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Stakeholders' Perspectives on Naturalisation in the UK:
Implications for Citizenship and National Identity

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
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Abstract

Naturalisation, the process whereby a non-national becomes a citizen, is a space where the national boundaries are demarcated institutionally and symbolically. Despite this, social psychology has generally disregarded citizenship as a topic of research. Against this background, this thesis argues that citizenship is a dynamic concept embedded in a system of self-other relations. The thesis examines processes of national identity construction within the naturalisation context of the United Kingdom. In particular, this research explores representations of citizenship held by three key stakeholders: naturalised citizens, citizenship officers and the British government. Thirty-three interviews with new British citizens, twenty interviews with citizenship officers and four key policy documents on earned citizenship have been analysed. Building on the theory of social representations and on a dialogical understanding of human thinking and identity, the thesis draws links between identity and processes of knowledge construction. Identity is defined as a process of positioning towards social representations and others. In studying processes of identity construction and negotiation, emphasis is placed on the quality of self-other relations and on the antinomic and argumentative nature of thinking about the social world. This research shows that Britishness, within this context, is constructed on the basis of the opposing themes of progress and decline. Consequently, identity construction takes the form of a complex negotiation between opposing positions or voices. For new citizens, 'becoming British' is constructed as both enrichment for the self and as identity threat. Furthermore, for citizenship officers, migrants are seen as both a resource and a burden, which resonates with the official distinction between skilled (elite) and unskilled (non-elite) migrants. These findings illustrate the interplay between the symbolic and institutional aspects of positioning processes and highlight the need for further social psychological study of citizenship.

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Preface

Although social psychology has studied issues of group membership and boundary construction, citizenship has been generally absent from its field of interest, with more emphasis being placed on national identity. This reluctance to study citizenship is based on the commonly held view that national identity is a social form of belonging, whereas citizenship is seen solely as a legal concept defining the citizen's relationship to the state and to other citizens. Against this background, I argue that since social psychology deals with boundaries, identities and processes of exclusion and inclusion, citizenship as a socio-institutional form of membership provides a fruitful area of research.

Indeed, an examination of the development of the concept of citizenship shows that it is a dynamic concept which changes along with the re-formulation of national boundaries. Although it is usually framed in a supposedly unambiguous discourse of rights and duties, its association with immigration matters and broader societal changes places it at the centre of many current debates. As Anthias and Yuval-Davis argue, "immigration controls and nationality legislation are what define, both symbolically and actually, the boundaries of the national collectivity" (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992, p. 49). I believe, therefore, that considering citizenship a non-contested legal concept belies its constructed nature and its ideological functions (Stasiulis & Bakan, 1997). Citizenship is, in fact, located at the intersection of ideas of national identity, nationalism, ethnicity, group solidarity and accommodation of difference. Thus, by its very nature, it is closely associated with processes of inclusion and exclusion; in essence, citizenship is a way to achieve a balance between these two opposing poles.

The focus of this research is British citizenship and, in particular, the British naturalisation process. Naturalisation is directly linked with issues of membership since it is the process by which a non-member becomes a member of the national community. My interest in the topic was sparked by a 'paradigm change' in Britain's policy towards citizenship. Since 2001, the British government has tried to redefine citizenship within a framework of common values and social cohesion. Two prominent measures towards this goal have been the introduction of the citizenship ceremony and the citizenship test into the naturalisation process. Both the citizenship test, where one has to prove that one has sufficient knowledge of the UK and its customs, and the citizenship ceremonies, where people need to pledge allegiance to the Queen and the country to become citizens, show that citizenship is becoming more associated with

ideas of nationhood, cultural values and tradition. More recently, the social cohesion agenda has led to policies of 'earned citizenship' and 'managed migration', which make immigration and naturalisation in the UK increasingly difficult, especially for 'low skilled' and 'unskilled' migrants.

This 'paradigm shift' in British policy is taking place in the era of globalisation, international migration and growing intercultural exchange. This situation challenges some of the foundational principles of the notion of citizenship: the idea that the national and the political communities are in alignment and, more importantly, the idea that the nation is a territorially bounded community with a shared, even homogeneous, culture and identity. Contrary to the view that nations can be clearly distinguished from each other, new forms of community and belonging are being established which are de-territorialised and challenge conventional notions of national identity. Boundary crossing has, indeed, become common practice for many people. The simple fact of being a dual citizen, for example, challenges the strict demarcation between nation-states and also the idea that national identities are mutually exclusive and singular.

A social psychological study of citizenship can shed light on the dynamics of membership and boundary construction under conditions of late modernity. This thesis explores the ways in which knowledge about British citizenship, in general, and naturalisation, in particular, is socially constructed and examines the impact that these constructions have on identity processes and the development of public policy. For this purpose, I am using the theory of social representations and the concept of positioning and seek to explore the links between representation and identity. Dialogical epistemology underpins my understanding of both lay knowledge and identity, as any act of knowledge construction and identification involves the interrelation between self and other. Employing a dialogical perspective, I perceive identity to be the dynamic interplay between identification and recognition. Within this framework, identity is approached as the position of a person or group in relation to a social representation and to others.

Three sets of stakeholders took part in this research: citizenship officers, naturalised citizens, and the UK Government. These stakeholders have different agendas and hold different power statuses, but are all active agents in the naturalisation context. By analysing these three perspectives on citizenship and naturalisation, I seek not only to gather a more holistic picture of the issue, but also to understand better the relations between citizenship as an institutionalised form of membership and national identity as

symbolic form of belonging, as well as the implications of this relationship for processes of inclusion and exclusion.

The first chapter of the thesis outlines the research problem. Focusing on the British case, it gives an overview of the history of citizenship, its relation with national identity and its nature in contemporary globalised societies. The chapter argues that the British Government has recently adopted a new approach in dealing with immigration and citizenship which emphasises the need to develop a common British identity. In search of this unity, it has strengthened its immigration legislation making sure that only the 'right' kinds of migrants are allowed into the country and have the opportunity to naturalise. In light of this, it is argued that citizenship legislation is not based on 'rational' decision making, but draws on representations of British identity and its 'others'. Chapter 1 concludes by outlining the aims and research questions of this thesis.

The second and third chapters provide an analysis of the theoretical framework employed in this research. Chapter 2 discusses the processes of knowledge construction in relation to the social representations theory. Drawing on Billig's rhetorical perspective and on Marková's dialogical perspective on social representations, the chapter presents a framework for understanding the construction and transformation of social knowledge which takes into account the dynamic social relations which are at the core of construction processes. This framework conceptualises thinking as a dialogical, antinomic process, rooted in the tensions of self-other relations.

Chapter 3 discusses the processes of identity construction by exploring the links between identity and representation. This chapter draws on Duveen's concept of positioning and on positioning theory's elaboration of the same concept, in order to account for the dynamics of self-other relations in identity construction. Chapter 3 also explores the multiplicity and ambivalence of positioning process, by arguing that the plurality of social representations and ways of thinking create not only a state of 'cognitive polyphasia', but also a multiplicity of identity positions which are in dialogical relationship with each other.

Chapter 4 outlines the methodology used for data collection and analysis. It explains the research design, sampling rationale and choice of methods for this research. Chapter 4 also describes the samples and procedure of the research, as well as the

techniques used for the analysis of interviews and policy documents. It concludes with a discussion of the quality assurance of this research.

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present the findings of the research. Chapter 5 presents the perspective of citizenship officers on citizenship and naturalisation. It argues that participants drew on opposing discourses in order to make sense of these issues, which illustrates that social thinking has a dilemmatic and argumentative quality. The chapter also explores the implications of these thematic tensions for positioning processes and identity construction. It is argued that both the identity of migrants and British identity are constructed in a polarised way. Britishness is constructed as both humanitarian and open towards others, and as a declining identity due to the effects of immigration. At the same time, migrants are seen as both an asset, contributing to an 'idealised' cosmopolitan image of Britishness, and a burden threatening the economy and culture of Britain.

Chapter 6 presents the perspective of naturalised citizens on citizenship and naturalisation. The chapter argues that representations of immigration and Britishness play a key role in how respondents construe their naturalisation experiences. In order to make sense of their place in the UK, respondents negotiate their position in relation to both representations of Britishness and representations of immigration. This process also entails re-positioning towards their country of origin. Positioning is further complicated by 'dilemmas of cultural integration'. This multifaceted positioning process involves both narratives of similarity and narratives of difference in relation to Britishness. The chapter also discusses the institutionalised aspect of identity construction, focusing on the distinction between elite and non-elite migrants, as well as the distinction between the 'West' and the 'Rest', which frame the positionings of new citizens.

Chapter 7 presents the public policy perspective on citizenship and, specifically, the policy discourse on 'earned citizenship', which constitutes the current political framework. The chapter argues that assessment, selection and security are key terms in the public policy on earned citizenship. Three sets of ALCESTE analyses of four policy documents show that the public policy perspective is structured around three main themes: 'immigration reform', 'immigration impact' and 'earned citizenship process'. These themes emphasise the profitability of skilled migration, whilst also stressing the undesirability of unskilled migrants and the prevention of immigration abuse. As such, immigration policies create a hierarchical system of classification of

migrants and can, thus, be described as constituting a practice of 'institutionalised positioning'.

Chapter 8 considers the theoretical and societal implications of this research. It discusses the main findings of the research in relation to the dilemmatic construction of Britishness and its implications for positioning. The chapter also discusses positioning as both a symbolic and an institutionalised process, which takes place at the level of representations and at the level of institutionalised practices, such as immigration policies. In addition, this chapter makes suggestions for further research and for the development of a social psychological study of citizenship. Chapter 8 concludes the thesis with some final thoughts on inclusion and tolerance in Britain.

Chapter 1. The Research Problem: Citizenship Policy and the Construction of National Boundaries

1.1. Overview of Chapter 1

This chapter sets the scene for this research on naturalisation in the UK. By discussing the concept and practice of citizenship, in general, and also in relation to Britain, it aims to show that citizenship, rather than a 'neutral' set of laws and policies, is a dynamic social object which is closely linked with constructions of national identity. The following section describes the modern model of citizenship as articulated by Marshall (1964). It will be shown that this model assumes that there is alignment between the nation, as a community of shared identity, and the demos, as a political community. This model also assumes that nation-states can be clearly demarcated; each is seen as being associated with a particular territory and a peoplehood which is distinct from the others. However, this idealised model is increasingly challenged due to the effects of globalisation and international mobility. The third and fourth sections of this chapter focus on Britain and provide a review of British citizenship, immigration and naturalisation policies. It is argued that British citizenship has become progressively more exclusionary and more defined in ethno-cultural terms. Thus, citizenship, as a legal status, is not detached from how nationhood, as a symbolic identity, is imagined. Building on this idea, the fifth section argues that citizenship and national identity are intertwined. The sixth section focuses on Britishness, showing that it is a complex identity which assumes a variety of meanings and cannot be simply classified as an ethnic or a civic identity; on the contrary, it incorporates elements from both. Following this discussion, the seventh section of this chapter draws conclusions about the 'nature' of citizenship, while the last section outlines the objectives and research questions of this thesis.

1.2 The modern model of citizenship

The modern model of citizenship is based on what is called 'Westphalian order'. The peace in Westphalia in 1648 is symbolically the starting point of the state building process in Europe, marking the transition from feudal or imperial structures to nation-states (Hettne, 2000). Today, the term 'Westphalian order' has come to mean an inter-state system of independent and sovereign nation-states (Benhabib, 2004; Hettne, 2000). Territoriality is a key concept here, since sovereign states are by definition territorially bounded and have ultimate authority over the national territory. This territory needs to have clearly circumscribed and widely recognised boundaries. It follows that in

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a territorially bounded nation-state system the distinction between insiders and outsiders, citizens and non-citizens, is crucial. Citizens are, in principle, equal members of the political community, sharing common rights and duties and having the same status towards the state. Conversely, as Hannah Arendt has argued, being stateless means being denied 'the right to have rights' (cited in Benhabib, 2004), since rights stem out of a citizen's relation to a state and the state is the supreme protector of one's rights.

The modern paradigm of citizenship, as a legal status endowed with a set of rights and responsibilities common to all nationals, has been articulated by Marshall (1964). This modern model of citizenship is egalitarian and inclusive, since all members share equal rights, and it is also uniform and universal, because rights are uniformly distributed (Cohen, 1999). For Marshall, full membership is defined by three types of rights: civil, like liberty and freedom of speech, political, like the right to vote and stand for an office, and social rights associated with the welfare state, like the right to healthcare and housing. Marshall traced the development of citizenship rights in England from the 18th to the 20th century. It is assumed in his conceptualisation of citizenship that the three sets of rights, historically expanded in scope and extended to all the population, provide a coherent whole. It has further been argued that a principal assumption in Marshall's conceptualisation is that the demos, the political community, corresponds to a single nation (Cohen, 1999)[1]. Indeed, the ideal model of the citizen in the modern nation-state is a person who resides inside the national boundaries, is subject to the state's administrative control, participates in the democratic process and shares a common culture with his or her fellow citizens. Territoriality, administrative control, democratic legitimacy and shared cultural or national identity form the traditional model of 'unitary' citizenship (Benhabib, 2002, 2004).

The backbone of the modern nation-state is territoriality, meaning that there is among people a 'boundary consciousness' of the world as naturally divided into nation-states (Billig, 1995). Both defining features of the nation-state, that the nation is equated with the demos and that the state has sovereign power over a demarcated territory, are based on this notion. Representations of space and place have been essential in the construction of 'imagined communities' (Anderson, 1991). In fact, spaces are transformed into national territories which *belong* to nations (Alonso, 1994). Thus, Germany belongs to the Germans, France to the French and so on. This way, an

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[1] Another problem with Marshall's theory is that it is assumed that the three sets of rights have developed in a linear and unchallenged manner, whereas citizenship is best understood as a negotiated relationship among political actors (Stasiulis & Bakan, 1997).

identity between people and places is created and often sustained through botanical metaphors, such as people having roots in certain countries, or kinship metaphors, like motherland, fatherland and others (Alonso, 1994; Malkki, 1992). In a way, the nation becomes concrete through this territorialisation; it becomes a *body* of people inextricably linked to a particular space. At the same time, citizenship becomes an inherited property based on a birthright (Shachar, 2007).

However, challenges to the taken for granted assumption that nation-states are strictly demarcated are evident in all spheres of life and are due to a range of phenomena grouped under the term globalisation. The effects of these transformations are so groundbreaking that many people speak of the nation-state as a thing of the past, whereas the future is seen as global or cosmopolitan. Above all, globalisation has an impact on the sovereignty of the state over the national territory. The internationalisation of the market, the existence of hegemonic powers, such as the U.S.A., and international organisations (e.g. NATO, EU), as well as the establishment of international law, constitute the most significant limitations to nation-state sovereignty (Held, 1996). What all this suggests is that the nation-state alone cannot make its own decisions; we have progressed from national sovereignty to a state of 'plural sovereignty' which is divided among various national, international and transnational parties (Held, 1996).

Since, by definition, citizenship is associated with the idea of the nation-state as a bounded political community, it follows that the declining sovereignty of the state has implications for citizenship. It is often argued that global society requires universalism (universal norms, values, laws etc.) and inclusion, whereas national society is based on particularism and exclusion of non-members[2]. A major issue in this respect is the scope of national legislation under conditions of increased human mobility. The conflict between universal human rights, which supposedly apply to all human beings, and national citizenship rights, which apply exclusively to citizens of a nation-state, alludes to these tensions between the universal and the particular. Several scholars have dealt with this issue, suggesting ways of integrating the two and developing an appropriate framework for cosmopolitan citizenship (Benhabib, 2002, 2006; Cohen, 1999; Falk, 2000; Hettne, 2000). Others speak of a post-national type of citizenship whereby rights are decoupled from national citizenship (Soysal, 1994). Overall, the practice of

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[2] Interestingly, however, the very idea of nationalism is based on the accommodation of universalism and particularism. Following the principles of the French revolution, the rights of citizens are based on the rights of man which provide the source of democratic legitimacy in modern nation-states (Benhabib, 2004).

citizenship in the contemporary world has changed; citizenship is no longer enacted in a narrow national framework (Soysal, 2000), nor is the state the only political formation within a territory (Walby, 2003).

What has been termed the 'disaggregation of citizenship' (Benhabib, 2002, 2004; Cohen, 1999) is already taking place, meaning that the components of citizenship have been disassociated from each other. As mentioned, modern citizenship is framed as a whole where political, civil and social rights are all linked with the status of being a member of the political community. Nonetheless, due to the effects of international mobility and migration, these three sets of rights no longer go hand in hand. One can be a foreign resident, rather than a citizen, and be able to enjoy social rights and benefits as a permanent resident. EU citizens have also political rights if they reside in another EU country, namely the right to vote and stand for an office in local elections. In other countries such rights have been granted to non-EU residents as well. Thus, the status of legal personhood has been disassociated from the status of citizenship in both international and national legislations.

The increasing diversity within national societies and the need to accommodate different sets of demands by various social groups pose another challenge for the modern paradigm of citizenship. Identity politics have created a tension between two analytically distinct justice paradigms: socio-economic justice, associated with claims of redistribution, and cultural justice, associated with recognition claims (for an effort to accommodate the two, see Fraser, 1996, 2000). Regarding the latter, the 'liberal' neutrality of the state, which conflates equality and sameness, has recently been questioned because it implies an ideal of assimilation and oppresses historically excluded groups. Against that, Young (1990) advocates the politics of difference whereby equality is conceptualised not as sameness, but as public respect of difference, as a type of democratic cultural pluralism. In this conceptualisation of 'differentiated', rather than universal, citizenship, group rights would be recognised (Young, 1989). Similarly, Taylor argues in favour of the politics of recognition on the basis that misrecognition and non-recognition of people's identities are forms of oppression (Taylor, 1992). Thus, whereas citizenship has traditionally been linked with political, civil and social rights, there is nowadays a strong claim that citizenship be extended to include cultural rights of groups (Pakulski, 1997).

The increased ethnic and cultural diversity within nation-states also challenges the taken-for-granted equation of the demos to the nation, leading to the 'crisis of the hyphen' as Benedict Anderson (1991) has famously observed. This is evident in

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processes of naturalisation. In 2007, more than 164,000 people acquired British citizenship (Freelove-Mensah, 2008). What is more, people do not only acquire citizenship status in countries other than the ones they have been born into, they may also have dual or multiple citizenships. This is the clearest evidence that political membership and national identity are not necessarily aligned. This also suggests that national identities may not be singular or mutually exclusive; people can belong to multiple national communities.

Overall, human mobility challenges the taken for granted equation of citizenship and national identity. More than that, it poses questions about the very nature of national identity in contemporary plural societies which goes beyond the simplistic ingroup/outgroup dichotomy (Chrysochoou, 2000). It can be argued that national identity has become irrelevant, giving its place to de-territorialised or cosmopolitan affiliations. However, as Billig (1995) observes, a national framework of conceiving the world is still in place, albeit in an unreflective way. This becomes more salient in border management practices. As will be shown in the following sections, efforts to boost a sense of British identity underscore recent immigration and citizenship policies in the UK, alluding to an increased uneasiness regarding the blurring of inter-national boundaries on the part of the British state.

1.3 The history of British citizenship and present state of affairs

Whereas the United Kingdom is one of the oldest democracies, British citizenship has a very short history (Hansen, 2000). Until the 1948 Nationality Act, the inhabitants of the British Isles and the British Empire in general were subjects to the Crown; membership was defined by loyalty to the monarch. This 'imperial model' (Baldwin-Edwards & Schain, 1994) of citizenship was based on the law of territory (*jus soli*) and gave equal rights to all citizens of the British Empire by virtue of having been born within British territory. This is not to suggest that discrimination was absent; on the contrary, racism served to legitimise the domination of the British Colonies. Nonetheless, it was in the heyday of the Empire that Britain had its widest boundaries, as there was no distinction between colonisers and colonised: "This was not only a question of territory; both British colonies and the British colonised were seen as an inherent part of the national glory" (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992, p. 45).

After 1945, for immigration purposes, the Dominions wished to introduce national citizenships. As a result, in 1948 the Labour government implemented new legislation which created two classes of citizenship: citizenship of the United Kingdom and

Colonies and citizenship of independent Commonwealth countries. The origins of British citizenship were both imperialist and liberal, since all citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies enjoyed equal rights (Hansen, 2000). Citizenship at the time continued to be granted through birth within the UK or the British Colonies. Within this legal framework, people from the Colonies and new Commonwealth countries migrated to the UK in the '50s and early '60s at a time when post-war Britain was in need of cheap labour. Yet, anti-immigration attitudes towards non-white migrants escalated and new immigration restrictions were introduced in the '60s (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992; Layton-Henry, 1994). The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act introduced for the first time restrictions to the rights of some Commonwealth citizens to enter the UK. The 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act and the 1971 Immigration Act stand out for their adoption of the partiality clause, which privileged citizens of the 'old' (white) Commonwealth compared to those of the 'new' (black) Commonwealth.

The notion of partiality was incorporated into the UK citizenship legislation in the 80's when the British nationality law was amended to create the category of British citizenship. Under Margaret Thatcher's government, the 1981 Nationality Act was voted and enacted in 1983. This piece of legislation defined British citizenship in more ethnic terms as it incorporated to some extent the law of blood (*jus sanguinis*) into the law of territory. With this legislation, people born in Britain cannot become British citizens or settle permanently in Britain unless they are born to a British citizen or to a parent who is legally settled in Britain (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992).

This brief sketch of British citizenship illustrates how it has become progressively more exclusionary. From distinguishing solely between fully entitled 'British subjects' and 'aliens', the post-war period saw the gradual reduction of the rights of the New Commonwealth citizens, constructing eventually a more exclusionary British citizenship. The past openness of British boundaries carried the imperial stamp of the country. Indeed, Britishness at the time has been described as an encompassing form of political identity which held together the various peoples and cultures under the Empire's rule (McCrone, 1997; McCrone & Kiely, 2000).

The complexity of current British nationality law stems from the country's history. There are currently six types of British nationality (see Table 1 below). Only British citizens and some British subjects with right of abode, through qualifying connections under the Immigration Act 1971, have the right to live and work in the UK (Home Office). All other British nationals can live and work in the UK only if their immigration status allows it (ibid.). However, European Union regulations mean that EU citizens have the right to

visit, live and work in the UK. In terms of acquiring British citizenship, other than by birth or descent, naturalisation, which is the focus of this thesis, is the most common way[3].

Table 1. Types of British nationality (source: Home Office)

Types of British nationality	Eligibility
British citizenship	People born in the UK before January 1st 1983 are British citizens. People born in the UK on or after 1 January 1983 (or in a qualifying territory[4] on or after 21 May 2002) to a parent who is a British citizen or legally settled in the UK are British citizens. Depending on the type of citizenship of the parents (British citizenship by descent or otherwise than by descent), people born outside the UK may also be British citizens.
British overseas citizenship	British overseas citizenship is a category of citizenship that was created by the British Nationality Act 1981. People became British overseas citizens on 1 January 1983 if they were citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies and did not become either British citizens or British overseas territories citizens on 1 January 1983.
British overseas territories citizenship	British overseas territories citizenship is a category of citizenship that was created by the British Nationality Act 1981 for people connected with the British overseas territories[5]. People became British overseas territories citizens on 1 January 1983 if they had connections with a British overseas territory because they, their parents or their grandparents were born, registered or naturalised in that British overseas territory (if they did not have these connections, they may have become British overseas citizens). People born in a British overseas territory on or after 1 January 1983 are British overseas territories citizens if one of their parents is a British overseas territories citizen or is legally settled in a British overseas territory. On 21 May 2002, British overseas territories citizens became British citizens automatically if they had British overseas territories citizenship by connection with a qualifying territory.
British national (overseas)	When sovereignty of Hong Kong returned to China, British overseas territories citizens from Hong Kong lost that citizenship. In 1986 new legislation allowed them to acquire the new status of British nationals (overseas).
British protected person	People born in British protected places outside the British Empire are British protected persons. Nowadays, very few people hold this status. British protected persons lose their status upon acquisition of another nationality or when the territory they have been connected with becomes independent and they acquire the citizenship of a newly independent country.
British subject	Until 1949 everyone connected to the UK by birth, adoption, descent, marriage, registration or naturalisation was a British subject. All citizens of Commonwealth countries were also British subjects until 1983. Since January 1983 a person who gains citizenship of any other country cannot be a British subject. Since then very few categories of people now qualify as British subjects.

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[3] The other ways of becoming a British citizen are: being adopted by British citizens and registration which relates to British nationals who are not British citizens but who have been residing in the UK for at least five years.

[4] Qualifying territories are the British overseas territories which qualify under certain sections of the nationality rules. They are all of the British overseas territories except for the sovereign base areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia.

[5] British overseas territories were formerly known as the British dependent territories: Anguilla, Bermuda, British Antarctic Territory, British Indian Ocean Territory, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands and Dependencies, Gibraltar, Montserrat, Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie and Oeno Islands, St Helena and Dependencies, the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia, Turks and Caicos Islands, and the Virgin Islands.

1.4 Current policies towards immigration and naturalisation in the UK

Britain's policy towards managing diversity has traditionally been based on a 'race relations' framework. In particular, a combination of strict immigration controls and racial equality legislation has shaped public policy in Britain (Favell, 2001; Well & Crowley, 1994). Limits on immigration in Britain have been accompanied by a series of Race Relations Acts (1965, 1968, and 1976, as well as the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006) and the establishment of the Commission for Racial Equality (the Equality and Human Rights Commission since 2007). In fact, the 1976 Act contained legislation against indirect discrimination and for this reason it is considered a step towards the recognition of the right to cultural difference and a clear example of multicultural policy compared to the more assimilationist approach of the rest of Europe (Mitchell & Russell, 1996). Good race relations in the UK are seen as a way of ensuring social order and may have been influenced by the British imperial history (Favell, 2001). During the Empire, the principle of indirect rule meant that the colonised populations had a degree of freedom in matters of governance. Multicultural policy can thus be described as paternalistic and pragmatic, meaning that the advocacy of tolerance is not so much based on its moral value but, rather, on its efficiency (Favell, 2001). In any case, tolerance and respect for difference have had a place in British policies of integration.

However, in the past few years the effectiveness of multiculturalism has been severely challenged. Critics argue that it enhances separatism and undermines solidarity; that it stresses differences and de-emphasises commonalities. David Cameron in his speech at the 2007 Open to Question Debate, hosted by the Equality and Human Rights Commission, depicted multiculturalism as "the idea that we should respect different cultures within Britain to the point of allowing them – indeed encouraging them – to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream" (Cameron, 2007).

The current debate on multiculturalism and cohesion was sparked by the 'racial tensions' in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley in the spring and summer of 2001. In the aftermath of the events, a series of reports on community cohesion were published to advance governmental policy[6]. Policies on community cohesion have since then been

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[6] The Home Office established the Independent Review Team, chaired by Ted Cantle, to identify the reasons of the 'tensions' and suggest ways to improve community cohesion after consulting local people and community organisations in Bradford, Oldham, Burnley and other towns. Also, the Home Secretary at the time, David Blunkett, set up a Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community Cohesion with the aim to provide recommendations on the enhancement of

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implemented predominantly on a local level. In the meantime, the 7th of July 2005 attacks in London intensified the 'cohesion-versus-multiculturalism' discourse. Shared British values, integration and cohesion are among the terms most commonly used nowadays in political debates by all political parties. While immigration policies and race relation policies had been legally distinguished in the UK, concerns over terrorism and the integration of 'suspect communities' brought the two issues closer together in public policy discourse (Sales, 2007).

McGhee (2005a, 2005b) notes that current community cohesion strategies target ethnic and religious minorities and function as a risk management strategy to avoid tensions like the ones in 2001. Compared to the past, a 'thicker' conception of British citizenship is advocated, meaning that citizenship is increasingly associated with a shared national-cultural identity. The key concept in all these recent developments is an emphasis on failed integration which will be combated by establishing a common bond among the British (McGhee, 2005a). Yet, this begs the question: into which common values are the new British citizens (and ethnic minorities) supposed to integrate? This is in essence a question about the definition of Britishness. It can be argued, therefore, that community cohesion policies are part of a nation-building process in contemporary Britain; indeed, this is a top-down effort to (re)construct British national identity. For example, in a pamphlet entitled *A Common Place,* written for the Fabian Society by Ruth Kelly (State Secretary for Communities and Local Government at the time) and Liam Byrne (Immigration Minister at the time), the link between strengthening a sense of Britishness and citizenship is explicit (Kelly & Byrne, 2007, pp. 3-4):

> Our approach to citizenship has been *laissez faire.* But today [...] we need a
> more vigorous debate about what it is that holds us together [...] We believe
> that the way we collectively develop a more overt but inclusive sense of
> citizenship will be one of the issues that define the coming decade in British
> politics.

Social cohesion policies are located within a more general communitarian conception of citizenship which maintains that rights are conditional on associated responsibilities. This 'active citizenship' perspective has been advocated by the British Government in recent years. The report produced by the Advisory Group on Citizenship, set up in 1997 by the Secretary of State for Education and Employment, is indicative of this trend. The Group, chaired by Bernard Crick, made proposals for the introduction of citizenship

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community cohesion on a national level. These were the most prominent reports produced at the time.

education in schools. Following these recommendations, compulsory citizenship education became part of the English National Curriculum. The final report of the Group, commonly referred to as the Crick Report, defines citizenship in a tripartite way entailing social and moral responsibility, community involvement and political literacy (Advisory Group on Citizenship, 1998). Having a sense of civic duty and being actively involved in the community are the key features of this definition of citizenship.

It is in this context that the UK Government's recent naturalisation policies should be interpreted. In particular, two measures have been controversial and highlight the government's increased efforts to enhance social cohesion and participation. The first one is the introduction of citizenship ceremonies in 2004. During the citizenship ceremony, new citizens affirm or swear allegiance to the Queen and also pledge their loyalty to the United Kingdom[7]. Before 2004, this took place privately in the presence of a solicitor. The rationale for implementing citizenship ceremonies according to the UK Border Agency is that "becoming a British citizen is a significant event and should be celebrated in a meaningful way" (Home Office). Citizenship ceremonies are conducted by the Registration Services of local councils. Applicants for naturalisation receive a letter inviting them to a ceremony at their local council when their application for naturalisation has been successful. In order to receive their certificate of naturalisation and complete the naturalisation process, they have to attend a citizenship ceremony. Ceremonies usually start with a speech given by the Registrar or an invited local dignitary. New citizens then take the oath and pledge of allegiance and are then asked to stand up for the national anthem. The ceremonies conclude by calling new citizens one by one and giving them their naturalisation certificates[8].

In addition to the introduction of the citizenship ceremonies, in 2005 passing a citizenship test about life in the UK became a requirement for British citizenship and, more recently, for the indefinite leave to remain also. The UK Border and Immigration Agency explains the purpose of the 'Life in the UK' test to applicants for naturalisation

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[7] **Oath of allegiance:** I (name) swear by Almighty God that on becoming a British citizen, I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, her Heirs and Successors, according to law.
Affirmation of allegiance: I (name) do solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm that on becoming a British citizen, I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, her Heirs and Successors, according to law.
Pledge: I will give my loyalty to the United Kingdom and respect its rights and freedoms. I will uphold its democratic values. I will observe its laws faithfully and fulfill my duties and obligations as a British citizen.
[8] These are the main elements of all citizenship ceremonies, but ceremonies also differ from council to council. In some councils, ceremonies are quite formal while in others they are not; some councils also arrange for 'special' ceremonies, for example inviting local schoolchildren to attend.

as follows: "...becoming a British citizen or deciding to settle permanently in this country is an important event in your life. If you are applying for naturalisation as a British citizen or for indefinite leave to remain, you will need to show that you know about life in the UK" (Home Office). However, the 'Britishness test', as it is routinely referred to by the media, has been heavily criticised for its narrow focus and factual errors (e.g. Glendinning, 2006; White, 2009). The citizenship test is coupled with the English requirement as it is meant to test both English proficiency and knowledge of life in the UK. The Life in the UK test is based on the *Life in the UK: A Journey to Citizenship* book, which all applicants for naturalisation need to study before taking the test. Topics covered in the test include: history, population, governance and issues related to work, health and education in the UK.

Alongside social cohesion policies aimed at integrating migrants and other minority groups, the new decade saw the introduction of a new scheme of 'managed migration' through the establishment of firm selection criteria concerning who is eligible to reside, work and naturalise in the UK. Towards this aim, two interconnected policies have been implemented: 'earned citizenship' and the 'points-based system'. Earned citizenship, as outlined in the green paper *Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System* (Home Office, 2008a), is characterised by an emphasis on the duties, contribution and assessment of migrants and epitomises the communitarian discourse adopted by the UK Government. For instance, full citizenship or permanent residency will be conditional on having gone through a period of 'probationary citizenship'. The rationale of this regulation is that during the probationary citizenship period potential citizens, who will, from now on, have limited access to social benefits, will be contributing to the country and making efforts to integrate. Supposedly, people who do voluntary work meet these requirements and, thus, will be rewarded by proceeding faster in acquiring full citizenship. Following a draft bill in July 2008, the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act received royal assent in July 2009.

Concerning immigration, Britain has adopted the Australian points-based system which states that migrants will have to fill in gaps in British economy in order to be granted entry to the country (Home Office, 2006). The government assesses these gaps in the economy with the advice of the Migration Advisory Committee and the Migration Impacts Forum. This selective immigration scheme aims to both reduce the number of migrants entering the country and enhance their contribution to the British economy. The nationalistic undertone of these measures is expressed by Gordon Brown's 'British jobs for British workers' statement in his speech at the 2007 Labour annual conference

(BBC, 2007). More efficient immigration controls, identity cards for foreign nationals and stricter penalties for illegal migration have also been part of the immigration reform agenda. More recently, in June 2010, the new coalition government announced its plans to set up an annual cap on immigration which will operate within the points system (Home Office, 2010).

On the whole, the British government (both Labour and Conservative-Liberal) is seeking to establish stricter selection criteria concerning immigration to the UK, while at the same time strongly emphasising contribution as a necessary requirement for integration in the country and as a precondition for good citizenship. Concerning these recent developments, it has been argued that the British state has revitalised an assimilationist project concerning its handling of diversity and migration (Alexander, 2007; Back, Keith, Khan, Shukra, & Solomos, 2002; Shukra, Back, Keith, Khan, & Solomos, 2004; Yuval-Davis, Anthias, & Kofman, 2005) and that it is engaged in a 'hyper-nationalist' project of securitocracy (Gilroy, 2008). On the whole, the new naturalisation requirements, as well as the stringent immigration controls, constitute an instance of what Isin and Turner (2007) call the 'enclave society', because they point to a new emphasis on security and territory.

Certainly, apart from the legal criteria of membership, symbolic processes of inclusion and exclusion also operate in the society, creating another set of boundaries, racial, cultural and others (Jacobson, 1997). Thus, the 'right to belong' is determined by a variety of formal and symbolic boundaries. What is shown, however, by this brief review of immigration and citizenship legislation in the UK, is that these formal and informal boundaries have an impact on each other. Citizenship is inevitably intertwined with the broader politics of belonging (Crowley, 1999; Yuval-Davis, 2006). As the next section intends to show, citizenship and national identity cannot be distinguished from each other.

1.5 Citizenship and national identity

Citizenship and national identity are often seen as interchangeable terms in sociological theory (McCrone & Kiely, 2000). The very meaning of the term nation-state assumes that the state, as a sovereign and territorially bounded entity, is associated with an equally bounded population, the nation. The conflation of the political and cultural spheres of membership stems from the modern paradigm of citizenship (see section 1.2, p. 14), which has traditionally been the ideal model of citizenship and assumes that democratic participation and cultural membership are in alignment (Benhabib, 2002,

2004). In other words, it is assumed that a nation's 'identity space' is conterminous with the nation's 'decision space' (Maier, 2000). This is not surprising as the cultural and the political spheres have been closely intertwined in the building of modern nations. Nationalism, the driving force for the development of the nation-state, is understood in political theory as "primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent" (Gellner, 1983, p. 1), meaning that the borders of the state should coincide with the borders of the nation. In other words, nationalism refers to a political claim that a peoplehood, the nation, is entitled to form a sovereign and territorially distinct political community.

Broadly speaking, there are two main approaches on the development of nationalism and nations in the modern era. For Anthony Smith (1996), modern nations have developed out of pre-existing communities of shared culture and identity which he calls 'ethnies'. While Smith argues that nations with their civic qualities are associated with modern developments, he maintains that they have been formed or reconstructed around pre-existing ethnic cores, comprising mythologies, symbolisms and cultures. These ethnic, rather that civic, elements of nations are 'rediscovered' in the process of nation building[9]. However, the idea that nations have such a long history has been controversial. For modernist scholars there is discontinuity between modern nations and pre-modern communities. Nations are seen as exclusively modern phenomena associated with socio-historical developments which led to the creation of nation-states in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Ernest Gellner has probably been the most cited modernist scholar. His theorisation of the nation as a modern phenomenon is based on the causal link between nationalism and industrialisation (cited in Poole, 1999). Benedict Anderson, another modernist scholar, refers to print-capitalism, the emergence and mass dissemination of print press in the era of capitalism, as the 'origin of national consciousness': "the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community [other than religion], which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation" (Anderson, 1991, p. 46).

By considering nations as cultural artefacts, Anderson was able to propose the following definition of the nation: "it is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited [with specific boundaries] and sovereign" (Anderson, 1991, p. 6). Consistent with this cultural perspective on nations, Anderson sees nationalism, not

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[9] It is important to stress that, for Smith, ethnicity refers to the *perception* of common culture and ancestry.

as an ideology, but as a cultural system, similar to religion, because it gives people a sense of continuity and destiny. Culture and ethnicity are therefore used as symbolic resources for nation building. A shared descent or common history is often seen as so crucial that it has been claimed that nations without a past are contradictions in terms (Hobsbawm & Kertzer, 1992). According to scholars like Wallerstein and Balibar, nationalism can be seen as an ideology which produces the people as an ethnic community and naturalises the idea of national belonging (Balibar, 1991); in this sense, it can be argued that statehood precedes nationhood (Wallerstein, 1991). Basically, it is argued here that the idea of ethnicity becomes objectified and serves as the 'glue', the source of solidarity among nationals. Ernest Renan (1996), a very important scholar of nationalism, argues that national solidarity is rooted in the nation's common legacy of memories.

That the creation of national cultures has been a key process in the development of the nation-state does not necessarily presuppose any kind of cultural homogeneity within nations, but it does suggest that some sort of commonality among nationals has been constructed so that a group of people can become imagined as a community. As Chryssochoou observes, "nationalism is a particular political project based on the reification of the nation and the essentialisation of the national character" (2004, p. 109). The essentialisation of the national category has both an epistemic function (simplification of the world) and a legitimating function in that it helps justify particular projects and actions (Wagner, Holtz, & Kashima, 2009). The essentialisation of nations helps to construct them as distinct and cohesive communities of people.

Despite the close relationship between the forging of ethno-national identities and the advent of modern nation-states, Kohn (1944) has made a distinction between nations which have an ethnic or organic conception of nationhood and nations that have a civic conception of national belonging. The former are seen as based on an ethnically and culturally homogenous vision of the nation, while the latter are viewed as based on common territory and political values which determine rights and obligations. An example of ethnic nationalism would be Germany, which has until recently relied on the law of blood to define citizens. France is supposedly closer to the civic model since citizenship is granted on the basis of birth in national territory. However, a strict distinction between civic and ethnic nations does not hold empirically (Nieguth, 1999; Thomas, 2002). The French model, for instance, is grounded on a Western liberal conception of justice, which is in turn based on the distinction between the public and the private spheres. In this model, justice is achieved through public sameness and

diversity is restricted to the private domain of life (Young, 1990). Since diversity is not publicly recognised, the logic of assimilation into the mainstream cultural norms underpins this model. The recent 'veil affair'[10] in France, which resulted in the banning of religious symbols from public schools under the spirit of laïcité and secularism, illustrates how public policy and legislation can marginalise minority identities.

1.6 British identity: Ethnic or civic?

In terms of national identity, the UK is a particular case because it comprises four nations rather than one. The Irish also reside in two different states. There is no sense of a 'UK identity' within the UK. Rather, the term 'British' is commonly used to refer to all citizens of the United Kingdom, although it literally only refers to the people of Great Britain excluding Northern Ireland[11].

The term 'British' has been used to unite all inhabitants of the British Empire under the 'umbrella identity' of the British subject (see section 1.3, p. 18). Since the English were the dominant group of the Empire, Britishness and Englishness are to this day very often conflated (Kearney, 1991). Indeed, power asymmetries amongst the nations of the UK have partly led to the construction of stronger 'local national identities', rather than an overarching British identity. Being Scottish, Welsh or Irish is often defined in contrast to the dominant English identity. Interestingly, British identity is said to be much more adopted by the white English and the ethnic minority population of England compared to the rest of the UK population (Stone & Muir, 2007). This is due on the one hand, to a tendency to imbue Englishness and Britishness with imperialistic nuances and on the other hand, to the ethnic connotations of Englishness that exclude ethnic minorities (for the case of British Muslim identities, see Modood, 2005). In short, for the Scottish, Welsh and Irish, their 'local national identities' seem to be more salient (Stone & Muir, 2007).

Furthermore, the meaning of these identities tends to change along with changes in the context. Reicher and Hopkins (2001) have convincingly shown that national identity can

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[10] The 'veil affair' ('l'affair du foulard') refers to a set of public debates in France which started in 1989 when three Muslim students were expelled from their school for refusing to remove their veils. Since then, more girls have been suspended for the same reason. In 1996, twenty-three Muslim girls were massively expelled. In 2004, the secularity law, also known as the 'veil law', was enacted and banned the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols, such as the Muslim veil, in French schools. The 'veil affair' has come to stand for all dilemmas of French identity in the era of multiculturalism (Benhabib, 2004).
[11] Nonetheless, the UK Home Office is consistently using the term 'British citizenship' to refer to citizenship in the United Kingdom. The term 'British' will also be used in this thesis to refer to British citizens from all parts of the UK.

take different meanings according to the political projects it serves. It has also been shown that Britishness, Englishness and Scottishness mean different things in England and in Scotland (Kiely, McCrone, & Bechhofer, 2005). While in England Britishness is seen as an inclusive identity, in Scotland it is associated with an ethnic conception of Englishness (ibid.). It is the very nature of national identity constructions that can change in different parts of the United Kingdom. For example, Condor and Abell (2006a) have argued that while in Scotland national identity helps to construct a communitarian feeling of 'we', in England it is treated as idiosyncratic due to its association with irrationality and xenophobia.

Overall, the term 'British' is quite an interesting case as it is a highly ambiguous and contested term. It can be equated with white Englishness, or have imperial connotations; but, it may also stand for values of pluralism and respect for diversity (e.g Parekh, 2000a). For some it may be a civic identity, defined by political values of freedom and democracy, whereas for others it is associated with an ethnic and cultural identity. Still, for others, British means nothing more than a passport. The fact that it is selectively embraced and that it acquires a variety of meanings suggests that it is a very complicated concept and it cannot have a simple definition (McCrone, 2002). As Cohen (1994, p. 35) has observed, Britishness is, above all, defined by its fuzziness:

> British identity shows a general pattern of fragmentation. Multiple axes of identification have meant that Irish, Scots, Welsh and English people, those from the white, black and brown Commonwealth, Americans, English-speakers, Europeans and even aliens have had their lives intersect one with another in overlapping and complex circles of identity-construction and rejection. The shape and edges of British identity are thus historically changing, often vague and to a degree, malleable – an aspect of the British identity I have called a 'fuzzy frontier'.

The idea that because the UK is a multinational state, British is a state-identity only overlooks the fact that Britain is not the only multi-national state; in fact, the situation in Britain is common around the world (McCrone & Kiely, 2000). Moreover, citizenship is, even in so called civic societies, closely related with national identity. The history of citizenship legislation in Britain shows that, rather than British nationality being a 'neutral' legal concept, it has been used in racially exclusive ways (see section 1.3, p. 18). Also, recent policies on immigration and naturalisation in the UK aim to 'nationalise' the idea of citizenship under the banner of shared values and social cohesion. Citizenship tests and ceremonies aim to assess the level of a migrant's participation

and commitment to the British society, as well as his or her understanding of the national culture and way of life. Current anti-immigration attitudes and racism towards foreigners are also indicators that a sense of the British nation does exist. For instance, a study by ETHNOS (2006) for the Commission for Racial Equality showed that British people perceive a decline of Britishness which is, among other reasons, attributed to immigration and multiculturalism. British debates over multiculturalism suggest that Britishness is, at least in part, a national-cultural identity, even it means different things to different people. The very idea of multiculturalism as a result of immigration, a discourse so commonly used in Britain, also implies a background of a homogeneous ethno-cultural British identity.

Britishness cannot, therefore, be simply positioned in one of the ends of the ethnic-civic continuum. It is a multifaceted identity that can acquire diverse meanings. Citizenship and immigration processes constitute one of the sites where British identity becomes constructed and enacted.

1.7 The 'nature' of citizenship

The conclusions that can be drawn from the previous discussion on the 'nature' of citizenship can be summarised as follows:

▪ Citizenship has been traditionally conceptualised as a unitary form of membership based on the alignment of the political community with the national community. Citizenship and national identity are seen as the two sides of the same coin: the former defines the civic aspect of national membership and the latter is a form of ethno-cultural attachment that binds people together. However, the previous sections of this chapter have argued that *the alignment between the nation and the demos does not hold empirically*. On the one hand, not all nations are polities; rather, there are actually more nations than nation-states (Walby, 2003). On the other hand, the diversity of people's backgrounds within contemporary states, such as Britain, suggests that people's affiliations are increasingly more complex. People may be members of more than one ethnic or national group and have multiple national citizenships. People's identities are not necessarily territorially bounded in the confines of a nation-state, as the unitary model suggests. Studies on diaspora and transnationalism have stressed this point: "immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement. We call these processes transnationalism to emphasise that many immigrants today build social fields that cross geographic, cultural and political borders" (Basch, Glick-Schiller, & Szanton-Blanc, 1994, p. 7).

- Although citizenship and national identity do not necessarily coincide, they are interlinked, such that *the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism is not as straightforward as has been conceived.* Since citizenship legislation delimits who is to be a citizen and enjoy equal status with other citizens, it crystallises the existing model of social relations into a temporary equilibrium (Balibar, 1988). The dynamics of political membership become clear in the history of British citizenship and immigration policies, which shows that policy development goes hand in hand with changes in the ways that Britishness is imagined. This is even more evident in the current immigration and naturalisation law in the UK which aims to re-construct Britishness through managing immigration.

- Citizenship in Western societies is at the moment undergoing serious changes, challenging the assumptions of Marshall's (1964) unitary model. At the heart of these transformations is the *tension between inclusion and exclusion.* The increased mobility of people and the partial loss of national sovereignty lead to the reconstruction of national boundaries in a way that the relations between self and other are re-negotiated. This is not simply a question of constructing boundaries between the out-group and the in-group. A variety of institutions (EU, Human Rights conventions, national immigration policies) create many levels of inclusion and exclusion. For instance, European Union citizens are allowed entry in the UK, while unskilled overseas workers are excluded. At the same time, residents of the UK enjoy different sets of rights according to their immigration status. Whereas EU citizens enjoy political rights, other economic migrants have fewer social and political rights, alluding to what Castles (2005) has called 'hierarchical citizenship'.

- *Citizenship and immigration law draws on discourses about the nation and its 'others' and is indicative of the quality of these relations.* The conditions of entry and residence in a nation-state are grounded in the types of inter-state relations that are established and, in particular, on the level of trust between them. Free movement within the EU is indicative of relations of trust among member states. On the other hand, strict visa requirements for other nationals indicate mistrust. Similarly, the position of migrants within a nation-state is partly defined by the accessibility of citizenship rights. For instance, in Germany, until 2000 foreign 'guest' workers could only naturalise if they had German ancestry. Being German was therefore constructed in a racially exclusive way, based on the strict distinction between the German nation and the 'others'. More generally, the criteria which make someone eligible for citizenship are a way to demarcate the national boundaries. Underlying such 'border management strategies'

are ideas about what the nation symbolises. Conditions for naturalisation, like place of birth, ancestry, knowledge of cultural values and language, are essentially used as markers of similarity and difference.

Overall, it can be argued that citizenship is a dynamic and socially constructed concept. It does not hold an 'objective' neutral status, but is highly contested, mainly because it relates to perceptions of national and ethnic identity. Citizenship is a site where formal and lay discourses about the nation and its 'others' intersect. Naturalisation, in particular, is a context where the nation meets its 'others'; it is a site where national boundaries are drawn, exercised and potentially negotiated.

1.8 Social psychological study of citizenship

1.8.1 Research objectives

Taking under consideration the above discussion on the nature and functions of citizenship policies, this thesis examines the naturalisation process of the United Kingdom. The perspectives of three stakeholders in this context are analysed: the official UK public policy, the civil servants working in the field and the naturalised British citizens. Through qualitative and quantitative analysis of these discourses, the overarching aim of this thesis is to explore the identity and boundary construction processes involved in naturalisation. More specifically the objectives of this research are:

1. *To show the relevance of a social psychological approach on citizenship and naturalisation.* The social psychological perspective offers the possibility for the integration of four levels of analysis: intra-personal, inter-personal, inter-group and societal or ideological level (Doise, 1986). Although the institutional level is part of this perspective, it is not always adequately explored[12]. This is evident in social psychology's lack of interest in citizenship. Social psychology has traditionally been preoccupied with groups; the nation, being a collective of co-nationals, has been part of its field of research. But, citizenship, commonly conceived more as a legal status than a type of membership, has not been sufficiently studied. As such, the normative framework of national inclusion and exclusion has been largely ignored. We need, however, to unpack the social psychological dimensions of citizenship so as to recognise that the political, cultural, ethnic and

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[12]There are only few exceptions where the institutional level of analysis of human behaviour is explicitly theorised in social psychology (see, for example, Lahlou, 2008).

national are intertwined and define the position of each citizen within the national collectivity.

2. *To explore the connections between the symbolic and the institutional levels in national identity processes as expressed within the British naturalisation context.* Public policy, as a set of norms and practices, is interlinked with the lay representational field. It can be said that there is a dialogical relationship between social institutions and social representations. As will be shown in the next chapter, social representations are based on self-other relations and the types of communication which are established among people and groups. Social institutions, like citizenship and immigration practices, shape these relations and legitimise patterns of representations. Thus, they have a significant effect on the construction of national identities and the position of people within the existing network of social relations. However, institutions can also be challenged. Social representations express this tension between constancy and change. It is because social thinking is based on the self-other dynamics that there is always room for transformation of established patterns of thinking and acting.

3. *To investigate lay understandings of citizenship within a dynamic framework of self-other relations.* Very few studies have explored public perceptions of citizenship creating a need to explore the ways that citizens themselves construct citizenship (Jones & Gaventa, 2002). Furthermore, the studies that have examined the psychology of the citizen conceptualise it in an individualistic way, thus overlooking the dynamics of membership (Barnes, Auburn, & Lea, 2004). A bottom-up understanding of both citizenship and national identity can complement the macro-structural analysis of nationalism and help to show that ordinary people are "active producers –and not just passive consumers – of national discourse" (Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008, p. 539).

4. *To understand the role that naturalisation plays in contemporary globalised societies.* Naturalisation has been seen predominantly as an indicator of assimilation in the literature (Gilbertson & Singer, 2003). However, as argued, the link between national belonging and citizenship is not straightforward. People are, to a great extent, mobile, forming de-territorialised and transnational affiliations (Basch, Glick-Schiller, & Szanton-Blanc, 1994). Academic discussions of cosmopolitan and post-national citizenship illustrate this trend towards de-nationalised forms of citizenship (Benhabib, 2004, 2006; Cohen, 1999; Falk, 2000; Hettne, 2000; Soysal, 1994). The UK has responded to these challenges by making commitment and contribution to the country a condition for granting naturalisation to migrants. This paradoxical situation creates the need for the

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exploration of the function of naturalisation in contemporary global societies for both the migrants and the 'host' country.

5. *To offer a critical perspective on immigration and naturalisation in the UK.* While strict immigration and citizenship policies are often portrayed as inevitable responses to problems of sustainability and social solidarity, this thesis adopts a more critical viewpoint. It aims to illustrate that public policy and lay discourses on national identity and immigration are not disassociated but together form an interwoven set of boundary management practices. As such, public policy is not necessarily based on rational decision making but draws on and reinforces representations of 'others'.

6. *To inform political debates on issues of naturalisation and immigration.* By acquiring an in-depth understanding of representations related to naturalisation, I seek to understand better the processes of inclusion and exclusion which operate in this context. My aim is to highlight the factors that make the United Kingdom a welcoming society, whilst also uncovering the factors that create exclusion and construct migrants as 'others'.

1.8.2 Research questions

As argued, citizenship in the UK is multifaceted and intertwined with representations of the nation and its 'others'. In order to explore the links between identity construction processes and citizenship, we need to acknowledge the complex interplay of various discourses that define similarity and difference. In other words, we need to unpack the self-other relations and the interplay of inclusion and exclusion which underlie both national identity construction and citizenship policy. The theory of social representations provides such a tool because it theorises the self-other interdependence in knowledge construction. From a social representations perspective, social knowledge is a dialogical, dynamic process rooted in the relations between the self and the other (Marková, 2000, 2003a). This suggests that thinking is always a dialogue between the self and the other. It is a process of argumentation which draws on multiple, sometimes conflicting, ideas and themes (Billig, 1987, 1991; Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton, & Radley, 1988). Tensions and conflicts provide the basis for the development of dialogue and argumentation leading to re-negotiation and re-construction of social representations. The prominence of self-other relations in the construction of social knowledge suggests that identity construction is also part of this process. Within this framework, identity can be theorised as a process of positioning of self and other in relation to the 'polyphasic' representational field which allows people to

make sense of themselves and others. Positioning processes draw on existing social representations and are always embedded in the broader societal and institutional 'moral order' that defines social relations by demarcating the rights and duties of social actors vis-à-vis each other (Davies & Harré, 1999; Harré & Moghaddam, 2003a; Harré & van Langehove, 1991, 1999b). Therefore, identity, as a process of relational positioning, is located at the intersection between micro and macro social processes; it is the concept that links the individual to his or her social world (Duveen, 1993). Using a social representations perspective, along with a positioning analysis of identity processes, this research seeks to answer the following research questions:

- Which social representations are associated with citizenship in the United Kingdom by the three sets of social actors involved in this context? What are the underlying themes that form the basis for these constructions and how are these themes organised?
- How are these social representations linked with positioning processes? In particular, how do people use these representations to construct and negotiate identities and what types of identities are constructed within the naturalisation context?
- What types of self-other relations form the basis of these representations and identities?

This PhD further aims to explore the relationship between representation and identity. In particular, it seeks to address the following theoretical questions:

- How can the notion of positioning be used to theorise the relationship between representation and identity through a consideration of self-other relations?
- How can the concept of positioning be employed to account for the normative aspect of social representations and identities so that we can better account for the quality of relations between self and other? More specifically, how do the symbolic and institutional spheres intersect to shape identity positions and their 'moral orders'?
- What implications do knowledge plurality and ambivalence have for identity construction? That is, if people draw on diverse and opposing themes to make sense of the world, as the idea of dialogical (Marková, 2003a) and dilemmatic (Billig, 1987) thinking suggests, how is this reflected in positioning processes and identity construction?

On the whole, this PhD research contributes to the social psychological literature of identity and social representations through a careful consideration of self-other dynamics in processes of identity construction. By incorporating the institutional level

into the study of nationhood, it offers a more holistic understanding of processes of inclusion and exclusion in contemporary societies. Furthermore, by highlighting the intersection of symbolic and institutional processes of positioning, it provides avenues for the integration of different levels of analysis which will benefit the study of social psychological phenomena in general. On an empirical level, this PhD, considering both the public policy approach and the lay perspectives of key actors in the naturalisation context, contributes to our understanding of the meanings and functions of citizenship in global and mobile societies. In addition, this thesis offers insights to the citizenship literature by unpacking the social-psychological processes involved in the process of becoming a citizen. Ultimately, this PhD contributes to our understanding of the factors that can enable dialogue between 'insiders' and 'outsiders'.

Chapter 2. The Construction of Social Knowledge

2.1 Overview of Chapter 2

As mentioned in the previous chapter, this research explores the social representations associated with citizenship within the UK naturalisation context, in an effort to understand the processes of national identity construction involved in this context. Since naturalisation is, in essence, a boundary crossing practice, exploring the dynamics of self-other relations are central in this study. The theory of social representations has been chosen as the theoretical framework for this research because it conceptualises knowledge construction through processes of social interaction and communication. The theory of social representations has provided a new approach to cognition in social psychology. Contrary to mainstream cognition research, it employs a 'social thinking' approach which views knowledge construction as a creative, social and dynamic process (Papastamou, 2001). The theory aims to understand the construction processes and products of the 'thinking society' (Moscovici, 2000a). As such, the social representations approach allows to view citizenship as a dynamic process embedded in the relations of the nation and its 'others'.

This chapter will introduce the theory of social representations and ground the theorisation of identity which is discussed in Chapter 3. The following section will discuss social representations as the 'intellectual products' of thinking societies and the third section will explore the conditions of their production, that is, the modes of communication and underlying social relations. Drawing on these two sections, the fourth section will discuss the notion of knowledge plurality which is based on the multiplicity of encounters between knowledge systems and on the diversity of relationships between self and other. The final section, drawing on the idea of plurality and multivoicedness, will consider the ambivalent and dilemmatic nature of social thinking.

2.2 Theorising common-sense knowledge: The theory of social representations

2.2.1 Sphere of production

In his seminal 1961 book *La Psychoanalyse, Son Image et Son Public*, Moscovici (1961/1998) studied the 'thinking society' by exploring cognition as a social process

undertaken by communities and not individual minds. His particular focus was the construction and transformation of lay knowledge about psychoanalysis when it moves from the field of science to the public sphere. Rather than 'distorting' or 'popularising' psychoanalysis, common sense knowledge 'socialised' this scientific theory. Moscovici 'rehabilitated' common sense knowledge by arguing that this is a creative process which involves constructive appropriation and not passive simplification (Jovchelovitch, 2008). What was important for Moscovici was that different types of knowledge serve different purposes. To make this case, Moscovici (1961/1998, 2000a) discussed the distinction between common sense, or social representations, and other forms of knowledge, namely science. The criteria for this distinction are the presence of dialogue, plurality and negotiation, as well as the sphere of production. Science is produced within a reified universe where only few have legitimate voices and where definiteness is the goal of communication. On the contrary, social representations are 'public' and their goal is to make the social world intelligible for people (Moscovici, 1981, 1988, 2000a). They are produced by lay people in everyday life and everyone has (potentially) a part in the knowledge construction process. Non-ambiguity is hardly achieved since disagreements and debates form an essential part of the public sphere. Although the strict dichotomisation between science and common sense has been criticised (Purkhardt, 1993), the distinction between systems of knowledge can still be maintained as a matter of degree rather than quality. We can, thus, make a distinction between belief-based representations (like religion and ideology) and knowledge-based representations (like common sense) according to the degree, not presence or absence, of dialogue, plurality and contestation (Marková, 2003a).

2.2.2 Functions

Social representations are inextricably linked with communicative practices taking place in the public sphere. They are produced and transformed in the public sphere through dialogue and communication. Thus, social representations are more than a source of information for people. Moscovici (1973, p. xiii) has defined them as:

> ...systems of values, ideas and practices with a twofold function: first to establish an order which will enable individuals to orientate themselves in their material and social world and to master it; and secondly to enable communication to take place among the members of a community by providing them with a code for social exchange and a code for naming and classifying unambiguously the various aspects of their world and their individual and group history.

In other words, social representations have an instrumental function (mastering the world) and a communicative function (enabling communication) (Gillespie, 2008a). They constitute a framework of thinking about the social world and they provide a common frame of reference for groups and communities (Rose, Efram, Gervais, Joffe, Jovchelovitch, & Morant, 1995). What makes social representations social is not that they are shared, but that they are socially constituted through a communicative process and that they serve social functions by orienting social behaviour and communication among people (Moscovici, 1961/1998). As such, they constitute symbolic resources and mediate the relations between people and groups. They are also embedded in everyday practices, cultural habits and institutions. The relationship between practice, social relations and social representations has been aptly shown by Jodelet (1991). In her study on social representations of madness in rural France, Jodelet was able to show how everyday practices, such as washing, are permeated by stigmatising representations of madness. Such practices regulate social relations so that the villagers and the 'mad' are kept as far apart as possible.

It follows that social representations are localised systems of knowledge (Jovchelovitch, 2007). They are dependent upon the context of their creation and are intrinsically linked to the identities of the group(s) that produce them. As such, knowledge is never 'disinterested' (Duveen, 2000). In his original psychoanalysis study, for instance, Moscovici (1961/1998) was able to show that different groups create different representations for the same object. This depends on the group identity, interests and motivations, as well as on the medium of communication used for the construction of new knowledge.

The fundamental aim of the construction of social representations is to 'make the unfamiliar familiar' (Moscovici, 1981, 1988, 2000a). Social representations 'fill in' the gaps so as to enable communication between different people. In other words, the strangeness of unfamiliar objects is reduced when social representations develop. It is this strangeness that creates the need for 'symbolic coping' and activates a socio-cognitive process whereby unfamiliar 'things' become 'objects' of knowledge (Wagner, 1998; Wagner, Duveen, Farr, Jovchelovitch, Fabio, Marková, & Rose, 1999a). Through anchoring, new ideas are classified into pre-established categories (Moscovici, 2000a). Thus, the unfamiliar idea acquires an identity, a set of features that characterises it. For instance, psychoanalysis, in order to be appropriated, was anchored in the notion of confession (Moscovici, 1961/1998). Anchoring gives social representations a historical foundation and links them with the identity and culture of a community (Moscovici,

2000a). This is how social representations connect the past and the present of a community and maintain a degree of continuity between new knowledge and traditional knowledge.

The second mechanism of knowledge construction is objectification whereby abstract ideas become objects (Moscovici, 2000a). This means that they acquire the status of being 'real'. To use the same example, the transformation of psychoanalysis into lay knowledge has eventually led to the use of psychoanalytic terms as if they were real entities. Moscovici (2000a) uses the example of neurosis to show that this term has come to signify a 'real' personality characteristic, to the extent that the elimination of the term 'neurosis' would essentially change the way we see other people and relate to them.

2.2.3 Constancy and change

A social representation, once objectified, is restrictive by its very 'objective' status, depending on the degree that it has been conventionalised within a community or social group. On the one hand, social representations are prescriptive because they are historical and connected to collective memory and culture in a way that informs people's way of thinking; the more conventional and 'taken for granted' they get, the more autonomy and resistance to change they acquire (Jovchelovitch, 1996; Moscovici, 2000a). On the other hand, however, social representations can never be wholly settled. It is precisely because knowledge is constructed through communication that whenever an object becomes the focus of public attention, it can potentially change through communication. Contrary to Durkheim who theorised collective representations as solid structures of knowledge which enhance group solidarity, Moscovici's aim was rather to theorise negotiation and transformation of knowledge in contemporary plural public spheres (Marková, 2003a). This potential for social change is what gives a critical edge to the theory of social representations. This also suggests that even though there is a degree of sharedness of social representations within a society, they are never completely shared by a community; rather, there is always the possibility for disagreement and negotiation – this point will be further elaborated in sections 2.4 and 2.5 in relation to the dialogical nature of thinking.

To sum up, the key contributions of the theory of social representations to our understanding of social knowledge are:

1. The 'rehabilitation' of common sense knowledge in social psychology.

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2. The emphasis on communicative practices and dialogue in knowledge construction.

3. The de-individualisation of the social psychology of knowledge.

4. The theorisation of change and innovation in terms of knowledge construction.

2.3 The process of knowledge construction

The previous section described social representations as the 'intellectual products' of thinking societies. Apart from contents or 'lay theories', social representations are also defined as processes of knowledge construction. Indeed, within the theory of social representations, there is an inseparable link between the process and the structure of social knowledge, because different construction processes create different networks of meanings (Jovchelovitch, 1996).

2.3.1 Self-other relations in knowledge construction

Since communication is at the core of knowledge construction, it can be argued that different communicative processes, based on the dynamics of self-other relations, give rise to different types of representations. For instance, in Moscovici's (1961/1998) psychoanalysis study, propaganda was the communication strategy employed by the communist press with regards to psychoanalysis. In that context, psychoanalysis was constructed as a tool of the American capitalist ideology which ran against the values and ideology of the Communist Party. The representations of psychoanalysis took the form of a stereotype based on the dichotomy between the American/capitalist and Soviet/communist ideology (Moscovici, 1961/1998). Each pole in this representation was defined and evaluated by its contrast to the other pole, creating a rigid opposition which prevented dialogue (Gillespie, 2008a). By offering no other alternatives but to reject psychoanalysis, propagandistic communication constructed a polarised representation.

Moscovici's (1988) distinction among hegemonic, emancipated and polemical representations also exemplifies the point that different types of communication construct different representations. Hegemonic representations are shared, uniform and are constructed by groups of high solidarity, much like Durkheim's collective representations. Emancipated representations reflect more heterogeneous social systems whereby different sub-communities construct different versions of the world; each version is not, however, detached from the others as there is exchange of ideas between groups. Finally, polemical representations are constructed on the basis of

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antagonistic relations between groups; the polarised representation of psychoanalysis produced by the Marxist press is such an example.

Jovchelovitch (2007) has also distinguished between dialogical and non-dialogical encounters between people holding different representations. While dialogical encounters allow for the construction of hybrid and pluralistic representations, non-dialogical relations construct a hierarchy of knowledge, such that the knowledge produced by more powerful groups acquires more validity than the knowledge constructed by dominated groups.

Duveen and colleagues have discussed in more detail how self-other relations shape knowledge construction processes through the mediation of social representations. Drawing on Piaget's distinction between symmetric and asymmetric social relations (constraint and cooperation), they have elaborated the role of recognition in cognitive development (Duveen & Psaltis, 2008; Leman & Duveen, 1999; Psaltis & Duveen, 2006, 2007). These studies have mainly investigated the social representations of gender and their impact on knowledge construction processes. They have illustrated that recognition can be hindered or facilitated by the social representations of gender. These social representations, based on the bipolar male-female, position men as more knowledgeable than women. As a result, the knowledge produced by men is perceived as more 'valid' than the knowledge produced by women. Through this positioning, social representations shape patterns of interaction and mediate communication practices, thus having an effect on the construction of new knowledge. For instance, in Duveen and colleagues' studies, it was shown that interactions characterised by recognition produced 'intellectual exchange' type processes of knowledge construction which resulted in the production of more original knowledge among children (Duveen & Psaltis, 2008; Psaltis & Duveen, 2006).

More recently, Duveen (2008) took this idea a step further by arguing that not only can we distinguish different representational types by the kinds of underlying communicative practices, but we can also use these communicative genres to distinguish types of groups from each other. In other words, we can identify forms of affiliation which correspond to different communication genres. Groups affiliated by relations of sympathy, whereby members are voluntarily associated, tend to diffuse information about new objects of social knowledge. Groups affiliated by communion, in the sense that the members share a particular belief system, tend to use propagation which sets limits on how new information is received. Groups which create clear boundaries between the in-group and the out-groups and are defined by solidarity, tend

to use propaganda as a mode of communication. Therefore, there is a three-fold relationship between group structure or social relations, communicative practices, and types of representations produced.

2.3.2 Epistemological foundations: Dialogicality

It follows from the above that it is the quality of communication and self-other relations that shapes the knowledge construction process. Moscovici's social representations theory is, indeed, based on the theorisation of self-other relations in knowledge construction. This is what he has called a 'systematic social psychology', defined as follows: "the relationship between Ego and Object is mediated through the intervention of another subject; this relationship becomes a complex triangular one in which each of the terms is fully determined by the other two" (Moscovici, 2000b, p. 107). This relationship among self, other and object/representation forms the unit of analysis in social representations theory (Marková, 2000, 2003a, 2003b).

The significance of the dialogue and self-other interaction can be traced back to the Hegelian paradigm which stresses the dialogical nature of thought and places interaction at the centre of knowledge construction (Marková, 1982, 2000). Marková (1996, 2000, 2003a, 2008a) has extensively studied the epistemological status of the social representations theory based on the idea that the individual and the society form an ontological unit. For Marková (2003a), the ontology of humanity is formulated in terms of communication, that is, to be is to communicate. Thus, the self (Ego) and the other (Alter) can only be conceived as interdependent, since the self has no meaning outside communication. It is communication that constructs both the self and the other simultaneously.

The idea that human beings are inherently social has also been expressed by developmental psychologists, like Vygotsky, Piaget and Winnicott (Jovchelovitch, 2007). Moscovici (1990) has acknowledged the links between developmental and social psychology, suggesting that development is first and foremost a process of socialisation. The work of Winnicott, in particular, shows that the process of self construction is essentially the process whereby the child develops his/her identity as different from his/her mother's; this takes place ontogenetically through the recognition of the other as different (Jovchelovitch, 2007; Marková, 2003b). Similarly, in Mead's writings we find the idea that by appropriating the perspective of the other, an individual becomes socialised as a member of a community and develops self-consciousness: "only in so far as he takes the attitudes of the organised social group to which he

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belongs towards the organised, co-operative social activity or set of such activities in which that group as such is engaged, does he develop a complete self' (Mead, 1934, p. 155). It can be argued, therefore, that the other (or a representation of the other) is indeed part of the self (Hermans, 2001a; Marková, 2006) – this point will be further discussed in the next chapter in relation to identity.

The de facto interdependence of self and other is the starting point for the theory of social representations and it is what distinguishes it from mainstream individualistic theories of cognition (Farr, 1987, 1993b). If the self cannot be viewed independently of the other, it follows that knowledge as well ought to be dialogical, meaning that 'the capacity to think is by definition the capacity to communicate' (Marková, 2003a, pp. 138-139). Thought and thus, knowledge, is indivisible from communication which involves the interaction between self and other. In other words, we only conceive objects or create knowledge in terms of the other(s). In epistemological terms, the dual relationship between knower and object becomes triadic as the relation between the self and the object is mediated by the other (Moscovici, 2000b). The self (or the Ego), as well as the other (or the Alter), can be an individual, a group, a nation etc. The relation of the two is the basis for the construction of social knowledge (see also 2.3.1, p. 39). This suggests that the individual and the society are to be conceived as interdependent; for social representations theory, cognition is, de facto, social and cultural (Voelklein & Howarth, 2005).

This triadic model of knowledge construction has been extended by Bauer and Gaskell who have added the project dimension (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999), which links the self and the other in time, and the intergroup context (Bauer & Gaskell, 2008), in order to capture the interaction of different social milieus in the representational process. For instance, the construction of social representations of Britishness involves various actors. One can think of the lay British public (which is composed of various social groups of a different status), the British state (which defines formal inclusion and exclusion), as well as the migrants (who, by claiming citizenship, redefine the national boundaries), as key actors in constructions of Britishness. While each actor has their own version or perspective on this issue, based on the project they are pursuing, it can be said that these versions intersect and overlap at points to construct Britishness as a complex and multifaceted representation.

Overall, the theory of social representations offers a systemic understanding of the social which is conceived, not as an aggregation of individuals, but as a whole that incorporates the individual and the social as aspects of the same system (Raudsepp,

2005). Social representations permeate both the individual and the cultural or social, thus, integrating the intra-personal, inter-personal, inter-group and societal levels of analysis which Doise (1986) has identified. As Farr (1987, p. 359) puts it, social representations are "'in the world' as well as being in the 'head'". The theory of social representations, instead of looking at objects or subjects as the initiators of the knowledge production processes, it looks at their interaction, at how each shapes the other during the process. Thus, rather than the object or the subject, it is the in-between space of interaction that becomes here the unit of analysis.

2.3.3 Dialogical tensions

This dynamic relation between self, other and object is an epistemology of change because it presupposes tensions among the three parties (Marková, 2000, 2003a). The tension between self and other is the starting point for change and construction of new knowledge. On the one hand, power relations define the legitimacy and validity of different knowledge systems. The degree of power asymmetry between groups defines who has more say in what becomes the 'truth' (Jovchelovitch, 2007). On the other hand, although asymmetries in dialogue and recognition help to maintain dominant representations, they are also the starting point for negotiations because they create debate and contestation; it is "the impossibility of consensus that is the basis of all dialogue" (Marková, 2000, p. 424). In other words, gaps in understanding and the impossibility of complete recognition of the perspective of the other provide the momentum for further dialogue. The continuous struggle for recognition is at the core of all self-other relations (Marková, 2000, 2003a). Indeed, if people agreed on everything, there would be nothing left to discuss or debate, because in order to engage with the other, the other must maintain a degree of 'strangeness'; our effort to reduce this strangeness enables dialogue (Marková, 2003a).

The third party in the knowledge construction triangle, the object, also has a dynamic role in representational processes. The object is, in a way, the 'anchor' of every dialogue. It poses restrictions on the representational process by its very status as an object. Depending on how conventionalised it has been, on how much it is rooted in the culture and the identity of a group, the object may not be easily transformed and contested.

In light of the above, it can be argued that the fundamental tension in the representational triangle is the tension between constancy and change. In belief-based social representations or in hegemonic representations (Moscovici, 1988) constancy

and conformity are stronger. Such representations, like the collective representations described by Durkheim, tend to be important for the identity and solidarity of a community. In knowledge-based social representations the balance leans towards change and negotiation, that is, the making of new knowledge. To put it differently, in belief-based representations the self-other relations are at the foreground (because such representations express commitment to the group), while in knowledge-based representations it is the self-object relations that are at the foreground (because the object of knowledge becomes a subject of examination – it is not taken for granted) (Marková, 2003a).

On the whole, the dialogical tensions among self, other and object allow us to theorise both stability and change. The opposing forces of constancy and change make social representations an inherently dialogical knowledge construction process. It will be shown later in this chapter that thinking is, indeed, a dialectic and creative process which employs both arguments and counter-arguments.

2.4 Plurality of knowledge

Moscovici theorised social representations by differentiating them from collective representations, which were conceptualised by Durkheim (Moscovici, 2000a). He argued that if collective representations were a suitable way of knowing for pre-modern societies, social representations form the basis for common-sense rationality nowadays. In traditional societies knowledge was relatively stable and un-questioned. It took the form of collective representations, which functioned as facts or truths. As Jovchelovitch (2001, 2007) observes, Durkheim's underlying goal when theorising collective representations was to explain how solidarity and stability comes about in a community. On the other hand, social representations is a theory of change and transformation akin to contemporary communities (Marková, 2003a).

As Beck and colleagues (Beck, Bonss, & Lau, 2003; Beck & Lau, 2005) argue, taken for granted distinctions, certainties and boundaries are dissolving in contemporary societies. This means that things are more ambiguous and that categories are based less on the either/or principle and more on the both/and principle. This multiplicity of boundaries goes hand in hand with the multiplicity of rationalities (Beck, Bonss, & Lau, 2003). Social representations are, thus, plural, dynamic and contested, reflecting the modern world in which knowledge is constantly circulated by various centres, none of which has complete authority over 'the truth' (Moscovici, 2000a). Social representations, as a phenomenon, are only possible because today there is no single

legitimating authority over knowledge, which allows for increased debate and communication (Duveen, 2000). The modern public sphere provides the space for communication and exchange of ideas and is, thus, associated with the pluralisation of knowledge forms and claims (Jovchelovitch, 2001, 2007). It is this plurality of knowledge systems and our ability to adapt to this increasing 'strangeness' that the theory of social representations addresses and, in particular, the concept of 'cognitive polyphasia'.

The cognitive polyphasia hypothesis was formulated by Moscovici (1961/1998, p. 301, my translation):

> ...the same group, and mutatis mutandis, the same individual are able to employ various logical registers, in domains to which they relate with perspectives, information and values that are distinctive to each of them... In a general way, we can argue that the dynamic co-existence... of different modalities of knowledge, corresponding to specific relations between man and his social context, determine a state of cognitive polyphasia.

The cognitive polyphasia hypothesis suggests that in order to be able to master the world, we have to combine a variety of conceptual tools which allow us to adjust to different circumstances. Thus, our relation to the world is not singular, defined by a unique set of beliefs about the nature of things (e.g. religion in the Middle Ages); rather, it is multifaceted, as different projects and contexts require different rationalities (Kalampalikis & Haas, 2008). Indeed, if knowledge is conceptualised as the result of the interaction between subjects and objects, then different types of interaction among the parties will produce different ways of knowing in different contexts.

Cognitive polyphasia has a diachronic and a synchronic aspect (Provencher, 2007). The diachronic perspective has to do with the temporal dimension of changes in ways of thinking. Polyphasia here refers to the coexistence of 'older' and 'newer' ways of thinking within the same community or individual. Several studies have, indeed, illustrated the combination of traditional and modern ways of thinking in different contexts: archaic and contemporary ideas about madness (Jodelet, 1991), traditional Chinese and biomedical knowledge (Jovchelovitch & Gervais, 1999), traditional Indian and Western views on mental illness (Wagner, Duveen, Themel, & Verma, 1999b). This type of polyphasia is also related with the disillusionment with knowledge systems which had been considered infallible in the past, such as science.

The synchronic perspective, which is complementary to the diachronic perspective, suggests that different ways of thinking coexist within a society and that people draw on different knowledge systems in different contexts (Provencher, 2007). The synchronic perspective maintains that different ways of thinking are not necessarily incompatible, but can be accommodated within a community or person. Contexts, norms and goals are, for Moscovici (2000c), the elements that define the choice of knowledge to be employed. The context defines the particularities of the situation, the norms define what counts as the 'appropriate way of thinking' about an issue and the goals refer to the purpose of knowledge construction and communication. Thus, 'cognitive systems' and thinking modes are not tied to particular individuals or personalities, but are part of co-constructed cultural resources on which people draw.

Within the synchronic approach in particular, cognitive polyphasia can be described as a way of dealing with change and unfamiliarity, since social representations are by definition a means of symbolic coping with unfamiliar situations (Wagner, 1998; Wagner & Kronberger, 2001). In our everyday life we all come across difference, otherness, novelty and change. Coping with this complex reality requires that we can mix and combine elements from different knowledge systems. If the aim of social representations is to make the unfamiliar familiar and to enable communication, it follows that for social reality to be rendered comprehensible, people must somehow come to grips with various kinds of knowledge produced by different communities. As Hermans and Dimaggio (2007) argue, the increasing cultural encounters of our globalised world create the need for dialogical capacity, meaning the capacity for dialogue between self and other. Thus, as Wagner (1998) notes, cognitive polyphasia can be conceptualised as a 'representational repertoire' which allows people to be flexible and deal with the variety and complexity of the social world.

The cognitive polyphasia hypothesis seems to suggest that people are increasingly more able to take on different perspectives. However, asymmetrical power relations pose constraints on the validity of different knowledge systems. This means that encounters between knowledge systems are not always dialogical (Jovchelovitch, 2007). As Gillespie (2008a) observes, the plurality of social representations does not necessarily mean that people have become more tolerant; rather, people may employ various defensive strategies, which he calls 'semantic barriers', against alternative representations. Certainly, one such strategy is denying the agency or ability of the other to construct valid accounts of the world. This can be conceptualised as an instance of misrecognition whereby the other is not recognised as an equal partner in

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dialogue (Taylor, 1992). This again illustrates that the knowledge construction process depends on the kinds of relationships that are established between self and other.

To sum up, cognitive polyphasia is the outcome of multiple knowledge encounters among various groups and communities which lead to the construction of a plurality of representations that people can employ in their dealings with the world. Cognitive polyphasia furthermore suggests that contradictions and ambivalence are part of our common sense knowledge. In line with this, Rose and colleagues (1995, p. 4) describe the representational field as "susceptible to contradiction, fragmentation, negotiation and debate. In such a representational field, there is incoherence, tension and ambivalence". It follows that representations are never autonomous; they interact, conflict and mix with other representations.

2.5 Dialogical thinking

This section draws on Marková's dialogical perspective and Billig's rhetorical approach to discuss the antinomic nature of common sense. Both perspectives emphasise the social-individual dynamics in knowledge construction, as well as the creativity of common sense through the use of dialogue. While Marková focuses on the epistemological and ontological foundations of the idea of antinomic thinking, Billig stresses the argumentative and strategic nature of discourse.

For Marková (2003a), cognitive polyphasia is an expression of dialogicality (see section 2.3.2, p. 43). According to this perspective, there is no self independent from the other as we can only speak of self and other within the realm of communication. Based on this premise, Marková (2003a) further argues that knowledge construction is a dialogical process, based on the dialogical tensions between self and other. Furthermore, the relation between the self and the other is not only external, but is also internal (Marková, 2003a, 2006). This suggests that different perspectives and representations do not only meet and interact in the public sphere, through public debates and discussions among various social agents. Rather, different perspectives are also located 'inside individual minds' and serve as symbolic resources on which people can draw in different contexts, as the cognitive polyphasia hypothesis suggests. Thus, thinking can be conceived as an internal dialogue with an 'inner Alter' defined as "symbolically and socially represented kinds of the *Alter* that are in an *internal dialogue* with the Ego" (Marková, 2006, p. 145, emphasis in original). The inner Alter represents a different perspective on the world. This may be, for instance, the voice of a social group or a significant other.

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This theoretical perspective conceptualises the human mind as polyphonic: one can speak from many positions or have more than one voice, each linked with a particular perspective on the world. Bakhtin has used the concept 'heteroglossia' to refer to the different internal voices or perspectives people may employ (Marková, 2003a). Polyphasia and heteroglossia, therefore, refer to the same phenomenon from a different angle. The former refers to the coexistence of diverse knowledge systems in society and the latter to the expression of this plurality within the individual through the coexistence of multiple voices (Marková, 2003a). If polyphasia, as Moscovici (1961/1998) claims, is the rule rather than the exception, then ambivalence and contradiction are both part of our thinking and of the knowledge we construct.

Billig and colleagues (Billig, 1987, 1988, 1991, 1993; Billig et al., 1988) have conceptualised dialogue in thinking from a rhetorical perspective. This viewpoint maintains that lay people think in an argumentative way; they are able to argue by drawing on opposing themes. Billig takes thinking to be a form of argumentation consisting of both logos and anti-logos. The capacity to negate is especially important here because it emphasises our ability to criticise and contest. Every position or attitude is simultaneously the negation of an opposing argument (Billig, 1987). Billig (1988, p. 12) comes very close to the idea of the dialogical mind when he argues that "thought is internalised argumentation". This means that neither common sense nor individual minds are monological. Arguing means employing both logos and anti-logos, being able to use contrary 'common-places' to pursue different projects. This is evident in the official political discourse whereby politicians of different parties employ the same values (justice, equality, etc) to make different arguments. This not only suggests that the definitions of values are debatable, but also that the public is able to understand, and potentially agree, with different parties which argue in opposing directions (Billig, 1987, pp. 233-234; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).

In accordance with the notion of the 'thinking society' developed by Moscovici, this approach challenges the idea of inner consistency which assumes that the individual is essentially a rigid unthinking subject; rather, it is the arguments within cultures, not just between cultures, that provide the 'matter' of human thinking (Billig, 1988). The existence of contrary themes within common-sense makes change possible because it opens up a space for argumentation and debate. Thus, taken for granted ideas, or common-places for Billig (1987), are not only the basis of agreement, but also of disagreement.

It follows that the human mind is antinomic; it is structured around the dialogue of opposites (Marková, 2003a). What is important is that the poles are interrelated; one is defined by the other. There is no 'us' if there is no 'them', nothing is 'same' if there is not something that is 'different'.

The idea that thinking is antinomic has been elaborated in the theory of social representations through the notion of themata, which are defined as oppositional categories and constitute an expression of dialogicality (Marková, 2000, 2003a). Moscovici borrowed the term 'thema' from science philosopher Gerald Holton (Moscovici & Vignaux, 2000). For Holton, themata are fundamental ideas which underpin scientific thought, even across different paradigms. They constitute the basis of scientific theories and hypotheses. Moscovici was the first to introduce this term in the social psychology of representations (Moscovici, 1992; Moscovici & Vignaux, 2000). He describes them as 'source' or 'primary' ideas to refer to their primacy in generating social representations. Themata take the form of oppositions, like man/woman, we/they, justice/injustice and so on. Moscovici also points to their canonical or commonplace nature showing that they are relatively stable (Moscovici, 1992; Moscovici & Vignaux, 2000). It is the content of the categories that can change, rather than the oppositional categories themselves. For instance, the 'we/they' and 'same/different' oppositions seem to be quite stable over time, even though the meanings of the poles change to include more people and/or exclude others. Thus, themata can be described as the 'deep structures' of social representations, resembling what the structural approach theorists call the 'central core' of a representation (Liu, 2004). Themata can be related to more than one social representations and also intermix with other themata in the construction of representations. Also, in the course of history themata can be re-thematized. The thema of 'social recognition/denial of recognition', for instance, has been said to be fundamental in human history, but with the development of modernity and humanism, it has been transformed from a matter of honour to a matter of dignity (Marková, 2003a).

Not all antinomies in thinking become themata. According to Marková (2000, 2003a), antinomies can become the primary ideas that generate social representations through a process of thematisation. For Marková, there are oppositions which may be 'dormant', not reflected upon. When an opposition becomes negotiated and communicated socially, that is, when it becomes socially relevant, it can become a thema. Specifically, when an object enters conscience and needs to become familiar, it gets anchored on a thema or more. This thema becomes negotiated and talked about. It is then that the

potential meanings of the thema, which at this point is a very basic opposition, are enriched and the social representation develops as a network of meanings grounded in this opposition (Moscovici, 1992).

The dilemma between individual and group rights is an example of this. Nowadays the social representations of multiculturalism in Britain are partly based on the opposition between communitarianism and liberal individualism. This is exemplified in the tension between the liberal and the communitarian values of justice and citizenship. The former advocate universal individual rights, while the latter emphasise the need to recognise specific group rights. The very meaning of equality is a matter of debate here. This is what Hall calls the 'multicultural question': "How then can the particular and the universal, the claims of both difference and equality, be recognised? This is the dilemma, the conundrum –the multi-cultural question– at the heart of the multi-cultural's transruptive and reconfigurative impact" (2000, p. 235, emphasis in original).

Billig and colleagues (Billig, 1991; Billig et al., 1988) use the term 'ideological dilemmas' for such phenomena, in order to emphasise both the antinomic and the argumentative nature of common-sense thinking, Dilemmas such as 'the individual versus the social good' and 'serving justice versus showing sympathy' are sources that people draw on to make arguments. Billig and colleagues' use of the term 'dilemma' is also indicative of the fact that such contrary themes and arguments can appear equally reasonable to common sense. For instance, both justice and mercy are equally valued ideals, but guide social behaviour in opposing directions.

These dilemmas are rooted in the history of modern societies. For example, the tension between prejudice and rationality originates in Enlightenment's ideal of rationality and rejection of prejudice (Billig, 1991; Billig et al., 1988; Figgou & Condor, 2006) . Condor has highlighted similar tensions in constructions of national identity in Britain and has drawn attention to the strategic nature of these constructions. In one of her studies (Condor, 2006a), she has shown that respondents in England made strategic temporal comparisons between the past and the present. A homogenous and singular national character was portrayed as anachronistic, whereas diversity was seen as characterising British society in the present. For Condor (2006a) this was an effort to suppress negative stereotypes for the ingroup. Moreover, she argues that there may be an assumption of superiority in such discourses, since cultural diversity makes Britain distinctively interesting and tolerant. Similar results have also been found by Condor (2006b) in her analysis of the Labour party representations of 'multicultural Britain', where multiculturalism was portrayed as a distinct British virtue or accomplishment,

whereas at the same time an Anglocentric historical narrative was evident in the politicians' accounts. These studies have shown that the British nation is represented as both culturally homogeneous and diverse, while ethnic minorities can be ambivalently positioned as both 'similar' and 'different'.

Billig (1987, 1988, 1993) discusses this strategic aspect of discourse with regards to the process of categorisation. He maintains that categorisation is not a straightforward process of neutral classification. Rather, categorising involves arguing about the essence of categories. For instance, 'who counts as British' is a question about the definition of not only the boundaries of Britishness, but also its very meaning, its defining features. Categories can be strategically constructed and selected to pursue various projects. Reicher and Hopkins (2001) have shown, for example, that there was a clear link between the way the Scottish identity was defined by the political parties during the 1992 election and the way people were mobilised in order to protect it. They demonstrated that unionists (Conservative Party) and devolutionists (Labour Party), as well as separatists/nationalists (Scottish National Party), all evoked Scottish identity to pursue different political projects. For everyone, Scottish identity (defined as an independent nation or as an indispensable part of the UK) was under threat and all claimed to represent the Scottish national interests with the aim to protect the nation either by devolution, independence or by remaining under the same status quo. Thus, category definitions were used as arguments that promoted different types of social action.

To sum up, dialogical epistemology suggests that thinking is a dialogic process which incorporates multiple and opposing themes or perspectives. Such themes, once thematised, form the core of social representations. They become dilemmas that are talked and argued about, often in a strategic manner. It is in the nature of common sense to comprise ambivalence and conflict between different ideas. This provides the impetus for creativity, change and innovation. By combining the dialogical approach to knowledge construction with the notion of argumentation, we have a framework which can explain the genesis of different ideas, as well as their (strategic) function in social relations.

2.6 Summary of Chapter 2

Chapter 2 has discussed the processes of knowledge construction through the lens of the social representations theory. The theory conceptualises knowledge both as content and as process embedded in the socio-historical context. Social

representations are constructed through communicative processes and are, therefore, linked with the dynamics of social relations. As such, they are constrained by power asymmetries which define the validity of different accounts. The self-other-object triangle for knowledge construction illustrates the interdependence among the three parties. Social representations are created and transformed through the dialogue between self and other within the context of already established knowledge systems which set the scene for new constructions. Based on this self-other-object epistemology, this chapter has further argued that thinking is a dialogical process that involves both the self and the other. It is a form of 'internal' interaction between different perspectives or, to put it differently, a form of internal argumentation drawing on different and opposing themes. Thinking is, thus, based on antinomies or themata, which are found at the core of social representations. These antinomies make thinking and argumentation possible. Drawing on these ideas, in particular on the centrality of self-other dynamics and dialogicality in thinking, the next chapter will discuss the construction of social identities.

Chapter 3. The Construction of Social Identities

3.1 Overview of Chapter 3

Chapter 2 discussed social representations as knowledge systems which arise through social interaction. Communicative practices are at the heart of their production and transformation and, because of that, they are always 'in the making'. Social representations can also accommodate plurality and ambivalence. Billig's idea of dilemmatic thinking and Marková's elaboration of themata have been used to describe the antinomic thinking which characterises human cognition, as well as the antinomic nature of common sense knowledge itself. Based on these ideas and drawing on the work of Duveen and on positioning theory, this chapter explores identity as a process of positioning in relation to the symbolic environment and to others, which provides people with a perspective on the world and with a social location in relation to others. Like social knowledge, identity is conceptualised here as a process embedded in social relations.

After identifying the main aspects of identity, this chapter will discuss identity as a function of social representations, that is, as the position of a person or a group in relation to a social representation. The next section will elaborate the processes of identity construction through a consideration of self-other relations and positioning processes, giving emphasis to the normative context of interactions. The last section of Chapter 3 will discuss the interlinked topics of multiplicity and ambivalence of identities. In line with the dialogical self theory, it will be argued that people can speak from more than one positions because they draw on multiple social representations to make sense of themselves and the world around them. Multivoicedness inside the person is, thus, seen as equivalent to cognitive polyphasia in society. Furthermore, the idea that we think in opposites and are able to take on different positions suggests that identities are not univocal. Rather, the last section will explore the idea that identities are fraught with tensions. This originates in the dynamics self-other relations which are based on the tensions between unity and differentiation of self and other.

3.2 Defining identity

Although it now appears to be an invaluable concept for social scientists, identity is a recent term within social science. Gleason (1983, p. 910) in his semantic history of identity notes that the original 1930s *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* had no entry for 'identity' while 'identification' referred mainly to criminal investigations and

fingerprinting. It was much later that identity became a key term in the social science. The psychologist Erickson was an important figure in popularising the term in the 1950s. However, even from the first uses of the term, the definition of identity was somewhat elusive. Erikson himself argued that identity is a process "located in the core of the individual and yet also in the core of his communal culture, a process which establishes, in fact, the identity of those two identities" (Erikson, 1950, cited in Gleason, 1983, p. 914). Identity is, thus, a subtle term because it is located at the social/individual interface; it is neither just 'inside' nor 'outside' the individual.

Exactly because of this complexity, identity has been employed to explain a variety of phenomena and has been defined in various and often conflicting ways. It has been predominantly associated with stability, sameness and uniqueness within psychology. It has been conceived as the essence that differentiates an individual (or group) from all the other people (or groups). Recently, such ideas have been challenged by scholars working in a variety of disciplines. With regards to migrant identities, for instance, terms like 'diaspora', 'hybridity', and 'transnationalism' have been employed to describe affiliations and cultural transformations which are far more complex, multifaceted and intersecting. Beck captures this in his critique of the methodological nationalism of the social science which takes society as meaning the nation-state and conceives a fundamental dualism between the national and the international, the former being internal to societies and the latter external (Beck, 2006; Beck & Sznaider, 2006). Within this approach, the intersection of the national and the international is left un-theorised. At the same time, because of this dualistic perception of identities, inter-cultural exchanges and the development of hybrid cultures are not acknowledged. Beck (2006) argues for a dialectical perspective that acknowledges the 'in-between space' and what he calls the 'both/and principle of inclusive oppositions'. Not only do people identify in multiple ways, but these identities are also intersected and negotiated in a variety of settings.

Brubaker and Cooper (2000) argue that identity has lost its analytical significance because it has acquired an array of conflicting meanings, from essentialist notions which focus on unity and distinctiveness to conceptions which emphasise the fragmentation of the modern subject. This critique is well-founded, but it is argued here that identity maintains explanatory power as a term that links the individual to his or her social world in multiple ways and contexts. The challenge in defining identity stems from the fact that it is located at the social/individual interface; as such, it is relational, dynamic and hard to pin down in fixed categories. Like social knowledge, identity is

constructed and re-negotiated through communicative processes. It is an open-ended project that involves simultaneously both the self and the other. Identity is, furthermore, embedded in the historical socio-cultural context which has an impact on how relations between the self and the other are constituted and negotiated. As Hall (1996, p. 4) observes, "identities are about questions of using the resources of history, language and culture in the process of becoming rather than being: not 'who we are' or 'where we came from', so much as what we might become".

In line with the self-other-object triangle of knowledge construction, identity is viewed here as linked with processes of representation which involve the dialogical relationship between self and other. Identity is defined as a position towards a social representation in relation to others. There are three interconnected aspects of identity which all need to be considered in identity research:

i. *Identity can be approached as a position from where one speaks and acts* (Davies & Harré, 1999). The content of these positions can be said to be a function of representations which define groups and social categories (Duveen, 1993; Duveen & Lloyd, 1986). For instance, representations of gender define what it means to be male or female and what type of behaviour is expected of men and women in a certain setting. The same applies for all social groups, whereby different types of social representations are indicative of different types of social formations (Wagner, 1994). Identity, therefore, provides the symbolic material that helps people define themselves and others and orient their behaviour accordingly.

ii. *Identity can be approached as a process of constructing a sense of 'who I am' and 'who we are' by appropriating social representations* (Duveen, 1993; Duveen & Lloyd, 1986). This appropriation process takes place through an act of positioning towards the symbolic field of a society or community on the basis of social relations. When we position ourselves towards social representations, we acquire a viewpoint stemming from that position. Being a woman, for instance, and positioning oneself in relation to the meanings of womanhood gives someone a way of interpreting themselves and the world around them, as well as a guideline for action. Points i and ii together suggest that pre-existing social representations define identities, but these identities are also elaborated and argued upon by individuals and groups through a process of positioning. In other words, there is a tension between constancy and change, as social representations allow for both change and stability (see section 2.2.3, p. 40).

iii. *Identity can be seen as a relationship with an other.* To use the same example, being a woman inevitably implies a relationship with men as the two concepts (male/female) are interdependent and, quite often, defined in opposition to each other. Identities are, thus, embedded within the system of social relations. The types of social relations established between self and other shape the normative aspect, or 'moral order' of identities (what is expected from each position) (Davies & Harré, 1990; Harré & Moghaddam, 2003a; Harré & van Langehove, 1991, 1999b). Also, the fact that social relations are dynamic and multifaceted suggests that social identities are also dynamic and complex.

On the whole, identity contents, processes and relationships with others constitute the three fundamental elements of identities. These three aspects are intertwined since identity is a process of positioning in relation to social representations on the basis of social relations. In other words, identity refers to three main questions: 'Who am I?', 'Who are they?' and 'What is our relationship?' (Chrysochoou, 2003).

3.3 Identities as functions of social representations

Henri Tajfel, in developing social identity theory, defined identity as "that *part* of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (1981, p. 255, emphasis in original). The question here is what is it that defines social groups and categories. We can argue that categories, which are used for the construction of identities, are social representations (Augoustinos, 2001). As social representations, they are systems of meaning which are developed through social interaction and guide behaviour.

Regarding national categories, Anderson (1991), acknowledging the contingent nature of nation formation, has argued that nations are cultural artefacts, they are 'imagined communities'. As Hall (1992) observes, a nation is not only a political institution, but a 'system of cultural representation', represented in the national culture. As such, people are not just citizens, in the legal sense of the term, but they also take part in nation formation practices. National symbols, like flags, and practices, like celebrations of national anniversaries, illustrate the embeddedness of nationalism into our everyday life. National identities are often so embedded in everyday habitual practices (Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008) that it is taken for granted that different nationalities reflect essential differences among people of this world. Indeed, Billig (1995) describes 'banal nationalism' as a lay ideology based on the idea that the world is naturally divided in a

world of nations. This lay representation of nations helps people categorise the world and classify others by attributing essential features to constructed categories. Chryssochoou (2004) links this idea with the concept of social representations, by arguing that nationalism is a social representation which objectifies the existing system of social relations.

Being a member of a nation, or any other community or grouping, is a symbolic resource for people. Belonging to a group allows people access to a particular stock of knowledge on which they can draw to make sense of the world. Moscovici (1961/1998) has argued that social representations are aspects of groups; groups can be defined and differentiated from each other through the social representations that they hold. Thus, social representations, as symbolic systems of knowledge, have an identity function because different groups hold different representations about social objects which help them engage with the world. It follows that identities are rooted in the culture and history of social groups and communities. In that sense, social representations are the 'glue' of social life (Brewer, 2001).

Social representations can, thus, be seen as the appropriations of a social object by a group of people in order to communicate and guide their interactions (Moscovici, 1963). This suggests that shared meanings and understandings of the world within groups make coordinated action possible. Groups do not only share meanings but also norms that guide behaviour, both of which form part of social representations. These meanings and norms develop through repeated patterns of interaction within groups which involve certain activities and objects. These patterns of interaction are what make group knowledge possible. In short, the social representations perspective suggests that different groups engage in different types of communicative practices, hold different representations and have different ways of acting upon the world (see also section 2.3.1, p. 39). For example, in Moscovici's (1961/1998) psychoanalysis study, the three social milieus, the Communist Party, the Catholic Church and the urban-liberal milieu, communicated about psychoanalysis in different manners and appropriated this object in different ways. Each group's representation, in turn, provided different ways of acting towards that object. The Communist press dictated, via propaganda, the full rejection of the psychoanalytic discipline. The Catholic Church, via propagation, aimed to shape attitudes rather than stereotypes and thus allowed for partial acceptance of psychoanalysis. Finally, diffusion, employed by the urban-liberal milieu, aimed at informing people about psychoanalysis without providing a particular guide for action towards it (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999).

Based on these ideas, Wagner links the socio-genetic character of social representations with identities and defines social identities as shared understandings that guide communication and coordinate action in groups (Wagner, 1994; Wagner et al., 1999a). Thus, social identity involves both a sense of group membership and access to the group's knowledge systems. As such, social identity allows group members to position themselves within a 'common discursive space' (Wagner, 1994). Thus, the world inhabited by social groups is a 'domesticated world' (Wagner, 1998), in that it is constructed specifically by that group in order to make sense of the world. Identity, thus, defines a group's perspective on the world. Moreover, Wagner (1994) argues that social representations regulate the joint action of group members. Adopting an identity, therefore, suggests that one activates a 'cluster of knowledge' that incorporates collective goals and normative interaction patters (Halloran & Kashima, 2006). It follows that identities provide ways of organising meanings and, because of that, they provide a sense of stability (Duveen, 2001). Even in cases where communities undergo change, new social representations can develop to re-construct the group identity. Jovchelovitch and Gervais (1999) have shown, for instance, that hybrid representations of health and illness, combining elements from Western and Chinese knowledge, provide the source of cultural identity for different generations of Chinese in England.

To conclude, within a social representations framework, identities have been approached in relation to the development of different social representations in groups; identities, in other words, attach people to particular sets of representations. Different groups construct different representations which give them a way of understanding and engaging with the social world. Subject and object are, thus, linked in the representational process because the content and elaboration of social representations depends on the social position of the bearers (Wagner & Hayes, 2005, pp. 206-207). In other words, representations do not only define an object, but they are also indicative of the relation between the subject and the object. But, while it makes sense to define identity in terms of group membership and shared social representations, we also need to have a framework for the very process of identity construction. The question is, in other words, how these representations become appropriated to construct social identities. By using the idea of positions, we are able to account for the process of identity construction which takes place in a dynamic framework of self-other relations. We are also able to account for the development of different identities with respect to the same representational field, rather than only study social identities as the causes for the construction of different representations among groups (Duveen, 1993; Duveen &

Lloyd, 1990; Lloyd & Duveen, 1990). Based on the idea that identities are functions of representations, the next section will elaborate the links between social representations and identity through a discussion of positioning as a process of appropriating social representations.

3.4 The process of identity construction: Self-other relations and positioning processes

3.4.1 Self-other relations

Tajfel, acknowledging the relational character of social identities, used 'inter-group comparison' and 'group distinctiveness' as key terms in conceptualising identity processes (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Indeed, in exploring the process of identity construction, we need to pay close attention to the self-other relations involved in a given context. Based on the self-other-object epistemology of social representations, Marková (2007, p. 219) argues that the relationship between self and other is fundamental in conceptualising identity:

> One cannot meaningfully ask the question about identity without posing the question about self and other. And one cannot talk about social representations as a theory of social knowledge without examining public discourses in which different dialogues between the Ego and the Alter take place and through which they generate representations.

If we take the interdependence of the social and the individual, or of the Ego and the Alter, as a central theoretical premise, we are forced to acknowledge that identity should also accommodate the 'other'. Identity is above all a social location; it binds an individual or group to the social world. It can be conceived as a position from where one speaks and acts towards others. Duveen has defined identity as "a psychological process through which meanings are organised and which enables the person to position themselves as a social actor. Social identity in this sense is a way of organising experience which contributes towards the definition of self, but does so by locating the self within the collective world" (1993, p. 2).

The fact that social identities construct people as actors in the social world has two implications: first, that people have to be positioned in relation to other social actors and second, that in order for people to become social actors, they need to be recognised as such. Regarding the former, it is argued here that identities are de facto relational. What it means to be a child is defined by what it means to be an adult; the same applies for

minority/majority relations, gender identities and so on. Billig (1995) has shown, for example, that in order to imagine our nation as a collectivity, we need to also locate it within a world of nations. Similarly Triandafyllidou (1998) has argued that national identities are defined in relation to a nation's significant others. Every identity construction provides a model of social relations (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001); it locates not only the self but also the others. In the construction of identities there is always a fundamental distinction between 'us' and 'them', which can be conceptualised as a thema defining the boundaries between different groups. The boundaries can change, but any change would be the result of a re-negotiation of social relations and associated representations.

Concerning social recognition, identity is a matter of both being identified and making identifications (Duveen, 2001); it is the interplay between identification and recognition. Several social representations studies have shown the interrelation between representations and identity in inter-group and minority/majority contexts (e.g. Augoustinos & Riggs, 2007; Howarth, 2002, 2007; Philogène, 2007). This field of research highlights the impact of self-other relations and (mis-)recognition on the construction of identities.

On the whole, the 'other' in identity needs to be seen as more than a reference group. Different types of social relations and different types of interactions give rise to different types of knowledge construction processes; it is through this representational activity that social positions are jointly constructed and negotiated. Thus, in constructing identities, that is to say, in positioning oneself in relation to the social world, it is the quality of self-other relations that is important (e.g. relations of trust/mistrust, recognition/misrecognition). What differentiates one social position from another is not just who the 'self' is and who the 'other' is, but the forms of communication which shape these positions.

3.4.2 The positioning process

In order to account for self-other relations in the construction of identities, the term positioning will be used here because it emphasises the dynamic and relational character of identity processes (see also Andreouli, 2010). Both Duveen and positioning theory scholars have used this term. Duveen, on the one hand, used it to link identity with processes of representation. Positioning theorists, on the other hand, have used it to explain meaning construction processes within micro-interactions. Although they concentrate on different levels of analysis, both approaches share an

interest in social-individual dynamics and self-other relations. The integration of the two can shed light on the relation between micro and macro social exchanges between social actors. While a focus on local discursive practices allows us to look at patterns of argumentation which shape positioning processes, there is a need to further illustrate how these patterns draw on social representations. This section, employing ideas from the two frameworks, will show how people use social knowledge to construct and argue about identities and how this takes place on the basis of existing social relations.

Duveen (1993) introduced the term 'position' to clarify the link between representation and identity. Although he argued for the primacy of the social, by claiming that social representations precede individual existence (Duveen, 2001), by employing the term position, he was able to account for variation in the development of identities within the same representational field (Duveen, 1993). Thus, he acknowledged the possibility of resistance through the negotiation of identity positions, that is, through the active appropriation and re-appropriation of the meanings of social representations (Duveen, 2001).

Duveen's (1993) primary proposition is that social representations provide a variety of possible identities which allow people to position themselves in different ways in relation to the symbolic field of culture. These identities are taken on, but are also negotiated by individuals. Identities allow people to both structure their social world and orient themselves within this world. In other words, social representations provide both the meanings associated with an object and the positions towards that object that are available for people; meanings and positions are the two components of social identities (Lloyd & Duveen, 1990). It can be argued, therefore, that social identities "reflect individuals' efforts to situate themselves in their societies in relation to the social representations of their societies" (Duveen & Lloyd, 1986, p. 220). Identities can be defined as positions in relation to social representations, since people make sense of themselves and their experiences by drawing on and reconstructing social representations (Duveen, 1993, 2001; Duveen & Lloyd, 1986; Lloyd & Duveen, 1990). In addition, social identities are an essential prerequisite for participation in social life as they provide people with both a location and a value in relation to other individuals who occupy different identity positions (Duveen & Lloyd, 1986). Thus, social representations provide people with a variety of positions but these positions are further elaborated by one's relations with an 'other'. As the previous section illustrated, self-other relations are at the basis of the construction of identity.

Through everyday interaction, positions become negotiated and social identities become elaborated and transformed. 'Microgenesis' has been described as the micro-scale social interaction whereby people construct an understanding of the situation and locate themselves and their interlocutors (Duveen & Lloyd, 1990). Focusing on the level of language use and meaning construction through discourse, Harré and colleagues have developed positioning theory (Davies & Harré, 1990; Harré & Moghaddam, 2003a; Harré & van Langehove, 1991, 1999b) which offers an elaboration of the discursive processes involved in identity construction. Positioning theory shares with the theory of social representations a focus on the dynamic co-construction of meaning which organises and mediates social relations. Based on speech act theory, it offers an account of meaning construction through a discussion of discursive practices.

In order to emphasise the contextual and fluid nature of selves, the term positioning, within this theory, is an alternative to the concepts of personhood and role (Davies & Harré, 1990, 1999). Under this perspective, identity is discursively co-produced in the course of communication (see also Burr, 1995/2003). Societal discourses make available a range of categories. By participating in discursive practices, people learn about these categories and position themselves towards them. This perspective is similar to the social representations approach in that positions not only situate people within a system of social relations and discursive 'storylines', but they also provide people with ways of making sense of the world (Davies & Harré, 1999, p. 35):

> A subject position incorporates both a conceptual repertoire and a location for
> persons within the structure of rights and duties for those who use that
> repertoire. Once having taken up a particular position as one's own, a person
> inevitably sees the world from the vantage point of that position and in terms of
> the particular images, metaphors, storylines and concepts which are made
> relevant within the particular discursive practice in which they are positioned.

Positioning theory also conceptualises the 'other' as an essential part of the positioning process; both self and other participate in meaning making. Positionings are always co-constructed so that the adoption of a position always assumes a position for the interlocutor as well (Harré & van Langehove, 1991; van Langehove & Harré, 1999). Furthermore, the positioning triangle is dynamic. Harré and his colleagues (Davies & Harré, 1990; Harré & van Langehove, 1991) argue that people can creatively negotiate and interpret the positions assigned to them. An interlocutor may not accept the position assigned to him or her and negotiate both the meaning of the situation and

his/her position with regards to this context[13]. Thus, positionings are dynamic, dialogical and plural: a person in a single encounter may adopt diverse, even contradictory, positions.

According to positioning theory, in addition to positions, the construction of meaning in interactions is also defined by storylines and social forces of speech acts (Davies & Harré, 1990; Harré & Moghaddam, 2003a; Harré & van Langehove, 1991, 1999b). Social forces refer to the illocutionary force of speech and other acts, that is, on how they are interpreted in relation to the storyline. For instance, a handshake may signify agreement, or it may just be a greeting when meeting someone for the first time. Storylines are the third element of the meaning construction triangle. They refer to the unfolding episodes in conversations and other forms of discursive interactions. Storylines are, in a way, the context of the interaction (Slocum-Bradley, 2010); they structure the interaction and define which types of positions are relevant or salient. It should be noted that the elements of the positioning triangle are interdependent and mutually define each other. The meaning of a speech act depends on the positions of the interlocutors within a jointly produced storyline.

The concept of storylines in positioning theory suggests that meaning construction is seen as taking a narrative form. The claim that knowledge is organised in a narrative form has been made by others as well (e.g. Lazlo, 1997). Although I do not subscribe to the idea that all social knowledge has necessarily a narrative format, I do believe that thinking has an argumentative format (Billig, 1987), which, very often, takes the form of evolving narratives; each 'episode' can be seen as an argument backed up by previous arguments or claims. Also, despite the fact that thinking is not as coherent as narratives, but is rather dialogical and open-ended, we can view storylines as argumentation lines or patterns of reasoning which support certain kinds of actions (Harré, Moghaddam, Pilkerton-Cairnie, Rothbart, & Sabat, 2009). In line with Billig's (1987) approach, I maintain that the themes and arguments that make up 'argumentation storylines' are drawn from common sense knowledge, or social representations, and are not, thus, re-created in every self-other encounter. As van Langehove and Harré (1999, pp. 19-20) argue, every conversation has a familiar air because it reflects 'already existing narrative forms' which are part of the symbolic material people use to participate in the social world.

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[13] In social identity theory, this has been conceptualised as the strategy of 'social creativity' for maintaining a positive social identity when social mobility is not possible. Social creativity is essentially a redefinition of an unfavourable social comparison between the in-group and the out-group. It may take the form of changing the comparison dimension, changing the evaluation of the attributes to the group, and changing the comparison out-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

The fact that interactions may involve more than one storylines also illustrates the argumentative and dialogical nature of 'thinking with others'. For instance, it has been shown that the Danish referendum on joining the European Economic Monetary Union was seen through different storylines by various social actors; it was seen as 'eroding Danish identity' or as 'increasing the power of Denmark' (Slocum-Bradley & Van Langehove, 2003). Each of these storylines justified a different course of action. At the same time, each storyline positioned Denmark in different ways in relation to Europe.

Discursive positioning processes can, thus, be seen through the lens of a rhetorical approach. They can take the form of argumentation strategies that justify some actions and not others. This point relates to the strategic nature of identity construction and categorisation (Hopkins & Reicher, 1996; Hopkins, Reicher, & Levine, 1997; Kahani-Hopkins & Hopkins, 2002; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). For instance, Moghaddam, Hanley and Harré (2003) studied conversations between Kissinger (Assistant to the US President for National Security Affairs) and Mao Zedong (Chairman of the Communist Party in China) and between Kissinger and Brezhnev (General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), which took place between 1971-1976. Kissinger, by positioning Zedong and Brezhnev as friends and maintaining the storyline that these conversations were among friends, tried to achieve dialogue between the US and China and the USSR. Positions here become a resource for action. Linking this to Billig's (1987) rhetorical approach, it can be argued that identity definitions can take the form of arguments. Indeed, every category selection and definition is an argument against alternative categorisations and definitions. Identity, therefore, is a project which entails negotiations and argumentation (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, see also 3.5, p. 68).

It is very useful to connect the notions of positioning as a (strategic) discursive practice and social representations as broader symbolic meanings and practices in studying identities (Elejabarrieta, 1994). Positioning, within positioning theory, can be seen as a conceptualisation of 'doing identities' or 'arguing about identities' in discourse. With a few exceptions (for intergroup positioning, see Lee, Lessem, & Moghaddam, 2008; Tan & Moghaddam, 1999), positioning, as has been originally elaborated, refers to local, here-and-now discursive practices among interlocutors. However, it is important to link those local discursive practices with broader societal processes (Falmagne, 2004). Linking the level of micro-exchanges and broader societal structures and knowledge systems is particularly important in theorising identity. If we consider the self as a set of positions which guide both our actions and the actions of others towards us, then, in

order to appreciate this multilayered process, we need to consider how stable social positions, which are associated with social structures, have an impact on micro-exchanges between agents (Wagoner & Kadianaki, 2007). In other words, we need to appreciate the social-individual dynamics in identity construction. The theory of social representations aims to link the individual and social levels of analysis within an integrated theory of knowledge construction via a careful consideration of communicative processes. Social representations and institutionalised practices and discourses both enable local positioning processes and constrain them. It is through broader discourses that local discursive practices acquire their meaning (Falmagne, 2004). Therefore, positioning processes draw on already established patterns of social interaction and social representations which define the meanings and availability of positions for people. However, as Duveen (2001) notes, individuals can also elaborate these positions; through processes of argumentation, they can re-negotiate their social location.

3.4.3 The normative aspect of social relations and identities

The impact of social representations in shaping positionings can be seen in relation to the normative context of interactions. Social representations are not only meanings, but also norms and practices. As Wagner (1994) notes, group norms derive from social representations and coordinate the joint action of group members both within the group and towards other groups.

The normative aspect of interactions has been examined in positioning theory through the concept of 'moral orders'. Every position has a 'moral quality' in the sense that it is associated with a set of rights and duties which delimit what can be said or done from a certain position, in a particular context and towards a particular interlocutor (Davies & Harré, 1990; Harré & Moghaddam, 2003a; Harré & van Langehove, 1991, 1999b). Taking the above under consideration, a position can be defined as "a cluster of rights and duties to perform certain actions with a certain significance as acts, but which also may include prohibitions or denials of access to some of the local repertoire of meaningful acts" (Harré & Moghaddam, 2003b, pp. 5-6). More recently, the positioning triangle for the construction of meaning (positions, storylines, social forces of discursive acts) has been extended to a positioning diamond that distinguishes between identities as discursive constructs (referring to the attribution of character, group membership etc. to an actor), on the one hand, and rights and duties, on the other hand (Slocum-Bradley, 2010).

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The link between rights and duties and identity positions brings communication and social relations to the centre of identity processes (Andreouli, 2010). Rights and duties define what can be communicated from a position and what types of actions are tolerated or expected from that position. Duveen (2001) has also made a similar point in his writings by arguing that the stability of certain forms of identity is associated with the stability of forms of social interactions which sustain dominant representations. In other words, asymmetrical relationships constrain what can be communicated by the social actors involved, thus, contributing to the maintenance of social representations. When the patterns of social interaction change, so do the patterns of identity which are a function of those representations.

Duveen and colleagues' studies on cognitive development have, indeed, shown that identities mediate the knowledge construction process because they shape the kinds of communication that can be established between social actors (Duveen & Psaltis, 2008; Leman & Duveen, 1999; Psaltis, 2005; Psaltis & Duveen, 2006, 2007). An important finding of these studies is that recognition or misrecognition, by defining the degree of participation of each participant, has a direct impact on what kind of knowledge will be created. In Duveen and colleagues' studies, an individual may be recognised as knowledgeable or misrecognised as unknowledgeable. This is a matter of legitimacy as defined by existing power dynamics and social hierarchies (Leman & Duveen, 1999). In Duveen's gender studies young girls were positioned as lacking the expertise to solve the experimental task, while boys were positioned as having more expertise, thus, their knowledge was more legitimate. This shows how social positioning processes can legitimise types of social behaviour and patterns of interaction.

Issues of legitimacy and entitlement are intertwined with the allocation of rights and duties but, as Moghaddam (2006) argues, despite the centrality of rights and duties in social relationships, they have been neglected in inter-group research. Positioning theory helps to elaborate such dialogical asymmetries because it emphasises the rights and duties associated with positioning processes (Andreouli, 2010). Positioning theory conceptualises power dynamics and legitimacy in terms of entitlements for action and participation. The differential assignment of rights and duties to social actors can be an indication of asymmetrical power relations. Thus, the girls of Duveen and colleagues' studies, positioned as less knowledgeable, had the duty to listen to the boys and a limited right to contribute to the research task. Therefore, they were less entitled to participate in knowledge construction. On the other hand, the boys, positioned as knowledgeable, had the right to express their view and the duty to provide the right

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answer. In other words, there was an unequal distribution of 'epistemic responsibility' (Rommetveit, 1991). This asymmetry is derived from the social representations of gender which, by attributing gender identity positions to boys and girls, shape the norms that guide intergroup interactions.

The assignment of rights and duties to social actors can become a matter of negotiation so that certain actors can be legitimated and others de-legitimated (Slocum-Bradley, 2006). Generally, dominant groups are powerful actors in a society. They have more legitimate voices and produce more 'valid' representations (Moghaddam, 2003, 2006; Tan & Moghaddam, 1999). They employ what Gergen (1989) has called a 'warranting voice' which grants them superiority in defining reality. The question here is how is such an entitlement justified, that is, which are the criteria that make someone entitled to speak on behalf of a community. For the case of national communities, Reicher and Hopkins (2001) argue that claims of prototypicality can justify speaking on behalf of the nation. The criteria that define who counts as a member of the nation can be subject to contestation, but are also sometimes associated with deeply held beliefs. For instance, ethnic representations of nationhood, based on a narrative of ethnic origins and antiquity, are still, to a large extent, taken for granted. Being ethnically similar to the majority can, therefore, serve as a justification that makes someone more entitled to have a say in national matters.

On the whole, allocations of rights, duties and entitlements to social actors reflect social norms (Luis & Taylor, 2005) and are derived from social representations (Wagner, 1994). It can be argued that these 'moral orders' constitute the normative aspect of identities; as such, they guide individual behaviour, as well as social interactions and communications. They place 'behavioural demands' upon people, on the basis of social relations (Luis & Taylor, 2005). In this sense, identity re-positionings may entail challenges to group or societal norms. For instance, social competition, a strategy for maintaining positive social identity according to social identity theory, when the social system is perceived as illegitimate, constitutes a direct challenge to the normative context of social relations in an effort to change the position of the in-group towards the outgroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Similarly, 'identity conflicts' involve a type of normative conflict between expectations associated with different positions. The tensions arising out of the different identity positions are based on the diverse expectations (i.e. rights and duties) placed upon people by different communities and normative contexts. Within a dialogical perspective, such tensions are seen as providing the source for dialogical negotiations of these positions (Aveling & Gillespie,

2008; Bhatia & Ram, 2001; Gillespie, Cornish, Aveling-E.-L., & Zittoun, 2008). The final two sections of this chapter will continue this discussion by considering the multiplicity of identity positions and the dialogical tensions in identity construction.

3.5 Multiplicity and ambivalence in positioning

3.5.1 Multiple identity positions

The framework presented so far describes identity as a position in relation to social knowledge and to others. In addition to this, it can be argued that the multiplicity of self-other relations and the multiplicity of social representations lead to the multiplicity of identities. This idea goes against the notion of the self as a bounded entity and suggests that identity is an open-ended dynamic process, as people have to position themselves in relation to various knowledge systems and different 'others'.

I wish to explore further the relation between the idea that people make use of different rationalities (polyphasia) and the idea that they occupy diverse positions towards social representations and towards others. This process varies according to the object of the representation, as different representations demarcate different positions for people. Thus, it is suggested here that the "enlarging complexity of society adds to the complexity of the self" (Hermans, 2002, p. 148), meaning that the polyphasic rationality of people is associated with a multiplicity of positions. In this section, I will draw on Hermans' theory of the dialogical self (Hermans, 1996, 2001a, 2001b, 2002; Hermans & Dimaggio, 2007; Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010; Hermans & Kempen, 1998) and on Marková's (2000, 2003a) perspective on the cognitive polyphasia hypothesis, both of whom have been greatly inspired by the work of Bakhtin. Dialogicality is again the underlying epistemological assumption. That is, the dialogue, the relation, between self and other is the basis for the formation of self.

The other, however, needs not be 'external'; the other, be it a person, a group, or another representation, can be part of the self and "occupy positions in a multivoiced self" (Hermans, 2001a, p. 250). As argued in section 2.5 (p. 47), people employ multiple representations to make sense of the world. Drawing on this idea, it can be argued that each of these different representations or perspectives constitutes a voice or position within the self. Therefore, there is no dualism between individual and society, but the society or the culture becomes part of the self (Hermans, 2001a, 2002). In this respect, we can make a distinction between external and internal interaction (Marková, 2003a,

2003b, 2006). Apart from external interaction among people and groups, there is also internal interaction of perspectives within 'individual minds'.

The other as part of the self can be termed 'inner alter', defined by Marková as "symbolically and socially represented kinds of the *Alter* that are in an *internal dialogue* with the Ego" (2006, p. 135, emphasis in original). The inner alter can take many forms. It may represent the voice of a significant other, or the voice of a community and its norms, the voice of a group, an institution and so on. It can also be a 'relatively stabilised perspective' (Marková, 2006), like Mead's (1934) 'generalised other', traditions, or dominant social representations. These voices are not the 'real' voices of institutions and groups; they are appropriated or personalised by the individual. Hermans (Hermans, 2001a, 2001b) refers to them as 'external positions' which are relevant from the perspective of one or more of the internal positions.

This theoretical perspective sees the self as polyphonic: one can speak from many positions or have more that one voice. According to dialogical self theory, the self is multiple and dynamic; it can be conceptualised as a set of I-positions (Hermans, 2001a, 2002). The 'I' moves from one position to the other in accordance with changes in context. For example, when people speak to their colleagues, they position themselves as professionals, when they speak to their children as parents and so on. Furthermore, these positions are in dialogical relation with each other and may be more or less in tension.

The notion of multivoicednesss stems from Bakhtin and his concept of 'heteroglossia' which refers to different styles of speech, to the different voices people may employ when they speak (Marková, 2003a). Polyphasia and heteroglossia are, for Marková (2003a), the two sides of the same coin. The former refers to the coexistence of diverse knowledge systems and the latter to the coexistence of multiple voices within the self. The multiplicity of inter-cultural encounters leads to the multiplicity of cultural positions or voices within an individual, as people need to cope with a variety of different cultural systems (Hermans, 1996, 2001a, 2001b, 2002; Hermans & Dimaggio, 2007; Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010; Hermans & Kempen, 1998). Thus, it is argued that "different and contrasting cultures can be part of a repertoire of collective voices playing their part in a multivoiced self" (Hermans & Kempen, 1998, p. 1118). These voices represent different representations as appropriated by the individual in relation to which he or she is positioned. In other words, the same process of knowledge construction, the outcome of communication between groups and people with various perspectives, can be said to operate 'within individuals'. Thinking can be conceptualised, therefore,

as a dialogical process which involves the dialogue between different positions, each representing a different perspective on the world. This has been exemplified in focus group research whereby participants spoke from diverse positions according to their line of argumentation (Marková, Linell, Grossen, & Salazar-Orvig, 2007).

But how can individuals retain a sense of unity within this multiplicity of positions? Maintaining coherence within a plural identity has been addressed by Salgado and Hermans (2005, p. 10) in terms of the subjectivity of the 'I':

> ...a human being is able to subjectively sense and centre every experience in herself or himself...In the temporal movement, from moment to moment, the *I* may occupy a different position, for example, stating something quite different from what it was saying until then. In a sense, this is a different position; in another, it still remains an I-position: unity and multiplicity are brought together in the notion of I-position.

On the whole, the multiplicity of selves is associated with the multiplicity of discourses which people employ to understand the world. Each identity position is a 'tool' for engaging with the social world and organising experience. People are 'equipped' with a 'positioning repertoire' (Hermans, 2001b), which enables them to situate themselves in various circumstances and towards various others. This idea finds particular relevance in migrant and transnational identities whereby people need to negotiate different identities and cultures (Aveling & Gillespie, 2008; Bhatia, 2002; Bhatia & Ram, 2001). It can be further argued that this positioning repertoire is the result of continuing patterns of interaction, some of which can become more conventionalised than others and, thus, advance certain positions over others. Furthermore, recognition by one's community or significant others may have an impact on which voices of the self will become more salient (Gillespie, Cornish, Aveling-E.-L., & Zittoun, 2008). Power asymmetries also play a part in the formation and salience of positions. Asymmetrical relations between voices reflect, in part, societal structures and inequalities (Hermans, 1996). Thus, the positions of the multivoiced self are not necessarily harmonious, but can be conflicting in a way that reflects societal power asymmetries (Bhatia, 2002; Valsiner, 2002). This suggests that dominant, 'entitled' voices within the self could correspond to the perspective of the majority. In other words, dialogical tensions between knowledge systems in society find expression in the dialogical self (Aveling & Gillespie, 2008). This theorisation goes beyond conceptualisations of identity as a singular sense of self. It also suggests that, although it is restrained by established patterns of social relations

and social representations, identity is neither choiceless nor predetermined (Sen, 2006).

3.5.2 'Dialectic' identities

As shown in the previous chapter, people draw on opposing common sense themes to create knowledge about the world. The tension between arguments and counter-arguments, or opposing poles in themata, provides the source for the development of thinking. Furthermore, as stated in the previous section, these opposing themes correspond to different voices or positions within the self, so that an individual can draw on opposing discourses to make sense of his or her experiences. An implication of this approach is that identities can be constructed in an ambivalent way.

Tensions within identity originate in tensions in self-other relations. As developmental psychologists, like Vygotsky and Winnicott, have shown, the development of the self goes hand in hand with the development of otherness. According to this viewpoint, the ontogeny of humans is based on encounters with others (Jovchelovitch, 2007). It is through the relation with the other that the self develops as an individual. The self arises through a tension between 'fusing' with the other and drawing boundaries between self and other; this interplay between sameness and difference defines individuals as both unique and similar to each other (Jovchelovitch, 2007). In order to become selves, we need to recognise the difference of the others. The interaction between the self and the other is the basis for mutual recognition. By seeing oneself through the eyes of the other, by taking the perspective of the other, the self becomes an object to itself; this ability to see ourselves as objects is the basis of self-consciousness (Mead, 1934). For Winnicott (cited in Jovchelovitch, 2007), this requires to move from a stage of un-differentiation (holding), where the baby conceives the caretaker as an extension of the self, to the acknowledgement of the other as someone outside the self (handling).

Similar ideas have been conceptualised under the framework of intersubjectivity (see Coelho & Claudio, 2003). Research, mainly the work of Trevarthen (e.g. Trevarthen, 1979; Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001; Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978), has shown that children are born with primary intersubjectivity, that is, an instinctive orientation towards others, an innate sociability and openness to the perspective of the other. But as Marková (2003a, 2003b) argues, self-other relations are not only about mutuality and the development of a common ground, but also about tension. While intersubjectivity tends to emphasise the fusion of self and other through closing the gap between them, the

approach of dialogicality stresses the tensions between the two parties. The desire for recognition of one's perspective is the driving force of dialogue. Complete recognition suggests that the self and the other are fused; however, the other always maintains a strangeness which mobilises continuing dialogue (Marková, 2003a, p. 104). There is, therefore, a tension between unity and division which is central in self-other relations. Identification with the 'other' and distancing oneself from the 'other' is the basis for identity construction: "...the self is deeply penetrated by "otherness-in-the-self" whereas, at the same time, it wants to confirm its own identity by the process of "othering"" (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 132).

From a social representations perspective, Joffe (1999, 2003, 2007; Joffe & Lee, 2004) has explored the notion of otherness and its functions in identity. Drawing on the work of the psychoanalyst Melanie Klein, Joffe maintains that otherising is a process of projecting negative feelings and thoughts outside ourselves. She explains this process through the defence mechanism of 'splitting' (projecting all the negatives to a 'bad other', while keeping all positives within a 'good self') which is present in infants. Through splitting in times of increased anxiety, the infant is able to protect itself against anxiety. Extending this to adult social life, Joffe argues that when we encounter risks, we re-invoke this mechanism and have a 'not me – other' response towards impending dangers. This is a protection against an incoming threat; by projecting the threat outside of us, we distance ourselves from it. Social representations of 'others' serve as symbolic tools which maintain this in-group purity, mainly by associating 'others' with the violation of highly-esteemed social values (Joffe, 2007; Joffe & Staeklé, 2007). By representing the 'deviant other' as the opposite of us, we are able to protect the cohesion and identity of the in-group.

I would add to this, however, that the 'other' is not necessarily only 'bad'. In line with the view presented in Chapter 2, I argue that social representations are networks of meanings structured around contrary themes (or themata). Since thinking has been conceptualised in this thesis as an argumentative and dialogical process which uses a multiplicity of symbolic resources, it follows that people can draw on oppositional themes in order to make sense of the world. Therefore, the process of constructing the 'other' can also incorporate an image of the other as 'good' or 'desired' – even though this pole of the opposition may be less salient. Postcolonial theory, drawing on psychoanalytic ideas, has explored this ambivalence with regards to colonial encounters in which the 'other' is both the object of desire and the object of aversion (Young, 1995). Edward Said (1995), the pioneer in this field, has argued that

representations of the Orient have been central in the development of Western identities: the West is defined by its opposition to the East. Both France and Britain that have colonised the Orient have depicted it as something that is both exotic and uncivilised. The 'other', objectified in the image of the Orient, is both desirable, as something exotic, and fearsome, as a threat. This ambivalence towards the other serves to construct colonial identities. As the mirror image of the East, the West is constructed as civilised and rational. But, as Billig (1987) argues, the meaning of terms can be the subject of negotiation between contrary definitions. The Orient can potentially be something attractive and desired, or something fearful and threatening. The two poles are not mutually exclusive, rather, they are interdependent like figure and ground (Marková, 2003a). It is precisely this tension between the two poles that defines the Orient. Still, both poles need not be salient simultaneously. One of them may be implicit or hidden (Marková, 2003a). This is the case with the Orient whereby the negative pole has taken precedence over the positive one.

Thus, the dialogue between opposing themes is at the root of category constructions. The co-existence of conflicting themes on which people draw can be the basis for the construction of ambivalent identities because these themes allow for the existence of multiple and conflicting positions for the self and the other (Renedo, 2010; Renedo & Jovchelovitch, 2007). Susan Condor has illustrated, for instance, the existence of ideological dilemmas in national identity construction in Britain. She has shown that national identity and citizenship can be represented on the basis of opposing themes, such as multiculturalism and Anglo-centrism (Condor, 2006b), nationalism and imperialism (Condor & Abell, 2006a), communitarianism and liberal individualism (Condor & Gibson, 2007), national diversity/tolerance and cultural homogeneity (Condor, 2006b; Verkuyten, 2004), national pride and ethnocentrism (Condor, 2000). These dilemmas, mainly structured around tolerance towards and rejection of ethno-cultural diversity, illustrate the interplay between sameness and diversity, or inclusion and exclusion, in constructions of national identities.

3.6 Summary of Chapter 3

This chapter has drawn on the idea of thinking as a dialogical and argumentative process, which was discussed in Chapter 2, to elaborate the process of identity construction. Drawing mainly on the work of Duveen and on positioning theory, identity has been defined as a position of a person or group towards social representations in relation to others. Identity is, thus, a social location; it defines a person's place within a

community. It is also a symbolic resource in that it gives people a way of making sense of the world through the appropriation of social representations. This appropriation takes place through a process of positioning of both self and other. Social representations demarcate the positions available for people, as well as the expectations, or moral orders, associated with these positions within the existing system of social relations. Although this normative context constrains individuals, identity positions are not choiceless; they can be negotiated and argued upon. Indeed, positioning processes can be seen through the lens of argumentation, such that each position can be seen an argument against an alternative position. This suggests that identities can be both strategically constructed and potentially negotiated.

Furthermore, because people are involved in a variety of relationships and draw on a variety of social representations, identities are also multiple and intersecting. In other words, polyphasia in ways of thinking is associated with multivoicednesss, that is, multiple identity positions from where people act and organise their experiences. Further to this, I have argued that as long as knowledge can be constructed on the basis of oppositions, so are identities. Identities are grounded in the tension between unity and differentiation of self and other. As such, both the self and the other can be constructed in an ambivalent way. Studies on otherness have, indeed, shown that the 'other' can be both 'good' and 'bad', although the two poles need not be salient simultaneously.

In short, the theoretical framework employed here is based on the conceptualisation of self-other relations. These relations are fraught with tensions, which make both social representations and identities plural and dialogical processes. This framework guides the present research on citizenship in the UK naturalisation context. It is considered suitable for this research for three main reasons:

- Firstly, this theoretical framework can conceptualise the centrality of self-other dynamics in processes of boundary construction and negotiation. Citizenship is, indeed, a dynamic concept that cannot be seen in isolation from social relations, which are established both nationally (within the nation-state) and internationally (in relation to other nation-states). What is more, naturalisation, as a boundary crossing process, is a site where self-other relations become especially prominent.

- Secondly, the theoretical framework presented here also allows us to consider the intricacies of identity processes, which take place in such boundary crossing

processes. It allows us, in other words, to understand the complexity and multiplicity of identity positions and the tensions between self and other associated with processes of identity.

- Thirdly, the theory of social representations, especially the dialogical and rhetorical perspective adopted here, allows for the elaboration of representational complexity with regards to citizenship and its manifold functions in defining 'insiders' and 'outsiders'.

Chapter 4. Methodology

4.1 Overview of Chapter 4

The aim of this research is to explore the social representations of British citizenship and the positioning processes which take place within this representational field. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the social representations of British citizenship held by three sets of stakeholders are being examined: citizenship officers, naturalised citizens, and the UK Government. Twenty interviews with citizenship officers and thirty-three interviews with naturalised citizens have been conducted. Also, four reports commissioned by the UK Home Office have been selected for the analysis of the official political discourse using the ALCESTE software for text analysis.

This chapter clarifies the methodology used for this project. The following section discusses the research design of this study. The epistemological foundations of the research will be first considered, followed by a discussion of the rationale for the selection of three social milieus (public policy, naturalised citizens, citizenship officers) and the methods employed for data collection. The third section of this chapter describes the samples of the study (interviewees and policy documents). The fourth section describes the research procedure and the fifth section discusses the analytic procedures used for the analysis of interviews and policy documents. The final section reviews the quality assurance procedures applied to this research.

4.2 Research design

4.2.1 Epistemological foundations: Constructionism & dialogicality

This thesis adopts a constructionist approach to research. For social constructionism, research does not aim to discover objective facts and make truth claims (Burr, 1995/2003). Rather, it locates its phenomena of study within a socio-historical context and focuses on the communicative processes that produce them. Kitzinger (2004, p. 128, cited in Silverman, 2006, p. 129) describes this in relation to the study of women's experience as follows:

> Constructionism [...] disputes the possibility of uncovering 'facts', 'realities' or 'truths' behind the talk, and treats as inappropriate any attempts to vet what people say for its 'accuracy', 'reliability', or 'validity' – thereby sidestepping altogether the positivist problems raised [...] From that perspective, what women say should not be taken as

evidence of their experience, but only as a form of talk – a 'discourse', 'account' or 'repertoire – which represents a culturally available way of packaging experience. This approach is valuable insofar as it draws attention to the fact that experience is never 'raw', but is embedded in a social wed of interpretation and re-interpretation. Women's 'experience' does not spring uncontaminated from an essential inner female way of knowing, but is structured within, and in opposition to, social (heterosexist, patriarchical etc.) discourses.

Social representations theory, which provides the backbone of this research, is based on a consructionist epistemology. It takes knowledge construction to be a process of active 're-creation' of the social world. Communication is at the core of transformations of common sense knowledge. In order to theorise this dynamic aspect of social representations, Marková has extensively discussed the dialogical foundations of the theory (2000, see also Chapter 2). Drawing on the self-other-object model of knowledge construction (Moscovici, 2000b), Marková (2003a) has argued that the interdependence of self and other forms the ontology of humanity: to be means to communicate with an other. It is the dialogue between self and other that makes knowledge possible. The self-other-object model does not necessarily refer to inter-personal interaction, as the self and the other can be individuals or groups. There are two main implications of this epistemology: firstly, that knowledge is plural, as the result of multiple knowledge encounters, and secondly, that thinking is itself a dialogical process. Billig and colleagues (Billig, 1987, 1991; Billig et al., 1988) have made a similar point by arguing that thinking has a dilemmatic quality. According to this view, thinking is a dialogue between different themes or points of view which makes it inherently dialectic (see also Marková, 2003a). This thesis adopts the same perspective on identity, which is considered here as a process of positioning embedded in the context of self-other relations (see Chapter 3). The epistemological perspective adopted here has four significant implications for this research on citizenship in the UK:

- There is a need to take into account the relations between the self and the other and between different perspectives on citizenship and immigration.
- We have to take into account the positioning processes which enable people to make sense of these issues and locate themselves within this representational field.
- We need to be able to study the negotiation and argumentation processes in the way people understand citizenship in the UK.
- We have to be able to identify the multiple sources of knowledge that people draw on to make sense of naturalisation and immigration.

4.2.2 Sources of data and sampling rationale

Sampling in qualitative research is different from quantitative research. The purpose is not to achieve representativeness but to establish correspondence between research questions and sampling (Bryman, 2008). This purposive sampling is based on the idea that participants and other data sources are selected on the basis of their relevance in relation to the research questions and the phenomenon under study (Flick, 2007). Thus, the aim is not to generalise the results, but to achieve a more in-depth understanding of how people engage with a social object. This means that, rather than identifying patterns and commonalities across a population, qualitative research is more interested in identifying a variety of perspectives and ways of thinking about a topic. As Gaskell observes: "The real purpose of qualitative research is not counting opinions or people but rather exploring the range of opinions, the different representations of the issue...Given a particular social milieu...what one is interested in finding out is the variety of views on the issue in question" (2000, p. 41).

Following this line of reasoning, the purpose of this study has not been to collect data from a representative population sample, but rather to explore different perspectives on citizenship by including in the study different actors involved in the naturalisation process. The selection of participants and other data sources was based on exploring on the one hand, the diversity of views on the issue and, on the other hand, on selecting social milieus that are in one way or another engaged with the issue of citizenship. I selected social actors who are relevant to the citizenship context and for whom citizenship and naturalisation would be salient matters. This study explores the social representations of citizenship in Britain within three social milieus: citizenship officers, naturalised citizens, and the UK Government (see Figure 1). Each of the three stakeholders has different positions, agendas and perspectives, which makes it likely that they hold a range of views, but are all active actors in the naturalisation process.

Figure 1. Research design

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┌─────────────────────┐                              ┌─────────────────────┐
│ Citizenship Officers│                              │ Naturalised Citizens│
│ Semi-structured     │                              │ Semi-structured     │
│ interviews (n= 20), │                              │ interviews (n= 33), │
│ selected from 12    │         ╱─────────╲          │ selected from 8     │
│ London councils     │        ╱           ╲         │ London councils     │
└─────────────────────┘       │ Representations│      └─────────────────────┘
                              │      of        │
                              │ Citizenship in │
                              │      UK        │
                              │ Naturalisation │
                              │    Context     │
                               ╲             ╱
                                ╲───────────╱
                                      ▲
                                      │
                         ┌─────────────────────┐
                         │ UK Public Policy    │
                         │ (Home Office)       │
                         │ ALCESTE analysis of │
                         │ consultation        │
                         │ documents (n= 4)    │
                         └─────────────────────┘
```

Naturalised citizens are lay people who have shifted from a migrant status to being citizens of the UK. They are an interesting population to study because not only have they decided to become citizens and have personally experienced the new naturalisation process in the UK, but they have also experienced both exclusion and inclusion in terms of their formal membership in Britain. They constitute the most relevant population to be studied in terms of naturalisation because they constitute the 'target population' of naturalisation policies. In addition, they are an interesting population to study because their boundary crossing practices challenge the conventional 'territorial theories of identity' (Beck, 2006), as well as some of foundational myths of the nation-state, such as the taken for granted equation of the nation to the demos. It can, thus, be assumed that the experiences of naturalised citizens would provide a window to understanding better identity processes in the era of globalisation. Exploring the perspective of naturalised citizens also enables us to appreciate the diverse meanings that citizenship and national identity can have for migrant people.

Citizenship officers are also involved in the citizenship process, but hold a different position and a different perspective. Following the 'paradigm shift' in British naturalisation policy, citizenship officers have become key actors in the citizenship process. One of the political strategies used to enhance social cohesion and British

identity by the government has been an increased emphasis on 'localism', that is, the strengthening of local or community bonds. Within this framework, local councils play now a mediating role between the Home Office and the public in the process of naturalisation. Citizenship officers are the first point of contact for applicants for naturalisation. The officers organise and conduct the citizenship ceremonies and usually provide the Nationality Checking Service which helps applicants with their naturalisation applications. Thus, they are familiar with the relevant legislation and procedures and also come into frequent contact with people wishing to naturalise. Not only is naturalisation an everyday matter for them, but they also constitute an integral element of the whole process.

The UK Government, the third selected stakeholder, determines public policy on matters of citizenship. Citizenship and immigration have a very significant institutional aspect and this study would be incomplete if it excluded the public policy perspective. By analysing the discourse produced by the government, I aim to understand the state's perspective on citizenship. The voice of the state is very powerful in that it shapes policy and determines who is entitled to become a British citizen and who is not. For this reason, it frames the issue and sets the agenda for any debates.

The combination of different sources of data is a source of triangulation for this research. Analysis of the discourses of the three main stakeholders in the naturalisation context helps to achieve an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon by exploring different perspectives on the issue (Fielding & Fielding, 1986). It constitutes an effort to map out the complexity of this topic by studying it from various angles.

It should be noted that this study is London-based. It can be argued that this is limiting its scope. However, the aim here is not to describe the entire range of representations of citizenship in the whole of the UK, but to explore the interrelations of identity and knowledge construction processes within the naturalisation context. Therefore, instead of selecting a representative sample, I opted for the criteria of salience and relevance in my sampling technique. I have sampled social actors who are relevant to the process of naturalisation and for whom naturalisation and citizenship would be salient matters. In this sense, London is the ideal context because it has a very large concentration of migrant and foreign-born populations (Rendall & Salt, 2005). Also, more than half of all citizenship ceremonies in the UK are held in Greater London – 52% in 2007 (Freelove-Mensah, 2008). It follows that matters of migration and inclusion or exclusion tend to be more prominent in the capital. London is a place where diverse cultures and people meet, making it an appropriate setting for the study of identity.

4.2.3 Methods

A variety of methodological approaches have been used for research in social representations (e.g. Wagner et al., 1999a). Although the theory is open to both qualitative and quantitative methods, there is a general departure from the traditional positivist attitude to research. This general stance marks the theory's socio-cultural approach towards phenomena and places it within a European or, to be exact, a French tradition of research (Farr, 1993a).

It has been argued that the study's research interests should determine the methodology to be used in terms of both data collection and analysis (Bauer, Gaskell, & Allum, 2000). This research aims to investigate the dialogical themes which ground knowledge about citizenship within the UK naturalisation context and also to explore the positioning processes that go hand in hand with these knowledge processes. The study of argumentation and negotiation of dilemmatic themes is essential in this research. In order to capture the dialogical co-construction of knowledge and the processes of positioning, this study requires a flexible, actor-oriented tool that allows for reflexivity and negotiation by the participant. Moscovici (1988) has himself advocated the use of observational methods that take into consideration the communicative and dynamic nature of social representations. In line with this, in-depth semi-structured interviewing was chosen as the appropriate tool for data elicitation, as in this type of data collection method, the interviewees are active participants in the research process (Silverman, 2006). For Farr (1984, p. 182), the interview is "essentially a technique or method for establishing or discovering that there are perspectives or viewpoints on events other than those of the person initiating the interview". In other words, interviewing is a method used when the interviewer seeks to understand the perspective of the interviewee without imposing his or her own perspective upon the participant. It aims to unfold the 'subjective theories' of the respondents, their way of thinking about a certain topic (Flick, 1998).

Furthermore, interviewing can capture the interaction between the subject and the object and the ways that people position themselves in relation to others and to the social world. Negotiation, polyphasia and multiplicity of positions are all elements of the knowledge construction process. Interviewing can, if used sensibly, bring to the fore the complexity of people's constructions because it is an actor-oriented technique and thus, can help explore *how* people think rather than just *what* people think. With interviews, the interaction of subject and object can be studied because in-depth interviewing

leaves room for the elaboration and negotiation of the meanings produced by the participants. Therefore, this method has the potential advantage of encouraging reflexivity and is, thus, sensitive to the multilayered nature of human thought (Marková, 1996). Focus groups have also been used as a way to study dilemmas in common sense thinking (Marková et al., 2007), but the participants of this research, especially the newly naturalised citizens, have different trajectories and do not form a homogeneous group that could be recruited for focus group research.

Regarding the study of the public policy discourse, I selected four consultation documents on 'earned citizenship' policy which represents the current UK approach on naturalisation and immigration. In order to analyse this set of data, I used the ALCESTE software package. ALCESTE was selected because it can handle the analysis of a large corpus of textual data and it can also identify the underlying themes which ground discourses on a particular topic. It requires that the text is 'clean', meaning that the language used is relatively homogeneous (without the use of many synonyms), accurate and with correct grammar and appropriate punctuation. This is extremely hard to do with verbal data such as interviews, but clearly written official documents are ideal for this analysis. ALCESTE conducts a statistical analysis based on word co-occurrences and identifies classes of words which tend to appear together in the text. These word classes represent 'chunks' of meaning which frame the discourse around a topic. Although ALCESTE does not analyse the interactions among word classes, it is a very powerful tool because it identifies the themes which structure a particular discourse, based on the assumption that different ways of talking about an issue represent different ways of thinking about this issue. The researcher can then go through every class in more detail in order to identify subtler nuances in the discourse. Table 2 below describes the objectives of the different data collection methods.

Table 2. Methods and objectives

Social milieu	Data	Objectives
Naturalised Citizens	In-depth semi-structured interviews (20)	▪ Obtain lay perspective on citizenship and naturalisation ▪ Identify main themes and positions in representations of citizenship ▪ Identify dilemmas and tensions in the representational field
Citizenship Officers	In-depth semi-structured interviews (33)	▪ Obtain lay perspective on citizenship and naturalisation ▪ Identify main themes and positions in representations of citizenship ▪ Identify dilemmas and tensions in the representational field
UK Public Policy	Policy consultation documents on 'earned citizenship' (4)	▪ Obtain official public policy perspective on citizenship and naturalisation ▪ Identify main themes and 'institutionalised' positioning patterns in citizenship policies

4.3 Sample selection

4.3.1 Local councils in London

In order to sample the interviewees of this research, I first selected a sample of local councils and sought to interview citizenship officers working there and new British citizens who had their citizenship ceremony at the same council. London is divided in thirty-two boroughs. I selected twelve of these boroughs based on their socio-economic and ethnic profiles. The initial selection was eight boroughs, but, in order to achieve more citizenship officers in the sample, I selected three more. My aim was to include boroughs that are relatively ethnically homogeneous and boroughs that are heterogeneous and, also, boroughs that are economically deprived and boroughs that are non-deprived, according to data obtained from the 2001 Census by the Office for National Statistics and the 2007 Indices of Deprivation. In particular, the selection was based on the rank of the number of people in the borough who are income deprived (income deprivation refers to the proportion of people living in low income families) (Office for National Statistics, 2007), the percentages of the people in each borough who are White British, White Irish and Other White, Mixed, Asian or Asian British, Black or Black British, and Chinese or Other Ethnic Group (Data Management and Analysis Group, 2005b), as well as the total percentage of ethnic minorities in each borough

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(Data Management and Analysis Group, 2005a)[14]. Table 3 below shows the average socio-demographics of the boroughs that took part in the study and of all the boroughs of London. It is shown that the difference between the selected boroughs and all the boroughs of London is rather small in all the criteria used for the selection. Table 4 describes the local councils that took part in the study compared to the London average.

Table 3. Socio-demographics of selected boroughs and all London boroughs[15]

	Selected Boroughs (12)	All London Boroughs (32)
White British (%)	58.69	59.80
White Irish and White Other (%)	11.54	11.40
Mixed (%)	3.10	3.20
Asian or Asian British (%)	12.71	12.10
Black or Black British (%)	11.10	10.90
Chinese or Other Ethnic Group (%)	2.75	2.70
Ethnic Minorities in general (%)	41.30	40.20
People born outside the UK	28.20	27.10
Rank of Income Deprivation [16]	53.16	51.18

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[14] Ethnic minorities refer to all ethnic groups that are not White British.
[15] The mean percentage or mean rank is given in each cell.
[16] Rank of number of people in the district who are income deprived (1 is most deprived).

Table 4. Description of London boroughs selected compared to London average and number of participants in each borough[17]

Local Councils	Description of Boroughs	Citizenship Officers	Naturalised Citizens
A	Below average White population, very large ethnic minority population, very low income deprivation rank	2	3
B	Below average White population, large ethnic minority population (mainly Black and Black British), low income deprivation rank	2	4
C	Below average White population, large ethnic minority population (mainly Asian and Asian British), above average income deprivation rank	1	5
D	About average ethnic minority and White population, below average income deprivation rank	2	4
E	Above average White British population, below average ethnic minority population, above average income deprivation rank	1	5
F	About average White population, somewhat above average ethnic minority population, below average income deprivation rank	2	4
G	Below average White population, large ethnic minority population, quite low income deprivation rank	3	5
H	Somewhat above average White population, below average ethnic minority population, about average income deprivation rank	3	3
I	Somewhat above average White population, below average ethnic minority population, above average income deprivation rank	1	0
J	Above average White population, below average ethnic minority population, very high income deprivation rank	1	0
K	Somewhat above average White population, below average ethnic minority population, below average income deprivation rank	1	0
L	Somewhat above average White population, below average ethnic minority population, above average income deprivation rank	1	0
Total		20	33

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[17] The local councils that took part in this research cannot be named for confidentiality reasons.

4.3.2 Citizenship officers

As mentioned, citizenship officers are civil servants working in local councils who organise and conduct citizenship ceremonies, which have been mandatory for naturalised and registered British citizens since 2004. In some of the councils they also provide the Nationality Checking Service, a service put in place to assist migrants with their citizenship applications. In each of the local councils selected, I interviewed one, two or three officers depending on the number of citizenship officers working there – some councils had one officer, while others had four or more. In each council I tried to interview the officers who had the most experience with citizenship matters, were of higher rank (for example, coordinating a designated citizenship team), or whose job was more relevant to citizenship compared to the other officers. However, recruitment was also dependent on the officers' keenness to participate.

Not all of the respondents' job title was 'citizenship officer' because not all councils had a designated citizenship team. Some of them were registrars with additional citizenship duties, while others were solely involved in citizenship matters. Also, in some councils there was just one designated citizenship officer, while in other councils the entire registration team dealt with citizenship. The level of specialisation of the officers' duties depended on the council's structure which was quite varied across boroughs. The interviewees' rank within the council was also varied. Some of the interviewees held higher positions, whereas others were lower-rank officers. Furthermore, there was variety in terms of the duration of their involvement with citizenship matters. A few of the officers had been involved with the citizenship ceremonies and the Nationality Checking Service since they were implemented in 2004. Others, however, had only been employed as citizenship officers for only a few months.

Regarding the sample size, following Gaskell (2000), I sought to conduct at least fifteen to twenty interviews with each sample of participants (new citizens and citizenship officers), but primarily, I sought to achieve 'meaning saturation' before terminating the interviews. Meaning saturation was easier to achieve with citizenship officers, compared to naturalised citizens, as this sample was more homogeneous. Twenty interviews were sufficient to establish that there would be no more surprise findings by conducting further interviews.

Seventeen of the citizenship officers were British citizens. Three were foreign nationals, having permanent residency status in the UK. The mean age of citizenship officers was

43.5 years old, but it ranged from 28 to 65 years. Eight officers were male and twelve were female. Table 5 below shows the officers' demographics and job positions.

Table 5. Citizenship Officers' demographics and job positions

Participant	Gender	Age	Ethnicity[18]	Position held	Local Council
1	Male	43	Black British	Registration Officer	A
2	Male	60	White British	Registration and Ceremonies Officer	
3	Female	27	White British	Citizenship Officer	B
4	Female	43	Black British	Citizenship Officer	
5	Female	65	White British	Interim Superintendent Registrar	C
6	Male	34	White Other	Citizenship Officer	D
7	Male	32	White Other	Citizenship Officer	
8	Female	36	White British	Additional Superintendent Registrar	E
9	Female	32	Asian British	Citizenship Administrator, Nationality Checking Advisor	F
10	Female	56	White British	Citizenship Administrator, Nationality Checking Advisor, Deputy Superintendent Registrar	
11	Female	33	Mixed British	Deputy Director of Registration and Nationality	G
12	Male	43	White British	Director of Registration and Nationality	
13	Female	29	Asian British	Citizenship Officer	
14	Male	60	White British	Registration Officer (higher rank)	H
15	Male	60	White British	Lead Ceremonies Officer	
16	Male	47	White British	Superintendent Registrar	
17	Female	52	White British	Ceremonies Coordinator	I
18	Female	42	Asian British	Citizenship Officer	J
19	Female	48	White Other	Administrator	K
20	Female	28	Other British	Citizenship Officer	L

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[18] The categories for ethnicity that are used here are the same as the ones used by the Office for National Statistics.

4.3.3 Naturalised citizens

In eight of the twelve councils selected, I conducted three to five interviews with naturalised citizens. The new citizens were contacted at the citizenship ceremonies. The selection of this part of the sample was less controlled by the researcher due to significant practical constraints (see section 4.4.1 below). Thirty-three naturalised British citizens were interviewed. The total interview sample is therefore fifty-three participants.

Compared to citizenship officers, naturalised citizens were a more heterogeneous sample; they came from different parts of the world and had different immigration trajectories. Thirty-three interviews were conducted in order to identify common patterns of thinking and arguing about citizenship. This sample size was adequate to achieve meaning saturation and make sure that there will be no more surprise findings by conducting additional interviews (Gaskell, 2000).

The new British citizens who took part in this study had a varied migration background. Out of the thirty-three respondents, seven of them had migrated to the UK to seek asylum, either on their own or as minors with their parents. The rest of the participants had moved to the UK to work, study and/or travel and gain new experiences. Participants originated in Europe, Asia, America, Africa and Australia.

The amount of time that the participants had spent in Britain ranged from 3 years to 40 years. Some of the participants can be described as 'newcomers', while others had spent most of their lives in the UK; some had migrated as adults and others as children. More than half of the respondents had spent between 5 and 10 years in the UK – the mean years in the UK was 10.5 years. About a quarter of them applied for naturalisation as soon as they became eligible (3-6 years, depending on their immigration status), while others applied later on.

Sixteen participants were male and seventeen were female. Their mean age was approximately 32 years old, but it ranged from 18 to 58 years. The vast majority (28 participants) were, however, less than forty years old, which resonates with the overall picture of naturalised citizens in the UK (Freelove-Mensah, 2008). Table 6 shows the naturalised citizens' socio-demographics and local councils where their citizenship ceremonies were held.

Table 6. Naturalised Citizens' socio-demographics and local councils

Participant	Age	Country of origin[19]	Gender	Reason for Migration	Years in UK	Local Council
21	37	Albania	Male	Asylum	10-15	E
22	40	Sierra Leone	Male	Asylum	5-9	
23	37	Serbia	Female	Study	16-20	
24	32	Australia	Male	Travel[20]	5-9	
25	22	Lithuania	Female	Family[21]	10-15	
26	29	Nigeria	Male	Study	10-15	C
27	26	Sri Lanka	Female	Marriage	5-9	
28	25	Raised in Kenya, Indian origin	Female	Study	5-9	
29	41	India	Female	Marriage	10-15	
30	35	Jamaica	Female	Family	5-9	
31	36	Australia	Female	Travel	5-9	H
32	33	Australia	Female	Travel	5-9	
33	35	South Africa	Male	Travel	5-9	
34	37	USA	Female	Travel	16-20	F
35	26	Thailand	Male	Study	10-15	
36	31	Germany	Male	Study	5-9	
37	58	USA	Female	Study	20+	
38	32	South Africa	Female	Travel	5-9	D
39	28	Greece	Female	Study	10-15	
40	43	Venezuela	Male	Study	16-20	
41	27	Russia	Female	Travel	5-9	
42	23	Sierra Leone	Male	Family & Asylum[22]	5-9	B
43	43	India	Male	Study & Travel	10-15	
44	28	Soviet Union	Female	Study	10-15	
45	35	Raised in Syria, Armenian origin	Male	Asylum	5-9	
46	34	Canada	Male	Study & Travel	10-15	A
47	30	India	Male	Work	5-9	
48	29	Ghana	Male	Work	5-9	
49	25	Raised in Lebanon, Undisclosed origin	Male	Asylum	5-9	G
50	20	China	Female	Family	5-9	
51	21	Raised in Iran, Iraqi	Female	Family & Asylum	10-15	
52	18	Afghanistan	Male	Family & Asylum	10-15	
53	32	Fiji	Female	Family	20+	

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[19] The country or origin of participants is strictly derived from how participants themselves described their ethnic and national backgrounds.

[20] Travel refers to moving to the UK in order to gain new experiences and live abroad.

[21] Family refers to family reunification.

[22] Family & Asylum refers to migrating to the UK for family reunification in cases where a member of the family (usually a parent) had migrated and sought asylum in the UK either earlier in time or at the same time.

4.3.4 Policy documents

As argued in Chapter 2, the British state has recently tried to redefine British national identity within a framework of enhancing integration, cohesion and a shared sense of common identity. Policies regarding immigration have been central in these efforts. There are three main strands of immigration reform policy that the government is pursuing with that objective: i) policies regarding managed labour migration (points-based system), ii) policies regarding stronger border control (the newly established UK Border Agency is now responsible for this; also, the controversial ID card scheme for foreign nationals is part of this project), iii) policies regarding the process of naturalisation and permanent residency in the UK (earned citizenship). With respect to naturalisation, the governmental approach in the past few years has been defined by the idea of earned citizenship. New policies are being introduced on the principle that migrants must earn their right to stay and settle in Britain, which resonates with both the idea of managed migration and the general objective of social cohesion and integration.

Against this background, I decided to focus specifically on policies of earned citizenship in exploring the public policy approach on naturalisation. The four consultation documents published on the topic of earned citizenship were all selected for analysis. Table 7 provides a description of these documents.

Table 7. Policy documents selected for analysis

Policy documents	Description	Date of publication	Government agency
The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System	Green paper; outlines new policies on earned citizenship	February 2008	Home Office, Border and Immigration Agency
The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Analysis of Consultation Responses	Analysis of green paper responses	July 2008	Home Office, UK Border Agency
The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Government Response to Consultation	Outlines new policy in light of analysis of green paper responses	July 2008	Home Office, UK Border Agency
Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship	Consultation document on further earned citizenship provisions	July 2009	Home Office, UK Border Agency

Earned citizenship was first introduced in the *"Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System"* green paper, published in February 2008 by the Border and Immigration Agency (Home Office, 2008a). The green paper depicts the 'journey to citizenship' as a process whereby migrants 'earn their right to stay' by showing that they have contributed to the country and that the benefits they acquire by living in Britain are matched by their responsibilities. Within the proposed framework, eligible migrants will have to go through three stages in what is called the "journey to citizenship": temporary residence, probationary citizenship and British citizenship/permanent residency. Migrants will have to earn the right to progress to the next stage or they will be asked to leave the country. The government is actively encouraging 'probationary citizens' to become full citizens rather than permanent residents by extending the probationary citizenship period for those who choose to become permanent residents. The criteria to progress from each stage to the next as outlined in the green paper are: English language proficiency, economic contribution through work and paying taxes, obeying the law and actively participating in the society. By doing voluntary work, for example, migrants will be able to proceed faster to the full citizenship stage. Overall, the government policy on earned citizenship emphasises the assessment of migrants by introducing a series of stages on the route to naturalisation, as well as their contribution to the economy and integration into the British society.

The results and analysis of the green paper responses were published by the UK Border Agency in July 2008 in the document *"Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Analysis of Consultation Responses"* (Home Office, 2008b). The government's response to the consultation was also published in July 2008 in the report *"Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Government Response to Consultation"* (Home Office, 2008c).

Based on these developments, earned citizenship became part of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act which received royal assent in July 2009. The earned citizenship provisions of the Act are to be enforced in the summer of 2011. Building on these provisions, Phil Woolas, at the time Minister of State for Borders and Immigration, introduced the idea of a new points test for citizenship in the consultation document *"Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship"* (Home Office, 2009). This test is planned to be incorporated into the earned citizenship process so that migrants who wish to proceed from the stage of temporary residence to permanent settlement will have to go through a process of assessment. Within this system, points would be awarded on the basis of a number of criteria, including knowledge of English

language and professional qualifications. Furthermore, in line with the notion of skilled migration, the government will be able to raise the threshold of the test in order to manage better the number of people allowed to stay permanently in the UK.

Overall, these four documents, issued by the Home Office and the UK Border Agency, outline the new earned citizenship legislation that characterises the current approach of the British government to naturalisation and immigration[23].

4.4 Research procedure

4.4.1 Recruitment of participants

Participants were recruited by first contacting the local authorities that were selected. I telephoned the local councils, explained the nature and aim of the research and asked to attend a few citizenship ceremonies for the purposes of my research. When I attended the ceremonies, I met the citizenship officers, gave them more details about the study and asked them to participate by giving an interview. The response rate of the citizenship officers was quite high; only two local councils refused permission to be included in the study and in only one of the local councils did the majority of citizenship officers refuse to be interviewed. Overall, citizenship officers were keen to take part in the study and allowed me to attend citizenship ceremonies.

After having gained permission from the citizenship officers, I met the naturalised citizens at their citizenship ceremonies. It was not possible to contact them prior to the ceremony, since their details were kept confidential by the local councils. I was also not able to speak to them during the ceremony or at the time when their details were being checked by the citizenship officers just before the ceremony started. I had to approach potential participants before the checking, when not everyone had yet arrived, or after the ceremony, when the new citizens would start departing. In the cases of busy ceremonies, it was impossible to have a chance to speak to everyone. To address these difficulties in recruitment, I tried giving an information sheet to the citizenship officers to pass on to naturalisation applicants at the Nationality Checking stage of the application, in case applicants were interested in taking part in the study. However, this

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[23] More recently, on June 28[th] 2010, the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government published a consultation document proposing an annual cap on immigration (Home Office, 2010). This cap will operate within the five-tier points system that was introduced by the previous Labour government. This consultation document, which was only published a few weeks prior to the submission of this thesis, was not included in the analysis as it is not strictly an earned citizenship proposal, but rather constitutes an immigration measure building on the points-based system.

did not prove to be an efficient technique for recruitment; only one of the participants was recruited this way. Due to these practical constraints, I did not have total control of the selection of the naturalised citizens to be interviewed. However, I made every effort to approach everyone present in the ceremonies and ask them to participate in the research. I attended as many ceremonies as necessary in each borough in order to gather at least four participants from each council, but, unfortunately, in two of the boroughs this was not achieved, so I settled for more interviewees from other councils. As a result of these problems, the response rate of the naturalised citizens' sample was rather low in comparison to the citizenship officers. The average response rate across boroughs was approximately 11% for the naturalised citizens[24].

4.4.2 Interview topic guides

The interview topic guides were designed to address the general issues of migration, citizenship and national identity through the discussion of the naturalisation context in Britain (see Appendix 1, for the detailed topic guides). One pilot interview with a naturalised citizen in London was used to check the relevance of the questions asked, as well as the overall structure of the topic guide. Due to the relatively small number of citizenship officers working in London and also because of access issues, I did not conduct pilot interviews with citizenship officers. Rather, I conducted two interviews with British-born, non-naturalised citizens. Furthermore, as a means to familiarise myself with the field of study, I had informal discussions with citizenship officers and I attended fifteen citizenship ceremonies.

The topic guide for the citizenship officers was developed around a few general themes: questions regarding the citizenship officers' work, questions about the process of naturalisation with an emphasis on the citizenship ceremony and the 'Life in the UK' test, questions about naturalisation and immigration and finally, questions about British citizenship. Their personal views, experiences and feelings were asked about, as well as their views on how applicants for naturalisation relate to these issues. The interview topic guide for the naturalised citizens had a similar format and included questions regarding: migration to Britain, naturalisation, with emphasis on the citizenship test and ceremony, and British citizenship. Each interview, for both samples, started with a 'warming-up' general discussion concerning the interviewees' locality and their work in general. The interviews were semi-structured and in-depth in format in order to allow

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[24] This response rate is calculated as if I had contacted all applicants for an interview in each ceremony I attended. However, I was unable to speak to all applicants at some of the ceremonies; thus, this response rate is an estimation and is lower than the actual response rate.

the participants to talk freely about the issues that were most relevant or significant for them and also in order to allow for the expression of unanticipated responses (see Appendix 2 for a typical interview with a citizenship officer and a typical interview with a naturalised citizen).

4.4.3 Interview procedure

The interviews with the citizenship officers were mostly conducted in the local councils during the officers' break. Only one was conducted at a restaurant after work. The interviews were conducted in the period from October 2007 to April 2008. They lasted from thirty to ninety minutes, most of them around one hour.

The interviews with the naturalised citizens were conducted in a variety of places (cafés, restaurants, participants' homes, workplaces) according to the interviewees' preference. They were conducted in the period November 2007-April 2008. They lasted from 35 minutes to two hours.

Both the citizenship officers and the naturalised citizens contacted for recruitment were given an information sheet with some basic information about the project and the interview process along with my contact details (see Appendix 3). Any other information requested by the participants about the nature of the research was also provided.

All of the participants were informed about the general aims of this study and their rights not to participate and withdraw at any point. They were also reassured that their identity would be protected and full confidentiality would be kept according to the British Psychological Society's code of ethics. After having been informed about the study and how their contribution would be used, they were asked to sign a consent form which would allow me to use and publicise extracts from the interviews provided that their identity is not revealed (see Appendix 4). All of the participants were encouraged to freely express their opinions. They were told that there were no right or wrong answers and that I was only interested in their personal views.

All interviews were recorded, with the permission of participants, and transcribed for the purposes of analysis.

4.5 Data analysis

4.5.1 Analysis of interviews

The analysis of the interviews with citizenship officers and naturalised citizens sought to address the following questions:

- How do participants engage with citizenship as an object of social knowledge? In other words, what are the themes they use to make sense of it?
- How are participants positioned in relation to this representational field and how do they negotiate these positions?
- What types of social relations are the basis for these representations?

In order to answer these questions, the analysis was conducted on two levels. On a first level, thematic analysis was used to identify the different themes that interviewees drew on to make sense of citizenship and naturalisation. On a second level, I sought to explore how participants positioned themselves and others in relation to the representational field of citizenship. This more subtle analysis aimed at investigating the dynamics of the self-other-object triangle in the representational field of citizenship.

The interviews with citizenship officers and naturalised citizens were analysed separately in order to allow for the exploration of different perspectives across the data set. Instead of strictly comparing the officers and new citizens, my aim has been to identify different perspectives on citizenship as expressed by different actors in order to capture the complexity of the issue. However, there were commonalities in how participants as a whole discussed citizenship – these will be discussed in the last chapter of the thesis.

The first step of the analysis was to listen to the interviews and read repeatedly the interview transcripts. This helped me familiarise myself with the data and make some first notes, comments and hypotheses about the underlying themes of discourses. The Nvivo qualitative analysis software was then used to code the interview data. This made the process easier and quicker, whilst also allowing for the better compilation of the coding framework. Although the use of computer software does not replace the researcher's role in segmenting and interpreting the data, it does render the process much more efficient. Nvivo is a particularly useful programme because it is very flexible and allows the researcher to easily rearrange the codes, making the process more open to re-interpretation and exploration of new ideas. Nvivo organises the codes

hierarchically, allowing for a large number of sub-codes, which helps establish links between abstract and descriptive codes. The creation of memos and annotations also helps to draw links between data and codes and ideas that emerge during the coding process.

The coding technique was mainly inductive. Although the three questions mentioned in the beginning of the chapter guided my reading of the data and my interpretation of the text, I used a data-driven approach to coding in order not to confine the richness of the interview data and allow for surprise findings to emerge. The unit of analysis was the meaning unit which could be a sentence or a whole paragraph. Codes were not mutually exclusive and interview segments were often multiply coded. Coding is an ongoing process, so the categories were refined many times during the course of the analysis. I started by coding separately four interviews from each sample. Based on these interviews, I devised a preliminary coding framework which I applied to the rest of the data. However, in the course of coding more interviews, some codes were abandoned while new ones were created and others were refined. With every change in the coding frame, I had to go back to my previous analysis and refine it in light of the amendments on the coding framework. This open approach to coding was quite lengthy and required a constant 'back-and-forth' process of re-reading the interviews and applying new codes. This process also allowed my to refine my research questions by drawing clearer links between my theoretical perspective and the empirical findings.

Once the whole data set was coded into codes and sub-codes, the codes were sorted into potential themes (Attride-Stirling, 2001; Braun & Clarke, 2006). At this stage the coding framework consisted of a set of preliminary themes, each of which comprised a series of interrelated codes and sub-codes. After I finalised the coding framework, I went back to the interview extracts and re-worked the coding framework in order to create a 'coherent story' within each theme. This part of analysis was more interpretative than descriptive as the themes were abstract and often latent topics in the interviews.

The themes were organised hierarchically according to the suggestions made by Attride-Stirling (2001): basic themes are descriptive and made up by codes or groups of codes, organising themes summarise the assumptions of a group of basic themes, and global themes are the higher-order, more abstract themes which summarise the main point or assumption of a group of organising themes. It should be noted that the way the themes have been devised does not necessarily reflect their frequency within the data set; rather, the 'keyness' of a theme depended more on its significance in

answering the research questions (Braun & Clarke, 2006) (see Appendix 5, for the complete coding frameworks).

In exploring the relations between themes and the ways of thinking that underlie them, I was particularly interested in oppositions and dilemmas in the ways participants talked about citizenship. As Billig (1987) observes, thinking takes the form of argumentation, since every theme on which people draw to make sense of the world has an opposing theme. Themes and counter-themes are in dialectical relationship with each other; they are linked with each other like figure and ground (Marková, 2003a). Social representations and common thinking are based on such basic oppositions – what Marková (2000, 2003a) calls 'themata'. In seeking to understand this dynamic way of talking and arguing about citizenship and naturalisation, I paid attention to thematic tensions in the discourses of participants. I tried to identify not only the themes but also the counter themes that structured the discourses of participants. Examining such tensions allowed me to appreciate the dynamic and dialogical nature of thinking about citizenship and also follow the argumentation of participants.

Concerning the second level of the analysis, I sought to further examine how participants negotiated their position within this complex representational field. In order to study this dynamic aspect of representations, I explored the self-other relations that were advanced and negotiated in the interviews. Following Moscovici's (2000b) triangle concerning the relation among self, other and object, it can be said that every representation involves the positioning of the self in relation to the other and to the object or representation. In this sense, every representational process also defines the relationship between self and other. Thus, the multiple ways in which people position themselves and are positioned by others with regards to an object is inherent in all acts of socially representing the world. Adopting a dialogical approach to knowledge construction, meaning that in every act of representation there is always an interlocutor (real or imagined), I tried to answer the following question in analysing the data: which voices come forth when people speak of citizenship and towards whom are people positioned? (Marková et al., 2007). As Hermans (2001a, 2002) argues, people are 'multivoiced', that is, they can assume a multiplicity of positions. A position can be seen as a "conceptual repertoire" (Davies & Harré, 1999) which is based on the location of an individual within the social world vis-à-vis others. I did not conduct a detailed analysis of every position taken up; rather, I was more interested in the prevalent positions associated with the main themes of representations of citizenship.

I was also interested in exploring how these positions were negotiated. Positioning processes can be seen through the lens of rhetoric and argumentation (Billig, 1987). This discursive approach to positioning has been advanced by positioning theory which sees positioning as a process of negotiation between different viewpoints (Harré & van Langehove, 1999). Therefore, tensions between themes are accompanied by tensions between different positions. By drawing on different representations, people are proposing different 'versions' of themselves towards others. Following Duveen and colleagues (Duveen, 1993, 2001; Duveen & Lloyd, 1986), who argue that identities are positions towards social representations, it can be said that negotiations between different dialogical themes are also negotiations of identities. This process can take the form of an 'internal dialogue' since different discourses represent different voices in the self (see Chapter 3). The divergence between voices becomes a resource for argumentation for participants (Marková et al., 2007).

Based on this rationale, in studying the positions of interviewees, I was guided by the following questions:

a) Which main positions become available for the participants within the representational field that defines citizenship and naturalisation and how do participants negotiate these positions?

b) How do participants position themselves in relation to thematic tensions? In other words, how do participants use opposing themes to make different identity claims and arguments?

4.5.2 Analysis of policy documents

The analysis of the four policy documents on earned citizenship was conducted using the ALCESTE software for analysis of text. Compared to qualitative analysis software packages, like Nvivo, which only helps to systematise the coding process, ALCESTE is a tool which analyses the text with relatively little intervention by the researcher. ALCESTE is a very sophisticated tool which operates under the principle that different ways of talking about a subject correspond to different was of thinking about it. Based on this principle, it conducts a statistical analysis of word co-occurrences in the text and produces classes of words that appear together. These classes represent the themes that underlie the discourse around the topic. ALCESTE allows to alter the parameters of the analysis to suit the aims of the research. In this study, I conducted three different sets of analyses which allowed me to identify three levels of classification ranging from broad classes to more detailed classes. I interpreted the classes by going through the

typical words and sentences in each class. I also explored the relations among classes using the dengrogram of descending hierarchical classification which shows how the classes have been divided. The details of the ALCESTE analysis are outlined in Chapter 7 which presents the procedure and findings of this analysis.

4.6 Quality assurance

Qualitative research has been heavily criticised for its lack of quality assessment criteria. Responding to this challenge, Gaskell and Bauer (2000) have devised a set of quality assurance criteria which can be applied in qualitative research and are functionally equivalent to the criteria used in quantitative research. Confidence and relevance are, for Gaskell and Bauer (2000), the guiding principles of quality assessment because they render qualitative research 'publicly accountable' for the claims it makes. Confidence refers to being confident that the results of the research represent the accounts of participants and are not fabricated by the researcher. Relevance indicators incorporate both 'utility and importance' (Gaskell & Bauer, 2000, p. 345); a 'relevant' research contributes theoretically and/or empirically with unexpected findings. Drawing on Gaskell and Bauer (2000), I have used five confidence and relevance markers for quality assurance in this research.

Triangulation is one of the proposed criteria for quality assessment (Gaskell & Bauer, 2000, see also section 4.2.2, p. 78). The aim of triangulating perspectives is not to obtain a 'true' representation of a phenomenon. Triangulation "is best understood as a strategy that adds rigour, breadth, complexity, richness and depth to any inquiry" (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p. 5). In the current study, I have sought to achieve triangulation of data and of methods. The former refers to collecting data from different sources (Flick, 2004). By studying three sets of social actors in the naturalisation context, this research achieves triangulation of perspectives on the issue of citizenship. Citizenship officers, the UK Government and naturalised citizens are the three most important stakeholders in this context. By analysing and comparing their different perspectives, I aim to understand the complexity of citizenship in contemporary Britain. Triangulation of methods, on the other hand, most commonly refers to the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. This research has combined these different types of analyses, through the use of semi-structured interviewing and statistical analysis of text (ALCESTE). More importantly, however, it has combined reactive procedures of data collection (interviews) and non-reactive procedures (collection of policy documents) (Marotzki, 1995, cited in Flick, 2004). The most important benefit of

triangulation is that it enhances the reflexivity of the researcher because it requires that the researcher addresses the complexity of the issue in question and explores potential inconsistencies (Gaskell & Bauer, 2000). Triangulation helps not only to appreciate this complexity, but also to interpret each perspective in light of the overall context. For example, public policy on naturalisation sets the scene for the experiences of naturalised citizens. Their accounts are defined against the background of immigration legislation as set by the UK Government.

Transparency and procedural clarity constitute another confidence marker for Gaskell and Bauer (2000). I have sought transparency and procedural clarity in this research by describing explicitly all the procedures of data collection and analysis.

Corpus construction is the third confidence and relevance marker used here (Gaskell & Bauer, 2000). Corpus construction, as a method of sample selection in qualitative research, aims to map the variety of representations on an issue (Bauer & Aarts, 2000). By selecting different sets of relevant actors, I aimed to investigate the diversity of perspectives on citizenship, rather than identifying the 'representative representation' of this topic. I also selected local councils with diverse ethnic and socio-economic profiles in order to recruit respondents with a variety of backgrounds.

Thick description, the extensive use of extracts from the data, constitutes one more confidence and relevance marker (Gaskell & Bauer, 2000). In the findings chapters that follow, I have used extracts from the analysed interviews and documents in order to support my interpretation. The claims made in this research, based on the evidence I have collected and which I report, are therefore open for potential alternative interpretations by another reader.

Finally, the fifth relevance marker of this research is surprise as a contribution to theory and/or common sense (Gaskell & Bauer, 2000). The surprise value of this research lies firstly in studying a topic that has not been adequately explored by social psychology so far. As mentioned in Chapter 1, while social psychology has studied national identities, it has been reluctant to study citizenship. I aim to contribute towards filling this gap by studying naturalisation as a context where the 'self' meets the 'other'. Furthermore, new policies on earned citizenship and managed migration deserve close attention, but have so far been studied from only a legal or political perspective. Such policies define the national boundaries and pose restrictions on the movement of people. In the era of globalisation and transnational identities, they create, as Baumann (1998) has argued, a new form of social stratification defined by people's capability to be mobile. This

thesis is a step towards understanding the social psychological parameters of such boundary management strategies and their implications for social relations. In terms of theory, this thesis aims to contribute to the elaboration of the concept of identity, particularly national identity, in contemporary societies, by drawing links with the concepts of social representations and positions.

Chapter 5. The Perspective of Citizenship Officers

5.1 Overview of Chapter 5

This chapter will discuss the findings from the interviews with citizenship officers. The analysis of interviews is based on three main questions:

- How do participants engage with citizenship as an object of social knowledge? In other words, what are the themes they use to make sense of this issue?
- How do participants position themselves and others in relation to this representational field?
- What types of social relations are the basis of these representations?

In addressing these questions, I draw on Billig's and Marková's (see Chapter 2) ideas on dialogical thinking as well as on Duveen's and positioning theory's theorisation of positioning vis-à-vis the other (see Chapter 3). This chapter will highlight: i) the polyphasic and antinomic nature of representations associated with citizenship, and ii) the implications of such antinomies for processes of identity construction.

Citizenship officers adopted in general an 'earned citizenship' storyline which also frames current public policy discourse in the UK. 'Earned citizenship' is based on the assumption that British citizenship is a conditional privilege selectively granted to those who deserve it. It emphasises the duties of new citizens, as well as the need to assess them rigorously during the naturalisation process. Three main duties were most salient in the interviews: contributing to the economy, integrating and being proud of becoming British. At the heart of the earned citizenship narrative was the distinction between the deserving and the undeserving new citizens. Thus, there were two 'branches' in this storyline: one that emphasised migrants' lack of contribution and participation, and one that saw migrants as worthy of British citizenship. These argumentation narratives structured the thematic content of representations. There were two main themes in the representation of citizenship by citizenship officers: citizenship as belonging and citizenship as opportunity. Within both these themes the opposing ideas of hospitality and abuse of hospitality by migrants were in dialogical relation to each other. Citizenship was, thus, constructed in a 'polyphasic' way, alluding to the existence of antinomic thinking. The dialogical tension between inclusion and exclusion created multiple positionings and for self and other. Migrants and new citizens were constructed in an ambivalent way, as both 'good' and 'bad'. While participants differed in how much they drew on each image of the immigrant, this tension was evident in the arguments of

all interviewees. It is argued in this chapter that these tensions are at the basis of the construction of Britishness. On the one hand, the migrant as 'good' supports Britain's image as a hospitable and freedom-loving country, but on the other hand, the migrant as 'bad' maintains the purity of Britain against the 'migrant threat'. The next section of this chapter will discuss the earned citizenship storyline, while the third and fourth sections will discuss the theme of citizenship as belonging and the theme of citizenship as opportunity respectively. The fifth section will elaborate the ambivalence between the 'good' and the 'bad' immigrant as well as its implications for the construction of Britishness. The final section of this chapter will conclude with an overview and discussion of the findings.

5.2 Earned citizenship discourse

The discourse of earned citizenship was the underlying storyline in the majority of the interviews with citizenship officers. It was based on the idea that British citizenship is a right to be earned in contrast to the birthright of the native population. In this storyline, Britain was positioned as a giver (mainly of freedom and economic prosperity), whereas immigrants were seen as the beneficiaries of these goods. While earned citizenship is based on both the image of the deserving new citizen (who has earned his/her right to citizenship) and the image of the undeserving new citizen (who has not earned his/her right to citizenship), the negative aspect of immigration was more common in the interviews. More often than not, participants argued that the UK has been too lenient on immigration allowing immigrants to abuse the system to their benefit. For many participants, the economic decline of the country and the problems of segregation and lack of social cohesion were seen as an outcome of this situation. Britain was seen, therefore, as having the right and the duty to limit immigration and be more selective about which migrants should be allowed in the country. At the same time, migrants and new citizens were seen as having the duty to contribute to the economy, integrate and be committed to the country. They were seen as having the right to reside in Britain and become citizens only if these conditions are met.

In accordance with this storyline, the privilege of British citizenship was taken for granted in the interviews. The idea that migrants are 'better off' in the UK than in their countries of origin was wholly unchallenged. Based on the taken-for-grantedness of the privilege of British citizenship, the discourses of the citizenship officers were framed in a social exchange framework. Britain was positioned as a provider of freedom and prosperity, while migrants were seen as the takers. In line with a reciprocity principle,

migrants can earn the right to British citizenship and associated benefits only if they abide by a set of conditions:

> ... [The increased importance attributed to citizenship] for us, as a nation, I think it's not... not being taken for granted. That, you know, this isn't something that's open to everyone. You have to fulfil certain criteria before you are granted citizenship. And that's important for the growth of the country. (Participant 16, male, 47 years old)

The criteria for deserving citizenship were formulated in terms of duties: the duty to contribute, the duty to integrate and the duty to be proud of becoming British (see Andreouli & Stockdale, 2009). Regarding the former, most of the citizenship officers mentioned the duty to contribute to British economy as a fundamental criterion of good citizenship. A distinction was often constructed in the interviews between people who migrate to Britain and give back to the community and those who take advantage of the welfare system. This stance towards migration is also reflected in the government's recent policy on migration; a new series of 'skilled migration' regulations has recently been introduced, that is, a points-based system that will regulate immigration on the grounds of the skills needed in British economy. All, but one, of the participants who mentioned the idea of skilled migration considered it a step towards the right direction. The main idea was that Britain has to be selective. It needs to be able to screen migrants efficiently on the basis of their skills and contribution. Most of the participants also argued for more stringent immigration controls in order to protect the British infrastructure, arguing at the same time that immigration is more of an economic burden than a resource for Britain. This 'rationalistic' argument, by framing the issue in a sustainability framework, manages to counter accusations of prejudice.

> Whilst our economy is actually healthy, people who want to come here, I think what we have to do is make a decision about who are the people we actually want to come to the UK in terms of their skills, in terms of the skills and abilities that we need to make the economy grow and continue to grow. [...] I think for people who are virtually economic migrants, who are not able to contribute in the way in which we need them to do, then perhaps there's an argument, perhaps it's saying "Well, I think we got to be restrictive" [...] I think that's a perfectly reasonable aspiration, we do have a finite amount of resource in terms of just the infrastructure; the burden on the National Health Service, the burden on schools, the burden on GP practices, the burden on housing has all been difficult in terms... and made more difficult by the number of migrants coming to the UK. (Participant 12, male, 43 years old)

In addition to contribution to the economy, the duty to participate actively in British society was also a recurrent theme in the interviews. It was related to civic engagement, being able to speak English, learning about the British culture and making efforts to integrate. Generally, lack of integration and English proficiency was seen as a problem in the migrant populations in Britain by most participants:

> I mean, I've had couples come here with their kid, the child was like 12 years old you know, because the child has been studying in the UK, schooling in the UK for five-six years, kids tend to pick up a language quite easier than adults, you know, it's just been proved, so the child will come as an interpreter for the mother and the father, which I don't really approve of. (Participant 7, male, 32 years old)

Another criterion for who deserves to be British was the responsibility to be proud or happy to become a citizen. This was construed as a moral duty for new citizens who need to be grateful for what Britain offers them. This was most frequently framed as a matter of freedom; the most important good that Britain offers to new citizens was seen as the opportunity to live in a democratic country. Like the duties to contribute and integrate, the duty to be proud was mostly viewed as something that is lacking and that should be enhanced. Obtaining the British passport was seen as a principal reason for naturalisation and it was construed as being in conflict with feeling proud to be British (this point will be elaborated later in the chapter, see section 5.4, p. 116).

> There's been a few people that have been very happy to become British citizens. I had one guy, he came to do a private ceremony and after he did his oath and he swore, he put the flag around him, he was very happy and he was kissing the flag, I was like, oh, he's very happy. Some of them are very very happy, you know. A lot of them are very happy, but you do get obviously the people who just want the passport because it makes things easier for them, easier to travel out of the country and go everywhere and they're not really interested in anything else, you know. I think you get that in every country, you get people that don't wanna be part of... (Participant 6, male, 34 years old)

In a few of the interviews, participants took this idea a step further by arguing that new citizens should not only be proud to become British citizens, but they should also 'feel' British. In fact, although the distinction between the legal aspect of citizenship and the identity aspect of nationhood was made in the interviews, identification with Britain was generally seen positively in contrast with only wishing to obtain the legal advantages of citizenship. Therefore, people who really deserve to be British were sometimes seen as

the ones who 'feel British'. This representation of citizenship is very close to images of Britishness as a cultural identity rather than a civic one. As the following extract shows, the legal aspect of nationhood can be associated with an opportunistic attitude to citizenship.

> Although they may have lived here for 20, 30 years, this is their home, if you see what I mean, so I think it's hard for some to say, you know, I'm giving that up, it seems you're giving up all your birthplace and... as I said, I think through the ceremonies when their first words are "a British passport", I still think that deep down they're more with their country from where they were born. Although they're becoming a British citizen, to them, they're not, if you see what I mean, they're still maybe, I don't know, Bangladeshi, Polish or they're still that. I think they may use the British citizenship more for legal or travelling [...] I don't see why become a British citizen. They're only getting benefits to become a British citizen... (Participant 10, female, 56 years old)

Overall, the three duties of contribution, participation and pride constitute the moral order of the position of naturalised citizens within the earned citizenship storyline. They define what is expected from that position. I argue that this positioning draws on a deeper distinction between two different modes of identification, 'being' and 'having' (Fromm, 1997)[25]. British can be something that one *is* by virtue of being born in Britain (birthright) or it can be something that one *has* by virtue of naturalising (earned right). Thus, the distinction between the birthright and the earned right of citizenship translates into two different identity positions[26]:

> This has been an eye-opener to- for me to realise how privileged it is for me to be born here; that I don't have to go through that. You know, it's my birthright whereas they have to buy this service, pay to become, you know, and that was, yes, an eye-opener. (Participant 4, female, 43 years old)

The distinction between 'being' and 'having' is evident in the kinds of claims one can make in relation to the 'management' of Britain. A few of the citizenship officers seemed to overtly express a kind of 'territorial entitlement' to speak on behalf of Britain or the nation with regards to the issue of naturalisation criteria (see also Andreouli & Stockdale, 2009). I term this symbolic entitlement 'territorial' because it is related to

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[25] This point will be further elaborated in the next chapter in relation to the interviews with naturalised citizens.
[26] There are subtler distinctions in-between the two poles, since social representations construct a variety of positions that can be taken on (Duveen, 1993). Representations of culture and race play a part in what kinds of claims one can make towards Britishness. As will be shown, in the next section, some cultures are perceived as less able to integrate into the British society.

perceiving the national space as the property of the native population[27]; essentially it is a matter of 'ownership'. This position of authority in managing the national space was most evident in a few of the interviews in which citizenship officers referred to their authority to block the naturalisation process. In reality, decisions over citizenship applications are made by the Home Office. However, some of the officers had sent back to the Home Office some applicants' naturalisation certificates for reconsideration of the application in cases when they thought that the eligibility of the applicant was insufficient. Such cases mainly had to do with the applicant not speaking up when saying the oath of allegiance during the ceremony or the applicant lacking knowledge of English and being unable to speak English during the nationality checking process.

> I am in a position, if I'm not happy with an applicant, to not allow the ceremony to take place [...] So I said, I'm not prepared to do your ceremony today, and afterwards I sent the certificate back to the Home Office with my views. I said I wasn't happy with his standard of English comprehension, you know... his friend was slightly better than him. I said, at the end, when I was trying to explain to him, I used a 14-year old boy as an interpreter. (Participant 2, male, 60 years old)

Here, the interviewee explicitly puts himself in a position of a decision-maker as to who has the right to claim citizenship. Gergen (1989) calls this a 'warranting voice' because it is based on the warrant that one's voice is superior or more legitimate compared to that of another. In the interviews, justification of the interviewees' warranting voice came from the superiority of birthrights compared to earned rights which positions British born citizens as 'fuller' members of the British community. Speaking from this warranting position means that one uses British identity as a resource for claim-making. Being 'properly British', in other words, legitimates people's expectations towards new citizens. This entitlement is quite similar to what Hage (1998) has called 'governmental belonging'. For Hage, there are two ways of belonging to a nation: feeling at home in the nation (passive belonging); and the belief that one has a right over that nation, the right to contribute to its management so that it remains one's home (governmental belonging). This is essentially a matter of having legitimate symbolic power to define or demarcate the national territory.

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[27] Following Sack, territoriality can be defined as "the attempt by an individual or group [and states] to affect, influence, or control people, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area" (Sack, 1986, p. 19).

5.3 Citizenship and belonging

While the earned citizenship discourse framed the argumentation of participants, two main themes, belonging and opportunity, provided the thematic content for constructions of citizenship. The theme of belonging was linked with an image of citizenship that incorporated civic and cultural elements. Belonging was mainly conceptualised as being integrated or making efforts to integrate. Settling and making a home in Britain was often seen as a main reason for naturalisation. Some respondents also made the assumption that by becoming British, migrants were relinquishing their previous nationality. In that case naturalisation was taken almost literally: acquiring the British citizenship meant that one also acquired (or should acquire) a British identity.

> For my parents, they came from Bangladesh back in the 60s, I think it was a very important thing for them to feel part of this country cos they decided to live here and to get citizenship meant that they were part of this country. Before, they were still foreigners even though they decided to settle here, they always felt like outsiders, you know. So, to get citizenship meant they were part of this country, so to them it was an important thing [...] it is more than a passport. It is a whole sort of way of life, I suppose. It's... a lot of people feel like a part of the country [...] of the way of life in the sense that... just being part of everything really. Being accepted, I guess it's what I'm trying to say, not being different, yeah. Because when you are a different nationality... (Participant 9, female, 32 years old)

> I suppose it depends from their background. If they're coming because it is a better place to live, maybe they just want to disown everything else. You know? Maybe people think, I'm not that person anymore, I'm British, I'm here, let's get on with it [the naturalisation]. I can only think that's why [people naturalise]... (Participant 8, female, 36 years old)

At the same time, Britishness was commonly constructed as a plural identity that can accommodate diversity. Respondents employed a 'narrative of national diversification' which described British diversity as the result of a historical process of migration inflows (Condor, 2006a, 2006b). Diversity was, thus, something that could be tolerated or even celebrated as a cultural resource. It was seen as making life in Britain generally and London in particular, more exciting. What is more, interviewees also expressed pride in the cultural diversity of Britain as it affirmed the value of tolerance, which was constructed as distinctively British (see also Condor, 2006b).

... [this borough] is the most diverse in the UK, over 53% of our population are
black or Asian [...] and a recent census actually said that if you're walking down
the High Road, you have 50% chance of actually meeting somebody, not of a
different ethnic origin, but actually somebody not born in the United Kingdom.
So, it's the most diverse in the UK and probably in Europe [...] If it's the most
diverse in London, I'm sure it's the most diverse in Europe, yeah [...] I think it's
tremendous, yeah. I mean, it makes life incredibly interesting. I'd be very bored
in a very sort of stable white community. (Participant 12, male, 43 years old)

This idea that diversity can be a cultural resource was often expressed in the
interviews. Indeed, the need to build a sense of community by welcoming new citizens
and encouraging their integration was evident in the data. In this regard, the new
naturalisation rules, which involve the citizenship test and the ceremony where new
citizens take an oath of allegiance, were welcomed by most participants. It was further
argued that the naturalisation process should incorporate symbols of Britishness. Many
participants talked about having the picture of the Queen in the ceremony and about
the importance of the national anthem as part of the process. The call to build a sense
of community through the citizenship process portrays a welcoming and other-oriented
attitude towards new citizens. It suggests that the native and British born population
makes efforts to embrace the new citizens. This is an instance of recognition of the
other as part of 'our' community.

I see this [citizenship ceremony] as a much better way of welcoming citizens
and hopefully giving them that sense of belonging and I think it definitely has a
worth that the ceremony itself gives a sense of pride and, you know,
presentation of a gift to commemorate the fact that you're obtaining your
citizenship, I think it is a good thing [...] and hopefully it makes them want to be
welcomed into the community and feel part of that community. (Participant 11,
female, 33 years old)

However, there was both a negative and a positive subtext in the integration discourse
employed by citizenship officers, based on the tension between two opposing themes
(Billig, 1987; Marková, 2003a). On the one hand, the integration discourse was about
creating a sense of community among all British citizens, but on the other hand, it was
also an expression of concerns over segregation. This tension between cultural threat
and cultural enrichment by immigration was the source for the development of
arguments on the part of participants. Moving from a rhetoric of community (that
emphasises commonality and unity) to a rhetoric of segregation (that emphasises
difference and dividedness) was commonplace in the data. An example is given in the

extract below. The respondent starts off by saying that the citizenship ceremony is a welcoming event. But, he bases his argument on the lack of integration of minority communities. So he moves from an other-oriented discourse of approaching new citizens to a discourse that emphasises their reluctance to integrate causing lack of cohesion. In the end, integration is seen as the personal responsibility of people who migrate to Britain:

> We start off [the ceremonies] with giving people a civic welcome and we have the mayor there cos we want to say, you know, this is a welcome into the community, and then we go on to actually explain, you know, a little bit of what citizenship is. That, you know, it brings rights to people, but it also brings responsibilities. And the responsibilities are basically, they go back to the very original interpretations of being a citizen. It's to participate, it's participation, it's getting involved and that's what we say, it's your side of the deal, you know, we will give you citizenship and that'll give you certain rights, but you have to contribute as well. And the contribution you make is that, you know, you see that this is your community, you get involved in this community, you contribute and you try to make this community a better place in which to live [...] And, you know, this is all part of this process of community cohesion and, you know, people can still have their own cultures and all like that, but they still have got to take steps towards more integration [...] I think the riots of North, when there was the troubles in a number of northern cities, when they reviewed, then they found that people had no sense of being British people[28]. Lots of people there, you know, still saw themselves as their country of origin and didn't feel any part of this country and so forth. They felt very distant, remote and I think that Ted Cantle was the one who said that we, you know, we need to move, you know, a little bit away from this multicultural approach and into more an integrationist approach... (Participant 14, male, 60 years old)

The above quotation alludes also to a sense of loss on the part of the participant. What is being lost is the feeling of solidarity and unity which is giving its place to diversity and multiculturalism. Thus, the perceived negative impact of immigration was linked in the interviews with a sense of decline of Britishness and nostalgia for the past. Claims to raise the importance of British citizenship were made by participants in response to this challenge. For that reason, the citizenship ceremony, as a rite of passage that marks a

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[28] The participant refers to the 'race riots' in the spring and summer of 2001 in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley. A series of reports were commissioned by the Home Office at that time in an effort to understand the causes of the events. The most prominent of them, the Cantle report (Cantle, 2001), attributed the protests to the lack of cohesion of ethnic minority communities, giving rise to the general social cohesion agenda of the Labour government.

migrant's transition to full membership, was generally seen in a very positive way (see Participant 9 below). The idea that citizenship acquisition is important and should be celebrated is, indeed, a reason for the implementation of the ceremonies. For instance, in Lord Goldsmith's Citizenship Review, commissioned by the Prime Minister, recommendations regarding the citizenship ceremonies were focused on making this event more meaningful for both new citizens and local communities (Rimmer, 2007).

> ...because obviously before the ceremonies came out, when people applied for citizenship, I think they had to go in front of a solicitor to say the oath and affirmation [or] whatever. And then they used to get their certificates through the post and that would be it. But now that it's made into more of a bigger thing, into a ceremony, I think it makes them feel...I don't know, I think they appreciate it more, if you like, and also, at the same time, meeting other people that have applied and [who are] in the same, you know, same position as themselves. So, they do appreciate it more, I think, the whole ceremony concept. (Participant 9, female, 32 years old)

While a feeling of loss of unity permeated the interviews, none of the participants explicitly argued that people should discard their cultural or ethnic backgrounds when migrating to Britain. Instead, what was common across interviews was a 'keep your own culture as well' argument. Interviewees argued extensively that migrants and new citizens have the right to maintain their 'original cultures'. But, this argument also suggested that 'different cultures' are not part of British culture but parallel to it. Diversity was constructed as external to Britishnesss since it is the already established British culture that defines the common core of Britishness. In line with the recent governmental approach, this common core was defined by 'British values' in the interviews. These values were about tolerance, freedom and democracy and were often constructed as distinctively British. This suggests that not abiding by British values was not only seen as a sign of segregation but also as a sign of insularity and lack of tolerance on the part of migrants and new citizens. This line of argumentation both reiterates British tolerance and attributes segregation to minorities' conservatism. This identity management technique allowed participants to counter accusations of racism and xenophobia (see also Condor, 2000, 2006a; Condor & Abell, 2006b; Condor, Gibson, & Abell, 2006). Furthermore, while minority identities were defined in cultural terms, British identity was defined, in this case, in terms of political values. The juxtaposition of the two creates the impression that there is a conflict between some cultural traditions and democratic values epitomised in British democracy. This conflict is explicitly expressed in some of the interviews with regards to Muslim communities,

constructing a contrast between Western and British tolerance and 'Islamic intolerance' (see also Said, 1981).

> I don't think the two are mutually exclusive. I think there is an element of integration between those two things. I think if you're a new migrant, some elements of your national identity will still remain in your country of origin [...] That doesn't mean to say that you will not also have an affinity and affection to the country in which you've chosen to live in. So, I think you're signing up to a national identity, you're signing up to some shared values, you're sharing, you're signing up to the fact that you're now living in a free and democratic society as you were before, but effectively if you come from a country which isn't free and democratic... You may come from an Islamic country that recognises or doesn't recognise certain rights for females for example. When you come here you're signing up to rights for females, you're signing up to equality and equality of access. Now, that is different with your old identity in some ways and you have to sort of shelve that because that's in the past... (Participant 12, male, 43 years old)

The use of tolerance here serves as an argumentative strategy to protect Britishness. By equating Britishness with values of democracy and tolerance participants were essentially arguing against change. If Britishness is defined by tolerance and open-mindedness, then it does not have to change to incorporate other cultural elements. On the contrary, it is assumed that it is already open to diversity.

However, the meaning of tolerance was not fixed in the interviews, but was re-negotiated according to the types of arguments participants wished to make. While tolerance was described above as a political value which positively differentiates Britishness from other cultures, it was, on other occasions, constructed negatively as political correctness. Interestingly, while a civic conceptualisation of Britishness was promoted in the extract above, in this case, British traditional culture becomes a more salient feature of Britishness. Many respondents expressed concerns about the decline of British cultural traditions due to political correctness. In this regard, 'bending over backwards' to accommodate minority cultures was often viewed as a threat to the unity of Britain and to British identity. A typically cited example of this was Christmas celebrations. It was argued in many interviews that political correctness can be detrimental to British traditions, mainly the ones associated with religion. While ethnic minorities were seen as maintaining and celebrating their cultures, the mainstream British culture was seen as being downplayed so as not to offend others. There are two implications of this. First, that political correctness is the other side of tolerance. As

Billig (1987) argues, the meaning of words can be a source of argumentation and debate. In the interviews tolerance could signify respect for diversity, but it could also mean political correctness linked with loss of British cultural identity. By complaining about political correctness, participants were effectively expressing concerns about the negative aspect of tolerance. Secondly, although political correctness characterises the behaviour of native British citizens, it was attributed to the 'sensitivity' of minority populations who were seen as being easily offended. This is why both participants below claim that minorities should make more efforts to participate in the majority culture. Reluctance to do so is construed as an abuse of hospitality and as a result of the migrants' intolerance. At the same time, both participants try not to sound intolerant, denying potential accusations of racism (Billig, 1991; van Dijk, 1992). Participant 8 asserts her respect to diversity before arguing against the segregation of migrant communities. Participant 14 downplays the racial connotation of his statement by saying that it is 'common courtesy' to integrate into the British culture. 'Common courtesy' is construed here as a universal social value that everyone should adhere to. Not participating in the mainstream culture becomes a sign of backwardness and incivility.

> I think it's very good when in schools, when we celebrate different religions and different nationality days [...] But, I also think it's very sad when we feel like we can't do things [...] I think that's quite sad when people think, oh, what about the Christmas lights, when it's Christmas and the council says, oh, we can't do that because it will offend other cultures [...] And I think if you're willing to live in another country then that's something that you should entertain, cos there're things that they do on their day. And there's always that argument on Christmas, isn't it? Oh, you know, Father Christmas and Christmas lights, and you might be offending other religions... well, you know, this is what we do here, but then also bringing whatever religions and more so, I suppose concentrated in an area, celebrate that as well, because children surely can only benefit from it. (Participant 8, female, 36 years old)

> I think the things that do us terribly harm in this country, and again it goes back to political correctness, you know, is things like, when you get, when it's Christmas and so forth and you get someone say, don't send Christmas cards cos that'll offend someone [...] And there are a lot of Muslims who have Christmas trees and have presents and lots of Sikhs who do the same and so forth and, cos they say, you know that's what, when you go to a country and, you know, you're living there that's what you do! I mean if I went to any country in the world, you know, I'd celebrate the Eid or whatever, or anything like that, it

wouldn't necessarily mean I'd want to become an Hindu or a Muslim or whatever, but that's basic, you know, common courtesy... (Participant 14, male, 60 years old)

Overall, there was a tension in the interviews between diversity as something positive and diversity as something negative. This dilemma was exemplified in the tensions between tolerance and political correctness, and between cultural enrichment and threat to cultural identity. These oppositions formed part of an 'internal dialogue' in the discourses of the interviewees (Marková, 2006). Susan Condor and colleagues (Condor, 2006a, 2006b; Condor, Gibson, & Abell, 2006) have found similar results in their studies on Britishness. These studies found a tension between mono-cultural and poly-cultural constructions of Britishness. In my findings, tolerance is the main source of tension as it can be discursively employed to emphasise openness towards otherness but also, when construed as political correctness, it can be employed to argue against diversity. I would also add here that there is an implicit tension between taking pride in people wanting to migrate to the UK, mainly because it asserts Britain's hospitality and tolerance to diversity, and resenting this very tolerance (or rather, political correctness) because it is sometimes equated to a 'bending over backwards' attitude towards 'foreigners'. On the one hand, diversity is constructed as something positive and enriching (or even as part of Britishness), but on the other hand, it ought to be limited. Diversity therefore is both a resource and a threat to national identity and lifestyle of Britain. While participants drew more on one or the other pole of this opposition, it was the tension between the two that was the source of their arguments.

5.4 Citizenship and opportunity

In addition to the theme of belonging, citizenship was also construed as an opportunity for new citizens. This theme was based on the image of Britain as a country of prosperity that can offer many opportunities to people who migrate. Mainly because of this, the fact that people want to migrate to Britain and become British was not really problematised in the interviews. Rather, with the exception of one participant, the advantages of becoming British in terms of work opportunities, safety and quality of life were taken as self-evident. Life in Britain was unquestionably considered better than in other countries.

People always knock this country, but you can't always blame them and kick them out. You know, everybody wants to get here, you know, from all quarters

of the world, they wanna come to Britain, you know, and it must have something to offer, you know. (Participant 14, make, 60 years old)

The concept of opportunity took many forms in the interviews. Most frequently, it signified safety for those migrants who come to the UK as asylum seekers. Through the Nationality Checking Service most of the interviewees were in frequent contact with applicants for citizenship. Many of the participants told me stories about new citizens who had fled their country to come to the UK. In these stories, the image of Britain as a democratic and freedom-loving country was very salient.

Obviously, you get those people that have come from disadvantaged countries or countries where there is war or something like that. I suppose for them, they happily have a place they can call home and they know they can bring up their children in safer surroundings and not have to worry about somebody coming along to kill them or something like that. (Participant 6, male, 34 years old)

You know, they've come from, yeah, we don't know what their backgrounds are, but, you know, you just need to read in the papers, whatever the different countries undergoing different regimes or whatever, that people come here because in England there is a freedom that they wouldn't experience in their own country. Freedom to express their sexuality, their religion, their political beliefs. All those things that they can get here that they're not getting or were getting in their own country. (Participant 16, male, 47 years old)

At the same time, asylum seekers were constructed as victims in need of Britain's help. This missionary connotation of humanitarianism is evident in the extract below where the participant argues that accepting and protecting people in need is a moral duty of Britain. What is more, her claim that helping others is 'part of us' shows that this is considered a defining feature of Britishness and Britain's place in the world.

I wouldn't feel happy if we turned them away, where would they go? [...] we should still be seen as a safe haven for people who really need help and need assistance, that need to flee their country. We shouldn't take that away, you know, that's part of us. (Participant 18, female, 42 years old)

However, in the interviews, the theme of democracy and humanitarianism towards those in need was in dialogical tension with the theme of abuse of hospitality by migrants. The distinction between 'genuine' and 'bogus' asylum seekers (e.g. Kushner, 2003; Lynn & Lea, 2003) is anchored in this dialogue. Here, the theme of hospitality abuse took mainly the form of abuse of welfare benefits. The ambivalence between

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being humanitarian and limiting the help given to migrants is shown in the extracts below. The participants consider receiving benefits a case of abuse that puts a strain on welfare and creates a burden for the rest of society. Interestingly, from a person in need, the immigrant is now positioned as an opportunist. While removing agency from migrants, especially asylum seekers, is necessary for constructions of humanitarianism, this agency has to be re-invoked in order to construct them as abusers of welfare benefits and to argue against immigration. The extracts illustrate the internal dialogue between the two themes in the discourses of the interviewees (Marková, 2006). The participants seem to be struggling to both argue that Britain should be a welcoming country and make claims against the financial help given to immigrants and especially asylum seekers. In other words, they engage in a negotiation between humanitarianism and pragmatism which is based on a sustainability discourse (see also van Dijk, 1992).

> At first when they're going through asylum, they do get a payment. I don't think it's actually money, it's more like a voucher system. [...] And then once they get their indefinite leave, then they can go and get the benefits and... you know, it's as if to say, well, let's go to Great Britain, you don't have to work because they pay you what we would have got in a week's wages in benefits and you don't have to do anything. [...] You know, for some asylum seekers that's a get-away from their countries. Which is only right, you know. It's, sad things have happened to them in their own countries and you wouldn't wish that on anyone. But to come here and then just sit around and not even look for work, you know, just think, well, I'm gonna get benefits, that's OK, I can sit here and... you know, I wouldn't want to say, right, no, back you go, because that's not, that's not fair, they've got to live and they've got to live somewhere. (Participant 10, female, 56 years old)

> We do get an awful, ninety per cent of the applications are unemployed and aren't contributing and I think that a lot of resentment comes from the fact that, you know, you do have a lot of people that are getting citizenship and have been on benefits since they came into the country. Now, they can work after they get indefinite leave to remain, but a lot don't. And I do see an awful lot of applications that are unemployed [...] Cos I don't think we can survive as a nation just giving out, giving out, giving out all the time. Especially in the national health services it's just in a complete mess at the moment. Well, at the moment, that will be for a long time because, you know, you just can't survive on... it's very nice you know, handing out benefits to people that are in need. Don't get me wrong, they are in need, they do need it, but it has to go, if you're giving out, you have to have some form of money coming back in again. (Participant 5, female, 65 years old)

The theme of abuse of welfare benefits was more salient than the theme of immigration as a resource for Britain. In fact, as the following extract shows, the image of the contributing migrant often served to only stress the inadequacy of 'ordinary' migrants. In other words, the 'good migrant' was in some interviews the exception to the rule. As Billig (1987, 1993) argues, people do only have the ability to categorise, but also the counter-ability to 'particularise', that is, to negate categorisation and identify special cases. In this case, particularisation can be described as a strategy to maintain the dominant categorisation of immigrants as abusers of hospitality.

> I mean why is it that all the Eastern Europeans, all flock through France and then sit in Calais waiting to jump on the back of the lorry? Or train or something like that? Because they know that England is the place where they want to be. So they can get as much as they can out of the country. I mean I've met some youngsters that have come into this country, 12 or 14 year old, and when they've gone to 18 or 19 they apply to become British citizens. And then they're telling me what they've done and I've met some nice... and they've got letters that they've brought in from particular places and they say, he's done a fantastic job, voluntary work, he's helping do this and he's helping do that and he's now, you know, he's got a little job as a photographer and blah-blah-blah... Great, this is a success story. (Participant 2, male, 60 years old)

As in the case of the loss of social solidarity which was identified in the opportunity theme, the perceived decline of the welfare state, attributed to the adverse effects of immigration, made participants wary about the future of Britain. The loss of social solidarity, along with the increasing decline of the economic prosperity of Britain, created a very grim image of the future of the country. This discourse of welfare benefits abuse was formed upon a relationship of mistrust between the 'native' and the 'new' British citizens. The latter were seen as taking advantage of British hospitality and this was considered a threat to the resources of Britain. Overall, officers seemed to perceive a clash of interests between the 'new' and the 'old' British citizens. Abuse of benefits was, indeed, the most significant complaint of the interviewees in matters of immigration. It was mentioned in all interviews and evoked resentment towards immigrants. In contrast to my initial expectations, resentment towards 'foreigners' was often framed in issues of fairness, exemplified in benefits allocation complaints, rather than in issues of cultural and/or racial diversity (see also Andreouli & Stockdale, 2009). By employing a 'rational' social justice framework and making 'reasonable' arguments (like Participant 5 above), participants were able to counter potential accusations of prejudice and legitimise anti-immigration attitudes (see also Billig, 1991; Figgou &

Condor, 2006; van Dijk, 1992). However, this 'rationalistic' discourse was based on an 'us-them' dichotomy that excluded and otherised migrants – a phenomenon which has been termed 'welfare chauvinism' (Betz, 1994, cited in Wells & Watson, 2005). As shown in the extract below, the underlying assumption of this fairness discourse is that Britain *belongs* to the native population.

> The only time I get frustrated from that is when you hear that British people can't get jobs or British people can't get housing, I think that's probably when it goes slightly wrong, it doesn't seem to be looking after the citizens first [...] I think it is quite sad when you don't come first in your own country of origin. (Participant 8, female, 36 years old)

In addition to welfare benefits, the second type of abuse of the opportunities offered in Britain was applying for citizenship in order to obtain the British passport. For the majority of citizenship officers, this motive was considered a sign of lack of commitment and ungratefulness. In some cases it even signified lack of respect towards Britain, as the following quotation shows. Participant 15 below undermines the motive of new citizens by arguing that citizenship is for them an opportunistic act rather than a sign of commitment to the UK. Gillespie (2008a) has identified this mechanism of undermining the motive as a 'semantic barrier' that hinders the dialogue between self and other. Indeed, the participant below, by claiming that new citizens 'are not truly interested in Britain', completely disqualifies their perspective[29].

> I think a lot of people who come to be British citizens will never understand what it means to be British, because they don't really care. They, they've done it for a reason. They want to stay here, they want to have the advantages of having a British passport. But they don't really care too much about anything else. A lot of Australians, New Zealanders, South Africans are like that. They don't really. Some are not. Some are, you know, truly interested in, in Britain. (Participant 15, male, 60 years old)

Overall, there was a fundamental ambivalence in constructions of citizenship as opportunity in the interviews. On the one hand, opportunity meant that Britain is a developed, prosperous and democratic country. On the other hand, opportunity could also mean taking advantage of what this country has to offer. Thus, there was a tension between migrants who use opportunities in Britain to make a better life for themselves

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[29] As will be shown in the next chapter, applying for citizenship in order to obtain the British passport cannot be simply interpreted as a sign of opportunism. Rather, for naturalised citizens the passport signifies freedom of mobility and inclusion in the UK and the Western world in general. More than a practical issue, it is a symbol of a new position towards the West.

and migrants who abuse these opportunities. The former were seen as grateful towards Britain while the latter were seen as exploitative and opportunistic. Although immigration was more commonly seen in a negative light, participants used both argumentation narratives to make arguments about immigration. As will be shown in the next section, Britishness is based on this ambivalent relation with the 'other'.

5.5 Ambivalence towards the 'other': The 'good' and the 'bad' immigrant

As argued in the beginning of this chapter, the discourse of earned citizenship was rooted in the distinction between the deserving 'good' and the undeserving 'bad' immigrants. There were two potential 'endings' in the storyline adopted by citizenship officers: earning the right to become British and being entitled to what Britain offers, and not earning this right due to failure to abide by the criteria set. As Slocum-Bradley (2006) argues, failure to fulfil one's duties (contribution, integration and commitment in this case) de-legitimates an actor.

In line with the earned citizenship narrative, migrants were seen as having a moral duty to be grateful and committed to Britain. This expectation of gratefulness suggests that humanitarianism and hospitality are not freely given in an altruistic fashion. Migrants have to give something back in return. Especially in the case of refugees and asylum seekers, being grateful and committed is what is expected of them. Thus, the language of humanitarianism easily slips into the rhetoric of charity (Grove & Zwi, 2006; Pickering, 2001). Rather than a moral and legal obligation under international law, British humanitarianism becomes an expression of generosity that requires reciprocity.

> I think the people that should be applying are people that have probably come here as asylum seekers, people that have spent many years here, people that want to put back into the community, into Britain, what Britain has done for them. I think if Britain, how can I explain, when you take somebody in and offer them shelter, then, when they're in a position, they should repay, I think they should put back into society what society has given to them to enable them to be safe and secure. (Participant 5, female, 65 years old)

Freedom in Britain was a common argument used to explain why becoming a British citizen should be appreciated as something important in a person's life. Here, the image of the asylum seeker as a person in need is dominant. Thus, the refugee is given an identity: he or she is a victim of a terrible regime, in need of Britain's humanitarianism (Malkki, 1996; Rajaram, 2002). Citizenship then is a matter of safety. Migrants are

represented here as victims who are need of Britain's philanthropy or generosity. Simultaneously, Britain is represented as a prosperous, free and humanitarian country that acts as a saviour for those in need. I argue that the image of the 'good' immigrant serves to confirm British hospitality, humanitarianism and respect for freedom, as both extracts below illustrate. By being grateful, migrants boost this idealised British identity. In fact, a surprise finding of this research was that some participants argued that naturalised citizens are prouder than British-born citizens about being British, as shown in the second extract below. In a way, naturalised citizens, having more of an observer's perspective towards Britishness, are positioned as 'objective reviewers' of British values. By appreciating British tolerance and freedom, new citizens validate this idealised image of Britishness.

> In my experience, the majority of them have been quite moved by the whole experience. Last week, we had a guy from Bulgaria who actually filled with tears. At the end, when he came up and said, thank you for the ceremony, or whatever and, yeah, this is such a wonderful country. He was just moved by the whole thing. And lot of people from other countries that have come from quite tough areas, yeah, where there is civil war, there is different strife, their political beliefs or whatever, have meant that they were really sort of under a terrible regime. And they come here and having their naturalisation affirmed in such a formal way is really moving from them. (Participant 16, male, 47 years old)

> I think sometimes the people that we take as citizens are prouder than people that are actually born here, to be honest, I think cos they know how important it is, they've taken on the importance, they have lived in other cultures, so they, they know the differences and they appreciate. (Participant 17, female, 52 years old)

While the need to be free was valued, the passport was disapproved of as a reason for naturalisation because it was seen as a sign of ungratefulness towards Britain (see previous section). Freedom and the passport were often contrasted as the 'good vs. not good enough' reason to become British which distinguished the deserving from the undeserving new citizens. While the 'deserving' migrants were seen as wanting to live and settle in the UK, the 'undeserving' ones were seen as not being committed to Britain.

> P17: ... I think that for everyone that you get like that, you get the genuine ones and that kind of, you know...

E: What, what do you mean by genuine ones?

P17: Well, that's probably the wrong way to phrase it I suppose. People that actually want to come to this country, contribute to the country, work to earn a living I think, and are here, you know, for genuine reasons, they want to be part of the community. We do see, a lot in the citizenships ceremonies which is nice, you know, the bit where they stand up, take their oath and the national anthem. It is quite nice to see, an awful lot of them are very proud at that point, to sort of stand up, take the oath and the national anthem, which, I kind of sit here and I think, now, that's, it actually does, this means something, but you also get people that will ring up and come in, and you know, it doesn't mean a thing really, it's just a piece of paper, it's a kind of thing for a British passport and the fact that they got British citizenship doesn't mean anything really to them. (Participant 17, female, 52 years old)

Therefore, the interviewees constructed a distinction between the practicality of the passport and feelings of pride towards British citizenship. The two were constructed as opposite and mutually exclusive, so that naturalising for the sake of the passport did not leave any room for pride and commitment towards Britain. More than a travel document, the passport acquired a significant symbolic value for citizenship officers. In a way, the passport was the objectification of opportunism on the part of 'bad immigrants', while pride and commitment were associated with 'good migrants'.

This discursive strategy of 'differentiating the other' (Lynn & Lea, 2003) was key in the arguments of participants. The grateful migrant, who is committed and contributes to society, symbolises the ideal new British citizen. However, at the heart of this discourse is 'the good versus the bad immigrant' distinction. The immigrant in need who appreciates British hospitality and contributes to society is in conflict with the image of the immigrant who puts a strain on the British welfare system and is driven by opportunistic motives such as obtaining a European Union passport. There are two different categorisation processes here which serve distinct functions. On the one hand, the category of the 'good immigrant' serves a positive function of familiarisation with the 'other'. On the other hand, the category of the 'bad immigrant' serves to maintain the threat posed by the 'other' (Joffe, 1999, 2003, 2007; Joffe & Lee, 2004; Joffe & Staeklé, 2007). In the former case, the 'other' is embraced, while, in the latter case, the 'other' is stigmatised and kept at safe distance (Kalampalikis & Haas, 2008). 'Semantic barriers', like undermining the motive of migrants, allows participants to avoid engaging with the stigmatised 'other' (Gillespie, 2008a).

Participants used both images of the immigrant showing ambivalence towards immigration. As a result, the migrant was positioned in two contrasting ways: as a person in need, who is entitled of help, and as an abuser of British hospitality, who should not be entitled to British hospitality. In the former case, a relationship of assistance and humanitarianism was created between Britain and migrants; in the latter case, a relationship of mistrust and defence against the threat posed by the immigrant was established (see also Grove & Zwi, 2006). At the same time, Britain was positioned as prosperous and humanitarian, and as a country in decline. These two opposing positioning processes draw on the dialogical relation between the themes of hospitality/humanitarianism and abuse/threat. Thus, in constructions of Britishness there is a deeply held ambivalence towards the 'other' who is both desired and unwanted. As Marková (2003a) argues, the two themes are interdependent like figure and ground. Britishness is anchored in and against both images of the immigrant.

5.6 Summary and conclusions

The distinction between 'us' and 'them', with 'us' being the British nation and 'them' being the immigrants wishing to naturalise as British, is a key thema (Marková, 2003a) of the representations associated with immigration, citizenship and Britishness. This chapter has explored how this relationship is enriched with meanings and negotiated in order to frame discourses of citizenship. The meanings associated with 'us' and 'them' were not fixed in the interviews. In accordance with the earned citizenship discourse, which rests on the distinction between 'being' and 'having' and emphasises the duties of potential new citizens towards Britain as well as the constant assessment of their eligibility, migrants were constructed on occasions as deserving to become British and on other occasions as undeserving. The emphasis on duties and the downplaying of rights of potential new citizens constitute the moral order of this discourse. The distinction between deserving and undeserving is based on a deeper ambivalence between the 'other' as desirable, because he or she confirms British tolerance, and the 'other' as undesirable, because he or she threatens the culture and economic resources of Britain. As has been shown in this chapter, Britishness is grounded in this ambivalence towards the 'other'.

The observed ambivalence between the 'good' and the 'bad' immigrant is an instance of what Billig and colleagues (1988) call 'ideological dilemmas'. It is a dilemma between particularism and universalism. On the one hand, tolerance and universalism are based on the ideals of the Enlightenment and, in particular, the idea that prejudice, as an

'irrational' belief, should be eradicated (Billig et al., 1988). What is more, tolerance, constructed as a distinctive British trait has historically framed Britain's relations towards 'others'. For example, the ruling system used to govern the colonies during the Empire was often a modification of the pre-existing system of governance, allowing a degree of freedom to the colonised populations (Favell, 2001). To this day, British 'multiculturalist' policies tend to recognise the right to cultural difference compared to the more assimilationist approach of the rest of Europe (Mitchell & Russell, 1996). Kumar (2000) maintains that the history of the Empire is the basis for the construction of Britishness as a missionary imperial identity. This imperial identity is characterised by tolerance of minority cultures and the downplaying of dominant ethnic identities. In the case of the United Kingdom and the British Empire, the English had to restrain assertions of their identity and promote a broader British identity. Rejection of popular nationalism has been documented particularly in England (Condor, 1996, 2000; Condor & Abell, 2006b). However, this is not so much a matter of identity suppression but an issue of identity construction as the assumption of superiority is part of the constitution of privileged identities; without the need to be explicitly articulated, mainstream identities are often the implicit universal to which others need to aspire (Johnson, 2002). Although there are not enough grounds to argue that Britain's moral duty to help and accept 'others' is a direct remnant of an imperial missionary identity, as Kumar (2000) maintains[30], it can be argued that the discourse of British tolerance, coupled with the assumption of national superiority, serves as a symbolic resource, which has been historically used as a means of making sense of and relating with the 'other'.

A more critical reading of the interviews suggests that tolerance towards other identities can be seen as a complimentary privilege given to 'less fortunate' groups. As Hage observes, tolerance is a way to manage the national space and maintain hegemony as well as a hierarchy of belonging among groups as it is the dominant social group that has the power to grant or withdraw tolerance towards minority groups (Hage, 1994, 1998; Wemuss, 2006). Therefore, tolerance goes hand in hand with intolerance and is always embedded in a system of asymmetrical power relations between the tolerators and the tolerated. In this sense, particularism and the construction of boundaries between 'us' and 'them' constitute the other side of values of cosmopolitanism and tolerance. These boundaries are evident in the positioning of minority cultures as external to Britishness, that is, as cultures which are tolerated but not necessarily embraced. More importantly, the boundaries between 'us' and 'them' are constructed

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[30] Indeed, discourses of British tolerance may originate in Britain's long history of democracy, rather than in Britain's imperial heritage.

and maintained by positioning migrants as a burden to Britain's resources and as abusers of British hospitality. In contrast to Britishness as an inclusive humanitarian identity, Britishness is constructed here as a declining identity due to the negative effects of immigration and cultural diversity (see also ETHNOS, 2006). Figure 2 below illustrates the central dilemmas in constructions of citizenship by citizenship officers.

Figure 2. Central dilemmas in representations of citizenship by Citizenship Officers

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┌─────────────────┐              ┌─────────────────┐
│   Belonging     │              │   Opportunity   │
└─────────────────┘              └─────────────────┘
       ╱    ╲                          ╱    ╲
┌─────────┐ ┌──────────┐      ┌───────────┐ ┌────────────┐
│ Threat  │ │Tolerance │      │ Abuse of  │ │Prosperity &│
│         │ │          │      │Hospitality│ │ Democracy  │
└─────────┘ └──────────┘      └───────────┘ └────────────┘
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
Thus, representations of citizenship and associated representations of immigration were constructed in a binary logic in the interviews (see also Pickering, 2001). Participants engaged in an 'internal dialogue' (Marková, 2006) between the opposing themes, drawing on one or the other according to the argumentation strategies they adopted. This logic polarises both the identity of the migrant and the British identity. Words such as ungrateful, demanding and different are juxtaposed with words like grateful and committed. Figure 3 shows the opposing positionings that ground arguments within the earned citizenship storyline.

Figure 3. Main positions in earned citizenship storyline

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┌─────────────────┐              ┌─────────────────┐
│Britain as a Giver│◄───────────►│Migrants as Takers│
└─────────────────┘              └─────────────────┘
       ╱    ╲                          ╱    ╲
┌───────────┐ ┌──────────┐    ┌────────────┐ ┌────────────┐
│Prosperous/ │ │Declining/│    │Contributors/│ │Opportunists│
│Humanitarian│ │Threatened│    │ Grateful    │ │            │
└───────────┘ └──────────┘    └────────────┘ └────────────┘
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
There is a strategic aspect (Billig, 1987; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001) in these constructions of citizenship since each image of the immigrant helps to make an

argument about Britishness. The 'bad immigrant' representation helps to protect Britain from cultural threat and economic decline. As Joffe and colleagues argue (Joffe, 1999, 2003, 2007; Joffe & Lee, 2004; Joffe & Staeklé, 2007), constructing 'bad others' is a strategy of risk reduction in that everything that is negative and risky is projected onto the 'other' while the self remains protected. Indeed, the 'bad immigrant' helps maintain the 'purity' of the nation from external influences. However, taking this one step further, I argue here that both the positive and the negative image of immigrants are essential for the construction of Britishness. While the 'bad immigrant' representation helps to protect Britain from cultural threat and economic decline, the 'good immigrant' constructs an idealised image of Britishness as the epitome of values of freedom and humanitarianism. The tension between the two themes is at the root of British identity and defines the relations of Britain to 'others'. By drawing on opposing themes, participants spoke from multiple positions which allowed them to negotiate their relationship towards the other. We can observe here a negotiation between openness towards the other (recognition and trust), but also defence against the risk that the other poses (mistrust and control).

Ever since colonial times Britishness has been defined by this dialectic between desire of and aversion to the colonised 'other' (Young, 1995). The 'other' cannot just be welcomed to satisfy the imagery of British hospitality; the 'other' also needs to be kept at a distance to maintain the integrity and purity of the nation. Therefore, the dilemma between universalism and particularism can also be framed as a distinction between humanism and solidarity (Triandafyllidou, 2000). The former opens the self towards the other, while the later aims to secure the self against the other. On the one hand, we have a relationship of hospitality and engagement of the self with the other, and, on the other hand, we have an antagonistic or defensive relationship which leads to lack of engagement or dialogue with the other. The two themes are opposing but are not mutually exclusive, alluding to the dilemmatic nature of thinking (Billig, 1987, 1991; Billig et al., 1988; Marková, 2000, 2003a). The ambivalence between unity and division forms the basis for the construction of Britishness. This dilemma is not settled; rather the dialogue between the two positions forms the basis for argumentation on immigration and identity.

Chapter 6. The Perspective of Naturalised Citizens

6.1 Overview of Chapter 6

This chapter discusses the findings from thirty-three interviews conducted with new British citizens. This sample of participants was more heterogeneous than the citizenship officers due to the variety of participants' experiences and backgrounds (for more details, see Chapter 4 on methodology). As with the interviews with officers, the following questions guided the analysis of these interviews:

- How do participants engage with citizenship as an object of social knowledge? In other words, what are the themes they use to make sense of it?
- How do participants position themselves and others in relation to this representational field?
- What types of social relations are the basis of these representations?

As in the previous chapter, in addressing these questions I will emphasise, firstly, the dialogical and argumentative nature of thinking about the social world (Billig, 1987; Marková, 2003a) and, secondly, the self-other relations that ground identity processes. Owing to the variety of interviewees, there was no overarching storyline in the interviews as was the case with citizenship officers. However, the main themes used to make sense of experiences of naturalisation were generally shared across interviews.

This chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part discusses identity construction on the symbolic representational level and the second part discusses positioning as embedded in institutionalised practices of immigration management. Regarding the former, it will be argued that identity construction requires a complex positioning process towards not only representations of Britishness, but also towards representations of the participants' country of origin. Respondents can be said to be overall located between the two positions that Schutz (1964a, 1964b) has identified: the position of the 'stranger' and the position of the 'homecomer'. Integrating into a new environment is, thus, not a straightforward process, but requires negotiation between the 'here' and the 'there'. Furthermore, Britain was represented in an ambivalent way in the interviews: on the one hand, it represented progress, freedom and openness to which new citizens aspired, but on the other hand, it also represented the decline of moral values. Integration in Britain involves, therefore, a negotiation of participants' positions in relation to both these poles. This process entails assertions of both difference and sameness in relation to Britishness. Social representations also pose

restrictions on the types of claims a migrant or new citizen can make towards Britishness. British identity is predominantly represented in an ethnic way which suggests that some types of migrants are positioned 'closer' to Britishness than others. This differential positioning is related to representations of immigration and the distinction between elite and non-elite migrants which permeates these representations.

Concerning the institutional level of immigration management, it will be shown that civic and ethnic representations of Britishness are not mutually exclusive, but are intertwined in the discourse and practice of earned citizenship. The distinction between the earned right and the birthright of citizenship marks the distinction between identity as something that one 'has' (and can thus be lost) and something that one 'is' (which is an essential part of the self). Not being British 'by nature' and, thus, having a precarious position in Britain, many participants acquired citizenship as a means to solidify their right to be in the UK. However, not all migrants viewed their position in the UK as insecure. This depends on where one is positioned within the 'West/Rest' opposition. For many participants who had been excluded from the prosperous Western world, the British passport, allowing for inter-national mobility, was a symbol of freedom and openness. In this sense, the passport is the objectification of inter-national relations and serves as an institutionalised positioning tool.

To sum up, representations of Britishness and immigration, structured around the distinction between the 'West and the Rest', gave meaning to the respondents' new status in the UK. While representations of Britishness and immigration define who is seen as similar and who is seen as different, tangible immigration policies exemplify this positioning through immigration control practices.

6.2 Positioning within the symbolic field of naturalisation

6.2.1 Identity transformations: Between the 'stranger' and the 'homecomer'

Identity has been defined in this thesis as a social location that binds an individual to his or her social world. As has been argued, identity has an organisational function in that it helps individuals make sense of themselves, their relationships with others and their dealings with the social world (Duveen, 1993, 2001; Duveen & Lloyd, 1986). Thus, identities provide a sense of stability by locating individuals within a network of social relations. Migration, however, creates a rupture of identity as the network of meanings and the system of social relations embedded in a person's country of origin may not fully apply in a new setting. The new citizens interviewed for this research differed in the

amount of time they had spent in the UK (see section 4.3.3, p. 90). While some had spent a considerable amount of time in Britain, the majority of them had spent most of their lives in their country of origin. The latter respondents, in particular, described the first years of their life in the UK as a period of transition whereby they had to re-negotiate their cultural values and identities. Acquiring new social knowledge and re-positioning themselves within a new system of social relations is a process of coping with this rupture of identity. For Participant 52, as well as for other respondents, the ethno-cultural diversity of Britain, in general, and London, in particular, was something novel to which he had to adapt. Other new citizens experienced more substantial integration difficulties due to their lack of English proficiency when they first arrived in the country, like Participant 29.

> I remember [my first experiences in Britain]. I came to Luton airport and I was very young and I was a bit afraid because it's like when you're young you just come to this country, the people are different, the culture is different [...] And everything is multicultural, this country is so multicultural, it's unbelievable, I mean, to be very honest with you, I first saw a black person [when I came to the UK], I mean not seen it myself, on the TV. So, I started to see all these new things and my eyes started opening and at the airport I saw so many different multicultural people... (Participant 52, male, 18 years old)

> I never spoke English in my country. When I came here I was just a stranger. I was a stranger for everybody. Once you can't communicate, you just feel like you're in a bubble. Nobody can touch, nobody can feel you. You know what I mean? (Participant 29, female, 41 years old)

Both extracts above describe a feeling of discontinuity between the participants' previous experiences and their experiences in the UK. Due to this discontinuity, these respondents lacked the necessary symbolic tools (knowledge of cultural diversity and language proficiency) that would allow them to make sense of their new environment. This rupture of identity and of taken-for-granted knowledge associated with migration has been described by Schutz (1964a) as the position of the 'stranger'. The 'stranger', according to Schutz, is an outsider in that his or her knowledge of the new environment is acquired through an observer's perspective; it is not the result of his or her embeddedness into the cultural patterns of the society. It is not that the 'stranger' is unable to understand the differences between the two societies; rather, he or she lacks the unquestioned or 'matter-of-course' nature of common-sense thinking in the new socio-cultural setting. Because of that, the 'stranger' does not have the tools to make full sense of the new environment and his or her place in it. Ways of thinking in the

'host' society, as Schutz (1964a, p. 104) correctly observes, rather than a means of sense making, become a 'field of adventure'. Identity rupture creates anxiety which originates in the individual's inability to master a new symbolic order.

In order to cope with this rupture, one needs to go through a process of 'making the unfamiliar familiar' (Moscovici, 1981, 1988, 2000a). Migration, in other words, is a learning experience because a migrant needs to learn new ways of thinking and re-assess his or her previously taken-for-granted knowledge. This idea challenges the assumption that identity is, in some way, fixed. Indeed, it is commonly assumed that national, cultural and ethnic identities are, to borrow Kronberger's and Wagner's (2007) term, 'inviolable identities', defined by an unalterable essence (Wagner, Holtz, & Kashima, 2009). Contrary to this view, Reicher and Hopkins (Reicher, 2004; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001) have convincingly argued that identity is a project; it is a process of becoming rather than a state of being. In the migration context investigated here, such identity projects become more salient. Many of the new citizens in this study were reflective about how immigration changed how they viewed the world and their place within it. Participants differed in how deep they perceived this change to be, but most of them described an 'identity transformation' process whereby they accommodated new ways of thinking into their perspective on the world. Becoming more open-minded was an example commonly cited by interviewees.

> People sometimes say to me that you are not the same person that I used to be [...] Even my wife said, I mean, cos I got friends from my country, when they come sometimes to my place and she sees the difference [...] And they got different things to say. They don't want to marry to an English person; they would like to marry to an Albanian person. Or they don't even mind to marry to an Eastern European girl, to put it our way, because they got similar things I think. That's the way they see it. I don't see it that way. [...] As I said, the rights that you get in here, you don't get in my country. The women got more rights in this country, of course, definitely, than in my country. You know what I'm saying? That's the thing, you learn things about... things that you never had it in your mind before. To say, put it our way, I never thought that when women got the first time to vote or whatever, or wherever the first time to get separated from their husbands and get a share from them. You know, so you learn those things in here, when I was back in my country, I didn't even... I wasn't even interested to know. (Participant 21, male, 37 years old)

The above quotation constructs a distinction between an open-minded way of thinking associated with Britain and a conservative way of thinking associated with the

respondent's country of origin, Albania. The participant argues that by living in Britain, he has become more tolerant in a way that differentiates him from his Albanian friends. The 'identity change' that the participant is describing is essentially a process of re-positioning himself in relation to the representations and values associated with his country of origin, as well as in relation to values associated with Britishness.

Participants of this study had spent a minimum of five years in the UK and thus, were not just 'strangers' in Schutz' use of the term. Rather, most of the participants were located in-between the two positions that Schutz has identified: that of the 'stranger' (1964a) and that of the 'homecomer' (1964b). The position of the 'homecomer' is the position of a person who, after being away for some time, returns home to find that he or she no longer finds this 'home' familiar. This change is more the result of the homecomer's transformation than a change in his or her home. This position explicates the experiences of many participants who described being 'de-identified' and 'de-familiarised' with their country of origin[31]. In the extract above, the participant explains how, by changing his perspective on the rights of women, he has less common points of reference with his old friends. Other respondents also described a lack of understanding of their new experiences and lives by their friends and relatives in their countries of origin. These participants, like Participant 39 below, found it hard to translate their experiences in Britain in a way that would make sense to their friends. In the following quotation, the respondent argues that the plurality and diversity which characterises Britain 'clashes' with the expectations and experiences of people who live in Greece. There is, in other words, a discrepancy of perspectives which makes communication more challenging.

> There's been a lot of discontinuity [between my life in Greece and my life in Britain] [...] The people in Greece, they can't have an image of my other life here [...] They've seen I've changed, but they don't know how to understand it. You know, in conversation there are more gaps in the discussion... after a while, what is there to say and explain? I mean, they ask, how is your work? And then you think of the whole setting [of work] and it's completely different from that of Greece and you just say, it's OK, it's fine. I mean, what I can I say? If I start explaining, like say, my colleague, Francesco who is Italian... I mean, this simple statement is already strange to them back home. Everyone would be like, oh, he's Italian? [with admiration and surprise] But, this is something

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[31] This depended on how participants made sense of the differences between life in the UK and their country of origin. This point will be elaborated in the following section on 'Dilemmas of cultural integration'.

normal here. But, for them it's not, so I just say, you know, I'm fine. (Participant 39, female, 28 years old)

On the whole, participants were located between the positions of the 'stranger' and the 'homecomer'. In constructing a new position in the UK, they were also re-negotiating their position in relation to their countries of origin. Thus, identity construction requires a negotiation process on at least two 'fronts'; it requires positioning towards multiple systems of social representations. The following two sections will elaborate these processes of identity negotiation and positioning. The next section, in particular, will discuss how interviewees negotiated the cultural differences between their countries of origin and Britain.

6.2.2 Dilemmas of cultural integration

As both Billig (1987) and Marková (2003a) have noted, thinking is a dialogical process which takes the form of arguing by drawing on opposing themes. In accordance with this theoretical perspective, Britishness was represented in the interviews in a 'dilemmatic' way. It was structured around two dialectic themes: progress and moral decline. The theme of progress signified openness (exemplified in values of freedom, tolerance and democracy), but also prosperity (exemplified in economic and professional opportunities). On the other hand, the theme of moral decline was associated with individualism, crime, violence and lack of respect for family and communitarian values. The themes were interdependent in that one was defined by the other (Marková, 2003a). The way participants positioned themselves in relation to these dialogical themes was a way to negotiate their identity and integration in the UK. Becoming more 'integrated' into the British culture could mean becoming more open-minded and tolerant, but it could also constitute a threat to a person's moral values and cultural identity associated with that person's country of origin. In other words, there was an 'internal negotiation', or 'internal dialogue', between the two opposing themes within individuals (Marková, 2006). As a result, participants positioned themselves in multiple ways and asserted both their similarity to and their difference from Britishness.

The theme of prosperity and openness in Britain was very salient in the interviews. Most of the naturalised citizens stressed the importance of the economic and career opportunities in Britain as a main reason for having migrated to the country and also the idea that the UK is developed, free and safe. Britain, as part of an idealised developed West, became a symbol of progress, democracy and future prosperity. What is more, values of openness and tolerance were frequently objectified as distinctively British

values. Consequently, reluctance to integrate into the British cultural system, attributed to other migrants, was viewed as a sign of closed-mindedness. On the contrary, openness to learning new things was one of the positive experiences that being in Britain could offer. The way participants positioned themselves in relation to this theme was dependent on how they represented their country of origin. For Participant 41, Britain is a space that allows for personal development. Russia, on the other hand, which is her country of origin, is seen as restraining and authoritarian. It is represented as having an almost backward mentality, whereas Britain is constructed as superior.

> I think there are more opportunities to develop for one, if you want, if you actually want. And also, you see, you are free from the things that keep you like restricted in your country, the mentality of your country and the traditions sometimes make [it] really, really hard for your development. I feel very free here. And no one will say, oh, you should do this or that. Of course you have commitments, like professional commitments and commitments to other people. But, it's not like there's something stupid about the mentality that doesn't make you the thing you want [...] So, in my country, many parents are very authoritative. They try to push their children to the things they want. And that's why I have many friends who've actually gone abroad or to other cities, yeah, because of this. (Participant 41, female, 27 years old)

Because of this openness, Britain was seen as a welcoming country by most interviewees. For Participant 45 below, moving to Britain was a liberating and empowering experience. It has allowed him to live openly as a gay man and have his sexual identity publicly recognised and respected. Not being recognised as a gay man in Syria, where he comes from, has led him to reject a Syrian identity altogether. Moreover, a close reading of the extract shows that Britain for him (and the West in general) is not only a place where he feels comfortable in because he is accepted; it also represents an ideal that he admires and that he wants to be affiliated with. Being called 'West' by his friends in Syria is something that he takes pride in because it shows that he is more similar to the British culture than the Syrian one. The extract below is structured around the bipolar 'Britain/tolerance versus Syria/intolerance': Britain's freedom is constructed as the opposite of Syrian narrow-mindedness. For him, being Syrian is incompatible with being British as the two identities are seen as based on opposing values. Being Syrian means that he does not have the right to be gay, while the moral order of being British allows him to be homosexual. By making assertions of similarity towards Britishness, he is also asserting his dissimilarity from Syria. As such, he does not make an effort to integrate the two identities, but chooses one over the

other. For this participant, integration is not a very complicated process; he wishes to fully assimilate into an idealised image of Britishness and leave his past experiences behind.

> One of my friends used to call me 'West' in Arabic, because the things I came up with were more Western and that's, you know, in a nice way and I quite enjoyed that. So, I wasn't fitting in there at all and I knew that, you know, this is more where I'm going to feel comfortable. And I'm not talking only about the UK, I think in any Western country I would adapt a lot quicker than I ever adapted in Syria. [...] When I first arrived here, I felt that I'm home. I was more confident, I could say what I wanted to say, not like there, you know, you have to think about what you say, and your friends are going to take the piss out of you and start laughing at you, or you'd be in trouble if you say things like that, the gay thing is... you would be in trouble for instance, you know? If you say, I'm gay, it would be even double that trouble. So it was a very, very restricted, under-pressure life. In a way, well, I was living a double life [...] Britain gave me the rights that I need in my life. But, Syria didn't give me these rights, you know? The way you live in Syria is forced on you. It says to you, this is you, this is the way, and you're gonna go this way. You don't have a say, you can't say 'No', you can't choose another way, so it's kind of a feeling of everything is forced on you, indirectly. Here I had choice. I always had a choice here to do whatever I want, you know? This country gave me the right as a gay man...
> (Participant 45, male, 35 years old)

However, British openness and progress were not one-dimensional values in the interviews. As Billig (1987) notes, for every value there is an opposing value, or even, the same value can have conflicting definitions. In the interviews, the other side of individual freedom and open-mindedness, which defined Britishness, was the lack of respect for traditions and communitarian values. In other words, some participants saw Britain as a country where individual freedom, independence and tolerance were counterbalanced by the lack of family, religious and moral values. It can be argued that participants made a distinction between political values (such as freedom and equality), which were seen to thrive in Britain, and moral values (such as community and solidarity), which were seen to be in decline in the UK but are still part of the culture of their country of origin. Because of this ambivalence, assertions of sameness towards Britishness and the desire to assimilate into the British culture were, in a way, counterbalanced by assertions of difference in the interviews. This depended on whether participants perceived a 'cultural clash' between Britain and their home country and also, on how they positioned themselves in relation to these opposing values.

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The negative aspect of British culture was commonly exemplified in the youth culture of the country. Interviewees discussed gangs, promiscuity, crime, drinking and disrespect towards elders as some of the main features of this culture. These attributes were a source of concern. Some participants were, for instance, reluctant to raise their children in the UK. Therefore, Britain and the British 'way of life' represented an identity threat for some respondents, a threat to their value system and moral integrity. Participant 36 below responded to this by fully rejecting an English identity[32]. The quotation below is extracted from the beginning of the interview when the participant was quick to assert his Germaness. His total rejection of Englishness is based on a very grim view of the country. Englishness, he argues, is not defined by achievements which would make a nation proud, but by moral decline exemplified in collective alcohol abuse. In direct opposition to the previous participant, Britishness (or Englishness) here is not a positive ideal for someone to achieve, but represents moral decline which is to be avoided. Britishness does not pose a serious identity threat for this participant as it is fully rejected from the beginning. In other words, there is no negotiation of identity positions or a dialogue between different values. It can be said that Britain is, in a way, 'otherised' and that the boundaries between the 'self' and the 'other' are so clear and solid that the participant does not need to engage with Britishness at a deeper level.

> I'm not a great fan, I live here and I enjoy it for what it is at the moment, but I'm not so impressed with England to be honest, I'm German [...] Different communities have this idea of Britain as a negative one. They say, yeah, we are not like the rest of this country, and also new communities, they only have a negative view of Britain; and it's true, it's true for Christians, Jews and Muslims. Muslims are very involved in that you see in all the news etc, everyone knows of it. With Jews it's exactly the same and part of the Christian community too, like [they say], we have nothing to do with people drinking, people having sex in the streets, these kind of things, that's Britain, but that's not us. So, Britain functions as a modulus idea, it functions only as a negative rather as a positive. [...] Well, I mean, to some extend that's how Britain portrays itself; if you see on TV, they show people just booze drinking and there is documentaries on people drinking [...] I've got nothing against alcohol, it's just, it's the culture, it is just combined with, like, common, experiences of alcoholism, that's just, it's pretty sad [...] that's the only thing, you know, that really is worth mentioning almost, right? It's kind of an expression of societal life... (Participant 36, male, 31 years old)

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[32] Many participants equated Britishness with Englishness in the interviews.

While the above position is rather extreme, it illustrates the theme of moral decline which made respondents wary about Britishness. Indeed, while very few participants challenged the idea that Britain is a developed country with opportunities for people, they also emphasised moral decline as a defining feature of the West and consequently of Britain. Compared to the participant above, other respondents struggled more to negotiate their position in relation to these dialogical themes. For Participant 51 below, freedom in Britain is an ambivalent ideal. On the one hand, it is positive compared to the 'rigidity' of Eastern countries. But, on the other hand, it is associated with lack of discipline and religiosity. This lack of religiosity seems to be a significant concern for this participant. The fact that she has 'become more Western' is uttered in an almost apologetic manner and it is something that she tries to 'control'. On a representational level, this identity threat can be dealt with through the construction of 'bad others' (Joffe, 1999, 2003, 2007; Joffe & Lee, 2004; Joffe & Staeklé, 2007). Like the previous respondent, she constructs Britishness mainly in a negative light. The difference between this participant and Participant 36 above, who also constructed a very negative representation of Britishness, is that she considers herself British to a certain extent. As such, she cannot but engage with Britishness and position herself towards it. Because of that, she cannot just construct Britishness as a 'bad other' and she also acknowledges some negative elements of 'Eastern' culture (rigidity and corruption). Still, she is unable to accommodate the two value systems as she constructs an unbridgeable opposition between the 'East' and the 'West'. The former is principally seen as 'pure', while the latter is mainly seen as 'immoral'. She creates, in other words, a clear-cut boundary between the 'East' and the 'West'. Gillespie (2008a) has described this mechanism of constructing rigid oppositions as a 'semantic barrier' that inhibits the dialogue between different perspectives. For this reason, Participant 51 is unable to accommodate her 'Eastern' and 'Western' selves. To put it differently, the moral order associated with being 'Eastern' clashes with the moral order of being 'Western' (Davies & Harré, 1990; Harré & Moghaddam, 2003a; Harré & van Langehove, 1991, 1999). The rights and duties of each position are seen as incompatible. While her position as 'Eastern' demands that she be religious and disciplined, for instance, her position as 'Western' demands that she set very few limits on her individual freedom. The lack of dialogue between the two positions means that she has to choose one over the other. However, she does acknowledge that she has both 'Western' and 'Eastern' elements in her identity, which makes it harder for her to maintain her 'Eastern purity' and her distance from 'Western values'. In the end, trying to negotiate her identity in relation to this 'representational conflict', she solves this incompatibility by distancing herself from both the East and the West and asserting a Muslim identity that supersedes the East-

West binary opposition, as well as the primacy of territorialised identities over other group identities such as religion[33].

> Eastern people are very... as much as they have a lot of advantages, there are
> a lot of good sides to the way morally they behave and their way they speak
> and stuff, but at the same time they're very rigid. And they're very rigid and like,
> you know, for someone who's lived here and they're like, you know, kind of free
> [...] they will expect things from you, because I'm Iraqi and I'm supposed to be
> like them and I'm sure I wouldn't satisfy their expectations. I'm sure they will
> expect to see you different from, like if they know that I'm gonna come there,
> they will expect someone different, someone who is Iraqi and very, you know,
> very strong Iraqi and this and that, and when they see me, I'm sure they'll be
> like 'what the hell!' you know, 'you brought like a British person here', you
> know! (laughs) [...] I know I have become very Western here. I've become very
> Western, I can't deny that. But, I still obviously try to hold on to the Eastern. I
> mean, it's not about an East and Western thing, you know. The Western way of
> life has affected me. But, I'm trying to control it. Recently I have tried to put
> more limits, trying to become more religious. So just to ... because the Western
> way of life can really make you think outside your religion. Hence, all these
> problems with Muslims and stuff they're having. So, I'm not saying that they
> have, they have a lot of problems in the East anyway there, they're so corrupt
> there, but it's like, but the Western way of life, the freedom and the ideas they
> give you can really affect you. So, I can say to a certain extent, yeah, I'm a
> Westerner but... [...] what I'm trying to understand, like explain to myself like,
> does it make a difference?, I mean if I'm trying to be, you know, I'm trying to be
> myself you know, I'm just trying to be myself, I don't want to identify, say I'm an
> Easterner or a Westerner, I'm just trying to be myself, I'm trying to, God help
> me, just be a better Muslim... (Participant 51, female, 21 years old)

Tensions between opposing themes, like the dilemma between openness and moral decline, are the basis for the development of argumentation. Drawing on opposing ideas, individuals can argue in different and conflicting directions; this provides the impetus for dialogue and creative thinking. This is exemplified in the extract below. This participant is negotiating the tension between two conflicting values: women's rights to behave as they wish, and setting limits to women's 'inappropriate' behaviour. She starts off by arguing that youngsters in the UK are not controlled by their parents as much as

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[33] Other participants also challenged national identities and nation-state boundaries as arbitrary by asserting de-territorialised and transnational identities. More commonly, London identities were asserted by these respondents. Being a Londoner was seen as an international and open identity which is not part of Britishness, but rather, constitutes a 'glocal' identity that transcends national boundaries (Sassen, 2000).

they should be. She then tells a story about a girl who was murdered waiting for the bus late at night. Throughout this extract, the participant constructs opposing arguments drawing on two different discourses. On the one hand, she blames the girl for being out at that time, and thus not having had enough control by her parents, but on the other hand, she draws on a gender equality discourse and argues for women's right to behave as men would. But, neither of the two sits very easily with her. She is against gender inequality, but also against lack of discipline by women. She negotiates her position by trying to find some common ground between individual freedom and discipline. Using the need to protect women, as a vulnerable population, as an argument, she is able to accommodate the two opposing values.

> A lot of youngsters [in Britain] they get to know only one thing; they want to go out at night. When I had that need back home, I had it yes, when I was a teenager, you know, I wanted to go out. Yeah, you wanted to go and you have to socialise, that's part of life, you have to allow them to go, but, at the same time, parents, they see whether that's a good place for them to go or not. [...] [My parents] could just go and drop me in and then they come pick me up after the party. They try to protect you, I would say. They don't want to leave room for anything bad to happen. Now, here, yes, parents will go and drop them and pick them. I think, in most cases, children, they are very arrogant and very aggressive, I would say. Because sometimes parents can't control them [...] If you're at the wrong place, at the wrong time, that's what my husband says, wrong place, wrong time, you can get attacked. You don't have to provoke anyone, you can just walk down the road, maybe you're going somewhere, but things can happen.[...] I heard somewhere that a girl around 1.15 at night, who was trying to catch a bus, I don't know maybe it was an emergency or what, I don't know [for being out this late]. That's what I mean, I have to respect her for what she did. A man drugged her into a car park and then he killed her. So, what I'm saying is, it must have been an emergency that she had to go somewhere, I don't know. But, when you do things like that, if you stand at the bus stop, at that time of night all alone, you're looking for things. Don't you think so? But, as a woman you must have the freedom to go out at night and then do what we like or go wherever we want. That should be the culture, but it is not so. Because it is not so, we have to take extra precaution steps so as not to leave room for it. (Participant 27, female, 26 years old)

Overall, while some participants felt comfortable with what they perceived to be the mainstream value system of Britain, others faced dilemmas about how to accommodate different cultural values. This tension is indicative of the dilemmatic representation of

British culture: at the one pole, there is freedom and openness and, at the other pole, there is a lack of moral values and lack of respect for tradition. The two themes that structure the representation of Britain are like figure and ground; they are interdependent (Marková, 2003a). Individual freedom, for instance, can be construed both as a positive value, associated with tolerance, but also as a negative one, associated with lack of discipline. Becoming 'more British' can, thus, provide a sense of empowerment (by becoming part of a developed country) and enrichment for the self (by becoming more open-minded and tolerant), but it can also signify loss and threat to someone's religious and/or cultural identity.

Generally, participants drew on both themes of the representations of Britishness to negotiate their position towards British culture. Some participants seemed to give more prominence to the positive pole and, thus, felt that they fitted well in the UK; for others, the negative pole was more salient making Britishness an unappealing identity. Others perceived an incompatible tension between different values and, having adopted cultural elements from both Britain and their country of origin, felt 'torn' between two opposing cultural systems. For these participants, identity was a more strenuous and reflexive project. Therefore, the 'rupture' of identity that participants experienced was not only dependent on how deep they perceived the 'cultural clash' between the UK and their countries of origin to be. Rather, it was the level of engagement with both cultures and the stakes involved that determined how participants argued about their integration in the UK. Integration is, therefore, a much more complex process than it is commonly perceived to be. Since Britain is represented in a dilemmatic way, incorporating interdependent opposing themes, integration requires much more than holding on to the 'best of both worlds'. It requires employing narratives of both sameness and difference (see also Nagel, 2002). It demands an elaborate negotiation between opposing values, such as individual freedom and values of family, and community. By doing this, new citizens negotiate not only their position within British culture, but also their relationship with their countries of origin.

But immigration is not only a matter of accommodating novel ways of thinking; it is also a process of being positioned within a new system of social relations. In this case, representations of immigration and Britishness play a central role as they mediate the

relation between the native or British-born population and the migrants or naturalised citizens[34].

6.2.3 Representational constraints on identity: Discourses of Britishness and immigration

Social representations are not easily malleable as they often comprise taken-for-granted assumptions and deeply held beliefs which permeate human behaviour and social institutions. This prescriptive nature of social knowledge creates 'inertia' in the social positions that people adopt (Duveen, 1993). In other words, social representations, by shaping patterns of interaction between individuals and groups, pose constraints upon the types of social positions that are available to people. Drawing on the power of history and long-established social structures, this inertia hinders change and resistance.

The ethnic conceptualisation of nations is a long-lasting representation, originating in the myths of origin that modern nation-states have used to turn pre-modern collectivities into nations (see Chapter 1). Billig (1995), indeed, argues that it has become 'banal' to think of the world in terms of clearly distinguishable nations. This unambiguous demarcation between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' essentialises the differences between the two. Essentialising representations define social relations (Wagner, Holtz, & Kashima, 2009) and pose constraints on which positions can be taken on by individuals of various ethno-cultural backgrounds (Duveen, 1993, 2001). We can further conceptualise the 'insider-outsider' distinction as a continuum which contains a range of positions that one can occupy in between the two poles. This section will show that, although being British and being an immigrant are constructed as opposites, drawing on the us/them thema (Marková, 2003a), some types of migrants are seen as 'more similar' or prototypical in relation to Britishness than others. This is exemplified in the migrants' symbolic right to make claims of similarity towards Britishness. Representations of race, ethnicity and cultural difference mediate this process. It follows that in order for a naturalised citizen to negotiate his or her position towards Britishness, he or must also negotiate his or her position towards representations of immigration.

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[34] Whereas naturalised citizens are not formally immigrants, they are still predominantly seen through the lens of representations of immigration, as was shown in the analysis of interviews with citizenship officers (see previous chapter). Furthermore, as will be shown in this chapter, most participants were reluctant to label themselves as British, which illustrates that 'becoming British' is a more complex process than acquiring the citizenship.

Concerning Britishness, it was predominantly represented in the interviews in ethnic and racial terms, which made it inaccessible for new citizens. Respondents differed in how much they drew on this ethnic representation of nations, but, for most of them, being part of the British nation meant being ethnically British. Thus, participants defined themselves primarily by their country of origin. It seems that for the participants 'identity-proper' was ethnic, as the boundaries between nations were seen as relatively impermeable. Therefore, becoming part of British society and feeling at home in Britain did not make participants feel part of the nation. Even when participants spoke about the impact that living in Britain has had on them, they did not position themselves as British. Most of them overtly rejected this idea, while only a small minority of participants (mainly the ones who had grown up in Britain) considered themselves British. It was also common that when participants called themselves British, this was qualified by a statement of their ethnic origin, for example being British-Albanian. This is similar to the discourse of citizenship officers who argued that Britishness is a tolerant rather than a plural identity, so that 'other' cultures were ultimately constructed as external to it, rather than as part of it (see Chapter 5).

In line with this representation, becoming British 'by name', that is, acquiring the citizenship, was generally distinguished from being 'really British'. However, living in Britain for some time made participants feel that they were becoming increasingly more 'acculturated' in the UK. Some participants, therefore, discussed Britishness as something that can potentially be learnt. In that case, becoming 'acculturated' into the customs of the country makes someone increasingly 'more British'. In the following extract, Britishness is seen as an identity that one can actually take on later in life. Although it is still conceived in ethno-cultural terms (as a set of cultural habits, like having carpet throughout one's home), it is not a fully essentialised identity, but is accessible through a learning process. Importantly, what makes this participant British is not only learning the customs and assimilating into the culture, but also the social recognition that she receives from friends and colleagues.

> I would probably [describe myself as British], because I grew up and matured here, I lived in Belgrade and I went to school in Belgrade and I started to learn about life in Belgrade, but I think that I became who I am here. And I don't think that anything that I learned here in English I could have then transposed back, like for example, living in Belgrade again. I could certainly not speak to you in scientific terms, in life science terms, in any other language but in English, because this is where I learned it and it's all I know. I'd say that, yes, I do feel British and probably my friends and colleagues think more, or think, or see me

as British more than I see myself. I think it is the behaviour and living and the lifestyle that I adopted, and certainly in appearance I don't look like a Brit (laughs) and I never will (laughs), which is good, but it's just, the habits I think, have almost, you know, I'm integrated into my everyday living and going into work and being with my colleagues and in terms of writing and using punctuation marks even when I write, it is... not quite the lifestyle, but, yes, it's almost as... even my flat is carpeted throughout (laughs) which is horrible, oh my God, fit from wall to wall. And, so they probably see me [as British] more than I do, but I just, I think I just went with the flow, I didn't notice the transition from one to the other, if there is a transition. (Participant 23, female, 37 years old)

The above extract, however, alludes to the fact that learning the culture may not be enough for someone to become 'fully British'; being ethnically similar does play a part as well ("in my appearance I don't look like a Brit"). An assumption permeating the interviews was that being considered culturally and ethnically similar (white European, American or Australian, for instance) positions someone 'closer' to Britishness. This positioning draws on representations of Britishness as an ethno-cultural identity and on associated constructions of difference exemplified in representations of immigration. The moral order of this positioning has to do with entitlements of making claims of similarity towards Britishness. Participant 49, coming from Lebanon, would not define himself as English. He thinks that this would be absurd and would not make sense to other people. The ethnic representation of Britishness, equated with Englishness in this extract, positions him as fundamentally different such that his identity cannot be altered. Here, Britishness is not something that one can become but something that one is (this point will be further elaborated in section 6.3.1, p. 146). In other words, his position does not allow him to make similarity claims towards Britishness. On the other hand, Participant 34, a white naturalised citizen originating in the U.S.A., seems to have more rights towards this form of symbolic inclusion. These contradictory views are evident in the following quotes:

This is strange, like, you're English now, you know? But you are not. You are not looking English. Your language is not English. Your accent, I mean, you speak your English, but if someone asks you, you know, where you're from, if you say 'English', I see myself [like] I'm silly, you know? The other one will start to think, 'oh, my God, he's very stupid'. He thinks I'm stupid believing I'm English; [he will think] he's not, he's looking fucking Arabic or Spanish or Italian. (Participant 49, male, 25 years old)

I'm comfortable [in the UK] and it's also a place that, because of my
background, I am quite safe. So, I'm not black. You know, or, you know, or in
France I'm not Arab, I'm, you know, I'm safe. You know, as I'm not in a position
where I'm going to be excluded. (Participant 34, female, 37 years old)

These different positionings mark the distinction between elite and non-elite migrants, which will be further elaborated later in this chapter. The former are objectified in the image of the white, Western and skilled migrant, while the latter are objectified in the image of the poor migrant or asylum seeker who comes from a developing country.

This distinction between different types of migrants and the viability of their claims to similarity was most evident in the ways participants talked about issues of integration and immigration. While immigration and integration have been linked together in the current political discourse on social cohesion, some of the participants positioned themselves outside the scope of this debate. They did not consider themselves immigrants, nor did they think that integration debates in Britain concerned them in any way. This suggests that they saw themselves as similar while positioning other migrants as different. The following extract by Participant 37 is an argument in favour of making the naturalisation process more accessible to the 'people for whom it has been designed'. The Bangladeshi woman without personal income and with poor IT skills exemplifies the objectification of this group of people. It is implied that these people constitute the epitome of the immigrant, or, to put it differently they constitute the prototype of this category (Rosch, 1978). Thus, the participant is also implicitly arguing about the definition of the immigrant category by arguing about which types of people constitute its prototype and which elements make up its essential, defining features (Billig, 1987). Immigrants here epitomise difference on several levels: they are underprivileged, in economic and educational terms, and are also culturally different. At the same time, Participant 37 positions herself as 'hardly an immigrant' because, as an American, she can easily 'relate' to the English. As in the interviews with citizenship officers, immigrants are constructed here as people who lack resources and are in need of British hospitality. Although they are more in need, it is implied that they are less able to integrate because of their cultural difference.

P37: I mean, I think there are two things I would say. One is, who is this
process directed towards? Is it directed towards people who have lived here for
a long time however they first came here?
E: Such as yourself?

P37: Well, not particularly myself because it's easy for me, I mean I'm very hugely integrated, I mean I'm hardly an immigrant, partly because that's just the way Americans and the English relate, I'm thinking about the Bangladeshi woman who's been living in East London for ten years, whose husband was British but she wasn't and she's here by right of his passport, not her own. And she, quite reasonably, lives here, wishes to become a UK citizen and I can't see how this process [naturalisation] is for her, but it should be. I think there's sort of lack of cultural sensitivity, if you like, from people who are coming from different cultures. Different IT levels of awareness for example. I think the cost of it is prohibiting for some groups, not short of a thousand quid, to get your nationality and a passport. I think some people would argue, well people receive a lot of benefits by coming here and this is a bit of payback for them. I just think the process is very expensive and I think it disfranchises people for whom this process might have been designed. (Participant 37, female, 58 years old)

In the interviews, the epitome of the immigrant, the immigrant par excellence, emerged as the disadvantaged asylum seeker who has difficulty integrating. Being an immigrant was constructed in opposition to being British, because the image of the immigrant was tantamount to the image of difference. Having lived in the UK for many years, some respondents did not want to be categorised as immigrants; they negotiated their position within this representational field. This is exemplified by one of the participants who was born in China but has lived in the UK since she was very young. The participant defined herself predominantly as British even before acquiring the British citizenship. However, it has been a struggle for her to be accepted as British. In the extract that follows she describes her experience of being excluded from the definition of Britishness and her efforts to be recognised.

I mean, my old name, previous name was [...], it's a lovely name in Chinese, but it doesn't work in English. It's not feminine, it's not elegant, it's different from others. Then I thought, I think I have to change it just for the sake of getting good jobs. And also I did study in A-level as well, there was a study on discrimination. So there's two CVs, same education, and there's one called, for example, Mohamed Abudu or something and the other one is John Smith, for example. And then, see the management, they would select John Smith rather than Mohamed Abudu or something, which is because of the name and your ethnicity. And I think, if I apply for a British passport and change my name, it would be easier for me. But then in a way, I still feel I'm British, but people don't accept it in that aspect. (Participant 50, female, 20 years old)

Comparing herself to the 'norm' this participant 'lacks' Britishness because she has Chinese heritage. She is being positioned as 'other' by representations that define Britishness as an ethnic identity. The ethnic representations of Britishness do not allow her to position herself as 'fully British'; in other words, this identity position does not seem to be available to her ('I still feel I'm British, but people don't accept it in that aspect'). The participant experiences this as a form of exclusion and in order to be included, to be recognised as British, she changed her name and applied for British citizenship – a strategy that social identity theorists have termed 'social mobility' (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In making efforts to become 'more British', she is in a way 'acting through' the dichotomising and exclusionary representations of Britishness.

In the following quotation, the same participant argues that she 'feels like an outsider' because representations of Britishness and immigration, as well as the institutionalised practices of naturalisation, position her in the same group as immigrants. This is again an instance of misrecognition. The social representations of Britishness that position her as 'other' are still at play here. However, in line with Duveen's (1993) framework, the assimilatory ethnic representation of Britishness constructs a range of identity positions that can potentially be taken on depending on the ethnic background and level of assimilation of migrants. Thus, although the ethnic representation of Britishness poses significant constraints on her position towards Britishness, it still leaves room for negotiation of her inclusion. The participant does not challenge the ethnic representation of Britishness per se, but in order to negotiate her position in Britain, she discusses the moral order of the naturalised citizen position (see also Andreouli, 2010). Like other new citizens who were interviewed, she draws on representations of immigrants as ungrateful abusers of the immigration system to de-legitimise other migrants, while asserting her own entitlement towards Britishness. In other words, by using the 'bad immigrant' category, which was substantially employed by citizenship officers (see Chapter 5), and distancing herself from it, she is able to position herself as similar to Britishness. In the following extract, she draws a line between assimilated naturalised citizens like herself (who are 'as good as British') and non-assimilated, exploitative new citizens (who deserve neither Britishness nor British citizenship).

> It shouldn't be tougher for me because I was growing up here. It's like my own country, I have to go through the same process as other people [...] This is my country. I think it's my country, you know? It's not fair! Why should I be tested? I know all the norms and values. You know, you don't have to be tested to prove you can be the citizen. To myself without the passport or with it, it doesn't make a difference. You know? I *belong* here. That's what I feel like, that's what

I believe. [...] I can understand it. It's for the security reasons. You know? They want to limit the immigration numbers because they have too many foreigners [...] In the nationalisation the other day, I felt I'm an outsider. I don't know, it's a strange feeling, it's like looking at those people in the ceremony, I feel, hold on a minute, I'm a British no matter if I'm applying for it, I'm British, it won't make a difference [...] I think in English, I speak English, you know, but then, I'm not against those people, but I think they have got, not that we don't have the same norms and values... I don't know, if you're looking at them, you think, do they actually deserve to be a British citizen? [...] [In order to be British] you have to follow the rules and, you know, the traditional views of this country. But, then those people don't actually communicate with you, that's the reason. I may just be judgmental, I don't know. [...] I heard stories, but I don't know if they're true or not. It's like the test they pay for the people working in the centres, so if they're same race and then they roughly look the same and they pay you like 300 pounds for those people to do it for you. (Participant 50, female, 20 years old)

Overall, naturalised citizens employed similar representations of immigration as the citizenship officers. As shown in this section, they made reference to both 'good immigrants' who are in need, and 'bad immigrants' who take advantage of British hospitality. Compared to citizenship officers, however, this distinction was not as central in their accounts. Nevertheless, the image of the 'bad immigrant' served to highlight participants' commitment to Britain and, consequently, their entitlement to stay in the country and naturalise. On the other hand, the representation of the 'good immigrant' allowed participants to position themselves as more privileged and 'more British'[35].

Representations of immigration, therefore, contain constructions of ethno-cultural similarity and difference. These representations, as well as ethnic representations of Britishness posed constraints on the level of belonging that participants were able to claim in the UK. But, this 'moral order' can also be contested. As the last extract shows, the definition of categories is never settled; people can re-negotiate their position by arguing about the definition of categories.

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[35] This latter position resonates with what can be called the position of the 'elite migrant', who originates in a developed country and is seen as being easily integrated and having skills which allow him/her to contribute to the economy. This is the type of migrant who is also easily allowed entry into the UK in the first place (see section 6.3.2, p. 152).

6.3 Positioning and immigration management

6.3.1 Earning citizenship: On 'being' and 'having'

As with citizenship officers, the discourse of earned citizenship was also employed by naturalised citizens. Participants argued that making a contribution (to the economy mainly, but also in other spheres of life) was an important criterion for being entitled to become British. Although, on the surface, earned citizenship seems to be based on a civic conceptualisation of national belonging, as it defines membership on the basis of participation, it is not completely detached from an ethnic conceptualisation of the British nation. On the contrary, it perpetuates a system of 'inherited inequality' (Shachar, 2007), because it is grounded in the idea that people who do not have a birthright to British citizenship should be treated differently than people who do.

Within the earned citizenship storyline, employed by both public policy and lay people, contribution to the economy serves, in a way, as a compensation for not being British by birth or by origin. This is the reason why earned citizenship places the assessment of migrants' contribution in the heart of the system. The emphasis on assessment of contribution, embedded in the earned citizenship process, was seen in two different ways in the interviews. Some new citizens saw naturalisation as recognition of their contribution to the country which allowed them to further participate in the society. However, the scrutiny embedded in the process was seen by other participants as something which questioned what they took for granted: that they were already part of the society and that they had been contributing to the economy. On the one hand, the emphasis on assessment suggests that citizenship is an achievement (like passing a very difficult exam); while on the other hand, it is based on a priori mistrust, on the assumption that migrants need to be scrutinised.

Furthermore, earned citizenship draws on a discourse of hospitality which defines the relation of the British nation ('hosts') with the migrants ('guests'). These relations of hospitality between Britain and migrants are based on a reciprocity norm which suggests that migrants pay something back in return for what Britain offers them. As the analysis of the interviews with citizenship officers has shown, earning citizenship through contribution is seen not only as a benefit to the country but also as a sign of gratitude on the part of migrants. This idea draws on the ethnic representation of nations and the notion that the political community is aligned with the national community. When the naturalisation process unsettles this alignment, a balance is re-established through a 'give-and-take' process.

The distinction between the birthright and the earned right of citizenship is key in understanding the discourses of naturalised citizens. This distinction is exemplified in the quotation below. Participant 38 argues that in order to earn the right to citizenship, or even stay in the country, one has to contribute to the economy. Moreover, the participant argues that not being born in the country disqualifies someone from having a say regarding who has the right to stay in the country and who does not ("It's not your right to say, I suppose if you're not born here"). On the other hand, however, she also argues that making a contribution entitles someone to stay in the UK. In other words, within the earned citizenship discourse, there is an asymmetry between British-born citizens, whose entitlements are unquestioned, and migrants, whose contribution has to be assessed in order to become British. Contribution to the economy is, thus, reparation for not being from the UK.

> I don't think it's unfair to expect people to do the test, I think thirty-five, or thirty-four pounds, whatever it is, is quite expensive. But, you know, the whole process is ridiculously expensive. But then, you know, it's, I suppose you're paying your right to... [...] I think that, well, I think if you've been living here for a few years and you've kind of done your time then you, say you have earned the right to stay [...] I don't know, I think as in any country, if you are living there, if you're contributing, if you're, you know, then yeah, I suppose you do [have the right to stay]. Maybe not. It's not your right to say, I suppose if you're not born here, but then if you have made you contribution and then, yeah, I suppose it is... (Participant 38, female, 32 years old)

This distinction between British-born or native British citizens and naturalised British citizens suggests that the earned citizenship discourse is permeated by an essentialistic view of national identity. It can further be argued that this discourse draws on a deeply held distinction between 'being' and 'having' as two different modes of identity. Identity can be something that one 'is' essentially, or it can be something that one 'obtains' but can never fully become part of one's being. Erick Fromm's (1997) analysis of this distinction, albeit within a different framework[36], is useful here. For Fromm, 'being' and 'having' are two distinct modes of existence, two different ways of relating to the world. The former is an 'authentic', even 'natural', way of existing in the world, while the latter is a form of owning rather than a 'real' or essential identity. Applying this to citizenship, it can be argued that being British by origin makes

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[36] Fromm's book is a critique of capitalism and consumerism which are driven by the unauthentic 'having' mode.

someone 'really British', while obtaining the British citizenship is not seen as an 'authentic' identity but only as a possession.

It follows that what one *has* can be lost, and is thus ephemeral, while what one *is* provides a stable core identity that cannot, by definition, be removed or changed. Therefore, the two modes of existence offer different levels of security to the individual: "The anxiety and insecurity engendered by the danger of losing what one has are absent in the being mode. If *I am who I am* and not what I have, nobody can deprive me or threaten my security and my sense of identity... the danger of losing is inherent in having" (Fromm, 1997, p. 90, emphasis in original). Such feelings of insecurity were expressed in the interviews with naturalised citizens especially when they described their immigration histories. The position of the immigrant is deeply precarious as migrants are commonly unwanted, or at least, potentially unwanted. The extract below illustrates this position. Participant 22, by being 'well-behaved' and playing by the rules, tries to make sure that his right to be in the country will not be taken away from him.

> ...You should understand this, as long as you are in this country [and] you stay off crime, then you're fine. And as long as you're in crime then it's hard for you to become a British, so and I'm the kind of person [that] I'm not, I'm never found around crime, crime scene. I don't want to be found and I don't want to get myself involved into any of that. So, I knew I was gonna get accepted [as a citizen] cos I've never done anything wrong in this country. I always make sure I never get myself involved into any trouble and I always advise my own family, my little family, my wife and kids, that they always have to stay away from trouble in this place. The minute you get yourself into trouble, they've messed up your whole life. So, I know that for sure. [...] The most important thing is you shouldn't have a criminal record. Once you have a criminal record it's over...
> (Participant 22, male, 23 years old)

Owing to this insecurity on the part of migrants, the process of acquiring citizenship was an effort to secure their presence in the UK. Participants were, in fact, aware of the increasingly stricter immigration controls which, they thought, could in the future threaten their residency status in the UK. In other words, they saw themselves as (potentially) unwanted. Citizenship was a way to solidify their right to be in Britain, as Participant 31 below explains. Acquiring the 'right to be here' was mentioned by many participants as a principal reason for applying for naturalisation. Gillbertson and Singer (2003) refer to this as 'protective citizenship' because it serves to protect migrants' right to stay in the country (see also Leitner & Ehrkamp, 2006, for similar findings in Germany and U.S.A.). Citizenship in this case signifies a positioning shift from an

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unwanted resident to a legitimate and entitled one who has an irrevocable 'right to be here'.

> I think, probably [I applied for citizenship] just cos I can. I mean, I know that sounds a bit silly, given that it costs so much (laughs), but what I had in mind was, I live here and I need to live here and I can currently live here on what I've got, but you never know what's going to happen in the future, you know, if some really right wing government gets in and starts making different rules, you know, it would be better to just get it, while I can... (Participant 31, female, 36 years old)

It could be argued that naturalisation (as implied by the term itself) is a process of moving from a state of 'having' to a state of 'being'. However, as shown in the previous section, the ethnic representation of Britishness means that naturalised citizens are distinguished from native or British-born citizens. Indeed, a small minority of participants did not see their place in the UK as completely secure even after naturalisation. Participant 49 below, a former asylum seeker, expressed, during the interview, his appreciation for being in the UK and being protected by the British state. British citizenship gave him security and optimism for the future. However, in the extract below, he argues that his citizenship can be easily revoked because 'they gave it to him and they can take it back'. This quotation exemplifies the distinction between 'being' and 'having'; the former is part of who we are, while the latter is given and, thus, can also be taken away from us. Consequently, being British by naturalisation is only a 'paper'; it makes someone 'British by name' only.

> P49: [I plan to stay in the country] if they accept me to stay here.
> E: You are a British citizen now.
> P49: Yeah, but, you know, they give to me, they can take it back.
> E: Do you think they might do that?
> P49: Why not? [...] I always ask myself. OK, they give to me this paper to protect me, I appreciate that, but anytime they can take it back. But, I'm not going to do anything dirty, like crime or something. (Participant 49, male, 25 years old)

It follows that naturalised citizens, to a certain extent, still saw themselves as migrants or 'foreigners', albeit with more rights to be in the UK[37]. The move from 'non-British' to 'British', as well as the move from 'migrant' to 'citizen', is not a straightforward transition

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[37] Citizenship officers also approached naturalised citizens through representations of immigration (see Chapter 5).

of acquiring one's citizenship certificate; it is also mediated by representations of similarity and difference. Furthermore, migrants are not a uniform category. Different types of migrants have different rights and positions in the UK. In this regard, it will be shown in the following section that the distinction between elite and non-elite migrants is a fundamental one and that this positioning is associated with representations of the 'West' and its relation with the 'Rest'.

6.3.2 The 'West' and the 'Rest': The meaning of British citizenship in the context of a hierarchical system of nation-states

Processes of inclusion and exclusion do not only operate on the symbolic level of constructions of similarity and difference. When it comes to immigration, managing otherness is also an institutionalised process which takes the form of various space management techniques. The symbolic aspect of boundary construction has to do with discourses of fitting in which demarcate 'who belongs where'. Physical borders, taking the form of immigration controls and visa requirements, regulate formal inclusion and exclusion by defining entitlements and rights of access. As Dixon and Durrheim (2000) argue, 'who am I' is often equivalent to 'where am I'. In the interviews, where one is and where one can enter were salient markers of classification. Indeed, through differentiated visa requirements, immigration controls take part in a positioning process by making a clear distinction between welcomed (and trusted) and non-welcomed (and mistrusted) migrants. The former have the right to travel while the latter are forced to be immobile. Within this context, the most salient aspect of citizenship in the interviews with naturalised citizens was acquiring the British passport which gives rights of free movement.

Almost all the participants in this study referred to the passport as one, or often the principal, reason that made them decide to naturalise. On a superficial level, this appears to be an instrumental use of citizenship. Certainly, many participants made a distinction between the passport as a practical issue and as an official top-down identification, and their everyday lives and identities. However, although the practical advantages of naturalisation in terms of the right to travel freely within the European Union and elsewhere were prevalent, the passport was not just a practical matter. It also acquired a symbolic significance in the interviews. It represented freedom of mobility and accessibility. As Bauman argues, "freedom has come to mean above all freedom of choice, and choice has acquired, conspicuously, a spatial dimension" (1998, p. 121).

Many of the participants of this study had been forced to be immobile and had encountered difficulties passing through immigration controls. This was construed as a devaluing and exclusionary experience for most interviewees. The very practice of going through immigration controls and visa applications positioned them as 'others' to the West. It was also a widely held view among the interviewees that the UK is becoming increasingly stricter on immigration. In fact, participants were familiar with the storyline that migrants move to Britain to abuse the welfare state – a storyline that was adopted by citizenship officers (see previous chapter). Within this narrative, migrants are positioned as 'unwanted guests' and as a burden to the economy. The following quotation shows how space management, as practised by immigration controls, creates a dichotomy between the 'West' and the 'Rest' and also between wanted and unwanted migrants, keeping 'others' spatially confined.

> If you're carrying a Syrian passport, you're a young man, and you wanna go to Europe or States or Australia, Canada, whichever Western country, they will reject you because they know most likely you go and won't come back. And obviously Western countries they don't want that. They don't want people, you know, they have to have strict rules to keep you away from them and that's, I think that's a normal thing to do but, at the same time, it's not that fair, but understandable. That the Western countries they have certain rules to... because when you arrive here, you know, there's lots of people arriving in this country, lots of migrants and, you know, they have problems with the migrants, you know, no integration, and, you know, people come and ask for benefits. (Participant 45, male, 35 years old)

In light of this, the passport signified a new position associated with a new set of rights. More than inclusion in the British society, the passport symbolised a broader type of 'inter-national inclusion', which expands beyond national borders and allows for international mobility. The passport marked a positioning shift from an unwanted migrant to a welcomed traveller (see Brettell, 2006, for similar findings among U.S. migrants). It represented social recognition and a 'status upgrade' in the global class hierarchy that is increasingly based on the criterion of mobility and rights of access[38].

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[38] Indeed, some scholars see free movement as a basic right and the restriction of movement as diminishing a person's freedom (Bauman, 1998; Torresi, 2010; van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2002) and as a form of entrapment (Jansen, 2009), or even a new form of 'transnational racism' (Castles, 2005). Mobility has also been described as an essential feature of human life: "Human beings are, as the old definition goes, featherless bipeds – that is, creatures whose form of life is in part constituted by the ability to move from place to place in a certain characteristic way, not only through the aid of tools that we have made but with our very own bodies. Human beings like moving about and dislike being deprived of mobility. An anthropomorphic being who, without

In the beginning I only had two wishes which were: one, to speak English fluently to the level of the native speaker and the other one was to have a British passport. For me it was like a symbol of freedom [...] I mean Russia and Belarus particularly are quite poor countries and after the Soviet Union collapsed, there was this whole Western and American way kind of penetrating the country [...] the Western values became very prominent and I guess one of the values is that, you know, you see these people who travel from one place to another which was impossible for most of the people. Like my dad, he's never been abroad. The Soviet Union has been completely cut off, so going to Europe was, is such a big thing. [...] When you can't have it and you really want it and I can't say that I wanted the lifestyle, but I didn't see why if I wanted I don't have an option of doing it, because to go anywhere you need to get a visa and that's what killed me. (Participant 44, female, 28 years old)

Furthermore, the UK, as part of the West, was seen in the interviews through an imagery of progress and opportunity; it was seen as a place of prosperity and advancement, as well as a secure place for those fleeing prosecution. Having access to it meant that one has access to all the benefits that this world can offer. As such, for some interviewees, holding the British passport was a matter of pride, a personal achievement owing to becoming part of an 'elite Western club'.

You have to apply for the visa and once you apply for the visa it's like people will do the check on you. Because, obviously, it's just a routine check but they're showing that like, you know, there's no trust in it. But, if you hold the British passport, they say OK, they are fine [because] the British people, they're not going to do anything bad to the country or they're not going to settle here for like whatever. So, they're free to travel, whenever they want it. So, I think it's a privilege. (Participant 35, male, 26 years old)

When I came out of the ceremony, there was a feeling of relief, because becoming a British citizen makes your life easier. If you go to any country, any other country and they ask you where you're from, [and you say] British citizen, it's like they give you more respect, I don't understand why, but they just give you more respect... (Participant 52, male, 18 years old)

But, while some people are forced to be immobile, others are free to travel, since the right to mobility is selectively granted to certain types of migrants. The permeability of national borders is dependent upon various classification criteria (such as being an EU

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disability, chose never to move from birth to death would be hard to view as human" (Nussbaum, 1992, p. 218).

citizen and being a skilled or unskilled worker), which create a set of categories of different migrants based on their (un-)desirability. Above all, rights to mobility are based on the quality of relationships between different nation-states. Not being able to enter a country suggests that one is a priori mistrusted, while being allowed entry means that one is a priori trusted. It can, thus, be argued that nowadays the passport has become the objectification of inter-national relations.

Thus, the status of British citizenship in the eyes of the respondents depended on where participants came from and on how they compared their previous position to their new one. While for some participants, the British citizenship and the passport were symbols of freedom, safety and opportunity, for others they were only a matter of convenience. In the following extract, the respondent compares himself with other migrants who, he argues, appreciate citizenship more. This links back to the 'prototype' immigrant, exemplified in the image of the asylum seeker, as a poor, uneducated person in need of Britain's philanthropy (see section 6.2.3, p. 141). For the participant below, becoming British does not make any difference to his life and his position in the UK. It is seen as a practicality only. While he jokes about becoming British himself, he argues that asylum seekers would see it as an 'achievement'.

> Before the ceremony I completely was, like, oh my God another, you know, hurdle, hassle [...] and I was like completely joking about it to everybody before and people also joked about it to me, "oh, are you going to, you know, declare your allegiance to the Queen?" [sarcastic tone] [...] And then, when I went there and I saw people from, you know, different parts of the world, and, you know, for example people from Iraq, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, you know, a lot of people, those people probably didn't have even a country, you know, they were asylum seekers and for them to reach that level, was probably a long and hard journey than me who had a fairly easy journey to that level, you know, and for them probably it is quite an achievement, you know, and now, you know, at least they can say that they belong to a country now, you know. And then, for them it is something for a celebration [...] I only went along because it didn't mean anything to me, it was just another thing to do... (Participant 43, male, 43 years old)

6.4 Summary and conclusions

This chapter has explored the main themes of the interviews with new British citizens. The focus has been on how British citizenship and Britishness were represented and the positions of the participants in relation to these representations.

Participants were generally located between the position of the 'stranger' and the position of the 'homecomer' (Schutz, 1964a, 1964b). By being 'strangers' in the UK, they had to accommodate new ways of thinking into their symbolic 'toolkit'. Many participants, in different degrees, experienced this as an 'identity rupture' whereby they had to re-assess the knowledge that they had taken for granted in the past. As part of this process, respondents had to also re-position themselves towards the representations and values associated with their countries of origin. This complex process of negotiation was evident in the ways respondents articulated their position in relation to 'integration dilemmas'. These dilemmas were exemplified in the distinction between the 'West' and the 'Rest'. Participants drew on this opposition to make sense of their experiences in the UK and to negotiate their position within British society and culture. The 'West', epitomised in the UK, was seen a place of progress, prosperity and freedom, while the 'Rest' was everything that the West was not: poor, underdeveloped, unsafe and conservative. As was shown, however, Britain was not solely constructed in a positive progress framework, but was 'dilemmatically' represented as both a place of progress and a place of moral decline compared to the participants' countries of origin[39]. For new citizens, ideas of British openness and development were counterbalanced by the image of Britain as a country of moral decline, evident in the country's youth culture. Because of this, participants, in different degrees, experienced an 'identity dilemma', exemplified in the clash between the moral order associated with their position within British culture and the moral order of their position in relation to the culture of their countries of origin. Thus, becoming 'more British' was both something enriching and something that could pose a threat to their religious and/or cultural identity. Britishness was something that participants aspired to, symbolising openness and tolerance, and something they resisted. In order to negotiate their identity in the UK, as well as their relationship with their country of origin, participants negotiated their position in relation to both these opposing themes, making claims of both similarity towards and difference from Britishness. Figure 4 below illustrates this dilemma and its implications for identity.

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[39] This dilemma is very similar to the representation of Britishness by citizenship officers (Chapter 5). However, the meaning of decline took different meanings in the two data sets. For citizenship officers, decline mainly signified economic decline largely attributed to immigration, while for naturalised citizens decline was defined in moral terms and was associated with negative representations of the West.

Figure 4. Central identity dilemma in representations of Britishness by Naturalised Citizens

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┌─────────────────────┐              ┌─────────────────────┐
│   Prosperity &      │◄───────────► │   Moral Decline     │
│   Openness          │              │                     │
└─────────────────────┘              └─────────────────────┘
      ╱         ╲                          ╱         ╲
     ╱           ╲                        ╱           ╲
┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐         ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐
│ Identity │ │Assertion │         │ Identity │ │Assertion │
│Empowerment│ │of        │         │Threat &  │ │of        │
│& Enrichment│ │Similarity│         │Loss      │ │Difference│
└──────────┘ └──────────┘         └──────────┘ └──────────┘
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
It needs to be noted, however, that claims of similarity and difference were not just a matter of personal choice. As Duveen (2001) notes, representations precede identities. That is, representations demarcate the positions available to people. In that regard, the ethnic representation of Britishness had a major impact on the way participants positioned themselves in the UK. For most of the participants, belonging in Britain did not mean that they were also part of the British nation. Rather, belonging in British society in a civic way and feeling at home in Britain were distinguished from being 'really British'. In other words, prevalent ethnic representations of Britishness positioned them as outsiders. However, the distinction between 'us' and 'them' was not that straightforward. Representations of Britishness and immigration entail more nuanced ideas about similarity and difference which add complexity to this issue. Some migrants (e.g. white Anglo-Saxon or European) are positioned as 'more similar' than others. Therefore, in order to negotiate their position towards Britishness, participants also had to negotiate their position towards representations of immigration. Thus, a new citizen's position depended not only on how Britishness was 'imagined', but also on how he or she was positioned in relation to representations of immigration. Indeed, being British and being an immigrant in Britain occupy the two opposing poles of a continuum. A naturalised citizen going through the citizenship process, which is designed for migrants, can be a no-win situation because in order to be British, one cannot be an immigrant. However, although the 'prototypes' of the British and the immigrant categories are shaped by dominant representations, they can still become a matter of argumentation (Billig, 1987).

It has been further argued in this chapter that positioning processes operate on both the symbolic, or representational, level and on a tangible institutional level. As such, immigration is an area where the politics of space and the politics of otherness are directly linked: "if it is acknowledged that cultural difference is produced and maintained

in a field of power relations in a world always already spatially interconnected, then the restriction of immigration becomes visible as one of the main means through which the disempowered as kept this way" (Gupta & Ferguson, 1992, p. 17).

The institutional level of positioning takes the form of immigration controls and naturalisation legislation which define rights of entry and criteria of membership. In terms of naturalisation, it has been argued in this chapter that earned citizenship policies, which emphasise the assessment of the contribution of migrants, are based on the distinction between the birthright and the earned right of citizenship. In fact, civic participation and contribution, as preconditions for earned citizenship, can be said to compensate for a naturalised citizen's lack of British ethnic origins. Through economic contribution one can earn the right to be a legitimate member of the society, an entitlement granted without question to the British by birth. This discourse draws on a deeper distinction between 'being' and 'having' as two different types of relationship with Britishness, which was also identified in the interviews with the citizenship officers. One can *be British* by virtue of being born British, but having earned the right to citizenship is not the same. Rather, naturalising refers to *having a British identity*. This identity is not construed as a stable or essential part of the self, but as something that can be acquired or gained and, thus, can also be lost. Jodelet (1991) has also identified these two modes of being in her research. In her study of mental illness in a small French community, she found that mental illness was constructed as an essence rather than as something that one has and can be treated. Therefore, the being-having distinction of identity modes can take different forms in different contexts. In every case, however, it serves a protective function, constructing an unbridgeable, essentialised boundary between those who 'have' and those who 'are'.

Concerning the second aspect of institutionalised positioning processes, immigration controls, they mainly refer to issues of spatial mobility and accessibility. The differential entitlements given to different types of migrants constitute the moral order of this positioning of migrants. The main distinction here is between elite and non-elite migrants. Within the current hierarchical nation-state system (Castles, 2005), a non-elite migrant, originating in a poor or unstable country does not have access to the prosperous Western life. Under these conditions, the British passport, which allows unrestricted entry to the affluent Western world, became, for some interviewees, a symbol of freedom and accessibility, or, in other words, a sign of social recognition. It marked a positioning shift from an unwelcomed immigrant to a welcomed traveller. On the other hand, elite migrants, originating in developed Western countries, constitute an

educated 'transnational elite' and can be defined by their 'spatial autonomy' (Beck, 2007; Weiss, 2005). Bauman (1998) has captured this new form of social classification by making a distinction between tourists and vagabonds. The former are allowed to travel freely and are welcomed, while the latter are resented because they are seen as an economic and social burden to their 'host' countries. In light of this, the passport can be conceptualised as the objectification of social relations. It is an institutionalised positioning tool which defines the level of trustworthiness of its holder. For instance, a European passport is a signifier of relations of trust, while a non-European passport stands for relations of mistrust between a migrant and a European state. Figure 5 illustrates the positioning of elite and non-elite migrants on both the representational and institutional levels.

Figure 5. Key positions of Naturalised Citizens on representational and institutional levels

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  ┌─────────────────┐              ┌──────────────────────┐
  │ 'Elite' Migrants │              │ 'Non-elite' Migrants │
  └─────────────────┘              └──────────────────────┘
         /    \                            /       \
  ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐      ┌──────────┐  ┌──────────┐
  │ Ethno-   │ │ Mobility │      │ Ethno-   │  │Immobility│
  │ cultural │ │          │      │ cultural │  │          │
  │Similarity│ │          │      │Difference│  │          │
  └──────────┘ └──────────┘      └──────────┘  └──────────┘

  Representational level

                                                Institutional level
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
As the figure shows, there is an intersection between symbolic representations of immigration (containing ideas about similarity and difference) and tangible immigration policies and practices (which define rights of mobility based mainly on skilled migration regimes). Migrants are positioned on both these levels, with the most fundamental distinction being that between elite and non-elite migrants. On the whole, it can be argued that constructions of similarity and difference, which target particular types of migrants, are translated into and enhanced by actual bordering mechanisms.

Chapter 7. The Perspective of Public Policy

7.1 Overview of Chapter 7

This chapter discusses the official public policy approach on naturalisation. It focuses on the governmental discourse on earned citizenship as expressed in four policy documents selected for analysis using the ALCESTE software package:

I. "The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System" (Home Office Border and Immigration Agency, February 2008)

II. "The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Analysis of Consultation Responses" (UK Border Agency, July 2008)

III. "The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Government Response to Consultation" (UK Border Agency, July 2008)

IV. "Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship" (UK Border Agency, July 2009)

The chapter is divided in four parts. The first part describes ALCESTE and explains how it can be used for the analysis of textual data within a social representations framework. The second part of the chapter outlines the different analyses which have been conducted and provides an overview of the lexical classes produced by ALCESTE. By modifying the parameters of ALCESTE, three types of analyses were conducted in order to identify both broad and detailed word classes of the policy discourse. The third section is a discussion of the classes identified using exemplary quotations to illustrate the interpretation of themes. The final section of the chapter draws conclusions about the main themes of the official governmental discourse on earned citizenship. It will be overall shown that public policy discourse represents naturalisation in terms of three main themes: immigration reform (which incorporates the subthemes of simplification of the immigration system and border control), immigration impact (which creates a dichotomy between skilled migration as a resource and unskilled migration as a burden) and earned citizenship (which emphasises assessment and penalisation). Objectifying migrants and classifying them in terms of their profitability and trustworthiness are central in this discourse.

7.2 Using ALCESTE for text analysis

ALCESTE (Analyse de Lexèmes Coocurrents dans les Enoncés Simples d'un Texte) was created by Max Reinert (1983) as a method for investigating the distribution of

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vocabulary in a corpus of text. It conducts a statistical analysis of word co-occurrences and is particularly useful for analysing large amounts of textual data.

ALCESTE is based on the assumption that different ways of talking about a topic represent different ways of thinking about the topic (Kronberger & Wagner, 2000). Using word co-occurrences, ALCESTE identifies word classes that signify different forms of discourse about a specific subject. Roure and Reinert (1993, cited in Guérin-Pace, 1998, p. 76) argue that:

> ...in the course of his statement, the speaker occupies a series of personal worlds... [which] impose their own type of vocabulary. Consequently, the statistical study of the distribution of this vocabulary must aim to recover the trace of the 'mental environments' that the speaker has successively occupied, a trace that can be detected in the form of 'lexical worlds'.

Some social representations researchers have used ALCESTE as a tool for identifying clusters of meanings through classes of co-occurring words. Lahlou (1996), for example, in his study of representations of eating, makes a link between semantic classes, which form the basic nuclei of social representations, and lexical classes produced by ALCESTE. Wagner, Kronberger and colleagues (Wagner & Kronberger, 2002b; Wagner, Kronberger, Allum, de Cheveigné, Diego, Gaskell, Heinssen, Midden, Odegaard, Olsson, Rizzo, Rusannen, & Stathopoulou, 2002a) have also used ALCESTE to study perceptions of biotechnology in Europe within a social representations framework, while Hohl and Gaskell (2008) have used it in their study of representations of food risk. Overall, although under-utilised[40], ALCESTE is gaining more ground in social science research and especially in a field that traditionally employs qualitative techniques, i.e. social representations. Still, the analysis conducted by ALCESTE cannot substitute the interpretation of the researcher who has to be able to describe and explain the output in light of other data and knowledge of the field.

ALCESTE works by first reducing the vocabulary of the corpus in root-forms. This process is called lemmatisation and allows ALCESTE to analyse all expressions of a root word as if they were one word – these are called 'reduced forms'. Also, ALCESTE categorises the words of the text according to their grammatical function. According to this classification, some words are used in the analysis, others are supplementary,

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[40] This is partly because ALCESTE is only available in French and its English dictionary is not as elaborate as its French dictionary.

while others, like prepositions, are excluded from the analysis. This first step of analysis constructs the dictionary of the analysis.

ALCESTE divides the text into two types of units used for the analysis. The 'initial context units' (ICUs) are predetermined by the researcher and usually refer to book chapters, documents, newspaper articles and so on. In this study the initial context units are the four policy documents selected for the analysis. The second type of units is the 'elementary contextual units' (ECUs) which are constructed by ALCESTE based on the criteria of punctuation and number of words. After identifying the two types of units, ALCESTE conducts a descending hierarchical classification in order to detect repetitive language patterns (Guérin-Pace, 1998; Kronberger & Wagner, 2000). Starting from the total set of contextual units (CUs)[41] as the first class, ALCESTE partitions the text into two new classes in a way that there is as less overlap between the classes as possible; it then divides the larger of the two new classes into two smaller classes and continues this process until it finds the 'best fitting model'. To do these divisions, ALCESTE constructs an indicator matrix with contextual units in rows and words in columns[42]. It then decomposes the matrix into more classes using a chi-square criterion (for more details, see Kronberger & Wagner, 2000).

Because the size of contextual units may influence the results, ALCESTE conducts two separate preliminary analyses using slightly different sizes of contextual units. If the classes resulting from the two analyses are similar, then it is assumed that the classes are stable. ALCESTE gives the percent of ECUs that are classified in the same classes in both analyses. This is the stability coefficient of the analysis.

The output produced by ALCESTE provides the most typical and atypical words of each class and their chi-square values which represent each word's strength of association with the entire class. It also gives the typical ECUs of each class which can be used for the interpretation of results.

A complementary analysis conducted by ALCESTE is a factor analysis of correspondence on the contingency table cross-tabulating the words and the classes; from this analysis a spatial representation of the results is derived (Guérin-Pace, 1998). Furthermore, ALCESTE conducts more calculations on each class, giving the most specific vocabulary for each class, the most representative ECUs per class, the most

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[41] A contextual unit (CU) corresponds to one or more ECUs within an ICU. A CU is measured by the number of analysed words.

[42] An indicator matrix is a table with 1 if a word is present in a contextual unit and 0 if a word is absent. This means that most cells in the indicator matrix are 0.

frequent strings of words in each class and an ascending hierarchical classification which helps to understand the links between words within a class.

Overall, ALCESTE provides a very rich output that can be used for the interpretation of the classification. It also allows to modify the default parameters of the analysis. In fact, conducting a single analysis in ALCESTE may be misleading because changes in the vocabulary or parameters of the analysis may have an impact on the division of classes. Therefore, it is useful to conduct multiple analyses to check the stability of the classification. For this research, I have conducted a series of analyses modifying the vocabulary of the corpus and the parameters used for the analysis.

7.3 Analysis & overview of results

7.3.1 Preparing the corpus and dictionary of analysis

Before conducting an ALCESTE analysis, the corpus needs to be prepared so that it meets the requirements of the software. Some punctuation marks and symbols, like asterisks, dollar signs and apostrophes, are interpreted differently by ALCESTE and interfere with the analysis and segmentation of the text. I checked and removed these symbols from the text. Also, I turned capitalised words into lower case words because ALCESTE excludes capitalised words from the analysis. Acronyms were also turned into their original forms. Moreover, I used underscores to link sets of words which have a particular meaning, so that ALCESTE treats them as single words. For example, I changed the words 'European Union' to 'European_Union' and 'European Economic Area' to 'European_Economic_Area'. To decide which words to link together with underscores, I used the ALCESTE output which shows which words tend to appear together in the text. Furthermore, because ALCESTE rests on the assumption that different ways of thinking about an object represent different ways of talking about an object, it is important to homogenise the text. Since changing the vocabulary may interfere with the analysis, I did not change words that were synonyms but only words that mean the exact same thing. For example, the words 'UK' and 'United Kingdom' were homogenised and turned into the word 'Britain'[43].

Finally, I checked every word in the dictionary that ALCESTE had constructed for the analysis. Because the English dictionary of ALCESTE is not as good as the French one, I had to correct mistakes in the dictionary and re-run the analysis.

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[43] Although 'UK' and 'United Kingdom' are not synonymous with 'Britain', the word 'Britain' in this analysis stands for the whole of the UK which is the scope of public policy regarding citizenship.

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7.3.2 Default parameters

I kept a protocol of all the changes I made to my original text (e.g. underscoring sets of words) and I also conducted an analysis, using the default parameters, after every change in the vocabulary and text. This allowed me to check the stability of the analysis. The results were overall stable as ALCESTE produced the same five classes in almost all analyses with the default parameters. In order to interpret these results and conduct further analyses by changing the default parameters, I had to select one of versions of the text that had been changed from the original. I chose the version which produced the five word classes that kept re-appearing in my analyses and provided stable results (stability coefficient: 81.03%[44]). Appendix 6 provides the key details of this analysis.

The five classes produced by ALCESTE in this analysis were: 'Immigration impact', 'Stages' (of the citizenship process), 'Consultation', 'Immigration reform' and 'English' (see Appendix 7 for the typical words of each class and the associated chi-square values, and Appendix 8 for the most typical ECUs of each class). Table 8 shows the distribution of ECUs in each class. 'Consultation' and 'English' are the smallest classes, while 'Immigration impact', 'Stages' and 'Immigration reform' are almost equally large with about 24%-29% of all ECUs each.

Table 8. Classes & distribution of ECUs per class (default analysis)

Classes	No of ECUs (% of all ECUs)
Immigration impact	297 (24.48%)
Stages	303 (24.98%)
Immigration reform	362 (29.84%)
Consultation	140 (11.54%)
English	111 (9.15%)

The dendrogram of the Descending Hierarchical Classification produced by ALCESTE shows how the classes were split (Figure 6). The first class that was created was 'Immigration impact', the second was 'Stages', the third was 'Immigration reform' stemming out from the same branch as 'Immigration impact', the fourth was 'Consultation' coming from the same branch as 'Stages' and the fifth one was 'English' belonging in the same group as 'Immigration impact' and 'Immigration reform'. What is important to note from the dendrogram is that the classes 'Consultation' and 'Stages' belong to the same branch, while 'Immigration reform', 'English' and 'Immigration

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[44] The stability coefficient refers to the percentage of Elementary Contextual Units that are classed twice in the same classes in the preliminary analysis that ALCESTE conducts using slightly different context units (see also previous section).

impact' form a different branch. In other words, classes 1, 3 and 5 are more linked with each other and so are classes 2 and 4.

Figure 6. Dedrogram of descending hierarchical classification (Default analysis) [45]

```
1.Immigration imp.    |-----------------------------+
                                                     |---------------+
3.Immigration ref.    |----------------+            |               |
                                       |----------+  |               |
5.English             |----------------+                             |
                                                                     +
2.Stages              |--------------+                               |
                                     |-----------------------------+
4.Consultation        |--------------+
```

7.3.3 Modified parameters

The parameters of the analysis are either pre-determined by default or they are defined by ALCESTE in a way that gives the 'best-fitting' model. However, there are two benefits in changing some of the parameters of the analysis. First, the stability of the analysis can be further checked by seeing whether further analyses produce the same or similar classifications. Secondly, by modifying the parameters (mainly the minimum number of occurrences for the definition of an ECU and the maximum number of terminal classes), we can look for broader or more detailed word classes in the same corpus.

7.3.3.1 Broad classes

In order to look for broader classes, I modified the maximum number of terminal classes. I changed it from ten, which is the default value, to five. This gave me larger classes, some of which were 'mergers' of the more detailed classes described in the previous section. The analysis of the corpus with maximum number of five classes produced three classes: 'Immigration reform', 'Consultation & Stages' and 'Immigration impact' (see Appendix 7 for the typical words of each class and the associated chi-square values and Appendix 8 for the most typical ECUs in each class).

Table 9. Classes & distribution of ECUs per class (maximum terminal classes=5)

Classes	No of ECUs (% of all ECUs)
Immigration reform	367 (30.2%)
Consultation & Stages	541 (44.5%)
Immigration impact	308 (25.3%)

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[45] The numbering of classes refers to the order in which they were classified. So, for instance, Class 1 is the class which was first classified and remained stable (did not divide) during further classifications.

The key details of this analysis were the same as when using the default parameters apart from the number of terminal classes which was five instead of ten (see Appendix 6). The stability coefficient for this analysis was 81.2%.

Figure 7 shows the dendrogram of the Descending Hierarchical Classification produced by ALCESTE. The first class that was created was 'Immigration reform', the second was 'Consultation & Stages' and the third was 'Immigration impact'. The dendrogram also shows that classes 1 and 3 stem from the same branch and are thus, more related, while class 2 'Consultation & Stages', which is also the largest one, is quite independent from the other two.

Figure 7. Dendrogram of descending hierarchical classification (maximum no of terminal classes= 5)

```
1. Immigration reform      |----------------------------+
                                                        |--------------------+
3. Immigration impact      |----------------------------+                    |
                                                                             +
2. Consultation & Stages   |------------------------------------------------+
```

7.3.3.2 Detailed classes

In order to obtain a more detailed analysis of the word classes, I systematically modified the following parameters:

a) Minimum number of occurrences for the definition of an ECU. By changing this parameter, I aimed to conduct a more detailed analysis that would use fewer words per ECU.

b) Length of contextual units that are used for the calculation of the double classification. By modifying the size of the contextual units, I sought to achieve a more detailed analysis of the classes.

c) Maximum number of terminal classes. I increased the maximum number of terminal classes from ten (default value) to twelve to allow ALCESTE to create more classes.

Table 10 below describes the changes in the parameters in the analyses conducted. As the table shows, by changing the parameters, I was able to obtain more classes and have a more detailed view of the data.

Table 10. Analysis using modified parameters (for detailed classes)

	Minimum no of occurrences for definition of ECU	Length of contextual units	Maximum no of final classes	No of classes obtained	Stability coefficient
Analysis 1	4	4	12	4	97%
Analysis 2	6	6	12	5	97%
Analysis 3	8	8	12	7	92%
Analysis 4	10	10	12	6	91%
Analysis 5	12	12	12	7	93%
Analysis 6	14	14	12	9	98%
Analysis 7	16	16	12	8	93%
Analysis 8	18	18	12	8	98%
Analysis 9	22	22	12	8	97%
Analysis 10	25	25	12	8	95%

In the ten analyses of the corpus only two extra classes appeared consistently. In seven out of ten analyses, a class which I have labelled 'Border control' was produced by ALCESTE and was linked with the branch of the classes 'Immigration reform', 'Immigration impact' and 'English'. Also, in five of the analyses, a class, which I have termed 'Penalties', emerged from the same branch as the classes 'Consultation' and 'Stages'.

In order to explore these two complementary themes in this chapter, I will use the results of Analysis 8 (see Appendix 7 for the typical words of each class and the associated chi-square values, and Appendix 8 for the most typical ECUs in each class). This analysis has the advantages of having both a high stability coefficient (98%) and including both the classes 'Border control' and 'Penalties' in its classification. Appendix 6 provides the key details of Analysis 8. Table 11 shows the classes and the percent of ECUs in each class.

Table 11. Classes & distribution of ECUs per class (Analysis 8)

Classes	No of ECUs (% of all ECUs)
Class 1: English	295 (15.9%)
Class 2: Immigration impact	248 (13.4%)
Class 3: Immigration reform	244 (13.1%)
Class 4: Consultation	234 (12.6%)
Class 5: Earned citizenship & local authorities	224 (12.1%)
Class 6: Border control	133 (7.2%)
Class 7: Penalties	95 (5.1%)
Class 8: Stages	384 (20.7%)

Classes 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8 correspond to the same themes identified in the default analysis of ALCESTE. Class 1, 'English' corresponds to Class 5 of the default analysis; Class 2, 'Immigration impact', corresponds to Class 1 of the default analysis; Class 3, 'Immigration reform', corresponds to Class 3 of the default classification; Class 4, 'Consultation' corresponds to Class 4 of the default analysis; Class 8, 'Stages' corresponds to Class 2 of the default analysis. Overall, there were three extra classes in this analysis compared with the default analysis, 'Earned citizenship & local authorities', 'Border control' and 'Penalties'. As mentioned, the classes 'Border control' and 'Penalties' appeared consistently in a series of analyses, which suggests that they are significant and stable. As shown in Figure 8, 'Border control' is linked with 'Immigration reform', while 'Penalties' forms a different branch in the classification along with 'Stages' and 'Consultation'. On the other hand, the third extra class of Analysis 8, 'Earned citizenship & local authorities', did not appear consistently in the other analyses with modified parameters and will be omitted from the discussion of the results. Suffice it to say that this class refers to expanding the role of local authorities in delivering earned citizenship provisions. This theme is incorporated into the larger class 'Immigration impact' in the analysis with broader classes and in the analysis with the default parameters.

Figure 8. Dendrogram of descending hierarchical classification (Analysis 8)

```
1. English        |------------------+
                                     |----------+
2. Impact         |-----------+      |          |
                              |-------+          |
5. Earned & Local |-----------+                 |
                                                 |----------------+
3. Reform         |--------+                     |                |
                           |------------------+                   |
6. Border control |--------+                                      |
                                                                  +
4. Consultation   |--------------+                                |
                                 |--+                             |
8. Stages         |--------------+  |                             |
                                    |-----------------------------+
7. Penalties      |----------------+
```

To sum up, the three types of analyses conducted by ALCESTE using default and modified parameters produced three broad classes ('Immigration reform', 'Immigration impact' and 'Consultation & Stages'), which can be further divided to five more detailed classes ('Immigration impact', 'Stages', 'Consultation', 'Immigration reform', 'English'), which, in turn, by further modifying the parameters, resulted consistently in two more classes ('Border control' and 'Penalties'). The following section will discuss these results starting from the broad classes and moving on to the more detailed ones.

7.4 Discussion of results

7.4.1 Broad classes

As explained above, the three broad lexical classes produced by ALCESTE (when the maximum terminal classes are five) were: 'Immigration reform', 'Immigration impact' and 'Consultation & Stages'.

Class 1, **'Immigration reform'**, refers to the changes in immigration legislation introduced by the government. This class was formed by approximately a third of all ECUs and was more associated with the green paper "The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System", which was the first to outline the new public policy. The most specific words in this class were[46]:

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[46] Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of times each word appears in the class.

border+(44), chang+(40), clear+(63), control+(35), decid+(34), immigration(112), law+(57), legal+(26), legisl+(33), permit+(27), reform+(50), system+(134), framework(26), power+(21), set_out(39), strength+(22), agenc+(18), automat+(17), enforce+(15), entry(22), path+(31), process+(34), single(15), visa+(14), make.(70), biometric+(12), consistent+(14), current+(35), easy+(18), effective+(20), heart(12), identity(10), illegal+(9), issue+(15), look+(16), new(60), point+(46), present+(17), rule+(22), simple+(37), out(16), build.(17), come.(24), deal.(13), put.(13), take.(28), understand.(22), abuse+(14), approach(19), architecture(14), asylum(13), bas+(42), cancel+(6), card+(6), challeng+(11), change+(17), coherent(8), combin+(5), complex+(13), comprehens+(7), confidence(7), country+(30), detail+(15), document+(19), earl+(8), efficien+(8), end+(9), ensur+(30), fast+(5), february(6), fingerprint+(6), foreign+(17), fundamental+(7), interest+(9), introduce+(29)

The idea of change in immigration law is salient in this class. Change is characterised as positive and necessary. The aim is to make the immigration system clearer, more streamlined and easier to understand. The simplification of the system is part of the new 'earned citizenship' regulations outlined in the green paper. Within this framework, all immigration legislation will be replaced by a single legal framework based on the principle that citizenship is a right that has to be earned. Under the earned citizenship provisions of the new system, different categories of migrants will now all fall under three routes to naturalisation or permanent residency: highly skilled and skilled workers, family members, and those in need of protection. Also, there is an effort to define the 'journey to citizenship' in a clear way by having only three distinct stages: temporary residence, probationary citizenship and British citizenship/permanent residency. These stages are in line with the points-based system which determines which migrants have the right to enter and stay in the UK. The newly established UK Border Agency will also handle all immigration matters in an effort to make the system more clear, transparent and efficient.

> The Green Paper sets out details of our plans to simplify the law's current complexity and make it fit for the 21st century. We propose that all existing immigration laws should be replaced with a clear, consistent and coherent legal framework for the control of our borders and management of migration... ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System", p.5)

But, there is another dimension to the simplification process. New legislation aims to make the system not only more streamlined but also more effective. Effectiveness is

defined in this context as stronger border controls which will result in less 'abuse' of the system by illegal migrants and immigration law offenders:

> Our objective is to make our immigration system clearer, more streamlined and easier to understand, in the process reducing the possibilities for abuse of the system, maximising the benefits of migration and putting British values at the heart of the system. ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System", p. 9)

Immigration reform is, thus, linked to more powers in policing the borders and preventing illegal immigration. Such responsibilities are undertaken by the new UK Border Agency. For example, the Agency has the power to automatically deport serious offenders. Furthermore, fingerprint visas for anyone entering the country and identity cards for foreign nationals, which have been the subject of major controversies in the UK, are being introduced. The purpose is to have more control of the people who come in to the country and prevent illegal migration. A typical ECU for this class comes from the following sentence:

> The formation of a new, single Border Force with police-like powers to tackle smuggling and immigration crime, coupled with stronger controls overseas such as fingerprinting of visa applicants, have strengthened the UK border... ("Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship", p. 11)

Words such as 'control', 'power', 'permission', 'deport', 'strength' and 'enforce' are among the typical words of this class, alluding to the idea that immigration reform is as much about simplification and transparency as about strengthening the British borders and making it harder for migrants to enter the UK. This includes tougher immigration controls and more policing to deter 'abuse'. Therefore, there is an exclusionary undertone in this class of keeping types of migrants out of the country – unskilled migrants will not be granted visas, while immigration offenders will be more efficiently deported.

> We will expand our detention capacity and implement powers to automatically deport serious offenders. To prevent illegal immigration, we will introduce the new points based system, introduce compulsory ID cards for foreign nationals who wish to stay in the UK, and introduce large on-the-spot fines for employers who do not make the right checks. ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System", p. 5)

Class 3, **'Immigration impact'**, is related with this class and together they constitute approximately 55% of the ECUs. The most specific words in this class are:

authorit+(55), communit+(47), day+(18), fund+(41), impact+(44), labour(20), local(92), migrat+(66), orient+(21), pressure+(21), service+(72), skill+(38), cohes+(17), countrY+(29), develop+(37), employ+(30), help+(31), market(14), product+(15), alleviate(11), population+(13), pounds(11), short+(20), bring.(22), run.(11), advise+(14), brain(7), co(10), deliver+(17), drain(7), facilitate+(7), fill+(11), govern+(42), health+(14), import+(16), improve+(19), integrat+(34), job+(14), mentor+(8), money(10), office+(15), ordinate+(10), provide+(44), role+(13), sector+(14), social+(12), transit+(16), volunt+(22), send.(10), amount+(7), april(8), assur+(4), attend+(5), avenue(4), award+(8), best(12), bodies(6), born(6), carry+(5), cent(4), ceremon+(4), circular(5), close+(9), committee(8), council+(5), cultur+(5), data(7), department+(14), distribut+(5), empower+(4), enhance+(8), entrepreneurs(4), envisage+(5), evidence(9), example+(14), explore+(7), extend+(13), financ+(9)

Class 3 is anchored mainly in the 2009 consultation "Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship". This document outlines the provision of a points test for progression from temporary residence to probationary citizenship. This document stems directly from the earned citizenship framework and aims to help develop provisions in order to enhance the integration of migrants in the UK:

> One of the key principles of the new earned citizenship system is to encourage cohesion; to help build communities where people get along together, feel empowered, and play an active role. We must therefore ensure that those who have earned the right to, or are on the path to British citizenship are given the support they need to integrate into the community ("Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship", p. 4)

There are two main strands of meanings within this class. The first one has to do with the impact of immigration. This refers mainly to the negative effect of immigration on local communities and welfare. For example, school education and English language provisions for migrant communities are mentioned as extra provisions that local councils need to undertake to accommodate migrants. This class resembles the theme identified in the interviews with citizenship officers who, arguing for the duty of migrants to contribute to the economy, claimed that migrants do not contribute as much as they should. This discourse is based on the underlying assumption that migrants in Britain are more of a burden than a benefit. The same assumption is found in this class.

Alleviating the negative impact of immigration is a central issue. One of the proposals put forward is that migrants contribute financially to a special fund that will be established in order to help reduce the economic pressures posed by migration.

> We will [...] introduce a fund to manage the transitional impacts of migration, to which we will ask newcomers to contribute, and which will be used to help alleviate the transitional pressures we know migration can bring. ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Government Response to Consultation", p. 5)

Skilled migration, another theme in this class, is also based on the idea that migrants should be contributing more to the economy of Britain. The Migration Advisory Committee and the Migration Impacts Forum have the responsibility of identifying gaps in the British economy that can be filled by migrants so that they can contribute to the economy in a more efficient and targeted way. On the other hand, unskilled migrants are not be granted work visas in the UK on the basis that there is no need for low skilled workers in the economy[47]. Thus, in this class migration is predominantly seen in terms of employability and profitability. Words like 'employ', 'product', 'market', 'job' and 'pounds' are typical of this class. The following sentence is very characteristic of Class 3; although the positive economics benefits of migration for Britain are mentioned, they are used as a 'preamble' for emphasising the alleviation of the negative impact:

> Migration has significant economic benefits, both for GDP and GDP per head. At the same time it produces benefits for the economy by improving the employment rate, wages, productivity, and by helping to fill skills gaps. But we know migration can have local impacts, so we are asking newcomers to pay a little extra to a fund to help. ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Government Response to Consultation", p. 6)

Another negative impact of immigration, which is found in this class, is the 'brain-drain' of developing countries. Several proposals have been put forward to address this, such as 'circular migration', which entails encouraging migrants to return to their home countries in order to use their skills and knowledge to contribute to developing countries.

The second, less significant strand of meaning in this class has to do with delivering earned citizenship provisions on a local level with emphasis on developing integration.

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[47] Any need for low skilled and unskilled workers is to be filled by workers coming from the new EU countries such as Poland.

It is being proposed, for instance, that local authorities can play a central role in enhancing the integration of migrant communities by organising 'orientation days' for new migrants. Such events would inform migrants about various issues including where to register for English courses and how they can volunteer for the community.

Class 2, **'Consultation & Stages'**, is the largest class with approximately 44% of the ECUs. However, it is the least meaningful one[48]. It consists of words and phrases that appear together in the text but only in a descriptive, non-informative way. The most characteristic words in this class are:

feel(91), british(181), citizen+(343), comment+(101), complete+(50), demonstr+(74), famil+(65), period+(95), permanent+(167), probation+(138), progress+(88), question+(69), resid+(181), respond+(144), down(38), migrant+(223), slow+(37), become.(57), show.(42), commit+(58), crim+(57), custodial(25), figure+(38), journey+(82), stage+(87), theme+(25), unsure(31), say.(18), answer+(20), depend+(39), multiple(17), offend+(29), propose+(113), refugee+(45), relat+(38), require+(80), sentence+(26), seven+(22), stop+(25), suggest+(23), suit+(22), choose(14), keep.(12), speed.(19), spend.(14), think.(59), abolish+(12), active+(57), agree+(36), categor+(23), child+(27), concern+(33), consequences(11), continu+(37), decreased(9), disagree+(15), discrimin+(12), eight+(10), elig+(25), forty(9), gateway+(13), grant+(34), humanitarian(15), indicat+(10), individual+(40), interview+(9), ipsos(17), member+(29), minimise+(34), minor+(15), nine(15), parent+(9), prison(9), proportion+(16)

This class is mainly anchored in two documents: "The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Analysis of Consultation Responses", and "The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Government Response to Consultation". The first is the analysis of the consultation responses of the "Path to Citizenship" green paper and the second is the government's response to the consultation.

Part of this class has to do with responding to the consultation and contains words such as 'respondents', 'comment' and 'question'. Another part of the class is a description of the stages of the 'journey to citizenship', mainly in relation to consultation questions. Thus, the class also contains words like 'citizen', 'resident' and 'progress'. The following is a typical sentence of this class:

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[48] One of the disadvantages of ALCESTE is that it groups together words that co-occur without any consideration of their meaning.

...Should partners of British citizens or permanent residents be required to demonstrate an ongoing relationship before moving from the probationary citizenship stage to permanent residence? ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Analysis of Consultation Responses", p. 22)

This class has, therefore, no apparent interest. However, the words 'slow', 'down', 'commit', 'crime', and 'offend', which are typical of this class, suggest that a sub-theme of this class refers to slowing down the journey to citizenship for migrants who commit crimes. This alludes to the idea that a key concern within the new citizenship legislation is making the process harder and emphasising the assessment of migrants who wish to stay and naturalise in the UK. This is an interesting finding and will be discussed later in this chapter, as this theme forms a class on its own in the more detailed analysis of the corpus (class 'Penalties').

7.4.2 Main classes

The five classes produced by ALCESTE using the default parameters resemble the three broad classes described above. In particular, the classes 'Immigration impact' and 'Immigration reform' remained almost identical with the previous classification.

Class 1, 'Immigration impact', consists of about a quarter of all ECUs (24.48%) and resembles Class 3 above on immigration impact. Like Class 3, it draws mainly on the 2009 consultation "Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship". Also, this class was the first class formed by ALCESTE in the analysis. This means that it remained stable throughout the analysis (it was not divided). Taken together, these two points show that the themes associated with this class (and with Class 3 above) are quite stable and salient in these documents. The most specific words in this class are the following:

authorit+(55), day+(17), fund+(41), impact+(44), labour(20), local(92), migrat+(66), orient+(20), pressure+(21), service+(72), skill+(37), communit+(45), countrY+(29), develop+(37), help+(30), product+(15), short+(20), alleviate(11), cohes+(15), employ+(30), job+(14), market(14), population+(13), pounds(11), run.(11), advise+(14), award+(8), brain(7), co(8), deliver+(16), drain(7), enhance+(8), facilitate+(7), fill+(11), govern+(42), health+(14), improve+(19), mentor+(7), million+(8), money(10), offer+(8), office+(13), ordinate+(8), role+(13), sector+(14), social+(12), transit+(16), volunt+(22), bring.(22), amount+(7), april(7), assist+(7), assur+(4), attend+(5), avenue(4),

average+(7), best(12), bodies(6), born(6), carry+(5), cent(4), ceremon+(4), circular(5), close+(9), committee(8), council+(5), data(7), department+(14), design+(5), distribut+(5), empower+(4), entrepreneurs(4), envisage+(5), essential+(6), explore+(7), financ+(9), focus+(11), forum(6)

A first theme that emerges in this class is skilled migration. As pointed out in the previous section, migration is seen in terms of financial benefits and profitability. Skilled migration is based on the idea that migration should be managed so that it can fill gaps in the economy and bring more benefits. The other facet of this argument is that migration has so far been more of a burden than a resource. This is also evident in the introduction of a fund to help 'alleviate' the short-term economic pressures of migration. Therefore, skilled migration aims to increase productivity and reduce the negative impact of migration. Taken as a whole, migration is constructed both positively and negatively in this class: positively, because it can potentially be a benefit to the economy and negatively, because it can drain the system. This is similar to the distinction between 'good immigrants' and 'bad immigrants' made by citizenship officers (see Chapter 5); the former are welcomed while the latter are seen as a burden to the country.

> Migration brings significant benefits to the UK and its economy; bringing new skills and talents, increasing the flexibility of our labour market, and improving productivity. But migration can also bring challenges. We know, for example, that migration is a significant factor in the UK's rising population. In order for migration to work for the UK, it must be carefully managed and respond to the changing needs of the country. ("Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship", p. 4)

Another theme in this class is earned citizenship from an administrative perspective. The issue here is the role of local authorities in delivering earned citizenship, a theme also present in Class 3 of the previous analysis. This subtheme draws heavily on the 2009 consultation "Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship".

> Therefore, in addition to a simple 'check and send' service provided by local authorities, there is potential for the service to extend into the provision of simple advice and signposting as well as performing a pivotal role in co-ordinating relevant local authority functions to provide a holistic service to the migrant. ("Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship", p. 19)

A final theme in Class 1 is the developing world. It is suggested in the 2009 consultation that in order to address the 'brain-drain' phenomenon, Britain can establish policies that encourage circular migration. Therefore, it is argued that while skilled migration works for Britain, it creates problems for developing countries. Underlying this discourse, there is a tension between economic profitability and international development. The commitment towards international development objectives is based on a moral responsibility towards the world and has a missionary connotation.

> We believe it is right that Government should play a role in managing negative impacts on developing countries, and are therefore seeking views on how we can better align the Government's migration policy with international development objectives. ("Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship", p. 29)

Class 5, **'English'**, is associated with Class 1 and, like Class 1, draws mainly on the consultation "Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship". It is also the smallest class of this analysis with 9.15% of the ECUs. The most specific vocabulary of this class is the following:

speak(24), common+(13), course+(13), english(71), entry(18), knowledge(17), language+(58), level+(21), life(22), pre(11), require+(42), speaker+(25), spouse+(16), test+(21), text+(7), topic+(11), assess+(10), compet+(5), europe+(11), familiar+(6), refer+(10), read(4), write.(7), integrat+(22), proficient+(4), standard+(8), tuition(4), take.(17), communic+(3), fluent+(3), histor+(6), import+(12), inform+(12), marr+(5), produce+(4), simple(5), into(13), learn.(6), meet.(12), apply+(22), bas+(21), britain+(38), event+(4), evidence(6), factor+(5), geograph+(4), implement+(6), material+(3), matter+(3), personal+(3), possible(6), practical+(4), promote+(3), relev+(7), able+(13), argu+(3), arrive+(7), cant(1), describ+(4), environment(2), explain+(2), listen+(5), location(1), opportunit+(5), political(2), safeguard+(2), situation+(4), strong+(5), switch(2), teacher+(2), term+(8), try+(1), vot+(2), well(6), box(2), contain+(2), element+(2), express+(4), regular+(2)

The predominant theme of this class is the English language requirement for migrants who go through the 'journey to citizenship' and their spouses, but also as a pre-entry requirement which is a proposal considered in the 2009 consultation. The language requirement is coupled with the 'Life in the UK' test which aims to assess both language skills and knowledge of the country. The underlying purpose of the language requirement is the integration of migrants.

As part of our commitment to helping people integrate into UK society, we have already introduced a number of measures. From 2004, people applying for naturalisation as a British citizen have had to demonstrate English language ability and from 1st November 2005, they have also had to show sufficient knowledge of life in the United Kingdom. ("Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship", p. 8)

Class 3, 'Immigration reform', belongs to the same branch as Classes 1 and 5. This class draws more on the green paper "The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System". It consists of approximately 30% of all ECUs and is almost the same as the class 'Immigration reform' that was identified as one of the three broad classes. The most characteristic words of this class are:

border+(43), chang+(40), clear+(63), control+(35), decid+(34), immigration(110), law+(56), legal+(26), legisl+(33), permit+(27), power+(21), reform+(49), system+(132), agenc+(18), set_out(39), automat+(17), enforce+(15), path+(31), process+(34), single(15), strength+(20), make.(68), approach(19), asylum(13), biometric+(12), consistent+(14), deport+(10), easy+(18), effective+(20), framework(26), identity(10), rule+(21), simple+(37), transparent+(14), visa+(14), out(16), put.(12), abuse+(14), architecture(14), cancel+(6), card+(6), change+(17), combin+(5), comprehens+(7), confidence(7), consult+(34), country+(29), crim+(16), current+(35), discretion(5), document+(19), efficien+(8), end+(9), ensur+(29), fast+(5), february(6), fingerprint+(6), foreign+(17), fundamental+(6), heart(11), illegal+(8), interest+(9), introduce+(29), issue+(15), look+(16), maximise+(11), month+(7), new(60), passenger+(8), piece+(7), point+(46), port+(6), present+(17), prison+(6), proceed+(5)

This class refers to changes in the immigration system in order to make the immigration legislation clearer, simpler and more streamlined, under the principle of earned citizenship. As in the previous classification, simplification is coupled with the idea of strengthening immigration controls and preventing illegal immigration and 'abuse' of the immigration system. Expanding detention capacity and implementing powers for automatic deportation of serious offenders, as well as introducing fingerprint visas and identity cards for foreign nationals, are all measures aimed at controlling migration more efficiently and checking who comes in and out of the country. Therefore, there are two axes in the theme of reform: simplifying the immigration system and strengthening UK border controls.

All existing immigration laws will be replaced with a clear, consistent and coherent legal framework for the control of our borders and management of migration. ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System", p. 48)

Classes 2 and 4, **'Stages'** and **'Consultation'**, are essentially a division of the broad class 'Consultation & Stages' from the previous analysis. The two classes are closely related, but 'Stages' is larger with approximately 25% of ECUs while 'Consultation' is smaller with 11.5% of ECUs. 'Stages' draws more on "The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Government Response to Consultation", while 'Consultation' draws mainly on "The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Analysis of Consultation Responses".

'Stages' outlines the new earned citizenship process and it is a very descriptive class. The most specific words of this class are:

become(48), british(127), citizen+(215), demonstr+(64), famil+(50), period+(54), permanent+(107), probation+(94), progress+(48), refugee+(36), resid+(120), elig+(23), route+(53), stage+(65), choose.(14), continu+(31), migrant+(125), relat+(29), right+(55), subsisting(10), temporar+(38), speed.(15), spend.(11), categor+(18), full+(23), humanitarian(13), individual+(30), interview+(8), ipsos(13), journey+(44), limit+(20), minimise+(24), protect+(28), qualify+(26), self(10), slow+(7), tax+(20), down(9), to(268), leave.(13), mean.(17), access+(38), active+(36), agree+(21), believ+(23), child+(13), choice(5), encourage+(16), gateway+(9), grant+(23), insurance(8), member+(20), obey+(14), pass+(12), person+(17), restrict+(13), retired(9), society(20), status(13), sufficien+(13), year+(36), towards(9), under(24), up(21), aid+(3), alternative+(5), ancest+(9), bereaved(3), claim+(5), commit+(19), concern+(18), contribute+(38), creat+(18), deny+(3), enter+(18), highlight+(7)

This class describes the stages of temporary residency, probationary citizenship, and British citizenship/permanent residency, as well as the three routes to citizenship, skilled economic migrants, family members and people in need of humanitarian protection. The class also refers to the time periods and requirements needed to proceed from one stage to the next, like contribution to the economy and 'active citizenship'.

'Consultation', on the other hand, is a rather meaningless class. Because it is anchored in the analysis of consultation responses document, it strictly refers to the quantitative

analysis of consultation and contains words like 'respond', 'question', 'comment' and 'disagree'. The most specific words of this class are:

feel(47), keep.(12), show.(28), think.(31), answer+(17), comment+(58), decreased(9), disagree+(15), figure+(27), multiple(15), proportion+(13), question+(53), raise+(22), respond+(86), result+(19), seven+(17), sixt+(9), suit+(18), theme+(23), total(11), unsure(28), say.(10), add+(10), propose+(51), separate+(12), charg+(10), complete+(18), discrimin+(7), eight+(6), fee+(12), forty(6), green(14), paragraph(5), sure(8), thirty(7), concept+(10), larg+(9), nine(7), organisation+(10), paper+(15), quarter+(6), abolish+(6), addition+(17), avail+(10), correct(2), depend+(12), follow+(11), lack+(4), outline+(4), prove(3), similar+(6), statement+(5), unnecessary(4), disincentiv+(2), dual(2), eleven(2), examin+(3), fifty(2), idea+(7), ongoing(4), parent+(1), rate+(6), suggest+(6), top(3), unclear(3), unfair(5), analys+(2), aspect+(2), difficult+(5), educat+(8), fourteen(2), human(2), remain+(9), arrangement+(3), ask+(6), compar+(2), high+(9), oppos+(2), overseas(4)

7.4.3 Complementary classes

In subsequent analyses with modified parameters, two more classes have been consistently identified: 'Border control', which stems from the same branch as 'Immigration impact', 'English' and 'Immigration reform'; and 'Penalties', which belongs to the same branch as 'Consultation' and 'Stages'.

In Analysis 8 (see section 7.3.3.2, p. 166), Class 6, **'Border control'** consisted of 7.2% of ECUs which makes it a relatively small class. It draws mainly on the green paper "The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System". The most specific words of this class are:

out(13), automat+(17), biometric+(8), border+(23), cancel+(5), card+(6), count+(9), deport+(11), expulsion(4), fingerprint+(6), foreign+(17), fundamental+(6), identity(10), illegal+(8), liable(4), passenger+(10), permit+(21), port+(6), power+(17), present+(13), prison+(6), remove+(13), visa+(14), waive+(5), combin+(4), control+(14), enforce+(9), physical+(4), tackl+(4), travel+(6), national+(22), secure+(8), single(7), break.(6), deal.(8), big+(3), check+(8), detention(3), end+(5), form+(6), obtain+(5), polic+(5), prevent+(5), prior(4), record+(5), roll+(3), technology(3), underway(3), sweep(2), admit+(3), comprehens+(3), conclude+(2), condition+(4), country+(13), european_union(4), fast+(2), force+(6), grounds(3), immigrant+(5), issue+(8), last+(4), month+(4), note+(2), overhaul+(2), passport+(3), procedures(4), programme+(5),

purpose+(4), robust(4), specif+(9), stay+(10), strength+(7), visit+(3), outside(3), circumstances(5), context(3), cultur+(3), defin+(3)

As argued in the two previous sections, in both the analysis with default parameters and the analysis with broader classes, the theme of immigration reform had a double meaning. On the one hand, it referred to the simplification of the immigration system with the aim to make the system more transparent, simpler and clearer. On the other hand, reform was associated with a security discourse which emphasises border controls, immigration checks, prevention of 'illegal immigration' and 'abuse of the system'. In Analysis 8, the two themes become two distinct lexical classes, 'Immigration reform' and 'Border control'. Words like 'permission', 'power', 'removal', and 'deportation', which are salient in the 'Border control' class, illustrate the increased emphasis on securing the borders and exercising stronger force against illegal migration within the new immigration framework. Granting or refusing permission to enter the UK is a key issue in this class and it is associated with stricter requirements for entry (as defined by the points-based system) and stricter penalties for 'offenders'.

> Over the next 12 months we are introducing the most sweeping changes to the immigration system for over 30 years [...] Transforming the way we police the system; locking down the identity of newcomers before they come; a single border force with new powers to guards our ports and airports, with new systems to count people in and out of Britain; with compulsory ID cards for foreign nationals so that public services and employers can be sure about the identity and rights of people who stay. ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System", p. 9)

> We are selective about who we let in. We are introducing an Australian-style points based system for newcomers, with a zero cap on non-EU low skill migration and an end to automatic citizenship based on length of stay. ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Government Response to Consultation", p. 6)

In the broad class 'Consultation & Stages' (see section 7.4.1, p. 169) a subtheme referring to slowing down the journey to citizenship was identified. In Analysis 8 this theme became a class on its own stemming from the same branch as 'Stages' and 'Consultation'. Class 7, labelled **'Penalties'**, is the smallest class of this analysis with only 5.1% of ECUs. This class is not anchored in any particular document, but seems to draw on all of them. Typical words of this class are the following:

down(29), attract+(13), child+(13), commit+(37), consequences(11), convict+(10), crim+(55), custodial(27), minor+(11), normal+(7), offend+(32), parent+(8), penalise+(9), prison(9), progress+(38), sentence+(27), serious+(11), slow+(32), stop+(29), fall.(4), behav+(6), effect+(8), delay+(5), exclude+(3), go.(5), deny+(3), refuse+(4), type+(4), towards(5), spend.(5), absolute+(2), approach(8), depend+(9), influence+(2), nature+(4), responsib+(7), abide+(2), expect+(6), highlight+(3), obey+(5), respect+(3), secretary(2), favour+(2), immediate+(2), drive.(1), deterr+(1), revoke+(1), table(1), lead.(3), chance+(1)

Words such as 'commit, 'crime', 'penalise', 'slow' and 'down' indicate that this class refers predominantly to crimes committed by migrants which result in slowing down or stopping their journey to citizenship as a penalty for those crimes. On the one hand, this shows that the immigration system is becoming stricter and that acquiring the British citizenship is increasingly harder. Indeed, obeying the law has become a key requirement for earned citizenship as outlined in the green paper. This links back to the immigration reform theme which refers to stricter rules against illegal migration and immigration offences. On the other hand, this class shows the increased emphasis on assessing and checking migrants in every stage of the process. The notion of assessment is foundational in earned citizenship, as it is the very practice of assessment which defines who can earn the privilege of citizenship and who cannot. The following two sentences are associated with two typical ECUs of this class:

> We will also slow a migrant's progress through the system even where minor offences are committed, so that behaviour that falls below the standards we expect has consequences. ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System", p. 7)

> We will ensure that migrants who are convicted of serious crimes will face automatic deportation. Now we are going further. Individuals convicted of a crime attracting a custodial sentence but which falls below the deportation threshold will normally be refused any application for probationary citizenship, permanent residence or citizenship. ("Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship", p. 17)

7.5 Summary and conclusions

This chapter has explored the public policy discourse on earned citizenship, which frames current policies on immigration and naturalisation, by analysing the four consultation documents published on this topic. The documents were analysed using

ALCESTE which identifies classes of meanings based on word co-occurrences. Three sets of analyses were conducted, using the default and modified parameters of ALCESTE, in order to explore both broad and more detailed themes in the corpus. The analysis of the four consultation papers published by the Home Office produced five stable classes (in the default analysis): a) Immigration reform; b) Immigration impact; c) English; d) Consultation; e) Stages. 'Immigration reform', 'Immigration impact', 'Consultation' and 'Stages' were also identified in the analyses with modified parameters[49]. This suggests that these four classes were quite stable and can be used to infer the meanings associated with public policy on earned citizenship.

There were two main branches in the classification produced by ALCESTE in all analyses discussed in this chapter. The first three classes above were associated with each other and so were the final two classes. The main themes of the first branch were immigration reform (referring to the simplification of immigration law and strengthening the British borders) and immigration impact (referring to the financial impact of immigration, positive and negative). The class 'English' was quite small, less stable (as it was not identified in all analyses) and was associated with the class 'Immigration impact'. The detailed analysis with modified parameters identified a further class stemming from this branch. This class was labelled 'Border control', as it emphasised the need to prevent 'immigration abuse'. This class was closely linked with 'Immigration reform'. Concerning the second branch, the classes 'Consultation' and 'Stages', which referred to the overall earned citizenship process, also contained a smaller class ('Penalties'), identified in the detailed analysis, referring to the penalties of potential citizens when they disobey the law. Overall, the analysis suggests that there are three main clusters of meaning in the public policy discourse on earned citizenship: **'immigration reform'**, including the themes of simplification and border control, **'immigration impact'**, which includes both the positive and the negative impact of migration, and **'earned citizenship process'**, which emphasises assessment and penalisation. A thread linking these themes together is the idea of selective and managed migration.

Immigration reform refers to the new immigration system. This system operates under the earned citizenship principle which states that British citizenship is a privilege to be earned. This was also a theme found in the interviews with citizenship officers who argued that in order for a migrant to deserve British citizenship, he or she must be able to integrate, speak English, contribute to the economy of Britain and be committed to

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[49] 'Consultation' and 'Stages' formed a single class in the analysis for broader classes.

the country. Immigration reform, as defined in the four policy documents, is structured along two main axes. The first one is simplification. The aim is to develop a new, clearer and more streamlined immigration system so that the decision making process on immigration matters becomes both more transparent and more efficient. Another strand in this theme is border control which was also a distinct lexical class in the more detailed classification produced by ALCESTE. This subtheme shows the increased emphasis on security and prevention. The new regulations aim to prevent 'abuse of the system' by illegal immigration and, therefore, enhancing the policing of the borders becomes a crucial objective. This class has an exclusionary undertone, within a security discourse, to not allow people without 'permission' (a typical word in this class) to enter or live in the UK. It is also based on mistrust towards migrants who, by 'abusing the immigration system', are seen as a threat. In other words, this class rests on the assumption that the abuse of the immigration system is a common phenomenon which needs to be addressed. This theme, therefore, has to do with both simplification and having more control over who enters and stays in the country.

This idea links this topic with the theme of immigration impact. This theme is organised around the dichotomy of the immigrant as a resource and the immigrant as a burden. The former is the skilled worker who contributes to the economy of the country, while the latter is associated with the stereotypical image of the immigrant as someone who uses (or abuses) Britain's resources without giving anything back to society. The impact of immigration, as in the citizenship officers' interviews, is mainly constructed negatively. Migration is seen as creating a financial drain to local communities and as posing challenges to the welfare system. This is used as an argument for the introduction of managed or skilled migration legislation which aims to enhance the economic benefits of migration. Within this system, migrants will be evaluated based on their qualifications and the gaps of British economy. The points-based system establishes a policy of selective openness and a cost-benefit rationale for the evaluation of migrants. This suggests that migration is seen predominantly in financial terms and that migrants are viewed in terms of their employability and productivity. This discourse objectifies migrants as a product that the government can invest in (Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2003). This managerial philosophy is also evident in the proposed measures to combat the 'brain drain' phenomenon in developing countries because of the migration of labour force to developed countries such as the UK.

Furthermore, the dualism between the 'good' and the 'bad' immigrant, which is central in the theme of immigration impact, resonates with lay constructions of citizenship as

expressed by citizenship officers (see Chapter 5). It creates a distinction between 'elite' skilled migrants and 'non-elite' unqualified migrants, a distinction which is more and more salient in immigration policies all over Europe (Mahroum, 2001). While the former migrants are a resource, the latter constitute a risk and a threat to British society, with asylum seekers being the least wanted migrants as the language of 'burden sharing' indicates (van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2002).

Being selective about who comes in to the UK is also the underlying principle of the 'earned citizenship process' theme. The new process for naturalisation consists of three stages: temporary residence, probationary citizenship and British citizenship or permanent residence. In order to proceed from one stage to the next, migrants will have to demonstrate that they obey the law, speak English, pay tax, are self-sufficient and are 'active citizens'. In every step of the process, migrants will be assessed based on these criteria. Thus, like in the lay discourses of citizenship officers, duties are more pronounced than rights for migrants and potential citizens. This focus on responsibilities has been criticised by advocates of a rights-based approach to migration. While earned citizenship starts from the assumption of migrants' inadequacy to contribute, an emphasis on empowerment and rights would encourage contribution by creating opportunities for equal participation (Páll Sveinsson, 2010). Furthermore, in the new system, criminal activity, even if it is minor, is to be penalised by slowing down or stopping a migrant's journey to citizenship. The fact that 'Penalties' was a class on its own illustrates both the increased importance on assessment and the mistrust on the part of the British government towards migrants. Penalising migrants is seen as the 'cure' for a presumed abuse of the immigration system.

To sum up, the main themes and subthemes identified in the policy reports analysed are the following:

1. immigration reform
   - simplification
   - security & border control
2. immigration impact
   - immigration as resource/skilled migration
   - immigration as burden
3. earned citizenship process
   - emphasis on assessment & penalisation

Overall, the earned citizenship discourse problematises immigration and focuses on the problems that it creates for the UK. Increasing immigration controls, enhancing security and being more selective about who is allowed entry are the principles that underline the suggested solutions. As a result of these policies, a hierarchical system is created that defines the desirability and trustworthiness of migrants. In this sense, naturalisation policies constitute a type of 'institutionalised positioning'. The moral order of this positioning is defined by the differential rights (to enter, live and work in the UK) assigned to different types of migrants. It follows that there are different kinds of relationships that are established between the British state and migrants. While skilled 'elite' migrants are welcomed (as an asset to the economy), unskilled 'non-elite' migrants are seen as threat (to the British economy) and are treated with suspicion (in order to prevent immigration 'abuse').

Chapter 8. Naturalisation in the UK: Theoretical and Societal Implications

This thesis has argued that practices of immigration and naturalisation constitute a space where national borders are drawn and negotiated. Such practices are, effectively, efforts to establish a balance between inclusion and exclusion. The distinction, however, between inclusion and exclusion is not straightforward. People can be included on one level and excluded on others. In the UK, which receives a large number of migrants every year, there is a variety of statuses that one can have. Undocumented migrants, temporary workers, permanent residents, citizens, EU citizens and, shortly, 'probationary citizens', are all positions that one can occupy; each one is associated with a different set of rights and responsibilities. There is, therefore, a complex classification of the population, creating what Castles (2005) has called 'hierarchical citizenship'. This suggests that the move from migration to citizenship has become a multi-level process, alluding to the complexity of self-other relations within and between contemporary nation-states.

This thesis has considered this multi-faceted nature of self-other relations and the interplay between the symbolic and the institutional spheres in processes of identity construction within the UK naturalisation context. Naturalisation, as a process whereby a non-member becomes, formally at least, a member of the national community, lends itself to the study of identity in that it brings the relations between the 'self' and the 'other', or between sameness and difference, to the fore. Towards this aim, three key stakeholders were selected as the sample for this research. Thirty-three interviews with naturalised citizens, twenty interviews with citizenship officers and four 'earned citizenship' policy documents, representing the official public policy perspective, were analysed.

In order to examine these different perspectives, I adopted a dialogical perspective on identity and knowledge, which acknowledges the tensions ingrained in self-other relations and the complexity of human thinking and identity. In particular, I adopted a dialogical perspective on the theory of social representations which maintains that the process of knowledge construction involves the three-fold relations between self, other and object (Marková, 2000, 2003a). The relations between these three parties make common-sense knowledge a dynamic and open-ended process. Furthermore, the dialogue between different knowledge systems, that the self-other dynamics presuppose, creates a polyphasic representational field. People can draw on this multiplicity of symbolic resources in order to make sense of the world. This pluralism

makes argumentation, dialogue and change possible. Both Billig (1987) and Marková (2003a) have taken this idea a step further by arguing that oppositions and tensions are the building blocks of common-sense knowledge. According to this viewpoint, social representations are based on fundamental oppositional themes. Billig and colleagues (1988) refer to 'ideological dilemmas' to emphasise the rhetorical or argumentative aspect of thinking, while Marková (2000, 2003a) refers to themata as the basic oppositional themes which form the core of social representations and from which further meanings are generated.

The dialogical perspective adopted here links together processes of identity and representation on the basis that the ontology of humanity is the self-other interdependence (Marková, 2003a, p. 204, emphasis in original):

> The theory of social representations... is based on dialogicality. Dialogical knowledge is generated from the three-component process of the *Ego-Alter-Object* (social representation)... Theories of self and identity, using the dialogical theory of social knowledge would focus on oppositions of identity, on the mutuality of social recognition, on the multiple kinds of *Ego-Alter* and on the culturally embedded themata pertaining to personal identities and personal change.

This thesis has argued that the concept of positioning is the missing link between identity and representation. Drawing on the work of Duveen (1993, 2001; Duveen & Lloyd, 1986) and on positioning theory (Harré & Moghaddam, 2003a; Harré et al., 2009; Harré & van Langehove, 1999), it has been shown that a process of positioning towards others and towards social representations is at the core of both knowledge and identity construction. By positioning themselves towards social representations, people are able to locate themselves within their social world and acquire a perspective towards this world. The polyphasic nature of common-sense knowledge suggests that this positioning is not a simple process. Rather, people position themselves towards a multitude of social representations which requires a complex process of negotiation. This suggests that the self is polyphonic (Hermans, 2001a, 2002). Each voice or position taken on is a way of engaging with the world and organising experience. In other words, the plurality of social representations is associated with the plurality of identities. Equally, representational tensions and oppositions can lead to identity 'conflicts', that is, to tensions between different identity positions within the same individual. While such conflicts are not necessarily problematic for the individual, they can, at times, create identity ruptures. In order to cope with such 'identity dilemmas',

individuals engage in a process of re-negotiation and dialogue of opposing representational themes. This is an iterative and argumentative process which can lead to the construction of new positions. Based on these theoretical premises, this thesis has argued that:

- Representations associated with naturalisation and citizenship are 'polyphasic'; they are intertwined with representations about immigration and Britishness, which incorporate ideas about ethno-cultural similarity and difference and position different types of migrants in different ways along a 'being/having' continuum of identity.

- Britishness is constructed on the basis of the dialogue between the opposing themes of prosperity/progress and decline/threat; each theme is associated with a different argumentation strategy or narrative regarding Britishness and immigration.

- People negotiate this opposition by positioning themselves and others in a multiplicity of ways; there is a dialogical tension between these different positions, suggesting that identity is not a fixed state, but an inherently dialectic process.

- Different self-other dynamics frame these representational and identity processes; on the whole, there is a fundamental tension, or dilemma, between openness towards and protection against the other.

- Positioning processes, with respect to immigration and citizenship, take place both on the symbolic level of representations and on the institutional level of immigration policies and practices; positions can, thus, be conceptualised both as socio-symbolic and as institutionalised locations which define one's place in the world.

This final chapter will discuss these issues in relation to the particular empirical findings of this research. The following section will discuss the dilemmatic nature of Britishness, while the second section will explore its implications for processes of positioning. The third section will examine the interplay between the symbolic and the institutional spheres in positioning processes, with an emphasis on earned citizenship which characterises current thinking on immigration and naturalisation and constructs a dichotomy between elite and non-elite migrants. The fourth section will consider the implications of this research for advancing a social psychological approach to citizenship. The fifth section will make suggestions for further research on citizenship. The last section will conclude this thesis with some final thoughts on dialogue and inclusion.

8.1 The dilemmatic nature of Britishness

The analysis of the interviews with new citizens and citizenship officers showed that Britishness was represented in a dilemmatic way by both these sets of participants. One pole of this dilemma represented progress and the other pole represented decline. The two were in opposition to each other, creating a tension between different storylines associated with each theme. Each storyline can be seen as an argumentation pattern regarding the definition of Britishness. However, the two themes were not mutually exclusive. Participants, for the most part, employed narratives of both progress and decline in order to discuss Britishness in relation to issues of immigration and citizenship.

Citizenship officers, the majority of whom were British-born, construed Britishness using a discourse of progress/humanitarianism and a discourse of decline/threat. These two themes stood in opposition to each other and were associated with different types of self-other relations. The discourse of British tolerance and humanitarianism, in particular, was very salient and was a key theme in the citizenship officers' interviews. Tolerance is, indeed, commonly perceived as a distinctive British trait (Condor, 2006b). Citizenship officers drew on this humanitarian discourse to make arguments about welcoming migrants to the UK and to assert that pluralism is intrinsic to Britishness. This 'cosmopolitan' frame of thinking is reminiscent of Britain's imperial openness towards colonised populations (Kumar, 2000) and it can be said to be a symbolic resource that has been historically used to frame Britain's relations with 'others'.

However, thinking is not monological. As Young (1995) has observed, British colonial identity was constructed around the dialogue between desire for and aversion of the other. In the interviews, the theme of progress and humanitarianism was in dialogical opposition with the theme of threat and decline, alluding to the dilemmatic nature of social representations of Britishness. This latter theme was based on a completely different image of the immigrant: from a person in need, the immigrant was transformed into an opportunist who exploits Britain's resources. Immigration was, therefore, constructed as a threat, while participants also expressed nostalgia for Britain's past. Interviews were permeated by a feeling of loss of both economic power and cultural superiority, largely attributed to the negative effects of immigration. This sense of declining Britishness due to the loss of Britain's imperial prestige is what Gilroy (2004) terms 'post-imperial melancholia'.

Abuse of welfare benefits and the British passport as a motivation for citizenship were the most commonly cited examples of migrant opportunism in the interviews with citizenship officers. Instead of cosmopolitanism, we have here a narrower nationalistic frame of thinking that puts the interests of the native population above any humanitarian duty to the world. As shown in Chapter 5, participants employed a 'rational' social exchange framework to argue against immigration. The most common argument was that migrants put a strain on Britain's resources, mainly on the welfare system, because they do not participate in the society and do not contribute to the economy. Limiting immigration was, thus, presented as a 'rational' response in order to protect the economic resources of the country. Employing such 'reasonable' arguments has been identified in the literature as a typical strategy to avoid accusations of prejudice (Billig, 1991; Figgou & Condor, 2006; van Dijk, 1992). This strategy is also indicative of an internal dialogue, whereby the Ego responds to accusations of prejudice made by an Inner Alter (Marková, 2006). This Inner Alter represents the voice of the prevailing normative system in Britain where rationality and tolerance are widely endorsed values. This internal dialogue also illustrates the inherent dialogism within concepts (Billig, 1987). Tolerance, for instance, was construed in the interviews in terms of respecting minority cultures and allowing them to flourish, but also as political correctness which can lead to the diminution of Britishness. The same arguments, therefore, can be used for and against immigration (see also Verkuyten, 2004). As Billig (1987) argues, it is the very definition of concepts that can be the source of controversy and debate. People not only draw on different representations, but representations themselves are based on conflicting themata (Marková, 2000, 2003a).

New citizens drew on similar representations of Britishness which, in their accounts, were intertwined with representations of the West. As with citizenship officers, Britishness was represented in terms of progress, democracy and tolerance. New citizens migrated to the UK to make the best of the opportunities it offers. Most participants compared their country of origin with the UK. While Britain was seen as developed and tolerant, their countries of origin were seen as conservative and narrow-minded. Some respondents showed admiration for this image of Britain and its imperial history. Becoming naturalised was, thus, an achievement that symbolised for them a 'status upgrade'. They were becoming part of a developed, civilised West. This was something they were proud of, while, at the same time, their country of origin was seen as backward. Drawing on this theme, new citizens argued that they had become more open-minded and tolerant by living in the UK, while they were also becoming increasingly less like people from their country of origin. But, integrating into the British

culture was not a one-way street for respondents. While Britain was admired for its political values, it was also resented for its lack of social values. Family, community and respect for elders were all seen as declining values in the UK, but were still seen as being respected in the participants' countries of origin. As was the case with the citizenship officers, the very meaning of terms was the subject of debate. Here, it was the meaning of freedom that was controversial. While freedom was seen as empowering, it was also seen as signifying lack of control and discipline. We have here an ideological dilemma between individual freedom and communitarian values (Billig et al., 1988).

On the whole, Britishness was represented in a polarised way for both new citizens and citizenship officers. It signified both development (economic and political) and decline (economic and cultural). While participants differed in how much they drew on each theme, the two themes were interdependent. The tension between the two themes was the source for the arguments of participants; it is what kept their discourse 'in motion'. The next section will show that these contrary themes were the basis for the development of different lines of argumentation with regards to the definition of Britishness and one's position towards it.

8.2 Dialogical positioning

Identity has been theorised in this thesis not only as content but also as a process. The process of identity construction can be conceptualised using the concept of positioning. As Duveen (1993) notes, identity is a process of positioning oneself towards a social representation. This suggests that processes of identity and processes of representation are intertwined. Identity can be seen as a process of appropriating social representations to construct a sense of our self and of our place in the world. Identity is first and foremost a social location (Duveen & Lloyd, 1986); it defines who we are in relation to others. The notion of positioning emphasises both the relational and the dynamic nature of identities. Thus, positioning refers at the same time to a process of appropriating a social representation for the purposes of meaning construction and to a social location in relation to others (Duveen, 1993; van Langehove & Harré, 1999).

Furthermore, as argued in Chapter 3, the multiplicity of ways of making sense of the world, as described by the cognitive polyphasia hypothesis (Moscovici, 1961/1998), suggests that people are also positioned in multiple ways. It has been argued that polyphasia and heteroglossia are the two sides of the same coin (Marková, 2003a). The former refers to the construction of complex system of different types of knowledge and

the latter refers to the multiple voices or positions that people employ. In other words, the plurality of social discourses goes hand in hand with the increasing complexity of the self, as the dialogical self theory also argues (Hermans, 2001a, 2002). If external interaction creates a state of cognitive polyphasia, then internal interaction (Marková, 2006), whereby the voice of different others is part of the self (Salgado & Hermans, 2005), creates a multiplicity of positions that people take on.

As shown in the previous section, Britishness was constructed in the interviews on the basis of the opposing themes of progress/humanitarianism and threat/decline. Therefore, positioning took the form of a complex negotiation between opposing positions or voices. By drawing on different themes, participants saw the world through different perspectives and positioned themselves in different ways. In the same way that there was a discursive dialogue between themes, there were also 'dialectic' identities, whereby positionings were in a dialogical relationship with each other.

In the interviews with citizenship officers, the theme of humanitarianism positioned Britain as a prosperous and freedom-loving country and migrants as people in need of Britain's philanthropy. The poor, victimised asylum seeker represented the 'prototypical' image of the immigrant in this case. Britain was seen as having a humanitarian duty to accept and embrace underprivileged people. On the other hand, the theme of decline positioned migrants as indifferent opportunists. Britain was positioned here, not as a superior and prosperous country, but as a country in decline, threatened by 'immigration flows'. Hospitality towards the other gave its place to antagonistic relations whereby the other was seen as a threat to be 'managed'. Citizenship officers drew on both themes showing ambivalence towards migrants.

A similar tension was also evident in the governmental discourse. As argued in Chapter 7, a main theme of the public policy discourse analysed was immigration impact. This theme was based on the distinction between immigration as a benefit and immigration as a burden. While skilled migration was seen as beneficial, all other types of immigration were seen as burdensome. For this reason, the consultation papers analysed proposed that skilled migration be accompanied by firmer border controls, which will keep unskilled immigrants out of the country, and by a stricter assessment of migrants so that their contribution to the UK can be continuously checked. There is a tension, overall, in the official discourse between welcoming skilled migrants and excluding unskilled migrants. One the one hand, we have a discourse of progress and profitability, which sees the other as an asset, and on the other hand, we have a

discourse of security and prevention, which sees the other as a risk and a threat to the nation and its resources.

It can also be said that we have here two distinct 'moral orders' (Harré & Moghaddam, 2003a; Harré et al., 2009; Harré & van Langehove, 1991, 1999) which are in conflict with each other: Britain's duty to embrace others in need, as defined by its 'missionary' role in the world, and Britain's right to exclude others, stemming from Britain's position as a territorially bounded nation-state. Citizenship officers and public policy discourse took on a humanitarian position and embraced the other, but also assumed a nationalistic position and made arguments for the exclusion of the other. The discursive strategy of 'differentiating the other', making a distinction between the 'good' grateful migrant and the 'bad' exploitative migrant, allows lay people and public policy to both affirm British tolerance and argue against immigration.

The themes of progress and decline were also expressed by naturalised citizens. Progress referred to British tolerance, freedom and economic development, while decline referred to Britain's lack of social and moral values. Naturalised citizens showed both admiration towards Britain's political values and resentment for its cultural values as exemplified in its youth culture. Becoming 'more British' was, thus, both seen as enrichment for the self and as a threat to one's religious or cultural values and identity. Many participants, in different degrees, experienced a positioning conflict. The moral order associated with the value system of their countries of origin was in conflict with the moral order associated with British culture. There was, therefore, a tension between wanting to be British and resisting this identity because it represented moral decline. Participants employed both narratives of similarity and narratives of difference in relation to Britishness, taking on a multiplicity of positions. Being located inbetween the position of the 'stranger' and the position of the 'homecomer' (Schutz, 1964a, 1964b), they drew on the values, norms and representations of their countries of origin, as well as on the values associated with Britishness, in order to make sense of their place in the UK. The two cultural systems were used as symbolic resources on which people drew to construct a complex positioning repertoire (Hermans & Kempen, 1998). This suggests that integration in the UK was, for new citizens, a complex process of negotiation of their position, not only in Britain, but also in relation to their countries of origin.

To sum up, the antinomic nature of thinking about Britishness not only led to a discursive tension between the opposing themes of progress and decline, but also to a tension between conflicting positions, as each position corresponded to a different

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discourse about Britishness. The interviews exemplified the construction of 'dialectic identities' grounded in oppositions and ambivalent self-other relations. The migrant was positioned as both 'good' and 'bad', while 'becoming British' was both an aspired position and a resisted one. The 'other' represented, in other words, both enrichment for the self and threat. These positioning conflicts were essentially conflicts of the moral orders, rights and duties, linked with each position. The dialogue between positions was made possible through an 'internal argumentation' on the themes of Britishness. Thinking can, therefore, be conceptualised as a dialogue between different positions and the movement between different positions can be seen a process of adaptation to different contexts (Aveling & Gillespie, 2008; Valsiner, 2002). However, representations of Britishness and immigration posed restrictions on the types of positions that could be adopted by naturalised citizens. As the next section shows, Britishness was not equally accessible to all new citizens.

8.3 Institutionalised and symbolic positioning: The distinction between 'elite' and 'non-elite' migrants

This section will discuss positioning both as a symbolic and as an institutionalised process. Identity construction has been predominantly approached from the perspective of the symbolic sphere. Duveen, for example, discusses identity as a process of positioning oneself in relation to the symbolic field of culture (Duveen, 1993, 2001; Duveen & Lloyd, 1986). Through positioning, a person acquires a social location; he or she becomes a social actor embedded in a network of social relations. The quality of one's position within the social world is defined by an actor's rights and duties, that is, by the 'moral order' associated with a positioning, which defines what types of actions are expected and permitted from a social position (Davies & Harré, 1990; Harré & Moghaddam, 2003a; Harré et al., 2009; Harré & van Langehove, 1991, 1999). But, a person's location within a network of social relations and the associated moral order are not only defined symbolically but also institutionally. Institutions are not just the external context of symbolic processes, but, by being normative and coercive, guide representations and frame the world (e.g. Lahlou, 2008). For issues of immigration in particular, institutions become key players in the social arena. In this research, this dual character of positions was exemplified in the distinction between 'elite' and 'non-elite' migrants. These two positions can be distinguished by their respective moral order: the expectations and entitlements associated with each position (its rights and duties) were defined both by symbolic representations and by tangible immigration practices.

Regarding the institutional aspect of positioning, the analysis of four key policy documents on earned citizenship showed that the official policy discourse is structured around three main themes: (i) reforming the immigration system, (ii) managing the impact of immigration, and (iii) rigorously assessing migrants in their 'journey to citizenship'. Immigration reform has two streams of meaning. On the one hand, it aims to create a new, transparent and simpler immigration system which will allow for better decision making. On the other hand, it aims to strengthen the British borders in order to deter 'abuse' of the immigration system by 'illegal immigrants'. Words such as 'removal' and 'deportation' were typical of this theme, illustrating the government's preoccupation with prevention and security against immigrants who 'abuse' the immigration system. At the same time, the theme of 'immigration impact' makes clear which types of migrants should be welcomed in the country. This theme constructs a dichotomy between the negative financial impact of immigration, which needs to be alleviated, and the positive impact of skilled migration. In short, what is being argued is that immigration has been more of a burden than a resource. New regulations aim to reverse this situation by keeping out the unwanted migrants and welcoming the ones who are deemed able to contribute. Migrants are assessed in every step of the 'journey to citizenship' so that it can be certain that are indeed eligible to reside in the country and that they are contributing as much as they should. We have, therefore, a tension between a discourse of security and prevention and a discourse of profitability with regards to immigration. The former positions migrants as an asset, while the latter positions them as a burden and a threat. Different types of relations between migrants and the 'host' society frame each positioning: skilled migrants are welcomed in the country while unskilled migrants are treated with suspicion and excluded with the introduction of more efficient removal mechanisms. In this sense, earned citizenship policies constitute a practice of institutionalised positioning. This positioning creates a fundamental distinction between 'elite' skilled migrants and 'non-elite' unskilled migrants, which resonates strongly with the distinction between 'good' and 'bad' migrants made by citizenship officers and, to a lesser extent, by naturalised citizens.

The differential assignment of rights of mobility constitutes the moral order of this positioning which is based on the institutionalisation of relations of trust and mistrust. Walters argues that borders, from points of reception and arrival, are increasingly becoming gateways serving predominantly a sorting function "differentiating the good and the bad, the useful and the dangerous, the licit and the illicit; constituting a safe, 'high trust' interior secured from the wild zones outside; immobilising and removing the risky elements so as not to speed the circulation of the rest" (2006, p. 197). The

passport in this case is not only a means of identification, but also a means of classification in the hierarchical world system of nation-states (Castles, 2005). It becomes a sign of trustworthiness and can be conceptualised as the objectification of social relations between different states. A European Union passport, for example, signifies that its carrier is trustworthy, whereas a passport from a developing country is a marker of a person's untrustworthiness (see Wang, 2004). While elite migrants are recognised as legitimate travellers, non-elite migrants are forced to be immobile. In other words, elite migrants constitute a 'transnational elite' defined by their 'spatial autonomy' (Weiss, 2005), while non-elite, unskilled migrants are 'vagabonds' (Bauman, 1998). The denial of the agency of some types of migrants can be described as misrecognition (Marková, 2008b); by being controlled and 'managed', these migrants lack the power to define their place in world.

In the interviews with naturalised citizens, the distinction between elite and non-elite migrants was formulated in a 'West vs. Rest' narrative. The West symbolised progress, development and freedom, but it was not accessible to people coming from the 'underdeveloped' rest of the world. Many of the participants of this study had in the past been forced to be immobile, thereby being denied access to what the Western world could offer. In contrast, other participants, originating in 'developed' countries, had access to this world. The meanings associated with British citizenship and the passport were partly based on where participants came from and on how they compared their previous position (as migrants) to their new one (as citizens). For some respondents, the British passport was a symbol of freedom, recognition and opportunity, while for others it was just a matter of convenience. Thus, the passport had both a symbolic importance (as a carrier of prosperity, freedom and agency) and a practical significance (as a 'ticket' that guarantees accessibility).

Processes of inclusion and exclusion operate both on this tangible policy level, but also on the symbolic level of representations. As Gupta and Ferguson (1992) argue, immigration is an area where the politics of otherness and the politics of space intersect. Non-elite migrants are not only spatially confined; they are also otherised. As shown in Chapter 5, representations of immigration construct migrants principally in a negative light both in terms of putting a financial strain on British resources and in terms of threatening British culture. Abuse of welfare benefits, reluctance to integrate and ungratefulness were all commonly employed in the interviews to describe the typical ('bad') immigrant. At the same time, representations of immigration were permeated by ideas about ethno-cultural similarity and difference. As argued in Chapter 5 and

Chapter 6, the earned citizenship narrative, employed by both lay respondents and public policy, draws on ethno-cultural representations of Britishness and on the fundamental distinction between two identity modes, 'being' and 'having'. Britishness was, thus, seen as something that one has or something that one is. Naturalising allows a former migrant to be formally British, to have the citizenship and passport of the country. However, being 'native' British was constructed as an inevitable and essentialised identity. New citizens, in negotiating their position towards Britishness, had to also negotiate their position towards representations of immigration. The two were construed almost antithetically, so that if someone is classified as an immigrant, then he or she cannot be easily re-classified as British. Indeed, some participants went to great lengths to distance themselves from the immigrant category in an effort to assert their Britishness. But, migrants did not constitute a uniform category in the interviews. Along the two ends of the being-having continuum, different migrants were positioned in different ways and had different entitlements towards Britishness. Constructions of cultural and racial difference played a major part in this positioning and overlapped significantly with the dichotomisation of the world into 'developed' and 'underdeveloped' nation-states.

To sum up, discourses about naturalisation and immigration, as well as associated policies and practices, are a space where the national boundaries are constructed both symbolically and physically. Therefore, public policy is not a neutral or rational decision making mechanism, but takes part in the construction of representations of immigration and Britishness. It can be argued that such practices of space management constitute a positioning process that assigns different types of rights and duties to different types of migrants. This official categorisation of people according to their trustworthiness perpetuates a hierarchical system of classification based on the fundamental distinction between the 'West' and the 'Rest' and between elite and non-elite migrants. The former are objectified in the image of the white, Western and skilled migrant, while the latter are objectified in the image of the poor migrant or asylum seeker who comes from a developing country. This top-down positioning intersects with lay representations of immigration and Britishness which position people as similar or different. Therefore, positioning, in the case of citizenship and immigration, refers to a socio-spatial location defined not only by one's place in relation to representations of Britishness and immigration, but also in terms of one's rights of movement and accessibility.

8.4 The social psychology of citizenship

This section proposes that a social psychological investigation of citizenship is a fruitful area of research and can complement more conventional analyses of citizenship as a political institution. It is argued that a social psychological perspective acknowledges the dynamic and relational character of citizenship both on the level of policy making and on the level of lay everyday experience. It is furthermore argued that both a top-down and a bottom-up understanding of citizenship are needed in order to account for the complexities of socio-political membership of contemporary societies.

Citizenship is, in essence, a way of managing the balance between inclusion and exclusion as it is based on both universalism, within the political community, and particularism, in relation to outsiders. This is, for Parekh, the paradox of national identity, which is based on both unity and division: "Every political community needs some shared view of its collective identity; but every such view has an exclusivist, authoritarian, repressive and ideological thrust and a tendency to demean those outsiders who constitute its acknowledged point of reference" (2000b, p. 7). As has been argued in this thesis, naturalisation and immigration are spaces where self-other relations are played out and negotiated. The history of British citizenship legislation shows very clearly that these relations change over time and, thus, are not neutral or given (see Chapter 1). However, these processes of inclusion and exclusion have traditionally been seen as rather straightforward. The modern model of citizenship assumes that there is an alignment between the nation, as an imagined community of shared identity, and the demos, as a political community defined by participation in the democratic process. But, this assumed homogeneity is more of a utopia nowadays than it has ever been. Globalisation, international mobility and migration suggest that people are no longer rooted in a particular locality or affiliated with a single community.

In the United Kingdom the blurring of national boundaries has been met with concern over the diminution of Britishness. This has been reflected in the design of public policy on immigration and citizenship. These policies are not the result of a detached calculation of the national interests, as the cost-benefit managed migration scheme in the UK seems to suggest, but are also rooted in how the nation is imagined in relation to others. Indeed, discourses of control and security frame the public policy approach on citizenship and immigration against the background of a lost social solidarity which is implicitly attributed to immigration and cultural diversity. As my document analysis shows, this prevention/security discourse permeates current policies of earned

citizenship. The emphasis on assessing the contribution of migrants is guided by an effort to ensure that new citizens are committed to the United Kingdom. At the same time, the introduction of citizenship tests and ceremonies, as well as the general discourse over 'shared British values', are part of an effort to 'induce' Britishness to newcomers. Thus, as the previous section also illustrated, citizenship is a site where the institutional and the symbolic spheres of national identity construction intersect.

This symbolic aspect of citizenship practices has been largely ignored. While identities and symbolic processes of inclusion and exclusion have been examined from the perspective of national identity construction, citizenship has been left to be predominantly studied by sociology and political science. There is an emphasis, in other words, on the institutional aspect of citizenship as a political institution. As Chapter 1 has shown, nationalism and associated concepts, like national identity and citizenship, have been conventionally theorised as state processes. Their institutional aspect has been far more theorised than their role in everyday life. However, the focus on top-down constructions of nationalism should be complemented by an understanding of nationalism 'from below' (Hobsbawm, 1990). By using an interdisciplinary approach that combines the study of top-down and bottom-up process, we can have a better understanding of membership of a state. Citizenship is not just an abstract institution; it is also a lay experience and an everyday practice which has actual implications in people's lives.

Understanding the symbolic representations that define citizenship and the social relations that support it can inform policy making. We need to know how naturalisation is viewed by those for whom it is designed in order to create more inclusive policies. There is a need to design and implement tolerant forms of citizenship that focus on the benefits of immigration, not its abuse. Paying attention to migrants' and potential new citizens' voices is the only way that this can be achieved.

There is, in general, both a theoretical and an empirical interest in investigating the functions of contemporary citizenship and national identity within an interdisciplinary framework that considers both the institutional level (which refers to processes of formal recognition) and the representational level (which refers to processes of symbolic recognition). For instance, this study has shown that while citizenship is articulated in terms of contribution and commitment by public policy, it acquires a different meaning for many new citizens who see it as a ticket for international mobility and as an opportunity to expand their experiences. Here, citizenship does not function as a link between an individual and his or her fellow nationals. It is, rather, a symbol of freedom, ·

accessibility and recognition, because it allows access to the Western world. Therefore, citizenship, despite being nationally defined, can serve a 'transnational' function. This understanding of citizenship by migrants themselves can complement scholarly work on the state and future of citizenship in globalised societies, such the work on post-national and cosmopolitan forms of citizenship.

In order to study lay understandings of nationhood, we need a perspective that acknowledges the 'interactional' character of membership: "What is missing...is a sense of the interactional work that underpins how individuals position themselves in relation to national symbols or national narratives, about how we make sense of, interpret or renegotiate what our nation and our national identity mean to us" (Thompson, 2001, p. 27). Indeed, citizenship is a social position. It locates a person in relation to both 'insiders' and 'outsiders', as well as towards the state and its institutions. In this respect, a dialogical approach is suitable as it emphasises the relational nature of positioning. It places self-other relations at the forefront of our understanding of identity and membership. As such, it acknowledges the dynamic character of processes of inclusion and exclusion.

Apart from advancing the study of citizenship as a socio-political phenomenon, a social psychological perspective on the issue can also benefit the discipline of social psychology by encouraging the incorporation of the institutional level of analysis into its field of research. Instead of taking citizenship as a background given, social psychology needs to bring it to the fore and account for both symbolic and institutional processes of inclusion and exclusion. Ignoring the dynamic role of institutionalised practices increases the risk of normalising citizenship and immigration legislation as a taken for granted state of affairs. Rather, as this thesis has shown, the institutional and symbolic levels intersect to construct both Britishness and migrant identities. The position of individuals and groups within this symbolic field is the outcome of symbolic processes of constructing the self, the other and their relationship, and tangible, institutionalised processes which place restrictions on how, when and whether citizenship is acquired and practised. Indeed, identity is not just symbolic; it is embedded and enacted in institutionalised practices.

Overall, a social psychological approach on citizenship can help to achieve the following aims:

- Theorise the intersection of different levels of analysis in the study of citizenship (i.e. symbolic and institutional).

- Encourage social psychology to pay more attention to concrete practices and institutions, where representations are embedded and enacted.
- Introduce a dynamic social-psychological perspective on citizenship, focused on self-other relations.
- Complement top-down studies on citizenship with a bottom-up perspective.

8.5 Suggestions for further research

This research has contributed to our understanding of citizenship as intertwined with processes of identity construction. It has sought to bring together analyses of citizenship as an institution with analyses of national identity as a symbolic representation. However, this thesis is only one step towards the better understanding of the role of citizenship and naturalisation in contemporary diverse and highly mobile societies. This section will outline some key directions that further research can take.

One limitation of this study is that it was conducted solely in London. The majority of naturalisation applications do, indeed, take place in London (see Chapter 4). London is also the most ethnically and culturally diverse place in the UK, being the home of most of Britain's migrant communities. However, as was argued in Chapter 1, national identity has different meanings and functions in different parts of the United Kingdom. It is quite possible that the idea of British citizenship has a very different meaning in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales than it has in England. Moreover, London cannot be said to represent the whole of England. Rather, as a metropolitan and 'glocal' city, it constitutes a particular case. Indeed, as was shown in the analysis of interviews, ideas about British tolerance were often exemplified in London's diversity and respect for difference, while there were also signs of the existence of London identities, mainly for new citizens. It is possible, therefore, that constructions of British citizenship, especially in terms of openness to diversity, may differ in other parts of England and the rest of the UK. Research on the meanings of citizenship can be complemented by further studies outside London.

Another point of departure for further research would be to focus on specific communities. This research has studied new citizens' understandings of citizenship without any consideration of their country of origin. It was found, however, that the positions of participants in the 'West-Rest' continuum had an impact on how they saw their place in the UK and the meanings they attached to becoming British. As was shown, constructions of elite and non-elite migration are fundamental in understanding people's different experiences of the naturalisation process and their life in the UK. A

potential new avenue for research would be, therefore, to study specific communities taking into consideration their particular migration trajectories and the social, cultural and political context of their country of origin. This would provide a more detailed and nuanced view on the functions and meanings of citizenship.

Finally, it is important to study citizenship as a practice. Although this research has sought to investigate the interplay between the institutional and the symbolic spheres, it has not studied the very practice of citizenship. It is necessary to understand how the rights and duties associated with citizenship are played out in practice. Specifically, there is a need to address the question of how newly naturalised British citizens 'enact' their citizenship. Certainly, political behaviours such as voting are no longer adequate to understand the whole range of current citizenship behaviours. On the one hand, a vast amount of scholarly work on the different forms of citizenship in contemporary societies suggests that current citizenship practices are transnational (e.g. Soysal, 2000). On the other hand, contemporary citizenship practices take place in various arenas and are displayed by a variety of political actors, such as grass-root community groups and voluntary sector organisations, which are not necessarily part of official parliamentary politics. In order to appreciate how citizenship is enacted, we need to look into different spheres of political action. Furthermore, it is important to also appreciate that political mobilisation and participation do not automatically stem from the official status of citizenship. As has been argued throughout this thesis, citizenship is embedded in a system of social relations which can empower or inhibit participation. It is essential to ask, therefore, whether citizens, particularly new citizens, feel empowered to participate in the political life of the country and what forms their participation takes. While both the official policy and the lay public discourse in the UK tend to attribute lack of integration to the reluctance of ethnic minorities to participate, this thesis has argued that the very design of immigration and naturalisation policies stresses exclusion rather than inclusion by focusing on what migrants fail to do, rather on what they contribute. By studying practices of citizenship of new citizens, we can better understand the facilitating factors as well as the barriers to political participation for the new members of the British political community.

8.6 Concluding remarks

Beck and colleagues (Beck, 2002, 2006; Beck & Sznaider, 2006) have argued that people in the West have become 'banal cosmopolitans'. By using this term, Beck and colleagues suggest that people in their everyday life challenge cultural

incommensurability and essentialising notions of otherness without being aware of it. Like Billig (1995) who used the term 'banal nationalism' to describe the ideology of taking the world of nations as a natural state of affairs, Beck argues that the dichotomising either/or principle of boundary construction has been replaced by the both/and principle of inclusive oppositions (Beck, 2002, 2006). This suggests that people have become open to diversity and alternative perspectives. But, as Gillespie notes: "It might be tempting to assume that an increasing plurality of co-existing representations would lead to an increasing plurality of mind, or at least tolerance for alternative forms of knowledge, but... such an assumption is not warranted" (Gillespie, 2008a, p. 276). As this research has shown, the 'other' is both embraced and resisted. 'Banal cosmopolitanism' is accompanied by efforts to demarcate the national boundaries. This is most evident in immigration policies which effectively serve as border management strategies. If the very concept of globalisation and the studies of transnationalism (Basch, Glick-Schiller, & Szanton-Blanc, 1994) make the world seem smaller, immigration practices highlight the boundedness of nation-states. In fact, the more globalised the world becomes, the stricter immigration policies become. For instance, while the European Union is borderless for those inside, it is securely bordered for those outside the EU creating a 'Fortress Europe' (Bhavnani, 1993). This constant negotiation between openness and exclusion shapes the construction of national identities and the management of otherness.

Taking this as a starting point, this research has sought to investigate the complexities of national identity construction within the UK naturalisation context. It has highlighted the value of a dialogical approach to knowledge and identity processes. It has stressed the necessity of considering identity as a process of positioning embedded in self-other relations which are shaped both institutionally (by state policies) and symbolically (by socio-cultural representations). This approach offers a dynamic relational framework which advances our understanding of citizenship, immigration and national identity on both a theoretical and a policy level. This framework allows for the conceptualisation of constancy and change by considering both the solidity of national boundaries, through processes of boundary maintenance, and their flexibility, through processes of negotiation and practices of boundary crossing.

It is my view that this dialogical approach can further offer a comprehensive understanding of processes of inclusion and exclusion, as well as open avenues for enhancing inter-group solidarity. According to the perspective adopted in this research, dialogue is not only a key theoretical concept for understanding identity and inter-group

relations, but it is also the means by which tolerance can be enhanced. As this research has shown, self-other relations are, more often than not, asymmetrical. There is a need in diverse societies, such as Britain, to acknowledge not only the existence but also the legitimacy of alternative, 'other' perspectives. It is only then that Beck's (2006) 'cosmopolitan vision' can be achieved. The first step is encouraging mutual trust and recognition. As Marková notes, trust is based on recognition, that is, on a "profoundly dialogical Ego-Alter relation" whereby both the self and the other treat each other with dignity (2008b, p. 210). The official public policy on immigration and naturalisation in the UK is currently far from this ideal. For the most part, public policy treats migrants with mistrust and suspicion. It enhances otherising and racialising representations which distinguish between positive elite migration and negative non-elite migration. Ultimately, a very fundamental distinction between 'us' and 'them' is maintained. Enhancing solidarity, on the other hand, means moving beyond a narrowly defined, patronising 'British tolerance'. It means recognition through taking the perspective of the 'other', so that "each member can appreciate the role that he or she fulfils for the other" (Gillespie, 2008b, p. 288). With that in mind, this thesis has offered a critical perspective on issues of immigration and belonging, a perspective which acknowledges the need to resist derogating representations of immigration and encourage dialogue, with the aim of enhancing recognition and widening participation in British society.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Topic Guides

Citizenship Officers' Interviews

General

- Do you live in this borough? How do you find it?
- How long have you been living in London in general? How do you find life in London?

Council work

- How long have you been working in the council?
- Do you enjoy it?
- What is your work about? What do you do that is related to the Nationality Checking Service and/or the organisation and conduction of the citizenship ceremonies?
- Can you explain to me the process of acquiring the British citizenship?

Naturalisation process

- What are your views about the ceremonies? What are the good/bad things about them?
- Why do you think the ceremony was implemented in the first place?
- Do you think it will succeed or has already succeeded in that?
- What changes may it bring or has already brought?

- What are your views about the 'Life in the UK' test? What are the good/bad things about it?
- What kind of knowledge do you think is tested in this test?
- Why do you think the test was implemented in the first place?
- What changes may it bring or has already brought?

- On the whole, what are your views about the British naturalisation process?
- Is it hard/easy to acquire the citizenship? More than it used to?
- Is there something that you would change?

Citizenship

- Why do you think people apply for citizenship?
- What are the advantages/disadvantages of becoming a British citizen?

- How would you describe a good citizen?
- How do you think new citizens view British citizenship?
- What is it for you to be a British citizen?
- What about dual citizenship? How do you think it is being a citizen of two countries?

The Future of Britain

- How do you imagine the future of Britain in ten-twenty years from today?
- What will have changed/remained the same?
- How do you imagine your future in ten-twenty years?

Naturalised Citizens' Interviews

General

- What do you do? Do you work/study? In which field?
- Do you enjoy it?

- Do you live in this borough? How do you find it?
- How do you find life in London generally?
- How is London/Britain compared to where you grew up?

Immigration History

- Why did you decide to move to Britain?
- Has your life changed? In what ways?

Naturalisation process

- What are your views about the naturalisation process in general? Has it been easy/difficult for you?

- What are your views about the ceremonies? What are the good/bad things about them?
- How was your ceremony?
- What do you think is the purpose of the ceremony?

- What are your views about the 'Life in the UK' test? What are the good/bad things about it?
- What do you think is the purpose of the test?

Citizenship

- Why did you decide to apply for the British citizenship?
- Is your life going to change or has already changed?
- What are the advantages/disadvantages of becoming a British citizen?
- In general, what does being a British citizen mean to you?
- What about dual citizenship? How is it being a citizen of two countries?
- Would you live somewhere else other than Britain? Where and why? How is that place better/worse compared to Britain?

The Future of Britain

- How do you imagine your future? Do you think it is going to be in London or in Britain generally? How do you think your life is going to be in 10-20 years from today?
- How do you imagine the future of Britain in ten-twenty years from today?

Appendix 2: Typical Interviews

Participant 2 – Registration and Ceremonies Officer in Council A

Duration 1:20:09

E: I'll just start by asking you a few questions about yourself.
P2: Yeah.
E: Do you live nearby?
P2: No. I don't live in the area. No. I live in [...][50]
E: Oh, so you commute everyday.
P2: Yes.
E: You've never lived in London?
P2: No. I'm, I'm [...]. Born, born in [...], lived there for 50 years and then I live now with a partner and she used to live in East London, in [...]. Her father still lives there, but she wanted to, to live out in, in more in the countryside having lived in London for thirty-forty years with no garden...
E: (laughs)
P2: ...she wanted to see some animals and things like that, so...
E: So, now you have a garden
P2: Yes, yes
E: Do you like London?
P2: I like the outer London...not so much inner London. I think it's too busy and you could fall over and hurt yourself and people would step over you. Had that happened in outer London or out in the countryside people would stop and help you. But because people are so busy with their working life and they need to be somewhere... they push and shout and, you know, so it's OK to visit, to go and see some of the sites and what have you but not to actually live in.
E: OK, so you wouldn't actually live in the centre?
P2: No, outer London, yes. I've lived in outer London. I used to live in [...] which is the London borough of [...]
E: OK. Yes.
P2: I lived there for a long time.
E: Yeah, yeah. It's nearby, like...
P2: Yeah. That's right. About 10 miles from the centre of London, where I used to live. The other side of the Thames.
E: So, you know [that part of London].
P2: I know [that part of London] quite well. Yes. Yeah. Because, as I said, my partner used to live in this area. So, I know the area quite well.
E: So, how do you find it? I mean those parts of London that you do know better.
P2: Yeah, It's certainly a more cosmopolitan area here, in [this part of London] than it is say in other parts of London where I was living. Because...for some reason it does seems to attract...a multitude of, of nationalities. I'm not so sure what the attraction is. But there must be an attraction for so many people to want to come here. You know, with over 140 different languages being spoken, I think it's over, it's about 61% of the population are ethnic minorities, so that makes them the majority. It's a young borough, I understand that many of the residents are under 25, so, it's a young, relatively young population compared to the national figures. So, all in all, I think given the mix of races, the... the population does live side by side, you know more or less happily. We have the odd incidents, stabbings and things like that, but that seems to be all over the country now.
E: You get incidents like that.
P2: So, that, I think that is a concern for everyone where everybody live. That there are more often than not younger people that for whatever reasons tend to carry weapons of some kind for, either for their safety, a lot of them say for their safety, but more often than not those knives will be used against them.
E: What do you mean 'for their safety'?

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[50] Brackets are used to conceal names of people and places in order to maintain the anonymity of the participant.

P2: Because, because if they go out on the street and they feel threatened, by having a knife with them they feel that they can then defend themselves

E: What's the threat?

P2: Well you've only got to read the papers, haven't you? People that walk down the street, my partner that travels on the train...and you've only got to look at someone in a funny way

E: OK.

P2: ...and they want to have an argument with you. And that can be said, you know, a lot of people are not happy to walk the streets at the night time.

E: Yeah.

P2: They're simply not happy.

E: Yeah.

P2: And we read about it nearly every day, somewhere in the country. And it's more often than, it's more the towns, the inner cities where this happens. What causes that, I don't know if it's the youngsters thinking that they have no place in society, they, they're ignored, they have nowhere where they can go and perhaps enjoy their free time and therefore they make their own amusement by pestering people. You know? In all sorts of different ways, you know, throwing stones at the window, laying the tires down or ridiculing someone because they've got some disability. You know?

E: Yeah, that's...

P2: So, you know, I have, I have a partner, I have nearly an ex-wife, I have three children, two daughters...and, yeah, the first thing that I did when they got to an age was to buy them mobile phones so they could then phone me.

E: In the case something happened.

P2: Yeah, I wouldn't rely on them coming home on their own at 12 'o clock at night. "Where are you? I will come and get you". You know? And you have to take those kind of... people say "you can't wrap people in cotton wool". It's an English saying. But if, yeah, if you have concerns, yeah, I mean you can't say "don't go to that area because it's unsafe". You can tell them that, doesn't stop them doing it

E: Yes.

P2: ...because they have no, they don't have the same fear. We have the experience. So you hope that they will go to places where they are safer, but that again is no guarantee that they will be safe. You know? So, but by and large my observation here is that people live side by side and people that I have that come in to this building here, I get as many of the ethnic minorities that are polite and pleasant to me as I do of the, the indigenous population. So, I have no bias towards anyone. I treat everyone exactly the same. You know, I call the gentlemen "Sir" and the ladies "Madam" and even the younger ones I treat them with respect, because that's what they deserve unless I see some behaviour where I think, well, that doesn't deserve respect. Then, my "philosophy", if you like, in life is to respect not just your elders, but respect the younger ones as well because there are some very big hearts in some of the young, younger people.

E: Yeah. It's true.

P2: You know. And they can show that. Which is nice. As a parent and a grandparent, it's nice to see. I hope that, I hope that their experience meeting me for Nationality Checking Service or for citizenship ceremony, performing their marriage, I hope that they will go away having enjoyed the experience and having enjoyed met me. And when they come along and say "thank you for that, I really enjoyed that service", then it's good. It's good to get that feedback.

E: Let me just ask you a few questions about your work here. How long have you been working in the Council?

P2: 20, this is my 21st month.

E: Month.

P2: Month, yes. I was made redundant from previous job after nearly 26 years, so this is a change of direction for me.

E: Oh, OK. How do you find it?

P2: There is a lot to learn, I still don't know everything. But it...the job is quite varied. I do enjoy the job, there's a lot less pressure in this job than I had in my last job.

E: Your last job was...?

P2: I was a contract manager. So, it's very different. Very different. Yeah, it was a good package with a good salary and a company car and private health and what have you. This,

this package here is half what I was getting, but now this gives me a good work-life balance, whereas that couldn't be said before.

E: Yes. OK, I mean, it's a give-and-take thing, I guess.

P2: Yeah. Yeah.

E: So, how is it? What do you do in the Council?

P2: My job is Registration and Ceremonies Officer. There are 5 other people that have that title and then below that we have deputies throughout positions. There should be 6 positions but we have 3 vacancies at the moment. Then, we have a Deputy Manager and then the Superintendent Registrar. So that's... and then we have a receptionist as well. So that's the make-up. And my responsibilities are... and we have rotated work here so that we're not doing the same thing every week. We vary the work. So, one week I can be doing the Nationality Checking Service, which is meeting, probably 6 applicants, unless it's a double applicant, husband and wife or a mother and child, each day, except Wednesdays when it's 5 appointments because we have a staff meeting in the morning. So I see those people, I check all their application forms, I look all their documents, I photocopy their documents which I'm entitled to do, because Home Office trained me. I give them all their original documents back, I can then send their application off to be considered by the Home Office for them to become British citizens. But it is a Home Office decision. It's not my decision at all.

E: You just help them with the documentation.

P2: I just check all their paperwork and send them off and may they know that once I have done that I have no further involvement. Only when they get the decision that says that they've been accepted maybe, or they've been told to contact the Local Authority, that would be our contact centre, to see what date and time they can come along for the ceremony.

E: OK.

P2: And then I might see them again because if it's my turn to do the work, It might be that I recognise the name or the face of the person...

E: Yeah.

P2: ...and so it then completes the circle. So that could be one week of doing the Nationality Checking Service, then it could be one week of actually doing the ceremonies.

E: Yeah.

P2: ...group ceremonies, as you've witnessed...

E: Four ceremonies per week.

P2: That's it. Four group ceremonies. We can, we can make that more, if we have a lot of people coming through and we find that our ceremonies are booked four weeks in advance.

E: Really?

P2: Yeah, Tuesdays and Thursdays for group ceremonies. So on the days I'm not doing group ceremonies, then I would either be registering marriages which is the actual writing of the marriage book, the Register...

E: Yes.

P2: ...and the certificate or performing the marriage. You need two people for a marriage; one to write the legal bit, the other one to perform the marriage. So, Monday, Wednesday and Friday I'll be doing that, but I could also be doing individual ceremonies where people don't want a group ceremony or they can't wait three or four weeks and they would then pay 50 pounds for an adult to have an individual ceremony. And we tend to do those 9.30 and 9.45 in the morning, before anything else really starts. So that's that. Other days my work could be registration of births and deaths. And during the course of the day we will, say, older people coming in to register new babies, those people that are coming in to register possibly still-born babies and also those that are registering the death of loved-ones. So that can be quite a taxing job.

E: I'm sure.

P2: If you have three deaths one after the other, you know and you've got to try and do the job and deal with people's emotions as well. And it's harder with a still-birth. So, this job can be quite demanding and touch upon your own experiences.

E: Yes, yes.

P2: But it's what makes us such people, it's character building and you can empathise with people, not that you necessarily want to share with them your experiences, but you can, yeah, you can, where it needs, you can converse with them. Yeah, I mean it makes do the job [if you just] take the details, do what they want and then go. But sometimes you don't feel like doing that. You feel that you need to give them some time.

E: Yes.

P2: Yeah. I'm quite happy to do that. I do see that as part of the job; never mind what the bosses say...

E: (laughs)

P2: -I think, I think you have to show some sincerity and understanding to people. And people when they can stand up at the end, big six-feet-two men, you know, and they can shake you by the hand and tell you "thank you for listening, thanks for your help" and it, you know, it makes the job worthwhile.

E: You basically deal with people in your job, as I understand it.

P2: You can, you can deal with them from the start to the finish. You know, you could potentially be registering a baby for a couple one week and three weeks later the same people could be coming in to register the death of the grandmother. You know? And in-between that, you might even see them here have their marriage and potentially to see them have their citizenship ceremony as well. You could see them for every important event of their life.

E: OK, lets talk about the citizenship ceremonies...

P2: Yeah.

E: What's your general view about them?

P2: I quite enjoy the ceremonies. I think you fully might gather that from last week when you, when you came in. I try to, as much as it is a... it's serious business to request and to become a British citizen. I think that when the people come in, that we should try and make it a happy event, where we can. Some people are simply not interested in that aspect of it. They just wanna come in and get the certificate, get the passport and that's it, which to me is sad. So when they actually come in, I do try to have a little bit of humour with them, which normally would start in the... when we actually receive them for registration in the waiting room, just to let them see that I'm human. I'm not an ogre, no one's fear. But at that point they don't, they still don't know that I'm actually going to do the ceremony, not till I walk back in the room with my jacket on and then I can say "it's me that's, that's doing the ceremony". So to try and make them as relaxed as they can be. The same as when I'm performing a marriage.

E: Why are people nervous?

P2: Yeah, they don't know what to expect, if they've not been to a ceremony before, where, you know, they watched what someone else has done or something like that. But it's just trying to make them relax and so... once they are there, if they are relaxed then they can actually take it in and enjoy it for what it's worth and, as I said to you before, when actually people come up to you at the end and shake you by the hand and say "thank you very much, I enjoyed that", you know, that little bit at the end when I say about the pictures, you know, "you're not obliged to buy them but if you don't buy one, our Civic Ambassadors will be very upset"

E: (laughs)

P2: ...you know, again they laugh and now they're gonna walk out with a smile on their face.

E: Yeah.

P2: And then they come along and say "could I have a picture with you?". The City Dignitary is there to present the certificate. If they have family, I ask them "do you have family or friends here today?" [and they're like] "Yes", right, "do you want a picture?". They don't all want a picture. So, in they come for a picture. More often than not, the Civic Ambassador wants me in the picture. Sometimes, I'll just step back. If there's three or four family members, fine, it's your day. If there's one person on their own, I'll ask them "do you have any friends or family here today?". I already know the answer cos I've seen them when they come in to register and they say "no" and I say "would you like to join me in the picture with you?". [They say] "Yes ", I say "I'll be your uncle today ". Yeah, "uncle" or "your brother", "I'm too young to be your dad"...

E: (laughs)

P2: ..."I'm your uncle today". And they, they're grateful for that. And the reason I do that: a) they've then got someone else in the picture, it's not just two of them and by me saying "I'll be your uncle today ", a lot of the people that we've got here are Black or, yeah, they're, yeah...by virtue of what they're here for, they're not White English (laughs), are they? So when I say "I'll be your uncle" and this guy is, you know, so far removed from me cos he's, he's, he's Black-African, they laugh. So again, it just, you know, it breaks the ice and it rounds off the occasion. And when they've gone back into the waiting room, if I've got time,

then I'll go in there or they're coming out and they've got the pictures [and I say] "Oh, let me have a look", you know? Same when they're with children. I might say to them "Yeah, if you've got, it's nice to see the children here", yeah, I could put up with some noise, it's not a problem, but if they get restless and by that I mean noisy, it's not fair for everyone else. Then you might need to step out of the room.

E: Of course. Yes.

P2: And if they quiet down, bring them back. You know? So, it's all about making it as, as good an experience for them. And if it's good an experience for them, it's good an experience for me. Cos I'm getting satisfaction. Cos a lot... most jobs get repetitive, don't they?

E: Yes, of course. Of course.

P2: Professional footballers can get bored with kicking a ball...a snooker player, you know, flashing balls round the table can get fed up. It's what you put in, it's what you get out, to make the job...you know.

E: I think it's two-three years since the ceremonies started?

P2: Well, it's obviously going before I joined. I think, I think we've actually got registers that go back possibly to... until late 2003.

E: It's recent...

P2: Relatively recent because if you hear some of our Civic Dignitaries that have become British citizens 30, 40 years ago, it was a much simpler process where they simply apply, they were then told to go along to a solicitor, swear the oath, pay 3.5 pounds and that was it.

E: Is it better now?

P2: Well, I think so from, from...many different respects. In that they have a ceremony that they can attend. I tell people to come along with their guests or someone else and they said "Oh, we didn't have this when I got my citizenship". They get a medal as well as, it's little keep-sake, you know, [they say] "I haven't got one of those". We have even, we have even considered but we're not so sure if we could afford the time and also have the accommodation to maybe do a renewal of citizenship vows.

E: Where did that idea come from?

P2: I think one or two people alluded to it and then I picked up on it and said "hm, that's something to think about".

E: So, there would be people that became British...

P2: 25 years ago.

E: And they would do the ceremony...

P2: It's a bit like people that come in and renew their marriage vows.

E: Yes. Yes.

P2: Yeah? Then maybe we could do the same. But, at present we, we would struggle because of accommodation, because of staff numbers. You know, we do sometimes find ourselves up against it and when you're like that, you can't always then give the same kind of service that I've just explained to you.

E: Yes.

P2: If you're really, yeah, up against it, well, you've got other things to do and you haven't got enough people in the general office and you've got people who want marriage certificates and copies of birth certificates, so that they can go get a passport, yeah, all this, all this has a knock-on effect.

E: How are the people at the ceremonies? How do you think they respond to the process?

P2: It's a mixed bag. We get those that have some enthusiasm for it, those that are very quiet by their nature, that's they way they are. The real...one of the tests is at the end when I say "right, we now finish with the playing of the national anthem. The words are printed on the back of the card you're reading from earlier. It is only the first verse, so you won't get out of breath when you join it". Otherwise they'll think "you can play the national anthem, fine, I'll just stand here." A lot of them do, but I'm trying to invite them.

E: And do they respond to that?

P2: Some of them do. Some of them respond very good. It's the same as when I ask them to say their... to say their pledge or to swear the oath. I do say to them, "you can all speak at the same time provided you speak up." Because I mean to actually see everyone of them say the words. I can't hear them all. Some, some of them could just be mumbling. And anyone that's over 65, isn't required, to sit the exams

E: Yeah.

P2: ...because they might find it difficult to learn the language or whatever. But it, it...I am in a position, if I'm not happy with an applicant, to not allow the ceremony to take place.
E: Has that happened?
P2: Yes.
E: What happened?
P2: He came in and he couldn't understand what I was saying. People say "I want to use an interpreter!". I say, "well that defeats the object of them becoming British citizens", sitting the Life in the UK test, which shows that you've got some ability to actually acquire knowledge about England, to be able to speak and understand. And this chap didn't...in my opinion could not have sat and passed the test. So, he had someone else do it for him. There have been, there have been examples up and down the country where people have got their Life in the UK test falsely.
E: Oh, OK.
P2: OK? So I said "I'm not prepared to do your ceremony today" and afterwards I sent, I sent the certificate back to the Home Office, with my views. I said I wasn't happy with his standard of English, comprehension, you know, his friend was slightly better than him. I said "at the end when I was trying to explain to him, I used a 14-year old boy as an interpreter". So, in my eyes, he, he couldn't pass that test. Therefore, he doesn't deserve to be a British citizen. All he kept saying was "please, boss". He kept just saying "please, boss, please, boss". I said "you can say 'please' as much as you like, I'm not happy that you are in a position to become a British citizen". I told him what I was going to do. I wasn't rude. And he wasn't rude back. He was a relatively young man, in his early 20s. And he did actually come back some weeks later, but there was no, I had no certificate back from the Home Office for him, so he turned up hoping that someone else would be there and he would be able to, perhaps, not force his way in, but buy some kind of deceit. Cos people, we get people that turn up, they're not on our list and what we do is we go on "OK, you are here. I've only got 12 people here today instead of 15, I've got time, I'll go and find your certificate and yes you can do happy ceremony". Provided they've got the paperwork. So, they can do that. And he was maybe hoping that he would get someone, he didn't realise I'd sent, he didn't remember I was going to send his certificate back.
E: He was hoping that you still had his certificate.
P2: Maybe, maybe. I spoke to him, I said "you're here with someone else, sir?". Yeah, you don't assume that you know that he's here for that. You're giving the opportunity and he said "I've actually come along for the ceremony, sir". So, I said to him "I haven't got your certificate, sir. It's back with the Home Office. I did tell you that I was returning it". So, you need to speak to them.
E: People should be able to speak English then?
P2: Oh, that's the purpose. When we do the Nationality Checking Service, when those people come in, if they say that they come in with a friend and you ask them a question, "when did you get indefinite leave to remain?" and the friend answers us and I say "excuse me, sir. I need the gentleman or lady to answer this question for me, it's their application, not yours" and then they keep interrupting and my answer is then "sir, if you can't keep quiet, as I've requested, then I'll ask you to sit in the waiting room". Cos if they can't answer simple questions, like "where did you sit your Life in the UK test?", then I've to suspect there's something not quite right about their application.
E: And does this happen?
P2: A couple of times I've sent people away. And said "If I send your application off now, I would feel obliged to say that I was not happy with your standard of speaking English or understanding". Doesn't mean to say they've got to know every word in the English language, but at least be able to answer the basic questions.
E: But they have passed the Life in the UK test.
P2: Well, I've got, I've got a Life in the UK test letter that it's been issued. But, if I believe that from my experience with them, that they couldn't have sat that test, then I've got to make some comment to them. And if, if, if they insist [that] I send off their application, I would do that. But I would say in my notes to the Home Office, "this person's standard of, of speaking English and understanding English, it was very poor and I would question whether or not they could have sat and passed the Life in the UK test". Now, where they listen to me and understand and like I said, well, it's nervous, it's this and that, what I say to them is "I'm going to make you another appointment, not charge you anymore money", cos it's 40 pounds for an individual. "What I'm going to do is make another appointment for you in say

two months or three months, tell you what that date is, that time is so you know when you're coming back and during that time I want you to go away and to try and improve your English". When I've got an 8-year old boy there that's telling his mum what I'm saying, what does that tell you? I said "you must spend more time with your son, to learn from your son." Yeah? If you're not able to get out of the house, because you've got other children and what have you, you must improve your English.

E: What are your views on the content of the test?

P2: I don't know. I'm not, I'm not, I've not gone, gone on the system to actually look at that test. Yeah my, my hours here, Monday to Friday are fully employed in doing my work without actually going and looking at the test.

E: It's not part of your job.

P2: No, it would...there are lot, lots of different things that we can go and look at... yeah, we have access to the Home Office website, where they issue updates on the...on the guidance notes for the Nationality Checking and what have you. There are other websites that we have to go on where they issue updates concerning marriages, registration of births and deaths. There's enough to do in that area without having to find the time to go and look and see what this test involves. Yeah? I mean I hear snippets from people, yeah, about aspects of it and I think, yeah, fair enough. But, I'm fairly sure that a lot of the questions in that test couldn't be answered by the indigenous population, let alone the immigrants. So, what does that tell you? So, how, how, how good is that test as part of this process? I don't know. If I looked at the test, I might be a little more critical of it, so, I've intentionally not found the time to go and look at it.

E: Should people have some sort of knowledge about the UK?

P2: I do, because...

E: Do you agree with the idea of the test?

P2: I do, because, you know, we are but an island and this island is... is becoming densely populated, to the extent we're having sufficient housing, you know, the government talks about having to build 3 million homes in 10 years. Yeah, we have...well according to the newspapers, I don't look at any of the official statistics, but, you know, they say that we, we receive 500.000 people a year. Well, there's only so much that we as a country can provide for. And if the people that come into to the country are unable to provide for themselves, then, that then becomes a burden on our society. It becomes a burden on our schooling, on the National Health, social welfare, all those kind of things. So, unless the people are able to contribute, and the only way they can contribute by is, is...mixing with people, you know, working across the different kind of cultural divides, then it will always be a burden to us. We've, we've got to, we've got to make sure that everyone can work together. If they come in and think that they will just see this country as a remote island of that country or that country or that country, that's not the way to do it. You know, if that's what you want, stay in the country where you've come from. If you're looking to come to this country, then you've got to be prepared to mix, understand. And we are the most tolerant society probably in the world. Because of the, the, the diverse, diverse mix of people that we have here. And we in this country seem to give more time and understanding to foreign people's needs than our own indigenous...

E: Does this happen, you think?

P2: I do. I do. Yeah.

E: In what sense?

P2: If you look at schooling, at schools. Yeah? There are some schools now where they don't actually teach English. I've got that from one of my colleagues. [There are] three white children in the class that are English and they're not actually teaching English as a subject.

E: Is that a state school or...

P2: I don't... I think it's a state school. I'm not sure. But, I mean, that's an observation they made at that, I'm not...so, it's third party information, but, every, every school, they say "we are, we are obliged to take that child because it moved into this area and we will take them on, but we haven't got a teacher that speaks that language"... So, it then becomes a drain on their resource to find someone that can come in and in some instances, I've even heard that even the children act as interpreters. So, again it's got an impact on the, on the quality of the teaching. Now, if you actually you check, check that out, I've a 24-year old daughter, who's a primary school teacher. She's been doing teaching and she starts in January full-time with a reception class. That's over, back in [...]. But, you know, I've got experience, my 4-year old granddaughter started in September, so I know that this does happen. And it does put a

drain on our, on our resources, that and how they're used. You can't, you can't [inaudible] for everyone, so in effect what we do is we reduce the service. It's no different from this office. You know, if I've only got seven people in this building, and our full complement of staff is meant to be fifteen, something has to give. But the town hall say "why would someone need to wait two hours to register a baby?" You can't have it all. Yeah, they say "you've got, you've got to give quality and value of service". Well, you can, within reason. Yeah? I mean I've had many years of not taking lunch breaks and my colleagues now say "you must take a lunch break". You know, when I was manager and I had staff, you know, I would just take a 15-minute break and that would be it. But they don't, they don't share that view downstairs and they're "I'm gonna take my hour". So, you've got four people waiting in the waiting room. You're used to say to them "I'm sorry, you've got to wait another hour till you're gonna have any certificate issued." So, if that... you know, we've had people who come in here and they're asking for things but they don't speak English. [They say] "I'll speak to that gentleman because he speaks Urdu". [And I'm like] "Sorry, that gentleman is registering births and deaths. He's not here to be your interpreter". "Ah, but he spoke to me last time I was here". He may have done, but we're not here to provide a translation service.

E: Should the government be, then, stricter on how many people they receive...

P2: Yes. Not, not, not to be difficult for those people who want to come into the country, but simply for the overall balance, if you like, in the country in terms of who come into the country, what skill sets they bring to the country, what demands they will put on our, on our society, the schools, the hospitals, the social service, all these things that we've mentioned, but... and, and, and housing. You know, people will come into this country and, and, and they may well have come from an, an oppressed regime, you know, where, where they've come from and they will be given accommodation. Where we had people in this country that've been 10 years on some kind of housing list with the council, they live with, with family, they're overcrowded, yet they're bypassed. You know, I'm not, I'm not in any way racist. You know, it doesn't... and I've been, I've been accused of being racist...by neighbours.

E: What, what for?

P2: A white mother and a black daughter, and when we first moved in they weren't that communicative and if they had a problem [like] "oh, my car has broken down, could you come and have a look at it?", [I was like] "Oh, yeah, fine", or [she would say] "I just bought a television for my daughter for Christmas, I can't tune it in. Could you drop in and have a look?" [and I would say] "Yes, I'll do that for you" and the first time that they actually parked the car on a shared drive, you're not meant to park on shared drives, they're for access only, my partner said "could you move the car, cos I can't get my car out?" [and the neighbour replied] "where do you want me to put it?". She [my partner] said "either on the drive", politely, "either on the drive or in your garage". So, yeah she slammed the door shut and my partner came in, she said "could you believe that woman?". And she didn't say that "black woman" or anything like that cos my partner has lived in this area so she's been brought up with the mix of societies.

E: Yeah.

P2: You know, like me, she works with all sorts of different races. And she told me what had happened, so I said "hang on a minute". So, I went out and as she parked the car, she took it back down the shared drive, and I thought she was going to knock down the gas-box off the side of the wall. I said "'excuse me". She said "Don't talk to me. You're racist". I said "Oh, you're gonna pull that one, are you?". So, from that point on, I was no longer a good neighbour. I didn't take up their bins every week when they would full, because the mum was all around, the daughter was working night work. You know, if they, they would knock on my door and said "oh, the car is not working". So all the time I was a good neighbour, that was fine. The minute politely she was asked to move the car, we were racist. So...it could, it could act like, like an excuse, you mean. Like... They, they can, these people can use it, like a chip on their shoulder. And I'm not saying that white people can't do the same in, in a slightly different way cos they can. Cos they always make, you know, find some reason to, to point the finger at you rather than themselves, yeah, their failure. But, as I said, I'm, I'm not racist, I treat everyone the same here.

E: You said there should be some limits on how many people the country receives. What about the people that become citizens?

P2: I think, I think that if you put a limit of... cos, because people that come to the country, they don't necessarily have to apply to become British citizens. Our Civic Ambassador has been in this country 34 years and she's still Indian.

E: OK. Yeah.

P2: And she came here as a victim of an arranged marriage. Her husband was member of the Armed Forces in [...] and, I'm not so sure of his nationality, he's an Asian, I know that, and at 19 she was made to come over here.

E: And she didn't decide to naturalise...

P2: No, I think she will do it at some point, but, but she hasn't done it. She says this is her home, even when she goes to India and visit, you know, she's looking to come home. When she's been to see family and, and what have you. So I think that... if, if you limit the number of immigrants, then it follows that the number of citizens would reduce. And I don't, I don't mind if every person who was allowed into the country became a British citizen. I really don't. If they pass the test, then, and, and there's a new point system that's going to come into being, which is what a lot of other countries do. You know, Australia and, and New Zealand and such like. If you, if you have no skill sets to offer to this country, then no. Sorry, no. Because you need to be able to contribute to society. Not to come in here and live off the state. Yeah, we've got pensions, in this country where in years to come my pension is not going to anywhere near worth what it was, say, 20 years ago. Why? And that's because the amount of money that's being paid out of the government coffers for all of these other benefits for people, you know, single parent families and, and things like that and people that say that they're incapable of work and therefore want incapacity benefit, are they really incapable or they're just lazy? And that can be as many white people as it can be foreign people. So we do need to have some kind of... there's no control over them. Yeah, we've seen over the last two years that the criticisms at the various Ministers that have been responsible for the Home Office. And now that one is gone and someone else's stepped in and that someone else. They keep moving the people, so that they can't keep hitting them with the same kind of criticism. They say, "Well, I 'm just taking it on, you know, I can't be responsible for what went on then".

E: Yeah.

P2: But there's got to be, there's got to be some kind of control. It's the same as there's got to be some degree of control in schools over discipline. Yeah, I'm not just homing in on immigrants.

E: Yeah.

P2: Yeah, there are, you know, maybe we don't provide enough entertainment for the teenagers of this country. Yeah, where they can go to youth clubs and not be hanging around on the street corners and mugging old people and, and doing, yeah, obviously it's terrible, when you hear of 80-year old people being beaten up for a few pence. So, rather than let this happen and give very weak jail sentences because the prisons are overcrowded, let's spend some money at the front end to try and make sure that they're not taken, taken down that path. That they are good members of society. It's what unfortunate, the youngsters is. They're likely to take more notice of bad influences in their life than good influences. Yeah, they'll always mock mum and dad when they say "Oh, you need to be in such and such a time" or "no, you're not going out with that particular person because he's a trouble-maker". You know? Or "don't smoke, it's not good for you". They'll always do the opposite of what you tell them.

E: Well, yeah...

P2: Unless, unless you set a good example. None of my children smoke. My parents smoked, my in-law smoked. And I say to my children "they all died as a result, or main contributing factor, of them smoking". My mum didn't speak for the last 11 years of her life cos she had throat cancer. She lost her voice chords. I said to the children "Nanny smokes from a young age. I can remember when I was small Nanny always smoking". And so they've accepted me for what I said there. Now, I may, may not be factually correct in saying that, but they've accepted what I said and it's worked.

E: It works.

P2: None of them smokes. None of them are great drinkers. I'm not a great drinker. My dad was. My father-in-law was. But it ruins your life. If it gets hold of you.

E: It does, yes.

P2: So, it's, it's... it's trying to set examples and that's when... I don't only talk about setting examples at home, but also examples here... If I choose, if I treat an 18-year old with respect in here as I will do with a 75-year old in here, then I would hope that he would acknowledge that... Well, it takes you through life. You know? The same as if a guy comes to my house to do a job or work, I'll respect him for the job that he's doing. Whether it'd be the gas man,

yesterday, when he came to look at the boiler, or the man that is going to chop down some trees. You know. Can you give me a quarter to do that job? Yes, I can. Right, nice to see you. And then he goes to offer his hand and his hand's dirty. So, I said "don't let that put you off". I said "You're a working man". I said "I can wash my hand" you know, I'd shake his hand, unless, he's been down the toilet (laughs).

E: (laughs)

P2: But that's the respect. You know?

E: Yeah.

P2: So, if you take that through life, I don't think you can go very wrong. The trouble is that youngsters today have a bit of a problem with respect. They don't get up and stand on the train to let you sit down. Even pregnant ladies, that have, you know, 8 months gone and they don't do it. They don't do it. And it's because it's not enough of an example being set to them. We've got second generation now families where the parents have never worked, the children aren't working and the next ones are coming along.

E: Yeah, to get back to this, you mentioned contribution earlier. So, how can people contribute?

P2: Well...if the, if we, if we use the system that the Australians use and the New Zealanders, they only take professional people. Plumbers, carpenters, accountants. People that they know when they go into the country can actually pay their own way, not live off savings, can contribute to society. OK? People that go out there and all they are is road sweepers, they're not going to get in, because they're gonna struggle then to live, they're gonna struggle to find somewhere to live and have sufficient money to live on. So, they won't get enough points. And that could be said here.

E: So, in terms of work...

P2: I think so, because... I mean that's, when you consider how much of our, our, of our life is either spent working or sleeping, you know, you've got to then say "wait a minute, I've got to take this person during their working hours, what they can contribute to the society, to this company, to this country". OK? In terms of taxing. Now a lot of the, the immigrant workers that are coming in are contributing. You know, there are nearly 6 billion pounds that comes into the Exchequer. Because we've got so many people now that won't go and pick potatoes in the fields, but Eastern Europe people will do that. Well, if our people won't do it, then fine, invite them in. For all the ones that are here, come up with something that where they've got to find some work, they've got to do something. Even if it means going cleaning up all of the areas that have become run down. You know, like this community work. Or if someone does a crime, they don't actually put him in prison, they say "Right, you're gonna go clear all that nature reserve cos it's all got overgrown". Find something for them to do.

E: Why do you think people come to Britain in the first place?

P2: Because they think that the country is a soft touch, because they will get benefits without so much... trouble. Yeah, they get, they get somewhere to live. Now, if, if we have to reduce the numbers of the people who come to this country, I'm not saying that they should all be workers. It may well be that you've got a percentage of those people that are true asylum seekers. I think the term asylum now is grossly misused. But if there are people that live in fear of their life, because of what they say or their religion or whatever, then we've got to make some room for some of these people. But we shouldn't take on all of the problems of the rest of the world. Other countries don't do it. But we've got a European policy now that tries to dictate to us what we'll do. Rather than our own government. Would you not agree?

E: I'm not sure. I'm not familiar with...all the laws and everything. But, yeah, I know that the UK and the EU have been having, there's some tension there in terms of immigration.

P2: Yes. I mean why is it all the all the Eastern Europeans all, all flock through France and then sit in Calais waiting to jump on the back of the lorry? Or train or something like that. Because they know that England is, is the place where they want to be. So they can get as much as they can out of the country. I mean I've met some, some youngsters that have come into this country, 12 or 14 year old, and then they've gone to 18 or 19, they apply to become British citizens. And then they're telling me what they've done and I've met some nice, and they've got letters that they've brought in from particular places and they say "He's done a fantastic job. Voluntary work. He's helping do this and he's helping do that and he's now, you know, he's got a little job as a photographer and bla-bla-bla". Great. This is a success story. So, I'm not, I'm not looking to put the shutters out for the sheer hell of it. I think we need it so that we can continue to be a worthwhile society to help other people. But if we get swarmed, we won't be able to do that.

E: OK, there are some reasons that people actually come to the UK. Why do you think people decide... some of them decide to get the citizenship?

P2: ... (long pause)

E: I mean you've talked to many of them, I guess.

P2: Probably not as much as I'd like to because again it comes down to time. I think you can see with some of them how much it means, you know, when they get a bit tearful or they come up and they show their gratitude that they've got that. Others, we give them the wallet where it's got the application form for the passport, you step outside and all you find is the wallet. They've got the application form for the passport. The rest is thrown away. All they want is the passport because it might well give them more entitlement, it certainly makes their travel easier than got to get visas to go all over the place. And they think that well "once I'm a British citizen, then, you know, I'm secure". Reality is that in this country you don't have to have a British citizen, to be secure. If you've been resident in this country for 10 years or more, then you can stay here, don't have to be a British citizen. You can't be kicked out. Not so long ago, there was a guy, can't remember the exact detail, he committed crimes and I think it was a murder and the Home Office said "we're gonna kick him out" and he reminded that "you can't do that". He's, he's got a right to family life. He's been in this country for about 14 years, more than a 10-year old, he's got to stay. So, I guess his punishment here, which is much much less than if he had committed that crime back in his own country, he'd be dead now. This country gave him...7 years? And people that they let out, they then commit same crimes, worse crimes. So, our punishment in this country isn't good enough. That's not, that's not the fault of the immigrants. That's the fault of weak, weak government. But again, they won't build more prisons cos it, again, it costs money. It costs a lot of money to keep a prisoner each week in a cell.

E: Yeah, I never thought of that, but I guess it does.

P2: More, it costs more money to keep them in a cell than it would cost you to stay in the Dorchester for a week.

E: (laughs)

P2: That is the truth. If we won't build any more prisons, then we can't punish people to the same extent or the same kind of tariff as they call it, as what we did 5 years ago or 10 years ago. Yeah, when they say "he's got life for committing murder" and it's 20 years, that's a generation, that's not a life, is it?

E: Yes.

P2: So, they say "but if he, if he, if he behaves himself, then he'll get time off". Yeah, that 20 years could be reduced effectively to 10. And then they let him out and he does it again. Yeah, we've got care in the community in this country that doesn't work. Since that was introduced in the early 1990s by the Conservatives, there've been over 700 people killed by people that are cared in the community, that are no longer taking their drugs. There's, there's a name that you might recall, "Ziko", a woman whose husband was killed on a, on a platform station, underground station. And she's now been for years and years trying to make young people more aware of this and these people need to support and they need to make sure they're taking their medication, and they're doing it. Because we should close all, all the mental hospitals. So, they're let out with the community for the community to worry about them. But if you don't know who's living next door to you, how can you look after them? How would you know to look after them? I'm not a professional nurse or psychiatrist, a psychiatric nurse. How can I do that? You know, there's, there's so much wrongness in this country and we've gone right off the track from what you wanted to meet to talk about (laughs).

E: No, I think, I mean, in a way or another these things are relevant...So we talked about the legal requirements of becoming British. What is British for you? What does it mean for you to be British?

P2: I want to say that it, it means anything more to me than say... where do you come from?

E: Greece.

P2: To say, you know, I think that the British is any better than, than Greek people. You know? I've got friends that are Greek people. I've got, my, my son, his sister in-law is married to a Greek man. And they live in [...] and it's funny listening to a Greek Barnsley accent. (laughs)

E: (laughs)

P2: So, I suppose, yeah, people talk about being British and it's really, it's a thing of the past. It is a thing of the past. Because British now means so many different things to so many different people. It's not just the Union Jack, the flag, it's not just the monarchy. Yeah, these

are all small facets. I would sooner... I mean I'm not particularly Christian person or a religious person. I have, I am a humanitarian. So, if someone said to me, someone landed from another planet and said "What are, who are you?", I'd say "I'm a person from this planet". Not a person from this country. And I like to think I'm a good person. You know? So, I'm no better than anyone else. I think I'm proud to be part of this...nation... and whatever makes that up. Whether it be the white English, Black, Greeks that've become... that relinquish their, their Greek citizenship and then become British. I mean that to me is a great shame. If you then sacrifice your own... country in order to become a British citizen.

E: Why is that?

P2: Not, not... it's a shame, it's a disappointment that they feel that they've got to do that. Why should they do that? Is it because they feel that their country has nothing to offer? Nothing to offer them? As we said earlier it's all about give and take. You know? You need to make this place better by what you do and what you contribute, yeah, if I have more leisure time, then I'd like to do more things for the society. Years ago, I used to drive voluntarily an ambulance.

E: Yes.

P2: For a club for people that had multiple sclerosis. You know... Every Thursday night from about 6 'o clock to 11 'o clock, with an hour's break, I need to get grab some dinner, I pick people up, take them to their little club and that was the only time they got out. They were in wheel chairs. They couldn't actually get out. So, they went to a church hall and they played a little game of bingo and did this and did that. And that was the only time they could get out. I had to stop doing that when my job moved away and I wasn't able to carry on. So, it's all about, it's more about what you give to than what you take. Mainly to people because countries are made up of people...

E: Yeah.

P2: ...they're not made up of buildings and the green spaces and things like that. It's all about the people. And what they, what they want their country to be. The area in which they live. Yeah.

E: Would you ever live outside this country?

P2: No ... The only time I would go and live outside this country is if my family were with me. When my job is relocated... for many many years, I've always left the family where they were and I've commuted long distances and lived in digs, you know, lodgings rather than travel every day. My partner would like to go and live in Greece, Crete...

E: Yeah?

P2: We had our first holiday there and we have friends that live in Crete, we were out there in September. And she would move there tomorrow, but I...

E: But you wouldn't?

P2:-I have 3 children. I've a granddaughter, hopefully I'll have another grandchild with my son, I have a sister and her family, a brother and his family. And I suppose that those family ties are greater than...yeah, I love going to, to...I mean we go all over the place, different countries. We have two holidays a year. But it's good for a holiday. Not to live. The...the novelty would wear off. Living in Crete with all the sun and what have you. What would it do? It would...it's the same as if I won the lottery. If I win five million pounds on a lottery, I don't all of a sudden then go and buy a Ferrari sports car, I don't go and buy a yacht, football club, race horses, a big house with a massive drive, because that then puts me in an environment that I'm not familiar with. So that I'm uncomfortable with. Money is helpful to you and I would get more satisfaction with that money helping people than I would doing anything with it myself. You know, I'd sooner quietly say to family "your mortgage is paid off". If they wanted. Some people are very proud. You have to respect that.

E: Of course.

P2: So I'd be happy that I could, that I've got the means to do what I want, but not actually going to do it. OK, maybe have few more holidays a year...

E: Yes, yes.

P2: But if I'm still working, then I've only got five weeks to take, yeah... So, I think you have to be realistic as to the way you are in society, how happy you are in your life and where you want to be. And I'm relatively content. You know, the job I enjoy, gives me enough satisfaction, good work-life balance, as I said earlier. And it gives me a chance to meet people which is quite an important part of the job. And sometimes when you get people that are difficult... and I've had one or two and I've had a woman sitting there giving me a lot of aggravation, the husband sitting there saying "No, no, no, no". Eventually, I won her over.

You know and I've offered my hand to shake her hand and I've not let go of the hand and said "don't want to let go of your hand till I see you smile." And then she said she forced herself but she managed to smile. And when they come in for ceremony, [it was] fine. But they just... we kept them waiting and then they said about the appointment and I said "Look, if I could have changed anything, I would have done it. I have apologised for other people, I can't apologise anymore" and she would keep going and that's why her husband said "look, he's trying to help us". So I said "well, thank you for saying that, Sir, cos I am trying to help you, I'm trying to make it better than it was". So that, you know, you get all those little challenges and that can be as rewarding as all the other good... handshakes that you get, "thank you for doing that" and "that was nice" and...

E: I'm sure it is.

P2: You know?

E: OK. I'd like to ask you something else.

P2: Yes.

E: Since we've been talking on issues around the UK and Britain, how do you see this country say in the future like say 10 years' time, maybe 20 years' time?

P2: ... (long pause) If we continue as we are... and we don't see... some significant changes in, in certain areas, then this country will not be as popular as it is. People will come to this country... potentially come to this country, with a misguided view of what this country is about cos they're based on history rather than on what is now or what has actually happened.

E: What do you mean by 'history'?

P2: Well, being, yeah, people come to this country because we've got a good social, yeah, benefit system. You know, you come to the country as an asylum seeker, then you get help, you get perhaps a home and so on. OK, you can't work, yes you've got a husband but he's back wherever that may be... yeah, all that kind of thing. If they've got false impression of what this country is about, we're no longer able to fulfil that. I wouldn't say that we'll have anarchy. But we will have more unrest...more dissatisfied people and that will be a mix of people. So, we will have the indigenous population still criticising this and that. We'll have the foreign input that also say "yeah, this is what I expected and I've not got that" and there will be more friction, I believe. You know, we've got UKIP, one of the political parties, yeah, United Kingdom Independence Party who has, who... the, their man that heads that up is seen more to be National Front.

E: Yeah.

P2: OK? They've got very very strong views on, on immigration. Extremely strong views. And some, some people could say that elements of their issues are correct and maybe that we should, should adopt them. But if, if we don't, if we don't recognise some of the issues that we've got and they are major issues, then it will get worse. And then I think we'll have, I think we'll have some...to show how it will actually manifest itself, we'll probably get more rallies for London, you know, going on about immigration, if we don't put a cap on it, we'll then get more rallies about the poor punishments given to offenders for murders and rapes and things like that. You know, the whole fabric of society will start to...

E: To weaken, somehow?

P2: It will. I'm sure it will. And, that, that gives me a great problem, because I've got children and I've got grandchildren. So, that doesn't bode very well for them. You know, I'm now, yeah, in the last quarter of my life circle. So, it's not perhaps going to affect me quite as much as it will affect them if that continues to perpetuate itself.

E: Yes.

P2: I don't know. What I believe would help... (long pause) would help this country, and not just this country, because so many countries around the world have got problems... (long pause) more often than not through religion...A lot of the wars have been caused by religious views and beliefs, it is if we could have a coalition government which is made up of all parties, so you then get a consensus of what we should do and how we should do it rather than the Conservatives all wanting to look after their haves that've got all the money, the Labour people trying to say that they help the people that haven't got a lot, but they're a little bit too feisty in what they say there and the Liberals that say "wouldn't it be nice, if everything was nice and green and rosy and happy, it would be an idyllic world", but, you know, we're not gonna get that. But if you had a mix of all of them and we came up with... fairly reasoned ways in what earned an explanation to why we're gonna do things, I think the country, country would benefit. And that could be said of any country that you looked at. Israel, Iraq, Iran, Cyprus, you know, where they've got this split there, where they don't wanna get on.

You know? Life is too short and you can't hide behind religion to say "oh, that's why I don't like that person", because he's got another religion. That's why this country, a lot of people are happy to come here. Because the see that, you know, you can believe in what you want and no one is going to put you down. But if you live in Iraq, you know, if you are a Shia or whatever it is, I think the Shia rule the...or is the...?

E: Sorry, are you talking about Iraq or Iran?

P2: Either because they both have similar... religions, but I mean when, when Saddam was...

E: Yeah, it's Shia and Sunny.

P2: Yeah, that's right. When Saddam Hussein was there, the way that he treated... I mean I thought it was right that we did go and invade them. Because of what had happened to all the Kurds. You know. So that the Kurds have a right to live. But you know to go in and gas them. That was totally wrong, but people say, yeah "well, the Americans did it because of the oil situation". Probably right. I think George Bush... I think he, he went for the invasion simply because he's got very weak home policies, domestic policies and they needed something as a smoke screen to keep him in power. Cos he's a muppet. He's not got a lot of brain. (laughs)

E: (laughs)

P2: But he's got a lot of power!

E: Yes, he does.

P2: So, I think that's his real reason for going there, just as a smoke screen. Because he then says "yeah, look at me, I'm going out there, I'm defending us against terrorism and so on". Yeah? That's why there's this conspiracy theory about the two planes...

E: Yes, yes.

P2: ...flying into the towers, you know. I mean I've, I mean I've watched various programs on that and that frightens me. To think that someone could possibly do that.

E: OK, I think, I think we are done.

P2: We're done.

E: Unless you want to add something.

P2: No, I don't think so. I don't think so. I've covered quite a bit there. Probably more than you wanted!

E: Thank you very much.

Participant 45 – Naturalised Citizen in Council B

Duration 1:25:31

E: So, OK, I'll just start by asking just a few questions about yourself and what you do.
P45: I'm a dental technician.
E: OK.
P45: I've been doing it for thirteen, fourteen years now.
E: Long time.
P45: Yeah, it is a long time.
E: And you told me that you work nearby, right?
P45: Twenty minutes drive from where I live.
E: Twenty minutes.
P45: So I live in [...][51], I work in [...]
E: Is that a nice part of London?
P45: Yeah, it's very nice, very nice. Very nice, so...
E: Have you always been living there, in London?
P45: No I... no, I've started in the UK in... when I first arrived in London, then went to Glasgow...
E: Oh.
P45: And stayed there around fifteen months, in Glasgow and then I moved to London.
E: Did you work in Glasgow?
P45: Well, the first six months I didn't have the work permit.
E: Yeah.
P45: But after six months I've got my work permit and, but meanwhile I was... the first six months when I arrived there I wanted, cos in my kind of work, if you stop for few months you really slow down, you know, cos you have to do it all the time, otherwise if you leave a few months you get really really slow in your work, so I wanted not to be out of work, but I didn't have a work permit. So I went, I went and worked in a lab as a volunteer. I used to go there for like five hours a day or something.
E: Oh, OK.
P45: And not ask for money, just work for him and just so I could keep in touch with the work.
E: What does your work entail? What does a dental technician do?
P45: For instance, if you go to dentist and you need a bridge or [inaudible] or anything of.... prosthetics, that's what we do. Dental, that's the word. So the dentist takes impressions and sends to us and we make the teeth and send them back to him and he fits it.
E: OK, OK.
P45: We're the foot soldiers in the back.
E: (laughing) Nobody understands...
P45: (laughing) Nobody knows about the dental technicians. Everyone thinks that the dentist does it and...
E: Oh, so patients could go directly to you then, instead of...
P45: No, no. You'd be illegal. It's because we're not dentists, so we're not allowed to...
E: You don't have like a medical...
P45: Yeah, we're not allowed to work on the patient. Unless, unless you're a clinical technician which mainly works with if you're making dentures and because in dental technology you can get, you have different branches, some people work in only orthodontics for instant (sic), they make all the wires and there are certain wires you need in the lab as well. And, but those people who does the dentures they do the orthodontics as well, you know remove the dentures? Then you can be clinical technician mainly if you do dentures because you can take impressions and you can maybe, cos, because if it's only dental you don't need any treatment cos all the teeth are out so, so you can work with patient, but the one I do is crowns and bridges so it's more fixed work. So, once you put it, cement there and that's it you don't...
E: Do you like it?

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[51] Brackets are used to conceal names of people and places in order to maintain the anonymity of the participant.

P45: Yes, I do, I do like it. But at times it can get very boring as well. Because the environment that I work, I work in a confined space, within, with four, five people and it's not always nice, you know, because it's you know the same people all the time, facing each other and it's normal, you get, you get bored with it and you do the same thing every day.

E: Yeah.

P45: What makes it rewarding, I think makes it rewarding that if I get a good outcome, good results and the patient's happy and you get feedback from the dentist saying that the patient is happy, I think that's quite rewarding, or rewarding for me. At least you know that you're doing something nice or giving a nicer smile to someone, you know. I think that's the rewarding part for me. And plus, plus I like to think that I'm good in it, so... (laughing), so it's quite good to know that *you are* doing something, *you are* good at something, you know?

E: Yeah.

P45: So, that's the rewarding part. A few times, doing this thirteen, fourteen years, I sort of, you know, 'why don't I change it or go do something else?' I think the main reason for that is the financial because, not always, I didn't get always good salaries. Because I'm, I'm an Armenian but I was born in Syria.

E: You're Armenian?

P45: I'm an Armenian. I consider myself Armenian. But now I'm British-Armenian (laughing)... as you know. I born and bred in Syria. Here, I carry all this time, I had Syrian nationality.

E: Yes.

P45: But, but I don't consider myself, I always considered myself Armenian.

E: Well, yes. We'll get back to that.

P45: We'll get back to that, OK. So I had, all this time I mean, I studied in Syria, the dental technology, graduated there and worked there for, I don't know, five, maybe more than five years, more than five years. Worked there and salary was, was... wasn't good.

E: Wasn't good.

P45: Only good when you own the lab. I mean, even here, salary is OK, I don't have any complaints about that, but always, it is better, you know, the more is always better but sometimes...

E: But it's better than Syria.

P45: Oh, much better than Syria. Here is everything is better organised, compared to there, you're obviously better paid, but obviously you get much better results financially if you own the lab, your own business.

E: Yeah, of course.

P45: But that's, that has it own difficulties as well.

E: So, you got your degree, worked there and came to Glasgow?

P45: My... I came to London and my, my reason I came to London to stay, it wasn't, it wasn't like that I came to stay. And I came when I asked asylum to stay on the basis of my sexuality. Because I'm, I'm gay.

E: Oh. Did you have problems in Syria?

P45: Well, in Syria it's crime.

E: Were you prosecuted?

P45: Well, I didn't, I wasn't that unlucky to be caught but I was, I was this much close to.

E: Oh...

P45: And I mean it was like three years in prison, up to three years in prison and the situation was absolutely horrendous. Like for instance there's a special section of prison that unofficially, unofficially for gay people that have been caught as doing any gay act. And even there, you know, the things people talk about it, not officially... So, you know, the things that you hear from people about that section is horrendous, you know? From rape being probably the simplest thing you get. If you got caught it would be the wrong day because they do consider homosexuality one of the lowest kinds of type of people or you know, or act against God...Because, for instance, although it doesn't say, it doesn't say it's against God, but it is against the law to see two men having sex together because they consider this against the nature, an act done against the nature. Which is more or less in there, in there. It's a Muslim country, majority. And in there it says it's law, that God's law was shaken when you saw two men having sex or things like that.

E: Are you Muslim yourself?

P45: I'm an Orthodox.

E: You're an Orthodox?

P45: Christian, yeah. Most Armenians are. Most Armenians.

E: I know. I'm Greek myself.

P45: Yes. Most Armenians are. Although there are Armenians Catholics and Protestants, but most the majority are Orthodox. So...

E: So you came this close to getting caught.

P45: Yeah, it was very close. You know I discovered at some point that the park it was a cruising area for instance, you know? And then, and there, as it was here like many years ago, police would...

E: Here in Soho you mean? In London?

P45: Here. Here in the UK. Police used to go with a friend, go and seduce people. This was talking maybe here... It was in the, in the... I cannot, I cannot be for sure. I think it's the 70s. I think it was in the 70s.

E: And they would do that in Syria then, now?

P45: Up till now they do it in Syria.

E: So they would approach you in the park...

P45: Yeah, like for instance, if you're 'cottaging' in the park or in the toilet, public toilet, they approach you, they seduce you and they try to trap you there and if you get in he has handcuffs in his back, you're handcuffed and that's it. You probably don't see the daylight again for a few years. It's not nice at all (laughing).

E: Yeah, that's...

P45: Yeah, it's a huge problem. So, finally, I came here.

E: So, was that the reason you decided to migrate?

P45: Yes. I mean, I was, I was, it wasn't, it wasn't that... I mean, apart from anything else it was a need for me to get out of there. It was a need for me to get out of there because I always knew that my life was going to start when I leave there and go to a Western country when I can, even if I shout out, say 'I'm gay' or whatever I am and nobody, no policeman would come and say 'Oh, you can't say that' or 'You can't do anything like that'. So it was, for me it was a need, it was essential, it was a matter of survival. If I'd stayed there, that must, I don't even wanna think what might happen or what my life would have taken a completely different direction.

E: And how come you came to Britain?

P45: No, it kind of, it kind of... I always wanted to come to England, but at the time... I kind of, I had basically, I had to, I had visa, I had Schengen visa to Europe.

E: That didn't cover the UK?

P45: That's not for the UK. But what happens after I get the Schengen visa, which my aim was to go to France because I had a family friend. But I didn't know anyone in the UK and although I knew the language, I knew English, but I didn't know French. I was depending on that family. So I got the Schengen visa and then I was flying, I was coming with British Airways, I apply for a UK visa which obviously I got it, I got the visa...

E: Oh, was that easy for you?

P45: It wasn't, no; that's one really long story.

E: You got a UK visa while being in France?

P45: No, no, no, in Syria, before I leave. Before I leave. But the whole visa thing, I don't really wanna go in that details, cos it's a bloody mess, you know...

E: Was it a tourist visa?

P45: Yeah, it was all tourist visas. So eventually when I got there, my intention wasn't to come to London, well I wanted to come to London but what was I going to do in London, eh?

E: Yeah.

P45: Then I arrived in France and there is this family. I went there, kind of, you know, I was hoping that they would tell me to stay, cos you know my visa was going to expire after some time...

E: Yeah.

P45: And either you stay legal or you do something.

E: Yeah.

P45: But they, they... it's quite strange. Cos they had... I think they're a very Armenian family, very Armenian family.

E: Traditional you mean?

P45: Very traditional. More than, I mean *very, very* traditional.

E: Oh, OK.

P45: Kind of, they don't like, for instance, their kids are born and bred in France, but they didn't want any interfere like for instance, or marriage or any, even boyfriends to their daughter with a French person would be, you know, like no-go area.

E: Yeah.

P45: So, when I arrived there it's kind of, I think they were hoping that I'd get engaged or married to one of their daughter.

E: With their daughter...

P45: But little they knew that, you know (laughing).

E: (laughing) that it would never happen.

P45: That would never happen (laughing). So, obviously that didn't work but they didn't know I was gay. And there were a homophobic family as well, they didn't like the gays, especially the father. He used to shout on gays every night, you know?

E: Oh...

P45: So, it wasn't nice, it wasn't comfortable at all. But luckily I met this French girl who knew English and I spoken to her and we went out for a drink and she realised I'm gay and I want to stay in France, I don't want to go back. She was very, very helpful. She was the one who introduced, who took me to this... like an organisation who helped gay people who was involved in prostitution. But because she knew someone who knew this guy they said they might be able to help you in this matter. So, they were very, very, very nice, very helpful. They took me even to a legal adviser.

E: So they were the ones that suggested that you get, that you request asylum?

P45: Yeah, because the adviser said that – she speaks English – she said you have two ways 'Either you get married or you become a refugee. There's no other way for you to do it.' And plus, she said, because you know, 'your first entry was the UK, first safe entry, because in the Geneva law it says the first safe entry, you have to apply asylum in the first safe country you arrive'. Say for instant, your life is in danger, you are running away from your country, and you arrive at a safe place, you have to stay there. You know, you can't pick and choose.

E: Was that France for you?

P45: No, because at first when I flew, I flew to the UK and then went to...

E: Oh, OK, OK.

P45: I stayed one day here and then went to... to Lyon and then Valance. So my first safe entry...

E: Was the UK.

P45: Was the UK. That's where the idea came that I come, I come here. And plus, you know, it was kind of, it worked in... it worked out very well for me, because there's, there I was stuck with this family, they were very homophobic. The girl had hoped, has hoped and she has started even, it was very obvious, she started hoping. I don't know if she had feelings as well that, towards me within this month I stayed there. And it was very dangerous move from, you know...It was kind of...

E: Not a good start.

P45: Not a good start, you know. I stay there in a family they don't like the gays, and they're hoping that I get married to their daughter which will never happen and plus making someone who is only twenty at the time, or ninteen, I didn't want to give any false hopes to anyone and when that happens and as I say, you know, and I decided 'That's it, I go there'. Cos I knew that was the only way. And I can't get married to anyone, obviously, and I don't want to get married to anyone to stay somewhere...

E: Yeah.

P45: And my only choice was to ask asylum.

E: So was that easy to get?

P45: Well, it was and it wasn't. It was because, it was, in a way, because I was lucky I got it within eleven months. So, it wasn't a long wait for me compared to other people.

E: OK.

P45: When I first arrived here, I went to the Home Office and I asked, so it was a government thing. When someone arrives in London and asks asylum they send you out of London. They don't let you stay here. Because of everyone wants to stay in London and the population is... that was my time, this is seven years ago, everyone who arrives here, unless you have someone to stay with in London, so if you are, if you don't have anyone else to stay, you can't stay in London. You have to be dispersed out, outside, somewhere in the UK. So,I don't want to get into much detail cos you know, it was like a drama (laughing), a lot of

things were happening, but eventually I got, I got after months staying in like emergency accommodation.

E: Outside of...

P45: No, no, here in London, waiting to be sent somewhere else.

E: OK.

P45: So initially, the process, initially you fly, they don't ask you much questions, just initial questions, you reply so you're going into the system, your papers go in there, and then you wait till you get dispersed to somewhere else. And also... so anyway, after a month of waiting, my... because I don't know why, I got two, three different places that I could choose from. I think because in my application I said I'm gay and I don't want to be dispersed in places where the gays are not welcome, take that into consideration. But I think because of that I got first Cardiff, and that didn't happen because I was the only one to be sent there and they didn't want to spend a whole bus to take me there so they cancelled that (laughing).

E: (laughing).

P45: And then I got Bolton and Glasgow at the same time. And I asked the people there, they were very nice, because I was helping them in translating cos I know Arabic, Turkish, English and Armenian. So, I was...

E: Oh (impressed)!

P45: No, it's not (laughing)... It's not that big deal. We grew up with few languages, you know, in Syria. So, they were quite helpful to me because I was helping them.

E: In Glasgow?

P45: No, no, this is in London who, you know, a group of people who's responsible for, to disperse these people who have left their towns and everything. So they have an office in this emergency accommodation.

E: Oh, OK.

P45: So they cannot govern all, organise, you know, the people who come from all over the place, different languages, most of them they don't know English, so I was kind of there helpful to them cos I could speak with the Turks, with the Arabs, there were few Armenians as well (laughing). So I was a hero there for them (laughing). And they were very helpful because when I got those letters they say 'Oh, take our advice and go to Glasgow, don't go to Bolton.' And now I know it is definitely the best choice because Bolton, Glasgow is much better than Bolton to start with, especially as a gay man rather than... so...

E: As a city, yeah.

P45: And people were very nice and helpful and friendly. And it was, I mean, you have to imagine that everything was a new start for me, even though, I knew I was gay for a long time and, but everything I knew about this life it was theoretical, for I had loads of experience, but living in a place that you can gay, you can say you're gay, go to gay bar and meet gay people, it was, everything was new. So it was very, very good for me to start in somewhere like Glasgow. Because, because people were nice and the scene was small, not like London. London can be a scary place if you arrive the first time, you know, especially if you are not experienced, you don't know how to deal in a certain situations. It was, everything was new for me, everything was new. So that's how I ended up in Glasgow, so I... the law of asylum the first six months you can't work. But if within six months you haven't heard anything from the Home Office, you haven't heard any reply or decision.

E: Yeah, approval.

P45: Approval or denial you can apply for work permit. So after six months I haven't heard anything so, and I was working as a volunteer in this lab...

E: Yes.

P45: I went and applied for work permit and, and I got it. I went to the Immigration [Office] there and at the same day, within half hour, they gave me the work permit.

E: Was it that quick?

P45: Well, it wasn't, again I was, I think I was a bit lucky. Because people apparently they don't go themselves. They send letters and when you send letters it takes a long time, some of them they don't get at all.

E: Yeah.

P45: But I was lucky because I just, I think, I think, there was a helpful person there and she was the one who said 'you know, usually my colleagues they don't care that much'. But what she's done, what they need to do [is] they have to check with London that if this person is saying right, if this person's decision hasn't been made and that if everything that I'm saying is correct, they give you the work permit. Simple as that.

E: So, it's a simple process.

P45: It's a simple, straightforward process.

E: And then if you get, if you, if they reject your application for asylum then you just...

P45: Then it's a different matter.

E: It's a different matter.

P45: This is just to work because up to that point I'm depending on the government. They give me vouchers to eat, they provide me with accommodation and I don't have the right to work, you know? But after six months, I got the work permit, I couldn't believe myself that I got it.

E: Was it easy for you to find a job?

P45: Well, I was already working in that lab.

: Was it in that place that you found a job then?

P45: In that place when I was working he liked my work.

E: Oh, good.

P45: And when I got the work permit he employed me full-time. So I started working there full-time.

E: Yeah.

P45: But the money was not good at all. Money was, was enough to start, but it wasn't good, you know, you can, you can only survive, you know? And if I stayed there it would have, it wouldn't improve, I wouldn't get anywhere. So, after I got the work permit, start working, basically they asked me to declare everything that I'm working, I'm earning this much money, they asked me to move out of the accommodation, so then I became dependant on myself. So I wasn't taking any benefits from the government at all after six months. So only it was this first six months. So after that maybe, I don't know, five months after that, I got an invitation for an interview, so after that interview I've got the second best option which was the 'exceptional leave to remain'. They declined my asylum application, they refused it.

E: Yes.

P45: But at the time, in the UK, it was, the exceptional leave to remain...

(Recording pause – Changed batteries)

E: I hope it's been recording. So, yeah, you were saying that you like London.

P45: I arrived in London and it was a whole new experience. But, but one thing, one thing was good; I learned a lot in Glasgow. When I arrived here, I knew, I knew how to survive or deal with situations in a much better way than I started because everything, even though, even though I always been, kind of Western-minded orientated, even when I was in Syria. I was the odd one out, I didn't fit in, in that situation. Even within the Armenians.

E: Why do you say that?

P45: I think, I think the way I was thinking, the way I used to think, it was more for Western rather than Eastern mentality.

E: Are there differences between the two?

P45: There are lots of differences. The way, the way people look at women for instant (sic), the simplest, you know that... I never liked the fact how all of my friends talk about women, it is quite degrading. I don't know if that has anything to do with me being gay. I'm not sure, you know. It could be, it could not be, I'm not sure. But, for instance, you know, one of the examples that I didn't, I didn't like it when people come and talk about, this is, this is happening within Armenians, you have to realise this is Armenians, they are Christian, they are not Muslim, but this because they are living in that kind of environment, it's affected by the surroundings, you know, they're affected by the mentality. And if you're not careful... very, very, very easily to drag into that circle and you become part of it without realising what you're doing, you know? If you don't watch yourself back or try hard to say 'No, this is not right', you know, or, or, you know, what you're saying is bullshit or this is an old-fashioned mentality and you have to look, you have to look outside that, I think, and it's quite difficult, I think it's quite difficult thing to do but I always had, I always had a problem with that. I am not talking only about the women issue, with lots of things, you know?

E: Being more open-minded you mean?

P45: Yes, you can put it that way. And I always, one of my friends used to call me, used to call me 'West' in Arabic, used to call me 'West' because, because the things I come up with were more Western and that's you know in a nice way and I quite enjoyed that (laughing).

E: Yeah.

P45: So, so I wasn't fitting in there at all and I knew that you know this is, this is more, this is more where I'm going to feel comfortable. And I'm not talking only about the UK, I think in any Western countries I would adapt a lot quicker that I ever adapted in Syria.

E: Yeah?

P45: Yes and when I first arrived here I felt 'I arrived, I'm home.' You know, this is, I was, I was more confident, I could say what I wanted to say, not like there, you know, you have to think about, oh, if you say something like that people would.. and your friends are going to take the piss out of you and start laughing at you or you'd be in trouble if you say things like that, or even the simplest things, if you say, if you say the gay thing is OK you would be in trouble for instance, you know? Or even you say 'I'm gay' would be even double that trouble. So it was a very, very restricted, under pressure life. In a way, well, I was living a double life. Not, not like, don't get me wrong, I never been with a woman and I never gone to that way and that was the other thing as well. You try realise now that loads of people, loads of people that they would go and marry with a woman, have kids, just to satisfy their surroundings, their parents and, because of the pressure. And I could never understand that. Because I always think if I can do that, if I can stand up and say 'No, I'm not going to marry you', whatever my reasons are, everyone else can do it as well, you know? So when I arrived home I was more home, you know? I didn't have any fear, I could be myself eventually, you know, and that was such liberating feeling. It was like you're born again. It was like that. Like you, I'm always saying 'Ah, you know, I'm seven years old.' (laughing)

E: (laughing) That's nice.

P45: And it was like that, you know. I'm not exaggerating at all. It was like that. It was like being born again. And it was, it was difficult, you know, don't get me wrong, it wasn't, it wasn't like everything's easy, you know, it's being a difficult road to get here where I'm now. And I think, I think I achieved quite a bit, you know, the only, the simple fact I'm now British citizen after seven years.

E: Yeah.

P45: That, that's bloody huge for me. It's a big, big, big thing. It's a big thing. (laughing)

E: Did you have any difficulties? I mean, first you had difficulties in getting the visa and that kind of stuff. But after arriving here, how was it?

P45: After arriving here the fact that I asked asylum, I think it was the society at the time, it is still now to certain extent cruel, still now, they... it was the one of the lowest, lowest title you can get. Like if you are someone entering as an asylum, or an asylum seeker I think through my experience, having said that, there's a lot of, there's always people, almost 50-50. You get the really nice ones, the really understanding ones, and you get the really, you know, awful ones. And the reactions that you get, they are just unbelievable. And it wasn't only the asylum situation, and being gay as well, you get again, you know, this is, all the stuff is in Glasgow.

E: You mean in everyday kind of conversations. With everyday people...

P45: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Your work colleague, I mean friends, who was... mainly I had gay friends, I didn't get in touch with the straight people, because I lived 28 years of straight life, surrounded mainly by straight people and I didn't need that anymore, I wanted to be only surrounded with gay people, feel free and say what I want to say, do what I want to do. But, at the same time, it was difficult because being a foreigner in Glasgow it wasn't that easy. Being a foreigner, asylum seeker and gay, those are three concepts that, that you need to be careful with. There are some people were very supportive, there are some other, like being a refugee was...was... it was... people look at you as you coming here, you're sucking the blood off the country and that you're and awful person, you know, regardless why you are here, regardless the reasons, you know, it's the stigma, the taboo of that name is huge, it's really huge. And plus, plus the government at the time, you know, giving vouchers to you. For six months I survived on these vouchers, you have to go to certain super markets to buy your food and everyone around you, you know, looking at you and they see that voucher and they know what it is and either you can see the faces they change, they don't even talk to you, they were talking to you and then they would stop talking to you, it was quite a degrading experience, that experience that I had to... I mean, I'm not complaining because that was my survival and that was needed and that's that. I'm grateful for having that, at the same time it was a degrading experience. On one aspect it was the asylum thing, but on the other aspect it was me learning all over again how to deal with coming out to people. For instance, I worked in a... this is my third lab in the UK. The first lab in Glasgow, first of all I didn't say I was gay. Yeah, I didn't come out and then at some point I decide this stupid, you

know, why wouldn't I say, you know? And then I came out one by one to people, you know, and that was a mistake as well. I think it was a mistake not to come out from the beginning. That's my personal opinion. Because everyone else has different ideas. When you come out, people, even you know, you expect everyone will be understanding or everyone will be open-minded, but not at all. Like for instant, there's one example I can give you, there's this one, one of my work colleagues. He was forty-five or forty-eight years old. I'm not being horrible, but not good looking at all! I'm not being horrible, he wasn't blessed with good look, whatsoever. He was married with kids. I had not some interest in any of them anyway (laughs), they were all straight, I was the only gay one. But at some point, you know, I come, he sits on his bench and I came to pick up something from which is like there, so I leaned over a bit closer like, as you see, I leaned over and 'Oh, oh, oh' he's done like that (laughing).
E: (laughing).
P45: Oh, oh, what the... Don't flatter yourself (laughs)! Things like that. This is, you know, it could be, you know, now I laugh about it but at the time it was quite frustrating that you know, how stupid can you be, you know, just because, how narrow-minded you can be, just because I am gay do you think, and you're a man, I'm gonna jump on you? It was things like that you know. And it's one thing dealing with the gay issue with the straight people and then, and then at the same time you feel, you feel a bit like a, like broken because you have that title, you have that title, the asylum [title], even though I didn't, I didn't have any lack of confidence, I was, especially when I arrived here, I was very confident because for some reason, because I knew the law is with me, you know, nobody can say to me or do anything to me because I'm gay. So that gave me quite a bit confidence. So, I didn't have any fears. The only, it wasn't, I didn't have any fears, but at the same time you're not relaxed at the same time, because it's all learning process, it's all learning, how to deal with people, how to say or the comments that people come up with, how to deal with those comments. Because if you let yourself go, you get irritated and you get annoyed and that affects your life and you're becoming some sort of bully, if you don't, if you let it, if you let it go. So it was all, everything was a learning process. And in the second lab where I worked in London, I made it clear from the beginning. When I went to the interview with the boss, at some point he asked me about 'Do you have a family or anything or something like that?' And I immediately mentioned, it was a, I wanted to mention, I said 'No, but I'm gay. I don't have a boyfriend but I'm gay.' So I thought, if they had any issue with that, so they won't hire me. But, you know, they cannot not hire me on that reason, but they can find hundreds of reasons not to hire me. But, if they don't have any problem with that, at least I know that I'm coming to a gay friendly environment. So I think that was a much better approach. And in the third lab which I'm working up to now for the last five years, again, I've done the same policy, say from the beginning, be out and open about it, and that's the best policy. And now I'm much, much better on dealing with things, you know because straight people, they can come up with certain comments. It's quite... it can, it can make your mouth wide open, you're thinking you know, how can they think that or how can they come up with things like that?
E: Yeah.
P45: You know? This is all you learn, how to do it, all you learn. I mean now I'm in a stage that I joke with my bosses about lots of gays, this is no problem at all. But, it took us a long time, it took us five years to get where we are now. So difficulties on that aspect, you know, the gay issue was enjoyable but not easy.
E: But you had your mind set on staying here as you said.
P45: Absolutely, absolutely. There was no other way around it, no other way around it. I mean I was lucky that I was given the exceptional leave to remain. That's it, you know, once you get that, at the time the lawyer said, you know, this is the second best thing you can get. I mean after that finished, expired, so, and the law changed in the UK. Everything got more difficult after 2003 I think, they changed everything. So now the system is completely different, completely. I do, I have no idea how it is now, but it's completely different. But because I fell into the old system, so when I, when that expired, [I proceeded to] straightforward application, they sent it to the Home Office and you should get indefinite leave. There's no other way, as long as you're not a criminal or, you know, you had clean records, everything, I'm working, I'm not unemployed, I've never been unemployed even one day after I start working. But even though I waited seven months and I hadn't heard anything from them, right, that was seven months amnesty, you know, so a friend of mine advised me actually to write to my MP. So I wrote to my MP explaining my situation that this is how it is

and he is, he was very helpful. [...] was my MP. And they were very, very helpful. They wrote a letter to the Home Office to, just to ask; they sent me a copy of the letter as well saying 'This is a member of my constituency, his application's with you, what's happening?' And one week later I've got the indefinite leave to remain! (laughing).

E: (laughing).

P45: It worked very well (laughing). Unbelievably well, you know. I was so lucky that my friend advised me. I wouldn't even have thought about that at all. A friend of mine said, 'why don't you write to your MP? They're there for these kinds of things.' So I got the indefinite leave and I had to wait for twelve months, so twelve months over and I applied for citizenship and I'm citizen now (laughing).

E: Were you planning to do that from the beginning, to become a citizen?

P45: In the beginning it doesn't even cross your mind. The only thing you can think about is to have the right to stay here. That's the only thing. But then, but then when you get to the point that you have indefinite leave obviously then you don't wanna stay any more time to become citizen and get over with all this, you know? Because I don't wanna be, I don't wanna be considered Syrian at all. If somebody asked me now I'll say 'I'm British of Armenian descend'.

E: Do you have dual nationality?

P45: Well, Syria allows dual nationality. But one thing it doesn't allow is the, what's the word? When you give up your nationality. I don't know the word for that.

E: Yeah... well, I don't know.

P45: Syria doesn't allow that.

E: You can't do that?

P45: You can't do that. If you're born Syrian, you die Syrian, for them, obviously. But the thing is with me when I left Syria, I left Syria. That's it.

E: You've never been back?

P45: No, never, I don't think I will be back. First, I will have trouble with the authorities if I go back, you know. Apart from anything else, being away from the country for seven years, come back with the British nationality, it will cause me huge trouble. Probably it changed now in Syria, probably it's better, but this is something that I wouldn't like to take the risk, you know? So, that was it, Syria page is over for me, you know? I lived there from eight years, I studied there, I done the military service, which is national service you have to do, so I paid my dues to that country, you know? I think that this is, it's not my place, it's not, it's not, I don't have a life there, you know? Because life is here, my life is here. Because I'm a completely different person than I was seven years ago.

E: You are a different person?

P45: Definitely. Definitely, big time.

E: Do you talk to, you know, friends or family in Syria?

P45: Yeah, few, yeah, few friends, yeah. Few friends, they are there. Few of them they know I'm gay. I think now there are lots of people know. Somehow the news got there.

E: Yeah...

P45: Armenians, 'woo-aah' (as if they're scared of gay people), that's how everybody goes. Yeah, everybody knows. That's another reason for me not to go. Because I would, I would get, I think I would get into trouble with the Armenians as well. Because Armenians, they are the first nation in the world history after war that they adopted Christianity. So, it's the first Christian nation, this was 1700 years ago. Therefore, they are very, very proud Christians, you know? It's like one of those things they say 'Oh, you can't be Armenian and gay', you know? Those who live in the Western world obviously they are more different, they are more open-minded. But whoever lives in the Middle East or you know, in that kind, they'll be extremely close-minded about this sort of issue, you know? Being with a man...I mean, it's still, still a, it's a problem, you know? That I wouldn't like to face and I don't know how to face it because it's a situation that you can't win. Or that you can't get anywhere, you know? It's when the reason doesn't exist, what can you do? That's it, you can't do anything. When the reason goes out the window...

E: I know what you mean. So, OK, yeah. Let's talk about the citizenship. On the whole do you think it was an easy process or a difficult process...?

P45: I think, I don't say, I don't say, it was a frustrating wait for me. Because I wanted this to happen and get done with it, you know? But because, you know, one of the main things is the travelling, because I don't, once you have British passport you can go anywhere. It was a frustrating wait for me, but if I look at the system or the way that I have done through my

personal experience, I don't think it was a difficult, difficult process. I think it was a very, I think it was a very well organised process for the citizenship. Cos the citizenship process, it didn't take more than four months. Within four months when I applied, I was citizen. So, considering that... But the thing is, everything was, you have to, you have to wait for your own time. You couldn't apply before you completed the last twelve months after your indefinite leave, you have to, it has to be indefinite leave, after five years of staying. My only, my only kind of wasted time was that seven months, when I was waiting a decision for that, and it was probably sitting there on the shelf and waiting to be processed. But once I got that, once I was in indefinite leave and I decided to become, when I applied for the citizenship the process was not difficult at all.

E: You've been through the whole process. What do you think? I mean, in the whole, how do you find the process? Do you think it's easy or hard for someone to...

P45: For me, I can only speak for myself. I can only for my personal experience. For me it was, it was, it was reasonable. For me it was reasonable. But I think, I think my major, my major advantage was I knew English. I knew English and more or less I knew myself, where I am and here I'm, you know, I knew why I'm here and why I'm applying, so, so... my mind was, it was, you know, I had a clear view of where I'm going. I think those are my true benefits, advantages that once you put that in forward, then you have no problem about interpreter, having interpreter to come and translate for you, all the time. You could do everything yourself. You can read the letter, you can apply, you can, you know, reply and do your own job. I think the system for me was reasonable. It could, it could have been obviously, it wasn't that reasonable about the process of the, of buying food, for instance. That was, that was degrading. That was degrading to any human, you know? You know, in this day and age you don't give to someone vouchers to go and buy food in a First World country, in a developed country like this. So that was, that was the fault for me and plus, I mean, I wasn't living in poverty in Syria. I was, I come from a... not that, financially, you know, not rich, but not poor, middle family. We didn't have any, we had everything that we wanted, we weren't in need of anything, so come from there, to come from Syria, living in Syria and being comfortable and come to Britain and buying food with vouchers that was...

E: You had no money on you? No money at all...

P45: That's my problem because I, that was the process before. Because I had savings, I had money like I said, but it's gone to the process to arrive here. When I arrived in the UK and believe me, you are free not to believe that, I had only one pound left on me (laughing).

E: Oh, no.

P45: One pound left on me. One pound left, I was, with that one pound I arrived to the Home Office to ask asylum. And from there it was all on them. They provided everything.

E: Yeah, not easy...

P45: Yes, it was actually at first, first time they don't believe me, but it was the case, I had one pound left on me (laughing). But after that, but I didn't care, you know. It wasn't, for me it wasn't like 'oh, I don't have money, I won't survive.' It was the first time for me being penniless and you don't have anyone around that you can ask, you know. Back in Syria even if you don't have money, you can ask your mum, dad, friends and you can have, there's no problem at all. But here, you don't know anyone, but it didn't, it didn't scare me. It didn't scare me. I wasn't, I wasn't feeling and saying, 'oh what am I going to do?' because I knew I trust, I trusted, I trusted the system here, you know. It was a system that, it wasn't great in terms of providing you with food and shelter, no, no shelter, food, but at the same time, they won't let you die of hunger or they won't let you sleep in the street. Everything was provided for me. And in that sense it was reasonable, you know? Plus looking around to see the sheer of people who arrive in this country and everyone with different needs, you know families and kids. You know, I was on my own, another benefit, I was a single man on my own, I didn't have anyone dependant on me so I could survive on just a normal bread if I wanted to, if I needed to. I didn't have a family to feed so in a way it was a bit easier for me in that sense; because I was on my own.

E: What about the criteria to enter? You told me you had a few problems getting the visa, the visa that you got...

P45: It was, it was, the problem was there, to get the visa in Syria. Once you get the visa, that's it, you go. You have no problem at all. It's a known fact in Syria, there's very strict rules about getting visa to Europe. You have to have money in a bank account, you have to have business, you have to be rich basically, and I didn't, I didn't have that money in my...

E: I see.

P45: Yeah. If you're carrying Syrian passport, you're a young man, and you wanna go to Europe or States or Australia, Canada, whichever Western country, they will reject you because they know you go, most likely you go and won't come back. And obviously Western countries they don't want that. They don't want people, you know they have to have strict rules to keep you away from them and that's, I think that's a normal thing to do but, at the same time, it's not that fair, but understandable. That the Western countries they have certain rules to, because when you arrive here, because, you know, there's lots of people arrive in this country, lots of migrants and lots, you know, they have problems with the migrants, you know, no integration, and you know, people come and ask for benefits. So you do understand why the difficulties, but at the same time also it's not fair, you know, why can't I go? It's just not fair because the world, because if you have that Syrian passport, that's it, you know, you have a Syrian passport, you are doomed. Because wherever you go, you, because as Syrian you're considered as an Arab, without people realising your background they consider you Muslim, so those two things sometimes it's a 'no-no' for many countries.

E: So, it's hard coming from Syria.

P45: Exactly. Before it was the President, it was economic sanctions from Western countries for long time, and the government, the Syrian President was very adamant about, you know, Israel, Palestine and all these matters. So, it wasn't very welcomed country by Westerners, so the citizen of the country obviously you won't be welcome to go there as well.

E: Yeah, OK, yeah. Let's talk a bit about the very process of becoming a citizen. So, first of all I wanna ask you about the ceremony. How did you find the ceremony?

P45: Ceremony, I found it quite, very formal, which was very good to see, very well organised, even though that guy who was the Mayor of somewhere, didn't arrive.

E: Yeah.

P45: He was late and then he arrived. But even with that, I think it was a very well organised, served the purpose.' I think it served the purpose. I think...

E: What's the purpose?

P45: The purpose of, the purpose of to welcome you to this, to this, to welcome you as a, it's kind of if you consider it joining a club; joining any club. And this is, this is a one hell of a big exclusive club, to join in, you know? You becoming...

E: Exclusive?

P45: Well you're becoming part of the UK, which is part of Europe, and you're coming from Syria and you're becoming part of this. I didn't realise the, the, it's kind of, I realised the feeling that I had afterwards, it was quite a strange, I wasn't expecting to have that feeling. All this time I felt, I felt home, here. I didn't feel estranged, I felt that I had rights here, I felt that, you know, I can do whatever I want, I experienced lots of things, so it was, so this was home for me. But I didn't, I only realised that my feelings was completely different after I become British citizen. After I become British citizen, when I, I cannot feel now, you feel you have even more rights. You feel that, no, you feel that you have the *right* to be in this place. You have the right to stay in this country. You are one member of this country. That's, so you become, it's quite strange to explain, it's like, it's like renting a car and then you buy your own car, you know? Let's put it that way. When you buy your own car, you start being more careful, I don't wanna to scratch the door, I don't wanna do anything to the window, you know. But while it is rental you don't care that much, so if something happens the insurance covers it. It's insured. But you have your *own* car, it's a completely different feeling. And I think it's something like that, you know? You have a beautiful feeling about you know, you are British citizen, it's, it's ... you give, you give yourself some sort of value. I mean it has a different value to become British citizen.

E: Yeah.

P45: I think for that particular reason, seeing, experiencing the afterwards, of becoming British citizen, and going back and inside to see the ceremony, I think, yes, it deserves, it deserves to be that formal, it deserves to be exactly how it was. It was like a single partnership wedding, you know, it was something similar to that business. It was very, very formally, everyone was very formal, then wearing certain clothing, which was formal, the readings... I think it was a very nice formal...

E: Did you have like a celebration or a party after that?

P45: I invited, I invited people...

E: I remember you had some friends with you, right, in the ceremony?

P45: Well yeah, it was my flatmate and his boyfriend. Yes. It was very, I mean, if it was, if I had the chance to invite loads of people, I would have invited lots of people. But they said 'strictly two guests'. And then afterwards they said 'no guests at all'. But then they...

E: Yeah, I remember.

P45: They let the door open and you know...

E: Yeah.

P45: So, I could have invited lots of people. But then afterwards, just last Saturday, I invited people to have a drink with me in a pub around the area...

E: Oh, OK.

P45: So, that was my celebration.

E: That's really good. OK, you also had to do the 'Life in the UK' test. Yeah?

P45: I think the 'Life in the UK' test, they should have, they should have had that for like many years ago; they should have had that, to be honest. I've done it and I think it was a very good thing to do because you can't pass that test unless you have certain knowledge in English and all this time people here, you know, they talk about the integration, they talk about this and that and without a test like this. I think this is a test that something they already, a big time late...

E: Is there a problem with integration?

P45: I think, yeah, yeah, I think to a certain extent there is. The problem is especially, I don't know about the rest of the UK a lot, but I know about Glasgow, talk about London for instance, even though it is a melting pot, even though you can see people from all over the place, fantastic place to be and one of the, probably, few places in the world they can find people from all over the world. When they are in the same area they're getting by, they're getting along with no problems, and it's, it's very good to see that, but on the other hand, they are, within my experiences within the gay world. You know, in the gay world, people are, people are, I like to believe that they are more open about foreigners, they are more open about welcoming people in, you know? Because every, most gay men at my age and a bit older they, most of them they had some sort of difficulties to come out and you know, in their lives by families, friends, the society. So, I'm not saying everyone, there's a lot of, lots of, please don't mind my language, assholes in the gay men world. But majority...

E: They are kind of more sensible...

P45: Sensible and open minded about this particular thing. So I think my environment, the friends I have around, even the straight or gay, they are more multicultural, welcoming and open minded. But at the same time I can see that there is, you know, there is difficulty, although probably there's no big ghettos in London, just small ghettos here and there, but still you can see people that they don't know, they've been here for the last 10-15 years and they know little bit of English, or they don't know any of things, and that's sad, you know? And I'm, I'm, you know, I come from Armenian background, and some Armenians they do the same as well. I'm not excluding me or my background from it, it's a, I think it's in every culture and every nation, even the Greeks when they go, for instance, to Spain they stick together, you know? They... so...

E: Yeah.

P45: Yeah, I think there's small, small ghettos all around, you know? I think that's always gonna be a problem. I think in that sense there is a problem with integration because everyone tries to keep their culture and they're very afraid of...

E: How about the test? Will it make a difference? You said you agree with it.

P45: It would, definitely make difference. In the test they do ask, they changed the book after my test. They added two more chapters. I did the old one. I don't know what chapters they add. I think, I think overall, overall, overall the test was very, very good, because, because if you read that book, you'll have a good history of Britain and you will have a good knowledge of how to live your daily life and you know how... It was information, it was about lots of things like how to, how to rent a flat, how to do this and do that, but the main thing I wish it was, that they introduce something like that from earlier stage rather than leave it to the end. I mean now they changed it after me, again they changed it. You need to have a test to apply for the indefinite leave to remain.

E: Yes, yes.

P45: In my time it was only for the citizenship. I already got the indefinite leave when I apply so that's, that's good. But even if they put it even further back to the process, even much better. I think that would force people to learn English and when it's become common knowledge that you have to learn English to pass certain test, you have to learn about British

life and style, I think that would be, that would push people to do things. Because lots of people if you don't kind of give them a stick to do it, they won't do it, you know? It's very human nature. If I come and give you this cup of tea every day to you in front of you, you will say 'thank you very much', you will drink it. But when I say to you the next day 'oh, I'm not doing your tea anymore, go and you do it', you will get irritated in the beginning, you know, why not, but eventually you don't have any other choice, you need to drink your tea, you go and do it yourself. I mean it's something like that. And this is exactly the same thing with, they have to, they have to put that as a rule, it's so good that it's now, they can do even better from the beginning, even though so for instant (sic), if you wanna migrate to the UK, do the test...

(Phone ringing – pause)

E: OK, so you've done your, you know you've done everything, you have your certificate, so how do you feel now?

P45: As I said, I think, I think that was the feeling that you have the right to be here.

E: The right to be here.

P45: I think that's the, that's the main...

E: Is your life going to change?

P45: After the...

E: Having the citizenship.

P45: I think, I think my life gonna change, the main change in my life will be the passport and the travelling. I think that will be the main change that you feel the difference.

E: Travel in the European Union?

P45: Yes, I think then, then I will feel, everyone around me or few people that they come from different backgrounds and they become British citizens and the one thing that they say 'oh, you will love it when you start travelling.' And I think I knew that anyway because it opens such doors and you become, all the troubles that you had in the past, of visas and this and that, you know, becomes... You know, it's just...

E: It makes you a member of the European Union...

P45: Oh, definitely! I always felt European (laughing). But definitely I, I think that's, that's, in my case, I don't think this has to do anything with being, having that certificate to become European. I think it was a feeling within me. That I always...

E: That you belong more here?

P45: Belong more here, yes. I think, I think that's my, when I say 'belong here' that's what I mean with that. Nothing's gonna change genetically, because I belong, genetically I belong to the Armenian nation wherever they come from, but...

E: Is that important for you? I mean, where you come from, genetically...

P45: I think it's important to know that you belong to, you have a... you have roots, yeah. Don't get me wrong, I'm not typical Armenian at all. Lots of things that Armenians do, I don't agree with, you know, my lifestyle or my behaviour or my way of thinking is very different from Armenians, but at the same time, I am very proud Armenian. I don't, I don't, when I, as I said, when I say, even though I'm born in Syria when I, when someone asks me, all this time when they ask me I say 'I'm an Armenian but born and bred in Syria.' I never said 'I'm Syrian', because I never felt I'm Syrian.

E: Why's that?

P45: It's quite, it's quite a strange...because when I say to people, lots of people they don't understand that. It's, it is difficult to explain but I think, I think because, I think, I think because I was, as I said, I was the odd one out there, you know. I never, I never felt close to the culture, I never felt close to the mentality, way of living, everything was not right for me, you know? Even, even though... But I can only compare it with here, you know. Here was everything opposite that was there, you know. Even though I'm not born here, but I felt here more home and more close to everything else. Here I was more surrounded with like-minded people, the percentage of that was higher, than back in Syria. In Syria probably there was one or two guys that I, you know, mentally were compatible...

E: Yeah...

P45: It was like, yeah, in that sense, mentally compatible. I think, I think that was the reason, since we were kids we always, my dad used to be, used to be a merchant, you know, like go to Germany and bring stuff from there and sell it in Syria. It was like with big cars, we used cars, so we had a... we had... so it's, we had this attachment to Europe since we were kids. And I think, I think that was a big effect on me, because everything was from Germany in our family, like, you know, at the time, when there was economic sanctions on Syria there was

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lots of things you couldn't get, although our getaway was Lebanon. Lebanon was next door neighbour, and Lebanon was more Western and you could find anything in Lebanon and Lebanon was Christian country and open-minded. So it was that getaway on one side and there was Germany on the other side. Everything in Germany was fantastic. Imagine a kid, who in Syria you don't have, you know, nice trainers or nice clothes and we were the one who were wearing the Adidas and the Puma and the Levi's, you know, and those were big things, you know, it wasn't, it wasn't a small thing at all. We got the Twix, the Mars bar, you know, everything, we grew up with this. We never used to wear clothes from Syria. All our clothes my dad used to get it from Germany. And I think that had a huge, huge impact. And how to...

E: So you preferred to call yourself Armenian...

P45: It's quite, it's quite difficult, I think, I think because probably I had two choices. But it wasn't a choice that I sat down and I thought about it. It was a natural instinct, that in one hand you are born in Syria and you have the Syrian values and everything, so I mean, and in the other hand you have Armenian, you are different from the Arabs surrounding them. Everything was different, lifestyle, everything was different. And, so that was already one step ahead than the Syrian, being Syrian, so immediately you say 'oh, no, I'm an Armenian' because you feel this one is more right, you know? If you felt close to that maybe I would say 'oh, yeah, I'm born in this country' and I heard lots of people they say 'well, you know, this country's given us, you know, in the past they helped us, they helped our grandparents, they were refugees from Turks and all this happens and we belong here' and all this stuff. I never felt that. For me, all the Armenians there they should move on, go out and live somewhere else. Don't stay there, cos this is not our place. You know?

E: Where should they go?

P45: (laughing) Anywhere but there. As I said, I had problems with me being gay, you know?

E: Yeah.

P45: So, like I said, I was the odd one out. And I think plus that my dad being, you know, going to Germany all the time and I went and helped him there when I was eight or nine, once, unfortunately only once (laughing). So, it kind of, it kind of, so you hold down, I think subconsciously to being Armenian and seeing the Western world is obviously, you know this is the right direction to go because, because you want to go forward in your life, you don't want to go backwards. And Germany is the forward and Syria is the backwards. You know, as simple as that. So which one you choose? It's up to you. It's up you how, how your mind operates.

E: So if people about your nationality, I mean, what do you say to them?

P45: Here, now?

E: Yes.

P45: Now I'm British of Armenian descendancy (sic).

E: Not Syrian...

P45: God no! (laughing)

E: Do you have family there?.

P45: No my family left. They're in Los Angeles now.

E: Los Angeles?

P45: Yeah, they are in the States.

E: OK, so you don't have any...

P45: No. Extended relatives which I'm not, you know, close with them anyway. I've only friends which I'm in touch. And I'm...

E: How come your family moved?

P45: Different reason, economical reasons more like it. You know, it wasn't, so... it wasn't going well for my dad's business, you know. That was the major thing for them.

E: So you kind of lost your attachment to the place.

P45: Yeah, I mean, ideally, in an ideal world, I would like to go for one day and have a looking back, you know, to see what's happening there... That's the only thing that I would like to do about, about that country, but apart from that you know, I wouldn't go. Not in the foreseeable future (laughing).

E: I take it that you are happy here.

P45: Yes, yes.

E: From what I understand you belong here more than you belonged to Syria?

P45: Yes, but because, because Britain gave me the rights that I need in my life. But Syria didn't give me these rights, you know? Syria forced on me the rights that they think is right,

you know? They forced on me the national service, which I didn't want to do. They forced on me certain sort of obligation you don't have any other choice to do, you know? It was, the way you live in Syria is forced on you. It says to you, this is you, this is the way and you gonna go this way. You don't have a say, you can't say no, you can't choose another way, so it's kind of a feeling of everything is forced on you indirectly. But here, Britain, maybe there are certain things is forced on you here as well in an indirect way, but nothing close to that. Here I had choice. I always had a choice here to do whatever I want, you know? If ... This country gave me the right as a gay man. And that's an important and huge thing. How can I do not, how can I not love being here or appreciate being here, but if someone, someone give me that right, which I didn't have for twenty-eight years of my life, you know?

E: Is there something you don't like? Is there something that you would like to see changing?

P45: I'm not saying this is a perfect place. There's lots of faults in this country. You know, there's lots of, certain things they do is a bit, you know, old-fashioned or, you know, the way, the way they deal with different things... There's lots of things, you know, they can change, but needs to be changed, but it's not happening. But it's no perfect place, at the same time, there is always, wherever you go, there is pros and cons and...

E: OK, that's good. I wanna ask you, if you can imagine your life in ten-twenty years. Where are you gonna be?

P45: I can't say that. I, because I think, I think for me it would be very unrealistic if I say 'oh, no, in twenty years I'll be here.' You never know. I never know. I didn't know seven years ago that I would be here, sitting here and I'll be British citizen. So, I cannot predict the future. But, so far I'm here. So, what brings future, I have no idea.

E: You might be somewhere else...

P45: Yeah, it could be anything, you know, and that's the other, that's the other freedom that it gives you. You can be free to live wherever, even, you know? Now I have a German boyfriend and God knows what happen if, I've known him for four months only, and I don't, you never know what future brings to us, you know? But this was a very important stage of my life and it's been done completely and I'm very, very happy with it, you know? It's the first, I think all happens in good time, in my life that's been so far the case, that's good, everything happened in good times and this was even a bit late, but, you know, but at least it wasn't too late, you know, at least it was the time now, now I can move forward than this, you know, this is, you can't, you can't always... some people... you know I have a friend, there's one friend back in Syria and when I say things to him and he cannot, he cannot get, he cannot, he doesn't understand it, because he thinks that I arrived in the UK and I should be and I'm living here, having the life I have and I should be grateful and that's it. You know? But I don't think that way. I think, I think you achieve something and there's the next step forward.

E: You want more out of life...

P45: You want more. It's not that you, I think it's the human, human nature, and that's, it's a progress, it's a going forward situation. You can't go back, you can't, you can't sit there, OK, you'd be grateful for everything you have but that doesn't mean that you can spend the rest of your life standing there in the same position just because this was a big thing to achieve. You achieve this big thing, and it is a big thing, but that's kind of push you to the next stage of your life, which God knows what's gonna happen, you know? And now, after, you know, this is a new, it's kind of opened new, new doors for me, in a way, you know the travelling, going and seeing different things and it might, might open different horizons for me, you know, and I don't know exactly where it's gonna go from here, but, but it's gonna get somewhere, you know (smiling)?

E: You're optimistic about the future...

P45: Yeah, I think you have to, yes, you have to. You can't sit down and... It's, I can, I can assure you, I can assure you this was, this was a huge thing. For me it was a huge thing, you know? Having been able to say to someone that I am a British citizen. For me it's an achievement, you know? That I achieved that, because, because lots of, you know, for instant (sic), yourself, you're from Greece probably you won't, probably you would appreciate it, but you wouldn't understand fully the importance of it. Because, because you didn't have a Syrian passport, you didn't have that difficulties, you didn't have, you didn't get treated like a second class citizen when you were travelling or you were doing anything really, even talking to someone. But, but, but coming from there and getting a British passport this is a huge thing for me. It's a huge thing.

E: OK. Thank you very much. It's been very interesting talking to you.

P45: Yeah, I hope so (laughing).
E: Thank you so much for your time.
P45: You're welcome.

Appendix 3: Information Sheet

London School of Economics and Political Science
Institute of Social Psychology
St Clements Building
Houghton Street
London WC2 2AE

Interview Information Sheet

This interview study is conducted as part of a PhD research project in the Institute of Social Psychology at the London School of Economics and Political Science. The aim is to explore people's views and experiences regarding the process of acquiring the British citizenship. This research has the potential to make a valuable contribution to our understanding of the meaning of citizenship in contemporary societies and its relation to people's sense of national belonging.

If you choose to participate in this interview, you should know that there are no right or wrong answers; I am only interested in your personal point of view. The interviews are semi-structured, meaning that they are more similar to a discussion rather than a questionnaire. They normally last around 60 minutes and may be conducted wherever and whenever would be most convenient for participants.

Interviews need to be recorded for transcription and analysis purposes. However, they are confidential and anonymous in accordance with the British Psychological Society's ethical principles and guidelines.

Your participation is also voluntary. You can refuse to answer any question and/or terminate the interview at any point. You are also free to withdraw your consent and discontinue your participation at any time.

If you have more questions about this study, I would be happy to answer them.

Thank you for taking the time to participate in this study and for your contribution.

Contact Information:

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Appendix 4: Consent Form

**London School of Economics
and Political Science
Institute of Social Psychology
Houghton Street
London WC2 2AE**

Interview Consent Form

I, _____, agree that the interview data

which I provide to Eleni Andreouli on this date _____ may be recorded

and used for research purposes, provided that my identity is not revealed by the

researcher.

I also agree that extracts from the recording can be used in reports relating to that

research, providing that confidentiality is respected in all cases.

_____   _____
         Interviewee   Eleni Andreouli

Contact Information:

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Appendix 5: Coding Frameworks

Citizenship Officers

Global themes	Organising themes	Basic themes (codes)
Belonging	Cultural diversity	Plural Britishness
		Tolerance/Political correctness
		Cultural threat
		Cultural enrichment
		Lack of integration
		Lack of cohesion/Decline of Britishness
		Shared values
		Accommodation of different identities
	Citizenship & belonging	Citizenship as identity
		Irrelevant to identity
		Welcoming new citizens
		Raising significance
Opportunity	Decline	Strain on economy by immigration
		Limit immigration
		Lack of commitment/opportunism
	Progress & Prosperity	Freedom & democracy
		Humanitarianism & safety
		Economic prosperity &opportunities
		Other rights
		Pride/Commitment
		Positive contribution
Earned citizenship	Duties	Citizenship as privilege
		Duty to contribute
		Duty to integrate
		Duty to be committed
	'Being' and 'having'	Earned vs. birthright
		Block naturalisation process

Naturalised Citizens

Global themes	Organising themes	Basic themes (codes)
Life in Britain & Belonging	Place belonging	Familiarity
		Settled
	Integration	Contribution to economy
		Commitment
		Civic participation
		Learning the culture
		Accepted
		Identity negotiation
	Representations of immigration	Similarity & difference
		Being scrutinised
		Immigration restrictions
	Britishness as ethno-cultural identity	Whiteness
		Culture
		Born with
		Language
		Exclusionary
		Acculturation
	Britishness as negative identity	Threat to identity
		Moral decline
	Britishness as progress	Freedom & democracy
		Openness & tolerance
		Economic development & opportunities
	Other identities	Country of origin
		London
		Other
Citizenship	'Closure'	Recognition of contribution
		Settling
	Earned citizenship/ 'Being' and 'having'	Contribution
		Earned vs. birthright
	New status	Right to mobility
		Right to reside
		Opportunity & Empowerment
		Achievement
		Enhances participation
	'Practical' aspect of citizenship	Differs from identity
		'Instrumental' use of citizenship

Appendix 6: Key Details of ALCETE Analyses

Default Analysis and Analysis for Broad classes

Number of words in corpus	56,638
Number of different textual forms[52]	4,004
Average frequency of textual forms in the corpus	14
Number of analysed occurrences[53]	29,633
% of analysed occurrences	54.89% (of the total occurrences)
Number of ECUs	1,497
Average number of words analysed per ECU	19.56
No of CUs in first classification	1,115
Minimum no of words per CU in first classification	17
No of CUs in second classification	1,012
Minimum no of words per CU in second classification	19
No of different analysed forms in first classification	924
No of different analysed forms in second classification	924
Stability coefficient	81.03%
No of classes	5
No of maximum terminal classes	10 (5 for Broad classes analysis)
Minimum chi-square for word selection (to be classified in a class)	4.04

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[52] Textual forms are words in their grammatical form. For example, the words 'eat' and 'ate' belong to the same form 'eat'.

[53] After the reduction of plurals and conjugation endings and the elimination of words which appear only once in the text.

Analysis 8 (Detailed classes)

Number of words in corpus	56,638
Number of different textual forms	4004
Average frequency of textual forms in the corpus	14
Number of analysed occurrences	29,633
% of analysed occurrences	54.89% (of the total occurrences)
Number of ECUs	1,889
Average number of words analysed per ECU	15.50
No of CUs in first classification	1,115
Minimum no of words per CU in first classification	18
No of CUs in second classification	1,115
Minimum no of words per CU in second classification	18
No of different analysed forms in first classification	924
No of different analysed forms in second classification	924
Stability coefficient	98%
No of classes	8
No of maximum terminal classes	12
Minimum chi-square for word selection (to be classified in a class)	6.19

Appendix 7: Typical words and associated chi2 values (≥20) in ALCESTE analyses

A. Broad classes

Class 1: Immigration Reform		Class 2: Consultation & Stages		Class 3: Immigration Impact	
Words	Chi2[1]	Words	Chi2	Words	Chi2
immigration	233	*consan08	351	local	260
*green[2]	165	citizen+	183	authorit+	151
system	117	resid+	164	*cons09	124
reform	101	permanent	143	service	116
border	97	comment	128	fund	89
our	79	probation+	125	skill	65
control	79	were	123	migrat+	65
legisl+	78	British	118	impact	63
clear	62	those	114	orient+	63
legal	57	should	102	labour	60
permit+	56	respond+	100	communit+	55
chang+	54	feel	88	day	54
decid+	53	period	86	pressure	54
we	52	who	77	employ	49
law	51	progress	66	cohes+	46
power	49	question	63	product	45
framework	47	their	62	country	44
set_out	43	demonstr+	58	develop+	44
strength	40	that	53	help	43

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[1] Chi-square values indicate the strength of association of each word with the entire class. A high chi-square value of a word means that the word is typical of the class.

[2] Asterisks indicate which document(s) each class draws more on. 'Green' refers to the green paper "The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System"; 'consan08' refers to "The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Analysis of Consultation Responses"; 'cons09' refers to "Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship"; 'consresp' refers to "The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Government Response to Consultation".

agenc+	35	complete	53	market	42
single	35	famil+	51	short	37
path	33	slow	48	pounds	33
visa	33	they	48	alleviate	33
entry	32	migrant	44	could	31
authomat+	32	down	43	co	30
enforce	31	figure	40	job	30
process	30	journey	40	advise	30
rule	29	commit+	38	ordinate	30
will	28	unsure	37	population	30
simple	28	not	36	office	29
biometric	28	show	35	no	28
point	27	become	34	fill	28
new	26	crim+	32	role	27
make	26	theme	32	health	27
identity	23	custodial	32	sector	27
effective	23	was	31	social	27
issue	22	time	31	transit+	27
consistent	22	stage	31	money	25
at	21	refugee	29	improve	25
now	21	seven	28	run	24
look	21	sentence	27	govern+	24
heart	21	be	26	mentor	24
illegal	21	did	26	integrat+	24
present	21	stop+	26	deliver	23
current	20	relat+	26	per	22
transparent	20	require	25	import	22
		or	24	brain	21
		depend	24	bring	21
		offend	24	drain	21
		say	23	volunt+	21
		twenty	23	facilitate	21
		suggest	23	uk_border_agency	20

		suit	22		
		answer	22		
		multiple	22		
		four	21		
		grant	20		
		propose	20		
		minimise	20		

B. Main Classes

Class 1: Immigration Impact		Class 2: Stages		Class 3: Immigration Reform		Class 4: Consultation		Class 5: English	
Words	**Chi2**	**Words**	**Chi2**	**Words**	**Chi2**	**Words**	**Chi2**	**Words**	**Chi2**
local	269	resid+	185	immigration	229	*consan08	721	English	452
authorit+	163	citizen+	156	*green	156	were	346	language	413
service	119	permanent	152	system	111	respond+	313	speaker	196
fund	87	British	121	reform	97	question	300	spouse	116
impact	69	probation+	121	border	96	comment	288	level	104
migrat+	68	demonstr+	91	our	75	unsure	210	life	92
orient+	63	*consresp	85	legisl+	75	feel	163	pre	90
labour	58	become	80	control	73	theme	162	topic	90
*cons09	58	famil+	76	legal	62	figure	141	*cons09	87
pressure	57	they	59	clear	57	answer	123	knowledge	87
day	53	their	59	decid+	57	disagree	116	require	71
skill	53	refugee	52	permit+	57	was	108	course	67
country	49	progress	51	chang+	53	suit	108	test	64
communit+	48	period	50	law	50	multiple	107	entry	52
product	47	elig+	47	power	50	seven	101	text	51
short	46	route	44	we	48	show	93	common	51
develop+	45	those	44	set_out	48	who	86	compet+	50
help	41	stage	42	agenc+	43	keep	84	assess	47
could	40	choose	38	single	36	raise	74	Europe	45
market	39	right	36	process	34	decreased	69	refer	44
cohes+	38	during	36	will	33	proportion	66	familiar	42
employ	37	continu+	33	authomat+	33	think	64	read	40
job	35	migrant	33	strength	33	not	56	proficient	40
pounds	34	temporar+	32	path	32	sixt+	54	other	38
alleviate	34	or	31	enforce	32	total	52	standard	36
population	32	relat+	30	simple	29	result	52	write	35
fill	30	speed	30	rule	28	add	50	integrat+	31
role	28	should	30	biometric	28	propose	49	fluent	30

sector	28	protect	30	make	26	did	44	tuition	30
transit+	28	individual	30	framework	26	separate	44	marr+	28
volunt+	28	ipsos	27	deport+	24	these	42	histor+	28
run	26	humanitarian	27	identity	24	say	41	import	27
money	26	categor+	26	effective	24	six	41	produce	24
co	25	limit	25	asylum	23	further	41	simple	23
advise	25	interview	24	easy	22	green	39	inform	22
health	25	tax	23	approach	22	should	39	take	21
office	25	complete	23	new	20	ninety	38	communic+	21
social	25	minimise	23	visa	20	paragraph	38	geograph+	20
ordinate	25	MORI	22	change	20	those	37	practical	20
govern+	24	self	22	foreign	20	sure	36		
per	23	spend	22	consistent	20	some	35		
improve	23	full	21	transparent	20	thirty	34		
brain	22	show	21			discrimin+	34		
drain	22	that	21			period	33		
mentor	22	qualify	21			non	32		
deliver	22	require	21			charg+	32		
facilitate	22	person	20			eight	32		
award	20	journey	20			forty	32		
close	20					fee	31		
offer	20					conplete	31		
enhance	20					larg+	29		
million	20					quarter	27		
						nine	26		
						half	25		
						paper	24		
						concept	22		
						time	21		
						that	20		
						simple	20		
						organisation	20		

C. Complementary Classes

Class 1: English		Class 2: Immigration Impact		Class 3: Immigration Reform		Class 4: Consultation		Class 5: Earned Citizenship & Local Authorities		Class 6: Border Control		Class 7: Penalties		Class 8: Stages	
Words	Chi2	Words	Chi2	Words	Chi2	Words	Chi2	Words	Chi2	Words	Chi2	Words	Chi2	Words	Chi2
English	398	migrat+	186	immigration	289	*cons08	1007	local	378	authomat+	174	crim+	627	resid+	229
language	318	country	153	Set_out	135	comment	469	authorit+	226	permit+	161	stop+	490	citizen+	195
*cons09	238	skill	139	simple	129	were	358	service	147	power	148	custodial	488	permanent	168
test	141	labour	109	legisl+	98	respond+	343	communit+	136	passenger	130	offend	486	probation+	141
speaker	130	develop+	85	system	98	question	218	fund	122	border	123	slow	472	British	126
speak	108	product	84	reform	93	feel	182	money	95	foreign	123	sentence	437	demonstrat+	105
day	107	bring	81	legal	91	unsure	180	govern+	69	identity	117	down	343	*conresp	85
integrat+	88	job	78	*green	91	theme	152	design	65	visa	113	commit+	246	elig+	77
life	79	population	78	decid+	78	who	122	pressure	64	illegal	91	consequences	170	become	74
pre	62	impact	76	framework	78	figure	120	cohes+	56	card	78	progress	166	famil+	73
point	58	market	70	law	77	disagree	105	group	48	port	78	prison	149	refugee	65
level	56	work	68	path	73	multiple	104	alleviate	45	*green	78	minor	126	stage	64
spouse	55	econom+	62	easy	65	was	97	amount	44	prison	78	attract	121	period	60
inform	54	stud+	60	understand	61	seven	91	deliver	43	fingerprint	78	convict+	118	they	59
simple	53	tier	59	process	60	nine	89	across	41	count	76	serious	117	minimise	50
topic	51	fill	58	rule	58	suggest	89	office	41	remove	66	parent	104	temporar+	49
require	49	growth	52	clear	58	twenty	86	short	36	present	66	normal	87	journey	48

knowledge	44	negative	47	complex	57	answer	85	operat+	34	waive	65	penalise	81	protect	48
entry	43	brain	46	consult+	56	discrimin+	84	housing	34	deport+	65	child	68	their	45
sign	37	drain	46	confidence	53	show	81	April	32	out	57	deport+	62	complete	45
attend	37	manage	46	chang+	43	those	76	million	32	fundamental	56	fall	47	route	44
other	35	world	40	border	40	suit	75	volunt+	31	cancel	53	behav+	45	speed	40
common	34	gross	39	make	35	sixt+	69	welcome	31	biometric	53	effect	42	choose	40
course	33	born	38	our	34	raise	65	policy	30	liable	52	delay	37	progress	39
personal	31	income	38	consistent	34	six	62	undertake	30	expulsion	52	remove	32	subsisting	39
no	30	Britain	38	radical	33	deceased	62	envisage	29	control	48	exclude	31	relat+	38
take	29	benefit	36	efficien+	33	did	61	distribut+	29	enforce	44	permanent	30	right	38
possible	29	positive	35	transform	33	thirty	55	department	29	travel	42	non	29	continu+	38
into	28	maximise	34	streamline	33	not	54	assist	28	tackl+	40	type	29	qualify	34
compet+	27	talent	33	case	32	proportion	54	uk_border_agency	26	combin+	40	whose	29	migrant	33
text	26	circular	33	paper	32	these	51	us	25	physical	40	any	27	categor+	32
online	26	net	32	public	29	add	44	verify	25	single	35	deny	25	during	31
learn	25	mobil+	32	summar+	28	keep	42	enhance	25	national	34	even	25	self	29
assess	25	invest	32	guide	27	think	42	role	24	secure	33	refuse	25	humanitarian	29
compulsory	25	licens+	32	piece	27	some	41	pounds	24	entry	32	or	24	or	28
threshold	24	employ	30	discretion	27	eight	41	best	23	form	30	go	23	year	25

refer	23	come	28	straightforward	27	say	39	sense	23	big	28	prevent	20	grant	25
Europe	23	care	26	overall	26	further	38	agenda	23	underway	28			member	25
import	23	avenue	26	stakeholder	26	charg+	36	share	22	detention	28			status	25
meet	22	industr+	26	publish	25	total	36	ceremon+	22	prior	26			partner	23
mentor	22	domestic	26	and	24	period	36	empower	22	break	25			limit	22
familiar	21	remittances	26	asylum	24	unfair	36	statistics	22	Britain	25			convention	22
introduce	21	Entrepreneurs	26	the	23	separate	36	homelessness	22	deal	24			time	21
proficient	21	transit+	25	staff	23	forty	35	wide	20	check	24			active	21
for	20	average	24	reflect	23	ninety	35	address	20	polic+	24			after	20
select	20	free	22	February	23	result	35			record	24			sufficien+	20
promote	20	high	22	we	22	fourteen	35			without	24				
list	21			step	22	abolish+	34			end	22				
pay	20			agenc+	22	should	32			obtain	22				
boost	20			uk	21	propose	32			prevent	22				
output	20			gov	21	concept	31			roll	21				
source	20			single	21	that	30			technology	21				
nations	20			outline	21	avail	30			separate	20				
				will	20	four	29								
						larg+	28								
						sure	28								
						wait	28								
						fifty	28								
						statement	28								
						fee	25								

						five	25								
						had	22								
						concern	22								
						half	21								
						ties	21								
						quarter	21								
						thirteen	21								
						disincent iv+	21								
						refer	20								

Appendix 8: Five most typical ECUs in each class and associated chi-square values in ALCESTE analyses[1]

A. Broad Classes

Class 1: Immigration Reform

1. Chi2= 37 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")

the task now is (to) (ensure) that all routes of (entry) (to) and (stay) in (britain) (combine) (to) (form) a (coherent) and (comprehensible) whole. (issues) with the (current) (legislation) 248. we need (to) embody in (legislation) the (new) (approach) (to) the (path) (to) citizenship which is (set_out) in the (earlier) (chapters) of this (document).

2. Chi2 = 31 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")

we will (look) further at the best (approach) (to) temporary (admission) within the (new) (legal) (architecture) we are proposing. 7. 5 (purpose) of (entry) and (stay) (context) 246. as the (earlier) (chapters) (make) (clear), we are already (introducing) the most (sweeping) (changes) (to) the (immigration) (system) in its history.

3. Chi2 = 30 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")

4. our (objective) is (to) (make) our (immigration) (system) (clearer), more (streamlined) and (easier) (to) (understand), in the (process) (reducing) the (possibilities) for (abuse) of the (system),

4. Chi2 = 30 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")

our (objective) is (to) (make) our (immigration) (system) (clearer), more (streamlined) and (easier) (to) (understand), in the (process) (reducing) the (possibilities) for (abuse) of the (system),

5. Chi2 = 29 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")

(going) forward, the (use) of (biometrics) will (underpin) other (changes). in the (future), (secure), (unique) (identity) (cards) will also be required for non (european_economic_area) (nationals) who do not require a (visa) (to) enter (britain) and do not already have a (secure), (unique) (identity) (card) (recorded) by the (agency).

Class 2: Consultation & Stages

1. Chi2 = 37 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Analysis of Consultation Responses")

A (quarter) of (respondents) (disagreed), 125, and the (remaining) 65, 13, were (unsure). these (results) are (shown) in (figure) 15. (question) 4. 3b should (partners) of (british) (citizens) or (permanent) (residents) be (required) to (demonstrate) an (ongoing) (relationship) before moving from the (probationary) (citizenship) (stage) to (permanent) (residence)?

2. Chi2 = 37 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Analysis of Consultation Responses")

(sixty) (seven), 13, (agreed) that this (requirement) should be (mandatory) and 33, 6, were (unsure). these (results) are (shown) in (figure) 18. further (comments) on this (question) were provided by 240 (respondents); some (raising) (multiple) (themes). A (total) of 219 (respondents) who did not support the (idea) of (active) (citizenship) (raised) the (following) (themes).

3. Chi2 = 36 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Analysis of Consultation Responses")

38%thought it should (stop) (progression) and 39%thought it should (slow) (down) rather than (stop) (progress). 5. in the (ipsos) MORI (research), (respondents) were (asked) how (migrants) who (commit) (minor) (offences) which do not (result) in a (prison) (sentence) should be (penalised).

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[1] Words in parentheses indicate characteristic words of the class.

4. Chi2 = 36 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Analysis of Consultation Responses")

these (results) are (shown) in (figure) 21. further (comments) on this (question) were provided by 158 (respondents), some (raising) (multiple) (themes). A (total) of 109, 69%of those who (commented), (felt) that any (slowing) (down) or (stopping) of the (journey) to (permanent) (residence) should (depend) on the circumstances, (type) and severity of the (crime) (committed).

5. Chi2 = 34 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")

are the (proposed) (minimum) time (periods) for a (migrant) to (complete) the (journey) to (permanent) (residence) (suitable)? 3. should (partners) of (british) (citizens) or (permanent) (residents) be (required) to (demonstrate) that they are in an (ongoing) (relationship) with the (citizen/) (permanent) (resident) before (progressing:)

Class 3: Immigration Impact

1. Chi2 = 38 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")

lawrence (homeoffice). gsi. (gov). (uk) nigel lawrence consultation (co) (ordinator) (performance) and (delivery) (unit) (home) (office) 3rd floor, seacole 2 marsham (street) (london) SW1P 4DF.

2. Chi2 = 35 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Government Response to Consultation")

we also proposed to require newcomers to (contribute) a (little) (extra) (financially) to (help) Britain (manage) the (transitional) (impacts) of (migration), which would allow us to (release) limited (amounts) of (money) (quickly) and responsively and (help) (local) (service) (providers) deal with the (short) (term) (pressures) resulting from (migration).

3. Chi2 = 34 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")

the (department) for (innovation), (universities) and (skills), DIUS, has already initiated a package of (measures) to encourage (employers) (contributions) to the (costs) of (english) for (speakers) of other (languages) for (work).

4. Chi2 = 34 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")

the (migration) (advisory) (committee) chair has been appointed: david metcalf, professor of (industrial) relations at the (london) (school) of (economics), LSE. the (migration) (advisory) (committee) will (provide) (independent) and (evidence) based (advice) to (government) on specific (sectors) and (occupations) in the (labour) (market) where (shortages) (exist) which can sensibly be (filled) by (migration).

5. Chi2 = 34 ("Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship")

A further means to (promote) (integration) might be for (local) (authorities) to (run) (orientation) (days) for migrants, to (provide) (information) about (local) (services) and (resources) to (help) them (integrate) more (quickly).

B. Main Classes

Class 1: Immigration Impact

1. Chi2 = 42 ("Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship")

and (managing) the (impacts) of (migration) on the (developing) (world). A points test for citizenship 4. (migration) (brings) great benefits to britain. it has (significant) (economic) benefits, both for (gross) (domestic) (product) and (gross) (domestic) (product) per (head), and (improves) the (employment) rate and (productivity), (helping) to (fill) (skills) gaps.

2. Chi2 = 41 ("Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship")

this (group) could be chaired by (home) (office) ministers or (officials), and might (include) (representatives) from the (voluntary) (sector) as well as from (local) and (central) (government).

3. Chi2 = 40 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")

the (migration) (advisory) (committee) chair has been appointed: david metcalf, professor of (industrial) relations at the (london) (school) of (economics), LSE. the (migration) (advisory) (committee) will (provide) independent and evidence based (advice) to (government) on specific

(sectors) and (occupations) in the (labour) (market) where (shortages) exist which can sensibly be (filled) by (migration).

4. Chi2 = 39 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")

(volunteering) with a (recognised) organisation, (employer) (supported) (volunteering), (volunteering) (activity), which may (involve) (short) periods overseas, to (support) britains, (international) (development) objectives, (running) or (helping) to (run) a playgroup which encourages the different (communities) to interact, (fund) raising activities for (charities) or (schools), (serving) on (community) (bodies), for (example) as a (school) (governor), (running) or (helping) (run) a (local) sporting team.

5. Chi2 = 39 ("Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship")

(bringing) new (skills) and (talents), (increasing) the flexibility of our (labour) (market), and (improving) (productivity). but (migration) can also (bring) challenges. we (know), for (example), that (migration) is a (significant) factor in britains rising (population). in (order) for (migration) to (work) for the britain, it must be (carefully) (managed) and respond to the changing needs of the country.

Class 2: Stages

1. Chi2 = 32 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")

150. (migrants) who (wish) (to) (become) (permanent) (residents), on the other hand, by (choice) or because they are (unable) (to) (become) (british) (citizens), would (spend) a (minimum) of 3 (years) as (probationary) (citizens).

2. Chi2 = 32 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Government Response to Consultation")

(family:) (family) (members) of (british) (citizens) and (permanent) (residents); 3. (protection:) those in need of (protection), (refugees) and those (granted) (humanitarian) (protection). and three (stages) in the (journey:) 1. (temporary) (residence); 2. (probationary) (citizenship); 3. (british) (citizenship) or (permanent) (residence).

3. Chi2 = 32 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Government Response to Consultation")

and those on the (protection) (route) (to) (demonstrate) a (continuing) need for our (protection). we will (speed) (up) the (journey) (to) (british) (citizenship) and (permanent) (residence) for (migrants) who (demonstrate) (active) (citizenship).

4. Chi2 = 31 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")

151. (to) (encourage) (migrants) (to) (actively) (contribute) (to) the wider community, they will only be (eligible) (to) (qualify) for the (minimum) time (periods), 1 (year) for (progression) from (probationary) (citizenship) (to) (british) (citizenship) and 3 (years) (probationary) (citizen) (to) (permanent) (residence), if they have (demonstrated) such a (contribution).

5. Chi2 = 30 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")

(migrants) who do not would be (eligible) (to) apply for (citizenship) after a (minimum) (period) of 3 (years). 170. (migrants) who (wish) (to) (become) (permanent) (residents) and who have (demonstrated) (active) (citizenship) would (spend) a (minimum) of 3 (years) as (probationary) (citizens).

Class 3: Immigration Reform

1. Chi2 = 46 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")

bia. (homeoffice). (gov). (uk/) (aboutus/) (consultations/) (current/) (chapter) 1 migration: the (challenges) and (reforms) 1. 1 (introduction) 17. (over) the next 12 (months) we are (introducing) the most (sweeping) (changes) to the (immigration) (system) for (over) 30 years: revolutionising the way in which we (judge) who can (come) through the (points) based (system), PBS;

2. Chi2 = 43 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")

we have (amended) the (immigration) (rules) to (reduce) the (grounds) on which (deportation) might be (prevented), and we have (legislated) through britain (borders) (act) so that (foreign) (prisoners/) (convicted) of (serious) (crimes) will (face) (automatic) (deportation) unless one of a narrow (set) of exceptions applies.

3. Chi2 = 40 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")

(introduce) (automatic) (deportation) for (serious) (criminals) and (build) more (detention) spaces to help but a compassionate (system) 10. (honour) our (asylum) (obligations) but (make) and (enforce) (decisions) much (faster), and with a more (sensitive) (treatment) for children 1.

4. Chi2 = 39 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")

bia. (homeoffice). (gov). (uk/) sitecontent/ (documents/) (aboutus/) (consultations/) closedconsultations/ simplification1stconsutlation/ 50. (immigration) (law) is very (complex). the (immigration) (act) 1971 is still at its (heart).

5. Chi2 = 38 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")

4. our (objective) is to (make) our (immigration) (system) (clearer), more (streamlined) and (easier) to (understand), in the (process) (reducing) the (possibilities) for (abuse) of the (system),

Class 4: Consultation

1. Chi2 = 90 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Analysis of Consultation Responses")

A (large) (proportion), 73, 373 of the 513respondents who (answered) this (question) supported the (proposal) for the creation of a permanent residence category. (eighty) two, 16, did not support this (proposal) and 58, 11, were (unsure). these (results) are (shown) in (figure) 8. further (comments) on this (question) were provided by 158 (respondents), some (raising) (multiple) (themes) in their (response).

2. Chi2 = 86 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Analysis of Consultation Responses")

(sixty) (nine), 15, (thought) it was (correct), but 141, 30, (thought) it was not (correct). these (results) are (shown) in (figure) 30. further (comments) on this (question) were provided by 27 (respondents). Some mentioned more than one (theme). thirteen (suggested) that the citizenship application (fees) were excessive.

3. Chi2 = 85 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Analysis of Consultation Responses")

(sixty) (seven), 13, agreed that this requirement should be mandatory and 33, 6, were (unsure). These (results) are (shown) in (figure) 18. further (comments) on this (question) were provided by 240 (respondents); some (raising) (multiple) (themes). A (total) of 219 (respondents) who did not support the (idea) of active citizenship (raised) the (following) (themes).

4. Chi2 = 82 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Analysis of Consultation Responses")

(overall), a (total) of 110, 21, (thought) the (concept) was a good (idea) and the (remaining) 62, 12, were (unsure). (responses) from british citizens and non british citizens are (shown) (separately) in (figures) 6 and 7.

5. Chi2 = 82 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Analysis of Consultation Responses")

further (comments) on this (question) were provided by 162 (respondents). some (raised) (multiple) (themes). of these, 156 who (disagreed) with the imposition of an (additional) (charge) (raised) the (following) (themes).

Class 5: English

1. Chi2 = 77 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")

can (describe) in (simple) (terms) aspects of his/ her background, immediate (environment/) and (matters) in areas of immediate need. (english) for (speakers) of other (languages) (entry) (level) 1; (common) (european) framework of (reference) A1; can understand and (use) (familiar)

everyday (expressions) and very (basic) phrases (aimed) at the satisfaction of needs of a concrete type;

2. *Chi2 = 69 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")*

(english) for (speakers) of other (languages) (entry) 3 (requires) the migrant to be (able) to understand and (communicate) on (familiar) (topics), (write) (simple) (text) and (describe) experiences and emotions.

3. *Chi2 = 69 ("Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship")*

we now propose to rename this (requirement) a (pre) (application) (english) (language) (requirement) for (spouses), rather than a (pre) (entry) (requirement). 3. 17 the new (pre) (application) (requirement) will be for (applicants) to (speak) (english) to (level) A1, (basic), of (common) (european) framework of (reference).

4. *Chi2 = 69 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Government Response to Consultation")*

(english) for (speakers) of other (languages) (entry) 3 (requires) the migrant to be (able) to understand and (communicate) on (familiar) (topics), (write) (simple) (text) and (describe) experiences and emotions.

5. *Chi2 = 68 ("Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship")*

3. 5 at present, there are two ways in which (applicants) can (meet) the (language) and (knowledge) of (life) in (britain) (requirement:) by successfully (taking) the (life) in (britain) (test), (based) on the (information) (contained) in the handbook (life) in the (britain)

C. Complementary Classes

Class 1: English

1. *Chi2 = 61 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")*

(english) for (speakers) of other (languages) (entry) 3 (requires) the migrant to be able to understand and (communicate) on (familiar) (topics), (write) (simple) (text) and (describe) (experiences) and emotions.

2. *Chi2 = 61 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Government Response to Consultation")*

(english) for (speakers) of other (languages) (entry) 3 (requires) the migrant to be able to understand and (communicate) on (familiar) (topics), (write) (simple) (text) and (describe) (experiences) and emotions.

3. *Chi2 = 60 ("Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship")*

3. 5 at present, there are two (ways) in which (applicants) can (meet) the (language) and (knowledge) of (life) in britain (requirement:) by successfully (taking) the (life) in britain (test), (based) on the (information) (contained) in the handbook (life) in the britain:

4. *Chi2 = 50 ("Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship")*

this is a (threshold) at which (people) can deal with most situations in (english). for those who (take) the (language) with citizenship (course) route, it is (possible) to (meet) the (requirements) for citizenship by progressing from no (english) at all to a minimum of A1 (level) on (common) (european) framework of (reference), (basic).

5. *Chi2 = 50 ("Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship")*

(box) 2 (assessing) (pre) (entry) (english) under the (points) (based) system those entering under the (points) (based) system are (required) to provide (evidence) of their (competency) in (english) (language) by (proving) that they:

Class 2: Immigration Impact

1. *Chi2 = 75 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Government Response to Consultation")*

we are (maximizing) the (benefits) of (migration) for (britain) and (managing) local (impacts). (migration) has (significant) (economic) (benefits), both for (gross) (domestic) (product) and (gross) (domestic) (product) per (head).

2. *Chi2 = 60 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")*

our position is clear: (carefully) (managed) (migration) (brings) (significant) and undoubted (benefits) to (britain). 26. (today), migrant (workers) are (filling) (skills) shortages and meeting (labour) (market) (demands).

3. Chi2 = 56 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")

g. (scientists) or (entrepreneurs) (tier) two: (skilled) (workers) with a (job) (offer), e. g. nurses, (teachers), engineers (tier) three: (low) (skilled) (workers) (filling) specific temporary (labour) shortages, e.

4. Chi2 = 55 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")

migrants in the other three (tiers) will not. (tier) one 108. this (tier) (consists) of (highly) (skilled) (workers), (entrepreneurs) and (investors) (bringing) the (skills) that we need to (boost) our (economy).

5. Chi2 = 52 ("Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship")

chapter 1 context 1. 1 (carefully) (managed) (migration) (brings) (significant) and undoubted (benefits) to (britain). in the same way that (free) (trade) and capital (mobility) (boost) our (income), so too does (migration).

Class 3: Immigration Reform

1. Chi2 = 62 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")

the (green) (paper) (set_out) (details) of our (plans) to (simplify) the (laws) (current) (complexity) and (make) it (fit) for the 21st century.

2. Chi2 = 62 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")

(chapter) 7 (simplifying) the (system) and (reforming) the (law) 222. as we (look) to (reform) the (path) to citizenship and continue to (transform) the (immigration) (system), we need to (simplify) the (laws) (current) (complexity) and (make) it (fit) for the 21st century.

3. Chi2 = 57 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")

(key) (provisions) will be (set_out) in a single focused (piece) of (primary) (legislation). the (key) (principles) which we believe should (underpin) the (simplification) (process) are that it should maximise: (transparency), (efficiency), (clarity);

4. Chi2 = 56 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")

(simplifying) the (system) and (reforming) the (law:) 14. as we (look) to (reform) the (path) to citizenship and continue to (transform) the (immigration) (system), we need to (simplify) the (laws) (current) (complexity) and (make) it (fit) for the 21st century.

5. Chi2 = 56 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")

bia. (homeoffice). (gov). (uk/) sitecontent/ (documents/) (aboutus/) (consultations/) closedconsultations/simplification1stconsutlation/ 50. (immigration) (law) is very (complex). the (immigration) act 1971 is still at its (heart).

Class 4: Consultation

1. Chi2 = 99 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Analysis of Consultation Responses")

(eighty) two, 16, did not support this (proposal) and 58, 11, were (unsure). these (results) are (shown) in (figure) 8. further (comments) on this (question) were provided by 158 (respondents), some (raising) (multiple) (themes) in their (response).

2. Chi2 = 88 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Analysis of Consultation Responses")

further (comments) on this (question) were provided by 162 (respondents). some (raised) (multiple) (themes). of these, 156 who (disagreed) with the imposition of an (additional) (charge) (raised) the (following) (themes).

3. Chi2 = 81 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Analysis of Consultation Responses")

51%thought it should be (decreased) and 4%were not (sure). once (responses) from migrants and (organisations) were (added) in, a (larger) (proportion), 78, 404 of the 516 (respondents) who (answered) this (question) (felt) that the (proposed) eight year period should be (decreased).

4. Chi2 = 79 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Analysis of Consultation Responses")
under a (quarter), 24, (disagreed) with this (statement) and a (similar) (proportion), 26, neither (agreed) nor (disagreed). these (results) are (shown) in (figure) 17.

5. Chi2 = 79 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Analysis of Consultation Responses")
these (results) are (shown) in (figure) 21. further (comments) on this (question) were provided by 158 (respondents), some (raising) (multiple) (themes).

Class 5: Earned Citizenship & Local Authorities

1. Chi2 = 58 ("Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship")
and (identifying) areas of research and (best) (practice). its (value) could be (enhanced) by the (inclusion) of a limited (number) of (independent) experts from the (voluntary) and (community) (sector).

2. Chi2 = 58 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Government Response to Consultation")
how will the (money) from the (fund) be (distributed)? the (fund) is (designed) to (assist) (local) (service) (providers) in dealing with the (short) (term) (pressures) of migration.

3. Chi2 = 55 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Government Response to Consultation")
this (calls) for public (service) (providers) to respond (quickly) and (innovatively) to this challenge. The (government) has (provided) a fair settlement for (local) (government), and many are already responding to this challenge; but with a (relatively) small (amount) of additional (money) we could (alleviate) some of
the (short) (term) (pressures).

4. Chi2 = 51 ("Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship")
this (group) could be chaired by home (office) ministers or (officials), and might (include) (representatives) from the (voluntary) (sector) as well as from (local) and (central) (government).

5. Chi2 = 50 ("Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship")
16. we are not seeking to (place) a (duty) on (local) (authorities) to (deliver) these new (services), but if we pursued any of these (options) we would (envisage) (extending) the (number) of (local) (authorities) working in partnership with us to (deliver) (increased) (geographical) coverage.

Class 6: Border Control

1. Chi2 = 99 ("Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship")
1. 3 the (formation) of a (new), (single) (border) (force) with (police) like (powers) to (tackle) smuggling and immigration crime, coupled with stronger (controls) overseas such as (fingerprinting) of (visa) applicants, have (strengthened) britain (border),

2. Chi2 = 88 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")
(check) (fingerprints) before we issue a (visa) anywhere in the world 4. (count) (foreign) (nationals) in and (out) of the (country) 5.

3. Chi2 = 82 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")
to further (secure) our (borders), we are now (checking) (fingerprints), as a matter of course, before we issue a (visa) anywhere in the world for those wishing to (travel) to britain, and we will again begin to (count) (foreign) (nationals) in and (out) of the (country).

4. Chi2 = 79 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Government Response to Consultation")
(rolling) (out) systems for (counting) people in and (out) of the (country); and the introduction of (identity) (cards) for (foreign) (nationals).

5. Chi2 = 71 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Government Response to Consultation")

we are creating a (single) (border) (force); introducing (new) electronic (controls) including (counting) people in and (out) of the (country);

Class 7: Penalties

1. Chi2 = 152 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Government Response to Consultation")
individual non (custodial) (crimes) should not have an (effect), while numerous non (custodial) (crimes) should (slow) (down) (progression), individual, this (depends) on the (nature) of the (crime).

2. Chi2 = 146 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Government Response to Consultation")
we would welcome views on this. there was some support for (slowing) (down) or (stopping) a (parents) (progression) (towards) citizenship on the basis of their (childs) (criminality), with respondents (highlighting) their views that a (childs) (behaviour) is the (responsibility) of the (parent).

3. Chi2 = 141 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")
we will also (slow) a migrants (progress) through the system even where (minor) (offences) are (committed), so that (behaviour) that (falls) below the standards we (expect) has (consequences).

4. Chi2 = 128 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Analysis of Consultation Responses")
38%thought it should (stop) (progression) and 39%thought it should (slow) (down) rather than (stop) (progress). 5. in the ipsos MORI research, respondents were asked how migrants who (commit) (minor) (offences) which do not result in a (prison) (sentence) should be (penalised).

5. Chi2 = 119 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")
do you think that (committing) a (crime) which (attracts) a (custodial) (sentence) should (slow) (down) or (stop) a migrants (progression) to permanent residence?

Class 8: Stages

1. Chi2 = 39 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Government Response to Consultation")
and those on the (protection) (route) (to) (demonstrate) a (continuing) need for our (protection). we will (speed) (up) the (journey) (to) (british) (citizenship) and (permanent) (residence) for (migrants) who (demonstrate) (active) (citizenship).

2. Chi2 = 35 ("Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship")
(probationary) (citizens) are therefore (able) (to) apply for (british) (citizenship) after a (minimum) (period) of one (year). (migrants) who (wish) (to) be obtain the (alternative) (category) of (permanent) (residence) (status), on the other hand, either by (choice) or because they are (unable) (to) (become) (british) (citizens), would need (to) spend a (minimum) of three (years) as (probationary) (citizens).

3. Chi2 = 34 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")
(family) (members) of (british) (citizens) and (permanent) (residents) 3. those in need of (protection), (refugees) and those (granted) (humanitarian) (protection), and there should be three (stages) in the (journey:) 1.

4. Chi2 = 34 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")
148. those who (qualify) as (family) (members) of (british) (citizens) or (permanent) (residents) would be (eligible) (to) (become) (probationary) (citizens) after 2 (years).

5. Chi2 = 32 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System")
150. (migrants) who (wish) (to) (become) (permanent) (residents), on the other hand, by (choice) or because they are (unable) (to) (become) (british) (citizens), would spend a (minimum) of 3 (years) as (probationary) (citizens).