and innocent and pure, but they also came to represent what was the best and the worst of human nature. Victorian attitudes to other animals thrived on sentimental anthropomorphism. Nonhuman animals that were very familiar yet utterly alien were comprehended through anthropomorphic projections which broke down the boundaries that humans perceived. Representations of these nonhuman animals were, consequently, polarised between the intimate, familiar, emotional attachment and the instrumental exploitation of them as resources.

The 'civilisation' of the middle classes brought with it concern for the feelings of others and the strengthening of the bourgeois notion of family and emotional life. By 1840 the RSPCA had become the favourite charity of the middle classes. New representations of the family, home and children set a precedent for new ideas about other animals. The increased intimacy and privacy of the nuclear home brought with it the notion of the vulnerability of children and of childhood as a special stage of life. Sensitivity to all vulnerable creatures became a legitimate and desired focus of moral concern. Both the family home and the family pet became idealised. Urbanised nature was romanticised and domesticated, reduced to a few tame, symbolic replicas in the form of pets. During the nineteenth century, Britain and the United States became increasingly obsessed with pets as human society simultaneously became increasingly divorced from the natural world. The most common pets, dogs and cats, incorporated the ideal characteristics for successful sentimental anthropomorphism. Their capacity to express pain and suffering, their physical features, complex mental states, fur,

large eyes head, in relation to the body, compared well with the sentimental feelings induced by human children. Indeed, in accordance with Leach's framework, Fiddes (1991:133) has observed that:

> We exclude pets from our food resources due to their social proximity to ourselves as humans.

This new moral sensibility soon spread from the middle classes to the aristocracy and eventually to the working classes. However, before the nineteenth century only a few individuals had expressed concern for nonhuman animals. The democratic revolutions increased the respect and dignity for the rights of individuals and brought with it new attention to the treatment of nonhuman animals. Jeremy Bentham's moral philosophy attacked rationalism with the oft-quoted question in reference to animals:

> The day *may* come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny...It may one day come to be recognised that the number of legs, the villosity of the skin or the termination of the *os sacrum*, are reasons...insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they *reason*: nor Can they *talk*? but, *Can they suffer*? (Bentham, 1789:847).

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, science began to blur the traditional boundaries between humans and other animals. The nineteenth century Romantics who attacked the pursuit of progress as the destruction of nature provided the discourse for the anti-instrumentalist rhetoric of the protests of the 1960s.

3.2 From Animal Welfare to Animal Rights

Victorian Britain had set the scene for the growth of the welfare movement based in sentimentality and hierarchy. The place of Darwin in this context brings a scientific account of the relation between humans and other animals which centres on the concept of adaptation, not hierarchical dualism. Darwinism provides the intellectual backdrop to the growth of animal welfare into animal rights. Here, this account leads to a review of the modern philosophy of animal rights.

Darwinism

Sentimental and regal credibility was replaced by intellectual fervour in the form of the evolutionary theory of Comte de Buffon in the eighteenth century and Charles Darwin's *The Origin of Species* (1859). Challenging long held views on the nature of humanity, Darwin proposed that humans were not created by God and, thus, placed at the top of the hierarchy but that they had evolved from other animal species. The differences in the mental power and moral senses of animals and humans was of degree not kind, as Darwin demonstrated in *The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals* (1872). Not surprisingly, the moral edifice did not collapse immediately and the conservative influence over moral ideas strengthened in response to this attack. Victorian culture would absorb Darwinian ideas but the Church was not ready for such revolutionary ideas and emerged from the controversy increasingly traditionalist and persisted in contributing to humans' fundamental contradictions about their relationship to other animals.

Darwin's theory was based on Malthus' *Essay on Population* (1817) in which Malthus described population growth as a Hobbesian war. Darwin used this metaphor in nature. More individuals were born than could survive so that the struggle for survival was both intraspecies and interspecies. The survival of the fittest was a metaphorical and contextual phrase that has

often been used out of context in absolutist terms in recent sociobiological writings. Darwin knew that cooperation could be as important as competition to species' survival. Indeed, Darwin's *The Descent of Man* (1871) focuses on the importance of socially acquired characteristics.

In the wake of Darwin's discovery of natural selection and the evolution of species, debates became focused on science and the way it had demonstrated the similarities amongst animals. Modern social science has found itself in the awkward position of denying any biological influence on human behaviour because hegemonic discourses maintain that humans are not animals and, simultaneously, objectifies nonhuman animals so that they have no 'human' qualities, in order that we may own them, experiment on them and feel justified in doing so. If there is one example of the inherently contradictory disposition of human behaviour, it is in our relationship to other animals because, within those relationships, we are deeply exploring our own condition.

One of the most interesting recent developments in evolutionary theory is the realisation that the question as to how far biology (nature) affects human behaviour, leads to the question as to how far does socialisation (culture) affect nonhuman animal behaviour. It seems that there are numerous reasons why modern evolutionary theory has been completely rejected as an explanation for modern human behaviour, not least the political agendas involved in 'race' and 'sex' differences. However, there also seem to be more fundamental issues at stake. As Degler (1991) proposed, the way forward is a rejection of the simplistic dualisms: animal:human; irrational:rational; nature:culture; and innate:acquired. These dualisms serve to maintain hierarchy and exploitation in the name of what is 'natural'. As Degler has pointed out, the rise of the animal rights movement and of evolutionary theories of behaviour have no immediate connection. But their respective intellectual positions mirror each other. The concepts of agency, subjectivity and consciousness have centre stage in both nonhuman animal

and human ethology. The notion of civil rights may no longer be the guardian of Homo sapiens alone, and animal rights may come to mean much more than the rights of those without a language we understand. As Darwin himself commented (quoted in Barrett, 1974:187):

> Animals whom we have made our slaves, we do not like to consider our equals.

Humans are biologically classified as animals yet we refer to all other species of animal with the self-imposed distinction that creates not only mineral, plant or animal, but also a separate category of human. This is not problematic if we are talking about human distinctiveness, of course there are many differences between humans and other animals. Indeed, it is tautological to say that there are species differences, that is self-evident through definition. The problem lies in the elevation of humans to a superior status based on spurious grounds, resulting in prejudice and discrimination, against other animals and against humans who are represented as animalistic. This process is a powerful concomitant to Darwin's implications that nonhuman animals, too, had the capacity to suffer and that should be taken into account when interacting with them. This meant that humans would have to find other ways of justifying the way they treated animals. Darwin's ideas about animal suffering were directly related to his concept of evolutionary continuity amongst species. He was, however, subject to the same speciesist assumptions as all other humans and his personal conflict over the vivisection debate was never resolved. Nevertheless, the legacy of Darwinism to the animal rights movement should not be underestimated.

Social control is evident as the motivating factor in the misuse of Darwinian theory (Rachels, 1990). Defence of the status quo is easily made by appeals to what is natural and, consequently, right and the dismantling of this requires the reconceptualisation of the status of humans in relation to other animals, as originally intended by Darwin himself. Darwin's

awareness of the human tendency to claim god-like status was evident:

> Man in his arrogance thinks himself a great work worthy the interposition of
> a deity. More humble and I think truer to consider him created from animals.
> Darwin (Notebooks, quoted in Barrett *et al*, 1987:300).

The problem with the emergence of Darwin's theory was that it could be used as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it eliminates the 'interposition of a deity' through recognising that humans are animals who have evolved, as all animals have, through natural selection. On the other hand, the tendency to use anthropocentric knowledge about other animals to direct our interpretations of human life is a double distortion. Establishing that humans are animals does not mean negating the enormous differences that there are between humans and other animals. The mechanisms of adaptation may be the same, but the content of those adaptations and the extent to which they can be applied to modern human life, where cultural adaptation is the most flexible amongst species, is to be guarded. The distinctiveness about human evolution is its flexibility due, mainly, to language. This does not mean that moral judgements should be made on this characteristic but, rather, there should be an understanding of the way biology expresses itself through culture and vice versa. In species, in our case only humans, where culture is defined by great flexibility, the extent of biological influence will not be as significant compared to other animals. Leach makes the point perfectly:

> It is perfectly true that, as members of a common species Homo sapiens, we
> are all predisposed to behave in certain fixed ways which reflect our
> biochemical constitutions. But this in itself does not tell us very much. We are
> all naturally endowed with a capacity for speech and all spoken languages have
> certain features in common - e.g. they convey meaning by means of an
> alternation of vowels and consonants - but these constraints set no limit on what
> we say. Likewise, the physical gestures of Homo are limited in kind by the
> fact that the actor is a man not a goose. But what we express by these gestures
> is not limited at all. Thus any belief that our customs are somehow

predetermined in the same way as the mating rituals of birds is an illusion (Leach, 1968:72).

There is an interesting and telling connection between the desired objectivity of scientific enquiry and the 'sin' of anthropomorphism. Anthropomorphism is commonly believed to be the utmost of scientific errors. It means the endowment of humans characteristics to other animals. This is interesting on a number of points. Firstly, humans are animals. We evolved in the same way that all life evolved. We are primates, closely related to other primates such as gorillas and chimpanzees. As we are biologically evolved beings, we would expect to share some characteristics with our relatives. Not all human activities are exclusively human. This presents us with the problem of deciding not only which behaviours are exclusively human but which behaviours are species-specific for all species. Secondly, anthropomorphism is viewed as a lack of objectivity, of being emotionally involved with the subject of enquiry. This has two related aspects: i) modern social science has shown that the objective study is an impossible task; and ii) the stereotypical association of emotionality with femininity and, therefore, with girls and women has both feminised and devalued nonhuman animal issues. If the objective study of humans is impossible then it seems even more implausible that the objective study of animal behaviour is possible, given the lack of inter-species communication. Our own insight will provide an heuristic, not a sin, for understanding the behaviour of other animals with emotional and intelligent lives. This notion was evident in Darwin's *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animal* (1872), yet is conspicuous, through its absence, in the contemporary debates on evolution. Again, however, this endeavour is to be conducted with caution as the human aspects of human behaviour, although animalistic by virtue of humans being animals, are the discontinuous defining characteristics of the human species. Once again, Leach makes the point incisively:

> The argument is in some respects circular. The ethologists interpret particular animal behaviour as *aggressive, amicable, dominant, submissive* etc., and they use such terms because of what they know intuitively about themselves. That being so, it is quite illogical to reverse the process and pretend that we might understand human aggression better because of its analogic similarity to 'animal aggression' (Leach, 1968:72).

There are good evolutionary reasons for rejecting the discourse determinism of some current social scientific theories on human nature. The view of the human *tabula rasa* has been thoroughly discredited and replaced with, amongst other concepts, the evolutionary concept of humans as appetitive animals with evolved, inherent capacities and needs (Robinson and Tiger, 1991). Nonetheless, these features of human animals are complicated by other 'human' characteristics as Montagu suggests:

> That heredity plays a part in all human behaviour is patently false, but that heredity plays a role in some human behaviour can scarcely be doubted; but this is a very different thing from saying that any form of human behaviour is determined by heredity (Montagu, 1968:xiii).

Darwinism has dispensed with the need for God but human desire to be unique and distinct from all other animals provides an ubiquitous motivation for the persistence of a divine hierarchy (Rachels, 1990). If we are created in the image of the divine God and we have souls, then we must do as much as possible to separate ourselves from those creatures that we can actually see doing what we do - eating and having sex. Jesus Christ, as the son of God, could not have been created in such a 'carnal' way, hence the need for the Virgin Birth. Likewise, the guilt associated with the doctrine of Original Sin is a fundamental chain on our way of thinking. Sex is dirty, animalistic, and sinful. Sex is what animals do. As Leach comments:

> Sex and sin do somehow go together and this seems to tie in with the distinction...between the scientific view that man differs from other animals only in degree and the religious view that there is an essential difference in kind. Sex is an animal quality which must somehow be pushed on to the other side of the great divide (Leach, 1982:116).

The ontological and moral separation between humans and animals is paralleled in the dichotomy between humans and God. Leach (1964:38) describes this relation between humans and gods as:

> Logically, life is simply the binary antithesis of death; the two concepts are the opposite sides of the same penny; we cannot have either without the other. But religion always tries to separate the two. To do this it creates a hypothetical 'other world' which is the antithesis of 'this world'. In this world life and death are inseparable; in the other world they are separate. This world is inhabited by imperfect mortal men; the other world is inhabited by immortal nonmen (gods). This category god is thus constructed as the binary antithesis of man.

The maintenance of guilt through reference to the doctrine of Original Sin is the prerequisite to the conflict produced in terms of evolutionary continuity and rights for animals. Creation science is a contemporary attempt to situate Darwinism within God's greater design, a contradiction in meaning that has, nevertheless, proven popular with modern-day Christians.

The Growth of Animal Welfare into Animal Rights

During the 1960s a new kind of animal welfare movement emerged. The animal rights movement challenged the most fundamental forms of animal exploitation such as meat-eating. Tension grew in the 1970s with an increasing frustration with the conservatism of the 'humane' tradition and an increasing awareness of individual rights. The compassion for nonhuman animals became an essential ingredient of the emerging rhetoric of animal rights (Francione, 1996).

The radicalisation of the animal protection movement followed the changing images of nonhuman animals from the objects of charity to beings with interests and then to autonomous individuals with the right to their own lives. The anti-instrumentalist rhetoric of the 1960s and 1970s restated the holism of nature and launched critiques on the emerging social and commercial institutions. The civil rights movement, the women's movement and various other campaigns demanded rights to full economic and political participation. In the 1980s the critique of instrumentalism drew on the New Age philosophies which were themselves derived from Eastern mystical religions. The interdependence of the human and the natural world was stressed, and individual consumer choice was advocated as a strategy to defeat exploitation by industry and governments (Jasper and Nelkin, 1993).

The animal rights movement rests on a simple moral position, which is that nonhuman animals are similar enough to humans to deserve serious moral consideration. The crux of it is that animals should be seen as ends in themselves and not merely means for the instrumental uses of humans. The moral vision of animal rights has been explicitly derived from feminism and environmentalism. These movements also engage in a critique of instrumentalism, challenging the constructions and representations of nature and women as things, objects devoid of agency. The change from animal welfare to animal rights came with the shift in emphasis from individual behaviour to institutional practices. Indeed, although the animal rights movement is centrally about the treatment of animals, it is fundamentally concerned with human definitions and notions of individualism and moral society. For the activists of the 1970s, ecosystems had inherent worth. Environmentalists linked the exploitation of nature to capitalism, Western science and Judaeo-Christian religious traditions. Ecofeminists linked exploitation to male domination (Gaard, 1993). Thus, the critique of instrumentalism developed within the environmental and feminist movements.

The animal protection groups vary widely in their aims from radicalism to reformist issues. The welfare tradition focuses on public education and minimising the pain and suffering of animals whilst maintaining that humans and animals are distinct, if not dichotomous. The pragmatists believe that certain species deserve moral consideration because of their similarities to humans. The fundamentalists demand an immediate abolition of all forms of animal exploitation. The animal rights movement emphasises the cognitive and emotional lives of animals, whilst the animal welfare groups emphasise pain and suffering of animals. The pragmatists and the fundamentalists form the radical side of the movement. They question the boundaries between humans and animals and, consequently, extend the rights of humans to other species. In doing so they are changing the human relationship to the natural world (Jasper and Nelkin, 1992).

In 1975 Peter Singer's *Animal Liberation* was published and soon became the key text for the animal rights movement. His philosophy was grounded in Jeremy Bentham's (1789) utilitarianism which called for the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number. Singer's thesis proclaimed that the capacity to feel both pleasure and pain brings nonhuman animals into the moral sphere of concern. Singer's argument steers clear of the absolutist rhetoric of rights, it is the potential for suffering rather than the actual instrumental use of nonhuman animals that is the problem. Pragmatists find Singer's work appealing for this compromise, however, more fundamentalist animal rights campaigners ultimately reject utilitarianism. It was left to Tom Regan to articulate the concerns of the fundamentalists in his *The Case for Animal Rights* (1983). In a more radical position than Singer's, Regan proposed that nonhuman animals have inherent worth and should never be used as food, experimental objects or other exploitative functions. It was this absolutist position which broke with the utilitarian tradition. Regan claims that instrumental consideration can never justify immoral practices. Furthermore, he denies the potential conflict between individual rights and species survival. Although Regan is far less widely read than *Animal Liberation*

and although Regan's ideas are often attributed to Singer, it is Regan's radicalism which provides an argument for the animal rights movement based primarily on rationalism and individualism, assumptions which are criticised by feminists advocating nonhuman animal liberation.

The Philosophy of Animal Rights

Habitual discrimination by one group against another results in the formation of an ideology, based in language, which attempts to justify such discrimination (Shapiro, 1990). Prejudice assumes an hierarchy, often based on arbitrary features such as intelligence, race or gender. Racist and sexist ideologies discriminate against members of a presumably 'inferior' group. However, speciesist ideology, discriminating on grounds of species membership (Ryder, 1989), extends this with categories of species of which the individual is not a member. When referring to nonhuman animals there is a tendency to refer to the species rather than to the individual. Individual members of a particular species are semantically subsumed under the class name. This abstract class is substituted for the concrete individual members of the class. Such a reversal in referents is speciesist.

Ethics are measures of human imperfection from representations of the 'ideal'. Ideals are necessary in order to progress beyond the status quo. Traditional and much of contemporary ethical considerations of nonhuman animals adhere to an ethic to 'love animals' and not to be 'cruel' to them. Many writers have suggested (Singer, 1975; Ryder, 1989; Rollin, 1992) this ethical position is fundamentally inadequate. It assumes that nonhuman animals are only subjected to intentional cruelty, moreover, it fails to take into account the positive obligation that humans have to other species. Similarly, the term 'animal-lover' assumes that the proper treatment of nonhuman animals is a question of love when, Garner (1993) argues, it is a question of justice. Issues pertaining to nonhuman animals are typically referred to through terms of 'kindness' and 'cruelty', however, such sentimental simplification leaves an ethical

void in which nonhuman animal users are stereotyped as sadists and nonhuman animal advocates are labelled emotional or puerile. Rollin (1992) has argued, following Plato, that ethical theory helps people to 'recollect' implicit moral beliefs that have not been previously realised. Rollin further suggests that the success of the civil rights movement and the women's movement was due to such implicit moral theory and not to revolutionary principles. The issue of the ethical consideration and, therefore, ethical treatment of nonhuman animals boils down to the question - Are there any reasonable arguments for not protecting the essential interests of nonhuman animals in the way that we defend and protect the central interests of humans?

People have tried to claim that there are. It is commonly believed that it is morally justifiable to kill a nonhuman animal, but not a human, as long as it is done 'humanely'. These claims have often involved the belief that nonhuman animals do not have souls. However, whether or not they have souls is morally irrelevant to a modern, scientific understanding of the evolution of life. The relevant differences between humans and nonhuman animals must be morally relevant and, if they are not, then humans must extend the sphere of moral concern to nonhuman animals. Neither possession of a soul, human dominion or intelligence provide morally relevant differences. These attributes translate into possession of power, but if power was a morally relevant criterion for moral consideration then there would be no concept of morality (Rollin, 1992). Since the philosophy of Kant, there has been an assumption that although nonhuman animals are not themselves direct objects of moral concern, there are, nevertheless, things that should not be done to them because immoral treatment of nonhuman animals would lead to the immoral treatment of humans.

The traditional Cartesian view is that only humans are rational because only humans possess language and, therefore, only humans can be objects of moral concern. However, the argument of rationality is, again, not relevant to the inclusion/exclusion of nonhuman animals

in moral consideration because there are many cases of 'marginal' humans (babies, senile people, severely mentally disabled, etc.) who are not rational yet are included in the sphere of moral concern. Indeed, rationality can only be a part of what makes something an object of moral concern. Moreover, language is often irrelevant to the making of an agreement, and nonhuman animals often behave in ways that would constitute an agreement (Rollin, 1992). Rollin further suggests that the crux of the matter lies in the vague distinction between the concepts of nature and culture. Moreover, he claims that all social contracts necessarily involve both natural and cultural aspects.

Rollin (1992) has suggested that the arguments for and against including nonhuman animals as objects of moral concern delineate between the philosophies of Hume and Kant. Hume claimed that all knowledge is gained through sensory perception and is, therefore, subject to conditioning. Thus, nonhuman animals could reason as well as humans. On the other hand, Kant's Theory of Reason claimed that only humans possess *a priori* knowledge. It is this knowledge that allows universal judgements to be made because it is not subject to particular times and places. For Kant this is the essential meaning of rationality, therefore, nonhuman animals are not rational because their judgements are dependent on stimulus and response reactions. Such rational functioning is an end in itself and, consequently, has intrinsic value. Nonhuman animals do not function rationally and, therefore, they are of instrumental value only, they are the means to an end. Reasoning which depends on universal concepts depends on language. Language allows humans to have generalised concepts and abstract notions. Herein lies the difference - according to Kant, whereas humans deal in universal symbols, nonhuman animals only comprehend signs.

Kant and many other philosophers insist that reason be equated with the possession of language and, therefore, they can justify not including nonhuman animals, who they suppose do not have linguistic ability, as objects of moral concern. However, Rollin (1992) argues that there

are instances of rationality that do not involve references to the universal. The ability to generalise is only one aspect of rationality. This is reflected in the psychological research into the learning behaviour of nonhuman animals which is based on the assumption that human cognition is, in some aspects, analogous to nonhuman cognition. Thus, the Kantian concept of rationality may not be exclusive to humans. If nonhuman animals are capable of learning then they must also be capable of holding general notions or concepts. Furthermore, the idea that it is necessary to possess language in order to memorise and, therefore, apply concepts is unfounded. As Rollin (1992) concludes, humans must be able to remember without language otherwise they would never learn to speak. In spite of all the arguments against including nonhuman animals in the sphere of moral concern, even if rationality and language were morally relevant, they still would not exclude nonhuman animals because of those nonrational, nonlinguistic humans who are included.

However, the major inadequacy of Kantian moral theory is the fact that most moral concern for people has nothing to do with rationality or language. Here enters Bentham's utilitarianism that states the rightness or wrongness (morality) of actions depends on whether or not such actions produce the greatest amount of pleasure for the greatest number. This view seems to agree more with moral intuition than Kantian moral theory. Moreover, utilitarianism necessarily includes nonhuman animals. However, the utilitarian view of pain and pleasure does not account for those aspects of life that are not based on pain or pleasure but which are still subject to morality, notably concepts such as freedom, truth and self-fulfilment. Rollin (1992) contends that something becomes the object of moral concern because of the presence of interests which it has and which can be affected by some other moral agent. Essentially, it is the fact that rationality and feeling pain/pleasure are interests for that being that makes it an object of moral concern. Like truth or freedom, Rollin (1992) argues, rationality and feeling pain or pleasure are examples of interests.

These interests define the nature and function of a being, and it is these intrinsic qualities that Aristotle referred to as *telos*. Rollin (1992) asserts that it is the *telos* of a being that qualifies it for moral consideration. The interests of a being suggest that the needs of the being 'matter' to it and this, in turn, indicates some sort of conscious awareness. Thus, nonhuman animals have a fundamental right. This is the right to be considered as objects of moral concern by humans who hold moral principles, whatever they might be. Rollin (1992) states that this is the only absolute right. Extending from this is the notion that nonhuman animals have the right to life, although, as with humans, this right is not absolute. Nevertheless, killing nonhuman animals for food is morally unjustifiable because it is not necessary. However, respecting the rights of nonhuman animals does not necessarily entail subordinating one's own interests, in the same way that respecting human rights does not mean letting other people take advantage. What it does entail, nonetheless, is taking the interests of nonhuman animals into consideration. Conscious life with associated interests and needs makes something an object of moral concern and, thus, gives intrinsic value.

3.3   The Modern Animal Rights Movement

Animal rights constitutes one of the major social movements in modern Britain. Regan, Singer and Rollin have been criticised for being rationalistic and individualistic (Donovan, 1990). It has been suggested that in their quest for criteria they reproduce the reason:emotion dichotomy. Feminists, like ecologists, have emphasised the importance of community, not what constitutes rights. Recent feminist theorising on the nature of animal rights provide intellectually rigorous defences for the improvement of the status of nonhuman animals.

Feminism and Animal Rights

The alliance between some feminists and the animal liberation movement is an obvious one given the common history of objectification and exclusion. However, the interpretation of

'rights' as described above has been the focus of feminist criticism, as demonstrated by Birke (1994:135):

> The primary problem for feminist critics has been the reliance in the animal rights literature on rationality and a justice conception of rights. This is clearly enunciated in, for instance, Singer (1975), Regan (1983) and Rollin (1992). Rights that depend on rationality are tricky for feminists, for how often have women been denied rights on the grounds of their alleged irrationality?

Birke's position is that 'rationality' as a concept for rights is flawed because of the difficulty in, firstly, defining rationality and, secondly, deciding which nonhuman animals are rational and which are not. The anthropocentric (and androcentric) construction of rationality or self-consciousness is such that it would exclude most other animals. This kind of moral reasoning makes nonhuman animals 'honorary humans'. Birke also criticises the utilitarian position of Singer (1975) which is also 'locked into rationalist decision-making' (Birke, 1994:138). Again, the problem rests with who is to decide the costs/benefits calculation? As Birke states:

> If it is not the animals who decide, neither is it most humans. In general, the decision-making of this kind of practical utilitarianism is done by men, and by men from privileged class and race backgrounds; deciding the 'greater good' in the design of a scientific experiment is not a democratic process open to all. So whose 'good' is it likely to be? (Birke, 1994:138).

Birke quotes Donovan's (1990) critique of Regan and Singer's concept of animal rights. She highlights their 'need to avoid sentimentality and emotionality in advocating rights for animals'. Through Regan and Singer's prioritisation of their concept of rationality, they denigrate the place of empathy as being too emotional. Echoing this thought, Plumwood claims:

Regan's difficulty here stems in part, it seems, from natural rights theory, which privileges rationalism and individualism, but it may also reflect his own determined exclusion of sentiment from 'serious' intellectual inquiry (Plumwood, 1993:170).

Here, the reason:emotion hierarchical dualism is invoked, the very dualism which undermines the interdependence of the terms 'human' and 'animal', and 'masculinity' and 'femininity'. In reproducing these dualistic assumptions, these animal rights advocators undermine their claims of rights for nonhuman animals:

> Recognising compassion and an unwillingness to harm as normal human responses to animals undermines each element of the patriarchal approach. The subordination of emotions to reason is justified by describing sympathies for animals as undependable. In fact, sympathies for animals are so dependable that every institution of animal exploitation develops some means of undercutting them. So rather than focusing exclusively on logic and consideration of formal consistency, we might better remember our feeling connection to animals, while challenging ourselves and others to overthrow the unnatural obstacles to the further development of these feelings (Luke, 1996: 312).

The notion of empathy is relevant to the object:subject opposition in science. Empathy is interpreted, and denigrated, as subjectivity, whilst dispassionate objectivity is considered the best scientific method. The fact that this objectivity is a form of subjectivity eludes those who practice it. These issues are fundamentally gendered, Birke (1994:139) expresses the problem as:

> In suggesting that empathy and respect for nature may have overtones of gender, I am saying that these are qualities that have become stereotyped in western culture as feminine. That is not to say, however, that they are the prerogative of women. I think these are qualities that contribute to being a good scientist, whatever the sex of the practitioner, contributing to a 'feeling for the organism' as Evelyn Fox Keller put it in her biography of Barbara McClintock (Keller 1983).

These issues of empathy, individualism and rationality are also criticised in the work of Benton (1993) who reformulates the notion of animal rights from the rationalist position to one of anti-dualist continuity.

The Issue of Social Relations

Benton (1993) focuses on the relations between the socialist critique of rights and the case for nonhuman animal rights. He emphasises the commonalities between human and nonhuman animals by placing animals within the context of human social relations and devising a human-animal continuities framework. Benton revises both animal theory and socialism within this naturalistic context. Benton provides details on an infamous exchange between animal rights protagonist, Jenkins, and animal rights antagonist, Rose. In a sustained critique of animal rights, Steven Rose (1991) has questioned the boundary between those animals with rights and those without. He claims that only humans can decide who has rights because only humans are 'subjects of history'. Furthermore, duties to nonhuman animals are overridden by duties to humans, and he states that it is offensive to equate speciesism with racism and sexism. In reply to Rose, Jenkins (1991) has proposed that the lack of a clear, non-arbitrary line between the extensions of two concepts does not mark no distinction. Furthermore, the fact that only humans assign rights does not mean that those rights cannot be assigned to non-human animals. Jenkins asserts that many people have rights independently of whether or not they claim them so, he asks, why should it be different for other animals. 'Species' loyalty is on a par with 'race-loyalty', therefore, Jenkins asks, how can the first be justified without justifying the second.

Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes and Kant all denied that people have moral duties to animals. Nevertheless, Rose and Jenkins agree that animals are proper objects of moral concern, what they fundamentally differ on is the question of rights and cross-species egalitarianism. Benton maintains that humans may not be logically required by the consensual uses of the term

'rights' either to confine it to human moral agents, or to extend it to non-human animals with morally relevant similarities to humans. However, neither is the decision about where to draw the dividing line an 'arbitrary' one. Jenkins insists that justice requires humans to assign equal importance to the suffering of animals but when it is a matter of killing or saving a life, a sense of self, place in a social network or capacity to plan are features that distinguish humans from other animals.

When Singer referred to equality of consideration, he did not mean that all animals should be treated the same. However, Benton suggests that if there are profound qualitative differences between humans and other animals then equality of consideration may be discriminatory. Both Singer and Jenkins claim that humans and other animals are sufficiently alike for it to be appropriate to argue for better treatment of nonhuman animals on the same terms as used by human liberation groups. Rose's insistence upon the political and moral priority of the struggles of oppressed groups of humans forms a polemical opposition to the animal rights cause. Francis and Norman (1978) have argued that Singer and others who consider the moral relevance of characteristics which differentiate humans and other animals base their case on non-relational features such as rationality and sentience. They propose that the focus be on the moral significance of social relations among humans, and between humans and other animals. In stating that humans have a range of social relations that other animals do not have, Francis and Norman argue for the moral privileging of humans. The particular human social relations that they expound are communicative, economic, political and familial. Consequently, they attach greater weight to the interests of humans because of their social relations. This seems to appeal to widespread moral intuitions.

As Benton claims, humans respond to fellow humans in distress by saving them rather than other animals, out of a feeling that emerges from Francis and Norman's social relation framework (Benton, 1993) and he applauds the use of social relations, instead of 'rationality'.

However, Benton argues that just as parents are more likely to save their own children rather than another's, this fact does not imply justice. Nothing in this shows that humans and other animals do not have equal rights to life. The point Benton makes is that just because humans will in some circumstances save the being with whom they most closely identify does not relate to the issue of rights and justice. Social relational, communicative, cultural and other bonds may lead a person to identify with a person of their own ethnicity more than someone of another ethnicity. In such a case greater weight is attached to one rather than the other. However, this is not morally defensible. Benton's argument is that like ethnicity, species difference is also not morally relevant.

In Benton's analysis, Francis and Norman's argument is vulnerable to the response that if our social relations produce morally justifiable preference for the interests of humans, why should similarly produced racial sentiments not be likewise justified. If the actual primacy of human-to-human relations generates human privileging of human interests, and this is justified, then a case for racism could easily be made on the same ground. Moreover, if the distinguishing feature between humans and animals is no longer sentience, rationality or language but complex sociality, then the moral privileging of this feature reasserts the moral priority of the non-relational human capacities which are themselves embedded in the human:animal opposition. Elevating human social relations prevents exploration of the common ground between humans and other animals. Furthermore, Benton points out that the supposedly distinctive features of human sociality are not realised in all human relations, even when they are realised, they do not cover every possibility and, therefore, they neglect all the moral consequences. Francis and Norman judge the moral status of animals within the context of human social relations. However, they avoid the explicit statement of what is implied in their framework, that being that the traditional human:animal opposition is reinstated.

Discussion

The instrumental use of nonhuman animals has served throughout history to benefit humans. The objectification of nonhuman animals, through religious or scientific means, has been the precursor to the subordination and exploitation of nonhuman animal species. In this chapter, I have attempted to trace the development of the modern animal rights movement. Its origins in the scientific discoveries of Darwin have often been conspicuous through their absence, but the moral implications of Darwinism has a direct effect on how we construct the notion of 'human' in relation to 'animal'. Other animals have moved with people from the rural country to the denaturalised cities. The appropriation of nature and the reinvention of the natural world within the artificial confines of urban Britain have produced the modern proliferation of pets and the dominance of animal welfare ideology. The domestication, artificial breeding and selection of nonhuman animals in agriculture and in the home have produced a gross replica of Darwinist theory. These 'manmade' animals are the legacy of Christian and Cartesian dualism. The animal welfare movement has served as a double-edged sword, simultaneously promoting the health and habitat welfare of nonhuman animals and providing ways of giving humans better quality products.

The status of humans as human animals involves the understanding of two related aspects. One is that, in Darwin's words, there is no qualitative difference between humans and other animals. Here we can elaborate on what that actually means. For Darwin, it meant that humans were not created by God in His image, rather all animals evolved through natural (not supernatural) selection. We can extend that to mean that humans are not in any way more or less 'special', valued or meaningful than any other species. We exist, not because we reflect some divine purpose, but because our ancestors evolved characteristics which meant that the human species would evolve to dominate the world. The moral elevation of humans, based on the notion of divine supremacy, here is invalidated. The way humans ontologically divide

themselves from all other animals is also discredited. Nonetheless, and here I reach the second point, these realisations do not mean that we should not take what is unique about humans seriously. The very fact that I am writing about these issues is indicative of the evolution of humans as powerful animals. It is difference, linguistic and technological, which has brought us to this point. The evolution of language has given humans complex subjectivities which make understanding human behaviour a complex task. The content of those subjectivities is discursively constituted. Montagu makes the point characteristically well:

> Humans are neither naked apes or fallen angels riven by that original sin, that great power of blackness, which Calvinistic commentators and their modern compeers have declared activate us. Neither are humans reducible to the category of animals, for we are the *human* animals, a humanity which adds to being a dimension lacking in all other animals, creatures of immense and extraordinary educability, capable of being molded into virtually every and any desired shape and form. Humans are not born *tabulae rasae*, blank tablets, without any predisposition whatever. They are born with many predispositions, to talk, to think, to engage in sexual behaviour, to love, to be aggressive, and the like, but they will achieve none of these behaviours unless they are exposed to the external stimuli necessary for the development of those potentialities into abilities (Montagu, 1976:316).

Our understanding of the mental lives of other animals is woefully inadequate, hindered by anthropocentrism, naive anthropomorphism and exploitative agendas. We are not yet in a position to comment on what we might call 'subjectivity' in other animals. Certainly, their lack of human language would make it very difficult indeed to come to an accurate picture of their lives. Nonetheless, what we do have insight to is nonhuman animal identity, the way humans construct, represent and treat other animals. Representations of nonhuman animal identities form some of the numerous discourses which constitute human subjectivities. The remainder of this thesis will attempt to map out the ways in which nonhuman animal identity is used to construct human subjectivity. In the following chapter, I shall explore the texture

of this cultural tapestry through an investigation of post-structuralist accounts of subjectivity. I shall use some well established concepts from a variety of disciplines to expand on the notion of subjectivity and apply it to human relations with other animals. The conceptual model of dehumanisation will be your guide to the empirical procedures and the deconstruction of texts.

4: THE PSYCHODYNAMICS OF DEHUMANISATION

The distinctive peculiarity of animals is that, being at once close to man and strange to him, both akin to him and unalterably not-man, they are able to alternate, as objects of human thought, between the contiguity of the metonymic mode and the distanced, analogical mode of the metaphor (Willis, 1974:128).

Overview

The theoretical focus to this thesis centres on two issues of knowledge and its relation to power. The first is the question of objectivity, the truthful nature of knowledge. Feminist theory has described objectivity as male subjectivity. Here the relevance and strength of this definition seems equally pertinent to the relations between 'human' and 'animal', culture and nature, the domestic and the wild. Hence, objective knowledge of the natural world is assumed to be based on an androcentric and anthropocentric dualism. Objectivity is not only male subjectivity, it is *human* subjectivity. Secondly, the modern notion of rationality and the rational human subject, which forms the basis of traditional psychology, is under question. This chapter addresses the issue of 'human' versus 'animal' definition, through disentangling the equation of rational-human-subject. The use of nonhuman animals to construct representations of humans which legitimise sexist and racist discourses is examined. This chapter builds on the structuralist framework established in Chapter 2. Here, I use Derrida's deconstruction, Foucault's power/knowledge relation, Lacan's psychoanalytic modelling, Klein's unconscious defence mechanisms and Hollway's feminist interpretation of the production of, and resistance to, power to illustrate the psychodynamic system of dehumanisation. I explore the metaphorical and metonymic structure of language and the unconscious, and their relation to anthropomorphism and zoomorphism. This conceptual model will demonstrate how human subjectivity and prejudice are fundamentally connected and dependent on the subjugation of the nonhuman animal world.

4.1 The Symbiotic Foundations of Prejudice

Through the concept of myth, the symbolic representations of nonhuman animals have implicitly served to justify and reinforce the discrimination and oppression of humans. Spiegel (1988) recalls how Darwin's (1871) evolutionary theory was misinterpreted by the so-called social Darwinists to claim that white male humans were evolutionarily superior to all other life forms (see also Chapter 3). This anthropocentric (as well as racist and sexist) world-view rendered the qualities possessed by humans as those by which all other species would be measured. Historically, the disqualification of nonhuman animals from the sphere of moral concern also included black people who were believed to be phylogenetically inferior to caucasians. Spiegel (1988) comments that only speciesists would find the comparison of nonhuman and black/women's suffering offensive.

The Speciesist Structure of Prejudice

In accordance with our notion of mythology and exclusion, Thomas (1983) posits that once people were perceived as 'beasts' they could be treated accordingly. The removal of nonhuman animals from the sphere of concern legitimised the ill-treatment of humans who were supposedly 'animalistic'. Birke comments that:

> ...a great many of the injustices that humans perpetuate against animals are themselves deeply embedded in the very same systems of domination that leads to injustices against humans (Birke, 1994:134).

Indeed, racist propaganda against black people often compared them to negative stereotypes of nonhuman animals. The representation of nonhuman animals had already been naturalised through mythology and metaphor. When a nonhuman animal is subservient and obedient, the representation is 'good', when independent it is 'bestial'. Spiegel (1988) has further proposed that the slavery-related sufferings of black people are parallel to the institutionalised oppression of nonhuman animals. The psychological rationalisation is buttressed by speciesist metaphors and the belief that black people, like nonhuman animals,

were grateful for being rescued from 'savagery'.

Adams (1990) has commented that people manipulate nature in order to project onto the 'other' those attributes that they fear. This projection of one's own self onto nature (the ideological antithesis of culture) confirms the irrationality, the 'beastliness', of nature. Midgeley (1979) has proposed that the notion of 'animal' serves two descriptive functions. It refers inclusively to a wide range of organisms and, in contrast, it separates the human species from other organisms. In the latter description, 'animal' defines humanity through its symbolic reference to the 'inhuman', to what is described as 'animalistic' in human experience. These 'natural' beings now come to represent something of which the oppressor is afraid, and/or cannot understand, and/or wants to deny in themselves. Through violent action against the symbol (nonhuman animal, blacks, women), the oppressor unconsciously tries to destroy those elements in themselves which they find so threatening. The representation of these symbols render the oppressed as 'other' and, consequently, outside the scope of moral concern. Through this symbolisation, humans recognise in nonhuman animals those elements of which they are afraid and ignorant (Berger, 1980).

Kappeler (1986) has appropriated Berger's (1980) analysis of human-nonhuman animal interaction and interpreted it in terms of gender. She asserts that 'what distinguishes men from women (like humans from nonhumans) is access to cultural symbolisation, the power of naming' (Kappeler, 1986:68). Through naming, men use women and nonhuman animals as symbols, objects for representation. Kappeler further equates the domestication of nonhuman animals with the domestication of women, thus, the domestic animal and the domestic housewife live lives of parallel marginalisation. Housewifery is akin to farm animals to the extent that women and nonhuman animals are 'beasts of burden', they have an obligation to work without pay. The 'pet' is the 'kept woman', a plaything for the male. Berger's (1980:14) comments on nonhuman animals applies equally well to women:

> ...animals are always the observed. The fact that they can observe us has lost all significance. They are the objects of our ever-extending knowledge. What we know about them is an index of our power, and thus an index of what separates us from them. The more we know, the further away they are.

Historically, women have been given the same status as nonhuman animals (Kappeler, 1986). Women are equated with nature and, in existential dualism, they are both revered and denigrated. Both the 'pet' and the 'wife' fulfil the needs of the master/husband. The modern-day zoo, the institution of polygamy, or pornographic peep-shows, similarly mirror each other. The construction of 'woman' and 'animal' has depicted them as objects. These constructions are implicitly dichotomous. The domestication of woman has rendered her desexualised, pure and Madonna-like on the one hand, and, on the other, she is construed as a wild, sexual beast - 'animalistic'. Both categories of women and nonhuman animals have been recategorised in relation to the given male identity (Kappeler, 1986).

'Disneyfication'

Baker (1993) has proposed that nonhuman animal imagery is a salient referent used to judge human identity. Here, constructions of nonhuman animals play an important role in the symbolic construction of human identity. Cultural representations of nonhuman animals are typically banal and stereotypical. The process of naturalisation embeds the symbolic and rhetorical uses of nonhuman animals in the collective mind. In relation to Foucault, Martin (1992:279) describes this process of naturalisation as:

> All categories of the natural or the normal, as well as the unnatural or abnormal, are exposed as social constructs rather than distinctions given at the level of the body or individual psyche, categories that have been produced discursively and which function as mutually determining oppositions to normalise and to discipline.

Myth renders these representations ahistorical and presents certain ideologies as self-evident. The historical and cultural are made invisible.

The 'reduction' of the nonhuman animal (Berger, 1980) is related to the loss of symbolic power which has been replaced with an 'inferior literacy' in the form of toys and zoos. The nonhuman animal has been subsumed into human society. Berger (1980) claims that nineteenth century middle-class attitudes towards nonhuman animals have been homogenised through the mass media. As we have seen, such representations are the result of Cartesian dualism, social Darwinism and increasing urbanisation. Today, nonhuman animal discourses are the result of the symbolic use of nonhuman animals in popular culture - Baker (1993) refers to this as 'our Walt Disney conscious'. These representations of nonhuman animals serve to maintain the illusion of human superiority. The meanings of these representations operate independently of the living animal.

Baker (1993) calls this naturalisation of images of nonhuman animals 'disneyfication'. He recalls Ingold's (1988) description of nonhuman animals as meaningful entities only when they exemplify a human ideal. The living nonhuman animal represents human meaning and identity. 'Disneyfication' has rendered nonhuman animals as meaningful only when they are represented as something else. Nonhuman animals cannot and do not represent themselves to humans. Humans define and represent them and these representations significantly reflect human agendas. The inconsistencies of nonhuman animal representations are naturalised so that they permeate popular culture unnoticed. The media anthropomorphise the benevolent actions of nonhuman animals, whereas they typically 'animalise' the malevolent actions of humans (Baker, 1993). Thus, the media perpetuate stereotypical images of nonhuman animals. These representations monopolise reality. Most nonhuman animal symbols are traditional, they are salient in everyday mythology and the collective memory (Rowland, 1974). Indeed, it is the ubiquity of these contradictory representations which trivialises nonhuman animals and reinforces negative stereotypes of them. These dualisms, oppositions and reflections which are structured

systematically are naturalised through myth and so enter our collective unconscious, require deconstructing to reveal what has been excluded - to make the invisible visible.

4.2   Deconstruction and the Critique of Logocentrism

Inherent to post-structuralism is Saussure's original proposal that meaning is derived from implicit and explicit difference (see Chapter 2). Consequently, any concept will contain repressed ideas. Analysis of the meaning of 'animal' or 'human' requires the exploration of negated ideas within those concepts. Meanings of 'animal' are tied to symbolic representations. These representations provide the basis for the organisation and comprehension of animal-human relations. The way humans and all other animals are represented as fixed opposites conceals the extent to which species are interdependent. Animality, like gender, derives its meaning from socially defined contrast rather than inherent antithesis.

Binary Oppositions

Derrida (1978) proposes that interdependence is hierarchical; one term dominates the other and derives its meaning through contrast with the other. Western philosophical tradition rests on such binary oppositions. Analysis of binary oppositions illuminates the construction of meaning. Such analyses cannot take binary oppositions at face value but must deconstruct them in order to reveal their interdependence. Binary differences are illusions created by the operation of difference. Difference emerges through the repression of characteristics within supposedly unitary entities.

For Derrida, all meaning is textual, derived from an infinite differentiating play of signs. Derrida's concept of deconstruction and 'differance' is based on his critique of logocentrism. Logocentrism, with its insistence on a rational and objective language through which to describe a rational and objective world, was indifferent to, indeed ignorant of, the 'other'. He describes this as the 'metaphysics of presence':

...the historical determination of the meaning of being in general as
presence, with all the subdeterminations which depend on this generic form
and which organize within their system and their historical sequence
(Derrida, 1967:12).

Derrida proposed that structures of meaning should include in their definition the observers
of those structures. Derrida's concept of differance is derived, in part, from Saussure's
notion of meaning emerging through differentiation. The concept of 'differance' includes
the simultaneous processes of difference, in which identity is constructed in opposition to
the 'other', and deferral, through which the 'other' is constantly projected or denied.
Differance is the process through which any semiological system is historically constituted,
therefore, it is 'open' as opposed to the 'closed' system of the 'metaphysics of presence':

Differance will be the playing moment that 'produces' - by means of
something that is not simply an activity - these differences, these effects of
difference (Derrida, 1968:11).

Deconstructing Animals

Through deconstruction of texts, both meaning and identity are seen to be provisional and
relative. The deconstruction of a binary opposition is, however, not aimed at the
annihilation of differences, rather it is an attempt to explore the subtle and powerful effects
of difference at work within the illusion of binary oppositions. The meaning of 'animal',
in Derridean terms, is always contested within discourses. Meaning is, however, managed
through systems of binary oppositions which make possible:

The relatively unitary and atomic structures that are called names, the
chains of substitution of names in which, for example, the nominal effect
differance is itself *enmeshed*, carried off, reinscribed, just as a false entry
or a false exit is still part of the game, a function of the system
(Derrida,1968:26-7).

As introduced in Chapter 2, Scott (1991) has proposed that the alliance of feminist and
post-structuralist theory can be used to analyse a variety of social phenomena.

Post-structuralist theory attempts to analyse the construction of meaning and the relationship of power to meaning. The construction of meaning, and the resulting power relations, arise from language, discourse, difference and subjectivities. People use language to assign meaning to life, and they simultaneously use language to represent and understand the world. Analysis of language shows how social relations are organised and comprehended. Post-structuralism assumes that words and texts have no intrinsic meaning, therefore, meanings may change through time.

Scott claims that the binary opposition of equality:difference that has been historically presented to feminists as their only choice, is, in fact, an impossible choice. The apparent antithesis of the terms hides their interdependence. Such a dichotomous pairing is a misrepresentation of their meaning and relationship. Equality necessarily requires ignoring (not eliminating) differences. Thus, the true concept of equality includes and depends on the acknowledgement of difference. If there was no such thing as difference then there would not be a need for equality because all individuals would be identical. Zimmerman (1994:140-1) has summarised the impact of deconstruction as:

> In disclosing the instability of power structures, deconstruction opens a space for those who are marginalised because they are perceived as other than the dominant pole.

However, Ledekis points out that the Derridean notion of deconstruction is limited in its application to the social:

> Although Derrida does indicate how through a reading of a text the intrusion by the 'outside' (what is not said or written) into the inside (what is said or written) can be discerned....it cannot specify the source and the origin of these assumptions within the wider social context (1995:99).

Social context is to be explored, here, through psychodynamics, the integration of Lacan's theory of the unconscious, Foucault's discourse theory and Kleinian defence mechanisms.

4.3 Psychodynamic Modelling: The Structure of the Unconscious

As seen in Chapter 2, structuralism assumes that meaning is made possible by the existence of underlying systems of convention which enable elements to function individually as signs. Psychodynamic constructionism is based partly in structuralism. The social world is not random but subject to cultural conventions and unconscious positioning in cultural contexts. The tension between structuralism and social constructionism is centred on 'finding' versus 'creating'. The social constructionist paradigm assumes that the social world is socially created, whilst the structuralist position focuses on identifying and exploring the social world as it is. The ideal position posited by Eco (1984) and Leach (1964) is 'sitting on the fence' because restrictions can not be made on significations. What this means is that the social world is constructed through signification but the infinite process of signification means that a complete account of the generation of meaning is implausible, whilst the identification of patterns of meaning is possible. Systems of meaning are both structured and dynamic. Like bridges, structures do not move, however, the bridge is part of a system with movement in the form of travelling vehicles. The system will always be structured, functional and dynamic.

The Lacanian Subject

Lacan promotes the notion of discursive knowledge:

> ...there is no knowledge without discourse. For what would such knowledge be: the unconscious one imagines is refuted by the unconscious as it is a knowledge put in place of truth; this can be conceived only within a structure of discourse (Lacan, 1977:viii).

For Lacan (1977), signs can only be known through signifiers and perpetual substitution. The signified is a chain of signifiers, an activity which imposes structure. Wherever you explore the emergence of meaning, you will reach a point where you recognise something because of the way meaning is constituted within a labyrinth. The concept of labyrinth is

an Eco (1984) idea which delves beyond signifying chains to structure which neither dissolves into movement, thus lacking stability, nor is a restrictive imposition of order. By using meaning as a labyrinth, there is structure but one avoids that fallacy that reality can be observed from outside meaning. The labyrinth is not random because certain things have to connect to produce a structure, however, it allows movement in defining capabilities and processes.

For Lacan, the 'I' or inherent self, is fictional, 'an impossible mirage in linguistic forms' (Lacan, 1977:73). These fictions are as important as the 'real' because they are the products of communication, they constitute systems of meaning and have effects. The unconscious emerges through the estrangement of the Other to the 'self'. Lacan proposed that the unconscious mind is structured like language. As a formal system of differences requiring discontinuity, language precedes the unconscious. Lemaire (1977) describes this relationship as:

> He [Lacan] proposes an understanding of the subject in terms of a schema composed of layers of structures. These correspond to Freud's topographical distinction between conscious, preconscious and unconscious. The unconscious is composed of signifiers and is itself structured in the sense that, although distinctive and summable, its elements are still articulated in categories and sub-sets in accordance with certain precise laws of arrangement. In this sense the structure of the unconscious is identical with that of language in its synchronic dimension, the dimension in which it is layered within a single class of element (Lemaire, 1977:3).

The unconscious develops around three organising principles namely, the imaginary, the symbolic and the real. The resistance between the signifier and the signified, which comprise the Saussurean sign, produces linguistic chains of meaning. In Saussurean semiology, in the life of signs in society, the only essential sign is the link between the signifier and the signified. Lacan extrapolated this idea to the realm of the unconscious. The initial imaginary stage aims to end discontinuity between the infant and the world. At this 'mirror phase', the infant's ideal ego develops through identification with the 'other'.

The coherence of the ideal ego precedes the discontinuity of language, and the resulting identity is a misrecognition with the ideal ego. In this phase, the ego is always only a reference object, not a controller. This became a metaphor for the 'self'. In this realm of the signified, the ideal ego serves to conceal the lack of unity between the infant and the outside world. Once the signified is structured by language, the infant's identification becomes increasingly alienated.

The plane of the symbolic (representations) prioritises the signifier whereas the plane of the real is never represented as real because it is only accessed through the symbolic. Parker (1994:455) describes the Lacanian symbolic order as:

> ...the source point for the unconscious in each individual, and the infant
> only becomes a speaking subject with an unconscious when it enters the
> Symbolic Order and is, at the same moment, entered by it (Lacan, 1977).
> What is actual, as the truth of the subject which is revealed in the subject's
> unconscious, is now seen as lying not underneath or outside language but
> contained *in* it.

The plane of the 'real' is excluded from knowable reality, it is the unknown, the unsymbolised and the unexplored area of the labyrinth. To Lacan, the 'symbolic' represents what may be explored along signifying chains. The links in the Lacanian signifying chain are attribution (metonymic) links to other signifiers. Symbolic meaning is not centralised on a denotative focus, but is referential and substantiated with different values, as Clement describes:

> In the hollow spaces, emptied of lost rituals, the idea of the individual takes
> shape as a desaturated, indeed disorganised, collective; one that it is
> vulnerable to the caving in of the imago, vulnerable to a syncope that is
> capable of nullifying, through subsidence, the foundational syncope of
> subjective identity (Clement, 1994:123).

Here the ideal ego is substituted by the ego ideal, the 'I' which is determined by language, culture, gender and, I propose, the psychodynamic construction of the human species as

not-animal.

The Lacanian structures of meaning give equal priority to 'is' and 'have', linkages which explore the symbolic construction of the 'other'. The Lacanian concept of sexuality is one that operates in the language system and centres on the two fundamental irregular verbs: 'to have' and 'to be'. These verbs do not describe actions or transactions, rather they show how the world is structured. Such a world is fundamentally structured by gender association and linguistic semantics. Men lay claim to 'having', whilst women are reserved for 'being'. These different structures rest on gender identity and stereotypes, but they are based on the possession of the symbolic phallus. Thus, there is the prioritisation of 'having'. This language submits to 'The Law of the Father', Lacan's abstract concept of patriarchy. This is a privileged symbolic function through which the linguistic representation of the signifier gives rise to the symbolic identification with the signifying element, the phallus. It is this structure of language into which we are inserted, given a gender-specific role, and where men are prioritised over women.

Lacan's theory of the culturally constituted unconscious has been criticised for being static and universalising. Urwin describes its limitations as:

> ...instead of prioritising the symbolic order with its universalist and timeless implications, we might prioritize instead the discursive order or particular discourses, viewed in their historical specificity. Following the post-structuralist emphasis on production of modern subject forms through social apparatuses, here we are focusing on the ways in which language is implicated in the production of particular regimes of truth, associated with the regulation of specific social practices... (Urwin, 1984:279-80).

The main problem with Lacanian modelling is that it only explores passive experiences even though there are active, dynamic relations between culture and the unconscious. The Lacanian view, thus, accounts for reflection, however, it says nothing about how people learn anything in the first place. Hollway (1989:59) has criticised Lacan's account of the subject by drawing attention to his synchronic structure:

Although the Lacanian subject is fundamentally split, the splits bear no
relation to the content of meaning nor the incompatibility between positions
in different discourses. For Lacan, the *symbolic* is a monolithic system.
Similarly, although Lacan recognizes that subjectivity is achieved in the
context of the other, this other is also an abstract, timeless concept, not
located in specific discourses and power relations.

This inadequacy is compensated for by Hollway's (1989) theory of investment which
integrates Lacan's psychoanalytic framework with Foucault's theory of discourse and
Kleinian defence mechanisms.

The Discursive Subject

With reference to the integration of psychoanalysis and discourse analysis, Parker
(1994:532) has commented that:

> Both hermeneutic interpretation of psychoanalysis and structuralist readings,
> in turn, reflect a growing concern with language in Western academic life.

In social psychology, this interest in language has been articulated through discourse
analysis, which has been described by two of its protagonists as:

> All forms of spoken interaction, formal and informal, and written texts of
> all kinds (Potter and Wetherell, 1987:7).

Discourse analysts have concerned themselves with contradictions which emerge through
communication and the organisation of meanings. The concept of discourse is itself the
amalgamation of several interrelated disciplines. From symbolic interactionism, discourse
gains its sense of the way social identity is constructed through interactions at the symbolic
level. From sociolinguistics, the issue of power becomes central, with different social
groups engaging in different discourses. Speech act theory expands the philosophy of
language to account for talk as action, so that we do not just say things with words, we do
things. Critical linguistics links discourse to the concept of ideology, whereas,
ethnomethodology introduces the rules of talk and the processes of negotiation through

talk. The notion of 'crisis' in social psychology (Harre and Secord, 1972) is seen as the birthplace of the study of the relationship amongst power, method and language, and the emergence of discourse analysis.

Many social psychological papers on discourse have been submitted by Potter and Wetherell. Their prime concern is language. However, they endeavour to limit criticism of being 'fashionable' and transitory, with cautious disclaimers. Action is separated from language and discourse, but not divorced from it because language is itself active:

> Talk has the property of being both about actions, events and situations, and
> at the same time *part* of those things (Potter and Wetherell, 1987:182).

Potter and Wetherell's critique of traditional social psychology has centred on the attribution of attitudes to individual properties. For example, explaining racism through appeals to the information processing systems of individuals is challenged for being too simplistic, individualistic and positivist. Indeed, Wetherell and Potter (1991) credit Adorno *et al*'s Authoritarian Personality theory with greater explanatory scope than theories of social cognition or social identity. Nevertheless, personality theory, although attempting to combine the social environment with emotional and motivational individual aspects, suffers from its insistence on stable traits and assumptions of rational unitary subjects.

Discourse analysis reinstates the social aspects of behaviour through concentrating on the most social of behaviours, language. The major theoretical principle of discourse analysis is, therefore, the deconstruction of language, of talk and texts. Language constitutes the building blocks through which experience is constructed, presented and represented. Discourse analysis seeks to identify those linguistic tools involved, and understand why some representations of reality prevail over others. From this standpoint, language is no longer seen as the neutral reflection of reality and so discourse, rather than the individual, becomes the unit of analysis. Wetherell and Potter suggest 'interpretative repertoires' as

the socially available filters that make sense of the world.

However, this form of discourse analysis is restrictive and verges on behaviourism. Discourse can, nonetheless, be used in a more dynamic way to account for the emergence of meaning and the establishment of hegemony. Ideology emerges from hegemonic discourses and the confusion between what is social and what is natural. The equation of what is morally right with what is natural is an ideological mechanism which prescribes the ubiquity of certain discourses and, likewise, the marginalisation or invisibility of others. The function of ideology is to naturalise and mythologise social inequalities. They form systems of justification which conceal the hierarchical basis of society. This concept of discourse is based on a Foucauldian account of subjects as the product of discursive power relations.

Theorising content is a matter of historical and cultural location. Post-structuralist analysis of discourse relates to the social structure of beliefs. Foucault (1972) has proposed that analysis of meaning requires the parallel analysis of conflict and power that produce meanings. Various discourses compete with each other in an attempt to legitimise their authority in any given organisation or institution. The power of the discourses on prejudice resides in the way that they perpetuate themselves as myths. Foucault claims that these mechanisms provide the shared assumptions of apparently different ideologies. It is for this reason that Foucault stressed the importance of re-thinking the social construction of meanings. For Foucault, power is constructed through the relations amongst practices, pleasures, knowledge and power. Foucault argues that Western culture has actually produced and dispersed sexuality. Representations and discourses are acts of power because they present themselves as knowledge. The analysis of culture requires the deconstruction and interpretation of semiotic systems, structural language and discourses.

This imposition of Foucauldian (1981) disciplinary power, with cultural supervision, is a psychodynamic construction. Foucault conceptualises power as operating through

discourses. Power, therefore, is a way of experiencing oneself as a subject, as historically and culturally constituted. The construction of subjectivity, thus, involves the operation of power. Compared to the juridico-discursive model, Foucault describes his concept of 'disciplinary power' as:

> ...power is not an institution, and not a structure, neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society (Foucault, 1981:93).

Power, therefore, is not possessed but is exercised and, as it is exercised, it is also productive:

> If I tell the truth about myself, as I am now doing, it is in part that I am constituted as a subject across a number of power relations which are exerted over me and which I exert over others (Foucault, 1994a:129).

For Foucault, 'truth' is not a fundamental concept, rather it exists within 'discourses of truth', a particularly coercive form of discourse. Competing discourses with differential power forces produce meaning and knowledge. Meaning is *relational* and power is intrinsically *productive*. Those subjects who are positioned within the dominant discourse will be empowered because they conform to a certain idea of 'truth'. Conforming to hegemonic beliefs is a successful way of satisfying desire, to affirm the individual's sense of identity. As power itself regulates desire, so society becomes increasingly consensual. Consequently, both desire to affirm one's identity, and hegemony, as an emergent structural form, marginalise alternative subjectivities. Factual knowledge, within 'discourses of truth', emerges from social relations which are accepted as 'true', and, as discourses are shared, they structure the world in order to exclude alternatives. Moreover, both power and knowledge revolve around social conventions. Psychodynamic discourse analysis is a challenge to these exclusionary practices.

Psychodynamics theorises both process and content. Deconstructing the psychodynamics of a given phenomenon will provide access to the process by which the phenomenon emerged but not the whole truth because only the latent (unaccessible) content contains the absolute truth. Indeed, 'truth' is a matter of Foucauldian discourses and the emergence of knowledge presented as truth through power relations. Where Lacan may be criticised for psychoanalytic reductionism, Hollway (1989) criticises Foucault for discourse determinism:

> If the concept of discourses is just a replacement for the notion of ideology, then we are left with one of two possibilities. Either the account sees discourses as mechanically repeating themselves or - and this is the tendency of materialist theory of ideology - changes in ideology follow from changes in material conditions. According to such a use of discourse theory people are the victims of certain systems of ideas which are outside them. Discourse determinism comes up against the old problem of agency typical of all sorts of social determinisms (Hollway, 1992:248-9).

Hollway's thesis is that people unconsciously invest in those discourses which affirm their gender. Through identifying with that subject position, people reproduce or construct both their identity and unconscious desire. Moreover, herein lies the possibility to challenge that identity and create alternative discourses to mediate unconscious desire. This change in identity is the transformation of discursive subjectification. In applying the concept of gender difference to the production of subjectivity, Hollway (1989) centres her argument on three basic tenets, which are of direct relevance to the construction of non-human animals in dominant, Western discourses: that women are negatively defined (unchanged signifiers); the notion of equality produces contradictions (person = man, therefore, woman as person = woman as not woman); and subjectivity is reproduced through discourses and practices.

Psychodynamic Investment

Discourses position people in relation to their status as object or subject. Traditional discourses on sexuality are gender-differentiated as the subject and object positions are not equally available to men and women. Those positions are specified for the category of

'man' or 'woman' through the history of those practices and meanings. The subject's investments and available positions are offered by multiple discourses. Those discourses are socially constituted and constitutive of subjectivity, therefore, they are not deterministic. However, discourse presents itself with the problem of lack of agency. In not theorising the subject, these ideas are prone to the critique of discourse determinism:

> He [Foucault] still does not account for how people are constituted as a result of certain truths being current rather than others. The advantage of the idea that current at any one time are competing, potentially contradictory discourses (concerning for example sexuality) rather than a single patriarchal ideology, is that we can pose the question, how is it that people take up positions in one discourse rather than another?...These questions require that attention is paid to the histories of individuals in order to see the recursive positioning in certain positions in discourses. It also requires a question concerning the *investment* in that position. (Hollway, 1992:249).

Hollway, following Foucault, states that there is a mutually constitutive relationship between power and knowledge. Power and knowledge are emergent concepts and their meanings and values are not inherently positive or negative. The question remains as to why there are certain 'discourses of truth' and not others. Hollway proposes the notion of 'investment' to account for individuals positioning themselves in certain discourses and not others:

> By claiming that people have investments (in this case gender-specific) in taking up certain positions in discourses, and consequently in relation to each other, I mean that there will be some satisfaction or pay-off or reward (these terms involve the same problem) for that person. The satisfaction may well be in contradiction with other resultant feelings. It is not necessarily conscious or rational (Hollway, 1992:249-50).

The effects and meanings of these positions will vary over time and context, so that the unique nature of individual subjectivity may be accounted for without sacrificing the social elements of discursive practices. Human subjectivity is a conglomerate of multiple positions in multiple discourses. As Hollway (1989:72) comments:

If we cease to view individuals as determining the boundaries around beliefs, positions or meanings and if we understand defence mechanisms as relational rather than intrapsychic, then it is possible to understand that multiple, potentially contradictory positions in discourses can be divided between people in a way which brings one or both of them advantages.

Positioning within certain discourses requires the simultaneous expression and suppression of signification. Availability and hegemony of discourses will partially determine the positioning of the self. Suppression of alternative positions is essential in order to maintain the power of the expressed position. Hollway incorporates Klein's (1960) psychic defence mechanisms of splitting (projection, introjection and projective identification) with Lacan's concept of the culturally constituted unconscious and Foucault's notion of discursive knowledge/power. Hollway (1989:71) quotes Mitchell's (1986) definition of Kleinian defence mechanisms:

> *Splitting* - the ego can stop the bad part of the object contaminating the good part, by dividing it, or it can split off and disown a part of itself. In fact, each kind of splitting always entails the other. In *projection* the ego fills the object with some of its own split feelings and experiences; in *introjection* it takes into itself what it perceives or experiences of the object. In [*projective identification*] the ego projects its feelings into the object which it then identifies with, becoming like the object which it has already imaginatively filled with itself. (1986:20)

The splitting of a given object is motivated, in Kleinian terms, by anxiety, a natural human state. Hollway favours Klein's notion of anxiety to Lacan's Freudian-based concept of desire, with the proviso that anxiety is culturally constituted, not 'natural':

> The defence mechanisms of introjection and projection - the means through which they are expressed in displaced ways - are interpsychic, that is they are relational. This means that they are dependent on the participation of another. This other represents needs which are opposite, rather than just different. The opposition is a product of the principle that positive and negative value is imbricated in the meanings. What is projected onto another person represents the material which is unacceptable because of contradictions in the one who is doing the projecting. What is repressed is

not just material whose repressed status is isolated from subjectivity. Freud maintained that repression was always related to a desire and vice versa, so that there is a principle of opposition. Repression of contradiction is thus a highly complementary mechanism to the principle of opposition which is fundamental to gender difference (Hollway, 1992:269).

Introjecting the identity-affirming aspects of a characteristic and projecting the negative aspects, which undermine an individual discursive subject position, onto the Other, provide an intersubjective means of allaying anxiety. In her psychodynamic extension of social representations theory, Joffe (1996:206) elucidates the roles of these defence mechanisms in relation to perceived threat:

> It [projective identification] is a highly relevant construct for social psychological theories concerned with the location of threat within the 'other': parts of the self which one does not want to own are projected into external objects and these external objects are then seen to be possessed by, controlled by and identified with the projected parts. The aim is not only to get rid of the 'bad' parts of the self, but, crucially, to be able to control the source of danger. While control is sought by the mechanism, and is accomplished to a certain degree, the object onto which the person has projected his or her own aggression becomes feared as a source of aggression (Moses, 1989).

Klein's theory of projection, introjection and projective identification is based on the premise that infants experience anxiety from the time they are born. This anxiety stems from the relationship the infant has to the primary object, usually the mother. The infant needs to develop through a number of interpsychic processes in order to protect herself against anxiety. Joffe (1996:205) describes the durability of these processes as:

> From the earliest stages of infancy mental operations which reduce anxiety, thereby producing a sense of safety and security, are utilised. Traces of these early defensive mechanisms remain with individuals throughout life. They are drawn upon when changes in the social environment make for insecurity, which exacerbates unresolved early conflicts.

The infant experiences the primary object as a source of both fulfilment and frustration. The inability of the mother to satisfy all the infant's needs lead the infant to experience the primary object as 'persecutory'. The infant's inability to separate her sense of 'self' from the primary object further leads to the experience of the self as also persecutory. Joffe elucidates this blurring of boundaries and experiences of persecution and pleasure as:

> Since the boundary between the individual's 'self' and the primary object is highly volatile at this stage, the infant also experiences itself as persecutory. Similarly, when its needs are fulfilled it experiences both its primary object and itself as satisfying and loving. So outside objects are easily seen as possessing qualities which belong to the self, and self is easily seen as possessing qualities which belong to others (Joffe, 1996:205).

This early interaction with the primary object is the initial 'paranoid-schizoid' position through which the interaction is simultaneously defined as 'good' and 'bad'. Also during the first months of a child's life, the early 'cognitive-emotional' development means that the infant experiences objects as part-objects. Joffe provides a clear exposition of this development:

> The part objects are viewed in polarised terms: there are 'bad', persecutory objects and 'good', loving objects. When the infant experiences persecution from an object, such as when the mother's breast does not provide sustenance, feelings of aggression, hate and destruction are evoked. Destructive feelings are accompanied by feelings of extreme anxiety. The infant is paranoid that destructive forces within or outside of itself are motivated to harm it. In order to maintain its experience of nurturance, satisfaction, safety and security with its primary object and, therefore, with itself, it must find a way of warding off this anxiety (Joffe, 1996:206).

The unconscious processes of projection, introjection and projective identification are the ways in which infants and, in later life, adults ward off anxiety. Kleinian theory permits, indeed, insists on the potential for change and, therefore, has a strong potential for resistance to prejudice and discrimination which arises from unconscious splitting. The development of the infant away from the paranoid-schizoid position into the 'depressive position' brings with it the ability to tolerate ambivalence (Klein, 1952). Joffe (1996:212-

213) recognises the implicit process of change involved in Klein's theory:

> Within the depressive position the infant realises that both 'good' and 'bad', nourishment and deprivation, satisfaction and persecution, derive from the same primary object. It needs to reconcile the polarisation between 'good' and 'bad' objects, which had been established in the earlier stage of development. It enters the depressive position when it begins to mourn the loss of the purely 'good' self and the 'purely good' primary object, realising that 'bad' is contained within both. If mourning takes place the infant acquires an ability to tolerate ambivalence. Toleration of ambivalence is central to a non-split way of viewing the world.

Hollway's (1989:66) concept of investment ties in to the nature of contradictory positions in a variety of discourses and meanings which emerge from and are made salient through those discourses:

> These meanings depend on discourses, but also they must pass through the psyche before they are reproduced. Certain meanings confer strength and thus protection, so that these will be likely to be reproduced.

Meanings that protect the self from psychic pain emerge from splitting. Countering the effects of splitting requires the tolerance of ambivalence, the notion that there is good and bad in everything. Joffe (1996) cites 'reflexivity' as key to the project of change:

> Reflexivity, which grows as the mass media and academia produce explanations and commentaries related to the multiple facets of social life, contributes to the modification of the ideas which have persisted from a less reflexive past (Joffe, 1996:213).

The potential for resistance to the effects of splitting has obvious social and political consequences. This thesis aims to contribute to that 'reflexivity' which enables people to reintegrate their defences against the threat of being dehumanised. The possibility of transformation of these representations and discourses on the nature of animals, both human and nonhuman, will be addressed in the concluding chapter.

Hollway's analysis of gender-differentiated investment and positioning is pertinent to this concept of bestial-differentiated positioning. That is to say, the *human* aspect of people's subjective positioning in discourse is determined by the ideological assumptions of human as not-animal. Humans do not include other animals in subject positions within discourses, however, they do use animal/bestial expressions in discourse to undermine (or seduce) the Other's (in the discourse) occupancy of a particular subject position. There is an important difference between Hollway's approach to gendered investment and my application of the theory to human relations with nonhuman animals. As far as we know, humans are the only animals to engage in unconscious intersubjectivity. That is to say, only human animals construct the Other as a means of defending against anxiety. Nonhuman animals do not project, introject and projectively identify in the ways that humans do.

A significant part of this asymmetry is that there is a clear difference between humans and all other animals in their ability to construct the symbolic. This has several effects. First, the unconscious intersubjectivity at work between women and men, as identified in Hollway's (1989) analysis, is retained in my application. I am not suggesting that nonhuman animals participate in the construction of 'human' versus 'animal' identities in an active way. Humans use their anthropocentric knowledge of other animals as a resource for the splitting of the 'animal' into the 'good', pets, and the 'bad', beasts. Second, as far as my theoretical framework is concerned, the psychodynamic construction of 'animal' may refer to humans and/or nonhuman animals. If it refers to humans, then those humans may contribute, through unconscious intersubjectivity, to the construction of human identity as not-animal. However, if it refers to nonhuman animals, those animals, because of their relative lack of symbolic construction, will not participate themselves as subjects. Their status as objects is the symbolic resource for *human* splitting. Third, because nonhuman animals do not have human language, the potential for them to empower themselves is very different to that of humans. Within the gender approach to intersubjective investment, humans have access to a voice through which to counter the effects of splitting. For nonhuman animals, it is inevitable that humans must provide that

voice for resistence and change. The significance and associated difficulties of humans having to be the linguistic representatives of non-human animals will be addressed in the final chapter.

Leach (1964) provides the means by which to introduce the place of nonhuman animals in Hollway's concept of investment. Leach's analysis of nonhuman animal categories and verbal abuse is based on the binary opposition of human:animal. Leach articulates the Derridean interdependence of binary oppositions with 'taboo'. Taboo, as established in Chapter 2, signifies the anomalies in life, the ambiguities which defy binary categorisation. The Darwinian concept of the human animal means that human relations to other animals require taboo significations. The legacies of Christian and Cartesian dualism make this a prerequisite. The construction of the human self is based on the perception of social distance from categories of nonhuman animals. The use of these animals as food or pets or referents will establish the meaning of the animal in relation to humans. Therefore, the construction of human subjectivity will be significantly dependent on the nonhuman animal content of the discourses which constitute subjectivity. Human constructions of nonhuman animal identity are part of the play of expressed and suppressed significations through which psychodynamic investments in discourses affirm human's sense of 'humanity'.

In Horney's (1946) concept, our desire to know the Other and our equally strong repulsion of the Other can only be resolved through the construction of an 'ideal self' which resolves this conflict through fantasy. The nature of that self is dependent on a number of ideological elements and available discourses. Although Horney's conceptualisation of the self is pre-Lacan and pre-Foucault, here it is still useful to extend Horney's resolution of this neurotic conflict to the conscious establishment of that ideal, namely the institution of animal welfare. In this sanitised arena, the 'beast' is tamed, even in need of our help and protection, and we too are absolved of our sins of exploitation through this liberal humanitarian act of care. It is my intention to integrate those fields of discourse and psyche in order to explicate those human constructions of 'animal', designed to resolve

inner conflicts and practised to maintain ideological structures of domination and subordination.

4.4   Animal Metaphors and Metonymies

Lacan (1977), divided the signifier into its rhetorical components: metaphor and metonymy. For Lacan, these dispositions form the sub-text of the mind - the unconscious. Consequently, the mind can be described in terms of the intersections between one signifying order and another. Metaphor and metonymy are forms of bonding in the signifying chain. Their structure contrasts implicitly with that of the signified:

> Lacan incorporates this theory [condensation and displacement] by using the
> idea of the signifier 'falling to the level of the signified', which in effect is
> synonymous with the suppression, or repression, of the signified (Hollway,
> 1989:52).

Condensation and Displacement

Lacan linked the psychoanalytic concept of condensation with the linguistic device, metaphor - whereby many meanings are contained in one image. Likewise, he associated displacement with metonymy - whereby a single aspect of an idea is extracted and repositioned:

> The mechanisms described by Freud as those of the primary process in
> which the unconscious assumes its rule, correspond exactly to the functions
> that this school believes determine the most radical effects of language,
> namely metaphor and metonymy, in other words, the signifiers effects of
> substitution and combination on the respectively synchronic and diachronic
> dimensions in which they appear in discourse (Lacan, 1977:27).

Lemaire (1977) describes the Lacanian division between metaphor and metonymy as:

> The diachrony of discourse owes this relative autonomy from the global
> signification to two major stylistic effects: metaphor and metonymy. These
> two stylistic figures authorise substitutions of signifiers which make the

meaning appear to 'float' somewhere without being literally contained in any one element of the sentence. Metaphor and metonymy follow precise and distinct linguistic laws: similarity of meaning between a signifier and its substitute in metaphor and displacement of meaning in metonymy (1977:4).

A recontextualised Lacanian perspective provides the links between discourse and subjectivity. Hollway describes this relation as:

> On the metonymic axis, signification may reproduce language or discourse which is normal for the (sub)culture...But on the metaphoric axis, signification is unique to each person, because at every point in their history, meanings have been invested by desire. Desire does not follow generalizable routes, and its logic is not that of the rational subject, because unconscious processes work through displacement and condensation. (Hollway, 1989:84).

Metaphors are conceptual systems which define everyday reality (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Consequently, thought and behaviour are tied to metaphor. Communication is based on the same conceptual system used in thinking and action, and language itself is evidence of this system. Nonhuman animal metaphors are a form of ontological metaphor, they provide a way of viewing emotions, activities and ideas. Nonhuman animal metaphors are used to comprehend a range of human motivations, characteristics and actions. Furthermore, the metaphor constructs a way of thinking about the nonhuman animal which may be used to justify certain behaviour towards the animal.

Anthropomorphism and Zoomorphism

Nonhuman animal metaphors and metonymies express more than anthropocentrism. As Thomas (1983:41) comments:

> It was as a comment on human nature that the concept of 'animality' was devised.

By which is meant that sentiments about nonhuman animals are usually projections which manifest in the use of metaphors and metonymies. Metaphors complete and conceal the process of distinction and opposition:

> ...in each constructed world of nature, the contrast between man and not-man provides an analogy for the contrast between the member of the human community and the outsider. (Douglas, 1975:289)

Nonhuman animal metaphors are anthropomorphic because they enable human motives to be attributed to nonhuman animals (Baker, 1993). In such metaphorical and metonymic discourses nonhuman animals are signified as moral agents. In mythology, nonhuman animals are either idealised as models for human morality or constructed as 'other', the 'beast', the model of immorality. They may also be used to bridge the gap between the sentient and the naturalised world, through mythology, whereby they have both human and animal characteristics, such as the minotaur. Either way such representations are demeaning and objectifying. Such binary oppositions are rife in the construction of animality.

The term 'animal' is connotative of immoral behaviour, often in terms of violence and sexuality (Baker, 1993). Such contemptuous attitudes to nonhuman animals through metaphor serve to define human identity. It is part of the hegemonic discourse based on cultural assumptions about the object-status of nonhuman animals. The use of metaphor constructs the notion of nonhuman animals as strange and different.

Zoomorphism, the projection or attribution of 'animal' characteristics to non-animals (including humans), involves either theriomorphism or therianthropism. The theriomorphic image is one in which someone or something is displayed with the form of a 'beast', whereas the therianthropic image is one that combines the forms of 'man' and 'beast' Baker (1993:108) explains these terms as:

A theriomorphic image would be one in which someone or something (in the words of the OED definition) was presented as 'having the form of a beast'. Therianthropic images, in contrast, would be those 'combining the form of a beast with that of a man'.

Theriomorphism and therianthropism are forms of zoomorphism. Baker (1993:108) makes the following connections between these terms and metonymy and metaphor:

> Where animal imagery is used to make statements about human identity, metonymic representations of selfhood will typically take theriomorphic form, whereas metaphoric representations of otherness will typically take therianthropic form. In other words we tend to represent ourselves as wholly animal, but our others as only half-animal.

Metonymic representation in theriomorphic form usually refers to human identity, whereas metaphoric representation in therianthropic form typically refers to 'otherness'. Therianthropism is more anomalous and, therefore, disturbing, than theriomorphism. Consequently, therianthropism is usually incorporated to represent others. Douglas's (1969) analysis of pollution and taboo is relevant here:

> The idea of holiness was given an external physical expression in the wholeness of the body seen as the perfect container...holiness is exemplified by completeness. Holiness requires that individuals shall conform to the class to which they belong. And holiness requires that different classes of things shall not be confused. (Douglas, 1969:51-52)

Prejudice against nonhuman animals renders them as 'other'. Those who are associated, through metaphor, with nonhuman animals are, therefore, also rendered 'other'.

Discussion

This section is an annotation of the conceptual model of dehumanisation (see Figure 4.1). The model is a conceptual construct - a way of looking at, describing and analysing an overall system of meaning, a process through which some meanings are denigrated through

dehumanisation. The central tenet of the model is the Derridean hierarchical dualistic opposition animal:human. Surrounding these constructs are a series of social psychological processes. These processes are inherently dynamic, subject to change across contexts and over time. However, there is a fundamental systematic process of dehumanisation which characterises these processes, therefore, this 'freezeframe' representation of a complex social phenomenon serves some function in conveying the relational and interactive nature of dehumanisation.

The 'Other' here, constructed as 'animal', is not the nonhuman animal but the *human* animal capable of engaging in unconscious intersubjective processes. The diagram illustrates the content of the primary split - human versus animal - and the processes which construct that split: projection into the external object, the Other, and introjection to the Self. Dehumanisation occurs because of the desire to protect the Self from the threat of being objectified as an animal (dehumanised). The 'other' human is constructed as animalistic, either positively or negatively, in order to protect the *human* elements either within the Self or outside in the Other. These processes require the primary ontological divide between humans and nonhuman animals. What is to be protected as 'good' is either the 'human' (in opposition to the animal) within the Self resulting with the 'animal' being projected into the Other (human); or what is to be expelled as 'bad' relies on the further split of 'animal' into pet ('good') or beast ('bad'). Humans can be either symbolically sentimentalised as 'pets' or dehumanised as 'beasts'. However, not only are nonhuman animals symbolically constructed as 'good' pets or 'bad' beasts, they are physically (literally) constructed as pets or beasts. Nonhuman animals do not project and introject in order to protect their sense of Self, through the psychodynamic construction of the Other, but they do suffer the consequences of this peculiarly human activity.

Figure 4.1: The Psychodynamics of Dehumanisation: A Conceptual Model

To the extent that dehumanisation is naturalised, the social meanings produced in relation to 'human' or 'animal' identities are value-laden. What is said to be natural, and what is invariably conflated to be what is morally right, is established through the 'dominance of...immediate presence' (Derrida, 1978:130). Discourse is fundamentally connected to both ideological effects of animal-human relations, and the ideology associated with presence itself. Ideology here functions as the coerciveness of meaning (Parker, 1989). The extent to which alternative discourses are muted or marginalised is an expression of the power of hegemonic discourse. Indeed, ideology, and the conflict which arises from competing discourses, is the result of the relation between established power and places of resistance in discourse and texts. Ideology is not an object but an effect (Parker, 1989). Consequently, in this system of dehumanisation, the overarching form of hegemonic

discourses produces ideologies related to animality, humanity and the bestial. Discourses provide the content for the psychodynamic construction of the 'beast' or 'pet' (see Figure 4.1). This reproduction, through texts and subject positions in discourses, is a continual legitimisation of the effect - the power of discourse through investment.

Between the ideological effects of the dominant speciesist discourses and the unconscious strategies of splitting are a series of symbolic representations relating to specific concepts of nonhuman animal identity. In a wide range of discriminatory practices, these animals are exploited for human gain. The representations of these various forms of exploitation depend on the perceived degree of necessity and hierarchy amongst species. The commonsense beliefs about the role of nonhuman animals in human life are held in the discourses of those specific animal-human interactions. These representations are a reflection of the Leachian system of social distance which construct the self. Examining the content of these discourses against a psychodynamic background will constitute an exploration of prejudice and violence in relation to the psychodynamic construction of the 'human' versus 'animal'

The apparently strange behaviour of nonhuman animals can only be understood in human terms. We compare 'animal' and 'human' behaviour and interpret the similarities and differences in line with speciesist discourse. From this set of inferences we reproduce anthropocentrism. Perceived similarity is used, differentially, to maintain the hierarchy between human and nonhuman animals. Essentially, we categorise other animals in relation to humans as a pre-existing given. As humanity is the measure of all things, similarity to, or difference from, can be used as measures of deviancy or abnormality. When people do not conform to the established parameters of normal human behaviour, they are systematically dehumanised, in relation to the objectified status of nonhuman animals. 'Beast' is such a psychodynamically constructed category that serves as a reference point. Its religious overtones ensure its mythological status. In a fundamental way, our understanding of other animals is severely limited by our understanding of

ourselves - rarely does the animal exist as a socially understandable reality, s/he is too often subsumed under the status of the mythological beast.

Individual unconscious minds complete the process. Following Lacan, the unconscious may be considered as constructed linguistically. The linguistic substitution devices of metaphor and metonymy are informed by therianthropic and theriomorphic images. Meaning is arbitrary and, therefore, symbolic. It is the symbolic associations at the unconscious level which play a role in the personal investments people make in different discourses. Following Hollway (1989), people position themselves in discourses in order to reproduce their subjectivity which affirms their gender and sexuality, or, in this case, reproduces their species stereotypical characteristics. Leach's (1964) concept of taboo constructs the boundaries between what is 'human' and what is 'animal' (see Figure 4.1). Taboo signifies the areas of anxiety within the social environment, and, as has been seen, the area of animal-human relations is ridden with anxiety and, therefore, taboo. Taboo separates the categories of 'human' from 'animal'. It is a resource of ambiguity and anomaly which threatens the ontological status of humans as not-animal and, as such, it is inhibited in order to maintain the integrity of the boundaries which distinguish humans from animalistic humans and nonhuman animals.

These parts of the process of dehumanisation are interactive, dynamic and, therefore, subject to change. The discursive and psychic investments continually interrupt each other. At each point meaning is contested but the dominance of speciesist ideologies ensure the relative stability of these processes and the contents of the investments. It is only through deconstructing the process into its complementary and opposing parts that dehumanisation is revealed as a process of naturalised psychodynamic construction and signification. This model (Figure 4.1), and its theoretical bases, are used in this thesis to identify and explore the content of representations, to identify discourses and their effects in terms of ideology.

This thesis aims to explore the representations and discourses which characterise animal-human relations and, consequently, define 'human' versus nonhuman 'animal' identities. It starts from the position that meaning is produced, and power simultaneously reproduced, through subject positioning in discourses. The ideologies which emerge from these discursive subjective investments are the result of the naturalisation of conflict, the denial of fragmentation and the dominance of the rational and the objective. The study of the language content of 'animal' discourses which are legitimised through speciesist rhetoric, aims to illuminate the dominant ideologies which emerge from hegemonic discourses. Myths are the social and historical mechanisms through which ideologies are transferred. These myths are concealed, and naturalised, through commonsense beliefs which are circulated in representations and discourses. The human unconscious mediates the effects of hegemonic discourse and the reproduction of ideology. Analysing the discourses which construct representations of nonhuman animals will give rise to the underlying inconsistencies which are suppressed through appeals to consensus. The analysis of those discourses will help to demythologise the 'beast' to reveal the psychodynamic construction of humans and other animals. This thesis aims to contribute to that demythologisation, the deconstruction of the 'beast' in order to reveal ideological violence as a naturalised system of dehumanisation which oppresses *all* animals.

PART TWO: DECONSTRUCTING THE BEAST

In Part Two, *Deconstructing the Beast*, I explore the contradictions in real transactions with nonhuman animals and their transformation into family (pets), food (meat) and fantasy ('beasts'). Beginning with an account of the methods employed in the empirical design, I examine the relation between the theoretical perspective presented in Part One and the methods utilised in Part Two. The analysis begins with a thematic discourse analysis of a series of semi-structured interviews with British vegetarians and meat eaters. The analysis reveals the form, structure and function of the participants' representations of nonhuman animals. These representations constitute the main discourses: the Object discourse, the Referent discourse and the Utensil discourse. One of the findings from this textual analysis is the psychodynamic construction of the 'beast'. Following this, I turn to a contemporary, semiological, content analysis of 'beast' metaphors in the British press. The analysis maps out the range of 'beast' definitions and meanings in relation to Human, Animal and Object domains. The findings support the concepts of anthropomorphism and zoomorphism. Within zoomorphism, the strategies of therianthropism and theriomorphism are explored and support is found for the relation between the Referent Discourse and the Object Discourse. This analysis of representations of the 'beast' leads to a case study of a popular myth, the werewolf. A contemporary novel and its derived television drama are semiotically analysed for their narrative continuities and discontinuities. This modern lycanthropic myth articulates key themes concerning human-animal relations and meanings including, issues of transformation, sexuality, rationality and freedom. The dialectics of Self and Other in constructing subjectivities which constitute domination and, therefore, prejudice are investigated throughout these analyses. Anthropocentrism, anthropomorphism and zoomorphism are explored as strategies which enable people to interpret these representations. The model of dehumanisation is developed throughout the analyses.

5: SYNTHESISING THEORY AND METHODS:
THE EMPIRICAL DESIGN

Overview

This chapter explores the synthesis of theory and method. It sets the scene for the empirical procedures and analyses. Beginning with a review of research methodology, scientific knowledge and its relation to psychological empiricism, this chapter explores the social constructionist perspective in relation to qualitative methods. The concepts of triangulation and reflexivity are established as qualitative research strategies for conceptual coherence and accountability. The chapter explores the psychodynamic playground through the integration of discourse analytical concepts and psychoanalytical strategies. This integration is based on defensive splitting, discursive positioning and the symbolic construction of the Other. Here, I describe the procedure for conducting semi-structured interviews with vegetarians and meat eaters. Framework analysis is utilised as a thematic form of discourse analysis. The media are discussed as forms of discourse in which texts can be analysed in order to deconstruct representations of nonhuman animals. A semiological content analysis is introduced as a method which goes beyond denotation and its role in the analysis of nonhuman animal metaphors in the media is established. The procedure details the range of newspapers used, the way in which the coding frame was constructed and provides a justification for the semiological use of content analysis. The structuralist analysis of semiological systems is articulated through exploring levels of signification and semiosis as applied to a narrative analysis. Here, I describe narrative analysis in relation to the novel, *Wilderness*, and its derived television drama. The method for analysing the themes and level of semiosis across these media are discussed. The relation between the design of the empirical studies and the questions of the thesis provides justification for the mix of methods employed.

5.1   Research Methodology and Scientific Knowledge

This section begins with a review of the development of psychological inquiry. It explores the philosophy of knowledge from experimental positivism, through the social construction of psychological knowledge, to the experimental alternatives. It reviews the criticisms of experimentalism and surveys the calls for a more qualitative research paradigm. Qualitative research is evaluated with reference to the issues of triangulation and reflexivity.

Psychological Empiricism

Experimentation in psychology has long been criticised for its artificiality. Harre and Secord (1972) are key protagonists in the debate on scientific method. They argue that the experimental set-up is manipulative and restrictive. Researchers are apt to construct knowledge rather than to merely observe it. Furthermore, empirical concepts are often impoverished in terms of their ability to appreciate the complexity of social situations. The critique of experimentation extends to the analogy between human characteristics and the variables or parameters of physical science. This analogy often leads to the exposition of the superficial nature of experimental results. Furthermore, the psychological laboratory has confounding difficulties of forced compliance and the experimenter effects of both verbal and nonverbal interaction. The formal character of experiments affects the results through the limitation of information and the inhibition of natural forms of response. Consequently, there is disparity between the concepts under investigation and the natural situations. The problems associated with generalising from the laboratory to real life are associated with the mechanical paradigms involved. Nevertheless, these logical and strategic limitations continue to be the accepted method of psychology.

The proposition that psychological experiments are social events in themselves has been held for decades. Both Orne's (1965) concept of demand characteristics and Rosenthal's (1966) notion of experimenter bias have informed the modern-day critique of the experimental method. Harre and Secord (1972) proposed the ethnogenic approach which

centred on an anthropomorphic theory of humans in which the participants should be viewed as following rules and conventions as social actors. They suggested that social behaviour should be explained through the collection and analysis of participant's accounts, which would construct a conceptual system for analysis of the participant as an agent acting according to rules.

However, experimental psychology has not been the only methodological form to misconceptualise the role of inter-subjective relations and the complex nature of human thought and behaviour. This tradition seeped into a methodological framework designed to access people's belief systems. It assumes that questions are understood in a consistent way and the rating process is a reflection of an underlying attitude. The assumption is that rating scales can access internal psychological variables, called attitudes, that a person holds about a particular object. They were designed to test hypotheses which were believed to be objective reflections of research questions. 'Independent' and 'dependent' variables were isolated and measured, whilst 'confounding' variables such as researcher 'bias' were to be minimised, preferably eliminated, through the concepts of reliability and validity. A key part of the quantitative paradigm was statistical sampling and the generalisability of results. This statistical generalisability is analytically deductive and aims to lead towards causal inference. Quantitative research is often said to fall within logical positivism. Positivism consists of:

> Methods that take the external world as extant and reproducible through scientific or logical means. (Manning and Cullum-Swan, 1994:463).

However, logical positivism had long been rejected as a research method (Meehl, 1986). As Shadish (1995) has commented, positivism these days is more likely to be used as a rhetorical device to widen the perceived epistemological gap between quantitative and qualitative methodologies. The differences between these methodologies have been exaggerated whilst the similarities underplayed (Hedges, 1987).

Qualitative methods, including interviews, ethnography and semiotics, are motivated by research questions aimed at exploring human experience, therefore requiring verbal or textual, interaction and interpretation. Here, hypotheses tend to emerge from the data. Sampling, in contrast to statistical sampling, is purposive or theoretical, aimed at maximising or minimising differences. In qualitative research, the researcher herself is an instrument for data collection. The data are analysed for theoretical transferability and the analytical approach is inductive, rather than deductive. Data are selected to fit the research questions; however, the theoretical assumptions which guide the formulation of the research questions are continually assessed through the dynamic relation between the researcher and the data. The methodological qualitative paradigm is influenced by the theoretical social constructionist paradigm.

Social Construction and Psychological Knowledge

Social constructionism is rooted in the sociology of knowledge (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Shadish's (1995a) analysis of social constructionism is relevant to my concerns here. He defines constructionists as 'monists' and 'dualists'. Dualist constructionists distinguish between actual states and representations of those states. Consequently, dualist constructionists separate the objective features of a phenomenon with an individual's representation of those features. Conversely, monist constructionists claim there are no objective features, that all reality is representational and, therefore, relative. Shadish argues that whilst monism is feasible in theory it is impossible in the practice of theory, methodology. In accordance with this, Pollner (1993:203-4) claims that monist constructionists:

> Bring analysts' as well as members' practices under the purview of the constructionist mandate. Constructionism is no longer confined to the specification of the topic of constructionist studies. It is understood to characterise the studies and their methods as well.

However, Shadish maintains that monists invariably conduct dualist research based on the normative constraints on language. Linguistic constructions are the crux of social constructionist research. However, those monists who claim there is no reality against which to evaluate representations, paradoxically, use their empirical findings based on dualist assumptions to support their relativist ideas. To engage in scientific research is to gather, empirically, knowledge about the object of inquiry. The motivation for research must be a lack of understanding of a given issue, if everything is clarified, why do the research in the first place? Therefore, the criteria for assessing research, whether it is 'good' research or fiction, will be implicit to research protocols. Research is conducted because it can be evaluated and because if it is positively evaluated it will have contributed to the existing body of knowledge. The rules and regulations on gaining a PhD are testament to this.

To proclaim that there is no reality, no way of assessing or judging knowledge, that representation is everything, is to make a dubious claim. Between the contradictions of monists and the hegemony of realists is a level playing field, succinctly described by Brown (1977:93) as:

> The dichotomy between the view of perception as the passive observation of objects which are whatever they appear to be and perception as the creation of perceptual objects out of nothing is by no means exhaustive. A third possibility is that we shape our percepts out of an already structured but still malleable material. This perceptual material, whatever it may be, will serve to limit the class of possible constructs without dictating a unique percept.

The objects of my study are the representations and discourses on the nature of animals. I use the word 'nature' advisedly and with some sense of irony and, of course, I include humans as animals. But at the heart of my motivations for studying these phenomena is the conviction that there is a knowable reality. Here, I am as sure that humans are animals as I am sure that women are human, and the parallels of these facts have informed and

motivated numerous feminist analyses into the subjugation of women. My deconstruction of these representations and discourses only makes sense in relation to my motivations. Evaluation is inherent to this research process. I evaluated the state of psychological knowledge about 'animals' and decided it was incomplete, hence this research. Whilst enjoying the insights of social constructionism, I am not blinded by its dogmatic refusal to engage with reality. Indeed, it is the pain (emotional and physical) resulting from ideological and institutionalised violence which propels me to do this research. Birke's analysis of the limitations of postmodern thinking are relevant here:

> But postmodernist thinking seems to me to fail adequately to address issues of pain and suffering, of human cruelties towards animals (or those of men towards women). If the world is collapsed into a set of narratives, what happens to the lived experiences of non-humans? (Birke, 1994:145).

Social constructionism is a set of general assumptions about the nature of social psychological theory and reality. The crux of these assumptions is that psychological reality is socially constructed. These approaches are:

> ...those which argue that our representations of the self and mental processes are wholly culturally produced rather than reflecting underlying universal truths about human beings...(Parker, 1994:451).

The implied dichotomy between 'universal truth' and 'cultural representations' oversimplifies the status of humans as complex social *animals*. This definition implicitly denies the fact that humans are animals. This thesis is not about universal truths, indeed, it is about the historically, culturally and unconsciously constituted discourses on nonhuman animals. However, the motivation for this research is embedded in a universal truth - that humans are animals. Of course, social life is shaped by social processes which are ultimately sociocultural products (Gergen, 1985). Consequently, cultural structures will determine behaviour whilst the rules, or conventions, are continually being negotiated and renegotiated by the participants.

Qualitative Research

The type of qualitative methods utilised in this research falls under the rubric of 'naturalistic' or 'interpretative' approaches. As has already been mentioned, it is grounded in a constructivist epistemology that seeks to describe social phenomena. It is a generative process which grows through the analysis of representations of reality. This research does not aim at the truth itself, but rather at why some truths prevail and others do not. The existence of reality is not contested, however, the ways in which reality is represented are to be explored. Concepts emerge from the critical exposure of contradictions and fragmentations found in the structure of subjectivities. The thesis focuses on social texts and ideological discourse in order to reveal dimensions of those constructions of reality, and to determine why and how some constructions are privileged to the detriment of others. As previously mentioned, qualitative analysis requires verbal data. Documents (transcripts, articles, scripts) are cultural products. Through analysis, these documents are converted into 'texts' to be read and interpreted. These texts constitute the data, representations that are themselves to be deconstructed and re-represented. Deconstruction of the texts explores the relation between the texts as social constructs and the meanings which they reflect and affect. In this Derridean (1967) sense, the texts are not so much objects as they are interplays of multiple significations. Deconstruction is part of constructionism (Culler, 1982). Deconstruction of these significations illuminates the means by which their meanings are conveyed. Here, deconstruction operates through reference to the model of dehumanisation. This framework does not determine the research process, rather, in this qualitative paradigm, the exploration of the data will contribute to the theory. Consequently, the contexts of this theory building, rather than hypothesis testing, are fully examined in order to justify the relationship between the theory and the analysis.

More specifically, this research enters the tradition of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) both in the research process and the analysis of textual data. Grounded theory is theory that is generated through the analysis of data. The systematic open-ended

classification of the data gives rise to concepts which propel the analysis. The multilayered process of abstraction of data may simultaneously explore old concepts and generate new ones. Glaser and Strauss have stressed the importance of the fit of the index classification and description to the data. The analysis proceeds from low-level descriptions to in-depth exploration which, at every level, are referenced by other categories from the analysis. This allows a continual comparative analysis which ensures a conceptually rich theoretical account of the data. Henwood and Pidgeon (1992) have countered criticisms of 'inductivist positivism' (Stanley and Wise, 1983:152) by proposing a 'constant interplay between data and conceptualisation' (Henwood and Pidgeon, 1992:104). They suggest that the initial ambiguity between data and theory should be accepted and explored when constructing a category system in order to prevent premature closure of the theory. Moreover, they insist that, through analysis, data are ordered so that the conceptual framework becomes continually more focused. The result, they maintain, is a 'rich, deep and well-integrated conceptual system, organised at various levels of theoretical abstraction all of which in some way articulate the data' (Henwood and Pidgeon, 1992:104).

Evaluating Qualitative Research

One of the main causes of concern in qualitative research is the notion of evaluation. How is it that we can determine what kind of naturalistic or interpretative study is worthwhile, intellectually rigorous and, in some sense, meaningful? The traditional method of evaluation is derived from the quantitative paradigm and centres on the concepts of reliability and validity. These concepts serve as a justification for the analytical approach, a rule of thumb for measures of objectivity, scientific detachment and analysis. The quantitative paradigm makes appeals to internal and external validity and under the auspices of strict empiricism, makes claims on error and truth. These are the implicit indicators of quantitative quality. Quantitative methods assumes that the measurement of people's 'attitudes' is indicative of a direct relation between the subject and the stimuli under investigation. This hypothesis testing model is inappropriate to the post-structuralist theory of subjectivity, the psychodynamic construction of identity and the production and

negotiation of meaning through difference. These issues can only be explored through qualitative methods which address the relations between the unconscious and the conscious, the individual and the social, and the relation between power and knowledge.

As Henwood and Pidgeon (1992) have stated, the benefits gained through qualitative design and procedure may be undermined by the limitations of quantitative approaches to methodology (Marshall, 1985). Henwood and Pidgeon (1992) suggest a number of practices to ensure the generation of good, relevant theory. These include the importance of the fit of the data to the theory; the integration of theory at diverse levels of abstraction; reflexivity; documentation and theoretical sampling. Indeed, qualitative researchers have defined their own indicators of quality rather than merely borrow those of a fundamentally different paradigm:

> Terms such as credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability
> replace the usual positivist criteria of internal and external validity,
> reliability and objectivity. (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994:14)

These terms are derived from Lincoln and Guba's (1985) criteria for qualitative evaluation. Credibility refers to the accuracy with which the object of study is identified and described. Transferability is about the theoretical parameters of the research and the extent to which the data collection and analyses are guided by concepts and models. Triangulation fits here as a means of elaborating research. Dependability accounts for the dynamic nature of the social world, the notion that as conditions change so too will the object under study. Confirmability refers to whether the findings could be confirmed by another researcher, whether the data confirm the findings independent of the original researcher. This is not meant to imply that qualitative research is replicable because, by its very nature, it is not. However, these data quality controls mean that the research process can be inspected for and assessed as to the legitimacy of its claims (Marshall and Rossman, 1995).

Instead of accounting for, and then excluding experimenter bias, it is essential to make visible, not only what is theoretically invisible but, also, what is rendered methodologically invisible. It is important to make explicit the assumptions of quantitative analysis and evaluation. Where 'bias' has been considered a confounding variable in quantitative research, the redefined concept of 'subjectivity' is the key issue involved in qualitative research. An account of subjectivity is a key concern in the qualitative strategy of 'reflexivity' to be discussed after triangulation.

Triangulation

The concept of triangulation has become central to qualitative research methods as a strategy for gaining insight to complex social phenomena. This method of collecting data reflects the dynamic nature of the phenomena under study and the depth and range of potential analytical interpretations of the data. Triangulation has developed from a multiple reference system for testing research hypotheses based on validation to a method of building interpretations (Flick, 1992). Fielding and Fielding (1986) claimed that triangulation could add range and depth but not accuracy because of the theoretical differences between methods. Triangulation became an alternative to validation rather than a strategy for it. It increases the breadth and depth of analysis through increasing analytical perspectives. There are many forms of triangulation available to the researcher as strategies for theory construction and I have utilised some of them in this research. These include:

Theoretical Triangulation: I have integrated well established theories from psychoanalysis, discourse analysis, structural linguistics, structural anthropology and mythology to produce a rich hybrid theory to guide the empirical research. The conceptual model of dehumanisation draws on a range of disciplinary, as well as theoretical, perspectives.

Data Triangulation: I have collected data from a range of sources reflecting different domains relevant to the research questions. These sources include interviews with

vegetarians and non vegetarians; 'beast' metaphors gleaned from a wide range of tabloid and broadsheets; and two different media representations of a 'beast' myth, a book of fiction and the television adaptation of the story into a three part drama series.

Analytical Triangulation: To reflect the range of theoretical perspectives involved in my interpretation of the data, I have employed three different, yet complementary, analytical methods - framework discourse analysis, contemporary content analysis and semiotic narrative analysis. The aim of all these analyses has been to define the concepts, map the range and nature of the phenomena and find patterns of association and disassociation. The type of analysis is chosen to reflect the methodological perspective and data collection particular to each study.

Levels of Triangulation: Through exploring representations and discourses about 'animals' and 'beasts', I have engaged with different levels of knowledge production. Drawing on a historical, cultural and psychodynamic levels of analysis and interpretation has given me a rich picture of the phenomena in question. The empirical design is presented in the following table:

Table 5.1: The Empirical Design

	PERSPECTIVE	TYPE	QUANTITY	ANALYSIS	OBJECTIVES
STUDY 1	Individuals	Interviews	20	Framework Analysis	To explore representations of animals and identify key discourses
STUDY 2	Media	Newspaper Articles	950	Content Analysis	To examine the use of `beast' metaphors and identify anthropomorphism and zoomorphism
STUDY 3	Media	Fiction:Book/TV Drama	1	Semiotic Analysis	To explore the `beast' through the lycanthropic myth and level of semiosis across media

Reflexivity

Reflexivity is a key concept is qualitative research as it is an attempt to make the researcher's subjective interests in the research transparent and, therefore, accountable. Reflexivity is the continual, complex interaction between the researcher and the data. Usually this interaction is absent from research reports and, therefore, assumed to be unimportant. However, this relationship produces the final text and its effects on the presentation, linearity and conclusions of the text are undeniable. Given that ideological discourse is under question, there is no escaping that any researcher researching phenomena from within the given culture will also have had their subjectivity constituted within that culture and by those ideological discourses under question. With reference to this, Banister *et al* (1994:13) have suggested:

> Subjectivity is a resource, not a problem, for a theoretically and pragmatically sufficient explanation. When researchers, whether quantitative or qualitative, believe that they are being most objective by keeping a distance between themselves and their objects of study, they are actually producing a subjective account, for a position of distance is still a position and it is all the more powerful if it refuses to acknowledge itself to be such.

Refusal to acknowledge the researcher's subjective position towards the data is one of the main criticisms of quantitative methods in relation to social phenomena. Here, I shall attempt to clarify my position, in relation to the research questions, which I have constructed through an overview of the empirical procedures.

My aim in relation to these methods has been to design the empirical work to reflect my theoretical perspective in order to produce a corpus of data which would illustrate, illuminate and develop my conceptual model of dehumanisation. My concern here has not been to test hypotheses but rather to explore the construction of knowledge from a psychodynamic perspective. It is not compatible with my theoretical perspective to prove the model or to try and establish it as a concrete referent, rather its purpose and its use is

as a guide, to provide some theorised direction for my analysis of the texts. In this way, the theoretical perspective presented in Part One is a clear account of my subjective positioning in relation to the data I have collected and interpreted. It has not been my intent to escape discourse but rather the opposite, to address the hegemony and naturalisation of certain discourses and present, in comparison, the marginalisation of alternative discourses. This thesis is, after all, another representation, legitimised through academia and intellectual resources, however I am consciously positioning this research within the realms of the opposing, resistant discourse, still ideological, still imbued with inescapable power relations, but constructed, negotiated and reproduced here as a site of resistance to violence against nonhuman animals and humans who are psychodynamically constructed as animalistic. The possibility of resistance is perhaps the only alternative to the pessimism of deconstruction, and the empirical work presented here is constructed with such resistance in mind.

The three empirical studies designed to elicit 'animal' representations and discourses are described in the remainder of the chapter. Beginning with the psychodynamic analytical framework, I discuss the methodological issues of my discourse analysis, content analysis and semiotic analysis. After each of these discussions, I explain the procedures and analyses.

5.2 Discourse and Psycho Analysis: The Psychodynamic Playground

The kind of theoretical assumptions that Potter and Wetherell make have been criticised for discourse determinism (Hollway, 1989). The way forward, Hollway argues, and I expand in this research, is to integrate discourse and psychoanalysis to account for subjectivity and resistance. Hollway's gender analysis is part of this structure as representations of masculinity and femininity differentially correspond to the 'humanity' and the 'animality'. Androcentrism is a key element which sustains and legitimises anthropocentrism.

Bestial discourse is that text and talk which centres on the psychodynamic construction of 'animal' versus 'human'. It relies on material circumstance and metaphorical projection to create a consistent world of animal-human relations. Exploring the model of dehumanisation requires a deep analysis of the way people psychodynamically construct their understanding of other animals and their perception of themselves in relation to other animals, to legitimise their actions. The contradictions and fragmentations which maintain that gulf between thought and action have not been previously extended to the issue of animal-human relations in social psychology. Indeed, it is not my intention merely to extend this concept to the representations of the animal world, but rather to propose that this relation, when applied to social psychological areas of research into violence and prejudice, is fundamental to theory building and practical application. Where 'humanity is the measure of all things' as it is in the Christian and Cartesian dualisms of modern Britain, it is essential that the concept of animality is fully exposed.

Procedure

The aim of the interviews was to elicit representations that people had about animals. My reading of these texts aimed to identify the psychodynamic positioning of the participants in ideological discourses. There were two main points of comparison and one of these emerged through the process of interviewing rather than at the stage of the topic guide. The first of these points was the question of vegetarianism. In gaining insight to the hegemonic discourses which constructed representations of nonhuman animals, I thought it would be necessary to talk to those people who had made conscious decisions about their relationship to other animals. As the use of nonhuman animals for meat production is the dominant form of human relation to and oppression of them, I decided that it would be important to speak to those people who had made a decision to stop eating meat. As eating meat is the dominant relation that humans have with other animals, it would appear that meat eating is a major representation of particular nonhuman animals. The reasons why people stopped eating meat would be important to an interpretation of how alternative discourses emerge from hegemonic discourses. The extent to which these discourses were

mutually exclusive was also a motivating factor. I was keen to explore how vegetarians constructed their meanings about other animals and how these representations would compare to non vegetarians. Here, the concepts of animal welfare and animal rights were key. I wanted to know if there was a clear delineation between these two groups of people reflected in their respective support of one or other of these positions.

The second point of reference, and one which emerged through the course of the interviews, was religion. I had decided that, as well as recruiting people who were vegetarian and people who ate meat, to make the analysis manageable, and for no other reason, I would restrict the ethnic, religious, cultural, class and region of the participants. These factors are important areas to explore, however, they did not fit the protocol of this research. Therefore, I decided to select British, atheist, agnostic or Christian participants. I was interested in religion, given the legacy of Christian dualism, however, the religious belief systems of people of not so easily categorised as whether they eat meat or not and so I allowed this point of comparison to emerge throughout the interviews. As it emerged from interviewee biographies, I talked to a range of people with atheist, agnostic and Christian beliefs, who were vegetarians and meat eaters. To avoid the introduction of other religions and to retain some cultural coherence I selected British participants only. Also, to avoid the effects of rural relations with nonhuman animals which are dominated by agriculture, I ensured that all the participants grew up and lived in urban Britain. In terms of culture and belief systems, I also aimed to interview a single generation of people and, therefore, restricted the age of the participants from 19 years to 36 years.

Much has been written about how to conduct qualitative interviews and the legacy of quantitative methods saturates many of these writings. The insistence on detached, objective questioning, guarded phrases and distancing oneself from the interviewee are remnants of positivist epistemology. The production of meaning is as much a relational process between interviewer and interviewee as anything else. Acknowledging that does not mean eliminating the interviewer subjectivity nor does it mean allowing undirected

conversation which runs the risk of ignoring the research questions. Indeed, the whole terminology of 'interview' implies a questioner asking questions and seeking answers. Certainly questions were asked, based loosely on an interview guide which was piloted for clarification, however, answers were not sought. The purpose of these, perhaps 'dialogues' is a more appropriate term, was to produce texts, representations held predominantly by the participants, which would yield, upon analysis, insight to the subject positioning of those individuals in the discourses available on this topic in Britain. The piloting of the interview guide clarified points about terminology, ordering of questions and the length of the dialogue.

The guide itself (see Appendix I) was based on my notion that the dominant areas of British contact, and therefore representations of, with nonhuman animals would be through 'meat', 'pets' and 'images'. Other, equally important areas of human relations to other animal such as experimentation, zoos and endangered species, were allowed to emerge through the course of the discussions. The aim, however, was to look at the accepted, common sense, naturalised issues and not the contested domains of human exploitation of other animals. There were some important issues about ordering and sensitivity to people's beliefs and behaviour that require further explanation. Firstly, to create a kind of rapport, and to establish biographical details of the participants, the discussions began with the participants' backgrounds, where they had lived, and what they did for a living. This usually served to put the participant at ease and reassure them that this was not an 'interview' in the usual sense. All the participants were unknown to me and were recruited through friends of friends and advertising at LSE. The interview guide was designed to draw the participants into thinking about issues that are so naturalised that they are difficult to access. I devised a simple initial question to set the tone by asking what animal the participant would like to be. This part of the dialogue was not used in the analysis, although, suffice to say the stereotypes associated with the chosen animals reflected human ideals.

Out of the three main areas of meat, pets and images to be explored, I decided that 'pets' would be a useful way of proceeding as people often have close relations to their pets especially when they were children and this would give further insight to their backgrounds. All the participants talked freely about their pets and at this stage all the discussions proceeded fluidly. Differences between the discussions with vegetarians and meat eaters emerged, somewhat obviously, as the talk turned to meat, and the juxtaposition of pets and meat was a difficult one for some participants. As talk of meat turned to animal welfare and its relation to 'animal rights', it emerged that the origins of life and, therefore, how humans related to other animals, was an important factor in the representations of nonhuman animals that atheists, agnostics and Christians held respectively. So, before discussing animal images, I introduced, or expanded on, the question of origins of life which became another important factor alongside the three main other themes. My interest in representations of 'beasts' and their meaning led into a discussion of animal imagery in general and the use of animals to represent humans. The discussions concluded with the participants being asked by me if they had anything to add or clarify.

Twenty semi-structured interviews were conducted. There were ten men and ten women. Five of each of these groups were vegetarian and the other five were meat eaters. Pilot interviews analysis resulted in the final interview guide. The participants were aged 19 to 36 years. They had lived the majority of their lives in urban Britain. They were either atheist, agnostic or Christian. A standard ethics protocol (see Appendix II) was devised which advised participants of their rights including confidentiality and anonymity. Opportunities were given for participants to request a copy of the final report. Interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. The average length of the interview was 60 minutes. Biographical details of the interviewees may be found in Appendix III. The interviews were analysed using a framework technique developed by the independent research body, Social and Community Planning Research. This thematic form of discourse analysis was adapted from Ritchie and Spencer (1994). The analysis avoids the linguistic behaviourism

of traditional discourse analyses and the fracturing of 'cut and paste' forms of analysis. This method is both flexible and systematic and encourages maximum use of the data.

Framework Analysis

This analysis involved four stages of familiarisation, indexing and annotating, charting and, finally, mapping and interpretation (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994:178).

Familiarisation

I made notes on important themes after each interview. The interviews were transcribed and the transcripts read several times. I took notes as I read and reread the transcripts. This process of familiarisation facilitated the sorting of the data. I gained an overview of the material involved and, at this stage, issues began to emerge as important themes. All the transcripts were reviewed as I searched for key ideas and recurrent themes. Notes were made on these ideas.

Indexing and Annotating

Having grasped a sense of the range and depth of the data, I began the process of abstraction and conceptualisation. At this stage, I reviewed my research notes and extracted recurrent themes and issues identified by the respondents. Here, a thematic framework, the theme index, was constructed. The purpose of the theme index is to sift and sort the data. At this stage of identifying and constructing the index, I began to draw on *a priori* issues from the original research aims (introduced into the interviews via the topic guide), together with emergent issues and analytical themes from the recurrence of particular views or experiences. The theme index underwent several refinements as it was applied to a few transcripts. The index categories became more sensitive to emergent and analytical themes. The index was constructed to account for the diversity of experiences, beliefs and behaviours. This process of refinement involved logical and intuitive thinking. Subjective judgements were made about meaning, the importance of issues and the validity of associations between ideas. Some of the index categories were identical to original

questions on the topic guide. Others were defined from emergent themes. The full index contained a total of 42 categories within 11 major subject headings.

The index is a mechanism for labelling data in manageable chunks for retrieval and exploration. The index was systematically applied to the data in its textual form. All the data were reread and annotated according to the theme index. Again, I made judgements on the meaning and significance of the data. Single passages often required multiple indexing as patterns began to emerge. This system of annotating the textual data makes the process of analysis visible and accessible to others. Once labelled, I was able to access each reference and identify patterns and the contexts in which they emerged. The theme index was as follows:

1.   Animals as Family Members

This theme was significant because all the participants characterised their particular pets as 'one of the family'. These pets, usually cats or dogs, provided reciprocal relationships with the participants and these relationships were characterised by the following sub-theme:

1.1   Relationships characterised by unconditional love, reciprocity, communication, affection
1.2   Identity - individual pet personalities and characteristics
1.3   Responsibility - duty of owner towards pet, care and protection
1.4   Utility - function of pet, therapeutic, entertainment, health

2.   Naturalisation of Food Choice

With reference to the use of nonhuman animals for food, this theme emerged predominantly to account for why people ate meat and why they did not. It included the following disparate reasons:

2.1   Evolution - humans as omnivores, adapted to eat meat, natural as morally right

2.2   Food Chain - natural order of carnivores, omnivores & herbivores

2.3   God Given - God gave humans animals as natural resources

2.4   Existence - if people did not eat meat, those animals they need for eating would not exist

3.   *Health as a Factor in Food Choice*

In justifying why the participants chose not to eat meat, to eat less meat or to eat meat, health was a common factor. It was used in both arguments for vegetarianism and against it in the following ways:

3.1   Meat Protein - necessary source of protein especially for children

3.2   Cholesterol - abstain from meat because of health risks

3.3   BSE - increased awareness of contamination

3.4   Food Scares - general awareness of lack hygiene, chemicals, artificial breeding

4.   *Concept of Choice as Deciding Factor in Food Preference*

Throughout the discussions on the issue of human relations to other animals and particularly on food choice, the participants cited 'choice' as a key factor which placed the behaviour within the untouchable realms of:

4.1   Personal - being vegetarian or not is personal choice, not legal or socially stigmatised

4.2   Cultural - what other countries chose to eat is culturally relative to UK and morally acceptable

5.   *Humane Behaviour*

A common concept across vegetarians and meat eaters alike was the concept of being 'humane', its definition is an important part in the deconstruction of human representations of nonhuman animals. It included the following references:

5.1   Killing - animals should be killed humanely, therefore, no need for vegetarianism
5.2   Quick and Painless - suffering should be minimised
5.3   No Right to Life - animals are inferior to humans and have no right to life like humans
5.4   Civilised Violence - humane killing is a sign of civilised country

6.   *Taboo*

Food taboos were common, contradictory and informative to the way the participants constructed the notion of edibility and inedibility. In accordance with Leach (1964), these were defined as:

6.1   Pets - taboo on eating pets, emotionally associated as not-animal but family members
6.2   Organs - associated with waste, and digestive process, unclean
6.3   Whole Animal - reminds people that meat is a dead animal
6.4   Humans - on no account should humans be eaten, unknown reasons, group (human) membership

7.   *Extreme Groups*

Representations of the human Other were as salient as representations of other animals and the two were often intertwined. Here the Other was categorised as:

7.1   Animal Lovers - overly sentimental, obsessive, prefer animals to humans
7.2   Vegans - take things too far, marginalised by vegetarians although still aspire to ideals
7.3   Activists - animal rights groups perceived as terrorists, troublemakers, violent

8.   *Ethics*

Ethical frameworks supported the participants representations of other animals and how they should be treated. The basic tenets of these frameworks were identified as:

8.1   Anti-Cruelty - avoid all unnecessary cruelty
8.2   Humanity - treating animals well makes people more human, humane
8.3   Superior Humans - human life and welfare is prioritised over animals

9.   Origins

The origins of life emerged as a topic through discussing how, and sometimes if, humans were related to other animals, and indeed whether humans were animals at all. Creationism and evolution found a meeting point in the following ways:

9.1   Christian God - man is made in the image of God, Creationism
9.2   Evolution - species evolved through natural selection and adaptation
9.3   Compatibility - God chose evolution as part of creation
9.4   Alternatives - evolution as just a theory, other possible (unknown) explanations

10.   Beast

The 'beast' as an archetypal animal representation was discussed for the associations the word produced in the minds of the participants. These associations were characterised as:

10.1   Mythical - fictional animal like Beauty & Beast, werewolves, Loch Ness monster
10.2   Inhuman - nonhuman other, untamed, wild
10.3   Violent - aggressive, ferocious, wanton destruction, control through violence
10. 4   Devil - the number of the beast: 666

11.   Images

General images of nonhuman animals used to represent humans were discussed, and the predominant ones were categorised as follows:

11.1   Female - images associated with women e.g. 'cow', 'bitch', 'dog'
11.2   Male - images associated with men eg 'ox', 'bull', 'bear'
11.3   Dehumanising - bad images of animals and devalued humans by association with animals
11.4   Harmless - standard, accepted use of language, worse insults
11.5   Negative - images reflecting negative human characteristics
11.6   Positive - images reflecting positive human characteristics

Charting

Having annotated the texts, I began to chart the data. This involved building up a picture of the data as a whole. I took data from their original context and rearranged according to the appropriate thematic reference. The charts were devised with headings and sub-headings which reflected the major subjects and categories from the theme index. As a thematic approach was adopted, I devised charts for each key subject area and entries were made for each respondent. The charts were ordered and grouped according to the four groups of analysis: male meat eaters, male vegetarians, female meat eaters and female vegetarians. The cases were always kept in the same order for each subject chart so that within-case and across-case analysis could occur simultaneously. A typical chart is presented in Appendix IV.

The benefit of this method of analysis is that charting involves abstraction and synthesis. Other qualitative methods rely on a 'cut and paste' approach by simply regrouping verbatim text chunks according to an index reference, resulting in a loss of context. Here, each passage of text, annotated with a particular reference, is distilled into a summary which is entered on the chart. The original text is referenced so that the source can be traced and the process of abstraction can be examined by other researchers.

Mapping and Interpretation

Having charted the core themes, I began to map and interpret the data as a whole, a process of theory building. I reviewed the charts and research notes, compared and contrasted accounts and experiences, searched for patterns and sought explanations. All this required that I evaluate the dynamics of the issues involved and search for an underlying structure. Identifying the key discourses which defined the object of study, the 'animal', directed the interpretation of the analysis. This involved identifying definitions, exploring the range and structure of the phenomenon, finding association and providing explanations. These aims constituted the form, the structure and the function of the phenomenon in question. Given the nature of the sampling and method of data collection,

the findings could not be generalised to a wider population on the basis of statistical representativeness. However, they can be generalised (using an inductive process) on the basis of the internal structure of the evidence (i.e. the strength, depth and detail of the explanations) to appropriate populations. The discovery of these themes led to the documentation of the thematic analysis and the final report of the findings presented in Chapter Six. Quotations are identified as being from male meat-eaters (mm), female meat-eaters (fm), male vegetarians (mv) and female vegetarians (fv). The numbers correspond to the interview and its charts.

5.3   Content Analysis: Beyond the Denotative Dimension

This section describes the development of media analysis and the transition from the predominant quantitative content analysis (Holsti, 1969) to semiological qualitative content analysis (Burgelin, 1972). Having established the definitions, range and structure of the 'beast' through the Framework analysis, I explored 'beast' metaphors further using a semiological form of content analysis.

Communication Theories

The media have become the focus of much social psychological research. Their effects as powerful dictators of beliefs and behaviour have been contested between the traditional models which supports audience homogeneity and passivity with the linear transmission of knowledge and the contemporary models which presuppose a heterogenous range of audience interpretations of media messages and propose discursive space and shared symbolic rituals as the circular relation between audience and the mass media. The long-term gradual effects of the mass media are difficult to measure because they can not be studied in an experimental setting. There needs to be an assessment of the indirect learning of social roles, the formulation of opinion and the effects, meaning and connotation of ideology disseminated in the media. The problems associated with treating the audience as an homogenous group are based on the assumptions that meanings are

interpreted in a homogenous way. However, audiences (readers) do not analyse texts in the same way that an analyst would (Livingstone, 1990). Consequently, the assumption of a straight-forward relationship is problematic.

Social Control

The cultivation theory of Gerbner (1969) and his associates points out that the mass media have replaced religion with its own narrative. Here, the assumption is that the mass media are homogenous and homogenising, that is to say, they attempt to override difference and to promote the mainstream. This suggests that the media are inherently conservative and pro-status quo. Indeed, increasingly the newspapers have become monopolised. They are basically concerned with selling rather than enlightening. They have taken over the role of describing the world symbolically. However, it is difficult to show the effects of the media because there are no control groups, no specific independent variables to manipulate and no specific exposure periods. Nevertheless, it is generally assumed that the mass media keep people believing in the status quo. The agenda-setting theory (McCombs and Shaw, 1972) states that the media do not tell us how to think but tell us what to think about. The newspapers, and other forms of communication, select topics and give them salience. The political hegemonic agenda is closely correlated with that of the media. The opposing theory is that of the spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1984). This is concerned with the way the media remove certain topics. It holds that public opinion is not private belief but that which can be expressed without risk of isolation. Moreover, people look to the media for the prevailing definition of reality, hence they express the views held by the majority. The spiral of silence can be broken by an external event that causes sudden change.

The Symbolic World

The North American approach to the mass media has been one of discovering the transmission of meanings that lead to social control. This compares with the European model that tries to identify what kind of symbolic world we live in because of the mass

media. It is essentially concerned with the rituals and the establishment of practice and expectation. The North American administrative approach centres on persuasion and cause-effect relationships within the social order. This contrasts with the European critical approach that seeks an interpretation outside the social order. The administrative approach is more quantitative and centres on the audience, the target of social control. Conversely, the critical approach, as illustrated in this study, centres on the production of meaning. The critical school developed out of the Marxist attempt to deal with the mass media. This was prompted by the fear of the dissemination of fascist ideology through the mass media. Based in Frankfurt in the 1930s, this approach attempted to see how the mass media developed and how society changed as a consequence. It centred on an economic analysis of who owned the mass media and, therefore, determined production of messages.

However, culture can not be reduced to economics alone. Culture has its own autonomy. Adorno and Horkheimer (1972) have suggested that technology has power over society. Following Marx, they posit that the audience has been alienated and isolated through the demise of art and the increase of popular culture. Essentially they perceive the messages of the mass media in terms of propaganda. The mass media have an important role in the construction and definition of acceptable identities. It has further been suggested that society is politically apathetic and, therefore, does not notice the mass influence of the media. The mass media have contributed to the commodification and standardisation of culture resulting in the negation of images and ideas. The bottom-up interpretation suggests that ideological discourses determine the way people think about life. The top-down interpretation posits that lived practices generate culture and that, in a Marxist sense, such practices are imposed by the powerful onto the unpowerful.

Communication is about the cultural assumptions that the communicators share with their audiences (de Fleur, 1970). This 'mirror' theory assumes communicators reflect social and cultural phenomena. It opposes the view that media affect attitude and behaviour through socialisation and the coding and construction of reality (Gerbner, 1969). A pragmatic

approach states that communicators both affect and reflect social and cultural phenomena. Analysis of communication, therefore, examines the way cultural formations are mediated in society. Moreover, the media's manifest portrayals of reality influence the audience's perceptions of society (McCombs and Shaw, 1972).

The media are presupposed to affect people through the transmission of hegemonic ideas and the implicit moral support of certain systems to the detriment of others. The pragmatic view that the media both affect and reflect social phenomena supports the notion of ideological discourse which is both created by the media and imbues the creators of the media. The audience contests the message of the media but the extent to which they will be able to construct alternative discourses will be partly determined by the access they have to alternative sources of information. A culture in which nonhuman animals are bifurcated into positive and negative representations of humans, evident through the dichotomous treatment of pets versus agricultural animals, will find those representations reflected in the media and supported by media discourses. Alternatives to this dichotomy, either eating pets or not eating agricultural animals, will not find a discursive space because of what these alternatives imply. Eating a member of one's family, regardless of species is not to be entertained as a serious thought, and stopping the mass slaughter of agricultural animals for food is marginalised as economically, ideologically, morally and naturally abhorrent. What remains is the stereotypical representations of nonhuman animals as contradictory images of human projections and introjections. The media, and particularly the written media, with their emphasis on parsimonious images to convey complex meanings make ample use of nonhuman animal imagery to express human thought and feelings. Simultaneously, the media support anthropocentric and speciesist ideologies through their representations of nonhuman animals as either family or food.

Newspapers, as the dominant form of the written media, rely on linguistic images in the form of metaphors to convey their messages. My interest in cultural nonhuman animal surrogates and the use of metaphor leads me to examine how the metaphor 'beast' is used

as a linguistic device in the British press. Because it is impractical to interview all the authors of all the individual stories which make use of this metaphor to decipher its meaning, I have decided to employ what, at the superficial level, appears to be a quantitative method. As I could not access the subject positions of the authors through dialogue, I used semiological principles to describe the metaphorical use of 'beast'. Content analysis has long been held to be a method of enumeration which aims to make comparisons based on the presence or absence of a coded unit. Obviously, this level of analysis is inadequate for my purposes of defining the meaning of 'beast'. However, the method is partially useful for gaining a sense of the range and diversity of the use of the metaphor. It is for this purpose, because I am dealing with pre-existing texts, newspaper articles, that I have decided to employ this quantitative method and upgrade it to a semiological level of analysis.

Content Analysis

Content analysis is most commonly used in cultural studies and mass communication research (Manning and Cullum-Swan, 1994). Content analysis has been described as 'the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication (Berelson, 1952). Essentially content analysis is used to analyse the meaning of messages. Such meanings are patterns among sets of variable categories. The analysis is theory-driven because the categories are based on hypotheses about the nature of the meaning. However, it is a quantitatively orientated method through which inferences are derived from the counts of frequency. The coding categories used in quantitative content analysis define what associations emerge aimed at reducing participant bias. The problem with traditional, quantitative content analysis is that it deals primarily with the manifest meaning of text, the denotative order of signification and, therefore, fails to account for the context of the coded pieces of text. The increasing use of semiological principles to analyse the results of content analysis has brought this method of media analysis into the qualitative paradigm.

Traditional Content Analysis

Content analysis of mass communication has been traditionally limited to the investigation of professional communicators, i.e. those people encoding the messages (Kerlinger, 1964). However, this approach has been criticised for assuming that encoding is an intra-individual process, i.e. that communicators exist within a vacuum (Krippendorf, 1969). Consequently, the referents of the encoders, the system of denotation, extend from the media organisation to the social structure. Content analysis of communication provides a way of deriving inferences about the communicators and about cultural assumptions that the communicators share with their audiences (de Fleur, 1970) However, Burgelin (1972) has argued that content analysis is only concerned with the manifest content, whereas structuralists are concerned with different levels of meaning in communication.

Contemporary Content Analysis

Moving away from traditional content analysis to semiological content analysis, there is an increasing awareness of the subjective factor in psychological methods. The coding frame is derived from categories which emerge from theoretically driven concepts. These categories ultimately influence the analysis. The coding categories used will define the results of the analysis. Communications both affect and reflect social and cultural phenomena. The analysis of these texts examines the means by which cultural formations are mediated in society, observing the interaction between communicators and their audience within the same cultural universe.

The denotative level of analysis is the manifest description of frequencies of the object of study. The connotative level of analysis explores the latent messages signified at the denotative level. Exploring the expressive meanings of media messages is a means of understanding the ideological and cultural frame of reference which underpin the messages (Burgelin, 1972) Content analysis studies examine interrelationships within texts as well as between texts. Content analysis is usually enumerative whereas structuralist analysis is rarely so. Denotations appear to efface the ideological process and portray an objectified

and naturalised world. However, content analysis is also concerned with the latent meaning of communications, the way in which it reflects or mediates cultural and ideological formations and the way in which messages are adapted and understood by audiences. Analysis of stylistic devices in content analysis is related to its context in order to understand the inflection given to a text, to examine the use of rhetorical devices as a way of organising material and to examine the ideological processes which underlie it.

Quantitative and structuralist methods have converged and moved away from claims of objectivity. Content analysts' new interests are increasingly in the cultural and ideological formations (or structures) expressed in the media. Structuralists' new interests focus on the inspection procedures used in content analysis. These approaches are inextricably linked (Curran, 1976). The generation of quantifiable codes in a content analysis is based on a qualitative, preliminary examination of the text. This selection of codes shapes the interpretation of findings.

Procedure

This form of content analysis has been transformed from quantitative enumeration to a more semiological analysis of meaning. The subjective elements in analysis are explicit through the selection of categories which invariably influence findings. Thus, in this thesis, the content analysis of 'beast' metaphors is used to expand on definitions and typologies of this referent identified in the discourse analysis. The analysis examines the range and the structure, as well as the associations, inherent to the use of 'beast' metaphors. This is an analysis of trend not predication. Simply,

> Content analysis...is a method of observation. Instead of observing people's behaviour directly, or asking them to respond to scales or interviewing them, the investigator takes the communications that people have produced and asks questions of communications. (Kerlinger, 1964:544).

The rationale for this is that the media affect and reflect social and cultural phenomena. The meaning of media messages contributes to an understanding of current ideologies. Both the latent and the manifest meaning are under examination. The aim of the present analysis is to deconstruct the mythological assumption about 'beast' references which render them neutral representations. Beneath the objectification of these metaphors is the legitimisation of certain power structures associated with specific meanings. The purpose of this analysis is to reveal those structures.

The word 'beast' was entered into the newspaper database, FTProfile, for a time range from August 1995 to August 1996 from the following newspapers: *The Mirror* (MIR), *Sunday Mirror* (SMR), the *Daily Mail* (DML), the *Mail on Sunday* (MOS), *The Times* (TMS), *The Sunday Times* (STM), *The Guardian* (GDN), *The Observer* (OBS), *The Independent* (IND), *The Independent on Sunday* (INS), *The Telegraph* (TEL) and the *Sunday Telegraph* (STL). 950 articles were retrieved, each containing references to 'beasts'. 200 articles were reviewed to construct a coding framework. All proper names, e.g. *Beauty and the Beast*, were discarded from the analysis, leaving a total of 834 articles.

All instances of 'beast' metaphors were coded according to these mutually exclusive categories. As this was not a traditional content analysis, enumeration was not the focus. It was the relation amongst the three main categories of Human, Animal and Object 'beast' metaphors, and the relation amongst the sub-categories, which was the key concern. The Coding Schedule is presented in Appendix V. Histograms were devised to represent the distribution of 'beast' metaphors amongst the categories and are presented in Chapter 7.

5.4   Semiotic Analysis: Signifying Polysemy

Having explored the form, structure and function of 'beast' metaphors, I semiotically analysed a specific example of the 'beast', the werewolf. I chose a contemporary novel, *Wilderness*, and the derived television drama for analysis based on its representation of a traditional 'beast' myth, the werewolf, and the opportunity for an intertextual analysis between the two different forms of media.

Narrative Analysis

Narrative analysis employs many semiotic principles, and has been described thus:

> If one defines narrative as a story with a beginning, middle, and end that reveals someone's experiences, narratives take many forms, are told in many settings, before many audiences, and with various degrees of connection to actual events or persons. Thus themes, principle metaphors, definitions of narrative, defining structures of stories (beginning, middle and end), and conclusions are often defined poetically and artistically and are quite context bound. (Manning and Cullum-Swan, 1994:465).

The semiotic analysis of text presupposes the permeability of textual boundaries. As meaning is negotiated, interpretations of any given text are diverse and complex. Indeed,

> Text...is a historical and cultural construct rather than an a priori given, and it breaks down and complicates the simple linear relationship between stimulus and response, speaker and hearer, subject and object (Livingstone 1990:65).

Texts conspire, through language, to direct readings which are culturally appropriate. This process is both affective and cognitive and defies the mind/body dualism. The possible meanings of the text and representational processes and desires of reader are bi-directional. Propp's (1968) propositional analysis of the Russian fairy tale claims that fairy tales can be understood by: the stable functions of the characters; the limited functions of the fairy tale; the identical sequence of functions; and the typical structure of fairy tales. Invariably,

the outcome of fairy tale is a 'lesson', a moral tale. Identifying with the structure of the text is part of the production of subjectivity. Structuralism's rule is that activities function first by decomposing/deconstructing the object of perception according to some rule and recomposing another object that renders the first 'intelligible'. This is accomplished by the creation of another object which 'manifests the rules of functioning of the original object.' (Barthes, 1972:149) The meaning of things is not to be found in the things themselves but in the system of signs itself. Therefore, fiction is useful as a way of describing the world, it makes those signified and signifying relations explicit.

Levi-Strauss's (1963) analysis of myth was based on binary oppositions, a closed, synchronic model. His analysis proposed that stories (myths) unravelled paradigmatically through oppositions rather than in the Proppian sense of functions. The difference in phonemes is the foundation for meaning, therefore, meaning is relational. Phonemes are produced by the realisation of members of a definitive set of binary distinctive features which generates the phoneme's information. Binary heuristic for analysis is relevant to mythemes - units of mythical thought. Signs and myths are understood because the brain is structured to decode binary information. Phonemes are distinctive sounds. Myths are distinctive themes and the brain decodes them unconsciously. Textual analyses must address these unconscious strategies of projection, introjection and projective identification:

> We do not pretend to demonstrate how men think in the myths but rather
> how these myths think themselves in men without them being aware of it.
> (Culler, 1975:50)

Language is not anchored in anything at all. Langue is a freefloating system of relations 'contingently' anchored in conventions not the brain. It parallels the culturally constituted unconscious. According to Jameson (1972), the binary method is simply a stimulant to perception. Behind the text there are systems of signification codifying affect responses, especially in fairy tales which serve to socialise desire. The werewolf myth is a fairy tale articulated in 'Little Red Riding Hood', and the films belonging to the horror genre. The

myth is a warning about the danger of the 'beast within' humans, it is the bestial version of 'Jekyll and Hyde'. Fear from the violence of the 'beast' produces discourses which represent humans as antithetical to 'beasts'. Desire is key to the development of subjectivity and one's own understanding of oneself. Modern fairy tales are reflections of the moral tales of the past and their endurance speaks volumes about their perceived relevance to life today. The continual struggle of humans to come to terms with themselves as animals is reflected in the ubiquity of these representations. Dialectic interaction between reader and text parallels other social relations between the Self and Other. These interactions reinforce and legitimise other ontological dichotomies, and, in the case of nonhuman animals, they are manifestations of Leach's (1964) concept of social distance. The reproduction of subjectivity through this interaction is delimited through ideological hegemony and socially acceptable modes of behaviour. The 'beast' is to be tamed, if not destroyed, in order to preserve the 'humanity' of humans. The self is a primarily normative construction and its articulation through myths, legends and fairy tales is testament to the pervasive fear of the 'beast'.

Having explored definitions of the 'beast' in the previous study and identified its polysemic meanings and uses, I wanted to further analyse the 'beast' and chose the mythical 'beast' reference to explore the narrative use of this image and the boundaries between humans and other animals which it signified. These desires were crystallised with the discovery that colleagues in my department were working on the production of a particular drama series called *Wilderness*. Having been told the basics of the story, and with access to the script, I decided to use *Wilderness* as a case study for my semiotic analysis of the 'beast', and to extend the analysis by looking at the transformation from the original USA novel to the British television drama. I bought the original book and began the process of comparison, identifying the level of semiosis between the original text and the derived television drama, and the explicit and implicit significations associated with werewolf mythology.

Procedure

I identified primary signifiers in the text by a set of sentences. This set is the Signifying Unit (SU) which is the unit of reading. These SUs are translated through analysis which leads to the 'dramatic' structure of the text by decomposition that stays at the level of signification. The text is made to 'slow down' and the identification of key signifiers structures the textual analysis for the researcher.

Wilderness, the book and derived television drama, was chosen for analysis because it exemplified the difficulties in translating animal symbolism from the written to the visual medium. I familiarised myself with the book and the script. This process involved identifying major changes in protagonists, plot development, contexts and symbolism in relation to affect signifiers. The texts were analysed to reveal the social conventions by which they were constructed. Deconstruction explored the denotative and connotative orders of signification. The naturalisation of these conventions was examined in relation to the different genres and the history of the lycanthropic myth.

Connotation, as the second order of signification, involves metaphor and metonymy. Metaphor expresses the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar. It involves the transposition of ideas on the paradigmatic level. The paradigmatic level is the set of alternative possibilities available at each point in the narrative. It is external as coherence is given by the reader through inter-textual, 'natural' and cultural readings. Metonymy expresses the invocation of ideas through associated details. It involves the contiguity of ideas on the syntagmatic level. The syntagmatic level is the sequential structure of the text. It is internal as it relies on something having taken place such as repetition, similarity, inversion, completion or factual events in the story. The syntagm and the paradigm are the two major sources of variation in the structure of a text. The structure of the *Wilderness* narrative was analysed in order to reveal the latent and manifest polysemy. Four primary signifiers were identified: Transformation, Sexuality, Rationality and Freedom. Each of these themes was identified as a narrative proposition. Signifying units

of text were analysed to illustrate the syntagmatic structure of metonymy and the paradigmatic structure of metaphor.

The metonymic meaning of the signifiers described how the theme fitted into the whole structure of the narrative. It identified the internal relations between the reinforcements and sequences which constituted the whole. The metaphorical meaning of the signifiers described how the themes fitted as a selection of the narrative. It identified the genre they belonged to and the central paired opposites, as well as their cultural implications. The analysis also explored the level of semiosis. This intertexuality examines which aspects of the narrative are fixed and which aspects changed across the media. Finally, specific or shared cultural codes were identified, and cultural assumptions that underpinned them were explored.

Discussion

The aim of this chapter has been to integrate the theoretical approach of Part One with the methods to be employed in Part Two. These qualitative methods are appropriate to the analysis of human subjectivity in relation to animal identity because the methods allow depth of analysis to account for inconsistencies in the psychodynamic construction of social phenomena. Triangulating the research provides multiple perspectives on representations and discourses on nonhuman animals. Identifying the discourses which mould human perceptions of nonhuman animals was facilitated by the series of interviews and the thematic discourse analysis. The semi-structured design of the interview allowed the participants to construct their own accounts of their beliefs and behaviours in relation to nonhuman animals. The more detailed exploration of media representations of a particular nonhuman animal referent, 'beast', was undertaken using a contemporary, semiological, content analysis. This semiological analysis avoids the quantitative enumerative emphasis whilst maintaining a wide range of examples of the uses of 'beast' metaphors. An explicitly mythological example of the 'beast' was semiotically analysed through the

deconstruction of *Wilderness*, the book and television narratives. The lycanthropic myth, retold, encompassed the dynamics of human versus nonhuman animal identity and subverts this dualism, thus, undermining all status dichotomies.

6: BESTIAL DISCOURSES

Comparing people to animals [is] hurtful to the human being but I think it also um puts down animals, so maybe it makes it easier for society, as a whole, to go along with factory farming without thinking this is horrific....people are able to do really brutal things. (fm3/11.3).

Overview

The aim of this chapter is to explore discourses on nonhuman animals through analysing the dynamics of vegetarians' and meat eaters' representations. The Framework Analysis of the interview transcripts revealed five main themes: *Animals as Family Members*; *Choices; Ethical Frameworks; Origins of Life*; and *'Beast' Representations*. The *Animals as Family Members* theme related to the participants' representations of pet animals. Anthropomorphic attribution of these pets constructed them as having identities corresponding to traditional roles in the family, whilst anthropocentric beliefs identified these animals' utility as a key factor in their incorporation into the family. Individual *Choices* was a prominent theme in representations of vegetarianism, meat eating and animal rights. There was consensus on the issue of freedom to choose what to eat and what not to eat, ranging from individual choices to the use of different animals for food in other cultures. The naturalisation of meat eating as morally correct was represented through religious and secular appeals. Furthermore, the issue of health in determining food choice was important for both vegetarians and meat eaters. Within *Ethical Frameworks*, the participants voiced concern for the treatment of nonhuman animals and, here, the distinction between animal welfare and animal rights was clarified. Taboos on eating certain animals and methods of humane killing were articulated within this framework, as were representations of extreme groups such as 'vegans' and 'animal rights activists'. Christian creation and evolution were cited as both mutually exclusive and compatible theories for the *Origins of Life*. The final theme, *'Beast' Representations*, incorporated the participants' representations of 'beasts', primarily as nonhuman animals, as well as the use of nonhuman animal names to describe humans. These uses were predominantly pejorative and were also sex differentiated. The analysis of these themes identified three principal discourses as Object, Referent and Utensil.

6.1 Animals As Family Members

As the process of indexing and charting showed, the primary representation of pet animals was of being a family member. Being one of the family is not a straightforward construction of this particular category of 'animal'. It brings with it much, if not all, of the familiar contingencies that define modern British families. An important aspect of defining the pet is finding a suitable family role for the animal. There are a wide range of possibilities, including the father figure protector, the parent's unconditional love, the sibling's role as friend and playmate and, not least, the role of child and, in one case, compensation for the lack of a grandchild. The participants in this research demonstrated, through talking about their pets, some of the key discourses associated with pet animals. Their definitions of both their pets and 'good pets' in general provide insight to the internal structure of the concept of the 'pet'.

Pet Identities

Some of the more conspicuous family characteristics associated with pets were the references to loyalty and unconditional love. An important aspect of what constituted a 'good pet' was this bond signifying exclusivity and trust. The relationship between the human (owner) and the nonhuman animal (pet) was characterised as reciprocal and emotional. Family pets were described as 'friends', 'surrogate grandchildren', 'little sister', 'third brother', and generally playmates for the participants when they were children. In defining their relationships with their pets, the participants spoke of fond memories, mutual love and trust, and growing up together.

The identity of the pets covered two related areas. One was how the pet was described as an individual animal. The other was those characteristics that the human identified with in the animal. Cats were generally described as 'independent', 'intelligent', 'calm', 'solitary', 'moody', 'suspicious' and 'affectionate'. Dogs were typically characterised as 'mischievous',

'naughty', 'good natured', 'bad tempered', 'friendly', 'loving', 'respectful' and 'obedient'. The majority of the respondents described themselves as either 'cat people' or 'dog people' and these mutually exclusive identities were reflected in their perceptions of cat versus dog characteristics. As one cat person claimed, 'Cats are more intelligent than dogs even though you can't train them.' (mm4/1.2) Whereas a dog's apparent lack of brain power was perfectly endearing to another respondent:

> Cats don't seem to have a great deal of personality in the way that a dog does,
> you know, a dog can be stupid or it can be aggressive or it can be docile
> whereas a cat just seems to slink around and look shifty. (mv5/1.2)

Despite the apparent cat-dog rivalry, there was also the acute perception that nonhuman animals, significantly pet animals, had individual characteristics and personalities, likened to human personalities and differences, 'I think animals, like people, all of them have different characters and even personalities' (fm3/1.2). Yet the difficulty in assigning or recognising an animal's identity was not overlooked:

> How do you define the identity of a dog? It's not something that I can write
> down a description of. It is just something that one has an emotive reaction to,
> that this dog has an identity and I can, OK that identity maybe I am imparting
> onto it but it is something that I can respond to and I can like it. It is no more
> than that. (mv2/1.2).

Part of defining the pet is the inescapable responsibility that goes with keeping a nonhuman animal. Such responsibility is seen by the adult participants as wholly beneficial to children, yet it was that inevitable responsibility of cleaning and care that led the participants, as children, to tire easily of their pets and, when the novelty of being responsible for another life wore off, all that was left were the chores of pet care. Those animals that were described as 'boring' or in 'cruel' caged conditions were often the same animals that required the most

cleaning. Caged birds, rodents, hamsters, snakes, guinea pigs and rabbits were all described as 'boring' and 'tedious' to take care of. Together with fish in tanks, these caged animals were described as being in cruel conditions, without freedom of their natural habitats. The benefits of responsibility of pets for children waned in adult years when the primary response to having pets was that they would 'tie me down' and where adequate time, space and money were key considerations.

Pet Utilities

Pets were also defined in terms of their utility. 'Good entertainment' value seemed to cover a wide range of useful pet activities including play, companionship, relaxation and affection. Pets as status symbols, or even household objects in relation to fish, were considered as motivations for keeping exotic or dangerous animals. Health benefits also accounted for pet utility, both physical activity and mental therapy. Uncomplicated affection characterised a number of discourses, 'They give comfort and don't talk back...and more in your life, another dimension, you know' (fm3/1.4). The ability to use pets for human needs was an important aspect of understanding why people keep pets:

> In a way there's almost a whole species that's now been created which is fine if people want to get enjoyment out of them...You need to own them because they need you to look after them so you can justify it more to yourself...because you own the animal anyway and its got no right to reject you because its your pet and it will bloody well love you. (mv1/ 1.4).

Moreover, there was also an awareness of the potential fallacy of the mutual unconditional bond between owner and pet:

> I know dogs appear to get a lot out of their owner's affections, but I just wonder whether that's kind of...really you wonder who's getting what out of what and...is the dog just being nice to you because you feed it. (mm2/1.4).

There were no discernable differences between the way vegetarians and meat eaters talked about their pets. There was evidence for the strong emotions that the participants invested in their pets, especially as children. Nor was there any gender-related accounts of pet participation in families. The overall theme was one of pet animals as members of the family, trusted companions who formed emotionally reciprocal relationships with their human owners. These animals were neither wholly animal nor wholly human. They are the anomalous category of domesticated animal, naturalised as quasi-kin through anthropomorphic identification.

6.2 Choices

Another strong theme which characterised all of the participants' discourse was 'choice'. The three themes associated with choice were: The Concept of Choice as a Factor in Food Preference; The Naturalisation of Food Choice and Health as a Factor in Food Choice.

The Concept of Choice as a Factor in Food Preference

The notion of choice plays an important role in defining meat. All the participants stated that eating meat or not eating meat was a matter of personal choice. Meat eaters, on their part, understood the health benefits of vegetarianism, marginalised the ethical issues and summed up their opinions with statements such as, 'It's wholly a matter of personal choice.' (fm4/4.1). Moreover, vegetarians, too, claimed personal choice to be a significant factor in their decision not to eat meat, and in their expectations of others, 'Ultimately, it's your own choice, it's your life not something you want to extend to other people' (fv4/4.1).

Most of the vegetarians said it was not necessary for their partners to be vegetarian, and when it came to potential children, a number of vegetarian participants expressed the following view:

> I accept and understand that people do eat meat and that's their preference...I wouldn't give them [children] meat, I mean I know that's imposing your view on them but I actually think now there are so many substitutes...but it's a very individual thing. (fv2/4.1).

Being vegetarian places you in minority group in Britain and, as a member of a minority group, the values associated with that group will be marginalised and stigmatised. These quotations demonstrate the internalisation of the majority's (meat eaters) representation of the minority. Being vegetarian is all right as long as it is a personal, individual choice. If you want to remain an accepted part of society you have to conform to the limits that society places on being in that minority. For vegetarians, the limits are, somewhat paradoxically, about choice. Meat eaters will accept vegetarians as long as vegetarians realise that being vegetarian is not a political, social or economic endeavour. Being vegetarian is about what you choose to eat for dinner, and being able to choose is everyone's right. What you choose is your personal decision whether it is a matter of taste, aesthetics, health or ethics. But because the ethical frameworks of the vegetarian are so individualised, they do not pose a threat to the majority.

When vegetarians talk about being vegetarian as a personal choice, we are hearing the dictates of the majority. Moreover, this individualisation of a moral system carries on into the next generation. Vegetarians believe enough in their values to educate their children about them but part of that education is the notion of personal choice. They will not 'impose' their values on their children because if they do they will exceed the limits of acceptable vegetarian boundaries.

This sensibility feeds into our understanding of other cultures and their use of animals as pets or meat. Cultural choice is the macro level of personal choice. It is all right as long as they keep it there and do not try to convert Britain into their ways as one meat-eater commented:

I suppose context matters. If I was abroad and people ate cats and dogs, I suppose, I...I perhaps I would. I suppose I am saying I wouldn't eat my own cat but that is obvious, you know,...but it is context specific, over here I wouldn't, somewhere else I possibly would. (mm2/4.2).

People tend to justify morally, not just explain socially, many human behaviours according to culture. Cultural relativism is a curious double-edged sword of the social sciences. It has been an undoubtedly invaluable weapon against the cultural imperialism of the West. Evaluating behaviour according to one's time in history, place in society, cultural and religious beliefs has been a somewhat ubiquitous, if not obvious, preoccupation of modern social science. Yet there seems to be something rather patronising about making claims of relativism for all societies in the world that extol their version of the 'truth' and the morally correct as equal. But let us take a few steps back. There is truth in the notion that different cultures use different animal in different ways. Difference is, as always, undeniable. Indeed, there is something to be said for the insight of those participants who claimed that just because British people kept certain animals as pets did not mean that in other countries those same species of animal should not be eaten. And vice versa for the British agricultural animals.

Nonetheless, what about the animal? Nonhuman animals that were surrogate fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, daughters, sons and best friends, in another part of the world would be roasted, stewed, baked or curried. Killing, cooking and eating a potential member of one's family appears to be a somewhat peculiar activity. Of course in those cultures, these nonhuman animals are not family members, but in Britain they are and the point is that, just because it is another culture, we prioritise human needs over nonhuman animals lives and make moral culturally relativist justifications for the use of lives and deaths of those animals. Yet there is further insight by another meat-eater:

> My immediate reaction is that's horrible and repulsive, and my second reaction is, my reaction to that is, irrational and unjustifiable because that's a cultural thing...you know, simply because I can relate to cats, I'm sure some people can relate to cows, for example, and would be equally repulsed by me eating them. (fm4/4.1).

Here, the issue of cultural relativism is apt. However, it is at the level where cultural choice reflects personal choice that the inconsistencies arise. The *laissez faire* attitudes that vegetarians have towards their own principles are reflected in the national considerations of what other cultures do with their nonhuman animals. Vegetarians think eating meat is wrong, for a range of reasons, but they also believe that not eating meat is a personal choice. British people tend to think that other countries and cultures treat nonhuman animals wrongly, but they also believe that doing so is a matter of cultural choice. At the heart of this matter is the status of the animal. Here the nonhuman animal is an irrelevance. Personal and cultural choice are about *human* rights.

Naturalisation of Food Choice

Defining nonhuman animals as meat is not the complicated task one might have imagined given the previous definitions of pet animals as members of the family. Indeed, it appears to the participants as a 'natural' order of things. There are nonhuman animals that are pets and there are nonhuman animals that are meat. Where these animals are not meat, and never should be, there is a clear demarcation that they have similar rights to humans. However, this is not a simple vegetarian versus meat eater divide that one might expect. Meat, as a culturally defined concept of animal, crosses the borders.

The naturalisation of food choice, here the decision to eat or not to eat meat, is characterised by the features of all naturalised issues. Firstly, there is a conflation between what is 'natural' and what is morally right or culturally acceptable. Secondly, the justification for eating or

abstaining from this category of animals delineates between secular appeals to evolution and natural orders and religious (in these cases Christian) appeals to God and divine order. Much of the justification for eating meat is summed up by one participant as, 'I believe we are meant to be meat eaters.' (mm1/2.1). Several facets to this sentence are of interest. Firstly, this a belief, a faith in the rightness of eating meat. But it is not a religious belief. Secondly, the notion of what people are meant to do carries with it the implicit assumption of what it is morally right to do. Thirdly, being described as meat eaters is different to being described as eating meat. Meat eater is a defined identity and unpacking that identity will be the subject of discussion later in the chapter. Unravelling the secular account invariably means treading on evolutionary ground as one meat eater did:

> Yeah, I think if someone said an argument, you know, you should not eat meat, I'd say well why, you know, because it becomes a moral issue both ways, doesn't it? If you're a strict vegetarian you know eating meat is wrong, but I can turn it around and say well we've always evolved eating a bit of meat, you know, and maybe it does you some good. (mm3/2.1).

There is conflict, though, in this realisation from another meat eater:

> I sort of believe that humans beings are omnivores and they were, they always have been omnivores...so I feel it's partly a natural thing though I don't personally kill animals or want to kill animals to eat them. (fm1/2.1).

At this point it may be useful to evaluate these quotations. Humans *are* evolved animals. Humans *are* omnivores. Humans have always eaten meat. However, the brilliance of naturalisation is not to state the facts of the case but to expose implicitly or explicitly the *value* of the facts. Being natural makes it right, and the appeals to the goodness, or rightness, of what is natural is being made more and more appealing in the artificial environments of the modern world. The 'food chain', as expressed by a number of participants, supports these

ideas, 'The way the food chain operates and the fact that animals eat other animals...I feel it is natural to eat animals' (fm3/2.2). Indeed, 'All other animals eat meat, it's sort of a natural food chain.' (mm1/2.2). There *is* a natural (evolved) food chain. Animals do eat other animals. A corollary to the 'natural equals right' argument is the apparent physical evidence offered us by the behaviours of other animals, in this case carnivores and omnivores. Other animals do it, therefore, as we are animals, we are justified in doing it. Vegetarians are in on the act too:

> People have rights too and a lot of people would argue that naturally man is carnivorous or at least semi carnivorous...more acceptable because [it] gets back to the idea that people have always hunted. (mv1/2.1).

Moreover, there is some support for the notion that where naturalisation is used as a justification for eating meat, the idea of 'natural' is contradictory:

> I think you're always going to get people that eat meat and in a way it's nature, whereas, apparently it's not natural for people to eat meat...you're always going to get people who are going to want to eat meat and I mean yeah the law of nature that you're always going to get something killing something else to eat it but, you know, within reason making sure it's done properly. (fv4/2.1).

'Within reason' is the ontological barrier between humans and animals. Nonhuman animals kill to eat and it is part of their nature. Humans kill to eat but it should not be in an animal nature because humans are not like other animals. We have reason. The problem of simultaneously being human and being animal is the source of this kind of leap in reasoning. The 'reason divide' was substituted by the 'spiritual divide' by the Christian participants. One participant considered Jesus Christ to have provided moral guidance on the question of eating meat:

> Because they [animals] have been eaten according to my religion, we're
> allowed to eat them. There is nothing ethically wrong with it, so it's not
> something on my conscience...if it was eaten by Christ then it should be, it can
> be used for his disciples. (mm5/2.3).

Indeed, another participant claimed, 'There is nothing in the Bible that says you should be

vegetarian.' (mv4/2.3) And according to this vegetarian Christian, 'Some [Christians] say

vegetarians are Satanists.' (mv4/2.3) The association of vegetarianism with Satanism is a clear

cut representation of Eastern religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism or Jainism. Believing

that animals have equal value to humans is akin to saying God is an animal, as humans are

made in the image of God. Conveniently enough the Devil is believed to be bestial, often

represented as a half man half animal chimera. Thus, vegetarians worship their own animal-

God, Satan. An interesting argument but one we shall have to leave for now. The crux of

the matter here is that animals are God given to humans:

> I think you can make a distinction between necessity and luxury and how we
> exploit the resources that God gave us, i. e. the animal kingdom and whatever
> else in order to fulfil our needs. (fm4/2.34).

The final reference for the naturalisation of eating meat is one that appears also to have

religious roots:

> People say, well they're bred for meat so what's wrong with eating them and
> if we didn't breed them for meat they wouldn't exist so, you know, there's
> nothing wrong with eating them...which I think is not a good argument because
> it's justifying the cruelty that's done to them. (mv5/2.4)

This argument also applies to zoos and nonhuman animals in captivity generally. There

appears to be a belief, which must be based significantly in religious beliefs, that life is

waiting to be born. With regard to human life, it is not inconceivable that some people do

hold notions of babies in heaven simply waiting to be born. With regards to other animals, there seems to be the same kind of argument: life at any cost, and it applies also to concern about endangered species. With regards to farm animals, the argument might go something like this: if we didn't breed them, raise them and kill them for food, they would never have had existed and that would be a bad thing because life is everything. Given the choice, one might argue that, your average caged pig would have chosen another planet to be born on. But here I am perilously close to falling, however flippantly, into this 'life is everything' reasoning. There seems to be so much that is sacred about life in general, but actually in practice this applies to humans only, that the belief system associated with justifying killing nonhuman animals for food has been infiltrated by it. This is a peculiar irony that requires some mind-set shift. The right to life is not being applied to nonhuman animals. Yet it is being used rhetorically to justify their deaths.

Health as a Factor in Food Choice

Defining animals as meat requires that eating meat is a 'natural' and, therefore, right thing to do. One of the factors that buttresses this argument is the health issue. Meat is defined as either a source of healthy protein or a source of unhealthy cholesterol on the one hand, and is characterised by high profile debates on issues such as BSE and other food scares on the other. The evolutionary justification has the added advantage of health benefits:

> I just believe there's a medical reason for it, maybe there's something in meat which is good and which er if you don't eat meat you might miss out. (mm3/3.1).

One of the important parts of this factor is the parent's reactions to their children giving up meat. Health was said to be a primary concern. It also figured strongly in the question of whether vegetarians would bring up their children to eat meat or not as one vegetarian believed, 'I also think children should have quite a lot of protein to grow and everything so

they probably should have ham, meat you know' (fv3/3.1) The representation of meat, especially red meat, as unhealthy shared equal coverage:

> Obviously red meat contains a lot of cholesterol and fat and obviously if you had natural protein substance like soya bean equivalent...you know you could obviously have a healthier diet. (mm5/3.2).

An interesting aspect of defining meat as unhealthy was that, not only did the vegetarians cite health reasons alongside ethical reasons for not eating meat, but meat eaters themselves claimed to be eating less and less meat for health reasons. Their understanding of why people stopped eating meat was balanced between the ethical and the health arguments. It appears that the awareness of the health risks associated with meat provides a point of reference for meat eaters towards vegetarians. Everyone agrees that cutting back on meat is a good thing for people's health, but the corollary of that is that the ethical aspects of abstaining from eating meat become marginalised. Modern day vegetarians are as likely to be concerned primarily about their health as they are about the animals being consumed. Indeed, where the ethical issues of animal rights are so contentious, the health issue of human heart disease is not.

BSE has had some far reaching effects on British sensibilities about meat. There are issues of nationalism beyond the scope of this chapter, but there are also important insights to why increasing vegetarianism is not necessarily a reflection of increasing awareness about animals. Several of the meat eaters claimed that BSE had been a decisive factor in them cutting down on, or eliminating, beef from their diets, as demonstrated by this meat-eater:

> BSE is pretty worrying...it shows the poor standards of farming which cast doubt on the quality of the meat products we eat...it's something to be fearful of and, as a result, I have stopped eating beef. (mm5/3.3)

BSE has also given some credence to vegetarianism:

> With the beef crisis at the moment, that's suddenly given vegetarians a bit more respect, you know, people are sort of saying, perhaps thinking, well it's not so vital after all. (fv5/3.3).

Yet the whole issue of food scares had one meat eating participant claim:

> If you don't eat meat what else do you eat? Chicken is said to be, you know, full of salmonella, umm equally, you know, fruit and vegetables are covered in pesticides, eggs you can't, cheese you can't, you know, whatever, you've got to make a decision somewhere. (fm4/3.4).

In this respect, meat is defined as the staple of British food. If you do not eat meat, what else is there? Many of the participants referred to their family life and the food they ate when they were children. The 'meat and two veg' meal was as much a part of the fabric of British family life as the pet. Recognising the health risks of meat, the cross-contamination of BSE, an increasing awareness of food hygiene and the effects of chemicals used in farming are generational differences that led parents of vegetarians to rationalise their children's abstinence from meat as faddish, nonsensical behaviour.

6.3 Ethical Frameworks

Part of the participants' understanding of nonhuman animals was their awareness of ethical issues involving these animals. This awareness had two strands. One was the more general realisation of animal issues involving farming methods, the protection of endangered species, pet breeding, zoos and experimentation. All the participants voiced some concern about the way nonhuman animals were treated in these areas. Part of their ethical framework was that these animals should be protected from 'abuse' but if conditions were good then the captivity or killing was justified. Eating meat was not necessarily an ethical issue for the meat eaters but there was an awareness of animal welfare, as one meat eater claimed:

The way animals are farmed and battery hens, the way cattle are slaughtered, the kinds of information I've gathered about just the way things are produced and killed. (fm1/8.1).

Animal welfare was perceived to involve the protection of animals, summarised as, 'Animals have the right not to be mistreated' (mm4/8.1). Often animal welfare was likened to human welfare, specifically child welfare, implying the responsibility of humans to more vulnerable beings. The second strand to the theme of awareness was the vegetarian respondents' motivation for becoming vegetarian. Raised consciousness about the lives and deaths of nonhuman animals featured prominently:

[Becoming vegetarian is a] consciousness about killing animals...and animal abuse...human consciousness about animal welfare...and animal rights. (fv1/8.1).

Another vegetarian described his motivation to stop eating meat as part of a broader political awareness, '[Animals are] unacceptably degraded by the way they are treated like umm...uniform objects in a production line' (mv2/8.1). Indeed, the reevaluation of the status of animals was considered to be a central issue in the protection of animals, as one vegetarian observed, 'Just because you've brought them into the world doesn't justify cruelty to them.' (mv5/8.1). An important aspect of awareness was the association made between meat and the animal that the meat came from. For the meat eaters, the association was consciously avoided whilst for the vegetarians the connection between the dead flesh and the living animal was a strong motivating factor for them becoming vegetarian. As a strategy for defending the emotions against being confronted with images of dead animals, meat was completely estranged from its origins. One meat eater described this disassociation as:

It's just out of sight, out of mind when you're eating your roast chicken on a Sunday, you know, you don't think about these poor little things going through the battery conveyor belt having their heads chopped off. (mm1/8.1).

Part of this disassociation was the familiarity of these animals as food products and, therefore, there was no sense amongst the meat eaters that they had any kind of emotional investment in these animals. Therefore, the animals could be killed for food, guilt free as this meat eater commented:

You don't have much affection for them [farm animals] so you don't feel, you feel rather indifferent about whether or not they're slaughtered for food...when you look at some food and you think of the animal from which it has been produced um, you know, that kind of turns you off. (mm5/8.2).

There is obviously some feeling of repulsion or guilt associated with the realisation that what you are eating was once an alive animal. An equally obvious defence to those feelings is the disassociation between the packaged or cooked product and the body parts of a corpse:

It's just the whole thing about I can't disassociate the meat from the animal, well I think when you've been brought up with products like chicken and beef you learn to disassociate what you're eating from what it is when it's on four legs and I can't do that with those things because I'm not used to it. (fm5/8.2).

The awareness of meat as animal provoked many of the vegetarians to consider whether they could continue to eat animals. Indeed, it was the defining factor in the conversion from meat eating to vegetarianism as described by this vegetarian, '[It was about] making the connection between living things and slaughter um...and the thing that was on your plate' (mv5/8.2).

At the heart of all the participants' concept of ethics was the hierarchy between human and nonhuman animals. All of the participants believed that human life was more important than nonhuman animal life. There were a variety of justifications for this and amongst the most prominent were consciousness, intelligence, the evolutionary tree and the concept that humans have God-given souls. The meat eaters were unequivocal about the moral relation of humans to other animals:

> Sometimes I think it's a bit perverse that we, we're so worried about the way animals are treated...I think humans are more important period...animals are owned by people whereas humans are not owned, therefore, there are different rules. (mm4/8.3).

Apart form the issues of consciousness and status, there were references to a distinct category of humans:

> I cannot get to grips with the theory that we evolved from animals...cos I tend to think if we evolved from animals then why are the animals still here. (fm5/8.3).

For the vegetarians their statements about the relative positions and value of humans and animals were more qualified:

> Obviously the main difference between us and animals is that we think and we think ahead and we're far more intelligent um...but whether that gives us the right to abuse animals, I don't think it does. (mv5/8.3).

There is a huge problem with the assumption that although humans are more important than other animals, these animals still should not be abused. There are many fundamental hierarchies in life in a variety of abilities and behaviours. As all life has evolved through

natural selection, successful species will be specially adapted to their environments and by their physiologies. The abilities of each successful species, therefore, will, on balance, grant them adaptive fitness. Because there are different environments and different physiological limits to each species, there will be inevitable hierarchies across species for a number of abilities. At this level of analysis there is no implicit or explicit value attached to those abilities except for the adaptive advantage that each characteristic confers on that species. Human consciousness, including language and intelligence, is an adaptation of our species. The adaptive advantages that it has provided are undeniable. And here we reach the point of the naturalistic fallacy which states that simply because something is natural (evolved) does not mean that it is morally desirable or right. Evolution has no morality. Human consciousness has evolved to allow the human concept of morality which is historically and culturally situated. Darwin did not describe a hierarchical tree of evolution. Implicit to the definition of natural selection is a bush-like evolution, a more egalitarian notion of how life evolved and how various life forms are related to each other. The fact that humans can make moral and ethical evaluations does not necessarily mean that those animals incapable of making moral choices should be denied moral consideration and treatment. The use of human consciousness to sustain a moral hierarchy erases the possibility of including animals in the human moral sphere.

The justification for excluding animals from the human moral sphere is not that humans are not animals but that humans are a special animal:

> We are just like other animals except that we've got a higher intelligence and we've got consciousness...that I think makes us more supreme in terms of what we can do. (mm5/8.4).

The crux of the matter was summed up by the following participant:

We've become like a dominant species yet we may have evolved from what we're calling now subordinate species um...I don't know, maybe there isn't really any difference between eating animals and eating each other. (fv5/8.4).

Taboos on Eating Animals

Defining what is meat also means defining what is not meat, or what is not accepted as edible. Animals who are pets are the main category of what is not edible meat:

I wouldn't consider eating [cat] but that's because...it has an emotional um...either emotional connection with a cat, you know, I guess...animals that I recognise as being domesticated, I would feel kind of...feel that I wouldn't want to eat. Yeah I would consider them to be meat but not edible. (mm2/6.1).

Part of this reasoning is associated with the cultural choice concept. Humans form emotional bonds with their pets. Certain animals in this country are considered to be pets, whilst others are meat, and there are a few cross category animals such as rabbits. Leach (1964) says of the taboo on eating pets:

I think most Englishmen would find the idea of eating dog equally disgusting [as humans] and in a similar way. I believe that this latter disgust is largely a matter of verbal categories. There are contexts in colloquial English in which man and dog may be thought of as beings of the same kind. Man and dog are 'companions'; the dog is 'the friend of man'. On the other hand man and food are antithetical categories. Man is not food, so dog cannot be food either (Leach, 1964:32).

Because there is an emotional bond, an emotional investment on the part of the human, the pet animal is conferred with a higher status compared to meat animals. The participant recognises that cats can be meat, like humans can be meat. Another participant qualifies the categorisation by saying that it is not edible.

It's because I associate say a dog or a cat with, you know, with...attachment and friendship and the thought of being killed and eaten is not very nice. (fm2/6.1).

Vegetarians obviously did not make a point of not eating their pets as they did not eat any animal. Nonetheless, one vegetarian provided some insight to the status of pet animals that supports the contention above, 'Dogs are represented alongside humans...they are a form of human...definitely animals are another human being but one that can't talk' (fv1/6.1). Indeed, Simoons (1967:114) observes that:

> Familiarity with animals, particularly in functional relationships and as pets, led to the rejection of entire species of domestic animal. Avoidance of dog flesh in the Western world may have come about because the dog was the friend of the family and eating it seemed an act akin to cannibalism.

Taboos on eating pets, whilst being of primary concern, were not the only exemptions. Meat eaters, on the whole, disliked animal organs, 'I dislike organs...part of the processing system so not particularly, I don't know, healthy... look unpleasant.' (mm5/6.2). Moreover, the idea of being presented with a recognisable animal produced revulsion:

> It's basically the idea of eating something which is dead...when you see a dead animal in front of you, then obviously that can put you off your meal. (mm5/6.3).

And the irony of fish-eating vegetarians was not lost on another participant:

> I mean I particularly have a problem even with a lot of people who are vegetarian who actually eat fish, and I always find that really odd because it does, it looks more like a living creature on your plate than almost anything else. (fv2/6.3).

Of course, the ultimate taboo is human meat and the problems even understanding the taboo are summed up by the following participant:

> I suppose it's hypocritical but no I can't condone eating human under any circumstances...I can't think of a good argument for...for not eating oneself, I mean obviously killing someone to eat them is wrong...but apart from that, it would be unpleasant and it's not a pleasant thought...it's interesting that I don't have the same revulsion about eating animals as I do about eating people. (mv3/6.4).

Humane Ways of Living and Dying

One of the ways in which people describe essentially violent behaviour is to term it 'humane'. Humane is a catchall for the good means to a bad end. Indeed, the humane means justify the violent end. Humane killing then is, as described by one meat eating participant:

> It's probably very similar to the death sentence in America, you know, where we say...you cannot shoot someone, you know, then you electrocute someone and then we move it on from electrocution to sort of chemical injection and more and more we sort of disassociate ourselves with any of it, you know, there's less blood involved and there's less...now you don't even touch, things are automatically press a computer button and you get stuff injected...you sleep and then you're dead. (mm3/5.1).

Humane killing is about that very method of disassociating from the act of killing itself. To render something humane is to make it more palatable. The death sentence allegory is highly appropriate. Indeed, killing animals again crosses the vegetarian meat eater border, 'I think killing animals for meat...in a humane manner is acceptable.' (fm1/5.1). And on the vegetarian side, 'If they were killed humanely as well it would change my opinion.' (fv4/5.1).

Part of the humane means towards the end of death is the notion that animals should have good living conditions. Keeping animals in environments as close to their natural habitats as

possible and using 'humane farming methods' sanitise the end, 'If animals had a good standard of life, I wouldn't object to them being used for food.' (mv2/5.2) Being vegetarian for some of the participants is about being humane. It is about acknowledging and protesting, personally, about the living conditions of British farm animals. But the concept of being humane also signifies something else to this meat eater:

> Animals have the right to be treated in a humane way and I suppose using the word humane towards an animal might sound a bit odd but...that's how I would like to treat an animal...humane is defined as how you would treat other humans. (mv5/5.2).

There are several points to be made here. Humans can obviously be treated in abysmal ways by other humans, so that can not serve as a benchmark for how they should treat other animals. Humans, on the whole, do not aspire to treat all other humans as they would want themselves to be treated. Boundaries of one sort or another create endless sources of categorisation and discrimination. The social distance, as described by Leach in Chapter Two, is a feature of how humans relate to each other in terms of family, friends, nationality, religion and 'race'. Such boundaries concerning race, religion, sex and culture do not need to be created for other animals. The difference is as obvious as it can be. As a generally undifferentiated category of Other (with the exception of pets) animals provide a ideological *tabula rasa* for humans to imprint on with their projections of the bestial. As nonhuman animals are not humans (and, importantly, humans are not animals) they can not be treated as humans. They can not be treated in a human-like manner. So they must succumb to the estranged concept of the 'humane'. Humane does not quite make it as a 'human' way of behaving. When we talk about genocide, homicide or suicide it does not tend to be couched in 'humane' terms. Nor should it be. But because nonhuman animals are *mere* animals, and humans are, paradoxically, by nature not, the slaughter, experimentation and vivisection on nonhuman animals should be 'humane' because it being humane is what, in part, makes

humans human. This kind of justification is rife:

> It is fair that animals don't have the right to life provided that the life they do have is free from cruelty and the death they have is humane but I think I personally tend to look at it as part of um...the food chain. (fm3/5.3).

Extreme Groups

A side-effect of defining nonhuman animals is that people are categorised in terms of their relationships with or beliefs about these animals. To be normal requires the concept of what is abnormal. And to hold justified concerns about the status and treatment of nonhuman animals in society necessitates the concept of extreme and, consequently, unjustifiable concern as one vegetarian claimed, 'Some people are animal lovers and they may be extreme but people in Britain do love their pets'. (mv1/7.1).

Britain as a nation of animal lovers is a peculiar national trait, unrivalled throughout the world. There are two related issues here. First is the general meaning associated with being a nation of animal lovers which one meat eater responded to as, 'Yeah people do really dote on animals a lot and they are really sentimental about animals which I find a bit nauseating' (fm1/7.1). The underpinnings of this concern are supported by the fact that the RSPCA receives more donations a year than the NSPCC, and are reflected in another vegetarian's observations, 'We have more consciousness or more adoration of animals than we do with children' (fv1/7.1).

The use of the phrase 'animal lover' to characterise the British describes a national obsession with pets and the cases of prioritising nonhuman animals over humans. The second issue is to do with the specific semantics of the term 'lover'. The use of the term 'lover' implies passion and one of the participants described British relations with their pets as passionate. Also, one vegetarian commented:

I suppose animal lover should really mean...in the same way the word lover connotates something very strong, it's not like best friend or sexual partner, it's, it's much stronger than that so maybe, maybe it's been diluted. (fm4/7.1).

The original sense of 'lover' was simply someone who loved, but modern day use has sexualised the word and people are still happy to call themselves animal lovers. Another source of categorisation is vegans. The meat eater's attitude might be fairly predictable:

The one I question is veganism actually because I feel that once you start denying your body calcium and milk and cheese and all other dairy products um...it's not really a very positive thing to do to yourself. (fm5/7.2).

However, having already been marginalised in society, the vegetarians' responses to vegans are more interesting:

I do tend to think about why am I, you know, why aren't I vegan and sometimes think well, you know, perhaps that's a bit extreme and...not very healthy...restricting...removing yourself from society. (mv1/7.2).

Vegetarians utilise the same health argument against vegans, as meat eaters use against vegetarians. In the face of a more coherent and consistent ethical framework, people invariably seek alternative levels of evaluation and criticism which are substantially irrelevant to argument.

Animal rights activists also receive a bad press and the representation of animal rights campaigners as terrorists has particular potency for British people with one meat eater recalling, 'More active more...possibly controversial and umm...I don't know, I just have this image in my head of people with balaclavers'. (fm2/7.3). The representations of animal rights activists as militant terrorists has several effects. In terms of the national psyche, influenced

by media representations, the perceived extremism of these activists provides a counterpoint to the acceptable concept of animal welfare. If granting nonhuman animals rights means succumbing to the demands of terrorists then those rights will be denied. The concept of rights at the heart of the debate is often neglected or misrepresented. The debate is grounded firmly in animal welfare rhetoric. The representation then leads people to believe that animal rights activists prioritise nonhuman animals over people, this representation renders them abnormal, possibly dysfunctional and antisocial members of society, as suggested by this quotation:

> My immediate reaction is...people stomping around the country causing general chaos I have to say, it's pretty much like CND umm...fairly unhelpful actually towards animals by the trouble they cause. (fm5/7.3).

Inverting the hierarchy and placing animals above humans is obviously not perceived as a rational enterprise:

> If they stepped back and took a more rational approach to it and a more democratic approach to it um...they might find that people do care...all they get thrown back at them is an antagonistic approach because of the way they behave. (fm5/7.3).

The vegetarian reaction to animal rights activists is equally dismissive, '[They are] extreme, militant and disruptive.' (fv4/7.3). Vegetarians themselves were not, on the whole, perceived as extreme as long as they did not try to 'force' other people into their way of thinking and eating. Again, the health issues provided an ideological bridge between the two groups. Yet at the heart of the argument against vegetarianism was the concept of pushing that reasoning to extreme limits:

> Maybe in twenty years time we'll find out that plants have got feelings as well and it means you can't eat, you know, um...if we're pushed to the extreme, it becomes a ridiculous argument. (mm3/7.4).

This is a common argument against vegetarianism and veganism. Its basic premise is that, given the possibility that all life can experience suffering or pain, abstaining from only a few life forms is not only hypocritical but pointless as we all have to eat to survive. The reality of experiencing pain and the philosophical debates on the nature of suffering are not to be discussed here, however, the rhetorical device of the accusation of hypocrisy is an interesting one. The definition of hypocrisy is the simulation of virtue, it is a pretence at goodness. Hypocrites are people who consciously pretend to be doing the right thing whilst knowing all along that they are not. It is seen as the height of deception because the pretender may gain credit and praise for certain beliefs and behaviours that they know to be false. Being accused of hypocrisy is not to be taken lightly. But why employ this attack against vegetarians. The answer lies in the marginalisation of animal rights and the line of reasoning is as follows.

Animals are not human because humans are not animals. Humans are special either because they are made in the image of God and have souls or because they are the pinnacle of the 'evolutionary tree' and have minds. Nonhuman animals are, therefore, morally inferior to humans and should not be afforded the same rights as humans. People who believe otherwise pose a serious threat to the dominant ideology. Granting animals rights has immense implications for religion, the economy, agriculture, in fact virtually for all of human activities from big business to the weekly shopping list. Human civilisation is built on the acceptance that nonhuman animals are inferior and humans are justified in using them as objects. In order to suppress those people who believe that nonhuman animals should be afforded with rights, it is in the interests of society to marginalise them as extremists, revolutionaries who would undermine the very fabric of social order. Vegans and animal rights activists make up this

group of radicals. Vegetarians are in a grey area. The health issue looms large so they do have a get out clause, but they pose a similar, if somewhat diluted risk. After all the step from being vegetarian to being vegan is not, philosophically speaking, a difficult one. Availability, access and finance are the obstacles to overcome. Nonetheless, any such threat that normal vegetarians might become abnormal vegans is thwarted by the notion of hypocrisy.

The first accusation is that vegetarians are hypocritical, not because they eat dairy products, but because they eat plants, and plants may have feelings too. This avoids allowing vegetarians to consider fully the problem of not wanting to support the meat industry, whilst sustaining it through supporting the dairy industry. However, everyone knows plants do not feel pain or anything else for that matter. So the second line of attack is that vegetarians are hypocrites because they are not vegans, but to be vegan you would have to be mad, so for the sake of your mental, as well as your physical, health you had better eat meat. It is a brilliant ploy and it works at preventing vegetarians becoming vegan.

6.4 Origins of Life

Ideas on the Christian creation ranged considerably from:

> When God was talking to Adam in the first Creation, he said, you know, I've
> put all this under your control, under your command. (fm4/9.1).

mediated by:

> I don't believe in literal creation cos I can't accept from the physical evidence
> like fossils that um it was um a literal seven day creation...I do believe that we
> were ultimately, everything was created by God. (mv4/9.1).

to:

> I don't believe in God...think people need a desire for immortality. It says
> something about themselves...religion is a form of self worship. (fv1/9.1).

And there was equal speculation about the validity of Darwinian evolution:

> In terms of evolution we are all related but then again I wouldn't like to push
> it too far. (mm3/9.2).

Understanding peoples' interpretation of Darwinism can provide some insight to how they perceive humans are related to animals, and whether they think humans are animals at all. This is not a simple religious-secular divide. Whether we got here because God put us here or because we were the results of millions of years of natural selection, humans are different to animals in the minds of many people and this is evident in the following comment:

> Darwin never wanted selection of species and natural selection to be ascribed
> to humankind, it was. As soon as you take the soul, the spirit or whatever is
> different in humankind out from the animal kingdom, then why should you
> worry about killing somebody bad...same level as the animal kingdom.
> (fm4/9.2).

The Descent of Man aside, what matters here is the signification of 'animal'. Animal signifies not human. But why animal, why not any other object? Why does it make intuitive sense to refer to animal behaviour in relation to humans? The answer lies in the obvious similarities between humans and animals. It is easy for people to project human behaviour and characteristics onto animals because humans are animals and, by definition, engage in animalistic behaviours. The reason that predominantly negative human characteristics, such as violence, are projected onto the concept of 'animal' is because of the religious and secular hierarchy between humans and animals. In other words, animals provide the perfect

'scapegoats' for unacceptable human behaviour.

The relationship between creation and evolution is an interesting sideline. There appears to be a tendency to interpret these two versions of the origins of life as compatible, 'I think creation is actually um...described by evolution or evolution was part of creation.' (mm5/9.3). Indeed, aside from that there was a conspicuous lack of conviction in some secular participants' acceptance of evolution, 'I would be interested in alternatives as much as in Darwinism...there are other theories which are yet to be developed.' (mv2/9.4). However, the important point here is that whether somebody believes primarily in creation or primarily in evolution, the underlying tendency is to categorise humans as not animal in relation to all other animal species. This hierarchical categorisation provides the foundations for the psychodynamic projection and introjection of human characteristics using nonhuman animals as the primary referent.

6.5 'Beast' Representations

The final theme explores the use of nonhuman animals as referents. Participants' understanding of the word 'beast' was predominantly related to nonhuman animals, indeed, some participants believed that the word 'beast' was interchangeable for the word 'animal'. Animal beasts were described as, 'Hairy, horny animals, attacking people.' (mm2/10.2), to 'Little beasties which would probably be the most dangerous ones, the ones we can't control, viruses, bacteria'. (mm3/10.1). The implicit notion of a threat or danger was summed up by one participant as:

> Things that pose a threat to humans or another animal which is potentially able
> to kill a human...quite fearful...the word 'beast' is more strongly akin to
> animals as opposed to humans...violent. (mm5/10.1).

Beast was also interchangeable with animal, described as a technical term rather than an evaluation,'Wild creatures, not necessarily uncontrolled or negative, just wild.' (fm1/10.1). The meaning of 'beast' varied from simply meaning animal to negative images of aggression, violence and intimidation. Indeed, there were, 'Connotations of sort of subordination to humans.' (fv5/10.1). The paradox of the beast was that, although there were a number of animal associations, the beast was ultimately unknowable:

> Beast whatever it may be has a certain tragedy about it in that it is a living thing, it is an animate thing, it moves about, it has an independent life...yet we will never really understand that creature or rather as the beast was not understood by Beauty. (mv2/10.1).

Beasts could also be humans, although they were described predominantly as animals and the connotations were equally negative:

> I don't really associate it with any human beings except, you know, people who do...you know criminal things...media perceptions...child molesters, perverts. (fm2/10.2).

But 'beast' was also described as a 'joking put down' and 'it can also be used in a camp way'. The most telling meaning of 'beast' when applied to humans was, 'Someone's a beast when you say they're like an animal.' (mv4/10.2). Beasts were also mythical creatures, 'Often in mythology we are presented with a beast being an aggressive big animal powerful in physical strength'. (mm4/10.3). The most common fictional reference was to *Beauty and the Beast*.. The 'beast' in this case was described as, 'Half man half animal.' (mv1/10.3). Other mythical creatures were characterised as werewolves or monsters, 'Tall, fat, hairy...horns, big fangs, dripping blood that sort of thing.' (mv3/10.3). And the features of such a 'legendary monster' would be, 'You probably, when you think of a beast, you think it's something that goes round killing for the sake of it and, you know, wanton destruction'. (fv4/10.3).

The final 'beast' connotation was less common but still culturally significant, 'Number of the beast in the Bible like the Devil.' (mv4/10.4). Here, the association between vegetarianism and Satanism is clarified. The Biblical reference clearly associates the Devil with beast imagery:

> Here is the key; and anyone who has intelligence may work out the number of the beast. The number represents a man's name, and the numerical value of its letters 666. (13:18)

Animal Images

Other animal images that were used to describe people were predominantly negative and sex differentiated. Female insults were cited as the primary uses of nonhuman animal names. Several of these terms overlapped in meaning but their underlying assumptions were the same:

> A bitch is a conniving woman, going behind people's backs, general bitchiness...obviously cow and bitch is a female dog and cow is female, why it's used for women, I don't really know. (mm1/11.1).

Most metaphors refer to domesticated animals bred for human service and consumption. Several of the participants cited 'cow' as a nonhuman animal image used for women, 'Cow is derogatory for female...gives milk...equivalent in female form.' (fv5/11.1). The use of 'cow' to describe women reflects the exploitation of cows based on their sex:

> Cows...generally women who have irritated men get called cows, fat old cows...I should imagine that large women get called 'cow' a lot more than thinner women and that's because cows are big bovine daisy things that are just dared to do as it's told and if it annoys you and doesn't do what it's told then...it's wrong (mv1/11.1).

Cows are female, domestically bred, agricultural animals. They are used for their milk, their muscle (meat) and their skin (leather). Cows are naturally large animals but their apparent fatness is purely a product of their captivity. On the one hand it is due to being overfed for increased meat production but the main source of fatness is that dairy cows are kept continually pregnant to provide milk. They are milked during and after pregnancy. Calves are removed from their mother when they are between one and three days old. Many calves are exported for veal, others reared for beef and some of the females are reared to replace the dairy cows. Cows' udders are unnaturally swollen due to the prevalence of mastitis caused by injected Bovine Somatotropin (a genetically engineered growth hormone) and by producing too much milk, resulting from high protein concentrates in their diets. Pregnancy, mastitis and increased body mass produces an exaggerated version of the original animal. Cows appear fat because people make them that way. The association between cows and women is based on the reproductive utility of cows. Cows are useful not only for meat but also for milk. Only female mammals (including women) produce milk. Cows are the primary animals used for milk. The representation of cows as fat, stupid and 'silly' is a projective defence mechanism that allows both women and cows to be dehumanised and objectified.

The female reproductive system is used in other animal associations, 'A bitch is an assertive women, sexual connotations.' (mv1/11.1). Moreover, 'Bitchy...she's like a bitch on heat...pregnant bitch...grouchy because having puppies.' (fv2/11.1). A bitch is a female dog of breeding age. There are two main facets to the association between women and bitches. The first is, in common with 'cow', a function of their reproductive systems. Dunayer (1995:14) assesses this use of 'bitch' as:

> Familiarity with the numerous ways in which breeders have disabled dogs
> through inbreeding and treated them like commodities dispels any mystery as
> to why *bitch* carries contempt.

The second is the exclusively female use of the word 'bitch'. Even when applied to men, the term 'bitch' is feminising. This also true of male gay discourse. The primary meaning of 'bitch' is being female, note 'son of a bitch', the primary meaning of 'cow' is reproductivity, a function of being female. Apart from 'cow' and 'bitch', another common derogatory term for a woman was 'dog':

> Dog is used to describe a woman who's ugly, whereas, bitch could be used to
> describe a woman who's maybe ugly as well but more likely to be venomous
> in some way. (mm4/11.1).

'Dog' is more than just a physical insult, it has strong sexual connotations associated with promiscuity as one male vegetarian suggested, 'I think the worst insult is "dog"...implication that this is a woman of zero value...sexually available *and* unattractive'. (mv2/11.1). Moreover, another male vegetarian observed that,'"Dog" is ugly...keep a dog like keep a wife'. (mv5/11.1).

'Dog' is a relatively recent animal term used for women. In the past 'cur' would have been applied to men. Nowadays, in the USA 'dog' is a common name for men. In Britain, however, 'dog' can refer to a man but is more likely to be used against a woman with reference to physical attractiveness. Dogs are common pets. They are owned and subservient to the desires of their owners. The insult 'dog' has two elements, firstly, the domestic status of dogs and, secondly, the sexual behaviour of dogs. The physical features of dogs (large wet nose, big tongue and teeth) are generally less attractive in relation to woman than men. For example, calling a woman a 'cat' in relation to her physical appearance would be complimentary, thus, the use of the word 'feline' to describe sexually attractive women. On the whole, dogs are identified with men and cats are identified with women.

Women could also be called 'horses', 'dragons' or 'catty'. The reasons why women were called these animal names were explained as, 'You're kind of, you know, trying to say you're not as good as me, you're nothing.' (mm4/11.1). As one female vegetarian claimed:

> It's implied that women have got qualities that are more irrational or emotional or wild and, therefore, more like the animals than superior intelligence. (fv3/11.1).

Indeed, the gender issue was clear for one participant:

> It's interesting that even when it comes to applying insults and compliments, people will draw sex discrimination so a woman would be described as a vixen rather than a fox...a vixen is seen, I think, as sly. (mv2/11.1).

The stereotypical association between women and nature, and men and culture have been well documented (see Plumwood, 1993) and one female participant expressed the relationship as, 'Men exert power over women through associating them with wild animals'. (fv4/11.1).

Male nonhuman animal names shared some of the features of female names but were not so predominantly negative:

> I would use the word 'pussy' quite a lot. Now I don't use that to in relation to female genitalia necessarily, although I understand that if I called a male friend a 'pussy', I'm sort of suggesting femininity by that so, and that's become much more of a common term. (mm4/11.2).

Calling a man a 'bitch' also implied femininity through being effeminate. There were, 'More violent associations...fox, beast, animal'. (fm2/11.2) to describe the way men behaved as opposed to the way women looked. Next to bitch, cow and dog, 'pig' was commonly referred to, 'Not uncommon for a man to be described as a pig...bloated, fat...gluttonous and crude.'

(mv2/11.2).

'Pig' was not gender specific because the female reproductive functions were not so obvious as they were for 'cow' or 'bitch'. Leach (1964) has described the suppression and projection of the guilt associated with breeding an animal simply to kill it:

> ...we rear pigs for the sole purpose of killing and eating them, and this is rather a shameful thing, a shame which quickly attaches to the pig itself (Leach, 1964:51).

Pigs are one of the few agricultural animals that serve no other purpose apart from providing their dead flesh as meat. Using 'pig' as a pejorative lends acceptability to the suffering they endure from their imprisonment. The representation of the pig as male conflicts with the image of the pig as a sow. Women who call men 'chauvinistic pigs' are dehumanising men using a female animal referent which is simply the reverse of what men do to women when they call them 'cows'.

The positive names attributed to women were conspicuous through their absence in relation to men. When women were referred to using positive or complimentary animal imagery it was, invariably, concerned with their sexual appearance, whereas, 'Animal phrases [for men] are power words...strong as an ox or bull headed'. (fv2/11.2). However, men could also be referred to as 'snakes', 'rats', 'toads' or'sharks'.

Whether these terms were negative or positive depended on how important the participants thought the role of language was in relation to behaviour, as one male participant extolled, 'Bitch...it's just an insult...rolls off the tongue rather well.' (mm1/11.5). The relation between thought and language was more explicit here:

If a person thinks of animals in a negative way then, you know, they're obviously going to perceive it (name) in an even more negative way. (mm3/11.5).

Positive animal images or names used to describe humans were few and far between, 'Foxy attractive woman.' (fm4/11.6) and 'Free as a bird.' (mv5/11.6).

The notion that these names might be dehumanising and, therefore, harmful to humans and other animals *was* expressed:

> You are sort of using an animal word to, you know,...some person for some reason...you hurt the person by saying these words...to say, you know, you are just like an animal, just to say you are inferior, you are horrible...you're bad. (fv3/11.30).

> Comparing people to animals...hurtful to the human being but I think it also um puts down animals, so maybe it makes it easier for society, as a whole, to go along with factory farming without thinking this is horrific....people are able to do really brutal things. (fm3/11.3).

However, next to the notion that calling people by animal names was hurtful to the person and could affect the way people viewed the animal was the feeling that these were standard phrases in common use and that their effects, if any, were limited, as one participant bizarrely claimed, 'Doesn't devalue animals because they don't understand.' (mm4/11.4). An obvious, if somewhat perplexing justification! Parsimony was also cited as a rationale for the use of animal images, 'They are good metaphors...instead of listing all the things associated with them...everybody knows what they mean' (fm2/11.4), as were physical acts towards animals:

> I don't think it has a great deal of impact on the way animals are treated because there are a lot of other things that sort of keep animals in that position. You know the fact that we eat them. (mv1/11.4).

The separation of language from beliefs and behaviour was a common response, summarised by this participant as, 'The words are derogatory but words are separate to behaviour and doesn't affect the way people view animals'. (fv2/11.4). Another participant concluded:

> I don't think that, you know, by using a derogatory term in relation to pigs the whole time that people would think that pigs were lesser creatures than before...just part of language really and not really thought about. (fv5/11.4).

Discussion

The purpose of this chapter has been to analyse the participants' representations of animals in order to identify the primary discourses which both reflect and affect human beliefs about, and behaviour towards, other animals. The texts are the products of a particular discursive practice, qualitative semi-structured interviews. They were produced within the parameters of the interview schedule, the interviewer-interviewee relation, individual's subjective positions and the social and institutional ideologies that mould those subjectivities. Associations and disassociations were identified through the process of subjective interpretation. This interpretation produced the intertheme patterns discussed above.

Through this analysis, I identified three key discourses. Here, I follow Hollway's (1989) account of her discourses relating to gender:

> These categories do not refer to actual entities. They are heuristic, that is, they are tools to help in organising the accounts of participants... (Hollway, 1989:53-54).

Discourses are series of organised signifiers which provide a systematic way of deriving meaning from texts. My analysis revealed that the participants organised their relations with nonhuman animals in three dominant ways. Here I delineate three dominant discourses which help to organise the participants' accounts in terms of the content of their representations of nonhuman animals. The importance of these discourses is that they reproduce 'human' subjectivity through the subordination of nonhuman animals. These discourses are: (i) the Object discourse which organises those signifiers that define nonhuman animals; (ii) the Referent discourse which arranges the signifiers that relate humans to other animals; (iii) the Utensil discourse which orchestrates those signifiers that provide implicit and explicit explanations for the human relations to other animals. These terms, 'object', 'referent' and 'utensil', were not referred to in the interviews as actual animals. Here, they serve as heuristics for organising the participants' accounts into meaningful dominant discourses which characterise their relations with nonhuman animals. The relation amongst these discourses is dynamic, each affecting the availability and status of the other. The focus of this discussion will be the identification of these representations as discourses.

The Object Discourse

Participants' representations of nonhuman animals were characterised by the Object discourse. This discourse referred to significations of nonhuman animals as material things. Nonhuman animals, whether they conformed to family, food or fantasy images, were primarily signified through the process of objectification. First, there was the consistent denial of agency or self to nonhuman animals. The pronoun 'it' was used to refer to these animals even when their sex was known as in the case of familiar pet animals. The use of 'it' as opposed to 'he' or 'she' is a generic linguistic device that effectively eradicates the possibility of ascribing rights, or moral consideration, to other animals. 'It' signifies the objectified status of nonhuman animals. Where these animals are assigned identities as pets ('good' animals), it is probable that their owners are engaged in an anthropomorphic form of projection, reflected by their

understanding of what a pet animal is or should be. Pets are human psychodynamic constructions which do not negate the primary construction of pets as 'its'. Second, nonhuman animals were signified as commodities, articles of trade which are bought and sold on a daily basis - possessions subject to financial exchange. Finally, animals were signified as products. They were described in terms of their muscles, milk, skin and physiological systems. The status of animals as possessions, commodities and products objectifies them. These representations of nonhuman animals compound the 'it' signifier.

The availability of the Object discourse allows individuals to define nonhuman animals as inferior to humans. This reflects the primary ontological divide between humans and all other animals, and it affects the extent to which humans permit certain nonhuman animals access to either the object or subject positions within discourses. Nonhuman animals are not active in their discursive positioning. They are positioned as possessions, commodities and products through the dominant Object discourse. The participants' investments in the available subject positions presented by the Object discourse were constrained by the ideology of humans as not 'real' animals. Objectification of nonhuman animals is considerably more acceptable than the objectification of human animals. The Object discourse contained within it the signifiers of objectification - descriptions of nonhuman animals as possessions, commodities, products and dehumanising terms of abuse.

The Referent Discourse

The Referent discourse organised the participants' relations with nonhuman animals into signifiers of human versus animal identity. There were three sets of signifiers which constituted the Referent discourse. The first was the way in which representations of nonhuman animals signified the moral antithesis between humans and animals through hierarchical dichotomies. There were two angles to this notion of hierarchy. One was the religious, in this case Christian, belief that humans were not animals because humans were

made in the image of God and, therefore, had souls. The 'Adam and Eve' story was quoted as the time at which humans became separate to animals when humans discovered morality. Here the Referent discourse contains within it the notion that nonhuman animals signify immorality. The same kind of reasoning, with different protagonists, was initiated by the more secular participants. They described the evolution of species according to natural selection. Their interpretations of Darwinism were, on the whole, correct, yet their application of his findings were as ontologically different as the Christians' accounts. The secular human:animal divide was also signified by appeals to different mental faculties, consciousness, intelligence and language. These two forms of hierarchy were based on essentially the same assumption, evolution may have happened the way Darwin described, but humans were fundamentally different to other animals, a notion that Darwin rejected. The Referent discourse organised signifiers which implied ontological difference between humans and all other animals. This difference was hierarchical with the participants making claims for the superior or privileged status of humans based on the Referent significations of nonhuman animals as morally, intellectually and emotionally inferior to humans.

The second feature of this discourse follows from the hierarchical dichotomy between humans and animals, notably that humans are special. The prioritisation of humans against other animals was accounted for, when it could be accounted for, by group membership. People prioritise people simply because they are people. That fact that humans are seen to be ontologically separate to other animals warrants that they be given special moral consideration. The notion that humans are special is a relational one. Either possession of a soul or a mind guarantees a superior status to humans in relation to animals. Those humans who are dehumanised as nonhuman animals suffer through association. Here the Referent discourse identifies a series of signifiers which, simultaneously, objectify nonhuman animals and dehumanise human animals.

The third aspect to the Referent discourse is the psychodynamics of anthropomorphism and zoomorphism. Anthropomorphism is the attribution of human form or personality, in this case to other animals. Zoomorphism is the representation of humans as animals. Humans are animals so this representation is about the human construction of 'animal', the bestial. Anthropomorphism is a form of projection. Zoomorphism is a form of introjection. The concept of 'animal' is the resource for psychodynamic splitting. The theriomorphic image is one in which someone or something is represented as a 'beast', whereas, the therianthropic image is one that combines human and beast forms. Theriomorphism is an expression of metonymy and usually refers to human identity. Therianthropism is an expression of metaphor and typically refers to otherness. Nonhuman animals were signified according to these forms. When animals are pets, part of the family, what is perceived to be human characteristics are projected onto them. This kind of anthropomorphism signifies the animal as not-animal. Animal representationss such as 'beast' are predominantly therianthropic, a combination of human and animal forms. The representation of Satan as a half-human, half-animal beast exemplifies the power of the therianthropic image. Its anomalous nature provokes deep reactions and fear. The Devil is a metaphorical representation, a transposition of ideas along the vertical axis. Other animal referents such as the derogatory terms are typically theriomorphic. Signifiers such as 'cow', 'dog' and 'pig' are metonymic expressions that represent the association of ideas on the horizontal level. These different signifiers interact to produce the Referent discourse. Nonhuman animals are signified within the Referent discourse as inferior in order that humans can fulfil their desire to exist beyond the animal kingdom.

The Utensil Discourse

The participants characterised their relations with nonhuman animals in terms of their utility. The Utensil discourse describes those signifiers which constructed nonhuman animals as having some use for humans. Nonhuman animals were describes in terms of their utility

whether they were pets, meat or terms of expression. As pets, animals were educational, entertaining, status symbols and decorative. As meat, animals were nutritional, a source of pleasure and had health benefits. As metaphors for humans, animals were parsimonious and useful images. Nonhuman animals as projections of human behaviour were also 'scapegoats'. The signification of certain human behaviours as animalistic implied that these animals were morally reprehensible in their natural behaviour and that some other aspects of human behaviour were not, in fact, animalistic at all because humans were perceived as a special, unique category. The economic, cultural, social, health, naturalised and anthropocentric reasons for signifying, constructing and treating animals as objects provided the rationale for this discourse. Nonhuman animals are objects because people want to possess them. They are products because people want to consume them. They are commodities because people want to make financial gain from them. 'Animal' refers to what is not human because humans do not want to be animals. Nonhuman animals signify what is negative about human behaviour because humans want to justify treating other animals as less than human. Nonhuman animals are signified by the Utensil discourse because they are the means, the implements, by which people achieve these desires.

This analysis of the participants' texts illustrates the content of the predominant discourses which is the material for moulding subjectivities. The analysis has concentrated on the emergent discourses and how they construct the concept of 'animal' and 'animality'. These discourses indicate the extent to which human representations of other animals form a significant part of the relations which produce individual subjectivities. It would have been almost impossible to gain any insight to these issues by asking the participants if, and to what extent, they believed 'animal identity' formed part of their subjectivities. However, by exploring what these participants believed about nonhuman animals, in a variety of domains (pets, meat, images), it was possible to glean a sense of the importance of the human:animal dichotomy as it is invested in through these beliefs and behaviours. The following chapter will

explore the construction of one of these nonhuman animal images, the 'beast'. The participants identified the 'beast' as predominantly 'animal' and, when referring to humans, it implied negative characteristics. The role of the 'beast' in constructing and mediating definitions of human versus nonhuman animal identities will be the focus of Chapter Seven.

7: REPRESENTATIONS OF THE BEAST

This is what manners do, he said. They make the distinction between man and beast. (DTL 24 May 96).

Overview

In this chapter I analyse representations of the 'beast' in the British press by exploring the metaphorical use of the 'beast' through a semiological content analysis. I examine 950 newspaper articles from 1st August 1995 to 31st August 1996 (see Chapter 5 for details). Any names using 'beast' such as references to 'Beauty and the Beast' films were eliminated from the analysis, leaving 834 articles. I constructed a coding frame for the three primary representations: 'beast' metaphors used to describe humans (n=288), 'beast' metaphors used to describe nonhuman 'animals' (n=339), and 'beast' metaphors used to describe inanimate 'objects' (n=207). Further exploration led to sub-categories within each of these domains. The use of 'object' here is different to the identification of the Object discourse in the previous chapter. There, the Object discourse referred to the organisation of signifiers which served to objectify nonhuman animals. In that way, animal subjects were constructed as objects. Here, the code, object, refers to that category of inanimate things which does not include nonhuman animals. Here I use the word 'object' to refer to a category of 'beast' metaphors used to describe inanimate things. In the previous chapter, the interview participants signified nonhuman animals in ways which constituted objectification - the construction of an animate subject into an inanimate object. In this chapter, the use of 'beast' metaphors across all these categories is explored using semiotic and psychodynamic principles. I identify the denotative and connotative levels of signification and the ideological contexts which the use of these metaphors supports. I explore the differential use of anthropomorphism and zoomorphism, including the zoomorphic strategies of therianthropism and theriomorphism. This analysis examines to what extent taboo characteristics are dealt with through 'beast' metaphors and how the concept of taboo mediates binary oppositions between humans and other animals. The findings of this analysis support the relationship between the Referent Discourse and the Object Discourse illustrated in the previous chapter. A histogram represents the distribution of the 'beast' metaphors amongst the three domains:

Figure 7.1: The Overall Distribution of 'Beast' Metaphors

7.1   The Human Beast

'Beast' metaphors referring to humans totalled 288 (34.5% of the total). In terms of frequency of metaphors, this was the second largest category after Animal. The Human category had five sub-categories of Body, Violence, Satanism, Enemy and Rare. Most of the metaphors were concentrated in the Body (n=103) and Violence (n=101) themes, whilst there were equal fewest (n=20) in the Satanism and Rare sub-categories, and Enemy had an intermediate number (n=44). Details of the distribution of these metaphors, their meaning and article examples are presented in this section, beginning with a histogram.

Figure 7.2: The Distribution of Human Beast Metaphors

Somatophobia and the Mind:Body Dualism

The category, Body, encompasses the descriptions of physical appearance including size, facial features, attractiveness and the general aesthetics of a human being. The 'beast' metaphor used in these contexts was predominantly negative, referring to 'ugliness' and stereotypically unattractive physical qualities. The majority of the metaphors in the Human category were coded as 'Body' metaphors.

'Beauty and the Beast' was a common metaphor used to describe the relation between the unattractive and attractive. The headline: 'Logic suggests style will overcome raw

commitment in beauty and the beast encounter' (DTL 13 Dec 95), was a reference to the 'ageing lions' in the Republic of Ireland's football team. However, the metaphor is extended to reveal further meanings of the 'beast', such as courage and spirit:

> It is beauty versus the beast; total football v boot-ball; but such criticism has a positive rather than a negative effect on the Irish, who beat Holland when it comes to team spirit. If Ireland have to take on the rest of the world, too, then so be it.

The denotative level of signification originally is the 'beast' as the 'ageing lion', the connotative level of meaning refers to the associated characteristics of lions - fortitude, determination and tenacity. The 'King of the Jungle' myth informs these connotations making the meaning of 'beast' here not so obviously negative. The 'beast' can also be a powerful positive image, but here weakened by the inherent ageism associated with unattractiveness.

The more abstract related features of the beast's body were encompassed by references to imprisonment in the following article:

> He was clearly tense, jiggling his leg and pacing around like a caged beast.
> (STL 21 Apr 96)

This metaphor refers to an actor in preparation for going on stage. The tension associated with nervousness of being frightened in easily encapsulated by the image of a 'caged beast' The caged status of a nonhuman animal, which this is a reference to, is a salient one, given the predominance of zoos, circuses and laboratory images depicting the 'pacing' behaviour of those animals.

Another very physical image of the 'beast' is of rapacity, the predatory search for food, often anthropomorphised into greed. The association between the hunting habits of nonhuman predators and the voracious desires of some humans is encapsulated in the following article referring to the press:

...has grown into a ravenous beast hungry for every titbit of news the Downing Street staff throw at it. (TMS 19 Aug 95).

'Ravenous beasts' are common images that describe rapacious human behaviour. The denotative image of a hungry animal is almost inseparable from the morally imbued judgement of avarice and insatiability which informs the connotative level of signification. The mythologised 'beast', the belligerent monsterised nonhuman animal provides a complex, yet parsimonious, referent for human projection of human-constructed values and interpretations.

This 'beast' referent is an example of somatophobia (Spelman, 1982), fear of the body. The Christian and Cartesian mind/body dualism described in Part One, accounts for the relegation of the body to the status of 'beast'. The human difficulty of acknowledging and accepting the dynamic integration of mind and body is reflected in the projection of the 'beast' onto the body. The body is 'animal'. It bleeds, excretes and hurts, and these bodily functions are beyond the control of the conscious mind. The bifurcation of the human being into the physical body and spiritual/social mind is the root cause of the degradation of the body in favour of the mind, the repression of bodily functions, the projection of sexual desire and the taboo status of excretion. The relational nature of body and mind was pointed out by Henriques *et al* (1984:21):

> The point that we are making is that whilst we should avoid founding a theory of subjectivity on a taken-for-granted biological origin, we cannot construct a position which altogether denies biology any effects. The only way to do this without granting either term of the biology-society couple the status of pregiven categories is to reconceptualize them in such a way that the implicit dualism is dissolved in favour of stressing the relational character of their mutual effects.

This quotation addresses the nature/nurture dualism which still dominates social psychology. The somatophobia, animal phobia and speciesism at the heart of the dualism prescribe it as the only scenario. The possibility of a relational character is subsumed beneath the prejudices of

both schools of thought.

'Red in Tooth and Claw'

Violence was the second largest category, close on the heels of Body. 'Beast' metaphors coded under the category, Violence, referred to all forms of physical violence. These included sexual violence, general brutality or savagery, institutional violence and the general violation of another human or other animal. Under the original piloted coding framework, sex was categorised separately. However, the pilot analysis revealed that the only sexual references to 'beasts' were those involving violence, usually rape or sexual assault of children. The recoded framework collapsed the sex category within the violence category. The references to 'beasts' in this category were dominated by 'sex beast'. One of the typical references to 'beasts' as violent sex offenders was an article on a convicted child killer who was suspected of killing a 13 year old girl: 'Father's Letter To Sex Beast: Father of Genette Tate Appeals For Meeting With Child Killer Robert Black' (DMR 02 Jul 96). Black was also referred to as 'sex-fiend' and 'fiend' may also mean 'beast', referring to the monstrous, demonic and maniacal aspects of the metaphor. 'Sex beast' is a salient metaphor, used predominantly in the tabloids, to describe violent sex offenders. Of course, all sex offences are violent, however, this metaphor was used more frequently with offences against children rather than against women, suggesting that sexual assaults on children are perceived as inherently more violent or more 'inhuman' and, therefore, reprehensible than assaults on women. Humans only have acceptable sex between adults, so sexual assault of men on women is still considered 'human behaviour' but with too much violence. However, sexual assault of an adult on a child (whether or not physical violence is used to achieve the assault) has no place in 'human behaviour', therefore, it is what 'beasts' do. This ignores the fact that sexually mature animals do not have sex with immature ones in any species except humans. The ability to quantify the suffering of those who have experienced sexual assault is beyond my imagination but the differential use of 'beast' metaphors in the press suggests otherwise.

Sexual violence is bestial because nonhuman animal sexual relations are constructed as violent. Sociobiological stereotypes dictate that the male is sexually aggressive whilst the female is sexually passive. The details of sexual selection are not of concern here. However, the use of bestial images to convey meaning about human behaviour is a slippery semantic slope. The 'sex beasts' of the tabloids are not a million miles away from the psychodynamic construction of human masculinity as animalistic. Sex is one of the important exceptions to the stereotypical rule that women are closer to nature than men. The notion of 'stud' used in agriculture is routinely applied to sexually active men. The animal images associated with human male sexuality are predominantly positive, conveying strength, agency, appetite and power. 'Sex beast' is not necessarily intended as a derogatory term in all contexts. Here, animality, sexuality and bestiality are ideological partners.

Brutality is a corollary to bestiality, the 'brute' and the 'beast' often serve the same function in bifurcating humans from nonhuman animals, as references such as '...the man known as "The Beast" for his brutality...' (STL 26 May 96), referring to a Mafia godfather, indicate. Brutality is a word used to describe cruelty, often meaning without any compassion. It is a base form of violation, unforgiving and often unforgivable. Its derivation from brute and 'beast' bind it to the synonymous function of 'beast' as 'animal'. Being bestial is being animalistic; being brutal is an explicitly negative and semantically related consequence. The 'brutality' of human behaviour is a rationalising description. In the endless search to separate humans from other animals, to elevate humans beyond the status of animals, human unacceptable behaviours are constructed as bestial and, therefore, projected onto the nonhuman animal representations.

Human violence is often conceptualised as bestial. In an article on *Killing Me Softly*, the television drama based on the true story of a woman who killed her husband after years of abuse, the actor who played the husband reports: 'I wanted to play up the sympathy so that Malcolm doesn't come over as just a beast.' (DMR 06 Jul 96). Here, the important part of

the metaphor is not that a man who is violent towards his wife is a 'beast', but that he could be *'just* a beast'. Being merely a 'beast' implies that, as a human, the man had no redeeming qualities. The actor obviously believes that the husband did and, therefore, wishes to portray a fuller picture than is implied by the referent 'beast'. The connotations refer to savagery and barbarism of 'beasts', the feral sadism of monsters. Though these 'beasts' might be figments of the human imagination, they are reified in the representations of the nonhuman animal world as brutal. Here, humans can not be simple 'beasts' for humans are more than animals.

As several authors have suggested (Baker, 1993, Birke, 1994, Adams, 1995) violence is one of the key human behavioural characteristics which is systematically projected onto animal images. The 'beast' is a representation of taboo. Physical violence is morally unacceptable within our culture and the representation of violence is an indication of the moral value attached to it. Violence is animalistic, it belongs to the animal world because nonhuman animals are constructed as amoral. However, when animalistic behaviour is introjected onto human behaviour it takes on an *im*moral tone. The immorality of human (animalistic) behaviour then feeds back into representations of the animal kingdom strewn with violent, immoral, sexually rapacious relations. Here, the symbolic animal dominates human understanding of the real animal.

This projection of human violence has two main functions. One is that it constructs violence within the 'animal' domain. This serves to justify the ontological divide between humans and other animals. Nonhuman animals' apparent lack of morality and their 'violent natures' means that treating them as objects becomes easily justified and institutionalising the subjugation of the nonhuman animal world becomes legitimised. The other function is to support systems of legalised violence within humans. On the face of it, physical violence is obviously reprehensible, but this construction of violence as primarily physical, therefore bestial, feeds into representations of normal (morally acceptable) and abnormal (morally unacceptable) behaviour. The need to define oneself as 'normal' often leads to the stigmatisation of a

suitable Other as abnormal. Physical violence provides a salient target for society to aim its moral disapproval at. However, the focus of physical forms of violence means that the naturalised conditions in society which produce that violence are ignored. Violence is not the exclusive characteristic of the 'abnormal' members of society. Rather, as societies are built on subject-object relations, the violation of the lives of certain members of society (human and nonhuman animals) is integral to each individual's place in society. This form of violence is institutionalised. It is ideological and affects epistemological and ontological constructions of life. Violence is something we all take part in. Some forms of violence are more explicit and obvious and, therefore, subject to moral disapproval and legal sanctions. The displacement of moral outrage on these forms of violence ensure that those who are outraged deny their complicity in supporting and reproducing systems of ideological violence. Human brutality not only divides humans from other animals, it separates us amongst ourselves.

The use of violence against animals to violate women has been documented in chapter two. Here, the concept of bestiality is explored further. Bestiality is the sexual abuse of animals other than human. Its counterpart is the concept of zoophilia, an attempt to claim equal sexual relations between humans and other animals. The defence claims of zoophiliacs sound peculiarly similar to those of paedophiles, both these groups, predominantly of human males, use the suffix 'phile', meaning 'lover', in this case lover of nonhuman animals or human children. 'Lover' is used here literally as sexual lover, however, zoophiles and paedophiles often claim to love the animals and children as a defence to justify their abuse. Yet zoophiles are proponents of bestiality, like paedophiles are proponents of the sexual abuse of children.

The Therianthropic Devil

Beast metaphors coded under the category, Satanism, referred to devil-worship, the number of the beast, 666, demons and black magic. Satan was the chief fallen angel from the Kingdom of Heaven. He is characterised in Christian theology as the Devil, who is God's primary adversary. Representations of the Devil as a 'beast' conform to the rules of

theriomorphism and therianthropism (see Chapter 4). Theriomorphism and therianthropism are forms of zoomorphism. Baker (1993:108) makes the following connections between these terms and metonymy and metaphor:

> Where animal imagery is used to make statements about human identity, metonymic representations of selfhood will typically take theriomorphic form, whereas metaphoric representations of otherness will typically take therianthropic form. In other words we tend to represent ourselves as wholly animal, but our others as only half-animal.

The Devil representations as 'beasts' conform to the metaphorical state of therianthropism. The predominance of half-man, half-animal images of the Devil are testament to the power of this chimeric image. The dissolution of boundaries and the restructuring of identity creates the anxiety and fear designed to be induced by Satan. Salvation from this terror is only to be found with God, whose representation as a grandfather-type Western male leaves no ambiguity about his humanness.

An article on Aleister Crowley, a man obsessed with violence, drugs, sex and black magic reported that his reputation as 'The Great Beast' (SMR 30 Jun 96) demonstrates the power of the therianthropic images which rests on its metonymic structure and the violation of species boundaries. The notion of physical integrity, well documented in Douglas's (1969) analysis of pollution and taboo, and Leach's (1964) analysis of animal categories and verbal abuse, has deep psychological foundations. The therianthropic image is a disturbing one because it violates natural (physical) structures by combining parts of discrete objects into a chimeric whole. People are able to project their fears of the physical integration of human and nonhuman by creating fantasy images to articulate their anxieties. The Devil crosses these tensions. The metaphysical need for Evil arises from the psychological construction of Good in the form of God. For any sense to be made of moral perfection, the personification of immorality is inevitable. The forces of Good and Evil, archetypal Derridean concepts, are played out in numerous myths and legends. Here though, the Christian reference to the Devil

as a 'beast' is pertinent to the Christian construction of humans as not-animal.

In the Christian hierarchical scheme of things, humans are created in the image of God, and God gave humans 'dominion' over the 'animals'. God, humans and animals are qualitatively different entities although humans are ontologically closer to God than they are to the 'beasts'. The Christian construction and representation of the Devil, Satan, the fallen angel, as bestial plays on the moral implication of this hierarchical taxonomy. The Devil is more 'animal' than human, God is more 'human' than even humans are. This moral dichotomy forms a dynamic relation with representations of nonhuman animals. Prejudice against other animals is supported by the concept of a bestial Devil, whilst representations of the Devil as bestial is supported by the constructed bestiality of nonhuman animal behaviour, which is, is turn, naturalised through the projection of violent human behaviour as brutal, or animalistic.

The physical hybrid is a parallel metaphor for the cognitive hybrid. The fact that humans are animals means that it is impossible to separate human cognitive abilities from animal cognitive abilities, as one is part of the other. It only makes sense to differentiate cognitive abilities between species. Human thought processes are as much 'animal' as any other animal's simply because we are animals. The behaviours which derive from these thought processes, such as sexual behaviour, which we manifestly share with many other animals, are, therefore, constructed as immoral and projected onto the bestial image. Whereas, the physical chimeras are the integration of visibly different forms (different species morphologies), the cognitive hybrid is a representation of the 'invisible' aspects of life such as thought processes, and in this sense the cognitive hybrid is impossible. It is a misnomer as the relation between human and animal cognition is not of a hybrid nature, it is one and the same thing. An attempt to construct a cognitive hybrid is at the heart of the fantasy chimeric constructions of half-human, half-animal. These physical hybrids are an attempt to address the deeper issues of cognitive continuity and discontinuity.

Another aspect of the Christian construction of the Devil as bestial is the etymological roots of Lucifer as described by Lopez (1978). The Greek word for wolf is *lukos*, close to the term for light, *leukos*. The Latin homology of *lupus* and *lucis* is a linguistic linkage that associates the twilight prowling wolves with the fallen lightbearer *Lucem Ferre* - Lucifer, the angel who rebelled against God and the quintessential personification of darkness. The depiction of the Devil and his followers as half-animal is testament to the power and pervasiveness of the therianthropic image of the Other. The metaphorical use of the wolf will be explored in the following chapter on *Wilderness*.

The Bestial Enemy

The 'beast' metaphors coded under the category of Enemy referred to opposition, adversaries, rivals, antagonists or nemesis. They were usually characterised in terms of politics, sport, business or culture. In less racially aware times, the national or racial enemy, too, would have been subject to the reconstruction of the therianthropic image. Hybrid racist images of a variety of different ethnicities serve to heighten the concept of otherness. The enemy is not simply like an animal in a metonymic sense, the enemy *is* an animal in a bestial, metaphorical sense. Nowadays, the British press does not propound xenophobic images to the extent that they once did. These images have been diluted from bigotry to nationalism. However, the cultural institution of politics, sport and business provide plenty of opportunity for the dehumanisation of the Other.

The use of 'beast' to describe a political adversary was commonplace. The threatening nature of the opposition was encapsulated in the article on Tony Blair:

> After wasting two years firing off in all directions, Tory strategists have refocused on a new, and, they claim, equally dangerous beast. They are portraying Mr Blair as an importer of continental social democrat ideas. (TMS 08 Jul 96).

The implicit notion of 'beasts' as monsters or predators (often conflated terms) mean that encounters with human adversarial 'beasts' are likely to be perceived as perilous. Beasts are threatening, not only because of their physical strength and predatory instincts, but also because they potentially jeopardise the boundaries between humans and other animals. In a Leachian sense, 'beasts' are simultaneously human and not-human, animal and not-animal. They cross the borders of conceptual beings in order to legitimise those borders. A 'beast' metaphor used in a sports context illustrates this point:

> The return of the powerful Nadal does make them an even tougher proposition, although all the lurid propaganda about the so-called beast of Barcelona is as misplaced as it is liable to be counter-productive. (DML 22 Jun 96).

Representation of the opposition, whatever form it takes, as bestial supports Thomas's (1983) notion that the dehumanisation (my term not his) of the Other makes the oppression or defeat of that Other possible, even desirable. The British labelling of another country's sportsman as a 'beast' has as much to do with xenophobia as it does with the perceived power or brutality of Nadal. The zoomorphism of humans is a complex process requiring the initial denial of humans as animals and the subsequent projection or attribution of stereotypical nonhuman animal characteristics onto a given human or group of humans. Both zoomorphism and anthropomorphism are forms of dehumanisation, both strategies are based on the hierarchical dichotomy between humans and all other animals, and both are strategies for maintaining and legitimising that relationship.

Endangered Species

The 'beast' metaphors coded under the category of Rare referred to the unusual, different, unique, the strange and singular. The basis of this comparison was the concept of endangered species. 'Beast' has an implicit mythical dimension to it. The fantasy animals of the Animal Beast section are evidence of that. One of the characteristics of mythical animals is their rarity. Mythological status is unobtainable to the ubiquitous species. The concept of a rare

beast is the conflation between the mythical status of the 'beast' and the use of the term to refer to endangered species. The mythologisation of endangered species is encapsulated in Kappeler's comments:

> [in relation to] the protection of endangered species, the fundamental presupposition remains that a moderate, 'lawful' amount of killing may take place. The aim is not to put an end to the slaughtering, the aim is moderate slaughtering, slaughtering 'within limits': permitted murder of individuals within a prohibition to exterminate the entire species....Self-interest is the motive, for the slaughters as well as the protectors, an interest that the survival of the *species* guarantees and to which the interests of *individuals* are being sacrificed. (Kappeler, 1995:326-7).

The rarity of the endangered 'beast' make it an exemplar of rare human qualities; rare, I presume because they are perceived as human ideals. The following article makes such a claim for 'honour':

> He is rather an old-fashioned and rare beast, a man of honour, and neither the army nor British hockey are likely to forget it. (STM 16 Jun 96).

Old fashioned values and good qualities are represented as absent from modern British life. The nostalgia for the past echoes the romanticised images of the endangered species in relation to the reality of modern life and the status of British nonhuman animals. The image of the 'noble beast' also informs this nostalgia, a representation akin to the 'noble savage' and equally condescending:

> There's something brave and unwhingeing about Shirley Bassey - something old-fashioned. She's a noble beast. That's what these people have come to see. (MOS 16 Jun 96).

Twenty or thirty years ago Shirley Bassey received a great deal of bad press - they could not make up their minds whether she was black or white, so they were always representing her as not cultural enough, in a Western enthnocentric sense, preferring to describe her sexuality

through reference to 'animality'. Now she is older, and having 'stood the test of time', she is allowed to be a noble beast, thus, giving her honorary (white) human status. Being 'noble' is about being magnanimous and admirable through having or being perceived to have human ideals of behaviour. This kind of behaviour is doubtlessly rare, if not impossible, as the fallibility of the human species is what denies us deification. Honesty is one such ideal and its status as rare in certain circumstances is exemplified in the following quotation:

> Perhaps Jack should give Douglas Hogg credit for being that strange beast, an
> honest Old Etonian: the rest of us skulk by on charm. (DTL 13 Apr 96).

Being rare, being unusual, fits the human understanding of other animals on two levels. First, there is the denotative level of signification, rare 'beasts' are rare nonhuman animals, endangered species, either through natural selection or, more usually these days, through loss of habitat, pollution or hunting. The rare 'beast' is the endangered beast. However, at the connotative level of signification, rarity is more about strangeness, the extraordinary, and many nonhuman animals, throughout human history, have appeared as strange, different beings, unknowable and indecipherable. Before ethological studies, human understanding of nonhuman animals was confined to the duel strategies of anthropomorphism and zoomorphism. Nowadays, human understanding of other animals has been greatly informed by naturalistic studies and the dissemination of information through the media (a double-edged sword if ever there was one). However, dehumanisation continues as a method of transforming the alien into the native.

Anthropomorphism is a way of getting to know other animals and, simultaneously, getting to know ourselves. Anthropomorphism works as a heuristic because humans are animals, therefore consciously attributing, or unconsciously projecting, some human characteristics onto other species makes sense. We all evolved through the same mechanisms. The content of what we do may be hugely different, but the reasons why we do things may equally be surprisingly similar. Anthropomorphism does not work when it takes on an anthropocentric

tone, when the world works and is measured from a human value-laden point of view. This defeats the notion that humans are animals in the same way that all animals are animals, as it presupposes an ontological divide, or epistemological hierarchy at the very least.

7.2   The Animal Beast

Most of the 'beast' metaphors were coded under the Animal category (n=339), forming 40.6% of the total number of metaphors coded. These metaphors were distributed amongst five sub-categories: Fantasy, Wild, Domestic, Work and Generalised Other. The majority of the metaphors by far were coded as Wild (n=139). Fewest were coded as Work (n=46), whist the intermediates were Fantasy (n=60) and equal numbers (n=47) for Domestic and Generalised Other. Details of the distribution of these metaphors, their meanings and article examples are presented in this section, beginning with a histogram.

Figure 7.3: The Distribution of Animal Beast Metaphors

Fantasy Animals

The 'beast' metaphors coded under the category, Fantasy, referred to mythical animals, aliens or hybrids. The fantastical images and myths relating to nonhuman animals reflect the way modern Britons relate to other species. These reflections constitute the multiplicity of roles which animals play in human cultural and psychological lives. The imaginary beasts give insight to the human imagination. Indeed, mythical beasts are a ubiquitous part of human legends (South, 1987). An English cultural 'beast' of mythology is the dragon, heroically slain by St George, England patron saint:

> In the satisfyingly weird opening ceremony at Euro 96, St George fought the dragon. Being none too bright and a bit lumbering, this beast was the perfect opposition for the direct and spirited English approach. (DTL 15 Jun 96).

In the typology of things, dragons are, undoubtedly, animals, fantastical creations of the human imagination. These mythical monsters are chimeric, often with reptilian bodies and wings, with a tendency to breathe fire. Satan was once commonly referred to as 'the old Dragon', nowadays the referent is used to describe women as part of the plethora of bestial pejoratives.

Fantasy animals often exemplify human ideals through magical powers. The unicorn, pegasus and other creatures which inhabited the ancient mythical worlds played parts in parables which retold human moral systems through typical narrative structures. The nonhuman animal chimeras do not imbue a sense of fear as do the human therianthropic images of devils and demons because the boundaries they cross are not subject to the ontological distinction which separates humans from other animals.

Wild Beasts

The Wild category contained by far the most references to nonhuman animal 'beasts'. 'Wild' has several meanings. Predominantly, it signifies being untamed or undomesticated. It can also mean violent or disordered. The positive side to these meanings is the notion of freedom,

a somewhat sentimentalised, romantic human construct, to be explored in the following chapter. The untamed notion of wild implies not only freedom but the more negative interpretation of being uncontrollable and, therefore, threatening. The landscape against which the concept of 'wild' is situated is the wilderness. The animals which symbolise freedom are often metaphors for human desire to escape the constraints of the modern world.

For Britain, and much of the 'Western' world, the 'wild beasts' inhabited the wilderness of the African, South American and Indian continents. These places were also home to 'savages', humans who were apparently so close to the natural world as to render the distinction between these humans and other animals almost meaningless. These stereotypical images of the past resonate in the modern world with representations of nonwhites as more physical, sexual, heretical and irrational. The nonhuman animals which lived in these strange, distant lands were utterly different to homegrown 'beasts'. Imported and caged in zoos across the Western world, these earthly aliens came to represent the natural world in the ever increasing industrialised nations. The metaphors which grew from these initial contacts represented the strangeness of these animals. The size of one animal helped ground a metaphorical image:

> 'Everyone's been looking at the elephant in different ways. Now we are beginning to see the whole beast'. (DML 11 Jul 96).

A native inhabitant of Britain, the fox, has attracted a large amount of media attention recently. The proposed bill to ban fox hunting with hounds produced a huge response reflecting the ambivalent attitudes that British people have towards other animals. The debates that centred on rural versus urban Britain, class issues, freedom to pursue 'sport', and animal welfare versus animal rights are interesting in themselves and highly indicative of the extent to which nonhuman animal issues are profound human issues. Nevertheless, these issues are not my concern here. In terms of bestial representations, what is interesting is the extent to which foxes were maligned as ravenous beasts. Before these debates on fox hunting, a writer

for the Daily Telegraph described the fox as:

> The fox is a handsome, intelligent and even admirable beast but, like many
> wild animals, it is a clever and ruthless killer. (DTL 04 Jul 96).

The extent to which humans are in a place to describe species qualities which subsume individual members of that species, when the equivalent is abhorred in relation to humans, is an interesting sideline. The main crux of the matter here is the extent to which this writer attributes 'intelligence' and 'ruthlessness' to all foxes. Undoubtedly some foxes are more or less 'intelligent' just as humans are, however, ruthlessness is another matter altogether. To be ruthless is in a sense to be brutal, merciless and inhuman. To have compassion has been appropriated as exclusively human, yet to not have it, to be 'ruthless', is attributed to other animals with ease. The term 'ruthless' is value-laden with moral overtones. To the extent that the moral capacities of foxes are unknown to humans, to talk of them as being 'ruthless' makes little sense, unless the aim is to 'dehumanise' the fox. As compassion is a human quality, denying the fox compassion by constructing them as 'ruthless' constructs the fox, within human terms, as inhuman. Leach (1964:52) accounts for the issue as:

> Just as the obscene rabbit, which is ambiguously game or vermin, occupies an
> intermediate status between the farm and field categories [see Chapter 2], the
> fox occupies the borderline between edible field and inedible wild animals. In
> England the hunting and killing of foxes is a barbarous ritual surrounded by
> extraordinary and fantastic taboos.

Foxes are not human. However, representing foxes within the human moral domain as immoral is a necessary strategy in order to dehumanise them. Dehumanised nonhuman animals, even more so then dehumanised human animals, are perfect for bearing the brunt of human moral outrage and suffering the consequences of their perceived immorality. Here, again, the concept of the 'beast' transcends the lines between species. Foxes, and other animals, are beasts because humans project bestial characteristics onto them. An escaped 'wild boar' represented the same issues. Nonhuman animals on the loose are bestial because

they have violated their imprisonment:

> For several months police had been trying to corral the beast which alarmed villagers in Hatfield Peveral and Wickham Bishops by wandering into their gardens. (DTL 03 Apr 96).

Equally, any nonhuman animal which threatens a human is acting, in some sense, immorally:

> The jaws of the beast remained tightly locked on the man's hooter, even after his friends had cut off its head. (DMR 15 Jan 96).

There is a profound relationship between humans and their conception of the 'wild'. The wild is represented as the antithesis to human civilisation and for that reason, throughout history, humans have attempted to subjugate the wilderness and its inhabitants, whether human or nonhuman. The representation of nonhuman animals which threaten the legitimacy of human control and exploitation of the wild as bestial ensures the moral righteousness of this oppression. However, the fate of many of these animals has been as described by Birke (1994:19):

> We have subdued animals to make them domesticated, tamed by contrast to those existing 'in the wild'. We domesticate them as beasts of burden in agriculture, as companions in our homes, for sport of various kinds. Taming may, in other circumstances, imply removing the animal symbolically from its wilderness; at its extreme, this may mean that the animal either becomes, or is controlled by, a machine.

Domestic and Dehumanised

The 'beast' metaphors coded under the category, Domestic, referred to selectively bred animals used for production and consumption, in other words, agricultural animals. Here is the flip side to the 'wild beast', the tamed animal, but still, nonetheless, a beast. Animals which we eat, we might well want to represent as 'beasts'. Beasts, generally, do not invoke sympathy, note there is no category for pet animals described as beasts. Here, domestic

'beasts' signify the deanimalisation of animals. This is a complex process contingent on many factors. One is that 'animal' is polysemic, the meaning of a pet cat is almost the antithesis to a domestic pig. If one takes the highest order in welfare or rights status given to any animal, then pet animals feature highly as family members receive more consideration than the family dinner. Therefore, the process of deanimalisation here is really a process of dehumanisation because pet animals are not in the Leachian sense wholly animals. Structurally, pet animals are a naturalised anomaly. They are imbued with human characteristics. Consequently, the deanimalisation of agricultural animals as 'beasts' is actually the dehumanisation of those animals based on the human construct of pet animals as not-animal.

Human guilt about the rearing and killing of other animals is rationalised away through psychodynamic means. As seen in the previous chapter, agricultural animals are used ubiquitously as terms of abuse - 'fat cow', 'greedy pig' and 'cowardly chicken' are a few of them. These representations support speciesist discourses about these animals - they are 'part of the food chain', 'if we didn't eat them, they wouldn't exist'. These rationalisations are key mechanisms for maintaining a moral and social distance between the way we treat our pets and the way we treat our meat. The dehumanisation of animals is inherent to the anthropomorphism of animals. These processes are selective but the underlying qualities are the same. Intelligence, personality and affection are described as key elements in good pets, the same qualities are denied to other animals based on human exploitation of them.

There is an obvious connection between the representation of agricultural animals as bestial. Human anxiety about eating other animals is bound to be allayed by the representation of those animals as 'beasts', a representation which simultaneously objectifies those animals and provides a rationale for human consumption of them. The use of this image is played out in this article for full effect:

> Never mind milking the sacred cow, the Pistols intended to carve it up, make burgers and feed them raw to the public. If the beast in question had BSE, all the better. (MOS 30 Jun 96).

The concept of the 'beast' mediates the living animal and the dead meat. Agricultural animals, on the whole, do not have reputations for aggressiveness or hostility to humans. Cows, sheep, pigs and poultry are not renowned for their despicable natures. Killing these animals for food requires some kind of rationalisation for any guilt that might be attached to their slaughter. The metaphorical use of their species names to abuse verbally humans is one way of subjugating their status and creating negative images of them. The 'beast' metaphor, a predominantly negative image implying brutality and savagery, is another way of constructing the agricultural animal as negatively as possible. And where it is possible to exploit humans based on their representation as bestial, it is almost desirable to exploit, though of course it is not seen in these terms, nonhuman animals based on their representation as 'beasts':

> From the sweeping prairies of the west to the genteel pastures of New England,
> the cow is facing a challenge as the beast of choice for a burger. (STM 12 May
> 96).

Closer to home, one of the most controversial artists of modern Britain is Damien Hirst. His agricultural animals suspended in formaldehyde are examples of postmodern artistic representation, the collapse of genres as the realism of traditional art is taken to its logical conclusions with the presentation of the real object, harking back to a traditional artistic skill, taxidermy. Outrage against Hirst has taken the form of the welfarists. The real dead animal and the roast dinner are estranged concepts that allow meat eating welfarists to convey their sense of disgust at the apparent morbidity of these works. Yet the art critic's appreciation of Hirst's work may be close to the artist's intentions:

> The skill of such an art [taxidermy] is to enliven a carcass so well that the
> viewer is momentarily fooled that the beast is alive. In this skill Damien Hirst
> excels: with their gracefully arched backs and delicately placed hooves, Hirst's
> pickled beasts serenely capture the joys of the farmyard and take them to an
> urban audience. (STL 03 Dec 95).

'Capturing joy' through death is undoubtedly some kind of achievement, however, the essence of this writer's critique holds true even if his details are mythical. Pets, zoos, cuddly toys and artistic representations of nonhuman animals are continual attempts of human to know nonhuman animals but on human terms. Dead calves do not tell us anything about factory farming and the lives and deaths of agricultural animals except that, in this representation, death is acceptable. Displaying death may be contested, but the actual death is part and parcel of the 'joys of the farmyard'. Whilst I agree with this critic's appreciation of urban Britain's desire for the 'natural', my reading of the details of this work of art differs. I see it as a representation of horror, the terrifying juxtaposition of life and death, the inability to appreciate one without the other, the terrorising image of happiness and freedom frozen forever in the rigour mortis of death. The representation of agricultural animals in children's story books are another example of the horror of myth. Polysemic interpretations are the explicit definitions of art. Artistic creativity lends itself to numerous interpretations, however, the description of the dead calf by the art critic as a 'beast' is indicative of the contradictory status of agricultural animals and the dubious claims in relation to the reality of farm life.

An interesting example of how nonhuman animal categories are culturally determined was presented in an account of eating 'dog'. It may be conspicuous through its absence that none of the 'animal' beast category has a reference to pets. However, pets are not bestial, they are family members and, therefore, their absence is consistent with the British classification of nonhuman animals. Here, however, dog as meat is referred to as a 'beast':

> I recently heard a gourmet acquaintance describe a Korean dog delicacy with
> unsavoury relish. The meat, he said, was more succulent than that of any other
> beast he had ever eaten. (DTL 25 Aug 95).

The context in which a dog could be referred to as a 'beast' has all the hallmarks of the way a cow or pig might be referred to as 'beasts'. The literal and symbolic transformation of an animal into a product requires this process of dehumanisation. The cultural contexts may vary

but the means by which the exploitation of the nonhuman animal world is achieved shares many characteristics. I could not apply these findings universally, nor would I want to since there is much that is peculiar to this nation of 'animal-lovers'. However, the increasing 'globalisation' of industry, the homogenising effects of the mass media and the massive advances in technology are making the world a much smaller place, and the everyday practices of living life in relation to other animals may be becoming less localised and more subject to hegemonic ideologies.

Beasts of Burden

Work 'beasts' comprised a group of domesticated animals which were bred for work but not consumption; for example, horses. These included 'beasts of burden', trained animals, entertainment animals and animals used for labour. When nonhuman animals are not culturally constructed as suitable for food, they are often subject to other forms of use. These animals were used extensively before industrialisation. Nowadays, their use comes in the form of entertainment. This utilitarian theme reflects the human tendency to dichotomise animals into ones to have relationships with and others to be used (Arluke, 1988; Russow, 1989).

An entertainment nonhuman animal, the bull, is represented as a 'beast' not only to justify the exploitation of the bull but to contribute to the bravado attributed to the matador. This archetypal battle between 'man and beast' is played out in arenas across Spain and is cherished as part of Spanish culture and heritage. The representation of the bull as bestial is a necessary precursor to the glory heaped on the matador after he has killed the bull. One of the few female bull fighters did not quite manage the kill in a blaze of glory:

> Sanchez eventually managed to kill the beast as it collapsed exhausted in a
> corner. (STM 07 Jul 96).

An example of British tensions in relation to other animals was evident in the debate on 'dangerous dogs' in the wake of attacks on children. With reactionary sentiments running high, the government banned certain breeds of dogs. The hitherto lack of reference to pets as 'beasts' is not remedied here, rather the status of certain dogs as 'killers' precedes the notion of them being legitimate pets. These 'beasts' might make suitable working guard dogs but their place as family members is severely contested, as one writer comments:

> It has the genes of a killer: Why anybody in society, beyond those trained to control professional guard dogs, should be allowed to own such a beast is beyond me. (STM 24 Mar 96).

Certain nonhuman animals can be pets, but only the kind of pets that 'good' pets make. Humans want nonhuman animals on human terms. These animals are not only ideological creations but also physical creations, designed by humans for human use. The artificial breeding of 'wild' dogs into modern day pedigrees, speciesism at its most grotesque, has produced animals that humans no longer want. When the animal becomes a menace to humans, the animal will always lose out despite the circumstances, despite the provocations, despite the human responsibilities. Frankenstein's 'monster', the allegorical human created 'beast', was the victim of Dr. Frankenstein not vice versa.

The Generalised Other

This category of Generalised Other reflected the differentiation between humans and all other animals. In this context, all nonhuman animals were referred to as an undifferentiated category of 'beast'. This dichotomy reflects the dual meaning of beast as a technical (interchangeable) term for animal (nonhuman) and as a negative term in the hierarchy between humans and other animals. In Derridean (1978) terms, the definition of humans is dependent on the subordinated definition of animal. The representations of 'beasts' as having strength and stamina, presumably based in the metaphorical and literal use of 'beasts of burden', is evident in a number of references to human physical endeavours:

> The significance of the statistics has certainly not escaped McCoist, who, according to Brown, 'has been training like a beast and smiling all through it'. (DTL 14 Jul 96).

Similes, however, were often substituted by statements of contrast when ontological distinctions were to be made between humans and other animals based on arbitrary factors:

> That is what manners do, he said. They make the distinction between man and beast. (DTL 24 May 96).

Indeed, where there was any recognition of nonhuman animal suffering at the hands of humans, it too relapsed into dualist terminology and impoverished the argument through such epistemological assumptions:

> It is not the first indication that modern food technology, driven relentlessly by the profit motive, may destroy the natural barriers between man and beast which protect us from countless complaints from which animals suffer - many of which we are totally unaware of. (DML 30 Apr 96).

These references to 'working like a beast', 'man and beast' and the like are metaphorical reflections of ontological divides. The model of dehumanisation suggests that the relation between the construction of human subjectivity and the construction of animal identity is psychodynamic. The process is shaped by social strategies and psychoanalytical defence mechanisms. The hegemonic ideological discourses which are produced and reproduced everyday by individuals' positioning in relation to the Other provide the most salient forms of knowledge about other animals. The discursive nature of knowledge means that it is imbued with power that determines what is culturally acceptable and what is not. This process of naturalisation of belief systems interactively produces subjectivities which are dependent on the subordination of the Other. The hierarchical relation between humans and nonhumans is semantically, and ideologically, interdependent but the psychodynamic process of naturalisation renders these two categories distinct givens. Dehumanisation is the process

which consciously and unconsciously links these two domains. The human dependency on their construction of nonhuman animal identity as inferior is a prerequisite to the formation and legitimisation of human subjectivity. The anthropocentric construction of identity means that human characteristics are the measure of subjective life. Nonhuman animals are anthropomorphised in order that they may be dehumanised.

7.3   The Object Beast

The least number of 'beast' metaphors in a particular category were coded under the Object category (n=207), which is 24.8% of the total. There were five sub-categories to the Object 'beast' metaphors including Obstacle, Power, threat, Size and Other. Most of these metaphors were coded as Power (n=76), whilst the least were coded as Threat (n=24). The intermediate categories were Size (n=41), Other (n=34) and Obstacle (n=32). The distribution of these metaphors, their meanings and article examples are presented in this section, beginning with a histogram.

Figure 7.4: The Distribution of Object Beast Metaphors

Object Beast Metaphors

Overcoming Obstacles

The 'beast' metaphors coded under the category of Obstacle referred to the taming of the 'beast', overcoming barriers, hurdles, restraints and deterrents, and triumphing over nature. These objectified representations are based on the legendary discourses about human slaying beasts. The 'beast' as enemy, the demonised animal, is the referent for these object beasts. Many of these metaphors were sports references, overcoming the opposition and 'taming the beast' were salient referents:

> Surrey's opening pair made the pitch look a much tamer beast while they rattled up a partnership of 85 in the remainder of the morning session. (DTL 06 Jul 96).

The 'beast on my back' metaphor also enjoyed the obstacle status, and this kind of metaphorical persecution suggests a power inversion of the relationship between human and 'beast', but still one that is dependent on the negative connotations of 'beast':

> The day I decided to break up the band, it was like an enormous beast had been lifted off my back I could finally get on with this other stuff, the stuff I feel in my guts to be right. (TMS 21 Jun 96).

One of the most common objects referred to as 'beasts' were cars. Cars are notably anthropomorphised. Often referred to as 'she', yet also cultural icons to masculinity and phallic representation, cars are one of the few objects which receive the kind of anthropomorphic attribution that nonhuman animals do. References to cars as 'beasts' were notable in several of the Object categories. Their size, power, human control and potential threat are features that cars share in common with the stereotypical image of nonhuman animal 'beasts':

> And when you get the beast rolling, another problem rears its ugly head: vibration. The new engine has the same basic design as a Formula One unit where refinement is not really an issue. (STM 19 May 96).

'The nature of the beast' is a metaphor that cropped up time and time again, and here it is a reference to the obstacle of writer's block.

> The writer's block - by this time I could no longer deny the nature of the beast
> - was all the more bewildering for coming out of the blue. (DTL 30 Sep 95).

In general, the 'nature of the beast' is a metaphor based on the biological bases of nonhuman animal behaviour. Here, the essence of the phrase is captured by the meaning of 'nature'. The common objection to the notion of the 'natural', that it is deterministic and reductionist, is based on the dualistic opposition of 'nature' to 'culture'. The nature/nurture debate is still pervasive within social sciences, as the dualistic paradigm perpetuates itself, and these meanings imbue the nonscientific world. To talk about the 'nature' of an entity is to attempt to describe its essence, unchanging character. The 'nature of the beast' suggests that there is a fundamental character which exists and which can be described and accessed. Humans often talk about other animals in this way, denying them complex social interactions, environmental learning, agency and subjectivity. The human identity attributed to nonhuman animals is predetermined by the notion that 'beasts' are simple manifestations of essential ingredients.

Power of the Beast

The Power 'beast' metaphors referred to strength, fortitude, stamina, authority and energy. These are the characteristics which define the 'beast' as an adversary, but put to human advantage they become the key elements of power desired in certain objects, notably cars. However, there were other references to power which were about cognitive rather than physical strength:

> A PC with Windows 3.1 installed, and all the software you need, is still a powerful beast, and the cost of moving to 95, when you add in extra memory, processing power and possibly disk space, will remain substantial. (STM 28 Jan 96).

Power underpins the other categories in this Object beast section - Obstacle, Threat and Size. Indeed, the categories here are more interrelated than those for Human or Animal 'beast' metaphors. The reason for this is that objects do not live in any biological sense, have no sentience or agency, and, therefore, no conscious behaviour. They are, in all the references here, under the control of humans, usually built by humans to suit some function or the other. There is no form of interaction like there is between two animals (human or otherwise), no emotion or desire, no *telos* in Rollin's (1992) terms. Consequently, the uses of these objects will significantly determine their representations (as they do for other animals) with the proviso that these anthropomorphic and zoomorphic projections and attributions are limited by the absence of conscious behaviour. When objects were represented as threatening 'beasts' it was because these objects - institutions, businesses or corporations - consisted of people.

The Threatening Beast

The threat 'beast' metaphors referred to fear of domination, intimidation, danger, menace and fear of the other. Again, the notion of the threatening 'beast' ties into the representation of 'beasts' as strong adversaries. Corporations, businesses and institutions, though comprised by people, were coded as Objects because these metaphors did not refer to humans beings themselves but the organisations which humans built and represented:

> 'They thought that being a minority group no longer mattered in a civilised Europe, and they thought the wild beast had been tamed ... The wild beast is out there, and the ground feels steady under my feet'. (MOS 26 May 96).

The representation of an injured nonhuman animal as threatening was drawn upon to make similar claims about organisations:

> A wounded beast can be dangerous when cornered. Computer games retailer Rhino, badly gored in the High Street jungle, is fighting back. (DML 14 Oct 95).

The implicit notion that beasts are powerful and adversarial informs these images of threat and danger. Yet the power of the 'beast' mirrors the power of dehumanisation. Beasts are not only constructed as powerful so that humans gain some sense of glory through destroying them. Their power is more clandestine and, therefore, more potent. This power resides in the threat that 'beast' poses as an anomalous category, somewhere between human and nonhuman, neither wholly one or the other. Because humans have bifurcated the category 'animal' into human and animals, the desire to know the animal, both the human animal and other animals, is reconciled through the metaphorical construction of the 'beast'. The 'beast' walks an unsteady line between maintaining the dualism between humans and other animals through representing anthropomorphic and zoomorphic strategies, and denying the dichotomy through representing the continuity amongst species.

Sizing the Beast

'Beasts' are often described as large animals, a representation which complements the notion of threat and power. In the Object category, the Size metaphors referred to the immensity of objects as well as their huge presence and far reaching effects. The devouring image of the 'beast' is drawn upon in this rapacious metaphor:

> Some boxes have a higher letter capacity than others. The hungriest box is the Town and Country - a C-Type Siamese twinned beast with double slots and dual cages inside, each holding 4.8 cubic feet of mail. (DML 18 Jun 96).

The anthropomorphisation of architecture is a common strategy aimed at getting to grips with the power of this form of construction and representation. Comprehending huge lifeless objects through reference to the bestial construction of animals provides a heuristic link between one form of construction and another:

> 'The cathedral here is like some huge, living beast,' reflects the artist Honor Brogan, who has been commissioned by the festival to draw and paint it for an exhibition in its chapterhouse. (STL 07 Jul 96).

Moreover, cars were again subject to bestial representation with their size this time being the connecting factor:

> It's too big a beast somehow to negotiate narrow roads with parked cars. (DML 09 Dec 95).

Other

Not all the Object metaphors could be categorised as well as the Human or Animal metaphors. Some miscellaneous references were coded as Other.

Discussion

In the Human category, representations of the 'beast' drew on *nonhuman* animal imagery. The representations of rapacious predators, the sexual and physical violence of 'nature, red in tooth and claw', endangered species, caged animals, the therianthropic images of the Devil and the enemy based on the power of the anomalous image of half-human half-animal, all these images were drawn from what people think they know of the nonhuman animal world. In the (nonhuman)Animal category, representations of the 'beast' also drew on nonhuman animal imagery. Representations of endangered species, the synonymous references to 'beasts' as animals, the dehumanisation of domestic animals, the reproduction of animal 'warfare', and the general human:animal dichotomy, all these representations of Animal 'beasts' drew, again, on what people think they know about the nonhuman animal world. In the (inanimate) Object category, representations of the 'beast' drew on several aspects of the same theme, the literal and symbolic threat of nonhuman animals.

Nonhuman animal imagery was the primary metaphor for the representation of humans, nonhuman animals and inanimate objects. The predominance of this zoomorphism explains how the Object discourse, as described in the previous chapter, relates to the Referent

discourse. The representation chosen here was 'beast'. The categories which emerged from the coding were Human, (nonhuman) Animal and (inanimate) Object. The use, primarily, of nonhuman animal imagery to describe these three domains of 'beast' representations indicates the relation between 'beast', 'human', 'animal' and 'object'. It supports the human:animal dichotomy and the subject:object dichotomy. Human characteristics were not anthropomorphised to either the (nonhuman) Animal or the (inanimate) Object category. Human and Object 'beasts' were, essentially, nonhuman animal 'beasts'. These dichotomies suggest that equation of (nonhuman) Animal and (inanimate) Object, therefore, the human(subject):animal(object) dichotomy. Here is the influence of the Object discourse which organised the interview participants' significations which defined nonhuman animals. The zoomorphic strategies employed here indicate that the representation 'beast' is literally and symbolically associated with *nonhuman* animals. The way in which the representation is employed suggests its basis in the objectification of nonhuman animals. Here, the subject:object dichotomy, as described in Chapter 2, is repeated in the human:animal dichotomy.

Figure 7.5: Constructing the 'Beast' ·

(i) Humans anthropomorphise nonhuman animals with 'human' characteristics. A prime example of this are pet animals. These animals are not beasts, they were absent from the analysis. However, they are still possessions as evident in the Object discourse described in Chapter 6. Anthropomorphism from humans to nonhumans is a one-way process.

(ii) Humans zoomorphise nonhuman and human animals as bestial. Zoomorphism consists of two processes - therianthropism and theriomorphism. Zoomorphism of humans is a form of dehumanisation. Humans who are dehumanised through zoomorphic constructions may engage in the two-way process of unconscious intersubjective investment by participating in the zoomorphic and anthropomorphic projections.

(iii) The 'beast' is a zoomorphic construction based on the equation of animality with the bestial and/or brutal. 'Beast' here may refer to human or nonhuman animals. However, despite this semantic overlap, it maintains the ontological divide between 'human' and 'animal' through its primary meaning as 'animal'.

'Beast' metaphors represent the 'bad' part of the psychodynamic split of 'animal'. The metaphors analysed here were predominantly based on the concept of 'beast=animal'. This image was used to describe humans, nonhuman animals and inanimate objects. The dominance of the 'animal' meaning of 'beast' attests to its role in the dehumanisation of humans and its equation with the 'object' status of inanimate things.

'Beast' is synonymous with nonhuman animal and is also a negative representation of human animals. This inherent anthropocentrism naturalises the speciesist construction of 'animal' as the moral antithesis to 'human'. Nonhuman animal meanings were invoked across the three categories of human, nonhuman animals and inanimate objects. The zoomorphic strategy of constructing the 'beast' is evidence of the psychodynamic split of 'animal' ('bad') in humans into the Other - either other humans, nonhuman animals or inanimate objects. The projection

of the 'beast' protects the ontological status of 'human' as distinct from and superior to 'animal'.

Like gender, the 'beast' has multiple meanings. The suppressed signification of the bestial is, perhaps paradoxically, closer to the truth of our relationship as biological beings to other species. Our animality, the 'beast inside', is forever projected onto the 'beast outside', the signified animal, the non-human, or at very least the dehumanised human. In this continual play of suppression, the expressed is rational, reasonable, moral, human. The expressed human signification is, thus, privileged, naturalised, mythologised and, ultimately, mystified. This splitting of differences through introjection and projection is the key to unconscious positioning in discourses. Here, the discursive contents of those splits support the findings of the previous chapter: the dominance of the Referent and the Object discourses as the predominant organisers of nonhuman animal signifiers. This continual, dynamic, interplay between the unconscious mind and hegemonic discourses constructs human subjectivity so that borders between self and society are no longer visible. The illusion of self-containment is shattered, yet the subject is recognisable. The deconstruction of this illusory and delusionary dualism renders human experience and existence so much more complex and rich. Assumptions about nature and culture also begin to fade. The constricting chains of duality and opposition, of hierarchy and hegemony, appear in their true colours as constructions, as relational, as political. The masks of personality versus society are stripped away to reveal an interconnected, power-play of related subjectivities. The deconstruction of the naturalisation of personality leads to the unveiling of human subjectivity and rationality, and to a revelation of the 'beast'.

A particular 'beast' referred to in the interviews and alluded to in the Fantasy category here is the werewolf. The therianthropic representation of the chimeric man-wolf has pervaded British literature and film for many decades. This reconstructed animal represents human fear of the 'beast', the animal within as well as nonhuman animals. This human:animal dichotomy

underpins the ubiquity of this image. In the following chapter on *Wilderness*, I shall explore this lycanthropic myth in two contemporary representations: the original novel and the derived television drama. This analysis will examine the semiosis of themes as they appear across these texts, and it will illustrate the tensions which arise from addressing species boundaries and acknowledging that humans are animals.

8: *WILDERNESS*: A SEMIOTIC ANALYSIS OF NARRATIVE

...the life of a wild animal becomes an ideal, an ideal internalised as a feeling surrounding a repressed desire. The image of a wild animal becomes the starting point of a day-dream, a point from which the day-dreamer departs with his back turned. (Berger, 1980:15)

Overview

This chapter explores a contemporary interpretation of a particular 'beast' myth, the werewolf. Here, I semiotically analyse the original novel, *Wilderness* written by Dennis Danvers (1991), and compare its narrative structure and meanings to the derived television drama, *Wilderness* produced by Red Rooster Film and Television Entertainment Ltd and screenplay written by Andrew Davies and Bernadette Davis (1996). My interpretation of the texts reveals four primary themes, each signifying paradigmatic and syntagmatic structures within the texts. The first theme, Transformation, has metaphorical, ideological and physical levels of signification attached to it. Anthropomorphism and zoomorphism demarcate the points of continuity and discontinuity within the dynamics of human-animal relations. The second theme, Sexuality, is perused as a play of bestial signs. Their meanings, interactions and consequences are related to representations of human versus nonhuman animal. The third theme, Rationality, provides an ontological divide between humans and other animals. The rational divide separates irrationality and savagery from the illusions of control and order. 'The beast within' is an extended metaphor for the retrained, repressed human animal which resides on the hierarchical dualistic foundations of species sentimentality and unresolved unconscious conflict. Here, fantasy versus reality is the mainstay of the illusion of sanity. The final theme, Freedom, revolves around the concepts of gender, sexual and animal liberation. It plays as an extended metaphor for the imposed restrictions on women and other animals. Freedom signifies the liberation from social constraints and the individual metamorphosis from human to animal to the human animal. These main themes of transformation, sexuality, rationality and freedom are compared between the original novel and the television drama derived from that text. The model of dehumanisation is used to interpret the findings.

8.1: Transformation

Where I live as a women is to some men a wilderness. But to me it is home.
Le Guin (1989:46)

The wolf is of the wilderness, and inseparable from it. But it can get by elsewhere. Durward Allen: *The Wolves of Minong* (quoted from *Wilderness*)

Transformation is a key signifier throughout the narrative. The most obvious transformation is Alice's change from woman to wolf. The lycanthropic elements to the tale are imbued with references to human relations with other animals, to species boundaries and to the mythical significance of the wolf. The modern twist on this ancient myth is that here the werewolf is a woman, and she is not a werewolf in the traditional sense. The werewolves of horror stories are invariably therianthropic images depicting half-man half-wolf, producing a terrifying beast. Here there is a *theriomorphic* transformation of Alice into the wolf. The wolf is not chimeric but a complete transformation from one species to another. The significance of this transformation is captured by the following themes of Acceptance, Resistance, Continuity and Discontinuity.

Accepting Change

One of the primary polysemic signifiers identified within the category of Transformation is *acceptance*. The acceptance by Alice of her physical transformation is evident throughout the story. This acts as a point of orientation throughout the narrative. Within the syntagmatic structure of the texts, Alice's transformation is a metonymic reference to other issues of change and acceptance. The acceptance of the transformation of the woman to wolf is a focus point that pulls together other aspects of the story identifying 'change' as crucial to life and fear of change as deleterious. A significant aspect of the plot development is Luther's, Alice's psychotherapist's, reactions to her transformation. His acceptance of her is key not only to Alice's interests but also to Luther's mental deterioration and increasing obsessiveness with Alice. During their first meeting, Luther reassures Alice, *No, I don't believe you actually are a werewolf, but, as I say, I do believe*

you sincerely believe you are, and I still like and respect you just the same. p.9 Alice's acceptance of herself as the wolf, *After almost twenty years, being a werewolf had a chilling dailiness about it* (p.45), relates to other instances of acceptance of change whereby humans' lives change constantly and the search for stability begins with accepting those changes. Alice's desires stem from her need to accept herself as both woman and wolf, and to have others accept her as such. It is the main point of contention that gives rise to the subplots and subtextual messages in the story. The respective book and script authors handle the acceptance of Alice's transformation in similar ways. Her confusion is evident and her desire to resolve the ambiguity of her identity is a major concern of the plot.

Within the paradigmatic structure of the texts, acceptance of the transformation is a meaningful part of the narrative in itself. It describes acknowledging and accepting the fact that humans are animals. Indeed, this human:animal dichotomy is the central paired opposition in the texts. Acceptance of the human animal amounts to the deconstruction of this hierarchical dichotomy and the reconstruction into an integrated dynamic whole. Humans are animals, and Alice's physical transformation into the wolf is an extended metaphor for that fact. The destruction or denial of the wolf necessitates the annihilation of herself.

Underpinning this desire for resolution is the ultimate recognition that she is both woman and wolf, but other people's failure to accept her *identities* forces her to retreat from the woman's world into that of the wolf. This escape is handled differently as it emerges from the original book to the television, and for important reasons to be discussed later. Nevertheless, the way in which the respective authors deal with this issue of acceptance is revealed in their grammatical description of the change and their identification of the wolf. Some of the key tenets in the original text such as the animal nature of humans, the continuity of emotions between species and the desire to escape ideological constraints about species behaviour are encompassed in the way Danvers refers to the wolf. The

wolf's desires are highlighted in his text, they are equally important to the desires of Alice as the woman. Danvers identifies the wolf with agency, subjectivity and emotional needs. His pronoun 'she' to refer to the wolf encapsulates this message. However, the screenplay writers do not share these assertions initially. Their reading of Danvers' text does not leave them with a sense of the wolf's agency. The reconstructed wolf is objectified, dehumanised, and referred to as 'it' in the script. This objectification is retracted in the television drama where Alice does refer to the wolf as 'her' and 'she', revealing both her own acceptance of the wolf, and the problem of trying to dehumanise the basic message of the original text.

Resisting Change

The paradigmatic opposite to *acceptance* is *resistance*, and this signifier is equally evident throughout the narratives. Resistance to Alice's transformation from woman into wolf serves to disrupt the story. The status quo is challenged as, in turn, Luther, Dan (her lover) and other key players deny the reality of Alice's experience. The disruptive structure of this narrative proposition is essential to the development of the plot and the establishment of narrative. Metaphorically, *resistance* signifies human desire for the predictable, knowable and, essentially, controllable aspects of life. Indeed, Alice's ambivalence towards her own identity is evident, *She wished she could be one or the other, the woman or the wolf.* (p.132). Species boundaries are biological facts, untenable yet for the process of natural selection. The social meanings attached to those boundaries, however, are fluid and sometimes arbitrary. The value of a species is established anthropocentrically with human utility being its primary benchmark. The key protagonists' resistance to the transformation signifies an inherent desire to categorise the value associated with different species as immutable and given, with the proviso that the human species is at the pinnacle. Metaphorically, *resistance* stands for this fear of the variable nature of life and the mutability of life characteristics amongst species. The expression of this fear is rationalised through the denial of the human animal and of so-called human characteristics in other animals. The irrationality of fear and prejudice is evident through

the projection of violence and immorality onto other animals, rendering them 'scapegoats' for the most contentious of human experience. This dualism of acceptance:resistance is grounded in other, equally pernicious, dichotomies. It establishes boundaries between notions of 'us' and 'them' which are conflated to 'good' and 'bad', and rationalised through appeals to 'chaos' and 'order'.

The implications of these paired opposites are that the interdependence of meaning is denied, the dynamic interactive nature of the biological and cultural is repressed through the ontological divide between animal and human, and the continuity amongst species is rendered insignificant. Battle lines are drawn between the rational, knowable and moral human and the non-rational, alien and immoral animal. Significantly, humans are at ease in denying any capacity for rationality to other animals but, when it comes to the question of morality, animals are attributed moral status seemingly without contradiction, a status which is invariably negative.

The syntagmatic structure of *resistance* as a signifying proposition centres on its role in the development of characters and plot. It is central to this story that Alice's transformation is resisted. Metonymically, the resistance Alice demonstrates to her own dilemma echoes the problems that the other protagonists have with her transformation. Alice's desire for a normal life is expressed through her desire for a relationship and for children, as Danvers comments ...*she had come to believe she was a freak mutation, an anomaly that began with her and, when she died childless, would end with her.* (p.13) Alice's resistance to the inevitability of her own situation is reflected in Luther's denial of his mental breakdown, Dan's reluctance to continue the relationship with her, her father's emotional estrangement and society's disbelief in the lycanthropic myth.

Where the Good:Evil divide has informed much of the debate on human-animal relations, women and animals have often found themselves on the same side of the divide separated from the moral guardians by ideological walls constructed to keep out the bestial. The

wolf, as such a beast, has long been the archetype of menace both in European literature and folklore. Indeed, the witch-burning of the Middle Ages is said to have coincided (but not so coincidently) with the Church-sponsored campaign against the wolf (Antonio, 1995). Moreover, whereas human werewolf burning ended in the eighteenth century, the nonhuman wolves suffered for their reputation until the present-day. Their persecution runs parallel to the ontological separation of nonhuman nature from human nature.

Continuity Amongst Species

Continuity within Transformation is a resolution to the disruption of resistance. It signifies the interdependence and interaction between the cultural human and the biological animal. The syntagmatic structure of continuity focuses the main themes of the story into one insight. Within the notion of continuity there is implicit acceptance of Alice's transformation. She is both human and animal. So are we all. Continuity between Alice the woman and the wolf is most explicitly expressed through the emotional experience of each animal, *She wondered just before she changed whether the wolf would feel scared or betrayed. They seemed to meet for a moment, Alice and the wolf, and each knew the other was frightened and alone.* (p.103) Despite the physical transformation, Alice and the wolf share feelings of isolation and imprisonment, *She lies down in the silence. As a wolf she doesn't think in words, but then she doesn't need words to feel lonely.* (p.25) It is this continuity that allows the reader to enter the world of the wolf. The accusation of anthropomorphism is highly inappropriate. Indeed, some forms of anthropomorphism are insidiously anthropocentrism, the idea that other animals do not experience emotions like humans implicitly presumes that human emotions are the definitive emotions and that other experience must be derived from that definition. Anthropomorphism, however, can be an useful heuristic that allows humans to acknowledge the emotional lives of other animals and not to assume that emotions are exclusively human. Within the context of the narrative, the continuity between Alice and the wolf provides a dual perspective on the central issues of freedom and change. *The wolf seemed like someone else, who was also her at the same time.* (p.42).

The paradigmatic structure of *continuity* as a narrative resolution is based on the human:animal opposition which is reflected in mind:body dualism. These dualisms are reinforced through the separation of nature and culture into arbitrary variables that have differential influence on the lives of animals versus humans. Continuity amongst species is a Darwinian fact, yet human desire to disassociate themselves from the rest of the animal kingdom has led to religious, secular and scientific justifications of the chasm between humans and other animals. In terms of cultural continuity, women have historically been associated with animals, rendering them dehumanised, objectified and commodified. The association of women and wolves, in light of religious prejudices, is an obvious one. Women were more often than men to be associated with nature, animals and, therefore, the irrationality and immorality of bestial existence. Wolves were represented as cruel, ferocious, rapacious creatures capable of treachery and lust. Significantly, *lupus* and *lupana* have the same etymological root. The latin for 'whore', *lupa,* is the homophone for wolf. This sexual imagery is embedded in the Western imagination concerning women, animals and sex. The link between the wolf and human female conjures the image of sinful sexuality, a rapacity that is actually uniquely human.

The vituperative use of animal imagery belies the socially empowering image of females (wolves) as leaders and survivors. With some anthropomorphic license, the female wolf's 'spirit' is said to resemble courage (Antonio,1995). The emotional congruence evident here finds support in evolutionary continuity of the mammalian brain, and in the increasing calls for the redefinition of anthropomorphism as a scientific heuristic rather than sin. Indeed, the zoomorphism of men's insistence on the cultural and philosophical construction of women as incarnations of evil, that justify both their persecution and the near extinction of those animals closely associated with them, has barely received a mention in the vilification of anthropomorphism as sin.

The collective Western memory of wolves is dominated by the religious concept of the devouring demon (described in Chapter 7). The vituperative abuse of the species masks

the fact that the wolf usually mates for life, may engage in temporary solitude, belongs to highly co-operative social groups that shun humans, feeds their old and collectively cares for their young. These evolutionary facts are in themselves, of course, amoral, however, they certainly fit the bill for historical and contemporary notions of being morally responsible humans, even belonging to the much quoted ethos of family values! The intelligence, subjectivity and agency of wolves has most certainly been relegated to the chaotic wilds and, psychologically speaking, women have also often been subject to that kind of exile (Le Guin, 1989). Indeed, the 'wild, wolf woman' is a cultural archetype that unites images of freedom, sexuality and emotions (Estes, 1992).

Discontinuity Amongst Species

Discontinuity within the transformation of Alice is another disruption within the narrative. It signifies the guilt felt by Alice as the woman towards the imprisonment of the wolf. It further represents the inability of others to understand the transformation, and to be fearful of what is unrecognisable in Alice, *It wasn't just the way she looked; it was something else, her 'presence' in the room. He didn't know what else to call it.* (p.19) Dan's ambivalence towards Alice is evidence of the problem of discontinuity between the woman and the wolf, as Alice comments: *I'm certainly the most mysterious animal he's ever encountered.* (p.63). *Discontinuity* signifies syntagmatically the problem of misunderstanding Alice's transformation. The wolf is represented as monstrous, the savagery of animal behaviour, whilst Alice is perceived as 'crazy', deluded through guilt and sexual desire. *Learning about werewolves, wolves, science and magic hadn't made any difference in the pattern of her life, had made nothing less painful.* (p.45). Indeed, Alice appears resigned to the ambiguity of her identity: *Kill her, most likely, or try to, and she would kill them. She was reasonably sure they would dissect her, eventually. They would have to. They would have to figure her out.* (p.101)

The inveterate relationship between women and nature reflects the wider construction of evolutionary continuity and ideological discontinuity. The androcentrism of the male-

female dualism is reflected in the anthropocentrism of the human:animal dichotomy. Rather than interpreting these relations as reciprocal, with knowledge of one structuring the knowledge of the other, they are presented as antithetical and hierarchical. Even when feminists move beyond the dualisms of gender, they often fall into the trap of replacing one system of hierarchy with another. However, concern for nonhuman animals has the potential to threaten notions of patriarchy or androcentrism because it questions the very nature of Otherness (Halpin, 1989), the relation between subjectivity and objectivity, and the gender assumptions surrounding species differentiation. As the boundaries of Otherness begin to be blurred, the construction of empathy and compassion as feminine (and, therefore, weak) also begins to defy stultification (Haraway, 1991). The very notion of how we use the idea of 'animal' becomes a question of how we construct and perceive nonhuman animal images and concepts of the Other, as insights to human ambivalence towards other animals. With increasing perspicacity, the deconstruction of 'animal' demonstrates what we think of ourselves through the projection of our most unresolved and contradictory desires.

8.2: Sexuality: Reasoning With Animal Passions

Sexuality is assigned in this hierarchical scheme of things to nature.
(Seidler, 1987:91)

Human sexuality is an area of intense contradiction and anxiety. Our primate sexuality connects us to all other animal species who reproduce sexually, yet our unique social and cultural construction of sex separates us from our animal relatives. Anxiety arises from this ambiguity over the exact demarcation of human sexuality as opposed to nonhuman animal sex. Human reluctance, even fear, of acknowledging their animal nature means that sex is highly ritualised and rendered a taboo subject in order to disassociate humans from the rest of the animal kingdom. However intellectual, linguistic, technological and artistic we are as a species, we still have sex, and at the heart of this human behaviour, we are engaging in an undeniably animalistic behaviour. The fact that all our behaviour is

animalistic by virtue of us being animals is unnecessarily splitting hairs but, perhaps, worth mentioning anyway. The issue here, however, is that human sexuality has been constructed as animalistic, carrying with it all the negative connotations of animality - bestial, instinctual, base, immoral, offensive to the well-honed sophisticated mind of modern man and woman. Throughout *Wilderness*, Sexuality relates to the concepts of Casual, Emotional, Unresolved and Physical.

Casual Sex

Sexuality is a signifier of multiple associations. Its polysemic character traverses the following theme of Rationality as its preferred reading mirrors the animal:human, instinctual:rational and immoral:moral dichotomies. A primary signifier for the central role of sexuality in this narrative is *casual* sexuality. The casual, uncomplicated sexual encounters of Alice are orientating propositions and the contexts are important. Alice is not a prostitute nor is she a nymphomaniac, however, her desire for human intimacy readily translates into one night stands. Emotionally divorced physical satisfaction is the only apparent substitute for emotional contentment in the beginning of the story. The syntagmatic structure of the metaphor of sexuality is encompassed in the way it defines the protagonists' relationships. The reader's perception of Alice is directed by her emotional needs and the physical translation of those desires. Whereas her apparent sexual independence and assertiveness may be read as a feminist coup on the traditional sex roles, its relation to defining concepts of being human and having sexual desires with simultaneous desires for love and acceptance form the crux of the casual nature of sex in the early stages of the narrative. Sex is important because it signifies, simultaneously, the human and the nonhuman animal. It reflects the continuity in behaviour between species and emphasises the uniqueness of human construction of sexuality, a social phenomenon aimed at resolving intense contradiction within sexual behaviour. Rationalising sex is not easy to do. Sexual reproduction is an evolutionary fact, human sexuality is the amalgamation of physical, emotional, moral and rational aspects of behaviour. What *casual* sex signifies is a lack, an emotional lack that finds expression in the emotionlessness

of sexuality. Syntagmatically, *casual* sex signifies Alice's profound problem - the reconciliation of herself as human and as animal. Sex to the other characters is part of emotional desire (Dan, his wife, Luther's wife) or obsession (Luther). To Alice, sex is the denial of emotions and the rationalisation of desire. As Danvers writes: *When she wanted sex, she went to the bar.* (p.44).

Apart from Alice's own search for casual sex, there is another narrative proposition that exemplifies emotional absence. The attempted rape episode is Alice's first sexual experience and it signifies many issues. Firstly, there is the gender issue and that is based in myths of seduction and the fetishising of violence. Secondly, there is the association with strong emotions, fear and anger and the appearance of the wolf. Thirdly, there is the relation between the emergence of transformation as a theme, and this violent sexual experience. Alice's belief in her complicity in this episode is evident, as she rejects his sexual advances: *Now he would think she didn't like him or was scared like some little girl who wouldn't go out after dark. That would be it. He wouldn't have any more to do with her.* (p.70).

The paired opposites which are structured around the paradigmatic elements of *casual* sexuality are premised on the traditional notion of morality and immorality. *Casual* sex, emotionally untied, is subject to the gender stereotypes of aggression and submission - real men want it and real women must resist. Nevertheless, *casual* sex as a paradigm within the narrative, is the manifestation of Alice's dual existence, as woman and wolf, as emotionally in need and physically satisfied. There is both freedom and constraint evident in the portrayal of this theme. A sexual freedom that is associated with uninvolved sex rests on the assumption that an unified integrated emotional and sexual experience is constraining, somehow deceptive and luring. Sexual freedom is imbued with cultural concepts of morality, gender and liberty. However, in Alice's case sexual freedom is a misnomer, signifying her emotional and physical constraint. She is, simultaneously, liberated as an animal and constrained as a woman; liberated physically and constrained

emotionally. Alice's sexual desires conceal her emotional needs: *She couldn't remember his name. She'd slept with him three or four weeks ago.* (p.20). *She looked him in the eye. She hoped her face was completely devoid of emotion.* (p.20).

So casual sex is problematic. We want it but we want to disguise it, separate it from the civilised behaviour of everyday life, render it so taboo that mentioning sex in 'polite company' may stigmatise you forever as a social outcast, attention-seeker, pervert or worse. Yet sex is fundamental. It seems tautological to say so, but it affects human life in a more clandestine manner than actual sexual acts. Sex permeates social life in numerous untold ways. Human gender identity is inextricably wound up with sexual identity. This association has been well documented by gender analysts, however, it fails to account for the primary construction of sex, that of the bestial. Our behaviour as gendered subjects is interwoven with our expectations of sexual behaviour. However, beyond the gender dimension, although most certainly tied up with it, is the *idea* of the animal.

Animals are not what they seem. In fact, nonhuman animals are often what people desire them to be - pets, meat, entertainment, objects, machines, toys and fantasies. The point here is that humans have constructed the very notion of 'animal' to reflect and fulfil their own needs. Part of that construction is the concept of a wild and brutish sexuality, untamed feral encounters. Certitude and voraciousness go hand in hand with this type of representation. When we talk about sex, we might think of 'animal lust'. When we need to remove ourselves from the 'animal' domain, we 'make love'. This kind of dichotomous representation is not unusual when humans try to resolve the ambivalence they feel about themselves, other animals and sex. In fact, these dichotomies are naturalised and, therefore, assumed to be self-evident. Indeed, the processes of naturalisation - the equation of what is morally right with what is natural, the removal of history and culture, the denial of social relativity - often rely, in secular society, on interpretations (often misinterpretations) of Darwin's theory of evolution. Sometimes people will admit that we

are animals, usually when justifying a particular set of sexual behaviours.

At the level of semiosis, the theme *casual* sexuality is pertinent to intertextual styles and meanings. In the book, sexuality is an important narrative player. Alice's sexual experiences are integral to her emotional states and reflect both her desires and repulsions. However, the television translation of the role of sexuality succumbs to an unnecessary exposure. The tenderness and revelation of emotional desire, as expressed in the book, are replaced in the television drama with relentless naked images of Alice, greased and dirty, and sexual explicitness irrelevant to the original tenets of the book. This serves to objectify Alice. It is the observer's perspective on Alice rather than Alice as the subject observing experiencing herself as the wolf. Whereas the reader's imagination was encouraged to build on the syntagmatic relations within the narrative, the viewer's imagination had little, if anything to do and sexuality became purely paradigmatic, exemplifying the genre of sexual primacy and visual explicitness. The drama fails catastrophically to integrate the concept of sexuality to the related narrative issue and in doing so, impoverishes the story and the associated meanings.

Emotional Involvement

The counterpoint to *casual* sexuality is *emotional* sexuality. It has already been suggested that this dichotomy reflects gender stereotypes and, therefore, fails to address the integrated experience of sex. The emotional aspects of sexuality provide the disruption to Alice's casual sex behaviour. Her sexuality is introduced as casual, uninvolved and intentional, however, the narrative mechanism which propels the plot is Alice's emotional desires. These desires for intimacy, freedom, truth, children, family and happiness revolve around the problem of emotional sexuality. As a defining characteristic in human identity and subjectivity, sexuality is a powerful motive for the rationalisation of desire. As sexual and sexualised animals, humans experience the intense contradiction of the physical and the emotional. Syntagmatically, Alice's desire for an emotional relationship explains her unhappiness, and her experience of entrapment. *Her life was unbelievable, even to herself.*

She never acted on her strongest feelings, ran from those she most desired. (p.99). Emotional fulfilment is the keystone for both Alice as woman and as the wolf. Indeed, whilst Alice's apparent promiscuity is self explained as a way of rationalising her emotions, the very desire to rationalise is emotional: *She would be horny, she always was the night after, but she would also be most desperate to be someone who didn't go to bars, who went out on a date with nice men who wanted to get to know her.* (p.46). Paradigmatically, the theme of emotional sexuality centres on the mind:body dualism and its relation to masculinity:femininity and culture:nature. Within the structure of the narrative, the tension between these dualisms is explored through the notion of unrequited emotional and physical desire. At the heart of these dualisms is the categorical, meaningful distinction between humans and all other animals.

The counterpoint to Alice integrating her emotional needs with her sexual desires is Luther's psychological breakdown. Whereas Alice's sexuality is initially expressed as emotionally devoid, and then as part of her emotional desire, Luther's emotional breakdown manifests itself through sexual obsession for Alice and the rationalisation of that obsession.

Recognising that humans are animals is not necessarily a straightforward process that one might hope for. As I have already said, 'animal' can mean many things, nevertheless, we might expect that, at least, we are on the right road, even if we are not all travelling in the same direction. However, when people acquiesce to the notion that humans are animals, they do so with certain aims in mind. One such aim is to justify, morally, the sexual behaviour of some humans by recall to the perceived fixity of evolved characteristics. People use their interpretation of evolution to justify sexual behaviour that might otherwise be subject to moral indignation. It is not with any great surprise that the main use of this justification concerns male sexuality.

This is not to say that female sexuality has not also been justified by appeals to the forces of nature, but rather that the balance of favour in these matters rests most forcibly in the male camp. This is not because people, in general, have a good understanding of sexual selection but rather that they choose to see snippets of evolutionary theory through biologically determined lenses in order to lend some 'scientific' credibility to their intensely contradictory desires. Animal lust and machismo are ideological buddies. When women are seen as sexual sirens who seduce men with heartless witchery, the ideas of nature can also come into play. These fantasy figures are constructed to resolve the feelings of fear that female sexuality arouses in men. The power of these images resides in the dynamics of seduction. The psychodynamic projection of sexual desire and the introjection of victimisation conspire, through inter-subjective relations, to protect the man from recognising his own emotions, a threat more terrifying than any witch imaginable. The woman, meanwhile is rendered naturally seductive, a *femme fatale*, with an eye on crushing vulnerable men within the walls of her vagina.

Unresolved Feelings

A relatively minor, yet interesting, aspect of sexuality is the play on *unresolved* feelings. This characterises the male protagonists in *Wilderness* more so than the females. Dan's unresolved conflict between lust and love, and his fear of emotional exposure given his recent divorce, add a masculine dimension to the issue of sexuality: *At first he couldn't seem to decide whether he wanted to rape or caress her, and she wasn't sure what she wanted from him either. But then he was sweet, but not too sweet, and she clung to him under the sky as if she might fall into the earth if she let him go.* (p.107). As a syntagmatic element in the narrative, *unresolved* sexuality signifies intense emotional and rational contradiction in human behaviour. The desire for sex and sexual fulfilment is dependent on the interaction of reason and emotions, and this dynamic force is not easily separated and compartmentalised.

Human subjectivity is a complex entity. Understanding it requires that we step back from the restrictions of unitary rational individualism and engage in a debate on the interactive dynamics of the human psyche and human cultural life. This fundamentally discursive and psychodynamic enterprise cannot afford to lose sight of the way in which human sexual desire dictates concepts of identity and normality. Whereas the naturalisation of some aspects of male sexuality serves to reinforce concepts of human animality, the association between rationality and masculinity provides an intellectual counterpoint to the savagery of sexuality. The physical, emotional and animal side of sex is somewhat antithetical to the higher echelons of cerebrality and logic. Nevertheless, they are simultaneously retained within the parameters of masculine identity, an archetypal identity seemingly without contingency. It is this fragmented, highly contradictory notion of the subject that illuminates human perception of ourselves and other animals, as indicated by Dan: *He was not sure what he needed. His reactions to women - lust, tenderness, curiosity - often seemed indistinguishable.* (p.36).

The rational masculinity is in constant battle against the seducing sorceress, and when 'animal passions' are aroused, it is the woman who is held responsible for the abandonment of morality. Sexuality is beyond the control of reason and, therefore, if sexuality itself cannot be controlled then those responsible for it must be. As Luther's insight, in the television drama, suggests: *The wolf is deeply embedded in you. To be precise, in your sexuality. You love the wolf, but she's hard to handle, she won't be contained - she's too strong. Strong enough to kill a man. There's enormous anger there. A sexual rage.* (3/3). Issues of sexuality and gender are a potential threat to the established dictates and discourses of a rationalist, androcentric society. Moreover, issues of animality and sexuality are a danger to anthropocentric assumptions about the nature of human and nonhuman animal identity. The Cartesian separation of the mind and body so effectively denigrated the body that it produced the somatophobic phenomenon by which the body is feared and reviled in favour of the mind. This mind:body split parallels the human:animal divide. The concept of the human signifies all that is intellectual, rational, logical and

moral. The concept of the animal symbolises all that is irrational, immoral, illogical, 'dumb', and generally undesirable.

The *unresolved* aspects of sexuality are highlighted at the level of semiosis. Not only did the television drama render the narrative explicitly sexual, it tried to comment on the notion of animal or bestial sexuality through crude references to the 'hunt' and anal sex. Specifically, the role of Alice's colleague, Serena, in the drama is to provide the sexual banter that the audience presumably requires in order to understand the relation between human and nonhuman animal sex. The purpose of this could be one of three options. Either the intent was to 'pander to the audience', or it was necessary to deal with the difficulties of the original text, or it was aimed at 'naturalising' or defining the subversive elements of the original text. My conclusion, having read the book and watched the film is that the subtle connection between the body, sex and desire and the conflict between the 'human' and 'animal' self is subsumed beneath Serena's sexual gossip. This kind of titillation assumes a simplistic notion of humans as animals based on negative stereotypes of bestiality. It therefore undermines the text's subversive messages and plays to the presumed desires of the audience.

Physical Satisfaction

The counterpoint to the notion of unresolved sexuality is physical sexuality which integrates and acknowledges the emotional and rational components of human sexual experience. The most telling example of this is Alice and Dan's relationship where physical attraction is underpinned by emotional needs and the desire for intimacy. Finding a student attractive, Dan feels: *His fantasy lost its charm. He could not lose himself in eyes that were closed.* (p.32) The expression of physical desire through sex is located in their mutual recognition of emotional need and commitment. Dan's fear of Alice is expressed as fear of her psychological instability yet it can also be read as part of the unresolved tensions within his own sexuality. Her emotional needs outweigh his sexual desire and so he returns to the familiar physical and emotional relationship with his ex-

wife. However, his final acceptance of her frees himself from this intense contradiction, and the integrated physical sexuality, expressed between him and Alice, illustrates the resolution of the previous narrative propositions. Physical sex encompasses the desire for emotional freedom: *As he moved harder, each thrust seemed to loosen something deep inside her until the scream wailed up, shaking her whole body - loud, inarticulate, shameless.* (p.111). Paradigmatically, physical sexuality transcends the hierarchical dualisms of animal:human, body:mind and rational:emotional. It expresses the interdependence of those categories in terms of meaning and definition. This form of sexuality escapes the constraints of dualistic convention.

However, the body *is* desired through sexuality. After all, it is not the mind we want to sexually engage with alone, however much the mind plays a role in the sexual experience. The power of the human mind is represented as residing in its ability to override the body and to overcome the 'beast within'. The 'naturally' evolved moral capacities of humans has served to disassociate humans from nature and to discredit any other animal's right to inclusion within the moral sphere. Moral thoughts belong to the mind, whereas, immoral acts belong to the body. Sexuality is relegated to the nonhuman animal status, suffering the constraints of stereotypes in true repressive style. In order to maintain the superiority of the rational, masculine-defined mind, men needed to become the masters of the natural world (and all its associates) and, thereby, affirm their humanity. As women were constructed as being closer to nature than men, they were also subject to domination and subservience. This denial of the human animal, the denial of sexual equality and the denial of acceptable sexual and emotional lives in men resulted in an ideological chasm that rendered nature the object and man the master. This disembodied concept of rationality easily replaces the religious concept of a soul. The eternal divine spirit, in secular terms, becomes the ephemeral mind. This segregation of mind from body is a fundamental form of displacement. The human, predominantly male, identification with the rational mind has led to an internal estrangement in the human animal between the mind and the rest of the body.

This kind of separation is necessary in order to affirm one's own gender identity. The denial of animality and femininity is a fundamental part of the psychodynamic construction of male human sexuality. This denial leads to anxiety about concealing one's sexual and gender identity, an anxiety which is mediated through the projection of desire onto the Other - the animal or the woman. These disguised desires serve to reinforce the dichotomy between humans and other animals, and between men and women. Those denied aspects of human subjectivity, however, will find expression, and if that takes the form of projection, reality becomes distorted and prejudice and violence will be natural products of disassociation. This misconstrued reality prevents people from recognising themselves as sexual animals (a factual rather than a derisory phrase). Of course, women engage in these psychodynamic plays of identity affirmation as well, however, the relationships between men and women are structured so that the man's privileged access to masculinity is the norm (the morally right and evolutionarily natural), and the woman's make do with femininity is the deviant (immoral and unnatural) yet, predictably enough, highly desirable. This intense conflict between reason and desire is at the heart of modern, Western industrialised, Cartesian assumptions on the nature of the human psyche.

8.3: Rationalising Madness

> ... *(there has been) a continuing allegiance paid to 'reason' and the complete failure to listen either to one's own 'necessary' madness or to those labelled 'mad'.* (Sheridan,1980:14)

Nonhuman animals are often said to serve as a mirror to human society, on the one hand, but also to provide an antithesis to humankind, a means of recognising and then subordinating the 'beast within' (Birke, 1994). The concept of rationality is an important rhetorical device for ensuring the proper demarcation of humanity's boundaries. Rationality dictates what is normal and, therefore, morally acceptable, and what is abnormal and, therefore, morally unacceptable. Animals are the quintessential Other, our own home-based aliens, unknowable and fundamentally different. The fact that any entity

is not completely knowable, however, does not prevent humans worldwide from creating knowledge about animals. Such knowledge, whether lay or scientific, is more often than not, either anthropocentric to the point of prejudice or anthropomorphic to the point of sentimentality. The real animal, the animal between, or even beyond, these polar visions is rendered invisible. The constructed animal provides the point of reference for humankind, a point of inferiority in intellect, status, power and reason. Within *Wilderness*, the theme of Rationality manifests in the areas of Control, Emotional, Superior and Sanity.

Control and Order

The rational mind is the defining factor of modern day (post Enlightenment) humans. Where once there was the ubiquitous notion of man made in the image of God and separated from other animals by their souls, secular societies have found an easy transition from one ephemeral concept - the soul - to another - the mind. Nowadays, the ability of the mind to reason has become an important player in the moral evaluation of species. The capacity to reason, though, is not an uniquely human capacity, indeed, the continuity amongst species extends to cognitive capacities. There are, of course, immense differences, but these differences as Darwin stated are of degree rather than kind. Part of the appeal of the superiority of the human rational mind is its ability to elevate humans out of the animal kingdom through the control of what is perceived to be irrational. This is a pervasive form of disciplinary power (Foucault, 1980) which privileges the unitary, individual subject of the Enlightenment.

Control is a significant feature of the Rationality theme. It is evident in the psychotherapy plotline as being both indicative of the aims of psychotherapy and of Luther's desire to control Alice. *He was losing control of the situation. Alice knew she could only stray so far before he brought her back in line.* (p.10). Psychotherapy can be liberating as long as it does not replace the dictates of one kind of emotional stress with another. The problem with trying to be normal is that it invariably involves revoking the most normative aspects

of one's subjectivity such as emotional desires. Alice's desire to reconcile the woman and the wolf lead her initially to want to control the wolf. This, in turn, makes her vulnerable to Luther's increasing psychological instability that expresses itself with the obsessional desire to control Alice through sexual subordination. This demonstrates the syntagmatic role of *control* in the narrative. The relationship between Alice and Luther is centred on their mutually reinforcing desire for control. Alice would...*remind herself of the chaos she avoided in her own life by keeping things under control.* (p.143). Metonymically, this thematic aspect relates to the wider issues of human control over other animals, and the ideological imperialism of culture over nature. These battles reflect the epistemological relation between the wild and the civil, a hierarchical dichotomy which simplifies human existence into good and bad, right and wrong.

As a paradigmatic structure, *control* signifies the tension between order and chaos, the objective and subjective, the mind and body and the male and female. At the heart of these opposites is the ontological divide between human and nonhuman animal identity. The metaphorical notion of control is exemplified by the 'beast within'. The symbolic animal is a real creation, masterminded in the human psyche where internal conflict about the simultaneous status of human as animal and not-animal provides an endless source of anxiety. The fragmented, contradictory minds of discursive subjects are presented as cohesive, predictable, rational and, ultimately, unanimal. The sources that feed the concept of rationality, the 'metaphysics of logocentrism' as Derrida called it, are ubiquitous everyday relationships with the Other, surviving on projections and introjections of reviled and desired characteristics. The irrationality of animality becomes the nemesis of human rationality. What is logical, reasonable and intelligent about humans is an ideological boundary that puts humans on a higher ground to other animals. The 'beast' is to be caged, controlled, tamed and conquered less it threatens the very cornerstone of what makes humans human, or at least what is commonly assumed to make humans human.

Emotion versus Reason

As part of the legacy of mind:body dualism, reason and emotion have been ontologically separated. The idea of an *emotional* rationality seems a contradiction in terms. However, the reality of reasoning is that it has an emotional basis, and the contingency of emotions is that they are often subject to, or mediated by, rational thought. The interdependency of these concepts is revealed when the prejudices upon which they are separated are deconstructed. The integration of emotions and reason form a syntagmatic part of the narrative structure by illustrating Alice's desires to reconcile the tensions between herself as a human woman and as a female wolf. The highly emotional aspects of passion, often described as sexual love, mean that it is often termed irrational, mad or 'crazy', the feeling of falling in love defies the rationalistic model and is described by Dan in a comparison between Alice's allegedly unstable mind and his own feelings for her: *Maybe she was crazy. Maybe they were both crazy. He'd fallen in love so quickly and so completely, so much passion had startled him.* (p.216).

The main narrative episodes involving the battle between emotions and reason centre on Luther's breakdown. His initial job to help Alice in what he perceives to be a psychological disorder leads to his own emotional breakdown which he rationalises by projecting his sexual desires onto Alice. An exemplifying visual metaphor for this breakdown is Luther's obsession with the detail of his topiary. The plant animals are pruned and cared for whilst his marriage deteriorates and his work becomes distorted. The topiary remains a bizarre picture of perfection. As Luther's frustration with Alice grows, his anger and psychological breakdown lead him to attack the topiary, decapitating the horticultural creatures, in a frenzy of destruction of contrived nature, obsessive order and emotional control.

Rationality provides an ontological and epistemological divide between humans and all other animals. The ability to reason, inductively or deductively, has expanded into the essence of humanity and the archenemy of animality and bestiality. It carries with it more

than the capacity of an evolved brain, but also the moral contingencies of a species valued beyond all others. Here there is no dispute that humans have the ability to be rational, to engage in logical arguments in ways that no other species on this planet has been seen to do. What is being discussed is the moral and ethical significance that has become attached to an uniquely human capacity in order to denigrate all other species who are said to lack such an ability. In the first instance, it is not at all clear that other animals lack rationality, even if it were possible to define conclusively what rationality is, it is a question of degree rather than kind, as it is with many other characteristics previously held to be uniquely human. The crux of the matter is the *symbolic* use of rationality as a concept to demarcate humanistic versus animalistic behaviour. Luther's psychological deterioration signifies blurring the boundaries between human and animal behaviour, excess of emotions and a lack of reason.

Superiority Complexes

The notion of *superiority* in the theme of Rationality expresses itself in the relationships between Alice and the psychiatrists/psychotherapist who evaluate her mental and emotional health, as she comments on Luther's attitude to her: *It suited him, so reasonable and above it all.* (p.11). Moreover, during the her mental assessment following the attempted rape, she was examined by ...*a trio of psychiatrists whose condescendingly smiles, Alice noticed, bore a remarkable resemblance to that of the boy she had killed.* (p.76). Her experience of condescension and being patronised exemplifies the notion that making rational judgements about mental health of others involves implicitly a prerequisite of superiority in knowledge, control and emotions. In particular, Luther's self-centredness expresses itself through arrogance and dismissal of his wife, colleagues and, ultimately, of Alice's desires. His belief in his own superior reasoning, however obsessional and deluded, leads him to create an image of Alice as a willing participant, though unconsciously so, and, therefore, complicit with his ideas of treatment involving sexual relationships and the release of Alice's repressed sexual appetite: *He suspected the beginnings of transference. That could prove useful in her treatment - handled properly,*

he reminded himself. (p.128).

Underlying the syntagmatic structure of *superiority* in Rationality, is the paradigmatic theme centred on the human:animal dichotomy under the project of the Enlightenment. Humans have constructed and morally elevated the concept of rationality, and with it objectivity, to estrange themselves from other animals. The ability to reason has played a significant role in the establishment, maintenance and justification of status hierarchies including between humans and other animals. It is this inherent superior value which legitimises the subordination and exploitation of human and nonhuman animals. Rationality is often purveyed as an upholder of discontinuity between humans and nonhuman animals and, often, between men and women. The wilderness, occupied by nonhuman animals, women and Others, is an unassimilated adversary, an alien defined through difference and subject to the propaganda of a culture that keeps watching the skies. The universal wilderness is the conceptual parallel to the earthly wilderness, an unknown, frightening uninhabitable place. The 'rational' mind of man seeks to exclude the irrational fear of difference. Its value is in its instrumentality and utility, subject to the stereotypes of sentimentality or subservience. Wilderness, more than anything, is a cultural artefact (Plumwood, 1993). Wilderness resides behind a definitional wall of madness, chaos, turmoil and anarchy. 'Civilisation' protects those humans perceived as 'sane' because only the sane desire civilisation. Wilderness is the domain of nonhuman animals, savages, women and the defamed underbelly of human psyche.

When the wilderness is not the enemy, it becomes, through existential dualistic reverence, the salvation of humankind, the spiritual guide to the folly of human endeavour. Or, more precisely, once the wilderness is cleared of its naturally crazy inhabitants, the civilised human is free to rediscover his/her connection with nature. Of course, the violent removal of wilderness inhabitants is always a necessary prerequisite to preparation for wilderness holidays for civilised tourists (Plumwood, 1993). Wilderness without beasts is sanitised, it is now wild but safe and, therefore, no longer wilderness. The repressed desires of the

human mind are represented by the symbolic wilderness (Midgeley, 1983). The good and the evil bifurcate the natural world. Ambivalence is resolved by splitting the alien group into dichotomous images of deities and devils.

Sanity

The notion of being sane is one that requires a historical context to elicit its meaning. It usually means not being mad, and that in itself presents a dichotomy which is not only medical and psychological but also cultural and ideological. Alice's referral to Luther for her own 'madness' contains several levels of meaning. The first of which is the medical/professional layer. As Alice comments: ...*he thought she was crazy. It was even his job to think she was crazy.* (p.75). Part of the medicalisation of mental health has been the ideological categorisation of normal versus abnormal: ...*my parents have been waiting for this all their life, some sign that their daughter is normal.* (p.89). The historical and cultural contexts dictate the content of these categories. Indeed, a significant theme in the story is the role of psychotherapy in society. Whereas psychiatry was once the mainstay of mental diagnosis and cure, the recognition that there are emotional problems which do not necessarily involve psychological or biochemical disorders has led to the proliferation of psychotherapy and the legitimisation of the 'talking cure': *I came to see you because Dr. Dougherty thought I was crazy and referred me to you.* (p.8). Again, however, the concepts of normality and abnormality continue to play an important role as evident in Alice's thoughts on being simultaneously crazy and sane: *Even though he thought she was crazy, talking to him made her feel more sane. Even if he didn't believe her, at least someone else knew the truth, increasing the population of her real world to two.* (p.45).

The metaphorical level of meaning centres on the conflict in human identity. Social and personal identity consist of numerous conscious and unconscious influences, from family, society, culture, religion, sexuality, gender, ethnicity and politics. However, beneath these factors is the inherent and implicit contradiction - humans are both human and animal simultaneously; humans live two lives, one is the evolved animal with a highly developed

cognitive system including language, technology and culture; the other is the 'cultured' human of the Enlightenment, no longer an animal but in the eyes of Biblical creationists and more recently, the new social creationists, a special biological, moral, intelligent, spiritual, meaningful being - human beings. Alice's conflict is presented as real. She really does change into a wolf once a month: she is, for all intents and purposes, a werewolf. Part of the human aspects of the human animal has been the ability to signify, to tell stories, allegories, to use metaphor to illustrate the most difficult aspects of life through reference to something else. Narrative is a peculiarly human form of communication. Human identity, who and what we are, is inseparable from why we are or how we got here and there are few aspects of human existence to rival the importance and difficulty of these issues. The psychological implication rest on how we interpret our behaviour through metaphor, which metaphors we choose and why.

The final level of meaning here is the mythical tale of werewolves and the place of lycanthropy in modern society. Werewolves are creations which represent human antagonism towards wolves. They also symbolise the psychodynamic struggle within humans to come to terms with 'animal' desires especially violence and sex. Lycanthropy itself has been documented as a psychological disorder, a state of 'madness'. Werewolves are cultural artefacts, hybrids that reflect the nightmares of the human imagination. Alice's wolf is a modern day chimera, a female werewolf with a social conscience. Danvers, however, never questions her sanity: *She hadn't anticipated the impossibility of persuading a psychiatrist that you were sane and a werewolf at the same time.* (p.46).

As Foucault (1967) has claimed, madness is no longer culturally represented as another window into wisdom. It has been relegated beyond dreams, fantasies and the power of the imagination to the margins of acceptability, into the mire of deviancy. The exclusion of madness from intellectual life, has reinforced the association between rationality and humanity, and between rationality and masculinity (Midgeley, 1978). The emotions and desires of humans threaten to bring down the edifice of 'reason', the foundation to status

hierarchies, and cause relapse into animality. In contrast to Alice's psychological stability, Luther's 'madness' is explicit as a commentary on the role of psychoanalysis in modern society and on the power imbued in relations between the analyst and analysand. Luther's abuse of his power is part of his sexual obsession with Alice. His rationalisation of this obsession leads him to project his own sexual desires onto Alice: *She experiences her sexuality as something so terrifyingly powerful that she dare not set it free* (p.23), and his justification for her apparent 'madness' reverts to her experience of attempted rape, but also supports Luther's beliefs that Alice requires sexual liberation and that he is the only person qualified to give it: *Add to that the feelings of guilt such an attack often precipitates, and a delusion of the sort she is experiencing is not at all unheard of.* (p.76).

The history of the werewolf is interwoven with religious stigmatisation of the wolf and cultural representations of madness and evil. During the Middle Ages, the Church constructed the wolf as the personification of evil itself, and any individual human who exhibited marginalised behaviours (such as schizophrenics, epileptics and the mentally disabled) was pressurised into admitting that they were werewolves, and as such were servants of Satan. The association of animals and the Devil is as powerful as the explanatory devil-possession is for insanity. The perceived, and constructed, image of animality as debased, irrational, immoral and inferior to the apotheosis of humans, made in the image of God, has pervaded both religious and secular animal imagery. As the belief in werewolves diminished in Europe, the association of the actual wolf with the devil became stronger. The negative image of the wolf as the purveyor of evil evinced the exploits of humans intent on the eradication of the species.

8.4: Freedom

> *Wilderness is not a place where there is no interaction between self and other, but where self does not impose itself. It is a place to be visited on its own terms and not on ours.* (Rolston, 1983:182)

The final primary signifier identified at having a syntagmatic and paradigmatic structure and function is Freedom. In this narrative, Freedom is comprised of three sub-themes: Emotional, Physical and Familiar.

Emotional Emancipation

Emotional freedom is evident throughout the story as an orientating proposition, it guides the reader and viewer to the desires and conflicts experienced by the characters. At a metonymic level, emotional freedom illustrates the human desire to remove constraints on personal liberty, to fulfil ambitions and to live life as one desires, without the chains of conformity or predictability. This kind of contiguity invokes ideas of freedom of expression and equality. As a syntagmatic structure, emotional freedom is an ubiquitous theme for a variety of protagonists. Primarily, it is Alice's search for emotional fulfilment that drives the story. Her desire for a complete life rather than two halves propels the narrative episodes. Emotional pressure has exerted itself on her from her parents: *good God, Mother, he's not a child! I have plans. And I'm sick to death of hearing about the arguments you and Daddy may or may not have because of something I do or do not, understand?* (p.23), her lovers, her colleagues, her therapist: *You've ... explored territory you wouldn't have set foot in when you first came here.* (p.8) and, finally, Dan himself. On the other hand, Dan is experiencing emotional pressure from Alice and his ex-wife, whilst Luther's increasingly deranged mind perceives pressure in all directions.

As a selection of narrative, emotional freedom's metaphorical meaning is a transposition of emotional needs and constraints to the paired opposites of rational:irrational and normal:abnormal. Emotional desires are often rationalised away due to conformity pressures and the expectations of others. The concept of an individual freedom is subsumed under the demands of social roles and predictable patterns of behaviour.

Freedom is more than the license to live life as one pleases. It also encompasses the world of fantasy, where anything is possible but still within the confines of discursive hegemony

and repressed desire. Fantasy and freedom are conceptually close, the desires for one often dictate the parameters of the other. Freedom is an imaginary place inhabited by taboo and contingent on individual experience and social norms. The existential desire for freedom is often the desire not only to escape one's environment, but also to escape one's self. Such fantasies of deliverance do not sway comfortably with the biological boundaries of the individual and, therefore, are recaptured in the psychodynamic strategies of introjection and projection. If we cannot save ourselves, the next best thing - liberating another - will do.

Physical Independence

The complementary aspect to *emotional* freedom is *physica*l freedom, and in this case apart from the usual desire to escape the social, regional or otherwise geographical boundaries, there is the problem of Alice's desire to escape from her body, oscillating from the entrapment of the wolf by the woman to the imprisonment of the woman by the wolf. As she is encaged as the wolf in the basement: *She is not looking for a way out. She knows there is none.* (p.24). Escape from physical boundaries provides a tangible counterpoint to the more abstract notion of *emotional* freedom. Syntagmatically, *physical* freedom is the human search for the wilderness, to live beyond the constraints of human life, to experience the freedom of animal existence. A corollary to this romanticised notion of nature is the psychological conflict experienced by being simultaneously human and non-human. This metonymic meaning signifies the contradictory nature of our animal selves and results in forlorn desires to escape ourselves, to replace the notion of a contrived humanity with the alleged freedom of animality. This desire to escape personal physical constraints is a common thread throughout the narrative.

Alice remembers as the wolf: *At one time she ran in the country. She sees herself then, she sees herself now. When she comes to the woman now, it is always here in this small place. It is full of her scent and no one else's.* (p.25). The wolf's desire for freedom is evident in Danvers' description of her experiences: *What she wants and cannot find is play,*

like the ravens who used to spring into the air at her charge, then flutter down slowly behind her. (p.25) *...she revelled in the monthly freedom of a night in the deep woods that lay beyond the fields, lay beyond the helpless tedium of her father's farm.* (p.67). And as Alice as woman and wolf experience the physical constraints of conformity, so too does Dan desire escape from his emotional loneliness: *He wanted to migrate. The sun and warm breeze, the grass and trees and freedom of spring, the youth scattered all around him restless to move, seemed to him a harsher environment than the frozen waters through which the penguin and his mate unnervingly swam toward home.* (p.32).

The paired opposites that physical freedom refers to as part of its paradigmatic structure are centred on the dualisms of freedom:constraint, natural:artificial, inclusion:exclusion and animal:human. Coveting freedom, while disciplined not to seize it, seems to be a symptom of rationalising interactive, dynamic subjectivities into unitary, self-contained, essential subjects, promoted through the Project of Enlightenment. Self-deception is not foolproof. The anxiety associated with establishing, and legitimising, identity permeates social life. The urge to escape the tyranny of 'humanity' can not, however, be achieved by presupposing a similar, yet oppositional, stereotype of nature.

Familiarity and Stability

Part of the psychological process of desiring freedom is the emotional basis which supports the concept of freedom. It is desired because it is meaningful and its meaning is derived from the emotions it elicits and the behaviours it sanctions. Consequently, to want to be free does not necessarily involve forsaking everything, but rather requires the desire for emotional fulfilment which often means a recognition of *familiar* circumstances where emotional contentment or the desire for familiarity is a vivid association. For Alice, this is a strong motivating force *...she winced that she had never found the same nest twice.* (p.60). Freedom is not just a political and legal requirement, it is a profound psychological journey to discover the boundaries of oneself and the contingencies upon which a fulfilling life can be led. If these contingencies do not conform to any particular

society's normative expectations of an individual then freedom becomes a real issue of the emotions. In *Wilderness,* there is a conflicting desire for a different life, for escape from the tedium of modern life to the wild, untamed and feral existence that allows complete freedom and, on the other hand, there is an equally intense desire for known comforts, for the familiarity of the known, the recognisable, those aspects of an individual's life history. The tension and splittings between these twins desires for freedom, for escape and return, resonate through the narrative.

Wilderness is more than escaping the metropolis, it is about the unidentifiable, alien aspects of metropolis itself, for Dan: *Spring break had now begun, but he was not sure he wanted the freedom. Freedom to sit on this porch all day and watch total strangers go about their lives. Perhaps the familiar contours of classes and papers and the fragile energy of his students would be better.* (p.35). There is not a simple urban:rural divide here, but an attempt to tap into the most problematic of human conditions, the relation between the evolved human animal and the cultured technological person. Familiarity, here, is the safety and stability of the known, what we can relate to and recognise as part of ourselves. As for Alice: *She felt safer staying put, not wanting to upset the balance she had established. In this house, in her mother's house, in the bar she sometimes visited, she felt, if not at home, at least less alien, with some measure or illusion of control.* (p.44). The wilderness is both an internal and external landscape. It signifies the anxieties and conflicts which humans have about their lives and their identities: *It's what you have to leave behind to head into the wilderness.* (p.52). Understanding wilderness should be a process of acknowledging both continuity and discontinuity, and of recognising this domain as the 'uncolonised other' (Plumwood, 1993). Wilderness is neither an alienation nor an assimilation into the self, it has its own autonomy.

Alice's desire for freedom and the comfort of familiarity is satisfied by her relationship with Dan, her fear of isolation becomes a role reversal for her: *She was afraid, but not of him. She was afraid that now he might go away, the way she always did, even with the*

men she'd liked and who wanted her to stay. (p.80). The final familiar freedom for Alice as a woman is the emotional intimacy she experiences with him: *Listening to the echo in her mind, she lay in Erik's embrace, letting her tears flow like welcome rain. It had only lasted a moment, but she knew the sound, even though she'd never given voice to it before. It was freedom.* (p.112). In the book, Alice's lives as woman and wolf are reconciled and she and Dan 'live happily ever after' as she finds her own wilderness, an escape to nature for the wolf, and the acceptance and love of a man for her as a woman. In the derived television drama, the ending to the narrative is dramatically changed. Alice as the wolf finds the wilderness but does not return. She leaves the life of a woman and her relationship with Dan to live as a wolf despite Dan's desire for her as a woman and acceptance of her as a wolf. The drama ends with Dan in a family scene with his wife and two young daughters, telling them a bedtime story. This fairy tale is about his relationship with Alice and her life as a wolf. He tells his children that Alice was happier as a wolf. And the final scene is of the wolf running through the forest, finally free.

The decision to change the ending is obviously made by the script writers and deemed suitable for television. The narrative is concluded with reference to itself as a story and is, therefore, diffused as the metaphorical and mythological aspects of the tale are erased. A happy ending here means that woman and wolf are separated and that Alice has chosen the life of the wolf, a decision for the apparent freedom of the wilderness. This ending sends several messages, not least that there will be a happy ending, a common narrative resolution but also the underlying paradigmatic structure is ignored. The deconstructed meaning associated with the human:animal dichotomy is obliterated, and the ideological assumptions which support the dichotomy are retained - humans are not animals and they cannot live the life of animals and be content. The wilderness is romanticised as some kind of external salvation, beyond the reach of humans and the time it has taken to construct a narrative about species boundaries, human relations to other animals, the bestial construction of sexuality and rationality and the function of freedom in human life is wasted in a final acquiescence to ideological speciesist sensibilities. The drama failed the

book and there are several reasons why that happened.

Discussion

One of the major reasons beyond the idiosyncrasies of the script writers and director of why the television drama deviated so much from the original text is to do with the pragmatics of television production. Producers want programmes to make money and to do that they need to have large audiences so that television companies will buy their programmes. In order to ensure large audiences (*Wilderness* averaged 8 million viewers for each of its three episodes) a drama has to abide by certain conventions. The first most obvious is that television is a visual medium. What we see is certainly as important, if not more so, than what we hear on television. Drama constitutes a set of events that are coherent and progress towards a resolution. The whole notion of the dramatic is highly relevant to television, the impressive, striking events and relations, the suspense and surprise involved in the dramatic telling of a story suit the visual media well. So, a successful drama has a good plot and strong characters. *Wilderness* the book meets both criteria, however, the major problem with the translation from a written text to a visual one is the inclusion of the protagonists' thoughts that often describe motivations of behaviour. Moreover, the author's description of a particular scene will bring detail to the attention of the reader that would most certainly be ignored by the viewer. So there are practical problems in the interpretation and translation of one medium to another. However, these difficulties do not excuse the intentional misrepresentation of the story. Some changes seem arbitrary and irrelevant: Alice was a part-time student and travel agent in the book, she became a university librarian in the drama; Alice's aunt was also a wolf in the book and helped her in her search for other wolves, in the television drama, an academic who specialises in wolves tells Alice of a wolf sanctuary and assists her in her integration there; but the representation of sexuality - the naked images of Alice and the references to anal sex - and the changes to the ending have profoundly affected the meaning of *Wilderness*.

On the whole, the television drama retains the syntagmatic structure of the narrative. The metonymic meaning of the primary elements holds the narrative propositions together in a coherent whole. The relationships are well defined and the sequence of events is maintained. However, the paradigmatic structure does not stand the test of media transformation. It is at this level of semiosis that the intertextuality of the narratives goes awry. The metaphorical aspects of the primary signifiers do not retain their original meaning. The subversion of the animal:human dichotomy is lost in the television drama. It reverts back to some of the two dimensional screen narratives on werewolves. Indeed, whereas the original text is a modern twist on the traditional lycanthropic tale, the screen adaptation is a reflection of the horror movie heritage. Naked women, savage animals, and saccharine endings are the stalwarts of that genre. Danvers' attempts to subvert these images are denied in the visual translation of his story. The cultural assumptions that were being challenged in the book are evident in the semantic meaning of the television drama as coded frames of reference for the relationship between humans and other animals.

In relation to the model of dehumanisation, this semiotic analysis of *Wilderness* produces several insights. In terms of psychodynamically structured hegemonic discourse, the book has tried and succeeded to provide an alternative discursive space for understanding humans as animals and human relation to animals. The television drama, on the other, has interpreted the narrative through the lens of the dominant ideology which depends primarily on the human:animal hierarchical dualism. The concept of a linguistically structured unconscious mind is addressed through the psychoanalytic elements in the narrative revolving around Alice's rebellion against her parents, her sexual reconciliation of emotional conflict and Luther's degenerative grasp of reality. Although these episodes are evident in the book and the drama, it is a practical consequence of translation that the extent to which the wolf represents Alice's unconscious and the woman represents the wolf's unconscious is severely underplayed. The relation between unconscious desire and available ideological discourses is mediated by the psychodynamic strategies of projection and introjection, and the ideological mechanisms of naturalisation and rationalisation. The

human Self is the meeting point for the introjection of 'human' qualities in relation to the projection of 'animal' qualities onto the Other, the other animals. This hierarchical opposition is mediated by taboo, and the immutability of species is amongst the highest order of taboos. The undifferentiated category of animals reflects the psychodynamic construction of animals as cultural artefacts and moral surrogates. This association is sustained through the naturalisation of animals, their relegation to the natural sphere. Whereas, this process of exclusion leads to the highly differentiated special category of human through the rationalisation of humans, their defined status as rational and cultural humans.

This system of dehumanisation is evident at the level of semiosis between the two different forms of media. This warped intertexuality signifies the power of hegemonic discourse and the vulnerability of alternative paradigms. The werewolf is a therianthropic beast, a representation of cultural myths which signify the taboo intermediary category between human and animal through the creation of chimeras. In Danvers' book the mythological chimera is the integrated human animal, in the television adaptation, the silver bullet translation destroys the chimera and once again privileges the human:animal dichotomy. The aim of this translation and all its changes is to preserve other human:human dichotomies. The book gave a language of access to the human:animal hierarchy which acts as a referent for all hierarchies. Giving that access to these hierarchies, through an authentic television translation of the story, is what the 'regulators' appear to have been scared of.

Wilderness, as an allegorical tale, tells the story of human representations of themselves as animals. In doing so, its insights are more than to the hierarchical boundaries between humans and all other animals. It provides perspicacity to the relations *amongst* humans which draw on the reason:emotion hierarchical dualism and all its contingencies. Humans are disciplined, through discursive power, to take subject positions which reproduce these dualisms. Their investments in these subjectivities permeate the construction of hierarchy

amongst all animals. *Wilderness* makes claims for the reconstruction and redefinition of the *human* animal and, in doing so, it subverts all the other status hierarchies which exercise ideological violence and naturalise inequality. The werewolf, here, is not the traditional threat to human ideological estrangement from the nonhuman animal world, it is a menace more horrifying than that genre's representation. The human animal (Alice) is a challenge to the foundations of hierarchy based on 'rationality' and the stigmatisation of the Other. These dualisms construct the world as a set of 'naturalised' hierarchies through which disciplinary power legitimises discourses of violence which are conditional on the establishment of hierarchy.

PART THREE: RECONSTRUCTING THE BEAST

In the final part of this thesis, I draw together the empirical findings and illustrate their theoretical and practical implications. The popular discourses, identified through the framework discourse analysis and the media representations which support these discourses, explored here through a semiological content analysis, are examples of disciplinary power at work. They restrict beliefs and behaviour through convergence to speciesist ideologies. Individual people take up subject positions within these discourses to legitimise (and reproduce) their status as 'human' (not-animal). These investments are articulated through metaphorical and metonymic projections and introjections, resulting in the psychodynamic splitting of 'animal' into 'pet' versus 'beast'. The psychodynamic construction of human subjectivity is predicated on the taboo (ambiguous) meaning of the 'beast'. Resistance to this dispersed power is possible through challenges to the hegemony of these discourses and the ideological (and physical) violence they perpetuate. This contest is based on the deconstruction of the human:animal hierarchical dichotomy. Reconstructing the 'beast' removes ideological restrictions and replaces speciesism with 'discourses of access', new discursive spaces which acknowledge both the *human* and the *nonhuman* beast.

9: FAMILY, FOOD OR FANTASY:
RECONSTRUCTING THE 'BEAST WITHIN'

Overview

The fact that social psychology has neglected nonhuman animals (except as 'human models') does not surprise me given the experimental use of animals in much of modern psychology. To talk about nonhuman animals in the way that I have done here would undermine the moral responsibility, if not the scientific credibility, of those psychologists who exploit nonhuman animals in the name of giving psychology 'scientific' status. Positioning this research within psychology constitutes such a challenge to this exploitation, as Birke comments:

> ...to challenge the twin assumptions that animals are in nature, and that domination of nature is intrinsic to human culture, means to call into question the ethical grounds for using animals as 'models' for humans (Birke, 1994:143).

What does surprise me, though, is the lack of application of some well established theoretical frameworks to the question of human subjectivity and nonhuman animal identity, even outside of psychology. Leach (1964) lay the foundations for this research in his seminal essay on animal categories and verbal abuse. As a structuralist, his work was influenced by Saussurean linguistics. Any delve into structuralism brings contact with Lacan's (1977) conceptualisation of the linguistically structured unconscious and the parallels between metaphor and condensation, metonymy and displacement. And reading some of these protagonists of the structuralist movement leads one, inevitably, to post-structuralism and the insights of Foucault (1980) and Derrida (1982). What these theoreticians have written has provided this generation of psychologists the vocabulary, the concepts and the impetus to reconceptualise the world they live in. Hollway (1989) has succeeded in integrating these theoretical perspectives in a way in which content *and* process can be, simultaneously, theorised. The application of these theories to human relations with other animals was just waiting to happen.

The thesis has attempted to map out this bestial territory which, simultaneously, divides and unites humans to the rest of the animal kingdom. Social psychology's theorisation of human subjectivity, never mind identity, had not addressed the issue of how and why nonhuman animals are used in these constructions. Hollway's work has confronted, and been motivated by, the issue of emancipation for women, through the analysis of the psychodynamic construction of subjectivity. My concern was to address the possibility, emanating from this, for the liberation of nonhuman *and* human animals from the dictates of anthropocentric and speciesist ideologies.

9.1 Theoretical Implications

Representations and discourses on nonhuman animals provide the resources for analysing and interpreting the psychodynamic constructions of human subjectivity. Deconstruction of these discourses, like those explored here in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, reveals the ways in which power pervades them and constructs knowledge about humans in relation to other animals.

Discursive Investments

This work is primarily theoretical based on the neglect in social psychology of human relations to other animals. By identifying the anti-speciesist potential in Hollway's work, it became possible to deconstruct anthropocentrism and identify its root causes and far-reaching effects. This depended on the ability of this theory of human subjectivity to account for the contradictions in people's beliefs and behaviour through the relation of the unconscious mind to the discursive world. Hollway's concept of investment provided the intellectual tool by which I could excavate the contents of human representations and discourses on nonhuman animals. It also required using other theoretical devices which Hollway herself had drawn upon: Foucault's analysis of power, Derrida's concept of deconstruction, Lacan's inquiry to

the unconscious mind and Klein's defence mechanisms, to interpret these texts and reconstruct a model of dehumanisation. By introducing Leach's analysis of human and nonhuman animal categories, based on social distance and taboo, I was able to integrate these theoretical perspectives to account for the place of nonhuman animal identity in the construction of human subjectivity.

The strength of psychodynamic modelling is in its ability to transcend the individual:social dichotomy whilst, simultaneously, accounting for the conscious *and* unconscious emergence of individual human beings through the multiplicity of discourses. The way discourses constitute the subject, in a dynamic relation with unconscious investment, through suppressing and expressing signification, provides a theoretical account of the process and content of human subjectivity. Hollway provides a post-structuralist, anti-dualist explanation for how and why people become subjects within discourse. The use of Leach's framework, for the analysis of nonhuman animal categories and verbal abuse, provides the context in which to explore the use of nonhuman animal identity in the construction of human subjectivity. Leach argued that taboo breaks up the environment so that it can be classified in terms of social distance from the Self. Through the empirical analyses, I have found evidence for Leach's framework.

Ambiguous Animals

Leach's original map of social distance proposed that 'pet' animals were neither wholly 'human' or wholly 'animal', indeed, they occupy an ambiguous and, therefore, taboo, position between humans and other animals. As the participants in the interviews talked about their pets, it became clear that these animals are anomalous. They are, simultaneously, members of human families and strictly taboo when it comes to nonhuman animal use for food, at least in Britain. However, the descriptions of 'pet' animals within the Object, Referent and Utensil

discourses conspire to position the pet, ideologically, on the 'animal' side of the human:animal dichotomy. The invocation of 'choice' as an ameliorating factor in why other cultures use these animals for food, undermines their 'family' status. These contradictions in the representations of pet animals are indicative of Leach's analysis of ambiguity and taboo. The contradictory status can only be reconciled through the anthropomorphic projections and attributions which place them in the private realm of the home, and the zoomorphic projections and attributions, usually theriomorphic, which serve to dehumanise the pet and reconstruct the animal as objectified and pejorative. The metonymic use of pet animals, as theriomorphic representations of humans, reinforces their contradictory status as, simultaneously, animal and not-animal.

The representations of nonhuman animals which British people eat, as indicated by the participants in the interviews, are objectified. The living animal is comprehended as 'meat', dead and disconnected to its previous life. The taboos on whole animals and organs are testament to the need to deny that these pieces of flesh once belonged to a live animal. The realisation of this relation was a significant factor in the vegetarian participants' exclusion of meat. Apart from the obvious health risks, it would be interesting to find out if the exposure of abattoir conditions in the recent 'BSE crisis' on television has had any effects in terms of reconnecting meat with its source. Agricultural animals are also subject to the objectification of pejorative use, as evident in the use of the 'beast' metaphors to describe a range of farm animals. The vituperative use of these animal names, especially against women, construct indifference, if not hostility, towards the fate of these animals. The representation of agricultural animals as 'natural' food is a construction based on contrived living conditions and the naturalistic fallacy (fantasy) that because humans are omnivores, it is morally justifiably to eat other animals, whilst eating people is morally abhorrent.

Representations of the 'beast', through the semiological content analysis of the newspaper articles, illustrated how the Referent and the Object discourses interacted. Pervasive zoomorphism, including therianthropic and theriomorphic strategies, defined each of the domains, Human, Animal and Object. The use of nonhuman animal imagery to describe each of these categories is indicative of the ideology of speciesism, based in the human:animal dichotomy. The fact that the inanimate objects did not have their own behaviour, for the writers to speak of, makes the use of nonhuman animal imagery plausible. Moreover, despite the predominance of Cartesian thinking, animals, apart from humans, do have a range of behaviours to draw upon so, again, the use of these images to describe Animal 'beasts' is credible. However, humans engage in a variety of behaviours which other animals do not and the neglect of these images, in favour for nonhuman animal representations in the construction of Human 'beasts', is a zoomorphic strategy based in the association of the morally negative 'beast' with the nonhuman animal. This not only dehumanises those humans who are represented as bestial, it further reinforces the negative representation of nonhuman animals through their synonymous definition with the bestial.

9.2 The Deconstructed Beast

The basis of these representations of nonhuman animals is in the Christian and Cartesian hierarchical dualisms between humans and other animals, and between mind and body. The relegation of nonhuman animals outside the scope of moral consideration and rights is a direct descendant of these hierarchical constructions. To legitimise the widespread use and abuse of nonhuman animals as food, labour and entertainment, the rationalisation for these objectifications had to come from appeals either to the supposed lack of sentience (and, therefore, pain) in these animals or the notion that these animals are dependent on humans for their survival and, therefore, happiness (an inversion of the sentience argument). At the root

of this rationalisation is the ideological position that humans are not really animals. The religious and secular elevation of humans is evident in the discourses and representation which emerged from this research. The chains of Christian and Cartesian hierarchy remain pervasive. The scientific world's dubious double-edged use of nonhuman animals in research as, simultaneously, 'models' for humans yet denied the moral consideration of humans, has emerged from, and been legitimised by, this human:animal dichotomy. In order for humans to be privileged, other animals must be penalised.

Anthropocentrism

Indeed, human ignorance of nonhuman animal lives, based on anthropocentric discourses, provides the structural parallel to other forms of ignorance and oppression. The use of nonhuman animal names, to objectify and dehumanise humans, is only one way of using these discourses to discriminate against the Other. The way in which hierarchy is defended as a 'natural' way of constructing the world, renders prejudice and discrimination amongst people less offensive. The mistaken equation of 'equality' and 'difference' means that denying humans and other animals the right not to be violated appears logical. Humans are different to other animals and, therefore, they can state claims on legal and moral protection and defences against their status as not-animal. However, this is not an absolute dichotomous position as the characteristics which determine the human:animal hierarchy ('rationality', intelligence, language) are replayed by humans against *other* humans. The structure of prejudice is built on status hierarchies, on privileged access to knowledge, produced by imbued power relations. The human:animal dichotomy is only one of these hierarchies but its strength lies in its clandestine nature. It is reproduced in homes with pets, on tables with meat and through symbolic representation. The ubiquity of the status of nonhuman animals as 'family', 'food' or 'fantasy' is the key to the power of ideological violence and the discursive structuring of knowledge about other animals and, by implication, about humans.

The complex and contradictory nature of 'humanity' and 'animality' has meant that redefining these concepts has required that they are culturally and historically located. Identifying the legacies and endurance of Christian and Cartesian dualism, the religious and secular faces of speciesism, provides the cultural context in which to locate the relations between humans and other animals as emergent, historically constituted, social phenomena. The Biblical and scientific 'beast' represents the Other to be controlled, destroyed or reconstructed. Our cultural neglect of Darwinism has been a consequence of wanting to deny that humans are not 'worthy the interposition of a deity' and, in the social sciences, wanting to deny the 'animal' body to the 'human' mind. The inherent dualism to these movements underpins the relegation of the status of the nonhuman animal to that of 'beast'. Darwin provided an alternative to dualism. Through detailing the continuity amongst species, the rhetorical power of the 'beast' could have become disabled. But resistance to Darwin's insights subjugated Darwinism to the realms of reactionary intellectual and religious denial. The social scientific construction of 'human' continued to necessitate the psychodynamic construction of the 'beast', as Birke comments:

> ...the very existence of this mythical beast is a problem for it helps to reconstruct the nature/culture boundary. It *is* nature, pure biology. In turn, those who would defend a belief that there is a little bit of this creature in all of us use tales of the mythical beast as a victim of its genes to defend their beliefs. And so the fables of biological determinism - of animals as models for fixity in our own behaviour - persist (Birke, 1994:133-4).

Humanity is constructed in relation to animality and vice versa. The psychological basis of this dichotomy is the hierarchical expression of subject positions through discourse; the strategies of anthropomorphism and zoomorphism (therianthropism and theriomorphism); and positioning nonhuman animals in the Object, Referent and Utensil discourses. Using the model of dehumanisation, I have deconstructed the binary opposition human:animal to reveal

the position of the 'beast' as a cultural surrogate for human fears and desires. The deconstructed 'beast' illustrates the operation of taboo as pet animals are not meat, and agricultural animals are not pets. Those few animals which cross these borders, such as the rabbit, are subject to Leach's analysis of obscenity. Equally, the 'beast' is synonymous with 'animal'. 'Beasts' may be described as human, but this representation will draw on *nonhuman* animal imagery to avoid the implication that humans really are animals. This deconstruction reveals the extent to which the terms 'human' and 'animal'' are dependent on one another for their meaning and value. The 'beast' is the taboo position between these naturalised categories; it signifies, simultaneously, continuity and discontinuity.

9.3 Methodological Post Scripts

The challenge of exploring nonhuman animal identity in relation to human subjectivity is significantly rooted in methodology. The need to use qualitative methods in this kind of research is justified by the nature of the theoretical questions. The intrinsic complexity to issues of nonhuman animal representations, and the reproduction of these images in discourse, means that only a qualitative design and analysis will do justice to this social psychological dilemma. Qualitative methods are characterised by two main issues. One concerns subjectivity and intersubjectivity, the other is triangulation.

Triangulation Revisited

Triangulation is based on the notion that social phenomena are dynamic, subject to change, emergent properties of social life and, therefore, multiple perspectives on the issue is an authentic way of accessing the meanings of the phenomena. Triangulation allows the exploration of the depth and breadth of complex issues. Furthermore, multiple methods will

permit a focus on change and process. Using different methods to triangulate the research inquiry incorporates different perspectives and produces deeper insight to account for the intrinsic complexity of the issue.

In this research I have triangulated three methods - discourse analysis, semiological content analysis and narrative semiological analysis - and each of these methods has produced data and analysis which contribute to the whole of the research being more than simply the sum of its parts. Through the interviews I identified three principal organising discourses which pertained to different, yet overlapping, sets of nonhuman animal signifiers. These discourses were the dominant ways through which the interview participants organised their representations of nonhuman animals. Whether they were talking about pets, meat or animal images, these participants' signifiers conformed to the Object, Referent and Utensil discourses. Each of these discourses contributed to the ideology of speciesism. Humans, because of their membership of Homo sapiens sapiens, were valued above and beyond all other animals. A significant part of the naturalisation of this ideology is that humans are not 'real' animals. Each of these discourses constructed nonhuman animals into 'good' or 'bad'. There were animals that were 'good' pets and others that would make 'bad' pets. There were animals that would be suitable for meat and others that would not. There were affectionate uses of animals names as well as pejorative uses. Each of these identifications reflected the split of nonhuman animals into 'good' pets - unthreatening and in some Leachian sense not-animal - and 'bad' beasts - those animals that could be eaten or used negatively to represent humans. This is a simplification, of course, there are animals that can not be pets simply because it would not be practical, however, a large part of that problem has been addressed through the selective breeding and domestication of nonhuman animals for human use in the first place. Within British culture, some of those domesticated animals are pets and the rest are meat, rarely the twain shall meet.

The Object discourse was identified as a heuristic for organising signifiers of nonhuman animals as material things that could be possessed, bought and sold, packaged and transformed. The Referent discourse was distinguished as a set of signifiers which identified nonhuman animals as the antithesis of humans, their moral and intellectual opposites. The Utensil discourse labelled signifiers which constructed nonhuman animals as implements for human use and benefit. The human participants were positioned and positioned themselves within these available discourses in order to construct and protect their subjectivities as 'human', not 'animal'. The semiological content analysis of the 'beast' metaphors explored the ambiguous nature of 'beast' representations as both synonymous with 'animal' and negatively identified with 'human'. The process of dehumanisation explored within the context of the three dominant discourses was investigated here using 'beast' representations.

This analysis illustrated several aspects of the discourses identified in the previous study. The 'beast' in the Object discourse was defined either as a neutral or technical term for 'animal' or as a negative representation of animal behaviour. Through the Referent discourse, the 'beast' signifier, simultaneously, objectified nonhuman animals and dehumanised human animals. In the Utensil discourse, 'beast' signified the parsimonious representation of 'bad' behaviour in either humans or nonhuman animals.

The metaphorical representations of 'beast' related to the ontological divide between 'human' versus 'animal' and the cultural moral surrogacy that defines the bestial. The ontological status of nonhuman animals, represented through the dominant discourses as inferior, to humans was illustrated through the use of nonhuman animal 'beast' metaphors to describe humans and inanimate objects. The predominance of the nonhuman animal category of 'beast' metaphors testifies to the projection of the 'beast within' humans to the rest of the animal kingdom. The psychodynamic construction of nonhuman animals (the Other) as bestial

preserves and protects the concept of humans (the Self) as moral, cultural and superior. The metaphors analysis illustrates the way in which psychodynamic positioning and reproduction of subjectivity occurs in the Object and Referent discourses.

The semiotic analysis of *Wilderness* revealed several insights to corroborate the findings of the two previous studies. The novel demonstrated that a contemporary translation of a popular myth could be undertaken which could potentially subvert the implicit messages of the original myth. By destabilising the species and gender boundaries which had previously defined the werewolf myth, the author, Danvers, had provided a text which could be interpreted as a new discursive space from which to draw new meanings about the relationship between humans and nonhuman animals, and between gender and species. The theriomorphic representation of the woman *as* the wolf signified the human animal. It deconstructed, through a fictional representation, the speciesist ideological assumption of humans as not-animals. It broke with the traditional therianthropic bestial representation of the werewolf as half-man half-animal. In doing so, the novel provided access to a non-hierarchical representation of 'animal', an inclusive representation which challenges the Object, Referent and Utensil discourses identified through the interview analysis. Furthermore, it contests the metaphorical representations of the bestial as 'animal', as the moral antithesis to 'human'. The bestial is human because humans are animals. In *Wilderness*, the book, moral surrogacy is replaced with subjective continuity. Nonhuman 'beasts' are no longer the 'scapegoats' of human behaviour; they are constructed as parallel subjects of life not antithetical objects to be feared and subjugated.

The inability of the film makers to produce a credible translation of this allegorical tale speaks volumes about the hegemony of speciesist ideology. Here, the woman cannot exist as women and wolf - humans cannot exist simultaneously as animals. They must choose one or the other. To be 'human' is to reject the wilderness, to sentimentalise it and covet its 'freedom'

from the cultural constraints of being human. To be 'animal' is to be the wilderness, wild, untamable, threatening and bestial. These representations are legitimised by the human:animal ontological divide. Alternatives are suppressed beneath the power of dualism.

The discourse analysis, the content analysis and the semiotic analysis established the model of dehumanisation as an authentic account of the literal and symbolic uses of nonhuman animal identities in psychodynamic constructions of human subjectivity. This level of authenticity was only possible through the use of these multiple methods and triangulated design. To ensure the credibility of qualitative research within psychology it is necessary to be explicit about the way in which the research belongs to the discipline. It will be evident from the previous chapters that I have employed a variety of theoretical perspectives from a variety of disciplines. Indeed, the purpose of this multidisciplinary approach has been to enrich the model of dehumanisation and to compensate for psychology's reluctance to move beyond modernism. I have located this research in the post-structuralist work of Hollway (1989), having drawn on important modernist and post-modernist concepts from a variety of theoreticians. The absence in the psychological literature on the relation between human subjectivity, an issue which has gained credibility within social psychology, and nonhuman animal identity has been the motivating force behind this research.

Reflexive Analysis

Subjectivity is commonly believed to mean the opposite of objectivity, being subjective is not to be objective and vice versa. Its relation to 'rationality' and the reason:emotion dichotomy have been explored in the thesis. Where in the majority of quantitative methods subjectivity has been maligned and eliminated in the name of objectivity, in qualitative research, subjectivity is a research tool, an insight to the mechanisms at work in any social phenomenon. Subjectivity, here, takes on the meaning of the subject, the description of individual human's

conscious and unconscious being. Within qualitative methodology, subjectivity is utilised through the notion of reflexivity and the researcher's insight to her motivations and ways of doing research. Incorporating reflexivity into the research protocol goes a long way to ensuring that the 'biases' of research are made explicit as a legitimate part of the research process. Accounting for researcher subjectivity, through reflexivity, is part of the process of making research questions and their evaluation transparent. Emotional investments in research account for the position of researcher, through reflexive analysis, to the construction and interpretations of research findings.

It is also central to qualitative methodology to address the intersubjectivity between the researcher and the participants. This is obviously not relevant when the data are drawn from pre-existing texts, such as newspaper articles, literature and film. However, where other people are involved as participants in the research, it is essential to protect their confidentiality and anonymity, as well as inviting them to receive final reports and submit comments if they so wish. The time of treating humans as experimental 'objects' is long gone in social psychology. It time now to turn our attention to the role of nonhuman animals in psychology and insist in the same level of respect. The participants in this research were previously unknown to me, although since then I have had the opportunity to meet some of them again and their response to their participation has been predominantly positive. They have expressed interest in the work and appreciation for being asked to think about issues that some of them had never considered. They had found thinking about their relations to animals hard work but felt that there was some intellectual reward in addressing these issues for themselves.

I was conscious throughout the interviews that as a researcher I had a responsibility to the participants in my research not to judge them nor to misrepresent them. I tried to maintain the integrity of their beliefs to the best of my ability whilst illustrating contradictions when and

where they emerged as part of the individual's reproduction of their subjective position. That reproduction occurred in the intersubjective context of one-to-one interviews. In establishing rapport and providing a positive atmosphere for the participants to express their beliefs, I did not reveal my own perspectives on these matters. To some degree that may have been a failing on my part, a remnant of positivist, detached methods where the participant is not to be 'contaminated' with the researcher's interests. However, I think that perhaps there is a prerequisite for maintaining some form of distance, after all interviews are not conversations in the conventional sense. I wanted to establish dialogue but not to contribute consciously to the inevitability of self-presentation on the part of the participants. To that end, during the interviews I did not consciously reinforce or contradict their beliefs, rather I aimed to produce a non-judgmental atmosphere in which genuine thoughts and feelings could be expressed.

Reflecting on the researcher's investments in the research is a genuine way of providing some form of accountability for the research. My motivations from the beginning have been stated, and, at the end, they have not changed. The desire to address the status of nonhuman animals in the psychodynamic construction of human subjectivity has propelled the thesis through times of internal and external doubt in the legitimacy of this project. Accusations of obscurity and absurdity have been rife. However, the very tenets of qualitative research, so currently esteemed in social psychology, have provided me with some of the concepts (subjectivity, reflexivity, discourse) which have been the bedrock for my explorations. In the area of qualitative research, the dimensions of subjectivity, the relation between subject and object, issues of power and prejudice, I feel vindicated.

9.4 Animal Liberation

Nevertheless, it is the *practical* implications of this research which have always been my motivations for doing it in the first place, and it is in the possibilities of social change where I find justification for this research. The practicalities addressed, here, are largely theoretical and, as there is nothing more practical than a good theory, let me elucidate on the implications of this work. The challenge to psychology, and to general ways about thinking about nonhuman animals, is to shatter the restraints influencing hegemonic discourse and explore knew ways of seeing and being. Analysing the process of dehumanisation has enabled me to replace the prejudiced and violent anthropocentrism with the anthropomorphic heuristic. This has meant engaging in a critical deconstruction of the Self in relation to the Other in order to identify and assess the position of nonhuman identities in relation to human subjectivities. This deconstruction has produced a new discursive space through problematising contemporary representations and discourses on the nature of nonhuman animals.

Discursive Resistance

An important part of the motivation behind this research has been an interest in the politics of change. In Chapter 4, I indicated some of the difficulties inherent to nonhuman animal liberation. Here I address some of these practical problems. The fact that nonhuman animals do not have the ability to empower themselves means that humans must provide a 'voice' for them. But this is not simply a question of human altruism. Humans must recognise, as I hope I have established through this research, that human emancipation is inextricably linked to animal liberation. As Joffe (1996) identified, there is a need to increase public awareness about issues which are perceived as threatening and are, therefore, subject to prejudice. To that end, there is a significant role for both public protest and education about the numerous violations of nonhuman animals by humans. However, the representation of that role has

proven contradictory.

A significant part of the problem is the way animal rights and animal welfare are represented as antithetical. The representations of animal rights activists, by the interview participants, describe the processes by which media images of the defence of animal rights produce salient images of terrorism and extremity. There is a fear that animal rights 'goes too far', that it disturbs boundaries, identities and morality. Indeed, this is an inevitable consequence of reconstructing the 'beast'. Where semantic interdependence is reinstated between humans and other animals, so moral interdependence will follow. The implications are extensive. To acknowledge that humans are animals, through more than just a casual reference to Darwin, invokes the moral and social contingencies of the deconstructed human:animal dichotomy. If we do not take 'rationality', 'intelligence' or 'language' as criteria for moral consideration as we affect not to do for humans, then the possibility of a consistent and agreeable charter for the treatment of all animals may be possible. The fact that it is not evident now in the way humans treat each other is testament to the ubiquity of mind:body dualism, somatophobia and the elevation of 'reason' to the detriment of emotion. Here, Kleinian theory on the resolution of the paranoid-schizoid position may provide some insight. As described in Chapter 4, infants develop from this position of splitting objects into 'good' and 'bad' parts and then projecting or introjecting accordingly to the 'depressive' position through which there is a tolerance and acceptance of ambivalence - that there is both 'good' and 'bad' in all objects including the Self. The acceptance of this ambivalence decreases the desire to split objects in order to protect the 'good' part of the Self. For my analysis, if people can come to accept the ambivalence of being 'simultaneously both animal and human' then the problem as Leach (1982) identified it would cease to be so problematic.

If we cannot achieve some sense of harmony amongst humans, it is said, then it is obtuse to insist on the inclusion of other animals to a moral system which fails humans. This would be true if it were not for the fact that this moral system, derived from the Enlightenment Project, succeeds in obscuring the disciplinary effects of 'rationalist' discourses, as Masson and McCarthy comment:

> When humans refuse to inflict pain on others, surely it is because they assume they *feel*. It is not because another person can think, nor because they can reason, nor because they speak that we respect their physical boundaries but because they feel. They feel pain, humiliation, sorrow and other emotions, perhaps even some we do not yet recognise. If, as I believe, animals feel pain and sorrow and all the other emotions, these feelings cannot be ignored in behaviour towards them. A bear is not going to compose Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, but then neither is our next-door neighbour. We do not for this reason conclude that we have the freedom to experiment upon him, hunt him for sport or eat him for food. (Masson and McCarthy, 1996:218).

Tracing the emergence of these concepts allows the identification of an appropriate space to resist the power of these discourses. Dehumanisation is the process by which people objectify themselves and other animals. The starting point of dehumanisation is the mind:body dualism (religious and secular) which elevates the notion of 'reason' to the detriment of 'emotion'. Humans and other animals are differentially assigned their semantic and ideological status according to these hierarchical dualisms. This relation between the subject and the object informs other status hierarchies. Dehumanisation, as a psychodynamic strategy, uses post-Enlightenment, anthropocentric and androcentric constructions and definitions of 'human' to exercise power and discriminate against animals (including humans) based on their exclusion from the realm of the 'soul', 'reason' or 'culture'. The consensual, disciplinary power of these discourses converges into homogenising ideological violence. The naturalisation of this violence is a product of these divisive discourses. This research was designed as a challenge

to the epistemological basis of such homogeneity.

By comparing the restrictive popular and media discourses with the subverting discourse of *Wilderness*, it is possible to propose an alternative 'discourse of access', access to the previously naturalised hierarchical status of certain subject positions, such as that of 'human' in opposition to 'animal':

> ...the discourse of access flattens subject positions in any situation by divesting
> them from the prestige they carry (Humphreys and Kirtsoglou, 1997:21).

The 'prestigious' subject positions, sustained by anthropocentric discourses and the reproduction of speciesist ideologies, can only be challenged by undermining the authority attached to them. This authority is sanctioned by 'discourses of truth' which naturalise hierarchy and promote violence. Recognising the dualistic foundations of hierarchy and the spurious nature of these discourses would invalidate their stature. *Wilderness*, the novel, provides this kind of access by illustrating the fallacy of binary oppositions, through the deconstruction of the human:animal dichotomy, and the redefinition of the 'beast'. The inability of the television production company to translate these themes onto the screen is testament to the pervasive power of speciesism. This thesis, through also deconstructing the 'beast', has attempted to play a role in the undermining of that power.

Alien Animals

As we approach the millennium, insecurity about human status on Earth has been reflected in the anxieties we feel about the universe in a series of films and television programmes on UFOs and extraterrestrials. The human exploration of the unknown - Space - and the inconceivable - aliens - is the cosmic mirroring of local earthly concerns. This double-edged anxiety/curiosity streak, expressing itself at a cultural level in these texts, corresponds to

Hollway's appropriation of Klein's motivating force behind projection and introjection - anxiety. A range of films - *Independence Day, Event Horizon, The Fifth Element, Men In Black, Contact, Alien: The Resurrection* - have articulated human anxiety through the inversion human(self):animal(other) hierarchy. The alien:human hierarchy is here to stay. These representations, implicitly, question human hierarchical constructions and the exploitations which arises from them. They reflect human anxiety about human identity, boundaries and the meaning of life. The aliens of our own habitat (Earth), nonhuman animals, are made familiar and controllable through anthropomorphism and zoomorphism. The same strategies are being incorporated in the representation of these alien animals. Their depiction as arthropodal and reptilian is a manifestation of a deep psychological fear of the Other. And the zoomorphism of these creatures as representative of animal species which humans have difficulty relating to and, therefore, understanding (the subject of numerous phobias) is the articulation of the home-based fear of those animals. I am reminded of an episode of *The Twilight Zone* which expresses these fears astutely. My adaptation, here, illustrates the essence of my argument:

'To Serve Man'

An American man is telling a story from a room with all the necessities - food, warmth, light but no luxuries. He is depressed as he recalls when he worked for the United Nations, how a ship landed on Earth from Outer Space. Of course the people of Earth were petrified but the aliens who emerged from the ship gave the people a book and began to eliminate war, poverty and disease from Earth. It was this man's and a female colleague's job to decode the book written in a strange language. As he began to work on the title he realised that the title of the book was 'To Serve Man'. As news of this spread, people throughout the world grew to like and trust the aliens. They were the new saviours of humanity. The man and women worked tirelessly on decoding the rest of the book, a long and detailed script. As the woman finally deciphers the meaning of the text, people from around the world begin to board alien ships which have come to take human tourists to the alien's planet. The man is amongst them as a representative of the United Nations. As the man is at the entrance to the ship, he sees his colleague. She runs into the crowd, screaming that she has decoded the rest of the book. The man looks at the woman. The doors to the ship close in front of him and all the others as the woman's words stab his ears: 'It's a recipe book!!!'

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Appendix I: Interview Schedule: Experiences with Animals

If you had to characterise yourself as an animal, what would that animal be?

(A) PETS

1   Do you have, or have you ever had, any pets?

2   How would you describe the relationship between yourself and your pet?

3   How would you describe your pet?

4   What kind of animals make good pets?

(B) MEAT

5   What kinds of animals do you consider to be meat?

6   What do you think of vegetarianism?

7   England has a reputation of being a nation of 'animal-lovers', would you agree?

8   What do you understand by the term 'animal welfare/rights'?

9   Do you think people/animals have rights?

(C) REPRESENTATION

10   What images come to mind when I say 'beast'?

11   Can you think of animal images that are used to describe humans?

12   What effects do you think calling people by animal names has?

Appendix II: Ethics Protocol

Hi, my name is Gemma Harper. I am the principal researcher on a project entitled:

Deconstructing the Beast:
Contemporary Representations and Discourses on the Nature of Animals in Urban Britain

This project is being supervised by the Department of Social Psychology at the London School of Economics. I may be contacted on this phone number 0171 955 7018 should you have any questions.

Thank you for your willingness to participate in this research project. Your participation is very much appreciated. Just before we start the interview, I would like to reassure you that as a participant in this project, you have several very definite rights.

First, your participation in this interview is entirely voluntary.

You are free to withdraw from the interview at any time.

This interview will be kept strictly confidential and will be available only to myself and the evaluators of this project.

Excerpts from this interview may be made part of the final research project, but under no circumstances will your name or identifying characteristics be included in this report.

I would be grateful if you would sign this form below to show that I have read you its contents.

--- (signed)

--- (printed)

--- (dated)

Please send me a report on the results of this research project. (Circle one)

YES   NO

Address for those requesting research project:

Appendix III: Biographical Details of the Interview Participants

	SEX	AGE	VEG/MEAT	RESIDENCE	RELIGION
INTERVIEW					
1	Female	23	Veg	Seven Oaks	Atheist
2	Female	25	Veg	St. Albans	Atheist
3	Female	29	Veg	London	Agnostic
4	Female	29	Veg	Hampton	Atheist
5	Female	20	Veg	London	Agnostic
6	Female	19	Meat	London	Agnostic
7	Female	24	Meat	Richmond	Christian
8	Female	33	Meat	Richmond	Agnostic
9	Female	22	Meat	Bromley	Agnostic
10	Female	21	Meat	West. Supermare	Christian
11	Male	30	Veg	Farnham	Agnostic
12	Male	23	Veg	London	Atheist
13	Male	36	Veg	Farnham	Agnostic
14	Male	23	Veg	Illford	Atheist
15	Male	29	Veg	Fulham	Agnostic
16	Male	20	Meat	Luton	Atheist
17	Male	26	Meat	London	Agnostic
18	Male	33	Meat	London	Atheist
19	Male	26	Meat	London	Atheist
20	Male	19	Meat	London	Christian

Appendix IV: Chart 1 - Animal as Family Members

	Male Meat			
	CHART 1 - ANIMALS AS FAMILY MEMBERS			
	1.1 Relationship	1.2 Identity	1.3 Responsibility	1.4 Utility
MM1	quite endearing 3, He was just one of the family...He alway seemed to know the hierarchy of the family 3, had a few good fights 4, gf boring 6 dg good company, loyal 6, good pet loyal & odedient 8, rbts & gp boring 8	puppy boisterous 4, cts ungrateful 6	dg like to have one but can't look after it properly yet 6	I thought he was great he was quite...superb taking for a walk he always wanted to fight the other dogs (laughs) 4, good entertainment 4, big tropical fish tanks relaxing, pretty 7, tortoise novel 9, pet should be entertaining 9
MM2	dg special rel w mum 2. dg not close 3., no rel w gf 3, ct emotional bond 4, computer ct (tamagotchi) no different except it doesn't sit on your lap and not warm 5	ct jumpy, affectionate, very independent 1, dg character 2	neglected dg cruel 3, dg disciplined training strange rough on them, not free at all 4	emotionally involved w toys & gf the same 3, I know dgs appear to get a lot out of their owners affections but I just wonder whether that's kind of...really you wonder who's getting what out of what and...is the dg just being nice to you because you feed it. 4, pets submissive, dominated, power, fit into your regime 5
MM3	dg playing together 3, rel changed as got older 4, dg fun, something to do 9, You know even a cow can be a pet if you can relate to it 9, friendship 9	ct wise, clever, didn't get run over 8	dg requires more attention than cat 8, pets expensive 9, birds not designed to be in a cage 10	
MM4	fascinated by ct characteristics, very independent, attention or ignore you 3, v close, played a lot together, grew up together, part of family 3, company 4, ct surrogate grandchild for parents, ignored 4, hms, gf boring, meaningless 5	ct lovely 2, cat around town, real personality 3, cts more intelligent than dgs even though can't train them 3, ct distinctive 7, rbs non aggressive 8, spiders ugly & horrible 10	cruel to not let cts have freedom of outside 4 rodents smell & require lots of attention 9	fish household objects 8, pets status symbols 18
MM5	gf amusing, play with, contact, interaction, feedback stimulating, attention 2, people become strongly bonded to their animals 2 as one of the family, dgs relate to owners 3, insects not good pets cos too small for interaction 6, the fundamental point about having pets is the interaction between the owner and the pet itself 6	rbs cute cuddly image 4, ct calm animal, independent, solitary 9	bdg esay to look after but not free 5, dislike aspect of clearing up after bdg 9	dgs good for health walking 3, gf mantelpeice item 4, bdg pleasant from a selfish point of view 6, dgs provide security 7

Appendix V: Coding Schedule for 'Beast' Metaphors

		LABEL	DEFINITION	EXAMPLE
HUMAN	CATEGORY 1	BODY	PHYSICAL APPEARANCE: ATTRACTIVENESS, SIZE, AESTHETICS, FACIAL FEATURES	*Beauty of a beast ... He-may-be-hideous-but-he's-rich,-powerful-and-easily-flattered-factor.*
	CATEGORY 2	VIOLENCE	PHYSICAL, IDEOLOGICAL, INSTITUTIONAL, SEXUAL VIOLATION OF ANOTHER, BRUTALITY, FEROCITY, SAVAGERY	*Who knows when an obedient, nicely behaved husband might be transformed, come the full-time whistle, into a slavering, snorting beast?*
	CATEGORY 3	SATANISM	BLACK MAGIC, PAGANISM, DEVIL-WORSHIP, THE NUMBER OF THE BEAST AND BESTIALITY, DEMONIC, FIEND, VILLAIN	*He saw a seven-foot beast, half-man, half-bird....it was a manifestation of the devil.*
	CATEGORY 4	ENEMY	OPPOSITION, XENOPHOBIA, RACISM, DEHUMANISATION OF THE OTHER, ADVERSARY, ANTAGONIST, RIVAL, NEMESIS	*Migual Nadal, a supremely talented player, was reviled as the beast of Barcelona before a kick had been kicked, a beef-eater was depicted executing a matador ... the images of cultural denigration were fighting for space by Saturday morning.*
	CATEGORY 5	RARE	UNUSUAL, DIFFERENCE, UNIQUENESS, DISTINGUISHED, STRANGE, SINGULAR	*O'Toole is that rare beast, an actor with a tremendous dramatic sense of the narrative of his own early life...*
ANIMAL	CATEGORY 1	FANTASY	FANTASTICAL CREATURES: ALIENS, MYTHICAL ANIMALS, HYBRIDS	*...the slimy beast that burst through the stomach of actor John Hurt in the 1979 movie...*
	CATEGORY 2	WILD	WILDLIFE, UNTAMED ANIMALS, FREE IN OWN HABITAT, UNDOMESTICATED, FERAL, UNCIVILISED, NATURE	*The fox is a handsome, intelligent and even admirable beast but, like many wild animals, it is a clever and ruthless killer.*
	CATEGORY 3	DOMESTIC	SELECTIVELY BRED ANIMALS USED FOR PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION	*If you're looking for a beast to burdan with blame, the Irish cow is already carrying plenty.*
	CATEGORY 4	WORK	BEASTS OF BURDAN, TRAINED ANIMALS, ENTERTAINMENT ANIMALS, LABOUR, FUNCTIONAL AND PERFORMING	*It is not that Spaniards delight in being cruel to animals, rather that they regard humans and animals in a different light and see the death of a bull by a matador's sword as something which can ennoble both man and beast.*
	CATEGORY 5	GENERALISED OTHER	REFERENCES TO ALL ANIMALS AS BEASTS: DIFFERENTIATING HUMANS FROM OTHER ANIMALS	*It is work which has differentiated man from beast.*
OBJECT	CATEGORY 1	OBSTACLE	METAPHORS FOR OVERCOMING OBSTACLES, TAMING THE BEAST, TRIUMPH OVER NATURE, BARRIER, HURDLES, RESTRAINTS, DETERRANTS	*The first summer of the cadet's first year - known in military circles as 'The Beast' - is a time of sleep and food deprivation, of intensive physical and intellectual challenges, and a time when the men (so to speak) are separarted from the boys.*
	CATEGORY 2	POWER	METAPHORS OF THE POWER OF THE BEAST, STRENGTH, FORTITUDE, STAMINA, POTENCY, PUISSANCE, VIGOUR, AUTHORITY, ENERGY	*Out of this vista comes an earth-shattering scream and a beast of such savage and raw, uncompromising power.*
	CATEGORY 3	THREAT	METAPHORS OF THREAT, FEAR OF DOMINATION, FEAR OF THE OTHER, DEHUMANISATION OF THE OTHER, INTIMIDATION, DANGER, MENACE, PERIL	*If the authorities refuse to allow such an old-fashioned beast onto the proper market, the threat is that the shares will in December be delisted.*
	CATEGORY 4	SIZE	REFERS TO THE IMMENSITY OF OBJECTS, THEIR HUGE PRESENCE, FAR-REACHING EFFECTS	*There's no visible sign of the kind of beast you are about to find lurking in Sutcliffe's cellar ... the country's largest store of vintage solid tyres and wheels.*
	CATEGORY 5	OTHER	MISCELLANEOUS REFERENCES TO OBJECTS AS BEASTS	*Europe is evolving into much the beast that Britain has fought hard for since the 1950s.*