Perceptions of the Nation:

A Sociological Perspective on

the Case of Croatia

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the processes of social change that characterise the /re/formation of the nation. It argues that such processes can only be identified through the examination of the interplay between social structure, culture and agency in a specific period of time. Through the exploration of the basic assumptions of Social Realist Theory, a methodological framework is constructed for the analysis of the *morphogenesis of the nation*. The basic assumptions of the developed framework are tested on the case of Croatia. A historical analysis explores the processes of structural change and the formation and competition of corporate agents from the beginning of the nineteenth until the end of the twentieth century. The processes of cultural change that occurred in the same period of time are investigated through a content analysis of the writings of the dominant Croatian nationalist ideologists, which identifies the ways in which the nation in general and the Croatian nation in particular were defined. The interaction between social structure and culture in the process of nation /re/formation is explored through a content analysis of secondary school history textbooks. This analysis looks at the ways dominant ideas of nations and nationalism were incorporated into the education system from the 1880s until the 1990s and, through the medium of textbooks, were designed to influence the attitudes of primary agents. In order to investigate the interplay between structure and culture, on the one side, and primary agents, on the other, a survey was undertaken in early 2000 on a sample of the population of Zagreb. It examined the ways these agents perceive the nation in general, the Croatian nation in particular, national symbols and national enemies. These analyses show that the issues of defining the nation and explaining the process of its formation are necessarily inter-linked. The study concludes that the nation emerges with the emergence of social processes - the formation of political community, the politicisation (nationalisation) of culture, the mobilisation of a population around specific nationalist ideologies, and the population's acceptance of certain aspects of these ideologies.

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INTRODUCTION

The 1990s were years of dramatic change for Croatian society. At a personal level, it was a tragedy for all involved. The experiences of war, moreover, a Balkan war, leave memories for life. Shelling, bomb-shelters, burning houses, dead bodies, they were all daily images, for the lucky ones on TV screens, and for those less lucky in front of their eyes. But at the same time, my compatriots and I had a chance to witness and, indeed, actively participate in 'making history'. It was the period of the /re/formation of the nation. The Croatian nation fulfilled its 'nine-hundred-years long dream' and formed an independent and sovereign state, the Constitution defined it as a nation-state, new national institutions were established, the national flag was redesigned, a national language was redefined, the new unity of the nation was proclaimed, national values were guarded, the Croats were ready to die for their nation.

Today, there is not a single scholar of nations and nationalism, not a single citizen of Croatia, and not a single Croat politician, who would not recognise the existence of the Croatian nation. Yet, at the same time, there is probably very little consensus between these scholars, citizens and politicians about when and how the Croatian nation was really formed.

To the key question 'when was the Croatian nation created?' different approaches and theories would offer a variety of answers. Some Croatian historians searched deep into the ancient past in order to detect traces of the Croatian name, assuming that the name is a sufficient condition for proving the existence of the nation. Others emphasised the creation of the Croatian Kingdom, and, hence, some form of statehood, in the tenth century as the beginning of the Croatian nation. After all, the rare documents and monuments, the surviving symbols, myths and legends, the Glagolitic script and the Bible written in the vernacular, could be interpreted as telling the story of the Croat nation. Still for others only the emergence of the first Croatian nationalist ideology and political movement in the first half of the nineteenth century signifies the transformation of the

Croats into a nation. Finally, some held that the Croatian nation could not have really existed prior to the formation of the nation-state. All in all, the range of disagreement spans 2000 years. The difference in answers is a consequence of the application of different concepts of the nation. Yet, regardless of these differences, it is almost too obvious to mention that a specific named social group went through considerable changes, so much so that what could be assumed as the tenth century Croatian nation could not possibly mean the same as the twentieth-century Croatian nation.

The Problem

The differences in the above answers are, of course, not just 'historical', but qualitative, and this brings us to the main questions of this research: What is the nation? How is the nation formed? What are the fundamental processes that form the social phenomenon called the nation?

The dominant theories of nations and nationalism offer numerous illuminating insights on the process of the formation of the nation. The complex nature of the subject of analysis initiated employment of different approaches to the study of nations and nationalism. As a result we learn from these theories about sociological, historical, anthropological, political and socio-psychological aspects of nations and nationalism. These theories apply various techniques and methods of analysis. They formed their conclusions on the basis of in-depth analyses of single case-studies and comparative analyses of various examples world-wide, in a certain period of time or long span of history. Different approaches and methods of analysis however resulted in different, sometimes directly opposite answers.

Different views that the existing theories of nations and nationalism offer on the processes and 'nature' of the formation of the nation is a logical consequence of ways in which the theories define the phenomenon. The predominant method for defining the nation is through enumeration of various constituent elements. A

review of these definitions[1] will show that the most common constituent elements of the nation mentioned in these theories are: state, shared culture, common language, history, religion, myths, traditions, and values, sense of solidarity, common destiny, economic system, territory, and many others.

Through an analysis of some existing 'theoretical definitions' of nations and nationalism, this thesis will demonstrate that: the nation cannot be defined by a single constituent element; there is no final set of constituent elements that could define the nation; there is no single constituent element that is generally more important for the formation of the nation than others, since this varies from case to case; and, finally, a set of constituent elements cannot clearly distinguish the nation from other forms of social community.

Second, through an analysis of the case of 'ideological definitions' of the nation, this study will argue that there is no final set of constitutive elements of the nation that signifies the existence of a specific nation, in this case the Croatian nation. The relevance of a single constitutive element for the /re/formation of a nation can change with changes of social conditions. It will be shown that the same nation could be defined in different and, indeed, in diametrically opposite ways.

Third, by 'measuring' perceptions of the nation through an analysis of attitudes of a sample of the Croatian population, it will be shown that even the members of the same nation, in a specific historical period, could perceive different constitutional elements as crucial for the formation of their nation.

If enumeration of constituent elements cannot offer a clear basis for defining the nation, an answer should be found in the 'nature' of the nation. The nation is a social phenomenon, where 'social' means not only a set of characteristics of a group of people, but also the organisation of their political and cultural life, and the establishment of interrelations between the members of that group. This premise assumes that a definition of the nation should point to the major

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[1] See Chapter Two.

characteristics of social organisation of the group in question. It should explain its structural, cultural and agential characteristics and their interrelations. Social processes that form these characteristics, at the same time, reveal the answer to the question 'How is the nation formed?'.

The problem of the formation of the nation is the issue that distinguishes the dominant approaches to the study of nations and nationalism. These are usually termed 'perennialist', 'primordialist', 'ethno-symbolist', 'modernist', 'instrumentalist', or 'constructionist'. They all offer explanations of the process of nation-formation. However, each emphasises different domains of the society as crucial factors in this process. Hence, perennialist, primordialist and ethno-symbolist theories would predominantly emphasise the relevance of certain ideas and ideologies, traditions and customs, myths and symbols, that is the domain of 'culture', as crucial for the formation of the nation. Modernist theories tend to place their explanations in certain properties of different political, social and economic institutions, that is, in the domain of 'social structure'. Finally, constructionist and instrumentalist theories tend to stress the role of certain individuals and social groups as the main 'creators' of the nation, hence, placing their explanations for the emergence of the nation in the domain of 'agency'. As a result, most of the theories of nations and nationalism, which fall within one or the other 'school of thought', by concentrating on a single domain of society and reducing one segment of the society to another, fail to offer an explanation that would analyse the whole complexity of the interplay between the three domains of structure, culture and agency in the process of the formation of the nation.

Hence, for example, an application of a modernist theory would offer important insights into the relevance of various institutions to the formation of the nation. At the same time, they would not offer any explanation for the questions of how institutions were changed, who changed them, or whether cultural elements played any role in the process of nation-formation. This theory explains 'agency' and 'culture' as mere epiphenomena of the social structure and, hence, fails to explain the interaction between these three segments of society.

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An application of a constructionist theory would provide a reverse picture of the process with similar types of fallacies. While it emphasises the role of the agency, that is, mainly of so-called elites, it fails to explain the relevance of cultural and structural conditioning of their actions, or the relevance of the so-called masses in this process of nation-formation. Therefore, social structure and culture are conflated with agency and explained as epiphenomena of the agencies' actions.

Finally, while an ethno-symbolist theory could reveal the importance of the cultural elements for the formation of the nation, it fails to elaborate the interrelation between culture and the structure of society, as well as processes of cultural change and the role of agency in these processes.

We can conclude that most of the dominant theories of nations and nationalism deprive either structure or culture or agency of their relative autonomy, fail to explain the relevance of each segment of reality, and, hence, fail to demonstrate the importance of cultural, structural and agential interrelations for the process of nation-formation.

The problem is not only of theoretical nature. While the dominant theories of nations and nationalism provide an understanding of the main concepts and social processes involved in the process of nation-formation, they offer very limited help for the understanding of specific case studies. The general approaches of these theories, on the one hand, very rarely offer methodological frameworks for analysis of various case studies, and, on the other hand, are difficult to operationalise so as to be applicable to empirical analysis.

Purpose of the Thesis

One of the main hypotheses of this thesis is that the process of the formation of the nation can only be explained by examining the interrelations between social structure, culture and agency as different spheres of social reality. Hence, it will be assumed that the nation emerges only as a consequence of specific processes

of social change that occur within structural, cultural and agential domains of society in a specific period of time. The aim of this research is to detect these relevant social processes and to analyse their interrelations and functions.

Hence, I will argue that the issue of defining the nation and explaining the process of its formation are necessarily inter-linked. A definition of the nation can only be given by defining a set of social processes that will lead to its formation and re-formation. It will be demonstrated that the nation emerges with the emergence of social processes of formation of political community, processes of politicisation (nationalisation) of culture, processes of mobilisation of a population around specific nationalist ideologies, and the population's acceptance of certain aspects of these ideologies. Only when these social processes emerge at the same historical period can we say that the process of the formation of the nation has begun.

A model that offers an explanation of the process of nation-formation has to provide a methodological framework for the analysis of the process through specific case studies. Such a framework should, on the one hand, point to the main relations between and within segments of structure, culture and agency in the process of nation-formation, and, on the other hand, provide a set of methodological tools for the analysis of each relation.

The framework will be constructed according to the main premises of Realist Social Theory, which will be fully elaborated in Chapter One. I should stress that the methodological framework for the analysis of the process of nation-formation based on this theory could offer important insights into the main stages of the processes of social change within the domains of social structure, culture and agency. Applied to a specific case, this research tends to explain the social dynamics and the emergence of a novel social form, such as the nation. An application of this framework will, I contend, result in an analytical history of the emergence of a nation.

Finally, this research will apply the developed framework to the case of the formation of the Croatian nation. This part of the research will not only test the

main hypotheses of the framework, but also provide a 'space' for developing different methods for the analysis of the role of social structure, culture and agency in the process of nation formation.

In order to conduct such an analysis, we need to set out certain premises of the investigation and to define the key terms of our enquiry.

Nation vs. Nationalism

From the start, it is important to emphasise that in this research the terms nations and nationalism are assumed to represent two distinct social phenomena. While the nation refers to a specific social group, a durable human collectivity, the term nationalism will be reserved for marking a consistent set of ideas or a doctrine that defines this social group, that is, its characteristics and aims. For the purpose of this research, therefore, nationalism as a doctrine will be clearly separated from another phenomenon, that is, 'a movement with national aspirations and goals' (Smith, 1999: 101). Such a phenomenon will be termed 'national movement', which clearly emphasises the phenomenon's distinctive characteristics.

As soon as the terms are separated a specific question imposes itself: Can there be nations before and without nationalism? In other words: What are the relationships between the three phenomena of nation, nationalism and nationalist movement? At this point, I would only mention that the answer to the above questions depends solely on the way the nation is defined. I shall return to these questions in Chapter Two.

Nation vs. Ethnie

Another term that has to be clearly distinguished from the nation is *ethnie*. This research will adopt Anthony D. Smith's definition (1986: 32) which sees *ethnies* as 'named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having as association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity'. It should be clearly emphasised that issues related to the *ethnie* as a social phenomenon do not form part of this research. The reason is mainly a question of the space that

such a discussion would require. For this reason some basic understandings about the relevance of *ethnie* for the formation of the nation should be stressed at this point.

As stated above, the process of the formation of the nation will be analysed in the context of the interplay of social structure, culture, and agency. As I will show, the process of social change within and between each segment of society occurs in different stages when the segments of society are conditioning and interacting with each other, and consequently going through some type of transformation. One of the premises of this research is that *ethnie* could play an important role in the process of the nation-formation. This research will maintain that ethnic ties and symbolism could condition the generation of a sense of belonging among population, as one of the factors in the rise of nations. However, it should be emphasised that ethnic ties could serve both as an enhancement of the formation of the sense of collectivity, as well as a barrier to that enhancement. I will attempt to demonstrate that the process of the formation of the nation is not only about the adoption of ethnic traditions and loyalties, but also about breaking with those traditions and loyalties. Hence, in order to avoid further complication, instead of discussing the relevance of *ethnie* as such, this research will concentrate on the importance of preceding cultural, structural and agential forms for the process of the formation of the nation.

Nation vs. Culture

One of the implications of the application of the basic assumptions of the Social Realist Theory is the rather specific understanding of 'culture'. The theory implies that relations between the components of culture can be clearly distinguished from the relationships between different cultural agents. That means that a system of ideas, definitions and explanations, doctrines and ideologies exist regardless of the fact whether, at a specific moment, any particular agency, individual or a social group, accepts and promotes such ideas. These ideas can complement or contradict each other, or are not in any direct relation. Relationships between various ideas, doctrines and ideologies form a specific Cultural System.

For example, some local traditions are regularly practised in a certain community and some underwent considerable changes. Yet, some are not practised at all. The fact that some traditions are not practised does not erase them from the cultural system of that community. They exist not only as a part of the community's past, but also as a part of the community's present in books, narratives or memories. As long as they are part of the community's present they could be part of the community's future. They could be revived and practised again. In order to understand why some of these traditions are not practised any more, it will not be sufficient just to explain the characteristics and conditions of the agency, that is the community. It will be necessary to analyse the relations between these non-practised traditions both with those that are practised and with other ideas, concepts and ideologies accepted by the community in question.

Hence, in order to analyse a process of nation-formation it is necessary first to detect the relevant ideas, doctrines and ideologies of the nation-as-a-concept that exist in a specific cultural system and then to analyse relationships between them. Therefore, my research will concentrate on analysing of various nationalist ideologies that were formed in Croatian society and then on existing logical consistencies between these ideologies. The importance of such a reduced understanding of 'culture' results from the premise that the cultural system conditions an agency's actions at any given period of time and that it is agency alone that transforms that cultural system.

Further on, I shall argue that a specific language, religion, symbols, myths, traditions, or memories (alone or any combination of them) could be seen as necessary, but never sufficient conditions for the formation of the nation. The nation could be formed in a social group that does not possess an authentic language, or a specific myth of origin, and whose members do not share the same religion. Regardless of the question 'which stated cultural elements a nation possesses', the process of nation-formation always involves the definition of a specifically defined culture as 'national'. Even an unauthentic language could be called 'national', even a multi-religious population could have a 'national' church. Hence, through the analysis of different nationalist ideologies and

attitudes of the members of the Croatian nation, I will show that there is no final set of constituent elements that define the nation either throughout a longer historical period or at one specific historical moment.

Therefore, we can conclude that the level of culture, just like the levels of social structure and agency, is crucial for understanding the process of the formation of the nation, and it cannot be conflated with other segments of society.

Why Croatia?

There are several reasons for choosing the case of Croatia as a case study and as a test-case for a developed methodological framework. One of them, and the least important, is probably of a personal nature. The experience of the process of nation-/re/formation in the 1990s awoke my desire to understand the social processes behind it. On the other hand, Croatia with its long history, specific geographical position, turbulent politics, and rich culture, offers a fertile ground for analysing the interplay of different segments of a society in the process of nation-formation. The history of Croatia involves histories of the medieval 'golden age' of the Croatian Kingdom, of the Hungarian-Croatian Kingdom, of the Venetian Republic, of the Habsburg Empire, of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, of the fascist Independent State of Croatia, of Socialist Yugoslavia and, finally, of the Republic of Croatia. Each state formation introduced various political, economic and social structures into Croatian society and opened a space for various cultural influences. All of these were creating and recreating specific sets of circumstances within which the Croatian nation was to be formed and re-formed.

For these reasons it seemed that the case of Croatia might offer a good basis for an analysis of the interplay of social structure, culture and agency in the process of the nation-formation.

Structure of the Research

In line with the above aims, this research is divided into two main parts. The first part is devoted to the formulation of the methodological framework for the analysis of the process of the formation of the nation, and, the second to the empirical application of the developed framework to the case of Croatia.

The first part consists of three chapters. **Chapter One**, through a review and criticism of the dominant sociological theories, firstly defines the phenomenon of social change, and, then, examines the main analytical requirements for analysing the processes of social change. It points to the necessity for such an analysis to examine the interplay of structure, culture and agency in the process of emergence of new social forms. Further on, it explores the basic assumptions of the Realist Social Theory and the concept of Morphogenetic cycles, mainly through writings of Margaret Archer. It concludes that such a concept offers an elaborate and comprehensive methodological framework that can be applied to the specific case of the emergence of the nation.

Chapter Two defines the main term of the dependant variable - the nation - and deals with problems of the analysis of its emergence. Through a brief examination of the dominant theories of nations and nationalism, such as those of Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, Anthony D. Smith and Pierre van den Berghe, this examination points to the main problems of 'upwards', 'downwards' and 'central' conflation in theorising the process of nation-formation. Finally, in the last section of this chapter, a methodological framework for the *Morphogenesis of the nation* is elaborated.

Chapter Three of Part I operationalises the main hypothesis of the methodological framework, describes the main relationships of the empirical research, defines periods and levels of analysis, and, finally, outlines the methodological tools used for analysing the main relationships and processes.

Part II of the research applies the results and tools of the methodological framework to the case of Croatia.

A brief historical analysis of the developments of different political, social and economic institutions and the formation of various competing agencies from the seventh until the early nineteenth century is given at the beginning of **Chapter Four**. This analysis shows that prior to the 1830s there were no significant attempts to define 'national culture', to form the concept of the Croatian nation or to form 'national' institution and agencies. Hence, this chapter, through a content analysis of the writings of the nineteenth century nationalist ideologists, examines the emergence of different doctrines and ideologies of the nation and nationalism from the 1830s until 1900. The three dominant ideologies are considered: the Illyrian nationalist ideology, the Yugoslav nationalist ideology, and the nationalist ideology of the Party of Right.

Chapter Five follows a similar plan. It analyses the twentieth century Croatian nationalist ideologies, that is, the nationalist ideology of the Croatian Peasants Party, the Ustasha's nationalist ideology, and the Communists' nationalist ideology. The content analysis looks at the ways in which each nationalist ideology answers the following questions: What is the nation? What is the Croatian nation? Who are the enemies of the Croatian nation?

Chapter Six concentrates on the events of the 1990s in Croatia. It offers a brief historical background, and analyses the nationalist ideology of Franjo Tudjman. This part of the research is based on a content analysis of Tudjman's published writings and interviews given to the media in the period of 1992-94.

Chapter Seven seeks to examine the interplay of the social structure and culture in a specific social segment. It explores the ways dominant ideas of nations and nationalism were incorporated into the education system and, in the form of textbooks, designed to influence the attitudes of agency. Hence, this chapter offers a review of the results of the content analysis of the history textbooks in the period from the 1880s until 1996. The comparison of the textbooks' content is organised around several issues: to what extent do the textbooks reflect the dominant ideology? what myths and symbols are portrayed as national? which historical personalities are described as national heroes? how does the textbook

describe the nation, national values and interests? and, finally, who are portrayed as historical enemies of the Croatian nation?

Chapter Eight presents the results of a survey undertaken in early 2000 in order to investigate the interplay between structure and culture, on the one side, and agents, on the other. This chapter examines the ways these agents perceive the nation in general, the Croatian nation in particular, national symbols and national enemies.

In the Conclusion, the findings of the empirical case of Croatia are considered with reference to the previously constructed methodological framework where the main hypotheses of the research are re-examined.

PART ONE

Chapter One

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1. Introduction

One of the few, and most evident points of agreement among the theories of nations and nationalism is that the nation is a social phenomenon. One could expect, then, that social theory should be able to offer a starting point for the study of the nation. It would be too optimistic to say that the debates in social theory are more articulate than those debates in theories of nations and nationalism. However, while the current social theories use at least similar terminology, respect some basic epistemological assumptions, or share methodological approaches, an interdisciplinary approach to the study of nations and nationalism frequently opens a wide space for disagreements and misunderstandings among theoreticians. Without any aspiration to deal with or, even less, to resolve the current debates in theories of nations and nationalism, I would attempt to restrict my analysis to a single approach - a sociological approach. Without offering any definition of the nation at this point it should be stated that the nation will be analysed as a particular social form with specific emergent properties. These properties have emerged as a result of a particular interplay of social structures and cultural systems among a given social group; as such the nation became a 'real' social phenomena, that is, irreducible to its 'parts'- members of the nation - and inexplicable as an epiphenomenon.

Any attempt to explain the emergence and characteristics of a phenomenon demands answers to several questions like *when, how* and *who*? In dealing with **social** phenomena the three simple questions serve as directions for an analysis, rather than as formulae for offering a 'correct' explanation. Answers to the question *when does a social phenomenon emerge?* could rarely be defined by a

date or precise time. Rather the question should be read as 'what were the conditions for the emergence of a social phenomenon'. By asking *how has a social phenomenon emerged?* one is asking which political, social and economic mechanisms and processes were activated, what functions they performed, and whose interests were promoted. In explaining the emergence of a social phenomenon, the answer to the question *who?* rarely has a first and second name. The major actors in the formation of this social form are social groups - defined as interest groups, social classes, elite and masses, leaders and followers, political parties etc.

These questions are at the centre of all sociological theories, and the differences and similarities in answers offered to these questions categorise these sociological theories into different 'schools of thought'. In the first chapter I will outline the basic debates in social theory regarding the process of the formation and emergence of social phenomena and social change. Working from the premise that any fruitful analysis of social change has to regard the interplay between structure, culture and social actors in time, the second part of this chapter will outline basic assumptions and methods of Realist Social Theory, especially the explanatory methodology which Margaret Archer calls the *Morphogenetic approach.*

1.2. Social Change

A thorough analysis of existing theories of social change could easily become an overview of the history of social thought. This particular analysis, however, has a much narrower focus. Dominant debates in theories of social change can provide a direction for formulating a methodological framework for analysis of the process of nation-/re/formation. Such a methodological framework should be able to define a scope, direction and aim of analysis, so as to provide definitions of the main terms used.

In that sense, the term 'social change' needs to be clarified. The first point of agreement between the theorists of social change is that every change occurs in a

period of time. The change is always observed in relation to previous stages: 'we are dealing with difference between what can be observed before that point in time, and what we see after that point in time' (Strasser and Randall, in: Sztompka, 1993: 4). The concept of change 'involves three ideas: (1) difference, (2) at different temporal moments, (3) between states of the same system' (*ibid.*). These three ideas could be considered as necessary conditions for defining change, yet, such a definition fails to distinguish between regular, cyclical changes, like seasons of the year, and situations when, as a result of some crucial events, a system acquires new characteristics and functions. Anthony D. Smith (1976: 13) emphasises the notion of novelty of change, and defines social change as 'a succession of events which produce over time a modification or replacement of particular patterns or units by other novel ones'. Smith's definition still contains a notion of progress and development. Even though the introduction of the criteria of novelty more specifically defines the phenomenon of social change, in some cases this definition could be considered as too narrow since it excludes the cases when a social system changes in an 'opposite direction', that is, reintroduces 'old' characteristics and functions.

Over any period of time, every society is changing. Some theoreticians consider change as being 'natural', while others emphasise stability of the system as a natural state of a society. In either case, they all agree that changes can vary by their scope, extent, and direction. Sztompka (1993: 5) states that a society can experience changes in composition, structure, functions, boundaries, relations of subsystems and environment. Some changes are labelled as partial and some as total changes. While Percy Cohen (1968: 176) shows that every change in a society is a partial change and that one can only distinguish between minor and fundamental changes, others emphasise that change can occur on micro, mezzo and macro level of society (Sztompka, 1993: 7).

Without any wish to enter further into discussion about the definition of social change[2] one could draw several conclusions:

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[2] For more about definition of social change, see Sztompka (1993), Cohen (1968), Smith (1973, 1976), Etzioni-Halevy & Etzioni (1973) and others.

i.   It looks as if social change is a process which could be detected only *ex post facto* - a social change is usually triggered by a set of events, but only after these events occur can one analyse if the previous state of a system differs significantly to the new characteristics of the system. If the system in question did not go through a significant transformation, one cannot say that social change occurred.

ii.   Even though a social change occurs, and this change is a relative factor of time, the same social change can differ in its characteristics - it is a prerogative of an analyst of the social change to select the time-span in which one could observe changes in the system. For example, one who analyses the events in the Habsburg Empire in the period of 1848-1849 could reach different conclusions about the nature of social change than one who analyses the social change in the period 1848-1918 in the same society.

iii.   It could be said that the subject of analysis itself defines the main characteristics of social change. Without specifically defining the subject for analysis, one is unable to conclude whether the social change that occurred is minor or fundamental. If the main subject of the analysis is the economic system in Socialist Yugoslavia, introduction of the so-called self-management system in early 1950s represents a fundamental change, while it could be categorised as a minor change in an analysis of the world economy in the same period. The same can be said for categorising a particular social change as micro, mezzo or macro. In the first case, introduction of the self-management could be labelled as macro change, and in the second as micro change.

When do social changes occur? Answers to this question are numerous enough to be systematically categorised into distinctive theories. If social change is defined as a pattern of events which brings a discontinuation of social processes, and as a consequence creates new patterns and units, another question arises: what triggered these patterns of events? Generally, this question deals with the problem of mechanisms and factors of social change. Many theories emphasise the salience of a single mechanism to bring about social change. These mechanisms are described as either endogenous or exogenous processes or

factors.[3] The former are dominant in social theory. These theories emphasise characteristics of a given social system, especially structural ones, in which, apparently, lie 'potentiality' for change. On the other hand, for the exogenous model a 'source of change is to be sought outside the phenomenon whose transformation is being analysed' (Smith, 1973: 158). Cohen (1968: 178) further develops categorisation of the theories which explain social change in terms of a single factor. The most representative ones are: the technological theory, the economic theory, the conflict theory, the malintegration theory, the adaptation theory, the ideational theory, and the cultural integration theory. At this point, only the outline of main ideas and criticism for each of these theories will be given.

Theories labelled as technological state that '(a)ny technological change *which is great enough* will produce some other social change as a consequence' (*ibid.*: 179, italics in original). Cohen argues that a rapid technological change can occur without affecting other factors in society, just as social change of other social factors can occur without a rapid technological change. The question of why technological change occurs remains unexplained by these theories.

The economic theories of change were mainly influenced by Marx and Marxism by stating that 'changes in economic "infra-structure" of society are the prime movers of social change' (*ibid.*: 180). These theories were mainly criticised for neglecting the influence of political and ideational "super-structure". The relationship between the economic "infra-structure" and "super-structure" of a society in these theories is mainly in one direction, since the former always directs the later.

Other Marxist theories emphasise conflict between different social groups and their interests as the prime cause of social change. However, Cohen holds that social conflict is equally a cause and a consequence of a social change (1968: 186). Another critique comes from Lockwood (1964: 249) who holds that

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[3] For more about endogenous and exogenous models, see Smith (1976: 124-129).

conflict theory cannot explain 'why some conflict results in change while other conflict does not'.

Similarly, malintegration theory is mainly concerned with the role of social actors in causing social change, but it emphasises the 'incompatibilities between different parts of social system', interpreting social change mainly as a consequence of the 'conflicting pressures or demands of different sectors of a society and culture' (Cohen, 1968: 186-187). Cohen's main critique of this theory is that it does not offer any explanation on 'why should any parts ever become incompatible with one another in the first place?' (*ibid*.: 189). The adaptation theory offers an answer to this question, by stating that the parts of society 'need' compatibility, and that social changes are serving exactly that purpose. Such theories are mainly criticised for their determinism in the explanation of social change, ignoring cases when social conflict could also enhance malintegration of the parts of the system.

The ideational theory of change charts the source of social change to a diffusion of doctrines, that is, to a system of ideas about 'social institutions, structures and system, as well as about the physical and "supranatural" world' (Cohen, 1968: 195). As already outlined, there are many, varying ideational theories of change. Some hold that the existence of a doctrine is a necessary condition for social change, while the others argue that it is just a sufficient one. In any case, the main criticism comes from the fact that not all doctrines cause a social change, and not all social changes are influenced by the formation of a doctrine in a society.

Cultural integration theory has been developed mainly as an attempt to explain change in simple societies, and is based on the idea that 'when the members of two cultures interact there is a tendency for cultural change to occur or for an acceleration of cultural change to occur' (Cohen, 1968: 203). Cohen's main critique of these theories stems from the fact that, while maintaining contact with other societies, some historical and simple societies resisted radical changes. Cohen also argues that 'it is also possible that some forms of contact encourage a resistance to change' (*ibid*.).

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Even this rather simplistic outline of demonstrates the existence of serious problems with the theories of social change. We can conclude that any attempt to explain social change in terms of a single factor is insufficient. These theories, nevertheless, point at the fact that factors of social change could be found in

- the domain of *ideas* - either as innovative technological ideas, political ideologies, or economic and religious doctrines;

- in the domain of integration or malintegration of the different political, social or economic *institutions* of a society; or

- in the domain of intended or unintended consequences of actions of individuals or different *social groups* in a society.

Hence, one could conclude that any attempt to explain the phenomenon of social change must deal with the interplay between social structure, social culture and social action. An examination of the interplay between structure, culture and actions could not only systematise factors of social change, but also provide a framework for analysis of the mechanisms of social change.

One theory which analyses the relationships between social structure, culture and action as a basis for social change is Realist Social Theory. In the next part of the chapter basic ideas of Realist Social Theory and especially the analytical framework of Morphogenesis will be outlined.

1.3. Realist Social Theory

Realist Social Theory, most clearly expressed in the work of Margaret Archer, has been developed around current debates in social theory regarding the relationship between structure, culture and agency. The last two decades of theorising in sociology have been marked by various attempts at the integration of, on the one hand, micro and macro theories - like George Ritzer's integrated sociological paradigm, Jeffrey Alexander's multidimensional sociology or Randall Collins' radical microsociology - and, on the other, theories based on action and those emphasising the social structure - such as Anthony Giddens'

structuration theory and Pierre Bourdieu's theory of habitus and field. The common starting point of these theories is an understanding that social theories which present the society in terms of dichotomies - like 'individual vs. society' and 'action vs. order' - fail to explain an interplay between structure, culture and agency and hence the dynamics of an open system such as human society.

Margaret Archer developed Realist Social Theory on similar assumptions. Archer claims that the fallacies of the *myth of cultural integration* and three types of conflation - 'downwards', 'upwards' and 'central' - marked the theorising of the relationship between structure and agency in social theory.

The *myth of cultural integration* is based on a perception of 'culture as the perfectly integrated system in which every element was interdependent with every other' (Archer, 1988: 2). This perception of culture as an 'integrated whole' was represented in German historicism, in the works of anthropologists such as Bronislav Malinowski and Ruth Benedict, in Parsonian Functionalism, and in humanistic Marxism. Archer argues that the myth pictures a well integrated, non-conflictual, harmonious culture accepted by all people in a given society. Hence, myth confounds two intrinsically distinct levels of analysis of culture. The first level of analysis is a property of ideas, *logical consistency*, that is, 'the degree of internal compatibility between the components of culture' (*ibid* 4), the second level is a *causal consensus* as the property of people, that is, 'the degree of social uniformity produced by the imposition of the culture ... by one set of the people on another' (*ibid.*). Archer argues that it is important to distinguish logical consistency and causal cohesion 'in order to gain analytical grip on the cultural components and upon socio-cultural dynamics' (*ibid:* 6). Archer's distinction between 'logical consistency' and 'cultural cohesion' is parallel to Lockwood's distinction between 'system integration' and 'social integration'.[4] Hence, logical consistency is termed *cultural system integration* and cultural cohesion is termed *socio-cultural integration*. Therefore, it could be said,

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[4] According to Lockwood 'whereas the problem of social integration focuses attention upon the orderly or conflictful relationships between the *actors*, the problem of system integration focuses on the orderly or conflictful relationships between the *parts*, of the social system' (Lockwood, 1964: 245).

the myth of cultural integration actually confuses cultural system integration with socio-cultural integration.

The *myth of cultural integration* is expressed as 'one-way theorising', which conflates structure with agency. Archer calls theorising which reduces structure and culture to agency, that is, which denies their independence as different strata of social reality and explains them just as epiphenomena of the activities of agents, *upwards conflation*. Archer labels theorising which reduces agency to structure and culture, that is, which explains agency as entirely determined and, hence, as their epiphenomenon, *downwards conflation*. These two versions of conflation, according to Archer, preclude any interplay between structure and agency. One level of social reality is always rendered inert: 'instead of interplay there was the one-way domination of either the logical (downwards account) or the causal (upwards account)' (*ibid*.: 97). However, epiphenomenalism, according to Archer, 'is not the only way in which the more general process of conflation operates' (*ibid*.). The third type of conflation Archer calls *central conflation*, and this theorising is characterised by elision of structure and agency. The best example of this type of conflation Archer finds in Giddens' structuration theory which introduces the concept of duality and agency and structure as ontologically inseparable.[5] Central conflation deprives both structure and agency of their relative autonomy, 'not through *reducing* one to the other, but by *compacting* the two together inseparably' (Archer, 1995: 101). As a result of this elision, any analysis of the interplay between structure and agency is impossible.

Through the criticism of conflation theorising, Archer develops another approach to the study of the relationship between structure and agency - *analytical dualism*. Analytical dualism is based on two premises:

> Firstly, it depends upon an ontological view of the social world as stratified, such that the emergent properties of structure and agents are irreducible to one another, meaning that in principle they are analytically separable. Secondly, it asserts that given structures and agents are also temporally distinguishable (in other words, it is justifiable and feasible to talk of pre-existance and posteriority when dealing with specific instances of the two), and this can be used methodologically in order to examine the interplay between them and thus explain changes in both - over time. In a

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[5] For more about Archer's criticism of the structuration theory, see Archer (1995: 93-134).

nutshell, 'analytical dualism' is a methodology based upon the *historicity of emergence.* (Archer, 1995: 66; italics in original)

Hence, analytical dualism assumes the social world as made up of structure, culture and agents that belong to different strata of social reality. Any reduction of one to the other or elision of them would preclude the exploration of the interplay between them.

However, 'without the proper incorporation of time the problem of structure and agency can never be satisfactorily resolved' (Archer, 1995: 65). According to Archer structure and agency are 'neither co-extensive nor co-variant through time' (1995: 66). Both structure and agency possess autonomous emergent properties, that is, their differentiating features are relative endurance, natural necessity and the possession of causal powers (*ibid.*: 167). They are capable of 'independent variation and therefore of being out of phase with one another in time' (*ibid.*). What distinguishes realist social theory is its basic assumption which holds that for a successful analysis of social processes 'analytical separability and temporal distinction were needed in conjunction' (Archer, 1995: 67). Archer argues that it is *necessary* to separate structure and agency in order to (a) 'identify the emergent structure(s), (b) differentiate their causal powers and the intervening influences of people due to their quite different causal powers as human beings, and, (c) explain the outcome at all, which in an open system always entails an interplay between the two' (1995: 70). As Roy Bhaskar (1998, 218-219) summarises: 'Social structures (...) do not exist independently of the activities they govern', but they also 'do not exist independently of the agents' conceptions of what they are doing in their activity' and hence, these structures 'may be only relatively enduring'. Hence, he defines society as 'an articulated assembly of tendencies and powers (...) which exist only as long as they (or at least some of them) are being exercised; are exercised in the last instance via the intentional activity of human beings; and are not necessarily space-time invariant' (Bhaskar, 1998; 219).

The analytical separation of structure and agency provides a methodological tool for analysis of the interplay between them. Structure, culture and agency shape and re-shape one another over time, and only by analysing that process can we

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'account for variable social outcomes at different times' (Archer, 1995: 64). Therefore, in opposition to the claims of so-called downwards and upwards conflationists, structures 'are not only irreducible to people, they pre-exist them, and people are not puppets of structures because they have their own emergent properties which mean they either reproduce or transform social structure, rather than creating it' (*ibid*.: 71).

According to Archer, agency always operates in some given structure. So, structure 'necessarily pre-dates the action(s) which transforms it'; and this 'structural elaboration necessarily post-dates those actions' (*ibid*.: 76). Structures, as emergent properties, are 'irreducible to the doings of contemporary actors', yet they emerge from the 'historical actions which generated them, thus creating the context for current agency' (*ibid*.: 139). Archer calls this process a *morphogenetic circle*. Processes in which a system, state or structure is elaborated or changed as a consequence of social interaction Archer defines as *morphogenesis*. Conversely, processes in which 'complex system-environmental exchanges' tend to preserve or maintain a system's given form, organisation or state are defined as *morphostasis* (*ibid*.: 166). Schematically, a morphogenetic/static circle of structure has three phases:

Structural conditioning

T^1

Social interaction

T^2 T^3

Structural elaboration (morphogenesis)

Structural reproduction (morphostasis) T^4

Figure 1: The basic morphogenetic/static cycle of structure (Archer, 1995: 157)

The morphogenetic/static cycle offers an explanatory framework which acknowledges and incorporates (a) '*pre-existent structures* as generative mechanisms' - structural conditioning, (b) 'their *interplay* with other objects possessing causal powers and liabilities proper to them in what is a stratified

social world', which happens at the level of social interaction, and (c) 'non-predictable but nonetheless explicable *outcomes* from interactions between the above', which can result as structural elaboration (morphogenesis) or as structural reproduction (morphostasis) (*ibid.*: 159). The morphogenetic/static analysis of the structure is therefore based on four propositions:

(i) there are internal and necessary relations within and between social structures (SS);

(ii) causal influences are exerted by social structure(s) (SS) on social interaction (SI);

(iii) there are causal relationships between the groups and individuals at the level of social interaction (SI);

(iv) social interaction (SI) elaborates upon the composition of social structure(s) (SS) by modifying current internal and necessary structural relationships and introducing new ones where morphogenesis is concerned. Alternatively, social interaction (SI) reproduces existing internal and necessary structural relations when morphostasis applies. (Archer, 1995: 168-69).

According to Archer, the method of analytical dualism based on separation and temporal analysis of the interplay between structure and agency can be directly applied to an analysis of the interplay between culture and agency. In this case, the basic propositions can be re-formulated by stating that culture can be separated from agency, since culture possesses its own emergent properties, that is, it has its own irreducible and relatively enduring character and autonomous influence. Culture, therefore, necessarily pre-dates the action(s) that transform it, and cultural elaboration necessarily post-dates those actions.

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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                                                                   │
│   Cultural conditioning _____                          │
│                                                                   │
│   T¹                                                              │
│                    Socio-Cultural interaction _____            │
│                                                                   │
│                    T²                          T³                 │
│                                                                   │
│                         Cultural elaboration _____       │
│                                                                   │
│                                                  T⁴               │
│                                                                   │
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
Figure 2: The morphogenesis of culture (Archer, 1995: 193)

The relative autonomy of structure and culture means that 'they are not necessarily in synchrony with one another' (*ibid.*: 218). Archer argues that 'any form of socio-cultural conditioning only exerts its effects on people and is only efficacious through people' (*ibid.*: 184). Both cultural system and structural integration are creating a situational logic which motivates different forms of agents' actions. This *situational logic* is a consequence of the relationships between the elements of structure and culture.

At the structural level, which exists at any given T^1, relationships between the elements (institutions) can be either necessarily or contingently related to one another. Alternatively these relationships may be ones of complementarity or incompatibility (Archer, 1995: 216). These relationships create four types of 'institutional configurations' which Archer calls the 'second order emergent properties' (*ibid.*), and they create four possible situational logics.

i.   When the institutions are in the relation of *necessary complementarity* they are 'mutually reinforcing, [they] mutually invoke one another and work in terms of each other' (*ibid.*: 219). This relationship of high system integration creates a situational logic of *protection* where the highest benefits for the agents are found in sustaining and supporting the established system, since alternative resources are unavailable. In this case morphostasis is the most probable outcome.

ii.   The institutions can be in a relationship of *necessary incompatibility*. '[W]hen two or more institutions are necessarily and internally related to one another yet the effects of their operations are to threaten the

endurance of the relationship itself, this has been referred to as a state of "contradiction"'(*ibid*.: 222). This relationship opens a space for changes, yet an unstable configuration creates the situational logic of *compromise*, since the outcome of any change is still uncertain.

iii. In the situation when contingent institutions are incompatible with each other, either because of internal or external influences (such as war), the agency finds itself in a situation when the greatest gains could be achieved by 'inflicting maximum injuries on the other side'. Hence, the institutional relationship of *contingent incompatibility* creates a situational logic of *elimination*.

iv. The contingent institutions can be compatible with the interests of particular groups. It creates a situation of status quo, that is, a situational logic of *pure opportunism* where the agencies tend to preserve their already achieved gains and protect themselves from any losses. Still, this situational logic can be morphogenetic with the emergence of new interests of the agency and new material means for institutional re-patterning.

Just as at the level of structure the elements (institutions) can be in the relationship of contradiction and complementarity, so the elements of culture can be in similar relationships. The four 'second order emergent properties of structure' listed above, correspond with four 'second order emergent properties of culture' and they create another four situational logics. At this point, culture is 'conceptualised as supplying directional guidance for agency' (*ibid*.: 229). Archer tries to analyse the possible relationships between the agencies which represent different theories, ideologies or beliefs. She argues that the 'maintenance of ideas which stand in manifest logical contradiction or complementarity to others, places their holders in different ideational situations' (Archer, 1995: 229):

```
Second order Emergent                    Situational Logic
Properties of Culture

CONSTRAINING CONTRADICTIONS  ──────▶  CORRECTION

CONCOMITANT COMPLEMENTARITIES  ──────▶  PROTECTION

COMPETITIVE CONTRADICTIONS  ──────▶  ELIMINATION

CONTINGENT COMPLEMENTARITIES  ──────▶  OPPORTUNISM
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
Figure 3: Cultural conditioning of strategic action

These second order emergent properties of structure and culture form a context which conditions the actions of the people within it - that is the first stage of every morphogenetic cycle which Archer calls 'Social and Cultural Conditioning'. However, only by analysing the second phase of the morphogenetic cycle - the level of socio-cultural and group interaction - is it possible to examine 'how the relationships between people are capable of changing or maintaining the relationships between ideas' (Archer, 1995: 184) and institutions. These 'people' are not merely passive holders of ideas or puppets of their institutions, but active agents who transform and maintain it. Yet, through the process of changing their environment, the agency changes itself. A specific position of agency[6] in a society as a medium of all changes is produced by 'double morphogenesis' - 'people collectively generate the elaboration of structure and culture, but they themselves undergo elaboration as people at the same time' (*ibid.*: 253). The morphogenesis of people happens in the three phases, just as structural and cultural morphogenesis:

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[6] Archer defines agency as a product of 'double morphogenesis', as 'Collectivities sharing the same life chances' (Archer, 1988: 255). She distinguishes Agency from Actors and Persons where 'Agency stands as the middle element linking Person to Actors' (*ibid.*). For more about the definitions and distinctions between Agency, Persons and Actors, see Archer (1995: 255-257) and (2000).

Socio-Cultural conditioning of groups

T¹

     Group interaction

     T²   T³

     Group elaboration

                                      T⁴

Figure 4: The elaboration of Agency (Archer, 1995: 248)

Socio-cultural conditioning of the groups does not direct behaviour of the agency. Rather, it is responsible for the distribution of resources amongst different agencies, and creates a context in which agencies are rewarded for protecting and promoting their vested material and ideational interests. Agency positioned in this way has 'powers proper to itself (...) Its typical powers are capacities for articulating shared interests, organising for collective action, generating social movements and exercising corporate influence in decision making' (*ibid*.: 259). An agency which organises and articulates its interests Archer calls *Corporate Agents*. On the other hand, Archer calls those which lack both organisation and articulation of their interests, and are unable to exercise their power in structural and cultural modelling, *Primary Agents* (Archer, 2000: 265). Even though passive in direct social action, a Primary Agent 'reconstitutes the environment which Corporate Agency seeks to control' (*ibid*.: 260).

However, as mentioned before, the context of the second order emergent properties of culture and structure condition the re-grouping of agency. In morphostatic situations the groups are mainly well defined, where structural and cultural Corporate Agents are in control of resources and hence prevent Primary Agents in organising and articulating their ideas. These situations resemble those which Archer labelled the 'Myth of Cultural Integration'. Yet any alterations in an agents' situation redefines the categories of both Corporate and Primary Agents. In a morphogenetic scenario 'progressive expansion of the number of Corporate Agents and divergence of the interests represented by them' results in 'substantial conflict between them' (*ibid*.: 263). This conflict alters the environment of Primary Agents by broadening the debate, which becomes an

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issue of 'popular agenda'. In conflicts between the Corporate Agents, their success becomes dependent on their success in the mobilisation of support amongst Primary Agents. The power of the Primary Agents in this context is what Archer calls 'Co-action' where 'groups in roughly the same position (act) in approximately the same way' (*ibid.*: 267) and produce an aggregate effect, which simultaneously constrains and enables Corporate Agents. In this way Primary Agents present an 'environmental pressure of numbers'. Elaboration of Social Agency is thus the 'resultant of aggregate effects produced by Primary Agents in conjunction with emergent properties generated by Corporate Agents and thus does not approximate to what anyone wants' (Archer, 1988: 265).

High   Low

		High	Necessary Complementarity	Necessary contradiction	Morphostasis
SOCIAL INTEGRATION		Low	Contingent complementarity	Contingent contradiction	Morphogenesis

SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION
(structural or cultural)

Figure 5: When morphostasis versus when morphogenesis (Archer, 1995: 295)

The question of whether a cultural, structural or group morphogenesis or morphostasis will occur depends directly on developments in Socio-cultural interaction, which is conditioned by the prior social context. Archer schematically represents relationships in this context (see Figure 5), following Lockwood's distinction between social and system integration, and claiming that 'mal-integration of the two at the same moment tended to issue in morphogenesis' (*ibid.*: 295).

However, the answer to 'when does morphogenesis happen' can only be found in 'relations (interaction) between groups' (*ibid.*: 297) since social elaboration does not depend only on cultural proliferation or re-stratification of structure, but also on social reception of these changes (*ibid.*: 304).

The distribution of resources and pre-grouping of agents determine their potential bargaining power. Finding themselves in the situations conceptualised by systemic complementarities and/or contradictions, these vested interest groups are confronted with situational benefits or penalties. Their further actions, guided by existing situational logic, depend directly on the ability of corporate agents to 'organise mobilisation of the resources potentially available' (*ibid*.: 297). Depending on the success of this mobilisation, corporate agents will acquire a specific negotiating strength which positions them in a specific relationship to the other corporate agents involved.

However well positioned and defined groups are at this stage, it is difficult to 'predict' the outcome of this conflictual situation, since it occurs in an open system, that is human society. Anyway, as mentioned earlier, social changes can be identified only ex post facto. But the purpose of this theoretical exercise was not to equip a social scientist with a tool for prediction of social events in general. Archer's Morphogenetic approach offers an explanatory methodology which results in an analytical history of emergence.

The purpose of this study is to offer an analytical history of the emergence of a nation. I believe that the Morphogenetic approach could offer a methodological basis for such an analysis. Hence, in the next section I will attempt to, firstly, define the nation as a specific social form, and, secondly, offer a theoretical framework for analysis of the history of emergence of any specific nation. In doing so, it is necessary to emphasise that the analysis of the process of the formation of the nation is: (1) an analysis of a distinctive social phenomenon - the nation; (2) an analysis of the formation of a new social phenomenon; and (3) an analysis of a social process. I will refer to these three issues from the perspective of Realist Social Theory. Lastly, such a framework will be employed for the analysis of the emergence of the Croatian nation.

Chapter Two

THE NATION AS A SOCIAL FORM

As outlined in previous chapter, I believe that realist social theory could provide a methodological tool for analysis of the process of nation-/re/formation. However, it is necessary first to define a phenomenon before getting involved in any analysis of the process of its emergence. When a phenomenon such as the nation is in question, that task is not easy. Even though there is a growing interest in the study of the nation, very little consensus among scholars exists where the issue of its definition is concerned. The numerous existing definitions of the nation throughout the literature are the best indicators of the problem.

2.1. Defining the Nation

The first problem arises even with the question: what kind of social phenomenon is the 'nation'? Benedict Anderson, Adrian Hastings, Paul R. Brass and many others describe the nation as a community. Walker Connor (1994: 74) sees it as a 'group of people' while Miroslav Hroch (1996: 79) adds that it is also a 'large' one. Peter Alter (1991: 17) simply calls it a 'social group', Karl Deutsch (in Alter, 1991: 10) 'a people', while Anthony Smith (1991: 14) calls it 'a human population'. Michael Billig (1995: 24) sees the nation as a more complex phenomenon which can designate both a specific type of state and the people, while Ernest Gellner (1996: 117) holds that the nation is a type of culture.

In an attempt to summarise existing definitions of the nation, Eric Hobsbawm found two different types to be the most frequent: objective and subjective definitions (Hobsbawm, 1991: 5-7). The first type tries to establish objective criteria for 'being the nation', either by emphasising particular criteria or by giving some combination of them. The other tries to escape from *a priori* constraints and define the nation through members' consciousness of belonging,

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at the level of the individual or a collectivity. According to Hobsbawm, both attempts fail to explain 'the nation'. Similarly, in opening his discussion about nations and nationalism, Gellner defined two 'provisional definitions, the cultural and voluntaristic' (1983: 7). The first emphasizes a shared culture as the main criterion for the identification of whether two persons belong to the same nation. In that sense, culture is defined as 'a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating' (1983: 7). The other, voluntaristic definition states that 'two men are of the same nation if, and only if, they *recognise* each other as belonging to the same nation. In other words, *nations maketh man*, nations are the artifacts of man's convictions and loyalties and solidarities' (1983: 7). These examples show us that scholars dealing with the national phenomenon tend to divide along familiar dichotomies in social sciences: objective vs. subjective, cultural vs. voluntaristic, individual vs. institutions. However, even when some scholars share the same assumptions about the 'nature' of the nation as a social phenomenon, they do not necessarily agree about its constituent elements, origins or functions.

For example, numerous scholars define the nation is **cultural terms**. Thus, Smith emphasises the importance of a common culture (1992: 450), and marks the nation as a cultural group (1973: 18). Various authors have emphasised the importance of 'cultural products' such as a common language (Kautsky in Nimni, 1991: 46) religion (Alter, 1991: 17-18), history (Stalin in Nimni, 1991: 47), myths (Smith, 1992: 438), symbols (Haas, 1993: 508), values (Hroch, 1996: 80), etc.

On the other hand, a group of theoreticians see the nation as based on a particular **social structure**: as a political association (Breuilly, 1985: 65), as an imagined political community (Anderson, 1983: 6), as a 'social entity only insofar as it relates to a certain kind of modern territorial state' (Hobsbawm, 1990: 9). Deutsch states that if a cultural community 'also possesses its own state apparatus and wields autonomous political power, then it can be regarded as a nation' (Alter, 1991: 10). According to Pierre van den Berghe, an ethny which is defined biologically and culturally, becomes the nation in the moment it 'claims the right to statehood' (1987: 61). Gellner (1983), on the other hand, emphasises

the role of the modern state, more precisely, the specific role of industrialisation and the universal education system.

Some of the above-mentioned authors have emphasised the role of the subjective feelings of the members of the nation, over and above the 'objective' characteristics of the nation. These authors find the base of the nation in the characteristics or properties of different **agencies**. Hugh Seton-Watson includes what Gellner calls a voluntaristic notion of the nation: 'the nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one' (1977: 5). Hence, Seton-Watson underlines the importance of a sense of solidarity (1977: 1). Jurgen Habermas (1992: 2) defines the nation as the 'prepolitical unity of a community with a shared historical destiny'. Achad Ha'am defines the nation as a subjective feeling (Smith, 1983: 11) and Ernest Renan as a 'daily plebiscite' based on a collective will (Kedourie, 1985: 81). Otto Bauer argues that the nation can be explored only on the basis of the notion of 'national character' where national character is understood as 'a historically modifiable characteristic which culturally links the members of a national community over a given historical period' (Nimni, 1991: 148).

Some constituent elements of the nation are sometimes seen as an objective bond that is often based on affective relations among members of the same nation. Hence, Otto Bauer sees the nation as a community of destiny (1996: 40), maintained by common blood (1996: 52), and supports Lord Acton's (1995: 29) emphasis on collective will of the members of the same nation. For some authors the nation has to develop special 'national' sentiments among co-nationals (Breuilly, 1995: 147), or a sense of uniqueness and self-awareness (Connor, 1994: 43).

Authors also often emphasise particular functions of the nation which could be seen as **emergent powers**. Thus, the nation has to provide equality (Hroch, 1996: 79), common rights and duties for all its members (Smith, 1991b: 40). It also provides a sense of institutional and symbolic legitimacy (Connor, 1994: 82). The nation is a base of sovereignty and social integration of its members

(Habermas, 1996: 284). Even Gellner defines the nation as a 'culture which was to provide the crucial moral identity for those who accepted it' (1996: 117).

Any definition of the nation which emphasises a single cultural or structural constituent element as the basis of the nation fails to explain it as a specific stratified *social form*. It merely reduces this social form to one of its 'parts'. For example, if the nation cannot be seen as a social entity unless related to a modern territorial state, as Hobsbawm claims, then the nation and this type of state become a synonym for the same phenomenon, in which case the term nation is either redundant or an ephipenomenon. Similarly, if the nation is marked as a group with a common language, then there is no need for the introduction of the term 'nation' where a 'linguistic group' is all that matters.

Some definitions of the nation acknowledge the stratified 'nature' of the nation and emphasizing the importance of some aspects of social structure, culture and agency. Hence, the nation, according to Smith, fuses three dimensions: territory, culture and citizenship (1973: 18). 'A nation can ... be defined as a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members' (Smith: 1991, 14). The nation can be also seen

> as a large social group integrated not by one but a combination of several kinds of objective relationships (economic, political, cultural, religious, geographical, historical) and their subjective reflections in collective consciousness. (...) But among [these ties], three stand out as irreplaceable: (1) a 'memory' of some common past, treated as a 'destiny' of the group - or at least of its core constituents; (2) a density of linguistic or cultural ties enabling a higher degree of social communication within the group than beyond it; (3) a conception of the equality of all members of the group organised as a civil society. (Hroch: 1996, 79)

It can be observed that most of the definitions mentioned above explain the nation as a type of social form. That is, the nation is described as a specific emergent property, which cannot be explained as an epiphenomenon and, as such, possesses a set of causal powers. Just as with other social forms, the nation presents a stratified set of relatively enduring relations between and amongst its structure, culture and agencies. Hence, the nation as a social form cannot be

people-less, since only the agency can maintain and transform it. Moreover, only through people's activities does the nation exist, regardless of possible differences in perception of that nation. The same people are the mediators of all relationships between and among the national structure and culture. However, these 'people', the members of the nation, do not act in an empty space. It is a structure and culture, that is, their causal powers, that sets conditional influences on people's projects; conditioning but not determining their actions. Hence, to paraphrase Archer (1995: 197), the structure of the nation provides a material basis for their action and the cultural system supplies a fixed set of symbols which these people use in interpreting their situation. Without explaining the relationships that exist between its 'parts', the nation as a social phenomenon cannot be fully explained. In order to define the nation, it is necessary to emphasise the uniqueness of this type of social phenomenon.

In this research *the nation* will be defined as *a social agency politically organised as a community which claims its rights on the basis of a culture defined as its own.*

It is a political organisation that, on the one hand, re-stratifies a structural system (by forming political parties, a leadership, and ultimately state institutions); and on the other, offers a set of values, beliefs, ideas etc. in the form of a 'nationalist ideology'. Such a nationalist ideology offers a basis for mobilisation of the population around proclaimed national symbols, national values, national myths and memories, aims and agendas.

On the basis of this politicised culture the social agency perceives itself as a community. In this definition the term 'community' implies, firstly, that its members *perceive* each other as members of the same social group and, hence, distinguish themselves from 'the other'. Secondly, being 'a community' assumes that this group *perceives* itself and is perceived by others as a group which possesses a set of unique characteristics. Finally, it implies that its members perceive each other as equals and promotes solidarity amongst its members. This definition does not claim that the members of the same nation *are* equal or that the characteristics of this community *are* unique for that group. A perception of its members is what constitutes them as a community.

However, the social structure of the nation and nationalist ideologies are not formed *ex nihilo*. The structure of the nation is always formed in reference to previous existing structures; nationalist ideologies are always formed in reference to existing culture.[7] Moreover, the formulation of a nationalist ideology is always contextualised by a form of social structure, and the structure of the nation is always reconstructed in reference to the proclaimed nationalist ideals.

The nation as a social form emerges as a consequence of a process of social change. An analytical history of the emergence of the nation could offer a more elaborate definition of the phenomenon and better understanding of its internal dynamics.

2.2. Conflation in Existing Theories of Nation-Formation

The most common classification of theories of the nations and nationalism has been centred around one question: what this theory infers about the origins of the nation. The discussion between so-called primordialists and modernists has been based on whether the nation is 'invented, imagined or reconstructed' (Smith, 1991: 353). This polarity is the most popular one, but authors dealing with the classification and explanation of similar theories use other polarising classifications: Smith (1983: 12) uses primordialism vs. instrumentalism, and perennialism vs. modernism; Comaroff and Stern (1994: 36) use primordialism vs. constructionism etc.[8] However they are named, one group of theories represent the attitude that 'nations and ethnic communities are the natural units of history and integral elements of the human experience' and the other group sees the nation 'as a purely modern phenomenon' (Smith, 1983: 8-12). Some theoreticians avoid this terminology and present this distinction simply by questioning whether a theory represents the idea of creation of the nation before or after the emergence of nationalism.

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[7] Diversity of structures and cultures which have *preceded* the formation of nations is what ultimately characterises these nations as 'Western' or 'Eastern', 'ethnic' or 'civic', 'state-seeking' or 'state-sustaining', 'cultural' or 'political', etc

[8] For a full explanation of these concepts, see (Smith, 1998).

Theories dealing with the issue of the 'origins of the nation' assume a particular approach to the question of the process of social change, a result of which is the formation of a distinctive type of social form - the nation - and hence, directly involves issues regarding the necessary conditions for change, and the factors, mechanisms and scope of that change. Several of the most dominant theories of nation-formation could be seen as examples of what Margaret Archer labels as 'conflation in social theorising'.

Today, one of the most prominent theories of the nation as a modern phenomenon is that developed by Ernest Gellner. According to Gellner, the nation and nationalism are phenomena which originate from the process of transition from an agrarian society into a growth-oriented industrial society. Agrarian society was characterised by the existence of two horizontally differentiated (socially, politically and culturally) social strata. The first massive one was illiterate, food-production orientated, and static. The other was a literate, educated group which had all the economic and political power. These two groups, or as Gellner calls them, 'subworlds' (1983: 23) were sharply divided along cultural lines, separated by different ways of life, traditions, even language. Such a society, Gellner argues, cannot create or maintain either the nation or nationalism - 'an ideology' which is supposed to overarch all strata in a society.

On the other hand, a modern industrialised society is based on the idea of perpetual growth. It demands a highly mobile, literate, specialised working-force. The transition from the previous centralised, closed, and fused society into a de-centralised, open, and specialised one (Gellner, 1983: 14) also transforms existing 'low culture' into a 'high culture'. High culture is 'a culture characterised by standardisation, a literacy- and education-based system of communication' (Gellner, 1983: 54). Gellner also labels this period of transition as the age of nationalism. 'Nationalism is not the awakening of an old, latent, dormant force, though that is how it does indeed present itself. It is in reality the consequence of a new form of social organisation, based on deeply internalised, education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own state' (1983: 48).

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Gellner's theory of nations and nationalism is a good example of 'downwards conflationism' in theorising the emergence of a social phenomenon. This theory implies that it is the social structure and the cultural system that not only provide the context of human action, but also direct and limit it. The relationship between structure and culture on one hand, and agency on the other, involves the one-way flow of influence from the former to the later. Structure and culture exercise their causal powers over agency and, hence, determine agency's actions. Gellner's theory of nation-formation is people-less. On the one hand, the changes in the structure and cultural system are seen as a product of contradictions within and between previous social structures and cultural systems; agency is only seen as their epiphenomenon. On the other hand, socio-cultural cohesion is explained as a result of system integration and cultural cohesion.

In describing the 'nature' of the so-called agrarian society Gellner emphasises how the emergence of new technologies brings structure and culture of the society into direct conflict. New technology requires changed economic and political systems which in return require a change in a cultural system. The sources of change are found exactly in these contradictions. Social change happens, and the nation emerges, as a result of the causal powers of social structures and cultural systems. The result of this social change is a fully integrated social system supported by cultural cohesion, now called 'national culture', achieved though a uniform educational system. The whole process is triggered from above. Members of the newly created nation are depicted as 'lemmings' whose actions and beliefs are shaped by a greater force. The mighty educational system teaches them to forget their old 'low and high' cultures, and introduces a new 'national' culture of uniform language.

The nation described in these terms has to be explained as a new social phenomenon. It is a product of industrial and technological revolutions, which constitute a dramatic change of social systems. Hence, Gellner could ignore the question whether the nation 'has a navel' or not, since it is explained as a social form with a new integrated social structure and cultural system which, according to Gellner, have little in common with the 'low' and 'high' culture of agrarian societies. The nation emerges at a particular point in Gellner's unilinear

evolutionist path of development after which a new era, the era of nationalism, starts, incomparable with previous stages of human development.

Gellner's theory of nations and nationalism points to some of the most important processes of structural and cultural change which, one could easily agree, set the context for the formation of the nation. Yet, the picture of the process of nation-formation is rather cloudy. The role of agency entirely disappears during this process. It leaves us wondering whether the industrial and technological revolutions and the introduction of a uniform state-sponsored educational system, besides being necessary, are also sufficient conditions for the formation of the nation.

One of the theories which is labelled as primordialist, and stands in direct opposition to Gellner's, is that of Pierre van den Berghe. Following basic sociobiological assumptions, van den Berghe understands ethnicity as an extension of the idiom of kinship. Ethnic sentiments can be understood only as an extended and reduced form of kin selection. Like many other types of human communities, an ethnic community, or as van den Berghe calls it *ethny*, is shaped endogamously and territorially.

In an attempt to explain the 'nature' of an *ethny*, van den Berghe reaches for the roots of human sociality. The basic units of human sociality are family, clan, tribe, i.e. small groups of interrelated individuals, who share common unilinear descent (patrilineal or matrilineal). This type of community has an 'evolutionary stable strategy'. Mutual inter-relatedness is a guarantee for mutual maximisation of inclusive fitness. A shared proportion of intrinsically selfish genes will always prefer kin over non-kin; nepotism will be the dominant kind of behaviour. Therefore, this mechanism can secure the immortality of the common gene, which is at the same time the basis of evolution.

When an exogamous basic group is transformed into an endogamous group (a breeding population of limited size whose members are related to each other), one can talk about an ethnic group. This 'ethnicity can be *manipulated*, but *not manufactured*' (van den Berghe, 1987: 27). Only with the developing of the

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political consciousness of an ethny, can an ethny develop into the nation: according to van den Berghe 'the nation is a politically conscious ethny, that is, an ethny that claims the right to statehood by virtue of being an ethny. Such ideology is called nationalism' (van den Berghe, 1987: 61).

This biologically based explanation of the process of nation-formation could be seen as an example of what Archer calls 'upwards conflation' in social theorising. Van den Berghe's starting point is the nature of human beings. Unlike Gellner, he rightly emphasises that humans as social beings are those which create and then transform and maintain a specific set of relations known as social structure and cultural system like kinship, the family, tribe, ethny and, hence, the nation. All of these social forms are seen by van den Berghe as 'evolutionary stable strategies' which secure human survival. Hence, the main rationale behind the creation and maintenance of these social forms is not found either in human free will or in the 'nature' of social structure and culture, but in the internal driving force of genes.

However, it would be unjust to say that van den Berghe describes the whole richness of human society as deriving exclusively from genes. He recognises that human actions could be motivated by their interests, principles and even curiosities. But van den Berghe does not recognise the causal powers of those human 'creations'. Social structure and culture are not only transformed or maintained by agency, but they also provide a context and, at the same time, enable and condition human behaviour. For example, even van den Berghe cannot ignore the power of the taboo in directing the behaviour of a member of a tribe. This taboo could have been created by members of a tribe in the past, but the taboo is maintained by the following generations who live according to the rules the taboo has set. These cultural and structural emergent properties always precede a particular agency, even though the same agency can transform them. This point can be even more clearly illustrated through another example of 'upward conflation' in explaining the process of nation-formation.

With the aim of explaining the processes of nation-formation, a group of theoreticians emphasise the role of social engineering 'which (is) often deliberate

and always innovative, if only because historical novelty implies innovation' (Hobsbawm, 1989: 13). This approach also considers the creation of the nation as a modern process, but its methods are found in the so-called 'invention of traditions'. Eric Hobsbawm sees this set of practices as a method for the implementation of certain values and norms of behaviour simply by repetition (Hobsbawm, 1989: 4). This process occurs in moments of great social change, of rapid transformation in societies, when older traditions cease to fulfil the task they were designed for: ' 'New' traditions simply resulted from the inability to use or adapt old ones' (*ibid.*: 5). Such a rapid social change was most visible in the age of industrialisation and innovation - in a modern society. To create the cohesion and stability necessary in such a society, three main modes of inclusion and control can be implemented: (1) by establishing or legitimising institutions; (2) by the invention of new status systems and modes of socialisation, which will also provide modes for desirable beliefs, value systems, and behaviour; and (3) through the formation of a community such as the nation, which can provoke a sense of identification either within that community or with the institutions representing, expressing or symbolising it (*ibid.*: 9). Put in this way, the nation becomes a perfect means for the creation and stabilisation of modern societies, and it is constructed with that aim.

Hobsbawn's concept of 'invention' assumes the role of agency and yet it plays a crucial part in the process of nation-formation. At the same time agency is strongly influenced by radical changes in social structure and culture, which occur as consequences of contingent contradictions between their 'parts'. However, it could not be said that Hobsbawm fully recognises the causal powers of structure and culture on human action. Following Hobsbawm's arguments, it seems that the structural and cultural elaboration is entirely a result of agency's free will, which can invent a whole new set of 'traditions'. He does not recognise that even these 'new traditions' are set in the context of previous 'traditions' and other cultural emergent properties; that these 'new traditions' need legitimisation for their introduction and are legitimised mainly by reference to the cultural system which preceded the changes.

Both van den Berghe's and Hobsbawm's theories of nation-formation explain the emergence of the nation as a result of agents' interests and agendas. At the same time both theories, though different in approach and context, fail to explain the influence of those necessary unintended consequences of human actions that appear in the form of stratified and complex social structures; they fail to explain the richness of the cultural system, and above all, the interrelations between these structures and culture. Even in the most turbulent periods it rarely happens that the whole social structure collapses, and that the entire existing cultural system proves unable to 'fulfil the task for which they were designed'. New social forms mainly emerge as a reflection of the old ones.

Several conclusions can be drawn from the examples of some of the most dominant theories of nation-formation given above:

- any theory of nation-formation which conflates one 'part' of social reality with another fails to explain the dynamics of the process of nation-formation;

- such a theory cannot explain the stratified 'nature' of social structure, cultural system and agency and their causal powers;

- hence, such a theory fails to explain relations and interactions between structure, culture and agency on which the process of nation-formation is based;

- this theory cannot offer a sufficient explanation of necessary and sufficient conditions for morphogenesis to occur, the product of which would be a nation.

One theory which recognises the importance of structuralised analysis of interrelations between social structure, cultural system and agency is the ethno-symbolic approach developed chiefly by Anthony D. Smith. Briefly, Smith argues that the nation and nationalism are modern phenomena, but that there are 'ethnic roots' which 'determine, to a considerable degree, the nature and limits of modern nationalisms and nations' (1986: 18). This constitutes an *ethnie*, which is the basis for a future nation, and is shaped by a quartet of myths, memories, values, and symbols, shared and transmitted by a group of people over generations. This community, characterised by its isolation, passivity and cultural accommodation, was forced to change into a more activist, mobilised and

politically more dynamic community - the nation. This process has occurred over time through triple revolutions: the division of labour, a revolution in the control of administration, and a revolution in cultural co-ordination (Smith, 1986: 131). These three revolutions have developed social surroundings which prefer centralised and culturally homogenised states. Achieving this aim, Smith argues, was possible only through a massive mobilisation of population and its further transformation into active citizens through the conjunction of culture with politics. The old ethnic 'myth-symbol' complexes and *mythomoteurs*[9] were revived and combined in order to achieve mobilisation, and create new identities among its citizens. These processes demanded a national unity, therefore, based on cohesion - fraternity, and on compact, secure, recognised territory - a homeland (Smith, 1986: 163). A long history of collective experience is necessary for both aims.

In his later work Smith (1998, 1999) emphasises that 'it is the sense of cultural affinities, rather than physical kinship ties, embodied in a *myth* of descent, shared historical memories and ethnic symbolism, that defines the structure of ethnic communities; and the same is true for any nations created on the bases of cultural affinity' (1998: 192, *italics* in original). In this sentence Smith emphasises a one-way relation between culture and structure: it is the cultural domain that formats a new social structure - the nation. Nevertheless, the term 'cultural affinity' implies *socio-cultural interaction* where an agency accepts and internalises a defined set of cultural properties. However, ethnic and/or national culture as a system contains a richer set of theories, doctrines, ideologies, systems of value and variety of myths, since, as Smith (1998: 187) himself defines, 'culture is both an inter-generational repository and heritage, or set of traditions, and an active shaping repertoire of meanings and images, embodied in values, myths and symbols'. At this point Smith adds that culture defined in this way 'serve(s) to unite a group of people with shared experiences and memories, and differentiate them from outsiders' (*ibid.*). But at the same time the 'ethnic past is composed of a series of traditions and memories which are the subject of constant

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[9] Smith defines *mythomoteur* as a constitutive myth of the ethnic polity, and 'myth-symbol' complex as a summarisation of existing ethnic 'myths, symbols, their historical memories and central values' (Smith, 1983: 15).

reinterpretation' (1999: 178). Following this argument, Smith's definition of culture needs to be redefined: what unites, or could unite an ethnic group and/or nation *in a particular moment*, or period of their history, are *specific* myths of descent, *particular* historical memories and *some* symbols that represent an *ethnie* or a nation at that time. At one and the same time, culture is a collection of the cultural achievements of the previous generations and knowledge of current generations.

The myth-symbol complex is, one could agree, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the formation of an ethnie and nation. However, throughout its history the members of a specific nation are redefining and reinterpreting this complex. Therefore, depending on given circumstances, a single nation could claim unity based on different interpretations of the same myths and symbols, or use different symbols and myths to claim the same unity. The current myth-symbol complex is what defines the dominant nationalist ideology.

These dominant nationalist ideologies are always formed in respect to given circumstances. It is Smith (1999: 179) who emphasises that existing 'concepts, institutions and symbols impose limits on the way subsequent generations grasp the experiences of their communal forebears. (...) As a result (...) it also sets clear limits to subsequent interpretations of itself, irrespective of the ideology of the interpreter'. At this point Smith recognises the causal powers of culture on agency that creates nationalist ideologies: 'The nationalist finds that there are clear limits to the way in which his or her chosen nation can be reconstructed. These are the limits of particular ethno-histories' (*ibid.*). However, the active role of agency in constructing nationalist ideologies is not only conditioned by cultural system, but also by the existing social structure. The role of nationalists does not end with an 'archaeological type of work'. It is always provoked by *current* political, economic and social circumstances. It is the past, myths, symbols etc. that provide legitimisation for present demands - an independent state, autonomy, sovereignty, minority rights, a redefined economic system etc. This is the reason why 'myth-symbol complexes' have to be, as Smith says, 'renewed periodically'. They have to provide legitimisation for new demands that have emerged as a reaction to a new set of structural and cultural

circumstances. Nationalist ideology is never just a set of reinterpreted 'myth-symbol complexes'. It is also a political, social and economic agenda with clearly stated aims, claiming to protect the interests of a specific social group. In their attempt to create a nationalist ideology, these nationalists are at the same time constrained and enabled by both existing social structure and culture.

Just as in previous cases, this brief summary falls short of describing the whole richness and thoroughness of the theory. However, it demonstrates that the process of nation-formation can be described in terms of 'active dynamism, the transformative power, which is characteristic of what we call "nation-building"' (Smith, 1999: 175). Dynamism in Smith's theory of nation-formation is reflected in interrelations between structure (triple revolutions), culture (myth-symbol complex), and agency (an elite which organises the 'masses'). In addition, unlike some 'modernist' theories, the ethno-symbolic approach emphasises the importance of the 'origins' of the nation which provides a picture of the structural and cultural conditioning associated with the emergence of the nation. For these reasons Smith's ethno-symbolic theory of nation-formation is a strong starting point for developing a social realist framework.

In the next section I will attempt to sketch a framework for analysis of the process of nation-formation based on the principles defined by Realist Social Theory.

2.3. Morphogenesis of Nation

The nation as a social form emerges through a process of social change. At the beginning of this chapter it was emphasised that in most cases it is difficult to predict when and if a social change will occur, and such a change can be detected and analysed only *ex post facto*. Nevertheless, even though subject to change, the relationships between structure, culture and agency are relatively enduring. It will now be argued that the process of nation-formation can only be analysed by a closer examination of these relationships.

This analysis of the process of nation-formation, based on the principles of analytical dualism, is necessarily historical in two senses: first, it assumes *historicity of emergence* (Archer, 1995: 66) where structure, culture and agency are not only analytically separable but also temporally distinguishable; and, second, the nation as a social phenomenon necessarily emerges in a specific historical period.

Following Margaret Archer's arguments this analysis consists of three stages: first, it is necessary to analyse structural and cultural conditioning, that is, circumstances that preceded the emergence of the nation; second, an analysis of the dynamics of socio-cultural and group interaction is necessary in which contradictions between them can be explained; and, third, it is necessary to analyse the ways structural, cultural and group elaboration occurs which could ultimately result in the creation of the nation. Following Lockwood, Archer (1996: 294) emphasises that agential interaction does not necessarily or even usually mirror systemic interaction. However, for a nation to emerge, a specific morphogenesis of structure, culture and agency has to occur in the relatively same period of time, and it could only be explained by individually analysing its three phases of emergence.

The aim of this section is not to offer a full account of the history of the emergence of the nation as a social phenomenon. Rather, it will be an attempt to construct a methodological framework for the analysis of the process of the /re/formation of a particular nation.

2.3.1. Structural and Cultural Conditioning

One of the common characteristics of all pre-national societies was the relation of necessary complementarity of structural emergent properties where the existing institutions were mutually reinforcing. The system has developed institutions designed for reinforcing the rule of the monarch, protecting the existing distribution of resources, and preventing the emergence of any potential force which could contest it. One of the major forces required for the implementation

of 'law and order' was the army, which served an individual, rather than a certain people or specific country. Even in situations where the rule of an existing monarch was contested by a pretender to the throne, the consequent system itself was not to be changed. Such a political system suited a mainly agricultural economy which, together with trade, small industry and occasional conquering, could sustain the existing political system. This high system integration produced a situational logic of protection, where those involved could only find sustaining the existing system personally beneficial.

While structural integration in these societies seems obvious, some authors, like Gellner, question the level of its cultural integration. Indeed, in the way Gellner describes them, 'low' and 'high' culture have little in common. They represent two different lifestyles, sets of traditions, customs and mores, even languages. It was a period of low socio-cultural integration. Yet, at the same time, at the level of the cultural system these two 'cultures' were in a direct logical relationship of 'necessary complementarity'. The 'high' culture of the elite would not be possible or understandable without reference to so-called 'low' culture and vice versa. However different in content these cultures were, reference to the 'low' culture necessarily invokes a 'high' one. The relationship between these two 'cultures' was regulated by the dominant doctrines, created in order to provide legitimisation for the existing distribution of resources. Hence, the idea of a divine source of the monarch's sovereignty, and 'rights by birth' were equally accepted by both cultures, as too was the idea of a 'natural' division between those who rule and those who are ruled. Such a situation can be described as high cultural system integration.

This situation of high systemic integration (both cultural and structural) created a situational logic for the agency and conditioned the creation of a single corporate (ruling) agency in a society. This agency managed to gain control over both ideational and material resources. Where structural and cultural emergent properties are in a relation of necessary compatibility, the cultural and structural corporate agents find an interest in sustaining and protecting the system. Hence, the cultural elite, mainly composed of, or controlled by, the clergy, found it beneficial to be sponsored by the political elite thus securing their material

interests. In return, the political elite adopted the doctrines promoted by the cultural elite which provided its legitimisation. In contrast to these corporate agents, the vast majority of the unorganised population of primary agents were unable to articulate their interests. As Archer describes it (1996: 263):

> (W)here there is unopposed cultural traditionalism and unchallenged structural domination, Corporate Agency tends to congeal into one, rather than developing fissiparous tendencies, and as a single group is even more empowered to mould and manipulate Primary Agents by controlling their opportunities for and attitudes towards greater social participation.

Even though the Primary Agents are described as passive and unable to directly participate in reconstructing the structural system in which they live, they still constitute the environment in which the corporate agents act and thus constrain them. What Archer calls 'cultural traditionalism' does not appear only at the level of the cultural system of the society. At the local level, independent from the corporate agents, primary agents are conditioned by their local 'low' cultures as well. While most of the corporate agents in a society share a similar 'high' culture, the primary agents are divided by their own traditions, maintaining their own local vernaculars, customs and mores, myths and symbols. Where these primary agents also sustained a specific name for their group, and were attached to a specific territory, they were also recognised as a unique ethnic group.[10] Hence, unlike the corporate agents, the primary agents of a pre-national society were culturally conditioned in two ways - by the dominant doctrine which legitimises the position of the corporate agents, and by their local traditions. The two doctrines and cultural systems were not necessarily in contradiction or competition. Yet, even those who denied the legitimacy of the existing rule, either due to the lack of a competing doctrine or a lack of material resources, could not successfully contest its legitimacy.

In spite of the existing high level of systemic integration, factors such as strong divisions between corporate and primary agents, and division amongst the primary agents themselves, also prevented the creation of high socio-cultural integration. Nevertheless, as long as the resources were concentrated in the hands

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[10] As explained in the Introduction, in order to keep the arguments simple and as clear as possible, at this point I will not further develop the relationship between the ethnic group and the nation.

of a single corporate agent, and as long as the cultural system was unable to produce alternatives, society was going through a series of morphostatic cycles.

According to Archer, these long periods of morphostasis are mainly responsible for the creation of a myth of cultural integration. However, every society undergoes some changes.

The situational logic of protection, Archer explains, which is a result of necessary complementarities between structural and cultural 'parts', tends to strengthen pre-existing relations by both a systematisation of existing relations, and an adoption of systemic innovations. At the level of the cultural system, the systematisation of ideas results in a substantial increase in 'cultural density' (Archer, 1996: 176). Thus it develops a specific vocabulary, distinctions, symbols and concepts, a tightly articulated set of ideas, which in return create 'natural boundaries' between cultures. Hence, while facing difficulties related to the adoption of further innovations, the systematised concept protects its stability by 'brooking no rivals from outside and repressing rivalry inside' (*ibid.*: 177). Such a protective closure strengthens boundary-maintenance of a particular culture. It is important to emphasise that the same process of cultural closure occurs at the level of 'high' and 'low' culture, yet not necessarily at the same time.

This is a rather simplistic picture of the structural and cultural conditioning of pre-national societies, mainly emphasising what was common in the majority of pre-national societies. Of course, there are some significant differences between these societies as well. Without any wish to enter into a detailed discussion, it will be enough to emphasise the strategic differences between systemic conditioning of monarchies, empires and city states.[11]

Besides the structural differences in the management of societies due to their size, the most significant difference in the conditioning of agency was in the cultural domain. Even though the cultural system of these societies was

characterised by relations of necessary complementarities, not all of these systems had an equal success in systematising its main ideas, values and doctrines, or in protecting and reproducing them among its population. Excluding the ancient civilizations, probably, in these terms, the most successful societies were those of Western European monarchies. Here, the cultural elite, in co-operation with a structural one, managed to create and reproduce a unifying doctrine of legitimisation of their status which even at this stage prevented the formation of competitive corporate agents. On the other hand, the vast majority of population shared a similar local, 'low' culture. By protecting the 'intrusion' of any rival concepts from outside, which could contest the 'high' culture, the corporate agents were, at the same time, protecting any major disturbance of the local culture as well. As long as corporate agents were successful, the stability of the society was secured.

European empires faced bigger difficulties. Firstly, the main principle of the legitimisation of the dominant corporate agents, which was based on 'birth' and 'divine' rights, did not necessarily incorporate former elites of the conquered or 'inherited' societies, which had claimed their rights by the same principles. Moreover, these potential counter-elites were still perceived as corporate agents by their local population. In spite of existing differences, the lack of resources, both material and ideational, prevented these former-corporate agents from organising and articulating their interests. Secondly, at the local level, corporate agents were facing different environments created by culturally distinct primary agents. This conditioning, in turn, created the context in which corporate agents acted, and these agents inadvertently found themselves introducing instability into these local cultures. Hence, for example, the stability of the Habsburg Empire, throughout its existence, depended greatly on capabilities of Habsburg rulers to gain support or at least some level of cooperation of Hungarian, Czech, Croatian and other 'local' nobility.

In European city-states, the situation was the opposite. Both 'high' and 'low' cultures found it difficult to 'protect' themselves from the influences of the

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[11] I believe that parallels could be drawn to the non-European and colonial societies as well, but at

surrounding cultures due to their closeness in space and structure. Except in terms of a specific territory, these cultures could not successfully produce their own 'natural boundaries'. Constant changes of alliances, borders and rulers of the German city-states, for example, and diversity of developed doctrines and ideologies that emerged at the time, illustrate the level of instability of their structural and cultural systems.

Nevertheless, every society is an open system and the protection from the 'intrusion' of novelties is always partial, even in the case of successfully systematised relations of necessary complementarities. By force of internal factors (i.e. pauperisation of the population, revolts, fiscal problems) and external factors (like wars, change of trade routes) the control of the corporate agents over the systemic configuration of the society was weakened. Hence, on the one hand, innovations in techniques and technologies implemented in the economy created a situation of contingent incompatibilities within the economic system which resulted in what some authors call the industrial revolution. The same innovations increased the mobility of population and the exchange of ideas. Those ideas, doctrines and ideologies that could not be incorporated into the existing dominant core doctrine, contested it.

These developments on both structural and cultural levels necessarily conditioned the relationship between corporate and primary agents. Industrialisation forced a re-distribution of resources. While the dominant elites were mainly engaged in agriculture, cultural reproduction and governing the society, the primary agents entered into the sphere of industrialisation, both as managers and entrepreneurs, and as a newly urbanised workers. A more complex economic system, along with the introduction of new technologies in war machinery, demanded stronger control by the corporate agents over the structural system. Industrialisation and developments of warfare brought with it bureaucratisation. These developments set the stage for possible socio-cultural interaction.

this point, in order to keep the argument simple as possible, I will not refer to these societies.

From this short overview of the systemic conditioning in pre-national societies, several methodological directions for an analysis of the emergence of a specific nation can be drawn. An analysis of nation-formation in a particular society must:

- take into account the specificities of developed structural and cultural systems;

- explore relations between existing institutions which condition the distribution of material resources in a pre-national society;

- explain the relationships between the dominant set of doctrines, and the emergence of new doctrines and ideas which contest them; and

- examine the level of socio-cultural integration in that society, that is, the existence of separate cultural (ethnic) groups and the distribution of resources among them.

An analysis which offers an explanation of this specific structural and cultural conditioning, represents a starting point for the analysis of the socio-cultural interaction of relevant agencies.

2.3.2. Socio-cultural Interaction

The structural and cultural conditioning described above created certain predispositions for the agency's actions. These conditional effects, 'to be socially efficacious (...) have to be taken up, articulated and acted upon' (Archer, 1996: 253). As previously emphasised, systemic conditioning is mediated through agency where it supplies the reasons for maintenance or change of the system. These reasons have to be recognised and accepted by an agency, and hence associated with its vested interests.

Newly created groups of entrepreneurs and bureaucrats that emerged in previous stage were increasingly recruited from the ranks of primary agents. Both groups took over positions which enabled them to control material resources, by increasing their wealth or power in governing the state. Yet, the strict distinction between the existing corporate agents and primary agents, as maintained by the dominant ideology, prevented these newly formed social groups from entering

the ranks of dominant corporate agents. Certain ranks in the army, as well as in politics, like top positions in bureaucracy for example, were primarily reserved for the corporate agents themselves. Certain social circles were closed to the 'newcomers'. The education system, mainly controlled by the Church, was not open for all social strata. In addition, the existing corporate agents were controlling the taxation and customs systems, which were perceived as being restrictive to the newly developing industrialisation.

Even though the new agencies, entrepreneurs and bureaucrats clearly recognised their own vested interests, they still could not directly challenge the legitimacy of the ruling elite. In order to accomplish this, these new agencies had to co-operate with a new cultural agency which could be able to create a counter-ideology. As Archer (1996: 266) explains:

> Only if resources can be brought to bear to undermine the basis of domination, only if organisation can mobilise sufficient members to this end, and only if a counter-ideology challenging legitimacy and legitimating assertions is developed does a new Corporate Agent confront the entrenched Vested Interest Group.

While the structural system produced new social actors, usually labelled as the 'bourgeoisie', at the cultural level a new group of cultural agents emerged. Their emergence was the result of an inability of the cultural corporate agents to adopt and systematise new ideas within the dominant doctrines, since these newly created concepts and ideologies were in direct confrontation with the dominant ones by contesting the same legitimacy of the corporate agents. The most dominant contesting ideology was that of nationalism. The 'core doctrine' of nationalism is summarised by Smith (1999: 102) as follows:

1. the world is divided into nations, each with its own character and destiny;
2. the nation is the sole source of political power, and loyalty to it overrides all other loyalties;
3. everyone must belong to a nation, if everyone is to be truly free;
4. to realise themselves, nations must be autonomous;
5. nations must be free and secure if there is to be peace and justice in the world.

As is apparent, the nationalist 'core doctrine' was built around the concept of popular sovereignty. The idea that the 'people' themselves have to be creators of

their own destiny by forming their own government was presented as a new 'natural law'. This concept was in direct opposition to the dominant doctrine, which recognised only one sovereign, the monarch. Yet, in order to successfully challenge the doctrine of the corporate agents, the term 'people' required further elaboration, and the demand for popular sovereignty further justification. Both were found in the concept of the 'nation'. The nation defined by a nationalist ideology is not an entirely 'new' concept created *ab ovo*. In this concept the nation is a delimited group, characterised by certain attributes. But the range of limitations and variety of attributes of such a group are necessarily constrained by pre-existing cultural and structural properties. On the one hand, those existing dominant doctrines and previously implemented structures, through the systematisation of their ideas and practices, had already formed a 'naturally bounded' agency. On the other hand, the broad population of these societies was not described as an agency just for the sake of being different from corporate agents. They were also adherents of their local cultures and structures. Nationalist ideologies defined the nation exactly around these specific properties - *their* culture. To be more precise: nationalist ideologies are not concerned with culture as a set of integrated ideas, concepts and doctrines, ways of life, symbols, myths and folk songs. Rather, they define a nation in terms of those cultural properties which could, first of all, be perceived by the majority of the given population as common and unifying, and second, as exclusive and unique. Only then can 'culture' be described as 'ours'. 'Our culture' is not only a marker of a group's boundaries. It is also a source of legitimisation for the group's existence and its rightful demands.

The vast majority of primary agents during the period of increased industrialisation were disorganised and their demands went unarticulated, yet they still formed the environment for corporate agents' actions. Newly emerging cultural agents could establish the idea of sovereignty among a specific population characterised by distinctive cultural characteristics. The idea of popular sovereignty was in a relation of necessary complementarity with the idea of the nation. This relation created a logical situation of protection and required further systematisation.

In order to challenge the position of dominant corporate agents, new structural agencies adopted the new nationalist ideology and hence made an alliance with the newly emergent cultural agency. At the same time, these new cultural agents, by collaborating with the new structural agents, found protection and sponsorship. Finding common interests, the new agencies acquired a structural organisation (either as political parties, movements or cultural groups), and an articulated legitimising ideology, which at the same time successfully challenged the legitimacy of the ruling elite. They gradually established themselves as the new corporate agency in direct confrontation with the old elite, each with their own bargaining powers.

Empires and city-state societies found themselves in an even more complex situation. In the case of empires, the redistribution of resources and the emergence of an alternative ideational concept - nationalist ideology - opened a space for the formation of several competing corporate agents. Those who managed to articulate their interests and organise themselves necessarily concentrated on challenging the legitimacy of the ruling elite. In addition, due to their competing vested interests, some found themselves in direct confrontation with each other. The *concept* of the nation provided them with a tool for mobilising, not only their own culturally distinctive primary agents, but the local former-elites as well.

The corporate agents of city-states, who managed to define the structural but not cultural boundaries of their societies, found themselves challenged by new corporate agents, who in turn, had found a solution in the concept of the nation.

As already emphasised, new cultural and structural agencies were mainly formed from the ranks of the primary agents. While corporate agents were still in possession of the bulk of material resources, these primary agents could rely mainly on their human resources. The appearance of new ideas, doctrines and ideologies, at the same time, opened a debate which put the issue of popular and national sovereignty on the 'popular agenda' (Archer, 1996: 267). The success of the new 'nationalistic' corporate agents now depended on the popular appeal of their proclaimed ideology.

Hence, in its second phase, an analysis of the formation of a particular nation has to examine developments of socio-cultural interaction, conditioned by the structural and cultural systems in a pre-national society. A few methodological directions can be drawn from this. For such an analysis it is necessary to:

- determine all relevant agencies, whose vested interests were in direct opposition to each other, due to the differential distribution of material and ideational resources;

- determine the main structural and cultural corporate agents, explain the process of their emergence, and the relations between them;

- at the same time, explain the main characteristics of the primary agents, especially in reference to their distinctive local cultures;

- give special attention to the explanation of which cultural corporate agents developed a nationalist ideology, and how they went about doing this. This must include an analysis of the proposed definition of the nation in general and 'their own' nation in particular, the way it defined national culture, and proclaimed political agenda; and

- examine the methods corporate agents employ for mobilising primary agents.

Therefore, an analysis of the socio-cultural interactions of the main agencies in pre-national societies could underline the main processes which may eventually result in the formation of a particular nation.

2.3.3. Social Elaboration

The main objective of this section, to paraphrase Archer (1996: 294), is to set out the conditions under which the morphogenesis of the nation could occur. taking into account the developments in the socio-cultural interaction conditioned in a prior social context. As Archer emphasises, bearing in mind that the nation emerges in a society defined as an open system, these conditions are only tendential. Moreover, the morphogenetic approach is not constructed with the aim of explaining the emergence of social phenomena, but rather to provide an explanatory methodological framework for an analysis of the emergence of a particular social phenomenon in a specific society at a defined time.

As already stressed, even though agency is conditioned by prior social structures and cultural systems, it also changes or maintains these systems. Therefore, whether a socio-cultural system will be reproduced or transformed depends exclusively on the developments in the socio-cultural interaction of the corporate agents. Hence, as Archer explains 'to specify the conditions under which changes are transacted is to indicate what, in addition to their initial bargaining position, gives a group *negotiating strength'* (1995: 297; italics in original)

These initial bargaining positions of the groups are mainly determined by available resources and pre-groupings of agents. As was shown earlier, newly developed corporate agents, which adopted a nationalist ideology and agenda and achieved some level of organisation and definition of their mutual interests, had limited access to material resources which necessarily limited promotion of their demands. However, with the development of industrialisation, division of labour, development of bureaucracy and systematisation of the new nationalistic doctrines, the availability and concentration of resources changed as well. These changes provided a new context for further interaction between conflicting corporate agents. The potential negotiating strength of the corporate agents in question depends on the availability of both material and ideational resources, but their real power depends mainly upon the social reception of their proclaimed ideology and political agenda by primary agents. These nationalistic corporate agents will occupy a better bargaining position only when they manage to successfully mobilise available material resources and gain the support of primary agents.

Primary agents were structurally and culturally constrained in a twofold manner: by their own local structure and culture, and by structure and culture that were shaped and maintained by corporate agents. What defined them as primary agents was a lack of proper organisation and failure to articulate their own vested interests. This disorganisation was a direct consequence of the conditional influences of that dual set of structural and cultural emergent properties. Differences of gender, age, education, socio-economic status, vernaculars, symbols, affinities, etc., in pre-national societies prevented them from forming an

organised collectivity beyond their narrow locality with clearly defined vested interests. At the same time, direct confrontation between 'old' and 'new' corporate agents forces them to seek support from primary agents. At this stage primary agents are still just 'recipients of struggles over decision-making between Corporate agents' (Archer, 1995: 186). Even though unorganised and internally divided, these primary agents still present a substantial human resource which corporate agents will try to mobilise for their own purposes. However, through that process of mobilisation these primary agents '(a)s self-reflective agents, (...) underwent regrouping in the process: in future time they were no longer a mere resource but have started to become a force - in a struggle which had now become their own' (*ibid.*). The primary agents increasingly became ogranised into 'movements'.

To be more specific, new nationalist corporate agents formed their ideology around the principle of popular national sovereignty and consequently the principle of national self-determination, which directly challenged the legitimising principle of the 'old' corporate agents. In order to legitimise these claims, it was firstly necessary to define what is the nation and who are its members. Legitimisation is found in 'national culture'. Even though defined in *terms* of local cultures, these local cultures are not adopted as a whole into the new 'national' culture. Rather, local cultures provided already an existing set of cultural 'products', myths, memories, vernaculars, and symbols, with which primary agents could identify. By carefully selecting specific cultural traits as markers of their nation, the corporate agents were politically organising fissiparous primary agents into a new community.

However, it would be misleading to conclude that an appeal to common cultural traits alone is what mobilises primary agents. The appeal to the common 'national' culture defines the group which is to be mobilised, and offers a legitimisation for proclaimed demands. These proclaimed demands, and the stated political agenda of the nationalist corporate agents are what will be decisive for the mobilisation of primary agents.

The beginning of this chapter also emphasised that the nation emerges as a result of a *process* of social change. According to the main principles of Realist Social Theory a new social change occurs through the series of distinctive morphogenetic cycles. Any change which occurs in a structural or cultural system at the same time forms systematic conditioning for the following morphogenetic cycles. The morphogenesis of the nation has to be examined in the same manner.

Every redistribution of material and ideational resources available to the corporate agents is a product of some morphogenetic cycle. The existing distribution of resources conditions the actions of corporate agents involved. The level of availability of resources to nationalist corporate agents at their inception, the level of systematisation of their proclaimed ideology, and their direct relation to other corporate agents, conditions the formulation of their demands. Therefore, for example, not all nationalist corporate agents have as their primary demand the formation of an independent nation-state. Conditioned by the structural and cultural context, corporate agents have to deal with the issues they perceive as the most constraining or beneficial for the development of their bargaining power. Hence, nationalist corporate agents would include in their political programme and make their primary aims issues regarding the usage of their 'national' language in the education system, minority rights, equality of opportunity, parliamentary representation, and other similar issues.

Even if corporate agents manage to define national culture and their nation in a form attractive to primary agents, their success in mobilising these primary agents will depend on the ways that nationalist corporate agents have responded to pressing political, economic and social problems. With a changed set of structural and cultural circumstances, the corporate agents would have to redefine their ideology in order to sustain the broad support of primary agents. This does not just include a redefinition of priorities or introduction of new political demands. Influenced by internal and external factors and changes of the structural and cultural segments of society, the nationalist corporate agents will also have to redefine *their* national culture, *their* concept of the nation in general

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and *'their own'* nation in particular. Like any other social form, the nation is an open system predisposed to changes.

The question still remains: when does the nation emerge? Following the definition of the nation given earlier, it could be said that a specific nation emerges when:

- the nationalist corporate agents manage to institutionalise their activity through some kind of political, economic or cultural organisation;

- the nationalist ideology of corporate agents manages to clearly define the 'national culture';

- the nationalist corporate agents successfully mobilise the primary agents around their proclaimed ideology and political agenda;

- the primary agents re-group into a promotive interest group whose co-action supports the corporate agents' demands;

- the primary agents perceive each other as a members of the same community; and

- such a triple morphogenesis, that of agency, structure and culture, occurs at a roughly similar time.

Hence, it could be concluded that the level of success of the processes of institutionalisation of nationalist groups, nationalisation of social institutions, ideologisation of the nation, nationalisation of culture, and mobilisation and nationalisation of primary agents determines the emergence of the social phenomenon called the nation.

This framework is developed with the aim of providing a methodology for the analysis of the history of the emergence of a nation in a particular society. In the following chapters this methodological framework will be applied to the case of the emergence of the Croatian nation.

Chapter Three

OPERATIONALISATION AND METHODOLOGY

The previous chapter examined Social Realist Theory, and developed a methodological framework for the analysis of the emergence of the nation. This chapter will operationalise the basic principles of the developed framework, so that is can be applied to a specific case: the emergence of the Croatian nation. This chapter aims to establish the principles of an historical analysis of the emergence of the Croatian nation through examining interrelations between structure, culture and agency within Croatian society over a specific period.

3.1. Period of the Analysis

The basic thesis of Social Realist Theory states that all social forms emerge as a consequence of social process. Therefore, in order to examine the consequence - the emergence of the Croatian nation - it is necessary to first limit the analysis to a specific historical period.

As examined in the previous chapter, this research defines the nation as *a social agency politically organised as a community which claims its rights on the basis of a culture defined as its own*. This definition itself limits the period of the analysis. The first organisation which attempted to introduce the broader population into Croatian politics appeared in the 1830s. The same organisation made the first attempt to formulate a more-or-less coherent Croatian nationalist ideology. Hence, the 1830s should be a starting point for a historical analysis of the emergence of the Croatian nation. However, since social developments in Croatia in the 1830s are conditioned by an earlier social system, as the previously developed theoretical framework makes clear, a brief historical analysis should explain the structural, cultural and agential interrelations which 'produced' the first attempts of defining the Croatian nation.

Just as in many other Eastern European cases, for more than 150 years after the formulation of the first nationalist ideology, the Croatian nation could not and did not, develop the ultimate nationalist aim of creating a state in which 'ethnic boundaries ... (will not) separate the power-holders from the rest' (Gellner, 1983: 1). Disregarding the tragic attempt of 1941-1945, the Croatian nation managed to establish its first *sovereign* nation-state in 1991. The established state, defined by its Constitution as national, provided a new social structure in which a new nationalist ideology and a new set of cultural properties marked as a new national culture. The 1990s will constitute the last stage of the analysis.

From the 1830s until the 1990s, Croatian society went through numerous changes. An historical analysis of the emergence of the Croatian nation does not imply that all of these changes should be accounted for. Rather, this analysis will be concentrated around a specific set of social processes. As argued before, since social change can be identified only *ex post facto*, the stages of analysis, that is, the morphogenetical cycles of the emergence of the Croatian nation, can be recognised from the outset. Taking into account the level of structural, cultural and agential change, from the 1830s until the 1990s Croatian society went through six stages:

- from 1830s until 1868 - the period of Enlightened Absolutism
- from 1868 until 1918 - the period of Dual Monarchy
- from 1918 until 1941 - the period of the First Yugoslavia
- from 1941 until 1945 - the period of the Independent State of Croatia
- from 1941 until 1990 - the period of the Second Yugoslavia
- from 1990 onwards - the period of the Croatian nation-state

Each of these stages and the transition from one stage into another will be analysed on several levels.

3.2. Levels of the Analysis

Even though the terms social structure, culture and agency signify specific levels of analysis, they are too general and undefined to be used as such in empirical research. Hence it is necessary to offer an operational definition of each of them (see Figure 5).

Figure 6: Operational Definition of Structure, Culture and Agency

For the purpose of this research morphogenetical cycles of *social structure* will be defined as dependent on three segments: the political and economic structures of the society and its educational system. Political structure will be examined through an analysis of the structure of the political institutions and political party system; economic structure through an analysis of the existing economic institutions and the dominant economic policy; and the educational system through an analysis of the educational institutions and some segments of the curriculum.

Bearing in mind that the term *culture* is one of the most widely used and defined concepts in social sciences, for the purpose of this research, as emphasised in the Introduction, 'culture' will be defined mainly as a set of ideas related to national and ethnic issues. Therefore, cultural morphogenetical cycles will be examined through existing nationalist ideologies. A consistent set of the ideas that offers a definition of the nation in general, a definition of the Croatian nation and a definition of the significant others, represents a Croatian nationalist ideology.

Finally, the *agency* will be analysed on two levels: the level of corporate agents and the level of primary agents. Hence, corporate agents will be analysed on the cultural level as nationalist ideologists and on a structural level as ruling or oppositional political agencies. This research will hold that the role of primary agents in the emergence of the Croatian nation can be examined only through the examination of their attitudes and only hypothesised through the examination of their actions.

For each historical period of analysis this research will give an account of its social structure, culture and relevant agencies operationally defined in the terms explained above.

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3.3. Interrelations of the Levels of the Analysis

Morphogenesis of the nation defined in the previous chapter assumes three types of interrelations between social segments (see Figure 6):

A. interrelations between social structure, culture and agency within a specific morphogenetical cycle that appears in three forms:

1. The first form (❶) signifies the interrelation between the structural and cultural *conditions*, that is, the ways political, economic and educational systems present an institutionalisation of the dominant doctrines/nationalist ideologies and local/national cultures, and, in return, how dominant doctrines/nationalist ideologies promote social structure.

2. The second form (❷) is a consequence of structural and cultural *conditioning* of the formation of agency and agential action. In the specific case of an empirical analysis of the emergence of the Croatian nation, these 'internal' relations will be presented through an analysis of the methods the political institutions, economic and educational systems on the one side, and dominant doctrines/existing nationalist ideologies and local/national cultures, on the other, determine the formation and action of the corporate agents and mould the attitudes towards the nation of primary agents.

3. The next type of interrelationship (❸), structural and cultural *elaboration*, examines corporate agents' attempts to transform social structure and culture according to their goals as stated in their nationalist ideology.

B. Interaction between different internal segments of structure, culture and agency (❹). As stated earlier, one of the significant relationship in the process of the emergence of the nation is an interrelation between corporate and primary agents. Hence, at the level of *socio-cultural interaction* relations between the corporate and primary agents have to be examined. Therefore, one of the aims of the research is to investigate the methods corporate agents utilise in the mobilising of primary agents around corporate agents' nationalist ideology and, consequently, primary agents' responses to these attempts.

Figure 7. Morphogenetic cycles of the nation

C. Interaction between consequent morphogenetical cycles (❺). According to the theoretical framework, each elaboration of the structural and cultural level at the same time composes social conditioning for the following morphogenetic cycle. However, in order to observe a social process, it is necessary to analyse the extent of structural, cultural and agential transformation which occurs between each period of analysis.

In this case an analysis of the process of the emergence of the Croatian nation these five types of interrelations dictate a specific structure for the empirical research.

3.4. Structure of the Empirical Research

In order to test the hypotheses stated in the theoretical framework, the set of five interrelations, described above, have to be examined throughout the six given periods of analysis. It is important to emphasise that the structure of empirical research is, in principle, conditioned not only by the stated hypotheses, but also by the availability of data; not only with a set of proclaimed research goals, but by the chosen period of analysis. Hence, bearing in mind the limitations of an analysis of social process, the process of the emergence of the Croatian nation is structured in the following way:

1. Such an analysis firstly has to offer a brief historical analysis of the development of structural and cultural conditioning in the period from the migration of the Croats to the Balkan peninsula until the 1830s. The main political structure and economic system of Croatian society will be given, as well as a brief account of the existing dominant doctrines and existing local cultures. A brief history of the emergence of those corporate agents who were dominating events prior to the 1830s will also be inclyded.

2. Consequently, for each period of the analysis a historical account of the main political structure and economic system will be given, followed by an examination of the ways established political and economic systems conditioned the formation of corporate agents.

3. For each period an analysis of the dominant nationalist ideology will be conveyed. Following the operational definition of these ideologies given above, these analyses will offer an overview on the main definitions of the nation in general and the Croatian nation in particular which will include analyses of the ways national culture, political goals and significant others have been defined.

4. In a separate chapter this research will offer a comparative analysis of the Croatian educational systems. This research which deals with their interrelation with the structure and culture at a given time, aims to explore the ways social structure incorporates dominant nationalist ideologies. Hence, the educational curriculum will be compared from the second half of the nineteenth century until the 1990s.

5. Finally, this research has to examine the relationship between corporate and primary agents. While the methods employed by the corporate agents in order to mobilise the primary agents will be analysed within each historical period, the final task of the research is to examine how the primary agents respond to structural and cultural conditioning and the nature of their response to the actions of the corporate agents. As already stated, the role of the primary agents in the process of the emergence of the nation can be examined only through investigation of their attitudes and only hypothesised through the examination of their actions. In this case the limitation of data available for analysis will manifest itself most intensively.

3.5. Methodology

The proposed structure of the empirical research sets strict conditions on the available methods of analysis.

The character of *structural and cultural conditioning* and the processes of the formation of relevant *corporate agents* for each period of analysis is investigated through a review of relevant secondary literature on Croatian history. This review offers a picture of Croatian political system, developed political institutions and party systems, and the Croatian economic system, with reference to its economic

institutions and economic policy. At the same time the review identifies relevant political, economic and cultural corporate agencies, and the relations between them.

The same review of literature reveals seven dominant Croatian *nationalist ideologies* within the set periods of analysis. These are:

- the Illyrian nationalist ideology,
- the Yugoslav nationalist ideology,
- the nationalist ideology of the Party of Rights,
- the nationalist ideology of the Croatian Peasants Party,
- the Ustasha's nationalist ideology,
- the Communists' nationalist ideology, and
- the nationalist ideology of Franjo Tudjman.

The main ideas and principles of each nationalist ideology are described through a content analysis of the writings of their creators. The content analysis looks at the ways each nationalist ideology answers the following questions: what is the nation? what is the Croatian nation? who are the enemies of the Croatian nation?

In addition, Tudjman's nationalist ideology is also analysed through a content analysis of Tudjman's public speeches printed in the Croatian daily newspaper *Vjesnik* during the period of June 1992 to October 1994. As well as addressing the stated three questions, this analysis identifies the messages the Croatian President of that time was sending to the Croatian primary agents.

In order to analyse the ways the Croatian *educational system* incorporates dominant nationalist ideologies, a comparative content analysis of high-school history textbooks is conveyed. This part of the empirical research is limited by the available data. The history curricula from the late nineteenth century until the first half of the twentieth century are reconstructed through the review of the relevant literature. For the period 1941-1995 a content analysis is carried out on the primary resources: history textbooks published in 1943 during the Ustasha regime; textbooks published in the period 1953-1957 during the Communist regime; and those published in 1995-96 during Tudjman's regime. The comparison of the textbooks is concentrated around several questions: to what

extent do the textbooks reflect the dominant ideology? what myths and legends are portrayed as national? which historical personalities are described as national heroes? how does the textbook describe the nation, national values and national interests? and, finally, who are portrayed as historical enemies of the Croatian nation?

Finally, in order to investigate whether Croatian *primary agents* actually incorporated and supported the dominant nationalist ideology, a survey has been undertaken. As already emphasised, a historical comparative analysis of the attitudes of primary agents is impossible due to the lack of data. These attitudes can only be partially, and probably inadequately, reconstructed through an analysis of national censuses and the results of party election.

The construction of my own survey followed the general structure of the empirical research. The questionnaire has four main parts: primary agents' perception of the nation in general, the Croatian nation in particular, attitudes towards other nations, and some demographic data about the sample. The perception of the nation in general is 'measured' by two separate instruments: constitutive elements of the nation, and origins of the nation. The perception of the Croatian nation was reconstructed from the data given by an instrument which 'measured' the acceptance of the dominant Croatian nationalist ideologies and that which 'measured' a level of acceptance of different Croatian historical personalities as 'national heroes'. Finally, the primary agents' attitudes towards other nations was 'measured' through a modified Bogardus' ethnic distance instrument. The survey was conducted on a sample (N=307) of the Zagreb population in late 1999 - early 2000. It was constructed on the basis on the 1991 census, which, unfortunately, even though the most recent, cannot be taken as representative of the Zagreb post-war population.[12]

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[12] For more about the sample and the construction of the questionnaire, see Chapter Eight.

PART TWO: THE CASE OF CROATIA

The framework developed in Part One of this thesis was constructed to provide a theoretical and methodological basis for an analysis of a specific case study. This framework points at significant relationships between and among the three segments of society - structure, culture and agency - in the process of nation-formation. It also offers methodological tools for the analysis of these relationships.

The hypothesis and methodological framework developed in Part One will be tested through the case of the nation-formation process in Croatia. The main reason for choosing the case of Croatia as a testing-ground for this analysis lies in the fact that the application of the dominant theories of nations and nationalism fails to fully explain the process of the formation of the Croatian nation. Hence, for example, an application of a modernist theory would not grasp the relevance of the pre-modern development of Croatian society to the process of formation of the Croatian nation. It would fail to offer an explanation for the emergence of supra-nationalist ideologies that played a crucial role throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It would also fail to explain all the relevant stages of the /re/formation of the Croatian nation. In addition, no modernist theory could offer a relevant answer to the question why the Croatian nation managed to form a nation-state only after two hundred years of the process of modernisation. In contrast, a primordialist theory would have some difficulty in offering an explanation for the significant structural and cultural differences that existed among that population that is today called Croatian, or for the lack of national consciousness even among the so-called elite up until the twentieth century. Finally, even though an ethno-symbolist theory could offer important insights into the relevance of long-enduring cultural forms for the formation of the Croatian nation, it would fail to stress importance of the structural conditioning of agencies and culture in creating the Croatian nation.

In brief, Part Two of this thesis aims to demonstrate how in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the Croatian nation was formed and re-formed in reference to different concepts of the nation, which developed at the level of structure, culture and different agencies. It will be shown that the emergence of a nation *does not* assume the existence of a single concept of the nation that would be shared by different corporate and primary agencies, supported by the social structure and promoted by the dominant culture. I will demonstrate that, in the case of Croatia, the nation emerged as a result of the process of:

- mobilisation of primary agents around *different* concepts of the nation,
- institutionalisation of certain nationalist groups,
- nationalisation of social institutions, and
- nationalisation of culture.

Hence, the historical, political and cultural complexity of Croatian society demands a broader approach for the analysis of the process of the formation of the Croatian nation. The developed framework of the *Morphogenesis of the Nation* provides a specific structure for the analysis of a specific case. The following chapters will focus on different levels of analysis.

First of all, it will be necessary to explore the formation of different ideas of the nation at the cultural level. Therefore all relevant nationalist ideologies developed since the nineteenth century will be analysed in Chapter Four. This analysis, which aims to investigate the ways Croatian nationalist ideologies have defined the nation, its meaning and functions, will be accompanied by brief historical accounts of major structural and cultural developments, corporate agencies that have emerged and certain socio-demographic characteristics of primary agents that preceded the development of each ideology.

Chapter Four

NINETEENTH-CENTURY CROATIAN NATIONALIST IDEOLOGIES

The Croats like to follow a famous name,
without really understanding
the content of the message
(Ante Starčević; in Gross, 1971: 207)

4.1. Introduction

In this chapter I will analyze the 'core doctrine', origins and aims of the three most dominant nationalist ideologies in nineteenth century Croatia. The first was created in the 1830s and 1840s by the leader of the *Illyrian Movement,* Ljudevit Gaj (1809-72). A continuation of this nationalist ideology, in some sense, takes the form of Yugoslavism mainly shaped by Josip Juraj Strossmayer (1815-1905) and Franjo Rački (1828-94). The end of the nineteenth century was marked by the clash of two nationalist ideologies - that of Yugoslavism and the ideology of *the Party of (State) Right* which was formulated by its leader Ante Starčević (1823-96).

It could be said that these three nationalist ideologies represent what Miroslav Hroch calls Phase A and Phase B of the national awakening of the Croats. Phase A, according to Hroch, is characterized by efforts for the 'development or improvement of national culture based on a local language which had to be used in education, administration and economic life' (Hroch, 1995: 66). It is the phase in which activists, or national awakeners, devote themselves to the search for a national history, traditions and language which characterize their ethnic group (Hroch, 1995: 66). According to Hroch, this phase of the nationalist movement lacks clearly stated political goals and the support of the broader masses. It is oriented towards an educated elite, and it is mainly inspired by the ideas of Romanticism. In this phase, the political awakening is preceded by a cultural awakening. Defined in this way, it can be said that the Illyrian Movement represents Phase A of the Croatian national awakening.

In Hroch's schema, Yugoslavism and the activities of the Party of Right could represent Phase B. The main aim of the activists of these nationalist movements and ideologies is to 'win over as many of their ethnic group as possible to the project of creating a future nation, by patriotic agitation to "awaken" national consciousness among them' (Hroch, 1996: 81). It is also the phase when the first political demands based on the 'natural rights' of the nation were formulated. However, Hroch points out, these 'activities' at first are not necessarily successful. The real mass movement occurs in Phase C. Hroch classifies the national movement in Croatia as a type[13] where the transition to a mass movement, or Phase C, was 'delayed until after a constitutional revolution' (Hroch, 1996: 83). In Croatia Phase C occurred only in the twentieth century.

Even though Hroch's schema is applicable to many cases of emergence of the nation in Eastern Europe, its evolutionist, uni-linear character would fail to grasp the dynamics of the process of nation-formation in Croatia. The case of Croatia and its national movements were more complicated. As will be shown in the Chapter Four and Five, the Croatian nationalist movements created specific and sometimes confrontational ideologies and defined and re-defined their 'national culture'. To use Hroch's terminology, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century Croatian nationalist movements repeated their Phase B and C several times. Croats found themselves squeezed between the demands of the Habsburg Empire and rising Magyar, Serb, German and Italian nationalisms. Moreover, as a non-dominant ethnic group, with territory divided among several big powers, with numerous ethnic minorities, economically under-developed, without any real national nobility, Croats developed very specific nationalist ideologies. Hence, the process of national awakening in Croatia, it might be said, has been shaped by its peculiar geographical position, by crucial historical political events

[13] Hroch's typology of the national movements in Europe is based on the relationship between the transition to Phase B and then to Phase C and the transition to a constitutional society based on equality before the law. According to this typology in the first type of the national movements, Phase B occurred under the old regime of absolutism, but it acquired a mass character in a time of revolutionary changes in the political system. In the second type, the national movements acquired a mass character already under the old regime, therefore before the establishment of a civil society or constitutional order. And in the final type, national agitation first began under constitutional conditions in a more developed capitalist setting, such as that of Western Europe (Hroch, 1996: 82-83).

and by its economic weakness. These three factors - geographical, political and economic - influenced the creation of national ideologies which were mainly oriented towards 'the others'. The most significant 'others' in the nineteenth century Croatia were Magyars, Serbs and the Austrian Germans.

These are the reasons why it is impossible to analyze a nationalist ideology in Croatia without strong reference to the historical events that helped to shape it and to the socio-economic situation which gave it its character.

Yet, the main aim of this chapter is to analyze the core doctrine of the nineteenth century Croatian nationalist ideologies and to offer an explanation of the origins and functions of these ideologies, as well as of the consequences created for nationalist ideologies in the twentieth century. Hence, each ideology will be analyzed around four questions: (1) how an ideology defines the nation; (2) how it defines the other nations; (3) which myths, memories, symbols and values an ideology advocates; and (4) how an ideology explains the political situation of the nation in its time. The analysis will be based on the original writings of the main ideologists where possible.

4.2. Historical Background I (Seventh - Eighteenth century)

Medieval history in most cases is based more on myths and legends than on actual historical facts. The Croatian case is no exception.

Once upon a time, Croatia was a great and independent kingdom. Croats migrated from the Karpathian area organized, according to myth, into 12 tribes. They settled on the territory of today's Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina around the seventh century. Soon after they accepted Christianity of their own free will.[14] In those early days the Croats survived and fought against the Byzantine and Frankish Empires, against invasions of Avars, Bulgarians, and

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[14] In 680, Pope Agathon issued a document which stated that the leaders of the twelve Croatian tribes agreed to 'respect the Christian religion and Christian practices in their territory' (Gaži, 1973: 17).

Magyars. The Croats were ruled by wise and less wise chieftains, *župans*, dukes, *bans* and finally kings. Medieval Croatia reached its peak under the rule of king Tomislav Trpimirović (910-28), who united the lands of Dalmatia and Pannonia and with the permission of the Pope, become the first Croatian king.[15]

Map 1. Croatia in 1070 and Medieval States of Bosnia and Serbia (Lampe, 2000: 18)

The kingdom of Croatia was short-lived. According to the thirteenth-century *Chronicle of the Priest of Dioclea,* frequently quoted by Croatian historians, the last descendant of the House of Trpimir, king Dmitar Zvonimir (1075-89) died at the hands of his own nobles at the assembly near Knin.[16] King Zvonimir died without heir and thus the question of succession to the throne was open. The interpretation of the end of the Croatian independent kingdom in 1102 varies, depending on the author. Yet, this issue influenced the whole of Croatian political life in the nineteenth century and, therefore, the formation of Croatian nationalist ideologies. The facts were that after Zvonimir's death there were two

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[15] The question of Tomislav's coronation, even though very prominent in the myths and legends, is still a point of dispute among Croatian historians. According to the myth, King Tomislav was crowned on the Field of Duvno (Tomislavgrad) or in Knin, or perhaps elsewhere, in approximately 924 or 925 (Gaži, 1973: 27; Tanner, 1997: 9; Jukić, 1965:6)

pretenders to the Croatian throne, each supported by different factions. The Court faction[17] supported Zvonimir's widow, Jelena, and offered the crown to her nephew Ladislav, King of Hungary (Gaži, 1973: 33). The popular faction backed, and in 1093 elected, Petar Svačić as king. In 1097, Ladislav's successor Koloman Arpad crossed the Drava river (which marks the border between Croatia and Hungary) and defeated Petar's army on Gvozd Mountain. Petar lost his life in the battle and the way to the Croatian throne was opened. In 1102 the historic agreement called *Pacta Conventa* was signed by which Koloman was recognized as the Croatian king.

Some Croatian historians have interpreted these events to show that Croats have elected Hungarian kings as their own by their free will, thus establishing only personal unity between two separate kingdoms. According to the *Pacta Conventa* the new kings were to be separately crowned as the kings of Dalmatia and Croatia. Croatian internal administration was to be left to the *ban* (viceroy) and the *Sabor* (diet), but kings were to appoint the *ban* (Goldstein, 1999: 21-22). Yet, Tanner points out that the Hungarian rulers had drawn a distinction between the lands of northern Croatia, which had accepted king Ladislav's rule in the 1090s (or simply those lands which had been conquered) and the lands of the South of Gvozd Mountain, which had accepted Koloman's rule on the basis of the *Pacta Conventa* (Tanner, 1997: 16). These northern territories, which Hungarians called Slavonia, were placed under the jurisdiction of a separate *ban* and *Sabor*. Hence, the lands of the former Croatian kingdom were known from then on as the Kingdom of Croatia, Dalmatia and Slavonia, or the Triune Kingdom.

Three hundred years later, Croatia was to be described by historians as *Reliquiae Reliquiarum* - the period when Croatia experienced the invasion of Tartars, Crusaders, and Turks and the attempts of the Venetian Republic to conquer

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[16] Myth has it that 'he cursed the unfaithful Croats and their descendants before God and all the saints for his violent death, declaring that the Croats should never again have a ruler of their own tongue but should always be under foreign rule' (Tanner, 1997:1).

[17] The political factions were created around conflict over religious matters, namely between the Latin Church and the Croatian Church, which advocated usage of the vernacular in religious practices. The first Court (or Latin) faction was created when the Latin Church affiliated itself with the court, while the Croatian church was affiliated with the popular or Glagolitic faction (Gaži, 1973: 35-38).

Dalmatia. In 1409, King Ladislav sold a major part of Dalmatia to Venice for 100,000 ducats, and by 1420 all of Dalmatia, except the Republic of Ragusa (Dubrovnik) was in Venice's hands and remained so until the Napoleonic era. In the 1420s, the Turks invaded Croatia for the first time and conquered most of its territory. In several battles Croats also lost its nobility. In 1493 at the battle on Krbavsko Polje the leaders of several hundreds of Croatia's noble families were killed, and as Goldstein quotes a chronicler, 'the flower of the Croatian nobility was wiped out' (1999: 31).

Map 2. Advance of the Ottomans (Goldstein, 2000: 35)

The invasion of the Turks triggered several significant events which would greatly influence the future of Croatia. The first result was a change of ruler. On 21 August 1526 at Mohács, Louis II (Ljudevit) King of Hungary, Croatia and Slavonia, was defeated by Suleyman the Magnificent. In the battle which lasted only one day, the King perished as well, apparently by drowning in a stream of the Drava river. Once again the throne was empty.

In 1527, one year after the Hungarians and Czechs elected Archduke Ferdinand of Austria as their king, the Croats did the same. For nearly 400 years the Habsburgs would remain on the throne. However, Croats and Hungarians elected Ferdinand as king in the hope of gaining more military aid against the Ottomans.

The election of Ferdinand provided another event on which the nineteenth century national awakeners would build their ideology and formulate their political demands. Once again, Croatian historians and politicians would emphasize the act as the free will of the Croatian people. Hence Gaži (1973: 95) writes how the *Sabor* at Krizevci declared Croatia as independent from Hungary and insisted that '(a)fter the death of Zvonimir, our last king of fond memory, we joined the holy crown of Hungary by our free will, just as we do now, the rule of your majesty (6 October, 1527)'.

The second effect of the Ottoman invasion was the creation of the so-called Military Frontier or *Vojna Krajina*.[18] With the constant threat of Turkish expansion to the west, the Habsburgs faced the problem of defending their frontiers. For that purpose a chain of fortresses and fortified villages was built mainly staffed by mercenary troops and settled by peasant soldiers. The significance of the Croatian Military Frontier for the defense of the entire Habsburg Empire was perceived by Austrians as too important to be left under the *Sabor's* and *ban's* jurisdiction. This was governed on a purely military basis directly from Vienna, and it remained under the Habsburgs' direct rule until 1881 when it was reincorporated into Croatia - after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Map 3. Habsburg Military Border in 1780 (Lampe, 2000: 28)

The third event which would play an important role in future events in Croatia was the direct result of the migration of the population. The lands occupied by the Turks were left devastated and depopulated by the Turkish war. The same happened in the newly established Military Frontier. At the invitation of the Habsburgs these areas were settled with Orthodox populations which fled from Turkish oppression. They were immediately incorporated into the strict military system of Krajina and were granted special privileges such as guaranteed freedom of religious practices and exemption from the feudal system. They were soldiers who were expected to spend their whole life in military service. The origins and ethnic identity of these settlers has become a point of dispute among Serbian and Croatian historians. There is some agreement that the settlers were Vlachs most of whom belonged to the Serbian Orthodox Church (Goldstein, 1999: 40). Yet, as Tanner (1997: 39) points out, Serbian historians have insisted

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[18] The territory of Military Frontier was around 8,000 square kilometers, just slightly smaller then area of rest of Croatia (c. 10,600 km2) (Goldstein, 1999: 41).

that these Vlachs were of Serbian ethnic origin, while Croatian scholars were more inclined to emphasize that these Orthodox Vlachs began to identify themselves as Serbs only in the nineteenth century under the pressure of the Serbian Orthodox Church. In any event, in the sixteenth century, the ethnic origins of the settlers meant little.

The conflict between the Habsburgs and the Croatian *Sabor* concerning the status of the Military Frontier culminated in the sixteenth century. The Croatian *Sabor*, which was composed as an assembly of estates, was disturbed mainly by the free status of the peasants who lived in the Military Frontier. Ethnic and religious matters would only appear significant a few centuries later.

After liberation from the Turks in the 1690s, only a small part of Slavonia was returned to the *Ban's* jurisdiction, while the rest either became part of Hungary or was transformed into a Military Frontier. In that way, very little territory came within the domain of the agreed Croatian autonomy - the *Sabor* and its *ban*.

Throughout the following centuries, although with some interruptions, the Triune Kingdom succeeded in retaining some remnants of its independence: internal affairs and administration were mainly headed by the Croatian *Sabor* and by the *ban* of Croatia. The *Sabor* and *ban* were responsible for justice and education and the rest was under the direct rule of Hungary. The territorial position of the Triune Kingdom as part of the Habsburg Empire, surrounded by the great powers constantly in conflict - the Ottoman Empire to the East and the Republic of Venice to the South-West - shaped its political position.

With the attempts of Maria Theresa and Joseph II to centralize the Empire with the establishment of the Council of the Kingdom for Croatia in 1767, the Croatian *Sabor* and the *ban* became even more limited in their sphere of jurisdiction. The main purpose of this Council was to strengthen the personal union between the ruler and the Kingdom. When the Council was abolished in 1779, the jurisdictions of the Council were not transferred back to the Croatian *Sabor* and *ban*, but directly to the Hungarian Court Chancellery. Hence, Croatia was simultaneously governed by Vienna and Budapest, and few political,

economic and social matters remained in the hands of the Croats themselves and were defined by the so-called Municipal Rights of Croatia which had existed for centuries and defined the Croatian position within Hungarian Kingdom. The most important rights were jurisdiction in internal affairs, reduced taxes, special representation at the meetings of the Hungarian Parliament, the maintenance of an independent military force, and independence from Hungary in decisions concerning religion and language (Despalatović, 1975: 12). The struggle for the defense of these Municipal Rights was the key element which marked political events in Croatia after the end of the eighteenth century.

Nevertheless, it could be said that the actions of the Croatian *Sabor* from the end of the eighteenth century onwards were more directed towards the preservation of the rights of the Croatian nobility than the Municipal Rights. The attempts of Joseph II to make his Empire a centralized egalitarian state provoked reaction throughout the Empire. Joseph II considered his state to be a German state and ruled it accordingly. Even Hungary was brought under the direct rule of German bureaucrats (Taylor, 1990: 20). The privileges to which Hungary was entitled were not recognized by the Emperor, moreover he refused to be crowned as the King of Hungary. At the same time, the Roman Church lost its privileged position and found itself under direct state control. The agrarian reforms introduced were another, perhaps more painful, blow for the nobility. Moreover, the abolition of serfdom, the reformation of taxation, the centralization of the administration, and educational reforms 'struck at the very roots of Croatian autonomy' (Despalatović, 1975: 13). In an attempt to preserve itself from any further undermining of its position, the Croatian nobility found an ally in its Hungarian counterpart. As a result, in 1790 and 1791 the Croatian *Sabor* surrendered a good part of its traditional autonomy to Hungary, placing it under the direct control of the Regent's Council in Budapest. Thereafter, the status of the *ban* and *Sabor* became increasingly symbolic. Only strictly internal affairs such as education and justice remained in their hands. 'The power of the Ban was radically curtailed, and Croatia-Slavonia came to be regarded no longer as *regna socia*, but merely as *partes adnexae* of the Crown of St. Stephan' (Seton-Watson, 1969: 24).

The Croatian nobility found itself under the great pressure of a rising Magyar nationalism. The linguistic question became the major point of conflict. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Magyars attempted to introduce Magyar as the official language of all administration and parliamentary discussions, while the Croats tried to preserve Latin. The hostile reaction to this push for Magyarisation could have been inspired by mere conservatism and the reluctance to learn a foreign language, but in 1805 Bishop Vrhovec of Zagreb 'openly urged the Croats to retaliate by introducing *lingua Illyrica* into the public life of the country' (Seton-Watson, 1969: 25), thus giving an ideological platform for the national awakeners. Still, in 1827 the *Sabor* passed a law by which Magyar was to be taught in Croat schools, and in 1830 introduced Magyar as obligatory for all officials. It could be said that 'Magyar nationalism pushed the Croat nobles into the arms of the Habsburgs' (Taylor, 1990: 31). Such was the situation in which the Illyrian movement under the leadership of Ljudevit Gaj began to arise.

However, to understand fully social and political life in Croatia preceding the emergence of the Illyrian Movement, it is necessary to consider the demographic structure of early nineteenth century Croatia.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the size of the Triune Kingdom (334.8 square miles) was smaller than that of the Military Frontier (373.7 square miles). However, the Triune Kingdom had a larger population: in 1785 it was estimated at 649,075 inhabitants, and 656,519 in 1805; the Croatian and Slavonian Military Frontier had 523,326 and 629,729 inhabitants respectively (Despalatović, 1975: 8).

In this period the vast majority of the population was peasants and the economy of the Triune Kingdom was almost entirely agrarian. The Church and nobility owned all the land which was worked by serfs. According to laws established in 1756 for Civil Slavonia and in 1789 for Civil Croatia by Maria Theresa and Joseph II, the serfs were personally free, but their obligations to landowners consisted of their labor, produce, and many payments. Additionally, the serfs had to pay a tithe to the Church (Despalatović, 1975: 9).

The nobility was divided according to their economic and political positions. The magnates owned large estates and, with the prelates, they participated directly in the meetings of the Croatian *Sabor*. The lesser nobility was indirectly represented in the *Sabor*. The magnates were of mixed ethnic origins: the majority were Hungarian and German, and a very small proportion were descendants of the old Croatian nobility.

The gentry was numerous and of different origins. It was composed of small landowners, those who owned only a title, and the peasant nobility which was granted this status mainly during the Turkish wars of the early fifteenth century. Despalatović states that in 1785 there were 8,946 male nobles in Civil Croatia and 314 in Civil Slavonia (1975:10). The industry of that time was small and undeveloped, based mainly on the processing of raw materials such as timber, foodstuffs, tobacco, and leather. There were some mines, shipyards and small ceramic and glass factories. Except in the manufacture of silk, the textile industry was poorly developed (Despalatović, 1975: 10).

Major towns in Croatia were growing along the main roads which connected the Hungarian lands and the coast. The small middle class was stationed in these towns which were administrative, military, religious, economic and cultural centres. In 1787 the biggest town was Varaždin, with 4,814 inhabitants. The populations of the towns grew rapidly, and in 1829 the largest town was Osijek with 9,242 inhabitants, most of whom were Hungarian. The second and third largest towns were Zagreb, with 8,175 inhabitants, and Varaždin with 7,787 inhabitants. Both these towns had large German populations. Karlovac, which had a population of about 4,000 at that time, was considered a 'Croatian town' (Despalatović, 1975: 11).

The educated population in the Triune Kingdom was small. According to Despalatović, in 1805 the Triune Kingdom had only 55 primary schools, and in 1825 six secondary schools, 'four theological seminaries and the two-year Zagreb Academy, a partial University which offered courses in law and philosophy' (1975: 19).

The late and slow development of the education system in the Triune Kingdom did not prevent the development of Croatian literacy and literature. The first inscriptions in the Glagolitic script and the Croatian language appeared in the late eleventh century. Though, as Goldstein (1999: 19) points out, Glagolitic was a 'formal script reserved chiefly for religious writing and unsuitable for widespread use, these monuments are nevertheless the beginning of vernacular literacy and literature among the Croats'. The twelfth and early thirteenth centuries witnessed the appearance of the first hagiographies and chronicles like the *Ljetopis popa Dukljanina* (Chronicles of the priest of Docleia) and the *Historia Salonitana* by Archdeacon Thomas of Split. The latter was the history of the town of Split, and according to Goldstein (1999: 25) was 'the best work of Croatian medieval historiography'.

In the fourteenth century the vernacular Glagolitic script spread northward and, hence, marked the beginning of cultural integration between Dalmatia and Croatia and Slavonia. Goldstein emphasizes that 'the first literature written in the pure vernacular speech dates from that time: prose describing the legend of St. Catherine and the *Životopisi svetih otaca* (Lives of the Holy Fathers) and recasting pseudo-historical Western '*gesta*' like *Priče o Troji* (The Tales of Troy) and *Aleksandar Makedonski* (Alexander of Macedon)' (1999: 27). A century later, in 1483, *Misal po zakonu rimskoga dvora* (Missal by the law of the Roman court) was printed and constituted the first book in the Croatian language and the Glagolitic script (Goldstein, 1999: 32).

In the sixteenth century some literary forms came to maturity, confirming that the literary language was completely developed. In the 1530s the first Croatian novel appeared, *Planine* (Mountains) by Petar Zoranić of Zadar. Renaissance literature was especially marked by the comedies of Marin Držić of Dubrovnik. At the end of the sixteenth century in Venice, Faust Vrančić of Šibenik printed his *Rječnik pet najuglednijih evropskih jezika* (Dictionary of the five most prominent European languages). It was a dictionary of Latin, Italian, German, Hungarian and 'Dalmatian' languages. Even though Goldstein (1999: 38) points out that by 'Dalmatian' Vrančić actually meant Croatian, it could be said that the concept of a 'Croatian' language, let alone 'nation', was still not developed. A year later the

Jesuit Bartol Kašić published the first grammar of the Croatian language in Rome. The first integral histories of the Croats were published a century later by Juraj Rattkay in Vienna, and in 1667 by Ivan Lučić (Lucius) in Amsterdam (Goldstein, 1999: 43).

Hence, it can be seen that the Croatian society followed the major cultural trends of Western European societies. Croatian literary traditions (as well as architecture, painting and science) firstly developed in the cities of Dalmatia as a result of their connections with the major European economic and cultural centres. With the decline of Venice, the importance of the Adriatic Sea as a trade route started to decline for the Dalmatian cities, except Dubrovnik (Republic of Ragusa). The cultural centre of Croatia shifted northwards. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it was Zagreb that established itself as the political and cultural centre of the Triune Kingdom. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Croatian society had developed literary and cultural traditions. However, even though these traditions today are subsumed under a single name - Croatian culture - they varied significantly from one region to another. Dalmatia, Slavonia, Croatia (in the narrow sense) and Military Krajina developed specific customs, myths, symbols, folk songs and dances, and promoted particular dialects.

From this brief historical account several conclusions could be drawn:

- Since the twelfth century, despite the constant loss of territory and jurisdiction, the Triune Kingdom preserved some form of political autonomy and some symbols of statehood like the *Sabor* and the position of the *ban*. Regardless of the fact that both institutions lacked real power to rule the Kingdom independently, they would remain a powerful symbol of the idea of continuity of Croatian statehood for the future generations.
- For about 700 years, from the beginning of the twelfth until the end of the eighteenth century, the structure of Croatian society changed little. Even with the abolition of serfdom the population remained strictly divided between the small group of corporate agents, consisting of local nobility and priesthood, and a large mass of predominantly peasant population.
- For the same period of time the only challenge to the Croatian corporate agency came from external factors like the Habsburg and Hungarian nobility.

Internally, the corporate agents faced, on a few occasions, peasant revolts[19] which, poorly organised and coordinated, were easily crushed and the participants severely punished. Primary agents at that time were not perceived by the Croatian nobility as significant political factors. Throughout this period the Croatian corporate agents did not appeal to the primary agents for support in their competition with the Hungarian and Habsburg nobility. Rather, the main tactic employed was the formation of an alliance with one corporate agency against the other.

- Continuous use of Glagolitic script and vernacular language in religious liturgies and scripts and secular writings since the eleventh century should not be misunderstood as proof of the existence of a kind of Croatian 'national'ᵢ consciousness. The uncertainty of the name of the language (Croatian or Dalmatian) and the predominance of Latin indicate that even though the vernacular was fully developed into a literary language, until the beginning of the nineteenth century it was still not considered as 'national'.

4.3. National Ideology of the Illyrian Movement

A nationality without nationalism is
like a body without bones.
(*Danica*, the journal of the Illyrian Movement)

The Illyrian movement represents the beginning of the Croatian national awakening. The movement reached its peak in the 1830s and 40s, when it was led by Ljudevit Gaj (1809-72). Three major features characterized the movement: 'it was a cultural renaissance in which the Croatian vernacular was made into a modern literary language. It was a political movement which strove to uphold the traditional privileges of Croatia within the Hungarian Kingdom, and it was an attempt to establish cultural unity among all South Slavs' (Despalatović, 1975: 2). The Illyrian movement grew in an atmosphere of national awakening in other nations within the Habsburg Empire, and to a great extent was shaped by contacts

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[19] The most famous serfs' revolt occurred in 1573 under the leadership of Matija Gubec who was subsequently arrested and crowned with molten iron on the main square in Zagreb. Matija Gubec

with them. The idea of Pan-Slavism, the Romantic idea of the nation based on national culture and liberal ideas of the freedom of nations, were reflected in the Illyrian national ideology. It can therefore be seen that the Illyrian movement was a 'natural' product of its political and social environment.

4.3.1. The Name: Illyrian, Croatian and South-Slav Nations

The nature of Illyrian national ideology is best expressed in the actual name, 'Illyrian'. The ambiguity of this term would give a special character to national movements in the future. In the Croatian history of national ideologies this term was not used for the first time in the nineteenth century. The earlier 'national awakeners' such as Juraj Križanić (1617-1683) and Pavao Ritter Vitezović (1652-1713) directly introduced the term 'Illyrian' into the language of later national ideologies. In their writings it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the precise meaning of the term. Križanić used the term Illyrians as a synonym for Slavs (Golub, 1986: 458), while sometimes the 'Illyrian nation' had the same meaning as the 'Croatian nation' (*ibid.* 466). Pavao Ritter Vitezović spoke about 'Illyrian or Slavic nationhood' and the 'Illyrian or Slavic tongue' (Banac, 1986: 495), but at the same time Vitezović considered that 'Slav' and 'Croat' were also synonyms (*ibid.*: 502). The terms 'Slav', 'Croat' and 'Illyrian' began to be used interchangeably (Despalatović, 1975: 3). 'Illyrian' was not only used in ideologies, but, especially after Napoleon's occupation and creation of the Illyrian province, it became a term which symbolized a specific territory as well. By 1825, 'Illyria' had been the name for many political and administrative entities: it was used in ancient times, in Roman-Byzantine periods, during the Napoleonic occupation and by the Habsburgs (Despalatović, 1975: 4).

In the same way, the leaders of the movement, and especially Ljudevit Gaj, considered 'Illyrianism' as a type of cultural and linguistic identification (Despalatović, 1975: 142). However, it is necessary to explain more precisely the

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became a powerful symbol of peasant resistance to serfdom especially during the Communist regime.

interplay between terms such as 'Illyrian', 'South-Slav' and 'Croatian' nation (*narod*) in the Illyrian national ideology.

In the writings of some historians from the period of socialist Yugoslavia it was common to explain the Illyrian movement as a 'proto-Yugoslavian' movement, i.e. as a movement which propagated the idea of unique national consciousness for all South Slavs.[20] Such an interpretation is, to a large extent, misleading. It could be said that Ljudevit Gaj and his followers developed a hierarchy of national/ethnic communities, a genealogical tree of nations and ethnic groups. First of all, it is important to emphasize the multiple meanings of the term *narod*. The leaders of the Illyrian Movement have used this term: 1) *narod* as citizens, 2) *narod* as plebes or commoners, 3) *narod* as an ethnic group, and 4) *narod* as a nation. Moreover, the term *narod* in the Illyrian nationalist ideology could have three levels of generality depending on its function and political meaning: 1) as Slav nation/*narod*, 2) as Illyrian-South-Slav nation/*narod* (later as Yugoslavian nation), and 3) as Croatian nation/*narod* (Korunić, 1989: 23-24). Hence, Gaj wrote: 'The broadest sense of the term *narod* includes us (Croats as Slavs) on one level together with all Indo-European nations, like Hellenic, Romanic and Germanic nations. The broad sense of the term *narod* includes us (Croats as Illyrians) on the same level with all Slavs - with Russians, Poles, Czechs. The narrower sense of the term *narod* includes us (Croats as Croatian *narod*) at the same level with our Illyro-Slav brothers - with Serbs, Slovenes and Bulgarians. The narrowest sense of the term *narod* includes us ourselves - the Croats, just as all of our brothers stand for themselves: Serbs, Slovenes or Bulgarians' (in Korunić, 1989: 24).

'Pan-Slavism' was present in Croatian national ideologies from the beginning. This idea had its basis in the myth of origin of the Slavs. Križanić was convinced that the only autochthonous Slavs were Russians and that all other Slavs originated from them (Golub, 1986: 479). Vitezović, on the other hand, took over the idea of Vinko Pribojević (fifteenth-sixteenth century) claiming that all the Slavs were actually Illyrians, i.e. Croats. This was based on the legend of three

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[20] See J. Šidak (1973, 113-124).

brothers - Czech, Lech, and Rus - expelled from Illyria during a period of civil strife, and who later on established new Slav tribes (Banac, 1986: 499). It was believed that these three brothers, the founders of three Slavic nations - the Czechs, Poles and Russians - originated from Gaj's native town Krapina. Therefore, Krapina, according to this legend, was the legendary home of all Slavs (Despalatović, 1975: 28). In his youth, Ljudevit Gaj himself was strongly influenced by this legend. His research among the people of Krapina and its archives was embodied in his *Die Schlosser bei Krapina* published in 1826. It could be said that his later Pan-Slavism was formulated through this legend as well.

Yet, the Illyrian ideologists clearly rejected the idea of creation of the unique 'Slav-nation'. Pan-Slavism in the Illyrian nationalist ideology was, above all, an expression of cultural unity. Illyrians, with the aim of preserving and reviving the Croatian culture and national consciousness, relied on Pan-Slavic unity as a support against aggressive attempts of Germanisation and Magyarisation of the Croat population.

On the other hand, the national ideology of the Illyrian Movement and their term 'Illyrian nation' wanted to signify and underline the importance of the creation of the *new* common Illyrian-South-Slav *culture*. In the beginning, the term 'Illyrian' did not have any political meaning. It was not an attempt to create political unity among the South-Slavs. Moreover, the Illyrian ideologists rejected any idea of ethnic unity of the South-Slavs. They clearly underlined different national identities, different histories, myths, symbols and values of the Croatian, Serb or Slovenian nations.

4.3.2. The Concept of the Croatian Nation

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, in the territories of the Habsburg monarchy, Herderian Romanticism found fruitful ground. Under this influence Ljudevit Gaj formulated his concept of the nation. Gaj considered the nation as a living being, 'a natural unit with its own personality. Humanity was divided into

nations, and it was the duty of each nation to develop to its full potential' (in Despalatović, 1975: 85). The nation in his writings was understood as a community which bases its identity on history. The nation occupies its specific territory - a homeland - and its population is bound by the same language, customs and history (Korunić, 1989: 31). However, the only way for a nation to preserve itself was through the development and nurturing of its national culture. Thus, Gaj believed that the cultivation of the mother tongue was essential for the survival of a nation: 'It is in language, above all things, that the life of the nation is reflected. Spirit and language are organically and inseparably united. Language is actually spirit making itself evident' (Despalatović, 1975: 85).

The standardization and modernization of the Croatian language and its orthography which Gaj initiated in 1829, and which was adopted by the writers of the Illyrian Movement by 1835, was influenced by the Pan-Slavic idea and the political position of the Croats within the Habsburg monarchy at that time. The reformation of the orthography was supposed, on the one hand, to encompass the differences in the Croatian language used in the territory of the Triune Kingdom, and, on the other, to encompass the languages of all South Slavs. The choice of the *štokavian* dialect as the literate variant of the Croatian language was influenced by the introduction of the same variant into the Serbian language conducted by Vuk Stefanović Karadžić some years earlier. The new Croatian orthography was a conglomerate of the orthography used in the Czech and Polish languages.

Map 4. Croatian and Serbian Dialects (Banac, 1984: 48)

Therefore, the new literary language, based on a new orthography and the *štokavian* dialect, was to establish a common literary tradition and, through this, a national identity for all of the people of Civil Croatia and Civil Slavonia, and by 'drawing them together enable them to withstand the pressures of Magyarisation' (*ibid.*: 65).

4.3.3 The Others

Therefore, the only effective weapon against growing Magyar nationalism, was seen to be heightened Croat/Illyrian nationalism. The motto of the Illyrian Movement, which was published in each issue of *Danica*[21] stated: 'A nationality without nationalism is like a body without bones' (Despalatović, 1975: 81). This nationalism was directed mainly against the Hungarians. Gaj described them as

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[21] The journal of the Illyrian Movement, firstly published in January 1835.

the 'enemies of all goodness, mercy, and virtue, enemies of our blood, enemy of our benevolent King and Emperor...' (*ibid.*: 101). With such a clearly identified enemy, the political goals of the Illyrian national movement became clear as well. The nation understood in the way Gaj formulated it was an ethnic nation, composed of all classes. However, the Illyrian Movement did not pay particular attention to the lowest class - the peasantry. It was a concept of the nation oriented to the specific, conservative interests of the Croatian nobles. In 1841, Ljudevit Gaj defined the political framework of the Illyrian movement: 'May God preserve the Hungarian Constitution, the Croatian Kingdom, and the Illyrian Nationality' (Despalatović, 1975: 137).

In the same year the Illyrian Movement, previously characterized only as a national cultural movement, formed a political party, later known as the National Party. In 1841 the pro-Hungarian nobles founded their own party with the aim of establishing closer ties with Hungary. In the beginning they were known as the Magyarones, and later they adopted the name of Unionists. It could be said that this party had been formed as a direct reaction to the Illyrian Movement and its anti-Hungarian policy. Soon after, in 1842, after the name of Illyria was banned, the Movement changed its name to the National Party *(Narodna stranka)*. The purpose of this party was to oppose the influence of the so-called 'Magyarons' and in that way ensure the survival of the Movement.

The political aims of the Illyrian Movement could not be formulated on the basis of Illyrianism alone, since it presented just a linguistic and cultural identification. On the other hand, Croatism did not belong in cultural life because at that time it meant support of the local *kajkavian* dialect.[22] Therefore, the Movement combined the traditional Croatian political goals of defending Municipal Rights with a linguistic nationalism. Cultural Illyrianism and political Croatism were the main features of the National Party *(ibid.*: 142).

This linguistic nationalism could not strive for an independent national state. Well aware of its position, the Illyrian Movement on many occasions expressed

its loyalty to the Habsburg monarchy and 'personal union' under the Hungarian crown, but with a redefined political position for Croatia. Nevertheless, Ljudevit Gaj in his later writings considered the idea of a sovereign Illyria as one possible future solution for the Croats. In 1842 he wrote: 'I knew that sooner or later harmony would be achieved, so that a united homeland and sovereign Illyria would come to life' (Despalatović, 1975: 149). At that time, however, both the Movement and Croatia lacked real political and economic strength for serving as the nucleus for a South Slav independent state.

The Illyrian Movement succeeded to a great degree in achieving its cultural goals, that is the standardization and modernization of the national language. It published several newspapers and journals, the reconstructed language was accepted by the majority of writers, they organized Reading Clubs, which would later come to form an independent organization known as *Matica Ilirska*, and, as its major victory, on 23 October 1847 the *Sabor* voted to make the national language the official language of the Triune Kingdom. On the other hand, its political aims remained just an aspiration. The revolutionary events of 1848 proved to the Illyrians that they were used just for settling relations between the Habsburg dynasty and the rising Magyar nationalism. According to Despalatović(1975: 183), 1847 represents the actual end of the Illyrian Movement, 'for in the next year with the coming of revolution, the Croats would be swept into a new phase of their national history'.

4.3.4. Conclusion

The Illyrian national movement was largely shaped by the political position and social composition of the Triune Kingdom: illiteracy, low living standards, the dominant peasant economy, growing Hungarian nationalism, and the conflict between Hungarian aspirations and official Habsburg policies limited activities of the Movement. The social structure and culture of Croatian society, and its position within the Habsburg Empire in the first half of the nineteenth century,

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[22] At that time the term 'Croatia' was used to refer only to 'Civil Croatia', a part of the Triune

conditioned the development of the Movement's political programme, the characteristics of the promoted 'national culture', and the formation of a specific concept of the nation.

For the first time Croatia witnessed a rising of a new *internal* corporate agency, organised around the Illyrian Movement and politically institutionalised through a political party, that contested the dominance of 'old' ruling corporate agents. The first task of this new 'nationalistic' agency was formation of a 'national culture'. As can be seen from the analysis of Gaj's writings, the formation of the 'national culture' was limited in scope and directed by a specific understanding of the concept of the nation and political goals. The 'newly' developed 'national culture' was formed *in opposition* to the local traditions. The introduction of the *štokavian* dialect as the 'national language', a newly developed script, the Illyrian name and a specific myth of origin formed a 'national culture' distinct from the local cultures of the Croatian peasantry. The broader peasant population did not play any part in the cultural and political life of the Triune Kingdom. The first phase of the national awakening of Croats was oriented mainly towards cultural issues, and, therefore, towards the Croatian nobility and small middle class, who were the only actors in cultural and political life.

Balancing between a strong Magyar nationalism, which directly endangered the position of these actors, and the centralized Habsburg administration was the main characteristic of the Illyrian political programme. Convinced of Habsburg support against the Magyars, the movement easily and openly chose its allies and enemies. The national ideology based on the idea of Pan-Slavism had the aim of unifying all divided Croats, as well as the South Slavs, against 'the worst enemy' - the Magyars. The 'nation-in-process' which was for centuries divided politically and culturally by the domination of different powers needed an element of integration, and the Movement served this end. On the other hand, the national composition of the Triune Kingdom, with its considerable Serb, Italian, German and Magyar population, could not be attracted by pure ethnic nationalism. The Illyrian ideology was supposed to be an overarching idea which

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Kingdom, in which the *kajkavian* dialect was spoken.

could unite all nationalities with the common aim of gaining political independence within the Habsburg monarchy. The chosen name of this cultural movement was also a clear political statement.

The Illyrian Movement influenced the shape of future national movements of the Croats. The romantic idea of a cultural nation, grounded in historicism, identified with the dominant national leader, uncertain in its strength for achieving an independent national state, were the main characteristics of the Illyrian national ideology, and would form the basis of future national ideologies. However, as Tanner (1997: 81) writes: 'The average Croat or Serb peasant certainly never came to think of himself as Illyrian, and Illyrianism faded in the era of mass politics, when the peasants got their vote'.

Even though at this point the Movement did not attempt to mobilise the broader population around its programme, it marked the beginning of the process of the formation of the Croatian nation by:

- institutionalising nationalistic politics through the formation of its political party and cultural institutions;
- nationalising culture mainly through the formation of a 'national language';
- developing the first nationalist ideology through the formation of a specific concept of the nation in general and of the Croatian nation in particular.

These achievements mark the end of the first morphogenetic cycle of the formation of the Croatian nation.

4.4. Historical Background II (1840-1900)

Political life in the 1840s in Croatia was characterized mainly by a latent conflict between Croats and Magyars, which just a few years later culminated in war. The conflict arose with the formation of Croatian national ideologies and the awakening of a Croatian national consciousness among the corporate agents, and it was clearly manifested in the issue of language.

Within the growing Magyar nationalist ideology, the necessity for the creation of a homogenous and unitary Hungarian state was repeatedly underlined. These attempts became more emphasized by the intolerant nationalistic movement under the leadership of Lajos Kossuth (1802-94). His program strove for the establishment of a single centralized Kingdom of Hungary and a single Magyar nation 'stretching from the Karpathian Mountains to the Adriatic Sea' (Gaži, 1973:144). Hence, Kossuth showed intolerance towards all other non-Magyar nationalities under Hungarian rule.

When the Hungarian authorities attempted to introduce the Magyar language as the official language in all lands under their rule, the *Sabor* resisted and in October 1847 proclaimed the Croatian language as official in return. Kossuth's reaction was to introduce a law aimed at the elimination of Croatian autonomy. The enforcement of this law was halted by the revolutionary events of 1848. Encouraged by these events, the Hungarian Diet requested the immediate formation of a Hungarian government independent from Vienna, the establishment of the exclusive Kingdom of Hungary and a united Magyar nation.

Croatian leaders reacted promptly and put forward Baron Josip Jelačić (1801-59), colonel of the Military Frontier, as a new *ban* of Croatia. Jelačić was a supporter of the Illyrian Movement and loyal to the dynasty at the same time. Soon after his election, the new *ban* ordered all authorities in Croatia not to act on any communication emanating from the Hungarian government and to act only on instructions issued from Zagreb (Gaži, 1973: 146). This act was later to be interpreted by Croatian historians as the end of all common affairs between the Hungarian and Croatian kingdoms. After unsuccessful meetings of the Hungarian and Croatian heads of government, Bathyany and Jelačić, the outbreak of armed conflict between the two countries was only a matter of time. In September 1848 Jelačić declared war 'on Ferdinand V, King of Hungary, in the name of Ferdinand V, King of Croatia' (*ibid.*: 148), and crossed the Drava River initiating the invasion of Hungary.

During the events of 1848,[23] the Croatian leadership took the side of the Empire and against Hungary. They did not react against the revolutionary demands which were in motion over almost the entire stretch of Europe, but rather against an increasingly intolerant Magyar nationalism. They were also counting on rewards for their loyalty to the dynasty, which actually never came.

Once Hungary was crushed the new Emperor Francis Joseph I (1848-1916) introduced a new centralized system which abolished all parliaments and local constitutions. The new so-called 'Bach-system' relied heavily on the police and the German-speaking bureaucrats. Tanner (1997: 91) writes: 'What Hungary received as a punishment, Croatia had received as a reward'.

During the 1850s the Croats enjoyed less control over their territories than ever. They lost their Diet, their ability to govern themselves, and very soon the German language was introduced as the official language for the administration and education system (Gaži, 1973: 152). Yet, the events of 1848 strongly determined future political life in Croatia.

Until then the National Party's main program followed the basic Illyrian ideas about the unity of the South Slavs. However, with Josip Juraj Strossmayer at its head, and in the changed political circumstances, the National Party reformulated its program as well as its terminology. Pan-Slavism was replaced by the new concept of Yugoslavism. Warned by the post-1848 events, the National Party adopted a policy of non-cooperation with Vienna.

At the same time a new ideology and a new party emerged: the Party of Right. This party had been formed and its program formulated mainly through the influential writings of Ante Starčević and Eugen Kvaternik. Unlike the National Party and Strossmayer, Starčević and Kvaternik developed an ideology of a 'pure' Croatian nation. Disappointed by the policy of Vienna towards Croatia, they developed a policy of non-cooperation towards both Vienna and Budapest.

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[23] For more about the 1848 events in the Habsburg Monarchy see Taylor (1990: 63-90) and

With the fall of Bach's absolutist system, the activities of these parties become more prevalent. The parliamentary life of the Empire was re-established, and a session of the *Sabor* was called in 1861. The elections for the *Sabor* were held on the basis of the electorate law of 1848, and the National Party won a majority of the seats. The first declaration of the *Sabor* was a demand for the unification of all Croatian lands, i.e. of re-uniting Dalmatia, Military Krajina and the city of Rijeka with the Triune Kingdom. Furthermore, the *Sabor* held that the events of 1848 had ended all ancient relations between the Hungarian and the Croatian Kingdoms, and hence, it demanded new negotiations which should determine their future relations. Finally, the *Sabor* refused to send a delegation to the new *Reichsrath*, declaring that Croatia had never had any common affairs with Austria. 'This decision brought about the dissolution of the Sabor' (Gaži, 1973: 157). In 1866, a delegation from the *Sabor* with Strossmayer at the head, tried and failed again to reach a compromise with Hungary. By the outbreak of the Austro-Prussian war, the talks had collapsed, and soon after Croats found that 'the Emperor and the Hungarians had already reached an agreement to split the empire between them' (Tanner, 1997: 98). With this agreement, Croatia was handed over to direct Hungarian control, and it was merely 'left to work out whatever form of autonomy was pleasing to Budapest' (*ibid.*).

The new political environment brought significant changes to Croatian political life. Baron Rauch, the leader of the Unionist Party had been appointed as a new *ban*. Soon after the electorate law was changed, favouring the nobility who were mainly supporters of the Unionist Party. At the 1867 election, 52 members of the Unionist Party were elected and the whole opposition consisted of only 14 representatives. As the majority in the *Sabor*, Unionists (Magyarons) formed a delegation for negotiating with the Hungarians. The result of these negotiations was the so-called *Nagodba* (Compromise), signed in January 1868. Hereafter it became the basic law for the Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia.

According to the *Nagodba*, Croatia was to retain a degree of autonomy in its internal administration, police, religion, judicial affairs and education. Croatian

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Goldstein (1999: 67-71).

was to remain as the official language for all public affairs in the territory of Croatia. Yet, even though Dalmatia had been recognized as a part of the Triune Kingdom, it remained under direct Austrian administration just like Military Krajina. Moreover, the city of Rijeka[24] was put under the direct administration of the Hungarian government. Hence, not only did the Triune Kingdom not achieve its ultimate goal of uniting the Croatian territories, but it additionally lost another part. Even though Croatia retained some form of autonomy, all crucial decisions about its future development were in the power of the Hungarian government. Moreover, according to the *Nagodba*, the *ban* was to be appointed by the King on the recommendation of the Hungarian Prime Minister.

Map 5. Austro-Hungarian Empire 1878-1918 (Goldstein, 1999: 91)

The leaders of the opposition, the National Party and the Party of Right, saw this agreement as treason against the Croatian nation. Both parties lacked any significant means for changing this situation. Activities of these parties were mainly focused on cultural domain. It is the period when Strossmayer and his

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[24] The port at the Adriatic Sea.

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colleagues succeeded in establishing several national institutions like the Yugoslav Academy of Art and Sciences (1866) and the University of Zagreb (1874). Yet, the more active cultural life was accompanied by constant defeats in the political arena. Hence, in 1873 Strossmayer withdrew from active politics entirely.

Changes in political activity were initiated by events within the Ottoman Empire. With the treaty of San Stefano in 1878 the Austro-Hungarian Empire occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina. This again brought into question the issue of the 'Croatian historical territories'. Starčević and his followers were demanding Bosnia and Herzegovina to be annexed to the Croatian Kingdom. They also demanded the abolition of Military Krajina, which now lost its purpose, and its reuniting with the Croatian lands. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the abolition of Military Krajina a few years later (1881) brought a new political group to the centre of Croatian political life - the Serbs.

After the incorporation of Military Krajina into Croatia, Serbs made up a quarter of the population (Taylor, 1990: 203). Moreover, Serbs from Krajina were, at that time, already fully nationally conscious. This consciousness had been 'preserved', and some would say 'constructed', through the institution of the Orthodox church, on the one hand, and with the establishment of an independent Serbian national state, on the other. Therefore, while Croat intelligentsia was supporting South Slav, and later the Yugoslav national ideas of Gaj and Strossmayer, Serbs expressed strong nationalist and expansionist ideas, and thus never really accepted Yugoslavism. By the 1840s, the Serbs had already formulated their political and cultural nationalist program. A political program was most clearly provided by the foreign minister of Serbia, Ilija Garašanin (1812-1874) in 1844 with the publication of the so-called *Načertanije* (Plan). In that plan, Garašanin saw the expansion and creation of a greater Serbia as the primary aim of Serbian foreign policy. These territories included Kosovo, which had been perceived as a cradle of the Serbian nation, and further south to Thessaloniki. Even the Slavs from the Habsburg Empire were to be included in greater Serbia. The justification of these plans was found in the cultural domain.

It was Vuk Stefanović Karadžić who introduced the criterion of language as a yardstick for nationality. According to him, most of the inhabitants who lived in Croatia, Dalmatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were Serbs. He wrote: 'those (Serbs) of the Roman Catholic Church find it difficult to call themselves Serbs but will probably get used to it little by little, for if they do not want to be Serbs they have no other choice' (in Tanner, 1997: 103). The second criterion, which in large part influenced the Serbs from Krajina, was religion. With the help of the local clergy the idea that 'to be Orthodox was to be Serb' had been propagated among the population. Hence, a clear distinction between the Orthodox Serbs and the Catholic Croats was formulated.

The political parties in Croatia reacted differently to these ideas. In the 1860s and 1870s, the National Party still held its position of Yugoslavism which aimed to create a new cultural and later political union among the South Slavs. On the other hand, the Party of Right reacted with equally nationalistic ideas. They adopted an ideology, according to which, the bare existence of Serb nationality was denied. The culmination of these ideas was Starčević's polemic '*Ime Srb*[25] (The Name Serb) published in 1868. In 1886 a disillusioned Franjo Rački wrote an article titled '*Zablude srpske politike*' (The Mistakes of Serbian Policy) in which even he, the most prominent advocate of Yugoslavism, concluded that in Serbdom, an overdeveloped national consciousness and national exclusionism had been established. As a sign of developed national consciousness, in 1881 the Serbs from Krajina established their own political party the Serb Independent Party (SSS, *Srpska samostalna stranka*) which, three years later, started to publish *Srbobran* (The Serb Defender) in Zagreb (Biondich, 2000: 14-16).

The reason for such a dramatic change even among the ideologues of Yugoslavism, was to be found in an open alliance and support for the Serbs, both in Serbia and in Krajina, by the Austro-Hungarian governments. As Taylor (1990: 203) describes: 'in that time the Magyar rulers of Croatia deliberately favoured its Serbs in order to spur on the Croats against them'. Those were the

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[25] See page 143.

years of the rule of *ban* Khuen-Hedervary. He was appointed as a *ban* in 1883 and he ruled Croatia for 20 years: also the years of the strongest Magyarization in Croatia. In 1888 the *ban* introduced new amendments on the 1881 electoral law. As Biondich (2000: 14) explains:

> The franchise was restricted to less then 2 per cent of the total population; in urban centres to men over twenty-four who paid 30 or more crowns in direct taxes, and in most rural areas to males who paid 100 crowns (...) Furthermore, all priests, retired army officers, members of the free professions, and government officials, including Magyar officials residing in Croatia-Slavonia, had the vote. By 1906 there were just over 45,000 voters in a total population of nearly 2,6 million.

All these events directly or indirectly shaped the two most dominant nationalist ideologies in the second part of the nineteenth century in Croatia: the Yugoslavism of the National Party, and the nationalist ideology of the Party of Right. For most of the time these mutually exclusive ideologies had been competing with each other.

For a better understanding of the situation in which the two dominant nationalist ideologies emerged, it is important to sketch the social structure of Croatian society.[26] In 1900, the Triune Kingdom had 2,400,766 inhabitants, i.e. 688,413 more than 20 years before. Of these, 1,482,353 were Croats and 607,381 Serbs. The biggest minorities were Magyars (90,180), and Germans (134,000). The religious composition of Croatia and Slavonia was 1,710,425 Roman Catholics, 612,604 Orthodox, 43,628 Protestant. In the same year the capital Zagreb had 61,002 inhabitants, and it was the centre of political and cultural life in Croatia. The biggest city in Slavonia was Osijek with a population of around 25,000. All other towns were much smaller. Zagreb was the seat of the Archbishop, and the other dioceses were Senj and Djakovo, under which the Bosnian archiepiscopal had been included until 1882. The small town of Karlovac was the seat of the Serb Orthodox Patriarch.

Around 82 per cent of the whole population was engaged in agricultural production, but the timber industry was growing. Factories were just a few and mainly with outdated technology. As Allcock (2000: 51) concludes the 'lack of

vigorous mercantile centres and the small numbers of the population facilitated reliance upon craft production'. Hence, even in 1910 68 per cent of firms in Croatia did not hire a single worker and another 30 per cent employed from one to five workers (Goldstein, 1999: 106). The railways were under direct Hungarian control, and they were constructed to meet Hungarian needs. Hence, the main railway connected Budapest and the port, Rijeka, via Zagreb, and there was no direct line from Zagreb to Vienna. Goldstein describes Croatian society at the end of the nineteenth century as 'peasant-middle-class society which retains some elements of traditional pre-capitalist forms of production and way of life' (1999: 106). In 1869 the Austro-Hungarian government established by law universal free elementary education.[27] In the same year 80.6 per cent of the population of Croatia-Slavonia was illiterate, and 20 years later, in 1890, 66.9 per cent (Biondich, 2000: 16).

At the end of the nineteenth century in Dalmatia 80 per cent of the population were Croats and 16 per cent Serb. Only 15,279 were Italians, and in spite of this, the Italians were controlling the Dalmatian *Sabor*. It was also a time when poverty forced tens of thousands to emigrate, mainly to America. The biggest cities in Dalmatia were Zadar with 16,000, Split with 24,000 and Dubrovnik with 10,000 inhabitants.

To summarise, Croatian society in the second half of the nineteenth century saw its first signs of industrialisation and modernisation. These processes were reflected at all levels of Croatian society:

- The formation of the first competing political parties in Croatia - National and Unionist parties - in the 1840s created institutionalised forms of political activities. It created a space for political competition between the dominant agencies: two 'external' - the central agency of the Empire in Vienna and the increasingly nationalistic Magyar leadership in Budapest - and two 'internal' agencies - leaders of the Unionists party that supported a strong connection between Croatia and Hungary, and the leaders of the National Party that demanded a broader autonomy for Croatia within the Empire.

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[26] All data is taken from Seton-Watson (1969: 3-6).

- The competition between the two 'external' corporate agencies resulted in a new structural arrangement for the Empire - the creation of the Dual Monarchy, which induced a new structural composition for Croatia.

- Redefinition of the position of Croatia within the Empire, and especially a new relationship between Croatia and Hungary, created a space for further differentiation of the 'internal' agencies, and, consequently, the creation of a new corporate agency around the Party of Right.

- Introduction of an absolutist system forced the 'internal' agencies to concentrate their activities at the level of culture. These activities resulted in the establishment of new cultural institutions - like the Yugoslav Academy of Art and Science and Zagreb University - and the proliferation of schools and art institutions.

- In addition, the redefined political and cultural structure of Croatian society conditioned the emergence of the two competing nationalist ideologies characterised by their specific concepts of the nation in general and the Croatian nation in particular.

In the next part of this chapter, the nationalist ideology of the National Party - so-called Yugoslavism - will be analyzed, followed by its direct political and ideological opponent - the nationalist ideology of the Party of Right.

4.5. Yugoslavism

> *This program is a program for the future*
> *(...) our nation is not ready for it yet*
> (Franjo Rački, 1870: 409)

A few decades after Croatian intellectuals introduced Illyrianism onto the political scene, a new term was invented - Yugoslavism. The difference was not only terminological. While Illyrianism had been presented as Pan-Slavism, Yugoslavism narrowed its scope. For now on, the Croatian intellectuals had as their aim the creation of a political and cultural union of certain South Slav

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[27] For more about the education system in Croatia in the nineteenth century, see Chapter Seven.

nations only. However, this desired union was not imagined as an amalgamation of nations. Yugoslavism, just like Illyrianism, created an interesting 'hierarchy' of ethnic/national identities for the South Slavs. The primary concern of this nationalist ideology was with the political and social position of the Croatian nation. Here, the Croatian nation was regarded as a Slav nation or, more precisely, as a South Slav nation in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and as a politically divided nation.

The aspiration for a more 'natural' environment in which all the Slav nations could live and prosper was the moving force of the Movement. The shameful current position of the once glorious Croatian nation was explained, and those responsible for it - the enemies of the South Slavs in general and the Croats in particular - were repeatedly condemned.

Yugoslavism was a product of the renewed National Party, created in 1861, and of its leaders Josip Juraj Strossmayer (1815-1905) and Franjo Rački (1828-1894). They became the charismatic leaders of the nation in both the political and cultural sphere. Josip Juraj Strossmayer was a bishop in Đakovo for more than fifty years, a leader of the National Party from 1861 to 1873, an active contributor to scholastic discussions, and, above all, a great donor and philanthropist, directly responsible for the establishment of the Yugoslav Academy of Art and Science and Zagreb University. Franjo Rački, for his part, was a prominent Croatian scholar: indeed he was the greatest Croatian historian of his time and the first President of the Yugoslav Academy of Art and Science. By means of an analysis of their original writings, I will seek to analyze the 'core doctrine' of Yugoslavism.

The first part of this discussion will deal with the way in which the Yugoslav national ideology defined the nation in general; the second part will focuse on the definitions and presentation of the Croatian nation; and the last section will look at the accounts of the 'enemies' of Croatia.

4.5.1. The Concept of the Nation

For the next hundred years after its emergence, the new phenomenon of Yugoslavism played an important role in the territories of the South Slavs. The interpretations of the term, however, varied throughout that time. In many twentieth century writings of social scientists, Yugoslavism was interpreted as an attempt to create a new Yugoslav nation, i.e. as an attempt to amalgamate the South Slav nations (see, for example, Schöpflin, 1993). But whatever the later interpretations of the term, its original meaning was quite different. In order to understand this original meaning, it is necessary first to analyse the concept of the nation introduced by the leaders of the Yugoslav Movement.

In their writings Rački and Strossmayer followed many of the ideas of the Illyrian Movement: for example, they defined the 'nation' in a similar fashion. Yet, as a consequence of the political circumstances of the second half of the nineteenth century in Europe, the emphasis shifted from cultural elements, such as language, to history. History, or a shared past, became a crucial condition for defining a group as a nation. Rački wrote: 'The real nation can be only that nation which has one history, either political or spiritual, which is tied by the common past, in which all individuals feel that they are of the same flesh and blood...' (Rački, 1860: 277). According to this definition history plays a crucial role at the level of the individual, by creating a sense of solidarity, and equally at the political level, as a source of 'national' and therefore 'natural' rights: 'a nation justifies and defends its longings by virtue of its natural rights and historical rights, (...) and the eternal laws which lie in the heart of every nation, and finally ancient documents' (Rački, 1861: 291). These eternal laws are derived from the belief that 'each nation is self-sufficient' (Strossmayer, 1886: 266). This self-sufficiency has been interpreted as the right of the nation to arrange its own political and cultural life. Hence, any interference from other nations in the political and cultural life of the nation is considered an attack on national rights.

It is clear that when Rački and Strossmayer defined their concept of the nation, the starting-point was their concern with the position of Croatia in the Austro-

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Hungarian Empire. The dominance of one nation over another was perceived as a mortal threat to the identity and spirit of the oppressed nation: 'it has always been, and it will always be, that when a weaker nation is in a relationship with a stronger nation, whatever precautions are taken the weaker nation will lose its self-consciousness and its rights, until the point when, as has happened to us, that consciousness becomes a shadow' (Strossmayer, 1861: 104). This is the reason why 'a nation cannot rule another nation on the basis of historical rights when the latter does not want to live in a community with the former' (Rački, 1870: 406).

Just a couple of years later, after the creation of the Dual Monarchy, the leaders of the Yugoslav Movement and the National Party changed their position. They realized that 'great changes in the life of the nation, which are happening these days in Europe, are not happening on the basis of the historical right, but rather in spite of written laws' (Rački, 1870: 422). They admitted that they had 'thought that a nation could be rescued and a people's essence developed without an independent homeland but (that was an) illusion' (*ibid*.: 405).

From now on, Rački and Strossmayer redefined the nation by putting greater emphasis on the 'spirit' of the nation and particularly on the need to develop a national consciousness among the Croats. It is also obvious that Rački and Strossmayer were concerned about the future of a Croatian nation. In that period the Croatian identity was under great threat of Magyarisation and Germanisation. They believed that a divided nation becomes an easy target for 'foreigners' (Rački, 1860: 281). The development of national consciousness offered the only solution. Hence, once again language and the spirit of the nation became crucial for national survival. Rački held that literature 'is a focal point around which nations have crystallized' (*ibid*.: 282). Language was also defined as a marker of nationality. Strossmayer wrote: 'I don't believe that our people would ever agree to let those who can speak only the Magyar language decide about matters of blood and sweat' (Strossmayer, 1861b: 125). In this way the notion of the blood connections that unite the members of the Croatian nation was introduced into the definition of the nation.

Rački and Strossmayer faced a difficult task in bringing the nation to self-consciousness. Hence they demanded loyalty to one's own nation and opposition to the rule of foreigner. National politics was also defined as that around which the whole nation must ultimately be united: 'He who betrays it is a traitor to the nation' (Rački, 1861b: 352). Strossmayer set another condition for the existence of the nation: 'Whether a nation can and should live will be judged in accordance with that nation's display of heart and energy in resisting infidel and unjust attacks on its holiest goods' (Strossmayer, 1866: 162). A few years later Strossmayer (1884: 240) was even more clear:

> A nation whose light leading to its Bethlehem has died out; a nation which is immersed in mud, so that it is not able to rise to the meaning that God intended for it; a nation which does not know how to fight for its ideals...; a nation which is always in fear and which always surrenders; a nation which thinks only about its weaknesses and its helplessness; a nation which holds that it can live only under foreign power, help and patronage: that kind of nation is rotten; it declines and collapses; that nation has no purpose in life, no future.

The message that Strossmayer and Rački wanted to send to the Croatian nation was clear. The major task of the nation was to liberate itself from foreign influences, and to create a national union of all its members and territories. For this purpose the nation had to be able to define its major opponents and allies.

This concept of the nation served as a basis for an explanation of Croatia's particular position in the Empire, and a formulation of the specific political program which was supposed to liberate the Croatian nation and hence to secure its prosperity. However, the position of the Croatian nation had to be understood in relation to its neighbouring nations; the issue of Yugoslavism and a clear definition of the enemy became crucial.

4.5.2. The Croatian Nation and Yugoslavism

As the follower and descendant of Illyrianism, Yugoslavism developed a peculiar concept of the nation. This concept was created with the aim of embracing South Slav nations and preserving the specificities of each of them. It could be said that the result of such an aspiration was the creation of a division between an ethnic

and national identity: *ethnically Croats were defined as Yugoslavs* - they had the same blood, myths of common ancestors, language and culture as other South Slavs, *but nationally they were Croats* - they had a different political history, state, laws etc. to other South Slavs.

In an article entitled *Jugoslavinstvo* (Yugoslavism), which was published in *Pozor* in 1860, Rački sought to explain the meaning of Yugoslavism. Throughout his article, Rački used term the 'Slav tribe' to emphasize the distinction from an another phenomenon - the nation. The Slav tribe was understood as a big family of Slav nations, and it belonged in the same category as the Roman and German tribes. He explained that 'Slavdom has never in history been one nation' (*ibid.*: 277). In the same manner Rački defined the 'Yugoslav tribe' (1870: 380). Originally this 'tribe' had comprised all South Slav nations, but gradually, it had narrowed. It was now supposed to embrace the Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian *nations.*

As has been already pointed out, the Yugoslavs were defined in ethnic terms. The most important constituent element was common language. Rački (1860: 278) wrote: 'We Yugoslavs are *divided by the same language*, by this real soul of the nation'. Therefore 'if Yugoslavism wants to become *one nation in a spiritual sense*, it should attempt *unity through literary language'* (*ibid.*:278). Once again, Rački emphasized 'the spiritual essence' of the Yugoslav nation. This nation should 'merge Croats and Serbs through language and books' (*ibid.*: 280) and 'both scripts (Latin and Cyrillic) are yours and mine' (*ibid.*: 281).[28] Hence, the Yugoslav Movement had as an aim the creation of a single cultural or, as Rački called it, 'spiritual' nation. Yet, he repeatedly emphasized that this 'spiritual nation' encompasses different 'historical nations': 'Croats and Serbs, one nation by blood and language, have established two different states; later on Bosnia joined them. Therefore we have different pasts, which should be sacred and preserved for all of us, and for the future we have a salutary ideology' (*ibid.*: 292). History, once again, became the crucial constituent element of the nation.

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[28] Rački was aware of the separate Slovenian language, but he held that 'Serbo-Croat is predestined to become the literal language ... the Slovenian dialect has to merge into it' (1860: 279).

Yugoslavism, according to the nationalist ideology of Strossmayer and Rački, was solely a political program. It was constructed purely from the Croatian standpoint and it was intended to serve Croatian interests in the first place. Strossmayer (1861b: 124) wrote: 'we are in the first instance Croats'. Rački (1870: 385) was even more clear: 'The Croatian nation needs an ally in order to achieve and secure freedom'. It is thus necessary to see how the Yugoslav nationalist ideology defined the Croatian nation: how it explained its political and social position and defined its future.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the issue of the unification of all Croats was still crucial for those who wished to 'awaken' the nation. The primary aim of the Yugoslav Movement was to unite all Croatian lands under the Croatian government. In 1861 Strossmayer (1861a: 131) was mourning the tragic destiny of Croatia: 'in the sixteenth century the sessions of the *Sabor* were opened with: *"Nos reliquaie Regnorum Dalmatiae, Croatiae et Slavoniae..."* (...) Today, I should open the session not only with that dismal *"Nos Reliquiae"* but, concerning our sufferings, I would say *"Nos rudera reliquiarum regnorum..."*: we the remnants of the old remnants of the Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia'. He proposed as the ultimate aim of the nation: 'The unity of our homeland!' (Strossmayer, 1866b: 131). Both leaders of the National Party were referring to the ancient historical rights according to which Slavonia, Dalmatia (including the Adriatic islands) and Serbian Vojvodina belonged to Croatia: 'We can show the whole of Europe that the Croatian nation has all possible rights to that territory: it has the historical right, the national right, the right based on ancient documents, and the right based on the blood of our brothers' (Rački, 1861b: 326).

Yet at this time the two leaders were not accusing foreign powers for the miserable position of Croatia. They were blaming the Croats themselves. In *Listovi jednoga antiunioniste* (The thoughts of one anti-unionist), published in 1870 Rački (1870: 377) wrote: 'All violations of the Croatian state right originated in either the *Sabor* or the Hungarian side...'. The election of the Hungarian king as king of Croatia he labeled 'the first major mistake of the

Croatian nation, the consequences of which we are suffering today' (*ibid.*: 371).
His intention was clear: by referring to the mistakes of 'our ancestors',
Strossmayer and Racki wanted to promote a national pride and aspirations for an
independent and sovereign government. They emphasized the necessity for a
change in attitudes among the Croats themselves, who should have had
confidence in their intrinsic values and courage.

However, this criticism was not aimed at the broad mass of the population.
Rather it was directed to the Croatian nobility. Having observed the role of the
nobility in the process of national awakening within other European nations,
Strossmayer and Racki were embittered by the behavior of the Croatian nobility:
'our nobility willingly follows the Hungarian nobility (...) the *Sabor* will gladly
recognize them as national leaders as soon as they express their love for the
homeland' (Racki, 1861b: 349). Even worse, 'they do not know even the
language which our Frankopans, Zrinskis[29] (...) spoke' (*ibid.*: 350). The Croatian
nobility was also accused of sabotaging the national awakening of the Croats: 'In
the Triune Kingdom thirty years ago, when the national spirit started to awake, it
found the greatest resistance among born Croats: descendants of the glorious
forefathers, but with hearts and minds tied to Pest' (*ibid.*). The leaders of the
National Party were convinced that the unity of the homeland could be achieved
through their own efforts, especially if national consciousness among the elite
was aroused, supported by other South Slav nations which were supposed to be
united around the concept of Yugoslavism.

It is interesting that Strossmayer and Racki perceived the Croatian nation as a
'good-hearted nation (which) happily forgets offences as well as suffering'
(Racki, 1870: 384). On several occasions Strossmayer (1884: 228) described
Croats as a 'loyal people' whose loyalty is 'proven by the rivers of spilled
blood'(Strossmayer, 1886: 257). What Strossmayer (1866b: 179) demanded from
his people was 'loyalty to their own nation'. These frequent references to loyalty
were intended to emphasize the sacrifice Croats had made for the entire Empire
and, at the same time, to highlight the lack of gratitude for these sacrifices that

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[29]The ancient Croatian noble families.

had by shown by the Empire. At the same time the great mission of the Croats was emphasized. It was the mission to protect the Western world from invasions of Avars, Franks, Tatars and Turks: 'Europe was lucky that the Croatian nation settled on the place where the keys to Italy and the entire West lay. If these territories had remained in the hands of the Avars, the whole Christian civilization would have been in mortal danger' (Rački, 1861b: 327). With this picture of a brave and self-sacrificing nation, a new image was created:

> [W]e have never, not even for a moment, made an agreement with the eternal enemy of Christianity and the Christian civilization; for centuries we were fighting against the enemy so bravely that, while Vienna was shaking, while Pest was for 150 years under the Turks, this holy land was never disgraced by the foot of a single Turk. Under the leadership of Frankopans and Zrinovics we fought so bravely that from all Europe we deserved the title: *antemurale christianitatis.* (Strossmayer, 1866a: 182)

The title 'rampart of Christianity' connected the idea of the mission of the Croats with their glorious past. Such symbolism was supposed to arouse a sense of national pride and readiness for further sacrifice. It is not surprising that a Catholic bishop should merge religious symbolism with national identity in his nationalist ideology. And in any case, this symbolism had been imposed by the political environment. The presence of other nations and religions played a significant part in the definition of the Croatian nation.

4.5.3. The Others

Strossmayer and Rački observed the position of the Croatian nation in relation to the Habsburg Monarchy as a whole, as a part of the Hungarian Kingdom, and as one element of the 'Slav tribe'.

The particularity of a nationalist movement such as Yugoslavism necessarily lay in its peculiar interrelations between proclaimed national interests and political reality. Even though an independent and sovereign state had been proclaimed as an ultimate goal of the Movement, the Habsburg monarchy was not perceived as an obstacle, or at least as an enemy. Strossmayer frequently stressed that 'Austria

would have to be invented if it did not exist' (1886: 258). The Habsburg Empire was seen as a 'European necessity' (*ibid.*: 261), as a 'microcosm' and a 'world for itself' (*ibid.*: 263). What Strossmayer advocated was the rearrangement of the internal policy of the Empire, which would guarantee prosperity for each nation. Hence, the centralism and unitarism which had been imposed in the period of 1848 to 1861 was perceived as a direct threat to the survival of the constituent nations.

This policy changed with the establishment of the Dual Monarchy. From then on, the leaders of the National Party were advocates of the so-called Trialism. They demanded the same position for Croatia as was enjoyed by Hungary. Even then, whenever Croats felt betrayed, Strossmayer and Rački were both unwilling to blame the Empire, or still less, the Emperor. Hungary or, more precisely, the Magyars were labelled the main enemy of the Croatian nation.

Rački called himself anti-unionist - 'a patriot (...) who holds that the union (with Hungary) cannot be sustained because of the Magyar politics. (...) Recent events have convinced me that the Magyars are aggressive towards weaker and indulgent nations, as has been proved throughout history' (Rački, 1870: 368).

The events of 1848 introduced a new factor to the politics of the Empire: the nation. However, it could be said that by the middle of the century the Magyars comprised the only self-conscious nation of the Empire. It set a pattern for the others: the issues of culture and language became tightly interwoven with political ambitions to create a national state. Hungary, as a union of several nations and nations-to-be, changed its character. The Magyar nationalist parties had as their purpose the creation of a state for the Magyar nation only. As a consequence, the Croatian nationalists started to distinguish between two different political factors - Hungary and the Magyars. Rački (1861b: 332) drew a clear distinction and proclaimed his major enemy: 'we Yugoslavs in the Triune Kingdom are not opponents of Hungary, but we are eternal enemies of Magyar politics in Hungary. (...) Our fathers, in fighting for Hungarian politics, were not ashamed of the Hungarian name (...) but nobody can ask from our people to make sacrifices for the Magyar politics'.

For Strossmayer and Rački Hungary became a 'multinational' state within which the Magyar nation intended to dominate over the other nations. Hence it was appropriate to view the Croatian nation as a part of the Hungarian state, but certainly not as an element of the Magyar state. The ideologists of Yugoslavism, it appears, were aware of the distinction between civic and ethnic identity. They were prepared to agree on common citizenship, i.e. to be described as a Hungarian nation, but were strongly opposed to being regarded as Magyars.

Fearing the strong position which the Magyars held after the establishment of the Dual Monarchy, the leaders of the National Party again questioned the union with Hungary. This once more caused them to reinterpret Croatian history. The task of the leaders was to prove that Croatia had always had a state that was independent of Hungary, and that only a personal union undertaken by the King tied the two countries. It was important to show that the Croats had always suffered and made sacrifices for the common state, while the Magyars wanted only to dominate over other nations. The crucial moment, it seems, was the creation of the Dual Monarchy: 'In 1867 Magyars showed such a lack of gratitude to the Croatian nation that we should never forget it. (...) Hungary cannot perceive the Triune Kingdom as an equal but only as a subordinate (...) now, between our homeland and Hungary eternal friendship cannot exist, and therefore it would be better for both sides to separate peacefully and live as a good neighbours if they cannot live as equals' (*ibid.*: 369).

All the Croats had got for their sacrifices, the leaders explained, was offence and humiliation. 'The Croatian regiments were spilling their blood at the battles of Siget, Kaniza, Kiseg, Djer, Budim etc., for the freedom of Hungary' (Rački, 1870: 376) and in return 'gradually, Hungary crippled Croatia, and up to 1790 it almost completely destroyed it' (*ibid.*: 375). Rački explained how the Croatian state, in the union with Hungary, had disappeared and 'the Croatian people fell into a state of unconsciousness so deep that for half of this century we have been struggling to bring them back to consciousness' (*ibid.*: 402).

Thus the only solution for Croatia lay in the creation of an independent homeland - or at least one that was independent from Hungary - or more precisely the Magyars. To make their point clear, the National Party tried to mobilize supporters through the newly created myth of Ban Jelačić. In November 1866, with the most splendid display, the monument of the *ban* was erected in Zagreb's main square. Jelačić's drawn sword was pointing North - to Hungary.

Until the 1880s the leaders of the National Party relied on the help of their 'same-blood brothers' in their struggle against Magyar dominance. However, with the change in the royal dynasty, Serbia changed its policy as well. When Serbia attacked Bulgaria in 1885, Strossmayer and Rački were greatly disappointed. That was also the moment when the National Party altered its perception of the Serbian role in the creation of the South Slav union. In 1886 Rački published an article *Zablude srpske politike* (The mistakes of Serbian politics). Even at this moment Rački was emphasizing the brotherhood of the two nations: '[The Croats] are not inspired by any hatred, even less because if we take into account the similarity of Serbs and Croats, at least in language, each gain of Serbian territory would be to Croatian benefit' (1886: 470). Rački finally realized that with such a developed and self-aware national identity on the part of the Serbian nation, it would be very difficult to establish a South Slav state. One of the reasons for that difficulty was the role of religion in Serbian national consciousness:

> [The Serbs have an] overdeveloped national consciousness and national exclusiveness. (...) The Serbs are nourishing and expressing their national and tribal specificity, and they are not willing to sacrifice anything for the sake of the community. They are marking their tribal uniqueness with markers which have no meaning in international politics; furthermore we can say that they are not justified by science. That marker is religion. Every person of the Greeko-Eastern church, even if he is settled in Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, where the Croatian name is dominant, even if he speaks the same language, is Serb. (...) Now, because of that the Croatian name has begun to be used more often and the memories connected with that name are more vividly expressed. *(ibid.:* 476)

Rački felt greatly disappointed with regard to the Serbian policy which tied itself to Hungary and with the Italians in Dalmatia. As a consequence the Serbs from

Croatia opposed the demand for territorial unity of Dalmatia with the Triune Kingdom. Rački thought that the 'Serbs of the Croatian state, i.e. of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, are obliged, for their own sake, to support the idea of territorial integrity and state independence of their own homeland, and to support the Croatian national policy which is not and cannot be anti-Serbian' (*ibid.:* 483). Even though the Serbian nationalistic ideas had been present in the Serbian media for a long period, only now did Rački acknowledge the aggression of the Serbian policy and their hegemonistic aspirations. 'Yugoslavian Piedmont', he wrote, actually strives to rule others by 'nourishing conquering aspirations towards its brother' (*ibid.:* 477). For the first time Rački stressed that Serbian nationalism did not even recognize the Croats as a separate nation. He found a little satisfaction in pointing out that Serbia 'is betrayed, when it itself had wished to betray everybody' (*ibid.:* 475).

The clearest signs of disappointment and the change in policy of the National Party and its ideologists occurred in 1893 when Strossmayer met his greatest opponent and rival Ante Starčević, in order to establish a political reconciliation within the ideologically divided nation. Ante Starčević, the leader of the Party of Right, had built his ideology around love for his own nation and anti-Serbianism.

4.5.4. Conclusion

In many respects Yugoslavism is a continuation of the Illyrian Movement. However, under the influence of the political events of the second half of the nineteenth century, the ideologists of Yugoslavism had to redefine their 'core doctrine'. Their doctrine was shaped in accordance with the ultimate aim: the creation of a union of South Slav nations. Their nationalist ideology can be analyzed only by keeping this aim in mind.

The first specificity of Yugoslavism is their definition of the nation. The distinction between the 'spiritual Yugoslav nation' and 'historical Croatian nation' unintentionally (?) imposed a distinction between an (wider) ethnic and (narrower) civic nation (*sic!*). Surprisingly, the Yugoslav nation was described as

an ethnic nation, and the Croatian nation as a civic one. At the same time, other nationalist ideologies, Serbian and Croatian, were using the same categories of common origins, language, culture etc., in the creation of their own 'greater-nations'. Yugoslavism had not been created as an amalgamation of nations, neither did it have the purpose of creating a nation-for-itself. It had been created with the aim of preserving the specificities of all the South Slav nations. The preservation and prosperity of the Croatian nation was the ultimate aim of Yugoslavism.

However it appears that political events were narrowing the scope of Yugoslavism. At the end of the century the creators of the Yugoslav nationalist ideology realized that neither Serbs nor Slovenes accepted their ideas. Yugoslavism had started as a Croatian ideology and it ended as such. However, the idea of Yugoslavism was to be resurrected just a few decades later, and was to mark the history of the South Slav nations over the course of the twentieth century.

4.6. The Nationalist Ideology of the Party of Right

For us the nationality is sacred,
and we are afraid of those who
love it less than we do
(Starčević, 1860: 93)

While the Illyrian Movement presented the first attempt to 'awaken' national consciousness among Croats, the formation of the nationalist ideology of the Party of Right signified the creation of the first nationalist ideology of the Croatian nation. For the first time the Croatian nation was given a clear definition, programme and aim. The ideology had been formulated by Ante Starčević who has become known as the 'Father of the Nation'. Starčević's programme was based on the 'historical' and 'natural' right of the Croatian nation for an independent and sovereign state. The nation was defined around that time by the dominant ideas of Romanticism combined with the ideas of the French Revolution. For the first time, Croatian nationalist ideology denied any

significance to Pan-Slavic or South-Slavic ideas. From the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Croatian nation was clearly distanced from all other nations - the Serbs, Magyars and Germans.

Since the creation of a comprehensive nationalist ideology by Ante Starčević in the 1850s until the end of the so-called 'Starčević's Party of Right' in 1918, the Party went through many schisms forming many branches, which were frequently directly opposed to each other. Still the core doctrine of their ideologies changed only a little. 'The Father of the Nation' developed his 'core doctrine' during the period from the 1850s to 1889, which was mainly influenced by the political and social situation of that time, and particularly by the formation of the Dual Monarchy. As Gross (1973: 22) pointed out, the roots of the nationalist ideology of the Party of Right could be found to originate from three sources: first, from the tradition of the Croatian nobility; second, from the fact that the Croatian national awakening started under the Illyrian, and not the Croatian name; and third, from the underestimation of the Croatian nation by Pan-Slavic and Serbian nationalism.

In the next few pages I will present the core doctrine of Starčević's nationalist ideology. This analysis will be based on Starčević's writings published in the period from 1860 to 1892 and collected by Tomislav Ladan (1971). The first part will deal with Starčević's definition of the nation, the second part with his definition of the Croatian nation in particular, and the third part with the definition of both internal and external enemies.

4.6.1. Definition of the Nation

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the ideas of Romanticism and the French Revolution started to play an important role in political and academic life in Croatia. Hence, it could be assumed that Starčević's nationalist ideology was greatly influenced by both of them. These influences were particularly reflected in Starčević's definition of the nation.

Starčević put forward two necessary conditions for the existence of the nation: first, the nation had to be homogenous, and second, it had to possess its own state. The problem of the homogeneity of the nation for Starčević, originates from the so-called 'nature' of the nation. The nation in his concept was understood as a living being, as a personality. Every nation is specific and original, and every nation has its own biography and peculiar national spirit. The nation itself is the ultimate value, and 'the nation in its life has no other judge than God' (Starčević, 1881: 353). The spirit and genius of the nation are its most vital characteristics. Moreover, Starčević understands the nation as a community tied by the same national consciousness, and by a specific language and culture. As with Romantic thought, Starčević believed that language, history, mores, art and literature are the expressions of a national spirit. It is interesting that Starčević did not see blood ties as important for the creation of the nation. He wrote: 'Every Croat probably has some Roman, Greek or Barbarian blood in himself. There were no Croats in the seventh century who were of pure Croatian blood' (in Gross, 1971: 132). The spirit of the nation was perceived in Starčević's ideology as the expression of the mystical centre of all creativity (Gross, 1971: 10). The preservation and development of this spirit has to be secured if a nation wants to be a nation. The only guarantee for national survival, i.e. the preservation of the national spirit and genius, is the state. To be more precise, the national state. Starčević wrote: 'Truly, without independence and sovereignty a nation cannot be a nation but just a group of people' (Starčević, 1869a: 176); and further on: 'as long as a nation wants to be a nation, it will struggle for its independence and sovereignty. That is a condition for its survival' (Starčević, 1869a: 188). Starčević held that when a nation loses its sovereignty, that nation has nothing more to lose. The national state in Starčević's ideology is a natural entity, based on the historical rights of each nation. Hence, a multinational state is an unnatural creation:

> it is impossible, and it is against nature, to unify regions, laws, governments by force or by free will; to unify the nations which are so different by breed, by history, by nationality, level of enlightenment, geographical position, social relations, economic interests or by the religious laws. (Starčević, 1878: 311)

The right of creation of a sovereign and independent state is not an exclusive right of a few, but rather a universal right for all nations. In 1860 Starčević explained: 'For us, each nationality is sacred. With the term nationality we understand an unrestricted right to develop the spiritual and physical strength of the nation, and so without harming any other nation' (in Gross, 1971: 59). Yet, the question remains 'who is the nation?'. The criteria for being recognized as a nation Starčević found in history - the source of legitimization and justification: 'Only real historical names of the nations have any real strength' (Starčević, 1871b: 240). History also provides the basis for all national rights. Starčević called these rights 'primary rights': 'the primary right to property is eternal, and every nation whose rights have been violated can and has to retrieve these rights at any time and against anyone as long as that nation exists' (in Gross, 1971: 45).

This is the framework within which Starčević explained the origins, aims and future of the Croatian nation.

4.6.2. The Croatian Nation

When Starčević described the Croatian nation he had one goal - to accelerate the process of formation and integration of the Croatian nation. He systematically compared the shameful position of the Croatian nation of the time with the glorious past and possible free and happy future. His aim was to provoke a desire for change in the position of the Croatian nation among the Croatian intelligentsia (Gross, 1971: 9).

Awakening and expanding the national consciousness for Starčević meant strengthening national pride. Starčević described the Croatian nation as 'the most glorious nation among the Slavs', 'once a ruling nation', a 'chosen people', but also as 'those who did not pass the childhood of nationhood' (Starčević, 1860: 88). Therefore, Starčević's personal aim was to bring and guide the Croatian nation to its maturity, i.e. to awake national consciousness among the Croats and to explain to them their national mission.

The first step in the realization of his aim was to explain who the Croats were. According to his concept of the nation, he held that a Croat is any person who, though not necessarily a descendent of the ancient Croats, was pervaded by the spirit of the Croatian nation. Hence, he labeled as an 'unclean breed' all of those who were Croats by origin, but 'foreigners' by spirit (Gross, 1971: 205). Therefore, Starčević did not deny the Slav origins of the Croats. However, he also refers to Croats as 'we Austrian Croats' (Starčević, 1860: 102), or 'we people from the East' (Starčević, 1869a: 182). The mission of the Croats, Starčević held, was to save Christian Europe from 'infidels'. He was convinced that Europe sees the Croats as a Rampart of Christianity - *Antemurale Christianitatis*. He also held that the territorial position of the Croatian Kingdom has been the source of all good and evil for his nation.

Starčević described the Croats as lazy and insentient, but 'Europe (...) knows that every people is like that if it suffers under despotic rule, and therefore cannot enjoy the fruits of its own labor, and especially if it is forced by its government to live a life of an animal' (Starčević, 1861a: 123). Yet, it was not always like that, 'Croatian people used to be strong, wealthy, sophisticated, and only because they used to be free' (Starčević, 1860: 97). In spite of all of this Starčević continues, 'we Croats have to say, without pretension, that we have four times more brains than any other nation' (Starčević, 1879: 336). From these quotations it is obvious that Starčević wanted to offer his compatriots a bleak picture of their position: the homeland was exploited, the Croatian people oppressed and ruined, the Croatian historic rights were violated, and national pride was dishonored. Therefore, Starčević felt he had to awaken their wish to change the position of the Croatian nation.

Besides the oppression and injustice, Starčević had to deal with the problem of a divided homeland. Hence, in his writings and speeches he paid particular attention to the so-called 'historic Croatian territory'. He described Croatia as a 'land blessed by God, gained by the blood of our fathers, defended from all our enemies' attacks' (Starčević, 1860: 81). It is exactly this blood, spilled sometime

in history which, according to Starčević, marks the 'historic Croatian lands'.[30] He was the advocate of a Greater Croatia. Not only did he consider Dalmatia as the 'historical limb of our nation' (Starčević, 1860: 95), and Slavonia, Istria and Bosnia as historic Croatian lands, but he also added the 'Croatian regions Styria, Carniola, Carinthia' (Starčević, 1878: 302). Once again, history for Starčević justifies the territorial rights of the nation.

In order to offer real justification, history has to be rewritten. Starčević, just as other Croatian national awakeners, paid particular attention to rewriting Croatian history so that it could fit his ideology. Here, few examples will be given.

To justify the claim of the 'historic Croatian territories', Starčević went far back in history. Hence, according to him, 'in the ninth century the Kingdom of Croatia (...) was divided into ten states...' (Starčević, 1860: 89), and therefore the territories of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia etc. historically belong to Croatia. According to Starčević's interpretations, the territories of the Croatian Kingdom are even bigger: 'when this part of Croatia (which kept the title of Kingdom of Croatia) chose the king of Hungary for its own constitutional king, then Croatia, which preserved its independence and sovereignty, in some way gained, or better, conquered Hungary' (Starčević, 1860: 92).

Starčević paid special attention to the events of 1102 and 1527, when the Croats were electing their kings. He tried to prove that the Croats had never declined their national rights, but rather that these rights had been violated. He repeatedly underlined that according to both treaties, Croats elected the kings, and hence, created only a personal union between the kingdoms. It follows that

> the Croatian Kingdom has never been and is not a hereditary kingdom (...) Just as the Croatian nation cannot inherit a ruler - a ruler cannot inherit the Croatian throne. Therefore, both sides continued to respect the contract, they inherited mutual rights and duties, and if these rights and

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[30] It is interesting that Starčević was using the term 'Croatian Kingdom' where, for example Strossmayer was using the 'Triune Kingdom' or 'Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia'. It could be said that even in terminology Starčević wanted to underline the unity of the historic Croatian lands.

duties were not respected, then the agreement between the two parties ceases to exist. (Starčević, 1878: 307)

This interpretation is the basis of Starčević's claim for the independent and sovereign national state. Since the rulers of Croatia repeatedly violated the historical rights of the Croats, the personal union ceased to exist.

Starčević was a product of Romanticism, but he was definitely not a naive person. He was fully aware that merely to refer to historic or natural rights would not be enough to overrule the Austrian and Hungarian yoke and establish an independent state. Starčević himself was not an advocate of violent means either.[31] He wrote: 'from one hundred rebellions maybe only one turns out to benefit the people, therefore I would say that rebellions are more deadly for the people than for the throne' (Starčević, 1861b: 137). Therefore, the only effective means, according to Starčević was to educate the people. He wrote: 'the worst misfortune for a nation is when a foreigner is raising its children. And if you allow your children to be raised abroad, you should be aware that from your children, you are creating your enemies. A child raised abroad is detached from its homeland, from its nation, from its parents' (Starčević, 1871b: 227).[32] Hence, the national education, according to Starčević, had to start from childhood. Furthermore Starčević stated that 'when raising your children, it is important to enlighten their hearts with love towards their nation, their homeland' (Starčević, 1871b: 232).

Besides education, Starčević advocated a policy of non-cooperation with the Austro-Hungarian Empire, because 'if we cannot work for ourselves (Croats) let us not work for foreigners (our enemies) either' (Starčević, 1869b: 223). He asks: 'Why, who, and how would anybody respect our rights when we ourselves don't care for them?'

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[31] In 1871 Eugen Kvaternik, an associate and ideologue of the Party of Right attempted to stir a rebellion in Military Krajina against the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Gross (1971: 167-193) argues that Starčević was not involved in the preparations for this rebellion and that he learned about it when it was already too late. In this rebellion Kvaternik lost his life.

[32] It is interesting that Starčević directed this advice towards Serbia.

Still, Starčević is very careful not to provoke anger from the authorities. Even though his statements about a free and independent Croatian state seem to be clear, he corrected himself: 'I don't want to say that for the first time Croatia will be an independent state, but I say that our homeland can be independent just as it used to be' (Starčević, 1861a: 124). Moreover, Starčević frequently emphasized that what he demands for the Croatian nation, he would not deny to other nations: 'we hold that the happiness and unhappiness of any nation in the East of Europe is directly related to the happiness or unhappiness of neighbouring nations' (*ibid.*: 100). It looks as Starčević really did advocate the equality of all nations. The only problem was that the status of being a nation cannot be granted to all, but only 'historical nations which are settled on their own land' (Starčević, 1871a: 180).

The ancient historical rights, the 'nature' of the nation, equality and freedom: all of these a Croat has to learn, to be ready for the fulfillment of the national mission - the establishment of the independent and sovereign state. Starčević demanded complete dedication of his co-nationals: 'Let's swear at the holy graves of our martyrs (and that grave is our homeland) that we will revenge our fathers, and let that revenge be freedom, equality and brotherhood for all of us' (Starčević, 1860: 102). The only help Croats could expect is help from God. The slogan 'God and Croats' became a battle-cry of the Party of Right in their struggle against numerous external and internal enemies of the Croatian nation.

4.6.3. Internal Enemies

In his writings Starčević spent a lot of energy attempting to reveal the internal enemies of the Croatian nation. This is not surprising bearing in mind that Starčević's ultimate aim was the homogenization of the nation. Starčević's main criteria for distinguishing and ranking the internal enemies was loyalty and attachment to the Croatian nation.

Starčević made a precise categorization of the internal enemies. Moreover, he introduced symbolic labels for each of them. There are two 'types' of enemies: Magyarons and Magyarols.

The first type - Magyarons - were mainly the members of the Croatian nobility but either of Magyar origins or supporters of the union with Hungary. They are '...egoists which look after only their own stomachs' (Starčević, 1869a: 165). Starčević showed some understanding toward these enemies of the Croatian nation, even though he also showed some bitterness, bearing in mind the role the nobility played in the national awakening of other nations: 'In all Europe the nobility takes first place in science and patriotism. How come that only the Croatian nobility is indifferent?' (*ibid.*: 166). Starčević made the sins of the Magyarons even clearer: 'But instead of extinguishing that Illyico-Slavo-Serbianism, instead of standing for Croatism and proving that throughout history (...) Illyro-Serbia has been nothing else but Croatia; instead they proved how Illyro-Serbo-Slavism is nothing but an illusion; (...) instead of all of that, Magyarons started to mess with Magyars' (*ibid.*: 167).

Yet, Starčević held that Magyarons are a 'breed'[33] which will eventually die out, and hence not the ultimate threat to the Croatian nation. He states: 'Magyaronism is an old sickness, but not contagious one' (*ibid.*: 168). The other type of enemy was perceived as much more dangerous - Magyarols.[34]

For Magyarols, who Starčević considered a much worse group of enemies of the Croatian nation, he also used the term 'Slavoserbs'.[35] In his article *Strankle u Hrvatskoj* (Parties in Croatia), Starčević described Slavoserbs with very vivid terminology: 'Slavoserbian trash' (*ibid.*: 211); 'such dirty bastards as Slavoserbs you cannot find anywhere, you cannot find such egoism, impatience and such

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[33] Starčević was not using the term 'breed' in a racist manner, not as a biological, but rather as a spiritual characteristic. For more details see Gross (1971: 205).
[34] Starčević was using term 'Magyarons' for those who accepted Magyar national and cultural identity. The term 'Magyarols' is combined by the name Magyars and Tyrolians (Tirolci), which Starčević uses to name the followers of the Illyrian and Yugoslav Movements. With this term he wanted to characterize the followers of the Yugoslav Movement as 'double slaves'.
[35] Starčević is not the founder of this term. It was a Slovak Šafarik who introduced it for the Serbs and Croats who spoke a *štokavian* dialect.

stupidity' (*ibid.*: 207); 'The Slavoserb breed (...) is by it very nature incapable of thinking, its spirit rejects any noble and high thought, it stays barbaric' (*ibid.*: 267); 'Slavoserbs know everything without learning anything' (*ibid.*: 198); 'Only Slavoserbs, who are disgusting slave creatures, want to equalize the world according to their own measure; they want to arrange the whole world; and yet they don't know how to arrange their own language, still waiting for others to arrange even their own stomachs' (*ibid.*: 202). The real reason for Starčević's open animosity towards the members of the Yugoslav Movement in general, and towards Strossmayer in particular, is because 'Slavoserbism (...) kills all particularities of the nations' (*ibid.*: 213). Magyarols or Slavoserbs are those who '...labeled as lunatics everybody who wants to defend the rights of the homeland, who want to retrieve a constitution and legal conditions in Croatia. They declared as lunatics and thieves those who did not want to embarrass Croatia, who did not want to convert a Croat into a Tyrol's or Magyar's slave' (*ibid.*: 170). Finally, 'that party has as its purpose to extinguish Croats' (*ibid.*: 173).

Here, it is important to emphasize that even though Starčević expressed clear animosity towards any Pan-Slavic, Illyrian and Yugoslav idea, he did not necessarily 'hate' the Slav or South-Slav nations.[36] He just held that such ideas present a clear danger for the national existence of the Croats. He emphasized how the history, culture, and even the language of the South Slav nations is so different that it would be 'unnatural' to push them into one political community. According to his ideological model, there is only one way of uniting the nations:

> If some nationality would not have the 'strength for life', it would disperse in a quiet and natural way, and other nationalities would progress and amalgamate[37] until, maybe, at one time, on this entire planet there would be one nationality only. (...) But when no other nationality cares about this, we Croats can also not deal with that business. Today that kind of unity cannot be our programme. (*ibid.*: 183)

Hence, all the Croats could do was to work on good neighbourly relations because 'the nations in Eastern Europe are settled in that numerical and geographical relation that none of them can harm the others without being

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[36] Well, as long as he recognized them as nations.

harmed itself: these nations, united under one government, under one law, cannot be happy and very soon they would be the target for foreigners' (Starčević, 1860: 89).

However succinct Starčević was in defining internal enemies, he was even more succinct in describing and defining external enemies.

4.6.4. External Enemies

The concept of external enemies Starčević developed was again in order to clearly separate the Croatian nation from other nations. Nevertheless, he held that history could provide numerous examples of how the Croatian nation had been oppressed and exploited by other nations. Yet, the most dangerous threat came from three neighbouring nations who were directly endangering the very existence of the Croatian nation: Austrian Germans, Magyars and Serbs. Each of these nations was endangering and violating political, cultural or economic rights and specificities of the Croatian nation.

While previously analyzed nationalist ideologies, i.e. Illyrianism and Yugoslavism, were attempting a balancing act between the Hungarian and Austrian side, after the events of 1848 Starčević was certain that neither side could bring any good to the Croatian people. Hence, in order to raise some sense of pride among Croats, he tried to present other nations as less great than what they presented themselves to be. Therefore, just as Srossmayer and Rački, Starčević held that it was of great importance to emphasize how Croats were a loyal and self-sacrificing nation, while the other nations thought only of their own benefit. Starčević wrote: 'the Habsburg monarchy has to thank the (Croatian) nation for its survival and its glory' (Starčević, 1860: 102). The Croatian people 'already for three hundred years have been making sacrifices for Austria, and for all the victims of sacrifice they received only stupidity,

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[37] In original: *sestrile se* - to become sisters.

enslavement, poverty; in spite of all our sacrifices, Austria made a mockery of the Croatian nation' (*ibid*.: 112).

Still, for purely pragmatic reasons, Starčević tried to separate the person of the king and the Austrian government. He frequently expressed 'our love to (the king) and distrust of Austria', and how for himself 'the person of the king is sacred, but the government is not' (Starčević, 1861a: 119). Now, when he made a clear separation between the two, he could describe the Austrian government in his specific way, as 'a bunch of Viennese hypocrites' (Starčević, 1861a: 104), or in one word as 'hell' (Starčević, 1861b: 130). Starčević blamed the Austrian government for all the evil in Croatia. They were responsible for the loss of the Croatian territory - 'since the Habsburgs were our rulers, no more than one third of the kingdom of Croatia was represented in the *Sabor'* (Starčević, 1861a: 110). He also blames the Austrian government for the economic backwardness of the Croats - 'from that beautiful land Austria made a desert' (Starčević, 1861b: 130). Even when Austria tries to help, it works against the Croats - 'as harder Austria tries to reconcile us with other nations, we are more in conflict' (*ibid*.: 103).

In order to make his point much clearer to the broader masses Starčević resurrected the myth of Krsto Frankopan and Petar Zrinski.[38] Starčević used this myth as the symbol of the destruction of the sovereign Croatian nation from the Habsburgs. He wrote: 'Our Krčki-Frankopans and our Šubić-Zrinski were declared as rebels and strangled just because Germans wanted the Croatian lands' (Starčević, 1878: 292). Starčević described Petar Zrinski as a leader with great 'intellectual and physical virtues, but he missed one thing - he was not liked by his own people' (Gross, 1971: 34). In other words, Starčević wanted to use a myth in order to show that the Croatian people had not understood Zrinski's message from the past, and therefore the people had been enslaved by the descendants of Zrinski's killers (*ibid*.). Such an interpretation of the myth was directly opposed to the myth of Ban Jelačić advocated by the ideologists of

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[38] In 1664 Krsto Frankopan and Petar Zrinski, members of old Croatian noble families, attempted to overthrow King Leopold as the Croatian king. This attempt would later be known as the Zrinsko-Frankopan conspiracy. Without the broader support of their fellow nobles, the two of them were condemned to failure. They went to Vienna to ask for mercy. Yet, they were put in prison, tried, and beheaded. For more details, see Gaži (1973: 107-109).

Yugoslavism. While Strossmayer wanted to promote a picture of the glorious resistance towards the Hungarians, Starčević used the myth of Zrinski and Frankopan to promote the image of the Austrians as the worst enemies of the Croats.

Similarly, Starčević was relying on other myths, symbols and peculiar interpretations of historical events in order to describe the Magyars in the same manner. In order to raise national pride among Croats, once again it was important to humiliate other nations. First of all, it was important to show that Magyars, as a nation, lack real national history, and therefore are less valuable than the Croats. He wrote: 'If in the tenth century Magyars had any name, it was 'Turks'' (Starčević, 1860: 90).

Further on, Starčević concentrated on the explanation of the events of 1848. He justified the actions of Croats not as a support to the Austrian government, but rather as a struggle for their national liberation. He was claiming that the Magyars attempted to raise their nation on the graves of other Eastern European nations: 'Magyars became known as evildoers and an unjust nation in the eyes of all nations in the East of Europe and all historians' (Starčević, 1860: 93). Moreover 'Magyars showed that they were not working for the liberation of the peoples of Hungary, but for the benefit of the Magyar breed only' (Starčević, 1869a: 161). Hence, with the events of 1848, Starčević was pointing out, that every alliance between Croats and Magyars had ceased to exist.

Starčević had not finished his list of enemies. Another side had been perceived as much more dangerous, especially because it presented itself both as external and internal enemy at the same time - the Serbs.

Provoked by the ideas of the Serbian nationalist and expansionist ideologies, Starčević formulated a Croatian counterpart. In 1876[39] he published an article

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[39] A year earlier, in 1875 in Bosnia and Herzegovina there began an uprising of the population against Ottoman rule. This event initiated aspirations among the Croatian and Serbian elite for annexation of the Bosnian territory. Both Croats and Serbs were convinced that the territory and population of Bosnia belongs to them. According to Gross (1971: 202) these events initiated a conflict between two elites which lasted for the next 30 years.

'The Slavoserbian breed' in which he denied the existence of the Serbian nation. Starčević denied their history, language and the name of Serbs. He held that since their migration, the Croats were a ruling and a state-creating nation, while Serbs were a people of beggars, and not a nation. He claimed that the name 'Serb' originates from the term '*servus*'- slaves. Serbs are, Starčević concluded, the only people who do not know their own name (Gross, 1971: 45). He was claiming that before the rule of Duke Miloš in the 1860s 'the people of Serbia had not been tied to anything: Croat, Bulgarian, Rumanian, Shiptar, Jew, Gypsy they were all mixed, all together ... without a permanent homeland' (Starčević, 1871b: 225). Using the same principle as Vuk Karadžić,[40] Starčević proclaimed all Serbs as Croats.

Moreover, Starčević reinterpreted the entire history of Serbia. In his particular way he was describing Serbian migration, explaining how 'that breed' had been capable only of theft and robbery. They were always ready for any evil, and always blamed somebody else for it. Rather than fighting against the Turks, they ran away, and, hence, just because of their cowardliness, the battle on Kosovo had been lost. Starčević respected some Serbian historical characters, but as Croats. For example, he would write about the glorious Croatian dynasty of Nemanjić (Gross, 1971: 203). However, at the same time, Starčević advocated equality of all religions, and hence, he referred to Serbs from Krajina as a Croatian Orthodox population. On the other hand Serbs from Serbia were described as unenlightened and uneducated people with barbaric behaviour (Starčević, 1971b: 232).

4.6.5. Conclusion

In the twentieth century, Starčević was perceived as a true Croatian nationalist and as the creator of an extremist nationalist ideology. From the perspective of the nineteenth century, this picture could look slightly different.

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[40] For more details, see p. 114.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Austro-Hungarian Empire brought new actors to the political scene - nations. It forced the Empire to redefine its policy, and indeed its constitution. It also forced nations to define themselves as nations. The Croatian nation gets its clear definition with Starčević.

Starčević's nationalist ideology entirely follows the political events of his time. These events shaped his definition of the nation in general and the Croatian nation in particular. The revolutionary events of 1848, the formation of the Dual Monarchy, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the issues provoked by these events, opened a new space for defining enemies.

Even though the basic ideas of Starčević's concept of the nation were well known and broadly employed by many nationalist ideologies in Europe, Starčević offered an interesting approach. In the tradition of Romanticism, Starčević formulated his definition of the nation in terms of culture and history, but the role of the language was not emphasized. Yet, at the same time, he found that blood relatedness was incompatible with that definition. Moreover, common ancestors in his concept became unimportant for the formation of the nation. Hence, though Starčević defines the nation in ethnic terms, as a community which shares the same myths, symbols, historic memories, culture, and, above all, common national spirit, he constructed an inclusive definition of the nation. Being born as a Croat was not a sufficient condition to be a 'real' Croat. This is the reason why he could perceive the Serbian ruler King Dušan as a Croat, not only because Starčević perceived all South Slav nations as Croats, but also because Dušan was pervaded by what Starčević called the 'Croatian spirit'. The meaning of this term - the Croatian spirit - is the main topic of Starčević's nationalist ideology.

In Starčević's ideology the nation is the ultimate value in itself. It is the centre of all social and political life. The nation is the meaning of the life of every individual and the struggle for national survival and prosperity should be one's main task. This collectivism was not constructed in order to create uniformity of co-nationals. Starčević's definition of the nation is a 'secular' definition, and this characteristic is another inclusive element of Starčević's nationalist ideology.

Religious affiliation, according to Starčević, is not a marker of national affiliation. Hence, Starčević can talk about the Orthodox and Muslim Croats.

The main reason for the formulation of an inclusive ethnically-defined nation was the heterogeneity of the Croatian nation. Divided by laws, language and history, Croats, Starčević held, needed an element of integration. Therefore, Starčević underlined all elements common to all Croats as important for the creation of a homogenous nation, and disregarded all elements of division. The glorious ancient history of the Croatian nation offered a basis for that unity.

To summarise, the nationalist ideologies created in the second half of the nineteenth century facilitated the formation of the Croatian nation:

- These ideologies introduced a Romantic idea of historicism[41] as the main source of national legitimacy. History in these ideologies was presented mainly as the means for understanding the 'spirit' and political and cultural rights of the Croatian nation. Such a 'national history' was perceived by the ideologists as the justification and direction of their present political and cultural demands.

- The proponents of these ideologies facilitated the process of institutionalisation of 'national culture'. Hence the JAZU (Yugoslav Academy of Science and Art), University of Zagreb and National Theatre became the major safeguards of that culture. Firmly established in 'national history', 'national culture' gained its structural establishment which secured its future existence.

- Both Yugoslavism and the ideology of the Party of Right acknowledged the importance of the nationalisation of the Croatian population in competition with the external corporate agents. Even though they failed to address their primary agents directly, they set the programme, symbols and rhetoric for the process of mobilisation of the broader Croatian population.

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[41] For more about the origins of historicist thought, see Breuilly (1993: 55-59).

These developments in the culture, structure and agency of the Croatian society at the end of the nineteenth century marked the end of the second morphogenetic cycle of the Croatian national re-formation.

Chapter Five

TWENTIETH-CENTURY CROATIAN NATIONALIST IDEOLOGIES

*'Only a cretin's mind or criminal soul
can propagate a Middle Age kind of
destructive tribal hatred '*
(Radić, 1902d: 264).

5.1. Introduction

At the beginning of the twentieth century for the first time the Croatian masses participated in national movements and experienced a shared sense of 'national identity as a specific value' (Hroch, 1995: 67). This stage of the 'national awakening' Hroch calls 'Phase C'.

However, Croatia's evolving political circumstances generated nationalist ideologies that did not correspond to Hroch's framework. Through the analysis of the three most dominant ideologies - those of the Croatian Peasant Party, the Ustasha Movement and the Communist Party - it will be shown how Croatian nationalist movements have repeatedly reconsidered and reconstructed national culture, in particular the role of language and history, and their political goals. Hence, it will be demonstrated how the Croatian nation went through various morphological cycles throughout the course of the twentieth century.

The nationalist ideology of the Croatian Peasant Party (*Hrvatska seljačka stranka* - HSS; formally established in March 1904) was the first to successfully gain the popular support of the Croatian masses. The activities of HSS shaped the whole Croatian political and social agenda between the two world wars. The content and direction of its nationalist ideology was formulated by the first leader and the founder of the HSS - Stjepan Radić (1871-1928).

During the inter-war period two other nationalist ideologies were created, both with deep roots in nineteenth century nationalist ideologies: the Ustasha

Movement, a radical and extremist movement which was formally established in January 1929 and led by Ante Pavelić (1889 -1957); and the Yugoslav Communist Party (founded in 1919) which re-introduced onto the political agenda a South-Slav nationalist ideology drawn up by the Party's main ideologist Edvard Kardelj (1910 - 1979).

These three dominant ideologies will be examined through an analysis of the writings of their main creators. As in the previous chapter, a brief overview will be given of the major historical events that created the circumstances in which these ideas emerged.

5.2. Historical Background III (1900-1928)

In the early years of the twentieth century 'Croatian lands' were fragmented, and territorially isolated from one another, ruled from Vienna, Budapest and Zagreb. The political life at that time in Civil Croatia was still shaped by the rule of ban Khuen-Hedervary. As a reaction to the ban's policies, the Croatian opposition parties[42] focused their attentions on resisting the enforced Magyarisation as well as the aspirations of Serbian nationalism.

Against this backdrop, a demonstration against the 'Magyarizing regime of Khuen-Hedervary' (Banac, 1984: 95) took place in 1895 on the streets of Zagreb during an official visit by Franz Joseph. This relatively minor episode was to have a significant impact on future political events in Croatia. The students who led the symbolic burning of the flag were subsequently expelled from Zagreb University, and had to continue their studies at the University of Prague. Stjepan Radić, the founder of the Croatian Peasant Party, was one of the expelled students. In Prague, they were greatly influenced by the ideas of Thomas G.

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[42] At this time the Croatian political parties were divided between those who supported the existing regime, such as the National Party (*Narodna stranka*) and to a large extent the Serbian National Independent Party (*Srpska narodna samostalna stranka*); and those who were in opposition, such as the Independent National Party (*Neodvisna narodna stranka*) and the Party of Right (*Stranka Prava*). Another descendent of Starčević's party, the Pure Party of Right (Čista stranka prava) led by Josip Frank, believed that the Croats could liberate themselves from the Magyars only with the support of the Habsburgs.

Masaryk. With their return to Croatia two years later, the group became known as the Progressive Youth (*Napredna omladina* - NO). The NO emerged as an important independent opposition movement. It recognized and actively advocated the idea of the natural right of the nation and the notion of national unity among the Croats and Serbs.

Khuen-Hedervary's policy of generating divisions between Serbs and Croats in order to increase Hungarian control over the region had been operating successfully since the 1890s. In 1902 however conflicts between Croatian and Serbian nationalism reached a peak. In September 1902, the daily newspaper *Srbobran* (The Defender of the Serbs - published in Zagreb) printed an article entitled *Rat do istrage* (The War Until Extinction), which had previously been published in Belgrade's *Srpski književni glasnik* (The Serbian Literary Gazette). This article was an open call for all-out war until the end between Serbs and Croats. In violent demonstrations that took place in Zagreb in the days following its publication, many Serbian shops and properties were destroyed. These demonstrations however marked the temporary end of hostilities between the two groups. The arrival of a new set of political circumstances the following year, along with a new generation of political activists, helped to foster a significant level of reconciliation between the two sides and heralded an era of increased co-operation.

This new found co-operation can be traced to two major political events. In 1903 the governments in both Serbia and Croatia collapsed. In Belgrade later that year, King Aleksandar Obrenović was assassinated by nationalist officers, and the dynasty of Karađorđević ascended to the Serbian throne. The new dynasty maintained a pro-Russian, anti-Habsburg stance. The change of dynasty on the Serbian throne had a profound effect on the political positions of the Serbs in Croatia.

In Zagreb, in the spring of 1903, a sign written in Hungarian at the main train station provoked widespread demonstrations throughout Croatia. General dissatisfaction with the direction of political events in Croatia, and, more

significantly, renewed conflicts between Hungarian nationalists and the Habsburgs,[43] contributed to ending the thirty-year rule of ban Khuen-Hedervary.

The last decade of the Austro-Hungarian Empire witnessed the most intense period of political activity in Croatia. For the first time the various national movements originated from Croats living in Dalmatia and Istria. At the turn of the century, the Habsburg policy of favouring the Italian minority[44] in Dalmatia provoked widespread dissatisfaction on the part of the Croat population. Ruled directly from Vienna, Dalmatia was not directly affected by clashes between the Serbs and Croats, because they found themselves united against the Habsburgs. The increase in nationalist aspirations among the Croats in Dalmatia and Istria was fuelled by economic hardship which drove tens of thousands to emigrate, mainly to America.[45] This socio-economic situation influenced the whole political structure of Dalmatia. In the 1880s, Croats and Serbs had replaced Italians from municipal councils and Italians lost control of the Dalmatian *Sabor* (Tanner, 1997: 110). The most prominent political leaders were Frano Supilo and Ante Trumbić, the architects of the so-called 'New Course' in Croatian politics. The main policies defining this 'New Course' were threefold: to take advantage of the crisis of the dualism to emphasize and press for Croatian national interests, to establish a level of co-operation between Croats and Magyars in order to prevent Austro-German expansionism, and to establish a Croatian-Serbian political union.[46] The 'New Course' immediately generated a strong degree of political support culminating in October 1905 in the signing of the 'Fiume Resolution' (*Riječka rezolucija*). Signed in Rijeka by forty Croat deputies from the Dalmatian *Sabor*, the resolution called for the unification of Dalmatia with the ban's Croatia. Moreover, this resolution recognized the Serbs as having a separate status in Croatia 'guaranteeing their equality as a nation' (Tanner, 1997: 111). Shortly after this declaration, Serbian politicians met in Zadar and formulated the 'Zadar Resolution' supporting demands for unification. These resolutions created the conditions for the establishment of the Croatian-Serbian

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[43] For more about Hungary-Austria relations at that time, see Taylor, 1990: 210-29.

[44] At the time, Italians made up only three percent of the Dalmatian population (see Taylor, 1990: 212).

[45] Hence, for example, Goldstein (1999: 97) writes that 'in the first years of the twentieth century the central Dalmatian island of Brač alone lost 8,063 (over 32 per cent) of its inhabitants'.

Coalition (*Hrvatsko-Srpska koalicija*) in December 1905.[47] The Coalition took no time in demonstrating its political strength by winning the majority of the seats at the elections for the Croatian Sabor in 1906, maintaining their majority until the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918.

During the same elections, another nationalist party, which had only been formed two years previously, won a mere 500 votes failing to win a single seat. Fifteen years later however that same party, *Hrvatska pučka seljačka stranka* (HPSS - the Croat People's Peasant Party), was to dominate the Croatian political scene. The HPSS was arguably the first Croatian political party which had as its aim to involve the broad Croatian peasant population directly in the political process. The HPSS was set up in March 1904 by two brothers Antun and Stjepan Radić, who were not only politicians but also social reformers striving to create a peasant republic. On the eve of the First World War, however, a political agenda of this type could not be realized.

The First World War precipitated by the Sarajevo assassination created the opportunity for negotiating the future of the South Slavs. However, the War also revealed the different nationalist aspirations of the nations involved, particularly those of the Serbs and Croats. These nations found themselves on opposite sides of the War: formally, as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Croatia was on the side of the Axis Powers, while Serbia was allied to the Entente.

Croatia found itself in the most difficult position. On the one hand, the Croatian political leaders were aware that only the complete collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire could secure an independent Croatia and unification with the South-Slavs. On the other hand, they were concerned by the political alliances the Entente Powers had established in order to secure the support of Italy. In 1915 in the secret 'Treaty of London' the Entente powers offered Italy the territories of Slovenia, Istria and the northern part of Dalmatia in return for

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[46] For more about the 'New Course' programme, see Banac, 1984: 97-98.
[47] In the Coalition emerged *Hrvatska stranka prava* (The Croatian Party of Right), *Hrvatska napredna stranka* (The Croatian Progressive Party), *Srpska narodna samostalna stranka* (The Serbian National Independent Party), *Srpska narodna radikalna stranka* (The Serbian National

declaring war against the Axis Powers (Tanner, 1997: 114). In addition, Bosnia and Herzegovina, part of southern Dalmatia and a large part of Slavonia were promised to Serbia. The Croatian politicians felt like they had been 'sacrificed at the altar of secret diplomacy' (Tanner, 1997: 114). For the leading politicians of the Croatian-Serbian Coalition, the formation of the South-Slav state - Yugoslavia - seemed the only viable solution.

An important step in the formation of the South-Slav state occurred in November 1914 in Italy, when Frano Supilo, Ante Trumbić, Ivan Meštrović and others formed the 'Yugoslav Committee' (*Jugoslavenski odbor*).[48] Their aim was to establish a level of co-operation with the Serbian government as Croatian representatives, and to gain the support of the Entente Powers for the unification of the South-Slavs. Soon after, the Serbian government sent two Bosnian Serbs as its official deputies. Also present were representatives of the Slovenian National Progressive Party (*Napredna narodna stranka*) and Starčević's Party of Right (*Starčevićeva stranka prava*) to participate in the committee. With representatives from the three dominant South-Slav nations, the Committee took a truly Yugoslav form. From the moment the Yugoslav Committee learned of the details of the 'London Treaty' (1915), their opposition to it and to Italian territorial aspirations became the major focus of the Committee's activities. The Yugoslav Committee was formally established on 30 April 1915 in Paris, issuing a manifesto which denounced any secret treaties involving Croatian territory. They shared a profound belief in the principle of the right to national self-determination. The Serbian government however did not entirely share the views of the Yugoslav Committee.

The Serbian government was headed at the time by the leader of the Serbian Radical Party (*Srpska radikalna stranka*) Nikola Pašić. In September 1914 the Serbian government had already informed its allies that in the case of victory, Serbia would expect to create a strong Serbian state which would embrace all Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Banac, 1984: 116). This unification however did not

Radical Party) and for a while *Socialdemokratska stranka* (The Social-Democratic Party), just as many other independent politicians.
[48] For more details about the process of unification, see Banac, 1984: 115-40.

have as its aim to create a 'Yugoslav' state, but rather a 'Greater Serbia'. The main obstacle to the creation of such a state was seen to be an independent Croatian state. Pašić therefore counted on the backing of supporters of the Yugoslav ideal, hoping that the idea of *narodno jedinstvo* (national unity) could be translated in such a way as to ensure Serbian supremacy over the new state (Banac, 1984: 117).

The conflict between the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee was indirectly resolved with the events in Russia in 1917. Having lost the crucial support of Petrograd, Pašić was forced to find a compromise with the Committee, in order to pre-empt the geo-political implications of a possible separate peace between Austro-Hungary and the Entente Powers. On 20 July 1917 the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee signed a treaty at Corfu. The two sides agreed that a new state would be a democratic, parliamentary monarchy under the Karađorđević dynasty. However, the question of the new state's political structure was to be decided by a freely elected constitutional assembly (Tanner, 1997: 117).

In October 1918, with the collapse of the Thessaloniki front, the Austro-Hungarian army was disbanded, marking the end of the First World War. Only a few days later, on 5 October 1918 representatives of Slovenian and Croatian political parties gathered in Zagreb and set up the National Council of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (*Narodno vijeće Slovenaca, Hrvata i Srba* - SHS). The Council comprised representatives from Slovenia, Croatia, Istria, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Vojvodina. The main role of the Council was to work towards the creation of an independent South-Slav state. On 29 October 1918 the Croatian *Sabor* proclaimed that on the basis of the principle of national self-determination all connections between Croatia, the Hungarian Kingdom and the Habsburg Empire were to be severed. Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia along with the city of Rijeka were declared as a single independent state which was to unite into a common State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (*Država SHS*).

Map 6. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia 1918 -1941(Goldstein, 1999: 123)

The social and political atmosphere within the newly created state was chaotic from the start. As early as November 1918 the Council sent a delegation to Belgrade 'pleading for the entry of the Serbian army into Croatia-Slavonia' (Banac, 1984: 131). The existence of numerous conflicting views regarding the process of unification within the Serbian government and within the National Council necessitated further negotiations. The president of the Serbian government, Nikola Pašić, and the president of the National Council, Antun Korošec, met in Geneva on 6 November 1918 and signed a declaration in which the Serbian government recognized the equal status of the State of SHS with the Serbian Kingdom regarding the unification process. The net result of these negotiations was that, on 1 December 1918 the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (*Kraljevina SHS*) was declared. After around 800 years of struggle for an autonomous and an independent state, as some Croatian nationalist ideologies would claim, Croats found themselves integrated into another multinational entity.

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The strongest opposition to unification came from the Party of Right and the HPSS, which made its views clear in 1920 by officially changing its name to the Croatian Republican Peasant Party (*Hrvatska republikanska seljačka stranka* - HRSS). Stjepan Radić, the Party leader, was concerned that the new Kingdom would resemble in practice the previous period of Hungarian rule. The first indication that Radić's fears had some foundation was in the new government's harsh policy of crushing any incidents of disobedience or protest among the Croats.[49] In 1920 following a public call for the creation of a republic, Radić was sentenced to two-and-a-half years in prison. During elections around the time of his imprisonment Radić's party won the biggest share of Croat votes, making the HRSS the third biggest party in Yugoslavia (Banac, 1984: 227). It is important to point out that for the 1920 elections the new state had introduced a system of universal suffrage. Hence, it could be argued that public support for the HRSS came directly from the Croatian peasant masses. This support was to continue to grow over the following years.

On 28 June 1921 Pašić succeeded in pushing through the constitutional assembly the first constitution known as *Vidovdanski Ustav* (the Constitution of St. Vitus' Day). This act 'abolished Croatia's traditional institutions, including the ban and the Sabor, and broke up Croatia (and the rest of the new state) into departments governed (...) by the prefects appointed by the government' (Tanner, 1997: 121). These events were to have immediate repercussions on the Croatian political scene. In the 1923 elections Stjepan Radić and his party doubled their share of votes. The main issues which drew in the broad support of the Croatian peasantry were his refusal to recognize the unification of Yugoslavia, and his demand for the establishment of a Croatian assembly which would establish a peasant republic (Banac, 1984: 229).

In order to gain support from the international community, Radić visited Moscow in 1924 and affiliated the HRSS to the Peasant International. On his return to Croatia in 1925, Radić and the whole HRSS leadership were arrested. Fearing

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[49] For more details, see Banac, 1984: 141-328.

that the party could disappear entirely from the political scene, Radić wrote a memorandum which was read to the Parliament in Belgrade. In it he recognized the legitimacy of the monarchy, abandoned his programme for Croatian independence, accepted the Vidovdan constitution and changed the name of the party to the Croatian Peasant Party (*Hrvatska seljačka stranka* - HSS). The reaction from the Croatian masses was clear: in the 1927 elections, the HSS lost almost 200,000 votes.[50] However, as a result of changes to the electoral system, the HSS actually only lost six seats in parliament.

In spite of the change of name, Radić's party did not lessen its level of opposition to the government in Belgrade. In 1927 Radić found an ally in Svetozar Pribićević (a Serb from Croatia), who was a disillusioned former minister of internal affairs and leader of the Democratic Party. Together they formed the Peasant-Democratic Coalition (*Demokratska seljačka koalicija* - DSK). Radić's determined opposition to the ruling government began to draw wide-ranging support from politicians and the masses alike and began to pose a major threat to the government.

During a session of the Belgrade Parliament on 20 June 1928, a Serbian nationalist Puniša Račić shot and killed Pavle Radić and Đuro Basariček, and wounded Stjepan Radić, Ivan Pernar and Ivan Granda, all of whom were HSS deputies at the Parliament. On 8 August 1928, Stjepan Radić died of his wounds. Puniša Račić was never tried.

Political unitarism of the Yugoslav state was reflected in the statistical representation of its society. Hence, two Yugoslav censuses held in 1921 and 1931 mirrored the existing political structure and presented the results according to the established *Banovine* - a rather artificial territorial division (see Map 6). Goldstein (1999: 117) offers an alternative estimate, according to which during the 1920s Croatia was still predominantly agricultural, where the proportion of people dependent on agriculture was just below 70 per cent. Goldstein (*ibid.*: 99) claims that in 1910 northern Croatia had 56 per cent illiteracy, and that 'the

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[50] In 1920 in the territory of the Kingdom of SHS, 1,607,255 people voted, whilst in Croatia-

whole country could only claim about 2 per cent intellectuals (excluding the clergy)'. The census of 1921 showed that 51 per cent of the Yugoslav population were illiterate. The number of children in elementary schools rose from 650,000 in 1919 to 1,404,000 in 1937. Even in 1934 'the average number of pupils per elementary school teacher was 53.6 so that in many schools classes were far too large for effective teaching' (Trouton, 1952: 163).

For Croatia the 1920s were years of rapid economic development. Yugoslavia provided a wide internal market for Croatian products. Zagreb became a centre of commerce and banking and Croatia, more then other part of Yugoslavia, experienced significant foreign investment in its industry. The opening of the Split-Zagreb railway line in 1925 boosted tourism on the Dalmatian coast. In spite of these circumstances, Goldstein emphasises (1999: 117), 'workers' purchasing power in the 1920s was below its 1914 level'.

To summarise, during the first three decades of the twentieth century Croatian society went through considerable structural and cultural changes and transformations of corporate agencies:

- After two hundred years of existence within the Habsburg Empire, Croatia found itself within another multicultural and multinational society. The political centre of the state moved from Vienna and Budapest to Belgrade.

- The agencies that agreed upon the establishment of the new state endowed it with new political and cultural institutions. At the same time, the 'old' Croatian national institutions, like the *Sabor* and the position of the *ban*, were abolished.

- Soon after the formation of Yugoslavia, the political and cultural Croatian corporate agencies that facilitated unification with the other South Slavs were overpowered by those that opposed it. The act of the establishment of Yugoslavia brought into the foreground the competition between the dominant Croatian political and national agency and the dominant state agency in Belgrade.

Slavonia the turn-out was 438,799 (Banac, 1984: 389).

- The introduction of general suffrage of the population brought a new element into politics - Croatian primary agents. In this situation gaining the support of the primary agents was the main task for competing corporate agents. In order to mobilise these primary agents, the corporate agencts had to develop clear programmes, ideologies and a vision of the future.

- Finally, with such a task, corporate agencies needed to redefine of certain political and cultural institutions (like the media, educational system and political practices) that would facilitate the transmission of corporate agencies' messages to their primary agents.

These were the circumstances in which Stjepan Radić offered his vision of the Croatian national past, present and future.

5.3. The Croatian Peasant Party's Nationalist ideology

> '...this new nationalism has
> to be both political and social'
> (Radić, 1902: 23)

After 800 years of fighting for an independent state, Croats found themselves subsumed within a new multicultural state. The setting up of a South-Slav state had been the ideal for many generations of Croatian politicians. However, those aspirations were a product of the political environment within the Habsburg Empire. The new and evolving circumstances in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes changed the outlook of the new breed of Croatian political leaders.

The national movement which was initiated by the activities of Stjepan Radić and his party, marks a new stage in the reformation of the Croatian nation. The Croatian masses had finally been introduced into mainstream politics and, with the introduction of universal suffrage, they were allowed for the first time to express their political attitudes and, as a consequence, their national identity. The mainly peasant population were equally attracted to the HSS's social ideas relating to the creation of a peasant republic, as they were to its nationalist ideology.

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This section will focus on the HSS's nationalist ideology. This ideology will be analyzed through the writings and public speeches of its founder Stjepan Radić. The aim of this analysis will be to identify the way Radić defined the nation in general, and more specifically the Croatian nation and its enemies.

5.3.1. Definition of the Nation

Radić defined the nation using the language of his times. The principle of self-determination was at the heart of his nationalist ideology. He held that the principle of self-determination was the only ideal which could protect the existence of small nations. This principle was based on two main premises: the first being that there is no nation without the state and, the second, that 'there is no state without the nation' (Radić, 1923: 426). Even though the state and the nation appear to play an equal role in this concept, 'nations are the only creators and the only state-builders' (*ibid.*: 428). For Radić the 'homeland', the 'nation' and the state were 'entities in which the population spoke a common language and breathed with a single national spirit' (Radić, 1897: 131). Hence, a distinct, national language is the ultimate determinant of the nation.

Central to Radić's nationalist ideology was the idea of the nation being linked in terms of morality. The 'spirit' of the nation became the ultimate value, which had to be nurtured and developed. As Radić wrote, 'poetically', the nation, just as human beings, had to mature:

> The childish love of the sea, lakes, woods, hills and springs can warm a young imagination and, for a moment, it can captivate its heart; but a soul can be uplifted... only through the mature love towards a nation, a love and understanding of national needs and aspirations. (Radić, 1897: 131-132)

An immature nation, according to Radić (1902: 162) is a 'mad' nation, i.e. 'it has no national consciousness, no national unity, and that nation cannot be its own master' (*ibid.*). In that context Radić argued that the nation is 'its own master' when it has control over its own land and has well defined territorial boundaries,

as well as its own government: 'A nation with its own land and government is called a state' (*ibid.*). A state alone, however, is not sufficient for a nation's maturation. A nation can mature only if its members are also mature - if they have a developed national consciousness and national spirit.

For Radić the achievement of national sovereignty and national freedom assumed a tremendous responsibility on the part of each member of the nation. It is interesting that he set the same criteria for an individual as for the nation. The nation, being a living organism, depended on the condition of every individual making up that nation. Hence, the nation can be mature only when its members are also matured, the nation can be free only when its members are free individuals (Radić, 1902b: 194). Through this equation Radić implicitly introduced the issue of the political and social structure of the national state. He held that democracy was the only guarantee for the preservation of small nations. Moreover, Radić (1902b: 192) wrote: 'a (state) which is not, in a real sense, liberal, cannot be called national. In this context, liberalism and nationalism complement each other'.

A democratic liberal national state, according to Radić, was the ideal vehicle through which to attract the broad support of the Croatian peasant population. The nation in his ideology was defined so as to awake the hope of the oppressed. Radić (1923: 429) rather poetically asserted that, 'the nation is not a flock of geese which cackle in the same way, but a chorus of angels who perform miracles'.

5.3.2. The Croatian Nation

Radić, just like his predecessors in the nineteenth century, held that one of the biggest problems of Croatian politics was the undeveloped national consciousness of the masses. Consequently, the 'national awakening' of the peasant population became one of his primary political objectives. The problem did not simply occur as a result of the perceived illiteracy and ignorance of the masses, but also because the nineteenth century national 'awakeners' had not

worked sufficiently towards raising the level of national consciousness among the masses. This was in part due to the fact that they had not perceived the Croatian peasants as a politically significant force. Radić, however, thought differently.

At the turn of the century Radić (1902a: 148), as part of his nationalist ideology, described the Croats as 'ignorant' and 'in peaceful times (...) quarrelsome people'. Radić believed that 'no nation perceived patriotism in so primitive a way as Croats' (Radić, 1897: 131). This primitivism, he argued, was manifested in perceptions of the nation among both the masses and its leaders. He wrote:

> We Croats think of Croatia just as a piece of land, and those who think about a bigger piece of land are considered to be bigger patriots. Even the term nation (narod) is not clear to us, because even today we cannot sincerely believe that that nation is made up of a peasant from Zagorje and goatman from Lika, and it is especially unpleasant to hear that a member of that nation could be a Vlach'. (ibid.: 131)

Radić was sincerely concerned that the Croatian masses were aware that the nation existed but they perceived it just as 'our nation'. On the other hand, 'where the national name (Croat) was broadly used, no state-right consciousness existed' (Radić, 1902c: 214). Radić saw an indicator of this under-developed national consciousness, in the everyday language where the word nationality (narodnost) did not exist, where the word tribe meant a 'race', and the word narod meant the people who remained loyal to their national life (Radić, 1902d: 251). This attitude among the Croat masses is exactly what Radić strove to change. He adopted the role of national educator whose aim was to explain to 'his' peasants the true nature of the nation and how it develops. A developed national consciousness was for Radić the only guarantee of national preservation: 'A conscious Croat cannot be Serbised or Magyarised (...) because a conscious nation cannot have its national identity taken away, it can only prosper or disappear without a trace' (Radić: 1902d: 273). The second stage of his attempt to enlighten his compatriots was to establish a clear workable definition of the Croatian nation. Radić introduced a distinction between the civic and ethnic nation. While the ethnic nation was defined mainly through language and national spirit, the civic nation was defined through the state - as a 'political nation'.

The *Political* nation means that all citizens of Croatia are one unit, one state, regardless of their religion and language. Therefore, those Germans, Magyars and Jews born in Croatia, have to recognize Croatia as their own homeland, and they should do nothing to harm it, even if their hearts do not allow them to love it. They are no longer foreigners in Croatia, because they became *Croatian citizens*. But we should not force them to call themselves Croats in the way that Magyars demand all those that are born in Hungary to be Magyars. (Radić, 1902a: 158, italics in original)

Radić's introduction of the term 'political nation' into his nationalist ideology had clear political significance. At the beginning of the twentieth century, when Croatia was still part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Radić was more than aware that Croatia alone, without strong support from other nations, could not achieve its ultimate aim - the establishment of an independent state. Radić (1902d: 271) described Croatia as a 'completely isolated' nation. He believed that the first sign of political maturity in each Croat should be an awareness that Croats could find again a place among their 'national brothers', which they had while they were 'wandering' in Illyrianism and Yugoslavism. This time, however, the Croats would take their place 'with a raised and unfurled Croatian flag' (*ibid*.). Radić wanted to re-establish relations with other South-Slav nations, whilst preserving the Croatian ethnic identity. He was convinced that the Croatian question could not be solved in Pest, Vienna, or Rome, but in Zagreb and Split, in Ljubljana and Belgrade, in Sofia, Sarajevo and Cetinje (*ibid*.).

The mistakes of Illyrianism and Yugoslavism, Radić argued, could be avoided if the Croatian nation was clearly defined. For that reason he drew up what he perceived to be the Croatian nation's geographic and ethnic borders. To the north, Croatia was separated from the Magyars by the 'thousand year old state border on the rivers Mura, Drava and Danube' (Radić, 1902c: 221); the city of Rijeka, Medjumurje and Istria, Radić considered, were integral components of Croatian territory, as were Slavonia, Srijem and Zemun. Radić also evoked historical rights when claiming the right of Croatia to one part of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH) 'which even today carries the name Turkish Croatia' (Radić, 1902a: 164).

After Radić had defined Croatia's geographical borders, he made some attempt to define the ethnic borders.[51] Aside from sharing a common national language, Radić did not define with any clarity the parameters of the 'ethnic nation', or rather, he did not clearly state what constituted being a Croat. That is not to say that he did not have a conception of what a Croat should be. For Radić, the image of the 'ideal type Croatian nation' was heavily influenced by the perceived idyllic lifestyle of the Croatian peasantry. This image was consistent with Radić's view that the 'peasantry not only represented the largest sector of the nation, but also the healthiest part', and moreover, 'from a spiritual point of view, the most valuable part of the nation' (Radić, 1907a: 283). The peasant was seen as being 'stable', 'patient like the earth, and as indestructible as the field on which he works' (*ibid.*).

Even though Radić did not particularly stress the importance of religion for the Croatian nation, he saw religion as being the basis of morality. Religion in general, and Christian dogma in particular should, he argued, become the basis of national education (Radić, 1921b: 377). Radić was aware of the importance and the power of symbols and history in the education of the population. He frequently referred to the 'ancient Croatian name', and to the 'sad but never shameful' glorious history of the Croats. The most powerful symbol of the Croatian state-right, of its struggle for independence, and the symbol which represented national honor, pride and strength for Radić was that of the *ban*. The position of the *ban* became known as the 'Seat of Ban Jelačić'. Radić (1902a: 163) wrote: 'The *ban's* power and honor is the foundation of the Croatian state, i.e. it is the source of the real Croatian state-right, the right that determines that in Croatia neither Magyars, Germans, Italians nor any other foreigners will ever be in command'.

His final definition of the nation in general and the Croatian nation in particular, was: 'a population with its own history, with cultural and political institutions, with its own organized economy, and, most of all with a clear and positively expressed national self-consciousness and national will - constitutes a separate

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[51] To employ the term 'ethnic' in Radić's nationalist ideology is an attempt to make a distinction

nation' (Radić, 1922b: 408). Hence, in 1921 Radić (1921b: 367) described the Croats as a 'nation with an ancient peasant culture, as a nation with twelve-years of Christian European education, with four-hundred-years of national written tradition and with a hundred-year-old conscious national life'.

Radić (1918b: 305) also described the Croatian nation in other terms: 'we Croats are the most Slavic nation'.

5.3.3. The Croatian Nation and South-Slav Union

Radić started to formulate his nationalist ideology in the 1890s. During that period he lived under the regimes of two different multinational states, both perceived to be oppressors of the Croat people. Under the Austro-Hungarian Empire the main oppressors were the Habsburgs and Magyar nationalists; in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (from 1929 known as Yugoslavia) the Serbian government played that role. Different oppressors required different strategies in the Croatian nation's struggle for liberation. Hence, during the time of the Habsburg Empire Radić strove for South-Slav unity, which he believed would empower the Croats in their fight for national liberation. A solution was seen in the creation of some form of state unity between all South-Slavs including Bulgarians. With the formation of Yugoslavia in 1918, however, Radić opposed firstly the manner in which it was created, and later the way it was governed. The solution for Radić was the creation of an independent peasant state of Croatia.

For a better understanding of Radić's ideology it is necessary to analyze these two periods separately, even though there is an obvious link between them. Radić's concept of South-Slav unity was never realized in the newly created Yugoslav state.

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from a more clearly defined civic nation.

In 1897 Radić asserted that 'the Croats and Serbs are one nation' (1897: 131). He referred to the South-Slavs as 'our nation' (*ibid.*: 135). According to Radić ethnographically the South-Slavs were a strong unit divided by tribal conflicts in the middle ages. The Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Bulgarians were perceived as the four tribes of a single South-Slav nation (*ibid.*: 136). Radić (1917: 294) wrote: 'the Slavs are one nation. But different processes of historical development, geographical divisions, and most of all, too different and antagonistic cultural and political influences have divided us into six or nine nations'.

Hence, in the first decade of the twentieth century, Radić - in contrast to the 'unhealthy' utopias about Great Croatia, Serbia, or Bulgaria, or the 'vain' dreams of establishing a political federation of Orthodox Balkan states - proposed the creation of an economic community of the South-Slav nation. He was convinced that Slovenes, Croats, Serbs and Bulgarians would cease futile conflicts and hostilities, and would devise a common action for economic liberation.

In 1902 violent clashes between the Croats and Serbs took place both in the media and on the streets. Since Radić saw the Croats and Serbs 'as the nucleus of South-Slavism' (*ibid.*: 137), this conflict was perceived as a consequence of German and Magyar political and cultural interference, as the act of a foreign spirit. Radić set out, as his first task, to point out the counter-productive nature of such a conflict for both nations. He underlined how these two nations, or 'tribes', could actually help each other in any joint endeavors, but in order to achieve this level of co-operation 'they should not have to, like sheep, be placed in single pen (*ibid.*: 150). Again, Radić used metaphors to explain his position: 'Each brother can have his own house (...) and some brothers, like in Croatia, can live together in a common house; but between single houses - between Croatia, Serbia and Bulgaria - there cannot be deep holes or high fences, only narrow landmarks' (*ibid.*).

Radić wanted to show that among the Croats and Serbs, especially those who lived in Croatia, there was absolutely no cause for conflict. He explained how in Croatia there existed only one nation, a nation with a common language, which

some (Croats) called the 'Croatian language' and others (Serbs) called the Serbian language. But the fact that it had two names did not mean to Radić that there were two languages. 'The name should not be a reason for dispute' (Radić, 1902a: 167). In the same way religion should not be the cause of argument between Croats and Serbs.

When in 1918 the issue of the creation of the South-Slav state became a reality, it did not take the form Radić had intended. Concerned by the events preceding the creation of Yugoslavia, Radić expressed his fears that the Serbs would not respond to the 'love of the Croats'. Moreover, Radić labeled as 'childish' the signing the Yugoslav Declaration at Corfu. He saw the Declaration as being shameful, because 'there is nothing more indecent, unjust and more harmful than a nation asking for subordination from one's own brother' (Radić, 1918f: 320). He could understand that the Serbian government was striving to unite all Serbs inside a single state, and held as natural that the president of thr Serbian government wanted the Serbian king as the head of that state. 'But it is not natural that a Croat like Ante Trumbić is in agreement with that' (Radić, 1918a: 301). Radić (1918g: 334) warned his compatriots: 'Don't rush like drunk geese into the fog!'

An ideal Yugoslav state for Radić would be one in which the true national names of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs would have equal rights and equal respect, and in which 'all that was created by that nation, good or bad, would be preserved and respected, in particular their history and literature' (Radić, 1918c: 307). He claimed that he was willing to promote a Yugoslav state abroad, but he also underlined the importance of preserving Croatian internal state borders. He warned those who wanted to erase all natural centennial and millennial internal borders and differences - borders which were 'not created by blood, but by God, nature and life' (*ibid.*) - that they would have to start with violence, civil war and slaughter. Radić clearly stated that the Croats wanted Croatian sovereignty, and that sovereignty would be achieved through an agreement. In response to government accusations, Radić (1918: 321) declared: 'they think that we are separatists. Of course we are!'

5.3.4. The Enemy

Two different views of the South-Slav union in two different periods - in the time of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and in the time of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia - influenced and shaped Radić's perception of Serbs. Radić did try to differentiate between Serbian leaders and politicians, and the Serbian masses, although not always successfully. As already pointed out, in Radić's early writings, the Croats and the Serbs were seen as two tribes from the same nation. Serbs were perceived as deriving from the same nation as Croats, speaking a common language, singing the same songs, enduring the same problems and having the same physical and spiritual needs as the Croats.

However, Radić was concerned at the possibility that the Serbs in Croatia did not perceive Croatia as their homeland. He asserted that it was not enough for the Croats that the Croatian Serbs were not acting against the interests of Croatia, 'we have to do everything so that they start to love Croatia as we do' (Radić, 1902a: 158). Radić demanded from Serbs to 'peacefully and willingly recognize Croatia as their homeland just as they recognized Hungary' (1902c: 202).

In the article which Radić wrote (1902e) in response to the *Srbobran*[52] article, he confessed that he had never conceived that he would write about the Serbs in that way. Radić understood the article as a declaration of war to the death from the Kingdom of Serbia. Yet, he did not accept the excuse that the declaration of war had originated from a few 'furious people': 'The Srbobran which was published in the middle of Zagreb, would not be able to print such articles (as it insults us in its every issue) if their subscribers did not agree with them - these subscribers are Serbs in Croatia' (*ibid.*: 237). Radić called for Croats to be cautious: 'We have to weaken the (Serbian) element: the stronger it becomes, the more dangerous it will be, and the harder it will be to resist' (*ibid.*: 236). He compared the Serbs to a snake winding its way into the Croatian heart, 'a snake which has prepared its poison and wants to inject it into our veins' (*ibid.*). The objective of

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[52] See p. 149.

the Serbs, Radić wrote, was no secret: 'firstly they wanted to weaken the Croats and, having done so, they would swallow them whole' (*ibid.*).

This was not just a protest against Serbian politicians. The Croats were called upon to prevent the Serbian 'offensive' against the Croats. Radić therefore called for the breaking of all links with the Serbs. He wanted everybody to rise up and boycott Serbian merchants, to fire all Serbs who were employed by Croats: 'do not give them a job, do not assist (...) a single Serb!' (*ibid.*). The Serbs became 'the evil and recalcitrant brothers'. From that point on, Croats were supposed to support their own - '*svoj k svomu*' - each for their own (*ibid.*).

The reason for the Serbs' hatred towards the Croats, Radić believed, was due to their over-developed self-confidence 'which was a natural consequence of strong historicism'[53] (*ibid.*: 267). The Serbs, Radić wrote (1917: 298), became megalomaniacs and were still living in the medieval empire of Dušan.[54] The Serbs from Croatia, Hungary and Bosnia were really only 'Dušanists' - working for the creation of a Great Serbian state.

The other main reason for the strong hatred between the Croatian and Serbian intelligentsia, Radić believed, was as a result of an experience of constant defeats and failures on both sides.

> In short: it is a general psychological phenomenon that the people exact their revenge on things weaker or lower than themselves (...). It is the same with nations. After great defeats or other failures, strong and centralized nations become savages; and when those still nationally unconscious nations experience a defeat - a violent tribal conflict starts. (Radić, 1902d: 269)

In the decades that followed, the idea of South-Slav unity lost its significance in Croatian political life. After a century of Croatian nationalist ideologies which, in one form or another, advocated Yugoslavism, the cleavages between the Croatian and the Serbian nation became clearer with the creation of the common state. Radić (1923c: 434) wrote: 'between us and Belgrade there exists not a wall or an

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[53] With the term historicism Radić mainly wanted to emphasise the Serb's national redefinition of their past.
[54] The Tsar Stefan Dušan Nemanjić (1331-55) was a creator of the strongest Serbian Kingdom.

abyss, but we are from fundamentally different worlds'. Two decades later, the Croats and Serbs were to really wage a war 'until extinction'.

5.3.5. Conclusion

Radić's nationalist ideology was the first to draw the broad support of the Croatian masses, yet it was also the first to work towards achieving such a goal. There were several reasons for its success.

Firstly, the new electoral system and the introduction of a system of universal suffrage had the effect of bringing the broad population directly into Croatian politics. The votes of the primary agents became the crucial factor for the success of any political party. However, at the same time, other parties, like the Party of Right, were not enjoying electoral success. It could therefore be concluded that the nationalist ideology of Stjepan Radić itself was the crucial element in attracting support. The social component of his ideology was closely interconnected with the nationalist part. Radić was also the first to include economic considerations into a nationalist ideology. The whole economy of Croatia at that time was based on agriculture. Hence, the peasantry was perceived as being the main element of society and consequently the most valuable part of the nation.

One should also take into account the specific circumstances of the peasantry after the First World War to understand the rapid success of the HSS. Four years of war had a serious and direct effect on the peasantry, as they were forced to play an active part on the battlefields and ended up suffering economic hardship. The creation of a new state only served to further provoke them. The attempt to introduce a draft-animal registration[55] proved to be the catalyst for a revolt in 1920 that lasted several days, and was violently crushed. Radić's clear anti-unification policy was a major factor which drew the support of the dissatisfied peasantry.

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[55] For more details, see Banac (1984: 248-260).

Radić also acted as a national educator. His aim was to teach the peasantry the meaning and importance of the nation. Radić had therefore firstly to define that particular nation. Radić defined the nation rather vaguely, in terms of national spirit and language. Language however could not serve as a strict distinguishing feature between the Croat and the Serb nations. Radić also refused to take into consideration religion as a national marker. Yet, the national spirit was defined through religious and moral life. When the Serbian nation was defined both by its religion and language, Radić viewed the *name* of the nation as being the clearest national indicator. The 'ancient name' - Croats - as Radić frequently referred to it, was the only marker which could clearly distinguish Croats from Serbs.

This vagueness in defining the nation was even more clearly reflected in his term 'political nation, which embraced all citizens of Croatia regardless of their 'ethnic' identity. However, Radić did not attempt to create an artificial ethnic nation. He respected and wanted to preserve all ethnic nations in Croatia. This brings into focus another national marker - the state. In Radić's nationalist ideology the nation state became the ultimate objective and the only guarantee for the preservation of the nation. The principle of self-determination offered him the ideological framework to achieve this.

Nevertheless, Radić's ideology introduced new elements into Croatian nationalist thought:

- While the previous nationalist ideologies in the nineteenth century strive to 'modernise' and 'Westernise' the Croatian nation, Radić was searching for an authentic nation. The source of authenticity was not found in distant history, but in culture and the way of life of the Croatian peasantry. Hence, the simplicity of peasant life, their morality and interests were proclaimed as the authentic national spirit.
- Radić's distinction between the ethnic and civic nation was not a novelty. However, the nationalist ideologies of the nineteenth century used the distinction in various ways in order to identify the place of the Croatian nation within the broader South Slav community. Radić, on the other hand, employed the distinction in order to enhance the unity of the Croatian

population. Ultimately, he developed a clear distinction between citizenship and nationality, both of which were based on the members' loyalty to the state.

- The state, therefore, became the central pillar of Radić's nationalist ideology. For the first time in Croatian history, without any reservation, the establishment of an independent Croatian state became the central national programme.

- Finally, Radić was the first nationalist ideologue that managed to successfully mobilise primary agents around his ideology. The reason for his success lay in his clear programme and vision of the future, simple rhetoric, and the employment of all necessary means so that his ideas could reach the broad Croatian population.

Radić and his nationalist ideology, facilitated the process of nation-formation. After his tragic death in the Belgrade parliament massacre in 1928, legends appeared. Since then, Radić has frequently been referred to as the 'father of the nation'. However, the Independent State of Croatia, created two decades later, in no way reflected the fulfilment of Radić's ideals.

5.4. Historical Background IV (1928-1941)

The massacre in the Belgrade Parliament in 1928 and the death of Stjepan Radić in particular, had the effect of polarizing the two main parties in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. This assassination of HSS MPs highlighted the level of deep intolerance, lack of understanding and enmity between the Government and the Croatian political leadership, and consequently served to fuel the activities of radical elements on both sides.

The death of the first real leader of the Croats provoked tremendous bitterness amongst the whole Croatian population, who viewed the massacre as an overt attack on the Croatian nation. This bitterness was mainly expressed through numerous demonstrations and clashes with the police. Members of parliament from the Peasant-Democratic Coalition severed any form of participation with

the government and refused to participate in the work of the parliament. Soon after, many other political and cultural organizations announced that they too were ceasing to co-operate with Belgrade. The most impressive demonstration occurred at Radić's funeral where more that 100,000 people gathered from all parts of Croatia to pay their respect to their leader and to express their political stance.

The reaction from King Aleksandar to this volatile and deteriorating situation was to proclaim a royal dictatorship on 6 January 1929. With this decree all political parties were abolished, as was the constitution, and Parliament was dissolved. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was officially renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The country was divided into nine provincial units (named *banovine*) each named after geographical features. On the same day the King introduced two laws: one setting out the King's authority (*Zakon o kraljevoj vlasti*), and one relating to the security of the state (*Zakon o zaštiti države*). These laws served to centralize power further into the King's hands. The courts made rulings 'in the name of the King', the King introduced laws by decree, and strong levels of censorship were introduced.

Against this backdrop, the emergence onto the Croatian political scene of a more radical and extremist nationalist movement - the Ustasha[56] Movement - came as no surprise. To a certain extent it can be argued that the formation of an illegal underground paramilitary organization such as the Ustasha Movement came as a direct result of the assassinations in Parliament and the introduction of the royal dictatorship. The leader and the founder of the Ustashas was Ante Pavelić, the president of the Main Council (*Glavni odbor*) of the Croatian Party of Right (*Hrvatska stranka prava* - HSP). The leaders of the HSP had as their primary political objective the formation of an independent and sovereign Croatian state. Pavelić was convinced that this task could only be accomplished through armed struggle. A day after the introduction of the royal dictatorship, on 7 January 1929, the Ustasha Croatian Liberation Movement was established in Zagreb. The movement proclaimed that: 'the Ustasha movement has as its main goal, the

liberation of Croatia from alien rule and the establishment of a completely free and independent state which will rule over all its national and historic territory' (in Tanner, 1997: 125). The Ustasha declared that they would consider all means to achieve this - including armed struggle.

Several days after the formal establishment of the Ustasha Movement, Ante Pavelić, in fear of being arrested and prosecuted, emigrated to Austria. Over the next few years, many supporters and members of the Ustasha Movement followed him. With the help of the Italian fascist regime, the Ustashas established several paramilitary training camps throughout Italy. Their actions were limited to terrorist activities in Yugoslavia. In 1932 the underground cells of the Ustasha Movement in Croatia organized an unsuccessful uprising in the region of Lika. Two years later, they assisted the VMRO[57] in assassinating King Aleksandar during an official visit in Marseilles. It was only during the Second World War, however, that the Ustasha Movement rose to become the major actor in Croatian politics.

At the end of the 1920s, all forms of political life in Yugoslavia were being suppressed by the royal dictatorship. With the establishment of the system of *banovina* Croatia was divided into four different provinces. In addition, the King introduced a national unitarism where the main Yugoslav nations - i.e. Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, Montenegrins and Macedonians - were considered as constituting a single Yugoslav nation. National particularities were not recognized and national symbols - such as flags, coats of arms and national anthems - were prohibited.

Under pressure from foreign powers, King Aleksandar, in a decree issued on 3 September 1931, introduced a new so-called 'Octroyd Constitution'. Enshrined in this new Constitution was the division of Parliament into two executive

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[56] In the Croatian language, the Ustasha means insurgents, those who take part in an uprising - ustanak.
[57] The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (VMRO) was organised in 1893 in Ottoman Macedinia. For more about it, see Lampe (2000: 90-92).

bodies, the National Parliament and Senate.[58] Elections were not anonymous and only males over the age of 21 were enfranchised. The 1931 Constitution codified the establishment of a centralized system, along with the principle of an integral Yugoslavism and royal absolutism. The persecution of Croatian nationalists and government opponents continued, many were killed by the police. In spite of this, political life in Croatia was quickly renewed.

After the death of Stjepan Radić, his close associate Vlatko Maček took over the leadership of the Croatian Peasant Party. One of his first declarations - the *Zagrebačke punktacije* proclamation,[59] in which he condemned the royal dictatorship and Serbian hegemonic rule - resulted in his immediate imprisonment (he remained incarcerated for two years). This, however, did not result in a reduction in popular support among Croatians for the HSS's policies.

After the assassination of King Aleksandar in Marseilles his brother Pavle took the position of Regent since the actual heir to the throne, Petar, was still a minor. Duke Pavle appointed Bogoljub Jevtić as a prime minister, and in May 1935 elections for the National Parliament were held. The Regent wanted to lessen the severity of the dictatorship he inherited, and in one of his first acts he issued a decree to release political prisoners. After a six-year absence, political parties re-appeared on the Yugoslav political scene. In the 1935 elections a united opposition list presented itself as an alternative to the government's list. Although the voting was still not anonymous, the government used all the means at their disposal to win the elections. The 'government's list' won 60.6 per cent of the vote, while the United Opposition gained 37.4 per cent.

Only a couple of weeks after the elections, determined to continue the process of change in the political system, the Regent Pavle appointed Milan Stojadinović to form a new government, signalling a change in the government's strategy. After only a few months in power, Stojadinović publicly recognized the existence of a 'Croatian question'. This was also the first statement since 1929 in which the

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[58] The National Parliament had 305 members which were to be elected in Banovinas. Each Banovina had a set number of representatives. One senator needed 300,000 votes to be elected, and for every elected candidate the King had a right to place his own candidate.

government referred to a specific nation, in this case the Croatian nation, other than to the unitarist and constitutional concept of the Yugoslav nation.

At the same time, according to Seton-Watson's estimations (1937: 105), Maček had 'at least 90 per cent of the electorate in Croatia and Dalmatia solidly behind him'. The Croatian masses perceived Maček as a faithful follower of Radić's teaching and they accepted him not as party leader, but as a national leader. The HSS was therefore undergoing a process of rejuvenation.

The new government was perceived by the HSS leadership as an anti-Croat bloc. Nevertheless, a slight shift in the government's attitude towards the Croats was noticeable. Over the next few years, Stojadinović attempted to set up several meetings with Maček in the hope of achieving some level of agreement with the Croatian side. In October 1937, after several unsuccessful attempts, representatives of three Serbian political parties and the Peasant Democratic Coalition (SDK) - which made up the bulk of the opposition in Croatia - met in a village called Farkašić and reached an agreement, according to which a new government would be appointed. One of its first tasks was the passing of a temporary law abolishing the 1931 constitution. On the same day as the establishment of this new government, new elections were announced. The new constitution, according to the agreement, was to be proclaimed only with the agreement of the majority of Croats, Slovenes and Serbs. This agreement was an attempt to resurrect a parliamentary system in Yugoslavia, but its success was entirely dependent on the Regent Pavle. As one might expect, the Regent did not favour the abolition of the very constitution which legalized and legitimized his power.

By 1938 the government was experiencing high levels of opposition and dissent, not only from Croats but also from the Serbs. Stojadinović was criticized for his undemocratic methods and for his dictatorial behavior. In addition, the Serbian opposition parties were against Stojadinović's foreign policy which was orientated towards fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. This widespread criticism

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[59] For more about the content of 'Zagrebačke punktacije', see Matković (1995: 135-137).

forced the Regent Pavle to announce early elections which were held on 11 December 1938. Even though the government won 54 per cent and the opposition 44 per cent of the votes, according to the existing constitution, the government won 306 seats while the opposition gained only 67. The HSS won their highest share of the votes ever. The elections demonstrated a radical decline in support for the government throughout the Kingdom. In January 1939 Stojadinović offered his resignation.[60] The Regent Pavle offered the position of prime minister to Dragiša Cvetković. The first major test for the new government was the achievement of an agreement with Maček.

On 14 August 1939 the leaders of the government and the Croatian opposition reached an agreement later known as the 'Cvetković-Maček agreement'. Since the Regent Pavle was opposed to changing the constitution until King Petar had reached maturity, the agreed restructuring of the Kingdom's political system was made within the framework of the existing constitution. For the Croats, the most important change was the establishment of the *Banovina* Croatia with Zagreb as its capital. The *Banovina's* territory comprised Croatia, Dalmatia and Herzegovina. The *Banovina* had jurisdiction over major internal policies, while foreign, military and transport policy, as well as control over common finances, remained in the hands of the central government in Belgrade. The legislature of the Croatian *Banovina* was under the jurisdiction of the newly recreated Croatian *Sabor* and the King. The King was also responsible for the appointment of the *ban*, who held the main executive position in the *Banovina*. The judiciary of the *Banovina* was entirely independent.

The establishment of the *Banovina* Croatia put the HSS and its leaders in a powerful position inside the *Banovina's* borders. Through the medium of cultural and political organizations (such as *Seljačka sloga* - The Peasant Accord, and *Hrvatski radnički savez* - The Croatian Workers Union) as well as newspapers (like *Seljački dom* - The Peasant Home, and *Hrvatski dnevnik* - The Croatian Daily) the HSS succeeded in influencing the opinion of a large proportion of the Croatian population. The HSS also established paramilitary organizations: in the

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[60] For more about the events which preceded this resignation, see Matković (1995: 150).

villages they were known as *Hrvatska seljačka zaštita* (The Croatia Peasant Protection) and in the cities - *Hrvatska građanska zaštita* (The Croatian Civil Protection). These paramilitary organizations were established in 1935 with the aim of controlling security during party rallies. Initially they were armed only with canes, but with the establishment of the *Banovina* they were allowed to carry weapons.

Not surprisingly there were many opponents to the establishment of the *Banovina* Croatia both within the Serbian and Croatian opposition. Among the Croats, the strongest opponents were the Ustasha Movement and the Communist Party.[61] The leaders of the Ustasha Movement were strongly opposed to any cooperation with the Belgrade Government, advocating the establishment of an independent state of Croatia. The Communist Party perceived the Cvetković-Maček agreement as an agreement between the Serbian and Croatian bourgeoisie against the interests of oppressed masses. These two groups were to play key roles during the war.

In 1941, after Bulgaria joined the Tripartite Pact, Hitler turned his attention to Yugoslavia, putting great pressure on the Yugoslav government and the Regent Pavle to join forces with the Nazis. On 25 March 1941 the government of Cvetković-Maček signed the Tripartite Pact. This act provoked strong levels of resistance within the Yugoslav army, which carried out a successful *coup d'etat* on 27 March 1941.[62] The instigators of the coup installed seventeen-year-old Petar as the new King of Yugoslavia. As a result the leaders of the HSS found themselves in a political quandary. The leaders of the coup opposed the Cvetković-Maček agreement, and the HSS was therefore worried it might lose the autonomy which it had achieved within the *Banovina* Croatia. On the other hand, to oppose the leaders of the coup would by implication associate them with Hitler. Maček therefore, chose to go to Belgrade to join the new cabinet in the hope that the government would strike an agreement with Hitler to avoid war.

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[61] The establishment and activities of the Yugoslav Communist Party will be discussed in more detail the next chapter.

[62] For more about the coup d'etat, see Tanner, 1997: 138.

On 6 April 1941 Germany declared war on Yugoslavia and by 17 April representatives of the government had already signed an unconditional surrender. The King and the cabinet fled to Britain.

As early as 10 April 1941, with the entry of the first German tanks into Zagreb, Slavko Kvaternik - Pavelić's most influential supporter in Croatia - proclaimed the establishment of the 'Independent State of Croatia' (*Nezavisna država Hrvatska* - NDH). Pavelić, along with 250 Ustashas, returned to Croatia from Italy a few days later, and unilaterally declared himself to be the new *poglavnik* (leader).

The Ustasha leaders were to pay a heavy price for establishing the NDH. According to the terms of the 'Rome agreement' signed on 18 May 1941 with Italy, the majority of Dalmatia along with the city Rijeka was annexed by Italy. Croatia was divided by Italy and Germany into two 'spheres of influence'. In addition the regions of Međumurje and Baranja were handed to Hungary. Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, did become part of the NDH.

Map 7. Independent State of Croatia 1941-1945 (Lampe, 2000: 204)

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The first days of Ustasha rule made it clear that the NDH was to be a 'carbon copy of Nazi Germany' (Tanner, 1997: 144). Even though Pavelić summoned the Croatian *Sabor*, in practice it had no authority. The Poglavnik ruled through decrees. Opposition political party activity was forbidden.[63] The first article of the decree issued on 17 April stated: 'One who violates or has violated the honor and interests of the Croatian nation in any way, or who has endangered the survival of the NDH or state government, even if such an act was only attempted, is guilty of high treason' (NDH, 1941a: 149). The second article clearly stated that the only punishment for high treason was the death penalty. Two days later Pavelić proclaimed another decree according to which all transactions between Jews, or Jews and Croats undertaken during the period between February-April 1941, were declared as void contracts (NDH, 1941b: 151). The Poglavnik abandoned the use of Cyrillic (NDH, 1941c: 151) and within the ministry of theology and education he established the Croatian state office for language (NDH, 1941d: 155). New anti-Semitic laws were proclaimed soon after: the decree of "racial classification" (NDH, 1941f), the decree of 'protection of the Aryan blood and honor of the Croatian nation' (NDH, 1941g), the decree requiring Jews to wear a yellow star (NDH, 1941k) and the decree confiscating Jewish property (NDH, 1941l).

The Ustasha regime ruled through terror and, mirroring Nazi Germany, it systematically carried out a policy of genocide against Serbs, Jews, Gypsies and all other opponents of the NDH regime. As part of this policy the Ustashas established concentration camps among which Jasenovac was the most notorious.[64] In the first months of the new regime, the Ustashas had already committed many massacres among the Serbian population.[65] The Ustashas also exhibited equal brutality towards those Croats who opposed to the regime.

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[63] In April 1941 Maček, the most prominent leader of the Croats, pleaded for obedience and co-operation with the new government. Yet he refused to actively participate in the government. Later, Pavelić imprisoned him in the Jasenovac concentration camp and then at Maček's home; all political activity was forbidden to him.

[64] The question about the number of victims in Jasenovac is still an issue among the historians. The number varies from 40,000 to 700,000 victims.

[65] According to Tanner (1997: 152), during the summer months of 1941 at least 20,000 Serbs were killed.

Historians[66] argue that the Ustasha Movement lacked a broad popular base. Even though many Croats supported the establishment of the NDH as the achievement of a 'thousand year old dream' of an independent Croatian state, after just a few months of Ustasha rule many were disillusioned. The loss of most of Dalmatia, Croatia's dependence on the two fascist powers, and the brutality of the regime, created strong feelings of opposition. The Ustasha Movement and Ante Pavelić himself did not attract many supporters on the basis of their nationalist or racist ideology.

At the end of the 1930s and after twenty years of direct conflict between the state-ruling and state-opposing corporate agents it looked as if the demands of the Croatian national leadership found an accommodation within the Yugoslav framework. Maček and HSS found themselves enjoying substantial autonomy in ruling the Croatian *Banovina*. The break-up of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1941 was not a consequence of internal strife, but of external military forces. Without these the Ustashas would have had a very slim chance for becoming a significant political force.

After just thirty years Croatian society experienced another wave of social change:

- The new ruling corporate agency, backed up by German and Italian guns, eliminated all competition. Its main task was the formation of a solid base by recruiting new members of the movement and strengthening its organisation. In order to preserve its position, it also undertook extensive reformation of Croatian society.
- For the first time in eight hundred years, the Ustashas claimed, the Croats gained their own state. Even though this state was heavily dependent on the support of its real creators, Italy and Germany, it required the formation of certain state institutions. Hence a new national army was established, a national currency introduced, and the educational system was reorganised.
- At the same time all cultural institutions were 'nationalised'. 'Foreign elements' were expelled from schools, newpapers, and theatres. The school

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[66] For example Tanner (1997: 154).

curriculum was designed to educate the youth in the 'Ustasha spirit'.[67] All newspapers and publications were controlled and censored. Croatian national culture was redefined. The Croatian language was 'purified' of foreign, especially Serbian, influences; Croatian history was rewritten.

All of these changes were justified by the developed nationalist ideology.

5.5. The Nationalist Ideology of the Ustasha Movement

'The crucifix, the dagger and the revolver
are the holy trinity for the Ustashas'
(NDH, 1942c: 265).

At the time the Ustashas established their totalitarian state, they were a small paramilitary group of relativelly well-organized nationalist extremists. The independent Croatian state they set up was one in which the great majority of the population still supported the HSS and its leader Maček. Since the formation of the Ustasha Movement in 1929, the Yugoslav authorities had made great efforts to suppress any Ustasha activities. Many of their supporters were prosecuted and some were executed.[68] Under such strong levels of repression, Ustasha supporters could only print their pamphlets and leaflets underground, with a limited circulation. The main Ustasha activities took place outside Yugoslav borders. As a result, the majority of the Croatian population was ignorant of their aims and ideology. Even the Ustasha's seizure of power in April 1941 did not happen by the will of the Croatian population, but through the support of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. The Ustashas therefore realized that they needed to put great efforts into 're-educating' the Croatian masses.

The nationalist ideology of the Ustasha Movement was based on the concept of both internal and external enemies; Nazi ideology served as a blueprint. The

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[67] See Chapter 7.
[68] The assassination of the Croatian historian Milan Šufflay was to play an important role in the creation of the myth of Ustasha martyrdom (Banac, 1995).

definition of the nation in general and the Croatian nation in particular was formulated in the Nazi vocabulary. For the first time in the history of the development of Croatian nationalist ideologies, the notion of 'race' was introduced. The concept of the nation was defined in terms of blood and origins.

In the following chapter the Ustasha's nationalist ideology will be analyzed through the writings of Ante Pavelić and other Ustasha officials, as well as through an analysis of their proclamations, decrees and laws.

5.5.1. The Concept of the Nation

Some authors[69] argue that the Ustasha Movement never developed a clearly defined nationalist ideology and was 'unable to create a coherent doctrine of its own and to synthesize different influences into a whole' (Djilas, 1991: 114). Djilas (*ibid.*) described the Ustasha Movement as a form of 'pseudo-romantic, populist terrorist nationalism'. Without wishing to enter the current debate concerning whether the Ustashas were true fascists or not, it would be interesting at this point to analyze the Ustasha's concept of the nation. It should be noted though that the concept of the nation in general is mainly developed in parallel with the definition of the Croatian nation.

In the 'Principles of the Croatian Ustasha Movement', published in 1933, Pavelić attempted to define and explain the nature of the Croatian nation in 17 points. The Principles (NDH, 1933: 57) defined the Croatian nation as a 'self-conscious national (ethnic) unit; a nation-in-itself, (...) identical to no other nation, (...) not part of a tribe or of any other nation'. Among Croats, their awareness of a common national sense of belonging was the result of several different factors. The Principles argued that individually these factors, 'cannot characterize a nation, but all together (...) they comprise the essence of every nation' (*ibid.*).

The first factor determining Croatian national self-awareness is its very origin and name. In the Principles, Pavelić argues that the Croatian nation has never had

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[69] Djilas (1991) for example.

any title other than 'Croat'. Its origins do not derive from other nations, nor it has ever been a part of another nation. The Croatian nation came to its present homeland from its native country as an organized national group named 'the Croats'. Pavelić thus introduced a new myth concerning the origins of the Croatian nation: claimed that the Croatian name was of Iranian origin.[70] For the first time, a Croatian nationalist ideology viewed the Croatian nation as being separate and distinct from the rest of the South Slav community, and especially from the Serbs. Hence for Pavelić, to deny such a 'pure uncorrupted and holy' name would mean to deny one's own individuality, to become, as he called it, a 'spiritual fraction' (*ibid.*: 61).

The other causes influencing Croatian national self-awareness, the Poglavnik argued, were: 'a collective feeling of historical destiny, a shared innate understanding of Croatian statehood, and common folk cultural creations and traditions' (*ibid.*: 57). The Principles argued that a nation's traditions, achievements and creations, have a common source which demonstrates the 'natural uniqueness of everything produced by the spirit and strength of that nation' (*ibid.*). Hence, the variety of national cultural creativity was not interpreted as a sign of national disunity, but rather as a sign of the creative strength of the Croatian spirit.

The Ustasha's leaders placed great emphasis on the notions of 'the homeland' and 'territory' in the creation of the Croatian nation. Their ideology stated that the bond a nation has with its territory is unbreakable: 'The land gave its soul to the nation, it built the national character, determined its national habits and its way of life' (*ibid.*: 61). With this anthropo-geographical notion of the nation's bond to its homeland, Pavelić was highlighting the divine nature of the nation, viewing 'the homeland' as the nation's most precious value.

Following the teachings of Ante Starčević, Pavelić, at least in theory, denied any importance of religion in national identification. The reasons were rather of a

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[70] The theory according to which the Croats are of Iranian descent is derived from the fact that the word Hrvat or Horvat is not of Slav origin. 'Some scholars opted for the Iranian theory, pointing

practical nature. According to Pavelić historical circumstances had compelled the Croats to accept other religions and as a result of this, he talks about Croats of Catholic, Muslim, Evangelist and Orthodox faith, since 'it is in the interests of the state not to have any (...) religious conflicts' (Pavelić, 1942b: 240). This practical religious tolerance was broadly employed regarding Bosnian Muslims. Pavelić claimed that the 'Muslim blood in our Muslims is Croatian blood' (*ibid.*: 241). In accordance with this argument in 1942 Pavelić established the so-called 'Croatian Orthodox Church' (NDH, 1942b: 262). He explained that Croats have nothing against the Orthodox Church in general and demonstrated his 'tolerance' stating that 'one prays to God according to one's own conscience and according to the way one has been taught during one's youth and at school' (Pavelić, 1942b: 241). Since the Orthodox churches were in effect national churches, Pavelić concluded that in Croatia there could only be a Croatian Orthodox Church (*ibid.*: 242).

One of the main features of the Ustasha's concept of the nation in general and the Croatian nation in particular, was that the national character was derived from the characteristics of the land on which a nation lives. Pavelić described the national character of the Croats (1929: 32) as having been imbued by Western culture with 'all the characteristics of a civilized and honest nation'. The Croatian nation is a part of Western-European civilization because it possesses a national sense of affiliation to that civilization, and because of its Western-oriented Church (*ibid.*). This nation, Pavelić argued, is striving for a peaceful and cultural life which suits its non-violent defensive nature (*ibid.*: 28).

The most efficient means for ensuring national preservation, according to Pavelić, was within a national state. Hence, the right to be part of an independent nation state is the 'ultimate and holiest right' (NDH, 1933: 71). This right legitimized the use of all means necessary to secure the freedom and independence of the Croatian nation (*ibid.*). With the aim of establishing an independent Croatian state, the Ustasha Movement wrote a codex which was intended to serve as a guide to every Croat. In 1933 Pavelić wrote: 'We are

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to Greek accounts of the Horvatos, or Horoatos, a community of Iranians who lived at the mouth

building a state of law and order, of submission and discipline! We are all equal in front of the state and the Poglavnik.' (NDH, 1933: 82). Such a state is imagined as a big national family: 'We all know that in every house there is one who commands and others who listen, so it is natural that the same principle should be valid for a state' (*ibid.*: 83).

The Ustasha's leadership introduced new symbols to Croatian 'revolutionary fighters': the crucifix, the dagger and the revolver. In 1942 the journal 'Ustasha' (NDH, 1942c: 265) explained:

> We Croats are not such a religious nation, however we are also not religious hypocrites, but we are neither infidels nor atheists. It is normal that a nation which has stood for centuries on the ramparts of Western culture has more fighters that saints. While other nations were fighting for their own personal benefits, the Croats had to fight for Croatia.

The article explained that the crucifix gives an Ustasha the courage to fulfill his duty to the Poglavnik. The dagger was needed as 'to break a chain one needs something sharp' (*ibid.*). The author warned that an Ustasha does not carry a dagger as jewellery, but to help him in close combat. 'The crucifix, the dagger and the revolver are the holy trinity for the Ustashas' (*ibid.*). The strategy for the struggle for independence was set. Pavelić was convinced that there was not one Ustasha who would be reluctant to take a machine gun, a bomb or a sharp knife, because 'every person in whom the Croatian blood is boiling is striving to enter the battlefield to carry out his oath, and to carry out the oaths of his forefathers' (*ibid.*: 56).

To a great extent, one could argue that the creation of the Ustasha radical nationalist ideology was influenced by the political circumstances existing in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Hence, it is important to analyze the way the Ustasha leaders perceived Yugoslavia and the position of the Croatian nation within its borders.

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of the Don around 200 BC' (Tanner, 1997: 3).

5.5.2. The Croats in Yugoslavia

For the Ustashas the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was a 'prison of nations'. The Ustasha Movement regarded the first decade of the existence of Yugoslavia as proof that Croats and Serbs could not live in the same state. The Yugoslav concept was considered as a criminal ideal 'which held that the Croatian nation had to deny its ancient name and to baptize itself with a new 'Yugoslav' name (Pavelić, 1928: 15). The adoption of the new name, however meant for Pavelić an attempt to 'erase the Croatian past and all those achievements which are linked to the honorable Croatian name' (*ibid.*). For Pavelić the first decade of Yugoslavia was a bloody and terrible experience and those years were to be 'written in Croatian history in black letters, black letters of devastation, hunger, backwardness and the presence of every evil' (*ibid.*: 17).

The establishment of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was perceived by the Ustashas as a criminal attempt to rid the Croatian nation of its national identity. The whole Yugoslav political system, Pavelić argued, was created to achieve those ends. The monarch was described as a 'butcher-clown' (Bzik, n/a: 19), the Serbian state apparatus as corrupt and unqualified (Pavelić, 1929: 30), the government as the 'violent Serbian beast which spilled the priceless blood of Croatian martyrs and which took the lives of its most valuable fighters' (Bzik, n/a: 20).

However, Pavelić held that the Serbian attempt to rid the Croats of their identity was an ancient plan, already initiated in previous centuries. The Poglavnik (Pavelić, 1929: 29) described how the Karađorđević dynasty had 'parked themselves on a bloody throne'. From that time, their propaganda spread the idea of Serbdom and Serbian nationality among the Orthodox population settled in Croatian territory 'who until then had considered themselves as Croatian' (*ibid.*). Furthermore, it was argued that the aim of the propaganda was also to win over the Croats to the Serbian concept. Serbian propaganda 'invented different terminologies such as the so-called Serbo-Croatdom and Yugoslavism' (*ibid.*) with the aim of proving how the Croats and Serbs were a single nation and that they belonged to a single state.

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An attempt to create a Yugoslav nation was considered unnatural by the Poglavnik. It was 'history, culture and race that formed the Croats' self-conscious national individuality, this cannot be either hushed up or destroyed' (Pavelić, 1936: 96). Hence, any alteration to the nation was considered as impossible since 'that would mean the complete destruction of the moral and economic values of the Croatian nation' (*ibid*.: 97). For more than a thousand years, Pavelić concluded, the Croats had been standing on one side and the Serbs on the other as neighbours, separated by a clearly marked border. That border is also a 'border between the East and the West' (*ibid*.). In the following years Pavelić put great efforts into marking out the border in clear and unambiguous forms.

When a radical nationalist ideology formulates its concept of the nation in general and its own nation in particular in terms such as those employed by the Ustasha Movement, the question of the enemies 'naturally' appears. Moreover, an ideology of this type requires enemies in order to forge national unity, to justify its own actions and, consequently, to justify eventual failures. The Ustasha Movement defined its enemies in systematic and very clear terms.

5.5.3. The Enemies

In the Ustasha's ideology the enemies of the nation ware almost a natural consequence of the formation of the nation. Even in their *Principles* the felt it necessary to explain that 'as soon as a nation realized the value and power of its national consciousness, the importance and the beauty of its own language or the importance of its own name, this created a desire on the part of the enemy to diminish, to weaken, to deny or to destroy those same values ' (NDH, 1933: 60).

In an article entitled 'The Croatian Question' published in German in 1936 Pavelić listed the 'enemies of the Croatian Liberation Movement' (Pavelić, 1936: 103). The first enemy was the Serbian state government, the second were the Jews, the third was international Freemasonry, and the fourth was communism.

The Serbs

By the end of the 1920s Pavelić proclaimed the Serbian Government to be the greatest enemy of the Croatian nation. Yet, as soon as Yugoslavia collapsed and the NDH was established it became clear that the Ustashas considered not only the Serbian government, but the whole Serbian nation as its enemy. The Ustashas did not categorize the Serbs as an inferior race, nor did they consider them as a separate racial group. The 'sins' of the Serbs were founded in history. It could be argued that in some ways the genocide against the Serbs was a form of revenge driven by pure hatred.

The Ustashas created a black-and-white picture in which the Serbs were portrayed as having all possible negative characteristics while, of course, the Croats were viewed in opposite terms. The major distinction drawn between the two was the difference in their origins in the East and West. For Pavelić it was important to emphasize that the Croatian nation belonged to Western civilization, in order to distinguish itself from the Serb's Eastern origins. The term 'Byzantism' became a pejorative term to describe the Serbs: 'Serbian Byzantism' (Pavelić, 1929: 33) was used to single out a 'perfidious, mediocre nation lacking integrity' (*ibid*.: 40). The Serbs were described as 'a nation without pride who, when they wished, presented themselves as being submissive, to enable them later to stick a knife in the back of an adversary. When they feel secure, then they are ruthless and without feelings'.

The Serbs were also described as being a chauvinistic nation which suffered from 'Serbian megalomania' (*ibid*.: 39). They were an uncivilized nation without a spiritual or material culture (*ibid*., 40). For Pavelić the conclusion was clear: 'The Serbs are a nation of Eastern culture and they are educated as pure Byzantine members of the Orthodox church and thus, they are eternal enemies of Western civilization and Catholicism' (*ibid*.: 39).

As soon as the Ustashas established their state they undertook large-scale massacres of Serbs. The number of Serbian victims within the territory of the NDH is still a matter of conjecture. The number ranges from a million to around

twenty thousand. Djilas used the approximate figure quoted by the Serbian scholar Bogoljub Kočović, who calculated that 'Serb' losses in Croatia numbered 125,000, or 17.5 per cent of the entire Serb population there, while in Bosnia-Herzegovina the number was 209,000, or 16.7 per cent' (Djilas, 1991: 126). Irrespective of the actual number of war victims, the fact remains that executions of Serbs, Jews, Gypsies and Communists by the Ustasha were systematic and organized, carried out with the expressed aim of 'purifying the Croatian nation of foreign influences', or to put it in other terms: genocide.

The Jews

Even though anti-Semitic attitudes were present in earlier Croatian nationalist ideologies, the Ustasha Movement introduced for the first time anti-Semitic attitudes based on racist assumptions. Racism, in the Ustasha's ideology, was justified by the 'interests of the nation'. In the *Principles* Pavelić states that a nation which desired to preserve its national individuality could not grant the same rights to those who were of 'foreign race as it could to people with the same ancestry and the same racial structure' (NDH, 1941h: 165). Moreover, those 'racial foreign elements' could not be involved in governing the nation and enhancing its national culture, because 'that would lead to a deviation from the way of life of the nation and would thus direct the nation into nationally foreign ways in conflict with the tradition of the nation and against the national spirit' (*ibid.*).

The Ustashas denied that they were racists. They justified this position arguing that biology does not classify according to any values but it just determines the facts. Therefore, the true racists were the Jews themselves who 'singled themselves out as the chosen people in their religious texts, which were also the basis of their life as a nation' (*ibid.*). According to the *Interpretation of the Racial Laws,* a special Croatian race did not exist. The Croats, 'just like other European nations were a mixture of the Nordic, Dynaroid, Alpic, Baltic and Mediterranean races with a very small input from other races' (*ibid.*: 166). The Jews on the other hand, the *Interpretation* continued, are a mixture of Oriental and Middle-Eastern

races with some input from the Mongol and Negroid races. However, as Pavlić argued 'the Jews do have around 20 per cent European origin' (*ibid.*: 167). This 20 per cent 'Aryan' blood in the Jewish race, according to the Ustasha 'experts on racial questions', opened a loophole for recognizing some Jews as Aryans. The criteria of an 'Aryan Jew' were founded on behaviour: 'If a Jew has suffered and sacrificed himself for years, and if that Jew has lived in poverty and risked his own life for a divine cause (...) then he passes the test which proves that he possesses the moral fiber which characterizes the Aryan community; it proves that he is a person in whom the Aryan inherited traits are dominant' (*ibid.*: 168). It would be naive to believe that the introduction of the 'Aryan Jew' category into the Ustasha's ideology was a sign of their 'flexibility' towards the Jews. Rather, it was used to explain and justify the fact that some of the prominent Croatian nationalists were Jews, such as Josip Frank the leader of the Croatian Pure Party of Right.

According to some authors,[71] the Ustasha Movement never developed a coherent racist theory. In practice however, there was little ambiguity in their actions.[72] The Ustasha's 'solution' was a radical one: 'Every Aryan national state has to get rid off non-Aryan elements, especially Jews who are constantly striving for the key positions and are attempting to influence the population with their political and moral principles in order to exploit the host nation' (*ibid.*: 168). Only nine days after the establishment of the NDH the Poglavnik published a decree stating that all transactions between the Jews and Croats were deemed invalid. Fifteen days later the decrees of 'racial affiliation' and of 'protection of the Aryan blood' were published. Those decrees determined who was to be classified as Jewish, as well as prohibiting mixed marriages and any relationship between a Jew and a member of the Aryan race. Soon after, the NDH authorities introduced the Yellow Star as the symbol for all Jews 'so that everybody could immediately recognize a Jew' (NDH, 1941k: 173), and they also forced Jews to resettle away from certain areas in Zagreb. The other decree demanded that all Jewish property had to be declared to the authorities (NDH, 1941l, 195). On 5 June 1941 Pavelić

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[71] See Djilas (1991: 119).

[72] Around 80 per cent of the Jewish population in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were killed during the Second World War (Tanner, 1997: 149).

issued an order according to which the racial origin of every state employee had to be determined (NDH, 1941m: 202).[73]

In 1936 Pavelić (1936: 105) declared that in Croatia all finance, journalism and trade were in 'Jewish hands'. The Jews, just like the communists, were identified as being pro-Yugoslav. The Jews were described as 'tough and destructive, malicious and extraordinarily skilled, the enemies of all nations except their own' (NDH, 1933: 76). The Poglavnik explained that the Jews:

> like dangerous parasites are attached to the bodies of all the nations, they are sucking the juices out of host nations and in so doing they are destroying those nations economically, politically, culturally and morally. They have never acted as an organized power, yet they have been the most organized power in the world. Even though nothing was sacred to them, they considered as sacred everything which led them to their ultimate aim: the exploitation and enslavement of the entire world.' (*ibid.*)

Hence, it was no surprise that for the Poglavnik the basic principle of the development of the Croatian nation was the requirement 'to eradicate those lethal parasites quickly and efficiently from the Croatian national body' (*ibid.*: 77).

Communists, Freemasons, Intelligentsia ...

The Ustasha's radical nationalist ideology was extremely anti-intellectual. Moreover, they regarded the peasantry as the foundation and source of 'national life and, as such, the peasants are the basis of state power in the Croatian land' (NDH, 1933: 77). They believed that in ninety cases out of a hundred, one who does not originate from a peasant family is not of Croatian descent or blood, but an immigrant. These immigrants or descendants of immigrants were perceived as the source of all the ideas which were destroying 'the Croatian national body'.

In his speech to the Croatian *Sabor* in 1942 Pavelić (1942a: 248) stated that the whole communist contingent in Croatia was comprised of intellectuals. The intelligentsia was responsible for the creation of Yugoslavia and the communists

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[73] According to this order the racial membership was to be marked in fractions. It gives an example: fraternal grandfather Aryan, fraternal grandmother Jew, mother Jew = 3/4 Jew, 1/4

were guilty of promoting the idea of Yugoslavia. Thus, the Ustashas viewed fascism not as the antithesis to democracy, but as a 'direct descendent of the democratic idea and as an antithesis to communism' (Pavelić, 1938: 110).

In Yugoslavia, as the Second World War progressed, the Partisans - led and organized in the main by the Yugoslav Communist Party - grew ever stronger. They constituted in effect the only real threat to the Ustashas. The Partisans were described in Ustasha propaganda as an 'element of destruction, an element of the worst terror, an element of the worst barbarity, which could only appear in a society during times of war' (Kovačević, 1943: 320). The Partisans were portrayed as being full of hatred for everything Croatian, and as being a direct threat to the Croatian nation and state. The Ustasha leaders could not reconcile the fact that many Croats had joined and, in many cases, established Partisans' groups throughout Croatia. The only explanation for the emergence of the Partisans on Croatian territory was that they were led by 'Jews and other non-Croats' (*ibid.*: 321). In 1944 Pavelić (1944: 327) asserted that a struggle for the salvation of the Croatian nation and Croatian land could not be waged with a 'tambourine or prayer book in one's hand'. He held that all political means had been exhausted and that 'those who want to continue the fight for the Croatian lands and the Croatian nation through political means, are not fighters but enemy agents' (*ibid.*).

Another enemy identified as being responsible for the creation of Yugoslavia were the Freemasons. The Poglavnik held that the whole of Yugoslavia lay in their hands: 'Every individual who has held any position of political importance since the creation of Yugoslavia has been a Freemason. The main patron of Yugoslavian Freemasonry is the Karađorđević dynasty' (Pavelić, 1936: 103).

The Ustasha Movement identified a wide range of enemies. Yet the only true external enemy was the Serbian Government. In spite of this, with the establishment of the NDH the Ustashas embarked on a full-scale attack against any opponent to their ideology. Pavelić emphasized that the Ustasha Movement

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Aryan (NDH, 1941m: 203).

'is fighting for the complete liberation of Croatia and for the creation of an internal order and system which would be based on healthy nationalist principles' (*ibid*.: 104). For the Ustashas, therefore, a direct corollary to their primary objective of achieving the complete liberation of the Croatian nation, involved the destruction of any other nationalities and ideologies within NDH borders. Indeed, during the four years of its existence, the Ustashas made great efforts to achieve this objective; its success can be measured by its hundreds of thousand of victims.

5.5.4. Conclusion

The Ustasha Movement attempted to justify its bloody actions through its concept of the nation. The nation, defined as a community of blood and common spirit, required a state for its protection. The 'pollution' of the Croatian blood, along with the influence of foreign cultures were identified as the main threat to the survival of a nation. The establishment of an Independent State of Croatia, it was believed, would prevent the continued dilution of Croatian blood, and would purify the spirit of the Croatian nation. The Ustasha Movement created what can be termed the 'cult of the state'. The state was the fulfillment of 'an eight-hundred-year long dream of the Croatian nation'. It, therefore, became the ultimate value which all Croats were to defend and protect from all of its enemies.

The Ustashas used 'biology' to justify their atrocities. For the first time in the development of Croatian nationalist ideologies, the Ustashas introduced the term 'race' into the ideological vocabulary. Previously, the term 'race' had been used to identify national groups such as the 'Slav race' where the main criterion was cultural similarity. The Ustashas used the term 'race' to categorize a social group which shared inherited characteristics, which in turn determined the behaviour of the group. Within this perspective, an individual becomes a member of a 'racial group' by birth, a membership which was considered to be everlasting. For the first time an individual became an enemy of the Croatian nation purely by being born as a member of another 'race' or nation.

The Ustashas attempted to rally the masses against a long list of internal enemies. In the tradition of the Croatian Peasant Party, the Ustasha Movement defined the Croatian nation as a peasant nation. They also created an ideal picture of the Croatian 'way of life' based on the patriarchal family, on Christian values and on the essential bond of the peasantry to the land. Anyone who did not match this ideal was proclaimed as an enemy of the nation. The state employed all means necessary to purify the Croatian nation of all non-Croatian influences. Communism, Freemasonry, liberalism and even democracy were perceived as products of foreign and, hence, hostile cultures.

In addition, the newly-created myth of the Croat's Iranian origins was the first attempt to clearly distinguish the Croats from the other South-Slav nations, and particularly the Serbs. Defined as a distinct group in terms of their origins, blood, history, spirit and culture, the Croats, according to Ustasha nationalist ideology, needed to once again defend themselves and Western civilization against the Eastern 'Byzantine' civilization. When an ideology perceives a dagger, a revolver and a crucifix as being its 'holy trinity', genocide becomes its 'natural' consequence.

The main characteristic of the Ustashas' nationalist ideology is actually a radicalisation of concepts that already existed in earlier Croatian nationalist ideologies:

- The Ustashas radicalised the Herderian concept of authenticity that was already developed within the nationalist ideology of the Croatian Peasant Party. However, Radić's search for the Croatian spirit within the Croatian peasantry the Ustashas radicalised by a strong anti-intellectualism.

- The claim about the originality of the Croatian name was presented as evidence of the uniqueness of the Croatian nation. Even Gaj, one century earlier, developed a myth of the origin of the Croatian nation that made the Croats unique. Yet the Ustashas' myth of origin served as a means to exclude of other nations.

- Already Radić had defined the creation of the nation-state as the ultimate goal and value of the Croatian nation. However, in their national ideology the

Ustashas created the 'cult of the state' for which every true Croat should be ready to die.

• The only Ustasha 'contribution' was the introduction of clear-cut racism. Even these ideas were borrowed from their German and Italian patrons. The only problem for this racist ideology was how to prove the Aryan origins of the Croats. This brings us again to the Ustashas' insistence on authenticity and uniqueness.

A nationalist ideology defined in these terms inevitably provoked strong opposition. The most organized and effective opposition was the one developed and led by the Yugoslav Communist Party.

5.6. Historical Background V (1941-1980)

In 1941, at the beginning of the Second World War in Yugoslavia, the only organized entity prepared for war was the Yugoslav Communist Party (*Komunistička partija Jugoslavije* - KPJ). Moreover, the KPJ was the only political organization which had branches and supporters all over Yugoslavia. At that time, the KPJ had already accumulated thirty years' experience of underground activity, where its members had been hunted and persecuted, and considered as the most dangerous enemies of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

In the post-war period, KPJ officials claimed that one of the main reasons for the successful uprising and socialist revolution led by the KPJ during the period 1941-45, was the KPJ's policy regarding the national question in Yugoslavia. Historians[74] have highlighted several different phases 'in the evolution of their Yugoslav nationalities policy' (Ramet, 1984: 48). In order to examine these phases it is necessary to look briefly at the KPJ's policies over the two previous decades.

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[74] For example Ramet (1984a) and Djilas (1991).

The first phase of the KPJ's policy on the national question, according to Ramet (1984), was one of 'centralism and unitarism' which lasted between 1919 and 1923. Only a few months after the creation of the Kingdom of SHS, in April 1919, the revolutionary factions of the pre-war socialist-democratic parties held a congress in Belgrade and established the United Socialist Worker's Party of Yugoslavia - Communists (*Ujedinjena socijalistička partija Jugoslavije - komunista*). While at that time the Yugoslav government was reluctant to proclaim Yugoslavism as its official policy,[75] the Yugoslav communists were 'unitarists from the very foundation of Yugoslavia' (Djilas, 1991: 61). They believed that the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were three tribes from one South Slav nation. Nationalism was regarded by the communists to be a capitalist construct created to unify national markets. It was argued that with the establishment of a socialist-communist society, nations, just like states, would wither away (Ramet, 1984a: 49). In December 1920, the government introduced anti-Communist legislation in the so-called *Obznana* (Pronouncement) and in August 1921 in *Zakon o zaštiti države* (Law for the Defense of the State), which outlawed the KPJ. Soon after, the KPJ entered the second phase of its policy on the national question.

The 'second phase', which lasted from 1923 to 1928, was characterized by internal conflicts between the left and right wings of the party (Ramet, 1984a: 48). These tensions arose partly as a result of the introduction of a federal system in the Soviet Union, and partly as a consequence of the conflicts and tensions within Yugoslavia.

The development of the Serb-Croat conflict in Yugoslavia in the mid-1920s forced the KPJ to re-examine its policies. The massive support of the Croatian masses for the HSS was a clear signal that the KPJ had to adopt a more determined and more proactive attitude towards the national question (*ibid.*: 71). It was only at the third Party congress, held in Belgrade in January 1924, that the KPJ truly recognized the importance of the national question in Yugoslavia and

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[75] In this context, Yugoslavism was defined as an ideology which held that all nations in Yugoslavia formed a single Yugoslav nation, and, hence, were defined as tribes of the Yugoslav nation. The Yugoslav government adopted Yugoslavism as an official policy only in 1929.

the true significance of the conflict between Croats and Serbs. The congress concluded that the 'process of assimilating the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes into a single nation had been impeded from the start, because the Serbian "bourgeoisie" was "exploiting" and "oppressing" the other South Slav nations' (*ibid*: 72). At this congress, the KPJ abandoned their unitarist position and recognized the right of every nation to secede and establish its own state.

The 'third phase' (1928-34) of the communist policy on the national question was heavily influenced by external factors. This phase was characterized by their submission to the 'Commintern dictum that Yugoslavia should be broken into separate, homogeneous nation-states' (Ramet, 1984a: 48). Under pressure from Stalin, who believed that Yugoslavia was a bourgeois creation, hence fundamentally against the interests of the proletariat, the KPJ adopted the approach of their left wing, and started to support secessionist demands. Since the national question in Yugoslavia could only be solved by transforming the political system, the Yugoslav communists called for the fall of the so-called 'Versailles Yugoslavia'. As previously mentioned, the 1931 Constitution was formulated with the aim of strengthening the centralist system in Yugoslavia, so as to 'generate a united Yugoslav national consciousness' (Djilas, 1991: 80). At the fourth Party congress held in Ljubljana in 1934 it was decided to create the Communist Party of Croatia and the Communist Party of Slovenia as separate branches of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. This decision was a clear sign of support to the Croatian and Slovenian secessionist movements.

In the mid-1930s the Party underwent a thorough reorganization. It also entered its 'fourth phase' (1935-43) of policy regarding the national question, in which KPJ policy, on the one hand, recognized the right to national self-determination, whilst on the other, remained committed to preserving Yugoslavia as a multinational community. After the Nazis came to power in Germany in 1933, the Comintern called for the fight against fascism to be the major objective of communist parties worldwide. To achieve this the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had to undergo a process of transformation. Conflicts between factions ceased and the organizational structure of the party was strengthened. Instead of engaging in endless theoretical debates, the party became much more

pragmatical towards existing crucial issues. In 1937 the KPJ changed its leader: the Comintern appointed Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980) to the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

The main task for the new Party leadership was to increase membership and to organize the Party structure in a more efficient way. Its underground activities and the constant purging of Party members resulted in an organizational structure based on conspiracy and secrecy, and one which demanded the commitment and the determination of its members. Djilas described the KPJ at the beginning of 1940s as 'united, disciplined, well organized, experienced, and Yugoslavist' (*ibid.*: 93).

Already in 1936 at the KPJ's plenum, which was held in Prague and then in Vienna, the Yugoslav Communists concluded that a common South Slav state was possible as long as Serbian hegemonism was abolished and the equality and brotherhood of its nations established. This resolution was a clear break with the Comintern's policy which favoured the break-up of 'Versailles Yugoslavia'. From then on, the KPJ supported the principle of self-determination whilst at the same time opposing any calls for the separation of the Yugoslav nations. Their solution was founded in the notion of a federal system based on equality of nations. However, only a year later, the Communist Party of Croatia[76] (*Komunistička partija Hrvatske* - KPH) was formally established. Its creation was a symbolic gesture; the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was still united in organization, leadership and policy.

In October 1940 the Communist Party of Yugoslavia held its fifth conference in Zagreb.[77] The conference confirmed the importance of the preservation of Yugoslavia, especially given the wartime context in Europe which was

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[76] In that period the KPJ had 6,455 members of whom 3,164 were in Croatia (Djilas, 1991: 98).

[77] More than one hundred delegates from all over Yugoslavia attended the conference. 'The delegates were 53 workers, 14 peasants, 29 intellectuals, and 5 administrative personnel. ... Their average age was thirty-three, their average length of party membership nine years, and their average time in prison two years. Around two-thirds had been tortured by the police at least once. Many of them were veterans, and some had held officer rank in the Spanish Civil War' (Djilas, 1991: 93).

threatening to spread onto the territory of Yugoslavia. Preparations for the expected war were the Party's overriding concern.

In June 1941, just a few months after the occupation and break-up of Yugoslavia, the Central Committee of the KPJ urged the population to resist the occupying forces and, in so doing, initiated the so-called 'national-liberation struggle'. Under the leadership of the Yugoslav Communists guerrilla military groups were organized and mobilized throughout Yugoslavia. In four years of war, the so-called Partisans grew into a formidable military organization which succeeded in liberating the whole country in spite of insufficient assistance from the Allies. After the fall of Fascist Italy to the Allies, the Partisans acquired military hardware from the fallen regime, which added to their military strength and influence in the middle of occupied Europe. This contributed towards their successfully holding and liberating much of the Yugoslav territory.

Along with co-ordinating military resistance, the KPJ initiated a social revolution. It established a new political entity, the so-called 'Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia' (*Antifašističko Vijeće Narodnog Oslobođenja Jugoslavije* - AVNOJ) which proclaimed itself as the only legitimate representative of the peoples of Yugoslavia (Djilas, 1991: 158). On 29 and 30 November 1943 AVNOJ held its second meeting in the Bosnian city Jajce.[78] This assembly announced the birth of the new Yugoslav federal state (Tanner, 1997: 163). It also recognized the 'existence of the Partisan-run local governments in Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Sandžak, known as National Liberation Councils' (*ibid.*). During the assembly, the leaders of the KPJ wanted to reassure the people of Yugoslavia that the future state would be a federal state of equal nations.

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[78] The first meeting of the AVNOJ was held in Bihać on 26 and 27 November 1942. Its main objective in that period was to represent the Partisans as the leading anti-German resistance group in Yugoslavia. In the same period the Chetniks (the Serbs' nationalist organization) claimed the same status.

In June 1943 the Partisans in Croatia[79] established a Croatian replica of AVNOJ -
the so-called ZAVNOH (*Zemaljsko anti-fašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja
Hrvatske*).[80] The ZAVNOH controlled large areas of territory and it ran its own
schools, ministries and newspapers (Tanner, 1997: 163). The establishment of the
ZAVNOH was perceived by the Croats as a guarantee for the establishment of
federalism in a post-war Yugoslavia. The ZAVNOH nullified the 1920 Treaty of
Rapallo according to which Istria, Zadar and some Adriatic islands were ceded to
Italy, and it 'pronounced illegitimate all international treaties, agreements, acts,
deeds, debts, and alliances made by the government of the NDH' (Djilas, 1991:
159).[81] A few months before the end of the war, in April 1945, the ZAVNOH
proclaimed itself as the only legitimate *Sabor* of Croatia and formed a
government of the 'Socialist Republic of Croatia'.

Map 8. Yugoslavia 1945-1991(Goldstein, 1999: 161)

[79] Goldstein (1999: 149) offers an estimation according to which in late 1943 the Partisans only in
Croatia had 100,000 soldiers and in 1944 150,000. At the same time the elite voluntary Ustasha
units had about 76,000 soldiers on the whole territory of the so-called NDH, which included
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
[80] Similar councils were created in other territories that would become republics after the war.
[81] For more about the ZAVNOH and the clashes between the leader of the Croatian Partisans
Andrija Hebrang and Tito see Tanner (1997: 163-167).

The second meeting of the AVNOJ represented the beginning of the fifth phase of the Yugoslav communists' policy regarding the national question. According to Ramet (1984: 48) during this phase, which lasted from 1943 until 1964, the communists adopted a policy of federalism, 'characterized by the disjunction of republics and nationalities and the concept of "Yugoslavism"'. The full scope and shape of this policy was demonstrated in the first post-war years.

Elections held at the end of 1945 resulted in a great victory for the Yugoslav communists.[82] On 29 November 1945 the newly-elected Constituent Assembly proclaimed the establishment of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (*Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavija* - FNRJ). As early as January 1946 the Assembly introduced the new Constitution of the FNRJ. The first article of the Basic Principles of the Constitution stated that: 'The nations of Yugoslavia, in accordance with the right of every nation to self-determination and the right to secession, have, on the basis of their free will (...) united in a federal republic' (FNRJ, 1946). According to the Constitution, the Federal Assembly (the supreme legislative body) was comprised of the Federal Council and the Council of Nations (Djilas, 1991. 160). The FNRJ was made up of six republics (Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, which included two autonomous provinces Kosovo and Vojvodina). The Constitution proclaimed the republics as having equal rights and duties. Officially the equality of the republics originated from their sovereignty. Each republic was declared as being 'a sovereign homeland of sovereign nations' (*ibid.*: 161). However, in practice, the sovereignty of the republics was severely limited. Each republic had its own assembly, yet federal laws took pre-eminence over all republican laws. The FNRJ was in practice a centralized and unitarist state.

During the war, the Yugoslav communists had launched the slogan 'Brotherhood and unity' and in the early post-war years, this slogan came to symbolize the policy of 'pan-Yugoslav solidarity, cooperation among the nations of Yugoslavia, Yugoslav integration, and, ultimately, the creation of a Yugoslav

national consciousness' (Djilas, 1991: 164). The process of building socialism, the communists declared, was based on the process of building a "socialist man". The consciousness of the "socialist man" was to be primarily based on patriotism and internationalism, both of which were declared as Yugoslav traits. Hence, although never officially advocated, the creation of the single Yugoslav nation was considered to be the ultimate product of the socialist revolution.

In 1948 the Informbureau[83] issued a resolution in which the leaders of the Yugoslav communists were accused of exhibiting anti-socialist behaviour and nationalist attitudes. The KPJ rejected these accusations and resisted Stalin's effort to bring Yugoslavia under his wing. The Eastern Bloc countries imposed a total economic embargo against Yugoslavia and launched a huge propaganda campaign, both within and outside the Yugoslav borders, aimed at creating disunity and discord among the Yugoslav communists. A number of KPJ members supported the resolution and Stalin. The KPJ leadership treated such 'renegades' brutally, many were arrested and sent to a detention camp on an Adriatic island called Goli otok. From that point on, Yugoslavia followed its own 'road to socialism'.

The first product of Yugoslav socialism was the introduction of the so-called 'self-management' system.[84] The Yugoslav economy, already devastated by the war, weakened by the nationalization of property and agrarian reform, suffered greatly from the economic embargo introduced by the Eastern Bloc. In 1950 the leadership acknowledged the weaknesses of the centralist state management of the economy and passed a federal law which 'handed over the state's enterprises to the management of the workers'. Hence, the state leadership introduced a new type of ownership: instead of being state property, enterprises were from that time considered the property of society. The enterprises were managed by 'workers' councils', yet each enterprise had to contribute towards the federal budget. Capital resources were still allocated from the centre. The Government

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[82] The so-called Popular Front, which was led by the communists, was the only party standing at the elections - it won over 95 per cent of votes.

[83] The so-called Communist Information Bureau was established in 1946 as a successor to the Comintern and it functioned as an inter-party organization made up of twelve communist parties.

[84] For more about the development of 'workers' self-management', see Allcock (2000: 76-78).

also introduced the policy of supporting less developed regions of the country from federal funds.

The introduction of self-management as the basis of the economic system had serious repercussions at the political level: 'once it was conceded that individual enterprises had a right to run their own affairs, the republics naturally demanded the same rights at state level' (Tanner, 1997: 185). At the same time, at least officially, the Party lessened its control over the state. In November 1952, at the Sixth Congress, the Party changed its name to the Communist League of Yugoslavia (*Savez komunista Jugoslavije* - SKJ) and declared a separation between the party and the state. This marked the start of a period of political and economic liberalization. These changes had the effect of intensifying the underlying tensions between the "conservative" and "reformist" factions within the Party. Political events in the 1960s were characterized by such factional fighting.[85]

The new economic and political tendencies in Yugoslavia were codified in the 1963 constitution. The constitution also represented the sixth and last phase of Yugoslav communist policy on the national question. Ramet called this phase the phase of genuine federalism 'expressed by the equation of republics and nationalities and of inter-republic and inter-ethnic relations' (Ramet, 1984a: 48). The changes in the economy[86] had profound effects on the Yugoslav political structure. Economic issues became the basis for political claims. According to the constitution the republics were accorded a high level of jurisdiction over their internal affairs. For the first time the republics expressed their opposition to certain federal directions which were perceived to be against their interest. The 1963 constitution, coupled with the 1969 constitutional amendments, in effect transformed the republics into mini-states.

The first expression of open opposition against the official state policy towards the national question came not from official circles in Croatia, but from the

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[85] See Djilas (1991: 177).
[86] For more about economic reforms from 1965, see Ramet (1984a: 89-91) and Allcock (2000: 78-89).

Croatian Writers' Club. In April 1967 the Club announced the *Declaration Concerning the Name and Position of the Croatian Language*. The catalyst for this Declaration was the publication of a new Serbo-Croat Dictionary by the *Matica Srpska*, in which Serbian words and expressions were presented as standard while Croatian words and expressions were either omitted or were presented as dialect (Tanner, 1997: 190). The *Declaration* interpreted the introduction of this dictionary as an attempt to reduce the Croatian language to the status of a dialect. It proposed the introduction of four, instead of three, official languages in Yugoslavia: Slovenian, Macedonian, Serbian and Croatian. The petition was signed by the twenty most influential cultural institutions in Croatia and by around 140 of the most prominent Croatian writers. The Serbian writers responded by warning that in the event of an official separation of these languages, they would demand the establishment of separate Serbian schools in Croatia and that Cyrillic would be the only script used in Serbia (*ibid.*: 191).

As a reaction to these events, reformists in Croatia highlighted other issues regarding the status of the Croatian nation in Yugoslavia. Aside from cultural issues, the reformists pointed to the predominance of Serbs within state institutions including the army and police,[87] and to an unjust economic system in which foreign currency earned in Croatia was being transferred to Belgrade. These events mark the beginning of what was referred to as the 'Croatian Spring' or *Maspok* (coming from *Masovni pokret* - Mass movement).

One of the major features of the Croatian Spring[88] was the variety of dimensions it took. It began as an inter-party conflict between forces of conservatism and reform, and ended as a full-scale Croatian nationalist movement. The Croatian Spring brought together the Croatian Communist Party leadership, activists from the *Matica Hrvatska* and students from Zagreb University. These institutions did not necessarily share the same ideological perspective, however. While the official Croatian Party leadership was working towards economic liberalization, and the students were demanding the liberalization of the Yugoslav political

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[87] According to Tanner (1997: 191) even though the Serbs in Croatia comprised about 12 per cent of the population, they made up about 60 or 70 per cent of the police forces and about 40 per cent of the Party membership.

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system, the small nationalist forces were calling for the establishment of an independent state of Croatia. During this period, the leaders of the Croatian Communist Party - Miko Tripalo and Savka Dabčević-Kučar - came to be considered by Croats as national leaders.

Mass political rallies, student strikes throughout Croatia, and nationalist articles published in the major Croatian newspapers and journals, provoked the Yugoslav leadership into taking tough measures against the movement. Even though at the beginning of the Croatian Spring, Tito and Kardelj expressed some sympathy towards the demands of the Croatian leadership, under pressure from influential conservative factions within the Party and from rising Serbian nationalist forces, at the end of 1971 it was decided that the Croatian Spring had to be crushed.[89] The perception of Croats as being Ustashas with genocidal aspirations towards the Serbs was re-awakened. The leadership of the SKH (League of Communists of Croatia - *Savez komunista Hrvatske*) was replaced, and many other activists were arrested and imprisoned for many years, charged with extreme nationalist activities.

Even though the Yugoslav leadership brutally suppressed the leaders and activities of the Croatian Spring; even though, from that point on, every expression of Croatian national consciousness was labeled as a nationalist act; and even though as a result of the 'Ustasha stigma' Croatia became known as the "silent republic", the events at the beginning of the 1970s had a tremendous influence on the Yugoslav political system. With the 1971 constitutional amendments and with the introduction of a new constitution in 1974, Yugoslavia entered a quasi-confederate stage.

While the 1964 constitution in effect transformed the republics into quasi-states, the 1974 constitution transformed them into 'real' states inside the federal state by increasing and strengthening their sovereignty. The republics gained almost complete control over their internal affairs, while foreign policy and the military

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[88] For more about the Croatian Spring see, Cuvalo (1990) and Tripalo (1989).

remained very much controlled from Belgrade. The republics gained a significant level of control over their finances, although they were still obliged to contribute towards the federal budget. The federal government maintained its control over foreign currency.

The creators of the new constitution (in particular, Edvard Kardelj) wanted to establish a balance of power between the republics, and consequently between the Yugoslav nations and nationalities. To achieve this, the 1974 constitution introduced several changes. Firstly, the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, which were part of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, gained a level of decision-making control over their internal affairs, which brought them close to the status of the republics. Representatives from these autonomous provinces participated in the Yugoslav Presidency and in the Central Committee of the SKJ, enjoying the same rights and duties as the representatives of the republics. This constitutional change considerably weakened the position of Serbia, whose jurisdiction was reduced to the so-called 'Serbia Proper'.

Secondly, the new constitution recognized the Slav Muslims of Bosnia and Hezegovina as a nation. This change of status officially introduced a third actor into the Bosnian political arena which countered Serb and Croat nationalist claims over the Bosnian population and territory.

Thirdly, the new constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia no longer defined Croatia in civic but in national terms. Where the previous constitution defined Croatia as a 'community of people living in Croatia' (SRH, 1969), the new one defined it as a 'community of the Croatian nation, Serbian nation in Croatia and other nationalities who live in Croatia' (SRH, 1974). Such a formulation does not only imply the strong connection between the state and the nation, but also that the Serbian nation was sovereign in Croatia.

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[89] However, in the same period the Yugoslav leadership swept away liberals throughout Yugoslavia - the liberal regime in Serbia under the leadership of Nikezić and Perović, Crvenkovski in Macedonia and liberals in Slovenia.

In just five years the Croatian population found itself within three fundamentally different state organisations: from *Banovina* Croatian within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Independent State of Croatia, to the Socialist Republic of Croatia within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Moreover, pressed by various internal and external factors, the central communist corporate agency introduced several waves of social change since its establishment in 1945. These social changes differed from previous examples first of all in terms of their thoroughness and intensity:

- From the first decades of its rule, the Communist regime mobilised extensive forces for the modernisation and industrialisation of the Yugoslav society. Such an effort was followed by rapid urbanisation, reform of agriculture, depopulation of rural areas and the introduction of a new type of property.

- The socialist system directly challenged the traditional social organisations and values by politicising every aspect of social life. Building the 'new socialist man' included adoption of new socialist values of equality, brotherhood and unity that in communist interpretations became value orientations of egalitarianism, unionism and populism.

- The same value orientations were reflected on the cultural level. From its first days of rule, the new regime put great efforts into education and the eradication of illiteracy. In order to secure the education of the population in a 'proper spirit', a strict control of the spoken and printed word was introduced. Even artistic expression was subjected to censorship.

- While every citizen of Yugoslavia belonged to at least one socialist organisation (like Pioneers, Socialist Youth, Socialist Union of Working People, or the Union of Yugoslav Communists) the ruling party opposed the formation of any competing corporate agency, even those within the Communist Party. Nevertheless, the 1974 constitution marked the beginning of increased decentralisation of power.

This 1974 constitution reflected in full Kardelj's nationalist ideology, which had originally been formulated in his 1938 *Razvoj slovenačkog nacionalnog pitanja* (Development of the Slovenian National Question). Kardelj's writings will be analysed in the following section. The analysis will attempt to identify the way Kardelj defined the nation and the Yugoslav national question; it will outline

Kardelj's views on the future of the nation in general and the Yugoslav nations in particular.

5.7. The Nationalist Ideology of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia

> *The nation is not an homogenous unity -*
> *it is divided by its internal oppositions.*
> (Kardelj, 1973: LVIII)

Edvard Kardelj, the Yugoslav Communist Party ideologue, defined his theory of nations and nationalism in terms of Marxism, evolutionism, functionalism and modernism. Nevertheless, his theory was constructed in opposition to the major Marxist theorists of his time, especially Stalin's definition of nation. Even though Kardelj only openly questioned Stalin's ideas in the Introduction to the second edition of his book (1973) he held that Stalin's 'theoretical assumptions about the national question are untenable' (Kardelj, 1973: LI). Kardelj offered another approach.

According to Kardelj Marxist thought in Yugoslavia had for a long time been under the influence of Stalin's theory of the nation. He conceded that Stalin had rightly assumed that the nation was a historical phenomenon, a product of the capitalist epoch.[90] Stalin had expanded the old Austro-Marxist cultural-linguistic definition of the nation, introducing the importance of the economic relations of populations in given territory. Kardelj held that such a definition only explains what connects a nation, but does not explain the social role of this historic phenomenon. It is clear, he argued, that the nation does not emerge accidentally, and once it is formed the nation naturally has a social function (*ibid.*: LI).

In the above-mentioned Introduction (1973: LI), Kardelj argued that Stalin's theory ignored the importance of the 'organic connection' between certain socio-economic structures in society and the emergence of the nation. Stalin also failed

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[90] Stalin defined the nation as a 'historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and psychological makeup manifested in a common culture' (in Nimni, 1991: 47).

to understand that the nation is a constituent element of economic and social relations, and not simply a manifestation of particular consciousness. This consciousness emerges as a consequence of the connection of technological-economic development and of established common interests which are really, Kardelj argued, only a consequence of the emergence of the nation. The 'economic connection' referred to by Stalin is a direct result of the social division of labour in capitalism. This development united the nation within its cultural-linguistic borders and, at the same time, enabled these nations to struggle for their independent economic and cultural affirmation (*ibid.*: LII). Stalin's definition of the nation, Kardelj concluded, was an idealistic theoretical explanation of the national question (*ibid.*: LV).

Kardelj's rejection of Stalin's definition of the nation put into focus a major component of his own theory. As will be shown, Kardelj defined the nation as a product of the division of labour, and he considered nationalism as representing the nation's greatest enemy.

Kardelj's theory of nations and nationalism was the official theory of socialist Yugoslavia. It was one which was propagated on a daily basis through the media and the education system. This theory was also strongly supported by many other ideologists, and in Croatia, especially by Vladimir Bakarić and Stipe Šuvar, who played an important role in Croatian and Yugoslav politics.

5.7.1. Definition and the Origin of the Nation

For Kardelj, even a cursory glance through history demonstrates that the national idea, that is, the expression of the emergence of the nation, is a historic phenomenon which emerges at certain stages in the development of human societies (Kardelj, 1973: 3). He pointed to the connection between the emergence of the national idea, and changes in the socio-economic structure of societies at the time of the collapse of feudalism and the emergence of capitalism. Kardelj's theory, however, does not fit into a classical modernist scheme. He held that even though the nation has emerged with the advent of capitalism, and that the

nineteenth century marked the beginning of the national idea, manifestations of that idea can in some cases be traced back to the Middle Ages.

Kardelj explained that in the ancient world and in the early feudal Middle Ages, states frequently overarched a single ethnic group (which he defined as a linguistically unique community). Their ruling classes, acting in their own interests, developed notions which resemble modern national ideas. Communities created in those ways were not socio-economic and culturally connected communities which represented what we consider today as being 'nations' (*ibid.*). In feudal times, a low level of social division of labor resulted in re-enforcing local consciousness and allegiances, which were always stronger than wider state-level community consciousness (*ibid.*: 4). Hence Kardelj (*ibid.*) argued that 'states existed before nations, and every identification of the nation with the state is false'.

As a condition for the emergence of the nation, a social consciousness had to develop away from existing local and provincial allegiances. Feudalism, characterized by its particularism, was in opposition to the centralist aspirations which later emerged associated with the national idea (*ibid.*: 6). The ideological manifestations which existed during that period in some ways resembled more modern developed national ideas and ideologies. Kardelj described them as slogans which appealed to the religious or ethnic community, that is, to common cultural or linguistic roots. Nevertheless, the feudal economic and political system was not capable of bonding specific ethnic communities into nations, and hence 'on that basis the consciousness of the national community could not be created' (*ibid.*: 7). Through the developed local consciousness the ethnic characteristics of the people were preserved for centuries, regardless of the ethnic origins of the feudal rulers. Yet, as soon as elements of capitalism started to develop, especially with respect to the development of trade and finance, this initiated a process whereby broader economic bonds were established between individuals, leading to the collapse of more narrow local economic and political orientations. Local perspectives, Kardelj argued, were no longer sufficient. Language, common culture, ethnic characteristics etc. became the 'external framework, inside which a new broader popular community developed - the

nation' (*ibid.*: 9) Hence, the process of internal national unification and national awakening had begun. Within that process, Kardelj continued, feudalism played an especially negative role in the case of the people who lost their statehood. This significantly delayed these peoples' evolution into nations.[91]

Kardelj held that no blueprint exists for successful national awakening (*ibid.*: 11). Nevertheless, every national movement went through a single socio-economic process - the development of the forces of production: 'the productivity of human labor irrepressibly created capitalist relations which demanded bigger popular communities, and which could subsequently not accommodate old local orientations' (*ibid.*: 11). However, in the tradition of Marxist ideology, Kardelj held that the national idea could not emerge as a common idea across all social classes, but only in a specific class - the bourgeoisie. Their need for an active workforce broke feudal relations, weakened people's bonds to the land, and, hence, was reflected in the internal cohesion of the nation.

The basis for national formation was found in ethnic affiliations, i.e. language and culture. According to Kardelj, the national language facilitated the process of centralization. The national language was also crucial for communication within the market. The free development of the economy was to an extent contingent on the free development of the national language. The process of nation-formation, aside from a common language, could also be based on factors such as citizenship, cultural uniqueness, religion, historic destiny, etc. (*ibid.*: 15).

Even though Kardelj pointed to the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia as being the creators of nationalist ideologies and as the national 'awakeners', he remained a strong opponent of what is currently called 'constructionism'. He held that historical communities and religions could influence, both negatively and positively, the development of a particular nation, but they could not formulate that national phenomenon (*ibid.*: 23). Kardelj clearly stated that nations could not be artificially created: 'they exist as soon as the necessary conditions which characterize that nation come into existence' (*ibid.*). Political ideologies cannot

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[91] For example the Croats (Kardelj, 1973: 9).

create a nation (*ibid.*: 39). The only creator of the nation, according to Kardelj, was history (*ibid.*: 38).

The technological, ideological and cultural developments which characterized the age of capitalism, Kardelj described as a historical force which demanded and initiated processes of more intensive social integration and which forged a new 'national' consciousness (*ibid.*: 34). Kardelj concluded:

> Therefore, the nation is a specific popular community which has emerged on the basis of the capitalist division of the labor in a compact territory and within the framework of a common language and close ethnic and cultural ties. (*ibid.*: 35)

Regardless of certain exceptional cases, Kardelj argued that in principle, one could not talk about a developed nation if all the above-mentioned elements did not exist in more or less developed forms (*ibid.*: 36).

Kardelj also turned his attention to the issue of national preservation. He maintained that within the current social climate, the nation state represented the most adequate framework for the free development of the nation (*ibid.*: 37). If a certain nation, Kardelj wrote, wants to freely join in a union with another nation then that nation has to be truly free. However, a nation is only politically equal if it is also economically equal, that is, if it is not in the process of being exploited by any foreign force. At this point, Kardelj indirectly referred to national relations within Yugoslavia. He held that the right to self-determination was universal. However, following Lenin, he also argued that the right to self-determination could only really exist as the right of every nation to create its own state, that is, in parallel with the right to secession (*ibid.*: 38). It would be misleading to interpret Kardelj's ideas as supporting the creation of independent nation states within Yugoslavia. He believed that for the Yugoslav nations, a federal state of equal nations would act as the best protection against external threats, and, hence, that 'secessionist aspirations are against their own interests' (*ibid.*). He argued: 'an independent nation-state and a free multinational federation are not contradictory' (*ibid.*).

For Kardelj national awakening was the result of a combination of processes: a process of internal social growth, a social process leading to internal homogenization and therefore the eradication of particularism, and a process of economic and cultural unification and common spiritual formation 'expressed in all spheres of national life' (*ibid.*: 125). Once these processes are halted or disrupted, a national question emerges.

5.7.2. The National Question

For Kardelj (*ibid.*: 40) the national question meant that the process of achieving full national independence has not been completed either in the creation of a centralist national state, or in the form of a freely established federation with other nations. In most cases where the national question was not solved, the obstacle to the formation of a certain nation was a centralized state. Throughout history, two patterns could be traced: in Western Europe nations regularly developed in opposition to feudalism, while the oppressed nations in Eastern Europe had to fight against both 'feudal-absolutist reactions and against the mature hegemonist tendencies of the bourgeoisie of the ruling nation' (*ibid.*: 42). Kardelj explained that through its opposition to 'feudal-absolutist reactions' nationalism became an ideology of the new bourgeois nationalist politics. As a consequence, nationalist hatred towards other nations dominated over the right for independence of all the nations. In that respect Kardelj (*ibid.*: 51) defined two stages of the development of the national question: in the first stage the national question was mainly an internal question within a certain state, and, in the second stage, it became a general question regarding the crisis of society - the crisis of imperialism - which, of course, could not be solved locally.

These assumptions Kardelj applied to the case of Yugoslavia during the inter-war period. He emphasized that even though one has to recognize the right to self-determination of Croats and Slovenes, every separatist aspiration which tries to breakup Yugoslavia will actually lead to new forms of oppression and not to self-determination (*ibid.*: 50). On the other hand, Kardelj strongly opposed Pan-Slav and Illyrian ideas which he described as 'fantasies' (*ibid.*: 132) and 'foggy

illusions' (*ibid*.: 159). Kardelj also described Illyrianism as an ideology calling for hegemony over other Slav nations (*ibid*.: 163). Kardelj expressed equally negative attitudes towards the so-called 'integral Yugoslavism' which he described as an excuse for the hegemony of one nation over another (*ibid*.: 252). 'Integral Yugoslavism', Kardelj asserted, was a nationalist utopia which strove to create some form of Yugoslav nation by artificially merging languages and cultures. This type of 'unitarist-Yugoslavist construction' was outdated. He wrote: 'The process of merging undifferentiated and related nations was possible only in the first stages of the national awakening, when the national communities were still not definitely constructed' (*ibid*.: 286). Kardelj advocated the creation of a federal state of free nations. This community of free nations could be achieved only by strengthening the individual characteristics of every nation and their cultures (*ibid*.: 323).

From these assumptions it could be concluded that Kardelj, on the one hand, recognized the historical necessity of the national phenomenon and supported every movement towards national liberation. On the other hand, nationalism for Kardelj was just a 'non-democratic and socially reactionary bourgeois ideology, which uses the feelings of affiliation and love of one's own nation in the interests of the reactionary and imperialistic forces' (*ibid*.: 321).

Kardelj frequently referred to Socialist Yugoslavia as a state which, in principle, had solved the national question. He held that the guarantee to achieve this was a federal system along with constitutional political and social mechanisms which secured the equal status and the self-determination of all the nations of Yugoslavia. Yet, he admitted, there were still some factors which could provoke national problems. One of those factors was the 'ideological and political remnants of classical bourgeois nationalism' (*ibid*.: 34). However, for Kardelj, the appearance of nationalism in postwar Yugoslavia was just a cover for different anti-socialist tendencies, and an advocate of certain egoistic particularistic interests. Nationalism hence manifests all that is reactionary, ideologically backward or temporarily disoriented in Yugoslav society. Nationalism in Yugoslavia, Kardelj continued, is 'one of those reactionary

ideological factors which is dragging back, and endangering the socialist perspective' (*ibid.*: 35).

One should bear in mind that Kardelj was, first and foremost, a Marxist. He clearly recognized the importance of the nation in a given social, economic, and political context. However, he maintained that, 'the nation is not an absolute which could not forever remain unchanged' (*ibid.*: 322).

5.7.3. Future of the Nation

In the Introduction to the second edition of his book (1973: XLII) Kardelj defined the nation as a historic socio-economic and cultural-political phenomenon which appears as the social division of labour develops within capitalism. He also emphasized that he did not believe that nations were eternally given forms. The development of social relations, Kardelj expected, would lead to the union of nations. This process was viewed as a consequence of the further development of the social division of labour, which would necessarily 'transcend narrow national borders, bring nations together, and involve human beings in the mechanism of the world economy' (*ibid.*: XLIII).

Kardelj held that narrow nationalist views would, in due time, necessarily decline in favour of wider humanist views; that national-cultural borders would disappear in the face of increased cultural exchanges between different parts of the world. This process Kardelj called the 'process of the merging of nations' (*ibid.*: XLIII).

The process of the merging of nations had, Kardelj argued, already started: 'even today nations are much closer with respect to their cultural structure than were provinces within the same nation a hundred years ago' (*ibid.*). However, Kardelj did not believe that the merging of nations meant the merging of languages, of national specificities, of culture etc. He strongly opposed assimilation by violent means, especially of small nations. On the contrary, for Kardelj, independence and the social and cultural development of the nation were 'the pre-conditions for closer co-operation and the merging of the nations' (*ibid.*). What Kardelj stood

for was, as he termed it, 'natural cultural assimilation' (*ibid.*: XLIV). The merging of nations was conceived as an inevitable process actually leading to the withering away of nations as a phenomenon. Only the complete reduction in all forms of national oppression could produce the conditions in which national cultures and general humanistic elements would prevail. Therefore, the necessary pre-condition for the liquidation of nationalism and separatism was the free development of the national cultures and economic forces of every nation (*ibid.*: 40).

The new socialist Yugoslavia, or more precisely its 'ruling socialist forces', Kardelj argued, rejected all attempts to achieve the merging of nations, languages and cultures by aggressive means. However, the same 'ruling socialist forces' did not oppose the creation of another type of consciousness - a 'socialist Yugoslav consciousness', as Kardelj called it. He did not interpret this consciousness as an alternative to national consciousness. Kardelj argued that the emergence of a socialist Yugoslav consciousness primarily meant an 'organic growth and strengthening of the socialist community of working people of all Yugoslav nations, the affirmation of their common interests on the basis of socialist relations' (*ibid.*). Kardelj hoped that it would be the people, and not their languages, which would merge to form a 'higher humanistic community' (*ibid.*: LIII).

5.7.4. Conclusion

Kardelj formulated the core of his theory of nations and nationalism in the late 1930s. However, his theory could be easily interpreted in the context of current debates regarding theories of nations and nationalism.

Above all, Kardelj's theory is a Marxist one. It is defined in terms of classical Marxist general theory in which the economy serves as the basis for the explanation of the existence of the superstructure, that is, of all social and political phenomena and their development. Hence, the emergence of the nation and nationalism is explained as a consequence of, to use Marxist terminology, the

transition from feudalism to capitalism, or in Gellnerian terminology, from an agrarian to an industrial society. In that respect, Kardelj's theory could be categorized as a modernist theory.

On the other hand, Kardelj placed a strong emphasis on the ethnic origins of the nation. Culture, language, religion, and common beliefs among a given population in a defined territory - these were what Kardelj described as the 'properties' of an ethnic group who, in a process of transition from feudalism to capitalism, would 'grow' into a nation. He also rejected ideas which are encompassed in what is currently described as constructionism. According to Kardelj, the nation cannot be invented or artificially constructed - it has to have a strong basis, and that basis is an ethnic group. Kardelj also emphasized that ideas which resemble the national idea, could be traced back to the Middle Ages. In that respect, Kardelj's theory could be described as being a perennialist theory.

What is clearly Marxist in Kardelj's theory is his definition of nationalism. Kardelj described nationalism as a bourgeois ideology, or more precisely, as an ideology which primarily serves the political and economic interests of the bourgeoisie. However, in the period of transition from feudalism to capitalism, Kardelj does view a progressive role for nationalism as long as it advocates liberation and the free development of the nation. Nationalism, however, in Kardelj's theory, loses its progressive role within a socialist society. Such nationalism is regarded as an enemy to the nation itself.

This dual role of nationalism is a consequence of Kardelj's evolutionist views. Human society, he believed, is developing in a uni-linear way: from feudalism to capitalism, and finally to socialism. Or, from another perspective, from ethnic group to nation, and finally to cosmopolitanism. Such an evolutionist view had several implications.

First of all, every society has to go through every stage of the development process in order to reach the final one - socialism. Therefore, the nation was a necessary consequence of the development of human society. Every disruption to this development, and, hence, every suppression or oppression of a nation,

necessarily serves as an obstacle towards the creation of socialism. That is the reason why Kardelj was a strong advocate of what he called the free development of the nation. Such a development could be achieved only within the framework of a nation-state or, referring to the case of Yugoslavia, within a federal state of equal nations.

Another implication of Kardelj's evolutionist views was that the nation would in due time wither away. What distinguishes Kardelj's theory from other Marxist theories, is his view of the mechanics leading to the disappearance of nations. To again use current terminology, according to Kardelj, the nation as a phenomenon would disappear as a consequence of the process of globalisation. Kardelj called this process 'the merging of nations'. Nations were to merge of their own free will as a consequence of their increased co-operation and shared economic interests, in the process, creating a new social consciousness - not a national consciousness, but a socialist one.

Future events, however, were to highlight the failure of the Yugoslav Communist Party's policy on nations and nationalism based on Kardelj's theory. With the collapse of central control, nationalism rose again within Yugoslavia and once again represented a powerful and dominant political and social force.

Chapter Six

FRANJO TUÐMAN'S NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY

> *...history, in its blind progress, can*
> *brutally punish even for the old sins.*
> (Tuđman, 1990c: 45)

6.1. Introduction

Franjo Tuđman's nationalist ideology was the dominant ideology in Croatia in the 1990s. It first began to take shape in the 1960s with the publication of Tuđman's books such as *Velike ideje i mali narodi* (Great Ideas and Small Nations, 1968). However, the form and content of the ideology has undergone a continuous process of revision over the past three decades, changing according to the prevailing political circumstances in Yugoslavia and Croatia, and according to the political status of the author. The short official biography[92] of Tuđman states that:

> Franjo Tuđman (...) is the President of the Republic of Croatia, and formerly a historian and political scientist who has written and lectured widely. Jailed repeatedly during the 1970s and early '80s for his dissident historical perspectives and political views by the Communist rulers of the former Yugoslavia, in 1989 he founded the Croatian Democratic Union and became its president. He has helped his nation achieve full sovereignty, independence and international recognition since becoming President of the Republic of Croatia in 1990 after the first democratic elections and was re-elected in 1992.[93] (Tuđman, 1995)

Not mentioned in this short official biography, but highlighted by a number authors[94] who dealt with the collapse of Yugoslavia, is the fact that Tuđman fought for the Partisans during the Second World War, that famously he was one of the youngest ever generals in the JNA[95], where he was appointed Head Political Commissar. His activities as a so-called dissident began in 1967 when he was accused of promoting nationalism through his writings as a historian, and

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[92] This biography was printed on the cover-page of the latest translation of Franjo Tuđman's book *Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti*, i.e *Horrors of War: Historical Reality and Philosophy*, New York: M. Evans & Company, Inc.
[93] At the 1997 elections Tuđman was re-elected as President.
[94] See for example Silber & Little (1995).

as director of the Institute for the Study of Workers' Movements, in which he addressed the controversial issue of the number of Second World War victims and, more specifically, with the number of victims in the Jasenovac concentration camp. In December 1999 Franjo Tudman died.

Since the first free elections in Croatia in 1990, Franjo Tudman, as President of state and President of the Croatian Democratic Union (*Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica* - HDZ), in practice ruled over every aspect of the political, social and economic process. Once again in Croatian history, a nationalist ideology was imposed through the mass media and education system, and dominated all aspects of daily life.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the content, origins, and influences on Tudman's nationalist ideology. The study is based on an analysis of Tudman's public speeches published in the Croatian daily newspaper *Vjesnik* during the period of June 1992 to October 1994 - a period of intensive national mobilisation. All Tudman's published press conferences (18) and interviews (16) have been analysed, along with 16 of his public speeches. The matrix employed for the content analysis has been divided into three sections: the first section aims to investigate Tudman's perception of the nation in general and the Croatian nation in particular; the second and third sections aim to analyse the way Tudman's nationalist ideology is defined and the way it views internal and external enemies of the nation.

Tudman's nationalist ideology has to be understood within the framework of the political and social events which had preceded its formulation, and which to great extent influenced its form.

Many works[96] designed to explain events leading to the dissolution of Yugoslavia have already been published. The historical background detailed in the next pages does not intend to provide yet another chronology of the break-up. For the

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[95] Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija (Yugoslav Popular Army).
[96] Tanner (1997), Glenny (1992), Allcock (2000), Lampe (2000), Silber & Little (1995), Magas (1993), Crnobrnja (1994) and many others.

purpose of this study I will just sketch the major events that marked the period 1980-1995.

6.2. Historical Background VI (1980-1995)

In the last decade of its existence, Yugoslavia was divided along political, economic, social and cultural lines. Ethnically it was the society where six nations comprised constitutive elements of the state (Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Muslims) with large groups of national minorities (such as Albanians, Italians, Hungarians, and many others). There were three major religious groups: Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim. The official languages were Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian and Macedonian; and both the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets were equally used. On the other hand, Yugoslavia nations were for a considerable period of time separated by either foreign occupation or culture: the Eastern part by the Ottoman and the Western part by that of the Habsburg Empire.

These *nations* were South Slavs, they used similar language (for some, the same) and for seventy years they have been living in the same country - Yugoslavia. Both of Yugoslavia's regimes, monarchist and communist tried, to some extent, to erase these differences, and especially the memories of fratricidal wars during both World Wars. The creation of a new 'nationality' - Yugoslavs - was one attempt, that became a cross-cutting, political factor, that was increasingly relevant. In spite of all attempts at establishing some form of unity, Yugoslavia remained a deeply divided society.

As explained in the previous chapter, these diversities were institutionalised, by means of the 1974 Constitution and the federal system. Federal segments were based on national 'borders', as far as they could be, except in Bosnia and Herzegovina where no nation had an absolute majority. The republics were largely autonomous in making decisions at the regional level (as long as they were not in contradiction with the main course of the federal communist party policy). The federal government and the party leadership insisted on equal economic

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development and distribution by allocation, and, also, on economic and cultural co-operation between different regions. Except for a few crises in the early 1970s, the communist regime under Josip Broz Tito's leadership and charisma succeeded in keeping such a system alive. With Tito's death in 1980, the whole system had to be changed. In the manner of M.G. Smith, it could be said that Yugoslavia was an example of a social pluralistic society - the society which was politically divided among culturally distinct collectivities and their members, characterised by social exclusion (M.G. Smith, 1992: 197).

The 1974 Constitution firmly established Yugoslavia as a federal state, ruled by the communist party, but mostly by its leader (of the party and the state) Josip Broz Tito. His death in May 1980 created the problem of governing the state. The Presidency, which in the 1970s was a kind of advisory body to the President, remained as the highest collective power in the state. It was comprised of representatives of each republic and both provinces, the president of the federal communist party, and the commander of the army. On some occasions, the presidents of each republic took part in the sessions, depending on the relevance of the issue. All decisions in this collective body were made by consensus, and every republic and autonomous province had an opportunity to use a veto. The head of the presidency was changed annually according to an established order. The communist party was governed in the same way as the state. Of course, both presidencies were in close contact. Jurisdiction of the federal presidency was limited to general political and economic problems of the whole state, its military issues and foreign affairs. Other questions, related to the internal problems of each republic, fell under republic jurisdiction. The republics had their own presidents, parliaments, and their own communist parties. It could be said that after 1980, each republic was developing independently, as far as it fulfilled the requirements of the federal state (mostly economic and monetary obligations) or as long as it stuck to the general communist line. Except in the sphere of military and foreign affairs, the republics had all the characteristics of independent states. Yugoslavia was established as a consociational society.[97]

What was common to all the republics was a still powerful communist ideology, relying mostly on a strong bureaucratic apparatus, and the important role of the Yugoslav People's Army as *portparole* of such ideology. Further, Yugoslavia in the 1980s was going through a period of economic hardship which was a concern of the federal government.[98] The republics were established as sovereign states of a particular nation.

The balance of power between ethnies was maintained in the early stages of consociational Yugoslavia. The largest republic (territorially and by population), Serbia, was according to the 1974 constitution, divided into two provinces: Vojvodina (with large communities of many national minorities) and Kosovo (with, at the time, around 90 per cent Albanian population). This division decreased Serbia's potential power. Every republic was a minority in comparison with others, and, therefore, 'forced' to co-operate with the others. However, by the end of the 1980s political relationships within and between the Yugoslav republics changed rapidly.

The 'grand coalition' - which included both the Yugoslav Presidency and the Central Committee of the SKJ[99] - was created with the aim of preserving the balance of power in multinational Yugoslavia. But it was challenged from two sides: from the republican leaderships and from the newly-arisen nationalist movements. At the end of the 1980s, it became clear that the federal government of Yugoslavia had lost any real state power. Republic leaderships (of party and state) took full control over their territories.

Even though the critical problem within Yugoslav society in the 1980s was the economic collapse, and the resultant hyper-inflation, the instability of the 'grand coalition' of Yugoslavia, and its eventual collapse, was to a great extent due to its

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[97] The theory of consociationalism was presented in Lijphart's book *Democracy in Plural Societies* (1977).
[98] For more about Yugoslavia's economic crisis in the 1980s, see Lampe (2000) and Allcock (2000).
[99] *Savez Komunista Jugoslavije* (League of Yugoslav Communists).

handling of national issues. As expected, the 'problem' of Kosovo[100] generated the first nationalist clashes. Prior to 1986 the federal presidency had faced the problem of an Albanian nationalist movement in Kosovo[101] a faction of which had grown into an all-out secessionist movement. However, the problem of Albanian nationalism had not been perceived as a Serbian internal affair, but rather as a problem for the federal system. With the publication[102] of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences' *Memorandum*,[103] the Kosovo issue stirred previously suppressed Serbian nationalist feelings which demanded that a solution to the Kosovo problem be treated as an internal Serbian affair. A section of the Serbian political elite supported Slobodan Milošević as he took maximum advantage of the political instability over the issue of Kosovo to become the 'leader of the Serbian nation'. While Kosovo, through various myths and legends, plays an immense role in the formation of the Serbian national identity[104] and has been perceived by Serbs as an issue of national survival, the other republics, particularly Slovenia and Croatia, perceived Kosovo 'simply' as a political and human rights issue. While Serbia was experiencing the rise of two antagonistic nationalist forces, those of the Serbs and Albanians, the western republics, and especially Slovenia, were going through a process of democratisation and liberalisation of their internal political and social life.[105] At that time, the political elites of Serbia and Slovenia had different and contradictory interests and agendas. The subsequent clash between them was unavoidable.

As Lijphart (1977: 100) frequently emphasised, political life in a consociational society is to a great extent determined by the behaviour of the elites. This was a view shared by the Serbian national leadership. In order to accomplish its aims, it

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[100] According to the 1974 constitution Kosovo gained the status of Autonomous Province (just like Vojvodina) with great control over its internal affairs. In 1981 Albanian students started demonstrations in Priština demanding the status of a republic for Kosovo. The demonstrations were crushed violently and martial law was imposed by the federal government.
[101] For more about the events in Kosovo in the 1960s and 1970s, and particularly on the role of Ranković, see Tanner (1997: 210).
[102] The Memorandum was published in Belgrade's mass-circulated daily *Večernje Novosti* on 24 September 1986 as an unfinished draft.
[103] For more about the content of the Memorandun, see Silber & Little (1995: 31-36).
[104] In the Serbian national formation, Kosovo has been perceived as a cradle of the Serbian nation. It is a place where, according to a myth, the Serbs chose death instead of surrender in 1389 on Kosovo Polje; it is also the place of the first Serbian Orthodox Patriarchy where the bones of Tzar Lazar were buried.

had to gain the support of other participants within the 'grand coalition'. To achieve this support, the Serbian leadership harnessed the pressure and discontent of the masses. This method became known as the 'happenings of the people' in which the masses were mobilised around the idea that they were part of an 'anti-bureaucratic revolution'. The old 'bureaucratic' elites in the republic and the federation became the scapegoats for all of society's problems.[106] Enormous public rallies supported by intensive media campaigns during the period of September-November 1988 swept through Kosovo Polje, Niš, Novi Sad, Podgorica[107] and Beograd, and resulted in the resignation of the whole leadership of the Republic of Montenegro and the Autonomous Provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. These leadership cadres were replaced by supporters of the Serbian leadership, i.e. of Slobodan Milošević.

These 'happenings of the people' provoked significant changes in the established consociational system of Yugoslavia, which ultimately affected the efficiency and governing capability of the 'grand coalition' of the federal government and the Central Committee. From then on, the Serbian national leadership, with the support of the political leaders in Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro, formed a bloc against the other constituents of the 'grand coalition': Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. By threatening to export the 'happening of the people' to other republics, tension between these elites rapidly increased. The 'anti-bureaucratic revolution' not only caused a change in the political cadres but it also resulted in changing the Serbian constitution, proclaimed on 28 March 1989,[108] which stripped the two provinces within Serbia of their autonomy.

In the same period, the democratisation and liberalisation of the political and social life in Slovenia and Croatia reached its peak, witnessed by the establishment of the

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[105] For more about Slovenian political liberalisation and the importance of the art movement known as *Neue Slovenische Kunst*, see Tanner (1997: 208-210) and Silber & Little (1995: 48-57).
[106] This accusation did not necessarilly sound wrong. However, these old elites have been replaced by equally bureaucratic ones. The only difference was that the newly established elites were obedient to the Serbian leadership.
[107] At that time known as Titograd.
[108] Under pressure from Milošević, on 25 November 1988 the federal parliament adopted amendments to the constitution which cleared the way for the new Serbian constitution (Silber & Little, 1995: 64).

first non-communist political parties.[109] It needs to be emphasised that the appearance through legitimate political processes of new political parties, which were to ultimately change the nature of political life in the two republics, was supported, although not initiated, by the republican Central Committees of the Communist Party. Indirectly, these changes in the political system heralded the collapse of socialism in Yugoslavia. However, the initiative for change came from the communist leadership of Slovenia, while the Croatian communists followed suit without a clear concept of the possible repercussions. Throughout the 1980s Croatia was labelled the 'silent republic' as a consequence of the rigid post-1971 political suppression of any nationalist or quasi-nationalist sentiment among the political, social and economic elite.[110] Hence, the Croatian Communist elite passively observed the events of the late 1980s and avoided taking an open stand in the developing conflict within the Communist Party leadership.

The final break-up of the Yugoslav Communist Party happened at the fourteenth extraordinary Party congress held in Belgrade on 23 January 1990. During this congress two competing views regarding the future development of the Yugoslav League of Communists and, hence of Yugoslavia itself, clashed openly: representatives from the Serbian Communists demanded a return to the centralist Party structure, while the Slovenian Communists advocated a loose association of republican parties.[111] After all the amendments proposed by the Slovenians had been overruled by majority votes, the Slovenian delegation walked out, followed by the Croatian delegation. It marked the end of the Yugoslav Communist Party. Moreover, this event constituted the end of the 'grand coalition' - the force which had kept Yugoslavia together. There was however another force which believed it could preserve Yugoslavia - the Yugoslav People's Army.

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[109] On 11 January 1989 the Democratic Alliance was established as the first non-communist party in Slovenia, and in March 1989 Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) as the first non-communist party in Croatia. A few months later, on 17 June 1989 the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) was established, although it was only legalized in December 1989.

[110] In the first half of the 1980s, many Croatian intellectuals who were lebelled as nationalists, for example Franjo Tuđman, Dobroslav Paraga, Vlado Gotovac and others, were prosecuted and given long prison sentences.

[111] For more about the 14th extraordinary congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists, see Tanner (1997: 220) and Silber & Little (1995: 79-81).

The conflict between the republics' elites within the federal government and within the Central Committee of the Yugoslav League of Communists created an opportunity for the rise of the nationalist movements emerging from outside the ranks of the Communist Party. The disintegration of the federal Party significantly weakened their control over the republics. The republics' Party leaders found themselves confronting not only the Communist elites from other republics, but also new nationalist elites within their own republics. These new elites vied directly for power within their republics' borders. Once allowed to participate legally in public discussions, the nationalist elites rapidly gained the support of the masses. One of the most powerful arguments employed by the new nationalist elites in their rhetoric against the old Communist guard was the assertion that the Communists were an ineffective force, powerless to solve the political, social and economic problems of the federal institutions. While some republican leaders still enjoyed a level of popular support, particularly in Slovenia, the Croatian Communists' inability to adopt a clear position allowed the nationalist elite to gain political capital by espousing their well-defined 'solution' to the crisis. However, one of the reasons why the Croatian Communist elite lacked the unity necessary for reaching any substantial decision in the conflict was the fact that approximately one-third of the members of the Croatian League of Communists were Serbs.

In the final analysis, it could be argued that Tudman's victory in the first multi-party elections in Croatia in May 1990 was not unexpected. The major prerequisites for the Yugoslav consociational system were the balance of power between the constitutional parts, coupled with co-operation between the elites involved. With the dramatic changes in the political system of Yugoslavia at the end of the 1980s, these prerequisites ceased to exist. In addition, the old Croatian elite itself functioned as a quasi-consociation created between the Croats and Serbs[112] in Croatia. Once national issues were brought onto the political agenda, the 'consociation' within the Croatian Communist Party collapsed as well. The same happened at the federal level. Clear nationalist demands for self-government and

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[112] In April 1978 the SKH (Savez Komunista Hrvatske - League of Croatian Communists) had 282,515 members, which was only 17% of the SKJ membership. According to nationality, 64.2% of these members were Croats, 24.2% Serbs and 7.4% Yugoslavs. Every fourth Yugoslav and every ninth Serb and every twentieth Croat was a member of the SKH (Tudman, 1990c: 148).

for the protection of national sovereignty, proved to be forces too powerful for an inefficient elite to cope with.

In an atmosphere of increasing conflict, the first Croatian democratic multi-party elections were announced for April and May 1990. Goldstein (1999: 210) emphasised that in these circumstances 'it became likely that whoever managed to offer voters the most forceful defence of Croatia's endangered sovereignty and settle accounts with the hated Communists would win'. The HDZ won 42 per cent of votes and got 57.6 per cent of seats in the *Sabor.* Soon after the HDZ leader Franjo Tudman was elected President of the Presidency of the Republic of Croatia.

At the same time as the *Sabor* promulgated new amendments to the republic's constitution and confirmed a new official flag and coat of arms, in the Croatian village of Srb the Serb National Council was founded (Goldstein, 1999: 218). The leaders of the council refused to accept the amendments and called for a referendum on sovereignty and autonomy of the Serbs in Croatia. Very soon it became obvious that neither side was willing to negotiate their terms. The day on which the leaders of the Serbs from Krajina called the referendum - 17 August 1990 - marks the beginning of the so-called 'log revolution' (*balvan revolucija*). That same day is marked as the beginning of the aggression against Croatia (*ibid.*).

After a year of fruitless attempts by the leaders of six Yugoslav republics to reach a consensus regarding the structural form of the future Yugoslavia, on 25 June 1991 the Croatian *Sabor* enacted the Constitutional Decision on the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Croatia. A few months later a 'proper' war in Croatia started. The military operation called *Oluja* (Storm) in early August 1995 marked the end of the war. The events that occurred between these dates deserve a more thorough analysis than the one I could offer here. At this point, it would be sufficient to say that the war in Croatia revived terms like genocide, ethnic cleansing and war crimes on European territory. For the purposes of this study it is more important to mention the consequences.

Parallel with the war, the Croats were preoccupied with the process of the /re/formation of their nation. The formation of the first independent nation-state[113] required considerable reorganisation of all spheres of society. Due to the circumstances in which the nation and the state were /re/formed and due to the policies of the ruling party, the war became the major point of reference in this process. Hence:

- Even though the opening of democratic processes at the beginning of the 1990s facilitated the formation of dozens of political parties, in practice one-party-rule was established. Until January 2000 the HDZ won all national, local and presidential elections. In the atmosphere of war the HDZ succeeded in installing either their party members or their sympathisers in all significant governing positions including the army, police, justice, education, media and health, as well as in the managerial positions in state-owned industry.

- With a two-thirds majority in the *Sabor*, the HDZ controlled the structural and legal formation of the state institutions. Even though the Croatian constitution defined the political system as so-called 'semi-presidential', Franjo Tuđman as the president of the state throughout the 1990s[114] concentrated all executive power within his office, even exceeding constitutional authority. Strong centralisation of government occurred at all levels of society.

- The new nation-state required new national symbols. After the first proposal for a national flag was criticised as too similar to that of the Ustashas' regime, the newly-designed flag was introduced, apparently directly approved by the President. The same critique of the name of the new national currency, the so-called *kuna*, failed to achieve any result. The President introduced a new 'presidential flag' as well and surrounded himself by guards dressed in 'historical' Croatian uniforms. The President also required a monument at which foreign delegations could pay their respect to the Croatian nation. With that aim the so-called 'Altar of the Homeland' was erected on a hill above Zagreb. The establishment of the new state required not only new national symbols, but, at the same time, the eradication of previous symbols. The communists' red star disappeared soon after the first elections; changing names

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[113] Previous state formation of the Croats could not be labelled as either 'independent' or 'nation-state'.

[114] Tuđman won the presidential elections in 1992 and 1997.

of streets was the first task of the local government; hundreds of Second World War monuments were literally blown up. It was a clear sign of the changing political system.

- The new nation-state also required a 'pure' national culture. One of the first tasks of the new regime was the purification of the Croatian language. New words were invented, and a new version of grammar introduced. This was accompanied by purification of the Croatian libraries when many books in Cyrillic disappeared together with Serbian and other South Slav authors. The popular culture became increasingly national. Numerous historians undertook the task of redefining national history.

All these processes gained a legitimisation in the nationalist ideology mainly created and propounded by President Franjo Tudman. In the following pages I will analyse the major characteristics of that nationalist ideology through, just as in previous cases, questions of how the nation in general and the Croatian nation in particular were defined and who were labelled as enemies of the nation.

6.3. Franjo Tudman's Nationalist Ideology

6.3.1. Introduction

The rise of Croatian nationalism in the 1990s was defined and directed by the Croatian national leader - Franjo Tudman. Tudman played a crucial role in shaping national, internal and international policies; he made all the crucial decisions for the whole society. Moreover, Tudman was the main ideologist of the Croatian nationalist movement, the main constructor of the processes of the Croatian national-/re/formation and state-building.

The aim of this chapter is to analyse the way Tudman defined the Croatian nation, explained its past and present, and formulated its national goals and interests. Furthermore, when the processes of nation- and state-building occur in a period of war, the notion of enemies becomes important. Therefore, the analysis of Tudman's nationalist ideology will be divided into two parts: the first

will deal with Tuđman's definitions and explanations of one's 'own nation', and second, Tuđman's definitions of both internal and external enemies.

In this section I would like to look at the extent to which Tuđman's nationalist ideology is indeed an ideology, and to what extent it is oriented towards what Breuilly defined as the three different functions which ideology can play within a political movement: 'co-ordination, mobilisation and legitimation' (Breuilly, 1993). According to Breuilly, nationalist ideology matters because it provides what he calls a 'conceptual map' which 'enables people to relate their particular material and moral interests to a broader terrain of action' (ibid.: 13). Moreover, it relates people's problems to society as a whole (ibid.). According to Breuilly nationalist ideologies 'tend to become specific, outlining clear objectives and targeting potential supporters' (ibid.: 54) only in relation to the requirements of specific political action. Therefore, through this content analysis it will be shown how a specific war situation in Croatia determined Tuđman's nationalist ideology, and how with changes of circumstances, ideology can be changed as well.

6.3.2. Tuđman's Rhetoric

Throughout the 1990s in Croatia, each daily newspaper published any public appearance, speech and comment of the President. Usually, an immense space was given to his interviews, press conferences or public speeches.[115] They are announced on the first page of the newspaper,[116] and they are accompanied with a proportional number of the President's photographs.[117]

The analysis of these articles reveals that Tuđman's typical sentence was long, often long enough to form a paragraph, with lots of references to history, many metaphors, and burdened with adjectives. In the process of reconstructing the

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[115] Of 50 analysed articles, 27 were one-page articles, 14 articles were more then one page and only 9 articles were less then one page in size.
[116] Only 10 articles were not announced.

nation and the state, the language was reconstructed as well. Hence, Tudman often used words drawn from the ancient Croatian language, as well as those that are newly invented. Here is an example of Tudman's rhetoric:

> Those who are raising the question about the building of the Presidential Palace, yacht or buying the presidential airplane, are belonging to those Yugo-unitarists, in other words, to remnants of the Yugo-communist ideology, who cannot accept the fact that Croatia has became a sovereign state and that it has its own Head of State who has settled in the Ban's Palace,[118] until it was attacked and destroyed, trying to decapitate Croatia[119] (...) such questions ask *politikanti*[120] and those who cannot deeply understand historical changes.[121] (8/93)

A few of the common features of Tudman's rhetoric can be found in the above sentence. One of them is the frequent use of the term 'history'. In 50 analysed articles, the term 'history' is used in 35 phrases.[122] The reason was not only because of Tudman's profession - a historian; history in this case was just a marker for certainty and stability. Examples include: 'the historical coat of arms of the historical Croatian kingdom' (5/94); an emphasis on the importance of an event: 'we should remember history' (12/92); or as an actor by itself: 'it will be written by history' (7/94).

In his speeches Tudman frequently emphasised the breaking point between the near communistic past and the present 'new democratic system'. This point was not just an important date in the textbooks of history, but it also provided a black

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[117] 25 analysed articles were accompanied with one picture, 15 articles with more then one picture, and 8 articles with four or more pictures. Only two articles were not covered with the President's picture.

[118] The residence of the President of Croatia in Zagreb.

[119] In November 1991, the JNA's Air-forces bombed the area of the president's residence.

[120] Originally *politikant* - in the Dictionary of the Croatian language - the man who is dealing with the daily, immediate policy without broader ideas and visions, who is involved in small political combinations and struggles (Anic, 1994).

[121] All quotations from Tudman's public speeches are translated from Croatian and were published in *Vjesnik*.

[122] Here is the list of the phrases used: history (11 times), historical circumstances (2), historical paradox (1), historical social development (1), historical meaning (3), historically well known (1), historical necessity (1), historically untrue (1), historical dream (2), historical tradition (2), historical events (4), historical wheel (2), historical territory (1), historically true (1), historical perspective (1), historical results (3), historical task (3), of historical importance (1), historical reasons (3), historical reality (1), historical fact (1), historical period (4), historical distance (1), historical context (1), historical responsibility (1), historical scene (1), historical experience (1), historical development (1), historical step-forward (1), historical connection (1), historical days (1), historical decision (2), historical act (2), tragic history (1), historical changes (1).

and white picture which served as the base for an evaluation of events, people and spoken words. Communism and Yugoslavia were seen as symbols of all that is evil. Therefore, the purpose of frequent expressions 'Yugo-communists' or 'Yugo-unitarists' is to disqualify those so named.[123]

Another characteristic of Tudman's rhetoric was his relation with those he was directly addressing in his speech. Whether he was addressing the broader masses, journalists or fellow politicians, Tudman often took a patronising position. He would direct journalists on how to write and what to cover in their articles: 'write about examples of how (...) Serbs already contribute into the Croatian government' (11/93), or 'You are putting everything into the press, it's a disgrace' (5/94), or 'instead of writing the *Sabor* without opposition', you could better write a 'new president of the *Sabor* is elected', because he was elected legally and according to law. You are also responsible for shaping public opinion so that our man understands what it means to have his own country' (2/93).

Not obeying this advice could be dangerous because '(i)n Croatian journalism there are some remnants of that old communism, Yugo-unitarism, and that is a result of our historical circumstances' (2/93). Following this remark, Croatian journalists have indeed become more cautious about what they are writing, how they are writing, and how they are asking a question:

> Q: Mister President, what do you consider as your biggest and, for the Croatian future, the most important achievement in these two years (...)?
> A: For Christ's sake, do I have to say that? Every normal citizen in Croatia and in the world knows that. (7/92)

The wrong question could provoke the President's accusations: 'In your question, as I said, one of the following is reflected: not knowing the essence of parliamentary democracy, insufficient political culture, or lack of good intentions' (5/94).

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[123] The list of such expressions is longer, and will be given in the chapter which deals with internal and external enemies.

Another feature separated Tudman from the majority of his colleagues - talking about himself and emphasising his merits. In the quotation given at the beginning of this section, Tudman's opinion about Tudman was clearly stated. He prefers to call himself 'the Head of State' more than simply the President. Therefore, any attempt to endanger the Head of State was an attempt to decapitate Croatia.

President Tudman's achievements in making Croatia a sovereign state were numerous. The one responsible for the creation of the independent state and its international recognition was clear enough in Tudman's statements: 'We achieved that not only because of our rational policy (...) but also because of my reputation' (7/92), and 'because of friendships, and because of my broad-mindedness' (4/94).

One of the major merits Tudman prescribed to himself was the establishment of his party HDZ: 'for me, as the president of the state, it would be much easier not to be tied with any party (...) but my party membership is crucial for the party that I have established, to which I gave the program, with which I contributed to the fact that we have an independent and democratic Croatia' (7/93).

To participate in the Partisan movement during the Second World War was thought of as a disadvantage for Tudman's political opponents. However, in Tudman's case, this affiliation was translated into an advantage over his opponents: 'If an anti-fascist would not be the head of Croatia, we would not have Croatia at all' (7/92). His episode as a general in the JNA is presented as an obstacle in his real interests: 'believe me or not, I was taking off general's epaulets in order to retire from politics, to concentrate on scientific work. There are several of my books which will stay' (7/93).

The position of Head of State gave Tudman broad obligations but also unlimited power over every segment of social life in Croatia. He liked to emphasise that power in his speeches: 'I replaced two ministers' (7/93), 'the courts were making

decisions without my knowledge'[124] (7/93).

A picture of Tudman's rhetoric, and of Tudman himself, should be somewhat clearer now. His rhetoric, but not only that, brought him to power during the first multiparty elections in May 1990. It probably also helped him to maintain power. He himself supported, if he did not initiate, the picture of Franjo Tudman as 'the Father of the Nation', 'the Creator of the Independent State of Croatia', 'the Saviour of the Nation'. Even though his sentences sometimes sound too bold, untrue, or even funny, for ten years Franjo Tudman and his party have won all the elections that have taken place in Croatia. It could be said that Tudman's rhetoric was strictly directed towards the broader masses. And it was successful.

In the next few pages, Tudman's definition of the nation will first be analysed. In his public speeches Tudman was mainly referring to the Croatian nation in specific. Therefore, for a better understanding of Tudman's concept of the nation his main writings will be analysed, the majority of which were written in the late 1960s and 1980s.[125]

6.3.3. Definition of the Nation

The concept of the nation in Tudman's writings was never a clear nor a well-defined one. The definition varied according to the context in which he was writing. However two main strands of thought can be identified. In the 1960s Tudman was a well established communist activist with a military past. Even though Tudman's interests as a historian were to some extent contrary to the interests of the communist establishment,[126] his theoretical approach was very much Marxist, and based on the ideas of historical materialism. However, even during that period, Tudman expressed certain nationalist attitudes, or at least sentiments, which the communist establishment considered nationalist. During

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[124] Originally: 'Sudovi su mi donosili odluke bez mog znanja'.
[125] For example Tudman (1968/1990) and (1987/1990).
[126] In that time, at the end of 1960s, Tudman was dealing with the issue of Second World War victims in Croatia and especially in the notorious concentration camp Jasenovac; while the

the 1980s Tudman was known as a dissident nationalist who had spent periods in prison. His writings during that period clearly expressed Croatian nationalist ideals and anti-Yugoslavism but, above all, they advocated the creation of an independent state of Croatia. It was within the context of this political program that Tudman defined the nation.

Tudman's concept of the nation is historic and organic. The nation exists as an historical product and as a distinctive living organism. Consequently, history, as an actor, guarantees the existence and preservation of the nation. Even though the nation is defined as a living organism, it cannot be compared to the life of an individual: 'The destiny of an individual or an idea is not the destiny of nations: they neither give up, nor die as easily; they have to live in the specific conditions in which they find themselves' (1990c: 46). Tudman does not discuss the process, nor the timing involved in the emergence of the nation. However, the nation does have to have a long and rich history of its own; it has to be a 'historical nation'.

In addition to history, the nation, according to Tudman's conceptualisation, is defined through its unique individuality. Tudman wrote: 'As soon as a social-ethnic community reaches a level of historical-political integration (language, culture, economy and territory), such that a community appears as a unique national individuality, it becomes an actor on the international arena; it strives to expand its power for its own gains' (1990c: 220). From this quotation it can be said that Tudman acknowledges the ethnic origins of the nation, even though he never defines the ethnic phenomenon.

Since Tudman defined the nation as a unique individuality, he also attributes to the nation all the characteristics of a living organism. The nation is not a sum of its members, it is an entity above its members. All parts of the nation have to function if it is to exist. The nation exists and acts according to its own impulses and interests. A nation can be compared only to another nation. As a result of his analyses, Tudman concludes that 'nations as a whole behave more or less

Communist establishment considered every discussion on the number of victims as a nationalist

uniformly in a psychological sense, according to their historically acquired impulses for self-preservation' (1990a: 437).

The fundamental impulse of the nation is therefore self-preservation. According to Tudman, the only guarantee for national self-preservation is the nation-state. He calls it a 'democratic principle, one nation - one state' (1990c: 9). Tudman reminds us that: 'it has often been forgotten that the creation of nation-states has been a necessary historical process' (1990c: 23). Tudman explains that national consciousness - by reaching a specific level of historically and culturally based self-awareness - cannot accept being ruled by another nation or by any kind of foreign oppression' (1990b: 312). An oppressed nation is in a 'continuous fight - spiritual and material - for life or death, for national self-preservation. That fight could finish, sooner or later, only when the national question is solved, that is, with the creation of an independent national state' (1990c: 221).

Tudman defines nationalism in Marxist terms. Nationalism is an 'expression of a national self-essence, of political individuality and of a natural aspiration to live as an equal, sovereign entity within the international community and human-kind' (1990c: 230). Nationalism expresses itself in modern history as a major obstacle against imperialist-hegemonist oppression and against the imposition of any form of dominance. For that reason, nationalism is a symbol of freedom and more broadly, of social development, because without nationalism (and this according to Tudman, is its most positive function) no country, and hence humanity, can progress in a normal way. Consequently, a crime against a single nation is a crime against humanity, 'because any limitation and any binding of any nation harms not only the peaceful, but also the harmonious development of human-kind' (*ibid.*). Hence, Tudman defines nationalism, narrowly, as a question of national integration and self-preservation of the non-recognized and oppressed nations, and broadly, as a normal, unavoidable phenomenon in the social and international development of history (1990c: 219).

Tudman concludes that 'every attempt to bind the national sovereignty of

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activity.

historical nations is a form of tyranny' (1990a: 480), and it is the right and duty of the nation to fight for its national preservation and against tyranny. This fight may also require violence or even genocide, but, as Tudman explains, even 'the Old Testament testifies, in a very dramatic way, how violence, hatred, crime and revenge are inseparable constituent elements of a human being as an individual, and of the nation as the most developed form of the human community' (1990a: 129).

In the next section I will examine how Tudman applied his concept of the nation to the case of the Croatian nation. This examination will be based mainly on the results of a content analysis of Tudman's public speeches.

6.3.4. The Croatian Nation by 'the Father of the Nation'

Tudman's idea of the nation is deeply rooted in history. Shared history, historical events, battles and kings, religion and customs serve as a base for the nation. It is history that gives the nation shape and determines its future.

By proclaiming the Croatian nation as 'one of the oldest nations in Europe' (5/94) Tudman's view of the nation is firmly couched in a historical context. Tudman finds a base for such a statement in another historical 'fact': 'here the Croatian people had their statehood 1300 years ago, and (...) it was a support for other non-Serb people to achieve their national constitution and their statehood' (7/93). The state is a kind of guarantee for the survival of the nation: 'all nations who did not achieve their own statehood, lost their fatherland' (10/93). That is one of the reasons why the state is defined strictly as a national state: 'Croatian state - the national state of the Croatian nation' (7/93). Even though, Croatia from 1102 till 1941 was not an independent state, the Croatian nation 'preserved the elements of both national and state self-essence' (7/93).

This is the reason why Tudman concentrates his political program around the idea of the creation of the national state. In the articles analysed in this content analysis, Tudman describes the Croatian independent state as 'the historical

tendency of the Croatian nation' (2 times), as 'the nine centuries long dream' (3), and as 'the thousand year long dream of the Croatian nation' (2). When the state is declared as the supreme value *per se*, the creation of that state is one of the greatest achievements of the whole nation, and of the leader particularly.

Moreover, in this concept the nation is highly determined by its geo-political position. Talking about the Croatian nation, as the most important factor which determines the past and the future of Croats, Tudman emphasises the Croatian position between different civilizations. The first division is a 'division between two civilizations: Eastern Orthodox Europe and Western Europe' (4/94). Another division is mentioned in relation to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH). Tudman defines Croats, Serbs and Muslims in BH as 'three nations - three civilizations' (5/94). A criterion for the constitution of these three separate civilizations is, at least in origin, religion. The centuries-long common life of Serbs, Croats and Muslims in BH undermined the role of the language, values and way of life that differentiated them. The only reliable marker for a national affiliation is, it could be said, religious affiliation. Boundaries between those nations, according to Tudman, are 'civilizational', i.e. unbreakable.

As a result of its historical position the Croatian nation developed particular national interests. National interests, according to Tudman, are the common essence of a nation: 'Using the example of Croatia and Slovenia we can draw the conclusion that there is no long-term love, and that nations *[narodi]* are led only by interests. And very often, we can find selfish decisions in relations between nations' (7/93). From this statement it follows that for Tudman a defense of national interests is the most significant goal:[127] 'But, when the national interests, the interests of the Croatian state, are in question then all considerations towards friends have to stop' (4/94). These interests cannot be changed, as 'the interests of the nation-state are eternal' (1/93).

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[127] In the analysed articles Tudman mentions 10 times 'defending national interests' as the primary aim of the Croatian government. The other aims mentioned are as follows: 'spiritual and national renaissance' (4), 'breaking with bureaucratic organizations' (2), 'defending constitutional order' (4), 'liberation of all Croatian territories' (8), 'stable Croatia' (4), 'democratization' (2), 'creation of the welfare state' (5).

Considering the starting premise that national interests are the moving forces of a nation throughout its history, historical events are to be explained in a way that justifies present events. In this way continuity with the past is secured. A perfect example of this usage of history can be observed through Tudman's explanation of the events in Croatia during the Second World War.

During the Second World War the Croatian nation found itself divided between two conflicting ideologies: fascism and communism. In April 1941 the pro-fascist Ustasha movement proclaimed the Independent State of Croatia (*Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska* - NDH)[128] and became notorious for atrocities and mass killings of Serbs, Jews, Gypsies and Croats themselves. On the other hand, anti-fascists gathered around the Communist Party in the battle against fascism and, consequently, against the Ustasha movement. The victory against the fascists in 1945 was, at the same time, the defeat of the Independent State of Croatia.

For Tudman, himself a member of the anti-fascist movement, this episode presents a key problem for an explanation of Croatian history. The fulfillment of the 'nine centuries long dream', i.e. the independent state, had been an achievement of the pro-fascistic movement. Nevertheless, the ultimate national interest needs to be defended.

The NDH in Tudman's speeches is described as a 'mortgage' for Croats (two times) and as a 'quisling regime' (2), but also as the 'Croatian state' (1). Tudman explains: '(it is) an historical truth that the NDH committed crimes' (6/92), but 'the centuries long Croatian history cannot be compromised because of a period of four years, because of the same period which all European countries went through' (8/93). After all, 'the Croatian people were (...) partly on the side of the NDH, not because it was a pro-fascist, quisling creation, but because they wanted their own state' (4/94).

Now the creation of an independent Croatian state is justified. Still the false

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[128] See Chapter 5.

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image of Croats being fascists has to be erased. With that aim Tuđman sees the anti-fascist movement in Croatia as 'stronger than in other, not only ex-Yugoslav countries, but (...) we could even say proportionally the strongest in Europe' (5/94). 'It is a lie of the Croatian and world public that the partisans and popular liberation struggle in Croatia were only Serbian. (...) The leadership of the anti-fascist movement was in the hands of Croats' (6/94). Frequent reminders of the anti-fascist movement serves also as a balance between an undoubtedly pro-fascist episode and the demands of the modern world: 'we are building Croatia on anti-fascism because anti-fascism is the base on which today's international system is built' (4/94). Still, it is not clear whether this statement is an explanation or an excuse.

The nation, it is clear, needs to be unified in order to accomplish its aims and protect its interests. For this reason Tuđman attached great importance to reconciling the 50-year long ideological divisions of the Croats. The ideal media for this reconciliation Tuđman finds in *Jasenovac,*[129] the biggest and the most terrible of the Ustasha's concentration camps. He explains: 'Jasenovac was the consequence of an ideological division of Europe and the world between two major opposing ideas - fascism and communism. Those two ideas were fighting for the lives and spirit of the people and they caused terrible evils. (...) When we already have the monument on that place, let's find out the historical truth and let's mark the victims separately - Jews,[130] Serbs, Croats - let everybody have their place, their museum, their chapel as evidence of one historical time. A place like that can be a place of reconciliation, of bringing together, an appeal to overcome similar evils in the future' (10/93).

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[129] In his book *Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti* (1990c) Tuđman deals extensively with the issue of Jasenovac where he accuses mainly Serbian nationalists for exaggerating the myth of Jasenovac in order to create a black legend about the historical guilt of the whole Croatian nation (1990c: 21).
[130] In the same book (Tuđman, 1990c), Tuđman tries to show that genocide is neither a modern nor a rare phenomena. In that sense, Tuđman analyses the genocide against the Jews throughout history, and concludes that the Jews 'provoked a hatred against themselves with the fact that they preserved their ethnic-religious individuality on the territories of other nations, even though they presented themselves as advocates of cosmopolitan-international ideas' (1990c: 140). Tuđman 'proves' his arguments concluding that 'only those Jewish communities which willingly and without resistance assimilated into a national majority were spared anti-Semitic pogroms' (*ibid*). It is clear that Tuđman actually blames the Jews for the genocide against them. It is also important

Again, Tudman attempts to strike a balance between Ustasha crimes and those crimes of the Partisans. The episode in Bleiburg in 1945 serves that purpose perfectly: 'On Bleiburg there were one hundred thousand Croatian people killed, and not only Ustashas, rather Ustashas were a minority, but there were people from different parts of Croatia whose families were aligned to the NDH as the Croatian state, and not to fascism, or to nazism' (5/94). It is clear that both ideologies committed crimes, and therefore, neither deserves any credit. The fact remains however that the only tragic victim of these events was the Croatian people. On this premise Tudman attempts to build a new unity around the reconciled nation.

In his speeches Tudman has praised the anti-fascist movement for one more reason - the return of lost territory.[131] Tudman sees all areas in which Croats have been living and still live, as the historic Croatian homeland. He mentions Istria (2 times), Herzegovina (2), some parts or the whole of Bosnia (4), and Sveta Gera[132] (1) as the historic Croatian territories. With the exception of Istria all are not parts of the Republic of Croatia.

On the other hand, all of those who have declared themselves as Croats, around the world, have the right to assume Croatian citizenship and can actively participate in Croatian political life through the right to vote at Croatian elections. Therefore, the population of territories that Tudman considers as historically Croatian, became a part of the Croatian state. Citizenship and national affiliation were equated, at least for Croats. Members of national minorities who lived in Croatia had to prove their right to Croatian citizenship. According to some opposition leaders in Croatia, the active involvement of Croatia in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, had as its aim the bringing together of all 'Croatian historical territories' in one state.

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to emphasize that in the English translation of this book (Tudman, 1995), these passages are erased.

[131] At the end of the First World War Croatia, which was part of the defeated Austro-Hungarian Empire, lost Istria and parts of Dalmatia, which were the price that the international community paid to Italy for its involvement in the war on the side of the Allies. After the Second World War, these territories became a part of the Republic of Croatia.

[132] A territory which today is divided between Croatia and Slovinia.

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This statement is not merely an attempt to discredit political opponents in a political struggle. As has already been mentioned, one of the most important characteristics of Tudman's rhetoric was emphasizing his own role in the process of the creation of the national state. For describing the present position of Croatia, Tudman used terms such as a 'political miracle' (7 times), 'a surprise for the other nations' (2), 'triumphant victory' (2), or 'the most democratic country' (2). It is a 'triumph that Croatian politics has not had in its entire history' (4/94), 'the highest achievement of Croatian politics yet' (4/94). Such qualifications are not surprising. It is interesting that it is a particular policy that is attributed to a 'creator' of the present 'miracles', not the Croatian people nor the Croatian nation.

The creation of these miracles is emphasised even further when one takes into account numerous obstacles Tudman and the HDZ had to face. In the next section I will attempt to determine Tudman's attitudes towards the 'others': those who belong to the other nations and those who proclaim different political orientations.

6.3.5. The 'Others'

In his books (1990a, 1990b, 1990c) Tudman develops a detailed analysis of the role of national enemies. He holds that when a movement or a nation has an enemy which has been perceived as a threat to its survival, it will do everything possible, and it will employ all means available, to overpower and destroy that enemy, if it cannot subject that enemy to its own will (1990c: 161). Tudman argues that the violence engendered by war escalates on a regular basis into genocide and ethnic cleansing in cases when a conqueror has a long-term claim over a territory and has as a goal the ethnic assimilation of an opposing nation (*ibid.*). By arguing that genocide and ethnic cleansing are a common phenomenon, Tudman attempts to explain how genocidal activities are not the property of just a few nations: 'every attempt to attribute genocidal tendencies to some nations or racial-ethnic communities, to some cultural-civilisational spheres and to some social-revolutionary movements, religions or ideologies, is to

misunderstand historical realities' (*ibid.*: 166). Tudman goes further by arguing that genocide and ethnic cleansing are historical necessities. In order to emphasize this necessity Tudman misuses A. Toynbee's words, and presents his own political programme: 'To be the carrion or the vulture' (*ibid.*: 303). According to Tudman, the only remedy for national conflicts and unavoidable genocide is the concept of the balance of power: 'Only when competing nations convince themselves that they can neither destroy each other nor can they impose their domination, will they finally, in some way, be reconciled to a peaceful common co-existence' (*ibid.*: 304). However, 'those who refuse to limit the mixing of nations, because of their allegedly democratic progressive ideas, they forget that in future that mixing can initiate conflicts with far-reaching consequences' (*ibid.*: 305).

In the next section, I will show how Tudman has applied these general principles to specific enemies of the Croatian nation.

The Internal Enemies

Fifty years ago in socialist Yugoslavia, the communist regime created a division between the working class and honest intelligentsia, on the one hand, and on the other, all those who could not fit into this typology. A product of those times - Franjo Tudman - makes a similar distinction. With cunning statements, Tudman reveals 'evidence' about how the intelligentsia is working against the national interests of the Croatian nation: 'in the mentality of one particular part of the intelligentsia it is modern to be in opposition to any authority, and furthermore to the authority of their state, thereby forgetting the interest of the state' (7/93). This could be understood as those intellectuals who are working behind 'our' back. It is evident that the President was angered by this perceived treachery and was unable to control his anger:

> some gentlemen do not know the meaning of democracy (...) but that
> kind has always existed, in all nations, countries and circumstances,
> from those biblical times of the Pharisees. They exist even today and
> even in the days when a demand for establishment of a new Balkan
> federation appears. That is not a coincidence. (7/93)

A few months later he is even more precise: 'some intellectuals are against the HDZ, and the reason for this is envy. And those who are most sarcastic, those unsuccessful amateurs, are their leaders' (10/93). In these statements Tudman has directly accused nobody. He merely implies that some intellectuals are actually trying to pull Croatia back to where it was a couple of years ago - in a 'hell'[133] called Yugoslavia. In a period when the country was engaged in war with the remnants of Yugoslavia, such an accusation is not harmless, especially because a whole category of the population is named. It seems that only the HDZ could provide a sanctuary from similar accusations.

In his speeches, Franjo Tudman uses a wide repertoire of names for his opponents: amateurs (3 times), ignorants (2), wise-guys (2), great-minded intellectuals (1), *politikanti* (4), irrationalists (2), etc. In this manner internal enemies are created, and they are not just opponents of Franjo Tudman and his politics, but direct opponents of the Croatian national interest, national state, and above all, opponents of the Croatian nation itself.

For the maintenance of absolute power, centralized in the hands of the Leader, manipulative techniques against internal enemies helped him to secure more time for the exercise of that power. The attention of the broad population was turned onto the internal enemies, rather then onto internal political, social and economic problems. But, external enemies can be of even more help.

The External Enemies

Defining external enemies in a war is not a difficult job. Nevertheless, *how* the enemy is defined could also shape the war on the ground. The war in Croatia started as an attempt by the communist remnants and those who strongly believed in the preservation of Yugoslavia, to keep Croatia inside the Yugoslavian borders by pure force. This war ended as a pure ethnic war. One of the reasons was the way in which enemies were defined. When a whole nation is

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[133] Tudman described Yugoslavia as unitaristic (4), hell (2), an artificial creation (2), and a place

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labelled an enemy, then genocide, ethnic cleansing, human resettlement, and all kinds of other atrocities can be expected. On the other hand, by observing Tudman's image and definition of enemies, we can get a clearer idea of his own nation.

In this chapter, Tudman's explanation of the origins and aims of two nations will be observed: Serbs[134] and Muslims.[135] As far as possible, differences in the perceptions of these two nationalities in Tudman's speeches will be explored.

Serbs

Since 1990, with the first multi-party elections in Croatia, some Serbs in Croatia declared themselves endangered by a rising Croatian nationalism. Helped by their co-nationals from Serbia, they soon became well organized and armed. Their open rebellion started in the summer of 1991 with the raising of the barricades around the territory which they inhabited (*Krajina*), and continued in an open war against the Croatian government and state until August 5, 1995. In Tudman's speeches these Serbs became known as 'rebel Serbs' (8 times), 'bandits' (1), 'Chetniks' (5), 'Serbian aggressors' (9), 'local Serbs' (8), 'extremists' (12).

In the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, Croatia was defined as the national state of the Croatian nation and Serbian nation in Croatia. Serbs in Croatia wanted to have the same status in the newly independent Croatia as their Croatian counterparts. Furthermore, they resisted the declaration of the Croatian *Sabor* which proclaimed the creation of an independent state of Croatia, separate

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where the Croatian national identity has been suppressed (6).

[134] In the Croatian language there is a difference between those members of a Serbian nationality who are living in Serbia - *Srbijanci*, and those who are living in Croatia - *Srbi*. Considering the fact that a similar distinction does not exist in English, the terms 'Serbs from Serbia' and 'Serbs from Croatia' will be used.

[135] In the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Muslims were recognized as a separate national group for the first time. During the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslims tried to determine their national identity more strictly. Since 1992 there have been different suggestions for naming their nationality: Muslims, Bosnian Muslims, Bosnians, Bosniaks, etc.

from the Yugoslav federation. Therefore, from 1990 the Serbs from Croatia became a national minority in Croatia. Helped by extreme nationalists from Serbia, misinformed, and with fresh memories of Croatian Ustashas' atrocities during the Second World War, Croatian Serbs considered themselves highly endangered, and demanded territorial autonomy and even the creation of a Greater Serbia.

Tudman's solution for this highly problematic situation was clear. In July 1992 Tudman declared that 'we have solved the Serbian question in Croatia'. Proclaiming Croatian Serbs as a national minority (16 times in the analysed speeches), and as an ethnic community (3 times), Tudman appealed to the international community to prevent the Serbian national minority having the right to self-determination on the grounds that 'national minorities do not have this right' (11/93). Rather, 'they have civil and ethnic rights according to international conventions' (5/94). On the other hand, Tudman concludes that 'Croatia is prepared to guarantee to the Serbs all that is written in the Constitution and in constitutional laws' (8/94). In the analysed speeches Tudman guaranteed to Croatian Serbs local government (mentioned once), cultural autonomy (1), all civil rights (12), all ethnic rights (15), minority rights (3), territorial autonomy (3), and special status (1). Nevertheless, Tudman can afford to be a little sarcastic: '(we could) solve the problem of Serbs in Croatia in the same way as Serbia solved the problem of Albanians in Kosovo' (5/94).

Tudman tried to make a distinction between the people and the leaders of the territory of Krajina. On the one hand, Tudman describes the leaders of the Croatian Serbs as extreme elements (6), leaders of an irrational policy (4), ringleaders (2), irresponsible (2), and other derogatory terms. On the other hand he speaks about 'frauded' (2) and 'deceited' (6) Serbian people who were 'drafted by force' (2) into their paramilitary groups. Yet, in the analysed articles published in 1994, Tudman used such an excuse for the Serbian people only once.

Later, in the war situation, it had become clearer what Tudman means by 'the solution to the Serbian question'. That solution is presented as, above all,

humanistic, inspired by the good will of the Leader:

> Now when we are already faced with demographic replacements of the population in such a size, rarely seen till now - we are doing everything we can to bring about a humanistic resettlement rather than a violent one. In this way the problems of people who live in those areas, where there are no chances for their survival, would be solved. (10/92)

When someone finds this sentence suspicious, Tudman calls for common sense: 'Lets be realistic, since the beginning of the world there have been bigger and smaller migrations of peoples, genocides and assimilations (...) isn't it normal to predict that people migrate?' (7/93) The only reason behind this idea of humanistic resettlement is stopping further human sufferings: 'we should allow voluntary resettlement with an aim to prevent violent expulsions and violent persecutions. Therefore, a political and humanistic willingness to prevail over persecution will be shown' (7/93).

Now, a solution to the problem of Serbs in Croatia could have been quite straight forward: without Serbs the problem does not exist. This idea is not referred to by Tudman as 'ethnic cleansing', but as 'humanistic' and 'voluntary' resettlement. They both have the same end results, but the tools used to bring about the results are different. This statement in 1992 and 1993 did not look so terrible, but after August 1995, when the Croatian army liberated the area of Krajina, and almost all of the Serbian population fled to Serbia, these statements became more serious.

Before and after the military action of the Croatian army in 1995, the Government sent appeals to the Serbian population in Krajina to remain in their homes, and reassured them that nothing would happen to them if they had not bloodied their hands. Still, in the issue of 22 July 1996, the independent weekly *Feral Tribune* stated that 942[136] older civilians of Serbian nationality who had stayed in their homes in Krajina had been killed since September 1995, i.e. since all military actions in Krajina were stopped. It would be pure speculation to say that Tudman's statements initiated or played an active role in these crimes, but

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[136] It is almost impossible to verify these numbers since the government still refuses to investigate many reports of atrocities that were allegedly committed after the military operation *Oluja*.

still the Croatian government did little to prevent them.

Knowing what Tudman thinks about Serbs, it is even clearer how he imagines the Croatian nation. Tudman is making the 'civilizational'[137] distinction between the Croatian and Serbian nation. According to him, that distinction has to be underlined by state borders. The phrase 'Croatian state - the state of the Croatian nation', could also mean 'for the Croatian nation exclusively'.

Muslims

As already mentioned Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina achieved recognition of their distinct national identity relatively recently. Through the centuries they were developing their specific way of life, culture, traditions and customs, but always squeezed between Croats and Serbs who lived in the same area. One of the reasons they received recognition in the 1974 Constitution was because Croatian and Serbian nationalists claimed that Muslims are in fact of Croatian or Serbian origin. By declaring themselves as Muslims and thus as a national group, they solved the conflicting problem of their identity. This situation remained until the break-up of Yugoslavia. Then came the claims for Bosnian territory and identity.

Tudman did not pay too much attention in his public speeches to the Muslims until the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina started in April 1992. Even then, preoccupied with the war in Croatia, Tudman just accepted Muslims as allies in the fight against the common enemy, i.e. the Serbs. In March 1993 relations between Muslims and Croats worsened. The clash of Croatian and Muslim political and national interests led to a clash on the battlefield. Tudman started to doubt the national identity of former 'natural allies'. Once again, he used traditional nationalist arguments about the Croatian origins of Muslims: 'The majority of Muslims in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina are, nevertheless, both genetically and by speech, of Croatian origin, but Islam separated them and

[137] It is difficult to detect the origins of Tudman's insistence on 'civilisational' distinctions between the three nations (Croats, Serbs and Muslims). However, it is interesting that, later,

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made them special' (7/93). Even the idea to declare Muslims a separate national group was brought into question: 'I said 'Muslim people' even though many people in the world asked me a question: "How come that only Muslims in BH are declared a special nation?" (...) Even an ambassador of Turkey had written that Tito's solution of the national question was a mistake' (7/93).

In his book *Nacionalno pitanje u suvremenoj Europi* (The National Question in Contemporary Europe, 1990c) Tudman points out in clear terms that the Muslim population 'in its great majority is undoubtedly of Croatian origin by virtue of its ethnic composition and language' (1990c: 121). He tried to prove this statement by arguing that whenever the Muslims had had the opportunity, they had declared themselves as being a constituent element of the Croatian nation (*ibid.*). Hence, in the 1920 elections, Tudman claims, 21 of 24 Muslim representatives in the parliament had declared themselves as Croats.[138] He even stressed how the 'Muslims and Catholics had accepted the NDH as their own state' *(ibid.)*. Tudman concludes: 'Based on these facts, we can see that Croats constitute the majority of the population of BH, and that the geographic-economic connection of BH with the other regions of Croatia is such that neither Croatia within its current borders nor BH separated from Croatia can fully develop' (*ibid.*). Prior to the outbreak of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, Tudman had already defined his political programme *vis-a-vis* BH: 'if BH enters into a union with Croatia, favourable conditions for their mutual harmonious development in the political, cultural and economic sphere would be created' (*ibid.*).

The war between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1993 was much worse than the war against the Serbs at that time. Massive executions of whole villages, terrible atrocities, notorious concentration camps on both sides, and the Croatian media created a picture of Muslims as the worst enemies the Croats had ever had. According to Tudman, 'there were objective reasons for the war between Croatian and Muslim forces in BH' (5/93). The policy of the

Tudman stated that Samuel Huntington's book 'The Clash of Civilisations' is one of the best he ever read.
[138] However, Tudman did not emphasize that in 1920 Muslims were not recognized as a separate national group. Therefore, they could declare themselves only as Croats or Serbs. For more, see Banac (1987).

Muslim leadership and 'their inclination towards an increasing birthrate' (5/93) directly endangered the survival of a Croatian nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 'the population of Croats in BH has decreased in periods of Serbian and Muslim hegemony' (11/93). In the analysed articles, Tudman stated ten times how Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina 'defended the whole of BH', even though their survival was 'endangered' (6 times). That is the reason the Croatian government actively participated in the Bosnian war: to 'protect Croatian interests' (12 times mentioned), to 'help Croats in BH' (7 times), to 'defend its own borders' (2), and to 'save the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina' (2) from Serbian occupation.

Tudman lays the blame for the war between Croats and Muslims squarely on the Muslim leadership. He described this leadership several times while addressing 'his' nation: 'The BH Government represents only the Muslim part of the population' (3/93); 'in the Muslim leadership there are ex-members of KOS[139] sitting, and they are intentionally sneaked into that body' (5/93); 'Izetbegović's[140] policy is a policy of unrealistic expectations and it is conveyed to the disadvantage of Croatians, but also to that of Muslims' (9/93).

One of the alleged major aims of the Muslim leadership - the creation of an Islamic state in Europe - is mentioned nine times in Tudman's speeches. In 1993, talking about the military forces under the Muslim leadership Tudman used terms like: Muslim Army (3), fundamentalist's forces (4), *mujahedin* forces (6), religious army (1), and extremists (4). For example, in July 1993, Tudman describes the Muslim military forces: 'In BH there are five Muslim Armies, of which two are under the command of the Army of BH, and three are of a purely religious character'. This emphasis on Muslim religious fanaticism created among Croats broad distrust towards Muslims in general. Newspapers published articles describing crimes Muslims had committed against Croats. But when crimes against Muslims were mentioned, Tudman tried to find an explanation: 'In Vitez[141] crimes against Muslims were committed, and they were committed by the people who wore black uniforms and Ustasha symbols from WWII,

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[139] Counter-intelligence service of Yugoslavia.
[140] The leader of the Bosnian Muslims.
[141] The small town in BH settled by Muslims.

therefore there is some evidence that it was an attempt to set-up Croats' (5/93).

It is interesting to see that Muslims were presented in a much more negative manner than Serbs during this period: 'Muslims are inclined to war, Serbs to compromise' (12/93). In Tudman's speeches Muslims are presented as wild religious fanatics and *mujahedins* who are committing genocide against Croats - that is why he would use all means necessary to 'defend Croatian interests in BH'. Tudman even intimated using the Muslim refugees in Croatia as a kind of hostage, hiding behind a 'justified' revolt of the Croatian people: 'Unless the Muslim leadership stop the war, this could provoke some changes from our side, where we would have to physically protect Muslim refugees' (7/93).

However, when it was thought that relations between the Croats and Muslims had reached a dead end in 1994, pressure from the international community made Croats and Muslims revitalise the old alliance. New agreements were signed, new interests invented, and a new picture of Muslims transmitted in Tudman's public addresses. Tudman started to assure Muslims that only through an alliance with Croats, could Muslims survive: '[Muslims] should side with Croats, they should bind themselves to western civilization through ties with Croats, that is the only chance for their survival' (5/94); 'we have to cooperate with Muslims, and that is also in the Muslim interest because then Muslims will be linked to Western civilization' (1/94). After all, 'the Muslim leadership understands that Croatia is their only connection with Europe' (5/94).

Once again, a civilizational division between nations was emphasised. The first of Tudman's assumptions was that Bosnian Muslims belong to some other non-Western civilization. The second assumption is that they desperately want to become a part of the 'Western civilization'. Considering the fact that Croats are almost the cradle of 'Western civilization', Tudman shows good intentions when he offered to Muslims Croatian guidance. A sense of superiority, as revealed in this chapter, is expressed not only towards individuals, but also towards whole groups, political parties, and nations. The 'others' are presented as inferior by definition. And, according to Tudman, it seems that this is the only way that one can emphasise ones own values as well as the values of one's own nation.

6.3.6. Conclusion

The aim of this content analysis was to determine the specific form of nationalist ideology propounded by Franjo Tudman. Yet it also provides the basis for a few more general considerations. First I would like to summarize the results of the content analysis.

For Tudman, the nation is an organic body with its own collective identity. This identity is shaped through, and by history. It is expressed through a national culture. Yet geo-political circumstances shape national interests that are seen as eternal and unchangeable goals of the nation. The most important national interest, according to Tudman, is the formation of the national state, because only through ones own state can the nation secure its existence and thus prosper. According to such a concept of the nation, individuals lose all significance, and the collective becomes the most significant actor.

In Tudman's speeches the Croatian nation is shaped in opposition to other nations. Even though Croats are presented as one of the oldest nations in Europe, other nations are seen as major obstacles in the fulfillment of the 'nine centuries long dream' - an independent Croatian state. Throughout history, Tudman sees Croats as humiliated, oppressed and exploited, without real friends. That is the reason why today's Croats can be proud of themselves: throughout the time of oppression Croats preserved their 'self-essence', their right to statehood, their culture, and finally, they created their own sovereign state all by themselves. Therefore, it is no surprise that when Tudman describes the war for Croatian independence, Serbs and Muslims are presented as barbarous, backward, 'Eastern civilizations'. Making a civilisational distinction between 'us' and 'them', Tudman concludes that these nations should be separated, preferably by state borders. Thus the ultimate national interest of the Croatian nation is not only the creation of a national state, but rather the creation of the nation-state in a literal sense: Croatia - the national state for Croats exclusively.

From this analysis, it is possible to talk about Tudman's *ideology*. Throughout the analysed period, Tudman consistently defined the nation, its origins and constituent elements, and its main objectives and functions. Moreover, Tudman's perception of his own nation was supported by convenient perception of the origins, function and objectives of other nations.

This ideology was constantly presented in the media and not only in Tudman's speeches and public addresses. His ideology had the purpose of mobilizing the masses, legitimating his actions and coordinating various political, cultural and economic elites. The legitimating function can be seen through frequent emphasis on Tudman's sovereign position as the 'Head of the State', 'Father of the Nation' or as the 'Creator of the Croatian Sovereign State'. Such a position not only allowed but also forced Tudman to take everything into his own hands. This then implies that he was the one who gave orders, made decisions and ran the country. Tudman tried to mobilize the masses by emphasizing the past and present situation of the nation that was surrounded by enemies both internal and external. When the situation is described in this way, the genius of the leader is not enough - what becomes crucial is the unity of the nation. The enemies of the nation serve also as a basis for consensus among political, economic and cultural national elites. Those who refused to accept Tudman's ideas became the enemies of the state and nation itself. For Tudman, history is the justification for all these definitions and statements. Thus, history becomes an actor by itself and it can be interpreted according to a situation. And who can interpret history better then a historian himself?

However, taking into account the basic ideas of earlier Croatian nationalist ideologies, one could say that Tudman's concept of the nation in general and the Croatian nation in particular is not an entirely original one. It would be interesting for further analysis to see to what extent Tudman was influenced by the ideas of his predecessor Croatian nationalist ideologists. Tudman himself frequently recalls the grandness of Starčević and Radić in his speeches. Nevertheless, the influences of the other nationalist ideologists could be traced as well.

In formulating his concept of the nation in general, Tudman indeed accepted many of Starčević's ideas. Just as for Starčević, the nation in Tudman's ideology takes a central position in all social and political life. The nation is the ultimate value by itself and it is defined in terms of history and culture. In his final stage, however, Tudman, unlike Starčević, indirectly introduced another national marker - religion. While Starčević deliberately disregarded religion as a significant marker of the nation, with the beginning of the war between the Croats and the Muslims in 1993, Tudman finally broke with the tradition of Croatian nationalist ideologists of describing the Bosnian Muslims as Croats. In this way, Tudman practically equated religious and national affiliation. Hence, while Starčević created an inclusive definition of the nation, Tudman created an exclusive one.

Another point of difference between Starčević and Tudman is the issue of the nation-state. Starčević did emphasize the importance of the state for the preservation of the nation, but Tudman, like the Ustashas, developed a cult of the nation-state. This difference is not a result of different perceptions of the state and the nation, but rather a product of the political and social circumstances of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Croatia. While Starčević would be satisfied with a federal status for Croatia within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the nationalist ideologists of the late twentieth century find the Croatian nation powerful enough to create their own state. Moreover, within the Yugoslav federation Croatia developed all the necessary institutions which were easily transformed into state institutions. The creation of the cult of the state in both the Ustasha ideology and Tudman's nationalist ideology is to a great extent related to their perception of the national enemies - notably the Serbs. Interestingly enough, both nationalist ideologies claimed to be the first that fulfilled the 900-years-old dream of the Croatian nation - the creation of a Croatian nation-state. Indirectly, in this way Tudman expressed some distance from the Ustasha part of Croatian history by not recognizing that they achieved the status of a 'real' state of the Croatian nation.

It could certainly not be said that Tudman was strongly influenced by the Ustasha ideology. Yet, while the Ustashas openly advocated a racist ideology, Tudman

did express anti-Semitic attitudes.[142] While the Ustasha Movement conducted genocide against all non-Croat nations, Tudman advocated the necessity of genocide in human history and conducted an ethnic cleansing.[143] To prevent the mixing of the nations meant for Tudman to prevent future conflicts. Moreover, where the mixing of the nations did occur, it had to be corrected.

Tudman was certainly influenced by Radić's nationalist ideology. Paradoxically, Tudman claimed to be influenced by Radić's policy of non-violence and peacemaking. Rather, it could be said that Tudman was more influenced by Radić's definition of the Croatian nation as a peasant nation. While for Radić this definition meant cherishing the peasant's traditions, values and customs, for Tudman it was an ideological justification for his anti-intellectualism.

In the end, it seems that Tudman was to the greatest extent influenced by the Yugoslav Communist ideology in general. Even though Tudman entirely rejected his communist past, his rhetoric is its fine example.

Hence, from the above analysis it could be observed that in the 1990s the process of the /re/formation of the Croatian nation went through another morphogenetic cycle. This cycle was characterised by:

- institutionalisation of national politics through the creation of the nation-state and defining state political institutions as national;
- nationalisation of the culture through the creation of state-sponsored and state-protected institutions, and codification of the 'national culture';
- institutionalisation of the state/national symbols in all spheres of social life;
- codification of the national interests and their implementation through state policies;
- creation of a nationally homogenous population of the nation-state through restrictive and violent state policies;

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[142] In 1993 Tudman, under pressure from some international forces, publicly rejected some of his ideas published in his earlier books and he apologised to the whole Jewish community. A good example is the recent English publication of his *Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti* (1987) under the title *Horrors of War: Historical Reality and Philosophy* (1995) where all the pasages which originally dealt with the issue of the Holocaust and Israeli politics were either deleted or rewritten.
[143] For more, see Tudman (1987/1990b).

- mass mobilisation of the population in war conditions; and

- homogenisation of the population through state-supported and state-promoted nationalist ideology.

This morphogenetic cycle of Croatian society marked the end of the twentieth century in these territories. It should be emphasised that it is certainly not the last stage of redefinition of the Croatian nation. It is also a preparation for another morphogenetic cycle whose processes and outcomes we will have to observe in the future.

6.4. Croatian Nationalist Ideologies - A Comparison

Over the previous chapters seven Croatian nationalist ideologies have been analysed:

- the Illyrianism of Ljudevit Gaj,

- the Yugoslavism of Josip Juraj Strossmayer and Franjo Rački,

- the 'state right' ideology of Ante Starčević,

- the nationalist ideology formulated by the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party Stjepan Radić,

- the nationalist ideology of the Ustasha Movement and its leader, Ante Pavelić,

- the nationalist ideology formulated by the main ideologist of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Edvard Kardelj, and lastly

- the nationalist ideology of Franjo Tudman.

These ideologies were analysed in a similar manner and each ideology was placed within its historical context.[144] The aim of the analyses was to identify how these nationalist ideologies defined the general concept of the nation, the Croatian nation, and lastly how they perceived and defined the enemies of their nation. The following section will take the form of a comparative study which will attempt to highlight the similarities between the aforementioned ideologies as well as their distinctive features.

Firstly, it is important to point out that the various definitions of the nation were in effect the subjective formulations of political activists. None of the ideologists followed a 'scientific' approach to the phenomenon, and their concepts were devised according to a specific political objective. Such nationalist ideologies could therefore arguably be viewed as what Brubaker calls 'remedial political actions' (1996: 79). From that perspective it would be futile to criticise such concepts of the nation or to highlight their bias, lack of empirical evidence or epistemological inconsistencies. What can be argued however is that all of these concepts of the

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[144] The impact of the structural conditioning and development of various agencies on the emergence of these ideologies will be analysed in the Conclusion.

nation succeeded in enhancing the political programmes and agendas of their creators. For example, given that the leaders of the Illyrian Movement aimed to 'awake' the national consciousness of the 'passive' Croatian intelligentsia and the masses, within a context of intensive Magyarisation and Germanisation, it is understandable that Ljudevit Gaj literally created the concept of the Illyrian nation. The fact that in Gaj's ideology, the nation, the people and 'race' were poorly defined terms, often used interchangeably, just as were the terms 'Illyrian', 'Croatian' and 'Slav', does not detract from the effectiveness of his ideology in the process of 'awakening' the nation. The fact that today, Pavelić's ideas of 'race' and of 'blood purity' are perceived as risible and farcical concepts, should not detract from the fact that in practice this ideology was the driving force leading to the perpetration of a genocide. It would therefore be a futile exercise to analyse these Croatian nationalist ideologies in a judgmental manner. What is of interest however are the messages the nationalist leaders and ideologists were sending to the masses and elites, and the extent to which these messages were effective in reaching and being accepted by the masses. It is according to these criteria that the ideologies will be evaluated.

It could be argued that two distinct and competing concepts of Croatian nationalist ideologies have evolved over the past two centuries, those which defined the Croatian nation in relation to some form of 'supra-nation' (either Pan-Slavic or Yugoslav) - what might be called 'pan-national ideologies'; and those oriented to the Croatian nation itself - 'pure' national ideologies. Hence, from the middle of the nineteenth century until the 1920s the Croatian political scene was dominated by the conflict between Yugoslavism and State-Right ideology. This conflict intensified during the Second World War with the all-out war between the Ustasha Movement and the Communist-led Partisans, and this competition culminated in the 1990s which, in the end, had as its consequence the break-up of Yugoslavia. One could argue that the conflict between the two concepts started with Gaj and the Illyrian Movement, who in the age of the formation of 'pure' nationalist ideologies created a 'supra-national' one. However, it should be remembered that this ideology was a product of the political and social circumstances of early nineteenth-century Croatia. One of the major reasons for the continuous conflict between the two concepts of the nation was the difficulty of the Croatian nationalist

ideologists to clearly define in theoretical terms the Croatian nation and, hence, divide it from the rest of their 'South-Slav brothers'.

The study of the various Croatian nationalist ideologies has brought to light the different ways in which the concept of the nation, and of the Croatian nation, have been defined over the past two centuries, and the ways in which the political, social and economic context have influenced their formulation and content. What follows will be an analysis of the different ways in which the creators of these nationalist ideologies viewed and evaluated the constituent elements of the nation: its language, history, territory, religion, myths of origin, etc.

Language. Much emphasis was placed on the role of language by the leaders of the Illyrian Movement - one of their primary objectives being the standardisation of the Croatian literary language. Language played a pivotal role in their ideology as it constituted a significant marker for the Croatian/Illyrian nation in their fight against the influence of Magyarisation and Germanisation. According to the ideology of the Movement, it was counter-productive to draw a distinction between the South-Slav nations. In the struggle against Magyarisation, closer ties with their 'South-Slav brothers' was seen as the only strategy for survival. With this objective in mind, the leaders of the Illyrian Movement standardised the Croatian literary language in close collaboration with their Serbian colleagues, naming it Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian. The choice of the *štokavian* dialect, and not the *kajkavian* (which was widely used in the Zagreb region) as the foundation of the standardised Croatian language was a clear indication of the Illyrian political agenda which aimed to bring the South-Slav nations closer together. This agenda was to be supported and built on by all subsequent Yugoslav nationalist ideologies.

The nationalist ideologies advocating some form of Croatian independence viewed the issue of language in a rather different way. The State-Right Party, the Ustasha Movement and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) attempted to develop the Croatian language away from the Serbian language, by re-introducing terms from 'old' Croatian and by purging the language of foreign terms. This process was undertaken in an attempt to emphasise how Croats were and remained a separate

and independent nation. The role of language in the process of national reformation had considerably more emphasis throughout the nineteenth century as part of the national awakeners' strategy to resist Magyarisation and Germanisation. Language could not serve as the major national marker for those Croatian nationalist ideologists who were attempting to highlight the distinctive nature of the Croatian nation, and to distinguish it from the rest of the South-Slavs.

There is another important aspect regarding the issue of language in Croatia which needs to be highlighted - the role of language in homogenising the Croatian population. However hard the nationalist ideologists tried to impose a single literary Croatian language, the regions have preserved their dialects. *Štokavian, kajkavian* and *čajkavijan* dialects are still reliable markers of one's regional origins. Through their dialects regions such as Slavonia, Dalmatia or Istria have also preserved their local cultures and maintained an awareness of their distinct histories. With the emergence of regional political parties over the past decade, which has resulted in the politicisation of their culture, it remains to be seen if the intensive national mobilisation also provokes a transformation of regional into ethnic identities.

Religion. With the break-up of Yugoslavia, religion became a significant national marker for the nations in conflict. Muslim, Catholic and Orthodox Christian became synonyms for a Bosnian Muslim, a Croat and a Serb respectively. As with language, religion has been dealt with and employed in different ways and to different ends by the pan-national ideologies and the 'pure' Croatian nationalist ideologies. Even though the Yugoslav Movement advocated a South-Slav union, the leaders of the Movement also considered it important to unify the South-Slav nations around a single religion. Though Strossmayer openly called for a 'reconciliation' between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, he was in effect advocating the conversion of the Orthodox Serbs to Catholicism. In contrast, the 'pure' Croatian nationalist ideologies did not consider religion as a significant marker of Croatian nationhood. These ideologies, hence, viewed all Bosnian Muslims as members of the Croatian nation. An emphasis on religion as a significant national marker for the Croatian nation would be counter-productive. That was the position held by Starčević and his Party of the Right, and one which

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was subsequently adopted by Pavelić's Ustasha Movement. At the beginning of the 1990s, Tudman and the HDZ advocated the same view. The Bosnian Muslims were seen as the 'natural allies' of Croats, and Bosnia and Herzegovina as a 'natural part' of Croatia. Only when the Muslims organized themselves politically and military and hence clearly expressed their own national identity and a wish for national independence, did the HDZ identify them as enemies of the Croatian nation. Once again, the nation was defined in accordance with the political agenda of the ideologists.

Myths of origin. In an attempt to define the Croatian nation, the Croatian nationalist ideologies could not rely on myths of origin either. Once again the most effective myth of origin was formulated by the Illyrian Movement. This myth however emphasised the common origins of all Slav nations. It served its purpose of uniting the Slavs against the non-Slav oppressors - the Germans and Magyars. The first attempt to create a myth of origin which served to differentiate the Croat nation from the other South-Slav nations was devised by the Ustasha Movement and, later on, adopted by the HDZ. The myth of the Croat's Iranian (and hence, non-Slav) origins was used to emphasise the ethnic difference between the Croats and the Serbs. The Ustasha Movement presented the Croats as an 'Aryan race'. Half a century later, the HDZ portrayed the Croats as a nation which had nothing in common with the 'barbarian' Serbs. Nevertheless, the Croatian nationalist ideologies in general failed to offer a myth of origin which could clearly differentiate the Croats from the rest of the Slavs.

History. As is the case with many other nations, history has provided a rich source of material for defining the Croatian nation. A grandiose Croatian history was rediscovered by the Illyrian Movement and by the emerging Croatian intelligentsia driven by nationalist ideas. The intellectual life of nineteenth-century Croatia was characterised by the works of historians such as Smičiklas and Rački. However, since its beginnings the history of Croatia has been presented by these historians as a mixture of historical facts and myths. Stories of ancient Croatian kings and queens, treacherous foreign rulers and heroic Croatian noblemen and commoners have aroused the imagination and hopes of the nationalist ideologists. That history was a picture of the lost golden age. Each Croatian nationalist ideology appealed to

their people to restore this golden age when Croats were ruled by their own kings and lived in their own state. The rule of the foreign kings - Hungarian, Austrian or Serb - was presented as the age of oppression, exploitation and suffering for the Croatian nation. The nationalist ideologies attempted to demonstrate that only a united nation prepared to undertake major sacrifices could restore that golden age. To achieve those ends, the creators of the nationalist ideologies celebrated and created myths around different national heroes. Hence, the myth of Zrinski and Frankopan was aimed to demonstrate the treacherous and corrupt nature of the Habsburgs, while the leaders of the Yugoslav Movement created a myth around Ban Jelačić in order to show the determination and ability of the Croats to fight against the threatening Magyar nationalism. The death of Stjepan Radić became a powerful symbol of Serbian oppression.

The nationalist ideologists considered history as the most significant and valuable marker of the Croatian nation, and not simply because it provided symbols and myths to arouse the imagination of their fellow compatriots. In Tuđman's nationalist ideology, history became an actor in itself and the source of national rights. At times when the Croatian nation exercised only limited power over its own internal affairs, and when the Croatian nation was perceived even by its leaders as being powerless and exploited, the ideologists claimed the historical right to self-determination. The nationalist ideologists were to select a proper historical moment in Croatian history which could serve as the basis for that right. One of the most 'popular' sources of the Croatian historical rights was the famous *Pacta Conventa* from 1102. Seven-and-a-half centuries later Croatian national leaders claimed rights that originated from that agreement. Hence, the nationalist ideologists claimed a historical right over the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the ground that it was, at some point, ruled by Croatian kings for several decades. Historical events that contradicted what the Croatian nationalist ideologists were attempting to argue were simply disregarded and ignored. The nationalist ideologists therefore manipulated and built myths around certain historical events to suit their political objectives.

State. Throughout its rule the HDZ has created a myth around the idea of the Croatian nation's 'nine-century-long dream' - the creation of an independent

Croatian state. However, it could be argued that it was only in the second half of the twentieth century that the Croatian nationalist ideologies had actually clearly expressed a wish for the creation of a Croatian nation-state. Until 1918 Croatian nationalists had either worked for the restructuring of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, with a view to according Croats the same rights as the Magyars, or they strove for the creation of a common South-Slav state in which the Croats would enjoy equal rights with the rest of the South-Slav nations. The first articulated claim for an independent state came from the HSS and Stjepan Radić. However, when the HSS compromised with the Yugoslav government in the 1930s, the only remaining advocates of an independent Croatian state were the Ustashas. The Ustasha Movement was the first political entity to secure the establishment of a Croatian state in eight centuries. Regardless of their respective political programmes, all Croatian nationalist ideologies held that the state was the ultimate means for the preservation of the nation. The form of the state however differed according to the nature of the ideologies: some favoured the formation of a triune kingdom, others, the creation of a federal state with rest of the South-Slav nations, with the 'pure' ideologies viewing the creation of the Croatian nation-state as their ultimate aim.

National character. In the tradition of Romanticism many Croatian nationalist ideologies considered it important to highlight the distinct and unique character of the Croatian nation. One of the common features of almost all Croatian nationalist ideologies was to describe the Croatian nation as a peasant nation. This did not simply aim to emphasise the fact that until the late twentieth century, the majority of Croats worked on the land and that the basis of the Croatian economy was the agricultural sector. These nationalist ideologies went further by romanticising the peasant way of life as the only authentic Croatian way of life. One of the major corollaries of this ideological focus on the peasantry was the constant undermining of the role of the Croatian intelligentsia. One of the reasons for this glorification of the peasantry may be the fact that the majority of the Croatian nationalist ideologists and national leaders were of peasant origins - Starčević, Radić, Pavelić, Tito, Tudman and many others. In contrast the Croatian intelligentsia was mainly concentrated in the cities. Many Croatian cities were actually built by non-Croats, and the majority of the non-

Croat, non-indigenous population were living in the cities. The cities were perceived as the root of all evil. After all, according to Radić, it was the cities and city-dwellers who exploited the villages and peasants. The average Croat was portrayed by many of the nationalist ideologists as being a hard-working peasant, whose life was characterised by great hardship and who lived at a minimum subsistence level. The Croatian peasantry was also praised for having preserved their own traditions and customs untarnished by foreign influences. The Ustasha Movement radicalised this perspective and created a new marker for the national affiliation - whoever was not of peasant origin could not be a Croat. When a nationalist ideology lacks the means to clearly distinguish its own nation from others, an emphasis on its peasant origins is an effective mechanism for creating a distinction.

The various ways in which Croatian nationalist ideologies have defined the major constituent elements of the nation bring to light the wide range of possibilities to define a distinct nation.

One could note that it is not a mere enumeration of the constituent elements of the nation that gives a specific character to a nationalist ideology. Differences between these Croatian nationalist ideologies lie in their emphasis on a specific constituent element. Hence, even though almost every ideology stresses that the nation cannot exist without a long common history, only in the case of Tuđman's nationalist ideology does history become the primary actor and, moreover, the creator of the nation. While almost all nationalist ideologies stress the national language as an important constituent element of the nation, only in Gaj's and Racki/Strossmayer's ideologies is language the central marker of nationality and the crucial element of inclusion/exclusion of members of a nation.

When these various nationalist ideologies are placed in their temporal perspective, it could be observed that nationalist ideologies define the nation not in order to prove the existence of a nation in a specific historical period, but to set a political agenda for that nation. Hence, at the time when the Croats used different variants of the similar vernacular and several variants of the Latin script, Gaj defined the nation as a social group with the same language. One could argue

that, following Gaj's definition of the nation, there was no Croatian nation at that time. Similarly, when Radic defined a nation as a socio-cultural group that possessed its own independent and sovereign state, the Croats did not have one of their own. If one follows Radic's argument, one could argue that the Croats become a nation in 1991, since the short-lived Ustasha state could not be described as independent and sovereign.

The nationalist ideologies not only evaluated and defined the constituent elements of the nation in a different way. It could also be said that at the same time the Croatian nation has been defined as a civic and as an ethnic nation, political and cultural, as an inclusive and an exclusive concept, as primordial (as in Starcevic's ideology), perennial (as in Radic's ideology) and modern (as in Kardelj's ideology). One could try to explain the differences between these 'ideological definitions' as products of their time, that is, by the fact that they were formed at different stages of history. If that is a relevant explanation, it is not clear whether it is the nation as a social phenomenon that changed, or whether it is social circumstances that dictate the employment of a different terminology. The former would lead to the conclusion that a set of constitutive elements of a nation is valid only for a certain historical period and is not valid for consecutive 'developments' of a nation. If the latter is the case, a change of circumstances would require a different sets of constitutive elements for defining a nation even in the same historical period, hence, the constitutive elements of a nation could not be seen as constitutive.

In a situation where consensus on the definition of the nation does not exist, the concept of the enemy can become one of the most efficient methods for defining it.[145] Each Croatian nationalist ideology was able to clearly define its enemies. By defining the national enemy, the nationalist ideologies defined the Croatian nation as well. When the Magyars and Germans were perceived as being the major obstacle to achieving the political aims of nineteenth century nationalist ideologists, the national language became the most significant national marker.

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[145] At this point I do not wish to engage in discussion and to make any implications on the relevance of the concept of 'others' for the formation of *national identity*. Rather, this statement is concerned only with the problems of the formation of *nationalist ideologies*.

That same marker (the national language) lost its political significance as soon as the Serbs were portrayed as the national enemies. Similarly, the selection of national myths, including the myth of origins, was also to a great extent determined by the nature of the national enemy. This does not imply that the definition of 'others' is a sufficient criterion on which to define one's own nation. Rather, the example of the Croatian nationalist ideologies shows that in some circumstances the definition of a nation contains both positive and negative markers, that is, it defines 'us' in terms of our own specific characteristics and, at the same time, as 'not-them'. 'Others' can therefore serve as a point of reference, as a black-and-white picture which helps to separate 'us' from 'them'.

As already stressed, the nationalist ideologies did not provide elaborate descriptions of the 'others', i.e. of the national enemies. The enemies of the nation were those groups which were perceived as constituting major obstacles, not necessarily to the interests of the nation, but to the interests of the nationalists' ideologies. National enemies were both internal and external, that is, groups of co-nationals with different political programmes, as well as' elements coming from other nations. The enemies were depicted according to current problems faced by the nation. The nationalist ideologies tried to portray national enemies as historical enemies, as enemies which had oppressed, betrayed and exploited the nation over the centuries. However, as soon as the 'others' ceased to be perceived as an obstacle to the current interests of the nationalist ideologists, the whole history of oppression was disregarded. Seven centuries of Hungarian oppression and exploitation meant little to twentieth century Croatian nationalist ideologists. Once again, history, myths and memories were used as symbols and were manipulated in order to serve the political agendas of nationalist ideologists and leaders. Historical realities counted for little in this process.

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Up to this point, the analysis of the differences in the perceptions and definitions of the nation has been undertaken mainly at the level of the corporate agents. It has been shown how the nationalist elites, or more precisely, the national leaders,

formulated and in some cases entirely created nationalist ideologies. A nationalist ideology was previously defined as a comprehensive set of statements which provides a definition of the nation in general and the Croatian nation in particular, which elaborates the origins, functions and goals of the nation. Through a variety of different means, the messages central to these nationalist ideologies were transmitted to the primary agents. The means of transmission differed according to political and social circumstances. Today's dominant theories of the nation and of nationalism, such as Gellner's, Anderson's, Hobsbawm's, etc., explain the creation of the nation as an uni-linear process 'from above'. The state, through the education system and media, promotes and transmits the dominant nationalist ideology, resulting in the homogenisation and mobilisation of the masses. A uni-linear interpretation of this kind could, however, be argued as being rather simplistic.

Through the example of Croatian nationalist ideologies it could be argued that in the process of the /re-/formation of the nation three distinct levels of analysis should be considered: (1) corporate agents such as the national elites, as the creators of an ideology; (2) state institutions, as *potential* transmitters or *opponents* of an ideology; and (3) the primary agents as *potential* acceptors of an ideology. A national elite can perceive the state and state institutions as the enemies of the nation either because they transmit a competing nationalist ideology or suppress transmission of any nationalist ideology. The nationalist ideologies which do have support from state institutions are not necessarily more 'successful' than those who lack such support. After all, a nation can be created even when a nationalist ideology lacks the support of state institutions. However, the nature of the relationship between state institutions and a particular nationalist ideology to a great extent influences and shapes the strategies employed by nationalist ideologists in their attempt to reach and gain the support of primary agents.

On the other hand, primary agents in many of the dominant theories of nations and nationalism have been described as passive objects on which any ideology can be foisted, their identities depicted as a *tabula rasa* which can easily be shaped from above. Even if a theory of nations and nationalism, such as Smith's,

takes into account that the masses already have a particular ethnic identity, this identity could evolve into a national identity, which means that an ethnic identity really disappears with the formation of a nation. Such a view is based on the assumption that once a nationalist ideology gains the full support of the state institutions in due time the masses will be homogenised.

Hence, for the further analysis of the process of national-/re/formation it is necessary to investigate, first, some mechanisms of transmission of nationalist ideologies though the institutions of social structure, and, second, the effectiveness of these mechanisms through an analysis of primary agents' attitudes. The first issue will be the subject of the next chapters in which a content analysis of Croatian secondary school history textbooks will be conveyed. Finally, Chapter Eight will present the results of a survey of a sample of Zagreb population and their attitudes towards the nation.

Chapter Seven

NATIONALIST IDEOLOGIES IN THE CROATIAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

> *...[U]pbringing of the future generations of
> one nation is a national imperative;
> therefore the upbringing of an individual
> is not an independent and individual matter,
> but (...) public, national and general.*
> (Blažeković, 1944: 18)

In previous chapters it was shown how throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries different nationalist ideologies defined the Croatian nation and explained its origin, history and myths in various ways. All of these definitions and ideas became a part of Croatian culture. The ideas of Starčević, Strossmayer and Radić remained on the political agenda long after their parties had disappeared. These ideas were reflected in history textbooks. Yet their place in Croatian history was not always the same. Dominant nationalist ideologies of the twentieth century interpreted these ideas and their authors in the ways they found most useful.

This chapter will demonstrate how the dominant nationalist ideologies were propagated by the educational system. As can be seen from the quotation above, some nationalist ideologists regarded education as one of their primary tasks. The most obvious means by which to teach the younger generation how to understand their nation was the rewriting of history textbooks.

In this analysis I will first show that the dominant nationalist ideologies were clearly reflected in nineteenth-century Croatian history textbooks. For this purpose, I will refer to Charles Jelavich's extensive analysis, published in 1990. I will then analyse three sets of secondary school history texts: a two-volume textbook published in 1943 during the Ustasha regime, four textbooks published

in the 1950s, in the time of socialist Croatia within Yugoslavia,[146] and three textbooks published in the 1990s in the independent Republic of Croatia.

This chapter is not conceived as yet another review of Croatian history. The aim is to analyse and compare the ways in which the dominant nationalist ideologies of their time influenced the re-writing of the history of the Croatian nation. In each case a different vocabulary was employed; different symbols were used; different events were highlighted and disregarded; and different individuals were described as national heroes and traitors. In other words, the discussion will show which aspects of history the nationalist ideologies wanted the younger generation to learn and which aspects they were hiding. Besides the fact that these ideologically different textbooks were describing the history of the same nation, they have one other thing in common - propagating their own nationalist ideas.

The dissolving of nationalist ideologies into the school curriculum indicates the direct relation between the cultural and structural systems of society. In this case the state institutions, such as secondary schools, were used with the aim of 'implanting' a specific set of ideas into younger generations. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is, first, to detect whether the history textbooks reflect the dominant nationalist ideology and, second, to investigate what kind of ideas and images the authors of the textbooks considered important for students' education.

7.1. The Nineteenth-Century Textbooks

In his book *South Slav Nationalism* Charles Jelavich analyses various literary, geography and history textbooks published in the second half of the nineteenth century in Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. Jelavich offers an interesting and revealing account of the images and messages the authors of the textbooks presented to the younger generations about their own nations and other South Slavs. Jelavich's (1990: 59) starting point is based on the assumption that the

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[146] It is important to emphasise that in the 1950s each federal republic of Yugoslavia had some autonomy in establishing the school curriculum. Hence, the analysed textbooks were published in Croatia, and were official textbooks in the Republic of Croatia only.

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educational system was of primary importance to the development of nationalism. Moreover, he holds that the teachers, lay or clerical, played the central role in the development of national movements, and that at the end of the nineteenth century 'they almost unanimously favoured national unification' (*ibid.*: 57) of the South Slavs.

The second reason for the analysis rests on Jelavich's assumption that 'most students, during their school years and afterward, believed that the books told the truth and that within their covers the reader could find a true expression of the nation's wisdom' (*ibid.*: 59). If we follow these premises, it could be concluded that the aim of Jelavich's analysis is to 'detect' the attitudes, beliefs and opinions of the South Slav population at the time of their unification in 1918.

Even though it is difficult for me to agree with Jelavich's assumptions, since we do not have any evidence of this direct correlation between education and the 'creation' of national sentiments, his book offers an extensive set of data about Croatian secondary school history textbooks at the end of the nineteenth century.

Before commencing with an analysis of these textbooks, Jelavich offers some basic data about the Croatian educational system of that time. In 1885, for example, there were 1,263 elementary schools and only 64 per cent of children of school age attended classes (*ibid.*: 53). A year later, in 1886, 5,947 students enrolled in the secondary schools, and in 1910 that number rose to over 10,000. Jelavich also estimates that about 25 per cent of the population were considered literate in 1880, and 52 per cent in 1910. It should be mentioned, however, that Ruth Trouton (1952: 102) underlines that at this time 'the school inspectors had reported that peasant children frequently lapsed into illiteracy after leaving school'.

Jelavich analyses the content of more then twenty Croatian secondary school history textbooks published in the period 1880-1920. At the beginning of his book Jelavich (1990: 208) stresses that the 'Croatian textbooks forcefully presented their nation's history'. The main aim of these textbooks was to 'present Croatian national history, identify the heroes, and describe the nation's relation

with Vienna and Budapest within the Habsburg Empire' (*ibid.*). In line with Jelavich's analysis, in this part of the chapter I will try to summarise the main characteristics of the nationalist ideology that is offered in these history textbooks.

The texts deal with the history of Croatia since the sixth century, that is, since the migration of the South Slavs onto the Balkan Peninsula. According to Jelavich, 'the critical issue for every Croatian historian was to identify the Croatian lands' (*ibid.*: 210). The most frequent arguments these historians applied by were historical and ethnical. To be more precise, if the historians could not discover any relevant 'historical rights' (like, who came first) on a certain territory, they stressed the current ethnic composition of the population. As a result, the historic Croatian lands, according to these textbooks, were areas corresponding to present-day 'eastern Istria, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro' (*ibid.*: 213). The importance of the issue of Croatian historic lands originates from the major concern of current Croatian nationalist ideologists - 'unification of the Croatian lands of the Habsburg Empire into a single political entity' (*ibid.*: 264).

With these territories, the story goes, lived a nation whose characteristics are determined by specific historical events. One of these characteristics is their religion. Not only does the Croat's religion clearly separate them from most of the other South Slav nations, but it also firmly establishes Croatian nationhood in European history. The textbooks firstly stressed that the Croats 'were the first of all the Slavic nations to become Christians, becoming thereby a recognised member of the European Christian community' (*ibid.*: 214). Moreover, the Croats were the only nation 'to gain and preserve the right to have the church service in their national language' (*ibid.*: 215). As Jelavich concludes, in Croatian textbooks from the nineteenth century religion played a prominent role. Such a position is understandable since religion was a 'compulsory subject in every grade of the elementary and secondary schools and was always listed as the first subject in the curriculum' (*ibid.*: 269). Through these images the Croats were presented as a nation with a special position among the Christian community. This position, according to these history textbooks, was re-affirmed

through centuries of defending Europe from Ottoman invasion; it earned them the right to the title '*Antemurale Cristhianiatatis*'.

The turbulent relationships of the Croats with their neighbouring nations throughout history provided a fertile ground for the imaging of **national heroes**. Two of the most important heroes of the war against the Ottomans were Petar Berislavić and Krsto Frankopan. As the *Ban* of Croatia, Petar Berislavić erected strategic fortifications. He was assassinated in an ambush, and was 'immortalised in national folk songs' (*ibid*.: 225). Krsto Frankopan, after his victory against the Turks at Jajce in 1525, became 'famous as the leading Croatian hero and father of his homeland' (*ibid*.). Yet, the major figure in Croatian historical mythology, according to Jelavich, was Nikola Zrinski. The story tells us that faced by 100,000 of Suleiman's soldiers in 1566 Zrinski organised 2,500 Croats in defence of Siget. Knowing that 'there was no more disgraceful sin then the betrayal of one's homeland' (*ibid*.: 228) Zrinski led a charge where he was killed. Jelavich stresses that Siget was for the Croats what Kosovo was for the Serbs. 'Each battle in its own way provided the historical inspiration of the nationalistic revival of the nineteenth century' (*ibid*.).

According to Jelavich, throughout the textbooks the authors repeatedly assert that all harm done to the nation in all of its history was the result of dissension and lack of unity among the Croats themselves. Hence, unity was stressed as one of the most important **values**. Another national value frequently stressed by the authors of the textbooks is the loyalty of the Croatian nation to their rulers. Through various stories from Croatian history, the authors emphasised the unrewarded loyalty and self-sacrifice of the Croats. Examples like the fate of Krsto Frankopan and Nikola Šubić, and the treatment of Croatia after the events of 1848, brought into question the relationship between Croats and other nations. The Croatian historians made an attempt to stress the need for Croats to reconsider their national interests and their loyalties.

Through his analysis of the history textbooks Jelavich discovers that at the end of the nineteenth century the Croatian historians contributed to the effort to make the *štokavian* dialect the standard literary language for the Croats. The issue of

the national language was perceived as crucial for strengthening the unity of the Croatian nation. After emphasising that 'Croatia's contributions to the monarchy were not rewarded' (*ibid*.: 237), the historians followed the main arguments of the Illyrian Movement, National Party and the Croatian-Serbian Coalition when stressing that the Croats could prosper as a nation only in close co-operation with fellow South Slavs, especially the Serbs. The unity of the two nations was firstly found in the common language. One of the writers of a textbook stressed that 'there was no difference [in the literary language] between them [the Croats] and the Serbs except for the alphabet' (*ibid*.: 236). As Jelavich concludes 'in their view, language was merely the link between the two separate but related nations' (*ibid*.). The adoption of the *štokavian* dialect was another step towards closer relations between the Serbs and the Croats.

The Croatian historians' concern was not only maintenance of a good picture of the history of the Serbian Kingdom. They also had on the agenda the integration of the Serbs that lived in Croatia and who, at that time, numbered 25 per cent of the Croatian population. The writers of the textbooks aimed at creating a sense of loyalty to Croatia among these Serbs, and not to the neighbouring Serbian kingdom (*ibid*.: 264). The textbooks stressed, therefore, 'the unity of the lands of the Triune Kingdom, but with the clear understanding that there were Croatian lands in which Serbs also lived' (*ibid*.). 'Their language was the same', Jelavich continues, 'but the only political nation in the Triune Kingdom was the Croatian' (*ibid*.).[147]

At the end of his analysis, Jelavich concludes that these textbooks conveyed the type of information that promoted the ideas of brotherhood, co-operation and understanding, but not unity and assimilation, between the Croatian and Serbian nations. He concludes that 'Yugoslavism appealed to idealists, but not to those who had to deal with realities of the South Slav world' (*ibid*.: 272). It is worth mentioning that, as can be seen from the analysis in Chapter Four, not a single Croatian nationalist ideology propagated the idea of assimilation of these two nations. Cultural and political co-operation for these ideologies could not 'erase'

the individuality of such a historical social group as a nation. Such an attitude was also reflected in the history textbooks. After all, 'in the national question, the overriding issue was to instil, through the schools and textbooks, a sense of pride, patriotism, and loyalty in the nation, its past, and its future' (*ibid.*: 273).

As shown, the main method for securing the development of 'patriotism' among the younger generations is found in the specific use of vocabulary, symbols, myths and legends, the promotion of carefully selected historical figures into national heroes, and clearly labelled friends and enemies. I will use the same method for an analysis of three sets of Croatian secondary school history textbooks used in the twentieth century. The main aim of this analysis is to examine whether the textbooks published in 1943 reflected the main ideology of the Ustasha Movement, those published between 1954 and 1956 reflected the ideology of the Communist Party, and whether textbooks published in the first half of the 1990s propagated the ideas of Tudman's nationalist ideology. Finally, a comparison of the content of these history textbooks should point to the methods the educational system employed in promoting the dominant ideas of the cultural level.

7.2. General Characteristics of the Textbooks

The three sets of textbooks cover history from the sixth century (the period of settlement of the Slavs in the Balkan Peninsula) to the twentieth century (that is, to the time of their publication). The 1943 textbook is published in two volumes. Together these two volumes have 313 pages, more then half (57.5 per cent) of which are dedicated to the history of the Croatian nation. The 1950s textbooks deal solely with the history of the Croatian nation in 31 per cent of their 702 pages of text, while the 1990s textbooks dedicate 348 pages (or 48 per cent) to the same subject.

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[147] For more details on Serbo-Croatian relations and the idea of 'political nation' at the end of the nineteenth century, see Chapter Four.

The 1943 textbook is not only characterised by the choice of topics and their interpretation, but also by topics that are deliberately avoided. Hence, for example, the Ustashas' textbooks completely disregard and ignore the history of other Slav states and nations. Actually, the Slavs are mentioned on only three pages when the author discusses the migrations of the 'Old Slavs' and their customs and religion. In contrast, the 1950s textbooks dedicate 41 per cent of the text to the history of the other Slav nations. However, not all of the Slav nations are equally represented: 17 per cent of the text deals with the history of the Serb nation, 17 per cent with the histories of the other Yugoslav nations (Macedonians, Montenegrins and Slovenes), and only 7 per cent with the rest of the Slav nations (Czechs and Slovaks, Poles and Russians). The 1990s textbooks cover the whole pre-Yugoslavian history of the Serb nation in 11 pages, and spend 18 pages on the histories of the other Slav nations.

The preoccupation with the histories of the Slav nations in the 1950s textbooks leaves very little space for dealing with the history of the rest of the world. Only 16 per cent of the text considers world history. The 1990s textbooks dedicate much more space to Europe and the rest of the world (39 per cent). The 1943 textbooks deal with world history on 100 pages (31.9 per cent). Yet, it should be mentioned, 15 of these pages are dedicated solely to the history of Germany and the German people and 11 pages to the history of the Turks and the Ottoman Empire.

Two other interesting points of contrast between these history textbooks are their perspectives on the Catholic Church and, for the 1950s and 1990s textbooks, the Second World War. The 1950s textbooks cover the Second World War in Yugoslavia (that is, mainly the Popular Liberation War) in detail on 55 pages, while the 1990s textbooks cover the events of the same period in Croatia only and in 12 pages. With regard to the Church, the 1990s textbooks explain the history of the Roman Catholic Church in 45 pages. As could be expected, the socialist textbooks do not spend a single page on the history or doctrine of the Church, yet use an image of church institutions as the main villain in world history. The Ustashas' textbook concentrates less on the history of the Catholic Church, then the 1990s text, though it stresses the importance of religion

throughout. Yet, unlike the 1990s textbooks, the 1943 volumes also put some effort into explaining the basic ideas of Islam and the biography of Muhammad.

7.3. Confronting Ideologies

The main difference between these history textbooks lies not in what was said, but how it is expressed.

After reading the two-volume textbook published in 1943 it could be said that its main purpose was the education of young generations in a specific 'national spirit'. Such a view on the purpose of education was not without an ideological basis. The ideology promoted in these textbooks could be easily labelled as 'national-socialist'. Such an ideology has two major points of reference: the cult of the nation-state and folk culture. These two cults are promoted from the very first pages of the textbook.

Discussing the origins of the Croatian nation, the author underlines that 'a militant northern Slav tribe called the Croats' lived on the territory between the Karpathian Mountains, and the Visla and Odra rivers. 'Already there', says the author, 'they had their own state, and that was the oldest Slav state' (Jakić, 1943a: 16). The main task for the author thereafter is to 'prove' the undisturbed existence of a Croatian state until the twentieth century. Hence, for example, Croatia was an 'independent state' (*ibid.*: 31) in the ninth century in the period of the rule of Duke Branimir, and in the tenth century, under the rule of King Držislav, it was a 'big and powerful state' (*ibid.*: 37). At the time when the Croats lived in a common kingdom with Magyars, Croatian statehood did not disappear. In 1382 when the Bosnian ruler Tvrtko became an independent ruler 'the Croatian state was resurrected' (*ibid.*: 88) when 'for a while Bosnia became a centre of Croatian statehood' (*ibid.*: 91). Even when the Croats elected Ferdinand for their ruler in 1527, the author emphasises that the new king confirmed the 'old rights of the Croatian Kingdom, that is, respect its state independence' (Jakić, 1943b: 18). The following years Jakić describes as a 'struggle against Vienna and Magyars for the preservation of [Croatia] as an

independent political totality' (*ibid.*: 61). The cult of the state, that is perceived as nation-state, was finally clearly instituted with the interpretation of the basic ideas of the 'new social order' (*ibid.*: 118) established by Mussolini and Hitler. Jakić explains that this 'new social order assumes that the state is the highest relic, where interests of individuals are subordinated to the interests of the community' (*ibid.*). Once the cult of the state is instituted, the creation of the Independent State of Croatia in 1941 becomes the highest national achievement and its creators the true national heroes.

The importance of the state was explained to younger generations through its functions. While discussing the terrible social conditions of the common people during the Middle Ages, the author found a good opportunity to stress that only in the modern time 'social care, that is, helping the poor and sick, became the first task of the state' (*ibid.*: 55). This is the point when the nation-state ideology gains its 'social' character.

Besides telling the story of the Croatian state and nation, Jakić's textbook offers a history of the suffering of the Croatian peasants, who are presented as symbols of anguish and endurance. While the life of the Old Slav peasants is described as poor and simple the author warns that 'even today many of our peasants live in very poor conditions and know nothing of a better and nicer life' (Jakić, 1943a: 8). The importance of peasants for the Ustashas' ideology originates from a view that these 'peasants remained faithful to their *national* culture' (*Jakić, 1943a*: 50; italics in original). 'Since at that time', Jakić (*ibid.*) explains, 'villages had no schools, which could spread foreign influences, the peasant population could protect and develop their culture, that is, language, traditions, songs and customs through centuries'. Numerous and detailed explanations of the hard life of Croatian peasants throughout history create a picture of martyrs, the guardians of the national culture. At the same time, while depicting the dissipated life of the Croatian nobility, the author had to grant them the status of the guardians of the Croatian statehood rights (*ibid.*: 105), since they were the only political body in Croatia for centuries. The textbook clearly offers a critique of the class society. In return, however, the ideology does not offer equality for individuals, but anonymity of the masses within an all-inclusive national community.

A critique of the class system reappeared in the Croatian textbooks ten years later. The 1950s textbooks have two related tasks of promoting both the Marxist and the official nationalist ideology of the Yugoslav Communist Party. All the history in these books is explained in terms of the class struggle. This history teaches us that there were always oppressors and oppressed, exploiters and exploited, rich and poor, smaller but better organised minorities and broad suffering masses. History is explained in terms of the struggle between slaves and slave-owners, nobles and surfs, capitalists and proletarians. In the Middle Ages 'the entire dominant feudal class lived off the hard labour of serfs' (Mali & Salzer, 1954: 24). The authors are asking their readers for compassion by directly inviting them to '[i]magine in what kind of poverty the workers lived! The capitalists grabbed great fortunes and lived comfortably and luxuriously on the fortune earned by the workers' blisters' (Čubelić, 1957a: 4). The way of life, values and attitudes of the bourgeoisie are described in scathing terms: 'education, culture and wealth were for the ruling class only' (Mali & Salzer, 1954: 119); 'the attitude of the bourgeoisie towards life and the world is not directed towards the fulfilment of their religious duties; they do not think that this world is merely "the valley of tears" and "a preparation for another world" as the Church preaches' (Salzer, 1953: 3).

In the 1950s textbooks, the institution of the Church appears as the second favourite villain in history. In their attempt to promote Marxist ideology, the authors engage in a crusade against Christianity. From the first pages of the first volume they make their accusations: 'Christianity had already became a supporter of the dominant classes in the fifth century' (Mali & Salzer, 1954: 19); 'the Church participated in the violent expropriation of land' (*ibid*: 22); 'the Church prevented the development of science and obstructed the development of society' (*ibid*: 88; and Salzer, 1953: 20). It is interesting that in making these accusations against the Church and Christianity the authors use a more personal manner of addressing their readers: 'Christianity, *as we already know*, supported the development of feudal relations' (Mali & Salzer: 27; italics mine); '*we know* that at that time there could be no political independence without church independence' (*ibid*: 42, 72; italics mine). However, the authors do not accuse

the Church simply of being a traitor to the nation throughout history: 'With the support of Christianity and the priests, the Franks could easily keep the people in subjugation' (Mali & Salzer, 1954: 30); 'Christianity promoted Germanization of the Slav tribes' (*ibid.*: 74). After these descriptions of the Church and priesthood as oppressors and traitors, the authors allow themselves some moderation in admitting that 'there were those who thought that religion is necessary and that a human being must be religious' (Salzer, 1953: 253). In the place of religion, the authors of the 1950s history textbooks offer to their masses a large portion of ideology. They divide all human beings and their communities into the progressive and the reactionary. Progressive, for example, was Jacobin rule in the French Revolution of 1789 (Salzer, 1953: 124), as were the Bolsheviks in the October Revolution (Čubelić, 1957b: 27), Gavrilo Princip and the organisation 'Young Bosnia' (Čubelić, 1957a: 58), and the broad masses in general.

The authors of the 1990s textbooks have a different opinion. The Croatian nationalist ideology of the 1990s makes an effort to confront the remnants of Communist ideology once and for all. The Yugoslav Communist regime is described as a dictatorship: 'The Communists were saying one thing, but were doing and thinking another. They were talking about democracy while they were suffocating every freedom and acting undemocratically. Demagogy and violence were the methods they employed' (Perić, 1994: 155). The 1990s textbooks are not only waging an ideological war against the Yugoslav Communists, but against Marxist ideology in general. The authors of the textbooks unequivocally state that 'Marx's solutions to economic and social problems were theoretically wrong' (Mirošević & Macan, 1995: 150). At this point, in support of their statement, the authors quote Pope Leo XIII, who 'correctly observes in his encyclical *Rerum novarum* that the socialists are imposing violence, injustice and confusion in all strata of society, and that the accomplishment of their ideas would open a door to jealousy, gossip and discord among different societies, while the proclaimed equality would actually mean general poverty' (*ibid.*).

Marxist ideology is not the only point of dispute between the 1950s and 1990s textbooks. Two nationalist ideologies are in direct opposition as well. As was shown in previous chapters, the Yugoslav Communists created a particular

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nationalist ideology which was supposed to accommodate both the individual nations that composed Yugoslavia and an overarching supra-nationalism. The 1950s history textbooks attempt the same task. Even though the books emphasise and glorify the national history of each Yugoslav nation[148] - thus, for instance, the history of the Croats - the supra-national Yugoslavism is ever-present. The authors emphasise the common origins of all South Slavs, the similarities in their culture, traditions, and languages, and common history. Throughout the textbooks, they write of 'our countries', 'our people', 'our coast' and 'our coastal cities'. Many historical figures are described as 'our man' (Omer-pasha Latas, for example, Mali & Salzer, 1954: 260) or as 'the sons of our country' (Čubelić, 1957b: 41). Others glorify 'our people' as 'skilled and courageous warriors' (Mali & Salzer, 1954: 12) who 'have never willingly submitted to any foreign power' (*ibid.*: 64).

In sharp contrast, the 1990s history textbooks make sure that the national identity of every important historical figure is well known: 'Petar Zrinski, Croatian ban' (Mirošević & Šanjek, 1995: 284) or 'Fran Hrsto Frankopan, Croatian Duke' (*ibid.*: 285) for example. Another characteristic of these textbooks is the 'Croatisation' of history. This is particularly evident in the description of the early history of the Croatian nation. Hence the authors stress, for example, that even though Pope Gregory I (590-604) mentioned the 'Slavs' in his letters, 'new archaeological findings prove that they were Croats' (*ibid.*: 47). With no evidence to support them, the authors claim that 'without any doubt King Tomislav's sympathies were on the side of the Croatian bishop' (*ibid.*: 61). King Peter is described as 'the last king of Croatian blood' (*ibid.*: 154). In places where the texts name Dalmatia and Slavonia, the authors add 'Croatia' in brackets (*ibid.*: 47, 49, 64, 145). The anti-regional stance of 1990s Croatian nationalist ideology is also present in the history texts, and is most evident in a general avoidance of the name of Dalmatia, instead of which the authors tend to use the term 'South Croatia' (Mirošević & Macan, 1995: 23, 27, 93, 96-97). Moreover, in discussion of the work of Pavao Ritter Vitezović, the authors state that he '*rightly*, denied the integrity of Dalmatia, which was just a slave of

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[148] Except the Muslims - in the 1950s they were not recognised as a separate nation.

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Venice' (*ibid.*: 27; italics mine). The authors Croatise even the Church - they write of 'the Croatian Church' in the eleventh century (Mirošević & Šanjek, 1995: 83) and 'the Bishop of the Croats' (*ibid.*: 61). While the 1990s textbooks have *Croatia* as a main actor in history - 'Croatia could not reconcile' (*ibid.*, 63); 'harmful for Croatia' (*ibid.*, 170) - the 1943 textbooks have *the Croatian people* - 'the Croatian people was relying on' (Jakić, 1943: 101); 'first ties between Pope and the Croatian people' (*ibid.*: 22); and 'the Croatian people stayed in touch with' (*ibid.*:31).

These are just a few examples of the differences in vocabulary between the three sets of history textbooks, which highlight their ideological differences and refute the image of history texts as simply collections of historical facts.

7.4. Myths and Legends

Early histories of peoples and nations - histories of times when written testimonies were rare or did not exist at all - provide plenty of space for historians' imagination. Myths and legends easily fill gaps left by the lack of historical facts. In this respect the three sets of history textbooks analysed here are no different from any others. However, it is interesting to compare the selection of myths and legends that appears in each set. Differences are obvious. While the 1950s textbooks chose to print those legends which promote supra-national Yugoslavism, the 1943 and the 1990s textbooks attempt the very opposite, that is, to emphasise individuality and particularity of the Croatian nation with respect to the other South Slavs.

Hence, from the first pages of the first volume of the 1950s textbooks, the authors recount the legends of the so-called 'Old Slavs' in their ancient homeland in the Karpathian Mountains: 'The Slavs believed that at the end of December, the sun liberates itself from the power of the evil gods. At this time the Slavs celebrated the "young sun" which will liberate them from winter and bring nature back to life again. That natural phenomenon has been celebrated by other nations as well, and so, later, the Christian Church chose this celebration as the

celebration of Christmas'[149] (Mali & Salzer, 1954: 9). In contrast, the authors of the 1990s textbooks emphasise, rather indirectly, the distinct origins of the Croats. They present a map entitled *The origins and migration of the Croats* which shows that the Croats - or the Harauvat and Harahvati[150] as they were known - originate from Persia, from where they migrated in the sixth and fifth centuries BC. In this way the authors not only show the distinct origins of the Croats, but they also extend the history of this people for ten centuries. According to the myth, the migration of Croats in the sixth century AD was led by five brothers (Kluk, Lobel, Muhlo, Kosens and Hrvat) and two sisters (Tuga and Buga). This myth also highlights the crucial role these Croats had in rescuing the Byzantine Empire from the Avars: 'The time of the Croats' migration to Illyria coincided with the defeat of the Avars under the ramparts of Constantinople' (Mirošević & Šanjek, 1995: 47).

The Ustashas' history textbook uses the same myth of the migration (Jakić, 1943a: 15). However, the author of this text had a more difficult task. Not only does he have to prove the difference between the Croats and the other South Slavs, but he also has to 'make' the Croats an Aryan race. Jakić clearly, without any doubt, states that the Croats 'were not of pure Slavic origins' (Jakić, 1943a: 16). Yet, Jakić is not so positive about what the Croats were. He offers two interpretations:

> [Some] scholars claim that [the Croats] were a German tribe, probably Goths, which settled on the other side of the Karpathian Mountains among a more numerous Slav population, and, as a consequence, over a certain period, it became Slavicised. Other scholars hold that they [the Croats] are relatives of some Iranian-Caucasian tribes, which during the great migration of people left their Caucasian homeland and settled in the Karpathian area, where they became Slavs. In any case, the Croats were not of pure Slav race and that is the reason why they were *more capable of creating a state* then other Slavs. (Jakić, 1943: 17, italics in original)

Both the 1943 and the 1990s textbooks make a legend of the Croat warriors, the 1950s textbooks describe the legendary resistance of 'the people' to all oppression. Hence, the 1950s textbook uses the legend of the death of

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[149] In the original, Christmas is printed in lower case.
[150] In the Croatian language Croats are called *Hrvati.*

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Zvonimir[151] to illustrate the people's determination to defend their freedom. The authors explain that 'the people had had enough of waging wars in the name of the Pope far from their homeland' and that 'the people were dissatisfied with Zvonimir's internal politics' which led to Zvonimir's death (Mali & Salzer, 1954: 59). Thus, while the Communist textbooks describe how Zvonimir was killed at the hands of fellow Croats, 'modern Croatian historiography', write the authors of the 1990s textbook, 'rejected the legend of Zvonimir's death on a Kosovo field next to the five churches around Knin'. According to legend, unfaithful Croats killed Zvonimir because he intended to lead them on a Crusade to Palestine. The dying king put a curse on the Croats that 'they will never have a ruler who speaks their own language, but will always be subjugated by a foreign language' (Mirošević & Šanjek, 1995: 69). 'It seems', the authors (*ibid.*) conclude, 'that the legend was created with the aim of justifying the rule of the Arpads[152] in Croatia, since they appear as those claiming revenge for the allegedly vicious killing of the ruler'. Obviously 'modern Croatian historiography' could not permit the notion that Croats could kill another Croat. The 1943 textbook is even more clear in denial: 'if that really happened, the writers of that time would record that event' (Jakić, 1943a: 43).

The three sets of history textbooks create legends around different historical figures. This issue deserves special attention.

7.5. National Heroes

Biographies of national heroes form a major part of every history textbook. One of the main indications of an ideologically coloured history textbook is its choice of figures that are described as such. As could be expected, the history textbooks analysed here depict rather different characters as heroes.

As already mentioned, the 1950s textbooks dedicate considerable space to an account of the history of all the South Slavs. Hence, unlike the 1940s and 1990s

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[151] The ruler of Dalmatia and Croatia in the eleventh century.

textbooks, the 1950s textbooks deal with the non-Croats as well as Croat national heroes. Interestingly, the Serb national heroes are dealt with in an unusually crude manner. It appears that the authors of the textbooks want to de-throne the Serbian national heroes, especially those most represented in Serbian national songs and epics. Hence Prince Marko, a character featured in many popular folk epics, is described in terms directly opposite to those used in the epics. While the national poems celebrate Prince Marko as a great hero of the struggle against the Turks in the fourteenth century, the textbooks describe him as a national traitor: 'From history we know that he [Prince Marko] did not fight against the Turks, but that he was a Turkish vassal, and so he fought with the Turks against Christians' (Mali & Salzer, 1954: 166). The authors explain that Prince Marko became a national hero through the popular songs in which, through Marko's deeds, 'the oppressed people expressed their longing for freedom' (*ibid.*: 167).

A whole series of Serbian national heroes are accused of the greatest sin of all: collaboration with the Turks. These include Konstantin Dejanović during the Turkish raid in 1394 (*ibid.*: 176), the son of Duke Lazar Stevan Lazarević (1389-1427) (*ibid.*: 177), and even Miloš Obrenović, the legendary leader of the Second Serbian Uprising in 1815 (Salzer, 1953: 167) who apparently helped the Turks in crushing the Hadži-Prodan's Uprising in 1814. Interestingly, one historic figure who appeared as a traitor in the popular folk songs - Vuk Branković - is described in the 1950s textbook as the one 'who did not want to help the Turks' so that the Turkish ruler gave all Branković's land to Stevan Lazarević (Mali & Salzar, 1954: 177). These discrepancies between Serbian popular epics and the history textbooks may arise out of an attempt by the Communist national ideology to make a space for new national heroes by 'de-throning' the old ones. It should also be noted that those Serbian national heroes who where traditionally praised as fighters against the Turks are described in especially negative terms. In this way, the whole story of the four centuries of Serbian struggle against the Turks - which was, and still is, one of the cornerstones of Serbian nationalism - is downgraded. This could also be seen as an attempt to put all the histories of the

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[152] Hungarian ruling family.

Yugoslav nations on an equal footing and as a direct attack on Serbian nationalism.

The 1950s textbooks prefer those historical figures who were active at a cultural level to the heroes of the battlefields. Two Serbian national figures of the nineteenth century were Dositej Obradović and Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, who are said to have established the 'foundations of the Serbian culture and the transformation of the vernacular into a literary language' (Salzer, 1953: 110 and 273). However, the 1990s textbooks have a different view of these historical figures. The 1950s textbooks forget, and the 1990s textbooks cannot fail to mention, Vuk Stefanović Karadžić's 'language policy'. This policy could be summarised in his creeds 'Serbs, all and everywhere' (Mirošević & Macan, 1995: 67) and 'Serbs of three confessions' (*ibid.*). Karadžić and his ideas, in this view, are the 'root of the Great Serbian ideology and Serbocentrism, which then, just as today, endangered the independence and freedom of the non-Serb nations of the Balkans' (*ibid.*). The 1943 textbooks, however, completely ignored characters from Serbian history.

The case of Vuk Stefanović Karadžić provides only one of many examples of discrepancies in views on national heroes between these textbooks. Better examples can be found in relation to Croatian historical figures.

The 1950s textbooks celebrate some of the very same Croatian national heroes as the 1943 and 1990s textbooks. These include Nikola Zrinski, a hero of the battle of Siget against the Turks (Mali & Salzer: 1954: 52), Matija Gubec, a popular leader of the peasant uprising in 1573 (*ibid.*: 75-82), and Petar Zrinski and Krsto Frankopan, whose plot against the Austrian rulers tragically ended with their execution in Vienna. The authors of the textbooks describe them as 'the Croatian nobles who even though they defended their own personal gains in the first place, defended the interests of Croatia as well' (*ibid.*: 90). All three sets of textbooks praise Croatian national heroes of the Middle Ages. However, there is a large discrepancy in their descriptions of historical figures of the nineteenth century.

One of the most celebrated figures of the nineteenth century who appears in the 1990s history textbooks is Ban Josip Jelačić. The textbook dedicated an eight-page chapter to this hero. He is described as 'a nationally conscious *Ban* and as a soldier loyal to the Emperor' (Mirošević & Macan, 1995: 106). During the events of 1848 the *Ban* not only became a 'fighter for Croatia' but also a 'fighter against the Magyar revolution and Viennese uprising' (*ibid*: 109) and as such he 'saved Croatia from aggressive Magyar chauvinism' (*ibid*). According to the 1990s textbook, Jelačić also 'defended the Croatian flag: he emphasised the importance of the flag to the masses during the events of 1848, and rejected regional flags as negations of the spirit of national unification' (*ibid*: 111). The 1943 textbooks mainly draw the same picture of Jelačić, though the emphasis is a little different. Jakić highlights Jelačić's military 'achievements' by claiming that 'the Croatian Ban' crushed the revolt in Vienna (Jakić, 1943b: 93) even though he actually never reached Vienna.[153]

The 1950s textbooks have another view of the *Ban*'s role in these events. He is described as a man 'in the service of the Viennese court' who was 'defending its reactionary policy' (Salzer, 1953: 216). The author of this textbook finds it important to emphasise that Jelačić 'had the support of the broad masses but at the same time was inclined towards feudal anti-popular aspirations' (*ibid*: 222); that he 'established drumhead trials' (*ibid*: 224); that he served the reactionary court (*ibid*: 226); and that he had an anti-revolutionary attitude (*ibid*: 227). The most damning evidence against Jelačić was that he waged wars under the Emperor's flag and for the Emperor's benefit' (*ibid*). Nevertheless, the author of the textbook is careful not to accuse the whole nation of the same sins as those of which Jelačić is accused: 'and while Jelačić continues to fight for the Habsburgs' interests, the Croats maintain their resistance' (*ibid*: 228).[154]

And so, looking at these history textbooks we find that yet another historical figure appears as a national hero in the one and a traitor in the other. The textbooks do not deny or pass over in silence any important event of that era.

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[153] For more about Jelačić's military expedition in 1848, see Goldstein (1999: 71).

Yet, the perspectives on Jelačić's deeds are contradictory. The Socialist regime could not forgive Jelačić for his anti-revolutionary attitude, and the 1940s and the 1990s Croatian nationalist ideologies refuse to overlook a hero who fought Magyar chauvinism.

The greatest national hero for the 1943 textbook is Ante Pavelić, the *Poglavnik* (leader) of the Ustasha Movement. In the manner that German or Italian official publications of that time described the *Führer* and *Duce*, Jakić describes 'the greatness' of Pavelić. Not only that Pavelić organised the Ustashas, established the Independent State of Croatia, gained international recognition of the state (sic!), and secured the state borders by himself, but he was also endowed with a visionary mind when he foresaw the 'great war' (Jakić, 1943b:122). While the textbook readily glorifies Pavelić for including Bosnia within the Croatian borders (*ibid*: 123), it somehow omits to mention that the whole of Dalmatia and Istria was handed to fascist Italy.

As could be expected, for the 1950s history textbooks Josip Broz Tito was the real hero, the 'greatest son of our nations'. Tito's leading role in the events of the 1940s and 1950s is frequently highlighted. Over the course of 50 pages the authors use the phrase 'the Communist Party with Tito at its head' 14 times, and 'Military committee with Tito at its head' twice. Tito is described as a great leader with a great love for his people: 'Comrade Tito showed warm-heartedness and deep love, and great concern for his wounded combatants' (Čubelić, 1957b: 76). Just a few pages later we read: 'it was again Comrade Tito who thought of the wounded and ill combatants' (*ibid*: 80). All the military operations of the National Liberation Army during the Second World War are presented as having been under the direct command of Tito, who 'demonstrated great military knowledge' (*ibid*: 78). The 1990s textbooks, in contrast, do not display such an enthusiasm for Tito and his deeds. The greatest sin Tito committed was his crushing of the Croatian Spring in 1971, and for the authors of the 1990s texts

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[154] It is worth mentioning that as soon as the Communists seized power in Yugoslavia in 1945, the statue of the Ban Jelačić disappeared from the main square in Zagreb which had borne his name, and the square was renamed the Square of the Republic.

that deed is unforgivable and must be classified as an act of open hostility towards the Croatian nation.

However, the 1990s textbooks reserve a special place for another leader: Franjo Tuđman. It is worth translating a part of the passage dedicated to the 'great leader':

> Dr. Franjo Tuđman, the president of the Republic, greatly contributed to the strength and international reputation of the Republic of Croatia. As a man whose preoccupation in life was a free and independent Croatia, who worked hard and suffered much for such a Croatia, as a man of great knowledge and experience, and as a powerful personality, Dr. Franjo Tuđman was at the political helm, and did not allow any deviation or digression. His authority is respected in Croatia just as in the wider world. In his speeches, press conferences and interviews he always gave directions on and answers to all the most important questions at the right time and in the right way, (...) important for Croatia and its interests. Working for the good of Croatia, he was also active abroad. (Perić, 1994: 213)

To conclude this analysis of how the three sets of history textbooks create and de-throne national heroes, it can be said that those individuals are not judged on their deeds, but rather in terms of their usefulness to national ideologies that were created long after their times. In addition, as could be expected, for each national ideology its own leader is the most important historical figure.

7.6. Nation, National Values, National Interests

The opposing ideologies that shaped the 1940s, 1950s and 1990s history textbooks could not but promote highly contrasting symbols and values. While the Communist ideology is preoccupied with emphasising class-based values and symbols, the followers of the Ustasha Movement and the nationalist ideology of Franjo Tuđman exclusively promote values and symbols of the Croatian nation, but in rather different ways.

The 1943 history textbooks do not offer a clear definition of the nation. For such a definition one has to 'read between lines'. The first impression when reading the textbook is that the nation in general, and definitely the Croatian nation, is a

primordial phenomenon. The existence of the nation is 'proven' by pointing to the existence of the name of the nation. In other words, the fact that a social group named *Hrvati* existed since time immemorial and that it has been recorded throughout history, in these texts testifies to the continuity of the existence of the Croatian *nation*. Yet even these textbooks recognise that something significantly different happened in the course of the nineteenth century. Everything starts with the Napoleonic Wars. Jakić (1943b: 78) admits that 'following the example of the French, the national consciousness of other peoples started to awaken, so that they became proud of their name, language and history'. The terminology used in this sentence could have several meanings. *Awakening* of the national consciousness literally could mean that at some point in history that consciousness existed, but was lost. It could also mean that national consciousness in the nineteenth century was a new phenomenon for previously 'un-awakened' social groups. While discussing European events in the first half of the nineteenth century, Jakić points to the emergence of a new idea which claims that one nation cannot be subjugated by another. 'Every nation has to decide its own destiny!' (Jakić, 1943b: 83). The author explains that this idea is the basis of the *'popular (national) idea'* (*ibid.*, italics mine). 'Patriotism', Jakić continues, 'became a new power in the world' (*ibid.*).

The 1943 textbooks repeatedly emphasise that name, language and history are the main (only?) constituent elements of the nation. Even though the role and importance of religion is underlined throughout the textbook, the author omits it as a significant marker of nationality. From the content of the textbook it is clear that emphasis on religion at this time would be counter to national interests. After all, the textbook is also written for Bosnian Muslims, who were considered by the Ustasha regime as Croats. For this reason the textbook incorporates the history of Bosnia as Croatian history and Islam as one of the Croatian religions. From the first pages the textbooks educate the younger generation about Muhammad and the basic teachings of Islam. Muhammad is described as 'a righteous and holy man' (Jakić, 1943a: 17) and his work marked the 'start of a new era for the Arab people, filled by great and famous deeds' (*ibid.*). Just two pages later, the textbook stresses that 'when the Turks came to the Balkan Peninsula, considerable numbers of the Croatian nation [in Bosnia and

Herzegovina] embraced Islam' (*ibid.*: 19). From now on, Jakić is very anxious to find an equilibrium between the history of Christianity and history of Islam. The first challenge came with the Crusades. Jakić (*ibid.*: 61) writes: 'Since the Christians met the Muslims for the first time, the view that the Muslims were industrious and good people, just as the Christians, gradually prevailed. That is the reason why the hatred between the two religions considerably lessened'.

An attempt to integrate the Bosnian Muslims within the Croatian core demanded a peculiar interpretation of the events that marked the Ottoman expansion on the Balkan Peninsula. As shown earlier, the 1943 textbooks celebrate those who distinguish themselves in the wars against the Ottomans as Croatian national heroes. At the same time it was necessary to celebrate heroes of the Bosnian Muslims who distinguished themselves in the same war, but on the other side. Jakić mentions many Muslim 'heroes and knights' (1943b: 14), like Mustajbeg of Lika, Smail-aga Čengić,[155] Gazi Huser-beg and Omer-pasha Latas.

Nevertheless, in spite of their different religions, the 1943 textbook presented Croatian Catholics and Muslims as sharing the same values. A frequently repeated characteristic of the Croats is their loyalty and readiness to lay down their lives for their rulers. In that vein we read that the Croats fought and died for Maria Teresa just as for Napoleon (*ibid.*: 65 and 82), and that 'with their blood they defended not only themselves, but the other nations as well' (*ibid.*: 26). By fighting against the Ottomans for centuries, the Croats 'defended Vienna and Middle Europe' (*ibid.*: 21 and 24). At the same time, the textbook emphasises, 'many Croats achieved the highest positions in Turkey and committed great deeds for the Turkish state' (*ibid.*: 14).

These heroic stories aimed to instil national pride and glorify Croatian military traditions. The young generation had to be reconciled with the idea that they

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[155] In 1831 Smail-aga crushed a peasant revolt in Herzegovina that was supported by the Montenegrins. In revenge Montenegrin *Vladika* Peter II Petrović Njegoš sent a small gang to assassinate Smail-aga. This event was described by a Croatian poet Ivan Mažuranić in his famous epic 'Death of Smail-aga Čengić'. Jakić (1943b: 106) writes: 'the content of the epic does not completely correspond with the truth. Čengić was not so bad a man, as rumour says, and he was a hero greater than many others'.

might be asked to give their own lives for the national cause, just as their ancestors did. Hence, at every opportunity, the 1943 textbook underlines how history teaches us that 'the nations could never gain their freedom and independence without great struggle and sacrifices' (*ibid.*: 98, 103 and 123). The atrocities committed by the Ustashas from 1941 until 1945 gained its justification - it is all in the name of the nation.

Ten years later the authors of the 1950s textbooks aim at reconciling the separate histories of the Yugoslav nations. Hence, the histories of all the nations must be presented as equally glorious and heroic. Past clashes between them, if mentioned at all, are mostly explained as having been initiated by foreign oppressors and aggressors or the domestic bourgeoisie. The authors demonstrate how the emphasis on the 'narrow' national values, symbols and cultures of the Yugoslav nations produced the extreme nationalisms of the period of the Second World War. According to Marxist ideology, nationalism is an ideology of the bourgeoisie that has as its aim the promotion of their class interests; it must therefore be overcome in the new socialist order. The interests of the broad masses are proclaimed to be the main concern of the authors of these textbooks. As could be expected, the glorious revolution of 1941-1945 provides the focus of the main symbols and values associated with the 'progressive forces' of Yugoslavia, that is, the working class, peasants and the 'honourable intelligentsia'.

The authors constantly emphasise the revolutionary spirit of the masses throughout history. They write of the 'slave revolutions' in the third and fourth centuries AD (Mali & Salzer, 1954: 3, 5), of the 'revolutionary people' in the sixteenth century Reformation (Salzer, 1953: 23), and the 'serfs' revolution' of the 1573 peasant uprising in Croatia (*ibid.*: 75) They celebrate the Hussite revolution, the French Revolution, which is described as 'the first attempt to introduce communism' (*ibid.*: 124), and, of course, the October Revolution. But for these authors, the Yugoslav revolution of 1941-1945 sets the precedent for future Yugoslav generations. This was the revolution during which the Yugoslav peoples showed that they 'loved their country', that 'they knew how to fight and were willing to lay down their lives for their country' (Čubelić, 1957b: 59).

Through this revolution the Yugoslav people 'won the right to determine their own destiny' (*ibid.*: 85). Moreover, the author claims that the 'liberation struggle of the Yugoslav nations became a model for the rest of the enslaved nations of Europe' (*ibid.*: 67). Thus the histories and glorious battles which have been celebrated by the individual Yugoslav nations could not compete with the 'greatest struggle in the history of our nations' (*ibid.*: 100). The revolution of 1941-1945 became a symbol of the common struggle of the Yugoslav nations for their freedom. It became a symbol of 'the brotherhood and unity of all the Yugoslav nations' (*ibid.*: 94, 101, 106). The author stresses that 'there is no force which could cause the Yugoslav people to stray from the path on which they have been set by the Party and Comrade Tito' (*ibid.*: 87). For the author, this history textbook is his own small contribution to the people's task.

The 1990s history textbooks have another goal: to destroy the symbols and values created by the Communist regime and to promote and propagate new, this time 'pure' national values and symbols of Croatia. The ideology of the Communist regime is used as a symbol for anything imposed on and foreign to the Croatian nation and the Croatian culture. The history of Croatia must prove that this nation is, if not the oldest, then at least as old as the oldest Western European nations. It must prove that the Croatian nation has always been a part of Western history and west European Catholic 'civilisation'. It must prove that Croatia is not a Balkan, but a central European country.

In pursuing this goal the authors of the 1990s history books use the terms 'civilisation' and 'cultural zones' not only to emphasise that the Croatian nation has always belonged to Western Europe, but also to sever all relations between Croatia and the other South Slav nations, particularly the Serbs. The term 'civilisation' in this context underlines the differences in culture, history, interests and values between the nations, and emphasises incompatibilities between the populations. The border between the two civilisations in the Balkan peninsula was, according to the authors, established in 395 AD with the division of the Roman Empire: 'the dividing line, which on the Balkan peninsula runs from the River Drina straight to the Adriatic Sea, is the civilisational, cultural and religious border between West and East, between Rome and Constantinople,

between universalistic (Catholic) and nationalistic (Orthodox) Christianity' (Mirošević & Šanjek, 1995: 12). The River Drina hence becomes a border between two civilisations, between two cultural zones, and Croatia is firmly established within an 'area of Western culture and civilisation' (Mirošević & Macan, 1995: 12).

The Croatian nation is described as a nation with a 'millennial history' (*ibid.*: 274), or, to be more precise, the authors are dealing with '13 centuries of written Croatian history' (*ibid.*: 297). The Croats comprise 'the only nation within western Christianity with a millennial liturgical tradition in their national language' (*ibid.*: 49). The authors emphasise 'the unity of Croatian culture, which will later become one of the cornerstones of national consciousness' (*ibid.*: 41). All of this is supposed to be proof that Croatia is one of the oldest nations in Europe. In addition to its long existence, according to the authors, the Croatian nation meets the necessary criteria of nationhood, since 'the main features which distinguish one nation from another are a common economy and common social interests, language, culture, history and political consciousness' (*ibid.*: 63). Later in the textbook, when outlining the errors made by Ljudevit Gaj, who defined the nation solely on the basis of a common language, the authors claim that:

> he did not realise that a nation requires other features like the feeling of belonging and knowledge of its origins, common history and state tradition, a developed ideology of national consciousness (which serves to integrate the different social strata and territories, and to propagate a common religion and general outlook on the world), the democratisation of politics, a longing for a shared future, and highly developed political, economic, cultural and institutional inter-connections and goals. (*ibid.*: 99)

A nation which meets all these criteria is entitled to its own nation-state in which 'there should be the rule of the majority' (*ibid.*: 63).

It was not only the case that the 'Croatian nation was following the route taken by other nations as an integral part of Europe' (*ibid.*: 4), but, furthermore, the Croats have also been the defenders of Europe. Using many examples, the authors teach their readers about the historical injustice done to the Croatian nation. They underline how 'throughout their long history the Croats unselfishly and actively participated in the building of the European Christian civilisation'

(*ibid.*: 200), and yet, on many occasions they were abandoned by the European powers. For example, 'in the war with the Turks, the Croats were not only defending their own freedom, but that of Europe as well, especially its central part. Waging a war for others as well, with minimal help from Europe (...) the Croatian people were strengthening their self-consciousness about their survival on these territories' (*ibid.*: 168). 'For two centuries' the authors accuse, 'Croatia was bleeding, suffering and pleading for help' (*ibid.*: 268). The struggle of the Croats 'amazed Europe' (*ibid.*: 181); 'Zrinski's victories strongly resounded throughout Europe' (*ibid.*: 285); 'the heroic defence of the two Croatian heroes (...) saved Vienna from the Turks' (*ibid.*: 186). Who else, then, is more deserving of the title 'rampart of Christianity' then the Croats (*ibid.*: 187)?

The authors focus on Catholicism as one of the most important features of the Croatian nation. On the basis of religion, the authors explain, the Croats built their specific national values. They created an image of themselves as the people chosen to be *Antemurale Cristhianiatatis*. Their national interests were closely tied to their religious mission. Religion, then, became the source of all the national values and interests they proclaimed. The destiny of Catholicism in the Balkans became dependent on the strength of the religious beliefs of the Croats. To emphasise this link between the nation and religion, the authors present a short history of the Catholic Church in parallel with the history of the Croatian nation. The Church is presented as the key political, cultural and social force in Europe throughout its history. Hence, the Crusades are described as a 'kind of opening drama for the *Europe of nations*, and they also brought this Europe's first success: they liberated (albeit only temporarily) Jesus' grave' (Mirošević & Šanjek, 1995: 11; italics in original). Sixty pages later the authors find that a motive of the Crusades lay in 'Western solidarity with the oppressed Christians of the East' (*ibid.*: 74). Furthermore, the authors try to mitigate the negative image of the Inquisition, in claiming that 'liberal historians over-emphasised the inhumanity of the Inquisition and exaggerated the number of victims' (*ibid.*: 142), and that the 'clash between the Inquisition and Galileo Gallilei arose from misunderstanding' (*ibid.*: 143). The Church is described as a major force against slavery (*ibid.*: 89), as a force against the rich and on the side of the poor (*ibid.*: 100). 'The Church was seen in feudal society', the author claims, 'as an

institution which gave ethical inspiration and provided basic social functions, like education, administration, the dissemination of information (novelties are more easily propagated in churches)' (*ibid.*: 136). The Church even 'confronted the military-inclined nobles and proclaimed "God's peace"' (*ibid.*: 143).

Even though the authors are constantly emphasising the universalism of the Catholic Church, in contrast to the nationalism of Orthodoxy, they write of the importance of the 'Church among Croats' (*ibid.*: 263) to the development of national culture. Hence, fraternities, like the orders of St. Francis and St. Benedict can be praised for 'developing new artistic expression within the Croatian territory', 'preserving the oldest documents of Croatian national history' and 'improvement of the Croatian economy' (*ibid.*: 133). The Franciscans 'contributed enormously to the development of science, expansion of education, and the struggle for better human relations; and with their personal talents and sense of beauty they created immortal works of art and, hence, enriched the cultural heritage of their nation' (*ibid.*: 134). The Jesuit monasteries, meanwhile, became the 'focus of intellectual, cultural and religious life' (*ibid.*: 135). The authors of the textbooks thus teach their readers that religion in general and the Catholic Church in particular became an integral part of Croatian national history and culture.

One of the most important achievements of the Catholic Church, according to the authors, was 'the establishment of a firm social and moral order within the decadent Western Christianity' (*ibid.*: 43). The authors describe the introduction of Christianity to the Croats as an 'historical turning-point' (*ibid.*: 47) and their conversion to Christianity as a 'painstaking process of centennial preaching through which a Christian mentality evolved' (*ibid.*: 48). The authors regard the Papal Encyclicals as the source of the values the Croats cherish. They quote the Encyclical *Rerum novarum* of Leo XIII which states that 'in this world inequality must exist (since not all people have the same intellectual capabilities, they are not equally diligent, nor do they have the same strength and health)' (Mirošević & Macan, 1995: 147). The Pope hereby rejects the socialist solution which is 'unacceptable because it is unjust' and appeals to 'human solidarity' (*ibid.*: 147). In place of socialism and socialist values, the textbook offers another set of

values: 'in the free market societies (capitalism), by the end of the nineteenth century the workers had already achieved social security, better education, better working and leaving conditions, and salaries which were sufficient for decent living (enough to support themselves, their wives and children, to save, and to own property)' (*ibid.*). This is a picture of the ideal life for every Croat at the end of the twentieth century.

7.7. National Enemies

The 1940s, 1950s and 1990s history textbooks published in Croatia portray the histories of other nations, states and communities in ways most appropriate for the nationalist ideologies which influenced these books. During the 1950s, the real enemies of the South Slavs, and hence of Croatia, were perceived to be the entire Western and Eastern blocs. On the other hand, the most significant enemies of the Croatian nation in both the 1940s and 1990s were the Serbs. In the 1990s textbooks they are portrayed as having been the enemies of the nation throughout its history. The 1943 textbook has a longer list of national enemies. Thus it appears that, once again, contemporary politics wrote the history.

In the 1950s, Yugoslavia found itself between two hostile blocs. As a socialist country, it was isolated from the Western 'capitalist' countries which labelled it an ideological enemy. In 1949, on the grounds of its Titoism, Yugoslavia was isolated from the Eastern socialist bloc as well. The authors of the 1950s history textbooks faced the task of explaining to their readers both the corruption of the West and the dangers of Stalinism.

According to the 1950s textbooks the South Slav nations had, throughout their history, suffered at the hands of stronger nations. Venetian, Norman, Frank, German, Hungarian, Austrian, Russian, French, Turkish and many other armies all passed through the territories of the South Slavs at some time in history. They exploited 'the internal conditions of the South Slav nations in grabbing parts of the (their) territory for themselves' (Mali & Salzer, 1954: 57). They used every means to conquer the Slavs. They 'tortured them and massacred the adult

population, and took the children away with them' (*ibid.*: 74). They 'used every opportunity to weaken the power of the Croatian nobles' (*ibid.*: 70). However, they were cowards who 'would run away even before the battle started' (*ibid.*: 202). No wonder, then, that these conquerors 'provoked hatred and repulsion among the Slavs' (*ibid.*: 74).

The authors of the textbooks do not concern themselves only with the conquerors. Russia, throughout history, bore the label of protector of the Slavs under the Turkish yoke, and among the Serbian and Montenegrin populations enjoyed great popularity. The authors try to diminish the role Russia played in these territories in the past, in order to alter popular attitudes towards Russia in their own day. Hence the authors stress several times that Russia 'deserted the Serbs' (Salzer, 1954: 157); that 'Russia did nothing to help the position of the Montenegrin tribes' (*ibid.*: 176). They explain that 'Russia exploited unrest among the Balkan nations under Turkish rule, and encouraged the Slavs to rise up against the Turks' (Čubelić, 1957a: 85); however 'this was done not in the interests of the Balkan nations but in its own interests' (*ibid.*). Just like Western countries, Russia was only following 'its own imperialist aspirations' (*ibid.*: 49). Nothing had changed in twentieth-century Soviet Union: the events of 1949 are described as yet another 'attempt by the government of the Soviet Union to subjugate our country to its own interests' (Čubelić, 1957b: 106). The lonely and righteous South Slavs, as they are depicted, have only one option. History finally taught us that 'the only way to suppress the national hatreds among the Balkan nations and prevent further interference of the great powers in the events of the Balkan' was to create the Balkan federation - Yugoslavia (Čubelić, 1957a: 92). The 1990s history textbooks describe that creation - Yugoslavia - as the most vicious enemy of the Croatian nation.

In the 1950s textbooks the Serbs are portrayed as those who 'were the first in the Balkans who rose up to fight for their freedom' (Salzer, 1953: 144); who fought for their freedom with 'great determination and courage' (Mali & Salzer, 1954: 168); who, in time, created an 'internally strong state, which became an important political power on the Balkan peninsula' (*ibid.*: 117); who, in the First World War, 'fought the aggressor heroically' (Čubelić, 1957b: 7); who were

celebrated by the other South Slavs for their 'heroic struggle and (who) demonstrated how people should fight their aggressors' (*ibid.*) - but the authors of the 1943 and 1990s textbooks have a different opinion.

Throughout the 1990s textbooks, the authors portray the Serbs as the eternal enemies of the Croats. The events from the 1990s are explained as the consequence of the Serbs' centuries-long hatred of 'everything Croatian'. From the first mention of the Serbs, the authors emphasise the depths of that hatred. Evidence of this is found by the authors in the events of 1444, when a 'Christian Army', supported by Pope Pius II, was waging a war against the Turks in which it was defeated. 'That defeat' the authors claim, 'was the outcome of the deceitful Byzantine politics of the Serbian despot (Đurađ Branković) and many others among the Orthodox, who "preferred to see in Constantinople a Turkish turban to a Roman hat". Hatred of everything Latin (Catholic) had already overwhelmed Orthodoxy in the fifteenth century, even when [the Catholics] were defending them from the Turks' (Miroševič & Šanjek, 1995: 124). It appears that the Serbian hatred of the Croats originated in their hatred of Catholicism.

The authors dedicate significant space to an account of the origins of the Serbs on Croatian territory. All sets of textbooks - those published in the 1940s, 1950s and 1990s - agree that the Serbs from Krajina are Serbianised Orthodox Vlachs. These Vlachs migrated to the area of Krajina in the sixteenth century. At first, the Vlachs were in the service of the Turks. Their 'sudden and vicious attacks on the territories which had belonged to the Croats for centuries left these areas as wasteland' (*ibid.*: 185). They 'burned Croatian villages, purged, pillaged and killed' (*ibid.*). According to the authors of the 1990s textbooks, after the Turkish defeat under the city of Sisak in 1593, the Vlachs 'wanted to change their masters' (*ibid.*). They took the side of the Austrians and migrated to Croatian territory. However, the area of Military Krajina where the Vlachs settled was under the direct control of Vienna, so 'from the beginning the Vlachs in Croatia had a special political role: in the service of the Austrian generals they were supposed to destroy Croatian rule on Croatian territory' (*ibid.*). Hence, the events of the sixteenth century and earlier are used as justification for the events that

would occur a few centuries later. The Vlachs, described as 'unwanted guests' and 'newcomers' (*ibid.*: 273), soon became known as the Serbs of Croatia.

In the 1860s, the issue of recognition of the Serbs in Croatia as a separate nation produced the first open hostilities on the political scene between that group and the Croats. In the 1990s texts, the rejection of the Serb demand is justified in terms of the events of the 1990s: 'recognition of the Serbian people in Croatia [in the 1860s] would have meant recognition of another sovereign people on the territory of Croatia, and that would have supported the Great Serbia ideology which regarded certain Croatian territories as Serbian, and it would also have meant a weakening of the Croatian state-right in the constitutional struggle of the time' (Miročević & Macan, 1995: 173). Once again, the blame for the period of hostility between the Croats and the Croatian Serbs is placed on the Orthodox priesthood: 'Their priesthood cherished the memory of the Medieval Serbian state and hence religion was used to enhance national consciousness. When they did not accept Illyrianism, the Serbs in South Croatia established a base for their own separate national development, for their own national awareness and for connections with their homeland outside Croatia' (*ibid.*: 182). Thus the priests were responsible for transforming the Vlachs into nationally conscious Serbs. The Orthodox priesthood of Bosnia and Herzegovina is accused of the same sin (*ibid.*: 151).

The foreign policy of the Serbian state is equally to blame. This policy is described as expansionistic, aggressive, and Serbocentric; as an expression of Greater Serbian politics: 'Serbia wanted to expand into other people's territories' (*ibid.*: 151); the state was preoccupied with 'the Serbocentric plan of gathering all Serbs within a single Greater Serbian state' (*ibid.*). This policy was clearly manifest, the authors claim, in Serbian interference in the internal affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which resulted in the 1875 uprising, in the 1885 war against Bulgaria, in the Balkan wars, and, above all, in Yugoslavia. The Serbs are accused of 'dishonestly glorifying and mythologising their history, especially in relation to the period of Dušan's empire. They claimed that Dušan's Serbia extended to Bosnia and Croatia, and even to the Czech Republic, when it is well known that it did not cross the River Drina. They described Bosnia and

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Macedonia as the Serbian lands' (*ibid.*: 153). The kind of conquerors the Serbs were is illustrated by the authors with the example of the Albanians: 'On the territories conquered in 1877/78 they started to persecute the Albanians and carried out genocide against them. They burned Albanian houses till the people abandoned the territories in which they were living' (*ibid.*). And history has taught us that Serbian expansionist politics in the Balkans 'has continued to be a most deadly danger until recent days' (*ibid.*).

Thus the authors present the Serbs and the Serbian state in such a way that the events at the end of the twentieth century, and, more specifically, in Yugoslavia, become explicable. With the creation of Yugoslavia in 1918, the Croats would experience this aggressive Serbian nationalist ideology first-hand. From the beginning, the Serbs displayed their 'political primitivism' (Perić, 1994: 57). They brought 'terror to the Slovenian and Croatian populations', 'they burnt Slovenian and Croatian institutions' (*ibid.*: 59). Gendarmes beat Croatian peasants (*ibid.*: 58); 'humiliated peasants' were told that the 'Serb is their only "master and God", and were made to kneel in front of *šajkača* [156] (*ibid.*: 58). The atrocities committed by the Serbs in the first years of Yugoslavia were numerous. It all culminated in the 1928 murder of Stjepan Radić.

The Second World War provides the late twentieth-century authors with more material to support their claim of an eternal Serbian hatred 'of everything Croatian'. The collapse of Yugoslavia in April 1941 after seven days' resistance allows the authors to ridicule the myth of Serbian military superiority: 'the Serbian people, who were always boasting about their military skills and their patriotism, showed neither their military courage nor "loyalty to the fatherland"; they avoided direct confrontations and deserted their military units; they did not refrain from cowardliness or treachery' (*ibid.*: 132). The authors spare a few pages to describe the Chetniks' crimes against the Croats: 'They showed themselves to be robbers, arsonists and butchers of an innocent population' (*ibid.*: 160); 'they expressed their commitment to crime through the song they enjoyed singing: "We Chetniks can do it, what is not good we'll kill it!" (*ibid.*);

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[156] Serbian national hat.

they also 'burn schools and Catholic churches' (*ibid.*: 161). The author gives similar space to a description of the 'partisan-Serbs' (*ibid.*: 164) killing 'several tens of thousand of people' in Blaiburg and Španovica (*ibid.*). On the other hand, it is interesting to note, the authors describe the Ustashas' atrocities in two paragraphs, that is, in four sentences (*ibid.*: 136).

The Ustasha textbook, on the other hand, does not bother to mention Serbian history. The first mention of Serbia is only in the second half of the first volume and even then only as a route of the Tatars' retreat (Jakić, 1943a: 69). The 1943 textbooks are more preoccupied with the history of the Croatian Serbs. These textbooks, just as the 1990s textbooks, offer a similar story of the Vlachs' migrations in Croatia and adoption of the Serbian name. The Serbs gain some importance only with the discussion of the events in Croatia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. While the textbooks could not fail to mention the relevance of the Illyrian Movement for the 'national awakening' of the Croats, the author emphasises the mistakes and misconceptions of Ljudevit Gaj and Josip Juraj Strossmayer - for example, their assertion that the South Slavs are one nation (Jakić, 1943b: 88). Jakić stresses the naivete of the two national leaders who wanted to create a common state with the Serbs, while Serbia was simultaneously developing its own concept of the 'Great Serbia' (*ibid.*: 100). The author explains how Croatian Serbs were always taking the side of the Hungarian and Austrian rulers, against Croatian interests (*ibid.*: 109), that history proved that every co-operation with the Serbs was harmful for the Croatian interests, such as the formation of Croatian-Serbian coalition at the end of the nineteenth century (*ibid.*: 112). Everything culminated with the formation of the Yugoslav Kingdom when 'the Croats were exposed to Serbian mercy' (*ibid.*: 119). In that state the Serbs 'had all power in their hands' (*ibid.*) and the Orthodox Church had 'more rights than the Catholic and Muslim had' (*ibid.*: 120). The period between the world wars are described as 'years of terrible persecutions' when 'the Croatian patriots were imprisoned, tortured and brought in front of the firing squad' (*ibid.*: 121). Jakić describes the establishment of Alexander's dictatorship in 1929 as the beginning of a 'Croatian Golgota' (*ibid.*). 'The dictatorship', the author concludes, 'marks the final break between the Croats and the Serbs' (*ibid.*). After

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these explanations, what was perpetrated during Ustasha rule could only be understood as revenge.

While the Serbs were portrayed in the 1943 textbooks as national enemies, the Jews were a kind of class enemy. The author frequently repeats that the majority of the world capitalists were Jews (*ibid.*: 91). He claims that the same happened in Croatia and Bosnia where the main profiteers of the economic development in the nineteenth century were 'foreigners, mainly Jews' (*ibid.*: 109). The 'Jewish crime' was illustrated through a description of the world economy in the inter-war period. Jakić (*ibid.*: 118) writes: 'Capitalism in the "winning" states had developed as never before by dragging the broad masses, especially workers and peasants, into worse poverty. Almost all capital, that is, money, was gathered in Jewish hands'. Even though the textbook does not express any racist view towards the Jews, it should be mentioned that only 12 per cent of the pre-1941 Jewish population in the territories controlled by the Ustashas - Croatia and Bosnia - survived the war.

7.8. Conclusion

At first glance, one might imagine that a history textbook is a collection of facts about events and battles, maps, and the dates of birth and death of important historical figures. It may be a book that one has had to learn by heart in childhood, and not considered interesting bed-time reading. Another characteristic of this kind of book is that the facts it contains are taken for granted and rarely, if ever, questioned by its readers. I have to admit that I found reading Croatian history textbooks much more interesting than I had expected. In these three sets of textbooks, the history of the nation is an ideologically coloured, interesting mix of historical facts, myths and legends. History written in this manner turns into an account of national values, interests and aspirations. These textbooks tell us more about the ideologies underlying them and the political circumstances of the time in which they were written, than about the history of Croatia and other nations.

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To conclude this analysis of the 1940s, 1950s and 1990s Croatian history texts, their major characteristics can be briefly summarised. The major feature of the 1990s books is their strong emphasis upon the victimisation of the Croatian nation. They show how the Croats were victims of numerous, aggressive, morally suspect nations, religions and states. Readers of such a story must sympathise with the Croatian side. It proves that the Croats, who had suffered throughout history, can find salvation only in their own independent national state. The authors of the 1950s textbooks apply the same methods to another subject. It is not only the Croatian nation, but all South Slav nations which have suffered and sacrificed themselves for higher causes throughout their history. However, while the 1990s textbooks give primacy to the nation, the 1950s books emphasise the sufferings of the masses oppressed both by other imperialist nations and the privileged classes of their own nations. These oppressed masses can finally be free and happy only within a socialist state, in which class oppression is bound to have been eliminated. This reasoning has another consequence. While the authors of the 1940s and 1990s textbooks blame entire nations for the atrocities committed against the Croats, the 1950s books take the line of Communist ideology. The aggressors, oppressors and murderers are never nations or peoples, but the leaders, governments, ideologists and other 'reactionary elements' of nations and states.

It would be impossible to demonstrate that the textbooks written in 1943 influenced the authors of the 1990s textbooks. However, many similarities can be observed. The suffering and heroic Croatian nation is the main actor of history in both sets of books. They emphasise similar myths and legends of the Croatian origins. The nation is defined in similar ways, but the 1990s textbooks are even more exclusive in defining the Croatian nation mainly because the idea of Croatisation of the Bosnian Muslims was 'unacceptable' after the 1993-95 Croatian-Bosnian war. Surprisingly, the 1943 textbooks do not reflect entirely the Ustashas' nationalist ideology. Even though the author's attempt to present the Croats as an Aryan race is almost comical, the textbooks do not show any wish to elaborate the racist part of the Ustasha ideology. Nevertheless, it could be said that the major characteristics of the history textbooks are, at the same time, major characteristics of the respective nationalist ideologies.

The analysed texts were written just a few years after the creation of new states - the Independent State of Croatia in 1941, socialist Yugoslavia in 1945 and the independent Republic of Croatia in 1992. It could be said that such 'young' states require ideological support to provide stability and to legitimise their existence. However, it is clear that the ideologically-driven school curricula, which lasted for almost fifty years, could not prevent the collapse of Yugoslavia and of the concept of Yugoslavism that had such a strong presence in the 1950s history textbooks. One might argue that any concept of supra-nationalism has little chance when contested by the nationalism of a particular nation. The events surrounding the collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s offer some support for that viewpoint. However, the Croatian nationalism of the early 1990s was not bolstered by the social structure. The schools' curricula, legislation, and the media were still firmly in the hands of the Communist Party. Hence, if a school curriculum is seen to shape the national identity of the pupils by propagating a particular nationalist ideology, one would have cause to question the stability of that national identity. It is difficult to imagine that the national identity of the Croats will change with a new history textbook. I am inclined to believe that the ideologically coloured textbooks can tell us something about the political circumstances in which they were written, rather then about the political attitudes of their readers.

All three sets of history textbooks were approved by their Ministries of Education, something that is clearly stated on their cover pages. From that fact we can only guess the extent to which the official state structures influenced the content of the textbooks. The above analysis, however, showed that the dominant Croatian nationalist ideologies have been clearly reflected in the school curriculum since the nineteenth century. Besides their educational function, these textbooks could also be seen as attempts to institutionalise these nationalist ideologies. As such they present an historical and 'scientific' justification of the ideology itself, an explanation of the origins of such an ideology and the political programmes of the creators of these ideologies.

The ideologisation of the school curriculum signifies that the proponents of a nationalist ideology succeeded in transforming both the structural level of the society (exemplified by establishing full control over the education system), and the cultural level (exemplified by the formation of 'official' history). The achievement of a situation of 'necessary complementarity' between the levels of structure and culture, according to Archer's framework, marks the last stage of social morphogenesis - the elaboration of structure and culture. Hence, the institutionalisation of a nationalist ideology by means of the creation of 'official' national history offered in school textbooks is one of the marks of the end, rather than the beginning, of a morphogenetic cycle of nation-formation. The new nationalist corporate agents formed a stable political structure that supported their ideas and ideology - like, for example, the Ustashas in the period 1941-43, or the Communists in 1945-50. The political structure of a society is transformed in such a way that it is able to strongly influence the form and the content of the educational system. Such an educational system aims at legitimising the existing social structure and dominant culture. The newly-established forms of social structure and culture condition further social interaction within society, and hence open a space for the beginning of a new morphogenetic cycle. Once firmly established at all levels of the social reality, the new corporate agency, in order to maintain its position, would have to either prevent the formation of a conflicting corporate agency or incorporate in its system new tendencies. While the Ustasha regime collapsed after only four years, unable to compete with the oppositional Partisan Movement, the Communist regime lasted for almost fifty years by either eliminating the opposition, or restructuring its structural and cultural systems to accommodate new social groups and ideas.

The last remaining questions that this thesis has to tackle is 'how can an educational system gain support from the primary agents?', that is, to paraphrase Eugene Weber, 'how can it transform the peasants into good nationalists?'. In the next chapter I will deal with this question and examine to what extent these institutionalised nationalist ideologies are actually accepted by the primary agents.

Chapter Eight

PRIMARY AGENTS: ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE NATION

After examining the ways the nation has been perceived at the structural and cultural levels by the corporate agents in Croatia throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and how these perceptions were reflected by cultural and structural elaboration in Croatian society, this chapter will focus on primary agents.[157] Hence, the main aim of this chapter is to investigate to what extent and in what form primary agents actually respond to corporate agents' attempts to mobilise them around proclaimed nationalist ideologies.

An analysis of the perceptions of the nation should include an analysis of the ways in which the nation is defined in general, and the Croatian nation in particular, and a description of significant 'others'. While a content analysis of the corporate agents' writings could signify the ways they perceive the nation at the cultural level, and while a content analysis of history textbooks could reveal the ways the nation has been perceived at the structural level throughout the given period of analysis, there is no data which could allow such a longitudinal analysis of the primary agents. From the available data, like censuses or elections results, it is not possible to reconstruct primary agents' *attitudes* throughout the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, that is, the ways they were understanding the concept of the nation, the nationalist ideology they were supporting, or their attitudes towards other nations. For these reasons, this research will concentrate on events in the 1990s, and the question of how primary agents reacted to the structural circumstances of that period and to attempts of their mobilisation on the part of the dominant corporate agents - the proponents of Tuđman's nationalist ideology.

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[157] Archer (2000: 265) defines Primary Agents as social collectivities that lack both organisation and articulation of their interests. As such, Primary Agents are unable to exercise their power in structural and cultural modelling. For more about the characteristics of primary agents, see Chapter Two.

As already outlined in the theoretical framework, primary agents play a crucial role in the process of nation-/re/formation. Only when corporate agents successfully mobilise primary agents around their nationalist ideology does a process of social interaction end and a process of structural, cultural and agential elaboration of the nation begin.

In the theoretical framework, I emphasised the fact that success in mobilising primary agents depends on several factors:

- the proclaimed nationalist ideology has to define 'national boundaries', that is, the ideology has to offer a clear set of ideas which define 'what is the nation', and 'who are the members of that nation', and where the primary agents could recognise themselves as the members of such a community;

- the nationalist ideology has to offer a vision of the 'future of the nation', that is, to clearly define 'nationalist interests', which primary agents are able to identify as their own personal interests; and, finally,

- the nationalist ideology has to offer a clear direction of action as a set of solutions, also perceived by the primary agents as solutions to their own problems, which would lead towards that proclaimed 'national future'; this is usually presented in relation to other nations, defined in a positive or negative manner.

At the most general level, the success of political and social mobilisation of primary agents around a nationalist ideology, by specific corporate agents, could be simply hypothesized through an *ex post facto* analysis, where the success of this mobilisation would be judged only by its ultimate consequences. Yet, such an analysis cannot offer any insights into the same process of mobilisation at the level of primary agents. Such an analysis is not able to answer to what extent the primary agents support the nationalist ideology, or which segment of nationalist ideology was decisive for their support. Only an analysis of primary agents' attitudes can offer some picture of the 'mechanisms' of social interaction between corporate and primary agents.

However, it should be kept in mind that the primary agents are not just recipients of ideology, a kind of *tabula rasa* ready to be moulded by a greater force. These primary agents are not only conditioned by a dominant political structure, but they are also a group of individuals conditioned by the long history of their own local culture. As such, they present a 'force' by itself which, in the end, conditions the formation and actions of the corporate agents, and, ultimately, the outcome of the social elaboration. Hence, in order to investigate primary agents' perceptions of the nation, it is not enough to analyse the level of their acceptance of the dominant nationalist ideology of their time. A thorough analysis has to identify all of the possible ways the primary agents could perceive the concept of the nation in general, and the Croatian nation in particular, and their attitudes towards all 'significant others'.

With this aim in mind, in the period of November 1999 to March 2000, I carried out a survey of primary agents' attitudes towards the nation on a sample of the Zagreb population. Before discussing the structure of this sample and analysing the data, a more detailed account of the construction of the survey's instruments and constructed sample will be given.

8.1. Methodology

In accordance with the aims of this part of the research, stated above, the survey was divided into four major parts.

The first part of the survey tries to establish the ways in which primary agents perceive the general concept of the nation, which ultimately offers a set of criteria for determining who are the members of that nation. With this aim in mind the concept of the nation is divided into two separate instruments: first, *constituent elements of the nation*, and, second, *origins of the nation*. Hence, by surveying the existing theories of nations and nationalism, a general schema of an operational definition of the nation has been created (see Figure 8). Each element was transformed into a statement which was offered to the respondents for their evaluation. The *Constituent elements* instrument consists of 22

statements that define the nation at the level of structure, culture, agency and its emergent properties. In addition, it has been assumed that the respondents could express different attitudes towards the origins of the nation. The *Origins of the nation* instrument, hence, offers four statements which define the nation as a modern, primordial, perennial and socially constructed phenomena.

The second part of the survey is constructed with the aim of investigating the extent of acceptance of the main Croatian nationalist ideologies, examined in previous chapters. Such an analysis has to investigate whether the primary agents support the specific political and social agenda of a nationalist ideology, as well as the level of acceptance of the national symbols. For that aim, two instruments have been constructed. The first, the *National interests* instrument, offers respondents a set of 25 statements for their evaluation. Each statement is a direct quotation taken from writings or speeches of those nationalist ideologists analysed in Chapters 4-6. The second instrument deals with the acceptance of certain national symbols and myths. Taking into account the methodological limitations of a survey and the complexity of the issue, the instrument focuses on the respondents' perceptions of *National heroes*. Hence, a list of twenty individuals, who have played an important role at some stage of Croatian history, has been selected. The respondents were asked to evaluate whether these individuals played a negative or positive role in the formation of the Croatian nation.[158]

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[158] To each statement offered in these two parts of the survey a Lickert scale of measurement has been attached (1=absolutely disagree; 2=disagee; 3=do not know, not sure; 4=agree; 5=absolutely agree).

Figure 8: Operational Definition of the Nation

The third part of the survey is concerned with the respondents' perceptions of other nations. With this purpose an instrument for 'measuring' ethnic distance has been created. The distance is measured using a modified Bogardus social distance scale.[159] The scale represented a continuum: from ethnic distance (1-5), ethnic ostracism (6-7) to ethnic aggressiveness (8-9), that is, from 'close relationship including marriage' to 'I would personally exterminate them all'. The respondents are asked to express the degree of their closeness/distance towards thirteen nationalities.

The fourth and final part of the questionnaire covers respondents' basic socio-demographic data.

Since the Lickert and Bogardus scale allows us to treat each statement in the survey as an interval variable, the data will be analysed using both univariate and multivariate methods. First, the descriptive statistics will be offered of each variable (frequencies, percentages and means). Second, each set of statements (Perception of the nation, Croatian nationalist ideologies, National heroes, and Ethnic distance) will be factorized separately.[160] Third, for each set of extracted factors, analyses of variance with demographic variables will be conveyed in order to distinguish whether certain categories of the sample significantly differ in their preferences of given concepts.

Finally, since the main aim of this survey is to investigate to what extent and in what form primary agents accept or reject the dominant nationalist ideology, regression analyses will be applied in order to establish possible relations between different segments of the research.

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[159] For more about the modified Borgardus scale, see Malešević and Uzelac (1997: 292).
[160] Each factor analysis will be carried out with the same method: the factors will be extracted with the Principle Component method, and rotated with the Promax method with Kaiser normalization. All relevant statistics will be given in tables and footnotes.

8. 2. Sample

The choice of sample for this research has been mainly restricted by available data and material resources. The first restriction came from the fact that the last census in Croatia was conducted in 1991, that is, before the war, which accounted for a significant fluctuation of the Croatian population. Bearing in mind the 'nature' of that war in Croatia, it could justifiably be assumed that data about the structure of the Croatian population gathered by the 1991 census does not correspond to the structure of the Croatian population in late 1999-early 2000. That is especially true for the national and religious composition of the population. Hence, it could be said that the sample chosen in this survey is random and representative according to age and gender. The second restriction dictated a smaller and geographically narrower sample. Hence, the survey was conducted on 307 respondents, who resided in the Zagreb area. A more detailed structural composition of the sample is shown in the tables below.

Table 1: Gender	
Males	44.3 %
Females	55.7 %

Table 2: Age	
20-34	26.3 %
35-49	29.7 %
50-65	27.1 %
65 and more	16.9 %

Table 3. - Nationality	
Croats	91.2 %
Serbs	8.1 %
Others	0.7 %

Table 4: Religion	
Catholic	83.4 %
Orthodox	4.9 %
Other	11.7 %

Table 5: Level of Education	
Primary school	3.3 %
Craft school	3.3 %
High school	51.8 %
University	41.6 %

Table 6: Support of political Party	
HDZ	2.3 %
SDP	16.6 %
HSLS	3.9 %
HSS	0 %
HNS	0 %
HSP	0.3 %
DS	0.7 %
NONE	76.2 %

Table 7: Level of religious convictions (mean=3.90)	
Against religion	0.7 %
Not religious	7.2 %
Indifferent towards religion	15.9 %
No different than other religious people	55.7 %
Very religious	20.5 %

Table 8: Material status (mean=2.92)	
Worse than majority of others	5.9 %
A little worse than others	13.4 %
Not better nor worste that majority of others	63.8 %
A little better than others	16.6 %
Significantly better than majority of others	0.3 %

Table 9: Period of living in Zagreb	
Not more than 5 years	0.3 %
5-10 years	2.0 %
10-20 years	14.3 %
More than 20 years	83.4 %

Table 10: Size of the place where grown up		
1	Village	4.6 %
2	Small town	5.5 %
3	Small city	9.1 %
4	City	15.6 %
5	Bigger city	7.2 %
6	Zagreb	58.0%

It is necessary to stress that the stated restrictions in sampling prevent me from drawing any conclusions about the possible attitudes of the whole Croatian population. Nevertheless, this example of the sample of the Zagreb population will allow me to examine the mechanisms of social interaction between corporate and primary agents. Such conclusions could serve as a basis for theorising about the success of nationalist ideologies in the mobilisation of primary agents in general.

8. 3. Interpretation of the results

In this section, the results of the applied analyses will be given, as well as their interpretation and explanation. For stylistic reasons all relevant methodological data will be explained in footnotes, except those necessary for understanding the results.

Firstly, each instrument will be analysed separately and the results from an application of different univariate and multivariate methods will be provided. After that, the relations between those instruments will be examined. Finally, at the end of this section, the expected and actual results will be compared and discussed with reference to the theoretical framework.

8.3.1. Origins of the Nation

Taking into account the purpose and the principle of the creation of this instrument, at this stage only some univariate methods were applied for its analysis. In this instrument four statements which were supposed to present four different concepts of the origins of the nation (modernist, perennialist, primordialist and constructionist[161]) were offered to respondents for their evaluation. None of these statements were direct quotations or stated in any theory of nations and nationalism. Rather, each statement was an attempt to summarize the major idea of each concept in such a way that the essence of a particular approach was conveyed in simple, clear terms that could be easily comprehended by the respondents.

According to the stated means and percentages of agreement or disagreement with the statements (see Table 11), it can be said that the respondents mostly agreed with the 'perennial' approach, represented by the first statement. Of all respondents, 42.6 per cent expressed their agreement with the idea that the nation originates in ethnic groups characterized by a distinctive name, tradition, history,

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[161] For more details about each concept, see Smith (1999).

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culture and homeland. It should be emphasised that a slight dominance of this concept of the origins of the nation does not signify anything about the theories which represent such an attitude, neither is it within the scope of this research. Rather, it expresses the respondents' conviction that their nation is a stable entity rooted in the distant past by a distinctive myth-symbol complex. Therefore, it is not surprising that the second most represented concept supports a primordial attitude. The idea that the nation has existed since the birth of human society is supported by almost half of the respondents.

Table 11: Origins of the Nation						
Statement	1*	2	3	4	5	mean
In modern times, the nation has developed from ethnic groups which have their own name, tradition, common history, culture and ancient homeland	12.7	19.2	25.4	33.2	9.4	3.07
The nation has existed since human society existed	15.6	22.8	15.0	36.2	10.4	3.03
The nation has been created by influential people who have standardized its language and wrote its history	9.4	33.2	22.1	26.1	9.1	2.92
The nation as a phenomenon emerged in the nineteenth century with the development of industrialised society	22.8	27.4	25.7	17.6	6.5	2.58

*1 - absolutely disagree; 2 - disagree; 3 - do not know; 4 - agree; 5 - absolutely agree

The last two statements show that even though the respondents do not entirely reject the importance of individual efforts in the process of nation-formation, more than 50 per cent of them do not support the idea that the nation emerged 'only' in modern times with the development of industrialised society. It appears that these two ideas of the origin of the nation (constructionist and modernist) stand out from the standard opinion about the ancient origins of the nation, which are in many cases supported by nationalistic doctrines (see Chapters 4-6).

Further application of an analysis of variance aimed to investigate whether certain categories of the sample are more inclined to support stated concepts of the origins of the nation. Interestingly, while none of the sample's categories significantly differ in perceiving so-called perennial and modernist perspectives, the other two statements tend to 'polarize' the respondents. Hence, an analysis of

variance[162] showed that while males are more inclined to reject, women were more inclined to accept[163] the 'primordial' statement according to which the nation has existed since the dawn of human society. The same statement tends to be accepted more by those of lower material status then those of middle material status;[164] and rejected more by those who considered themselves as 'indifferent towards religion'.[165] The same method revealed that Serbs, more then Croats, are inclined to accept the idea that the nation has been created by influential people who have standardized its language and written its history.[166]

8.3.2. Constituent Elements of the Nation

The results of the first instrument give us an insight into how the respondents perceive the origins of the nation. However, it is still unknown what the respondents think the nation is as a specific phenomenon. With the aim of examining the manner in which the respondents define the nation, and consequently, how they define the criteria for membership of the nation, the respondents were asked to evaluate which constituent elements of the nation are crucial for its existence. In order to examine whether the respondents express a consistent set of attitudes regarding the issue, a factor analysis of the 22 offered statements[167] was conducted. The analysis extracted five significant concepts.[168] The structure of each concept will be given in a table below, and its content will be explained.

The first extracted factor (Table 12) consists of five highly saturated statements.

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[162] Each statement has been analysed by the Oneway ANOVA method where a set of independent variables consisted of all demographic variables (see Tables 1- 10). The mean difference was significant at the 0.05 level. Where applicable, a Post Hoc method was applied.

[163] The mean difference was significant at the 0.002 level, F=10.17.

[164] The difference between those of lower material status and those of middle material status was significant at the 0.004 level, F=4.61.

[165] ANOVA was significant at the .001 level. The difference between means of 'not religious' (mean=3.36) and 'indifferent' (mean=2.37) was significant at the .002 level, and between 'indifferent' and 'not different that other religious people' (mean=3.16) at the .000 level.

[166] The difference between the means was significant at the .006 level, F=5.27 (mean of the Serbs' = 3.56 and mean of the Croats = 2.86).

[167] For the list of statements and their level of acceptance, see Appendix, Table 42.

Table 12: Nation 1 - Concept of Nation-State		
Statement	r[169]	mean
Every nation has to have its own state	.733	3.28
The nation has to have specifically defined borders	.677	3.03
The nation has to have its own specific territory	.636	3.18
The nation must be sovereign	.501	3.69
The nation has to have one common economic system	.487	3.26
$R^2 = 20.6$ per cent Lambda = 3.71		

The respondents who are more attached to this factor hold that the nation cannot be formed without establishing its own sovereign state. It has to have strictly defined borders, and its own territory and economic system. In this case the concept of the nation is equated with the **concept of nation-state**. Since the nation is defined in pure political terms, these respondents do not attach themselves to any specific national cultural markers or sense of distinctiveness. It is not surprising that this concept appeared as significant, especially among a predominantly Croatian sample. However, while this concept corresponds with a myth of a '900 years long dream of a Croatian state', a concept intensively supported by many Croatian nationalist ideologies, it raises the question of whether a nation exists before the establishment of a sovereign national state.

The analysis of variance showed that while this concept is significantly[170] more supported by those who consider themselves Catholics, those of 'other' religions tend to reject it. Moreover, the proponents of this concept are those who consider themselves as 'very religious', while those who consider themselves as 'no different than other religious people', those 'indifferent towards religion', 'not religious' or 'against religion' tend to reject it.[171] The same method revealed that those of lowest material status and born in small towns tend to accept this concept significantly more than other groups.[172] Taking into account these results and the lack of cultural 'markers' as significant for this concept of the nation, it could suggest that those respondents more attached to this concept would

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[168] These five concepts explained 51.63 per cent of total variance.
[169] The main criterion in the interpretation of each factor was the existence of at least three variables with a saturation (r = correlation between a factor and a variable) of more than .30. In the tables presented, the saturation of each variable will be presented as well as their mean on the scale from 1-5. The table presents only five of the most correlated variables.
[170] ANOVA was significant at the .027 level, F=3.655.
[171] Oneway ANOVA between Factor 2 and Level of Religiousness was significant at the .009 level, F=3.44.

probably be more inclined to equate citizenship with national affiliation. In short, the boundaries of the state are the boundaries of the nation.

The second extracted concept (Table 13) could be provisionally named an **egalitarian concept of the nation**. According to the content of the five most highly correlated statements, it is a complex concept which combines structural and cultural levels with the nation's emergent powers.

Table 13: Nation 2 - Egalitarian Concept of the Nation		
Statement	r	mean
The members of the same nation must share a sense of equality	.782	3.81
The members of the same nation must have the same rights and duties	.733	3.94
The nation must be sovereign	.644	3.69
The nation has to have one common economic system	.487	3.26
The members of the same nation have to have a sense of distinctiveness	.411	2.76
R^2 = 9.76 per cent Lambda = 1.72		

This concept is built around the idea that the nation 'makes' its members equal individuals who have the same rights and duties. It implies a notion of the nation as a community sovereign in its own state. Even though these respondents admit that the nation has to have a sense of distinctiveness, it is not related to any particular cultural markers. Taking all of these characteristics into account, it could be said that this concept resembles liberal civic concepts of the nation. Yet, against the Western European liberal tradition, the respondents of different levels of religiousness significantly differ in their attitudes towards such a concept. Since the concept emphasises the notion of community it could be anticipated that those 'very religious' respondents of lowest material status tend to accept it, and those 'indifferent towards religion' of average material status tend to reject this concept of the nation[173]

The five most saturated statements on the third factor (Table 14) all deal with the properties of the members of the nation. They compose a 'subjective' definition

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[172] These analyses of variance were significant at the levels of .000 (F=8.769) and .002 (F=4.016) respectively.

[173] Both Oneway analyses of variance were significant at the .000 level ('Level of Religiousness' F=5.662, and 'Material Status' F=14.91).

of the nation which could be provisionally named the **concept of the nation as a belief system.**

Table 14: Nation 3 - Concept of the Nation as a Belief System		
Statement	r	mean
The members of the same nation have to be of the same religion	.595	2.36
The members of the same nation have to have the same ancestors	.573	2.71
The members of the same nation have to be characterized by the same national character	.570	2.65
The members of the same nation have to share the same value system	.525	2.68
The members of the same nation have to have a sense of distinctiveness	.484	2.76
$R^2 = 8.13$ per cent $\quad\quad$ Lambda = 1.46		

What composes this concept is a belief that the members of the same nation are descendants of the same ancestors, that they share the same national character and value system, and that they possess a clear sense of distinctiveness. The only 'objective' constitutive element significant for this concept is shared religion, which, after all, is a belief system of its own. According to the results of analyses of variance, this concept tends to be rejected by those of lower material status[174] and those with higher education.[175]

Table 15 shows the structure of the fourth extracted factor. This concept sees the nation as a community not created by some historical chance or momentary set of circumstances. Throughout the nation's long history, which ultimately justifies its existence, the members of the nation have shared a sense of distinctiveness and a value system, which formed them into a community with a common will. Directed by good leadership, the nation becomes a social force with the sole purpose to guard and promote that will. Such a concept could be named a **concept of the nation-by-design.** Analyses of variance reveal that this concept is mainly accepted by Catholics born in city centres, and of the lowest material status.[176]

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[174] ANOVA was significant at the .027 level, F=3.105.

[175] ANOVA was significant at the .037 level, F=3.182.

[176] These three analyses of variance were significant at the .000 (F=9.838), .006 (F=3.355) and .000 (F=7.617) levels respectively.

Table 15: Nation 4 - Concept of the Nation-By-Design		
Statement	r	mean
The nation has to have a long history	.734	2.69
The nation has to have a common will	.636	2.87
The nation has to have good leadership	.540	4.06
The members of the same nation have to have a sense of distinctiveness	.531	2.76
The members of the same nation have to share the same value system	.373	2.68
R² = 7.16 per cent Lambda = 1.29		

The respondents attached to the last extracted factor (Table 16) do not think that an 'external' representation of the nation plays any crucial role in national formation. It is not important whether the nation is represented by a distinctive set of myths and symbols. The nation in this concept is **homogenous community** whose members live in the same territory, attend the same education system, and are of the same national character, and linked by the same destiny. Such a concept sees the nation as a unifying and harmonious community where any divergence is perceived as jeopardizing the essence of the nation. It is therefore no wonder that an analysis of variance[177] shows that Croatian Serbs tend to reject this concept.

Table 16: Nation 5 - Concept of the Nation as a Homogenous Community		
Statement	r	mean
The members of the same nation are linked by a common destiny	.722	2.18
The members of the same nation have to attend the same education system	.717	2.32
The nation has to have its own specific myths and symbols	-.517	3.35
The members of the same nation have to be characterized by the same national character	.426	2.65
The nation has to have its own specific territory	.441	3.26
R² = 6.19 per cent Lambda = 1.12		

As explained earlier, the basic solutions of extracted factors were transformed by applying the Promax oblique rotation. This method allows us to examine possible relations between the extracted factors. From the data given in the Factor Correlation Matrix (Table 17) it should be noticed that all factors are positively correlated, that is, the proponents of one factor do not entirely reject the importance of the other factors. Taking into account the idea behind the construction of the instrument, this result is not unexpected. While the

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[177] ANOVA was significant at the .007 level, F=4.231.

respondents held that any constitutive elements can play a role in the process of the formation of the nation, they perceive differently the crucial segments of the nation.

Table 17: Nation - Factor Correlation Matrix					
	Nation 1	Nation 2	Nation 3	Nation 4	Nation 5
Nation 1	1.00	.384	.130	.295	.262
Nation 2		1.00	.237	.294	.276
Nation 3			1.00	.197	.309
Nation 4				1.00	.193
Nation 5					1.00

It is interesting to note that the egalitarian concept of the nation (Nation 2) has a higher correlation with the concept of the nation-state (Nation 1, r=.384), which could signify respondents' equation between the sate and the nation. The concept of the nation as a belief system (Nation 3) is highly correlated with the concept of the nation as a homogenous community (Nation 5, r=.309). Obviously the respondents more attached to these concepts emphasise a subjective definition of the nation by considering certain properties of membership to be a base for the existence of the nation. To paraphrase Benedict Anderson, the nation in these cases is an imagined community.

The factor analysis as a multivariate method is not designed to show to what extent these factors are represented by the respondents. Therefore, an artificial prediction can be made based on the average means of significant variables, and then only in comparison with other factors.

Chart 1:

Representativeness of the Concepts of the Nation

From Chart 1, it could be seen that the second factor, an *egalitarian concept of the nation*, is the most represented concept, mainly due to the high means of the

two most significantly correlated statements, according to which the members of the same nation must share a sense of equality and have the same rights and duties. The least represented concept is Nation 3, the **concept of the nation as a belief system.**

8.3.3. Croatian Nationalist ideologies

Having examined the perception of the concept of the nation in general, this chapter will now examine how respondents perceive the Croatian nation, its constitutional elements, national values, and national interests. Moreover, by offering the respondents specific ideas expressed by relevant Croatian nationalist ideologists for their evaluation, this chapter will simultaneously investigate to what extent historical Croatian nationalist ideologies are acceptable to the current Croatian population.

The instrument consists of 25 statements.[178] These statements are factorized in order to detect consistent sets of attitudes towards the Croatian nation. The factor analysis extracted six significant factors which together explained 53.87 per cent of variance.

Table 18: Ideology 1 - Ethnically Exclusive Nationalist Ideology		
Statement	r	mean
Croatian historical territory is that on which Croatian blood has been spilt	.734	1.92
Without any pretensions, Croats could say that they have four times more brains than members of other nations	.731	1.80
Croats are a chosen people, a holy community, which deserves to be respected and worshipped	.589	1.92
Those who are not descendants of a peasant family, in 90 cases out of 100, are not of Croatian descent or blood, but immigrants	.517	2.33
The Croatian nation has preserved the racial and blood characteristics of its forefathers, and embraced the religion of its ancestors	.482	2.77
R² = 13.42 Lambda = 2.23		

The first extracted factor (Table 18) consists of five positively saturated variables. In this concept the Croatian nation is defined in a strictly biological, racial manner. The national affiliation, according to this concept, can only be

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[178] The percentages and means of responses are given in Table 43, in the Appendix.

inherited. This is to say, not only is national affiliation determined by blood, but also by national 'historical' (sic!) territory.

The Croatian nation is perceived as a sacred community, a community of a biologically and religiously homogenous population of chosen people. This concept, which can be provisionally entitled the **Ethnically Exclusive Nationalist Ideology**, is significantly more accepted by those born in a village than those born in a bigger city,[179] and rejected by those of somewhat lower economic status[180] and of university education.[181]

The second factor (Table 19) is provisionally entitled the **Integrational Nationalist Ideology**. Even though the respondents more attached to this concept perceive the Croatian nation as a small unit within an international order, its 'historical' borders are identical with the borders of Greater Croatia. This map, offered by the Ustasha leader Ante Pavelić, is acceptable as a historical Croatian territory to these respondents potentially because it includes the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a good part of Montenegro, regardless of the fact that it does not include Istria. Still, Croatian national interests are seen to be linked with those of bigger, more powerful and Slav nations. This concept does not propose any kind of state unity with these nations. National sovereignty is still perceived as one of the greatest national characteristics.

Table 19: Ideology 2 - Integrational Nationalist Ideology		
Statement	r	mean
Croats are a small nation and hence they have to look for friends among big and powerful nations	.754	3.37
Sovereignty over the Croatian territories belongs to the Croatian nation and it cannot be shared with anyone else	.624	3.60
One who loves Croatdom will look for friends among Slav nations	.471	2.41
From the West along the Adriatic Sea from Rijeka until Kotor, then between the rivers Drava and Danube from North and the river Drina from the East lies the ancient historical Croatian state	.441	3.17
Once when circumstances allow for it, the Croatian nation, just as all other nations, will disappear as an important source of an individual's identity	-.437	2.94
$R^2 = 10.95$ Lambda = 1.96		

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[179] Oneway ANOVA was significant at the .001 level, F=4.496.
[180] Oneway ANOVA was significant at the .028 level, F=3.069.

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Interestingly this concept is significantly more acceptable for women and those with a high school education. At the same time, it is rejected by those born in a village and of better economic status. Bearing in mind the perceived historical borders of the Croatian nation, it is not surprising that those of Serbian nationality tend to reject such a concept.[182]

The third factor (Table 20) presents a classical idea of a **Communist Nationalist Ideology**. The Croatian nation is seen as a modern phenomenon developed in the conditions of the nineteenth century. It is accepted as a current necessity that will eventually wither away as a phenomenon with a change of circumstances (achievement of communism?). This concept perceives the state borders as the greatest obstacle for peaceful co-existence between nations and the greatest source of nationalism. Such a concept of the Croatian nationalist ideology is significantly more rejected by women that men, and significantly more accepted by those who have lived in Zagreb for more than 20 years.[183]

Table 20: Ideology 3 - Communist Nationalist Ideology		
Statement	r	mean
The only way to solve the problem of Croatian national minorities in other states is abolishing the borders between these states	.643	2.31
The Croatian nation was formed in the nineteenth century, thanks to the efforts of important individuals of that time	.642	2.49
Once when circumstances allow for it, the Croatian nation, just as all other nations, will disappear as an important source of individual's identity	.485	2.94
Croats think of Croatia only as a piece of land, and those who think about a bigger area are considered more patriotic	.474	2.43
One who loves Croatdom will look for friends among Slav nations	.449	2.41
$R^2 = 9.38$ Lambda = 1.95		

Four out of five statements chosen from Franjo Tudman's speeches and writings appeared as the most saturated on the fourth factor. This clear concept of Tudman's nationalist ideology is strongly grounded in references to national history. It is history that teaches us how disunity and weak leaders were to be blamed for all Croatian suffering. These leaders could not even prevent the

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[181] Oneway ANOVA was significant at the .002 level, F=4.909.

[182] An analysis of variance shows that acceptance of this concept by women and by those with a high school diploma is significant at the same level of .003 (F=4.584 and F=4.824 respectively); while the rejection by Serbs is significant at the .003 level (F=5.857), by those born in a village at the level of .01 (F=3.06) and by those of better economic status at the .034 level (F=2.92).

exaggerations of the Myth of Jasenovac which created a black legend of historical guilt for the whole Croatian nation. Yet this concept emphasises the greatness of 'one of the oldest nations in Europe' which had the spiritual openness to recognise the Muslim religion. The consequences of this concept of the Croatian nationalist ideology are given elsewhere[184] and, therefore, will not be elaborated any further at this point. Nevertheless, some data important for this empirical research is given by an analysis of variance: there is no significant difference between different socio-demographic categories of the sample in level of the acceptance/rejection of this concept.

Table 21: Ideology 4 - Tuđman's Nationalist Ideology		
Statement	r	mean
Systemic exaggeration of the Myth of Jasenovac in Socialist Yugoslavia aimed to create a black legend of historical guilt for the whole Croatian nation	.672	3.41
The worst enemy of the Croatian nation is their disunity	.631	3.50
Throughout history, indecisive and weak leaders can be blamed for many sufferings of the Croatian nation	.619	3.36
Croatdom, though Catholic, had a spiritual openness and need to recognise Muslim religion, which had emerged due to historical circumstances within the Croat national entity	.470	3.03
The Croatian nation is one of the oldest nations in Europe	.328	3.30
$R^2 = 7.58$ Lambda = 1.98		

Table 22: Ideology 5 - Ustasha Nationalist Ideology		
Statement	r	mean
The Croatian name is of Iranian origins	.662	2.77
The Croatian nation has preserved the racial and blood characteristics of its forefathers and embraced the religion of its ancestors	.509	2.77
From the West along the Adriatic Sea from Rijeka until Kotor, then between the rivers Drava and Danube from North and the river Drina from the East lies the ancient historical Croatian state	.463	3.17
Croats think of Croatia only as a piece of land, and those who think about a bigger area are considered as more patriotic	.418	2.43
The Croatian nation is one of the oldest nations in Europe	.416	3.30
$R^2 = 6.58$ Lambda = 1.67		

The next concept, the concept of the **Ustasha Nationalist Ideology** (Table 22), however, is significantly more accepted by women,[185] yet rejected by those of the lowest economic status.[186] It is a racist ideology that claims its right to a 'Greater

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[183] Oneway ANOVA shows that women's rejection of this concept is significant at the .003 level (F=8.944), and the acceptance of those who have lived in Zagreb for more than 20 years at the .001 level (F=7.673).
[184] See Chapter Six.
[185] ANOVA significant at the .024 level (F=5.160).
[186] ANOVA significant at the .021 level (F=3.285).

Croatia' on the basis of history. This concept proclaims the Croatian nation as one of the oldest in Europe and attempts to 'purify' it from any connection with other South Slav nations by 'tracing' its national origins to Iran. It is a concept which tightly binds soil and blood.

Table 23: Ideology 6 - Ethnically 'Inclusive' Nationalist Ideology		
Statement	r	mean
In spite of all attempts, Croatdom has survived mainly due to the survival of its own language	.720	3.22
The Croatian nation is one of the oldest nations in Europe	.551	3.30
Croatdom, though Catholic, had a spiritual openness and need to recognise the Muslim religion, which had emerged due to historical circumstances within the Croat national entity	.529	3.03
Croats think of Croatia only as a piece of land, and those who think about a bigger area are considered as more patriotic	-.326	2.43
$R^2 = 5.96$ Lambda = 1.54		

The last concept (Table 23) of the Croatian nationalist ideology consists of four highly saturated variables. It has been provisionally entitled the concept of the **Ethnically 'Inclusive' Nationalist Ideology**. It clearly defines the Croatian nation in cultural terms (language, history, religion), yet it expresses 'flexibility' in those criteria for defining who are the Croats. The Croats are Catholics, but they can also be Muslims. As far as the national interest demands, the Croats will open their 'national boundaries' even to those who claim a different nationality.

The factor correlation matrix given in Table 24 shows that the highest correlation between factors exist between Ideology 4 and Ideologies 1 (r=.238) and 5 (r=242). It could be interpreted that those respondents who are more attached to Tudman's Nationalist Ideology (Ideology 4) are also more inclined towards the Ethnically Exclusive (Ideology 1) and Ustasha (Ideology 5) nationalist ideologies. It is also interesting that Ideology 3, the Communist Nationalist Ideology, is negatively correlated with all other concepts, except with the Ethnically Exclusive Nationalist Ideology.

Table 24: Ideology - Factor Correlation Matrix						
	Ideol_1	Ideol_2	Ideol_3	Ideol_4	Ideol_5	Ideol_6
Ideol_1	1.00	.148	.120	.238	.084	.020
Ideol_2		1.00	-.53	.001	.003	.039
Ideol_3			1.00	-.111	-.026	-.089
Ideol_4				1.00	.242	.147
Ideol_5					1.00	.042
Ideol_6						1.00

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.

Chart 2:

By applying the same method of approximation as in the case of the Constitutive Elements Factors, Chart 2 offers some clues about the relative acceptance of the extracted factors. With a mean of 3.32 and 3.1 respectively, the most accepted concepts are nationalist ideologies of Tuđman and the Communists. Hence, even though some ideas deriving from the nationalist ideologies of the Croatian past are still present within the current Croatian population, the long dominance of the Communists' and Tuđman's nationalist ideologies in the media and the educational system has secured their weak and relative supremacy.

8.3.4. National Heroes

The task of 'measuring' respondents' perceptions of national symbols is a rather complicated one, since it has to deal with diversity and the mixture of symbols'

forms and content, on the one hand, and the respondents' emotional and cognitive perceptions of these symbols, on the other. In the process of the construction of the instruments used to analyse this data, the purpose and method of analysis has to be clear and simple. With this objective, this section deals with just one form of national symbols - the perception of national heroes. Secondly, since a questionnaire cannot offer an answer to the question 'why the respondents perceive some historical personalities as heroes', by applying specific methodological tools, at least, it should be possible to reconstruct a logic behind the respondents' choices. These were the premises in seeking to construct this analytical instrument. A list of twenty names of personalities who played a crucial part in Croatian history[187] was offered to the respondents, and they were asked to evaluate whether these historical personalities played a positive or negative role for the formation of the Croatian nation. A factor analysis has also been applied with the aim of investigating whether the respondents express consistency in choosing their national heroes.

The factor analysis extracted five significant factors which together explained 52.17 per cent of cumulative variance. Just as in previous cases, each factor will be analysed separately, and the results will be compared. The complete data of responses is given in Table 44 in the Appendix.

The first extracted factor (Table 25) consists of five positively saturated names. This list is a mixture of three leaders and founders of some Croatian political parties (Ante Starčević, a leader of the Croatian Party of Right; Ljudevit Gaj, a leader of the National Party; and Stjepan Radić,[188] a leader of the Croatian Peasant Party), and two personalities more associated with their military than political activities (King Tomislav, reigned c. 910-c. 928, who apparently threw the Hungarian army out of Croatia in the tenth century, and Ban Jelačić, who, nine centuries later, marched against the Hungarian revolutionary army). All of these historical personalities could be perceived as **Croatian National Awakeners**

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[187] Most of the names offered in this instrument were already mentioned and discussed in the historical overviews in previous chapters.

[188] For more about Starčević, Gaj and Radić, see Chapters 4-6.

except for King Tomislav who has been perceived in many ideologies as the first monarch to unite the Croatian territories under one rule.

Table 25: Heroes 1 - Croatian National Awakeners		
Statement	r	mean
Ante Starčević	.699	3.90
King Tomislav	.692	4.04
Ljudevit Gaj	.690	4.25
Stjepan Radić	.661	4.22
Ban Jelačić	.488	3.82
$R^2 = 18.53$ Lambda = 3.15		

At first glance, it seems surprising that these historical personalities are perceived as playing a positive role for the Croatian nation more by those of Serb nationality and the Orthodox religion.[189] Yet, as shown in previous chapters, none of these historical individuals were proponents of negative attitudes towards the Serbs in general. At the same time these individuals are accepted as national heroes by those who are very religious[190] and rejected by those with a university education.[191]

The first three individuals who were the most saturated on the second factor (Table 26) were all more active in the cultural sphere than in the political sphere of Croatian social life. Franjo Rački,[192] though highly affiliated with Strossmayer's National Party, was a distinguished historian and the first president of the Yugoslav Academy of Science and Art, established in 1867 in Zagreb. Vladimir Nazor (1876-1949), though the first president of ZAVNOH,[193] was one of Croatia's greatest poets and novelists; and Janko Drašković (1770-1856), though one of the leaders of the Illyrian Movement, was a distinguished Croatian writer. Since the respondents more attached to this factor perceive these individuals as Croatian national heroes, this factor could be provisionally entitled **Croatian Cultural Awakeners**. By expressing a negative attitude towards the role of Franz Joseph I, these respondents also reject any quasi-nostalgic feelings

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[189] The difference of variance between the Serbs, Croats and Others was significant at the .006 level (F=5.177), and between Catholics, Orthodox and Others at the level of .000 (F=11.159).
[190] ANOVA was significant at the level of .014 (F=3.169).
[191] ANOVA was significant at the level of .022 (F=3.251).
[192] For more about Rački, see Chapter 5.
[193] ZAVNOH (Zemaljsko Antifašističko Vijeće Narodnog Oslobođenja Hrvatske - Regional Antifascist Council of the Popular Liberation of Croatia) was established in 1943 as the supreme body of Partisan civil government in Croatia.

towards the era of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. By perceiving Mika Tripalo, one of the 1971 leaders of the Croatian Spring, as a national hero the respondents also express their sympathies towards the idea of a democratic Croatia.

Table 26: Heroes 2 - Croatian Cultural Awakeners		
Statement	r	mean
Franjo Rački	.716	3.68
Vladimir Nazor	.690	4.08
Janko Drašković	.641	3.66
Franz Joseph I	-.395	3.07
Mika Tripalo	.373	3.58
R² = 10.9 Lambda = 1.86		

Predictably, an analysis of variance showed that this concept of the Croatian Cultural Awakeners as national heroes is significantly more supported by those born in Zagreb[194] then those in other regions of Croatia and rejected by those with only a primary school level of education.[195]

Table 27: Heroes 3 - Right Extremists		
Statement	r	mean
Josip Frank	.689	3.20
Mile Budak	.602	2.95
Mika Tripalo	.522	3.58
Ante Pavelić	.314	1.88
Baron Trenk	.314	3.02
R² = 9.23 Lambda = 1.57		

The respondents more strongly attached to the third extracted factor (Table 27) perceive the **Croatian Right Extremists** as national heroes. Two of the most notorious leaders of the Ustashas (Ante Pavelić and Mile Budak) found their place on this factor together with Josip Frank, the leader of the Croatian Party of Right in the first decades of the twentieth century, and Baron Trenk, the 'legendary' leader of his 'Panduri', a paramilitary group of Maria Teresa, who spread terror wherever they appeared.

As expected, this concept of the Croatian nationalist heroes is significantly more rejected by those of Serb nationality and Orthodox religion[196] then those of other nationalities and religions represented in this sample. It is also rejected by those

[194] ANOVA was significant at the level of .001 (F=4.149).
[195] ANOVA was significant at the level of .001 (F=5.608).

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who declare themselves as agnostics.[197] Yet, those with a high school diploma,[198] and those who are not supporters of any current Croatian political parties,[199] are more inclined to accept these personalities as national heroes.

The fourth extracted factor (Table 28) consists of two positively and two negatively correlated variables. It could be said that the respondents most attached to this factor perceive **South Slav Unity Proponents** as Croatian national heroes. The founder and ruler of the so-called Second Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980), is perceived positively just as Josip Juraj Strossmayer (1815-1905),[200] the leader of the National Party and main ideological proponent of Yugoslavism. It is not a surprise that the two leaders of the Ustashas Movement, perhaps the greatest enemies of the idea of Yugoslavism, Ante Pavelić and Mile Budak, are perceived as playing a negative role for the Croatian nation.

Table 28: Heroes 4 - South Slav Unity Proponents		
Statement	r	mean
Josip Broz Tito	.806	3.38
Ante Pavelić	-.699	1.88
Mile Budak	-.373	2.95
Josip Juraj Strossmayer	.331	3.96
$R^2 = 6.93$ Lambda = 1.18		

Analyses of variance show that those of Serb nationality,[201] those with a university education,[202] supporters of the SDP,[203] and those born in a village are more inclined to support this concept, while those who declare themselves as Catholics[204] and very religious reject it.

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[196] Both analyses of variance were significant at the .000 level (F=9.916 and F=12.345 respectively).

[197] ANOVA was significant at the level of .003 (F=4.009).

[198] ANOVA was significant at the level of .003 (F=4.762).

[199] ANOVA was significant at the level of .003 (F=4.777).

[200] For more about Strossmayer, see Chapter 4.

[201] ANOVA was significant at the level of .002 (F=6.188).

[202] ANOVA was significant at the level of .000 (F=7.828).

[203] The SDP (Social Democratic Party), formed in 1990 through reformation of the Croatian Communist Party, was one of the winners of the 3 January 2000 elections. ANOVA was significant at the level of .002 (F=4.989).

[204] The religious affiliation variable was significant at the .000 level (F=9.468) and the level of religiousness was significant on .020 level (F=3.088).

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Table 29: Heroes 5 - Habsburg Empire Proponents		
Statement	r	mean
Maria Teresa	.631	3.03
Ban Jelačić	.508	3.82
Franc Joseph I	.504	3.07
Ante Pavelić	.351	1.88
Baron Trenk	-.329	3.02
$R^2 = 6.56$ Lambda = 1.11		

The last extracted factor (Table 29) could be perceived as an expression of nostalgia for the era of the Habsburg Empire, the time of Emperors (Franc Joseph I) and Empresses (Maria Teresa), the time of the brave (Josip Jelačić) and the not-so-brave (Baron Trenk) warriors. It appears that those respondents who are more attached to this factor express a similar kind of nostalgia towards the era of the Independent State of Croatia, by perceiving its *Poglavnik* as a national hero as well. Still, this concept of national heroes could be provisionally entitled **Habsburg Empire Proponents**. Interestingly, analyses of variance show that no significant category of the Croatian population more significantly accepts or rejects this concept.

It could be said that the analyses of variance applied on this instrument show a kind of polarization of the respondents around three concepts: Croatian National Awakeners, Right Extremists and South Slav Unity Proponents. According to the Factor Correlation Matrix (Table 30), the first factor (Croatian National Awakeners) is positively correlated with all other factors, which could be interpreted in terms of a recognition by most of the respondents that these Awakeners played a positive role for the Croatian nation to some degree.

Table 30: Heroes - Factor Correlation Matrix					
	Heroes 1	Heroes 2	Heroes 3	Heroes 4	Heroes 5
Heroes 1	1.00	.157	.168	.047	.121
Heroes 2		1.00	-.084	.188	-.254
Heroes 3			1.00	-.130	.164
Heroes 4				1.00	-.039
Heroes 5					1.00

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.

Those parties that were historically in conflict are also perceived by the current Croatian population as antagonistic: those who perceive Right Extremists (Heroes 3) as Croatian national heroes cannot equally perceive the South Slav Unity Proponents (Heroes 4, r= -.130) or Cultural Awakeners (Heroes 2, r= -.084) as heroes, amongst whom the prime position is given to Vladimir Nazor, a strong symbol of the Partisan Movement. Similarly, the respondents who perceive the South Slav Unity Proponents (Heroes 4) as national heroes, could not support the proponents of the Habsburg Empire (Heroes 5) with a touch of the Ustashas' fascism (Heroes 3, r= -.039).

Chart 3:

Representativeness of the Concepts of National Heroes

8.3.5. Attitudes Towards the Others

Following the operational definition of the perceptions of the nation, after examining the ways the respondents perceived the nation in general and the Croatian nation in particular, the last part of the survey has been constructed to investigate the respondents' attitudes towards other nations. With that aim, a modified Bogardus' scale of social distance was offered for the respondents' evaluation. The modification, that is, the extension of the scale, was guided by the extreme circumstances of war and the post-war climate that existed in

Croatia, assuming that ethnic war had an impact on the radicalization of social attitudes. Hence, the original Bogardus' scale of seven degrees was expanded to nine. It presented a continuum of three parts: ethnic distance (from 1-close relationship including marriage, to 5-citizen in my country), ethnic ostracism (6- to avoid any contact with them, and 7-to forbid them entry in my country) and ethnic aggressiveness (8-would like someone to kill them, and 9-would personally exterminate them all). This scale was attached to a list of thirteen different nationalities which could be considered as 'significant others' at some stage in the history of the Croatian nation.

No	Nationalities	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	mean
1	Albanians	0.0	3.9	4.2	22.8	56.0	10.1	2.6	0.0	0.3	4.74
2	Montenegrins	0.0	7.5	5.5	18.6	55.0	10.4	2.9	0.0	0.0	4.64
3	Undeclared	0.0	3.6	7.2	14.7	71.0	3.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.64
4	Jews	0.0	4.6	5.5	20.2	68.1	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.57
5	Russians	1.0	5.2	10.7	11.7	66.1	2.9	2.3	0.0	0.0	4.55
6	Italians	1.0	2.6	12.1	16.3	65.5	0.7	0.7	0.0	1.3	4.55
7	Hungarians	2.6	2.3	6.8	16.9	71.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.52
8	Muslims	0.0	5.9	16.9	12.1	56.0	4.6	4.6	0.0	0.0	4.50
9	Macedonians	2.0	8.8	7.8	14.7	63.5	2.3	1.0	0.0	0.0	4.40
10	Slovenes	3.6	9.1	10.1	10.7	62.9	2.6	1.0	0.0	0.0	4.32
11	Germans	2.6	8.8	9.4	17.3	61.6	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.27
12	Serbs	13.4	11.7	8.5	21.2	34.9	7.8	2.3	0.0	0.3	3.87
13	Croats	72.3	14.0	3.3	3.6	6.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.59

Table 31: Social Distance

1 = close relationship including marriage; 2 = close friend; 3 = colleague at work; 4 = citizen in my town; 5 = citizen in my country; 6 = to avoid any contact with them; 7 = to forbid them entry in my country; 8 = would like someone to kill them; 9 = would personally exterminate them all

In Table 31 the percentages of the respondents' evaluation are given. The list of thirteen nationalities is rank-ordered depending on the average (mean) distance expressed by the respondents.

As can be seen from the mean values of each variable, the respondents expressed a high level of social distance towards all nationalities, except the Croats themselves. Even though, on average, the respondents showed a low level of ethnic ostracism and almost no ethnic aggressiveness, the distances varied between '4-citizen in my town' to '5-citizen in my country'. Perceiving other nationalities as just citizens in a town or country actually expresses a wish for weak personal contact with them. The highest social distance was shown towards the Albanians, Montenegrins and those who declare themselves as Undeclared. The highest distance expressed towards Albanians reveals that stereotypes about this group were not undermined, even by recent political events in Kosovo. The

distance towards Montenegrins, regardless of a significant improvement in political relations between the two countries, could be interpreted as unwillingness on the part of the Croats to forget the involvement of Montenegrins in the destruction of Dubrovnik and the still unsolved status of Prevlaka, the area on the Montenegrin and Croatian border, over which both sides claim sovereignty. A high social distance towards those who declare themselves as Undeclared could also be seen as a reaction on the part of respondents to those who are usually offspring of nationally mixed marriages. In times of socialism, most of these individuals declared themselves Yugoslavs.

The second group consists of those nationalities with whom the Croats have little personal contact, yet are still present as national minorities in Croatia: Jews, Russians, Italians, and Hungarians. While the distance towards the Jews could just be interpreted as an expression of the respondents' stereotypes, the Russians are mainly perceived as traditional allies of the Serbs, and, hence, as not so friendly towards Croats. Still a relatively high distance towards Italians and Hungarians cannot be explained by any recent political controversies with these national minorities in Croatia or their domicile countries. This is especially surprising when one takes into account the fact that the respondents showed a relative higher degree of social distance towards these nationalities than towards Muslims, Macedonians and Slovenes, fellow South Slavs and former Croatian compatriots within the former Yugoslavia. Perceived as traditional friends and Croatian allies, the Germans are the lowest rejected nationality among this group, where more than 22 per cent of the respondents expressed their willingness for closer personal relationships with the Germans either through marriage, friendship or as colleagues at work.

Yet the biggest surprise of this part of the research came from the respondents' attitudes towards the Serbs. According to the results, the Serbs are the most accepted nationality: almost 34 per cent of the respondents expressed their willingness to have close personal contact with those of Serbian nationality. Bearing in mind that similar research conducted just only a few years earlier,[205]

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[205] See Malešević and Uzelac (1997).

demonstrated that the Croatians expressed the highest social distance towards the Serbs, these results were at first taken with a good deal of reservation. Another reason for skepticism was the fact that 8.1 per cent of the respondents declared themselves as Serbs, which could significantly alter the picture of the social distance towards the Serbs as a category. Thus, in order to clarify this result, some further analyses of the data were undertaken.

In the first instance, a factor analysis was conducted to examine whether the respondents consistently expressed a higher distance to specific groups of listed nationalities. The factor analysis extracted two relatively non-correlated factors (r=.055) which together explained 57.98 per cent of cumulative variance.

The first extracted factor (Table 32) consists of a list of nine nationalities. The high positive correlation of these variables with the factor could indicate that the respondents more attached to this concept express higher social distance towards these nationalities. At the same time, none of these nationalities could be perceived as directly threatening the existence of the Croatian nation or the Croatian state. It could be said that it just clearly expresses a **xenophobic attitude** towards all non-Croatian nationalities.

Table 32: Distance 1 - Xenophobia towards non-Croats		
Statement	r	mean
Hungarians	.883	4.52
Slovenes	.850	4.32
Russians	.810	4.55
Undeclared	.790	4.64
Jews	.760	4.57
Germans	.743	4.27
Italians	.691	4.55
Montenegrins	.690	4.64
Macedonians	.658	4.40
$R^2 = 47.10$ Lambda = 6.12		

This conclusion was further justified after the application of analyses of variance. This concept is mainly accepted by those of Croatian nationality, and those with a high school education,[206] and rejected by those who declare themselves as atheists[207] and those of 'other', that is non-Catholic and non-Orthodox, religion.[208]

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[206] Both ANOVA were significant at the level of .000, (F=11.133 and F=13.247 respectively).
[207] ANOVA was significant at the level of .007, (F=3.556).
[208] ANOVA was significant at the level of .001, (F=6.861).

The second factor (Table 33) indicates those nationalities towards which the respondents, at the same time, expressed a high level of social distance and a level of closeness. According to the three positively saturated variables, these respondents expressed high levels of social distance towards Albanians, Croats and Muslims, and, at the same time, preferred Serbs and Montenegrins. It came as no surprise that this concept was significantly more accepted by the Serbs, those of Orthodox religion and atheists, supporters of the SDP, and those with a craft school education.[209] Such a factor could be provisionally entitled a Pro-Serbian concept.

Table 33: Distance 2 - Pro-Serbian Concept		
Statement	r	mean
Albanians	.639	4.74
Croats	.599	1.59
Serbs	-.552	3.87
Muslims	.379	4.50
Montenegrins	-.338	4.64
$R^2 = 10.89$ Lambda = 1.42		

The results of this factor analysis demanded a different approach to the distribution of frequencies interpreted in the first instance. A new analysis was carried out which looked at the level of social distance expressed by those respondents of Croatian and those of Serbian nationality separately.

Table 34 reveals that the results, where only those respondents of Croatian nationality are included, did not significantly change from the original one, except that the Croatian respondents expressed higher distance towards the Montenegrins than the Albanians. It showed once again that, though still a high average (mean=4.12), the respondents of the Croatian nationality expressed the lowest social distance towards the Serbs.

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[209] All analyses of variance were significant at the level of .000 (F=47.512; 51.00; 16.739, 22.505; and 12.374 respectively).

Table 34: Distribution of Frequencies for the respondents of Croatian nationality										
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Mean
1	Montenegrins			17	45	165	32	9			4.68
2	Albanians		11	13	67	160	26	3			4.66
3	Undeclared		7	22	45	195	11				4.65
4	Russians	1	11	33	30	189	9	7			4.61
5	Jews		11	17	54	193	5				4.59
6	Italians	3	6	35	47	181	2	2		4	4.55
7	Hungarians	8	6	18	43	204	1				4.54
8	Muslims		17	46	37	160	9	11			4.47
9	Slovenes	9	20	26	33	181	8	3			4.40
10	Macedonians	5	26	16	45	184	3	1			4.39
11	Germans	8	24	29	43	175	1				4.27
12	Serbs	18	35	23	65	107	24	7		1	4.12
13	Croats	215	23	10	11	21					1.57

1 = close relationship including marriage; 2 = close friend; 3 = colleague at work; 4 = citizen in my town; 5 = citizen in my country; 6 = to avoid any contact with them; 7 = to forbid them entry in my country; 8 = would like someone to kill them; 9 = would personally exterminate them all

On the other hand, the results of social distance expressed by those of Serbian nationality (Table 35) revealed an extremely high social distance towards Albanians (mean=5.60) which is a clear expression of ethnic ostracism, followed by a high distance towards the Muslims (mean=5.00).

Table 35: Distribution of Frequencies for the respondents of Serb nationality										
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Mean
1	Albanians		1		1	12	5	5		1	5.60
2	Muslims		1	4		12	5	3			5.00
3	Undeclared		2			23					4.76
4	Italians		2		3	20					4.64
5	Macedonians	1	1	6		11	4	2			4.56
6	Jews		1		8	16					4.56
7	Germans		1		10	14					4.48
8	Hungarians		1	1	9	14					4.44
9	Russians		5		6	14					4.16
10	Slovenes		8	5		12					3.64
11	Montenegrins		9		12	4					3.44
12	Croats	5	20								1.80
13	Serbs	21	1	3							1.28

1 = close relationship including marriage; 2 = close friend; 3 = colleague at work; 4 = citizen in my town; 5 = citizen in my country; 6 = to avoid any contact with them; 7 = to forbid them entry in my country; 8 = would like someone to kill them; 9 = would personally exterminate them all

Comparing the results given in these two tables, it is apparent that the Serb and the Croat respondents still mostly prefer each other. Yet, the distance of the Croats towards the Serbs cannot be called small. On average, the Croats accept

the Serbs just as citizens in their own town (mean=4.12), while the Serb respondents express a high degree of closeness to the Croats (mean=1.80).

On the other hand, both Croat and Serb respondents expressed a high, and almost equal, level of social distance towards all other nationalities (the average distance towards all other nationalities are 4.53 for the Croat and 4.48 for the Serb respondents). It is also noticeable that both groups expressed an extremely small willingness to marry anyone except a member of their own nationality.

For these reasons, it could be concluded that ten years of isolation from all relevant international relations, the war, and internal ethnic conflicts have turned Croatian citizens into a nearly xenophobic population striving for a life within an ethnically homogenous community.

8.3.6. Attitudes Towards the Nation

After examining the ways the respondents perceive the nation as a social phenomenon (through an examination of their views on constituent elements and origins of the nation in general), after the analyses of the respondents' attitudes towards the Croatian nationalist ideologies and national symbols, and after examining the respondents' attitudes towards other nations, we still know little about the relations between these sets of attitudes. In other words, at the end of this part of the research, it has yet to be examined whether a specifically expressed type of nationalist ideology assumes a specific set of views on the origins of the nation and its constituent elements, national symbols and national enemies.

For that reason a regression analysis was applied to those different concepts of Croatian nationalist ideology, where the five factors of the constituent elements of the nation, four views of the origins of the nation, five concepts of national heroes, and two distinctive concepts of social distance towards other nations served as a predictor set.

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Four concepts appeared as significant predictors for the concept of the Ethnically Exclusive Nationalist Ideology (Table 36). Together they explained 38.1 per cent of the dependent variable's variance. The respondents most attached to the concept of an Ethnically Exclusive nationalist ideology are inclined to define the Croatian nation in terms of a blood-related and sanctified community. It could be expected that the same respondents perceive the nation in general as a homogenous community of those who share the same belief-systems, that is, the same religion, value system and national character.[210] Even though the concept of the nation as a homogenous community implies that the nation has to have its own specific set of myths and symbols, the respondents who are most attached to this concept of nationalist ideology show a stronger bond or rejection of a specific set of symbols. They express a high negative attitude towards the proponents of South Slav unity and everything related to that era of Croatian history. Yet, they share one attitude with at least one group of South Slav unity proponents - the proponents of the Communist nationalist ideology. Surprisingly, though not incompatible with the above attitudes, some of these respondents perceive the nation as a modern phenomenon, emerging in the nineteenth century with the development of industrial society. Such a concept shows that the nation does not have to be perceived as either primordial or perennial to be, at the same time, perceived as sacred. The concept of common ancestors does not have to reach into an ancient past, as long as it is held that the members of the nation managed to preserve their national characteristics and purity of their blood.

Table 36: Regression Analysis on the First Nationalist Ideology Factor			
IDEOLOGY 1- Ethnically Exclusive Nationalist Ideology	Corr.	beta	sig.
1	Nation 3 - Concept of the Nation as a Belief System	.447	.260	.000
2	Nation 5 - Concept of the Nation as a Homogenous Community	.382	.245	.000
3	Heroes 4 - South Slav Union Proponents	-.365	-.257	.000
4	Origins 1 - The Nation as a Modern Concept	.233	.173	.000
R = .617 R² = .381 Sig. = .000			

The regression analysis applied to the second concept of nationalist ideology (Table 37) extracted five predictors as statistically significant, which together

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[210] The differences between the values of direct correlation and beta-coefficients of Nation 3 and Nation 5 are the result of higher correlation between these predictors (r=.309) which can serve as suppressors of each other.

explained 24.4 per cent of the dependent variable's variance. This second concept, which has been provisionally entitled Integrationist Nationalist Ideology, held the view that the Croatian nation, in order to survive as a small nation, has had to establish good relations among its neighbouring and powerful nations. However, good relations with other nations does not imply in any sense that the Croatian nation has to deny any aspect of its own sovereignty. The nation is seen as a homogenous community (Nation 5, r=2.75) of equal citizens (Nation 2, r=.244), which has existed since the beginning of human society (Origin 2, r=.261), and as such exercises full sovereignty over its territory. A clear rejection of the proponents of South Slav Unity as national heroes (Heroes 4, r=-.201), does not mean that the respondents who support this attitude also support the formation of any new common state with other South Slavs, in spite of an attitude which supports establishing good relations with these nations, as expressed by the concept of Integrational Nationalist Ideology. In short, the respondents most attached to this concept believe that national sovereignty goes hand-in-hand with wider international co-operation, and hence, directly oppose a dominant policy of Tudjman's regime which in the 1990s brought Croatia into a state of international isolation.

Table 37: Regression Analysis on the Second Nationalist Ideology Factor				
	IDEOLOGY 2- Integrational Nationalist Ideology	Corr.	beta	sig.
1	Nation 5 - Concept of the Nation as a Homogenous Community	.275	.170	.005
2	Nation 2 - Egalitarian Concept of the Nation	.244	.146	.018
3	Origins 2 - The Nation as a Primordial Concept	.261	.208	.000
4	Origins 4 - The Nation as a Social Constructed Concept	-.195	-.127	.021
5	Heroes 4 - South Slav Union Proponents	-.201	-.149	.021
R = .494　　　　R^2= .244　　　　Sig. = .000				

In Table 38 the results of the regression analysis, where the dependant variable was the concept of Communist nationalist ideology, are given. Five predictors were extracted as significant, while the whole predictors' set explained 28.9 per cent of total variance. The composition of the Communist Nationalist Ideology, as shown before, indicates the presence of Kardelj's ideas of the nation and nationalism. This conclusion is supported by the appearance of the Concept of the Nation as a Belief System (Nation 3, r=1.77) as a significant predictor of this nationalist ideology. The nation is not perceived just as a bourgeois concept

created in the age of industrialization, but also as a new 'opium' of the people who share the same religion, national character, value system, sense of distinctiveness and belief in common ancestors. This non-territorially-delimited concept of the nation is more understandable in combination with the Pro-Serbian Concept of social distance. A positive correlation of this concept (Distance 2, r=.161) shows that the majority of the respondents most attached to this concept of nationalist ideology are of Serbian nationality. Hence, it could be said that their status as a national minority in Croatia 'forces' them to define their national bonds in terms of a belief system, which could preserve their sense of national identity. The existence of state borders and national boundaries directly influences their everyday life, and a nationalist ideology which propagates the imminence of the withering away of these obstacles, also promises a solution to their problems emerging from their status as a national minority.

Table 38: Regression Analysis on the Third Nationalist Ideology Factor			
	IDEOLOGY 3- Communist Nationalist Ideology	corr.	beta	sig.
1	Nation 3 - Concept of the Nation as a Belief System	.177	.160	.006
2	Heroes 1 - Croatian National Awakeners	-.293	-.231	.000
3	Distance 2 - Pro-Serbian Concept	.161	.217	.000
4	Origins 1 - The Nation as a Modern Concept	.242	.222	.000
5	Origins 2 - The Nation as a Primordial Concept	-.239	-.174	.001
	R = .537 R² = .289 Sig. = .000			

The regression analysis (Table 39), where the dependent variable was Tudman's Nationalist Ideology, extracted four predictors as significant. The predictor set explained 39.1 per cent of total variance.

Table 39: Regression Analysis on the Fourth Nationalist Ideology Factor			
	IDEOLOGY 4- Tudman's Nationalist Ideology	corr.	beta	sig.
1	Nation 3 - Concept of the Nation as a Belief System	.304	.186	.001
2	Heroes 1 - Croatian National Awakeners	.373	.281	.000
3	Heroes 4 - South Slav Unity Proponents	-.205	-.197	.001
4	Origins 4 - The Nation as a Social Constructed Concept	.196	.198	.000
	R = .625 R2 = .391 Sig. = .000			

The respondents who are most attached to the concept of Tudman's Nationalist Ideology share with those proponents of the Communist Nationalist Ideology the same concept of the nation as a belief system. Sarcastically, one could say that this bond between the two concepts is no surprise when we take into account

Tuđman's Communist past. Yet, the respondents who are most attached to Tuđman's ideology at the same time strongly reject any positive attitude towards Tuđman's once supreme commander, Josip Broz Tito, as one of the strongest proponents of South Slav unity (r=-.205). Instead these respondents are more inclined to perceive Stjepan Radić and Ante Starčević as true fighters for the Croatian cause. This clear expression of both positive and negative attitudes towards the individuals who played important roles in Croatian history, are not an expression of support or rejection of national symbols. Rather, they are an expression of a specific definition of the nation as a phenomenon. These respondents hold that the nation has been created by influential people who have standardized its language and written its history (Origins 4, r=.196). Hence, it could be concluded that not only did Tuđman perceive himself in these terms, but he was similarly perceived by the members of his nation. According to this concept, the nation should not only share the same ancestors, religion, values and character, but also a belief in one national leader who symbolizes a re-creation of the nation itself.

The results of the regression analysis of the same predictors set[211] on the Ustasha Nationalist Ideology (Table 40) reveals that the supporters of this concept went just one step further than in previous case. Even though this nationalist ideology also assumes the nation as a belief system, it clearly emphasises the importance of the will of the nation, embodied in a great leader (Nation 4, r=.188).

Table 40: Regression Analysis on the Fifth Nationalist Ideology Factor				
	IDEOLOGY 5 - Ustasha Nationalist Ideology	Corr.	beta	sig.
1	Nation 3 - The Concept of the Nation as a Belief System	.223	.202	.001
2	Nation 4 - Concept of the Nation-by-Design	.188	.183	.002
3	Heroes 1- Croatian National Awakeners	.199	.250	.000
4	Heroes 5 - Habsburg Empire Proponents	-.126	-.088	.012
5	Origins 3 - The Nation as a Perennial Concept	.159	.158	.006
R = .456 R2 = .208 Sig. = .000				

Unlike the previous case, the respondents most attached to this concept perceive national heroes and anti-heroes merely as a set of symbols. The nation is a perennial social phenomenon and the role of the individual cannot disrupt the nation from its given destiny.

The last regression analysis was applied to the concept of an Ethnically 'Inclusive' Nationalist Ideology (Table 41).[212] This concept does not denote a tolerance of other nationalities, but rather the exclusion of a specific set of criteria as crucial for national membership. By emphasizing the importance of common ancestors and disregarding religious affiliation, the Croats could become a much greater nation. This notion is upheld by the concept of the Nation-by-Design, which does not define the nation in terms of cultural markers, but in terms of the accomplishments of some 'greater forces' like national will and destiny. The respondents most attached to this concept perceive proponents of the Habsburg Empire as playing a positive role in the Croatian nation. It is the Habsburg Empire which incorporated all Croatian 'historical territories', and forced the Muslim population in Bosnia and Herzegovina to declare themselves as Croats.

Table 41: Regression Analysis on the Sixth Nationalist Ideology Factor				
	IDEOLOGY 6- Ethnically Inclusive Nationalist Ideology	Corr.	beta	sig.
1	Nation 4 - Concept of the Nation-by-Design	.173	.181	.003
2	Heroes 5 - Habsburg Empire Proponents	.165	.197	.001
3	Origins 3 - The Nation as a Perennial Concept	.239	.250	.000
R = .422 R² = .178		Sig. = .000		

The oldest nation in Europe, as formulated in this nationalist ideology, traces its roots to ancient history, probably with the formation of the first Croatian kingdoms. That ancient history offers a 'myth of a golden age', an age where all subjects of the kingdom were Croats, which ultimately accounts for their destiny even to today.

8.3.7. Conclusion

In this research, attention was focused on primary agents as both recipients of corporate agents' attempts at mobilisation around a specific nationalist ideology, and as proponents of different local and national cultures. The specific position

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[211] The predictors' set explained 20.8 per cent of the total variance of the dependent variable.

of primary agents in society posed a methodological problem for any attempt to reveal the 'mechanisms' of this type of social interaction. The research aimed to investigate, on the one hand, the level of acceptance of the existing dominant nationalist ideology, and, on the other, to discover the limitations and forms of that acceptance. The final question remains whether the analysed data support the main assumptions stated in the theoretical framework.

Before addressing the above issues, I should stress certain limitations of this type of analysis. While the survey enables us to deal with a large group of individuals and to 'measure' their attitudes, at the same time it gives us no answers to questions such as 'Why did the respondents express these attitudes in the first place?'. If a research project sought answers to this question, the application of alternative qualitative methods would probably be more desirable. The research presented here, however, has a much narrower aim.

The choice of sample of the Zagreb population in the period of late 1999-early 2000 set the social and cultural parameters of the analysis. It was a period when the social structure clearly reflected the main ideas of Tudman's nationalist ideology, mainly through political institutions and policies, the media and the educational system. It was a post-war period when the country faced serious economic and social problems, like poverty, bankruptcies of most large companies, and a high rate of unemployment. At the cultural level, it was a period of strong censorship and of revision of ideas, symbols and values, when long suppressed and unsolved issues found a new forum for debate. To what extent were such circumstances reflected by primary agents?

One of the most obvious conclusions of this empirical research is that the respondents showed a certain variety in their perceptions of the nation. Respondents expressed even diametrically opposite views of the possibilities of defining the nation in general and the Croatian nation in particular. They expressed different views on the origins of the nation and its constituent elements; they perceived some national symbols as directly confronting each

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[212] The predictors' set explained 17.8 per cent of the total variance of the dependent variable.

other. These results showed that regardless of the dominance of a specific ideology, the primary agents in question could uphold these different attitudes, which - though not dominant in the media and education - were nevertheless still very much alive at the cultural level, a level of ideas. They showed that complementarity of the structural elements does not entail a homogeneity of attitudes among the primary agents. Ten years after the death of the system, the concepts proposed during fifty years of socialism were still present in the perceptions of primary agents. Even more, sixty years after the tragic Croatian fascist episode, the concepts of the Ustashas still live on.

Nevertheless, the presence of concepts different from the dominant ones does not mean that the attempts at mobilisation around a specific nationalist ideology have been unsuccessful. On the contrary, the data showed that Tudman's nationalist ideology is the most represented among the respondents. But that is not all. The analysis of variance showed that all socio-demographic categories of the sample equally accept (and reject) Tudman's ideology. The dominant nationalist ideology of the 1990s, supported and distributed by all available means, reached all social strata equally. Yet, a consensus was achieved in just a few spheres. While these respondents expressed some agreement in defining the position and interests of the Croatian nation, they were polarized around the definitions of the nation in general, its origins, and national symbols.

Thus, the analysis of national symbols revealed that the Croatian population is more likely to reach some kind of consensus around those individuals who symbolize Croatian 'earlier' history. Differences between the concepts and agendas of the national and cultural awakeners from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries disappeared in the wake of a romantic view of fighters for the Croatian cause. In contrast, it seems that antagonisms which marked recent Croatian history still tend to polarize the Croatian population, especially when the evaluation of the historical role of the Partisans and the Ustashas is in question.

The 'measurement' of social distances towards other nationalities signified another strong polarization among the Croatian population - that between Croats

and Serbs. Within their national groups, each nationality was unanimous in expressing a high social distance towards almost all other nationalities. Yet, the internal relation between these two groups remains peculiar. The Serbs from Zagreb obviously expressed closeness with the Croats, which is not surprising taking into account the groups' centuries of experience of common life, a high rate of intermarriage, and, more recently, a mainly supportive attitude of the urbanized Serbs towards the independence of the Republic of Croatia. A pleasant surprise is that the Croats, out of all nationalities represented, expressed the lowest social distance towards the Serbs. It is methodologically useless to speculate about the reasons for such an attitude, though it still points to one important result of this research - the structure of the sample itself.

However significant for this research it would be to make assertions about the entire Croatian population, the data warns us that the socio-demographic variables are the determinants of the modes of acceptance of nationalist ideologies and perceptions of the nation. The research shows that certain concepts are more or less acceptable to specific categories of the sample, depending on their gender, nationality, religious affiliation and level of religious convictions, on their level of education and their economic status. This also implies that a nationalist ideology which tends to mobilise a majority of primary agents has to offer a programme acceptable to the majority of social strata.

At this point, after an empirical analysis of primary agents' attitudes, it becomes possible to hypothesize about their role in the process of national /re/formation.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK RECONSIDERED

With the conclusion of the discussion of the case study of the /re/formation of the Croatian nation from the early nineteenth until the end of the twentieth century, it is time to return to some arguments stated in the theoretical framework. This framework, developed in Chapter Two, dealt with two major issues: how to define such a phenomenon as the nation, and how to analyse the processes of nation-/re/formation. The application of social realist theory to the case of the emergence of the nation hypothesised that the nation can be defined only through identification of the processes of social change that occurred in a specific period of time. This led to the conclusion that the process of the emergence of the nation can be disentangled only through an analysis of the interrelations between changes of the social structure, developments at the level of culture, and /re/formations of agency.

The hypotheses outlined in the theoretical framework were tested on the case of Croatia. The empirical analyses followed the structure of the theoretical framework. While the social changes that occurred on separate levels of social reality were analysed separately, at this point it is necessary to synthesise these findings. First, I will discuss the relevance of the empirical analyses for theorising the definition of the nation. After that, I will address the question to what extent the morphogenetic approach was useful in identifying the crucial processes of nation-/re/formation.

Defining the nation

Throughout this thesis the issue of defining the nation as a specific social form imposed itself as the starting point for all ensuing analyses. In Chapter Two it was demonstrated that at the theoretical level it is impossible to tackle the issue of nation-/re/formation without defining the concept of the nation. A review of

various definitions of the nation offered by the dominant theories of nations and nationalism showed that the nation as a social phenomenon was defined at two levels: conditionally and temporally. A 'conditional definition' of the nation is most often constructed in the form of an enumeration of necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the nation that are understood as 'constituent elements' of the nation. Even though the definitions constructed in this way assume that elements like various forms of common culture, language, state and common political institutions, a common economy, some level of self-awareness, or a specific territory constitute a nation, they actually argue that the nation cannot exist without the existence of these elements. This type of definition also has a practical consequence. Since the dominant definitions of the nation are starting points for the analyses of historical social formations, these definitions are used as a means for determining whether a specific social group in a certain historical period fulfills all the necessary conditions in order to be labelled as a nation. A 'temporal definition' of the nation delineates a specific stage in history when the nation as a social phenomenon emerged. Conditional definitions of the nation necessarily determine the nation's temporal definition. Hence, if the nation is defined as a social entity related to the equality of rights and duties of its members, for example, it would be impossible to define the nation as a primordial phenomenon.

The discussion, offered in Chapter Two, about this method of defining the nation concluded that a set of constitutive elements, however defined, could not serve as a conditional definition of the nation for several reasons:

- the nation cannot be defined by a single constituent element;
- there is no final set of constituent elements that could define the nation;
- there is no one constituent element that is generally more important for the formation of the nation than others, since this varies from case to case;
- a set of constituent elements cannot clearly distinguish the nation from other forms of social community.

The problem of defining the nation reappeared with the analyses of Croatian nationalist ideologies. These ideologies postulate two interconnected definitions: they offered a definition of the nation in general, and a definition of the Croatian

nation. As demonstrated throughout Chapters Four, Five and Six, definitions of *the* nation and *a* specific nation, offered by a nationalist ideology, serve rather different functions than those definitions offered by general theories of nations and nationalism. In the case of nationalist ideology, a definition of the nation, at the same time, provides criteria for group membership and claims for the group's rights. The Croatian case study demonstrated that *the same nation, in different circumstances* and within different structural, cultural and agential conditions, could be defined in opposite ways by emphasising disparate constituent elements of a/the nation. Hence, the analysis of seven Croatian nationalist ideologies revealed that by defining the nation the ideologues set their own political agendas rather than formulating conditions for the existence of the nation.

Finally, the question 'what is the nation?' provided the basis for examining the ways primary agents perceive the nation as a general concept. The data of the survey (conducted on a sample of the Croatian population) revealed that a group of co-nationals did not reach a consensus about the relevance of constituent elements for defining the nation. This result indicates that *the same nation, in the same historical period,* could be perceived by its own members as having different temporal and conditional definitions. An obvious fact was also demonstrated: the perceived relevance of certain constituent elements of the nation does not determine national identification, since the respondents clearly identified themselves as members of the same nation.

From the analysis of Croatian nationalist ideologies and the results of the survey it may be concluded that a set of constituent elements could not serve as a conditional definition of a/the nation for several reasons:

- the relevance of a single constituent element for the /re/formation of a nation can change with a variation in social conditions;
- in a given historical period a nation could lack a constituent element that is described by an ideology as the most significant for its emergence;
- in a given historical period a nation could be defined by various constituent elements;
- conditional (and temporal) definitions of a specific nation do not determine attitudes (national identification?) of the population to a nation;

- the emergence of a nation is a process, and any set of constituent elements of the nation will fail to distinguish different stages of its emergence.

Every social group consists of 'people' who possess a certain 'culture'; and the group operates in a specific 'structure'. The above analyses demonstrated that enumeration of any set of properties of the 'people', elements of culture or of structure, and any combination of them, cannot determine when a/the nation emerges. If the nation is defined as a specific social group, a community, composed of both corporate and primary agents, then it is not the quality of agents that determine the nation, but their actions. For example, even a group of people that are queuing for a bus could be understood as a social group. They are conditioned by the structure (buses, bus stations), and culture (not jumping in front of the queue), but they are not defined by this structure and culture. What defines them as a social group is the act of queuing within certain structural and cultural conditions. In parallel, what determines the conditional definition of a/the nation are the relationships and processes in which a social group is engaged. Hence, in Chapter Two *the nation* was defined as *a social agency politically organised as a community which claims its rights on the basis of a culture defined as its own.*

In the same chapter I postulate an assumption that the application of the social realist theory to the case of the nation can offer a methodological framework for the analysis of the process of the formation of the nation. In Part Two of the thesis this methodological framework was applied to the case of Croatia. At this point it is necessary to make a re-evaluation of the developed framework and to summarise the results of its application.

Processes of Nation-/re/formation

The starting point of the theoretical formulation of the process of nation-/re/formation was the assumption that the process of the formation of a specific social form can be analysed only in the context of the emergence of social changes. It was stated that every social change necessarily involves changes at

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the level of social structure, the level of culture, and of the formation and transformation of agencies. From a methodological point of view it was important to emphasise that social changes can be identified only *ex post facto*, that is, once morphogenesis of social reality occurs.

The application of these theoretical premises to the empirical analysis of the /re/formation of the Croatian nation determined both the period of analysis and the major morphogenetic cycles. I identified six such cycles that have emerged since the beginning of the nineteenth century:

- from 1830s until 1868 - the period of Enlightened Absolutism;
- from 1868 until 1918 - the period of Dual Monarchy;
- from 1918 until 1941 - the period of the First Yugoslavia;
- from 1941 until 1945 - the period of the Independent State of Croatia;
- from 1941 until 1990 - the period of the Second Yugoslavia;
- from 1990 onwards - the period of the Croatian nation-state.

The identification of the main structural changes in Croatian society was not only the marker of morphogenetic cycles, but also the starting point of my analysis. On the one hand, the assumption that the existing structure of society and developed cultural forms condition the emergence of relevant agencies pointed to the importance of a historical examination of the main characteristics of political, social and economic systems and the emergence of certain ideas and cultural forms. It was also argued that only agencies can initiate the process of transforming structural and cultural systems.

These theoretical assumptions, operationalised in Chapter Three, pointed to the main relations between the three levels of social reality within and between different morphogenetic cycles of nation-/re/formation. I identified three such interrelationships between:

1) social structure, culture and agency within a specific morphogenetic cycle that includes:

   a) structural and cultural *conditioning* of agency,

   b) interrelation between structural and cultural *conditions,*

c) *elaboration* of structural and cultural systems and agency;

2) internal segments of agency, that is, between corporate and primary agents;

3) consequent morphogenetic cycles.

All of these interrelations were applied to the case of Croatia, and at this point it is necessary to summarise the main findings.

Structural and Cultural Conditioning of Agency

Historical analysis of the structural and cultural circumstances of Croatian society revealed several levels of conditioning of the formation and transformation of a nationalist agency. It is clear that the existing political, cultural and social systems strongly conditioned the formation of the first Croatian nationalist agency. The internal structure of the Habsburg Empire at the beginning of the nineteenth century brought the existing corporate agencies into direct conflict. The main issues of dispute included problems within the political system and the form of political institutions, administrative reform, the introduction of the official language, and the division of power, that is, the problem of defining the boundaries of jurisdiction of the corporate agencies within the Empire. Later, economic and educational developments facilitated the creation of a relatively small Croatian intelligentsia independent of and excluded from the dominant local corporate agency. At the cultural level the Napoleonic Wars left ideological legacies from both the French Revolution and German Romanticism. These developments, as shown in Chapter Four, created the circumstances for the development of the Illyrian Movement.

The following analyses demonstrated that structural and cultural systems not only condition the formation of nationalist agencies, but also their form. The territorial composition of the Habsburg Empire impeded the formation of 'nation'-wide groups and organisations, while the federal composition of Socialist Yugoslavia promoted it. The regime of so-called Enlightened Absolutism facilitated the formation of cultural rather than political agencies, while the political system of the Dual Monarchy opened a space for the

formation of both. Both the Ustasha and Communist regimes, on the other hand, forbade the formation of any competing political or cultural agencies.

Another impact of structural and cultural conditioning could be seen in the formation of agents' **patterns of organisation**. Pressed by the perceived problems set by the existing structural and cultural systems, some nationalist agencies opted for the formation of broad political movements rather then political parties. Hence, for example, in search of the broadest possible support the Illyrian Movement was formed from rather disparate groups and individuals who incorporated diverse political and economic orientations. The Ustasha Movement united its membership around strictly defined political aims and 'nationalist interests'. The oppressive political system of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia forced both Ustashas and Communists to opt for tight 'underground' organisation.

The same political and cultural conditioning had a direct impact on the formulation of various agents' **aims and programmes**. The historical analysis offered in Chapters Four, Five and Six showed that the dominant ideas and ideologies, promoted by relevant nationalist agencies, were not created in reference to their grand visions of the past or future of the nation, but as a direct response to the pressing current constraints and perceived injustice. The insistence on the codification and systematisation of the Croatian language in the nineteenth century was not initiated by the idea that every nation should have its own language. Rather, it was a response to threatened attempts of Magyarisation and Germanisation on the one hand, and a move towards closer Serbian-Croatian relations, on the other. The strongly advocated creation of the Croatian national state by Radić's party lost its importance with the incorporation of that party into the system of power by the establishment of the Croatian *Banovina*. A national history, so much cherished by Starčević and Tuđman, did not serve as a value in itself, but as a source of national rights in the present.

Therefore it can be concluded that the formations and transformations, forms, organisations and programmes of national agencies cannot be explained without elaboration of the structural and cultural conditions in which they were created and in which they operated.

Interrelation between Structural and Cultural Conditions

The analysis of history textbooks, presented in Chapter Seven, re-emphasised the importance of the cultural system in the process of nation-formation. Once dominant ideas and ideologies, after being replaced by another set of ideas, are not forgotten or lost. They always remain within the cultural system ready for further exploitation once the 'proper' time comes. The idea of Yugoslavism dominated Croatian history textbooks at the end of the nineteenth century. After fifty years it re-emerged as the dominant doctrine of the Communist ideology and textbooks. The ideas of Ante Starčević which stressed state independence as the most important national interest of the Croats found its new expression within Ustasha ideology, just as within the nationalist ideology of Franjo Tudjman. Radić's search for an authentic nation 'discovered' the Croatian peasant culture. This idea gained its radical form in Ustasha ideology, and was again revived in Tudman's writings and textbooks.

In addition, the historical analysis of Croatian nationalist ideologies demonstrated that in the same period of time several ideologies could offer diametrically opposite views on the definition of a/the nation and its interests, characteristics and significant 'others'. These ideas and ideologies stand in a relation of logical inconsistency with each other and with other 'non-nationalist' ideas. The ideas of Starčević, for example, were in direct competition with the nationalist ideology of Yugoslavism, just as with the unitary ideas propounded from Vienna or nationalist ideologies of the Hungarian nationalist corporate agents. This clearly illustrates that an analysis of the formation of nationalist ideas has to take into account the existence of a 'conflict' of ideas, or, in Margaret Archer's words, of a logical inconsistency within the cultural system and a lack of socio-cultural integration. Since these contradictory ideas supply directional guidance for agencies, as Archer claims, whether the society will go through the process of morphostasis or morphogenesis would clearly depend on the outcome of the interaction of the social groups that advocate these ideas.

One of the hypotheses of social realist theory states that developments in the cultural system necessarily relate to the structural system. High systemic integration (structural and/or cultural), such as existed during Socialist Yugoslavia, resembles Archer's 'myth of cultural integration' where a highly integrated structural system is supported by a highly integrated cultural system. In return, society was structured in order to protect that culture. The analysis of secondary school history textbooks in Chapter Seven points to these situations. The analysis revealed how a social institution (in this case a school system) can be used to promote the dominant nationalist ideology. The adoption of a single nationalist ideology by the structural elements marks the end of a morphogenetic cycle of nation-/re/formation and, at the same time, creates an opportunity for the formation of a new competition between social groups. The creation of structural and cultural integration will be sustained as long as the corporate agency that maintains it is successful in accommodating new structural and cultural tendencies, preventing the formation of competing corporate agencies, and/or enjoying the support of primary agents.

Corporate and Primary Agents

The theoretical framework developed in Chapter Two emphasised that the nation is formed through the efforts of social groups and individuals. This does not imply that the nation is a form of 'invention' in Hobsbawm's sense. 'Invention' of the nation can only be understood as an intervention of the agents in the formation of a social form as a driving force of social changes. Social realist theory reminds us that no single agency, and no single individual, operates outside given structural and cultural systems, unconstrained by the pressures of primary agents. Rather, the nation emerges as an outcome of social, socio-cultural, and group interactions. In other words, the nation is a 'product' of interaction between different social groups that promote conflicting structural and cultural institutions and nationalist ideologies. These groups are termed corporate agencies.

The example of Croatia demonstrates that the formation of a corporate agency that arises in opposition to the ruling corporate agency is conditioned by the existence of:

- structural incompatibilities within society, when the structural system is unable to accommodate these differences - for instance, in late nineteenth-century Croatia when the existence of the relatively independent *Sabor* was in contradiction with the introduction of Bach's absolutism;

- cultural incompatibilities, when the dominant cultural system cannot accommodate new ideas without endangering its consistency - as in the 1920s when a centrally promoted unitarism was in direct contradiction with the developed Croatian nationalist ideology;

- incompatibilities between social groups, when the current social system is unable to integrate new groups and individuals without endangering the system itself - as in the late 1930s in the *Banovina* Croatia when the ruling HSS could not incorporate either Ustashas or Communists.

Nevertheless, the existence of these incompatibilities within a society is not a sufficient condition for the creation of an opposing corporate agency. The ruling corporate agency maintains its position by controlling material resources, the means of force, and/or enjoying some support from the primary agents. The new social group that promotes a distinctive nationalist ideology will become an opposing corporate agency only at the point when it gains a favourable bargaining position. The case of Croatia shows that this has been achieved by:

- creating national cultural institutions - as in the case of the Illyrian Movement;

- obtaining support from external powers - as in the case of the Ustasha movement;

- the collapse of the ruling corporate agency through internal political and economic circumstances - as was the case in the 1990s, and the rise of HDZ to power;

- mobilising primary agents in support of the agency's programme - as happened with the Croatian Peasant Party in the 1930s.

The example of Croatia also demonstrated that the mobilisation of primary agents proved to be the most efficient way for both obtaining and maintaining a corporate agency's bargaining power. Yet, it should be also noted that, in the case of Croatia, the importance of the primary agents' support for a corporate agency is a relatively new phenomenon. Only with the spread of nationalist ideologies and with the introduction of general suffrage at the beginning of the twentieth century did primary agents 'became introduced into history'.

While nineteenth-century nationalist corporate agencies concentrated their efforts on mobilising a small circle of nationally 'awakened' intelligentsia, at the beginning of the twentieth century agencies operated in changed circumstances of competing political parties. The votes of primary agents became crucial for defining the bargaining power of corporate agents. Since then corporate agencies have invested much effort into mobilising the population around a specific nationalist ideology.

The case of Croatia revealed that mobilisation of primary agents occurs in two stages: by formulating a nationalist ideology, and by disseminating it to the primary agents. The method of dissemination directly depends on the status of the corporate agency. While the corporate agency in opposition has to rely on either personal contacts with primary agents or on the restrictive availability of the mass media, the ruling corporate agency also mobilises the whole social structure for the same purpose. Hence, we saw how, besides controlling the mass media, the Ustasha, Communist and Tudman's regimes used the educational system, various cultural institutions, and the military, police, and youth organisations to mobilise primary agents. This is a point on which many dominant theories of nations and nationalism, like Ernest Gellner's, and some empirical researchers, like Eugene Weber, base their explanations of the process of nation-formation - 'creation from above'.

The results of the survey discussed in Chapter Eight shed some further light on the mechanisms of mobilising primary agents and the importance of a nationalist ideology in that process. These results demonstrated that a group of primary agents that claim to be members of the same nation do not necessarily share the

same perception of that nation. They might ascribe different significance to the same constitutive elements; they might have different ideas about the origin of their nation; they might define national interests differently; they might also recognise different symbols as national. The survey showed that the only homogenising element for these co-nationals is the perception of the 'significant other'. By no means do I want to claim that national identity is formed only through a negative point of reference, through identification of 'not-us' groups. However, the results of the survey allow me to claim that national identification *does not require* a single agreed definition of a/the nation, identification with the same symbols, or recognition of the same national interests. Regardless of the fact that the members of the same nation may identify with different political and cultural elements defined as national, the case of 1990s Croatia indicates that the power of a nationalist ideology to mobilise primary agents lies in pointing out the 'problems' or threats to the nation and offering solutions to those problems. The ideological and cultural homogeneity of the population of co-nationals is an ideological formulation, not a description of reality.

Elaboration of Structural and Cultural Systems and Elaboration of Agency

If a nation is understood as a social form, then the process of nation-/re/formation means the process of /re/formation and elaboration of its structural and cultural systems and the corporate and primary agencies. This means that the existence of a nationalist ideology alone cannot be a mark of the formation of a nation; that the formation of a national institution does not mean that a nation is created; that the existence of a group of 'nationally awakened' individuals cannot be considered as the sufficient condition for the existence of a nation.

Social realist theory assumes that the end of a morphogenetic cycle requires the formation of some form of structural and cultural /re/integration. The analysis of six morphogenetic cycles of the Croatian nation at the level of social structure, culture and agency from the early nineteenth until the late twentieth century allows me to conclude that an integrated social form can be called **a nation** when social, socio-cultural, and group interaction generate:

- the formation of a political community, through the definition of its 'membership';

- the institutionalisation of national doctrines, through the 'nationalisation' of social, political and cultural institutions;

- the politicisation of culture, by offering a defined national culture;

- the mobilisation of the population around specific nationalist ideologies;

- a change in the population's perceptions of their own social group;

and all of these occurring in the same period of time.

After developing a theoretical framework and applying that framework to the case of Croatia, it is impossible for me to determine *the date* of the creation of the Croatian nation. Nevertheless, it could be claimed that it was formed at the beginning of the twentieth century. This was the period when the Croats formed themselves as a political community; the Croatian national - political, cultural and social - institutions were created; when Croatian national culture was defined; when the Croats were mobilised around two distinctive nationalist ideologies; when these ideologies defined the main criteria for 'being a Croat'; when the Croatian population for the first time, literally on the streets, demonstrated their support for these ideologies. At this point it is important to emphasise that the label of 'being a nation' is not a form of evaluation of a social group, but a theoretical and methodological point of reference. The nation defined through these processes, not constituent elements, allows us to analyse the process of its creation and, at the same time, to *clearly distinguish this social form from others*, like the ethnic group whose creation in not the result of these particular precesses.

Morphogenetic Cycles of the Nation

The question that remains to be answered is whether the social realist approach proved valuable for examining the process of nation-/re/formation. This question can only be assessed through a review of the main findings of this research and a brief comparison with the dominant theoretical concepts of nations and nationalism.

1. The developed theoretical framework insists on defining nation-/re/formation as a **process**. This premise has several consequences: it points to the dynamics of social change and the importance of time as a variable. It is based upon the *historicity of emergence*. This implies that no social form, and that means no single nation, emerges without being conditioned by the existence of previous social forms. The social form that goes through a morphogenetic cycle, or a series of morphogenetic cycles, could gain such distinctive characteristics that we can assign to it a new label - the nation, for example. Yet these characteristics could not be understood without the analysis of processes that preceded their emergence. The social form that preceded the emergence of the nation in the literature of nations and nationalism is usually labelled the 'ethnic group'.

2. Analytical dualism is an approach to the study of the emergence of the nation that enables us to analyse separately the processes of structural, cultural and agential transformations. It assumes that structure, culture and agency are in constant interaction with one another, but only active agents can transform and maintain their structural and cultural systems. Hence, unlike many dominant theories of nations and nationalism, this approach does not consider the formation of the nation as an 'evolutionary' process, as an historical necessity, or series of historical stages; neither does it treat human beings as puppets of their institutions. At the same time, this approach strongly emphasises the importance of structural and cultural conditioning of an agency's actions. Therefore, this leads us to the conclusion that the process of nation-/re/formation can be examined only through the analysis of the outcomes of socio-cultural interactions.

3. The premises of analytical separability and temporal distinction underlying the theoretical framework and its application to the case of Croatia demonstrated that the nation is not created in a single process of social change. There is no single event that marked the emergence of the Croatian nation. It emerged as the consequence of *a series* of morphogenetic cycles. Elaborations of each of these cycles condition, but do not determine, the cycle that follows.

4. The findings of this research also demonstrate that the nation itself can pass through several morphogenetic cycles. This indicates that the nation is not a static social form that preserves its assumed characteristics once and for all. The case of Croatia shows that these reformations of the nation can be dramatic. Throughout its existence the Croatian nation frequently changed its definition, its rights of membership, its national symbols, its national culture, and defined various groups as 'significant others'. Hence I would conclude that a nation *cannot* be described as cultural or political, as ethnic or civic, as 'Western' or 'Eastern' (unless it is just a mark of its geographical position). We can only claim that a certain nation*alism* in a *specific period of time* could be seen as predominantly cultural or political, ethnic or civic, Western or Eastern.

5. Finally, the dynamics of the process of nation-/re/formation developed in this research point to the dominance of, to paraphrase Archer, 'the myth of national integration' within theories of nations and nationalism. The theoretical and empirical analyses offered in this thesis indicate diversities and varieties of perception*s* of the nation even within the same nation and the same period of time.

There are probably many other positive and negative implications of this research and its theoretical framework. I believe that only their further application to a range of examples could reveal them all.

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APENDIX

Table 42: Constituent Elements of the Nation							
No.	Statement	1*	2	3	4	5	mean
1	The nation has to have good leadership	2.3	10.1	10.4	33.9	43.3	4.06
2	The members of the same nation must have the same rights and duties	5.2	12.1	10.7	27.7	44.3	3.94
3	The members of the same nation must share a sense of equality	4.6	13.4	12.1	36.2	33.9	3.81
4	The nation must be sovereign	7.8	9.1	18.9	34.2	30.0	3.69
5	The members of the same nation must share a sense of solidarity	9.1	17.3	11.1	38.4	24.1	3.51
6	The nation has to have its own specific language	13.4	22.5	4.2	29.6	30.3	3.41
7	The nation has to have its own specific myths and symbols	5.9	24.4	14.0	40.4	15.3	3.35
8	The nation has to have one common culture	7.1	22.8	14.0	44.0	12.1	3.31
9	Every nation has to have its own state	15.3	18.2	9.1	37.5	19.9	3.28
10	The nation has to have one common economic system	12.1	23.1	15.3	25.4	24.1	3.26
11	The nation has to have its own specific territory	19.9	19.5	9.1	25.7	25.7	3.18
12	The nation has to have specifically defined borders	21.2	17.3	14.7	31.3	15.6	3.03
13	The nation has to share a common will	26.1	20.5	7.2	32.9	13.4	2.87
14	The members of the same nation have to have a sense of distinctiveness	28.0	17.9	21.2	16.3	16.6	2.76
15	The members of the same nation have to have the same ancestors	20.5	30.6	16.9	20.8	11.1	2.71
16	The nation has to have a long history	26.4	22.1	17.6	24.1	9.8	2.69
17	The members of the same nation have to share the same value system	24.1	29.3	9.8	28.3	8.5	2.68
18	The members of the same nation have to be characterized by the same national character	27.0	23.1	13.4	30.6	5.9	2.65
19	The members of the same nation have to be of the same religion	30.9	34.9	10.1	15.6	8.5	2.36
20	The members of the same nation have to attend the same education system	34.9	28.3	13.7	16.0	7.2	2.32
21	The members of the same nation are linked by a common destiny	36.8	31.3	13.4	14.3	4.2	2.18
22	The members of the same nation have to share the same blood	42.3	29.0	13.0	11.7	3.9	2.06

*1 - absolutely disagree; 2 - disagree; 3 - do not know; 4 - agree; 5 - absolutely agree

No.	Statement	1*	2	3	4	5	mean
Table 43: Croatian Nationalist Ideologies							
1	The Croatian nation can prosper only when other nations prosper as well	3.3	7.2	16.0	46.9	26.7	3.87
2	Sovereignty over the Croatian territories belongs to the Croatian nation and it cannot be shared with anyone else	4.9	14.7	14.3	47.9	18.2	3.60
3	The worst enemy of the Croatian nation is its own disunity	7.8	14.7	16.3	42.3	18.9	3.50
4	Systemic exaggeration of the Myth of Jasenovac in Socialist Yugoslavia aimed to create a black legend of historical guilt of the whole Croatian nation	11.1	17.9	8.5	44.3	18.2	3.41
5	A Croat is not one who is a descendent of ancient Croats, but one who is imbued in the Croatian spirit	6.2	19.9	17.3	43.3	13.4	3.38
6	Croats are a small nation and hence they have to look for friends among big and powerful nations	12.7	12.4	13.0	48.9	13.0	3.37
7	Throughout history, current indecisive and week leaderships can be blamed for the many sufferings of the Croatian nation	5.5	21.8	16.0	45.0	11.7	3.36
8	The Croatian nation is one of the oldest nations in Europe	6.8	20.2	20.8	40.7	11.4	3.30
9	In spite of all attempts, Croatdom has survived mainly due to the survival of its own language	7.2	28.7	12.1	39.1	13.0	3.22
10	Croats, just as other South Slavs, originate form common Karpathian homeland	12.7	11.4	29.6	35.5	10.7	3.20
11	From the West along the Adriatic Sea from Rijeka until Kotor, then between the rivers Drava and Danube from North and the river Drina from the East lies the ancient historical Croatian state	9.8	17.3	28.0	36.2	8.8	3.17
12	Croatdom, though Catholic, had a spiritual openness and need to recognise the Muslim religion, which had emerged due to historical circumstances within the Croat national entity	9.8	26.4	23.5	31.9	8.5	3.03
13	Throughout its history Croats were ramparts of Christianity	7.5	32.6	20.5	33.9	5.5	2.97
14	Once, when circumstances allow it, the Croatian nation, just as all other nations, will disappear as an important source of individual's identity	6.5	33.6	24.8	29.3	5.9	2.94
15	The Croatian name is of Iranian origins	13.7	23.8	43.6	9.8	9.1	2.77
16	The Croatian nation has preserved the racial and blood characteristics of its forefathers and embraced the religion of its ancestors	15.0	32.2	22.8	20.8	9.1	2.77
17	The original Croatian culture is one which is based on old traditions of the Croatian peasantry	24.4	25.4	19.5	20.8	9.8	2.66
18	The Croatian nation was formed in the nineteenth century, thanks to strivings and efforts of important individuals of that time	17.9	43.0	20.2	10.1	8.8	2.49
19	Croats think of Croatia only as a piece of land, and those who think about a bigger area are considered as more patriotic	26.7	34.5	16.6	13.0	9.1	2.43
20	One who loves Croatdom will look for friends among Slav nations	23.1	41.7	13.4	14.3	7.5	2.41
21	Those who are not descendants of a peasant family, in 90 cases out of 100, are not of Croatian descent or blood, but immigrated foreigners	23.1	41.4	19.2	11.7	4.6	2.33
22	The only way to solve the problem of Croatian national minorities in other states is by abolishing the borders between these states	19.5	49.2	18.6	6.2	6.5	2.31
23	Croats are a chosen people, a holy community which deserves to be respected and worshipped	45.9	29.3	15.0	6.5	3.3	1.92
24	Croatian historical territory is territory on which Croatian blood has been spelt	49.5	26.4	10.7	9.1	4.2	1.92
25	Without any pretensions, Croats could say that they have four times more brains than members of other nations	56.4	25.1	7.8	3.3	7.5	1.80

*1 - absolutely disagree; 2 - disagree; 3 - do not know; 4 - agree; 5 - absolutely agree

Table 44: Croatian National Heroes							
No.	Statement	1*	2	3	4	5	mean
1	Ljudevit Gaj	1.3	3.3	3.9	52.1	39.4	4.25
2	Stjepan Radić	1.0	2.3	8.8	49.8	38.1	4.22
3	Vladimir Nazor	2.0	3.9	11.4	49.5	33.2	4.08
4	King Tomislav	1.6	2.3	7.5	67.8	20.8	4.04
5	Josip Juraj Strossmayer	2.3	2.3	18.6	50.8	26.1	3.96
6	Ante Starčević	2.3	11.1	11.7	44.6	30.3	3.90
7	Ban Jelačić	4.2	7.2	13.0	53.7	21.8	3.82
8	Franjo Rački	1.6	7.8	24.4	53.1	13.0	3.68
9	Janko Drašković	2.6	4.6	25.7	58.3	8.8	3.66
10	Mika Tripalo	5.5	11.4	26.4	33.2	23.5	3.58
11	Matija Gubec	0.3	2.6	11.1	75.6	10.4	3.39
12	Josip Broz Tito	8.5	17.6	18.6	37.8	17.6	3.38
13	Josip Franck	8.5	14.0	38.8	27.0	11.7	3.20
14	Vlatko Maček	8.5	22.1	25.7	34.9	8.8	3.13
15	Franc Joseph I	2.3	23.1	46.9	20.8	6.8	3.07
16	Maria Teresa	9.1	21.8	34.5	26.4	8.1	3.03
17	Baron Trenk	4.2	20.8	50.8	16.6	7.5	3.02
18	King Coloman	4.2	19.9	55.7	14.7	5.5	2.97
19	Mile Budak	15.6	14.0	36.8	26.4	7.2	2.95
20	Ante Pavelić	49.5	26.1	15.3	5.5	3.6	1.88

* 1 - explicitly negative role; 2 - negative role; 3 - do not know; 4 - positive role; 5 - explicitly positive role

Table 45: Correlation Matrix: Constituent Elements of the Nation

Variables	N1	N4	N5	N6	N7	N8	N9	N10	N11	N13	N15	N16	N19	N20	N21	N2	N12	N17
N1	1.000	.181	.006	.185	-.044	-.025	.090	.008	-.065	.182	.113	.075	-.025	-.061	-.117	.234	.011	.069
N4	.181	1.000	.038	.033	.123	.123	.103	.138	.037	.205	.037	.211	.106	.027	.008	.135	.078	.222
N5	.006	.038	1.000	.067	.119	.055	-.148	.111	.064	.018	.084	-.035	.073	.183	.106	.014	.059	-.047
N6	.185	.033	.067	1.000	.006	.109	.054	.140	.162	.290	.258	.178	-.011	-.053	.036	.142	.148	.151
N7	-.044	.123	.119	.006	1.000	.297	.142	.291	.217	.104	.032	.055	.266	-.026	.109	.055	.198	.166
N8	-.025	.123	.055	.109	.297	1.000	.228	.358	.122	.176	.117	.271	.250	.088	.171	.161	.303	.272
N9	.090	.103	-.148	.054	.142	.228	1.000	.222	.069	.130	.094	.154	.159	.012	.025	.125	.214	.438
N10	.008	.138	.111	.140	.291	.358	.222	1.000	.153	.162	.185	.234	.342	.055	.106	.215	.307	.235
N11	-.065	.037	.064	.162	.217	.122	.069	.153	1.000	.115	.171	-.069	.082	.030	.219	.064	.159	.081
N13	.182	.205	.018	.290	.104	.176	.130	.162	.115	1.000	.259	.249	.303	.157	.202	.316	.264	.339
N15	.113	.037	.084	.258	.032	.117	.094	.185	.171	.259	1.000	.252	.212	.136	.130	.227	.192	.197
N16	.075	.211	-.035	.178	.055	.271	.154	.234	-.069	.249	.252	1.000	.166	.159	.027	.215	.160	.318
N19	-.025	.106	.073	-.011	.266	.250	.159	.342	.082	.303	.212	.166	1.000	.280	.366	.218	.327	.261
N20	-.061	.027	.183	-.053	-.026	.088	.012	.055	.030	.157	.136	.159	.280	1.000	.463	.150	.224	.229
N21	-.117	.008	.106	.036	.109	.171	.025	.106	.219	.202	.130	.027	.366	.463	1.000	.146	.222	.030
N2	.234	.135	.014	.142	.055	.161	.125	.215	.064	.316	.227	.215	.218	.150	.146	1.000	.152	.172
N12	.011	.078	.059	.148	.198	.303	.214	.307	.159	.264	.192	.160	.327	.224	.222	.152	1.000	.401
N17	.069	.222	-.047	.151	.166	.272	.438	.235	.081	.339	.197	.318	.261	.229	.030	.172	.401	1.000

Table 46: Correlation Matrix - Factors

	Nation1	Nation2	Nation3	Nation4	Nation5	Ideol. 1	Ideol. 2	Ideol. 3	Ideol. 4	Ideol. 5	Ideol. 6	Origin 1	Origin 2	Origin 3	Origin 4	Heroes1	Heroes2	Heroes 3	Heroes 4	Heroes 5	Distan. 1	Distan. 2
Nation 1	1.000	.384	.130	.295	.262	.220	.206	-.064	.259	-.048	.078	-.039	.005	.042	-.080	.131	.086	.270	-.129	-.093	.114	-.191
Nation 2	.384	1.000	.237	.294	.276	.190	.244	.014	.304	.056	.095	-.062	.059	.057	-.084	.164	.039	.064	.012	-.050	-.050	-.149
Nation 3	.130	.237	1.000	.197	.309	.447	.151	.177	.119	.223	.030	.125	.066	.101	-.034	-.051	-.080	.293	-.319	-.015	-.057	-.170
Nation 4	.295	.294	.197	1.000	.193	.257	.269	.040	.291	.188	.173	.080	.110	.016	-.008	.116	-.063	.330	-.133	-.026	.093	-.072
Nation 5	.262	.276	.309	.193	1.000	.382	.275	.110	.130	.096	.109	.084	.000	.083	-.042	-.136	-.051	.351	-.104	-.015	.114	-.139
Ideology 1	.220	.190	.447	.257	.382	1.000	.148	.120	.238	.084	.020	.233	.040	-.017	-.032	.032	-.098	.259	-.365	.034	.048	-.154
Ideology 2	.206	.244	.151	.269	.275	.148	1.000	-.054	.002	.003	.040	.052	.261	-.040	-.195	-.003	-.038	.198	-.201	-.054	.126	-.097
Ideology 3	-.064	.014	.177	.040	.110	.120	-.054	1.000	-.111	-.026	-.090	.242	-.239	.002	.147	-.293	-.114	-.072	.051	-.043	-.176	.161
Ideology 4	.259	.304	.119	.291	.130	.238	.002	-.111	1.000	.242	.147	-.026	.176	.139	.196	.373	.127	.243	-.205	-.117	-.049	-.235
Ideology 5	-.048	.056	.223	.188	.096	.084	.003	-.026	.242	1.000	.042	-.053	.128	.159	.060	.199	.055	.064	-.079	-.126	-.026	.048
Ideology 6	.078	.095	.030	.173	.109	.020	.040	-.090	.147	.042	1.000	-.052	-.052	.239	.069	.132	.041	.102	-.074	.165	-.099	-.085
Origins 1	-.039	-.062	.125	.080	.084	.233	.052	.242	-.026	-.053	-.052	1.000	-.073	.095	-.080	-.125	-.040	.068	-.156	-.116	-.030	-.162
Origins 2	.005	.059	.066	.110	.000	.040	.261	-.239	.176	.128	-.052	-.073	1.000	-.042	-.083	.179	.049	.126	-.127	-.110	.063	-.023
Origins 3	.042	.057	.101	.016	.083	-.017	-.040	.002	.139	.159	.239	.095	-.042	1.000	.097	-.030	-.015	.099	-.041	-.107	-.074	-.090
Origins 4	-.080	-.084	-.034	-.008	-.042	-.032	-.195	.147	.196	.060	.069	-.080	-.083	.097	1.000	.117	-.023	-.039	.095	.006	-.214	.110
Heroes 1	.131	.164	-.051	.116	-.136	.032	-.003	-.293	.373	.199	.132	-.125	.179	-.030	.117	1.000	.157	.168	.047	.121	.059	.019
Heroes 2	.086	.039	-.080	-.063	-.051	-.098	-.038	-.114	.127	.055	.041	-.040	.049	-.015	-.023	.157	1.000	-.084	.188	-.254	-.047	-.003
Heroes 3	.270	.064	.293	.330	.351	.259	.198	-.072	.243	.064	.102	.068	.126	.099	-.039	.168	-.084	1.000	-.130	.164	.226	-.172
Heroes 4	-.129	.012	-.319	-.133	-.104	-.365	-.201	.051	-.205	-.079	-.074	-.156	-.127	-.041	.095	.047	.188	-.130	1.000	-.039	-.087	.468
Heroes 5	-.093	-.050	-.015	-.026	-.015	.034	-.054	-.043	-.117	-.126	.165	-.116	-.110	-.107	.006	.121	-.254	.164	-.039	1.000	.033	.057
Distance 1	.114	-.050	-.057	.093	.114	.048	.126	-.176	-.049	-.026	-.099	-.030	.063	-.074	-.214	.059	-.047	.226	-.087	.033	1.000	.055
Distance 2	-.191	-.149	-.170	-.072	-.139	-.154	-.097	.161	-.235	.048	-.085	-.162	-.023	-.090	.110	.019	-.003	-.172	.468	.057	.055	1.000