The Idea of the Territorial State:
Discourses of Political Space in Renaissance Italy

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Abstract

This thesis, presented as a theoretical contribution to the discipline of International Relations, describes the intellectual origins of the idea of the territorial state. The idea of the territorial state has a privileged place in International Relations for it is an integral element of Realism, the discipline's dominant intellectual tradition. Realism assumes that the primary actors in the modern international system are states, as identified by their exercise of sovereignty over a delimited space or territory. In Realist history, the territorial state and the modern territorial international order emerged together, twin products of seventeenth century political theory and practice, as signified by political settlement of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.

This thesis challenges the Realist narrative of the idea of the territorial state on two counts: methodologically and historically. First, it rejects the view that it is possible to account for the idea of the territorial state exclusively in terms of political practice and knowledge. It argues that the Realist idea of the territorial state needs to be understood as one expression of a much broader and more complex matrix of narratives – social, political, philosophical and cultural – about man's capacity to know, represent and order the spaces of modernity.

Second, the thesis rejects the Realist history that dates the emergence of the territorial state to the seventeenth century. An alternative chronology is put forward that dates the origins of the idea of the territorial state to fifteenth and sixteenth century Renaissance Italy. The thesis argues that the first signs of the idea of the territorial state can be identified in various Renaissance spatial discourses: political, cosmological, artistic and cartographic. These spatial discourses and the practices they led to established the templates for thinking about and representing space in modernity, including those underlying the articulation of the idea of the modern territorial state.

Contents

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Finally, I dedicate the thesis to my parents, Fay and Gordon, without whose constant support and encouragement none of this would have seen the light of day.

'...In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection that the map of a single Province occupied the entirety of a City, and the map of the Empire, the entirety of a Province. In time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartographers Guilds struck a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided point for point with it. The following Generations, who were not so fond of the study of Cartography as their Forebears had been, saw that that vast Map was Useless, and not without some Pitilessness was it, that they delivered it up to the Inclemencies of Sun and Winters. In the Deserts of the West, still today, there are Tattered Ruins of that Map, inhabited by Animals and Beggars; in all of the Land there is no other Relic of the Disciplines of Geography.'[1]

the author must know that to classify is to embalm. Real identity is incompatible with schools and categories, except by mutilation.[2]

But I return to the subject of walls.[3]

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[1]Jorge Luis Borges, 'On Exactitude in Science' in Borges, *Collected Fictions*, trans. Andrew Hurley, (London, Allen Lane, 1999), p. 325.

[2]Mark Rothko, letter to the editor, *Art News*, 56:6 (December 1957), quoted in, *Mark Rothko 1903-1970*, Revised Edition, (London, Tate Gallery Publishing, 1999), p. 86.

[3]Leon Battista Alberti, *On the Art of Building in Ten Books*, trans. Joseph Rykwert, (Cambridge MA, The MIT Press, 1994),

The Renaissance Origins of the Idea of the Territorial State

This thesis is a work of intellectual or cultural history, presented as a theoretical contribution to the discipline of International Relations. It identifies the intellectual or discursive origins of the idea of the territorial state. The idea of the territorial state has long had a privileged place in the discipline of International Relations because it is an integral element of Realist theory, which since 1945 has been the main tradition of thinking about international politics. Realism assumes that the primary actors in the modern international system are states defined as political units exercising sovereignty over a defined territory. In Realist history, both the territorial state and the modern territorial international system emerged together in the seventeenth century.

This thesis challenges the Realist narrative of the idea of the territorial state by means of a double-edged critique. First, the thesis, which uses the approach of discourse analysis, rejects the view that it is possible to account for the idea of the territorial state exclusively in terms of political practice and knowledge. It argues that the Realist idea of the territorial state needs to be understood as one expression of a much broader and complex matrix of narratives – social, political, philosophical and cultural – about man's capacity to know, represent and order the spaces of modernity.

Second, the thesis rejects the traditional Realist history of the territorial state, which claims that it emerged in the seventeenth century. My counter hypothesis is that the origins of the idea of the territorial state lie in fifteenth and sixteenth century Renaissance Italy. I shall show that the Italian Renaissance not only produced the idea of the territorial state in political discourse but also provided in discourses and practices as varied as cosmology, perspective and mapping, the underlying structures for thinking about and representing space that were to produce the modern idea of the territorial state.

Realism and the Westphalian Origins of the Territorial State

In the discipline of International Relations the Treaties of Westphalia of 1648 have a privileged place. In the disciplines' standard history, that of the dominant intellectual tradition of Realism, these settlements signified the moment when the modern

international state system was born. Westphalia signalled the end of the medieval European cartography of political order based in overlapping spheres of authority and centrifugal hierarchies centered on Pope and Emperor. The medieval order was replaced by a modern international order, a state system in which authority was layered horizontally, invested in individual states with equal claims to sovereign independence. So important is Westphalia to the Realist history of international relations that the modern states system is often referred to as the 'European Westphalian system'. The exclusive signature of the Westphalian international system is that only states are recognised as legitimate political actors. This legitimacy is conferred by the status of sovereignty, which gives to state authorities the exclusive right of internal rule and guarantees that other states recognise this right and do not intervene in another sovereign state's domestic affairs.

This work focuses on one element of Westphalian sovereignty: the relationship between sovereignty and territory. If the Realist state is first and foremost sovereign, it is also most definitely territorial. As with sovereignty there is an internal and external consequence of territoriality. Raymond Aron derived from the fact that states were 'masters within their own frontiers', each possessing 'a fragment of the earth's crust, with the men and objects thereon', that '[e]very international order, down to our own day, has been essentially territorial. It represents an agreement among sovereignties, the compartmentalization of space.'[1] The modern Westphalian international system is thus one of bounded, compartmentalised sovereign-spaces: a territorial order.[2] This proposition is almost a truism for Realism. More recently, Stephen Krasner agrees that '[t]he assertion of final authority within a given territory is the core element in any

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[1] Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* (London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1966), p. 181.

[2] It should be noted that I am interested in the intellectual origins of a Realist concept, the *idea* of the territorial state, rather than about the territorial state *per se*. Often it seems that the use of the term territorial state in Realist theory serves less as an accurate description of the modern state, than an *ideal* to be aspired to. If we take just one element of the idea of territorial sovereignty: the claim that between states there exist sharply defined boundaries, it is evident that even in the twentieth century the entire surface of the globe has not been neatly compartmentalised into sharply differentiated sovereign territorial units, but also includes many spaces where the boundaries are more porous, such as UN Protectorates, Imperial spheres of interest, mandates, trusteeships and neutral zones. Furthermore, many claim that state boundaries are being eroded by the interdependencies of modern economic life, markets and cultures. See, on the changing nature of boundaries, Friedrich Kratochwil, 'Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System', *World Politics*, 39:1 (Oct. 1986), pp. 27-52.

definition of sovereignty', the only alternatives being 'either a world in which there are no clear boundaries or a world in which there is no final authority within a given territory.'[3] This final authority is derived not only from the internal achievement of the monopoly of violence but also from positive belief in a state system organised around the principle 'that political life must be territorially organized with one final authority within a given territory.'[4]

Krasner highlights an important element of the sovereignty-territory relationship: the catalytic role of violence. The 'Realist-state' of the Westphalian system is, notes Daniel Deudney, imagined as 'a hierarchically organized protection-providing entity, monopolizing violence in a particular territory and possessing sovereignty and autonomy. States were built by concentrating armed force at the centre ... by disarming autonomous feudal lords, communal militias, mercenaries, and duelling aristocracies.'[5] This understanding of the state is based in a paradigm established by Max Weber, and currently favoured by historical sociologists, that defines the state as an organisation that successfully upholds the exclusive legitimate right to exercise the means of violence for the maintenance of order over a defined territory.[6] The presence of the Weberian idea of the territorial state in Realism ties in discourses on international politics to a broad and well-established tradition of thinking about the spatial allocation of politics in modernity.

Discourse and Space: The Idea of the Territorial State

The thesis adopts a particular attitude to the idea of the territorial state. This attitude

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[3]Stephen D. Krasner, 'Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective' in James A. Caporoso (ed.), *The Elusive State: International and Comparative Perspectives* (Newbury Park CA, Sage, 1989), pp. 69-96, at p. 92.

[4]Krasner, 'Sovereignty', p. 92.

[5]Daniel H. Deudney, 'The Philadelphian System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-Union, Circa 1787-1861', *International Organization*, 49:2 (Spring 1995), pp. 191-228, at p. 192. For Deudney, the consequence of the prevalence of the image of the Westphalian system in International Relations has been to occlude other modern 'non-dyadic' sovereign international orders. The most significant of these was the American Union or Philadelphian system, which, during the eighteenth century, was held up as an alternative model to the European state system. The Philadelphia system was the product of a structural republican theory of security institutions that emphasised popular sovereignty, formal state equality, the balance of power, and the division of power.

[6]I shall discuss Weber's definition of the state and its relationship to Realism in the following chapter.

requires that we do not assume that the territorial state is somehow present in the 'real world' of international relations 'out there', and that Realism simply provides an objective, disinterested account of how it engages with other territorial states in the international system. We are interested in how this idea functions in the production of knowledge about international politics. This research is guided by the epistemological and theoretical orientations of discourse analysis – or what in International Relations has, unsatisfactorily, become known as postmodernism.[7] Mainstream scholars have dismissed discourse analysis as ephemeral, accusing 'reflectivism' of failing to contribute to empirical policy research.[8] However, a small contingent of critical scholars have shown that discourse analysis has a place in the discipline. For Michael Shapiro discourse analysis alerts us to the fact that language is not simply a 'transparent conduit' between thought and objects, but is an opaque realm full of 'meaning- and value-producing practices.'[9] Likewise, David Campbell questions the *epistemic realism* of Realism and Marxism, which assumes that the world comprises objects whose existence is independent of the theories and epistemologies used in order to know it. Campbell wants to replace *epistemic realism* with an 'interpretative logic' which 'asks how certain terms and concepts have historically functioned within discourse.' He abandons the traditional epistemological distinction between discourse and an external realm that is apprehended through it. Discourse not only represents, but more significantly, constitutes the real: '[it] is a managed space in which some statements and depictions have come to have greater value than others.'[10]

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[7]For a useful discussion of the impact of postmodernism in International Relations, see Jim George, *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations* (Boulder CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), esp. pp. 191-219. Prominent postmodernists in International Relations are, according to George, Rob Walker, James Der Derian, Richard Ashley, Michael Shapiro and David Campbell. He notes that their work is varied, encompassing the deconstruction of disciplinary canons, genealogies of diplomacy, critiques of the discourse of sovereignty, and analyses of the politics of representation. I prefer to use the term 'discourse theory' as it avoids confusing it with recent historical materialist critiques of 'postmodernity'. I shall refer to these distinctions again in chapter two.

[8]Robert Keohane,'International Institutions: Two Approaches', *International Studies Quarterly*, 32:4 (1989), pp. 379-96.

[9]Michael J. Shapiro, 'Textualising Global Politics' in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds), *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Lexington MA, Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 11-22, at p. 14.

[10]David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1992), pp. 5-6.

Campbell claims that French thinker Michel Foucault has been a major influence on his work. Foucault rejected the view that discourse is 'groups of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or representations)', and urged us to think of them as 'practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak.'[11] This productive element of discourse is central to our analysis. I shall argue that the idea of the territorial state is produced by several modern discourses of space. These discourses are not, however, just political. Foucault observed that beneath discourse there lie networks which determine the type of knowledge produced. These networks or *epistemes* are not restricted to disciplinary boundaries, but determine the production of knowledge in areas that seem to have little in common. Foucault encourages us to look for the production of the idea of the territorial state, not just in the discourses of politics and international relations, but also in discourses on geography, cosmology, cartography and perspective, which represent and produce the spaces of modernity.

Within International Relations, two thinkers who have done much to open up spaces for this kind of enquiry are Rob Walker and Richard Ashley. I shall discuss their work in some depth presently, but one of their central arguments usefully illustrates the potential of discourse analysis for this enquiry. Ashley and Walker are interested in the dominance of the all-pervasive 'sign of sovereignty' in international theory. They point out that all theories of the state in International Relations – usually identified as a unitary body having a defined set of interests and the means to achieve them – represent the state as a sovereign presence. The state is 'represented as an entity having absolute boundaries unambiguously demarcating a domestic "inside" and setting it off from an international "outside".'[12] The inside is presented as the realm of identity, rationality and order, and the outside is figured, from the inside, as the realm of anarchy, war and difference. Ashley and Walker suggest, furthermore, that the sovereignty-as-presence code not only produces the inside/outside spaces of international relations – state vs system, order vs anarchy, the good life vs chaos – but also underpins much of modern Western thought. The effects of the 'sign of sovereignty' extend beyond International Relations or even

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[11]Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith, (London, Routledge, 1972), p. 49.

[12]Richard K. Ashley, 'Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique', *Millennium*, 17:2 (Summer 1988), pp. 227-62, at p. 248.

beyond the distinction between political theory and international theory. The sign of sovereignty underpins not only knowledge of international relations but a whole matrix of modern epistemologies and ontologies.[13] The idea of the sovereign territorial state is not an isolated concept of political theory, but is produced in a network of interrelated spatial vocabularies and figures which extend beyond the boundaries of political thought. In this work I shall explore, in the context of Renaissance Italy, the interdiscursive relations between the idea of the territorial state and the spatial discourse of cosmology, perspective and cartography.

The Renaissance Origins of the Modern State

Ashley and Walker claim that the intellectual structures that produced the idea of the territorial state came together in the seventeenth century; Ashley for example, talks of the 'Cartesian practice' that separated the space of the state from other spaces outside. In this respect, discourse analysis does not offer an alternative to the Realist Westphalian dating of the origins of the territorial state: Descartes was obviously a paradigmatic figure of seventeenth century philosophy.[14] For Realism and its critics the territorial state is a product of the seventeenth century.

In terms of artistic and cultural production, the seventeenth century is viewed as the age of the Baroque. For Lewis Mumford Baroque culture is riven by contradiction. There is

> the abstract mathematical and methodical side, expressed to perfection in its rigorous street plans, its formal city layouts, and in its geometrically ordered gardens and landscape designs. And at the same time, in the painting and sculpture of the period, it embraces the sensuous, rebellious, extravagant, anti-classical, anti-mechanical side, expressed in its clothes and its sexual life and its religious fanaticism and its crazy statecraft.[15]

There seem to be two modernities co-existing simultaneously in the seventeenth century.

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[13]R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993).

[14]Richard K. Ashley, 'Living On Borderlines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War' in Der Derian and Shapiro, *International/Intertextual Relations*, pp. 259-321.

[15]Lewis Mumford, *The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects* (London, Penguin Books, 1961), p. 402.

It will be apparent that the idea of the territorial state refers to the former modernity: the abstract, rigorous and ordered spaces of baroque cities and gardens. A similar term which has been used to describe not only the culture of the seventeenth but also that of the eighteenth centuries is the 'Classical age'. For Foucault the Classical age lasted from the middle of the seventeenth century to the end of the nineteenth, when it was replaced by the modern age.[16] I shall call the historical narrative that claims that the idea of the territorial state originated in the political culture of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Classical state hypothesis.

Although Mumford differentiates Baroque culture from the Renaissance culture that preceded it, he acknowledges that the Baroque city was anticipated by the Renaissance city. Taking a broad historical view, he suggests that between 1400 and 1800 there was a widespread transformation in European life, from 'medieval universality to baroque uniformity: from medieval localism to baroque centralism: from the absolutism of the God and the Holy Catholic Church to the absolutism of the temporal sovereign and the national state'.[17] Now, and this is very significant, Mumford argues that the 'underlying tendency of this new order' became *visible* in the seventeenth century, but that its *foundations*, were established in the Renaissance culture of the fifteenth century. It was during the Renaissance that the medieval city was first imagined in terms of a modern order and when patches of the medieval city were modified by 'Renaissance order, openings and clarifications'.[18] Renaissance city planners introduced clarity, openness and simplicity into the forms and structure of the city, symbolised by 'the straight street, the unbroken horizontal roof line, the round arch, and the repetition of uniform elements, cornice, lintel, window, and column, on the facade.'[19] The medieval cities were not, however, totally swept away to accommodate these new values; new plans attempted to harmonize the new design with the existing buildings and infrastructure. However, by the seventeenth century these principles had become

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[16]See, for this periodisation, Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (London, Routledge, 1970). For a history of sovereignty that adopts the same periodisation, see Jens Bartleson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995).

[17]Mumford, *City in History*, p. 398.

[18]Mumford, *City in History*, p. 399.

[19]Mumford, *City in History*, p. 400.

completely dominant, sweeping away all vestiges of the medieval order and producing the regimented, uniform and grandiose avenues and architecture characteristic of the Baroque city.

I shall argue that in the same way that Baroque or Classical city was preceded by and anticipated by the Renaissance city, so the Classical idea of the territorial state was preceded by and arose out of a Renaissance idea of the territorial state. The terms Classical and Renaissance allow us to identify different moments in the development of the city and the development of the idea of the territorial state, but they are not absolutely distinct or discontinuous: the Baroque/Classical order had its roots in the Renaissance. Cartesian practice had its roots in the spatial discourse of Machiavelli and Alberti. In the seventeenth century

> every aspect of life departed from the medieval pole and re-united under a new sign, the sign of the Prince. Machiavelli's work on *The Prince* provides more than one clue to both the politics and the plan of the new city, and Descartes, coming later, will re-interpret the world of science in terms of the unified order of the baroque city. In the seventeenth century the intuitions of precursors like Alberti were finally realized in the baroque style of life, the baroque plan, the baroque garden, and the baroque city.[20]

Following Mumford we can hypothesise that the *foundations* of the idea of the territorial state were established during the Renaissance – even if, it only became clearly *visible* as the Classical state of the seventeenth century.

My claim, that the idea of the territorial state originated in Renaissance Italy, is allied to a tradition of intellectual and cultural history that traces the origins of modernity to Renaissance Italy. The paradigm for this tradition is Jacob Burckhardt's *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, first published in 1860, which framed the Italian Renaissance as the simultaneous 'discovery of the world and man'.[21] Burkhardt believed that the Renaissance Italian states were unique among the polities of Europe because they were not based in a feudal order and did not, as in the rest of Europe, naturally evolve into unified monarchies. Because the rulers of Italian states, whether princely despots or republican leaders, had, more often than not, acquired power through 'recent

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[20]Mumford, *City in History*, p. 398.

[21]Jacob Burckhardt, *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* (London, Phaidon Press Limited, 1995).

usurpations', both the internal constitutions and the foreign policies of the Italian states, were required to be 'works of art', the 'fruit of reflection and adaptation'.[22] These traits of reflection and adaptation precipitated in Italians, both rulers and ruled, a sense of singularity or individuality. For Burkhardt the political circumstance of Italy produced the modern individual; Renaissance Italians were the 'first-born among the sons of modern Europe'.

> In the Middle Ages both sides of human consciousness – that which was turned within as that which was turned without – lay dreaming or half awake beneath a common veil. The veil was woven of faith, illusion, and childish prepossession, through which the world and history were seen clad in strange hues. Man was conscious of himself only as a member of a race, people, party, family, or corporation – only through some general category. In Italy this veil first melted into air; an *objective* treatment and consideration of the State and of all the things of this world became possible. The *subjective* side at the same time asserted itself with corresponding emphasis; man became a spiritual *individual*, and recognized himself as such.[23]

Burkhardt's vision of the birth of modernity is evident in the work of historians like Garrett Mattingly who argue that the 1495 Treaty of Venice, rather than the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, really marks the beginnings of the modern international system.[24] Mattingly claims that the exchange of resident embassies between the courts of the Italian city-states during the Concert of Italy, 1455-94, was the precursor to modern diplomatic practice. Furthermore, Mattingly suggests that Charles VIII's invasion of Italy in 1494, which lead to the Holy League alliance against France, agreed at the Treaty of Venice 1495, 'began the age of modern European diplomacy.'[25] In sympathy with these positions, this work will hopefully show that not only modernity and the modern international system but also the modern idea of the territorial state originated in Renaissance Italy.

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[22]Burckhardt, *The Civilization of the Renaissance*, p. 61.

[23]Burkhardt, *Civilization*, p. 87. One of the many pleasures gained from reading Burkhardt is to share in his breadth of vision. Unfettered by the boundary markings of today's disciplines, Burckhardt's history of the Italian Renaissance paints a broad canvas. He draws together the threads that united political history with the birth of the individual, humanist culture to the discovery of man and his world, and morality and religion with festival and spectacle. Perhaps Burkhardt could be regarded as a pioneer of the sort of inter-disciplinary research undertaken here.

[24]Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (New York NY, Dover Publications Inc, 1955).

[25]Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 115.

The Itinerary

The first three chapters establish the problematic and methodology of the thesis. Chapter one shows that the idea of the territorial state is a fundamental component of all schools of contemporary Realism because it reinforces Realist views of order, sovereignty and violence in the international system and it is integral to the Weberian tradition of modern political theory – of which Realism is one offshoot. Chapter two which discusses various theoretical work on space, representation and power establishes the methodology used to analyse the relationship between the idea of the territorial state and related discourses of space. The third chapter fleshes out the Baroque state thesis. It positions the idea of the territorial state within an absolutist-cosmopolitan tradition of modernity, characterised by a drive to order and rationalise space.

The second half of the thesis will reveal the origins of the idea of the territorial state in various spatial discourses and practices of fifteenth and sixteenth century Renaissance Italy. Chapter four identifies a nascent territorial imagination in Niccolò Machiavelli's work. Chapter five examines how an important condition for territoriality, that space is ordered horizontally, was established through the Renaissance dismantling of the medieval hierarchies of the medieval Christian order. Finally, chapter six explores the relationship between the idea of the territorial state and the invention of perspective in Renaissance Italy. It examines the representation of territorial sovereignty in paintings of princes and at the impact of cartography on the inscription of territorial boundaries.

Realism and the Territorial State

> Sovereignty implies 'space', and what is more it implies a space against
> which violence, whether latent or overt, is directed – a space established
> and constituted by violence.[1]

The thesis will show that the idea of the territorial state originated in Renaissance Italy. This is significant for students of International Relations in so far as the idea of the territorial state is a fundamental component of contemporary Realist discourse. Each of the three main traditions of Realist thought: Classical Realism, Neorealism and English School Realism, endorses the idea of the territorial state. They all assume that the modern state is enclosed within, or extends over, a distinct space or territory, delimited by sharply defined borders. This rather familiar image of political space, found in any school atlas, in which separate states are represented by brightly colored and sharply defined spaces, is not unique to Realism in International Relations, but is found in much contemporary social and political theory. In this chapter I want to contextualise the Realist idea of the territorial state, in terms of a tradition of social and political theory that extends from Max Weber to contemporary historical sociology. I shall show how the presence of the idea of the territorial state in Realism draws it into the Weberian tradition and its aspirations for the ideal order of political space in modernity. The first half of the chapter analyses the place and role of the idea of the territorial state in Realist and Weberian theory. The second half shows how the idea of the territorial state reinforces Realist-Weberian claims about order and violence, and sovereignty and identity.

Realism and the Territorial State

In the 1980s the discipline of International Relations experienced a revival of Realist theory in the form of Neorealism. In the context of the debates about Neorealism, Robert Keohane declared that 'Realism is a necessary component in a coherent analysis of world politics because its focus on power interests and rationality is crucial to any

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[1]Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith, (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1991), p. 280.

understanding of the subject'.[2] Since Keohane's declaration much water has passed under the bridge. Two developments in particular: the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a critical-theoretical agenda, might have been expected to dislodge Realism from its privileged position. Yet, in mainstream International Relations, Realism remains the dominant intellectual tradition, and its concepts and principles continue to dictate the research concerns of the academic community.

International Political Realism is, as Rob Walker has pointed out, best approached as a branch of the Western tradition of political realism that is 'the site of a great many contested claims and metaphysical disputes'.[3] Two rich strands of Western political thought emphasizing, on the one hand, becoming and difference, and, on the other, being and identity, find their Realist expressions in historicist Classical Realism and structural Neorealism respectively.[4] Realism so conceived is hard to define, but it does have some identifying traits. Robert Gilpin, a self-proclaimed Realist, sees Realism as a 'philosophical disposition' based on three assumptions about the world. The first assumption is that international affairs are conflictual by nature; '[a]narchy is the rule; [and] order, justice and morality are the exceptions'.[5] The second assumption is that social reality is not constituted by the Liberal individual nor by the Marxist class, but by the tribal group, which in a world of scarcity is a 'conflict group'. The final Realist assumption is that political life reveals the primacy of power and security in human motivation. The Realist critic John Vasquez argues that since the Second World War, Realism has functioned as a Kuhnian paradigm determining the 'fundamental assumptions' International Relations scholars have had about 'the world they are studying.'[6] Although Realism has not been a particularly good paradigm – Vasquez

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[2]Robert Keohane, 'Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond' in Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York NY, Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 158-204, at p. 159.

[3]Rob Walker, 'Realism, Change and "International Political Theory"', *International Studies Quarterly*, 31:1 (March 1987), pp. 65-86, at p. 67.

[4]Rob Walker, 'Realism, Change'. Walker is more sympathetic to historicist Realists like Raymond Aron, Hans Morgenthau and R.N. Berki. In their work 'beyond all the dubious propositions about the innate aggressiveness of human nature or the pursuit of a mysterious national interest, realism does express the ontological principles of pluralism, becoming and difference.' p. 39.

[5]Robert Gilpin, 'The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism' in Keohane, *Neorealism and Its Critics*, pp. 301-21, quotes from pp. 304-5.

[6]John A. Vasquez, *The Power of 'Power Politics': A Critique* (London, Frances Pinter, 1983), p. 5.

thinks it has failed to demonstrate any significant explanatory power and that its hypotheses have been consistently falsified – it does possess, in Hans Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations,* a paradigmatic text that has established the basic assumptions guiding Realist 'normal science' research. These assumptions are: first, that national states and their decision-makers are the most important actors for understanding international relations; second, that there is a sharp distinction between international and domestic politics; and third, in so far as international politics is the struggle for power and peace, then the purpose of the discipline of International Relations is to understand how that struggle occurs and to suggest ways of regulating it.[7]

Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach claim that there is no agreed understanding of the state in International Relations.[8] They identify ten different operative concepts of the state derived from various normative and subjective preferences held by International Relations scholars. They do not view this plurality positively, for they worry that if the discipline fails to achieve a consensual understanding of the state it will never achieve the status of a science, capable of assuming 'the objective and operational qualities that are prerequisites to scientific observation and analysis.'[9] However, the argument that there is a surfeit of state theory in International Relations is voiced less often than the counterclaim that the discipline suffers from a lack of proper state theory. More common is the complaint that 'it would be difficult to argue that theories of international relations possess anything like an adequate account of the nature of the state or the diversity of state formations.'[10] Many critics of Realism argue that it cannot justifiably theorise the interactions *between* states without a proper theory *of* the state. The Realist state is,

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[7]Vasquez points out that all three assumptions contain anomalies which undermine Realism's effectiveness as a paradigm. The assumption that the nation-state is the primary actor has been undermined by Foreign Policy Analysis critiques of the rational actor model; the domestic *vs* international dichotomy is undermined by world society theory and transnationalism; and, the struggle for power and peace framed as *Realpolitik* is an image rather than a theory, a description of behaviour rather than an explanation. Vasquez, *Power of 'Power Politics'.*

[8]Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, *The Elusive Quest: Theory and International Politics* (Columbia SC, University of South Carolina Press, 1988).

[9]Ferguson and Mansbach conclude that 'the multiple connotations accorded the concept of "state" ... and related concepts like "autonomy" casts doubt on the present existence of and prospects for a discipline of international relations.' *Elusive Quest,* p. 142.

[10]R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 125.

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argues Fred Halliday, 'the vague and heuristically unhelpful notion' of a 'national territorial totality'; it 'comprises in conceptual form what is denoted visually on a map – *viz.* the country as a whole and all that is within it: territory, government, people, society.'[11]

It is true that the 'national territorial totality', or variations of it, is present in much Realist theory. For Classical Realists, like John Herz and Raymond Aron, the state is first and foremost territorial.[12] Herz believed that the modern nation-state is characterized by a 'peculiar unity, compactness, and coherence' that exists

> in that substratum of statehood where the state unit confronts us, as it were, in its physical, corporeal capacity: as an expanse of territory encircled for its identification and its defense by a "hard shell" of fortifications. In this lies what will be here referred to as the "impermeability," or "impenetrability," or simply the territoriality of the modern state.[13]

Reflecting on the state at the beginning of the Cold War, Herz foresaw in subsequent years the 'passing of the age of territoriality', as state space was penetrated by economic, psychological, air and nuclear warfare. However, ten years later, he expressed renewed confidence in the ability of the territorial state to survive: the 'new or neo-territorial' state was capable of resisting both nuclear attack and the forces of transnationalism.[14] Not only the territorial state, but also the modern form of international relations would remain intact, for Herz believed that the state's territorial impermeability was the underlying foundation of the classical system of international relations and its institutions of international law, the balance of power and war.[15] Aron's Realism was equally tempered by geopolitical discourse – he entitled one of the chapters of *Peace and War*, 'On Space'.[16] Aron argued that the space or milieu a state occupies is an important source of

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[11]Fred Halliday, 'State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda', *Millennium*, 16: 2 (1987), pp. 215-29, at p. 217.

[12]John H. Herz, 'The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State' reprinted in Herz, *The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics* (New York NY, David McKay Company, 1976), pp. 99-123; and Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1966).

[13]Herz, 'Rise and Demise', pp. 100-1.

[14]John Herz, 'The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of the Nation-State' reprinted in Herz, *The Nation-State*, pp. 226-52, at p. 238.

[15]See Herz, 'Rise and Demise', pp. 108-14.

[16]Aron discusses space and power in *Peace and War*, pp. 181-209.

its power; it provides the resources and manpower required for defense. The aim of states is therefore to increase their space, and the history of the international system has been one of conflict over space, as states seeking to increase their power dispute the territories occupied by some and desired by others.

Like their Classical forefathers, Neorealists also regard territory to be a defining characteristic of the modern state.[17] The modern state, argues Robert Gilpin – in an analysis which, it must be admitted, is considerably more sophisticated than the banalities of 'national-territorial totality' – is defined by its territoriality. Gilpin wants theorists of international relations to recognise that the modern nation-state is a specific historical phenomenon that can be distinguished from its predecessors in terms of three qualities: the control of a territory, complex class and social structures, and national identity.[18] Of these, the control of a territory is the most distinctive; only the modern state has

> a strong central authority that is differentiated from other social organizations, and ... exercises control over a well-defined and contiguous territory. The sovereign has a monopoly over the legitimate use of force and is served by a bureaucracy and single set of laws that reach down into the everyday lives of the people.[19]

Furthermore, the state's role in the international system is derived from its territoriality. The primary external function of the state is to protect the property rights and personal security of its members against the citizens and the actions of other states. States can increase their control over the international system by consolidating and increasing their control over territory:

> In international affairs, territoriality is the functional equivalent of property rights. Like the definition of property, the control of territory confers a bundle of rights. The control and division of territory constitutes the basic mechanism governing the distribution of scarce resources among the states in an international system. Whereas domestic political change involves redefinition and redistribution of property rights, international political change has been primarily a matter of redistributing territory among groups or states following the great wars of history.[20]

English School Realists seek to distance themselves from, what they see as, the

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[17]Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981).

[18]Gilpin, *War and Change*, p. 15.

[19]Gilpin, *War and Change*, p. 122.

[20]Gilpin, *War and Change*, p. 37.

crude mechanics of Neorealism by emphasizing the legal and normative constraints of International Society. However, they have not managed to provide an alternative to the territorial state, as is clearly demonstrated by Hedley Bull's observation that membership of international society is restricted to those 'independent political communities' that 'possess a government and assert their sovereignty in relation to a *particular portion of the earth's surface* and a particular segment of the human population.'[21] Robert Jackson also views the sovereign states of international society as territorial bodies:

> A sovereign state ... consists traditionally of a bordered territory occupied by a settled population under effective and at least to some extent civil – that is 'civilized' – government.[22]

Even if, as Cornelia Navari hopes it will, international theory abandons the *Machstaat*, which focuses attention on state autonomy and power, in favour of a *Rechstaat*, embodying the collective agency of social power through representative institutions, created by laws, customs and practices, this would not mean that territoriality is abandoned.[23] The *Rechstaat* is still a territorial body; it is 'a particular kind of political community, one which is territorially located, with a more or less delimited set of persons distinguished from the citizenry by the name of government, and which is conceived as law maker.'[24] It is possible that the legal affirmation of state territoriality found in English School state theory reflects this school's interest in international law. In contemporary international law the state is defined as a body possesing a territory, people and power. State territory is, as Hans Kelsen observes,

> that space within which, in principle, one state, the state to which the territory belongs, is entitled to carry out coercive acts, a space from which all the other states are excluded. It is the space for which, according to general international law, only one definite national legal order is authorized to prescribe coercive acts, the space within which only the coercive acts stipulated by this order may be executed. It is the space

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[21]Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London, Macmillan, 1977), pp. 8-9. Italics added.

[22]Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and The Third World* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 38.

[23]See Cornelia Navari, 'Introduction: The State as Contested Concept in International Relations' in Navari (ed.), *The Condition of States* (Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 1991), pp. 1-18.

[24]Navari, 'State as Contested Concept', all quotes from pp. 12-5.

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within the so-called boundaries of the state.[25]

Max Weber and the Modern Territorial State

Kelsen emphasizes that state territory is a space over which only one authority has the right to carry out coercive measures. Force, coercion and violence are recurring motifs in the Realist idea of the territorial state. They are all, especially violence, also prominent motifs in a tradition of modern social and political theory that started with Max Weber's definition of the state as the institution with legitimate access to the means of violence within a defined territory. This section analyses the relationship between Weber's definition of the territorial state and his concerns with the geopolitical issues of his time. In drawing together the themes of territoriality and geopolitics it reaffirms once more that 'more than any other modern figure Weber established the discourse of the realist approach to international relations.'[26]

> Weber's classic definition of the state is in 'Politics as a Vocation':
>
> Today, however, we have to say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory. Note that 'territory' is one of the characteristics of the state. ... The state is considered the sole source of the 'right' to use violence.[27]

Outside of Realism, Weber's definition of the territorial state continues to inform the work of many historical sociologist – some of whose work on the state Halliday recommends as an alternative to the Realist national-territorial totality.[28] The state,

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[25]Hans Kelsen, *General Theory of Law and State*, trans. Anders Wedberg, (New York NY, Russell and Russell, 1945), pp. 210-11.

[26]Michael Joseph Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger* (Baton Rouge LA, Louisiana State University Press, 1986), p. 53.

[27]Max Weber, 'Politics as a Vocation' in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (London, Routledge, 1970), pp. 77-128, at p. 78.

[28]Halliday views the institutional state theory of historical sociology as an alternative to the Realist 'national-territorial totality'. The institutional state is not a 'social-territorial totality, but a specific set of coercive and administrative institutions, distinct from the broader political, social and national context in which it finds itself.' The value, for Halliday, of this approach is that it highlights the interaction between the state and its international setting; in particular 'why and how participation in the international realm enhances and strengthens states, and, in particular, why it enables them to act more independently of the societies they rule.' Halliday, 'State and Society', pp. 218-9. However, the institutional state of historical sociology is, in essence, Weber's territorial state. As a result, the historical sociological view of international relations is often couched in standard Realist vocabulary. As Michael Mann says, '[t]he very

according to the neo-Weberian Michael Mann, is

> a *differentiated* set of institutions and personnel, embodying ... *centrality*, in the sense that political relations radiate outward from a centre to cover a ... *territorially demarcated area*, over which it exercises ... a monopoly of *authoritative binding rule-making*, backed up by a monopoly of the means of physical violence.[29]

Whether ancient or modern, all states are, for Mann, distinguished by territorial centralization. The state is the only political or social institution that is centralized over a 'delimited territory over which it has binding powers'. Whether a state is despotic – able to carry out its activities without routine institutionalized negotiation with civil society – or infrastructural – able to control and infiltrate social life through a dialectic with civil society – its autonomous power is partially derived from its territoriality.[30] The state is 'both a central place and a unified territorial reach' because the resources and authority of state elites radiate out from a centre to territorial boundaries.[31] Neo-Weberians regard the territorial state to be the mainstay of a geopolitical international system. Gianfranco Poggi suggests that the modern state – an autonomous, territorially distinct, centralised organization – secures its territory in three ways: first, through sovereignty or the state's ability to control its population by means of its access to the means of coercion; second, by geographically distinct and militarily defensible boundaries; and third by the state's participation in geopolitics: 'the modern state exists in a system of other nation-states, thus its international environment is, as it was for Weber, the geopolitical realm of power politics.'[32] Likewise, Theda Skocpol regards the modern state, 'as conceptualised by Weber and Hintze ... as part of a system of

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definition of the state as a delimited territory suggests a further set of political relations between this state and other states – that is, *geopolitics*. Indeed, '[p]olitics and geopolitics are intertwined; the one should not be studied without the other.' Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume Two: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 56.

[29]Michael Mann, 'The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results' in John A. Hall (ed.), *States in History* (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1986) pp. 109-36, at p. 112.

[30]From various combinations of infrastructural and despotic power, Mann constructs four ideal-type state forms: feudal, imperial, bureaucratic and authoritarian. See Mann, 'Autonomous Power', pp. 115-6.

[31]Mann, 'Autonomous Power', p. 123.

[32]Gianfranco Poggi, *The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990), at pp. 22 & 5.

competing and mutually involved states.'[33] The modern state is 'Janus faced, with an intrinsically dual anchorage in class divided socioeconomic structures and an international system of states.'[34] It is the state's participation in the international system that provides it with potential relative autonomy from the interests of civil society or the dominant classes, which it may have to disregard depending on the actions required to guarantee the state's international standing.

Weber's own interest in the 'geopolitical realm of power politics' derived from his aspirations for Germany. Weber believed that all political structures strive for prestige or the 'glory of power', but that only 'big political communities' are the 'natural exponents of such pretensions.' Any nation-state able to achieve the status of a great power by occupying a large space was rewarded with considerable 'value-prestige', and Weber sought for the German people the prestige that would accompany the achievement of great power status.[35] However, he believed that in return for this prestige the great *Machstaaten* had duties to the smaller nation-states. In a 'world of power states' the balance among the Great Powers must not threaten the independence of smaller nations, and Germany's particular duty was to prevent the world being carved up between the 'regulations of Russian officialdom' and the 'convention of Anglo-Saxon society.'[36]

Although Weber opposed the cult of *Machtpolitik*, his aspirations for Germany reflected the concerns of the newly established discourse of geopolitics.[37] The rise of geopolitics during the *fin de siècle* was, as Stephen Kern notes, one response of Western European culture experiencing a sense of collapsing distances as new technologies –

[33]Theda Skocpol, 'Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research' in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds), *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 3-37, at p. 8.

[34]Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 32.

[35]For Weber's discussion of great powers, see Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, Vol. 1*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York NY, Bedminster Press, 1968), pp. 910-1.

[36]See Weber's wartime article '*Zwischen zwei Gesetzen*' referred to in David Beetham, *Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics*, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1985), p. 137. Weber almost considered it Germany's duty to become a great power, otherwise '[w]hat would become of the independence of the Scandinavians, the Dutch, the people of Tessin, if Russia, France, England, Italy did not have to respect our armies? Only the balance of the great powers against one another guarantees the freedom of the small states.', p. 142.

[37]Weber despised 'the parvenu-like braggart with power, and the vain self-reflection in the feeling of power, and in general every worship of power *per se.*', 'Politics as a Vocation', p. 116.

railways, roads, telegraphs and telephones – 'knitted distant places together with unprecedented speed and efficiency.[38] This perception that the world's spaces were getting smaller and coming together, revitalized the European desire 'embedded in their historical consciousness' to take command of space.[39] In the discipline of geopolitics the control of space was paramount. Geopolitical writers explained how the size, location and distance between states determined their politics and history. Friedrich Ratzel, the discipline's founder and Weber's contemporary, applied Darwinian evolutionary theory to questions of space and politics and represented national struggles for survival as struggles over space. States were rooted, living organisms that had to evolve by increasing their territories. Ratzel believed that because national cultures were grounded in the 'spatial unity of life', that is, the land – culture meaning literally, the tillage of soil – cultural development was dependent on territorial expansion. The larger a state was the more civilized it could become, and, conversely, '[a]ll people who remain at lower stages of cultural development are also spatially small (*kleinräumig*)'.[40] Ratzel, implicitly justifying imperialist expansion, argued that the development of all states "stands under the law of progress from small to big spaces."[41]

Echoes of Ratzel's view that national culture is based in land, can be heard in Weber's warnings that the increasing numbers of Polish peasants working on the Junker estates of Prussia's Eastern border posed a serious threat to German national *Kulture*.[42] German peasants had left the Eastern territories because of a general decline in working and living conditions, and the Junker land owners had been forced to replace them with cheap labor from Poland. The net result of this, Weber pointed out using decidedly racist language, was a 'victory of the less developed types of human being' because the Poles, with their 'habitually low physical and intellectual standard of living', were better able to adapt to the worsening conditions. In order to halt this devaluation of German culture,

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[38]Stephen Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space 1880-1918* (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 236.

[39]Kern, *Culture of Time and Space*, p. 236.

[40]Ratzel, quoted in Kern, *Culture of Time and Space*, p. 224.

[41]Ratzel, quoted in Kern, *Culture of Time and Space*, p. 226.

[42]Max Weber, 'The Nation State and Economic Policy', inaugural lecture delivered at Freiburg in May 1895, in Max Weber, *Political Writings*, ed. Peter Lassman and Ronald Spiers, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 1-28. All the quotes in this paragraph are from pp. 10-2.

Weber advised the government to close the Eastern frontier and to systematically purchase land, either by extending crown demesne lands or by colonizing suitable soils with German Peasants. These measures were, he felt, legitimate because 'our state is a *nation state*' and the interest of the German people demanded the 'stemming [of] the tide of Slavs ... [through] the transfer of significant tracts of eastern Germany into the hands of the state.'

Inside and Outside the Territorial State

For most Realists the distinguishing feature of the modern state is its sovereignty. The international system is made up of individual sovereign states. In this section I want to look at the, by now well-established, argument that the claim to sovereignty lies at the heart of both international relations theory and practice. I want to look, in particular, at how the confluence of sovereignty and territory in Realist discourse serves as the fundamental spatial pivot around which the separate orders of inside and outside are established. The section will provide a backdrop for the following discussion of the relationship between territory and order, violence and identity in Realist and Weberian state theory.

For English school Realists sovereign territoriality is the minimum requirement for entry into the society of states. Membership of International Society is, as Alan James makes quite clear, limited to those political organizations able to demonstrate sovereignty or 'constitutional independence' in combination with frontiers enclosing people, some form of government and a territorial base. Each of the member states of international society must represent a defined 'physical sector of the land mass of the globe' and 'at the international level represents it exclusively'. The landscape of international society is 'divided into states by frontiers rather as a farm is into fields by fences and walls.'[43] Today, now that international society has expanded globally, 'almost every square kilometer of the earth's land surface' has been allocated to 'one sovereign state or

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[43]Alan James, *Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society* (London, Allen and Unwin, 1986), p. 13.

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another, with virtually all frontiers being tidily delineated or clearly demarcated.'[44] These territorial frontiers, says Bull, demarcate the separate realms of internal and external sovereignty:

> On the one hand, states assert, in relation to this territory and population, what may be called internal sovereignty, which means supremacy over all other authorities within that territory and population. On the other hand, they assert what may be called external sovereignty, by which is meant not supremacy but independence of outside authorities.[45]

The very existence of the discipline of International Relations requires that these internal/external, inside/outside distinctions are not erased or blurred. The representation of international relations as the space of anarchy requires its separation from domestic politics and, suggests Justin Rosenberg, from social, economic and cultural phenomena generally: '[t]he borders and landscape of this environment are set and policed by the twin concepts of sovereignty and anarchy.'[46] Further, 'the same absolute character of the sovereignty of the modern state which is the foundation of order *within* national boundaries simultaneously dictates the persistence of an *external* condition of anarchy among states.'[47] This distinction between internal order and international anarchy is reflected in the common categorical distinction made between Political Theory and International Relations Theory. Political Theory, as Martin Wight tells us, explores the possibility of the 'good life' within sovereign states and is a discourse amenable to progress. However international theory, whose subject matter is the relations between states, amounts to little more than a rather depressing history of perpetual war and balancing of power:[48]

> The study of international politics presupposes absence of a system of government, the study of domestic politics presupposes the existence of one. ... while in domestic politics the struggle for power is governed and circumscribed by the framework of laws and institutions, in international politics laws and institutions are governed and circumscribed by the

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[44]James, *Sovereign Statehood*, p. 31.

[45]Bull, *Anarchical Society*, pp. 8-9.

[46]Justin Rosenberg, *The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of The Realist Theory of International Relations* (London, Verso, 1994), p. 30.

[47]Rosenberg, *Empire of Civil Society*, p. 142.

[48]Martin Wight, 'Why is There No International Theory' in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds), *Diplomatic Investigations* (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1966), pp. 17-34.

struggle for power.[49]

To understand how pervasive this inside/outside mark of the sovereign territorial state is, we can turn to the critical readings of Realism by Richard Ashley and Rob Walker. They note that in International Relations theory the state is generally represented as a unitary actor possessing sovereignty and capable of choosing its actions based on rational decision-making. However, they suggest that this portrayal of the state is not disinterested, for it sets up an hierarchical opposition between the sign of 'sovereignty' embedded in the state, and the sign of 'anarchy' as all that which is non-sovereign i.e. outside of the state:

> the sign of 'sovereignty' betokens a rational identity: a homogeneous and continuous presence that is hierarchically ordered, that has a unique center of decision presiding over a coherent 'self', and that is demarcated from, and in opposition to, an external domain of difference and change that resists assimilation to its identical being. ... the sign of 'anarchy' betokens this residual external domain: an aleatory domain characterized by difference and discontinuity, contingency and ambiguity....[50]

Ashley points out that for the state to be imagined as a rational actor capable of pursuing its interests, it must 'be represented as an entity having absolute borders unambiguously demarcating a domestic "inside" and setting it off from an international "outside"'.[51] For Ashley this representation of the state mirrors the ideal qualities of Western man as a rational, sovereign self-identical presence; while for Walker the political discourse of state sovereignty is a particular manifestation of the general principle of 'sovereign identity' found throughout Western thought.[52] Sovereign identity is secured through the establishment of difference; it is derived from the 'claim to be able to fix a point of identity – a universality in space and time against which all differences in space and time can be measured, judged and put in their place'.[53] This principle

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[49]Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad, (Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1978), at pp. 101&2.

[50]Richard K. Ashley, 'Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique', *Millennium*, 17:2 (Summer 1988), pp. 227-62, at p. 230.

[51]Ashley, 'Untying the Sovereign State', p. 248.

[52]R. B. J. Walker, 'Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of Contemporary Political Practice' in Walker and Saul H. Mendlovitz (eds), *Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community* (Boulder CO, Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1990), pp. 159-85.

[53]Walker, 'Sovereignty, Identity', p. 175.

pervades the entire culture of modernity, starting with the dualism of modern philosophy, which constructs epistemologies upon the grounds of an ontology of spatial separation between an autonomous knowing subject and a known object. Walker interprets modern philosophical categories as attempts to overcome 'a metaphysics of distance, a dialectics of here and there, the delineation of presence and absence in the stately measure of eternal geometry.'[54] In political thought the principle of sovereign identity underpins a hierarchical opposition between 'domestic *community as presence*' and an 'international *absence of community.*'[55] The universal values of freedom, truth and obligation have been allocated to those communities which can claim to be within the boundaries of a sovereign state. Outside the state there is only the residual realm of the particular, the different and the other.

The 'demarcation between an inside and an outside, a self and an other' is produced in discourse about states and through the practice of states themselves.[56] Ashley claims that the domestic domain of sovereign men, enclosed within the territorial state, is constituted and differentiated from the foreign, dangerous and external by means of the knowledge-practices of 'statecraft'.[57] Statecraft produces and secures the identity of the domestic state-society by marking off as dangerous and as requiring discipline and control other forms of knowledge and ways of being, such as the insane and the criminal. By inscribing specific problems and dangers as exterior to sovereign men, statecraft differentiates the space of the 'domestic population' over which the state is dominant and able to secure its claims to legitimacy.[58] One realm marked out by statecraft as 'other' is 'International Politics' envisioned as the permanent threat of war and anarchy.

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[54]Walker, *Inside/Outside*, p. 128.

[55]Richard K. Ashley, 'The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Towards a Critical Social Theory of International Politics', *Alternatives*, 17:4 (October 1987), pp. 403-34. See esp. pp. 413-420.

[56] R. B. J. Walker, 'International Relations and the Concept of the Political' in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds), *International Relations Theory Today* (Cambridge, Polity, 1991), pp. 306-27, at p. 321. Walker claims that the formalization of the *principle* of state sovereignty through debates serves to reify 'the *practices* of state sovereignty – the disciplining of boundaries, the affirmation of inclusions, the defamation of foreigners, the inscription of danger, the legitimation of violence.' See 'Sovereignty, Identity', p. 160.

[57]Richard K. Ashley, 'Living on Borderlines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War' in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds), *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Lexington MA, Lexington Books, 1989) pp. 259-321, at p. 301.

[58]Ashley, 'Living on Borderlines', p. 302.

'International Politics' is not, as it is represented in modern discourse, the original source of danger and threat to modern societies. It is, rather, a product of statecraft that, in order to produce modern domestic societies as social identities consisting of populations subordinate to a rational center, must inscribe the external dangers of 'international politics' as a permanent threat to the identity of the society within:

> 'international politics' is a practice of the inscription of the dangerous, the externalization and totalisation of dangers, and the mobilization of populations to control these dangers – all in the name of a social totality that is never really present, that always contains traces of the outside within, and that is never more than an effect of the practices by which total dangers are inscribed.[59] The sign of international politics is invoked in opposition to a 'domestic society' conceived as an identical social *whole*.[60]

Ashley and Walker show us that the spatial demarcation of political and international political theory and practice is constructed around the principle of sovereign identity. In the following section I develop these themes with reference to the idea of the territorial state in Realist and Weberian theory.

The Territorial Spaces of Order, Identity and Violence

Weber's extensive definition of the state in *Economy and Society* highlights the way in which the idea of the territorial state serves to ground a complex matrix of modern assumptions about political order, identity and violence:

> The primary formal characteristics of the modern state are as follows: It possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which the organized activities of the administrative staff, which are also controlled by regulations, are orientated. This system of order claims a binding authority, not only over the members of the state, the citizens, most of whom have obtained membership by birth, but also to a very large extent over all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory organization with a territorial basis. Furthermore, today, the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the state or prescribed by it. ... The claim of the modern state to monopolize the use of force is as essential to it as its

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[59]Ashley, 'Living on Borderlines', p. 304.

[60]Ashley, 'Living on Borderlines', pp. 303-4.

character of compulsory jurisdiction and of continuous operation.[61]

Weber's view of the state as a 'system of order' provides one immediate connection to Realist discourse, for, as Helen Milner points out, although Realists represent the international system as an anarchy, for many the primary task of international theory is to account for regulative order underpinning it. Few Realists accept the crude proposition that international relations is nothing more than an unmitigated realm of chaos and irrational violence. To claim that the international system is anarchical is not necessarily to insist that it is a Hobbesian state of nature in which sovereign states, unconstrained by an enforceable system of law, are left to judge their own 'grievances and ambitions' based on their own 'reason and desire'.[62] On the contrary, Realists detect many practices and institutions that produce order in international anarchy: International Society is regulated by common rules, values and customs; the Neoliberal world order is distinguished by co-operation enhancing international regimes; and even the Neorealist's system is regulated by the balance of power.

More significantly, the Realist hypothesis that order is possible in anarchy is based on the Weberian premise that state territory is ordered. The English School supposition of an anarchical society – in effect, an ordered anarchy – is premised upon the existence of domestic order. Bull defines order in international society as 'a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary and primary goals of the society of states', i.e. first, the preservation of the society of states itself, second, the sanctity and security of state sovereignty and, finally, peace.[63] Order is embodied in the common rules, values and institutions through which states are able to maintain formal relations. However, Bull recognizes that in modernity order has primarily been exercised in 'local areas of order established by the authority of states.'[64] Domestic order, unlike that of international society, is coercive; it is derived from the authority of the government which, because it

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[61]Weber, *Economy and Society, Vol. 1*, p. 56.

[62]Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, The State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York NY, Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 159.

[63]Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, p. 8.

[64]Hedley Bull, 'The State's Positive Role in World Affairs', *Daedalus*, 108: 4 (Fall 1979), pp. 111-23, at p. 115.

'possesses a near monopoly of physical force', can make and enforce laws via sanction in the courts backed up by the police and armed forces.[65] This claim is readily interpreted as part of the discourse of sovereign identity. For without the existence of a hierarchical coercive domestic order extending over a delimited space, it would not be possible to posit the existence of an 'other' or 'different' order – non-hierarchical, non-coercive – as underpinning international society. If they both shared similar structures of order or degrees of anarchy, it would be conceptually impossible to distinguish the space of international society from the territory of domestic society. This is one of the reasons why the doctrine of non-intervention precludes intervention by foreign states onto the territory of other state – except in situations where order has been replaced by anarchy.

Bull's acknowledgment that domestic order is maintained by coercion is a variant of Weber's view that all political community is based in domination and the use of force over a specific space:

> The term 'political community' shall apply to a community whose social
> action is aimed at subordinating to orderly domination by the participants
> a 'territory' and the conduct of the persons within it, through readiness to
> resort to physical force.[66]

Politics, at its most basic, is the exercise of rule or domination within a defined territory. What marks out the state is that it is the only form of territorially-based political community that has the exclusive legitimate claim to use the means of violence:

> A "ruling or dominating (Herrschaftverband) organization" will be called
> "political" insofar as its existence and order is continuously safeguarded
> within a given *territorial* area by the threat and application of physical
> force on the part of the administrative staff. A compulsory political
> organization with continuous organizations (*politischer Anstaltbetrieb*)
> will be called a "state" insofar as its administrative staff successfully
> upholds the claim to the *monopoly* of the *legitimate* use of physical force
> in the enforcement of its order.[67]

Weber's view that only states have the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence over a specified territory, is also employed to reinforce the Realist distinction between inside and outside. Kenneth Waltz, for example, adopts the Weberian position that all politics is about struggle and the use of force, but points out that

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[65]Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, p. 57.

[66]Weber, *Economy and Society, Vol. 2*, p. 901.

[67]Weber, *Economy and Society: Vol. 1*, p. 54.

[t]he difference between national and international politics lies not in the use of force but in the different modes of organization for doing something about it. A government, ruling by some standard of legitimacy, arrogates to itself the right to use force – that is, to apply a variety of sanctions to control the use of force by its subjects. If some use private force, others may appeal to the government. A government has no monopoly on the use of force, as is all too evident. An effective government, however has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and legitimate here means that public agents are organized to prevent and to counter the private use of force.[68]

Aron also views the domestic/international divide along a fracture defined by the legitimate use of force. Inter-state relations 'take place within the shadow of war' and are driven by the desire of state authorities to preserve their own monopolies of violence within their territories, their recognition of one another's monopolies, and their mutual endorsement of the legal right to resort to war. The possession of a monopoly of violence by 'territorially organized political communities' is what distinguishes domestic politics from international relations:

So long as humanity has not achieved unification into a universal state, an *essential* difference will exist between internal politics and internal politics. The former tends to reserve the monopoly on violence to those wielding legitimate authority, the latter accept the plurality of centers of armed force.[69]

Once a state looses the monopoly of violence and several centers of violence arise within the space over which it claims authority, the boundaries separating domestic from international politics become blurred: where international relations consists of overlapping realms of violence, or where the state is not juridically organized, or when a civil war is being fought, then the spaces of internal and external politics tend to blend with 'the former not being essentially pacific and the latter not being radically bellicose.'[70] Bull also viewed the state's monopoly of violence benignly, arguing that the only historical alternative to the modern states-system, in which war between states is regulated by the twin principles of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bellum*, has been ubiquitous violence and disorder. The modern states-system is unique in that states are 'united in

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[68]Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading MA, Addison Wesley, 1979), pp. 103-4.

[69]Aron, *Peace and War*, p. 6.

[70]Aron, *Peace and War*, p. 7.

maintaining that they are entitled to a monopoly of the legitimate use of force, both domestically and across state frontiers'. This arrangement is largely beneficial, for the fact that war is not available to 'self-appointed political groups of all kinds is one of the most vital barriers we have against anarchy.'[71]

The modern state is able to coerce its population not just because it can access physical violence, but also because it has an extensive bureaucratic machinery through which it disciplines the everyday activity of society. Modernity as a whole, claimed Weber, is characterized by the triumph of purposeful rationality – whereby an actor rationally assesses the possible consequences of using various means to achieve a desired end – over value rationality – where an actor pursues an end single-mindedly with little regard for the consequences. Rationalization determines action in all spheres of modern life, from the scientific mastery of nature to the bureaucratic control of society. It routinizes human action, making it 'calculating, instrumentalist, and predictable.'[72] In modern Western society, technical means of capitalist production are complemented by rational structures of law and administration.[73] The main conduit of rationalization is bureaucracy. The modern world has experienced the proliferation of bureaucracy which has invaded all forms of organization that depend on expertise and technical knowledge directed towards the efficient achievement of goals. Rationalization through bureaucracy reaches its apotheosis in the political sphere, where the bureaucracy of the modern state

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[71]Bull, 'The State's Positive Role', p. 117.

[72]Sheldon S. Wolin, 'Max Weber: Legitimation, Method, and the Politics of Theory' in Asher Horowitz and Terry Maley (eds), *The Barbarism of Reason: Max Weber and the Twilight of Enlightenment* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1994), pp. 287-309, at p. 297. Rationalization in modern science produces 'intellectualization' or the belief that 'one can, in principle, master all things by calculation.' The implication of such intellectualization which rejects 'mysterious incalculable forces' is the 'disenchantment of the world' in which 'the ultimate and sublime values' have retreated from public life into either 'the transcendental realm of mystic life or into the brotherliness of direct and personal human relations.' See Max Weber, 'Science as a Vocation' in *From Max Weber*, pp. 129-156, at pp. 139 & 155. Rationalization is not, however, entirely homogeneous. Different forms of rationalization dominate in different areas of life and culture. There are 'rationalizations of economic life, of technique, of scientific research, of military training, of law and administration, each of which may be rationalized in terms of very different ultimate values and ends.' Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons, (London, Routledge, 1992), p. 26. There are also non-Western forms of rationalization, although, as Colin Gordon notes, they display limitations which disqualify them from 'providing a matrix for modernity in the Western manner.' Colin Gordon, 'The Soul of the Citizen: Max Weber and Michel Foucault on Rationality and Government' in Scott Lash and Sam Whimster (eds), *Weber: Rationality and Modernity* (London, Allen and Unwin, 1987), pp. 293-316, at p. 301.

[73]Weber, *Protestant Ethic*, pp. 25-6.

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is 'superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability.' Bureaucracy is 'domination through knowledge' and in its purest *monocratic* form in the modern state is the 'most rational known means of exercising authority over human beings ... superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability.[74] However, the relentless bureaucratization of the modern state concerned Weber who warned that the state was in danger of becoming a 'frozen spirit' or a 'living machine', which [t]ogether with the dead machine (in the factories) ... is in the process of erecting the scaffolding of that future subjection or enslavement.'[75]

Rationalization through bureaucracy underpins certain disciplinary practices which regulate the body's location in space and time. Weber traced the history of discipline – 'the consistently rationalized, methodically trained and exact execution of the received order, in which all personal criticism is unconditionally suspended and the actor is unswervingly and exclusively set for carrying out the command' – from its origins in the medieval monastic communities, to capitalist factories, and later into administrative rationality in the army, sciences and state administrations.[76] For Neo-Weberians the themes of rationalization and discipline are recast as surveillance. Anthony Giddens suggest surveillance is a twofold process, combining the collection and organization of information stored by agencies used to monitor the activities of an administered population, with the direct supervision of the activities of subordinates by superiors in a particular organization. Together they form the basis of an administrative power that controls the timing and spacing of human activity. Giddens claims that the modern state is the most effective organization of surveillance.[77] All states engage in surveillance activity, but only the modern state is capable of concentrating of surveillance as governmental power. The modern state's ability to maintain a monopoly of violence

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[74]Weber, *Economy and Society, Vol. 1*, pp. 225 & 3.

[75]Weber, quoted in Fred Dallmayr, 'Max Weber and the Modern State' in Horowitz and Maley, *Barbarism of Reason*, pp. 49-67, at p. 59.

[76]Max Weber, 'The Meaning of Discipline' in Gerth and Wright Mills, *From Max Weber*, pp. 253-64, at p. 253.

[77]Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990), pp. 55-63; and Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence: Volume Two of a Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1985), p. 47.

'rests upon the secular maintenance of new codes of criminal law, plus the supervisory control of "deviance."' The order imposed through surveillance is what allows the state to co-ordinate its administrative scope with the borders its territory:

> All states have a territorial aspect to them but, prior to the advent of the nation-state, it is unusual for the administrative power of the state apparatus to coincide with defined territorial boundaries. In the era dominated by the nation-state, however, this has become virtually universal.[78]

Rationalization also extends into the legal basis of state authority in modernity. State legitimacy *per se* depends on the justification of the claim to the monopoly of violence within a defined territory. This claim is particularly significant for the modern state, being as 'essential to it as its character of compulsory jurisdiction and of continuous operation.'[79] The modern state is the only political body to base its claim to violence in the 'legal rational authority' that comes from the shared belief of the members of the political community in 'the legality of the enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands'.[80] Legal rational authority differs from traditional forms of state domination which rest on 'established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions', and charismatic domination based in a sense of 'devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative pattern or order revealed or ordained by him.' While all forms of legitimacy are derived from subjective belief in the existence of a legitimate order, only in modernity is this legitimacy derived from a belief in positive enactment or legality. Weber's theory of legitimate order 'takes as prototypical (at least in modernity) the model of a deliberately constructed legal order governed by positive enactments or formal law.'[81] Weber recognized that all law, even positive law, has to be guaranteed by coercion. However, only state law is guaranteed specifically by the capacity of state authorities to use physical violence over the entire space occupied by the political community:

> Today legal coercion by violence is the monopoly of the state. ... We shall speak of "state law" i.e., of law guaranteed by the state, only when

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[78]Giddens, *Nation-State and Violence*, p. 49.

[79]Weber, *Economy and Society: Vol. 1*, p. 56.

[80]Weber's discussion of legal orders is in *Economy and Society: Vol. 1*, pp. 212-301. All the quotes in this paragraph are taken from p. 215.

[81]Fred Dallmayr, 'Max Weber and the Modern State', p. 55.

legal coercion is exercised through the specific, i.e. normally directed *physical* means of coercion of the political community[82]

The Realist ideal of state sovereignty has considerable parallels with Weber's notion of legitimate domination. Both concepts assume that a centralized authority has the capacity to make law backed up by a monopoly of violence over a defined space. Hans Morgenthau views the modern legal doctrine of sovereignty much as Weber saw legitimate domination, as positive empirical fact. He presents sovereignty as a basic 'political fact' that arises when, in a given territory, a certain group of persons become more powerful than other groups and their power becomes institutionalized and manifests 'itself as the supreme authority to enact and enforced legal rules within that territory.'[83]

Order and legitimacy grounded in territoriality are, in Realist and Weberian theory, further complemented by the assertion of identity as nationhood. Weber anticipated that in a disenchanted world the procedural criteria of legal and political legitimacy could not secure political commitment to the state. Modern states faced a 'legitimacy deficit' which had to be compensated by emotional attachments to the nation and charismatic leaders. Once natural law no longer served as a foundation for the legitimacy of the state, Weber sought 'to prop up the state by an appeal to certain irrational political instincts in the masses towards the nation-state.'[84] Weber's views on nationalism can also be read as a response to the 'insecurities of a shifting relative space' that Harvey suggests characterized *fin de siècle* Europe. The increasingly heterogeneous nature of space combined with a general sense of impotence in face of collapsing distances, lead to attempts to reaffirm identities in terms of place. In the late nineteenth century, links between place and personal and communal identity were accentuated as invented traditions aestheticized politics, and newly established memorial institutions such as museums, libraries, exhibitions and ruins, attempted to re-affirm the experience of identity in place, which was being eroded by abstract capitalist space.[85]

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[82]Weber, *Economy and Society: Vol. 1*, p. 314.

[83]Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson, 6th ed., (New York NY, McGraw-Hill Inc, 1985), p. 335.

[84]Bryan S. Turner, 'Nietzsche, Weber and the Devaluation of Politics: The Problem of State Legitimacy' in Turner, *Max Weber: From History to Modernity* (London, Routledge, 1992), pp. 184-208, at p. 197.

[85]David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1989), pp. 258-83.

Weber considered nationalism to be simultaneously subjective – a nation exists where a people have a sense of belonging to a 'community of sentiment' – and objective – the subjective sense of solidarity is based in objective factors, such as common race, language, religion, customs and political experience. A nation must meet three criteria: there must be an objective common factor between the people which differentiates them from others; this common factor must be considered as a source of value, able to produce 'a feeling of solidarity against outsiders'; and this feeling of solidarity must be expressed in autonomous political institutions co-extensive with the community.[86] A nation's identity is secured through its *Kulture* or 'those *particular* values which distinguish a group or society from others ... and which are given self-conscious formation, typically in the art or literature of the society.'[87] Where national *Kulture* is inscribed within the state, state and nation develop a mutually-reinforcing relationship. The state provides the protection necessary for safeguarding *Kulture*, while national communities generate the feelings of solidarity that reinforce the state's legitimacy. However, while state and nation are ideally co-extensive, Weber recognized that this was not always so: '[t]here are three rational components of a political boundary, military security, economic interest, community of national culture; the three do not just coincide like that on a map.'[88]

Charles Turner had pointed out that Weber's concern to stress 'the continuing relevance of spatial boundaries' contrasts with his sensitivity to the transformations accompanying modernization which seemed to be erasing spatial boundaries and prioritizing the temporal nature of being – changes which he acknowledged in other parts of his work.[89] Walker reads this paradox in Weber's work in the context of Weber's account of the nation-state as an attempt to reinforce state autonomy in a world of 'radical

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[86]Much of the following discussion of Weber's theory of the nation-state is adapted from David Beetham, *Max Weber and Modern Politics*, pp. 119-47, quote p. 122.

[87]Max Weber, *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*, quoted in Beetham, *Weber and Modern Politics* p. 125.

[88]Weber, *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*, pp. 169-170, in Beetham, *Weber and Modern Politics*, p. 129.

[89]For a commentary on the spatial nature of Weber's thought, see Charles Turner, *Modernity and Politics* (London, Routledge, 1992), at p. 10. Weber also established rigid spatial boundaries between the five value spheres: economic, political, aesthetic, erotic and intellectual. Max Weber, 'Religious Rejections of the World and their Directions' in Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, pp. 322-59.

historicity' by fixing 'history on a spatial terrain'.[90] By means of a nationalist appeal to history '[t]he initial assumption of territoriality, is rewritten as an autonomous nationalism that fills the spatial form, that gives life and agency to the abstract claims of the modern state.'[91] Weber's analysis of the state places him in a tradition that assert the 'spatial delineation of an inside and an outside' and wants to limit political life to the former. The space over which the monopoly of violence may be exercised by state authorities is a restricted territory. The implication of this is that other states must be able to claim to similar monopolies over other territories: 'Weber takes the spatial separation for granted, the relevant territory is a spatial segment among other spatial segments, and the state of which he speaks is only a monopoly among other monopolies.'[92]

The Realist 'national-territorial totality' is a direct descendent of Weber's ideal nation state. In *Politics Among Nations* Morgenthau revisions Weber's *Kulture* as Coleridge's "invisible spirit that breathes through a whole people ...".[93] A strong sense of national culture is important not only because it contributes to a state's power, but also because it is another pole of sovereign identity that differentiates in space 'one nation apart from others.'[94] The state is the expression of the sovereignty of the nation, which is inscribed into the spaces of its territory. For Morgenthau, 'on a given territory only one nation can have sovereignty – supreme authority – and ... no other state has the right to perform governmental acts on its territory without its consent.'[95] In modernity, which, following Weber, Morgenthau describes as a disenchanted age, it is the state's expression of national sentiment which has allowed it to become a 'mortal God'. Furthermore, in an age that no longer believes in an 'immortal God' this means that 'the state becomes the only God there is.'[96]

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[90]R.B.J. Walker, 'Violence, Modernity, Silence: From Max Weber to International Relations' in David Campbell and Mick Dillon (eds), *The Political Subject of Violence* (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1993), pp. 137-58.

[91]Walker, 'Violence, Modernity, Silence', p. 150.

[92]Walker, 'Violence, Modernity, Silence', p. 152.

[93]Coleridge, quoted in Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 147.

[94]Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 147.

[95]Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 330.

[96]Hans Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (Chicago IL, University of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 197.

Conclusion

Weber's theory of the state as a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory is the paradigm for the Realist idea of the national territorial totality. Both Realists and Weberians stake their claims about the nature of identity, order and violence in modernity upon the ground that is provided by the idea of the territorial state. In so doing, both Realism and Weberian theory reinforce the inside/outside spatial demarcation as determined by the principle of sovereign identity. It is this spatial distinction that makes possible the conception of international relations as a distinct realm of practice and theory. In the next chapter I propose to take the analysis further. I want to show that a constructive way to think about the idea of the territorial state is as one discourse on space, forming part of a complex network or matrix of discourse and practice that have represented and produced the social, political and cultural spaces of modernity.

Space in Theory

> All people, everywhere, in all ages, have a distinctive experience of time
> and space and, however unconscious, some conception of it. It is possible
> to interpret how class structures, modes of production, patterns of
> diplomacy, or means of waging war were manifested historically in terms
> of changing experiences of time and space.[1]

We have established that the idea of the territorial state is a mainstay of Realist and
Weberian theory. The idea of the territorial state is the pivot upon which the practice of
sovereign identity inscribes the space of domestic political community, marks it as inside,
and separates it from the outside spaces of international relations. Further, it is the ground
upon which the resolution of order, violence and identity is settled in Realist and
Weberian theory.

At its most basic, the term territory signifies a space constituted by power. Robert
Sack insists that territory is not synonymous with space.[2] Spatial designates activities and
events which take place in and through space and which have spatial properties such as
location, shape and orientation. Territory refers to the dominant geographical expression
of social power and control. Merely circumscribing things in space or on a map does not
create territory. Territoriality involves the sustained 'attempt by an individual or group
to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and
asserting control over a geographic area.'[3] Delimitation becomes territory only when the
control of access determines behaviour and the boundaries are used 'to mould, influence
and control activities.'[4] The most effective instrument of territorialisation is the abstract
form of power embodied in the modern state, which controls a society made up of
different classes pursing distinctive economic activities abstracted from place. However,

> to make this power more accessible, visible or "real", the state is endowed
> with the most basic attribute of objects – location and extension in space.
> In civilisation, the political power of the state is areal or territorial. The

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[1] Stephen Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space 1880-1918* (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 4.

[2] Robert David Sack, *Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986).

[3] Sack, *Human Territoriality*, p. 19.

[4] Sack, *Human Territoriality*, p. 19.

state is reified by placing it in space. Whatever else a state may be or do, it is territorial.[5]

In this chapter I want to look at the way in which the territorial space of the modern state is produced. The French philosopher Michel Foucault agrees with Sack that territory is not just 'a geographical notion' but a 'juridico-political one: the area controlled by a certain kind of power.'[6] However, unlike Sack, Foucault argues that the form of power through which territory is circumscribed is 'discursive'. Drawing on Foucault's work I want to put forward a number of propositions that will allow us to view the idea of the territorial state not as an objective intellectual category, but as a discursive practice that produces and legitimises the dominant order of political space in modernity. I shall extract from the work of several French writers, who have analysed the representation and production of space in modernity, some guidelines for situating the idea of the territorial state not as part of an unfolding narrative of political theory, but in terms of a set or network of interrelated discourses and practices that have produced the spaces of modernity.

The argument will unfold as follows. The first section, which will establish the background scenography, will examine the spatial consciousness of French structuralism and the critique of it advanced by historical materialist geographers. This discussion will focus on the use of spatial metaphor and vocabulary in Foucault's archaeology of the human sciences, and will introduce the meaning of the term discourse as it is used in this work. The second section will compare and contrast two different theoretical approaches to theorising the relationship between space, knowledge and power: Foucault's later genealogies of power/knowledge will be considered alongside Henri Lefebvre's work on the representation and production of space. In the final section I bring the question of the state more sharply into focus by means of a discussion of the themes of 'territorialisation' and 'striated' state-space as presented in the writings of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.

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[5]Robert David Sack, *Conceptions of Space in Social Thought: A Geographic Perspective* (London, Macmillan, 1980), pp. 40-1.

[6]Michel Foucault, 'Questions on Geography' in Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, ed. Colin Gordon (Brighton, The Harvester Press, 1980), pp. 63-77, at p. 68.

Space, Structure, Discourse

The geographer Edward Soja has claimed that twentieth century social and political thought has privileged time at the expense of space.[7] Liberals and Marxists have a 'historical imagination' in which social being and becoming have been interpreted in the context of time. This preoccupation with man's social and political association in light of the unfolding of history has meant that the instrumentality of space has been overlooked. The historical imagination has failed to recognise modernity's 'spatial fix', that is the radical restructuring of the spatial organisation of society as a response to the crisis of capitalism, and the role of the state – itself a 'socially produced space' – in reproducing capitalist space.[8] However, one branch of twentieth century theory, French structuralism and its post-structuralist derivatives, has had more of a spatial than historical imagination.[9] In his recent history of structuralism, the French historian François Dosse argues that structuralism rejected 'the dialectic of temporalities' for 'a spatial logic with its multiple games of positions.'[10] The structuralists' penchant for spatial metaphors: inside, outside, borders and boundaries complements a distinctive landscape; albeit one of absence and lack, one that is 'void of content and meaning'.[11] Structuralism, according to Dosse,

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[7]Edward W. Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* (London, Verso, 1989).

[8]Soja, *Postmodern Geographies*, pp. 34-5.

[9]Michael Lane views structuralism as a method that has six distinctive properties. First, its advocates consider it applicable to all realms of human social phenomena; all manifestations of social activity (clothes, books, stories, kinship and marriage) are viewed as constituting formal languages whose regularities can be reduced to a set of abstract rules that define and govern those languages. Second, structuralism is holistic; it gives logical priority to the whole over the parts, although the whole can only be explained in terms of the relations between parts or the networks which link and unite the elements. Third, structuralism seeks structure not at the surface level of empirical observables, but beneath or behind the empirical reality; its domain is the unconscious laws and rules governing behaviour. Fourth, structuralists assume that all the social phenomena of a society are indivisible and therefore that it is possible to identify the homologies and correspondences between, say, structures of language, myth and kinship. Fifth, relations discerned at the abstracted level of deep structure can be reduced to relations of binary opposites (*raw/cooked*, fire/water, sun/moon). Finally, structuralist analysis emphasises synchronicity rather than diachronicity, the relations across a moment in time rather than through time. See Michael Lane, 'Introduction' to Lane, *Structuralism: A Reader* (London, Jonathan Cape Ltd, 1970), pp. 11-42.

[10]François Dosse, *History of Structuralism, Vol. 2: The Sign Sets, 1967-Present*, trans. Deborah Glassman, (Minneapolis MN, University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 437.

[11]Dosse, *History of Structuralism*, p. 437.

looked for its logic not in the vertical depths of an impossible genesis, but in the horizontality of the many possibilities organized by a certain number of operators of generalised exchange: phonemes, incest taboos, the *objet petit a*. This was the space wherein structural logic was constructed, yet "spacing means nothing, nothing which is, no present to set at a distance; it is the index of an irreducible outside and, at the same time, the index of a movement, a shift indicated by an irreducible alterity."[12]

We can get some sense of the spatial imagination of (post)-structuralism from Foucault's early archaeological work on the constitution of knowledge in the human sciences.[13] In *The Order of Things* – his classic work of archaeology – Foucault sought to expose the shared 'conditions of possibility' that structured the enunciation of statements in different discourses of man. He wanted to know 'how it is that the human subject took itself as the object of possible knowledge? Through what forms of rationality and historical conditions? And, finally at what price? This is my question: at what price can subjects speak the truth about themselves?'[14] The *Order of Things* explored the history of the order circumscribing the modern discourses of man: philology, political economy and biology, which identified man as a user of language, as a wealth creator, and as a living organism. Foucault asked,

> what modalities of order have been recognized, posited, linked with space and time, in order to create the positive basis of knowledge as we find it employed in grammar and philology, in natural history and biology, in the study of wealth and political economy. ... on what basis knowledge and theory became possible; within what space of order knowledge was constituted; on the basis of what historical *a priori*, and in the element of what positivity, ideas could appear, sciences be established, experience be reflected in philosophies, rationalities be formed.[15]

In *The Order of Things* Foucault found, at the unconscious level of rule

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[12]Jacques Derrida, quoted in Dosse, *History of Structuralism*, p. 438.

[13]In the preface to the English translation of the *Order of Things* Foucault dismisses as 'half-witted' the French commentators who 'persist in labelling me a "structuralist". I have been unable to get it into their tiny minds that I have used none of the methods, concepts or, key terms that characterize structural analysis.' Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, trans. Alan Sheridan, (London, Routledge, 1970), p. xiv. Nevertheless, I shall, for the sake of this introductory argument, adopt Dosse's view that Foucault, at least as an archaeologist, was, with Lévi-Strauss, Barthes and Lacan, a major figure in the French structuralist movement of the 1960s.

[14]Foucault, quoted in J. G. Merquior, *Foucault* (London, Fontana, 1985), p. 17.

[15]Foucault, *The Order of Things*, pp. xxi-ii.

formation, in the discourses of natural history, economic exchange and general grammar of the Classical period (roughly 1650-1800) a common archaeological system, a set of 'discursive regularities', a 'polymorphous cluster of correlations' that determined which objects were studied, how concepts were formed and the premises of theory construction.[16] Foucault termed this system an *interdiscursive configuration* or *episteme*.[17] The spirit of the classical episteme, the episteme of *representation*, was 'discrimination': the identities of things were established by marking out their differences from others; its main structures were *mathesis* – 'a universal science of measurement and order' – and *taxonomia* – the principle of classification or ordered tabulation. The spatial imagery of the episteme is quite striking. J. G Merquior understands the episteme as 'a basement (*sous-sol*) of thought, a mental infrastructure underlying all strands of knowledge (on man) at a given age, a conceptual 'grid' (*grille*, in Foucault's Lévi-Straussian wording) that amounts to an 'historical *a priori*' – almost a historicized form of Kant's categories.'[18] Similarly, Dosse suggests that Foucault conceived of the episteme 'as a vast transversal anchor that could only shift rather than evolve between the quakes, or give way to another layer that would superpose itself on the first and become sediment' and that it 'found its parallel in the geologists approach.' He describes Foucault as a 'stratigrapher of discursivity and its discontinuities' and his archaeology as substituting 'a horizontal, synchronic, spatial orientation for a genetic, historical approach.'[19] Spatial metaphors infuse Foucault's own accounts of his project:

> what is available to archaeological knowledge is the ... threshold that separates us from Classical thought and constitutes our modernity. It was upon this threshold that the strange figure of knowledge called man first appeared and revealed a space proper to the human sciences. In attempting to uncover the deepest strata of Western culture, I am restoring to our silent and apparently immobile soil its rifts, its instability, its flaws; and it is the same ground that is once more stirring under our feet.[20]

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[16]Michel Foucault, 'Politics and the Study of Discourse' in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds), *The Foucault Effect* (Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 53-72, at p. 58.

[17]Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. A. M. Sheridan-Smith, (London, Tavistock Publications, 1972), p. 191.

[18]Merquior, *Foucault*, p. 38.

[19]Dosse, *History of Structuralism*, p. 441.

[20]Foucault, *Order of Things*, p. xxiv.

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The spatial language of structuralism has, however, failed to convince all of its critics of its validity. Taking aim at the epistemological studies of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Julia Kristeva, the Marxist theorist Henri Lefebvre charged them with purveying an intellectual sophistry that fetishised space as a 'mental thing' or 'mental place' and promoted the untenable claim that the mental realm envelops the social and physical ones.[21] Criticising Foucault's archaeology, Lefebvre claimed that Foucault's liberal use of spatial metaphors – as in the statement "knowledge [savior] is also the space in which the subject may take up a position and speak of the objects with which he deals in his discourse" – is problematic because he does not make it clear what sort of space he is referring to, or how it bridges the gap between epistemology and the social use of space.[22] Although Lefebvre was sympathetic to the semiotic claim that space could be read, decoded and deciphered, he felt that formal semiotics was unable to convey a sense of how man experiences space, or to explain the role of power in the production of space. To add to its woes, epistemological-philosophical thinking failed to provide a strong basis for a 'science of space', which has only managed to produce fragmentary descriptions of space, rather than profound theory or analysis; the spatial sciences merely provided 'inventories of what *exists in* space' or 'discourses *on* space', and were unable to provide 'knowledge *of* space'. Structuralist theory transferred 'onto the level of discourse, of language *per se* – i.e. the level of mental space – a large portion of the attributes and 'properties' of what is actually social space.'[23]

In the next section I shall suggest that Lefebvre's approach to theorising space as a social product is, in fact, quite similar to Foucault's genealogical conceptualisation of space as the product of power/knowledge. However, I want to end this section with a consideration of Foucault's characterisation of the discourses uncovered by the archaeology. The single most important point to bear in mind about Foucault's understanding of discourse is his claim that discourse *produces* the objects about which it speaks. Foucault dismissed the traditional epistemological position that discourse denotes 'the sign of something else' of 'things' which are 'silently anterior to it.' Things

[21]Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. D. Nicholson-Smith, (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1991).

[22]Lefebvre, *Production of Space*, pp. 3-4.

[23]Lefebvre, *Production of Space*, p. 7.

or objects (*choses*) are not just revealed through discourse (*mots*) but are formed in it.[24] Foucault's view that objects are produced by discourse effectively overturns the epistemological view that signs represent a pre-existing reality, and that words are linked to things by relations such as symbolisation, reference or truth.[25] Discourse is not 'groups of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or representations)', but 'practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak.'[26] We must, therefore, avoid the temptation to

> resolve discourse into a play of pre-existing significations; we must not imagine that the world turns towards us a legible face which we would have only to decipher; the world is not the accomplice of our knowledge; there is no prediscursive providence which disposes the world in our favour. We must conceive discourse as a violence which we do to things, or in any case as a practice which we impose on them.[27]

There are two immediate implications of conceiving of the idea of the territorial state as a discourse in Foucault's sense. First, any reference to the idea of the territorial must not be treated simply as a disinterested statement about the objective order of political space in modernity; rather the idea of the territorial state must be seen as a discursive configuration which assists in the production of that order. Second, the term discourse allows us to extend our understanding of the relationship between the idea of the territorial state and violence. It is not simply that the state has, as in Weberian terminology, the exclusive legitimate access to the means of violence, but that the enunciation of the statement 'the state is territorial' implicitly legitimises the violence by which the spaces of politics in modernity have been demarcated and legitimised. I shall develop these themes in the next section, where I shall discuss the production of space in light of the themes of knowledge, power and representation.

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[24]Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, p. 47.

[25]See, for a discussion of Foucault's epistemology, Richard Rorty, 'Foucault and Epistemology' in David Couzens Hoy (ed.), *Foucault: A Critical Reader* (Oxford, Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1986), pp. 41-9.

[26]Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, p. 49.

[27]Michel Foucault, 'The Order of Discourse' in Robert Young (ed.), *Untying the Text: A Poststructuralist Reader* (Boston MA, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), pp. 48-78, at p. 67.

Space, Knowledge and Power

Soja argues that the Western spatial imagination could be enriched by a critical geography, which would reveal how space hides consequences from us and 'how relations of power and discipline are 'inscribed into the apparently innocent spatiality of social life.'[28] Foucault is one theorist whose work Soja thinks offers a potentially rewarding analysis of space, knowledge and power in modernity.

Foucault's understanding of discourse changed as his work shifted from the archaeology of knowledge in the human sciences to the genealogy of power and knowledge; as he became less of an *archivist* and more of a *cartographer*.[29] Robert Young captures the difference between these two moments of Foucault's work aptly: archaeology is a 'method for the synchronic analyses and representation of the history of systems of thought', while genealogy or cartography is 'a more directly political mapping of the forms of power exercised in discursive and other practices.'[30] In his later archaeological work, Foucault began to be impressed by the institutional constraints and controls exercised over the formation of discourses. He noted that in all societies 'the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers.'[31] To account for this institutional factor, he replaced the *episteme* with the *dispositif* or 'apparatus: a 'heterogeneous ensemble' whose elements include discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, 'the said as much as the unsaid.'[32] The *dispositif* is a formation that, at a given historical moment, responds to an urgent need, has a strategic function and manipulates specific relations of force. As an example, Foucault claimed that the apparatus which controlled and subjected madness and neurosis arose as a response to the need of the mercantilist economy to assimilate the mobile population. The dispositif highlights a complex interplay between

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[28]Soja, *Postmodern Geographies*, p. 6.

[29]See Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, trans. Seán Hand, (London, The Athlone Press, 1988).

[30]Robert Young, 'Introduction' to Foucault, 'Order of Discourse', p. 48.

[31]Foucault, 'Order of Discourse', p. 52.

[32]Michel Foucault, 'The Confession of the Flesh' in *Power/Knowledge*, pp. 194-228, at p. 194.

relations of power and 'coordinates of knowledge': 'the apparatus consists in: strategies of relations of forces supporting, and supported by, types of knowledge.'[33] Thus, while 'the *episteme* is a specifically *discursive* apparatus – the apparatus in its general form is both discursive and non-discursive, its elements being much more heterogeneous.'[34] It is worth emphasising two features of the relationship between power and knowledge uncovered by the genealogy. First, power through knowledge creates subjectivity and gives identity. It

> categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches
> him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must
> recognize and which other have to recognize in him. It is a form of power
> which makes individuals subjects.[35]

Second, power produces truth. Truth is not the 'mythic reward of free spirits' or the 'child of protracted solitude', but is constituted in power relations: 'Each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true, and which is reproduced in institutions, techniques and regimes of truth.[36] Power is exercised 'through the production of truth.'[37]

In terms of our immediate concern with the relationship between territoriality and the broad discursive production of space in modernity, several aspects of Foucault's work on power/knowledge stand out. First is the role of disciplinary power in the production of space. We may recall that Weber had observed that modern life is ordered by the disciplines. Bryan Turner suggests that Weber's writings on discipline anticipated Foucault's work on the power/knowledge practices which discipline both individual and social bodies: 'Foucault's analysis of "disciplines" can ... be regarded as a contemporary

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[33]Foucault, 'Confession of the Flesh', p. 196.

[34]Foucault, 'Confession of the Flesh', p. 197. Dreyfus and Rabinow illustrate the *dispositif* with reference to Charcot and Freud's experiments on hysterical women given amyl-nitrate to excite them to act out fantasies. While Charcot's etiology of neurosis sought out the objective cause of these actions, and Freud wanted to interpret the actor's hidden intentions so as to discover their sense, Foucault is interested in the *dispositif de sexualité* which is 'not the objective causes of sexual neurosis, nor the hidden intentions of the hysterical woman, but the organization, coherence, and intelligibility of all of the practices which make up the performances in Charcot's clinic. Foucault seeks to analyse exactly *what* these practices are doing.' See Herbert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982), pp. 119-22.

[35]Michel Foucault, 'Afterward: The Subject and Power' in Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, pp. 208-26, at p. 212.

[36]Michel Foucault, 'Truth and Power' in Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, pp. 109-133, at p. 131.

[37]Michel Foucault, 'Two Lectures' in Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, pp. 78-108, at p. 93.

version of Weber's analysis of the iron cage'.[38] According to Foucault, disciplinary power emerged with the discovery of 'the body as object and target of power' in the classical age.[39] The 'docile' body is inserted into a machinery of power which 'explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it' and restricts its operations and actions according to techniques determining speed and efficiency.[40] Disciplinary power distributes individuals in space according to four principles. First, from the 'great confinement' of vagabonds and paupers to the imposition of the monastic cell model in *collèges*, schools, barracks, workshops and factories, *enclosure* produces heterogeneous, closed-off spaces. Second, *partitioning* ensures that every individual is assigned a separate place; groups and pluralities are broken up, so reducing desertion and vagabondage. Through partitioning the individual's location could always be known and his conduct constantly supervised: '[i]t was a procedure therefore aimed at knowing, mastering and using. Discipline organises an analytical space.'[41] Third, discipline produces *functional sites* or 'useful spaces' coded for particular operations rather than for general multi-purpose use. Finally, disciplinary elements are *interchangeable*: they are defined by the place they occupies in a series. For Foucault the primary unit of spatial discipline is not 'the territory (unit of domination), nor the place (unit of residence), but the *rank*: the place one occupies in a classification':[42]

> In organizing "cells", "places", and "ranks", the disciplines create complex spaces that are at once architectural, functional and hierarchical. It is spaces that provide fixed positions and permit circulation; they carve out individual segments and establish operational links; they mark places and indicate values; they guarantee the obedience of individuals, but also better economy of time and gesture. They are mixed spaces: real because they govern the disposition of buildings, rooms, furniture, but also ideal, because they are projected over this arrangement of characterizations, assessments, hierarchies. The first of the great operations of discipline is, therefore, the constitution of "*tableaux vivants*", which transform the

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[38]Bryan S. Turner, 'Nietzsche, Weber and the Devaluation of Politics: The Problem of State Legitimacy' in Turner, *Max Weber: From History to Modernity* (London, Routledge, 1992), pp. 184-208, at p. 205.

[39]Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1979), p. 136.

[40]Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p. 138.

[41]Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p. 143.

[42]Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p. 146.

confused, useless or dangerous multitudes into ordered multiplicities.[43]

If we are to remain true to Foucault's conceptualisation of disciplinary power we must acknowledge that he posited it as an alternative to state or sovereign power. He insisted that the disciplinary techniques of power could only be exposed if we rid ourselves of the old notion of 'juridico-discursive power' based in the 'discourse of right'. Juridico-discursive power operates by prohibition, negative interdiction and repression; it is the power of 'sovereign, law and prohibition', and, since the Middle Ages, has dominated our conceptualisation of power. Foucault wants us to forget our obsession with the person of the sovereign, to dispense with this representation of power, and to 'cut off the King's head', so that we might understand the mechanisms and techniques of modern power, which the juridico-discursive notion of power not only fails to describe, but also masks.[44] Nevertheless, as our discussion of the Realist-Weberian tradition of state theory revealed, many consider the modern state's bureaucracy to be the most efficient instrument of disciplinary power. We saw how thinkers in this tradition, like Giddens, have reframed discipline in terms of state surveillance and how it is implicated in the idea of the territorial state. Michel de Certeau sees disciplinary strategies ordering space at all levels of modern power relations, from states down. A strategy is the

> calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships that becomes possible as soon as a subject with will and power (a business, an army, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated. It postulates a *place* that can be delimited as its *own* and serve as the base from which relations with an *exteriority* composed of targets or threats (customers or competitors, enemies, the country surrounding the city, objectives and objects of research, etc.) can be managed. ... A Cartesian attitude, if you wish: it is an effort to delimit one's place in a world bewitched by the invisible powers of the Other. It is also the typical attitude of modern science, politics and military strategy.[45]

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[43]Foucault continues: 'The drawing up of "tables" was one of the great problems of the scientific, political and economic technology of the eighteenth century. ... In the eighteenth century, the table was both a technique of power and a procedure of knowledge. It was a question of organising the multiple, of providing oneself with an instrument to cover it and to master it; it was a question of imposing upon it an "order".' *Discipline and Punish*, p. 148.

[44]Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: Vol 1* (London, Penguin, 1984), p. 85; and Foucault, 'Truth and Power', p. 121.

[45]Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. Steven Rendall, (Berkeley CA, University of California Press, 1984), pp. 35-6.

There are, according to de Certeau, three effects of this strategy of marking out in space the *loci* of self and other. First, it produces a triumph of space over time, which is effectively mastered through the ownership of an autonomous place. Second, this mastery of place is achieved through sight: '[t]he division of space makes possible a *panoptic practice* proceeding from a place whence the eye can transform foreign forms into objects that can be observed and measured, and thus control and "include" them within its scope of vision.' Third, the capacity to 'transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces' is the *power of knowledge*.[46] These strategies produce a knowledge that is sustained and determined by the provision of one's own space; this power is not only the precondition of this knowledge, but (re)produces itself in and through this knowledge.

Foucault felt that the genealogy was capable of exposing the production of space by regimes of power/knowledge. Responding to a question about the use of spatial metaphors (territory, site, position) in his work, Foucault suggested that they allowed him to conceive of the relations between power and knowledge: '[there is an administration of knowledge, a politics of knowledge, relations of power which pass via knowledge and which, if one tries to transcribe them, lead one to consider forms of domination designated by such notions as field, region and territory.[47] Strategic spatial metaphors allow discourse to be deciphered; they expose the 'points at which discourses are transformed in, through and on the basis of relations of power.'[48] Discourse formation and the genealogy of knowledge should not be analysed

> in terms of types of consciousness, modes of perception and forms of ideology, but in terms of tactics and strategies of power. Tactics and strategies deployed through implantations, distributions, demarcations, control of territories and organisations of domains which could well make up a sort of geopolitics ...[49]

Themes of space, power and knowledge are also emphasised by Henri Lefebvre – the second author in whose work Soja identifies the seeds of a critical geography. We have already encountered Lefebvre's critique of Foucault's use of spatial language. However, Lefebvre's own analysis of the production of space has much more in common

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[46] de Certeau, *Practice of Everyday Life,* p. 36.
[47] Foucault, 'Questions on Geography', p. 69.
[48] Foucault, 'Questions on Geography', p. 70.
[49] Foucault, 'Questions on Geography', p. 77.

with Foucault's genealogical work than Lefebvre seemed to be prepared to admit. Lefebvre always maintained his historical materialist credentials and insisted on the social rather than linguistic production of space. All societies produce a particular space in which the dominant relations of production are reproduced. Space for Lefebvre, is 'a precondition and a result of social superstructures'; it is not an *a priori* condition for the state and its institutions but is organised by them for their specific needs.[50] Although space has

> been shaped and moulded from historical and natural elements ... this has been a political process. Space is political and ideological. It a product literally filled with ideologies.[51]

The politics and ideologies hidden in social space can be revealed by 'spatial architectonics', which traces shifts in the relationship of the body to space. It shows that in Western culture there has been a process of *decorporealization* from the 'space of the body' – in which spaces were ordered and conceived in terms of the body's organisation – to the 'body-in-space' – where the body becomes fragmented and decomposed into localised functions. Space is produced through three modalities: 'the perceived, 'the conceived' and 'the lived'. Perceived space is embodied in *spatial practices* or the time-space routines and spatial structures through which social, political and economic life is produced and reproduced. Lived space is experienced through the *representational spaces* of historically embedded signs and images – these spaces are often sites of resistance inaugurated by cultural and artistic movements in opposition to the spatial practices of the dominant social order. Representational spaces are lived spaces – those analysed by ethnologists, psychoanalysts and anthropologists – and are redolent with imaginary and symbolic elements. Representational space 'is alive: it speaks, it has an affective kernel or centre: Ego, bed, bedroom, dwelling, house; or; square, church,

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[50]Lefebvre, *Production of Space*, p. 85.Two points are worth noting here. First, although Lefebvre contends that social spaces mirror the dominant relations of production, he does not suggest that space is reducible to them. Each mode of production has a space, but the characteristics of space are not equivalent to the mode of production. Indeed he regarded the tendency to reduce the aesthetic, social and mental realms to the economic as a 'disastrous error'. Lefebvre quoted in Derek Gregory, *Geographical Imaginations*, (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1994), p. 38. Second, Lefebvre was aware that social spaces are not distinct and bounded, but overlapping, interpenetrating and superimposed on one another; they cannot be explained in terms of isolated discourses (urban, geographic, architectural or anthropological) which focus on aspects rather than the whole of social space.

[51]Henri Lefebvre, 'Reflections on the Politics of Space', *Antipode*, 8:2 (1976), pp. 30-7, at p. 31.

graveyard. It embraces the loci of passion, of action, and of lived situations...'[52] The third – and most relevant for our historical investigation into the origins of the idea of the territorial state – modality is conceived space, produced through *representations of space*. Representations of space are the abstract, visual and imaginary spaces of social engineers, urban planners, architects and cartographers which materially inscribe the dominant social order's relations of production. Representations of space, like Foucauldian apparatuses, are the axes through which knowledge of space leads to the production of space through practice:

> representations of space are shot throughout with a knowledge (*savoir*) – i.e. a mixture of understanding (*connaissance*) and ideology – which is always relative and in the process of change. Such representations are thus objective, though subject to revision. ... Representations of space are certainly abstract, but they also play a part in social and political practice: established relations between objects and people in represented space are subordinate to a logic which will sooner or later break them up...[53]

Representations of space intervene and modify spatial textures and have a substantial role in the production of space. Their intervention occurs through 'construction': 'by way of architecture, conceived of not as the building of a particular structure, palace or monument, but rather as a project embedded in a spatial context and a texture which calls for "representations" that will not vanish into the symbolic or imaginary realms.'[54]

Foucault's analysis of technologies of power/knowledge shares with Lefebvre's analysis of representations of space a suspicion of, what Martin Jay has called, modernity's 'empire of the gaze' and the 'ocularcentric discourse' of Western culture.[55] (I will address these themes more substantially in chapter six, where I assess the relationship between the Renaissance idea of the territorial state and the invention of perspective.) For Lefebvre the conceived or conceptual space produced by *representations of space* is primarily visual. In modernity the power of the eye dominates the construction and imposition of abstract space. Thought

> sours up into the abstract space of the visible, the geometric. The architect

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[52]Lefebvre, *Production of Space*, p. 42.

[53]Lefebvre, *Production of Space*, p. 41.

[54]Lefebvre, *Production of Space*, p. 42.

[55]Martin Jay, *Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought* (Berkeley CA, University of California Press, 1994).

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who designs, the planner who draws up master-plans, see their "objects", buildings and neighbourhoods, from on high and from afar. ... They pass from the "lived" to the abstract in order to project that abstraction onto the level of the "lived".[56]

Foucault shares this concern that modern society is controlled by the 'eye of power' embodied in the panopticon.[57] Panopticism is a response to a realisation that space is a historical and political problem which must be specified and made functional. Bentham's famous panopticon complements Rousseau's dream of a 'transparent society' in which all of its parts were 'at once visible and legible' and not obscured by the 'privileges of royal power or the prerogatives of a given body'. Each man should be able to see the whole of society from wherever he stands. Bentham's panopticon both embodies and restricts these ideals for

> [h]e poses the problem of visibility, but his conception of visibility is organised completely around a dominating and observing gaze. He initiates the project of a universal visibility that would function on behalf of a rigorous and meticulous form of power. In this sense the technical idea of the exercise of an "all-seeing" power, which is Bentham's obsession, is connected to the great Rousseauian theme ...[58]

The Striated Space of the Territorialising State

It will have been noted that neither Foucault's analysis of the micropolitics of discipline nor Lefebvre's discussion of the social production of space say much about the particular relationship of the state to its territory. Both Foucault and Lefebvre tell us much about the general discursive and representational dynamics which produce space in modernity – and as we shall see these dynamics feed into the production of state territory – but they do not isolate the space of the state for specific consideration. Two thinkers who do are Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in their two volume work, *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*.[59] Like Foucault they are interested in the micropolitical dynamics of

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[56]Lefebvre, quoted in Gregory, *Geographical Imaginations*, p. 404.

[57]Michel Foucault, 'The Eye of Power' in Foucault, *Foucault Live: Collected Interviews 1961-1984*, ed. Sylvère Lotringer, (New York NY, Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 226-40, at p. 230.

[58]All quotes from Foucault, 'Eye of Power', p. 230-1.

[59]Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Robert Hurley, (London, The Athlone Press, 1984); and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Brain Massumi, (London, The Athlone Press, 1988).

power, but they also analyse the molar power embodied in the state. Of particular interest for us is the distinction they find between the smooth space of micropolitical or nomadic forms of becoming and the State's being in striated space.

Deleuze and Guattari's work, which they call schizoanalysis or rhizomatics, is an idiosyncratic conflation of historical materialism – particularly Marx's notion of 'primitive accumulation' – and psychoanalytic theory. They bring together the operations of large socio-economic structures with individual psyches. One concept they use to convey this conjunction is 'territorialization' – an idea adapted from Lacan, for whom it designates the imprint of the mother's nourishment and care on the child's libido, producing charged erogenous zones and objects out of organs. Territorialization signifies the regulation and coding of flows of material bodies and desire
by social and political 'machines'. Coding flows is the 'business of the socius'; society is not a milieu of free-exchange and circulation, but 'a socius of inscription where the essential thing is to mark and be marked.'[60]

Three different abstract social machines: primitive, despotic and capitalist produce three different moments of territorialization – which is at once a process of *de*territorialization and *re*territorialization (for example, the English Enclosure Acts served the capitalist machine by *de*territorializing dispossessed peasants thereby establishing the conditions for their *re*territorialization in the textile looms).[61] The only machine that is strictly territorial is the primitive one, which literally inscribes bodies on an indivisible earth. It controls the productive forces by 'tattooing, excising, carving,

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[60]Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 142.

[61]See Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 139-271, for the 'universal history' of the three 'social machines'. Universal history is an abstraction and the social machines, rather than describing particular societies, suggest a set of abstract figures in terms of which particular societies may be understood. Universal history is also 'anti-historicist'; the abstract machines are not stages of evolution with one machine resulting from the effects of another. Patton points out that they all 'co-exist in abstraction, which is eternal. Concrete history is simply the working out of these processes in particular cases.' Paul Patton, 'Conceptual Politics and the War-Machine in *Mille Plateaux*', *SubStance*, 13:3/4 (1984), pp. 62-80, at p. 68. The 'social machines' are literally machines, which have 'an immobile motor and undertakes a variety of interventions: flows are set apart, elements are detached from a chain, and portions of the tasks to be performed are distributed. Coding the flows implies all these operations.' *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 141. See also, for a discussion of territorialization, Eugene W. Holland, 'Deterritorializing "Deterritorialization": From the *Anti-Oedipus* to *A Thousand Plateaus*', *SubStance*, 20:3 (Winter 1991), pp. 55-65.

scarifying, mutilating, encircling and initiating' bodies.[62] In the primitive socius the enjoyment of rights and the assignation of duties are legitimised by marking the primitive's body and consigning his organs and their exercise to the collectivity. The first signs in human history are, therefore, these 'territorial signs that plant their flags in bodies' through which the primitive's body is attached and inscribed to the undifferentiated, undivided earth.'[63] Primitive rural communities are eventually invaded by barbarian despotic states, which extend division to

> the earth itself, by virtue of an administration that is landed and
> residential, this cannot be regarded as a promotion of territoriality; on the
> contrary, it is rather the effect of the first great movement of
> deterritorialization on the primitive communes. The immanent unity of
> the earth as the immobile motor gives way to a transcendent unity of an
> altogether different nature – the unity of the State; the full body is no
> longer that of the earth, it is the full body of the Despot ...[64]

The despotic State machine *overcodes* the territorial codes and filiations of the primitive machine and transfers them to the 'body of the despot' which becomes the focus of desire and production. The third moment is the social machine of capitalism which consists only of decoded flows. Capitalism is a 'general axiomatic of decoded flows' that evolves from the conjugation of decoded and deterritorialized flows of unqualified wealth and unqualified labour; it replaces intrinsic codes with an 'axiomatic of abstract quantities in the form of money'.[65] Capitalism deterritorializes not by over-coding but by de-coding: it substitutes the codes and overcodes of primitive and despotic machines for an axiomatic of abstract quantities determined by exchange. The risk of this decoding, which releases subjectivity as both labour and desire, is that desire may not be reintegrated into exchange. Hence the emphasis on schizophrenia as the *exterior* limit of capitalism, as that which 'causes the flows to travel in a free state on a desocialised body without organs' and resists their reintegration into the capitalist axiomatic.[66]

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[62]Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 144.

[63]Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 145.

[64]Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 145-6.

[65]Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 453; and *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 139. This resume of Deleuze and Guattari's discussion of capitalism is greatly simplified. See *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 222-71, for a fuller discussion. See also the commentary by Robert D' Amico, *Marx and the Philosophy of Culture* (Gainsville FA, University Presses of Florida, 1981), pp. 58-99.

[66]For Deleuze and Guattari: 'Schizophrenia is not the identity of capitalism, but on the contrary its difference, its divergence and its death.' *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 246.

The role of the state in the logics of territorialization is to reterritorialize, to code and segment deterritorialized flows of desire and production. This function reaches its apotheosis in capitalism:

> the conjunction of the decoded flows, their differential relations, and their multiple schizzes or breaks require a whole apparatus of regulation whose principle organ is the State. The capitalist State is the regulator of decoded flows as such, insofar as they are caught up in the axiomatic of capital.[67]

The modern state is not displaced by global capitalism, but serves as a space wherein capitalism is realised: it groups together and combines the various flows required by capitalist production. Capitalist territorialization combines 'trans-national capital as locus of high-speed deterritorialization and ... various forms of State as *loci* of reterritorialization.'[68] Modern states are the realised models of 'an independent, worldwide axiomatic that is like a single City, megalopolis, or "megamachine" of which the States are parts, or neighbourhoods.'[69]

Deleuze and Guattari, like Walker and Ashley, view the state as the main spatial pivot upon which the political settlements of inside and outside are articulated. The state is a 'milieu of interiority', which captures flows of populations, commodities, commerce, money and capital. However, its outside, its exteriority, its 'other' is not simply the arena of foreign policy or relations among states, but is constituted by worldwide machines (commercial organisations, industrial complexes, artistic movements and religious formations) which extend over the entire *ecumenon* and which are largely autonomous from states. In this realm of exteriority, local mechanisms of bands, margins and minorities – the nomadic – continue to affirm their rights against state power.[70] All pervasive in this space of exteriority is the war-machine, which 'is of an other species, another nature, another origin than the State apparatus.'[71] In their depiction of the war-

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[67]Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 252.

[68]Holland, 'Deterritorializing "Deterritorialization"', p. 63.

[69]Delueze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 434-5. Lefebvre also considers the most important function of the modern capitalist state to be 'the organization of space, the regularization of its flows, and the control of its networks.' Lefebvre, *Production of Space*, p. 383.

[70]Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 360.

[71]Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 452. See Plateau 12, '1227: Treatise on Nomadology – The War Machine', pp. 351-423, for the distinctions between the nomadic war machine and the State-form.

machine, Deleuze and Guattari deconstruct the Weberian premise that physical violence is integral to the identity of the state. The war-machine is not embodied in the institutions and tools of state violence – the structural and legal violence of 'capture which employs 'police officers and jailers'. On the contrary, they argue, the war-machine is not of the state but of its other: the nomadic warrior, and the State has no intrinsic relation to war. For states to conduct war they must first capture a war-machine, which is outside of the two poles of political sovereignty: the magician-king and jurist-priest: '*Indra the warrior god is in opposition to Varuna no less than to Mitra.*'[72] Furthermore, the war-machine itself does not have war as its object, but operates in many constituencies including literature, philosophy and science; it only becomes engaged in war when appropriated by the State.

The opposition between the State and the nomadic war-machine extends across diverse fields of knowledge and practice. Both the state and the nomad produce and are reproduced in different types of knowledge. Archimedean and atomist science, characterised by 'flux and flows' and emphasising becoming and heterogeneity are nomadic knowledges, marginalised by the keepers of 'royal' or 'State science': the science of Euclidean space and Newtonian gravity, which emphasises the stable, the eternal and the identical. Similarly, modern philosophy as embodied in the Kantian critique and the *cogito* takes the form of State-thought; as in the modern rational state everything 'revolves around the legislator and the subject.'[73] State-thought striates mental space in terms of two universals: 'the Whole as the final ground of being' and 'the Subject as the principle that converts being into being-for-us'.[74] State-thought is the tumour that produces what Gaston Bachelard refers to as the 'geometrical cancerization of the linguistic tissue of contemporary philosophy' in which

> [o]utside and inside form a dialectic of division, the obvious geometry of
> which blinds us as soon as we bring it into play in metaphorical domains.
> It has the sharpness of the dialectics of *yes* and *no*, which decides

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[72]Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 352. The exteriority of the war machine to the state is evident in the traditional hostility between warriors and statesman. 'Colonel Kurtz, in the film *Apocalypse Now*, provides an example of a warrior or war-machine gone out of control, an arm of the military apparatus of the State which has surrendered to the flow of total violence and therefore can no longer be tolerated.' Patton, 'Conceptual Politics', p. 70.

[73]Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus*, p. 376.

[74]Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus*, p. 379.

everything. Philosophers, when confronted with outside and inside, think in terms of being and non-being. Thus profound metaphysics is rooted in an implicit geometry ... The dialectics of *here* and *there* has been promoted to the rank of an absolutism according to which these unfortunate adverbs of place are endowed with unsupervised powers of ontological determination.[75]

However, state thought and its geometrical cancerization are resisted by the nomadic thought of thinkers like Kierkegaard and Nietzsche – as well as, of course, Deleuze and Guattari themselves – who seek to overthrow the universal thinking subject and to resist any grounding in totality.[76]

State thought and practice produces a fundamentally different space to that produced by nomadic thought and practice. Nomads occupy smooth space, while states striate space. The relations between points and lines differ in smooth and striated space: in striated space a line is something going between two points, as in geometry, while in smooth space the priority is given to the line, with the points acting merely as relays between successive lines. The lines themselves have different characteristics: in smooth space lines are locally directional with open intervals, while in striated space lines are subordinate to global dimensionality and have closed intervals. In sum, 'striated space closes a surface, divides it up at indeterminate intervals, establishes breaks, whereas a smooth space involves distribution across a surface, by frequency or along paths.'[77] Hence nomadic territoriality is exercised across smooth space, it constitutes points, such as water holes and assembly points, as mere relays on a trajectory, subordinate to and not determining of paths: 'the in-between has its own autonomy and the life of the nomad is in the intermezzo.' Nomadic trails or routes have a different function to sedentary roads which parcel out a closed space to people, assigning each person a share and regulating communication. The nomad's trajectory *'distributes people (or animals) in an open*

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[75]Gaston Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space* (Boston MA, Beacon Press, 1994), pp. 211-2.

[76]Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus*, p. 379. Nietzsche's aphoristic method is typical of nomadic thought, a 'force that destroys both the image *and* its copies, the model *and* its reproductions, every possibility of subordinating thought to a model of the True, the Just, or the Right (Cartesian truth, Kantian just, Hegelian right, etc.). A "method" is the striated space of the *cogitato universalis* and draws a path that must be followed from one point to another. But the form of exteriority situates thought in a smooth space that it must occupy without counting, and for which there is no possible method, no conceivable reproduction, but only relays, intermezzos, resurgences.' *Thousand Plateaus*, p. 377.

[77]See Plateau 14, '1440: The Smooth and the Striated', *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 474-500.

space, one that is indefinite and noncommunicating.'[78] *Nomos* is opposed to the law of the *polis*, as the backcountry, mountainside or expanse around a city. Sedentary space is striated, by 'walls, enclosures, and roads between enclosures', while nomad space is smooth, 'marked only by "traits" that are effaced and displaced with the trajectory.'[79] The nomad not only inhabit smooth spaces, but seeks to expand them. Nomads are 'vectors of deterritorialisation' who use the war-machine, 'the constitutive element of smooth space', to 'increase the desert.'[80]

The state opposes the nomad's drive to expand smooth space and, guided by theories of geometric and mathematical space, imposes a linear segmentarity that homogenises spatial segments while ensuring equivalence and translatability between units. As with Foucault's disciplined spaces, striated state space is produced by vision: 'the central eye has as its correlate a space through which it moves, but it itself remains invariant in relation to its movements.'[81] The Greek city-states introduced a 'homogeneous isotopic space', and later the Roman Empire imposed a geometrical or *linear reason of State* on its space marking the boundaries of segmented spaces by the lines of camps and fortifications. The state's priority is to

> striate the space over which it reigns, or to utilize smooth spaces as a
> means of communication in the service of striated space. It is the vital
> concern of every State not only to vanquish nomadism but to control
> migrations and, more generally, to establish a zone of rights over an entire
> "exterior", over all of the flows traversing the ecumenon. If it can help it,
> the State does not dissociate itself from a process of capture of flows of
> all kinds, populations, commodities or commerce, money or capital, etc.
> There is still a need for fixed paths in well-defined directions, which
> restrict speed, regulate circulation, relativize movement, and measure in
> detail the relative movement of subjects and objects. This is why Paul
> Virilio's thesis is important, when he shows that "the political power of
> the State is *polis*, police, that is, management of the public ways", and
> that "the gates of the city, its levies and duties, are barriers, filters against
> the fluidity of the masses, against the penetration power of migratory
> packs", people, animals, and goods.[82]

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[78]Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus*, p. 380.

[79]Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus*, p. 381.

[80]Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus*, p. 382.

[81]Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus*, p. 211.

[82]Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 386-7.

This territorializing logic, which pits the state against the nomadic flows, is, suggests William Connolly, integral to the ideal of the modern territorial state. The idea of the territorial state is one of the most important modern institutions for fixing identity and marking out difference in space. Connolly takes Rousseau's text, *The Government of Poland*, as an illustration of how in modern political discourse the establishment of identity on the territory of the modern state legitimises a necessary violence against the 'other'. Rousseau argued that if the Poles were to be a free people, they had to have a strong identity with a particular territory. Rousseau's text, suggests Connolly, reveals an important set of correspondences: 'to be free you must belong to a people; to be a people you must have a common identity burned into you; to be a flourishing people you must exclusively inhabit a contiguous territory; to flourish freely as a territorialized people you must stringently limit contact with the foreign.'[83] According to Connolly, Rousseau was aware that Poland could only be endeared to its citizens through the violence 'done to the internal other (those inhabiting the territory who do not belong), the interior other (the other within the self which resists such strong identification with the collectivity) and the external other (those who are foreign).'[84] This logic is also present in Tocqueville's narrative of the founding of the American state, *Democracy in America*. Tocqueville had to justify the founding of the American 'civi-territorial complex' which was basically the imposition of an alien social form on the pre-existing Indian communities. Tocqueville's resolution was to argue that the Indians were nomadic, wandering tribes who lived on the surface of the land, and who, because they lacked agriculture, only occupied but did not posses the land they inhabited. Hence, the continent of North America was effectively empty, waiting for the introduction of 'civilisation' by newcomers who would overcode the territory by means of agri-culture, possession, and the exploitation of natural wealth. With the arrival of the Europeans, America became a 'civi-territorial complex' in which

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[83]William E. Connolly, 'Tocqueville, Territory and Violence', *Theory, Culture and Society*, 11:1 (Feb 1994), pp. 19-40, at pp. 22-3.

[84]Connolly, 'Tocqueville, Territory', p. 22. Connolly notes that violence is evident in the etymology of territory, which the '*OED* says, is presumed by most moderns to derive from *terra*. *Terra* means land, earth, nourishment, sustenance; it conveys the sense of sustaining medium, soil, fading off into indefiniteness. But the form of the word, the *OED* says, suggests that it actually derives from *terrere*, meaning to frighten, to terrorize. And *territorium* is "a place from which people are warned". Perhaps these two derivations continue to occupy the same territory today. To occupy a territory is to receive sustenance and to exercise violence. Territory is land occupied by violence.' pp. 23-4.

civilization was coded onto a contiguous territory and reinforced by the cultural glue of Christian monotheism. However, in this 'civi-theo-territorial' culture, pluralism did not extend to atheism or nomadic religions. The establishment of the sovereignty of the American people required the displacement of those human beings who diverged from the essence of civilization. The Indian had to be eliminated.

> The Indian is thus simultaneously the first Other of the civi-territorial complex, the first sign of violence inscribed in its boundaries and the first marker of how that violence is obscured or forgotten by the complex that requires it.[85]

Conclusion

Our review of the work of several thinkers who have analysed the production and representation of space in modernity has revealed a number of themes that we can carry through into the rest of this work. Foucault and Lefebvre reveal that space, including that of the territorial state, is produced through discourse or representations of space. Deleuze and Guattari show that the idea of the territorial state is a product of a whole tradition of state-thought which in many areas of knowledge and practice marks out the spaces of inside and outside and provides the framework for state authorities to discipline and striate their territories. All four thinkers remind us that the discursive production of state territory is inherently violent. The state notes Lefebvre, has a 'totalitarian vocation': it seeks to concentrate political life into itself while asserting the superiority of political over social and cultural existence while justifying its own authority through an appeal to sovereignty. Sovereignty constitutes the state 'as an imaginary and real, abstract-concrete being', which recognises no authority other than its own and is only able to endure 'by virtue of violence directed towards a space.'[86] State-power 'introduces its own particular way of partitioning space, its own particular administrative classification of discourses about space and about things and people in space.'[87]

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[85]Connolly, 'Tocqueville, Territory', p. 27.

[86]Lefebvre, *Production of Space*, p. 279.

[87]Lefebvre, *Production of Space*, p. 281.

Histories of the Territorial State

> A whole "history of spaces" could be written, that would be at the same
> time a "history of the powers" (both these terms in the plural), from the
> great strategies of geopolitics to the little tactics of housing, institutional
> architectures, from the classroom to the hospital organization, by way of
> all the political and economic implantations.[1]

In the previous chapter we saw that space is produced in discourse. In this chapter I want

to make a related argument that modern territoriality has a history, or rather lends itself

to interpretation by a number of histories. Most of this chapter discusses the standard

history of the idea of the territorial state, which claims that it originated in the political

culture of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This history is part of the Baroque

or Classical narrative of the territorial state which, as I suggested in the introduction, is

endorsed in Realism. It is this narrative or, at least, its originary claim that I shall

challenge in the rest of the thesis by showing that the idea of the territorial state had its

foundations in the spatial discourses and practices of Renaissance Italy.

It is important to establish that territoriality is not to be regarded as a universal

ideal-type feature of all human political or social formations. Primordialists claim that

all human political activity is territorial and that there is nothing particularly 'modern'

about the territorial organisation of the modern state. This primordialist thesis has a

strong following in the human sciences, most notably among theorists of nationalism.

Primordialists often cite Aristotle's concept of the *polis* as the first articulation of the

territorial basis of society. The Aristotelian notion of territoriality was advanced in social

thought by Ferdinand Tönnies in his description of *Gemeinschaft* societies. The soil on

which the closely knit *Gemeinschaft* lives acquires symbolic value, even sacredness, so

that residence in and contact with it becomes qualification for membership of the

community.[2] Primordialist theorists of nationalism also stress an identification with soil.

A territory signifies not just a society's location in space, but it is an aspect of social life

where individuals establish their obligations and identities. It is not, they claim, a modern

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[1]Michel Foucault, 'The Eye of Power' in Sylvère Lotringer (ed.), *Foucault Live: Collected Interviews* (New York NY, Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 226-40, at p. 228.

[2]See, for a discussion of the Aristotelian territorial legacy, Edward Shils, *Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology* (Chicago IL, University of Chicago Press, 1975).

phenomenon related to the modern state, but, as Steven Grosby states, 'a fundamental feature of all human societies.'[3] Primordialists reject the modernist argument that man's relation to space has undergone fundamental change in modernity. Territory is the space inhabited by people and has always been life-sustaining and the repository of symbolic value. John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge detect a primordialist view of territoriality in International Relations theory that continues to endorse the idea of the 'national-territorial totality' and which reifies state territories 'as set or fixed units of sovereign space', constituting the state as 'a sacred unit beyond historical time.'[4]

This primordialist argument is rather easily dispensed with on the basis that it is precisely the idea of the sovereign territorial state which distinguishes the political spaces of modern or civilised society from those of primitive or traditional societies. John Ruggie has demonstrated that only in modernity is the division of political space in distinctive territories underpinned by the principle of differentiation; it is differentiation that differentiates medieval and modern systems of rule over space.[5] Ruggie accepts the Weberian premise that all politics is about rule and that any system of rule entails legitimate domination over spatial extension, but he does not accept that this is necessarily resolved in the form of modern territoriality. There have been non-territorial systems of rule: for example those based on kinship and those which assume nomadic property rights. For our purposes the most significant non-modern form of rule over space described by Ruggie is that in which the claim to territory is non-exclusive. Ruggie characterises the spatial order of medieval Europe as one in which rule over space was 'structured by a nonexclusive form of territoriality; authority was both personalized and parcelized within and across territorial formations.'[6] The shift to the differentiated modern form of territoriality is, for Ruggie, summed up in Locke's question: "how men might come to have a property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in

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[3]Steven Grosby, 'Territoriality: The Transcendental Primordial Feature of Modern Societies', *Nations and Nationalism*, 1:2 (1995), pp. 143-62, at p. 155.

[4]John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy* (London, Routledge, 1995), pp. 83 & 89.

[5]John Gerard Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations', *International Organisation*, 47:1 (Winter 1993), pp. 138-74.

[6]Locke, quoted in Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond', p. 150.

common."[7] Determined by the principle of differentiation, the order of political space in modernity is one of 'territorially disjoint, mutually exclusive, functionally similar, sovereign states.'[8] The process by which autonomous state territories began to claim exclusive authority over their territories parallelled a widespread Bachelardian 'geometric cancerization' of the social and political worlds, as the divisions between public and private and internal and external were consolidated. Because spatial organisation in modernity is organised by differentiation, which divides 'its subject collectivity into territorially defined, fixed, and mutually exclusive enclaves of legitimate dominion', so the international relations of modernity have been played out against the backdrop of this 'peculiar and historically unique configuration of territorial space.'[9]

The immediate question that arises from Ruggie's work is to ask when this peculiar and historically unique configuration of territorial space first arose? The standard Realist response is to point to the early modern political culture of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For Realists the territorial state was a fact of European political life after Westphalia as is shown by its presence in political theory from Hobbes to Hegel. In the first section of this chapter we shall examine the Classical political theory of Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel to confirm that the idea of the territorial state was, in Mumford's terms, clearly 'visible' in these texts.[10] Political discourse is never isolated and the second section will consider how the visibility of the idea of the territorial state in political theory reflects a complementary history of the rise of the absolutist state and *cosmopolitan* modernity in Europe. *Cosmopolis* is defined by an all-pervasive 'will to order' and is represented as a fundamental rift with the humanist tradition of modernity that came before it. In the third section, inspired by Henri Lefebvre's history of the abstract space of modernity – a history which underline the importance of the Renaissance in this development – I want to propose an alternative history of the idea of the territorial state that is not fixed to the *cosmopolitan* reading of modernity, but which views it as an integral part the modern culture of space, founded in the spatial discourses

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[7]Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond', p. 149.

[8]Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond', p. 151.

[9]Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond', pp. 151 & 144.

[10]My use of the term 'Classical' is borrowed from Foucault, who uses it to describe Western European culture between (roughly) 1630 and 1790.

and practices of Renaissance Italy. Lefebvre's history of abstract space provides the backdrop for the subsequent argument that although the idea of the territorial state became clearly visible in the political culture of Classical Europe, its foundations were established in the spatial discourses – political and non-political – of the Renaissance.

The Idea of the Territorial State from Hobbes to Hegel.

Thomas Hobbes is often, at least within International Relations, portrayed as the most important seventeenth century political writer. Although John Vincent has shown that Hobbes' Realist credentials are often more imagined than real, his famous image of the state of nature is still regarded by many to be the paradigmatic foundational statement of international anarchy.[11] For some contemporary political theorists, Hobbes' political theory was original precisely because it sought to provide a spatial frame for political community. Rob Walker argues that Hobbes attempted to overcome the temporality of political life – which for Renaissance humanists was always exposed to the capricious whims of *fortuna* – by attempting to fix politics within a secure and permanent spatial structure.[12] Likewise, Sheldon Wolin reads Hobbes as a thinker who believed that 'scientific and geometric method could be applied to politics and that 'man could construct a political order as timeless as a Euclidean theorem.'[13]

Nevertheless, it is not clear from Hobbes work that he anticipated the characteristics which would define the political spaces of the modern territorial state. In the *Leviathan*, Hobbes does not put a strong emphasis on the territorial aspect of the Common-wealth and his discussion of territory is largely restricted to passages where he considers the rights that the European Common-wealths have over their colonies. Hobbes points out that God has distributed the raw materials over different parts of the 'face of the earth' and this has resulted in the need for trade between different Common-wealths,

[11]R. John Vincent, 'The Hobbesian Tradition in Twentieth Century International Thought', *Millennium*, 10:2 (Summer 1981), pp. 91-101.

[12]Rob Walker, 'Realism, Change and "International Political Theory"', *International Studies Quarterly*, 31:1 (March 1987), pp. 65-86.

[13]Sheldon S. Wolin, 'Hobbes: Political Society as a System of Rules' in Wolin, *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought* (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1961), pp. 239-85, at p. 243.

which are distinguished, at least partly, by their dominion over different territories: [t]his Matter, commonly called Commodities, is partly *Native*, and partly *Forraign: Native*, that which is to be had within the Territory of the Common-wealth: *Forraign*, that which is imported from without.'[14] Further there is little indication that Hobbes saw the territorial

1. Frontispiece, Hobbes, *Leviathan*

state as the proper locus of identity and violence except, perhaps, in the image of the *Leviathan* presented on the frontispiece (Fig. 1). Here the figure of the Leviathan towers over a landscape in the foreground. The spaces of this landscape – a city and the surrounding countryside – are clearly protected by and ruled over by the Leviathan who is represented brandishing a sceptre of justice in his left hand – a sign of sovereignty – and a sword in his right – a sign of violence.

In the previous chapter we saw how Jean-Jacques Rousseau's writings on Poland – at least as interpreted through Connolly's Deleuze and Guattari-influenced reading –

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[14]Hobbes' concern with territory is almost entirely confined to one chapter of *Leviathan*. See Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Richard Tuck, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), chap XXXIV, 'Of the Nutrition and Procreation of the Common-wealth', pp. 170-6, at p. 171.

seems to express the ethical dilemma at the heart of the modern idea territorial state: the sovereign identity of a political community can only be established on a territory through practices which do violence to the other. Questions of space and politics appear throughout his work. First, in the *Social Contract* Rousseau engages in a 'geopolitical-type' discussion of the optimum size a state should be. For Rousseau size matters. A successful political community must have an appropriate balance between the size of its territory and the number of people that inhabit it: men 'make up the State and the land feeds the men.'[15] Rousseau's admiration for the ancient *polis* and Renaissance city-states possibly influenced his conclusion that social harmony is achieved more easily in small rather than large communities. In large states the social bond becomes too protracted, producing 'deficient government'. Rousseau warned those intent on expansion that 'the larger the State grows, the less freedom there is.'[16]

Second, Rousseau points out that the social contract is forged in a bond between the private property of individuals and the state's territory. In order to establish a political community each individual must give himself, 'his force and possession' to it: '*[e]ach of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.*'[17] Under such an arrangement Rousseau thinks that it is understandable

> how the combined and contiguous lands of private individuals become public territory, and how the right of sovereignty, extending from the subjects to the ground they occupy, comes to include both property and persons, which places those who possess land in a greater dependency and turns even their force into a guarantee of their loyalty. This advantage does not appear to have been well understood by ancient monarchs who, only calling themselves Kings of the Persians, the Scythians, the Macedonians, seem to have considered themselves leaders of men rather than masters of the country. Today's kings more cleverly call themselves Kings of France, Spain, England, etc. By thus holding the land, they are quite sure to hold its inhabitants.[18]

Finally, in a discussion which allows Rousseau to partially redeem himself after

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[15] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *On The Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right* in Rousseau, *Collected Writings Vol. 4*, ed. Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly, trans. Judith R. Bush, Masters and Kelly, (Hanover NH, University Press of New England, 1994), pp. 127-224, at p. 160.

[16] Rousseau, *Social Contract*, p. 168.

[17] Rousseau, *Social Contract*, p. 139. Italics in original.

[18] Rousseau, *Social Contract*, p. 143.

Connolly's criticisms, he argues that the European powers do not have to right to dispossess the inhabitants of lands they 'discover' even if they are not arranged into state-type communities. The inhabitants of any land are protected by 'the right of first occupant' secured through the institution of private property. However, in order to secure this right the first inhabitants must only occupy preciously uninhabited land, they must only occupy the amount of land required for subsistence, and possession must be taken by labour and cultivation rather than 'vain ceremony'. From these premises Rousseau, perhaps with an eye to the exclusion of the French from the conquest of South America, criticises the territorial claims of the European Imperial Powers:

> How can a man or a people seize an immense territory and deprive the whole human race of it except through punishable usurpation, since this act takes away from the remaining men the dwelling place and foods that nature gives them in common? When Nuñez Balboa, standing on the shore, took possession of the South Sea and all of South America in the name of the crown of Castile, was this enough to dispossess all the inhabitants and exclude all the Princes of the world?[19]

By the time Immanuel Kant came to write his famous essay *Perpetual Peace*, the idea of the territorial state, negotiated through the principle of sovereign identity, was firmly established in European political thought.[20] Kant affirms the legitimacy of international politics based on independent sovereign territorial states in three arguments. First, he argues that the *Ancien Regime* habit of acquiring states by 'inheritance, exchange, purchase, or gift' is illegitimate because 'a state, unlike the ground upon which it is based, is not a possession (*patrimonium*). It is a society of men, which no-one other than itself can command or dispose of. Like a tree, it has its own roots, and to graft it on to another state as if it were a shoot is to terminate its existence as a moral personality and make it into a commodity.'[21] Second, for republics to combine in a pacific federation each one must have established its control over its territory: the pacific federation is not in any sense the single space of a universal international state. This spatial separateness

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[19]Rousseau, *Social Contract*, p. 143.

[20]Immanuel Kant, 'Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch' in Kant, *Political Writings*, trans. H. B. Nisbet, ed. Hans Reiss, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93-130.

[21]Kant, 'Perpetual Peace', p. 94. Kant accepts the contemporary distribution of political territories, even though many were acquired by these illegitimate means, on the grounds that 'the prohibition relates only to the *mode of acquisition*, which is to be forbidden henceforth, but not to the present *state of* political possessions.'

is the basis of international right: '[t]he idea of international right presupposes the separate existence of many independent adjoining states.'[22] Although this state of affairs is 'essentially a state of war' and can only be pacified by a federal union it is still, Kant concludes, 'in the light of the idea of reason' ... to be preferred to an amalgamation of the separate nations under a single power which has overruled the rest and created a universal monarchy'. As for Rousseau, so for Kant: small is better. Laws loose their impact over distance; larges states tend towards 'soulness despotism' and eventual anarchy.[23] Finally, territorial differentiation is a necessary precondition of the cosmopolitan right to universal hospitality, which requires that the 'stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else's territory.'[24] While the stranger may be turned away, as long as he behaves in a peaceable manner he must not be treated with enmity.[25]

It is worth noting that as regards discourses of space Kant is more famous for his philosophical categorisation of space in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In the *Critique*, Kant posits space and time as two pure forms of sensible intuition, which make possible the *a priori* knowledge of the 'Transcendental Aesthetic'.[26] Kant views space and time as *a priori* particulars and not as the properties of, or relations between, particulars. This is derived from two sources: Newton – whom 'Kant revered' – and Euclid. Kant accepted both Newton's concept of absolute space that 'in its own nature, without relation to anything external, remains always similar and immovable', and Euclidean geometry understood 'as a body of synthetic *a priori* propositions about the structure of perceptual space'.[27] Kant's Euclidean-Newtonian spatial framework has several prominent characteristics. First, Kant rejects the idea that space is empirical on the basis that the representation of an object outside of oneself, or as different from other objects,

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[22]Kant, 'Perpetual Peace', p. 115.

[23]Kant, 'Perpetual Peace', p. 113.

[24]Kant, 'Perpetual Peace', p. 105.

[25]The stranger may claim a 'right of resort' as all men are entitled to present themselves in the society of others 'by virtue of their right to communal possession of the earth's surface'. See Kant, 'Perpetual Peace', pp. 105-8, for his discussion of Universal Hospitality.

[26]Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, (Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 1929). Kant's discussion of the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' is on pp. 65-91.

[27]S. Korner, *Kant* (London, Penguin Books, 1955), quotes at p. 33 & 5.

presupposes the representation of space. Second, space has to be regarded as a necessary *a priori* representation underlying all outer intuitions because it is not possible to represent to ourselves the absence of space. Third, space is a pure intuition because it is only possible to represent one and not multiple spaces to ourselves; 'space is essentially one'; an 'infinite given magnitude.'[28] Kant did however acknowledge the subjective element to space, which as an *a priori* intuition 'has its seat in the subject only' and which precedes objects and allows the concept of the object to be determined *a priori*. For Kant '[s]pace is nothing but the form of all appearances of outer sense. It is the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone outer intuition is possible for us. ... It is, therefore, solely from the human standpoint that we can speak of space, of extended things.'[29]

Hegel is the final classical thinker in whose work we can see a visible territorial consciousness. In International Relations Hegel's communitarianism is often set against Kant's cosmopolitanism.[30] Hegel views the modern state as an arena within which the necessary conditions of freedom in modernity: subjectivity and expressive unity, come together. The state is also the locus in which Spirit achieves 'its highest and most differentiated political expression.'[31] Hegel's philosophical reading of the state, as the 'actuality of the ethical idea' and as an absolutely rational being, regarded 'external appearances', such as 'force' and 'riches', as merely indications of moments in the historical development of the state, rather than as features of its essential being.[32] Although territoriality could be regarded as an aspect of the state's external appearance,

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[28]Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 69.

[29]All quotes from Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 70-1. Kant continues: 'The transcendental concept of appearance in space ... is a critical reminder that nothing intuited in space is a thing in itself, that space is not a form inhering in things in themselves as their intrinsic property, that objects in themselves are quite unknown to us, and that what we call outer objects are nothing but mere representations of our sensibility, the form of which is space.' p. 74.

[30]Kant is accredited with establishing the universalist cosmopolitan principle that denies that existing political structures are the source of ultimate value. Hegel is the forerunner of communitarians who believe that 'value stems from the community, that the individual finds meaning in life by virtue of his or her membership of a political community.' Chris Brown, *International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches* (Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), p. 55.

[31]William E. Connolly, *Political Theory and Modernity* (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1988), p. 121. Connolly provides a far more profound discussion of Hegel's state theory than I can offer here, see pp. 116-25.

[32]G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. T.M. Knox, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 157.

Hegel was sensitive to the spatial dimension of the state. Henri Lefebvre argues that the modern understanding of the relationship between space and politics is derived from Hegel. It is with Hegel that historical time gives birth to the space which the state occupies and rules over: '[f]or Hegel space brought historical time to an end, and the master of space was the state. Space perfected the rational and the real – simultaneously.'[33] Reflecting on international law, Hegel observes that for states to be sovereign individuals they must be autonomous and differentiated in space by well-established borders: 'autonomous states are principally wholes whose needs are meet within their own borders.'[34] The individual state, like the individual human being, is an individual to the extent that it is aware of its own existence 'as a unit in sharp distinction from others. It manifests itself here in the state as a relation to other states, each of which is autonomous *vis-à-vis* the others.'[35] Further, because '[t]he nation state is mind in its substantive rationality and immediate actuality and is therefore the absolute power on earth. It follows that every state is sovereign and autonomous against its neighbours.'[36]

By the end of the eighteenth century the idea of the territorial state was a mainstay of Western political theory. Hegel articulates a sense of sovereign territoriality that anticipates the Realist image of the autonomous sovereign territorial state in almost every detail. In this section, perhaps at the risk of providing Realists with support for their claim that the national territorial totality has a good pedigree, I have shown that the basic premises of the Realist theory of the state are inherited from the Classical tradition of Western political thought. In the next section I want contextualise the whole Classical-(Realist) tradition of state theory itself, as part of a larger structure of discourse about modernity. This discourse, which I shall call absolutist-cosmopolitanism, is characterised by the claim that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there was a rupture with the civilization of the Renaissance; and that this rupture was the midwife of modernity.

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[33]Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space,* trans. D. Nicholson-Smith, (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1974), p. 279.

[34]Hegel, *Philosophy of Right,* p. 213.

[35]Hegel, *Philosophy of Right,* p. 208.

[36]Hegel, *Philosophy of Right,* p. 210.

The Territorial State in the Absolutist-Cosmopolitan Tradition of Modernity

International relations began in 1648, or so the story goes. According to the discipline's founding myth, the modern state system came into being as a result of the agreements reached by delegates present at the Congresses of Münster 1644-8 and Osnabrück 1645-8, and ratified by the Treaties of Westphalia. At the Congress of Münster, attended by the Catholic parties, the Hapsburg family complex (uniting Spain, the Empire and various territories in Italy and central Europe) was effectively broken up as Emperor Ferdinand III agreed to renounce the right to assist Spain and to pursue any imperial ambitions. At the Congress of Osnabrück, attended mainly by the Protestant parties, the principle of religious toleration, *cuius regio, eius religio*, previously established at the Peace of Augsburg 1555, was reaffirmed and complemented by the right to private worship. Osnabrück also confirmed the ancient rights, privileges and liberties of all the Empire's polities and gave to the members of the Imperial Diet effective control over the Empire's foreign policy – previously the exclusive prerogative of the Emperor.

Westphalia, according to the standard Realist history of international relations, signalled the birth of the modern international system. It was the moment when the Christian medieval order – structured in multiple hierarchies centered on the Pope and Emperor – was replaced by an international order, based on individual bounded sovereign states. The Peace of Westphalia, argues K.J. Holsti,

> legitimized the ideas of sovereignty and dynastic autonomy from hierarchical control. It created a framework that would sustain the political fragmentation of Europe. ... it delegitimized all forms of hegemony and the vestiges of hierarchical controls. ... By sanctifying Europe's centrifugal forces, by providing a legal basis for the developing territorial particularisms of Europe, and by terminating the vestiges of relations between superiors and inferiors, with authority emanating downward from the Emperor and Pope, the documents licensed an anarchical dynastic states system and the internal consolidation of its members.[37]

Many Realists date the origins of the modern international system, composed of differentiated sovereign territorial states, to the Westphalian settlements or, more

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[37]Kalevi J. Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 39.

generally, to the political discourse and practice of the middle of the seventeenth century. In *Politics Among Nations* Hans Morgenthau argues that by the end of the Thirty Years War, sovereignty or supreme power over a particular territory was the predominate 'political fact' of early modern Europe. This 'political fact' reflected the 'social reality' that the territorial princes had triumphed externally over the Holy Roman Emperor and the Pope and internally over local barons. The legal doctrine of territorial sovereignty was

> formulated in the latter part of the sixteenth century with reference to the
> new phenomenon of the territorial state. It referred in legal terms to the
> elemental political fact of that age – the appearance of a centralised power
> that exercised its lawmaking and law-enforcing authority within a certain
> territory.[38]

In Realist history state autonomy and sovereignty were no the only things established during this period. John Herz claims that states also acquired their monopolies of the means of violence in Classical Europe. The victors of the civil and religious wars of early modern Europe were 'neutralist central powers' each one of which 'eventually managed to establish itself in and for each of the different territories like so many *rochers de bronze.*' Peripheral spaces of political authority, such as noble estates and the town jurisdictional zones, were eradicated, independent fortifications were destroyed, and monarchs built and manned fortresses on the borders of their states.[39]

The Realist Westphalian narrative of the origins of the territorial state is complemented by contemporary political theory. Cornelia Navari suggests that it was in the seventeenth century that the identity of the territorial state was secured through political discourse which established the state of nature as its 'other'. Through a combination of epistemology and political theory the architects of the new state created the state's own frame of knowledge about itself as modern: i.e. as bounded, abstract, institutional, demythologised and secularised.[40] At the same time, 'a number of princes sitting in a field uttering the words, *cuius regio, eius religio*' effectively invented

[38]Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson, 6th ed., (New York NY, McGraw-Hill Inc, 1985), p. 327.

[39]John H. Herz, 'The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State' reprinted in Herz, *The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics* (New York NY, David McKay Company, 1976), pp. 99-123, at pp. 103 & 4.

[40]Cornelia Navari, 'Knowledge, the State and the State of Nature' in Michael Donelan (ed.), *The Reason of States: A Study in International Political Theory* (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1978), pp 102-21, at p. 108.

international relations as a state of nature:[41]

> It was scarcely natural to the men of the time that social organisation be cut off from external authority, formed into billiard balls and the space between emptied. The notion of the state as a billiard ball is a convention; it was instituted. That condition of affairs is maintained by other conventions, such as non-intervention and recognition which were also instituted. To say simply that the space between is 'empty' is not true. It is 'empty' in the sense that the state is for certain purposes a billiard ball. But the space is full of the convention that maintains that image ...[42]

The type of state that was busy creating this frame of knowledge about itself, while consolidating its control over territorial space through violence and sovereignty, was the absolutist state. For Zygmunt Bauman the rise of the absolutist state was one manifestation of the post-Renaissance European drive to impose order – any order – on things, so as to compensate for the perceived collapse of the structures and hierarchies of the medieval world.[43] The superficial presentation of the early-modern world as one of 'absolute monarchs and absolute truths' hid a deep sense of discomfort and malaise precipitated by 'a desperate search for structure in a world suddenly devoid of structure.'[44] The search for a perfect world driven by the 'will to order' was expressed in discourses and practices that marginalised and excluded misfits and aliens: '[i]n the city of reason there were to be no winding roads, no *cul-de-sacs* and no unattended sites left to chance, and hence no vagabonds, vagrants or nomads.'[45] The design, creation and legitimation of this new order was overseen by

> a specifically *modern* state: one that modelled its intentions and the prerogatives it claimed after the pattern of a gardener, a medical man, or an architect: a *gardening* state, a *therapeutic/surgical* state, a *space-managing* state. It was a gardening state, in so far as it usurped the right to set apart the 'useful' and the 'useless' plants, to select a final model of harmony that made some plants useful and others useless, and to propagate such plants as are useful while exterminating the useless ones. It was a therapeutic/surgical state in so far as it set the standard of 'normality' and thus drew the borderline between the acceptable and the intolerable, between health and disease ... It was a space-managing state, in so far as it was busy landscaping the wasteland (it was the landscaping

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[41]Navari, 'Knowledge, the State', p. 119.

[42]Navari, 'Knowledge, the State', p. 119.

[43]Zygmunt Bauman, *Intimations of Postmodernity* (London, Routledge, 1992).

[44]Bauman, *Intimations of Postmodernity*, p. xv.

[45]Bauman, *Intimations of Postmodernity*, p. xv.

intention that cast the operating territory as wasteland), subjecting all local features to one unifying homogenizing principle of harmony.[46]

The absolutist desire to impose order on things, including the spaces of state territory, was not just limited to the political realm. The widespread 'will to order' of Classical or Baroque culture has been identified by Stephen Toulmin as the rational of a tradition of modernity that he terms *Cosmopolis*.[47] Toulmin argues that the architects of the *Cosmopolitan* tradition of modernity consciously departed from the principles and ideals of a Renaissance humanist tradition of modernity that preceded it. Unlike the humanist tradition which was grounded in classical literature, the *Cosmopolitan* tradition of modernity was predominately scientific and rooted in natural philosophy.[48] The thought of the major figures in Renaissance humanism: Montaigne, Rabelais, Shakespeare and Erasmus, was open-minded and characterised by a 'sceptical tolerance' of plurality and ambiguity. Renaissance modernity was characterised by a lack of certainty that embodied a 'respect for the rational possibilities of human experience ... [and] ... a delicate feeling for the *limits* of human experience.'[49] However, in the seventeenth century there was a widespread 'Retreat from Renaissance'. Partially precipitated by the economic crises and the extreme violence of the Thirty Years War, seventeenth century rationalists embarked upon a 'Quest for Certainty'. This quest found its holy grail in the ideal of *Cosmopolis* – a rational order combining nature (*cosmos*) and human society (*polis*), in which the structure of nature reinforced a rational social order according to the dictates of reason. The humanistic and literary modernity of the Renaissance was submerged beneath the waters of a rational, scientific and philosophical modernity. *Cosmopolis* was promoted in the rationalist architectonic projects of Galileo, Descartes and Newton, but was most pronounced in philosophy where, 'from 1630 on, the focus of philosophical enquiries has ignored the particular, concrete, timely and local details of everyday human affairs: instead it has shifted to a higher, stratospheric plane,

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[46]Bauman, *Intimations,* p. 178-9. Bauman suggests that the architects of modernity recognised that their man-made order was vulnerable and 'bound to remain an artificial imposition on the unruly natural state of things and humans'. Consequently modernity was distinguished by 'constant supervision and policing' of the created order. Bauman, *Intimations of Postmodernity,* p. xv.

[47]Stephen Toulmin, *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity* (Chicago IL, University of Chicago Press, 1990).

[48]Toulmin, *Cosmopolis,* p. 43.

[49]Toulmin, *Cosmopolis,* at pp. 25 & 7.

on which nature and ethics conform to abstract, timeless, general and universal theories.'[50]

This sense of *cosmopolis* is the proper context for understanding Richard Ashley's claim that a 'Cartesian practice of spatialization' distinguishes domestic from 'international politics'. Cartesian practice draws an absolute boundary between 'inside and 'outside', and privileges the former at the expense of the later:

> The *inside* is taken to be the space of identity and continuity – the privileged space of the Self. Here, it is assumed, is a sharply bounded identity – an identity that is hierarchically ordered, that has a unique centre of decision presiding over a coherent Self, and that is demarcated from and in opposition to an external space of difference and change beyond its boundaries and eluding its rational control. Here, too, according to Cartesian practice, resides the very possibility of rational political subjectivity, be it that of an individual or a political community. As for the *outside,* this is the space of difference and discontinuity – the residual space of the Other that escapes the rational truth and meaning presiding within.[51]

Ashley does not tell us which themes in Descartes' work contribute to the Cartesian practice of spatialization. Descartes' most significant contribution to the mathematical understanding of space came with his use of co-ordinates to determine the position of a point in a plane by its distance from two fixed lines.[52] However, it is more likely that Ashley is drawing upon the philosopher's famous dualism of mind and matter as the two mutually exclusive divisions of the universe: 'man is a thinking mind; matter is extension in motion.'[53] Nevertheless, Rob Walker agrees with Ashley that the epistemological and ontological structures of *cosmopolis* are the context for the seventeenth century European discourse of the sovereign territorial state and a whole 'politics of spatial containment'.[54] Walker suggests that the combination of the political doctrine of state sovereignty with

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[50]Toulmin, *Cosmopolis*, p. 35.

[51]Richard K. Ashley, 'Living on Borderlines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War' in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds), *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Lexington MA, Lexington Books, 1989) pp. 259-321, at p. 290.

[52]See Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy* (London, Unwin Paperbacks, 1984), pp. 544-5.

[53]For a discussion of Descartes' philosophy see Anthony Kenny, 'Descartes to Kant' in Kenny (ed.) *The Oxford Illustrated History of Western Philosophy* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 110-27.

[54]R. B. J. Walker, 'International Relations and the Concept of the Political' in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds), *International Relations Theory Today* (Cambridge, Polity, 1991), pp. 306-27, at p. 321.

certain 'spatial constructs associated with Euclid and Newton' produced a 'sense of inviolable and sharply delimited space.'[55] In the Classical period the political discourse of territorial sovereignty is underpinned by, intersects with and, is to some extent produced by, contemporaneous spatial concepts and discourses; the discourse of sovereignty fed off a 'spatial consciousness' which extended 'from Descartes' philosophy to Mercator's cartography, from Galilean mechanics to the magnificent constructions of Isaac Newton and Immanuel Kant.'[56]

These spaces were carved out by the agents of capitalist interests and absolutist state rulers. David Harvey notes that the Enlightenment conquest and control of space was co-ordinated through cartographic projects that conceived of space as abstract, homogeneous and universal:

> Euclidean representations of objective space could be converted into a spatially ordered physical landscape. Merchants and landowners used such practices for their own class purposes, while the absolutist state (with its concern for the taxation of land and the definition of its own domain of domination and social control) likewise relished the capacity to define and produce spaces with fixed spatial co-ordinates.[57]

Practices, designed to realise Enlightenment aspirations for a better society that would guarantee individual liberties and human welfare practices, assumed a mechanistic Newtonian vision of the universe, in which the absolutes of homogeneous time and space formed the limits to thought and action. Many Enlightenment projects shared a common-sense view of time and space as qualities that could be rationally ordered by man. Enlightenment time, symbolised by the mechanical pendulum, was linear – with a past, a present and a future – and so leant itself to scientific prediction, social engineering and rational planning. Similarly, homogeneous space was known and colonised by rational, mathematical cartographic projects and cadastral surveying. Property rights, territorial boundaries, communication routes and administrative domains were fixed and legitimised by means of such discursive practices. Harvey even claims that the ability of

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[55]Rob Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 129.

[56]R. B. J. Walker, 'Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of Contemporary Political Practice' in Walker and Saul H. Mendlovitz (eds), *Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community* (Boulder CO, Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1990), pp. 159-85, at p. 172.

[57]David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 254.

Enlightenment cartographers to map the global system as a unity and to represent the location of the earth's population within a single spatial frame, provided the conditions for a distinctive conception of otherness: 'Enlightenment thought perceived "the other" as ... having ... a specific *place* in the social order that was ethnocentrically conceived to have homogeneous and absolute qualities.'[58]

The social and cultural spaces of *Cosmopolis* and the political spaces of absolutist territoriality were fashioned from an absolute, abstract, homogeneous space that could be controlled by rational man. Because space has not always been represented this way, we may legitimately ask if it is possible to write an alternative history of the origins of the idea of the territorial state; a history which reads the idea of the territorial state as one spatial discourse among spatial discourses that together make up modernity's unique culture of space. After all, if, as we have seen Sack argue, the modern territorial state is an abstract form of power, is it not possible that its rise in Western modernity is related to the increasing abstraction of space in the same cultural formation.

The History of Abstract Space and Its Origins in the Renaissance

Space, which common-sense tells us has a secure ontological existence within the parameters revealed by Euclid, Newton and Kant, now has a history. Recent work by cultural historians has shown that our conceptions of space are conditioned and structured by the intellectual categories and practices of our culture. To demonstrate this, Stephen Kern has shown that in the Western world between 1880 and 1918 similar vocabularies of space (and time) structured knowledge in discourses that varied from philosophy to aesthetics, from architecture to urban design, and from anthropology to studies of the natural world.

For Kern three parallel developments in the *fin de siècle* representation of space stand out. First, homogeneous space was replaced by heterogeneous space. In physics Einstein's theory of relativity had no place for absolute space which it replaced with an infinite number of spaces perpetually changing position relative to one another. In art the Cubists 'abandoned the homogeneous space of linear perspective and painted objects in

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[58]Harvey, *Condition of Postmodernity*, p. 252.

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a multiplicity of spaces from multiple perspectives.'[59] The anthropologist Émile Durkheim concluded from his studies of primitive religions that space was not a universal category of knowledge, but the product of diverse cultural collective representations.[60] Because different primitive societies had different spatial orders and ways of dividing up space, Durkheim claimed that they could not be 'based exclusively on the inborn nature of man.'[61] Second, the established view of space as an inert void, within which objects existed, was challenged by an increasing awareness of the constituent function of space. In 'positive negative space' distinctions between primary and secondary in the experience of space – matter/void, subject/background, figure/ground and sacred/profane – were levelled and 'new constituent negativities' appeared in 'physical fields, architectural spaces, and town squares'.[62] Architects no longer saw space as a negative element between walls, ceilings and floors, but began to 'compose with space', making architecture an 'art of space'. Third, there was a levelling of traditional spatial hierarchies. The Cubist subversion of the traditional view that the subject of a painting was more important than its background, mirrored the levelling of aristocratic society, the emergence of democracy and the collapse of the distinction between the sacred and profane spaces of religion.

Kern admits that it is not always possible to identify the causal factors – the Foucauldian epistemes perhaps? – that determine widespread changes in the experience and representation of space. He admits that often the best he is able to do is to describe analogous developments in different fields. However, the merit of his approach is to

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[59]Stephen Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space 1880-1918* (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1983),
p. 143.

[60]Émile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life,* trans. Karen E. Fields, (New York NY, The Free Press, 1995), p. 9.

[61]Durkheim, *Elementary Forms,* fn to p. 11. In one primitive society space has the form of a circle reflecting the camp's circular form. The spatial circle is divided in the same manner as the tribal circle; there are as many regions as tribes in the clan, and the orientation of the regions is determined by the position of the clans in the encampment. The Zuñi classified and ordered things according to their own spatial system: everything in nature is 'classed, labelled and assigned' to fixed places in an integrated system whose guiding principle is 'a division of space into seven regions: north, south, west east, zenith, nadir and the centre. Everything in the universe is assigned to one or other of these seven regions.' Émile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, *Primitive Classification,* trans. Rodney Needham, (London, Cohen and West, 1963), p. 43.

[62]Kern, *Culture of Space,* p. 179.

suggest that there is a distinct modern culture of space – which underwent several transformations during the *fin de siècle* – that determines the way that space is thought about and represented across heterogeneous fields of knowledge. Henri Lefebvre agrees that modernity has its own space. Between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries a modern code of space, 'existed on the practical basis of a specific relationship between town, country and political territory, a language founded on classical perspective and Euclidean space.'[63] Deciphering the codes of modern space, we find a space of

> common-sense, of knowledge (*savoir*), of social practice, of political power, a space hitherto enshrined in everyday discourse, just as in abstract thought, as the environment of and channel for communications; the space, too, of classical perspective and geometry, developed from the Renaissance onwards on the basis of the Greek tradition (Euclid, logic) and bodied forth in Western art and philosophy, as in the form of the city and town.[64]

In *The Production of Space* Lefebvre narrates a history of space which traces a transition from 'absolute' to 'abstract' space' in Western European civilisation. This history also records the triumph of the 'logic of visualization'.

Absolute space dominates the early modes of production. In 'primitive' societies space is analogical. The physical form of dwellings and villages represent and reproduce a divine body that is itself a projection of the human body. With the rise of ancient civilizations analogical space is replaced by cosmological space, in which the built form of the political city, its elements and configurations, expressed the architecture of the cosmos. The city-state

> establishes a fixed centre by coming to constitute a hub, a privileged focal point, surrounded by peripheral areas which bear it stamp. From this moment on, the vastness of pre-existing space appears to come under the thrall of a divine order. At the same time the town seems to gather in everything which surrounds it, including the natural and the divine, and the earth's evil and good forces. As image of the universes (*imago mundi*), urban space is reflected in the rural space that it possesses and indeed in a sense *contains*.[65]

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[63]Lefebvre, *Production of Space*, p. 17.

[64]Lefebvre, *Production of Space*, p. 25. Like Kern, Lefebvre suggests that modern space was fundamentally altered around 1910, when its codes and practices began to dissolve. However, common-sense space, Euclidean space and perspectivist space did not disappear completely, but left traces in consciousness, where it continues to inform words, images and metaphors.

[65]Lefebvre, *Production of Space*, p. 235.

Analogical and cosmological space are absolute and iconic. They do not refer to or symbolise a reality outside or behind them. For its citizens 'the city constituted their representation of space as a whole, of the earth, of the world.'[66] These spaces are both imaginary and real, '[t]he "mental" is "realized" in a chain of "social" activities because, in the temple, in the city, in monuments and palaces, the imaginary is transformed into the real.'[67]

With the emergence of the feudal mode of production in Western Europe, these absolute spaces are replaced by symbolic space. Symbolic space literally *de-crypted* the underworld spaces of death which had embodied the space of the Christian cosmology. In the twelfth century space is turned on its head and inverted. Tombs and crypts give way to the spaces of the monumental Gothic cathedrals, which conveyed illumination and elevation and marked an 'emancipation from the crypt and from cryptic space'. The structures of these buildings, based in the hierarchical allocation of horizontal layers, drew the observer's thought up from the mundane world of appearances to contemplation of the divine order. These vast symbolic spaces were also social because they were suffused with signs of power. The vertical towers and emblematic facades signified the prestige and authority of 'Church, King and city to the crowds flocking to the porch.'[68]

The symbolic spaces of the feudal order were partially constituted through a visual logic, 'in collusion on the one hand with abstraction, with geometry and logic, and on the other with authority.'[69] However, the 'logic of visualisation' really came into its own with the perspectival space of Renaissance Europe. The Renaissance early capitalist mode of production was, for Lefebvre, based in a *logical space* born out of the discovery of linear perspective. I shall discuss the implications of perspectival space for the Renaissance discourse of the territorial state in some depth in chapter six, but for the moment, it is worth noting the significance of Renaissance perspectival space in Lefebvre's account of the emergence of abstract space. The technique of perspectival representation,

[t]he vanishing line, the vanishing point and the meeting of parallel lines

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[66]Lefebvre, *Production of Space*, p. 244.

[67]Lefebvre, *Production of Space*, p. 251.

[68]Lefebvre, *Production of Space*, p. 261.

[69]Lefebvre, *Production of Space*, p. 261

at infinity were the determinants of a representation, at once intellectual and visual which promoted the primacy of the gaze in a kind of 'logic of visualisation'. This representation ... now became enshrined in architectural and urbanistic practice as the *code* of linear perspective.[70]

This code stratified and extended hierarchies onto all possible configurations of space: 'the room, the building, the group of buildings, the quarter, the town, and its insertion into the surrounding space.'[71]

Among the many consequences of the Renaissance triumph of perspectival space mentioned by Lefebvre, three are particularly worthy of note. First, the invention of perspective was a urban-based revolution which complemented the rise of the town and the decline of the feudal landed order. Towns were conceived of as wholes and urban space was unified in terms of a political principle. The town was no longer ascribed a metaphysical character as *imago mundi* – the centre and epitome of the Cosmos, but assumed its own identity and represented itself graphically according to plans in perspective. Second, the representation of space codified in linear perspective came to dominate a representational space, 'of religious origin, which was now reduced to symbolic figures, to images of Heaven and Hell, of the Devil and the angels.' Nevertheless, this representational space continued to express the common-sense view that the forces of good and evil were engaged in a complex interplay in the places that held special significance for the individual, such as his house, body, church and land. Many artists continued to portray this representational space, but the important point for Lefebvre is 'that *some* artists and men of learning arrived at a very different *representation of space*: a homogeneous, clearly demarcated space complete with horizon and vanishing-point.'[72] Third, anticipating the role Foucault gives to the panopticon in ordering the disciplinary space of the Classical age, the Renaissance regime of perspectival-logical space privileges the eye and the gaze at the expense of the body:

> Space remained symbolic of the body and of the universe, while at the same time becoming measured and visual. The transformation of space towards visualization and the visual is a phenomenon of the utmost importance ... [Perspectival space] recaptures nature by measuring it and

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[70]Lefebvre, *Production of Space,* p. 41.

[71]Lefebvre, *De l'état,* pp. 288-9, quoted in Derek Gregory, *Geographical Imaginations* (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1994), p. 391.

[72]Lefebvre, *Production of Space,* p. 79

subordinating it to the exigencies of society, under the domination of the eye and no longer of the body as a whole.[73]

The triumph of abstract space was completed with the global spread of the late capitalist mode of production in the twentieth century. In the aesthetic register, abstract space was created through the spatial language of modernists like Picasso, Klee and Kandinsky, who privileged opticality as the basis of aesthetic practice. In Picasso's art the space of modernity is 'an unreservedly visualized space, a dictatorship of the eye and of the phallus' and it reflects the fact that in modernist culture as a whole 'space has no social existence independently of an intense, aggressive and repressive visualization. It is ... a purely visual space...[that]... overwhelms the whole body and usurps its role.'[74] Modernist culture reflects the pervasive impact of abstract space on social, economic and political life. The modern state embraces the abstract space of late capitalism. In the twentieth century the concrete space of everyday life has become totally colonised by abstract space. Space is both commodified and bureaucratized. The commodification *of* space imposes a geometric grid of property relations and property markets on the earth, while commodification *through* space installs economic grids of capital circulation through which abstract space inscribes abstract labour and the commodity form. This commodification is complemented by bureaucratisation. The bureaucratisation *of* space occurs where an administrative system "maps out its own territory, stakes it out and signposts it". Meanwhile bureaucratization *through* space installs juridico-political grids which allow the state to survey and regulate social life[75] Abstract capitalist space is

> a space of quantification and growing homogeneity, a merchandised space where all the elements are exchangeable and thus interchangeable; a police space in which the state tolerates no resistance and no obstacles. Economic space and political space thus converge towards the elimination of all differences.[76]

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[73]Lefebvre, *De l'état*, p. 287, quoted in Gregory, *Geographical Imaginations*, p. 389.

[74]Lefebvre, *Production of Space*, pp. 302 & 286

[75]This summary of the colonisation of lived by abstract space is taken from Gregory, *Geographical Imaginations*, p. 401.

[76]Henri Lefebvre, 'Space: Social Product and Use Value' in J. W. Frieburg (ed.), *Critical Sociology: European Perspectives* (New York NY, Irvington, 1979), pp. 285-95, at p. 293.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that the idea of the territorial state has a history. It is not a universal ideal-type category that defines the distribution of political space in all human societies. We have seen that the standard history of the origins of the idea of the territorial state locates it foundation and consolidation in Classical political discourse and practice of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This history is endorsed by Realists who point to the Peace of Westphalia as the temporal sign of the birth of the international territorial system and by critical thinkers who show that the presence of the idea of the territorial state in Classical political discourse reflects an absolutist-cosmopolitan desire to order and control space.

Typical of this history is a claim that there is a rupture between the modernity of the seventeenth century and the Renaissance culture which preceded it. Walker, for example, draws a sharp distinction between the temporal concerns of Machiavelli's political theory – preoccupied with the foundation and maintenance of new principalities and republics in the context of *fortuna* – and Hobbes' political theory that seeks to overcome time and fortune by establishing a universal theory of sovereign power through the combination of novel spatial categories with the timeless truths of a rational metaphysic: it is 'only after Machiavelli that the principle of state sovereignty came to be framed within the context of the Euclidean-Galilean principle of absolute space rather than the complex overlapping jurisdictions of the medieval era.'[77]

However, many regard the Renaissance to be the forge of modernity. Harvey claims that the 'Renaissance revolution in concepts of space and time laid the conceptual foundations for the Enlightenment project.'[78] Once again, Renaissance perspective has a particular importance. Harvey claims that because it conceived of the world from the individual's standpoint it provided the material foundation for the Cartesian principle of rationality central to Enlightenment. In our discussion of Rousseau, Kant and Hegel we saw that the idea of the territorial state was firmly established, became clearly visible, in the political theory of the Classical age. These thinkers were not articulating this idea for

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[77]Walker, *Inside/Outside*, p. 46.

[78]Harvey, *Condition of Postmodernity*, p. 249.

the first time and so we must turn to a previous age of Western culture: Renaissance Italy between 1430 and 1530, to find the first statements, the intellectual foundations of the idea of territorial sovereignty. Later chapters will look for signs of a territorial consciousness in the discourse of cosmology and the power/knowledge technology of perspective. However, we shall begin our survey of Renaissance spatial discourse in the next chapter which traces the idea of the territorial state in Machiavelli's political theory.

Machiavelli and the Territory of *Lo Stato*

So far we have established as the thesis problematic the idea of the territorial state, considered the discursive approach we shall adopt in analysing it, and discussed various histories of its origins. Chapter one showed that Realist theories of international relations are based on a theory of the state that prioritises its spatial attribute of territoriality. This emphasis on territory connects Realism with a Weberian tradition of thought that defines the state as the institution with legitimate access to the means of physical violence over a delimited space. Chapter two argued that the Realist-Weberian theory of the territorial state does not simply reflect a pre-existing reality but, as a part of a discursive regime, produces and legitimises the territorialised space of modernity. The third chapter discussed the standard Realist history of the idea of the territorial state, which locates its origins in the political culture and practice of the Classical Age, and offered an alternative history of the idea of the territorial state that sees it as one element of modernity's culture of space, rather than as part of an unfolding narrative of political theory. The modern culture of space is characterised by the increasing abstraction of space, a process which was particulary pronounced in Renaissance Italy. Following on from this the rest of the thesis will flesh out my general argument that the idea of the territorial state is a product of the discourses and practices of political space that first emerged in the Italian Renaissance between 1430 and 1530. Later chapters will look at the production of territoriality in Renaissance discourses of cosmology, perspective and cartography, but in this chapter we start on slightly more familiar territory with the political theory of Machiavelli.

Several historians of political theory (whose work I shall discuss later) claim that the political writings and practices of Renaissance Italy reveal a sense of the state, which if not fully 'modern', certainly anticipated later theories of the modern state. This chapter aims to uncover a modern understanding of territoriality in Renaissance political discourse. Rather than attempting to survey the entire body of Renaissance political thought for signs of territoriality, it focuses on the work of the paradigmatic political theorist of the Italian Renaissance, Niccolò Machiavelli. The framework for discussion is provided by the chapters of *The Prince* in which Machiavelli discusses the nature of

the space occupied by principalities.

Two preliminary caveats should be noted at this stage. First, in choosing to focus on *The Prince* I am not denying the probability that Machiavelli, who had served as Chancellor to Soderini's republican government for fourteen years, was committed to the ideals of civic republicanism laid out in *The Discourses*.[1] Furthermore, I recognise that even though Machiavelli was aware of the relative weaknesses of the Italian city republics compared to the 'territorial' kingdoms of the North, he remained convinced that the political communities of Tuscany could survive if they continued to develop the traditions of civic humanism upon which their liberties and greatness had depended upon in the past.[2] Second, I shall not read Machiavelli with the aim of adjudicating between

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[1]The challenge of reconciling *The Prince* with *The Discourses* has produced three different responses in the twentieth century. Meinecke and his followers deny that there is any real opposition. They argue that Machiavelli was less interested in the relative merits of republicanism or princely rule than in writing a dispassionate study of the technique of politics: the nature of political action, the study of the autonomous realm of politics and the consequences of its separation from that of morality. The second approach, that of Chabod, acknowledges the differences, but explains then in terms of a gradual shift in Machiavelli's outlook away from a nostalgic affection for the virtues of republicanism to a painful awareness that the city-republics of central Italy, corrupt and outdated, had to give way to the rational political expediency of princely absolutism if Italy was to be rid of foreign powers. Chabod argues that there is a change of tone in *The Discourses* from the earlier chapters where Machiavelli confidently expresses his hopes republicanism, to the more dispiriting discussion of the present state of Italy's republics in chs XVI-XVII. This shift, suggests Chabod, supports the thesis that Machiavelli interrupted *The Discourses* in the autumn of 1513 to write *The Prince*. Third, Hans Baron argues that Machiavelli did not break off *The Discourses* to write *The Prince*, but that there is a natural progression in his thought. The 'realistic pragmatism' of *The Prince* reflected Machiavelli's experience as Secretary of Florence during power struggles for Italy which threatened Florence's dominions in Northern Tuscany. In contrast, the 'civic humanism' of *The Discourses* was influenced by the humanist philosophy of political history favoured by the members of the Orti Oricellari circle, which led Machiavelli to reconsider the acquisition and defence of political power, not 'exclusively in diplomatic craftsmanship but also – and primarily – in the creation of a social and constitutional fabric allowing civic energies and a spirit of political devotion and sacrifice to develop in all classes of a people.' See, for this discussion, Hans Baron, 'Machiavelli the Republican Citizen and Author of *The Prince*' in Baron, *In Search of Civic Humanism: Essays on the Transition from Medieval to Modern Thought, Vol. II,* (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 101-51, at p. 146.

[2]Machiavelli was not the only one to have this aspiration. At the end of the fifteenth century the triumph of the modern territorial state was not taken for granted in Renaissance Europe. Although by the 1480s the four major territorial states, France, England, Castile-Aragon and Burgundy-Castille, were consolidating their power and spaces through dynastic and legal diplomacy, only a few decades earlier 'the chief monarchies of Christendom seemed to touch nadir' to the extent that '[a] detached observer, scanning Europe in the 1460s, might excusably have concluded that the greater feudal monarchies were played out, and that the only political hope lay in such islands of relative peace and security as the Italian and German city states.' Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (New York NY, Dover Publications Inc, 1955), p. 106.

various interpretations of his work in International Relations.[3] *The Prince* is not read as a storehouse of time-honoured principles of power-politics and the reason of states. So, Martin Wight's claim that Machiavelli is the 'tutelary hero of International Relations', and E.H. Carr's contention that Machiavelli was the 'first important political realist' are left to the realm of speculation.[4] Nor shall I endorse or refute Hayward Alker's reading of *The Discourses* as a theory of civic humanism having an interpretative disposition that could assist us in understanding the international relations of postmodernity.[5]

I read Machiavelli in light of the modern understanding of the relationship between space and politics as resolved in the idea of the modern territorial state. The first section sets the scene by looking at the various meanings that *lo stato* has in Renaissance political discourse. In the chapter on Realism we saw how the idea of the territorial state complements specific understandings of sovereignty, violence and identity. These three themes provide the framework for our discussion of territoriality in Machiavelli's political theory. I concentrate on *The Prince* because of its sensitivity to the consequences that the territorialisation of power was having on politics. In section two I shall argue that Machiavelli's understanding of dominion anticipates the modern idea that sovereignty is restricted to well-defined territories. In section three I shall note that Machiavelli was aware that political space could only be consolidated through violence and the acquisition of a monopoly of violence in the form of a militia. Finally, in the fourth section I focus on the last chapter of *The Prince*, which has been interpreted by many as an appeal to nationalism on behalf of the territorial integrity of the Italian people.

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[3]The best discussion of the different interpretations Machiavelli has inspired is Isaiah Berlin, 'The Originality of Machiavelli' reprinted in Berlin, *Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas*, ed. Henry Hardy, (London, The Hogarth Press, 1979), pp. 25-79. Berlin notes that although Machiavelli's work is clear and lucid, it has inspired a mass of different interpretations and aroused much hostility. This is due to Machiavelli's dispassionate acceptance of two incompatible moral orders, Christian and Pagan, with irreconcilable ultimate values, respectively, the redemption of the individual and the preservation of the *polis*. Machiavelli's moral relativism unsettled the fundamental assumption of Western civilisation since Plato that one overarching principle – Nature, God, The Chain of Being – regulates life and sets the standard by which means and ends can be evaluated.

[4]Martin Wight, 'Why Is There No International Theory?' in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds), *Diplomatic Investigations* (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1966), p. 20; and E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis,* 2nd ed., (London, Macmillan, 1989), p. 63.

[5]Hayward R. Alker, Jr., 'The Humanistic Moment In International Studies: Reflections on Machiavelli and las Casas', *International Studies Quarterly*, 36:4 (1992), pp. 347-71.

Lo Stato in Renaissance Political Discourse

In order to assess how important territory was to Machiavelli's understanding of the state

we must first consider the general meaning of *lo stato* in his political philosophy. This

has been much debated by Machiavellian scholars who contest both the originality and

modernity of Machiavelli's *stato*.[6] Today few accept Chiapelli's bold claim that

Machiavelli's *stato* 'bears the meaning of "State" in its full maturity.'[7] More common is

the view of contextualists like Felix Gilbert and Quentin Skinner who read Machiavelli

in terms of the narrative conventions of Renaissance political writing and who do not

regard his use of *lo stato* as a radical departure from standard usage. They reject the view

that Machiavelli's *stato* was the modern state in all its glory. Of course, this begs the

question of what we might mean by the modern state. If one views, as Felix Gilbert does,

the modern state as everything belonging to the body politic, Machiavelli's notion of *lo*

stato as a body with its own laws of existence, anticipates, if it does not fully express, the

idea of the modern state.[8] If, however, like Quentin Skinner, one understands the modern

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[6]The literature on the meaning of *lo stato* in Renaissance political theory, including Machiavelli's work, is extensive. I have relied chiefly upon Sebastian de Grazia, *Machiavelli in Hell* (New York NY, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989); Nicolai Rubinstein, 'Notes on the Word *Stato* in Florence before Machiavelli' in J. G. Rowe and W.H. Stockdale (eds), *Florilegium Historiale: Essays Presented to Wallace K. Ferguson* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1971), pp. 313-26; Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Volume One: The Renaissance* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978); Quentin Skinner, 'The State' in Terence Ball, James Farr and Russell L. Hanson (eds), *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 90-131; Federico Chabod, 'Esiste uno Stato del Rinascimento?' in Chabod, *Scritti sul Rinascimento* (Torino, Giulio Einaudi editore, 1967), pp. 593-623; and Federico Chabod, 'Alcune questioni di terminologia: Stato, nazione, patria nel linguaggio del Cinquecento' in Chabod, *Scritti sul Rinascimento*, pp. 625-61.

[7]F. Chiappelli, *Studi sul linguaggio del Machiavelli* (Florence, F. Le Monnier, 1952), quoted in Skinner 'The State', p. 102.

[8]Gilbert's 'contextualist' reading of Machiavelli and Guicciardini stresses the influence of contemporary political events, personal aspirations and established traditions of political writing and historiography on their work. Gilbert downplays the originality of Machiavelli's thought, noting that much of Machiavelli's vocabulary was well- established, that his historical methods and allegorical interpretation were commonplace, and that his intention to clarify and codify the principles which the ancients had followed in politics mirrored his contemporaries' aspirations for art, jurisprudence and medicine. In the context of the political and intellectual frameworks of his time, Machiavelli's ideas were not particularly original, however, what was novel was his capacity to synthesis them into a new form of politics. This synthesis was derived from Machiavelli's position outside of the two main groups of political writers in Renaissance Florence: the humanists and the aristocrats. First, although Machiavelli shared the humanists' interest in the recovery of the *istoria* of classical Rome, his personal desire for active involvement in politics meant that he was more interested in producing practical and useful guides for those actively engaged in politics rather than in entering into debates over ideal political communities. Second, as regards the dominant aristocratic class, Machiavelli resented the fact that because his relatively poor family was

state as a 'single, supreme authority within a body politic', distinct from both the person of the monarch or the magistrates entrusted with the exercise of its power and from the society or community from which it derived its authority through contract, then Machiavelli's state theory, which fulfilled neither of these criteria, was in no sense modern.[9] Federico Chabod argues that if the modern state is conceived of as a sovereign unit, distinct from the ruler, confined within defined territorial boundaries, incorporating the notion of a nation or patria, and represented institutionally by a rationalised bureaucracy of appointed officials, then only the last of these was present in the Renaissance state from Lorenzo di Medici to Richelieu. The characteristic feature of the Renaissance state was that it was concentrated around two poles, 'the power of the sovereign and the hierarchy of the "officials"'.[10]

If the Renaissance *stato* is not the modern state, what are we to understand by the term in Renaissance political discourse? Not one thing for sure, because it is well acknowledged that *lo stato* has several different meanings in Renaissance political texts.[11] Two of the meanings are not directly relevant to our concerns and are only mentioned in passing. The first, common in the Northern kingdoms such as England and France, is the Roman law idea of *status* to denote the status or standing a ruler enjoyed, that is the status of majesty, or the status of the political community. In *quattrocento* Italy this sense is found in humanist texts like Giovanni Campano's *De regendo magistratu* where he argues that republics could only achieve *bonus status respublicae* if their leaders strove for justice. According to Skinner, Machiavelli gives this meaning to *lo stato* where he advises new princes on how to '*tenere* or *mantenere lo stato*', i.e. how to maintain their

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not part of the elite class of Florentine families, his own access to political life had been relatively curtailed – hence, his criticism of those who hold political office on the basis of wealth and prestige, criteria which do not guarantee *virtù* and success in politics. See Felix Gilbert, *Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth Century Florence* (New York NY, W.W. Norton and Co, 1965), pp. 153-200.

[9]For Skinner this concept of the modern state was a product of the seventeenth century tradition of natural law absolutism represented by Bodin, Suarez, Grotius and Hobbes. Nevertheless, Skinner admits that this idea of the modern state was derived in part from the Renaissance republican writing that stressed that in the *res publica* the community was the ultimate source of authority, and that the rulers and magistrates were merely elected officials: 'there is a distinct form of "civil" or "political" authority which is wholly autonomous, which exists to regulate the public affairs of an independent community, and which brooks no rivals as a source of coercive power within its own *civitas* or *respublica*.' Skinner, 'The State', p. 107.

[10]Chabod, 'Esiste uno Stato del Rinascimento?', p. 604. My translation.

[11]The following discussion relies heavily on Skinner, 'The State', esp. pp. 90-102, from where most of the citations to humanist political works are taken.

position as rulers over their new territories.[12] Second, evolving out of the humanist use of *status* to translate Aristotle's types of government constitutions, *lo stato* is also employed to denote forms of government. In this context Bruni translates Aristotle's distinction between democracy and aristocracy as *status popularis* and *status optimatum;* and the typology of legitimate regimes in Filippo Beroaldo's *Libellus de optimo statu* are *status populare, status paucorum* and *status unius.*[13] During the fourteenth century the Florentines described their own popular regime government as *populare stato* or *popularis status.*[14]

However, notes Nicolai Rubinstein, the use of *lo stato* to denote different forms of government gave way to *stato* as an indication of effective power; '[s]*tatus*, defined by "what has the supreme power in the state" comes close to the meaning with which *stato* was widely used in fifteenth-century Florence.'[15] This use of *lo stato* 'to refer to the institutions of government and means of coercive control that serve to organize and preserve order within political communities was a major linguistic innovation of the Renaissance.[16] Although this sense of *lo stato* to denote the governmental and administrative apparatus was kept conceptually distinct from *città* or *republica* – the political community or state as a whole – it was not always clearly distinguished from those who had effective control of it. Sometimes the distinction is relatively clear as when Vespasiano describes how Alessandro Sforza conducted himself "in his government of *lo stato*", and when Guicciardi in his *Ricordi* asks how the Medici "lost control of *lo stato* in 1527."[17] Writing to Lorenzo about the security that is likely to result from a proposed treaty with Naples, the Florentine Chancellor pointed out that the benefits will be felt by 'you and the regime which is joined to you and for the state which is joined to the regime.'[18] However, by the time Lorenzo had overcome the Pazzi plot in 1477 'the transformation of the *stato* of Florence into the Medici regime' was almost complete, and

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[12]Skinner, 'The State', p. 98.

[13]These examples are from Rubinstein and Skinner respectively.

[14]Rubinstein, 'Notes', p. 315.

[15]Rubinstein, 'Notes', p. 317. Rubinstein contextualises Machiavelli's *stato* not just in terms of Italian humanist writing generally, but specifically in terms of Florentine political vernacular.

[16]Skinner, 'The State', p. 101.

[17]Vespasiano and Guicciardini both quoted in Skinner, 'The State', p. 101.

[18]Rubinstein, 'Notes', p. 319. My translation.

lo stato came to refer not to the power structure *of* the state but to the dominant regime in control of it: *lo stato di Medici*.[19] For Skinner, Machiavelli's work reveals these ambiguities over the meaning of *lo stato*. On the one hand, Machiavelli does occasionally distinguish the institutions and structure of *lo stato* from those who control it; *stati* have their own foundations, laws, customs and ordinances and are agents capable of choosing between different courses of actions and of drawing on the citizen's loyalties. In this context we can read *The Prince* not just as a handbook of princely conduct, but as a reflection on abstract issues of 'statecraft (*dello stato*) and *cose di stato* or affairs of state.'[20] On the other hand, Machiavelli often writes of *lo stato* as an apparatus of government or a power structure that is not independent of those in charge of it; '*lo stato,* as he often puts it, remains equivalent to *il suo stato,* the prince's own state or conditions of rulership.'[21]

This third sense of *lo stato* to denote the apparatus of power brings to mind Weber's institutional concept of the state. However, it is the final meaning of *lo stato* as 'a way of referring to the general area over which a ruler or chief magistrate needs to exercise control' which is of most interest to us.[22] In the rest of this chapter I will read passages in *The Prince* where Machiavelli refers to the spatial nature of sovereignty, identity and violence, in an attempt to elucidate what was meant when 'writers contemporaneous with Machiavelli used *stato* to designate a geographical area'.[23]

The Prince, *Dominion* and Sovereignty

Machiavelli opens *The Prince* with the famous declaration 'Tutti gli stati, tutti e' dominii che hanno avuto e hanno imperio sopra gli uomini, sono stati e sono o republiche o

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[19]Rubinstein, 'Notes', p. 318. For Rubinstein, by the time Piero de Medici was ousted in 1494, 'the theoretical concept of *stato* as constitution had lost most of its original meaning by the transformation of the power structure of Florence into the Medici régime.' p. 319. For a vivid description of the events surrounding the Pazzi plot, see Christopher Hibbert, *The Rise and Fall of the House of Medici* (London, Penguin Books, 1979), pp. 128-43.

[20]Skinner, 'The State', p. 102.

[21]Skinner, 'The State', p. 103.

[22]Skinner, 'The State', p. 100.

[23]Gilbert, *Machiavelli and Guicciardini*, p. 177.

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principati.'[24] This translates as '[a]ll the states (*stati*), all the dominions (*dominii*) that have had or now have authority (*imperio*) over men have been and now are either republics or princedoms (*principati*).'[25] In the rest of the first chapter, he observes that princedoms are either hereditary or new. If new, they are either totally new as Milan was for Francesco Sforza, or they can be joined to the hereditary state like new members (*come membri aggiunti allo stato*) as was Naples to the Kingdom of Spain. These dominions (*questi dominii*) are either used to living under princely rule or they are free (i.e. they are republics). They can be acquired either by using one's own forces or those of another (mercenaries) and by *fortuna* or *virtù*. In the second chapter, Machiavelli points out that in hereditary states (*nelli stati ereditori*) the new prince should have little difficulty into holding onto his position (*nel suo stato* – here in the sense of *status*) if he continues the customary rule established by his predecessors. As long as he does not develop any particularly unpleasant vices, the people of his state should be well disposed to him and innovation will be tolerated as bad memories and resentment will be subsumed '*nella antiquità e continuazione del dominio*'.

The word *dominion* appears three times in these two opening chapters of *The Prince* and is fundamental to Machiavelli's conception of *lo stato*. Indeed, in so far as it may be translated as 'sovereignty' – as in the above phrase '[t]he remote origin and long continuance of such sovereignty' – it alerts us to the possibility that a mainstay of the modern discourse of the territorial state was already being erected in the political and legal discourses of Renaissance Italy.[26] Sebastian de Grazia argues that the opening sentence of *The Prince* presents us with the essential components of the Machiavellian state. Machiavelli

> locates the constituents of a state in three nouns. A state has all three – a dominion, an imperium, and men. It is a special case of dominion (the *definiens*): one that is held by rightful (for which can be substituted just, lawful, or authoritative) command (which from its military antecedents contains a strong sense of sanctions or force) over men (who are located in the territory and obey the commands – laws, orders, rules, decrees – as

[24]Niccolò Machiavelli, *Il Principe*, ed. Giorgio Inglese, (Torino, Giulio Einaudi editore, 1995), p. 7. All subsequent Italian quotes taken from *The Prince* will refer to this text.

[25]Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince* in Machiavelli, *Chief Works and Others, Volume I*, trans. Allan Gilbert, (Durham NC, Duke University Press, 1989), pp. 5-96, at p.11. All subsequent English quotations will be drawn from this translation of *The Prince*, unless otherwise stated.

[26]Gilbert's translation of Machiavelli, *ThePrince*, p. 12.

rightful).[27]

The antecedents of the terms *dominium* (referring to a domain or territory) and *imperium* (denoting the right or authority to command) in Renaissance political discourse can be traced to the legal, political and military vernacular of the Roman and Holy Roman Empires. In Roman Law the Latin word *dominium* denoted ownership or

> full legal power over a corporeal thing, the right of the owner to use it, to take proceeds therefrom, and to dispose of it freely. The owner's *plena potestas in re* (full power over a thing) is manifested by his faculty to do with it what he pleases and to exclude anyone from the use thereof unless the latter has acquired a specific right to it ... which he might obtain only with the owner's consent.[28]

However, by the Renaissance the Roman Law sense of *dominion* to denote *private* property or ownership had been supplemented by two *public* meanings. First was the '[t]he power or right of governing and controlling' where *dominion* refers to the acts of exercising control authority or sovereignty. Second, *dominion* also referred to the space over which rule or sovereignty is exercised: '[t]he lands or domains of a feudal lord. ... The territory owned by or subject to a king or ruler, or under a particular government or control.'[29] In its public meaning *dominion* denotes both a subject – the sovereign – and an object – the territory over which sovereignty is exercised – and as such anticipates the modern concept of sovereign-territoriality.

We must acknowledge that few historians of political theory accept that the modern sense of sovereignty or 'the idea that there is a final and absolute political authority in the political community ... *and no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere*' was fully developed in Renaissance political discourse.[30] F.H. Hinsley argues that while many Renaissance political theorists did challenge the secular authority claimed by the Papacy and Emperor, the first explicit justification and recognition of the legitimate independence of political communities was Jean Bodin's *Six Livres de la*

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[27]de Grazia, *Machiavelli in Hell*, pp. 158-9.

[28]Adolf Berger, *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law* (Philadelphia PA, The American Philosophical Society, 1953), p. 441.

[29]*Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. IV*, 2nd ed., (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 949.

[30]F. H. Hinsley, *Sovereignty,* 2nd ed., (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 26.

Republique, which was not published until 1576.[31] Likewise, Jens Bartleson finds only a loosely developed notion of proto-sovereignty in Renaissance political texts. The Renaissance 'general theory of the state' did not individuate the state as a sovereign entity and prioritise it as the object of study.[32] Further, to the extent that the discourse of sovereignty presupposes the existence of an 'outside' comprising an international system of identical sovereign states, then this was lacking from the Renaissance 'general theory of the state' which had no coherent discourse as to what lay outside it, 'since what is outside it, also is beyond the scope of knowledge.'[33]

That said, both Hinsley and Bartleson admit that the idea of sovereignty was not totally alien to Renaissance political discourse. Furthermore, both acknowledge Machiavelli's role in preparing the ground for the modern concept of sovereignty. For Hinsley, Machiavelli made two contributions to the development of the idea of sovereignty. First, Machiavelli, like Guicciardini, sought to resolve the competing interests of rulers and ruled by conceiving of *lo stato* as an instrument in the hands of the ruler to be used in the interests of the ruled. However, Machiavelli's argument that the interests of both would be served if the prince was freed from custom and tradition, thereby allowing him to act in the interests of the body politic, stopped short of 'knitting ruler and society closer together in a body politic which itself became endowed with

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[31]Hinsley acknowledges that Renaissance political theory challenged three main tenants of the Christian order that had held back the emergence of the modern notion of sovereignty: first, that the theocratically-based claims of Papacy and Empire to universal authority contained the proper understanding of political authority; second, that Christendom was a political society; and third, that regional rulers were beholden to laws superior to them.

[32]Jens Bartleson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 88-136. The Renaissance 'general theory of the state' arose out of three conditions. First, the replacement of the eternal time-frame of the Augustinian cosmos by Aristotelian time of change and contingency in which political communities could be imagined as continuous political beings inscribed into an order of change and contingency. Second, the nominalist challenge to the universal whole of theological knowledge, which opened up the question of particularity – although, as in Dante and Marsiglio of Padua's writings, it was generally resolved within a universalist framework. Third, the general theory of the continuous and nominal state was supported by an epistemology of *resemblance* and *exempla*, and by an exemplary historiography drawing on the recovery of ancient political texts.

[33]Bartleson, *Genealogy of Sovereignty*, p. 136. Bartleson rejects the 'Renaissance hypothesis' that the French invasion of Italy in 1494 was the moment at which the state became distinguished as a separate being from an international system outside its borders. He suggests that there was no firm line of demarcation establishing the inside and outside of particular states and thus the notion of the international as a realm of the relations between autonomous states, 'dependent on yet ontologically distinguishable from individual states' was non-sensical. Bartleson, *Genealogy of Sovereignty*, p. 89.

sovereign power.'[34] Second, Machiavelli dismissed the ancient notion that the ruler in a kingdom existed to realise a law superior to him and his government. With Machiavelli power has its own rules and *raison d'être*. Bartleson is also forced to admit that Machiavelli had some sense of a sovereign subject; '[i]f *Il Principe* was focussed around the problem of security and written from the vantage point of the sovereign subjectivity of a ruler, this perspective is reversed in the *Discorsi*. It is written from the vantage point of the sovereign subjectivity of a people.'[35]

Political theorists only begrudgingly admit that the idea of territorial sovereignty was part of the Renaissance political consciousness. However, for legal historians by the time of the Renaissance the principle of territorial sovereignty was well established. Its basic principles had been hammered out during the fourteenth century when regional monarchs asserted their independence from the Holy Roman Empire. The test case, which had established and then legitimised the principle, was Robert of Naples' challenge to the authority of the Emperor Henry VII in 1312. Robert was supported by French and Neapolitan lawyers who opposed the Holy Roman Emperor's claim of *dominus mundi*, i.e. to be the lawful overlord and supreme monarch of Europe with jurisdictional authority over all kings, was invalid. Lawyers like John of Paris and Andreas de Isernia championed the principle of *Rex est monarcha in regno suo* and denied that the Holy Roman Empire had any superior juristic or political status over the regional kings.[36] Andreas regarded the Emperor as one king among equals, whose jurisdiction extended only over his own territory. The Emperor had equivalent powers to the other kings; the kings have the same powers within their realms as the Emperor has within the imperial empire: '*Rex poterit in regno suo, quod imperator in terra imperii ... liberi reges tantum habent in regnis suis quantum imperator in imperio*.'[37] On the basis of these principles, Robert – charged with inciting imperial enemies in Lombardy and Tuscany, concluding treaties with them, and occupying imperial territory – rejected the charge of *crimen laesa majestatis* laid against him, and claimed that the Emperor's claim to universal

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[34]Hinsley, *Sovereignty*, p. 113.

[35]Bartleson, *Genealogy of Sovereignty*, p. 118.

[36]For a discussion of these lawyers, see Walter Ullman, 'The Development of the Medieval Idea of Sovereignty', *English Historical Review*, 64 (1949), pp. 1-33.

[37]Quoted in Ullman, 'Medieval Idea of Sovereignty', p. 24.

overlordship was invalid. As a sovereign he, Robert, was inferior to no one. The Emperor's claim to overlordship was again refuted by Pope Clement V in the decree *Pastoralis Cura* of 1313. Clement, who regarded Naples as a papal fief, had been upset by Henry's claim that Neapolitan territory was part of his kingdom, and declared in the bull that the Emperor could not summon a king *extra districtum imperii*, nor use force to bring a king to book *extra imperium*. In effect the bull stated that the Emperor had no jurisdictional power over kings resident in territories outside of the Empire, and that he was no longer *dominus mundi*. By the time Marsiglio of Padua wrote the *Defensor Pacis* in 1324, legal discourse had established that the sovereignty of the humanist individual *legislator humanus* should be reflected in the sovereign status of the *universitas civium*.[38]

> subjectivized sovereignty must be supplemented by it objectivized component part, and that means that sovereignty, or what is the same, jurisdiction must be territorially anchored, must have a territorial connection ... territorial boundaries had become boundaries of the law, jurisdiction and hence of sovereignty. The territory had acquired juristic personality. Both governmental practice and juristic doctrine had postulated that the personal kind of sovereignty must be complemented by its territorial counterpart.[39]

The citizen's residence was regarded as an integral part of justice. A person's domicile linked the *res* or territory to the *persona*; domicile in legal practice and theory was the nexus between the animate person and inanimate soil. The territorialisation of the *universitas civium* meant that no government could claim legitimate jurisdiction outside its own territory and, as was demonstrated in 1312, a citizen with his domicile in one territory could not be summoned to a court in another.[40]

This legal sense of territorial sovereignty was part of the Renaissance discourse of state authority. Indeed, it informed both the internal constitution of jurisdiction and the relations between the republics and principalities of Italy. As regards internal jurisdiction, the idea of sovereign territoriality associated with dominion anticipated the coercive

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[38]Walter Ullman, 'Personality and Territoriality in The "Defensor Pacis": The Problem of Political Humanism' in Ullman, *Law and Jurisdiction in the Middle Ages*, (London, Variorum Reprints, 1986), pp. 397-410. Ullman notes that the development of the principle of territorial sovereignty could be seen in the changing intitulations of kings from *Rex Francorum* to *Rex Franciae* and from *Rex Anglorum* to *Rex Angliae*.

[39]Ullman, 'Personality and Territoriality', p. 401. Marsiglio's omission of the territorial elements of sovereignty in "Defensor Pacis" went against the established conventions of late medieval political theory.

[40]Robert could not "potest trahi extra territorium." Ullman, 'Personality and Territoriality', p. 402.

element that was to be so fundamental to the Weberian idea of the territorial state. Machiavelli experienced this coercive element first hand in November 1512 when, following the fall of Soderini's government, he was expelled from the Chancery and confined *in territorio et dominio florentino per unum annum contiuum*.[41] Machiavelli experience his confinement within the territory of Florence as a major hardship and after six months wrote to his friend Venturi in Rome declaring his intention to visit "if I could get out of this hole of dominion."[42] The legal sense of territorial sovereignty was also evident in diplomatic treaties where *lo stato* refers to a combination of political power and territorial dominion, as in the agreements leading to the formation of the Italian League 1454 which 'was concluded *ad tutelam et conservationem statuum et dominiorum* of the signatories.'[43]

The presence of the legal notion of territorial sovereignty in Machiavelli's work has been noted by Michel Foucault who sees in *The Prince*

> a juridical principal which from the Middle Ages to the sixteenth century defined sovereignty in public law: sovereignty is not exercised on things, but above all on a territory and consequently on the subjects who inhabit it. In this sense we can say that the territory is the fundamental element both in Machiavellian principality and in juridical sovereignty as defined by the theoreticians and philosophers of right. Obviously enough, these territories can be fertile or not, the population dense or sparse, the inhabitants rich or poor, active or lazy, but all these elements are mere variables by comparison with territory itself, which is the very foundation of principality and sovereignty.[44]

Machiavelli's *stato* represents a shift in the notion of state territoriality from 'the state of justice, born in the feudal type of territorial regime which corresponds to a society of laws' to 'the administrative state, born in the territoriality of national boundaries in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and corresponding to a society of regulation and discipline.'[45]

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[41]De Grazia, *Machiavelli in Hell*, p. 159.

[42]Machiavelli, quoted in de Grazia, *Machiavelli in Hell*, p. 159.

[43]Rubinstein, 'Notes', p. 320. In diplomatic documentation despotic states had the same status as republics.

[44]Michel Foucault, 'Governmentality' in Graham Burchill, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds), *The Foucault Effect* (Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 87-104, at p. 93.

[45]Foucault, 'Governmentality', p. 104. The third form of the state, and the one Foucault is most interested in, is the modern 'governmental state, essentially defined no longer in terms of its territoriality, of its surface area, but in terms of the mass of its population with its volume and density.' p. 104. While the sixteenth century administrative state is defined by its territory, territory is only one of many elements

However, Foucault suggests that the link between the prince and his territory is fragile and in need of permanent attention. Because the prince's links to his principality were synthetic, fragile and constantly threatened by external enemies and internal disloyalty, his main interest was to hold onto it. Irrespective of how he had acquired his principality, whether by conquest or inheritance, the prince remained 'external to it.'[46] The objective of the prince's exercise of power is to strengthen and protect the principality – understood not as 'the objective ensemble of its subjects and the territory, but rather the prince's relation with what he owns, with the territory he has inherited or acquired, and with his subjects.'[47] Foucault's reading of Machiavelli captures, I think, the essence of Renaissance territorial sovereignty. On the one hand it shows that during the Renaissance sovereignty and territory were drawn into the same discursive realm. On the other hand it shows that they did not become fused as they would in Classical political theory. Perhaps we can conclude that in Renaissance sovereign-territoriality the hyphen separates rather than unites; it differentiates the subject sovereign prince from the object of his power, his territory. For Federico Chabod, Machiavelli's theory of the state is predicated upon this understanding that territory is an object to be subjected to the authority of the prince.

> For Machiavelli "State" signifies first of all authority, preeminence, political power (of the prince alone or of the dominant political group in the republic) which is exercised over a distinctive group of men. That is, it is the subject, clearly separated from the object of command, which remains outside of and subservient to it. But it also signifies territorial extension, "dominio" in the objective sense (the space – and population – within which and upon which a determined authority is exercised). [48]

This 'sovereign as subject, territory as object' distinction appears in Renaissance diplomatic documents in which the *stato* of a ruler is distinguished from his lands and subjects. For example, under the terms of the treaty between Francesco Sforza and Federico Montefeltro (31 August 1450), Sforza agrees to take into his protection "el stato,

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making up the governmental state For its advocates like Guillaume de La Perrière, government was about the 'right disposition of things' i.e. control of the population through economic *savoir*. Machiavelli's *Prince* with its suggestion that the art of government should have 'the sole interest of the prince as its object and principle of rationality' was viewed as the antithesis of the proper art of government. p. 89.

[46]Foucault, 'Governmentality', p. 90.

[47]Foucault, 'Governmentality', p. 90.

[48]Chabod, 'Alcune questioni', p. 631. My translation.

citade, terre, castelle, homini, subditi ..." of Federico.[49] This distinction was especially relevant to the territories of the principalities and despotic states, since both the internal regime and the territory were held by the signore as his dominions.[50]

In this section we have seen that historians do not agree whether or not Renaissance political and legal discourse articulated a recognisably modern notion of sovereign territoriality. I think that it is fair to say that Machiavelli's understanding of dominion, reflecting developments in the legal notion of territoriality, anticipates the Classical resolution of space and politics. Although the subjective and objective components of sovereign territoriality may not have fused to the extent that they will in the modern representation of the state, nevertheless they were both part of Renaissance political discourse. In the discussion of the Realist idea of the territorial state in the opening chapter it was pointed out that sovereignty and territoriality were cemented through violence. In the next section I shall analyse the relationship between territory and violence as Machiavelli as presented in *The Prince*.

The Prince and Violence

Sheldon Wolin has written that Machiavelli was the first political philosopher to confront the state as an 'aggregate of power' and to depict its profile as 'that of violence.'[51] Indeed, one of the central messages of *The Prince* is that the prince should not shirk from employing appropriate economies of violence in order to achieve his desired political ends. Machiavelli considered the successful acquisition and maintenance of a principality to be dependent on the prince's capability and prowess in military matters. In chapter x, where Machiavelli seeks to establish the criteria by which it is possible to assesses the power of princes, he suggests that a strong prince will have 'tanto stato' so as to be able

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[49]Rubinstein, 'Notes', fn. 79, p. 326.

[50]Rubinstein reads Machiavelli's opening sentence in *The Prince* as following diplomatic use. Machiavelli is identifying states with dominions, whose acquisition and preservation by princes is the subject of the work.

[51]Sheldon S. Wolin, 'Machiavelli and the Economy of Violence' in Wolin, *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought* (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1961), pp. 195-238, at p. 221.

to defend himself against any attacker without calling upon other princes for assistance.[52] His advice for weak princes who, under attack are obliged to 'take refuge behind walls and defend them', is that they will be able to hold onto their states during a siege if they make sure that the city is well fortified and that the people remain loyal.[53]

In this passage Machiavelli also advises the besieged prince to 'fortify and provision his city, and to make no account of the territory lying outside it.'[54] Machiavelli implies that as long as the city holds fast, the countryside or *contado* may be regarded as peripheral space that the enemy can take without threatening the existence of the state as a whole. This image of central and peripheral spaces of state territoriality perhaps contrasts to the Weberian ideal in which the state's authority or capacity to exercise its monopoly of violence is distributed evenly across the entire territory. However this image of a centre based in the city and a periphery of outlying areas is common among republican writers in Florence who use *lo stato* in a geographical sense to denote the territorial dominion. Giovanni Villani divided the *stato* of Florence into city, *contado*, and *distretto*, and Guicciardini spoke of Pisa as belonging to "*lo nostro stato.*"[55] According to Elena Fasano Guarani, Machiavelli's centre-periphery image of territoriality reflects the characteristic structure of Italian political communities in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In the Renaissance states where territoriality extended to spaces beyond the surrounding castles and villages already under the jurisdiction of cities, it was less 'a form of immediate sovereignty over a territory' than 'jurisdiction exercised over the subjects through the entities and communities representing them.'[56] Territorial control

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[52]Machiavelli, *Il Principe*, p. 69. The phrase, 'se uno principe ha tanto stato, che possa, bisognando, per sé medesimo reggersi' is translated by Gilbert as 'whether a prince has so much power that by his own strength alone he can repel attack', *The Prince* [A], p. 42. However, in light of our concerns, perhaps the translation by Russell Price in Machiavelli, *The Prince* [B], ed. Quentin Skinner and Price, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988) is more pertinent: 'whether a ruler has sufficient territory and power to defend himself.', p. 38.

[53]Machiavelli, *The Prince* [A], p. 42.

[54]Machiavelli, *The Prince* [A], p. 43: 'a fortificare e munirela terra propria e del paese non tenere alcuno conto.' *Il Principe*, p. 70.

[55]Rubinstein, 'Notes', pp. 320-1. The references are to Giovanni Vallani, *Cronica*, ed. I. Moutier, (Florence, 1823), p. 655; and Francesco Guicciardini, *Storie Fiorentine*, ed. R. Palmarocchi, (Bari, 1931), p. 113.

[56]Elana Fasano Guarani, 'Centre and Periphery', *The Journal of Modern History*, 67:Supplement (December 1995), pp. S74-96, at p. S74. Guarani's work is part of a research project of the *Istituto Storico Italo-Germanico* in Trent, some of which was published as a supplement to *The Journal of Modern History* in December 1995. Many of these papers appeared earlier in the Italian edited collection, Giorgio Chittolini, Anthony Molho and Pierangelo Schiera (eds), *Origini dello Stato: Processi di formazione*

of Renaissance states was marked by a divide between centre and periphery which revealed a 'hierarchical and polarized organisation of that space.'[57]

In Renaissance Italy the city and the countryside closer together than in feudal societies, although mutual distrust and resentment remained. The widespread replacement of serfdom by more flexible tenancies based in commercial leases and contractual sharecropping or *mezzadría* drew the cities and countryside together in relations of dependency: city dwellers relied on food, fuel and labour drawn from rural areas, while investment and speculations by the rich and middle classes of the cities brought prosperity to the countryside. Like Machiavelli who owned a farm at Sant'Andrea in Percussina outside Florence, many city dwellers had farms near the city or were absentee landlords in estates further out. Yet, economic ties of necessity between urban upper classes and the agrarian economy did not produce feelings of trust or affection between city and country people. The landowning patriciate exhibited virulent prejudice towards the peasantry and farm workers, who in turn sought to avoid conceding too much of their produce to them. The cleavage between urban and rural is expressed in Franco Sacchetti's declaration that "[t]he city should produce good men, the villa good beasts."[58] This spirit of difference between the spaces of the city and countryside is, suggests Martin Warnke,

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statale in Italia fra medioevo ed età moderna (Bologna, Il Mulino, 1994). Italian historians began to emphasise the territorial dimension of state power following the translation of the German socio-historical work of Hintze, Weber and Brunner in the 1970s. This paradigm is by now well established, as is revealed by the title of Julius Kirschner's introductory essay to the *JMH* Supplement, 'The State is "Back In"', pp. S1-S10. These historians detect signs of the modern state in the consolidation of juridical, military and fiscal powers by regional Italian states in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but they stop short of the claim that 'autonomous, self-sustaining, centralized administrative structures came into existence.' p. S5.

[57]Guarani, 'Centre and Periphery', pp. S74-5. For these historians the centre-periphery trope is not limited to analyses of the extension of the state's control over a territory, but informs a general tendency to avoid conceiving of the state as a monolithic caricature, 'connoted by full sovereignty, absolutism, coercion, the exercise of power in the name of the public interest.' Giorgio Chittolini, 'The "Private," the "Public," the State', *The Journal of Modern History*, 67:Supplement (December 1995), pp. S34-61, at p. S46. For Chittolini the institutional arrangements of the Renaissance and *ancien régime* need to be explored in terms of a dialectic between public and private interests – while recognising that the modern distinction between public and private established by 'the political geometry of absolutism' should not be projected back onto earlier institutional formations. Nevertheless, for Chittolini, 'the institutions of the *ancien régime* are not the expression of a public order centred entirely on the prince, nor do they draw the historians attention only to the "centre", but focus attention on 'cities, communities, fiefs, corporations, orders, and social groups, examining not only their political forms but also the way they complement the prince and the ruling city, and hence their integral contribution to the dualistic arrangements of those states as estates-polities.' p. S48.

[58]Sacchetti quoted in Lauro Martines, *Power and Imagination: City-States in Renaissance Italy* (New York NY, Alfred A Knopf, 1979), p. 165.

a legacy of the medieval view that the city was the place of law and order and the countryside a lawless open landscape. Although this vision was in decline during the Renaissance, its images were still evident, as in, for example, Giotto's frescos for the *Arena Chapel* in which Injustice is depicted as a tyrant sitting outside the city-gate and ruling over a wilderness were brigands indulge in robbery and murder.[59] For Lauro Martines the image of the city 'haunts' countless Renaissance paintings, in which clustered urban space are presented as testaments to civic life and implicitly reject the country as organised space for living. Furthermore, artists like Leonardo and Mantegna stamped on their 'country views',

> the architecture, geometry, and lapidary textures of cities. The countryside is disavowed. ... In certain views of walled-in cities, the surrounding rural space is depicted as a sort of no man's land fit for armies and desolation, not for civilized living (*vivere civilmente*). Infected by the arrogance of the domineering city, the artistic imagination was also affected by the immediacy of a subjugated countryside, and so it produced fantasticated pictures of the established relationships of power.[60]

While serving in the Florentine Chancery, Machiavelli travelled extensively within Italy, visiting potentially rebellious cities and recruiting soldiers for the militia, and he became sensitive to the potential weaknesses of these centre-periphery systems. It was generally recognised that the inability of the communes to unify and discipline the feudal aristocracies in their *contadi* precipitated the crises of the fourteenth century. Machiavelli felt that the territorial arrangements of Venice and Florence displayed similar weaknesses. As regards Venice, Machiavelli shared the view that the weakness of the Venetian state lay in the estranged nature of the relations between the city, which one historians describes as "a strange centre placed at the borders of its state, a seafaring and mercantile city, foreign to the world of common law" and the Terrafirma, "a multiform and polycentric periphery, organized around big urban poles and dotted with feudal lordships and 'little princes'."[61] Machiavelli noted that Venice's expansion, which had

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[59]Martin Warnke, *Political Landscape: The Art History of Nature,* (London, Reaktion Books Ltd, 1994), p. 40. Warnke also finds this imagery in the castle landscape of Stephan Lochner's *Last Judgement* which assigns 'the city to heaven and the castle – the emblem of country power – to hell.'

[60]Martines, *Power and Imagination*, p. 166.

[61]S. Zamperetti, *I piccoli principi: Signorie locali, feudi e comunità soggette nello Stato regionale veneto dall' espansione territoriale ai primi decenni del '600* (Treviso, 1991), quoted in Guarani, 'Centre and Periphery' p, S86.

taken 'possession of a large part of Italy, for the most part not with war but with money and craft', threatened not only many Italian princes but also foreign kings.[62] Indeed, he attributed Venice's defeat at the battle of Agnadello (14 May 1509) by the combined Spanish, French and German forces of the League of Cambrai brought together by Pope Julius II, to the fact that

> they attained such a reputation for power that not merely to the Italian princes but to the kings beyond the Alps they gave cause for dread. Hence when these foreign rulers made a league against them, in one day the Venetians were deprived of the territory which in the course of many years they had gained with boundless expense.[63]

As far as Machiavelli was concerned, Venice's great weakness was its fixed constitution. While this constitution allowed the city-state to maintain its liberty and freedom because only the *gentiluomini*, who knew how to conduct affairs of state, had access to administrative posts, it was not flexible enough to allow for expansionist policies. Because the *plebe* were un-armed the Venetians were forced to rely on mercenaries, whose unreliability was the cause of the defeat at Agnadello.[64]

Closer to home, Machiavelli was also preoccupied with Florence's own struggles to control its subject territories. Machiavelli had become familiar with the threats to Florence's *dominio* during his travels as Secretary to rebellious cities like Pisa. In *The Prince*, Pisa, which Florence had bought from Gabriele Maria Visconti in 1405 and lost in 1494 as a consequence of Charles VIII's invasion, is cited as an example of the difficulties a prince will face when trying to holding onto recently acquired city-states with long established traditions of liberty.[65] Earlier in the *Discorso dell'ordinare lo stato di Firenze alle armi* 1506, Machiavelli had contrasted the restlessness in the Florentine *distretto*, populated by potentially rebellious cities, to the peaceful *contado* of Florence's

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[62]Niccolò Machiavelli, *Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius* in Machiavelli, *Chief Works and Others, Volume I*, 1:6, p. 210.

[63]Niccolò Machiavelli, *The History of Florence* in Machiavelli, *Chief Works and Others, Volume III*, 1: 29, p. 1069.

[64]After the Venetians' defeat at the battle of Agnadello Machiavelli was in Verona, one of Venice's subject cities, and wrote to the Dieci explaining that Venice's defeat was compounded by the use of mercenary forces and the ambivalent loyalties of the aristocracy in the subject cities. See, for details, Elena Fasano Guarani, 'Machiavelli and the Crisis of the Italian Republics' in Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner and Maurizio Viroli (eds), *Machiavelli and Republicanism* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 17-40, at p. 23.

[65]Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 24.

immediate vicinity.[66] Machiavelli feared that without sufficient *armi* and *giustizia* to defend and punish its subjects, Florence was incapable of governing its *dominio* properly. Florence's very survival was threatened by 'the fragility of its territorial system, badly guarded, exposed to external pressures, undermined internally by the presence of cities "che desiderano più la vostra morte che la loro vita".'[67] Machiavelli advised Florence's rulers that if they wanted to consolidate the state's territory they would not only have to reinforce Florence's military force and institutions of justice, but also take a firm control over internal matters by rewarding faithful subjects and punishing rebel cities. However, the centre-periphery system remained the dominant structure of power in Renaissance states, even in the territories of the princes, throughout the sixteenth century. Guarani's own research on the Medici rule of Florence in the sixteenth century reveals a centre-periphery ordering of power which extended outwards from Florence to the Tuscan territories. Tuscany was a pluralistic society in which cities, towns and rural communities maintained their own councils and government bodies and were responsible for tax collection and allocation, the maintenance of public order, and, till Cosimo I, defence.[68]

Machiavelli is often quite explicit that states are institutions grounded in violence. As he says '[t]he principal foundations of all states, the new as well as the old and the mixed, are good laws and good armies' and it is not possible to have good laws without the existence of competent armies.[69] The subject of armies was very important to Machiavelli, who had been responsible for recruiting a militia force for Florence, and discussions on how to raise, maintain and deploy armed forces appear in all his major works.[70] In *The Prince* he devotes chapters xii-xiv to a critique of the widespread, and he felt entirely regrettable, practice among Italy's rulers of employing foreign mercenaries or auxiliaries. Machiavelli had much contempt for mercenaries whom he considered as 'disunited, ambitious, without discipline, disloyal … [and] … cowardly'. Indeed, he laid the responsibility for the 'present ruin of Italy' entirely at the feet of Italian rulers who

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[66]See, for details, Guarani, 'Crisis of the Italian Republics', p. 23.
[67]Guarani, 'Crisis of the Italian Republics', p. 23.
[68]Guarani, 'Centre and Periphery', pp. S81-2.
[69]Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 47.
[70]See especially Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Art of War*, ed. N. Wood, (New York NY, Da Capo, 1965).

have relied upon 'mercenaries for a stretch of many years.'[71] Auxiliaries are even more dangerous because their primarily loyalty is always to their own commander, who could easily turn his soldiers against their employers. Machiavelli advises both princes and the ruling elites of city-states to substitute for mercenaries, militia forces made up of local men whose allegiances would be more predictable. Machiavelli warned that unless the Prince could call upon armies made up of his own subjects or citizens, then his principality would remain insecure and dependent on *fortuna*, 'not having strength that in adversity loyally defends her.'[72] In rejecting foreign mercenaries and recommending locally-based militias Machiavelli anticipates the inside/outside distribution of territorial violence. The militias have two roles: internally they ensure pacification by quashing any rebellious factions that challenge the state authorities, externally they defend the state against the marauding armies of the *oltramontani*. If the militia is conducted properly, 'it naturally suppresses all disturbances – rather than fomenting them – among its constituents' as well as being able 'to protect them against the fear of foreign enemies.'[73]

Michel Foucault has pointed out that state violence in Early Modern Europe was both spectacular and disciplinary.[74] In *The Prince* Machiavelli provides examples of princes using both forms of violence to secure the territories of their states. In the tract 'On the Method of Dealing With the Rebellious Peoples of the Valdichiana', Machiavelli warns the Florentine leaders that the Duke of Valentino Cesare Borgia, who was seeking to establish his authority in Romagna and to build a powerful territorial state in central Italy, was trying to incite rebellion among the discontented peoples of the Florentine state.[75] In *The Prince*, however, Valentino is praised for his attempts to hold onto his new principality in the most difficult of circumstances. Valentino's hold over Romagna was considered to be weak because he had relied on other men's forces – his armies were heavily reinforced by mercenaries belonging to the Orsini and by soldiers on loan from the French king Louis XII – but had also relied on *fortuna* – he had been able to rely on the support of the pope Alexander VI who was Roderigo Borgia his father. Valentino

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[71]Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 47.

[72]Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 54.

[73]Machiavelli, *Art of War*, p. 40

[74]Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1979).

[75]See the extracts in Machiavelli, *Chief Works and Others, Vol. 1*, p. 161-2.

recognised that three factors potentially threatened his position: the dubious loyalties of the Orsini mercenaries, Louis' disapproval of his plans for further expansion into Tuscany, and the anarchy within Romagna whose peoples were disunified and sick of being ruled by weak lords who had exploited them. Cesare began to strengthen his position by eradicating the leaders of the Orsini and Colonna families and by breaking his alliance with the French.[76] In order to pacify Romagna, Cesare put in charge 'Messer Remirro de Orco, a man cruel and ready' who 'in a short time tendered the province peaceful and united.' In order to avoid incurring resentment at the violent means used to restore order, Cesare wanted to show that

> any cruelty which had gone on did not originate with himself but with the harsh nature of his agent. So getting an opportunity for it, one morning at Cesena he had Messer Remirro laid in two pieces in the public square with a block of wood and a bloody sword near him. The ferocity of this spectacle left those people at the same time gratified and awestruck.[77]

The Remirro case is an example of the use of spectacular violence in the consolidation of the territory of a Renaissance state. The spaces of Renaissance polities were also constituted through disciplinary violence. Pierangelo Schiera sees the modern state as 'a point of unity' in which the institutional and legitimate organization of power is combined with the discipline that determines the collective behaviour its subjects.[78] For Schiera these three elements come together in the seventeenth century, but they all developed, albeit separately, in Italian humanism.[79] The institutional dimension arose out of negotiations between the *signoria*, the papal and imperial *vicariati*, and the *principate*, which replaced ancient civic legitimacy with a state based legitimacy. City-states derive

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[76]Between 1502 and 1503 Machiavelli was sent on official missions to Valentino's courts at Imola and Cesana, and then to the Papal court in Rome. From these courts he sent detailed dispatches to the Ten of Liberty reporting on the status of the ongoing alliance negotiations between Florence and Borgia. In these legations Machiavelli describes Cesare's rise and fall. See the extracts from Legation 11, 'An Official Mission to Duke Valentino in Romagna' in Machiavelli, *Chief Works*, pp. 121-42; and Legation 13, 'An Official Mission to the Court of Rome' in Machiavelli, *Chief Works* pp. 142-60. In the Roman legation Machiavelli reports on the death of Pope Alexander in 1503 and the succession of Julius II; these events reappear in *The Prince* as the blow of *fortuna* which ultimately cost Cesare his princedom. On Cesare's elimination of the Vitelli and Orsini factions in January 1503, see Machiavelli, 'A Description of the Method Used by Duke Valentino in Killing Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermoi, and Others' in Machiavelli, *Chief Works*, pp. 163-9.

[77]Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 31.

[78]Pierangelo Schiera, 'Legitimacy, Discipline and Institutions: Three Necessary Conditions for the Birth of the Modern State', *The Journal of Modern History*, 67:Supplement (December 1995), pp. S11-33, at p. S30.

[79]Schiera, 'Legitimacy, Discipline and Institutions', p. S32.

their legitimacy, as Marsiglio noted, from their status as a community that protects individuals so that "the men belonging to it may live and live well."[80] Discipline arose from the codes of the guilds, corporations, universities and Church, which ensured the co-ordination of the citizens' behaviour with the needs of the communal civic order. Machiavelli, despite his contempt for the institutions of the Roman church, recognised that religion had a vital role in reinforcing social cohesion and identity. It is the duty of 'the rulers of a republic or of a kingdom to preserve the foundations of the religion they hold. If they do this, it will be an easy thing for them to keep their state religious, and consequently good and united.'[81] Religion can also assist in securing the discipline of armies. Machiavelli praises rulers who 'with very great ceremonies ... had their soldiers swear to observe military discipline, in order that if they acted against it, they would have to fear not merely the laws and men but God; and they used every device to give them strong religious feeling.'[82]

It would perhaps be rash to conclude that the political conditions of his time would have allowed Machiavelli to entertain with too much hope the Weberian ideal that one central authority should have sole control over the means of violence within a state's territory. Nevertheless, he recognises that violence is an important element in the acquisition and consolidation of a state's territory. For Machiavelli a prince cannot have effective control over his *dominio* unless he has effective armies at his command. Machiavelli's desire for a local militia and his accounts of the use of spectacular and disciplinary violence in the subjugation of new lands, do display an awareness that state territoriality is founded and legitimised through violence.

The Prince and Identity

Along with sovereignty and violence, the third component of the Realist-Weberian territorial state is a national identity inscribed into the state's territory. In *The Prince* Machiavelli touches upon themes of identity in chapter iii on 'Mixed Princedoms' and in the famous last chapter xxiv, 'An Exhortation to Grasp Italy and Set her Free from the

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[80]Marsiglio of Padua, quoted in Schiera, 'Legitimacy, Discipline and Institutions', p. S19.
[81]Machiavelli, *Discourses*, 1:12, in *Chief Works*, p. 227.
[82]Machiavelli, *Art of War*, 6, in *Chief Works*, p. 69.

Barbarians'.[83] In chapter iii Machiavelli discusses the problems faced by a prince who has recently acquired mixed principalities. If the new territory has the same customs, mores and language as those established in his *antico stato*, and if the inhabitants of the new territory are already accustomed to princely rule, then assimilating the territory in *tutto un corpo* will be relatively easy. The prince does not need to alter existing laws and taxes, but if he ensures that the previous ruling family is wiped out 'in a very short time they unite with his old princedom in a single body.'[84] However, if the inhabitants of the newly acquired territory possess different language, laws and customs he will require good fortune and have to cultivate *virtù* to retain it. He may have to either move his residency to the new lands or establish colonies in it. Further, he must forge alliances with the lesser princes of the region, while making sure not to increase the power of any potential rivals. In the next chapter Machiavelli argues that it is particularly hard for the new prince to hold onto territories in which his predecessor shared power with several feudal lords because there will be several foci of hereditary allegiance opposed to his rule. However, the most difficult territories to retain are republican cities with strong traditions of liberty and in which civil life is conducted according to their own laws. As it is not possible to eradicate memories of liberty and freedom, the only sure ways to hold onto these states is either to destroy them, or to go and live there, while retaining as many old laws as is possible.[85]

In these chapters we get the sense that the Renaissance individual's political identity is mainly derived from local spaces. A man's political identity is determined primarily by his residence in the lands of a particular prince or in a certain city's *dominio*. The notion that one's identity is derived from some sense of *Italia* seems, at best, to be a secondary consideration. This comes across in Machiavelli's statement that 'the territories a conqueror annexes and joins to his own well-established state are either in

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[83]Machiavelli, *The Prince*, pp. 12-20 & 92-6.

[84]Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 14.

[85]The problem of holding onto cities with traditions of liberty – a particular problem for Florence – is also noted by Guicciardini: 'it has been more difficult for the Florentines to acquire their small dominion than for the Venetians to acquire their large one. This is because the Florentines live in a province that used to be full of free republics, which it is extremely difficult to extinguish. So it requires the greatest effort to conquer them and, once conquered, it is no less difficult to keep them. ... The cities the Venetians have had to capture have been accustomed to subjection and lack any determination to defend themselves or rebel.' Francesco Guicciardini, *Maxims or Ricordi* reprinted in Guicciardini, *Dialogue on the Government of Florence*, trans. Alison Brown, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 171.

the same country, with the same language, or they are not.'[86] It is interesting that he identifies language as the most important factor in determining whether the residents of newly acquired lands are in the same *provincia* (which can be translated as nationality) and thus of the same identity to those in the prince's *antico stato*.[87] Through this emphasis on *provincia* and language Machiavelli wants to impress upon his reader that the new prince will find it hard to hold onto a territory that has different mores and customs than those in his original principality. In terms of Connolly's analysis of Rousseau's concept of territoriality, we can say that the tracts of land which the new prince acquires are not empty spaces, but are already territorialised because the inhabitants already possess mores, languages and customs; they already have an identity inscribed into the land that the new prince must overcode.

In Renaissance Italy loyalties were mostly captured by regimes and city-states and not by the *patria, Italia*. Florentines felt, for example, that the Palazzo della Signoria and the Duomo symbolised their city's unique status; 'Brunelleschi's cupola high in the heavens is the cosmos centered in Florence and covering an empire of the peoples of Tuscany.'[88] They proclaimed Florence's political, artistic and scientific hegemony over the rest of Italy. Machiavelli's own pride in Florence was sightly tempered by a fear that her cultural achievements were threatened by the political weakness that came from a multitude of minor allegiances to individual families rather than to the city as a whole. Such locally-based identity formations contrasted to those being developed in the Northern states, where political symbolism and the institutions of hereditary succession and primogeniture were fixing loyalties on the person, the body, of the monarch. The parochial loyalties to cities and princes could not compete with the mass loyalties enjoyed by the Northern monarchs. Indeed, some commentators have argued that Machiavelli,

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[86]Machiavelli, *The Prince*, [B], p. 8. In Italian the phrase is 'Dico pertanto che questi Stati, quali, acquistandosi si aggiungono a uno stato antico di quello che acquista, o e' sono della medesima provincia e della medesima lingua, o non sono.' Machiavelli, *Il Principe*, p. 12. Price translates *provincia* as country; it 'denotes any area that is larger than a "city" or "city-state" (città).' fn (a) p. 80. Price claims that in *The Prince* Machiavelli gives *lo stato* two different meanings. It is a 'political community existing within certain territorial boundaries as well as the government of such a community ... (I have usually translated the first sense as "state", but sometimes I have used "territory" and "region".) See, Appendix B: 'Notes on the Vocabulary of *The Prince*.' p. 102.

[87]J.G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 163.

[88]de Grazia, *Machiavelli in Hell*, p. 146.

who famously declared to Vettori 'I love my country more than my soul', was prepared to sacrifice these parochial loyalties for an *Italic* spirit that would reunite the entire geographical area beneath the Alps with its proud heritage in the Roman Empire.[89]

The final chapter of *The Prince* easily lends itself to an interpretation that Machiavelli saw the future in terms of a large territorial state clothed in a single Italian identity. Machiavelli urges his reader, probably either Guiliano or Lorenzo de Medici, to take up the challenge to liberate Italy from foreign occupation. The 'barbarous cruelty and arrogance' of the foreigners has reduced the Italians to a situation where they are 'without order, beaten, despoiled, lacerated, devastated, subject to every sort of ruination.' However, the Italians have retained their spirit and are 'ready and willing to follow a banner.'[90] The Medici are well positioned to provide this leadership, for not only are they blessed by *fortuna*, but now, with the benefits of Machiavelli's advice, they can learn from the examples of great leaders like Moses, Cyrus and Theseus. Machiavelli advises the Medici to reform Italy's laws and institutions and to provide them with wise leadership. In 'Italy there is no lack of matter on which to impose any form; there is great power in the limbs, if only it were not wanting in the heads.'[91] The most important reform must be to ensure that Italy has own armies.[92] Should the Medici accept this task in the spirit of justice, they will be revered and loved by all Italians.

Since Ranke, Machiavellian scholars have debated whether chapter xxiv is the logical *telos* of *The Prince* or merely a rhetorical addendum designed to curry favour with Guiliano and then Lorenzo de Medici.[93] Whatever the outcome of these debates, one can

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[89]See, for example, de Grazia, pp. 145-56. Others claim that Machiavelli did not despair of the future of the city-states. Though Florence's situation was serious, it was not hopeless if it could achieve a strong and virtuous government like Rome had had at the time of the Empire. See Gilbert, *Machiavelli and Guicciardini*, pp. 182-4.

[90]Machiavelli, *The Prince* quotes p. 93.

[91]Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 94.

[92]Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 95.

[93]Sidney Anglo believes that *The Prince* "is a deliberately structured work; and the apex of that structure is the call to the Medici to unite Italy – or rather North Italy – and lead it from the dominion of the barbarians.", quoted in David Laven, 'Machiavelli, *italianità* and the French invasion of 1494' in David Abulafia, *The French Descent into Renaissance Italy: Antecedents and Effects* (Variorum, Aldershot, 1995), pp. 355-69, at p. 366. Others however believe that the emotional and rhetorical appeal for national salvation is out of tune with the preceding rational and detached analysis of the means to acquire and hold onto power. In the nineteenth century Ranke and Villari, influenced by contemporary nationalist discourse, read *The Prince* as a statement of Italian patriotism. Villari, writing after wars of Italian unification, suggested that the purpose of *The Prince* "is a question of achieving the unity of his Italian motherland and delivering it from foreign rule." quoted in Laven, 'Machiavelli, *italianità*', p. 365. Later Meinecke

nevertheless analyse the chapter's discourse in order to determine whether or not it expressed aspirations for an Italian territorial based national identity. Machiavelli was certainly not alone in voicing aspirations for a revival of an Italian spirit. In the fifteenth century

> the Italian view about the position of Italy in Europe was clear and simple: there was Italy; and there was the indistinct mass of all other nations of Europe which the Italians regarded as culturally inferior. The Italians of the Renaissance liked to repeat the classical adage that God – or Nature – had placed the Alps as a protecting wall around Italy. People living beyond the Alps were foreigners and it was unnatural for *oltramontani* to interfere in Italian affairs.[94]

In concluding *The Prince* with a verse from Petrarch's *Italia Mia*, Machiavelli refers his reader to a long tradition of praise for the Italian spirit. In the fourteenth century Petrarch's ideas were picked up by the poets Fazio Degli Uberti and Francesco di Vanozzo. In the fifteenth century, when foreign influence was less invasive and Italian politics relatively autonomous, humanists tended to reserve their praise for individual cities or states, while acknowledging the larger unity within which the individual state flourished. Florence's chancellor Coluccio Salutati praised the city because 'in defending her own freedom she had "saved liberty in Italy."'[95] The humanists' accentuation of Italy's rich intellectual history increased the feeling of a distinctiveness from the rest of Europe located somewhere over the Alps.

The discourse of Italian identity was articulated in opposition to that of the barbarian other. By the time Machiavelli wrote *The Prince* the theme of the 'barbarian'

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interpreted the chapter as a piece of humanist rhetoric tacked on as an afterthought. Contemporary scholars adopt three different positions. Chabod argues that the whole of *The Prince* was written in small period of 1513 and was a work of unified conception that lead logically to its conclusion. Sergio Bertelli and Felix Gilbert suggest that the last chapter was written at the same time as the final dedication of the work to Lorenzo de' Medici between September 1315 and September 1516, and reflected the plan of Pope Leo X to create a new state for a *nepote* in north-central Italy capable of resisting the French. Finally, Hans Baron argues that it was written between January and March 1515 and reflected the brief hope that a coalition organised by Leo in February 1515 could resist the French designs on Milan and Lombardy. The coalition not only included military commitments from the Swiss, the Spanish and the Emperor, but also gathered together nearly all the northwestern Italian states. This period of hope was, however, short-lived for the coalition weakened throughout the summer and plans were scuppered by the French victory at Marigiano in September 1515. See Hans Baron, 'The *Principe* and the Puzzle of the Date of Chapter 26', *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies*, 21:1 (Spring 1991), pp. 83-102.

[94]Felix Gilbert, *Machiavelli and Guicciardini*, p. 255.

[95]See Felix Gilbert, 'The Concept of Nationalism in Machiavelli's *Prince*', *Studies in the Renaissance*, 1 (1954), pp. 38-48; Salutati is quoted on p. 41.

was a standard of rhetoric and discourse. In his *Ricordi,* Guicciardini expressed a desire to see "Italia liberata da tutti e' barbari."[96] By the fourteenth century 'barbarian' had acquired several meanings: someone who wasn't a Christian and who therefore lacked civilization, a writer of bad Latin, and the ancient sense of one outside of the cultural world of Rome.[97] From the fourteenth century humanists developed the later meaning to distinguish Italy, the home of the Roman church, from the *rabies barbarica* north of the Alps. Salutati's official correspondence of 1376 'identified Florence with Italy, Italy with *Latinitas* and barbarism with the French and English mercenaries.'[98] The discourse of Italy's superiority due to its Roman ancestry, continued throughout the fifteenth century, as in Flavio Biondo's histories of medieval Europe. This historical narrative, which constantly harked back to the golden days of the Roman Empire, is a powerful subtext in Machiavelli's depiction of the disunity of Italy in *The History of Florence.* In this text Machiavelli uses the term barbarian to describe and to draw analogies between the northern tribes (Cimbri, Visigoths, Vandels, Burgundians, Alans and Franks) who had ravaged the Roman Empire between 377-439 and the northern invaders of more recent times. The wars between 1434-1494 meant 'a new road was opened to the barbarians, and Italy put herself back into slavery to them.'[99]

While the discourse of national territorial identity flourished at the level of cultural and political aspiration, it rarely functioned as more than a tool of *realpolitik* in the calculations of Italy's regional princes. Appeals to national interest were usually made by princes seeking alliances with other princes when they felt threatened by the alliance of other states with a foreign power. For example, Florentine and Papal negotiators used the discourse of national identity to appeal to Venice to drop her stance of neutrality after Charles VIII's invasion. The Venetians were informed that "'a good Italian," would have regard for the "universal danger" and "universal needs of Italy".'[100] The national interest was easily appealed to 'as it was by Naples, by Venice , by Ludovico Moro, by Julius II

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[96]Guicciardini, quoted in fn. 3, p. 168, Machiavelli, *Il Principe.*

[97]Denys Hay, 'Italy and Barbarian Europe' in E.F. Jacobs (ed.), *Italian Renaissance Studies* (London, Faber and Faber, 1960), pp. 48-68.

[98]Hays, 'Italy and Barbarian Europe', pp. 57-8.

[99]Machiavelli, *History of Florence* in Machiavelli, *Chief Works Vol III,* at pp. 1034 & 1233.

[100]Quoted in Gilbert, 'The Concept of Nationalism', p. 43.

– when their own interest was threatened.'[101] But the national interest almost always came second to the interest of the city or principality. The Venetian Doge replied to the Papal legate that they would not risk a war with Milan and France and the possibility of ruining the state. The discourse of the barbarian which contrasted the cultural richness of Italy to backwardness of the uncivilised peoples who threatened them was also more evident at the level of rhetoric than as an influence on the practical policies of Italy's rulers, many of whom were prepared to call upon the services of the barbarians if they could assist in struggles against local rivals. Most Italian princes and governments were largely indifferent to the idea of *Italia*. The events of 1494 when the Duke of Milan, Ludovico Sforza 'il Moro', hoping to gain some Venetian territory, encouraged Charles VIII's invasion on the pretext of the Angevin claim to the Kingdom of Naples, illustrated the weakness of the claim to Italian identity in the face of the interests of the regional princes. However, Machiavelli was disgusted that Ludovico's personal ambition should have put Italy's interests under threat. His deviousness was the source of 'the growth of those evil seeds that not long after, since no living man could destroy them, devastated – and are still devastating – Italy.'[102]

Conclusion

In our discussion of Realism we saw that the idea of the territorial state serves as the ground for the resolution of a set of claims about sovereignty, violence and identity in modernity. In this chapter I have argued, in support of my thesis that the modern idea of the territorial state emerged in the spatial discourses of Renaissance humanism, that Italian Renaissance political and historical, text and practice reveals a similar, if perhaps

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[101]Gilbert, 'The Concept of Nationalism', p. 44.

[102]Machiavelli, *History of Florence*, 6:36, p. 1435. Machiavelli viewed the invasion of Italy as a vindication of his argument that Italy had become weakened because her slothful princes had given up the pursuit of military virtù in favour of luxury and the arts. They were forced to rely on condottieri whose ineffectiveness was demonstrated by the French victory over the forces of the Holy League at the battle of Fornovo, July 1495. Laven argues that in chapter xxiv Machiavelli implies that the 1494 invasion and the subsequent barbarian yoke are to be welcomed on the basis that 'Italy had become so corrupt that the old system needed to be proved totally rotten so that it might be swept away, and virtù restored.' Laven, 'Machiavelli, *italianità*', p. 364.

unformed, set of claims about sovereignty, violence and identity and the space occupied by *lo stato*. While it is admitted that the Renaissance articulation of territorial sovereignty, violence and identity, in the work of thinkers like Machiavelli, was not as visible as it would become in Classical political discourse, there is enough evidence to suggest that foundations of the idea of the territorial state were partially established in Renaissance political theory and practice. One of the claims I made in the opening chapters of the thesis is that the idea of the territorial state can be analysed not just as an objective concept in a tradition of political theory, but also as the product and producer of discourse associated with the birth and development of the modern culture of abstract space. In the next chapter I shall examine how Renaissance cosmological discourse, which set about dismantling the hierarchies of various medieval spatial hierarchies, established the foundations of the modern territorial order based in vertically structured and differentiated sovereign-territorial spaces.

Dismantling the Hierarchical Cosmos

The previous chapter exposed the foundations of the Realist idea of the modern territorial state in the political discourses of Renaissance Italy. Machiavelli largely anticipated the dynamics that would conjoin the idea of the territorial state to modern conceptions of political identity, sovereignty and violence. An important condition for the modern discourse of territoriality to flourish is a widespread acceptance that authority is layered horizontally; that it can be distributed equally among separate units, rather than being derived from a universal, vertical, hierarchical structure. In the Christian medieval world the spatial metaphor of hierarchy structured all belief about the order of things. In both political and cosmological discourses, which were often barely distinguishable, hierarchies abounded, distinguishing temporal from celestial, mundane from divine, becoming from being and the City of God from the *humana civilitas*. In the Renaissance, however, the hegemony of this order was undermined by several critiques mounted in various fields of spatial knowledge. Together these challenges re-imagined the spatial order as being horizontal and homogeneous. This chapter argues that this re-imaging of space was an important discursive foundation of the modern idea of the territorial state.

Michael Shapiro observes that the implicit 'separation of the world into kinds of space is perhaps the most significant kind of practice for establishing the systems of intelligibility within which understandings of global politics are forged.'[1] Shapiro claims that Cardinal Richelieu and his foreign emissary Father James, the two protagonists of Aldous Huxley's novel *Grey Eminence*, embody respectively a modern and a medieval spatial imagination. Father James' medieval mentality presents the world to him as a vertical set of spaces, organised into a mundane present and a transcendental eternity. Richelieu, by contrast, has a modern, horizontal, geopolitical mentality. Huxley's story can, therefore, be read as

> a chronical (sic) of the waning of the medieval and the waxing of the modern spatialization of the world, an effect so powerful that, ever since, people pursuing statecraft have been able to subjugate and direct ecclesiastical authority on behalf of policy that unfolds within a

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[1]Michael J. Shapiro, 'Textualising Global Politics' in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds), *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Lexington MA, Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 11-22, at p. 12.

horizontal, desacralized world. Indeed, much of the subsequent history of world politics involves the demise of the authorities connected to a vertical world and the ascension of those connected to a horizontal, geopolitical one.[2]

Shapiro correctly observes that the modern spatio-political order is structured horizontally and consists of equivalent spaces (of course, within each space authority is structured vertically; perhaps we could best define the modern political spatial regime as the horizontal ordering of differentiated spaces of vertical authority). This is the landscape within which the foundations of the idea of the modern sovereign territorial state could be laid down. However, Shapiro also lends another voice to the Classical dating of the origins of modern territoriality. Richelieu was the statesman *par excellence* of the seventeenth century. I however, want to rejoin the general argument of the thesis that visibility is not necessarily the moment of foundation. I shall argue that the Medieval Christian cosmos began to crumble in the face of critiques mounted by various Renaissance thinkers in the *Cinquecento*. Rob Walker traces the origins of the European state system to the Italian High Renaissance, claiming it was attendant on a transition 'from the hierarchically ordered universe of medieval Christendom to the system of independent sovereign states that accelerated after the late fifteenth century.'[3] For Walker this process began in fifteenth century Renaissance Italy:

> The modern conception of international relations may be said to have begun with the closure of political space in Italy, becoming increasingly elaborated throughout Europe after the French invasion of Italy in 1494, and attaining its classical legal expression with the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Peace of Utrecht of 1713.[4]

Our claim may initially derive some support from the narrative which identifies a novel conception of time in the political discourse of the Renaissance; after all, representations of space and time are, as Kern has shown, woven together in a complex cultural tapestry.[5] J.G.A. Pocock claims that one of Machiavelli's (many) original contributions to political theory was to point out that political communities exist in a

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[2]Shapiro, 'Textualising Global Politics', pp. 12-13.

[3]R.B.J. Walker, 'Political Theory and the Transformation of World Politics', (World Order Studies Program, Occasional Paper No. 8, Princeton University, 1980), p. 17.

[4]R.B.J. Walker, 'Political Theory and the Transformation of World Politics', p. 18.

[5]Stephen Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space 1880-1918* (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1983).

world dominated by time. In medieval Europe, time was either figured as the cyclical time of constitutional change, as in Polybius' cycles, or as eschatological Christian time in which secular or temporal events were absorbed into the eternal order determined by divine intention. These temporal frameworks had underpinned medieval conceptions of political society. Dante, as we shall see, viewed the Holy Roman Empire as an embodiment of the hierarchy and structure of the eternal order of the cosmos: 'political society was envisaged as the existence among men of the hierarchical order existing in heaven and in nature; its legitimation and its organising categories were alike timeless.'[6] For Machiavelli, however, time is a succession of various series of events, physical, conscious, chemical, legal or military.[7] This new understanding of time as a series of events allowed the humanists Colluccio Salutati and Leonardo Bruni to portray the Florentine Republic as a secular ideal in itself, distinct from the eternal order. This freedom, however, came at a price. Once Florence was conceived of as a 'particular being' existing in time rather than in eternity, it became transitory and doomed to impermanence. This is Pocock's famous 'Machiavellian moment', the 'moment in conceptualised time in which the republic was seen as confronting its own temporal finitude, as attempting to remain morally and politically stable in a stream of irrational events that were destructive of systems of secular stability.'[8] The Christian doxy that asserted that political life played out in the temporal realm is subordinate to and merely a preparation for the universal kingdom of God was, suggests Walker, undermined by Machiavelli's placement of politics in

> the world of fleeting impressions, of flux, becoming, and illusions. Political reality is ... rescued from its subordination to eternity and transcendence. It becomes redefined in terms of time: time as the context of political life; temporal images as the source of new vocabularies of political thought within a discourse dominated by universals; and maxims about how to cope with time, change and illusions as the distillation of political knowledge. Even where he appeals to the possibility of fixing political life within a spatial form – *lo stato* – it is a spatial form with its

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[6]J.G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 53.

[7]Robert Orr, 'The Time Motif in Machiavelli' in Martin Fleisher (ed.), *Machiavelli and the Nature of Political Thought* (New York NY, Atheneum, 1972), pp 185-208, esp. pp. 188-9.

[8]Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, p. viii

own temporal contingency.[9]

If, for Machiavelli, political life is played out in time then *Fortuna* takes centre-stage. The founders and rulers of political communities were permanently exposed to the unpredictable, and often capricious, intervention of this goddess, the realm of 'pure, uncontrolled and unlegitimated contingency.'[10] Against such a foe, political leaders must cultivate a judicious combination of *virtù*, instinct and force. Of these, *virtù* – the ability to anticipate, prepare for and act rationally in the face of contingent events – is most valued. In the principality *virtù* depended upon the talents and character of the prince, while in the Republics it was acquired by the active participation of the citizens in the *res publica*.[11] It is possible that Machiavelli's insistence on the contingency and transmutability of politics reflected a widespread feeling among Italians that, ever since the 1494 invasion by Charles VIII, Italy's political fortunes had been determined by external historical forces driven by power struggles over the Alps. Under these circumstances, concludes Felix Gilbert, 'it was natural for Machiavelli to draw the conclusion that the dimension in which politics worked was history and that every political action had to be fitted into the context of historical change.'[12]

Our interest, however, is less with the temporal than with the spatial setting of politics. We are interested in the intellectual processes which began to undermine the foundations of the hierarchies of the Christian Medieval order and so established the conditions of possibility for the representation of the modern territorial order. The first section of this chapter sets the scene by offering a portrait of the medieval cosmos drawn upon a canvas framed by Dante Alighieri's two works *The Divine Comedy* and *On*

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[9]R. B. J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 109. See also R.B.J. Walker, '*The Prince* and "The Pauper": Tradition, Modernity and Practice in the Theory of International Relations' in Der Derian and Shapiro (eds), *International/Intertextual Relations*, pp. 25-48, esp. pp. 35-8.

[10]Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, p. 156. Both Machiavelli and Guicciardini had aspirations for political society that were caught between 'thought aimed at the constitution and stabilization of civic bodies in intimate tension with thought aimed at the rapid and unpredictable change.' p. 117.

[11]Pocock notes that 'by the institutionalization of civic virtue, the republic or polis maintains its own stability in time and develops the human raw material composing it toward that political life which is the end of man. By the exercise of a partly nonmoral *virtù*, the innovator imposes form on *fortuna* ... upon the sequence of happenings in time disordered by his own act.' Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, p. 184.

[12]Felix Gilbert, *Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth Century Florence* (New York NY, W.W. Norton and Co, 1965), p. 199.

Monarchy. The second section examines the impact that the re-imagination of man and cosmos by the Neo Platonist philosophers Marsilio Ficino and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola had on the hierarchical spatial ontology of the medieval cosmos. In the final section I discuss the combined impact of Copernicus' heliocentric re-ordering of the universe and Machiavelli's terrestialization of political life on the Christian hierarchical cosmos and the structures of political authority emanating from it. Renaissance thinkers often sought to articulate novel ideas while being confined within traditional categories of thought. Nevertheless, the hierarchical order did not remain unchallenged until the seventeenth century and the 'waning of the medieval and the waxing of the modern' spatial order of the world began sometime before Cardinal Richelieu.

Dante's Universe

Dante's political cosmology was structured by a hierarchical and vertical order of political space, with its apex in God (Fig.1).

1. Spatial Hierarchies of Medieval Political Cosmos (Drawn by JL)

In contrast the graphic representation of the modern international state system, comprised of differentiated sovereign-territorial states has a horizontal rather than vertical structure (Fig. 2). This representation of the modern political cosmos, in which authority is ordered horizontally, would not have been recognisable to Dante. Dante's whole world-view was structured by spatial hierarchy. The spaces of the political cosmos were intertwined with the spaces of the material cosmos and both were determined by the same spatial imaginary, which, to borrow Foucault's phrase, was underpinned by spatial episteme of

hierarchy. In this section I want to explore the intimate relationship between political and cosmological space in the Christian medieval world as conveyed in Dante's *Divine Comedy* and *On Monarchy*.[13]

2. Modern Sovereign-Territorial Political Order (Drawn by JL)

This episteme of hierarchy conditioned the medieval image of the spatial world, which by Dante's time, combined premises of Aristotelian physics with Ptolemaic astronomy and Christian theology. Aristotle's universe was a sphere (the perfect solid form), eternal and finite, but was shot through with hierarchy.[14] The most fundamental hierarchy divides the order of objects, placing the eternal and perfect over and above the mutable and imperfect. In the spatial world 'an unbridgeable gap separates the "above" from the "below", the "higher" heavenly world from the "lower" sublunar world.'[15] In the sublunar world nature is imprecise and objects come to be and pass away. By contrast,

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[13]Dante Alighieri, *The Divine Comedy*, trans. John Ciardi, (New York NY, W.W. Norton and Company, 1970); and Dante Alighieri, *Monarchy and Three Political Letters*, trans. by D. Nicholl and C. Hardie, (London, Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1954).

[14]On Aristotle's cosmos see Ernst Cassirer, *The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy*, trans. Marco Domandi, (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1963), pp. 174-85; Michael Hoskin (ed.), *The Cambridge Illustrated History of Astronomy* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 31-4; and M.A. Orr, *Dante and the Early Astronomers* (London, Allan Wingate, 1956), pp. 75-83. In Aristotle's physics matter had three kinds of motion: heavy bodies move in a straight line down to the centre of the World; light bodies, such as fire, move straight up towards the world's circumference; and the eternal heavenly bodies circulate forever in a circle around the central Earth at rest.

[15]Cassirer, *Individual and Cosmos*, p. 178. Aristotelian space is also aggregate and topological. One all-embracing space contains all particular places. There can be nothing outside of the universe, not even space or time for they are qualities of matter. Space encloses bodies; it is the geometrical line between bodies constituted by the boundaries of other adjacent bodies. There are no gaps between bodies and so all individual places are connected to space as a whole. In this universe there is no empty space. Aristotle replaces Plato's idea of *chōra* or space as a massive spatial sphere of vast extent in which objects are placed but not in any specific places or regions, by place as distinct *topos*. For Aristotle place is analogous to a vessel in that it surrounds and contains the body located within it. Place is unchanging, "the inner surface of the innermost unmoved container of a body". Aristotle from *Physics* quoted in Edward S. Casey, *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History,* (Berkeley CA, University of California Press, 1997), p. 55.

in the heavens the celestial bodies are made of imperishable substance or *quinta essentia* and revolve eternally through geometrically perfect cycles: 'all is changeless, eternal, divine. Motion is in circles, space is filled with ether, the heavenly bodies as well as their spheres are of an ethereal substance.'[16] Within the sublunar world things are ordered according to the relative baseness of the elements: at the centre the earth is surrounded by water, air, and then fire reaching to moon. In the heavens the spheres simply rotate carrying along the stars and planets which have no motion themselves. The movement of the planets proves the existence of Essences, eternal and immovable themselves, who cause these movements. Above all these is a First Mover, the *Primum Movens Immobile* who is one and eternal and upon whom the whole of heaven and all of Nature depends (See Fig. 3).


3. *Prime Mover and Geocentric universe*, Nuremberg Chronicle, late 15thc

The order of the seven planets was established by Ptolemy in the *Almagast*. This order was based on the relative time the planets took to rotate the Earth. Following Eudoxus and Aristotle, Ptolemy allocated the fixed stars to the outermost sphere and placed in the positions nearest to them those planets, Saturn, Jupiter and Mars, whose motions were most similar. The moon, whose motion was the most removed from that of the heavens, was placed nearest the earth. The remaining three planets, Sun, Mercury and Venus all shared an annual orbit around the earth. So, in accordance with astrological tradition, the Sun was assigned to the middle sphere, leaving Mercury and Venus below the Sun.

[16]Orr, *Dante and the Early Astronomers*, p. 82.

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Ptolemy's final order was Moon, Mercury, Venus, Sun, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn and fixed stars. Ptolemy also calculated that the radius of the universe was 19,865 times greater than that of the earth or about 75 million miles; it was 'in the work of Ptolemy that the universe first became too large for the human mind truly to comprehend.'[17]

4. Anonymous, *Medieval astronomer breaks through sphere of stars and discovers the mechanism of the Platonic universe* ,Woodcut

Christian theologians adapted Aristotle's physics and the Ptolemaic order to make the cosmos equivalent to the description of the heavens in Genesis. The biblical 'firmament' was identified as the eighth sphere of the fixed stars. The 'waters above the firmament', which were understood to be hard and made of crystal, became the crystalline heaven. The heaven created on the first day was the outermost sphere, the motionless Empyrean, the ultimate container of the universe and the dwelling place of God and the elect. The ultimate source of the motions of the planets and starry skies was God, the Prime Mover, who acted directly on the outermost sphere and who assigned to each of the other spheres an immaterial spiritual intelligence or angel to move it in a uniform circular motion.[18]

In the *Vita Nuova* Dante affirms that 'according to Ptolemy and Christian truth there are nine heavens which move.'[19] Dante's universe includes eight Ptolemaic heavens

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[17]Hoskin, *History of Astronomy*, p. 47. Dante meets both Aristotle and Ptolemy in the First Circle of Hell or Limbo among the Virtuous Pagans whose souls inhabit the Citadel of Human Reason, the highest state man can reach without God. See Canto IV of *The Inferno,* Dante Alighieri, *The Divine Comedy*, pp. 19-23.

[18]For details, see Hoskin, *History of Astronomy*, p. 78-9.

[19]My translation of, 'secondo Tolommeo e secondo la Cristiana verità, nove siano li cieli che si muovono.', quoted in Orr, *Dante and the Early Astronomers*, p. 291. See Orr, pp. 289-328, for details of Dante's cosmology.

as well as the Crystalline sphere and the Empyrean. In *Paradiso* Dante and Beatrice ascend the spheres.

> The moon is "la prima stella," Mercury "il secondo regno", Venus "il terzo ciel," the spirits met in the sun are "la quarta famiglia," Mars is "questa quinta soglia," and "più levato" than the last heaven, Jupiter is the "stella sesta," Saturn "il settimo splendore." The starry heaven is alluded to as "la spera ottava." The Primum Mobile is "il cile velocissimo," "il maggior corpo." The Empyrean, "il ciel ch' è pura luce," is called "l' ultimate spera, ...[20]

5. *Dante's Universe*, **Drawn for Sapegno Edition**

In the *Divine Comedy* an ontological fault line separates the sublunar world from the celestial heavens. In the heaven of Mercury, Beatrice discourses on the mysteries of

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[20]Orr, *Dante and the Early Astronomers*, pp. 296-97.

creation and redemption and affirms that while mens' souls, the spheres and the angels were created directly by God and are thus immortal, the elements and their compounds as well as the souls of plants and animals were created through the intermediate instruments of the heavenly bodies.[21] Dante also arranges the four elements in accordance with Aristotle's hierarchy. At the centre of the universe is the Earth, 'the bedrock of the elemental core'[22] – although, as we can see from the above image, the real centre of Dante's universe is Hell, 'in the spatial sense the medieval world was literally diabolocentric.'[23] Above Earth is the sphere of water or the oceans which cover three quarters of the world.[24] On the Mountain of Purgatory, 'that soars highest to Heaven from the sea', Dante and Virgil reach the sphere of air devoid of any cold vapours from the sea or earth.[25] On the top of Mount Purgatory Dante enters the Garden of Eden whose bounteous nature is composed by 'that free air open to heaven and earth'.[26] Then, having exchanged Virgil for Beatrice, Dante ascends rapidly with her through the sphere of fire to the moon, the lowest sphere of the heavens. Beatrice informs him that the heavenly bodies are made up of ether, lacking either heaviness or lightness; 'the round ether'.[27] The movement of the spheres is provided by the fervour and adoration of the Angels. In Canto xxvii of *Paradiso* Dante and Beatrice reach the Primum Mobile the sphere 'that spins with it as it goes all of the universe.'[28] As in the *De Celestia Hierarchia* of Dionysius the Areopagite there are nine orders of angels and each one is responsible for the movement of one sphere.[29] All such movement proves the existence of a First Mover of who is 'loved, / desired by all creation, sole, eternal / who moves the turning Heavens, Himself

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[21]See Dante, *Paradiso*, VII, l. 124-41, p. 434.

[22]Dante, *Paradiso*, XXIX, l. 51, p. 573.

[23]Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 102.

[24]See Orr, *Dante and the Early Astronomers*, pp 298-305, for a discussion of how medieval thinkers dealt with the fact that in many places the earth rises out of and is above the waters.

[25]Dante, *Purgatorio*, III, l. 15, p. 196.

[26]Dante, *Purgatorio*, XXXI, l. 145, p. 375.

[27]Dante, *Paradiso*, XXII, l. 132, p. 531.

[28]Dante, *Paradiso*, XXVII, l. 70, p. 567.

[29]Beatrice explains the angelic order to Dante in Canto XXVIII of *Paradiso*. The nine orders of the angels are grouped into three trinities: first, Seraphim, Cherubim and Thrones; second, Dominations, Virtues and Powers; and third Principalities, Archangels and Angels.

unmoved.'[30]

The principle of hierarchy that determines the order of space and place in the material cosmos also underpins the social and political cosmos. As Ernst Cassirer tells us:

> In religious life we find the ecclesiastical hierarchy that reaches from the Pope as the summit, to the cardinals, the archbishops, the bishops down to the lower degrees of the clergy. In the state the highest power is concentrated in the Emperor, who delegates this power to his inferiors, the princes, the dukes, and all the other vassals. This feudal system is an exact image and counterpart of the general hierarchical system; it is an expression and a symbol of that universal cosmic order that has been established by God and which, therefore, is eternal and immutable.[31]

Dante's political cosmos is centred on the person of the Emperor. On the third cornice of Mount Purgatory, occupied by the souls of the Wrathful, Dante and Virgil meet Marco Lombardo who is discoursing on the causes of the world's corruption. According to Marco, God created man out of an act of love and the purpose of man's life is to reconcile himself with God in *letizia* or eternal bliss. However, because man has a tendency to pursue earthly goods rather than divine purpose, guides or curbs are required to 'divert the soul's inclination to pursue "small goods" and direct it again towards true Love.' At the personal, intellectual and ethical levels these curbs are provided by 'Reason and Faith, Philosophy and Theology, Love of Poetry and Love of Woman.'[32] At the social level the main guide is law. But, to give and impose laws requires a supreme authority so, argues Dante through Marco, the need for the Emperor who because of his position of Eminence is high above other human beings and able to see the tower of the *Civitas Dei* and to guide people to it:

> Men, therefore, need restraint by law, and need
> a monarch over them who sees at least
> the towers of The True City...[33]

In Dante's spatial imagination the hierarchies of the cosmos not only mirror but are of the same order as the structure of political authority which is invested in the

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[30]Dante, *Paradiso*, XXIV, l. 130-2, p. 544.

[31]Ernst Cassirer, *The Myth of the State* (New Haven NH, Yale University Press, 1946), p. 132.

[32]Piero Boitani, 'From Darkness to Light: Governance and Government in *Purgatorio* XVI' in John Woodhouse (ed.), *Dante and Governance* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 12-26, at p. 21.

[33]Dante, *Purgatorio*, XVI, l. 94-6, p. 279.

Emperor by God.

> The Empire 'tends' towards the city of God, where the soul shall return in perfect joy if its use of free will has deserved it and if laws are implemented. *Governance of the soul and government of the kingdom* are inextricably tied together. ... Dante knows the world, *il mondo*. But he is interested in seeing how it relates to a higher world, *il cielo*.[34]

The world-city of the Empire on Earth and the world-city in Heaven or Empyrean are, for Dante, linked by resemblance. 'Empire' and 'Empyrean' are, points out Donna Mancusi-Ungaro practically interchangeable; the 'two sides of one coin – the ideal *polis* for mankind reflects and is reflected in God's eternal empire.'[35] In the celestial kingdom the citizens enjoy the everlasting peace which is the paragon of right political order sought by Dante on earth. Dante, however, never forgets that the world of the Empyrean is of a higher order and is the "sovereign edifice of the world, in which all the world is enclosed."[36]

The reason why the *Humana Civilitas* has not been realised on earth is because of Papal interference in temporal affairs. Voicing an anti-Papalism that was to resurface with Machiavelli, Dante complains that the Papacy, which should be providing spiritual guidance, is itself devouring earthly riches and setting a bad example, '[t]he bad state of the modern world is due ... to bad leadership.'[37] In Canto XXX, Beatrice proclaims before the entire court of heaven that the plans of Emperor Henry VII of Luxembourg to introduce order in Italy were sabotaged by the devious policies of the 'prefect of the holy court' Clement V – whom Dante condemns to the eighth circle of Inferno.[38] Papal nefariousness has corrupted Italy to such a degree that it now bears little resemblance to the good society achieved under ancient Rome:

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[34]Boitani, 'From Darkness to Light', p. 22.

[35]Donna Mancusi-Ungaro, *Dante and the Empire* (New York NY, Peter Lang, 1987). Ungaro points out that Dante accepts Aristotle's belief that civilization can only be achieved in the *polis*, but enlarges the scale arguing that *humana civilitas* requires a world city modelled on the Roman *Imperium*. The image of the city is basic to his political philosophy, '[t]he earthly city and the heavenly city are as parallel for Dante as the themes in *the Monarchia* and the *Commedia*. *Humana civilitas* – the perfect flourishing of human civilisation – in the *Monarchia* is in fact the groundwork for the ideal community of souls in Paradise.' p. 54.

[36]Dante in the *Epistola*, quoted by Orr, *Dante and the Early Astronomers*, fn. 3, p. 297.

[37]Dante, *Purgatorio*, XVI, l. 103-4, p. 179.

[38]Dante, *Paradiso*, XXX, l. 130-50, p. 581.

Rome use to shine in two suns when her rod
made the world good, and each showed her its way:
one to the ordered world, and one to God.

Now one declining sun puts out the other.
The sword and crook are one, and only evil
can follow from them when they are together[39]

Dante yearns for a world in which the two suns, the emperor and the pope, co-exist as two equal lights illuminating respectively the complementary ways of the world and of God. In the above quoted passage Dante alludes to and reworks Pope Innocent III's 1198 depiction of papal authority as represented by the light of the sun and imperial authority by that of the moon; the implication being that as the moon receives its light from the sun, so the Emperor receives his authority from the pope. In *De Monarchia* Dante argues that while the moon's light comes from the sun it does not follow that its existence, powers or operation depend on the sun; '[s]imilarly ... temporal government does not owe its existence to the spiritual government, nor its power (which constitutes its authority), nor even its operation as such.'[40] If the Emperor's authority 'does not depend upon the vicar of God, then he must depend upon God himself.'[41] For Dante, 'the temporal Monarch receives his authority directly and without intermediary from the Source of all authority.'[42] Dante also rejects the claim in Boniface VIII's 1302 bull *Unam sanctam* that "both the spiritual and the material *swords* are in the hands of the Church."[43] In Dante's hierarchy the Pope is not above the Emperor, but in a different sphere entirely. The Emperor's authority to rule the world comes directly through God and is not mediated by papal jurisdiction. For Dante, 'government belonged only to the emperor and to the subordinate officials authorised by him. The emperor should rule the *humana civilitas*. The pope should point men to the *polis* that was Paradise.'[44] Man has two goals,

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[39]Dante, *Purgatorio,* XVI, 1. 106-111 p. 280.

[40]Dante, *Monarchy*, III, p. 71.

[41]Dante, *Monarchy*, III p. 91.

[42]Dante, *Monarchy,* III, p. 94.

[43]Quoted in Boitani, 'From Darkness to Light', p. 23. In the Canto, Dante replaces the sword of spiritual power with a crook signifying the Good Shepherd, the ancient symbol of peace and charity. In joining this with the sword he creates an impossible oxymoron, thereby exposing the impossibility of Papal aspiration for coterminous spiritual and temporal power.

[44]See Charles Till Davis, 'Dante and the Empire' in Rachel Jacoff (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Dante* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 67-79, at p. 68.

'the first is happiness in this life, which consists in the exercise of his own powers and is typified by the earthly paradise; the second is the happiness of eternal life, which consists in the enjoyment of the divine countenance ... and is typified by the heavenly paradise.'[45] To achieve these two different goals man requires two distinct and separate guides, 'there is the Supreme Pontiff who is to lead mankind to eternal life in accordance with revelation; and there is the Emperor who, in accordance with philosophical teaching, is to lead mankind to temporal happiness.'[46]

I have tried to demonstrate, by means of a reading of Dante, that the entire universe of medieval man, material and political, was structured in terms of hierarchically ordered spaces. In the medieval imaginary the material and political were not regarded as separate realms of existence but were expressions of the same order of things: the God who sets the planet in motion is the same God from whom the Emperor's political authority stems; things are eternal and perfect in both the material Empyrean and the constitution of the *Civitas Dei,* while in the lower world things are mutable and decay and the political system in corrupt and decadent. In the next two sections I want to explore how this intricate set of dependencies begins to unravel in the Renaissance, so paving the way for the modern order of political territory underpinned by the spatial principle of horizontal differentiation.

Individual and Cosmos in Ficino and Pico

In chapter two we considered Ashley and Walker's argument that the Cartesian practice of spatialization, which in modernity marks out the spaces of territorial sovereignty from those of difference and anarchy, is one manifestation of the widespread principle of sovereign identity that dictates the inside/outside divisions of modern culture. In this section I want to argue that the principle of sovereign identity was anticipated in the Neoplatonist and Humanist re-evaluations of man's nature and place in the cosmos in Renaissance philosophy. In particular I shall suggest that the Renaissance discourse on the 'dignity of man', as developed in the work of Marsilio Ficino and Giovanni Pico della

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[45]Dante, *Monarchy*, III, p. 92.
[46]Dante, *Monarchy*, III, p. 93.

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Mirandola, had two consequences for the re-imagination of man's being in space as the medieval hierarchical order collapsed into the modern vertical order of territoriality.[47] First, the discourse of the dignity of man released man from the hierarchies of the medieval universe and so removed the pivotal foundation upon which the hierarchical universe was constructed. Second, by asserting man's capacity for self-fashioning, this discourse affirmed man's capacity to shape and order the world around him including its spaces, rather than being shaped and ordered by them. Both philosophers contributed to the legitimation of the principle of sovereign identity. Ficino because he viewed man's divinity 'as an image of God, and of God himself through this human image', while Pico asserted the dignity of man on the basis that man was not created as a fixed part of the universe but was free to participate in the universe when and how he wanted.[48] The dignity of man is the first sign of the sovereign identity that underpinned the Cartesian practice of space that inscribes the territorial spaces of modernity.

It must be acknowledged at the outset that because Ficino and Pico could only build their philosophical systems using the existing categories of Christian scholasticism and Neoplatonism their work is best thought of as a threshold between 'il passato antico e medioevale e il futuro moderno ... vale la frase di Leibniz: *chargé du passé et gros de l'avenir.*'[49] This reflected, suggests Peter Burke, a widespread prevalence of the imagery and poetry of the medieval cosmos in Renaissance art and culture. Most sixteenth century Italians shared Dante's view of the cosmos as divided between a higher and a lower world; the mental universe of Renaissance Italians was 'like that of their medieval ancestors, animate rather than mechanical, moralized rather than neutral and organized

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[47]My focus on Ficino and Pico's philosophical systems is necessarily limited to their cosmologies. Good general introductions to their work are Brian P. Copenhaver and Charles B. Schmitt, *Renaissance Philosophy* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992), esp. ch. 3; and Charles Trinkaus, *In Our Image and Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist Thought, Vol II* (Notre Dame, Notre Dame Press, 1970), esp. chs ix & x.

[48]Trinkaus, *In Our Image and Likeness*, p. 465.

[49]Eusebio Colomer, 'Individuo e Cosmo in Nicolo Cusano e Giovanni Pico' in *L'opera e il pensiero di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola nella storia dell' umanesimo* (Firenze, Istituto Nazionale di Studi sul Rinascimento, MCMLXV), pp. 53-102, at p. 102. Copenhaver and Schmitt suggest that Ficino's *Platonic Theology* is 'as much patristic and scholastic as classical, depending not only on Plato, Plotinus and Proclus but also on Augustine and Aquinus', *Renaissance Philosophy*, p. 149.

in terms of correspondences rather than causes.'[50] J. Hale agrees that the traditional view of the universe retained much heuristic value because it continued to provide an intelligible 'ready-reference system for the allocation by category of every phenomenon to its place in the scheme of things.'[51] The widespread acceptance of this mental universe ensured that novel theories of the universe were resisted by much of the educated elite and remained unknown to the mass of the population. By and large, concludes Arthur Lovejoy, '[t]he men of the fifteenth century still lived in a walled universe as well as in walled towns.'[52]

Ficino's image of the cosmos would therefore have been recognisable to Dante. It was a closed system of hierarchically ordered spheres in which each being has its place and degree of perfection. God, residing at the summit, presided over a descending hierarchy of orders: angels and souls; celestial and elementary spheres; then animal, plant and mineral species; and finally shapeless prime matter.

> Above the four elements which are moved according to substance and quality are the seven heavens of the planets. They are not moved by substance but in a certain manner by a kind of quality or, as it were, disposition. Since the movements of these planets is erratic, an eighth heaven, whose motion is more regular, is set over them. But this heaven has two motions, namely one from the East to West and another in the opposite direction. It has two qualities also, namely brilliance and splendour. For that reason, the crystalline sphere whose one motion is from the East [to the West] and has a single quality, brilliance, is ascendant over it. But since position is superior to motion and since what gives light is superior to light, therefore one ascends to the Empyrean which is entirely stable and shining throughout. The Empyrean is rightly related to the stability and light of the Trinity, and the nine other heavens

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[50]Peter Burke, *The Italian Renaissance: Culture and Society in Italy* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1986), p. 201. In Botticelli's *Primavera,* for example, the space between the earth and moon is inhabited by nymphs, woodspirits and demons. Burke points out that although there were intimations of an emergent mechanical worldview in Renaissance sciences, the organic model was the norm until the seventeenth century. Alberti's idea that a building is 'like an animal' or Donato Gianotti's understanding that '[e]very republic is like a natural body' were more typical than Leonardo's view that 'the bird is an instrument operating by mathematical law'. Even Machiavelli, whose notion of *lo stato* is not conceived of in terms of an organic analogy, saw political disorder as something that could be diagnosed in the manner of a physician. See pp. 200-3.

[51]John Hale, *The Civilization of Europe in the Renaissance* (London, Harper Collins, 1993), p. 562. The traditional cosmos was not only regular and harmonious, but 'winningly participatory, a cosmos of leakings from above, of sympathetic reactions across space, of correspondences between man and universe which linked a war with a comet, a syphilitic infection with the conjunction of virile Mars with Saturn, for whom heated pleasure was an anathema.', p. 562.

[52]Lovejoy, *Great Chain*, p. 101.

to the nine orders of angels. Indeed, they are disposed in a manner consistent with Dionysius the Areopagite; three hierarchies of divine spirits, each of which contains three orders.[53]

Underpinning Ficino's cosmological hierarchy is a Neoplatonist conception of the structure of being as a continual hierarchy obtaining through the principle of division, '[t]his hierarchical order constitutes ... an ontological space that embraces all corporeal and incorporeal elements alike and in which all things have a definite relationship of proximity to each other.'[54] Within the sphere of Being an object has a rank that determines its ontological proximity to other things. The rank determines its relative dignity or perfection and hence its essence. Ficino conceives of the totality of things as an ascending, or descending, sequence of grades. At the summit is 'divine sun' and 'angelic mind', then comes rational soul, in the middle position, below it are the 'active quality' that gives form to matter and, finally, at the bottom the 'dull mass of bodies'.[55]

In the *Heptaplus* Pico's adds a cabalistic dimension to Ficino's Neoplatonic hierarchy of being.[56] Pico's cosmos consists of three worlds: the elemental world of nature, the celestial world of the planets, and the angelic world of the intelligences, arranged in an ascending order illustrating a clear value hierarchy:

> In the first world, God, the primal unity, presides over the nine orders of angels as if over many spheres and, without moving, moves all toward himself. In the middle world, that is, the celestial, the empyrean heaven likewise presides like the commander of an army over nine heavenly spheres, each of which revolves with an unceasing motion; yet in imitation of God, it is itself unmoving. There are also in the elemental world, after the prime matter which is its foundation, nine spheres of corruptible forms.[57]

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[53]Marsilio Ficino, *Opera omnia* (Basel 1576) 1:19, quoted in Pauline Moffit Watts, 'Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and Three Renaissance Neoplatonists: Cusanus, Ficino and Pico on Mind and Cosmos' in James Hankins, John Monfasani and Frederick Purnell Jr (eds), *Supplementum Festivum: Studies in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller* (Binghampton NY, Centre for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, 1987), pp. 279-98, at p. 294.

[54]Paul Oskar Kristeller, *The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino*, trans. V. Conant, (New York NY, Columbia University Press, 1943), pp. 74-5.

[55]See, Kristeller, *Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino*, pp. 104-9, for details of Ficino's hierarchy of being.

[56]Pico's philosophy was more eclectic and syncretic than Ficino's sacralized Platonism. It was not only influenced by Neoplatonism but also included Aristotelian and Averroist elements as well as Hebraic Cabbalism.

[57]G. Pico della Mirandola, *Heptaplus*, trans. D. Carmichael (New York NY, 1965), p. 78, quoted in Watts, 'Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite', p. 290.

However, Pico also mentions a fourth world, that of man, which contains all things that are found in the other worlds.

Ficino and Pico's representation of the hierarchy of being and the structure of the cosmos had epistemological consequences. Foucault describes the Renaissance episteme as 'the prose of the world' in which words and things are united in a seamless web of resemblances.[58] Four resemblances or similitudes relates things to each other. First, *convenientia* brings 'like things together and makes adjacent things similar, [so] the world is linked together like a chain.'[59] Second, through *aemulatio* objects separated in space come to imitate one another – for example, the sky resembles the face with its two eyes the earth and sun – and so 'by duplicating itself in a mirror the world abolishes the distance proper to it; in this way it overcomes the place allotted to each thing.'[60] Through *analogy* all figures in the universe are brought together to one point, i.e. man, who, 'saturated with analogies', is the 'the great fulcrum of proportions; the center upon which relations are concentrated and from which they are once again reflected.'[61] Finally, *sympathy* draws all things together into the homogeneous identity of the 'Same' – a drive always countered by *antipathy* which reinforces difference. The cognitive idiom of the Renaissance *episteme* was *signature*. God had inscribed everything with a mark or signature to illustrate their mutual resemblance. Thus, knowledge is acquired through a 'hermeneutics of resemblances' and a 'semiology of signatures' which interpret the 'nature of things, their coexistence, the way in which they are linked together and communicate' through the chain of resemblance that is 'visible only in the network of signs that crosses the world from one end to the other.'[62] The Renaissance episteme influenced Ficino and Pico. Ficino's theory of knowledge as *adaequatio* assumed a correspondence between the knowing mind and the object of its knowledge and reflected a conception of the universe as a hierarchically ordered *sympatheia*:

> As long as the intellect is only potentially prepared to know, it is not yet
> united with the object potentially to be known; but when it is actually

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[58]Foucault's description of the Renaissance episteme is in Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, (London, Routledge, 1974), pp. 17-45.

[59]Foucault, *Order of Things*, p. 19.

[60]Foucault, *Order of Things*, p. 19.

[61]Foucault, *Order of Things*, p. 23.

[62]Foucault, *Order of Things*, p. 29.

knowing, it is united with it...since the form of that object is inherent in the mind. ... Thus the knowing mind and the thing known becomes one, since the form of that thing, as such, molds the mind.[63]

Pico's universe was also an emanative *sympatheia:* "whatever is in any of the worlds is at the same time contained in each, and there is not one of them in which is not to be found whatever is in each of the others."[64] The allegorical principle 'everything is in everything' is the basis of all knowledge. For Pico, "[b]ound by the chains of concord, all these worlds exchange nature as well as names with mutual liberality."[65]

It may be remarked at this stage that Ficino and Pico seem to offer little by way of a critique of the medieval hierarchical cosmos. So far so *chargé du passé*. Nevertheless both philosophers do, by means of a re-evaluation of man's being in the cosmos, offer the first signs of the principle of sovereign identity. In this sense their work is *gros de l'avenir*. In the medieval cosmos the standard order of things was established by Plotinus' model of six hypostases: One, Mind, Soul, Sensation, Nature and Body. In the *Theologia Platonica* Ficino profers a new typology consisting of five grades of substances in the universe: God, Angel, Soul, Quality and Body. Although the upper part of Ficino's hierarchy reproduces that of Plotinus, by placing the soul at the centre of a symmetrical hierarchy of ontological order, Ficino guarantees its dissolubility and immortality; if the soul perishes the whole hierarchy dissolves. Paul Kristeller points out that in assigning 'the privileged place in its centre to the human soul ... [Ficino gives] ... a kind of metaphysical setting and sanction to the doctrine of the dignity of man.'[66] The soul is the absolute median which connects the extremes of the world and confirms the inner unity of Being. It is the mean of all God's creations; situated between and having attributes of both higher and lower beings. Plato argued in the *Symposium* that love is an active force that binds all things together. For Ficino the human soul extends its thought and love to all things from the highest to the lowest:

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[63]Ficino quoted in Watts, 'Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite', p. 296.

[64]Pico, *Heptaplus* p. 77, quoted in Watts, 'Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite', p 290-1.

[65]Pico, *Heptaplus,* pp. 78-9, quoted in R. Waddington, 'The Sun at the Centre: Structure as Meaning in Pico della Mirandola's *Heptaplus*', *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies,* 3 (1973), pp. 69-86, at p. 83.

[66]Paul Oskar Kristeller, *Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance* (Stanford CA, Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 43.

the Soul is all things together. It possesses the images of the divine things on which it depends itself and the concepts and originals of the lower things which in a certain sense it produces itself. And since it is the centre of all things, it has the forces of all. Hence, it passes into all things. And since it is the true connection of things, it goes to the one without leaving the others. It goes into an individual thing and always deals with all. Therefore it may be rightly called the center of nature, the middle term of all things, the series of the world, the face of all, the bond and juncture of the universe.[67]

Ficino's conception of the soul is, for Charles Trinkaus, the most radical statement of human autonomy in the Renaissance.[68] Man signified as rational soul is the mean between eternal and temporal and between divine and nature, and is the only agent with the primacy of movement between the corporeal and divine realms. Man has a unique status in the universe for his soul "is not compelled by the divine, from whose providence it is free from the start, nor is it coerced by anything natural over which it widely rules".[69] Unlike other animate creatures which are forced to act in compliance with the rules of nature, the human soul is able to exercise free will through the application of intellect. Man's actions are – like those of God who created man in his own likeness – not determined by nature, but by the purpose of his own will. Man acts freely and *on* nature rather than according *to* nature and as such is capable of ordering rather than being ordered by time and space. Furthermore, intellect provides man with relative autonomy from the influence of the heavens; the soul's direct relationship to God elevates man above the heavens.

> The form of the heavens is corporeal, singular, local and temporal. The form by which the mind intellects is incorporeal, universal and absolute. Therefore this is not born from the heavens. Moreover, since the intellect does not receive its own action or the principle of its action from heaven, it is not subject to a heavenly body, especially because our mind according that power by which it is joined to things which are said to be above the heavens, is not only not subject to the heavens but also is above

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[67]Ficino, quoted in Kristeller, *Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino*, p. 120. Kristeller provides a much more in-depth discussion of the soul, love and the principle of affinity in Ficino's work than can be entered into here.

[68]Charles Trinkaus, 'Marsilio Ficino and the Idea of Human Autonomy' in G. Garfagnini (ed.), *Marsilio Ficino e il ritorno di Platone: Studi e documenti* (Firenze, Leo S. Olschki Editore, 1986), pp. 197-210.

[69]Ficino, *Disputatio contra iudicium astrologorum*, quoted in Trinkaus, 'Human Autonomy', p. 201.

them.[70]

Man's autonomy gives him the exclusive use of the industrial, civil and liberal arts, and science:

> For, as though a participant of providence on the model of divine governance the soul rules itself, the home, the city, the arts, and the animals. ... the power of man, therefore, is very similar to that of the divine nature, seeing that man by himself, that is through his own decision and art, rules himself without being in the least limited by his physical nature, and imitates individual works of the higher nature.[71]

Pico takes another step towards dismantling the hierarchies of the spatial order of things and establishing the principle of sovereign identity in his *Oration on the Dignity of Man*.[72] Pico agrees with the humanist view that man is the most wonderful and fortunate of creatures, but does not think that the reasons put forward – man is an intermediary between creatures, the intimate of the gods, the king of lower beings, or the being with the most developed senses, intellect or use of reason – explain why man is so worthy of admiration and occupies an enviable rank in the universal chain of being. The dignity of man is a consequence of the desire of the 'supreme Architect', once he had created the world, for a being to appreciate and contemplate his creation:[73]

> He therefore took man as a creature of indeterminate nature, and assigning him a place in the middle of the world, addressed him thus: "Neither a fixed abode not a form that is thine alone nor any function peculiar to thyself have we given thee, Adam, to the end that according to thy longing and according to thy judgement thou mayest have and possess what abode, what form, and what functions thou thyself shalt desire. The nature of all other beings is limited and constrained within the bounds of laws prescribed by Us. Thou, constrained by no limits, in accordance with thine own free will, in whose hand We have placed thee, shalt ordain for thyself the limits of thy nature. We have set thee at the world's centre that thou mayest from thence more easily observe whatever is in the world. We have made thee neither of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, so that with freedom of choice and with honour, as though the maker and moulder of thyself, thou mayest fashion thyself in

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[70]Ficino, *Theologica Platonica* II, p. 24, quoted in Trinkaus, 'Human Autonomy', p. 204.

[71]Ficino, *Theologica Platonica* II, pp. 209 & 224, quoted in Trinkaus, 'Human Autonomy', pp. 206 & 7.

[72]Giovanni Pico della Mirandola,'Oration on the Dignity of Man' in Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller and J.H. Randall Jr (eds), *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man: Selections in Translation* (Chicago IL, University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 223-54.

[73]Pico, 'Oration', p. 224.

whatever shape thou shalt prefer. Thou shalt have the power to degenerate into the lower forms of life, which are brutish. Thou shalt have the power, out of thy soul's judgment, to be reborn into the higher forms, which are divine."[74]

There can be few more emphatic declarations of the principle of sovereign identity than Pico's *Oration*. Man is not only his own maker, capable of fashioning himself as he desires, but he also occupies a place at the centre of the world, from where he can observe it all. Of particular note is the fact that Pico's declaration of the dignity of man is a statement of the principle of sovereign identity expressed in the vocabularies of modernity's ocularcentric discourse. Pico's man endorses the principle of sovereign identity that for Walker, to quote him again, seeks to 'fix a point of identity – a universality in space and time against which all differences in space and time can be measured, judged and put in their place.'[75] For Pico man is not simply the microcosm of the universe, a *mixtum compositum* of the world, but he also remains different from the world and so has a privileged position in relation to the natural and spiritual worlds: 'unlike any other creature, he owes his moral character to himself. He is what he *makes* of himself ...'[76] Man has all the elements of the universe at his service: elements and beasts below and angels and celestial souls above:

> It is a truly divine possession of all these natures at the same time flowing into one, so that it pleases us to exclaim with Hermes, "A great miracle, O Asclepius, is man." The human condition can especially be glorified for this reason, through which it happens that no created substance disdains to serve him. To him the earth and the elements, to him the animals are ready for service, for him the heavens fight, for him the angelic minds procure safety and goodness.[77]

Because man is not enclosed within the limits of a determinate being, he is raised above

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[74]Pico, 'Oration', pp. 224-5.

[75]R. B. J. Walker, 'Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of Contemporary Political Practice' in R.B.J. Walker and Saul H. Mendlovitz (eds), *Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community* (Boulder CO, Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1990), pp. 159-85, at p. 175.

[76]Ernst Cassirer, 'Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: A Study in the History of Renaissance Ideas' in Paul Oskar Kristeller and Philip P. Wiener (eds), *Renaissance Essays From the Journal of the History of Ideas*, (New York NY, Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 11-60, at p. 34. Foucault points out that in the Renaissance episteme the dominant spatial metaphor was that of microcosm and macrocosm, which simultaneously differentiates between and unites the spaces of different realities; so that '[n]ature, like the interplay of signs and resemblances, is closed in upon itself in conformity with the duplicated form of the cosmos.' Foucault, *Order of Things*, p. 31.

[77]Pico, *Heptaplus*, quoted in Trinkaus, *In Our Image and Likeness*, p. 519.

even those beings that stand higher than him in the hierarchical order. The angels and heavenly intelligences have their nature and perfection impressed upon them at creation, while the lives of the natural animate beings are determined by instinct. Man is the only being that can achieve perfection through his own actions and intellect. Man's distinctive privilege is thus the 'almost unlimited *power of self-transformation* at his disposal. Man is that being to whom no particular form has been prescribed and assigned. He possesses the power of entering into any form whatever.'[78]

In this section we have identified in the work Ficino and Pico signs of the intellectual deconstruction of the medieval hierarchical cosmos. Both philosophers assert the dignity of man and so remove him from his fixed and low position in the hierarchy of being. Man becomes the fulcrum of the universe and is able to move up and down its hierarchies as he wishes. Man is no longer under the influence of the heavens and is able to manipulate and control nature, especially space and time, for his own ends, rather than being shaped and constrained by them. They re-imagine of man as the prototype of an identical sovereign presence which would provide the epistemic figure for the demarcation of territorial space through Cartesian practice. Kristeller concludes that Ficino and Pico played a 'modest part' in the disintegration of the hierarchies of the medieval cosmos. Ficino offers a dynamic conception of the universe which 'transcends the limits of the traditional notion of hierarchy'.[79] Pico goes even further. He elevates the chameleon-like status of man to the highest order and overturns the hierarchical premise of Aristotelian metaphysics that the highest value is in the immutable and eternal. He also questions the Christian world-view which sets the goal of all human activity in eternity and which regards the temporal aspirations of man as mere vanity. With Pico

> man is no longer a definite element in the hierarchical series, not even its privileged centre: he is entirely detached from the hierarchy and can move upward and downward according to his free will. Thus the hierarchy is no longer all inclusive, while man, because of his possession of freedom, seems to be set entirely apart from the order of objective reality.[80]

Here is the principle of sovereign identity that proclaims man's distance from an

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[78]Cassirer, 'Giovanni Pico', p. 45.

[79]Paul Oskar Kristeller, 'Ficino and Pomponazzi on the Place of Man in the Universe' in Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought and the Arts* (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 102-10, at p. 109

[80]Kristeller, 'Ficino and Pomponazzi', pp. 109-10.

objective reality which he is predisposed to order.

The End of Hierarchy for Space and Politics

In the discussion of Dante's universe it was pointed out that the material and political cosmos were interwoven, both being determined by the epistemic figure of hierarchy. In this section I want to follow up Ernst Cassirer's claim in *The Myth of the State* that between 1400 and 1600 in both political and astronomical discourse 'one breach after another is made in the hierarchical system', which, although not levelled overnight, gradually began to fade away.[81] Copernicus' astronomical system replaced the Aristotelian distinction between higher and lower worlds with an assumption that all movement, whether of the earth or the celestial bodies, obeys the same universal rules. In Copernicus' system, according to Giordano Bruno, 'the world is an infinite whole, pervaded and animated by the same infinite divine spirit. There are no privileged points in the universe, no "above" or "below".'[82] Parallel breaches occurred in the political sphere as the feudal order began to crumble and embryonic states created by individuals, appeared. Cassirer suggests that Machiavelli's *Prince* captures a new centre of gravity in the political world that had little concern for the established structures of the Papal and Imperial order. The erasure of hierarchies in Renaissance cosmology and Renaissance political discourse is identical.

> In both cases the difference between the "lower" and the "higher" world vanishes. The same principles and natural laws hold for the "world below" and the "world above". Things are on the same level both in the physical and in the political order.[83]

Elsewhere, Cassirer notes that Pico's discourse of the dignity of man applied the principles underlying the new conceptions of space developed by Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa to history. As Cusa relativized the centre of the universe and collapsed the division between higher and lower orders of being, so Pico claimed that any point in time could be taken as a centre. The dignity or freedom of man arises when the fixed temporal

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[81]Ernst Cassirer, *The Myth of the State* (New Haven NH, Yale University Press, 1946), p. 132.

[82]Cassirer, *The Myth of the State*, p. 133.

[83]Cassirer, *The Myth of the State*, p. 136.

distinctions between past, present and future are dissolved or unified in a single vision; it is revealed in such a 'seeing together'.[84] Although he was not an Italian, 'the disintegration of the old idea of hierarchy, took place most definitely in Nicholas of Cusa,' and we cannot really understand the transition in the Renaissance from a hierarchical universe to a horizontal universe of equivalent spaces without some consideration of his cosmology.[85]

The point of Cusa's famous work, *De docta ignorantia* of 1440 was not to develop a new cosmology – which arose as a by-product – but to demonstrate that because it is impossible to know the physical and quantitative world – *docta ignorantia* meaning that which 'consists in knowing that we do not know' – we may as well give up trying to conceive of the world and concentrate on God.[86] Cusa applied the 'principle of plenitude' to the size of the universe and to the possibility of life in other places. If God's creative power was infinite then its 'manifestation should therefore be infinite' and everywhere there was matter there could be life. His arguments challenged Christian cosmology on two counts: first, the possibility that the universe contained other inhabited worlds challenged the importance of human and terrestrial life; second, the physical universe was no longer imagined as being heliocentric with a conceivable shape but *acentric* and composed of a large number of unevenly distributed, isolated systems. *De docta ignorantia* challenged the Aristotelian system in three ways. First, Cusa relativised the fixed and absolute nature of place and movement. He argued that in order to know the objective measure of the universe, fixed and immutable points from which to take measurements must be established. Such points are not, as Aristotle claims, prescribed by the objective nature of thing and absolute, but hypothetical and ideal, posited by the free mind.[87] Second, Cusa rejected the hierarchical structure of the universe and the earth's lowly position within it. Since all things change and motion is inherent in all finite things, so the idea of a natural centre looses all meaning. Since only a being in state of absolute rest, or God, can constitute a natural centre, only God, who remains equally

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[84]Cassirer, 'Giovanni Pico', pp. 37-8.

[85]Kristeller, 'Ficino and Pomponazzi', p. 109.

[86]For details of Cusa's cosmology see Lovejoy, *Great Chain*, pp. 108-16; and Alexandre Koyré, *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe* (New York NY, Harper and Brothers, 1957), pp. 5-23.

[87]See Cassirer, *Individual and Cosmos*, pp. 176-7.

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close to all points in the universe, can constitute it. Finally, the idea of the 'closed world' collapses: because since time and space exist only in terms of this moving universe, nothing can limit it from the outside and the cosmos must be a least privatively infinite. Cusanus' universe is one of indefinite if not infinite extension (infinity was still considered to be an exclusive attribute of God). It is a 'sphere of which the center is everywhere, and the circumference nowhere'. Cusa surmised that the world could have no circumference

> for if it had a centre and a circumference there would be some space and some thing beyond the world, suppositions which are wholly lacking in truth. Since, therefore, it is impossible that the world should be enclosed within a corporeal centre and a corporeal boundary, it is not within our power to understand the world, whose centre and circumference are God. And though this world cannot be infinite, nevertheless it cannot be conceived as finite, since there are no limits within which it could be confined. The earth, therefore, which cannot be the centre, cannot be wholly without motion. ... And just as the world has no centre, so neither the sphere of the fixed stars nor any other is its circumference.'[88]

However, for Cassirer, the real revolution in the conceptualisation of the cosmos comes not with Cusa but with Copernicus. Copernicus' description of the heliocentric universe in *De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium* was published in 1543.[89] Book One was a treatise on the cosmos designed to demonstrate from the proposition that earth moves around the sun that the planets would form a coherent integrated system. In Book Two, Copernicus justified this claim by proving that adequate planetary tables could be calculated from geometrical models with the sun at their center. For some historians of science the case for the Copernican revolution is overstated. Bertrand Russell argues that 'the atmosphere of Copernicus's work is not modern; it might rather be described as Pythagorean.'[90] Lovejoy agrees with Russell that Copernicus' thought remained constrained within traditional categories. Although Copernicus challenged details of the historical orthodoxy of Christian theology, his system did not imply the deconstruction

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[88]Cusanus quoted in Lovejoy, *Great Chain of Being*, pp. 112-3.

[89]The first ten chapters of Book One of Nicholas Copernicus, *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium* are reprinted in Michael J. Crowe, *Theories of the World from Antiquity to the Copernican Revolution* (New York NY, Dover Publications Inc., 1990), pp. 102-34. For discussions of Copernicus' system see Crowe, pp. 85-102; Hoskin, *History of Astronomy*, pp. 90-7; and Koyré, *Closed World*, pp. 28-33.

[90]Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (London, Unwin Paperbacks, 1979), p. 513.

of the medieval cosmos: '[f]or Copernicus the solar system and the universe remained identical; his world, though not geocentric, was still centred, still spherical in shape, still securely walled in by the outermost sphere'.[91]

Certainly traditional premises influenced Copernicus' thought.[92] Indeed it was from these traditional premises that Copernicus was able to undermine Ptolemy's geocentric system. First, Copernicus accepted the established view of the earth as a sphere having the rotational motion appropriate to its form. Hence the apparent rising and setting of sun, moon, stars and planets could, he suggested, be accounted for by the earth's daily rotation. Second, Copernicus accepted the Aristotelian premise that the movement of the eternal heavenly bodies in a symmetrical and harmonious universe must be circular and uniform. From this he surmised that because their movement, as viewed from the earth, was non-uniform and irregular the earth could not be the center of the universe. Because 'the same planets are observed nearer to the earth and farther away [this] necessarily proves that the center of the earth is not the centre of their circles.'[93] In more detail Copernicus theorised that

> [i]f, then, the earth too moves in other ways, for example, about a center, its additional motions must likewise be reflected in many bodies outside it. Among these motions we find the yearly revolution. For if this is transformed from a solar to a terrestrial movement, with the sun acknowledged to be at rest, the risings and settings which bring the zodiacal signs and fixed stars into view morning and evening will appear the same way. The stations of the planets, moreover, as well as their retrogradations and forward motion will be recognised as being, not movements of the planets, but a motion of the earth, which the planets borrow for their own appearances. Lastly it will be realised that the sun occupies the middle of the universe. All these facts are disclosed to us by the principle governing the order in which the planets follow one another, and by the harmony of the entire universe, if only we look at the matter, as the saying goes with both eyes.[94]

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[91]Lovejoy, *Great Chain*, pp. 103-4.

[92]Copernicus assumed that the structure of the universe was based on the symmetry of its parts. He placed the sun, the symbol of good in the Platonic tradition, in the middle of the universe. He assumed that the universe must be a sphere because 'of all forms, the sphere is the most perfect.' Furthermore, the 'earth too is evidently enclosed between poles and is therefore spherical' and 'is perfectly round, as the philosophers taught.' Copernicus, *De revolutionibus*, at pp. 114 & 116.

[93]Copernicus, *De revolutionibus*, p. 119.

[94]Copernicus, *De revolutionibus*, p. 127-8.

Once he had established that the earth is a planet revolving around the sun, Copernicus was able to order the rest of the planets. Venus and Mercury, which were only seen at dawn and dusk, were positioned within the earth's orbit. All the others, which could be seen all night, were placed outside the earth's orbit. With the sun at centre of the system their relative positions could be established according to the durations of their orbits. Copernicus introduced a new planetary order: 'the sphere of the fixed stars, which is immovable, then Saturn (with a circuit of thirty years) followed by Jupiter (twelve), Mars (two), the Earth (an annual orbit), Venus (nine months) and Mercury (eighty days).[95] The sovereign centre of this universe is the sun.

> At rest, however, in the middle of everything is the sun. For in this most beautiful temple, who would place this lamp in another or better position than that from which it can illuminate the whole at one and the same time? For, the sun is not inappropriately called by some people the lantern of the universe, its mind by others, and its ruler by still others. The Thrice-Great Hermes labels it a "visible god"; and Sophocles' Electra, "that which gazes upon all things". Thus indeed, as if seated on a kingly throne, the sun governs the family of planets revolving around it.[96]

In terms of the themes that we have been pursing in this chapter, Copernicus' re-imagination of the cosmos had several consequences for discourses on space and politics. First, Copernicus gave a further boost to the principle of sovereign identity. Russell reads Copernicus' 'dethronement of the world from its geometrical pre-eminence' as withdrawing from man the cosmic significance he had in Christian theology.'[97] However, the central position occupied by man in the medieval cosmos is a low and degraded one. Therefore by removing man from the centre of things, Copernicus does not make him less significant, but, on the contrary, raises him from his lowly estate. Copernicus rejected Aristotle's premise that the central position is degraded and denied the 'whole antithesis between the sublunary world of becoming and the immortal immutable heavens.'[98] Second, Copernicus' representation of a heliocentric universe further undermined the validity of the spatial hierarchies of the medieval cosmos. Koyré thinks that Copernican astrology had an 'overwhelming scientific and philosophical importance' because

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[95]Copernicus, *De revolutionibus*, p. 132.

[96]Copernicus, *De revolutionibus*, p. 133.

[97]Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*, p. 513.

[98]Lovejoy, *Great Chain*, p. 104.

by removing the earth from the centre of the world and placing it among the planets, [it] undermined the very foundations of the traditional cosmic world-order with its hierarchical structure and qualitative opposition of the celestial realm of immutable being to the terrestrial or sublunar region of change and decay.[99]

Third, the Copernican re-imagination of astronomical space had consequences for all branches of knowledge based in with spatial hierarchies. Goethe claimed that after Copernicus all the hierarchies of the medieval order lost their heuristic and practical value:

Humanity has perhaps never faced a greater challenge; for by [Copernicus'] admission [that humanity is not the center of the universe], how much else did not collapse in dust and smoke: a second paradise, a world of innocence, poetry and piety, the witness of the senses, the conviction of a religious and poetic faith...[100]

The hierarchical structure of the medieval political cosmos also collapsed in the dust and smoke of the Renaissance. In Renaissance Europe spatial hierarchies collapsed simultaneously in various fields of discourse and practice. The old spatial order was ending and a new modern one based in a horizontal ordering of homogeneous spaces was coming to replace it.

Cassirer claims that Machiavelli's *Prince* opened the way for modern political philosophy because of its implicit rejection of the whole scholastic tradition and, in particular Machiavelli's destruction of the 'the cornerstone of this tradition – the hierarchic system.'[101] For medieval philosophers, quoting from St Paul, all power is of God and the state is of divine origin. This belief was so ingrained that even during the Renaissance advocates of temporal power rarely challenged the theocratic principle. Machiavelli does not attack it head on but simply ignores it thereby illustrating its irrelevance for the new political order that he sought to describe. From his political experience Machiavelli was well aware that real power is not divine. The power wielded by the new princes had precious little to do with God. As a political realist Machiavelli ignored the medieval political system; he viewed the divine origin of kings as a product

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[99]Koyré, *Closed World,* p. 29.

[100]Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Theory of Three Colours,* quoted in Crowe, *Theories of the World,* p. 194.

[101]Cassirer, *The Myth of the State,* p. 135.

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of imagination not of political thought. Machiavelli ignored the scholastic debates about the relations between temporal and heavenly authority and simply set about describing the facts of political life as he saw them, facts which, when brought to life, were enough to 'destroy the hierarchic and theocratic system.'[102]

There are, of course, moments when the hierarchical images and figures of the medieval cosmos appear in Machiavelli's work – we should not expect him to have completely divested his thought of what was still a very influential episteme. Machiavelli occasionally suggests that the heavenly bodies can influence natural and human affairs in the sublunar world. The influence that celestial design has on natural phenomena in the lower world is revealed in signs. In the *Discourses* Machiavelli asserts that 'both ancient and modern instances indicate that nothing important ever happens in a city or a region that has not been foretold either by diviners or by revelations or by prodigies or by other celestial signs.'[103] Elsewhere Machiavelli considers the possibility that the air may contain 'intelligences' or, 'spirits' which 'warn men with such signs, so they can prepare for resistance.'[104] Nature also – in contrast to Pico's view – can influence political outcomes. In the *Florentine Histories* Machiavelli refers to the cycles of political order that are conditioned by the nature of things in the sublunar world:

> In their normal changes, countries generally go from order to disorder and then from disorder move back to order, because, since nature does not allow things of the world (*mondane cose*) to remain fixed, when they come to their utmost perfection and have no further possibility of rising, they must go down.[105]

In this passage Machiavelli seems to be saying, claims A.J. Parel who argues that Machiavelli was not a modern thinker, that the patterns of the rise and fall of civilisations, states and religions are not the exclusive outcome of human volition, for 'history is dependent on "heaven, the planets and the elements" for its "motion, order and

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[102]Cassirer, *The Myth of the State*, p. 136.

[103]Niccolò Machiavelli, *Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius* in Machiavelli, *The Chief Works and Others: Volume One*, trans. Allan Gilbert, (Durham NC, Duke University Press, 1989), pp. 175-529, 1:56, p. 311.

[104]All quotes from Machiavelli, *Discourses,* 1:56, pp. 311-2.

[105]Machiavelli quoted in A.J. Parel, 'The Question of Machiavelli's Modernity', *The Review of Politics*, 53:2 (1991), pp. 320-39, at p. 323.

power".'[106]

Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that in general Machiavelli's political philosophy is not underpinned by the episteme of spatial hierarchy. His discussion of religion and religious authority is not couched in the same language of hierarchy we can detect in Dante's writings. Machiavelli was a harsh critic of Christianity, both as a belief system and as an institution of political governance. In *The Discourses* the Christian religion is represented as a flawed belief-system precisely because it directs men's attention to the futile contemplation of other-worldly truths. Because Christianity does not value the honour of the world it does not stir men to action or to fight for freedom. Machiavelli has far more admiration for those ancient religions which not only valued honour in this world and actively encouraged men to seek it, but incited them into action through spectacle and sacrifice. Christianity values humility and contempt for worldly things and so fails to stir men for action in the service of freedom as the ancient religions did. If religion is to have any use, argued Machiavelli, it must be to instill *virtù* in political actors. Religions that inspire contemplation of 'another' world – I do not think that Machiavelli would have regarded it as a 'higher' world – are of no use in the conduct of effective political life.

> Ancient religion ... attributed blessedness only to men abounding in worldly glory, such as the generals of armies and the princes of states. Our religion has glorified humble and contemplative men rather than active ones.[107]

Machiavelli was even more critical of the Roman Church as an institution. He felt that the reason why 'this land has lost all piety and religion' was directly due to the bad example set by the conduct of the papacy and church.[108] The Church was also responsible for keeping Italy divided because it was not strong enough to unite all Italy, nor so weak that when threatened it was unable to call on men to defend its interests. Machiavelli's disdain for Rome is to the fore in his distinctly sarcastic observation in *The Prince* that 'since they [Ecclesiastical Princedoms] are protected by superior causes, to which the

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[106]A. J. Parel, 'Machiavelli's Modernity', p. 321. Parel feels that Machiavelli's inability to escape the confines of a pre-modern cosmology combined with a pre-modern anthropology, means that '[i]f modernity requires the acceptance of a post-seventeenth-century concept of physical nature and human nature, then Machiavelli cannot be considered a modern.' p. 339.

[107]Machiavelli, *Discourses*, 2:2, p. 331.

[108]Machiavelli, *Discourses*, 1:12, p. 226.

human mind does not reach, I omit speaking about them because since they are set on high and maintained by God, to discuss them would be the act of a man presumptuous and rash.'[109]

Yet it is Machiavelli's relativization of religion that really undermines the spatial structure of the Christian hierarchy. In *The Discourses* Machiavelli praises Romulus' successor Numa Poppilius for his ability to maintain a well-ordered state by turning to religion. Roman history demonstrates how 'helpful religion was in controlling the armies, in inspiring the people, in keeping men good, in making the wicked ashamed.'[110] Machiavelli no longer seeks to relate religion to a transcendental order nor is he concerned with spiritual salvation. He evaluates religion purely in instrumentalist terms as a cultural glue in the service of politics:

> It is the duty, then, of the rulers of a republic or a kingdom to preserve the foundations of the religion they hold. If they do this, it will be an easy thing for them to keep their state religious, and consequently good and united. Also whatever comes up in favour of religion, even though they think it false, they are to accept and magnify.[111]

By such criteria Machiavelli evaluates Christianity negatively because it renders men weak and effeminate and hinders the development of political *virtù*. Stephen KcKnight characterises the Renaissance as a period in which two drives dominate: secularization, which produces independence from God and the sacred, and sacralization, which 'transforms the secular realm to the point where it is indistinguishable from the sacred. Man becomes God, and society becomes an earthly paradise.'[112] Machiavelli's contribution was to sacralize the secular world of the state.

> With Machiavelli we stand at the gateway of the modern world. The desired end is attained; the state has won its full autonomy .... The sharp knife of Machiavelli's thought has cut off all the threads by which in former generations the state was fastened to the organic whole of human existence. The political world has lost its connection not only with religion or metaphysics but also with all the other forms of man's ethical and cultural life. It stands alone – in an empty space.[113]

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[109]Machiavelli, *The Prince* in Machiavelli, *Chief Works*, p. 44.

[110]Machiavelli, *Discourses* 1:11, p. 224.

[111]Machiavelli, *Discourses* I:12, p. 227.

[112]Stephen A. McKnight, *Sacralizing the Secular: The Renaissance Origins of Modernity* (Baton Rouge LA, Louisiana State University,1989), p. 25.

[113]Cassirer, *Myth of the State*, p. 140.

Conclusion

Dante and Machiavelli present us with two very different images of the spatial order of things. In Dante's universe the material and political worlds combine in a rigid, vertically-ordered, hierarchy in which the spaces of divine and mundane, heaven and earth are qualitatively different. In Machiavelli's world not only is the relationship between the structure of the political cosmos and the hierarchies of being more tenuous, so weakening the overall structure, but temporal politics acquires its own authority and values in a space that is inferior to no other. Machiavelli's contention that principalities could be legitimately acquired by power and human volition rather than through the sanctified authority of divine providence amounted to a total rejection of the hierarchical and theocratic system of authority. A crucial step in the process which led to the dismantling of the hierarchies of the medieval cosmos was taken by Renaissance philosophers who in proclaiming the dignity of man, extricated man from the rigid hierarchies of the medieval universe and breathed the first signs of life into the principle of sovereign identity that was to underpin the Cartesian allocation of political authority to separate and equivalent spaces of sovereign territory. Although Renaissance thinkers, even those as irreverent as Machiavelli, were not able to completely dispense with the images and language of spatial hierarchy, by articulating different possibilities of being and politics they set in motion a process that would eventually leave the broken structures of the hierarchical cosmos littered over the entire landscape of the modern culture of space and its horizontally-ordered world of sovereign-territoriality.

Representing Territoriality in the Regime of Perspective

1. Piero della Francesca, Portraits of *Battista Sforza, Duchess of Urbino* and *Federico da Montefeltro, Duke of Urbino*, Florence, Uffizi Gallery

The last chapter showed that important steps in the intellectual development of the idea of the territorial state were taken in the Italian Renaissance discourses of cosmology. The gradual dismantling of the hierarchies of the vertically-structured spatial order of the Christian medieval cosmos established the groundwork for the re-imagination of a political spatial order based in the horizontally-ordered, homogeneous spaces of sovereign territoriality. In this chapter the discussion moves to the pictorial representation of the idea of the territorial state in Renaissance Italy. In particular it considers the impact that the invention or re-discovery of perspective in painting – which made it possible to represent three-dimensional space on a two-dimensional canvas – had on the representation and production of the idea of the territorial state.

This chapter takes its cue from John Ruggie's proposition that perspective and the modern European states-system share the same underlying ordering principle of differentiation. For Ruggie the principle of differentiation defines the modern 'social

episteme', or the mental equipment used 'in imagining and symbolizing forms of political community' in modernity.[1] The transition from the juxtaposed, overlapping political spaces of the medieval world to the differentiated, bounded state-spaces of the modern world required the imagination and symbolisation of this change at the level of social epistemology. Differentiation characterised not only new political doctrines like *cujus regio ejus religio* and *Rex in regno suo est Imperator regni sui*, but also the mechanistic and atomistic political metaphysics which portrayed individual societies as autonomous bodies-in-motion. These political discourses of differentiation mirrored equivalent transformations in social epistemology: the replacement of Latin by vernacular vocabularies, the standardisation of the I-form of speech, and new notions of individual subjectivity.[2] However, the most significant component of the modern social epitome was the invention of single-point perspective in visual art. According to Ruggie single-point perspective prioritised the sovereignty of 'a *single* point of view, the point of view of a *single* subjectivity, from which all other subjectivities were differentiated' in relation to the vanishing point.[3] As in art, so in politics:

> political space came to be defined *as it appeared from a single fixed viewpoint*. The concept of sovereignty ... was ... the doctrinal counterpart of the application of single-point perspectival forms to the spatial organisation of politics.[4]

Unfortunately Ruggie does not develop this initial observation and we are left wondering how exactly 'single-point perspectival forms' were applied to the 'spatial organisation of politics'. How could perspective – a code of pictorial representation – have influenced the articulation of the political spatial discourse of territoriality? What is required is an approach which allows us to analyse the aesthetics of politics or, if you will, the politics of aesthetics. One school of thought which has made some advance in this area is New Cultural History. One of its most prominent thinkers is Stephen

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[1]John Gerard Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations', *International Organization*, 47:1 (Winter 1993), pp 139-74, at p. 158. The concept of the social episteme is rather unclear. Ruggie claims that it manages to combine the view of German social theorists that society consists of 'webs of meaning and signification' with the French notion of '*mentalités collectives*'.

[2]Ruggie, 'Territoriality', p. 158.

[3]Ruggie, 'Territoriality', p. 159.

[4]Ruggie, 'Territoriality', p. 159.

Greenblatt who argues that the political and social conventions, the norms and practices of any society, are not only reflected in but partially produced by a society's cultural and aesthetic discourses: through its poetic, literary and artistic texts. Greenblatt urges us to regard the work of art not as

> a pure flame that lies at the source of our speculations. Rather the work of art is itself the product of a set of manipulations, some of them our own ... any others undertaken in the construction of the original work. That is, the work of art is the product of a negotiation between a creator or class of creators, equipped with a complex, communally shared repertoire of conventions, and the institutions and practices of society.[5]

I shall argue that during the Italian Renaissance the 'institution' of territorial sovereignty was partially produced through works of art commissioned by new territorial princes. The representation of territoriality in the these works of art was produced by means of a 'negotiation' with the 'convention' of perspective.

The details of perspective may be unfamiliar to students of political theory, so in the first section of the chapter I shall provide, in the context of Renaissance Italy, a brief overview of the origins, the principles and the development of perspective theory. This discussion will focus on perspective as theorised by Alberti and applied in painting by Piero della Francesca. In the second section, entitled 'Painting the Prince', I shall examine how perspective facilitated the artistic representation of sovereign-territoriality. I shall base my discussion on Piero della Francesca's portrait of *Battista Sforza* and *Federico da Montefeltro* (Fig.1). Perspective, however, is more than simply an 'innocent' technique of artistic representation. Cultural and geographical theory has shown that perspective also produces space: it is, in Foucault's terms, a network of power and knowledge that has facilitated human mastery of space in modernity. In the third section I consider perspective as a power-knowledge *dispositif*, whose defining signatures, the sovereignty of the eye and the production of rationalised space, were established during the Italian Renaissance. The final section shows how the power/knowledge matrix of perspective produced territorial spaces in Renaissance cartography. This chapter, then, continues to develop my critique of the Classical Westphalia thesis that the idea of the sovereign territorial state was a product of the political discourse and practice of the

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[5]Stephen J. Greenblatt, 'Towards a Poetics of Culture' in Greenblatt, *Learning to Curse: Essays in Early Modern Culture* (New York NY, Routledge, 1990), pp. 146-60, p. 158.

seventeenth century. It argues that the invention of perspective in fifteenth century Italy was a key moment in the representation and production of the modern idea of the territorial state.

Perspective in Renaissance Theory and Practice

At its most basic, perspective is a representational technique allowing artists to depict three-dimensional space, and the positions of objects within it, on a two-dimensional canvas. According to Erwin Panofsky, perspective transforms a picture into a window and creates the illusion that 'we are looking through this window into a space'.[6] Perspective is

> the capacity to represent a number of objects together with a part of the space around them in such a way that the conception of the material picture support is completely supplanted by the conception of a transparent plane, through which we believe we are looking into an imaginary space. This space comprises the entirety of the objects in apparent recession into depth, and is not bounded by the edges of the picture, but rather only cut off.[7]

The main task of this section is to present a simple introduction to the basic themes of Renaissance perspective with reference to Piero della Francesca's work. However, because Piero's application and understanding of perspective was both advanced and idiosyncratic, it is best to begin with Leon Battista Alberti's *On Painting* of 1435, which is widely regarded as the foundational text of Quattrocento perspective theory.[8]

In histories of the Renaissance 'invention' or 're-discovery' of perspective, Alberti's text, 'the "Magna Carta" of the Renaissance', is often presented as one of three foundational events.[9] The first event was Filippo Brunelleschi's 'peepshow' experiments carried out Florence's *Piazza de Duomo* and *Piazza dei Signori* in 1425, which *demonstrated* the principles of perspective. The second event was the rigorous

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[6]Erwin Panofsky, *Perspective as Symbolic Form*, trans. Christopher S. Wood, (New York NY, Zone Books, 1991), at p. 27.

[7]Panofsky, *Perspective as Symbolic Form*, fn. 5, p. 77.

[8]Leon Battista Alberti, *On Painting*, trans. Cecil Greyson, (London, Penguin Books, 1991). The clearest and most accessible introduction to Alberti's work, and indeed to the whole subject of perspective, is Alison Cole, *Perspective* (London, Dorling Kindersley Limited, 1992).

[9]Henri Focillon, *Piero della Francesca* (Parma, Pratiche Editrice, 1992), p. 76. My translation.

application of Brunelleschi's principles by Masaccio in his *Trinity* fresco in Florence's *Santa Maria Novella* in 1427.[10] The publication of Alberti's *On Painting* was the third foundational moment because it *codifi*ed perspective in terms of an underlying geometry. It gave 'painting, as a discipline, a rootedness in the underlying order of things no less strong than that of other arts which claimed liberal status.'[11]

At the heart of Alberti's philosophy lay the familiar humanist motif – which we have already encountered in the work of Neo-Platonist philosophers – that man is 'the measure of all things'. Alberti reminds us that

> [t]he Stoics taught that man was by nature constituted the observer and manager of things. Chrysippus thought that everything on earth was born only to serve man. ... Protagoras ... seems to some interpreters to have said essentially the same thing, when he declared that man is the mean and measure of all things.[12]

Man had a duty to 'study of the natural order of things in God's creation' and the painter's task was to reveal the *concinnatus* or harmony of nature as inscribed in the perfect proportional correspondence of the properties of number, shape and location.[13] Since perspective was capable of representing things in proportion, it enabled the artist to represent the classically defined ideal of beauty as a harmony of parts.[14]

On Painting is divided into three books. In Book One, which is concerned with 'first principles', Alberti describes the geometrical concepts of point, line and surface in terms of their material existence. The material world is manifested through rays of light which issue from the surface of a material object and converge on the eye in the configuration of a cone or pyramid.[15] The visual pyramid comprises three types of light rays. *Extrinsic* rays 'hold on like teeth to the whole of the outline, form an enclosure around the entire surface like a cage' and form a visual pyramid:

> The base of the pyramid is the surface seen, and the sides are the visual rays we said are called extrinsic. The vertex of the pyramid resides within

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[10]See Cole, *Perspective,* pp. 14-5, for a discussion of Masaccio's *Trinity.*

[11]Martin Kemp, *Behind the Picture: Art and Evidence in the Italian Renaissance* (New Haven NH, Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 95-6.

[12]Alberti, quoted in Kemp, *Behind the Picture,* p. 90.

[13]Martin Kemp, 'Introduction' to Alberti, *On Painting,* p. 2.

[14]See Giulio Carlo Argan, 'The Architecture of Brunelleschi and the Origins of Perspective Theory in the Fifteenth Century', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes,* 9 (1946), pp. 96-121.

[15]Alberti, *On Painting,* p. 37.

the eye, where the angles of the quantities meet together.[16]

2. Alberti's Visual Pyramid

Median rays designate surface features such as light and colour. Finally, there is the *centric* (perpendicular or axial) ray, 'the leader and prince of rays', that passes along our visual axis and whose position determines what appears on the surface (Fig. 2). Alberti's visual pyramid was not an original concept, but it was derived from medieval optics.[17] However, his subsequent claim that a painting may be defined as the intersection of the visual pyramid by a plane perpendicular to the centric ray was novel. So was the implication that because the painting forms a proportional triangle within the broader triangle, objects recorded on it retain their relative proportions (Fig. 3).

3. Alberti's Picture Plane in Perspective

In Book Two, Alberti described the rules of *costruzione legittima*, the way to achieve a correct representation of vertical and horizontal dimensions into and across the space of the picture, which today is known as 'vanishing point' construction.[18] In *costruzione legittima* man is 'the scale and measure of all things' from which the sizes and distances

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[16]Alberti, *On Painting,* pp. 42-3.

[17]Kemp, *Behind the Picture,* points out that this notion of the visual pyramid is 'drawn from medieval optical science, the *perspectiva* on which a number of Islamic and Christian authors had written, including John Pecham, whose treatise had become the standard textbook.' p. 93.

[18]For graphic representations of *costruzione legittima* see Cole, *Perspective,* p. 13; and Kemp, *Behind the Picture,* p. 92.

of objects can be represented in proportion.[19] Having mastered the rules of *costruzione legittima* the artist is then in a position to create a painting in three stages:

> We divide painting into three parts, and this division we learn from Nature herself. As painting aims to represent things seen, let us note how in fact things are seen. In the first place, when we look at a thing, we see it as an object which occupies a space. The painter will draw around this space, and he will call this process of setting down the outline, appropriately, circumscription. Then, as we look, we discern how the several surfaces of the object seen are fitted together; the artist, when drawing these combinations of surfaces in their correct relationship, will properly call this composition. Finally, in looking we observe more clearly the colours of surfaces; the representation in painting of this aspect, since it receives all its variation from light, will aptly here be termed the reception of light.[20]

Following these rules, the artist is able to represent appropriate subjects or *istoria* – selected from Scriptures, histories or myths – with 'a systematic and communicative naturalism within a framework of order and restrained delectation.'[21] In the final section of the book, Alberti discusses the requirements for artistic *virtù*. The artist must be learned in the liberal arts and he must study nature to divine all of its principles, especially that of beauty, so that he can choose appropriate *istoria* for representation.[22]

4. Piero della Francesca, *The Flagellation*, Urbino, Galleria Nazionale

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[19] Alberti, *On Painting*, p. 53.

[20] Alberti, *On Painting*, pp. 64-5.

[21] Kemp, *Behind the Picture*, p. 96.

[22] See, for a discussion of Alberti's notion of the virtuous painter, Kemp, *Behind the Picture*, pp. 96-7.

A good example of the impact that Alberti's perspective system had on the representation of space in Renaissance painting can, argues Henri Focillon, be seen in the work of Piero della Francesca who interpreted 'space in a totally Albertian manner in many of his paintings.[23] Particularly revealing is the *Flagellation of Christ* (Fig. 4).

> The severe simplicity of the composition, with the lines of the floor and ceiling converging onto an imaginary point, indicates the presence of a scheme which underpins the painting and which divides the image into sections. The figures, similar to pawns in a game of chess, are placed with implacable and rigorous precision in their halves. The portico is drawn according to the rules of the visual pyramid. However, in Piero's painting one sees less fidelity to the rules of optics than a lyrical instinct, the happiness at mastering space for the first time.[24]

The influence of Alberti's rules on measuring volume and space can be seen, argues Alessandro Angelini, in the way Piero uses the architecture of the elegant classical temple to order the space of the *Flagellation.*

> Just as Masaccio's concept of space would be inconceivable to us without Brunelleschi's architecture, if it were not for Alberti's work we would not be able to understand Piero's scientific methods of arranging his figures within his compositions. The onlooker must stand directly in the centre of the painting, for the composition is strictly unitarian, and this unity is achieved by the rigorous use of a single vanishing point. ... The Urbino *Flagellation* is the ultimate example of *Quattrocento* linear perspective.[25]

Alberti's instructions regarding circumscription, composition, and the reception of light can be detected throughout Piero's work. Piero applies Alberti's rules on circumscription by painting a luminous border around his figures so as to differentiate foreground figures from the background, while ensuring that they remain within the depth of the painting's space. As regards composition, Piero follows Alberti's recommendation that, whatever *istoria* is to be represented, the space of the painting should not be crowded out by highly animated figures, but should include empty space and distance between figures, allowing them space in which to move about with dignity and calm. For Focillon, *The Flagellation* achieves an effect in which the protagonists' 'movements are so removed from the flow of time, that they appear to be inscribed in eternity.'[26] Finally,

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[23]Focillon, *Piero*, p. 80. My translation.

[24]Focillon, *Piero*, p. 80. My translation.

[25]Alessandro Angelini, *Piero della Francesca*, (Florence, Scala, 1985), p. 17.

[26]Focillon, *Piero della Francesca*, p. 84. My translation.

Alberti instructs the artist to forego pure colour – especially the traditional gold backdrops which absorbed the depth of figures, denying them their plastic verisimilitude – and to add black and white so as to show the hues and shades appropriate to the different effects of light in night and day.

It is important to acknowledge that neither Piero nor Alberti conceived of perspective just as a set of rules for precise pictorial representation. They understood perspective as a symbolic system that was capable of reproducing the essential harmony of the universe as created by God. As is evident in his own treatise on perspective, *De prospectiva pingendi*, Piero shared the Neoplatonic belief that perfect geometry underlies God's creation. Piero was committed to the correct geometrical representation of objects and figures.[27] Piero's commitment to the construction and representation of space according to the perfect proportion made possible by perspective can also be seen in the numerical harmony of the angular stones in *The Flagellation*. In this painting the architectural proportions and dimensions have symbolic overtones and, in combination with the light, they reflect the divine order of things. Perhaps invoking the Christian symbolism of the number eight – which, coming after the seven of the days of creation, signified rebirth or Christ's resurrection – Piero relates the eight figures to their architectural surroundings by repeating the number eight throughout the composition.[28]

Piero's space, notes Marco Bussagli, is itself symbolic: the geometrical system and perspective are 'symbolic elements for the representation of the dimensions of the Absolute, which are themselves mirrored in perceivable reality.'[29] Because they incarnate absolute values, the objects and figures represented must fit in with this structure. Piero's

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[27]On *De prospectiva pingendi* see Kemp, *Behind the Picture*, pp. 97-101; and Marco Bussagli, *Piero della Francesca*, (Firenze, Giunti, 1992), pp. 5-13. Kemp describes *De prospectiva* as a 'sort of geometrical "cook-book" for the dedicated beginner' because it reads as a technical manual, full of geometrical diagrams and mathematical logic, outlining precise techniques for achieving an accurate geometrical rendering in perspective of specific objects. p. 100. James Elkins argues that Piero hoped to free the rules of perspective from their basis in the medieval science of optics and to reconfigure them in terms of geometry. James Elkins, 'Piero della Francesca and the Renaissance Proof of Linear Perspective' *The Art Bulletin*, LXIX:2 (June 1987), pp. 220-30.

[28]Cole, *Perspective*, p. 18. The squares of the terra cotta pavement are eight wide and deep, there are eight-pointed stars behind and front of Jesus Christ, and an octagonal arrangement of patterned floor tiles around the stars. The piazza, in which the foreground figures are standing, is eight units deep into the shade of the middle distance, and then another eight units deep into light-flooded areas in front of the far wall.

[29]Bussagli, *Piero della Francesca*, p. 15. My translation.

5. Piero della Francesca, *Resurrection*, Sansepolcro, Museo Civico

Piero's symbolic use of perspective is powerfully demonstrated in *The Resurrection of Christ* (Fig. 5) with its two axial points of view. The higher one directs the viewer's gaze to Christ and imbues his figure with a sense of atemporal otherworldliness; in contrast, the lower point of view, which draws the eyes to the sleeping guards at the level of the tomb, emphasises that these are men whose physical being limits their experience to the mundane world.[30]

Painting The Prince

One way in which perspective contributed to the legitimation of the idea of sovereign territoriality was in providing artists with the technical means to portray their patrons in landscapes that were clearly intended to represent their territories. In this section, I shall discuss Piero's diptych of *Federico da Montefeltro, the Duke of Urbino*, and his wife *Battista Sforza* (Figs 1 and 6) as an early pictorial representation of sovereign territoriality.[31]

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[30]Bussagli, *Piero della Francesca*, p. 22.

[31]The most inclusive discussion of the *Urbino Portraits* is Eugenio Battisti, *Piero della Francesca* (Milano, Instituto Editoriale Italiano, 1971), pp. 355-71. See also Angelini, *Piero della Francesca*, pp. 60-7; and Bussagli, *Piero della Francesca*, pp. 43-7. Originally the two portraits were

6. Piero della Francesca, *Allegorical Triumphs of Federico da Montelfeltro and Battista Sforza*, Florence, Uffizi Gallery

The inner panels of the diptych are profiles of Federico and Battista. Battista's portrait, on the left, has two notable features: first, her face is very white, like a funeral mask – she had recently died giving birth to their son Guidubalbo; second, Battista's elaborate hairstyle and exquisite jewellery are rendered in considerable detail, showing Piero's mastery of 'miniaturistic' portraiture.[32] Federico's portrait, in the right panel, is also very detailed, showing moles and blemishes on his olive skin. Because Federico

separated by a hinge which allowed it to be opened and shut like a book. When it was closed the two allegorical triumphal processions made up the cover. The form of the painting, with the portraits in profile on one side and the triumphal emblem on the reverse, may have been influenced by the tradition of the double-sided medallion portraiture associated with Pisanello. Today the panels are in the Uffizi, opposite Paolo Uccello's, *Battle of San Romano* (c. 1450s). Uccello was also a master of perspective who experimented both with the geometric representation of figures and objects, and with the mathematics of three-dimensional space. Uccello painted three versions of the *Battle of San Romano*, celebrating Florence's victory over Sienna in 1432, which once hung together in the Medici Palace. See, Cole, *Perspective*, pp. 16-7, for details.

[32]It is not known precisely when the portraits were painted. Battista's portraits were probably commissioned by Federico, after her death in July 1472, as a commemoration. The portraits of Federico have been dated variously. Bussagli claims they were painted before 1467, while for Battisti the fact that in his allegorical triumph there appears to be a reference to his crowning in Rome means they must be dated after the summer of 1474. Focillon dates both portraits much earlier, to Piero's residency in Urbino in 1456. Focillon, *Piero della Francesca*. Bussagli notes that the correct identification of the personalities was first made in 1834, when previous hypotheses – that it was either a portrait of Francesco Petrarca and Laura, or of Sigismondo Pandolfo Mataltesta and his consort Isotta degli Atti – were finally abandoned.

presents us with his left profile, his blind right eye – a wound gained in battle, like his broken nose – is hidden. Behind both Federico and Battista, receding into the far distance until the horizon where it merges with the sky, is an extensive countryside landscape of cone-shaped hills, fields and a lake. On the reverse panels, Battista and Federico are represented in triumphal procession. Federico sits on a gilded chair placed on a carriage pulled by two white cavalry horses driven by *Eros*. Dressed in a full suit of armour and holding a sceptre, Federico is being crowned by the angle of *la Vittoria*. Towards the front of the carriage sit the four Virtues: *Prudenza*, T*emperanza*, *Fortezza* and *Giustizia*. Battista's carriage, also driven by *Eros*, is drawn by two unicorns – the symbols of chastity and purity. She appears in a pious reading pose, and is accompanied by *Fede* and *Carità* at the front, and *Speranza* and *Modestia* at the back of the carriage. Once again the backgrounds of both pictures are landscapes of the Urbino territories: behind Federico is Lake Trasimeno and behind Battista is the fertile countryside of Valdichiana.

The Latin inscription underneath Federico's triumph reinforces the message these paintings were intended to convey: "His eminence is carried is great triumph for his famed eternal virtue proclaims him worthy of bearing the sceptre as the equal of the most distinguished condottieri."[33] Federico did not want to be seen simply as 'the leader of a band of mercenaries' – he had followed in the family's traditional 'profession of arms' – but strove to 'comport himself like prince' possessing great *virtù*.[34] Thus in the portraits, apart from the fact that Federico is wearing armour in his triumph, the standard iconography of the warrior-prince is largely absent. Federico's military *virtù* is presented alongside and complementary to the *virtù* of good governance and cultural patronage.[35] His biographer Pierantonio Paltroni recorded that Federico aspired to the status of the virtuous, wise and benevolent prince, able to combine military skill with good

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[33]My translation of Bussagli's translation from Latin into Italian: "Colui che la fama imperitura delle virtù proclama degno di reggare lo scettro, pari ai più insigni condottieri, l'illustre è portato in grandioso trionfo.", Bussagli, *Piero della Francesca*, p. 45.

[34]Hubert Damisch, *The Origin of Perspective*, trans. John Goodman, (Cambridge MA, The MIT Press, 1994) p. 188.The Montefeltro had been mercenaries since the Middle Ages. The rewards of this profession had given them the resources to control their *terre castellate* in the mountainous frontier region between the Papal domains and the Emperor's territories.

[35]According to his biographer Vespasiano da Bisticci, Federico's military *virtù* was partially derived from his mastery of Latin which allowed him to absorb the lessons of the ancients. See Vespasiano da Bisticci, *Vite* in Eugenio Garin, *Il Rinascimento Italiano* (Bologna, Capelli, 1980), pp. 236-8.

governance and a learned disposition:

> It appeared that the life of this excellent prince is to be compared and
> equated with the life of any of the more worthy and notable ancients in
> any of the great generations. For the things he did so outstandingly in
> handling arms he merits the greatest fame and eternal memory, as he does
> for his singular *sapienza* (wisdom) in ruling and governing .... and for
> being learned in *scienza* (knowledge), eloquence, liberality, benevolence,
> and clemency, and for the splendid court and for magnificent and splendid
> buildings.[36]

All three of these princely virtues (military prowess, wise and just governance, and learning) were symbolised in Federico's palace at Urbino.[37] Baldassar Castiglione portrayed Federico's palace, built by the architect Laurana, as the 'most beautiful to be found anywhere in Italy'.[38] To Castiglione it seemed more like a city than a palace. It was not only furnished and decorated with the usual luxurious trappings of wealth and prestige, but with objects – antique statues, pictures, musical instrument and rare Latin Greek and Jewish texts – which identified it as a court of high culture and learning.[39] The palace also symbolised Federico's magnificent and benevolent rule. The public spaces of the palace, particularly the cortile and garden where Federico received his subjects, were designed to provide ease of access for his subjects, who, if we are to believe da Bisticci, were treated by Federico with such kindness and humility that they considered themselves to be the favoured children of a kindly parent.[40] Castiglione also regarded the people of Urbino as especially fortunate, not only because they inhabited a fertile and

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[36]Pierantonio Paltroni, *Commentari della vita et gesti dell'illustrissimo Federico Duca d' Urbino*, quoted in C. W. Westfall, Chivalric Declaration: The Palazzo Ducale in Urbino as a Political Statement' in Henry A. Millon and Linda Nochlin (eds), *Art and Architecture in the Service of Politics* (Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1978), pp. 20-45. Baldassar Castiglione regarded Federico's military talents to be equal to those of the great generals of antiquity, nevertheless he placed them at the end of a litany of Federico's virtues after prudence, humanity, justice, generosity and an indomitable spirit. See Castiglione's portrayal of Federico in Bk. I, II, of Baldassar Castiglione, *Il Libro del Cortegiano*, (Milano, Garzanti Editore, 1981). The quote is my translation of 'della sua prudenzia, della umanità, della giustizia, della liberalità, dell'animo invitto e della disciplina militare.' p. 23. *Il Cortegiano* was set in the court of Federico's heir as Duke of Urbino, Guidubalbo. All subsequent Castiglione quotes are from pp. 17-9.

[37]Westfall, 'Chivalric Declaration'.

[38]My translation of 'il più bello che in tutta Italia si ritrovi'. Castiglione, *Libro del Cortegiano*, p. 18.

[39]da Bisticci notes that these objects were not just for show, but reflected the fact that Federico was himself a man of high culture: well read in history, conversant with philosophy, knowledgeable of architecture, and appreciative of music, sculpture and painting. *Vite*, pp. 236-7.

[40]See, Westfall, 'Chivalric Declaration', pp. 28-31.

abundant land, but also because they were ruled by *ottimi Signori*. Federico took a personal interested in the preservation and development of his land: he not only provided his subjects with housing and secure conditions within which to make a good living, but often went personally on foot to their workshops and farms to enquire into their well-being and to offer any assistance he could.[41]

Although we might have expected Machiavelli to admire Federico's princely *virtù* – Federico's ambition and ruthlessness seemed to mirror those of Machiavelli's exemplary prince Cesare Borgia – he despised the fact that Federico had achieved his princely status as a mercenary. In *The History of Florence* Machiavelli casts Federico as a typically untrustworthy and unreliable *condottieri*. He saw Federico as a fickle character, whose opportunist changes of allegiance between Florence and her enemies were to be despised. Machiavelli records that during the negotiations of 1473 and 1474 when Florence, Milan and Venice were allied against the Papacy and Naples,

> Frederick, the ruler of Urbino, then considered the ablest general in Italy,
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> had for a long time carried on wars for the Florentine people. The Pope [Sixtus IV] and the King [Ferdinand of Naples], therefore, in order that the hostile league might be without this leader, determined to get hold of Frederick, so the Pope advised him to visit the King of Naples and Ferdinand invited him. Frederick consented, to the wonder and displeasure of the Florentines ... and Frederick returned from Naples and Rome with high honour and as general of Sixtus and Ferdinand's league.[42]

Federico's shift to the Church broke with the Montefeltro's traditional allegiance to the Emperor – who had bestowed their titles of nobility upon them. Hubert Damisch suggests that it was this move that prompted Federico to revoke 'the Ghibelline mode of tyranny' and while 'motivated by power politics as much as by reason' to endorse the idea that his authority should be founded on *virtù* and prudence.[43]

In Renaissance Italy the relative prosperity and happiness of the subjects living

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[41]da Bisticci, *Vite*, p. 238.

[42]Niccolò Machiavelli, *The History of Florence* in Machiavelli, *Chief Works and Others Volume III*, trans. Allan Gilbert, (Durham NC, Duke University Press, 1989), p. 1376. This was not the first shift of allegiance recorded by Machiavelli. From 1447-8 Federico acted as a general for Florence against King Alfonso of Naples; in 1452 he commanded 12,000 of Alfonso's troops against Florence; later, between 1467 and 1474, Federico was again in the pay of Florence, assisting in a war against Venice and helping to put down disturbances in the City of Volterra; after his move to the papal camp Federico participated in campaigns against Florence, such as the attack in 1478 on the Chianti city of Radda.

[43]Damisch, *Origin of Perspective*, p. 187.

in a government's territories were interpreted as the visible signs of an administration's

good or bad governance. Good and bad government therefore lent themselves to pictorial

representation in the new genre of landscape. In the Renaissance the painted landscape

> whatever its particular form, exists to serve mankind. Its fields and groves
> are carefully groomed and only rarely give way to wild ravines,
> spectacular vistas, or deserted places. This domesticated world gives
> sustenance to the physical needs and spiritual yearnings of the men who
> inhabit it. In the broadest sense the landscape is humanized.[44]

The attention given to landscape satisfied a desire for greater realism in the narrative

function of painting or, in Alberti's terms, for painting to convey *istoria*. Richard Turner

claims that this new historical sensitivity can be seen in Duccio's *Entry into Jerusalem*.

Duccio replaced the traditional symbolic narrative history of the implacable unfolding of

God's will, with a sense of the lived experience and emotional reactions of participants

to a specific historical event. For the 'real' experiences of human subjects to be

communicated convincingly, the scenographic spaces in which the *istoria* were set had

to be represented as realistically as possible, especially when the landscape itself was

intended to convey a clear political message.

> Perhaps the paradigmatic use of landscape in Renaissance political discourse are

Ambrogio Lorenzetti's frescoes of *Good and Bad Government* made in 1338-9 that adorn

the walls of the Sala della Pace in the Palazzo Pubblico in Siena. In a fresco depicting the

effects of Good Government on the country (Fig. 7), Lorenzetti offers a

> real manifestation of an abstract idea. Therefore human activity in relation
> to the land is the essential quality of the landscape. Elegant city folk ride
> out to enjoy the salubrious effects of the country, while peasants walk to
> town to dispose of their animals and crops. We glimpse varied activities;
> reaping in the fields, tilling of the soil, hunting in the country. In the
> distance the painter shows us properly cultivated hillsides, where the rules
> of sound agricultural practice have been observed. In microcosm this
> detail focuses the essential meaning of the fresco, the presentation of a
> well-governed land where both human needs and pleasures are satisfied.[45]

The landscape we see behind Federico and Battista is clearly intended to convey to the

viewer the beneficial effects that Federico's own good governance is having on life and

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[44]A. Richard Turner, *The Vision of Landscape in Renaissance Italy* (Princeton NJ, Princeton
University Press, 1966), p. 3.

[45]Turner, *Vision of Landscape*, p. 12.

7. Ambrogio Lorenzetti, *Allegory of Good Government in the Country*, Palazzo Pubblico, Siena

activity in his territory. Eugenio Battisti sees this as a landscape that has clearly been 'modified by man'; there are buildings constructed according to advanced building techniques, little farmsteads, and a network of roads.[46] This is a countryside that has been made more productive by modern farming practices: irrigation schemes, artificially created pastures, farms enclosed within rectangular hedgerows, and ploughing and tillage systems. If we recall Connolly's discussion of Tocqueville's work in chapter two, we may remember that Tocqueville recognised the legitimacy the American 'civi-territorial complex' only because its had *possessed* its land by agri-culture and the exploitation of natural wealth.[47] The agri-cultural possession of the land, signifying not only occupation but also ownership, is an important element in the modern idea of the territorial state and is conspicuous in the *Urbino Portraits*. While we cannot be sure if Federico and his advisors introduced these agricultural innovations, or whether they indicate processes already underway, nevertheless, 'the general system of agriculture has ... characteristics of modernity.'[48] Battisti feels that by including the landscape Piero imparts 'to the sovereigns a rare form of royalty, as if suspended between the contemplation of the beauty of natural things and the assiduous intervention in social reality.'[49]

At a compositional, rather than symbolic, level the declaration of Federico's

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[46]See, for this discussion, Battisti, *Piero della Francesca*, pp. 357-8.

[47]See pp. 59-60.

[48]Battisti, *Piero*, p. 358. My translation.

[49]Battisti, *Piero*, p. 358. My translation.

territorial sovereignty is enhanced by the capacity of Renaissance landscape painting to unite figures with the space that surrounds them. Kenneth Clarke points out that landscape's ability to convey increased realism and naturalism complemented a rupture with Christian symbolism and didactic imagery in medieval art.[50] In the Renaissance, according to Clarke, a 'landscape of symbols' – in which material objects were presented as symbols of spiritual truth and arranged in a unified flat surface in a decorative yet harmonious pattern – was replaced by a 'landscape of fact' in which *istoria* could be presented in a realistic setting embodying a new nexus of unity or enclosed space.'[51]

In the *Urbino Portraits* this capacity of landscape painting to unite human figures within a unified space reinforces the message that Federico's political authority is territorial. Federico and Battista are not only the sovereign surveyors of a landscape from their high vantage-point, but have become inscribed into their territorial dominion. The wealth and authority revealed in the minutia of the portrait detail in their faces and clothes are mirrored in the details of the fertile and productive land. The geometric lines of their profiles replicate and unite with the horizontal and receding lines which carve out the extended territory behind them.[52] Damisch suggests that this portrait frames the relationship between Federico and Battista and their territory in terms of both a legitimating past and future aspirations:

> as the subjects' profiles are inscribed against landscape backgrounds with horizons blocked by a line of hills or mountains, and which, while a bit rough behind the duchess, opens behind the duke onto a large, navigable

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[50]Scholars disagree as to when the first landscapes were painted. Gombrich regards Marc Antonio Michiel's description of Giorgione's *tempesta* (1521) as 'a small landscape (*paesetto*), on canvas, with a thunderstorm, a gipsy and a soldier' to be the first expression of landscape, while for Clark the 'landscape of fact' first appears in the 1420s. See E.H. Gombrich, 'The Renaissance Theory of Art and the Rise of Landscape' in Gombrich, *Norm and Form: Studies in the Art of the Renaissance* (London, Phaidon Press, 1966), pp. 107-21; and Kenneth Clark, *Landscape into Art* (London, John Murray, 1949).

[51]Clark, *Landscape into Art*, p. 14. For Clark the landscape of fact was combined with a new sensitivity to light which was used to unify the details of the landscape.

[52]One notable compositional feature of the painting is Piero's successful unification of two distant perspective planes – the foreground figures and the landscape background – without resorting to the traditional ploy of placing an architectural balustrade between the figures and the landscape. Piero achieved 'a remarkable synthesis ... between the accurate description according to the rules of linear perspective, as elaborated by Italian art, and "miniaturistic" painting obtained thanks to the techniques of oil paints, developed to such an extraordinary degree by Netherlandish artists. The greatness of Piero's art, rather than in his radical break away from traditional patterns, lies in this unique ability to harmonize elements from such different cultures and transform them into a universal language.' Angelini, *Piero*, p. 66.

body of water. The same opposition – which thus accrues a programmatic meaning – is to be found on the backs of the two panels, which bear representations of the triumph of Federico and Battista; almost as if these were the two complementary wings of a single political agenda, one of them affirming the dynasty's geographic roots, the other signalling the opening to the exterior reflected in the duke's enterprises.[53]

The viewer is presented with an image of Federico and Battista that confirms their status as territorial sovereigns: 'the portraits, with the imposing hieratic profiles, dominate the painting just as the power of the rulers portrayed dominates over the expanse of their territories.'[54] This portrait is a visual representation of the modern idea of the territorial state wherein sovereign and territory become melded together.

Perspective impacted on Renaissance political discourse not only as a facilitator of the pictorial representation of territorial sovereignty. James Elkins notes that in Western thought perspective has often been referred to as 'a metaphor for something ... a sign signifying a mental state, a culture, or an expressive language.'[55] This metaphorical use of perspective has, suggests Elkins, been most prevalent since the Enlightenment when it became affiliated to two ideas. The first, common to philosophical perspectivism from Leibnitz to Nietzsche, is the subjectivist and historically relativist idea of the 'point of view'. The second is the claim that space logically precedes and make possible the existence and apprehension of objects. However the metaphorical function of perspective was already being deployed in the Renaissance by political writers, most notably by Machiavelli in his dedicatory letter to Lorenzo de Medici in *The Prince*. Machiavelli was worried that Lorenzo might be offended that a mere citizen should presume to offer him advice on the conduct of his affairs, and he attempted to justify his advice by drawing a parallel between political observation and the artistic representation of space:

> No one, I hope, will think that a man of low and humble station is overconfident when he dares to discuss and direct the conduct of princes, because, just as those who draw maps of countries put themselves low down on the plain to observe the nature of mountains and of places high above, and to observe that of low places put themselves high up on

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[53]Damisch, *Origin of Perspective*, p. 188.

[54]Angelini, *Piero*, p. 62.

[55]James Elkins, *The Poetics of Perspective* (Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 16-7. Elkins contrasts the metaphorical usage of perspective with 'meaningless' perspective, where it is discussed as a rigorous branch of mathematics – as an offshoot of Euclidean and Cartesian geometry and 'it "means" only equations, points, lines, angles, and various geometric operations.' p. 6.

mountain tops, so likewise, in order to discern clearly the people's nature, the observer must be a prince, and to discern clearly that of princes, he must be one of the populace.[56]

Here Machiavelli is invoking Leonardo da Vinci's declaration in his *Treatise on Painting* that

> [t]he painter is lord of all types of peoples and of all things. If he wants valleys, if he wants from high mountain tops to unfold a great plain extending down to the sea's horizon, he is lord to do so; and likewise if from low plains he wishes to see high mountains.[57]

Machiavelli was familiar with Leonardo's cartography and aerial perspective. They are known to have come into contact on several occasions. In 1502 Machiavelli was the ambassador of the Florentine republic to the court of Cesare Borgia when Leonardo presented his ariel projection of the city of Imola to Cesare, and in May 1504 Machiavelli, acting as Segretario della Cancelleria della Republica, commissioned Leonardo on behalf of the Signori to paint the, never realised, *Battle of Anghairi* fresco for the *Sala del Consiglio Grande* in the *Palazzo della Signoria*.[58] Carlo Ginsburg has argued that Machiavelli appropriated the perspective metaphor because he admired Leonardo's attempt to use perspective to achieve an analytical distance from the reality he sought to describe.[59] Leonardo's analytical distance mirrored Machiavelli's desire to

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[56]Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince* in Machiavelli, *Chief Works and Others Volume I*, trans. Allan Gilbert, (Durham NC, Duke University Press, 1989), p. 10-1.

[57]Leonardo, quoted in Roger D. Masters, *Machiavelli, Leonardo, and the Science of Power* (Notre Dame IA, University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), p. 52. Leonardo's writings on perspective are less systematic than those of Alberti and Piero. See Leonardo da Vinci, *On Painting*, ed. Martin Kemp, (New Haven NH, Yale University Press, 1989). All subsequent quotes from this work. Because it was verifiable through demonstration, Leonardo considered perspective to be connected to the 'glories of mathematics and physics' and to be 'preferred to all the human discourse of disciplines.' p. 49. Like Alberti, Leonardo based his theory of perspective in the laws of optics. Perspective is focussed on the eye, the noblest of the senses, which 'sees in no other way than by a pyramid' and in which the 'shapes, the colours, all the images of the parts of the universe are reduced to a point, and this point is such a marvellous thing!'p. 50. It was important for all painters to grasp the basic principles of perspective because it is the system which controls the representation of diminution: of the size of bodies at various distances, of the colours of these bodies, and of the shapes and boundaries of these bodies at various distances. Like Alberti, the basic principle of perspective for Leonardo was the idea that a painting is an intersection of the visual pyramid, a plane on which '[t]he image of the original object will be smaller to the extent that the pyramid is intersected nearer the eye.' p. 53.

[58]The contract for the *Battle of Anghairi*, 1504, as '[d]rawn up in the palace of the said Magnifici Signori in the presence of Niccolò, son of Bernardo Machiavelli, Chancellor of the said Signori ...', is reprinted in Leonardo da Vinci, *On Painting*, pp. 270-1.

[59]Carlo Ginsburg, 'Distanza e prospettiva: Due metafore' in Ginzburg, *Occhiacci di legno: Nove riflessioni sulla distanza* (Milano, Feltrinelli Editore, 1998), pp. 171-93.

describe 'la verita effectual delle cosa' rather than construct utopian models of ideal republics. Machiavelli, according to Ginsburg, alluded to the perspective metaphor because it strengthened his thesis that political reality is constituted in the relationship between the prince and the people: neither the prince nor the people are able to see the whole, for both have restricted points of view due to their subjective positions.[60] Machiavelli's cognitive metaphor of perspective is, however, based in a conflictual ontology for '[t]he contrast between different representations of political life is born from things, from their intrinsically conflictual nature.'[61] Nevertheless political regimes can be successfully based on such tensions: '[t]he fact that the Plebs and Senate of the Roman republic were disunited set free that republic and made it powerful.'[62]

Space in the Gaze of Modernity

So far we have discussed the impact of perspective upon Renaissance ideas of territoriality in terms of two registers: its function as a representational technique that, though the medium of landscape painting, gave artists the means to present images of sovereign authority extending over distinct territories; and as a metaphorical tool that enabled theorists like Machiavelli to justify their advice to princes. These two registers could, in Foucault's terms, be described as the archaeological manifestations of perspective as a structural vocabulary. In this section I want to examine perspective from another Foucauldian point of view, as a *dispositif* or a matrix of discourse and practice which produced the abstract and rational space within which the idea of the modern territorial state could be inscribed.

Recent work on perspective and space in cultural geography has drawn upon Lefebvre's concept of 'representations of space' and Foucault's work on power/knowledge networks. Derek Gregory argues that modernity has been partially constituted in

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[60]Machiavelli felt that his particular insight was special because, first, he was one of few citizens who had had a subjective experience of political life; second, his extensive historical studies of politics had taught him how to observe politics with an objective and dispassionate eye.

[61]Ginzburg, 'Distanza', p. 182.

[62]Machiavelli, *Discourses* 1:4, quoted in Ginzburg, 'Distanza', p. 182. My translation.

a complex cultural geography of perspective that radiates into far wider constellations of power and knowledge: perspective was not only a visual ideology ... but also what Foucault would have called a technology of power. The same geometrical techniques were used by surveyors to map private estates, by cartographers to map political boundaries, and by engineers to calculate the trajectories of cannon.[63]

Similarly, Stuart Cosgrove talks about 'landscape' as 'a composition and structuring of the world so that it may be appropriated by a detached, individual spectator to whom an illusion of order and control is offered through the composition of space according to the certainties of geometry.'[64] Landscape combined Renaissance humanist concepts and constructs of space, specifically the articulation of linear perspective, with the vocabularies of Euclidean geometry. Its history is one of 'the physical appropriation of space as property, or territory'[65] It was extended ideologically through painting and garden design and practically through surveying which located and measured individual estates, cartographic maps which apportioned global space through coordinates, and engineers' plans for fortresses and canon trajectories to conquer or defend national territory. Landscape ultimately achieved 'the control and domination over space as an absolute, objective entity, its transformation into the property of individual or state.'[66]

Like Foucault and Lefebvre, these geographers stress the importance of vision in the production of modern space. For Gregory the spaces of modernity, perspectival space, *'marks the erasure of the living body itself: this is a space dominated by the eye and the gaze'*.[67] In this context a latent double symbolism derived from two biblical motifs becomes evident in the *Urbino Portraits*: 'the "gaze from the window", which denotes the almost sacred majesty of the two personalities; and dominion from on high'.[68] For many cultural historians, 'the gaze' is one of the dominant forms of discursive power in Western modernity. As we saw in our discussion of Lefebvre's work, the 'ocularcentric' nature of modernity is well recognized. Martin Jay argues that one unified visual model

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[63]Derek Gregory, *Geographical Imaginations* (Cambridge, Blackwell Publishers, 1994), p. 391.

[64]Denis Cosgrove, 'Prospect, Perspective and the Evolution of the Landscape Idea', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers: New Series*, 10 (1985), pp. 45-62, p. 55.

[65]Cosgrove, 'Prospect, Perspective', p. 55

[66]Cosgrove, 'Prospect, Perspective', p. 46.

[67]Gregory, *Geographical Imaginations*, p. 392.

[68]Battisti, *Piero*, p. 358. My translation.

or 'scopic regime', that of 'Cartesian perspectivalism', has dominated the visual imagination of modern culture.[69] This regime, which combined the 'Renaissance notion of perspective in the visual arts and Cartesian ideas of subjective rationality in philosophy', has produced a distinctive notion of space as 'geometrically isotropic, rectilinear, abstract and uniform'.[70] This space arose out of the idea – itself an outcome of the belief that perspective symbolized a harmony between the mathematical regularities of optics and God's will – that the composition, the order of objects within a space, rather than the objects themselves, had positive connotations.

As a technology of power, perspective or landscape has a number of distinguishing features. The most important is 'the sovereignty of the eye' that reinforces a distinction between man as sovereign subject and space as an object to be known and controlled by him. The single perceiving eye – 'static, unblinking and fixated rather than dynamic' – is privileged in perspective composition.[71] This 'logic of the Gaze' – as distinct from 'the Glance' – privileges 'a visual take that was eternalized, reduced to one "point of view," and disembodied'.[72]

> In the founding perception, the gaze of the painter arrests the flux of phenomena, contemplates the visual field from a vantage-point outside the mobility of duration, in an eternal moment of disclosed presence; while in the moment of viewing, the viewing subject unites his gaze with

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[69]Martin Jay, 'Scopic Regimes of Modernity' in Hal Foster (ed.), *Vision and Visuality* (Seattle WA, Bay Press, 1988), pp. 3-23. Jay does not see the modern visual order as 'a harmoniously integrated complex of visual theories and practice' but as a 'contested terrain' characterised by 'a differentiation of visual subcultures.' p. 4. 'Cartesian-Perspectivalism' has been privileged as the scopic regime in modernity because it seemed to best express 'the "natural" experience of sight valorized by a scientific world-view.' (p. 5) However, two other scopic regimes have also informed the modern visual order: 1) an 'art of describing', as in seventeenth century Dutch painting based in cartographic principles; and 2) a 'madness of vision', as in Baroque art, which flaunted the opacity of the sublime subject and underscored the rhetorical conventionality of sight.

[70]Jay, 'Scopic Regimes', at pp. 4 & 6. There are two implications that follow from the imposition of this scopic regime. First, the visual order was 'de-eroticised' as the abstract coldness of the perspectival gaze eliminated any emotional contact between the artist/viewer and the image depicted, '[t]he moment of erotic projection in vision – what St. Augustine had anxiously condemned as "ocular desire" – was lost as the bodies of the painter and viewer were forgotten in the name of an allegedly disincarnated, absolute eye.' Second, the visual order was 'de-narrativized or de-textualized' as the image became more autonomous from its extrinsic purpose – religious or other; painters became more interested in the abstract, qualitatively conceptualized space than in the subjects painted in it. Jay 'Scopic Regimes', p. 8.

[71]Jay, 'Scopic Regimes', p. 7.

[72]Jay, 'Scopic Regimes', p. 7.

the Founding Perception, in a perfect recreation of that first epiphany.[73]

If we retrace our steps for a moment and return to Alberti's *On Painting*, we can see how the sovereignty of the eye is privileged in perspective discourse. First, the form and position of the objects depicted in space are, for Alberti, no longer determined by absolute principles but produced by the relative position of the sovereign eye. Second, Alberti's rays of vision originate in the eye, confirming its sovereignty at centre of the visual world. Third, linear perspective reinforces a realist representation of space in the external world; the external world is directed towards the individual located outside of that space. The eye has 'absolute mastery over space. ... Visually space is rendered the property of the individual detached observer, from whose divine location it is a dependent, appropriated object.'[74]

Ruggie's observation – outlined at the start of this chapter – that territorial differentiation mirrors the social episteme of perspective, is an example of the way that5 the sovereignty of the eye is privileged in perspective discourse. As Ruggie says, 'political space came to be defined as it appeared from a single fixed viewpoint.'[75] Ruggie also reproduces a concept of the sovereign subject, identical to the humanist ideal, that is outside of and able to order the space it inhabits. Ruggie, in effect, offers us Alberti's 'Man', who occupies 'a central position as observer of a pictorial world of which he himself is the measure.'[76] Giulio Argan points out that this conception of subjectivity is inseparable from the notion that perspective is a conception of the world, the artistic representation of the Platonic ideal of man knowing himself in Nature. Once man is no longer a particular inscribed within a universal transcendent Nature, perspective is the vehicle by which the newly constituted Ego, endowed with senses and reason, is able to apprehend Nature. Further, because the laws of form and nature are

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[73]Norman Bryson, *Vision and Painting: The Logic of the Gaze* (Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 1983), p. 94.

[74]See, for these three points and the quote, Cosgrove, 'Prospect, Perspective', pp. 48-9.

[75]Ruggie, 'Territoriality', p. 159.

[76]John White, *The Birth and Rebirth of Pictorial Space* (London, Faber and Faber, 1976), p. 121. For White '[t]he new role of the spectator in relation to the picture, which played such an important part in the discovery of Brunelleschi's two panels, is underlined throughout Alberti's treatise, and reflects the growing humanism of the period. This humanist approach is carried into the pictorial world itself when Alberti points out that all the appearances of things are purely relative, and that it is the human figure which alone provides the measure of whatever else the artist cares to represent.' p. 122.

equivalent, through perspective the sovereign-artist comprehends 'nature as a reality conceived by man and distinct from him as the object from the subject'.[77]

The eye-as-sovereign thesis also implies that space is, to paraphrase Argan, 'a reality conceived by man and distinct from him as the object from the subject'. The space produced by the sovereign eye of the ideal humanist subject through perspective is known and ordered rationally in the same way that territory is demarcated and disciplined by sovereign political authority. The rational nature of perspectival space is emphasised by Panofsky in *Perspective as Symbolic Form*. Panofsky argues that perspective transformed psycho-physiological space into rational, systematic and modern mathematical space. Panofsky even goes so far as to claim that perspective constitutes the modern *Weltanschauung* which 'demands and realizes a systematic space'. In modernity perception is 'governed by a conception of space expressed by strict linear perspective' which, in turn, is 'comprehensible' only for a 'specifically modern, sense of space, or ... sense of the world'.[78] It is worth noting that Panofsky maintains that modern rational systematic space is a prerequisite *for* rather than a product *of* perspective. Indeed he argues that modern systematic space first appeared in the art of the early Renaissance – as in Ambrogio Lorenzetti's *Annunciation* (1344) which Panofsky reads as the first use of a coordinate system – 'well before it had been postulated by abstract mathematical thought.'[79] This system was later formalised in terms of mathematical theory by Quattrocento *costruzione legittima*. Panofsky's argument that systematic rational space provided the conditions for linear perspective is reinforced by Edgerton's view that 'a "systematic" space," infinite, homogeneous, and isotropic', precipitated the re-discovery of linear perspective in the Quattrocento.'[80]

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[77]Argan, 'Architecture of Brunelleschi', p. 96.

[78]Panofsky, *Perspective,* at pp. 42 & 34.

[79]Panofsky, *Perspective*, p. 58.

[80]Samuel Y. Edgerton, Jr, *The Renaissance Rediscovery of Linear Perspective* (New York NY, Basic Books Inc, 1975), p. 161. For Edgerton linear perspective is based on the assumption that 'visual space is ordered *a priori* by an abstract uniform system of linear coordinates' which allows painters to conceive of a subject in the realm of spatial homogeneity. Edgerton *Rediscovery*, p. 7. Panofsky and Edgerton's thesis that perspective is a product of rational systematic space has not gone unchallenged. Elkins argues that Panofsky engages in a chronological sleight-of-hand by attributing to the Renaissance a Kantian conception of space – in which the *a posteriori* world of objects is disconnected from the *a priori* intuition of pure space that makes the appearance of objects possible. For Elkins perspective did not arise out of a general sense of rationalized space. While some painters did have 'an inchoate idea of rationalized space' we cannot 'attribute an interest in the rationalization of *all* space to painters who looked

The hegemony of the perspective visual order and its production of abstract rational space was reinforced by the simultaneous rise of a modern scientific *Weltanschauung* and bourgeois mentality. Cartesian-Perspectivalism was 'in league with a scientific world view that no longer hermeneutically read the world as a divine text, but rather saw it as situated in a mathematically regular spatio-temporal order filled with natural objects that could only be observed from without by the dispassionate eye of the neutral observer.'[81] During the Renaissance the eye's ability to observe and record the world was acknowledged by Leonardo da Vinci:

> Now do you not see that the eye embraces the beauty of the whole world? It is the lord of astronomy and the maker of cosmography; it counsels and corrects all the arts of mankind; it leads men to different parts of the world; it is the prince of mathematics, and the sciences founded on it are absolutely certain. It has measured the distances and sizes of the stars; it has found the elements and their locations; it divines the future from the course of the stars; it has given birth to architecture, and to perspective, and to the divine art of painting.[82]

Leonardo's proclamation of the 'triumph of the Eye/I' over word and tradition is, argues Turner, evidence that the seeds of modern scientific rationality were being nurtured in Renaissance knowledge.[83] Perspective which abstracted space created a distance between the experiencing subject and the experienced object – the pictorial surface acted as an invisible plane separating the space occupied by the viewing subject from the fictive space on the other side – and so can be seen as

> one of the first steps in the modern scientific outlook, in the sense that an object is no longer as it was in the Middle Ages, something loaded with symbolic qualities in which experienced subject and external object tend to fuse, but an entity to be held at arm's length and subjected to

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at specific objects with geometrical eyes.' Elkins, *Poetics,* pp. 28-9.

[81]Jay, 'Scopic Regimes', p. 9.

[82]Leonardo, quoted in A. Richard Turner, *Inventing Leonardo: The Anatomy of A Legend* (London, Papermac, 1995), p. 157.

[83]Turner, *Inventing Leonardo,* pp. 155-7. Perspective and sight were valued because, unlike words which required interpretation through other words, they permitted the immediate perception and objective representation of the world's phenomena, especially the three-dimensional structures of objects. Leonardo regarded himself as an 'omo sanza lettera' who acknowledged that words are human inventions requiring interpretation through more words and as such susceptible to errors of tradition. For Leonardo the phenomena of the world, the truths of the present can be directly grasped by the eye: "Painting presents the works of nature to our understanding with more truth and accuracy that do words or letters; but letters represent words with more truth than does painting." Leonardo, quoted in Turner, *Inventing Leonardo,* p. 169.

dispassionate optical scrutiny.[84]

The hegemony of the perspectivalist scopic regime of modernity, invented or, at least, re-discovered during the Italian Renaissance, underpins a whole technology of power. This regime organised the appropriation and ordering of various social, political and cultural spaces. Its impact on the legitimation of the idea of the territorial state came principally through its reinforcement of territorial borders in cartographic discourse. Cartographic representations of space facilitated not only the production of the political spaces of differentiated territorial sovereignty but also the spatial imagination of modern European International Society.

Mapping Territory

8. Ptolemy, *World Map*, British Library, London

The beginnings of Renaissance cartography can be traced to the publication in Florence in 1406 of Jacopo d'Angelo's Latin translation of Ptolemy's *Geographia* (Fig. 8). The influence of the *Geographia* was widespread, reaching beyond the obvious constituency

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[84]Turner, *Inventing Leonardo*, p. 169. Leonardo was not a scientist in the modern sense of someone developing a theory based on empirical perception. He was a naturalist who observed natural visual phenomenon and ordered them, according to the requirements of the Renaissance *episteme*, through correspondence and analogies: 'the human body is like a machine; swimming and flying are similar activities; the cardiovascular system is like a tree, the heart and its attendant vessels like a developing seed; the support of the skull by the neck like the rigging of a ship ... etc.' Turner, *Inventing Leonardo* p. 171.

of the spatial disciplines to many branches of Renaissance knowledge.[85] Edgerton suggests that it was appealing to the Renaissance mind because, like perspective, it was based in the classical discourse of optics or *perspectiva*. Ptolemy's instruction to mapmakers to view the part of the world to be mapped as if it were connected at its centre to the centre of the viewer's eye by an abstract visual axis or perpendicular line, followed on from the optical theorem that only the aspect of an object on an axis with the eye's centre could be clearly observed. The *Geographia*, argues Edgerton, reinforced rather than overturned the traditional belief of Euclidean-based *perspectiva* that the perfect harmonies and symmetries of geometry revealed the plan of the universe as designed by God.[86] Although scholars have, so far, not been able to establish precise associations between cartography and the emergence of perspective in the fifteenth century, there is a strong link between cartography and the production of the idea of the territorial state in the Renaissance power/knowledge regime of perspective. David Woodward argues that

> a community of scholarship and practice ... grew up later in the fifteenth century around the idea of measured space. There was a common interest in geometrically proportioned representations of nature among artists and engineers of the fifteenth century that is the hallmark of the "universal man" of the Renaissance. Surveying and mapping the Earth were at the very heart of this activity.[87]

One of the advantages of Ptolemy's world map was that once places were mapped according to their longitude and latitude the cartographer was able to preserve the correct proportion of small areas to the whole earth. Ptolemy unified the 'chorographic' mapping of smaller areas by using pictorial elements with the 'geographic' maps of the world that showed features by lines and dots. For Renaissance scholars much of the value of Ptolemy's *Geographia* was in showing how to combine chorography and geography in one geometrical space. Renaissance cartographers drew upon Ptolemy's mapping

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[85]Leonardo, deploying the familiar microcosm-macrocosm trope, cites the *Geographia* while discussing human anatomy: 'Therefore, by my plan you will become acquainted with every part of the human body ... There will be revealed to you in fifteen entire figures the cosmography of this *minor mondo*, in the same order as was used by Ptolemy before me in his *Cosmographia.*' Leonardo, quoted in Samuel Y. Edgerton, Jr, 'From Mental Matrix to *Mappamundi* to Christian Empire: The Heritage of Ptolemaic Cartography in the Renaissance' in David Woodward (ed.), *Art and Cartography: Six Historical Essays* (Chicago IL, University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 10-50, quote at p. 12.

[86]See Edgerton, 'From Mental Matrix', pp. 12-15.

[87]David Woodward, 'Maps and the Rationalization of Geographic Space' in Jay A. Levenson (ed.), *Circa 1492: Art in the Age of Exploration* [National Gallery of Art, Washington](New Haven NH, Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 83-7, at p. 84.

techniques – plotting co-ordinates on intersecting perpendicular axes based in the geometrical space of Euclidean plane geometry – in their attempts to combine the local surveys of the new lands revealed through the 'voyages of discovery' and the spaces of the known world in a synthetic whole. The distinction between geographic and chorographic mapping does however allow us to explore two different conduits through which the perspectival power/knowledge matrix contributed to the Renaissance development of the idea of the territorial state.

Mapping the Boundaries of International Society

The *Geographia*'s publication precipitated a radical revision of the European world view. In particular it condemned the traditional symbolic imagery of the medieval *mappa-mundi* to obsolescence (Fig. 9). The medieval *mappa-mundi* was structured according to

9. Beatus, *Mappa Mundi*, British Library, London

the classic T-O design. The O defined the outer limits of the landmass which was divided into one upper (orientated to the east) semi-circle occupied by Asia, and two lower quarter circles, Europe bottom left and Africa bottom right. The T was formed by the rivers which separated the three continents: the Tanais and Nile rivers formed the T's crossbar and the Mediterranean was the downstroke. These maps symbolised the

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Christian cross with Jerusalem – rather than Rome – located at the geographical and symbolic centre. (It is worth noting that for the medieval European mind, as is clearly indicated by the size its landmass in the T-O map, Asia was a strong presence: commercial and diplomatic relations with Asian rulers contributed significantly to the European world-view.) The T-O maps depicted the *orbis terrarum* – the territory of the foreshortened three-continental land mass (Europe, Asia, and Africa) – as being limited and confined by an all-encircling Ocean sea, commonly regarded as being inaccessible.[88]

However, by the latter decades of the fifteenth century many educated Europeans had, at least intellectually, escaped from the confines of the medieval *orbis terrarum*. This new vision is most starkly presented in Paolo dal Pozzo's famous letter to Toscanelli of 1474 which suggested to Columbus the theory of the 'westward route' from Portugal and Spain to the spice islands of the Indies. The 'Toscanelli letter' advanced two novel premises: first, that the ocean could be used as an intercontinental waterway; and second, that the navigable Ocean sea included the Southern Hemisphere.[89] Thomas Goldstein has argued that although the Toscanelli letter was the most important single statement of the western route, it should be seen as the outcome of the process of the Florentine 'intellectual conquest of the earth' that began in the first decades of the fifteenth century. The imposition of heavy tolls by the Turks and Venetians on trade through Cairo and the Red Sea meant that the Florentines had to find a new way to the spice islands. Florentine scholars hypothesised from their readings of the word-views in the *Geographia* and the manuscripts of Strabo – introduced to the Florentines by Gemistos Plethon at the Council of Florence 1439-40 – that they could be reached by a navigable sea. First, the 'eastern' (northern) territorial sweep of the T-O map was reframed. Ptolemy's *oikoumene* extended west-east from Gibralter to India and north-south from the Central Asian steppes to Ethiopia and put the Far East into sharper focus – his anticipation of several Southeast Asian islands were confirmed by Marco Polo. Second, Ptolemy's Africa extended beyond the equator, implying that the Southern Hemisphere was not just the traditional "torrid

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[88]See, on *mappae-mundi*, Jerry Brotton, *Trading Territories: Mapping the Early Modern World* (London, Reaktion Books Ltd, 1997), pp. 26-33; and Woodward, 'Maps and Rationalization', p. 83.

[89]See, on the "Toscanelli Letter', Thomas Goldstein, 'Geography in Fifteenth-Century Florence' in John Parker (ed.), *Merchants and Scholars* (Minneapolis MN, University of Minnesota Press, 1965), pp. 11-32.

zone" but could be both inhabitable and navigable. Third, from Strabo came the startling idea, at least for fifteenth century geographers, 'that the Asiatic land mass as a whole, south as well as east, was washed by the Ocean Sea. ("But the Southern and Eastern sides [of 'India'] which are much greater than the other two, extend out into the Atlantic sea," he had said.)'[90] This meant that in theory Southeast Asia, including the Spice Islands, was accessible from the east by sailing west – no one of course, had anticipated the barrier that the American continent would prove to be to these aspirations.

In terms of the representation and production of rationally ordered space in the discourse of perspective, the longitude and latitude grid system of the *Geographia* signalled the end of the Christian symbolism of the T-O map. Ptolemy's known world was presented in terms of geometrical co-ordinates; his organising system 'depended on imagining the globe not as amorphous topography but as a homogeneous surface ruled by a uniform geometric grid.'[91] The *Geographia* suggested that the world could be mapped according to a rational system in which a single geometric framework related local discoveries to the whole world. Fifteenth century world-maps produced the 'first coherent, and rationally cumulative pictures of the world since antiquity.'[92] Possibly the first true map of the world, an oval projection graduated with 360 degrees longitude and 180 latitude onto which every point on earth could be plotted, was produced by the

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[90]Goldstein, 'Geography in Fifteenth-Century Florence', p. 24.

[91]Edgerton, 'From Mental Matrix', p. 13.

[92]Joan Kelly Gadol, *Leon Battista Alberti: Universal Man of the Early Renaissance* (Chicago IL, 1969), p. 201, quoted in Woodward, 'Maps and Rationalization', p. 85. Some historians warn against over-stressing the novelty of Renaissance cartography. Edgerton notes that the 'new Renaissance grid consciousness' had its antecedents in the grid organisation of space in several ancient civilisations: Alexander the Great made 'the grid the trademark of Greek civilisation'; the Romans imposed a modular grid plan on all towns in the Empire and their centurion surveyors divided up conquered land into hundred square units for distribution to colonists; finally, the Chinese built grid cities and had a view of world based on rectangles centered on the Middle Kingdom. See Edgerton, 'Mental Matrix', pp. 15-26. Second, Whitfield suggests that Renaissance cartography was not revolutionary because it did not redefine the sources of knowledge. Even in 1600 the standard *Cosmographia Universalis* still bore the traces of a scholastic narratives of the past and was not constructed exclusively on the basis of reason or empiricism. While the form and social context of maps had been partially secularised, 'emancipation from traditional sources, literary and legendary, would have been seen as impoverishing the map'. Even Mercator's world map of 1569 constructed by mathematical principles drew on non-scientific geographical sources. Mercator's representation of the Arctic for example is 'pure medievalism' based on the legend of the four rivers recounted by the fourteenth century English monk, Nicholas of Lynn; the Antarctic also is hypothetical based on the traditional authority of Ptolemy and Marco Polo. Renaissance map-makers were still cosmologers rather than scientifically-based geographers. See Peter Whitfield, *The Image of the World: Twenty Centuries of World Maps* (London, The British Library, 1994), esp. p. 38.

workshop of Francesco Rosselli in Florence in 1508 (Fig. 10).

10. Rosselli, *World Map*, Florence

The spaces of the fifteenth century were no longer organised, as in the medieval hierarchy, into central and peripheral positions, but all had equal status in the geometrical net of lines of longitude and latitude. This was an important source of the abstract rational space which Lefebvre identified as the dominant modern 'representation of space'. This space was more easily colonised and appropriated by monarchs and merchants.

> Within this spatially determined grid fifteenth century geographers were able to plot a proliferation of locations across terrestrial space which was no longer circumscribed by the principles of Christian belief. Ptolemy's impact on the world of geography was to revolutionize a certain perception of space itself, which was no longer charged with religious significance but was instead a continuous, open terrestrial space across which the monarchs and merchants who invested in copies of his *Geographia* could envisage themselves conquering and trading regardless of religious prescription.[93]

Such an abstract image of the whole earth revealed a finite world 'over which systematic dominance was possible, and provided a powerful framework for political expansion and control.'[94]

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[93]Brotton, *Trading Territories*, p. 32.

[94]Woodward, 'Maps and Rationalization', p. 87.

Cartography played a major role in demarcating the new spaces of International Society that were discovered in the late-fifteenth and early-sixteenth centuries. The first major cartographic inscription of the spaces of an extra-European International Society was the demarcation line established by the Treaty of Tordesillas in June 1494. This treaty was agreed upon after Columbus' return in 1493 with the news of his discovery of islands in the Bahamas group and his exploration of the northern coasts of Cuba and Hispaniola. Columbus not only believed that he had discovered a part of Asia, but also claimed the discovered territories in the name of his sponsors, the crown of Castile. This upset the Portugese king João II who argued that Columbus' discoveries infringed the terms of the Treaty of Alcáçovas of 1479 agreed between Portugal and Castile which had stipulated that any territories discovered 'beyond' Guinea were to be Portugese. Castile countered by suggesting that this undetermined 'beyond' did not extend so far as to include the lands discovered by Columbus. Eventually an agreement was reached between the two crowns, negotiated and brokered by Pope Alexander VI. The Spanish retained their claim to Columbus' discoveries while the Portuguese were guaranteed exclusive rights to all navigational routes throughout Africa, the eastern Atlantic and all territories to the East.[95] This agreement was literally inscribed into the space of the world-map when

> Pope Alexander VI ... sat down before his *mappamundi* and arbitrarily, in the blank space to the left of the *oikoumene*, drew in a new meridian that he proclaimed to be "one hundred leagues west of the Azores". All the vast terra incognita to the west of this purely abstract "demarcation line" he awarded to the Spanish. Everything East must go to Portugal.[96]

The final text of the Treaty of Tordesillas stipulated that

> ... a boundary or straight line be determined and drawn north and south, from pole to pole, on the said ocean sea, from the Arctic to the Antarctic pole. This boundary or line shall be drawn straight, at a distance of three hundred and seventy leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands.[97]

Martin Wight has suggested that the most significant cartographic delineation of the space of international society came not at Tordesillas but at the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559 when a boundary-line was drawn on the world-map between the

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[95]See, for details, Brotton, *Trading Territories*, pp. 71-2.

[96]Edgerton, 'From Mental Matrix', p. 46.

[97]Cited in Brotton, *Trading Territories*, p. 72.

spaces of the civilized (European-Christian) world and the spaces allocated to uncivilized cultures. Early-Modern conceptions of international society, such as that in the legal work of Hugo Grotius, were 'dual or concentric'. Grotius distinguished between 'an outer circle that embraces all mankind, under natural law, and an inner circle, the *corpus christianorum*, bound by the law of Christ.'[98] Yet almost a century before Grotius this concentric or dual conception of international society was represented on world-maps. Wight contends that at Cateau-Cambrésis the modern states-system's 'dual nature, two concentric circles, European and universal' achieved formal diplomatic recognition. The European signatories agreed verbally that beyond a line on a meridian of the Azores and the Tropic of Cancer – to the west and the south – acts of hostility would not violate the treaty. This overlaid the papal line of demarcation drawn up at Treaty of Tordesillas, which the French argued was not part of the law of Christendom as it had not been legitimated by a papal bull.

> Thus the papal 'line of demarcation', which in theory or legend was an arbitral award to preserve peace, gave way to the 'amity line', which divided the zone of peace from the zone of war ... "No peace beyond the Line" became almost a rule of international law, giving freedom to plunder, attack and settle without upsetting the peace of Europe.[99]

From the late fifteenth century new cartographic techniques of geographical representation were deployed in the demarcation of the spaces and boundaries of the territories of international society. International society was imagined in terms of geographic space that was 'abstract, geometric and homogeneous' and no longer ordered according to Christian symbolism.[100] One implication of the arrangement whereby the the 'outside' spaces of extra-European international society were designated as arenas for violence and war was to leave the European princes free to use violence to consolidate the 'inside' spaces of their territorial dominions without outside interference. Cartography was used by these princes to define the spaces and limits of the new territorial states of Renaissance Europe.

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[98]Martin Wight, *Systems of States*, ed. Hedley Bull, (Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1977), p. 128.

[99]Martin Wight, *Systems of States*, p. 125.

[100]David Woodward, 'Maps and Rationalization', p. 84.

In the previous section it was pointed out that geographical mapping was an important element in the Renaissance production of the spaces of international society. In this section I wish to explore how chorographic or topographical mapping – another mapping technique inspired by the *Geographia* – was deployed in marking-out territorial boundaries in the Renaissance. Topographical maps are large-scale maps of small districts which show the shapes and patterns of the landscape – as distinct from small-scale maps showing features of a whole province or nation. Like the geographical maps, the Renaissance topographical maps were drawn to scale: 'a landscape portrayed by selected features [was] shown in a standardized form and set in the framework of a uniform scale.'[101] Italian cartographers were at the forefront of the development of topographical mapping and they established its essential characteristics and methods by 1500. P.D.A. Harvey argues that Italy was 'by far the most map-conscious part of Europe in the middle ages.'[102]

In Renaissance Italy two types of topographical maps were especially important to the representation of territoriality in the discourse of perspective: bird's-eye views of towns, and district or regional maps of small areas. Between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries several rather basic picture maps, showing mainly the outline of walls and the most notable buildings, were drawn of Italian towns. Usually these maps depicted Rome – like the map published in Paolino Veneto's *Magna chronologia* from the 1320s and 1330s, and the map in Flavio Biondo's *Roma instaurate* 1444-6 – but Milan and Florence were also mapped.[103] By the end of the fifteenth century, however, the basic town plan no longer satisfied the desire for realism in Italian art and maps were produced which drew on the realist, or at least less symbolic, ground-views of towns. Ambrogio

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[101]P.D.A. Harvey, *The History of Topographical Maps: Symbols, Pictures and Surveys* (London, Thames and Hudson, 1980), p. 11.

[102]Harvey, *History of Topographical Maps*, p. 58. John Marino cautions that while a 'map consciousness' did distinguish Italy from the rest of medieval Europe, the meaning of this vision was an idealized and moralised geography: 'an integrated cosmography of spiritual and geographical knowledge'. John Marino, 'Administrative Mapping in the Italian States' in David Buisseret (ed.), *Monarchs, Ministers and Maps: The Emergence of Cartography as a Tool of Government in Early Modern Europe* (Chicago IL, University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 5-25, at p. 5.

[103]See, on these early picture-maps, Harvey, *The History of Topographical Maps*, pp. 68-75.

Lorenzetti's view of Siena in *Good Government* and the image of Perugia in Benedetto Bonfigli's 1454 chapel of Palazzo dei Priori are good examples of such work. The realism of these paintings was combined with perspective to present a birds-eye view of the city 'as it really was'.

In Renaissance Italy three map makers were especially important in the development of bird's-eye town plans.[104] The Florentine Francesco Rosselli, whose world-map we have already come across, made various engraving of Pisa, Florence, Rome and Constantinople. Rosselli introduced into the genre a 'detailed realism' that can be seen in his 1482 view of Florence, known as the 'Map with the Chain' [Fig .11] Although this map looks at first sight like a simple landscape view looking down on the city from hills to the south-west, it can be read as an important image of territoriality. Florence lies secure within her walls guaranteeing the sovereignty of the territorial dominion whose good governance is evident in the wealth and prosperity of the *contado* – note that Rosselli actually shows us the artist-surveyor drawing up the perspective plan, in the bottom right hand corner.[105] The second Italian pioneer of birds-eye mapping was

11. Woodcut of Rosselli's *Map with the Chain*, Florence

Jacopo de' Barbari whose 1500 map of Venice is regarded as 'a masterpiece of the vision

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[104]The following discussion of Rosselli, De' Barbari and Leonardo is drawn mainly from Harvey, *The History of Topographical Maps*, respectively pp. 66-9, 75-8 & 153-6.

[105]The whole image is actually misleading, as no hills overlook Florence from point at which the map is drawn; it is drawn from an unobtainable viewpoint.

and skill of the Italian Renaissance.'[106] Barbari managed to symbolise Venice's size, wealth and power by means of a complex artistic technique which combined a mosaic of individual sketches within a framework of an existing plan of Venice adjusted to achieve the uniform foreshortening, the single perspective, required by a birds-eye view.

The third innovator, perhaps not surprisingly, was Leonardo da Vinci. Two of Leonardo's maps are of particular interest, not only because of their innovative cartography, but also because they have known associations with Machiavelli. When Machiavelli was serving as Florence's Secretary of State for War during the 1503 war with Pisa, he commissioned Leonardo as a military architect to draw up a scheme to divert the course of the Arno to cut Pisa off from the sea. Leonardo's subsequent plan for the embanking scheme was drawn to scale and depicted the surrounding countryside not as a landscape as viewed from the ground, but as a flattened projection as seen from above (Fig. 12).

12. Leonard da Vinci, *Plan of Scheme to Divert the River Arno*, Royal Library, Windsor

It is possible that Machiavelli commissioned Leonardo for this project after seeing Leonardo's famous bird's-eye plan of Imola – which Machiavelli, as Florentine ambassador, witnessed Leonardo presenting to Cesare Borgia in 1502. In the Imola map all the buildings have their plans drawn in proportion, and obvious monuments are not exaggerated. The eight compass lines radiating out from centre of the city to the circumference of map's frame shows Leonardo's concern with distance. These plans anticipated many of the subsequent designs of and uses for topographical maps across

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[106]Harvey, *The History of Topographical Maps*, p. 76.

sixteenth century Europe. Leonardo was an innovator 'in his concern for scale, his move away from pictorial representation towards outline plan, the union in himself of the surveyor and military engineer with the artist ... in his interest in the problems of cartography and his use of maps to set out and clarify all sorts of problems involving landscape: drainage, military strategy and tactics'.[107]

The other form of topographical maps based in perspective that contributed to the Renaissance idea of territoriality were district maps. In Italy maps were not widely deployed as administrative tools until the latter half of the sixteenth century. However, some state authorities did commission district maps as early as the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.[108] Often these maps were used for military-strategic purposes. This was especially so in the *Venetian terrafirma* where the surviving maps provide 'a graphic guide to the theatre of war at the time of the first Venetian conquests of the *terrrafirma*'.[109] In the fifteenth century the Venetians were alone in their appreciation of the potential that maps had for planning military campaigns and for governing and administering territories The war between Milan and Venice, which lasted from 1437 to 1441, produced two maps of Lombardy on which we can see details of several items of military significance such as walled towns and bridges. One of these maps highlights the Fosse Bergamasca boundary ditch dug between Milan and Bergamo in the thirteenth century. Other district maps of Verona @1440), Padua 1449, Parma @ 1460 and Brescia 1471-2 were also executed. The main Venetian mapping project was begun in 1460 when the Council of Ten requested that the governors of territories, cites and castles under Venetian rule should commission maps and surveys and then send them to Venice. Several of these maps survive, including Padua 1465 by Francesco Squarcione, Brescia 1469-70 and Verona 1479-80.[110] There is also a 1496-9 military map of the Venetian *terrafirma* that emphasises territorial fortifications (Fig. 13). These maps were used to

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[107]Harvey, *History of Topographical Maps*, p. 155.

[108]Marino points out that few maps in the state archives of Venice, Florence and Naples and in the published collections of Milan and Vatican are dated before the 1560s. See Marino, 'Administrative Mapping in the Italian States'.

[109]Harvey, *History of Topographical Maps*, p. 59.

[110]These fifteenth century maps were not particularly sophisticated. They tended to focus on the main city, often shown in exaggerated size; rarely illustrated much more than the fortifications of outlying towns; and were rarely drawn to a consistent scale.

'define borders, to aid in water and lagoon management, to illustrate and clarify ambassadorial dispatches, for defence and fortress designs, and to resolve disputes in court cases.'[111]

13. Map of Venetian Terafirma late 15th century

In the sixteenth century the Venetian topographical and chorographical projects came into their own. Venetian land surveyors or *periti*, like Cristoforo Sorte, mapped and charted 150000 hectares of land in the *terrafirma* between 1560 and 1600. These schemes were indicative of the way that the regime of perspective assisted the human mastery of space and territory. The new territories of the Venetian state were demarcated using methods which combined perspective and Euclidean geometry with naturalistic landscape imagery.[112] Sorte considered perspective "the most essential foundation for painters and requiring of them the greatest familiarity, recognising that without it nothing can be depicted of any value."[113] Cosgrove argues that because the same Euclidean principles of geometry underpinned both perspective theory and the surveyors' techniques of land reclamation – conducted using compasses, cross-staff quadrants and astrolabes – 'technically and theoretically therefore both the reality and the illusion of Venetian

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[111]Marino, 'Administrative Mapping', p. 6.

[112]Denis Cosgrove, 'The Geometry of Landscape: Practical and Speculative Arts in Sixteenth-Century Venetian Land Territories' in Denis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels (eds), *The Iconography of Landscape* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 254-76.

[113]Sorte, *Osservazione nella pittura*, 1580, quoted in Cosgrove, 'Geometry of Landscape', at p. 261.

landscape were grounded in Euclidean geometry.'[114] Although the tradition of district maps was almost exclusively restricted to north Italy, some were commissioned in other parts of Italy. A manuscript of the *Geographia* printed in 1448 reproduced a map of Tuscany by Pietro de Massaio; and in the first decade of the sixteenth century Giovanni Pontano produced a map of the northern boundary of Naples for King Ferdinand based on a measured survey and drawn to scale.[115] In any case, the pioneering district maps of the Italian Renaissance did help to define the territorial boundaries of Renaissance Italian states.

14. Map of the Border Commissioners tracing the Aussa River

This can be seen in the example from the Office of the Border Commissions (1538) [Fig. 14] which

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[114]Cosgrove, 'Geometry of Landscape', p. 261.

[115]Marino argues in 'Administrative Mapping' that there are two reasons why accurate maps of cities, towns, provinces and principalities only emerged as administrative tools for Italian states in the last decades of the sixteenth century, despite the fact that since the early fifteenth century perspective had dominated Western modes of perception. First, it took a while for cartographers to escape the aesthetic requirement of maps commissioned by princes, rulers and clergy for didactic, spiritual or commemorative purposes. Second, in the fifteenth century the bureaucratic imagination was more concerned with the control of finances than with organising space. In the sixteenth century two changes increased the use of mapping as form of administrative control: i) government bureaucracies increased their control over the state's domains: in Florence and Milan, organisations overseeing borders, roads, water and buildings all sprung up; ii) this reflected a general upturn in the economy: the 'Italian Indian summer' that followed the end of the Italian wars, signalled by the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis 1559, increased demand, credit and production in Northern cities, and maps were among the goods produced for these revived markets.

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depicts the land between Strasoldo, Cervignano, Aquileia, and the Aussa River, with clear demarcation of proprietorship between Venice and Germany (*de Tedeschi*). ... note the specificity of jurisdictions. Some are named after cities like Strasoldo and Malisana, others after lords like the monks of Aquileia or the Savorgnani. ... Territorial information distinguishes such maps.[116]

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the representation and production of the idea of the territorial state in Renaissance Italy was intimately bound up with the invention or rediscovery of perspective in art. In the Italian Renaissance perspective facilitated the production and legitimation of the modern idea of the territorial state. We have seen that perspective not only enabled the pictorial representation of territoriality but also informed various discursive practices like cartography that produced territorial differentiation on the ground. As a technique for the artistic representation of three–dimensional space on a two-dimensional canvas, perspective gave artists like Piero della Francesca the means to represent their patron princes as sovereigns whose authority extended over and issued from their territories. Perspective also operated as an element of an all pervasive Foucauldian regime of power and knowledge, defined by the sovereignty of the eye and the mastery and control of rational space. As a component in this regime of power and knowledge perspective facilitated the demarcation of territorial spaces, from city-states to international society, primarily through Renaissance cartography. The invention of perspective in Renaissance Italy was a significant factor in the representation, production and legitimation of the idea of the territorial state that has dominated the political landscape of modernity ever since.

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[116]Marino, 'Administrative Mapping', p. 7.

The Territorial State From the Renaissance to Postmodernity

> In his *Istoria Fiorentina* of about 1440, Giovanni Cavalcanti described a
> territorial dispute between his home city and Milan during the wars of the
> 1420s, and mentions that a longitudinal line was to be established as a
> boundary between the two states. This may have been the first instance in
> history in which an imaginary mathematic line – rather than a physical
> landmark – was recognized as a political-territorial limit.[1]

The thesis has argued that the modern idea of the territorial state originated in
Renaissance Italy. It has rejected the claim of traditional Realist history that the idea of
the territorial state originated in the political discourse and practice of seventeenth and
eighteenth Classical Europe on two counts. First, in terms of chronology, it has shown
that the foundations of the idea of the territorial state were established much earlier in the
Italian Renaissance of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Second, in terms of the
scope of analysis it has shown that the idea of the territorial state is not a concept
disinterestedly signifying the objective reality of the distribution of political space in
modernity, but is the product of a set of heterogeneous discourses and practices ranging
from cosmology and perspective to cartography and urbanization that make up the
modern cosmopolitan culture of space.

In this concluding chapter I want to do three things. First, in a brief review I want
to draw all the threads of the argument together by tracing its development throughout
the chapters. Second, with reference to Renaissance representations of the Ideal City, I
want to re-state my argument that the spatial discourses of Renaissance Italy established
the conditions of possibility for the Classical idea of the territorial state. Third, I want to
bring the discussion up to date by considering the arguments that the emergence of a
postmodern spatial order signals the end of the legitimacy of the idea of the modern
territorial state.

Résumé

The first chapter established that the three dominant Realist schools of International

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[1]Samuel Y. Edgerton, *The Renaissance Rediscovery of Linear Perspective* (New York NY, Basic
Books Inc., 1975), pp 113-4.

Relations all conceive of the state as a variant of the 'national-territorial totality'. The Realist notion of national territorial totality is derived from Weber's definition of the state as the human community that claims a monopoly of the use of physical force within a defined space or territory. This conception of the territorial state has been a mainstay of twentieth century geopolitical theory from *fin de siècle* thinkers like Ratzel and Weber to contemporary Realism. The Realist-Weberian idea of the territorial state serves as a spatial pivot upon which the modern logic of inside/outside is translated to representations of political space in modernity. The territorial state is the site upon which the principle of sovereign identity marks out the modern state as the locus of rational ordered self-identical presence. It is from this place of identity that the outside of international relations marked by alterity, difference and chaos is defined. Within this logic, political order, legitimacy and identity is ascribed to the sovereign state encased within secure territorial boundaries.

The second chapter considered some of the consequences of looking at the history of the Realist-Weberian idea of territorial state from the perspective of discourse analysis. The idea of the territorial state is not an objective reality that exists independently of our attempts to know and represent it, but is a product of complex networks of discourse and practice, power and knowledge. In the same way that Foucault's archaeology of the discourses of the human sciences revealed that knowledge of man is determined by interdiscursive networks or epistemes, so the idea of the territorial state can be analyzed as a concept whose spatial characteristics are determined by shared spatial vocabularies that are reproduced in a wide variety of knowledges of space. If we acknowledge, as Foucault did in the later genealogy, that discourse consists of a complex interplay of power and knowledge, then we can begin to analyze the idea of the territorial state as one strand of a matrix of modern practices and discourses on and about space. In modernity space is produced by representations of space, the abstract images of architects, planners and cartographers that have produced an abstract, visualized space. At the state level, modern abstract space is striated and opposed to the smooth space of the nomad. Rousseau's writings on Poland and Tocqueville's writings on America revealed that the process of state territorialisation, of the codification of identity in territory, is a practice of violence requiring the elimination of other identities and forms of existence in space.

Starting from the premise that space, produced in discourse, has a history, the third chapter assessed the traditional history of the territorial state and offered an alternative narrative. It identified a Classical historical narrative of the idea of the modern state which locates it origins in the political culture of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This history points to the presence of the idea of the territorial state in the political theory of Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel. I argued that this historical narrative is not disinterested, but is itself part of an absolutist or cosmopolitan tradition of modernity that identifies its own origins in terms of a rupture at the start of the seventeenth century with the values of the Renaissance. This cosmopolitan tradition of modernity is characterized by a will to order and a quest for certainty. As regards space these aspirations were realized in the 'Cartesian practices', in the service of absolutist state authorities, that represented space as objective, rational, homogenous and amenable to mastery and discipline by sovereign man. I accepted that the history of the territorial state needs to be contextualised in terms of its relationship to the dominant spatial practices of modern culture, but concluded by suggesting that it is possible to write an alternative history of the origins of the idea of the territorial state. This history draws upon Lefebvre's account of the transformations of Western space from absolute to abstract space. It would start from the premise that if so many of the codes and practices of modernity's representation and production of space were founded in the Italian Renaissance it is probable that much of what in termed 'Cartesian practice' – the differentiation of identity and difference in abstract homogeneous space – which underpins the idea of the territorial state, could have its origins in the Italian Renaissance.

The next three chapters provided the substantive evidence for my claim that the origin of the idea of the territorial state has its foundations in Renaissance Italy. In chapter four I identified signs of a territorial consciousness in Machiavelli's political theory of the princely state. In Machiavelli's work there are indications that he anticipated the Realist-Weberian ideal of the territorial state as the legitimate locus of sovereignty, violence and identity. Machiavelli's understanding of *dominion*, while it still retained a hierarchical division between the space of the city and the spaces of the *contado*, nevertheless reflected the established legal precedent that no higher power, even that of the Papacy or Holy Roman existed that could interfere in the affairs of a prince in his own

territory. Second, we saw that Machiavelli recognized that in order for a prince to gain, and hold onto a principality he must be prepared to exercise both spectacular and disciplinary violence as well as secure a monopoly of legitimate violence in the form of a militia. Violence was needed to bind the prince's subjective sovereignty to the objective territory over which he asserted his authority. In Deleuze and Guattari's terms Machiavelli was aware that the new prince must overcode pre-existing territorial affiliations of identity and loyalty. Finally, in the exhortation to free Italy from the barbarians, Machiavelli discloses an awareness that the future lay with those states capable of inscribing national identity into their territories. Further, his patriotic discourse revealed the workings of a inside/outside logic of identity and difference which differentiated and downgraded the spaces inhabited by the barbarian hordes over the Alps from the spaces of Italy which had given birth to Western civilization

In chapter five we turned our attention to the Renaissance deconstruction of the medieval-Christian spatial lexicon or episteme of hierarchy. I argued that the Renaissance undermined the foundation of the Christian medieval spatial order and so paved the way for a modern spatial order of homogeneous, rational and logical space upon which the differentiated but equal spaces of sovereign territoriality could be marked out Renaissance humanists began the process of clearing away the vocabularies of the Christian medieval spatial cosmos in which the spaces of political and material being were united in a single hierarchical structure. We saw in Dante's work how the hierarchies of Aristotelian physics, Ptolemaic astrology and Christian theology were mirrored in and reinforced by the political order of things reaching from the *Civitas Dei* down to the degraded concerns of temporal politics. Renaissance thinkers mounted a dual attack on the structures of the medieval universe. First, the Neo-Platonic discourses on the dignity of man, promoted in the philosophies of Ficino and Pico, established the principle of sovereign identity. Man was removed from his low position in the traditional hierarchy – a move which took away an important keystone of that structure – and was lauded as a sovereign identity able to know and control nature and space rather than be determined by them. Second, the new cosmologies of Cusa and Copernicus together with Machiavelli's erasure of religious authority from temporal politics amounted to a combined sacrilization of the secular. The astronomical re-imagination of cosmological

space as homogeneous, extended and objective destroyed spatial hierarchy in a manner analogous to Machiavelli's simultaneous demotion of the Papacy and Empire to the status of princes among princes.

In chapter six we examined the impact of the Renaissance Italian development of perspective, the cornerstone of the ocularcentric culture of modernity, on the representation and production of the idea of the modern territorial state. We used Piero della Francesca's portrait of the Duke and Duchess of Urbino to demonstrate how perspective facilitated the pictorial representation of territoriality. As a technique for the artistic representation of three-dimensional space on a two-dimensional canvas, perspective gave artists the means to represent princes as sovereigns whose authority was seen to extend over and emanate from their territories. Perspective also operated as a technology of power and knowledge, defined by the sovereignty of the eye and the mastery and control of rational space. Through discursive practices like cartography, perspective defined and marked out in abstract space territorial boundaries from the confines of city-states to the perimeters of international society.

The Ideal City and the Territorialisation of Abstract Space

1. Unknown Central Italian Artist, *Ideal City*, Urbino, Galleria Nazionale

This thesis has proposed that the *foundations* of the idea of the territorial state – which became *visible* in the political discourses of Classical Europe – were established in fifteenth century Renaissance Italy. I have adapted the distinction between foundation and visibility from Mumford's claim that the qualities of grandiosity, uniformity and regimentation that characterized the Baroque city had their foundations in the Renaissance vision of the forms and structure of the city as clear, open and simple.

Nowhere is the Baroque city more anticipated in Renaissance discourse than in a famous group of anonymous paintings of ideal cities. The one reproduced above is known as the Urbino panel and was probably painted between 1470 and 1520. It seems to express all the spatial ideals of the Mumford's Baroque city: this space is grandiose, uniform and regimented (Fig 1). In this section I want to revisit the terrain of our enquiry once more, this time using the Renaissance image of the ideal city as a sign, an expression, of the structure of the Renaissance culture of space that served as the bedrock upon which the architecture of the idea of the territorial state could be constructed.

In the discourse of art history the Urbino image of the ideal city is often viewed in the context two other images of ideal cities, known as the Baltimore (Fig. 2) and Berlin (Fig. 3) panels.


2. Unknown Central Italian Artist, *Architectural Perspective*, Baltimore, Walters Art Gallery

All three images, unique in fifteenth century painting, present grand urban architectural or theatrical settings constructed with strict adherence to the principles of *costruzione legittima*. Ordinary housing is barely evident and the countryside is shown far outside the walls. There are no human figures in the Berlin or Urbino panels and those in the Baltimore panel, possibly added later, are 'lost in the vastness of the spatial composition'[2]. The composition and structure of the squares and buildings comply with the principles and vocabularies of architectural humanism as set out in texts like Alberti's

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[2]Richard Krautheimer, 'The Panels in Urbino, Baltimore and Berlin Reconsidered' in Henry A. Millon and Vittorio Magnagno Lampugnani (eds), *The Renaissance From Brunelleschi to Michelangelo: The Representation of Architecture* (London, Thames and Hudson, 1994), pp. 233-56, at p. 238.

De re aedificatoria.[3] There are appropriate monuments of antiquity, the required ecclesiastical and secular public buildings, and the facades, porticos, loggia, windows and columns all conform to Alberti's instructions. The panels show the categories of building required by Alberti in an ideal urban layout: a *templum* or principal church or cathedral, a *basilica* or law court, palaces for leaders serving both administrative and domicile functions, squares for commercial and political meetings; and lower class housing.[4]

3. Unknown Central Italian Artist, *Architectural Perspective*, Berlin, Staatliche Museen

The provenance and purpose of the panels continue to be the subjects of speculation. The author of the paintings, according to Fiske Kimball was Luciano Laurana, the architect of Federico de Montelfeltro's palace at Urbino.[5] The architectural content of the paintings indicates the influence of Bramante and Raphael on Laurana – all three were residents at Federico's court at Urbino (the *Città ideale* is today exhibited in the dressing room of Laurana's palace of Urbino, now the National Gallery of the Marches). Kimball dates the Urbino perspectives to between 1470-1480. Alessandro Parronchi claims that the panels were set designs conceived, probably by Franciabigio and Ridolfo Ghirlandaio, directly for specific theatrical productions: the comedies

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[3]Leon Battista Alberti, *On the Art of Building in Ten Books*, trans. Joseph Rykwert, (Cambridge MA, The MIT Press, 1988).

[4]For an overview of the theme of the ideal city in the Renaissance with particular emphasis on Alberti's *De Re Aedificatoria* and Filarete's *Trattato d' Architettura*, see Helen Rosenau, *The Ideal City: Its Architectural Evolution in Europe*, 3rd ed., (London, Methuen and Co, 1983), pp. 42-67.

[5]Fiske Kimball, 'Luciano Laurana and the "High Renaissance"', *Art Bulletin*, 10 (1927-8), pp. 124-51. Krautheimer notes that the only other similar work, i.e. of grand visionary urban settings, produced until the second decade of Cinquecento were the doors of the ducal apartment in the palace of Urbino executed between 1474-82. It is therefore possible that all three panels were commissioned by Federico da Montelfeltro whose aspirations for Urbino as the perfect humanist society drew on the architectural vision of his friend Alberti. See Krautheimer, 'Panels Reconsidered', p. 256.

mounted in Florence, including Machiavelli's Mandragola, for the festivities occasioned by the marriage of Lorenzo di Medici and Madeleine di Il Tour d'Auvergne in Sept 1518. The panels were subsequently transferred to Urbino by Lorenzo de Medici when he was made Duke of Urbino by Leo X in 1519.[6] Richard Krautheimer, before he revised his thesis, saw the panels not as specific models for particular theatrical productions, but as generic models of theater architecture; they are figural representations of what Sebastiano Serlio, would later term, drawing on Vitruvius, the 'tragic' (Baltimore) and 'comic' (Urbino) scenes.[7] Andre Chastel claims the panels are 'urban views in perspective' similar to the images on many marquetry panels and cassone frontals; the paintings were intended to valorize the space of the city in representational terms: "it's a matter of using perspective to define *solemn* places, ennobled by forceful architectural references, Colissea, triumphal arches, temples ..., so as to suggest singular, crystalline spaces set apart in the interior of the city, ideal for processions.... One should think of them in the context of ritual entries, of ceremonial decorations."[8] Finally, Hubert Damisch who considers all the above accounts to be flawed due to their adherence to the 'descriptive illusion', which assumes that 'representation is the primary function of both language and art, a pictorial proposition, like a linguistic statement, having meaning only to the extent it describes the "state of things" and refers to facts presented as real, or at least thinkable.'[9] The 'descriptive illusion' is preoccupied with establishing the 'referents in reality' of the buildings depicted in the three panels.[10] Rather, argues Damisch, we should see these paintings as a series which demonstrate how the paradigm of perspective works

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[6]Alessandro Parronchi, 'Due note, 2. Urbino-Baltimora-Berlino', *Rinascimento*, 29 (Dec 1968), pp. 355-61.

[7]Richard Krautheimer, 'The Tragic and Comic Scenes of the Renaissance. The Baltimore and Urbino Panels, Gazette des Beaux-Arts, 33 (1948), pp. 327-48. Krautheimer later retracted this reading of the panels as the *scena comica* and *tragica* of Serlio, admitting it was 'a major blunder', see Krautheimer, 'The Panels Reconsidered'.

[8]André Chastel, 'Vues urbaines' peintes et théâtre', quoted in Hubert Damisch, *The Origin of Perspective*, trans John Goodman, (Cambridge MA, The MIT Press, 1994), p. 225.

[9]Damisch, *Origin of Perspective*, pp. 238-9.

[10]Damisch notes that three modes of representation are evident in the readings of the panels. First, there are representations which refer to an older model, such as the amphitheater, triumphal arch and octagonal temple in the Baltimore panel; second, there are representations which have a contemporary reference, for example in the Berlin panel there is a replica of Alberti's Palazzo Rucellai in Florence and in the Urbino panel a model similar to the buildings of Antonio da Sangallo; finally, there are representations of a 'utopian renaissance' in which models from the past are combined with anticipated projections of the future.

as an 'expressive apparatus' that determines the proper position of objects on the pictorial plane.[11]

> in the historical context in which we placed ourselves, *perspectiva artificialis* provided the painter with a formal apparatus like that of the sentence, with which it shares many features. Starting with its organization of point of view, vanishing point, and distance point, and the other corollary points designating *here*, *there*, and *over there* – which is sufficient to make it possible to speak, again non metaphorically, of a geometry of the sentence that would have its analogue in the figurative register. What is demonstrated by the group of Urbino perspectives, and had previously been demonstrated by Brunelleschi's configuration and would be demonstrated again by *Las Meninas*, is that the sentence is not assignable to a single system of pronouns and positional indexes in space and time. The formal apparatus put in place by the perspective paradigm is equivalent to that of the sentence, in that it assigns the subject a place within a previously established network that gives it meaning, while at the same time opening up the possibility of something like a statement in painting: as Wittgenstein wrote, words are but points, while propositions are arrows that have meaning, which is to say direction.[12]

Although Damisch denies that one can establish precisely the effect that Quattrocento perspective had on Classical architecture or stage production, he notes that the problems posed and solutions offered by Renaissance painters and architects did lead to developments in diverse areas such as mathematics and theater design Indeed, in a quote which captures the spirit of the research undertaken here, he suggests that perspective 'plays' across centuries and discourses and so,

> If there's no question of seeking to establish relations of cause and effect, or of derivation, between this manifestation and that, between this production and that, from heterogeneous domains, and if the links that can be established between diverse fields of knowledge are usually of an analogous, if not an imaginary or even fantasmatic, character (when they're not simply anecdotal), such juxtapositions nonetheless oblige us to jettison the compartmentalization of discourses imposed by the

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[11]Damisch sees the 'Ideal City' panels as 'representations of representation', a demonstration of perspective. Drawing on Lacanian psychoanalysis, Beneviste's linguistics and Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms, Damisch is interested in how *costruzione legittima* functions as a *dispositif* or model 'equivalent to a network of spatial adverbs, if not personal pronouns: in other words, to what linguistics call an "expressive apparatus" (*dispositif d'enonciation*, sometimes translated as "sentence structure").' p. xxi. *Costruzione legittima* is 'characterized by the conjunction, the bringing together at a given point designated the "origin," of lines that measure the declension of figures, by establishing their relationship to a shared horizon line, while simultaneously determining their conjugation on a plane.' *Origin of Perspective*, p. xxi.

[12]Damisch, *Origin of Perspective*, p. 446.

academic categorization of knowledge and to pose questions about the irreducible, necessary multiplicity of the forms that thought can assume.[13]

This 'interdiscursive approach encourages us to read the 'ideal city' panel as one more product of the Renaissance culture of space that also produced the idea of the territorial state. The same 'conditions of possibility' underpin the idea of the territorial state and the spaces of the ideal city.

The principle of sovereign identity that orders the modern spaces of presence and absence also orders the spatial structure of the panels. Damisch argues that perspective is like a language because perspective 'institutes and constitutes itself under the auspices of a point, a factor analogous to the "subject" or "person" in language, always posited in relation to a "here" or "there".'[14] In the Urbino panel the orthogonals come together at a point, the vanishing point, within the opening of the *tempio* door 'at the height of an eye of an imagined observer standing there, half hidden by the closed panel of the door and directing a Cyclopean gaze towards us.'[15] This is the place of the sovereign subject, occupying a space towards which our sight is inexorably drawn, and from which an ever present panoptic gaze observes us at all times.

Lefebvre showed us that in modernity symbolic and imaginary places are colonized by the abstract, cold and rational spaces of capitalism and the modern territorial state. The abstract spaces of modernity, including those designed by urban planners and architects, are produced in representations of space, sanctified by the sovereignty of the gaze. The planned architectural space of the three ideal city panels is cold, rational and architectonic. Stuart Cosgrove compares Ambrogio Lorenzetti's frescoes of *Good and Bad Government* (Fig. 4), painted between 1338-9, and referred to in the last chapter, with Pietro Perugino's *Christ Giving to St Peter the Keys to the Kingdom of Heaven* in the Sistine Chapel, painted around 1481-2 (Fig. 5), to show how the Quattrocento transformed the Renaissance experience of urban space.

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[13]Damisch, *Origin of Perspective*, p. 228.

[14]Damisch, *The Origin of Perspective,* p. 53. This subject is not, for Damisch, humanist 'man' because 'when man comes to terms with the symbolic order, his being is, from the very start, entirely absorbed in it, and produced by it, not as "man", but as subject.'

[15]Damisch, *The Origins of Perspective*, p. 341.

4. Ambrogio Lorenzetti, *Allegory of Good Government in the City*, **detail, Siena, Palazzo Pubblico**

In the Lorenzetti fresco the city is depicted as an active bustling world of human life. There is a feel for how a pedestrian walking in the city might have directly experienced its sights sounds and smells. It is not presented as viewed from the position of a detached observer. This is in sharp contrast with, what Walter Benjamin has called, the '*acting/gaming space for the figures*' in which the *istoria* of Saint Peter receiving the

5. Perugino, *Consignment of the Keys to St. Peter*, **Vatican, Sistine Chapel**

keys is taking place.[16] This is a formalized space of a 'monumental order ... organized through precise geometry' in which the regimented geometrical order of the checkerboard

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[16]Benjamin, quoted in Damisch, *Origin of Perspective*, p. 235

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piazza, drawing the eye to the temple at the center, is 'symbolic of the whole city. The hills and trees beyond reflect the same regimented order as the urban architecture.'[17] The theatrical poses of the various groups of people are choreographed with an almost disciplinary precision. The city is an abstract formal space that defines the places of the individuals in it; individuals who seem to be located within rather than being of the city. In our ideal city panels this motif is taken to its extreme and the abstract space is almost entirely void of human presence – only in the Baltimore panel do we see a few scattered figures whose bodies, like that of the burdened figure, leaning on a stick, in the foreground, are oppressed and disciplined by the totalitarian monumental space enclosing them.

The space represented in these ideal city paintings is what Deleuze and Guattari have called state space. State space is striated and coded with signs of the state's presence. Lauro Martines identifies the space in the panels as 'signorial space': this imaginary space conveys all the aspirations of the urban elites to construct spaces in accordance with the humanist principles of magnificence with its allusions to the grandeur of classical antiquity.[18] This space is one of striated hierarchies that communicates through established signs the presence of the ecclesiastical and secular oligarchies and the absence of the poor, the nomadic or the alien. So strong are the territorial logics of state based identity and nomadic difference in these images that we are reminded of Bauman's description of the spaces of the cosmopolitan-absolutist state and its policed sites, broad avenues and monumental order without 'vagabonds, vagrants or nomads.'[19]

Plans to develop urban space in the Renaissance favoured the urban elites at the expense of other groups. In the cities of vast squares, wide streets and large buildings 'more space was allotted to 'the powerful and less to the powerless.'[20] In Alberti's plans for an ideal city important families were kept away from the poor, the noise of tradesmen

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[17]Denis Cosgrove, 'Prospect, Perspective and the Evolution of the Landscape Idea', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers: New Series*, 10 (1985), pp. 45-6, at p. 49.

[18]Lauro Martines, *Power and Imagination: City-States in Renaissance Italy* (New York NY, Alfred A Knopf, 1979), see esp. pp. 271-6.

[19]Zygmunt Bauman, *Intimations of Postmodernity* (London, Routledge, 1992), p. xv.

[20]Martines, *Power and Imagination*, p. 274.

and the pernicious influences of the 'scoundrel rabble'. He envisaged a city built on a circular plan consisting of two walled cities: one concentrically inside the other, with the poor enclosed within the inner city.[21]

> This wall, I believe, should not run diametrically across the city but should form a kind of circle. For the wealthy citizens are happier in more spacious surroundings and would readily accept being excluded by an inner wall, and would not unwillingly leave the stalls and the town-center workshops to the market traders; and that rabble, as Terence's Gnatho calls them, of poulterers, butchers, cooks, and so on, will be less of a risk and less of a nuisance if they do not mix with the important citizens.[22]

This space is full of the cosmopolitan drive to order and control rational space. Francoise Choay reads Alberti's *De re aedificatoria*, presented to Pope Nicholas V in 1452 and first printed by Poliziano in 1485, as an 'instaurational' text that founded the discourse of urbanism. It was the first text to conceive of the built domain as a totality and the first to propose a rational method for conceptualizing and realizing buildings. *De re aedificatoria* was part of an epistemological configuration constituted by investigations into space in architecture, painting and sculpture, part of a 'cultural revolution 'which resulted in the imposition of a new ideal of control over the world and a transformation of relations between European man and his productions.'[23] For Martines the panels show 'vast organized spaces, or spaces more neatly boxed and absolutely controlled. Both the visual and scripted discourses of ideal cities are part of the modern culture of space, the site of the idea of the modern territorial state, in which man as sovereign subject seeks to control and order a rationalized space. In the projects of the ideal city, says Martines, 'power and imagination united and the ensuing vision of space was domineering, moved by a faith in men's ability to control the spatial continuum.'[24] If we were to replace the words 'ideal city' with 'idea of the territorial state' in the following quote we would have a good summary of our argument:

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[21]Alberti, *On the Art of Building*, V:1 & 6. Alberti's utopia was a product of its time, 'adapted to the realities of fifteenth-century Italy and thus envisioned under different forms of government – a republic; a prince ruling in accord with his subjects; or one imposing his will, a *tyrannus*.' Krautheimer, 'The Panels Reconsidered', p. 255.

[22]Alberti, *De re aedificatoria*, p. 118.

[23]Françoise Choay, *The Rule and the Method: On the Theory of Architecture and Urbanism* (Cambridge MA, The MIT Press, 1997). p. 5.

[24]Martines, *Power and Imagination*, p. 272.

The perfected forms of the imaginary ideal city – grand, symmetrical, proportioned, in fixed optical recession – went forth from a wish for control over the whole enviroment and from the implicit assumption that this was possible. The quest for the control of space in architecture, painting, and bas-relief sculpture was not analogous to a policy for more hegemony over the entire society; it belonged, rather, to the same movement of consciousness. Behind the two different enterprises was the same drive to comprehend the environment: to convert the surroundings, urban and even rural to a "known" field.[25]

Wither the Territorial State?

I hope to have shown that the idea of the territorial state is not an ahistorial universal category of knowledge but a specific representation of a particular modern configuration of political space. The idea of the territorial state is a modern idea. Its origins can be traced to the dawning of modernity. The modernity of the idea of the territorial state raise one final question: what status can this idea have in an age when the modern appears to be being replaced by the postmodern.

Within International Relations there is a growing body of work that is revising Herz's theme that demise of the idea of the territorial state is imminent. This time however the argument is that the idea of the territorial state does not sit comfortably with the landscape of a postmodern international order. John Ruggie feels that at the present moment of discontinuity in the history of the international system, when 'postmodern forms of configuring political space' are becoming increasingly prevalent, the idea of the territorial state is becoming a conceptual dinosaur.[26] Rob Walker agrees that international and political theory which continues to affirm the sovereign and territorial independence of states is at odds with contemporary experiences of 'temporality, speed, velocity and acceleration'. In a world of global flows of capital, internationalised production and transnational cultural experiences 'the complexity of spatial relations is more obvious than the simple legalistic maps of state sovereignty.'[27] Most damming of all, John Agnew

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[25]Martines, *Power and Imagination*, p. 275.

[26]John Gerard Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations', *International Organisation*, 47:1 (Winter 1993), pp. 138-74, quotes from pp. 143-4.

[27]R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 5 & 46.

and Stuart Corbridge argue that the discipline of International Relations is caught in a 'territorial trap'. International theory clinging to territorial representations of the state based 'on the methodological assumption of "timeless space" and the ontological presupposition that social, economic and political life can be contained within the state's territorial boundaries' is becoming increasingly irrelevant in a world of population movements, capital mobility, ecological interdependence, the information economy and military chronopolitics.[28]

These critiques of the idea of the territorial state in contemporary International Relations theory, reflect a general sense that order of the modern culture of space that emerged in the Renaissance may be coming to an end. We are informed that established modern conceptions of sovereignty, identity and violence, precisely those which we saw are grounded in the space of the idea of the territorial state, are dissolving into new postmodern configurations.

Gearóid O' Tauthail and Tim Luke claim that the modern world order is no longer one based in sovereign territorial states but is characterized by new types of post-territorial sovereignties. For O' Tauthail the 'new spatiality of flows' of regimes of information, globalization and capital which move in 'multiple, decentered flowmations' are 'provoking the development of un-stated space, networks, and webs that are not simply beyond, but overwhelm the jurisdictional power and territorial control of sovereign states.'[29] The territorial state, claims Luke, is isolated in hyperreal currents of informationalization and is unable to exercise its traditional geopolitical desires to police its territories, populations and markets.[30] The rules and norms established by state territories regarding their internal and external sovereignty are permeated by 'un-stated sovran potentates' constituted in the flows of 'Islam, populism, ecology, racialism, or gender to the drug trade, global tourism, fast capital, computer networks or mass media'[31]

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[28] John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy* (London, Routledge, 1995), pp. 78-100.

[29] Gearóid Ó Tuathail, 'At the End of Geopolitics? Reflections on a Plural Problematic at the Century's End', *Alternatives*, 22:1 (1997), pp. 35-55, p. 45.

[30] Timothy W. Luke, 'Placing Power/Siting Space: The Politics of Global and Local in the New World Order', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 12 (1994), pp. 613-28.

[31] Timothy W. Luke, 'Governmentality and Contragovernmentality: Rethinking Sovereignty and Territoriality After the Cold War' *Political Geography*, 15:6/7 (1996), pp. 491-507, at p. 500.

Centered sovereignty is being replaced by 'unstated sovrantees – decentered power centres, illegitimate law-making bodies, unruly rule setting agencies' these 'fissionable nuclei' are able to enter traverse and leave spaces that states can no longer exercise control over.[32]

As territorial sovereignty erodes, territorially-based violence gives way to a regime of chronopolitics centered on the war-machine. Paul Virilio argues that space is being effaced by speed.[33] Since the industrial or *dromocratic* revolution, mankind has passed 'from the age of brakes to the age of the accelerator.'[34] The age of geopolitics represented by the city-state and nation-state capable of mapping 'out a political space that existed in a given duration' by parceling out geographical space and organizing populations within territories, is over.[35] In the era of speed, geography has been replaced by chronology as new technological vectors of transport, communication and warfare have deregulated distance:

> Space is no longer in geography – it's in electronics. Unity is in the terminals. It's in the instantaneous time of command posts, multi-national headquarters, control towers, etc. Politics is less in physical space than in the time systems administered by various technologies, from telecommunications to airplanes ... There is a movement from geo- to chronopolitics: the distribution of territory becomes the distribution of time. The distribution of territory is outmoded, minimal.[36]

As speed restricts the field of freedom, Virilio anticipates a dystopian future in which 'nothing is left but absolute immediate control' and in which '[t]he loss of material space leads to the government of nothing but time.'[37] James Der Derian argues that speed in combination with the technologies of simulation and surveillance has produced new 'technostrategic practices' which privilege image over fact and time over space,

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[32]Luke, 'Governmentality', p. 505.

[33]See, among many other works, Paul Virilio, *Speed and Politics: An Essay on Dromology*, trans Mark Polizotti, (New York NY, Semiotext(e), 1986); and Paul Virilio (with Sylvere Lotringer), *Pure War*, trans. Mark Polizotti, (New York NY, Semiotext(e), 1983).

[34]Virilio, *Pure War*, p. 45. Until the industrial or, as Virilio prefers to call it, *dromocratic* revolution, the potential for producing speed was limited by the capabilities of horse and ship. Society was 'founded on the brake, in obstacles: ramparts, laws and interdictions. The term *dromology* is derived from *dromos,* race.

[35]Virilio, *Pure War*, p. 60.

[36]Virilio, *Pure War*, p. 115.

[37]Virilio, *Speed and Politics*, p. 141.

producing a 'war of perception and representation'.[38] International relations is today no longer a 'realm defined by sovereign places, impermeable borders and rigid geopolitics' but 'a site of accelerating flows, contested borders, and fluid chronopolitics.'[39]

These transformations in the spatial qualities of sovereignty and violence are complemented by a de-spatialisation of identity. According to Fredric Jameson the Cartesian subject is disorientated by the landscape of the postmodern in which an all-pervasive spatial logic has effaced historical time and eliminated 'the past as "referent", leaving us with 'nothing but texts.'[40] The disorientation felt by the modern subject as it attempt to negotiate postmodern space is typified by the visitor to Frank Gehry's *House* in Santa Monica who is positioned in a space of contradictory perspective in which the standing human subject of Renaissance perspective is denied a place. As the postmodern erases the traditional referents of family, city or state, the subject is faced with an increasing level of spatial abstraction and displacement.[41] The modern subject submerged within the abstract spaces of global, multinational, de-centered capitalism, spaces in which the traditional referents of depth, distance and perspective are no longer viable, lacks the necessary conceptual tools and vocabularies with which to map them and its place within them. In the saturated spaces of postmodernity constituting a 'multidimensional set of radically discontinuous realities' the modern subject becomes fragmented and schizophrenically de-centered.[42] Along with our subjectivity, the spaces of the postmodern threaten our notion of identity in place. Marc Augé claims that today 'anthropological places' in which individuals were once able to negotiate their place in society in terms of historical genealogies, bounded relations and coherent identities, that is through the 'concrete and symbolic construction of space', are being substituted by non-places or spaces 'which cannot be defined as relational, or historical, or concerned

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[38]James Der Derian, 'The (S)pace of International Relations: Simulation, Surveillance, and Speed', *International Studies Quarterly*, 34:3 (1990), pp. 295-310.

[39]James Der Derian, *Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War* (Cambridge MA, Blackwell Publishers, 1992), pp. 129-30.

[40]See, Fredric Jameson, 'Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism', *New Left Review*, 146 (July-August 1984), pp. 53-92 at p. 66.

[41]For Jameson's discussion of Gehry's architecture and postmodern space, see Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (London, Verso, 1991), pp. 412-3.

[42]Jameson, *Postmodernism*, p. 413.

with identity.'[43] These non-places – motorways, airport terminals, supermarkets, computer screens, automatic cash dispensers – are the spaces of a world 'surrendered to solitary individuality, to the fleeting, the temporary and ephemeral.'[44] In non-places the social contract is mediated by abstract signs and images which constitute the individual as a homogeneous identity – as customer, passenger or banker, yet also ensure that the individual's experience of these spaces is solitary.[45]

These accounts of the transition from a modern to postmodern spatial order lead to a number of final reflections in the context of our work on the discursive production and origins of the idea of the Realist-Weberian territorial state in Renaissance Italy. First, these narratives all endorse the inter-disciplinary research undertaken here. They insist that we trace the contours of the postmodern spatial order in terms of the emergent logics of sovereignty, violence and identity. Second, they all confirm that the spaces of politics, be they the modern spaces of the sovereign territorial state or the post-territorial political spaces of the postmodern, must be analyzed in terms of their positions in networks of heterogeneous discourses and practices of space, which they both produce and are produced by. Cartographers of the unfamiliar political spaces of postmodernity must begin to trace their contours by addressing the whole postmodern culture of space and the conditions of possibility that it establishes for the ways in which we order, represent and experience space. Perhaps this research into the origins of the idea of the modern territorial state can suggest some ways in which we can begin to identify the origins of the idea of the postmodern post-territorial state.

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[43]Marc Augé, *Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity* (London, Verso 1995) pp. 77-8. For Augé it is possible to 'contrast the realities of *transit* (transit camps or passengers in transit) with those of residence or dwelling; the *interchange* (where nobody crosses anyone else's path) with the *crossroads* (where people meet); the *passenger* (defined by his *destination*) with the *traveller* (who strolls along his *route* ...; the *housing estate* ... where people do not live together and which is never situated in the centre of anything ... with the *monument* where people share and commemorate', pp. 107-8.

[44]Augé, *Non-places*, p. 78.

[45]Augé, *Non-places*, p. 103. Augé illustrates this phenomenon with reference to the experience of motorway travel. Motorways no longer pass through places and thus deny the driver or passenger direct experience of the rhythms of daily life. The individual speeding past a place is only aware of it and able to imagine it in terms of the signs and images referring to it on motorway notices.

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