

**RECONCILING HISTORICALLY EXCLUDED AND
DISADVANTAGED GROUPS:
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, RECOGNITION AND THE POLITICS OF
RECONCILIATION**

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

Bashir Bashir

Government Department
London School of Economics and Political Science
University of London
2006

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To my parents, Barakat and Fauziya

ABSTRACT

This thesis provides a critical examination of four approaches to democratic inclusion. These approaches are: egalitarian theories of deliberative democracy, identity politics and its post-structuralist critics, and integrative approaches. The thesis presents each approach as a successively more effective way of addressing democratic exclusion. Each theory is measured against the demands of accommodating the claims of groups that have suffered some form of historical exclusion and injustice. The thesis explains the significance of the demands of historical injustices in relation to these approaches and concludes that deliberative democracy and the politics of recognition require supplementation by a politics of reconciliation. Drawing on the idea of reconciliation from conflict resolution and international relations, the thesis explores the way in which democratic inclusion can be supplemented.

The politics of reconciliation is fundamentally crucial for the task of accommodating demands of historically excluded social groups primarily because of its emphasis on confronting the past, acknowledging injustices, taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices and embracing the concrete and specific experiences of historical oppression and exclusion. Briefly, the distinctiveness of reconciliation stems from its serious engagement with the specificities and particularities of real and concrete experiences of historical oppression and exclusion.

The originality of this thesis lies in providing a supplement to and therefore transforming the politics of recognition and deliberative democracy and their ability to address political problems of excluded social groups. This thesis does not aim to replace deliberation and recognition with new substitutes but seeks to offer a new interpretation of these theories and supplement them with reconciliation. Briefly, the thesis offers a new interpretation to familiar issues in different disciplines and the novel task has been to bring them together. The application of the ethic of reconciliation, from International Relations and conflict resolution, to the politics of recognition and deliberation makes a significant contribution to the field and the opening of a new research agenda for normative theories of democratic inclusion.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My first and foremost debt is to my supervisor, Paul Kelly. Aside from being consistently patient and supportive, Paul has also been a source of inspiration for me throughout all the phases of my Ph.D. His sound advice and stimulating feedback made writing this thesis an enriching learning experience.

Cecile Fabre, my advisor, was also of great help to me. Cecile read several drafts of my chapters and provided valuable guidance and comments.

Elena Bechberger, Claire Moon, Ori Lev, Michelle Obeid, Shani Orgad, and Shlomi Segall read drafts of some of the chapters in the dissertation and offered invaluable comments and suggestions. This would have been a very different work if not for their help.

I would also like to thank Gad Barzilai, Avner de-Shalit, Iris Marion Young, Cillian McBride, Peretz Segal, Nathan Widder and Will Kymlicka for helpful comments and suggestions on different parts of the thesis.

My friends Sufyan Alayasa, Amnon Aran, Fadi Bala'awi, Nabih Bashir, Zahir Bashir, Gertraud Borea d'Olmo, Carlos Ibarguen, Rosi Kahane, Keren Segal, Simone Seper, Margit Schmidt, and Husam Zomlot have all provided helpful advice and support when these were most needed.

I benefited enormously from presenting and discussing my work at the Government Department's Political Theory Workshop. I am grateful to Rodney Barker, Claire Chamber, John Charvet, Katrin Flikschuh, John Gray, Christian List and other participants of the workshop for their encouragement and useful comments.

During the time it took to write the dissertation I received the generous financial support of *The Karim Rida Said Foundation*, *The LSE*, *The President and Rector Scholarship of Tel-Aviv University*, *The Overseas Reward Scheme*, and *The Arab British Chamber of Commerce*. I wish to express my gratitude to all of them.

Finally, my parents, Fauziya and Barakat, my sisters, Akaber and Amira, and my brothers, Ahmad and Amir, have been there for me throughout, to offer their unconditional love and support. It is to them that I am ultimately indebted.

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SECTION I: HISTORICAL EXCLUSION AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

1. INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the communist bloc, the alleged end of ‘the age of ideologies’, the massive influx of immigration into Western democracies, the emergence of religious fundamentalism, and the processes of globalisation have all contributed to put pressure on contemporary liberal democracies to deal more profoundly with ‘the fact of pluralism’. More recently and particularly after September 11th there has been an alarming increase in Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, Anti-Arab sentiments and other forms of discrimination and racism against minorities in Europe, the United States and elsewhere in the world. Lately, the public debates in France and Germany have been dominated by the question of whether or not young Muslim women should be allowed to wear the Islamic headscarf, or *hijab* as it is known in Arabic, in public schools. The disquieting increase in racism, discrimination and the formal institutional reactions to them do not only raise serious doubts about the effectiveness and adequacy of certain policies and decisions but also question and challenge certain values, beliefs and principles underlying the politics in contemporary Western liberal democracies. Briefly, the phenomenon of cultural diversity re-imposes itself again as a very pressing issue for contemporary multicultural and pluralist societies. Different political and social theorists have tried to rethink liberalism and democracy,¹ hoping to offer better theories of democratic accommodation. There are many approaches in contemporary political theory to developing a more ‘inclusive’ idea of democratic citizenship, including theories of liberal egalitarianism, theories of deliberative democracy, theories of multicultural recognition and theories of agonistic democracy.²

¹ It should be emphasized that liberalism should not be viewed as a monolithic tradition. What I refer to as liberalism here is mostly the contemporary *rights* based liberal theory that has dominated the debates in the last 40 years.

² There are several other attempts that endeavour to recast liberalism. While the thesis is aware of the main attempts, it is certainly beyond its scope to provide an exhaustive discussion of all of them. Some of these attempts are advanced by liberal scholars that primarily focus on accommodating the demands of cultural groups in relation to questions of justice and not political deliberation. See for example: Will

The task of democratic accommodation is made even more difficult when there are persistent and unresolved issues of historical injustice. In the last decade there have been numerous developments that have considerably contributed to the centrality of historical injustices in contemporary politics. Among these developments are the formation of the Reparations Coordinating Committee (RCC) and the National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America (N'COBRA) that advocate reparations for African Americans on the history of slavery and its consequences, the American Congress offering in 1988 an apology and compensation to the survivors and relatives of Japanese Americans jailed in concentration camps during the Second World War, the Swiss government creating a \$ 71 millions special compensation fund for Holocaust victims to compensate for holding assets of Holocaust survivors at Swiss banks, and the establishment of truth and reconciliation committees in countries such as South Africa, Algeria, Chile, Germany, and Argentina. This thesis argues that persistent historical injustices give rise to a set of special demands, such as collective memory of exclusion, acknowledgement of historical injustices, and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices, which go beyond the types of democratic inclusion that are often offered by theories such as deliberative democracy and the politics of recognition. This set of demands, this thesis claims, requires a 'politics of reconciliation'.

The present thesis focuses primarily on four approaches to democratic inclusion and their attentiveness to persistent and unresolved issues of historical injustice. These approaches are deliberative democracy, the politics of recognition and its democratic critics (considered as two different and contradictory – but related

Kymlicka, *Liberalism, Community and Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Oxford: New York: Clarendon Press, 1995), *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); David Miller, *On Nationality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), *Citizenship and National Identity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000); Brian Barry, *Justice as Impartiality* (Oxford University Press, 1995); *Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001). Other more critical scholars, such as value pluralists, have suggested rethinking liberalism through raising serious doubts about the commensurabilities and compatibility of values, beliefs and principles that underline the dominant versions of liberalism, i.e., liberalism of *rights* theory. Along these lines John Gray proposes a neo-Hobbesian form of politics and Chantal Mouffe suggests an agonistic form of politics that denies the possibility of achieving pure consensus and emphasizes the impossibility of eradicating power from social relations and politics. For more see: John Gray, *Two Faces of Liberalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), *Heresies: Against Progress and other Illusions* (London: Granta, 2004); Chantal Mouffe, *The Democratic Paradox* (London: Verso, 2000), 'Democracy, Power, and the "Political"' in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 245-256.

approaches), and combinatorial theories of democratic inclusion. The thesis critically examines and presents each approach as a successively more effective way of addressing democratic exclusion. Each theory is measured against the demands of accommodating the claims of groups that have suffered some form of historical exclusion and injustice. The thesis demonstrates that these approaches are insufficiently attentive to issues of historical injustice and concludes that they require supplementation by a politics of reconciliation. Since the thesis is primarily concerned with issues pertaining to historical exclusions and injustices suffered by social groups, I will provide an account of the general character of these injustices and social groups before I move to briefly introduce each of the four main approaches of democratic inclusion examined in the thesis and 'the politics of reconciliation' as a solution to their unsatisfactory treatment of historical exclusions and injustices. I will finish by describing how the argument unfolds and the structure of the thesis.

The focus of this thesis is on social groups that have suffered from persistent historical injustices. This thesis is concerned with historical injustices that are either persistent or intimately linked to present inequalities and injustices. These historical injustices are not the product of contingency and luck but stem primarily from oppressive social practices and institutions that operate over long periods of time, across generations. These oppressive social practices and structures systematically legitimize the exclusion and oppression of social groups because their members possess certain features that mark them as inferiors and deviants. Moreover, these oppressive social practices and structures do not only function at the level of formal and bureaucratic institutions but also at the informal level of ordinary cultural and social interactions. Therefore, these oppressive social practices and structures produce historical injustices that are concerned with material resources and goods as well as with cultural and symbolic ones. Historical injustices do not, however, have a single general character but are diverse and plural in character. This thesis is concerned with social groups (such as racial, national, and ethnic groups) that are defined through relations of oppression and not merely associations (such as churches, universities, and political parties) or aggregations (such as 'friends of Mozart', and 'drivers of Honda cars'). One of the main differences among these three types of categories is that while what brings members of associations and aggregations together is a common set of attributes (such as admiration of a specific singer, football player or club, passion to a certain type of art, cuisine or brand of cars, or affiliation to a

particular political party), members of social groups are bound by something additional, namely, a shared sense of identity. This notion of common identity stems from shared history and similarities members of the group have in their way of life, experiences, social norms and cultural practices. Moreover, while associations and aggregations are created by independent individuals who voluntarily create them, social groups are what constitute individuals and shape their tastes, memories, and modes of behaviours, communication and reasoning abilities.³ Membership in social groups is often involuntary.⁴

What makes a social group *oppressed*? Iris Marion Young offers a very useful definition of oppression. According to her definition people are oppressed when, by virtue of their membership in a particular social group, they are vulnerable to exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, or violence.⁵ These five faces of oppression can be explained as follows. Exploitation occurs when the product of the human capacity of labour of a group of people is systematically controlled and transferred for the benefit of another group. While exploitation in its traditional Marxist interpretation referred only to class oppression, Young argues that exploitation is also organized along sexual and racial lines. Marginalization is a form

³ For more on the differences between social groups, associations, and aggregations see: Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 42-48. Melissa S. Williams, *Voice, Trust and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 15-18.

⁴ I am not implying here that individuals cannot develop their own tastes and styles that differ from what is dominant in their group. Indeed, they are able to develop their own tastes and styles. Moreover, the involuntary character does not necessarily imply that individuals are entirely incapable of rejecting certain aspects of their group identity and sometimes even, though it could be emotionally and psychologically demanding, withdrawing from this group. Additionally, individuals do not belong only to one group but they are likely to simultaneously belong to several.

⁵ Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, pp. 48-63. Nancy Fraser proposes a similar account of exclusion and injustice. Yet, she proposes to analytically distinguish between two types of injustice; socio-economic injustice that 'is rooted in the political-economic structure of society' and cultural or symbolic injustice that 'is rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication'. Examples of socio-economic injustice include: 'exploitation (having the fruits of one's labour appropriated for the benefit of others); economic marginalization (being confined to undesirable or poorly paid work or being denied access to income-generating labour altogether); and deprivation (being denied an adequate material standard of living)'. Examples of cultural or symbolic injustice include: 'cultural domination (being subjected to patterns of interpretation and communication that are associated with another culture and are alien and /or hostile to one's own); nonrecognition (being rendered invisible via the authoritative representational, communicative, and interpretative practices of one's culture); and disrespect (being routinely maligned or disparaged in stereotypic public cultural representations and/or in everyday life interactions)'. Fraser acknowledges that these two types of injustice are intertwined yet she insists that in her account of social theory it is important to keep them analytically distinct. For more on this see: Nancy Fraser, 'From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a 'Post-Socialist' Age', *New Left Review*, 212 (1995), pp. 68-93.

of oppression that constitutes a group of people, such as Blacks, old people and Latin Americans, as useless in the wage system of labour. The economy and its market define the organization and hierarchy of the social division of labour. Those who are marked as useless by the wage system of labour are likely to be subject to material deprivation that severely influences their living conditions. However, marginalization causes harms that go beyond material distribution. These harms take the forms of feelings of uselessness, boredom and low self-esteem. Even when welfare policies are introduced to remedy the material deprivation, they are likely to produce marginalization because marginalized people are constructed and viewed as dependent people. Moreover, marginalized people feel that they lack the opportunity to engage in socially meaningful productive activities. Powerlessness is a form of oppression that stems from the social division of labour between professionals and non-professionals. Non-professionals are powerless because they lack social respect and recognition, authority over others and avenues to develop their capacities and skills. Professionals receive respect and recognition for their talents, enjoy authority over others and have avenues to develop their skills. Cultural imperialism is experienced when the dominant and hegemonic group universalizes its perspectives, interpretations of events and history, experiences, and cultural beliefs and practices and constructs them as the norm and views those who have different experiences, values, beliefs and perspectives as outsiders, inferiors and deviants. Therefore, the dominant culture assigns negative connotations, stereotypes, and prejudices to these groups and their identities. The negative connotations, stereotypes, and prejudices depict and fix these groups and their members as essentially inferiors and deviants that need to be civilized, controlled, denied, administrated or educated. This stigmatized demeaning depiction is often made socially acceptable and institutionalized and therefore legitimizes the exercise of oppressive acts such as coercive assimilative policies. Moreover, the social recognition and institutionalization of the inferiority of these groups justify the exercise of systematic violence that takes the shape of harassment, humiliation, psychological fear, physical violence, arbitrary imprisonment, and under special circumstances leads to occupation, genocide or massacre, especially when the hegemony of the dominant culture is challenged by these inferior groups.⁶

⁶ Occupation, genocide and massacre are not clearly mentioned in Young's account. Yet as several

What makes a social group *historically* oppressed? It is the systematic vulnerability to one, or more, of the previous forms of oppression over long periods of time, across generations. These prolonged and systematic forms of oppression do not only strengthen the affinities between the group's members but also generate common experiences and a history of oppression. The common experience and history of oppression do not only revolve around injury, harm, suffering and pain but also achievements, determination and resistance. These negative and positive aspects are manifested and expressed through different cultural and political practices such as art, music, literature, story-telling, memorials, ceremonies, collective actions and mobilization, demonstrations, and various forms of struggle. While these common experiences and history of oppression do not create a fixed core essence for the groups because of the dynamic nature of the social processes that create social groups, they do give rise to a set of special claims and demands that go beyond the mere recognition of their culture and identity. Among these claims and demands are: collective memory and history of exclusion, acknowledgement of historical injustices, and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices. These are the types of claims, the thesis will argue, that are insufficiently captured by egalitarian theories of deliberative democracy, politics of recognition and its post-structuralist critics and combinatory theories of democratic inclusion.

Exploitation, marginalization, and powerlessness, refer to forms of oppression that are primarily generated by the social division of labour. The social division of labour determines 'who works for whom, who does not work, and how the content of the work defines one institutional position relative to others.'⁷ While these three forms of oppression could generate certain types of historical injustices if they are systematically exercised over a long period of time, this thesis is chiefly concerned with the last two forms of oppression, i.e., cultural imperialism and violence. In other words, although oppression is likely to emerge along categories of identity such as gender, disability, sexuality, age and class, the emphasis in this thesis is primarily on oppression that stems along categories of identity such as race, ethnicity and culture. The thesis, therefore, focuses primarily on social groups such as indigenous

historical examples suggest these forms of violence are likely to be perpetrated under the pretext of cultural imperialism. The examples include the treatment of the indigenous peoples of Australia, North and South America, and Palestine by the colonizing settler societies.

⁷ Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, p. 58.

communities, national groups and minorities, and immigrant communities. Indeed, members of oppressed social groups that suffer from cultural imperialism and systematic violence are also likely to suffer from exploitation, marginalization, or powerlessness. This is not to argue that only historical oppression and injustice is important or urgent nor that the historical dimension is at the forefront of all political struggles for inclusion, but it is to acknowledge that some forms of oppression and domination cannot be characterized or addressed without taking seriously the historical dimension. In other words, it is the historical character of the oppression that creates political urgency because it is this which shapes identities in terms of conflict and opposition. Moreover, it should be emphasized that the historical dimension is plural in character and this is why I do not aim to provide a simple list of the relevant historically excluded groups. The historical character of oppression transforms the urgency and priority of issues of inclusion and accommodation. However, its nature and significance is varied in different cases. In some cases, such as ethno-national conflicts it might have absolute priority in deciding the terms of a democratic resolution. In other cases the urgency is less but the demands of reconciliation might still be central to addressing the demands of the excluded group in a way that fits within other theories of democratic inclusion and practice.

The historical dimension is not only a temporal or chronological dimension as much oppression is long-standing. What is distinctive about historical oppression is that it leaves a stigma that persists even after certain kinds of reparations are made, and it is the eradication of that stigma which is tied up in the identity of a group that is so important. What matters to some groups is not simply that they are oppressed but also how they came to be oppressed; for example, we can think of enslavement, forcible removal from land or property, physical expulsion or the coercive denial of aspects of identity such as language and religion. How a group came to occupy a position of subordination matters; this is reflected, for instance, in the Quebec concern for linguistic justice. It is the historical fact of groups becoming colonised that matters to them, even if many outsiders might regard some of their claims as less than compelling. Where history really matters is with groups or nations such as African Americans, Jews after the holocaust and Palestinians to name but three, where certain historical acts of injustice, expropriation, forcible transfer, and domination are central to shaping those groups' identities. In such cases the historical legacy is a very deep wound and one which goes to the very core of a group's identity and being. It is for

this reason that Holocaust denial is so important to Jews; it is not merely an error of scholarship. Similarly, it is for this reason that the legacy of slavery is so important to African Americans; the issue is not simply one of racial domination, but the peculiar character of that domination in terms of the denial of history, identity and value through the institution of slavery. For Palestinians the issue of having the particularities of their oppression acknowledged as an expropriated and colonised people is important especially when Palestinian rights, identity and claims are denied by Israel and subject to the interests of Western powers and U.S. foreign policy elites. To fail to address these specific, albeit plural dimensions of historical oppression, involves a denial of recognition and inclusion, whatever other goods such as material resources and rights are being offered.

Earlier I have claimed that the common experiences and history of oppression gave rise to a set of special claims and demands that go beyond the mere recognition of culture and identity. Most importantly among these demands are collective memory of exclusion, acknowledgement of historical injustices, and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices. These three demands emerge and require special treatment because of the significance of the past in achieving democratic accommodation through unmasking and explaining historical injustices and their intimate connection with present inequalities. Since these three claims lie at the core of 'the politics and of reconciliation', and because they will be used to measure the ability of the four main approaches discussed in this thesis to accommodate historically excluded social groups, saying a few words about each one of them is very important at this initial stage. According to the politics of reconciliation, collective memory and history of exclusion are important because they often serve as invaluable sources for undermining and confronting dominant views, stories, narratives and past and present political arrangements and practices. These dominant views, stories, narratives and political institutions tend to downplay or deny historical injustices and harms. In other words, collective memory and history of exclusion operate as counter narratives to the hegemonic institutionalized and often celebrated account of national history. The significance of these counter narratives is to bring to public attention voices, stories and inequalities that have been either silenced or denied. The national account of history either denies or downplays the occurrence of past harms and portrays the dominant group as irresponsible for causing these harms. Several scholars have emphasized the role of collective memory in

challenging and countering the hegemonic national accounts of history. Thomas McCarthy has pointed out that a distorted account of the history of slavery and its consequences on African Americans has considerably contributed to the refusal of the broader white American society and its establishment to recognize the historical injustices of slavery, to take responsibility for causing them and for not linking them to present racial exclusions.⁸ The Palestinians, at least until the 1960s, have invoked their memories of expulsion by relying mostly on oral testimonies and story-telling in order to continuously counter the dominant Zionist and Israeli narratives. The dominant narratives of the Israeli and Zionist historiography have denied the role of the Jewish Zionist military groups in creating the Palestinian *nakba* (disaster) and denied the existence of a master plan to expel and dispossess Palestinians from their villages and towns.⁹ Burke Hendrix has argued that mainstream celebrated American national narratives downplay or deny the historical injustices and harms of slavery, racial segregation and the massive expropriation of Native lands. While focusing on the land claims of Native Americans, Hendrix has argued that memories and narratives of Native Americans that lend support to their land claims have challenged the mainstream American national narratives and demanded their revision and reformulation so they acknowledge the historical injustices committed against Native Americans.¹⁰

⁸ See: Thomas McCarthy, 'Vergangenheitsbewältigung in the USA: On the Politics of Memory of Slavery', *Political Theory*, 30:5 (2002), pp. 623-648, 'Coming to Terms with Our Past, Part II: On the Morality and Politics of Reparations for Slavery', *Political Theory*, 32:6 (2004), pp. 750-772.

⁹ Recently revealed archives in Israel have led a few Israeli historians, referred to as the 'new historians', to recognize what Palestinians have been persistently claiming, i.e. the active role the Zionist movement played in organizing forceful expulsion of Palestinians from their villages and towns. For more on this debate and the role of Palestinian memory in challenging the Israeli 'master narratives' see: Joel Beinin, 'Forgetfulness for Memory: The Limits of the New Israeli History', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 34:2 (2005), pp. 6-23. Norman Finkelstein, 'Myths, Old and New', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 21:1 (1991), pp. 66-89; Nur Masalha, 'A Critique of Benny Morris', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 21:1 (1991), pp. 90-97; Benny Morris, 'Response to Finkelstein and Masalha', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 21:1 (1991), pp. 98-114.

¹⁰ Burke Hendrix argues that both groups need to revise their memories in a process of reconciliation. She insists, however, that the revision has to occur mostly on the side of those who are not Natives. For more on her views regarding the significance of memories in Native American land claims see: Burke A. Hendrix, 'Memory in Native American Land Claims', *Political Theory*, 33:6 (2005), pp. 763-785. For more on the role of memory see also: Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, Lewis A. Coser (ed. and trans.) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), *The Collective Memory*, Francis J. Ditter, Jr. and Vida Yazdi Ditter (trans.) (New York: Harper & Row, 1980); Milton Takei, 'Collective Memory as the Key to National and Ethnic Identity: The Case of Cambodia', *Nationalism & Ethnic Politics*, 4:3 (1998), pp. 59-78.

Therefore, the politics of reconciliation does not only demand uncovering historical wrongs and their influence on the current social and political arrangements but also requires acknowledging the occurrence of these historical harms and taking collective responsibility for causing them. As long as these past injustices are denied or portrayed as accidental historical events and not as an integral part of the national narratives, the achievement of democratic resolutions and accommodation remains difficult to attain, if at all possible, from the perspective of the historically excluded social groups. Hendrix has argued that unless past wrongs against Native Americans' ancestors are acknowledged as an integral part of the United States history, it will be very hard for Native Americans to trust the broader society and its institutions and identify with them.¹¹ Thomas McCarthy has pursued a similar argument in the case of African Americans and the history of slavery and segregation.¹² One might argue that it is plausible to demand national responsibility when the nation is not composed out of successive and culturally diverse waves of immigration but it is implausible to demand such responsibility when it is composed from successive and culturally diverse waves of immigration. It is precisely because coming to terms with past wrongs has direct bearings on the present and the future of the political community and its institutions that immigrants do share the national responsibility of causing historical injustices. Therefore, scholars such as Thomas McCarthy have argued that national responsibility is not grounded on cultural or primordial ties but on constitutional and political ties. McCarthy claims that all U.S. citizens, regardless of ancestry, i.e. natives or immigrants, inherit the burdens as well as the benefits of the membership.¹³ According to the politics of reconciliation, taking responsibility and offering an apology should not remain at the declarative level. It requires structural changes in the distribution of material resources and goods that are very likely to transform the living conditions of the members of historically excluded social groups.

¹¹ Hendrix, 'Memory in Native American Land Claims', p. 775.

¹² Thomas McCarthy, 'Vergangenheitsbewältigung in the USA: On the Politics of Memory of Slavery', *Political Theory*, 30:5 (2002), pp. 635-636. The issue of acknowledging past injustices and harms is also discussed in: Carol A.L. Prager and Trudy Govier (eds.), *Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts* (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2003); and William J. Long and Peter Brecke, *War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution*, (The MIT Press, 2003).

¹³ McCarthy, 'Vergangenheitsbewältigung in the USA: On the Politics of Memory of Slavery', p. 636, 'Coming to Terms with Our Past, Part II: On the Morality and Politics of Reparations for Slavery', pp. 757-758; Balfour, 'Reparations After Identity Politics', p.790; and Hendrix, 'Memory in Native American Land Claims', p.775.

Additionally, taking responsibility and offering an apology for past injustices goes beyond distributive changes and entails activities such as the creation of national symbols, public holiday, museums, memorials and introducing new curriculum in the education system to commemorate these past injustices. The task of these activities is not to perpetuate guilt or victimhood. Rather, they are invaluable because of their social, pedagogical and educational influences. That is, they are important in helping citizens understand their history differently and successfully link it to the current distorted political, social and economic inequalities and to help members of stigmatized and excluded groups to reclaim, re-describe or transform their self-image and self-understanding.¹⁴

Let me now return to examine the adequacy of some prominent accounts of democratic inclusion in contemporary political theory to accommodate historical exclusion and injustices. The current debate in democratic theory is primarily centred on the model of deliberative democracy. This model has been proposed by thinkers such as Jurgen Habermas and John Rawls as an alternative model to the 'aggregative model of democracy' that prevailed in Western democracies after the Second World War. In the aggregative model, democracy is viewed as an electoral competitive system to elect skilled political leaders who are capable of making legislative and administrative decisions. This model places the preferences and interests of individuals rather than those of community at the core of its concern. It views these preferences and interests as predetermined and fixed prior to the political process. According to the aggregative model, individual citizens combine efforts and create interest-groups, associations, parties or factions that allegedly represent and defend their interests and compete for power on their behalf. Citizens in this system lose their centrality; their role is reduced to merely voting at regular intervals for political parties and interest groups who bargain and take decisions on their behalf. Democracy, according to this aggregative understanding, is a method without a substance. In other words, it does not embody specific moral values or principles but it is just a

¹⁴For more on taking responsibility and offering an apology and their material and symbolic consequences see: Eric K. Yamamoto and Susan K. Serrano, 'Healing Racial Wounds? The Final Report of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission', in Roy L. Brooks (ed.), *When Sorry Isn't Enough: The Controversy over Apologies and Reparations for Human Rights* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), pp. 492-500; McCarthy, 'Coming to Terms with Our Past, Part II: On the Morality and Politics of Reparations for Slavery', pp. 765-766; Balfour, 'Reparations After Identity Politics', p. 790; and Martha Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998).

mechanism or institutional arrangement for competition among several interest-groups on political leadership.¹⁵ The imposed divorce between democratic politics and its moral dimension, the reduction of democratic politics to voting, and the thin notion of legitimacy that lies at the core of the aggregative model, have led several thinkers to recast democracy to focus on substantial moral principles and thicker notions of democratic legitimacy.

The shift to substantial moral principles and thicker notions of democratic legitimacy coincided with the development of the 'deliberative turn' in democratic theory during the 1990's. This turn has added a new dimension to debates about democratic legitimacy. According to the deliberative turn, collective decisions are legitimate only when all those who are affected by them have the right to participate in deliberation, as free and equal persons, about their content.¹⁶ The deliberative turn together with the renewed concern with moral principles have given rise to several theories of deliberative democracy that are primarily concerned with social justice and democratic legitimacy. These theories have been proposed by their advocates as adequate answers to the challenges facing contemporary democratic theory. Broadly the deliberative democracy enterprise can be mapped out into three different variants: Aristotelian, epistemic and egalitarian.¹⁷ The present thesis focuses primarily on the third variant, namely, the egalitarian.¹⁸ The egalitarian variant of deliberative

¹⁵ For more on the aggregative model of democracy see: Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1976); David Held, *Models of Democracy* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1996).

¹⁶ Bernard Manin, 'On Legitimacy and Political deliberation', *Political Theory*, 15:3 (1987), pp. 338-368; Joshua Cohen, 'Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy.' in Alan Hamlin and Phillip Pettit (eds.), *The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 17-34; Seyla Benhabib, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy', in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996).

¹⁷ Cillian McBride draws similar distinctions. See Cillian McBride, *Context and Social Criticism* (PhD Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2001). Moreover, Ricardo Blaug makes interesting distinctions between different models of democracy. For more see: Ricardo Blaug, 'Engineering Democracy', *Political Studies*, 50:1 (2002), pp. 102-116.

¹⁸ Unlike the epistemic variant of deliberative democracy that focuses primarily on institutional questions and public policy, this thesis focuses on normative questions. Moreover, both the Aristotelian and epistemic variants of deliberative democracy do not suggest an appealing way to deal with the demands of historically excluded social groups. For while the former views political participation as a superior notion of the good, the latter carries an elitist potential. The Aristotelian variant rejects the model of representative democracy and aspires to conjure up the Athenian ideal of direct democracy that characterized the Greek polis and presents it as a desirable model for contemporary modern societies. What lies at the crux of this Aristotelian version is the centrality of political participation in public life. In other words, according to this version of democracy, there is a single favourite way of

democracy, it is often claimed, is more desirable for multicultural and pluralistic societies. For, among other things, it emphasizes egalitarian procedures, recognizes the existence of equally valuable different notions of the good, and is committed to individual autonomy.

Two main approaches can be identified within the egalitarian version of deliberative democracy, the Rawlsian and the Habermasian. Both Habermas and Rawls aim to reconcile liberal principles of individual rights with the democratic principles of popular sovereignty and participation while avoiding the problem of majoritarianism. They aspire to achieve this task by replacing the instrumental rationality (means-ends) of the aggregative model by a different version of rationality (communicative rationality) that is based on a different understanding of reason. This new version of rationality is grounded on unconstrained communicative action in Habermas' theory and on free public reason in Rawls'. This rationality is the driving force of citizens in democracy and the source of their commitment to shared institutions. While Habermas views legitimacy as the key issue of a functioning

life that is superior to others, that is the life of a politically engaged and active citizen. Unlike liberal representative democracy that is primarily individualist and instrumental in the way it views agents, the Aristotelian participatory version attaches greater value to the communal character of human nature. Benjamin Barber and Hannah Arendt are representatives of this version of deliberation.[See: Benjamin Barber, *Strong Democracy* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1984), Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958).] For Barber, political participation cultivates 'civic friendship and solidarity' and for Arendt it generates 'reciprocal empathy and mutual respect.' In addition to valid concerns of scale, practicality and feasibility of direct democracy in contemporary massive and complex societies, the claim of privileging a single notion of the good life, that of politically engaged citizenry, is not convincing. According to many scholars and particularly value pluralists there are several competing equally valuable ways of living good lives. Moreover, the emphasis on a collective identity raises serious doubts about the ability of this version to effectively deal with diversity in general and the demands of historically excluded social groups in particular. In his book *Democracy and Deliberation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991) James Fishkin has proposed an epistemic version of deliberative democracy. One of the main concerns of this approach is the improvement of the quality of the decision-making process. Driven by fears of populism and the majoritarian tyranny, Fishkin rejects the Greek ideal of direct democracy. Moreover, he criticizes representative democracy for focusing purely on the agents' preferences. Alternatively, he suggests the introduction of deliberative components to the decision making process. The deliberative mechanisms, he argues, will generate better decisions. Fishkin suggests *Deliberative Opinion Polls* as a deliberative mechanism to primarily yield a more genuine picture of citizens' views and preferences. Unlike in deliberative bodies like Citizens' Juries where the members are often chosen randomly to discuss specific political issues, deliberative opinion polls are expected to be as representative as possible and place a lot of emphasis on encounters with political candidates and politicians and not only professionals and experts. Fishkin's ultimate goal is to achieve outcomes that will enhance the decision making process for voters as well as for politicians. Fishkin's proposal has been subject to several criticisms. Mainly his account has been criticized for being appealing and attractive primarily to a very particular type of citizens. Put differently, despite his explicit commitment to formal equality and the reflective character of his deliberative bodies, his account has been criticized for being implicitly elitist and favouring experts. For more on this point see Mitofsky, W. J., 'It's Not Deliberative and it's Not a Poll', *Public Perspective*, 7:1(1996), pp. 4-6.

democracy and Rawls invokes justice as the key issue of a well-ordered society, both however seek to achieve rational consensus. The aim of this rational consensus is to ground the liberal institutions on a stable ground and secure their future. Rawls' and Habermas' theories have been subject to several criticisms. More specifically, their approaches' demand to 'put aside' or 'bracket' our notions of the good for the sake of securing rational consensus while engaging in public deliberation about political issues, has raised several criticisms. Put differently, their demand to relegate our values and beliefs to the background of politics allegedly renders the content of politics empty. This demand to strip individuals from their identities, goals, gender, nationalities, sex, religions etc., leaves their theories of deliberative democracy, I will argue, with a thin notion of selfhood which leads to an individualistic, de-historicized and impoverished notion of politics. Their accounts of deliberative politics view history, culture and context as irrelevant factors to politics, namely irrelevant to achieve freedom, equality and social justice. It is precisely this denial, among other things, of the significance of history, culture and context to politics in general and to social justice in particular that makes deliberative democracy insufficiently attentive to historical justices and the demands of historically excluded social groups.

Political theorists of various creeds, such as communitarians, feminists, and postmodernists, have accused egalitarian theories of deliberative democracy, not only of casting the individual as an atomistic, rational, abstract and self-creating entity but also of tending to dismiss the role of culture in politics.¹⁹ These deliberative theories,

¹⁹ For communitarian views see: Charles Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', in Amy Gutmann (ed.), *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 25-73, *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), *The Ethics of Authenticity* (London: Harvard University Press, 1992); Michael Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998); Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (London: Duckworth, 1981); Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice* (New York: Basic Books, 1983). Also, closely related to the communitarians are the views of republican scholars that emphasize and place, among other things, great value on political participation, see: Richard Dagger, *Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Philip Pettit, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). For feminist critiques of liberalism see for example: Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), *Inclusion and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Judith Squires, *Gender in Political Theory* (Malden, Mass: Polity Press, 1999); Susan Moller Okin, *Justice, Gender, and the Family* (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Catharine A. MacKinnon, *Toward a Feminist Theory of the State* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1989); Seyla Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Anne Phillips, *The Politics of Presence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Lucy Irigaray, *To Be Two* (London: Routledge, 2000). For postmodern critiques see: Judith Butler, 'Feminism and Postmodernism', in *Feminist Contentions* (New York: Routledge, 1995); William Connolly, *Identity/ difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991); Chantal Mouffe,

it is said, underestimate the importance of cultural differences in the operation of politics in contemporary multicultural societies and therefore fail to properly address the issue of cultural diversity. Friendly critics of deliberative democracy, such as James Bohman and Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, have not abandoned the main premises of the Rawlsian and Habermasian deliberative accounts and have proposed improved versions of deliberation. Liberal scholars such as Charles Larmore, Chandran Kukathas, and William Galston have conceded the importance of values and ends in politics and claimed that the liberal principles of individuality and autonomy are too controversial and liberalism should instead focus on tolerating and encouraging diversity that exists in contemporary liberal societies including groups and communities that deny the importance of individual autonomy.²⁰ Other liberal scholars, such as Will Kymlicka, Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, have appealed to 'culture' (and pointed out its importance for the individual's socialization and the determination of its horizon of opportunities without necessarily conceding individual autonomy) and Yael Tamir and David Miller have invoked 'nation' to address these challenges.²¹ These scholars, nonetheless, have remained unclear and vague about the meaning(s) of 'culture' and 'nation'. John Gray has claimed that in a society where different ways of life exist, political values and principles are incompatible,

Dimensions of Radical Democracy (London, Verso: 1992); Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, forward by Fredric Jameson, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984).

²⁰ For more see: Charles Larmore, *The Morals of Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), especially pp.121-174; Chandran Kukathas, 'Are There Any Cultural Rights?', *Political Theory*, 20 (1992), pp. 105-139, 'Cultural Toleration', in Will Kymlicka & Ian Shapiro (eds.), *Ethnicity and Group Rights* (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 'Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference', *Political Theory*, 26 (1998), pp .686-699; William Galston, 'Pluralism and Social Unity', *Ethics*, 99 (1989), pp. 711-726, *Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtue, and Diversity in the Liberal State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 'Value Pluralism and Political Liberalism', *Report from the Institute of Philosophy and Public Policy*, 16:2 (1996), 'Moral Inquiry and Liberal Education in the American University', *Ethics*, 110 (2000), pp. 812-822.

²¹ For more see: Yael Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); David Miller, *On Nationality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), *Citizenship and National Identity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000); Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, (eds.), *Citizenship in Diverse Societies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Will Kymlicka, *Liberalism, Community and Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Oxford: New York: Clarendon Press, 1995); Joseph Raz, *The Morality of Freedom* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 'Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective', *Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 155-176; Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, 'National Self-Determination', *Journal of Philosophy*, 87:9 (1990), pp. 439-461. While all of these scholars emphasize the importance of membership in groups, communities and cultures to defend the liberal principle of autonomy and accommodate cultural diversity they remain vague about the definition of 'culture', 'community' and 'nation'.

incommensurable, and always conflict. Therefore, *modus vivendi* (which allows peaceful coexistence among rival values) is the only proper answer to diversity.²² Other friends of liberal democracy have argued that liberalism recognises ‘the fact of pluralism’ only at the level of ideas, opinions, preferences and beliefs. In other words, it acknowledges the existence of a ‘politics of ideas.’²³

The thesis, however, focuses on the views of more dismissive critics of egalitarian liberalism. Scholars, such as Charles Taylor, have argued that egalitarian liberalism has adopted ‘the politics of equal dignity’ that is primarily concerned with universalizing equal rights and entitlements to all citizens regardless of their differences.²⁴ Egalitarian liberalism adopts a notion of tolerance, which entails that groups are free to assert their identity and practice their culture through the formation of associations in the private sphere and the background culture as described by Rawls. According to this liberal understanding the state is viewed as a neutral actor that does not privilege or favour any particular culture. In other words, according to the egalitarian liberal view the private sphere is the site of particularism and diversity and the public sphere is the site of universal neutral norms and consensus. It is precisely this undue insistence on formal equality, sameness, neutrality, and individualism that turns, according to these critics, egalitarian liberalism ‘blind’ to the significance of identity, authenticity, and cultural differences in the operation of politics. It is ‘the politics of recognition’, these theorists insist, that offers effective solutions to the main problems of egalitarian liberalism and deliberative democracy. For it proposes a better engagement with ontological questions about culture and subjectivity. The

²² John Gray, *Two Faces of Liberalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000). He argues that liberalism has two ideals of toleration. The first is ‘the ideal of a rational consensus on the best way of life’. The second is ‘the belief that human beings can flourish in many ways of life’. Yet he claims that the second one is the most adequate for contemporary societies because it recognises different ways of life as legitimate. This form of toleration, Gray claims, is grounded in Berlin’s ‘value pluralism’. For a critical assessment of Gray’s value pluralism see: William A. Galston, ‘From Value Pluralism to Liberal Pluralism’, in *Liberal Pluralism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 48-64.

²³ Anne Phillips distinguishes between the ‘politics of ideas’ and ‘politics of presence’. Whilst the first focuses on the diversity of ideas and preferences, the second emphasizes the importance of caucuses and quotas of presentation. She argues that a combination between these two forms of politics is not only possible but also necessary for modern societies. For more see: Anne Phillips, ‘Dealing with Difference: A Politics of Ideas, or a Politics of Presence’, in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), *The Politics of Presence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

²⁴ Charles Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’, in Amy Gutmann (ed.), *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 25-73.

politics of recognition, they insist, goes beyond the traditional liberal model of toleration and 'benign neglect'. Advocates of the politics of recognition have opposed this liberal view because it confines groups to the private domain and fails to recognize publicly their distinctive identities. These advocates insist that the citizenship status alone is insufficient to adequately address issues of group identities and exclusion. While the move of the politics of recognition to emphasize exclusion and the role of context, culture and identity in politics is important to democratic inclusion, it will be argued that its tendency to insist on the existence of fixed essence of collective identities with discrete boundaries and focus exclusively on cultural matters raises several suspicions and risks.

Generally we can identify two main approaches within the politics of recognition: the essentialist and the non-essentialist. The essentialist approach, advocated by scholars such as Charles Taylor, is often referred to as 'identity politics'. This approach tends to view groups as fixed and given essences with discrete boundaries and focuses exclusively on cultural recognition. Consequently, this approach is suspect, among other things, of promoting essentialism. Essentialism is problematic because it inhibits individual autonomy and entails risks such as closure, hatred, exclusion, separation and balkanization. The non-essentialist approach has been developed by cautious supporters of recognition. This approach views identities as fluid, overlapping and hybrid; it also views recognition struggles as struggles about cultural matters as well as distributive ones. Cautious supporters of recognition, such as Nancy Fraser and Iris Marion Young, have both criticized 'identity politics' and presented non-essentialist theories of democratic inclusion. Nancy Fraser has criticized the model of 'identity politics' for its promotion of separatism, conformism, intolerance and essentialism (she refers to this as 'the problem of reification'). Moreover, she argues that it displaces questions of redistribution by questions of recognition (she refers to this as 'the problem of displacement'). To meet these problems, Fraser proposes what she calls the 'status model', a 'non-identitarian' form of politics that seeks to recognize the fluidity of identities and combine redistribution and recognition in a dual theory of social justice. Unlike scholars who claim that all economic maldistributions can be considered as issues of recognition or Marxist theorists who claim that all issues of cultural misrecognitions are economic issues at origins, Fraser insists that recognition and redistribution are two distinct components that need to be combined in a dual theory of social justice. She proposes what she

calls 'perspectival dualism' to theorize and analyze the complex relationship between redistribution and recognition.²⁵ Iris Marion Young criticizes 'identity politics' for reifying identities and promoting balkanization and deliberative democracy for privileging particular modes of speech and silencing others²⁶ and for aspiring to 'reduce difference to unity'²⁷ through suppressing diversity under the pretext of consensus, impartiality, and universal views. Consequently, Young calls for an emancipatory 'politics of difference' that ensures 'the effective recognition and representation of the distinct voices and perspectives' of the excluded.²⁸

Young presents a combinatory approach that aspires to synthesize and negotiate recognition and deliberation. This thesis focuses its examination on combinatory approaches similar to Young's.²⁹ Combinatory approaches are theories that attempt to negotiate and synthesize recognition, deliberation or dialogue. Ultimately, these theories aim to primarily avoid the weaknesses of certain accounts of deliberative democracy and politics of recognition and retain their strengths. They propose to modify the politics of recognition through offering a non-essentialist or 'relational' social ontology that recognizes the fluidity and interdependence of social groups and to modify deliberative democracy through recognizing modes of speech such as story-telling, testimonies as fully legitimate modes of speech. In this thesis I refer to the approaches of Iris Marion Young, Melissa Williams, Seyla Benhabib, and Fred Dallmayr as combinatory theories. It will be argued that while the combinatory approaches are the closest to offering a form of democratic inclusion that is more attentive to historical injustices, their accounts remain insufficient because, among

²⁵ For more on Fraser's view regarding the shift to recognition, 'status model', 'perspectival dualism' and her debate with Axel Honneth see: Nancy Fraser, 'From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemma of Justice in a 'Post-Socialist' Age', *New Left Review*, 212 (1995), pp. 68-93, 'Rethinking Recognition', *New Left Review*, 3 (2000), pp.107-120; Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange* (London: Verso, 2003); Simon Thompson (review article), 'Is Redistribution a Form of Recognition? Comments on the Fraser-Honneth Debate', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, 8:1 (2005), pp. 85-102.

²⁶ Iris Marion Young, 'Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy', in Benhabib Seyla (ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Lynn Sanders, 'Against Deliberation', *Political Theory*, 25:3 (1997), pp. 347-376.

²⁷ Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), p.97.

²⁸ Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, p.184.

²⁹ I used the terms 'combinatory approaches' and 'integrative approaches' interchangeably as they both refer to the same approaches.

other things, they either ignore core principles of reconciliation such as collective responsibility and apology or when they recognize the role of memory they insist on the symmetry and equality of memory and history between the victim and the victimizer.

Post-structural theorists, such as Judith Butler, have strongly criticized the politics of recognition and suggested radical alternative forms of politics. These radical forms of politics reject the view that the subject has a fixed and authentic essence that shapes his or her identity and alternatively claim that the subject is itself a product of discursive forces. These discursive forces construct positions of selfhood for individuals to occupy before they start to express themselves as individuals. While the views of these radical scholars are useful to criticize the politics of recognition, their form of politics does not provide a successful alternative because it endorses, among other things, excessively fluid and hybrid identities that are constantly engaged in transcending their existing cultural, political and social boundaries. This emphasis on undue fluidity and transformation considerably undermines an effective democratic accommodation because it does not seem to take seriously issues of history, context and concrete experiences of historical injustices.

Thus far, I have introduced the four main approaches of democratic inclusion that the thesis focuses on and briefly explained their insufficient sensitivity to questions of historical injustices. Given their insufficient attentiveness to claims of historical injustice, the present thesis offers 'the politics of reconciliation' as an effective model for responding to such claims. The politics of reconciliation places significant emphasis on confronting the past, acknowledging injustices and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices. The emphasis on these issues is important, among other things, because it helps to bring into public attention the specificities of the experiences of oppression and exclusion and the need to address them. The politics of reconciliation that I defend in this thesis is one that simultaneously refuses the blindness of deliberative democracy to history and avoids several main risks of 'identity politics' and post-structuralism. Moreover, while the combinatory approaches make the most progress towards offering a form of democratic inclusion that is more attentive to historical injustices, their accounts remain insufficient because they either ignore core principles of reconciliation such as responsibility and apology or when they recognize the role of memory they insist on the symmetry and the equality of memory and history between the oppressed and the

oppressor. The account of reconciliation presented in this thesis does not fully endorse essentialism but recognizes the existence of authoritative traditions that allow a communal character of groups. Moreover, the politics of reconciliation acknowledges the interdependence and overlapping of identities, but refuses the excessive level of fluidity of identities that undermines the very possibility of politics. Therefore, the politics of reconciliation that is presented here occupies a mid way between essentialism and non-essentialism.

This account of the politics of reconciliation departs from other accounts that emphasize the compatibility of reconciliation with democracy in that that it fleshes out and scores a very fine balance. It does so by demanding social and cultural transformations that require revising cultural and social norms, practices and images and therefore undermine the fixation of identities found in essentialist theories of recognition. Furthermore, it acknowledges that these social and cultural transformations take time and do not occur overnight; it therefore rejects the excessive fluidity and transformation endorsed by post-structuralist critics of recognition. The politics of reconciliation accords a significant role for narration and story-telling that involve interpretations and theretofore it secures a room for contestation rather than homogeneity and consensus. Finally the politics of reconciliation seeks and embraces the solidarity of international and local organizations and activists and therefore extends the struggle beyond the narrow boundaries of the particular national, ethnic, racial or cultural group.³⁰ This solidarity does not only help the politics of reconciliation to meet the challenge of essentialism through the participations of non-members in the struggle against historical injustices but also helps the politics of reconciliation refute the charges raised against it as inhibiting dialogue and mutual understanding because it allegedly supports monopoly on suffering and views the oppressed as epistemically privileged in understanding their own condition. In other words, seeking and embracing local and international solidarity disproves the claims of those who accuse the politics of reconciliation as supporting the view that experiences of oppression give rise to specific perspectives and feelings that are fully transparent and accessible only to the oppressed and cannot be shared and understood by those who do not live these experiences of oppression.

³⁰ Martha Biondi stresses the importance of a transnational and national solidarity with the African Americans' reparations movement. See her article: 'The Rise of Reparations Movement', *Radical History Review*, 87 (2003), p. 15.

My intention in this thesis is five-fold. First, I seek to demonstrate that existing core egalitarian versions of deliberative democracy, i.e., Rawls', Habermas', and Gutmann and Thompson's, fail to present a satisfactory form of politics that effectively addresses the demands of historically excluded social groups in historically divided and pluralistic societies. Second, to show the insufficient attentiveness of identity politics and its post-structuralist critics to appropriately accommodate the demands of these historically excluded social groups. Third, to demonstrate that accounts of democratic accommodation proposed by integrative theories, that combine recognition, deliberation or dialogue, are not sufficient to deal with the demands of historically excluded social groups because they do not fully address core issues that lie at the basis of these demands. Most importantly among these issues are: collective memory of exclusion, acknowledgement of historical injustices and harms, taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices and harms. Fourth, I argue that it is the notion of reconciliation that encompasses these core issues. Finally, to claim that deliberation and recognition, understood in a certain way, are not rival or competitive concepts to reconciliation but are complementary ones. Now I move to describe how the arguments unfold in the chapters to follow.

Chapter 2 explores three main theories of deliberative democracy.³¹ More specifically, it sets out to describe Rawls', Habermas' and Gutmann and Thompson's

³¹ It should be emphasized that these three theories of deliberative democracy do not provide an exhaustive list of the egalitarian theories of deliberative democracy. Yet, the two main theories of egalitarian deliberative democracy are Rawls' and Habermas'. There are several attempts that draw on the work of Rawls and Habermas to develop deliberative theories of democracy that are not discussed in this thesis primarily because of concerns of scope and also because of the weaknesses of these theories. Among these attempts are the theories of John Dryzek and James Bohman. John Dryzek develops a discursive theory of democracy that is supposedly distinct from other theories. He argues that his theory of discursive democracy is 'pluralistic in embracing the necessity to communicate across difference without erasing difference, reflexive in its questioning orientation to established traditions (including the tradition of deliberative democracy itself), transnational in its capacity to extend across state boundaries into settings where there is no constitutional framework, ecological in terms of openness to communication with non-human nature, and dynamic in its openness to ever-changing constraints upon and opportunities for democratisation'. Though his theory seems to be attractive, I do not discuss it in the thesis because, among other things, of its eclectic character and the over-exaggerated harmony that is implicitly assumed among its different components (pluralistic, reflexive, transnational, ecological, and dynamic). John Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). James Bohman draws on Habermas' and Rawls' ideas and develops his own version of deliberative democracy. He argues that the main problem of Rawls' and Habermas' theories is their assumption about the existence of an impartial and neutral standpoint leading to universally accepted reasons and norms. They are both, he claims, committed to unrealistic assumptions concerning public deliberation. Bohman recognizes the influence of structural inequalities and ideology on inhibiting public deliberation. He insists on two conditions that any moral compromise should meet in order to be considered as fair. The first is 'if they take

approaches to deliberation as the standard approach to the politics of accommodation in pluralist societies.³² It goes on to offer a critique of their adequacy to accommodate the claims of historically excluded social groups. The chapter argues that these deliberative theories are wanting. More specifically, it argues that these theories, rather than and despite their subtle and substantial differences, are insufficiently attentive to claims of historical exclusion and injustice. Rawls' notions of politics and public reason, it will be argued, give rise to several problems that make the task of accommodating historical injustices very difficult. Most importantly among these problems are: cultural imperialism, denying the role of history and memory in politics, privileging elitist rational forms of communication, and excessive legalism. Gutmann and Thompson's theory of deliberative democracy, it will be claimed, suffers from several problems that undermine its ability to effectively accommodate claims of historical exclusion. Most importantly among these problems are: ignoring the role of

deliberative inequalities into account' and the second is 'if they promote the ongoing participation of all groups in a common deliberative political community. He considers the assimilation of deliberative democracy into liberal constitutionalism as a sign of maturity of the debate of deliberative democracy. He argues that the formidable challenges to deliberative democracy are pluralization, globalisation and social differentiation. These challenges necessitate the emergence of a new mode of publicity that 'preserves the democratic virtues of the older universalistic interpretation and increases its problem-solving power.' While Bohman's theory aspires to propose a more adequate version of deliberative democracy than the Rawlsian and Habermasian by being more sensitive to cultural pluralism and concrete real politics, his theory suffers from some serious deficiencies. Firstly, Bohman is unable to provide support for either one of the two standards of fair moral compromises. Secondly, it seems that for Bohman the maturity of the debate in the field means giving up more and more radical discursive democracy components and adopting more typical liberal and procedural elements. Finally, Bohman celebrates globalisation and cosmopolitan public sphere without indicating who benefits from them, the globalisers or the globalised. For more on James Bohman 's version of deliberative democracy see: James Bohman, *Public Deliberation* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); 'The Coming Age of Deliberative Democracy', *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 6:4 (1998), pp. 400-425; 'Citizenship and Norms of Publicity: Wide Public Reason in Cosmopolitan Societies', *Political Theory*, 27:2 (1999), pp. 176-202 ; 'Distorted Communication: Formal Pragmatics as a Critical Theory', in L. Hahn (ed.) *Perspectives on Habermas* (Indianapolis: Open Court, 2000).

³² John Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 14:3 (1985), pp. 223-251, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 'The Idea of Public Reason Revisited', *The University of Chicago Law Review*, 64:3 (1997), pp. 765-807, *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Jurgen Habermas, 'Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States', *European Journal of Philosophy*, 1:2 (1993), pp. 128-155, 'Three Normative Models of Democracy', *Constellations*, 1:1 (1994), pp. 1-10, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy* trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), *On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminary Studies in the Theory of Communicative Action* trans. Barbara Fultner (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2001), 'Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?', *Political Theory*, 29:6 (2001), pp. 766-781, 'Religious Tolerance- The Peacemaking of Cultural Rights', *Philosophy*, 79 (2004), pp. 5-18; Amy Guttmann, and Dennis Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 'Why Deliberative Democracy is Different', *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 17:1 (2000), pp. 161-180, 'The Moral Foundations of Truth Commissions', in Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (eds.) *Truth V. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions* (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 22-23.

identities in generating political conflicts, postulating the mutual acceptance prior to the process of reconciliation, and the operation of the idea of reasonableness as a mechanism of exclusion. Habermas' theory of deliberative democracy, it will be argued, is inadequate primarily because it relies on excessive proceduralism and legalism, favours rational and disembodied modes of speech, brackets power relations from moral reasoning and determining 'reasonableness', and gives primacy to the state as the ultimate frame for political authority and therefore fails to capture the claims of historically excluded social groups that undermine the notion of statehood by their demand to separate or secede.

The inadequacies of Rawls', Habermas', and Gutmann and Thompson' theories of deliberative democracy to effectively deal with demands of historically excluded social groups, stem primarily from their failure to engage seriously with context, cultural embeddedness, identity, and concrete experiences of exclusion and oppression. Consequently, this failure has led to a turn away from simple deliberation to a 'politics of recognition' that is based on a thicker notion of social ontology. In chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 I turn to focus on questions of social ontology that are undervalued by deliberative democracy and seem to underlie the claims of historically excluded social groups. The key ontological components that will be discussed are self, culture, representation, and intercultural dialogue. The turn to a different social ontology than the one that underlies deliberative democracy is what is offered by 'the politics of recognition' and 'integrative theories'.

Chapter 3 explores Rawls' atomistic and Habermas' intersubjective notions of the self.³³ Relying chiefly on communitarian criticisms, the chapter argues that Rawls' and Habermas' notions of selfhood both underplay, among other things, the

³³ John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Michael Sandel, *Liberalism and The Limits of Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Jurgen Habermas, *Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essay* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1992), *On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminary Studies in the Theory of Communicative Action*, trans. Barbara Fultner (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2001); Charles Taylor, *Hegel and Modern Society*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 157-159, *Philosophy and the Human Sciences*, Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Axel Honneth, 'Recognition I: Invisibility: On the Epistemology of 'Recognition'', *Aristotelian Society Supp* (75), (2001), pp. 111-126. (Trans. Maeve Cooke and Jeff Seitzer), *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), *The Fragmented World of the Social* (ed.) Charles W. Wright (Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 1995); Judith Butler, 'Contingent Foundations', in *Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange*, Seyla Benhabib, Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell, Nancy Fraser (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 35-57. Introduction by Linda Nicholson.

significance of culture, context and history in the process of identity formation for the sake of determining the governing principles and procedures of social justice and legitimacy. In other words, they both tend to view culture and history as insignificant to politics, namely insignificant to achieve freedom, equality and social justice. The chapter goes on to argue that it is precisely this denial of the significance of history and culture to identity and politics which makes their theories insufficiently attentive to claims of historical injustices raised by historically excluded social groups. The communitarian critique has significantly contributed to the rise of a particular form of the politics of recognition, namely 'identity politics', which emphasizes embeddedness, situatedness, cultural distinctiveness and difference.

Chapter 4 focuses on 'identity politics' and its weaknesses. More precisely, it discusses Charles Taylor's 'politics of recognition' and Judith Butler's criticisms of identity politics.³⁴ Taylor has challenged the atomism and blindness to cultural differences that underlie dominant contemporary accounts of liberalism.³⁵ He has proposed 'the politics of recognition' as an alternative form to a difference-blind

³⁴ Charles Taylor, *Hegel and Modern Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), *The Ethics of Authenticity* (London: Harvard University Press, 1992), 'The Politics of Recognition', in Amy Gutmann (ed.), *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 25-73; James Tully (ed.), *Philosophy in An Age of Pluralism: The Philosophy of Charles Taylor in Question* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); John Horton, 'Charles Taylor: Selfhood, Community and Democracy', in April Carter and Geoffrey Stokes (eds.), *Liberal Democracy and Its Critics* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), pp. 155-174; Joel Anderson, 'The Personal Lives of Strong Evaluators: Identity, Pluralism, and Ontology in Charles Taylor's Value Theory', *Constellations*, 3:1 (1996), pp. 17-38; Michael Kenny, 'Liberalism and the Politics of Recognition' in *The Politics of Identity: Liberal Political Theory and the Dilemmas of Difference* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004), pp. 148-168; Brian Barry, *Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Nancy Fraser, 'Rethinking Recognition', *New Left Review*, 3 (2000), pp. 107-120; Jacob T. Levy, *The Multiculturalism of Fear* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Linda Nicholson, 'To Be or Not To Be: Charles Taylor and The Politic of Recognition', *Constellations*, 3:1 (1996), pp. 1-16; Maeve Cooke, 'Authenticity and Autonomy: Taylor, Habermas, and the Politics of Recognition', *Political Theory*, 25:2 (1997), pp. 258-288; Paul Saurette, (review essay), 'Questioning Political Theory: Charles Taylor's Contrarianism', *Political Theory*, 32:5 (2004), pp. 723-733; Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 16-25, 'Contingent Foundations', in *Feminist Contentions: a philosophical exchange*, (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 33-57; Seyla Benhabib, 'Subjectivity, Historiography, and Politics' in *Feminist Contentions* (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 108-111.

³⁵ For more on Taylor's views see: Charles Taylor, *Hegel and Modern Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), *The Ethics of Authenticity* (London: Harvard University Press, 1992), 'The Politics of Recognition', in Amy Gutmann (ed.), *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 25-73.

liberalism.³⁶ Taylor grounds his account of politics on a dialogical notion of selfhood that accords significant roles to identity, culture and difference. The chapter argues that while Taylor's demand to give due recognition to excluded and oppressed social groups is an important progress that goes beyond the liberal notion of tolerance that underlies Rawls' and Habermas' theories, his notion of recognition seems to rely on an essentialist conception of culture which poses serious challenges to his account of democratic accommodation. Moreover, it argues that while Butler's views pose some significant challenges to identity politics by revealing the oppositional logic that lies at its core and the important role power relations play in identity formation, her post-structuralist model of identity is not persuasive because, among other things, it postulates an experimental and hybrid self that is expected to continuously transcend and transform its limits and boundaries. This agonistic self looks like the liberal self, at least, in being detached from cultural and political context.

Chapter 5 explores the ontological issue of representation which is viewed as one of the core components of democratic accommodation. The chapter argues that the diverse notions of representation employed by proponents of identity politics, post-modern critics of identity politics, and integrative theorists are insufficiently attentive to demands of historically excluded social groups. More specifically, the chapter argues that proponents of identity politics have primarily relied on a descriptive Aristotelian notion of representation when they demand the representation of excluded social groups. This descriptive Aristotelian notion, it will be argued, is problematic because it leads to the promotion of essentialism, fixation, closure, balkanization, and homogeneity. To free identity and politics from the 'chains' of essentialism, fixation and homogeneity, post-modern theorists such as Deleuze and Guattari have developed a non-essentialist and hybrid notion of representation. The chapter claims that Deleuze and Guattari's notion of representation is unpersuasive because while they try to avoid the risks of essentialism, closure, hierarchy and homogeneity, they celebrate excessive hybridity and fluidity that undermine the very

³⁶ The term 'the politics of recognition' appears in Taylor famous piece: 'The Politics of Recognition', in Amy Gutmann (ed.), *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 25-73. It should be noted here, however, that in the literature 'the politics of recognition' is often distinguished from 'identity politics' because the first is a more inclusive category than the second. Identity politics tend not to address political and social exclusion rooted in class and economy for instance. In this thesis I consider Taylor's theory mostly as 'identity politics' because of its principal emphasis on cultural recognition.

possibility of politics and identity. Moreover, they do not provide guidance on how to transfer their views into concrete and practical mechanisms of representation. Finally, the dispute between those who view group representation as a positive tool to achieve inclusion and those who view it as a negative instrument that essentialises identities and reproduces existing hierarchies, has given rise to integrative approaches that aim to combine components from both sides and offer more elaborated notions of representation. The chapter goes on to argue that the modified and integrative notions of representation proposed by scholars such as Iris Marion Young and Melissa Williams are attractive but incomplete. It argues that while their notions of representation are more appealing than the hitherto discussed ones because of their attempt to take social inequalities, experiences of exclusion, history and memory seriously and combine procedural as well as substantive political principles, they remain insufficient. For while Young's account unwillingly comes too close to the liberal interest-group pluralism and rests on two conflictual and mutually exclusive commitments and the issue of impartiality that she consistently dismisses, Williams' forward oriented account fails to fully recognize the role of past wrongs and the significance of asymmetries in taking responsibilities on causing these past wrongs.³⁷

Chapter 6 focuses on the integrative approaches of Bhikhu Parekh, Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr. It goes on to argue that they have not been entirely successful in fulfilling their promise to propose effective accounts of democratic inclusion that are capable of fully accommodating demands of historically excluded social groups. More precisely, the chapter examines the revised notions of intercultural dialogue and deliberation enthusiastically proposed by Bhikhu Parekh,

³⁷ Judith Squires, *Gender in Political Theory* (Malden, Mass: Polity Press, 1999); Dorothea Olkowski, *Gilles Deleuze and The Ruin of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Nomadology: The War Machine* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1994); Nathan Widder, *Genealogies of Difference* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 2002); Jacques Derrida, 'Sending: On Representation', trans. Peter Dews and Mary Dews, *Social Research*, 49 (1982), pp. 294-326; Iris Marion Young, *Inclusion and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), 'Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy', *Political Theory*, 29:5 (2001), pp. 670-690; Anne Phillips, *The Politics of Presence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 'Dealing with Difference: A Politics of Ideas, or a Politics of Presence', in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Melissa S. Williams, *Voice, Trust and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998); Hanna F. Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: London University of California Press, 1972); David Plotke, 'Representation is Democracy', *Constellations*, 4:1 (1997), pp. 19-34; Bernard Manin, *The Principles of Representative Government* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr. It argues that while each of these three accounts has several different merits, each fails to fully accommodate claims of historical exclusion. It will be argued that the failure of these accounts stems, among other things, from ignoring the significance of collective memory of exclusion (clearly not in the case of Dallmayr and to a lesser extent in the case of Benhabib), acknowledgment of historical injustices and harms and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these historical injustices and harms.³⁸

Up to now, the discussion has focused on the inadequacies of egalitarian theories of deliberative democracy, identity politics and its post-structuralist critics and integrative approaches to accommodate appropriately demands of historical exclusion and oppression. Their inadequacies stem primarily, but not exclusively, from overlooking the significance of crucial issues that reside at the basis of the claims of historically excluded social groups. These crucial issues include: collective memory of exclusion, acknowledgment of historical injustices, and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these historical injustices. Consequently, there is a need for a proper 'candidate' that is capable of capturing these crucial issues and thus accommodating appropriately demands of historically excluded social groups.

Chapter 7 introduces the notion of reconciliation that is often discussed in International Relations and conflict resolution literatures. It goes on to argue that it is 'the politics of reconciliation' that promises an effective accommodation to the demands of historically excluded social groups. More precisely, it argues that the politics of reconciliation successfully encompasses the three overlooked issues which

³⁸ Seyla Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), *Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1992), 'Epistemology of Postmodernism: A Rejoinder to Jean-Francois Lyotard' in *Feminism/ Postmodernism* edited by Linda J. Nicholson (New York; London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 105-130; Bhikhu Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000); Fred R. Dallmayr, *Beyond Orientalism: Essays on Cross-Cultural Encounters* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), *Alternative Visions: Paths in the Global Village* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), *Dialogue Among Civilizations: Some Exemplary Voices* (Palgrave, 2001), 'A Gadamerian Perspective on Civilizational Dialogue', *Global Dialogue*, 3:1 (2001), pp. 64-75; Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1975); Hans-Herbert Kogler, *The Power of Dialogue: Critical Hermeneutic after Gadamer and Foucault* (trans.) Paul Hendrickson (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996); Diane P. Michelfelder & Richard E. Palmer (eds.), *Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989); Simone Dentih, *Bakhtinian Thought: An Introductory Reader* (London ; New York : Routledge, 1995); Tzvetan Todorov, *The Conquest of America: The Question of The Other* trans. by Richard Howard (New York: Harper& Row, 1984); Charles Taylor, 'Understanding and Ethnocentricity' in *Philosophy and Human Sciences* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985).

lie at the core of demands of historical exclusion and offers appealing answers to several accusations that are raised against it. The politics of reconciliation, it will be argued, proposes an effective accommodation to demands of historically excluded social groups because its main principles and characteristics enable serious engagement with the specificities of experiences of historical exclusion and oppression.³⁹ More specifically, this chapter suggests a fourfold argument. First, it demonstrates that the politics of reconciliation captures more adequately the issues of collective memory of exclusion, acknowledgement of historical injustices and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices. Second, the politics of reconciliation, it will propose, offers convincing answers to several charges, such as essentialism and consensus, which are often levelled against it. Third, reconciliation needs not be viewed as an alternative concept to deliberation and recognition but as a supplement to them. Fourth, the principles of reconciliation, it will be shown, are applicable to milder as well as to mortal conflicts although their relevance is more urgent in the latter type.

The thesis concludes that the 'politics of reconciliation' is indispensable to effectively tackle the demands of historically excluded social groups. However, in dealing with demands of historically excluded social groups, reconciliation is not and should not be viewed as a conclusive exhaustive concept. Rather, it is a supplement to recognition and deliberative politics. The politics of reconciliation is not exclusively a state-focused one and it does not favour only one single moral feature. It recognizes the significance of other complex-pressing objectives and values relevant to politics. The politics of reconciliation, therefore, is not an ultimate universal recipe with static

³⁹ Paul Muldoon, 'Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 49:2 (2003), pp. 182-196; Andrew Schaap, 'Guilty Subjects and Political Responsibility: Arendt, Jaspers and the Resonance of the 'German Question' in Politics of Reconciliation', *Political Studies*, 49:4 (2001), pp. 749-766, 'Agonism in Divided Societies', *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, 32:2 (2006), pp. 255-277; Roy L. Brooks (ed.), *When Sorry Isn't Enough: The Controversy over Apologies and Reparations for Human Rights* (New York: New York University Press, 1999); Carol A.L. Prager and Trudy Govier (eds.), *Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts* (Wtaerloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2003); William J. Long and Peter Brecke, *War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution*, (The MIT Press, 2003); Thomas McCarthy, 'Vergangenheitsbewältigung in the USA: On the Politics of Memory of Slavery', *Political Theory*, 30:5 (2002), pp. 623-648, 'Coming to Terms with Our Past, Part II: On the Morality and Politics of Reparations for Slavery', *Political Theory*, 32:6 (2004), pp. 750-772; Burke A. Hendrix, 'Memory in Native American Land Claims', *Political Theory*, 33:6 (2005), pp. 763-785; Emilios A. Christodoulidis, "'Truth and Reconciliation' as Risks' *Social and Legal Studies*, 9:2 (2000), pp. 188-190; John Borneman, 'Reconciliation after Ethnic Cleansing: Listening, Retribution, Affiliation', *Public Culture*, 14:2 (2002), pp. 281-304; Daan Bronkhorst, *Truth Commissions and Transitional Justice: A Short Guide for Users* (Amnesty International Dutch Section, 2003).

ingredients for resolving conflicts in pluralistic societies; rather, it provides guidelines that are likely to take different forms and orders in different contexts.

The thesis is original because it analyses and demonstrates the insufficient adequacies of egalitarian theories of deliberative democracy, identity politics and its post-structuralist critics, and some integrative approaches to accommodate the claims of social groups that have suffered some form of historical exclusion and injustice. By introducing the concept of reconciliation, the thesis proposes a supplement to the deliberative democracy and the politics of recognition. In other words, the originality lies in providing a supplement to and therefore transforming deliberative democracy and the politics of recognition and their ability to address political problems of historically excluded social groups. This thesis, however, does not aim to replace deliberation and recognition with new substitutes but aspires to offer a new interpretation of these theories and supplement them with a politics of reconciliation. Briefly, the thesis offers a new interpretation of familiar issues in different disciplines and the novel task has been to bring them together. The application of the ethic of reconciliation, from International Relations and conflict resolution, to democratic theory makes a significant contribution to the field and the opening of a new research agenda for normative theories of democratic accommodation in historically divided and pluralistic societies.

2. THEORIES OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

This chapter focuses on the adequacy of three main egalitarian theories of deliberative democracy to accommodate the demands of social groups that have suffered some form of historical exclusion. Deliberative democracy has emerged as an alternative model to the 'aggregative model of democracy' that prevailed in Western societies after the Second World War.¹ The aggregative model views democracy as a set of mechanisms and institutional arrangements that regulate competition for political leadership among interest groups. According to the aggregative model, democracy does not embody specific moral values or principles but it is just a system that facilitates competition on political leadership. Citizens are organized in associations, aggregations, parties and other forms of interest groups that compete over political power. These interest groups are supposed to pursue the interests of their members. The reduction of politics to aggregation of interests, the divorce between democracy and substantial moral principles and growing concerns about

¹ Thinkers such as Benjamin Barber, Richard Dagger and Michael Sandel have developed other models of democracy, such as participatory (strong) and republican democracy, as alternatives to liberal democracy. This chapter does not, however, address these models of democracy. Nonetheless, these thinkers underscore and specify a number of civic obligations. The principal among them is the claim that participation in public affairs fights individualism and ultimately enhances mutual understanding, solidarity and common good politics. Some of them are even willing to coerce it through mandatory voting for example. Yet, these models of democracy do not seem to be compelling or seriously deal with pluralism. For their inclusive concept of citizenship and their over-exaggerated emphasis on commonality can easily endanger individual freedom and autonomy. Moreover, at the foundation of their politics lies the thrust to sameness and unity. For more about these models of democracy see: Benjamin Barber, *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1984); Richard Dagger, *Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); David Held, *Models of Democracy* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1996). William E. Connolly and Chantal Mouffe have developed more radical/agonistic models of democracy. While these models provide, among other things, unusual insights about the constitution of identity, subjectivity and the boundaries of the political, their overemphasis on the undecidability of democratic politics as a constitutive condition can easily lead to paralysis and under special circumstances even license chaos. For more about these thinkers' accounts of democracy and their weaknesses see: William E. Connolly, *identity/ difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Chantal Mouffe, 'Democracy, Power, and the "Political"' in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 245-256, *Dimensions of Radical Democracy* (London: Verso, 1992), *The Democratic Paradox* (London: Verso, 2000); Arash Abizadeh, 'Does Collective Identity Presuppose an Other? On the Alleged Incoherence of Global Solidarity', *American Political Science Review*, 99:1 (2005), pp. 45-60; and Mark Devenney, *Ethics and Politics in Contemporary Theory: Between Critical Theory and Post-Marxism* (London: Routledge, 2004).

questions of political legitimacy, cultural pluralism and social justice have led thinkers such as Rawls and Habermas to offer alternative theories of democracy that take seriously these challenges and concerns. This chapter sets out to describe the Rawlsian and Habermasian approaches to deliberation as the standard approach to the politics of accommodation in pluralist societies.² Both approaches are fundamentally concerned with spelling out the conditions under which collective political decisions should be regarded as legitimate expressions of the collective will of the people. More specifically, they both develop a political theory grounded in deliberation that seeks to combine liberal and democratic principles while avoiding the problem of majoritarianism. They aspire to achieve this task by replacing the instrumental rationality (means-ends) of the aggregative model by a different version of rationality (communicative rationality) that is based on a different understanding of reason. This new version of rationality is grounded on unconstrained communicative action in Habermas' theory and on free public reason in Rawls'. The deliberative process, they claim, must be governed by a set of basic principles that guarantee fair procedures that yield legitimate collective decisions. Legitimate collective decisions are the outcome of a procedure of free and reasoned deliberation among morally and politically equal individuals. While Habermas views legitimacy as the key issue of a functioning democracy and Rawls invokes justice as the key issue of a well-ordered society, both however seek to achieve rational consensus. The aim of this rational consensus is to ground the liberal institutions on a stable ground and secure their future.

Rawls' and Habermas' theories are the main two egalitarian theories of deliberative democracy. Several scholars have relied on their views to develop modified versions of deliberative democracy. From these modified versions I will particularly focus on Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson's version of deliberative democracy because of their claim that their theory provides the most adequate framework to justify and assess the work of truth commissions and address historical injustice. The chapter offers a critique of the adequacy of these three theories to accommodate the claims and self-understanding of historically excluded social groups

² I consider Rawls' liberal egalitarian theory of deliberative democracy and Habermas' theory of deliberative democracy to be two dimensions of the same project. For both theories are dominantly governed by liberal principles and values. Notice what Habermas says about Rawls' theory of political liberalism: 'I admire this project, share its intentions, and regard its essential results as correct, the dissent I express here will remain within the bounds of a familial dispute'. Jurgen Habermas, 'Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason,' *The Journal of Philosophy*, 92:3 (1995), p. 110.

in complex plural societies. The chapter argues that these three approaches fail to sufficiently address issues of historical injustices. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part deals with Rawls' theory. Gutmann and Thompson's theory is the focus of the second part. The final part is devoted to Habermas' accounts of discursive democracy. I shall now turn to the first part.

Part I

Rawlsian deliberative democracy

Liberal egalitarianism places individual's rights and interests at the heart of its political order. According to the liberal view, the main concern of the individual is to pursue her private interest within the limits drawn by law. Therefore, the citizen is conceived as a bearer of negative civil and political rights and certain positive rights to welfare.³ As a bearer of these rights, she enjoys protection against government intervention as well as protection from other citizens. Consequently, liberal politics is primarily about compromise and the aggregation of predetermined interests under the auspices of a neutral constitution. The fear that self-interested individuals turn public power into private advantage then necessitates a set of neutral constitutional rights to protect individuals against government and against each other.

Recently some political theorists have argued for a strong and genuine linkage between a constitutional liberal version of democracy and deliberative democracy.⁴ Yet, a few thinkers are also suspicious of this connection. They are suspicious because according to them deliberative democracy by definition is open to preference change and provides protection against manipulation and power within political interaction, while liberal democracy by definition deals only with reconciliation and aggregation

³ It should be clear that citizens not only have rights but also duties such as respecting the law and paying taxes. Yet I assume that such duties are implied in the rights the citizens are entitled to. For more on this view see the chapter on community in Adam Swift, *Political Philosophy: A Beginners' Guide for Students and Politicians* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).

⁴ John Dryzek points out three arguments in which deliberative democracy can be assimilated into liberalism. First, deliberative principles justify liberal rights. Second, liberal constitutions promote deliberation. Third, constitution making is itself a deliberative process. For more see: John Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 11-14.

of preferences defined prior to political interaction.⁵ Therefore, they conclude that any attempt to assimilate deliberative democracy into liberalism is problematic and will be unsuccessful. However, most of the thinkers discussed in this chapter not only see the marriage between liberalism and deliberative democracy as possible but also desirable.

Rawls: public reason and constitutional democracy

The linkage between liberalism and deliberative democracy has been strongly advocated by John Rawls. He claims that there are three fundamental elements that constitute deliberative democracy, 'public reason', 'a framework of constitutional democratic institutions that specifies the setting for deliberative legislative body', and 'knowledge and desire on the part of citizens generally to follow public reason and to realise its details in their political conduct', which in turn requires 'public occasions of orderly and serious discussion of fundamental questions and issues of public policy.'⁶ He argues that his idea of 'a well-ordered constitutional democracy' should be 'understood also as deliberative democracy.'⁷

According to him, public reason is a set of commitments that individuals must adopt before they enter the public arena, not what they will be encouraged to discover once they are there. Deliberation is a personal reflection that individuals make on their own. Therefore, a solitary thinker can reason publicly. He implies that all individuals will reason in the same way, and must ultimately reach the same conclusions. Rawlsian public reason is singular and produces rational consensus. Deliberation guided by public reason, he argues, should only be about constitutional affairs and what he calls 'matters of basic justice'. As he puts it:

In a democratic society public reason is the reason of equal citizens who, as a collective body, exercise final political and coercive power

⁵ This argument is a contested one. More about this distinction can be found in: David Miller, 'Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice', *Political Studies*, 40: special issue (1992), pp. 54-67.

⁶ John Rawls, 'The Idea of Public Reason Revisited', *The University of Chicago Law Review*, 64:3 (1997), p. 772.

⁷ Rawls, 'The Idea of Public Reason Revisited', pp. 771-772.

over one another in enacting laws and in amending the constitution. The first point is that the limits imposed by public reason do not apply it to all political questions but only to those involving what we may call “constitutional essentials” and questions of basic justice...⁸

Basic justice refers to equality of opportunity and the fair distribution of material goods.⁹ These questions of basic justice and constitutional essentials have to be discussed *only* in what he calls the ‘public political forum’. This forum is constituted from three parts, the discourse of judges and their decisions, the discourse of government officials, and finally, the discourse of candidates for public office and their campaign managers.¹⁰ This forum is viewed as a neutral platform where citizens are expected to reach rational consensus on basic universal principles that should guide and govern solutions and decisions regarding matters of public interest, i.e., justice and constitutional affairs. Moreover, these principles are viewed as neutral towards different and conflicting notions of the good life.

The idea of public reason, Rawls insists, does not apply to what he calls the ‘background culture’ or to media of any kind. This culture, he maintains, comprises universities, churches, and all kinds of associations. It is not guided by one central idea of public reason but by diverse forms of non-public reason. However, he states that political liberalism favours arguments and discussions about common good in the background culture as well. Briefly, public reason, according to Rawls, operates in the public sphere and non-public reasons operate in the ‘background culture’ or civil society. Consequently, in his view, the public sphere ‘is not located *in civil society but in the state and its organizations, including first and foremost the legal sphere and its institutions.*’¹¹ Public reason, in Rawls’ theory, is viewed as a site where citizens are expected to be detached from their concrete situations and circumstances and use universal forms of rationality and reasoning to deliberate on fundamental matters of justice. Rawls draws a very rigid distinction between the public and private sphere.

⁸ Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 214.

⁹ John Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 14.

¹⁰ Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’, p. 767.

¹¹ Benhabib, ‘Deliberative Rationality and Models of Democratic Legitimacy’, pp. 36-37.

While the former is governed by public reason that requires rational consensus and unity, the latter is governed by non-public reason that allows diversity and pluralism. Rawls goes on to argue that individuals are endowed with two identities, public and non-public, that they possess in different spheres. While public identity views the individual as a 'citizen' that is constituted by rights of political participation and communication ('liberties of the ancients'), the non-public identity views the individual as a 'person' that is protected by basic liberal rights ('liberties of the moderns'; subjective liberties such as liberty of belief and conscience, the protection of life, personal liberty and property).¹² In Rawls' theory the basic liberties that protect individuals in the private realm have priority over the political democratic liberties. The democratic liberties are viewed as an instrument that serves the preservation of the basic subjective liberties. Rawls maintains that the distinction between the public and the private realms enables us to achieve a just political society and base the liberal institutions on a stable ground and to secure their future. This aim is attained through the insulation of the public political sphere from controversial ontological issues of the good life that might inflame and enhance disagreements. These controversial ontological issues are ruled out by the 'veil of ignorance' and relegated to the 'background culture'. Briefly, Rawls' theory consistently restricts information, selectively chooses the conditions of the framework of his theory, and strategically avoids fundamental relevant controversial questions so it achieves a coherent, freestanding and self-contained theory of a just society. This theory constitutes a framework from within which citizens assess existing institutions and policies.

Shortcomings and weaknesses in Rawls' account

In this section I will examine the ability of Rawls' notion of politics and public reason to democratically accommodate the claims of groups that have suffered some form of historical exclusion and injustice. I will argue that Rawls' notions of politics and public reason give rise to several problems that make the task of accommodating historical injustices very difficult. Most importantly among these problems are:

¹² For more on reconciling the 'liberties of the ancients' and the 'liberties of the moderns' see Jurgen Habermas, 'Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason,' *Journal of Philosophy*, 92:3 (1995), p. 127.

cultural imperialism, denying the role of history and memory in politics, privileging elitist rational forms of communication, and excessive legalism.

The first problem is cultural imperialism. Cultural imperialism is experienced when the dominant and hegemonic group universalises its perspectives, interpretations of events and history, experiences, and cultural beliefs and practices and constructs them as the norm and views those who have different experiences, values, beliefs and perspectives as outsiders, inferiors and deviants. Several scholars have argued that the impartial liberal principles of justice advocated by Rawls reflect the values, beliefs, perspectives and experiences of the hegemonic group. Rawls' liberal egalitarianism universalises the liberal perspectives, experiences, forms of speech, and other social and cultural practices and presents them as impartial universal norms that others are expected to follow and conform to. It is here that the risk of cultural imperialism emerges. Iris Marion Young has supported this charge by arguing that the impartial universal citizen that is postulated in liberal theories such as Rawls's theory is a bearer of a very particular identity- that is, white, male, middle-class, heterosexual and able-bodied.¹³

The second problem is the role of history and memory in addressing questions of social justice. Rawls' demand to strip individuals from their identities, goals, history, gender, nationalities, sex, religions etc., behind the 'veil of ignorance' to achieve rational consensus on principles of social justice poses a problem for historically excluded social groups. It is precisely this demand of liberal egalitarianism that views history and context as irrelevant to deliberation on matters of justice that makes historically excluded social groups very suspicious of the formalism and legalism of the liberal egalitarianism. These groups view their history and memory as intimately linked to political deliberation about the historical injustices that they have been suffering from. History and memory play an important role in challenging the national narrative and revealing and bringing to public attention the causes and roots of historical injustices and their link to current distorted social and political structures and arrangements.

The third problem is concerned with favouring exclusively rational and elitist forms of communication. As it has been indicated in the introduction of the thesis, historically excluded social groups use several modes of communication and speech

¹³ Young, 'The Ideal of Impartiality and the Civic Public', pp. 96-121.

including story-telling, testimonies and oral history to construct their narratives and challenge the national hegemonic narrative. The difficulty here emerges because Rawls' notion of public reason explicitly favours rational and argumentative modes of speech. According to Iris Marion Young, Rawls' normative public reason privileges certain kinds of speech; 'assertive and confrontational', 'formal and general', 'dispassionate and disembodied',¹⁴ and excludes others such as rhetoric, testimony, and greeting. Similarly, Seyla Benhabib argues that Rawls' public reason misses 'contestatory, rhetorical, affective, impassioned elements of public discourse'.¹⁵ Since public reason systemically excludes forms of communications such as rhetoric, initiation, greeting, and storytelling, Lynn Sanders argues that public reason represents the interests and the speech culture of the powerful.¹⁶ In other words, it encourages the reproduction of existing hierarchies.¹⁷ Therefore, public reason ignores

¹⁴ Iris Marion Young, 'Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy', in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 120-35.

¹⁵ Benhabib, 'Deliberative Rationality and Models of Democratic Legitimacy', p. 37.

¹⁶ Lynn Sanders, 'Against Deliberation', *Political Theory*, 25:3 (1997), pp. 347-376.

¹⁷ David Miller defends deliberative democracy and rejects the charges that have been posed against it by Young and Sanders. He denies their charge that deliberation favours elitist forms of communication and rejects their suggested alternatives (such as rhetoric, testimony and greeting) to rational and formal argumentation. Miller argues that Rawls' (and Joshua Cohen's) 'criterion of reciprocity'; deliberators must put forwards reasons that they believe *all* other will accept in public reason, renders deliberation to be a very restrictive process. He proposes a new formulation where it is not necessarily that *everybody* has to accept the other person's reason but rather a *majority* of co-deliberators. This alleged requirement, Miller argues, 'will itself serve as a filter that eliminates certain arguments in the course of debate without disqualifying them *a priori*.' Miller argues that the claim that deliberative democracy privileges dispassionate forms of communication at the expense of emotional ones is based on the false dichotomy between reason and desire. He asserts that both reason and emotions are involved in a deliberative process. Yet, one may argue that it is inaccurate to claim that Young maintains this dichotomy because she precisely argues against this kind of dichotomy. She contends that 'The norms of deliberation, finally, privilege speech that is dispassionate and disembodied. They tend to presuppose an opposition between mind and body, reason and emotion. They tend falsely to identify objectivity with calm and absence of emotional expression.' Miller misrepresents Young's view. For Miller says that 'According to Young and Sanders, what disadvantaged groups need is not deliberation *at all*, but other forms of political interaction in which their distinct perspectives and distinct concerns can emerge more clearly.' However, Young not only does not flatly reject argument as a form of communication, but she also considers it as an essential form of deliberation. She states that 'While argument is a *necessary* element in such efforts to discuss with and persuade one another about political issues, argument is *not* the *only* mode of political communication, and argument can be expressed in a plurality of ways, interspersed with or alongside *other* communicative forms.' For more see: David Miller, *Citizenship and National Identity* (Oxford: Polity Press, 2000); Rawls, 'The Idea of Public Reason Revisited'; Joshua Cohen, 'Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,' in Alan Hamlin and Phillip Pettit (eds.) *The Good Polity* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989); Iris Marion Young, 'Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy', in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Avner De- Shalit, 'Deliberative Democracy: Guarantee for Justice or Preventing Injustice?', in

the voices and interests of historically excluded social groups and minorities and is detached from their concrete experiences of suffering, misrecognition and oppression.¹⁸

Another problem that shows the difficulties Rawls' liberal egalitarianism faces concerning the accommodation of demands of historical exclusion is excessive legalism. Rawls' concept of public reason confines deliberation to be only on issues that deal with constitutional affairs and questions of basic justice. Rawls' notion of politics is primarily legalistic and anti political. Rawls believes that the representative institutions and the legal systems are the primary sites for political deliberation. As a result, the Supreme Court, and not the anonymous public, is very often the principal exemplar of the exercise of public reason. John Gray claims that:

The basic liberties and the distribution of social goods are matters of justice, and in political liberalism what justice demands is a matter not for political decision but for *legal* adjudication. The central institution of Rawls's 'political liberalism' is not a deliberative assembly such as a parliament. It is a *court of law*. All fundamental issues are removed from political deliberation in order to be adjudicated by a Supreme Court. The self-description of Rawlsian doctrine as political liberalism is supremely ironic. In fact, Rawls's doctrine is a species of *anti-political legalism*.¹⁹

This excessively legalistic form of politics is problematic from the perspective of historically excluded social groups because of their distrust in constitutional and legal mechanisms as ultimate means to remedy historical inequalities and exclusion. This lack of trust stems from the claim that the existing legal system is based primarily on the norms and values of the dominant group and therefore actively contributes to sustaining and reproducing inequalities.

Daniel Bell & Avner De-Shalit (eds.), *Forms of Justice* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003).

¹⁸ The dominant group usually tends to combine some motivations, images, and motifs of the dominated group in its discourse/ forms of communication to enhance its control. For more about this idea see: Slavoj Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject* (London: Verso, 1999).

¹⁹ John Gray, *Two Faces of Liberalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press: 2000), p. 16. (emphasis added).

Rawls argues that the public sphere is the realm of rational consensus and the private sphere is the realm of diversity. Achieving rational consensus, Rawls insists, is important to ground the liberal institutions on a stable foundation and to guarantee their future. To avoid insecurity and instability in public life, consensus upon the content of public reason has to be reached once and for all. This content includes substantive principles of justice and procedures for making public reason possible. According to Rawls, behind the 'veil of ignorance' all individuals appeal to reasonable standards and generalizable rational arguments and reach the same conclusion about the principles of justice adequate for a fair well-ordered society. Achieving pure rational consensus is based on viewing power and value pluralism as external forces that can be bracketed from deliberation on moral and political matters. Historically excluded social groups view these claims as problematic and naïve. The consensus on allegedly neutral principles of justice is problematic because it necessarily involves power. It involves power because these principles tend to reflect the values, experiences and perspectives of the powerful.²⁰ Advocates of the demands of historically excluded social groups insist on the importance of engaging in political democratic struggles and oppositional activities, such as street marches, sit-ins, leaflets, and boycotts, to challenge the institutions and policies that are grounded on alleged neutrality and consensus.²¹

Moreover, many feminists have rejected Rawls' rigid distinction between the public and private realms and his insistence on impartiality and consensus.²² Though

²⁰ Chantal Mouffe views power as a lasting, ineradicable and constitutive dimension of social relations, politics and identities. This persistent conflictual and antagonistic dimension of social relations and politics is what makes pure consensus (overlapping or other forms) impossibility. The ineradicability of the antagonistic dimension of social relations and politics stems from the pluralism of values in human life. Chantal Mouffe, *The Democratic Paradox* (London: Verso, 2000).

²¹ Iris Marion Young, 'Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy', *Political Theory*, 29:5 (2001), pp. 670-690.

²² Some feminists argue that the Western tradition has been dominated by 'phallogocentric' theories. For example Lacan's psychoanalysis theory is accused of being such a theory. For it recognises only the desires and preferences of men and neglects (or presents as an enigma) the desire of women. The 'Third Term', or the 'Other', in Lacan's theory is the phallus. According to Lacan, the signifier is inevitable for the constitution of meaning and the categories of masculine and feminine. Yet this signifier, some feminists, argue cannot be neutral because it is derived from the man's world of imagination. Additionally, it is problematic because it recognizes only two categories and therefore ignores the legitimacy of homosexuality. For more on Lacan's account of identity formation, see: Luce Irigaray, *To Be Two*, (New York: Routledge, 2000) and Juliet Mitchell & Jacqueline Rose, *Female Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the Ecole Freudienne*, (New York and London: Pantheon Books and W.W. Norton & Co.c, 1982).

Rawls is one of a few political theorists of justice who accords a great significance to the family as a primary important source for moral development, his theory of justice, according to several feminists, belongs to a deceiving and problematic tradition of gender neutral theories.²³ The family according to Rawls is a fundamental institution that enables the acquirement and development of sense of justice. This acquired sense of justice plays a critical role in his theory of justice. According to Susan Moller Okin, the claim of Rawls' theory about the moral significance of developing a sense of justice is problematic because it relies on the unexplained assumption that the institution of the family is just.²⁴ For the problem with the assumed justice in Rawls' theory is that it ignores the existing gendered-family institutions and practices that certainly do not operate or distribute resources, benefits, access and social roles according to the principles of justice he arrives at. Conversely, these structures and practices are clearly unjust in the sense that men and women do not enjoy the same social roles, benefits, powers, and access to recourses and opportunities. Worse than that, Okin claims that Rawls' view, in latter writings where he suggests that 'families are "private institutions" to which it is not appropriate to apply standards of justice,' renders his theory problematic. For if the family is a primary source for the development of the moral capacity of justice, then it must be just itself.²⁵ Okin claims that the family needs not be treated as an institution of the private domestic sphere but as a political institution that the principles of justice must apply to.

Rawls admits that a 'well-ordered society', based on justice as fairness, affirmed by all members is impossible in a society in which 'the fact of reasonable pluralism' is a chief characteristic.²⁶ In his latter writings, especially in *Political Liberalism*, Rawls concedes several criticisms. In *Political Liberalism* he acknowledges a plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines.²⁷ Moreover, he

²³ Susan Moller Okin accuses, theorists such as Ronald Dworkin, Bruce Ackerman and Robert Nozick to be worse than Rawls because they pay less attention to justice in the family in their theories. Their theories are mistakenly presented as gender neutral that ignore the differences in histories, social roles, power, and access to recourses and opportunities between the sexes.

²⁴ Susan Moller Okin, *Justice, Gender, and the Family* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), p. 22.

²⁵ Okin, *Justice, Gender, and the Family*, p. 22.

²⁶ Rawls, 'The Idea of Public Reason Revisited', p. 807.

²⁷ 'Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal in a system of social cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one another fair terms of cooperation of political justice; and when they agree to act on those terms, even at the cost of their own interests in

argues that in political liberalism ‘the content of public reason is given by a family of political conceptions of justice, and not by a single one.’²⁸ In other words, political liberalism acknowledges that the content of public reason is not definitive and defined once and for all. Rather it is dynamic, reflexive, and contains different political conceptions of justice. For citizens, he maintains, act from ‘irreconcilable yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines’²⁹ and therefore public reason should not always lead to consensus.

However, citizens who hold these comprehensive doctrines endorse, through an ‘overlapping consensus’, common reasonable political principles. Every comprehensive doctrine, from its own point of view, endorses these alleged political principles. These principles ultimately stipulate ‘the basic rights, liberties, and opportunities of citizens in society’s basic structure.’³⁰ Rawls maintains that they are both ‘liberal and self-standing’ (their content is based on liberal morality).³¹ He alerts us not to confuse his overlapping consensus with a simple *modus vivendi* based on mere procedures.³² ‘Overlapping consensus,’ he insists, is much deeper than mere *modus vivendi* in the sense that it is, despite all the different reasonable comprehensive doctrines, based on a core liberal morality. This kind of politics, offered by Rawls, discriminates against groups with strong communal character that do not adopt necessarily liberal moral values or outlook. Consequently, this kind of politics, which is exclusively based on liberal values, is less tolerant than it often claims to be. For it clearly favours a very particular set of principles, i.e., liberal principles. This is particularly true in cases of historically excluded social groups where their similarities and their constant vulnerability to certain forms of oppression

particular situations, provided that other citizens also accept those terms’, this he calls the criterion of reciprocity. Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’, p. 770.

²⁸ Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ , p. 773.

²⁹ Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ , p. 807.

³⁰ Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ , p. 807.

³¹ Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ , p. 807.

³² Moreover, Rawls asserts that overlapping consensus differs from constitutional consensus too. While constitutional consensus guarantees basic liberties and rights and establishes democratic procedures, it is not grounded in a certain political conception of justice. Consequently, the content of these rights and liberty are always contested and this leads to instability in the public life. The content of these liberties and rights, in Rawls’ theory, is fixed irreversibly by the overlapping consensus that is based on a liberal moral outlook.

and exclusion generate strong affinities among their members and a sense of common collective identity.³³ While these groups could value liberal principles of individual liberties, in several cases they tend not to accord to them the priority Rawls assigns to them. They value other communal values and principles.

To sum up, I have argued, hitherto, that Rawls' notions of public reason and politics give rise to several problems that make the task of accommodating historical injustices considerably difficult. However, more problems can be identified in Rawls' theory which hinders its attentiveness to demands of historical injustice. Some of these problems are linked to the thin liberal notion of social ontology that underlies his theory and will be thoroughly discussed in the next chapter.

Part II

Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson: 'economy of moral disagreement' and democracy

The previous part has demonstrated the inadequacies of Rawls' egalitarian deliberative democracy to sufficiently tackle demands of historically excluded social groups. This part examines Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson's theory of deliberative democracy. Gutmann and Thompson argue that their theory of deliberative democracy provides the best framework to justify and assess the work of truth commissions that try to address historical injustice. Moreover, they are presented here as a bridge between the Rawls' and Habermas' approaches because they attempt to combine Rawlsian and Habermasian principles in their theories. Despite Gutmann and Thompson's claim about the appropriateness of their theory to address issues of historical injustice, it will be argued that their theory does not offer an adequate treatment to effectively accommodate the demands of historically excluded social groups in divided and pluralistic societies.

Gutmann and Thompson argue in *Democracy and Disagreement* that liberal principles can be derived from deliberative democracy. Unlike Rawls, they bring moral disagreements, such as abortion, preferential hiring and health care, from the background culture and private sphere to the heart of public life. They claim that

³³ For more on affinities and a sense of shared identity see: Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, pp. 44-45.

Rawls 'avoids confronting the apparent indeterminacy of many moral conflicts that arise in contemporary politics' by confining them to the private sphere. Therefore, they insist that he 'stops short of arguing that a well-ordered democracy requires extensive deliberation to resolve moral disagreements.'³⁴ Consequently, they urge for the abandonment of the dichotomy between 'the political' and 'the moral'. They argue that political conflicts often reflect deep moral disagreements. Any satisfactory theory of democracy, they insist, must provide a way of dealing with these moral disagreements.

However, they draw upon Rawls' concept of public reason and therefore they also believe that a set of ideals and conditions are required for political decisions to constitute a legitimate expression of the collective will of the people. They point out three foundational conditions of deliberative democracy to deal with moral disagreements. These three conditions are: reciprocity, or 'the capacity to seek fair terms of social cooperation for their own sake'; publicity; and accountability, to constituents and other citizens, to citizens of other political systems, and to future generations.³⁵ Besides these three conditions they point out three additional substantive principles that rule the content of public reason. These three principles are 'basic liberties', 'basic opportunity', and 'fair opportunity.'³⁶ These conditions and principles are related to each other and therefore always interact among themselves.

Gutmann and Thompson insist that the principle of reciprocity is a more adequate basis for democratic politics than the principles of impartiality or prudence.³⁷ According to the principle of prudence the best way of dealing with moral

³⁴ Amy Gutman, and Dennis Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 35, 37.

³⁵ Gutman and Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement*, p. 8.

³⁶ Gutman and Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement*, p. 229.

³⁷ They endeavour to demarcate deliberative democracy from other conventional theories of democracy such as procedural democracy and constitutional democracy. Deliberative democracy, they insist, is different from other theories of democracy in that it is a 'second-order theory'. It is a second order theory because it leaves room for continuing moral conflict that first-order theories seek to eliminate. Additionally, it avoids the difficulties of procedural theories by explicitly acknowledging the substantive conflicts underlying procedures. The principles of deliberative democracy are, they insist, distinctive in two significant respects: they are morally and politically provisional. They are morally provisional in the sense that they are subject to change through further moral argument. They are politically provisional in the sense that they are subject to change through further political argument. This self-correcting capacity enhances moral progress in deliberative democracy. For more on this see: Amy Gutman and Dennis Thompson, 'Why Deliberative Democracy is Different', *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 17:1 (2000), pp. 161-180, *Democracy and Disagreement*, pp. 26-51.

disagreements is through various forms of bargaining among self-interested citizens. Therefore, in the bargaining process, citizens are strategically motivated by their particular interests. The reasons prudential citizens invoke to justify the result (decision, policy, or law) of the bargaining process is that in the given circumstances the result is mutually advantageous. Reciprocity requires more than the narrow interest-based reasons. It requires the appeal to general moral reasons so that similarly situated citizens can recognize them as acceptable. According to the impartiality principle when citizens decide on public policies and laws they should appeal to universal general moral reasons that transcend their particular partial perspectives and notions of the good. Reciprocity is not as demanding as impartiality because it does not require the altruism impartiality demands. In other words, it does not require citizens to suppress their partial perspectives. Instead reciprocity demands the articulation of particular perspectives and claims in general principles so that other similarly situated citizens can reasonably accept them.³⁸

Unlike Rawls and Habermas who seek rational consensus, Gutmann and Thompson do not think that deliberation around moral issues should produce consensus or a unified public will, but an accommodation of rival moral convictions. This kind of accommodation, called in their terms ‘economy of moral disagreement’,³⁹ is driven by the principle of reciprocity. Reciprocity requires that citizens should be prepared to ‘appeal to reasons that are shared or could come to be shared’ by their fellow citizens to justify their interests and views.⁴⁰ The ultimate aim of the ‘economy of moral disagreement’ is to achieve moral agreements when it is possible and mutual respect and a *modus vivendi* when citizens morally disagree.⁴¹ They argue that it is

³⁸ Guttmann and Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement*, p. 7 and pp. 52-63.

³⁹ Guttmann and Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement*, p. 3.

⁴⁰ Guttmann and Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement*, p. 14.

⁴¹ Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond*, (2000), pp. 16-17. *Modus vivendi*, in its simple definition, means peaceful coexistence between different and rival views or values. John Gray promotes a political system that is based on *modus vivendi* as well. Yet, his approach seems to be quite different from Guttmann and Thompson’s because they still seem to favour one certain conception of justice. Gray claims that *modus vivendi* is a political not moral project that asserts that the test of legitimacy of any regime is not its consistency in pursuing one particular, or even a set, value such as justice, but its ability to mediate and reach compromises among conflicting, incompatible and incommensurable values. Gray reformulates Hobbes’ conception of the politics in pluralistic terms and concludes that ‘The end of politics is not the mere absence of war, but a *modus vivendi* among goods and evils. Like a Hobbesian peace, this can never be achieved once and for all’. John Gray, *Two Faces of Liberalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press: 2000), p. 133.

precisely this economy of moral disagreement, with the principle of reciprocity at its core, what makes their notion of deliberative democracy an adequate framework to address historical injustice. More precisely, they claim that their notion of deliberative democracy is the 'most promising perspective' to justify and assess the work of truth commissions.⁴² For deliberative democracy is primarily designed to deal with ongoing moral conflicts.⁴³

Gutmann and Thompson identify three common justifications of truth commissions: realist, compassionate and historicist. They claim that these three justifications are incomplete. Alternatively, they propose the principle of democratic reciprocity which lies at the core of their notion of deliberative democracy as a more appropriate basis to justify and assess the work of truth commissions. For the principle of democratic reciprocity requires citizens, who are committed to fair terms of social cooperation and hold reasonable views, to seek an economy of moral disagreement. This economy of moral disagreement aims to accommodate moral conflicts while recognizing that certain moral conflicts are irresolvable and therefore reasonable disagreements should be allowed. The realist approach provides a prudential justification according to which the truth commission is viewed as a result of strategic negotiations between conflicting parties who seek to achieve political stability by putting an end to a violent conflict. The difficulty with this justification, according to Gutmann and Thompson, is that it is inappropriate from a democratic perspective because it views moral considerations as irrelevant and it does not provide convincing reasons why citizens should be prepared to sacrifice seeking justice for achieving political stability especially that stable regimes can be excessively oppressive.⁴⁴ The compassionate justification seeks 'restorative justice' that is based on the idea of forgiveness. To achieve restorative justice, the victimizers should recognize the harm they have caused and express remorse and the victims should grant them forgiveness. The difficulty with this justification is that it relies on a specific interpretation of a theological, Christian, value that is not shared by all

⁴² Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, 'The Moral Foundations of Truth Commissions', in Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (eds.) *Truth V. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 22-23.

⁴³ Gutmann and Thompson, 'The Moral Foundations of Truth Commissions' , p. 35.

⁴⁴ Gutmann and Thompson, 'The Moral Foundations of Truth Commissions' , p. 23, pp. 26-29.

Christians. This claim becomes even more challenging if the society is pluralistic and has several comprehensive doctrines.⁴⁵ The historicist justification views the task of truth commissions as discovering the historical truth about past facts and wrongs. Finding historical truth is indispensable for creating a common ground for future social and political cooperation. The problem of this justification is that it views historical truth as constant and fixed entity that can be revealed without being influenced by the social and cultural contexts in which it has been revealed. In other words, the difficulty is in the claim that historical truth has a single and final interpretation.⁴⁶

Restating the dilemma but not escaping it

In this section I want to point out three main problems in Gutmann and Thompson's theory of democracy that undermine its appropriateness to deal sufficiently with demands of historically excluded social groups. Firstly, Gutmann and Thompson postulate the egalitarian principle of reciprocity (and accountability and publicity) as a precondition for deliberation. They argue that democratic reciprocity is a precondition for embarking on deliberation (including deliberation on historical injustice, truth commissions). The problem with this claim is that it theoretically presupposes what the process of reconciliation seeks to achieve.⁴⁷ Put differently, they assume that political adversaries in divided societies mutually accept and respect each other prior to the process of reconciliation. This mutual acceptance is precisely what political adversaries lack and what a process of reconciliation aspires to realise. John Dryzek argues that 'mutual acceptance of reasonableness is precisely what is lacking in divided societies'.⁴⁸

Secondly, mutual respect and acceptance of the principle of democratic reciprocity is based on the idea of 'reasonableness'. Citizens are required to appeal to

⁴⁵ Gutmann and Thompson, 'The Moral Foundations of Truth Commissions' , pp. 29-33.

⁴⁶ Gutmann and Thompson, 'The Moral Foundations of Truth Commissions' , pp. 33-35.

⁴⁷ Margaret Kohn argues that these principles must not be assumed theoretically but fought for. For more see her article: 'Language, Power, and Persuasion: Toward a Critique of Deliberative Democracy' *Constellations*, 7:3 (2000), pp. 408-429.

⁴⁸ John Dryzek, 'Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia' (Canberra: SPT, RSCS, ANU., 2003), p. 2.

general principles of public reason to justify the reasonableness of their preferences and views to their fellow citizens. In other words, citizens should articulate their claims in reasonable terms so that their fellow citizens might reasonably accept them. The trouble with the idea of reasonableness is that it might exclude certain claims that seemingly appear unreasonable or hard to express in reasonable terms. Since the process of reasoning takes place within a concrete cultural and social context, the criteria that determine what is reasonable are likely to reflect the values and norms of the hegemonic groups and not the excluded and marginalized ones. Therefore, Stanley Fish concludes that unlike Gutmann and Thompson who view the test of reasonableness as purely moral, exclusion from deliberation is political action that involves power. The idea of 'reasonableness', Fish argues, operates as a 'device of exclusion'.⁴⁹ Moreover, scholars such as Iris Marion Young and Lynn Sander have argued that the political modes of speech that are associated with the requirement of reasonableness are often the speech modes of the hegemonic groups. Political modes of speech such as testimony, rhetoric and narrative that are used by excluded and oppressed social groups are often viewed as unreasonable.⁵⁰

Finally, Gutmann and Thompson, like other deliberative democrats such as Rawls and Habermas, tend to view political conflicts as primarily stemming from disagreements between particular preferences and interests. They downplay the role of identities in generating political conflicts. As we have indicated in the introduction of the thesis the main feature which distinguishes a social group from an association or an aggregation is identity. This sense of identity tends to be stronger among historically excluded social groups. Several historically excluded social groups demand the recognition and respect of their unique identities and not only the interests and preferences of their individual members. The problem with focusing exclusively on the interests of sporadic individuals is that it de-politicises social struggles and

⁴⁹ Stanley Fish, 'Mutual Respect as a Device of Exclusion', in Stephen Macedo (ed.), *Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 88-102.

⁵⁰ Iris Marion Young, 'Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy', in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 120-35; Lynn Sanders, 'Against Deliberation', *Political Theory*, 25:3 (1997), pp. 347-376.

likely to prevent collective action.⁵¹ Moreover, ‘privatising’ exclusion and oppression leads to the risk of viewing inequalities as merely individual cases rather than structural ones that are legitimised by social, political and cultural norms and practices.

Briefly, ignoring the role of identities in generating political conflicts, postulating the mutual acceptance prior to the process of reconciliation, and the operation of the idea of reasonableness as mechanism of exclusion, all pose serious problems to the ability of Gutmann and Thompson’s theory of deliberative democracy to effectively accommodate claims of historical exclusion.

To sum up, thus far it has been argued that Rawls’s and Gutmann and Thompson’s theories propose theories of deliberation that are inappropriate to accommodate sufficiently demands of historically excluded social groups. Rawls’ and Gutmann and Thompson’s theories of deliberative democracy are not the only major theories of deliberation. Several other scholars have proposed different theories of deliberative democracy that are supposedly more attentive to claims of historical exclusion. Most importantly among these theories is Habermas’ ‘discursive theory’. The next part of this chapter will be devoted to explore and analyze the adequacy of Habermas’ theory of deliberative democracy to accommodate demands of historical exclusion.

Part III

The Habermasian model

This part is divided into three sections. The first and the second sections trace Habermas’ early position and the recent changes in it. The third section critically assesses Habermas’ theory of deliberative democracy and demonstrates its inadequacies to accommodate effectively demands of historically excluded social groups. These inadequacies, it will be argued, stem chiefly from excessive proceduralism and legalism, favouring rational and disembodied modes of speech, bracketing power relations from moral reasoning and determining ‘reasonableness’,

⁵¹ Axel Honneth raises similar charge against Habermas’ notion of deliberative democracy as running the risk of privatizing the ‘class-specific consciousness of injustice’. This will be discussed in the chapter 3. Honneth, ‘Moral Consciousness and Class Domination: Some Problems in the Analysis of Hidden Morality’, in Honneth, Axel, *The Fragmented World of the Social*, (Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), pp. 212-215.

and finally giving primacy to the state as the ultimate frame for political authority and therefore failing to capture the claims of historically excluded social groups which undermine the notion of statehood by their demand to separate or secede.

Habermas saving the Enlightenment

Habermas follows Max Weber and expresses his fears about the modern age as essentially an age of rationalization. The principal problem that characterises modernity, he argues, is the universalization of instrumental rationality that has converted political and social questions into technical ones. Intensive processes of scientization, bureaucratisation, and commercialisation have significantly influenced democratic politics and reduced it to be primarily about the aggregation of pre-determined interests. The process of stripping democratic politics from any sense of morality has stimulated Habermas to offer a different version of democracy, a version of democracy that is based on a different understanding of rationality. This different understanding of rationality is to be found in unconstrained communicative action. Habermas distinguishes between two forms of rationality, instrumental and communicative. Instrumental rationality is 'the capacity to devise, select and effect good means to' the achievement of clear and consistent ends.⁵² By contrast, communicative action is oriented towards mutual understanding between individuals rather than success in attaining predefined individual interests. Unlike Rawls and other liberals, Habermas argues that communicative action can transform individuals and their interests and therefore make them more tolerable and attentive to the interests of others. Communicative rationality, according to Habermas, 'is found to the degree that communicative action is free from coercion, deception and, self-deception, strategizing, and manipulation.'⁵³

This communicative and intersubjective understanding of rationality, Habermas insists, paves the way for a secure combination between liberal principles of individual rights and republican democratic principles of popular sovereignty and participation. This marriage of principles leads to the creation of a distinct theory of deliberative democracy, namely 'discourse theory', which is based on a notion of an

⁵² Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond*, p. 22.

⁵³ Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond*, p. 22.

ideal procedure for deliberation and decision-making. Habermas distinguishes his theory of democracy from communitarian, republican and liberal theories of democracy. It differs, he insists, from the communitarian theories by rejecting the need for any pre-existing ethically integrated community and associated tradition that enforces the content of deliberation. Also, it is distinct from republican theories 'in its denial of any undifferentiated popular sovereignty'.⁵⁴ Unlike many liberal theories that conceive politics in terms of reconciliation and aggregation of individual private interests, discourse theory emphasizes the need for a common good politics that leads to solidarity. Moreover, discourse theory does not assign primacy to rights for the sole sake of their bearers- but rather for guaranteeing a space for deliberation.⁵⁵ Whereas the primary venue for deliberation, for liberal deliberative democrats, is the state and its legal system, for Habermas the public sphere is the main site for political interaction. Political associations and social movements, that often confront the state and its institutions, inhabit the public sphere.

Habermas views legitimacy as the key issue of a functioning democracy. A functioning democracy requires rational consensus. The aim of this rational consensus is to ground the liberal institutions on a stable ground and to secure their future. To achieve this consensus, Habermas distinguishes between morality and ethics and prioritizes the former over the latter. While moral norms are universal and detached from context, ethical values are particular and context specific. As he puts it 'the universalization principle acts like a knife that makes razor-sharp cuts between evaluative statements and strictly normative ones, between the good and the just.'⁵⁶ He argues that moral deliberation is a tool for discovering universal normative validity claims. However, normative validity is the result of an intersubjective dialogue and not an individual's monological reason. Conversely, ethical deliberation deals with substantive questions of the good life in a particular context. Briefly, ethics is viewed as the realm of diversity and conflict and morality as the realm of rational consensus and unity.

⁵⁴ Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond*, p. 26; Habermas, 'Three Normative Models of Democracy', *Constellations*, 1:1 (1994), pp. 1-10.

⁵⁵ Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond*, p. 26.

⁵⁶ Jurgen Habermas, 'Discourse Ethics', in *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Actions* Christian Lenhardt, and Shierry Weber Nicholson (trans.), (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press:1990), p. 104.

Habermas argues that in the ideal speech situation, all speakers implicitly raise and accept the following validity claims: ‘the truth of the propositional content, comprehensibility of utterances, the truthfulness or authenticity of the speaking subject, and appropriateness given the existing context.’⁵⁷ Under these conditions, actual interactions will lead to consensus formation. Consensus is inherent in the premises of ‘normal’ communication. Habermas claims that ‘consensus is possible because of the “already operative potential for rationality contained in the everyday practice of communication”.’ This claim, he insists, ‘is based on the assumption that under ideal conditions, language is fully transparent.’⁵⁸ Habermas values rational argument more than other forms of communication. He considers manipulating, lying, misleading, and deceiving as distorted forms of communication.

Despite his efforts to emphasize the dialogical aspect of politics and subjectivity formation, his theory has been under continuous criticism primarily due to its excessive procedural character, its rigid distinction between morality and ethics, the endorsement of universal abstract moral principles, and its unserious engagement with cultural pluralism.⁵⁹ Recently, Habermas has made some changes in his theory to relax the distinction between morality and ethics and to ground universal principles in an historical, hermeneutic project of self-understanding through constitutions. Through these changes he hoped to offer a more sensitive approach to the issue of cultural pluralism and real politics. The following section will trace and explore these changes.

The new face of Habermas: calming the distinction between morality and ethics

In his recent writings (such as *Between Facts and Norms* and *The Inclusion of the Other*) Habermas claims that his theory is sensitive to the real-world politics and

⁵⁷ Margaret Kohn, ‘Language, Power, and Persuasion: Toward a Critique of Deliberative Democracy’ *Constellations*, 7:3 (2000), p. 409.

⁵⁸ Kohn, ‘Language, Power, and Persuasion: Toward a Critique of Deliberative Democracy’, p. 410.

⁵⁹ Some of these criticisms are discussed in the work of Chantal Mouffe and Iris Marion Young. For more see: Chantal Mouffe, *The Democratic Paradox* (London: Verso, 2000); Iris Marion Young, *Inclusion and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), ‘Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy’, in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 120-35.

plurality of modern societies. He argues that scholars, such as Charles Taylor, who claim that an individualistic theory of rights cannot do justice to struggles of recognition, are mistaken because of their interpretation of the modern individualistic system of rights.⁶⁰ More precisely, they are mistaken because of their narrow understanding of the conception of autonomy. Autonomy for them is conceived only as a private autonomy; the freedom of each individual to pursue her own conception of the good life. Private autonomy is primarily concerned with securing subjective individual rights. Autonomy for Habermas, however, is more than private autonomy. Autonomy is 'a *multidimensional* conception.'⁶¹ It is, he maintains, composed of private and civic/public autonomy. Public autonomy, according to him, refers to the citizens' capacity to participate in processes of democratic will and opinion formation. In other words, public autonomy refers to the democratic rights of popular sovereignty and participation. These two components of autonomy, i.e. private and public, are internally related and 'mutually presuppose each other'.⁶² Citizens, Habermas adds, cannot attain:

equal liberties unless they themselves, by jointly exercising their autonomy as citizens, arrive at a clear understanding of the legitimate interests and standards involved and reach agreement on those aspects and criteria according to which equal things should be treated equally and unequal things unequally.⁶³

Habermas' main reason to indicate the interdependency between private and public autonomy is to show how the 'rule of law' and the 'general will' of people are interrelated and equally important. Consequently, unlike republicans who present the

⁶⁰ Habermas refers primarily to the charges that Charles Taylor raises against liberalism. For Taylor's views see: Charles Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', in Amy Gutmann (ed.), *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 25-73, *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), *The Ethics of Authenticity* (London: Harvard University Press, 1992).

⁶¹ Maeve Cooke, 'Authenticity and Autonomy: Taylor, Habermas, and the Politics of Recognition', *Political Theory*, 25:2 (1997), p. 272.

⁶² Habermas, 'Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason,' *The Journal of Philosophy*, 92:3 (1995), p.130.

⁶³ Habermas, 'Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States', *European Journal of Philosophy*, 1:2 (1993), p. 131.

'rule of law' and 'popular sovereignty' as incompatible/ competing sources of legitimacy and therefore necessarily lead to two different forms of regimes or liberals who accord priority to subjective individual rights over political rights of democratic participation, Habermas concludes that constitutionalism and democracy are not only interrelated but also compatible.⁶⁴ Put in his terms, 'The interdependence of constitutionalism and democracy comes to light in this complementary relationship between private and civic autonomy: each side is fed by resources it has from the other.'⁶⁵ Taking this intrinsic relation between the rule of law and constitutionalism seriously, Habermas insists, leads to the conclusion that the alleged individualistic system of rights is not blind to differences. For it protects cultural differences by insisting that the integrity of citizens cannot be guaranteed, from a normative point of view, without simultaneously safeguarding its intersubjective culturally specific context of life 'in which he or she was socialised and in which they formed their identity.'⁶⁶ The realization of this system of rights, he emphasizes, is hard and necessitates 'political struggle' and 'social movements.'⁶⁷

Against the charge that the discursive democratic process is trapped in a circular self-creation, Habermas argues that the alleged tension between the rule of law and democracy is resolved once democratic-constitution is conceived as an historical, dynamic, continuous and fallible project of hermeneutic self exploration that has a clear founding point in time. Additionally, Habermas presumes that this process is a hermeneutic and 'self-correcting learning process.'⁶⁸ As he puts it:

the interpretation of constitutional history as a learning process is predicted on the nontrivial assumption that later generations will start with the same standards as did the founders. Whoever bases her

⁶⁴ For more how Habermas' views regarding the relationship between democracy and constitutionalism are distinct from liberal, particularly Rawls's approach, and republican approaches see: Habermas, 'Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason,' *The Journal of Philosophy*, 92:3 (1995), particularly pp. 126-131, 'Three Normative Models of Democracy', *Constellations*, 1:1 (1994), pp. 1-10.

⁶⁵ Habermas, 'Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?', *Political Theory*, 29:6 (2001), p. 780.

⁶⁶ Habermas, 'Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States', p. 141.

⁶⁷ Habermas, 'Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States', p. 132.

⁶⁸ Habermas, 'Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?', p. 774.

judgement today on the normative expectation of complete inclusion and mutual recognition, as well as on the expectation of equal opportunities for utilizing equal rights, must assume that she can find these standards by reasonably appropriating the constitution and its history of interpretation.⁶⁹

The recognition of differences, implied in Habermas' reading of the individualistic system of rights, raises the issue of the impartiality of legal norms, namely, the neutrality of law. Unlike his earlier position where he presents a clear cut between ethics and morality, he introduces a more complicated account of interaction between morality and ethics. Whilst moral norms regulate the interaction between subjects in general regardless of the concrete specific context, 'legal norms refer to the network of interactions in a given specific society.'⁷⁰ Legal norms, applied in a given defined society, need to take into account society's political goals when it regulates normative rules for modes of behaviour. Therefore, he claims that 'every legal system is *also* the expression of a particular lifeform and not merely a reflection of the universalist features of basic rights.'⁷¹ However, Habermas insists that the diverse interpretations, grounded in a specific historical context, of constitutional principles and rights 'always revolve around the best interpretation of *the same* basic rights and principles.'⁷² He implies that there is one set of principles and rights that is universal and transcendental. These principles are decided once and for all.

Additionally, unlike his earlier position (where the only forms of communication that were accepted are those that deal with universal validity claims) he claims that ethical discourses, alongside moral discourses, pragmatic discourses and negotiation processes, are involved in public discussions around legislative matters. He argues that 'the simple fact is that in addition to moral considerations,

⁶⁹ Habermas, 'Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?', p. 775.

⁷⁰ Habermas, 'Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States', p. 138.

⁷¹ Habermas, 'Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States', p. 138. (original emphasis).

⁷² Habermas, 'Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States', p. 144. (original emphasis).

pragmatic deliberations and the results of fair negotiations, ethical reasons also play a role in the deliberation and justifications in support of legislative decisions.’⁷³

Recently, Habermas is more concerned with how informal public opinion formation in the public sphere can influence the state’s policies. Viewing the state as the ultimate frame for political activities and public opinion formation, he talks about transforming the ‘communicative power’ produced in the public sphere into ‘administrative power’ of the state’s system. Unlike his earlier position where he emphasizes the centrality of deliberation, Habermas accords a central role to elections, legislation, and lawful administrative implementation of policy as well. He contends that ‘Informal public opinion formation generates “influence”; influence is transformed into “communicative power” through the channels of political elections; and communicative power is again transformed into “administrative power” through legislation.’⁷⁴

Thus far, I have tried to identify some important changes that Habermas has made to his theory hoping to offer a more sensitive approach to the issue of cultural pluralism and exclusion. Habermas has keenly tried to reformulate his earlier universal ideal of discursive democracy so that it becomes more sensitive to diversity and pluralism. In order to do so, he primarily feels pressure to relieve the tension in his sharp distinction between morality and ethics through introducing his ideal of the constitutional state and ethical deliberation. In the following section I will examine the appropriateness of Habermas’ modified version of deliberative democracy to democratically accommodate demands of historical exclusion and injustice.

What is problematic in Habermas’ account?

In this section I argue that despite the amendments Habermas has introduced to his theory, it is still trapped in several problems that render it inadequate to satisfactorily deal with the demands of historically excluded social groups in contemporary divided societies. I will point out and discuss some important problems.

⁷³ Habermas, ‘Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States’, pp. 138-139. Maeve Cooke counts three developments in Habermas’ recent writings that relax the distinction between morality and ethics. First, ‘his introduction of a category of ethical *discourses* (ii), the insistence on such discourses as an important strand of politics, (iii) the acknowledgment of the ethical shaping of the constitutional state’. See: Maeve Cooke, ‘Authenticity and Autonomy: Taylor, Habermas, and the Politics of Recognition’, *Political Theory*, 25:2 (1997), pp. 275-277.

⁷⁴ Habermas, ‘Three Normative Models of Democracy’, p. 8.

First, despite Habermas's endorsement of ethical discourses as a legitimate strand of politics, his theory favours particular and exclusive forms of political communication. According to Iris Marion Young, Habermas' discursive model of democracy favours rational, disembodied, formal and dispassionate modes of speech and excludes others such as rhetoric, initiation, storytelling, testimony, and greeting.⁷⁵ The trouble with favouring 'rational argument' as the ultimate mode of political speech is that it is often the elites who possess 'the linguistic and analytic skills conventionally defined as rational.'⁷⁶ Historically excluded social groups also use passionate and less formal modes of political speech such as testimony, oral history, and narrative to express their experiences of oppression and articulate their political claims. Consequently, it is not implausible to argue that rational modes of political speech tend to represent the interests and the speech culture of the powerful and ignore the voices and interests of the excluded groups and minorities.⁷⁷

Second, Habermas' deliberative democracy strongly strives to achieve rational consensus on the procedures that should govern politics. Habermas' achieves this rational consensus through the distinction that he draws between morality and ethics. While morality is the sphere of consensus and universalism, ethics is the sphere of diversity and particularism. Despite Habermas' attempts to relax the dichotomy between ethics and morality, he still views the ideal speech situation as the basis for an intersubjective and rational consensus. The ideal speech situation, Habermas maintains, operates as a regulative ideal which sets the conditions of actual interaction and determines what counts as reasonable procedure or principle. The problem with Habermas' theory is that it overemphasizes the emancipatory force of discourse and attainability of moral consensus, while it neglects the structures and regimes of power that underlie consensus formation and discourse. He presumes that in an ideal speech situation power can be bracketed. This understanding of discourse is problematic because it assumes that language is neutral and transparent and power is something

⁷⁵ Iris Marion Young, 'Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy', in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 120-135.

⁷⁶ Kohn, 'Language, Power, and Persuasion: Toward a Critique of Deliberative Democracy', pp. 411-412.

⁷⁷ Sanders, 'Against Deliberation', *Political Theory*, 25:3 (1997), pp. 347-376.

accidental and external that can be eliminated.⁷⁸ Determining the moral conditions of actual deliberation and reasonableness does not take place in a vacuum but by individuals who are positioned in a concrete particular social and cultural context. These individuals have ethical evaluative principles that have direct bearing on their moral reasoning and deliberation.⁷⁹ In divided societies it is often the dominant group that determines what counts as reasonable and it is precisely based on this notion of reasonableness that other groups are excluded and defined as unreasonable and inferior. Consequently, for historically excluded social groups accepting the theory's assumptions about the neutrality and transparency of communication and discourse means concealing and denying the exclusions and hierarchies that legitimise their oppression and depiction as inferior or unreasonable.

Third, while Habermas seemingly provides a defensible account addressing the struggles of recognition through the appeal to a multidimensional and intersubjective conception of individual autonomy in a constitutional state, his theory seems to be insensitive to struggles for recognition that do not necessarily assign the significance he does to the ideal of autonomy. As we have indicated earlier in the introduction of the thesis what distinguishes social groups from mere aggregations or associations is the existence of a sense of collective identity. Several historically excluded social groups give considerable importance to their collective identity in their demands for recognition. Maeve Cooke argues that Habermas':

view of the modern constitutional state permits equal political recognition only in the case of those groups who accept its underlying commitment to the ideal of individual autonomy [...]The modern state, as conceived by Habermas, is thus inevitably exclusionary of certain

⁷⁸ Scholars such as Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu view power relations as constitutive of discourse and therefore refuse to view language as power-free, transparent and neutral. For more on their views see: Foucault, Michel, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Alan Sheridan (trans.) (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 'Afterword by Michel Foucault: The Subject and Power', in Hubert L. Dreyfus & Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Harvester and Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 208-226; Pierre Bourdieu, *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).

⁷⁹ Chantal Mouffe rejects Habermas' claim that procedures could be neutral and lack any substantial principles. According to her, procedures cannot be separable from concrete forms of life that necessarily assign ethical dimension to these procedures. Moreover, she argues that pure consensus is impossible because power is a lasting, ineradicable, and constitutive dimension of social relations, politics and identities. The ineradicability of the antagonistic dimension of social relations and politics stems from the pluralism of values in human life. For more see: Chantal Mouffe, 'For An Agonistic Model of Democracy', *The Democratic Paradox* (London, Verso: 2000).

forms of ethical difference – its ability to accommodate demands for recognition of specific identity is limited.⁸⁰

Briefly, Habermas' theory explicitly favours liberal individualistic values and clearly prioritizes political recognition for groups that put the ideal of individual autonomy at the centre of their struggle.

Fourth, despite Habermas' attempt, in his early writings, to differentiate his discourse theory from liberal theories of democracy, in his recent writings he ends up adopting a traditional liberal belief: 'that law-making constitutes the *only* rightful mechanism for transforming public opinion into administrative decision.'⁸¹ He dropped his commitment to the centrality of deliberation and the power of civil society in generating political and social change, in favour of legislative liberal procedures. This excessive proceduralism and legalism of Habermas' theory tend to tame political and social struggles by subjecting them to the legal domain and its chief representative the Supreme Court (In the case of Germany the Constitutional Court). Therefore, this process of legalisation of political and social struggles prevents potential alternative means of political and social change. Habermas' discursive theory is too legalistic and strives to institutionalise and co-opt opposition instead of facilitating 'enclaves of resistance' or oppositional bodies that are indispensable for achieving substantial changes in the existing political and legal arrangements. Historically excluded social groups are particularly suspicious of this strategy of co-opting.⁸² Their suspicion stems from the claim that in certain cases where inequalities are persistent and rooted in social and political norms and practices, accepting deliberation under the existing circumstances means agreeing to the present political institutional arrangements. These present political institutional arrangements have implicit and explicit agendas, priorities and biases that serve the interest of the powerful. Historically excluded social groups often demand transforming these institutional arrangements rather than joining them in their current format.

Finally, in *Between Facts and Norms* Habermas appears as a statist in the sense that his approach is primarily a state-focused approach. Habermas'

⁸⁰ Cooke, 'Authenticity and Autonomy: Taylor, Habermas, and the Politics of Recognition', p. 279.

⁸¹ Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations*, pp. 24-25.

⁸² For more on the strategy of co-opting see: Iris Marion Young, 'Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy', *Political Theory*, 29:5 (2001), pp. 670-690.

constitutional state or 'proceduralist concept of democracy' advocated in *Between Facts and Norms* implicitly favours a particular type of state, namely Weberian type of state, where the state is the primary frame for political, legal authority and deliberation. Despite Habermas' explicit support of a European constitution, in his writings after *Between Facts and Norms* on the possibility of creating a cosmopolitan democracy he remains suspicious of the attainability of a global civic solidarity. Therefore, he keeps according a fundamental role to the constitutional modern state and its institutions.⁸³ Habermas claims, however, that due to several changes in the world, such as globalization, economic forces, and the influx of immigration, the nation-state has been transformed. While Habermas recognizes and endorses the importance of this transformation to a changing world, he rejects the idea of abolishing the nation-state because he is doubtful about the formation of solidarity beyond national boundaries.⁸⁴ This Habermasian state-focused approach is problematic when it comes to certain types of historical injustices. More specifically, his approach fails to appropriately address the nature of some deep cultural and political divisions in modern pluralist states, particularly where the notion of 'statehood' and 'polity' are themselves contested. In other words, while Habermas's theory, clearly in his book *Between Facts and Norms*, presupposes the state as the ultimate framework for politics, his theory fails to deal with the demands of historically excluded social groups particularly those who demand separation or secession.

In summary, it has been argued that Habermas' model of deliberative democracy suffers from several weaknesses that render it inadequate to sufficiently deal with demands of historically excluded social groups. Most importantly among these weaknesses are: excessive proceduralism and legalism, favouring rational and disembodied modes of speech, bracketing power relations from moral reasoning and determining 'reasonableness', and finally giving primacy to the state as the ultimate frame for political authority and therefore failing to capture the claims of historically

⁸³ For more see: Jurgen Habermas, 'Citizenship and National Identity' in *Between Facts and Norms*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), pp. 491-515.

⁸⁴ Jurgen Habermas, 'The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship', in *The Inclusion of the Other* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2001), 3rd Edition, p. 127.

excluded social groups which undermine the notion of statehood by their demand to separate or secede.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the adequacy of Rawls', Gutmann and Thompson's and Habermas' theories of deliberative democracy to sufficiently accommodate claims of historically excluded social groups in divided societies. The chapter has found these deliberative theories wanting. In other words, it has argued that these theories, rather than and despite their subtle and substantial differences, are insufficiently attentive to claims of historical exclusion and injustice. Rawls' notions of politics and public reason, it has been argued, give rise to several problems that make the task of accommodating historical injustices very difficult. Most importantly among these problems are: cultural imperialism, denying the role of history and memory in politics, privileging elitist rational forms of communication, and excessive legalism. Gutmann and Thompson's theory of deliberative democracy suffers from several problems that undermine its ability to effectively accommodate claims of historical exclusion. Most importantly among these problems are: ignoring the role of identities in generating political conflicts, postulating the mutual acceptance prior to the process of reconciliation, and the operation of the idea of reasonableness as mechanism of exclusion. Habermas' theory of deliberative democracy is inadequate primarily because it: relies on excessive proceduralism and legalism, favours rational and disembodied modes of speech, brackets power relations from moral reasoning and determining 'reasonableness', and gives primacy to the state as the ultimate frame for political authority and therefore fails to capture the claims of historically excluded social groups which undermine the notion of statehood by their demand to separate or secede.

Several political and social theorists have identified another set of problems that demonstrates the insufficient attentiveness of these egalitarian theories of deliberative democracy to accommodate the demands of oppressed social groups. Most importantly among these problems is the failure to seriously engage with cultural pluralism, situatedness, embeddedness, and concrete experiences of exclusion and marginalization. Many of these theorists have argued that these problems stem

primarily from the thin, ahistorical, and individualistic notion of social ontology that underlies the egalitarian theories of deliberation. These problems have led to a turn away from simple deliberation towards a 'politics of recognition'. The politics of recognition, supposedly, is built upon a more adequate, thicker, notion of social ontology. This social ontology takes seriously issues such as context, culture, identity etc. Therefore, recognition is proposed to transform the approach found in the liberal egalitarian theories of deliberative democracy by relying on a thicker notion of social ontology.

In the next four chapters I will explore some of the basic features of the turn towards a different notion of social ontology and its impact on debates surrounding 'the politics of recognition', as well as 'integrative approaches' to democratic inclusion before developing my own response to their inadequacies and the need to supplement them with a 'politics of reconciliation'. The social ontological questions that will be examined in chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 revolve around four core components: self, culture, representation, and intercultural dialogue. These four constitutive ontological elements are core issues in the debates surrounding 'the politics of recognition' and 'integrative theories'.⁸⁵ More specifically, the four chapters of social ontology will primarily focus on the views of: a particular version of recognition; i.e., 'identity politics', the post-modern critics of recognition, and cautious supporters of recognition who present integrative theories that aim to avoid the risks of 'identity politics' and weaknesses of deliberative democracy through combining deliberation and/ or dialogue with recognition. Chapters 3 and 4 will be mostly devoted to discussing the communitarian critique of the notions of selfhood underlying the theories of Rawls and Habermas, the rise of a particular version of the politics of recognition, i.e., 'identity politics' and the dangers of this 'identity politics'. Chapters 5 and 6 form a separate section which will primarily examine the adequacy of integrative approaches to accommodate historical injustice.

⁸⁵ I am not implying here that these four elements of social ontology represent an exhaustive list of the core issues surrounding the politics of recognition and integrative approaches to democratic inclusion. Yet, their selection is not random for they are discussed in the literature quite extensively. Moreover, it should be emphasized that the politics of recognition is a blanket term that hosts a wide range of views and the focus of the thesis will be primarily on Charles Taylor's theory of recognition.

SECTION II: THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION AND ITS CRITICS

3. SELFHOOD AND THE COMMUNITARIAN CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM

This chapter focuses on a central ontological issue in debates around recognition and identity, namely the self. More precisely, the chapter explores two models of selfhood: the atomistic model of Rawls and the intersubjective model of Habermas, and examines which of these two models take seriously the role of context, culture and history in politics. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part scrutinizes Rawls' notion of the self as it was presented in his early and latter writings and the second part explores the Habermasian intersubjective notion of the self. In assessing Rawls' and Habermas' accounts I will rely mostly on the communitarian critique of liberalism. The communitarian critique of liberalism is important here because it has considerably contributed to the rise and development of the politics of recognition.¹

The problem with Rawls' and Habermas' notions of selfhood, it will be argued, is that they both underplay, among other things, the significance of culture, context and history in the process of identity formation for the sake of determining the governing principles and procedures of social justice and legitimacy. In other words, they both tend to view culture and history as insignificant to politics, namely insignificant to achieve freedom, equality and social justice. The chapter goes on to argue that it is precisely this denial of the significance of history and culture to identity and politics which makes these theories insufficiently attentive to claims of historical injustice and exclusion raised by historically excluded social groups. This denial of the importance of culture, history and identity has given rise to a politics of

¹ For more on the development of the communitarian critique of liberalism into a specific form of the politics of recognition see: Will Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 336-337.

recognition which emphasizes embeddedness, situatedness and cultural distinctiveness and difference.

Part I

Liberal theory and the self

This part of the chapter examines Rawls' notion of the self. Despite Rawls' claim to renounce the reliance on a Kantian account of selfhood and to avoid its metaphysical premises, this part demonstrates that Rawls, in *A Theory of Justice* as well as in *Political Liberalism*, still depends upon some metaphysical premises of selfhood.² These metaphysical premises render his account of selfhood problematic because they significantly underestimate the importance of culture, context, and history in shaping and sustaining one's identity. According to Rawls' the chief aim of 'reasonable deliberation' among equal and free citizens is to achieve fair political cooperation based on their strategic interests and without referring to their particular identities, loyalties, and conditions. Put another way, stripping the subjects from their ends and attachments in political deliberation and relegating them to the private domain is the condition for achieving consensus (or overlapping consensus) on principles of justice. According to this view, consensus on the basic structure of society is achieved when these particularistic identities and convictions are transcended and avoided. In other words, this improvised notion of selfhood views culture, identity and history as irrelevant factors to politics, namely irrelevant to achieve freedom, equality and social justice. It is precisely this denial of the significance of history, culture and identity to politics in general and to social justice in particular that makes Rawls' liberal egalitarianism insufficiently attentive to historical justices and the demands of historically excluded social groups. Rawls has conceded some criticisms and his views have developed over the time. I will first

² John Rawls argues that 'If we look at the presentation of justice as fairness and note how it is set up, and note the ideas and conceptions it uses, no particular metaphysical doctrine about the nature of persons, *distinctive and opposed to other metaphysical doctrines*, appears among its premises, or seems required by its argument. *If metaphysical propositions are involved, perhaps they are so general that they would not distinguish between the metaphysical views-Cartesian, Leibnizian, or Kantian; realist, idealist, or materialist-with which philosophy has traditionally been concerned*'. John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), footnote 31, p. 29 section I.5 (emphasis added).

examine his notion of selfhood as presented in *A Theory of Justice* and then trace the amendments he has introduced to it in his latter writings, primarily *Political Liberalism*.

Rawls' moral psychology

Rawls argues that he does not rely on the Kantian metaphysical notion of selfhood that dominated liberal theory. Kant's notion of the self rests on two presuppositions. The first is that the person is capable of knowing itself through introspection. It reflects on its inner nature by taking itself as an object of experience and discovers itself as the bearer of desires and preferences. In other words, the subject is transparent to itself. However, this is not enough to gain a full self-knowledge. For all one sees while reflecting is the chaos of perceptions that does not have any sense or meaning. A further presupposition is, indeed, required to fully achieve self-understanding. This presupposition is the 'subject'. This subject precedes any experience and gives sense to our diverse views in one single unified consciousness. This subject is capable of acting freely, independently of the laws of nature, according to laws it imposes on itself. The subject's free will is the first cause. It is not an effect of a mere cause or an instrument for achieving an end but rather is autonomous and precedes any end. The subject, here, is not an empirical being but a transcendental notion. This notion of the self is the condition for understanding the subject as autonomous and free person.

Rawls criticizes this Kantian conception of the self. Kant's moral outlook, he contends, is not compelling enough to form a basis for a theory of justice. It is obscure and relies excessively on idealistic metaphysical assumptions that postulate the subject as a radically transcendental and disembodied being ignoring the actual human situation. Rawls, however, does not reject the ideal entirely but claims that it needs reformulation. Rawls writes that:

Kant's view is marked by a number of deep dualisms, in particular, the dualism between the necessary and the contingent, form and content, reason and desire, and noumena and phenomena. To abandon these dualisms as he understood them is, for many, to abandon what is

distinctive in his theory. I believe otherwise. His moral conception has a characteristic structure that is more clearly discernible when these dualisms are not taken in the sense he gave them but recast and their moral force reformulated within the scope of an empirical theory.³

Rawls redeployment of Kant's moral conception is demonstrated in the idea of the 'original position' and its 'veil of ignorance'. In the original position, Rawls maintains, individuals are 'mutually disinterested' - in the sense that 'they are not willing to have their interests sacrificed to the others.'⁴ They choose the principles of justice when they are ignorant of their social conditions (status, gender, wealth, ethnicity, strength) and notions of the good.⁵ This guarantees 'that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances.'⁶ However, unlike Kant who argues that individuals work out their principles of justice in a purely noumenal kingdom, Rawls argues that individuals operate in a phenomenal space that takes into account common non-contingent humanistic characteristics that all human beings share as free and equal rational beings. This Rawls attains by presenting the individual as a 'subject of possession'. The subject of possession is capable of distancing itself from its ends and attachments without being disembodied. This argument is based on the distinction between 'me' and 'mine'. When I possess a desire it means its mine but it does not mean it is me. If I lose this desire I stay the same person. This account, however, assumes a certain kind of transparency, self-knowledge and ability of reflection.

In short, Rawls' aim in the original position is to rule out contingencies that might discriminate between persons but simultaneously prove that his theory of

³ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 226-227.

⁴ Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, p. 112.

⁵ Rawls concludes that individuals will specify, given the condition of the original position, two principles of justice. The first principle is: 'Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. The second principle is: 'Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principles, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.' Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, p. 266.

⁶ Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, p. 11.

justice takes into account factual aspects about individuals and their human circumstances. The original position, Rawls maintains, 'is meant to incorporate widely shared and yet weak conditions'⁷ about the background intuitions of justice. Human beings, Rawls stresses, share the desire to have certain primary goods. To desire certain primary goods is very rational and fits the nature of human life. Put differently, 'The preference for primary goods is derived, then, from only the most general assumptions about rationality and the conditions of human life.'⁸ These circumstances of justice (objective and subjective), Rawls emphasizes, are indispensable for the emergence of the virtue of justice.

Michael Sandel demonstrates that Rawls' attempt in *A Theory of Justice* to avoid Kant's transcendental, metaphysical premises by deriving principles of justice from a hypothetical situation - the original position - has not been successful. For to attain the distinguished, glorious status of justice as 'the first virtue of social institutions' and its two principles⁹, persons must always keep a certain distance from their aims, attachments and the human conditions. Consequently, in the final analysis his 'deontological arguments'¹⁰ about the primacy of justice inevitably lead to what his theory allegedly tries to avoid, namely a transcendental and disembodied conception of the self.

Other communitarians such as Charles Taylor have argued that Rawls' notion of the self is propertyless and empty.¹¹ For the individual, according to liberals, is free and self-determining only if it is capable of detaching itself from its social roles, commitments and desires to employ reason to judge different goods, aims and plans. Consequently, the subject is postulated without character, purpose and content. Sandel insists that to postulate a person where aims and attachments are never related to its identity, 'is not to conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a person

⁷ Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, p. 111.

⁸ Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, p. 223.

⁹ Footnote 5 points out the two principles of justice.

¹⁰ Deontological liberalism is a theory that chiefly deals with justice and emphasizes its precedence and superiority over other moral and political ideals. According to this view the subject precedes its ends and the right is prior to the good. The justification of the priority of the right over the good is independent. It is independent in the sense that it does not rely on any particular notion of the good. For more about deontological liberalism see: Michael Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 2-7.

¹¹ Charles Taylor has forcefully advocated this point in his book: *Hegel and Modern Society*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 157-159.

wholly without character, without moral depth.’¹² The self, communitarians claim, does not exercise its self-determination through detaching itself from its social context but only within that context. The self, they maintain, does not precede its ends but is rather constituted by them. Furthermore, the self is situated and embedded in cultural and social practices based on shared values and beliefs. The existing common values serve as ‘authoritative horizons’ that provide society’s members with ends and goals. The self, therefore, is partly formed by goals that it does not choose but becomes aware of. Discovering these goals, communitarians underscore, means being engaged in a process of self-understanding.

Taylor insists that the difference-blind liberalism of Rawls, and other liberal thinkers such as Dworkin, relies on the idea of atomism. According to Taylor, atomism mistakenly postulates the individual as a self-creating moral entity which his or her rights precede particular notions of the good life. He argues that rights and a conception of justice cannot exist prior and independently of particular notions of the good. He claims that:

The basic error of atomism in all of its forms is that it fails to take account of the degree to which the free individual with his own goals and aspirations, whose just rewards it is trying to protect, is himself only possible within a certain kind of civilization; that it took a long development of certain institutions and practices, of the rule of law, of rules of equal respect, of habits of common deliberation, of common association, of cultural development, and so on, to produce the modern individual.¹³

Some liberals have argued that communitarians have misinterpreted the liberal claim to prioritize the self over its ends and liberty rights over the good. These liberals insist that prioritising the self over its ends means that all of its ends and convictions are subject to scrutiny and examination. Additionally, they argue that prioritising liberty rights over the good is not for its own sake but as an indispensable condition

¹² Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, p. 179.

¹³ Charles Taylor, *Philosophy and the Human Sciences*, Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 309.

that allows their promotion. Freedom of choice, Will Kymlicka argues, 'is not pursued for its own sake, but as a precondition for pursuing those projects [projects about the good life] that are valued for their own sake.'¹⁴ However, some communitarians such as Sandel acknowledge that the subject is not a receptive and passive agent, but active. It is capable of re-examining its constitutive goals, excluding some and adding new ones. The question, nonetheless, is why the proper conditions for individuals to conduct these critical and reflective assessments of the 'authoritative horizons' of their social values should not be guaranteed. This is precisely what liberty rights, in liberalism, secure.

Consequently, one may argue that the anthropological notion of the subject that communitarians advocate does not necessarily contradict the normative status liberals accord to legally protected rights derived from the principle of self-determination. In the final analysis these protected rights provide the appropriate situation for individuals to pursue their notions of the good and examine them critically. If communitarians pose a serious challenge, however, to liberalism it is through focusing on the principle of self-realisation and not the principle of self-determination. Self-realisation is about the individual's ability to independently plan and freely pursue its life, knowing her desires and preferences, without any constraints. This principle is based on at least two unattainable premises, namely self-transparency and the ability to solitarily constitute meaning. Nonetheless, before moving to address this challenge we should examine the changes Rawls has introduced to his theory, in his latter writings, following the communitarian critique. These changes, some scholars have argued, represent an attempt to 'contextualise' his theory of justice.

Political not metaphysical: Rawls' reply to communitarians

In his writings after *A Theory of Justice* Rawls appears to be more sensitive to some communitarian criticisms. He admits that his principles of justice are not universally valid. They apply in all societies that are characterized by the 'fact of

¹⁴ Will Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 222.

reasonable pluralism', i.e. mostly modern Western democracies.¹⁵ A pluralism of irreconcilable yet 'reasonable comprehensive doctrines', Rawls admits, characterizes modern Western democracies. Consequently, the endorsement of the principles of justice is not conducted from an Archimedean abstracted point of equilibrium any more but within different particular comprehensive reasonable doctrines. This endorsement takes the form of an 'overlapping consensus'; each group endorses the principles of justice within itself by appealing to different values, beliefs and notions of the self. However, a certain notion of the self, Rawls maintains, is still required to determine our civil rights and duties. This notion of the self, nonetheless, is not an overarching notion that detects and governs human being's actions and thoughts in all domains of life. Rather it is limited to the political domain.¹⁶

Rawls insists that his political notion of the self is a normative notion that stems from a political conception of justice. His view of the self, he insists, is based on a moral psychology that is philosophical and not psychological. Put another way, it is different from accounts of the person introduced by social theory and natural psychology by, exclusively, relying on a normative scheme of ideals and principles, derived from a political conception of justice, and not from empirical and historical evidence. The moral psychology of the person that is 'drawn from the political conception of justice as fairness', he argues, 'is not a psychology originating in the science of human nature but rather a scheme of concepts and principles for expressing a certain political conception of the person and an ideal of citizenship.'¹⁷ What Rawls has in mind here is a division of labour among the different disciplines.

Reasoning along these lines leads Rawls to the conclusion that the political conception of the self exclusively deals with the 'public institutional identity' of the citizen and not necessarily with its 'private non-institutional identity'. According to the political conception of justice all citizens, including communitarian groups, must value the principle of autonomy that enables them to form, revise and assess their

¹⁵ Here I refer to writings such as: 'Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 14:3 (1985), pp. 223-51, *Political Liberalism*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 'The Idea of Public Reason Revisited', *The University of Chicago Law Review*, 64:3 (1997), pp. 765-807.

¹⁶ This restriction in applicability is what distinguishes *political liberalism* and its political notion of the self from a *comprehensive liberalism* that takes autonomy and rational reflection to be applicable to person's actions and thoughts in all domains.

¹⁷ John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 86- 87.

notions of the good in public life in order to determine their civil rights and duties. In private life, however, citizens should not necessarily apply this notion of autonomy.

One of the ways that citizens are considered to be free,¹⁸ Rawls maintains, is when they possess the moral power of forming a notion of the good.¹⁹ This conception of the good does not challenge persons' 'public or institutional identity'. For free persons can always adjust, modify and change their conceptions of the good. In other words, in a constitutional democracy of equal and free citizens, persons' public identity, concerning questions of political justice, is not jeopardized when their conceptions of the good change. For in public life they must detach themselves from their particular allegiances and convictions. Non-institutional identity, nevertheless, is related to the citizens' attachments and goals. These goals and commitments 'specify moral identity and give shape to a person's way of life, what one sees oneself as doing and trying to accomplish in social world.'²⁰ This sharp dualism of the possibility of being a communitarian in private life and the inevitability to be liberal in public life, Rawls maintains, is a characteristic of modern Western democratic societies 'marked by reasonable pluralism.'²¹

Rawls seems to make certain concessions to communitarians. Acknowledging the 'fact of reasonable pluralism' impels him to limit the applicability of his theory to modern Western democracies.²² This contextualist move implies that Rawls seems to recognise to a certain degree the importance of community and notions of the good in citizens' identity. Nevertheless, there are several points that demonstrate that Rawls's thin notion of political personhood is still captured by metaphysical elements that

¹⁸ Rawls points out two other ways in which citizens conceive themselves to be free. The first way is that they conceive themselves 'as self-authenticating sources of valid claims.' They view themselves as having rights 'to make claims on their institutions' in order to pursue their conceptions of the good. Persons consider these claims to be of autonomous weight regardless if they stem from commitments determined by a political conception of justice and of their duties to their own societies. The second way in which citizens are considered free is that they can be held responsible upon their own aims. They are thought to be able to revise and amend their goals. These goals can be promoted not according to the persons' desires and needs but according to 'the means that they can reasonably acquire in return for what they can reasonably expect to contribute.' Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, p. 34

¹⁹ Rawls argues that persons are free 'in virtue of their two moral powers (a capacity for a sense of justice and for a conception of the good) and the powers of reason (of judgment, thought, and inference connected with these powers)'. Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, p. 19.

²⁰ Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, p. 31.

²¹ Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, p. xxiii.

²² For a critical examination of Rawls' move to contextualise his theory see: Chantal Mouffe, 'Rawls: Political Philosophy without Politics', *The Return of the Political* (London, Verso: 1993), pp. 41-59.

push towards an atomistic and abstract notion of selfhood. This abstract notion of selfhood poses several problems to his theory. According to several critics, Rawls' notion of selfhood is implausible. Rawls maintains that individuals are capable of self-realization through pursuing and organizing their lives totally free from restraints. This kind of autonomy allows individuals to lead their own plans of the good life as unique and irreplaceable individuals while taking into account their preferences and needs. Two abilities are implied by this notion of autonomy. The first is the ability to be transparent to oneself by being fully conscious of what one needs and the second is the ability to attribute meaning to one's own actions and behaviours. The very possibility of these two faculties is challenged by the modern critique of language and libidinal forces. Two different intellectual perspectives; the philosophy of language and psychoanalysis, Axel Honneth argues, have challenged the classical notion of an autonomous and self-determining person. The assumption of full transparency of the person's action, in the sense that she controls all of her actions and behaviours has been questioned by Freud's theories about libidinal forces and the unconscious. Moreover, the claim that a solitary individual is capable of constituting meaning has been questioned by thinkers such as Wittgenstein and Saussure. Both of these thinkers, in different ways, argue that constituting meaning depends on a pre-given system of linguistic meanings, and therefore the individual cannot be completely autonomous in the sense of being a self-creating entity and in a total command of itself.²³

While the issues of transparency and meaning constitution do undermine the plausibility of Rawls' notion of selfhood, I want to primarily focus on three main points that stem from Rawls' notion of selfhood and pose a serious challenge to the ability of his theory to adequately accommodate demands of historically excluded social groups. I will turn to explore these three main points.²⁴

First, Rawls' requirement to detach yourself from your beliefs, culture, history, and convictions in public deliberation on justice and liberties and adhere to them in private, seems to rest on the same Kantian dualism that Rawls purportedly wanted to avoid. As the communitarian critique of liberalism has shown, culture, history and

²³ Axel Honneth, 'Decentred Autonomy: The Subject After the Fall', *The Fragmented World of the Social*, (Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 262.

²⁴ In part I of the previous chapter I have critically assessed Rawls' theory of deliberative democracy. There I have identified several problems in his account regarding historical injustice. Some of these problems are intimately linked to his notion of selfhood. To avoid repetition, I do not discuss these points again here.

context play a constitutive role in shaping the individual's character and conception of the good and directly influence his or her deliberation on public matters. Taylor and Sandel have argued that individuals do not act solipsistically in a vacuum but they are embedded in a concrete context and culture. The relevance of culture, history and identity is particularly important in cases of historical injustices because social groups who suffer from these historical injustices are chiefly oppressed because of their depiction as inferior groups who possess less valuable cultures, values, identities, and beliefs.

Second, Rawls insists on a thin notion of selfhood because it serves his ultimate aim, namely achieving consensus on political arrangements that place at their core justice and individual liberties. These political arrangements primarily focus on the distribution of material goods and individual rights and downplay the significance of symbolic goods and collective rights. Several historically excluded social groups do not demand only material rectifications but they also demand the creation of museums, memorials, and national days to commemorate their oppression and protect their language, cultural heritage, and in certain cases their right to national self-determination. The insistence on symbolic activities and good such as commemoration need not be viewed as a way of intensifying feelings of victimhood but as an important way of acknowledging the harm that has been committed. Moreover, these symbolic activities and goods have pedagogical purposes for the current and future generations. That is, they serve as educational resources that expose the public to often ignored parts of the history of the nation.

The issue of education leads to another problem. One might ask who guarantees that the liberal political arrangements achieved, limit their purpose to achieve justice and secure public liberties. In the final analysis, liberal institutions do not only safeguard the formal legal liberty rights but also form educational mechanisms, such as the education system, that provide the knowledge and conditions for their actualisation. This is likely to conflict with excluded social groups who do not necessarily accord the same level of priority and significance liberals accord to individualistic rights and who raise profound challenges to the dominant national narrative and the content of the curriculum. Briefly, Rawls' theory fails to explain the roots of certain social conflicts because in many cases attempts to achieve equality of material goods and secure individual rights have not put an end to social struggles.

To sum up, it has been argued that despite Rawls' denial, his atomistic model of subjectivity formation still rests on Kantian metaphysical abstract assumptions. According to the atomistic notion, the individual is capable of creating its identity solely in isolation from others. The human being is independently capable of maintaining its identity, relying on its own power, through referring to itself, without the help or the mediation of others. In order to do this the individual refers to itself as an object of reflection. This model is based on the assumption that the human mind is capable of picturing and reflecting reality. I have argued, however, that this atomistic model of selfhood is neither compelling nor suitable to seriously accommodate the demands of historically excluded social groups.

The decline of the transcendental notion of reason that the atomistic model rests on, the rise of empirically and historically grounded notions of reason, the linguistic turn²⁵ that challenges the existence of metanarratives and bestows significance on discursive and signifying processes, and the discoveries of 'libidinal forces' in psychoanalysis, all have put the liberal atomistic model of selfhood under pressure primarily because of its metaphysical assumptions about the subject's total independence, self-creation and self-transparency. These pragmatic changes and turns in the intellectual movement in modern Western culture have given rise to several theories that emphasize the intersubjective and dialogical character of the self. By relying on an intersubjective notion of selfhood these theories allegedly propose an effective account of democratic accommodation. In the following part I will discuss and explore Habermas' notion of intersubjective selfhood. I will primarily rely on Axel Honneth's views to assess Habermas' account of accommodation. The next part concludes that there is a need to go beyond Habermasian theory in the direction of recognition in order to effectively accommodate demands of historical injustice.

²⁵ The linguistic turn has been considered as one of the most fundamental paradigmatic shifts in modern philosophy. Habermas argues that 'Whereas linguistic signs had previously been taken as instruments and accessories of mental representation, the intermediate domain of symbolic meanings now takes on a dignity of its own. The relation of language to the world or of a proposition to a state of affairs takes the place of the relation between subject and object. World-constitutive accomplishments are transferred from transcendental subjectivity to grammatical structures.' Jurgen Habermas, *Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essay* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1992) p. 7. and pp. 44-48.

Part II

The intersubjective account of selfhood

Habermas proposes a post-metaphysical intersubjective account of selfhood which he argues is more appealing than the atomistic notion because of its recognition of the inevitability of the 'other' for the constitution of the self. The key to Habermas' projects lies in rethinking Hegel's philosophy of 'intersubjective recognition' and Mead's 'theory of socialization'. Before moving to examine the adequacies of Habermas' account, I shall first shed the light on the basic assumptions of Hegel's notion of intersubjective recognition and Mead's theory of socialization. Hegel's and Mead's ideas have also informed theories of recognition advocated by scholars such as Charles Taylor. Taylor's theory of recognition will be examined in the next chapter.

Hegel's account of the self

For Hegel the formation of individual consciousness is a process of subjectivity formation. This process, however, is part of an overarching process of spirit's formation that is driven by dialectical movements that combine simultaneously oppositions and their reconciliation. It is reciprocal, mutual, communicative and dialogical. It is based on the existence of the 'other'. One gains her or his identity, Hegel insists, through recognizing and being recognized by another self-conscious subject. Consequently, the other is inevitable in this process of individualization. Put in other terms, 'Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.'²⁶ If we take intersubjective recognition and not the dialectical relation of master and slave to be at the ground of Hegel's conception of recognition (*Anerkennung*) then his ideas might be compatible with democratic politics.²⁷ For in

²⁶ G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 109.

²⁷ There is a stiff debate among different scholars whether Hegel's main theme is recognition or not. Jurgen Habermas and Axel Honneth, for example, argue that intersubjective recognition was Hegel's main concern only in his early writings, only in the Jena period. Others such as Robert Williams (*Hegel's Ethics of Recognition*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997) contend that in the final analysis intersubjective recognition between equals and not dialectical relations of master and

the former mode of recognition the self and the other are equals whereas in the second they are not. Avishai Margalit argues that 'Hegel's primordial struggle is a struggle between non-equals, as the terms 'master' and 'slave' already suggest- unequal in power and unequal in prestige.'²⁸ Misrecognizing someone's identity means distorting its relation to itself. In other words, denial of recognition involves devaluation and demeaning that has to be restored.

Hegel's model, however, has come under attack, among other things, for being based on metaphysical German Idealist premises that hardly fit into post-metaphysical contemporary thought. In addition, Hegel's notion of negativity seems to be trapped in determinism and totalization. For Hegel insists that negativity, which is the generating power of the dialectical process, can reach a final reconciliation. Reconciling differences and oppositions, is manifested in reaching the universal Absolute, the One, the Spirit. This totalising system, however, not only relegates, inconsistently, all oppositions to the 'principle of singularity' but also promotes closure and totalitarianism.²⁹ Consequently, several scholars have argued that the adoption of this Hegelian model of identification, by proponents of identity politics poses several problems such as reification, balkanisation and displacement; shifting the focus from distribution of wealth to issues of identity.³⁰ These problems will be extensively discussed in the next chapter.

Habermas took Hegel's insights about intersubjective recognition and grounded them on empirical (historical, sociological, linguistic and psychological) evidence instead of the teleological and transcendental premises of the philosophy of

slave is the overarching concept in Hegel's philosophy from the beginning until the end. This debate, however, does not concern me here. For my purpose in this chapter is to examine his logic of recognition that has been used by different scholars regardless if it was at the basis of his entire philosophy or only in his early writings.

²⁸ Margalit, however, argues that we can generally conclude from Hegel's account that every subject is equally capable of understanding that realising its humanity depends on recognizing the humanity in the other. Avishai Margalit, 'Recognition II: Recognizing the Brother and the Other', *Aristotelian Society*, supp. 75, (2001), p. 135.

²⁹ For a meaningful treatment of the notion of negativity in Hegel's philosophy and the Frankfurt school critique of it see: Nina Belmonte, 'Evolving negativity: From Hegel to Derrida', *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, 28:1 (1997), pp. 18-58.

³⁰ See for example: Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990); Nancy Fraser, 'Rethinking Recognition', *New Left Review*, 3 (2000), pp. 107-120; William E. Connolly, *identity/ difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Arash Abizadeh, 'Does Collective Identity Presuppose an Other? On the Alleged Incoherence of Global Solidarity', *American Political Science Review*, 99:1 (2005), pp. 45-60.

consciousness. Habermas has referred to George Herbert Mead as the one who used social psychology, to give empirical content to Hegel's notion of intersubjective recognition and the formative process of socialization. Habermas has utilized Mead's ideas to ground his critical theory on universal discursive ethics. Mead contends that individuation is an intersubjective process mediated by language. He rejects the claim that the individual is a self-creating entity. That is, it constitutes itself independently and in isolation from others. A self-conscious human subject, he insists, emerges in a moment of crisis and contradictory impulses while interacting with others. What is primarily important and allows us access to the psyche, according to Mead, is the understanding of the emergence of knowledge of the meaning of human behaviour in interaction. For Mead, a person becomes aware of her subjectivity when she can engender in herself the same reaction one action provokes in her partner to interaction, i.e. the ability to put herself in the other's shoes. An individual can gain an awareness of itself only 'to the extent to which it learns to perceive its own action from the symbolically represented second-person perspective.'³¹ In short, 'the individual acquires a sense of self by learning to differentiate him or herself from others by role playing the perspectives of partners to interaction.'³² This is how the constitution of identity comes to be an intersubjective process that is linguistically mediated.

What constitutes identity, according to Mead, are the 'I' and the 'me'. The 'me' is the conservative aspect of the individual personality. It is the internalised 'generalized other'. In other words, it is the social norms that dictate the codes of conduct. The 'I', however, represents the uncontrollable fantasies, demands and impulses that continuously challenge the internalised social norms. The intersubjectivity of the self is reflected in the conflict between the 'I' and the 'me'. A self that is formed primarily by the 'me' is conventional. This conventional ego, Habermas insists, cannot meet the demands of a modern society. Put another way, 'modern societies burden the individual with decisions that require a postconventional ego identity and thus also necessitates a radicalisation of the actor's practical self-

³¹ Axel Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 75.

³² Jon Mahoney, 'Axel Honneth's Ethical Theory of Recognition', *International Studies in Philosophy*, 32:1 (1999), p. 97.

understanding...'.³³ In a postconventional identity, however, the 'I' and not the 'me' has the upper hand. Following Mead, Habermas argues that realising a postconventional identity does not mean leaving the community, which is a precondition for the development of an intersubjective ego, but appealing to a larger, universal communicative community that includes all the generalized others.

Mead vaguely distinguishes between two forms of the 'me', the moral (self determination) 'me' and the ethical (self-realisation) 'me'. The moral 'me' requires that the individual becomes intersubjectively aware of possessing the same moral qualities, rights and duties as all other members of its community. The self-realisation 'me', conversely, demands that the individual distinguishes itself as a particular and irreplaceable person with unique abilities. This particularity demands the recognition of the larger community. One gets to gain her or his sense of particularity, Mead argues, through a 'transparent system of the functional division of labour.'³⁴ The individual's particularity has to be recognised by its partners to interaction as positively contributing to the common good of the community. Consequently, the person does not only share moral commonalities with other members of the community but also evaluative goals.

I shall turn now to address Habermas's theory of 'formal pragmatics' and his reliance on Mead's idea to develop an intersubjective notion of selfhood. It is important to explore Habermas' theory because it claims to offer an account of democratic accommodation that is based on post-metaphysical premises. This account of accommodation is supposedly attentive to demands of democratic exclusion.

Habermas' formal pragmatics

Habermas develops his notion of intersubjectivity based on his critique of the objectivist and subjectivist paradigms that dominated Western philosophy. The objectivist approach, Habermas argues, fails to offer an account of intersubjectivity because it subjects social situations to empirical and scientific rules implied in natural

³³ Jurgen Habermas, 'Individuation Through Socialization: On George Herbert Mead's Theory of Subjectivity', in *Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays*, trans. William Mark Hohengarten (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 192-193.

³⁴ Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, p. 89.

sciences. In other words, it examines social practices and institutions from an external perspective of an observer aiming, primarily, to identify patterns of behaviour. Consequently, the agent in this account is neglected. Conversely, the subjectivist paradigm, Habermas contends, recognizes the participants' perspectives, views and intentions but its main problem is that it assumes a Cartesian subject that is solely capable of constituting itself. These approaches, Habermas insists, not only fail to account for an intersubjective notion of selfhood but their metaphysical and idealistic assumptions and ideas tend also to suppress the individual in favour of universal forms and characterizations. This, Habermas maintains, is the case in the classic theories of sociology too, where there has been a failure to distinguish in the process of socialization between social differentiation that deals with the uniqueness of the subject and individuation processes that increase the subject's autonomy. What is required, however, is an approach that catches these two components (uniqueness and sameness).

Habermas' alternative to the subjectivist and objectivist paradigms is a communicative paradigm that allegedly takes intersubjectivity more seriously. This communicative paradigm is based on rethinking Hegel's theory of recognition, by freeing it from the premises of 'the philosophy of consciousness' which presupposes a self-conscious subject capable of reflecting and objectifying itself, backed by Mead's ideas about the process of individuation and a sophisticated theory of meaning. Habermas' communicative paradigm does not presuppose intersubjectivity but considers it from the beginning as the very existence of meaning, validity and individuality. Unlike Rawls's original position where the rational, egoist and 'unencumbered' individual determines monologically the conditions and principles of justice, Habermas argues that moral agents, whose interests and needs are open to deliberation and transformation, are capable of putting themselves in the shoes of others and reaching through dialogue, mutual understanding and consensus about moral norms and their validity. Following Mead he proposes that:

individuation is pictured not as the self-realisation of an independently acting subject carried out in isolation and freedom but as a linguistically mediated process of socialization and the simultaneous constitution of a life history that is conscious of itself. The identity of socialized individuals forms itself simultaneously in the medium of

coming to an understanding with others in language and in the medium of coming to historical and intrasubjective understanding with oneself.³⁵

Habermas concludes that individuality constitutes 'itself in relations of intersubjective acknowledgment and of intersubjectively mediated self-understanding.'³⁶ Briefly, the individualization process is not a monological process but an intersubjective process based on a network and a web of mutual social relations of recognition mediated by language.

Mead's emphasis on the role of language as an inevitable medium in the process of individuation represents, Habermas insists, a paradigmatic shift from 'the philosophy of consciousness' which dominated Hegel's theory to communication. Mead's idea of 'individuation through socialisation' is what paves the way for Habermas to develop his theory of communicative action (formal pragmatics).³⁷ Based on this theory of 'formal pragmatics,' Habermas contends that our moral intuitions do not stem from our contingent particular traditions but from something more universal. Every competent social agent, Habermas argues, obtains these universal moral intuitions through the process of socialization. Yet they include a core of universal intuitions that are not culturally specific. According to the communicative paradigm, intersubjectivity can be understood when individuals interact with each other reaching the same interpretations of their actions and circumstances. Consequently, intersubjectivity necessitates a 'sameness of meaning'. Sameness of meaning assumes rules that govern communication. Every subject capable of speech and action acquires these rules. Following these rules, Habermas maintains, cannot happen monologically in isolation from others but only dialogically. This means that somebody else is needed to assess, evaluate and criticize. In short, to determine

³⁵ Habermas, 'Individuation Through Socialization: On George Herbert Mead's Theory of Subjectivity', pp. 152-153.

³⁶ Habermas, 'Individuation Through Socialization: On George Herbert Mead's Theory of Subjectivity', pp. 152-153.

³⁷ For more on this paradigmatic shift and the influence of Mead and other thinkers on Habermas' notion of intersubjectivity see: Peter Dews, 'Communicative Paradigms and the Question of Subjectivity: Habermas, Mead and Lacan', in Peter Dews (ed.), *Habermas: A Critical Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 87-117.

whether a moral norm is valid and justifiable cannot be done solitarily but intersubjectively.

Habermas argues that the origins of postmetaphysical³⁸ communicative rationality are not to be found in an external and transcendental power but in the structures of the ordinary communicative practices people use in their daily life. The critical force of reason is inherent in everyday language and not in transcendental, external power. Unlike the strategic action that is oriented towards achieving private goals, the communicative action is oriented towards reaching mutual understanding (*Verständigung*) and rational consensus. Rational consensus is possible, Habermas insists, because mutual understanding is an inherent *telos* of ordinary language.³⁹ Reaching mutual understanding, he insists, requires that the partners to interaction use the 'double structure of speech.' The first is cognitive; the propositional component that states facts that form the world. The second is communicative; the illocutionary force of the utterance that indicates how the propositional content is being put forth. Every speech act, Habermas maintains, includes these two dimensions. Additionally, every communicative speech act implicitly contains different validity claims (truth-objective world, normative rightness- social world, and sincerity- subjective world).⁴⁰ Thus, every speech act has an implicit commitment to provide sound justification. Put another way, it includes potential reasons that can be given, by the speaker to the hearers, in support of its claims. The partners to communication, however, must accept these reasons based on their force (the force of the better argument that

³⁸ Maeve Cooke points out that Habermas's notion of communicative rationality is postmetaphysical in two senses. The first is that it is rooted in the existing world and can be extracted by empirical research. The second is that its universal claims to validity are derived from existing human language in our world. However, Cooke challenges this argument by contending that Habermas draws his conclusions on assumptions that historically emerged in specific kinds of cultural and social contexts- post-traditional societies. Consequently, his argument for universal morality is problematic. For more about this point and Habermas' formal pragmatics see: Maeve Cooke, 'Meaning and Truth in Habermas's Pragmatics', *European Journal of Philosophy*, 9:1 (2001), pp. 1-23.

³⁹ Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures*, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1987), p. 311, *On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminary Studies in the Theory of Communicative Action*, trans. Barbara Fultner (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2001).

⁴⁰ Recently Habermas relinquishes this claim and argues that there are weak and strong communicative actions. The three validity claims to truth, normative rightness and truthfulness, he argues, rise only in the case of a strong communicative action. A weak communicative action, however, involves only validity claims to truth and sincerity but not to normative rightness. For more see: Jürgen Habermas, 'Some Further Clarifications of the Concept of Communicative Rationality', in Maeve Cooke, (ed.) *On the Pragmatics of Communication* (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1998), pp. 307-343.

includes fairness, equality and impartiality) and not according to power relations among deliberators. The validity of a norm is established when 'all possibly affected persons could agree (to it) as participants in rational discourses.'⁴¹ This Habermas calls the (D) principle. It is supposed to regulate the disputes among deliberators. These are the conditions of an ideal speech situation. It is ideal, Habermas stresses, in the sense that it forms a standard for regulating and judging speech situations.

Hitherto, I have tried to reveal Habermas's account of intersubjectivity and show how reformulating Hegel's and Mead's ideas of intersubjective recognition leads him to discourse ethics. While Habermas' intersubjective account of selfhood seems appealing, in the following section I want to demonstrate that his final conclusion, namely a theory of discourse ethics, fails to effectively deal with demands of historically excluded social groups.

Criticizing Habermas

There are several criticisms that can be raised against Habermas' theory. For example, Habermas' account of intersubjectivity, which is derived from the philosophy of language to explain the process of socialization, tends to neglect the interiority of the subject and other signifying forces that might not be linguistically mediated. Habermas's linguistic transcendentalism is based on a problematic implicit force that propels the extra linguistic and pre-linguistic unconscious to the domain of the interpretable or more precisely to the domain of the linguistic. Along similar lines Joel Whitebook argues that 'Habermas' commitment to the linguistic position is so strong that he is *compelled to eliminate systematically the existence of any putatively pre-linguistic phenomena by assimilating their apparent pre linguisticity to the linguistic.*'⁴² However, I want to focus my discussion on points that demonstrate the

⁴¹ Jurgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to A Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy* trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996), p. 107.

⁴² Joel Whitebook, 'Intersubjectivity and The Monadic Core of The Psyche: Habermas and Castoriadis on The Unconscious', *Praxis International*, 9:4 (1990), p. 356.

ineffectiveness of his theory to accommodate demands of historically oppressed social groups.⁴³

Firstly, Habermas's discourse ethics exclusively focuses on formal rules, cognitive and linguistic capacities and denies the roles of esteem and culture in identity formation and politics. Habermas' notion of intersubjective selfhood 'privileges the linguistically mediated features of identity formation' and neglects moral properties such as esteem.⁴⁴ Ignoring the significance of esteem for the self stems from Habermas' exclusive focus on specifying the ideal conditions and pragmatic presuppositions of speech that supposedly make the universal procedure of public deliberation and will formation fair, legitimate and accessible to all. This focus on the ideal speech situation and its conditions leads Habermas to underplay the role of cultural and social conditions, networks and structures in facilitating and making deliberation possible in the first place. The issue of esteem is of a particular relevance to historically excluded social groups because it is the misrecognition and disrespect of the identity and culture of these groups that generate oppression, injuries and low self-image.

Secondly, in the ideal speech situation Habermas assumes that all speakers who are involved in deliberation share equal communicative competence and have equal epistemological resources. To support their claims, speakers, according to Habermas, are expected to provide sound justifications to their interlocutors. The partners to communication accept these justifications as reasonable based on their force as arguments that rest on fairness, equality and impartiality and not on power relations among deliberators. It is this intersubjective exchange of reasoning and recognition that lies at the core of public deliberation which supposedly lead to rational consensus on common political arrangements. The difficulty with this view is that in divided and pluralistic societies there are socio-economic inequalities that often overlap with cultural differences. These socio-economic inequalities do not only significantly effect the determination of what counts as reasonable but also directly influence the attainment and access of communicative competence and epistemological resources. Indeed, historically excluded social groups who suffer

⁴³ In the previous chapter it has been argued that Habermas' notion of identity is individualistic, formalistic and culturally specific. To avoid repetition I will not discuss these points again but focus on points that have not been raised yet and have direct bearing on Habermas' account of accommodation.

⁴⁴ Jon Mahoney, 'Axel Honneth's Ethical Theory of Recognition', *International Studies in Philosophy*, 31:1 (1999), p. 101.

from economic and cultural exclusion, do not have the same level of communicative competence and access to epistemological resources enjoyed by hegemonic groups. Therefore, even if excluded social groups enjoy formal equality to participate in public deliberation, the inequalities in communicative competence and access to epistemological resources considerably limit their effective participation and impact on the deliberative process and its results.

Finally, Habermas' discourse ethics is unable to access the moral claims of oppressed social groups. For suppressed social groups present their moral claims in negative terms of situated feelings of injustices and injuries (*consciousness of injustice*) rather than in a comprehensive, generalized, consistent, abstract and logical moral system or order of values projected in theory of justice. The source of this particular formation of moral consciousness of socially oppressed groups, Honneth contends, is social-structural. He goes on to argue that unlike privileged and hegemonic groups who are enduringly compelled to normatively justify and legitimise their superiority appealing to general and universal claims that go beyond their specific context, the oppressed groups do not feel this pressure. Moreover, Honneth claims that whereas the dominant groups are pressured and stimulated to elaborate their normative beliefs, the cultural environment of the underprivileged groups 'does not include any pressure to elaborate the normative convictions of its members.'⁴⁵ Honneth identifies two strategies of social control that profoundly influence the articulation of injustices felt by deprived groups in the public sphere and render Habermas' discourse ethics ill-equipped in this regards. The first way of restricting the manifestation of injustices is by 'systematically withholding the appropriate linguistic and symbolic means for their expression.' This strategy is called 'desymbolization'. The second strategy limits the force of the claims of deprived groups through privatising the 'class-specific consciousness of injustice'. This is done through a strong encouragement and support of individualistic initiatives and actions by the state and other institutions whose main goal is to prevent a common collective

⁴⁵ Honneth, 'Moral Consciousness and Class Domination: Some Problems in the Analysis of Hidden Morality', in Axel Honneth, *The Fragmented World of the Social* (Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 211.

understanding and cooperation that helps people to articulate their feelings of injustices and act to change them.⁴⁶

Conclusion

Based primarily on communitarian criticisms, this chapter has argued that the Rawls' and Habermas' accounts of selfhood generate several problems that considerably undermine the ability of their respective theories to accommodate demands of historically oppressed social groups. Rawls' notion of selfhood poses problems to his account of democratic accommodation because it is too thin and still based on metaphysical assumptions which downplay the significance of culture, history and identity. Habermas' post-metaphysical intersubjective account of selfhood leads to 'desymbolization' and 'privatisation' of oppression and injustice. Moreover, Habermas' reduces intersubjectivity to merely linguistic and cognitive forces for validating legal procedures and rules and ignores the role of esteem and culture for the self. Furthermore, Habermas downplays the inequalities in the level of communicative competence and access to epistemological resources.

Relying mainly on the challenges communitarians have raised against the excessively thin and individualistic notion of social ontology that underlie liberal theories, several scholars have argued that an alternative approach is required. This approach has, among other things, to be more attentive to cultural diversity, esteem, oppression, and distinct identities. More specifically, this approach should place excluded social groups, their cultural distinctiveness, and their collective rights at its core and defend them against an individualistic, legalistic, assimilative and difference-blind form of liberalism.

⁴⁶ Honneth, 'Moral Consciousness and Class Domination: Some Problems in the Analysis of Hidden Morality', pp. 212-215.

4. CULTURE, THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION AND THE POST-STRUCTURALIST THESIS

It has been argued that Rawls' and Habermas' notions of selfhood are excessively thin, individualistic and abstract. Citizens, in the 'original position' or the 'ideal speech situation', are required to transcend their particular identities and affiliations in order to achieve rational consensus on common political arrangements. In their models of democratic politics citizens are viewed as essentially similar and as bearers of interests. Citizens enjoy formal equality and form voluntarily political associations and groups to pursue and protect their interests. The state in these models is viewed as a neutral entity towards the cultures, values and different notions of the good of its citizens. It is this insistence on sameness, cultural neutrality, and interest rather than on cultural difference and identity that has considerably contributed to the rise of a particular type of the politics of recognition that is often referred to as 'identity politics'.

According to proponents of identity politics, citizens are not abstract and ahistorical subjects but culturally, socially and historically embedded and situated beings. It is this different understanding of the nature of identity formation that lies at the core of identity politics. Identity politics relies on a thicker notion of social ontology that accords major significance to identity, culture and context in the operation of politics. According to proponents of identity politics, members of particular social groups are oppressed and excluded primarily because of their particular identity rather than their interests. In other words, it is one's identity as a Native Canadian, a black or a woman that makes her vulnerable to violence, cultural imperialism, exploitation or other faces of oppression. A wide range of views and a broad scope of political struggles fall under the rubric of identity politics.¹ Identity politics, nevertheless, is widely referred to as a form of politics that seeks to liberate

¹ It is beyond the scope of this thesis to trace and map out all of these views and struggles. For more on these various views and struggles see: Michael Kenny, *The Politics of Identity: Liberal Political Theory and the Dilemmas of Difference* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004); Susan Bickford, 'Anti-Anti-Identity Politics: Feminism, Democracy, and the Complexities of Citizenship', *Hypatia*, 12:4 (1997), pp. 111-131; A. Wolfe and Y. Klausen, 'Identity Politics and the Welfare State', *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 14 (1992), pp. 231-255, 'Other People', *Prospect*, December (2000), pp. 28-33.

excluded social groups and give full recognition to their authentic distinct identities. One of the first and most prominent advocates of this form of politics is Charles Taylor. Taylor has criticized the atomism and blindness to cultural differences that characterize dominant contemporary interpretations of liberalism.² He has proposed ‘the politics of recognition’ as a substitute to difference-blind liberalism.³ Taylor grounds his account of politics on a dialogical notion of selfhood that accords significant roles to identity, cultural difference and collective rights.

This chapter is divided into two parts. Charles Taylor’s theory of recognition is the focus of the first part. The first part focuses on Taylor’s theory because of its principal centrality to the debate on recognition. The second part concentrates on Judith Butler’s criticisms of the politics of recognition. In the first part I will argue that while Taylor’s demands to give due recognition to excluded and oppressed social groups is an important advance beyond the liberal notion of tolerance that underlie Rawls’ and Habermas’ theories, his account of recognition arguably relies on an essentialist conception of culture which poses serious challenges to his notion of democratic accommodation. In the second part I will argue that while Butler’s views pose some significant challenges to identity politics by revealing the oppositional logic that lies at its core and the important role power relations play in identity formation and politics, her post-structuralist model of identity is ultimately not persuasive.

² For more on Taylor’s views see: Charles Taylor, *Hegel and Modern Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), *The Ethics of Authenticity* (London: Harvard University Press, 1992), ‘The Politics of Recognition’, in Amy Gutmann (ed.), *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 25-73.

³ The term ‘the politics of recognition’ appears in Taylor famous piece: ‘The Politics of Recognition’, in Amy Gutmann (ed.), *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 25-73. It should be noted, however, that in the literature ‘the politics of recognition’ is often distinguished from ‘identity politics’. For the first is a more inclusive category than the second. Identity politics tends not to address political and social exclusion rooted in class and economy for instance. In this thesis I consider Taylor’s theory as belonging to ‘identity politics’ because of its principal emphasis on cultural recognition.

Part I

The politics of recognition and the challenge of culture

Taylor also relies on the ethical theory of Hegel and the psychological theory of George Herbert Mead to conceptualise a dialogical notion of selfhood.⁴ According to the dialogic argument, the sense of selfhood is gained and developed through the recognition of 'significant others' in social interaction. Rawls' and Habermas' considerably downplay the role of culture in the formation of the self and the operation of politics. Rawls and Habermas explicitly avoid tackling core ontological issues in public deliberation under the pretext that ontological questions of the good will hinder achieving consensus on neutral political principles that are supposed to secure individual and democratic rights. Taylor rejects this view and argues that ontological issues such as identity and culture clearly influence our public deliberation on political principles and fundamental rights. Taylor identifies two major changes that have made the modern preoccupation with identity and recognition indispensable. The first is the breakdown of social hierarchies.⁵ This collapse has led to the replacement of the notion of honour, according to which recognition was attainable

⁴ Taylor is not the only theorist of recognition that relies on recasting Mead's and Hegel's views. Axel Honneth also invokes Hegel's and Mead's ideas and develops what he calls a 'formal conception of ethical life'. Materializing Hegel's notion of intersubjective recognition (in the sense of disarming it from its metaphysical premises) through appealing to Mead's social psychology and empirical evidences from sociology and history leads Honneth to the following conclusion: the attainment of person's sense of identity and the realisation of its desires and needs as a fully autonomous individual, decisively rely on the development of self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem. These three modes of 'practical relations-to-self' can only be achieved and sustained intersubjectively. These relationships, Honneth emphasizes, are not pre-given but constituted and achieved through social struggles. What drive these diverse social struggles are not solely interests but primarily moral claims; feelings of disrespect and indignation that stem from denial of recognition. Based on the three modes of positive relations to oneself; self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem, Honneth distinguishes among three forms of recognition that a 'healthy' identity relies on; love, rights, and esteem. For more on Honneth's theory and its weaknesses see: Axel Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), *The Fragmented World of the Social*, Charles W. Wright (ed.) (Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), 'Recognition I: Invisibility: On the Epistemology of 'Recognition'', *Aristotelian Society*, Supp (75), (2001), pp. 111-126; Avishai Margalit, 'Recognition II: Recognizing the Brother and the Other', *Aristotelian Society*, Supp (75), (2001), pp. 127-139; Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange* (London: Verso, 2003); Simon Thompson (review article), 'Is Redistribution a Form of Recognition? Comments on the Fraser-Honneth Debate', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, 8:1 (2005), pp. 85-102; Allen Jonathan, 'Decency and the Struggle for Recognition', *Social Theory and Practice*, 24:3 (1998), pp. 449-469; Roger Foster, 'Recognition and Resistance: Axel Honneth's Critical Social Theory', *Radical Philosophy*, 94 (1999), pp. 6-18; Christopher Zurn, 'Review Essay: Anthropology and Normativity: A Critique of Axel Honneth's 'Formal Conception of Ethical Life'', *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, 26:1 (2000), pp. 115-124.

⁵ For more on these two changes see: Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', pp. 26-37.

only by few, with a notion of dignity according to which recognition was attainable universally by everyone. The second major change that has considerably contributed to the emergence of identity and recognition as inevitable in modern societies is the rise of 'the ideal of authenticity.' Taylor claims that central to the modern notion of selfhood is its intrinsic inner voice of authenticity that makes her/ him culturally distinct. Authenticity is the moral force to be true to 'my own inner nature' which makes me distinct from others. My inner distinctiveness can only be articulated and discovered by me and is that which gives shape to my identity.⁶ Identity is not gained through 'solitary reflection' but crucially depends on the recognition granted by 'significant others' in social interactions. The approval or disapproval of these significant others substantially influences our identities. The absence of recognition, Taylor argues, can cause moral harm and injury to the self-esteem and self-image of the misrecognized person or group. Taylor insists that 'Due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need.'⁷

Taylor appeals to the ideas of the German thinker Johann Gottfried Herder to invoke the principle of authenticity. Similar to Herder, Taylor believes that the principle of authenticity, i.e., being true to your own inner distinctiveness, applies to individual persons as well as to groups. Enthusiastically supporting Herder's ideal of authenticity, Taylor states 'Just like individuals, a *Volk* should be true to itself, that is, its own culture. Germans shouldn't try to be derivative and (inevitably) second-rate Frenchmen, as Frederick the Great's patronage seemed to be encouraging them to do.'⁸ The need to belong to a culture and society, according to Taylor, is a basic human need. It is as basic as food, shelter and freedom. In other words, belonging to a culture is constitutive of what defines us as humans. Taylor believes that identity and culture have inner natures and essences.⁹ Human beings do not achieve self-realization outside of the structures of society and culture. Culture and society, according to Taylor, are organic structures into which humans are born. Yet unlike liberal scholars who view culture either as insignificant for politics or just as a

⁶ Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', p. 30.

⁷ Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', pp. 25-26.

⁸ Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', p. 31.

⁹ Isaiah Berlin, 'Introduction' in James Tully (ed.), *Philosophy in an age of Pluralism: the philosophy of Charles Taylor in question* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 2.

framework for individuals to determine and pursue their notions of the good life, Taylor believes culture is intrinsically valuable.

The move from honour to dignity has given rise to what Taylor calls 'the politics of equal dignity'. A form of politics according to which individuals are viewed as essentially similar in the sense that they enjoy an identical set of rights and entitlements. The ideal of authenticity has given rise to 'the politics of difference' which demands the recognition of the distinct identity of each individual or group. The first form of politics emphasizes the universal human capacity to define and pursue an autonomous life. It is precisely this human capacity that individual rights are supposed to protect. The second form of politics focuses on a different universal human potential, that is, the capacity to define and form a distinct identity as individuals and groups. Both of these forms of politics, nevertheless, are based on the notion of equal respect. However, while in the first form of politics the notion of equal respect cherishes sameness, i.e., treating people in a difference-blind fashion; in the second form of politics the notion of equal respect values difference and distinctiveness.¹⁰

According to Taylor, the politics of equal dignity has been associated with a particular kind of liberalism, namely a liberalism that is primarily difference-blind and procedural (advocated by scholars such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin). Taylor clearly favours a different kind of liberalism, one that is not based on 'homogenizing difference' but on endorsing and protecting cultural difference. This form of politics does not only recognize the significance of particular fundamental individual rights, but also the importance of protecting certain collective rights of minorities. The problem with the politics of equal dignity, Taylor argues, is not only that it is 'inhospitable to difference' and 'suspicious of collective goals', but also implausibly assumes that there is allegedly a set of difference-blind principles that form a neutral ground for different cultures to coexist. These difference-blind principles supposedly provide a political framework that is neutral towards the different projects of the good life. Taylor argues that the liberal demand to relegate the notions of the good to the private sphere itself reflects a commitment to substantive goals. The universal difference-blind principles in fact reflect particular values and cultures. The separation between the church and the state that has been favoured by this kind of liberalism is

¹⁰ Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', pp. 37-44.

the product of a specific religious history. Liberalism, he insists, 'is not a possible meeting ground for all cultures, but is the political expression of one range of cultures, and quite incompatible with other ranges.'¹¹ Taylor's rejection of the neutrality of a difference-blind liberalism does not imply that he proposes a form of politics which tolerates all types of cultures. He clearly states that liberalism, in its procedural and non-procedural forms, has to draw lines of tolerance. He claims that 'liberalism can't and shouldn't claim complete cultural neutrality. Liberalism is also a fighting creed.'¹² Taylor admits that there are members of social groups who are citizens in our societies and also belong to cultures that undermine our cultural and philosophical values. The challenge, Taylor claims, 'is to deal with their sense of marginalization without compromising our basic political principles.'¹³

Taylor argues that the demand for recognition of hitherto excluded social groups does not only require acknowledging the distinct identities and cultures of these groups but also recognizing their cultural worth. Underlying this demand, according to Taylor, is 'a premise that we owe equal respect to all cultures'.¹⁴ Taylor examines two formulations of this premise. The first formulation makes the claim that the equal worth of all cultures is a matter of right. The second formulation makes a weaker claim that a comparative cultural study will enable us to see the worth of 'a culture sufficiently different from our own'.¹⁵ Taylor rejects the stronger claim and favours the weaker one. He argues that the stronger claim is problematic because judgments of worth need not be grounded on principles of ethics. In other words, judgments of value should not rest on 'our own wills and desires' but on independent criteria.¹⁶ The weak claim is based on 'a starting hypothesis' that they we ought to apply when we start studying a culture amply different from our own. This starting hypothesis assumes that 'cultures that have animated whole societies over considerable stretch of time have something important to say to all humans.' While

¹¹ Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', p. 62.

¹² Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', p. 62.

¹³ Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', p. 63.

¹⁴ Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', p. 66, and *The Ethics of Authenticity* (London: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 36.

¹⁵ Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', p. 67.

¹⁶ Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', p. 69.

this presumption does not rule out a possible positive judgment *a priori* (because doing that would be arrogant and ethnocentric), it does not imply that we will necessarily come up with a positive judgment about the value of the culture. The comparative cultural study that underlies this hypothesis enables us, Taylor insists, to expand our horizon, learn and understand other cultures and revise and transform our standards.¹⁷ This comparative study of other cultures is crucial for excluded social groups because it requires from the hegemonic groups to review their views about the worth and image of marginalized groups. Taylor argues that the dominant groups tend to depict excluded social groups as inferior. The struggle for recognition necessarily requires the transformation of this demeaning depiction and the judgments of worth applied by the dominant group.¹⁸

Problems in Taylor's theory of recognition

Taylor's theory of recognition has been subject to several criticisms.¹⁹ Scholars such as Linda Nicholson have argued that Taylor's analysis focuses on recognizing the distinctiveness and worth of the identity and culture of excluded social groups while ignoring the importance of the process of recognition itself and the power relations implicated into it.²⁰ Maeve Cooke identifies an ambiguity in Taylor's principle of authenticity and shows that this principle requires capacities

¹⁷ Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', pp. 67-73.

¹⁸ Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', pp. 66.

¹⁹ See for example: James Tully (ed.), *Philosophy in An Age of Pluralism: The Philosophy of Charles Taylor in Question* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); John Horton, 'Charles Taylor: Selfhood, Community and Democracy', in April Carter and Geoffrey Stokes (eds.), *Liberal Democracy and Its Critics* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), pp. 155-174; Joel Anderson, 'The Personal Lives of Strong Evaluators: Identity, Pluralism, and Ontology in Charles Taylor's Value Theory', *Constellations*, 3:1 (1996), pp. 17-38; Michael Kenny, 'Liberalism and the Politics of Recognition' in *The Politics of Identity: Liberal Political Theory and the Dilemmas of Difference* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004), pp. 148-168; Brian Barry, *Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Nancy Fraser, 'Rethinking Recognition', *New Left Review*, 3 (2000), pp. 107-120; Jacob T. Levy, *The Multiculturalism of Fear* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

²⁰ Linda Nicholson, 'To Be or Not To Be: Charles Taylor and The Politic of Recognition', *Constellations*, 3:1 (1996), pp. 1-16.

which are strikingly similar to ones found in the value of individual autonomy.²¹ Paul Saurette identifies other ambiguities and inconsistencies that stem from Taylor's attempt to score balance between individual rights and social good.²² Seyla Benhabib points out the difficulty that emerges from the analogy Taylor draws between the recognition individuals demand and that which *Volks* require.²³ However, the focus of my assessment of Taylor's account of recognition revolves primarily around the notion of culture that underlies his theory. This notion of culture, I argue, undermines the adequacy of his account of democratic accommodation to effectively deal with historical injustices.

Taylor argues that comparative cultural study is likely to transform our standards and measures and therefore blocks the adoption of ethnocentric and narrow views. While seemingly Taylor's account of politics aspires to achieve mutual understanding through dialogue with the other, the trouble with his account, however, is that even after the transformations have taken place he maintains a very clear distinction between 'our culture' and 'their culture'. In other words, despite the dialogue and interaction among different cultures in the same political society, Taylor still refers to cultures as having clear and rigid boundaries of belonging. Taylor explicitly rejects 'homogenizing difference' that is often led by a hegemonic group. However, again Taylor refers to homogenizing as potentially happening only among cultures but not within the boundaries of an individual culture. Taylor endorses Herder's principles of authenticity and argues that it is applicable not only to individuals but also to groups. The principle of authenticity clearly points towards an essentialist notion of culture. The principle of authenticity implies that each identity and culture has an inner original essence/nature that makes it clearly distinct from other cultures. This originality, according to Taylor, can be articulated and discovered.²⁴ Using these latter terms implies as if the inner nature is fixed and constant that needs to be discovered in interaction. Taylor supports Herder's claim

²¹ Maeve Cooke, 'Authenticity and Autonomy: Taylor, Habermas, and the Politics of Recognition', *Political Theory*, 25:2 (1997), pp. 258-288.

²² Paul Saurette, (review essay), 'Questioning Political Theory: Charles Taylor's Contrarianism', *Political Theory*, 32:5 (2004), pp. 723-733.

²³ Seyla Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 51-59.

²⁴ Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', p. 31.

that Germans should be true to themselves, i.e., to their own culture and not 'try to be derivative and (inevitably) second rate Frenchmen'.²⁵ It is very plausible to infer from this that Taylor depicts 'Germans' and 'Frenchmen' as clearly distinct, different and fixed categories. Briefly, Taylor tends to treat cultures as distinct, coherent and homogeneous wholes that their 'survival' and 'integrity' need to be secured and protected.²⁶ The problem with this notion of culture is that it overlooks internal differences and the potential pressure exercised on individuals to comply with the norms, values and practices of the group's culture. In other words, his notion of culture seems to impose specific single identity which ignores multiple identities that stem from intermarriages, cultural interconnectedness, social mobilization and political goals.²⁷ This essentialist notion of culture can endanger individual autonomy.²⁸

Unlike liberal egalitarian theories which view oppression mostly in economic terms and focus on socio-economic injustices, Taylor's theory focuses on struggles for recognition that stem primarily from cultural oppression. Taylor is primarily motivated and inspired by his experience in Canadian politics. While he has been committed to the significance of federalism in Canada, he has supported the claims of those who want to grant rights to protect indigenous groups and preserve the Francophone culture within the province of Quebec.²⁹ He appeals to Herder's ideas to conceptualise these particular struggles for recognition and draws general political and philosophical conclusions which he views as applicable to other struggles of recognition. One crucial problem with these political and philosophical conclusions is

²⁵ Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', p. 31.

²⁶ For more on the need to secure the survival and integrity of culture see Taylor's example of the French Culture in Quebec: Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', pp. 40-41 and pp. 58-61.

²⁷ Brenda Lyshaug points out that Taylor's principle of cultural authenticity implies an essentialist notion of culture. See her article: Brenda Lyshaug, 'Authenticity and the Politics of Identity: A Critique of Charles Taylor's Politics of Recognition', *Contemporary Political Theory*, 3 (2004), pp. 300-320.

²⁸ On the risk of inhibiting autonomy in Taylor's theory of recognition see: K. Anthony Appiah, 'Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction', in: Amy Gutmann (ed.), *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 149-163.

²⁹ Several scholars have pointed out the strong and explicit influence of Taylor's experience in Canadian politics on his political and philosophical conclusions. For more on this point see: Nicholas H. Smith, *Charles Taylor: Meaning, Morals, and Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), pp. 183-192; Linda Nicholson, 'To Be or Not To Be: Charles Taylor and The Politic of Recognition', *Constellations*, 3:1 (1996), p. 8.

that they view struggles for recognition primarily in cultural terms. According to Taylor due recognition is a fundamental human need. He goes on to argue that the lack or denial of due recognition, i.e., inferior and demeaning depiction, of the individual's or group's identity can cause serious injury and harm to their self-image and esteem. The trouble with Taylor's account here is that it views struggles for recognition as ultimately revolving around cultural and symbolic remedies such as language rights demanded by Quebeckers in Canada. As we have indicated in the introduction of this thesis, claims of historical injustice involve cultural as well as socio-economic components. Cultural and socio-economic injustices are intimately interlinked and intertwined.³⁰ In other words, the demeaning and inferior depiction of social groups and their members is intimately linked to their economic exploitation and marginalization.

In summery, unlike the difference-blind liberalism that views identity and culture as irrelevant to politics, Taylor's proposes a form of politics that assigns significance to the identity and cultural distinctiveness of social groups that have experienced exclusion and injustice. Taylor's form of politics recognizes the previously denied, hidden or suppressed collective identities of certain social groups and calls for their protection and respect. While Taylor's demands to give due recognition to excluded and oppressed social groups yields important progress towards democratic accommodation that goes beyond the narrow liberal notion of tolerance that underlie Rawls' and Habermas' theories, his account of recognition seems to rely on an essentialist conception of culture which poses serious challenges to his notion of democratic accommodation. Moreover, Taylor's focus on identity and cultural distinctiveness overlooks specific demands that are particular to social groups that have suffered from historical injustices. In other words, although Taylor's theory of recognition focuses on situatedness and embeddedness, it seems to stop short of indicating the importance of collective memory and taking responsibility and offering an apology in the case of demands of historical injustice. In the final chapter I will argue that it is the politics of reconciliation that capture these issues. Additionally, the politics of reconciliation avoids the problem of essentialism that plagues identity politics by seeking and encouraging the solidarity of non-members. Now I want to

³⁰ On the interconnectedness of cultural and economic injustices see: Nancy Fraser, 'From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemma of Justice in a 'Post-Socialist' Age', *New Left Review*, 212 (1995), pp. 68-93, 'Rethinking Recognition', *New Left Review*, 3 (2000), pp. 107-120.

turn to discuss briefly the post-structuralist thesis which poses further challenges to identity politics.

Part II

The death of the subject and the politics of recognition

Post-modern and post-structural³¹ theorists have raised several important challenges to the politics of recognition. They argue that the claim that theories of recognition are grounded on post-metaphysical premises rather than on metaphysical ones is not convincing. For the 'shadow' of the dead Judeo Christian God; i.e. metaphysical principles, is still present in these theories of recognition. The most prominent proof for this presence, they insist, is the reliance on 'metaphysics of substance' in conceptualising identity, politics, ethics and meaning.³² More specifically, post-structural theorists have charged the politics of recognition, advocated by scholars such as Taylor, of defending essentialist accounts of identity and culture that necessarily lead to reification, separatism, repression and closure.

This part of the chapter discusses briefly the post-structuralist views of Judith Butler because of the challenges they pose to identity politics. It goes on to argue that while her views provide important criticisms against identity politics by revealing the oppositional logic that lies at its core and the important role power relations play in identity formation, her post-structuralist model of identity is neither ultimately compelling nor attractive. For the over-exaggerated role she accords to discourse and processes of signification in the formation of identity, the excessive subversion and transformation which are translated into the demand to transcend the limits and

³¹ A wide variety of thinkers such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Theodor Adorno, Lucy Irigaray and Judith Butler are often included under the umbrella of postmodernism or post-structuralism. These thinkers hold different views. While the views of the more radical or ultrapostmodernist among them, such as Nietzsche, Deleuze, and Lyotard, undermine the very possibility of politics and identity, the views of other less radical thinkers, such as Adorno and Butler, still view identities as contingent. However, these identities, the less radical group insists, do not demand the elimination of politics but serve as the 'ungrounded ground' of it. The discussion here will focus primarily on the claims of Judith Butler. Judith Butler argues that she defends a post-structural theory and not a post-modern one. For post-modernism, according to her, is a very wide and vague term that includes arguments that she could not accept. However, this debate, valuable or not, does not concern us in this chapter. Additionally, I am not implying that post-modernism or post-structuralism designate one fixed theory but they include different views and schools of thought.

³² Judith Butler uses the term 'metaphysics of substance' in her book: *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 16-25.

boundaries of culture and context, and the enthusiastic celebration of a hybrid mode of being, lead to detached 'linguistified' and hybrid identities which are not sufficiently sensitive to cultural, historical and social forces.

Identity politics and the post-structuralist thesis

Butlers argues that the identity categories which are often presumed to lie at the foundation of feminist politics portray feminism as identity politics. The trouble with identity politics, Butler argues, is that it is rooted in a problematic metaphysical binary logic of identification. She argues that this logic of identification restricts identity to oppositional ontological categories such as 'male' versus 'female', and 'us' versus 'them'. This binary and oppositional logic of identification relies on a 'metaphysics of substance' in which the subject is presupposed as a given, self-identical, constant, unified and internally coherent entity.³³ The binary logic of identification implies that the subject has authentic core traits that define his or her identity. This logic of identity requires the existence of an external other in contrast to which the subject defines itself. Butler goes on to argue that even in social theories, such as Taylor's, which insist on a dialogically constituted and situated self, the discursive and dialogical process through which one gains his or her identity is framed in an oppositional epistemological frame.³⁴

The problem, therefore, with the binary logic that underlies identity politics is that it denies the internal complexity and indeterminacy within each of the dichotomous categories, ignores the intersection between both of these categories and imposes unified and essentialised identities through presenting the binary categories as the only ontological modes of being. The denial of internal complexity and indeterminacy of identity, the failure to capture identities that exceed the boundaries of the two dichotomous categories and the drive to essentialise and impose unified identities give rise to several risks that are associated with identity politics. Most importantly among these risks is the problem of essentialism that could license balkanisation, patriarchy, closure, xenophobia and radical forms of nationalism.

³³ For more on the binary logic of identity see: Judith Butler: *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 13-16.

³⁴ Butler: *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*, p. 143.

Consequently, Butler and several other post-structural theorists have called for the revaluation of the principles and ideas that underlie this oppositional logic of identity to conceive a different form of politics that is capable of overcoming the constraints and limits of identity politics and recognizing the multiplicity and hybridity of identity. In other words, a form of politics that is capable of theorizing alternative modes of recognition, thinking and being that have been either ignored and erased or are inconceivable. These alternative modes, she claims, are dynamic, contradictory, uncertain, groundless and unfamiliar.

The subject, according to Butler, is not a pre-given and self-creating entity. Rather, it is discursively constructed. It is the artefact of continuous linguistic and discursive processes that are implicated by power relations. These processes determine diverse roles and positions for the subject to hold. Butler contends that the subject is performatively formed. It is constituted through a performative act. This performative speech act is not merely about stating utterances but about bringing into being an action. Put another way, performative utterance is not about describing objects or actions but about giving a birth to what it names. Butler argues that:

[T]o be constituted by language is to be produced within a given network of power/discourse which is open to resignification, redeployment, subversive citation from within, and interruption and inadvertent convergences with other such networks.³⁵

The subject, however, is not situated relatively to the positions and roles it holds but is constituted by them. In other words, they are not instrumentally external forces but constitutive of its formation. These positions, Butler stresses, are not merely theoretical constellations but entrenched by 'organizing principles of material practices and institutional arrangements.'³⁶ Butler denies the claim that there are 'free wills' and free subjects who can act autonomously and freely in a space where power is bracketed. For power relations operate everywhere.

³⁵ Judith Butler, 'For a Careful Reading', in *Feminist Contentions: a philosophical exchange*, (New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 135.

³⁶ Judith Butler, 'Contingent Foundations', in *Feminist Contentions: a philosophical exchange*, (New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 42.

Butler rejects the claim that criticizing the subject means repudiating it. Rather, it means, she insists, to interrogate its formation as apolitical and as a pre-given entity. The constitution of the subject, according to her account, is not prior to politics; lies in the normative domain outside of the boundaries of the political. Rather, it is a political process par excellence where power relations, exclusion and repression are involved. Put another way, the process of subjectivity formation, she maintains, involves exclusion, differentiation and repression. These latter elements are often concealed by claims of autonomy and independence. Relying on assumptions from psychoanalysis, Butler argues, that the exclusionary process of differentiation is inevitable for the formation of the subject as a unique and particular being. The aim of a post-structural theory, or what she calls 'feminist genealogy,'³⁷ is to trace these exclusions and repressions. To put it in Butler's terms:

to deconstruct the subject is not to negate or throw away the concept; on the contrary, deconstruction implies only that we suspend all commitments to that to which the term, "the subject," refers, and that we consider the linguistic functions it serves in the consolidation and concealment of authority. To deconstruct is not to negate..., but to call into question..., to open up a term, like the subject, to a reusage or redeployment that previously has not been authorized.³⁸

The redeployment of the subject as an open site for enduring multiple resignifications liberates it from the closure, separatism and reification of identity politics. Challenging the givenness and the fixedness of categories such as woman, black, or Muslim, allow new, overlooked and erased meanings and modes of being to arise. Here Butler, and several other post-structural theorists, seems to imply a hybrid notion of identity that views the individual as an experimental subject that is continuously engaged in struggle and subversion that necessarily lead to detachment from social and cultural practices and norms.

³⁷ For more on her notion of feminist genealogy see Butler: *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*, pp. 5-6.

³⁸ Butler, 'Contingent Foundations', p. 49.

Criticizing Butler

The experimental and hybrid notion of identity that Butler enthusiastically defends is not plausible. For it has been demonstrated that intersubjectivity establishes that the individual self-realisation does not lie in the distance the individual maintains from its social and cultural bonds and norms. Rather, it lies in a network of social relations of mutual recognition. Individuals cannot achieve their chosen aims solipsistically away from the normative affirmation of others. One's practical claims and goals gain recognition when a counterpart positively affirms them. Axel Honneth argues that:

Subjects are really only capable of realizing the possibilities of freedom when they can, without constraints, positively identify, from the perspective of assenting others, with their own objectives; the realization of freedom presupposes the experience of recognition because I can be in true and complete accord with my goals of action only to the extent that I can be sure of the normative agreement of a communicative community which, if not a concrete one, is at least an idealized one.³⁹

Butler's notion of identity, therefore, seems to underestimate the role of cultural and social networks, practices and institutions. More precisely, Butler tends to 'linguistify' subjectivity formation in the sense that it views linguistic practices or the structure of signification as the primary site for subjectivity formation. Therefore, she downplays the significance of other important structures and practices such as culture and family traditions in the process of identity formation.⁴⁰ The speech-act theory of performative gender and identity constitution confines the process of gender and identity formation to discourse, signification and processes of meaning-constitution and therefore fails to explain the acquisition of human capabilities (such as self

³⁹ Honneth, 'Pluralization and Recognition: On the Self-Misunderstanding of Post Modern Social Theories', p. 226.

⁴⁰ It is quite evident to the reader that in her book *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1999), Judith Butler overemphasizes the role of discourse and processes of signification and meaning-constitution.

determination) and the constitutive role of cultural, social and psychological forces in identity formation. Put differently, several thinkers such as Seyla Benhabib have argued that Butler's performative account of gender and identity formation fails to capture well the complexities and multiple dimensions that are involved in gender and identity formation. Briefly, Butler's account of identity formation overemphasizes the role of linguistic and discursive forces and underestimates the role of cultural and social forces.⁴¹ These cultural and social forces, as it has been argued in previous chapters, are particularly important in the context of historical exclusion because of their role in understanding experiences of oppression and their causes.

Moreover, Butler's claim that subjects are always caught in a continuous process of resignification and regimes of power relation implies that there is no moment of stability. Additionally, while the argument that subjectivation involves power relations seems to be plausible, it is implausible to entirely reject the possibility of autonomy and normative claims. For denying the possibility of autonomy and normative claims necessarily lead to a problematic strand of politics that lacks any kind of regulative principles. Put another way, it might lead to a politics where everything goes.

To sum up, by revealing the binary logic of identification that underlies identity politics and focusing on the regimes of power engaged in identity formation, Butler's post-structuralist views pose serious challenges to identity politics. However, it has been argued that her approach is incomplete because it does not fully capture forces other than linguistic that are involved in the constitution of identity in particular and politics in general. Moreover, presenting the individual as an experimental and hybrid agent that is always engaged in subversion leads, maybe unwillingly, to an unsituated, transcendent and detached notion of identity that is open to similar criticisms posed against liberal atomism.

Conclusion

Taylor and other theorists of recognition have argued that to achieve fair political arrangements that are capable of accommodating demands of excluded social groups, we need more than the difference-blind and neutral form of politics proposed

⁴¹ Seyla Benhabib, 'Subjectivity, Historiography, and Politics' in *Feminist Contentions* (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 108-111.

by John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas. Taylor has claimed that considerations of justice, equality, liberty and citizenship necessarily lead to taking context, situatedness, and cultural pluralism into account. This chapter has demonstrated, however, that while acknowledging an important role for culture in politics in general and identity formation in particular is plausible, it is not evident that every notion of culture plays a constructive role. More specifically, the notion of culture that seems to underlie Taylor's politics of recognition is an essentialist notion. The problem of this notion is that it views culture as a closed, fixed, given and organic entity. Viewing culture this way leads to closure, essentialism, homogeneity and balkanization. Moreover, while Taylor's theory of recognition achieves some important progress towards addressing democratic exclusion by placing excluded social groups, their identities, cultures, and rights at its core, it remains silent on the significance of the historical dimension in cases of excluded social groups who have suffered some form of historical exclusion and injustice. The historical dimension of exclusion, it has been claimed in the introduction of the thesis, gives rise to specific types of demands, such as collective memory, acknowledging historical injustices, and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices, which seem to go beyond the frame of Taylor's account of democratic accommodation.

Judith Butler has presented a post-structuralist theory that aspires to offer an emancipatory form of politics which releases individuals from the chains of metaphysics and essentialism. This chapter has argued that while this emancipatory form of politics generates significant criticisms against identity politics by unmasking the binary logic of identity and the structures of power that are involved in the formation of identities in particular and politics in general, its hybrid and subversive notion of identity considerably undervalues the significance of culture, background and situatedness in politics. Moreover, by focusing excessively on the role of discursive and signification processes, this form of politics tends to 'linguistify' the formation of subjectivity and ends up adopting an excessively linguistic notion of selfhood. Finally, Butler's notion of selfhood turns out to be similar to the atomistic liberal notion, at least, in being narrow and detached.

One might argue that the most interesting and recent face of the contemporary debate on democratic accommodation is one that avoids the essentialism of identity politics advocated by scholars of recognition such as Taylor. This new face emphasizes the interdependence, fluidity and hybridity of identities and cultures of

social groups.⁴² It presents theories of democratic accommodation which propose different conceptualisations of ontological issues such as culture, representation and dialogue. In the following two chapters I will examine primarily theories that belong to this new face of the debate on democratic accommodation. More precisely, chapters 5 and 6 form a section that focuses primarily on ‘integrative’ approaches which try to combine non-essentialist notions of recognition with deliberation or dialogue to offer effective accounts of democratic accommodation. I will approach these accounts through the focus on the ontological questions of representation and intercultural dialogue.

⁴² There has been an extensive and rich debate in cultural anthropology about the different meanings of the term culture. Generally the debate focuses on two main meanings of the notion of culture; essentialist and non-essentialist. Several political theorists have appealed to anthropology to invoke a notion of culture. For more on the debate on culture in cultural anthropology see: Clifford Geertz, ‘Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture’, in *Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays* (London, Hutchinson: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 3-30, *Negara: The Theatre- State in Nineteenth Century Bali* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), ‘The Uses of Diversity’, *Michigan Quarterly Review*, 25:1 (1987), pp. 105-123; Pierre Bourdieu, *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology*, (trans.) Matthew Adamson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990); Antonio Gramsci, *Selections From Cultural Writings* (eds.) David Forgacs and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith; (trans.) William Boelhower (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1985); Kate A. F. Crehan, *Gramsci, Culture and Anthropology* (London: Pluto Press, 2002); Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (London: Vintage, 1994), *Orientalism* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1995), *Power, Politics, and Culture: Interviews with Edward W. Said* Gauri Viswanathan (ed.), (New York : Pantheon Books, 2001), chapters 8-10, ‘Representing the Colonized: Anthropology’s Interlocutors’, *Reflections on Exile and Other Literary and Cultural Essays* (London: Granta, 2001), pp. 293-316; Eric R. Wolf, *Envisioning Power: Ideologies of Dominance and Crisis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley; California; London: University of California Press, 1997); James Clifford, and George E. Marcus, *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography* (Berkeley: University of California, 1986); James Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-century Ethnography, Literature and Art* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988); David Scott, ‘Criticism and Culture: Theory and Post-colonial Claims on Anthropological Disciplinarity’, *Critique of Anthropology*, 12:4 (1992), pp. 371-394, ‘Culture in Political Theory’, *Political Theory*, 31:1 (2003), pp. 92-115; Paul Kelly, ‘Introduction: Between Culture and Equality’, in Paul, Kelly (ed.) *Multiculturalism Reconsidered: Culture and Equality and Its Critics* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); Adam Kuper, *Culture: The Anthropologists’ Account* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999).

SECTION III: INTEGRATIVE THEORIES

5. ON REPRESENTATION

This chapter examines another constitutive ontological issue that is central to theories of democratic inclusion, namely, the issue of representation. While proponents of identity politics have viewed ‘descriptive representation’ as an effective tool to show sensitivity to social divisions and accommodate the demands of excluded social groups, other scholars have pointed out the issues of essentialism and reproduction of existing inequalities as the main dangers of this descriptive notion of representation and thus have demanded to release representation from the chains of essentialism. The dispute between those who view group representation as a positive tool to achieve inclusion and those who view it as a negative instrument that essentialises identities and reproduces existing hierarchies, has given rise to an integrative approach that aims to combine components from both sides and offers a more elaborated notion of representation. The aim of this chapter is to analyse critically these three main approaches to representation. The chapter, however, does not aim to provide an exhaustive and conclusive discussion of all the aspects (metaphysical, linguistic and aesthetic) of the notion of representation. Rather, it aims to examine the notion of representation as it is often used in the debates on recognition and democratic accommodation.¹

¹ Although these aspects of the notion of representation are closely connected, this chapter does not deal with linguistic representation but primarily with political representation. In the linguistic context representation, it is said, is the production of meaning through language. The debate on linguistic representation has influenced and inspired several political theorists. Three major different approaches of meaning can be identified: reflective, intentional, and constructivist. The constructivist approach, however, is the dominant one. These three approaches try to answer the question: where does meaning come from? The reflective and intentional approaches are ultimately not persuasive and are open to many criticisms. The reflective or mimetic approach holds the view that meaning lies in the objects, persons, ideas or events themselves. Meaning, according to this approach, lies in the real and actual world and the task of language is merely to mirror and imitate the real meaning that already exists in the world. This approach is based on the classical Greek notion of *mimesis*. According to this notion, the function of language and painting is to mirror nature. One of the fundamental underlying assumptions of this approach is the existence of a true and real meaning that is universal, fixed and unchangeable. A major problem of this approach, among others, is that it fails to explain how we fully understand words, sounds, ideas, and images that are totally fictional, imaginary and fantasy. Conversely, the intentional approach argues that it is the speakers who impose meanings on the world: objects, ideas and images. According to this approach, words convey the private intended meanings

This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part examines the move from liberal interest-based pluralism to identity-based representation. It illustrates that identity-based representation, advocated by proponents of identity politics, is primarily inspired by a 'descriptive Aristotelian notion of representation,' or what the French philosopher Jacques Derrida calls 'metaphysics of presence.' Drawing chiefly on the work of post-modern critics of recognition, it will be argued that this Aristotelian notion of representation is problematic because it is hierarchical, unitary and based on an oppositional logic of identification. In short, descriptive representation runs risks such as essentialism, closure, separation and hierarchy. Avoiding the essentialism and hierarchy of the descriptive Aristotelian notion of representation, has led post-modern theorists to develop and advocate non-essentialist hybrid notions of representation. The second part explores Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's rhizomic notion of representation. While Deleuze and Guattari's views offer insightful critique of the notion of descriptive representation found in identity politics, I will argue that their alternative, i.e., rhizomic and horizontal modes of representation, is problematic because it defends implausible notions of identity and politics. The last part analyses the views of Iris Marion Young and Melissa Williams. These two scholars have proposed integrative and modified notions of representation. These integrative notions try to incorporate views from different models of representation, such as the liberal interest-based pluralism, the descriptive Aristotelian notion of representation and the non-essentialist account of representation, and aim to

that the speaker accords to them. The main flaw of this approach, however, is that it presents language and meaning to be entirely private. In other words, it implausibly assumes that there are private languages where a sole individual can make sense of her own world without anybody else. This is problematic because the core of language is communication and interaction that are based on common linguistic codes and conventions. Language cannot be entirely private. For our private intended meanings to be shared and intelligible they have to rely on codes and conventions that are commonly and publicly recognized. The social constructivist approach recognizes the public, relational and social dimension of language. It rejects the view that the material world - things in themselves - or individual speakers of language are able to define and fix meaning in language. Meanings are not 'given' and fixed properties but are socially constructed. We rely on the two representational systems, the conceptual and the linguistic, to produce meaning. Briefly, language is not given by God or discovered in nature, but it is the production of human social agents. Human beings construct meaning through using their own representational systems to make the world meaningful and to communicate about the world meaningfully to others. The social constructivist approach has two variants; the semiotic influenced by the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure and the discursive influenced by Michel Foucault. The major difference between the semiotic and discursive approaches, is that while the first, i.e., semiotic, exclusively focuses on 'the *how* of representation' i.e., on how language constructs meaning (the poetics of representation), the second approach focuses more on 'the *effects and consequences* of representation,' i.e., on its implications on conduct, norms, and identities (its politics). For more on these three approaches see: Stuart Hall (ed.), *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices* (London: SAGE, 1997).

avoid their major weaknesses. It will be argued that although their integrative notions of representation are appealing, they remain insufficient to adequately tackle demands of historically excluded social groups.

Part I

Under-representation and the politics of recognition

It has been argued in chapters 2 and 3 that egalitarian theories of deliberative democracy are primarily procedural, legalistic, individualistic, insensitive to situatedness and blind to racial and social divisions and hierarchies. These deliberative theories often promote an interest-based politics. According to them, race, gender, religion and similar features are irrelevant to the political process and representation. In other words, the political process secures that every individual citizen, regardless of his or her colour, gender, race, sex, social class, age etc., has an equal opportunity to influence the electoral process (one person, one vote). The result of this process, therefore, is fair regardless of its content. Groups or associations according to these deliberative approaches are voluntary and they are tolerated and accepted when they advocate interests and not identity, race, religion etc. Briefly, politics primarily deals with the aggregation of interests and preferences within fair procedures and thus political representation should be exclusively confined to representing these interests and preferences.² Judith Squires calls this form of representation a functional representation.³ It was primarily the blindness and insensitivity to social divisions, exclusions and inequalities and the under-representation of minorities and excluded social groups which have led to the move towards the politics of recognition.

Based on these criticisms, proponents of identity politics have rejected this liberal model of pluralism and suggested a descriptive notion of representation instead.

² For more on liberal representation and its interest-group pluralism see: Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1956); *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

³ Judith Squires draws a useful distinction between four types of representation. These types are ideological, functional, geographical and social. Ideological representation refers to the representation of beliefs, functional to the representation of interests, geographical to the representation of constituencies, and social to the representation of identities. Judith Squires, *Gender in Political Theory* (Malden, Mass: Polity Press, 1999), pp. 201-204.

The development of the civil rights movement in the US, the feminist movements and other social movements in the 1960s and 1970s has considerably contributed to emergence of 'descriptive representation'. These social movements have placed the voices, claims and rights of excluded and oppressed social groups at the core of their advocacy and struggle. Among these social movements, some have increasingly focused on the specificity and 'authenticity' of experiences of exclusion and their intimate link to specific identities. These unique experiences of exclusion and their intimate link to identities, it is said, lead to the constitution of distinct excluded social groups. Inspired by identity-based politics, several political theorists and activists have claimed that a more adequate and fair political representation requires the representation of the different social groups that make up the political body. Put differently, achieving appropriate political inclusion necessarily requires, they insist, including members of the excluded social groups. This can be achieved through practical mechanisms such as the quota system.⁴

Relying primarily on the views of post-modern critics of recognition such as Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, I will argue that the group-based representation which is often adopted by proponents of identity politics suffers from several problems that render it unsuccessful and problematic. A group-based representation, it will be argued, essentializes identities, imposes homogeneity, overlooks internal complex differences, prioritizes the collective over individual autonomy and solidifies and reinforces the separations and hierarchies between different groups. However, although Deleuze and Guattari provide valuable criticisms against descriptive representation, I will argue that their notions of representation and politics are not convincing.

Deleuze and Guattari have argued that the notion of representation that is defended by proponents of identity politics has been primarily constructed within an Aristotelian framework. Representation conceived in Aristotelian terms is limited to

⁴ For more on the development of 'descriptive representation' and its link to social movements and identity politics see: Anne Phillips, 'From a Politics of Idea to a Politics of Presence?', *The Politics of Presence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 1-26, and 'Dealing with Difference: A Politics of Ideas, or a Politics of Presence', in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996). Phillips distinguishes between a 'politics of ideas' and a 'politics of presence'. Whilst the first focuses on the diversity of ideas and preferences, the second emphasizes the importance of caucuses and quotas of presentation. She argues that a combination between these two forms of politics is not only possible but necessary for modern societies.

particular modes of acting and thinking. Unlike Plato's 'Theory of Forms' that presumes the existence of a One pure form that others are defined according to lacking what this One has, Aristotle proposes a different notion of difference that allows more plurality and differentiation but within clear and rigid limits of totality. This Aristotelian notion prioritises the existing, defined and actual over the infinite and potential. It is ultimately framed and limited into a totality that prioritises the whole over its parts. What lies at the core of Aristotle's notion is the primacy of *telos*; an inherent defined end that a thing progresses towards. This process of becoming, to achieve the *telos* or end, is taking place according to clearly defined principles and within 'boundaries that are carefully constructed and fiercely maintained.'⁵ Briefly, it takes place in a fixed, closed and defined system of principles that does not have enough room for contingencies, disruptions and ambiguities. The consequence of this logic is 'a series of hierarchies privileging determinacy over indeterminacy; intention over accident; formal, efficient, and final causes over material cause; space over time; and being over nonbeing.'⁶

The establishment of the Aristotelian notion of representation as the standard and norm for images and thought, Deleuze and Guattari insist, is not simply a contingent historical event, but reflects a more profound philosophical preference. Deleuze argues that in answering the question: what is difference, philosophy preferred a particular definition of difference and therefore specific modes of representation. This preferred notion of difference was chiefly Aristotelian. Deleuze argues that the Aristotelian model of organic representation has dominated most of the political, ethnic, social, artistic, economic, philosophical, scientific and linguistic practices in the Western tradition. He examines the emergence and formation of the Aristotelian notion of representation as 'the single and authoritative source of visible intelligibility and political stabilization.' The Aristotelian model of representation is

⁵ Some scholars have argued that the Christian thinkers who later adopted Aristotle's ideas interpreted them in a very rigid way overlooking alternative avenues that might be pursued and exceed his logic. According to these scholars, Aristotle does not deny disruptions, contingencies, and ambiguities within his fixed, closed and hierarchically ordered system but even tries to include them into his defined totality. These contingencies and paradoxes that Aristotle, often unsuccessfully, attempts to contain in his system point out for potential alternative routes of thought and being that cannot be captured by Aristotle's restricted framework. See Nathan Widder, *Genealogies of Difference* (Urbana, III.: University of Illinois Press, 2002), p. 62.

⁶ Widder, *Genealogies of Difference*, p. 62.

attractive, according to him, because it is intelligible and simplistic.⁷ The Aristotelian notion of difference presupposes a kind of sameness. To account for difference we have to share something - identity. In other words, it assumes the existence of a single centre or referent that everything is measured and differentiated (mediated) according to its proximity - a principle of proximity to being and a degree of being - to this centre (this necessarily leads to hierarchy of distribution and imposes unity). Consequently, this model seeks to secure coherence, logic, order and hierarchy. Descriptive and organic representation, Deleuze argues, is based on a binary and oppositional logic of identification.⁸ This binary and oppositional logic has been used to legitimize and construct strict and rigid social and political norms and practices.⁹

Proponents of a group-based representation, who demand the presence of members of excluded social groups as the representatives of these groups, are clearly inspired by the descriptive Aristotelian notion of representation. These proponents go on to argue that achieving an effective and fair representation of under-represented and excluded social groups necessarily requires guaranteeing the presence of certain members of these groups in legislative, administrative and decision making bodies.

⁷ Dorothea Olkowski claims that Aristotle's notion of time is fully compatible with his organic representations. His conception of time takes 'now' to be its unit of measure for 'before' and 'after' as if 'now', despite its multiple points, is fixed, static or nontime. Recognizing motion destabilizes 'now' and gives birth to a new mode of time that exceeds the Aristotelian one. Dorothea Olkowski, *Gilles Deleuze and The Ruin of Representation*, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1999), pp. 21-22.

⁸ Representation in Aristotle's account, Dorothea Olkowski argues, is composed of two elements. 'The first consists of the differences (conceived in terms of analogy) between species that are subsumed under the *identity* of a genus, or it consists of the genus that stands in relations of *analogy* with other genera. However, this abstract, in order to be a representation, insofar as it subsumes species, must also rely on what constitutes them, a second element, namely *resemblance* that presumes the continuity of the sensible intuition in a concrete representation.' Therefore, according to Deleuze the Aristotelian notion of representation is 'organic', when it is based on the four elements of judgment; namely, identity, opposition, analogy and resemblance. Terms according to Aristotle differ through mediation of something else. The mediated Aristotelian difference, Olkowski states, 'submits itself fully to the *identity* of the concept, to the *opposition* of predicates, to the *analogy* of judgment, and to the *resemblance* of perception.' Deleuze and Guattari argue that it is this form of organic and oppositional representation that they question and reject. 'If difference were to show itself at all as a concept and reality, it could do so in this model only as a crack, a catastrophe, a break in resemblance or as the impossibility of claiming identity, opposition, analogy, or resemblance where reflection demands that they should occur.' For more see: Dorothea Olkowski, *Gilles Deleuze and The Ruin of Representation*, p. 20.

⁹ Some scholars have indicated that Renaissance artists fought against the theorists' preferences of static, symmetrical, logical and hierarchically ordered form of representation (drawing). These Renaissance artists favoured a more dynamic and fluid one. They preferred the 'living quality of images in *movement* to the mirrored perfection of nature.' At the end, however, the model of mirroring and idealizing prevailed. For more on this see David Summers' book on *Michelangelo and the Language of Art* and Dorothea Olkowski, *Gilles Deleuze and The Ruin of Representation*, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1999), p. 16.

Securing the representation of the excluded social groups in these bodies, it is believed, will necessarily enhance their conditions because their representatives will influence the decision making process and the allocation of resources. There are different mechanisms that an identity-based notion of representation suggests to overcome under-representation of excluded social groups. The most common mechanisms are caucuses and quotas, i.e., specific number of seats or positions that are allocated to members of the excluded social groups. In the following discussion it will be argued that an identity-based representation, enthusiastically adopted by advocates of identity politics, is not compelling and runs some serious risks such as essentialism, separation and balkanisation.

The problems of descriptive and organic representation

Descriptive representation has attracted several criticisms from liberals, democrats and post-modernists.¹⁰ Most of these criticisms revolve around issues such as essentialism, accountability, individual autonomy, balkanisation and equality. In the following discussion, however, I will focus only on three major problems that plague descriptive representation. These problems undermine the ability of identity politics to sufficiently accommodate demands of historically excluded social groups. First, it seems that descriptive representation implies that experiences of oppression give rise to specific perspectives and feelings that are fully transparent and accessible only to the oppressed and cannot be shared and understood by those who do not live these experiences of oppression. This claim might even be stronger in cases of historical injustices where oppression is often persistent and institutionalised. However, the difficulty with this claim is that it supports the unreasonable view that entirely doubts and rejects the ability of non-members to grasp the oppression suffered by members of excluded and oppressed social groups. There are many national and international human rights and peace activists who are not members of excluded social group and still faithfully advocate the rights of these groups. In the

¹⁰ For more see for example: Melissa S. Williams, *Voice, Trust and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 178-181; Anne Phillips, 'From a Politics of Idea to a Politics of Presence?', *The Politics of Presence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 21-26; Iris Marion Young, 'The Ideal of Impartiality', in *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 96-121.

concluding chapter it will be argued that it is precisely this type of national and international solidarity that the politics of reconciliation relies on to refuse the monopoly on grasping suffering and oppression that inhibit dialogue and mutual understanding.

Second, allocating a fixed number of seats to members of excluded social groups implies that these groups are distinct and share common identities, interests and opinions. This logic of reasoning clearly imposes a particular homogenous identity on the excluded social groups. Imposing these identities does not only essentialise identities, but also ignores the diversity of views and opinions within the same group, the multiplicity of affiliation and the role of the individual agency in determining the meaning of their social norms, values and features. In short, descriptive representation unconvincingly relies on assumptions that presuppose that the wills, opinions, interests, identities and cultural boundaries of the excluded social groups are self-evident, fixed and constant. The depiction of certain social groups as inferior and thus subjecting them to oppression that continues over a long period of time generates collective memory, particular experiences and history of oppression. The existence of a legacy of oppression is important for the struggle of historically excluded social groups, among other things, because of its ability to challenge the hegemonic national narrative that justifies or denies that oppression. While a membership, often involuntary, in excluded social group plays a major role in structuring, determining and restricting the life prospects and choices of the members and leads to experiencing particular experiences, it is implausible to view these social groups, their collective memory and history as entirely coherent and unified. Indeed, many excluded social groups can be distinguished from the oppressing groups but that should not lead to overlook the internal differences, conflicts and multiplicities of views, interests and preferences within the groups. The politics of reconciliation, it will be argued in the concluding chapter of the thesis, recognizes this complexity and multiplicity because it holds the view that narration and testimony are likely to generate multiple, and sometimes conflicting, views and stories within the excluded social group about their memory and history of exclusion.

Third, identity-based representation will very likely accelerate conflicts and segmentation and reinforce the hierarchical divisions and separations between groups. Group-based representation is based on a binary and oppositional logic of identification. As it has been demonstrated in the previous chapter, this logic develops

and promotes dichotomous categorization such as 'us' versus 'them', 'black' versus 'white', and 'men' versus 'women'. It is precisely these dichotomous and oppositional classifications that draw rigid boundaries between groups that are likely to licence hatred, separation and fragmentation, thus leading to political and social instability. To meet these challenges of balkanization and rigid separations, defenders of group representation are required to develop relatively clear standards that enable us to distinguish between those who have strong claims for representation and those who have weak ones. In cases of historical exclusion it will be argued in the final chapter that the politics of reconciliation offers relatively clear standards to distinguish between strong and weak claims because of its emphasis on the persistence of exclusion over a long period of time and collective memory.

Based on the above-discussed problems and some others, several theorists have proposed alternative notions of representation that aspire to bypass the problems that stem from descriptive representation. In the following two parts I will explore respectively Deleuze and Guattari's non-essentialist notion of representation and Iris Marion Young's and Melissa Williams' integrative notions of representation against the demands of historical exclusion.

Part II

Non-essentialist notions of representation: Deleuze and Guattari's nomadism

Deleuze and Guattari have offered valuable criticisms against descriptive representation. They have argued that the descriptive representation essentialises identities, imposes unity and coherence and overlooks the complexities and interdependence of identities. They, however, do not only propose a critique of descriptive representation but they also offer an alternative notion to it. More specifically, they propose a non-essentialist notion of representation that challenges the fixation of group identities and recognizes the multiplicity of belonging, fluidity of identities and conflict and resistance. To release representation and politics from the constraints of essentialism, coherence and unity we need, they insist, to destabilize the fixation of identities and celebrate their contingency and hybridity. This part of the

chapter explores Deleuze and Guattari's 'nomadic' notion of representation.¹¹ It will be argued that while Deleuze and Guattari's ideas are useful to critically examine descriptive representation, their alternative notion of representation is problematic and does not propose an appealing account of democratic accommodation.

In their common work Deleuze and Guattari argue that it is the descriptive organic notion of representation with its fierce 'desire' to coherence, logic, order and hierarchy that they are so keen to reject. They reject it primarily because of its failure to capture conflict, resistance, irruption, mobility and multiplicity that are involved in the process of 'becoming'.¹² According to them there is always a 'monstrous' aspect in representation that the Aristotelian descriptive notion of representation denies. This cruel and monstrous aspect, they persist, cannot be escaped. The cruel and monstrous aspect exceeds the frame of the descriptive notion of representation and distorts the

¹¹ Though this chapter focuses on Deleuze and Guattari's, Iris Marion Young's and Melissa Williams' views, the author is aware of the existence of other attempts that have proposed alternatives to the liberal interest-based pluralism and the identity-based representation of identity politics. These attempts have advocated a more robust democratic theory based on active participation and engagement. According to this robust democratic theory, the remedy to the deficiencies of interest-based pluralism and identity-based representation lies in adopting radical notions of democratic engagement, deliberation and empowerment. Within this robust democratic approach we can identify, nevertheless, two different groups of scholars that hold different views. While one group adopts republican forms of politics, the other one embraces agonistic notions of politics. Critical theorists, such as William Connolly, Chantal Mouffe, Jacques Derrida and Homi Bhabha, have adopted agonistic views that are relatively similar to the views of Deleuze and Guattari. For them identities are embedded in structures of power. Politics is about destabilizing, negotiating and contesting these identities and exposing the power structures. Generally, instead of a teleological, synchronous, predictive, progressive, serial and linear notion of difference they, though they hold slightly different views, propose a disjunctive, liminal, disruptive, repetitive, schizophrenic and subaltern notion. Although their views are less radical than Deleuze and Guattari's, they face similar challenges that Deleuze and Guattari's views face. The republican alternatives are not particularly promising either. For in addition to valid concerns of scale, practicality and feasibility of direct democracy in contemporary massive and complex societies, the claim of privileging a single notion of the good life, that of politically engaged citizenry, is not convincing. According to many scholars and particularly value pluralists, there are several competing equally valuable ways of living good lives. Moreover, the emphasis on a collective identity raises serious doubts about the ability of this version to effectively deal with diversity in general and the demands of historically excluded social groups in particular. For more on agonistic views see: Chantal Mouffe, *Dimensions of Radical Democracy* (London, Verso: 1992), *The Democratic Paradox* (London: Verso, 2000), 'Democracy, Power, and the "Political"' in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp.245-256; William Connolly, *Identity/ difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Jacques Derrida, 'Sending: On Representation', trans. Peter Dews and Mary Dews, *Social Research*, 49 (1982), pp. 294-326; Homi K. Bhabha, 'DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation', in *Nation and Narration*, Homi K. Bhabha, (ed.) (London: Routledge, 1990). For republican views see: Benjamin Barber, *Strong Democracy* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1984); Richard Dagger, *Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Philip Pettit, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

¹² Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Nomadology: The War Machine* (New York: Semiotex(e), 1994).

order, coherence and hierarchy it seeks to achieve and secure. They propose an alternative form of representation that recognizes what they call the perpetual movement, struggle, hybridity and fluidity of identity. This alternative form, therefore, challenges the fixation, hierarchy, coherence and singularity of identity. They call this form of representation 'rhizomic,' (rhizome is 'a subterranean plant stem that grows horizontally, sending out roots below and stems above'). In other words, unlike the hierarchical, closed and static Aristotelian notion of representation, rhizomic representation is nomadic, flexible, non-hierarchical and irreducible to one single core reference (it simultaneously participates in the constitution of multiple forms). Olkowski argues that the measure 'Deleuze proposes to account for monstrous difference is the "*nomadic nomos*, without property, enclosure or measure. . . . an allocation of those who distribute *themselves* . . . in a *space without precise limits*.'"¹³

The 'nomadic nomos', however, should not be viewed as an anarchic and chaotic organization of elements because 'It begins with substances that are molecular or quasi-molecular elements - assemblages - and imposes upon them a form that consists only of connections and successions.'¹⁴ Assemblage is neither a pure becoming nor a pure chaos and void. It simultaneously includes forces and movements of formation and demolition, stratification and destratification, territorialization and deterritorialization. All of these movements lead to conflictual and contradictory flows.¹⁵ Briefly, assemblage is neither a discrete subject or object nor undefined anarchy of amorphous substances. Rather, it is the composition and arrangement of the different movements, flows and distribution of these matters. To put it in Olkowski's terms:

Thus, while the assemblage cannot be identified as either a subject or an object (only representation does this), neither is it the indeterminate chaos of unformed matters. Rather, it is a configuration of speeds (thus

¹³ Olkowski, *Gilles Deleuze and The Ruin of Representation*, p. 24.

¹⁴ Olkowski, *Gilles Deleuze and The Ruin of Representation*, pp. 26-27.

¹⁵ Deleuze and Guattari, *Nomadology*, p. 4; Olkowski, *Gilles Deleuze and The Ruin of Representation*, pp. 26-27.

movements), intensities (qualitative variations), and varying distributions of its elements.¹⁶

Deleuze and Guattari argue that the Aristotelian organic notion of representation is connected to the hierarchical distribution of power that the state apparatus deploys. They use the term 'state apparatus' to refer to the most fixed and hierarchized arrangement of power. This state apparatus uses the simplicity, intelligibility and inflexibility of organic representation to justify its existence and operation. Like organic representation, the state apparatus views the ever-mobile nomad as a monster or a criminal. The mobility of the nomad and its distribution in a space without definite boundaries create what Deleuze and Guattari call a 'war machine'. This war machine is not an organized and institutionalized force, like an army, but a mode of organization that is irreducible and exterior to any state apparatus. As they put it, the war machine 'seems to be irreducible to the State apparatus, to be outside its sovereignty and prior to its law.'¹⁷ It is external in the sense that it exceeds the frame of the state apparatus. It escapes its borders, intelligibility and comprehension, therefore it is monsterfied, criminalized and often punished and rejected.

In short, Deleuze and Guattari argue that an organic notion of representation is inadequate means to account for difference and becoming. For, it creates a narrow form of being that strives to secure hierarchical and logical order. In other words, it fails to capture the multiplicity, fluidity and multidimensionality of becoming. Alternatively, Deleuze and Guattari propose a rhizomic notion of representation that undermines and destabilizes the fixity, coherence, hierarchy and immobility of identity. This notion supports differentiated forms of being and affiliation that are not reduced to a single unit or common base. Deleuze and Guattari's rhizomic representational schema invites us to assemblage along different lines that recognize the multiplicity and mobility of identification. It invites us to account for a more plural mode of pluralism that does not rely on a one single base. In the following section, however, I will argue that while Deleuze and Guattari's views are thought-

¹⁶ Olkowski, *Gilles Deleuze and The Ruin of Representation*, p. 27.

¹⁷ Deleuze and Guattari, *Nomadology*, p. 2; Olkowski, *Gilles Deleuze and The Ruin of Representation*, pp. 29-30.

provoking and insightful, their notion of representation is problematic for various reasons.

Problems in Deleuze and Guattari's approach

Although one might raise several criticisms against Deleuze and Guattari's views¹⁸, I will confine my discussion to two major points that demonstrate the failure of their views to provide an appealing account of democratic inclusion. First, Deleuze and Guattari assume a type of agency that is implausible and if it is to be found it characterizes a small number of people. Their notion of politics favors a cosmopolitan nomadic citizen of the world who feels 'at home everywhere and nowhere.' They enthusiastically view identity as fluid, hybrid, conflictual and in a perpetual flux. Their extreme nomadism does not only deny the role of influential forces of grouping, such as race, culture, ethnicity, religion, history and nation, but also imposes excessive hybridity, fluidity and struggle which involve very strong degree of transformation and subversion. This insistence on excessive hybridity, transformation and subversion necessarily leads to unreasonable transcendentalism and detachment from concrete social and cultural contexts and to the underestimation of the significance of culture, collective memory and history in identity formation and operation of politics. Their extreme individualism and nomadism, which lead to constant instabilities, undermine the very possibility of representation, identity and politics. Indeed, historically excluded social groups demand the transformation of the status quo which is a state of inequality, denial and oppression. This transformation, however, does not require transcending their culture, identity, memory and history but recognizing and respecting them.

Second, Deleuze and Guattari propose a rhizomic notion of representation that aspires to overcome the essentialism, coherence and hierarchy found in the descriptive notion of representation. Although this rhizomic notion seems more appealing than the descriptive notion, Deleuze and Guattari do not provide guidance on how to cash

¹⁸ Some of these criticisms can be found in: Catherine Malabou, 'Who's Afraid of Hegelian Wolves' in Paul Patten (ed.) *Deleuze: A Critical Reader* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1996), pp. 114-138; Vincent Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy* Trans. L. Scott-Fox and J.M. Harding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Nathan Widder, *Genealogies of Difference* (Urbana, III.: University of Illinois Press, 2002); Roxanne L. Euben (review), 'Journeys to "The Other Shore"', *Political Theory*, 28:3 (2000), pp. 399-420.

out these modes of horizontal and rhizomic modes into practical proposals and concrete mechanisms of representation. Therefore, their views remain abstract and underdeveloped. They are underdeveloped in the sense that their theoretical premises are not sufficiently developed and we remain puzzled and unclear about their applicability and feasibility in concrete political contexts. Their views are not particularly appealing to historically excluded social groups because these groups are often concerned with practical and feasible mechanisms and policies that can change their conditions and status while recognizing and respecting their memories, cultures and histories.

Thus far, I have argued in parts I and II of the chapter that the descriptive notion of representation as well as the rhizomic hybrid non-essentialist notion of representation are problematic. While the descriptive notion of representation found in identity politics imposes harmony and unity and fixes identities, the hybrid non-essentialist notion of representation advocated by Deleuze and Guattari implausibly endorses too much conflict, contest, flexibility, shifting configuration of power relations and fluidity and thus undermines the very possibility of politics, representation and identity. In the subsequent part, I will explore the attempts of some scholars to present integrative versions of representation. These integrative versions aspire to combine elements from different approaches and offer more appealing solutions to the problems that face interest-based pluralism, descriptive representation and rhizomic non-essentialist representation. While these integrative approaches are closer than any of the hitherto discussed approaches to accommodate demands of historically excluded social groups, it will be argued that their accounts of democratic inclusion remain insufficient.

Part III

Integrative notions of representation

The problems that plague the interest-based pluralism of egalitarian theories of deliberative democracy, the descriptive representation of identity politics and the horizontal non-essentialist representation of post-modern theories, have stimulated several thinkers to develop modified and integrative proposals that combine views from these different approaches. In this part I will explore the views of two scholars

who present modified notions of representation. More specifically, I will briefly examine the attempts of Iris Marion Young and Melissa Williams to offer defensible models of representation. I will argue that while their elaborate accounts are clearly more sensitive to pluralism and experiences of exclusion than the hitherto discussed ones, they both, for different reasons, remain insufficient to effectively accommodate the demands of historically excluded social groups. I will turn to analyse Iris Marion Young's views and then move to Melissa Williams'.

Representation, it is often argued, is incompatible with participation and deliberation.¹⁹ While deliberation involves immediacy, unmediated presence, directness, self-government and horizontal relations between the state and its citizens, representation, it is argued, involves deferring judgments, transcending immediateness, promoting vertical relationship between the state and its subjects and delegating representatives. Young refuses the argument that representation is incompatible with participatory and deliberative democracy and argues that 'in large-scale mass society, representation and participation mutually require each other for politics to be deeply democratic.'²⁰ Similarly, Nadia Urbinati argues that representation and deliberation are not opposed but related and constitute 'the *continuum* of political action in modern democracy.'²¹ Representation, according to Urbinati, carries the potential of transcending the immediateness of the experience, deferring judgments, orienting political subjects towards the future, creating a distance between the moment of speech and decision and therefore enabling reflexivity and protecting citizens from the

¹⁹ Bernard Manin argues that viewing direct democracy and representative democracy as opposites is inaccurate. For in Athenian direct democracy the assembled citizens did not exercise *all* the executive powers and authorities. There were other institutions that executed substantial tasks. The chief institution of the representative system is *election*. Yet, before the invention of the representative system, the governors were selected on basis of *lot*. The institution of lot was found not only in the Athenian democracy but also in the Roman Empire, Italian republics of the middle ages and the Renaissance (Florence and Venice). Lot matched fundamental democratic principles. It was compatible with 'the imperative of rotation; it reflected the democrats' deep distrust of political professionalism; and above all, it produced an effect similar to that paramount principle of democracy *isegoria*- the equal right to speak in the Assembly.' Lot secured the equal probability of each citizen to have an equal share in exercising the tasks that were performed by few citizens. Manin, *The Principles of Representative Government*, p. 41.

²⁰ Iris Marion Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 123-124.

²¹ Nadia Urbinati, 'Representation as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic Deliberation', *Political Theory*, 28: 6 (2000), p. 759.

rhetoric of politicians.²² Based on these reasons, some scholars have viewed representation as morally distinctive.²³

Subscribing to this view about the compatibility of representation with deliberation and participation, Young proposes a ‘communicative’ account of democracy that aims to offer an institutional framework that accommodates pluralism and difference. Young argues that domination and oppression are significant characteristics of politics. Domination and oppression take the form of institutional constraints that hinder the self-determination and self-development of individuals.²⁴ It is precisely this domination and oppression that leads her to complement her account of democracy with a particular notion of representation, namely ‘a group-differentiated representation’. This group-differentiated representation primarily guarantees that the oppressed and excluded social groups get the resources necessary to develop institutional mechanisms that enable them to articulate their own particular

²² Urbinati proposes a model of proportional representation that satisfies ‘the democratic principles of equal political opportunity’ and offers better control than a majoritarian electoral system (single-member territorial constituency). The problem of the majoritarian model is that it focuses on the right of the majority to decide while it does not guarantee that all citizens’ voices will be heard and represented. Proportional representation, according to Urbinati, simultaneously secures that all citizens are treated equally and that the specific conditions of the individual citizen are not ignored. The majoritarian model is blind to differences while the proportional model is aware of them. Proportional representation takes pluralism and difference to be one of its main basic assumptions, ‘whereas majoritarianism first recognizes the majority and then tries to deal with the reality of pluralism through “compensatory” treatment.’ Urbinati maintains that proportional representation should be complemented by ‘advocacy’. Advocacy is composed of two elements; ‘the representative’s “passionate” link to the electors’ cause and the representative’s relative autonomy of judgment.’ While the first provides representatives with partisan determined beliefs, commitments and positions, the second enables deliberation and contestation with other deliberators on these beliefs and thus leaves room for transformation and compromise to ultimately reach decisions. Advocacy, Urbinati insists, does not aim at getting ‘a copy of ourselves’ but seeking ‘to get the best defendant.’ What should be represented, therefore, ‘is not people’s identity *as such*,’ rather ‘their ideas and claims as citizens who suffer, or are liable to suffer, injustice *because* of their identity.’ For more on her account see: Nadia Urbinati, ‘Representation as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic Deliberation’, *Political Theory*, 28:6 (2000), pp. 758-786.

²³ For more on the issue of the ‘moral distinctiveness’ of representation see: David Plotke, ‘Representation is Democracy’, *Constellations*, 4:1 (1997), pp. 19-34. Moreover, Bernard Manin argues that representative government is not merely one type of democracy but a distinguished and superior form of government. It is desirable for different reasons. For J. Madison, representative institutions are attractive not because of concerns of feasibility and practicality but because they form and produce fair, calculated and less passionate /unbiased public decisions. Emmanuel Siéyès favours a representative system because it suits better the circumstances of modern “commercial societies”. Citizens in these societies are primarily concerned with economic production and exchange. Consequently, they do not have enough time to continuously involve in public affairs and thus delegate people to fulfil this task. What is at work in Siéyès’ argument is the principle of division of labour that is important for achieving social progress. See: Bernard Manin, *The Principles of Representative Government*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

²⁴ Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, p. 31.

voices and perspectives. It is this emphasis on empowerment, Young insists, that allows her notion of group-differentiated representation to avoid the assimilative and paternalistic forces of the 'assimilationist ideal' championed by a difference-blind liberalism. She insists that her notion of group-differentiated representation is different from the liberal interest-based pluralism which promotes assimilation and views differences as insignificant to politics and from the communitarian notion of group-based representation that is trapped in essentialism.²⁵ She asserts that her notion of representation is grounded in deliberation, or what she calls 'communicative democracy'.²⁶ According to this notion, representation is viewed 'as a *differentiated relationship* among political actors engaged in a process extending over space and time.'²⁷ Unlike the liberal interest-based pluralism that narrowly focuses on rational pursuit of interests, her notion of representation requires engaging in a deliberative political activity which aims to grasp and consider views and perspectives other than one's own.

Young goes on to argue that her notion of representation is non-essentialist. Inspired by the Derridian concept of *différance*, she adopts a form of representation that does not aim at reducing the plurality of entities into one common essentialist identity. Things gain their beings and meanings according to 'their place in a process of differentiated relationships.' Unlike other forms of representation where things are defined according to their sameness and opposition, in Young's account '[t]hings are similar without being identical, and different without being contrary depending on the point of reference and the moment in a process.' Derrida suggests rethinking the 'metaphysics of presence' of identity-based representation through the idea of the *trace*. Trace is 'a movement of temporalization that carries past and future with it.' In other words, it carries 'traces of the history of relationships that produced it, and its current tendencies anticipate future relationships.'²⁸ Thinking of representation in terms of *différance*, Young insists, enables us to avoid essentialism by viewing the

²⁵ For more on this point see: Young, 'Social Movements and the Politics of Difference', in *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 156-191.

²⁶ Young, 'Communicating and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy', in Seyla Benhabib (ed.) *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 120-135.

²⁷ Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, p. 123.

²⁸ Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, p. 127.

representative not as a substitute to the constituents, but as distinct and separated. Therefore, representatives are not a copy of their constituents but they defend and represent their claims and interests. In other words, the task of representatives is to speak for their electorates' case(s), beliefs, interests and claims.

Though Young recognizes that social groups have similarities and shared histories and perspectives, she claims that the intensive modern processes of urbanisation and the dominance of market economy, have produced 'economic interdependencies, the physical intermingling of members of differently-identifying groups in public places and workplaces, and partial identities cutting across more encompassing group identities.'²⁹ For Young, therefore, cultural boundaries are overlapping and fuzzy. These interdependent, intermingling and overlapping identities, Young argues, necessarily render human beings' lives, interests, beliefs and identities complex and multidimensional and diversify and complicate their relations with other groups. However, she proposes to focus on three different general modes through which a person can be represented, namely interest, opinion and perspective. This distinction does not imply that an individual can be represented only in one way within these modes but rather she could be represented in various ways within each one of them. Young argues that in the context of excluded and marginalized groups, it is the last one, i.e., perspective, that is of a particular significance. For explaining what does it mean to represent a perspective 'provides arguments for the special representation of oppressed or disadvantaged social groups while avoiding the problem of attributing to all members of those groups common opinions or interests.'³⁰ Interests, according to Young, are defined 'as what affects or is important to the life prospects of individuals, or the goals of organizations.' Opinions, however, are those principles, values and priorities that influence and determine people's ends. Unlike opinion that defines and determines people's judgment and their ends in life, interest helps to specify the means for realizing these goals.³¹ Young argues that individuals are differently positioned in social group structures - perspectives. Yet

²⁹ Young, 'Together in Difference: Transforming the Logic Group Political Conflict', in Judith Squires (ed.), *Principled Positions: Postmodernism and the Rediscovery of Value* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1993), p. 128.

³⁰ Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, p. 134.

³¹ Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, p. 135.

their identities are not determined and defined by these structures. These structures do not have a distinct and clear content with particular features and attributes that render all their members to have a common identity. Alternatively, these social structures or perspectives provide a frame that ‘consists in a set of questions, kinds of experience, and assumptions with which reasoning begins, rather than the conclusions drawn.’³²

Unlike those who claim that group-differentiated politics exclusively produces fragmentation and tension, Young argues that it ‘offers resources to a communicative democratic public that aims to do justice, because differently positioned people have different experience, history, and social knowledge derived from that positioning.’³³ Young insists that it is this communicative character, among other things, that distinguishes her proposal from liberal interest-based pluralism and communitarian essentialist notion of group representation. The communicative character guarantees that the form of politics she advocates is not about promoting pre-determined group interests, but about generating public deliberation that potentially will lead to the transformation of people’s opinions and preferences. Here Young relies on the possibility of mutual understanding, i.e., the ability of individuals and groups to recognize and understand, at least partly, the claims of the ‘other’.

Several scholars have argued that it is precisely this communicative dimension that poses a serious challenge to Young’s attempt to theoretically defend special representation for excluded social groups. Although Young recognises the significance of other modes of speech such as rhetoric, testimony and narration in addition to rational argument and denies that her account relies on a notion of impartiality, the communicative character of the theory that she enthusiastically views as leading to transformation in people’s views and preferences towards the claims of the ‘other’ as a result of public deliberation, clearly forces her to appeal to impartiality. Indeed, it is quite challenging to imagine a situation where citizens consider and recognize the claims of others without appealing to impartial measures and standards. The problem with this issue of impartiality is that Young in her writings has been consistent in rejecting the liberal appeal to impartiality because it privileges, she insists, the interests, claims, views and voices of the powerful and prevents those of

³² Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, p. 137.

³³ Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, p. 136.

the marginalized and excluded.³⁴ Consequently, scholars such as Judith Squires and David Miller have pointed out that Young ends up grounding her theory on deliberative premises she herself rejected for being too universalistic and abstract.³⁵

To avoid the problems that emerge from adopting an essentialist notion of representation, Young's proposes a non-essentialist account of 'relational' difference according to which identities and cultural boundaries are overlapping, hybrid, interdependent and intermingling. This relational notion of difference renders her form of politics more interest-based than she is willing to admit. Scholars such as Chantal Mouffe have argued that Young's account of representation comes inconveniently close to the liberal model of interest-group pluralism.³⁶ Similarly, Judith Squires argues that Young's model of representation comes too close to a 'principal-agent representation' that is based on groups instead of individuals. Principal-agent representation is a form of representation where the representative is viewed as an agent that represents the interests of her clients and advocates them on their behalf. Squires, therefore, shares the views of other scholars that Young's model inconveniently turns to be similar to the interest-based representation.³⁷ One difficulty with her model in relation to historical exclusion and injustice is that its implicit interest-based politics could lead to privatising exclusion. Indeed, Young recognizes the significance of history and memory of exclusion on the formation of identities and operation of politics, but her relational notion of difference reduces politics to advocacy of interests which downplays the significance of collective forces. Moreover, the recognition Young's accords to the significance of memory and history of exclusion in identity formation is insufficient because it overlooks the importance of

³⁴ Young, 'The Ideal of Impartiality and the Civic Public', in *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 96-121.

³⁵ Judith Squires raises similar criticisms against Young's proposal of a modified version of representation. For more see her book *Gender in Political Theory* (Malden, Mass: Polity Press, 1999), pp. 211-214. For Miller's critique of Young see: David Miller, *Citizenship and National Identity* (Oxford: Polity Press, 2000), chapters 3+4.

³⁶ For more on this point see: Chantal Mouffe (ed.), *Dimension of Radical Democracy* (London: Verso, 1992).

³⁷ Squires, *Gender in Political Theory*, p. 212. Squires claims that representation can take place in the form of two other types: microcosm and symbolic. While microcosm representation demands that the representative shares some of the features (such as sex, age, class) of a politically prominent group, symbolic representation requires that the representative symbolizes the identity of a community or a group. For more on this see: Squires, *Gender in Political Theory*, p. 203.

special claims such as taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing historical injustice that often emerge from longstanding history of exclusion and oppression. These claims, it will be argued in the final chapter, are indispensable if we aim at achieving an effective accommodation of historical injustices.

Adam James Tebble argues that despite Young's attempt to introduce some significant changes to her account of the politics of difference in her recent book *Inclusion and Democracy*, her account remains trapped by a serious tension that undermines the consistency of her argument.³⁸ This tension, Tebble argues, stems from Young's implicit and hidden dual commitments to liberalism and communitarianism. Young simultaneously wants to endorse an anti-essentialist notion of representation that recognizes the multiplicities and interdependencies of memberships and identities, and she wants to advocate special representation for excluded social groups (with group veto power regarding particular decisions and policies³⁹) to include their perspectives and voices without treating these groups as bounded and fixed entities. Tebble argues that Young fails to reconcile these two commitments. For if we consistently follow and take seriously the commitment to view groups as anti-essentialist and acknowledge the significance of the self-determination and self-development of individuals, then we necessarily end up deserting the demand to prioritise special representation for oppressed social groups.⁴⁰

To sum up, the attractiveness of Young's modified version is that she aspires to avoid the problems of essentialism. Additionally, through her emphasis on empowerment, i.e., giving the resources to oppressed groups to articulate and express their views, perspective and have their voices heard, she hopes to avoid the paternalism and cultural imperialism of the assimilationist ideal. In her books *Justice and the Politics of Difference* and *Inclusion and Democracy*, Young insists on distinguishing her modified version of representation from the liberal interest-based

³⁸ Adam Tebble points out three significant changes in Young's account in her book *Inclusion and Democracy*. These three are: her claim to extend the domain of democratic heterogeneous public to the level of the global; restating the significance of civil society in her account of the politics of difference; and her reply to criticisms on her notion of social groups. For a full discussion of these three points and a critical analysis of Young's work see: Adam James Tebble, 'What is the Politics of Difference?', *Political Theory*, 30:2 (2002), pp. 259-281.

³⁹ On the issue of veto power see: Young, 'Social Movements and the Politics of Difference', in *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 184.

⁴⁰ Tebble, 'What is the Politics of Difference?', pp. 275-277. For Young's answer to Tebble's criticisms see: Iris Marion Young, 'Reply to Tebble', *Political Theory*, 30:2 (2002), pp. 282-288.

pluralism and essentialist communitarian notion of representation. She claims that her model is significantly different because it focuses on differentiated social groups and not autonomous rational individuals and it promotes public deliberation rather than a simple pursuing of interest. However, despite Young's insistence, the brief analysis of her views has proved that her account comes uncomfortably close to the liberal interest-group pluralism, is trapped in two conflictual and mutually exclusive commitments, relies on a notion of impartiality that she herself has consistently criticized, and overlooks the significance of special issues that lie at the core of demands of historical exclusion.

Melissa Williams' 'complete and coherent theory of fair representation'

Young's politics of difference is not the only account that offers a modified and integrative notion of representation to accommodate excluded social groups. Melissa Williams tries to theoretically justify why fair representation of historically excluded social groups requires the presence of their own members in the legislative bodies. Williams states that she tries to advocate a group-based theory of fair representation instead of the procedural liberal theory of representation. The procedural liberal justification of fair representation, she insists, cannot rationally justify and defend the presence of members of historically excluded social groups in the legislative bodies. For, generally, procedural fairness is primarily concerned with individuals and committed to sameness and is thus difference-blind. This proceduralist view of fair representation has failed to be sufficiently sensitive to social inequalities that stem from social differences. Its commitment to moral autonomy, impartiality and egalitarianism (abstract and ahistorical principles) does not allow the transformation of the existing longstanding social inequalities but reproduces them. Pure proceduralism,⁴¹ according to Williams, neither removes structural inequalities

⁴¹ Williams argues that there are two strands of the proceduralist conception of fair representation: 'one person, one vote' and 'interest group pluralism.' While the first emphasizes the formal equality of all citizens manifested in an equal weight of all votes, the second wants to secure an equal opportunity to organize and politically mobilize with other citizens around their important interests. The interests that enjoy major recognition in the legislative policies are the ones advocated and defended by interest groups. In other words, while the first secures formal equality that leads to equal representation, the pluralist strand highlights the aggregating of citizen's preferences and interests by groups interests and yields equitable representation. Both strands, though different, rely on procedures, conditioned by treating individuals equally and impartially, to achieve fair outcomes. In both the social identity of the

nor achieves substantial increases in the legislative presence of marginalized groups.⁴² Therefore, we need to move beyond a proceduralist conception of fairness to a substantive conception of justice to adequately justify group representation. Williams, however, does not totally dismiss proceduralism. She mentions three of its advantages. First, procedural accounts of fairness enable individuals to reach an agreement upon the fairness of an outcome or policy, 'even when they disagree substantively about what the outcome should be.'⁴³ Second, fair procedures provide clear measures and mechanisms to manage 'complex and iterative social interactions without the need for constant intervention.'⁴⁴ Third, when procedural accounts that are based on formal equality are employed they reconfirm the principle of equal respect for individuals.

Notwithstanding its limitations, proceduralism, she admits, plays an essential role in defending groups-based fair representation and its three advantages should be secured when it is possible. Nevertheless, instead of exclusively focusing on procedures, our focus should also be directed towards outcome-oriented standards of justice to assess our procedures and modify them when it is required. Therefore, Williams's theory, as she puts it, 'occupies a middle ground between procedural and substantive fairness.'⁴⁵ In other words, her theory tries to combine procedural and substantive principles of justice. She calls this theory, following Charles Beitz, complex proceduralism. Unlike imperfect procedural justice which defines an independent substantive principle of justice (one principle) and specifies procedures that will realize this principle, complex proceduralism recognizes that there could be more than one substantive standard of fairness and also there might be a range of substantively fair outcomes instead of one. Moreover, complex proceduralism, unlike imperfect procedural justice that is interested in the effectiveness of these procedures in realizing the right outcome regardless their content, 'applies standards of fairness directly to the procedures. More importantly, it favours those procedures that embody

representative is irrelevant to the fairness of representation and the fairness of the process and outcome. These two strands form what John Rawls refers to as pure proceduralism. Melissa S. Williams, *Voice, Trust and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998).

⁴² Williams, *Voice, Trust and Memory*, p. 20.

⁴³ Williams, *Voice, Trust and Memory*, p. 20.

⁴⁴ Williams, *Voice, Trust and Memory*, p. 20.

⁴⁵ Williams, *Voice, Trust and Memory*, p. 21.

the principles of equal respect for persons and of individual autonomy over those that do not.’⁴⁶ Recognizing the significance of combining procedural and substantive principles is important, but there is a need to specify the relationship between these principles. A standard of legislative presence for members of historically excluded social groups and the adequate procedures required to realize it, determine and define the particular relation between the procedural and substantive principles. The required electoral procedures for achieving fair representation are subject to change and revision especially if the electoral outcomes reproduce the under-representation of the historically disadvantaged social groups. Clearly, Williams links the fairness of representation to institutions. Since institutional solutions are proposed to achieve certain values and exclude others, it is necessary to check whether they achieve their goals or not.

Williams proposes what she calls ‘a complete and coherent theory of fair representation’ for historically excluded social groups that seriously takes into account long-lasting social inequalities and exclusions. However, the attempt to account for these social inequalities and exclusions, according to her, runs some risks. She examines four of these risks, namely group essentialism, accountability, legislative marginalization and balkanization, and aspires to articulate adequate responses to each one of them. First, the claim that fair representation of excluded social groups requires their presence in legislative bodies implies that these groups are distinct and share a common identity, interests and opinions. Relying on this kind of claim clearly leads to the trap of essentialism that ignores the diversity of views and opinions within the same group, the multiplicity of affiliation and the role of individuals’ agency in determining the meaning of their social norms, values and features. However, regardless of the different meanings that the members of these social groups accord to these norms, values and characteristics, they are still socially valuable. For they define the shapes of important patterns of social, political and economic inequalities. Consequently, group membership plays a major role in structuring, determining and restricting the life prospects and choices of the members. Williams concludes that what members of these excluded social groups have in common is the ‘*experience* of marginalization and the *distinctive* perspective on

⁴⁶ Williams, *Voice, Trust and Memory*, p. 21.

matters of public policy that comes of that experience.’⁴⁷ Williams admits that the experiences and perspectives of members of the same groups are different. Yet she argues that their social positions are ‘sufficiently similar that there are good reasons to believe that members of marginalized groups, *on average*, are more likely to represent the concerns and interests of citizens from those groups than are nonmembers.’⁴⁸ A representative that lacks an experience of subordination and discrimination, though he might be a brilliant speaker and a master of coalition formation, ‘will not be able to explain why some policies reinforce the constituency’s experience of subordination while others alleviate it.’⁴⁹ Williams stresses that the experience of subordination does not only bring expressions of suffering but also leads to an understanding of the social conditions that substantially influence policy making. The experience of oppression, she claims, ‘brings not only a knowledge of the sources of inequality but also a power of judgement regarding the likely effectiveness of alternative approaches to ameliorate that inequality.’⁵⁰ While non-members need to invest a lot of efforts to gain that understanding, ‘group members are likely to possess it immediately, as an outgrowth of their own experience.’⁵¹

The second risk that Williams addresses is the lack of accountability. She argues that the presence of members of excluded social groups in legislative bodies is necessary but not sufficient to achieve fair representation. For being a member and representative of an excluded social group does not necessarily mean that you will faithfully represent (being responsive to the citizens’ interest) the concerns and interests of your group. The answer to this difficulty, however, is the creation of different mechanisms of accountability that secure the loyalty of the representatives to their groups/ constituencies. A third problem that arises here is that the mere presence of the representatives in the legislative body does not necessarily mean that they will have an effective influence on the decision-making process. The presence of legislatures could yield policy influence, Williams asserts, if the decision-making

⁴⁷ Williams, *Voice, Trust and Memory*, p. 6.

⁴⁸ Williams, *Voice, Trust and Memory*, p. 6.

⁴⁹ Williams, *Voice, Trust and Memory*, p. 242.

⁵⁰ Williams, *Voice, Trust and Memory*, p. 241.

⁵¹ Williams, *Voice, Trust and Memory*, p. 242.

process in the legislative body is based on deliberation among the legislatures rather than bargaining.⁵² Unlike bargaining that views people's preferences as given and fixed prior to political engagement, deliberation recognises the formative impact of politics and its institutions on shaping and transforming the representatives' opinions and preferences based on the data, information and reasoning raised and exchanged by their colleagues in the debates.

The fourth risk that Williams examines is balkanisation. Against the argument that group recognition will necessarily accelerate conflicts and segmentation and thus lead to political and social instability and collapse, she argues that a group based theory of fair representation suggests relatively clear conditions and standards to distinguish between those who have strong claims for representation and those who have weak ones. Defenders of group rights often view the deep history of marginalization of particular groups as convincing enough to give their claims priority over others. Williams argues that history could be one of the criteria but there is a need for more qualifications. She employs the notion of 'memory' to develop these criteria. The memory argument relies on understanding the political sociology of excluded social groups. She argues that there are two factors that establish a strong claim for group representation. These two factors are: history of subjection and common identity. The former refers to groups whose members have been subject to continuous and systematic patterns of structural inequalities. The latter refers to the existence of a common sense of identity that the members of the group share. Williams differentiates between two sources of group identity: objective and subjective. Objective sources of group identity, she maintains, refer to the existence of a long-standing and state-sponsored discrimination against the group and the persistence of this discrimination in contemporary political, economic and social structures along lines of membership in these groups. Subjective sources of identity indicate the existence of a common memory of that discrimination and the belief in common political interests in the present. Both of these sources of group identity are necessary to establish a criterion for assessing the strength and weakness of group

⁵² For more on the distinction between deliberation and bargaining and their opposition see: Jon Elster, 'The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory' in J. Elster and H. Aanund (eds), *The Foundations of Social Choice Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 103-132.

claims.⁵³ This criterion arms the group-based theory of fair representation with an effective means to overcome the fear of balkanisation.

Williams argues that representation involves complex processes. This complexity stems from the existence of different ways of mediating between the citizens' interest and the decision-making bodies. She examines three forms of such mediation: 'the dynamics of legislative decision making, the nature of legislator-constituent relations, and the basis for aggregating citizens into representable constituencies.'⁵⁴ The relationship between representative and constituent leads to the issue of trust. Citizens, members of excluded social groups in a deeply fragmented society, tend not to trust legislators who are not members of their groups. Trust, however, is not enough. For legislators could 'betray' their constituents. Consequently, trust should be complemented by accountability. Accountability, Williams argues, 'secures trust for historically marginalized groups by allowing those groups to define the constituencies from which representatives are elected.'⁵⁵ Williams emphasizes the need to listen to the distinctive voices, manifested in claims, pleas and calls, of members of historically excluded social groups (Iris Young calls this the strategy of 'listening'). She argues that understanding demands of justice should begin from listening and understanding the peculiar points of view and claims, which are not necessarily fixed, of the members of the excluded group and not through imagining a hypothetical state of affairs. For these distinctive voices to influence the decision making processes, a deliberative form of politics and not bargaining is required. For the former gives enough room for expressing and communicating these voices and potentially transforms people's views and preferences. The issue of 'voice' gives content to the first line of mediation, namely the dynamics of legislative decision-

⁵³ Williams draws a distinction between 'marginalized groups' and 'voluntarily associations'. She identifies four features that distinguish marginalized ascriptive groups from voluntarily associations. First, 'patterns of social and political inequality are structured along the lines of group membership'. Second, 'membership in these groups is not usually experienced as voluntary'. Third, 'membership in these groups is not usually experienced as mutable.' Finally, 'generally, negative meanings are assigned to group identity by the broader society or the dominant culture.' These features, if they are possessed over a long time (generations) by a group of people, form a marginalized group. Williams, *Voice, Trust and Memory*, pp. 15-18.

⁵⁴ Williams, *Voice, Trust and Memory*, p. 8.

⁵⁵ Williams, *Voice, Trust and Memory*, p. 14.

making.⁵⁶ The argument of ‘memory’ corresponds to the third form of mediation; namely the defining boundaries of constituencies or excluded social groups.

In summary, Williams proposes an appealing notion of representation. This notion of representation is a constitutive component of Williams’ integrative account of democratic accommodation which aspires to combine procedural as well as substantive principles and to avoid the weaknesses of procedural liberalism and identity politics and benefit from their strengths. Moreover, Williams’ notion is particularly attractive because of the centrality it accords to history, memory and trust in accommodating historical exclusions. Her account, however, is subject to several criticisms. For example her insistence on adopting deliberation and viewing it as entirely opposed to bargaining leads to the problem of assuming an abstract ideal speech situation where the process of deliberation is presented as free of power relations.⁵⁷ Moreover, some serious doubts could be raised regarding the epistemological privilege she accords to the oppressed in understanding their own condition and the harmony she assumes to exist among the procedural and substantive principles of her theory. I will, nevertheless, confine my critique to two main issues that pose serious difficulties to her account’s ability to effectively address the demands of historically excluded social groups. More specifically, I will critically analyse her claims about the issues of memory and responsibility.

While Williams rightly and convincingly recognizes the importance of the ‘experience of marginalization’ in shaping the perspectives of members of excluded social groups on public matters, she downplays the significance of past wrongs in their claims of democratic accommodation. She argues that the members of the privileged groups are not morally more responsible for being advantaged than members of excluded groups for being disadvantaged. If they are responsible for their circumstances, they, i.e., members of excluded as well as privileged social groups, share equal moral responsibility for causing their own respective disadvantage and advantage. Redressing historical exclusion, she insists, should be based on ‘a commitment to *contemporary* equality’ and not on ‘a desire to acknowledge guilt for

⁵⁶ Williams emphasizes that her conclusions on the role of “voice” and “trust” in representing groups, although similar to other insights of other scholars, depend primarily on sources from the American political culture. Williams, *Voice, Trust and Memory*, p. 13

⁵⁷ This point has been discussed extensively in chapters 2 and 3.

past wrongs.’⁵⁸ It is precisely this forward-orientation and the assumed symmetry and equality between the oppressed and the oppressor that undermine her account of accommodation. By invoking the past, historically excluded social groups do not aim at achieving revenge, but they want to reveal the causes of their oppression and the role of the hegemonic groups in causing this oppression. While it is reasonable to argue that historically excluded social groups do have a certain responsibility for their fate, circumstances and choices, it is implausible to view them as an equal source for causing and contributing to their misery, poverty and exclusion. Empirical as well as historical evidences show that the disadvantage, poverty and marginalization of oppressed social groups are chiefly the result of a systematic exclusion and a disproportionate distribution of resources orchestrated by dominant and hegemonic groups. The principal justification for the systematic exclusion and disproportionate distribution of resources is the depiction of the excluded social groups (their identity, culture, practices, values etc.) as inferior. Briefly, the problem of Williams’ account is that it is exclusively forward oriented and assumes an equality of responsibility on causing historical exclusions and injustices.

While Williams recognizes the role of collective memory of oppression, she unconvincingly accords to it a very minor role in the claims of addressing historical exclusion because of its subjective character. While it is plausible to argue that memory has a strong subjective element, it is implausible to downplay the significance of memory to the level Williams suggests. For in many cases, such as the Holocaust, the execution of aboriginals in America, and the Armenian genocide, memory does not only reflect partial subjective and emotional views and feelings but also reflects factious distorted unequal histories, realities and relations of power where it is not hard to identify who is the victim and who is the victimizer. Moreover, I have claimed earlier in the thesis that collective memory plays a crucial role in challenging the master narrative of the dominant group and revealing the intimate link between historical exclusions and current inequalities. Unlike previous accounts of democratic accommodation, Williams’ account of democratic accommodation does seem to take into account issues of memory, history and responsibility in addressing historical exclusion. However, her insistence on the symmetry and equality of responsibility between the oppressed and the oppressor and the minor subjective role she accords to

⁵⁸ Williams, *Voice, Trust and Memory*, p. 197.

collective memory renders her account of democratic inclusion incomplete. In chapter 7, it will be argued that it is the politics of reconciliation that fully captures the issues of memory, asymmetries and responsibility. Therefore, the politics of reconciliation, it will be argued, is crucial to accommodate demands of historically excluded social groups.

Thus far, I have argued in this part that while Young's and Williams' modified and integrative versions of representation seem to be appealing because of their attempt to take social inequalities and experiences of marginalization seriously and combine procedural as well as substantive political principles, their versions are insufficient. For while Young's account comes too close to the liberal interest-group pluralism, is trapped in two conflictual and mutually exclusive commitments, rests on a notion of impartiality that she herself has constantly criticized, and overlooks the significance of core issues that underlie fundamental demands of historical exclusion, Williams' forward oriented account of democratic accommodation fails to fully recognize the role of past wrongs and the significance of asymmetries in taking responsibilities on causing these past wrongs.

Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed and explored the ontological issue of representation which is viewed as one of the core components of democratic accommodation. The chapter has argued that the diverse notions of representation employed by proponents of identity politics, post-modern critics of identity politics, and integrative theorists are insufficiently attentive to demands of historically excluded social groups. More specifically, the chapter has argued that proponents of identity politics have primarily relied on a descriptive Aristotelian notion of representation when they demand the representation of excluded and disadvantaged groups. This descriptive Aristotelian notion has been found problematic because it leads to the promotion of essentialism, fixation, closure, balkanization and homogeneity. To free identity and politics from the 'chains' of essentialism, fixation and homogeneity, post-modern theorists such as Deleuze and Guattari have developed a non-essentialist and hybrid notion of representation. The chapter has found Deleuze and Guattari's notion of representation unpersuasive. For while they try to avoid the risks of essentialism, closure, hierarchy

and homogeneity, they celebrate excessive hybridity and fluidity that undermine the very possibility of politics and identity. Moreover, they do not provide guidance on how to transfer their views into concrete and practical mechanisms of representation.

Finally, it has been argued that the modified and integrative notions of Iris Marion Young and Melissa Williams are attractive but incomplete. While their notions of representation are more appealing than the hitherto discussed ones because of their attempt to take social inequalities, experiences of marginalization, history and memory seriously and combine procedural as well as substantive political principles, they remain insufficient. The next chapter will focus on some other integrative approaches that seek to negotiate and synthesise elements from deliberation and recognition.

6. INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE AND DELIBERATION

Iris Marion Young and Melissa Williams are not the only scholars who have suggested integrative theories. Recently, thinkers such as Bhikhu Parekh, Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr have developed integrative theories that propose intercultural dialogue and modified versions of deliberation as strengthening the adequacy of their theories to effectively accommodate demands of historically excluded social groups and bypass the problems that plague deliberative democracy and identity politics. This chapter critically assesses the adequacy of intercultural dialogue and modified version of deliberation to accommodate claims of historical exclusion. The chapter argues that neither deliberation nor intercultural dialogue provide a satisfactory answer to the issues of pluralism and demands of historically excluded social groups. For in addition to the often discussed charges against deliberation and dialogue, such as privileging certain modes of speech and purchasing consensus at the expense of recognizing diversity, this chapter argues that they also fail to properly address at least three main issues that lie at the core of the demands of historically excluded social groups; namely, collective memory of exclusion, acknowledgement of historical injustices and taking responsibility and offering an apology. These three issues emerge from democratic accommodation as involving a norm of practical deliberation which itself involves an accommodation to the past.

The present chapter is divided into two parts. The first part briefly reviews some unsuccessful modes of intercultural encounters and demonstrates the desirability of non-hierarchical mode of intercultural dialogue. The second part of the chapter focuses on the most accepted and discussed form of intercultural communication, namely dialogue. The accounts of intercultural dialogue of some recognition and democratic thinkers; such as Bhikhu Parekh, Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr will be analyzed. While Parekh proposes a modified version of the politics of recognition, Benhabib and Dallmayr suggest integrative approaches that attempt to overcome the constraints of identity politics and offer more appealing accounts of democratic accommodation. Though these proposals enjoy certain merits, it will be argued that they suffer from serious weaknesses that render them unsuccessful. Consequently, a

more compelling 'candidate' should be sought to effectively deal with demands of historically excluded social groups.

Part I

Different forms of intercultural encounters

In the literature of social and human sciences two flawed forms of cross-cultural understanding are usually discussed. These two types are 'ethnocentrism' and the 'incurability thesis.'¹ The 'incurability thesis' is a thesis that claims that understanding the 'other' (agents, cultures, societies) requires the adoption of their own point of view. In other words, it involves self-denial and abandonment. Conversely, the former type of cross-cultural understanding, i.e. ethnocentrism, is a state of self-admiration; kind of narcissism, where the individual views him or herself as superior and as an ultimate and exclusive measure for the 'other.' The 'other' is viewed as an inferior and primitive being that needs to be educated, controlled, transformed or modernized so that it becomes as similar as possible. There are several other modes of inter-cultural engagements and this section addresses some of them. These different modes of cross-cultural encounters range from total domination to dialogical interaction. Dialogical interaction is the most attractive mode of engagement. These forms of cross-cultural encounters usually overlap and two of them or more can be at work in one society. Fred Dallmayr examines some of these forms. Based on his account I will turn to briefly present some of these forms starting from the least attractive and concluding by the most desirable one.

Conquest, it is a mode of forceful physical incorporation and occupation of alien territories and populations. It usually involves total subjugation and control of the populations and sometimes attempts to culturally assimilate them. The 'other' is viewed as an inferior being which needs to be controlled and sometimes educated. While in the case of control and subjugation human difference is recognized, though hierarchal, in the case of assimilation or conversion human difference is denied and a common core of humanity, often European, is invoked. This leads to the second form of cultural engagement; conversion. Conversion is the mode of cultural assimilation.

¹ Charles Taylor, 'Understanding and Ethnocentricity' in *Philosophy and Human Sciences* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 116-134, p. 125.

It is a form of cultural and spiritual colonialism. It involves dissemination of particular beliefs and ideas. Conversion does not necessarily entail conquest and occupation. It is not only repressive and dominating but it could be liberating as well. Many communities have adopted certain religions and beliefs and used them to liberate themselves from grievances such as colonialism and poverty. Assimilation and Acculturation constitute a form of cultural hegemony and domination. Assimilation applies not only externally to foreign population but also domestically to excluded and disadvantaged ethnic groups and minorities. While assimilation is usually used to refer to policies to be found in Western societies, acculturation is invoked to refer to domestic or global interaction between Western societies and non-Western societies. These two forms of cultural hegemony were increased by nationalism and the nation states. Conquest, conversion and assimilation and acculturation are indefensible modes of interaction for various explicit reasons. Briefly, these forms of cultural interaction are based on morally unaccepted and unbalanced situations of intolerance, exploitation, domination and the absence of reciprocity and equality.

A milder form of interaction is 'partial assimilation: cultural borrowing.' The encounters between cultures here are roughly equal and reciprocal. Unlike hegemonic and hierarchical modes of cultural interaction such as conversion and assimilation, in partial assimilation cultures partly adopt from each other through borrowing and lending certain ingredients while maintaining their distinctiveness – keeping some indigenous characteristics. This form of partial accommodation is based on a certain level of reciprocity and mutuality. Unlike partial assimilation where the interaction leads to partial adjustment and adaptation of certain indigenous habits, in 'liberalism and minimal engagement' the contact does not lead to transformation. Here cultures coexist 'in a mode of relative indifference.'² Modern liberalism, particularly its procedural variant, 'has promoted a tolerant juxtaposition of cultures and life-forms predicated on relative mutual disinterest and aloofness.'³ Liberalism recognizes the need for general procedural rules that treat everybody equally leaving concrete differences to be private issues that are irrelevant to politics. The main risk of

² Fred R. Dallmayr, *Beyond Orientalism: Essays on Cross-Cultural Encounters* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), p. 24.

³ Dallmayr, *Beyond Orientalism*, p. 24.

liberalism and minimal engagement is that it could lead to segregation and ghettoization among the different groups that constitute the polity.

According to Dallmayr, 'dialogical engagement' is the most appealing and normatively desirable form of intercultural interaction. For this form of interaction is committed to 'dialogue' and 'communication' where a constructive non-dominating and non-assimilative relationship between 'self' and 'other' flourishes. The 'self' and 'other' are engaged in a relationship while each one maintains its freedom. Put differently, it is a relationship of a 'non-unifying love.'⁴ It is this non-hierarchical mode of intercultural interaction that several political theorists have enthusiastically invoked hoping to accommodate more effectively the issues of pluralism and demands of historically excluded social groups. The attractiveness of intercultural dialogues, it is often said, stems from their reliance on assumptions of symmetry, equality, reciprocity and respect and their potential to meet challenges of essentialism and closure through the emphasis they place on self-transformation, mutual-understanding and openness to cross-cultural links.

Thus far, this part has primarily explored some unpersuasive modes of interaction. These unpersuasive modes of communication are asymmetrical, hierarchical and involve domination. It is on the basis of rejecting these hierarchical modes of communication that several political theorists have invoked more appealing and egalitarian modes of interaction, namely intercultural dialogue and deliberation, to offer effective accounts of democratic accommodation. The next part of this chapter will analyse the attempts of three political theorists who place intercultural dialogue or deliberation at the core of their theories. They ultimately hope that intercultural dialogue or deliberation strengthens their theories' abilities to effectively accommodate demands of historically excluded social groups. Although their approaches are different, it will be argued that none of them provides an entirely successful accommodation of historical injustices.

⁴ Dallmayr, *Beyond Orientalism*, p. 32.

Part II

Intercultural dialogue in multicultural societies

This part of the chapter critically examines the notion of dialogue in a multicultural society as presented in the approaches of three different scholars; Bhikhu Parekh, Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr. Notwithstanding their attractiveness, for different reasons, it will be argued that these approaches fail, in different degrees, to provide an effective accommodation of the claims of historically excluded social groups. Parekh's account of 'intercultural dialogue' will be discussed first and then I will move to Benhabib's 'politics of complex cultural dialogue'. I will conclude the chapter by Dallmayr's notion of 'inter-civilizational dialogue.'

Bhikhu Parekh

In his book *Rethinking Multiculturalism*, Bhikhu Parekh discusses several issues such as national identity, the controversy over Rushdie's book *The Satanic Verses*, monism, polygamy, political equality and intercultural dialogue. In this section, however, I will primarily focus on his account of intercultural dialogue. His account of intercultural dialogue serves as a form of democratic inclusion which solves social and cultural conflicts. I will argue that his account is not appealing to accommodate demands of historically excluded social groups because it clearly favours the interests and values of the established liberal hegemonic groups.

Parekh argues that the liberal assumptions of individualism and neutrality are insufficient to effectively engage with the multicultural character of the contemporary societies. Instead Parekh advocates a politics of recognition that views individuals as contextually embedded in particular cultures. Parekh places the issue of cultural pluralism at the centre of his theory. However, he does not seek to entirely reject liberalism but suggests recasting it so it becomes more sensitive to cultural differences. Unlike identity politics which favours an essentialist notion of culture, Parekh defends a version of the politics of recognition which endorses a non-essentialist notion of culture. Culture, according to him, is 'a historically created system of meaning and

significance'.⁵ Parekh refuses to treat culture as a coherent, unified, homogenous and fixed entity. He insists that 'culture is internally varied, speaks in several voices, and its range of interpretive possibility is often indeterminate.'⁶ However, Parekh rejects excessive hybridity and maintains that each culture has some common beliefs and practices which provide a sense of belonging to its members and enable distinguishing it from other cultures.

Having this notion of culture at the core of his theory, Parekh suggests an outline of an account of intercultural dialogue. He proposes conducting intercultural dialogues between non-liberal minorities and the wider society to settle cultural and social conflicts. This intercultural dialogue, he argues, is challenging and demanding because it is 'necessarily multistranded, heterogeneous, and involves arguments of different kinds and levels of generality.'⁷ The conflicts emerge, he claims, when cultural practices and values of minority groups contradict the majority's 'operative public values.' He goes on to argue that every society needs a kind of agreement on common values and practices - operative values - that regulate their collective public life. These values prevail as a result of coercion, negotiation and indoctrination. Moreover, they are embodied in practices, institutions and norms. They are not constant, harmonious and fixed. Rather, they are changeable (subject to circumstances and self-understanding), conflicting and contested. They form and shape the moral structure of public life and provide vocabulary for public debate and dialogue. Excluded groups continuously challenge these values. Parekh claims that each society should review its prevailing operative values. The clash with minorities' cultural practices provides an opportunity for the review and assessment to occur.⁸ The minorities' and majority's practices, values and ways of life are subject to reassessment through a process of 'intercultural evaluation'. Parekh argues that the dialogue should be 'bifocal, centring both on the minority practice and the society's operative public values, both on the minority's and the wider society's way of life.'⁹

⁵ Bhikhu Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), p. 143.

⁶ Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism*, p. 144.

⁷ Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism*, p. 294.

⁸ Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism*, pp. 269-270

⁹ Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism*, p. 271.

Dialogue generates debates and transformation within the minority, the wider society and among the two.

Parekh specifies four main principles that guide us once we have a cultural clash between minorities and the wider society. These principles are ‘universally valid standards of evaluation,’ ‘core common values,’ ‘no harm principle’ and ‘dialogical consensus principle.’ He clearly favours the last one. Some scholars have appealed to universally valid standards of evaluation to examine cultural conflicts. These standards are universal human rights. The problem with these standards, according to Parekh, is that they are often general and limited in their capacity to tackle important issues in pluralistic societies. Additionally, it is very hard to have a clear prioritization among them and if there is one it differs from one society to another. Other scholars have argued that every society has historically developed core common values (the second principle) that lie at its foundation and compose its character. People will defend these core values against other’s offending practices. The problem of this principle is that it is doubtful to claim that there are core values that *all* members of society endorse. Sometimes, there are shared core values, such as slavery and racism, which are morally unacceptable.

Other scholars have claimed that only practices that cause harm to others will be disallowed - the no harm principle. To go further would be viewed as ‘cultural imperialism’. The weakness of this principle is that while it might be easy to define and identify physical harm, it is very complicated to reach an agreement on what is emotional and moral harm for the agent and the ‘other’. The fourth guiding principle is the ‘dialogical consensus principle.’ Parekh argues that given the weaknesses and problems of the previous principles ‘the most desirable and indeed the only possible course of action is to engage in an open-minded and morally serious dialogue with minority spokesmen and act on the resulting consensus.’¹⁰ Parekh argues that for dialogues and debates on deep moral and ethical issues to be effective, they should not remain at the philosophical, universal and abstract level but should be viewed as happening in:

a particular society with a particular moral structure, history and traditions, and its participants are not abstract moral beings but

¹⁰ Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism*, p. 266.

constituted in a certain way. [...] The dialogue cannot therefore be open-ended and free-floating and must start with and centre on the prevailing values, which provide its vocabulary, structure its context, and impose limits on its direction and likely outcome.¹¹

The debates on morally controversial issues between the wider society and its minorities might pass through three stages. These stages, Parekh insists, 'are neither successive nor all necessary; they overlap and any one of them might be skipped.'¹² The first stage is when the wider society rejects a certain minority's practice because it is incompatible with the operative public values. In this case, the minority tries to justify its practice through appealing to 'the cultural authority of the practice and argue that it is therefore binding on it.' The second stage is when the minority's response was not convincing. In this case, the minority's spokesmen tend to emphasize the importance of this unacceptable practice by linking to other significant practices that together constitute their own way of life. Briefly, the disapproval of this practice, the spokesmen insist, could undermine the sustainability of their way of life. The third stage emerges when the minority's spokesmen fail to defend the practice by referring either to 'its cultural authority or its community-sustaining role.'¹³ In this case, the spokesmen need to cross their cultural boundaries and appeal to external norms and values that the wider society endorses or can potentially be convinced to endorse. In case and the wider society does not get persuaded by the values the contested practice aspires to achieve, an inconvenient and challenging situation emerges. This is particularly true, according to Parekh, because moral contested values involve strong beliefs, passions and emotions. The dialogue in this situation, Parekh maintains, involves passages of lack of understanding, intransigence and incompatible differences.¹⁴ Consequently, in these situations he suggests postponing a final decision regarding the contested practice hoping 'that the passage of time and the fusion of ideas brought about by formal and informal public discussions will create

¹¹ Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism*, p. 267.

¹² Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism*, p. 267.

¹³ Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism*, p. 272.

¹⁴ Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism*, p. 272.

enough common ground and willingness to facilitate a consensus or at least a negotiated compromise in future.¹⁵ Parekh argues that in case the contested issue is pressing and there is an urgent need to take a decision, the practice in question should be rejected and ‘the operative public values of the wider society should prevail.’¹⁶

Parekh argues that he has ‘sketched outlines of a theory of intercultural evaluation.’¹⁷ While he acknowledges that it is only ‘outlines’ of a theory, it seems that his outlines are philosophically underdeveloped and insufficiently attentive to historical exclusion and injustices. He does not further his examination to develop something deeper and more elaborate than his sketchy account. Moreover, it is plausible to argue that his principles are not only ineffective for explaining complex intercultural dialogues but also clearly tend to favour the wider liberal society’s norms and operative values over the ones of excluded social groups. Put it differently, Parekh’s account is problematic for it gives superiority to the liberal values and legitimises the exclusions these values cause. Shiraz Dossa argues that Parekh’s claim that ‘liberal public values and liberal rationality should *trump* rival ideals and values’ indicates ‘a deep ambivalence and incoherence in Parekh’s attitude to multiculturalism.’¹⁸ Additionally, it could be argued that prioritising the wider society’s values and norms when an urgent decision is needed to be taken on a pressing issue has certain validity while dealing with issues related to relatively new immigrant communities, this claim, however, is less defensible when we are talking about historical injustices suffered by established and deeply rooted groups such as native communities and national minorities. These latter groups raise demands that do

¹⁵ Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism*, p. 272.

¹⁶ Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism*, p. 272. Parekh points out three reasons that justify the primacy of the operative public values of the majority. ‘First, they are woven into its institutions and practices and cannot be radically revised without causing considerable moral and social disorientation. Second, while a society has an obligation to accommodate the minority way of life, it has no obligation to do so at the cost of its own, especially if it remains genuinely unconvinced by the minority’s defence of the practice. Third, when the minority consists of immigrants they need to appreciate that since they are unfamiliar with the wider society’s way of life, they should defer to its judgment in contentious matters. They also need its support to counter the resentment their presence generally provokes among some sections of society, and are more likely to secure it, after making their point, they gracefully accept its decision.’ p. 273.

¹⁷ Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism*, p. 292.

¹⁸ Shiraz Dossa, (review essays), ‘Liberal Imperialism? Natives, Muslims, and Others’, *Political Theory*, 30:5 (2002), p. 742. In this article Dossa raises some other valuable criticisms against Parekh’s account.

not only question and challenge the operative values, history and governing principles of the dominant society, but also require substantial transformations in the existing political and social arrangements and practices. Transforming these political and social arrangements and practices is crucially important because they play a principal role in justifying the oppression of excluded social groups and ignoring their history and memory. Briefly, his account does not offer a serious engagement with experiences of historical exclusion and neglects the significance of some core issues that lie at the basis of the demands of historically excluded social minorities. Most importantly among these core issues are ones that are concerned with collective memory of exclusion, acknowledgment of historical injustice and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices.

In summary, it has been argued that Parekh's appeal to intercultural dialogue to strengthen the ability of his account of the politics of recognition to accommodate pluralism is ultimately not appealing. This is particularly true when facing demands of historical exclusion because, among other things, the notion of dialogue he is so keen to defend is underdeveloped, endorses the superiority of the liberal values, reinforces the inferiority of excluded social groups and overlooks core issues such as collective memory of exclusion, acknowledgment of historical grievances and taking responsibility and offering an apology. By developing more sophisticated and elaborated notions of intercultural dialogue and deliberation, Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr have aspired to offer more appealing accounts of democratic inclusion than the ones that have been proposed by advocates of recognition such as Parekh. Primarily inspired by Habermas and Gadamer's approaches, Benhabib and Dallmayr have presented revised notions of intercultural dialogue and deliberation that, they insist, are capable of effectively accommodating pluralism and demands of historical exclusion without collapsing into essentialism, closure and rigid abstractions. The next two sections analyse their views respectively.

Seyla Benhabib: the politics of complex cultural dialogue

This section explores Seyla Benhabib's account of the 'politics of complex cultural dialogue.' Benhabib claims that individual autonomy resides at the core of her account. She refuses the egalitarian understanding of culture that was introduced and

defended by social anthropology. She argues that this egalitarian understanding of culture is problematic because it rests on 'faulty epistemic premises' that view culture as a closed and discrete social system of representation and signification. Benhabib claims that her politics of complex cultural dialogue is based, among other things, on the assumption that cultures are not closed wholes but hybrid, fluid and in a continuous interaction and dialogue. Benhabib argues that some contemporary multiculturalists, such as Tully, Parekh and Carens, reject these essentializing premises too, but her social constructivist approach to cultural differences rejects them for different reasons. What distinguishes her rejection of cultural essentialism from these multiculturalists, she insists, 'is the *narrative view of actions and culture* that informs it.'¹⁹ Analysing cultures, she believes, should be based on the distinction between the points of view or perspective of the 'social observer' (outsider) and that of the 'social agent' (insider). The outsiders or external social observers, be they anthropologists, secret agents, linguists, or consultants, inflict coherence and homogeneity on cultures in order to understand or control them. Conversely, from within, members of the culture 'experience their traditions, stories, rituals and symbols, tools, and material living conditions through shared, albeit contested and contestable, narrative accounts.'²⁰

She claims that there are two major reasons why culture is presented as narratively constituted by contested accounts. The first reason is that 'human actions and relations are formed through a double hermeneutic: We identify *what* we do through an *account* of what we do.'²¹ In other words, human actions and interactions are recognized and presented as human deeds through accounts that the agents and others form about their own doings. The second reason is that human actions and deeds are formed through the person's evaluative perspective or attitude towards their deeds. In other words, these actions are already carrying an element of assessment and judgment. To put it in her terms, she claims that 'there are second-order narratives entailing a certain normative attitude towards accounts of first-order deeds.' Culture, she concludes, 'is the horizon formed by these evaluative stances, through which the

¹⁹ Seyla Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 5.

²⁰ Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture*, p. 5.

²¹ Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture*, p. 6.

infinite chain of space-time sequences is demarcated into “good” and “bad”, “holy” and “profane”, “pure” and “impure”.²² Cultures, Benhabib insists, ‘are formed through binaries because human beings live in an evaluative universe.’²³ Benhabib rejects the ‘mosaic multiculturalism’ of the politics of recognition for it views multicultural society as coexisting groups with clear determined boundaries. This form of multiculturalism, she argues, is indefensible, neither empirically nor normatively. Intercultural justice among groups, according to her, rests on a belief in justice and freedom and not on the preservation of cultures. Benhabib insists that:

We should view human cultures as constant creations, recreations, and negotiations of imaginary boundaries between “we” and the “other(s).” The “other” is always also within us and is one of us. A self is a self only because it distinguishes itself from a real, or more often than not imagined, “other.” Struggles for recognition among individuals and groups are really efforts to negate the status of “otherness,” insofar as otherness is taken to entail disrespect, domination, and inequality.²⁴

However, Benhabib admits that ‘it is very difficult to accept the “other” as deeply different while recognizing his/her fundamental human equality and dignity.’ Moreover, she maintains that ‘History as well as society study shows us that any minority group in human society may adopt any of a number of political positions; political attitudes cannot be derived from group identities.’²⁵

Benhabib argues that in John Rawls’ political liberalism as well as in Brian Barry’s egalitarian liberalism a very little patience is demonstrated to examine the relationship between the liberal political principles and the background culture. They view the official public sphere (which includes the executive, legislative, and juridical institutions and political parties) as the only ‘site of political contestation and of opinion and will formation.’ Following Habermas, Benhabib claims that the

²² Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture*, p. 7.

²³ Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture*, p. 7.

²⁴ Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture*, p. 8.

²⁵ Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture*, p. 18.

uniqueness of deliberative democracy is in its 'dual track approach' to multiculturalism. This duality emerges from the recognition of the importance not only of the official public sphere but also the significance of civil society in forming political wills and contesting opinions. Put differently, deliberative democracy views the unofficial public sphere with its diverse movements as an additional important site for political contestation. Political or egalitarian liberalism neglects the importance of this sphere and opts for 'a juridical calculus of liberal rights' to address problems of multiculturalism.²⁶

Recently, Benhabib claims, several proposals, such as Ayelet Shachar's 'jurisdictional systems' for different cultural and religious groups, have been suggested to deal with pluralism in multicultural societies.²⁷ These proposals, Benhabib insists, could be compatible with 'a universal deliberative democracy model' only if they do not violate the following three normative principles: egalitarian reciprocity, voluntary self-ascription and freedom of exit and association. Egalitarian reciprocity means that members of cultural, ethnic, linguistic and any other minorities must enjoy the same kind of political, civic, economic and cultural rights that the majority enjoys. Voluntary self-ascriptive refers to the claim that individuals should not be ascribed to cultural, linguistic, ethnic or religious groups by virtue of their birth.

²⁶ Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture*, pp. 21, 114, 106.

²⁷ Ayelet Shachar proposes a model of joint governance that is called 'transformative accommodation.' This model aspires to be sensitive to demands of non-liberal minorities by allowing them to develop their own institutions. Furthermore, it aims to secure fundamental individual rights. In this model, the minority group and the state share the authority to decide on the contested social matters. In other words, the model is based on the division of jurisdiction between different political actors. This model of 'transformative accommodation' recognizes the problem of power asymmetry between the minority and the state and therefore gives priority to the minority group in the 'initial allocation of areas of authority'. Secondly, this model secures an exit or way out for the members of the group if they feel that practices or certain arrangements systematically discriminate against them. This latter point encourages the groups to pursue internal reforms in order to secure that the members keep their alliance and membership. This secures the liberal commitment to individual liberties too. Finally, this model encourages cooperation, dialogue and transformation in views and opinions between the different political actors. This model, however, focuses on the interaction between formal or governmental political actors and institutions and the minority's representatives and ignores other forms of cultural and social interaction at the informal level. Moreover, while this model recognizes the asymmetries in power, it does not seem to adequately deal with issues of historical injustices and the relevance of memory in this transformative politics. For the recognition of power asymmetries is manifested only through giving priority to the minority in administrative judicial authorities at the very initial stages, while underestimating other important non-formal issues such as historical harms and injustices. Briefly, this model primarily offers an institutional solution and therefore ends up adopting traditional liberal solutions, namely formal procedural mechanisms. For more on this model see: Ayelet Shachar, *Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women's Rights* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Andrea T. Baumeister, 'Habermas: Discourse and Cultural Diversity', *Political Studies*, 51:4 (2003), pp. 740-758.

A wide range of identification should be allowed. Freedom of exit and association means that individuals should have the choice of freely walking out of their ascriptive group and join a new one. Benhabib thinks that the resolution of multicultural dilemmas occurs through processes of will and opinion formation in civil society. These resolutions should be compatible with the three above-mentioned normative conditions. These three normative conditions are derived from the two principles of discourse ethics that Benhabib is so keen to defend. The two principles of discourse ethics are universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity. According to Benhabib, universal moral respect ‘requires that we recognize the right of all beings capable of speech and action to be participants in the moral conversation.’²⁸ The principle of egalitarian reciprocity demands ‘that within discourses each should have the same right to various speech acts, to initiate new topics, and to ask for justifications of the presuppositions of the conversation and the like.’²⁹ In a deliberative democracy model, Benhabib asserts, ‘these principles can be realized through a range of legal and political arrangements as well as through noninstitutionalized practices and associations in civil society.’³⁰

Benhabib argues that what makes deliberative democracy attractive to disadvantaged groups is its focus on democratic inclusion. The inclusion is demonstrated through the condition that collective democratic decisions are legitimate only if the engagement of all those who are affected is secured. Additionally, she argues that:

deliberative democracy promises not only inclusion but empowerment, in that the insistence that democratic legitimacy can be attained only through the agreement of *all* affected assures, at the normative level at least, that norms *cannot* be adopted and institutional arrangements advocated at the cost of the most disadvantaged and disaffected.³¹

²⁸ Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture*, p. 107.

²⁹ Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture*, p. 107.

³⁰ Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture*, p. 107.

³¹ Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture*, p. 134.

Democratic theorists have raised several concerns regarding the ability of deliberative democracy to accommodate deep-rooted ethno-cultural and nationalist conflicts. These concerns, Benhabib suggests, can be divided into two kinds; 'epistemic concerns about the cognitive and affective biases of a deliberative consensus model; and political and institutional concerns with the limits of deliberative politics.'³² I will primarily focus on the epistemic concerns because they touch the underlying assumptions that lie at the basis of her account of democratic inclusion.³³ Benhabib argues that the epistemic concerns take three forms. First, the claim that the model can accommodate incommensurable, diverse and conflicting values and beliefs in a multicultural society is unconvincing. Second, the 'public nature of reason giving' privileges certain forms of speech, usually rational and disembodied. Third, the requirement to attain 'reasoned agreement' or consensus is 'both unrealistic and exclusionary.'³⁴ Benhabib challenges these three charges.

Benhabib rejects the claim of radical incommensurability and argues that it is indefensible and inconsistent. For if this incommensurability of views and beliefs existed, 'we would not be able to know it for we would not be able to state in what it consisted.'³⁵ Moreover, though she recognizes the differences in the epistemic horizon of experience, she claims that most of the democratic debates are not about strong incommensurables 'but about divergent and convergent beliefs.' She goes on to argue that 'very often we do not know how deep these divergences are, or how great their overlap may be, until we have engaged in conversation.'³⁶ Those who defend incommensurability often explain its existence due to social positionality. Social

³² Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture*, p. 133.

³³ Political and institutional concerns rise, according to Benhabib, because deliberative democracy presupposes a unitary political framework which is insufficiently attentive to demands of power-sharing and secession. Benhabib rejects these concerns because she claims that her notion of deliberative democracy accepts certain power sharing arrangements. While she sees no reason to argue against secession on deliberative grounds, she warns that secession is morally costly and politically inconsistent within the frame of modern nation-state given the fact that contemporary practices and systems of citizenship are evolving and transcending the narrow political boundaries of the old nation states. Benhabib gives the example of Europe and the development of a European citizenship. One might argue that this evolving system of citizenship is very specific to Europe and even in Europe itself this did not put an end to demands of secession raised by the Basque in Spain for instance? For more on the political and institutional concerns see: Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture*, pp. 147-177.

³⁴ Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture*, p. 135.

³⁵ Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture*, p. 135.

³⁶ Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture*, p. 136.

positionality is the view that only those who occupy certain positions and live certain experiences can relate to them and therefore this leads to incompatibility with others that do not occupy or live the same position or experience. She maintains that when we closely examine these social positions we end up with identity politics where individuals who occupy certain structures are affiliated with particular discrete groups. Consequently, this positionality collapses into essentialism. Defenders of social positionality do not tell us much about defining and determining the boundaries of the groups. Moreover, Benhabib argues that it is questionable whether there are ideal - typical views that can be attributed to these groups. Put differently, she denies the existence of 'holistic structures of consciousness.' Furthermore, she claims 'that advocates of social positionality themselves operate with the fiction of a unitary consciousness' because 'they reduce the contentious debates of every human group about itself and its identity to a coherent easily delineable narrative.'³⁷

As against the argument that deliberation or the public nature of reason-giving necessarily favours rational disembodied modes of speech, she argues that the deliberative democracy model recognizes the diversity and multiplicity of institutions and organizations of opinion-making in the public sphere. These interconnected and overlapping institutions and organizations of opinion-making accept not only reason giving but also other forms of speech such as greeting and storytelling. Moreover, Benhabib refuses the association of reason with domination and body with liberation of the marginalized. She warns against metaphysical binary divisions such as reason versus body, and impartiality versus embodiedness. Melissa Williams and others have criticized deliberative democracy for its regulative principle of publicity and reasonableness. Simply, Williams' concern is on how reasons will be defined. What will be counted as a reason and what not? More specifically, Williams' major fear is about the acceptance of excluded social groups' reasons as reasons for public political deliberation by other citizens.³⁸ Benhabib argues that the answer to this challenge is provided through the distinction between the syntax and the semantics of reasons in the public sphere. The syntax of reasons, she asserts, 'would refer to certain structural

³⁷ Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture*, p. 137.

³⁸ For more on Williams' views see her article: 'The Uneasy Alliance of Group Representation and Deliberative Democracy', in Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (eds.) *Citizenship in Diverse Societies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 124-152.

features all statements that articulate public reasons would have to possess.’³⁹ She goes on to argue that ‘reasons would count as reasons because they could be defended as being in the interest of all considered as equal moral and political beings.’⁴⁰ In other words, the syntax structures of reasons lead to the adoption of policies and laws that are in the interest of all because they are the result of public deliberation that involves all of those are affected by them. The semantics of reason refer to the content of reason. While the content of the reason might vary, the normative syntax of public justification is one and not many.⁴¹

The last epistemic charge that Benhabib tries to answer is the unattainability of consensus. Several scholars have viewed Habermas’s criterion of consensus among participants in deliberation as too demanding and implausible.⁴² Though his theory has gone through significant amendments, he still argues that consensus on moral norms must be based on ‘identical reasons’ that are able to convince every participant in the same way. Benhabib argues that the answer to this charge lies in Habermas’s insistence to maintain the distinction between semantic content of reasons and their syntactical structure. While the first recognizes the plurality of public reasons, the second insists on the uniformity of the normative syntax of public justification; namely ‘that they are in the best interest of all considered as free and equal moral beings.’⁴³ The insistence on the universality of the meta level of public deliberation, namely the universality of the normative structure of public justifications; i.e., being in the interest of all viewed as equal and free moral agents, has a totalizing character and does not seem to meet successfully the challenge of incommensurability (not the radical one but the more moderate). Even when parties compromise upon beliefs and values it is not always because it is in the interest of everybody but other

³⁹ Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture*, p. 140.

⁴⁰ Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture*, p. 140.

⁴¹ Michael Ranbinder James has made similar distinction. He distinguishes between *formal* and *substantial* criteria for justification. See Michael Ranbinder James, ‘Tribal Sovereignty and the Intercultural Public Sphere’, *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, 25 (1999), pp. 57-96.

⁴² By invoking Hannah Arendt’s idea of ‘enlarged thinking,’ Benhabib makes the distinction between ‘consensus’ and ‘reaching an agreement’ on the ‘general interests’ that all those who are affected could endorse. She argues that the aim of moral conversation is not to achieve consensus ‘but the “anticipated communication with others with whom I know I must finally come to some agreement.”’ See: Seyla Benhabib, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 8-9.

⁴³ Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture*, p. 143.

considerations play a role. These considerations could take the form of interests and strategic planning. This last point, therefore, raises doubts about the rigid distinction between the normative and strategic in democratic political deliberation. Benhabib admits that democratic deliberation involves ethical, political (strategic) and moral reasoning, yet she insists to maintain the distinction between the normative and strategic for it provides a useful (methodological) tool to understand the universalising power of normative principles. Though this distinction might serve certain methodological purposes, it is not convincing. It is not convincing because it ignores what have been recognized, i.e. the interrelatedness, overlap and contradictions among normative, ethical and strategic components of democratic deliberation. Briefly, recognizing the analytical significance of the distinction at the meta level does not provide a convincing answer to the implausibility of the normative consensus endorsed by every participant for the same reasons.

While Benhabib's notion of culture (culture as narratively constituted by contested accounts) seems appealing because it leads her to view culture not as a closed discrete whole but as hybrid, fluid and dynamic, it is, however, based on an unconvincing and rigid distinction between the perspective of the 'social observers' who impose unity and coherence and that of the 'social agents' (insiders) who 'experience their traditions, stories, rituals and symbols, tools, and material living conditions through shared, albeit contested and contestable, narrative accounts.'⁴⁴ This distinction is ill qualified and seems to be incompatible, even contradicts, with Benhabib's argument about the blurring and shifting boundaries of groups' identities. The question that could be raised here is: how do we distinguish between the outsiders and the insiders (along religious, linguistic, racial, national, ethnic lines)? Does not this lead to essentialism that her account is trying to reject? Where do you draw the line of belonging without collapsing into essentialism? Is it not hard to ascertain clearly the boundaries and point of view from which the terms of 'external' and 'internal' make sense? Moreover, one might argue that the dichotomy between participant and observer is problematic for we can have the possibility of participant - observation. In anthropology this method is a very developed and well-established one. It is true that classic anthropology, both social and cultural, mostly viewed culture as closed, whole and homogeneous entity, but recently many anthropologists

⁴⁴ Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture*, p. 5.

have maintained this kind of participant-observation approach and refused to view culture as a closed system of beliefs, values and symbols.⁴⁵

Several other criticisms can be raised against Benhabib's modified version of deliberative democracy in general and her answers to the epistemic concerns in particular. However, I will focus my examination on some issues that cast serious doubts about the effectiveness of her account of democratic inclusion to accommodate historical exclusion. More specifically, I will argue that while she claims that her version of deliberative democracy empowers excluded social groups because of its condition of inclusion; i.e., including all of those who are affected by the decisions and policies, her account of democratic inclusion is ill qualified primarily because it overlooks three main issues that lie at the core of the demands of historically excluded social groups; namely, issues such as collective memory of exclusion, acknowledgement of historical injustices, and taking responsibility and offering an apology. These issues are not arbitrarily chosen but emerge from inclusion as involving a norm of practical deliberation which itself involves an accommodation to the past.

First, while her notion of the narratively constituted 'self' and the recognition of the importance of narrative knowledge as a legitimate source of raising validity claims (hand in hand with discursive knowledge)⁴⁶ seem to implicitly recognize the role of collective memory as a necessary means to articulate and form our life stories, it is not implausible to argue that she stops short of explicitly specifying or further explaining the significance of 'memory of exclusion' and historical injustices and harms in achieving transformation in the status of the excluded. In other words, it is

⁴⁵ For more on this issue see: James Clifford and George E. Marcus, *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography* (Berkeley: University of California, 1986); James Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-century Ethnography, Literature and Art* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988); Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (London: Vintage, 1994), *Orientalism* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1995), *Power, Politics, and Culture: Interviews with Edward W. Said* Gauri Viswanathan (ed.), (New York : Pantheon Books, 2001), chapters 8-10, 'Representing the Colonized: Anthropology's Interlocutors', *Reflections on Exile and Other Literary and Cultural Essays* (London: Granta, 2001), pp. 293-316; Eric R. Wolf, *Envisioning Power: Ideologies of Dominance and Crisis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley; California; London: University of California Press, 1997); David Scott, 'Criticism and Culture: Theory and Post-colonial Claims on Anthropological Disciplinarity', *Critique of Anthropology*, 12:4 (1992), pp. 371-394, 'Culture in Political Theory', *Political Theory*, 31:1 (2003), pp. 92-115; Adam Kuper, *Culture: The Anthropologists' Account* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999).

⁴⁶ See Seyla Benhabib, 'Epistemology of Postmodernism: A Rejoinder to Jean-Francois Lyotard' in *Feminism/ Postmodernism* edited by Linda J. Nicholson (New York; London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 117- 119.

not enough to claim that the 'self' gets thrown into webs of narratives and it gets to know itself through learning to participate as a conversation partner in these narratives. More precisely, for the inclusion of the historically excluded social groups to be effective, it is not enough to subscribe to the narrativity of the 'self' and view the excluded social groups as full equal partners in the decision making process, but also to recognize the role of memory of exclusion in unmasking inequalities and their sources and causes. Memory of exclusion reveals the unbalanced relationships between the dominant and the excluded and challenges the invitation of the excluded, often under the pretext of equals, to join the existing institutions and structures whereas the ultimate aim is transforming these structures (or creating new ones).

The second weakness of her theory is that her account of deliberation in an intercultural context does not seem to well capture the importance of 'acknowledgement' in political interaction. Acknowledgment goes beyond the standard of reciprocity that equalizes between two unequal parties. It demands the recognition of asymmetries and unbalanced power relations. In other words, unlike the deliberative requirement for reciprocity that usually masks prolonged and embedded unbalanced relations of power and often equalizes the victim with the victimizer, acknowledgement seeks to reveal these asymmetries and demands their significance not only as dark events of history that need to be commemorated once a year but as fundamental issues for political public debate on the existing political and social arrangements. Acknowledgment is closely related to the last weakness that is often overlooked or underestimated in Benhabib's account and in the literature of deliberation and dialogue; namely taking responsibility and offering an apology.

The willingness of the hegemonic and oppressing side to take responsibility and offer an apology for the injustices and exclusions that have been committed is of a great importance to the demands of historically excluded social groups. Taking responsibility and offering an apology for injustices and grievances are not an invitation to a politics of balm and retribution, but to a politics of restitution. Taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing injustices and harms by the oppressing side do not exempt the oppressed side from having a certain level of responsibility for its undesirable situation or justifies internal oppression, i.e., oppression within the oppressed group itself. Furthermore, taking responsibility and offering an apology by the victimizers do not legitimize morally inconsistent and unacceptable activities committed by the oppressed against members of the

oppressing group. The acknowledgment of injustices and the readiness to take responsibility and offer an apology for causing them, lead to the empowerment of the excluded. This empowerment is reflected not only through the will on the side of the oppressed to move beyond revenge but also the readiness to enhance their participation in the political system. This readiness stems from gaining more faith and trust in the political system and from viewing it as an adequate potential platform for representing their demands and voices and for achieving effective transformations in existing distorted political and social arrangements.

To sum up, Benhabib's account of the politics of complex cultural dialogue has several merits. It presents an updated version of deliberative democracy that tries to answer serious challenges raised by opponents and advocates of deliberation. However, it has been argued that her revised notion of deliberative democracy does not sufficiently accommodate claims of historical exclusion. More precisely, it has been argued that her notion of cultural dialogue ignores and overlooks the significance of memory of exclusion, acknowledgement of injustices and taking responsibility and offering an apology, claims that are fundamental to historically excluded social groups. Benhabib's approach has not been the only attempt to present a revised and integrative account of politics that aims to efficiently accommodate demands of historical exclusion without collapsing into essentialism, closure and rigid abstractions. Fred Dallmayr, it is argued, seems to have a more developed and compelling account of intercultural dialogue. The following section is devoted to explore and analyse his account.

Fred Dallmayr

Fred Dallmayr proposes a theory of inter-civilizational dialogue to meet the challenges of pluralism and exclusion. I will argue that Dallmayr's account of inter-civilizational dialogue seems to be appealing when it is examined in the context of historical exclusion primarily because it is hospitable to modes of speech other than rational argument, emphasizes the importance of memory of exclusion in the struggles of oppressed social groups, and does not promote consensus. However, his account fails to fully accommodate claims of historical exclusion chiefly because it does not address the issues of acknowledgement of historical injustices and taking

responsibility and offering an apology for causing them. Dallmayr relies, among other things, on Hans-Georg Gadamer's notion of dialogue to develop his theory of inter-civilizational dialogue. Dialogue in his theory is not an abstract individual activity but an interactive, concrete and situated practice. Every dialogue, according to Gadamer, starts from the sedimented prejudices or background assumptions (historical and cultural pre-judgments) of interlocutors. These pre-judgments should be viewed as enabling rather than disabling elements of journeys to the otherness of the unfamiliar. Dallmayr argues that dialogue, as presented in Gadamer and Buber,⁴⁷ seems to be exclusively 'human-centered or polis-centered.' This, he insists, is not satisfactory because civility is only one dimension of the human experience. We must take into consideration other dimensions of the human experience.⁴⁸ He thematizes these corollaries under the labels 'nature' and 'the divine.' Unlike contemporary Western philosophy that sees these different dimensions of human experience as clearly and rigidly separated (polarized and dichotomous; reason versus non-reason, human versus nature, humans versus divine etc; or in the form of totalizing fusion - Hegel), Dallmayr stresses that they are interconnected and related. In other words, unlike the binary or totalizing notions of difference found in identity politics, Dallmayr, inspired by Martin Heidegger's notion of ontology; the ontology of Dasein as 'Being - in - the-world', opts for an alternative notion of difference that recognizes interconnectedness across boundaries. What lies at the core of this ontology is the idea of 'connectedness;' 'everything is connected to everything else and nothing exists in isolation.'⁴⁹ Moreover, against the dominance of a rational argumentative discourse or 'occidental rationalism,' Dallmayr offers a more flexible mode of speech. He invokes Michael Oakeshott's 'conversational speech' to offer an alternative form of conversation.

Dallmayr tries to examine the meanings of the term 'civilization' as it appears in the Western culture. He establishes the linkage between the term 'civilization' and 'civility'. In other words, he makes the case for the link between the life of citizens in

⁴⁷ Martin Buber is also famous for supporting the dialogical aspect of human experience.

⁴⁸ Fred R. Dallmayr, *Dialogue Among Civilizations: Some Exemplary Voices* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 3.

⁴⁹ Hwa Yol Jung, (book review), 'Doing Philosophy in the Age of Globalization ("Idquo Modernization")', *Human Studies*, 24:4 (2001), p. 338.

city - polis - and citizenship. He claims that there are two, complementary, terms that are closely related to the term civilization. These are nature and divine. In the Western tradition they were usually and misleadingly viewed as in opposition to civilization. Nature is viewed as limiting the city and divine as transcending and going beyond the worldly temporality of the city. Dallmayr does not prefer to view nature and divine as counter terms but constitutive supplements or corollaries to civilization. The relationships between civilization and its corollaries are complex and dynamic. In the Western tradition, the relationship between civilization and its supplements were often characterized as conflictual and oppositional, i.e., dichotomous. Aristotle's distinction between *physis* and *polis* got more oppositional connotation with the time especially in modern times. In modern social and human sciences binary distinctions between 'nature' and 'culture', 'nature' and 'nurture' and 'states of nature' and 'civil state' were strongly drawn. The relationship between civilization and the divine in the West was usually viewed as conflictual, though there were episodes of reconciliation too. The distinction between the earthly and heavenly city is an example of that. Dallmayr wants to challenge these distinctions and go beyond them through Gadamer's proposal of hermeneutical dialogue. In discussing the origins of the Western civilization, Gadmaer refuses to view 'Athens' and 'Jerusalem' as contradictory or mutually exclusive but, though tensional, mutually complementary. Western civilization, one may argue, 'has largely evolved in the interstices of the two central labels, Graeco-Roman and Judaeo-Christian.'⁵⁰ Dallmayr claims that 'modernity' is a third element that is constitutive of the Western culture. Though carrying certain elements from the two previous constitutive components, it broke with those traditions. Briefly, Dallmayr identifies in the West a 'civilizing process' that has been operating in the history of the West. Dallmayr maintains that 'civilization' is multidimensional, complex and subject to various interpretations and readings.

Dallmayr claims that the rational universal argumentative discourse has dominated the Western culture. This form of discourse (scientific and technological) clearly favours instrumental reasoning directed towards practical efficiency. Dallmayr claims that Habermas proposes communicative reason and rationality as the solution for the theoretical quarrels between radical diversity or contextualism and unified

⁵⁰ Fred R. Dallmayr, 'A Gadamerian Perspective on Civilizational Dialogue', *Global Dialogue*, 3:1 (2001), p. 69.

metaphysical holism or universalism.⁵¹ Habermas argues that communicative rationality is the best way of reconciling the One and Many. Habermas revisits the traditional debate on the One and Many. He examines the Platonic dominance of 'the One as the origin and ground of everything.' He examines later developments in the One and Many as they appear in Kant, Hegel and contemporary philosophers such as Richard Rorty. According to Dallmayr, Habermas' alternative secular-humanist approach, concludes "that the unity of reason only remains perceptible in the plurality of its voices- as the basic possibility of a contingent-occasional, but intelligible passage from one language into another"⁵²

Habermas's approach, according to Dallmayr, has a lot of merits. Most importantly, it recognizes the linguistic turn, i.e., the move from a monological *cogito* to intersubjective communication, and moves from a metaphysical reason (the Archimedean privileged point) to a post-metaphysical reason that is situated but also can be transcended. Habermas grounds reason and rationality on the concrete, worldly, ordinary and trivial human experience. Habermas's work has been, rightly according to Dallmayr, criticized for privileging certain voices and specific modes of speech. This type of criticism we found in the writings of scholars such as Iris Marion Young and Lynn Sanders.⁵³

Based on these criticisms of Habermas' theory, Dallmayr suggests a more flexible mode of communication. He argues that Michael Oakeshott offers a more adequate mode of speech; namely 'conversational speech.' The key term in Oakeshott's theory is 'conversation.' Though it might include argument as a mode of interaction, conversation is not an argumentative encounter where communicators seek to exchange exclusively rational claims; nor is a strategic contest where the

⁵¹ Habermas, 'The Unity of Reason in the Diversity of Its Voices' in *Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essay*, William Mark Hohengarten (trans.) (Oxford: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 115-148.

⁵² Dallmayr, *Dialogue Among Civilizations*, p. 37.

⁵³ See for example: Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), 'Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy', in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 120-35; Lynn Sanders, 'Against Deliberation', *Political Theory*, 25:3 (1997), pp. 347-76. Daina Coole raises similar argument too. She argues that a 'strategy of exclusion and marginalization' is inherent in his argumentative discursive approach because it is still based on binary dualism of reason versus unreason and inside versus outside and therefore misses the excess or as she puts the alterity of the other. Diana Coole, 'Habermas and the Question of Alterity', in Maurizio Passerin d'Entrèves and Seyla Benhabib (eds.), *Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), pp. 221-244.

primary goal of the speakers is to win over each other.⁵⁴ Conversation is a more inclusive form of communication because it is open to a wider range of modes of speech. Briefly, it hosts people's hopes, frustrations, beliefs and convictions, differences and contestations. Dallmayr calls this form of communication 'thick conversation' or 'thick dialogue.' It is a conversation of 'self-transgressive friendship'. Dallmayr goes on to insist that dialogue should not be viewed anymore as an interaction between an ego-alter ego. Rather, it should be viewed as 'an encounter between mutually decentred agents involved in a transformative event.'⁵⁵ Following Oakeshott, Dallmayr claims that ultimately 'conversational encounter is not "an enterprise designed to yield an extrinsic profit, a contest where a winner gets a prize"; rather, it "is an unrehearsed intellectual adventure."' This conversational paradigm better captures the human experience of communicative interaction because 'it recognizes the qualities, the diversities, and the proper relationships of human utterances.'⁵⁶ Oakeshott's 'conversation', Dallmayr argues, offers us an alternative route to the imposed abstract universalism or the range of self-sealed essentialist particularism.

Dallmayr argues that a genuine dialogue necessitates openness to the otherness of the other, i.e., to the strange. In dialogue speakers seek mutual understanding through adjusting and articulating their views, claims and 'prejudices within a language that evolves to accommodate and ultimately transform disparate understandings into mutually intelligible meanings.'⁵⁷ Therefore, dialogue necessarily involves crossing borders and divides to the unknown and unvisited. In short, cross-cultural understanding or dialogue is a reciprocal and transformative experience. However, Dallmayr is cautious not to present this cross-cultural dialogue as a harmonious and easy mixture of different perspectives. Following the Russian dialogist Mikhail Bakhtin, and unlike the totality and closure of the Hegalian

⁵⁴ Dallmayr, *Dialogue Among Civilizations*, p. 31.

⁵⁵ Dallmayr, *Dialogue Among Civilizations*, p. 45.

⁵⁶ Dallmayr, *Dialogue Among Civilizations*, pp. 31-32.

⁵⁷ Roxanne L. Euben (review essay), 'Journeys to "The Other Shore"', *Political Theory*, 28:3 (2000), p. 403.

dialectics, Dallmayr believes in the ‘unfinalizability’ of dialogue.⁵⁸ Moreover, he is aware of the complexities and multidimensionality that characterize each side of the encounter.⁵⁹ Unlike Habermas and other thinkers who claim that reflexivity (the ability to distance oneself from tradition) and the expansion of perspectives stem from ‘Occidental rationalism’, Dallmayr argues that a ‘genuinely cosmopolitan philosophical discourse’ emerges from those who are situated at the ‘crossroads... between East and West, between polytheism and monotheism, and also between tradition and modernity.’ It is through this mediated and negotiated territory, through the in-betweenness of the Western- non-Western, past and future, ‘self’ and ‘other,’ and modernity and tradition, that cross cultural dialogue emerges. It is a dialogue that moves beyond Orientalism and Occidentalism.⁶⁰

Dallmayr strongly supports the recognition of the persistence of differences and multiplicity of voices in political theory. Based on his views on the inclusiveness of dialogue or conversation, he refuses to view political theory as an exclusively Western enterprise. Consequently, he discusses and examines usually unnoticed views and voices of thinkers from India, Near East, Africa and South America. It is precisely this claim of inclusiveness that exposes his account to criticism. Not only that Dallmayr’s account of the range of possible cross-cultural encounters is inspired and determined by his explicit reliance on hermeneutics and continental philosophy, the main criticism against Dallmayr, according to Roxanne Euben, is that he engages with few voices and therefore ignores others. In other words, he seems to ignore women’s voices, Islamic voices or post-colonial feminist theorists’ voices. It is precisely because Dallmayr is committed to cross-cultural dialogue and recognizes the multiplicity of voices that he needs to include more voices especially of those who disagree with the significance of cross cultural dialogue, worldliness and

⁵⁸ On Bakhtin’s ‘unfinalizability’ of dialogue and ‘dialogism’ see: Stephen Hutchings, ‘Ghosts of the Machine: Literature as Translation Mechanism in Post-Soviet Televisual Representations of Westernness’, *International Journal of Cultural Studies*, 5:3 (2002), pp. 291-315. And Simone Dentih, *Bakhtinian Thought: An Introductory Reader* (London ; New York : Routledge, 1995).

⁵⁹ Though Dallmayr recognizes this complexity and multidimensionality, he is quite dismissive regarding the attempt to move from postmodern recognition of unfixed identities; i.e., hybridity, into an “ultrapostmodernism” of radical destabilization that leads to tasteless and characterless cosmopolitanism as it appears in the work of Lyotard and Gilles Deleuze. Briefly, he fears the tendency of the latter to ‘cultural relativism and radical alterity (or the absolute otherness of the other).’ See: Jung, ‘Doing Philosophy in the Age of Globalization’, p. 340.

⁶⁰ Euben, ‘Journeys to “The Other Shore”’, p. 404.

hermeneutical projects. Euben argues that if 'living together in a postcolonial world' forces us to engage in intercultural dialogues then 'it is crucial to engage those with systematic and politically powerful objections to cross cultural engagement itself.'⁶¹

Dallmayr's reliance on hermeneutics is quite problematic because Gadamer's hermeneutics is too fusionist. Gadamer views interpretation as a transsubjective event (every interpreting subject draws on a background of implicit-holistic assumptions; 'linguistic disclosure,' that are always beyond their control) that ultimately leads to 'fusion of horizons.' Some scholars have charged Gadamer of being too consensual or fusionist and overemphasizing transsubjectivity and therefore leaving little space, if any, for reflexivity and critical engagement. Hans-Herbert Kogler claims that 'Gadamer's linguistic idealism plays itself out negatively in his harmonistic conception of the undisturbed fusion of interpretive horizons within interpretation.' For 'Instead of being able to develop a critical hermeneutics that preserves the alterity of the other within understanding,' he 'is finally forced, because of his truth-oriented linguistic holism, to conceive of interpretation either as a shared agreement about the subject matter or as the disengaged description of contextual factors that "explain" the other's otherness.'⁶² Nevertheless, Dallmayr refuses this charge and argues that in his latter writings, especially his exchange with Derrida, Gadamer clearly distanced himself from fusionism in favour of recognizing the inexhaustible alterity of the other in dialogue and the 'unfinalizability' of interpretation.⁶³

Despite these criticisms, Dallmayr's account of inter-civilizational dialogue seems appealing to accommodate historical exclusion. It is appealing because of various reasons. First, his account of cross-cultural dialogue is not consensual. While he rejects the Hegelian total synthesis of different perspectives or a fusionist interpretation of Gadamer and favours a more open and flexible form of communication, he clearly refuses to endorse radical hybridity often celebrated by extreme postmodernists. Second, relying on the work of Milan Kundera, Dallmayr, emphasizes the importance of memory not as an avenue for escapism and nostalgia

⁶¹ Euben, 'Journeys to "The Other Shore"', pp. 404-405.

⁶² Hans-Herbert Kogler, *The Power of Dialogue: Critical Hermeneutic after Gadamer and Foucault* (trans.) Paul Hendrickson (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), p. 14.

⁶³ See: Dallmayr, *Beyond Orientalism*, pp. 31-32. Also, Diane P. Michelfelder & Richard E. Palmer (eds.), *Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989).

but as a means to ‘retrieve resources of empowerment and social imagination, resources enabling humans, especially the oppressed and marginalized, to “struggle against power.”’⁶⁴ Put differently, the need to hear the voices of the excluded and oppressed necessarily involves the recognition of the significance of memory in revealing inequalities and injustices. Briefly, Dallmayr supports the view that for dialogue to be liberating and transformative it must ‘embrace memory-work: above all, by recollecting the asymmetry between oppressor and oppressed.’⁶⁵ Finally, unlike Habermas’ normative deliberation that unconvincingly rules out certain important modes of communication or strategic contestation that emphasize interest, manipulations and accepts distorted forms of communication, Dallmayr’s cross-cultural dialogue does not only accommodate diversity of beliefs, passions, values, frustrations and wishes but also hopes to transform them through the invitation to the otherness of the other. Ultimately this invitation aspires to form constructive relationships; ones of humanism and friendship that exceeds indiscriminate universalism, ethnocentrism, Orientalism or other undesirable forms of relations.

Though Dallmayr’s account seems more appealing than the other two accounts discussed in this chapter, it does not, however, fully capture the demands of historically excluded social groups. For it does not clearly address the issues of acknowledgement of historical injustices and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing them. These two elements, it has been argued in the introduction of the thesis, are interlinked to collective memory of exclusion and play a crucial role in achieving an effective accommodation of historical exclusion. Put differently, they are crucial for the reparation and restoration of lasting institutionalised grievances and harms. Briefly, Dallmayr’s recognition of the importance of memory falls short of capturing other core issues that are crucial for effectively tackling demands of historically excluded social groups.

To sum up, while Dallmayr’s account of politics recognizes certain important demands of historically excluded social groups, particularly a wide range of different modes of speech and the significance of memory for empowerment and revealing inequalities, it does not clearly refer to other constitutive components of the politics required to sufficiently accommodate demands of historical exclusion. These other

⁶⁴ Dallmayr, *Dialogue Among Civilizations*, p. 105.

⁶⁵ Dallmayr, *Dialogue Among Civilizations*, p. 116.

constitutive components are acknowledgment of historical injustices and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing them. These constitutive components are intimately linked to recognizing the role of memory of exclusion in practical deliberation. Following the failure of the three accounts discussed in this chapter to sufficiently accommodate demands of historically excluded social groups, the next chapter seeks to offer a more compelling 'candidate' that meets these issues.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the integrative approaches of Bhikhu Parekh, Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr, have not been entirely successful in fulfilling their promise, i.e., to propose effective accounts of democratic inclusion which are capable of fully accommodating demands of historically excluded social groups. More specifically, the chapter has examined the revised notions of intercultural dialogue and deliberation enthusiastically proposed by Bhikhu Parekh, Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr. It has argued that while each of these three accounts have several different merits, they, nevertheless, in different degrees fail to fully accommodate claims of historical exclusion. It has been argued that their failure, among other things, stems from ignoring the significance of collective memory of exclusion (clearly not in the case of Dallmayr and to less extent in the case of Benhabib), acknowledgment of historical injustices and harms and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these historical injustices and harms.

Thus far the thesis has argued that the egalitarian theories of deliberative democracy, identity politics and its post-structuralist critics, and integrative approaches have not been sufficiently successful in accommodating demands of historically excluded social groups. In the following chapter I will argue that it is 'the politics of reconciliation' that promises effective solutions to several problems that have been disabling the egalitarian deliberative theories of democracy, identity politics and its post-structuralist critics, and integrative approaches to accommodate fully demands of historically excluded social groups.

SECTION IV: THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION

7. THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION

Thus far I have argued in this thesis that the democratic accounts of accommodation offered by egalitarian theories of deliberative democracy, identity politics and its post-structuralist critics, and integrative approaches are insufficiently attentive to demands of historically excluded social groups. Their insufficient attentiveness stems primarily, but not exclusively, from overlooking the significance of crucial issues that reside at the basis of the claims of historically excluded social groups. These crucial issues include: collective memory of exclusion, acknowledgment of historical injustices, taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these historical injustices. This chapter argues that it is the politics of reconciliation that promises effective solutions to many of the problems that plague the hitherto discussed accounts of democratic inclusion when they face demands of historically excluded social groups. The politics of reconciliation accords capital significance to confronting the past, acknowledging injustices and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices. The emphasis on these issues of memory, acknowledgement, responsibility and apology is important because it helps, among other things, to unmask and explain historical injustices and their intimate link with present inequalities and bring into public attention the specificities of the experiences of oppression and exclusion and the need to address them.

The politics of reconciliation which will be defended in this chapter is one that simultaneously refuses the blindness of deliberative democracy to history and memory and avoids several main risks of identity politics and post-structuralism. The politics of reconciliation presented in this chapter does not fully endorse essentialism but recognizes the existence of authoritative traditions that construct communities and groups. Moreover, the politics of reconciliation acknowledges the interdependence and overlapping of identities, but refuses the excessive level of fluidity of identities that undermines the very possibility of politics. Therefore, the politics of

reconciliation that is presented here occupies a mid way between essentialism and non essentialism. Furthermore, the chapter goes on to argue that it is to the revised notions of deliberation and recognition found in the integrative approaches that the politics of reconciliation is proposed as a supplement to. In other words, reconciliation needs not be viewed as an alternative or competitive notion to these revised notions of deliberation and recognition but as a complementary component. Put differently, in order to successfully tackle issues pertaining historical injustices we cannot and should not embark on deliberation and recognition without guaranteeing a sufficient and serious attention to memory, acknowledgement, responsibility and apology.

Additionally, this account of the politics of reconciliation is distinct because it demands social and cultural transformations that require revising cultural and social norms, practices and images. Therefore, by demanding social and cultural changes, the politics of reconciliation undermines the fixation of identities often found in identity politics. Furthermore, it acknowledges that these social and cultural transformations take time and do not occur over night and therefore it rejects the excessive fluidity and subversion endorsed by post-structuralist critics of recognition. The politics of reconciliation accords a significant role for narration and story-telling that involve interpretations and theretofore it secures a room for contestation rather than conformism, homogeneity and consensus. Finally the politics of reconciliation seeks and embraces the solidarity of international and local organizations and activists and therefore extends the struggle beyond the narrow boundaries of the particular national, ethnic, racial or cultural group. This solidarity does not only help the politics of reconciliation to meet the challenge of essentialism through the participation of non-members in the struggle against historical injustices, but also helps the politics of reconciliation to refute the charge raised against it as inhibiting dialogue and mutual understanding because it allegedly supports monopoly on suffering and views the oppressed as epistemically privileged in understanding their own condition. In other words, seeking and embracing local and international solidarity disprove the claims of those who accuse the politics of reconciliation as supporting the view that experiences of oppression give rise to specific perspectives and feelings that are fully transparent and accessible only to the oppressed and cannot be sufficiently shared and understood by those who do not live these experiences of oppression.

This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part critically examines different approaches to reconciliation and argues in favor of a particular account of

the politics of reconciliation which is the most adequate to capture the particularities of experiences of oppression and accommodate historical injustices. The politics of reconciliation could be accused, among other things, of promoting essentialism and revenge and inhibiting dialogue and mutual understanding. The second part is devoted to explore these charges and examine the relationship between reconciliation, deliberation and recognition. The third part examines the applicability of the main principles of reconciliation to mortal and milder communal and inter-group conflicts.¹ While it is often agreed that reconciliation could be an effective tool to deal with mortal conflicts between different nations and communities, this part suggests that the notion of reconciliation and its three main principles are valid and applicable to milder conflicts as well. The applicability of these principles will be examined in the context of three different types of group conflicts; political conflicts between national groups; social conflicts between social, cultural and racial groups; and finally conflicts between indigenous communities and the larger colonial newly established societies. The last part briefly outlines institutional and practical questions related to reconciliation.

Part I

Interrogating the literature on reconciliation

One of the weaknesses of the literature on reconciliation has been the excessive focus on conflict violence, order and stability primarily derived from a perspective of International Relations. Recently, some scholars have started presenting reconciliation as begging normative questions of pluralism and diversity in historically divided societies. This part seeks to critically present some of the main views on reconciliation. The debate on reconciliation has intensified after the formation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. Reconciliation is a highly contested concept. Views on reconciliation in divided societies are very diverse. These views include perceiving reconciliation as a religious

¹ By mortal conflicts I mean ongoing violent conflicts that involve activities such as war, ethnic cleansing, occupation and abuses of human rights and breaching of treaties. The violent national conflicts in Kurdistan, Palestine and Kashmir are typical forms of mortal conflicts. Milder conflicts are less enduring and violent. They do not involve extreme destabilization. They do not involve physical violence, war and abusive violation of fundamental human rights. Demands of cultural recognition such as language, folklore and cultural practice are milder types of conflicts.

and confessional enterprise, a juridical and legal tribunal, a secular public discursive forum, or a nation building project. Scholars who adopt these views often base their approaches on liberal, communitarian, deliberative or agonistic principles. The appeal to these philosophical and normative principles has led to different and sometime incompatible interpretations and conclusions about the nature and character of reconciliation. The politics of reconciliation advocated in this chapter offers a different take on historical exclusion and injustices than the discursive, religious, juridical, or nation building forms of politics. Let me turn to critically explore the adequacy of some of the main approaches of reconciliation to effectively accommodate claims of historical injustice before moving to present my own take in the following section.

Underlying a nation-building project are the ideas of national integration and state-building. In this model of state-building an undifferentiated notion of citizenship is viewed as the ultimate vehicle for achieving social harmony, stability and legitimacy. Reconciliation in the nation-building model is supposed to integrate the excluded in the political community as free and equal citizens that are entitled to the same set of rights enjoyed by members of the hegemonic groups. One major difficulty that emerges from viewing reconciliation through the lenses of an assimilative nation-building project is its principal focus on achieving order and stability rather than addressing questions of justice and exclusion. Another difficulty stems from treating oppression as the case of sporadic individuals in which the remedy to it is to grant these individuals citizen's rights in abstraction from their particular experiences and history of exclusion. Moreover, the nation-building project presupposes the existence of a unified political community whereas what is at stake in many divided societies is precisely the very possibility of this community. In some cases historically excluded social groups contest the very possibility of forming a community and demand self-determination and secession.²

In the confessional model, or what Gutmann and Thompson calls the 'compassionate justification', reconciliation seeks 'restorative justice' which is based on the idea of forgiveness. To achieve restorative justice, the victimisers should recognize the harm they have caused to the victimised and express remorse and in

² Paul Muldoon, 'Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 49:2 (2003), pp. 182-196; Andrew Schaap, 'Agonism in Divided Societies', *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, 32:2 (2006), pp. 255-277.

turn the victims should grant them forgiveness. The difficulty with this form of reconciliation is that it relies on a specific interpretation of a theological, Christian, value that is not shared by all Christians and other non-Christian groups who have their own comprehensive doctrines.³ Moreover, it is well documented for example that in the case of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa several people refused to confess or admit that they have committed wrongs and survivors and families of victims refused to grant forgiveness for what they viewed as unforgivable abuses and demanded reparation. Consequently, several scholars have concluded that coming to terms with past atrocities, abuses and injustices should not occur through confining reconciliation to a 'Christian ethical economy of sin, guilt, confession and redemption,' but through viewing reconciliation as a form of politics which seeks to reveal and address socio-economic, political and cultural patterns of domination.⁴

Scholars such as William J. Long and Peter Brecke have proposed a model of 'social forgiveness' which is based on evolutionary psychology rather than on theological grounds. Their model emphasizes the issue of acknowledging past injustice and grievances in terms of 'truth telling.' They have suggested three other principles. First, the redefinition of the identity of the conflicting sides. This redefinition involves self-empowerment and transformation which lead to moving beyond victimhood and humanizing the 'other' or the enemy. Second, the conflicting parties must give up the option of revenge, though it might be justified. Third, an urge for public contact and interaction between the conflicting parties hoping to form a new relationship that is different from the previous one. Long and Brecke go on to argue that emotions and reason are simultaneously engaged in reconciliation and that their model of 'social forgiveness' is based on evolutionary psychology which views emotions as 'products of an evolutionary process: the results of functional adaptation.' This theory suggests that the mind's structure has evolved in a way that integrates

³ Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, 'The Moral Foundations of Truth Commissions' in Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (eds.) *Truth V. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 29-33.

⁴ Muldoon, 'Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa,' pp. 192. For a useful discussion on the influence of Christian elements on the Australian political debate in general and on reconciliation with Aboriginal people in particular see: Michael Phillips, 'Aboriginal Reconciliation as Religious Politics: Secularisation in Australia', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 40:1 (2005), pp. 111-124.

emotion and reason and both deal with social problems.⁵ The authors admit that there have been other attempts, relying not necessarily on psychological cognitive terms, to demonstrate the connectedness between reason and emotion. Yet they insist to base their claim on evolutionary psychology. They argue that ‘Evolutionary psychology, which is informed by evolutionary biology, offers an alternative framework for explaining the reconciliation process that connects social theory with the natural sciences and attempts to integrate human reasoning with human emotions.’ This approach, they insist, ‘begins by assuming that theories of human motivations and behaviour must be consistent with the fact that the human mind is an evolved structure, a fact consistent with modern biology.’⁶ They suggest that their claim leads to a new understanding of rationality that is broader than the narrow notion in rational choice theory. While their theory focuses on important issues concerning historical injustice such as acknowledgement and transformation, one of its main problems, however, is that the evolutionary psychology which their theory heavily rests on leads to problematic and unconvincing conclusions about the process of reconciliation. Implicit in this evolutionary approach is a notion of progress that views effective reconciliation processes to be a characteristic of ‘mature’ and ‘civilized’ nations and groups. Put differently, this hierarchical and discriminatory approach is problematic because it is likely to view excluded and marginalized social groups as ‘uncivilised’ and ‘immature’ partners for reconciliatory politics.

Another common approach to reconciliation is the ‘historicist model’ of reconciliation, or what is often referred to as ‘juridical model.’ This approach views the task of reconciliation as revealing the historical truth about past violence and wrongs. Revealing historical truth about past violence and wrongs often occurs through the work of ‘revisionist historians’ who expose denied and ignored violent events, activities and atrocities committed against excluded social groups. This ‘new history’ undermines the master national narrative and requires revisiting and rewriting certain parts of the national narrative. The debate on this ‘new history’ becomes more important when it exceeds the academic circles and turns into a public debate on national history, exclusion and oppression. Finding historical truth, according to this model, is indispensable for creating common inclusive ground for future social and

⁵ William J. Long and Peter Brecke, *War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution*, (The MIT Press, 2003), pp. ix, x, 27.

⁶ Long and Brecke, *War and Reconciliation*, pp. 24-25

political cooperation. However, one problem that plagues this model is that it views historical truth as constant and fixed entity that can be revealed without being influenced by the social and cultural contexts in which it has been unmasked. In other words, the difficulty is in the claim that historical truth has a single and final interpretation.⁷ Another problem with this model is that the new exposed history which reveals denied atrocities, abuses and oppressions often gets displaced and reduced by the opponents, usually members of the hegemonic groups, into a scientific controversy on the interpretation of history and reliable methodologies of historical investigations among historians, academics and experts rather than a social issue with a great significance to the public and its future.⁸ For example, in both Israel and Australia the views of the revisionist historians who exposed historical materials that questioned the validity of main tenets of the national narratives failed to remain on the public agenda and were reduced by the hegemonic groups into academic and scientific debates and therefore diffused their potential influence on the public.⁹

Other scholars such as Paul Muldoon and Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson have argued that a discursive approach is the most appealing approach to reconciliation. For example Muldoon argues that a discursive approach to reconciliation, or what he calls truth-telling, places political deliberation at its core.¹⁰ According to him, reconciliation should be viewed as a conversational forum for public deliberation about the past and its links to the present. Public deliberation, Muldoon claims, is grounded on two premises, namely 'reciprocity and openness'. According to this understanding of reconciliation, the oppressors and the oppressed

⁷ Gutmann and Thompson, 'The Moral Foundations of Truth Commissions', pp. 33-35.

⁸ Muldoon, 'Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa,' pp. 188-191.

⁹ For more on the Israeli revisionist historians see: Joel Beinin, 'Forgetfulness for Memory: The Limits of the New Israeli History', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 34:2 (2005), pp. 6-23; Kristen Blomeley, 'The 'New Historians' and the Origins of the Arab/Israeli Conflict', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 40:1 (2005), pp. 125-139; Norman Finkelstein, 'Myths, Old and New', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 21:1 (1991), pp. 66-89; Nur Masalha, 'A Critique of Benny Morris', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 21:1 (1991), pp. 90-97; Benny Morris, 'Response to Finkelstein and Masalha', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 21:1 (1991), pp. 98-114. For more on the Australian revisionist historians see: W.E.H. Stanner, *After the Dreaming: The 1968 Boyer Lectures* (Australian Broadcasting Commission, 1969); Paul Muldoon, 'Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa,' *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 49:2 (2003), pp. 182-196; Andrew Schaap, 'Agonism in Divided Societies', *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, 32:2 (2006), pp. 255-277.

¹⁰ Note that I do not examine Gutmann and Thompson's theory in this chapter because it has been extensively explored in chapter 2 of the thesis.

are expected to embark on a dialogical venture where each one of them is supposed to visit the 'shores' of the 'other' and try to understand the experience of history from the perspective of that 'other'. Put differently, the conflicting parties are expected to be able to exchange roles, i.e., putting themselves in the shoes of each other, in order to achieve mutual understanding. For reconciliation to be effective and go 'beyond a mere clash of opinions,' participants to conversation need to have the courage to reassess their views by being 'open' to the perspectives of their adversaries. According to this understanding of reconciliation, 'divided memories' need not be seen as a problem that hinders the construction of unified national identity which can be solved through conventional liberal tools of assimilation or secession. Divided memories should be viewed as an opportunity for renegotiating the moral foundations of the existing political arrangements based on concerns of justice. This process of renegotiation, Muldoon claims, rests on the appreciation of the experiences of the opponents which leads to understanding and 'emancipation'. It is understanding and emancipation that lead to transforming the moral foundation of the political order. Muldoon refers to Habermas' 'intersubjective praxis of argumentation' as a tool which could legitimise these changes in the moral foundation.¹¹

It is precisely this enthusiastic appeal to procedures of political deliberation that poses some problems to Muldoon's account. He argues that these procedures of political deliberation are 'expressly outlined or clearly implied in a good deal of the literature on reconciliation and do not require further elaboration here.'¹² The problem here is that procedures of political deliberation indeed require further elaboration. For the premises that underlie these procedures of political deliberation in Muldoon's account, i.e., openness and reciprocity, demand that participants in conversation use argumentative mode of speech ('intersubjective praxis of argumentation') and appeal to an ideal of 'reasonableness' in order to achieve mutual understanding. Like the egalitarian theories of deliberative democracy, Muldoon's discursive approach is subject to the charge that what counts as reasonable claims and legitimate modes of speech are likely to correspond and reflect the norms and values of the powerful and downplay or ignore the norms and values of the oppressed and excluded.

¹¹ Muldoon, 'Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa', pp. 195-196.

¹² Muldoon, 'Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa', p. 195.

Muldoon, however, is careful not to overlook the asymmetry in the relationship between the oppressed and the oppressor and argues that it is the members of the powerful groups who are first expected to look at things differently. He goes on to argue that while in order to avoid the reproduction of the patterns of domination we should maintain an initial suspicion towards the views of the dominant, we must view both parties to conversation as equally 'willing to undertake an imaginative entry into another worldview – both must accept the obligation of democratic reciprocity'.¹³ Muldoon is right to place more burden on the side of the oppressor to review their perspectives but this is not enough to address historical injustices. What is required for an effective process of reconciliation is not only an initial suspicion but also recognizing the established and embedded asymmetries and inequalities in material as well as symbolic resources and the responsibility of the oppressors on causing these asymmetries and inequalities. This is why recognizing memory is not enough and it has to be accompanied, among other things, by the issues of acknowledgement, taking responsibility and offering an apology. Briefly, a deliberative approach to reconciliation is not sufficient to fully account to historical exclusion. It needs to be supplemented by a politics of reconciliation that clearly insists on the asymmetries between the oppressor and the oppressed and underscores the centrality of the issues of acknowledgement, responsibility and apology.

Other scholars such as Andrew Schaap have adopted an agonistic approach to reconciliation. Schaap relies on Carl Schmitt's and Hannah Arendt's ideas to develop his notion of reconciliation. According to Schaap, reconciliation is a political enterprise that seeks to transform a relation of enmity into one of civic friendship. Unlike those who presuppose a moral community that needs to be restored or a notion of reasonableness that the conflicting parties need to appeal to, an agonistic approach to reconciliation claims that a common political community and a notion of reasonableness are the result of political deliberation and contestations which inevitably involve power relations. Schaap's account is seemingly appealing because of its emphasis on the operation of power relation in politics and identity formation and the persistence of conflict and disagreement in politics. However, his account is problematic because, among other things, it endorses hybrid and fluid notions of culture and identity that lead to abstractions from the concrete experiences of

¹³ Muldoon, 'Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa', p. 194.

exclusion, fails to offer practical proposals to cash out the agonistic ideas, and considerably downplays the significance of authoritative and distinctive cultural traditions on forming collectivities and cultural boundaries.¹⁴

The appropriate form of the politics of reconciliation

Thus far I have explored several main approaches to reconciliation and demonstrated their inadequacies. Moreover, the previous chapter has examined the revised notions of intercultural dialogue and deliberation enthusiastically proposed by Bhikhu Parekh, Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr to effectively accommodate historical exclusion suffered by social groups. These notions, it has been argued, enjoy a number of different merits but suffer from various serious weaknesses. More precisely, the previous chapter has argued that these accounts of deliberation and intercultural dialogue are not satisfactory because they tend to overlook the significance of fundamental issues that underlie the claims of historically excluded social groups. These issues include: collective memory of exclusion, acknowledgment of historical injustices, and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices.

This section of the chapter argues that these three crucial issues and several other relevant ones are better captured by a particular account of the politics of reconciliation. The argument advanced here is that since this account of the politics of reconciliation adequately encompasses these three principles it becomes a crucial element in addressing demands of historically excluded social groups. Put differently, the inclusion of the three core issues of memory, acknowledgement and responsibility and apology, endow it with the ability to be sufficiently attentive to the specificities of the defining experiences of historical oppression and exclusion.

Let me now start characterizing the form of the politics of reconciliation that is most adequate to effectively accommodate historical exclusion and oppression. Unlike those who tend to individualise and psychologise the process of reconciliation

¹⁴ Andrew Schaap, 'Agonism in Divided Societies', *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, 32:2 (2006), pp. 255-277; For more on other agonistic accounts of reconciliation see: Aletta J. Norval, *The Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse* (New York: Verso, 1996); Colin Perrin and Scott Veitch, 'The Promise of Reconciliation' *Law, Text, Culture*, 4:1 (1998), pp. 225-232; Jacques Derrida, *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness* (London: Routledge, 2001).

in the sense of reducing it into an interpersonal process or an intrapsychic process, the analysis here views it as an inter-group process that is embedded in power relations.¹⁵ Longstanding common experiences of oppression give rise to a set of special claims and demands that go beyond the mere recognition of culture and identity and the postulation of abstract egalitarian principles of deliberation and justice. Most importantly among these demands are: collective memory of exclusion, acknowledgement of historical injustices, and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices. These three demands emerge and require special treatment because of the significance of the past in achieving democratic accommodation through unmasking and explaining historical injustices and their intimate connection with present inequalities. I will start by discussing and explaining the centrality of the three, often, overlooked principles of memory of exclusion, acknowledgment and responsibility and apology to the politics of reconciliation and then I will move, in the next part, to examine other constitutive characteristics of reconciliation¹⁶ that will be derived from refuting often raised charges against reconciliation.

Firstly, the politics of reconciliation that this thesis favours is one that recognizes the significance of collective memory and history of exclusion. Collective memory and history of exclusion are important, according to this account of reconciliation, because they often serve as invaluable sources for undermining and confronting the dominant views, stories, narratives and past and present political arrangements and practices. These dominant views, stories, narratives and political arrangements tend to downplay or deny historical injustices and harms. In other words, collective memory and history of exclusion operate as counter narratives to the hegemonic institutionalized and often celebrated account of national history. The

¹⁵ For more on this point see: Rouhana, Nadim N., 'Identity and Power in the Reconciliation of National Conflict', in Alice H. Eagly, Reuben M. Baron and V. Lee Hamilton (eds.), *The Social Psychology of Group Identity and Social Conflict: Theory, Application, and Practice* (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2004), p. 174.

¹⁶ See for example: Carol A.L. Prager and Trudy Govier (eds.), *Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts* (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2003), p.3. They emphasize the issue of acknowledging past injustices and harms. Eric Yamamoto and Susan Serrano argue that reconciliation necessarily involves what they call 'the four R's': recognition, responsibility, reconstruction, and reparations for victims. For more see: Eric K. Yamamoto and Susan K. Serrano, 'Healing Racial Wounds? The Final Report of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission', in Roy L. Brooks (ed.), *When Sorry Isn't Enough: The Controversy over Apologies and Reparations for Human Rights* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), pp. 492-500. See: William J. Long and Peter Brecke, *War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution*, (The MIT Press, 2003).

significance of these counter narratives is to bring to public attention voices, stories, inequalities that either have been silenced or denied. The national account of history either denies or downplays the occurrence of past harms and portrays the dominant group as irresponsible for causing these harms. Several scholars have emphasized the role of collective memory as challenging and countering the hegemonic national accounts of history. Thomas McCarthy has pointed out that a distorted account of the history of slavery and its consequences on African Americans has considerably contributed to the refusal of the broader white American society and its establishment to recognize the historical injustices of slavery, to take responsibility for causing them and for linking them to present racial exclusions.¹⁷ In his analysis of the case of reconciliation in South Africa and Australia, Paul Muldoon points out the significance of what he calls, following Heribert Adam, 'divided memory' in casting doubts and undermining the national narrative and moral foundations of its political order.¹⁸ Burke Hendrix has argued that the mainstream celebrated American national narratives downplay or deny the historical injustices and harms of slavery, racial segregation and the massive expropriation of Native lands. While focusing on the land claims of Native Americans, Hendrix has argued that memories and narratives of Native Americans that lend support to their land claims have challenged the mainstream American national narratives and demanded their revision and reformulation so they acknowledge the historical injustices committed against Native Americans.¹⁹ Historically excluded social groups are often suspicious of the universal formal discourse of legal equality that tends to underestimate or disqualify, and in many cases deny, their stories and memories of oppression and exclusion. The politics of reconciliation provides a more hospitable platform for these memories and stories

¹⁷ See: Thomas McCarthy, 'Vergangenheitsbewältigung in the USA: On the Politics of Memory of Slavery', *Political Theory*, 30:5 (2002), pp. 623-648; 'Coming to Terms with Our Past, Part II: On the Morality and Politics of Reparations for Slavery', *Political Theory*, 32:6 (2004), pp. 750-772.

¹⁸ Muldoon, 'Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa', pp. 182-196.

¹⁹ Burke Hendrix argues that both groups need to revise their memories in a process of reconciliation. However, she insists that the revision has to occur mostly on the side of those who are not Natives. For more on her views regarding the significance of memories in Native American land claims see: Burke A. Hendrix, 'Memory in Native American Land Claims', *Political Theory*, 33:6 (2005), pp. 763-785. For more on the role of memory see also: Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, Lewis A. Coser (ed. and trans.) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); *The Collective Memory*, Francis J. Ditter, Jr. and Vida Yazdi Ditter (trans.) (New York: Harper & Row, 1980); and Milton Takei, 'Collective Memory as the Key to National and Ethnic Identity: The Case of Cambodia', *Nationalism & Ethnic Politics*, 4:3 (1998), pp. 59-78.

to be expressed and voiced.²⁰ In previous chapters I have argued that egalitarian theories of deliberative democracy are problematic because, among other things, their abstract procedures and rules either tend to ignore or downplay the specific and defining experiences of the oppressed social groups by abstracting and subjecting them to generic and universal concepts of justice and rights.²¹

However, voicing these memories and stories of exclusion is crucial but not sufficient because they also need to be acknowledged. This leads us to the second principle of reconciliation, namely acknowledgment. Reconciliation necessarily involves acknowledging these historical injustices and sufferings and seeks to repair them. As long as these past injustices are denied or portrayed as accidental historical incidents and not as an integral part of the national narratives, the achievement of democratic accommodation is hardly attainable, if at all, from the perspective of the historically oppressed social groups. Hendrix has argued that unless past wrongs against their ancestors are acknowledged as an integral part of the United States history, it will be very hard for Native Americans to trust the broader society and its institutions and identify with them.²² Thomas McCarthy has advocated a similar argument in the case of African Americans and the history of slavery and segregation.²³

²⁰ It should be emphasized here that I am not implying that reconciliation is always inclusive. Sometimes the mandate of the reconciliatory bodies is narrow and specifies certain types of atrocities and injustices that should be addressed and therefore excludes other crucial types of injustices. The denial and exclusion of these injustices lead to a distorted form of reconciliation. In Argentina for example, reconciliation processes addressed only the disappearances and killings leaving a considerable number of cases of torture and political detention unaddressed.

²¹ In his analysis of the paradoxes that are invested in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, Emiliios Christodoulidis argues that law or justice inevitably require classification and categorization that necessarily lead to abstractions and reductions and therefore fail to grasp the complexities, contingencies and particularities of persons and events. Conversely, reconciliation is sensitive to these particularities, complexities and contingencies because it embraces flexibility, plasticity and reflexivity. Christodoulidis argues that the Truth and reconciliation Commission in South Africa is trapped in a paradox that stems from being simultaneously a public confessional forum and a legal juridical tribunal. He contends that law and reconciliation or justice and mercy are incompatible. For while law requires the reductions of risk, reconciliation necessarily demands openness, risk, and reflexivity. See: Emiliios A. Christodoulidis, '“Truth and Reconciliation” as Risks’ *Social and Legal Studies*, 9:2 (2000), pp. 188-190.

²² Hendrix, 'Memory in Native American Land Claims', pp. 775.

²³ McCarthy, 'Vergangenheitsbewältigung in the USA: On the Politics of Memory of Slavery', *Political Theory*, 30:5 (2002), pp. 635-636. The issue of acknowledging past injustices and harms is also discussed in: Carol A.L. Prager and Trudy Govier (eds.), *Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts* (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2003); and William J. Long and Peter Brecke, *War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution*, (The MIT Press, 2003).

The demand of acknowledgement is intimately linked to third principle of reconciliation, i.e., taking responsibility and offering an apology. Reconciliation does not only require the acknowledgment of historical injustices and grievances but also expects the oppressor(s) and dominators to take responsibility for causing these injustices and offer public apology. Taking responsibility and offering an apology are of great significance not only because of moral reasons of admitting wrongs but also due to practical concerns such as redistribution of material resources and holding alleged criminals accountable. Additionally, taking responsibility and offering an apology for past injustices go beyond distributive changes and entail activities such as the creation of national symbols, public holiday, museums, memorials and introducing new curriculum in the education system to commemorate these past injustices.²⁴ The task of these activities is not to romanticise and perpetuate guilt or victimhood. Rather, they are significant because of their social and pedagogical influence. That is, they are important because they help citizens to differently understand their history and its connection to the current distorted political, social and economic inequalities. Furthermore, they help members of stigmatized and excluded social groups to reclaim, re-describe or transform their self-understanding and self-image.²⁵ Lately many liberal politicians, such as the prime minister of Britain Tony Blair and the prime minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi, have offered public apologies for the injustices and grievances that were committed by their countries in Asia and Africa. These apologies are ineffective for they often take spurious responsibility that fails to understand the claims of the previously oppressed peoples and does not involve real transformations

²⁴ In the literature there is a distinction between two general forms of reparation. The first is called compensatory and often directed toward individuals and the second form is called rehabilitative and directed towards groups. These reparations can be either monetary or non-monetary. Examples of non-monetary reparations are amnesty, apology, affirmative actions and services such as health and education. Non-monetary reparations 'can be more effective than cash in responding to the victims' individual or collective current needs.' See: Roy L. Brooks, 'The Age of Apology', in Brooks, Roy L., (ed.), *When Sorry Isn't Enough: The Controversy over Apologies and Reparations for Human Rights* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), pp. 3-11.

²⁵ For more on taking responsibility and offering an apology and their material and symbolic consequences see: Eric K. Yamamoto and Susan K. Serrano, 'Healing Racial Wounds? The Final Report of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission', in Roy L. Brooks (ed.), *When Sorry Isn't Enough: The Controversy over Apologies and Reparations for Human Rights* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), pp. 492-500; McCarthy, 'Coming to Terms with Our Past, Part II: On the Morality and Politics of Reparations for Slavery', pp. 765-766; Balfour, 'Reparations After Identity Politics', p. 790; and Martha Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998).

and serious compensations and reparations.²⁶ Briefly, in many cases of historical exclusion acknowledging and taking responsibility and offering an apology are incomplete if they remain either symbolic or exclusively take the form of material compensation.

The question of responsibility becomes even more complicated when the perpetrators are not alive and belong to a previous historical period or when the society is composed from successive and culturally diverse waves of immigration. Yet while it is quite plausible not to charge current generations of the injustices committed by their ancestors, it is not unreasonable to see them politically (not personally)²⁷ responsible because they are beneficiaries of the resources and gains of the historical injustices committed by their ancestors.²⁸ Additionally, the current situation and circumstances of several excluded social groups have explicit and causal link to past injustices. For example, it is plausible to argue that the current socioeconomic situation of the African Americans is related to their history of slavery.²⁹ Furthermore, some scholars argue that some psychological fears of previously oppressed and persecuted generations pass to current generations 'through emotional ties and identities.'³⁰ To sum up, for the politics of reconciliation to achieve an effective

²⁶ For more on apology see: Roy L. Brooks (ed.), *When Sorry Isn't Enough: The Controversy over Apologies and Reparations for Human Rights* (New York: New York University Press, 1999); For a useful discussion on apology as a social, dyadic (involves two parties offended and offender) and relational concept and practice and its different modes see: Nicholas Tavuchis, *Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991).

²⁷ Following Hannah Arendt several scholars have convincingly distinguished between personal responsibility and political responsibility. The latter is distinct from the former in being both vicarious and involuntary. Andrew Schaap argues that political responsibility is 'vicarious because a citizen may be held liable for things he or she did not do and it is involuntary because it results from his or her (typically not chosen) membership of a political community'. Andrew Schaap, 'Guilty Subjects and Political Responsibility: Arendt, Jaspers and the Resonance of the 'German Question' in Politics of Reconciliation', *Political Studies*, 49:4 (2001), pp. 749-766.

²⁸ Janna Thompson insists that the responsibility of members of a nation necessarily includes accepting responsibility over the actions of their ancestors. Janna Thompson, *Taking Responsibility for the Past: Reparation and Historical Injustice* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).

²⁹ For more on this point see: McCarthy, 'Vergangenheitsbewältigung in the USA: On the Politics of Memory of Slavery', p. 636; 'Coming to Terms with Our Past, Part II: On the Morality and Politics of Reparations for Slavery', pp. 757-758; Balfour, 'Reparations After Identity Politics', p. 790; and Hendrix, 'Memory in Native American Land Claims', p. 775.

³⁰ For more on these claims of responsibility see: Roy L. Brooks (ed.), *When Sorry Isn't Enough: The Controversy over Apologies and Reparations for Human Rights* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), pp. 8, 417-421; Muldoon, 'Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa,' *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 49:2 (2003), pp. 191, 193-194;

accommodation of historical injustice it should fully capture these three fundamental issues that lie at the core of demands of historical exclusion.

Part II

Additional characteristics and main charges against the politics of reconciliation

Thus far, it has been argued that the most adequate form of the politics of reconciliation is one that places significant emphasis on confronting the past, acknowledging injustices and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices. The emphasis on these issues is important because it helps to bring into public attention the specificities of the experiences of oppression and the present political and social inequalities and the need to transform them. The politics of reconciliation, it is often believed, promotes essentialism, views members of oppressed social groups as epistemically privileged in understanding their own condition, supports a politics of revenge that romanticizes the past, and presupposes consensus and unity among the members of the excluded social group. In the following paragraphs, I aim to present some additional characteristics of the politics of reconciliation and demonstrate how it refutes most of these challenges. Put differently, these characteristics, I will argue, considerably enhance the ability of the politics of reconciliation to efficiently accommodate demands of historically excluded social groups.

The version of the politics of reconciliation defended in this thesis is one that simultaneously refuses the blindness of deliberative democracy to history and avoids several main risks of 'identity politics' and post-structuralism. Unlike egalitarian theories of deliberation that adopt a 'strategy of avoidance;' i.e., a strategy that relegates fundamental characters of gender, ethnicity, national belonging and other cultural characteristics to the background of politics, the politics of reconciliation shares with the politics of recognition the claim that these characteristics need to be taken seriously. Put differently, the politics of reconciliation refers to these characteristics as fundamental components to politics and its agents, i.e., individuals. The politics of reconciliation refuses to cast individuals as abstracted and

and McCarthy, 'Coming to Terms with Our Past, Part II: On the Morality and Politics of Reparation for Slavery', *Political Theory*, 32:6 (2004), pp. 750-772.

decontextualized entities that live out of time and history. Rather, it clearly favours a notion of selfhood that views individuals as embedded beings in history, society, culture and tradition. The experiences of exclusion and oppression are likely to enhance the feelings of connectedness to particular systems of beliefs and norms.

However, the account of reconciliation I defend here is one that does not fully endorse the essentialism found in identity politics in which oppressed social groups are viewed as possessing a fixed and unified identities. Rather, it recognizes the existence of authoritative traditions that enable a communal character. Seemingly the politics of reconciliation entails an essentialist notion of culture because it requires processes that involve discrete and delineated conflicting sides. It is not implausible, however, to claim that in addition to its sensitivity to particularities and complexities of oppression, the politics of reconciliation demands transformations that could bypass the challenge of essentialism. The transformative character of reconciliation requires the redefinition of the relationships between the 'self' and the 'other' in a more constructive manner that obscures, to certain extent, the previous rigid boundaries of 'us' and 'them' which have led to rejection, exclusion and violence. While this power of transformation points out towards a certain flexibility in identity and culture, it is far from endorsing a hybrid and fluid notion of culture, a notion that is usually endorsed by post-structuralist critics of identity politics. Indeed, the politics of reconciliation acknowledges that social and cultural transformations take time and do not occur fast. Briefly, the politics of reconciliation that is presented here strikes a very fine balance because it occupies a mid point between essentialism and non essentialism. Moreover, while the integrative approaches make the most progress towards offering a form of democratic inclusion that is more attentive to historical injustices, their accounts remain insufficient because either they overlook fundamental principles of reconciliation such as responsibility and apology or when they recognize the role of memory they insist on the symmetry and equality of memory and history between the victim and the oppressor.

The politics of reconciliation recognizes that passionate modes of speech such as testimony and story-telling are fully legitimate modes of communication and expression.³¹ However, this does not entail the rejection of rational argument. In other

³¹ John Borneman focuses on reconciliation processes after extreme violent conflicts such as ethnic cleansing and argues in favour of the primacy of the practice of listening or witnessing. This activity of listening or witnessing is a constitutive tool for healing after a violent conflict. Witnessing, Borneman

words, contrary to various models, such as the egalitarian models of deliberation, where emotions are usually divorced from rationality and viewed as external or irrelevant to deliberative processes of problem solving, the politics of reconciliation insists on the significance of emotions together with reasons to conflict resolution. Reconciliation does not only involve rational calculation but also deep and intensive emotional responses. By according a significant role for narration and story-telling which are likely to involve diverse interpretations, the politics of reconciliation secures room for contestations rather than conformism and homogeneity. This leads us to the charge of consensus against reconciliation.

Contrary to scholars such as David Crocker who views the politics of reconciliation as leading to harmony and consensus or conversely to minimal workable coexistence, the politics of reconciliation defended here neither aims at minimal coexistence nor consensus. Rather, it aspires to sustainable coexistence. The politics of reconciliation is not necessarily consensual because invoking historical narratives and memory of exclusion secures contestations and conflicts. In other words, according to this understanding of reconciliation the past is not viewed as a fixed factual entity but as a realm of experience that gives rise to different and conflicting interpretations, narratives and memories. Some of these interpretations, narratives, and memories will be settled and some of them will remain contested. Therefore, reconciliation provides a platform for voicing, discussing and confronting deeply contested and controversial political issues in a context in which their denial or avoidance is likely to lead to an ineffective and unstable political system. In discussing the goal of reconciling former enemies, David Crocker distinguishes between three meanings of reconciliation 'ranging from "thinner" to "thicker" conceptions.' The first meaning is a mere *modus vivendi*; minimal coexistence between former enemies who comply with agreed procedures and laws instead of violence. This form is called 'simple coexistence.' The second meaning requires more engagement in public affairs and the show of respect to fellow citizens. In other words, though the parties still disagree, they are expected to do more than just 'live together non-violently.' This form of reconciliation is called by Mark J. Osiel 'liberal social

insists, is different from confessing in several ways. While confessing that aims to achieve forgiveness, focuses on the perpetrator and is often imposed, witnessing focuses on the victim and is voluntary. The ultimate aim of witnessing or listening is truth telling that creates an opportunity for new experiences and horizons and changes social situations. Borneman, 'Reconciliation after Ethnic Cleansing: Listening, Retribution, Affiliation', *Public Culture*, 14:2 (2002), pp. 281-304.

solidarity' and by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson 'democratic reciprocity.'³² A thicker conception of reconciliation is the one that lies at the core of truth commissions like the ones in Chile and in South Africa. In this more robust form of reconciliation, the attempt is to go through reconciliatory processes that involve 'forgiveness, mercy (rather than justice), a shared comprehensive vision, mutual healing, or harmony.'³³ This latter form of reconciliation, Crocker maintains, is more challenging to defend. As he puts it: 'Given the depth of hostility between past opponents and objections to coercing mutuality or contrition, these thicker conceptions of reconciliation are more difficult to defend than the thinner notions.'³⁴ While the author is right to imply that the first two models; *modus vivendi* and 'democratic reciprocity,' are primarily about managing conflicts, he is wrong in presenting them as milder forms of reconciliation. For reconciliation, as its main hitherto discussed principles have indicated, is not about minimal agreed procedures of maintaining a relatively peaceful situation, but it aspires to attain a more transformative optimistic and substantial form of politics. Put differently, unlike conflict resolution and management, the case of *modus vivendi* and 'democratic reciprocity,' that seek to achieve compromises and agreements on minimal principles and procedures that reflect the existing distorting power relations between the conflicting groups, reconciliation necessarily requires deeper transformations and reparations that profoundly undermine the existing 'balance' of power and distribution of resources.³⁵

Reconciliation has a very particular transformative power. Though it cannot guarantee a complete healing,³⁶ reconciliation necessarily requires both the promotion

³² David A. Crocker, 'Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework', in Carol A.L. Prager and Trudy Govier (eds.), *Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts* (Waterloo Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2003), p. 54.

³³ Crocker, 'Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework', p. 54.

³⁴ Crocker, 'Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework', p. 55.

³⁵ Nadim Rouhana draws a very useful distinction between three different processes: conflict settlement, conflict resolution and reconciliation. For more on this distinction see: Rouhana, Nadim N., 'Identity and Power in the Reconciliation of National Conflict', in Alice H. Eagly, Reuben M. Baron and V. Lee Hamilton (eds.), *The Social Psychology of Group Identity and Social Conflict: Theory, Application, and Practice* (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2004), pp. 174-176.

³⁶ In some cases providing testimonies about suffering and oppression invoke repressed and denied feelings, pains and memories that might worsen the situation of the victims. Other victims are not willing to meet their oppressors because they feel that confronting them will expose them to dangers

of existing and the creation of new, mechanisms of healing to address psychological, emotional and social problems. Prolonged subjection to oppressive social and political regimes and various types of exclusion and rejection lead human beings to suffer emotionally, psychologically and socially. This suffering could take various forms such as injury, pain, shame, low self-esteem, anger depression, guilt, despair and what is known in psychology as 'post-traumatic stress disorder.' Healing could take different forms and faces such as creating memorials and monuments for the killed people, naming public places in the honour of victims, conducting religious and spiritual activities, forming solidarity groups and using artistic modes to express suffering and oppression.³⁷ While dealing with these emotional and psychological disorders requires a cognitive recognition and change, healing the political exclusions and rejection should be translated into institutional changes that correspond to a new agenda of resources allocation. This is particularly important because while psychological support and healing are crucial for the victims, reconciliation has to influence and enhance their material and social conditions. The healing powers of reconciliation, therefore, indicate the transformative potential implicit in it. For former antagonists change their own views or at least tend to rethink them. Reconciliation aspires to overcome rooted mistrust and antagonism between historically conflicting social groups. It involves a stage of transition and transformation for something new. Regardless their character and deepness, reconciliatory events entail a *liminal* stage. It is a stage of transition and in-betweenness that involves disorientation and displacement and therefore allows space for reflexivity and criticism. This reflexivity could lead to different outcomes in their nature and strength. Eventually, these outcomes are not characterized by exhaustive and conclusive integration between the former adversaries, rather an enhanced new negotiated setting of coexistence is created. While this new setting recognizes contestations and the persistence of conflicts, it does not aim to achieve minimal simple coexistence but one that is sustainable.

and deteriorate their psychological and emotional situation. This is particularly true when the perpetrators are not persecuted.

³⁷ For more on these healing methods and others see: See Daan Bronkhorst, *Truth Commissions and Transitional Justice: A Short Guide for Users* (Amnesty International Dutch Section, 2003), pp. 24-25.

Finally, it is often said that the politics of reconciliation inhibits mutual understanding and dialogue because it assigns an epistemic privilege to the excluded in understanding their own experiences and conditions. This accusation is not persuasive because the politics of reconciliation advocated here is one that seeks and embraces the solidarity of international and local organizations and activists and therefore extends the struggle beyond the narrow boundaries of the particular excluded social group.³⁸ This solidarity does not only help the politics of reconciliation refute the charge raised against it as inhibiting dialogue and mutual understanding because it supposedly views the oppressed as epistemically privileged in understanding their own conditions, but also helps it to meet the challenge of essentialism through welcoming the participation of non-members in the struggle against exclusion and oppression. In other words, seeking and embracing local and international solidarity undermine the claims of those who accuse the politics of reconciliation as promoting essentialism and supporting the view that experiences of exclusion give rise to particular perspectives and feelings that are fully transparent and accessible only to the oppressed and can hardly be grasped by those who do not live these experiences of exclusion.

The relationship between the politics of reconciliation, deliberation and recognition.

Thus far, I have defended the politics of reconciliation against certain potential challenges and explored various characteristics that demonstrate the attractiveness of reconciliation to accommodate the demands of historically excluded social groups. The diverse characteristics of reconciliation together with its accommodation of the three core issues of memory, acknowledgement and responsibility and apology, endow it (i.e., reconciliation) with the ability to be sensitive and sufficiently capture the specificities of the experiences and claims of historical oppression and exclusion. A fundamental question that emerges here, however, regards the relationship between the politics of reconciliation, deliberation and recognition. Does the politics of reconciliation entail surrendering deliberation and recognition? Are these concepts

³⁸ Martha Biondi stresses the importance of a transnational and national solidarity with the African Americans' reparations movement. See her article: 'The Rise of Reparations movement', *Radical History Review*, 87 (2003), p. 15.

incompatible or complementary ones? This section argues that reconciliation, deliberation and recognition are compatible. That is, when dealing with historical injustices and aiming to settle them, the politics of reconciliation is a crucial supplement to deliberation and recognition. In other words, in historically divided societies the politics of reconciliation is inevitable to sufficiently accommodate the demands of historically excluded social groups.

Unlike scholars such as Emiliios Christodoulidis and Andrew Schaap who, though they hold slightly different views, propose reconciliation as a substitute to ordinary politics in divided pluralistic societies, I argue that reconciliation is not a comprehensive frame for the operation of politics but a supplement to deliberation and recognition.³⁹ Put differently, I argue that in order to successfully accommodate demands and experiences of historical exclusion and oppression, we cannot and should not embark on deliberation and recognition without guaranteeing the operation of the politics of reconciliation. Several scholars such as Emiliios Christodoulidis have viewed reconciliation as a future oriented notion (in the sense that it is forward-looking) that offers a complete and exhaustive frame for the operation of politics in divided societies. These views are unconvincing not only because they downplay the significance of the past in present politics and reduce it to symbolic accessories, but also because reconciliation tends to lack a regulative procedural character that is required to move forward into ordinary political decision-making. Reconciliation is primarily a backward oriented concept that recognizes memory of exclusion and asymmetries in power relations. Deliberation is primarily a forward oriented concept that provides regulative procedures for taking decisions. Consequently, reconciliation and deliberation fulfil different and complementary tasks. While the principal task of reconciliation is to insist on the significance of the historical dimension in claims of historically excluded social groups, the main task of deliberation is to provide regulative principles that govern political deliberation and decision-making. However,

³⁹ Though these scholars have some differences in their views, they all favour an agonistic form of politics. Besides their failure to translate their views and ideas into practical detailed accounts on how reconciliation operates, they implicitly end up, unwillingly, adopting what they strongly reject, i.e., impartiality. The demand that reconciliation transforms people's views through mutual understanding inevitably requires the appeal to a notion of impartiality. It is this impartiality that they accuse liberalism and deliberative democracy of promoting. Moreover, their agonistic approaches favour hybrid and fluid notions of identity and culture that lead to a form of individualism that does not only fail to recognize the existence of authoritative and distinctive cultural traditions and boundaries, but also yields extreme abstractions from context. Additionally, these agonistic approaches to politics tend to over-exaggerate the indecisiveness, instability and fluidity of politics.

the politics of reconciliation is not compatible with any notion of deliberation. Rather it favours deliberation as presented in the integrative approaches. That is, deliberation which is hospitable to modes of speech other than rational argumentation. Put it differently, a thicker notion of deliberation which views modes of speech, such as story-telling, testimonies and greetings, as legitimate modes of political deliberation. Briefly, unlike those who view reconciliation as offering a complete frame for the operation of politics after confronting past atrocities and wrongs, its significance does not lie in its future oriented tendency because it lacks regulative principles that deliberation or theories of justice and recognition provide. Rather, its importance lies in its insistence on making the past relevant to the present and capturing the particularities and specificities of the experiences of exclusion and oppression.⁴⁰

The politics of reconciliation shares with the politics of recognition the fundamental centrality it assigns to experiences of exclusion in politics. In other words, the politics of reconciliation endorses the bias that the politics of recognition shows towards demands of excluded social groups. However, it goes beyond the politics of recognition in its emphasis on the significance of the historical dimension in cases of longstanding oppression and injustices. This historical dimension, it has been shown, gives rise to a set of specific claims that require a special treatment that is most adequately captured by a politics of reconciliation. The politics of reconciliation, therefore, operates as a medium for revealing and debating hitherto denied or repressed historical injustices that are intimately linked to present inequalities. In itself the politics of reconciliation does not offer a comprehensive frame for the operation of politics in historically divided societies but it is a crucial supplement.

The significance of reconciliation to deadly and long-standing conflicts between groups, states and communities such as genocide, forced migration or

⁴⁰ The claim that reconciliation embraces the specificities of experiences of exclusion and oppression and is sensitive to issues of context and situatedness is close to some views advocated by the feminist standpoint theory. However, it should be emphasized that the politics of reconciliation is not a standpoint theory. One main difference is that the politics of reconciliation rejects the claim of the standpoint theory that insists that members of excluded social groups have a 'privileged' understanding of their experiences of oppression and exclusion. For more on the standpoint theory see: Nancy Hartsock, *Money, Sex and Power: towards a feminist historical materialism* (New York: Longman, 1983); Sandra Harding, 'Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: what is 'strong objectivity'?', in Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter (eds.), *Feminist Epistemologies* (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 49-82; Liz Stanley and Sue Wise, *Breaking Out Again: Feminist Ontology and Epistemology* (London: Routledge, 1993); and Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka (eds.), *Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1983).

expropriation and slavery, is quite established in the literature. However, the claim that reconciliation is also applicable to milder social political conflicts is not a straightforward one and needs to be demonstrated. In other words, does reconciliation have any relevance to the claims of excluded social groups such as immigrants, religious and ethnic groups, and homosexual and lesbian communities? To which extent does reconciliation solve the problems of these groups? The following part tries to tackle these and other questions by examining primarily the applicability of the three principles of reconciliation (i.e., collective memory of exclusion, acknowledgment of historical injustices and finally taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices) to different types of group conflicts ranging from mortal to milder non-mortal forms of conflict.

Part III

The applicability of the three principles

This part examines the applicability of primarily three principles of reconciliation, namely, collective memory of exclusion, acknowledgment of historical wrongs and grievances, and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing them, to three different types of group or communal violent and non-violent conflicts. These conflicts are: national conflicts between contesting national and political groups; social, cultural and racial conflicts; and finally conflicts between indigenous communities and colonial societies.⁴¹ The purpose of this part is to demonstrate the operation of these principles in extreme lasting conflicts as well as in milder ones.⁴²

⁴¹ It is very plausible that the classifications and distinctions I present here are reductive and overlook subtle and substantial differences. Yet my aim here is not to offer an exhaustive list of group conflicts classified along different lines such as ethnicity, nationality, gender, life--style etc., but to show the applicability of reconciliation to different communal conflicts. Several scholars make different classifications. For example, in his discussion of the issue of social unity in liberal democracies, Will Kymlicka draws a distinction between immigrant communities and national minorities. He distinguishes between two types of diversity; 'polyethnic' diversity and multinational diversity. The former is the result of voluntary immigration and the latter is the result of 'involuntary incorporation of previously self governing societies.' He argues that unlike the demands of immigrant communities, that are usually demands of inclusion and full citizenship, the demands of national minorities pose serious challenges to the social cohesion and stability of liberal democracies. For more on this see: Will Kymlicka, 'Social Unity in a Liberal State', *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 13: 1 (1996) especially pp. 106-115.

⁴² Violent conflicts are those ones that involve physical violence and abuses such as killing, torturing, raping, and destroying property and infrastructure. Spite, contempt and psychological harms are

Showing the operation of these principles in different types of group conflicts ultimately serves to strengthen the argument advanced in this chapter about the significance of reconciliation to historically divided and pluralistic societies. I shall first examine the applicability of these principles to national conflicts, then move to social conflicts and end by considering conflicts between native communities and colonial societies. While the aim is to demonstrate the operation of these principles in different types of communal and inter-group conflicts, it should be emphasized that there is a kind of hierarchy or priority in the relevance of reconciliation in these types of conflicts. More specifically, in national conflicts where there is a strong case of historical exclusion, the politics of reconciliation is urgent, in conflicts between indigenous and colonial societies it is quite pressing, and in the case of social conflicts it is less pressing.

Conflicts between national political communities

How do the three principles of reconciliation, (memory, acknowledgment and responsibility and apology), apply to national political conflicts? The conflicts in these cases are usually between two conflicting political communities. The main driving force of the conflict is the national belonging or identities of the contesting parties. The conflicting sides are usually concentrated in bordering territories, sometimes overlapping and intersected. The claims of the conflicting groups are often articulated in the form of the right to national self-determination. The right to national self-determination takes different forms ranging from autonomy, self-government up to total secession. Secession, therefore, could be a plausible result of reconciliation. Yet, it has to be economically and politically viable and morally convincing.⁴³ In these types of group conflicts, regardless the kind of solution achieved, the three

included in the milder or non-violent conflicts all the while acknowledging that these forms of oppression might nevertheless feel very serious to the immediate victims, my point is to categorise types of conflict and not to belittle the suffering of any victims.

⁴³ For different justifications to secession and other related themes see: Beran Harry, 'The place of secession in liberal democratic theory', in Paul Gilbert and Paul Gregory (eds.), *Nations, Cultures and Markets* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1994); Percy P. Lehning (ed.), *Theories of Secession* (London; New York: Routledge, 1998); and Margaret Moore (ed.), *National Self-Determination and Secession* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

principles of reconciliation are straightforwardly applicable. If the solution is separation then it means the three principles apply and separation needs to be endorsed by the conflicting parties. If other forms of arrangements, such as federation and confederation, were achieved then the three principles are still essential and preliminary for sustaining the solutions reached. The examples of Quebec in Canada, apartheid South Africa, Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the conflict in Sudan between the central government and the rebels in the South, might be revealing here. Although the content, result and nature of reconciliation might be different in each of these cases, the three principles are directly applicable.

Let us briefly explore some examples. If we take the principle of collective memory, we can identify constructed histories, traditions and cultures that lead to discrete boundaries of 'imagined communities.'⁴⁴ Collective memory is essential in the construction of a collective sense of identity, it is no accident that all car number plates in the province of Quebec carry the motto 'I will remember'.⁴⁵ Lasting oppression and exclusion profoundly contribute to the formation of a very strong sense of collective memory and identity. For example, the displacement of the Palestinians from their lands in 1948, their struggle to get recognized as a nation, and their subjection to a continuous Israeli occupation have strongly contributed to the formation of their collective identity and memory.⁴⁶ The construction of a collective memory among certain, not all, Jewish communities in Europe was the result of European anti-Semitism and persecution, the Holocaust, and the growth of Zionist movements and it is to protect this memory that 'Holocaust denial' is criminalised. Whatever harm is involved in Holocaust denial must be explained in terms of historical memories in shaping a group's current identity. The emergence of the Zionist movement (it had different factions and schools of thought), conjured up

⁴⁴ See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

⁴⁵ On the role of collective memory in forming collective identities see: Milton Takei, 'Collective Memory as the Key to National and Ethnic Identity: The Case of Cambodia', *Nationalism & Ethnic Politics* 4:3 (1998), pp. 59-78; Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, Lewis A. Coser (ed. and trans.) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); *The Collective Memory*, Francis J. Ditter, Jr. and Vida Yazdi Ditter (trans.) (New York: Harper & Row, 1980).

⁴⁶ For a useful discussion on the construction of Palestinian collective memory and national identity see: Rashid Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity: The Genesis of Modern National Consciousness* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

motives, images from the Bible, secularized them and put them in the service of constructing a modern national Jewish identity.

As for the principle of acknowledging historical injustices and harms, the Palestinians claim that for a lasting just peace to be achieved, the state of Israel has to first recognize the historical injustices that have been caused to them by the establishment of the state of Israel on the ruins of their lands, villages and cities. The claim, however, does not stop here, Palestinians do not only demand mere recognition of these grievances in terms of monetary reparations, but also expect the state of Israel to take responsibility for causing these injustices and for it to offer an acknowledgement and apology. Several groups that have experienced relatively similar conditions have viewed these demands, i.e., three principles, as preliminary conditions for achieving sustainable coexistence and peace. The example of reconciliation between Germans and several European Jewish communities that are scattered in many parts of the world today is another example where these principles are applicable and the case is not necessarily state focused. It is reasonable to argue that the same principles are at work in the claims of the Armenian people demanding the recognition of their genocide caused by the Ottoman Empire, and the continued denial of an Armenian holocaust by the Turks that sustains part of Armenian national identity today. India, Pakistan and many other countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East are demanding an acknowledgment from Britain, France, Spain and other previous colonizing imperial powers about the historical exploitation and injustices that were caused, taking responsibility and offering public apology for causing them. Different forms of assistance (economic, developmental, military, humanitarian, medical etc.) and commemorating the harms and injustices through ceremonies, memorials, and museums are crucial supplements to apology, but they cannot be substitutes – the two must go side by side.

Hitherto, I have tried to show the relevance of main principles of reconciliation to enduring national conflicts. The significance of main principles of reconciliation to enduring national conflicts seems to be clear and straightforward. However, demonstrating the applicability of these principles to milder conflicts, such as multicultural social and cultural conflicts, seems to be more challenging.

Social, cultural and racial group conflicts

Social and cultural conflicts involve social groups such as immigrant communities, either from relatively poor neighbouring countries or previous colonies, which voluntarily came to the host countries as a cheap labour force or to search for better life opportunities.⁴⁷ Though these communities tend to live in the same neighbourhoods, for various reasons, at the national level they are dispersed in the sense that they are not concentrated in one area with territorial continuity. These communities tend to suffer from discrimination and exclusion based on their ethnicity, race and social class. Their demands and claims are often articulated in the form of achieving better living conditions and the ability to preserve their cultures and traditions. They do not have territorial claims or national aspirations but could ask for forms of cultural autonomy, respect of their norms and practices, and demand affirmative actions and policies to enhance their conditions and opportunities.⁴⁸ Some of the groups that fall under this category are viewed as relatively new arrivals and are *not* historically rooted in the host country. This latter point poses some challenges to the validity of the three principles because the line of history seems to play a crucial role in justifying the operation of the politics of reconciliation. Under this category fall certain excluded social groups, such as women, homosexuals and lesbians and the working class, who are not necessarily immigrants and still suffer from serious degrees of exclusion and discrimination. These groups are disadvantaged because of their social belonging, i.e., class or gender, religion etc. The social groups that are discussed here can be divided roughly into two types; immigrants or racial groups and social groups based on life style (homosexual, lesbian) and gender (women).

Let us try to exemplify the operation of the three principles in a few cases that fall under the first type. If we take the case of the African Americans in the U.S. and apply the first principle, i.e., collective memory of exclusion, then the issue of a collective memory of exclusion is central to their case for recognition. For these communities, dispersed in many states in US., had a prolonged history of slavery,

⁴⁷ Economic immigration is not entirely voluntary because many people are forced to leave their countries to escape severe economic conditions and search for better ones.

⁴⁸ Notice Kymlicka's distinction, in: Will Kymlicka, 'Social Unity in a Liberal State', *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 13: 1 (1996) especially pp. 106-115.

exclusion and discrimination. While the extreme case of slavery does not exist anymore these communities are still subject to discriminatory, exclusionist and racist policies that are imbedded in society and institutions. Their collective memory of exclusion has a clear presence in the literature, music, art and social movements of the African–American communities. While the American establishment has taken few steps to acknowledge (second principle) the history of slavery, and the harms and injustices caused to the African American communities and the stigma that still attaches to them as a former enslaved people, there is more work to be done at the level of taking responsibility (third principle) over causing these exclusions and injustices, offering apology, commemorating and anchoring these exclusions in the public life and official history of the U.S., and actively engaging in providing affirmative and inclusive policies to remedy them.⁴⁹

More challenging cases for the applicability of the three principles would be in milder conflicts such as the case of relatively new immigrant communities that have willingly arrived in hosting countries primarily for purposes of work. If we take for example the case of the Indian, Bangladeshi or Pakistani communities in the U.K., they are relatively new arrivals and one could argue that these communities do not have a strong sense of collective memory of exclusion as assimilation is often strong in some groups (the Indian community is more assimilated than the Bangladeshi or Pakistani communities). That said, one could point to the apparent breach of promise to former colonised peoples, who were brought into the community when needed, during time of war or time of labour shortages, but who find their welcome and inclusion withdrawn once they have settled. The alienation felt by many second generation South Asian immigrants is partly explained by this fact – they are no longer always welcomed, but they have no ‘homeland’ to return to as they are British. Furthermore, one can argue that these communities have been suffering from different forms of exclusion, discrimination and Islamophobia (this last one influences more the Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities) and we can point to a sense of collective memory of exclusion that exists and is now being reinforced. Taking responsibility in the case of immigrants who come to host countries of their own free will and

⁴⁹ For a useful discussion on the case of slavery and African Americans see for example: McCarthy, ‘*Vergangenheitsbewältigung* in the USA: On the Politics of Memory of Slavery’, *Political Theory*, 30:5 (2002), pp. 635-636; ‘Coming to Terms with Our Past, Part II: On the Morality and Politics of Reparation for Slavery’, *Political Theory*, 32:6 (2004), pp. 750-772; and Roy L. Brooks (ed.), *When Sorry Isn't Enough: The Controversy over Apologies and Reparations for Human Rights* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), particularly part 7, pp. 395-438.

following the request of the host countries to fill a shortage in the labour force is different than taking historical responsibility for causing injustices like in the case of the African Americans in the States. These new arrivals were mostly invited as a cheap labour. Most of these immigrants turned to be citizens after a few years. After being established in the host country, they brought their families and the young generation established new families. These communities have naturally grown with second and third generations of children. It is quite often claimed that the citizenship of the members of these groups is flawed, subject to confirmation and needs more qualifications from the larger society and its institutions. Since they are new arrivals and some of their social norms and cultural practices are different from the dominant norms and practices, they are often viewed as not, if at all, belonging to the nation.

Similar claims are often invoked in Germany against its Turkish and Kurdish origin residents and in France against its North African origins residents. These communities, in the U.K. as well as in Germany and France, live under unequal conditions compared to the rest of the society. The causes of these living standards are mostly, but not only, due to unfair treatment, discrimination and marginalization. The state and larger society are obliged to move beyond the usually invoked discourse of legal equality, acknowledge these social inequalities, mistreatments and discriminations. Once these people become citizens, the state and the larger society have a clear and direct responsibility for their conditions and treatments. Therefore, the state and the civil society do carry responsibility over the marginalization and exclusion of these communities. This form of responsibility is more subtle and milder than the one that results from longstanding exclusion and marginalization suffered by social groups such as African Americans nevertheless it has an important historical dimension that needs to be addressed in any attempt to overcome it.

The application of the three principles in cases of excluded social groups that are subject to marginalization and misrecognition, due to their gender and sexuality for example, seems to pose further challenges to the applicability of the principles of reconciliation. If we take the homosexual and lesbian communities we can talk about a thinner notion of collective memory of exclusion because of the fluidity of the structure of these social groups. Moreover, these members cross groups' boundaries in the sense that they belong to other types of groups that might also suffer from exclusion because of other reasons such as their religious affiliation, ethnicity or race. However, we can clearly talk about a sense of collectivity. For in many places in

contemporary modern Western societies we find homosexual or lesbian bars, literature, fashion, art etc. It is quite established that homosexuals were, and in many places are still, subject to persecution, exclusion and discrimination. Yet the problems of numbers (size) and the inter-groups character do not contribute to the formation of a strong sense of collective memory of exclusion. As for the principle of acknowledging mistreatments, injustices and exclusions, it is plausible to expect from the larger society and its institutions to recognize the unjustified mistreatment and misrecognition of homosexuals. Moreover, the society and its institution should take principal responsibility (third principle) for causing these mistreatments and exclusions, offer an apology and adopt inclusive policies that clearly work to remedy the injustices, sufferings and misrecognitions that have this crucial historical dimension. More specifically, it is plausible to argue that in the case of homophobia the process of reconciliation must take place between the institutions that have bolstered the legal and social discrimination, such as the church, and the excluded groups. In this case it is primarily the church which is supposed to apologize and take responsibility. Recent events in the Anglican communion have touched on claims by Gay and Lesbian Christians to be acknowledged by the wider community as victims of coercive marginalisation and misrepresentation. The issue of apology and acknowledgement in this case is more for the institution of the Church than for wider political institutions such as the State, but it does show how even in civil society the issue of reconciliation can form an important part in overcoming exclusion and injustice. In the case of the gay and lesbian communities, restoration is unlikely to take the form of material compensations such as money property etc. For their suffering is mostly emotional, psychological and social. Therefore, it is likely that their restoration claims will be non-monetary in the sense they demand the respect of their honour and identities and the introduction of new laws that remedy their exclusion but it could equally involve the public acknowledgement by the state of practices such as forced cures for homosexuality that formed part of the punishment of homosexual offences until de-criminalisation in the 1960s.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Daan Bronkhorst draws out a useful distinction between compensation, restitution, restoration, and reparation. Compensation refers to material forms of repair for things that cannot be regained. Examples include death and lost opportunity. Restitution refers to giving back lost property. Restoration refers to restoration of honour, dignity, identities and names. Reparation refers to the non-monetary things such as services of education, health, and the introduction of new laws in favour of the victims. See Daan Bronkhorst, *Truth Commissions and Transitional Justice: A Short Guide for Users* (Amnesty International Dutch Section, 2003), p. 26.

Though the previous examples have shown that the validity of principles of reconciliation in milder group conflicts is not as straightforward and pressing as in the case of longstanding violent conflicts, examining a few types of milder conflicts has indicated that it is very plausible to argue that the principles of reconciliation can operate in these types of conflicts within civil society as well. In the following paragraphs I will briefly examine the applicability of reconciliation to a particular type of conflicts, namely, conflicts between indigenous communities and colonial settler societies.

Conflicts between indigenous communities and colonial societies

In the case of conflicts between native communities and colonial societies the three principles seem to clearly apply. The case here is that colonial power(s), mostly Europeans, allowed and encouraged, or sometimes forced, some of their inhabitants to settle in the occupied foreign territories where they later established colonies and states at the expense of the indigenous local population. These indigenous populations were mostly executed and those of them who have survived have been subject to enduring mistreatment, discrimination, exclusion and persecution. Their rights, traditions and histories were denied and in the best case were ignored. The American Indians and the indigenous populations of Canada and Australia are examples that fall under this category.⁵¹ Now I will turn to showing the applicability of each of the three principles in the case of indigenous communities. As for the first principle, i.e., collective memory of exclusion, the state or the dominant group views the natives as distinctive groups with a particular inferior tradition and culture. These groups tend to have a very strong sense of collective memory of exclusion because of their continuous subjection to discrimination, exclusion and oppression. Many of these native communities in different parts of the world have been subject to long-lasting

⁵¹ For a good discussion on the case of native Americans see: Roy L. Brooks (ed.), *When Sorry Isn't Enough: The Controversy over Apologies and Reparations for Human Rights* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), particularly part 5, pp. 233-304; Burke A. Hendrix, 'Memory in Native American Land Claims', *Political Theory*, 33:6 (2005), pp. 763-785. On reconciliation in Australia see: Michael Phillips, 'Aboriginal Reconciliation as Religious Politics: Secularisation in Australia', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 40:1 (2005), pp. 111-124; and Paul Muldoon, 'Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa,' *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 49:2 (2003), pp. 182-196.

denial of rights. Their memories and identities are usually maintained through ceremonies, rituals, daily practices, story telling, oral history and the arts. The second principle is acknowledging historical injustices and the suffering they have caused. This suffering included severe forms of violence such as genocide and large-scale massacres. The dominant groups should recognize that these native communities have suffered from enduring and long-standing grievances. The second principle is crucial but not sufficient. For the dominant groups are expected to take direct responsibility for causing these sufferings and grievances. The larger society should recognize that their state has been established at the ruins of the culture, lands and houses of the native populations. Taking responsibility does not require only the willingness to restore and remedy these injustices and grievances through redistribution of resources, compensation, etc., but also what should accompany this willingness is a deliberate public apology. This public apology should not take the form of a passing one time announcement but must be anchored as an important historic event in the school's curriculum and annually remembered as public holiday to give few examples.

Thus far, my aim has been to demonstrate the operation of three principles of the politics of reconciliation, namely, memory, acknowledgment and responsibility and apology, in three different types of group conflicts. It has been shown that these principles are applicable in the three different communal conflicts. However, there is a kind of hierarchy or priority in the urgency of their relevance. Put differently, while in the case of national conflicts their relevance is urgent and quite straightforward and in conflicts between indigenous and colonial societies it is quite pressing, their relevance is less pressing in the case of social conflicts. Showing the applicability of the principles of reconciliation to mortal as well as milder conflicts contributes to strengthening the crucial significance of the politics of reconciliation to historically divided and multicultural societies.

Part IV

Institutional questions

This part briefly outlines institutional and practical questions related to reconciliation. In other words, in this part I will briefly tackle how we can cash out reconciliation in practical political context. How can we implement the principles of

reconciliation in historically divided and pluralistic societies? Which types of institutions should we form in order to implement the principles of reconciliation? Though addressing these questions requires a substantial and detailed discussion that is beyond the scope of this thesis, in the following paragraph I will discuss some institutional features while keeping in mind that these features do not represent an exhaustive list. Moreover, different mechanisms and designs can be devised to implement the principles of reconciliation. These different mechanisms and designs depend on the nature of injustices committed and the concrete conditions and context of oppression.

One of the potential avenues to institutionally implement reconciliatory processes is the formation of special bodies for this purpose. These bodies take the form of special committees or commissions. Several countries such as Argentina, Chile, South Africa and Germany, have established 'truth commissions' to deal with historical injustices and abuses of human rights. Let me briefly introduce some of the constitutive general features of these bodies. The features include the mandate, authority, budget, purpose, composition and duration. The special committees or commissions of truth and reconciliation are often contemporary formal and governmental bodies (but can be informal and non-governmental too). Their formation is the result of a parliamentary decision, a presidential order or a peace agreement between conflicting parties. They are set up to investigate patterns of exclusion, oppression and injustices. Their mandate is quite specific in the sense that they are authorized to investigate specific types of abuses and violations that were committed during a particular period of time. The members of these bodies, the number usually ranges between 10-20 persons, are often reliable and respected public figures such as academics, religious leaders, international experts and human right activists. These bodies are expected to come out with a comprehensive report which often includes binding recommendations for concrete policies including compensation and restorative actions, institutional reforms, developmental programs and prosecution of perpetrators. Sometimes the recommendations of these commissions include the creation of a permanent institution that monitors discrimination, exclusion, segregation, racism and other violations of human rights.⁵²

⁵² For more on these features and others see: See Daan Bronkhorst, *Truth Commissions and Transitional Justice: A Short Guide for Users* (Amnesty International Dutch Section, 2003), pp. 11-12. Also David Crocker outlines a general normative framework for reconciliatory processes that gives a

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the politics of reconciliation promises an effective accommodation to the demands of historically excluded social groups. More precisely, it has argued that the politics of reconciliation successfully encompasses three fundamental, often overlooked, issues which lie at the core of demands of historical exclusion and offers appealing answers to several accusations that are raised against it. The politics of reconciliation, it has been argued, proposes an effective accommodation of the demands of historically excluded social groups because its main principles and characteristics enable serious engagement with the specificities of experiences of historical exclusion and oppression.

More specifically, this chapter has suggested a fourfold argument. First, it has been demonstrated that the politics of reconciliation captures more adequately the issues of collective memory of exclusion, acknowledgement of historical injustices and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices. Second, the politics of reconciliation, it has been argued, offers convincing answers to several charges, such as essentialism and consensus, that are often levelled against it. Third, reconciliation should not be viewed as an alternative concept to deliberation and recognition but as a supplement to them. Fourth, the principles of reconciliation are applicable to milder or non-mortal conflicts as well as to mortal conflicts although their relevance is more urgent in the latter type. Part I of the chapter has advanced the first claim of the argument. After interrogating the existing literature on reconciliation, it has suggested that in light of the failure of integrative approaches (chapters 5 and 6) to sufficiently address the issues of collective memory of exclusion, acknowledgment of historical injustices and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices, issues of a great significance to historically excluded social groups, it has proposed the politics of reconciliation as the most adequate 'candidate' to tackle these issues. Part II of the chapter has advanced the second and third claims of the argument. It has argued that the politics of reconciliation needs not promote

significant institutional component to reconciliation. For more see: David A. Crocker, 'Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework', in Carol A.L. Prager and Trudy Govier (eds.), *Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts* (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2003), pp. 39-63.

essentialism, consensus and politics of revenge. The politics of reconciliation advocated in this chapter has refuted all of these charges. Furthermore, it has argued that reconciliation, deliberation and recognition are not competitive concepts but complementary ones. Put it differently, in order to attain an effective accommodation of claims of historical injustices suffered by social groups, the politics of reconciliation is an inevitable supplement to deliberation and recognition. Reconciliation is often viewed as an effective remedy to enduring violent (war, killing etc.) conflicts. Part III of the chapter, however, has suggested that reconciliatory processes are not solely applicable to mortal deadly conflicts, but also to milder conflicts that characterize contemporary modern multicultural societies. The last part has briefly outlined institutional and practical questions related to reconciliation.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has sought to follow certain contemporary attempts to recast liberalism and democracy in order to accommodate demands of historically excluded social groups. In particular, this thesis has provided a critical examination of four approaches to democratic inclusion. These approaches are: egalitarian theories of deliberative democracy, identity politics and its post-structuralist critics (regarded as two different and contradictory – but related approaches), and integrative approaches. The thesis has presented each approach as a successively more effective way of addressing democratic exclusion. Each theory has been measured against the demands of accommodating the claims of groups that have suffered some form of historical exclusion and injustice. The thesis has explained the significance of the demands of historical injustices in relation to these approaches and concluded that theories of deliberation and recognition require supplementation by ‘a politics of reconciliation’. The incompleteness of egalitarian theories of deliberative democracy, identity politics and its post-structuralist critics, and integrative approaches stems primarily from their failure to demonstrate a satisfactory attentiveness to core issues that underlie demands of historical exclusion. Most importantly among these issues are: collective memory of exclusion, acknowledgement of historical injustices, and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices. These three issues emerge and require special treatment that goes beyond the mere recognition of culture and identity and the postulation of abstract egalitarian principles of deliberation and justice; this is especially significant because of the importance of the past in achieving democratic accommodation through unmasking and explaining historical injustices and their intimate link with present inequalities.

I have argued that in order to achieve an effective accommodation of historical exclusion and injustice, certain understandings of deliberative democracy and the politics of recognition need to be complemented by ‘a politics of reconciliation.’ The politics of reconciliation is fundamentally crucial for the task of accommodating demands of historically excluded social groups primarily because of its emphasis on confronting the past, acknowledging injustices, taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices and embracing the concrete and specific

experiences of historical oppression and exclusion. The distinctiveness of reconciliation stems from its serious engagement with the specificities and particularities of real and concrete experiences of historical oppression and exclusion.

Subsequently, it has been argued that reconciliation is indispensable for effectively tackling demands of historically excluded social groups. However, reconciliation, recognition and deliberation are *not* rival concepts but complementary ones. They are complementary in the sense that reconciliation is not and should not be viewed as a conclusive and exhaustive alternative, but rather a crucial requirement to appropriately accommodate demands of historical exclusion and injustice. If the politics of recognition fails to give significant recognition to memory of exclusion, historical injustice and harm and the need to accept responsibility, it fails to offer genuine recognition. It is for this reason that recognition and reconciliation are inseparable if the former is to be a genuinely 'political' project. Reconciliation does not dispense with the insights of the social ontology of the politics of recognition, but it shows that social ontology does not in and of itself guarantee an appropriate political agenda. Moreover, it has been argued that reconciliation is not an exhaustive and conclusive frame for politics because it is primarily a backward-looking notion that lacks a regulative character. Deliberation is primarily a forward oriented concept that provides regulative procedures for taking decisions. Therefore, reconciliation and deliberation fulfil different and complementary functions. While the primary task of reconciliation is to insist on the significance of the historical dimension in claims of historical injustice, the principal task of deliberation is to provide regulative principles that govern political deliberation and decision-making.

In demonstrating the crucial necessity of complementing deliberation and recognition with reconciliation to satisfactorily accommodate claims of social groups that have suffered some form of historical oppression and injustice, I began by exploring, in chapter 2, the adequacy of the egalitarian theories of deliberative democracy of Rawls, Habermas and Gutmann and Thompson to accommodate the claims of historically excluded social groups. The chapter has found these deliberative theories wanting. More particularly, it has argued that these theories, despite their subtle and substantial differences, are insufficiently attentive to claims of historical exclusion and injustice. Rawls' notions of politics and public reason, it has been argued, give rise to several problems that make the task of accommodating historical injustices very difficult. Rawls' notions exacerbate problems of cultural imperialism,

denying the role of history and memory in politics, privileging elitist rational forms of communication, and excessive legalism. Gutmann and Thompson's theory of deliberative democracy, it has been demonstrated, suffers from several problems that undermine its ability to effectively accommodate claims of historical exclusion. These problems can be summed up as follows: ignoring the role of identities in generating political conflicts, postulating the mutual acceptance prior to the process of reconciliation, and the operation of the idea of reasonableness as a mechanism of exclusion. Habermas' theory of deliberative democracy, it has been argued, is also inadequate primarily because it: relies on excessive proceduralism and legalism, favours rational and disembodied modes of speech, brackets power relations from moral reasoning and determining 'reasonableness', and gives primacy to the state as the ultimate frame for political authority; this theory, therefore, fails to capture the claims of historically excluded social groups which undermine the notion of statehood by their demand to separate or secede.

The inadequacies of Rawls', Habermas', and Gutmann and Thompson' theories of deliberative democracy to appropriately accommodate demands of historically excluded social groups stem primarily from their failure to engage seriously with context, cultural embeddedness, identity and concrete experiences of exclusion and oppression. Consequently, this failure has led to a turn away from simple deliberation to a 'politics of recognition' which is based on a thicker notion of social ontology. In chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 I turned my focus to questions of social ontology that are undervalued by deliberative democracy and seem to underlie the claims of historically excluded social groups. The key ontological components that were discussed are self, culture, representation, and intercultural dialogue. The turn to a different social ontology than the one underlying deliberative democracy is what is offered by 'the politics of recognition' and 'integrative theories of democratic inclusion'.

Chapter 3 has examined Rawls' atomistic and Habermas' intersubjective notions of the self. Relying chiefly on communitarian criticisms, the chapter has argued that Rawls' and Habermas' notions of selfhood both significantly underplay the importance of culture, context and history in the process of identity formation for the sake of determining the governing principles and procedures of social justice and legitimacy. In other words, they both tend to view culture and history as insignificant to politics; namely, they see it as insignificant to achieve freedom, equality and social

justice. The chapter has argued that it is precisely this denial of the significance of history and culture to identity and politics which makes their theories insufficiently attentive to claims of historical injustices raised by historically excluded social groups. The communitarian critique has contributed considerably to the rise of a particular form of the politics of recognition, namely 'identity politics', which emphasizes embeddedness, situatedness and cultural distinctiveness and difference.

Chapter 4 has focused on 'identity politics' and its weaknesses. More precisely, it has discussed Charles Taylor's 'politics of recognition' and Judith Butler's criticisms of identity politics. Taylor has criticized the atomism and blindness to difference that lie at the core of dominant contemporary versions of liberalism. He has proposed to replace a difference-blind liberalism with 'the politics of recognition'. Taylor grounds his account of politics on a dialogical notion of selfhood that accords significant roles to identity, culture and difference. The chapter has argued that while Taylor's demand to give due recognition to excluded and oppressed social groups is an important progress that goes beyond the liberal notion of tolerance that underlie Rawls' and Habermas' theories, his notion of recognition seems to rely on an essentialist conception of culture which poses serious challenges to his account of democratic accommodation. Furthermore, the chapter has argued that while Butler's views pose some significant challenges to identity politics by revealing the oppositional logic that lies at its core and the important role power relations play in identity formation, her post-structuralist model of identity is not persuasive because, among other things, it postulates an experimental and hybrid self that is expected to continuously transcend and transform its limits and boundaries. This agonistic self looks like the liberal self in that it is detached from cultural and political contexts.

Chapter 5 has explored the ontological issue of representation which is viewed as one of the core components of democratic accommodation. The chapter has argued that the diverse notions of representation employed by proponents of identity politics, post-modern critics of identity politics, and integrative theorists are insufficiently attentive to demands of historically excluded social groups. More specifically, the chapter has argued that proponents of identity politics have primarily relied on a descriptive Aristotelian notion of representation when they demand the representation of excluded social groups. This descriptive Aristotelian notion, it has been argued, is problematic because it leads to the promotion of essentialism, fixation, closure, balkanization and homogeneity. To free identity and politics from the 'chains' of

essentialism, fixation and homogeneity, post-modern theorists such as Deleuze and Guattari have developed a non-essentialist and hybrid notion of representation. The chapter has claimed that Deleuze and Guattari's notion of representation is unpersuasive because while they try to avoid the risks of essentialism, closure, hierarchy and homogeneity, they celebrate excessive hybridity and fluidity that undermines the very possibility of politics and identity. Moreover, they do not provide guidance on how to transfer their views into concrete and practical mechanisms of representation. The dispute between those who view group representation as a positive tool to achieve inclusion and those who view it as a negative instrument that essentialises identities and reproduces existing hierarchies, has given rise to integrative approaches that aim to combine components from both sides and offer more elaborate notions of representation. The chapter has argued that the modified and integrative notions of representation proposed by scholars such as Iris Marion Young and Melissa Williams are attractive but incomplete. It has argued that while their notions of representation are more appealing than the hitherto discussed ones because of their attempt to take social inequalities, experiences of exclusion, history and memory seriously and combine procedural as well as substantive political principles, they remain insufficient.

Chapter 6 has focused on the integrative approaches of Bhikhu Parekh, Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr. It went on to argue that these approaches have not been entirely successful in fulfilling their promise to propose effective accounts of democratic inclusion which are capable of fully accommodating demands of historically excluded social groups. More precisely, the chapter has examined the revised notions of intercultural dialogue and deliberation enthusiastically proposed by Bhikhu Parekh, Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr. It has argued that while each of these three accounts has several different merits, each fails to fully accommodate claims of historical exclusion. Their failure, it has been argued, stems primarily from ignoring the significance of collective memory of exclusion (clearly not in the case of Dallmayr and to a lesser extent in the case of Benhabib), acknowledgment of historical injustices and harms, taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these historical injustices and harms.

Thus far, the discussion has been about the inadequacies of egalitarian theories of deliberative democracy, identity politics and its post-structuralist critics and integrative approaches to appropriately accommodate demands of historical exclusion

and oppression. Their inadequacies stem primarily, but not exclusively, from overlooking the significance of crucial issues that reside at the basis of the claims of historically excluded social groups. These crucial issues include: collective memory of exclusion, acknowledgment of historical injustices, and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these historical injustices.

Chapter 7 introduced the notion of reconciliation that is often discussed in International Relations and conflict resolution literatures. The chapter argued that it is 'the politics of reconciliation' that promises an effective accommodation to the demands of historically excluded social groups. More precisely, it has argued that the politics of reconciliation successfully encompasses the three overlooked issues that lie at the core of demands of historical exclusion and offers appealing answers to several accusations that are raised against it. The politics of reconciliation, it has been argued, proposes an effective accommodation to demands of historically excluded social groups because its main principles and characteristics enable serious engagement with the specificities of experiences of historical exclusion and oppression. More specifically, this chapter has suggested a fourfold argument. First, it has demonstrated that the politics of reconciliation captures more adequately the issues of collective memory of exclusion, acknowledgement of historical injustices, and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices. Second, the politics of reconciliation, it has been claimed, offers convincing answers to several charges, such as essentialism and consensus, which are often levelled against it. Third, reconciliation needs not be viewed as an alternative concept to deliberation and recognition but as a supplement to them. Fourth, the principles of reconciliation, it has been demonstrated, are applicable to milder as well as to mortal conflicts although their relevance is more urgent in the latter type.

The originality of this thesis lies in providing a supplement and therefore transforming the politics of recognition and deliberative democracy and their ability to address political problems of excluded social groups. This thesis has not aimed to replace deliberation and recognition with new substitutes but has sought to offer a new interpretation of these theories and supplement them with reconciliation. Briefly, the thesis has offered a new interpretation to familiar issues in different disciplines and the novel task has been to bring them together. The application of the ethic of reconciliation, from International Relations and conflict resolution, to the politics of recognition and deliberation makes a significant contribution to the field and the

opening of a new research agenda for normative theories of democratic inclusion. This new research agenda could open new avenues for further research that is more optimistic about the purpose of politics and its potential to improve citizens' lives, especially those who are underprivileged and excluded in modern pluralistic and divided societies. Moreover, it is worth examining what other implications the politics of reconciliation has on attempts to design more inclusive political systems.

Drawing on this Ph.D. thesis, one potential research avenue would be to explore further what the politics of reconciliation involves and develop a better understanding of the demands of historically excluded social groups in historically divided and pluralistic societies. This research avenue aspires to examine further the operation of the principles of reconciliation in specific types of conflicts in contemporary pluralistic societies. More specifically, it aims to explore indigenous traditions of dispute resolution. These indigenous traditions of conflict resolutions primarily deal with social disputes over land, family affairs etc. It is not implausible, however, to argue that these indigenous traditions could be extended (or at least could be inspiring and instructive) to deal with political and social disputes within and among different communities in contemporary pluralistic and divided societies. The proposed research avenue does not only aspire to explore the compatibility of indigenous traditions of dispute resolution with contemporary conceptions of procedural justice and deliberation, but also aims at offering guidelines in designing institutions and practical frameworks that engender the compatibility of these indigenous traditions with the modern procedures of justice and deliberation. This type of research is likely to combine normative analysis as well as empirical surveys to critically examine these indigenous mechanisms and their ability to settle political and moral disputes in contemporary pluralistic and divided societies. The indigenous tradition of conflict resolution within the Arab-Palestinian minority in Israel and the native Canadian tradition of conflict resolution could serve as possible case studies and it is to these traditions I hope to turn in subsequent research.

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