

**CONTAINING THE GERMAN THREAT:
THE BRITISH DEBATE OVER
WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT
1949-55**

SPENCER WILLIAM MAWBY

PhD

LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

1



UMI Number: U615178

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



UMI U615178

Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.



ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

THESES

F
7391



585316

The thesis provides a new interpretation of Britain's policy towards German rearmament through an analysis of the views of government ministers, Foreign Office officials and military planners. It analyses the role of five key influences.

British antipathy to the Germans was of seminal importance. Suspicion of the Germans among Labour ministers produced a backlash against a policy of German rearmament from September 1950. The Foreign Office feared a new German-Soviet, Rapallo-style pact and sought to prevent this by integrating the Federal Republic into the West. Once political and military integration were conjoined in the EDC-contract negotiations they became supportive of the EDC as a means of containing the German threat.

The American role was crucial in persuading the British to accept German rearmament within the EDC. However, Washington consistently came into conflict with London over Germany's financial contribution to defence, the extent of German rearmament and British attempts to moderate German policy in order to conciliate the Soviets. The Anglo-Soviet relationship constitutes a third crucial factor. Initially, fear of Soviet reactions inhibited the British from supporting extensive German rearmament. The apparently less provocative nature of EDC was one reason for British acceptance of it. In 1951, 1953 and 1955 elements within the British government sought to promote detente through concessions to the Soviets on German rearmament.

Though the British military put the German rearmament issue on to the government's agenda in spring 1950, subsequently the strategic rationale became less important than the diplomatic. From 1952 a German defence contribution was seen as a means of compensating for NATO deficiencies rather than as part of a wider force expansion. German rearmament involved substantial financial costs for Britain but a series of favourable financial agreements with the Federal Republic enabled policy-makers to discount this factor.

CONTENTS

	page no.
Preface	4
Introduction	6
Ch.1:The Gendarmerie Scheme	27
Ch.2: The Labour Backlash	54
Ch.3: The EDC Option	98
Ch.4: German Rearmament Reconsidered	152
Ch.5: Revisiting Rapallo?	193
Ch.6: The Unresolved German Problem	226
Conclusion	260
Appendix: Foreign Office Policy-Makers	269
Bibliography	273

PREFACE

I have greatly enjoyed researching and writing this thesis. It originated from a desire to examine how Britain viewed the transformation of Germany, or at least the western half of it, from a bitter enemy to a partner in the western alliance system. The study of British foreign policy in the first post-war decade has tended to concentrate on the problems experienced in adapting to the decline of Britain's global influence, Britain's attitudes towards European integration and on the souring of Anglo-Soviet relations. Less has been written on the effect which three generations of hostility between Germany and Britain had on Britain's view of the post-1945 balance, or imbalance, of power on the European continent. Naturally an interest in this subject leads one to consider British attitudes to the arming of the nascent Federal Republic.

Much important research has of course been done on this subject, particularly by Saki Dockrill, John Young and Klaus Larres. However, their work centres around two particular facets of the German rearmament issue, namely Britain's attitude towards the European Army and the role of Churchill's diplomacy in this controversy. The development of the Labour government's policy between 1949 and 1951 has been somewhat neglected, as has the reconsideration of policy which occurred in 1954-5. In addition the disagreements within the western alliance over issues such as German arms production, the German financial contribution, the role of German rearmament in Allied military strategy and the decoupling of the EDC from the establishment of contractual relations need further examination. My over-riding aim has been to discover the nature of the internal debate within the British government on the subject of German rearmament. As a result of my analysis I discovered that the uncertain future of Germany played as large a role as the seemingly unremitting hostility of the Soviet Union in the development of Britain's Cold War policy.

This thesis could not have been completed without the assistance of a number of people and institutions. I owe a huge debt to my supervisor, Dr John Kent, for his help and encouragement, without which this project could never have been finished within the three year deadline. The International History department at LSE provided a stimulating environment for my work and I would particularly like to thank Pat Christopher for her assistance in steering me through

a series of administrative obstacles. I received invaluable advice on the draft manuscript from Dr Kate Morris, Christine Murray, Ian Speller and Bryan White. Professor John Young assisted in the publication of the first chapter, provided me with a draft manuscript of his book, **Churchill's Last Campaign**, and scrutinised the final draft for which I am very grateful. Professor Geoffrey Warner gave me access to the Kenneth Younger papers which I quote with the kind permission Lady Younger. I would also like to thank Mrs Elizabeth Al Qadhi for granting me access to her father's papers.

The staff at the Public Records Office at Kew supplied me with an endless stream of papers from the government archives on which most of this thesis is based. The resources of the British Library of Political and Economic Science proved immensely useful and I would like to thank the staff there for their assistance. I have receive help from the staff at a number of other libraries and institutions and I acknowledge my debt to those working at the British Library; the Imperial War Museum; the Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge; the Department of Modern Manuscripts at the Bodleian Library and the Nuffield College Library, Oxford; the House of Lords Record Office; the Liddell Hart Centre at King's College, London; the University of London Library; the archives centre at the University of Birmingham; the National Army Museum; and the National Register of Archives and Historical Manuscripts Commission at Quality House.

I am immensely grateful to the British Academy who have funded my work for the past three years and have been helpful and efficient in all my dealings with them.

The greatest debt of all I owe to my mother, Mrs Sheila Mawby, who unflinchingly typed chapter after chapter, draft after draft, while retaining an unshakable conviction that one day at some hour we would eventually get to the end. And, astonishingly enough, we did.

INTRODUCTION

The complexities of British foreign policy in the first half of the 1950s have perhaps not yet been fully appreciated. During 1950 Bevin's attempts to create a viable Western Union based on a transatlantic partnership reached fruition with the agreement to create an integrated NATO structure and the appointment of an American Supreme Commander for Allied forces in Europe. However, a series of new problems emerged during the course of the year. In rapid succession the French proposed greater European economic integration in the form of the Schuman Plan and a new European defence structure embodied in the Pleven Plan. After a period of relative calm following the end of the Berlin Blockade the outbreak of the Korean War appeared to signal an escalation in the Cold War. The Soviets sought to exploit western fears through renewed offers of four power negotiations. Meanwhile, the Americans became ever more vehement in their insistence upon a greater defence effort from the European powers. Finally, the new Chancellor of Germany, Konrad Adenauer, sought to utilise his domestic weakness to international advantage by warning that without concessions from the Allies on the subject of a security guarantee and the establishment of an armed Federal police force, his position would be endangered. All of these issues fed into the debate within the British government on the subject of a German defence contribution and in various forms fears about Germany's future, American pressure, the Soviet Cold War challenge and the debate over European defence were to create endless difficulties for British policy-makers over the next five years. Perhaps because of these intricacies there is no full, accurate, narrative account of the evolution of British policy towards German rearmament in this period. This thesis is intended to provide such a narrative and to analyse the factors which influenced British foreign policy-makers. In doing so it will demonstrate that the British had a singular perspective on the Cold War in the early 1950s and evaluate how influential the British view was in the international debate over the arming of Germany.

The general view of British policy between 1949 and 1951 has been that it was marked by the slow acceptance of the idea of German rearmament by the

Labour government.¹ In fact the reverse is true. In the spring of 1950 the British government developed a plan for a German defence contribution based on the notion that this was essential to western defence in the long term but that such a policy must proceed cautiously. After June 1950 a reaction set in which accelerated with the forced acceptance by the British of the principle of German rearmament at the New York Foreign Ministers conference in September. In the winter of 1950-1 the majority of the Cabinet, most Foreign Office officials and even some military analysts were seeking a delay or even the abandonment of the policy of German rearmament. Chapter one of this thesis deals with the early British plans for a German defence contribution and chapter two outlines the backlash. Chapter three chronicles a series of Anglo-American disputes over German arms production and the Federal Republic's financial contribution to defence. It argues that the European Defence Community (EDC) became an essential component of the government's policy for the integration of Germany into the western system which was the central goal of British foreign policy. However, there were dissenters from this line and the procrastination of the French on this issue provided them with their opportunity. Chapter four analyses Churchill's failed attempt to revise policy and suggests that the defeat of his initiative, combined with the emergence of a new military rationale for German rearmament merely reinforced the status quo. The Conservative government did eventually lose faith in EDC but only during the last months of its life. To suggest they had been trying to strangle it since its infancy² is a distortion. Chapter five suggests that the real abandonment of EDC did not consist of the formulation of plans for German rearmament within NATO, which many military analysts believed were profoundly flawed but which have nevertheless been used as evidence of British coolness towards the European Army, but of a plan to postpone German rearmament in order to establish a contractual relationship with the Federal Republic which did not emerge until the summer of 1954. The

1. Saki Dockrill, *Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991), chs. 1-4; D.C. Watt, *Britain Looks to Germany* (Oswald Wolff, London, 1965), p.102-8; David Clay Large, *Germans to the Front* (University of North Carolina Press, Stanford Hill, 1996), p. 41-4.

2. For the extreme version of this view see Klaus Larres, 'British Attitudes to German Rearmament and Reunification in the 1950s', *Contemporary Record*, 5, 1991, p.292-3. Dockrill also argues that Eden and the Conservatives were tepid towards EDC. See Saki Dockrill, 'The Evolution of British Policy Towards a European Army', *Strategic Studies*, 12, 1989, p.38-62.

primacy of the new political relationship is the theme of chapter six which demonstrates the increasing indifference of the Foreign Office to a German defence contribution and their willingness to negotiate over this issue with the Soviet Union.

For the sake of convenience the main foreign policy decision-makers are often discussed as members of one of three groups: Whitehall officials, of whom the most important were the members of the Foreign Office, the military, represented mainly by the Chiefs of Staff, and government ministers. Of these three groups it was the permanent officials at the Foreign Office who had the greatest influence. The Foreign Office was both the point at which information on foreign affairs was collected and analysed and a centre for decision-making. Those departments responsible for Germany received telegrams from Bonn covering events in the Federal Republic but their staff also read reports from the other embassies whose work impinged on German affairs, including Washington, Moscow and Paris. At the centre of the decision-making process was an official with the remit to supervise German affairs. His work included deciding which issues needed to be addressed by his supervisors, the writing of advisory memoranda to the Permanent Under-Secretary and the Foreign Secretary on these matters and the taking of decisions when he believed further consultation was unnecessary. For the 1949-51 period this official had the rank of Permanent Under-Secretary in the semi-autonomous German section of the Foreign Office, but subsequently German affairs were reintegrated into the parent organisation and a superintending Deputy Under-Secretary took responsibility. As Permanent Under-Secretary for the German section between 1949 and 1950, Ivone Kirkpatrick exercised enormous influence, while Frank Roberts, as Deputy Under-Secretary superintending German affairs, played a crucial role in guiding British policy from 1951 to 1954. The former initially opposed German rearmament, while the latter favoured it, and the change in personnel at least partially explains the British government's more positive attitude towards a German defence contribution after 1951. Donald Gainer, the Permanent Under-Secretary for the German section between 1950 and 1951, and Geoffrey Harrison, the superintending Under-Secretary after 1954, were less influential. The key official abroad was the British High Commissioner to Germany. Of the three occupants

of this post it was Kirkpatrick who, as High Commissioner for three years from 1950, had a commanding role. However his predecessor, General Brian Robertson, who helped persuade Bevin of the need for a Federal gendarmerie, and his successor, Frederick Hoyer-Millar, who stressed the need for an end to the occupation after 1953, were also important figures. Other officials abroad, notably the ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1950, David Kelly, and the ambassador to France in 1954, Gladwyn Jebb, were influential on occasions. The head of the Foreign Office, the Permanent Under-Secretary, often acted as a conduit for the views of his officials rather than as an active policy-maker. However, the two officials who held this post in our period, William Strang and Kirkpatrick, both had strong views on German policy and played an active role in its development.

The Cabinet was some distance removed from the process of active foreign policy-making. They received periodic reports from the Foreign Secretary in the form of memoranda drafted by the responsible Under-Secretary but with a few exceptions, notably Hugh Dalton and Harold Macmillan, they were inevitably distracted by the affairs of their own departments and were less well briefed than the Foreign Secretary. Outside interventions were generally the result of either party pressure or individual initiative. While the second Attlee government suffered disruption from both sources, during Churchill's second administration Eden only had to deal with personal challenges. The increasing divisions within the Labour Party during the 1950s began to exert a disruptive influence as Bevin's grip on foreign affairs weakened due to ill health in 1950. The Labour left, which came under Anuerin Bevan's leadership, persistently argued the case for negotiations with the Soviets to achieve German unification and they gained additional support from the strong Germanophobic elements in the party when urging the postponement of the German defence contribution. The emergence of this powerful coalition provided the background to Attlee's increasing scepticism about arming the Germans in the winter of 1950-1. There were numerous forums in which this dissent could be expressed including the National Executive Committee (NEC), meetings of the Parliamentary Labour Party and the annual party conference. The controversy reached its climax at the 1954 Scarborough conference when the leadership's motion endorsing the rearmament of Germany

passed by a narrow majority following a bitter party row. In the Conservative Party the dissenters were a smaller faction, with greater loyalty to the party leadership and less opportunity to express their discontent. During Churchill's second premiership German rearmament was increasingly tied to the EDC issue and, though there was a range of opinion about the idea of a European Army in the Conservative Party, when it came to votes on Britain's association there were few willing to abstain. This may have been at least partly a reaction to Labour disunity.

Even without the constraints of party pressure there were a number of prominent Cabinet ministers willing to oppose the development of government policy on this issue. Hugh Dalton, who had been one of Labour's leading spokesmen on foreign affairs in the 1930s and was still a prominent NEC member, provided leadership for a group of ministers determined to prevent Bevin's agreement to the principle of German rearmament in 1950 being put into practise in 1951. In the 1951-5 Conservative government the most prominent opponent of Eden's foreign policy was Churchill himself. The Prime Minister was bitterly critical of the form which EDC had taken and was infuriated when French hesitancy about ratifying the treaty appeared to be blocking the path to detente. Macmillan too regarded the EDC as a misconceived continental project which ought to be abandoned but he was unable to muster the support Dalton had gained within the Labour government and was defeated by the silencing authority of Eden. Significantly, one Cabinet minister who never joined the dissenters was the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Both Gaitskell and Butler accepted German rearmament and seemed to regard the trade implications as advantageous, even if the consequences for the balance of payments were not. The Treasury arguments against a German defence contribution based on the increase in the defence budget which would result from Britain's assumption of occupation costs in Germany were never put to the Cabinet by either Chancellor. It was left to Eden to give the Foreign Office view of the economic consequences of German rearmament.

The British Chiefs of Staff had access to foreign policy-making through regular consultations with the Foreign Office, the Defence Committee and the

presence of the Minister of Defence at Cabinet meetings. However, their influence was circumscribed during the Churchill administration by the increasing infrequency of Defence Committee meetings and the weakness of Alexander as a departmental head.³ Their most notable success came in early 1950 when they persuaded Bevin to accept their conception of an armed Federal gendarmerie for West Germany. After the outbreak of the Korean War they lost the initiative and never regained it. Nevertheless, the views of two key figures, John Slessor and John Harding, had some impact even after June 1950. Slessor, the Chief of the Air Staff between 1950 and 1952, believed it was essential to harness German military potential to the western cause and argued strongly that fears of a new German threat were anachronistic because the threat of atomic retaliation was bound to inhibit any future German government from pursuing an adventurist foreign policy. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff from 1952, proved a vigorous advocate of a substantial German defence contribution at a time when its strategic rationale was becoming increasingly unclear.

The role of domestic factors, with the exception of party politics, has been largely discounted in this study. It has generally been recognised that public opinion has had a very marginal influence on British foreign policy.⁴ Kenneth Younger, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office between 1950 and 1951, could recall no example of a foreign policy decision being taken under the influence of domestic pressures.⁵ Though the Beaverbrook press launched a campaign against the idea of German rearmament, there is little evidence to suggest it had a great impact on policy-making. Indeed, if one examines the Foreign Office files it is clear that they took a much greater interest in the state of German than British public opinion. The formal reason for this was that, whereas the High Commissioner in Germany sent a stream of reports to the leading figures in the Foreign Office analysing the state of German opinion, reporting and shaping British public opinion was left to the separate German Information department, under the long serving but obscure functionary, Roland

3. Anthony Seldon, *Churchill's Indian Summer* (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1981), p.298-9.

4. David Vital, *The Making of British Foreign Policy* (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1968), ch.4.

5. James Barber, *Who Makes British Foreign Policy?* (Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1976), p.11-12.

Chaput de Saintonge. Despite constant reorganisation the German Information department remained outside the policy-making structure. However, the central reason for Foreign Office disinterest was their awareness that the British had at least tacitly accepted the need for a western alliance to counter communist influence and showed no sign of changing this view but the Germans had yet to be persuaded of the West's Cold War case and had traditionally been drawn towards an eastern alliance. Countering this latter tendency was central to Foreign Office strategy and was accepted as such by Bevin, Morrison and Eden. Even the opponents of German rearmament tended to concentrate on opposition to it in Germany rather than attempting to harness British public opinion in an extra-Parliamentary campaign. Thus the February 1951 Attlee conditions called for the consent of the German people to be demonstrated and the Labour Party returned to this theme in May 1952, when they demanded new elections in the Federal Republic to endorse Adenauer's policy.⁶

In examining British policy towards German rearmament this study will concentrate on five key factors:

1. British antipathy towards the Germans. The British had endured two recent wars against the Germans and the quondam Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Robert Vansittart, held them responsible for the last five European conflicts.⁷ In order to understand British attitudes towards German rearmament it is essential to be cognisant of the emotive nature of the issue.

2. The relationship with the United States. The Americans had been drawn into European affairs by Hitler's declaration of war upon them in December 1941 and since that time it had been a goal of British policy-makers to maintain the Atlantic alliance and avoid a repetition of the post-1918 era when American engagement with the Old World seemed restricted to the exercise of dollar diplomacy. In April 1949 the Americans signed the North Atlantic Treaty and this was followed in December 1950 by the commitment of American reinforcements to Europe and the appointment of an American Supreme Commander for NATO. American involvement inevitably implied American leadership and the role of Anglo-

6. Kenneth Harris, *Attlee* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1982), p.498.

7. In November 1939 Vansittart wrote his version of the origins of the Second World War and called it 'The Origins of Germany's Fifth War'. See Norman Rose, *Vansittart: Study of a Diplomat* (William Heinemann, London, 1978), p.239.

American relations must be considered from this perspective in any analysis of British policy towards German rearmament.

3.The relationship with the Soviet Union. After the ending of the Berlin Blockade in 1949 Anglo-Soviet relations can best be described as antagonistic but stable. Despite the overt hostility between London and Moscow, the Soviets could still offer British policy-makers inducements, in the form of a relaxation of tension which would allow both countries an opportunity to confront their domestic problems, and potent threats, ranging from intimidatory probes into the western sphere of influence to the launching of all out war, in an effort to influence British policy. Thus the influence of Soviet diplomacy must also be considered.

4.The military situation. The threat posed by the still vast military forces deployed by the Soviets dominated British military thinking at the end of the 1940s. Since August 1945 the British and the Americans had completed a vast demobilisation programme which had produced a huge disparity between the armed forces of the West and those of the Soviet Union. The rearming of the western zones of Germany offered the opportunity to narrow this gap at a time when the West's technological advantage was apparently eroding.

5.The economics of German rearmament. British forces had been in occupation of Germany since 1945 and though this had initially involved huge costs, by the time of the founding of the Federal Republic in September 1949, the Germans were making a substantial contribution to the British defence budget by paying for the stationing of allied troops on their territory. The rearming of Germany implied that the funds previously allocated to the occupying powers would go towards the raising of German forces instead. The new costs on the Exchequer had to be considered against the possible benefits which British exporters might gain from the strains on the German economy resulting from a large scale rearmament programme.

Of these five factors, the background to the Anglo-American and Anglo-Soviet relationships are well known, while the military and economic aspects relate specifically to the conditions prevailing in the 1949-55 period and will be examined in subsequent chapters. However, the role of Anglo-German antagonism is rarely discussed as a factor in the development of the Cold War and it is necessary, therefore, to place this in historical context.

Though it is often assumed that prior to the 20th century Britain had developed close relations with Germany based on racial, linguistic and cultural affinities, in fact the historical record is ambiguous. In geopolitical terms Germany lies at the heart of Europe, while Britain is on the periphery, and this fact has been reflected in the very different histories of the two countries. Since the start of the Early Modern period Germany has been at the centre of European politics, first as a battleground for the great powers, then as a hotbed in which the modern phenomena of nationalism, militarism and totalitarianism developed at an accelerated pace. By contrast, the British did not suffer the depredations which accompany the march of foreign armies and were distracted from playing a larger role in Europe by the process of acquiring a global empire. On the occasions when the British did interfere it was not always to the benefit of the German states. In 1704, for example, Marlborough conducted a brutal campaign of terror in Bavaria as part of Britain's policy of opposing the ambitions of Louis XIV and his German ally, the Elector of Bavaria. Indeed Britain's policy towards the German states seems largely to have been conducted on the basis of the latter's utility in opposing French policy. Thus, when Prussia allied itself to France during the Silesian Wars of the 1740s she found herself in conflict with Britain, but when Prussia fought France, as during the Seven Years War, she gained British support.

Anglo-German relations were further complicated by the close dynastic ties between the two countries. In the 18th century the Hanoverian kings had a dual role as German electors and British monarchs. These dynastic influences survived into the 19th century when Queen Victoria and her German spouse, Prince Albert, became ardent advocates of close Anglo-German relations. However, the disruptive influence of the rise of Prussia prompted many British statesmen to question whether it was wise to encourage German nationalism, even if it did provide a continental counterweight to Britain's traditional foes, France and Russia. Palmerston was prepared to align himself with despotic Russia in order to prevent the Prussian annexation of Schleswig-Holstein. This venture ended in humiliating failure and demonstrated that neither pro-Germans nor anti-Germans within Britain had much hope of influencing events on the continent of Europe in the mid-19th century.

In 1914 the British did intervene in Europe to oppose German designs and

it is possible to trace the origins of this decision to the autocratic Bismarck era. The first German Chancellor's influence on Anglo-German relations was a baleful one. Queen Victoria was shocked by his brutal treatment of the pro-British party at court, led by her son-in-law, the Crown Prince Frederick. Liberals were dismayed by Prussia's comprehensive victory in the war against France, and then further alienated by Bismarck's contempt for Gladstone. Even some Conservative politicians, such as Derby, who later defected to the Liberals, and Salisbury, became concerned at the vigour with which a united Germany conducted itself.⁸ These worries intensified with the adoption by Bismarck's successors of Weltpolitik and, most significant of all, the emergence of a German naval challenge. The erratic course of German foreign policy in the 1890s not only strained relations between William II and his uncle, the Prince of Wales, but, more significantly, soured Sir Edward Grey's view of Germany.⁹ The outburst of violent anti-British feeling during the Boer War cemented the new antagonism.

One crucial development during the years of escalating tension leading up to World War I was the virtual takeover of the British Foreign Office by the Germanophobes, the effects of which could still be felt half a century later.¹⁰ The key figure in this group was Francis Bertie. As an Assistant Under-Secretary he used his influence, which extended as far as the court, to advance the careers of like-minded officials, including Charles Hardinge, Arthur Nicolson, Louis Mallet and Eyre Crowe. Crowe was regarded as a mentor by the most famous of this line, Sir Robert Vansittart, although Crowe himself was not particularly impressed by his successor's abilities. Vansittart's own influence continued to be felt in the post-1945 era when his close ally in opposing appeasement, Sir Orme Sargent, was head of the Foreign Office. Though it may be argued that these officials were a good deal more reasonable than some of the more violent Germanophobes outside the Civil Service, they nevertheless showed a consistent hostility to the Germans. Their existence proved a formidable obstacle within the government to

8. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism* (The Ashfield Press, London, 1980), especially ch.11.

9. C.J. Lowe and M.L. Dockrill, *The Mirage of Power: British Foreign Policy, 1902-16*, vol.1 (Routledge, Kegan and Paul, London, 1972), p.18.

10. Zara Steiner, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy 1898-1914* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1969), ch.3; Paul Kennedy, *The Realities Behind Diplomacy* (Fontana edition, London, 1986), p.61-2.

a policy of conciliation, though one which could be overcome, as it was in the inter-war years. Furthermore, by any objective standard, their view of the German people was bleak, and the outbreak of war in 1939 seemed to justify their beliefs. In 1940 Vansittart wrote to Halifax that "eighty per cent of the German race are the political and moral scum of the earth".¹¹ After the Soviet Union's entry into the war, Sargent, contemplating the refugee problem which might result from the removal of German-populated territory from the Reich, suggested it might be best if those uprooted "disappear into Siberia, instead of forming themselves into a compact and indigestible mass in Germany".¹² The descendant of this line of Permanent Under-Secretaries in our period was Sir William Strang. At the outbreak of the war he stated his view, which was the antithesis of the appeasers' foreign policy perspective, that it was "less dangerous in the immediate future for western Europe that Russia should displace Germany in Eastern Europe than that Germany should maintain herself."¹³

The influence of this group reached its peak in the pre-1914 period, when they had a sympathetic Foreign Secretary in Grey. Many Liberal politicians argued against the drift towards a commitment to France and in favour of a neutrality pact with Germany. In the summer of 1914 Morley, representing the Gladstonian tradition within the party, resigned from the Cabinet with two of his colleagues in protest against the drift towards war. After August 1914 tales of German atrocities in Belgium gave impetus to a tide of anti-German emotion. More surprising was the speed with which these feelings ebbed in the aftermath of the war. Curzon, the Foreign Secretary, was sympathetic to Germany's post-war plight, while Keynes's book, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, proved to many that Versailles was unjust. The popularity of Wilsonian ideals and the League of Nations demonstrated the wider public's disillusionment with the war. As Martin Gilbert has demonstrated, appeasement of Germany was not simply the policy of Neville Chamberlain, but of the post-1918 generation.¹⁴

11. Rose, *op. cit.*, p.242.

12. Victor Rothwell, *Britain and the Cold War* (Jonathan Cape, London, 1982), p.38; Neil Thomas, *A Compromised Policy* (Minerva Press, London, 1994), p.19-20.

13. Anthony Glees, *Exile Politics During the Second World War* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982), p.58-9.

14. Martin Gilbert, *The Roots of Appeasement* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1966), especially ch.6.

The most interesting aspect of appeasement for those considering its influence on the post-1945 period, is its connection with the Bolshevik threat. This was most apparent in the aftermath of the October Revolution. In the spring of 1919 the new Bolshevik government was at war with Poland, Bavaria experienced a Communist coup and a Soviet regime was established in Hungary. Churchill, the leader of the alarmist party in London, advocated the use of German troops against the Bolsheviks. When he publicly aired this idea in April 1919, it was given a rousing reception.¹⁵ The first part of his formula, 'Kill the Bolshie; Kiss the Hun',¹⁶ was abandoned long before the second part. With Stalin's destruction of the Left Opposition in the 1920s, the Soviets recanted from their ideal of world revolution and to a large extent withdrew from active European diplomacy. In contrast, the threat of German recidivism remained a potent one which British statesmen sought to counter by conciliating the government in Berlin. Lloyd George explained the need to adopt a policy of judicious magnanimity in his Fontainebleau Memorandum, which warned that the punitive peace favoured by the French would leave Germany weak and vulnerable to a left wing take-over.¹⁷ Surprisingly, this belief in the possibility of a communist revival was to reemerge in 1945 and would again be used to justify a policy of opposition to French revanchism. However, even more significant was to be the influence of the Rapallo pact which was signed in the last year of Lloyd George's premiership. He had succeeded in assembling the European powers at Genoa in an effort to achieve reconciliation but found his efforts undermined by the signing of a bilateral Soviet-German agreement at Rapallo in the middle of the conference. Rapallo was to become a by-word for German duplicity.

The appointment of Hitler as Chancellor in 1933 finally galvanised the opponents of appeasement. However, they were few in number, divided among themselves and their antipathy to the Germans generally predated the Nazi era. Macmillan, Duff Cooper, Dalton, Bevin and Boothby were all prominent in publicising the German threat in the 1930s and, with the exception of Boothby,

15. Lowe and Dockrill, *op. cit.*, vol.2, p.324-5.

16. The quote comes from a letter to Asquith's daughter, Violet. See Martin Gilbert, *Churchill: A Life* (William Heinemann, London, 1991), p.412.

17. Gilbert, (1966) *op. cit.*, p.60; Lowe and Dockrill, *op. cit.*, vol.2, p.343.

their dislike of the Germans predated the 1930s.¹⁸ All five went on to express grave concerns about the policy of German rearmament in the 1950s. Those politicians whose reputation survived their association with appeasement, notably Morrison and Butler, later proved sanguine about the proposed recreation of German armed forces. The two figures who do not fit this schema are Churchill and Eden. Churchill did not have fixed views about Germany and his opinions on Britain's relations with that country fluctuated wildly, depending upon current circumstances.¹⁹ This phenomena can be observed in the spring of 1953 when he tried to reverse Britain's policy on German rearmament, before switching back to supporting it before the end of the year. Eden had a somewhat chequered record as an anti-appeaser and his opposition to Chamberlain centred on Italian policy.²⁰ He would later reluctantly accept the Foreign Office thesis that German rearmament was a regrettable necessity.

The anti-German views of Dalton and Bevin became increasingly influential in the Labour Party, until by 1945 they were predominant. Between the wars the party developed close links with the German Social Democrats and Ramsey MacDonald was one of the most fervent advocates of friendship with the Weimar Republic, arguing that it represented the "better Germany".²¹ However, the left found the tactics of the Nazis repugnant and the Trade Unions in particular were active in opposition to appeasement. By 1937 Dalton had persuaded the parliamentary party to drop its opposition to the Service estimates which had hindered efforts to portray the party as strong opponents of the Nazis.²² During the war it was Labour ministers who were most active in arguing for a punitive

18. The views of Macmillan and Dalton were shaped by their service in World War I, while Duff Cooper developed a dislike for the Germans even before 1914. See Ben Pimlott, *Hugh Dalton* (Jonathan Cape, London, 1985), p.104-5; Alistair Horne, *Macmillan 1894-1956* (Macmillan, London, 1988), p.48; John Charmley, *Duff Cooper: The Authorised Biography* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1986), ch.2. Apparently Bevin became disenchanted with the Germans after their socialist movement backed war in 1914. See Frank Roberts, *Dealing with Dictators, 1930-1970* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1991), p.133; Ivone Kirkpatrick, *The Inner Circle* (Macmillan, London, 1959), p.205; Alan Bullock, *Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945-51* (Heinemann, London, 1983), p.90.

19. Gordon A. Craig, 'Churchill and Germany' in Robert Blake and William Roger Louis (eds.), *Churchill* (Oxford University Press, 1993).

20. David Carlton, *Anthony Eden: A Biography* (Allen Lane, London, 1981), chs.4-6.

21. Stefan Berger, *The British Labour Party and the German Social Democrats, 1900-1931*, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984), ch.6.

22. Pimlott, op. cit., p.241-2; Kennedy (1986), op. cit., p.286; Allan Bullock, *The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin: Trade Union Leader, 1881-1940* (William Heinemann, London, 1960), p.526 and 546-7.

peace. In 1942 anti-German Labour MPs formed the 'Fight for Freedom' group to argue that the blame for Germany's crimes was not restricted to the Nazis, but extended to the population as a whole.²³ Within the government, Attlee argued that the eradication of Germany's war potential must have priority over the restoration of order and stability on the grounds "that everything that brings home to the Germans the completeness and irrevocability of their defeat is worthwhile in the end".²⁴ Bevin favoured dismemberment and was insistent that the Germans should not retain control over the industrialised Ruhr.²⁵ After the war anti-German feeling was not restricted to senior Labour ministers. Indeed opposition to German rearmament in the 1950s was even more pronounced among the next generation of Labour leaders. Harold Wilson, James Callaghan, Michael Stewart, Tony Benn, Richard Crossman, Michael Foot and Barbara Castle all opposed the idea of German rearmament during the early 1950s.²⁶ The Labour Party and the Foreign Office were the two bastions of anti-German sentiment after the war, though their calculations about the best means of preventing the reemergence of the German menace eventually led them to different conclusions about the wisdom of German rearmament.

Distrust of Russia was one of a number of factors which influenced Neville Chamberlain in his determination to settle European problems peacefully.²⁷ The outbreak of war with Germany and the unforeseen alliance with the Soviet Union which came about two years later represented a complete defeat for Chamberlain and his supporters. The likelihood of this new alignment outlasting the war was an issue which the Churchill government preferred to ignore, but it inevitably became a matter of controversy once victory was assured. Churchill continued to demonstrate a somewhat eccentric attitude to the future of Germany.

23. T.D. Burridge, *British Labour and Hitler's War* (Andre Deutsch, London, 1976), ch.5.

24. *Ibid.*, p.127-30; Kenneth Harris, *Attlee* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1982), p.210-12.

25. Rothwell, *op. cit.*, p.224-7; Thomas, *op. cit.*, p.21-2; Burridge, *op. cit.*, p.136-7.

26. Through a study of six Early Day Motions, Hugh Berrington concludes that opposition to German rearmament was greatest among younger Labour MPs. See Hugh B. Berrington, *Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons* (Pergamon, Oxford, 1973), p.104. It is also noteworthy that opposition to German rearmament was not restricted to the left of the party. For the motivation of one right wing opponent see Michael Stewart, *Life and Labour: An Autobiography* (Sidgwick and Jackson, London, 1980), p.96-7.

27. In March 1939 he wrote to his sister "I must confess to the most profound distrust of Russia... I distrust her motives which seem to me to have little connections with our ideas of liberty and to be concerned only with setting everyone else by the ears". Martin Gilbert, *Britain and Germany Between the Wars* (Longmans, London, 1964), p.134.

His main enthusiasm was for the detachment of Prussia and the creation of a separate south German 'Danubian' federation, but he also proposed that a proportion of German men should be separated from their womenfolk in an effort to restrict population growth.²⁸ Generally, however, Churchill was willing to defer to the Allies on the subject of Germany's future. At the 1944 Quebec conference he agreed to the Morgenthau Plan for the pastoralisation of Germany, and at Yalta it was left to Eden to argue the case against Soviet demands for the dismemberment of the country.²⁹ It was only when both the Americans and the Soviets lost their enthusiasm for dismemberment that the idea was abandoned.³⁰

Below the ministerial level an important debate did take place among civilian and military planners about the future of Germany. In 1943 there was some discussion about the prospect of using the threat of aerial bombardment as an alternative to policing Germany with ground troops. This idea was to be revived by Sir John Slessor during the debates over German rearmament in the 1950s but was rejected at this time by the Chiefs of Staff.³¹ In the summer of 1944 the Post Hostilities Planning Staff raised an even more controversial subject when they suggested that if the Soviets proved hostile to Britain after the war "in the last resort this might even entail coming to some arrangement with our enemies". Gladwyn Jebb, the Foreign Office representative on the committee, reported to his colleagues that the Chiefs were obsessed with the idea of drawing as much as possible of Germany into the western sphere of influence after the war. He suggested this view derived "from some kind of suicidal mania." The Foreign Office were resentful of what they saw as military interference in their sphere of competence and perturbed that the Chiefs' advocacy of a post-war alliance with Germany might be relayed to the Soviets. On 25 August a PHP paper was submitted which, as part of a discussion of the possible tripartite division of Germany, suggested that the British and American zones could be

28 Keith Sainsbury, 'British Policy and German Unity at the End of the Second World War' *English Historical Review*, 94, 1973, p.792-4; D.C. Watt, op. cit., p.36; Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill: Road to Victory*, vol.8, (Heinemann, London, 1986), p.591 and 642-3; Roger Parkinson, *A Day's March Nearer Home* (Hart Davis, McGibbon, London, 1974), p.143.

29. Sainsbury, op. cit., p.798-9; Parkinson op. cit., p.374-5 and 443-4; Gilbert (1986), op. cit., p.961-5.

30. Sainsbury, op. cit., p.800; Watt, op. cit., p.44.

31. Julian Lewis, *Changing Direction* (Sherwood Press, London, 1988), p.75.

integrated into a future western alliance. The presupposition was "We must above all prevent Germany combining with the Soviet Union against us". This prompted Jebb to withdraw from the committee and Eden to intervene personally. In September 1944 he warned the Chiefs that discussion of German membership of a western bloc must "be avoided like the plague... we shall quickly destroy any hope of preserving the Anglo-Soviet alliance and soon find ourselves advocating the relaxations of the disarmament and other measures which we regard as essential guarantees against future German aggression".³²

A number of Foreign Office officials regarded the communisation of Germany as a real danger. Geoffrey Harrison, who a decade later became Under-Secretary responsible for Germany, believed that the Germans, with their "innate reverence for ruthless power", might be attracted to Stalinism, and this view was supported by Frank Roberts.³³ Though these opinions have been criticised as crude and unrealistic,³⁴ it should be stressed that generally Foreign Office concerns centred on the threat of the Germans trying to undermine the wartime alliance through an accommodation with Moscow, rather than the possibility of a communist take-over in Berlin. They were surely correct in suggesting that the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact had proved precisely the point that the two countries could reach a rapprochement based on power-political, rather than ideological, considerations. John Troutbeck and Orme Sargent were worried about a return to Bismarckian diplomacy rather than a German swing towards communism. Thus, Troutbeck was convinced that what was required in the post-war era was to destroy, not communism, but "to stamp out the whole tradition on which the German nation has been built."³⁵ In his famous memorandum 'Stocktaking After VE-Day' written in July 1945, Sargent warned that a revived Germany might "put herself up to the highest bidder so as to play off each of the three Great Powers one against the other".³⁶

Between 1945 and 1947 the Soviet threat came to dominate Foreign Office

32. Ibid, p.112-134; Rothwell, op. cit., p.119-123; John Baylis, *The Diplomacy of Pragmatism* (Macmillan, London, 1983), p.19-27.

33. Rothwell, op. cit., p.60-61.

34. Ibid., p.335; Thomas, op. cit., p.37-39.

35. Nicholas Pronay, 'Introduction' in Nicholas Pronay and Keith Wilson, *The Political Re-education of Germany and her Allies after World War II* (Croom Helm, London, 1985), p.18.

36. Rothwell, op. cit., p.146.

thinking, but the possibility that a revived Germany could play a destabilising role in the emerging Cold War was never entirely forgotten. It re-emerged forcibly once Germany began to recover from the catastrophic post-war collapse and Britain's relationship with the Soviet Union stabilised. In this period the Foreign Office saw itself in a competition for influence in Germany and developed the view that the best means of countering Moscow's strategy was to isolate and build up the western zones.³⁷ The huge costs involved in maintaining the British zone were also influential in persuading Bevin of the need to raise German industry levels and ultimately to accept a merger with the American zone. The expense of feeding the large population of the British zone, now swollen by an influx of refugees, was a terrible burden. The British had to supply 70% of the food for their zone at a cost of £80 million despite severe shortages in Britain.³⁸ At the 1947 Moscow conference, Bevin encouraged the Americans to raise production levels in the bizon, while fending off Soviet demands for reparations. The new American Secretary of State, George Marshall, came away from the conference disillusioned with the prospect of a deal with Stalin and it is generally agreed that this was the period in which the chances of a deal on unification evaporated, although the formal division of the country was not assured until the introduction of currency reforms a year later.³⁹

During the evolution of the West German state there remained a latent concern about what policy the Germans would adopt once they regained their independence. In many respects developments in central Europe seemed to offer Moscow the prospect of future successes even after an economic recovery had begun. There were millions of refugees in the western zones of Germany who hankered after the return of the territories beyond the Oder-Neisse line and only the Soviets had the necessary influence to return these lands. Furthermore, the division of the country was felt as a loss by practically all Germans and the Soviets continued to retain the option of offering new, attractive terms for reunification in an effort to win over the Germans and disrupt western plans. Bevin's brief for

37. Anne Deighton, *The Impossible Peace* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990).

38. John Farquharson, 'From Unity to Division: What Prompted Britain to Change Its Policy in Germany in 1946?', *European History Quarterly*, 26, 1996; Kenneth O. Morgan, *Labour in Power, 1945-51* (Oxford University Press, 1984), p.256-7.

39. Deighton, *op. cit.*, ch.7; Bullock (1983), *op. cit.*, ch.9.

the 1947 Moscow conference stated: "If a German government in Berlin fairly reproduced the outlook of the country it would be neither wholly eastward looking nor wholly westward looking. The question would then turn on whether the western democracies or the Soviet Union would exercise the stronger pull. On the whole the balance of advantage seems to lie with the Russians".⁴⁰

Fearing that the Germans would once more assume a position of influence in world affairs, Labour ministers had hoped for a deal with Moscow on unification, even when relations with the Soviets were clearly deteriorating, and continued to seek restrictions on Germany's future freedom of action. Bevin was convinced that the Allies should retain control over Germany's industrial heartland in the Ruhr valley, and during 1946 pursued plans for international control and the socialisation of industry despite the scepticism of his officials.⁴¹ In January 1947 Bevin told the intensely Germanophobic British ambassador to Paris, Duff Cooper, that he agreed with him that the Germans still posed a potent threat.⁴² At the end of the year he reiterated this view during a conversation with the French Foreign Minister, Bidault.⁴³ Attlee too was concerned about what would occur once Germany had built up its strength; a policy he described as "using Satan to defeat Sin". He warned the Dominions Prime Ministers in May 1946 that, "A Germany under Russian influence might in time develop into a Russia under German influence".⁴⁴ Though the enthusiasm of Labour ministers for industrial controls and decentralisation generally went beyond what was desired by the Foreign Office, some more independently minded officials were sympathetic to their concerns. In December 1946 Nigel Ronald proposed cooperating with Moscow to achieve the "long-term containment of Germany" and Gladwyn Jebb

40. Anne Deighton, 'The Frozen Front: The Labour Government, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War', *International Affairs*, 63, 1987, p.458.

41. Rothwell, *op. cit.*, p.313-4; Bullock (1983), *op. cit.*, p.266-7; Morgan, *op. cit.*, p.254-6.

42. Bullock (1983), *op. cit.*, p.358. In November 1947 Bevin advised in a minute that "we have to have regard to a German recovery. Like Duff Cooper I am concerned about that". See Rothwell, *op. cit.*, p.288.

43. Rothwell, *op. cit.*, p.337. Note also that in June 1947 Bevin told a staff meeting that "Germany in time might well regain her previous position as the chief threat to the peace of the world." See Lewis, *op. cit.*, p.331.

44. Geoffrey Warner, 'Britain and Europe in 1948: The View from the Cabinet' in Joseph Becker and Franz Knipping (eds.), *Power in Europe?* (Walter de Gruyter, New York, 1986), p.42; Rothwell, *op. cit.*, p.321. The idea that Germany might prove the senior partner in a hostile alliance with the Soviet Union had been suggested to Attlee by Dalton three years earlier. See Burridge, *op. cit.*, p.91.

feared that, if such cooperation did not occur, Germany "might well, in default of such agreement, become once again a menace owing to both sides competing for her favours".⁴⁵

The creation of the bizonie and the introduction of the Marshall Plan gave the Americans increasing influence over German affairs and brought them into conflict with the British who, having taken measures to ameliorate conditions in north-west Germany during the previous two years, now favoured a more cautious policy which reflected their fear of the consequences of a resurgent Germany. Bevin initially opposed the inclusion of the bizonie in the European Recovery Programme⁴⁶, but this disagreement was far less serious than the dispute which occurred over socialisation in the Ruhr. Bevin was determined that the Ruhr industries should not be returned to the German industrialists who, he believed, had abused their responsibilities in the past. With British encouragement the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) had developed plans for nationalisation. However, American policy was that the Ruhr coal mines should be run on the basis of private enterprise, and in September 1947 the British finally acquiesced.⁴⁷ A year later Bevin again came into conflict with the Americans when they proposed to halve the number of industrial plants on the reparations list. He remained an enthusiastic advocate of dismantling and he warned Washington that unless it was carried out thoroughly, Germany would remain a potential danger to the peace of Europe. After months of argument a compromise agreement, which favoured the American rather more than the British view, was agreed in March 1949.⁴⁸

At the same time as these arguments were proceeding, the constitution of a new West German state was being formulated. In June 1948 a conference of the western powers in London had recommended the formation of a provisional government and during the following winter progress was made towards this

45. Lord Gladwyn, *The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1972), p.198; Rothwell, *op. cit.*, p.429-30.

46. Bullock (1983), *op. cit.*, p.457-8.

47. *Ibid.*, p.434-5; Wilfried Loth, *The Division of the World, 1941-1955* (Routledge, London, 1988), p.187.

48. Bullock (1983), *op. cit.*, p.600-2 and 662-4; John W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe, 1945-1951* (Leicester University Press, 1984); Matthias Peter, 'Britain, the Cold War and the Economics of German Rearmament' in Anne Deighton (ed.), *Britain and the First Cold War* (Macmillan, London, 1990), p.275-6.

objective, despite the Berlin Blockade. The Basic Law or constitution of the new state, as devised by the regional governments or Lander, was presented to the Military Governors in March 1949 and approved two months later. In August elections were held which were won by the Christian Democrats and Konrad Adenauer became the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic.⁴⁹ However, his freedom of action was restricted by the Occupation Statute which, among other things, strictly forbade the creation of German armed forces and gave the Allied High Commission complete control over the demilitarisation process.⁵⁰

Central to this thesis will be an examination of the tortuous process by which the western powers finally gave up these rights and forged a plan for the creation of German armed forces. It will be argued that British policy towards German rearmament was governed by a set of assumptions which were derived as much from pre-1939 as Cold War experiences. They were:-

1. The Soviet Union was hostile to Britain and the West and its aim was to destroy the capitalist system. However, the Soviets did not want war and saw the destruction of the West as a very long term goal. In the short term they were willing to accept the status quo and consolidate their gains. The Soviets would pursue limited tactical goals in order to avoid conflict with the West.
2. Britain's relationship with Germany was much less stable than with the Soviet Union. While it seemed clear that the Soviets would adopt a hostile but restrained policy unless provoked, it was less easy to predict Germany's future course. They were the unstable element in international relations. As a race, they were emotionally unstable and committed to the relentless pursuit of political advantage. The combination of these two characteristics meant that they often fervently pursued self-defeating and damaging policies.
3. There was a real danger of the Germans seeking a Soviet alliance once they regained freedom of action. After 1918 the Germans, believing they were being treated as parasites, had allied themselves with that other outcast state, the Soviet Union. The tendency of the Germans to ally themselves with the Russians was something of a historical tradition, which was only confirmed by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

49. Dennis L. Bork and David R. Gress, *From Shadow to Substance: A History of West Germany* (2nd edition, Blackwell, Oxford, 1993), part 2, chs.15-16.

50. Parliamentary Papers, 1948-9, vol. 36, cmd 7677.

4. A Soviet-German alliance would be a disaster for the West. The acquisition by Moscow of German military and industrial potential would probably result in a decisive Soviet victory in the Cold War.

5. The best means of preventing a Soviet-German alliance was to create permanent institutional, economic and political ties with West Germany. Continued occupation would only encourage Germany's tendency to drift into an eastern alliance, while giving her complete freedom of action was far too dangerous. Though there was no ideal German policy, the tying of the Federal Republic to western organisations was the best available.

These nostrums were never incorporated into a single document but I hope to show that they were widely believed and formed the basis of British policy towards German rearmament. They were undoubtedly influential in other areas of policy, but the detailed discussion of such important issues as the treatment of war criminals, industrial controls, the allied reserved powers, the Saar and Berlin is beyond the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, though many of these beliefs were shared by policy-makers in the United States and France, and even by Adenauer, the focus of this study is the British debate. The efforts of the nascent German Defence Ministry or Blank Office to eradicate many of the malign traditions of the German army, and subordinate its interests to those of a new civil society is another subject of importance which cannot be addressed here. It was of very little interest to British policy-makers in the early 1950s. They believed that history had shown that the Germans were almost incorrigible in their bellicosity and that Britain's task was to restrain these impulses to as great an extent as possible. The rearmament of Germany in a controlled manner was an essential part of this process, but one which was believed to entail substantial risks.

CHAPTER 1

THE GENDARMERIE SCHEME

When Ernest Bevin, the ailing British Foreign Secretary, arrived in New York in September 1950 for a meeting with his French and American colleagues, he brought with him a scheme for the arming of a German Federal gendarmerie which had been the product of almost a years debate between British military and diplomatic planners. Far from being a hastily devised expedient cobbled together in reaction to the Korean War, the British plan was actually similar to an earlier proposal put forward before the eruption of full scale war in the Far East. Though the rationale behind the British scheme had somewhat altered during the summer, Bevin's proposal for the creation of an armed West German police force or gendarmerie presented at the New York conference was similar to that put forward by the British in the High Commission for Germany months earlier. The period between the first discussions of German rearmament at the end of 1949 and the New York meeting was the time when British policy was least subject to international pressures. In the absence of any rival scheme for German rearmament, and with the Soviets unaware that the British were preparing to provide the Federal Republic with an armed police force, the Attlee government was able to make long-term plans for Germany's future defence contribution, free from either the threats or inducements which the superpowers would utilise after September 1950. Furthermore, the British did not seriously consider the economic consequences of German rearmament at this stage. These initial British plans were, therefore, of particular interest as they constituted the British government's ideal solution to the German rearmament problem, with the proviso that, as British policy-makers were constantly reiterating, any policy for Germany contained inherent dangers.

The essence of the first British plan was the creation of an armed police force similar to the paramilitary Volkspolizei which the Soviets had created in their zone. Though this constituted a programme on which diplomatic and military planners were able to agree in May 1950, there was an inherent tension between the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff. The former regarded the rearmament of Germany as a long-term proposition which could only occur as part of the wider process of integrating the Federal Republic into the West, while the latter

saw it as a security problem requiring an immediate military solution. These different perspectives produced a series of disagreements which began towards the end of 1949, abated in spring 1950 and reached a climax in December 1950.

Another view among British policy-makers was that Germany should never be rearmed. At the end of 1949 this was still the majority opinion among Foreign Office officials and Labour ministers. Influential figures such as the Permanent Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, Sir William Strang, and the ex-Chancellor, Hugh Dalton, were to continue to oppose the implementation of any proposal for German rearmament long after the government had officially accepted its inevitability. Strang's passionate opposition to any scheme for the creation of German armed forces was all the more surprising because he was known for his equanimity. In contrast to his flamboyant predecessors, he was generally regarded as colourless, bureaucratic and quiescent. However, having witnessed at first hand the consequences of Britain's appeasement of Germany in the 1930s, he was unwilling to place his faith in German good will again.¹

In February 1949 a Permanent Under-Secretary's Committee was established to discuss long term planning, with Strang as Chairman. They produced a paper on Germany's future in November. Despite the recent creation of the Federal Republic, the committee still regarded the unification of Germany as the long term aim of British policy. Among the disadvantages of maintaining the current division was that "while there is no Four-Power control, it is easier for the Germans to blackmail the Western Powers and the Soviet Union in turn and so to recover their strength as a nation and a dominant influence in Europe." The means of achieving unification was through the creation of "a strong and democratic German Federal Republic", which, it was optimistically believed, would force Moscow to accept free all-German elections. Though confidence in this programme faded over the following years, the British government continued to regard the unification of Germany as their ultimate goal and to retain reservations about perpetuating the division of the country. Strang's Committee were at this

1. William Strang, *Home and Abroad* (Andre Deutsch, London, 1956); Lord Blake and C.S. Nicholls, *Dictionary of National Biography 1971-80* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986), p.817-8; Ritchie Ovendale, 'William Strang and the Permanent Under-Secretary's Committee' in John Zametica (ed.), *British Official and British Foreign Policy* (Leicester University Press, 1990), p.213-4.

stage still convinced, however, that the Federal Republic must remain disarmed and that even if reunification occurred, rearmament would have to be prohibited for a specified period. Though they made a crucial concession in accepting that a united Germany could have an armed gendarmerie, the Committee considered that "In view of the possibility of a German nationalist revival, inflamed by a desire to see German unity restored, the occupation and the essential controls to prevent German rearmament should continue." The difficulty for Strang and his colleagues was that this policy was somewhat inconsistent with another of their stated aims: the raising of the prestige of the Federal Republic and its integration into the West prior to unification.²

Following the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, the British military had the problem of devising a plan for the defence of western Europe with the utterly inadequate forces available to the alliance. In the month the treaty was signed, the signatories had only 12 ill-equipped divisions assigned to the defence of western Europe. By mid-1950 there were still only 14 divisions available. These units were unprepared for war and deployed for maximum administrative rather than military efficiency. Lord Ismay, the first NATO Secretary General, stated of British forces in Germany at this time, "It is difficult to imagine dispositions that could be more unsuitable for operations in the event of aggression."³ Before the results of the first Medium Term Defence Plan (MTDP) became available, British military planners worked on the assumption that roughly 35 ready divisions would be required to provide an adequate defence for western Europe.⁴ In April 1950 the Allies were shocked to discover that the first draft of the Medium Term Defence Plan called for the creation of a force of 90 ready and reserve divisions and 12,000 aircraft by 1954.⁵ As the British High Commissioner in Germany, General Robertson, stated in June 1950, the repeated assertions that western Europe was indefensible without a West German

2. FO 371/76386, w6201, PUSC(62)Final, November 1949.

3. William Park, *Defending the West* (Wheatsheaf Books, Brighton, 1988), p.23-4; Lord Ismay, *NATO : The First Five Years 1949-54* (Bosch-Utrecht, 1954), p.29-30.

4. Slim, the CIGS, hoped that the promise of British reinforcements might contribute to a force of 35 divisions, Slessor's estimate was 40 divisions, while Montgomery was demanding 18 divisions for D-Day, with an additional 16 at D+3 days. See DEFE 4/26, COS(49)168th mtg., minute 1, 14 November 1949; AIR 75/61, Slessor memo on Atlantic Foreign and Strategic Policy, 10 July 1949; Nigel Hamilton, *Monty : The Field Marshall* (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1986), p.763.

5. CAB 134/37, AOC(50)3, 28 June 1950.

contribution were, "a statement of the mathematically obvious."⁶

The significance of Robertson's remark is further illustrated by an analysis of Britain's own vulnerable position in the NATO alliance. Though after June 1950 the Americans conditionally accepted the need for an American Supreme Commander and an increased U.S. military contribution to European defence, and the French promised a major rearmament programme involving an increase of 20 divisions, it is important to realise that the British military first proposed German rearmament in the very different, pre-Korean War environment. Responsibility for taking the lead in western defence had devolved on Britain due to American refusals to participate in European defence planning.⁷ The American government had declined membership of the Western European, Northern European and South-Eastern Europe/Western Mediterranean Regional Planning Groups within NATO.⁸ Furthermore, American strategy continued to be based on the evacuation of continental Europe. Following the outbreak of war in Europe, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff planned to send reinforcements to Morocco from where, it was hoped, a bridgehead could be established in southern Spain. The British Chiefs were critical of the American concept for a number of reasons, but principally because such a strategy would be disastrous for French morale. The Joint Planning Staff visited Washington in late September 1949 to press British objections but were unable to secure any substantial change in American strategy.⁹ On 19 October 1950 the Chief Staff Officer, Sir William Elliot, recalled: "Almost to a day a year ago I was with Lord Tedder in Washington discussing round the table with the American Chiefs of Staff what they might be prepared to do for the land battle in Europe. The initial answer...was that they would do virtually nothing...Thus a year ago American strategy was content to liberate Europe. Today it insists on defending Europe".¹⁰

On 13 February 1950 the First Sea Lord, Lord Fraser of North Cape,

6. FO 371/85022, C4350/20/18, Robertson to Bevin, 22 June 1950.

7. DEFE 5/20, COS(50)93, 16 March 1950, states that as the US will not provide troops for Rhine defence Britain must assume the responsibility: "If we fail to do so, Western Union will fail."

8. Timothy P. Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance* (Aldwych Press, London, 1989), p.162-3.

9. DEFE 4/24, COS(49)131st mtg., minute 8, 8 September 1949; DEFE 4/25, COS(49)154th mtg., minute 5, 19 October 1949; DEFE 6/11, JP(49)136 (Final), 1 March 1950.

10. Sir William Elliot Papers 2/1, Some Reflections on the Present Deadlock over the Question of German Rearmament, 19 October 1950.

presented a paper which stressed the deficiencies in western defence and the Chiefs endorsed its conclusion that the forces available "were at present quite inadequate".¹¹ France was the only one of the European allies with the manpower resources to close the gap in western defences but she was politically unstable and the morale of the French military establishment was low. In March the Joint Planning Staff recommended that Britain should promise to contribute an additional two divisions to the continent at the outbreak of war, while reiterating that France was the key to solving Europe's defence problems. They claimed that a promise of British reinforcements was essential to boost French morale and provide them with an incentive to make a greater contribution to western defence.¹² Field Marshal Montgomery, as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, had argued this case persistently, but it was his successor, Sir William Slim, who in changed circumstances proved more persuasive. A modified version of the proposal was adopted by the Chiefs and accepted by Attlee at a Defence Committee meeting on 23 March.¹³ The change had little effect in France however. In July Bevin complained: "at the present moment the military effectiveness of France and the Benelux Powers is still very small. France is still sick, perhaps more sick than at the time of the signature of the Brussels Treaty."¹⁴

It was in these circumstances that the British Chiefs became accustomed to making strategic plans without the resources to implement them. In May 1948 they instructed the British Military Governor in Germany, Sir Brian Robertson, to fight on the Rhine in the event of a Soviet attack. In October 1949 they reaffirmed their commitment to Rhine defence as the basis of Allied strategy.¹⁵ They accepted this concept despite the fact that it "was not a policy which we would advocate on strategic grounds alone as it was in some respects militarily unsound." There was particular concern that the Soviets might make a limited attack, delaying their main assault on the Rhine until Allied reinforcements were

11. DEFE 4/29, COS(50)26th mtg., minute 1, 13 February 1950.

12. DEFE 6/12, JP(50)22, 10 March 1950.

13. DEFE 4/29, COS(50)39th mtg., minutes 1 and 2, 13 March 1950; DEFE 5/20, COS(50)93, 16 March 1950; CAB 131/9, DO(50)20, 20 March 1950; CAB 131/8, DO(50)5th mtg., minute 1, 23 March 1950.

14. FO 371/85050, C4807/27/18, Barclay to Gainer and others, 20 July 1950.

15. DEFE 4/13, COS(48)64th mtg., minute 1, 10 May 1948 and COS(48)73rd mtg., minute 1, 28 May 1948; DEFE 4/25 COS(49)158th mtg., minute 8, 26th October 1949.

drawn into position and could be destroyed. Nevertheless, a declaratory policy of Rhine defence was seen as essential to reassure the French.¹⁶

The problem of implementing this policy remained. At the end of 1949 the probability of a Soviet attack in the immediate future was almost discounted; but the possibility of ever building up a successful defence system in Europe which could meet the long term threat appeared remote. The British military had been forced to accept a strategy of Rhine defence which they regarded as unsound, while making continued and largely unavailing efforts to persuade the French to improve their armed forces and the Americans to abandon their plan to give priority to North Africa in the event of war.

It was the future Chief of the Air Staff, Sir John Slessor, who took the lead in addressing the problems of western defence. Unlike his colleagues, Slim and Fraser, who gained their reputation as war time commanders, Slessor's standing is based on his influence as a strategic thinker. He was an iconoclast who proved a formidable advocate for the RAF during inter-service disputes. By the late 1940s his two principal concerns were the promotion of strategic bombing and the countering of the Soviet military threat. This led him to develop an unusual perspective on the German rearmament issue. In 1943 he had been "convinced that Germany is and will be the danger, and the one way to ensure that we never have a World War III is to ensure that Germany is never again in a position of military strength." However, even at this stage, he regarded the revival of a German air force, rather than armoured divisions as the essence of the German menace. By 1949 he had accepted the need for a German defence contribution which would in the long term allow NATO to push its defence line east of the Rhine. He acknowledged that because of French susceptibilities it was an inappropriate time to raise the issue, but warned that the Germans would never become firmly allied to the West unless they could be given an adequate defence. He wrote: "GERMANY has turned to Russia several times in comparatively recent history. And if we continue to talk about the RHINE line the time will come when the GERMANS, believing the Allies intend anyway to abandon them to their fate if war comes, will reinsure with RUSSIA. And that will be a day of mortal peril for the West."

16. DEFE 4/25, COS(49)154th mtg., minute 4, 19 October 1949.

This was to be the theme of British discussions of German rearmament over the next six years, but Slessor brought a singular perspective to the dilemma. He argued that it was French ignorance of the true strategic situation which prevented Britain from beginning the process of German rearmament. He believed that the point "which Allied policy in GERMANY has overlooked is that as long as we occupy GERMANY and in this Air and Atomic age even if we cease to do so, we have the practical means of preventing potential becoming actual, if we, the Western democracies, are prepared to face up to realities." The idea which the French and others had failed to grasp was that the threat of aerial bombardment could be used to control Germany in the same way as the British had policed colonial areas between the wars. Slessor placed the failure of Britain's European policy in the 1930s on the absence of "the Will to Act" and called for greater resolution in the future. The solution to the German rearmament problem, according to Slessor, "involves a really drastic revision of many of the historic canons of military doctrine...it is the threat and if necessary the use of the bomb (and, if appropriate, the atomic bomb) as the form of force to be employed to prevent the expansion of the GERMAN peace economy to a war footing." Thus Slessor's confidence that German rearmament could proceed was based on his belief that the western democracies could employ the threat of bombing against the Germans to prevent them re-emerging as an independent threat, rather than on any faith that the Germans had changed. The only remaining obstacle was to persuade the Allies of the soundness of this view.¹⁷

The current Chiefs, while not embracing the whole of Slessor's thesis, were equally convinced that a German contribution was essential to provide an effective defence for western Europe. When presented with the Strang Committee's report on Germany in November 1949, they suggested that the West should take the initiative in proposing talks on unification because the division of the country was "a permanent source of friction." They dissented from the Foreign Office view that a united Germany should remain disarmed and argued instead that, "The size of the German army should be related to that of the French army". Taking up the suggestion that a united Germany should have an armed gendarmerie they applied

17. AIR 75/61, Slessor to Pakenham, 28 May 1949, Slessor memo on Atlantic Foreign and Strategic Policy, 10 July 1949. See also Sir John Slessor, *Strategy for the West* (Cassels, London, 1954), ch.6.

it to the Federal Republic and stated: "the creation of a German armed gendarmerie...was urgent and should be set in hand as soon as possible." In reply the Strang Committee accepted the latter suggestion but stressed that it could not be the basis for the creation of an army in the Federal Republic. They believed such action would be opposed by the Soviets and that "it seems too early to decide to entrust an army to the German Federal Government, at least until we have seen how the new state develops".¹⁸ This discussion revealed that a policy of arming the gendarmerie in West Germany provided an area of possible compromise between the Foreign Office and the military, but also the potential for conflict over the urgency with which German rearmament should be pursued.

The parlous condition of western defences led to similar discussions in the USA, the Netherlands and West Germany. In America the Senate was unwilling to consider the Truman's request for a large scale Mutual Assistance Program without guarantees that the Europeans would use the funds to create an effective defence. Taft complained that "although the amount was not large enough to do any good it was sufficient to start an arms race".¹⁹ Many Senators believed that the only method by which an effective defence could be created was to arm the Germans. Vandenberg declared: "Western Germany is the final key to our peace hopes in Western Europe and to our final victory in case of war".²⁰ The American military was also increasingly convinced of the need for some form of German contribution. During November 1949 Generals Bradley and Clay both hinted at the need for a measure of German rearmament.²¹

While the American Congress was concerned about the wasting of resources on inadequate defence arrangements, the continental Europeans were alarmed at the threat to their territory resulting from NATO's military impotence. By the end of 1949 the Dutch States-General were moving towards support for West German rearmament. Their Foreign Minister, Dirk Stikker, became one of

18. DEFE 4/26, COS(49)166th mtg., minute 1, 9 November 1949; DEFE 4/30, COS(50)52nd mtg., minute 4, 29 March 1950; DEFE 5/20, COS(50)109, 3 April 1950; DEFE 6/11, JP(49)156, 17 March 1950; DEFE 11/26, Makins to Barclay, 9 November 1949; FO 371/76386, w6137, FO to Paris, 9 November 1949.

19. Ireland (1989), *op.cit.*, p.153.

20. *Ibid.*, p.156.

21. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1949, vol. 3, memo of conversation by Perkins, 16 November 1949, p.317-8 and Acheson to McCloy, 21 November 1949, p.340.

the leading advocates of German rearmament during the course of 1950.²² The position of the new West German state was even more exposed than that of the Netherlands. Following his victory in the country's first national election, Adenauer began to agitate for a new Alliance strategy encompassing the defence of German territory east of the Rhine. This inevitably raised the possibility of a German contribution and he discussed this matter with the Allied High Commissioners on 8 December 1949.²³

All of this was very unwelcome to the Foreign Office. Though they were not averse to the idea of an armed gendarmerie for the Federal Republic, they did not trust the Germans sufficiently to accept that they should possess regular armed forces. On 15 December 1949, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Permanent Under-Secretary of the German section and future British High Commissioner in Germany, produced a memorandum which contained many of the themes of Foreign Office opposition to early German rearmament. Like Strang, Kirkpatrick had reluctantly participated in the appeasement of Germany in the 1930s and was determined to prevent that country from regaining a position of influence. However, the two men had very different personalities. Kirkpatrick was highly opinionated and his antipathy to the Germans was part of a more general xenophobia. He once told an emissary from the United States government "that foreigners were either redundant or insanitary".²⁴ In his December memorandum he explained his opposition to early rearmament on the grounds that the French would not accept it, it was provocative to the Soviets, the resources were not available and it might lead to an end to the occupation followed by American withdrawal from Europe. Finally, Kirkpatrick argued that the Germans were untrustworthy. Even if they did not ally with the Soviets, "experience teaches us that an armed German soon develops a truculence and arrogance which makes him impossible to deal with."²⁵ This idea of German

22. FO 371/85050, C4582/22/18, Ministry of Defence minute, 13 July 1950 (Annex D, FO Record of US and Western European views on German rearmament); FO 371/85087, C57/57/18, Nichols to Shuckburgh, 28 December 1949 and C3360/57/18, note of Stikker's speech to Benelux meeting on 13 May 1950.

23. DEFE 5/19, COS(50)8, 10 January 1950 (Appendix 1, Telegram from UK High Commissioner to FO).

24. FRUS, 1955-7, vol.5, memo of a conversation, 1 September 1955, p.573.

25. DEFE 5/19, COS(50)8, 10 January 1950 (Appendix 4, Kirkpatrick Paper on the Problem of German Rearmament, 15 December 1949).

duplicity, already hinted at in the Strang Committee's paper on Germany, was a constant motif during Foreign Office discussions of this subject.

Despite the stated opposition of the Foreign Office to a German military contribution, the Chiefs raised the subject again in their paper on the Japanese Peace Treaty completed on 23 December 1949. This argued that the Allies could not be less generous to the Germans than to the Japanese and that therefore a future treaty with Germany ought to allow "a German army within the North Atlantic Treaty, whilst the other North Atlantic Treaty Powers would be responsible for the navy and air force."²⁶ Gilchrist, of the Foreign Office's German section, complained that this paper, combined with various statements by Stikker, Clay, Bradley and Robert Schuman, was causing progress towards German rearmament to be made prematurely.²⁷ At the end of December the Foreign Office contacted British diplomatic missions around the world to urge that discussion of a German military contribution "should be firmly discouraged". They stated: "the attractiveness of German armed support for Western Europe against an attack by the Russians themselves are superficial and outweighed by the risks which, unlike the hypothetical contingency of Soviet aggression would be real, immediate and inescapable." The risks included the threat of preventive war by the Soviets, the sowing of discord in France, German dominance of Western Union and even the possibility of a military coup in the new Federal Republic.²⁸

The Chiefs' determination to present the case for early German rearmament only increased when Slessor replaced Tedder as Chief of the Air Staff. At a meeting on 29 March 1950 they discussed two Joint Planning Staff (JPS) papers, drawn up in consultation with the Foreign Office, which emphasised the diplomatic obstacles to a policy of German rearmament. The papers again stressed the duplicitous nature of the Germans, stating: "we believe that the Germans were no more than superficially interested in western democracy for itself and their real concern is the restoration of a united Germany." They suggested that the build up of other western defence resources and the political

26. DEFE 5/18, COS(49)453, 23 December 1949.

27. FO 371/85048, C27/27/18, Gilchrist minute, 1 January 1950.

28. FO 371/85087, C57/57/18, Telegram to HM representatives around the world, 22 December 1949.

integration of the Federal Republic into western Europe were essential prerequisites to German militarisation. Slessor complained that these papers "dealt too much with political factors and did not bring out clearly enough the military case for the eventual creation of a German army". Though the paper dealing with specific Foreign Office questions was approved in amended form, the main paper covering the military aspects of German policy was rejected. The Chiefs urged that the rewrite should consider the possibility of using German rearmament as "a way of meeting part of the serious deficit between the forces required and the forces available for the defence of Western Europe."²⁹ This instruction was to provide the basis for the later proposal to form a German army of twenty divisions. In the interim Slessor wrote directly to Strang to suggest that the insistence of his committee that Germany must remain disarmed should be modified. He suggested Germany should be allowed to make a defence contribution while making it "perfectly clear that if she ever attacks the West again... she is bound to get in the first month what she got over 5 years last time, and then some with the atomic weapon as the opening gambit."³⁰

During the first months of 1950, though discussion of German rearmament in Europe and America was less prevalent, in Germany the Allies continued to come under pressure from Adenauer on the issue of a security guarantee for the Federal Republic.³¹ On 28 April he proposed the creation of a gendarmerie of 25,000 men to enforce Federal policies and as a police force for Bonn.³² This plan produced a brief truce in the dispute between the civilian and military branches of the British government. Kirkpatrick had hoped that the issue of a Federal gendarmerie could be postponed but, accepting the military's assessment that it was a matter of urgency, he agreed not to oppose Adenauer's request.³³ At a meeting on 2 May the Chiefs and the Foreign Office representative, Gilchrist, agreed that Adenauer's proposal "was a step in the right direction."³⁴ However, on 11 May the High Commissioners rejected Adenauer's request,

29. DEFE 4/30, COS(50)52nd mtg., minute 4, 29 March 1950; DEFE 5/20, COS(50)109, 3 April 1950; DEFE 6/11, JP(49)156(Final), 17 March 1950; DEFE 11/26, Elliot to Shinwell, 5 April 1950.

30. CAB 21/1761, Slessor to Strang, 8 May 1950.

31. FO 371/85048, C3136/27/18, Kirkpatrick to Bevin, 28 April 1950.

32. FO 371/85324, C3333/3333/18, Robertson to FO, 28 April 1950.

33. FO 371/85324, C3335/3333/18, Kirkpatrick minute, 25 April 1950.

34. DEFE 4/31, COS(50)70th mtg., minute 9, 2 May 1950.

offering instead a force of 5,000 men, carrying only small arms.³⁵

It is apparent that during the spring of 1950, with France still prostrate and America unwilling to become fully committed to European defence, the arguments of the Chiefs were becoming increasingly persuasive and that a consensus was emerging in favour of the creation of an armed gendarmerie. On reading the Permanent Under-Secretary's Committee's paper, Attlee argued in favour of the close integration of German forces into those of the West. He suggested: "German armed forces would be integrated with other Western Union Forces in such a way that while adding substantially to their strength the German contingent would not be as effective as an independent Force". In future discussions of the EDC these arguments would become common place but at the time they were a novel contribution to the debate.³⁶ In Cabinet on 8 May the view was expressed that "before long it would be necessary to consider how Germany could best contribute towards the defence of Western Europe - though this raised grave questions which would require most careful consideration."³⁷ There were, however, strong anti-German prejudices in the Cabinet. In an unscripted outburst to the House of Commons on 28 March, Bevin had expressed the view that the Hitler revolution had been an expression of the German character and had been "latent there right from Bismarkian days."³⁸ Nevertheless, Bevin was forced to consider the Chiefs' case that western Europe could not be defended without a West German contribution. The Chiefs presented their proposals in paragraphs 24 and 25 of their paper on Defence Policy and Global Strategy which was produced in its final form just a few days after Adenauer's request for a 25,000 man gendarmerie. This paper acknowledged French concerns about German rearmament and noted the possibility that a strong Germany might play off West against East, but declared that, "in the long run the defence of western Germany against a Russian invasion can only be secured with the assistance of German armed forces". The danger of a split in Western Union and of the Soviets opting for a preventive war meant

35. FO 371/85324, C3337/3333/18, Recommendations of the High Commissioners, 11 May 1950.

36. CAB 21/1896, Elliot minute, 9 June 1950.

37. CAB 128/17, CM(50)29th mtg., minute 3, 8 May 1950.

38. Alan Bullock, *The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin*, vol3 : *Foreign Secretary 1945-51* (Heinemann, London 1983), p.764. See also p.90 and p.268-9. As on so many other issues Bevin's view on this matter chimed with that of Eden. Ten years earlier Eden had commented: "Hitler is not a phenomenon but a symptom, the expression of a great part of the German nation." Glee, *op.cit.*, p.62.

that full German rearmament could not begin yet, but certain steps should be taken. The main proposal was for "the formation of an armed gendarmerie similar to the Bereitschaft in the East zone." This particular phrase indicated the ambitious nature of the military's plans, for the Bereitschaften was a miniature East German army rather than a police force. That the Chiefs saw the proposed gendarmerie as the basis of a future West German defence contribution is confirmed by their statement that "The ultimate aim would be the formation of a German contingent within the forces of Western Europe."³⁹

The problem was that, though Kirkpatrick had now accepted the military arguments for a gendarmerie, the Foreign Office and the Chiefs still differed over the tasks it would be expected to perform within the Federal Republic. The Foreign Office brief on Germany for the May London conference of Foreign Ministers agreed, in line with the new policy, that the British government should not oppose a German request for a gendarmerie. However, they suggested that its main functions would be to give the Federal government the means to enforce its authority, thus relieving the occupying forces of this responsibility; to enhance the Federal government's prestige whilst lifting West German morale which was being damaged by the expansion of the East German police; and to make a small contribution to defence should war break out.⁴⁰

The Foreign Office draft provided the basis for official British policy towards the gendarmerie whilst the Chiefs of Staff paper provided an additional covert rationale. The tension between these two visions of the future role of the German gendarmerie was not resolved until after the outbreak of the Korean War. When the Defence Committee discussed the Global Strategy Paper on 25 May they approved the section on Germany. This decision was in effect a victory for the military as it meant that the government was not merely committed to the principle of German rearmament, but was also prepared to take the first steps towards achieving it through the medium of a heavily armed Federal gendarmerie.

39. The paper on Global Strategy and Defence Policy will not be released until 2000 but the relevant paragraphs can be found in FO 371/8505, C4719/27/18, FO paper on the Communication of Views to the US Chiefs of Staff, 12 July 1950. In addition an official version of their report, which omits any reference to the Volkspolizei can be found in H.J. Yasamee and K.A. Hamilton, *Documents on British Policy Overseas: Korea, Series II, vol.2, appendix 1, p.419-20.*

40. FO 371/85324, C3335/3333/18, FO brief on Germany for the London conference, 28 April 1950.

Though it may appear anomalous that Bevin sided with the Chiefs on this issue two additional considerations help explain his decision. The first is that Bevin took this step somewhat tentatively and ensured it was not communicated to the Allies. He stressed that "it would be wholly premature to discuss any such far reaching measure with our Allies at the present time."⁴¹ The second key factor was that Bevin was particularly susceptible to the advice of his military advisers and had intervened on their behalf more than once in the past.⁴²

The problem for British foreign policy was that it was practically impossible to make the creation of a heavily armed German police force appear as anything other than a first step towards a German army. British representatives in Washington immediately questioned this new foreign policy departure. The Chiefs of Staff had sought to persuade the Americans of the need for a gendarmerie through the representations of the British Joint Services Mission (BJSJ) in Washington.⁴³ On receiving the minutes of the May Defence Committee meeting, the BJSJ asked for confirmation that the new policy was not to be discussed with the Americans and that the government was now seeking to establish a police force of 25,000 men in line with Adenauer's request, rather than the 5,000 men agreed by the High Commissioners. This was confirmed but was then subject to further queries by the British Embassy in Washington. Oliver Franks, the British Ambassador, noted that the paper on Global Strategy, "set Federal police proposal in a context entirely different from that subsequently outlined in the joint submission to Foreign Ministers... of 11 May."⁴⁴ When Tedder, representing the BJSJ, went on to discuss the Global Strategy Paper with the Americans, the reference to arming the German gendarmerie in the same manner as East German para-military forces, who were being equipped with tanks and artillery, was removed. The Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Kenneth Younger, informed the Ministry of Defence of Bevin's view that using the

41. FO 371/85325, C4587/3333/18, Mallet minute, 7 July 1950; DEFE 11/26, Elliot to Shinwell, 9 June 1950.

42. During the war Bevin had championed the military's view that they must have priority in the allocation of manpower. In January 1947 he had sided with the Chiefs of Staff when Attlee attempted to reduce British commitments in the Middle East. Bullock, *op. cit.*, vol.2, **Minister of Labour 1940-45** (Heinemann, London 1967), p.132-3, and vol.3, p.348-51.

43. FO 371/85325, C27/3333/18, Gainer to Attlee, 6 July 1950.

44. DEFE 11/26, BJSJ to MOD, 2 June and 8 June 1950; FO371/85324, C3854/3333/18, Franks to FO, 8 June 1950.

gendarmerie as a first step towards rearming the Germans was "a subject which should not be pursued with the Americans at the present moment and that no further exchange of views should take place regarding the studies now being carried out by the Chiefs of Staff on this problem".⁴⁵

Despite these efforts at concealment, the Americans were aware that the German federal gendarmerie could form the basis of German armed forces and their Joint Chiefs had already considered pursuing this method of German rearmament.⁴⁶ The American High Commissioner, John McCloy, and the State Department disapproved of this scheme and became alarmed at the British government's vigorous espousal of Adenauer's gendarmerie proposals. In June the visit of Adenauer's security adviser, Schwerin, to London raised suspicions among American officials that the British were conspiring with the West German authorities to expedite the process of German rearmament. On 13 June McCloy reported that it was "becoming increasingly evident that the UK is utilizing pressure for the creation of a German police force as a first step towards the remilitarization of Germany".⁴⁷ On 6 July the American Ambassador spoke to Attlee about Schwerin's visit and urged the divorcing of the issues of German rearmament and a Federal police force. He insisted "it would be premature to discuss the remilitarisation of Germany and that any step in that direction might serve to induce the Soviet (sic) to march in the west."⁴⁸

The French too were concerned at the new British attitude. Their Embassy warned: "it seemed to them impossible to disguise the fact that a Federal gendarmerie, once created, would in fact form the nucleus of German armed forces". They proposed that the Federal government make use of the local Land forces in emergencies. A Foreign Office minute stated that, "Since one of our objectives in supporting the creation of a Federal gendarmerie is, in fact, to lay the foundations for an eventual armed force of some kind for employment within

45. FO 371/85050, C4719/27/18, Gilchrist to Barnes, 13 July 1950 and C4582/22/18, Younger to MoD, 13 July 1950.

46. Records of the JCS, pt.2, reel 2, (A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, Washington 1980), JCS 2124/5, Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee on a German Gendarmerie for the Western Zones, 7 July 1950.

47. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (W.W. Norton, New York 1969), p.390; FRUS 1950, vol.4, memo by Truman for Acheson, 16 June, including footnote 1, McCloy telegram, 13 June 1950, p.688.

48. FRUS 1950, vol.4, Ambassador to Britain (Douglas) to Acheson, 6 July 1950, p.695-6; PREM 8/1209, Mallet minute, 6 July 1950.

the Western European defence system, the French proposals here defeat our purpose." Ivo Mallet, the Under-Secretary superintending the German Political Department, suggested: "Ministers will have to decide whether to attempt to overcome French opposition by openly stating that we regard the proposed force as the first step towards a Federal gendarmerie, which in turn will be a first step towards a measure of German rearmament; or whether we content ourselves for the present with meeting Adenauer's request as far as can be done".⁴⁹

American and French opposition to any form of German rearmament was also evident from their obstruction of the Federal gendarmerie scheme in the High Commission. The plan for a force of 5,000 men sanctioned by the High Commissioners on 11 May was insufficient to achieve the purposes agreed at the Defence Committee meeting of 25 May and the British representatives therefore set about trying to achieve agreement on stronger measures through the establishment of a working party to examine alternative proposals for a Federal police force. Robertson believed a gendarmerie was essential both for the defence of western Europe and the maintenance of internal security. It was required to prevent a recurrence of an incident in March 1950 when British troops were forced to intervene following attacks on a British dismantling team at the Salzgitter steel plant.⁵⁰ Robertson was a figure on whom Bevin had come to rely and it is probable that his views, along with those of the Chiefs, overcame Bevin's innate suspicion of the Germans during the summer of 1950.⁵¹

Though the outbreak of war in Korea on 24 June had a profound effect on the Truman administration's attitude to German rearmament and therefore indirectly led to British acceptance of full scale German rearmament in response to American pressure, its immediate effect on British policy has been exaggerated, while its long term effects have been misunderstood. In June 1950 the Joint Planning Staff at the insistence of the Chiefs of Staff were already making plans for a German contribution to western defence. The Foreign Office had agreed to support Adenauer's request for a 25,000 man Federal police force though, as their

49. FO 371/85324, C4094/3333/18, Ashe minute, 22 June 1950 and Mallet minute, 27 June 1950.

50. Thomas Alan Schwartz, *America's Germany* (Harvard University Press, London 1991), p.119; FO 371/85022, C4350/20/18, Robertson to Bevin, 22 June 1950.

51. Barbara Schwepke, *The British High Commissioners in Germany: Some Aspects of their Work*, PhD(Arts), London, 1991, p.29-30.

brief for the London conference had shown, they believed its role should be the maintenance of internal order. Their scepticism about the rearmament of West Germany through a gendarmerie was only confirmed by events in Korea. Outside the government, Churchill had written to Attlee on 5 May suggesting a contribution of five divisions from the Federal Republic.⁵² Attlee, as we have seen, was already contemplating a German contribution to an integrated NATO force. In this context Churchill's subsequent call, during a speech to the Council of Europe, for the creation of a European army containing German units appears less dramatic, though he did now privately speak of 10 rather than 5 German divisions.⁵³ Admittedly, the Korean conflict persuaded many people who had not been party to these arguments of the need for a German contribution to a large programme of western rearmament. The Under-Secretary of State at the Air Ministry, Aidan Crawley, after consulting with the Secretary of State for War, John Strachey, wrote that unless "it is decided now that German forces must be included in Western defence by the time we aim at making these defences adequate all our money will be wasted".⁵⁴ Similarly, Kenneth Younger wrote: "it is surely essential to face the fact that without the Germans, realistic western defence by 1954 or probably 1957 is out of the question".⁵⁵

Initially Bevin remained committed to a policy of German rearmament. This is evident from a note by Roderick Barclay, Bevin's Private Secretary, written after the Korean War in response to a minute from Mallet stating the Chiefs of Staff's view that, "Even if and when France can be rearmed the question of the association of Federal Germany will have to be effected." Barclay responded that this was Bevin's opinion also and "that once some progress has been made with the rearming of France I do not think he would necessarily exclude the taking of the necessary steps to incorporate the Germans in the general defensive system... it is only on account of French and American susceptibilities that the Secretary of State has felt we must be so very cautious."⁵⁶ By the end of the year the

52. Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill: Never Despair*, vol.8 (Heinemann, London, 1988), p.530.

53. Churchill Papers 1945-65, 2/32, Churchill to Truman, 14 August 1950, telephone message to Sandys, 15 August 1950.

54. John Strachey Papers, box 10, 1950, Crawley to Strachey, 14 July 1950 and memo by Crawley, 17 July 1950. Note that the Strachey papers are currently being re-filed.

55. Kenneth Younger Diaries, 6 July 1950.

56. FO 371/85050, C4807/3333/18, Mallet and Barclay minutes of 21 and 22 July 1950.

positions would be reversed as the Americans pressed the issue of German rearmament while Bevin and the Foreign Office sought to delay it, but during this period it was evident that neither the French nor the Americans were willing to accept British proposals for a police force of 25,000 men. On 1 July 1950 Kirkpatrick, the new British High Commissioner, who was evidently reluctant to press the matter, was warning "that in the face of French opposition and American hesitation the whole project may become irretrievably stuck."⁵⁷ Speaking to Mallet on the phone later that month Kirkpatrick warned "the Americans are with the French on this."⁵⁸

By 4 July Mallet was advocating the separation of the gendarmerie and rearmament issues. He suggested that in order to overcome the opposition of the other High Commissioners to the gendarmerie plan it was "necessary to make it clear to the US and French Governments that we regard the question of the German police as one wholly distinct from that of the rearmament of Germany".⁵⁹ This idea was implicit in a new plan put forward by Kirkpatrick which became the basis of British policy at the New York conferences in September 1950. In the interim the High Commission agreed to the creation of a Land based mobile police force of 10,000 men.⁶⁰ After the rejection of the initial British concept, the Foreign Office continued to support the idea of a Federal gendarmerie but with a new rationale, based on the Korean experience. The Chiefs of Staff pressed ahead with their demands for early German rearmament which events in Korea appeared to have made more urgent and the scale of which they calculated on the basis of NATO's strategic requirements.

Foreign Office policy was largely the work of Kirkpatrick. He had accepted the gendarmerie plan only with reluctance and failed to press for it vigorously after replacing Robertson as High Commissioner. His primary goal was the integration of the Federal Republic into the western system. In November 1948 he had written that West Germany should ultimately join Western Union, thus "making them so dependent, economically, politically and militarily on the Western

57. FO 371/85324, C4374/3333/18, Kirkpatrick to Gainer, 1 July 1950 and C4414/3333/18, Kirkpatrick to Gainer, 30 June 1950; FO 371/85325, C27/3333/18, Gainer summary of German police position for Attlee, 6 July 1950.

58. FO371/85325, C4673/3333/18, Kirkpatrick to FO, 20 July, including Mallet minute.

59. FO 371/85325, C4587/3333/18, Mallet minute, 7 July 1950.

60. FO 371/85325, C4831/3333/18, Kirkpatrick to FO, 28 July 1950.

World that they cannot afford to break away and join the East."⁶¹ However, in mid-1950 he was still convinced that military integration would be premature and this view was confirmed by his first experiences as High Commissioner. He took up his post only weeks before the Korean conflict began and was shocked by the anguished reaction of the German public to events in the Far East. The experience left him with a jaundiced view of the Germans which was to influence his opinions in the years to come. In particular he identified a strain of instability and unpredictability in the German character which he believed the West would have to counter by a policy of judicious concessions mixed with a determined effort to develop permanent ties between the Federal Republic and the West. Kirkpatrick was concerned about the state of civilian morale in the Federal Republic and about the panic induced by the Korean War. The West Germans feared that the East German regime might follow a similar course to the North Koreans. On 15 July Kirkpatrick warned: "Failing any evidence of our resolve there will be an increasing tendency to compound with the Russians while there is time." He was hopeful that the West could "hold the position", but only if there was some evidence that they were tackling the defence problem.⁶² At the start of August Kirkpatrick outlined a five point plan for restoring confidence among the population without resorting to rearmament. He insisted that there was no support for this idea among the German people and that the West would have to continue to bear the main burden of defence. As an alternative to rearmament he proposed that the Federal government be allowed an effective gendarmerie, that alterations be made in the role of the Germans working for the occupying forces as auxiliaries and that improvements be made in the German frontier police. In addition, he suggested that studies should be made of the potential refugee problem in Germany which would result from a Soviet attack and of the possibility of West Germany making an industrial contribution to western rearmament.⁶³

On 18 August, two weeks after the Kirkpatrick note was received, the

61. Rolf Steininger, *The German Question: The Stalin Note of 1952 and the Problem of Reunification* (American edition, Columbia University Press, New York 1985), p.39.

62. FO 371/85049, C4574/27/18, Kirkpatrick to FO, 15 July 1950; Ivone Kirkpatrick, *The Inner Circle* (Macmillan, London, 1979), p.238-41.

63. FO 371/85051, C5096/27/18, Kirkpatrick to Gainer, 3 August 1950.

Chiefs presented their paper on German rearmament. It was based on a second redraft of the Joint Planning Staff paper first presented on 29 March. At that meeting the Chiefs had called for greater emphasis on the military arguments in favour of German rearmament; but the redraft was rejected on 2 May in favour of a more comprehensive survey.⁶⁴ Thus the origins of the August proposals can be found in the Chiefs' pre-Korean War convictions that large scale German rearmament had to be considered. Their plan was entirely different from Kirkpatrick's. Their proposal to immediately start building up a 20 division German army with an additional 10 reserve divisions was the most ambitious form of German rearmament proposed during 1950. The extreme nature of the plan reflected the increased importance of western Europe in British strategy and the vast deficit between the forces required and those available for European defence, as revealed by NATO planning. The Chiefs knew that the deterrent value of the American atomic bomb was waning and feared that Britain's position would become untenable should the Soviets take advantage of western conventional weaknesses and overrun the continent. They believed that Britain would be highly vulnerable once the Rhine defences were breached. Historically the Low Countries had been an area of vital military interest to Britain and the Chiefs recognised their continued relevance to British defence policy. They noted: "It had become of vital importance for the survival of the United Kingdom that the enemy should be held no further west than the line of the Rhine. Even with the advent of improved weapons we could not afford to forego the early warning of an air attack that could be obtained by Allied possession of the Low Countries."⁶⁵ In 1949 the Chiefs had rejected the possibility of holding a bridgehead west of the Rhine and so the defence line had to be drawn on the Rhine or further east. The new importance of European defence was evident from the decision to allot two reserve divisions to western Europe and the revision of the three pillar defence policy to incorporate the defence of the continent into the first pillar of British strategy, the defence of the home base.⁶⁶

64. DEFE 4/30, COS(50)52nd mtg., minute 4, 29 March 1950; DEFE 4/31, COS(50)70th mtg., minute 9, 2 May 1950.

65. DEFE 4/29, COS(50)37th mtg., minute 8, 8 March 1950 and COS(50)39th mtg., minute 2, 27 March 1950; DEFE 4/33, COS(50)113th mtg., minute 3, 19 July 1950.

66. DEFE 4/31, COS(50)74th mtg., minute 2, 11 May 1950.

The inadequacy of the forces available to implement a strategy of Rhine defence was obvious from the widespread lack of confidence in the Western Union's Short Term Plan, while the scale of rearmament required for an effective system of Rhine defence was revealed by the negotiations over NATO's Medium Term Defence Plan. Montgomery, as Commander in Chief of the forces of Western Union, noted that the Short Term Plan, which was based on Rhine defence, "was quite inoperable because the forces available were totally inadequate."⁶⁷ Yet the task of building up an effective defence was formidable, especially when economic costs were considered. Initial estimates of the forces required to implement the Medium Term Defence Plan were so daunting that they had to be scaled down to reduce the gap between requirements and the forces likely to be available.⁶⁸ The eventual targets, which did not take account of a possible German contribution, required Britain to provide 7 divisions and 520 fighters by D + 90 days. As Sir George Creasey, Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, noted, the UK "could not hope" to meet this figure, "without an upheaval in our national economy". The French, whose defence establishment was in a state of chaos and who were involved in a war in Indochina were expected to provide 24½ divisions.⁶⁹ During the summer the NATO planners considered a less drastic programme of rearmament which would include the raising of 3 German divisions and an additional American contribution of 3 divisions. Even in these circumstances, however, the British Chiefs were dubious about their ability to meet their allotted contribution of 6 British divisions by D+20 days.⁷⁰

It appeared that the only means of filling the gap between the estimated requirements of western defence and those likely to be actually available was to proceed with a more substantial measure of German rearmament. The Chiefs of Staff had already noted on 8 March "the importance of enlisting German manpower to redress the balance between east and west."⁷¹ The problem with

67. DEFE 4/35, COS(50)136th mtg., minute 1, 24 August 1950.

68. DEFE 4/30, COS(50)53rd mtg., minute 1, 30 March 1950.

69. DEFE 4/36, COS(50)168th mtg., minute 4, 13 October 1950.

70. DEFE 4/35, COS(50)136th mtg., minute 1, 24 August 1950. The Chiefs suggested that it was "unlikely" that they could meet these requirements and doubted was the likelihood of the US contributing 3 extra divisions by D+20. Later it was suggested that Britain might be able to provide 5 1/3rd divisions by D+90. See DEFE 4/35, COS(50)141st mtg., minute 1, 1 September 1950.

71. DEFE 4/29, COS(50)37th mtg., minute 8, 8 March 1950.

the plan that they advocated in August 1950, however, was that they allowed their proposals to be based entirely on the extent of the likely deficit between defence requirements and capabilities. The type of scheme this would produce was already evident in the rejected Joint Planning Staff paper of 21 April, which estimated that the deficit would be around 30 divisions and stated that West Germany had the manpower to fill this gap.⁷² The revised paper of August 1950 merely elaborated on this analysis. Its main conclusion was stated in the covering note which read: "In view of the present defenceless position of Western Europe in face of the impending threat and present mounting tension, and since the only way in which this position can be remedied is to use the military resources of Western Germany we recommend that HM Government should take the initiative in effecting the necessary political and economic measures which will enable the rearmament of Western Germany to start since without this measure there is no possibility of defending Western Europe." Though deference was paid to Foreign Office arguments about the need to give priority to rearming other west European countries, the economic obstacles to rearmament and the importance of not bargaining with the Germans, these factors are not evident from the actual recommendations of the report, which involved a programme more ambitious than that put forward by the Americans at the September meetings in New York or by Adenauer's advisers in the Himmerod Memorandum of October.⁷³

The JPS recommended, and the Chiefs of Staff approved, that measures be taken immediately to begin the process of creating German armed forces consisting of 20 balanced ground divisions and 10 reserve divisions, an air defence force of 1,000 fighters and a tactical air component of 1,100 aircraft. The size of this force was a reflection of the deficiencies in western defences. Though a more complex procedure is adopted to reach the figure of 30 divisions, essentially the calculation is the same as that made in the rejected JPS report of 21 April. The 30 divisions were the minimum required to fill the expected gap between NATO targets and Allied capabilities. Basing the plan on the NATO requirement for 56 divisions at M + 30 days to defend the Rhine, the JPS estimated that 60 divisions

72. DEFE 6/12, JP(50)46, 21 April 1950.

73. The Himmerod Memorandum envisaged the creation of 12 West German divisions within NATO. See Dennis L. Bork and David R. Gress, *From Shadow to Substance : A History of West Germany*, vol.1 (2nd edition, Blackwell, Oxford, 1993), p.283-4.

would be required for a defence inside West German territory. Moving the defence line further east was essential to fill "the military vacuum between the Rhine and the Elbe", and gave the Chiefs the opportunity to change the emphasis on Rhine defence which they had always believed was unsound. Apparently in response to Foreign Office concerns, at this point the military planners introduced the idea that German forces should constitute no more than a third of the total Allied force. On the basis that 60 divisions would be required for a defence west of the Rhine, the West Germans would be expected to provide 20 divisions by M+30 days. The problem with this calculation was that the size of the German contribution was calculated as a ratio of the troops NATO ought to deploy to fulfil military requirements. As the paper admitted, however, the most optimistic assessment of the non-German forces likely to be available in 1954 was 27 divisions. If this figure were used then the German contribution would have to be reduced to 13 or 14 divisions. Rather than employing the two to one ratio to limit German rearmament, it was actually used to urge the adoption of drastic new measures for west European rearmament including "a major degree of industrial mobilisation", increases in American financial aid and even the utilisation of obsolete equipment to provide arms for the extra forces. In calculating the German air contribution the planners estimated that 4,400 planes were required, and the fraction to be provided by the Germans was one quarter, instead of the one third used for ground forces. The resulting figure of 1,100 was only a small proportion of the expected deficiency of 3,000 aircraft. Again, however, if the proposals were implemented and the projected size of the Allied tactical air force proved correct, the West Germans would supply closer to a half than a quarter of the NATO air forces.⁷⁴

In contrast to the ambitious plans of the Army and Air Force, the Navy were distinctly unenthusiastic about a German defence contribution. Of the three services they remained the most concerned about the revival of Germany's war-making capacity. Thus they insisted that the Federal Republic must be prohibited from possession of, "All major war vessels, including submarines."⁷⁵ When the Navy's Director of Plans was forced to clarify the Admiralty's proposals for the

74. DEFE 5/23, COS(50)305, 18 August 1950.

75. Ibid.

planned German Navy during the EDC discussions of the following year, he reiterated the view that the Germans should not be allowed destroyers of submarines but restricted to the possession of coastal escorts and minesweepers.⁷⁶ Unlike their colleagues in the other services, Admiralty planners consistently refused to contemplate a major German contribution in their field and reacted with alarm whenever the Germans expressed any interest in expanding their planned naval contribution.⁷⁷

The Chiefs presented their proposals at a time when a backlash against the idea of either covert or open German rearmament was occurring in the Foreign Office. Mallet told the Chiefs that their report gave "insufficient weight to the formidable political difficulties involved in the policy proposed." Both the French and the Americans were opposed to German rearmament, while the German economy would be unable to support the scale of defence effort envisaged.⁷⁸ This was not merely a reaction to the American refusal to countenance the gendarmerie scheme, but also the product of a new assessment of the German situation following developments in Korea. It was felt that an armed gendarmerie of the type proposed by Kirkpatrick would have a crucial role in combating the threat from the East German para-military force and ought not to be regarded merely as the basis for a larger scheme of rearmament. It was now evident that the East German *Bereitschaften*, or *Volkspolizei*, was being turned "into a highly trained regular German army of 150,000 men which is to include a number of armoured divisions." In West Germany, negotiations for a Land based mobile police were subject to endless delays, and at the end of August Adenauer made a new request for a gendarmerie of 150,000 men to counter the East German forces.⁷⁹ Like the German Chancellor, Bevin believed that the threat of a Korean style attack against the Federal Republic was genuine. Under his direction a paper incorporating Kirkpatrick's proposals was prepared for the Cabinet. It

76. ADM 1/24420, R.M. Walsh memo, 19 April 1951.

77. For an example of Admiralty suspicions of German intentions see ADM 1/27307, C.S. Sheppard to Director of Naval Intelligence, 29 September 1952, with Hilken minute, 22 October 1952.

78. DEFE 4/34, COS(50)130th mtg., minute 4, 16 August 1950.

79. Adenauer hoped he would eventually be allowed a force of 150,000, but sought initially to reach agreement on a force of 25,000. See FO 371/85052, C5400/27/18, Kirkpatrick to FO, 17 August 1950; FO 371/85326, C5573/3333/18, containing Adenauer's memorandum, and C5596/3333/18, Kirkpatrick to FO, 2 September 1950.

envisaged the creation of a 100,000 strong gendarmerie and the expansion of and improvements in the German customs police and auxiliary forces. This policy, "would give us at an early date nearly 200,000 trained Germans an access[ion] of strength which would be sufficient to deter the Russians from using the Eastern German army against the western zones." On 1 September the Defence Committee endorsed this policy and three days later Bevin informed the Cabinet that he proposed to advocate the creation of a West German gendarmerie of up to 100,000 men at the New York Foreign Ministers meeting.⁸⁰

The Chiefs' plans had been by-passed. On 13 August a Foreign Office brief for Bevin outlined their formal objections to the Chiefs' ideas. Though the 20 division proposal is described as a useful "first estimate", the paper is criticised for paying "insufficient attention a) to the difficulties we are likely to have with our allies, particularly in regard to the fear of Soviet reactions...b) to the ability of the German economy to support such a load... and c) to the dangers of rearming Germany."⁸¹ By the end of the month the Minister of Defence, Emanuel Shinwell, had accepted that the proposals of his military advisors were impractical and agreed to accept the Foreign Office line.⁸²

More interesting than this debate are the comments of Ivo Mallet on the new gendarmerie plan. On 15 March 1950, responding to a request from Robertson that the Foreign Office take some action to reassure the West German population, Mallet had clearly envisaged the formation of a gendarmerie as a possible starting point for German rearmament. His minute stated: "If ultimately an integration of German manpower and resources into western defence becomes possible we may have some hope of defending western Europe and ourselves... As this is at present impossible can we make a start with this most urgent problem by beginning to create a gendarmerie?"⁸³ By September he was complaining that, to the Chiefs of Staff, "the federal gendarmerie has always been nothing more than a first step towards a German armed force." The idea of 'making a start' on rearmament with the gendarmerie now appeared ridiculous to Mallet. He

80. FO 371/85051, C5375/27/18, draft Cabinet Paper, 22 August 1950; CAB 128/18, CM(50)55th mtg., minute 3, 4 September 1950; CAB 131/8, DO(50)17th mtg., minute 2, 1 September 1950; CAB 131/9, DO(50)66, 29 August 1950.

81. FO 371/85050, C4582/22/18, FO memo, 13 August 1950.

82. CAB 21/1896, Shinwell to Elliot, 30 August 1950.

83. FO 371/85020, C1709/20/18, Mallet minute, 15 March 1950.

explained that, "Just as there is a job for the frontier police and the auxiliaries so there is a job for the gendarmerie." Their role was to deal with disturbances and sabotage which would otherwise distract the attention of the Allied forces. In a key section, revealing the change in thinking brought about by the Korean War, he stated that the need for a gendarmerie, "has become urgent since Korea opened our eyes to the danger that the Russians will use the Bereitschaften to stage a civil war in Germany for the avowed purpose of reuniting the country and freeing it from foreign occupation. It is doubtful whether the Allied forces, as at present constituted... would be able to hold Western Germany by the end of next year if the Bereitschaften continued to develop as they are doing."⁸⁴

These comments by one of the senior Foreign Office officials dealing with German policy illustrate the changes in British thinking about a gendarmerie as well as undermining the current historical consensus about its role in British policy. Christian Greiner has stated that prior to the Korean War the western occupying powers "adhered strictly to their demilitarisation policy", while Saki Dockrill has argued that it was only after June 1950 that the British began to contemplate using a Federal gendarmerie as the basis for a future army.⁸⁵ These accounts have strong intuitive appeal. After all, prior to the Korean War, the British were thinking in terms of a 25,000 man gendarmerie, while Bevin was railing against the Germans in the Commons; after June 1950 the Foreign Secretary moderated his language and a scheme emerged for a 100,000 man force. However, though we do not have a complete record of the May Defence Committee meeting, it is quite clear that Bevin gave at least tentative approval to the Chiefs' plans at this time, while at the Defence Committee meeting of September he explicitly ruled out German rearmament "before Western Europe was stronger".⁸⁶ The strongest evidence that on the first occasions the gendarmerie was regarded as a step towards full German rearmament is contained in the minutes of Foreign Office officials such as Barclay and Mallet which suggest that Bevin had now agreed to take the first steps towards German rearmament,

84. FO 371/85327, C6004/3333/18, Mallet minute, 12 September 1950.

85. Christian Greiner, 'The Defence of Europe and the Rearmament of West Germany, 1947-50' in Olav Riste (ed.), *Western Security: European and Atlantic Defence, 1947-53* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1985), p.159; Saki Dockrill, *Britain and the Problem of a West German Military Contribution to NATO*, Ph.D.(Arts), London, 1988, ch.2.

86. CAB 131/8, DO(50)17th mtg., minute 2, 1 September 1950.

and the reactions of British officials abroad who clearly discerned the change in policy initiated at the May Defence Committee meeting.

It may appear anomalous that the British, who for four years after 1950 were to argue with the Americans for a more cautious approach to the rearmament of Germany and a more conciliatory line towards the Soviets, were the first to propose arming the Germans. However, when placed in their proper context the British arguments in favour of an armed gendarmerie do not appear so peculiar. Though the British military envisaged the gendarmerie as the basis for a major defence contribution from West Germany, their arguments were never wholly accepted. Initially the Foreign Office resisted the Chiefs' conception vigorously and they only reluctantly succumbed when Bevin was persuaded that the long term military situation was hopeless without a German defence contribution. The Korean War transformed the debate in a rather unexpected way. With the West about to engage in a massive programme of rearmament and with industry unable to meet the demands of the newly buoyant defence sector, the prospect of finding any arms to supply to the Germans appeared distant. Instead a new rationale for German rearmament emerged which was hinted at in Kirkpatrick's post-Korean War gendarmerie proposals. This argument was based on the notion, which was already embedded in Foreign Office thinking, that the Germans were unreliable and prone to extreme reactions. When combined with the realisation that the occupation could not be permanent it produced a conviction that West Germany must be rearmed in such a way that the country would find itself bound by political and military ties to the West before the end of Allied controls became inevitable. The door to an eastern alliance must be firmly shut. However, this analysis did not triumph immediately and in the next chapter the main theme will be the continuation of the post-Korean War reaction during which the anti-German prejudices of the government, the belief that German rearmament must be subordinate to NATO rearmament and the fear engendered by the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea produced a backlash against the whole idea of arming the Germans.

CHAPTER 2

THE LABOUR BACKLASH

It was in the winter of 1950-1 that those factors militating against the acceptance of German rearmament, namely a visceral antipathy to the Germans resulting from two world wars and a fear of Soviet reactions, had the greatest influence on the development of British policy. This was also the period in which the government first began to consider the financial costs which would result from Germany making its contribution to defence directly through the training and equipping of its own armed forces, rather than indirectly through the payment of occupation costs to Britain, the United States and France. However, there were countervailing pressures which were to be more influential in the long run. The most significant of these was American pressure to accept German rearmament. The Truman administration gained a nominal success in September by persuading Bevin to accept the idea of German rearmament in principle but they were to be frustrated by a combination of French intransigence and British insistence that agreeing to the principle did not imply agreement to the immediate execution of the policy. The Labour government's scrupulous adherence to this principle was facilitated by the American decision of December 1950 to end the linkage between German rearmament and American reinforcements to Europe. However, the Franco-American agreement to support a German contribution to a European army in the summer of 1951 left the British isolated. This development and the realisation that some kind of arrangement for a German defence contribution would be needed before the occupation ended, ensured that the British revolt against the demands of American foreign policy petered out with the defeat of the Labour government in the October general election.

An analysis of British policy between September 1950 and October 1951 reveals that the deep divisions which developed earlier in 1950 on the subject of a German defence contribution persisted. The military chiefs and their political masters had very different priorities. The military's principal aim was the successful completion of negotiations to provide additional forces to close the gap between the force levels required to provide an effective defence for western Europe and the forces available. They hoped that the Germans would contribute to this process as soon as possible, though there were doubts about when this

would be feasible. The Foreign Office, which had been pursuing a policy of seeking to tie western Germany into the western alliance since 1946, were primarily concerned with the completion of this process through the replacement of the Occupation Statute with a contract between the Federal Republic and the wartime allies. The majority of ministers and of the Parliamentary Labour Party regarded the possibility of achieving a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet Union as a more attractive goal than pressing ahead with German rearmament. Indeed, it was hoped that the latter could be sacrificed to achieve the former. Despite the collapse of the preliminary discussions with the Soviets in June 1951, it was still hoped that German rearmament could be postponed. Even had the international circumstances been propitious the British government were not prepared to accept the immediate creation of German armed forces in this period.

The position of the Labour government with regard to German rearmament and the prospect of four power talks was influenced by the enervated condition of the second Attlee administration. Within the country at large, the Parliamentary Labour Party and the Cabinet itself there was much anti-German and anti-American prejudice but it was the lack of foreign policy leadership which allowed these tendencies to flourish. At the February 1950 election Labour's majority was cut to five and for the next eighteen months the party continued to govern under the constant threat of a general election.¹ This made the Cabinet vulnerable to the pressure of backbench and public opinion, but more important in this respect were the deficiencies of Labour's national leadership. The Big Five were in decline and the bipolar world of Gaitskellite and Bevanite politics had yet to emerge. By September 1950, when the decision to support German rearmament in principle was taken, Bevin and Cripps were fatally ill, Dalton, though still with some influence, was at the backwater of Town and Country Planning, and Attlee appeared to be more diffident than ever.² The key figure

1. The actual Labour majority was often even smaller due to the poor health of a number of Labour MPs. Kenneth O. Morgan, *Labour in Power 1945-1951* (Oxford University Press, 1984) p.462.

2. Cripps resigned in October 1950 and died two years later. Bevin died in April 1951, a month after leaving the Foreign Office. Dalton's portfolio was changed from Town and Country Planning to Local Government and Planning in February 1951. Attlee was in hospital during the Cabinet crisis over NHS charges and has been criticised for failing to give a lead in this matter. See Morgan, *op.cit.*, p.456 and Philip M. Williams, *Hugh Gaitskell : A Political Biography* (Jonathan Cape, London, 1979), p.267.

was the party strategist and electoral planner, Herbert Morrison. When he replaced Bevin as Foreign Secretary in March 1951 he seemed the only possible successor to Attlee. Yet it was from this moment that Morrison's career went into decline. He was regarded both by his contemporaries and by his future biographers as a poor Foreign Secretary.³ The consequence of Bevin's frailty and then Morrison's weakness was that German policy became the subject of numerous indecisive squabbles between ministers. In this atmosphere Attlee, responding to the concerns of the Parliamentary Labour Party and hopeful of some sort of rapprochement with the Soviet Union, guided the government towards a policy of delaying German rearmament. Though it is possible that even if Bevin had still been the vigorous, autocratic figure of the 1940s he would have pursued a similar policy, he would never have allowed his decision to become the subject of a prolonged governmental dispute of this kind.

The Chiefs of Staff, who were in the process of reassessing the Soviet threat during early 1951, were eager to begin the process of German rearmament as rapidly as possible. As we shall see there was a certain inconsistency about their views as to the effect this would have on Soviet policy, but despite this it is clear that during this period the British military were making a serious attempt to assist in the construction of an effective conventional defence for western Europe. Indeed, in December 1950 the Chiefs had their most serious clash yet with the Foreign Office over the issue of German rearmament. They sought to downplay suggestions from the diplomatic corps that it might provoke a dangerous Soviet reaction. The strategy developed by Eisenhower at NATO headquarters called for a defence east of the Rhine and if this was to be successfully implemented then a German contribution seemed essential. During 1951 the Chiefs remained among the most radical and persistent advocates of measures designed to achieve a substantial German contribution to defence at an early date, but there was

3. Dalton recorded: "HM doesn't work at Foreign Affairs and doesn't know about them." Acheson claimed Morrison "knew nothing of foreign affairs and had no feeling for situations beyond the sound of Bow Bells". Dirk Stikker, the Dutch Foreign Minister, complained in June 1951 that "inspirational" British leadership in foreign affairs "disappeared from the Labour Government with the departure of Cripps and the death of Bevin." See the Hugh Dalton Diaries, part 1 vol.42, 4 June 1951; Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (W.W. Norton, New York, 1969), p.505; Louis Galambos (ed.), *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: NATO and the Campaign of 1952*, vol.12, (John Hopkins Press, London, 1989), Eisenhower to Harriman, 12 June 1951, p.346; Bernard Donoughue and G.W. Jones, *Herbert Morrison: Portrait of a Politician* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1975), ch.36.

increasing concern about how soon the alliance would have the resources available to rearm the Germans. The Chiefs were generally more pessimistic than the other allies about the length of time required to develop effective German armed forces and were sceptical about the likelihood of the continental powers meeting their obligations to NATO. German rearmament was an obvious solution to the problem of closing at least part of the projected gap between the force requirement prescribed by NATO and the actual contribution which the continental powers were likely to make.

Foreign Office officials were, in general, less convinced than the military of the need to achieve early German rearmament, but were also highly suspicious of the attempts of the politicians to bargain with the Soviets over Germany's future. Though there was a great deal of hostility to Germany in the Foreign Office, by 1951 this did not match the pessimism with which the Soviet Union was regarded. The Russians were seen as implacable enemies. A global settlement was believed to be wholly unrealistic and any partial settlement was likely to be exploited by Moscow. The diplomats were particularly anxious that the achievements of German policy since 1948 should not be prejudiced. The failure of the London conference of Foreign Ministers in December 1947, followed by the Soviet withdrawal from the Allied Control Commission in March 1948 and the imposition of the Berlin Blockade allowed Bevin to proceed with the policy, formulated by the British in 1946, of tying the western zones of Germany into the West.⁴ A process of gradual liberalisation began with currency reform, proceeded with the abolition of the Military Government and continued with the reform of the Occupation Statute. Though even in 1951 the ultimate fate of West Germany remained unclear, the Foreign Office were unwilling to sacrifice the substantial achievements of the previous three years to embark on a risky new policy based on the possibility of achieving an agreement with the quarrelsome

4. There is general agreement that 1948 was a watershed for British and western policy in Germany. See Saki Dockrill, *Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament* (Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.6; Dennis L. Bork and David R. Gress, *From Shadow to Substance : A History of West Germany* vol.1 (2nd edition, Blackwell, Oxford 1993), p.191; Alan Bullock, *Ernest Bevin : Foreign Secretary 1945-1951* (Heinemann, London, 1983), p.513-6; Geoffrey Warner, 'Britain and Europe in 1948 : The View from the Cabinet' in Becker and Knipping (eds.), *Power in Europe?* (Walter de Gruyter, New York, 1986), p.40.

Soviets.⁵ Though the Foreign Office accepted that German rearmament would be a part of the process of restoring sovereignty to the Federal Republic, they were concerned about its timing, and believed the military were acting prematurely. During 1951 they became reconciled to the idea that the moment when the Germans ought to begin making a contribution to western defence was approaching. This was only accepted as the corollary to the framing of a contract, however, and the general, though not unanimous view, was that the contractual negotiations should have priority.

By the time of the September New York Foreign Ministers meeting the Foreign Office had won a clear victory on the issue of German rearmament, but their triumph appeared hollow when the Americans presented their 'one package' proposal. The British government had initially believed that American obstruction of their gendarmerie schemes was indicative of a general opposition to German rearmament in the Truman administration. Thus, on 6 July Gilchrist noted that the Americans were unconvinced of the need for a gendarmerie and that "considered as a first step towards German rearmament its establishment would be opposed by United States public opinion. The State Department do not feel that democracy is well enough established in Germany to take any risks yet by embarking on something which looks like rearmament." On 14 July the British Embassy in Washington explained that the State Department "would like to see clearer signs of political development in Western Germany... before committing themselves to even such a moderate concession to German rearmament as a small Federal police force."⁶

During the week prior to the New York meeting the British became aware of Washington's desire to see German units incorporated into European defence.⁷ They remained unaware, however, that Acheson would advocate German rearmament so vigorously, with the aid of a range of inducements linked to rearmament in one package. In fact even before the Korean War the American

5. CAB 129/43, CP(50)294 annex A, 2 December 1950; CAB 129/44, CP(51)33 annex A, 26 January 1951.

6. FO 371/85325, C27/3333/18, Gilchrist minute, 6 July 1950 and C4689/3333/18, Penson to Allen, 14 July 1950.

7. FO 371/85327, C5757/3333/18, Washington to FO, 9 September 1950; FO 371/85053, C5756/27/18, Franks to FO, 9 September 1950; FO 371/85052, C5049/27/18, Kirkpatrick to FO, 24 August 1950; DEFE 4/34, COS(50)144th mtg., minute 2, 8 September 1950.

military had been determined to make American commitments "conditional upon the other NATO countries doing their full share and of satisfying the United States that they are doing their full share".⁸ The eventual package agreement was the result of rushed negotiations between the Pentagon, who wanted to make an American commitment to an integrated force dependent upon German rearmament, and the State Department, who opposed the linking of these issues, following Truman's demand on 28 August that they develop an agreed policy.⁹ When Bevin met the American chargé, Holmes, he was informed "that United States thinking was much in line with the Secretary of State's" on the subject of a gendarmerie. There was no hint that the American proposals for the creation of a unified defence force would be linked to German rearmament, though Holmes made clear that Washington did favour both of these proposals.¹⁰ The true nature of the American scheme was not clarified until the Foreign Ministers meeting on 12 September when Acheson, having reluctantly accepted the military's formula, promised American reinforcements for Europe and agreement to an integrated NATO staff on condition that a policy of German rearmament was approved. He later made it clear that the US administration had considered how to defend Europe as far east as possible and had "concluded that without some German participation the simple arithmetic would not work out".¹¹

The American initiative in New York brought the issue of German rearmament into the realm of Cabinet decision making for the first time. The decision in May 1950 to support covert German rearmament had been taken in the Defence Committee and there had been little discussion when Bevin had informed the Cabinet on 4 September of the position to be taken at New York. Despite Shinwell's recollection that "none of us liked it", there were evidently

8. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1950, vol.3, memo from Service Chiefs to Johnson, 13 July, p.133-4; Records of the JCS, 1946-53 (A Microfilm Project of the UPA, Washington), pt.2, reel 1, JCS2124/9, 20 July 1950.

9. FRUS 1950, vol.3, Truman to Acheson, 26 August, p.250, Acheson and Johnson to Truman, 8 September, p.273-7. See also Timothy P. Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance* (Aldwych Press, London, 1989), p.185-95; Acheson, *op.cit.*, p.437-40; R. McGeehan, *The German Rearmament Question* (University of Illinois Press, London, 1971), p.25-30; Geoffrey Warner, 'The United States and Rearmament of West Germany' *International Affairs*, 61, 1985, p.280-81.

10. Roger Bullen and M.E. Pelly, *Documents on British Policy Overseas* (HMSO), series 2, vol. 3, record of a meeting on 4 September 1950, including annex. p.4-8.

11. FRUS 1950, vol.3, memorandum of a conversation between Acheson and Schuman, 12 September 1950, p.285-7 and memorandum of a private conference of the three Foreign Ministers and High Commissioners, p.293-300; Bullock (1983), *op.cit.*, p.804-8; McGeehan, *op.cit.*, p.34-5.

considerable differences over the issue.¹² Dalton, who subsequently campaigned against it, was in a state of depression which prevented him opposing it during September 1950.¹³ Bevin and Attlee, who favoured agreement in principle while delaying in practice, were at first unable to persuade the majority of the Cabinet. At their meeting on 14 September the Cabinet refused to endorse the Foreign Secretary's proposals. The revolt was an ephemeral affair and the next day, following further telegrams from Bevin, they agreed to accept German rearmament in principle.¹⁴ Once agreement was reached, however, Shinwell became a vigorous proponent of the American scheme. The contrast between Foreign Office caution and military urgency soon became evident. At a meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers in New York on 22 September, Shinwell emphasised that 1951 would be "the critical year", that it would be "fatal" not to accept the American offer and that planning the form of a German contribution would have to begin immediately.¹⁵ In contrast Bevin's deputy, Kenneth Younger, complained that, "The Americans are rushing things too fast for the French and the Germans and possibly, even, too fast for British opinion. We are trying to stall them, but they have the bit between their teeth and I fear there will be no holding them for a month or two at most".¹⁶

It was the suggested change in American foreign and defence policy which persuaded Bevin and eventually the rest of the Cabinet to accept the American concept of German rearmament.¹⁷ The main points of the American offer were the promise to increase American forces in Europe to a peace time strength of 4 infantry and 1½ armoured divisions, to reinforce these in the event of war and to appoint an American Supreme Commander for NATO.¹⁸ The British hope was that agreement in principle would allow the substantive part of the American

12. Emanuel Shinwell, *I've Lived Through It All* (Victor Gollancz, London 1973), p.204.

13. Dalton collapsed on 18 September. See Hugh Dalton Diaries, pt.1/38 (1950), 8 and 18 September.

14. CAB 128/18, CM(50)58th mtg., minute 3, 14 September 1950, CM(50)59th mtg., minute 1, 15 September 1950.

15. FRUS 1950, vol.3, Acheson telegrams to Assistant Secretary of State (Byroade), 22 and 23 September 1950, p.338-41; FO 371/85055, C6105/27/18 and C166/27/18, Jebb to FO, 22 September 1950.

16. Kenneth Younger Diaries, 17 September 1950.

17. FO 371/85053, C5845/27/18, Jebb to FO, 13 September 1950 and C5865/27/18, Jebb to FO, 14 September 1950; CAB 128/18, CM(50)63rd mtg., minute 3, 9 October 1950.

18. FRUS 1950, vol. 3, Acheson and Johnson to Truman, 6 September 1950, p.273-7 and Johnson to Acheson, 12 September 1950, p.292.

proposals to be implemented before German rearmament began.¹⁹ The American scheme certainly appeared to offer scope for extended negotiations. The plan presented to NATO's Defence Committee was for the incorporation of West German balanced ground divisions into an integrated NATO force. The number of divisions would never exceed one fifth of the total and the Supreme Commander would control their operational activities.²⁰

The problem for the British government was that the French would not accept the American plan, and without French acceptance of the principle of German rearmament the Americans would not proceed with the remainder of their package. The result was a three month crisis in NATO which only ended with the adoption of the Spofford Plan by the North Atlantic Council in December.²¹ The primary concern of the Attlee administration during this period was to maintain the Atlantic Alliance, which appeared under serious threat, while seeking to avoid unduly provoking the Soviets. Acceptance of the principle of German rearmament, while leaving its detailed application as a matter for future discussion was seen as the only way forward and the French were bitterly criticised for obstructing this path. On 20 October Attlee told a meeting at 10 Downing Street: "It was not acceptable that the present situation should continue. The French should be pressed by every form of argument to come to some positive and helpful conclusion." The Pleven Plan for the creation of an integrated European Army, introduced to the French National Assembly on 24 October, did not, from the British perspective, meet either of these criteria. At the NATO Defence Committee meeting which began on 28 October, Shinwell told Marshall that the Plan "did not seem to us to hold out any real or substantial hope for the defence of Western Europe. On the contrary it seemed to be a political manoeuvre which was designed to give the French 'a way out' of their difficulties." Privately Shinwell was even more outspoken, describing the Plan as, "disgusting

19. FO 371/85053, C5865/27/18, FO telegram to New York, 15 September 1950; CAB 128/18, CM(50)59th mtg., minute 1, 15 September 1950.

20. FRUS 1950, vol.3, State-Defence Memo for North Atlantic Council, 6 October 1950, p.362-3.

21. For an account of this period see Dockrill (1991), op.cit., p.41-55; Saki Dockrill, 'Britain's Strategy for Europe: Must West Germany be Rearmed?' in Richard J. Aldrich (ed.), *British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War 1945-51* (Macmillan, London 1980), p.202-4; Maj-Gen Edward Fursdon, *The European Defence Community : A History* (Macmillan, London, 1980), p.86-98; McGeehan, op. cit., p.61-92; Ireland, op. cit., p.198-207.

and nauseous...military folly and political madness."²² At the meeting the French defence minister, Jules Moch, was intransigent. He insisted that integration should be at battalion level as the creation of German divisions "would unavoidably lead to camouflaged Ger general staff and Ger army."²³ The European Army idea posed a double threat to the British government by both delaying, perhaps indefinitely, the American commitment to European defence promised by Acheson in September and by promoting a European based defence system rivalling the Atlantic Alliance.

Frustration with the French became intense. Attlee complained that the failure of the NATO meeting was "entirely due to French intransigence and lack of resolution. Valuable time was being lost; chances of substantial American reinforcements in Europe were being thrown away; and there was little prospect of being able to build up adequate strength against the real dangers of aggression in Europe in 1951."²⁴ Evelyn Shuckburgh, the head of the Foreign Office's Western Organisations department, was relatively unconcerned about the dangers of German rearmament but regarded the French plan as potentially fatal to the cause of Western security. He described the Pleven Plan as "a conscious move away from the Atlantic conception of defence...and towards a European federal solution which is impossible for us and which we consider futile...it overlooks the present Soviet threat and concentrates on the remoter danger of a rearmed Germany in Europe relieved of the Russian menace and abandoned by the USA".²⁵ In order to forestall the French, Bevin developed a plan for an Atlantic Federal Force based, like the European Army, on the idea of creating an integrated multi-national army in western Europe, but to include British, American and Canadian forces. As with the Pleven Plan the participants would have to sacrifice a degree of military sovereignty but this would strengthen rather than weaken the Atlantic system. Bevin's plan was designed to build on the achievements of NATO, while by contrast the French design with "its emphasis on the European idea, its determination to exclude Germany from NATO and its

22. PREM 8/1429, pt.1, note of an Informal Meeting at 10 Downing Street on 20 October 1950, BJSM in Washington to Ministry of Defence, 28 October 1950; Walter S. Poole **The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1950-1952**, vol.4, p.212.

23. FRUS 1950, vol.3, Secretary of State (Acheson) to Embassy in France, 19 October 1950, p.416.

24. CAB 131/18, DO(50)21st mtg., minute 4, 8 November 1950.

25. Bullen and Pelly, op.cit., note by Shuckburgh for Bevin, 26 October 1950, p.212.

covert hostility to US participation in European affairs...strikes at the very root of the Atlantic ideal and threatens to undermine the whole treaty." The British military, who were in any case less hostile to the European Army concept, regarded Bevin's plan as wholly unrealistic. They argued it had "no sound military basis" and that it was unlikely to be acceptable to the Americans who were still maintaining the link between the appointment of a Supreme Commander and the German rearmament issue. The American offer to appoint a Supreme Commander was regarded by the Chiefs as "a vital advantage which we must seize now or may lose forever". Bevin's plan was rejected by the Defence Committee on 27 November on the grounds that it seemed likely to delay still further the fulfilment of the American offer.²⁶

The debate over the French proposals was conducted at the same time as a separate discussion about whether the British government should seek to delay, perhaps indefinitely, the implementation of German rearmament, despite having accepted the idea in principle. Though the New York conferences of September 1950 witnessed the first open agreement to German rearmament by the British government, paradoxically they also marked the start of a period of reaction against the idea, facilitated by French delaying tactics and brought to a climax by the intervention of the Chinese Communists in Korea. The more open nature of the commitment led to a much wider debate on the issue than had occurred in May. This provided an opportunity for opponents of German rearmament, including the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir William Strang, to intervene to stop or delay the scheme. On 15 September Strang wrote to Younger that a rearmed Germany would "possess a power of manoeuvre, with or without the Soviet Union which will be profoundly disturbing and disruptive. I have a conviction, possibly a foolish one which is not amenable to reason that it is still a mistake to put arms into German hands for purposes of war".²⁷ In November Mallet proposed a bizarre scheme to rearm Germany on a Land basis, thus recreating the Bavarian and Prussian armies of the 19th century. This gained

26. PREM 8/1429, pt.1, FO paper on 'German Contribution to the Defence of Western Europe', 24 November 1950, Elliot brief for Attlee, 25 November 1950; DEFE 4/37, COS(50)177th mtg., minute 1, 9 November 1950 and COS(50)186th mtg., minute 2, 24 November 1950; CAB 131/8, DO(50)22nd mtg., 27 November 1950.

27. FO 371/85054, C5999/27/18, Strang to Younger, 14 September 1950.

the support of another Deputy Under-Secretary, Sir Pierson Dixon. He wrote: "In spite of all objections to it, it does seem to me that by basing ourselves on the federal principle we should be less likely to risk the creation of a German monster which we as well as the French would have reason to distrust... By the time we have created an effective police force & army & when the economic controls which rearmament are likely to involve have been reimposed the Fourth Reich will be in being tho' still divided".²⁸

By contrast events in New York were welcomed by the Chiefs of Staff and prompted them to return to the ideas set out in their 20 division plan. This became apparent when the matter of safeguards against a resurgence of German military power was discussed. Initially the military seemed unwilling to consider any measures which might sacrifice military effectiveness for political expediency. When the Ministry of Defence was consulted on this issue, the Chief Staff Officer, Sir William Elliot, suggested "that on the assumption that we denied an Air Force to Germany the best safeguard was the Allied power to pulverise the German war industry in the Ruhr with the atom bomb."²⁹ The role that strategic bombardment could play in restraining Germany became a theme in military discussions of German rearmament. Slessor and his deputy, Sanders, suggested French fears could be removed if "we should undertake to maintain powerful air striking forces, including a strong French element under French control ready for immediate action against Germany".³⁰ Nor were the Chiefs prepared to sacrifice the 2 to 1 ratio of Allied to German troops in favour of the American suggestion of 4 to 1 or Kirkpatrick's advocacy of 4 to 1 or perhaps 3 to 1.³¹ The Joint Planning Staff argued that restricting German forces to a third of the total Allied strength should ensure that "the demands of Allied security would be more than satisfied." Sanders and Creasey, the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, argued that the 2 to 1 ratio was based on the needs of the Medium Term Defence Plan which the Americans had taken insufficiently into account in their

28. FO 371/85057, C7268/27/18, Mallet minute, 6 November and C7269/27/18, Dixon minute, 13 November 1950.

29. DEFE 4/36, COS(50)160th mtg., minute 5, 3 October 1950.

30. DEFE 4/37, COS(50)177th mtg., minute 1, 9 November 1950.

31. FRUS 1950, vol.3, State-Defence memo for North Atlantic Council, 6 October 1950, p.362-3; FO 371/85056, C6582/27/18, Kirkpatrick to FO, 15 October 1950.

scheme.³² Eventually it was accepted that the ratio of Allied to German troops should remain subject to further negotiations. The principal concession made by the Chiefs was over the level of integration at which German troops would be incorporated into Allied forces. In order to ease French concerns, they were willing to accept a brigade group as the basic unit.³³

The main disagreement between the Foreign Office and the Chiefs in the aftermath of New York was not, however, over the safeguards which ought to accompany German rearmament, but over its timing. Where the Chiefs were determined to expedite the measures necessary to achieve a German military contribution as soon as possible, the diplomats were anxious to delay it until the West could build up its defences without German assistance. The initial dispute concerned the Marshall Points which had been agreed by the American, British and French Defence Ministers at New York. These constituted a series of interim measures which could be implemented in the absence of agreement on German rearmament, and included the establishment of an armed Land-based police force.³⁴ Bevin was unable to persuade the French and Americans of the benefits of a Federal force under the control of the government in Bonn.³⁵ Despite the fact that the police force envisaged in the Marshall Points was to be organised on a regional basis, the Chiefs apparently still regarded it as a starting point for military rearmament. This was a return to the ideas of the May Defence Committee agreement. On this occasion the Foreign Office, led by Bevin, resisted. The Foreign Secretary warned Shinwell that using the mobile police as a means to achieve covert German rearmament would "lead to a political crisis of the first magnitude in Germany."³⁶

32. DEFE 4/36, COS(50)168th mtg., minute 3, 13 October 1950; DEFE 6/14, JP(50)137 (Final), 12 October 1950.

33. DEFE 4/37, COS(50)186th mtg., minute 2, 24 November 1950; DEFE 6/15, JP(50)161, 10 November 1950, annex 2.

34. FO 371/85055, C6109/27/18, New York Delegation to FO, 22 September 1950; FO 371/85056, C6218/27, Gainer to Attlee, 25 September 1950; DEFE 4/36, COS(50)155th mtg., 25 September 1950. The agreement to the Marshall Points was actually the product of a mistake by the American Defence Secretary who regarded his brief from the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a subject for negotiation, rather than the private briefing paper it was intended to be. See FRUS 1950, vol.3., Acting Secretary of State (Byroade) to McCloy, 25 September 1950, p.346 and FO 371/85056, C6457/27/18, Barclay to Gainer, 3 October 1950.

35. FO 371/85327, C5883/3333/18, Jebb to FO, 14 September 1950; CAB 129/39, CP(50)223, 6 October 1950.

36. FO 371/85056, C6599/27/18, Gilchrist to Gainer, 11 October and Gainer to Dixon, 12 October 1950 and C6624/27/18, Gainer to Bevin, 1 October and Bevin to Shinwell, 13 October 1950.

The second and more important confrontation came in the aftermath of the Chinese intervention in Korea. On 25 November a massive Chinese counter-attack was launched in Korea, precipitating a chaotic American retreat. For the three weeks after the Chinese intervention, strategic planning in Britain and America took place against the background of a massive American evacuation of northern Korea. The atmosphere of crisis was further exacerbated by concern over the Communist victories of Cao Bang and Langson in Indochina the previous month. This increase in Cold War tension had a profound effect on British attitudes towards German rearmament. On 12 December Bevin informed the Cabinet that "it can legitimately be said that the conditions in which we are called upon to accept the present plans for German participation are different from those in which we committed ourselves, in September last, to the principles of a German contribution."³⁷

Events in the Far East affected Foreign Office thinking about German rearmament in two ways. Firstly, they increased concern about possible Soviet reactions to an announcement that German rearmament was to commence. Just as the Chinese had warned MacArthur not to advance to the Yalu, the Soviets had issued clear warnings about German rearmament. Fear of Soviet reaction had been an important factor in Foreign Office thinking for some time. On 1 September Bevin told the Defence Committee: "There was serious danger in endeavouring to support any measure of German rearmament which apart from its effect on public opinion in Western European countries, might provoke serious reactions from Russia, from Eastern Germany, from the Russian satellites, or from all of these."³⁸ The American package plan increased these concerns. Gainer, Kirkpatrick's replacement as Permanent Under-Secretary for the German section, feared the deal offered by the Americans "will give us a negligible accession of strength over the critical period of preparation... at the cost of alerting the Russians by the fullest possibility as to our intentions."³⁹ The escalation of the Korean War in November and the Soviet request of 3 November for a four power

37. CAB 129/43, CP(50)311, 12 December 1950.

38. CAB 131/8, DO(50)17th mtg., minute 3, 1 September 1950. See also FO 371/85052, C554/27/18, Bevin to Harvey, 5 September 1950 and FRUS 1950, vol.3, US Ambassador to Soviet Union (Kirk) to Acheson, 8 August 1950, p.129 and Bevin to Acheson, 4 September 1950, p.264.

39. FO 371/85055, C6052/27/18, Gainer to Younger, 18 September 1950.

Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) to discuss German demilitarisation made this tendency in Foreign Office thought still more pronounced. Strang stressed the fact that the Soviets had declared they would "not reconcile themselves to measures directed towards the restoration, in Western Germany of a German regular army." The Foreign Office took the threat seriously. Gainer argued that, in light of the Chinese intervention in Korea, the threat from Russia "has greatly increased and I think we must regard the Soviet statements... and the Soviet request for a CFM meeting on German rearmament in the light of serious warnings, to be disregarded at our peril."⁴⁰

Bevin was preoccupied during late November and early December with the second problem that the escalation of the war in Korea posed: the possibility that the American military effort might have to be switched from Europe to Asia. This was a corollary of the first; the incentive for a Soviet attack would increase if the Truman administration appeared to be distracted by events in the Far East. Both dangers were discussed when Attlee and Bevin met Plevin, the French Prime Minister, and Robert Schuman, the Foreign Minister, on 2 December. Bevin stressed that "it was essential to avoid getting too heavily committed in the East" and that Acheson's proposals were "too good to miss". However, Schuman warned that the Soviets might follow the same policy in Germany as they had in Korea if the West proceeded with German rearmament. Attlee concluded by arguing that a German defence contribution was a strategic necessity but that it would take time to implement and in the interim other Allied forces must be strengthened. Evidently French objections made some impact because at a meeting the next day to brief Attlee on his trip to Washington, Bevin said that "as a result of his conversations with the French Prime Minister and the French Foreign Minister, he desired more time to consider the attitude which the United Kingdom should adopt towards the problem of the German contribution to Western defence. He undertook to send his considered views to the Prime Minister in Washington."⁴¹ Three days later he sent a telegram to Attlee urging the Prime Minister to suggest to Truman a delay in the implementation of

40. FO 371/85058, C7955/27/18, Strang minute, 5 December 1950 and C8028/27/18, Gainer minute, 6 December 1950.

41. Bullen and Pelly, *op.cit.*, record of a meeting on 2 December 1950, p.310-16; CAB 130/65, GEN 347/2, 4 December 1950.

German rearmament. Bevin explained that he was "very much concerned" about the fact that the Allied decision to rearm Germany would soon become known and about "the effect which this is likely to have on the general situation at the present time, having regard to the position of extreme weakness in which the Western Powers now find themselves and the grave doubts which we must feel as to whether any American reinforcement of Europe is possible in the near future." He insisted that circumstances were "entirely different from those which obtained when we first agreed with the Americans that it was safe to embark on German rearmament". The Americans had promised substantial reinforcements during 1951 but now "we cannot even be sure until the consequences of present Korean developments are made clear, that we are not going to be faced with a situation in the Far East in which a large proportion of Allied military resources would be tied up for a long time to come." Bevin then went on to relay Foreign Office fears about Soviet reactions to German rearmament. He recommended that Attlee discuss these problems frankly with Truman to see whether he would accept a delay in German rearmament.⁴²

This telegram had precipitated a confrontation between Bevin and the Chiefs of Staffs and coincided with an increase in Cabinet divisions on the issue. The defence establishment continued to regard the resolution of the German rearmament controversy as a priority. In November 1950 Shinwell was still "impressed with the urgency of this matter and the necessity for a quick settlement of the problem to meet a possible Russian move in 1951 or 1952", while the Chiefs had written to the BJSM stressing the necessity of overcoming French obstruction of the American proposals. They suggested that there would be sufficient safeguards against a German military revival even without a European army, including the fact that "with key industries concentrated on the Ruhr she is particularly vulnerable to atomic bomb attack".⁴³ When Bevin had proposed his Atlantic Confederacy scheme as a counter to the European Army concept embodied in the Pleven Plan, Shinwell had explained that his "main concern was to ensure that an increase of strength on the ground was achieved by 1951" and warned that Bevin's scheme might cause further delays in achieving this.⁴⁴ The

42. FO 800/456, Def 50/21, FO to Washington, 6 December 1950.

43. CAB 21/1898, Ministry of Defence to BJSM, 17 November 1950.

44. CAB 131/8, DO(50)22nd mtg., 27 November 1950; CAB 131/9, DO(50)95, 7 November 1950.

Chiefs were horrified when they discovered that Bevin intended to send a telegram to Attlee voicing his concerns about German rearmament. Slessor warned that Bevin's prevarication might jeopardise the sending of American reinforcements, while Elliot believed it would "have a deplorable effect in France." On 4 December they agreed to make urgent representations to prevent the telegram being sent. The following day Bevin and the British ambassador to the Soviet Union, Sir David Kelly, met the Chiefs and explained their view that, with the possibility of the Americans being distracted by events in the Far East, "we could clearly not afford to gamble on the result of any decision which might provoke the Russians into action." Kelly emphasised that there would be "a dangerous time" between the announcement of German rearmament and the appearance of German forces. However, the Chiefs continued to warn of the disastrous effect the proposed telegram would have on the Americans and it was agreed that it should be re-drafted. Considering this re-draft the following day, they remained dissatisfied. Nevertheless, they agreed not to disassociate themselves from it provided a statement of their views was included.⁴⁵

Attlee decided not to raise Bevin's fears about German rearmament with Truman, but a split was developing in the Cabinet on this issue. Bevin and Shinwell had clashed on a number of occasions during the last few months and now Morrison insisted on Bevin communicating his support for the Chiefs' position to Attlee.⁴⁶ Following his return, the Prime Minister was confronted by a recovered Hugh Dalton who expressed his reservations about German rearmament and claimed that Bevin "shared my apprehensions".⁴⁷ Kenneth Younger, who gradually took over Bevin's responsibilities during the next few weeks, was highly critical of the Americans. In early January he complained they had "been pressing for immediate German rearmament, regardless of the risk of provoking the Russians at the moment of Europe's greatest weakness, you could scarcely get a more complete picture of dangerous stupidity on the part of a leading power".⁴⁸ This was the first phase of a bitter Labour Party dispute

45. DEFE 4/38, COS(50)193rd mtg., minute 3, 4 December 1950, COS(50)194th mtg., minute 1, 4 December 1950, COS(50)197th mtg., 5 December 1950, COS(50)198th mtg., minute 1, 6 December 1950.

46. FO 800/456, Def 50/21, FO to Washington, 8 December 1950.

47. Hugh Dalton Diaries, pt.1/38 (1950), 9 and 20 December 1950.

48. Kenneth Younger Diaries, 9 January 1951.

which lasted into the mid-1950s. Labour's ambivalence about German rearmament prevented the government giving full endorsement to a policy which they had accepted in principle at New York.

The failure of the Atlantic Federal Force idea and Attlee's refusal to backtrack on Britain's commitment to German rearmament during his meetings with Truman left acceptance of the deal engineered by the American representative on the North Atlantic Council, Charles Spofford, as the only viable alternative. The Spofford Plan sanctioned both negotiations for the creation of German armed forces and separate discussions to examine the feasibility of the Pleven Plan. As this compromise was to precipitate the vital negotiations of 1951 it is worth noting that the British government was unenthusiastic about it from the outset. This was partly because it implied acceptance of the European Army. Bevin informed the British representative on the NATO Defence Committee that he had "grave misgivings" about the Spofford Plan because he objected to "taking any risk whatever that the French might succeed in creating the European Defence Force...it would be a weakening of the Atlantic Community as a whole and might well result, in the long run, in the emergence of a neutral third force in Europe."⁴⁹ There was also a feeling that the plan would involve the western powers in a process of bargaining with the Germans over the 'price' of their defence contribution. The British representative on the North Atlantic Council, Hoyer-Millar, "expressed concern that dual approach to Germans under US proposals (by HICOMS on basis US plan and in Paris on basis European Army) concurrently might cause German temporize on first until terms of second visible." He did not begin to give support to Spofford's plan until 28 November, a week after Spofford presented his proposals and the day after Bevin's Atlantic Federal Force scheme was rejected by the Defence Committee.⁵⁰ The Foreign Secretary still insisted that his acceptance "did not commit the governments as to the precise timing of the approach to the Federal Government" and that there must be flexibility over how the issue was to be raised with the West German

49. PREM 8/1429, pt.1, Elliot brief for Defence Committee meeting of 25 November 1950. See also FRUS 1950, vol.3, memo of conversation between Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (MacArthur) and Steele, 30 November 1950, p.507.

50. FRUS 1950, vol.3, US Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to Acheson, 25 November 1950, p.484 and Spofford to Acheson, 28 November 1950, p.494; CAB 131/8, DO(50)22nd mtg., 27 November 1950.

government. During December Bevin continued to make it plain that he had "always felt very strongly that it would be fatal to go to the Germans cap in hand with a request for their contribution, thereby putting them in a position where they can bargain with us and...that if we put the Spofford Plan formally to them at the present moment we should court a rebuff which may weaken our position not only in Germany but also vis-a-vis the Russians".⁵¹

By December 1950 Bevin was contemplating the prospect of some form of rapprochement with the Soviets through a conference of Foreign Ministers. Moscow's warnings that they would not be reconciled to German rearmament were balanced by the offer of new talks on Germany. In October, during a meeting at Prague with their Eastern European allies, they called for the creation of an all-German Constitutional Council consisting of representatives from the East and West German governments and they subsequently requested a Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) to discuss this proposal and ensure a return to the Potsdam formula for Germany. The British Foreign Office were sceptical about Soviet motives and it was decided that the Prague proposals, or indeed any discussion of German problems in isolation, was unacceptable.⁵² However, the Cabinet were more enthusiastic about the prospect of talks.⁵³ Partly this was because of a desire to reassure British public opinion. On 5 December they agreed that, "Although the chances of reaching a satisfactory settlement with the Soviet government were slight, public opinion in this country would not stand firm unless it were felt that all reasonable steps had been taken to settle the many outstanding points of disagreement with Russia." Ministers subsequently tried to alter the text of a Foreign Office note to make it appear more conciliatory to the Soviets.⁵⁴ Though Bevin rebuffed these attempts at redrafting, there is some evidence that he believed a CFM could have a successful outcome. His initial reaction to the Prague proposals was that "the Russians were apprehensive about the consequences of rearming Germany." He was unsure whether they wanted a

51. FO 800/456, FO to Washington, 7 December 1950; FO 371/85058, C8165/27/18, Aide-Memoir from Paris, 18 December 1950. See also CAB 129/43, CP(50)311, 12 December 1950.

52. CAB 128/18, CM(50)73rd mtg., minute 3, 13 November 1950 and CM(50)82nd mtg., minute 2, 5 December 1950; CAB 129/43, CP(50)294, 2 December 1950; FO 371/93316, C1015/32, Dixon to Strang, 29 November 1950.

53. CAB 128/18, CM(50)78th mtg., minute 2, 29 November 1950.

54. CAB 128/18, CM(50)82nd mtg., minute 2, 5 December 1950 and CM(50)86th mtg., minute 3, 14 December 1950; CAB 129/43, CP(50)312, 12 December 1950.

CFM "for the purpose of obstructing the plans of the North Atlantic Treaty Powers or whether they were prepared to face a realistic settlement of outstanding issues." In December the American chargé in Britain reported that Bevin felt "that if we push our defense preparations resolutely there may be some chance of a CFM producing at least a lessening of the tension between East and West."⁵⁵

With the acceptance of the Spofford Plan at the Brussels North Atlantic Council in December 1950 it appeared that the American advocates of early German rearmament had succeeded in their goal. The Plan stated that the Germans could participate in the French scheme for a European Defence Force, if militarily acceptable arrangements could be devised, but that "the generation of combat worthy German units should not await solutions to these problems...the formation of small units should be started in the immediate future and these gradually built up to units of the required size."⁵⁶ As in September 1950 it seemed that American support for German rearmament had persuaded the British government to acquiesce in a decision which would expedite the formation of German military forces. The parallel turned out to be too exact, however, because the prospect of early German rearmament proved illusory again. The Foreign Office were quite satisfied that they had made no irrevocable commitment to early German rearmament. In the brief provided by Pierson Dixon for the Brussels meeting he made clear that one of the British objectives was to ensure that German rearmament was not rushed. He stated: "political evolution must develop first and rearmament come later". After the meeting he acknowledged that this was "partly because we wanted to avoid producing any unnecessarily sharp Soviet reaction".⁵⁷ Dixon was content that at Brussels it had been agreed that the Occupation Statute should be revised in tandem with German rearmament. In the years that followed the Foreign Office continued to give priority to the ending of the occupation.

The rearmament of Germany on a substantial scale had important financial implications. Though these were perceived by British policy-makers at an early

55. CAB 128/18, CM(50)67th mtg., minute 2, 23 October 1950; FRUS 1950, vol.3, US Chargé (Holmes) to Acheson, 15 December 1950, p.577.

56. FRUS 1950, vol.3, Report by the North Atlantic Military Committee, 12 December 1950, p.540-41.

57. Bullen and Pelly, *op.cit.*, Brief by Dixon for Bevin, 17 December 1950, p.378, Note by Dixon, 21 December 1950, p.396.

stage, little was done to address the problems which might arise. Furthermore, even when in the winter of 1951-2 the financial debate became central to discussions of German rearmament, it had little impact on British policy. The opponents of German rearmament never really utilised the financial argument against the creation of German armed forces. Their objections were based on military and diplomatic factors. In 1950 the Federal Republic was paying for the costs of British forces in Germany and it seemed inevitable that when the Germans had to create their own army they would terminate these payments. At a meeting of British officials on 22 September 1950 it was noted that the Federal Republic's budget was already "delicately balanced" and that, even without having to pay for German armed forces, the cost of the increased number of Allied divisions and the police force would be "extremely difficult" for the Germans to meet. A fortnight later Stevens, the Under-Secretary responsible for the German financial department who had chaired the meeting, raised this issue with Bevin. He warned that the creation of German armed forces when added to the cost of occupation could "impose an intolerable fiscal burden" on the Federal Republic and suggested there was a "need for reducing occupation costs to the lowest per capita figure in order to leave the largest possible room for direct German contribution to her own defence". Bevin wrote to Attlee to inform him that the British Exchequer would lose an estimated DM 1,376 million or £120 million if the Germans could no longer meet the occupation costs. He warned that once the cost of German armed forces began to mount "we shall be likely to pass the taxable capacity of the country" and concluded that retrenchment in the British occupation budget was "of capital importance".⁵⁸

Despite this flurry of autumnal activity the issue of the German financial contribution was allowed to lapse in the months that followed. General Sir Sidney Kirkman was despatched to Germany to advise on how cuts in the British occupation budget could be made but despite this the total cost of the occupation continued to rise as allied reinforcements began to arrive. A British working party suggested that occupation costs would increase from DM4.1 milliard to at least DM7.1 milliard in 1951-2. The High Commission meanwhile engaged in an

58. T225/229, minutes of a meeting 22 September 1950; DEFE 7/872, pt.1, Bevin to Attlee, 25 October 1950; Bullen and Pelly, *op.cit.*, memo from Stevens to Bevin, 10 October 1950, including appendix, p.147-50.

acrimonious dispute, with the British and French arguing in favour of charging the Germans approximately DM7 milliard and the Americans trying to reduce this figure to DM6 milliard. The compromise figure eventually agreed was DM6.6 milliard, with the British share set at DM2.08 milliard.⁵⁹

As well as increasing occupation costs in Germany the expansion of NATO armed forces created a further economic obstacle to German rearmament because western defence industries would be incapable of supplying sufficient equipment for the German armed forces. This was particularly true of the proposed German air force, and it was Slessor who in early 1951 began to question the feasibility of the planned German contribution. He had been one of the first to advocate arming the Federal Republic but it was typical of him that he should now seek to question those strategic orthodoxies which he had been so influential in propagating. By March 1951 he was privately chastising the Americans for forcing the British government to accept the creation of German armed forces when "there appeared to be little chance of the Germans getting any equipment before 1954". This demonstrated some effrontery when one considers that Slessor had in the summer of 1950 approved a plan for the creation of 20 German divisions. Nevertheless, at this stage Slessor opined: "we have said so much that to go back on our policy would presumably cause a lot of trouble in Germany and give the Russians the impression that we have surrendered to their threats...we are now in a position of having made a lot of public fuss about German rearmament - and incurred the consequential risks and disadvantages - while being in fact quite incapable of implementing it".⁶⁰

Despite Slessor's reservations, the strategic demands of the situation on the European continent led the Chiefs to plan for a major German contribution. They believed that a defence system based on the line of the Rhine was strategically flawed. In their brief for a Commonwealth conference in December 1950 they restated their view that a more forward strategy was "essential in order that the considerable potential of Western Germany is denied to the enemy and secured

59. CAB 130/69, GEN 369/24, draft report of a working party in Germany, 8 August 1951; DEFE 7/872, MAC(51)93, Mutual Aid Committee report on German occupation costs, 10 July 1951; FO 1005/1105, record of 57th meeting of the Allied High Commission, 8 March 1951; T 225/230, Kirkpatrick to Morrison, 4 May 1951.

60. DEFE 4/41, COS(51)48th mtg., minute 6, 14 March 1951; AIR 75/120, Slessor to the Chiefs of Staff, 14 March 1951.

for the Allies; to give depth and continuity to the ground and air defence of the territories of all NATO nations in Europe and Western Germany; to honour the pledge of all tripartite forces to protect Germany, and to retain the goodwill of the Western Germans."⁶¹ In order to implement this forward strategy it was apparent that greater military efforts would be required of the Allies. Despite the fact that current strategy was based on the defence of the Rhine and not on a more ambitious forward strategy, a gap had emerged between the force requirements prescribed by the Medium Term Defence Plan and the forces promised by western governments. The Americans estimated that the shortfall in western Europe, excluding the northern and southern flanks, would be 1 and a third divisions on D-Day, rising to 9 and two thirds by D+30. The NATO Standing Group's request that the Allies forward plans for filling this gap by 1 February 1951 met with little response.⁶² The British Chiefs were wary of committing precious resources to the European continent unless their efforts were to be matched by the Allies. In October 1950 Slim contemplated allocating a division earmarked for the strategic reserve to the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) but made this conditional on American reinforcements. By February 1951 while he was willing, in principle, to send the 6th Armoured Division, he insisted that this would be "subject to satisfactory similar action by the United States and French governments."⁶³

It was in these circumstances that the Chiefs sought to achieve the maximum German contribution in the shortest possible time. The Petersberg talks between the representatives of the Allied High Commission and Adenauer's military experts seemed to offer the best prospect of achieving this. The discussions were a result of the Spofford Plan which called for the formation of German units "in the immediate future". The Chiefs, therefore, instructed the JPS to prepare a statement on the size of the military contribution the Germans could be expected to make by the autumn of 1952. The JPS accepted the Spofford Plan safeguards which stated that the Germans should not contribute any more than

61. DEFE 4/38, COS(50)200th mtg., minute 5, 8 December 1950.

62. Records of the JCS 1946-1953, pt.2, reel 5, JCS 2073/136, 20 February 1951, reel 6, JCS 2073/157, 25 May 1951. The JCS estimated the total gap as 4 divisions on D-Day and 11 on D+30.

63. DEFE 4/36, COS(50)167th mtg., minute 1, 11 October 1950; WO 216/366, Brownjohn to Slim, 27 January 1951 and Slim to Fraser, Slessor and Elliot, 20 February 1951.

one fifth of the land based forces allocated to NATO but, as in the summer of 1950, they based their calculations on the figures prescribed by NATO planners rather than the total contribution offered by the members of the Alliance. On the basis that 34 and two thirds divisions were required in 1952 they argued that the Germans ought to be allowed to contribute the equivalent of 7 divisions. As the Petersberg negotiations were proceeding on the basis that the initial German units would be formed at a level lower than that of the division, this figure translated into 21 brigade groups.⁶⁴ No account was taken of the difficulties of equipping such a force.

The sense of urgency felt by military planners did not seem to be shared by those negotiating at Petersberg. As during the negotiations over a German gendarmerie in the summer of 1950, the discussions in Germany were being conducted by Foreign Office officials who were not entirely persuaded by the military's case. Ward, the Deputy High Commissioner who was Britain's representative on the Petersberg committee, believed that a withdrawal from West Germany was still a possibility because the pledge to defend it "would not depend solely on having troops in Western Germany; the true defence would remain, as today, in western air strength and the atomic bomb."⁶⁵ Still more damaging to the Chiefs' cause was the attitude of the Americans. Eisenhower was not anxious for an immediate solution. He had been "very sympathetic" to French concerns during late 1950 and in January 1951 told the American Cabinet that he was worried the Germans were becoming "cocky about their importance in the picture."⁶⁶ The State Department shared the concerns of Bevin and Eisenhower that the public debate over the need for German rearmament would place the "Germans in a bargaining position where they can attempt to fix maximum and even unreasonable conditions." Rearmament, they argued, should follow the

64. DEFE 6/16, JP(51)19 (Final), 1 February 1951; DEFE 4/39 COS(51)23rd mtg., minute 5, 2 February 1951; DEFE 5/27, COS(51)33, 3 February 1951; FRUS 1951, vol.3, p.1000. The core of the brigade group proposed by the Germans was 1 armoured regiment, 1 artillery regiment and 4 infantry battalions, compared to the British concept of 1 armoured regiment and 3 infantry battalions.

65. FO 1008/9, Ward to Kirkpatrick, 15 February 1951.

66. Galambos (ed.), *op.cit.*, vol.9, Eisenhower to Lawrence Young, 6 November 1950, p.1413, and Eisenhower to Truman, 16 December 1950, p.1489; Thomas A. Schwartz, 'Eisenhower and the Germans' in Gunther Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose (eds.) *Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment* (Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1995), p.212.

integration of West Germany into the western democratic system.⁶⁷

If the Americans were unwilling to force the issue at Petersberg, then the British government were certainly not prepared to take the initiative in precipitating a solution. The Parliamentary Labour Party had reacted with hostility to Bevin's public acceptance of German rearmament at New York. Crossman reminded Parliament of Bevin's previous assertions that a decision in favour of German rearmament would be "frightful". Frederick Elwyn Jones summed up the general feeling on the Labour benches when he warned that "a Germany armed will add to the political dynamite that is already sufficiently powerful to blow up the world."⁶⁸ Within the government a group of ministers including John Strachey, the Secretary of State for War, Kenneth Younger, the Foreign Office Minister of State, and Attlee himself hoped that the threat of German rearmament could be used as a bargaining counter which could be traded to achieve concessions from the Russians. The Foreign Office, which believed that a settlement of differences with Russia as a result of a conference of Foreign Ministers was highly unlikely, opposed this idea but, with Bevin seriously ill, lacked an effective spokesman to put their case.

On 11 January 1951 Mallet raised the crucial questions regarding the proposed conference of Foreign Ministers: "What are to be our terms to agreeing to discuss the demilitarisation of Germany? That is to say what other items do we want put on the agenda? Secondly are we prepared to accept the demilitarisation of Germany in return for a settlement of any of these problems on our lines, and if so, which?"⁶⁹ The Foreign Office proposed to put a disarmament treaty as the first item on the agenda and warned that any settlement of the German problem outside the context of a broader agreement on disarmament would be dangerous. It would make it more difficult to retain the support of public opinion for western rearmament, weaken American interest in Europe, cause severe military problems and, worst of all, there would be a "grave risk that, with the west lulled into a false feeling of relief, the whole of Germany would fall into the hands of the Communists." It was admitted, however, that the possibility could not be excluded that the Soviets "would force war upon us rather than see the

67. FRUS 1951, vol.3, State Department memo for the President, 5 January 1951, p.399.

68. The Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, vol.480, col.365 and vol.481, col.1241.

69. FO371/93317, C1015/44, Mallet to Strang, 11 January 1951.

manpower and industrial resources of Western Germany harnessed into the military effort of the Atlantic Powers."⁷⁰

This analysis prompted Strachey to complain to Attlee, "an early general war must be final catastrophe for this country... Yet the Cabinet is being urged to decide tomorrow (Thursday 1 February) on a course which its advocates frankly state, involves the serious risk of just such an early war." He insisted: "a settlement of even the German problem alone appears to me to be an immense gain, both to the cause of the West and the cause of peace." He reminded Attlee, "You told me the other day that you considered that our proposals for German rearmament might well be used as a bargaining weapon with the Russians to bring them to reason on Germany and in particular force them to abandon their own rearmament of the East German military police."⁷¹ At the Cabinet meeting on 1 February it was agreed that the issue of German rearmament could be "a very powerful factor" at a CFM. It was accepted that such a meeting should have a wider agenda than just German problems but the general view was that the Foreign Office were "unnecessarily pessimistic" about the prospect of a four-power meeting producing a reduction in tension. The Foreign Office brief was rejected in favour of retaining a "flexible" position.⁷² After the meeting Gaitskell recorded the strength of opposition to German rearmament in his diary. After suggesting that much of the opposition to German rearmament stemmed from a dislike of American policies, he noted, "H[arold] W[ilson] is clearly ganging up with the Minister of Labour... The others on Bevan's side are very genuine, Jim Griffiths for pacifism; Chuter Ede because he is anti-American and Dalton because he hates the Germans." He was concerned that anti-American sentiment "leads to accepting...an agreement with Russia which...might be extraordinarily dangerous."⁷³

On 6 February Strachey sent another memorandum to Attlee in which he analysed the military situation in terms very similar to Slessor. He argued that the

70. FO 371/93320, C1015/84, FO brief for the Four Power Talks in Paris, 28 December 1950; CAB 129/44, CP(51)33, 26 January 1951.

71. PREM 8/1433, Strachey to Attlee, 31 January 1951.

72. CAB 128/19, CM(51)10th mtg., minute 4, 29 January 1951 and CM(51)11th mtg., minute 6, 1 February 1951.

73. Williams, op.cit., p.245-6. See Hugh Dalton Diaries, pt.1, vol.39, 9 February 1951 and Kenneth Younger Diaries, 4 February 1951 for confirmation of the opposition to German rearmament within the government and their desire to do a deal with the Soviets over Germany.

West was avoiding discussions with the Soviet Union "not so much because of any practical gain in the military security of the West which German rearmament can quickly give use (sic), as because the American reaction to an abandonment or even postponement of German rearmament is so much feared...for some years there will not be enough arms to equip all the troops which will be available to the NATO armies without the Germans. During this time each German formation equipped will mean, other things being equal, one less British, French or American formation equipped. There would be no net gain in security." Strachey went on to warn that, "expecting the Russians to sit passively by while we carry out a full German rearmament...is asking a good deal". His advice was that the government should "base our policy on a real instead of a simulated attempt to come to an acceptable, limited agreement with Russia, in which we secure substantial advantages from her (such as, for example, the disarmament of Eastern Germany and/or an Austrian treaty) in return for a postponement of German rearmament...to use the threat of German rearmament as a bargaining weapon upon Russia".⁷⁴ These persuasive arguments evidently had some effect on Attlee. When the issue was debated again on 8 February he stated very specifically, "we were anxious to use German rearmament as a bargaining counter in the discussions at the proposed Council of Foreign Ministers."⁷⁵ This prompted Pakenham, the principal advocate of early German rearmament within the government, to complain about ministers "trying to prevent German rearmament by hook or by crook".⁷⁶

Within the Cabinet there was a strong feeling that they should now make public their desire to delay the creation of West German armed forces. During the 8 February meeting they discussed a Foreign Office paper reassuring them that "the opening of exploratory conversations with the German authorities do not constitute any final decision on the part of the Allied Governments." The issue was now whether they "should take any initiative to delay the moment at which

74. John Strachey papers 1951, Box 14, Strachey memo to Attlee, 6 February 1951.

75. CAB 128/19, CM(51)12th mtg., minute 4, 8 February. Dalton reminded Attlee in July 1951 of the Prime Minister's earlier views that the West Germans could not be rearmed "for some considerable time" and that "It was in your mind to use this as a bargaining counter with the Russians if ever we succeeded in getting a Four Power conference." PREM 8/1429, pt.1, Dalton to Attlee, 10 July 1951.

76. FO 371/93376, C10110/81, Pakenham to Attlee, 9 February 1951.

a positive move forward might occur." Younger, deputising for Bevin, argued that the lack of enthusiasm for German rearmament in the Federal Republic and the absence of any urgency on Eisenhower's part meant that there was no likelihood of an early decision in any case. Attlee, however, suggested that it was necessary to rearm the other western European countries before West Germany and that the negotiations on a German defence contribution ought to be "spun out." Dalton complained that the Americans had "bulldozed" the government into accepting the principle of German rearmament and declared that "there were some principles that were accepted but never applied...Any forces raised in W[est] Germany would consist of Nazis, SS & refugees... they would think of nothing but reconquering their old homes beyond the O[der]-N[eisse] line." The Cabinet also noted that a delay would be popular with public opinion and would thus be of "great political advantage" as well as being less provocative to the Soviet Union. Though others argued that German rearmament was necessary to counter Soviet moves in East Germany and that it was inevitable in any case, the anti-rearmers again had the upper hand.⁷⁷ The result of these deliberations was the adoption of a very negative attitude by the British government to the Petersberg negotiations. Already on 7 February Ernest Davies, the junior minister at the Foreign Office, was insisting in answer to Parliamentary questions that no irrevocable decision regarding German rearmament had yet been taken, somewhat to the surprise of Eden who detected a distinct ambiguity in the government's attitude to the Petersberg discussions.⁷⁸ On 9 February, the day after the crucial Cabinet discussion of the matter, Kirkpatrick told the other High Commissioners that he believed the talks with the German military representatives had reached "complete deadlock" and suggested referring the matter back to NATO. The Americans wished to continue however, and Bevin instructed Kirkpatrick to allow further discussions of the military problem but to ensure that "they should not outrun the political discussions...there is no advantage to be gained in bringing them to a head until agreement has been reached on the political discussions." He believed that "the process of transferring authority to the Federal government should continue whatever form the association of the Federal Republic in Western

77. CAB 129/44, CP(51)43, 7 February 1951; CAB 128/19, CM(51)12th mtg., minute 4, 8 February 1951; Dalton Diaries, pt.1, vol.39, entry for mid-February.

78. The Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, vol.483, cols. 1722-3.

defence may take."⁷⁹ On 12 February Attlee finally gave a public clarification of the government's strategy of delay. He told the Commons that "the time and method" of German rearmament "will require a great deal of working out". The final resolution of the issue would be conditional on the rearmament of NATO, the preliminary strengthening of Allied forces, agreement on measures to prevent the re-emergence of the German military threat and a deal with the West Germans on the level of their contribution.⁸⁰ Attlee could not reveal the full extent of the government's change of attitude without seriously alarming the Allies. The so-called Attlee conditions were a means of publicly flagging the Cabinet's increasing disenchantment with German rearmament in order to reassure Labour backbenchers.

The extent of the Cabinet's misgivings about German rearmament and their desire to have serious negotiations with the Soviets on the matter alarmed the Foreign Office. Prior to the four power preliminary conference which began in Paris on 5 March they began to marshal the arguments against a deal with the Soviets on Germany. Gainer, Dixon and Shuckburgh all wrote papers setting out the case against any agreement to a neutral, disarmed Germany. The core of their argument was "that a neutralised (unitary) Germany must fall prey to Russia." Shuckburgh concluded that "the freedom of Europe depends on holding Germany in the Western camp, that we must regard this as a vital objective and take no risks with it; and that far from agreeing to loosen our hold on Western Germany for the sake of a partial and temporary detente with Russia, we should keep our eye on the ultimate objective of freeing the whole of Germany from Russian bondage." This provocative language was regarded by Kenneth Younger as far too uncompromising. He complained that the officials in the Foreign Office were ignoring the "real danger of the Russians acting before Western defence has become effective", and that there was a tendency "to underestimate the long-term danger of maintaining the present division of Germany and proceeding with German rearmament...As Western Germany gets militarily stronger...her influence upon Western policy - and indeed her power of blackmail - will also increase." He added: "British official policy until recently was opposed to German rearmament

79. FRUS 1951, vol.3, US High Commissioner (McCloy) to Acheson, 9 February 1951, p.1012; FO 371/93376, C10110/70, Bevin to Kirkpatrick, 23 February 1951

80. The Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, vol. 484, cols.65-7.

on its merits, and they (the public) will not understand if we now take the line that German rearmament is so essential to us that it can be given up only in return for larger scale Soviet disarmament." He disliked Shuckburgh's paper and favoured a memo by Strang, which argued that "By deciding to admit Western Germany to participate in the defence of Western Europe...the Western Powers have taken a step which is less easily defensible than, for example, the decision to provide Western Germany with its own governmental institutions." A brief was prepared for the Secretary of State's use at a future CFM, which tried to reconcile the divergent points of view. It concluded that a united, demilitarised Germany "would still involve grave risks and should only be adopted by the Western Powers provided they could secure from the Soviet government further concessions which would constitute a substantial alleviation of the underlying causes of tension." The "minimum alleviation" constituted an Austrian Treaty, the proper settling of the Balkan peace treaties and an armaments agreement based on East-West parity.⁸¹

The Soviet suggestion of a Council of Foreign Ministers and the American agreement to the appointment of Eisenhower as Supreme Commander of an integrated NATO force combined during the first two months of 1951 to produce a definite shift in British foreign policy away from the idea of rearming Germany in the immediate future, if at all. It must be stressed, however, that the Attlee government had been inclined towards this position since the matter was first discussed by the full Cabinet in September 1950. As the Cabinet papers state, policy towards Germany had to take account of "the consideration, expressed at almost every discussion of this topic and by the Secretary of State and other Foreign Ministers... that caution must be exercised in the timing of the actual

81. FO 371/93329, C1015/287, Dixon minute, 22 February 1951 and Shuckburgh memo on German rearmament and Four Power Talks, 22 February 1951, C1015/288, Younger to Strang, 7 March 1951 and Dixon minute, 9 March 1951, C1015/289, Gainer to Strang, 19 February 1951; FO 371/93331, C1015/329, draft for Secretary of State on German Questions at a conference of Foreign Ministers, 16 March 1951; FO 371/93377, C10110/99, Strang memo, 5 March 1951. It is indicative of Foreign Office scepticism about the idea of negotiating an agreement with the Soviets that Strang, who was the most ardent opponent of German rearmament, did not hold out any hope of a deal with the Soviets at a conference of Foreign Ministers. See FO 371/93318, C1015/52, minutes of a meeting in Strang's room, 17 January 1951; FO 371/93319, C1015/74, minute from Strang on Four Power Talks, 20 January 1951; FO 371/93331, C1015/328, Dixon and Strang minutes, 15 March 1951.

raising of German forces."⁸²

One of the main causes of ministerial tentativeness about German rearmament was the fear of Soviet reactions and their concern was only exacerbated by the inconsistent views of the Chiefs of Staff about the role that West German rearmament would play in provoking a Soviet attack. On one occasion they described the threat of provocation as "the weakest of all arguments" against a German defence contribution, and claimed that it "would have little effect on Russia's decisions as to whether or not she would go to war."⁸³ Generally, however, they accepted the view that the rearming of West Germany would increase the likelihood of Soviet attack, but insisted that this was a risk which must be taken. Thus, when Kelly warned that the Soviets might "launch a war" before German rearmament could be made effective, Slim replied that they had accepted this policy as "the lesser of two evils, and the Chiefs of Staff still firmly maintained that this was the course to follow."⁸⁴ Nevertheless, the essential point of Kelly's analysis was confirmed by a Joint Intelligence Committee report of 21 February which stated "the main danger of war was about the end of 1952." This conclusion was reached on the assumption that at this time German rearmament would begin to take effect and start eroding Soviet conventional superiority which would have increased during the previous eighteen months. Thus the period of maximum danger would occur just before the German defence contribution became effective.⁸⁵

Though the report was endorsed by the Chiefs, its prediction that German rearmament would be influential in a Soviet decision to attack western Europe was a powerful argument for those who wished to delay it, most notably John Strachey. Another of Strachey's beliefs, that the current discussion of German rearmament was otiose because there was no equipment available to achieve it, was shared by Slessor and his staff. Thus, when the Joint Planning Staff circulated the revised figure of 20 brigade groups and 114 squadrons as the German contribution for 1952, MacFadyen of the Air Staff complained that the target for the air force was "entirely unrealistic; in any circumstances the idea of building up

82. CAB 129/44, CP(51)43, 7 February 1951.

83. DEFE 4/45, COS(51)118th mtg., minute 2, 20 July 1951.

84. DEFE 4/40, COS(51)26th mtg., minute 1, 7 February 1951.

85. DEFE 4/40, COS(51)34th mtg., minute 1, 21 February 1951.

an air force from scratch at the speed envisaged was to put it mildly optimistic, in present conditions of shortage of aircraft and training facilities...the idea was manifestly absurd." Ten days later, on 22 March, in studying the figures prepared by the NATO Standing Group for the German contributions, the Chiefs agreed that it would be best not to give the Germans a specific timetable and that they ought to maintain "a realistic outlook." At a subsequent meeting Slessor was even more emphatic, declaring: "the time factor envisaged made no sense at all, particularly in relation to providing the necessary equipment... we should not lead the Germans up the garden path by telling them we wanted things which, though acceptable in principle, were unrealistic in practise in the time envisaged."⁸⁶ Thus, in early 1951 there were doubts in the military as well as the Cabinet over the feasibility of German rearmament.

The more active nature of British opposition to early German rearmament caused some alarm among other western governments. The Italian ambassador told Ernest Davies that he had noticed "a slight change in our approach to German rearmament and wondered whether this was due to a fear of provoking Russia." Davies replied that "the political atmosphere had to be right before Germany could rearm."⁸⁷ Within the American administration it was noted that the British were exhibiting "a tendency to hold off on the matter of German rearmament until the outcome of a possible Four-Power meeting is known." They were "disturbed" by the Attlee conditions which seemed to imply "that the Brussels decision to proceed with German rearmament was one taken in principle only, and not seriously to be implemented as soon as possible."⁸⁸ Adenauer too was critical of the new British line. To Kirkpatrick the Chancellor merely noted "that the British attitude had changed since Brussels and that in this matter the British government were aligned with the French."⁸⁹ To the American Joseph Alsop, however, he "bluntly blamed the British as well as the French for the postponement of the German defense contribution." They seemed "to think a

86. DEFE 6/16, JP(51)43 (Final), 8 March 1951; DEFE 4/40, COS(51)47th mtg., 12 March 1951; DEFE 4/41, COS(51)52nd mtg., minute 1, 22 March 1951 and COS(51)54th mtg., minute 7, 28 March 1951.

87. FO 371/93322, C1015/116, Davies minute, 6 February 1951.

88. FRUS 1951, vol.3, memo by the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Byroade) to Acheson, 21 February 1951, p.1021.

89. FO 371/93376, C10110/78, Kirkpatrick to FO, 26 February 1951.

Russian attack on their countries could be bought off at the cost of Germany...Both France and England were susceptible to Russian blandishments."⁹⁰ Oliver Franks gave an astonishingly honest explanation of the background to this change in policy to Dean Acheson. Following a trip back to London he told the American Secretary of State in April 1951 that "the government had been under unceasing fire and had had to cope with crises about once a week, which they had barely pulled through; everyone was tired; the Foreign Office had been practically leaderless, with the Prime Minister, Mr Bevin (who was fatally ill), Mr Younger (the Minister of State), Mr Strang (the Permanent Under-Secretary) all contributing a little with Dixon and Makins (the Deputy Under-Secretaries) contributing most of the leadership." In the confusion "he found the Foreign Office adhering to rather partial and wholly inadequate conclusions, such as the idea that a revitalized Germany offered no solution but great danger...continually the visceral feeling became articulate. The rearming of the Germans was a very painful subject and there was a general desire to escape from this problem in ways which those who followed it knew were inadequate."⁹¹

Franks suggested it was now Morrison's job to develop a coherent policy on Germany and the other crucial foreign policy issues. Morrison was one of the first Labour ministers to advocate consideration of German rearmament and the only one of the Big Five to consistently support it.⁹² The problem was that Morrison was distracted by other matters during his first weeks as Foreign Secretary. In his role as deputy Prime Minister he dealt with the crisis over Bevan's resignation while Attlee was in hospital. The Festival of Britain, a long term Morrison project, was another distraction. Finally, Morrison learnt in April that his wife was fatally ill.⁹³ In terms of foreign policy, his main concern was the Abadan crisis. He seemed to have no fixed policy for dealing with Anglo-Soviet relations or European problems and as a result he badly mishandled the preliminary four power meeting in Paris at the Palais Rose. The negotiations were

90. FRUS 1951, vol.3, Liaison division of HICOG to US High Commission, 16 March 1951, p.1026.

91. Alex Danchev, *Oliver Franks: Founding Father* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993), p.120.

92. Morrison raised the idea of utilising German manpower to supplement Western defence as early as December 1948. See FO 371/76527, C120/5/18, Morrison to Bevin, December 1948.

93. Donoghue and Jones, *op.cit.*, ch.36.

intended to set the agenda for a future conference of Foreign Ministers but their main consequence was to strain Anglo-American relations as the American delegation realised that the British were determined to delay any action on the defence front until a meeting of Foreign Ministers could be held. The British delegation was led by Ernest Davies, the junior Foreign Office minister, rather than a professional diplomat like the American representative, Philip Jessup.⁹⁴ The latter soon developed a poor opinion of Davies, describing him as inept and lacking in the experience necessary for negotiating with the Soviets.⁹⁵ Like so many members of the government Davies had bitter memories of German policy during the 1930s and was "fearful of the re-emergence of a German military machine". He "considered that German rearmament could not be permitted until the atmosphere in Germany was ripe for it". Initially at least he seemed to believe in the possibility of striking a deal with the Soviets.⁹⁶ The real problem, however, was that Davies was too faithful in representing the concerns of the Cabinet and Morrison failed to control him.

After the first few meetings there was a disagreement over the wording of an item on German demilitarisation, with Davies much more willing to accept the Soviet phraseology than the Americans. He was apparently surprised that, "The State Department are evidently very anxious to avoid giving the Russians any excuse for arguing that the participation of Germany is still an open question." The Americans were thoroughly confused by Davies's attitude and unable to understand Morrison's policy.⁹⁷ Though the Foreign Secretary tried to placate the Americans he did nothing to restrain Davies, whose constant themes in tripartite discussions were the need to reassure western public opinion and grant concessions to the Soviets.⁹⁸ This led to a major clash when on 18 April Davies sent a note to the American and French representatives containing a subtle threat. He stated: "While we on our side are equally determined that the defence

94. CAB 129/44, CP(51)60, 26 February 1951.

95. FRUS 1951, vol.3, US Representative at the Four Power Meeting (Jessup) to Acheson, 17 March 1951, p.1096.

96. Ernest Davies, *Random Recollections of a Journalist and Politician* (privately produced, 1987), p.349.

97. FRUS 1951, vol.3, Minister of the Office of German Political Affairs (Laukhuff) to the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Byroade), 13 March 1951, p.1094; FO 371/93330, C1015/298, Davies to the FO, 15 March 1951.

98. See for example FO 371/93332, C1015/347, Davies to the FO, 21 March 1951; FO 371/93334, C1015/411, Davies to the FO, 9 April 1951.

programme of the Atlantic Powers shall remain unaffected, we feel obliged to take account of the fact that the British people will require to be convinced that no agreement can be reached with the Soviet government." This prompted Jessup to complain that British policy "amounted to capitulation". One member of the American delegation wrote to Washington that "The British attitude here can leave one with only the following conclusions: that they regard the Brussels decision on Germany as an agreement in principle only not to be carried forward seriously before a CFM; and that they will not put their hearts into their own rearmament... until they have had a CFM discussion."⁹⁹ In Washington Franks provided his own gloss on the situation, explaining that his government's conciliatory attitude to Moscow was motivated by "memories of the Anglo-French negotiating failures that had led to the disastrous 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact."¹⁰⁰ The Foreign Office soon became aware of American displeasure and, "apprehensive of a split with the Americans and French", decided to adopt a tougher attitude towards the Soviets.¹⁰¹ By April the idea of striking a deal with Moscow over Germany was in abeyance.¹⁰² Cabinet discussion of the talks resumed in June and the general view was that either they should continue or a Council of Foreign Ministers ought to be held without an agenda. At least one Cabinet minister expressed "astonishment" on learning that the discussions had been terminated on 21 June without any agreement on a CFM.¹⁰³

The end of the Four Power preliminary conference, combined with the issuing of a report on the Petersberg discussions on 6 June and the holding of the French elections on 17 June, marked the beginnings of the next phase in the

99. FO 371/93335, C1015/438, Davies to the FO, 16 April 1951 and Davies to Morrison, 18 April 1951; FRUS 1951, vol.3., Minister of the Office of German Political Affairs (Laukhuff) to the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Byroade), 18 April 1951, p. 1128. Perkins complained to Oliver Franks that the Davies note "could be read as forcing the issue not only with the Russians but also with the Americans and French...it might produce a crisis." See FO 371/93335, C1015/456, Franks to the FO, 20 April 1951.

100. Poole, *op. cit.*, p.254.

101. FO 371/93336, C1015/480, Dixon minute on discussions with Davies, 21 April 1951.

102. The Cabinet did not mention this possibility when they discussed the issue of the Four Power conference on 26 April 1951. In the Foreign Office Gilchrist sketched the outlines of a possible deal with the Soviets over German demilitarisation but his ideas were not approved by his superiors. See CAB 128/19, CM(51)31st mtg., minute 3, 26 April 1951; FO 371/93336, C1015/469, Gilchrist to Dixon, 20 April 1951, C1015/475, Mallet memo, 17 April 1951 and C1015/476, Mallet to Dixon, 21 April 1951.

103. CAB 128/19, CM(51)40th mtg., minute 3, 5 June 1951, CM(51)43rd mtg., minute 4, 14 June and CM(51)44th mtg., minute 4, 18 June 1951; FO 371/93348, C1015/765, Stokes to Morrison, 23 June 1951.

German rearmament controversy. In Britain a new three way debate began between the military, civilian and political branches of the government which again resulted in a victory for the advocates of delay.

The principal concern of the military was to get the decision to begin German rearmament taken. On 20 July Creasey stated: "What was required was some drastic action to start things moving, otherwise this delay would be protracted endlessly. In reaching any decision how German rearmament was to be put into effect, our primary consideration must be that a German military contribution to Western European defence was an urgent military necessity." Though equipment shortages were inevitable, "there was no need to delay the formation of German units on this account." The target date set by the Chiefs for a decision was the October North Atlantic Council meeting in Rome, which was also the American deadline. They warned that "By that time nearly a year would have elapsed since agreement in principle had been reached on the necessity for this contribution: if still no progress was made, there might be disastrous repercussions to European defence." Shuckburgh had warned the Chiefs that the Cabinet were still uncommitted and that "There was a school of thought that the present moment was most inopportune". However, he stressed that there was now little difference between the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff view.¹⁰⁴

The limited entente between the military and the diplomatic branches of the government was given substance by a joint paper submitted by Shinwell and Morrison to the Defence Committee on 24 July. While the Petersberg discussions were continuing, Morrison had been content to reaffirm Bevin's instruction to Kirkpatrick to seek agreement on the political aspects of the planned contract with West Germany "even without a decision regarding the German contribution to defence".¹⁰⁵ In the joint paper presented in July, however, Morrison and Shinwell argued that any further delay over a decision on German rearmament would be dangerous. There were two main arguments; one military and one political. On the political front, "the whole future of Western Germany is involved and on our handling of this matter may turn the question whether she can be retained in the Western camp or not. Any attempt to 'sterilise' West Germany by

104. DEFE 4/45, COS(51)118th mtg., minute 2, 20 July 1951; DEFE 4/46, COS(51)127th mtg., minute 1, 8 August 1951.

105. FO 371/93381, C10110/159, Morrison to Kirkpatrick, 16 May 1951.

keeping her disarmed and neutral would inevitably result in her being lost to the West." Militarily, "the defence of Europe demands a strategy based on the Elbe not on the Rhine, and the Western Powers clearly cannot defend Western Germany without German cooperation and the assistance of German manpower." In addition the paper noted that the Americans were becoming impatient for a decision, that the Four Power talks, which "had inhibited a forward policy in this matter", were now finished and that German expectations had been raised by the issuing of the Bonn report on the Petersberg negotiations. Though Shinwell was still doubtful about the practicality of a European Army, the paper advocated accepting the idea as the only means by which French acquiescence to a German defence contribution could be secured.¹⁰⁶

Prior to the Defence Committee meeting, however, the forces opposed to German rearmament were already mobilising. Dalton wrote to Attlee on 10 July that the Germans had "a vested interest in a war of revenge" and reminded him "there is a substantial element on the National Executive and in our party who are against West Germany's rearmament at the present time." Attlee replied: "I am very much of your view" and Dalton was invited to the Defence Committee meeting of 26 July.¹⁰⁷ At the meeting Morrison argued that it was "exceedingly dangerous to permit a vacuum in Western Germany and it was impossible to keep the Germans in a permanent state of submission and inequality", and that the climate was now favourable for an agreement on German rearmament. Attlee, however, returning to the conditions he had set in February, said "It would be very difficult to accept any system of priority which put the allocation of equipment to the Germans above the allocation of equipment to the members of NATO". The main confrontation at the meeting was between Pakenham, who had recently been appointed First Lord of the Admiralty, and Dalton. The former argued: "If no beginning were made now and if decisions were indefinitely delayed there would never be any German forces and it was more than doubtful if Western Europe could in fact be defended without them." Dalton responded that a German army would only work for a war of revenge and that "we should delay until the latest possible moment and, at any rate, for the next

106. CAB 131/11, DO(51)89, 24 July 1951; CAB 131/10, DO(51)20th mtg., minute 2, 26 July 1951.

107. PREM 8/1429, pt.1, Dalton to Attlee, 10 July 1951; Hugh Dalton Diaries, pt.1, vol.41, entry for August 1951.

year or two, to give effect to the principle of German rearmament." It was impossible to reconcile these views and the issue passed to the full Cabinet.¹⁰⁸

One of the key arguments remained whether German rearmament would be provocative to the Soviets. The military assessment was that the date when German rearmament became effective would be an important factor in Soviet calculations of whether to launch a preventive war. The Chiefs of Staff had argued that with 1952 as the period of maximum danger it was essential to proceed with German rearmament as rapidly as possible. Yet if the autumn of 1952 was the key moment because at this point German rearmament would become effective, surely there was an argument for postponing it until western strength was built up to a level sufficient to deter the Soviets. This case was put once again by Strachey. He told the Defence Committee: "The military advice which had been given to him had always emphasized that German rearmament would be a provocation to the Soviet Union... he thought that it was essential that we should not take any practical action with regard to the Germans which might provoke the Soviet Union into a preventive war during the next two years, when we should be far from ready." In a letter to Attlee of 27 July Strachey drew attention to a statement by Slim that "The Russians were probably still more afraid of the German bayonet than of the American atomic bomb." He argued in favour of delaying a decision until 1953 because "within two to three years both ourselves and the west as a whole will have greatly improved our relative strength as compared with Russia, and will be in a position to offer a much more effective deterrent should German rearmament then provoke a Soviet attack."¹⁰⁹ By suggesting that the period of maximum danger would occur when German rearmament became effective, the Chiefs had presented the opponents of early German rearmament with a powerful argument, even though they themselves were insistent that the threat of war in 1952 made an early decision more urgent.

Morrison took a sanguine view of the situation and at the full Cabinet meeting of 30 July, which saw a continuation of the Defence Committee debate,

108. CAB 131/10, DO(51)20th mtg., minute 2, 26 July 1951.

109. Ibid; PREM 8/1429, pt.2, Strachey to Attlee, 27 July 1951. Strachey also argued that the threat of war in 1952 was forcing the military to advocate a partial mobilisation, but in fact the measures advocated by the Army Council in AC/P(51)17, 23 July 1951 were largely a response to Eisenhower's demand for an overhaul of national mobilisation arrangements.

he argued that the integration of German units into a European Army, "would probably overcome French reluctance to proceed with German rearmament and would be less provocative to the Russians." By this stage the arguments for and against a decision on German rearmament had been well rehearsed and what mattered was the balance of forces in the Cabinet and the attitude of the Prime Minister. Dalton had the support of Alexander, Griffiths, McNeil and Strachey and claimed that Robens, who did not speak, also agreed with him. Morrison, Jowitt and the Chiefs were of the opposite opinion, while Shinwell, perhaps because of his reservations about the European Army solution, did not forcibly argue the case for the paper which he had co-authored. In these circumstances Attlee, who Dalton recorded as being "much our way", avoided taking any decision and thereby rejected the argument of the Morrison-Shinwell paper which was that immediate action was required. According to the Cabinet records Attlee declared that they needed more information on the European Army "before any decision was taken on German rearmament." In Dalton's account the Prime Minister declared he wanted "this whole thing to be played very slow."¹¹⁰

The issuing of the Interim Report on the European Army by the Paris conference and a new American initiative to get a final decision on a German defence contribution forced the Cabinet to compromise over the policy of postponement formulated by Attlee at the Cabinet meeting of 30 July. The Paris conference had been in session since January but neither the British nor the Dutch were participating and the Americans were initially unwilling to give the idea their full support. In these circumstances the conference became a forum for Franco-German disputes over the size of German units and the role of a German military staff.¹¹¹ The initiative in reinvigorating the Paris talks was taken by two American diplomats: the American High Commissioner in West Germany, McCloy, and the Ambassador to France, David Bruce. With the assistance of Jean Monnet they succeeded in persuading Eisenhower to give his full support to the European Army concept.¹¹² In a speech to the English Speaking Union on

110. PREM 8/1429, pt.2, Dalton to Attlee, 31 July 1951; Hugh Dalton Diaries, pt.1, vol.41, entry for August 1951; CAB 128/20, CM(51)56th mtg., minute 6, 30 July 1951.

111. Fursdon, op.cit., p.110-15.

112. Thomas Alan Schwartz, *America's Germany* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1991), p.215-24; McGeehan, op.cit., p.127-31.

3 July Eisenhower publicly announced his conversion. A month later he explained to Marshall: "Some spectacular accomplishment is vitally necessary to us if we are to get this whole security program moving with the kind of rapidity that will generate confidence both here and in the North American Continent."¹¹³

At the same time as the leading American representatives in Europe were campaigning in favour of a European Army, the Truman administration was developing plans to mark the first anniversary of their initial attempt to obtain an agreement on German rearmament with a second, more carefully planned, campaign of persuasion. On 28 June Acheson declared that the "time for attempting to remove deadlock now at hand". Initially he proposed immediate German membership of NATO, which was the favoured option of the American military, but McCloy and Bruce persuaded him that the European Army option was a practical alternative. Despite some further opposition from the American Chiefs, on 30 July Truman approved a memorandum from Acheson and Defence Secretary Lovett setting out a schedule which involved obtaining agreement on a European Defence Force, a specific plan for raising German units and a further restoration of sovereignty to the Federal Republic by the time of the expected North Atlantic Council meeting in late October.¹¹⁴

The British response to this proposed schedule was that it was "a very tight one". However, some Foreign Office officials were themselves beginning to accept that it was necessary to make progress both on the contract and the German rearmament issue. Like his American counter-part, the British High Commissioner, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, was concerned about the domestic political situation in West Germany. The execution of five Nazi war criminals and the enactment of Law 27 enforcing decartelisation had caused popular protests against the continuing occupation regime. The radical right wing SRP polled 11% in elections in Lower Saxony and in opinion polls 60% of those questioned declared themselves to be neutral in the Cold War.¹¹⁵ In December 1950 Kirkpatrick

113. Galambos (ed), *op.cit.*, vol.12, Eisenhower to Marshall, 3 August 1951, p.459.

114. FRUS 1951, vol.3, Acheson to the Embassy in France, 28 June 1951, p.801 and memo from the Acheson and Acting Secretary of State to the President, 30 July 1951, p.849-52; Michael Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1992), p.413-5; Schwartz, *op.cit.*, p.231-2.

115. Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, *Germany Rejoins the Powers* (Octagon Books, New York, 1973 edition), p.23; Schwartz, *op.cit.*, p.216-7.

had suggested that on the issue of German rearmament and the contract "we have a long row to hoe." During the months that followed he was converted to the cause of German rearmament just as Slessor was turning away from the idea. While Slessor was concerned with the strategic feasibility of the policy, Kirkpatrick was worried about the political implications of not proceeding with a German defence contribution. In August 1951 he wrote to Morrison, "I do not believe that the Allies can with safety defer for much longer a decision in regard to German participation in Western defence... if by the end of the year it becomes clear that the Allies are unwilling to reach any decision there is likely to be a damaging collapse of public confidence in the West."¹¹⁶ Kirkpatrick's telegram sparked off a fierce debate in the Foreign Office. Though a number of officials supported the High Commissioner, there was no consensus in favour of immediate German rearmament, despite Shuckburgh's reassurances to the Chiefs of Staff. Strang stated that, "political equality is more important than a defence contribution; and we might well go slow on the latter, the more so as it is not clear how it is to be paid for." He personally believed that the attempt to integrate the Federal Republic into the western system would fail. He wrote of his view, "that whatever course we follow, the extremists in Germany (as in Italy) will sooner or later bedevil German policy and in the end gain control, that the attempt... to bring Germany into the western community will probably fail, Germany being unassimilable; that the Germans... will in the long run make such intolerable nuisances of themselves, that we may find ourselves... coming to think that it might be better to keep the Germans down in a common policy with Russia than to build up against Russia in a common policy with the Germans." Younger confessed to sharing Strang's doubts about the Germans and Gainer, though much less extreme than these two, suggested "the defence horse has been setting the pace and it is important to give the political horse a touch of the spur."¹¹⁷ There was now a clear division in the Foreign Office between those like Kirkpatrick and Shuckburgh who accepted that the process of German

116. FO 371/93373, C10110/5, Kirkpatrick to the FO, 22 December 1950: FO 371/93389, C10110/299, Kirkpatrick to Morrison, 13 August 1951.

117. FO 371/93389, C10110/299, minutes by Strang (19 August 1951), Younger (24 August 1951) and Gainer (29 August 1951). For the arguments in support of Kirkpatrick see the minutes by Shuckburgh (27 August 1951) and Dixon (28 August 1951) in the same file.

rearmament should begin and those such as Strang and Gainer who favoured continued delay.

The paper eventually submitted to the Cabinet under Attlee's name followed Kirkpatrick's line of argument that "we cannot escape from the necessity of pressing on towards a political solution with its corollary of a defence contribution",¹¹⁸ but the Cabinet continued to raise objections. To Dalton and his allies the unstable political situation in Germany was an argument against giving arms to the Germans. As many as 80% of West Germans favoured a policy of regaining the territories east of the Oder-Neisse and Jacob Kaiser, a prominent member of Adenauer's Cabinet, had declared "we must have once more a German Breslau, a German Marienberg, a German Stettin."¹¹⁹ Younger noted that, though Morrison seemed to regard the issue of German rearmament as urgent, "That is not the general Cabinet view, but the Cabinet is so muddled and indecisive on this subject as to be quite ineffective".¹²⁰ On 4 September Morrison again pressed the Cabinet on the need to support the European Army idea provided it could be made militarily effective. Dalton denounced the Germans as "warmongers" and pointed to Kaiser's speech as evidence of this. Even though two opponents of German rearmament, Griffiths and McNeil, were absent, Dalton gained support from Robens and Chuter Ede, and he noticed the presence of Strang sitting behind Morrison who "nods vehemently when I develop an anti-German case". Though the Cabinet still insisted that further details of the European Army would have to be provided "before final approval could be given to the raising and incorporation of German units", they did modify their policy of delay somewhat by accepting in principle that the European Army could be the vehicle for German rearmament.¹²¹

Morrison made the maximum use of this concession at the Washington Foreign Ministers meeting of September 1951, but it was clear that Britain was now the dissenting voice as Franco-American unity on the European Army scheme was achieved. When the Foreign Ministers drafted a note to the High

118. CAB 129/47, CP(51)240, 30 August 1951.

119. Deutsch and Edinger, *op.cit.*, p.25; PREM 8/1429, pt.2, Dalton minute, 30 August 1951.

120. Kenneth Younger Diaries, 28 August 1951.

121. CAB 128/20, CM(51)58th mtg., minute 2, 4 September 1951; Hugh Dalton Diaries, pt.1, vol.42, 4 September 1951; CAB 21/1901, FO to Washington (Allen for Roberts), 5 September 1951.

Commissioners they agreed that German units must be incorporated into an international defence force but the British would not accept the assumption that this would necessarily be the European Defence Force. Morrison also stressed "that the provision of arms to members of the North Atlantic Treaty should receive priority over requirements for German military forces."¹²² A few days later at the Ottawa North Atlantic Council meeting, Morrison stated: "UK desired to give whole-hearted support to EDF which was bold and visionary idea that would require, however, considerable thought and work before it became a reality."¹²³ Furthermore, at the Washington meeting the issue of who would pay for the German defence contribution arose and there were indications that both the British and the French would oppose any agreement imposing additional costs on their budgets. Morrison warned: "we must guard against allowing the Germans to manoeuvre us into a position from which they could refuse to fulfil their part in Western defence unless we bear some of the occupation costs."¹²⁴ The issue would become increasingly important during the next few months and will be further examined in the next chapter. Though Morrison could claim "to have re-established three power unity on the question of German defence",¹²⁵ there were obvious differences in the American, French and British approaches to this problem and it was the British who were, temporarily at least, isolated.

On 19 September, while Morrison was in Ottawa, Attlee informed a depleted Cabinet that he planned to call an election. In the weeks leading up to polling day the Foreign Office had to deal with the new set of contractual negotiations with the Federal Republic, while the Chiefs of Staff examined the revised SHAPE estimates for European defence, but the issues raised by these developments were to be dealt with by the new Conservative government. It seems clear that had the Labour government remained in office the German rearmament issue would have been a continuing source of controversy. Though

122. PREM 8/1432, Record of a meeting between Morrison, Acheson and Schuman, 12 September 1951 (including annex A).

123. FRUS 1951, vol.3, US Delegation to Ottawa to Acting Secretary of State (Lovett), 16 September 1951, p.656.

124. FO 371/93397, C10110/4244, UK Delegation to the FO, 24 September 1951, containing a record of the meeting of 13 September 1951.

125. CAB 129/47, CP(51)266, 22 October 1951.

the Attlee administration was beginning to yield to American pressure to accept the European Army, they were unlikely to have been as compliant as the Conservative Cabinet was to prove.

Rolf Steininger has stated: "In the spring of 1951 the Western allies, especially the Americans and the British, could hardly imagine not including a German defence contribution in their plans."¹²⁶ In fact the Americans had as much difficulty in persuading the British as the French to accept the implementation of the policy of German rearmament. The Labour government's opposition to early German rearmament began to take effect in the aftermath of the Korean War. The decision to accept rearmament was only taken because the inducements offered by the Americans were so attractive. Once these were secured at Brussels in December 1950 the British proved quite as troublesome as the French on the issue. The Chiefs of Staff continued to insist that a German defence contribution was urgently required, but they had lost the initiative in the summer of 1950 and by 1951 divisions between them were emerging. The contradictory accounts of the role German rearmament might play in a Soviet decision to launch a preventive war only alarmed their political superiors. Though Attlee did not get the opportunity to strike a bargain with the Soviets over German rearmament, following the failure of the Paris preliminary conference he was able to lead a divided Cabinet away from any advance on the agreement to German rearmament in principle made the previous September. In following this course he was reflecting opinion within his party which was opposed to arming the Germans and was powerfully represented in the Cabinet by Dalton and his allies. The Foreign Office was also divided and though a number of important figures, most notably Kirkpatrick, came to believe in the summer of 1951 that the appropriate moment to begin German rearmament had arrived, there was still strong anti-German prejudice within the department. Morrison, who favoured German rearmament, was initially unable to overturn the Cabinet's policy of delay which had been formulated in the first two months of the year but did manage to secure limited support for the European Army with the assistance of Kirkpatrick's arguments and American pressure.

126. Rolf Steininger, *The German Question: The Stalin Note of 1952 and the Problem of Reunification* (American edition, Columbia University Press, New York, 1985, p.33-4.

CHAPTER 3

THE EDC OPTION

Though there was a strong element of continuity in British foreign policy in the decade after 1945, the return of a Conservative administration at the 1951 election did produce a significant change in the attitude of the British government towards the European Defence Community and German rearmament. The reasons for the change were manifold. Firstly, Eden had greater authority in Cabinet than Morrison. Though both men argued for a positive British attitude towards the EDC, Eden was able to secure Cabinet approval for his policy where his predecessor had failed. Only Harold Macmillan appears to have expressed fears that a rearmed Germany might come to dominate Europe, and his opposition was partly based on his desire for Britain to participate in the European debate over integration.¹ In Parliament too Eden was generally able to impose his views on his party. Though there remained substantial opposition to German rearmament in the Commons, the majority of the dissenters sat on the Labour backbenches from where the Attlee government's German policy had been assailed. The Conservatives generally supported the idea of a German defence contribution. Butler had summed up their mood a few months before the election when he demanded to know from Morrison, "why this vital question of German re-armament has been so consistently delayed...progress in this matter must be made *pari passu* at the same time as progress in our own re-armament and progress in the political sphere in Germany."² The Conservative delegation to the Council of Europe had played its own part in the reintegration of Germany into the western community when, following Churchill's demand "Where are the Germans?", they played a seminal role in the admittance of the Federal Republic to the Council.³ After the 1951 election, though a few maverick Conservative MPs such as Viscount Hinchinbrooke and Bob Boothby spoke out against the policy of German rearmament, the government could rely on the support of the vast bulk of their own backbenchers and a number of Labour MPs who strongly

1. Harold Macmillan, *Tides of Fortune 1945-55* (Macmillan, London, 1969), p.466-71; Alistair Horne, *Macmillan 1894-56*, vol.1, (Macmillan, London, 1988), p.350-1.

2. *The Parliamentary Debates*, 5th series, vol.478, cols. 496-7.

3. Macmillan, *op.cit.*, p.177-84; Horne, *op.cit.*, p.316-7; Earl Kilmuir, *Political Adventure* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1964), p.179.

supported the policy of raising a German army as part of the West's overall defence effort.

Opposition to German rearmament in the Foreign Office was also weakening. The officials of the German department had been contemplating the possibility of a German defence contribution since early 1950 but had regarded it as a long term measure; the last step in Germany's reintegration into the western community. Now that this process was reaching completion, and with the international situation much calmer than it had been in 1950, they were willing to accept the idea of German rearmament within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and the European Defence Community. They were also aware that with the US becoming ever more insistent on this course there were serious diplomatic dangers associated with any attempt to deviate from such a policy. Finally, it was evident that the actual raising of German divisions would continue to be delayed by the need to complete the vastly complex negotiations on the German contract and then to secure ratification in the EDC countries. From a financial point of view the new government could not afford to see the process of German rearmament begin before the end of 1952 but the period of negotiation and ratification was certain to be lengthy enough to provide the requisite delay.

As these shifts in parliamentary and diplomatic thinking were occurring, the British military were reaching the final stage of an almost unique period in the history of British peace-time defence planning, during which they planned to make the maximum possible contribution to establishing an effective conventional defence on the continent of Europe. During the course of 1952 the reduction in the planned defence programme and the formulation of the revised Global Strategy Paper would undermine this policy. In the winter of 1951-2, however, the Chiefs of Staff continued to regard German rearmament as an essential component of their strategy of continental defence. They hoped that the West Germans would provide a substantial manpower contribution and help fill the expected equipment gap. Their advocacy of extensive German arms production brought them into conflict with Eden, but, with the assistance of American pressure, they won their case.

Eden's opposition to the production of heavy military equipment reflected continuing British doubts about German trustworthiness. Eden himself had only

accepted the idea of German rearmament with reluctance. He had told the Commons in March 1950: "I can never altogether escape the feeling that in the minds of many Germans there is a desire, or at any rate a tendency, to believe that the Germans have some special mission with regard to the rest of Europe...which in fact means the domination of their neighbours".⁴ His subsequent efforts to promote EDC reflected a genuine belief that it was the best solution to the German rearmament problem. As early as November 1950 he expressed his support for a "European Army which Russia would fear less than an Atlantic army." Shortly after his reappointment as Foreign Secretary he told the Labour backbencher, Richard Crossman, that it would be "really dangerous" to allow the Germans into NATO. He added: "That's why the European Army is so very important. If the Germans are thoroughly mixed up with the French, the Russians won't be so provoked."⁵ However, there were an array of difficulties to be overcome before the European Army solution could be implemented, and it was during the course of the exasperating negotiations on these matters that some residual doubts became evident. During the controversies over the production of civil aircraft and guided missiles as well as over heavy military equipment, British policy-makers initially advocated a ban on German production, though on each occasion they were forced by diplomatic considerations to modify their position. On the subject of the German financial contribution it was the British who were the most insistent on a binding agreement covering Allied occupation costs for the 1952-3 financial year. At times of particular tension in the negotiations Foreign Office officials, such as Kirkpatrick and Jebb, even went as far as to suggest that the whole policy should be abandoned. However, the disastrous consequences of failure were constantly in the minds of the diplomats and ensured that the British government pressed on to the conclusion of the negotiations.

The most intractable of the difficulties confronting the government was the negotiation of an agreement with the West Germans to cover occupation costs

4. The Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, vol.473, col.315. For other evidence of Eden's Germanophobia see Victor Rothwell, *Anthony Eden: A Political Biography* (Manchester University Press, 1992), p.77-8; Harold Nicolson, *Diary and Letters 1930-1964* (William Collins, London, 1980), diary entry, 22 July 1948, p.335 and AIR 75/61, Slessor's 'Rough Note' on the rearmament of Germany, December 1948.

5. Rothwell, op. cit., p.110; Janet Morgan (ed.), *The Backbench Diaries of Richard Crossman* (Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, London, 1981), 20 November 1951, p.39-40.

after German rearmament had begun. The High Commissioners had agreed a figure of DM6.6 milliard for occupation costs in 1951-2. The British were to receive DM2.08 milliard, which was described in a Treasury report of 10 July 1951 as "a substantial contribution to our defence effort from the German economy". The report noted: "if that contribution were diminished or disappeared, we would therefore have to increase our Defence Budget substantially or else reduce the size or effectiveness of the forces to which it is at present related". However, it estimated that the German contribution to occupation costs was "of comparable magnitude" to the defence costs of other European countries and came to the somewhat complacent conclusion that the German subsidy would not be endangered in "the near future" because the creation of German armed forces remained "a distant prospect". As Geoffrey Humphrey-Davies, one of the Treasury's Under-Secretaries, noted when faced with the fact that the United Kingdom defence budget would have to increase by £130 million or 10% if Britain lost the contribution from Germany "our financial advantage lies in putting off the evil day as long as we reasonably can".⁶

The October election was held at a time when Britain's economic position was steadily worsening. The sterling area had a deficit of £1,600 million with the rest of the world⁷ which would only increase if Britain assumed responsibility for occupation costs in Germany. At the meeting on 4 September at which the Cabinet gave its heavily qualified support to the European Army scheme, they also agreed that in no circumstances would they accept the extra burden of occupation costs.⁸ Negotiations for the establishment of contractual relations between the occupying powers and the Germans began on 24 September and lasted eight months. One of the subsidiary conventions in the planned contract was intended to cover the financing of foreign forces in West Germany. The lack of preparation in confronting the problem of the occupation costs now became evident. Whereas the Treasury insisted that Britain would under no circumstances accept any additional costs and hoped to postpone the issue, the Foreign Office

6. DEFE 7/872, pt.1, Treasury report, 10 July 1951; T 225/394, Humphrey-Davies minute, 25 July 1951.

7. Anthony Seldon, *Churchill's Indian Summer*, (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1981), p.170.

8. CAB 128/20, CM(51)58th mtg., minute 2, 4 September 1951; T 225/395, FO to Washington, 5 September 1951.

were convinced that the problem had to be confronted and that a solution would inevitably involve extra costs for the British Exchequer.⁹ The Treasury opposed discussion with the Germans on the size of their financial contribution. Sir Leslie Rowan, the Treasury's Second Secretary, told Kirkpatrick on 9 October, "that our economic position was so serious that it was quite impossible for us to shoulder any further burdens.... He appreciated the German constitutional difficulties but this made it essential that we should not enter into any agreement until we were assured that the Bundestag was prepared to endorse it. This might place heavy burdens on the German exchequer but...the German economy was able to bear the burden entailed by the support of our troops."¹⁰ A month later Humphrey-Davies suggested that though it was "very difficult to tell the Germans that they cannot have the 12 Divisions recommended by SHAPE", the British government should seek "some phasing back of the rate of the build up of the German resources".¹¹ Frank Roberts, the new Foreign Office Under-Secretary responsible for German affairs, admitted that with regard to "the financial implications of the German defence contribution we are in a state of the utmost confusion amongst ourselves and will be in no position to begin any discussions with the Germans for some time to come."¹² He was anxious to get an idea of where Britain stood on the financial question as soon as possible.¹³ For the Foreign Office, the contract, the financial convention, the EDC and the German defence contribution were all bound together. One of the first briefs that Eden received on his return stressed that early negotiations on a German financial contribution were "absolutely essential". Any delay would "prejudice the contractual arrangement and the whole process of bringing Germany into Western partnership."¹⁴

The Treasury case for a delay or a phasing in of German rearmament was never considered by the Cabinet. When Sir James Crombie, the Third Secretary to the Treasury, noted that the creation of an indigenous German arms industry

9. T 225/395, Compton minute, 5 October 1951.

10. FO 1008/59, minutes of a meeting at the Foreign Office, 9 October 1951; FO 371/93408, C10110/641, Roberts to Strang, 14 November 1951.

11. T 225/396, Humphrey-Davies memos, 12 November 1951 and 14 November 1951.

12. FO 371/93405, C10110/577, Roberts to Dixon, 8 November 1951.

13. FO 371/93408, C10110/641, Roberts to Strang, 12 November 1951.

14. FO 371/93885, CF(W)111 118/38, FO brief on a German Financial Contribution to Defence, 1 November 1951.

was "not altogether welcome" because it would "increase our already formidable difficulties in getting our own expenditure met", Butler revealed his own feelings on the issue. He commented: "in deciding this question more weight should be given to political and military than to financial and economic considerations...I should like to see German industry partly occupied in this way, rather than in competing in our markets".¹⁵ Thus, when Eden outlined the current difficulties over the German financial contribution to the Cabinet on 15 November, Butler did not present the case for delay. Eden warned that the raising of a 12 division German army was bound to give rise to a gap between the amount the Germans were willing to spend on defence and the combined costs of the occupation and their own military build up. The gap could be reduced either by additional American aid, by a smaller West German contribution, or by reducing the size of the British occupation forces. These solutions were all flawed, either on the grounds of practicality or desirability. The immediate issue for the Cabinet to decide was whether to proceed with negotiations. The Germans would inevitably argue "that they should pay for their forces and we for ours". However, entering negotiations was, Eden suggested, the best way in which to utilise American influence to secure the maximum possible German financial contribution. The Cabinet were remarkably sanguine when confronted with this sombre analysis. The Mutual Aid Committee had estimated that the likely size of the financial gap, on even the most optimistic assumptions, would be approximately DM8 milliard or £700 million up to 1954. Ministers responded by asserting that these were only "rough estimates" and would probably prove "excessive". A sub-committee including Butler, Salisbury and Cherwell was established and reported on 17 November that the best policy would be to begin negotiations on the subject of the German financial contribution to defence "at an early date". They noted that a slow down in the German build up might help postpone the problem but added that "open advocacy of such a course would be politically most undesirable". The Cabinet accepted the case for the immediate opening of negotiations with equanimity, but instructed Eden to make it clear to the other participants that

15. T 225/131, Humphrey-Davies memo, 12 November 1951, Crombie minute, 12 November 1951, Butler to Attlee, 16 November 1951.

"they were not prepared to accept any additional financial burden".¹⁶ No realistic solution to the problem was mooted, either by the committee or the full Cabinet.

The optimism of the new government appeared to be misplaced. British, American and French officials met during the autumn to discuss these problems. They recommended a German financial contribution to defence of DM13 milliard for the 1952-3 financial year, of which DM 7.4 milliard would be spent on the support of the Allied forces. Using NATO estimates they suggested that between 1 April 1952 and 30 June 1953 the cost of German rearmament within the EDC would be DM 15.8 milliard. They concluded: "even if the three governments are able to convince the German Federal Government that a total contribution of the order of magnitude set out... above should be made... the total of the contribution to the European Defence Community and the cost of the support of other Allied forces in Germany will exceed the total German contribution. Whether the gap will occur by June 1953 is still uncertain, but there can be absolutely no doubt that such a gap will occur during 1953-4."¹⁷ Despite some difficulties with the French, by the end of November the three governments had reached agreement that they should seek a contribution of DM 13 milliard from the West German government for the financial year 1952-3.¹⁸ Kirkpatrick was, however, unconvinced that the Germans would accept this figure. He warned that when Adenauer discovered "that we are resolved to require that Germany should not only pay the whole bill for our forces but that her total contribution to defence should be in the region of 12½ milliards we are likely to have an explosion." Though the German reaction was considerably more composed than Kirkpatrick expected, the German finance minister, Schaeffer, nevertheless declared that "it would be physically impossible for him to produce a sum of DM 13 milliards for defence next year without creating an inflation of such magnitude as would shake the Federal Republic to its very foundation."¹⁹

16. CAB 128/23, CC(51)7th mtg., minute 4, 15 November 1951, CC(51)8th mtg., minute 2, 19 November 1951; CAB 129/48, C(51)15, 13 November 1951, C(51)19, 17 November 1951; CAB 130/72, GEN 389, 1st mtg., 15 November 1951.

17. FO 371/93886, CF(W)111 118/53, Report of the Tripartite Group, 17 November 1951.

18. FO 371/93884, CF(W)111 118/6, Roberts to Eden, 25 November 1951, CF(W)111 118/7, Roberts to Eden, 27 November 1951.

19. FO 371/93418, C10110/810, annex B to the Brief for the Paris talks on Germany, 16 November 1951; FO 371/93886, CF(w)111 118/65, Kirkpatrick to FO, 21 December 1951.

Though German rearmament appeared to pose a threat to Britain's financial position, policy-makers were aware of its potential long term advantages. As part of the contractual negotiations which had begun in September it was necessary to consider whether Germany should be allowed an arms industry which could be utilised for the purposes of western rearmament. Roberts noted: "There is a basic contradiction between the NATO desire to limit German arms production severely and the western need... to obtain a balanced combat-worthy German defence contribution at an early date. A further important consideration is that a Germany with an unduly restricted armaments industry would be likely to become an increasingly serious economic competitor to the United Kingdom with her heavy rearmament burden."²⁰

The choice that British policy-makers had to make was whether to implement in full the Brussels compromise agreement of December 1950 which included the prohibition of a German arms industry as one of its safeguards or to take a more liberal attitude in order to facilitate the completion of NATO's huge rearmament programme. Distrust of the Germans cautioned against the latter but the size of the latest NATO force goals argued against the former. The Spofford Plan agreed at Brussels specified a moratorium on the production of "heavy military equipment, military aircraft or naval vessels other than minor defensive craft" in West Germany. Following the Washington meeting of Foreign Ministers in September 1951 a steering committee was established to clarify these prohibitions. Subsequently a dispute developed in which the British found themselves allied with the French in opposing the recreation of a large scale German arms industry. The Americans advocated that only heavy calibre artillery and super-heavy tanks ought to be banned, while the French argued that the Germans should not be allowed to produce any tracked armoured fighting vehicles nor any guns with a calibre greater than 60mm. The British favoured a limit of 50mm on gun barrels and 80mm on howitzers and a ban on all tanks and armoured cars heavier than 6 tons. The eventual tentative compromise suggested by the committee was for a ban on armour plate more than 50mm thick and guns with a calibre greater than 60mm.²¹ The American case was strengthened by

20. FO 371/93411, C10110/687, FO brief for Eden, 29 October 1951.

21. DEFE 5/34, COS(51)644, 6 November 1951; FRUS 1951, vol.3, US Delegation at the Tripartite Talks on Security Controls to Acheson, 27 October 1951, p.1707-8.

Eisenhower's latest estimates of NATO force requirements. SHAPE figures, calculated during the summer of 1951, called for an Allied force of 97 divisions at D+30, an increase of nearly 20 divisions on previous NATO estimates.²² At the Ottawa North Atlantic Council meeting in September 1951 a three man advisory group called the Temporary Council Committee (TCC) was established to draft a plan for future force levels which would take economic factors into account. The so-called 'Three Wise Men' were designated as Averell Harriman, Sir Edwin Plowden and Jean Monnet. In December 1951 they submitted an interim assessment of force requirements. Though the projected number of divisions required by 1954 was only 86 2/3, estimates of the likely equipment gap were as large as \$22 billion, if the four year programme of US aid was excluded. Rearming the Germans, should they be barred from producing their own military equipment, would add \$6 billion to this figure.²³

The British Chiefs were concerned about how an enlarged NATO force and a German contingent could be equipped simultaneously. Under the influence of Slessor, they had argued that Germany should be allowed to establish effective armed forces on the basis that they could never commit another act of aggression against the West because of their vulnerability to strategic bombing. These arguments were now applied to the dispute over a German arms industry. On being consulted about the current controversy, Brownjohn, the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff, stressed "the importance of obtaining German help" and opposed allowing the EDC to regulate German arms production on the grounds that this would effectively give France a veto.²⁴ At their meeting of 12 November, the Chiefs went so far as to argue that no restrictions at all were necessary on the production of heavy military equipment in Germany. Sanders, the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, explained that "the plain fact was that the only necessary restriction was that manufacture take place in the Ruhr as this area was highly vulnerable to a modern air force. Thus we could always exercise adequate

22. Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1946-53 (A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America), pt.2, reel 6, JCS 2073/201 Enclosure B, 12 September 1951; FRUS 1951, vol.3, US Delegation at Rome to the Acting Secretary of State (Lovett), 27 November 1951, p.730-1.

23. FRUS 1951, vol.3, Ambassador in France (Bruce) to Acheson, 6 December 1951, p.370 and Summary of the TCC Report, 17 December 1951, p.389; Walter S. Poole, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff : The JCS and National Policy 1950-1952* (Michael Glazier, Wilmington, 1980), p.274.

24. DEFE 4/48, COS(51)181st mtg., minute 1, 9 November 1951.

control."²⁵

The Chiefs' confidence that Germany could not, in any circumstances, again become a menace to the West was not shared by Eden. On 13 November he complained to Churchill that Acheson was now advocating "that the Germans should be able to [make a] maximum contribution to arming the forces they contribute to the European Army". While noting the Chiefs' view that Britain could safely accept the new American proposal, he pointed out that Schuman was likely to vigorously oppose the American demands. His intention was to "urge Mr Acheson to accept as the Allied starting point in negotiations with the Germans the compromise already proposed by the tripartite official conference. This is the solution I should prefer." Eden was aware of the economic as well as the military implications of the decision. If Germany made a substantial contribution to NATO arms production "the proportion of her defence budget which could otherwise contribute to the build up of the German defence contribution and to the maintenance in Germany of Allied troops will be considerably reduced. On the other hand potential German commercial competition in the export field would also be reduced."²⁶

As noted earlier Butler believed that German rearmament would be beneficial to the British economy in the long run because it would hinder German attempts to compete in British markets. His predecessor, Gaitskell, had expressed a similar view, supported by the arguments in a Board of Trade brief that there might be advantages in having a section of the German economy turned over to military production. At the end of December Roberts outlined the dual reasoning behind the switch in policy towards acceptance of a German industrial contribution towards rearmament. They had changed policy "partly because it provides the only basis on which we could hope to reach agreement with the Germans but also for the reasons in the Board of Trade brief."²⁷ In fact there was some continuity in Foreign Office thinking on this matter. Though initially siding with the French on the limits to be imposed on German arms production, they had no intention of allowing this dispute to jeopardise the negotiations. In

25. DEFE 4/49, COS(51)183rd mtg., minute 7, 12 November 1951.

26. FO 800/792, Eden to the Prime Minister, 13 November 1951.

27. FO 371/93886, CF(w)111 118/76, Roberts minute, 27 November 1951 and Crawford minute, 28 November 1951.

order to accommodate Adenauer they had, for example, been willing to accept that restrictions on German arms production should not be embodied in the contract, where they would appear discriminatory, but contained instead in a unilateral declaration of intent by the West German government.²⁸ It was the economic and diplomatic arguments in favour of lifting prohibitions on the production of heavy military equipment, combined with American pressure, which were more influential in altering Foreign Office policy than the arguments of the Chiefs. By the end of December tentative tripartite agreement had been reached on the lifting of restrictions on most heavy military equipment with the exception of propellants and gun barrels of a calibre greater than 105mm.²⁹

During his first months back in office Eden also had to confront the possibility of the collapse of the EDC negotiations in the face of Benelux hesitations. Though his policy on this issue became the subject of recriminations, it is clear that he was anxious to give full support to the European Army concept. The Labour government, though willing to express general support for some form of European defence organisation, was not prepared to endorse EDC specifically as the vehicle for German rearmament. By contrast, Eden was eager to associate Britain with the EDC. The day after the infamous Rome press conference of 28 November, at which he merely restated the established policy that Britain would not join the EDC as a full member, Eden expressed his regrets about the negative reaction to Acheson. He then asked the American Secretary of State whether it would be advisable for Britain to offer some form of institutional association but Acheson rejected the idea.³⁰ Nevertheless, the Foreign Office believed that some form of military cooperation would be possible. They feared that the failure of the EDC conference in Paris would mean that "the provision of the German

28. DEFE 5/34, COS(51)644, 6 November 1951.

29. DEFE 5/37, COS(52)108, 12 February 1952; FO 371/93886, CF(w)111 118/76, Roberts minute, 27 November 1951; FRUS 1951, vol.3, Ambassador in France (Bruce) to Acheson, 22 December 1951, p.1741-2 and Secretary of State to Embassy in France, 29 December 1951, p.1745.

30. John W. Young, 'German Rearmament and the European Defence Community' in John W. Young (ed.), *The Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peacetime Administration* (Leicester University Press, 1988), p.84; FRUS 1951, vol.3, memo of Conversation between Acheson and Eden, 29 November 1951, p.746-7. Eden had discussed this issue with Eisenhower prior to his Rome press conference and the SACEUR also suggested that an offer by Britain to join EDC would only create further complications for the Paris negotiations. In his memoirs Eden states that his Rome press conference declaration was influenced by this conversation. See Lord Avon, *Full Circle* (Cassels, London, 1960), p.32-3.

military contribution to Western European defence would be further delayed, and the whole programme for establishing a new relationship with Germany and her closer association with the West would be hung up." The alternative of a German army was open to "a variety of objections" which had been the subject of intensive discussion for the previous two years. Furthermore, if the European Army project ended in failure Britain would be held responsible.³¹

This enthusiastic endorsement of a European Army by the Foreign Office would have been unthinkable a year earlier and it is important to realise that strategic factors were not the most important in changing the opinions of the diplomatic corps. The American conversion to the EDC idea and the linking of it with the contractual negotiations were of seminal importance. As we shall see Foreign Office officials would constantly return to the theme that the EDC was the only solution to the German rearmament problem in light of the linkage between the European Army and the contract. Furthermore, there was much less fear of the likely Soviet reaction than there had been twelve months previously. During a meeting of the Foreign Office's Russia Committee in November Roberts pointed out "that there was now less Russian fear of Germany as such, they were afraid of Atlantic rearmament as a whole". A few months later Dixon declared "he had been struck by the surprising mildness of Soviet reaction to the latest EDC discussions".³² The role of these officials is of crucial importance for an understanding of the switch to a policy of support for the European Army. Kirkpatrick's conversion to this point of view was a result of his long standing fears about the domestic situation in the Federal Republic. Another important event was Gainer's replacement as Under-Secretary superintending the German department by Frank Roberts. Roberts was industrious, perceptive and a dedicated opponent of the Soviets. As Minister at the Moscow Embassy between 1945 and 1947 he had co-operated with George Kennan in alerting western governments to the bellicosity of Soviet policy. Though like Strang and Kirkpatrick, Roberts had witnessed the appeasement policy of the 1930s at first hand, after the war he was far less concerned about the re-emergence of the

31. DEFE 5/35, COS(51)733, 8 December 1951.

32. FO 371/94845, NS 1053/46, minutes of a Russia Committee meeting, 13 November 1951; FO 371/100841, NS 1052/9, minutes of a Russia Committee meeting, 4 March 1952.

German threat than about the new danger from the Soviet Union.³³ In this sense Roberts was an atypical, though very effective, Foreign Office official.

When the Foreign Office consulted the military about the possibility of cooperation with the EDC they found them surprisingly enthusiastic about the idea of some form of integration between British and EDC forces. In November the Joint Planning Staff had listed among the advantages of British participation in EDC the fact that "Anglo-French solidarity would be strengthened and any German tendency to dominate the forces... would be counterbalanced". Though the Chiefs considered that the advantages of full membership were outweighed by the disadvantages, the various arguments in favour of some form of British association were influential when the matter of military cooperation was discussed the following month.³⁴ On 7 December Sanders, representing the views of Slessor, stressed "the importance of achieving a settlement" of the EDC negotiations. A British contribution to the European force "might regain in Europe the initiative and leadership which at present had passed to the United States... The feasibility of integrating British personnel into a European Defence Force might not be so difficult as at present envisaged."³⁵ Thus, though the Chiefs could not accept the idea of full membership, they were willing to offer close cooperation with the European Army under the overall command of SHAPE. During the first few months of 1952 detailed planning began on the means by which the British armed forces could assist a nascent European Defence Force and by April an extensive plan of cooperation had been agreed.³⁶

The only dissenting voice among the general consensus in favour of utilising the EDC as a means to secure German rearmament was that of the Prime Minister. Churchill had an ambivalent attitude towards Germany and particularly the Prussian element of the German nation. He both feared the Germans as a military threat to the West and admired them for their success in blocking Russian

33. John Zametica, 'Three Letters to Bevin: Frank Roberts at the Moscow Embassy, 1945-1946' in Zametica (ed.), *British Officials and British Foreign Policy, 1945-50* (Leicester University Press, 1990); Frank Roberts, *Dealing with Dictators* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1991), ch.11.

34. DEFE 4/49, COS(51)192nd mtg., minute 7, 28 November 1951; DEFE 6/19, JP(51)196, 13 November 1951.

35. DEFE 4/50, COS(51)199th mtg., minute 5, 7 December 1951.

36. DEFE 4/53, COS(52)50th mtg., minute 8, 8 April 1952.

expansion westwards.³⁷ By the end of 1951 he was seeking to utilise them in the latter role. He suggested to the Cabinet in a memorandum of 29 November: "There can be no effective defence of Western Europe without the Germans. As things developed my idea has always been as follows. There is the NATO army. Inside the NATO army there is the European Army, and inside the European Army there is the German Army."³⁸ Churchill had been one of the first to propose the creation of a European Army in his speech to the Council of Europe in August 1950, but his conception of such a force was radically different from the design of the EDC. His ideas seemed guaranteed to destroy any prospect of French acceptance of the European Army. Surprisingly, however, Eden countered Churchill's arguments by warning about the effects his plan would have on the Soviets, rather than on the possibly disastrous repercussions it might have on Britain's European policy. He warned that the Soviets "were likely to regard the creation of a German national army as more provocative than any of the steps so far taken in building up the defence of Western Europe."³⁹ That the Foreign Secretary was not using this argument simply as a debating point is confirmed by his opposition to American plans for German membership of NATO. He warned of "the serious difficulties in which this step might involve us with the Russians. The latter would regard the Federal Republic's direct membership of NATO as an even more provocative step than their participation in the European defence community."⁴⁰ Concern for Soviet reactions was an area of continuity in the German policies of the Labour and Conservative governments. The difference was that Eden was more willing to press ahead with German rearmament through the European Defence Community as a means of overcoming Soviet fears.

Having aired his views, Churchill was willing to acquiesce to Foreign Office policy on the EDC. On a visit to Paris in December he promised that British forces would "be linked with those of the European Defence Community for training, supply and operations by land, sea and air." In their discussions with the French government Churchill and Eden promised to associate Britain "as closely

37. Gordon A. Craig, 'Churchill and Germany' in Blake and Louis (eds.), *Churchill* (Oxford University Press, 1993), p.37.

38. CAB 129/48, C(51)32, 29 November 1951.

39. CAB 128/23, CC(51)16th mtg., minute 8, 11 December 1951.

40. FO 371/93404, C10110/560, FO to Washington, 7 November 1951.

as possible" with the EDC.⁴¹ During their visit to Washington in January 1952, Acheson noticed that the Prime Minister had been persuaded by his Foreign Secretary to give public support to the EDC idea, despite Churchill's private pleas on behalf of the platoon commanders of the European Army who he believed would find it impossible to control their polyglot forces.⁴²

The Foreign Office remained committed to the EDC as part of the overall solution to the German problem. They held strictly to the view that everything possible must be done to ensure that all aspects of relations with Germany were covered by the contract, the EDC and the various additional conventions. However, the first priority remained the contract. This was regarded as essential in order to prevent the Germans from embracing neutrality or, in the worst possible scenario, aligning with the Soviet Union. The head of the German political department, Dennis Allen, minuted on 17 December 1951 that "in practise we shall have to proceed with our new political relationship with Germany even without a defence contribution."⁴³

The importance attached to both elements of the overall policy of reintegration was evident from the Foreign Office response to the reaction against EDC in Europe during early 1952. On 8 February the Bundestag, whose members were furious at French policy towards the Saar, voted for a resolution demanding strict equality for West Germany within the EDC, membership of NATO and a policy to re-establish the rights of the German inhabitants of the Saar.⁴⁴ In France the Communists and Gaullists, who were opposed to the EDC, were now joined by dissidents from the ranks of the Socialists, the Radicals and the MRP as feeling against the European Army intensified. The National Assembly attached a long list of preliminary conditions to their acceptance of EDC and even the

41. Major-General Edward Fursdon, *The European Defence Community : A History* (Macmillan, London, 1980), p.134; CAB 129/48, C(51)62, 29 December 1951.

42. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (W.W. Norton, New York, 1969). Eden had to explain to the Prime Minister that the European Army would be integrated at divisional, not platoon, level.

43. FO 371/93415, C10110/772, Porter to Allen, 11 December 1951 and Allen minute, 17 December 1951.

44. Fursdon, *op.cit.*, p.137; Thomas Alan Schwartz, *America's Germany* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1991), p.254; K. Adenauer, *Memoirs, 1945-53* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1966), p.403-7.

resulting tendentious motion passed by only 327 votes to 287 on 19 February.⁴⁵ There was some sympathy for French concerns in Britain. Bob Boothby told the House of Commons on 5 February: "it will be very difficult to persuade the French people- or the German people- or, indeed, the British people- to accept even the possibility of the creation of another Wehrmacht which could have as its only objective... the recapture of the lost Eastern Provinces."⁴⁶

From Paris Sir Gladwyn Jebb, one of the Foreign Office's most distinguished diplomats, dispatched a report on French disenchantment with the EDC to Strang in London. Jebb was a friend of Hugh Dalton and seems to have shared the ex-Chancellor's suspicions about German motives. He reported: "nearly all assert that the only real incentive that the Germans, for their part, have for rearming... is in order to achieve the reunification of Germany." The French feared that the Americans were intent on a war with the Soviet Union which would be disastrous for them. Even if France was able to avoid occupation or atomic bombardment "it is evident that the elimination of Russia as a power would result in the domination of Europe by Germany." Though initially describing his memorandum as "reportage", he concluded: "these doubts may be criticised as being unconstructive and even to some extent groundless; but I suggest that they cannot be altogether dismissed as invalid... are the dangers inherent in the... policy of encouraging the reunification of Germany by all possible means... as illusory as some would seek to suggest?"

The comments of Roberts and Strang on this analysis reveal the priorities of the Foreign Office at this time. They demonstrate that the diplomats saw a German defence contribution as an important part of the reintegration of the Federal Republic into the West, that the EDC was regarded as an effective means of controlling German rearmament, that they believed the international situation was now propitious and that they were convinced that there was in any case no viable alternative. Roberts described the idea that German rearmament was going "too fast" as "rather ridiculous... The real danger is quite a different one ie. that even a small German army will absorb so much of Germany's available financial resources that there will be little or nothing left to pay for Allied troops stationed

45. Jean Stoetzel, 'The Evolution of French Opinion' in Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron (eds.), *France Defeats EDC* (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, New York, 1957), p.129-32.

46. The Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, vol.495, cols. 847-8.

in Germany and that the UK will then have to consider withdrawing its own divisions there." He added: "we cannot hope to sit permanently upon Germany, which is now reviving fast and fortunately in rather better political circumstances than we had any right to expect. From the military point of view we cannot defend Germany and Western Europe behind her, without a German contribution... We must therefore press a reluctant Germany to make her defence contribution to the EDC ensuring that we control Germany within the NATO framework. Otherwise a neutral Germany would before long fall prey to the Soviet Union and Sir G. Jebb's French friends would really have something to worry about." The role of the EDC in controlling German rearmament was an important factor in Strang's thinking. Previously he had opposed German rearmament but he now wrote to Jebb: "We cannot contemplate a neutralised, demilitarised Germany; and the only alternative to the present plan for a European Defence Community is in fact the creation of a completely independent German national army. In that event the risk of our being involved in 'a war for East Prussia' (or alternatively of finding ourselves confronted with a new Rapallo policy!) would in our judgement be greater than it is under the present plan which at least offers the prospect of getting the West German forces closely tied up with the other forces of Western Europe and brought under full NATO control."⁴⁷

This positive attitude to the EDC led the government to adopt a policy of concessions to accommodate French concerns. When Eden outlined the military's plans for cooperation to Schuman on 2 February, the French Foreign Minister showed "great interest" and was evidently pleased with the idea of close cooperation between the RAF and the putative European air force.⁴⁸ On 5 February Eden gave further encouragement to the EDC states by promising "we on this island are resolved to maintain armed forces on the continent of Europe for as long as is necessary."⁴⁹ Following the French National Assembly's call for British membership of EDC, the Cabinet agreed to a public declaration of their intention to oppose the secession of any member state from the EDC in the

47. FO 371/97898, C1083/2, Jebb to Strang, 12 February 1952, Roberts minute, 29 February 1952 and Strang to Jebb, 14 March 1952.

48. FO 371/97738, C1017/48, memo of Secretary of State's conversation with Schuman in Paris, 2 February 1952.

49. The Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, vol.495, col. 820.

future.⁵⁰ This satisfied Schuman temporarily, though he cautioned that his government might require yet more concessions at a later date.⁵¹

The principal difficulties with the implementation of the government's German policy were associated not with the tortuous negotiations over the EDC but with the even more byzantine complications of the High Commissioner's discussions on the establishment of contractual relations. At Adenauer's request the occupying powers had agreed in January that the size of the German financial contribution to defence, which had initially been set at DM13 milliard, should be re-assessed by the Temporary Council Committee who were responsible for prescribing the military targets for all the Alliance members.⁵² When the three Foreign Ministers presented Adenauer with the TCC's proposed figure of DM 11.25 milliard at London in February, the Chancellor refused to accept even this reduced figure without further expert analysis.⁵³ The London meeting was called to take advantage of the presence of the leading foreign statesmen at George VI's funeral, and provided an opportunity for the Americans to press for reductions in the size of the occupation costs. They had already been cut from the tripartite group figure of DM 7.4 milliard to DM 6.8 milliard. On 17 February Acheson suggested a further 10% reduction, to which Eden responded that "so far as the British forces were concerned, it might prove very difficult to effect further economies in expenditure." The three foreign ministers agreed that DM 6.8 milliard should be a maximum figure for defence expenditure in Germany in 1952-3 and that the High Commissioners should consider how this figure could be pared down.⁵⁴ When the High Commissioners totalled together their budgets for the 1952-3 year they actually produced a figure of DM7.5 milliard, but this included a number of items of civil expenditure and Kirkpatrick argued that no reductions could be made in this figure without jeopardising the DM6.8 milliard which constituted the actual cost of the military occupation. At the end of March

50. CAB 128/24, CC(52)17th mtg., minute 6, 14 February 1951.

51. John W. Young (1988), *op.cit.*, p.86.

52. FO 371/100023, CF(w) 1111/13, Aide-Memoir from Allied High Commission to the Chancellor, 24 January 1952; CAB 128/24, CC(52)17th mtg., minute 5, 14 February 1952.

53. FO 371/97738, C1017/27, Roberts to Strang, 24 January 1952; FO 371/97739, C1017/73, Roberts to Strang, 1 February 1952; FO 371/97740, C1017/95, memo of a Quadripartite Meeting Between Acheson, Eden, Schuman and Adenauer on 18 February 1952.

54. FO 371/97740, C1017/95, memo of a Tripartite Meeting on 17 February 1952; FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, US Delegation to the London conference to the State Department, 18 February 1952, p.59 and Secretary of State to the President, 21 February 1952, p.84.

he agreed to put forward a French compromise proposal for a ceiling on civil and defence costs of DM600 million a month, which included a sum of DM206 million for the British zone. The British government rejected this proposal and Kirkpatrick now began a trivial quarrel with his American counterpart, McCloy, over the expense of maid service in the British zone. However, within a few days the government in London accepted a ceiling of DM215 million a month, with a tacitly agreed limit of DM600 million a month on occupation costs as a whole. Though this agreement was only intended to run for four months in fact it was to be constantly extended with very little variation until 1955.⁵⁵

The three occupying powers were also in dispute at the London conference over the items whose production would be prohibited in Germany unless special authorisation approving their manufacture was given by a unanimous vote of the EDC powers. Though the list was intended to restrict the manufacture of armaments in Germany, civil aircraft were also included. The Chiefs had accepted the revival of a German arms industry on the basis that "since such industry would be concentrated in the Ruhr and without an aircraft industry to produce defensive fighters from Germany's internal resources [it] would be an open target to Allied bombers." The Air Ministry argued that a retention of the ban on civil aircraft manufacture "should be regarded as the last ditch in our defences against future German aggression and we should not concur in the lifting of the ban unless this step is essential to securing a German contribution to Western Defence."⁵⁶ Eden embraced the idea of continued prohibitions on the manufacture of civil aircraft in West Germany with enthusiasm. He told the Cabinet it was "desirable that we should insist on its maintenance as a military safeguard." As usual Eden was aware of the economic implications and he added: "We might be able to sell civil aircraft to the Germans from our own production."⁵⁷

As had been the case with heavy military equipment, however, the Foreign Secretary was forced to bow to American pressure on this issue. When Acheson

55. FO 1005/1106, verbatim records of the Allied High Commission, 88th meeting of the Allied High Commission, 27 March 1952, 89th Meeting of the Allied High Commission, 1 April 1952; T 225/339, Kirkpatrick to FO, 27 March 1952, FO to UK High Commission, 28 March 1952, FO to UK High Commission, 2 April 1952, Kirkpatrick to FO, 3 April 1952.

56. DEFE 5/37, COS(51)193, 6 April 1951; DEFE 4/52, COS(52)26th mtg., minute 1 (annex A), 13 February 1952.

57. CAB 128/24, CC(52)17th mtg., minute 5, 14 February 1952.

discussed a ban on the production of civil aircraft on 14 February, he noted that "Eden was very tenacious on this matter, spoke of the British recollection of the bombing during the war, and I am sure that we will have trouble on this point."⁵⁸ Two days later Eden was in a more conciliatory mood. He told Acheson that in Britain "memories of the blitz were still lively", but now seemed willing to accept a public declaration from Adenauer promising not to manufacture aircraft rather than a binding treaty guarantee prohibiting it.⁵⁹ By 19 February he had accepted this solution and was aligning himself with the Americans in pressing the French to adopt a more flexible attitude over the banning of propellants and large gun barrels.⁶⁰

The North Atlantic Council meeting of February 1952, which followed the London Foreign Ministers conference, confirmed the need for a German defence contribution and saw some progress made towards achieving it. The British brief stressed that the "overriding consideration" from a strategic perspective must be "the efficiency of the NATO forces and the early inclusion of Germans amongst them". The scale of German rearmament had been a much less controversial issue at the Paris EDC conference than the level of integration. During the course of 1951 a figure of 12 divisions or 'groupements' had been agreed and accepted by NATO's Standing Group. At Lisbon this figure was confirmed. It was remarkable that it continued to act as the target for the Federal Republic's defence contribution from 1951 onwards, despite the fact that the planned contributions of the other North Atlantic countries, including Britain, shrank drastically from the peak set at Lisbon. The Lisbon force goals, based on Eisenhower's estimates, called for the creation of 50 divisions by the end of 1952 and 96 divisions by the end of 1954 to be ready by M+30.⁶¹ The deal outlined at London, whereby Adenauer would provide a reassurance that his government had no intention of

58. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, memo of a Conversation between Acheson and Eden on 14 February 1952, p.43.

59. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, minute of a meeting between Acheson and Eden on 16 February 1952, p.50-1; FO 371/97740, C1017/95, memo of Anglo-US meeting at the Foreign Office, 16 February 1952.

60. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, US Delegation to the State Department, 19 February 1952, p.72-4; CAB 128/24, CC(52)18th mtg., minute 2, 18 February 1952.

61. DEFE 6/18, JP(51)173, part 4, 15 October 1951; CAB 134/763, AOC(52)27, 16 February 1952; William S. Park, *Defending the West : A History of NATO* (Wheatsheaf Books, Brighton, 1988), p.55; Robert Endicott Osgood, *NATO : The Entangling Alliance* (University of Chicago Press, London, 1962), p.87.

manufacturing civil aircraft, was confirmed. In addition the French dropped their demand for a moratorium on the production of gun barrels larger than 105mm and accepted a formula which precluded the manufacture of propellants in "strategically exposed areas".⁶²

The smaller NATO powers now began to question whether sufficient funds would be available to finance both the German contribution and the occupation costs. The British delegation sought to reassure them that the current negotiations on a German financial contribution covered only the first year when "the Germans will have great difficulty spending as much as DM 3.5 milliards" on their own rearmament.⁶³ The question of how German forces were to be paid for once the process gained momentum and costs increased was not addressed. Despite this progress was made on the issue of the first year's contribution. Adenauer accepted the report of the TCC in principle and offered the figure of DM 850 million a month with the proviso that the Federal Republic should be given financial assistance if the economic forecasts of the TCC should prove optimistic. Roberts noted that this amounted to an acceptance of the Allied demands but "in the most unacceptable form possible." The French too were unenthusiastic, but Acheson stressed: "This was a great victory for the Allies and it must not be thrown away because of the difficulty over presentation."⁶⁴ In fact it was to be the division of the DM 850 million sum, rather than the conditional nature of the offer, which was to be a source of continuing difficulty for the Allies and this issue was not addressed at Lisbon.

In the aftermath of Lisbon it became clear to the British government that they could not afford German rearmament to begin before the autumn of 1952. Prior to the start of German rearmament they could be confident that the Germans would continue to contribute at least DM600 million a month to Allied occupation costs under the deal agreed by the Allied High Commission. After German rearmament began, though they were determined to push down the share

62. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, Acheson to Department of State, 26-7 February 1952, p.170-1.

63. FO 371/97753, C1017/330, British record of the Lisbon conference including a meeting of the three foreign ministers with the Benelux foreign ministers on 21 February 1952 and a meeting of UK, US, French and Benelux officials on 21 February 1952.

64 Ibid., meeting of the Tripartite Working Group, 24 February 1952 and meeting of the three Foreign Ministers, 26 February 1952; FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, US High Commissioner (McCloy) to the State Department, 23 February 1952, p.256-7 and Secretary of State to High Commissioner, 26 February 1952, p.258-9.

of the German financial contribution of DM 10.2 milliard allocated to the build up of German forces as much as possible in order to ensure that a more substantial portion was spent on the upkeep of Allied troops in West Germany, it was clear the Allies would not receive as much as the current figure of DM7.2 milliard a year. Stewart Crawford, the head of the Mutual Aid Committee, explained in March that the financial gap between German payments and the combined costs of the Allied budget and the German military build-up "is bound to arise before very long and the only question is when that will happen. Our hope has been that it would not happen for at least a year. I think that provided ratification does not take place before the autumn, the gap is unlikely to arise before March 1953." The Foreign Office argued that West Germany would only require DM 3.4 milliard in the first year, while the Germans demanded DM7 milliard with an additional DM 1.85 milliard to subsidise German industry. Strang concluded gloomily, "the decision to rearm Germany is going to mean before the next year from now is out, either an increased demand on the British taxpayer or a reduction in the British defence programme, and the effect in the first year will be much less than in the second year, when there will be little or nothing from German funds for the upkeep of British forces in Germany. These are consequences we have not yet really faced."⁶⁵ Much depended on the judgement of the EDC conference in Paris which was to arbitrate on the competing Allied and German estimates of the financial costs of German rearmament during the first year. R.S. Symons, an Assistant Secretary in the Treasury, calculated that if occupation costs were kept down to the agreed figure of DM6.8 milliard and the German build up cost no more than DM3.3 milliard in the first year, which was the latest estimate of the American, British and French experts, then the budget could just about be balanced. However, the German estimate of DM8.9 milliard for the first year of rearmament completely destroyed this calculation. Symons recommended that Britain retain the option of withdrawing forces from Germany if occupation costs could not be met, and advised the government to press NATO to consider "the military and strategic implications of any threatened reduction in forces as above, so that the alternative

65. FO 371/100026, CF(w)1111/95, Crawford brief, 10 March 1952 and Strang minute, 11 March 1952.

of a slowing up of German rearmament may be properly examined". This latter suggestion was not taken up, but the Treasury continued to stress that if the costs of British forces in Germany could not be met by the Federal Republic, Britain would have to keep the option of force withdrawals open.⁶⁶ Eden warned the Cabinet that if the Paris conference supported the German case Britain would be presented "with a serious problem of political and military priorities."⁶⁷

In the months that followed, the negotiations for the signing of the EDC treaty continued to be characterised by hesitation and delay. On 14 March the EDC powers requested that a formal treaty be negotiated with Britain and that reciprocal guarantees be exchanged under the mutual defence provisions of the Brussels treaty. The British response to this request demonstrated once again Eden's commitment to EDC as the vehicle for German rearmament. He told the Cabinet that his discussions in Paris "have left me with the clear impression that the EDC is not likely to go ahead unless we respond to this latest proposal. I believe that without running too great a risk we can give the desired undertaking provided that it is limited to the period during which the United Kingdom is a party to the North Atlantic Treaty." Though Schuman had only requested a declaration, Eden was prepared to offer a formal treaty stating that if any of the EDC parties were attacked, the United Kingdom would, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, afford "all the military and other aid and assistance in its power." Britain would thus extend its guarantees on the continent to West Germany and Italy.⁶⁸ Alexander, the Minister of Defence, insisted on consulting the Chiefs before accepting Eden's proposals, but they were as enthusiastic about the EDC as the Foreign Secretary. They "agreed that it was essential that we should do everything possible- short of actually joining the organisation- both to strengthen and encourage the EDC." They also approved the idea of talks with the French on military cooperation. Having worked on the subject since November 1951 they were able to produce an extensive list of proposals for

66. T 225/398, Symons memo, 18 March 1952; T 225/399, Humphrey-Davies memo, 31 March 1952 with Rowan minute, 31 March 1952.

67. CAB 129/51, C(52)106, 4 April 1952; FO 371/97742, C1017/152, Roberts paper on Outstanding Problems in the Contractual Negotiations including annex, 27 March 1952.

68. CAB 129/50, C(52)92, 28 March 1952.

assisting the nascent European defence force when it came into existence.⁶⁹

It was still the contractual negotiations which, from a British perspective, seemed to pose almost insuperable problems for policy-makers. The Foreign Office remained unconvinced by optimistic American forecasts of when the contract could be signed and Kirkpatrick, who as High Commissioner was responsible for the detailed negotiations, almost despaired of ever completing it. On 19 March he told Roberts that the negotiations were still dragging on and that "I see no prospects of bringing them to an end in any measurable distance of time."⁷⁰ Acheson, however, was determined to make progress in order to facilitate the passage of the Mutual Security Agency appropriations through Congress before its current session ended. On 11 April he sent out instructions to his ambassadors in western Europe urging them to encourage the EDC countries and Britain to complete negotiations by 9 May.⁷¹ Kirkpatrick regarded this schedule as impossible. He and his colleagues on the High Commission had set 20 May as a provisional date for the signing of the contract but he believed that "Even that was cutting things rather fine." Eden suggested to Acheson that the earliest possible date for signature would be between 15 and 20 May while stressing that "we must allow ourselves time to get the very important financial provisions fully agreed." He was adamant that Britain could not accept McCloy's suggestion that some form of written assurance on the German financial contribution could serve as a substitute for an agreed convention within the contract.⁷²

The schedule was further jeopardised by the emergence of a new disagreement concerning the prohibitions on the German arms industry. The pattern of this dispute was very similar to that established during the arguments over heavy military equipment and civil aircraft, with the British initially favouring restrictions on the Germans but eventually conceding victory to the more liberal American approach. The list of weapons whose manufacture in Germany would

69. CAB 128/24, CC(52)35th mtg., minute 7, 1 April 1952, CC(52)37th mtg., minute 5, 4 April 1952; DEFE 4/35, COS(52)47th mtg., minute 5, 1 April 1952, COS(52)50th mtg., minute 8, 8 April 1952.

70. FO 371/97742, C1017/152, Kirkpatrick to Roberts, 19 March 1952.

71. FRUS 1952-4, vol. 5, Acheson to Embassy in French, 11 April 1952, p.639-42.

72. FO 371/97742, C1017/159, FO to Washington, 16 April 1952 and C1017/160, Kirkpatrick to FO, 14 April 1952; FO 371/97743, C1017/171, Roberts to Strang, 15 April 1952.

be prohibited included guided weapons, but in April the Germans requested permission to produce highly sophisticated short range guided missiles for use against aircraft. They argued that these weapons were essential for protection against fast Soviet planes. The Chiefs, who had based their arguments in favour of a liberal attitude towards the production of heavy military equipment in West Germany on the vulnerability of German industry to air attack, at first opposed the new German initiative. They argued: "It was inevitable that if the Germans were allowed to produce short range guided missiles they would in fact acquire the knowledge and potential to produce long range guided missiles." However, they were determined that a dispute at this late stage in the negotiations should not be allowed to prejudice a final settlement and subsequently accepted that due to American pressure there was "no alternative" but to permit the Germans to manufacture guided missiles for anti-aircraft defence.⁷³

The Americans were attracted to the German proposals because the Wasserfall-Rheintocher-Enziron missile which the Germans had been developing in 1945 was more advanced than anything the Allies had produced since, and would constitute a new weapon in the armoury of the West. To politicians in Britain, however, this was an alarming development. Despite the ambivalence of the Chiefs of Staff, Eden remained opposed to the German request. He stated that there were "serious political objections to allowing the Germans to manufacture weapons which would differ from V2s only in size as this would be the thin end of the wedge." The Defence Committee was concerned that the development of this valuable technology in West Germany would increase the danger of it falling into Soviet hands.⁷⁴ Once again, however, Eden was unable to sustain his opposition. By 13 May, with the date for the signing of the contract approaching, Eden promised to make one last effort to persuade Adenauer to put short-range guided missiles on the prohibited list but warned that he would probably have to accept their removal.⁷⁵ The French proved more tenacious in opposing German demands and it was not until 24 May that agreement was finally reached on the exclusion of short range anti-aircraft guided missiles from

73. DEFE 4/53, COS(52)54th mtg., minute 1, 21 April 1952 and COS(52)58th mtg., minute 4, 28 April 1952.

74. CAB 131/12, D(52)15, 29 April 1952 and D(52)4th mtg., minute 3, 30 April 1952.

75. CAB 129/52, C(52)161, 13 May 1952; CAB 128/25, CC(52)52nd mtg., minute 7, 13 May 1952.

the general prohibition on guided missiles.⁷⁶

The final resolution of Germany's financial contribution to defence was subject to the same frantic last minute negotiations. The British found that the claim to a DM 6.8 milliard share of the total German financial contribution of DM 10.2 milliard for the Allies was being squeezed from two directions at once; from the EDC powers who believed that the DM 3.4 milliard which had been allocated to the Germans for the purposes of rearmament was insufficient, and by the other occupying powers who regarded the DM 6.8 milliard figure for occupation costs as provisional and subject to downward revision. The EDC powers estimated that the cost of German rearmament would be DM 4.2 milliard for nine months and DM 8.1 milliard for twelve months. On the assumption that heavy equipment could be provided by the Americans, these figures could be reduced to DM 2.4 milliard and DM 4.2 milliard respectively. Even if the minimum EDC figures were adopted, however, the Allied share of the German contribution would have to be reduced from DM 6.8 milliard to DM 6.0 milliard in order to fit within the overall total of DM 10.2 milliard. The likelihood of the Germans accepting this was negligible. They were now including the costs of purchasing heavy equipment and subsidising the new arms industries in their figures and had arrived at a total cost of DM 6.3 milliard for the first nine months of rearmament, rising to DM 15.6 milliard for a twelve month period.⁷⁷ On 1 May the High Commissioners had a depressing meeting with Adenauer. The latter was concerned at the loss of his majority in the Bundesrat and the hardening of opposition to the contract in the Bundestag. In addition, the Finance Ministry had been alarmed by the size of the occupation costs for the months of March and April. The Allies had spent DM1.4 milliard in March and DM 850 million in April. Kirkpatrick recorded: "Dr Schaeffer's till is empty, there is panic in the Ministry of Finance and the Germans have been led to re-examine the financial implications of the contract." Adenauer had pointed out "that the Germans cannot bear all the burdens we have imposed on them... and in addition make extensive concessions involving loss of revenue." Exasperated by these developments,

76. FO 371/97763, C1017/505, UK Record of the visit of Eden to Bonn, Paris and Berlin including Tripartite and Quadripartite meetings of 24 May 1952.

77. DEFE 5/39, COS(52)245, 30 April 1952; CAB 129/51, C(52)141 Annex B, 3 May 1952; FO 371/100032, CF(w)1111/210, Roberts to Eden, 14 May 1952.

Kirkpatrick proposed making further concessions to the Germans. If this was not acceptable in London he suggested that "we should reflect whether the present exchange of notes with the Russians should not be used to launch Four-Power talks which would probably have the effect of bringing our present negotiations to an end and so avoid the damage which would be caused by manifest failure to reach agreement with the Federal Government."⁷⁸

Eden did not propose to accept such a radical reversal of policy as this, but informed the Cabinet of the bleak situation in a paper of 3 May. From his analysis it was plain that the British government would require American assistance in pressing for the largest possible Allied share of the German financial contribution. He argued that Britain would be unable to receive its full occupation costs in Germany beyond mid-1953. Indeed, she might cease to receive full costs even earlier unless circumstances became more favourable. To prevent any additional strain on the British economy there were four alternatives: the redeployment of forces, economies in the budget, a smaller German defence contribution or additional US aid. However the first of these would have disastrous repercussions on western defence arrangements, the second was impractical, the third would never be acceptable to the Allies and the fourth could not be relied upon. In the short term Eden advocated putting pressure on the Americans to support British demands that a larger share of the German financial contribution for 1952-3 should go to the Allies. He had no solution to the long term problem.⁷⁹ When Franks raised this matter with Acheson, the American Secretary of State admitted that German claims were probably excessive, but declared that the problem was one of "manageable proportions". He also reminded Franks that the occupying powers had agreed to make further cuts in their DM 6.8 milliard claim in February.⁸⁰

The Treasury continued to believe that if Britain's financial position in Germany could not be guaranteed then re-deployment must be considered, but during the two last frantic weeks of negotiation, which preceded the final

78. FO 371/97744, C1017/199, Kirkpatrick to the Foreign Office, 2 May 1952; DEFE 7/874 pt.3, Adenauer to Kirkpatrick, 28 April 1952.

79. CAB 129/52, C(52)141 including annex A, 3 May 1952.

80. FRUS 1952-4, vol. 7, memo of a conversation between Franks and Acheson, 9 May 1952, p.59-62.

agreement on a contractual settlement, economic considerations took second place to diplomatic ones.⁸¹ The squeeze put on the British by the Germans and the other occupying powers forced Eden into a series of concessions which resulted in a substantial reduction in the portion of the German defence contribution allocated to the Allies. However, the expectation of further long delays before the contract was ratified and the emergence of a formula which gave the Allies a larger share of the budget in the first six months after ratification, led Eden to predict confidently that Britain would have its occupation costs met in full until the end of June 1953. On 2 May Kirkpatrick reported to London that the High Commissioners were considering the idea of accepting a sum of DM 570 million a month to cover occupation costs for a period of less than twelve months, with the allocation for the final months left as the subject for later negotiations. He explained: "If the ratification of the contract were delayed till 1st October it might then be possible to get our full costs covered till 30th June 1953 and the further division contemplated would not take place." On 7 May the Cabinet were informed of German demands for a reduction in the Allied share to DM 4.5 milliard for the full twelve month period. They agreed to establish a committee to examine the latitude for retrenchment in the British occupation budget, while in the interim Kirkpatrick was instructed to argue against any further reduction in the DM 6.8 milliard allocated to the occupying powers. Eden did, however, give Kirkpatrick license to explore a settlement based on a six or nine month rather than a twelve month time period.⁸² On 9 May Eden told the American ambassador that Britain "could not possibly agree to accept arbitrary cuts in the figure of DM6.8 milliards", while in Washington Franks pleaded with Acheson to support the British position.⁸³

Though the French and Americans were not willing to accept German claims for a majority share of the financial contribution, they were prepared to consider cuts of up to 15% in the Allied claim. On 14 May Eden was forced to return to the Cabinet to seek their approval for a cut of up to 10% in the Allied

81. FO 225/400, Compton minute, 6 May 1952.

82. CAB 128/24, CC(52)50th mtg., minute 4, 7 May 1952; CAB 129/51, C(52)141, 3 May 1952; FO 371/100030, CF(w)1111/163, Kirkpatrick to FO, 2 May 1952 and FO to High Commission, 10 May 1952.

83. T225/401, FO to Washington, 9 May 1952, Washington (Franks) to FO, 9 May 1952.

share. They accepted this measure even though Eden informed them that "while there might be scope for further economies, it did not follow that if we abated our demand on the Germans by 10 per cent we should be able to achieve a reduction of that amount."⁸⁴ British hopes of meeting their costs in Germany up to mid-1953 now depended on devising a formula to cover a period of less than twelve months and on a delay in ratification. Initially Eden had favoured a flat monthly rate which would fully cover Allied costs in the first six months but on 15 May he instructed Kirkpatrick to accept reductions of up to 10% in the Allied claim and to negotiate for a settlement covering nine months. He was opposed to the latest idea to emerge from the High Commission for a sliding scale of payments which would give the Allies a larger portion of the German contribution in the first months and a smaller amount in subsequent months. The acceptance of a smaller Allied sum for the period between six and nine months would, he believed, prejudice the Allied case for a larger share in any subsequent negotiations. The Americans favoured the idea of a variable rate and only accepted the flat rate formula with reluctance. On 17 May the High Commissioners presented their agreed proposal for a nine month deal giving the Germans DM339 million a month. Once again, however, the Germans were unwilling to accept the Allied calculation of the amount they required for the purposes of rearmament.⁸⁵

The failure to reach agreement on the basis of a flat rate led to a further retreat by Eden and his acceptance of the American sponsored sliding scale. As the deadline for agreement drew near he authorised Kirkpatrick to accept a reduced allocation for the Allies in the final three months of the nine month period but insisted that "it is essential that the Allies should be allowed to carry forward any balance from the first two quarters into the third quarter." A plethora of formulas were discussed in the final few days until agreement was finally reached on a figure of DM 551 million for the first six months and DM 319 million for the three months afterwards. It was not until 24 June that the High Commission finally struck a deal on the division of this sum which gave the British DM198 million a month for 6 months and DM115 million a month for the next

84. FO 371/100031, CF(w)1111/182, Hoyer-Miller to FO, 12 May 1952; CAB 128/25, CC(52)53rd mtg., minute 8, 15 May 1951; CAB 129/52, C(52)162, 14 May 1952.

85. FO 371/100032, CF(w)1111/207, Kirkpatrick to FO, 17 May 1952, CF(w)1111/215, Kirkpatrick to FO, 18 May 1952, and CF(w)1111/216, Kirkpatrick to FO, 18 May 1952.

three.⁸⁶ The extent to which this deal would cut into the British budget depended upon the date on which it would come into force. The later that ratification occurred, the longer would be the period during which the allies would receive contributions at the current higher rate of DM600 million a month. Kirkpatrick estimated that if the whole nine month deal was implemented (which implied ratification by 30 September) there would have to be a 16.7% cut in the British occupation budget; if it only ran for eight months (implying ratification by 31 October) the cut would be only 13%. Eden told the Cabinet that the deal meant that "Allied requirements will, therefore, be more than covered in the six months, and it will be possible to carry a surplus forward which would enable Allied costs to be met to the beginning of the third month of the third quarter." He added that if, as seemed likely, the EDC and the contract were not ratified before 1 November 1952, "our full Deutschemerk requirements for the local costs of the United Kingdom forces will be met from the German contribution until 30 June 1953. If the date is later, we should gain financially."⁸⁷ One disadvantage which Eden did not mention was that the Allies had conceded the principle that six months from the moment when EDC was ratified the Allied share of the German contribution would drop to DM 319 million. It was expected that after nine months the size of the German contribution to the Allied budget would be reduced still further. Though Treasury views on the necessity of refusing to accept any extra costs had been ignored, the government was saved from severe financial embarrassment by the long delay in the contractual negotiations.

The history of the negotiations between October 1951 and May 1952 had been marked by a series of apparently unending British concessions. They had accepted a reduction in the German contribution to occupation costs from DM 7.4 milliard a year as recommended by the Tripartite Group to an average figure of DM 474 million a month. The Germans were to be allowed to manufacture heavy military equipment and short range guided missiles, despite initial opposition from the British government to these concessions. On the matter of civil aircraft the British had yielded the principle, even though in practise the

86. T 225/401, Castle (UK High Commission) to Crawford (FO), 24 June 1952.

87. CAB 129/52, C(52)185, 9 June 1952; FO 371/100033, CF(w)1111/225, Kirkpatrick to FO, 21 May 1952, CF(w)1111/226, Kirkpatrick to FO, 22 May 1952, CF(w)1111/228, Roberts to Strang, 21 May 1952, CF(w)1111/230, Kirkpatrick to FO, 23 May 1952.

Germans were unwilling and probably unable to develop an aircraft industry. The government was more enthusiastic about the EDC but nevertheless it had to be goaded into offering a promise to retain troops on the continent for as long as necessary and into extending a guarantee to the Community in order to prevent the collapse of the treaty negotiations. The offer of military cooperation was, however, a genuine one based on enthusiasm for the idea of close association between the British and EDC armed forces.

Thus there was a remarkable change in the British government's attitude towards the issues surrounding German rearmament in the winter of 1951-2. The previous summer the Labour government had opposed the implementation of German rearmament and expressed ambivalence about the EDC. In the succeeding winter the new administration worked assiduously in support of the EDC and the signing of a contract. With the signing of the Bonn Conventions on 26 May 1952 and of the EDC treaty in Paris the next day they appeared to have succeeded. The main changes were in the Cabinet and the Foreign Office. The return of Eden as Foreign Secretary was particularly important because his authority on the subject of foreign affairs went almost unchallenged within the Conservative administration.⁸⁸ Macmillan testified ruefully to Eden's dominance and his verdict is confirmed by the Cabinet records which reveal that Eden's views were accepted with alacrity on almost every occasion.⁸⁹ This was in marked contrast to Morrison's lack of stature as Foreign Secretary. Eden's weakness was in long-term policy making; his great strength was negotiation. He thus took up Foreign Office ideas on the need to integrate Germany militarily, economically and politically into the West and brought them to fruition.

Eden's advisers in the Foreign Office now fully accepted the need for German rearmament as part of the final integration of Germany into the West which was the *cynosure* of British foreign policy at this time. There was actually still not a great deal of enthusiasm for a German defence contribution in itself but it was seen as the only viable policy in the circumstances. As Foreign Office officials constantly reiterated the alternatives were worse. This pessimism was based on suspicion of both the Soviets and the Germans. Kirkpatrick declared that

88. David Carlton, *Anthony Eden : A Biography* (Allen Lane, London, 1981), p.294.

89. Macmillan, *op.cit.*, p.465.

in Germany "any policy is attended by risks." Thus in going ahead with the EDC and the contract the West was making permanent the division in Berlin which was "obviously dangerous to peace." However, making concessions to the Soviets would "run a serious risk of seeing the whole of Germany sovietised and of losing all."⁹⁰ An alliance of Germany with the communist powers was regarded in the Foreign Office as the greatest danger of all. Thus Roberts echoed Kirkpatrick by declaring "there is no ideal German policy. Our aim must be to choose that which offers fewest risks and, above all, to prevent a Russo-German alignment."⁹¹ Allen wrote to an opponent of German rearmament, "we have grave doubts about whether the demilitarisation of Germany... could in fact be permanently maintained and enforced without grave risk to peace... if a solution on these lines appealed to the Russians it would be because they saw in it possibilities of Communist trouble-making and subversion... If it appealed to the Germans, it would be because they saw in it the hope of playing off East against West to their advantage."⁹²

The continued suspicion of Germany combined with an examination of the economic consequences of German rearmament meant that the nature of the German settlement was a much more difficult issue for policy makers during this period than the more well known controversies surrounding the creation of the EDC. Eden generally favoured quite strict controls over the German armaments industry, especially those sectors of it, such as missile production, which revived memories of the wartime threat to Britain. However, on every occasion that he came into conflict with the Americans on these issues he was forced to yield. Acheson recalled with satisfaction that, during the contractual negotiations, Eden "could be counted on to end up on the side of the angels, which I tended to identify with my own. If it sometimes took a little while to get there, he was well worth waiting for."⁹³ On the matter of Germany's financial contribution there was a steady erosion of Britain's position, but Eden could see no alternative policy which would safeguard British financial interests. The final settlement was actually quite satisfactory from the short term point of view but this was largely due to the

90. FO 371/97881, C1074/84, Kirkpatrick to Roberts, 18 April 1952.

91. Ibid, C1074/94, Roberts to Eden, 22 April 1952.

92. FO 371/97750, C1017/285, Draft Reply to the Duke of Bedford, 23 May 1952.

93. Acheson, op.cit., p.615.

actual delay in negotiating the contract and the potential delay in ratification. The long term problem had still not been resolved. The EDC caused fewer difficulties as the military pressed ahead with their plans for cooperation with European armed forces and Eden proposed a series of measures designed to placate European opinion. British policy during this period was thus characterised by a desire to see Germany finally integrated into the West, to prevent undue provocation to the Soviets, to encourage the EDC powers to complete their work on a treaty and to prevent the possibility of Britain having to pay any part of the occupation costs before the end of the 1952-3 financial year.

These would continue to be the themes of British policy, though the context was now provided by continuous French hesitations at the prospect of entering into a partnership with a rearmed, economically reascent, West Germany. The British government believed there would be some delay in ratification, which was regarded as useful from the financial perspective, but no one expected that it would be two and a half years before the German rearmament dilemma was finally resolved. As the French procrastinated, British policy-makers were forced to confront the implications of the failure of a policy for which they had never had great enthusiasm but which appeared to be the only possible solution in the prevailing circumstances. Before May 1952 British policy was characterised by the acceptance, one by one, of policies which had previously been regarded as unthinkable. In the spring of 1950 the Attlee government decided on a cautious policy of rearming Germany through the medium of a Federal gendarmerie but from the outbreak of the Korean War the British lost the initiative. They were forced to accept first the principle of a German army (as distinct from an armed German police force), then the creation of a European Army to contain German armed forces, and finally liberal provisions for German arms manufacture as part of the contract. Though the Labour government put up some resistance to these policies, during the first six months of the Churchill administration the pace of negotiations accelerated and there was little time to consider any alternative to the course set by the Americans. The focus of attention was on getting a solution which would be accepted and which would work.

Though the British government was now able to re-examine the long term implications of their German policy in a way which had not been possible since

the Americans pressed their 'one package' deal at the New York conference of September 1950, their freedom to act on these conclusions was strictly limited by Eden's determination to press ahead with the EDC. Between May 1952 and April 1953 Eden was scrupulous in his efforts to promote ratification. Though the EDC-contract solution was not regarded as the ideal German policy, none of the alternatives available was regarded as a sufficient improvement to risk its failure. It required the impulsiveness of Churchill to break the logic of this calculation. British support for the European Army was evident both from their attitude to the so-called battle of the notes, which began with the issuing of new Soviet proposals for German reunification on 10 March, and from the decision to ratify those sections of the EDC-contract treaty complex which concerned Britain as quickly as possible.

When the Soviets delivered the first of the four notes to the western powers which they issued during 1952, Eden considered that they might genuinely desire a European settlement and could possibly be persuaded to make concessions on Germany. Though containing the usual Soviet demands for unification and neutralisation, the note dropped their previous advocacy of demilitarisation and suggested that Germany could be allowed armed forces. Eden recognised the propagandist motives behind the note but was not entirely cynical in his attitude. He believed that "it might reflect a sincere desire on their part to make further efforts towards the achievement of a united Germany." He suggested to Franks in Washington that the note indicated "that the Soviet government might now be prepared to pay a bigger price in order to prevent the integration of the Federal Republic in the western world. While we could not regard the price now offered... as in any way satisfactory, we could reasonably regard this development as encouraging."⁹⁴ Neither the Chiefs of Staff nor the Foreign Office shared Eden's hopes for some sort of deal with the Soviets on Germany. Slessor judged that the note was "pure propaganda", while the Foreign Office described it as "primarily a tactical move designed to interfere with present Western defence plans."⁹⁵ Indeed, Eden's senior officials would have been

94. FO 371/97877, C1074/1, FO to Washington, 12 March 1952; CAB 128/24, CC(52)29th mtg., 12 March 1952.

95. DEFE 4/52, COS(52)38th mtg., minute 7, 11 March 1952; FO 371/97879, C1074/52, draft memo from the FO for a meeting with the French and American Ambassadors.

disappointed if the Soviet note had actually marked a change in policy. Strang warned that "the result of a free all-German election would probably be to establish a Schumacher Govt in power... Such a Govt would probably reverse Adenauer's policy of integration with the West and go for a policy of neutrality and manoeuvring between East and West." Eden responded: "Is this really so? Are there not other conditions we could add?" He then elaborated: "My marginal comment simply refers to the possibility that the Soviets really want to pursue this new policy. If they could realise it would it not have important advantages for them."⁹⁶ Thus, Eden was clearly more optimistic than his advisers that the Soviet note represented an opportunity for a deal with the Soviets on Germany.

Eden's views were not shared by the Americans either, and between March and September 1952 the western allies co-ordinated their responses to the Soviet notes in order to gain the maximum propaganda advantage and so facilitate the ratification of the EDC treaty in the European parliaments. The drafting of the replies to the first two Soviet notes was relatively uncontroversial, but the basis of future disagreements became evident at a meeting of Foreign Office officials held on 15 April at which Britain's response to the second of the Soviet notes was considered. Roberts, Strang, Allen and the other participants agreed that the government should "proceed with our present policy of trying to secure the signature and subsequent ratification of the E.D.C. Treaty and the German Contract. We must so handle the Soviet Note as to encourage Germany not only to sign, but also to ratify these agreements." They opposed any four power meeting before the EDC and the contract were signed, but believed such a meeting "will probably be a necessary prelude to ratification in Germany and France. We also have to consider our own public opinion".⁹⁷

Despite the fact that the Foreign Office had absolutely no intention of using the EDC as a bargaining counter at a four power meeting but rather saw talks with the Russians as a means of securing EDC ratification, the apparently more accommodating attitude of the British government led to a clash with the Americans over tactics. The dispute arose immediately after the signing of the EDC, which was the time at which the Foreign Office officials had envisaged a

96. FO 371/97879, C1074/52, Strang minute, 15 March 1952, with marginal note from Eden and additional Eden minute, 16 March 1952.

97. FO 371/97881, C1074/85, Roberts minute of meeting of FO officials, 15 April 1952.

meeting with the Soviets at their April meeting. To Acheson's astonishment Eden supported a French draft reply to the third Soviet note which envisaged talks with the Russians on the subject of free elections in Germany. Acheson told Oliver Franks an early meeting with the Soviets would jeopardise ratification in the United States and Germany, and that "he was baffled by fact that, after thorough discussion with Eden and Schuman in Paris, he had no word from Eden regarding the change in position or the reasons for it."⁹⁸

During the subsequent tripartite discussions the British continued to support the more conciliatory French position, while stressing "that the difference in substance between us and the Americans did not seem so very great. We were both prepared to contemplate a meeting but the American draft so hedged this round with difficulties and questions that the general appearance of the Note was entirely negative."⁹⁹ This was the key point for British policy-makers. They believed that a positive response to the Soviets was essential to facilitate the process of ratification. Roberts declared: "There is undoubtedly a strong although confused feeling throughout Germany against ratification until a last attempt has been made to achieve German unity at a four-Power meeting....it is essential, not only for the Western Powers, but also for the Federal Government, to have a four-Power meeting on Germany this summer, or at all events to be in a position to show very clearly to a sceptical public that the Russians alone are responsible for any failure to hold such a meeting." Franks told Acheson that the reply "must be viewed in broader terms of European opinion".¹⁰⁰

The drafting of the reply to the latest note was one of the few major issues to be the subject of substantive discussions during Acheson's trip to Europe at the end of June. Eden's brief, while advising him to accept the American position in the last resort, stressed that Adenauer, who remained opposed to any meeting, was not representing the general feeling of his own public. Even if he had been, "German opinion....is not the only factor to be taken into account. There is also French, British and European opinion generally. We should have great difficulty

98. FRUS 1952-4, vol.7, Acheson to the Embassy in the UK, 10 June 1952, p.263-4, Acheson to the Embassy in the UK, 12 June 1952, p.267-8; Leffler, *op. cit.*, p.461.

99. *Ibid.*, Editorial Note, p.270; FO 371/97885, C1074/198, Roberts to Strang, 16 June 1952.

100. FRUS 1952-1954, vol.7, Acheson to Embassy in France, 19 June 1952, p.272; FO 371/97757, C1017/386, Roberts to Strang, 21 June 1952.

holding the position until October or later without making some new initiative." The eventual compromise agreed by the three Foreign Ministers on 27 June proposed a meeting to discuss the composition and terms of reference for an electoral commission, with the proviso that all four governments must first accept the principle of free elections as defined by the western powers. The reply was sent on 10 July and was met with six weeks of silence by the Soviets.¹⁰¹

Though the episode caused some bitterness in the American administration, this disagreement was not nearly so serious as the dispute which had occurred during the Palais Rose conference in the spring of 1951. On both occasions the British and French had adopted a more conciliatory attitude to the Soviets on the subject of talks on Germany than the Americans. However, the earlier disagreement reflected a genuine divergence of view on long term policy. The Labour government had hoped that by offering concessions on German rearmament at a four power meeting some kind of general settlement might be achieved, while the Americans did not want a meeting at all. In the summer of 1952 both the Americans and the British had the same object: the ratification of the EDC treaties. London believed that a conciliatory attitude towards the Soviets would encourage ratification, while Washington thought a four power meeting would undermine Adenauer's attempts to get a favourable vote in the Bundestag. The change in the British attitude reflected the much more positive attitude towards German rearmament which had developed after the return of the Conservatives in October 1951.

The British strengthened their reputation as supporters of the EDC by being the first of the European powers to ratify the relevant aspects of the EDC-contract treaty complex on 1 August. The ease with which the Churchill government accomplished this, compared with the almost insuperable difficulties successive French governments encountered was as much the result of the British political system's tendency to invest the incumbent government with overwhelming power as it was of differences in French and British perceptions of EDC. Though

101. FRUS 1952-4, vol.7, Acheson to Department of State, 28 June 1952, p.275-7, draft reply, 27 June 1952, p.279-80; FO 371/97886, C1074/225, brief for Secretary of State's talks with Schuman and Acheson, 26 June 1952; FO 371/97887, C1074/227, record of meeting of Foreign Ministers, 27 June 1952; FO 800/793, records of meetings between Eden and Acheson on 24 June and three Foreign Ministers' Meeting on 27 June 1952.

the French National Assembly had a different, more pressing set of concerns regarding EDC this ought not to obscure the fact that many British MPs had severe reservations about German rearmament as well. On the Conservative side Boothby argued that without British participation the EDC would merely be a vehicle for German domination of the continent. He had written to Eden as early as November 1951 to inform him of advice he had received that the German generals were "waiting in the wings" and that their objective was "the restoration of the lost European provinces". He warned that without American and British participation, the European Army "must sooner or later be directed by a revived German General Staff".¹⁰² Another Conservative back-bencher, Sir Herbert Williams, continued to express the view in private that the Germans remained "potentially dangerous as in the past". Conservative criticism of the EDC in the two day debate which began on 31 July was muted but John Peyton, the MP for Yeovil who had been a prisoner of war in Germany from 1940 to 1945, warned that Adenauer, like Stresemann before him, could be overthrown and his place taken by less responsible men. Speaking of the German character he declared, "their race consciousness is near to the surface and can rise so easily to something which is bordering on mania". The Churchill government was, however, able to take advantage of the loyalty of its back benchers in order to secure ratification.¹⁰³

Moreover, the Labour leadership were unable to rally the opponents of EDC because they were divided amongst themselves. In May the National Executive Committee adopted a motion demanding that a series of conditions be met before Germany should be allowed to rearm, including the holding of free elections. Attlee refused to regard the NEC decision as binding and the eventual Opposition motion merely criticised the decision to proceed with ratification as "inopportune" while the exchange of notes with the Soviet Union was continuing.¹⁰⁴ Though the idea of exploring the possibility of a settlement with

102. Avon Papers, AP 20/50/53, Handwritten copy of a note from Boothby to Eden, 15 December 1951, enclosed in Moir to Eden, 5 July 1966.

103. The Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, vol.504, cols.1809-10; Martin Ceadal, 'British Parties and the European situation 1950-7' in Ennio Di Nolfo (ed.), *Power in Europe II* (Walter de Gruyter, New York, 1992), p.328-9.

104. The Parliamentary Debates, vol.504, col.1752; Kenneth Harris, *Attlee* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1982), p.498-9; Leon D. Epstein, *Britain: Uneasy Ally* (University of Chicago, 1954), p.247-9.

Russia in preference to the rearmament of Germany was attractive to at least one Conservative MP, in general those Tory MPs most concerned about the German defence contribution were anxious that stricter controls should be imposed.¹⁰⁵ They were sceptical about the prospect of talks with the Soviets and the abstainers from the Conservative side were swamped by the large number of Labour MPs who believed the government was merely proceeding with the policy of western rearmament endorsed by Attlee and Bevin when Labour was in office. Crossman, who presented the most cogent arguments against a German defence contribution, declared that the Labour government had been forced to accept German rearmament in principle by American pressure. Bevin he insisted, "was passionately opposed to German rearmament." This speech aroused the ire of the Labour right. Christopher Mayhew, who had worked under Bevin at the Foreign Office, declared: "it is absurd to suggest that if Mr. Bevin were here now to decide this issue he would not decide wholeheartedly to go ahead with contractual arrangements."¹⁰⁶ With this internecine conflict being conducted on the Labour benches, the government could be confident of victory despite the existence of reservations among their own MPs.

While the Foreign Office sought to encourage EDC ratification in order to complete the integration of Germany into the western system, the Chiefs of Staff were engaged in a major review of Britain's strategic priorities. On 17 June they produced a new Global Strategy Paper entitled Defence Policy and Global Strategy which argued for greater reliance on long-range strategic bombing, both as a deterrent and as a war-winning weapon. This shift in policy would take advantage of American atomic superiority and provide a less costly alternative to the build-up of large conventional forces on the continent of Europe. A comparison of the Global Strategy Paper with the plans of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff demonstrates the different force requirements of the two different strategies. The British paper suggested that conventional forces would act as a complementary deterrent which could demonstrate "to the Russians that the Allies are able to make their advance across Europe both slow and difficult - a state of

105. The maverick Conservative was Viscount Hinchinbrooke who described NATO as a "palsied organisation" and warned that the Soviets would meet force with force, "as is the habit of some of the baser animals." See *The Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, vol.505, cols.1911-12.

106. *Ibid*, vol.504, cols.1764-6 and 1786.

affairs which we are now approaching." Presumably the Chiefs regarded the force goals set for the end of 1952 as sufficient. This would entail the creation of a force of 50 divisions and 4,000 aircraft to be ready by M+30. They were themselves no longer prepared to fulfil their force requirements for 1954 as specified in the Lisbon force goals. The Global Strategy Paper envisaged a reduction of three and one third divisions in the British forces earmarked as reinforcements for the central front and a cut of nearly 1,000 in the number of British aircraft to be made available to NATO.¹⁰⁷ When the Chiefs presented their analysis to their American counterparts, without revealing the planned cut in Britain's NATO contribution, they found that, though the Joint Chiefs were prepared to accept the long term need for economies in defence expenditure, they regarded the risk of war in 1954 as too great for the strategy to be implemented immediately.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, the American Chiefs believed the British were overestimating the effectiveness of atomic weapons. Bradley detected "considerable wishful thinking" on this subject.¹⁰⁹ In fact, the American military were planning an increase in the force goals set at Lisbon. On 20 May they presented their proposals for the American submission to the NATO Annual Review. They envisaged the creation of an M+30 force of 118 divisions with an additional 12 brigades in 1954, which should increase to 123 divisions and 10 brigades by the following year.¹¹⁰ Though Acheson insisted these figures were unrealistic and had them reduced during the course of the year, the proposals of the American Chiefs provided a good estimate of the force levels which it was believed would be necessary to make a war-winning conventional strategy effective, and against which the British Chiefs were rebelling.

The American military had always been vigorous in their espousal of German rearmament. Under their plans of May 1952, the Germans would provide

107. CAB 131/12, D(52)26, 17 June 1952.

108. The Chiefs of Staff informed the Defence Committee in September that the Americans "are insistent that every effort should be made to build up the largest possible land and air forces in Europe in the next two years." See CAB 131/12, D(52)41, 29 September 1952, and for Slessor's Report to the Chiefs of Staff on his talks in America, DEFE 4/55, COS(52)114th mtg., minute 2, 12 August 1952; DEFE 5/41, COS(52)443, 18 August 1952.

109. Walter S. Poole, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff : The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1950-1952*, vol.4, (Michael Glazier, Wilmington, 1980), p.309.

110. Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1946-53 (A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America), pt.2, reel 7, JCS 2073/352, 20 May 1952; FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, Acheson to Secretary of Defence (Lovett), 19 June 1952, p.302-7; Poole, op. cit., p.300-306.

6 divisions by the end of 1953 and 12 by the end of 1954. Though this was a somewhat optimistic estimate of the likely delay in rearming the Germans, ostensibly the British Chiefs' position was the same as their American counterparts. The Global Strategy Paper stated: "We are in full agreement with the present allied policy and plans for integrating German armed forces with those of the Allies and these should be vigorously pursued. Indeed for the present we can see no satisfactory alternative to doing so." The rearmament of Germany would be a part of the limited build-up of conventional strength which was "essential to prevent the characteristic Russian tactics of confronting the West with local faits accomplis, to discourage the Western Communists, and to restore confidence along the frontiers of the Free World by a demonstration on the spot of Western strength."¹¹¹ Looking at the long term prospects for western defence, however, the Chiefs returned to a subject which they had stressed in the period prior to the Korean War, when they had not envisaged making a major effort to defend the continent using conventional forces. This subject was German reunification. In November 1949 the Chiefs had advocated reunification in order to achieve a reduction in tension in central Europe. The new Germany would be friendly to the West and would be allowed armed forces to protect itself, but NATO forces would be withdrawn west of the Rhine. This policy would remove "a permanent source of friction" between the West and the Soviet Union and, with the Soviets withdrawing from East Germany, would rectify the "unsound" position of Berlin.¹¹² The Global Strategy Paper took up this argument again. It stated that "a unified Germany could only be established independent of the defence orbit either of Russia or the West. In the long term we consider that there might be a definite military advantage in such a position. The present division of Germany and the precarious position of Berlin are bound to be sources of friction and possible causes of war." The Chiefs argued, as they had in November 1949, that it would be better for the West if the initiative for reunification came from their side, as whoever made the first move would gain German good will. The Joint Planning Staff recommended that the Foreign Office should make a study of the reunification of Germany in light of the Chiefs'

111. CAB 131/12, D(52)26, 17 June 1952.

112. DEFE 4/26, COS(49)166th mtg., minute 1, 9 November 1949; FO 371/76386, W6137, FO to Paris, 9 November 1949.

analysis. However, these revolutionary proposals were not transmitted to the Americans.¹¹³

The Chiefs did not directly link the subject of German reunification with their new strategic concept but it is difficult to believe that their renewed interest in the subject was not connected to the reduced emphasis they now placed on the role of conventional forces. In November 1949, though notionally committed to the defence of the Rhine, the Chiefs did not believe a defence of the European continent was possible, and a policy of disengagement in central Europe resulting in the creation of an armed but neutral Germany was therefore attractive. During the course of 1950 the importance of a German contribution to western defence increased as the Chiefs became enamoured of the idea of conducting a conventional defence of the continent. With the creation in June 1952 of a new strategic concept based on the notion of conducting a fighting withdrawal in western Europe in conjunction with a massive air attack on the Soviet Union, German reunification could be put back on the agenda. Though the Chiefs continued to advocate a German contribution to western defence it was clear that they no longer regarded this as essential in the long term.

The effects of a German defence contribution also had to be considered when the costs of implementing the Global Strategy Paper were assessed. The total cost of the three year programme was initially estimated at £5,483 million, but the Cabinet agreed that the Ministry of Defence should find means of economising and by September this figure had been reduced to £5,286 million. It was emphasised by the Chiefs of Staff that during the three year period there would be a number of new demands on defence expenditure amounting to £420 million. The principle increase in expenditure would result from the gradual assumption by the Ministry of Defence of the whole of the occupation budget for the forces in Germany, which would entail charges of £245 million.¹¹⁴ Initially the Ministry of Defence had set a figure of £112 million for annual occupation costs and the lower three year total was only achieved by planning a policy of retrenchment in the occupation budget including savings from the purchase of equipment and stores in the United Kingdom, reductions in labour costs and

113. CAB 131/12, D(52)26, 17 June 1952; DEFE 6/21, JP(52)75(Final), 17 July 1952.

114. CAB 128/25, CC(52) 72nd mtg., minute 5, 23 July 1952; CAB 131/12, D(52)41, 29 September 1952.

economies resulting from a less ambitious programme for the 2nd Tactical Air Force stationed in Germany.¹¹⁵

It was the date at which rearmament was to begin, combined with the amount which the Americans and Germans would be willing to contribute for the support of British forces after this date, which were the crucial factors in assessing the costs of German rearmament to Britain. The Ministry of Defence assumed that the start of the German defence build-up would be delayed for at least a year, and that this would produce a saving of £10 million. However, it was the Treasury which produced the very optimistic analysis which was to be the basis for future planning. They estimated that once the surplus from the previous year was taken into account, expenditure in Germany in the nine months of the financial year remaining after July 1953 would be only £60 million. The Germans would contribute £30 million, leaving the Treasury with only £30 million to pay. Once the programme of economies was implemented, they calculated that annual costs could be reduced to £70 million in all subsequent years and that either the Americans or the Germans would pay half of this amount. On this basis the Treasury were willing to provide £30 million in 1953-4 and £35 million for the two following years. It was by these ingenious, if unrealistic, calculations that the Treasury reduced the cost of the occupation over three years from £245 million to £100 million.¹¹⁶ The assumptions used in effecting this notional reduction were highly questionable, but this was all the additional expenditure Butler would allow. He had initially argued in favour of maintaining the current level of defence expenditure which was £1,462 million, but eventually proposed a higher ceiling of £1,550 million against the Ministry of Defence claim for £1,645 million. The bitter opposition of the Chiefs persuaded Ministers to reject the Treasury figure. On 7 November 1952 the Cabinet agreed to a figure of £1,610 million, on condition that a radical review of defence expenditure be undertaken.¹¹⁷ As will be seen in

115. CAB 131/12, D(52)34, 14 July 1952; CAB 134/762, AOC(52)18th mtg., 28 July 1952; DEFE 4/55, COS(52)91st mtg., minute 9, 26 June 1952, COS(52)94th mtg., minute 1, 1 July 1952; T 225/162, annex to MISC/P(52)11, 26 June 1952, MISC/M(52)47, 4 July 1952.

116. CAB 129/55, C(52)316, 3 October 1952 and C(52)320, 3 October 1952; CAB 131/12, D(52)34, 14 July 1952; DEFE 7/677, Treasury to Powell (MOD), 27 August 1952.

117. CAB 128/25, CC(52)94th mtg., 7 November 1952; CAB 129/55, C(52)316, 3 October 1952 and C(52)320, 3 October 1952; CAB 129/56, C(52)393, 5 November 1952, C(52)394, 6 November 1952; CAB 130/77, GEN 411/7th mtg., 21 July 1952, GEN 411/19, 16 July 1952, GEN 411/20, 16 July 1952; CAB 131/12, D(52)9th mtg., minute 2, 16 July 1952, D(52)11th mtg., 5 November 1952; D(52)41, 29 September 1952 and D(52)45, 31 October 1952. The figure for defence expenditure

the next chapter, Butler's economy drive was to have important consequences for the British military's attitude towards German rearmament.

The British government's inability to agree a figure for defence expenditure for 1953-4 was to a large extent responsible for the delay in completing the first of the NATO Annual Reviews.¹¹⁸ The postponement of this exercise, the perfunctory nature of the exchange of notes with the Soviets and the meandering progress of the Interim Committee of the EDC made the second half of 1952 the quietest period in international diplomacy since the Cold War began. Without any overt Soviet challenge to the status quo and with the Truman administration on its last legs these were arid months for the cause of western unity. This state of inertia was reflected in the agonisingly slow progress of EDC ratification.

On 17 June 1952 Eden told the Cabinet that he hoped the EDC treaty would be ratified by the end of the year. At the same time he issued a prescient warning. If the German Supreme Court, whose task was to assess whether proposed legislation conflicted with the constitution, or Basic Law, decided that the EDC and the contract did require changes to the Basic Law, then Adenauer would be required to obtain a two thirds majority in the German parliament, which he could not command. A week earlier, the Federal President, Heuss, had requested that the Court give a ruling on the constitutionality of the treaties. The Court was already considering an earlier complaint by the SPD on the same subject and its deliberations were prolonged. By November the indications were that the ruling would go against Adenauer. The following month he postponed the third reading of the legislation in the Bundestag and persuaded Heuss to withdraw his request for a ruling from the Court. Meanwhile in France the Pinay government refused to submit the treaties to the National Assembly.¹¹⁹

On 6 November Kirkpatrick wrote to Roberts to warn of the possibility of an adverse judgement by the German Supreme Court on the constitutionality of

in 1953-4 which had initially been set by the Ministry of Defence was £1759 million. The reduction to £1645 million occurred in two stages and included the Treasury inspired cut in German costs to £30 million.

118. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, US North Atlantic Council Representative (Draper) to the State Department, 6 November 1952, p.339-40.

119. CAB 128/25, C(52)60th mtg., minute 3, 17 June 1952; Dennis L. Bork and David R. Gress, *From Shadow to Substance: A History of West Germany*, vol.1, (2nd edition, Blackwell, Oxford, 1989, 1993), p.316-17; Jacques Fauvet, 'Birth and Death of a Treaty' in Lerner and Aron (eds.), *op. cit.*, p.133-5; Fursdon, *op.cit.*, p.205-7.

the EDC and to suggest that the Foreign Office ought to begin considering what policy to adopt should the EDC fail. He was very pessimistic about the prospects of gaining a new agreement with the Germans before the Federal elections in a years time and predicted that the collapse of the EDC, should it occur, would result in "a complete shake-up and turn-round in German politics." The Foreign Office had always regarded the establishment of contractual relations as the first priority and they continued to do so. Allen and Roberts believed that it would be impossible to delay this until the next Federal election. They explained: "we are no longer capable of running Germany on a full Occupation basis for much longer. It is therefore going to be necessary to find some means of bringing into force without too much delay, a new political relationship with the Germans, with or without a defence contribution." Roberts was still convinced that a Four Power meeting, as the British had advocated during the battle of the notes, would be useful in persuading the waverers to support the EDC.¹²⁰

Kirkpatrick believed that German membership of NATO was the only feasible alternative to EDC but he argued that there should be no immediate concessions to the Germans if EDC failed. Instead the promise to end the occupation should be used as a bargaining counter in negotiations.¹²¹ The main work on alternatives to EDC was done by the Foreign Office's Western Organisations department. On 2 December Lord Hood, the head of the department, sent the latest draft of the Foreign Office's contingency plan to the Chiefs of Staff. The crux of the problem was that a German defence contribution "must be based upon the principles of equality of treatment for Germany but also provide safeguards without which German rearmament will not be acceptable to public opinion, in particular to the French." The proposed solution was German membership of a reconstituted NATO, which would include elements of the EDC structure. Thus the continental powers would be required not to keep any armed forces outside the NATO structure without the authority of the North Atlantic Council or some other international body, and arms production in Germany would be restricted by its designation as a strategically exposed area. In order to bind German forces tightly into the Atlantic framework there would be an 'Atlantic

120. FO 371/97764, C1017/529, Kirkpatrick to Roberts, 6 November 1952, Allen minute, 10 November 1952 and Roberts minute, 11 November 1952.

121. FO 371/97765, C1017/540, Kirkpatrick to Roberts, 17 November 1952.

Force' constituting the armies of the continental powers and American and British forces on the European mainland, which would be more closely integrated than was currently the case. The main doubt for the Western Department planners was the feasibility of the project, and they warned that the British and Americans might have to make far-reaching concessions to achieve a solution along these lines. However, they also saw many benefits in the proposals, including the chance to reform NATO and the fact that "in NATO the United Kingdom is in a better position to influence the development of German policy than in the EDC." This last point was a controversial one as many of those who were concerned about the prospect of German rearmament had only been persuaded to accept it on the basis that the EDC provided the best means of controlling the process. A week before Hood's paper was sent to the Chiefs they had their own discussion of the possible alternatives to EDC with the Foreign Office representatives, Frank Roberts and Pierson Dixon. The Chiefs "emphasized that our first consideration must be to do everything possible to encourage the ratification of the EDC Treaty by both Germany and France". When Roberts suggested that "Probably Germany could be better controlled as a member of NATO than as a member of the EDC", the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, Sir Guy Grantham, dissented. He "feared that, once Germany had been admitted as a member of NATO, it would quickly be found that she was the only nation which could provide additional forces to fill the inevitable gap in Western defence, she might therefore be allowed to expand her forces for this purpose until she became more powerful than France."¹²²

When Eden presented the case for German membership of NATO as a provisional alternative to EDC to the Cabinet on 10 December, he stressed that in the immediate future Britain would give full support to the EDC and "actively discourage any suggestion that alternative plans might be considered." Beyond giving encouragement, however, there were few positive steps which Britain could take to facilitate ratification. The most effective concession would be to offer a permanent commitment of forces to the continent, but this would be "the first step on a slippery slope, to which there might be no end....Any commitment of ground or air forces to the EDC would result in a loss of flexibility in our plans for

122. DEFE 4/57, COS(52)160th mtg., minute 1, 24 November 1952; DEFE 5/43, COS(52)658, 4 December 1952.

defence, both militarily and economically." Thus the solution which Eden adopted two years later was rejected at this stage. He was willing, however, to offer the continental powers institutional links through the EDC Council of Ministers, the EDC Assembly and the Board of Commissioners. When the alternatives to EDC were considered, Eden was emphatic that a NATO solution was the only option and that there was "no half-way house between the EDC arrangements....and full German membership of NATO." He then outlined the past objections to the proposal including German untrustworthiness, the fear of Soviet reactions, the Germans' claim to territory east of the Oder-Neisse line and finally, French opposition. It is indicative of the changed attitudes of the government that the first two factors were now regarded as less important than previously. The issue of the Oder-Neisse line was still seen as a serious problem, and indeed three months later there was a brief scare that Adenauer was seeking to revive the issue of irredentism, but it was hoped that this problem and that of French obstruction could be overcome by imposing safeguards such as public guarantees of current frontiers, an increase in SACEUR's powers and restrictions on German arms production. Eden was still committed to the May 1952 treaties and to the policy of German rearmament. However, the Foreign Office were now prepared to consider alternative policies should EDC fail. They even discussed the possibility of using the Brussels Treaty as a framework for German rearmament, an idea for which Eden was to claim credit two years later.¹²³

When Eden met Auriol on 16 December, the French President greeted him with a full exposition of French grievances against Germany, as was his habit when meeting foreign statesmen. Eden told him that he "shared his mistrust of the German character but the only solution....was to hold on to the Western part of Germany and bring it into our system." His purpose was to persuade Auriol to try and hasten EDC ratification. He went on, "The Russians had already begun rearming the Germans in the East and the only safe way to prevent the whole of

123. CAB 129/57, C(52)434, 10 December 1952. The commotion over German claims to territory beyond the Oder-Neisse line was the result of a press conference given by Adenauer at which it was incorrectly reported that the Chancellor had stated that he and Dulles had agreed that German reunification would include the territories east of the line. See FO371/103714, C1013/2, Hall minute, 18 March 1953. Frank Roberts claims that he and Christopher Steele devised the contingency plan. See Frank Roberts, *Dealing with Dictators* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1991), p.158-9.

Germany from moving over to the East was by the policy of the Atlantic Pact and the EDC....Surely if Britain and France stood together combined, they were more than strong enough to refuse to be drawn into German irredentist policies."¹²⁴

It was the changes to both the French and American governments in January 1953, combined with Adenauer's victory over the Supreme Court in Germany, rather than any initiative on behalf of the British, which gave EDC renewed impetus. Acheson had made little effort to promote EDC during his last months in office and it soon became clear that the new Republican administration would be much more tenacious in its efforts to promote ratification.¹²⁵ As noted previously, Eisenhower was converted to the cause of a European Army in the summer of 1951 while serving as NATO Supreme Commander and subsequently became one of its most passionate advocates. In his first State of the Union address he called for a "more closely integrated economic and political system in Europe" and argued that EDC was the most effective spur to this process. Walter Lippman provided a graphic picture of the commitment of Eisenhower's Secretary of State to the European Army when he declared: "Foster Dulles's real feeling about EDC is that of a man who sat down on a flypaper and can't think of what to do next."¹²⁶ In France the new Prime Minister, Rene Mayer, was also a supporter of EDC and at last took the decision to begin the process of ratification. However, the changes in the French government were not all satisfactory to advocates of the EDC. Mayer's Foreign Minister, Bidault, was a captious successor to the accommodating Schuman. The new coalition was dependent on the Gaullist RPF for support, and at their insistence, Mayer agreed to re-open negotiations on a number of controversial aspects of the EDC treaty.¹²⁷

As well as these international pressures Eden had to deal with internal opposition to his policy from a junior and the most senior member of the Cabinet. On 4 December 1952, while Eden was briefing Commonwealth Prime Ministers

124. FO 800/793, conversation between Eden and Auriol, 16 December 1952.

125. Pascaline Winand, *Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe* (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1993) p.33-7.

126. Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: The President 1952-69*, vol.2, (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1984), p.49; Schwartz, *op.cit.*, p.280-81; Richard J. Barnet, *The Allies: America, Europe, Japan Since the War* (Jonathan Cape, London, 1984), p.162.

127. Jacques Fauvet, 'Birth and Death of a Treaty', in Aron and Lerner (eds.), *op.cit.*, p.137-9.

at a special Cabinet meeting, Churchill interrupted to declare that "he would not be unduly disturbed if the present plans for a European Defence Community were not carried into effect....he doubted whether the soldier in the line would fight with the same ardour for an international institution as he would for his home and his country." A month later on a visit to the United States prior to the inauguration, the Prime Minister told Eisenhower that he still regarded EDC as a "sludgy amalgam" which would be much less effective than separate national armies. Evidently Churchill was in one of his most cantankerous moods during the visit and Eisenhower concluded that he ought to resign.¹²⁸

Eden was, however, able to re-assert official policy during Dulles's trip to Europe. On 1 February Dulles met with the main American ambassadors to western Europe in order to express his determination to make EDC a success. Holmes, the American chargé in London, told him "that British opinion particularly that of Eden, had changed much in the last eighteen months....they no longer oppose and, in fact, are prepared to actively support EDC." Though he stated that the Prime Minister was unenthusiastic about the project, he added that "Churchill stood alone among the British in this position, and that the Prime Minister would complain but in the last analysis would not actively oppose." Dulles met Eden on 5 February and was impressed with the measures for military and institutional association outlined by Eden and Alexander. He told Eisenhower that in his meetings with British officials they "developed unity of purpose re EDC which the government now clearly accepts as indispensable." Churchill followed up the success of this meeting with a letter on 9 February stating "you can rely upon us to continue to give every support and encouragement to this great undertaking".¹²⁹

Though Dulles may have been convinced of this, the French were not. Mayer was now demanding that a number of protocols should be added to the

128. John Colville, *The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries 1939-1955* (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1985), p.663; Louis Galambos, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: NATO and the Campaign of 1952*, vol.13, diary entry, 6 January 1953, p.1481-3; CAB 128/25, CC(52)102nd mtg., 4 December 1952.

129. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, memo of a conversation between Dulles and US Representatives in Europe, 1 February 1953, p.1555-6, Acting US High Commissioner (Reber) to the State Department, 5 February 1953, p.1565 and Secretary of State to the President, 5 February 1953; Peter G. Boyle (ed.), *The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence* (University of North Carolina Press, 1990), Churchill to Eisenhower, 9 February 1953, p.23.

EDC treaty in order to provide the French with a greater degree of independence from the supra-national EDC authorities. In addition he wanted the British to provide tangible evidence of their support for the European Army by giving a commitment to retain troops on the continent. In return for this Britain would be allowed a voice in each of the three main EDC institutions: the Council of Ministers, the EDC Assembly and the Board of Commissioners. Eden was somewhat shocked to discover that the concessions he had been considering offering to the French were now being offered to him by the Mayer government as an inducement to commit troops to the continent. He told the Cabinet: "It is absurd that they should expect us to pay a price for what is really a concession on our part." Regardless of who was doing the conceding, Eden was not prepared to offer a guarantee of British force levels on the continent. Though the French had offered to include an escape clause in any agreement, which would allow Britain to withdraw troops during an overseas crisis, Eden rejected this on the grounds that it would be impossible to invoke the clause without incurring the opprobrium of Britain's European allies. Thus another aspect of the eventual settlement was rejected at this stage. All Eden was prepared to offer was an agreement on military and political association with EDC and the promise of talks with the Americans to discuss the possibility of extending the North Atlantic Treaty to make it coterminus with the EDC treaty. He rejected the idea of consultations with the continental powers on British troop levels as an "additional vague and unnecessary commitment".¹³⁰

During the subsequent negotiations with the French, Eden received strong support from the Americans, who were inclined to blame Paris for the continuing delays.¹³¹ However, at least one member of the British government objected to any further concessions to the French at all. Despite his lowly position as Housing Minister, Macmillan prepared his own paper for the Cabinet on the subject of the EDC, which he regarded as a vehicle for German dominance of the continent. Among those who were still concerned about the German threat there

130. CAB 129/59, C(53)73, 21 February 1953, with French and British proposals at annex; Anthony Nutting, *Europe Will Not Wait* (Hollis and Carter, London, 1960), p.48.

131. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, memo from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) to Dulles, 4 March 1953, p.745-8; minutes of Eden-Dulles Talks 1953, p.749-52, Chargé in France (Achilles) to State Department, 6 March 1953, p.753.

was a vast array of views on how best to contain it. Thus whereas Grantham saw German membership of NATO as a more dangerous policy than EDC, Macmillan believed the exact reverse. Discussing the prospect of a six power federal Europe, he asked: "Will not Germany ultimately control this State, and may we not have created the very situation in Europe to prevent which, in every century, since the Elizabethan age, we have fought long and bitter wars?" Unlike Sir John Slessor, who also regarded German dominance as a threat to the future of EDC, Macmillan did not regard British involvement in the Community as an effective palliative. Any further concessions would only be followed by demands for yet more. He believed EDC should be allowed to fail. Once it did, "then will be the opportunity for us should we wish to seize it." Eden brushed aside Macmillan's challenge, declaring loftily that "there was no occasion at present for the United Kingdom Government to reconsider their present policy of working for early ratification of the Treaty as the quickest method of obtaining a German contribution towards the defence of Western Europe." Despite claiming that he had made no further concessions, Eden proposed to instruct Britain's observer at the EDC Interim Commission to inform the French "that apart from consultation in the NATO we shall be willing to consult with the EDC about our level of forces."¹³²

While Mayer succeeded in persuading the other EDC powers to accept a number of additional protocols to the treaty as 'interpretative texts' at the Rome conference of 24-25 February, it was clear that the French position was weakening just as Adenauer's was becoming stronger. Thus proposals for an increase in the size of the German frontier police and for discussions with NATO on the future deployment of German forces were greeted with enthusiasm by the Anglo-Saxon powers. Churchill commented on this second proposal: "I like it all. Two if not three years have been lost through French obstruction."¹³³ Domestically, Adenauer's position was bolstered by the Bundestag's ratification of the EDC and the contract on 19 March. Ratification by the upper house or Bundesrat posed a

132. CAB 128/26, CC(53)23rd mtg., minute 10, 26 March 1953; CAB 129/60, C(53)108, 19 March 1953, C(53)111, 23 March 1953; Harold Macmillan *op.cit.*, p.477-8.

133. FO 371/103658, C1015/2, Roberts to Strang, 25 February 1953; FO 800/794, Eden to Churchill, 23 February 1953 and Churchill minute, 25 February 1953; DEFE 5/44, COS(53)81, 9 February 1953.

new set of problems, but on 15 May this obstacle too was surmounted. The efforts Adenauer made to secure ratification ensured him a cordial reception when he made his first trip to the United States in April.¹³⁴

Though Adenauer's increasing national and international authority had its advantages, there was concern in Britain that the Federal Republic's position was becoming too strong, in particular with regard to the negotiations on the German financial contribution to western defence. The current financial arrangements for the payment of occupation costs were proving advantageous to the British. In April 1952 the Allied High Commission had agreed that Britain should receive DM214 million a month from the total German contribution of DM600 million and this arrangement was renewed in November.¹³⁵ Due to reductions in the occupation budget and the seasonal nature of capital construction projects, it was agreed that the British could reduce their bid for early 1953 to DM203.5 million a month. However, this figure was still DM90.5 million more than the services expected to spend and the main interest of the British government was to obtain an agreement to allow the unspent contributions to be put into suspense accounts and used in later months.¹³⁶ At the end of March 1953 Schaeffer accepted the idea of the so-called carry-over and promised to continue paying DM600 million a month up to the end of the occupation. The latest agreement on the division of this figure gave the British between DM202 million and DM209 million a month depending upon whether the Germans or the Allies financed NATO infrastructure costs.¹³⁷

Though these arrangements secured Britain's financial position during the occupation period, it was clear that it would be endangered during the contractual period. Once the EDC came into force the German contribution would take two forms. They were to contribute a sum to the EDC to pay for the costs of their own rearmament whilst also continuing to pay a proportion of the costs of Allied forces in Germany. By early 1953 it was evident that the arrangement worked out in May 1952 for the 1952-3 period was redundant and that a new agreement

134. Bork and Gress, *op.cit.*, p.318-9.

135. T225/403, Kirkpatrick to FO, 23 October 1952, March to Allen, 4 November 1952.

136. T 225/404, FO to UK High Commission, 8 January 1953; T 225/405, Kirkpatrick to FO, 11 January 1953, FO to UK High Commission, 16 January 1953.

137 T225/407, Kirkpatrick to FO, 25 March, 2 April and 9 April.

covering the 1953-4 year would be required. In March Eden warned the Cabinet that the Germans were in a much stronger position in these negotiations than they had been the previous year. However, he hoped that an agreement would be reached by the time of the North Atlantic Council meeting in April. The outcome would be crucial to Britain's future economic situation. The Cabinet were warned that if Germany would not meet British costs in the first half of 1954, this "would hit our economy at its most vulnerable point, its balance of payments, and so oblige us to reconsider our defence programme."¹³⁸ Eden hoped to gain American support for a major German contribution to Allied costs after the implementation of the contract. The Treasury supported these tactics, though they were disappointed that the Foreign Office would not consider using the threat of troop withdrawals to strengthen the Allied case. Their aim was to gain an extension of the May 1952 agreement which would effectively secure the British financial position.¹³⁹ In April 1953 the Foreign Office submitted a slightly reduced bid of DM475 million a month for six months and DM300 million for the next three. However, the Germans presented proposals for a sliding scale which would give the Allies a smaller overall share of the total German contribution and reduce the Allied share to DM175 million within seven months of ratification. Eden was again forced to compromise. At the Paris North Atlantic Council meeting the post-ratification defence contribution of the Federal Republic was set at DM950 million a month. The American, British and French forces would receive DM400 million for the first six months, DM300 million for the following two months and, assuming ratification occurred by 1 October, DM200 million in the ninth month.¹⁴⁰

It was Washington's support for the EDC which played the crucial role in persuading the British to accept the European Army and in maintaining their support for it. Within the British government there were those, like Macmillan

138. CAB 128/26, CC(53)23rd mtg., minute 3, 26 March 1953; CAB 129/60, C(53)112, 23 March 1953.

139. T 225/427, Humphrey-Davies minute on C(53)112, 25 March 1953; CAB 134/1046, MAC(G)(53)1st mtg., 2 February 1953, MAC(G)(53)5, Treasury note, 4 February 1953.

140. CAB 134/1046, MAC(G)(53)12th mtg., 18 April 1953; T 225/408, FO to Permanent UK Delegation (Paris), 18 April 1953, Permanent UK Delegation (Paris) to FO, 20 April 1953, Crawford to France, 23 April 1953, Permanent UK Delegation (Paris) to FO, 25 April 1953; FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, US Delegation to the North Atlantic Council to the State Department, 25 April 1953, p.389.

and Jebb, who saw EDC as a vehicle for German domination of the Continent and those, like Eden and Strang, who were persuaded to acquiesce in German rearmament because the integration of German armed forces into a supra-national organisation appeared to lessen these dangers, but these disagreements were insignificant compared with the danger of destroying the international consensus in favour of EDC which had been so painstakingly constructed during the course of 1951. Both during the EDC-contract negotiations in the winter of 1951-2 and the subsequent ratification controversies, Eden guided the Cabinet towards a policy of concessions. Whereas in the autumn of 1950 Bevin had regarded the European Army as a threat to Atlantic unity, from the return of the Conservatives in October 1951, its achievement was seen as essential to the success of the western cause. The Treasury arguments for a delay in German rearmament or for the consideration of troop withdrawals from West Germany were rejected on the grounds that they would have adverse diplomatic consequences. Similarly, the suggestion in the Global Strategy Paper that there was a military case for a unified Germany outside the western alliance was never seriously considered. Subsequently Dickson replaced Slessor as Chief of the Air Staff and Harding succeeded Slim as Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the agenda of the military reverted to arguing the case for German rearmament but with a new rationale. The idea of reunification as a long term solution to the German problem was not attractive to the Foreign Office. They were prepared to examine alternatives to the EDC in case it should fail, but these contingency plans were still based on the notion of integrating German armed forces into the western defence system. The schemes which they had considered in the winter of 1952-3 were to prove useful when EDC finally did collapse, but it is noticeable that many of the ideas which were adopted in 1954 were rejected as impractical or inexpedient in this earlier period.

CHAPTER 4

GERMAN REARMAMENT RECONSIDERED

There was plentiful justification for a re-examination of both the diplomatic and military cases for a German contribution to western defence during the course of 1953. On the political front, Stalin's death, followed by the subsequent relaxation in Soviet policy, combined with perpetual French quibbling over the form of EDC, raised questions both about the necessity and the feasibility of current western policy. In terms of military strategy, the overhaul of British and later American policy in favour of smaller conventional forces designed to maintain an effective deterrent to the Soviet Union over the long haul called at least for a re-think of the nature of the German contribution. However, while Churchill provided a singular critique of the diplomatic case for the Federal Republic's incorporation into the western defence system, no attempt was made to re-assess that country's future military role in the light of new strategic developments. This chapter will describe the course of Churchill's efforts to secure a change in policy and the effects of his failure, while examining the reasons why no similar debate took place on the subject of the strategic role of German armed forces. It will show that, despite all the attention which has been devoted to it, Churchill's initiative left the situation fundamentally unchanged and that by the time of the Bermuda conference Britain's foreign policy priority had reverted, under the guidance of Salisbury and Eden, to the ratification of the EDC treaty.

Until the death of Stalin Churchill had taken relatively little interest in the development of his administration's German policy and instead devoted much of his limited energy to criticising Eden's plans to withdraw from Egypt. His interventions in European policy were restricted to complaints about the inferiority of the European Defence Community in comparison with a coalition of national armies. From April 1953, however, the securing of an 'easement' in relations with the Soviet Union became his overriding priority.¹ In order to secure this rapprochement he was prepared to offer the Soviets the prize of German neutralisation. This was completely at odds with current British policy and provoked a violent reaction from the Foreign Office. Though the extent of the

1. John W. Young, 'Cold War and Detente With Moscow' in John W. Young (ed.), *The Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peace-Time Administration* (Leicester University Press, 1988).

reversal being contemplated by the Prime Minister was kept secret, both Eisenhower and Adenauer had justifiable concerns about what sort of deal Churchill was contemplating. Adenauer, in particular, regarded Churchill as completely unreliable. Though the strength of the opposition within the government to Churchill's ideas forced him to abandon the notion of overturning German policy in order to appease the Soviets, the episode was only one indication of a general and widespread concern in Britain about developments on the continent. The continued state of paralysis in France and the alarmingly rapid recovery of the Federal Republic combined to create a sense of unease in the United Kingdom and even among some American officials.

In the context of the changed emphasis in western strategy which developed during 1953, it would have been legitimate to ask whether a German defence contribution of the size agreed in the aftermath of the Korean War was still essential. In fact this question was never put, and no attempt was made to examine what sort of contribution Germany should make if the planned build-up in conventional forces was to be overturned in favour of a strategy based on smaller conventional forces and the use of atomic weapons as the British Chiefs advocated. Both the British and American military continued to insist that a German contribution was a necessity without making any effort to re-define its function now that the Lisbon force goals were redundant. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir John Harding, was particularly persistent in his calls for a German contribution. At a time when the Chiefs were unable to meet the targets set by NATO and were under severe Treasury pressure to restrict defence expenditure still further, it was convenient for them to advocate the assumption by Germany of a greater responsibility for continental defence. Indeed, they displayed an increasing tendency to subordinate military to economic considerations in their discussions of NATO strategy. They opposed the setting of long term force goals in order to allow NATO's defence forces to stabilise at a level which could be sustained by the European economies. The role of conventional forces was to be downgraded, but no effort was made to calculate the force levels required for this new approach and the planned reinforcement of NATO by German units was regarded as a good thing in itself. It provided either the only means of increasing conventional capabilities or, if the continental

countries reduced their defence effort, a means of compensating for future reductions in NATO forces.

Churchill, though he was acutely conscious of the revolutionary nature of the hydrogen bomb, did not link the case for German neutralisation to any new strategic analysis. His motivation was purely diplomatic. The Russians would have to be offered something if a deal was to be struck and a change in German policy was the most obvious, and to Churchill the most appealing, concession. Following Churchill's stroke, the hawkish figure of Robert Cecil, 5th Marquis of Salisbury, was able to reassert the conventional Foreign Office line as, in the absence of Eden, he took up responsibility for the government's foreign policy. As the Labour Party pointed out, this policy precluded any deal with the Soviets as it required the incorporation of the whole of Germany into the western system as the price the Soviets must pay for an agreement on reunification. The exchange of notes with Moscow which followed the Washington conference, or 'Little Bermuda', was largely an exercise in propaganda on both sides, as the Prime Minister himself pointed out. Churchill's stroke was a significant moment in the history of Britain's attitude towards a German defence contribution because from that moment the EDC sceptics within the government lost the initiative they had gained following Churchill's May speech. During his convalescence Churchill became persuaded that, as there would clearly be a long delay before he could attend a summit, it was best to support the early ratification of EDC in order to facilitate the subsequent holding of a high level meeting.

Until Churchill's dramatic speech to the House of Commons on 11 May, the NATO powers had responded cautiously to the new Soviet leadership's 'peace offensive'. Though Eisenhower's speech of 16 April received a rapturous press response, the pre-conditions he outlined for an improvement in relations with the Soviets were quite unrealistic. This was a relief to Dulles who had opposed the idea from the outset. He told the Paris North Atlantic Council meeting in April that as long as a Soviet threat existed "we must match Soviet unity imposed by force with equal unity". Ratification of EDC was "now within our grasp. We must act rapidly since it is the principal missing ingredient to real strength and

security."² Though the Council approved a shift towards qualitative improvement and away from quantitative expansion, this was the result of a greater stress on economic feasibility which had been developing for a year before Stalin's death.

The response of the British government was more ambiguous. In correspondence with Churchill, Eisenhower must have gained the impression that the British Prime Minister saw the Far East, rather than Germany, as the most likely region in which there was a possibility of a reduction in tensions. On 5 April Churchill wrote: "We think....that we ought to leave no chance of finding out how far the Malenkov regime are prepared to go in easing things up all round. There seems certainly to be great possibilities in Korea and we are glad of the steps you have taken to resume truce negotiations." Later that month Selwyn Lloyd told Dulles "that Mr. Churchill felt strongly that this was not appropriate time to give any indication of easing up on part of western powers as result of Soviet tactics."³ However, with his attention now focused on the problem of East-West relations, Churchill was quick to detect what he regarded as a softening of Moscow's attitude.⁴ In another letter to Eisenhower on 12 April he spoke of "the Soviet change of attitude and policy", and asked "Would it not be well to combine the reassertions of your and our inflexible resolve with some balancing expression of hope that we have entered upon a new era? A new hope has, I feel, been created in the unhappy, bewildered world." Ten days later, Churchill was arguing that the Soviets would never accept a unified Korea and that the three heads of government ought to resume the negotiations which had ended in 1945.⁵ On 28 April he told a sceptical Cabinet that he wanted to call a summit at which the three leaders could "take up the discussion at the point at which it had been left at the end of the Potsdam Conference."⁶ The reference to Potsdam is significant

2. Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: The President*, vol. II, (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1984), p.94-5; Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (Little Brown, Boston, 1973), p.172-3; Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-4, vol.5, US Delegation to the North Atlantic Council to the State Department, 24 April 1953, p.375.

3. Peter G. Boyle (ed.), *The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence* (University of North Carolina Press, 1990), Churchill to Eisenhower, 5 April 1953, p.36; CAB 128/26, CC(53)26th mtg., minute 6, 21 April 1953; FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the State Department, 23 April 1953, p.372-3.

4. John W. Young, op. cit., p.59.

5. Peter G. Boyle (ed.), op. cit., Churchill to Eisenhower, 12 April 1953, p.43, and Churchill to Eisenhower, 22 April 1953, p.46.

6. CAB 128/26, CC(53)29th mtg., minute 1, 28 April 1953.

because at that conference it was agreed to maintain Four Power control of a united Germany and to exchange industrial for agricultural goods across the zonal boundaries. A return to Potsdam would be a huge step backwards. Despite the tepid reaction of the Cabinet, Churchill wrote again to Eisenhower announcing his intention to send a message to Malenkov offering to meet him in Moscow. The President expressed "astonishment" at this suggestion and Churchill agreed to delay sending his missive. However, it was clear that he was not willing to abandon the idea of talks with the new Soviet leader and he added mischievously that if Eisenhower went with him to a conference they would have "the best chance of a good result".⁷

Eden had initially seen Stalin's death as an opportunity for him to meet Molotov, but his chance to engage in personal diplomacy was frustrated when he was hospitalised as a result of a botched operation.⁸ In the Foreign Secretary's absence, Strang adopted a conciliatory attitude towards Churchill's demands for a summit, suggesting only that such a meeting would have to be "approached with all circumspection" and that any discussion of Germany might jeopardise EDC ratification.⁹ In general, however, the Foreign Office were strongly opposed to a summit and believed that if the Soviets did take a more accommodating line over Germany, Britain's long term objectives would be jeopardised. Dennis Allen both doubted that the Soviets were pursuing a softer policy and feared the consequences of new proposals for German reunification. He warned that it might suit Moscow to resurrect this issue, "in a last attempt to delay still further French ratification of the EDC Treaty." Roberts was also convinced that Soviet concessions could endanger the EDC. He minuted, "The Russians could put us in a very awkward position in this way but fortunately they are not gamblers by nature and rarely behave as skilfully as we think they should in their own interests." A hostile Russia was more useful to the Foreign Office than a conciliatory one; at least until EDC was ratified.¹⁰

The problem for the Foreign Office was that the absence of Eden meant

7. Boyle (ed.), *op.cit.*, Churchill to Eisenhower, 4 May 1953, p.48, Eisenhower to Churchill, 5 May 1953, p.49-50 and Churchill to Eisenhower, 7 May 1953, p.50-1.

8. Avon Papers, AP20/16/10, Strang draft telegrams to Moscow, 28 and 29 March 1953.

9. FO 800/759, Strang to Churchill, 20 April 1953.

10. FO 371/103659, C1016/10A, Allen minute, 31 March 1953 and C1016/16, Roberts minute, 21 April 1953.

that there was no-one of sufficient standing to present their case effectively. In a note prepared for the foreign affairs debate on 11 May, they stated that there had been "little sign" of a change in the Soviets' policy towards Germany, adding that they had not replied to the last western note of 23 November 1952 and concluded "We see no reason to take the initiative in the meantime."¹¹ Instead of pressing this view, Selwyn Lloyd, the Minister of State, actually helped draft the Prime Minister's 11 May speech which was so at variance with the advice given in the Foreign Office note.¹² Despite the laudatory reception given to Churchill's speech it was marred by a contradiction between his insistence that there would be no compromise over the European Defence Community or Germany and the offer to the Soviets of a private meeting at which a wide range of issues could be discussed without any fixed agenda or the presence of over zealous experts.¹³ In terms of practical diplomacy, it was quite evident that if the participants at a high level conference were to discuss anything but platitudes, the EDC and the German question would be two of the first items for discussion. Furthermore, if an agreement was to be reached, compromise on both sides would be necessary. Officially, Churchill's suggested inducement to the Soviets was an offer to conclude some sort of new Locarno agreement guaranteeing frontiers. Apart from the fact that no peace treaty defining Germany's post war borders had yet been agreed, this was clearly too insubstantial an idea to be attractive to Moscow. It seems that Churchill himself was aware of this problem and hoped to offer the Soviets something more tempting at the prospective meeting of the leaders. In his 11 May speech he promised that when Adenauer visited London in a few days time he would re-assure the Chancellor "that West Germany will in no way be sacrificed or- I pick these words with special care- cease to be master of its own fortunes within the agreements we and the other NATO countries have made with them."¹⁴ However, after his two days of talks in London, Adenauer left the country thoroughly alarmed. According to the official records of their meetings, Adenauer told Churchill on 15 May that he "did not think there were any important differences between the recent speeches of the Prime Minister and of

11. FO 371/103664, C1071/9, Foreign Office note for Foreign Affairs debate, 7 May 1953.

12. D.R.Thorpe, *Selwyn Lloyd* (Jonathan Cape, London 1989), p.171.

13. *The Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, vol.515, cols.889-898.

14. *Ibid.*, col.890.

the President....it seemed generally agreed that progress could only be made with Russia on the basis of continued vigilance, fidelity and unity in the west." The "misgivings" of the EDC states about Churchill's speech were put down to inadequate reporting. The next day Roberts congratulated Strang on the fact that Adenauer and his foreign affairs adviser, Herbert Blankenhorn, were "very satisfied with the conversation and with the visit generally." However, Churchill had actually told the Chancellor that a meeting with the Soviets was essential, that his own promises to West Germany could not exclude "secret diplomacy" and that the Americans, who once could not be persuaded of the existence of a Soviet threat, had now gone "to the other extreme."¹⁵ Over the next few weeks Adenauer had separate discussions with the American writer, Drew Middleton, the German journalist, Ernst Friedlander, and the Dutch statesman, Dirk Stikker, and told each of them of his concern about Churchill's attitude.¹⁶ The fullest account of the Chancellor's perspective on his conversations with Churchill was provided by Blankenhorn who conveyed his views to the British diplomat Con O'Neill. This revealed that Adenauer's worries about Churchill's initiative had only been exacerbated by their meeting. He regarded the ageing Prime Minister as dangerously unstable and seems actually to have developed feelings of contempt for him. According to Blankenhorn, Adenauer was "scared stiff" by Churchill's views and had been so infuriated by his approach to German problems that he had very nearly walked out of the meeting. The Chancellor did not know whether Churchill "was now standing on his head or his heels", but was convinced that "he could not trust him to conduct conversations with the Russians on German or other subjects."¹⁷

Had Adenauer known of the private discussions Churchill was having with Foreign Office officials, he would have discovered that his fears were justified. On 16 May the Prime Minister told Pierson Dixon that "he had not closed his mind to the possibility of a unified and neutralised Germany." Dixon recorded that this remark was made "in the context of a possible high level discussion with the

15. FO 371/103705, C1074/14, record of German Chancellor's visit, conversation of 15 May 1953, C1074/15, Roberts to Strang, 16 May 1953, C1074/16, record of conversation between Churchill and Adenauer at lunch on 15 May 1953.

16. FO 371/103664, C1071/32, Roberts to Strang, 4 June 1953 and C1071/34, Roberts to Strang, 10 June 1953; FO 371/103666, C1071/64, Johnston to Hancock, 18 June 1953.

17. FO 371/103665, C1071/60, Roberts to Strang, 17 June 1953.

Russians, and his meaning, I think, was that it might be desirable to agree to such a solution for Germany as part of a settlement with the Russians." Churchill also told Lloyd and Strang that "he would be willing to consider the unification and neutralisation of Germany if the Germans wished, but only if they wished for this."¹⁸

It was Frank Roberts who, as Under-Secretary responsible for German affairs, organised the Foreign Office campaign to frustrate Churchill's plans. He warned that "a 'neutralised' Germany would mean a fundamental change in allied policy pursued since 1947." His principle argument against German neutralisation was the same one that the Foreign Office had been using for years. If Germany was not firmly tied to the West she could not be trusted to resist Soviet blandishments. Roberts stated "A reunited Germany with a national army would sooner or later be tempted to use its economic and military power as a bargaining factor between East and West. As the Russians would have Germany's former Eastern territories to offer and the West would have nothing, except perhaps the Saar, such a Germany would inevitably become associated with the Soviet bloc. We should thus have created by our own action the most deadly danger to our own security and that of the world. A disarmed Germany would be so weak that, American troops having departed, she would be at the mercy of the most powerful, ruthless and determined power in Europe ie. the Soviet Union..... Throughout history Germany has never shown any particular vocation for neutrality". Churchill's initiative, if successful, would result in the collapse of European institutions, "and sooner or later a return to German nationalism and the revival of the German quarrel with France and Western Europe." Dixon agreed and added, "The rearmament of the Federal Republic, her integration into Western Europe, the collective defence effort are component parts of a whole. If we reverse our German policy, we bring the whole structure tumbling about our ears & advance the frontiers of the Soviet bloc to the Rhine." He wanted a "re-armed & anti-Russian" Germany and asked, "can anyone suppose that the outbreak of an American-Soviet conflict could be long deferred from the day that Germany became a Soviet satellite or partner in an unholy alliance?" Strang transmitted these views to the Prime Minister in a formal memorandum on 30

18. FO 371/103660, C1016/32, Dixon and Strang minutes, 19 May 1953.

May. The reply from 10 Downing Street was enigmatic. Churchill insisted that he was fully aware of the "awful consequences" of a change in policy but added "It is certain that on present lines we are moving steadily towards war and that the French have managed with their EDC for nearly four years to prevent a German army being created." Though declaring he had no "final inhibitions", he also promised not to let Adenauer down and expressed concern that a united Germany might suffer the same fate as Czechoslovakia. Having thus apparently accepted the dangers of neutralisation, he finally confounded expectations with the cryptic comment that "Larger combinations might alter the proportion", and the statement that the crucial American atomic advantage "would not be affected by the great issues which we both have in our minds and with which your paper deals."¹⁹

The Foreign Office sought to play on the Czech analogy in order to frighten Churchill into dropping the whole idea of a deal with the Soviets on neutralisation. They failed. On 13 June Churchill wrote to Strang and Lloyd, "I do not think a free and united Germany would join the Soviets in any foreseeable period, if so they would only form part of a wider no-man's land, communications across which could be dealt with by the Atomic Bomb." Then on 23 June, the day of his stroke, Churchill wrote to Lloyd with the bizarre but revealing statement "We are still firmly behind the Bonn Treaty and EDC Agreements unless they lag or fail, or unless something better comes up."²⁰ Anthony Nutting, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, reported to a stricken Eden that he and Lloyd had discussed these matters with Churchill but "could not get it out of his head that a divided Germany was a greater risk than a neutral and united Germany." In his revealing account covering events since Eden's hospitalisation, Nutting suggested that Churchill's speech had set back the ratification of the EDC in France but that "The worst anxiety, however, has been felt in Germany where the speech has given rise to all sorts of fears, not least in Adenauer's breast, that we are out to do a deal with the Russians at Germany's

19. Frank Roberts, *'Dealing with Dictators'* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1991), p.166; FO 371/103660, C1016/32, Roberts memo, 19 May 1953 and Dixon minute, 19 May 1953, Strang to Churchill, 30 May 1953, C1016/34, Churchill to Strang, 31 May 1953.

20. FO 371/103660, C1016/34, Dixon minute, 1 June 1953; PREM 11/449, Churchill to Strang and Lloyd, 13 June 1953, Churchill to Lloyd, 23 June 1953.

expense. The Chancellor's meeting with the Prime Minister did not I am afraid do much to remove this anxiety". Nutting did offer some reassurance to Eden when he suggested that Churchill would continue to support the EDC in public "until October or November at least".²¹

From this fragmentary evidence it is possible to piece together Churchill's thinking about the relationship between a high level conference with the Soviets and German policy. His personality was a curious mixture of eirenism and bellicosity and by the early 1950s he had become fearful that without a reduction in tension the Cold War could turn hot. He believed that with the recent development of the hydrogen bomb this would be the ultimate disaster and that a meeting with the new Kremlin leadership was the best means of averting this catastrophe. It would be necessary, however, to offer some sort of tangible reassurance to the Soviets if the meeting was to be a success. Publicly he raised the idea of a new Locarno, while in private he discussed the prospect of German neutralisation. This latter notion was attractive to him because it was precisely the sort of concession which would be welcomed by the Soviets, it would scupper the hated EDC, and it would not, in his view, impair the military superiority which the West possessed by virtue of their lead in atomic weapons technology. In his own thinking the only factor militating against German neutralisation was his loyalty to Adenauer who he described to Eisenhower as, "The best German we have found for a long time."²² However, Churchill remained somewhat distrustful of the German people in general and in this, if nothing else, he was fairly representative of both public and governmental opinion.

At this stage in his life Churchill had little respect for the opinions of the career diplomats in the Foreign Office. He remained committed to the special relationship with the United States, however, and winning over the Eisenhower administration was one of the main obstacles to be overcome before a high level conference could take place. Eisenhower had consistently tried to dampen the Prime Minister's enthusiasm for such a meeting and Dulles had been thoroughly

21 The Avon Papers, AP 20/16/127, Nutting to Eden, 25 June 1953.

22. Boyle (ed), op.cit., Churchill to Eisenhower, 12 April 1953, p.44.

irritated by the 11 May speech.²³ On 20 May Churchill and Eisenhower spoke on the phone and agreed to accept the French proposal for a meeting of western heads of government.²⁴

However, the Bermuda conference was delayed by the governmental crisis in France and then cancelled following Churchill's stroke on 23 June. In the days after the attack it seemed unlikely that Churchill would ever resume his duties as Prime Minister. His absence allowed the Foreign Office to re-impose the prevailing orthodoxy on German policy. Though he retained his desire for a conference with Eisenhower and Malenkov, after his stroke Churchill realised that he had lost any opportunity there might have been of persuading the Americans to accept his ideas on German neutralisation. He was persuaded that the American administration would only agree to a three power heads of government meeting after a final decision had been reached on EDC. On 1 July he sent a message to Eisenhower in which he disingenuously announced: "I have never thought of a Four Power meeting taking place till after EDC was either ratified or discarded by the French." He cautioned that the Soviets could at any time march to the Rhine while throwing Asia into chaos and explained: "It is this feeling that makes me so anxious that before we reject all hope of a Soviet change of heart we should convince our peoples that we have done our best." The President replied with an emphatic endorsement of EDC and a veiled warning that should it fail the US might return to a policy of isolationism. In his Cabinet paper Churchill now set out a schedule involving French ratification of EDC before the end of October. If the French government continued to prevaricate he proposed that Germany should be rearmed within the NATO structure. Once this matter was resolved the West "should be in a far better position to talk to Russia than if the present indefinite delay continued." He was still concerned that German rearmament was "a profound and legitimate anxiety in Russia", but, with his plans for neutralisation now abandoned, he could only suggest that its implementation "should be coupled with a declaration of willingness for a four

23. Townshend Hoopes, *op cit.*, p.174; Thomas Alan Schwartz, *'America's Germany'*, (Harvard University Press, London 1991), p.282; M. Steven Fish, 'After Stalin's Death: The Anglo-American Debate Over a New Cold War', *Diplomatic History*, 10, 1986, p.338.

24. CAB 128/26, CC(53)33rd mtg., minute 2, 21 May 1953.

Power conference before the end of the year."²⁵

In the absence of both Churchill and Eden, the Marquis of Salisbury took responsibility for foreign affairs. He had informed Churchill on 11 June that he was "frankly sceptical" about the likelihood of a change of heart in Moscow and he evidently shared the opinions of the most suspicious of Foreign Office officials in this matter. Frank Roberts had recommended that the three powers should make clear at Bermuda that western policy remained "firmly based upon the Bonn and Paris Treaties of May 1952 and upon the allied note of September 23, 1952." The Foreign Office brief for Bermuda stressed that the government's "immediate aim... is to integrate Western Germany into Western Europe and to enable her to take part in its defence." The threat of an unholy alliance between Russia and Germany was at the forefront of their thinking. The paper urged that the object of the Bermuda meeting ought to be "to strengthen and unite the West, to bring the German Federal Republic solidly within the western family... and so to prevent German flirtations with Moscow at our expense on the Rapallo model. Germany, even reunited, cannot any longer alone play the role of a major World Power, but in alliance with the Soviet Union she would shift the balance of power against the West. There are many powerful arguments from German history encouraging the Germans to such an alignment which would follow the advice bequeathed to them by Frederick the Great and Bismark." Though the brief paid lip-service to German reunification, it contained the qualification that "it will be much safer for us and for Europe if the Federal Republic can be solidly anchored with the West before we move on to German reunification."²⁶ On 6 July Salisbury presented a paper to the Cabinet in which he listed his priorities for the Washington Foreign Ministers meeting which had been called as a substitute for the Bermuda meeting. The first three were the reaffirmation of German policy, supporting Adenauer in his election year and pressing France to ratify EDC. Persuading the Americans to keep the door open for high level talks was listed sixth and last. Salisbury promised to present the case for such a conference but "without pressing the

25. Boyle (ed), *op.cit.*, Churchill to Eisenhower, 1 July 1953, p.82-3, Eisenhower to Churchill, 6 July 1953, p.85-6; CAB 129/61, C(53)194, 7 July 1953; PREM 11/449, Churchill to Strang, 6 July 1953.

26. FO 371/103666, C1071/65, Roberts to Strang, 8 June 1953 and C1071/67, FO Brief on 'The Problem of Germany' for Bermuda, June 1953; PREM 11/428, Salisbury to Churchill, 11 June 1953.

Americans too hard" on the issue. The Cabinet accepted Salisbury's argument that he should seek to persuade the French to ratify EDC prior to any four power conference.²⁷

At Washington, Salisbury warned that "immediate 4-power talks would provoke uncertainty in Germany which might impair Adenauer's chances... Great Britain was firmly attached to such talks after the German elections." However, he subsequently added the further qualification that "it was important to obtain German military integration with the West before discussing the German problem with the Soviets, since otherwise the Soviets would have a chance to wreck the meeting and gain their objectives." Following Churchill's enthusiastic advocacy of a meeting with the Soviets, this argument surprised the other delegates. Bidault wished to demonstrate the "impossibility" of a deal with Moscow in order to facilitate French ratification, while Dulles accepted Adenauer's own argument that a meeting would actually improve his electoral prospects.²⁸ Salisbury contacted the Cabinet to say that he was convinced, "Bidault simply cannot commit himself to securing early ratification of EDC before the possibility of a Four-Power meeting on Germany has been fully explored." With Bidault, Dulles and Adenauer all supporting the holding of talks prior to ratification, he urged the Cabinet to modify their position. They accepted this advice but were keen that the talks should not be restricted to Germany and hoped it would "be possible to give the impression in any public communique that if progress were made the talks would proceed to wider issues." In line with Churchill's 11 May speech Salisbury was instructed that the agenda should "be kept as open as possible".²⁹

Throughout the meeting, Salisbury urged the French to ratify EDC

27. CAB 128/26, CC(53)39th mtg., minute 3, 6 July 1953; CAB 129/61, C(53)187, 3 July 1953.

28. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, McBride minutes of 1st Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting, 10 July 1953, p.1613, McBride minutes of 2nd Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting, 11 July 1953, p.1624-1628; PREM 11/425, records of 1st and 2nd Tripartite Meeting on 10-11 July in Washington. For Adenauer's views on a four Power Meeting see FO 371/103667, C1071/84, Makins (Washington) to FO, 11 July 1953 and C1071/85, Makins (Washington) to FO, 11 July 1953. Adenauer proposed that the agenda for the meeting should consisted of free all-German elections, the formation of a free all-German government, the conclusion of a Peace Treaty, the settlement of territorial problems, and the guarantee of freedom of action for an all-German government. Blankenhorn told Roberts that Adenauer had made the proposal "mainly for electioneering purposes."

29. FO 371/103667, C1071/86, Makins to FO with a message from Salisbury for Butler, 11 July 1953 and C1071/87, FO to Washington, 13 July 1953; CAB 128/26, CC(53)42nd mtg., minute 1, 13 July 1953.

speedily. On the first day he explained that the Community was essential because there "remained an important gap in our defences and that no alternative thereto had been found." Three days later, having conceded that a meeting with the Soviets could precede ratification, he stated "there should be no question of deciding that there was no need for EDC.... firm reaffirmation of the attached three governments to the EDC was absolutely necessary". He criticised a draft tripartite statement on European unity because, "There was little reference to the EDC as an immediate objective and there was no sense of urgency expressed. Failure to recognise this urgency would be disastrous."³⁰

Salisbury was much less active in pressing for a high level meeting and despite his own claims to the contrary did not support the idea at all strongly. On 10 July he suggested a conference of the three western leaders should be held in about three months time to discuss the possibility of a four power high level conference in order to "prevent a feeling of frustration in Europe, and retain the initiative for the Western Powers." However, by 13 July Salisbury had to report that any meeting would only be at Foreign Minister's level. He expressed regret that he had not achieved agreement on a higher level meeting and explained that, though he had "pressed strongly", Dulles had made it clear that the President had categorically refused to attend the initial stages of a meeting. According to the American minutes, however, Salisbury had restricted his advocacy of a high level meeting to some mild criticisms of the wording of the draft communique. They state that he "noted that the communique referred to a four power meeting of 'Foreign Ministers', commenting that the original conception had been for a meeting on a higher level. While he had no doubt that any resulting meeting would in fact be a meeting of Foreign Ministers he said that he would much prefer that the communique read 'representatives of the French, United Kingdom, United States and the Soviet Union'." After Dulles intervened to explain Eisenhower's opposition to a high level meeting Salisbury immediately accepted the initial wording.³¹

30. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, McBride minutes of 1st Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting, 10 July 1953, p.1620, Trulock minutes of 3rd Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting, 13 July 1953, p.1663-4.

31. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, McBride minutes of 1st Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting, 10 July 1953, p.1612-14, Wilson minutes of 4th Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting, 13 July 1953, p.1673-4; FO 371/103667, C1071/91, Makins to FO with message from Salisbury, 13 July 1953.

On 14 July, at the end of the conference, the three powers issued a note to the Soviet Union offering to meet at the end of September to discuss the organisation of free elections throughout Germany and conditions for the creation of an all German government. In the official communique the three reasserted their support for EDC as part of the movement towards European unity and announced their desire for talks with the Soviet Union "to discuss directly the first steps which should lead to a satisfactory solution of the German problem, namely, the organization of free elections and the establishment of a free all-German government."³²

Butler told the House of Commons that the Foreign Ministers talks "are intended not as a substitute for, but as a prelude to..... further discussions if..... real progress can be made..... the present proposals in no way exclude or excluded a widening of the present talks in terms either of personalities or of topics." However, he was insistent that the Soviets must accept that free elections should be the first priority in any German settlement and warned that the Soviet proposals "would mean a Germany left in dangerous and irresponsible isolation at the heart of Europe."³³ Salisbury and Butler were vigorously criticised by the Labour opposition for having, as Ian Mikardo memorably put it, "muted down the reverberating chord which the Prime Minister had struck to the plaintive peep-peep of a penny tin whistle." However, the debate was notable mainly for the concerns expressed about the growing power and influence of Germany. F.J. Bellenger argued for the demilitarisation of Central Europe and was supported by Bob Boothby who noted "the Russians... have had the Germans at their throats during the last decade, and one thing they would surely ask for is some safeguard against a repetition of that unpleasing experience." G.A. Pargiter declared "I am one of those - one of many millions in the country - who have a greater fear of the possibility at some future time of German aggression than of Russian aggression."³⁴

During the summer of 1953 the imminence of elections in West Germany,

32. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, notes from the governments of the US, UK and France to the Soviet Union, 14 July 1953, p.1701-2, communique of the meetings of the three Foreign Ministers, 14 July 1953, p.1703-6.

33. The Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, vol.518, cols.219-221.

34. Ibid., cols.298, 427-8, 435-7 and 453.

the riots against communist rule in East Germany and the apparent strengthening of Germany's economic and diplomatic position created uneasiness in the British Government. Adenauer's election victory provided some reassurance but doubts about Germany's future remained a powerful factor and re-emerged strongly in 1954. Roberts noted on 4 June 1953 that there was "a great danger, at worst of the German ship getting out of control with all Dr. Adenauer's election pressures, or, at best, of an American-German line-up developing in Europe against us and the French." The revolts in Berlin and other East German cities in mid-June elicited little sympathy. Kirkpatrick warned "we must not close our eyes to the dangers inherent in the riots. The Germans were a hysterical people, rioting was contagious and if we deliberately inflamed passions for propaganda purposes we might one day find the Germans using violence to express disapproval of our policy."³⁵ In his Cabinet memorandum Churchill had stated "We must face the fact that there will always be 'a German problem' and a 'Prussian danger'." Like Roberts, he was concerned that the Americans, frustrated by continued paralysis in France, might ally themselves with the Germans and remove all measure of control which the West had over the Federal Republic. He complained to his physician that the Americans "will not listen now when I warn them about Germany. At Potsdam I wanted Prussia isolated and Germany divided horizontally and not vertically." During his convalescence he lambasted the Americans as "fools" and outlined his new thinking: "If we'd got EDC, then we could have spoken to Russia from strength, because German rearmament is the only thing they are afraid of. I want to use Germany and EDC to keep Russia in the mood to be reasonable - to make her play. And I would use Russia to prevent Germany getting out of hand."³⁶ Though most Foreign Office officials had been shocked by Churchill's 11 May speech and appalled by his subsequent consideration of a disarmed Germany, Strang regarded the speech as "well balanced", and noted on 25 June that the Prime Minister was "still open to argument" over his

35. Klaus Larres, *Politik der Illusionen: Churchill, Eisenhower und die Deutsche Frage, 1945-55* (Vandershoeck and Rupprecht, Gottingen, 1995) p. ;Larres, 'Reunification or Integration with the West?: Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1950s' in Richard J. Aldrich and Michael F. Hopkins, *Intelligence, Defence and Diplomacy: British Policy in the Post-War World* (Frank Cass, Ilford, 1994) p.57-8.

36. CAB 129/61, C(53)194, 7 July 1953; Lord Moran, *Winston Churchill: Struggle for Survival* (Constable, London, 1966), 5 July 1953, p.423 and 12 July 1953, p.431.

neutralisation idea. He bristled at Adenauer's criticisms of Churchill, declaring "I think these Germans are getting above themselves."³⁷ Salisbury's own memorandum on the Washington conference stated the Soviet and western powers were both "afraid of the re-emergence of a strong Germany allied to, or likely to fall under the influence of, the other party. There is also the fear.... of the re-emergence of a strong and independent reunified Germany."³⁸

The EDC was now regarded officially as the best means of containing any potential German threat within the confines of a more united Europe. Though the government remained opposed to the idea of British membership, they had persuaded their NATO allies that they would co-operate closely with EDC. In May the French had finally accepted Britain's proposals to send representatives to the Council of Ministers and Board of Commissioners, on condition that they be embodied in a formal agreement rather than a unilateral declaration. On 19 May the Cabinet assented to this procedure.³⁹ When these plans were presented to the EDC's Interim Commission they were given a unanimous welcome and negotiations began on the nature of future co-operation between the British and European armed forces.⁴⁰ Experts in the American State Department described the British offer as "sufficiently far reaching to have a favourable impact on French ratification".⁴¹

However, EDC was still regarded as a means to an end rather than, as the Americans tended to treat it, as a goal in itself. The main aim of British policy-makers was to safely integrate Germany into the western system, and by the summer of 1953 some were beginning to question whether EDC was a feasible means of achieving this. As early as April Hood had written to the Chiefs of Staff suggesting that if the EDC treaty was not ratified by mid-summer the government should consider an alternative scheme based on German membership of NATO.⁴² In June Nutting suggested that with France in a continuous state of political turmoil it might be advantageous to examine the possibility of bringing

37. FO 371/103960, CW1055/1, Strang minute, 25 June 1953; FO 371/103665, C1071/60, Strang minute, 18 June 1953.

38. CAB 129/61, C(53)187, 3 July 1953.

39. CAB 128/26, CC(53)32nd mtg., minute 3, 19 May 1953; CAB 129/61, C(53)158, 18 May 1953.

40. DEFE 5/47, COS(53)301, 19 June 1953; CAB129/61, C(53)186, 2 July 1953.

41. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, undated State Department memo by Fessenden to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant), p.805.

42. DEFE 5/45, COS(53)181, 14 April 1953.

the contract into force before the EDC. In response Jack Ward, admitted that "the Bonn Conventions represented the goal of our policies regardless of a German defence contribution." He concluded, however, that it would be injudicious to re-open negotiations on the EDC-contract treaty complex. Kirkpatrick explained that the two were linked because "we are not prepared to take the risk of giving the Germans sovereignty until they were fully committed to integration with the West... Secondly if concessions as regards sovereignty were to be made to the Germans we wanted to be sure that, in return, they would meet their share of the cost of Western Defence."⁴³ Nutting accepted these arguments and dropped the subject, but in Cabinet Macmillan continued to make clear his own doubts about the EDC. On 6 July, while agreeing to support EDC for the present, he stated that "The incorporation of a reunified Germany in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) might well prove to be a more satisfactory solution in the long term". At a Cabinet meeting on 21 July the contrary view was advanced that "If Germany was to be united, it would be best that she should be unified within EDC: for this would go some way to ensure that she did not again emerge as a strong and aggressive independent Power. The alternatives were to admit a unified Germany to NATO which would leave her free to build up her independent strength and to leave NATO when she desired, or to neutralise the whole of Germany - which was a solution unacceptable to the Western Allies."⁴⁴ Thus despite the doubts of many about the European Army it clearly still had many supporters in the British government.

The British Chiefs had been among the most enthusiastic advocates of EDC and German rearmament, regarding them as essential to the forward strategy which they advocated. By early 1953 they had dropped the idea of a massive conventional force build up in favour of greater dependence on atomic weapons, and it was difficult to present the case in the same terms. They now began to argue that the EDC and a German defence contribution were necessary in order to compensate for deficiencies in the contributions of other countries, including the United Kingdom. The 1952 Global Strategy Paper had estimated

43. FO371/103964, CF(W)1071/46, Nutting to Roberts, 9 June 1953, Ward to Roberts, 22 June 1953, CF(W)1071/52, Kirkpatrick to Roberts, 3 July 1953, Nutting minute, 21 July 1953.

44. CAB 128/26, CC(53)39th mtg., minute 3, 6 July 1953 and CC(53)54th mtg. minute 4, 21 July 1953.

that the forces available at the end of 1952, if supplemented by the planned German contribution, would be sufficient to implement a strategy based on the large scale use of nuclear weapons.⁴⁵ By December 1952 the allies had 22 divisions and 3,103 aircraft at NATO standards of readiness available to fight at M-day. This was a shortfall of 31% for land forces and 24% for air forces on the Lisbon goals.⁴⁶ It was clear that, with France and Britain determined to economise on defence expenditure, the forces available were unlikely to expand, and might actually contract. The French, who would provide the bulk of NATO's land forces prior to a German contribution, decided in November 1952 that they could not produce the additional three divisions required of them by NATO planners during the course of 1953.⁴⁷ In Britain, Butler had insisted in December 1952 that a Radical Review of defence expenditure should be undertaken in an effort to secure long term reductions. During early 1953 the Joint Planning Staff produced a series of papers examining the possibilities of reducing British commitments to Hong Kong, Malaya, Korea, the Middle East and NATO. In this latter paper it was argued that Britain was already planning to default on its contribution to the NATO air force by 40% and that any other reductions would have an adverse effect on the alliance.⁴⁸

The studies undertaken by the JPS for the 1952 Annual Review, which had been postponed to April 1953, revealed the extent of the short-fall in the British army's contribution to continental defence. Though they could provide 4 divisions at M-day as required, the 2 divisions supposed to be available by M+30 would arrive later than planned, while the further 2 1/3 divisions needed by M+90 could not be deployed at all due to equipment shortages which would not be made good until 1960. Discussing the issue of a German contribution, they commented "We agree that the importance of this can hardly be over stressed."⁴⁹ On 26 March Alexander presented these figures to the Defence Committee and outlined the new approach recommended by his military advisers. He explained that the

45. CAB 131/12, D(52)26, 17 June 1952.

46. Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1946-1953, pt.2, (A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, 1980), reel 8, JCS 2073/553, 9 April 1953, Appendix B.

47. Robert E. Osgood, *Nato: The Entangling Alliance* (University of Chicago Press, London, 1962), p.89-90.

48. DEFE 6/23, JP(53)25, 6 February 1953.

49. DEFE 6/23, JP(53)65, 14 April 1953.

current force goals "took no account of Soviet intentions, as against Soviet capabilities, nor of the economic factors. In consequence the gap between what nations could contribute and what the Supreme Commanders said they required was growing wider, and there was a danger that this would encourage pessimism and defeatism in NATO." He suggested a new political approach to force goals "which would be based upon the forces needed to conduct the Cold War, to deter the outbreak of a major war and to impose an initial delay upon the enemy if a war should start." It was agreed that Alexander should present the case for this new approach to the Americans at the forthcoming NATO meeting in Paris.⁵⁰

The problem for the British was that the NATO Supreme Commander, Matthew Bunker Ridgway, was actually planning increased force goals to implement his forward strategy. In order to launch his putative air counter-offensive, he recommended an increase of 55% or 3,000 aircraft on the central front. Though the American Chiefs were cautious about endorsing such an ambitious programme of expansion, they too were committed to the military rather than the political approach to force planning. In February 1953 they stated "The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the political implications of any substantial increase in NATO force requirements. If force goals are adopted which do not show any progress towards meeting these requirements the risk to the security of the NATO appears to be increased. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it essential that responsible military authorities determine their force requirements for a reasonable chance of success in war by considering military factors."⁵¹ Within NATO the main support for the British government's point of view came from Montgomery. In March 1953 he told the American Chiefs that what was required was a force which could be maintained over a long haul of 20 to 30 years. He warned that Ridgway's "continuous bleating for more and more forces without any idea how they were to be maintained over an indefinite period was doing immense harm." In June he advised Ridgway's successor, Gruenther, that NATO had reached its limit in terms of conventional land forces and would have to rely increasingly on superior sea and air power.⁵² However, when SHAPE produced a paper on the effect of new weapons upon force requirements it

50. CAB 131/13, D(53)5th mtg., minute 4, 26 May 1953, D(53)14, 2 May 1953.

51. Records of the JCS, pt.2, reel 8, JSPC876/623, 13 February 1953.

52. Nigel Hamilton, *Monty: The Field-Marshal* (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1986), p.829-846.

showed that an increase of 10 divisions and 3,000 aircraft was needed on current estimates of D-day forces, though this was partially compensated by a reduction of 15 divisions at D+30.⁵³ The American Chiefs commented that "the availability of large scale quantities of atomic munitions in 1956 will neither open the way for an entirely new and different strategy for the defence of Europe, nor permit a reduction in force requirements in support of currently approved NATO defense concepts. Instead a large scale use of atomic weapons by the Allies would compensate, but only in part, for the gap between estimated force requirements and attainable force goals."⁵⁴

The British Chiefs believed that such an attitude would only have a demoralising effect on the NATO powers. During the remainder of 1953 a lengthy battle was conducted over whether force goals should be produced at all. On 7 July Elliot warned that gaining American agreement to a 'long haul' strategy "would be a lengthy process since the American political climate was not at present so favourable towards us."⁵⁵ In fact the British military were conducting a battle on two fronts; with the Americans who would not accept the abandonment of large-scale force goals, and with the Treasury who continued to press for economies in the defence budget. On 18 June a meeting was held under Churchill's chairmanship which recommended a cut of £308 million on defence expenditure for the 1955 Financial Year, despite the expected reduction in American military assistance. The Chiefs were instructed to concentrate on acquiring the most modern military technology at the expense of manpower and maintenance. The reduction in the size of the armed forces would necessarily mean the acceptance of increased risks in the discharge of overseas obligations and might "also mean that we shall have to consider some reduction in the commitments which we have undertaken to our partners in NATO." When the Chiefs questioned this threat to Britain's Alliance commitments they were

5353. DEFE 4/65, COS(53)110th mtg., minute 4, 30 September 1953 including JP(53)115, 17 September 1953; DEFE 5/48, COS(53)382, 7 August 1953.

54. Records of the JCS, reel 8, JCS 2073/630, 24 August 1953. The American Chief of Air Staff actually dissented from this paper but he did not directly discuss that section of it dealing with the impact of new weapons. His argument was with the endorsement by the other Chiefs of current NATO strategy. He stated: "If the current strategy for the defence of Western Europe is dependent on force requirements which naturally cannot or will not be attained, then it appears obvious that some solution other than a statement of increased force requirements must be found." See JCS 2073/633, 31 August 1953.

55. DEFE 4/64, COS(53)85th mtg., minute 1, 7 July 1953.

instructed "that the planned United Kingdom contribution to NATO forces could not be considered sacrosanct but that the priorities laid down in the directive should be applied equally to it." Significantly, the Chiefs also wanted to know, for the purposes of planning, when they could assume that the first German units would be available. They were given the optimistic reply that the first formations should be ready by the end of 1955. The Chiefs had already decided by this stage that the "German contribution to the defence of NATO might in the long run lead to some reduction of United Kingdom forces in Germany."⁵⁶ The Ministry of Defence informed the Foreign Office that they might "have to reconsider our own military commitments on the Continent and the raising of German forces is the major factor in such an examination".⁵⁷

Clearly the importance of the planned German forces was now seen to lie in their role as a substitute for the contributions which other NATO countries, including Britain, had hoped to make. The British military were abandoning the practice of setting precise force goals in order to implement a defined strategy. The confusion which this could cause was evident from Sir John Harding's contribution to a discussion of future strategy, which the Chiefs conducted with Lord Hood, on 21 July. Hood argued that the death of Stalin and the subsequent reduction in international tension meant "there was a strong argument for basing NATO policy on the maintenance of present NATO defence expenditure as a continuing deterrent to Soviet aggression, and for planning for the continuance of this defence effort over a prolonged period: rather than the current policy which envisaged a period of maximum danger occurring in the near future and possibly an even greater build up of NATO forces in subsequent years." McGrigor then pointed out "that there might be difficulties in maintaining the argument that within NATO there should be no reduction in the present tempo of defence effort, whereas we ourselves were at this present moment being hard-pressed to make drastic economies within our own Services." He accepted, however, that Hood's ideas reflected those of the Global Strategy Paper. Harding then declared that "In view of the uncertainty of any future NATO policy, he felt that it was not only a waste of time, but positively dangerous to set 1956 force requirements and

56. DEFE 4/63, COS(53)76th mtg., 22 June 1953; DEFE 5/47, COS(53)328, 8 July 1953.

57 T225/409, Beagley to Crawford, 3 July 1953.

to publicise these hypothetical forces." However, having admitted that force requirements could not be met, he went on to criticise Montgomery's support for the abandonment of the forward strategy because "without a forward strategy, a German contribution - and this was essential to NATO defence - was not attainable. Any rearmament of Germany must go hand in hand with a forward strategy."⁵⁸ Unfortunately for Harding, SHAPE assessments had also shown that a forward strategy went hand in hand with large scale conventional forces, which he and the other Chiefs regarded as no longer feasible for economic reasons. In correspondence with Montgomery, Harding concentrated on the diplomatic, rather than the flawed military rationale, for German rearmament. He wrote that "the greatest danger to the West would come from a united and independent Germany allied to Russia, and that we should therefore do everything in our power to prevent that ever becoming possible. On the other hand the best solution for us would be a united Germany firmly anchored to the West and unable to lead the West by the nose". He continued by stating that "once she has achieved unity Germany will insist on rearming herself and that no one will be brave enough to prevent her. That makes it all the more important to ensure that western Germany now, and the whole of Germany later should be firmly anchored to the West".⁵⁹

At a second meeting to discuss the Foreign Office's new directive for NATO, Harding criticised the stress laid on the role of political factors in formulating the new strategy, "whereas, in fact, economic factors were clearly more powerful." Powell of the Ministry of Defence warned "that should there be any appreciable reduction of NATO forces, then the effective deterrent would begin to disappear, with a consequent greater risk of war." Like Harding, he favoured the continuance of the forward strategy. The Committee agreed that without a German defence contribution Denmark would be rapidly overrun and urged the Foreign Office to stress "the great importance of an effective German defence contribution" in their paper.⁶⁰ The brief supplied by the Ministry of Defence on 20 November for the rescheduled Bermuda conference confirmed that

58. DEFE 4/64, COS(53)91st mtg., minute 1, 21 July 1953.

59. Montgomery Collection, NATO Unclassified Series, Box 1, Harding to Montgomery, 14 July 1953.

60. DEFE 4/64, COS(53)93rd mtg., minute 3, 28 July 1953.

the gap between the forces available and those required was likely to grow, but still insisted that the forward strategy must be implemented, because to abandon it would "put in jeopardy a German contribution to the NATO defence forces which it is essential to secure as soon as possible". However, at a meeting of officials three days later a feeling of ambivalence about Britain's commitment to the continent was evident. Sir Harold Parker, representing the Defence Ministry, explained that though the French wanted a further commitment of forces from Britain to European defence, "For us, the worst drain on our resources was the retention of forces in Europe". Speaking for the Foreign Office, Dixon commented that, in the context of EDC ratification, it was necessary to "do everything to reassure the French that it was our policy and that of the United States to maintain our forces at substantially the same level over the next few years". Sir Norman Brook gave the Cabinet view that NATO planning should be based on the assumption that "roughly the present level of forces in aggregate, plus German forces, would be available over the next few years". He suggested that the best solution to French anxieties might be some kind of Anglo-American guarantee to maintain approximately the current level of forces on the continent.⁶¹

The British position was, not surprisingly, causing some confusion in the United States. The American deputy on the NATO Standing Group urged that his government must sponsor the case for the production of 1956 force goals, "Since there has been a continuing pressure from certain NATO nations to delay and discredit the necessity for the development of realistic force requirements, apparently because of domestic political considerations." He warned that the production of the 1956 figures was "essential" and complained about "the continuing tendency among NATO nations to assume that the use of new weapons would materially reduce existing force requirements, which SHAPE/704/53... clearly indicate to be improbable."⁶² However, Eisenhower had insisted on cuts in American defence expenditure and by the second half of 1953 his administration was beginning to consider revising Alliance strategy to take account of the inability of NATO to meet its force goals. By September the State Department was expressing "general agreement on the UK formulation of the

61 CAB 134/765, AOC(53)17th mtg., 23 November 1953; CAB 134/766, AOC(53)48, 20 November 1953.

62. Records of the JCS, reel 8, JCS 2073/610, 27 July 1953.

problem", while voicing reservations that the British were willing to gloss over many of the problems. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs argued that to fill the gap between contributions and requirements, "further build-up will be required over and above the German contribution", and that current American atomic superiority could only provide a breathing space. He suggested putting the case to the Allies that "Given the present NATO forces, the Alliance can safely count only on holding critical areas in Europe. If our allies would prefer to defend the whole area that means carrying out the forward strategy. This in turn means a German contribution... and additional effective forces." When Dulles discussed the matter with administration officials it was agreed that some new conception of NATO strategy was needed and that the "British were groping for such a concept but had not yet hit upon right formulation." In November the American ambassador to Britain accurately identified the main flaw in British military planning as the "absence satisfactory rationalisation of present magnitude forces, qualitatively improved, plus German contingents, in fact constituting adequate future deterrent."⁶³

There was also some confusion over the purpose of a meeting with the Soviets. Dulles saw a conference as a means of proving that the Soviets were intractable in order to encourage EDC ratification while Churchill hoped that genuine progress could be made. In fact, this was a contentious issue even within the British government. On 4 August the Soviets replied to the note sent to them by the three Foreign Ministers at Washington. They called for the inclusion of China at the conference and the discussion of measures to reduce international tension. The British ambassador to Moscow, Gascoigne, expressed his belief that the Soviets "will not play on the German or Austrian questions", while in London Roberts stated that "the Soviet note... is designed primarily to confuse public opinion in Western Europe and to postpone indefinitely any four power meeting." However, Churchill complained to Salisbury "we are in no position to accuse the Soviets of 'bad faith' when we know that our triple Note proposing the 4-power conference of Foreign Ministers on Germany and Austria was very likely to lead

63. FRUS 1953-54, vol.5, memo by Deputy Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) to Dulles, 24 September 1953, p.440-443, Acting Secretary of State to Embassy in France, 13 October 1953, p.444-6, Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to Dulles, 27 November 1953, p.1724.

to a breakdown and thus afford Bidault after a long delay greater possibility of carrying EDC through the French parliament. The Soviets are replying to one manoeuvre by another. I fear we are moving into a course of propaganda manoeuvring on both sides likely to end in failure." This infuriated Roberts who complained that Churchill had wanted them to pursue three contradictory objectives: talks with Russia, EDC ratification and victory for Adenauer in the German elections. He bridled at the suggestion that Soviet and Western policies towards Germany were "on all fours".⁶⁴

Churchill found an ally in Macmillan who wrote an extraordinary memorandum arguing against shutting the door to a meeting with the Russians. He claimed that the differences in the British and Soviet approach to talks were due to philosophical traditions. He wrote "We, in this country, have followed (since Bacon and Newton) the 'a posteriori' or inductive method of reasoning... the Russians (like the French and sometimes the Americans) argue 'a priori' and deductively". As a result Macmillan claimed that the Soviets attached importance to solving the great issues first, while the British gave priority to smaller matters. He added of the Soviets, "Though their purpose is largely to cause trouble, this may also reflect a genuine and natural approach to the problem. It is the normal way anyone (except an Englishman) would think." In the second half of his paper Macmillan concentrated on the need to bind Germany into the western system. He explained "At present the French are alarmed at the prospect of an EDC which... may merely do peacefully what Hitler almost did by force - that is, lead to the domination of Western Europe by Germany... they must be made to realise that a neutralised Germany is far more dangerous... if the French are not prepared to go on with EDC they must agree to the Germans being in NATO and NATO must be made to include them and bind them. A free Germany means, or may mean, another Stalin-Ribbentrop pact in 5 or 10 years."⁶⁵ These sentiments were echoed by Churchill in his criticisms of the initial drafts of a western reply to the Soviets. He urged the removal of a passage calling for "a free all-German Government enjoying freedom of action in internal and external

64. FO 371/103670, C1071/160, text of Soviet Note, 4 August 1953, C1071/163, Gascoigne (Moscow) to FO, 5 August 1953, C1071/173, draft telegram by Roberts, 5 August 1953, C1071/175, Churchill to Salisbury, 7 August 1953, and Roberts minute, 8 August 1953.

65. FO 371/103671, C1071/186, Macmillan memorandum, 7 August 1953.

affairs". He believed this would "entitle the Germans to have unlimited armaments and to make an alliance with Russia and then on this basis to discuss a Peace Treaty ending the war in which they surrendered unconditionally. If Germany is united and free to act as she pleases in internal and external affairs what else does she need in a Peace Treaty except a settlement of frontiers. This she might think would be better settled after some years exercise of the freedoms mentioned." Salisbury agreed to support the removal of the offensive phrase and, after further discussions with the French and Americans, it was excised.⁶⁶

The Soviets followed their note of 4 August with another on 15 August which concentrated on the subordination of the Federal Republic to the Western powers. The main disagreement over the drafting of the reply to these two notes was over the amount of detail to include, with the Americans favouring a comprehensive rebuttal of the Soviet charges and the British supporting a shorter text emphasising their willingness to attend a conference. This latter approach had been suggested by Macmillan and was embraced by Salisbury.⁶⁷ However, the acting Foreign Secretary did not share the hopes of Macmillan and Churchill for a successful meeting with the Soviets. With Churchill still absent, he told the Cabinet on 10 August "that Stalin's death had not led to any fundamental change in Soviet Foreign policy." By 23 August he was declaring himself "not altogether happy" about the idea of continuing to press for a broader agenda than the German problem. When it was suggested in Cabinet two days later that the current draft reply deviated too far from the Prime Minister's initiative of 11 May, Salisbury used the same argument that he had employed at Washington; that the Americans and the French would not accept a discussion of wider issues.⁶⁸

There remains the question of what Macmillan and Churchill hoped could be achieved at a meeting with the Soviets, given the intransigence of both Moscow

66. FO 371/103673, C1071/230, Churchill to Salisbury, 16 August 1953 and Salisbury to Churchill, 17 August 1953, C1071/248, P.G. Oates to Churchill, 18 August 1953 with Churchill minute; CAB 128/26 CC(53)49th mtg., minute 8, 18 August 1953 and CC(53)50th mtg., minute 2, 25 August 1953.

67. The Drafting Committee eventually agreed to work from a French Draft. See FO371/103671, C1071/186, Macmillan memo, 11 August 1953 and Salisbury minute, 13 August 1953; FO371/103673, C1071/234, Roberts and Salisbury minutes, 22 August 1953, C1071/236, Roberts and Dixon minutes, 15 August 1953, C1071/245, Harvey (Paris) to FO, 22 August 1953; FRUS 1952-4, vol.8, Editorial Note, p.626-7.

68. CAB 128/26, CC(53)48th mtg., minute 2, 10 August 1953 and CC(53)50th mtg., minute 2, 25 August 1953; FO 371/103674, C1071/267, Salisbury minute, 23 August 1953.

and Washington. Certainly the possible threat to the European peace of a renascent Germany appears to have been on both their minds. In his memoirs Macmillan recalls a meeting with the Prime Minister on 1 September at which Churchill explained that the Soviets had a genuine fear of a rearmed Germany. When Macmillan then presented his view that this was "the only card we have to play", Churchill assented. The following day Moran recorded Churchill's concern that the world was "in a terrible state. Germany is rapidly regaining strength and will soon be reunited, while Russia, America and Britain outbid each other for her favour".⁶⁹ On the other hand, Churchill seemed after his stroke to have accepted that the Americans were going to insist that EDC was ratified, thus ruling out a deal with the Soviets over German rearmament. In correspondence with his old friend Beaverbrook, who strongly opposed the idea of a German defence contribution, he advised "there is certainly going to be a German army and I hope it will be on our side and not against us. This need in no way prevent, but may on the contrary help, friendly relations with the bear."⁷⁰ The truth is that Churchill's mental health was poor throughout his second administration and, though he was still capable of visionary leaps of the imagination, he was often confused and contradictory when dealing with practical matters of policy. It seems likely that had Churchill been able to attend a conference with the Soviets prior to his stroke he would have tried to engage in secret diplomacy; offering concessions on Germany in an effort to achieve success in his role as world peacemaker. After his stroke, though still concerned about Germany's revival and the state of East-West relations, he appears to have acknowledged that there was no real alternative to EDC.

In their reply of 2 September the western powers suggested that the 4-Power conference should be held in Lugano, and during the next few weeks the Foreign Office began to make preparations for the prospective meeting. The problem was how to make German reunification acceptable to Moscow, when the West's terms were non-negotiable. This was the quandary which had apparently led Churchill to consider neutralisation. The Foreign Office's solution was to offer

69. Harold Macmillan, *Tides of Fortune, 1945-1955* (Macmillan, London, 1969), p.525; Lord Moran, *op.cit.*, 2 September 1953, p.465.

70. Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill: Never Despair*, vol.8, (Heinemann, London 1988), p.890-1; Kenneth Young, *Churchill and Beaverbrook* (Eyre and Spottiswood, London 1966), p.302.

some form of security guarantee to the Soviet Union. On 16 September Salisbury presented the Cabinet with various options which could be put to the Soviets, ranging from non-aggression pacts to treaties of mutual assistance. A ministerial sub-committee was established which adopted the idea of a non-aggression pact between the EDC and the Soviet Union, backed by American and British guarantees, as the most practical solution.⁷¹

Not surprisingly with so little to offer, the Foreign Office was not optimistic about a deal with the Soviet Union at Lugano. From Moscow Paul Grey warned, in a dispatch which was given an enthusiastic welcome, that if the Soviets did go to Lugano it would only be with the intention of continuing the struggle against the EDC by other means. Geoffrey Harrison, the new Under-Secretary responsible for the Western Department, produced both old and new arguments against accepting the Soviet terms for German reunification. He claimed that under the Soviet scheme "there would be no effective limit on her power to rearm. The danger of this to Western Europe and to the United Kingdom is self-evident. We should be back in the position where Germany could play off East against the West, increasing her own strength all the while by exacting alternate concessions from either side." He added the new concern that even if "a reunited and re-armed Germany succeeded in avoiding becoming a Soviet satellite the danger of a future German/Polish conflict (leading almost inevitably to a further world war) would be grave." Pat Hancock, the new head of the Central Department, informed Salisbury bluntly "a united Germany must be a member of the EDC, itself an element in the Western alliance."⁷² The arrival of a particularly hostile Soviet note on 28 September seemed to confirm the gloomy prognosis of those who believed a deal with Moscow was impossible, while casting new doubt on whether the Soviets wished even to meet.⁷³

The Americans remained singularly unenthusiastic about the prospect of

71. CAB 128/26, CC(53)52nd mtg., minute 7, 16 September 1953; CAB 129/63, C(53)256, 14 September 1953; CAB 130/95, GEN 443/1st mtg., 22 September 1953; FO 371/103676, C1071/334, Roberts to Strang, 3 September 1953.

72. FO 371/103677, C1071/349, Grey (Moscow) to Salisbury, 11 September 1953, Pallister minute, 18 September 1953, Hancock minute, 21 September 1953, Harrison minute, 28 September 1953; FO 371/103679, C1071/393, Harrison memo, 24 September 1953; FO 371/103680, C1071/403, Hancock minute, 24 September 1953.

73. FO 371/103680, C1071/404, text of Soviet Note, 28 September 1953, C1071/415, Grey to FO, 29 September 1953; FO371/103683, C1071/475, Hancock minute, 30 September 1953.

a conference and regarded British efforts to formulate a security guarantee as a rather tiresome distraction. When Dulles discussed the idea of such a guarantee with his advisers on 26 September, he stated that "he would never place much dependability on an arrangement based on neutralization or limitation", while any other arrangement would require "a system for proof against evasions and violations". The arrival of the third Soviet note of the year prompted him to ask "Do we really want a meeting?" and to reflect that though the note was "evasive and dilatory", the administration's task was "to determine whether this view is reflected in French and German public opinion or if we still have to go through another exchange of notes to pin down Soviet unwillingness to meet."⁷⁴ Following Eden's recovery Dulles came to London to discuss the international situation. On 14 October he told Eisenhower and that he intended "strongly to oppose" any suggestion from Churchill for a high level conference. The President supported his Secretary on this point and Dulles went on to add that "he was doubtful about the wisdom of tendering any non-aggression pacts or similar guarantees to the Soviets at least until EDC had been ratified." Thus, when Eden raised this subject at the London meeting and outlined three different formulations, Dulles said he doubted "that USSR, in view of its own record, rates non-aggression pacts very high." On his return Dulles declared that "we ought not seriously to seek discussions with the Soviets until decisions have been taken on EDC. If they occurred before then they would arrest progress towards EDC ratification and provide Moscow with opportunity to try and disrupt western unity."⁷⁵

It must have been somewhat disheartening for Eden to find that after his long absence the EDC remained the seminal issue confronting the western alliance. In June after a month-long crisis, Laniel had become Prime Minister of France with the support of the anti-EDC RPF who succeeded in further delaying

74. FRUS 1952-4, vol.7, memo of conversation, 26 September 1953, p.637, memo of conversation, 30 September 1953, p.646-7.

75. FRUS 1952-4, vol.7, memo of conversation, 14 October 1953, p.689-90, US Delegation at Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting to State Department, 16 October 1953, p.697; The Papers of John Foster Dulles and of Christian Herter, Chronological Correspondence Series (A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America), reel 3, Dulles memo for Eisenhower, 23 October 1953.

ratification.⁷⁶ However, progress continued to be made in discussions concerning Britain's military association with the community. The Military Committee of the EDC Interim Commission still sought closer links with British forces on the continent and the British military were flexible in meeting their suggestions. It was agreed that the RAF would second officers to the European Air Force, provide training for the Community's airmen, including German recruits, and accept European air squadrons and wings into their organisation when this was practicable. Though the Army's programme of co-operation was less extensive, they were prepared to give substantial assistance with training and to exchange personnel. The only proposals emanating from the Military Committee which the Chiefs refused to countenance were for common operational control of EDC and UK air forces and the incorporation of divisions from the European into the British army and vice versa. In November the British military representative on the EDC Interim Commission reported that though the Military Delegates Committee had reiterated their proposal for joint operational control of the two air forces, they accepted that the British draft statement of policy was "an objective endeavour to define a workable association between our forces and those of the future EDC."⁷⁷

The question that was increasingly being asked in late 1953, in the face of apparently interminable French delaying tactics, was whether there was any alternative to EDC. In August Eisenhower's Special Assistant, C.D. Jackson, asked "Does it have to be EDC, unification, free elections or else?", and suggested as a possible solution arming the Federal Republic's police force while phasing in EDC.⁷⁸ That same month the Joint Chiefs of Staff complained that "the attitude of France continues in effect to obstruct ratification of the EDC Treaty... thereby denying to NATO the German contribution in military forces and in industrial back up which are essential to an adequate European defence position". They suggested: "In the absence... of clear indications portending the early realization of EDC action to obtain a German contribution of military forces and

76. Jacques Fauvet, 'Birth and Death of a Treaty', in Lerner and Aron (eds.), *France Defeats EDC* (American Edition, MIT, New York 1957), p.141.

77. DEFE 4/64, COS(53)102nd mtg., minute 3, 3 September 1953; DEFE 5/49, COS(53)54, 9 November 1953; DEFE 6/24, JP(53)98, 29 June 1953.

78. FRUS 1952-4, vol.7, Special Assistant to the President (Jackson) to Dulles, 8 August 1953, p.613.

armaments by other means should be initiated."⁷⁹ In Britain the erstwhile international secretary of the Labour Party and recently elected MP, Denis Healey, warned that it was "preposterous" to expect the other continental powers to accept a united Germany into EDC and suggested an 'Austrian' solution to the German problem.⁸⁰ Meanwhile French politicians continued to insist that the Community in its current form was unacceptable without closer British involvement.⁸¹

The two figures whose disgruntlement with EDC was of greatest significance were Adenauer and Churchill. In March 1953 Adenauer had made a secret approach to the new American administration suggesting that German cadres should begin training according to EDC stipulations immediately after the Federal Republic had ratified the Treaty.⁸² During the following summer Adenauer intervened to ensure the phraseology of the various western notes to the Soviet Union did not prejudice his position. Then in September the Chancellor produced his own plan for reunification based on the establishment of a demilitarised zone in central Europe and the garrisoning of Germany west of the Elbe solely by EDC forces. When the Foreign Office heard rumours of this plan they made clear their hostility to the idea of British and American troop withdrawals but asked the Chiefs of Staff to consider the possibility of demilitarising the Eastern zone of Germany or establishing a narrow demilitarised belt of 10 km along the German frontier. The Chiefs dismissed the possibility of the Soviet Union accepting the demilitarisation of East Germany, unless some part of the Federal Republic was treated similarly, and when they examined this prospect concluded "on purely military grounds the UK cannot accept a plan which involves the partial evacuation... of any territory in the Western zone of Germany." They found that a small demilitarised zone would cause only minor strategic difficulties and were willing to accept it if it was politically expedient.⁸³

79. Records of the JCS, reel 8, JCS 2073/630, 24 August 1953.

80. The Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, vol.518, col.320.

81. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, memo of conversation between Faure, Dulin, Seydoux and US Officials, 30 November 1953, p.856-7.

82. The Declassified Documents Reference System (Carrolton Press), 1983, McCloy memo of Blankenhorn visit, 16 March 1953, 2512.

83. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, US High Commissioner (Conant) to the State Department, 16 September 1953, p.806; DEFE 5/49, COS(53)485, 29 September 1953 and COS(53)518, 16 October 1953; DEFE 6/24, JP(53)121, 30 September 1953.

Adenauer's initiative had come at a time when the British military were re-emphasising the need for a full scale German contribution to western defence in order to compensate for shortcoming in Alliance force levels. The Chiefs were reluctant to "haul down our flag over much of the world" in face of the cuts demanded by the radical review.⁸⁴ Nor were they willing to abandon their commitment to continental defence. However, they were quite convinced that NATO would have to accept a scaling down of its ambitions to account for the economic factors which were causing member states, including Britain, to default on their force goals. The Chiefs were beginning to consider the possibility of withdrawing divisions from the continent once the German defence contribution became effective, while the RAF was already planning to make a smaller contribution to NATO on the assumption that German air units would act as substitutes. In conducting the 1953 Annual Review, Baker, the Vice Chief of the Air Staff, noted "the RAF could no longer avoid showing its hand to NATO" about the deficiencies in their contribution. What they did not intend to reveal, however, was their plan to reduce their contribution still further. The Air Staff concluded that due to defence cuts they could not "support 500 aircraft in 2nd TAF. It seems reasonable to assume that as German forces build up they should take over a part of the responsibilities which we now hold, thus our own forces should begin to taper off in step with the German build-up." The Chiefs agreed that the maximum contribution which could be made in the long term was 372 aircraft. The army meanwhile were unable to provide the 4 divisions required by NATO at D+90. The best that could be done was to supply one division by D+105 and a second by D+120. The Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Harold Redman, suggested being "quite frank" with NATO that Britain "could not put our forces at the priority required by NATO Commanders because of national priorities which were unlikely to change... Our inability stemmed from shortage of manpower and of money."⁸⁵ By September Harding was willing to acknowledge that a forward strategy was not feasible "because the forces necessary for such a policy would clearly not be available in time." When the Chiefs examined Montgomery's latest strategic analysis, which stressed the need

84. DEFE 5/47 COS(53)332, 9 July 1953.

85. DEFE 4/64, COS(53)92nd mtg., minute 1, 23 July 1953; DEFE 4/65, COS(53)106th mtg., minute 3, 21 September 1953; DEFE 5/48, COS(53)447, 10 September 1953.

for air and naval units at the expense of conventional land forces, they were generally sympathetic. McGrigor suggested that the British army might be neglecting its role as a global power due to its commitment to Europe. He was supported by Dickson, the Chief of the Air Staff, in this analysis. Though he acknowledged current commitments to Europe could not be reduced in the long term, Dickson suggested that it should "be clearly understood that the United Kingdom contribution to Germany must diminish inversely as the German contribution increased." The Chief Staff Officer, Sir Neville Brownjohn, looked forward to the time when it would be possible to build up Britain's strategic reserve by withdrawing forces from Germany.⁸⁶ The British military had been stressing the importance of a German military contribution since 1950 and continued to do so during discussions of the 1953 NATO Annual Review⁸⁷ but it is clear that by the end of 1953 the reasons why it was regarded as essential were very different from those put forward previously. Under pressure from the Treasury, the Chiefs had cut back on their commitments to the continent and the German contribution was increasingly seen as a substitute for the forces which Britain and the other NATO countries could not supply, rather than as part of a wider force build-up.

By contrast the Foreign Office was a model of consistency. They had always regarded German rearmament as part of the process by which Germany would be integrated into the West. At the start of the decade it had been perceived as a distant last step in the process, but under American pressure it had become irrevocably tied up with the political integration of the Federal Republic with the West. Convinced that they were involved in a zero-sum game with the Soviets for control of Germany, securing the western half of the country had become a top priority for the diplomatic corps. By the end of 1953 it appeared that the political balance within western Europe was becoming unstable due to French inaction and German assertiveness. There was an increasing sense of an opportunity being lost. Thus Frederick Warner of the Foreign Office's Central department wrote of "a vicious circle: the more openly impatient with France the Germans became, the

86. DEFE 4/65, COS(53)110th mtg., minute 4, 30 September 1953, COS(53)119th mtg., 20 October 1953. For Montgomery's new strategic analysis see Ismay Papers III, 12/6/2a, Montgomery to Ismay, 12 July 1953, 12/12/1, record of Ismay's lunch party, 13 July 1953.

87. DEFE 6/24, JP(53)137, 27 November 1953, Annex C.

more Frenchmen will point to the dangerous recurrence of German nationalist feelings etc. The worry is that the same Frenchmen will use the alleged danger as an argument against ratifying EDC whereas it is an argument for ratification." In response to a letter from the High Commissioner warning of the increasing attraction of a German national army in the Federal Republic, Hancock wrote, "In fact the Germans do not at present trust themselves to have a national army... we should leave no time in taking advantage of this extraordinarily favourable situation to bring the EDC into being".⁸⁸

Churchill shared the general sense of frustration about EDC and his attitude continued to annoy the Americans. Their ambassador in Paris had suggested that a positive statement from Churchill about EDC would be useful in securing ratification and Dulles decided to take up this suggestion. When Dulles visited London in October he found the Prime Minister as unenthusiastic as ever about a European Army. Churchill "made uncomplimentary references EDC with grudging acquiescence in important early decision one way or another." He promised Bidault "he would put British troops in line with American and French again if Germany should become aggressor" in an effort to persuade him that Germany should be allowed to join NATO. Churchill's main preoccupation was still the holding of a high level conference and it was obvious to the American delegation that on this issue he was at odds with Eden and Salisbury. On returning to Washington Dulles described the idea of such a conference as "a sleeping pill" which "would have a potentially disastrous effect on both NATO and the EDC, and would enable the Russians to pull ahead while the western democracies doze."⁸⁹

Even a new Soviet note delivered on 3 November and described by the Moscow embassy as being "in the best tradition of Soviet obtrusiveness and obstinacy" did not dim Churchill's enthusiasm for a meeting with Malenkov. In a note to Eden on 5 November his veiled criticisms of the idea of a Foreign

88. FO 371/103687, C1071/585, Hope to Hood, 26 October 1953 and Hancock minute, 2 November 1953; FO371/103940, CW10116/15, Warner minute, 5 November 1953.

89. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, Ambassador in France (Dillon) to Dulles, 17 September 1953, p.809, Dulles to Embassy in France, 5 October 1953, p.816; vol.8, Dulles to the President, 16 October 1953, p.691-2, US Delegation to London Foreign Ministers Meeting, 17 October 1953, p.711, Ambassador to UK (Aldrich) to State Department, 19 October 1953, p.716-7, memo of 167th NSC meeting, 22 October 1953, p.719.

Ministers conference can be read as a coded justification of his own preference for a higher level meeting. He wrote: "I never thought anything would come of the plan made at Washington for a formal conference of Foreign Ministers to settle the German problem....I am not at all surprised, nor I gather were you, that the project collapsed....My only hope was for more friendly contacts bringing about a gradual easement while of course we all maintained our unity and strength." Alerted by the reference to "more friendly contacts", Eden replied "I feel there are serious dangers in having discussions with the bear unless we have some idea what we are to talk about and what we expect to achieve."⁹⁰ Churchill still hoped he could at least meet Eisenhower and, after the President had turned down the suggestion of a meeting in the Azores in October, the Prime Minister tried again in November with a suggestion for a conference at Bermuda. Eisenhower accepted largely because he wished to discuss the situation which resulted from "the negative character of the Soviet reply."⁹¹ On 26 November the Cabinet, guided by Eden, "agreed that, at the Bermuda conference every effort should be made to persuade the French to ratify the EDC Treaty without further delay....The essential need was that an early start should be made with the re-creation of the German army....if Germany's military strength were re-created within the framework of the EDC, this would give a greater assurance that it would not be used for an aggressive purpose; and from that point of view it was preferable that Germany's contribution to the defence of Western Europe should be made within EDC rather than through Germany's accession to NATO."⁹²

The Bermuda conference was predicated on the belief that the Soviets had abandoned any hope of reuniting Germany on their terms. Roberts wrote on 7 November that "the Soviet notes and more particularly the last note suggest that the Russians, while continuing to put spokes in wheels, must now be reconciled to the probability that the Federal Republic will be integrated within the Western alliance, and are comforting themselves with the thought that they still at least

90. FO 371/103688, C1071/618, Hayter (Moscow) to FO with text of Soviet Note, 3 November 1953; FO 371/103690, C1071/661, Hayter (Moscow) to Eden, 5 November 1953; FO371/103691, C1071/699, Churchill to Eden, 5 November 1953 and Eden to Churchill.

91. Boyle (ed.), op.cit., Churchill to Eisenhower, 7 October 1953, p.89, Eisenhower to Churchill, 8 October 1953, p.90, Churchill to Eisenhower, 5 November 1953, p.93, Eisenhower to Churchill, 6 November 1953, p.94; CAB 128/26, CC(53)64th mtg., minute 2, 9 November 1953.

92. CAB 128/26, CC(53)72nd mtg., minute 4, 26 November 1953.

retain control of eastern Germany". This reassuring analysis was complicated by the arrival on 26 November of a more conciliatory Soviet note suggesting a four power Foreign Ministers meeting in Berlin. The Allies had been calling for such a meeting since the Washington conference and could not now refuse, whatever the complications it might cause. As one Foreign Office minute put it, "Although the Note makes it clear that the chances of agreement are almost non-existent, we cannot now refuse a meeting now that the Russians have expressed their willingness to go into one without prior conditions."⁹³ One of the reasons that the chances of an agreement were so slim was that the Allies now had absolutely no concessions to offer the Soviets. The Foreign Office had taken their idea of a non-aggression pact or some other security guarantee into the preparatory tripartite discussions for the abortive Lugano conference which took place in Paris, but the Americans emasculated the idea. Five sub-committees were set up to examine various aspects of the negotiations with the Soviets. The most controversial work was done by the sub-committee dealing with security guarantees. The British argued for a non-aggression pact to reassure the Soviet Union, while the French and Americans insisted they would go no further than a declaration of intent. Roberts, as head of the British delegation, initially opposed the declaration of intent idea but eventually acquiesced. While the British and French were willing to give this declaration some substance, offering for example "to resolve by peaceful means any disputes which may arise between the Federal Republic and other states", the Americans would not go beyond a restatement of their responsibilities under the UN Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty. The sub-committee on security guarantees was the only one which failed to produce a unanimous report.⁹⁴ There was a further disagreement over the American desire to produce a declaration of intent, outlining future policy towards Germany. On this matter it was the British delegation's turn to eviscerate the planned declarations, transforming a detailed programme of reforms into a general

93. FO 371/103694, C1071/753, Hayter (Moscow) to FO with text of Soviet Note, 26 November 1953, C1071/754, FO to Washington, 27 November 1953; FO 371/103695, C1071/791, Hohler minute, 27 November 1953.

94. FO 371/103687, C1071/573, record of 2nd Tripartite Meeting of Experts, 22 October 1953, C1071/590, record of 5th Tripartite Meeting of Experts, 27 October 1953; FO 371/103691, C1071/676, official record of the Tripartite Experts Meeting, Document 2, Security Assurances.

expression of good will towards the Federal Republic.⁹⁵ The British and American initiatives cancelled one another out, leaving the Allies with little to offer either the Soviets or the Germans. The Foreign Office brief for Bermuda agreed that it would be "premature" to bring any part of the Bonn conventions into force prior to EDC ratification and suggested American pressure for a declaration of intent ought to be resisted on this basis. It noted that Eden had agreed to delay any further discussions of a declaration on European security and expressed the hope that British restraint on this subject would encourage the Americans to reciprocate on the subject of the declaration of intent.⁹⁶ However, it proved impossible to prevent the Prime Minister from raising the issue of guarantees, or 'Locarnoisms' as he called them, at Bermuda.

The Bermuda meeting was one of the most bad-tempered international conferences since Bevin and Molotov had traded insults in the immediate post-1945 conferences of Foreign Ministers. With no fresh initiative possible on Soviet or German policy, the allies took to squabbling amongst themselves. At the first plenary session held by the Heads of Government on 4 December Churchill suggested that the firm opposition of the United States combined with their economic problems "may well have brought about a definite change in Russian policy and outlook which may govern their actions for many years to come." This elicited a furious response from Eisenhower, who declared that though the Soviets might be presenting their policies differently, they still occupied the position of international prostitutes or, as the American minutes more demurely put it, "that despite both, perfume or lace, it was still the same old girl". He then abruptly adjourned the meeting.⁹⁷ The Prime Minister blamed Dulles for turning Eisenhower against a meeting with Malenkov and told his doctor a few days later "even now I have not been defeated by this bastard. I have been humiliated by my

95. The British and French were particularly concerned that the initial American draft of the Declaration of Intent referred to the withdrawal of Allied occupational forces. See FO 371/103688, C1071/605, Warner (Paris) to Hancock, 2 November 1953; FO 371/103689, C1071/640, record of 8th Tripartite Meeting of Experts, 31 October 1953; FO 371/103691, C1071/676, official record of the Tripartite Experts Meeting, Document 4, Declaration of Intent, C1071/683, Roberts to Eden, 6 November 1953.

96. FO 371/103694, C1071/771, FO brief for Bermuda, 30 November 1953.

97. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5 (pt.2) US minutes of 1st Tripartite Heads of Government Meeting, 4 December 1953, p.1758-61; John Colville, *Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries, 1939-1955* (Hodder and Stoughton, London 1985), 4 December 1953, p.683; Gilbert, *op.cit.*, p.920-23.

own decay."⁹⁸ He wished to ensure that the three powers offered some conciliatory gesture to the Soviets. On 7 December he wrote to Eden that the draft communique did not "show the slightest desire for the success of the [Berlin] Conference or for an easement in relations with Russia. We are going to gang up on them without any reference to the Locarno idea.... Many people would think that we are deliberately riding for a fall. Perhaps we are." At the fifth plenary meeting that day, during a discussion of the prospects for Berlin, Churchill said "It would be very difficult to make any arrangement if we could not do anything of interest to them.... He had read many thing in the communique on one side and few on what he called Locarnoisms or reassurances."⁹⁹

The other source of disagreement among the three western leaders was the EDC. Despite his disagreements with the Americans on the issue of guarantees for the Soviets, Churchill reserved most of his venom for the French, and on the issue of the EDC allied himself with Eisenhower in demanding action from Paris. The second plenary session was hardly an improvement on the first. Laniel, the French Prime Minister, had retired to his bed where he remained for the rest of the conference, so that Bidault was left to deal with Anglo-American demands for action. Eisenhower was relatively tactful in dealing with the French Foreign Minister but Churchill launched "an emotional attack" in which he complained that three years had been wasted in discussing the EDC. He warned that if the treaties were not ratified by France, then the Germans would have to be rearmed under NATO auspices.¹⁰⁰ During the remainder of the conference both the British and American delegations became increasingly frustrated by Bidault's failure to give a firm commitment to putting the EDC treaty before the National Assembly.¹⁰¹ The final plenary session, at which the communique was discussed, was particularly chaotic. Bidault wanted the communique to state that the fulfilment of EDC was dependent "on the solutions of problems with which France has long been faced". Churchill was furious at what he regarded as

98. Moran, op.cit., 7 December 1953, p.508.

99. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, US minutes of 5th Tripartite Heads of Government Meeting, 7 December 1953, p.1831; PREM 11/418, Churchill to Eden, 7 December 1953.

100. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, US minutes of 2nd Tripartite Heads of Government Meeting, 5 December 1953, p.1778-85; Evelyn Shuckburgh and John Charmley (ed.), *Descent to Suez: Diaries, 1951-1956* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1986), 5 December 1953, p.114.

101. Shuckburgh, op.cit., 6 December 1953, p.115; Colville, op.cit., 6 December 1953, p.685-7.

quibbling over the terms of EDC, which he damned as "a French invention". Eden was by this stage as annoyed as his chief by Bidault's attempts to place the onus for ratification of the EDC on to the British. The session actually broke up during an argument over what reference to make to the European Army in the communique. The dispute was only resolved when Eden made a visit to Laniel's sickbed and got final French agreement to a revised text.¹⁰² Churchill regarded EDC ratification as necessary in order to clear the way for a summit, the Foreign Office wanted it as a means of binding the Federal Republic to the West before the forces of German nationalism re-emerged and the Americans had made it a cornerstone of their European policy, but at Bermuda it was clear that the French were not prepared to bring the issue to its final resolution. Another eight months would pass before the treaty was finally put to the French Assembly.

The period between the death of Stalin and the Bermuda conference was one of seemingly endless frustration for the Allies, which manifested itself in a series of bad-tempered rows. Churchill fought with Adenauer, Eisenhower and most of his own government in an effort to achieve his ambition of a high level conference. The British and American Chiefs disputed the issue of force levels and a new strategy for NATO. Conant stirred up a controversy with his suggestion that Adenauer might be planning to raise a German national army and discord reigned in France's relations with her allies as the latter sought ever more urgently a resolution to the EDC saga. The fractious Bermuda meeting was only the culmination of a frustrating year. The two disputes with which the British were most actively involved were Churchill's plan for a meeting with the Soviet leaders and the British military's attempt to revise NATO strategy both of which were linked to the German rearmament issue. In the first case Churchill, who retained a mistrust of certain elements of the German nation, contemplated sacrificing a German defence contribution in order to achieve a reduction in international tension. Whereas in the winter of 1950-1 it had been the fear of Soviet aggression which had undermined British support for the concept of a German contribution to western defence, under Churchill it was the hope that some kind of

102. FRUS 1952-54, vol.5, US minutes of 6th Tripartite Heads of Government Meeting, 7 December 1953, p.1834-7; Shuckburgh, *op.cit.*, 7 December 1953, p.116; PREM 11/418, minutes of 7th Plenary Meeting at Bermuda, 7 December 1953; David Carlton, *'Anthony Eden : A Biography'* (Allen Lane, London, 1981), p.336-7.

rapprochement could be achieved which threatened to destroy the consensus. In the second case the Chiefs argued for a major revision in Allied strategy which gave a new role to the planned German army. The Federal Republic was now expected to provide substitute divisions for those which the NATO nations were unable to provide. The Prime Minister failed where the Chiefs succeeded and the result was the reinforcement of the status quo, for the new military analysis complemented the diplomatic case for German rearmament. The only thing which had changed was the military rationale for German rearmament and this was barely acknowledged.

CHAPTER 5

REVISITING RAPALLO?

The first eight months of 1954 were a period of ever increasing tension in the western alliance as policy-makers awaited the outcome of the European Army project. The pressure could not be released until the French parliament voted on the ratification of the EDC treaty. In Washington and London much of the uneasiness was due to the belief that the status quo in Germany was becoming untenable. The British and Americans feared that the demands within the Federal Republic for an end to the occupation and the creation of German armed forces were becoming so insistent that not even Adenauer would be able to prevent dire consequences should they be frustrated. They developed a dual policy of trying to bring the EDC drama to a final successful resolution, while seeking to relieve pressure on the German Chancellor by offering to implement at least some of the constitutional freedoms contained in the Bonn Conventions. Though they co-operated in pursuit of these goals, there was a latent tension between London and Washington on German policy. The American administration genuinely believed that there was no feasible alternative to EDC, while many British officials, including the Prime Minister, believed a NATO solution was preferable. Furthermore, the British government was less concerned with an immediate solution to the problem of German rearmament than with the implementation of the contract which they believed was the real key to European security. They were torn between their suspicion of the Germans, with its concomitant desire to maintain a measure of control over German rearmament, and the demands emanating from Washington for an early solution to the contractual and defence problems which would finally grant the Federal Republic its freedom. The Americans were much more anxious to begin the process of German rearmament and sought to impose a deadline for its implementation.

The British perspective partly reflected a new attitude towards the German defence contribution which was increasingly seen as a means of overcoming some of the long term problems caused by the need to economise on the defence budget, rather than as a solution to the problem of continental defence. Since the 1952 Global Strategy Paper the British Chiefs of Staff had been of the view that the solution to European defence lay in new technology rather than vast

conventional forces. The Americans only came to accept this position towards the end of 1953, and with the crucial qualification that the Europeans, including the British and Germans, ought to take responsibility for providing the conventional forces which would act as the 'shield' without which the Alliance's nuclear 'sword' would be ineffective. In fact both the American and British military establishments hoped that the implementation of EDC would allow them to make reductions in their commitments to the European continent, though neither was willing to inform their allies of these plans. The promises they made to the French on maintaining current force levels were hedged around with qualifications. Though the financial arguments for and against German rearmament were of little importance, the discussion of the technicalities which occurred during the first half of 1954 revealed that the burdens imposed by the continental commitment on the Exchequer were likely to increase substantially in the post-contractual period.

The American equivalent of the British Global Strategy Paper was NSC 162/2 which was approved by Eisenhower in October 1953. This stated that, in terms of their employment in a future war, nuclear weapons would be regarded as just as legitimate as conventional forces. It was intended that this new emphasis on nuclear weapons would allow for a reduction in American commitments overseas and hence provide a more cost effective means of meeting America's global commitments. Eisenhower stated "that the real issue was not the pros and cons of redeployment, but rather how fast such a redeployment could be carried out."¹ It was clear to him that the process could not begin immediately and he reacted angrily when Defence Secretary Wilson suggested at a National Security Council meeting held in preparation for the December North Atlantic Council in Paris, that there was a desire in America "to bring our forces home." Eisenhower responded "that our great objective at the moment was to secure the ratification of EDC. Accordingly... we could not afford to take any steps towards redeployment, or even to talk about redeployment, until these objectives had been reached." Paris did, however, provide an opportunity to inform the Allies of what

1. Klaus A. Maier, 'The Federal Republic of Germany as a Battlefield in American Nuclear Strategy', p.396-7 and Bruno Thoss, 'American Troops in Germany and German-American Relations 1949-1956', p.420-1 in Jeffrey M. Diefendorf, Axel Frohn and Herman Josef Rupieper (eds.), *American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany 1945-1955* (Cambridge University Press, 1993).

Dulles described as the "added capabilities for defence conferred by new weapons", and to bring further pressure to bear on the French to ratify the EDC treaty. On 14 December Dulles informed the Allies that if EDC should fail "there would indeed be great doubt as to whether continental Europe could be made a place of safety. That would compel an agonising reappraisal of United States policy... Unless unity is achieved soon, different and divisive forces may take command."²

Not surprisingly in view of the long campaign which the British Chiefs had waged in favour of a strategy placing greater reliance on new weapons in conjunction with a reduction in conventional force goals, the British supported the American 'New Look'. There was some disappointment that SACEUR had not yet produced the lower force goals which the British military deemed appropriate for the new nuclear dependent strategy. However, the Military Committee of NATO had accepted British views on the urgency of German rearmament within the EDC and on the need for a new policy directive. Powell of the Ministry of Defence informed the Chiefs on 2 December that the Americans were now finally "sold on the 'long haul' concept."³ As far as the British were concerned, one of the most important aspects of the new strategy was the scope it provided for economies in the defence budget. Alexander's presentation to the North Atlantic Council stressed the "need for German force contribution and need to go on increasing NATO forces and raising their efficiency within politico-economic capabilities." He said that the aim of NATO now should be "to press on with task of reviewing and reassessing pattern of our defense efforts against background of political and economic assumptions which they have been given and taking into account as realistically as possible effect of new weapons."⁴ Though Paris marked an advance for the British strategy of the 'long haul' it did not see any progress made towards the other major goal of the Chiefs of Staff; the implementation of EDC. Following Bidault's obstreperous performance at Bermuda and the minatory

2. Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954, vol.5,(pt.1) Memorandum of 174th NSC meeting, 10 December 1953, p.450-1, Statement by Secretary of State to North Atlantic Council, 14 December 1953, p.463.

3. DEFE 4/67, COS(53)137th mtg., minute 1, 2 December 1953, COS(53)139th mtg., minute 1, 4 December 1953; DEFE 6/24, JP(53)137 (Final), 27 November 1953.

4. FRUS 1952-54, vol.5, US Delegation to the North Atlantic Council to the State Department, 16 December 1953, p.472.

tone employed by Dulles at Paris, it was evident that the European Army idea was likely to remain a source of dangerous conflict for months to come. On 22 December Harding suggested to the other Chiefs "that it would be prudent therefore to give increased attention to possible alternative methods of raising German armed forces."⁵ This proposal was endorsed by his colleagues but the process of reassessment was to demonstrate just how difficult it was to find an effective means of integrating the Federal Republic into western defence without reviving fears of German militarism.

On 5 February the Foreign Office sent a long paper to the Chiefs outlining what they regarded as the two main alternatives to a European Army. The favoured option, should EDC fail, was the admission of Germany to NATO. This had the advantages of including the United States and Canada, of being relatively simple to implement and of providing an effective means of containing Germany. The Foreign Office noted that "NATO is the organisation best suited, failing EDC, to contain the Germans. The British counterweight by itself might not suffice to restrain Germany". In order to prevent German domination of the Alliance the Foreign Office produced a list of safeguards. There would have to be restrictions on German arms production, both to prevent the Soviets from gaining access to important assets during any offensive in central Europe and to ensure that the Germans themselves did not "misuse" their military potential. The size of German armed forces would be controlled by an agreement between the NATO partners that no member state would be allowed to maintain any forces independent of SACEUR's control except for a gendarmerie, a bodyguard for the head of state, forces required by other NATO commanders or forces required for defence responsibilities outside the NATO area. This last qualification was an effective means of discriminating against Germany which had no out of area commitments. The Foreign Office were confident that the creation of more integrated NATO structures, which would control the armed forces, production and infrastructure programmes of the member states, would prove effective against any new German threat. Though recognising the difficulties of gaining American, French and German acceptance of the restructuring of NATO, they still believed this was the best and most practical alternative. The other option

5. DEFE 4/67, COS(53)144th mtg., minute 1, 22 December 1953.

considered was German membership of the Brussels Treaty Organisation and the revival of the military structures of the Western Union. The principal objections to this were that it would weaken the Atlantic link and force the United Kingdom to take up the leadership of Europe, with all the responsibilities in the form of continental commitments that this would entail. Even with Britain taking a vigorous lead and the Americans giving the project their support, "there will be a danger that the Germans and not ourselves will become the dominant element." The Foreign Office were, however, attracted by the fact that this scheme would exclude Italy. This would remove the danger of "a Rome-Bonn axis" as well as dividing "a rather unhealthy grouping of the Catholic powers". Nevertheless, they concluded that this policy would involve "for the United Kingdom a new departure in European leadership with its attendant risks and continental commitments. Even if we were ready to accept these, there would be immense political difficulties to overcome."⁶

The military, who had been among the first to point out the merits of the European Army scheme, were very unhappy with the alternatives presented to them by the Foreign Office. The report produced by the Joint Planners on 3 March was critical of the Brussels Treaty option. Like the Foreign Office they emphasised that this solution would be much more complex and time-consuming than German membership of NATO. Their main concern, however, was that the resurrection of the Brussels Treaty would weaken the Atlantic link. The fear was that if the Americans became divorced from European defence planning they might have "an opportunity... to reduce their active participation in European defence, a possibility which would of itself make the plan unacceptable." Commenting on the Joint Planners work, the Chiefs declared that the European option was "definitely unacceptable". The JPS report gave a cautious endorsement to the Foreign Office plan for German entry into NATO, while pointing out the many practical difficulties of integration. However, this aspect of the JPS paper and of the Foreign Office proposals was much less acceptable to the Chiefs. They doubted the practicality of the measures designed to integrate Germany's defence effort into the Western alliance and were particularly critical of the idea of a European arms pool. On the subject of force restrictions the Chiefs insisted the

6. DEFE 5/51, COS(54)41, 5 February 1954.

Joint Planners redraft their paper "to indicate that it would be extremely difficult to devise a formula that would prevent the Germans from 'cheating' in relation to the strength of their armed and hidden national forces." They were "sceptical" about the formula devised by the Foreign Office to prevent any forces being formed outside the auspices of NATO. The paper which the Chiefs finally approved stressed the importance of finding a formula which would limit German forces "while, at the same time, safeguarding the national position of UK Fighter and Bomber Commands." After reiterating the practical problems with the NATO solution, the Chiefs concluded that "The greatest difficulties and dangers brought out by the report indicated the importance of achieving ratification of the EDC Treaty."⁷

Hood was unimpressed by the Chiefs' negative approach to the NATO option. The JPS had recommended that the Germans should not be allowed possession of strategic bombers and the Chiefs had sought an additional moratorium on German submarines. Hood told them that these measures "conflicted with the whole concept of the Foreign Office suggestions which were based on the assumption that the Germans would not agree to any arrangements which would involve discrimination against them... the best safeguard against the resurgence of German militarism was to bring Germany into NATO... It would have to be accepted that there was no absolute guarantee that Germany would play fair and it was inevitable that considerable reliance would have to be placed on her good will." The Chiefs responded bluntly that they "would be failing in their duty if, at this stage, they did not make clear that in their considered opinion there was considerable danger in making no reservations in relation to the production by Germany of submarines, strategic aircraft and fissile material." Their report, published the next day, stated "We consider it essential that Germany shall re-arm but we would point out that certain aspects of her re-armament might involve a grave potential threat to the security of the United Kingdom. We would view with very serious misgivings any resurrection by her of strategic air or submarine forces, and consider that these should not be permitted to her. We consider further that she should not be allowed to possess fissile

7. DEFE 4/69, COS(54)27th mtg., minute 4, 11 March 1954; DEFE 5/52, COS(54)94, 26 March 1954; DEFE 6/25, JP(54)20 (Final), 3 March 1954.

material."⁸

In May 1953 Churchill had suggested making the EDC treaty made palatable to the Soviets by a security guarantee similar to Locarno, or offering a unified, demilitarised Germany, but his proposals were not treated seriously by the allies. On 16 December the representatives of the occupying powers met in Paris to resume their discussion of Germany's future. Their task now was to consider the tactics which the foreign ministers should adopt during the forthcoming meeting with the Soviets in Berlin. Since the Prime Minister's Commons speech of 11 May, the British had been attempting to devise some form of security guarantee which would reassure the Soviets that EDC had no offensive purpose. By the end of the year, however, the Foreign Office were no longer prepared to press the matter. Against their advice Churchill had raised the issue of "Locarnoisms" at Bermuda and had been rebuffed. From Moscow the new ambassador, Hayter, declared "I am inclined to agree with a remark Chip Bohlen made to me... that the only security guarantee in which the Russians would be interested would be a guarantee that we would not rearm Germany." At Paris Roberts abandoned the Locarno proposals. The officials of the three powers agreed that neither a mutual assistance treaty nor a non-aggression pact was acceptable. All they were prepared to offer Moscow was a non-contractual declaration of intent intended to reassure Moscow of their pacific intentions. Agreement was also reached that any Soviet proposal for a demilitarised zone in Germany would be treated with the "greatest reserve". The experts reported to their governments that "any demilitarised zone would form a vacuum in Europe and which might well become the scene of frequent incidents and would afford very questionable security."⁹

The Foreign Office were convinced that the Soviets had no intention of deviating from their standard proposals for unification based on the merger of the

8. DEFE 4/69, COS(54)33rd mtg., minute 4, 24 March 1954; DEFE 5/52, COS(54)94, 26 March 1954.

9. FO 371/103695, C1071/798, Hayter to Roberts, 10 November 1953; FO 371/103700, C1071/951, report on the Tripartite Talks in Paris, Document 4 on the Problem of Security in Europe, 21 December 1953; FO 371/103701, C1071/977, report from Paris on Tripartite Talks on the Problem of Security in Europe, 19 December 1953. The British position going into the tripartite talks had been that a non-aggression pact would be the best means of securing Soviet acceptance of German unification within EDC. After the meeting of officials in Paris this concept was abandoned. Compare CAB 129/63, C(53)256, 14 September 1953 with CAB 129/65, C(54)10 including annexes A and B, 11 January 1954.

governments of West and East Germany. At the same time they insisted that the western powers should make no concessions to the Soviets during the conference. Stalemate was the expected outcome. Hayter wrote that "it seems difficult to imagine that in the absence of fresh developments the Kremlin expect the conference to reach agreement even of a limited scope. They show no signs of having modified any of their fundamental requirements and not many of hoping that we can be convinced to modify ours." This analysis received a string of endorsements in the Foreign Office. From Germany Johnston suggested that "a fairly early breakdown" must be expected over whether an all-German government or all-German elections should come first. He tried to introduce some flexibility into the British position, which gave priority to free elections, by suggesting that separate polls should take place in East and West Germany under international supervision prior to the formation of an all-German government. Roberts rejected this "very ingenious" suggestion, citing as one of the reasons for his opposition that it might give the communists some say in the negotiation of a peace treaty.¹⁰

The main purpose of the Berlin conference as far as the diplomatic corps were concerned was to facilitate ratification of the EDC treaty in France. In order to impress European public opinion it was necessary to present a realistic programme for German reunification. The two main difficulties in formulating such a plan were the status of the East and West German governments during the transition from free elections to the signature of a peace treaty and whether the government of a united Germany should be allowed the freedom to join whichever international groupings it chose. The Foreign Office were prepared to allow the Germans to formulate their own solution to the former problem but the second was of greater concern as it obviously had crucial implications for EDC. Discussing tactics at Berlin, Anthony Nutting commented that the Soviets were "nothing like ready to make any settlement. Therefore we should treat Berlin as a cold war exercise... French ratification of EDC very largely hangs on its outcome". He suggested that the West should emphasise the point, already conceded to the Federal Republic in the Bonn Conventions, that a reunited

10. FO 371/103696, C1071/836 Hayter to FO, 1 December 1953 with Pallister minute, 9 December 1953, Hancock minute 10 December 1953, Hohler minute, 11 December 1953; FO 371/109269, C1071/5, Johnston to Hancock, 31 December 1953 with Roberts minute, 11 January 1954.

Germany should be free to decide its own international relations, including whether or not to join EDC. Roberts wrote in support of this line that "By concentration upon... free elections leading to the formation of a free all-German government which must decide its own international relationships, we should also get over the main public relations difficulties... i.e. suggestion that we are asking the Russians not only to make concessions over German reunification but also to accept German membership of the EDC." Eden told the Cabinet that he intended to stress at Berlin that under the British plan Germany would be free to decide its own international alignments but that this concession was made without any expectation that it would be accepted. As Kirkpatrick commented on Nutting's original memorandum, the risk of a German refusal to join was "not real, for the Russians will not accept the proposal but will insist that Germany should be compulsorily neutralised, an alternative which is much more dangerous for us." Eden responded: "I like all this".¹¹

Thus the Foreign Office expected Berlin to be a propaganda battle and intended to be victorious in the war of words. The discussion of German policy itself had now become sterile as officials repeated old dogmas, but what is interesting is the extent to which they believed they had reached a *modus vivendi* with the Soviets on the subject of German rearmament. Roberts recorded a conversation between Russian and French officials during which the Soviet diplomat, Rodionov, stated "The Soviet Union could not make concessions over free elections... At the same time the Russians realised there was no reason for the Western Powers to abandon their thesis about free elections etc." Rodionov also apparently conceded that "the most unacceptable form of German rearmament for the Soviet Union would be full and independent German membership of NATO. The least unacceptable form... was German membership of the EDC." Kirkpatrick minuted "I believe that the Russians have come to the same conclusion as we have, namely that a rearmed Germany on her own presents no great threat but that a rearmed Germany is a dangerous accession of

11. FO 371/109271, C1071/89, Nutting to Secretary of State, 30 December 1953 with Kirkpatrick minute, 30 December 1953, Eden minute, 31 December 1953; FO 371/109275, C1071/218, Roberts minute, 9 January 1954, C1071/222, Steering Brief for Berlin conference, January 1954; FO 371/109276, C1071/232, Brief for Berlin on the Establishment of an all-German Government, January 1954; CAB 129/65, C(54)13, 11 January 1954.

strength to any potentially hostile consortium... it is probably true that the Russians have really reconciled themselves to EDC."¹² This opinion was apparently confirmed by a conversation Eden had with Molotov at Berlin on 27 January. Eden wrote to London that his discussion with Molotov "confirmed my impression that if we proceed firmly but unprovocatively with the EDC the Soviet Union will as so often in the past acquiesce in this as a fait accompli despite all their efforts to destroy it. But we shall never succeed in persuading them to accept it as corresponding to the general including the Soviet interest."¹³ It is clear from both these versions that the British now regarded EDC as the form of German rearmament which was least likely to provoke a reaction from Moscow. This development was of particular significance because both the Attlee and Churchill governments had been fearful of the likely Soviet reaction to the rearmament of Germany by the West.

The atmosphere at Berlin was cordial but, as had been expected, no progress was made towards an agreement on German reunification. From the outset the western allies aimed for a break with the Soviets over Germany which would facilitate ratification of EDC in France after the conference. There was some discussion in the Foreign Office of the need to boost German morale by reaching some minor agreements with the Soviets on issues such as interzonal trade but Roberts placed this in context with his statement that "we and the Russians are really both shadow-boxing in that neither of us really wants to unite Germany soon. They will use the conference to delay the EDC and, if possible, confuse the whole western alliance. We, on the other hand, want to be able, immediately after the conference, to complete our plans for EDC etc".¹⁴ In Washington Dulles told the National Security Council "that the forthcoming Berlin meeting would be more important in its negative than in its positive aspects... this meeting might represent the last major Soviet effort to disrupt the Western Alliance and to destroy the security of Western Europe. If this effort failed, our

12. FO 371/109271, C1071/75, Roberts to Kirkpatrick, 8 January 1954, Kirkpatrick minute, 8 January 1954.

13. FO 371/109277, C1071/288, UK Delegation to Berlin to FO, 28 January 1954; FRUS 1952-4, vol.7, US Delegation to Berlin to State Department, 28 January 1954, p.850.

14. FO 371/109269, C1071/14, Hancock minute, 23 December 1953, Roberts minute, 24 December 1953, Kirkpatrick minute, 24 December 1953; FO 371/10273, C1071/146, FO (Hancock) to Johnston, 21 January 1954.

own programme would succeed."¹⁵ The highlight of the meeting for the western powers was the presentation of the Eden Plan on German reunification. It proposed a five stage process towards unification involving free elections, the convocation of a national assembly, the drafting of a constitution, the formation of an all-German government and finally the negotiation of a peace treaty. As agreed by the allies in the preparations for the meeting, it stated that "The all-German government shall have authority to assume or reject the international rights and obligations of the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone of Germany and to conclude such other international agreements as it may wish."¹⁶ The plan, of course, proved unacceptable to the Russians.

The Berlin conference did not produce the desired effect of hastening French ratification of EDC but it did finally persuade the Labour opposition in Britain to support government policy on German rearmament. In office the Labour Party had accepted the principle of a German defence contribution, while seeking to delay its implementation in practise. In opposition they had continued to argue for postponement of German rearmament until in February 1954 Attlee finally decided to settle the issue by a vote of the Parliamentary Labour Party. This only served to reveal the bitter divisions among Labour MPs. A motion by Wilson opposing German rearmament was defeated by the precarious margin of 111 votes to 109.¹⁷ During the first day of the Commons debate on the Berlin conference, Morrison praised Eden for the "genuine attempt" he had made to reach a German settlement and Nutting was able to declare that during the debate there had "been a remarkable amount of agreement and a remarkable lack of division". The next day Attlee opined that Eden had "showed a great deal of patience", but the Labour dissenters, with the aid of the rebel Conservative Viscount Hinchingbrooke, launched a sustained assault on government policy

15. FRUS 1952/4, vol.7, memo of 181st NSC Meeting, 21 January 1954, p.781. See also James B. Conant, *My Several Lives* (Harper and Row, New York, 1990), p.603.

16. FO 371/109278, C1071/321, UK proposals, Eden Plan, 29 January 1954: FO 371/109279, C1071/332, record of proceedings at the 5th Plenary Meeting of the Berlin conference, 29 January 1954.

17. Kenneth Harris, *Attlee* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1982), p.515-6; Tony Benn, *Years of Hope: Diaries, Letters and Papers* (ed. Ruth Winstone, Hutchinson, London, 1994), 23 February 1954, p.177-8; Roy Jenkins, *A Life at the Centre* (Macmillan, London, 1991), p.106. Janet Davies, *The Backbench Diaries of Richard Crossman* (Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, London, 1981), 3 March 1954, p.291-2.

which demonstrated that the Commons remained split on the issue.¹⁸

Within the government the debate continued over how to encourage the French to ratify EDC and what alternative to adopt should they refuse to do so. One complication was removed by Churchill's decision to give his full support to the policy of rearming Germany. He wrote to Eden in Berlin that "we must stand by the principle of a German contingent either to EDC or an amended NATO. This alone gives the West the chance of obtaining the necessary strength by creating a European or internationalized German army but not a National one". He now evinced the arguments against a neutralised Germany that he had rejected before his stroke, namely that "we should in no circumstances agree to Germany being reduced to a neutralised, defenceless hiatus (sic) which would only be the preliminary to another Czechoslovakia process."¹⁹ The Prime Minister's hopes of attending a summit now rested on the successful conclusion of negotiations on Indochina and Korea.

There was no great disagreement on the need to offer yet more concessions to the French in order to facilitate EDC ratification. On returning from Berlin Eden told the Cabinet of his concern for the future of Germany. He had gained the "impression from many Germans... that Western Germany was becoming impatient of the policy of the Western Powers. The Germans were once again growing prosperous and with their prosperity had come a strain of arrogance." Over the next few months this concern was to be transformed into alarm at the prospect of a German break with the West. In February 1954, however, Eden still hoped EDC could be ratified reasonably quickly if Britain agreed to further concessions. His initial suggestion was that a brigade group of the BAOR might be integrated into the European Army.²⁰ The British military were reluctantly prepared to go even further than this and incorporate a whole British division into the EDC force. The previous month the Foreign Office had warned the Chiefs of the "very serious crisis" which would occur if EDC was not ratified. As usual the military treated the request to give further support to the EDC sympathetically. They were not prepared to accept common operational

18. The Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, vol.524, cols. 425, 519, 575, 594-6, 645-52.

19. PREM 11/665, FO to Berlin, 27 January 1954; CAB 128/27, CC(54)8th mtg., minute 5, 10 February 1954.

20. CAB 128/27, CC(54)10th mtg., minute 1, 22 February 1954.

control of the British and European air forces, nor to give any promises to maintain indefinitely the current level of forces on the continent. The former was impractical while the latter would obviously jeopardise the Army's plans to reduce its commitment to Europe once German forces were created. However, the Chiefs were prepared to consider some sort of promise to maintain current "fighting capacity", with the proviso that this would only be for a short period and would be subject to change if the international situation altered. In addition they were willing to accept EDC divisions into the BAOR on a temporary basis and vice versa whenever this proved practicable.²¹ When Hood returned to the Chiefs to explain that "if we were to influence the French... it would have to be made clear that a British formation would be available permanently to the EDC" he found them reluctant to agree, but ultimately willing to accept that the proposal might be necessary. Among the many faults they found with the idea was that "Against the background of reduced defence expenditure it would be very difficult to obtain sanction for any really long term commitment for British forces." Despite this Redman made it clear that Harding was willing to commit a division to EDC as the most practical option and the Army's opinion seems to have been decisive.²² On 10 March Eden presented the military's proposals to the Cabinet where it was noted that the concessions would be "worthwhile" if they achieved the desired goal of EDC ratification.²³

This British concession, combined with a restatement of the American government's attitude towards EDC, did result in some progress during the spring of 1954. On 15 March Eden wrote to the British representative at the EDC conference in Paris, Steel, instructing him to present the new British proposals while making clear that Britain would retain the "right to remove forces from Europe to meet an emergency outside the NATO area and that the introduction of new weapons or a change in the international situation might make possible a general reduction in the level of NATO forces." He was to emphasise that there

21. DEFE 4/68, COS(54)2nd mtg., minute 1A, 7 January 1954, COS(54)4th mtg., minute 4, 19 January 1954; DEFE 5/51, COS(54)14, 14 January 1954.

22. DEFE 4/69, COS(54)22nd mtg., minute 4, 3 March 1954.

23. CAB 128/27, CC(54)17th mtg., minute 4, 10 March 1954; CAB 129/66, C(54)93, 9 March 1954. Victor Rothwell, *Anthony Eden: A Political Biography* (Manchester University Press, 1992), P.154; Maj-Gen Edward Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: A History* (Macmillan, London, 1980), p.253.

would be a serious problem once the full £80 million cost of British forces in Germany fell on the British Exchequer.²⁴ Despite these reservations Laniel told the American ambassador on 23 March "that British and United States assurances were satisfactory and that United Kingdom in particular would change the view of a considerable number of deputies."²⁵ On 13 April the EDC Interim Commission finally approved the statement on military association between British and American forces and the agreement was signed.²⁶ Following a discussion with Dulles on 14 April, during which both men praised Britain's new policy towards EDC, Laniel promised to set a date for the submission of the treaty to the National Assembly.²⁷

Though the British government made its offer to the French in good faith, in retrospect it is possible to question whether they were not being somewhat injudicious in making a commitment which, for financial reasons, they might have great difficulty in keeping. The current arrangements for a German financial contribution to defence were hugely advantageous and this would make the adaptation to the changed post-contractual situation even more difficult. The British forces in Germany actually found it impossible to spend their full share of the DM600 million paid monthly to the allies by the Germans. This was partly because the British High Commission had been wary of beginning long term capital projects which might extend into the post-contractual period. It was agreed in February that execution of capital works projects should be accelerated in an effort to spend the excess funds.²⁸ The British underspend also seemed likely to prejudice their position in discussions of the post-contractual German defence contribution. In the second half of 1953 a consensus emerged in favour of extending the April 1953 agreement to the end of 1954. Though this would involve an immediate reduction in the German contribution to the upkeep of Allied forces

24. FO 800/779, Eden to Steel, 15 March 1954.

25. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the State Department, 23 March 1954, p.912.

26. DEFE 5/53, COS(54)227, 8 July 1954.

27. The Declassified Documents Reference System (Carrolton Press), 1981, 532B, memo of Conversation between Laniel, Bidault and Dulles, 14 April 1954; Jacques Fauvet, 'Birth and Death of a Treaty', in Aron and Lerner (eds.), *France Defeats EDC* (US edition, MIT, New York, 1957), p.153-4. Despite the conditions set by Laniel a number of Gaullist Ministers threatened to resign when he insisted upon setting 18 May as the date to begin ratification.

28. T225/411, memo of a meeting of officials, 25 February 1954, Hoyer-Millar to FO, 26 April 1954, Hoyer-Millar to FO, 27 April 1954.

from DM600 to DM400 million a month as soon as the EDC and the contract came into force, the Foreign Office could not envisage the Germans accepting any increase in the Allied share and the Treasury accepted this argument.²⁹ This brought the British into conflict with the Americans who wanted to replace the current "arbitrary" figures with a new NATO assessment of the scale of the expected total German financial contribution to defence. However, with delays to EDC ratification continuing, they agreed to support the extension of the April 1953 agreement to the end of the year.³⁰ The next difficulty was getting the Germans to accept this. When Schaeffer, the German Minister of Finance, met Allied representatives in May he claimed that he could no longer agree to the figure of DM950 million a month for Allied and German forces in the post-occupation period and cited the vast underspend resulting from the current DM600 million agreement as evidence that the Allied share of the total should be reduced. This was obviously unwelcome to the Foreign Office and British woes increased when the following month the Americans suggested scaling down the current DM600 million allocation to DM500 million. In July the Allied High Commission pressurised Schaeffer into accepting the extension of the post-contractual agreement until the end of the year but the Federal government now made clear its determination to abrogate the current DM600 million agreement at the end of September. The issue was still unresolved when the French Assembly rejected the EDC Treaty at the end of August.³¹

The British military now regarded German rearmament as part of the solution to the long term problem of an affordable defence for Western Europe rather than as an urgent military requirement. In February the Chiefs had received a request from Gruenther for information on what forces the British would make available to him during the first six months of war. This provided an opportunity to inform him of the shift away from a continental strategy which had

29. T225/409, Crawford to France, 6 July 1953, Allen minute, 8 October 1953, Treasury memo, 12 November 1953, FO to UK Permanent Delegation (Paris), 25 November 1953.

30. T225/410, Washington (Makins) to FO, 10 December 1953, FO to Washington, 11 December 1953, Washington (Makins) to FO, 19 January 1954, Hoyer-Millar to Jackling, February 1954, UK Permanent Delegation (Paris) (Steel) to FO, 1 March 1953.

31. CAB 134/1047, MAC(G)(54)4th mtg., 19 May 1954, MAC(G)(54)5th mtg., 14 June 1954, MAC(G)(54)8th mtg., 26 July 1954; T225/411, Jackling (Bonn) to Crawford, 13 May 1954, FO to UK High Commission, 20 May 1954, Hoyer-Millar (Bonn) to FO, 10 June 1954, Hoyer-Millar (Bonn) to FO, 23 June 1954; T225/412, Hoyer-Millar(Bonn) to FO, 13 July 1954, Hoyer-Millar (Bonn) to FO, 24 July 1954.

been under way since 1952. In 1953 the Chiefs had agreed that they could only earmark two reserve divisions as reinforcements for NATO. Conscious of their own limited resources and the potential problem of moving troops to the continent under war-time conditions, the Army was convinced that it would be impossible to provide SACEUR with two extra divisions until M+90 at the earliest. Their efforts were now increasingly concentrated on creating a strategic reserve in Britain. The Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Harold Redman, suggested "it would have to be made clear that any forces built up in the United Kingdom during the period up to M+180 would not necessarily be committed to NATO." This policy was supported by Dickson. The Air Staff were conscious of the fact that their own contribution to continental defence would become a "wasting asset" after M+30. On 14 April the Defence Committee accepted the impracticality of providing reserve units before M+90 and agreed that SACEUR should be informed of the decision to concentrate on the build-up of a strategic reserve. However, the British did not reveal their thoughts about the future of British forces on the continent. On 20 April the Joint Planning Staff requested an opinion from the Chiefs on whether the H-bomb would allow for a reduction in NATO forces or obviate the need for a German defence contribution. The answer to both questions was negative. Nevertheless, when it came to the issue of Britain's contribution to continental defence, the Chiefs felt compelled to consider the financial restraints imposed upon them. During May they discussed the possibility of "a phased reduction in our contributions to NATO". They agreed that the British government "should not give the impression that any reduction in our present contributions was unthinkable. When a German contribution had become effective it might be strategically possible to effect some reduction." Though they described this as a political decision their willingness to contemplate it demonstrates that the new military rationale behind German rearmament.³²

However, the diplomatic need for some resolution of the EDC-contract, saga was becoming still more urgent. During early 1954 doubts were increasing in

32. DEFE 4/68, COS(54)18th mtg., minute 4, 18 February 1954; DEFE 4/69, COS(54)36th mtg., minute 4, 31 March 1954, COS(54)43rd mtg., minute 4; DEFE 5/52, COS(54)158, 14 May 1954; DEFE 6/25, JP(54)39 (Final), 29 April 1954; CAB 131/14, D(54)5th mtg., minute 3, 14 April 1954, D(54)21, 3 April 1954.

both Britain and the United States about whether France would ever ratify EDC. Eisenhower was becoming impatient with the constant delays resulting from the French preconditions for ratification. At a meeting of the NSC in March he asked "Must we go on forever coddling the French?" However, when the Deputy Secretary of Defence, Keys, suggested threatening the French that if they did not ratify EDC the US would withdraw its troops from Europe, Eisenhower made clear his opposition to this alternative.³³ In Washington, with the President vetoing any discussion of a peripheral defence, there seemed to be no alternative but to press ahead single-mindedly with the EDC project.

With the long-standing policy of support for EDC being constantly undermined by French delaying tactics, the Foreign Office began to reconsider its policy towards Germany during the spring and summer of 1954. The sense that the European balance was being undermined by French vacillation in the face of growing German assertiveness produced a crisis atmosphere in which the Foreign Office reconsidered the fundamentals of its policy towards continental Europe and reasserted the importance of the political integration of West Germany, even if this required a delay in a German defence contribution. What was in fact occurring was a return to the principles which had governed policy in the 1950-51 period. On both occasions the ingrained British distrust of the German character created a fear that they might once again destabilise the delicate post-war European balance. Though Strang's belief that the Germans would always be a menace to European peace was no longer so prominent, Foreign Office officials remained convinced that if the Federal Republic was given complete liberty to pursue an independent foreign policy she would eventually opt for an alliance with the Soviet Union. The solution to this problem, agreed upon following long negotiations with the Americans and French, was the creation of a political and military framework inside which the Germans could be safely integrated into the West. This took concrete form in the EDC treaty and the Bonn Conventions. Though willing to support German rearmament within the EDC as part of the overall settlement, the Foreign Office had always regarded the new political relationship as their priority. By summer 1954, however, the deterioration in the German political situation, which they had always predicted would occur unless

33. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, memo of 187th NSC mtg., 4 March 1954, p.886-90.

progress was made with the task of integrating the Federal Republic into the West, appeared to have begun. Urgent remedial action in the form of the implementation of the contract was required, whatever the fate of EDC might be.

In Germany the American High Commissioner, Conant, was concerned about the threat to the Federal Republic's stability resulting from the sense of German frustration at the current prevarication in Paris over EDC and the restoration of sovereignty. At the start of the year Adenauer decided to take advantage of his majorities in the Bundestag and Bundesrat to seek an amendment to the constitution, or Basic Law, which would ensure the legality of German rearmament. By March, however, Adenauer's actions had created a crisis. Though the Americans and British were unperturbed by the constitutional change, the French refused to authorise them unless Adenauer agreed to sign the protocols to the EDC Treaty, which had been agreed in February 1953, on behalf of the Head of State, President Heuss. This extremely complex dispute, which raised issues concerning the status of the EDC protocols as interpretative texts, the nature of the Federal Republic's Basic Law and the role of the High Commission in Germany, aroused bitter feelings in the Federal Republic. Conant wrote to the State Department that the French position was "having serious influence on domestic politics here and threatens to divide coalition parties and even split Chancellor's own party. State of excitement has been aroused which given nature of German temperament may well explode in undesirable ways with increasing bitterness."³⁴

Following a strong warning from Dulles to Bidault, the French finally agreed to sign the amendment to the Basic Law on 25 March.³⁵ Two days later Conant suggested to a meeting of lawyers in Frankfurt that it might now be necessary to separate the contract from the EDC in order to bring the occupation to an end. E.R. Warner, the deputy head of the Foreign Office's German Department, supported this idea declaring "we shall on the one hand be under very great pressure from the Federal Government and German public opinion,

34. FO 371/109715, CW1641/5, Ward to Eden, 1 February 1954; FO 371/109717, CW1641/50, Hoyer-Millar to FO, 21 March 1954; FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, US High Commissioner (Conant) to State Department, 24 March 1954, p.915.

35. FO 371/109717, CW1641/64, Hoyer-Millar to FO, 25 March 1954; FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, Dulles to Bidault, 24 March 1954, p.918.

while on the other hand we shall meet endless further delays and hesitations from the French about the alternative nature of a defence contribution. If we are not to have a first-class German crisis on our hands as well as a French crisis, we shall have to be prepared to terminate the occupation without waiting for final agreement on a defence contribution." Though other officials were sceptical of this solution, Roberts acknowledged that the link between the contract and the EDC could not be maintained beyond the autumn.³⁶

By early May Conant was recommending that the occupation be terminated, citing as evidence of the deterioration of the Chancellor's position, his "unprecedented difficulty" in obtaining coalition support for his Saar policy and the promotion in German newspapers of the idea of a German national army.³⁷ The Laniel government was by this stage embroiled in the catastrophic consequences of the failure of their Dien Bien Phu operation in Indochina and was unable to put EDC before the National Assembly on the specified date. On 28 May, three weeks after the fall of Dien Bien Phu, Roberts met Crouy-Chanel of the French Embassy who warned that EDC would never be acceptable in France and that it was time to consider the alternatives. Roberts stressed the need for a quick solution "if we were not to find ourselves in an embarrassing and dangerous position in Germany." Kirkpatrick, who had now replaced Strang as Permanent Under-Secretary, minuted acerbically, "I have always believed that the real 'German danger' lies in the Germans' traditional inclination to do a deal with the East. But whatever Crouy may say, the French conception of the German danger is a lot of repugnant men in picklehaube invading France and routing a lesser number of valiant Frenchmen wearing red trousers and blue coats. Unless we are careful my bad dream will come true. The Russians could offer the Germans enormous inducements. We have only one little inducement to offer; membership of the Smarter Club." A few weeks later Kirkpatrick told Churchill's private secretary, Jock Colville, that there were "dangerous movements" in

36. FO 371/109576, CW1072/6, Ward to FO, 29 March 1954, Pallister minute, 31 March 1954, Warner minute, 2 April 1954; Laskey minute, 5 April 1954, Hood minute, 5 April 1954, Roberts minute, 10 April 1954.

37. FRUS 1952/4, vol.7, US High Commissioner (Conant) to the State Department, 5 May 1954, p.569-70.

Germany which were "tending towards a new Rapallo".³⁸ So concerned were the Foreign Office with the deteriorating situation in Germany that they began to consider the idea of rearming Germany through a gendarmerie, which was the solution which they had rejected during 1950, and twice raised this matter with the Americans.³⁹ However, their main energies were devoted to finding a means of ending the occupation without the need to reach an agreed solution to the problem of the German defence contribution. Serious consideration of this idea preceded Churchill's visit to Washington at the end of June 1954.

By this time the entire cause of western defence seemed to be jeopardised by events in Indochina. The already poisonous political atmosphere of the Fourth Republic had become still more noxious since the French humiliation in Indochina, and on 12 June the Laniel government collapsed. In an attempt to create some order in French politics the National Assembly chose the enigmatic Pierre Mendes-France as Prime Minister. He insisted that a solution to the Indochina war must have priority over all other issues and committed himself to achieving a settlement within a month. Meanwhile the situation in Germany appeared certain to deteriorate. These events led to further disagreements among the Anglo-American partners. Eisenhower and Churchill continued to argue about the viability of a reformed NATO as an alternative to EDC, while the officials in their respective foreign ministries began a new dispute on the subject of how long a German defence contribution could be delayed once an agreement on a new political relationship had been reached.

In Britain there was scepticism about the prospect of EDC being ratified in Paris following the fall of Laniel. The new British ambassador in Paris, Gladwyn Jebb, was convinced that the treaty would never succeed in the National Assembly and urged his government to search for an alternative. When the Commons debated foreign affairs on 23 June the general presumption was that the plan to

38. FO 371/109571, CW1052/17, Roberts to Kirkpatrick, 28 May 1954 and Kirkpatrick minute, 29 May 1954; PREM 11/666, Colville to Brook, 16 June 1954.

39. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, Dulles to the State Department, 13 April 1954, p.431; vol.7, Dulles to US High Commissioner (Conant), 18 June 1954, p.573. In January 1954 the British High Commission discovered that the Germans were planning to double the size of their frontier police force from 10,000 to 20,000. Despite criticism of "this typically clumsy and deceitful German conduct", the High Commission allowed this unilateral German initiative to proceed. By November the force had increased to 17,500 men. See FO371/109719, CW1646/1, Ward to Hancock, 24 January 1954 and CW1646/20, Johnston to Hancock, 23 December 1954.

create a European Army had failed. Woodrow Wyatt, a consistent supporter of the treaty, declared, "The falling fortresses of Vietnam are the background to the funeral of the European Defence Community." Julian Amery suggested that the government should "persuade our American friends to stop nagging the French Government into signing an agreement which they are determined not to sign." Both men argued that the best alternative was a European organisation in which Britain could fully participate. This new grouping within NATO would be less supra-national than EDC but would feature more integration than the Atlantic alliance.⁴⁰

Immediately following Mendes-France's appointment as Prime Minister and just prior to the Washington meeting, Churchill wrote to Eisenhower concerning Germany, "If EDC fails we ought to get her into NATO or a revised form of NATO under the best terms possible."⁴¹ Contemporaneously Eden instructed his officials to prepare a paper examining the possibility of British membership of a modified, less federal EDC, along the lines of the proposals made by Wyatt and Amery. In a draft Cabinet paper prepared for his return from Washington, the Foreign Office considered what alternatives might be available should France be unwilling to accept the entry of the Federal Republic into NATO. They admitted that the revival of the EDC in a less supra-national form was "not unattractive. It is as much in our interest as in the French to keep German rearmament within limits and the security of the UK now requires us to share, indeed lead, in the defence of the Continent". Mindful of the current plans to reduce Britain's defence commitments, the Foreign Office noted the economic obstacles to this solution, stating that "The fixed level of British forces could hardly be less than what we now maintain on the Continent and we should then be faced with a long-term commitment for their support costs". In their view the current British land and air commitment was in any case insufficient to contain a twelve division German force. Thus the primary objection was that Britain could not carry the burden of European security without American assistance. Nevertheless, such was the current concern over Germany's future that the paper concluded that if both

40. Lord Gladwyn, *The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1972), p.271-3; *The Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, vol.529, cols.467-8, 497-8.

41. Peter G. Boyle (ed.), *The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence* (University of North Carolina Press, 1990), Churchill to Eisenhower, 21 June 1954, p.148.

the NATO and EDC solutions failed, "we might then have to consider urgently a modified EDC to include the UK if only to avoid the certain loss of Germany in one form or another to the Soviet camp". This document set out clearly the twin British fears of a rupture in the Atlantic Alliance should Britain be drawn into a federalist European defence organisation and of a new threat from Germany if the project to tie the Federal Republic to the West should fail. On his return from Washington, Eden decided to shelve the paper, at least until Mendes had put the EDC treaty before the National Assembly in August.⁴²

The Americans, though unaware of the extent of British planning, were concerned about the canvassing by British diplomats, and in particular Jebb's Paris Embassy, of alternatives to EDC and by Churchill's own inconsistent attitude towards the Community. Eisenhower told Dulles that "Churchill is not supporting EDC but he won't say so, so both you and I, Foster, had to be very cagey on this. We are not interested in anything but EDC and we have got to be tough about it".⁴³ On 15 June the American ambassador to France informed the State Department that the British were discussing alternatives to EDC with opponents of the treaty. Dulles instructed the ambassador in London to raise the matter and urge the British not to encourage opposition to EDC. He was anxious to "discuss with the British as soon as possible problems of general strategy for immediate period."⁴⁴

Though not yet ready to discuss alternatives to EDC, the Americans were willing to be flexible about the timing of German rearmament. They were prepared to see the contract, or some other form of political arrangement between the Allies and the Federal Republic, introduced prior to a final solution of the EDC issue. On 15 June the British ambassador in Washington, Roger Makins, reported the concern of the American administration that nothing should be done to "rock the EDC boat". Though committed to the European Army as the ultimate solution to European defence, he explained that "the Americans are out

42. T225/413, Roberts to Brownjohn, 30 June 1954, including FO draft paper, Roberts to Brownjohn, 12 July 1954.

43. Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: The President*, vol.2, (George Allen and Unwin, New York 1984), p.207; *The Papers of Dulles and Herter 1953-61: The White House Correspondence and Memoranda Series* (A Microfilm Project of the UPA), State Department Paper on Problems with the UK, May 1954.

44. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, Dulles to Embassy in the UK, 17 June 1954, (including footnote covering Dillon to State Department, 17 June 1954), p.970-1.

for very quick action in the political side in Germany."⁴⁵ Two days later Leishman of the Washington Embassy was informed by the State Department that they aimed "to make sufficient progress on political side to hold situation for Adenauer, while gaining few more months to work on solution rearmament problem." Leishman explained to the Americans that the "British approach had been directed first to question alternatives in event EDC not ratified and then of interim political action in Germany to save Chancellor's position while military problem being solved." He agreed that "solution military question may take time, while political situation in Germany requires early action."⁴⁶

The Foreign Office had now decided that political reform in the Federal Republic must have priority. Roberts suggested the simplest solution would be "the conclusion of a short Protocol, signed by the four parties to the Bonn Conventions, which would bring the Convention into force, while reserving Allied powers in the fields of disarmament, demilitarisation and industrial production and research, thus preventing independent German rearmament." By 22 June the Foreign Office had completed a draft statement of principles for the Washington meeting of Churchill and Eisenhower. The first principle was that "The situation in Germany is slipping fast." The paper went on to discuss the remedial action which should be taken if EDC was not ratified within two months. The main proposals were for a short treaty to bring the Bonn Conventions into effect or, should the French refuse to sanction this, joint action by the American and British High Commissioners to end the most objectionable aspects of the occupation in their zones.⁴⁷

Eisenhower, Dulles, Churchill and Eden discussed Germany's future on 27 June and agreed that if the French Assembly went into recess during the summer having failed to ratify EDC, action would have to be taken to bring the contractual arrangements into force without prejudicing a final solution to the German rearmament problem. Eden declared "that if something were not done to restore sovereignty to Germany by October, (in the absence of French ratification of EDC) the Soviets would be able to pull the Germans across the

45. FO 371/109576, CW1072/29, Makins (Washington) to FO, 16 June 1954.

46. FRUS 1952-4, vol.7, Dulles to US High Commissioner (Conant), 18 June 1954, p.572-3.

47. FO 371/109576, CW1072/39, Roberts memo for Kirkpatrick on 'Alternatives to EDC', 19 June 1954; FO 371/109577, CW1072/57, Kirkpatrick to Colville, 22 June 1954.

line." Eisenhower and Churchill signed an agreement that if the French Assembly did not ratify the treaty before going into recess, they would take action to restore German sovereignty while getting an assurance from Adenauer "that Germany will defer for the time being the unilateral exercise by Germany of the right to rearmament." British and American experts were to meet in London to discuss methods by which the contract could be implemented separately from the EDC treaty.⁴⁸

The Anglo-American Working Group met for the first time on 5 July and over the next seven days they discussed what action could be taken to grant sovereignty to West Germany should EDC not be ratified before the French Assembly went into its summer recess. They examined three different scenarios which envisaged firstly, full French co-operation in implementing the Bonn Conventions, secondly, limited French co-operation in ameliorating the occupation regime and finally French opposition to political concessions. Even if this last scenario proved to be the most realistic, the group were confident that a number of reforms could be introduced by a majority vote of the Allied High Commission. The principal area of disagreement was over the length of time which the French should be allowed, following the introduction of political reforms, before further action was taken to implement German rearmament. In the case of continued French failure to ratify the Americans wished to make provision for the calling of a meeting of EDC countries ninety days after the implementation of the contract. The restrictions on German rearmament imposed as part of the political settlement would then lapse after another 60 days. Roberts explained that on this basis "Germany would resume complete liberty of action to rearm how she saw fit one-hundred-and-fifty days after the signature of the protocols. She could then decide to build up her own national army before considering what, if any, collective security system she would join. However unlikely this eventuality we cannot, and there is no need to, run such a risk." The British delegation suggested that if a conference of EDC powers was to be called after 90 days it should be to consider West Germany's "immediate contribution to the defence of the free

48. CAB 134/767, AOC(54)6th mtg., 5 July 1954; PREM 11/667, Makins (Washington) to FO, 28 June 1954; FO 371/109576, CW1072/54, Washington to FO, 28 June 1954; FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, memoranda of two conversations between Eisenhower, Churchill, Dulles and Eden, 27 June 1954, p.984-5.

world as part of a system of mutual collective security." They would not accept any time limit on the period during which restrictions on German rearmament were to remain in force. The British and American positions proved irreconcilable and the final report of the working party included a number of different versions of the controversial article.⁴⁹ The British delegation also produced a paper covering the possible military restrictions which could be imposed upon the Federal Republic if she were to join NATO. The Americans agreed to include the document in the official record of the meeting but were not prepared to enter into discussions upon the text.⁵⁰

There followed a hiatus in discussion of Germany's future as Eden and Dulles became preoccupied with the negotiation of an Indochina settlement at the reconvened Geneva conference. However, Eden made his own view of the Working Party's proposed solution to the rearmament dilemma very clear to Roberts. The Foreign Secretary "was very strongly against" the American proposals and "not very enthusiastic" about the British counter-proposals. In late July the Americans put forward a new draft which omitted any mention of a time limit after which restrictions on German rearmament would end. Instead, provision was made for a meeting of the EDC powers 90 days from the introduction of the contract with the Federal Republic in order to agree "comparable arrangements for obtaining its immediate contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security." This was acceptable to the British. Unfortunately, the Americans also introduced a new clause which referred to the Federal Republic's decision to "defer for the time being the unilateral exercise of the right to rearmament." Despite the fact that the Eisenhower-Churchill memorandum of 27 June had used exactly the same phrase, the Foreign Office argued that its inclusion in a formal treaty would allow the Federal Republic to rearm shortly after the conference of EDC powers was called. They were not prepared to accept that Germany had a right to rearm. Roberts wrote that "What we cannot do (and I think this was the very strong opinion of the

49. FO 371/109578, CW1072/117, Roberts to Eden, 10 July 1954, including current draft of Anglo-American Working Paper; FO 371/109579, CW1072/161, report on Anglo-American Discussions on Germany, 6-12 July 1954.

50. FO371/109579, CW1072/161, record of Anglo-American Working Party on Germany, 5-12 July 1954, Document 6.

Secretary of State) is to commit ourselves now to (a) any specific date by which the Germans will rearm with or without restrictions, or (b) any particular kind of German rearmament to replace the EDC solution."⁵¹ Churchill was reluctant to defer German rearmament yet again and had to be persuaded to make a statement to the House of Commons on 14 July that the discussion of the introduction of the contract "would entail the deferment of German rearmament for the time being". The announcement of a further delay in rearming the Germans clearly infuriated him and after announcing it he growled "which should please you people" to the Bevanites on Labour's backbenches.⁵² For once the British won their argument with Washington and an article redrafted by Roberts which avoided any mention of the Federal Republic's right to rearm was finally accepted by the Eisenhower administration.⁵³

British scrupulousness over the drafting of those sections of the Anglo-American document which dealt with German rearmament was a product of persistent doubts about German reliability. The Foreign Office was convinced that the situation in the Federal Republic was deteriorating and that until the country was firmly linked to the West it could not be relied upon as an ally. Officials in London were sceptical of reports from West Germany that the situation was less volatile than they believed. On 21 June Kirkpatrick's replacement as High Commissioner, Hoyer-Millar, informed his colleagues in London that there was "no doubt that the Chancellor's position has weakened in recent months", but that he was confident Adenauer could maintain control over the situation until the end of the year and probably longer. The Foreign Office simply refused to believe these reassurances. Kirkpatrick, Roberts and Hancock all expressed their disbelief. The former wrote "This err's (sic) on the optimistic side. In Germany the position

51. FO 371/109580, CW1072/195, Roberts to Kirkpatrick, 3 August 1954, Warner minute, 29 July 1954, CW1072/200, FO to Washington, 11 August 1954, CW1072/201, Roberts memo, 7 August 1954.

52. Avon Papers, AP 20/17/148, Lloyd to Eden, 15 July 1954; The Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, vol.530, cols.500-1 and 591-2; Davies (ed.), op. cit., 19 July 1954, p.338. Churchill's announcement caused some confusion as to whether the government had decided to abandon EDC or not. Attlee, fearing that Germany might be allowed to rearm unilaterally, demanded that the House be allowed to debate any decision to grant Germany sovereignty without forcing her to accede to the EDC Treaty. This was discussed in Cabinet, where Churchill made it clear that it would not be necessary to recall Parliament because the decision was unlikely to have been taken before the Commons returned in October. See CAB 128/27, CC(54)55th mtg., minute 3, 28 July 1954.

53. FO 371/109581, CW1072/217, Hancock to Roberts, 28 August 1954.

can melt away with bewildering rapidity." Roberts claimed Hoyer-Millar had "deliberately painted the picture in less sombre colours because he thought that we were going to the other extreme." These men were much more susceptible to the alarming reports being provided by Adenauer's own advisers.⁵⁴ The nature of their concerns about the Germans was illustrated by their response to a valedictory report from the British consul in Stuttgart, Andrew Gilchrist. In 1950 Gilchrist had been an opponent of early German rearmament but after his term in the Federal Republic he was much more sanguine about that country's future. On 15 July he wrote of his belief that "German society is morally and spiritually healthy", and that, though they now desired an army, it was not so as they could attack others "but to prove that they are a force and equal Power in Europe". He suggested that the resurgence of virulent German nationalism was unlikely and that German antipathy to the Soviets made a German-Soviet alliance highly improbable. Even Hoyer-Millar thought this "too optimistic" and the general view in London was that Gilchrist was "over enthusiastic and naive". Wright commented on the subject of Germany's spiritual health that "the Germans were quite capable of performing the mental gymnastics necessary to create a regime very similar to that of the Nazis, and at the same time to disassociate this historically from the Hitler regime." Warner added that "the Germans are excitable and changeable people who will adopt one view in a given set of circumstances and a quite different view in another."⁵⁵

With Eden's assistance and Dulles's grudging acquiescence, Mendes-France was able to achieve a settlement of the Indochina question by 21 July. Attention now shifted to the EDC question and three days later the Soviets proposed a conference to discuss European security. This served to complicate still further the process of EDC ratification. Hancock had been expecting this Soviet move and had no doubt it would "greatly impair the chances of any early decision by the French Assembly". He made clear that "any such Soviet initiative must be resisted." On 12 August Mendes-France met British and French representatives

54. FO 371/109576, CW1072/37, Hoyer-Millar to FO, 21 June 1954, with Kirkpatrick minute attached, Warner minute, 22 June 1954, Hancock minute, 23 June 1954, Roberts minute, 23 June 1954, CW1072/45, Roberts to Kirkpatrick, 22 June 1954.

55. FO 371/109571, CW1052/32, Gilchrist to US High Commissioner, 15 June 1954, Hoyer-Millar to Roberts, 26 June 1954, Wright minute, 3 August 1954, Warner minute, 9 August 1954, Roberts minute, 10 August 1954.

and informed them that the pressure in France for a further meeting with the Soviets was very great. Reilly of the British Embassy was blunt. He informed the French Prime Minister that the British government "would much prefer not to negotiate with the Russians until the ratification process had been fully completed."⁵⁶ However, it was the Americans who took the lead in quashing this new French demarche. Dulles declared himself "deeply shocked and disheartened" by Mendes-France's attitude and Dillon was instructed to make clear American displeasure. By 13 August the French Prime Minister was declaring that "he was not proposing another meeting with the Russians."⁵⁷

Mendes-France was more tenacious in pursuing revisions to the EDC treaty in order to make it more palatable to the National Assembly. He was dependent on Socialist support and they had long been critical of the nature of British and American guarantees and of those supra-national elements of the EDC which implied a loss of democratic accountability. The group of experts appointed by Mendes to draft an additional protocol to the treaty completed their deliberations in early August. Between 11 and 13 August there was a battle in the Cabinet over the nature of the Working Group proposals which resulted in the resignation of three Gaullist ministers, who regarded the modifications as insufficiently extensive. When the proposals were made public, pro-EDC figures were bitterly critical of the extent of the changes.⁵⁸ Their principal effect would be to delay or modify many of the supra-national elements of the treaty. Thus the introduction of common European regulations concerning military doctrine, recruitment, discipline and other measures would be delayed for up to five years. In addition for eight years each member would have a veto over decisions by the EDC's commissariat. Other important proposals provided members with the opportunity to withdraw should Anglo-American guarantees be retracted, or German reunification occur,

56. DEFE 4/70, COS(54)45th mtg., minute 1, 22 April (including JP(54) note 10), COS(54)53rd mtg., minute 1, 10 May 1954 (including JP(54) note 11), COS(54)53rd mtg., 12 May 1954.

57. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, Ambassador in France (Dillon) to State Department, 12 August 1954, p.1027-9, Dulles to Embassy in France, 12 August 1954, p.1029-30, Ambassador in France (Dillon) to State Department, 13 August 1954, p.1031; FO 371/109294, CW 1071/759, Hancock memo, 22 July 1954.

58. Jean Lacouture, *Pierre Mendes-France* (British edition, translated by George Holloch, Holmes and Meier, London 1984), p.269-73; Jacques Fauvet, 'Birth and Death of a Treaty' in Lerner and Aron (eds.), *op.cit.*, p.155-60; Maj-Gen.Edward Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: A History* (Macmillan, London 1980), p.278-9.

and limited the integration of European Army units to forward areas.⁵⁹

The British and American reactions to the French initiative were very different. On 6 August the French ambassador in London, Massigli, had raised the prospect of removing the supra-national elements of the treaty in a conversation with Kirkpatrick. The Permanent Under-Secretary reacted calmly, declaring that presentation would be crucial and that "the postponement of the application of certain provisions of the Treaty would be more acceptable than their removal." After examining the French amendments, Kirkpatrick informed Churchill that they were "not unacceptable on the points of direct interest to us and the Americans." His main concern, as always, was the likely effects in Germany where "Dr. Adenauer in his present weakened position, could not accept an unfavourable or discriminatory arrangement."⁶⁰ In contrast, the Americans regarded French proposals as disastrous. Dillon described them as "unacceptable beyond our worst expectations", while Bedell Smith, the Acting Secretary of State, was thoroughly depressed by them. His policy was to encourage the other EDC countries "to stand firm against unrealistic concessions or destructive compromises". The American government was firmly opposed to any measures which would require a reconsideration of the treaty by the other European parliaments, which would dilute the supra-national element, which would discriminate against Germany or which would raise the issue of relations with NATO.⁶¹ In short they were opposed to the entire French programme.

The Anglo-Saxon powers were, however, prepared to let France's EDC partners take the lead in dealing with Mendes-France's plans for the revision of the EDC treaty. The Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, had proposed that the six signatories should meet in June, but at that time Mendes-France was devoting his energies to Indochina. With the French now seeking major revisions to the treaty, a conference became essential and representatives of the six met at

59. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, Ambassador to France (Dillon) and US Observer to Interim Commission of EDC (Bruce) to State Department, 13 August 1954, p.1034-5.

60. FO 800/779, Kirkpatrick to Churchill, 6 August 1954, Kirkpatrick to Churchill, 16 August 1954; FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, memo of conversation between Elbrick (Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs) and Watson (UK Counsellor in Washington), 16 August 1954, p.1045-6.

61. FO 800/779, Watson (Washington) to Roberts, 16 August 1954; FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, Ambassador in France (Dillon) to State Department, 15 August 1954, p.1039, Acting Secretary of State (Bedell Smith) to Embassy in France, 16 August 1954, p.1042-3, Dulles to Embassy in Belgium, 17 August 1954, p.1047.

Brussels on 19 August for four days of discussions. Spaak presented a compromise deal based on the gradual introduction of the supra-national provisions of the treaty. However, the other EDC countries would not consent to the idea of a veto. Mendes was in no mood to compromise and the conference descended into acrimony. The antipathy between Spaak and Mendes-France manifested itself in a series of virulent exchanges and the controversy between the two continued long after the collapse of the EDC.⁶² Towards the end of the conference, Mendes told an American official that the conference had failed and that "continued discussion seemed pointless". He "insisted over and over again that fault was not his, listing examples in an effort to show that other Ministers had not given him 'one single' concession." The French Prime Minister wished to meet with Eisenhower and Churchill to "map new plans for European policy and limit damage for failure of EDC."⁶³

Immediately after the Brussels conference Mendes-France flew to England where he met Eden and Churchill at the Prime Minister's own home, Chartwell. Despite American urging to confine discussions to the subject of EDC ratification, the Churchill government had continued to discuss the various possible alternatives while the delays in Paris continued. The Prime Minister had twice written to Dulles offering his view that German rearmament within NATO was the best solution to the current dilemmas of European security policy. Spaak was also consulted about this solution but he, like Dulles, opposed the idea. In Paris, Jebb campaigned for a European solution which could include Great Britain in a less federal European defence organisation.⁶⁴ It was not surprising therefore that Churchill, Eden and Mendes seem to have discussed a broad range of alternative policies at Chartwell. Mendes-France asserted that EDC would be rejected by the National Assembly. The favoured British alternative of German membership of NATO was mentioned along with the possibility of some form of European organisation within the Atlantic alliance in which Britain would

62. Lacouture, *op.cit.*, p.275-6; Fursdon, *op.cit.*, p.285-7; Paul Henri Spaak, **The Continuing Battle : Memoirs of a European 1936-66** (English edition, translated by Henry Fox, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London 1971), p.166-171.

63. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, Ambassador to Belgium (Alger) to State Department, 20 August 1954, p.1055-6, Chargé in Belgium (Sprouse) to State Department, 22 August 1954, p.1064-6.

64. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, Churchill to Dulles, 14 August 1954, p.1037, Churchill to Dulles, 19 August 1954, p.1051-2; PREM 11/891, Jebb to Churchill, 20 August 1954; Spaak, *op.cit.*, p.160.

participate. Mendes-France suggested that this latter alternative might merely involve a common armaments pool but Eden was wary of this suggestion as being only the first step towards greater integration. The Foreign Secretary concluded from his talks with Mendes-France that German membership of NATO with limitations on her rearmament was still the best option. The main difficulty would be in trying to gain agreement on safeguards, for Eden could not envisage Adenauer accepting extensive restrictions. Nevertheless, he concluded that "as many as possible of these must be secured."⁶⁵ Churchill's main function at the talks seems to have been to chastise the French for their slow progress. His frustration with them had grown to anger and he "pointed out that we should not agree to be governed by the impotence of the French Chamber." In their correspondence with the Americans, the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary emphasised their efforts to persuade Mendes-France to give his full support to EDC rather than the discussion of alternatives which had taken place.⁶⁶

As the EDC debate in the French National Assembly approached, American officials in Europe made a last bid to save the treaty but found their initiative blocked by the Foreign Office which wished to see the matter finally resolved. David Bruce had been a staunch supporter of EDC and an influential figure in making it the centrepiece of America's policy in Europe. On 26 August he proposed to the State Department a further conference of the EDC powers, this time with British and American representatives present. He hoped that if they displayed a united front it might be possible to influence French opinion. Meanwhile, pro-EDC politicians in France sought support for a motion to adjourn the EDC debate while a European conference was convened. However, the Foreign Office was not convinced that a conference was worthwhile if there were no new proposals on offer. They argued that "The overriding consideration must surely be to give the French no further excuse for delay and to avoid driving the Germans to exasperation." In France, Mendes outmanoeuvred the supporters of

65. CAB 128/27, CC(54)57th mtg., minute 1, 27 August 1954; CAB 129/70, CC(54)276, 27 August 1954.

66. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, Churchill to Dulles, 24 August 1954, p.1077, Eden to Secretary of State, 24 August 1954, p.1078. Apparently Churchill was at this stage already considering the possibility of a new alignment in NATO which would include Germany but exclude France. On 23 August Alexander wrote to the Prime Minister arguing against this proposal. See FO 800/779, Alexander to the Prime Minister, 23 August 1954.

EDC by initially appearing to support the reconvening of a conference and then dropping the idea once the debate in the National Assembly began. Having failed to get the changes he wanted at Brussels, he refused to support the treaty and hinted broadly that if it failed the Allies would be ready to discuss alternative solutions. On 30 August the Assembly passed a motion putting the preliminary question, known as a dry guillotine, which had the effect of ending discussion of the treaty without a vote on its substance and thus killing it. The anti-EDC faction won with a comfortable majority of 319 votes to 264.⁶⁷

Mendes-France's decision to put EDC to the vote in the National Assembly has had the effect of distorting perceptions of American and especially British policy during the summer of 1954. The Anglo-Saxon powers were preparing themselves for yet more procrastination on the part of the French government and by the end of August 1954 had finally reached agreement on a document which would grant sovereignty to Germany, while retaining restrictions on her ability to rearm. As will be discussed in the next chapter this policy may well have brought the Allies into conflict with Adenauer. However, the rejection of EDC and the astonishing speed with which a substitute was found have left the impression that little consideration was given to separating the issues of sovereignty and rearmament. In fact the Foreign Office, and Eden in particular, were much more anxious to bring an end to the occupation in order to relieve the mounting pressure on Adenauer, than they were to achieve an early German defence contribution. Since May 1952 British support for the European Army solution had been predicated on the notion that EDC was essential if the occupation was to be ended. The British military had been inclined to give more emphasis to the merits of EDC as a useful solution to the problems of western European defence and in early 1954 they were willing to make substantial concessions in order to accommodate the French. However, they were no longer so vigorous in pressing the case for German rearmament, which was increasingly seen as a means of reducing Britain's continental commitment in the long term.

67. Lacouture, *op.cit.*, p.277-80; FO 800/779, FO to Washington, 28 August 1954; FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, US Observer to the Interim Commission of the EDC (Bruce) to State Department, 26 August 1954, p.1079-80, Ambassador in France (Dillon) to State Department, 27 August 1954, p.1084, Ambassador in France to State Department, 30 August 1954, p.1091-2, memo by 2nd Secretary of the Embassy, 16 September 1954, p.1105-7.

The absence of any urgent military need for German reinforcements contributed to the relatively sanguine British attitude to the prospect of further delays in German rearmament. It was the integration of West Germany into the political system of western Europe which really mattered.

CHAPTER 6

THE UNRESOLVED GERMAN PROBLEM

The signing of the Paris Agreements in the autumn of 1954 and the subsequent induction of the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO in May 1955 are generally taken to mark the end of the great debate over Germany's future which the wartime allies had conducted since 1945. In the years after 1955 West Germany came to be regarded as a trusted member of the western alliance. To British policy-makers at the time, however, the creation of West German armed forces was not regarded as marking the beginning of a period in which they could relax their vigilance. Though in 1949-50 German rearmament had been regarded by many as a possible last step in the process of integrating Germany into the western community, force of circumstances, in the shape of American pressure, had ensured that this came about sooner than had been envisaged. It may appear bizarre, having catalogued the long saga of procrastination which preceded the collapse of EDC, to describe the Paris Agreements as premature, but it should be remembered that only a decade earlier Britain, the United States, France and the Soviet Union had been engaged in a bitter war with Germany. Though, unlike France and the Soviet Union, Britain had not endured German occupation, British policy-makers, like their colleagues in Paris and Moscow, were still not sure that the Germans could be trusted. The issue of German unification briefly assumed great importance in the Foreign Office in 1955, firstly because they believed the West was now in the strongest position to negotiate with Moscow and secondly because a really determined effort to reunite the country was regarded as essential to persuade the Germans that the western alliance would be beneficial to them. The idea of imposing restraints on a reunited Germany's military capacity therefore appealed as a means of convincing both the Soviets and the Germans that the West was serious. The Foreign Office used the interval between the ratification of the Paris Agreements and the recruitment of German troops to reconsider the role of these forces in a possible diplomatic settlement. The Chiefs of Staff, however, were not convinced that the West could afford to make military concessions in order to achieve a united Germany. Indeed, according to British military planners, a united Germany ought to make a larger defence contribution than that assigned to the Federal Republic. These

contradictions were never resolved and the Foreign Office chose to sponsor a German plan based on the neutralisation of East Germany rather than embark on an initiative which would require an overhaul of western defence plans. Even this more cautious scheme floundered on Franco-American opposition. Any serious attempt to reach a settlement with the Soviet Union was lost with the increased sense of complacency which accompanied the emergence of the self-congratulatory spirit of Geneva. In this period we see once again the fear of a rearmed Germany exerting its powerful influence on Britain's diplomatic strategy.

Though the Foreign Office had anticipated the defeat of the EDC treaty and had prepared contingency plans as early as December 1952, there was still a sense of shock when it actually occurred. The problems of implementing the NATO solution which had been held in reserve for nearly two years appeared formidable. The threat of a reappraisal of American policy was a card which Dulles was not averse to playing. In addition, Adenauer's outright refusal to accept the implementation of the contractual agreement worked out by the British and Americans and the lingering suspicion that Mendes-France was determined to kill any plan which involved sanctioning any form of German rearmament, combined to create a bleak outlook at the start of September 1954. Yet the American decision to await a European solution to the crisis allowed the British to retake the initiative which they had lost in New York four years previously, while Adenauer actually shared the British conviction that unless a solution was found to the German rearmament problem which linked the Federal Republic to western defence organisations, then Germany could once more be a menace to European stability. Mistrust of Mendes-France lingered throughout the remainder of 1954 but at the very end of the year he placed all his authority behind the Paris Agreements and succeeded in obtaining the approval of the National Assembly.

In December 1952 the British Cabinet had been presented with contingency plans to be used in the event of the French either failing to ratify EDC or attaching unacceptable conditions to ratification. The basis of the plans was German membership of NATO combined with a reform of the organisation's structure to give the Supreme Commander greater authority. The possibility of utilising the machinery of the Brussels Treaty was even mentioned as a means of substituting for the European element provided by the EDC structure. By

February 1954 the Foreign Office, in consultation with the Chiefs of Staff, had drafted detailed plans for the incorporation of Germany into NATO which included controls over German arms production and the integration of her armed forces into the Alliance. As an alternative it was suggested that the Federal Republic might accept membership of the Brussels Treaty Organisation in place of full NATO membership. The drawback of this solution was that it would probably involve Britain in new commitments on the continent. In this revised scheme the Brussels Treaty solution had ceased to be seen as complementary to the NATO solution.¹

In July 1954 the British had presented their ideas on the inclusion of West Germany in NATO to the Americans in the Anglo-American Study Group. It was indicative of American reservations that they refused to endorse the British proposals even in the form of a draft contingency plan.² Despite persistent American coolness Eden again outlined the case for German membership of NATO in a Cabinet paper written in anticipation of the defeat of EDC. He warned that a European solution would drag Britain into dubious continental projects such as a common arms programme, while vitiating the prized Atlantic partnership. Furthermore, a European grouping "would be much less powerful to contain Germany than NATO with America and Canada present."³ Yet there remained concern that, in the context of continuing French reservations about any form of German rearmament, the admittance of Germany to NATO might prove as impracticable as the EDC project. In the immediate aftermath of the negative vote of the French National Assembly, Kirkpatrick's prognosis was gloomy. He believed that the French would never accept German entry into NATO without restrictions, while the Germans would not agree to any discrimination against them. Consequently, the dilemma facing British policy-makers was what to do when France vetoed German entry into the Atlantic Alliance. He suggested that in the circumstances all the European countries might have to adopt the same restrictions as those proposed for Germany. If the French rejected this alternative

1. CAB 129/57, C(52)434, 10 December 1952; DEFE 5/51, COS(54)41, 5 February 1954.

2. FO 371/109578, CW 1072/117, Roberts to Eden, 10 July 1954; FO 371/109579, CW1071/161, Report on the Anglo-American Discussions on Germany, 5-12 July 1954, document 6.

3. CAB 128/27, CC(54)57th mtg., minute 1, 27 August 1954; CAB 129/70, C(54)276, 27 August 1954.

the choice was between the apparently desperate options of coming to a deal with the Russians on Germany "whilst we still have a little bargaining capacity" or an attempt to maintain the status quo which would "allow Germany to drift slowly and irrevocably into the Russian camp."⁴

This analysis proved overly sombre. Though the initial British attempts to resolve the dilemma posed by the defeat of EDC were frustrated it was Eden who eventually secured an agreement on a formula which both allowed German membership of NATO and revived the European pillar of NATO through the creation of a Western European Union (WEU). However a number of military and economic objections were brushed aside in the rush to achieve a settlement. Initially the British regarded the restoration of sovereignty to the Federal Republic as their most important objective. Despite arguments over the link between the restoration of sovereignty and the rearmament of Germany, by the end of August the British and Americans had agreed upon a scheme to end the occupation. A new difficulty then arose as reports from Bonn indicated that Adenauer was opposed to severing the link between the return of sovereignty and the creation of German armed forces. Hancock believed Adenauer's reservations were due to his fear of a long delay in German rearmament following the establishment of contractual relations. In what turned out to be a pessimistic assessment he suggested the German rearmament negotiations were unlikely to be completed before the end of the year.⁵

The Allied High Commission was instructed to press Adenauer to accept the revised Bonn Conventions on the grounds "that discussions about the form of German rearmament would inevitably occupy some little time." The British plan was that the American and British High Commissioners would present the Study Group paper on the implementation of the Bonn Conventions to Adenauer, while in Paris the Ambassadors pressed Mendes-France to accept this scheme. It was the American High Commissioner, Conant, who first raised the matter with Adenauer in a disastrous meeting on 2 September. The Chancellor described the Anglo-American document as "worse than blow which he had suffered after vote of French Assembly" and insisted he could not possibly present it to the

4. FO 371/109294, C1071/792, Kirkpatrick minute, 31 August 1954.

5. FO 371/109581, CW 1072/218, Johnston (Bonn) to FO, 26 August 1954, Johnston (Bonn) to FO, 27 August 1954, Hancock minute, 30 August 1954.

Bundestag. At this stage Adenauer still seemed to want to try and salvage the EDC. Later that day Hoyer-Miller explained to Adenauer that from the British point of view "the important thing in the interest of the German Government itself was to give back to Germany as much as possible of its sovereignty at once without waiting for the negotiations on the military question." Adenauer again demurred. As a result of these conversations it was decided in London and Washington to abandon the Study Group paper and not to raise the subject with Mendes-France. Nevertheless there was a residue of bitterness. Conant recommended to the State Department that "we proceed to disengage completely from the British in our approach German problem...British insistence that French must be kept on equal basis nearly caused major blow-up in delicate situation."⁶

It was from this moment that responsibility for a solution devolved on to the British government. Following an exchange of letters with Churchill and a more cordial conversation with Hoyer-Millar on 3 September, Adenauer agreed that the eventual solution to the German problem should be based on the long standing British contingency plan for German membership of NATO with limitations on the extent of German rearmament.⁷ On 8 September Eden suggested to the Cabinet the outlines of the eventual solution. His plan involved West German admittance to NATO and the revival of the Brussels Treaty to include Germany and Italy. Eden warned that to secure agreement it might be necessary to offer a permanent commitment of three British divisions to Europe, which was an increase on the promised commitment of one division to the EDC. It was Churchill who proved averse to this idea, and while the Brussels Treaty option was welcomed by ministers, they refused to endorse any additional continental commitment as yet.⁸

Eden's dilemma was how to placate both Churchill, who saw no reason to

6. PREM 11/843, two telegrams from FO to Bonn, 1 September 1954, FO to Paris, 1 September 1954, FO to Washington, 1 September 1954, Washington (Scott) to FO, 1 September 1954; FO 371/109581, CW 1072/231, Hoyer-Millar (Bonn) to FO, 2 September 1954, CW 1072/236, Washington (Scott) to FO, 3 September 1954, FO to Washington, 4 September 1954; FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, US High Commissioner (Conant) to State Department, 2 September 1954, p.1138-40, US High Commissioner (Conant) to State Department (For Merchant), 3 September 1954, p.1140.

7. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, Charge in UK (Butterworth) to the State Department, 3 September 1954, p.1142; FO 800/779, FO to Bonn (Churchill to Adenauer), 1 September 1954; PREM 11/843, Bonn (Hoyer-Millar) to FO, 3 September 1954; FO 800/779, Bonn to FO (Adenauer to Churchill), 4 September 1954.

8. CAB 128/27, CC(54)59th mtg., minute 1, 8 September 1954; Nutting op.cit., p.71.

pander to French susceptibilities, and Mendes-France, who was working on a rival scheme for German membership of a new Brussels Treaty organisation. In response to a report from the Washington Embassy that the Pentagon wished to reduce its commitment to France, Churchill expressed the hope that the threat of a peripheral defence would bring the French to their senses. He contemplated the possibility of "a triple alliance between Britain, the United States and Germany to protect France against itself." On 9 September he wrote to Eden expressing reservations about the planned commitment of three British divisions to the continent which would be "unsustained by the United States", and asking with reference to the French, "Ought they not in the first instance...to be confronted with and to feel the peril of the kind of ideas of re-appraisal now being considered by the Pentagon?" However, when Eden discussed German rearmament with the French ambassador, Massigli, on 10 September he refrained from using the threat of an 'agonizing reappraisal' of America's role in Europe. Massigli made clear that the French were not prepared to wait passively for an Anglo-American plan to emerge. He told Eden "that the admission of Germany into NATO with nothing but some conditions Germany might offer would have no chance in the French Chamber." Instead the Quai d'Orsay were proposing that the Brussels Treaty "might be reshaped to include Germany and Italy and some military arrangement might be made under it which could conceivably include a European Commander-in-Chief." Eden "pulled a long face" when Massigli said German membership of NATO with voluntary safeguards would be rejected and told the Ambassador "I was firmly convinced that the admission of Germany into NATO was the right way to handle the military aspect."⁹

It was during his tour of European capitals that Eden was able to secure sufficient support for the NATO option to leave France isolated. After gaining an enthusiastic reception for his ideas in Brussels, Bonn and Rome that Mendes-France had prepared detailed counter-proposals based on continued German exclusion from NATO. He explained to the French Prime Minister that he had gained widespread support for German admission to NATO but that he recognised "safeguards were the crux of the matter". He suggested "that they

9. PREM 11/843, Washington (Scott) to FO, 7 September 1954; Churchill minute, 8 September 1954; FO 800/795, Churchill to Eden, 9 September 1954; FO 800/794, conversation between Eden and the French Ambassador, 10 September 1954.

should be organised through a strengthening of the NATO machinery with additional powers and duties allocated to SACEUR." Mendes-France responded that any safeguards should be included in the new military clauses which the French wished to add to the Brussels Treaty as a means of facilitating German accession. When Eden pressed him on German membership of NATO, Mendes said "this could only be contemplated later, after the safeguards had been set up, or at least it would have to be considered separately". Eden was evidently depressed by his conversation and it was left to Roberts to hear the details of the French plans. However, before Eden departed for London the following day Mendes declared himself "resigned" to German admission to NATO, but he insisted that safeguards must be the responsibility of the Brussels Treaty powers.¹⁰

On 17 September Eden gained a further success when he persuaded Dulles to attend a nine power conference and to accept the concept of an expanded Brussels Treaty.¹¹ On the same day as his meeting with Dulles, Eden briefed the Cabinet on his European tour and made it clear that the French were still the main obstacle to a settlement. In return for Mendes-France's acceptance of German membership of NATO he was willing to give substantial powers to the new Brussels Treaty Organisation. He agreed that "it might be preferable that agreement limiting the size of contingents should be concluded under the aegis of the Brussels Treaty rather than through the machinery of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe, whose interest was naturally to secure the largest possible NATO force". Eden reported that he had not been questioned about troop commitments and that they might not be called upon to give a permanent guarantee covering British force levels on the Continent.¹² However, during the next few days Mendes-France made public statements suggesting that the restructuring of the Brussels Treaty might involve "a certain dose of

10. Lord Avon, *Full Circle* (Cassels, London, 1960), p.154-61; Frank Roberts, *Dealing with Dictators* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1991), p.170-1; PREM 11/843, two telegrams from Paris (Jebb) to FO (Eden to Churchill), 16 September 1954, FO to Paris, 17 September 1954; FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, Ambassador in France (Dillon) to Office of US High Commissioner in Germany, 16 September 1954, p.1198-9 and Ambassador in France to US High Commissioner (Gruenther to Conant and Dulles), p.1200-1.

11. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, report on Dulles's conversation with Adenauer and Eden, 16-17 September 1954, p.1213-21, Dulles to the President, 18 September 1954, p.1227-8.

12. CAB 128/27, CC(54)60th mtg., minute 1, 17 September 1954.

supranationality", while failing to endorse German membership of NATO.¹³ Erring on the side of caution, the Foreign Office sought Cabinet approval for an offer to maintain current force levels on the continent. Their paper explained that the French would "have to accept German sovereignty and German membership of NATO and withdraw or drastically reduce their safeguard proposals. If they are to do this they must be given some striking quid pro quo. The assurance most likely to strike French opinion is the continued presence of British troops in Europe." The London conference opened on 28 September before Eden had an opportunity to gain ministerial approval for his proposed concessions. Churchill had been discussing with Dulles his "grave concern at possibility of having British troops committed to continent after US forces might have been withdrawn", while Mendes-France only seemed interested in discussing the new functions to be given to the Brussels Treaty Organisation. Relations between Eden and Churchill had been scarred by the issue of the succession and at a meeting of ministers that night the Foreign Secretary found Churchill "very difficult" to deal with. Eden explained that both Adenauer and the Canadian, Pearson, had appealed to him to make the offer of a permanent troop commitment. In response Churchill expressed his anxiety that the Americans would not be entering into a parallel commitment. Eventually the Prime Minister yielded, but only after he had noted that if "the French still refused to adopt a reasonable attitude it would subsequently be easier to impose the solution of 'the empty chair'."¹⁴ The only other possible source of opposition was the Treasury, but they too seemed to be swayed by the prevalent mood of crisis. Crombie wrote that "the whole Western Defence structure is in jeopardy and we can hardly avoid taking some risks in its support". Nevertheless Treasury officials were somewhat alarmed by the speed with which the decision in favour of a commitment was taken. Faced with a fait accompli by Eden their task was to minimise the financial burden which would

13. CAB 128/27, CC(54)61st mtg., minute 1, 21 September 1954; Jean Lacouture, **Pierre Mendes-France** (UK edition, translated by George Holoch, Holmes and Meier, London 1984), p.280.

14. CAB 129/70, C(54)298, 27 September 1954; CAB 129/71, C(54)302, 30 September 1954; PREM 11/843, record of meeting on 28 September 1954; FO 800/779, Churchill to Eden, 27 September 1954; FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, Dulles to the President, 28 September 1954, p.1293; Robert Rhodes James, **Anthony Eden** (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1986), p.388, Young in Young (ed.), op.cit., p.98-9.

result from the loss of occupation costs.¹⁵

Eden made his statement on Britain's contribution to continental defence at the fourth plenary session of the conference on 29 September. He pledged that Britain would maintain four divisions and the 2nd Tactical Air Force or their "equivalent fighting capacity" on the continent and that reductions would only be made with the consent of all the Brussels Treaty powers. However in the event of the commitment producing too great a strain on Britain's finances Eden reserved the right to have the North Atlantic Council review the level of Britain's contribution, while Britain also retained the right to withdraw from Europe, in the event of "an acute overseas emergency". Eden's initiative was welcomed by the other powers at the conference and Dulles informed the President that it made "it almost impossible for France to reject a reasonable settlement of the conditions which would make possible the admission of Germany to NATO." In Spaak's view the British offer "ensured the success of the conference".¹⁶

Nevertheless, Mendes clung obdurately to French proposals for strict controls over German rearmament, including the idea of a European arms pool. The British Chiefs of Staff had examined these proposals in their draft form and concluded that they were "unduly cumbersome and difficult to implement." They were concerned as to whether the Germans could be trusted to act honestly, but concluded that the presence of Allied troops in the Federal Republic would ensure compliance. When the issue of restrictions on the German contribution was discussed, it was the Admiralty, who had always been the least enthusiastic of the three services about German rearmament, who were most concerned to impose restrictions. They insisted that Germany should not be allowed to manufacture warships above 2,500 tons, submarines or influence mines. At the London conference these issues were passed on to a working group, which reported back on 1 October. Their proposals largely concerned the strengthening of SACEUR's powers and Mendes-France complained that the French proposal for limiting German arms manufacture through the use of the EDC concept of strategically

15. T225/414, Strath minute, 11 September 1954, Crombie minute, 10 September 1954, Crombie minute, 30 September 1954.

16. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, draft protocol to Brussels Treaty, Annex IIB, Statement by UK Secretary of State at Fourth Plenary Meeting of London conference, 29 September, p.1361-2, Dulles to President, 29 September 1954, p.1366-7; Paul-Henri Spaak, *The Continuing Battle* (translated by Henry Fox, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1971), p.184-5.

exposed areas and a common arms pool had been ignored. A settlement was finally reached on 2 October based on Adenauer's offer to voluntarily renounce the manufacture of atomic, biological and chemical weapons and not to manufacture weapons on an agreed list unless authorised to do so by a two-thirds majority of the Brussels Council. The list included long-range and guided missiles, influence mines, warships larger than 3,000 tons, submarines of above 350 tons or strategic bombers. The subject of the arms pool was referred to the Brussels Treaty Council for further discussion. The Admiralty were disappointed that the limits they had set for the German navy were to be exceeded, but with both Eden and Churchill supporting the arms agreement there was little they could do to prevent its incorporation into the Final Act of the London conference.¹⁷ At the Paris conference, during which the terms for German membership of NATO were finally confirmed, it was agreed that the revised Brussels Treaty Organisation, now renamed the Western European Union (WEU), would set a ceiling for the defence contributions of its members, that any proposed increase in these force levels would require unanimous approval by WEU, that until the occupation was officially terminated the occupying powers would retain their rights in the field of demilitarisation and that the French proposals for an arms pool would be studied by a special working group rather than the Brussels Council.¹⁸

Before the Allies could terminate the occupation it was necessary to reach agreement on the future status of their forces stationed in the Federal Republic and on the financial support which the Germans would offer them. As discussed in the previous chapter, during the summer of 1954 the Americans had suggested, and the Germans had demanded, a reduction in the current DM 600 million a month payment to the Allies. The British government and especially the Treasury were staunchly opposed to any such change, but feared that the French refusal to

17. DEFE 4/72, COS(54)102nd mtg., minute 1, 27 September 1954; DEFE 5/54 COS(54)311, 24 September 1954; PREM 11/843, Rumbold to the Prime Minister, 2 October 1954; FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, Telegraphic Summary of 8th Plenary Meeting of the Nine-Power conference, 2 October 1954, p.1321-3, Telegraphic Summary of 9th Plenary Meeting of the Nine-Power conference, 3 October 1954, p.1324-5, memo prepared by the French Delegation, p.1333-4, report by Working Party on a German Defence Contribution, 1 October 1954, p.1338-9, Final Act of the Nine-Power conference, p.1345-52.

18. FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, Telegraphic Summary of 2nd Plenary Meeting of the Nine Power conference, 21 October 1954, p.1415-7, Draft Resolution to Implement Section IV of the Final Act of the London conference, 19 October 1954, p.1432, Protocol on the Termination of Occupation Regime, 21 October 1954, p.1434, Protocol to the Brussels Treaty, p.1441-57.

accept EDC had placed Germany in a strong bargaining position. Their proposals for the London conference were that the Germans should continue to pay the DM 600 million up to the date of German entry into NATO and should then pay on the previously agreed EDC scale which stipulated contributions of DM 400 million for six months, DM 300 million for the next two months and DM 200 million for the ninth month. However, the Germans were determined to revise these terms. They proposed that the DM 600 million a month arrangements should continue to the end of the year on condition that there was no increase in the reserves of unspent funds or carry-over, but that, in the expected interim period between the signing of the contract and German induction into NATO, DM 100 million should be deducted from the monthly payment and put into a fund which could be used for jointly agreed defence projects. Once West Germany entered NATO, and assuming that the other measures for a German defence contribution and the restoration of sovereignty were in force by 30 June 1955, the Federal Republic promised to make monthly payments of DM400 million for two months, DM300 million for the four months after that and DM200 million for another six months. The German figures were supported by the Americans and accepted by the British on the grounds that if they had rejected them "finance would have been the only substantial matter disagreed in the London conference". Once again the financial argument yielded to the diplomatic. Nevertheless, Treasury officials estimated that British costs would be met in full up to the end of the 1954-5 financial year and that in the following year the extra costs would only be around £15-20 million. Macmillan told a somewhat sceptical House of Commons that the Paris Agreements would not entail any large increase in the costs of maintaining British forces on the continent of Europe in the foreseeable future.¹⁹

When at the end of the year it became necessary to seek yet another extension of the current agreement, the British adopted their customary tactic of arguing in favour of an extension of the existing agreement on the grounds that any changes were only likely to favour the Germans. However, the Foreign Office

19. CAB 134/1047, MAC(G)(54)10th mtg., 24 September 1954; T225/412, Turnbull memo to Crombie, 20 September 1954, undated Turnbull memo on Occupation Costs; T225/414, Crombie memo, 28 September 1954; FO 371/109772, CW1072/4, Jackling to UK High Commission, 23 September 1954, CW 1072/10, Bonn (Hoyer-Millar) to FO, 11 October 1954, CW 10712/14, Bonn (Hoyer-Millar) to FO, 14 October 1954; The Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, vol.531, cols.1929-35.

decided that if it proved impossible to secure a continuation of the status quo, they would accept the creation of a DM 100 million a month fund from the total DM 600 million contribution for jointly agreed defence projects. The High Commission eventually adopted a proposal which involved little change in the financial deal struck in London. However, the DM 100 million fund would now cover the interim period between the ratification of the Paris Agreements by the Federal Republic and their implementation. The result of the long series of financial negotiations was that the British got the full cost of their forces in Germany covered well into 1956.²⁰ This outcome, which was far better than the most optimistic analysis made at the outset, was the result of two factors; the long delay in implementing German rearmament and the constant extension of the favourable 1952 agreement guaranteeing the Allies DM 600 million a month. The various Treasury projections of future additional costs had little impact on the debate over German rearmament. Initially it had seemed that the financial burdens involved might undermine Britain's support for the policy but Butler never raised this issue. In later years, with the economy recovering and the date of German rearmament being constantly postponed, the financial factor had even less effect.

After the formality of having the Paris Agreements endorsed by the North Atlantic Council, the final task was to achieve ratification. As a result of Adenauer's refusal to contemplate the restoration of the Federal Republic's sovereignty without the conclusion of an agreement sanctioning German rearmament, the two issues had once again been fused together. Inside the Foreign Office, even at this very late stage, some officials were still unhappy about having to rearm Germany at all. R.A. Chaput de Saintonge, of the Foreign Office's German Information Department, was convinced that the German generals would set themselves up as the true leaders of the German nation and that those forces "likely to oppose the renascent militarism", such as the Trade Unions, must be strengthened. Still more alarming was the fact that Adenauer

20. CAB 134/1047, MAC(G)(54)13th mtg., 2 December 1954; T 225/415, FO to Bonn, 4 December 1954, Hoyer-Millar(Bonn) to FO, 8 December 1954; T225/416, Hoyer-Millar (Bonn) to FO, 5 January 1955. For the twelve months after May 1955 the British were to receive DM843 million, while the projected cost of their forces was DM902 million. See T225/416, Jackling memo, 4 May 1955, Allen (Bonn) to FO, May 1955.

seemed to share these concerns. In mid-October the Foreign Office learned of a conversation between the Chancellor, Spaak and Beck at Claridges during the opening phase of the London conference. Adenauer told the Benelux ministers "that he feared the resurgence of German nationalism and militarism and wondered what would happen after he had disappeared from the scene if European Union had not in the meantime been brought about." In Paris, Jebb, who had always been sceptical about German rearmament and gave a particularly alarming account of this conversation, seized on this admission. He wrote "there is no doubt to my mind that an armed Germany will speak a very different language. If indeed the Germans should then use their twelve divisions in an effort to come to terms with the Soviet Union we should not, I suppose, be able to say that we were not warned."²¹ Despite this, the diplomatic consequences of re-examining German rearmament were too great even to consider a change of policy. Eden told the House of Commons, "Much has been said and written in the last months of the importance of a German military contribution to the West, and I should be the last to under-estimate this. But for my part, if our hopes in these agreements can finally be realised, my greatest satisfaction will lie in the fact that Germany can find her place in joint membership with countries she has in the past invaded. In no other way can we hope to rebuild our shattered Europe."²²

German rearmament continued to be unpopular in the Labour Party. At the Scarborough party conference in September 1954 the Bevanites submitted an amendment opposing German rearmament. Attlee declared "I am not in the least likely to underrate the danger of a resurgent military, nationalist Germany", and after much effort the NEC won the crucial vote by 3,270,000 votes to 3,022,000.

21. FO 371/109312, C1193/15, Chaput de Saintonge minute, 4 October 1954; FO 371/109638, CW 1194/37, Allchin (Luxemburg) to Roberts, 19 October 1954, Jebb (Paris) to Harrison (FO), 10 November 1954, In response to Jebb's letters Hoyer-Millar restated the familiar concerns about a possible German-Soviet alignment and argued that there was no alternative to the current course. In London Warner was optimistic that the situation in Germany had improved since 1950 but feared what would happen when Adenauer died. See FO 371/109639, CW 1194/54, Hoyer-Millar to Harrison, 25 November 1954, Warner minute, 6 December 1954.

22. The Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, vol.531, cols.1041-2. In a television broadcast in November Eden reiterated this view, declaring: "it never seemed to me that the German military contribution in defence, though it is important, is what really matters in the new arrangements. What really matters is the chance of Germany working with the West and our ending... this age-long Franco-German feud which has cost us all so much. That's what counts to me, the other is secondary". See Avon Papers, AP 14/3/259B, Transcript of a Press conference broadcast by the BBC, 19 November 1954.

In November six Labour backbenchers defied party orders and voted against the Paris Agreements. The whip was removed from the dissenters.²³ As had been the case with EDC, however, the divisions which German rearmament caused in French society were more accurately reflected in the French National Assembly than equivalent concerns were in the British Parliament. In contrast to his indifference over EDC, Mendes-France gave the Paris Agreements his full backing, but this was insufficient to prevent the National Assembly defeating a motion for the creation of the WEU by 280 votes to 259 on Christmas Eve, 1954. At this stage even Jebb recommended that the French be given "a sharp knock on the head" which Eden duly delivered with a threat that unless this decision was reversed the other powers would go ahead and rearm Germany without any regard to French opinion. Eden had requested a joint Anglo-American statement but Dulles and Eisenhower refused. Both governments recognised the need for urgent action if, as Eden put it, "we are to hold the position not only in Germany but in other Western European countries". There was, however, no need to implement contingency plans calling for the "empty chair" for France in NATO because, on the night of 30 December, the French National Assembly reversed their position by 287 votes to 260.²⁴

There were to be further false alarms over the fate of the Paris Agreements, particularly when Faure replaced Mendes-France as Prime Minister in February 1955, but the British government began the new year confident of foreign policy success. For once there was actually almost complete unity within the government over policy towards Moscow. The consensus view was that once the Paris Agreements were brought into force the West would have its best opportunity yet to make a deal with the Soviet Union. These hopes were to some extent justified, as the signing of the Austrian State Treaty was to demonstrate, but on the crucial issue of Germany they were to prove misguided. Now that the

23. Philip M. Williams, *Hugh Gaitskell : A Political Biography* (Jonathan Cape, London 1979), p.331-4; Kenneth Harris, *Attlee*, (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1982), p.522-5; The six who had the whip removed were Craddock, Stephens, Davies, Fernyhough, Yates, Emrys Hughes and Silverman. James Carmichael, Monslow, Crossman and Bevan all spoke out against the agreement in the Commons.

24. PREM 11/891, Jebb to FO, 24 December 1954; PREM 11/843, FO to Washington (Eden to Dulles), 27 December 1954; FRUS 1952-4, vol.5, Diary entry by President's Press Secretary, 24 December 1954, p.1522, memo of conversation by the Director of the Office of German Affairs (Lyon), 29 December 1954, p.1532-3; Saki Dockrill, *Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament* (Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.149; Lacouture, *op.cit.*, p.321-5.

West appeared to be in such a position of strength, the Foreign Office believed that it would be appropriate to offer some further concessions to the Soviet Union on the subject of unification. This idea was given some urgency by the belief that if progress towards German reunification was not made a process of political entropy would begin. Kirkpatrick and his officials believed that, whatever the successes of their policy so far, the situation in Germany was still volatile. Adenauer was an old man and it was feared that if he left the scene while Germany was still divided the possibility of doing a deal with Moscow might prove too tempting for his successors to resist. During 1955 the Foreign Office came up with a range of inducements in an effort to persuade the Soviets to accept unification on western terms but few of them were put on the negotiating table due to the opposition of Britain's allies.

Eden had told the Commons during the debate on the Paris Agreements, "if we proceed calmly and steadily with these proposals we shall have better opportunities for negotiations than we have had for a very long time".²⁵ Mendes-France could not, however, afford to adopt quite such a relaxed approach to the prospect of negotiations with Moscow. Even though he had forced the Paris Agreements through the National Assembly they still had to be approved by the Senate. On 5 January Mendes wrote to Eisenhower and Churchill to argue that a fresh approach to Moscow should be made in order to persuade French public opinion that ratification would not hinder efforts to reduce international tensions. He suggested a conference could be held in May. Though Jebb was not unsympathetic to this approach, Churchill and Eden were furious. The Foreign Secretary's initial reaction was that any prospect of talks with the Soviets would delay ratification in France and Germany, but when Mendes accepted that a meeting could only occur after ratification he became still more angry. He warned that if Mendes went ahead with his proposals he would "wreck the alliance" and insisted "Jebb must stand up to the French on this."²⁶ Meanwhile, Churchill drafted his own reply to Mendes in which he returned to his idea about an

25. The Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, vol.533, col.414.

26. FO 371/118195, WG 1071/1, Jebb to FO, 3 January 1955, WG 1071/3, FO to Paris, 5 January 1955, WG 1071/7, Jebb to FO, 6 January 1955, WG 1071/8, Mendes-France to Churchill, 5 January 1955, WG 1071/16, Jebb to FO, 8 January 1955 with Eden minute; FO 371/118196, WG 1071/29, Jebb to FO, 11 January 1955 with Eden minute, WG 1071/33, Aide-Memoire to Quai d'Orsay, 9 January 1955.

alliance between the Anglo-Saxon powers and Germany. He threatened the French with the "Empty Chair" and went on to explain his view "that the United States with their immense superiority of nuclear weapons and acting in association with Great Britain, the British Commonwealth and the German Federal Republic will be strong enough, at any rate during the next few years, to afford to the Benelux countries and our other Allies... a definite and substantial security based on physical and moral deterrent power." However, that Churchill himself had not abandoned the hope of a meeting with the Soviets was clear from his statement, which the Foreign Office tried but failed to amend, that "The sooner we can get our united ratification the sooner the Top-Level Four-Power Conference may come".²⁷ With the Americans threatening that any French demarche on this subject would have "a very adverse influence on the future of the Western alliance and the role of France within it", Mendes gave up his hopes of an early summit.²⁸

The precariousness of Mendes-France's position was conclusively proven on 6 February when he was toppled from the premiership. In the British Foreign Office this event caused dismay at the thought of yet more delays before ratification could be completed. Warner suggested putting the contingency plans which had been worked out with the Americans into final form and perhaps even ending the occupation in the British and American zones independently of the French. However, Harrison, who had taken over Roberts's responsibilities for German affairs, regarded Anglo-American plans to institute the 'Empty Chair' proposal as "a counsel virtually of despair" and warned Jebb to be cautious in his use of this threat.²⁹ It was still an end to the occupation which was seen as the essential requirement if progress was to be made in solving the German problem. Two dispatches from Hoyer-Millar that same month highlighted the opposition within Germany to rearmament. He reported that many Germans "feel that the creation of armed forces would inevitably crystallise, for as long as can be foreseen, the partition of Germany and will by regularising the status of the

27. FO 371/118197, WG 1071/66, Churchill to Mendes-France (draft), January 1955, FO to Prime Minister, 11 January 1955, Churchill to Eden, 12 January 1955.

28. FRUS 1955-7, vol.5, State Department to Embassy in France, 8 January 1955, p.121.

29. FO 371/118200, WG 1071/166, Hancock minute, 7 February 1955, Harrison minute, 7 February 1955; FO 371/118258, WG 1074/12, Harrison minute, 10 February 1955, WG 1074/10, Warner minute, 5 February 1955.

Federal Republic as an American satellite, render impossible any deal with the Russians." Wright noted that it was "quite clear that the reunification issue had now assumed an overwhelming importance in German public opinion." Harrison complained that the emphasis given to Germany's future defence role had been too great. He minuted "It has always struck me over the past 4 or 5 years that it has been a major blunder of SACEUR and of US policy to put all the emphasis on the need of their miserable twelve divisions for the effective defence of Europe. The right line today surely is that full and equal partnership in the Western community involves for Germany obligations as well as rights."³⁰

Indifference about the "miserable twelve divisions" and concern about the state of German public opinion led the Foreign Office to begin considering a new approach to negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Deputy High Commissioner in Bonn, Roger Allen, expressed "serious doubts" about whether it would be possible to achieve unification after the Paris Agreements, while warning that German sensitivities on this point would have to be taken into account "if we want to avoid having a disgruntled Germany as well as a dicky France in the team." Warner in London concurred with this analysis suggesting it might be "several decades" before reunification would be feasible. From Paris Jebb argued that given Germany's past record it might be better not to make the attempt to reunify Germany. This elicited yet another reprimand for the unconventional ambassador. Revealingly, Jebb was told "German forces are, of course, required to defend the existing status quo but our policy and purpose is more dynamic...It is based on the premise that it is only when Western unity and strength has been consolidated that we shall be able to get down to serious negotiations with the Russians, looking eventually towards the reunification of Germany and the genuine appeasement of Europe."³¹ The Germans were keen to exploit British fears about the future. Despite a distinct lack of evidence von Braun, the Germany charge in London, told Turton, the British Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, that there was not the same level of enthusiasm for WEU in

30. FO 371/118161, WG 10112/3, Hoyer-Millar (Bonn) to FO, 4 February 1955; FO 371/118258, WG 1074/15, Hoyer-Millar to Eden, 14 February 1955, Wright minute, 17 February 1955, Harrison minute, 22 February 1955.

31. FO 371/118198, WG 1071/84, R. Allen (Bonn) to FO, 19 January 1955, Warner minute, 25 January 1955; WG 1071/113, Jebb to Kirkpatrick, 25 January 1955, Kirkpatrick minute, 25 January 1955.

Germany as there had been for EDC.³²

In March the Foreign Office produced a paper on the subject of East-West talks which confirmed that new thinking was taking place on the subject of unification and rearmament. It stated "We are this year as close to being able to talk on terms of equality with the Soviet leaders as we are likely to be in the foreseeable future...once 'saturation' in thermo-nuclear weapons is reached, our relative military strength declines. Moreover the cohesion of the West may well be at a high point in the period immediately after the ratification of the Paris agreements." The paper also outlined the dangers of not talking with the Russians. The Foreign Office believed "Unless we make a demonstrably serious effort to reunify Germany, the Germans cannot be relied on to resist Russian blandishments." They argued for negotiations with the Soviets "as soon as seems practicable after ratification." In discussing a four-power conference they acknowledged "We cannot expect any concessions from the Russians unless we advance on our opinion at Berlin...the only possible advance would be to undertake that the Federal Government would suspend their plans for the raising of 12 divisions etc., contemplated in the Paris agreements pending the decision of an all-German Constituent Assembly."³³ Though there were differences over the prospects of making a deal on Germany with the Soviets, there was unanimity that the effort should be made. Warner, who was generally sceptical about the prospect of a deal, wrote to Hoyer-Millar that "The recent Soviet initiative over Austria suggested that the Russians might be willing to seek some reasonable kind of compromise." Neither Allen nor Hoyer-Millar believed agreement with the Soviets was possible, but the latter was insistent that the West must adopt a more flexible attitude in order "to smoke the Russians out about reunification" and pacify German opinion.³⁴

The Foreign Office was determined that the next meeting would not be a repetition of Berlin and in late March and early April discussed a range of new

32. Opinion polls showed that the WEU solution was actually more popular in Germany than the EDC. See Deutsch and Edinger (eds.), *Germany Rejoins the Powers* (Octagon Books, New York, 1973 edition), p.166; FO 371/118200, WG 1071/163, Turton minute, 4 February 1955.

33. FO 371/118204, WG 1071/278, FO to Washington, 26 March 1955 (two telegrams), WG 1071/291, draft FO paper including proposals for a Four-Power conference at appendix, 24 March 1955.

34. FO 1008/345, Warner (FO) to Hoyer-Millar, 24 March 1955; FO 1008/346, Allen minute, 13 April 1955, Hoyer-Millar minute, 13 April 1955; FO 1008/347, Hoyer-Millar to FO, 25 April 1955.

proposals, including the withdrawal of troops from the whole or a part of the Federal Republic, the staging of the West German rearmament programme and the setting of a ceiling on German rearmament at the same level as the East German Volkspolizei. Initially, Kirkpatrick did not want the "possible 'bun' to the Russians ventilated or discussed outside the office", but on 22 April he presented some of these ideas to the Chiefs of Staff. He stated bluntly that "we might be faced shortly with the difficult task of negotiating a German treaty with the Russians...If Russia suggested that Germany should be neutralised, and Germany estimated that this was the quickest way to unification, we would have to be very careful that we in no way appeared to be dragging our feet because such action might result in the Germans making a deal with Russia." He added that it had always been expected that a peace treaty would make "provision for some German Armed Forces, but they did not appear to be in a position either materially or psychologically to support a large force." The Chiefs were asked to consider various formulae for troop withdrawals from a united Germany, including neutralisation. The Joint Planning Staff reported that neutralisation of an armed Germany "would be fraught with the greatest military dangers", while the Soviets were unlikely to accept a reunited Germany which was free to invite NATO forces to advance to the Polish border. Surprisingly, however, the planners did not regard either the withdrawal of NATO forces to the Rhine or to the French frontier as militarily unsafe provided Soviet forces were withdrawn from East Germany. Though Kirkpatrick did not raise the subject of future arms limitations on a reunified Germany, Harding took it up. He suggested that Germany's "forces should be of sufficient size not to tempt Russia to attack her, but at the same time there must be some safeguard against them becoming so strong that they could menace the stability of Western Europe." At this point discussion turned to the possibility of a reunified, non-aligned Germany acting as a bulwark against Soviet aggression and it was agreed the shape and size of the forces required by Germany to fulfil this role should be considered. Thus, because of Kirkpatrick's failure to raise the issue of a force ceiling or a delay in West German rearmament openly, the military concentrated their attention on the possibility of NATO troop withdrawals as an inducement to the Soviets to agree to reunification. This in turn led to a study of the force levels which the Germans would require if they were

to confront the Soviets on the Polish border unsupported by NATO forces.³⁵

There was little doubt that the government of the Federal Republic would co-operate with the Foreign Office should they propose a phasing in of German rearmament. The Bundestag had voted in favour of the WEU agreement on 27 February by a large majority of 314 votes to 157. Hoyer-Miller was, however, concerned that the strength of opposition to German rearmament in the Federal Republic would cause difficulties in the long term. Like so many other British diplomats he still did not really trust the Germans. In a dispatch addressed to the new Foreign Secretary, Harold Macmillan, he stated "I cannot help having a sneaking feeling of relief that the Germans are so far failing to show, in their rearmament plans, the same skill and determination which they demonstrated to our great disadvantage in the years between the wars." However, Hoyer-Millar was concerned that the anti-rearmament campaign might be symptomatic of a wider tendency towards neutralism. On 21 April he warned that "The coming end of the occupation has given encouragement to the 'national-neutralists'." He continued by stating that it was inevitable, following the thermo-nuclear revolution in warfare, that "the Germans should ask themselves whether their contribution of twelve divisions of conventional type will weigh at all in the strategic balance when many of them feel that it risks depriving Germany irrevocably of political benefits which she might otherwise one day hope to enjoy from Russia." He noted that one of Adenauer's aides, von Herwarth, had suggested a contribution of 6 rather than 12 divisions.³⁶ Earlier he had speculated that the Chancellor himself might favour a delay in rearmament, writing that Adenauer "has always maintained that he is ready for Four-Power talks before the re-establishment of German armed forces is fully effective, the implications being that a favourable outcome of the talks might make possible a modification of rearmament plans." On 28 April Kirkpatrick met Blankenhorn, who presented proposals for a force ceiling in a reunited Germany and the neutralisation of the Russian zone. Kirkpatrick was delighted and presented his own two favoured options of an agreement "that

35. FO 371/118206, WG 1071/379, Hancock minute, 1 April 1955, Harrison minute, 1 April 1955; DEFE 4/76, COS(55)28th mtg., minute 1, 22 April 1955 including JP(55)30 (Final), 20 April 1955; DEFE 5/57, COS(55)74, 7 April 1955.

36. FO 371/118208, WG 1071/429, UK High Commissioner (Hoyer-Millar) to Macmillan, 21 April 1955; FO 371/118321, WG 1192/61, Hoyer-Millar (Bonn) to Macmillan, 12 April 1955.

pending unification, the rearmament of Western Germany should be phased or should not exceed the strength of the *volkspolizie*", or acceptance by the West that they should "move out Anglo-American troops in return for the move of Russian troops".³⁷

Following Churchill's resignation, Eden and Macmillan proved quite as eager as Churchill himself had been for a meeting with the Soviets. On 19 April Macmillan presented the Cabinet with a version of the Foreign Office paper on talks with the Soviet Union which had been written the previous month, including the suggestion of offering to delay German rearmament as part of a deal on unification. He explained that he was trying to secure a meeting of officials to discuss these ideas before the end of the month.³⁸ The working party began its discussions in London on 27 April and completed its report on 5 May, the day on which the occupation of Germany ended and the Paris Agreements came into force. The British representative, Geoffrey Harrison, did not press for consideration of NATO troop withdrawals or the phasing in of German rearmament and instead the discussion of possible concessions to the Russians centred on a proposal by the German representative, Blankenhorn, to offer them some kind of European security system. The final report did not indicate much of a change from the western position at Berlin. It stated that acceptance of the Eden Plan was "the essential first step" towards unification and, while mentioning the possibility of mutual assistance pacts and guarantees of frontiers, it stressed their practical difficulties.³⁹ Harrison's main efforts during the discussions were directed towards gaining agreement to a heads of government rather than a Foreign Ministers meeting. With Churchill removed from power Eden was now anxious for a summit, and on 26 April Macmillan informed the Cabinet of this shift in policy. During the course of the working party discussions the British

37. FO 371/118209, WG 1071/477, Kirkpatrick minute, 28 April 1955; FO 371/118324, WG 1193/18, Hoyer-Millar (Bonn) to FO, 31 March 1955; FO 1008/347, Hancock to Hoyer-Millar, 2 May 1955. Blankenhorn seems to have been considerably less forthcoming on the subject of new concessions to the Soviets when he discussed the unification issue with the Americans. See FRUS 1955-7, vol.5, Delegation to London (Beam) to State Department, 28 April 1955, p.153-4, and Delegation to London (Beam) to State Department, 29 April 1955, p.157-8.

38. CAB 128/29, CM(55)4th mtg., minute 5, 19 April 1955, CM(55)5th mtg., minute 5, 22 April 1955; CAB 129/74, C(55)83, 26 March 1955.

39. FO 371/118210, WG 1071/514, Hancock minute of conversation between Harrison, Bean and Seydoux, 8 May 1955; FO 371/118211, WG 1071/516, Report of the Official Working Party in London, 27 April-5 May 1955 including Harrison memo, 5 May 1955.

delegation were "disarmingly frank in acknowledging their proposals, particularly for meeting at summit, aimed at local electorate."⁴⁰ On 6 May Eden wrote to Eisenhower urging him to accept the idea of a summit and explaining "much in our country depends upon it; this is not a party question here, but responds to a deep desire of our people." Eisenhower doubted such a meeting could be a success without some rough agenda which would have to be discussed by the western Foreign Ministers.⁴¹ Nevertheless, four days later the western powers invited the Soviet leaders to a summit meeting.

The British had given very little indication to the allies of the possible inducements which were under consideration. This reflected continuing uncertainty about the diplomatic and strategic implications of German reunification. On 11 May the Joint Planning Staff completed their report on this subject. They concluded that a neutral Germany would have serious disadvantages for the western alliance. They argued that a neutral Germany might be lured towards the Soviet camp by an offer from Moscow to restore her pre-war borders in eastern Europe and that to keep Germany in the western orbit it would be necessary to extend NATO guarantees and give economic and political support. Strategically, a neutral Germany would necessitate a redeployment of NATO forces, the loss of the Baltic exits and of forward radar stations and airfields. Similar difficulties would arise if a united Germany was allowed to remain a member of NATO on condition that all foreign troops were withdrawn. In either case Germany would form the front line in any defence against a Soviet advance westwards. In an attempt to balance the need for a strong German force to counter a Soviet invasion against the threat a massive German army could pose to the West, the JPS suggested a united Germany free of all foreign troops ought to be allowed a force of 18 divisions and 1,200 aircraft. When the Chiefs of Staff discussed this report with Kirkpatrick, Dean and Hancock of the Foreign Office, it was acknowledged that the neutralisation of Germany would be "a major cold war defeat" and the Chiefs agreed that the unification of Germany combined with the

40. CAB 128/29, CM(55)6th mtg., minute 5, 26 April 1955: FRUS 1955-7, vol.5, Delegation to London (Beam) to State Department, 27 April 1955, p.151-2, Delegation to London (Beam) to State Department, 30 April 1955, p.160-161.

41. FRUS 1955-7, vol.5, Eden to Eisenhower, 6 May 1955, p.164-5, Dulles to British Ambassador (Makins), 6 May 1955, p.165-6, State Department to Dulles, 9 May 1955, p.178-9.

withdrawal of all foreign forces "comprised the minimum conditions that could be considered but the practical implications...should be considered."⁴² Thus instead of considering the phasing in of West German rearmament or the setting of a ceiling on German force levels, the military were concentrating their attention on the possibility of NATO force withdrawals. Before the opening of the summit for which Eden and Macmillan had worked so assiduously, all these options would be discounted in favour of the establishment of a demilitarised zone in the eastern half of a united Germany. Though less dangerous for the western allies, this proposal was bound to be unacceptable to the Soviets and so ensured that the plans made for German rearmament in 1951 would be implemented in 1956 with very little variation despite the five year hiatus.

At the beginning of June the British Embassy in Washington consulted the Americans on a new western plan for presentation to the Soviets at the planned summit. The brief supplied by the Foreign Office for ambassador Makins reiterated the theme that they had been emphasising since the start of the year; that the period between the ratification of the Paris agreements and the erosion of American nuclear superiority represented the optimum moment for negotiations with the Soviet Union. It stated that it was also "important that the Western negotiators should take account both of the political advantage of unifying Germany and of the need to impress the German people with the resolve of the West to achieve German unification." However, any solution must be based on the cardinal principles of free elections and Germany's right to choose an alliance with the West. Within this framework a number of concessions were contemplated including the removal of all foreign troops from the east zone, from Germany east of the Rhine or from the entire country. Another option was the complete demilitarization of the east zone to include German as well as foreign troops. The draft went on to state "Additional variations could be made by providing for the liquidation of the East German forces (volkspolizei) or by offering to phase West German rearmament up to a stage equivalent to the Volkspolizei." Finally it was suggested that if a general disarmament plan could be agreed with the Russians, this could include a ceiling of perhaps 300,000 men

42. DEFE 4/76, COS(55)33rd mtg., 13 May 1955, minute 1, including JP(55)36 (Final), 11 May 1955.

on German forces. Even without a disarmament agreement the paper suggested a ceiling could be imposed on German forces either at the WEU figure of 12 divisions or at some other level.⁴³ The ill-defined nature of these proposals, which reflected the uncertainty in current British planning for Germany, seemed designed to create confusion and they had just that effect.

Makins outlined British ideas to the State Department over two days on 2 and 3 June and, though he reported that the American officials "were clearly impressed by the comprehensive nature of our studies", in fact his presentation left numerous questions unanswered. The Americans warned that the plan for the westward move of NATO forces "might lead the Soviets to suggest withdrawal of American forces to the US in return for the withdrawal of their forces to the USSR" and also "questioned how inviting the British proposals might be to the Soviets". On the subject of the rearmament of West Germany up to the level of the Volkspolizei, Leishman of the British Embassy reported "Neither we nor the Americans when we mentioned this to them were quite clear what you had in mind. Would these be possible variations only in the case that Germany remained divided? If Germany were reunited, would not the all-German government take care of the Volkspolizei? Are you contemplating the possibility that the German build-up in the West could be modified in return for the disbandment of the Volkspolizei?" The vagueness of the Foreign Office reply only illuminated their own uncertainty about this subject. Hancock claimed the idea was Kirkpatrick's and continued "I should not wish to be too explicit about its exact implications...as I understand...the idea would relate not necessarily to a divided Germany or to a reunited Germany but rather to the interim period between free elections and the transfer of powers to a civil Government. It might even apply during an earlier period when German reunification was the subject of Four-Power discussions. The idea of 'phasing' is one which we have not examined closely and I should myself imagine that, if we got the military to advise on it they would see every kind of difficulty...The idea of West German rearmament up to a strength equivalent to that of the Volkspolizei is perhaps, one which would represent fewer practical difficulties." Hancock concluded, without any apparent use of irony: "I think you would be well advised not to make the attempt of explaining to the Americans

43. FO 371/118215, WG 1071/628, Harrison (FO) to Makins (Washington), 28 May 1955.

what we mean." In response to the Embassy's queries about the strategic implications of the plans for mutual withdrawals the Foreign Office would only reply that the military were studying the problem.⁴⁴

On 10 June the Chiefs considered two papers from the JPS which analysed the implications of the withdrawal of foreign troops from a united Germany and the preconditions which the Soviets were likely to set for any settlement. The JPS considered that the seminal point about the withdrawal of NATO forces to Germany's western border was that it would require a complete revision of current strategy. As a result SACEUR "might regard it as impractical to defend the Eastern frontier on (sic) a reunified Germany unless Germany were allowed to raise much larger conventional forces than those at present assumed, and unless sufficient traditional air forces, with a nuclear capability, were retained on the continent to support them." The new estimate of the German forces required was 26 divisions. This was not likely to be acceptable to the Russians but if a ceiling on force levels was set at a lower level in order to propitiate Moscow "not only would Germany be unable to provide the replacement for the NATO forces which would be withdrawn from her territory, but she would be unable to defend herself." The Chiefs took up this issue stating "Our defence in Western Europe could only be effective if our withdrawal from Germany were so timed that our forces could be replaced by German forces. This would, however, mean that Germany might raise larger forces than at present envisaged, which might not be possible of fulfilment." They were convinced that the problems of large scale redeployment were almost insurmountable and revised the section of the JPS paper covering Soviet preconditions to state "The defence of Western Europe cannot be assured except by the use of German territory and the use of infrastructure that has been built there." Dickson was particularly vehement that the West now had the advantage in the Cold War and should not lose it at the negotiating table. He suggested that redeployment could only be considered in the

44. FO 371/118215, WG 1071/632, Makins (Washington) to FO, 3 June 1955, WG 1071/636, memo by Makins, 2 June 1955, Warner minute, 7 June 1955; FO 371/118216, WG 1071/653, Leishman (Washington) to Hood, 3 June 1955, Hancock to Leishman (Washington), 7 June 1955; FRUS 1955-7, vol.5, memo from the Counsellor of the State Department (MacArthur) to Dulles, 3 June 1955, p.209-212.

context of an effective disarmament treaty.⁴⁵

The reluctance of the Foreign Office to pursue Kirkpatrick's ideas about phasing German rearmament or setting a limit on it, combined with the rejection by the Chiefs of a policy of mutual withdrawals, marked a watershed in British policy towards future negotiations with the Soviet Union. The former notions would perhaps have involved a reduced German defence contribution, while the latter implied an increase in the size of German forces. The Foreign Office seemed to believe that with the Paris Agreements now ratified, the scale and rate of German military build-up were of little consequence in comparison with the advantages of a possible deal with the Soviets on unification or, at least, a propaganda victory at the forthcoming summit meeting. The military, not surprisingly, were more concerned with creating an effective defence system in Western Europe. Any of the concessions suggested by the Foreign Office would require changes in NATO strategy. The Chiefs were not consulted on the issue of force ceilings and concluded that a NATO withdrawal from Germany would be too damaging to the alliance. As a result attention now shifted to the prospect of a one sided withdrawal involving a Soviet evacuation of the eastern zone of Germany. This had fewer implications for German rearmament and was never likely to be acceptable to the Soviets and can, therefore, be dealt with more briefly.

On 7 June the Foreign Office received reports that the Germans supported the linking of unification to disarmament and that they were considering a proposal to create a demilitarised zone in the eastern half of Germany which could also incorporate parts of Czechoslovakia and Poland. When the Foreign Ministers met with Adenauer in New York later that month, Macmillan found that Adenauer's ideas on unification were very similar to his own. The Chancellor stressed that he was quite willing to accept a ceiling of 12 divisions on the forces of a united Germany, while his military adviser, Heusinger, outlined plans for a demilitarised zone along the Stettin-Prague-Vienna axis. The German plan also incorporated the idea of additional zones to the east and west of the demilitarised zone in which there would be a ceiling on force levels. Macmillan told Adenauer

45. DEFE 4/77, COS(55)41st mtg., minute 2, 10 June 1955; DEFE 5/58, COS(55)132, 10 June 1955; DEFE 6/29, JP(55)42 (Final), 2 June 1955; DEFE 6/30, JP(55)53 (Final), 9 June 1955.

"our minds were working on lines not dissimilar to those which he had outlined". He instructed the Foreign Office and the Chiefs to consider the Heusinger Plan and their initial reaction was favourable.⁴⁶ By 23 June the Joint Planners had produced a variant of the Heusinger Plan based on a trizonal division of continental Europe. The central zone, consisting of the Soviet area of Germany and western areas of Poland and Czechoslovakia, would be completely demilitarized to the extent of the removal of all arms industries; a second zone, consisting of eastern Poland and Western Germany, would have limits on conventional force sizes and prohibitions on rocket and missile sites; while an outer zone covering Europe from the Pyrenees to Riga in the Soviet Union would have forces of equal strength. The Chiefs stressed that disengagement in central Europe would not necessarily entail a reduction in the strength of the forces required for western defence and that the forces allowed in western Germany should be sufficiently large to contain the British, American and Canadian units currently stationed there. They also wanted the forces in the outer zone to be set as close to current NATO force levels as possible "as any higher level would be to our disadvantage."⁴⁷ A week later the Chiefs considered a much simpler plan for the creation of a narrow demilitarised strip in Central Europe. Once again they wished to ensure that any deal with the Russians involved as little disruption to NATO as possible. Their report stated that the Wismer-Elbe-Saale line was the best defensive position for NATO and that it was "essential therefore that the line of the Elbe-Saale is not included in the demilitarised strip."⁴⁸

By the beginning of July the Foreign Office had prepared a formula for

46. FO 371/118216, WG 1071/661, Steel (UK Delegation to NATO) to Harrison, 7 June 1955; FO 371/118219, WG 1071/735, Dixon (UK Delegation to UN) to FO (from Macmillan), 18 June 1955, WG 1071/736, four telegrams from Macmillan to Dixon (UK Del to UN) to FO, 18 June 1955 and Dean minute, 20 June 1955, WG 1071/737, Dixon (UK Del to UN) to FO (from Macmillan), 18 June 1955; FRUS 1955-7, vol.5, Memo from the Assistant Secretary of state for European Affairs (Merchant) to Dulles, 15 June 1955, p.228-230, memo of conversation between Dulles, Adenauer, Macmillan and Pinay, New York, 17 June 1955, p.235-8. Adenauer spoke to Eden about the German proposals on his way back to Germany from New York. Eden said his government "had been thinking ourselves on rather similar though more modest lines...same plan for a phased withdrawal of forces from a central line in Europe, on a basis which does not imperil our NATO plans, could be regarded as a limitation of armaments." See FO 371/118221, WG 1071/748, PM to Foreign Secretary, 21 June 1955.

47. DEFE 4/77, COS(55)50th mtg., minute 1, 27 June 1955; DEFE 5/59, COS(55)143, 28 June 1955; DEFE 6/30, JP(55)56, 23 June 1955.

48. DEFE 4/77, COS(55)53rd mtg., minute 3, 6 July 1955; DEFE 5/59, COS(55)151, 6 July 1955; DEFE 6/30, JP(55)59, 1 July 1955.

German unification for presentation to the Americans. It suggested that the West should inform the Soviet Union that they were "prepared in principle to agree to a completely demilitarised area between East and West, accompanied by a Security Pact and, if the Russians desire it, an agreement as to the total and stationing of Russian and satellite forces on the one hand and the forces of NATO countries on the other in Germany and the countries of Europe neighbouring Germany." When Makins presented the British zonal plan and the demilitarised strip plan to State Department officials on 1 July the Americans were quick to point out that these ideas were unlikely to be regarded with much favour in Moscow. The British Ambassador had no effective response except to say "the demilitarised strip might be less unpalatable than the other proposal." When he reported the results of the meeting to the Foreign Office they quickly agreed to drop the zonal plan but refused to accede to Makins's request for more details on the demilitarised strip idea.⁴⁹ On 8 July Makins raised the issue with Dulles who made clear that there were numerous military objections to a demilitarised strip in central Europe. While he might be willing to accept the idea as the basis of a long-term solution, he did not want it raised at the Geneva summit.⁵⁰ At the preliminary meeting of western Foreign Ministers Macmillan pressed for the inclusion of the British proposal in western presentations at the Geneva summit but both Dulles and Pinay opposed this. The matter was remitted to the Heads of Government when, as so often in the past, Eden acceded to American wishes and agreed "that anything which might be said about a demilitarised zone must be tentative and vague."⁵¹

49. FO 371/118224, WG 1071/821, Warner minute, 2 July 1955, WG 1071/823, Makins (Washington) to FO, 2 July 1955, two telegrams from FO to Washington, 5 July 1955, Makins (Washington) to FO, 6 July 1955 with FO minute; FO 371/118225, WG 1071/826, FO 'Formula' on Geneva Aims, 2 July 1955; FRUS 1955-7, vol.5, memo of conversation between Makins and State Department officials, 1 July 1955, p.253-8.

50. FO 371/118226, WG 1071/859, Makins (Washington) to FO, 6 July 1955, FO 371/118228, WG 1071/890, Makins (Washington) to FO, 9 July 1955. Dulles had difficulty in persuading the NSC to agree to either a ceiling with the Soviets on German rearmament or a zonal agreement. The idea of a demilitarised zone was accepted "providing the Western military position in Germany is not thereby jeopardized and Germany is not precluded from effectively rearming". See FRUS 1955-7, vol.5, memo of an NSC meeting, 7 July 1955, p.274-9, Statement of Policy by the NSC, 11 July 1955, p.287-95.

51. FO 371/118233, WG 1071/973, note of informal meeting between Heads of Government, 17 July 1955; FRUS 1955-7, vol.5, Delegation at Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting to State Department, 15 July 1955, p.323-4, Delegation at Geneva conference to State Department, 18 July 1955, p.341-2.

The Geneva Heads of Government conference was marked by cordiality and a complete failure to reach agreement on any of the current outstanding issues. The Soviets presented proposals for a disarmament treaty and a European security system, while the West advocated unification of Germany through free elections and a five power mutual security pact. At the third plenary session on 20 July Eden mentioned that some force limitations on Germany and neighbouring countries could be agreed as part of a deal on unification. He had already raised the matter bilaterally with the Soviets, but during the four power meetings Eisenhower seemed anxious to end the fruitless debate on the terms for unification and the British proposals were not formally tabled. Instead the remainder of the Geneva conference was taken up with jejune discussions of whether European security or Germany should have priority on the agenda for the future Foreign Ministers conference.⁵² The second Geneva conference of the year, at which the Foreign Ministers met to reconsider the issues the Heads of Government had examined previously, opened on 27 October and proved as fruitless as its predecessor. The British government prepared yet another variant of their demilitarisation scheme and combined it with the offer of an East-West reciprocal guarantee against attack but once again found that Dulles was determined to emasculate any new initiative. The Soviets showed little interest in the idea of unification and seemed more concerned about consolidating their hold in East Germany. Macmillan informed his colleagues a week before the conference opened that he believed "that the Russians were not prepared to leave Germany."⁵³

Thus the ill-co-ordinated British attempt to revise the settlement reached at Paris in October 1954 ended in failure. However, the fact that it was

52. For the full British record of the conference see FO 371/118248, WG 1071/1254, and for the plenary session of 20 July see FO 371/118234, WG 1071/998, Geneva (UK Del) to FO, 20 July 1955; FO 371/118235, WG 1071/1020 and FRUS 1955-7, vol.5, Telegram from Delegation at Geneva conference to State Department, 20 July 1955, p.388-397. For the bilateral Anglo-Soviet meeting see CAB 129/76, CP(55)99, 27 July 1955 containing Eden memorandum, 19 July 1955 and FRUS 1955-7, vol.5, memo of conversation at President's Breakfast, 20 July 1955, p.398-400. Eventually it was agreed that the first item on the agenda for the Foreign Ministers would be 'European Security and Germany', see FO 371/118240, WG 1071/1111, Directive of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers to the Foreign Ministers, 23 July 1955.

53. CAB 130/111, GEN 506/1st mtg., 19 October 1955, GEN 506/1, 6 October 1955; FRUS 1955-57, vol.5, memo of conversation at New York, 28 September 1955, p.598-600, memo of conversation at Paris, 24 October 1955, p.625-7; Wilfried Loth, *The Division of the World* (Routledge, London 1988), p.295-9.

undertaken at all is revealing. It was the result of a belief that the Russians might be amenable to a deal on German unification now that the West had demonstrated its solidarity, and fear that the situation in Germany remained dangerously unstable. Though the former thesis was falsified, British diplomats still clung to the latter conviction, as an analysis of their reactions to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union reveals. Adenauer paid his first visit to Moscow in September 1955. Both before and during his trip he issued a stream of reassurances to the western allies that he had no intention of making any concessions to the Soviets. Thus when it was revealed that he had agreed to the granting of full diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in return for the release of 10,000 German prisoners who had been held in Russia since the end of the war, western diplomats reacted with outrage. The American Ambassador to Moscow, Charles Bohlen, declared that the "Soviets have achieved probably their greatest diplomatic victory in the post-war period." His British colleague, Sir William Hayter, commented "the German Chancellor has thrown away his most treasured card and gained nothing at all in return."⁵⁴

Ironically, the reaction in London was far more composed. Foreign Office cynicism about German motives insulated officials against any sense of shock. They were expecting the Germans to try and come to some kind of agreement with the Soviets and were delighted that Adenauer's encounters had been so bruising. Having received the verdict from the British embassy in Bonn that the Germans "have been taken for a ride by the Russians...the Germans may be wary how they come within reach of the bears hug again", Harrison concluded: "the visit will at least have had the salutary effect of destroying certain incipient German illusions, specifically, (a) that the Germans if given the chance, could deal with the Russians and (b) that reunification was perhaps not necessarily so far off." Though there was not quite the same level of virulent anti-Germanism as to be found in France, ten years after the end of the war British officials remained bitterly distrustful of the Germans, with the exception of the reliable Adenauer. On 4 October Hoyer-Millar sent a report to London describing the views of the

54. FRUS 1955-7, vol.5, Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to State Department, 14 September 1955, p.582-4; FO 371/118182, WG 10338/134, Hayter (Moscow) to Macmillan, 16 September 1955 and Wright minute, 31 September 1955. Wright described Hayter's dispatch as "unnecessarily gloomy and pessimistic."

departing French Ambassador, Francois-Poncet. The erstwhile French High Commissioner had a gloomy view of the future and suggested that "the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Moscow would only make things worse." In response Kirkpatrick criticised Francois-Poncet for his partisanship but conceded "that we must look to the future of Germany with some misgivings. The Germans are so stupid politically that one cannot rely on them to see on which side their bread is buttered, and they have a sneaking longing to commit suicide. The consequence is that their conduct of affairs is unstable, hysterical and unpredictable...The most urgent and real German danger we have to face is the deeply implanted German longing to do a deal with Russia. I agree...that the opening of direct Russo-German diplomatic relations is unfortunate. But, of course, this need not be fatal and will not in my opinion be even seriously damaging so long as Adenauer is at the helm."⁵⁵

Another cause for alarm was that in planning Germany's contribution to western defence the nascent German defence ministry, or Blank Office, adopted a latitudinarian approach to the guidelines provided by the Allies. As early as February 1955, with the Paris Agreements still unratified, it was clear that they intended to have six armoured and six infantry divisions instead of four armoured and eight infantry divisions, and that they were planning to reduce the manpower committed to these formations to enable them to create specialised brigades. By August Hoyer-Millar was reporting that the Germans were intending to increase the number of their all-weather fighters and reconnaissance planes at the expense of fighter-bombers.⁵⁶ However, when the Chiefs of Staff were asked to consider the German plans in November, it was clear to them that the main changes related to Germany's naval forces. The Germans intended to operate 18 destroyers, 6 ocean going minesweepers and 12 submarines despite the fact that none of these types of craft had been allowed to them under the EDC. In addition the manpower allotted to the German navy had been increased from 20,500 to 35,000. Though the War Office and Air Ministry accepted that the changes made

55 FO 371/118248, WG 1071/1258, Hoyer-Millar to Johnston with memo, 4 October 1955, Warner to Hoyer-Millar, 14 October 1955.

56. FO 371/118323, WG 1193/12, Hoyer-Millar (Bonn) to Eden, 23 February 1955; FO 371/118325, WG 1193/42, Hoyer-Millar (Bonn) to Eden, 29 June 1955; FO 371/118327, WG 1193/56, Allen (Bonn) to Macmillan, 16 August 1955.

by the Germans in their spheres of competence did not go beyond the "equivalent fighting capacity" of the EDC figures, at a meeting of the Chiefs on 29 November Mountbatten made clear the Admiralty's concerns. He said that the German plans "would provide a force entirely different in concept from that originally proposed under the EDC Treaty. The force now planned was offensive in character...the German navy now planned was a much more effective force than that originally envisaged and provided that Germany remained in NATO and allied to the West, it would be greatly to our advantage and that of NATO. We should note, however, that if at some future date the German desire for reunification outweighed their leaning towards an alliance with the West, then this new and large offensive Navy would be a dangerous factor in the situation." It was agreed by the Committee "That if ever there was a revival of Germany's political position then the German navy, as now proposed, might constitute a serious danger. This fact ought to be brought to the attention of the Foreign Secretary."⁵⁷

On 2 January 1956 at separate ceremonies in Andernach, Wilhelmshaven and Norvinick the first recruits of the new German armed forces were inducted into the three services. In 1945 the creation of a new German military machine was regarded as anathema by practically all responsible statesmen. By the end of 1949 the western powers were beginning to contemplate rearmament in their zones and the Soviets had already begun the process in the east. In December 1950 and again in May 1952 West German rearmament appeared imminent, but on both occasions the French effectively sabotaged the project. From the British perspective what is remarkable is how little influence the Attlee and Churchill governments had over either bringing forward or postponing the date of German rearmament. Immediately after the war, with the possible exception of Churchill, British statesmen and officials shared in the consensus that Germany must be permanently disarmed. Following the public discussion of rearmament at the end of 1949, in the spring of 1950 the British government formulated a cautious compromise plan which was shattered by the conflict of American and French policies. In 1951 the Attlee government was the principal opponent of the European Army, only to find it adopted by the American government. From 1952

57. FO 1008/368, Beagley (UK Permanent Delegation to NATO) to Ward, 5 December 1955; DEFE 4/81, COS(55)98th mtg., minute 1, 29 November 1955; DEFE 5/63, COS(55)320, 29 November 1955; DEFE 6/31, JP(55)150 (Final), 28 November 1955.

the British were unable to overcome French opposition to the compromise deal agreed in May of that year.

The argument of this thesis has been that the continuing antipathy towards the Germans felt in Westminster and Whitehall is crucial to an understanding of Britain's policy towards German rearmament. At the simplest level it explains the backlash against German rearmament which occurred in the year following the New York conference of September 1950. In a more complex way it explains the subsequent advocacy of German rearmament after it was tied to the contract in the May 1952 treaty complex. It was believed by British policy-makers that unless Germany was granted its sovereignty, which now included its military sovereignty, the politically "stupid" Germans would seek a deal with the Soviet Union which would be the greatest disaster imaginable for British diplomacy. Once agreement on the implementation of the contract was reached with the ratification of the Paris Agreements, the Foreign Office became interested in the possibility of bargaining away some of the military advantages of a German defence contribution for Russian concessions on German unification. However, these ideas were never fully developed and the negative results of the Geneva conference restored the status quo.

The British military's view of German rearmament had always been distinct from that of the Foreign Office. The Army and the Air Force initially regarded a German defence contribution as essential to the expansion of NATO's resources on the central front, which was the basic requirement of an effective defence. As East-West tension reduced, arsenals expanded and economies became strained, a new Alliance strategy emerged which concentrated on increasing capability through the deployment of nuclear weapons, and the Chiefs of Staff increasingly regarded German rearmament as a method of compensating for the failure of the Allies, including Britain, to provide adequate conventional forces, even for the revised nuclear strategy. The Navy was always the most sceptical about the need for a large German contribution and this pattern continued up to the end of 1955.

The period from September 1954 was significant because for a brief period after this date British diplomacy operated free from the restraints imposed by fear of the Soviet Union and overbearing American pressure. Though the WEU compromise fashioned by Eden was designed to allow German rearmament in a

European context, it should be stressed that the primary aim of British diplomacy was to implement the contract. A solution to the rearmament problem only became urgent when Adenauer refused to separate it from the grant of sovereignty to the Federal Republic. Nevertheless, the Paris Agreements were a major achievement, not least because they seemed to offer the prospect of a new flexibility in Britain's attitude towards negotiations with the Soviet Union. This is why the events of 1955 form a fascinating coda to the controversy over German rearmament. Bruno Thoss has argued that during this period the British considered a smaller German defence contribution because they recognised that some concessions would be necessary in response to the more conciliatory Soviet policy, and that their aim was to forestall any American offer of troop reductions which might involve an American withdrawal from Europe.⁵⁸ Actually the British were still concerned about Germany's future and it was to forestall any drift in the Federal Republic towards an alliance with the Soviets that they considered a variety of schemes to allow them greater flexibility in any future negotiations with the new Soviet leaders. In considering the possible role of German armed forces in a united country they paid very little attention to military factors but when they did consult the Chiefs, the Foreign Office discovered that the 12 German divisions remained an integral part of Alliance strategy and that under some circumstances an even larger force might be required. However, it was the interest of the two superpowers in maintaining their respective positions in a divided Germany, rather than any internal dissension within the government, which ensured that the plans devised for Germany's future by British policy-makers were, like many earlier British initiatives, rendered redundant.

⁵⁸ Bruno Thoss, 'American Troops in Germany and German-American Relations, 1949-1956' in Diefendorf, Frohn and Rupieper (eds.), 'American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany, 1949-1955' (Cambridge University Press, 1993) p.426.

CONCLUSION

The current consensus concerning the development of Britain's policy towards the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany needs revision. In narrative terms the story is generally perceived as having begun in June 1950 with the Korean War and ended in September 1954 with the agreement on the WEU at the London Conference. Yet the British government had actually decided on a long term plan for German rearmament in May 1950 and the genesis of this decision can be traced back to November 1949. Furthermore, the ratification of the Paris agreements in May 1955 sparked off renewed debate in the Foreign Office about the scale and nature of German rearmament. There is also a need to revise current orthodoxies relating to British policy between 1950 and 1954. The extent of the backlash against German rearmament precipitated by the Korean War and the Labour government's enthusiasm for a deal with the Soviets on Germany have both been underestimated; the Anglo-American disputes over the nature of German arms production are seldom discussed; the widespread support for the EDC rather than the NATO solution, particularly in the military, is rarely recognised; while the willingness of the British government to delay German rearmament in order to implement the contract in the summer of 1954 has not been properly acknowledged.

In more general terms there is a need to reconsider the motivation behind British policy. Though it is evident that the British eventually accepted German rearmament for diplomatic reasons, it remains unclear whether this was part of a more general Cold War strategy aimed at strengthening western solidarity or the result of a fear which predated the Cold War: that German instability was a potent threat to European peace and that finding a means of controlling the nascent West German state was an urgent priority. A detailed analysis of British views proves that the latter consideration was of greater importance. In addition, though the pervasive influence of American pressure on British policy has, quite rightly, been acknowledged, with the exception of Churchill's May 1953 speech, insufficient attention has been paid to the constant British interest in possible Soviet reactions.

It is also necessary to examine the military and economic implications of German rearmament before one can discount them as a factor in the British

debate. Indeed, such an examination shows that on at least one occasion the military rationale for German rearmament overrode diplomatic objections. This occurred at the outset of the debate when Bevin approved the Chiefs' gendarmerie scheme. Though Bevin was somewhat tentative in revealing to the Allies that the arming of a West German gendarmerie was seen as a long term solution to the problem of a German defence contribution, it is quite clear that in May 1950 the Attlee administration was more prepared than the other western powers to contemplate this somewhat unpalatable option.¹ The British military were convinced that an effective defence for western Europe required a measure of German rearmament and the formation of a gendarmerie appeared to be the least dangerous method of achieving it. Bevin accepted the scheme even though the Foreign Office were reluctant to press ahead with any measure of German rearmament. French and American hostility to the plan, combined with the outbreak of the Korean War, caused its abandonment. It had never been put to the full Cabinet and only a small circle of ministers and officials knew of it. The widening of the debate in late 1950 which resulted from the presentation of the American 'package' proposal produced a powerful coalition of Germanophobic government officials and Labour politicians who were determined to block German rearmament. Instead of being confronted by the long-term, cautious proposals accepted by Bevin in May, they were presented with an American plan calling for the creation of a large German army at an early date. Thus western policy towards German rearmament developed on an entirely different basis from that which Bevin had envisaged.

However, the main factor which persuaded the government to oppose the idea of early German rearmament was the Korean War. Though most writers have suggested that the Korean War galvanised the western powers into accepting a German military build-up,² it actually had the contrary effect in Britain. It

1. The most accurate accounts of this situation come from two German historians but they only deal with the matter in cursory fashion. See Hans Peter Schwarz, *Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction*, vol.1, (British Edition, Berghahn Books, Oxford, 1995), p.524-9 and Matthias Peter, 'Britain, the Cold War and the Economics of German Rearmament' in Deighton (ed.), *Britain and the First Cold War* (Macmillan, London, 1990), p.277-8.

2. Christian Greiner, 'The Defence of Europe and the Rearmament of West Germany' in Riste (ed.), *Western European Security and Atlantic Defence, 1947-1953* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1985), p.172; Klaus Larres, 'Reunification or Integration with the West?: Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany in the Early 1950s' in Aldrich and Hopkins (eds.) *Intelligence*,

convinced the Foreign Office that an armed gendarmerie was essential for dealing with intra-German conflict on the Korean model, and could not therefore be the basis for a German army. Chinese intervention produced an even stronger backlash against the policy because it increased concerns about possible Soviet retaliation. Finally, the massive western build-up now planned by NATO appeared to render any plans for the incorporation of German units impractical on the grounds of cost and equipment shortages. In the first months of 1951 a number of senior Foreign Office officials, the majority of the Cabinet and even the Chief of the Air Staff, Sir John Slessor, were convinced that German rearmament should be delayed. However, the idea that it should be traded in return for Soviet concessions at a Foreign Ministers conference was less widely accepted. This policy was advocated by a group of Labour ministers led by Attlee and, like the gendarmerie scheme before it, foundered on allied opposition. At the preliminary meetings in Paris it became clear that the Americans were not prepared to compromise with Moscow even on the subject of an agenda. As on so many occasions the shelving of a British scheme has resulted in a neglect of it in the secondary literature.³

There is a similar gap in discussions of the initial EDC negotiations. A great deal has been written on the controversy surrounding Eden's Rome press conference and the refusal of the British government to join the community,⁴ but the Anglo-American controversies over German production of heavy military equipment, short range missiles and civil aircraft have been neglected. Consequently, the fact that Eden and the Foreign Office continued to have

Defence and Diplomacy: British Foreign Policy in the Post-War World (Frank Cass, Ilford, 1994), p.44; Dennis L. Bork and David R. Gress, **From Shadow to Substance: A History of West Germany**, vol.1, (2nd edition, Blackwell, Oxford, 1993), p.278-9; James Matthew Jones, 'British Threat Analyses in the 1950s' in Schweitzer (ed), **The Changing Western Analysis of the Soviet Threat** (Pinter, London, 1989) p.126; Mark Cioc, **Pax Atomica** (Columbia University Press, New York, 1988), p.12.

3. There appears to be no analysis of the Attlee government's desire for a deal on Germany with the Soviet Union in the literature. The extent of the Labour backlash against German rearmament is generally underestimated but for two accounts acknowledging the extent of their hostility, see Kenneth O. Morgan, **Labour in Power, 1945-1951** (Oxford University Press, 1984), p.430-1, and Bernard Donoughue and G.W. Jones, **Herbert Morrison: Portrait of a Politician** (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1973), p.483.

4. Saki Dockrill, **Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament** (Cambridge University Press, 1991), ch.5; Maj-Gen Edward Fursdon, **The European Defence Community: A History** (Macmillan, London, 1980), p.133-147; Robert Rhodes James, **Anthony Eden** (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1986), p.350-1; David Carlton, **Anthony Eden: A Biography** (Allen Lane, London, 1981), p.294-7.

concerns about the extent of German rearmament has been ignored. Though Eden's return had coincided with a shift in opinion at the Foreign Office in favour of arming the Germans, the British government remained intensely suspicious of the Germans and were convinced of the need for extensive safeguards to accompany it.

There was a clear division between those who regarded EDC as the best vehicle for containing the German threat and those who favoured a NATO solution. The commonly held view that the British always viewed NATO as the best solution⁵ is erroneous. Sir William Strang, though unenthusiastic about German rearmament in general, was willing to accept EDC as the most effective means of controlling it. The Chiefs of Staff were constant in their advocacy of EDC as the best solution to the German problem. Thus, it was not merely to avoid American censure that Eden made a whole series of concessions designed to secure French ratification. His policy reflected a genuine commitment to the treaty as a means of resolving the Franco-German antagonism and the dilemma of German rearmament without unduly provoking the Soviets.⁶

Within the government it was Churchill who was the principal opponent of EDC and his constant opposition to it is another of the reasons why the British have been castigated for their lack of support for EDC. His attempt to overturn the treaty in May 1953 is the most well-documented episode in the history of his second premiership.⁷ However, his plans met with strong opposition from both within and outside the government and his failure left the status quo on the subject of German rearmament untouched. By contrast, in the summer of 1954

5. James, *op. cit.*, p.347; Carlton *op. cit.*, p.361; Witness Seminar, *British Attitudes Towards German Rearmament and Reunification in the 1950s*, *Contemporary Record* 5, 1991, p.292-3; Geoffrey Goodwin, 'British Foreign Policy Since 1945: The Long Odyssey into Europe' in Leifer (ed.), *Constraints and Adjustments in British Foreign Policy* (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1972), p.39; Saki Dockrill, 'Britain and the Settlement of West German Rearmament Question' in Young and Dockrill (eds.), *British Foreign Policy, 1945-1955* (Macmillan, London, 1989), p.153. Larres in Aldrich and Hopkins (1994), *op. cit.*, p.51.

6. John W. Young has shown that Eden's efforts to achieve EDC were genuine. See John W. Young, 'German Rearmament and the European Defence Community' in Young (ed.), *The Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peace-Time Administration* (Leicester University Press, 1988).

7. Rolf Steininger, *The German Question: The Stalin Note of 1952 and the Problem of Reunification* British edition, Columbia University Press, New York, 1985), ch.10; Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill: Never Despair*, vol.8, (Heinemann, London, 1988), ch.44; John W. Young, *Winston Churchill's Last Campaign: Britain and the Cold War, 1951-1955* (1995), ch.7; Klaus Larres, *Politik der Illusionen: Churchill, Eisenhower und die Deutsch Frage* (Vandershoech and Rupprecht, Gottingen, 1995), ch. 4; Anthony Glees, 'Churchill's Last Gambit', *Encounter* 64, 1985.

the government adopted a policy of delaying the creation of a German army in order to save the contract, which involved the revision of current orthodoxies and left Churchill once again isolated, but this time in defence of the policy of early German rearmament. Despite his objections the British and Americans developed a scheme designed to restore the sovereignty of Germany, without a resolution of the rearmament question. The significant difference between their approaches was that whereas the Americans wished to acknowledge that the Federal Republic had the right to rearm and impose a deadline for ending the policy of demilitarisation the British, and especially Eden, would not agree to any formula which committed them on the timing or nature of German rearmament after a contractual settlement. Once again it was clear that the political rather than the military rationale was paramount.⁸

This was only confirmed by the events which followed the ratification of the Paris Agreements in 1955. In preparing for the Geneva conference that year Kirkpatrick and his officials adumbrated a range of diplomatic formulae on Germany, while displaying a supreme disregard for the importance of the 12 divisions which the Federal Republic was supposed to contribute to western defence. These various initiatives were the culmination of long-standing British concerns about Germany's future. It was not that the Foreign Office saw a larger German defence contribution as a significantly greater military threat, but that they believed that support for the western alliance in Germany was fragile and that Adenauer's death or retirement could shatter it. They wished to take advantage of the favourable circumstances prevailing in 1955 to make a further attempt at demonstrating to the Germans where their interests lay. Britain's diplomatic strategy during the Geneva conferences is a subject worthy of further examination.⁹

Ten years after the end of the Second World War the British government remained suspicious of German intentions. This unease can be traced back at least as far as British distaste for the autocratic domineering Germany over which

8. Brief reference is made to this episode in Dockrill (1991), *op. cit.*, p.140-1, Bork and Gress *op. cit.*, p.329 and Pascaline Winand, *Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe* (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1993), p.58.

9. For a recent study see Rolf Steininger, 'Zwischen Paiser Vertragen und Genfer Gepfelkonferenz: Grossbritannien und die Deutsch Frage, 1955' in Steininger, Weber, Bischof, Albrick and Eisterer (eds.), *Die Doppelte Einammung* (Hase and Kohler, Munich, 1993)

Bismarck presided. Though the British have occasionally been portrayed as enthusiastic advocates of a German defence contribution,¹⁰ the policy was actually only accepted with great reluctance. Some writers have argued that the primary impulse behind British policy was the belief that it was imperative to integrate the nascent West German polity into the evolving western community.¹¹ This is an accurate description of the consensus which had developed by May 1952 and which governed British policy for the next two years. However, it does not give sufficient emphasis to the visceral antipathy to the Germans which underlay this policy and consequently does not explain the strong opposition to German rearmament in the 1950-51 period. Furthermore, it lays insufficient stress on the fact that this policy was to a large degree forced on the British by the linking of the EDC and the contract. When the prospect of decoupling these emerged, the British embraced the idea with enthusiasm. Nevertheless, the general point that the predominant rationale for German rearmament was a diplomatic one and the linking of the issue to western integration is a significant advance in the historiography of post-war British attitudes to the Federal Republic.

Those writers who have stressed the reluctance of Britain to rearm and the role of "relentless American pressure",¹² also have a good case but their arguments require perhaps more substantial revision than those who stress the integrationist rationale. The importance of the series of independent foreign policy forays undertaken by the British government has been obscured by the study of the methods by which the Americans stifled British initiative in this field. The fact that London was marginally more willing to accept a NATO solution than Washington does not seem as important as the fact that in the spring of 1950 they developed their own plans for the creation of German armed forces or that in 1955 they considered modifying the WEU compromise.

10. Arthur Cyr, *British Foreign Policy and the Atlantic Area* (Macmillan, London, 1979), p.21; Frederick W. Marks III, *Power and Peace: The Diplomacy of John Foster Dulles* (Praeger, London, 1993), p.55.

11. Larres in Hopkins and Aldrich, *op. cit.*, p.45; Hans-Jurgen Kusters, 'West Germany's Foreign Policy in Western Europe, 1949-1958' in Wurms (ed.), *Western Europe and Germany: The Beginnings of European Integration*, p.66.

12. Dockrill (1991), *op. cit.*, p.152; Leon D. Epstein, *Britain: Uneasy Ally* (University of Chicago Press, 1954) p.245; Ernest R. May, 'The American Commitment to Germany, 1949-1955', *Diplomatic History* 13, 1989.

It is only when one takes account of the Anglo-Soviet relationship that the whole picture becomes clear. Britain's policy for German rearmament was predicated on the existence of a long term, rather than an immediate, Soviet threat. The gendarmerie scheme was designed as a solution to the problem of the Soviet Union's vast military superiority. When the threat of an early war increased, a strong reaction against the whole idea of German rearmament set in. It was not merely American pressure, but also the apparently quiescent attitude of the Soviet Union which persuaded the British government to take the EDC option in late 1951. As Eden noted at Berlin, the European Army project appeared to be the least provocative form of German rearmament and this was one reason why it had many supporters within the British government. Furthermore, one must acknowledge that by this stage the British were increasingly interested in the idea of detente with the Soviet Union.¹³ In 1951, 1953 and 1955 the possibility of concessions to the Soviets on the subject of German rearmament was discussed as a means of achieving a rapprochement with Moscow.

The corollary of the integrationist thesis is that military and economic motives were subordinate to diplomatic considerations in the debate over the Federal Republic's defence contribution. This is substantially correct but the details of the development of British thinking about these aspects of policy are enlightening and have not been fully considered. The arguments presented by the Chiefs of Staff, and particularly Slessor, were based not on a more favourable assessment of German reliability, but on a belief that a strategic revolution had occurred which removed the long-standing German threat. They believed that Germany was so vulnerable to the threat of strategic bombardment, including nuclear attack, that she could never again undertake a policy of aggression. However, the Labour government was much more concerned by the military's confession that the danger of Soviet aggression would increase in the period immediately prior to the creation of German armed forces, and from the spring of 1950 the Chiefs' arguments were increasingly marginalised. Indeed at the start of 1951 Slessor himself began to have doubts about the policy. The 1952 Global Strategy Paper amounted to a recognition that once NATO had increased its

13. Young, 1995 op. cit.; Brian White, *Britain, Detente and Changing East-West Relations* (Routledge, London, 1972), ch.4; F.S. Northedge and Audrey Wells, *Britain and Soviet Communism* (Macmillan, London, 1982), p.124.

nuclear capability a German defence contribution was not essential to western defence. This was a controversial thesis and the Chiefs did not press the point during the next three years. Instead, under pressure from the Treasury to accept a ceiling on defence expenditure, they increasingly regarded German armed forces as a substitute for their own continental commitment. This fact helps put the subsequent decision to reduce the size of the BAOR into context.

There has only been one serious attempt to consider the role of economic factors in Britain's decision to accept German rearmament.¹⁴ This is surprising in light of the potentially serious repercussions which the policy of German rearmament had for Britain's financial position. However, it does reflect the low priority given to the Treasury's arguments during discussions of this subject. In late 1950 the Labour government became aware that once the Federal Republic began to create its own armed forces they would demand a reduction in occupation costs. It was not until a year later that the Conservatives fully examined the implications of this and Butler concluded that the benefits of German rearmament, in terms of reducing the Federal Republic's competitiveness in world trade, outweighed the disadvantages. Though the Treasury continued to make occasional protests against the burden likely to result from the loss of occupation costs, this factor played little role in the wider policy debate. In the crisis atmosphere of September 1954 the commitment to maintain current force levels on the continent was made so quickly that no serious consideration was given to its long-term consequences. It should be noted, however, that, had the Allies not secured a very favourable financial settlement for the pre-ratification period in 1952, the government might have been forced to consider these problems much earlier.

This examination of the German rearmament debate has demonstrated how substantially different London's Cold War agenda was from Washington's. The Attlee and Churchill governments were regularly forced to defer to the senior partner in the Atlantic Alliance, but if we are to understand the distinctive role played by the British it is necessary to examine closely those failed attempts to divert the American Cold War juggernaut. Though tied to Washington by the demands of expediency, the British repeatedly clashed with the Americans during

¹⁴ Peter in Deighton (ed.) *op. cit.*

discussions of German rearmament. The disagreement over the gendarmerie scheme was the first and the most unusual of these disputes but there were a series of further clashes over the package proposal, the Spofford Plan, arms controls in Germany, the replies to the 1952 Stalin notes, Churchill's summit proposals, the decoupling of German rearmament from the contract, and the strategy to be adopted at the 1955 Geneva summit. With the possible exception of the battle of the notes, all these incidents were at least partially the result of genuine disagreements about the nature and importance of German rearmament. The British found it much more difficult to accept this policy than the Americans and only really acquiesced on the basis that it was essential in order to integrate the Federal Republic into the West.

For British policy-makers in the early 1950s the threat posed by Germany appeared to be as dangerous as the long term Soviet menace. In order to understand their attitude it is essential to erase memories of subsequent Cold War history as far as possible. Germany has now been a reliable member of the western alliance for forty years, while the collapse of the Soviet Union is too recent to bury memories of the long hostility between Russia and the West. Memories of the Berlin Wall, Cuba, the Prague Spring and Afghanistan remain vivid, but for the policy-makers of the early 1950s the resonant recollections were of Sarajevo, Rapallo, Munich and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. These carried a different message about Germany from the one which has been conveyed by forty years of division. Of these incidents it was the least known today, the Soviet-German Rapallo Pact which was seminal in British discussion of German rearmament in the early 1950s. It seemed to give a double lesson for it did not merely illustrate the allegedly natural German proclivity to seek alliances with eastern autocrats but it also demonstrated that this tendency would only be encouraged by a punitive peace. British policy-makers were not convinced that a policy of magnanimity would succeed but they believed it was the only feasible option in the light of recent history and current dilemmas. If there is one thing which the study of German rearmament demonstrates it is the heavy burden which the supposed lessons of the past impose on those planning for the future.

APPENDIX

FOREIGN OFFICE POLICY MAKERS

DENIS ALLEN (1910-87) Schooled in New Zealand and a graduate of Cambridge, Allen headed the German Political department between 1950 and 1952 and the Central department from 1952 to 1953. He was subsequently ambassador to Turkey and promoted to Deputy Under-Secretary.

ROGER ALLEN (1909-72) Educated at Repton and Corpus Christi, Roger Allen initially pursued a legal career before joining the FO in 1940. He was in Moscow between 1946 and 1948 and British Deputy High Commander from 1954 to the end of the occupation. Later he was ambassador to Greece and Iraq.

DEREK ASHE (b.1919) Educated at Bradfield and Trinity, Oxford, between 1947 and 1949 Ashe was second secretary to Berlin and then Frankfurt. In 1950 he became Kirkpatrick's Private Secretary. He was ambassador to Romania and Argentina in the 1970s.

RODERICK BARCLAY (1909-96) an Old Harrovian and graduate of Trinity, Cambridge, Barclay was posted to Brussels, Paris and Washington prior to World War II. He was Principal Private Secretary to Bevin in the last two years of his Foreign Secretaryship. He reached the rank of Deputy Under-Secretary in 1953 and was ambassador to Denmark and Belgium.

STEWART CRAWFORD (b.1913) Crawford was educated at Greshams and Oriel, Oxford. He worked at the Air Ministry in the 1930s and in 1946 joined the German section of the FO. From 1948 to 1951 he headed the German Finance department and the Mutual Aid Committee from 1952 to 1954. He led Britain's delegation to the OEEC between 1959 and 1960 and became a Deputy Under-Secretary in the 1970s.

PIERSON DIXON (1904-65) Schooled at Bedford and Pembroke, Cambridge Dixon became a fellow of Pembroke in 1928. He was posted to Manila, Ankara and Rome in the 1930s and was Principal Private Secretary to Eden and Bevin between 1943 and 1948. From 1950 to 1954 he was a Deputy Under-Secretary before becoming Britain's representative to the UN and then ambassador to France.

OLIVER FRANKS (1905-92) Franks was educated at British Grammar and Queens, Oxford. He taught philosophy at Queens between the wars and

worked at the Ministry of Supply during World War II and on the Committee of European Economic Cooperation afterwards. From 1948 to 1952 he was British ambassador to the US before resuming his academic career.

ALVARY GASCOIGNE (1893-1970) Schooled at Eton. Gascoigne fought in World War I with the Coldstream Guards. Between the wars he was attached to various home departments of the FO. After 1945 he acted as British representative in Hungary and Japan and from 1951 to 1953 was ambassador to the Soviet Union.

PAT HANCOCK (1914-1980) Hancock was a graduate of Trinity, Cambridge and became Allen's assistant in the German Political department in 1951. Two years later he became head of the Central department. He was briefly Lloyd's Private Secretary in 1955-6 and later ambassador to Israel, Norway and Italy.

GEOFFREY HARRISON (1908-90) A Wykehamist and graduate of Kings, Harrison served in Tokyo and Berlin in the 1930s. Between 1947 and 1949 he worked at the Moscow embassy. From 1951 he was an Assistant Under-Secretary and in 1954 replaced Roberts superintending German affairs. He was ambassador to the USSR between 1965 and 1968.

OLIVER HARVEY (LORD HARVEY) (1893-1968) Schooled at Malvern and Trinity, Cambridge, Harvey served in France and the Middle East during World War I. He was posted to Rome, Athens and Paris between the wars and was twice Principal Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary between 1936 and 1943. From 1948 to 1954 he was ambassador to France.

WILLIAM HAYTER (1906-95) Hayter was educated at Winchester and New College, Oxford and served the FO in Vienna, Moscow and China in the 1930s. During World War II he worked in Washington and was minister in Paris between 1949 and 1953. From 1953 to 1957 he was ambassador to the USSR.

LORD SAMUEL HOOD (1910-81) An Old Etonian and graduate of Trinity, Cambridge, Hood worked at the India Office in the late 1930s and the Ministry of Information during World War II. He was posted to Madrid and Paris before becoming Assistant Under-Secretary superintending the Western Organisations department in 1951. Hood was later minister in Washington and in 1957 was promoted to Deputy Under-Secretary.

FREDERICK HOYER-MILLAR (LORD INCHYRA) (1900-89) Educated at Wellington and New College, Oxford, Hoyer-Millar served in Brussels, Berlin, Paris and Cairo between the wars. From 1950 to 1953 he was Britain's representative to NATO and then British High Commissioner to Germany in the last two years of the occupation. He was Britain's first ambassador to the Federal Republic and in 1957 became Permanent Under-Secretary.

GLADWYN JEBB (LORD GLADWYN) (1900-96) Jebb was educated at Eton and Magdalen, Oxford. He served in Tehran and Rome between the wars and was Private Secretary to the Permanent Under Secretary from 1937 to 1940. He played an influential role at the UN between 1945 and 1954 and was ambassador to France from 1954 to 1960. He was Liberal spokesman on foreign affairs in the House of Lords for 23 years after 1965.

DAVID KELLY (1891-1959) Schooled at St. Pauls and a graduate of Magdalen, Oxford, Kelly fought in France in World War I. Between the wars he was posted to Buenos Aires, Lisbon, Mexico, Brussels, Stockholm and Cairo. He was ambassador to the Soviet Union between 1949 and 1951.

IVONE KIRKPATRICK (1897-1964) Kirkpatrick was schooled at Downside and fought in World War I. He was posted to Rio de Janeiro, Rome and Berlin between the wars. In 1945 he was made Assistant Under-Secretary before becoming Permanent Under-Secretary for the German section in 1949. From 1950 to 1953 he was British High Commissioner in Germany and from 1953 to 1957, Permanent Under-Secretary.

ROGER MAKINS (LORD SHERFIELD) (1904-96) A Wykehamist and graduate of Christ Church, Oxford, Makins became a fellow of All Souls in 1925. He served in Washington and Oslo for the FO between the wars. He was minister in Washington between 1945 and 1947 and then returned as ambassador in 1952.

IVO MALLET (b.1900) Mallet was educated at Harrow and Balliol, Oxford. Between the wars he was posted to Constantinople, Berlin and the Vatican before becoming a counsellor at the FO. From 1949 to 1951 he was Assistant Under-Secretary superintending the German Political department. In 1954 he was appointed ambassador to Spain.

FRANK ROBERTS (b.1907) Educated at Bedales, Rugby and Trinity, Cambridge, Roberts served in Paris and Cairo between the wars. He was minister

in Moscow between 1945 and 1947 and then Principal Private Secretary to Bevin for two years. In 1951 he was made Deputy Under-Secretary with responsibility for Germany. After 1954 he held ambassadorships in Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and West Germany.

EVELYN SHUCKBURGH (1909-94) Schooled at Winchester and a graduate of Kings, Cambridge, during World War II Shuckburgh worked at the Canadian High Commission and at Buenos Aires. He was posted to Prague from 1946-47 and then head of the Western department. From 1951 to 1954 he was Eden's Principal Private Secretary. In the 1960s he was ambassador to Italy.

ROGER STEVENS (1906-80) Educated at Wellington and Queens, Oxford, Stevens was posted to New York and Antwerp in the 1930s. Between 1948 and 1951 he was an Assistant Under-Secretary superintending the German Financial department. Subsequently he was ambassador to Sweden and Iran.

WILLIAM STRANG (LORD STRANG) (1893-1978) A graduate of University College, London, Strang fought in World War I with the Worcestershire Regiment. Between the wars he was posted to Belgrade and Moscow. In 1939 he became an Assistant Under-Secretary and was Britain's representative on the European Advisory Committee from 1943. He was successively political adviser to the British occupation, Permanent Under-Secretary of the German section and from 1949 to 1953 FO Permanent Under-Secretary.

JOHN WARD (1909-91) Ward was educated at Wellington and Pembroke, Cambridge. He was posted to Baghdad and Cairo in the 1930s and was an acting first secretary during World War II. Later he served in Rome before becoming Deputy High Commissioner to Germany for the period 1950 to 1954. Subsequently he was ambassador to Argentina and Italy.

FREDERICK WARNER (b.1918) Schooled at the Royal Naval College and Magdalen, Oxford, Warner fought in World War II and entered the FO in 1946. He served in Moscow in 1950 before becoming head of the German General department the next year. Following reorganisation he was assistant to Allen and then Hancock in the Central and Western departments.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Public Records Office

- | | | | |
|------|------|---|---|
| ADM | 1 | - | Admiralty and Secretariat Papers 1660-1976 |
| | 205 | - | First Sea Lord's Papers 1937-65 |
| AIR | 2 | - | Air Ministry Registered Files 1887-1985 |
| | 8 | - | Chief of Air Staff's Records 1916-1982 |
| | 75 | - | Marshall Sir John Slessor's Papers 1914-1980 |
| CAB | 21 | - | Cabinet Office Registered Files 1916 - 1965 |
| | 128 | - | Cabinet Memoranda From 1945 |
| | 129 | - | Cabinet Memoranda From 1945 |
| | 130 | - | Ad Hoc Committees: General and Miscellaneous Series 1945-1964 |
| | 131 | - | Defence Committee 1946-1963 |
| | 132 | - | Lord President's Committee and Sub-Committees 1945-1968 |
| | 134 | - | Cabinet Committees: General Series from 1945 |
| DEFE | 4 | - | Chief of Staff Committee: Minutes of Meetings 1947-1964 |
| | 5 | - | Chiefs of Staff Committee: Memoranda 1947-67 |
| | 6 | - | Chiefs of Staff Committee: Joint Planning Staff Reports 1947-1965 |
| | 7 | - | Registered Files: General Series 1942-79 |
| | 11 | - | Chiefs of Staff Committee: Registered Files 1946-73 |
| | 13 | - | Private Office Papers 1950-1976 |
| FO | 371 | - | Political Department: General Correspondence From 1906 |
| | 800 | - | Private Collections: Ministers and Officials: Various 1824-1965 |
| | 1005 | - | Control Commission for Germany (British Element): Records Library 1943-1959 |
| | 1008 | - | Office of the British High Commissioner for Germany 1950-1955 |
| PREM | 8 | - | Prime Minister's Papers and Correspondence 1945-1951 |
| | 11 | - | Prime Minister's Papers and Correspondence 1951 - 1957 |
| T | 225 | - | Defence Policy and Material Division Files 1911-1964 |
| WO | 32 | - | Registered Files: General Series 1845-1985 |
| | 216 | - | Chief of the (Imperial) General Staff's Papers 1935-1964 |

Private Papers

Clement ATTLEE, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

Lord AVON, University of Birmingham.

Lord BEAVERBROOK, House of Lords Record Office.

Ernest BEVIN, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge.

Winston CHURCHILL (1945-1965), Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge.

Hugh DALTON, London School of Economics.

Ernest DAVIES, London School of Economics.

Sir William DICKSON, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge.

Sir William ELLIOT, Liddell Hart Centre, Kings College.

Sir John HARDING, National Army Museum.
 Lord ISMAY, Liddell Hart Centre, Kings College.
 Selwyn LLOYD, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge.
 Viscount MONTGOMERY, Imperial War Museum.
 Herbert MORRISON, Nuffield College, Oxford.
 Emanuel SHINWELL, London School of Economics.
 Sir John SLESSOR, Public Records Office (AIR 75).
 Sir William SLIM, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge.
 John STRACHEY, privately held.
 Sir William STRANG, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge.
 Lord WOOLTON, Bodleian Library, Oxford.
 Kenneth YOUNGER, privately held.

Memoirs Diaries and Autobiographies

Acheson, Dean, **Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department** (W.W. Norton, New York, 1969)
 Adams, Sherman, **Firsthand Report: The Story of the Eisenhower Administration** (Harper and Bros, New York, 1961)
 Adenauer, Konrad, **Memoirs 1945-53** (British edition, translated by Beate Ruhm van Oppen, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1966: German edition, 1965)
 Annan, Noel, **Changing Enemies: The Defeat and Regeneration of Germany** (Harper Collins, London, 1995)
 Attlee, Clement, **As It Happened** (William Heinemann, London, 1954)
 Avon, Lord, **Full Circle** (Cassels, London, 1960)
 Barclay, Roderick, **Ernest Bevin and the Foreign Office 1932-69** (Latimer, London, 1975)
 Benn, Tony, **Years of Hope : Diaries Letters and Papers ?** (edited by Ruth Winstone, Hutchinson, London, 1994)
 Bidault, Georges, **Resistance: The Political Autobiography of Georges Bidault** (British edition, translated by Marianne Sinclair, London, 1967: French edition, 1965)
 Bohlen, Charles E, **Witness to History** (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1973)
 Boothby, Lord, **Recollections of a Rebel** (Hutchinson, London, 1978)
 Bradley, Omar, **A General's Life** (Sidgwick and Jackson, London, 1983)
 Browne, Anthony Montague, **Long Sunset: Memoirs of Winston Churchill's Last Private Secretary** (Cassels, London, 1995)
 Callaghan, James, **Time and Chance** (Collins, London, 1987)
 Colville, John, **Footprints in Time** (Collins, London, 1976)
 Colville, John, **The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries 1939-1955** (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1985)
 Conant, James B., **My Several Lives: Memoirs of a Social Inventor** (Harper and Row, New York, 1970)
 Dalton, Hugh, **High Tide and After** (Frederick and Muller, London, 1962)
 Davies, Ernest, **Random Recollections of a Journalist and Politician** (privately produced, 1987)
 Ferrell, Robert H. (ed.), **The Eisenhower Diaries** (W.W. Norton, New York, 1981)
 Ferrell, Robert H. (ed.), **The Diary of James C. Hagerty : Eisenhower in Mid-Course 1954-1955** (Indiana University Press, 1983).

Gladwyn, Lord, *The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1972)

Hayter, Sir William, *The Kremlin and the Embassy* (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1966)

Healey, Denis, *The Time of My Life* (Michael Joseph, London, 1989)

Hughes, Emmett John, *The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years* (London, Macmillan, 1963)

Ismay, Lord, *NATO: The First Five Years* (Bosch-Utrecht, 1954)

Jenkins, Roy, *A Life at the Centre* (Macmillan, London, 1991)

Kennan, George F., *Memoirs 1950-63* (Hutchinson, London, 1973)

Kennan, George F., *Memoirs 1925-50* (Hutchinson, London, 1968)

Kilmuir, Earl, *Political Adventure: Memoirs* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1964)

Kirkpatrick, Ivone, *The Inner Circle* (Macmillan, London, 1959)

Macmillan, Harold, *Tides of Fortune 1945-1955* (Macmillan, London, 1969)

Montgomery, Viscount, *Memoirs* (Collins, London, 1958)

Moran, Lord, *Winston Churchill : Struggle for Survival* (Constable, London, 1966)

Morgan, Janet (ed.), *The Backbench Diaries of Richard Crossman* (Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, London, 1981)

Morrison, Herbert, *An Autobiography* (Odhams, London, 1960)

Nicolson, Harold, *Diary and Letters 1930-1964* (edited by Stanley Olson, William Collins, London, 1980)

Nitze, Paul H., *From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Centre of Decision* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1989)

Nutting, Anthony, *Europe Will Not Wait: A Warning and a Way Out* (Hollis and Carter, London, 1960)

Pakenham, Lord, *Born to Believe* (Jonathan Cape, London, 1953)

Pimlott, Ben (ed.), *The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton 1918-40, 1945-60* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1987)

Roberts, Frank, *Dealing With Dictators: The Destruction and Revival of Europe 1930-1970* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1991)

Rostow, W.W., *Europe After Stalin: Eisenhower's Three Decisions of March 11, 1953* (University of Texas Press, Austin, 1982)

Shinwell, Emanuel, *Conflict Without Malice* (Odhams, London, 1955)

Shinwell, Emanuel, *I've Lived Through It All* (Victor Gollancz, London, 1973)

Shuckburgh, Evelyn, *Descent to Suez: Diaries 1951-1956* (edited by John Charmley, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1986)

Slessor, Sir John, *Strategy for the West* (Cassels, London, 1954)

Spaak, Paul-Henri, *The Continuing Battle: Memoirs of a European 1936-1966* (British edition, translated by Henry Fox, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1971)

Stassen, Harold and Houts, Marshall, *Eisenhower: Turning the World Towards Peace* (Merrill/Magnus, St. Paul, 1990)

Stewart, Michael, *Life and Labour: An Autobiography* (Sidgwick and Jackson, London, 1980)

Strang, Lord, *Home and Abroad* (Andre Deutsch, London, 1956)

Truman, Harry, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Doubleday, New York, 1956)

Wheeler-Bennett, John (ed.), *Action This Day: Working With Churchill* (Macmillan, London, 1968)

Wigg, Lord, *George Wigg* (Michael Joseph, London, 1972)

Williams, Philip (ed.), *The Diary of Hugh Gaitskell* (Cape, London, 1983)
Young, Kenneth (ed.), *The Diaries of Robert Bruce Lockhart, Vol.II 1939-65*
(Macmillan, London, 1980)

Published Document Collections

Boyle, Peter G., *The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence* (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1990)

The Declassified Documents Reference System, Vols. 5-18, 1978-92 (Carrollton Press, 1978-81: Research Publications, 1981-92)

The Diaries of Dwight D. Eisenhower (A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, Washington, 1983)

Documents on British Policy Overseas (HMSO), Series II:

Vol.II Bullen, Roger and Pelly, M.E., *The London Conferences: Anglo-American Relations and Cold War Strategy, January-June 1950.*

Vol. III Bullen, Roger and Pelly, M.E., *German Rearmament, September-December 1950*

Vol.IV Yasamee, H.J. and Hamilton, K.A., *Korea, June 1950-April 1951*

Foreign Relations of the United States:

1949 (Washington, 1976):

Vol.III *Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria*
1950 (Washington, 1976)

Vol.1 *National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy*
Vol.III *Western Europe*

Vol.IV *Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union*
1951 (Washington, 1977):

Vol.I *National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy*

Vol.IV *European Security and the German Question*

Vol.V *Western European Security*

1952-4 (Washington, 1986)

Vol.II *National Security Affairs*

Vol.V *Western Europe*

Vol.VII *Germany and Austria*

1955-7 (Washington, 1987):

Vol.IV *Western European Security and Integration*

Vol.V *Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers' Meetings, 1955*

Galambos, Louis, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower;*

Vol.XI *Columbia University* (John Hopkins Press, London, 1984)

Vol.XII *NATO and the Campaign of 1952* (John Hopkins Press, London, 1989)

Gilbert, Martin, *Britain and Germany Between the Wars* (Longman, London, 1964)

Noelle-Neumann, Elizabeth, *The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1947-66* (British edition, translated by Gerard Finan, Verlag fur Demoskopie, Bonn, 1967)

The Papers of John Foster Dulles and Christian A. Herter (A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, Washington, 1986)

The Parliamentary Debates: Official Report (Hansard), 5th series, Vols. 469-544 (1949-55)

Parliamentary Papers (Cmd series), 1949-55
Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part II, 1946-53 (A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, Washington, 1980)
Ruhm von Oppen, Beate, Documents on Germany Under the Occupation, 1945-54 (Oxford University Press, 1955)

SECONDARY SOURCES

Monographs, Biographies and Other Books

Ambrose, Stephen E., Eisenhower:
Vol.I Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 1890-1952 (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1983)
Vol.II The President, 1952-1969 (George Allen and Unwin, London 1986)
Barber, James, Who Makes British Foreign Policy? (Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1969)
Barker, Elizabeth, Britain Between the Superpowers, 1945-50 (Macmillan, London, 1983)
Barnet, Richard J., Allies: America, Japan, Europe Since the War (Jonathan Cape, London, 1984)
Baylis, John, The Diplomacy of Pragmatism: Britain and the Formation of NATO, 1942-1949 (Macmillan, London, 1993)
Bell, Coral, Negotiation From Strength: A Study of the Politics of Power (Chatto and Windus, London, 1962)
Berger, Stefan, The British Labour Party and the German Social Democrats 1900-1931 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994)
Berrington, Hugh B., Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons (Pergamon, Oxford, 1973)
Black, Cyril E., Helmreich, Jonathan E., Helmreich, Paul C., Issawi, Charles P. and McAdams, A. James, Rebirth: A History of Europe Since World War II (Oxford, 1992)
Blackwell, Michael, Clinging to Grandeur: British Attitudes and Foreign Policy in the Aftermath of the Second World War (Greenwood Press, London, 1993)
Bluth, Christopher, Britain, Germany and Nuclear Strategy (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995)
Bork Dennis, and Gress, David R., From Shadow to Substance: A History of West Germany, vol.I (2nd edition, Blackwell, Oxford 1993: 1st published, 1989)
Brands Jnr, H.W., Cold Warriors : Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy (Columbia University Press, New York, 1988)
Bullock, Alan, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin:
vol.I Trade Union Leader 1881-1940 (William Heinemann, London, 1960)
vol.II Ministry of Labour 1940-1945 (William Heinemann, London 1967)
vol.III Foreign Secretary 1945-1951 (William Heinemann, London 1983)
Burridge, Trevor, Clement Attlee: A Political Biography (Jonathan Cape, London, 1985)
Burridge, Trevor, British Labour and Hitler's War (Andre Deutsch, London, 1976)
Cioc, Mark, Pax Atomica: The Nuclear Defense Debate in West Germany During the Adenauer Era (Columbia University Press, New York, 1988)
Cairncross, Alec, The Price of War: British Policy on German Reparations 1941-

49 (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986)

Carlton, David, **Anthony Eden: A Biography** (Allen Lane, London, 1981)

Carver, Michael, **Harding of Petherington: Field-Marshal** (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1978)

Charmley, John, **Duff Cooper: The Authorised Biography** (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1986)

Cloake, Richard, **Templer: Tiger of Malaya: The Life of Field-Marshal Sir Gerald Templer** (Harrap, London, 1985)

Cook, Don, **Forging the Alliance : NATO 1945-1950** (Secker and Warburg, London, 1989)

Cyr, Arthur, **British Foreign Policy and the Atlantic Era: The Techniques of Accommodation** (Macmillan, London, 1979)

Dalloz, Jaques, **The War in Indochina 1945-54** (British edition, translated by Josephine Bacon, Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1990: French edition, 1987)

Danchev, Alex, **Oliver Franks: Founding Father** (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993)

Deighton, Anne, **The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War** (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990)

Deutsch, Karl W., and Edinger, Lewis J., **Germany Rejoins the Powers: Mass Opinions, Interest Groups and Elites in Contemporary German Foreign Policy** (American edition, Octagon Books, New York, 1973: originally published, 1953)

Divine, Robert A., **Eisenhower and the Cold War** (Oxford University Press, 1981)

Dixon, Piers, **Double Diploma: The Life of Sir Pierson Dixon: Don and Diplomat** (Hutchinson, London, 1968)

Dockrill, Saki, **Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament** (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991)

Donoghue, Bernard and Jones, G.W., **Herbert Morrison: Portrait of a Politician** (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1973)

Donovan, Robert J., **Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman 1949-1953** (W.W.Norton, New York, 1982)

Drummond, Gordon D., **The German Social Democrats in Opposition 1949-1960 : The Case Against Rearmament** (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1982)

Dunbabin, J.P.D., **The Cold War: The Great Powers and their Allies** (Longman, London, 1994)

Epstein, Leon D., **Britain: Uneasy Ally** (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1954)

Eubank, Keith, **The Summit Conferences 1919-1960** (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1966)

Foot, Michael, **Anuerin Bevan: Vol. II 1945-60** (Davis-Poynter, London, 1973)

Forster, Thomas M., **The East German Army: A Pattern of Communist Military Establishment** (British edition, translated by Anthony Buzek, George Allen & Unwin, London 1967)

Fursdon, Maj-Gen Edward, **The European Defence Community: A History** (Macmillan, London, 1980)

Gatzke, Hans W., **Germany and the United States: A Special Relationship?** (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1989)

Gerson, Louis L., **John Foster Dulles** (Cooper Square, New York, 1987)

Gilbert, Martin, **The Roots of Appeasement** (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1966)

Gilbert, Martin, **Churchill : A Life** (William Heinemann, London, 1991)

Gilbert, Martin, **Winston S. Churchill**:
 Vol. VII **Road to Victory** (Heinemann, London, 1986)
 Vol. VIII **Never Despair** (Heinemann, London 1988)
 Glees, Anthony, **Exile Politics During the Second World War: The German Social Democrats in Britain** (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982)
 Gordon, Michael R., **Conflict and Consensus in Labour's Foreign Policy, 1914-1965** (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1969)
 Grosser, Alfred, **The Western Alliance: European-American Relations Since 1945** (British edition, translated by Herbert Marcuse and Erica Sherova, Macmillan, London, 1980: Franco-German edition, 1978)
 Harris, Kenneth, **Attlee** (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1982)
 Harrison, Michael M., **The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security** (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1981)
 Hennessy, Michael, **Never Again: Britain 1945-51** (Cape, London, 1992)
 Hogan, Michael J., **The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe 1947-1952** (Cambridge University Press, 1987)
 Holland, Robert, **The Pursuit of Greatness: Britain and the World Role 1900-1970** (Fontana, London, 1991)
 Horne, Alastair, **Macmillan: Vol II of the Official Biography 1896-1956** (Macmillan, London, 1988)
 Hoopes, Townsend, **The Devil and John Foster Dulles** (Little Brown, Boston, 1973)
 Ireland, Timothy P., **Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation** (Aldwych Press, London, 1981)
 Isaacson, Walter and Thomas, Evan, **The Wise Men** (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1986)
 Jackson, Gen. Sir William, and Bramall, Field-Marshal, Lord, **The Chiefs: The Story of the British Chiefs of Staff** (Brassey's, London, 1992)
 James, Robert Rhodes, **Anthony Eden** (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1986)
 James, Robert Rhodes, **Bob Boothby: A Portrait** (Hodder and Stoughton, London 1991)
 Kaplan, Lawrence, **The United States and NATO: The Formative Years** (University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 1984)
 Kaplan, Lawrence, **NATO and the United States** (updated edition, Twayne Publications, New York, 1994)
 Kaplan, Lawrence, **A Community of Interests: NATO and the Mutual Assistance Program 1948-51** (Office of the State Department, Washington, 1980)
 Kaplan, Martin A., **Life and Death of the Cold War: Selected Studies in Postwar Statecraft** (Nelson Hall, Chicago, 1976)
 Kellner, Peter and Hitchens, Christopher, **Callaghan: The Road to Number Ten** (Cassell, London, 1976)
 Kennedy, Paul M., **The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914** (The Ashfield Press, London, 1980)
 Kennedy, Paul M., **The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980** (Fontana edition, London, 1985: first published, 1981)
 Korb, Josef, **Detente in Europe: Real or Imaginary?** (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1972)
 Lacouture, Jean, **Pierre Mendes-France** (British edition, translated by George

Holoch, Holmes and Meier, London, 1984: French edition, 1981)

LaFeber, Walter, *America, Russia and the Cold War* (7th edition, McGraw Hill, New York, 1993)

Large, David Clay, *Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era* (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1996)

Larres, Klaus, *Politik der Illusionen: Churchill, Eisenhower und die Deutsche Frage 1945-1955* (Vandershoeck and Ruprecht, Gottingen, 1995)

Leffler, Michael, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1992)

Lewin, Ronald, *Slim: The Standardbearer: A Biography of Field-Marshal the Viscount Slim* (Leo Cooper, London, 1972)

Lewis, Julian, *Changing Direction : British Military Planning for Post-War Strategic Defence, 1942-1947* (Sherwood Press, London, 1988)

Loth, Wilfried, *The Division of the World 1941-1955* (Routledge, London, 1988)

Lowe, C.J., and Dockrill, Michael L., *The Mirage of Power: Vol.I British Foreign Policy 1902-14* (Routledge, Kegan and Paul, London, 1972)

Vol.II British Foreign Policy 1914-22 (Routledge, Kegan and Paul, London, 1972)

Marks III, Frederick W., *Power and Peace: The Diplomacy of John Foster Dulles* (Praeger, London, 1993)

McCullough, David, *Truman* (Simon and Schuster, London, 1992)

McGeehan, Robert, *The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defence after World War II* (University of Illinois Press, Chicago, 1971)

McLellan, David S., *Dean Acheson: The State Department Years* (Dodd Mead and Co., New York, 1976)

Newman, Michael, *John Strachey* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1989)

Morgan, Kenneth O., *Labour in Power, 1945-1951* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984)

Northedge, F.S., and Wells, Audrey, *Britain and Soviet Communism: The Impact of a Revolution* (Macmillan, London, 1982)

Osgood, Robert Endicott, *NATO : The Entangling Alliance* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962)

Parkinson, Roger, *A Day's March Nearer Home: The War History from Alamein to VE Day Based on the War Cabinet Papers of 1942 to 1945* (Hart, Davis, McGibbon, London, 1974)

Park, William, *Defending the West: A History of NATO* (Wheatsheaf Books, Brighton, 1986)

Pelling, Henry, *The Labour Governments, 1945-1951* (Macmillan, London 1984)

Pimlott, Ben, *Hugh Dalton* (Jonathan Cape, London 1985)

Pimlott, Ben, *Harold Wilson* (Harper Collins, London, 1992)

Plischke, Elmer, *Diplomat in Chief: A President at the Summit* (Praeger, New York, 1986)

Walter S. Poole, *The History of the JCS: Vol. III, The JCS and National Policy 1950-1952* (Michael Glazier, Wilmington, 1980)

Prittie, Terrence, *Konrad Adenauer 1876-1967* (Tom Stacey, London, 1972)

Rose, Norman, *Vansittart: Study of a Diplomat* (William Heinemann, London, 1987)

Roseman, Michael, *Recasting the Ruhr, 1945-58* (Berg, Oxford, 1992)

Rothwell, Victor, **Anthony Eden: A Political Biography** (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1992).

Rothwell, Victor, **Britain and the Cold War, 1941-1947** (Jonathan Cape, London, 1982)

Seldon, Anthony, **Churchill's Indian Summer** (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1981)

Schwartz, Thomas Alan, **America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany** (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1991)

Schwarz, Hans Peter, **Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction:**
Vol. I From the German Empire to the Federal Republic (British edition, translated by Louise Willmot, Berghahn Books, Oxford, 1995: German edition, 1986)

Slowe, Peter, **Manny Shinwell: An Authorised Biography** (Pluto Press, London 1993)

Smith, Gaddis, **Dean Acheson** (Cooper Square, New York, 1972)

Smith Jr., Arthur L., **Churchill's German Army: Wartime Strategy and Cold War Politics, 1943-1947** (Sage Publications, London, 1977)

Snell, John L., **The Wartime Origins of the East-West Dilemma over Germany** (Hauser Press, New Orleans, 1959)

Steiner, Zara, **The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy 1898-1914** (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1969)

Steininger, Rolf, **The German Question: The Stalin Note of 1952 and the Problem of Reunification** (American edition, translated by Jane T. Hedges, edited by Mark Cioc, Columbia University Press, New York, 1985)

Taylor, A.J.P., **The Origins of the Second World War** (Penguin edition, London, 1964: first published, 1961)

Taylor, A.J.P., **Beaverbrook** (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1972)

Thomas, Neil, **A Compromised Policy: Britain, Germany and the Soviet Threat 1945-46** (Minerva Press, London, 1994)

Thorpe, D.R., **Selwyn Lloyd** (Jonathan Cape, London, 1989)

Trachtenberg, Mark, **History and Strategy** (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991)

Ulam, Adam B., **Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1973** (second edition, Praeger, New York, 1974)

Vital, David, **The Making of British Foreign Policy** (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1968)

Wallace, William, **The Foreign Policy Process in Britain** (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1975)

Watson, Robert J., **The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Vol.V The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1953-54** (Wilmington, 1980)

Watt, D. Cameron, **Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's Place 1900-1975** (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985)

Watt, D Cameron, **Britain Looks to Germany: British Opinion and Policy Towards Germany Since 1945** (Oswald Wolff, London, 1965)

White, Brian, **Detente and Changing East-West Relations** (Routledge, London, 1992)

Williams, Philip M., **Hugh Gaitskell: A Political Biography** (Jonathan Cape, London, 1979)

Winand, Pascaline, **Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe** (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1993)

Yergin, Daniel, **Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State** (Andre Deutsch, London 1978)

Young, John W., **Britain, France and the Unity of Europe, 1945-1951** (Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1984)

Young, John W., **Winston Churchill's Last Campaign: Britain and the Cold War 1951-55** (manuscript copy)

Young, Kenneth, **Churchill and Beaverbrook: A Study in Friendship and Politics** (Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1966)

Essay Collections

Aldrich, Richard J., **British Intelligence Strategy and the Cold War 1945-1951** (Routledge, London, 1992)

Becker, Joseph and Knipping, Franz, **Power in Europe?: Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany in a Post-War World** (Walter de Gruyter, New York, 1986)

Bischof, Gunter, and Ambrose, Stephen E., **Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment** (Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1995)

Blake, Robert, and Louis, William Roger, **Churchill** (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993)

Brivati, Brian and Jones, Harriet, **From Reconstruction to Integration: Britain and Europe Since 1945** (Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1993)

Cooney, James, Craig, Gordon A., Schwartz, Hans Peter and Stein, Fritz, **The Federal Republic of Germany and the United States** (Westview Press, Boulder, 1984)

Crockatt, Richard and Smith, Steve, **The Cold War: Past and Present** (Allen and Unwin, London, 1984)

Deighton, Anne, **Britain and the First Cold War** (Macmillan, London, 1990).

Diefendorf, Jeffrey M., Frohn, Axel and Rupieper, Herman-Josef, **American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany 1945-1955** (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993)

Dockrill, Michael and Hopkins, Michael F. **Intelligence, Defence and Diplomacy: British Policy in the Post-War World** (Frank Cass, Ilford, 1994)

Edmonds, Martin, **The Defence Equation: British Military Systems, Policy, Planning and Performance** (Brassey's, London, 1986)

Heller, Francis H. and Gillingham John R., **NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance** (Macmillan, London, 1992)

Immerman, Richard H., **John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War** (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1990)

Jordan, Robert S., **Generals in International Politics: NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe** (University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 1987)

Leifer, Michael, **Constraints and Adjustments in British Foreign Policy** (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1972)

Lerner, Daniel and Aron, Raymond, **France Defeats EDC** (American edition, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, New York, 1957)

Melanson, Richard A. and Myers, David, **Re-evaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s** (University of Illinois Press, Chicago, 1987)

Morgan, Kenneth O., **Labour People: Leaders and Lieutenants, Hardie to Kinnock** (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987)

di Nolfo, Enrico, **Power in Europe? II: Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the Origins of the EEC 1952-1957** (Walter de Gruyter, New York, 1992)

Ovendale, Ritchie, **The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments, 1945-1951** (Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1984)

Pommerin, Reiner, **The American Impact on Post-War Germany** (Berghahn Books, Oxford, 1995)

Pronay, Nicholas and Wilson, Keith, **The Political Re-Education of Germany and her Allies after World War II** (Croom Helm, London, 1985)

Reynolds, David, **The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives** (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1994)

Riste, Olave, **Western Security: European and Atlantic Defence 1947-1953**, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1985)

Shlaim, Avi, Jones, Peter, and Sainsbury, Keith, **British Foreign Secretaries Since 1945** (David and Charles, London, 1977)

Smith, John, **The Origins of NATO** (University of Exeter Press, Exeter, 1990)

Smith, Michael, Smith, Steve and White, Brian, **British Foreign Policy** (Unwin Hyman, London, 1988)

Spencer, Robert, **Perceptions of the Federal Republic of Germany** (Centre for International Studies, Toronto, 1986)

Stein, Harold, **American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies** (University of Alabama Press, Birmingham, 1963)

Steininger, Rolph, Weber, Jurgen, Bischof, Gunter, Albrich, Thomas and Eisterer, Klaus, **Die Doppelte Eindammung: Europäische Sicherheit und die Duetsche Frage in den Funfzigern** (Hase and Koehler Verlag, Munich, 1993)

Tiratsoo, Nick, **The Attlee Years** (Pinter Publications, London, 1991)

Turner, Ian D., **Reconstruction in Post-War Germany: British Occupation Policy and the Western Zones** (Berg, Oxford, 1989)

Waites, Neville, **Troubled Neighbours: Franco-British Relations in the 20th Century** (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1971)

Wurms, Clemens, **Western Europe and Germany: The Beginnings of European Integration** (Berg, Oxford, 1995)

Young, John W., **The Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peacetime Administration, 1951-55** (Leicester University Press, 1988)

Zametica, John, **British Officials and British Foreign Policy 1945-1950** (Leicester University Press, 1990)

Articles

Adamthwaite, Adam, **Overstretched and Overstrung: Eden, the Foreign Office and the Making of Policy**, *International Affairs*, 64, 1988, p.241-59

Baylis, John and Macmillan, Alan, **The British Global Strategy Paper of 1952**, *Strategic Studies*, 16, 1993, p.200-26

Deighton, Anne, **The 'Frozen Front': The Labour Government, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War**, *International Affairs*, 63, 1987, p.449-65

- Dockrill, Saki, The Evolution of Britain's Policy Towards a European Army, **Strategic Studies**, 12, 1989, p.38-62
- Duchin, Brian, The 'Agonising Reappraisal': Eisenhower Dulles and the EDC, **Diplomatic History**, 16, 1992, p.201-21
- Farquharson, John, From Unity to Division: What Prompted Britain to Change its Policy in Germany in 1946?. **European History Quarterly**, 26, 1996, p.81-123
- Fish, M. Steven, After Stalin's Death: The Anglo-American Debate Over a New Cold War, **Diplomatic History**, 10, 1986, p.333-55
- Folly, Martin H., Breaking the Vicious Circle: Britain, the United States and the Genesis of the North Atlantic Treaty, **Diplomatic History**, 12, 1988 p.59-77
- Foschepoth, Josef, British Interest in the Division of Germany after the Second World War, **Journal of Contemporary History**, 21, 1986, p.391-411
- Garnett, John, The British Army of the Rhine and NATO, **International Affairs**, 46, 1970, p.670-81
- Glees, Anthony, Churchill's Last Gambit, **Encounter**, 64, 1985, p.27-35
- Greenwood, Sean, Bevin, the Ruhr and the Division of Germany: August 1945-December 1946, **Historical Journal**, 29, 1986, p.203-12
- Herschberg, James G., Explosion in the Offing: German Rearmament and American Diplomacy, **Diplomatic History**, 16, 1992, p.511-49
- Larres, Klaus, British Attitudes to German Rearmament and Reunification in the 1950s (Witness Seminar), **Contemporary Record**, 5, 1991, p.291-318
- May, Ernest R., The American Commitment to Germany 1949-55, **Diplomatic History**, 13, 1989, p.431-60
- Peterson, Nikolaj, Who Pulled Whom and How Much?: Britain, the United States and the Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, **Millenium**, 11, 1982, p.93-110
- Pruessen, Ronald W., Beyond the Cold War- Again, **Political Science Quarterly**, 108, 1993, p.59-84
- Sainsbury, Keith, British Policy and German Unity at the End of the Second World War, **English Historical Review**, 94, 1979, p.786-804
- Schmidt, Gustav, 'Divided Europe - Divided Germany 1950-63', **Contemporary European History**, 3, 1994, p.155-92
- Schwartz, Thomas A., The 'Skeleton Key': American Foreign Policy, European Unity and German Rearmament, **Central European History**, 19, 1986, p.370-84
- Steininger, Rolph, Germany after 1945: Divided and Integrated or United and Neutral?, **German History**, 7, 1989, p.4-16
- Warner, Geoffrey, The United States and the Rearmament of West Germany, **International Affairs**, 61, 1985, p.279-86

Theses

- Dockrill, Saki, **Britain and the Problem of a West German Military Contribution to NATO**, PhD(Arts), London, 1988
- Lehmann, Ronald A., **The Effect of Stalin's Death on British Foreign Policy: Churchill's Search for a Summit**, MLitt, Oxford, 1986.
- Michel, Manfred, **German Rearmament as a Factor in Anglo-West German Relation**, PhD(Econ), London, 1963
- Schwepeke, Barbara, **The British High Commissioners in Germany: Some Aspects of their Work**, PhD(Arts), London, 1991